The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda 1945-1953 (Oxford Historical Monagraphs)

OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS Editors R. J. W. EVANS J. HARRIS B. WARD-PERKINS J. ROBERTSON R. SERVICE P. A. SLACK J. M...

Author: Dirk Spilker

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OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS Editors R. J. W. EVANS J. HARRIS B. WARD-PERKINS J. ROBERTSON R. SERVICE P. A. SLACK

J. MADDICOTT

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The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany Patriotism and Propaganda 1945–1953 DIRK SPILKER

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York # Dirk Spilker 2006 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 0–19–928412–1 978–0–19–928412–2 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

In memory of my mother Elisabeth Spilker (neé Schweppe) 1932–2003


Acknowledgements I am indebted to a number of people who have helped to bring this book about. Above all, I would like to thank Tony Nicholls, my supervisor at St Antony’s College, Oxford, who gave me tremendous support through his expertise and conscientiousness and who was always a source of great intellectual stimulation. Other scholars helped me with interesting thoughts and suggestions, or by drawing my attention to new publications and documents. They included, at one time or another, Timothy Garton Ash, Dr Jochen Laufer, Dr Ulrich Ma¨hlert, Dr Werner Mu¨ller, Dr Elke Scherstjanoi, and Professor Hermann Weber. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Dr Peter Grieder of Hull University, whose incisive comments on my research and my writing were indispensable. I would also like to thank Richard Byrne for helping me proofread the revised typescript. The staff in the SED archives deserve a mention for their efficiency and kindness, in particular Frau Hohenwald, Frau Mu¨ller, Frau Raüber, and Herr Lange. I am grateful to the German National Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes) for awarding me a doctoral scholarship without which this book might never have been written. Dr Alexander Weber, a friend and fellow alumnus of King’s College, Cambridge, gave me useful advice in many conversations. A special word of thanks goes to Petra Uhlmann, who helped me gain many new insights into the former East Germany. Finally, I wish to thank Eva Nyika, my copy editor, and the other staff at Oxford University Press. Without their professionalism and cheerfulness, this book might never been completed. Dirk Spilker Frankfurt am Main June 2005


Contents Abbreviations Introduction

x 1

1. ‘It Should Look Democratic . . . ’: The German Communists and the Birth of the SED

10

2. Nationwide Goals and Zonal Priorities: The KPD/SED and the German Question from Potsdam to Bizonia

58

3. Between Hope and Despair: The SED and the Consolidation of the SBZ

95

4. Unity Postponed: The SED and the Founding of the GDR

142

5. Retreat and Retrenchment: The SED and the German Question in the Early 1950s

194

Conclusion Bibliography Index

246 250 279

Abbreviations ACC AG BzG CDU CFM Cominform Comintern CPSU(b) CSR CSU CWIHP DA DBD DDR D-Mark DVdI DWK EAC ECCI EDC FDGB FDJ FRUS GDR GlavPURKKA IWK KPD KS KVP LDP MfS NATO NDPD NKFD NKVD NL

Allied Control Council Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED–KPD Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung Christian Democratic Union Council of Foreign Ministers Communist Information Bureau Communist International Communist Party of the Soviet Union (bolshevik) Republic of Czechoslovakia Christian Social Union Cold War International History Project Deutschland Archiv Democratic Peasants’ Party of Germany Deutsche Demokratische Republik (see GDR) Deutsche Mark German Administration of the Interior German Economic Commission European Advisory Commission Executive Committee of the Communist International European Defence Community Free German Trade Union Association Free German Youth Foreign Relations of the United States German Democratic Republic (see DDR) Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung Communist Party of Germany Little Secretariat [of the Politburo] Barracked People’s Police Liberal Democratic Party Ministry of State Security North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Democratic Party of Germany National Committee ‘Free Germany’ People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs Nachlaß (private papers)

Abbreviations NSDAP OMGUS PG PolZG POW PV SAPMO-BArch, ZPA SBZ SED SKK SMAD SPD SS SVD UN VdgB VfZG WTUL ZA ZfG ZK ZPKK ZS

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National Socialist German Workers’ Party Office of Military Government, United States Parteigenosse (Communist term of reference for ex-members of the NSDAP) Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Prisoner of War Parteivorstand Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv Soviet zone of occupation Socialist Unity Party of Germany Soviet Control Commission Soviet Military Administration in Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany Schutzstaffel Socialist People’s Party of Germany United Nations Peasants’ Mutual Aid Association Vierteljahreshefte fu¨r Zeitgeschichte World Trade Union League Zentralausschuß Zeitschrift fu¨r Geschichtswissenschaft Central Committee Central Party Control Commission Central Secretariat


Introduction This book aims to offer a new perspective on the ‘German Question’— the question of why Germany was divided after the Second World War and whether that division could have been avoided. Although this question has intrigued many historians, it has never before been studied comprehensively from the point of view of the SED, the communistdominated Socialist Unity Party installed by the Soviet Union in what was to become East Germany. While numerous publications have dealt with the SED and the German Question in one way or another, many of these were written before the collapse of communism and thus without recourse to archival material1 (or, worse, as SED eulogies if authored by East German historians).2 The fall of the Berlin Wall paved the way for access to the East German archives, but in the 1990s writing on the SED and the German Question mainly took the form of specialized articles that address only some of the issues involved because of their limited scope.3 More recent publications on this topic offer a more comprehensive account. However, their focus is firmly on the 1950s

1 Older publications include: Wilhelm Bleek, ‘Einheitspartei und nationale Frage 1945 bis 1955’ Der X. Parteitag der SED: 35 Jahre SED-Politik; Edition Deutschland Archiv (Cologne, 1981), 87–99. Werner Mu¨ller, ‘Volksdemokratie fu¨r Deutschland? KPD und SED zwischen gesamtdeutscher Option und ‘‘sozialistischem Lager’’ 1945–1950’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (PolZG ) B37/1984, 15–26. Roland W. Schweizer, ‘Die DDR und die Nationale Frage: Zum Wandel der Positionen von der Staatsgru¨ndung bis zur Gegenwart’, PolZG B51–52/1985, 37–54. Manfred Overesch, Die Deutschen und die Deutsche Frage 1945–1955: Darstellung und Dokumente (Du¨sseldorf, 1985). Dietrich Staritz, ‘Zwischen Ostintegration und nationaler Verpflichtung: Zur Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der SED, 1948 bis 1952’ Westdeutschland 1945–1955: Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration, ed. by Ludolf Herbst (Munich, 1986), 279–89. Jochen Meiners, Die doppelte Deutschlandpolitik: Zur nationalen Politik der SED im Spiegel ihres Zentralorgans ‘Neues Deutschland ’ 1946 bis 1952 (Frankfurt am Main, 1987). Gottfried Zieger, Die Haltung von SED und DDR zur Einheit Deutschlands 1949–1987 (Cologne, 1988). 2 See, for example: Die DDR in der U ¨ bergangsperiode: Studien zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der DDR 1945–61, ed. by Rolf Badstu¨bner and Heinz Heitzer (Berlin, 1979). Rolf Badstu¨bner (Autorenkollektiv), Die antifaschistischdemokratische Umwa¨lzung, der Kampf gegen die Spaltung Deutschlands und die Entstehung der DDR von 1945 bis 1949 (Berlin, 1989). For an indictment of East German historiography by one of its former protagonists, see Heinz Heitzer, ‘Fu¨r eine radikale Erneuerung der Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Geschichtswissenschaft (ZfG) 38/6 (1990), 498–509. 3 Dietrich Staritz, ‘Die SED, Stalin und die Gru ¨ ndung der DDR: Aus den Akten des Zentralen Parteiarchivs des Instituts fu¨r Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (ehemals

2

Introduction

and the events leading up to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.4 What is still missing is a detailed analysis of the crucial period between the end of the war and the foundation of the two German states. It is this gap in the historiography of post-war Germany which the author of this book has sought to fill. In doing so, he has looked at the period between 1944, the year when the future leaders of the SED determined their post-war strategy, and 1953, the year of the failed East German uprising that was to seal the division of Germany for almost half a century. Because the SED was a strictly hierarchical organization in which all important decisions were made at the top,5 the author has refrained from portraying the SED in its entirety and has focused his account on the party’s collective leadership (as represented initially by the Central Secretariat and the Parteivorstand and, from 1949/50 onwards, by the Politburo and the Central Committee). Since more than one-third of post-war Germany was occupied by the Soviet Union, and since the SED was controlled by Moscow, this book would be incomplete without addressing the issue of Soviet post-war strategy. Indeed, the fact that a decade after the Soviet Union’s peaceful collapse the Soviet archives are still far from open (while their future remains uncertain)6 means that this book, with its emphasis on the close Institut fu¨r Marxismus–Leninismus beim ZK der SED)’; PolZG B5/1991, 3–16. Dietrich Staritz, ‘Die SED, Stalin und der ‘‘Aufbau des Sozialismus’’ in der DDR: Aus den Akten des Zentralen Parteiarchivs’, Deutschland Archiv (DA) 24/7 (1991), 686–700. Gerhard Wettig, ‘Neue Aufschlu¨sse u¨ber Moskauer Planungen fu¨r die politischgesellschaftliche Ordnung in Deutschland nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Ein Defizit bisheriger Forschung’, Jahrbuch fu¨r Historische Kommunismusforschung 1995, ed. by Hermann Weber, Egbert Jahn, Gu¨nter Braun, Horst Dahn, and Jan Foitzik (Berlin, 1995), 151–72. Wolfgang Pfeiler, ‘Die ‘‘nationale’’ Politik der KPD/SED 1945–1952’, Materialien der Enqueˆte-Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SEDDiktatur in Deutschland ’, Vol. 5: Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen, ed. by Deutscher Bundestag (Baden-Baden, 1995), 1966–2004. Manfred Wilke, ‘Demokratie, Sozialismus und nationale Einheit’, ‘Ho¨rt die Signale!’ Die Deutschlandpolitik von KPD/SED und SPD 1945–1970, ed. by Reinhard Hu¨bsch (Berlin, 2002), 43–54. 4 Heike Amos, Die Westpolitik der SED 1948/49–1961: ‘Arbeit nach Westdeutschland ’ durch die Nationale Front, das Ministerium fu¨r Auswa¨rtige Angelegenheiten und das Ministerium fu¨r Staatssicherheit (Berlin, 1999). Michael Lemke, Einheit oder Sozialismus? Die Deutschlandpolitik der SED 1949–1961 (Cologne, 2001). 5 Monika Kaiser, ‘Die Zentrale der Diktatur—organisatorische Weichenstellungen, Strukturen und Kompetenzen der SED-Fu¨hrung in der SBZ/DDR 1946 bis 1952’, Historische Studien zur DDR-Forschung: Aufsa¨tze und Studien, ed. by Ju¨rgen Kocka (Berlin, 1993), 57–86. 6 Mark Kramer, ‘Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls’, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin No. 3, ed. by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, DC, 1993), 18–39. Jan Foitzik, ‘Zur

Introduction

3

collaboration between Soviet and German communists, is also a contribution to the debate on the Kremlin’s goals. This is all the more true since the revelations from the Soviet archives about the German Question have failed to live up to previous expectations.7 ‘Perhaps the greatest surprise so far to come out of the Russian archives is that there was no surprise’, one scholar wryly remarked.8 His comment reflects the growing realization that there was little discrepancy between the thinking of Soviet officials and their public statements. It also testifies to a growing consensus among historians that personal records by Stalin which could provide definitive answers to the questions still open may perhaps never be found.9 The interpretation of Soviet post-war strategy has undergone a number of reappraisals since research on this topic began.10 In the early stages of the debate, in the 1950s and 1960s, the prevailing view was that at the end of the war Moscow had harboured aggressive designs and had sought to establish a Soviet-style socialist regime throughout Germany.11 Situation in den Moskauer Archiven’, Jahrbuch fu¨r Historische Kommunismusforschung 1993, ed. by Hermann Weber, Dietrich Staritz, and Gu¨nter Braun (Berlin, 1993), 299–308. Donald J. Raleigh, ‘Doing Soviet History: The Impact of the Archival Revolution’, The Russian Review 61/1 (2002), 16–24. Stefan Creuzberger and Rainer Lindner, ‘Das Geheimnis der Archive—Perspektiven historiographischer Sowjetforschung: Eine Synthese’, Russische Archive und Geschichtswissenschaft: Rechtsgrundlagen, Arbeitsbedingungen, Forschungsperspektiven, ed. by Stefan Creuzberger and Rainer Lindner (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), 297–313. 7 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, ‘Archives of Russia Seven Years After: ‘‘Purveyors of Sensation’’ or ‘‘Shadows cast to the Past’’ ’? (Part I), CWIHP Working Paper No. 20 (September 1998), 20–7. Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, ‘Archives in the Former Soviet Union Ten Years After; or, ‘‘Still Caught between Political Crossfire and Economic Crisis’’ ’, Russische Archive und Geschichtswissenschaft, 51–80. 8 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford, 1996), 9. 9 The fact that, unlike Hitler, Stalin never took notes of important decisions, let alone his personal motives, has been stressed by Wjatscheslaw Daschitschew, ‘Deutschland in der Politik Stalins’, DA 33/3 (2000), 391–8. See also, Wladimir Wolkow, ‘Die deutsche Frage aus Stalins Sicht (1947–1952)’, ZfG 48/1 (2000), 20–49. 10 For a recent summary of this debate, see Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (London, 2002), 151–5. Gu¨nter Braun, ‘Die Geschichte der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone im Spiegel der Forschung: Eine Bestandsaufnahme der neueren Literatur (Teil I)’, Jahrbuch fu¨r Historische Kommunismusforschung 1995, ed. by Hermann Weber, Egbert Jahn, Gu¨nter Braun, Horst Da¨hn, and Jan Foitzik (Berlin, 1995), 275–305. See also Gerhart Wettig, ‘Treue Dienste fu¨r den Kreml: Zur Rolle der KPD/SED in der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1952’, DA 33/3 (2000), 399–416. Gerhard Wettig, ‘Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1990’, Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung, ed. by Rainer Eppelmann, Bernd Faulenbach, and Ulrich Ma¨hlert (Paderborn, 2003), 311–17. 11 Fritz Kopp, Kurs auf ganz Deutschland: Die Deutschlandpolitik der SED (Stuttgart, 1965). Thilo Vogelsang, Das geteilte Deutschland (Munich, 1966).

4

Introduction

This view came under heavy attack in the late 1960s and early 1970s from revisionist American historians who blamed the Cold War on the global economic ambitions of the United States,12 but the pendulum swung back when it became clear that the revisionists had completely ignored the question of Soviet culpability. A new consensus emerged, with studies by Walrab von Buttlar, Karel Kaplan, and Alexander Fischer insisting once again that the Soviet Union’s aim in the aftermath of the war had been to achieve domination in Europe and in Germany as a whole.13 Some scholars stressed the apparent impossibility of extending a Sovietstyle regime into the Western Allies’ sphere of influence and concluded that the Kremlin must have opted for the division of Germany—and the Sovietization of its Soviet-occupied Eastern half—at an early stage.14 In the 1980s, after the opening of the British, French, and American archives, historians began to review the role played by the Western powers, and in particular by their latent anti-communism, in the events that followed the Second World War, with some scholars arguing that these powers, and not the Soviet Union, precipitated the breakdown of the quadripartite occupation regime and the subsequent division of Germany.15 The opening of the East German archives in the wake of Germany’s reunification has triggered a fresh controversy. At its heart is a new school of thought that has gone beyond earlier criticism of Western strategy by insisting that, far from being concerned with the spread of socialism, the Kremlin’s aim was a peaceful and bourgeois democratic Germany, to be established under joint Allied tutelage.16 The chief 12 See Wilfried Loth, Die Teilung der Welt: Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941–1955 (7th, rev. edn., Munich, 1989), 17–22. 13 Walrab von Buttlar, Ziele und Zielkonflikte der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1947 (Stuttgart, 1980). Karel Kaplan, Der kurze Marsch: Die kommunistische Machtu¨bernahme in der Tschechoslowakei 1945–1948 (Munich, 1981). Alexander Fischer, ‘Die Sowjetunion und die ‘‘deutsche Frage’’ 1945–1949’, Die Deutschlandfrage und die Anfa¨nge des Ost–West Konflikts 1945–1949, ed. by Go¨ttinger Arbeitskreis (Berlin, 1984), 41–57. 14 Dietrich Staritz, Sozialismus in einem halben Lande: Zur Programmatik und Politik der KPD/SED in der Phase der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umwa¨lzung in der DDR (Berlin, 1976). Ernst Nolte, Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg (2nd edn., Stuttgart, 1985). Hermann Graml, Die Alliierten und die Teilung Deutschlands: Konflikte und Entscheidungen 1941–1948 (Frankfurt am Main, 1985). 15 Rolf Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1961: Darstellungen und Dokumente in zwei Ba¨nden (Frankfurt am Main, 1983). Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Widerstreit der Ma¨chte 1945–1952, ed. by Josef Foschepoth (Go¨ttingen, 1985). 16 Rolf Badstu ¨ bner, ‘ ‘‘Beratungen’’ bei J. W. Stalin: Neue Dokumente’, Utopie kreativ 7 (1991), 99–116. Rolf Badstu¨bner, ‘Zum Problem der historischen Alternativen

Introduction

5

proponent of this argument is Wilfried Loth, who claims that Stalin wanted ‘neither a separate state on the territory of the Soviet zone of occupation nor any socialist state in Germany at all’ and that he ended up getting both only because his plans were sabotaged by the leadership of the SED, and in particular by Ulbricht.17 Unsurprisingly, this argument has been greeted with fierce hostility and even ridicule, but Loth’s critics have found it hard to refute his claims.18 Does this mean that Loth is right and that, but for Ulbricht’s obsession with socialism (as well as the West’s refusal to trust the Kremlin), post-war Germany as a whole could have enjoyed the gift of Western-style bourgeois democracy? The author of this book does not think so. He is of the opinion that the communists did not want (and would not have accepted) a liberal Western-style regime, but adopted a bourgeois democratic approach in the mistaken belief that they could win political hegemony— and the chance to nudge the whole of Germany towards socialism— through the ballot box. The author will argue that, in keeping with this idea, the communists applied the rules of bourgeois democracy only when they were confident of victory, always preferring control over Eastern Germany to marginalization in a united Germany and thus effectively blocking the road to German unity. The author will suggest that this preference was not confined to Ulbricht but was shared by most SED leaders (including many former social democrats) as well as by Stalin, whose disagreements with the German comrades were less serious than Loth makes out.19 im ersten Nachkriegsjahrzehnt: Neue Quellen zur Deutschlandpolitik von KPdSU und SED’, Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (BzG) 33/5 (1991), 579–92. Rolf Badstu¨bner, ‘Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im Lichte neuer Quellen’, Die deutsche Frage in der Nachkriegszeit, ed. by Wilfried Loth (Berlin, 1994), 102–35. 17 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Stalin die DDR nicht wollte (Berlin, 1994), 10. See also Wilfried Loth, ‘Ziele sowjetischer Deutschlandpolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, Sozialismus und Kommunismus im Wandel: Hermann Weber zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. by Klaus Scho¨nhoven and Dietrich Staritz (Cologne, 1993), 303–23. For an updated version of his argument, see Wilfried Loth, ‘Die Entstehung der ‘‘StalinNote’’: Dokumente aus Moskauer Archiven’, Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952: Neue Quellen und Analysen, ed. by Ju¨rgen Zarusky (Munich, 2002), 19–115. 18 For Loth’s reply to his critics, see Wilfried Loth, ‘Stalin, die deutsche Frage und die DDR: Eine Antwort an meine Kritiker’, DA 28/3 (1995), 290–8. See also Wilfried Loth, ‘Das Ende der Legende: Hermann Graml und die ‘‘Stalin-Note’’. Eine Entgegnung’, VfZG 50/4 (2002), 653–64. 19 Doubts about Loth’s claim that the goals of the SED leadership during those years were profoundly at odds with those of the Kremlin have also been raised by Monika Kaiser. See Monika Kaiser, ‘Wechsel von sowjetischer Besatzungspolitik zu sowjetischer Kontrolle? Sowjetische Einflußnahme und ostdeutsche Handlungsspielraüme im

6

Introduction

Communist optimism, as this book will show, rested on specific assumptions about the political situation after the war, namely: (a) that the experience of defeat would result in a leftward shift in German public opinion, (b) that Germany’s Social Democratic Party would be a shadow of its former self and be easily absorbed by the communist-led SED, (c) that a separate West German state would not be viable because of its inability to feed itself, (d) that capitalism was on the brink of collapse and a potential cause for social unrest in Western-occupied Germany, and (e) that out of fear of another war as well as a feeling of national pride the German masses would be hostile to the Western Allies and in favour of Germany’s orientation towards the East. In revealing these assumptions in detail for the first time, this book will draw attention to the crucial role played by Marxist–Leninist ideology, with its emphasis on the inevitability of capitalism’s replacement by socialism, in SED policy- and decision-making. It will argue that the SED leaders were so convinced of the superiority of their party, their regime, and their main ally, the Soviet Union, that there was hardly any difference, at least initially, between their official propaganda and their private thoughts: they did not just say that they would ultimately prevail, they genuinely believed it. When the SED’s difficulties increased, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, ideological faith became an even more important pillar of party morale, enabling the SED leaders to retain their optimism in the face of serious political setbacks. Nor was this optimism purely the product of ideological fantasies, although it is tempting to dismiss it as such with the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, in a wider sense this book is a reminder of the fact that the West German state had a troubled start and initially bore little resemblance to the Wirtschaftswunder paradise of later years. It would therefore seem that the SED’s hopes were by no means absurd. The following study is based on a doctoral thesis completed at St Antony’s College, Oxford, in 1998. The argument advanced in this book is based on the author’s research in the Central Party Archive (ZPA) of the SED, which contains all internal records (some 80,000 files) of the SED’s collective leadership and central party apparatus.20 First opened to scholars in 1990 and now owned by the Federal Archives of Germany ¨ bergangsjahr von der SBZ zur DDR’, Sowjetisierung und Eigensta¨ndigkeit in der SBZ/ U DDR (1945–1953), ed. by Michael Lemke (Cologne, 1999), 197–8. 20 Heinz Voßke, ‘U ¨ ber die Besta¨nde des Archivs im Institut fu¨r Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Berlin’, Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung (IWK ) 26/2 (1990), 191–7.

Introduction

7

(BArch), the ZPA has undergone a radical reorganization which has involved changing its name several times as well as having all its documents reclassified.21 Like other historians, the author was struck by the enormous discrepancy between the quantity and quality of the material available in the ZPA.22 Documents of little historical interest, such as draft articles for the SED press and lists of proposed SED propaganda slogans, abound (and are frequently labelled ‘confidential’), while material that could shed light on decisions, and on the circumstances in which they were taken, is rare. One possible explanation for this is that sensitive information was removed from the files before they entered the ZPA.23 However, there is also a more innocent explanation. As Monika Kaiser points out, paper shortages in post-war Germany discouraged the taking of notes by the SED leaders who, as would-be revolutionaries, were in any event not fond of desk-bound work. One should also remember that the SED leaders, and especially those with a communist past, shared the same ideologically prescribed view of the world and understood each other instinctively, without having to rely on elaborate notes.24 If, for the reasons outlined above, the records of the SED’s main decision-making body—initially the Central Secretariat and later the Politburo together with the Little Secretariat—are disappointing, other files kept in the ZPA are a mine of information. This is especially true of the minutes of the Parteivorstand and Central Committee meetings, which give a verbatim account of the internal discussions among the SED leaders. These meetings were held on a regular basis inside the SED’s headquarters, the ‘House of Unity’, and usually lasted two or three days, allowing plenty of time for a detailed exchange of views. Because these meetings took place in an informal atmosphere, with speakers being regularly heckled or otherwise interrupted from the floor, they provide a unique insight not only into the mood of the SED leaders but also into their assessment of the political situation. 21 Hermann Weber, ‘Die aktuelle Situation in den Archiven fu ¨ r die Erforschung der DDR-Geschichte’, DA 27/7 (1994), 690–9. Matthias Buchholz, ‘Anmerkungen zur Problematik der ‘‘DDR-Archive’’ ’, Bilanz und Perspektiven, 383–90. 22 Ralph Jessen, ‘Die Akten und das Chaos: Eine quellenkritische Zwischenbilanz zur Geschichte der DDR’, DA 25/11 (1992), 1202–3. 23 The author owes this information to a talk given by archivist Elke Warning at the ‘Tagung DDR-Akten und Quellenkritik’, a conference on the SED archives held on 18 September 1992 and organized by the ‘Historische Kommission zu Berlin’. 24 Monika Kaiser, ‘Die Zentrale’, 65–6.

8

Introduction

Other important ZPA sources are the Nachla¨sse (private papers) of the top SED leaders, especially those of Pieck, Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and Dahlem. These files are not so much collections of documents written by the SED leaders as collections of material received (and sometimes annotated) by them. As such, they afford a glimpse of how the SED leaders were being briefed about the developments in Germany and the wider world. The most valuable Nachlaß is that of Pieck, the only SED leader who, through his habit of taking regular notes, kept something akin to a diary.25 His notes describe the regular meetings between the SED leaders and Soviet officials in Berlin as well as the eight post-war meetings between German comrades and Stalin, thus underlining the closeness of co-operation between Soviet and German communists. Among the other SED files consulted by the author, those falling under Parteiorgane, Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED–KPD, Westkommission, and Staat und Recht stand out because of the detailed reports they contain on the situation in West Germany, which is regularly painted in extremely dark colours and must have fuelled communist hopes or, once existing hopes had been dashed, given rise to new ones. Since SED documents are invariably distorted by ideology and loaded with jargon, they make little sense unless they are set in context. The author has therefore made extensive use of the existing secondary literature on the SED, post-war Germany, and the Soviet Union. He has also used the various new publications that are based on archival research in Moscow. In quoting from the SED files, the author has tried to stick as closely as possible to the format of the archival records. Quotes that are underlined or shown in bold print (as is often the case with quotes from the Pieck notes) indicate the highlighting of words or sentences in the original files. The author has decided to treat his topic in five thematic chapters which broadly follow a chronological order. The first chapter, which covers the period from 1944 to 1946, describes the communists’ plans for post-war Germany, their bid for control in Soviet-occupied Eastern Germany (which they were hoping to use as a springboard), and the foundation of the SED through a communist–social democratic merger under Soviet pressure. 25 For a detailed assessment of this crucial source on the history of the SED, see Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1953, ed. by Rolf Badstu¨bner and Wilfried Loth (Berlin, 1994), 13–47.

Introduction

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The second chapter, which covers roughly the same period, introduces the German Question and Soviet and SED attitudes towards it. It argues that, with Moscow’s backing, the SED leaders sought to extend their control over the whole of Germany but found themselves frustrated by the Western Allies as well as the incompetence of their West German fellow comrades. By mid-1946, the lines for the division of Germany had been drawn following a dramatic decline in Soviet– Western relations as well as the SED’s failure to turn itself into a nationwide party, although the belief that Western Germany was not viable on its own gave the SED leaders hope. The third chapter, which covers 1946 and 1947, describes how, in line with their fierce hostility to German unification under a Westernstyle regime and after unexpectedly failing to win semi-free elections, the SED leaders began to consolidate their regime in the east. While the Kremlin initially restrained the SED leaders in an attempt to hold out for an inter-Allied settlement, it eventually gave them the green light after failing to win the desired concessions. The fourth chapter, which covers 1948 and 1949, chronicles the breakup of Germany into two separate states, and the SED’s reaction to this event. It suggests that the SED leaders were already resigned to the division of Germany but had hopes that the new West German state would fail because of a crisis of capitalism as well as an increase in (communist-led) German patriotic resistance. The fifth chapter, which covers the period from 1950 to 1953, outlines the various offers for East–West negotiations extended by the SED leaders as well as the Kremlin in the aftermath of Germany’s formal division. It suggests that these initiatives were inspired by inflated hopes about their effect on the German masses, rather than a desire for a genuine compromise. As before, a united Germany based on Western-style bourgeois democracy was not envisaged by the leading communists (with the possible exception of Beria, who was, however, quickly removed from office) because of the risk that such a Germany might end up in the Western camp.

1 ‘It Should Look Democratic . . . ’: The German Communists and the Birth of the SED THE ORIGINS O F POST-WAR KPD STRATEGY When the Third Reich collapsed at the end of the Second World War, one organization swung into action in a bid to exploit the power vacuum and implement its plans for a new German society and state: the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). Backed by the victorious Soviet Union, and guided by a resolute leadership that had survived the Nazi regime in exile,1 the KPD resumed its activities in Germany before the fighting ceased. The first émigre´ KPD cadres to return to their country were flown from Moscow to a makeshift airfield near Berlin on 30 April 1945, the day of Hitler’s suicide and two days before the city’s fall. To the astonishment of most Germans, however, these cadres turned their attention not to the struggle for proletarian rule but to the building of bourgeois democratic administrations.2 There was even 1 After the arrest of the party chairman, Ernst Tha ¨lmann, in March 1933, the KPD’s Politburo and Central Committee fled to Prague, before moving on to Paris at the end of the year. From January 1935 the KPD leadership was officially based in Moscow, while operating mainly from Prague and, between 1936 and 1939, from Paris. By 1940 most KPD leaders who had escaped the Nazis had arrived in the Soviet Union and joined the Moscow émigre´s, who had taken over formal control of the party after the internment of the Paris-based leaders by the French authorities in September 1939. See Horst Duhnke, Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945 (Cologne, 1972), 101–16, 183–9, 365–8. Hans-Albert Walter, ‘Das Pariser KPD-Sekretariat, der deutsch-sowjetische Nichtangriffsvertrag und die Internierung deutscher Emigranten in Frankreich zu Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, Vierteljahreshefte fu¨r Zeitgeschichte (VfZG) 36/3 (1988), 483–528. 2 Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entla ¨ ßt ihre Kinder (paperback edn., Cologne, 1990), 411–44. ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’ in Berlin April bis Juni 1945: Von den Vorbereitungen im Sommer 1944 bis zur Wiedergru¨ndung der KPD im Juni 1945. Eine Dokumentation, ed. by Gerhard Keiderling (Berlin, 1993), 39–46.

The German Communists and the Birth of the SED

11

greater surprise when, on 11 June 1945, a KPD Aufruf (appeal) formally rejected the idea of imposing a ‘Soviet dictatorship’ on Germany and called instead for the creation of a ‘parliamentary democratic republic with all democratic rights and freedoms for the people’.3 The KPD’s conversion from scourge to apparent champion of bourgeois democracy did not come out of the blue. Its origins lay in a major reversal of strategy performed in the mid-1930s, under the auspices of the Communist International (Comintern), by all communist parties in the Soviet fold. Signs that the newly installed Nazi regime was not the expected curtain-raiser for world revolution prompted some communists in 1934 to reject the ‘ultra-leftist’ approach that had guided them since the Comintern’s 6th World Congress in 1928. The quest for a more flexible communist strategy was endorsed by the Comintern’s Executive Committee (ECCI), whose members had finally woken up to the threat posed to the Soviet Union by a proliferation of right-wing regimes and the potential rise of a phalanx of militant capitalist states. Communist fears of a military attack on the motherland of the proletarian revolution had been fuelled by an unexpected rapprochement in January 1934 between Nazi Germany and Poland. With the ECCI’s help, a pact was concluded in July 1934 between communists and socialists in France. Its success in preventing a right-wing regime in Paris inspired a new communist strategy that was subsequently promulgated as the official Comintern line, although the change was not formally announced but masked in criticism of the KPD.4 At the Comintern’s 7th World Congress, in the summer of 1935, the German communist and ECCI member Wilhelm Pieck declared that his party had made a serious error in branding all other parties as fascist and denouncing the bourgeois Bru¨ning government as a fascist dictatorship. Communists, he explained, had a stake in preserving ‘every scrap of bourgeois democracy’ so long as ‘proletarian democracy’ remained out of reach. A landmark speech by Georgi Dimitrov, the Comintern’s secretary-general designate and the driving force behind the French experiment, left the delegates in no doubt that the final triumph of the 3 Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschland, Reihe 1945/ 1946, Vol. 1, ed. by Gu¨nter Benser and Hans-Joachim Krusch (Munich, 1993), 231. 4 Dietrich Staritz, Sozialismus, 42–5. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above 1928–1941 (New York, 1990), 341–2. Arnold Sywottek, Deutsche Volksdemokratie: Studien zur politischen Konzeption der KPD 1935–1946 (Du¨sseldorf, 1971), 23–5, 39–40.

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international proletariat would have to be postponed. The congress heard that, since the masses were obviously not ready for proletarian rule, communists must discard their radical antics and form alliances with non-communists in an effort to combat fascism while skilfully using these alliances to further the proletarian cause. Their aim must be to unite the workers in the face of the fascist threat and thus galvanize other likely opponents of fascism—such as the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the intellectuals—so as to create a ‘broad-based antifascist popular front on the basis of the proletarian united front’.5 In spite of repeated prompting by the ECCI from the summer of 1934, the KPD was slow to adopt the new course, whose supporters were initially in a minority in the party’s exiled Politburo. Yet tight control by Moscow, a result of the party’s progressive ‘Bolshevization’ from the mid-1920s,6 made it impossible for the KPD to ignore the ECCI’s demand for change. A Politburo meeting held at the ECCI’s request in January 1935 strengthened the hand of the proponents of change, Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht, but the decisive shift in the KPD’s position took place after the Comintern’s 7th World Congress. At the so-called ‘Brussels Conference’, in October 1935, the KPD articulated the new line and removed its opponents from the Politburo and the Central Committee (ZK), so that the leadership of the party lay firmly with Pieck and Ulbricht.7 In keeping with Dimitrov’s instructions, the KPD’s new guidelines stressed the need for co-operation with the party’s main rival, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which was believed to have moved further to the left, and thus closer to the KPD, under the impact of Nazi oppression. The blanket vilification of social democrats as ‘social fascists’, the cornerstone of communist ultra-leftism, was to be abandoned in favour of a bid for a ‘united front’, to be based on a formal agreement between the two party leaderships. The new approach, as Pieck made clear, would not mean the end of KPD hostility to the SPD’s anti-revolutionary 5 Quoted ibid., 39, 41. The congress took place in Moscow between 25 July and 20 August 1935. See Edward H. Carr, The Twilight of Comintern, 1930–1935 (London, 1982), 403–27. For details on the KPD delegates, see Wladislaw Hedeler, ‘Die deutschen Delegierten auf dem VII. Weltkongreß der Kommunistischen Internationale 1937’, IWK 37/3 (2001), 370–83. 6 Ossip K. Flechtheim, Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), 191–248. 7 Horst Duhnke, KPD, 145–50. The conference was held in Kuntsevo, a town near Moscow, 3–15 October 1935. It was referred to as the ‘Brussels Conference’ for conspiratorial reasons. See Die Bru¨sseler Konferenz der KPD (3.–15. Oktober 1935), ed. with an intro. by Klaus Mammach (Berlin, 1975), 20–1.


13

stance and ‘reformism’. But neither would it be merely ‘[a cover for] the recruitment of social democratic workers into the KPD’ and ‘a pretext for the denunciation of social democratic leaders’.8 There was to be no return to the notorious ‘united-front-from-below’ campaign which the KPD had waged intermittently during the 1920s and, fatally, at the time of Hitler’s accession to power, in January 1933.9 Soon after the KPD had changed course, it became clear that the conditions for a united front did not exist. The KPD leaders concluded that they had not done enough to rid themselves of their sectarian image, and swiftly set out to formulate a more detailed anti-fascist platform in the hope of winning political allies. The result was a plan for a ‘democratic republic’, a distinctly moderate programme unveiled in 1936 and designed to reassure non-communists by ruling out the possibility of a direct transition to socialism. For the first time, there was no suggestion that the popular front would be a stepping-stone to proletarian rule. Instead, the alliance of ‘the social democratic, communist, Catholic, and all other workers’ with ‘the working petty bourgeoisie, the peasants, and the intellectuals’ was now seen as having an important role after Nazism’s defeat as the nucleus of an anti-fascist coalition government with communist participation. The future regime, however, would not be a replica of the ill-fated Weimar Republic that had preceded the Third Reich. Rather, as Anton Ackermann explained in his 1937 programme for a ‘democratic people’s republic’, its aim would be to ‘advance democracy to such an extent as effectively to remove the privileges of the great capitalists . . . ’. The hallmark of the new regime, as the KPD’s ‘Berne Conference’ subsequently confirmed, would be a redistribution of power through far-reaching economic reforms. Centred upon the ‘expropriation of the fascist trust capitalists’ and a ‘democratic land reform’, the proposed measures were aimed at ensuring that political ascendancy in the new Germany rested with the workers and their allies in the popular front, and not with the country’s old social élites.10 8 Wilhelm Pieck, Der neue Weg zum gemeinsamen Kampf fu ¨ r den Sturz der Hitlerdiktatur: Referat und Schlußwort auf der Bru¨sseler Parteikonferenz der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands, Oktober 1935 (Berlin, 1954), 152–3. 9 Conan Fischer, The German Communists and the Rise of Nazism (London, 1991), 17–19, 65–9, 160–1. Andreas Dorpalen, ‘SPD und KPD in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik’, VfZG 31/1 (1983), 88–98. 10 Quoted in Arnold Sywottek, Volksdemokratie, 62, 74, 90. The ‘Berne Conference’ was held in the French town of Draveil, south of Paris, 30 January–1 February 1939. As with the KPD’s ‘Brussels Conference’, the name was chosen for conspiratorial reasons. See Die Berner Konferenz der KPD (30. Januar–1. Februar 1939), ed. with an intro. by Klaus Mammach (Berlin, 1974), 11–12.

14


Notwithstanding its persistent popular-front rhetoric, the KPD was sliding back into sectarianism from around 1938 as evidence mounted that its alliance strategy had failed. Its overtures to the exiled SPD leadership in Prague, resulting in bilateral talks in November 1935, had foundered on social democratic suspicion that the communists’ sudden enthusiasm for bourgeois democracy was but a tactical ploy. Meanwhile, negotiations with Paris-based émigre´s on the establishment of a ‘German Popular Front’ had broken down amidst accusations from left-wing SPD breakaway groups that the KPD was betraying socialism and selling out to the bourgeoisie.11 In the autumn of 1939, major changes in the international situation removed the rationale for the popular front—to prevent the emergence of an anti-Soviet coalition of states—and thus paved the way for communists to return openly to their pre-1935 line. On 23 and 28 August, a Nazi-Soviet non-aggression treaty was signed, incorporating a secret protocol that divided Poland between the two signatories, while giving Moscow a free hand against Finland, Bessarabia, and the Baltic states. On 1 September, Hitler’s armies invaded Poland, triggering declarations of war from the Western powers committed to its defence, Britain and France, and raising the prospect of an internecine struggle between the Soviet Union’s potential foes. For the next two years, the Comintern and the KPD, in slavish submission to Soviet diplomacy, treated the war as an internal affair among capitalist states, blaming Anglo-French ‘imperialism’ and its alleged tool, the SPD.12 Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, following German lightning victories in the Polish and French campaigns, prompted the ECCI to renew the injunctions of the 7th World Congress and give them a patriotic spin. Dimitrov banned the use of revolutionary slogans and called for the establishment of ‘broad-based national liberation movements’ in a bid for the support of the conservative sections of the bourgeoisie. The communist-led ‘national fronts’ which subsequently sprang up across German-occupied Eastern Europe were enjoined not to commit themselves to a specific 11

Horst Duhnke, KPD, 163–82. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–67 (London, 1968), 267–89. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, ‘Der deutsch-sowjetische Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrag vom 28. September 1939: Die deutschen Aufzeichnungen u¨ber die Verhandlungen zwischen Stalin, Molotov und Ribbentrop in Moskau’, VfZG 39/3 (1991), 447–70. Jan Foitzik, ‘Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands und der Hitler–Stalin-Pakt: Die Erkla¨rung des Zentralkomitees zum 25. August 1939 im Wortlaut’, VfZG 37/3 (1989), 499–514. 12


15

programme and urged to waste no time pondering over the nature of their country’s post-war regime.13 After the rebuff of secret Soviet peace feelers, in the summer of 1943, Moscow took more concrete steps to further the development of a German anti-fascist front in the hope of overthrowing Hitler and thus ending the war. Earlier attempts by the exiled KPD leadership to undermine the German war effort through propaganda, culminating in December 1942 in a passionate call for a ‘great national peace movement’, had miserably failed to produce results. Interviews with German prisoners of war (POWs) had compounded the despair of the KPD émigre´s by highlighting the strength of pro-Nazi feelings in Germany, also among the workers. Since then, however, dramatic changes in the military situation had created a more favourable climate for domestic opposition to the Nazi regime and raised communist hopes for an antiHitler coup. In February 1943, the Wehrmacht had suffered a catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad and forever lost the aura of invincibility. The Soviet Union’s allies in the war against Hitler, Britain and the United States, had been advancing in Northern Africa and, through their strategic bombing campaign, carried the war to Germany. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, their leaders, Churchill and Roosevelt, had demanded the unconditional surrender of Germany and its Far Eastern ally, Japan, ruling out any possibility of a separate peace. After the Wehrmacht’s failed summer offensive and defeat in the battle of Kursk, it was evident that both the military and the diplomatic initiative had finally slipped from Germany’s grasp.14 In July 1943, a group of German POWs, supported by senior KPD members, founded the ‘National Committee ‘‘Free Germany’’ ’ (NKFD), complemented in September by a ‘German Officers’ League’, as a focus for anti-Nazi resistance within the Wehrmacht and a nucleus for a German national front. Eschewing any reference to the KPD and demanding no economic reforms beyond the expropriation of ‘those responsible for the war as well as the war profiteers’,15 the NKFD’s founding manifesto marked the high point of Soviet efforts to woo Germany’s old social élites. However, unable to trigger an anti-Hitler coup, the NKFD quickly 13 Dietrich Staritz, Die Gru ¨ ndung der DDR: Von der sowjetischen Besatzungsherrschaft zum sozialistischen Staat (2nd edn., Munich, 1987), 67–8. 14 Alexander Fischer, Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1941–1945 (Stuttgart, 1975), 17–27, 33–53. Andreas Hillgruber, Der Zweite Weltkrieg 1939–1945: Kriegsziele und Strategie der großen Ma¨chte (3rd edn., Stuttgart, 1983), 88–105, 122–3. 15 Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, Sozialismus, 55.

16


forfeited Moscow’s goodwill and, during the remainder of the war, became ever more patently an adjunct of the KPD.16 From late 1943, after the Moscow Conference of Allied Foreign Ministers (19–30 October) and the Teheran Conference of the Big Three (28 November–1 December), Soviet strategy was based on the assumption of Germany’s complete military defeat and subsequent subjection to a joint Allied occupation regime. The prospect of a Soviet military presence in Germany after the end of the war marked an important change, not least because it opened up new opportunities for the KPD. It was against this background that Dimitrov, now head of the ‘Department of International Information’ of the Central Committee of the Soviet communist party, the CPSU(b), instructed the KPD leadership in January 1944 to turn its attention to the issue of Germany’s post-war regime.17 On 6 February 1944, three weeks after the opening of inter-Allied negotiations on Germany’s post-war treatment at the London-based European Advisory Commission (EAC),18 the KPD’s Politburo appointed a ‘Work Commission’ of twenty leading party figures to map out the KPD’s future strategy in preparation for Hitler’s fall. In eighteen sessions, held between 6 March and 21 August 1944, the commission heard presentations by party experts on a variety of issues, such as political leadership in post-war Germany, KPD economic policy, agricultural policy, the role of the intellectuals, and the future of the trade unions. Their conclusions were incorporated in late 1944 into the so-called ‘Action Programme of the Bloc of Militant Democracy’, a comprehensive programme for post-Nazi Germany which harked back to the KPD’s earlier plans for a ‘democratic republic’.19 16 Bodo Scheurig, Freies Deutschland: Das Nationalkomitee und der Bund Deutscher Offiziere in der Sowjetunion 1943–1945 (Munich, 1960), 33–70. Paul Heider, ‘Nationalkomitee ‘‘Freies Deutschland’’—Antihitlerbu¨ndnis oder Koalition fu¨r ein demokratisches Deutschland?’, BzG 35/4 (1993), 13–30. On the NKFD’s transformation into a KPD tool, see Arnold Sywottek, Volksdemokratie, 123–47. Paul Heider, ‘Gru¨ndung des Nationalkomitees ‘‘Freies Deutschland’’ und des Bundes Deutscher Offiziere—alleiniges Verdienst der KPD oder sowjetischer Entschluß?’, BzG 34/3 (1992), 4–28. Jo¨rg Morre´, Hinter den Kulissen des Nationalkomitees: Das Institut 99 in Moskau und die Deutschlandpolitik der UdSSR 1943–1946 (Munich, 2001), 179–86. 17 Alexander Fischer, Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik, 60–75, 83–4. 18 Hans-Gu ¨ nter Kowalski, ‘Die ‘‘European Advisory Commission’’ als Instrument alliierter Deutschlandplanung 1943–1945’, VfZG 19/3 (1971), 261–93. Joseph Foschepoth, ‘Britische Deutschlandpolitik zwischen Jalta und Potsdam’, VfZG 30/4 (1982), 677–9. 19 Gregory W. Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht: The Communist Reconstruction of East Germany 1945–46 (Princeton, NJ, 1983), 12–18. The programme was produced in


17

Designed as a platform for a KPD-led alliance of all anti-Nazi individuals and groups (the so-called ‘Bloc of Militant Democracy’), the Action Programme demanded the establishment of a ‘democratic people’s regime’. Its key proposition was that the stranglehold of ‘fascist-imperialist monopoly capitalism’ must be broken, in addition to the punishment of Nazis and war criminals, to prevent a repetition of the Weimar experience and achieve the thorough democratization of Germany forgone in 1918. To this end, Germany’s old social élites must be purged from the government and the administrations, while their economic power base must be destroyed through expropriations. The intended beneficiaries of the proposed reforms—namely the expropriation of the big landowners and the nationalization of all war industries, banks, and utilities—were the German masses, whom the KPD was to approach as a champion of their respective political goals. Thus the peasantry was to be wooed with the creation of ‘land funds’ that would assuage ‘the worst hunger for land’, while the workers were promised better living conditions and greater social security. As for the numerous petty bourgeoisie, this group was to be courted with guarantees for the protection of bourgeois freedoms and the prospect of free elections as well as with promises of financial support for small private businesses.20 In adopting this programme, the KPD leadership acknowledged that proletarian revolution was no longer on the agenda and that, after the war, there would be no alternative to working from within a multi-party regime. Yet if this marked a watershed for an organization that had vowed five years earlier, in the autumn of 1939, ‘to fight all forms of bourgeois dictatorship’ in order not to ‘bail out the rotten capitalist system again’,21 it did not mean that the KPD had abandoned its struggle for socialism. Rather, that struggle was now to be drawn out over several stages and be waged by more subtle means. This was made clear by Pieck, who, in a lecture given to fellow KPD émigre´s on four different drafts. The first three drafts were authored by Pieck and written in October 1944. A more detailed and carefully worded fourth draft was written by Ackermann at the end of 1944. See ‘Nach Hitler kommen wir’: Dokumente zur Programmatik der Moskauer KPD-Fu¨hrung 1944/45 fu¨r Nachkriegsdeutschland, ed. by Peter Erler, Horst Laude, and Manfred Wilke (Berlin, 1994), 89–99. 20 ‘ ‘‘Aktionsprogramm des Blocks der ka ¨mpferischen Demokratie’’—Maschinenschriftlicher 3. Entwurf o. D. (1944)’, ibid., 265–9. ‘ ‘‘Aktionsprogramm des Blocks der ka¨mpferischen Demokratie’’—Maschinenschriftliche Abschrift des Entwurfs von Anton Ackermann von Ende 1944’, ibid., 290–303. 21 Quoted in Arnold Sywottek, Volksdemokratie, 94.

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18 October 1944, likened the Action Programme to the revolutionary programme recommended by Lenin in 1905. Quoting from Lenin’s famous tract on the ‘Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution’, Pieck described the Action Programme as the entire list of minimum goals of our party, the list of those basic political and economic reforms that are both entirely feasible under the current social [and] economic conditions and absolutely essential for the next step forward, towards the establishment of socialism.

Communists would have to accept ‘unconditionally’ the bourgeois nature of the coming revolution, Pieck explained by quoting another passage of Lenin’s tract. That way, they would be able to push the revolution ahead and use it ‘for the further successful struggle of the proletariat for socialism’.22

STALIN, THE KPD, AND SOVIET PLANS FOR POST-NAZI G ERMANY The preparations made by the KPD leaders for the time after Hitler were inextricably intertwined with Soviet political, economic, and military goals. The KPD’s line was effectively laid down in Moscow from the mid-1920s, when the Comintern was transformed into a Soviet tool. Initiated by Lenin’s ‘twenty-one conditions’ of 1920, and proclaimed at the Comintern’s 5th World Congress in 1924, this so-called ‘Bolshevization’ of the foreign communist parties reached its conclusion with the consolidation of Stalin’s dictatorship in 1929. Thereafter, the KPD’s relationship with Moscow was one of total subordination, with the party accepting that its first duty was to defend the Soviet Union against external threats. Although the KPD gained nominal independence in 1943 as a result of the Comintern’s dissolution, the Kremlin retained its firm hold on the party via control of its exiled leadership, famously based in Moscow’s ‘Hotel Lux’ since 1935.23 As before, the linchpin of Soviet control was Georgi Dimitrov, 22 ‘ ‘‘Zum Aktionsprogramm der KPD’’—Handschriftliche Disposition Wilhelm Piecks’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 249. 23 Edward H. Carr, Twilight, 5–6. Hermann Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republik, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), 294–318. ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’, 25–8. Norbert Podewin, Walter Ulbricht: Eine neue Biographie (Berlin, 1995), 129–36.


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the Bulgarian-born former Comintern chief who now co-ordinated the work of the foreign communist parties as head of the CPSU(b)’s ‘Department of International Information’. A person held by Stalin in high regard, Dimitrov supervised the drafting of the KPD’s Action Programme, working, as ever, for the ‘ideological purity and steel unity of the party and its unshakeable loyalty to the Soviet Union’.24 In doing so, he could rely on the wholehearted support of the KPD’s top brass— party chairman Wilhelm Pieck, Politburo members Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Florin, and Anton Ackermann, a ‘candidate member’ of the Politburo—all of whom had proved their unswerving loyalty to Moscow in a series of bloody purges culminating in the ‘great terror’ of 1936–8.25 Although few details have transpired about Soviet plans for the postwar world,26 there can be little doubt that in the spring of 1945 the Kremlin had no appetite for exporting Bolshevism. After a monumental struggle that had cost it more than 20 million lives and nearly one-third of its national wealth, the Soviet Union desperately needed peace as a basis for its domestic reconstruction. Convinced that the outcome of the Teheran Conference gave them the right to hold on to their territorial gains under the Nazi–Soviet pact and install friendly governments in the neighbouring countries of Eastern Europe, Soviet officials had no interest in destabilizing Europe through proletarian revolts, all the more since they regarded socialism’s short-term prospects abroad as poor.27 Stalin, the Soviet dictator, had always been sceptical about the potential of the foreign communist parties, in stark contrast to his predecessor, Lenin. In the 1920s, he had famously revealed his contempt for proletarian internationalism by advocating ‘socialism in one 24 Franz Dahlem, Erinnerungen; Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv (SAPMO-BArch, ZPA), SGY 30/1078. 25 On the KPD and the ‘great terror’, see Hermann Weber, ‘Die deutschen Opfer Stalins’, DA 22/4 (1989), 407–18. Hermann Weber, ‘Weiße Flecken’ in der Geschichte: Die KPD-Opfer der Stalinschen Saüberungen und ihre Rehabilitierung (2nd edn., Frankfurt am Main, 1990), 13–35. Reinhard Mu¨ller, ‘ ‘‘Wir kommen alle dran’’: Saüberungen unter den deutschen Politemigranten in der Sowjetunion (1934–1938)’, Terror: Stalinistische Parteisaüberungen 1936–1953, ed. by Hermann Weber and Ulrich Ma¨hlert (Paderborn, 1998), 121–66. 26 On the limited evidence that has emerged from the Soviet archives, see Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War, 3–9. Gerhard Wettig, Bereitschaft zu Einheit in Freiheit? Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik 1945–1955 (Munich, 1999), 26–32. 27 Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945 (New York, 1979), 122–32.

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country’, allegedly remarking that the Comintern represented nothing and existed only because of Soviet support.28 The disbandment of the Comintern in May 1943, presumably motivated by Moscow’s desire to facilitate the establishment of antifascist national fronts, was a measure of the dramatic decline of world revolution in the hierarchy of Soviet goals. Its implications were spelt out to the émigre´ leaders of the East European communist parties on the eve of their repatriation. In December 1944, the Czech communists were told that ‘there must be no talk of establishing a Soviet regime in the CSR’.29 A similar order tied the hands of the Bulgarian communists when they returned home. At a meeting of their party’s Central Committee in March 1945, their chairman, Traicho Kostov, admitted that any attempt at imposing a Soviet regime on Bulgaria immediately after its liberation would have created ‘enormous difficulties for us and the Soviet Union’ and ‘would not have been permitted by the Red Army’s command’.30 According to Milovan Djilas, the famous Yugoslav communist and aide to Tito, the communist partisan leader, Stalin did not allow Dimitrov to return to his native country in the footsteps of the Red Army for fear that he might push Bulgarian politics to the left too soon. The strength of Stalin’s hostility to communist insurrectionism was highlighted in late 1944 by his refusal to support the communist-dominated ELAS resistance movement in its bid for power in Greece, a decision that paved the way for the suppression of the Greek rising by British troops.31 The main problem confronting Soviet officials at the end of the war was, without doubt, the question of what should be done with Germany. New research has strengthened the view that the Kremlin’s policy towards the defeated enemy was not based on a fixed scheme but designed to offer Stalin maximum flexibility.32 However, given the 28 Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy (London, 1991), 101–16. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (2nd edn., London, 1967), 391–2. 29 Quoted in Karel Kaplan, ‘U ¨ ber den tschechoslowakischen Weg zum Sozialismus’, Ziele, Formen und Grenzen der ‘besonderen’ Wege zum Sozialismus: Zur Analyse der Transformationskonzepte europaïscher kommunistischer Parteien in den Jahren zwischen 1944/45 und 1948, ed. by Arbeitsbereich Geschichte und Politik der DDR am Institut fu¨r Sozialwissenschaft der Universita¨t Mannheim (Mannheim, 1984), 92. 30 Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, ‘Ein ‘‘besonderer deutscher Weg’’ zum Sozialismus?’, PolZG B51–52/1982, 18. 31 Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (London, 1962), 107–8. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, 516–17. 32 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 9–10.


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enormous suffering endured by the Soviet Union during the struggle against Hitler, even a flexible approach to the German Question was bound to be guided by two overriding goals: reparations; and lasting security against a new German threat. Indeed, those two goals featured prominently in an early memorandum on Soviet post-war strategy, dated 10 January 1944 and drafted by I. M. Maisky, an assistant people’s commissar for foreign affairs who had gained prominence earlier in the war as Soviet ambassador to London. Describing the cornerstones of Soviet foreign policy for ‘the next 30–50 years’, Maisky insisted that Germany must be ‘rendered harmless for the said period’ through a combination of different measures, including dismemberment, Allied occupation (for a period of ‘about ten years’), disarmament, reparations, and re-education.33 Fears of renewed German aggression loomed large for a Soviet leadership convinced that the Germans were capable of shrugging off defeat and restoring their country’s might. Stalin, in particular, had great respect for German industriousness and organizational skills. In August 1944, he advised Mikolajczyk, the head of the London-based Polish government-in-exile, that Germany was ‘a strong country even though Hitler is weakening it’, and he warned: ‘The Germans will rise again.’34 In the same vein, he told a delegation of Yugoslav communists in April 1945: ‘ . . . they will recover, and very quickly. It is a highly developed industrial country with an extremely skilled and numerous working class and technical intelligentsia. Give them twelve to fifteen years and they’ll be on their feet again.’35 The solution to the Soviet Union’s predicament lay in strengthening the alliance with Britain and the United States. Its implications for the KPD had already been taken into account by the Work Commission in 1944. At the commission’s opening meeting, on 6 March 1944, Florin defined the party’s main task as: ‘To continue to support the alliance between the three great powers and to refrain from any activity that might enable the reactionaries in the United States and [in] England to cause the break-up of this alliance.’ There was no mistaking the kind of activity from which the KPD would have to refrain: ‘If we decided 33 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, ‘The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with the United States and Great Britain’; CWIHP Working Paper No. 13 (July 1995), 2–3. See also Gerhard Wettig, Bereitschaft, 36–40. 34 Quoted in Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland (New 35 Milovan Djilas, Conversations, 105–6. York, 1958), 247.

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today to give in to the requests made by some [of the German] prisoners of war and drew up a socialist action programme, we might through such a mistake enable the reactionaries to bring about the downfall of Roosevelt, which would also have negative consequences for us.’36 In an echo of Florin’s remarks, the first émigre´ KPD cadres to return to their country in the spring of 1945 were told in their final briefings that any attempt to undermine the unity of the anti-Hitler alliance must be thoroughly squashed. With victory over Nazism to be followed by a prolonged period of joint Allied occupation, there would be no question of them establishing socialism in Germany. Rather, their task would be to complete the bourgeois democratic revolution of 1848 and actively oppose calls for the creation of a socialist regime.37 By that time, after the Yalta Conference (4–11 February 1945), Moscow’s support for the principle of inter-Allied collaboration was growing, as communist hopes for a last-minute uprising against Hitler gave way to the conclusion that the Germans were not Nazism’s innocent victims but willing accomplices in its crimes. Soviet disillusionment with the political instincts of the German people was echoed by Pieck when he subsequently urged his fellow comrades to acquaint themselves with the decisions of Yalta and ‘their significance for the developments to come’. Its consequence was a major modification of the KPD’s post-war programme, prompting Pieck, in March 1945, to describe the Action Programme as ‘completely outdated’.38 The new ‘Guidelines for the Work of German Anti-Fascists in the Area of Germany Occupied by the Red Army’, drawn up by Ulbricht and approved by Dimitrov on 5 April 1945, assumed that no central authority would exist upon Nazism’s collapse and that political organizations would not be allowed for some time. In those circumstances, the émigre´ KPD cadres would have to build an anti-fascist regime from the ground up via communist-sponsored local administrations.39 Much as Soviet officials were eager to reap the potential benefits of continued inter-Allied collaboration, they were also aware of its inherent limitations. Their commitment to the wartime alliance was tempered by an implacable hostility to capitalism inspired by the teachings of Lenin and hardened by the prospect of Anglo-American 36 ‘ ‘‘Die Lage und die Aufgaben in Deutschland bis zum Sturz Hitlers’’— Handschriftliche Ausarbeitung Wilhelm Florins’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 143. 37 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 398–404. 38 Quoted in Alexander Fischer, Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik, 135, 138. 39 Ibid., 136–53.


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domination in Europe after Germany’s defeat. Indeed, a new spectre was already stalking the Kremlin: a post-war Germany under predominant Western control. Addressing the Work Commission on 6 March 1944, Florin warned: Reactionary circles in England and in the United States are eager to bring Germany under their imperialist control. . . . They will try to persuade their governments to go to Germany with bacon and loans, [and] with low reparation demands in order to lure our people into a Western orientation, only to use it once again with the help of the German reactionaries against the Soviet Union.40

Since then, the Kremlin’s unease about the strategic goals of Britain and the United States had grown. By March 1945, the military situation in Europe had shifted dramatically. The Soviet winter offensives, which in the days of the Yalta Conference had reached the River Oder, less than 100 miles from Berlin, had become bogged down in fierce fighting in Silesia and Pomerania. On the Western front, by contrast, General Eisenhower’s Anglo-American armies, which had landed in Normandy on 6 June 1944, had succeeded in crossing the Rhine after a string of military reverses and had finally begun to pour into Germany at high speed, a breakthrough which Stalin attributed to Western collusion with the German foe. At the same time, news of soundings by an SS-general, Karl Wolff, for a surrender of German forces in Italy had rekindled Stalin’s concern over the possibility of a separate peace in the West and, after a bout of Soviet–Western recriminations, prompted him to speed up the Red Army’s drive on Berlin. Soviet misgivings about Western intentions were compounded, after the Wehrmacht’s unconditional surrender at Eisenhower’s Reims headquarters on 7 May 1945, by British attempts to use the disgraced Do¨nitz government as a basis for future German central administrations, and by reports that some Wehrmacht units were being maintained as labour brigades under British command.41 On the whole, however, the international situation at the end of the war looked encouraging for Stalin and his lieutenants. At Teheran, they had secured Western acquiescence to their demand for the Curzon Line 40

‘ ‘‘Die Lage und die Aufgaben in Deutschland’’ ’, ‘Nach Hitler ’, 143–4. William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled 1943–1948 (Detroit, Mich., 1978), 52, 171. Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and his Era (2nd edn., London, 1989), 611–12. Boris Meissner, Rußland die Westma¨chte und Deutschland: Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1943–1953 (2nd edn., Hamburg, 1954), 56–9. 41

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as the new Soviet–Polish frontier, gaining a free hand to move Poland westwards at Germany’s expense. Their victorious armies stood in the heart of Europe and had captured Berlin, viewed in Moscow as the main battleground for Germany’s political future.42 The Allied zonal protocol, agreed at the EAC in September 1944 and confirmed at Yalta, assigned them supreme authority over the designated Eastern occupation zone (which incorporated the rich agricultural land to the east of the River Elbe) as well as the Eastern sector of Berlin, ensuring that 40 per cent of pre-1937 German territory (Germany minus Austria and the Sudetenland) and 36 per cent of the German population would end up under their control.43 The prospects for a further expansion of Soviet influence also looked favourable from Moscow’s point of view. A prolonged economic slump was predicted for the West European countries by Eugen Varga, the director of the Soviet ‘Institute of World Economics and World Politics’ and Stalin’s main economic adviser. His forecasts raised the hope that the policies of these countries might be pushed to the left by their own governments, expected to be composed of broad-based coalitions with communist participation. Indeed, in April 1944 the French communists had entered the exiled provisional government of General de Gaulle and received two cabinet posts, paving the way for their Italian comrades to join the government of Marshall Badoglio.44 Stalin himself had mentioned the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism within the framework of bourgeois democratic regimes. In a conversation with Tito in April 1945, he explained: ‘Today socialism is possible even under the English monarchy. Revolution is no longer necessary everywhere.’ A man who epitomized communism’s schizophrenic attitude towards capitalism at its most extreme, Stalin was deeply afraid of the West yet ultimately convinced that capitalism was doomed.45 42 Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road, 122–32. Manfred Zeidler, Kriegsende im Osten: Die Rote Armee und die Besetzung Deutschlands o¨stlich von Oder und Neiße 1944/45 (Munich, 1996), 33–47. Alexander Fischer, ‘ ‘‘Antifaschistisch-demokratischer’’ Neubeginn 1945: Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik am Ende des ‘‘Dritten Reiches’’ ’, DA 8/4 (1975), 363–4. 43 Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford, 1975), 56–119. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die UdSSR und die Zoneneinteilung Deutschlands (1943/44)’, ZfG 43/4 (1995), 324–31. 44 William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 31–2. Wilfried Loth, ‘Frankreichs Kommunisten und der Beginn des Kalten Krieges: Die Entlassung der kommunistischen Minister im Mai 1947’, VfZG 26/1 (1978), 12–24. 45 Milovan Djilas, Conversations, 104. On Stalin’s schizophrenic attitude towards the West, see Robert Conquest, Stalin: Breaker of Nations (London, 1991), 280. One of


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There was a general feeling in Moscow that the Soviet Union would emerge from the war with added international weight as a result of being ‘militarily the strongest power in the world’ as well as a major economic force whose strength had increased ‘disproportionately’. Florin, for one, was convinced that, after the war, the Soviet Union would be able to ‘work for the triumph of the workers in many countries far more effectively than the Comintern [ever] could’.46 These expectations were fuelled by the belief that the Soviet Union enjoyed great popularity among ordinary people in the West, and that anticommunist sentiments were confined to the West’s reactionary social élites. Briefing the Work Commission on Soviet post-war strategy, Florin expressed the view that ‘all honest people’ in the West recognized the enormous debt which the world owed to the Soviet Union as a result of its heroic struggle against Nazism. He even claimed that this recognition was reflected in growing opposition to the ‘reactionary circles in England and in the United States’.47 Hopes for a leftward shift in public opinion also existed with regard to Germany, where the successful expansion of Soviet influence depended heavily on the KPD. In his lecture of 6 March 1944, Florin reminded his fellow comrades that it was their duty to save Germany from being lured into a Western orientation: We must prevent the German reactionaries from selling themselves to foreign imperialists, and [we must] prevent the reactionaries of the world from turning the collapsed imperialist Hitler-state that is Germany into a semi-colony controlled by Anglo-American trusts.

The challenge facing the KPD in this volatile situation would be to lay the foundations for a left-wing and, more importantly, pro-Soviet regime without antagonizing the Western Allies, in other words: ‘to push the internal restructuring of Germany as far ahead as the international situation and the balance of power within Germany allows’. To this end, the KPD would have to transform itself from a radical Stalin’s successors, Khrushchev, has testified to the widespread belief among Soviet officials at the end of the war that ‘Everyone would take the path from capitalism to socialism’. See Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston, Mass., 1990), 100. 46 ‘ ‘‘Die Rolle der Sowjetunion und die nationale Frage in Deutschland’’—Handschriftliche Notizen Wilhelm Piecks’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 173. ‘ ‘‘Die Rolle der Sowjetunion und die nationale Frage der Deutschen’’—Handschriftliche Ausarbeitung Wilhelm Florins’, ibid., 186. 47 Ibid., 185. ‘ ‘‘Die Lage und die Aufgaben in Deutschland’’ ’, ibid., 141.

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protest movement into a respectable ‘people’s party’ (‘Volkspartei’) and assume political leadership by splitting the German bourgeoisie, whose anti-Western wing was to be drawn into a communist-led ‘national front’. Florin was confident that this strategy would succeed. He insisted that the prospect of domination by Anglo-American capitalism was already dividing the German bourgeoisie, and he instructed his fellow comrades: ‘We must skilfully deepen this rift . . . without endangering the alliance between the three states.’48

THE K PD’ S RET UR N T O T HE G ERM AN P OL I T IC AL AR E NA The main vehicles for the KPD’s ambitions were three clandestine ‘Initiative Groups’ dispatched to Germany in the dying days of the war. The first of these groups, made up of ten hand-picked KPD émigre´s, left Moscow for Berlin on 30 April 1945 under the leadership of Walter Ulbricht. The second group, headed by Anton Ackermann, departed for Saxony on the following day. On 6 May, a third group, led by Gustav Sobottka, set off for Mecklenburg and the towns on the Baltic coast. Attached to the three Red Army fronts (the 1st Belorussian front, the 1st Ukrainian front, and the 2nd Belorussian front), these groups entered their designated areas of operation alongside the victorious Soviet troops.49 On arrival, they found a country in ruins and a society in a state of total collapse. Allied bombing had laid waste to most cities, while vast rural areas had been devastated by battle during the Wehrmacht’s retreat. All administration had broken down and such order as existed was the result of spontaneous measures taken by the local Red Army commanders to avert the threat of famine and disease. Adding to the chaos was the presence of millions of refugees from Germany’s Eastern territories who had fled westwards before the advancing Soviet troops. Assigned to the 7th Section of the ‘Main Political Administration of the Red Army’ (GlavPURKKA) and assisted by 70 fellow KPD émigre´s as well as 300 members of the NKFD, the Initiative Groups immediately began to organize the first 48

‘ ‘‘Die Lage und die Aufgaben in Deutschland’’ ’, 143, 145, 158. Wolfgang Leonhard, Spurensuche: Vierzig Jahre nach ‘Die Revolution entla¨ßt ihre Kinder’ (Cologne, 1992), 87–147. Gerhard Keiderling, ‘Wir sind die Staatspartei’: Die KPD-Bezirksorganisation Groß-Berlin April 1945—April 1946 (Berlin, 1997), 57–62. 49


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clear-up and advise the Soviet authorities in the appointment of antifascist local administrations.50 In resuming their activities in Germany, the KPD leaders focused their efforts on Berlin, so as to gain a firm foothold where it was likely to matter most. Priority was given to the Western districts of the city to ensure that by the time these districts were to be handed over to the Western Allies, in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the groundwork for the regime envisaged by the KPD would be firmly in place. Spearheading the KPD’s onslaught on the German capital was Walter Ulbricht, the uncharismatic yet tireless former head of the KPD’s Berlin–Brandenburg organization.51 A stickler for detail who left nothing to chance, Ulbricht had risen from the party’s ranks to become, in effect, the KPD’s second-in-command and the right-hand man of Pieck, especially after the sudden death of Florin, in July 1944.52 The political void left behind by the Nazi regime ensured that Ulbricht’s trail-blazing mission did not take long to produce results. By 9 May 1945, little more than a week after the arrival of the ‘Ulbricht Group’, mayors and local councils had been appointed in all districts of Berlin. On 19 May, a city council, the Magistrat, was formally installed. In the same fashion, new local administrations were established in the other areas of the Soviet occupation zone (SBZ) by the ‘Ackermann’ and ‘Sobottka’ groups. In keeping with their instructions as well as procedures throughout Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, the Initiative Groups went out of their way to give the new administrations an immaculate democratic appearance. While there was a rigorous purge of Nazis, the traditional structure of local government was retained and, more importantly, the participation of social democratic and bourgeois representatives actively sought. At the same time, however, great care was taken to ensure that the key posts were filled with loyal communists, many of whom were recent returnees from Soviet exile and specially 50 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 16–20, 252–4. John P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany (London, 1951), 56–7. Jo¨rg Morre´, Hinter den Kulissen, 158–77. Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945–1946 (London, 1956), 117–23. Dieter Marc Schneider, ‘Renaissance und Zersto¨rung der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone’, VfZG 37/3 (1989), 457–97. 51 Mario Frank, Walter Ulbricht: Eine deutsche Biografie (Berlin, 2001), 57–93. Carola Stern, Ulbricht: Eine politische Biographie (Cologne, 1964), 35–70. 52 Ernst Wollweber, ‘Aus Erinnerungen: Ein Portrait Walter Ulbrichts’, BzG 32/3 (1990), 351–5. Florin had died in a Moscow hospital during a stomach operation. See ‘Nach Hitler’, 405.

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trained for their new role.53 The purpose of this approach was summed up most astutely by Ulbricht himself in his famous remark, recalled by Wolfgang Leonhard, a member of his Initiative Group, that ‘it should look democratic, but everything must be in our hands’.54 Ulbricht’s insistence on communist domination of the new administrations was complemented by his refusal to tolerate any political activity outside them. One of his first actions in Berlin was to order a crack-down on the independent ‘Anti-Fascist Committees’ which had sprung up in the final days of the war (ironically in response to the NKFD’s propaganda) and on the dozens of left-wing firebrands who had leaped into action believing their hour had come, many of them wearing ‘red armbands with the inscription ‘‘KPD’’ ’.55 Ulbricht’s approach reflected an awareness that, if the KPD’s strategy was to succeed, all challenges to the leading role claimed by the Initiative Groups had to be nipped in the bud, especially those coming from within the party itself. Indeed, the Work Commission had ruled that, upon their return to Germany, the ‘Muscovites’ must re-establish themselves as the KPD’s only legitimate leadership and rebuild the party’s shattered organization along strictly hierarchical lines.56 Added to this was the task of bringing the KPD’s rank and file into line with the party’s new orthodoxy. Because communists in Germany (who included 150,000–300,000 KPD members) had been largely cut off from their exiled leadership both before and during the war, many of them were not familiar with the popular front strategy, and those who were seldom appreciated its seeming support for bourgeois democracy. The resulting ideological confusion quickly convinced Ulbricht that the party’s membership would have to be retrained and that new members would have to be recruited to dilute the influence of intransigent hardliners. In a letter to Pieck, written on 17 May 1945, he explained: ‘We have to face up to the fact that the majority of our comrades is prone to Gregory W. Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht, 23–32. ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’, 47–68. Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 440. 55 ‘Rekonstruierte Notizen aus einem Bericht des Gen. Walter Ulbricht an Gen. Dimitroff vom 17. Mai 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. 56 Manfred Wilke, ‘Konzeptionen der KPD-Fu ¨ hrung 1944/45 fu¨r das Parteiensystem der SBZ und der Beginn der Umsetzung’, DA 26/2 (1993), 254. On the leadership ambitions of the KPD’s Moscow émigre´s, see also Peter Erler, ‘ ‘‘Moskau-Kader’’ der KPD in der SBZ’, Anatomie der Parteizentrale: Die KPD/SED auf dem Weg zur Macht, ed. by Manfred Wilke (Berlin, 1998), 242–5. Peter Erler, ‘Heerschau und Einsatzplanung: Ein Dokument zur Kaderpolitik der SED aus dem Jahre 1944’, Geschichte und Transformation des SED-Staates: Beitra¨ge und Analysen, ed. by Klaus Schroeder (Berlin, 1994), 52–70. 53 54


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sectarianism, and that we must change the membership of our party as soon as possible by admitting active anti-fascists who are now proving themselves through their work.’57 Such measures, of course, had to await the readmission of political parties on a formal basis, something the émigre´ KPD cadres had earlier been told not to expect for some time.58 However, signs that the situation in Berlin was beginning to calm down, and that the members of other political parties were about to resume their work, soon brought the issue to a head. By late May 1945, several Red Army commanders had become convinced of the need to establish ‘some kind of anti-fascist organization to guide the activities of the Germans towards the elimination of the ideology and legacy of fascism’. Pieck was informed that Ulbricht had ‘raised the issue with Moscow’, but had ‘not yet received a reply’.59 Ulbricht’s request struck a responsive chord with the Kremlin. On 26 May 1945, word came from Moscow ‘that parties and trade union[s] are [now] permitted’. Ulbricht was told to prepare for the relaunch of the KPD and the readmission of other parties, such as the SPD and the old Centre Party (as an organization representing the bourgeoisie).60 The Kremlin’s sudden change of heart on the matter suggests that Stalin and his lieutenants had become more confident about their ability to see the KPD’s programme through. They had initially feared that Nazism’s hold on the German people might survive the Third Reich’s collapse, but the absence of any underground Nazi activity seems to have laid those concerns to rest. The change may have come in response to a favourable report by A. I. Mikoyan, the Soviet Politburo member who had been touring Germany in the aftermath of its defeat, on the achievements of the Initiative Groups and the latest state of affairs in Berlin.61 57 Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung: Aus Reden und Aufsa¨tzen, Vol. 2: 1933–1946, Zusatzband (Berlin, 1966), 205. For details on the KPD’s membership figures, see Werner Mu¨ller, ‘Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD)’, SBZ-Handbuch: Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Fu¨hrungskra¨fte in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands, ed. by Martin Broszat and Hermann Weber (Munich, 1990), 441. 58 In mid-May 1945 Ulbricht was still telling fellow communists ‘that it would not be appropriate at this stage to commence with the establishment of the KPD’. ‘Rekonstruierte Notizen aus einem Bericht des Gen. Walter Ulbricht an Gen. Dimitroff vom 17. Mai 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. See also, Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 402. 59 ‘Telegramm von der 1. Bjelorussischen Front’, 26 May 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 60 ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. 61 Alexander Fischer, ‘Der Einfluß der SMAD auf das Parteiensystem in der SBZ am Beispiel der CDUD’, DA 26/2 (1993), 266–7.

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It was not until 4 June 1945, however, that the road to a formal communist bid for political leadership in post-Nazi Germany was finally cleared. On that day, the heads of the three Initiative Groups—Ulbricht, Ackermann, and Sobottka—secretly travelled to Moscow for a meeting with Stalin, who was joined by Molotov and Zhdanov. There, according to Pieck’s private notes, the German comrades were told that their ZK must ‘come out into the open’ and issue a ‘manifesto’. Its purpose would be to promote the KPD as the nucleus of a unified ‘party of the workers’ capable of enlisting support from other groups, such as the ‘working peasants’ and the ‘intellectuals’. Confirming previous Soviet instructions, Stalin reminded the German comrades that their main task would be to guide the ‘anti-fascist struggle’ towards the ‘completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution’.62 The Kremlin’s decision to raise the stakes in the battle for long-term control over Germany appears to have been prompted by mounting concern over the policies of Britain and the United States. On 1 March 1945, Pieck had warned fellow comrades that the Western Allies would seek to create ‘a counterweight against the growing influence of the S[oviet] U[nion]’ by allowing ‘reformist’ SPD and trade union leaders in their zones ‘to regain influence among the workers—at the expense of the communists’.63 Shortly afterwards, on 12 April 1945, Soviet hopes for a common Allied policy towards post-war Germany had suffered a heavy blow through the death of President Roosevelt, whose pro-Soviet leanings had been regarded by communists as a safeguard against hostile American designs.64 There was an uneasy feeling in Moscow that 62 ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. See also, Jochen Laufer, ‘ ‘‘Genossen, wie ist das Gesamtbild?’’: Ackermann, Ulbricht und Sobottka in Moskau im Juni 1945’, DA 29/3 (1996), 355–71. Most historians initially assumed that Pieck personally attended the meeting and that the notes represent a verbatim record of Stalin’s remarks. (See Dietrich Staritz, ‘Die SED, Stalin und die Gru¨ndung der DDR’, 3–16. Rolf Badstu¨bner, ‘ ‘‘Beratungen’’ ’, 99–116. Manfred Wilke, ‘ ‘‘Es wird zwei Deutschlands geben’’: Entscheidung u¨ber die Zusammensetzung der Kader. Eine Niederschrift Piecks u¨ber ein Treffen Stalins mit der KPD-Fu¨hrung’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 March 1991, 6.) However, there is strong evidence to suggest that Pieck, who still lived in Moscow at the time, was not present at the meeting, but was afterwards briefed about its proceedings by the leaders of the three Initiative Groups. (See Gu¨nter Benser, ‘Quellenvero¨ffentlichungen ja, doch so pra¨zis wie mo¨glich: Einwa¨nde gegen Interpretationen von Stalins Direktiven an KPD und SED’, Utopie kreativ 11/1991, 101–7). For further details on this debate, see Heinrich Bodensieck, ‘Wilhelm Piecks Moskauer Aufzeichnungen vom ‘‘4./6. 45’’: Ein Schlu¨sseldokument fu¨r Stalins Deutschlandpolitik?’, Studien zur Geschichte der SBZ/DDR, ed. by Alexander Fischer (Berlin, 1993), 38–41. 63 ‘ ‘‘Probleme des Kampfes fu ¨ r ein neues Deutschland’’—Handschriftliche Disposition Wilhelm Piecks’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 371. 64 Robert H. McNeil, Stalin: Man and Ruler (London, 1988), 250–1.


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Soviet- and Western-occupied Germany might eventually drift apart. It was voiced by Stalin when, at his meeting with the heads of the three Initiative Groups, he hinted ominously: ‘there will be 2 Germanies— notwithstanding the unity between the Allies’.65 Stalin’s remark has been cited in support of the view that, as early as 1945, the division of Germany was a Soviet goal.66 However, according to Pieck’s notes, the Soviet dictator was referring to a ‘prospect’ rather than a plan.67 Outlining his views on the German Question, Stalin explained that a ‘plan for German dismemberment’, providing for a ‘division into North and South Germany’ (‘Rhineland—Bavaria with Austria’), had been proposed by Britain and the United States. His evident concern over Western efforts to create ‘governments for Bavaria, Thuringia, Rhineland-Palatinate, [and the] Rhineland’ suggests that he suspected the Western Allies of secretly carrying out the dismemberment plans discussed at Teheran in 1943, when Churchill and Roosevelt had proposed two different schemes for German dismemberment, both of which aimed at isolating Prussia and splitting up the remaining German territories into various smaller states in the North and South.68 To counter the developments in the Western zones, Stalin ordered the creation of provincial governments in the East, and, in early July 1945, three La¨nder (Saxony, Mecklenburg, and Thuringia) as well as two provinces (Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg, both of which were converted into La¨nder in early 1947) were established in the SBZ, each headed by a German administration. However, the Soviet dictator stopped short of taking any decision likely to rule out German unity, advising the German comrades that it was ‘not yet clear’ whether a central German authority would eventually be created for the SBZ.69 Far from favouring such a solution, Stalin was evidently convinced that it would be both advantageous and feasible to establish a unified German state. To be sure, he himself had briefly toyed with the idea of German dismemberment and even proposed it to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, who had visited him in Moscow in December 1941.70 65

‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. Manfred Wilke, ‘ ‘‘Es wird zwei Deutschlands geben’’ ’, 6. ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. 68 Teheran—Jalta—Potsdam: Die sowjetischen Protokolle von den Kriegskonferenzen der ‘Großen Drei’, ed. by Alexander Fischer (Cologne, 1968), 84–6. 69 ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. On the establishment of the La¨nder in the SBZ, see Barbara Fait, ‘Landesregierungen und -verwaltungen’, SBZ-Handbuch, 73–9. 70 Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs, Vol. 2: The Reckoning (London, 1965), 322–41. 66 67

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Yet, since then, his enthusiasm for such an extreme solution had cooled. At his meeting with the heads of the three Initiative Groups, whom he told—somewhat disingenuously—that he had always opposed Western dismemberment plans, he insisted that there was no alternative to a united Germany, stressing that ‘German unity’ must be secured ‘through [a] unified KPD—[a] unified ZK—[a] unified party of the workers’.71 His plans may have reflected the view, expressed to Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran, that German dismemberment could not be maintained indefinitely in the face of the German people’s desire to reunite.72 On the assumption that German national unity would eventually prevail, Stalin was bound to conclude that the best strategy for the Soviet Union would be to harness German patriotic sentiments by posing as a champion of the German people and its legitimate national aims. Soviet efforts to implement such a strategy were already under way. At Yalta, in early 1945, Soviet officials had strongly supported the principle of dismemberment, securing a reference to it in the Allied terms of surrender. But they had subsequently changed their position and effectively scuppered the interAllied ‘Dismemberment Commission’ set up at the conference by announcing, on 26 March 1945, that they did not regard the conference’s decision on German dismemberment as an obligatory plan.73 At the same time, they had adopted a more conciliatory tone in their pronouncements on Germany’s future and ostentatiously silenced Ilya Ehrenburg, the most strident anti-German voice raised in the Soviet Union during the war.74 In a victory address to the Soviet people delivered on 9 May 1945, a day after the holding of a second ceremony of surrender at the Red Army’s Berlin headquarters, Stalin himself had declared that the Soviet Union had ‘no intention to dismember or destroy Germany’.75 Converted by Ackermann into a formal Aufruf, and approved by Stalin at another meeting with the heads of the three Initiative Groups, this time in the presence of Pieck,76 the KPD’s new programme as ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. Heinrich Bodensieck, ‘Moskauer Aufzeichnungen’, 44. As an explanation for Moscow’s sudden about-turn, Lothar Kettenacker has suggested that, far from favouring German dismemberment, Soviet officials were interested in the idea only as a re-insurance against a separate peace in the West. See Lothar Kettenacker, Krieg zur Friedenssicherung: Die Deutschlandplanung der britischen Regierung wa¨hrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Go¨ttingen, 1989), 494–502. 74 William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 173–4. Manfred Zeidler, Kriegsende im 75 Quoted in Boris Meissner, Rußland, 57. Osten, 113–24, 155–67. 76 ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. Recalling the event, Pieck later noted: ‘7. 6./[meeting] with Stalin/completion of the Aufruf’, undated notes, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/23. 71 72 73


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outlined by the Kremlin was finally issued on 11 June 1945 to mark the party’s official return to the German political arena.77 A few days before, on 5 June, the Allied commanders-in-chief had gathered in Berlin and assumed supreme authority in Germany, to be exercised individually, in their respective zones of occupation, and jointly, via the Allied Control Council (ACC) (whose decisions were to be unanimous), ‘in matters affecting Germany as a whole’.78 No sooner had the Allied control machinery been established than British and American troops began to pull out of their ceasefire positions inside the designated Soviet zone while preparing to take over their Berlin sectors from the Red Army, which, until then, had occupied the German capital on its own. On 11 July, an inter-Allied Kommandatura assumed control over the administration of Berlin following the arrival in the city of the British and American garrisons. Shortly afterwards, the EAC finally reached agreement on the zonal protocol, which had been amended to provide for the inclusion of France in the occupation regime, and on 30 July the first meeting of the quadripartite ACC was held in Berlin.79 Throughout this period of transition, however, the Soviet Union had retained the initiative in shaping Germany’s political future by becoming the first Allied power to readmit German political organizations. Announced in the famous ‘Order No. 2’, on 10 June 1945, the readmission of political parties in Berlin and the SBZ came only one day after the establishment of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD).80 Set up in accordance with inter-Allied agreements to assume the functions of military government previously exercised by the local Red Army commanders, the SMAD was the supreme Allied authority in the SBZ and the linchpin of Soviet control over Germany’s post-war development. In the latter role, the SMAD was responsible for guiding the KPD towards attainment of its Soviet-ordained goals, not least by acting as a conduit for the Kremlin’s instructions to the KPD leadership. Orders, often issued by Stalin himself, were relayed to the SMAD by wire 77 The declaration was published in the first issue of the KPD’s official newspaper, Deutsche Volkszeitung, on 13 June 1945, having been read out in the late hours of the previous day in a broadcast by Radio Berlin. See ‘Nach Hitler’, 123. 78 Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945–1954, selected and ed. by Beate Ruhm v. Oppen (London, 1955), 29–37. See also Gunther Mai, Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945–1948: Alliierte Einheit—deutsche Teilung? (Mu¨nchen, 1995), 40–9. 79 Tony Sharp, Alliance, 165–203. Gunther Mai, ‘Deutschlandpolitische Entscheidungen im Alliierten Kontrollrat 1945–1948’, Die deutsche Frage, 29–38. 80 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 20–4. Jan Foitzik, Sowjetische Milita ¨ radministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945–1949: Struktur und Funktion (Berlin, 1999), 97–114.

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or telephone before being passed on to the German comrades at high-level bilateral meetings.81 Following his return to Germany, on 1 July 1945, Pieck was a regular guest at the SMAD’s headquarters in the Berlin borough of Karlshorst. The same was true for the tireless Ulbricht, who was especially anxious to ensure that all SMAD directives were faithfully carried out.82 Strengthening the close collaboration between the German comrades and their Soviet minders at the SMAD was a history of mutual contacts reaching back to the height of the war. Thus the members of the SMAD’s ‘Department of Information’ had been recruited mainly from the GlavPURKKA and many of them, including their influential head, Colonel S. I. Tiulpanov, had been closely acquainted with Pieck, Ulbricht, and Ackermann since their joint involvement in the founding of the NKFD.83 Indeed, despite their lack of formal authority and dependence on Soviet backing, Pieck and his colleagues were not without means of influencing the SMAD. As members of the KPD’s Moscowtrained e´lite, they enjoyed the trust of their Soviet counterparts, who often took them into their confidence and, it seems, treated them almost as equals. Pieck, in particular, commanded genuine respect in Karlshorst because of his charisma and former role within the Comintern.84 Soviet officials and their KPD allies were aware that the absence of anti-communist opposition encountered by the Initiative Groups was unlikely to endure and that more testing times lay ahead for the German communists. Pieck warned his colleagues on his return from Moscow that their struggle was far from won: Nearly all the reactionaries, not just the utterly discredited Nazi bigwigs, have currently gone to ground, but they are unlikely to remain there for long. They 81 Stefan Creuzberger, Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht und das politische System der SBZ (Cologne, 1996), 40–1. Michael Kubina, ‘Der Aufbau des zentralen Parteiapparates der KPD 1945–1946’, Anatomie der Parteizentrale, 102–107. The SMAD was directly responsible to both the CPSU(b)’s Politburo and the Soviet government, the Council of People’s Commissars. See Gu¨nter Benser, Die KPD im Jahre der Befreiung: Vorbereitung und Aufbau der legalen Kommunistischen Massenpartei (Jahreswende 1944/1945 bis Herbst 1945) (Berlin, 1985), 140–1. 82 Franz Dahlem, Erinnerungen, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SGY 30/1078. Wolfgang Leonhard, ‘Der Anfang vom Ende aus betrachtet: Gespra¨ch mit Wolfgang Leonhard’, LiLi Korrespondenz 1991, 48–50. 83 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 322–27. See also Sergej I. Tiulpanov, Deutschland nach dem Kriege: 1945–1949. Erinnerungen eines Offiziers der Sowjetarmee (Berlin, 1986), 14–22, 42–3. 84 Peter Erler, ‘ ‘‘Moskau-Kader’’ ’, 234–35. Stefan Doernberg, ‘Zum Zusammenwirken von SMAD und KPD bzw. SED’, Zum deutschen Neuanfang 1945–1949: Tatsachen—Probleme—Ereignisse—Irrwege. Die Arbeiterbewegung und die Entstehung der beiden deutschen Staaten, ed. by Hans-Joachim Krusch (Bonn, 1993), 313–14.


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know just as well as we [do] what is at stake in the coming weeks and months, namely who will be calling the shots in the new Germany . . . .85

Similarly, Florin had warned the members of the Work Commission that, after the end of the war, the reactionary German bourgeoisie would try to reassert itself ‘under a new mask, regrouped and with new, untarnished leaders’.86 Mindful of their ambitious agenda, the German comrades were determined not to waste any time in carrying out their programme in the SBZ, so as to bring about lasting political change in at least one part of Germany before the window of opportunity created by Nazism’s collapse was to close. The implementation of the land reform is a case in point. Identified in the Action Programme as one of the KPD’s future priorities, and confirmed as such by Stalin on 4 June 1945,87 the campaign against the Junkers, the large East-Elbian landowners, became the focus of the KPD’s activities from August 1945, after the end of the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three. In September 1945, the communistdominated Land and provincial administrations, starting with SaxonyAnhalt, issued formal decrees for a land reform. At the same time, the KPD’s propaganda machine changed into top gear to generate public support for this measure and use it for the party’s own good. Although the communists had apparently hoped for greater enthusiasm on the part of the peasants, their efforts were not in vain. During the next few weeks all private landowners with more than 100 hectares lost their land, which was then used to create some 500,000 new peasant farms.88 Such was the determination of the émigre´ KPD cadres to change the balance of power in Germany that they ignored warnings by their own agricultural experts about the adverse effects an immediate land reform would have on the autumn harvest. Asked by V. S. Semenov, the highly influential political adviser to the Soviet

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Franz Dahlem, Erinnerungen, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, SGY 30/1078. ‘ ‘‘Die Lage und die Aufgaben in Deutschland’’ ’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 148. ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. 88 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 150–4. Arnd Bauerka ¨ mper, ‘Problemdruck und Ressourcenverbrauch: Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen der Bodenreform in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1952’, Wirtschaftliche Folgen des Krieges in der SBZ/ DDR, ed. by Christoph Buchheim (Baden-Baden, 1995), 298–302. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die UdSSR und die Einleitung der Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone’, ‘Junkerland in Bauernhand?’ Durchfu¨hrung, Auswirkungen und Stellenwert der Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone, ed. by Arnd Bauerka¨mper (Stuttgart, 1996), 21–35. 86 87

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commander-in-chief,89 what he thought about expert advice in favour of postponing the land reform, Pieck replied that such advice was ‘correct economically, but not from a political point of view’. He explained that too much was at stake to risk further delays, adding: ‘Time is short’.90 KPD ‘BLOC POLITICS ’ AND THE ROLE OF T H E NO N - C O M M UN I ST P A R T IE S The KPD’s bid for political leadership in post-Nazi Germany enjoyed a propitious start. A SMAD official dispatched to Moscow from Berlin told Pieck on 26 June 1945, two weeks after the official re-establishment of the KPD, that the party’s Aufruf had been ‘well received’. A confidential KPD memorandum would later conclude: ‘When the Aufruf of the Central Committee of the KP[D] was published on 11 June 1945, it was enthusiastically received in all sections of Berlin’s population. . . . Particularly strong was its impact on the Social Democratic Party.’91 Eschewing any reference to socialism and calling for a collective effort to eradicate Nazism, restore decent living conditions, and complete the bourgeois democratic revolution of 1848, this declaration had been carefully phrased with a view to disarming all potential opponents of the KPD. Rather than being a party political programme in the usual sense, the Aufruf was a platform for the so-called ‘Bloc of Anti-Fascist Democratic Parties’ set up on 14 July 1945, after the founding under Soviet auspices of the SPD, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—a new party for Protestants and Catholics whose aim was to replace the old Catholic Centre Party—and the small Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).92 Stefan Creuzberger, Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht, 34–5. ‘Besprechung mit Semjonow vom 28. 8. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 91 ‘Mitteilung von Oberstlt. Selesnow’, 26 June 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. ‘ZK-Kaderabteilung: ‘‘Bericht u¨ber das Verha¨ltnis KPD-SPD in Berlin’’ ’, October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631. 92 Gregory W. Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht, 45–53. Frederike Sattler, ‘Bu ¨ ndnispolitik als politisch-organisatorisches Problem des zentralen Parteiapparates der KPD 1945/46’, Anatomie der Parteizentrale, 136–43. Gerhard Keiderling, ‘Scheinpluralismus und Blockparteien: Die KPD und die Gru¨ndung der Parteien in Berlin 1945’, VfZG 45/ 2 (1997), 273–94. Gerhard Papke, ‘Die Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone und DDR 1945–1952’, Bu¨rgerliche Parteien in der SBZ/DDR: Zur Geschichte von CDU, LDP(D), DBD und NDPD 1945 bis 1953, ed. by Ju¨rgen Fro¨lich (Cologne, 1994), 25–45. Manfred Agethen, ‘Die CDU in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1953’, ibid., 47–72. 89 90


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In restoring the party spectrum of the Weimar Republic, the communists were guided by the belief that Germany’s traditional political milieus had survived the war and that, rather than hampering the re-establishment of the old parties, the KPD should seek to ‘reduce their mass appeal’.93 This was to be achieved by means of the AntiFascist Bloc, an embryonic legislative assembly in the popular-front mould which, operating as it did under a unanimity rule, ensured that no decisions could be taken against the KPD. Since none of the other parties dared to oppose the KPD for fear of being denounced as fascist, the Anti-Fascist Bloc effectively harnessed all parties to the communist transformation programme, thereby laying the groundwork for a communist-led German government based in Berlin. When the Potsdam Conference ended, in early August 1945, the prototype of such a government was already in place following the establishment in late July 1945 of eleven KPD-dominated German Central Administrations—for transport, information, energy, trade, industry, agriculture, finance, labour and social security, education, justice, and health. (Three more central administrations—for statistics, German refugees and internal affairs, and for sequestration and confiscation—were added between October 1945 and July 1946.)94 Soviet officials and their KPD allies were hoping that the reach of the new political institutions created in Berlin would not be confined to the SBZ.95 In doing so, they were encouraged by the Potsdam Agreement, which closely followed a draft American proposal whose wording was compatible with the KPD’s programme and, it seems, known to the Kremlin before the conference began.96 Under the terms of this agreement, Germany was to be subject to complete demilitarization and denazification, while preparations were to be made ‘for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis’. To this end, ‘democratic political parties’ were to be ‘allowed and encouraged 93

‘ ‘‘Die Lage und die Aufgaben in Deutschland’’ ’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 149. Bernd Niedbalski, ‘Deutsche Zentralverwaltungen und Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission (DWK): Ansa¨tze zur zentralen Wirtschaftsplanung in der SBZ 1945– 1948’, VfZG 33/3 (1985), 456–8. 95 According to Tiulpanov, Soviet officials regarded the Anti-Fascist Bloc as ‘an organ whose decisions were significant not only for the Soviet occupation zone, but for all zones’. Sergej I. Tjulpanow, ‘Die Rolle der Sowjetischen Milita¨radministration im demokratischen Deutschland’, 50 Jahre Triumph des Marxismus–Leninismus: Die Große Sozialistische Oktoberrevolution und die Entwicklung des Marxismus–Leninismus, ed. by the Parteihochschule ‘Karl Marx’ beim ZK der SED (Berlin, 1967), 56. See also, Richard C. Raack, ‘Stalin Plans his Post-war Germany’, Journal of Contemporary History 96 Rolf Badstu ¨ bner, ‘Zum Problem’, 581. 28/1 (1993), 53–73. 94

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throughout Germany’, while the German economy was to be ‘decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power . . . ’. Although the agreement made no reference to a central German government, it nevertheless provided for the creation of ‘certain essential central German administrative departments’ (in fields such as finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry) which were to operate ‘under the direction of the Control Council’.97 Since the communists thought that the Potsdam Agreement would hold and that it would constitute Germany’s post-war political framework, it was not unreasonable for them to assume that in moving towards an anti-fascist regime, the Western zones would eventually follow Berlin’s lead. Franz Dahlem, a member of the newly formed secretariat of the KPD’s ZK and one of the five most senior KPD figures, was confident that such a development would take place.98 Addressing a conference of KPD functionaries on 5 August 1945, he proclaimed: ‘What we have now achieved in the area occupied by the Soviet Union will be extended across the whole of Germany.’99 Underpinning these hopes was the belief that, as the party most consistently opposed to the regime that had made Nazism possible, the KPD would find itself in a strong position throughout Germany. Speaking at a conference of KPD functionaries from Berlin on 25 June 1945, Ulbricht suggested that, after the experience of the Third Reich, ‘millions of people’ were at last realizing the enormous dangers inherent in the ‘old imperialist approach’. He added that the KPD could also expect to benefit from the disastrous social consequences of Hitler’s war, which had ‘thrown middle-class men and women out of their normal way of life’.100 Similarly, Pieck had told fellow KPD émigre´s in March 1945 that the collapse of the Third Reich was a ‘great opportunity’ for the KPD. One reason for this was that German society had changed dramatically since 1933, especially as a result of the bourgeoisie 97 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS ): Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, Vol. II (Washington, DC, 1960), 1502–4. 98 The other members of the Secretariat were Pieck, Ulbricht, Ackermann, and Paul Merker. However, Merker did not return from exile in Mexico until mid-1946, so that the Secretariat was composed of only four de facto members during the nine months of its existence. See Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschland, Reihe 1945/1946, Vol. 1, 24. 99 ‘Protokoll der Konferenz verantwortlicher Parteiarbeiter (Mecklenburgs) am 5. 8. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209. 100 Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung: Aus Reden und Aufsa¨tzen, Vol. 2: 1933–1946 (Berlin, 1953), 439.


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having been ruined financially and women having entered the workforce en masse. The most powerful agent of political change, however, would be the disillusionment of the masses, not only with Nazism but also with the representatives of the old Weimar regime: Above all it will be the political experiences which the masses have had during that period [—] with the Hitler regime and the Nazi party, [but] also with the old bourgeois parties and [with] their leaders [—] that will strongly influence the political re-orientation of the masses and bring about [some] great surprises with regard to their party-political preferences.101

More specifically, there were hopes that the KPD would at last succeed in gaining the leadership of the working masses, the most progressive social class according to Marxist theory, by eclipsing its arch rival, the SPD. The idea of eliminating social democratic competition had been central to the communist popular-front strategy ever since its conception in the 1930s. Since then, however, the KPD’s assumptions about the strength the SPD would be able to muster in post-Nazi Germany had undergone a dramatic change. Towards the end of the war, leading communists were openly questioning whether the SPD would be able to reconstitute itself as a proper mass organization. Florin, addressing the Work Commission on 10 April 1944, was in no doubt: ‘We will be able’, he confidently predicted, ‘to prevent that.’102 Stalin seems to have been of a similar mind. According to Pieck, he told the heads of the three Initiative Groups on 4 June 1945 that the SPD was ‘extremely fragmented’, with a majority of its members being ‘in favour of [working class] unity’.103 The confusion surrounding the SPD’s return to the German political arena strengthened the KPD leaders in their belief that the one-time leading workers’ party would be an easy prey for a reconstructed KPD. Thus many social democrats were initially prepared to forgo the re-founding of their party in favour of the immediate creation of a unified workers’ party through a merger with the KPD. It was only in response to the KPD’s persistent rebuffs that a circle of senior social democrats in Berlin responded to the SMAD’s ‘Order No. 2’ by constituting themselves as the SPD’s Zentralausschuß (ZA) and releasing 101 ‘ ‘‘Politischorganisatorische Probleme beim Wiederaufbau der Partei’’—Handschriftliche Disposition Wilhelm Piecks’, ‘Nach Hitler ’, 377. 102 ‘ ‘‘Alle illegalen Parteien und Gruppen sollen sich rasch in einem Kampfblock vereinigen.’’—Handschriftliche Ausarbeitung Wilhelm Florins’, ibid., 160. 103 ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629.

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their founding declaration on 15 June 1945.104 Its content, with its commitment to sweeping nationalization, convinced Ulbricht that ‘the supporters of a strong anti-fascist bloc have decisive influence’. ‘They are trying’, he noted gleefully, ‘to appear more radical than we.’105 Further SPD appeals for an immediate amalgamation of the two parties met with a lukewarm response from the KPD, resulting only in a limited two-party arrangement, the so-called ‘Aktionseinheit’ (‘unity of action’), which involved regular bilateral meetings with the aim of preparing the ground for a future merger, and strongly favoured the more firmly established KPD.106 Communist hostility to the idea of an immediate merger has generally been attributed to tactical considerations. Thus historians have argued that, in the summer of 1945, the KPD leadership had yet to reassert its authority over the party’s rank and file as well as recruit and train new cadres, so as to get the better of the more loosely organized SPD and dominate a future unified party. They have also suggested that it was in the KPD’s interest to give the ZA more time to consolidate its leadership of the SPD throughout Germany to prevent that party from splitting when the final decision for unity would be made.107 These considerations were indeed cited as the KPD’s chief motives by Dahlem when he addressed KPD functionaries on 5 August 1945. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the KPD leaders were worried about their ability to control a merger in view of the greater numerical strength traditionally enjoyed by the SPD. Explaining why the KPD leadership had opted against the immediate creation of a unified workers’ party, contrary to the wishes of ‘many communists and social democrats in all parts of the country’, Dahlem stressed that the KPD’s reconstruction was still at an early stage. At the end of the war communists from different backgrounds had come together, ‘comrades, who have remained stuck in the attitudes of 1932/33, which were condemned by comrades Dimitrov and Pieck at the 7th World 104 Andreas Malycha, ‘Der Zentralausschuß der SPD und der gesellschaftliche Neubeginn im Nachkriegsdeutschland’, ZfG 38/1 (1990), 584–7. 105 ‘Telegramm von Walter Ulbricht vom 19. Juni 1945’ (to Pieck); SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. 106 Frederike Sattler, ‘Bu ¨ ndnispolitik als politisch-organisatorisches Problem’, 132–6. Manfred Teresiak, ‘Vor 50 Jahren: Verschmelzung von KPD und SPD. Das Projekt Berlin’, DA 29/2 (1996), 216–17. 107 For an overview of this debate, see Dietrich Staritz, ‘Zur Gru ¨ ndung der SED: Forschungsstand, Kontroversen, offene Fragen’, Einheitsfront—Einheitspartei: Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten in Ost- und Westeuropa 1944–1948, ed. by Dietrich Staritz and Hermann Weber (Cologne, 1989), 41–5.


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Congress, and comrades who understand the policies of today’, in particular ‘those comrades who [have] returned from the Soviet Union [and] who [have] had the best insights’. As a result, the party had yet to be forged into a stable and ideologically coherent unit as a prerequisite for leading the united front of the workers. As for the KPD’s main rival, Dahlem claimed that the SPD was in a ‘pitiful state’. However, while he expressed the view that ‘absorbing the left-wing social democrats would be easy’, he gave a warning that such a move would fall short of eliminating the SPD because some social democrats were still advocating ‘an anti-Soviet, anti-communist policy’.108 When these comments were made, in late summer 1945, the period of swift KPD victories ushered in by the arrival of the Initiative Groups was drawing to a close. A first stocktaking memorandum, drafted by Dahlem on 16 October, concluded that the KPD had firmly established itself as the dominant political force in the SBZ while the other parties had been ‘hesitant’ and ‘passive’, but warned: ‘This phase of events is [now] over.’109 Indeed, there were signs that an anti-communist backlash was under way. At a meeting with General F. E. Bokov, a leading member of the SMAD’s Military Council who had titular responsibility for political developments in the SBZ,110 Pieck complained about growing opposition to the KPD in Berlin: ‘Difficulty— enemies are on the move.’111 Dahlem believed that the KPD’s opponents had been encouraged by the Western Allies, who were purging the administrations in their Berlin sectors of communist sympathizers and who were ‘openly striving to annul and reverse the positions won by the workers during the first few months of Soviet occupation’.112 More alarmingly, there were signs that the KPD’s campaign for working-class unity was losing momentum. Dahlem warned: ‘[Here] in Berlin we can see a hardening of the resistance within the united front among the middle-ranking SPD functionaries against closer co-operation with the KPD . . . ’. While suggesting that this was partly due to recent events in other countries, such as the ‘victory of the Labour Party’ 108 ‘Protokoll der Konferenz verantwortlicher Parteiarbeiter (Mecklenburgs) am 5. 8. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209. 109 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209. 110 Stefan Creuzberger, Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht, 32–3. Jan Foitzik, Sowjetische Milita¨radministration, 114–17. 111 ‘Gespra ¨ch mit Bockow am 25. 9. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 112 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209.

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in the 1945 British general elections, he conceded that some developments in the SBZ were also to blame, in particular the ‘current wave of popular dissatisfaction with the excesses of Red Army troops’.113 The orgy of rape and pillage with which Soviet troops had celebrated their victory had created enormous resentment among the German population which more than offset the popularity the Red Army had gained in some areas by helping to restore food supplies and public order.114 Adding to German bitterness, especially among the workers, was the mass dismantling of factories by Soviet reparations brigades that had begun immediately after the end of the fighting, in some cases affecting plants that had only just been restored to operation by the workers themselves.115 As the party most closely associated with the occupying power, the KPD was automatically held responsible for unpopular Soviet actions, all the more since it was unwilling to criticize them in public. The conclusion drawn by many social democrats, according to Dahlem, was that the KPD had been disgraced by the behaviour of the Red Army and that the SPD would be well advised to enter future elections ‘unburdened by too close a relationship with the KPD’.116 Another social democratic grievance was the preferential treatment accorded to the KPD by the SMAD. Although the Soviet military authorities had actively supported the re-founding of the SPD, in some cases ordering unity-minded social democrats who had joined the KPD to resign their membership and help in the re-establishment of their former party, it was clear that Soviet occupation policy was heavily biased in favour of the KPD. Not only was the SPD powerless to prevent the KPD from assuming the key posts in the new administrations but it was also forced to accept KPD leadership in the various anti-fascist mass organizations established during the summer of 1945. Of the five regional chairmen of the Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB), the unified trade union organization, four were members of the KPD, while the Cultural League, an organization for intellectuals, 113 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAMPO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209. 114 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 69–140. Manfred Zeidler, Kriegsende im Osten, 143–54. Gerhard Keiderling, ‘ ‘‘Als Befreier unsere Herzen zerbrachen’’: Zu den ¨ bergriffen der Sowjetarmee in Berlin 1945’, DA 28/3 (1995), 234–43. U 115 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 178–83. Rainer Karlsch, ‘ ‘‘Arbeiter, schu ¨ tzt Eure Betriebe!’’ Widerstand gegen Demontagen in der SBZ’, IWK 30/3 (1994), 380–404. Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt? Die Reparationsleistungen der SBZ/DDR 1945– 1953 (Berlin, 1993), 55–63. 116 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209.


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had no social democratic founding members at all.117 There was massive inequality in the allocation of transport and publishing facilities, with the KPD newspapers leading those of the other parties in everything from size of format to circulation.118 The consequence was growing resentment among the SPD functionaries, summed up in their complaint: ‘the KPD has pulled us over the barrel’.119 Meanwhile, the KPD’s relationship with the bourgeois parties had also taken a turn for the worse. Dahlem commented: ‘As a result of the growth in propaganda by the Western occupation authorities, and parallel to the hardening of relations between the KPD and the SPD in Berlin, grass roots co-operation with the bourgeois parties has also come to a halt.’120 Much of the tension was the result of disagreements over the economic transformation initiated by the KPD, in particular over its cornerstone, the land reform. The bourgeois parties accepted the need for a land reform but were opposed to the sequestration of land without compensation, as demanded by the KPD. The dispute was eventually resolved in the KPD’s favour through the intervention of the SMAD, whose pressure on the bourgeois parties led to the resignation of LDP chairman, Waldemar Koch, and the dismissal of Andreas Hermes and Walther Schreiber, the two joint leaders of the CDU, before the end of the year.121 Further problems for the KPD had arisen within the party itself. Since July 1945, the KPD had been holding weekly training sessions for all its members in an effort to acquaint the party’s rank and file with the new communist line and eliminate latent sectarian deviations.122 Yet the old communist stalwarts who had joined the KPD before 1933, and who still accounted for the majority of its members, were woefully slow to come round,123 unable to make sense of a communist policy that 117 Gerhard Keiderling, ‘Wir sind die Staatspartei’, 249–62. The FDGB’s Mecklenburg organization was initially headed by a social democrat, but in November 1945 he, too, was replaced by a communist. See Werner Mu¨ller, ‘Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB)’, SBZ-Handbuch, 650. 118 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 495. Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre mit Ulbricht (Cologne, 1966), 88. 119 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 120 Ibid. 4072/209. 121 Frederike Sattler, ‘Bu ¨ ndnispolitik als politisch-organisatorisches Problem’, 160–6. Alexander Fischer, ‘Andreas Hermes und die gesamtdeutschen Anfa¨nge der Union’, Die Ost-CDU: Beitra¨ge zu ihrer Entstehung und Entwicklung, ed. by Michael Richter and Martin Rissmann (Cologne, 1995), 9–23. Manfred Koch, ‘Blockpolitik und Parteiensystem in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1950’, PolZG B37/1984, 8–9. 122 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 514–15. 123 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 36.

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forbade the wearing of the red star and publicly advocated the ‘totally unfettered development of free trade and private entrepreneurial initiative’.124 Dahlem was forced to conclude that the existing ‘lack of trust in the honesty’ of the KPD’s policies was fuelled, at least in part, by ‘the sectarianism which still exists in our party, which has not yet been overcome and which sometimes bursts forth’.125 Compounding the KPD’s difficulties were signs of growing assertiveness on the part of the ZA. The leading circle of social democrats in Berlin—formed around Otto Grotewohl, Erich Gniffke, Gustav Dahrendorf, and Max Fechner—had initially posed no threat to the KPD’s ambitions. Eager to distance itself from what was seen as the failed policies of the pre-1933 SPD, the ZA strongly supported the idea of working-class unity and at least three of its members—Fechner, Dahrendorf, and Gniffke—were known to share the KPD’s desire to move Germany towards an Eastern orientation.126 Nor did the ZA carry much political weight at a time when, in the summer of 1945, the SPD was still lacking a coherent party organization upon which its authority might have been based. A few months later, however, the situation had changed. By early September 1945, the ZA had consolidated its leadership of the SPD in the SBZ, while its authority had been boosted by a massive increase in the party’s membership, which now exceeded that of the originally much faster growing KPD.127 There were signs that the ZA was becoming increasingly unwilling to follow the KPD’s lead. An internal KPD memorandum on the development of 124 Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschland, Reihe 1945/1946: Vol. 1, 231. 125 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209. 126 See Henry Krisch, German Politics under Soviet Occupation (New York, 1974), 61–71. For the claim that Fechner supported ‘an unequivocal orientation towards the policies of the S[oviet] U[nion’, see ‘ZK-Kaderabteilung: ‘‘Bericht u¨ber das Verha¨ltnis KPD-SPD in Berlin’’ ’, October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631. Dahrendorf allegedly told a KPD member working for the Magistrat that to him and Gniffke there was ‘no alternative to a conscious orientation towards the East . . . ’. See ‘Bericht u¨ber eine Unterredung mit Gustav Dahrendorf vom Zentralausschuß der SPD am 23. 9. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631. 127 Gerhard Keiderling, ‘Wir sind die Staatspartei ’, 486–9. Frank Moraw, Die Parole der ‘Einheit’ und die Sozialdemokratie: Zur parteiorganisatorischen und gesellschaftspolitschen Orientierung der SPD in der Periode der Illegalita¨t und der ersten Phase der Nachkriegszeit 1933–1948 (Bonn, 1973), 80–92. By the end of October 1945, SPD membership in the Soviet zone stood at 302,400, compared with 248,900 for the KPD. See Werner Mu¨ller, ‘KPD’, 458. Werner Mu¨ller, ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)’, SBZ-Handbuch; 479.


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the SPD warned: ‘The ideological development within the Social Democratic Party . . . is characterized by numerous vacillations.’128

KP D– SP D F US I ON I N T HE S OV IET ZO NE In the autumn of 1945, the changes that had taken place in the relationship between the two parties gave rise to a new KPD policy towards the SPD. The turning-point was a speech by Otto Grotewohl, given on 14 September, which openly challenged the KPD’s claim to political leadership in Germany by describing the SPD as a ‘lens . . . that serves as a focus for the aspirations of the other parties and political persuasions in Germany’. Pieck, who was attending the SPD rally as a guest, responded by calling for the creation of a unified workers’ party ‘in order to complete the tasks which we have begun’,129 and two weeks later, on 28 September, the secretariat of the KPD’s ZK took a formal decision to step up the unity campaign.130 The KPD did not easily abandon its opposition to quick amalgamation. For most of the autumn, its prescriptions for working-class unity remained firmly rooted in the established framework of cross-party collaboration. However, new developments soon brought the issue of unity to a head. Foremost among them was another address by Grotewohl, which carried the ZA’s bid for autonomy to new heights, promptly triggering a Soviet ban on its publication. Speaking on 11 November 1945, at a packed rally commemorating the failed revolution of 1918, Grotewohl insisted that organizational fusion was acceptable only at national level and after the proper establishment of the two parties on a nationwide basis, a condition that stood no chance of rapid fulfilment.131 The prospect of a long delay in the desired merger alarmed the KPD leaders, especially in view of the weakness of the Austrian communists, 128 Untitled ZK memorandum, 17 November 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631. 129 Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, Gru ¨ ndung, 113–14. See also Wolfgang Triebel, Otto Grotewohls Weg in die Einheitspartei: Hintergru¨nde und Zusammenha¨nge. Eine Betrachtung seines politischen Denkens und Handelns zwischen Mai 1945 und April 1946 (Berlin, 1993), 25–9. 130 Hans-Joachim Krusch, ‘Fu ¨ r eine neue Offensive: Zur Septemberberatung 1945 der KPD’, BzG 22/3 (1980), 349–60. 131 Markus Jodl, Amboß oder Hammer? Otto Grotewohl. Eine politische Biographie (Berlin, 1997), 118–19. Andreas Malycha, ‘ ‘‘Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders!’’: Rede Otto Grotewohls am 11. November 1945’, BzG 34/2 (1992), 167–84.

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who had won only 4 seats in their country’s recent elections (as opposed to 76 seats for the social democrats). There were fears that the German communists might suffer a similar fate, captured in Pieck’s reference to a ‘danger—Austria’.132 Indeed, as Wolfgang Leonhard recalls, it was after the Austrian de´baˆcle, which had taken the KPD by complete surprise, that the great unity campaign began in Berlin.133 The KPD leaders were deeply unhappy about the prospect of a merger whose scope would be confined, at least initially, to the SBZ. Pondering on the dilemma faced by his party, Pieck jotted: We want to work with all our hearts for [the achievement of working-class] unity throughout the country. [The] merger [must] not [take place] zonally, only throughout the entire Reich . . . only if this takes up too much time will we probably content ourselves for the time being with the achievement of [working-class] unity in only one part [of Germany] . . . 134

In fact, the choice had already been made for the KPD by the apparently unstoppable rise of a fervently anti-communist SPD in Western Germany. That rise had begun during the summer of 1945 when, parallel to the establishment of the ZA, Kurt Schumacher’s office in Hanover emerged as the unofficial headquarters of the fledgling (and still unlicensed) SPD in the Western zones.135 In contrast to the KPD, which managed to unite all its party organizations behind the ZK by August 1945, the SPD was thus effectively split, with the ZA’s authority being limited to the SBZ. Grotewohl’s plan to turn a Berlin-led SPD into Germany’s dominant political force was doomed when, at a conference in the Hanover suburb of Wennigsen in early October 1945, he agreed to a compromise which formally recognized the existence of two SPD leaderships until the time when a national party congress would be held.136 What was more, 132 ‘Information von Walter Ulbricht u ¨ ber ein Gespra¨ch mit Bockow, Tulpanow, Wolkow am 22. 12. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 133 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 525. 134 Private notes by Wilhelm Pieck, December 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/639. 135 Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei: Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945 bis 1965 (Berlin, 1982), 39–54. Ulla Plener, ‘Kurt Schumacher und die Einheitspartei 1945/46’, BzG 39/1 (1997), 8–13. Peter Mersburger, ‘Kurt Schumacher und der Kommunismus’, Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten nach Nationalsozialismus und Krieg: Zur historischen Einordnung der Zwangsvereinigung, ed. by Bernd Faulenbach and Heinrich Potthoff (Essen, 1998), 69–81. Peter Merseburger, Der schwierige Deutsche: Kurt Schumacher. Eine Biographie (Stuttgart, 1996), 195–236. 136 Lucio Caracciolo, ‘Der Untergang der Sozialdemokratie in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone: Otto Grotewohl und die ‘‘Einheit der Arbeiterklasse’’ 1945/46’, VfGZ


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Schumacher’s growing popularity and influence in the Western zones forced the ZA to adopt a more reserved attitude towards the KPD. As a result, there was a growing feeling among the KPD leaders that the ZA was drifting towards the right. An internal KPD memorandum warned Leading exponents of social democracy such as Grotewohl, Fechner, and Dahrendorf, who prior to this conference . . . had reacted very positively to the question of unity-of-action between the socialist parties and [who] had also expressed their support for the closest possible co-operation with the Soviet Union, are refusing to give a clear answer after the conference.137

The KPD’s response to this unexpected development was to call for a meeting of thirty representatives of both parties to discuss closer co-operation. Held on 20 and 21 December 1945, this ‘Conference of the Sixty’ paved the way for the demise of the SPD in the SBZ. On the first day of its proceedings the conference was close to failure when Grotewohl, speaking on behalf of the ZA, presented the KPD leaders with a catalogue of complaints. Yet Grotewohl’s criticism was tempered by a firm commitment to working-class unity, and on the following day the SPD delegates, swayed by a mixture of communist blandishments and pressure, endorsed in principle a draft programme for amalgamation submitted by the KPD, creating the impression that KPD–SPD fusion was imminent in the SBZ.138 There has been some speculation among historians that the sudden intensification of the unity campaign was ordered by the SMAD, which was under instructions to assist the KPD in the establishment of working-class unity.139 However, in bringing the issue of unity to a head at the December conference, the KPD seems to have overstepped the limits for action set by Karlshorst. When Ulbricht, known as the ‘engine of the party’,140 met Bokov on 22 December 1945, he was told that the KPD must tread 36/2 (1988), 295–301. Andreas Malycha, ‘Der Zentralausschuß, Kurt Schumacher und die Einheit der SPD’, BzG 33/2 (1991), 182–93. Manfred Wilke, ‘Schumachers sozialdemokratischer Fu¨hrungsanspruch und die Gru¨ndung der SED’, Anatomie der Parteizentrale, 213–28. 137 Untitled ZK memorandum, 17 November 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631. 138 Henry Krisch, German Politics, 128–44. Gerhard Keiderling, ‘Wir sind die Staatspartei ’, 481–6. Albrecht Kaden, Einheit oder Freiheit? Die Wiedergru¨ndung der SPD 1945/46 (Hanover, 1964), 205–32. Einheitsdrang oder Zwangsvereinigung? Die Sechziger Konferenzen von KPD und SPD 1945 und 1946, ed. with an intro. by HansJoachim Krusch and Andreas Malycha (Berlin, 1990), 19–22. 139 See Dietrich Staritz, ‘Zur Gru ¨ ndung’, 46–7. 140 Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow: Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission 1939–1991 (Berlin, 1995), 246.

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more cautiously ‘because of the [Western] Allies’. Similarly, Marshal G. K. Zhukov, the Soviet commander-in-chief and the head of the SMAD, told Pieck and Ulbricht on 26 December that he did not believe the time for a merger was ripe. There was unveiled criticism of the KPD’s handling of the December conference when the KPD leaders were asked ‘why’ the question of a merger between the two workers’ parties had been brought up and ‘whether [an] agreement on this matter [had been reached] with M[oscow]’.141 If, in December 1945, the KPD leaders had been pressing for fusion without formal Soviet consent, they were soon given the green light. On 23 January 1946, the SMAD ordered that the ‘merger between the two working class parties’ be speeded up. The KPD leaders, who had been warned only four weeks before that a merger in four months’ time would be ‘premature’, were now told that 1 May, Labour Day, would be an appropriate date for unification.142 The SMAD’s new line originated in Moscow, where Ulbricht travelled for further instructions at the end of the month. It was there that the fate of the Soviet-zone SPD was sealed when, at a meeting with Ulbricht on 6 February 1946, Stalin announced: ‘merger approved—line correct’. The name of the new party was to be ‘Socialist Unity Party of Germany’.143 Meanwhile, the unity campaign was entering its final phase with a concerted KPD–SMAD effort to bring about unity from below. On 1 February 1946, Pieck learned that the Red Army commanders had been instructed to enforce organizational fusion at local level.144 In the following weeks, local SPD organizations were subjected to ceaseless harassment by the SMAD, while the KPD was organizing hundreds of joint KPD–SPD rallies demanding fusion at the earliest possible date.145 The KPD’s assumption had always been that support for unity was strongest 141 ‘Information von Walter Ulbricht u ¨ ber ein Gespra¨ch mit Bockow, Tulpanow, Wolkow am 22. 12. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. ‘Besprechung am 26. 12. 45 in Babelsberg mit Marsch.’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/740. 142 ‘Besprechung am 23. 1. 1946 um 4 Uhr in Karlshorst bei Marsch. Bockow ’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. ‘Information von Walter Ulbricht u¨ber ein Gespra¨ch mit Bockow, Tjulpanow, Wolkow am 22. 12. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 143 ‘Bericht Walter Ulbrichts u ¨ ber eine Beratung bei Stalin am 6. 2. 1946 um 9 Uhr abends’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631. Ulbricht left for Moscow on 28 January and returned to Berlin on 6 February 1946. See Pieck’s diary entry: ‘Aus dem Kalender 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 144 ‘Besprechung am 1. 2. in Karlshorst bei Bockow’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 145 Lucio Caracciolo, ‘Der Untergang’, 307–10. Andreas Malycha, ‘Sozialdemokratie und sowjetische Besatzungsmacht’, Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten, 101–5.


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at the SPD’s grass roots. In his stocktaking memorandum of 16 October 1945, Dahlem had expressed the belief ‘that the mass of both the social democratic factory workers and the ordinary social democratic members in the residential areas are in favour of [working-class] unity . . . ’. Consequently, the KPD targeted its campaign at the SPD’s rank and file, encouraged by the experience ‘that at joint functionaries’ meetings and in particular at joint members’ meetings or educational evenings many SPD members embraced our ideological positions’.146 A central plank of the KPD’s campaign was the party’s struggle for control of the FDGB, described by Pieck as the ‘most pressing issue apart from the land reform’.147 Having failed in the summer of 1945 to secure total control of the trade unions, traditionally dominated by the SPD, the KPD now launched an intensive campaign for its trade-union policies, effectively turning the scheduled FDGB leadership elections into a referendum on working-class unity.148 The road to unity was finally cleared, from the KPD’s point of view, when a central FDGB conference for the SBZ (9–11 February 1946) passed a resolution in favour of fusion. Wolfgang Leonhard recalls being told by a jubilant fellow comrade that the die had been cast: ‘The trade union conference has made the decision. The merger will take place on the evening of 22 April.’149 In this situation, and after two days of turbulent discussions as well as a highly controversial vote, the ZA finally passed a motion calling for KPD–SPD fusion to be consummated on Easter Sunday (22 April). The scene was thus set for the final act. In keeping with a prearranged schedule agreed on 26 February 1946 at a second Conference of the Sixty, separate KPD and SPD congresses were held in all provinces of the SBZ on 6 and 7 April 1946, followed on 19 and 20 April by separate party congresses for the entire zone, and, on 21 and 22 April, a unification congress which formally constituted the new party—the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED—with a symbolic handshake between Pieck and Grotewohl.150 The only cloud over the KPD’s successful coup in the SBZ was the emergence of an autonomous 146 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209. 147 ‘Gespra ¨ch mit Bockow am 25. 9. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 148 Gregory W. Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht, 134–55. Gerhard Keiderling, ‘Wir sind die Staatspartei ’, 249–56, 293–301. 149 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 531. 150 Henry Krisch, German Politics, 174–99. Andreas Malycha, ‘Sozialdemokraten und die Gru¨ndung der SPD: Gleichschaltung und Handlungsspielraüme’, DA 29/2 (1996), 205–9. Manfred Teresiak, ‘Vor 50 Jahren’, 222–6.

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SPD in Berlin which constituted itself in the Western sectors, and, using the protection afforded by four-power rule, quickly extended its operations into the city’s Eastern half (where it managed to exist side by side with the SED until 1961).151 THE ‘SPECIAL GERMAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM’ There is overwhelming evidence, now recognized even by former East German scholars, that the founding of the SED took place under extreme duress.152 In 1961, Erich Ollenhauer, the then chairman of the SPD, estimated that between December 1945 and April 1946 at least 20,000 social democrats had become victims of the communist unity campaign by being harassed, imprisoned, or even killed.153 However, there is little doubt that the KPD’s bid for a socialist unity party, a goal first mentioned at the Berne Conference in 1939, was crucially assisted by a genuine desire for working-class unity on the part of the social democrats, many of whom believed that Hitler might have been stopped but for the schism of the German left. Indeed, it would seem that the attitude of the regional SPD chairmen, who, in early February 1946, threatened the ZA with rebellion in the event of it refusing to consummate fusion, owed less to communist pressure than to a belief in working-class unity as a socialist ideal.154 151 Beatrix Bouvier, Ausgeschaltet: Sozialdemokraten in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone und in der DDR 1945–1953 (Bonn, 1996), 62–8. Manfred Rexin, Die SPD in OstBerlin 1946–1961 (2nd edn., Berlin, 1989), 2–3. 152 Beatrix Bouvier, ‘Die Zwangsvereinigung von SPD und KPD und die Folgen fu ¨r die Sozialdemokratie’, Zwangsvereinigung? Zur Debatte u¨ber den Zusammenschluß von SPD und KPD 1946 in Ostdeutschland, ed. by Johannes Klotz (Heilbronn, 1996), 30–9. Werner Mu¨ller, ‘SED-Gru¨ndung unter Zwang—ein Streit ohne Ende? Pla¨doyer fu¨r den Begriff ‘‘Zwangsvereinigung’’ ’, DA 24/1 (1991), 52–8. Werner Mu¨ller, ‘Die Gru¨ndung der SED—Alte Kontroversen und neue Positionen um die Zwangsvereinigung 1946’, Jahrbuch fu¨r Historische Kommunismusforschung 1996, ed. by Hermann Weber Egbert Jahn, and Gu¨nter Braun (Berlin, 1996), 163–80. Werner Mu¨ller, ‘Die Gru¨ndung der SED. Zwangsvereinigung, Demokratieprinzip und gesamtdeutscher Anspruch’, PolZG B16–17/1996, 12–21. For the East German perspective, see Wilfriede Otto, ‘Druck und Demokratiedefizit im Vereinigungsprozeß’, Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten, 107–9. Hans-Joachim Krusch, ‘Neuansatz und widerspru¨chliches Erbe: Zur KPD 1945/1946’, BZG 33/5 (1991), 624–7. Gu¨nter Benser, Zusammenschluß von KPD und SPD 1946: Erkla¨rungsversuche jenseits von Jubel und Verdammnis (Berlin, 1995), 21–6. Gu¨nter Benser, ‘Der 50. Jahrestag der Vereinigung von KPD und SPD. Eine historisch-kritische Nachlese’, BzG 39/2 (1997), 35–54. 153 Werner Mu ¨ ller, ‘Sozialdemokratische Politik unter sowjetischer Milita¨rverwaltung: Chancen und Grenzen der SPD in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone zwischen Kriegsende und SED-Gru¨ndung’, IWK 23/2 (1987), 199. 154 Andreas Malycha, ‘Sozialdemokraten und die Gru ¨ ndung der SED’, 208–9.


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In accepting the KPD’s demands, the SPD leaders were driven by hopes that the future unity party would strongly reflect social democratic practices and values. Encouraged by the SPD’s greater numerical strength at the time of unification,155 leading social democrats like Fritz Schreiber believed that they could bring the new party under their control.156 Fuelling their hopes was the attention they received from leading SMAD officials. In June 1945, Zhukov told the SPD leaders that in installing a democratic regime in Germany he would have to rely heavily on them, and not just on the KPD, ‘because I know that you have the support of the masses’.157 At another meeting with Zhukov, in early February 1946, Grotewohl, a gentle and popular character whom the SMAD always treated with great respect, was told that the SPD’s organizational structures would be preserved in the new unity party and that Moscow was ready to withdraw Ulbricht, whose brusque manners and wooden rhetoric had done little to boost the KPD’s popularity.158 The offer implied that Grotewohl would become the head of the SED and, possibly, the chancellor of a future German Reich. It is true that in pressing for unity the KPD made a number of concessions to the SPD. In doing so, the party followed instructions from Pieck, who had told the Work Commission in April 1944: ‘We must do our bit to create a social democracy [sic] that will co-operate with us. . . . We must be prepared to accept the greatest compromises if this ensures a common front in public and demonstrates the unity of the working class.’159 The draft SED programme approved by the second Conference of the Sixty, the so-called ‘Principles and Aims of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany’, abandoned the communist principle of ‘democratic centralism’ (whereby the party was controlled from the top) in favour of the ‘members’ right to democratic determination’. The new party was to be led by a Central Secretariat (ZS) elected by an executive council, or Parteivorstand (PV)—the ZS being, 155 In April 1946, SPD membership in the Soviet zone and Berlin stood at 695,400, as against 624,600 for the KPD. See Werner Mu¨ller, ‘KPD’, 459. Werner Mu¨ller, ‘SPD’, 480. 156 Fritz Schreiber was the chief secretary of the SPD’s ZA and one of the two secretaries of the SED’s ZS from April 1946 until his defection to the West in June 157 Quoted ibid., 289. 1948. See Lucio Caracciolo, ‘Der Untergang’, 314. 158 Lucio Caracciolo, ‘Grotewohls Positionen im Vereinigungsprozeß (1945–1946)’, Einheitsfront—Einheitspartei, 78–82. Fred Stempel, ‘Erinnerung an Otto Grotewohl: Zu dessen 100. Geburtstag am 11. Ma¨rz 1994’, Utopie kreativ 3/1994, 156–7. 159 ‘ ‘‘Strategie und Taktik der Machtu ¨ bernahme’’ ’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 168.

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according to Dahlem, ‘the permanent operational leadership of the party in the period between the meetings of the Parteivorstand ’160— rather than by a Politburo and a ZK, as the KPD’s top decision-making bodies had traditionally been called. Finally, there was to be total equality between communists and social democrats, with all party appointments to be made on the basis of strict parity.161 Wavering social democrats could draw further encouragement from the KPD’s efforts to prove its political independence and rid itself of its old image as a Soviet tool. The KPD’s draft resolution for the first Conference of the Sixty described the future unity party as an ‘independent’ political force whose task would be ‘to develop its policies and tactics in accordance with the interests of the German workers and the particular circumstances in Germany’. Distinguishing between a minimum and a maximum goal—respectively ‘the completion of Germany’s democratic renewal on the basis of an anti-fascist democratic republic’ and ‘the establishment of socialism through the exercise of political power by the working class in accordance with the teachings of consistent Marxism’—the document emphasized that, in pursuing its policies, the Socialist Unity Party would follow a ‘special German road’.162 The promotion of this special-road thesis peaked at the same time as the KPD’s unity campaign with a widely noted article by Ackermann, ‘Is there a Special German Road to Socialism?’, published in February 1946 in the first issue of the SED’s party journal, Einheit, in time for the FDGB congress held in Berlin.163 Ackermann’s key assertion was that, according to Marxist–Leninist theory, revolutionary violence was not a prerequisite for the transition to socialism. Rather, such a transition would be ‘possible on relatively peaceful lines, if the bourgeois class cannot make use of the militaristic and bureaucratic apparatus of the state . . . ’,164 the implication being that such a unique situation existed in Germany in the aftermath of the war.

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Second meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/2. Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 148–9. 162 Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, ‘Ein ‘‘besonderer deutscher Weg’’ ’, 24. 163 Peter Grieder, The East German Leadership 1946–1973: Conflict and Crisis (Manchester, 1999), 9–10. Gerd Dietrich, ‘Ein Mitbu¨rger der Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft. Anton Ackermann’, BzG 33/1 (1991), 109–13. Ju¨rgen Hofmann, ‘Die SED—eine Partei neuer Art? Visionen und Illusionen des Anton Ackermann’, Zwangsvereinigung, 65–75. 164 Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, ‘Ein ‘‘besonderer deutscher Weg’’ ’, 25. 161


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The extraordinary effort made by the KPD in casting itself as a reformed party has given rise to the assertion that the special-road thesis was not merely a tactical ploy aimed at making unification more palatable for wavering social democrats.165 There is indeed evidence to suggest that hopes for German independence from Moscow inspired not only the social democrats but also many KPD leaders. One of them was undoubtedly Ackermann himself, whom Wolfgang Leonhard had never seen happier than during those weeks. His enthusiasm for a more democratic communist approach was such that he even supported Fechner’s proposal to hold an SPD membership ballot on the issue of unification.166 In his quest for a distinctly German communist policy, Ackermann was supported by Pieck, a lifelong stranger to Russian culture, who did not speak the language and who was evidently glad to be back in Germany. In a letter to Ulbricht, written on 22 May 1945, Pieck had expressed the hope that the KPD would have a ‘truly German’ communist newspaper, an indication that hopes for a ‘truly German’ communist policy were never far from his mind.167 However, it is misleading to suggest, as Wilfried Loth does, ‘that the communists were indeed thinking of a Western-type democracy when talking about ‘‘the establishment of an anti-fascist democratic republic’’ ’.168 Rather, their support for bourgeois democratic methods was conditional upon the realization of their overriding aim: to gain political hegemony in Germany. Underpinning it were delusions about the KPD’s popularity in post-war Germany which were all the more remarkable in view of the party’s patent weakness in the Weimar Republic, when its share of the votes in Reichstag elections had never exceeded 16.9 per cent. Thus Pieck could write in September 1945: ‘[The] workers and labourers understand, that Hitler [has led] to disaster; but [they] also [understand] that [the] S[oviet] U[nion]—stands for strong growth and [good] prospects for G[ermany]—[which can be enjoyed] via closer links to [the] S[oviet] U[nion].’169 It was for that reason that the KPD leaders believed they could afford the luxury of Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 32. Wolfgang Leonhard, ‘Der Anfang’, 48–50. Fred Oldenburg, Konflikt und Konfliktregelung in der Parteifu¨hrung der SED 1945/46–1972 (Cologne, 1972), 11–12. 167 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 501. Heinrich Bodensieck, ‘Moskauer Aufzeichnungen’, 30, 49. ‘Interview mit S. F. am 21. Ma¨rz 1974’, ‘ . . . die SPD aber aufgeho¨rt hat zu existieren’: Sozialdemokraten unter sowjetischer Besatzung, ed. by Beatrix W. Bouvier and Horst-Peter Schulz (Bonn, 1991), 63. 168 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 24. 169 ‘Gespra ¨ch mit Bockow am 25. 9. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 165 166

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a bourgeois democratic approach. Criticism of the KPD’s new line from hard-line party members, Pieck wrote in December 1945, was simply the result of ‘[a] failure to understand our policy’, a policy that was not ‘opportunism’—the communist term for deviations from the Marxist– Leninist faith—but ‘revol[utionary] policy in the best possible sense— for [the] creation of [a] proletarian regime’.170 Consequently, the KPD’s commitment to bourgeois democratic principles ended where bourgeois democracy is commonly understood to begin—in the face of political dissent. Nor was communist mistrust of all non-communists confined to Ulbricht, who, in January 1946, secretly urged his fellow comrades to vote only for fellow communists in the forthcoming FDGB leadership elections (in breach of a promise of parity previously given to the SPD).171 Like Ulbricht, Pieck was in no doubt about who was to blame for the Third Reich, when, after a meeting with Bokov in September 1945, he jotted: ‘Hitler [came] to power because of [the] division [of the working class]—social d[emocrats]—[are] to blame.’172 In the same vein, he told the last conference of the KPD’s Berlin organization on 13 April 1946 that the KPD was the only party always to have pursued the right policies, and he vowed that its main strengths would be carried on in the new unity party, ‘in particular our Marxist–Leninist training’ and the ‘discipline’ inherent in a ‘militant party’ (‘Kampfpartei’).173 Convinced that theirs was the only party guided by ‘a scientific theory that has correctly predicted the course of history’,174 the KPD leaders had no difficulty in concluding that their opponents must be ‘enemies of democracy’. Consequently, they opposed the holding of a membership ballot on amalgamation—as demanded by the SPD’s Berlin organization on 1 March 1946—when they realized that it was unlikely to produce the desired result. ‘No ballot’, Pieck jotted after a meeting with Bokov, ‘because [it has been] sabotaged by [the] advocates of division (Spalter)’. He added that the KPD must take a firmer line towards the opponents of unity, something the party was now in a position to do as a result of being ‘no longer in opposition’.175 170 Private notes by Wilhelm Pieck, December 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 171 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 529–30. 4036/639. 172 ‘Gespra ¨ch mit Bockow am 25. 9. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 173 Quoted in Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR (3rd edn., Munich, 1989), 130. 174 Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte, Vol. 2: Zusatzband, 283. 175 ‘Besprechung bei Bockow o. D. [March 1946]’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/ 734. The ballot was eventually held on 31 March 1946, but voting in the Eastern sector of Berlin was immediately stopped by the SMAD. In the Western sectors, 82 per cent of


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Similarly, Ackermann, the KPD’s strongest champion of democracy, had made it clear in his article that under no circumstances could socialism be established in Germany via the ballot-box alone. The reason for this was the reactionary disposition of the representatives of the bourgeoisie, who, when facing political defeat, would always resort to repression ‘to break the back of the socialist workers’ movement’.176 Nor is there any evidence to suggest that in violating the basic tenets of bourgeois democracy the KPD was defying Soviet instructions. It is clear from Leonhard’s account that the Kremlin fully endorsed the special-German-road thesis, in the same way as it approved of the promotion of ‘special’ Polish, Czech, and Bulgarian roads by the communist parties of those countries.177 The fact that the Soviet military authorities tolerated the independent anti-fascist committees during the first few weeks of occupation has led to their abolition being blamed exclusively on the Initiative Groups, and in particular on Ulbricht.178 However, their disbandment was approved by none other than Stalin himself at his meeting with the KPD leaders on 4 June 1945. Similarly, Soviet officials went out of their way to limit interparty competition by serving notice, on 11 June 1945, that ‘only the known, large, former democratic anti-fascist parties’ would be allowed to register in Berlin. In August 1945, they forced the veteran social democrat Hermann Brill, a former inmate of the Buchenwald concentration camp and a co-author of the famous ‘Buchenwald Manifesto’, to wind up his ‘League of Democratic Socialists’, a radical socialist unity party launched in Thuringia while that province was under American control.179 the balloted members rejected a motion calling for immediate KPD–SPD fusion, although 64 per cent were in favour of mutual collaboration. See Norbert Podewin and Manfred Teresiak, ‘Bru¨der, in eins nun die Ha¨nde . . . ’: Das Fu¨r und Wider um die Einheitspartei in Berlin (Berlin, 1996), 141–4. Alexandr Haritonow, ‘Freiwilliger Zwang: Die SMAD und die Verschmelzung von KPD und SPD in Berlin’, DA 29/3 (1996), 407–18. 176 Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, ‘Ein ‘‘besonderer deutscher Weg’’ ’, 25. 177 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 546–8. 178 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 28, 42. 179 Citing Stalin’s instructions to the leaders of the Initiative Groups, Pieck noted: ‘Establishment of anti-fascist committees not useful either . . . ’, ‘Beratung am 4. 6. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/629. See also, Stefan Creuzberger, ‘Die Liquidierung antifaschistischer Organisationen in Berlin: Ein sowjetisches Dokument’, DA 26/11 (1993), 1266–79. On Hermann Brill’s political activities in Thuringia, see Manfred Overesch, Hermann Brill in Thu¨ringen 1895–1946: Ein Ka¨mpfer gegen Hitler und Ulbricht (Bonn, 1992), 339–62.

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In installing a pro-Soviet regime in its occupation zone, the Kremlin was clearly not prepared to accept the risk of a loss of control which the establishment of a proper democratic system would have entailed. As one Soviet general explained to a social democrat in early 1946, victory over Nazism had provided the Soviet Union with a unique opportunity ‘to exert influence, not only politically, but also militarily, in the area [of Germany] in which we now live’.180 It was therefore important that the leading political party in the SBZ was kept under strict Soviet control. Indeed, the hegemony of the Moscow émigre´s within the KPD was never in doubt. Of the 16 signatories of the KPD’s Aufruf, 13 (who together constituted the party’s provisional ZK) had spent the war in the Soviet Union, the main exception being Franz Dahlem, who had been liberated in May 1945 from the Mauthausen concentration camp. Their firm hold on the KPD was assured via control of the party’s chief organ, the Secretariat of the ZK, whose legitimacy during the nine months of its existence was never confirmed by a vote.181 Nor was their influence diminished as a result of the merger with the SPD. The 7 social democratic members of the SED’s ZS were all eclipsed by their communist counterparts with whom they shared their portfolios and whose seasoned professionalism and superior political skills they were unable to match.182 Few of them were held in respect by their communist peers, and some were treated with open disdain. Gniffke recalls 180 ‘Diskussion mit den Zeitzeugen Willy Boepple, Fritz Borges, Kurt Borges, Julius Bredenbeck, Hans Hermsdorf, Dieter Rieke, Josef Scho¨lmerich, Adam Wolfram’, Einheitsfront–Einheitspartei, 206. 181 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 72–3. Hans-Joachim Krusch, ‘Neuansatz’, 624–5. 182 Werner Mu ¨ ller, ‘Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED)’, SBZ-Handbuch, 485–6. The seating arrangement of the ZS (showing the seven pairs of ex-KPD and ex-SPD functionaries as well their place in the SED’s hierarchy) was as follows:

Otto Grotewohl (spd) Walter Ulbricht (kpd) Max Fechner (spd) Paul Merker (kpd) Helmut Lehmann (spd) Hermann Matern (kpd) Ka¨the Kern (spd)

Wilhelm Pieck (kpd) Erich Gniffke (spd) Franz Dahlem (kpd) Otto Meier (spd) Anton Ackermann (kpd) August Karsten (spd) Elli Schmidt (kpd)


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that Fechner, who shared his portfolio with Ulbricht, found himself completely ignored.183 As events were to show, the veteran communist Hermann Matern was right when he told the last conference of the KPD’s Saxony organization on 6 April 1946 that the SED would be ‘an improved version’ (‘eine Weiterentwicklung’) of the KPD.184

See ‘Sitzordnung des Zentralsekretariats der SED im Jahre 1947 im Arbeitszimmer des Parteivorsitzenden Wilhelm Pieck’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/655. 183 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 181–2. 184 Quoted in Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 130.

2 Nationwide Goals and Zonal Priorities: The KPD/SED and the German Question from Potsdam to Bizonia THE THINKING BEHIND THE SED’S PATRIOTIC LINE The founding of the SED via a zonal rather than a nationwide KPD– SPD merger was a severe blow to the idea of German political unity. Its implications were not lost on the KPD leaders. Pieck privately voiced disquiet about the possible consequences of the KPD’s approach when, in December 1945, he noted: ‘[A] zonal merger would mean the splitting up of the SPD [and] also the breaking up of the Reich.’1 There was an uneasy feeling in KPD circles that the two halves of Germany were slowly drifting apart. Addressing a conference of KPD functionaries on 5 August 1945, Dahlem suggested that there were already ‘two Germanies’, ‘the Germany occupied by the armies of the Soviet Union’ and ‘the Germany occupied by the armies of England [sic], France, and America’.2 Reflecting the deepening inter-German divide, in the eyes of the leading comrades, were the enormous difficulties faced by the KPD in the Western zones. While, in the autumn of 1945, the Soviet-zone KPD had been able to operate legally for several weeks, the formation of political parties in the Western zones was still at an infant stage. Parties were initially licensed only at local level, and when they were finally permitted at zonal level they were still forbidden to communicate and operate between the zones, although they did so informally. What was 1 Private notes by Wilhelm Pieck, December 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/639. 2 ‘Protokoll der Konferenz verantwortlicher Parteiarbeiter (Mecklenburgs) am 5. 8. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 59 more, the Western occupation authorities, far from supporting the KPD in the manner of the SMAD, frequently delayed the licensing of KPD organizations, depriving them of the right to issue propaganda and effectively consigning the Western KPD to a limbo-like state until 1946.3 Dahlem, responsible within the ZK’s Secretariat for party organization, including liaison with the Western zones,4 was satisfied that the Western Allies were discriminating against the KPD, in particular the British, who were trying to ‘check and inhibit the growth of the KPD’s influence among the masses with all the means at their disposal’.5 Another sign of the growing division between the two halves of Germany were the differences that had emerged between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies in their approach to denazification. Both sides agreed on what to do with the ‘main war criminals’, the top leaders of the Third Reich and the NSDAP (Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers’ Party), who were tried and sentenced by a joint Allied tribunal at Nuremberg between November 1945 and October 1946. Yet there was no agreement on how to treat the rest of German society, with the Western Allies being considerably more lenient than was the Soviet Union, largely confining their anti-Nazi purge to the removal from public office of NSDAP members.6 Dahlem, who was kept informed about these events via reports from the KPD’s West German district organizations, was convinced that the Western powers had sabotaged the denazification programme agreed at Potsdam by allowing the members of Germany’s old social élites to retain their positions and regain political influence.7 The unease with which the KPD leadership viewed these developments was echoed in Ackermann’s article on the 3 Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany 1945–1956 (Oxford, 1997), 238–9. Gu¨nter Benser, Befreiung, 214–15. Werner Mu¨ller, Die KPD und die ‘Einheit der Arbeiterklasse’ (Frankfurt am Main, 1979), 63–73. 4 Michael Kubina, ‘ ‘‘Was in dem einen Teil verwirklicht werden kann mit Hilfe der Roten Armee, wird im anderen Teil Kampffrage sein.’’ Zum Aufbau des zentralen Westapparates der KPD/SED 1945–1949’, Anatomie der Parteizentrale, 417–21. 5 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209. 6 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, Vol. 1: From Shadow to Substance 1945–1963 (Oxford, 1989), 63–89. Wolfgang Benz, Potsdam 1945: Besatzungsherrschaft und Neuaufbau im Vier-Zonen-Deutschland (2nd edn., Munich, 1992), 157–82. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ‘Die Grenzen der politischen Saüberung in Deutschland nach 1945’, Westdeutschland 1945–1955, 127–33. 7 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209.

60 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia ‘special German road’, which bemoaned the fact ‘that the supporters of a restoration of the reactionary imperialist Germany [of old] are already re-emerging from their mouse-holes . . .’.8 Despite their complaints, however, the KPD leaders were in a much stronger position than were their opponents, and could afford to look to the future with optimism. Unlike the other parties, their party had quickly succeeded in establishing itself as a nationwide organization— in keeping with Stalin’s instructions. Western KPD functionaries trying to rebuild their party during the summer of 1945 had lost no time in contacting the provisional ZK in Berlin. From August 1945 the Secretariat was linked to all KPD district organizations via a courier network.9 Dahlem, the official in charge of this network, was convinced that the KPD stood an excellent chance of establishing itself as ‘the leading mass party of the labouring people’ in the Western zones as a result of being ‘the only party’ to combine the advantage of having ‘a firm [and] ideologically steeled organization’ with that of having ‘its headquarters in Berlin’.10 To strengthen party discipline and ensure tight control by Berlin, special KPD ‘instructors’ were dispatched to the Western zones. As early as 19 July 1945, the first instructor had left Berlin for the British zone, and between late August and early October 1945 another instructor, Bruno Fuhrmann, carried out an eight-week tour of the American zone.11 In addition, Western KPD functionaries regularly travelled to Berlin for meetings with their party’s top brass. Of the 57 meetings held by the Secretariat during the summer and autumn of 1945, seven were attended by ‘Western comrades’, as KPD members from the Western zones were called in Berlin. In December 1945, the Secretariat invited KPD representatives from all Western districts to Berlin for a series of meetings beginning on 3 January 1946, Pieck’s seventieth birthday. From 4 to 9 January, the Western KPD functionaries were in constant session with the Berlin leaders, attending a meeting with Pieck (4 January), a meeting of the Secretariat (5 and 7 January), talks with officials from various ZK departments, and, finally, the so-called KPD 8

Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, ‘Ein ‘‘besonderer deutscher Weg’’ ’, 25. Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 60–1. Michael Kubina, ‘ ‘‘Was in dem einen Teil verwirklicht werden kann mit Hilfe der Roten Armee’’ ’, 417–21. Dietrich Staritz, ‘Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands’, Parteien-Handbuch: Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1980, Vol. II: FDP bis WAV, ed. by Richard Sto¨ss (Opladen, 1984), 1667–8. 10 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 11 Gu ¨ nter Benser, Befreiung, 211–12. 4072/209. 9

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 61 ‘Reichsberatung’ (8 and 9 January), a national KPD congress in all but name and the first nationwide party meeting to be held in post-war Germany. Barely two months later, on 2 and 3 March 1946, the Western KPD functionaries were back in Berlin to attend another nationwide KPD meeting, the so-called KPD ‘Reichskonferenz’.12 The KPD’s organizational structure—based on Bezirk (district) organizations directly responsible to the ZK in Berlin13—reflected the party’s commitment to a nationwide approach. Anxious to squash any sign of particularism among the Western comrades, the Berlinbased KPD leaders firmly opposed the idea of a combined KPD leadership for the Western zones. They also rejected suggestions to hold a West German KPD congress. As Ulbricht explained at a meeting of KPD functionaries on 5 January 1946: ‘We do not want to highlight the [existence of] zones. We did not hold a party congress only for the Soviet zone and [we] never will. We are a unified party based on Bezirk organizations . . . .’14 Crucially, the KPD leaders saw to it that their bid for nationwide political leadership was upheld by the SED. To underline the SED’s nationwide scope, they ensured that the new party was founded by communists and social democrats from both parts of Germany. Thus, of the more than 1,000 delegates who attended the SED’s founding congress, some 230 came from the Western zones.15 Similarly, the 80 members of the SED’s newly elected PV, who usually met on the second Tuesday of every month,16 included 12 West German communists as well as 8 West German social democrats, who were defying Schumacher’s ban on collaboration with the KPD. To strengthen the links between the Western KPD organizations and the newly established ZS—which initially met twice every week (on Tuesdays and Fridays) and later once (first on Tuesdays, and then on Mondays)17—a new department, the so-called ‘Department for Zonal Control and Instructors’ (known as ‘Zonenleitung’) was created within 12 Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschland, Reihe 1945/1946, Vol. 1, 32–145. Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschland, Reihe 1945/1946, Vol. 3: Protokoll der Reichsberatung der KPD 8./9. Januar 1945, ed. by Gu¨nter Benser and HansJoachim Krusch (Munich, 1995), pp. ix–xi. HansJoachim Krusch, ‘Neuansatz’, 619–20. See also Gu¨nter Benser, ‘Zur sozialen und politischen Struktur der KPD und ihres Kaders (1945/1946)’, BzG 39/4 (1997), 17–40. 13 Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 195–8. 14 ‘Funktiona ¨rskonferenz am 5. Januar 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, RY 1/I 2/5/39. 15 Werner Mu ¨ ller, ‘SED’, 503–4. 16 1st meeting of the PV, 23 April 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/1. 17 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am 4. 5. 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/4. Having resolved in early 1947 to hold its meetings ‘regularly every Tuesday’, the

62 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia the SED’s headquarters, while the existing ‘Department for Land and Provincial Politics’ was formally advised to ‘assist the comrades in the West . . . in their difficult struggle for the people’s right to democratic self-determination’.18 All KPD–SED links were subject to a ban imposed by the Western military authorities on the grounds that no joint Allied decision to admit all-German political parties had been made. Yet this ban—which officially barred West Germans from membership of the SED’s PV— was half-hearted and ineffective outside the French zone, ensuring that until the formal separation of the two parties in 1948 all important SED meetings were attended by representatives of the KPD.19 Underpinning the KPD/SED’s bid for a nationwide role was a staunchly patriotic stance that was a far cry from the zealous proletarian internationalism of the pre-Hitler years. It was cast into relief by the KPD’s Aufruf of 11 June 1945, a passionate appeal to the ‘working people in town and country’, ‘men and women’ and the ‘German youth’ which called upon the German people to unite and rebuild their country as a single political entity.20 When, in the autumn of 1945, the gap between the two halves of Germany widened, the KPD reacted angrily by warning against the creation of ‘a Western bloc in Germany’. On 30 January 1946, the anniversary of Hitler’s accession to power, a mass rally for German unity was held in Berlin by the communist-led Anti-Fascist Bloc.21 In a skillfully orchestrated show of support for the ‘parliamentary democratic republic’ demanded by the KPD, the chairmen of the four parties—Wilhelm Pieck (KPD), Otto Grotewohl (SPD), Jacob Kaiser (CDU), and Wilhelm Ku¨lz (LDP)—addressed the crowd. There was a passionate appeal to German nationalism when, in a keynote speech, Pieck urged the masses to put ‘the fatherland before everything else’ and, quoting from Schiller’s ‘Wilhelm Tell’, solemnly proclaimed: ‘We are one people and will act as one!’22 His claim that ZS decided in the autumn of 1947 to hold its meetings ‘every Monday at ten o’clock’. See ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am 17. 2. 1947’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/68. ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am 3. 11. 1947’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/143. 18 2nd meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/2. 19 Werner Mu ¨ ller, KPD, 322–3. See also Franz Dahlem, Erinnerungen, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, SGY 30/1078. 20 Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschland, Reihe 21 Hans-Joachim Krusch, ‘Neuansatz’, 619–20. 1945/1946, Vol. 1, 227. 22 Wilhelm Pieck, Reden und Aufsa ¨ tze: Auswahl aus den Jahren 1908–1950, Vol. 2 (Berlin, 1950), 32–3.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 63 the German communists had always been guided by ‘the national interests of our people’ was echoed in the SED’s ‘Principles and Aims’, which stated that the new party was fighting ‘for the true national interests of its people’, including ‘the economic, cultural and political unity of Germany’.23 This striking rhetoric was a product of the new communist strategy initiated in the 1930s. At the Comintern’s 7th World Congress, in the summer of 1935, Dimitrov had sternly rebuked the KPD for having underestimated the national humiliation felt by the German people after the First World War as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. Citing Lenin’s article of 1914 ‘On the National Pride of the Great Russians’, he had made it clear that communists were not ‘believers in national nihilism’ and must not ridicule the patriotic feelings of the working masses.24 The length to which Moscow was prepared to go in pandering to German patriotic instincts was starkly revealed when, in the summer of 1943, the Soviet-sponsored NKFD launched itself with an invocation of nineteenth-century Prussian heroes such as Stein, Clausewitz, and Yorck, and, to the disbelief of many KPD émigre´s, adopted the black-white-red German imperial tricolour as its official flag.25 While the launch of the NKFD failed to spawn an anti-fascist German ‘national front’, it had the lasting effect of turning patriotism into a central pillar of KPD strategy. The Work Commission devoted much thought to the ‘nat[ional] question in Germany’ during its deliberations,26 prompting Ackermann to remark: ‘What is important is whether our people [will] regard [us] as a nat[ional] force’.27 On their return to Germany after the end of the war, the KPD leaders wasted no time in imparting their new insights to the communist rank and file. When, on 25 June 1945, Ulbricht set out the KPD’s new programme at the first post-war meeting of communist functionaries from Berlin, he made a point of describing the KPD as a ‘truly national’ party.28 The feeling among the KPD leaders was that their switch to an openly patriotic line would help to ensure the future success of the SED, not only in the SBZ but throughout Germany. At the KPD’s 15th Congress, held on 19–20 April 1946, on the eve of the SED’s 23 Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 1: Beschlu ¨ sse und Erkla¨rungen des Zentralsekretariats und des Parteivorstandes (Berlin, 1951), 10. 24 Edward H. Carr, Twilight, 406. 25 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 343–4. Arnold Sywottek, Volksdemokratie, 139–40. 26 ‘ ‘‘Die Rolle der Sowjetunion und die nationale Frage in Deutschland’’ ’, ‘Nach 27 Quoted in Manfred Wilke, ‘Konzeptionen’, 254. Hitler ’, 172. 28 Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte, Vol. 2, 440.

64 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia founding conference, Ackermann explained that the German communists must not repeat the mistakes of the past, when they had frowned upon words like ‘fatherland’ and ‘nation’ because of their bourgeois ring. Instead, they must realize that patriotism could become ‘a new source of strength’ for the party if it were used properly, namely as a means to bring down the barriers that had previously kept ‘wide sections of the people from joining the socialist movement’. Expressing his faith in the SED’s ability to acquire the mass appeal that had always eluded the KPD, Ackermann told his applauding audience: ‘Our broad national strategy will enable us to become the decisive [political] force among the people. . . . That way the Socialist Unity Party of Germany will become a mass party (Millionenpartei) leading the entire nation.’29

SOVIET OC CUPATION POLICY AND THE PRIMACY OF ZONAL CONTROL The KPD’s bid for a nationwide role was firmly backed by the Kremlin, which went out of its way to fuel German hopes for the preservation of German unity. Despite widespread murdering, looting, and raping, Soviet troops advancing through Eastern Germany at the end of the war made overtures to the population by trumpeting Stalin’s famous dictum of February 1942: ‘History shows that the Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state, remains.’30 On 4 June 1945, at his meeting with the leaders of the Initiative Groups, Stalin instructed the German comrades to secure German unity via a unified KPD. Similarly, Soviet officials told Grotewohl, on 20 July 1945, that the heads of the new Berlin-based German Central Administrations, who were to be nominated by the parties, should be ‘sufficiently popular for their names to be well-known throughout the country, including the Western parts of the Reich’,31 the implication being that these administrations were nothing less than an embryonic national government. That impression was also given to the heads of the German Central Administrations themselves, who were told after their appointment that 29 Bericht u ¨ ber die Verhandlungen des 15. Parteitages der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands. 19. und 20. April 1946 in Berlin (Berlin, 1946), 109–12. 30 Quoted in Gu ¨ nter Benser, Befreiung, 63. 31 Quoted in Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 100.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 65 in a future unified German state they could expect eventually to become either ministers or secretaries of state.32 There has been speculation that the German Central Administrations, whose establishment was made public only after the event, were designed purely as administrative organs for the SBZ and were never intended to assume a nationwide governmental role.33 However, Soviet officials at the time saw things differently. Their feeling was that, in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, ‘Reich administrations’ would eventually be created for ‘finance, transport, communication, [and] external trade’.34 There can be little doubt that if the Kremlin had wanted to turn the SBZ into a separate state, it would not have reduced the SBZ’s economic viability by handing over control of the German territories east of the Oder and Western Neiße rivers—Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia—to the provisional Polish government, as happened early in 1945 (the only exception being the Northern half of East Prussia, including the city of Ko¨nigsberg, which the Soviet Union annexed itself).35 It is of no small significance that, at his meeting with the leaders of the Initiative Groups on 4 June 1945, Stalin refrained from authorizing the creation of a central government for the SBZ. Half a year later, at a meeting with Ulbricht, on 6 February 1946, he again stressed the need to preserve the ‘unity [of] Germany’, stating unequivocally: ‘unity is correct’.36 Stalin’s instructions should be seen against the background of Soviet hopes for continued inter-Allied co-operation. These hopes had been publicly voiced by Stalin himself, on 6 November 1944, in a speech commemorating the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In a major departure from Marxist–Leninist orthodoxy, more precisely its belief in the inevitability of imperialist wars, the Soviet dictator had declared that the foundation of the anti-Hitler alliance lay ‘not in chance and passing considerations but in vitally important and long-term interests’. Furthermore, in a reference to the recent conference at Dumbarton Oaks, at which the issue of a collective post-war security system had been 32 Elisabeth Kraus, Ministerien fu ¨ r ganz Deutschland? Der Alliierte Kontrollrat und die Frage gesamtdeutscher Zentralverwaltungen (Munich, 1990), 56. 33 See ibid., 42–4, 51–60. 34 ‘Besprechung am 22. 10. 1945 mit Oberst Tulpanow, Semjonow, Sobelow, Woskrawsinski’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 35 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 55–6, 62–8. See also Sebastian Siebel-Aschenbach, Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland 1942–49 (London, 1994), 31–55. 36 ‘Bericht Walter Ulbrichts u ¨ ber eine Beratung mit Stalin am 6. 2. 1946’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631.

66 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia discussed, he had announced his support for the idea of perpetuating the alliance in the form of a United Nations organization responsible for peace-keeping after the war.37 This did not mean that Stalin’s antagonism towards Britain and the United States had waned. As a faithful believer in Marxism–Leninism, the Soviet dictator was bound to regard the two leading capitalist countries as the chief protagonists of ‘imperialism’, and he had not forgotten that, during the civil war that followed the Bolshevik Revolution, both countries had intervened in Russia on the counterrevolutionary side. At a meeting with Yugoslav communist leaders in the summer of 1944, he denounced Churchill as ‘the kind of man who will pick your pocket of a kopeck if you don’t watch him’, only to add: ‘Roosevelt is not like that. He dips in his hand only for bigger coins.’ It is indicative of Stalin’s confrontational frame of mind that before the fall of Berlin he was already thinking about future wars. When the Yugoslav communist leaders visited him again, in April 1945, they were told: ‘The war will soon be over. We shall recover in fifteen or twenty years, and then we’ll have another go at it.’38 Even without a new military conflict the Kremlin could hope to strengthen its position vis-a`-vis the West. For Hitler’s war had initiated dramatic changes within the capitalist camp and, in doing so, opened up new opportunities for Soviet diplomacy. These changes were outlined a year after the end of the war in a memorandum drafted by the Soviet ambassador to Washington, N. V. Novikov,39 and approved by V. M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign commissar and Stalin’s right-hand man. Writing on 27 September 1946, Novikov explained: The two main aggressive powers, fascist Germany and militant Japan, which were at the same time the main competitors of the United States in both the economic and the foreign policy fields, were thoroughly defeated. The third great power, Great Britain, which had taken heavy blows during the war, now faces enormous economic and political difficulties. The political foundations of the British Empire were appreciably shaken . . .40

A similar view prevailed in Berlin. ‘[There have been] great changes in the balance of power between the cap[italist] states as a result of Hitler’s war’, Pieck concluded in his private notes. The veteran German 37

William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 62–5. Milovan Djilas, Conversations, 70, 106. 39 ‘The Soviet Side of the Cold War: A Symposium’, Diplomatic History 15/4 (1991), 40 Ibid., 528. 523–6, 539–43. 38

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 67 communist was certain that three capitalist states—Germany, Italy, and Japan—had been eliminated from the international power struggle, while two others—Britain and France—had been left ‘greatly weakened’. Another important change, according to Pieck, was the replacement of Britain as the leading capitalist power by the United States. ‘[The] only winner [is]: America’, the SED chairman mused.41 Pieck’s conclusions echoed those reached by Varga in his influential study ‘Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the War’, the first extracts of which had appeared in article form in the autumn of 1945, although the book was not published until the following year. The significance of Varga’s study lay in the fact that it reconciled Lenin’s theory of imperialism, which postulated the inevitability of capitalism’s collapse, with the West’s patent economic strength. Capitalism’s terminal crisis, Varga’s book argued, had been postponed by the wartime shift in the Western economies towards state management and central planning. However, as postulated by Lenin, capitalism’s demise was bound to occur eventually as a result of the enormous imbalance of colonial possessions within the capitalist camp and the inevitable imperialist power struggle between the colonial haves, such as Britain, and the have-nots, led by the newly preponderant United States.42 Varga’s assessment was backed by Novikov, who was convinced that ‘the current relations between England and the United States, despite all temporary attainment of agreements on very important questions, are plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting’.43 On the assumption that new wars could be prevented, Soviet officials could hope that future tensions within the capitalist camp would allow them to manipulate the peace settlement in their favour and turn it into an instrument for the promotion of Soviet strategic goals. These hopes were not wholly unfounded. After all, tensions had existed between the Western Allies ever since America’s entry into the war (after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour), and in view of Roosevelt’s wellknown desire to dissolve the colonial empires there was no reason to think that these tensions would quietly go away.44 At the Yalta Conference, in Undated notes by Wilhelm Pieck, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/639. William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 156–8. Gavriel D. Ra’anan, International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional ‘Debates’ During the Zhdanovschina (Hamden, Conn., 1983), 62–74. 43 ‘The Soviet Side of the Cold War’, 535. For evidence that other Soviet officials thought likewise see Vladimir O. Pechatnov, ‘The Big Three’, 15–25. 44 For details, see Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948), 571–4, 733–4. Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. II (London, 1971), 599–603. 41 42

68 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia early 1945, Roosevelt admitted to Stalin that he had originally wanted the United States to occupy North-Western Germany, demanded by Britain, and only grudgingly accepted the South-Western zone. He hinted that the British government wanted to rebuild France with American money and then turn it into a British satellite. Brushing aside British doubts, he yielded to Stalin’s demands in Poland, where Moscow had just recognized the communist-led ‘Lublin Committee of National Liberation’ as the official government, in return for a Soviet pledge to help in the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and enter the war against Japan.45 The Potsdam Conference of the Big Three in the summer of 1945 (17 July–1 August) strengthened the Kremlin’s faith in the benefits of a non-confrontational stance towards the West. To be sure, a discordant note was struck when Soviet demands for international control of the Ruhr area, Germany’s industrial heartland, were blocked by the British, who resented what they saw as Soviet meddling in the internal affairs of their zone.46 However, from the Kremlin’s perspective, this minor setback was outweighed by the advantageous deal struck over the crucial issue of reparations, which not only allowed the Soviet Union to remove capital assets from its zone of occupation but also accommodated Moscow’s demand for access to the industrial wealth of the Ruhr (via the provision that 25 per cent of all assets removed from the Western zones were to be given to the Soviet Union—15 per cent in return for food and raw materials and the remaining 10 per cent without payment).47 Not surprisingly, Soviet officials were thoroughly pleased with this deal. On 3 August 1945, Pravda, the Kremlin’s mouthpiece, praised the conference for its ‘successful conclusion’, claiming that it had ‘strengthened the relationship between the Allies’.48 According to Gregory Klimov, an official in the SMAD, the Potsdam Agreement surpassed the Kremlin’s own expectations and was viewed in Moscow as ‘the greatest triumph of Soviet diplomacy’.49 Internal Soviet documents corroborate this account, showing as they do that the Kremlin regarded the Potsdam Agreement as a diplomatic defeat for the West.50 45 Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road, 239–53. Tony Sharp, Alliance, 82–92. Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought 46 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 73–6. (Princeton, NJ, 1957), 531–2. 47 Jo ¨ rg Fisch, ‘Die deutschen Reparationen und die Teilung Europas’, Die deutsche Frage, 74–80. Alec Cairncross, The Price of War: British Policy on German Reparations (Oxford, 1986), 93–9. 48 Quoted in Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 89. 49 Gregory Klimow, Berliner Kreml (Cologne, 1953), 153. 50 See Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War, 21–2.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 69 In gambling on Western disunity and weakness, however, the Kremlin soon overplayed its hand. At Potsdam, the Big Three had resolved to set up a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), representing the five permanent members of the newly established UN Security Council (namely, the three major Allies plus France and China), to prepare the peace treaties with the former German satellites—Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. Yet the CFM’s first meeting, held in London from 11 September to 2 October 1945, broke down amidst confusion and acrimony when the Americans (whose confidence had been boosted by the successful dropping of two American atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the ensuing unconditional surrender of Japan) resisted the demands made by Molotov (in particular his call for the Soviet Union to be given the UN trusteeship for the former Italian colony of Tripolitania), while challenging the establishment of communist-dominated regimes in Romania and Bulgaria.51 The failure of the London CFM prompted a hardening of the Kremlin’s line, which found expression in the political comeback of A. A. Zhdanov, a long-time exponent of extreme hostility to the West, who had spent several years in obscurity as a punishment for his advocacy of the ill-fated Nazi–Soviet pact.52 The change was most visible in Germany, where the Soviets were becoming preoccupied with the consolidation of their authority in the SBZ at the expense of all other considerations, including their desire for German unity. Ostensibly, this shift in Soviet occupation policy was prompted by the behaviour of France, who had only recently been granted membership of the ACC and been given its own occupation zone (to be carved, upon Soviet insistence, out of the designated British and American zones). However, France had not been invited to the meeting at Potsdam and, furious about this snub as well as fiercely hostile to the idea of German unity, it subsequently vetoed the proposed establishment of German Central Administrations at the ACC, providing the Kremlin with a perfect excuse to put the issue on hold.53 51 Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (paperback edn., Oxford, 1993), 36–7. Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945–1951 (London, 1983), 129–37. 52 William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 106–7. Gavriel D. Ra’anan, Policy Formation, 13–15, 25–6. 53 Elisabeth Kraus, Ministerien, 61–86. Gunter Mai, Der Alliierte Kontrollrat, 106–7. Thilo Vogelsang, ‘Die Bemu¨hungen um eine deutsche Zentralverwaltung 1945/46’, VfZG 18/4 (1970), 515–16.

70 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia American attempts to breach the stalemate over central agencies by proposing the establishment of joint administrations for the Soviet and the American zone were rejected by Soviet officials on the grounds that such a move would violate the ACC’s unanimity rule. However, as Jochen Laufer has shown with the help of SMAD documents, the real reason for Soviet hostility to the American proposal was unhappiness with the political developments in the Western zones, whose contrast with the policies carried out in the SBZ had alarmed the Kremlin.54 Soviet officials were equally unenthusiastic about the idea of establishing a central economic machinery in Germany, presumably because they realized that treating the country as a ‘single economic unit’, as agreed at Potsdam,55 would result in the SBZ having to feed the more densely populated Western zones. At a meeting of the ACC’s Economic Directorate, on 1 September 1945, the Soviets rejected an American bid for a common economic policy, insisting that the question of German exports and imports must be handled zonally until there was a positive balance of trade for Germany as a whole.56 At the same time, the Kremlin changed its policy on German reparations. Based on the concept of ‘economic disarmament’ developed during the war by Politburo member G. M. Malenkov, this policy (which had been ruthlessly implemented during the summer and autumn of 1945) had resulted in the dismantling or destruction of all German industrial equipment that fell into Soviet hands. The resulting chaos in the SBZ and the unstoppable rise of Zhdanov, Malenkov’s chief political rival, sealed the demise of ‘economic disarmament’ and its replacement with a new policy which stressed the importance of keeping the SBZ economically strong.57 Underpinning the Kremlin’s about-turn, according to an account by SMAD member Vladimir Rudolph, was the view that Moscow must tighten its grip on the SBZ in preparation for a conflict over Germany.58 This development had been foreseen by Stalin, who had warned the Yugoslav communist leaders in April 1945: ‘This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own 54 Jochen Laufer, ‘Konfrontation oder Kooperation? Zur sowjetischen Politik in Deutschland und im Alliierten Kontrollrat 1945–1948’, Studien zur Geschichte der 55 FRUS. The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, 1504–5. SBZ/DDR, 68–9. 56 Jochen Laufer, ‘Konfrontation’, 67–71. 57 William O. McCagg, Stalin Embattled, 86–95, 136–7. Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt?, 47–53, 64–71. 58 Soviet Economic Policy in Post-War Germany: A Collection of Papers by Former Soviet Officials, ed. with an intro. by Robert Slusser (New York, 1953), 18–41, 41–2.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 71 system as far as his army has power to do so. It cannot be otherwise.’59 By the spring of 1946, that process was well under way following the Kremlin’s decision to go ahead with working-class fusion in one zone. Much as they favoured German unity, Soviet officials were in no mood to compromise for fear of endangering the success of the KPD. Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the discussions at the ACC on the admission of all-German political parties. Prompted by the Americans in January 1946, these talks reached a deadlock only a few weeks later, when, at a meeting of the ACC’s Political Directorate on 14 March 1946, the French stated their firm opposition to a merger of the existing zonal party organizations at national level. However, a compromise formula agreed at the ACC’s Co-ordinating Committee was eventually scuppered by the Soviet representative, on 13 May 1946, when he realized, after further discussions with his Western colleagues, that the proposed formula made the admission of all-German political parties conditional upon the ACC’s consent.60 The reason for this Soviet volte-face is not known, but it is fair to assume, as Dietrich Staritz does, that the proposed arrangement was unacceptable to Moscow because it raised the prospect of the SBZ being swamped by West German parties hostile to Soviet aims, in particular the SPD.61 The premium which the Kremlin placed on tight control of the SBZ, first highlighted in 1944 by Soviet opposition to British plans for a mixed Allied occupation regime,62 was reflected in secret instructions issued to Soviet officials in Germany in April 1946, shortly before the dismissal of Marshal Zhukov. According to these instructions, which subsequently became known to the British Foreign Office through Frank Roberts, the British charge´ in Moscow, the Soviet Union had achieved its first goal in Germany by gaining a firm foothold in the SBZ, and was now ready to reach out to the Western zones by means of the newly created Socialist Unity Party. However, Soviet officials were warned that it would take time for the new party to become firmly established, not only in Western Germany but also in Berlin. Only when this had been achieved would the time be ripe to create central agencies and establish a uniform system of administration in Germany.63 59

Milovan Djilas, Conversations, 105. Dietrich Staritz, ‘Parteien fu¨r ganz Deutschland? Zu den Kontroversen u¨ber ein Parteiengesetz im Alliierten Kontrollrat 1946/47’, VfZG 32/2 (1984), 246–53. 61 Ibid., 255–6. 62 Tony Sharp, Alliance, 73–6. 63 Roberts had been given the information by George F. Kennan, who had apparently benefited from a Soviet security lapse. See Reiner Pommerin, ‘Die Zwangsvereinigung von KPD und SPD zur SED: Eine kritische Analyse vom April 1946’, VfZG 36/2 (1988), 323–4. 60

72 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia Emboldened by a string of military and diplomatic victories, the Soviet leaders were evidently convinced that the SED would soon start to flourish and could then be used to gain political leverage over the whole of Germany. Indeed, one of Stalin’s successors, Khrushchev, later recalled that Soviet officials at the time thought the war had created ‘the most favourable conditions’ in Germany for the establishment of ‘a working-class, revolutionary state with no private property’.64 This belief may have been behind repeated statements by Stalin and other Soviet leaders—made in the spring of 1946 in front of a delegation of Bulgarian and Yugoslav communists—‘that all of Germany must be ours, that is, Soviet, Communist’.65 The Kremlin’s faith in the SED’s future success was fully shared by the SMAD, whose members told Pieck on 26 July 1946: ‘[The] prospect [is this:] / [the] SED [will have] great power, [a] leading role / [and] enormous responsibility.’66

T H E WE S T ER N C O M R A D E S I N 1 9 45 – 46 In keeping with the main thrust of Soviet occupation policy, the overriding aim of the KPD was to gain a firm foothold in Eastern Germany. It was there that political activities were permitted first and that, owing to massive Soviet assistance, the KPD stood the best chance of becoming the dominant political force. The decision to focus the KPD’s activities squarely on the SBZ was quickly vindicated by the enormous difficulties the party encountered in the Western zones. A meeting of KPD functionaries from both parts of Germany, on 4 January 1946, forced Pieck to conclude that, for the time being, the opportunities for the Western KPD organizations were ‘extremely limited’. The lesson to be drawn from this, Pieck told the assembled comrades, was that ‘we must apply ourselves even more vigorously to the important issues currently facing us here in the Soviet zone’, in particular ‘the reconstruction of the economy’.67 Senior KPD leaders had always realized that the generous assistance on which they could hope to rely in the SBZ would be denied to them in the Western zones. ‘[The] mil[itary Occupation]—[will be] very different [in the two halves of Germany]’, the Work Commission had 64

65 Milovan Djilas, Conversations, 139. Khrushchev Remembers, 99. ‘Besprechung am 26. 7. 1946 in Karlshorst um 9 Uhr abends’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 67 ‘Funktiona ¨rskonferenz am 4. Januar 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, RY 1/I 2/5/39. 66

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 73 been warned by one of its members in May 1944.68 In the event, however, the Western KPD organizations fared far worse than expected. News that the KPD’s factory cell at I. G. Farben’s Leverkusen plant had only 50 members, out of a workforce of 12,000, dismayed the Berlin leaders, and prompted a stunned Ulbricht to remark that the cell was so small ‘you can’t even find it in Leverkusen’.69 Indeed, the reports reaching Berlin in early 1946 overwhelmingly suggested that in the Western zones the KPD’s bid for political leadership had failed. A report by the KPD’s Weser-Ems organization explained: Because of the difficulties created from the beginning especially for our party, it was impossible to guide the feelings of the masses . . . towards democracy and reconstruction. After a bout of initial enthusiasm the great mass of the population fell back into a feeling of political indifference that was also noticeable among the grass roots of our party organizations.70

Worse still, the West German communists had been thwarted in their attempts to achieve working-class unity. During the summer of 1945, many West German social democrats, inspired by the belief that the KPD–SPD split was to blame for Hitler’s rise, had been in favour of an immediate merger between the two parties, only to be rebuffed by a KPD instructed to limit itself to ‘unity of action’. However, by the end of the year, communist pressure on the Soviet-zone SPD and the strict delimitation demanded by their leader, Kurt Schumacher, had dampened their desire for unity, the result being that the KPD’s campaign for bilateral co-operation committees lost its initial momentum and fizzled out in abortive attempts to achieve unity from below.71 Much as they tried to put a gloss on these events, Western KPD organizations reporting to Berlin were forced to concede that ‘the majority within the SPD leadership supports the Western orientation demanded by Schumacher of Hanover’.72 In Hamburg, the setback suffered by the KPD was especially severe ‘as a result of the appearance of Dahrendorf ’,73 who had resigned from the ZA in February 1946 and moved back from 68 ‘ ‘‘Die Rolle der Sowjetunion und die nationale Frage in Deutschland’’ ’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 174. 69 ‘Funktiona ¨rskonferenz am 5. Januar 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, RY 1/I 2/5/39. 70 ‘Bericht aus dem Bezirk Weser-Ems’, 21 January 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/635. 71 Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 41–50. Werner Mu ¨ ller, KPD, 45–50, 169–75. 72 ‘Bericht aus dem Bezirk Weser-Ems’, 21 January 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/635. 73 ‘Hamburg’, report by H.S., 30 March 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/635.

74 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia Berlin to his native city (situated in the British zone) in protest against the ZA’s decision to accept unity on the KPD’s terms.74 There was equally disappointing news from the American zone, with Fuhrmann concluding, in early April 1946, that ‘although we do have some contacts among social democratic functionaries, there is currently a lack of individuals who are really capable of organizing a popular base for the Socialist Unity Party and of presenting themselves accordingly’.75 Compounding the KPD’s plight in the Western zones were fierce anti-communist feelings on the part of the population, especially among former soldiers and refugees. Traditional German antiBolshevism and reports of Soviet atrocities against civilians combined to give rise to a plethora of rumours about the latest events in the SBZ. There were tales of Germans committing suicide to avoid starvation and of several East German cities having been torched by the Red Army after an outbreak of plague.76 As one communist from the British sector of Berlin explained after visiting the British zone in February 1946: ‘It is significant that there is not only ignorance in the Western zones but that numerous reactionary sources are contributing to the blossoming of anti-Bolshevism.’77 West German KPD activists were shocked to discover ‘that all [our] arguments, however impressive they may be, are leaving the majority of the population completely untouched’. They were forced to concede that even ordinary West Germans with no military background were strongly biased against Soviet occupation policy, which they regarded as consisting mainly of the ‘separation of the Eastern territories’, the ‘abduction of the factories’, ‘poor nutrition’, and ‘bad treatment’ of the German population. Anti-communist feelings in the Western zones had also been fuelled by the poor condition of German POWs returning from the Soviet Union, and the lack of news from those POWs who remained in Soviet captivity.78 At the same time, there were rumours about an imminent war between the Soviet Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 149–51. ‘Bericht unseres Kuriers zur Frage der Einheitspartei in der Amerikanischen Zone’, 6 April 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/635. 76 ‘Bericht aus der englischen Besatzungszone, Helmstedt bis Heiligenhafen (von Mitte November)’, 2 February 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/30. 77 ‘Betr. Reise nach dem Westen’, 26 February 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/365. 78 ‘An das Zentralkomitee Berlin’ (from the Hessian KPD leadership), 6 February 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/642. On the experiences of German POWs in the Soviet Union, see Andreas Hilger, Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion 1941–1956: Kriegsgefangenschaft, Lageralltag und Erinnerung (Essen, 2000), 141–72, 302–13. 74 75

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 75 Union and the Western Allies, stoking up fears among Western KPD functionaries that ‘a sharp dividing line’ was beginning to emerge between East and West.79 The KPD leaders in Berlin were themselves no strangers to such fears. Yet they preferred to regard the apparent discrepancy between the SBZ and the Western zones as a passing phenomenon, insisting that the KPD’s programme would ultimately prevail in Germany as a whole. Welcoming KPD functionaries from both parts of Germany, on 4 January 1946, Pieck claimed that ‘everything that has been achieved over here by means of the Aktionseinheit is producing the strongest echoes in the other zones . . .’.80 In the same vein, Dahlem told the members of SED’s newly established PV, in May 1946, that ‘the articifial web of lies and myths currently hanging between the Soviet zone and the Western zones will be destroyed most effectively through the continuous creation of progressive faits accomplis, such as the ones that are [now] being created in the Eastern zone’.81 Indeed, it was by presenting the SBZ as a pacesetter for Germany as a whole that the KPD leaders justified the shotgun marriage with the Soviet-zone SPD. Addressing his fellow comrades, on 4 January 1946, Pieck had made it clear that ‘the great example’ that was the KPD-SPD merger had to be set ‘here in the Soviet zone’.82 Similarly, in an article published in the communist Deutsche Volkszeitung, in midDecember 1945, Ulbricht had claimed that ‘it is precisely by setting a good example of unity in the area east of the Elbe that the Communist and [the] Social Democratic Party will be able to stimulate developments in the other parts of Germany’.83 It would seem that the upbeat rhetoric of the KPD leaders was inspired by genuine hopes that their party would, one day, achieve a nationwide political breakthrough. The view that a socialist merger in the SBZ would be ‘encouraging’ for the workers in the Western zones was expressed not only in numerous speeches and articles by KPD leaders but also in Pieck’s private notes.84 Pieck’s optimism was apparently shared by Dahlem, who had insisted in his stock-taking memorandum of 16 October 1945 that the Soviet-sponsored ‘democratization’ of ‘Funktiona¨rskonferenz am 4. Januar 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, RY 1/I 2/5/39. Ibid. 2nd meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/2. 82 ‘Funktiona ¨rskonferenz am 4. Januar 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, RY 1/I 2/5/39. 83 Quoted in Frank T. Sto ¨ ßel, Positionen und Stro¨mungen in der KPD/SED 1945–1954 (Cologne, 1985), 133. 84 Private notes by Wilhelm Pieck, December 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/639. 79 80 81

76 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia the SBZ was ‘an example and [an] encouragement for the development of the mass movement in the other parts of the Reich’ and would make it impossible for the Western Allies to continue their current ‘anti-communist policies’.85 Their deeply ingrained belief in the superiority of their cause made the KPD leaders extremely reluctant to admit defeats, not only to their superiors but also to themselves. Djilas has given a vivid account of the bizarre tendency to self-deception caused by a strong communist faith, describing how he and his fellow comrades believed that the war would end in 1942 simply because Stalin had said so, and how the Soviet dictator lost none of his lustre when his prophecy failed to come true.86 The same credulity appears to have characterized the German communists. Gniffke reports that Dahlem, in particular, was prone to illusions in the face of unpleasant facts: ‘In my conversations with him, I received the impression that, far from deceiving others, he himself was deceived. He was also only too willing to delude himself.’87 Indeed, the KPD leaders were slow to abandon their hopes for a nationwide SED. Immediately after the unification congress, in April 1946, they initiated a campaign for socialist fusion in the Western zones. As Dahlem explained before the PV, the comrades in Berlin had thus far devoted themselves ‘almost entirely to the reconstruction of the Eastern zone’. However, the time had now come for the ZS to ‘carry out a decisive reversal of strategy in a bid for an all-German policy . . .’.88 That bid was launched on 7 May 1946 with the publication of an open letter to ‘all German social democrats and communists’ advising them ‘what unites you is stronger than all the differences that keep you apart’ and calling for the establishment of bilateral SED ‘founding committees’.89 The next day, a moderately phrased offer of co-operation was extended to the SPD’s Hanover Conference (9–11 May) by the Britishzone KPD. However, these overtures met with a firm rebuff. One by one the SPD district organizations declared support for the SED to be incompatible with membership of the SPD, and expelled the most fervent advocates of socialist fusion.90 85 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 86 Milovan Djilas, Conversations, 15–16. 4072/209. 87 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 99. 88 2nd meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/2. 89 Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 1, 32–3. 90 Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 50–4. Ulrich Hauth, Die Politik von KPD und SED gegenu¨ber der westdeutschen Sozialdemokratie (1945–1948) (Frankfurt am Main, 1978), 74–6, 92–8.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 77 In resisting communist blandishments, the SPD was strongly encouraged by the Western Allies, who had initially refused to license the SED in their Berlin sectors and, in doing so, caused considerable confusion among that party’s ranks. When, on 31 May 1946, the Kommandatura ended the uncertainty over party activities in Berlin via a compromise ruling that allowed both the SED and the SPD to operate throughout the city,91 the new campaign for socialist fusion had already lost its momentum. Pieck himself admitted as much when he told the PV, in mid-June 1946: ‘When, after the merger between SPD and KPD in Greater Berlin, we failed to secure the licensing of the SED for Greater Berlin because of the zonal division . . . serious difficulties began to set in. . . . The great momentum that had accompanied the merger was lost . . .’.92 Nor did the SED founding committees established in the Western zones in accordance with Stalin’s instructions93 live up to communist hopes. Set up unilaterally by communist activists, they failed to attract more than a handful of renegade social democrats and never managed to acquire the necessary legitimacy.94 Far from uniting the German working class, the committees helped to perpetuate its division by establishing a party that was, in the words of the Hessian KPD chairman and PV member Walter Fisch, ‘nothing but a KPD enlarged by a small group of progressive social democratic comrades’. Worse still, the committees unwittingly strengthened the SPD by causing the resignation or the expulsion of the party’s few unity-minded members.95 The KPD’s unity campaign culminated, in the summer of 1946, in a string of visits by leading members of the SED’s ZS. From 22 June to 4 August, Dahlem and Gniffke toured the Western zones. From 27 July to 3 August, Ulbricht and Fechner visited Bavaria, one of the key regions in the American zone. A few days before, from 19 to 24 July, Pieck and Grotewohl, the SED’s joint chairmen, had visited the British zone and addressed several large rallies. However, British orders had required these rallies to be convened under the auspices of the KPD, a fact that greatly reduced their propaganda value. Furthermore, both the British and the American military authorities banned the bipartisan Gerhard Keiderling, ‘Wir sind die Staatspartei’, 565–7. Frank Moraw, Parole, 175–6. 3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 93 ‘Bericht Walter Ulbrichts u ¨ ber eine Beratung mit Stalin am 6. 2. 1946 um 9 Uhr abends’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631. 94 Werner Mu ¨ ller, KPD, 224–41. 95 2nd meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/2. 91 92

78 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia ‘assembly committees’ that had replaced the failed SED founding committees, on the ground that they falsely implied official SPD involvement.96 Following his return to Berlin, Ulbricht conceded that there was currently ‘a wall’ between communists and social democrats in the Western zones. While claiming that this ‘wall’ had been erected largely by the Western Allies, he also blamed latent sectarianism among the KPD’s rank and file, as well as a widespread feeling among social democrats that ‘Schumacher’s policies might perhaps produce a majority for the SPD’.97 By August 1946, the communists had dropped their plans for an immediate socialist merger in the Western zones.98 Addressing a meeting of the ZS on 25 September 1946, Max Reimann, the head of the KPD’s Ruhr organization and a member of the PV, explained that ‘in contrast to the successful merger of the two workers’ parties in the Soviet zone, the relationship between the two workers’ parties in our zone has sharply deteriorated in recent times’. He admitted that in the British zone all co-operation between the two parties had ceased.99 In the same vein, Fisch had previously told the PV to calls of ‘hear, hear’: ‘It is impossible for us to achieve a merger today or tomorrow . . . The entire [party] organization of the SPD is influenced by Hanover, and although some [very] able functionaries are opposed to Hanover’s line they nevertheless refuse to condemn this line in public.’ His gloomy analysis was echoed by Dahlem, who told the same meeting ‘that owing to the policy of the Schumacher-functionaries and the stance adopted by the occupying powers, there is no reason to believe that the creation of the Socialist Unity Party as a proper mass organization will happen in the near future’.100 For all the warnings about the inherent weakness of the KPD, the failure of socialist fusion in the Western zones took the communists by surprise. As Reimann told the members of the ZS, on 25 September 1946, the Western comrades had grossly overestimated the impact of the unification congress on the developments in their zones: ‘In those days we returned from the unification congress with great enthusiasm, convinced that in the Western zones too we would make good progress, Werner Mu¨ller, KPD, 246–55. 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 98 Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 50–4. 2/1/8. 99 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35. 100 3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 96 97

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 79 especially in the Ruhr area, where the conditions were relatively favourable.’101 Kurt Baumgarte, a KPD delegate in the diet of Lower Saxony,102 agreed, adding that ‘we in the British zone realized too late that in the process of reconstruction a gulf has opened up between West and East’. A stark reflection of the KPD’s false hopes was the fact that we in the British zone still called for the completion of working class unity as late as Easter and [even] after Easter, although there was almost no co-operation between the organizations and functionaries of the two workers’ parties in the factories and [in the] administrations, [and] although we had no action committees of the two parties.103

Far from being prepared for such a development, the SED leaders had also been caught out. ‘We frankly admit that the direct approach we had intended to take and had previously agreed on is not feasible, and we will therefore make a de´tour’, Ulbricht told the PV in June 1946. His colleague Dahlem concurred and announced that the SED leaders would reconsider their approach: ‘We are doing this’, he explained, ‘because the situation is different from what we had originally expected.’104 There was evidence that, dogged by disappointment, the KPD was sliding back into its old sectarian ways. Fisch warned the PV in June 1946 that there was strong opposition against continued co-operation with the SPD among the KPD’s rank and file, many of whom were asking just how much longer they were expected to hold out the ‘olive branch’ to their erstwhile political foes.105 Reimann was sharply rebuked for suggesting that the KPD should galvanize the masses by organizing strikes for better living conditions in defiance of the Western occupation authorities.106 The strongest condemnation was reserved for Willy Boepple, the head of the KPD’s Baden organization and a member of the PV, whose claim that the fight against fascism in the Western zones was a ‘fight against capitalism as such’ was 101 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35. 102 Jens Ulrich Klocksin, Kommunisten im Parlament: Die KPD in Regierungen und Parlamenten der westdeutschen Besatzungszonen und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1956 (Bonn, 1993), 160. 103 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35. 104 3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 105 Ibid. 106 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35.

80 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia condemned by Grotewohl as a dangerous fantasy about the ‘blaze of world revolution’.107 The SED’s failure to ease the KPD’s plight gave rise to tensions between the East and West German communist leaders, culminating in Western accusations of neglect. Baumgarte warned the ZS, on 25 September 1946, that the KPD would make no further progress unless Western issues were being given proper attention in Berlin.108 In the same vein, Fisch told the PV in January 1947: ‘For as long as the West . . . is viewed as an area that ought to be written off . . . it will be impossible actively to influence the [current] events.’109 The Western comrades were especially angry about the failure of Soviet-zone representatives to attend the Bremen inter-zonal conference, a meeting of German political leaders organized by the mayor of Bremen, Wilhelm Kaisen, and held on 4 and 5 October 1946.110 According to Fritz Sperling, the Bavarian KPD chairman and a member of the PV, the view in the KPD was that the SBZ should have been represented at Bremen to put across the communist point of view and thus give the KPD ‘a better echo in the West’. He warned that, owing to the KPD’s isolation, more and more Western comrades were regarding the SED as a totally separate organization and were asking their leaders: ‘Why do you travel to Berlin?’111 Complaints such as these did not impress the SED leaders, who made no secret of their priorities. Responding to KPD criticism at a meeting of the PV in January 1947, Ulbricht stressed that the most important thing had been ‘to establish a democratic regime over here’.112 Nor was there any suggestion that the SED’s priorities might change. In late 1946, at a two-day meeting (17 and 18 December) held to conduct a ‘comprehensive discussion of the Western problems’, 107

8th meeting of the PV, 22/23 January 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/14. ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35. 109 8th meeting of the PV, 22/23 January 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/14. 110 Under instructions from the French military government, representatives from the French zone had also stayed away from the Bremen meeting, reducing the event to a bizonal affair. See Adolf M. Birke, Nation ohne Haus: Deutschland 1945–1961 (Berlin, 1989), 169–70. Manfred Overesch, ‘Westdeutsche Konzeptionen zur Lo¨sung der deutschen Frage 1945–1949’, Die Deutschlandfrage, 106–9. 111 ‘Beratung mit den Delegierten aus dem Westen und Su ¨ den am Mittwoch, dem 23. und Donnerstag, dem 24. 10. 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01/20. ‘Besprechung mit Westdelegierten am Mittwoch, dem 18. Dezember 1946’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01/30. 112 8th meeting of the PV, 22/23 January 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/14. 108

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 81 Dahlem warned that it would be extremely difficult to shift the focus of the SED’s activities to the Western zones, the simple reason being that political opportunities were far greater in the SBZ.113 A similar warning had previously been given by Pieck, who had bluntly told the Western comrades in September 1946 that the SED’s achievements could not be shared with them: ‘We cannot share any of this with [the comrades in] the West and the South. We cannot carry out the land reform and the democratization in those areas from over here, rather that must be done by the workers over there.’114

T H E I N D U S T R I AL E X P R O P R I AT I O N S I N TH E SBZ AND T HE SAXON REFERENDUM The KPD leaders had never left any doubt about their view that Germany’s democratization would require radical changes in the country’s economic system. The idea had featured prominently in the various pre-war plans for a ‘democratic republic’ as well as in the 1944 Action Programme before being enshrined, in June 1945, in the KPD’s Aufruf, which called for the abolition of feudalism and the elimination of Prussian militarism ‘together with all its economic and political offshoots’. The scale of the changes envisaged by the KPD was deliberately played down to forestall potential opposition. The Aufruf presented the case for expropriations solely in terms of the need to punish ‘Nazi bosses and war criminals’, while stating that it would be wrong ‘to force the Soviet regime onto Germany’.115 Similarly, a self-assured Ulbricht told surprised representatives of the SPD’s ZA, on 19 June 1945, that the changes sought by the KPD would not automatically result in a socialist regime: ‘They may be radical, but [they] have nothing to do with socialism.’116 The German comrades seem to have thought initially that the limited expropriations to which they were committed would occur in all 113 ‘Kurzer Bericht u ¨ ber meine letzte Instruktionsfahrt in die amerikanische Zone’ (by Fuhrmann), 7 December 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/862. ‘Besprechung mit Westdelegierten am Mittwoch, dem 18. Dezember 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01/30. 114 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/8. 115 Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschland, Reihe 116 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 33. 1945/1946, Vol. 1, 231.

82 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia four occupation zones as a by-product of Allied denazification efforts. According to Wolfgang Leonhard, the members of the Initiative Groups had been told in the spring of 1945 that, although the exact measures to be taken by the Allied occupation authorities were not yet known, it was certain that they would include measures against German monopoly capitalism.117 This expectation was by no means absurd given that in the aftermath of the war many people, not only communists, believed that capitalist excesses had been partly responsible for Hitler’s rise. Even among the German bourgeoisie there was widespread support for public ownership of large enterprises, culminating in the Western zones in the CDU’s 1947 ‘Ahlen Programme’, which effectively advocated a planned economy. There was also a strong tendency towards collectivist solutions for economic problems in Britain and the United States.118 In these circumstances, KPD hopes that Hitler’s defeat had sounded the death-knell for German capitalism were fuelled not only by the Potsdam Protocol, with its ringing endorsement of economic decentralization, but also by several Western laws and directives providing for the seizure of properties owned by Nazis and war criminals, notably the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff directive JCS 1067.119 However, such expropriations as took place in the Western zones turned out to be empty gestures from a communist point of view, because the administration of the confiscated enterprises remained in the hands of the old managers, who controlled the newly created trusteeship bodies with the full backing of the Western authorities and who were themselves representatives of ‘monopoly capitalism’. Commenting on the situation in the British zone in October 1945, Dahlem was forced to concede that the influence of the workers there was not as great as expected ‘because almost everywhere the old managements and the old administrations staffed with former Nazis, who enjoy the full support of the English [sic], have remained in control’.120 A similar view was taken by Karlshorst. ‘Democratization—not uniform in Germany’, Bokov complained to Pieck on 25 September 1945, adding that only in 117

Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 401. Anthony J. Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918–1963, paperback edn. (Oxford, 2000), 129–32. Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, From Shadow to Substance, 191–7. Werner Abelshauser, ‘Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshall-Plan: Westeuropas Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik in der zweiten Ha¨lfte der vierziger Jahre’, VfZG 29/4 (1981), 545–78. 119 Gregory W. Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht, 187–8. 120 ‘Zu den Organisationsberichten’, 16 October 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4072/209. 118

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 83 the SBZ had a ‘consistent’ democracy been established, while the other zones had moved towards the adoption of a ‘bourgeois Engl[ish] democracy’.121 Half a year later, Ulbricht admitted that communist hopes for radical social change in all parts of Germany had not been fulfilled. Addressing the KPD’s Reichskonferenz, he explained: ‘The dialectics of the development in Germany are somewhat strange. It is not possible, contrary to what we naively thought in the past, to do everything simultaneously in all parts of Germany.’122 By that time, in the spring of 1946, the economic changes the KPD intended to make were already well under way in the SBZ. These changes had been initiated without communist prompting immediately after the Third Reich’s collapse, when workers’ committees and antifascist groups took over factories to restore production and local authorities indulged in a spate of spontaneous confiscations. It took the KPD leadership several months to gain control of these independent initiatives and channel them into the official anti-Nazi purge. From August 1945, parallel to the land reform, the communist-dominated Land and provincial administrations had issued a series of laws providing for the seizure of companies abandoned by their managers or run by Nazis, and, by the end of the year, they had succeeded in placing all the large enterprises in the SBZ under their control. On 30 October 1945, presumably to regain control of the sequestrations, the SMAD had published its ‘Order No. 124’, which provided for the taking into Soviet custody of property owned by the German state, the German military and leading Nazis, and on the following day it had confiscated the property owned by the NSDAP. A few weeks before, between July and August 1945, the SMAD had already closed all financial institutions in the SBZ and transferred their assets to the newly created Land and provincial governments.123 This bid to whittle away the power of Germany’s old social élites (whose property was to be made subject to ‘confiscation— expropriation—transfer to public ownership’)124 was a key element in Moscow’s plans to prevent the restoration of capitalism in Germany. It was Stalin himself who reminded Ulbricht during their meeting on ‘Gespra¨ch mit Bockow am 25. 9. 1945’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte, Vol. 2: Zusatzband, 358. 123 Gregory W. Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht, 196–204. Dietrich Staritz, Gru¨ndung, 108–9. 124 ‘ ‘‘Die Wirtschaft im neuen Deutschland und unsere Wirtschaftspolitik nach dem Sturze Hitlers’’—Handschriftliche Notizen Wilhelm Piecks vom Referat Anton Ackermanns’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 210. 121 122

84 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 6 February 1946 that, together with the ‘purge of the administrations’ and the ‘expropriation of the large landowners’, the ‘placing of the enterprises in communal ownership’ was an important step on the road to the KPD’s final goal, ‘socialism’. Indeed, the Soviet dictator thought that the economic measures initiated by the SMAD did not go far enough (‘Dangers/Order No. 124 is not sufficient’), and he ordered that control of the sequestrations be handed over to the German administrations, advising Ulbricht: ‘Transfer warmly approved.’125 As ever, Stalin’s instructions were swiftly carried out. On 29 March 1946, the SMAD’s ‘Order No. 97’ placed the sequestered properties— with the exception of a group of selected enterprises that remained in Soviet hands—at the disposal of the German administrations, who were given possession of these properties on 21 May 1946. At the same time, preparations began for a formal transfer of ownership, a measure which the German comrades—now organized in the SED following the successful KPD–SPD merger in the SBZ—resolved to submit to a referendum.126 In doing so, they heeded Stalin’s warning, communicated to Ulbricht on 6 February 1946, that the situation facing them was ‘totally different’ from the one encountered by Lenin in 1917, and that they must therefore establish proletarian rule ‘via a democratic route . . . not [via a] dictatorship’.127 While the rural province of Saxony-Anhalt had been chosen by the German comrades to spearhead the land reform, the Land of Saxony, which boasted almost half of the SBZ’s industrial capacity and had always been home to a strong communist party organization, was picked to test the water for the proposed industrial expropriations. A massive propaganda campaign was launched in an attempt to divide the masses into different social groups and present the SED as a champion of their respective political goals, a tactic recommended by the Work Commission in 1944. Thus the peasants were reminded of their suffering during the war and told that the industrial expropriations were part of the same struggle as the land reform, while the petty bourgeoisie was given assurances that its property would be safe. In a final bid for the support of this crucial group, Saxony’s SED-led administration

125 ‘Bericht Walter Ulbrichts u ¨ ber eine Beratung mit Stalin am 6. 2. 1946’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631. 126 Gu ¨ nter Braun, ‘Wahlen und Abstimmungen’, SBZ-Handbuch, 381. 127 ‘Bericht Walter Ulbrichts u ¨ ber eine Beratung mit Stalin am 6. 2. 1946’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/631.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 85 returned 1,900 sequestered small- and medium-size businesses to their original owners only days before the referendum was held.128 Contrary to what Loth has suggested,129 these measures do not show that the communists had renounced their authoritarian past and embraced the concept of bourgeois democracy. Rather, as senior SED figures explained to their fellow comrades, returning the small- and medium-size businesses to their original owners was but a small concession to the SED’s opponents and unlikely to endanger the party’s overall control. ‘It is perfectly sufficient for us if [only] the large enterprises are owned by the Land. Why should we burden ourselves with any of those little shops and kick up a fuss about them, pretending that we run everything’, Ulbricht told the PV with disarming frankness.130 Nothing illustrates the SED’s contempt for the spirit of bourgeois democracy more vividly than the decision to restrict the referendum to a communist stronghold, where victory was virtually guaranteed. Ulbricht was adamant that only in Saxony must the issue of expropriations be put to the vote: ‘In Saxony the formal legal issue [of expropriation] will be decided through [a] referendum’, he announced at the 2nd meeting of the PV, adding: ‘We shall see how we are going to do it in the other La¨nder.’131 Far from being the product of Ulbricht’s whims, this decision was fully endorsed by the Soviet military authorities, who had been explicitly asked ‘whether [the expropriations] in the other La¨nder [should be based on a] plebiscite (Volksentscheid) or [on an administrative] directive (Verordnung)’.132 The SED’s preparations were not in vain, for the Saxon referendum, which was held on 30 June 1946, turned out to be a great success for the party. Out of 3.46 million voters who cast their votes, 2.69 million, or 77.7 per cent, voted in favour of the proposed expropriation of ‘Nazis and war criminals’, with only 16.6 per cent voting against and 5.8 per cent casting invalid votes. As a consequence, 1,861 enterprises were expropriated in Saxony, out of a total of 4,700 originally seized. The road was thus cleared for state ownership of the key industries throughout the SBZ, and the SED wasted no time in pushing through 128

Gregory W. Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht, 204–9. Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 75. 130 2nd meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/2. 131 Ibid. 132 ‘Besprechung am 29. 5. 1946 um 10 Uhr abends im Parteihaus’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 129

86 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia expropriation laws in the other East German La¨nder and provinces (despite muffled protests from the bourgeois parties, especially in Thuringia).133 The only exception was Berlin, where similar measures were blocked by the Western Allies and, after the city’s formal division in 1948, carried out only in the Soviet-occupied Eastern half. By then, over 9,000 enterprises had been expropriated—40 per cent of the industrial capacity of the SBZ.134 The positive outcome of the Saxon referendum greatly boosted the morale of the SED leaders by convincing them that their policies had the potential to become truly popular and win electoral support—not only in the SBZ but throughout Germany. Typically, Ulbricht now boasted that ‘the economic unity [of Germany]’ was ‘perfectly possible’ on the basis of the SED’s policies.135 As with the KPD–SPD merger, the SED leaders believed that the failure of their economic reforms to catch on in West Germany was a temporary phenomenon resulting from inter-zonal ‘communication difficulties’ which, according to Grotewohl, were preventing West Germans from gaining ‘a proper understanding of the situation [in the SBZ]’. Indeed, when Grotewohl asserted that ‘the political and economic developments in the Eastern zone’ would one day ‘make an impact on the other German La¨nder’, one faithful comrade and fellow member of the PV shouted enthusiastically: ‘It’s already happening today!’136

THE R ISE OF SOVIET–WESTERN ANTAGONISM AND THE FOUNDING OF THE BIZONE The implementation of the KPD’s programme throughout Germany required Western acquiescence, if not active collaboration. However, communist hopes that the Western governments would maintain the pro-Soviet stance that had characterized their policies during the war and become increasingly left wing were short lived. It soon became clear that the political changes that had taken place in the West at the end of the war would make Soviet–Western co-operation more rather than less difficult. Given their heartfelt contempt for ‘English socialism’, 133 Gu ¨ nter Braun, ‘Wahlen und Abstimmungen’, 382, 395. Gregory W. Sandford, From Hitler to Ulbricht, 212–17. 134 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 115. 135 2nd meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/2. 136 3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 87 communists could draw little comfort from the landslide victory won by the British Labour Party in July 1945,137 while their attitude towards the new American administration that had taken over from Roosevelt was one of intense suspicion. Within months, Soviet officials were complaining that there had been ‘a strengthening of the influence on U[nited] S[tates] foreign policy of the most reactionary circles of the Democratic Party’ as a result of Roosevelt’s replacement by Truman. They were especially concerned about Washington’s policy towards Germany. In his memorandum of 27 September 1946, Novikov claimed that in Germany the Americans were ‘taking measures to strengthen reactionary forces’ and were opposing ‘democratic reconstruction’, while accompanying that policy ‘with completely inadequate measures for the demilitarization of Germany’.138 The significance which the Kremlin attached to Germany’s economic disarmament had been highlighted at the Yalta Conference, where deputy foreign commissar I. M. Maisky had demanded the removal of 80 per cent of German heavy industry as well as the establishment of a joint Allied supervisory body capable of exercising lasting control over the German economy.139 The Potsdam Agreement had settled how reparations from Germany were to be shared between the Allies, but had not specified how much industrial equipment was to be removed, except for stating that ‘average living standards’ in Germany should not exceed ‘the average of the standards of living of European countries’.140 Thus, there was plenty of room for disagreement at the quadripartite ‘Level of Industry Committee’ set up in September 1945 to draft the Allied reparations plan. When the committee began to consider what should be the permitted capacity and output in individual industries, the figures put forward by the four powers showed wide discrepancies. As a rule, the British and the American figures were fairly close together and, while the French suggestion tended to be lower, a compromise between the three Western Allies was not too difficult to reach. Negotiations therefore focused on reconciling this figure with the— generally much lower—Soviet one. Although agreement was finally reached and, on 28 March 1946, a ‘Level of Industry Plan’ was 137 Alan Bullock, Bevin, 49–80. In 1944, Florin had warned that after the end of the war some people in Germany would advocate a ‘so-called English socialism’ and describe as socialist ‘many things . . . that have nothing to do with socialism’. See ‘ ‘‘Was wu¨rde sein, wenn Deutschland ein Sowjetstaat werden wu¨rde?’’ ’, ‘Nach Hitler’, 130. 138 ‘The Soviet Side of the Cold War’, 536, 539. 139 FRUS. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945 (Washington, DC, 1955), 620–1. 140 FRUS. The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, 1504–5.

88 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia unveiled,141 Soviet officials had been confirmed in their view that their Americans counterparts were, to quote Novikov, ‘not taking measures to eliminate the monopolistic associations of German industrialists on which German Fascism depended in preparing aggression and waging war’.142 Meanwhile, the Kremlin was refusing to treat Germany as a ‘single economic unit’ as agreed at Potsdam by taking reparations from current production in addition to the removal of plants. When pressed on this issue by James Byrnes, the American Secretary of State appointed by Truman, Molotov laconically replied that the Soviet Union was determined to get what she had asked for at Yalta— ‘10 billion of dollars in reparations, and also participation with the United States, the United Kingdom and France in a four-power control of the industries of the Ruhr’.143 Faced with an inflexible Soviet stance, the British and the American governments, who were paying hundreds of millions of dollars to feed the German population in their zones, were becoming increasingly disillusioned with Moscow. On 3 May 1946, after fruitless negotiations with the Soviet representative on the ACC’s Co-ordinating Committee, General Lucius D. Clay, the American Deputy Military Governor, announced the suspension of all reparations deliveries from the American zone, effectively admitting that efforts to treat Germany as an economic unit had failed.144 Soviet–Western differences over the treatment of Germany came into full view at the Paris CFM (25 April–16 May, and 15 June–12 July 1946), where an agreement to lift reporting restrictions ensured that the negotiations swiftly degenerated into a noisy publicity war. In a prepared statement read out on 9 July, Molotov accused the Western Allies of having failed to carry out the agreements reached at Yalta and Potsdam with regard to the demilitarization and democratization of 141 Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four-Power Control, 126–8. Alec Cairncross, The Price of War, 100–36. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die Reparationsplanungen im sowjetischen Außenministerium wa¨hrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, Wirtschaftliche Folgelasten des Krieges in der SBZ/DDR, ed. by Christoph Buchheim (Baden-Baden, 1995), 21–43. 142 ‘The Soviet Side of the Cold War’, 536. 143 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), 194. 144 Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four-Power Control, 131–7. Falk Pingel, ‘ ‘‘Die Russen am Rhein?’’: Zur Wende der britischen Besatzungspolitik im Fru¨hjahr 1946’, VfZG 30/1 (1982), 98–116. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die sowjetische Reparationspolitik 1946 und das Problem der alliierten Kooperationsfa¨higkeit’, Konfrontation und De´tente 1945–1989, Vol. 3, ed. by Gustav Schmidt (Bochum, 1995), 54–72.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 89 Germany.145 From a Soviet perspective, this development was highly alarming, given Washington’s apparent desire to end the occupation of Germany at an early date. At Yalta Roosevelt had said that ‘he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years’, and at the London CFM Byrnes had proposed a twentyfive-year treaty between the four powers to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany after the withdrawal of Allied troops.146 At a foreign ministers’ meeting in Moscow in late 1945 (16–26 December), Stalin had seemed sympathetic to Byrnes’s proposal,147 but half a year later, at the Paris CFM, Molotov firmly rejected the plan, under which punitive action was to be taken by a majority vote, on the grounds that it provided inadequate safeguards against new aggression by Germany.148 Anxiety over Western intentions stiffened the Kremlin’s determination to drive a hard bargain over Germany. In a prepared statement delivered at Paris on 10 July 1946, Molotov stressed the need for a peace treaty with Germany, but insisted that the conclusion of such a treaty required the existence ‘of a single German government’ capable of both extirpating ‘all remnants of fascism in Germany’ and fulfilling ‘all its obligations towards the Allies’, in particular with regard to reparations deliveries.149 Privately, Soviet officials were beginning to doubt that the gap between East and West could be bridged. In June 1946, former Soviet foreign commissar Maksim Litvinov warned a Western journalist that the Kremlin’s line had hardened in recent months. He explained that, while there had been a chance for Soviet– Western co-operation at the end of the war, the Kremlin’s policies were now based once again on the assumption of an ‘inevitability of conflict between [the] communist and capitalist worlds’. Litivinov hinted that, in these circumstances, it would be impossible to reach agreement on Germany, which would ‘obviously be broken up into two parts’.150

145 William H. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict 1941–1946 (London, 1953), 717–18. FRUS. 1946, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers (Washington, DC, 1970), 842–7. 146 FRUS. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945, 617. FRUS. 1945, Vol. II: General. Political and Economic Matters (Washington, DC, 1967), 267–8. 147 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 171–2. 148 FRUS. 1946, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 842–7. 149 Ibid., 872. 150 FRUS. 1946, Vol. VI: Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC, 1969), 763–5.

90 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia The same conclusion had been reached by the leadership of the SED. Addressing the PV in June 1946, Fechner concluded gloomily: The zonal boundaries have gradually stiffened, and [today] the projected restoration of Germany as a single economic and political entity is further away than [it was] a year ago. This fact is obviously the result of the difficulties that have arisen during the past 12 months between the occupying powers in their search for a peace settlement in general and for a solution to the German Question in particular.151

He warned that the occupation zones had evolved into ‘independent economic and political entities’ that were posing ‘a mortal danger to the re-establishment of German unity’. Grotewohl agreed, adding that ‘as far as we can judge, there will be no united Germany for the time being’. His assessment was based on the view that the Soviet Union’s interpretation of the Potsdam Protocol could ‘under no circumstances be reconciled with the aims of the English and the Americans’.152 Soon afterwards, the prospect of a divided Germany took on a more concrete form. On 10 July 1946, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, made a statement at Paris to the effect that his government would be ‘compelled to organize the British zone of occupation in Germany in such a manner that no further liability shall fall on the British taxpayer’.153 On the following day, Byrnes responded by offering to merge the American zone with any or all of the other zones. As expected, the offer was rejected by the Soviet and French foreign ministers, but accepted by Bevin, and negotiations on the fusion of the American and the British zones soon got under way. The final agreement was signed on 2 December 1946, and ‘Bizonia’, as the new entity soon came to be called, was brought into being on 1 January 1947.154 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was carrying out major changes in the economic administration of its zone in anticipation of a protracted stalemate.155 Despite large-scale dismantling in the SBZ, the Soviet reparations plan had not been fulfilled, and a report ordered by the Council of Ministers had laid the blame squarely at Malenkov’s door. According to Vladimir Rudolph, Zhdanov went even further, calling the policy of economic disarmament a political error, since the deliberate destruction of German industrial facilities had been of no use to the 151 152 154 155

3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 153 FRUS. 1946, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 868. Ibid. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, 728–9. Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt?, 99–102.

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 91 Soviet Union but had alienated the German workers by depriving them of their jobs. A solution to the problem was proposed by Mikoyan, who suggested that 200 of the largest enterprises in the SBZ be saved from dismantling and converted into Soviet-owned corporations. That way, he argued, they could be used in the fulfilment of the reparations plan while removing the potential threat to Soviet security posed by heavy industries under German control.156 By October 1946, the establishment of the socalled ‘Soviet-owned Stock Corporations’ (SAGs) had been completed. However, if this measure was designed to assist in the economic consolidation of the SBZ, it did not mean that Germany’s steady drift towards division was regarded as irreversible by Soviet officials and SED leaders. After a meeting at the SMAD’s headquarters in Karlshorst, Pieck boldly dismissed the bizonal project as ‘nonsense’ on the grounds that the overall situation, as he put it, would ‘not allow its implementation’.157 T H E S ED’ S ‘MA GNET T H EO RY ’ The summer of 1946 saw the collapse of communist hopes, conspicuous in the previous year, that the anti-fascist regime established in the SBZ could be swiftly extended to the Western zones. The first year of occupation had clearly shown that the West German communists were unable to emulate the sweeping success enjoyed by their fellow comrades in Berlin. Delays in the licensing of political parties in the Western zones had hampered the strictly hierarchical KPD far more than the bourgeois parties, with their decentralized party organizations. From the beginning, bourgeois representatives, together with social democrats, had also dominated the administrations in the Western zones—partly because the Western Allies had preferred to fill vacant posts with non-communists, and partly because denazification had been less rigorous than in the SBZ and had not resulted in a blanket purge of the old social e´lites.158 The SED leaders were quick to conclude that their bid for nationwide political leadership had been foiled by an Anglo-American conspiracy. There were shouts of approval when, in June 1946, Grotewohl told the 3rd meeting of the PV ‘that the English and the Americans have already Soviet Economic Policy, 42–56. ‘Besprechung am 23. 12. 1946 um 12 Uhr in Karlshorst’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 158 Werner Mu ¨ ller, KPD, 42–3, 65–6. On the anti-Nazi purge in the Soviet zone and the reactions of the German population, see Gareth Pritchard, The Making of the GDR 1945–1953 (Manchester, 2000), 83–6. 156 157

92 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia sealed the division of Germany because of the growing influence of our movement in the Soviet zone’.159 The same sentiment was voiced by Pieck when, during a visit to Saxony-Anhalt in September 1946, he told a local SMAD official in the town of Ballenstedt: ‘I believe that the division of Germany is inevitable. Indeed, the country’s division into two halves is already a fact.’160 None the less, the SED leaders took the view that the long-term prospects for German unity were far from bleak. As Grotewohl explained, their main hope was that future developments would prove the superiority of their regime and ensure ‘that the things which we will achieve in our zone will stand as a shining example for the working class in the other zones’.161 Underpinning this hope was the belief that the SBZ could overtake the Western zones economically. Ulbricht claimed that the SED’s efforts to rebuild the economy were already bearing fruit: We can point to a number of improvements. . . . The implementation of the SED’s economic programme, which has now begun, has substantially increased the output of the factories in the Sov[iet] occupation zone. The number of factories that are producing is much higher than in all other parts of Germany. That is our advantage . . .162

Other comrades agreed, with one member of the PV voicing his assent by interrupting Ulbricht and reminding the audience that the increase in the SBZ’s industrial output had been achieved ‘despite [Soviet] dismantling!’163 Such bullishness did not seem unwarranted in view of the gloomy economic picture painted in the reports that were reaching Berlin from the Western zones. Thus, the SED leaders had learned that in Hamburg the clear-up was seemingly lacking direction and progressing far more slowly than in Berlin, and that the displays in the Hanover branch of Karstadt, the department store chain, looked ‘even more pathetic than what we are used to over here’.164 A memorandum drafted by the SED’s

3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, ‘Historisches aus der Provinz. Pieck 1946 in Ballenstedt: Spaltung perfekt’, DA 17/3 (1984), 305. 161 3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 ‘Die derzeitige Lage in der englischen Zone, insbesondere in Hamburg’, 14 November 1945, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/635. ‘Betr. Reise nach dem Westen’, 26 February 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/635. 159 160

The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia 93 Economics Department also concluded that the West German economy was not doing well: Since the beginning of the year 1946 there has been stagnation everywhere. Production figures for basic goods were static and in some cases even dropped. The construction of new houses failed to make any progress, and in manufacturing industry too no improvement could be felt. Agricultural production failed to increase. In general it is fair to say that there has been a standstill in industrial development. Since the spring of 1946 the entire situation has been marked by despair and moral regression among the population.165

Particularly encouraging from the SED’s point of view were the severe food shortages that had hit the Western zones now that they were cut off from Germany’s main agricultural areas, situated in the SBZ and east of the Oder–Neiße line. To understand the seriousness of these shortages, one should remember that during 1946 food rations in Western Germany (which had averaged 2,000 calories per day in the final months of the war) fell to 1,200 calories per day for ordinary workers, and could be as low as 700–800 calories per day for ordinary consumers (approximately the intake of Nazi concentration camps’ inmates) despite massive British and American relief efforts.166 The SED’s Economics Department crowed: . . . the food situation [in the Western zones] is critical, especially in the British zone. On 15 August the British news service in Germany (BBC) issued an urgent appeal to the farmers in the British zone, [asking them] to flail as soon as possible the largest possible quantity of grain and offer it for sale immediately. If this does not happen, there will be a serious disruption of the bread supply, because this year there are no reserve stocks available [that might be used] to bridge the difficult transition period between the old and the new harvest.167

A much-discussed topic at the regular meetings with the Western comrades,168 the food shortages convinced the SED leaders that the 165 ‘Die Hindernisse der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in den Westgebieten Deutschlands’, memorandum drawn up by the SED’s Economics Department, 7 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/948. 166 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, From Shadow to Substance, 129–32. Gu ¨ nter J. Trittel, ‘Hans Schlange-Scho¨ningen: Ein vergessener Politiker der ‘‘ersten Stunde’’ ’, VfZG 35/1 (1987), 25–63. Gu¨nter J. Trittel, Hunger und Politik: Die Erna¨hrungskrise in der Bizone (1945–1949) (Frankfurt am Main, 1990), 87–96. 167 ‘Die Hindernisse der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in den Westgebieten Deutschlands’, memorandum drawn up by the SED’s Economics Department, 7 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/948. 168 3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 4th meeting of the PV, 16/17 July 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/6. 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/10.

94 The KPD/SED and the German Question: Potsdam to Bizonia Western zones were not economically viable and would sooner or later be forced to merge with the SBZ. As Grotewohl explained before the PV, the view in Berlin was that the Western Allies, with their capitalist ‘stinginess’ (‘Rechenhaftigkeit’), would be unwilling to feed the German population forever. The suspension of Western aid would aggravate the economic crisis in the Western zones and result in massive political instability: ‘But if they [i.e. the Western Allies] prove incapable of mastering such [important] economic issues as food, housing and the priming of the economy, the political pressure and the tensions produced by our zone will be felt in the Western zones.’169 In a striking reversal of the West German ‘magnet theory’ put forward by Schumacher around that time,170 Grotewohl went on to predict that the SBZ, with its self-sufficiency in food, would increasingly draw the Western zones into its economic orbit and, in doing so, pave the way for German unification on the SED’s terms: We will be able to exercise enormous political and economic pressure, because we will be able to guarantee the food supply in our zone, something that will be totally impossible in the West . . . The maintenance of the food supply in our zone will then literally act as a magnet.171

He claimed that ‘the same magnetic effect’ on the working masses in West Germany would be created by the ‘political freedom’ achieved in the SBZ, before adding that ‘the establishment of a planned economy’ too would become the envy of the workers throughout Germany and thus pave the way for the nationwide triumph of the SED. Admitting that these developments might be some way off, he nevertheless let it be known that he was awaiting future events with ‘complete equanimity’.172

‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35. ‘Besprechung mit Westdelegierten am Mittwoch, dem 18. Dezember 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01/30. 169 3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 170 Peter Merseburger, Der schwierige Deutsche, Kurt Schumacher. Eine Biographie, 3rd edn. (Stuttgart, 1996), 385–8. Kurt Klotzbach, Der Weg zur Staatspartei, 98–110. Werner Abelshauser, ‘Zur Entstehung der ‘‘Magnet-Theorie’’ in der Deutschlandpolitik: Ein Bericht von Hans Schlange-Scho¨ningen u¨ber einen Staatsbesuch in Thu¨ringen im Mai 1946’, VfZG 27/4 (1979), 661–2. 171 3rd meeting of the PV, 18–20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 172 Ibid.

3 Between Hope and Despair: The SED and the Consolidation of the SBZ THE F IRST EL EC TIONS IN T HE SBZ The willingness of the SED leaders to contemplate a protracted division of Germany was not shared by their Soviet minders, who were increasingly worried about the developments in the Western zones. Writing in September 1946, Novikov warned that Washington was creating ‘the prerequisites for the revival of an imperialist Germany, which the United States plans to use in a future war on its side’.1 Soviet fears that the Western zones were sliding irreversibly into a Western orientation had been boosted by Western efforts to rebuild Germany as a federal state. The driving force behind these efforts was the United States, which had established three provisional La¨nder—Bavaria, Wu¨rttemberg-Baden, and Hesse—in the autumn of 1945. In February 1946, the newly appointed minister-presidents of these La¨nder had been instructed to submit draft Land constitutions to the American military government, and elections to legislative Land assemblies had been scheduled for the autumn of 1946.2 Developments in the British and the French zones had been slower, but here too La¨nder were being established in an undisguised effort to prevent Germany’s re-emergence as a centralized state run from Berlin.3 Soviet officials concluded that they had to take action or risk losing the initiative in the struggle for Germany’s future regime. At Paris, on 10 July 1946, Molotov had renewed Moscow’s overtures to the German 1

‘The Soviet Side of the Cold War’, 536. Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 58–61. Barbara Fait, ‘ ‘‘In einer Atmospha¨re von Freiheit’’: Die Rolle der Amerikaner bei der Verfassungsgebung in den La¨ndern der US-Zone 1946’, VfZG 33/3 (1985), 420–55. 3 Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung 1945–1949 (Stuttgart, 1983), 77–102. 2

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people when, in a swipe at the defunct American Morgenthau Plan,4 he had denounced attempts to ‘identify Hitler’s Germany with the German people’, stressing that it would be ‘incorrect to adopt the course of Germany’s annihilation as a state or that of its agrarianization, including the annihilation of its main industrial centres’.5 When the SED leaders visited Karlshorst, on 26 July 1946, shortly after the end of the Paris CFM, they were told: ‘[The] Angl[o]-Americans [are] about to launch [a] bid for [a] new/regime . . . [the responsibility for the] necessary response [lies] in our hands.’6 Words of encouragement such as these were important for a party that was still without a proper sense of direction and unsure about its next steps. Indeed, according to Wolfgang Leonhard, SED morale in the weeks after the party’s establishment was at low ebb. There was a strong feeling among some SED functionaries, fuelled by the unexpected delay of the SED’s legalization in Berlin, that the KPD–SPD merger had been pushed through too fast. Meanwhile, the fusion of the two party organizations on the basis of parity had created a bloated party bureaucracy that nearly brought the SED to a standstill in the weeks after its launch. It was not until June 1946, when the Saxon referendum was held, that the SED finally found its feet. The positive outcome of the Saxon referendum gave the party an enormous boost and encouraged it, with the SMAD’s backing, to test the waters on a wider front by holding elections in the SBZ.7 The SED leaders were seemingly undaunted by the poor showing of their West German comrades in the first post-war elections in the Western zones—the Gemeinde (lower level local authorities) elections in the American zone, held in late January 1946. Although the KPD’s share of the votes was hardly encouraging—ranging from 2.3 per cent in Bavaria to 5.7 per cent in Greater Hesse—adverse circumstances could be cited as an excuse.8 Not only was the establishment of the KPD incomplete by the time the elections were held but the elections 4 On the Morgenthau Plan, see Jo ¨ rg Fisch, Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich, 1992), 41–53. Bernd Greiner, ‘Morgenthau-Plan’, Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung 1945–1949/55: Ein Handbuch, ed. by Wolfgang Benz (Berlin, 1999), 358–60. 5 FRUS 1946, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 869. 6 ‘Besprechung am 26. 7. 1946 in Karlshorst um 9 Uhr abends’, SAPMO-BArch, 7 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 548–50. ZPA, NY 4036/734. 8 These figures were cited by Fritz Sperling and Walter Fisch before the 2nd meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/2. See also Richard Schachtner, Die deutschen Nachkriegswahlen: Wahlergebnisse in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in den deutschen Bundesla¨ndern, in West-Berlin, im Saarland und in der Sowjetzone (SBZ) 1946 bis 1956 (Munich, 1956), 22–68.


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were confined to communities of less than 20,000 inhabitants, where the working-class population was small and the KPD traditionally weak. Far from blaming themselves, the communists subsequently blamed their defeat on the social democrats, on the ground that they had rejected offers for joint KPD–SPD candidacies, stressing that in many constituencies the combined vote of the two workers’ parties constituted an absolute majority.9 Indeed, the communists were by no means surprised at their defeat. In early January 1946, at a meeting with KPD functionaries from both parts of Germany, Pieck had cautioned his fellow comrades against undue optimism regarding the forthcoming elections in the American zone. Stressing that these elections were coming too early for the KPD, he had warned that their outcome might be as disappointing as that of the recent general elections in Austria.10 The communists were determined, however, not to suffer a similar humiliation in the SBZ. An internal SED memorandum drafted shortly after the unification congress pointed out: ‘Of great importance are the preparations for the elections, which will also be held in the Soviet zone in a few months’ time. The outcome of the elections in the American zone points to a very serious danger, namely the consolidation and rise of the forces of reaction.’11 A few weeks before, in an address to the KPD’s Reichskonferenz, Ulbricht had made it clear that, while elections would be held in the SBZ, their outcome would not be left to chance: We have been asked: Will you also hold elections in the Soviet zone? We are saying: Yes, indeed, and [you will see] how we will organize those elections! We will organize them with the [sense of] responsibility that is required for the holding of such elections, and we will organize them in such a manner as to ensure that there is a working class majority in all towns and villages.12

In keeping with these prescriptions, the ZS decided to hold the Gemeinde and Land elections in the SBZ before the scheduled elections in the four sectors of Berlin, the assumption being that an SED triumph in the provinces would boost the party’s vote in the German capital. The ZS was also swayed by Ulbricht’s suggestion that the elections Werner Mu¨ller, KPD, 175–84. ‘Protokoll der Funktiona¨rskonferenz am 4. Januar 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, RY 1/I 2/5/39. 11 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber die Vereinigung der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands und der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands’, 6 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/1. 12 DDR: Dokumente zur Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1945–1985, ed. by Hermann Weber, 3rd edn. (Munich, 1986), 65–6. 9

10

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should be contested not only by the three parties—SED, CDU, and LDP—but also by the communist-dominated mass organizations—the FDGB, the Cultural League, the Peasants’ Mutual Aid Association (VdgB), the Women’s Committees, and the Free German Youth (FDJ).13 That way, it was hoped, the bourgeois vote would be split, ensuring a comfortable majority for the SED and forcing the two bourgeois parties, as Ulbricht put it, ‘to join us in making bloc politics’.14 Although Ulbricht’s proposal met with some opposition from the former social democrats within the ZS, it eventually carried the day when, after further discussion, the ZS agreed on a compromise to the effect that one mass organization—the VdgB—should be permitted to field its own candidates in the elections (a privilege which the state of Saxony also granted to the Cultural League).15 Significantly, the SED leaders did not regard the forthcoming elections as a purely zonal event. Grotewohl emphasized that the SED needed a decisive election victory to strengthen its claim to nationwide political leadership as well as to underline the key lesson of the Gemeinde elections in the American zone, namely ‘that the division of the working class diminishes its success, while the unity of the working class ensures its victory’. And he added: ‘For that reason the elections must be viewed not exclusively from the point of view of local politics, but with due regard to the great political issues that are shaping the political situation in Germany today.’16 Consequently, the SED based its election campaign on a firm commitment to German unity. An SED campaign leaflet stated passionately: ‘Today our biggest and most important task is to preserve the national unity of the German people. For this reason, the SED is fighting against all plans to dismember Germany.’17 Naturally, the SED’s campaign was massively supported by the SMAD, both directly through propaganda material and indirectly through discriminatory measures against the other parties. Thus, candidates put forward by the CDU and the LDP were often rejected by the military authorities because of alleged Nazi links, the result being that many constituencies were contested only by the SED.18 13

Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 207–8. Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 550–1. 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 15 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 207–8. 2/1/8. 16 3rd meeting of the PV, 18/20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 17 Quoted in Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 138–9. 18 Stefan Creuzberger, Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht, 52–76. 14


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Not surprisingly, the Gemeinde elections in the SBZ, held between 1 and 15 September 1946, resulted in an overall SED victory, with the party polling some 57 per cent of the votes (60 per cent if one includes the mass organizations). However, the SED leaders were far from satisfied, not least because in many constituencies, including large cities like Dresden and Leipzig, their party had failed to win an absolute majority.19 Grotewohl did not hide his disappointment when he told the 5th meeting of the PV that the SMAD’s generous support had failed to achieve ‘the resounding effect which was hoped for’. While he insisted that the outcome of the elections constituted a victory for the SED, since it had shown that socialism was now more popular than before 1933, he stressed that there was no room for complacency. Genuine support for the SED, he warned, stood only at around 40 per cent, since the bourgeois parties would in future be better organized and be able to attract more support, both by taking votes away from the SED and by tapping the sizeable pool of spoilt votes. He left his audience in no doubt that in order to clinch victory in future elections the SED would need a better result: ‘If we base our projections on a figure of 40 per cent . . . we will have to win at least another 10–15 per cent of the votes if we are to achieve the kind of majority in the Land elections that we need for [further political] progress.’20 To achieve that goal, the SED initiated a public debate on the political future of Germany. The idea had come from Soviet officials in Moscow, who apparently thought that they could wrest the diplomatic initiative from the Western Allies by casting themselves and their SED allies as the sole defenders of German unity. At Paris, Molotov had openly pandered to German patriotic feelings by attacking ‘talk about the dismemberment of Germany into several ‘‘autonomous’’ states, about the federalization of Germany and about the separation of the Ruhr from Germany’.21 The SED leaders had been ordered to step up their campaign for a ‘democr[atic] republic’ by calling for the issuing of a ‘constitution for the Reich’ as well as the appointment of a German national government. The aim of these measures, Soviet officials had indicated, was to ensure that a pro-Soviet government would be installed in Germany in time for a future peace conference and 19 Gu ¨ nter Braun, ‘Wahlen und Abstimmungen’, 386, 396. Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 139–40. 20 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 21 FRUS 1946, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 870. 2/1/8.

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a possible Allied withdrawal.22 The SED leaders also regarded the issue of German unity as their trump card. Fechner had no doubt that the German people’s desire for unity was ‘strong and resilient’. Addressing the 3rd meeting of the PV, he explained: ‘Here lies a great task for our party. Faced with the danger of a division of Germany, it [i.e. the party] must raise the banner of [national] unity and must in future become an even more vociferous caller for the economic and political unity of Germany than [it is] today.’ He argued that, although such a policy would not yield instant results, it would acquire ‘great popularity among a broad section of our people’ and strengthen the SED’s claim to nationwide political leadership. Grotewohl agreed, insisting that the call for a united Germany was ‘not only a slogan for today, but a prospective slogan for the next few years’. And he added: ‘If, during the years to come, we stick firmly and unequivocally to our position that the political unity of Germany is inviolable, all patriotic [and] progressive people in Germany will be pinning their hopes on us.’23 In line with these considerations as well as Soviet instructions, the SED leaders wasted no time in putting forward a constitutional framework for a future German state. On 22 September 1946, Neues Deutschland, the SED’s mouthpiece, published an article under the headline ‘Basic Rights of the German People—The Path to German Unity’.24 Drafted by the ZS in close collaboration with the SMAD, in particular with Semenov,25 this document was designed to boost the SED’s appeal in the crucial run-up to the Kreis (higher level local authorities) and Land elections in the SBZ. Defining Germany as an ‘indivisible democratic republic’, the document called for the creation of German central agencies while denouncing all moves towards federalism as an attempt to turn the Western zones into a bulwark of ‘imperialism’ and prevent the thorough democratization of Germany. In keeping with established SED policy, the document scrupulously avoided any mention of socialism, restricting itself to a ban on big businesses and large estates, while pledging support to small private enterprises and confirming the right to own private property.26

22 ‘Besprechung am 26. 7. 1946 in Karlshorst um 9 Uhr abends’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 23 3rd meeting of the PV, 18/20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 24 Neues Deutschland, 22 September 1946. 25 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 209. 26 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 14–17.


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However, despite receiving massive publicity, the new initiative failed to lift the SED’s popularity. In the Kreis and Land elections in the SBZ, held on 20 October 1946, the SED failed to win an absolute majority, polling on average just under 50 per cent of the votes. In no Land diet did the SED have a plurality of seats, although only in Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg could it and its ally, the VdgB, be outvoted by the combined forces of the CDU and LDP.27 The SED leaders had clearly expected a better result, but managed to put on a brave face. August Karsten, a member of the ZS and a former social democrat, laconically remarked: ‘It could have been worse!’28 His comment was echoed by Pieck, who told the 6th meeting of the PV: ‘We cannot exactly be pleased with the [election] result in the Soviet zone, but it has become clear that the party is firmly rooted among the working people.’29 If the Kreis and Land elections in the SBZ had failed to live up to the SED’s hopes, the elections in Berlin, also held on 20 October 1946, gave the party a severe shock. For the most popular party in Greater Berlin, with 48.7 per cent of the votes, turned out to be the SPD, a party which the communists had previously written off and nicknamed—after a sleepy middle-class borough in West Berlin—the ‘Zehlendorf Hospital Club’.30 Worse still, the SED (19.8 per cent) was beaten into third place by the CDU (22.2 per cent), eclipsing only the small LDP (9.3 per cent). Compounding the SED’s humiliation was the fact that the SPD was the strongest party even in the Soviet sector, where it won 43.6 per cent of the votes, compared with 29.8 per cent for the SED.31 The SED leaders were totally unprepared for such a result. Although some members of the SED’s Berlin organization had previously warned against undue optimism, the mood inside the ‘House of Unity’, the SED’s headquarters in East Berlin, had been one of quiet confidence. Shortly before the elections, Pieck had announced 27 The SED’s results in the Land elections were as follows: Mecklenburg 49.5%, Thuringia 49.3%, Saxony 49.1%, Brandenburg 43.9%, Saxony-Anhalt 45.8%. See Gu¨nter Braun, ‘Wahlen und Abstimmungen’, 386, 397. See also Gu¨nter Braun, ‘Die Wahlen in der SBZ im Herbst 1946’, Parteiensystem zwischen Demokratie und Volksdemokratie: Dokumente und Materialien zum Funktionswandel der Parteien und Massenorganisationen in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1950, ed. by Hermann Weber (Cologne, 1982), 545–62. Martin McCauley, The German Democratic Republic since 1945 28 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 210–11. (London, 1983), 30–1. 29 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 30 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 557. 2/1/10. 31 Gu ¨ nter Braun, ‘Wahlen und Abstimmungen’, 389, 422. Martin McCauley, The German Democratic Republic, 31–2.

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that the SED would stand ‘a fair chance of winning a majority of the votes’.32 In the event, however, the SED leaders were forced to eat their words, with ZS member Matern, the head of the SED’s Berlin organization, declaring before the PV: ‘Let me say unequivocally: the result of the election was unexpected in this form. We had expected a larger number of votes for our party.’33 The SED’s hopes for a better result had not been completely unfounded. The communists had, after all, played a major role in the reconstruction of Berlin. Their Soviet-backed efforts to restore public order had kept disease and famine at bay, while creating jobs and housing as well as a basic system of welfare for people in need. Medical care, public transport, and the education system had all been restored, and unemployment was virtually unknown.34 Yet ordinary Berliners were still suffering from shortages, and they overwhelmingly blamed their plight on the SED as the dominant political force. Matern was right when he described the Berlin elections as ‘a protest vote against the present situation, for which we have been blamed’.35 Nor had the SED been helped by its close collaboration with the SMAD, which had bestowed a host of high-profile privileges on the party’s top brass, including the use of cars with Soviet number plates, and prompted the label ‘Russenpartei’ (‘party of the Russians’). The SPD and the bourgeois parties had shrewdly exploited this fact by holding the SED responsible for unpopular Soviet actions, such as the closure of the banks and the dismantling of German industry.36 Privately, SED leaders like Grotewohl acknowledged that anti-Soviet feelings had been a major factor in their party’s defeat: ‘The election results in Berlin show more clearly than anything that our relationship with the Soviet occupation force has had an adverse effect on [the fortunes of] our party.’37 The outcome of the Berlin elections was extremely alarming for the SED, since it called into question the party’s ability to perform its assigned task—to assume nationwide political leadership under the 32 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 555–6. For further evidence of SED optimism on the eve of the Berlin elections, see Elke Scherstjanoi, ‘Die Berliner Arbeiterschaft vor den Wahlen im Oktober 1946: Eine Moskauer ZK-Kommission befragt Hermann Matern’, BzG 38/3 (1996), 59–88. 33 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 34 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 213–14. 2/1/10. 35 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/ 1/10. 36 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 558. See also Gu ¨ nter Braun, ‘Determinanten der Wahlentscheidungen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone 1946. Problemskizze’, Deutsche Studien 24 (1986), 341–57. 37 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/10.


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conditions of a bourgeois democratic regime. Matern admitted as much when he complained that the SED’s result in the German capital was ‘also alarming from the point of view of the situation in Germany as a whole’.38 This was all the more true given the communists’ persistent weakness in the Western zones. In the American zone, where Kreis elections had been held between March and May 1946, the KPD’s share of the votes had increased since the disastrous Gemeinde elections in January, but it still ranged well below 10 per cent.39 In the British and the French zones, where Gemeinde and Kreis elections had taken place in September and October,40 the picture was equally grim. Analysing the latest election results before the PV, Grotewohl pointed out that overall the strongest party in Germany was the CDU, with 34.5 per cent of the votes, followed by the SPD with 23 per cent, the SED/KPD with 16.8 and 4.8 per cent, respectively, the Liberals with 12.5 per cent, and some others with 7 to 8 per cent. What this meant was that in a united Germany even a coalition of all working-class parties would not command an absolute majority. Indeed, Grotewohl went out of his way to spell out the implications of his analysis when he added: ‘From the point of view of the working-class parties, the chance of winning a majority looks rather slim.’41 The steady rise of the CDU was all the more serious from a communist point of view, since that party was becoming increasingly rightwing. Whereas Jakob Kaiser and other protagonists of the CDU’s Berlin organization came from a trade union background and openly advocated a socialist regime, albeit one based on Christian rather than Marxist principles, the CDU leaders in the Rhineland, to whom the party’s centre of gravity had increasingly shifted, were all members of the upper bourgeoisie and, as such, firmly opposed to radical social change.42 Addressing the ZS, on 25 September 1946, Reimann, the head of the KPD’s Ruhr organization, complained: Only a year ago it seemed as if the developments in the Western CDU would enable the trade union secretaries of the former Christian trade unions as well as other bourgeois democratic groups to clinch the leadership [of that party]. [However,] what we have seen during the last three quarters [of this year] is that 38

Ibid. According to Sperling and Fisch the new figures were 3.7% for Bavaria and 8.9% for Greater Hesse. 2nd meeting of the PV, 14/15 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 40 Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung, 547–60. 30/IV 2/1/2. 41 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/10. 42 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, From Shadow to Substance, 114–16. 39

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chairmen and executives from the boards of industry are joining the CDU and [are] systematically taking over the leadership.43

Equally disturbing were signs of growing confidence on the part of the SPD, whose fiercely anti-communist functionaries had been emboldened by the communists’ humiliating election results. Reimann warned that the mood in SPD circles was one of triumph, with many social democrats privately saying: ‘Schumacher was right . . . !’44

T H E SED ’ S 1 94 6 DR AF T C O N S T I T UT I O N The disappointing outcome of the 1946 elections gave rise to considerable tension within the SED, culminating in calls for a change in the party’s strategy.45 Yet these calls were swiftly silenced by a party leadership determined to stick to its course. At the 5th meeting of the PV, Pieck angrily dismissed the suggestion that the SED might have to distance itself from the SMAD, denouncing it as ‘a total misunderstanding of our work’.46 Criticism from the Western comrades, whose constant humiliation at the hands of the SPD had caused them to despair of the united-front approach, met with an equally robust response when, at the 8th meeting of the PV, Grotewohl sternly announced that there was ‘no reason to embark on a so-called critical examination of our stance’. While admitting that there was still a discrepancy between the SED’s ideological precepts and political reality, he insisted—to cheers from his audience—that the last eighteen months had thoroughly vindicated the party’s approach and shown beyond doubt ‘that our basic beliefs are correct’.47 This did not mean, however, that the SED leaders were entirely clear about their next moves. Compounding their lack of direction was the fluid state of inter-Allied relations, which made it difficult to predict when, if at all, a peace settlement for Germany would be achieved. Addressing the PV in October 1946, Grotewohl concluded that it was still unclear when the 43 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, 44 Ibid. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35. 45 Andreas Malycha, Partei von Stalins Gnaden? Die Entwicklung der SED zur Partei neuen Typs in den Jahren 1946 bis 1950 (Berlin, 1996), 74–81. 46 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/8. 47 8th meeting of the PV, 22/23 January 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV /21/14.


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‘German problem’, as he called it, would eventually be solved. He told the assembled comrades that serious talks on a peace treaty for Germany could not be expected to begin before January 1947. His assessment was echoed by Pieck, who told the same gathering: ‘Given the differences that exist between the Allies on this issue, we should assume that it will be several months before an agreement on a future peace settlement for the German people can be reached.’48 Recent international developments suggested that the gulf between East and West was wider than ever. To be sure, the Allied powers had co-operated fruitfully at the Paris Peace Conference (29 July– 15 October 1946), which had drafted the peace treaties for the five former German satellites.49 However, a marked feature of this conference, attended by delegates from twenty-one states, had been ‘the mechanical discipline of the bloc of states under Soviet influence’, which had, in turn, prompted the emergence of a Western bloc of states.50 Despite its successful conclusion, the conference had thus failed to heal the inter-Allied rift, the consequences of which were already becoming apparent in the form of a radical reorientation of American policy towards Germany. In line with the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff directive JCS 1067, that policy had originally been marked by a narrow preoccupation with punishment, but in the autumn of 1946, in response to the cooling of Soviet–Western relations, the Americans adopted a more constructive approach.51 Signalling this change was a speech by Byrnes delivered at Stuttgart, the capital of Wu¨rttemberg-Baden, on 6 September 1946. Addressing the minister-presidents of the four La¨nder of the American zone in what was effectively a reply to Molotov’s statement at the Paris CFM, the American Secretary of State announced that it was ‘the view of the American government that the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs’. The first step towards German self-rule, he explained, would be the creation of a ‘provisional German government for Germany’ in the form of a ‘German national council composed of democratically responsible minister-presidents or other chief officials of the several States or 48 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/10. 49 John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War (London, 1972), 432–6. 50 William H. McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, 721. 51 Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, From Shadow to Substance, 26–7, 175–8.

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provinces which have been established in each of the four zones’. This German ‘national council’ would be charged, among other things, ‘with the preparation of a draft of a federal constitution for Germany’.52 Byrnes’s proposals were anathema to the SED leaders, who viewed them as a capitalist ploy designed to turn Germany into a Western colony and a threat to Soviet security. Echoing renewed Soviet misgivings about Western intentions, ZS member Helmut Lehmann warned: ‘There is a great danger that Byrnes will try to harness the German people to the monopoly-capitalist designs of the United States and usher in a global rivalry with the Soviet Union.’53 There were fears in Berlin that support for federalism might spread to the SBZ and undermine the SED’s authority. Fuelling those fears was the realization, expressed by Grotewohl at the 6th meeting of the PV, that the impact of the SED’s ‘Basic Rights’ had as yet been ‘not as strong as we would have liked . . . ’.54 Worse still, as Grotewohl explained at the 7th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, there was a danger that one of the other parties might seize the initiative and unveil a draft constitution for Germany in time for the forthcoming meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in New York.55 The SED leaders acted swiftly to forestall such a development. On 15 November 1946, Neues Deutschland published a draft constitution for a ‘German Democratic Republic’, approved by the PV at its 7th (extraordinary) meeting on the previous day. Echoing the SED’s ‘Basic Rights’, the document condemned all moves towards federalism, while calling for the establishment of a German central government within the framework of a democratic people’s regime.56 To advertise the SED’s new initiative, Neues Deutschland orchestrated a formal ‘constitutional debate’, publishing fourteen one-page articles on the draft constitution as well as dozens of letters from readers expressing their support.57 Complemented by the issuing of anti-federalist constitutions 52 ‘American Policy on Germany: Speech by the Hon. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, at Stuttgart, September 6, 1946’; International Conciliation, No. 424 (October 1946), 475, 477. See also James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 187–8. Hans-Dieter Kreikamp, ‘Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik im Herbst 1946 und die Byrnes-Rede in Stuttgart’, VfZG 29/2 (1981), 269–85. 53 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/8. 54 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/10. 55 7th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 14 November 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, 56 Neues Deutschland, 15 November 1946. DY 30/IV 2/1/12. 57 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 17–26.


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for the La¨nder and provinces in the SBZ,58 the release of the SED’s draft constitution was an important step towards the formal establishment of a communist-controlled German state. Addressing the 7th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, Ulbricht explained that, despite having been modelled on the constitution of Weimar, the new document had broken fresh ground as a result of going ‘far beyond’ its predecessor. The main difference, Ulbricht pointed out, was that the draft constitution had abolished the separation of powers between parliament, the executive and the judiciary, providing instead for a regime under which the ‘people’s parliament’—which was to include not only the three parties but also the mass organizations—would constitute ‘the only and ultimate source of power’.59 The purpose of this arrangement could not be in doubt. At the 5th meeting of the PV, Ulbricht had warned his fellow comrades against the dangers of a ‘formal democracy’ and called for the creation of a ‘progressive democracy’ in which the SED, through its domination of parliament via the mass organizations, would be totally free to carry out its policies. Grotewohl, using a language that belied his social democratic origins, had voiced similar views, insisting that what mattered for the SED was the ‘social transformation’ which had taken place in the SBZ and which had found expression ‘in the political impotence and the economic weakness of the bourgeoisie . . . ’. Like Ulbricht, he had made it clear that the SED would not be content with a Western-style regime, proclaiming: ‘ . . . our aim is socialism, and our method is the seizure of political power; these are the basic principles of our work (das A und O unserer Arbeit) which cannot be altered in any way by our [system of] bloc politics’.60 Statements such as these raise the question just how the SED leaders were hoping to achieve acceptance of their constitutional principles (which enshrined the industrial expropriations as well as the land reform)61 in the Western zones. The truth seems to be that, in the short term at least, the SED leaders had no such hopes and that their draft constitution was designed primarily as an instrument for the 58 Gerhard Braas, ‘Verfassungsgebung auf Landes- und zonaler Ebene’, SBZ-Handbuch, 359–65. Gerhard Braas, Die Entstehung der La¨nderverfassungen in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1946/47 (Cologne, 1987), 31–128. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die Verfassungsgebung in der SBZ 1946–1949’, PolZG B32–3/1998, 30–3. 59 7th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 14 November 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/12. 60 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/8. 61 Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 1, 114–37.

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consolidation of the SBZ. Pieck left his fellow comrades in no doubt about the SED’s priorities when, in September 1946, he told the 5th meeting of the PV: ‘It is in the existing La¨nder and provinces in the Soviet-occupied zone that we must try to lay the foundations for the establishment of a [German] state and draft a constitution or, more precisely, install a democratic regime that reflects our views.’62 In the same vein, Grotewohl had previously hinted that life within the different occupation zones would develop ‘very differently’, suggesting that the new state the SED was determined to build would be confined, at least initially, to the SBZ.63 Indeed, the SED leaders did not expect their draft constitution to make a great impact on the Western zones. Addressing the 7th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, Grotewohl admitted that outside the SBZ the release of the document would have no immediate consequences apart from enabling the party to score ‘a great moral victory . . . ’.64 The SED leaders had by no means abandoned earlier hopes of extending their regime to the Western zones. Yet, rather than being directed towards the near future, as they had been before, these hopes now rested upon assumptions about long-term developments. Foremost among them was the assumption that federalism would hamper the economic development of the Western zones and, in doing so, eventually convince the people there of the need to establish a united Germany along the lines advocated by the SED. As Grotewohl explained: People will blame the inevitable [economic] difficulties on the federal structures set up in the West, and in a few years time, when there are thirteen instead of one fatherlands, all progressive people in the West will realize that the reason for the economic difficulties lies in the division (Zerschneidung) of Germany.65

THE ‘A RBE I TSG E ME I NSCH A F T SED–KPD ’ The ongoing division of Germany raised the question of whether the SBZ should be turned into a separate state, but this was a step which the Kremlin was not yet prepared to take. After all, inter-Allied negotiations 62 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/8. 63 3rd meeting of the PV, 18/20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4. 64 7th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 14 November 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/12. 65 3rd meeting of the PV, 18/20 June 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/4.


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were continuing at the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met in New York from 4 November to 12 December 1946 to finalize the peace treaties with the five former German satellites. The German Question was not discussed on this occasion, but the foreign ministers agreed to tackle it at their next meeting, to be held in Moscow in March 1947.66 In these circumstances, the SED leaders were urged to show restraint. On 26 December 1946, the SMAD advised the German comrades that it could see ‘as yet no benefit/[in a] zonal government’.67 That these instructions reflected not the SMAD’s whims but official Kremlin policy became clear when, between 30 January and 7 February 1947, the top four SED leaders—Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, and Fechner (accompanied by Fred Oelßner, who acted as an interpreter)—travelled to Moscow for consultations with the Soviet leadership. There Grotewohl, who acted as the SED’s spokesman, was firmly rebuffed by Stalin when, during a three-hour meeting between the SED leaders and top Soviet officials on 31 January, he suggested that in response to the creation of central bizonal agencies in the Western zones, which had taken place a few weeks before, a central agency should be established in the SBZ.68 However, the discussions that were held at this meeting also show that one should not exaggerate the gap that existed between the Kremlin’s position and that of the SED. For, although the Soviet comrades would clearly have liked to see the creation of central agencies for the whole of Germany, they were extremely doubtful whether this could be achieved. Thus Molotov explained that, in accordance with the Potsdam Protocol, the Soviet Union would continue to press for the establishment of central German administrative departments as the first step towards the creation of a German central government. Yet he warned that this policy would fail if, as was likely, the Western Allies refused to co-operate. Stalin too was pessimistic about the prospects for FRUS 1946, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 1481–90. ‘Besprechung am 23. 12. 1946 um 12 Uhr in Karlshorst’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 68 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 30. 1.–7. 2. 1947’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/694. More comprehensive records of the discussions in Moscow—tallying with Pieck’s notes—have been discovered in the archives of the Soviet Central Committee. See Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordjugov, ‘Stalin und die SBZ: Ein Besuch der SED-Fu¨hrung in Moskau vom 30. Januar–7. Februar 1947’, VfZG 42/2 (1994), 279–303. On the creation of central agencies in the Bizone, see Wolfgang Benz, Die Gru¨ndung der Bundesrepublik: Von der Bizone zum souvera¨nen Staat (3rd edn., Munich, 1989), 52–61. 66 67

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German central agencies, claiming that Britain and the United States were trying to divide Germany in a cynical attempt to enslave it and prevent it from becoming an economic rival: ‘Instead of a united Germany—[the Western Allies are promoting] federalism and separatism, for this equals [German] weakness.’ And he stressed that if efforts to establish a German central government were to fail, a central government would have to be created ‘in the Soviet zone’, although this would be ‘the less desirable option’.69 In trying to prove the existence of a Soviet–SED rift over the issue of central agencies for the SBZ, Loth has pointed to Soviet efforts to revive the faltering negotiations at the ACC.70 However, as Jochen Laufer has shown with the help of Soviet documents,71 claims that in late 1946 and early 1947 the Kremlin was ready to make substantial concessions to the Western Allies in order to end the de facto division of Germany are grossly exaggerated. To be sure, in August 1946, V. D. Sokolovsky, Zhukov’s successor as head of the SMAD, privately told Clay that the Soviet Union was eager to break the deadlock that prevented Germany from being treated as an economic unit, suggesting that Moscow might scale down dismantling and raise German production, the limits of which should be set more generously under a new Level of Industry Plan. However, Sokolovsky’s proposals were never formally submitted to the ACC, and in the weeks that followed, Soviet officials resumed their obstructive tactics, withholding vital information on the economy of the SBZ and ostentatiously rejecting reports in the Western press that they were interested in joining the Anglo-American Bizone.72 Similarly, negotiations at the ACC on the admission of all-German political parties, revived at Moscow’s suggestion after the Paris CFM, were suspended in October 1946, after French objections to a proposed compromise formula had once again prompted Soviet officials to harden their line.73 Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the Kremlin was prepared to abandon the SED. To be sure, at his meeting with the SED leaders on 31 January 1947, Stalin argued that the SPD should be readmitted into the SBZ in order to remove Western objections to the licensing of the 69

Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordjugov, ‘Stalin und die SBZ’, 299–300. Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 79–80. 71 Jochen Laufer, ‘Konfrontation’, 71–80. See also, Konstantin I. Koval, ‘Mein Treffen mit General Draper im Juli 1947: Mit Anmerkungen von Jochen Laufer und Rainer Karlsch’, BzG 37/2 (1995), 41–68. 72 Jochen Laufer, ‘Konfrontation’, 71–80. 73 See Dietrich Staritz, ‘Parteien’, 257–62. 70


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SED in the Western zones. Grotewohl’s insistence that there was ‘no need’ to license the SPD in the SBZ was brushed aside by the Soviet dictator, who sternly remarked: ‘She must be admitted’. However, far from reflecting a fundamental change in Soviet strategy, Stalin’s proposal was inspired by the belief that the readmission of the SPD would constitute no real threat to the SED. Concerns voiced by the visiting SED leaders failed to convince the Soviet dictator, who somewhat naively inquired ‘What is there to fear?’ and who expressed the hope that the SPD could be defeated via the SED’s propaganda.74 Indeed, the Soviet dictator renewed his commitment to the SED by stressing the importance of extending the party to the Western zones, where its existence would, as he put it, ‘make it easier’ for many workers to ‘join [the forces of] socialism’.75 Stalin evidently believed that the SED’s failure to become the dominant political force throughout Germany was the result of a capitalist conspiracy, rather than a reflection of the party’s limited popularity. He agreed with Grotewohl’s suggestion that the SED might be able to split the bourgeoisie in the Western zones, hinting that it might be possible to separate the ‘genuinely patriotic elements’ from the ‘forces of fascism’ and draw the former into the Anti-Fascist Bloc. He also endorsed the SED’s plan to call for a nationwide referendum on German unity.76 This idea had been developed by the SED leaders in the autumn of 1946 following Molotov’s suggestion at the Paris CFM that the German Question should be resolved in accordance with ‘the real desire of the German people’ as manifested in a ‘plebiscite’.77 At the 5th meeting of the PV, in September 1946, Grotewohl had explained that a referendum could be effectively highlighted in the SED’s propaganda, thereby enabling the SED to ‘make an impression on broad sections of the German bourgeoisie’, increase the party’s popularity ‘among broad sections of the peasantry’, and, finally, ‘bring the issue of national unity and the unity of the German working class to a conclusion in the Western zones’.78 Stalin apparently shared this view. When, at his meeting with the SED leaders on 31 January 1947, 74

Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordjugov, ‘Stalin und die SBZ’, 299. Stalin explained: ‘It would be good if we had the Socialist Unity Party in the western zones.’ Ibid. 76 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 30. 1.–7. 2. 1947’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/694. 77 FRUS 1946, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 870. 78 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/8. 75

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Grotewohl maintained that in a referendum some 30 million voters— out of a total of 50 million—would back the SED’s call for German unity, the Soviet dictator wondered whether the total number ‘might not be greater than 30 mill[ion] . . . ’.79 The Kremlin’s refusal to abandon the quest for a German central government raised the prospect of an inter-Allied deal over Germany— possibly involving the admission of all-German political parties—at the forthcoming Moscow CFM. According to Pieck, it was ‘perfectly possible that the Control Council will soon decide to give the existing anti-fascist parties an opportunity to extend their activities across [the] whole of Germany’. While he admitted that such a development would pose a problem for the SED, since it might lead to the readmission of the SPD into the SBZ, he believed that the risks were far outweighed by the opportunities, in particular the opportunity for the SED ‘to campaign legally in the Western occupation zones’.80 It was against this background that the SED leaders launched a fresh attempt to establish their party in the Western zones. On 14 February 1947, at a specially convened meeting of the PV, an SED– KPD working group, the so-called ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED-KPD’, was formed as a nucleus of a nationwide SED.81 Led by a Berlin-based steering committee (the so-called ‘Zentraler Ausschuß’’)—which was linked to liaison bureaus at each of the KPD’s three zonal head offices (known as ‘Zonenleitungen’)82—the AG further tightened the SED’s hold on the KPD, who had so far preserved a modicum of independence. This independence had increasingly irritated the communists in Berlin, who were generally unimpressed by their West German comrades, whom they apparently regarded as ‘politically second- and third-rate’.83 There was a tendency among the SED leaders to blame the KPD’s misfortunes not only on external factors, such as British and American occupation policy, but also on what was seen as the KPD’s incompetence. In particular, there was a feeling that the

‘Reise nach Moskau vom 30. 1.–7. 2. 1947’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/694. 10th meeting of the PV, 26/27 March 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/18. 81 Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 54–5. Michael Kubina, ‘ ‘‘Was in dem einen Teil verwirklicht werden kann mit Hilfe der Roten Armee’’ ’, 427–35. 82 The Zentraler Ausschuß was made up of eight leading SED functionaries (Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, Fechner, Dahlem, Gniffke, Ka¨the Kern, and Elli Schmidt) as well as eight leading representatives of the KPD. See Ulrich Hauth, Die Politik, 123–7. 83 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 225. 79 80


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Western comrades had failed to rid themselves of the old ultra-leftist stance now condemned as ‘sectarianism’. At a meeting of the ZS on 25 September 1946, Ulbricht had told his fellow comrades—to calls of ‘hear, hear!’—‘that our party leaderships in Western Germany have made a mistake in failing to condemn the sectarian deviations [that have occurred] in our party and in failing to warn the membership against the potential dangers [of these deviations]’.84 Stalin appears to have been of a similar mind. At his meeting with the SED leaders on 31 January 1947, he had warned that the KPD’s approach was too radical, adding: ‘That puts many workers off.’85 Designed to bring the KPD firmly into line with the SED, the AG was expected to change that. To be sure, mindful of the failure of previous attempts to bring about working-class unity in the Western zones, the SED leaders did not believe that they could engineer a formal KPD–SPD merger of the kind that had established the SED in the SBZ. Addressing the PV, on 14 February 1947, Grotewohl explained that ‘notwithstanding the current tensions within the Social Democratic Party and the conflict between its different wings’ there was ‘no possibility of achieving a formal merger with the SPD’.86 However, the SED leaders did believe in the possibility of achieving working-class unity from below. Grotewohl was convinced that the SPD was dogged by ‘profound differences of opinion’ made worse by ‘personal animosities’. He claimed that the SPD leadership was out of touch with its own grass roots, a situation that would allow the SED to make substantial inroads into the SPD’s ranks and poach ‘large chunks of the soc[ial] dem[ocratic] workers’. Similarly, Lehmann predicted that the founding of the SED in the Western zones would speed up the disintegration of the SPD, which would split up along the fault-line between its ‘socialist’ and its ‘petty bourgeois’ wing.87 The SED leaders acknowledged that, given the strength of anticommunist feelings within the SPD, nationwide working-class unity could not be achieved overnight. However, they insisted that it would

84 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35. 85 Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordjugov, ‘Stalin und die SBZ’, 299. 86 9th meeting of the PV, 14 February 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/16. 87 Ibid.

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come about eventually as a result of economic chaos and social upheaval in the Western zones. Thus Grotewohl believed that . . . the conversion of the soc[ial] democratic masses can probably not be achieved solely through ideological persuasion (durch eine geistige Auseinandersetzung), but that it will be strongly influenced and encouraged by the social situation in which we now live, by the emerging social tensions . . . 88

Similarly, Reimann, the head of the KPD’s Ruhr organization, was convinced ‘that the violent social tensions and other developments that will occur in the future will take us a giant step ahead’.89 His speeches before the PV left Pieck in no doubt that the Western zones were heading towards social ‘explosions’ and that the SED could await further developments there ‘with confidence’.90 These hopes were not wholly unfounded, given the vast economic problems that did exist in the Western zones. Foremost among them were the shortage of accommodation and the scarcity of food. At the end of the war, 45 per cent of residential housing in the Western zones was either damaged or destroyed—a much higher percentage than in the SBZ, which had suffered less under Allied aerial bombardment. As a consequence, economic recovery was hampered, since in many industrial areas urgently needed labour could not be housed. Even worse—because it was more difficult to solve—was the problem of food. Although food shortages affected people throughout Germany, the situation was particularly bad in the Western zones, which had a higher population density and a lower level of indigenous food production per head of population than did the SBZ.91 Allied rationing and large-scale food imports from overseas failed to resolve the crisis, as did the bizonal merger of January 1947, which had been marred by a lack of co-ordination and a sluggish bureaucracy.92 Indeed, after one of the harshest winters ever recorded in Germany, the food situation in the Bizone actually worsened in early 1947, giving rise to outbreaks of social unrest. In February 1947, there were strikes and demonstrations by 15,000 miners and Krupp 88 8th meeting of the PV, 22/23 January 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/14. 89 9th meeting of the PV, 14 February 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/16. 90 10th meeting of the PV, 26/27 March 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/18. 91 Alan Kramer, The West German Economy, 1945–1955 (New York, 1991), 71–82. Anthony J. Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, 122–3. 92 Gu ¨ nter Trittel, ‘Die westlichen Besatzungsma¨chte und der Kampf gegen den Mangel 1945–49’, PolZG B22/1986, 20–5.


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engineering workers in Essen as part of a wave of protest that was to climax on 3 April 1947 in a 24-hour general strike of the Ruhr miners.93 In these circumstances, claims that the Western zones would soon be facing economic collapse did not seem far-fetched. Indeed, they were supported by the SED’s Economics Department, which, in a detailed memorandum on the West German economy, concluded: The capitalist economy of the West is locked in a process of degeneration . . . Whereas in early 1946 one could encounter enormous optimism—fuelled by the occupying powers—in the business community of the Western parts of Germany, this [optimism] quickly turned into despair during the remainder of the year. Today opinion differs only on the timing of the expected catastrophe.94

A similar view was taken by the PV, which erupted into laughter when, at its 8th meeting, in January 1947, Ulbricht ridiculed Schumacher’s ‘magnet theory’: Schumacher has the cheek . . . to say: the bizonal project must generate a socioeconomic magnetism that attracts the other zones. (Laughter [from the audience].) I think, millions will be laughing when they read this. Just imagine, [to think of] this crisis as a magnetic force!95

Similarly, there were exuberant calls of ‘hear, hear!’ when, at the same meeting, Grotewohl insisted that, ‘now that the entire economic development and [all] the political conflicts are going our way, we only have to show a little patience in this matter’.96 Some members of the PV were none the less sceptical about the SED’s prospects in the west. Fisch, the Hessian KPD chairman, urged his fellow comrades not to fall prey to illusions, but to face up to the fact ‘that, organizationally, the Social Democratic Party is still a relatively solid bloc’. The most powerful voice of dissent was that of Ackermann, who actively opposed the founding of the AG—becoming the only member of the PV to vote against it—on the grounds that it would fail to have the desired effect, while making the SED more vulnerable than ever to the charge that it was merely a front for the KPD.97 However, Ackermann was a voice in the wilderness, and the SED leadership wasted no time in Alan Kramer, The West German Economy, 83–4. Wolfgang Benz, Gru¨ndung, 61–2. ‘Die Wirtschaft im Westen. Gegenwa¨rtiger Zustand–die Folgerungen’, memorandum drawn up by the SED’s Economics Department, 21 January 1947, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4090/630. 95 8th meeting of the PV, 22/23 January 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 96 Ibid. 2/1/14. 97 9th meeting of the PV, 14 February 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/16. 93 94

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carrying out its new plans. On 1 March 1947, the PV issued a statement urging ‘all those communists, social democrats, [and] progressive people in West and South Germany . . . who are in favour of the freedom of the workers’ movement, the unity of Germany, [and] the victory of socialism’ to unite and establish the SED in the Western zones.98 During the following weeks, the SED unleashed a massive propaganda campaign for nationwide working-class unity, which culminated (in March and in Apri/May) in two trips by prominent SED leaders—led by Pieck and Grotewohl—to the American zone (the only Western zone accessible to the SED leaders, since the authorities in the British zone had refused to lift an existing ban on visits by Pieck and Grotewohl—imposed in the summer of 1946 in retaliation against the suppression of the SPD in the SBZ—and the authorities in the French zone had withdrawn travel permits previously granted to Gniffke and Dahlem).99 Following a meeting on 10 March 1947 between representatives of the KPD’s Zonenleitungen and the SED’s PV (and in line with that meeting’s recommendations), the KPD’s Land organizations formally adopted the ‘Principles and Aims’ at their first formal meetings, held between March and May 1947, and officially annexed themselves to the SED.100 However, hopes that these measures would pave the way for an all-German Socialist Unity party controlled from Berlin were short lived. For, as before, the KPD proved incapable of winning significant support from non-communists, even though the KPD’s Land conferences were attended by a small number of social democratic and non-partisan delegates.101 Consequently, the Western military authorities refused to recognize that the product of the latest communist unity drive was anything other than the old KPD. In early May 1947, OMGUS, the American Military Government in Germany, ruled that any name change from KPD to SED was illegal, since it falsely implied a formal KPD–SPD merger. In the same vein, the British military authorities subsequently turned down requests by the KPD in their zone to change its name to SED.102 In refusing to recognize the SED in their zones, the Western powers could also cite the absence of an inter-Allied agreement on the Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 1, 166. Ulrich Hauth, Die Politik, 128–30, 144–6. 100 Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 56–9. Werner Mu ¨ ller, KPD, 328–35. 101 Of the 808 delegates who attended the KPD’s Land convention in North-RhineWestphalia, 213 were non-communists. See Ulrich Hauth, Die Politik, 135–6. 102 Udo Vorholt and Volker Zaib, ‘Zur Deutschlandpolitik der SED in den Jahren 1947/48: Die SED-Gru¨ndungskomitees in der britischen Besatzungszone’, DA 28/12 (1995), 1286–88. 98 99


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admission of all-German political parties. The Moscow CFM, held between 10 March and 24 April 1947, had failed to produce such an agreement, despite some earlier hopes to the contrary.103 Indeed, while seemingly narrowing the gap between the Allies—all of whom, including France, were now in favour of establishing German central agencies—the conference had once again highlighted the Allies’ inability to agree on a peace settlement for Germany. Thus Molotov’s opposition to federalism, and his suggestion that the Weimar Republic might serve as a constitutional model for post-war Germany, had been firmly rejected by Bevin and Bidault, who obviously feared a re-run of 1933. Similarly, his call for a referendum on the choice between a centralized and a federal Germany had been rebuffed by his Western colleagues, who, as Bevin had explained, were in no mood to submit the policies of their countries to the whims of a people that had voted in large numbers for Hitler. Conversely, a detailed British proposal backed by the new American Secretary of State, George Marshall, the so-called ‘Bevin Plan’, had failed to pass muster with Molotov, since it rejected Moscow’s demand for the payment of $10 billion in reparations and the creation of a four-power regime in the Ruhr.104 While the inconclusive outcome of the Moscow CFM meant that the SED would not have to fear a readmission of the SPD into the SBZ, it also meant—for the time being at least—that the SED would not be able to gain a foothold in the Western zones. The SED leaders therefore advised their West German comrades to concentrate on promoting working-class unity via loosely organized SED ‘founding committees’ and—in places where these committees were banned by the military authorities, as happened in May 1947 in the American zone—via similar groups labelled ‘friends of unity’.105 However, the SED leaders did not expect quick results. At the 11th meeting of the PV, in May 1947, Pieck suggested that there would be no significant change in the political situation in Germany until the next meeting of the CFM, scheduled to take place in London in November 1947. The intervening months, he explained, were ‘a kind of transition period’ which the SED and its West German comrades would have to use as imaginatively as possible. He gave a warning that the division of Germany would be sealed if the London CFM were to fail as well: ‘If our assumption proves wrong and the November conference does not reach such an agreement 103 104

Dietrich Staritz, ‘Parteien’, 262–7. Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War, 26–7. 105 Werner Mu ¨ ller, KPD, 336–49. Elisabeth Kraus, Ministerien, 297–319.

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[i.e., one that preserves German unity], we will have to take new decisions in the light of the new situation.’106 THE SED AND THE MUNICH MINISTER-PRESIDENTS’ CONFERENCE While, in the spring of 1947, the SED leaders were not ruling out the possibility of a last-minute inter-Allied deal over Germany, they regarded its chances as extremely small. At the 11th meeting of the PV, in May 1947, Fechner declared that the Moscow CFM had highlighted the differences of opinion between the Allied powers ‘with a degree of clarity . . . that has not existed hitherto’.107 Similarly, his colleague Lehmann had previously warned that Soviet–Western differences over Germany were based on conflicting ‘material interests’ and thus almost impossible to resolve.108 However, Pieck believed that, in view of the unpredictable consequences of a long-term division of Germany, the Western Allies might yet decide to pull back from the brink and make further concessions to Moscow in a desperate bid for a compromise: ‘If Germany is to be split up into two parts, there will be a new situation which we cannot yet assess. [Yet] I doubt very much whether the others [i.e., the Western Allies] will allow this to happen. The situation in November may look very different from the situation we have today.’109 Aware that these developments were beyond their control, the SED leaders decided to take no chances and press ahead with the consolidation of the SBZ, convinced, as Grotewohl said, that their future success would depend not least on their ability to create a ‘sound economic basis’ for their policies.110 Unlike before, this approach now met with approval from Moscow. As early as September 1946, Ulbricht had written to the Soviet Politburo to suggest that responsibility for the running of the German economy be transferred to German agencies ‘not later than 1 January 1947’, only to be told—via Karlshorst—that the time for such a dramatic step had not yet come.111 Half a year later, 106

11th meeting of the PV, 21/22 May 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/20. Ibid. 10th meeting of the PV, 26/27 March 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/18. 109 11th meeting of the PV, 21/22 May 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/20. 110 9th meeting of the PV, 14 February 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/16. 111 Quoted in Jochen Laufer, ‘Auf dem Wege zur staatlichen Verselbsta ¨ndigung der SBZ. Neue Quellen zur Mu¨nchener Konferenz der Ministerpra¨sidenten 1947’, Historische Studien zur DDR-Forschung, 35. 107 108


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however, the situation had changed. The economic disruption caused by the unusually harsh winter of 1946–7 had highlighted the need for an effective central agency in the SBZ, a need which some members of the SMAD had privately acknowledged before.112 Furthermore, the creation of a state-controlled sector of the economy in 1946 had increased the importance of economic planning (introduced as early as 1945 and refined in 1946), all the more since it had become clear— after the failure of the Moscow CFM—that the Soviet Union’s outstanding reparation demands would have to be met entirely by the economy of the SBZ.113 A meeting at Karlshorst on 25 April 1947, in which Grotewohl and Ulbricht pleaded for a strengthening of the existing German Central Administrations, finally paved the way for the creation of an embryonic zonal government in the SBZ.114 On 4 June 1947, the SMAD issued its ‘Order No. 138’, which merged the six economically most important German Central Administrations—the administrations for industry, energy, trade, agriculture, transport, and a newly established administration for ‘inter-zonal and external trade’—into the German Economic Commission (DWK).115 This measure mirrored the latest developments in the West, where— in response to the Moscow CFM—Britain and the United States had taken steps to reorganize the Bizone. At the heart of this reorganization, completed in June 1947, lay the establishment of an Economic Council comprising 52 members and sitting in Frankfurt—effectively an embryonic parliament for a West German state.116 The choice of Frankfurt (situated in the American zone) as the de facto capital of the Bizone seriously alarmed the communists. At the 11th meeting of the 112 SMAD chief Sokolovsky had been convinced of the need to establish a central government for the SBZ as early as October 1946. See ibid., 36–7. 113 Economic activity in the SBZ had been controlled via SMAD ‘production orders’ since the summer of 1945, and via ‘quarterly plans’ since 1946. See Bernd Niedbalski, ‘Deutsche Zentralverwaltungen’, 462–72. Klaus Holzwarth, ‘Die Anfa¨nge der zentralen Wirtschaftsplanung in der SBZ’, Wirtschaftliche Folgelasten, 247–69. 114 Jochen Laufer, ‘Auf dem Wege’, 38. 115 Bernd Niedbalski, ‘Deutsche Zentralverwaltungen’, 458. Wolfgang Zank, ‘Wirtschaftliche Zentralverwaltungen und Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission (DWK)’, SBZ-Handbuch, 256–64. Christoph Boyer, ‘Die Kader entscheiden alles . . . ’: Kaderpolitik und Kaderentwicklung in der zentralen Staatsverwaltung der SBZ und der fru¨hen DDR (1945–1952) (Dresden, 1996), 11–18. 116 Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung, 384–90. Wolfgang Benz, Gru ¨ ndung, 66–70. Uwe Uffelmann, ‘Der Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat 1947–1949: Weichenstellungen fu¨r das politische Kra¨ftefeld und die Wirtschaftsordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, PolZG B37/1984, 36–46.

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PV, Sperling, the Bavarian KPD chairman, warned ‘that the policies of the American occupation authorities have triumphed over [those of] the English’. His view was echoed by Grotewohl, who told the same audience that the German problem was evidently overshadowed by ‘the great twentieth century struggle between capitalism and socialism’. The SED chairman warned that the capitalist camp had recently become more assertive as a result of the growing power of the United States, which had succeeded in reducing all other capitalist countries, including Britain, to the status of ‘vassals’. He claimed that the effects of this change could already be seen in Germany: in the recent scrapping of British plans for the nationalization of the Ruhr industries; in the decision not to license the SED in the Western zones; in the rise of federalism and, finally; in plans to hold a conference of the German minister-presidents in Munich, in the heart of the American zone.117 The SED leadership had long been in favour of German initiatives to preserve German unity. However, these were to take the form of a nationwide cross-party bloc that was to include the trade unions—a plan supported by Jakob Kaiser, the head of the Soviet-zone CDU, who had tried to promote it in the spring of 1947 with a call for a ‘National Representation’ but had failed to overcome the fierce resistance of both Schumacher and the West German CDU.118 An initiative by the heads of the German La¨nder, which promised the SED little leverage, was viewed very differently in Berlin, as had been shown in October 1946 by the SED’s refusal to attend the Bremen inter-zonal conference. Consequently, the proposal to hold a conference of the German minister-presidents in Munich from 6 to 7 June 1947, made in early May 1947 by the minister-president of Bavaria, Hans Ehard,119 found no favour with the SED’s top brass. Addressing the 11th meeting of the PV, Pieck asserted that such a conference would yield no benefits to the German people, and he reiterated that it was far more important to establish a nationwide cross-party bloc ‘because only the parties and 117 11th meeting of the PV, 21/22 May 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/20. For details on the developments in the western zones, see Rolf Steininger, ‘Reform und Realita¨t: Ruhrfrage und Sozialisierung in der anglo-amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik’, VfZG 27/2 (1979), 167–240. 118 Elmar Krautkra ¨mer, ‘Der innderdeutsche Konflikt um die Ministerpra¨sidentenkonferenz in Mu¨nchen 1947’, VfZG 20/2 (1972), 158–61. Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser: Politiker zwischen Ost und West, 1945–1949 (Stuttgart, 1969), 133–49. 119 Rolf Steininger, ‘Zur Geschichte der Mu ¨ nchener Ministerpra¨sidenten-Konferenz 1947’, VfZG 23/4 (1975), 377–81. Elmar Krautkra¨mer, ‘Erga¨nzende Bemerkungen zur Mu¨nchener Ministerpra¨sidenten-Konferenz 1947’, VfZG 20/4 (1972), 418–21.


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trade unions are truly qualified and entitled to speak on behalf of the German people’.120 The SED leaders were nevertheless unsure about how to respond to Ehard’s offer, since they feared that it might strike a responsive chord with the German public and win the support of the bourgeois ‘bloc’ parties. Gniffke recalls that there was a split within the ZS, many of whose members, especially the former social democrats, resented the uncompromising line advocated by Ulbricht.121 However, Soviet documents, including a detailed report by Tiulpanov, suggest that Gniffke’s account of this episode exaggerates the disunity and tension that did exist within the SED leadership. For much of the wrangling within the ZS appears to have been caused by disagreements over the tactical handling of Ehard’s offer and not, as Gniffke suggests, over the SED’s basic stance. Thus, while only three members of the ZS— Ulbricht, Ackermann, and Elli Schmidt—advocated a boycott of the proposed conference, several others—including Pieck and Grotewohl—were equally unenthusiastic, but feared that non-participation might result in a loss of face for the SED. Consequently, the compromise finally adopted by the ZS, at a turbulent meeting on 3 June 1947, combined a decision in favour of participation with a decision to sabotage the conference. The Soviet-zone minister-presidents (members of the SED with the exception of LDP member Erhard Hu¨bener of Saxony-Anhalt) were to travel to Munich, but they were to make their stay conditional upon the conference’s agenda being changed to include as its first item a discussion on initiatives by the ‘democratic’ parties and trade unions for the establishment of a German central government, a condition that stood no chance of acceptance by the West German minister-presidents.122 In failing to understand this manœuvre, which was secretly backed by the SMAD,123 Gniffke was not alone. By his own admission, Hu¨bener—who was seen in Berlin as less reliable than the SED minister-presidents, and who had not been kept fully informed—realized only afterwards ‘that my SED colleagues had gone to the conference with the firm intention of sabotaging it . . . ’.124 The swift walk-out of 120

11th meeting of the PV, 21/22 May 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/20. Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 235–41. 122 Jochen Laufer, ‘Auf dem Wege’, 39–52. 123 The SED minister-presidents, all of whom were former social democrats, received explicit ‘recommendations’ from Karlshorst which confirmed the instructions given to 124 Quoted ibid. them by the ZS. See ibid., 51–2. 121

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the East German minister-presidents which followed the blunt rejection of their demand (and which was led by Kurt Fischer, the deputy minister-president of Saxony and one of Ulbricht’s cronies)125 also puzzled the West German communists. At the 12th meeting of the PV, in early July 1947, Fisch, the Hessian KPD chairman, complained that he and his fellow comrades had been kept in the dark about the SED’s position towards the conference, only to be told by Pieck that the SED’s position had been clear from the start, and that the only question had been ‘whether we should walk out immediately or undertake a manœuvre to make sure that the other side gets the blame’. Fisch’s insistence that he would have preferred to be told in advance about the SED’s tactics drew a stinging rebuke from Ulbricht, who haughtily told him: ‘It is also part of our tactics that we didn’t make our position clear.’126 The failure of the Munich conference constituted a personal victory for Ulbricht, who used the 12th meeting of the PV to repeat his message that the SED must not be deflected from its goals, and that German unity could not be restored until the Western zones embraced the anti-fascist regime established in the SBZ: I would like to stress once again that, in connection with the struggle for German national unity, the struggle for democracy must be stepped up in all areas [of Germany] . . . . Our comrades must abandon their defensive approach. They must make it clear [to the people] that what has happened in the Soviet zone is nothing but the implementation of our all-German programme for Germany.127

According to one of his fellow comrades, the first few months after the end of the war had been ‘a difficult time’ for the man whom Ernst Tha¨lmann, the KPD chairman in the Weimar Republic, had once likened to a ‘hussar’ because of his tendency to be politically ‘always on the attack’.128 In 1945–6, Ulbricht had been forced to suppress this tendency because of the need to placate the social democrats and the bourgeois ‘bloc’ parties. Furthermore, according to Gniffke, he had been temporarily upstaged by Grotewohl, who had been openly backed by Semenov and Zhukov, and whose confidence had grown to the point where he began to patronize the elderly Pieck. Zhukov’s abrupt recall 125 Elmar Krautkra ¨mer, ‘Der innderdeutsche Konflikt’, 169–70. Rolf Steininger, ‘Mu¨nchener Ministerpra¨sidenten-Konferenz’, 420–42. Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 244–6. Regine Just, ‘Die Ministerpra¨sidentenkonferenz von Mu¨nchen 1947 und die Flu¨chtlingsfrage im Vier-Zonen-Deutschland: Erfahrungen und Entscheidungen im Lande Sachsen’, Studien zur Geschichte der SBZ/DDR, 142–6. 126 12th meeting of the PV, 1/3 July 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/22. 127 Ibid. 128 Ernst Wollweber, ‘Aus Erinnerungen’, 355–6.


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and replacement by Sokolovsky (in April 1946) had changed that.129 Under the SMAD’s new chief, who was more openly ideological than his predecessor, a strong supporter of Ulbricht—Tiulpanov—had become the key figure in Karlshorst, paving the way for Grotewohl’s eclipse and Ulbricht’s rise.130 However, it is misleading to suggest—as Gniffke does—that the subsequent hardening of the SED’s line was exclusively Ulbricht’s fault. For, although they may have lacked the aggressive instinct of the ‘hussar’, Ulbricht’s colleagues within the ZS generally shared his loathing of capitalism, as well as his view that the goals and policies of the SED must be different from those of the bourgeois SPD. Soviet officials who met the top four SED leaders—Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, and Fechner—during their visit to Moscow in early 1947 noted that all of them genuinely hated Schumacher.131 At the meetings of the PV, Ulbricht’s colleagues regularly expressed contempt for the SPD. Thus Pieck urged his fellow comrades, in the spring of 1947, to pay greater heed to ‘the revolutionary content of our democratic mass policy’,132 while the former social democrat Grotewohl warned against a relapse into what he described as ‘the mawkish opportunism of old’.133 Another former social democrat, Lehmann, similarly distanced himself from his bourgeois democratic past and bemoaned the fact that not all former social democrats had done likewise or, as he put it, ‘that many of them are still carrying around their reformist egg-shells’.134 Attitudes such as these may explain why support within the ZS for a hard line towards the Munich conference was stronger than Gniffke had deemed possible and was later prepared to admit. The ideological differences between the social democratic and the communist members of the ZS had shrunk dramatically as a result of the former social democrats 129 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 184–5. It is now clear that Zhukov’s demotion from head of the SMAD and chief of the Soviet ground forces to commander of the Odessa military district was engineered by Stalin in a bid to prevent the popular Soviet war hero from becoming a political rival. See Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster, paperback edn. (London, 1995), 311–12. See also, Jan Foitzik, Sowjetische Milita¨radministration, 124–5. 130 Tiulpanov’s role within the SMAD and his influence on SED policy-making are the subject of an ongoing debate. For details, see Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 318–21. 131 Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordjugov, ‘Stalin und die SBZ’, 303. 132 10th meeting of the PV, 26/27 March 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/18. 133 9th meeting of the PV, 14 February 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/16. 134 10th meeting of the PV, 26/27 March 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/18.

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becoming more left wing.135 Indeed, it was the former social democrat Fechner who proudly announced before the PV that, through the SED’s tactics, the federalist plot that was the Munich conference had been ‘exposed before the eyes of the German people and unmasked’. Notwithstanding the internal wrangling that had taken place within the ZS, none of its members had broken ranks. Consequently, Pieck could point out to the Western comrades that their criticism of the SED’s tactics revealed ‘by no means’ a disagreement between them and Ulbricht, but a disagreement between them and the entire ZS.136

THE SED’S 2ND CONGRESS Soviet officials at Karlshorst, who had secretly recommended a boycott of Ehard’s initiative,137 were not pleased with the SED’s handling of the Munich conference. When Pieck met Tiulpanov, on 11 July 1947, he was told: ‘[The] preparations [for the] Moscow conference were successful/as for [the] Munich conference/[our efforts were] not successful’. More specifically, Tiulpanov complained that the SED had been infiltrated by ‘Schumacher’s ideology’ and was riddled with self-doubts. He claimed that the prospect of a division of Germany had made some SED members afraid to see their party’s bid for power through. He also noted that there had been ‘vacillations within the PV owing to [fears over a possible re-] admission of the SPD in [the] Eastern zone’.138 Nor was this all. According to Pieck’s notes of this conversation, some people had been wondering ‘ . . . whether federalism [might not be]/better/than [a] division [of Germany] into two parts’, and they had asked themselves ‘whether [the SED should] distance [itself] from [the] SMA[D]’ and become ‘a party of opposition against [the] SMA[D]’.139 There have been claims that the people in question were the Soviet officials themselves, who had become increasingly disillusioned with their German allies.140 However, this interpretation is unconvincing. Since Tiulpanov’s remarks were part of a wider attack on 135 Andreas Malycha, ‘Die SED auf dem Weg zur Staatspartei: Wandlungen in ihrem Charakter und Selbstversta¨ndnis’, ‘Provisorium’, 280–1. 136 12th meeting of the PV, 1/3 July 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/22. 137 Jochen Laufer, ‘Auf dem Wege’, 44. Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 568. 138 ‘Bericht Tulpanows vom 11. 7. 1947 um 2 Uhr’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 139 Ibid. 4036/734. 140 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 91.


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the SED’s proneness to ‘ideological vacillations’, it would appear that the idea of a separation between SED and SMAD originated among the German comrades and, far from being espoused by the SMAD, was a cause of concern for Karlshorst. Tiulpanov’s worries were shared by Soviet officials in Moscow. In a letter to Molotov, dated 25 June 1947, A. A. Smirnov, a Soviet diplomat remembered by colleagues for his ability to think strategically,141 expressed concern over the fact that, in accepting Ehard’s invitation, the ZS had for the first time made a decision ‘against the votes of those members of the central leadership who have their roots in the former KPD’. Smirnov warned that ‘some of the former social democrats— including members of the central leadership of the Socialist Unity Party—are beginning to view the policies of the SMA[D] as being opposed to the true interests of the German people’. There was evidence, he claimed, that some members of the SED were succumbing to the influence of ‘Schumacher’s men’ as well as to that of equally dangerous ‘bourgeois nationalists’.142 There were indeed signs that relations between the German population and the Soviet occupiers, severely troubled from the start, had worsened in 1946–7. Gniffke recalls being shocked when, during a visit to Mecklenburg in May 1946, he was greeted by a ‘strongly anti-Soviet mood’, not only among ordinary people but also among members and local functionaries of the SED.143 The reasons for this wave of German Russophobia lay in the effects of Soviet occupation policy as well as in the behaviour of Soviet troops. Thus the Soviet Union was continuing to strip the SBZ’s economy bare, in spite of repeated promises by the SMAD that dismantling would end soon. This was happening at a time when the economic situation in the SBZ, like that in the Western zones, was still very tense due to widespread shortages which manifested themselves in low productivity.144 German anger at having to part with some of the country’s best and most valuable industrial equipment at a time of desperate need was boosted by tales that, on arrival in the Soviet Union, much of this equipment could not be properly reassembled and Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 87. Quoted in Jochen Laufer, ‘Auf dem Wege’, 49. 143 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 189. 144 Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt?, 66–81, 102–7. Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 164–5. See also Jochen Laufer, ‘Politik und Bilanz der sowjetischen Demontagen in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1950’, Sowjetische Demontagen in Deutschland 1944–1949: Hintergru¨nde, Ziele und Wirkungen, ed. by Rainer Karlsch (Berlin, 2002), 48–55. 141 142

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was simply left to rot.145 Adding to German bitterness was a general atmosphere of oppression characterized by lawlessness, random arrests, and the brutal persecution by officers of the NKVD, the Soviet ‘People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs’, of anyone suspected of antiSoviet activities or links. Equally damaging to German–Soviet relations was the fact that Soviet mass rapes of German women had continued after the establishment of the occupation regime.146 The SED leadership had been largely shielded from these developments and initially failed to take them seriously. Since the spring of 1946, the top SED leaders—Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, Dahlem, and Ackermann—had been living in relative isolation on a specially requisitioned luxury estate, complete with barbed-wire fences and Soviet guards, in the Berlin suburb of Hohenscho¨nhausen.147 As a consequence, they had become ever more dependent on party channels for their information—channels which, according to Gniffke, were often economical with the truth. The resulting ignorance of the SED leaders about the general mood in the SBZ—apparent in their wildly inflated hopes on the eve of the 1946 Berlin elections—was made worse by the fact that, as Gniffke recalls, all SED leaders were ‘willing to see progress wherever they could’ and ‘only too ready to accept rose-tinted reports as true’. Indeed, as Gniffke also recalls, dissent within the ZS was voiced mainly by minor SED leaders such as Otto Meier and August Karsten, both of whom were eclipsed by the SED’s heavyweights and rarely invited to the regular top-level meetings held at Karlshorst.148 However, there was widespread discontent among the SED’s rank and file, reflected in mounting tensions between the former social democrats and the former communists. These tensions had existed ever since the SED’s founding, in April 1946, with an internal SED report warning as early as May 1946 that many former social democrats were reluctant to embrace their new comrades and plagued by ‘very serious inhibitions’ about ‘the scientific teachings of 145

‘Diskussion mit den Zeitzeugen’, 227. Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 83–90. Peter Erler, Wilfriede Otto, and Lutz Prieß, ‘Sowjetische Internierungslager in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1950’, BzG 32/6 (1990), 723–34. Michael Klonovsky and Jan von Flocken, Stalins Lager in Deutschland 1945– 1950: Dokumentation–Zeugenberichte (Berlin, 1991), 11–51. Gu¨nter Braun and Gunter Ehnert, ‘Das Speziallager Buchenwald in einem zeitgeno¨ssischen Bericht: Ein seltenes Dokument und ein außergewo¨hnlicher Fall aus der Internierungspraxis des NKWD’, DA 28/2 (1995), 163–78. 147 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 162. Fritz Schenk, Im Vorzimmer der Diktatur: 12 Jahre 148 Eric W. Gniffke, Jahre, 220, 223. Pankow (Cologne, 1962), 233. 146


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Marxism–Leninism’.149 The frustration which many ex-social democrats felt about the SED’s domination by ex-communists had sharply increased under the impact of the occupation regime, forcing Pieck to concede, in May 1947, that the merger between the two parties had been hampered by what he described as ‘some inept measures taken by the commandants of the occupation force’.150 As Grotewohl had admitted at the 6th meeting of the PV, there were ‘SPD tendencies’ within the SED which were posing no lesser threat to working-class unity than communist sectarianism.151 This threat had been all the more serious because of the possibility of a readmission of the SPD into the SBZ, a possibility which, according to Lehmann, was viewed by many comrades ‘with some apprehension’.152 Karlshorst noted that preparations for the SED’s 2nd Congress (which the PV had earlier agreed to postpone until the autumn of 1947 to prevent it from clashing with the Moscow CFM, as well as the SPD’s Nuremberg conference, scheduled for late June/early July)153 were not going well. In a report drafted in mid-summer 1947, and passed on to the SED leadership, Soviet officials complained that attendance at SED membership meetings was poor (often no more than 30–50 per cent) and that most of these meetings were marked by ‘a low ideological [and] political standard’. Worse still, these meetings were being used as a platform for ‘hostile attacks by Schumacher’s men’, who were claiming that the KPD–SPD merger had happened too soon and that the SED lacked unity as a result of the behaviour of the former communists. There had also been attacks on the Soviet Union, which had been accused of having failed to exercise ‘international solidarity’, with some SED members claiming that there was ‘no difference’ between Soviet and Western occupation policy. Added to this had been attempts to disparage the teachings of Marx and achieve an ‘orientation towards Western democracy . . . ’.154 149 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber die Vereinigung der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands und der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands’, 6 May 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/1. 150 11th meeting of the PV, 21/22 May 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/20. 151 6th meeting of the PV, 24/25 October 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/10. 152 10th meeting of the PV, 26/27 March 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/18. 153 See Pieck’s concluding remarks at the 8th meeting of the PV 22/23 January 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/14. 154 ‘Sowjetische Einscha ¨tzung der Vorbereitungen zum 2. Parteitag, o. D., wahrscheinlich vom Juli 1947’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734.

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By late summer 1947, the SED leadership was forced to admit that there was a strong feeling of gloom, not only within the SED but among the entire population of the SBZ. At the 13th meeting of the PV, in August 1947, Ackermann, the most thoughtful of the SED leaders,155 gave a warning that he and his colleagues were in danger of losing touch: . . . for in the Parteivorstand too we have often discussed major political issues at great length, but what is happening out there in the country and [is] occupying the people, [or the fact] that the people’s mood keeps changing, and by no means always in our favour, these are things that have been mentioned very rarely, and [certainly] not sufficiently, in the Parteivorstand.156

He urged his fellow comrades not to repeat the fundamental mistake so often made by communists in the past and roundly condemned by Dimitrov at the Comintern’s 7th World Congress, namely ‘to mistake our wishes for the reality and to delude ourselves about what the masses really think’. He added that ordinary comrades had repeatedly told him: ‘Ackermann, you should travel more often by tram or by underground; you [top functionaries] don’t know what the people think!’157 Similarly, Dahlem later admitted that, in the summer of 1947, there had been a ‘wide gap’ between the mood of the SED’s functionaries and that of the SED’s grass roots, among whom there was ‘much depression and pessimism, doubts, sometimes resulting in a complete loss of faith, as to the party’s ability to solve the fundamental problems facing the [German] people, [and also] disappointment [due to the realization] that [some] promises have not been kept’.158 The growing unease felt in senior SED circles was echoed in a letter to Stalin which the SED leaders drafted shortly after the 13th meeting of the PV, on the eve of the SED’s 2nd Congress. An urgent request for ‘advice’ and ‘support’, the letter described the SED’s situation as ‘extremely serious’. Admitting that the SED’s ideological consolidation had failed to keep pace with the growth in the SED’s membership (from 1.3 million to 1.8 million in one year), the letter conceded that there had been ‘serious vacillations in our party’ in the form of both left-wing ‘sectarian tendencies’ and right-wing ‘opportunistic views’. Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 233. 13th meeting of the PV, 20/21 August 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 157 Ibid. 2/1/24. 158 3rd/17th meeting of the PV, 12/13 November 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/32. 155 156


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Compounding these vacillations, the letter explained, had been the difficult economic situation in the SBZ, which had resulted in shortages of food and other important goods, in particular ‘clothes’, ‘shoes’ and ‘coal’.159 Significantly, the SED leaders blamed their difficulties not on themselves but on the German masses, which they accused of failing to appreciate the benefits of the SED’s policies. Displaying the very arrogance which Ackermann had condemned, Grotewohl told the 13th meeting of the PV—to cheers from Pieck—that the SED had made ‘no political mistake’ and that the party’s development had been ‘perfectly straight’. He dismissed calls for a change in the SED’s strategy, insisting: ‘ . . . we must maintain the straightforwardness and consistency of our views as a prerequisite of success’. While acknowledging that the continuation of Soviet dismantling in spite of official declarations to the contrary had harmed the SED, he stressed that these developments had not been the SED’s fault. He also questioned whether the SBZ was suffering more under the payment of reparations than were the Western zones. Low morale in the SBZ, he concluded, was ‘not the party’s fault’ but ‘the result [of the developments] of the last six months’, during which an increasing number of people, including members of SEDcontrolled organizations, had succumbed to ‘external influences’.160 By far the most dangerous of these external influences, as the SED leaders explained in their letter to Stalin, was the American offer of ‘Dollar aid’, which had raised hopes among the German masses that their ‘daily plight’ would soon come to an end.161 This offer had been made by George Marshall, the incumbent American Secretary of State, in response to the deadlock in East–West relations reached after the Moscow CFM. In a speech delivered at Harvard University, on 5 June 1947, Marshall had declared that the United States ‘should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world . . . ’. He had called on the European countries to launch ‘a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically’, and he had announced that America was ready to provide ‘friendly aid’ in the drafting of such a programme as well as give ‘support later’. The Soviet Union had not been excluded from this offer of help, which was open to ‘any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery’, but Marshall had warned that ‘governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human 159

‘Briefentwurf, o. D.’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 13th meeting of the PV, 20/21 August 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 161 ‘Briefentwurf, o. D.’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 2/1/24. 160

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misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise’ would encounter ‘the opposition of the United States’.162 From the SED’s point of view, the ‘Marshall Plan’, as the American offer came to be known, was just another attempt by American monopoly capitalism to secure global hegemony, all the more since it had been unveiled only weeks after the proclamation of the ‘Truman Doctrine’ (a promise by the American President to assist free nations in their struggle against totalitarianism, given on 12 March 1947 in a speech before Congress defending an American aid package for Turkey and Greece).163 Addressing the 13th meeting of the PV, Pieck declared that Washington’s aim was ‘to use the promised Dollar-aid to gain decisive influence on the internal affairs of the countries that decide to accept this aid . . . ’. With regard to Germany, he claimed, the purpose of the Marshall Plan was ‘to take the Ruhr area out of German hands and deliver it into the hands of the American monopoly capitalists’.164 An equally negative view of the American offer prevailed in Moscow. The Kremlin had initially reacted positively to Marshall’s announcement and, on 27 June 1947, dispatched Molotov to Paris for discussions on this issue with his British and French counterparts, Bevin and Bidault, before denouncing the American offer on 2 July 1947, after several rounds of inconclusive talks. As Soviet documents show, the Kremlin’s initial directive was to co-operate with the Western Allies in an attempt to obtain capital for the reconstruction of the devastated Soviet economy, but this line was swiftly abandoned amidst fears that the project would obstruct the consolidation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe.165 Another indication that Moscow’s policies were not dictated by a ‘desire for compromise’ with the West, as has sometimes been claimed,166 is an admission by Molotov that the idea of allowing Polish, Czech, and Yugoslav delegates to accompany him to Paris had quickly been dropped ‘because we could not yet trust their experiences’.167

162 Quoted in Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945– 163 Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 163–8. 1950 (New York, 1970), 244. 164 13th meeting of the PV, 20/21 August 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/24. 165 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, 245–9. Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War, 26–9. Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, ‘New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 9 (March 1994), 166 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 92. 1–51. 167 Quoted in Jan Foitzik, ‘Die Bildung des Kominform-Bu ¨ ros 1947 im Lichte neuer Quellen’, ZfG 40/12 (1992), 1124.


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Molotov’s firm rejection of the Marshall Plan—and the subsequent (Soviet-inspired) decision by the governments of the East European countries to decline an Anglo-French invitation to a conference on European economic co-operation168—dealt another blow to the already shaky morale of the SED’s membership. Addressing the 13th meeting of the PV, Ulbricht warned that many comrades—both in the SBZ and the Western zones—were already resigned to the division of Germany and no longer committed to a nationwide strategy. Worse still, as Ulbricht went on to explain, some comrades had given up all hope of defeating German monopoly capitalism—now that it was openly backed by Western monopoly capitalism—and had concluded ‘that our current policy of fighting for democracy cannot be continued unchanged’.169 The SED leaders were fully aware of the need to quell such thoughts and restore confidence among their party’s grass roots. They believed that this could best be achieved through improved ideological training, the purpose of which would be to immunize the SED’s membership against doubts. At the 11th meeting of the PV, in May 1947, Ulbricht had told his applauding comrades that one of the SED’s future tasks would be ‘to pay greater attention to our ideological work and to fight reactionary ideologies that are capable of drawing the workers’ movement and our party into their spell’.170 The view that the SED’s problems stemmed from a lack of ideological faith was shared by Tiulpanov, who had told Pieck, on 11 July 1947, that the SED suffered from ‘[a] lack [of] fighting spirit’ as well as an ‘under-estimation of ideology as an instrument of power’.171 In fact, efforts to strengthen the SED’s ideological backbone were already under way. The SED had responded to the Berlin election de´baˆcle with a sharp lurch to the left and increased pandering to Moscow. In October 1946, the PV had resolved to establish a network of party schools at Kreis and Land level, with the aim of improving the ideological training of SED functionaries. On 7 November 1946, the SED had organized celebrations to mark the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and on 21 December, Stalin’s birthday, a lengthy article eulogizing the Soviet dictator had been published by Pieck. 168

Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 183–4. 13th meeting of the PV, 20/21 August 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/24. 170 11th meeting of the PV, 21/22 May 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/20. 171 ‘Bericht Tulpanows vom 11. 7. 1947 um 2 Uhr’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/734. 169

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At the same time, SED leaders like Pieck and Ulbricht had become increasingly obsequious to the SMAD, responding to a new Soviet promise to end dismantling, made in January 1947 by Sokolovsky, with grovelling declarations of thanks.172 Another indication of the SED’s creeping Stalinization was the party’s about-turn on the issue of Germany’s Eastern territories. The German communists who ended up dominating the SED had initially backed Moscow’s claim that the fate of these territories was sealed (in spite of the Western Allies’ refusal to recognize the Oder–Neiße line),173 but they had subsequently changed their tune in response to the enduring unpopularity of the Oder–Neiße line among their compatriots, especially among the former refugees. On 13 September 1946, the SED’s Mecklenburg organization had issued a leaflet condemning the ‘provisional Eastern frontier’, and on the following day, the day before the Gemeinde elections in Mecklenburg, where the concentration of refugees was particularly high, Neues Deutschland had published an authoritative statement by Fechner saying that the SED would ‘oppose any reduction of Germany’s territory’.174 However, in the spring of 1947—after being told by Stalin, on 31 January, that raising the issue of the ‘Eastern frontier’ meant ‘war’175—the SED leaders had stopped calling for a return of the Eastern territories, with Dahlem writing in Neues Deutschland on 2 April: ‘The loss of the Eastern territories hits the German people hard. But life must go on.’176 The SED’s Stalinization177 reached its first climax at the party’s 2nd Congress, which the SED leaders were determined to turn into ‘an imposing parade of the masses controlled by us’.178 On the face of it, the event, held in Berlin’s State Opera from 20 to 24 September 1947, still observed the SED’s founding principle of ‘parity’ between ex-communists and ex-social democrats.179 Yet, on closer inspection, the eclipse of the latter faction was impossible to ignore. Thus there was a strong emphasis throughout the congress on the ‘superb achievements of the 172

Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 561–5. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 40–4, 62–8. Sebastian Siebel-Aschenbach, Lower Silesia, 174 Neues Deutschland, 14 September 1946. 83–116, 227–65. 175 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 30. 1.–7. 2. 1947’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/694. 176 Neues Deutschland, 2 April 1947. 177 Andreas Malycha, Partei von Stalins Gnaden?, 70–88. Harold Hurwitz, Die Stalinisierung der SED: Zum Verlust von Freiraümen und sozialdemokratischer Identita¨t in den Vorsta¨nden 1946–1949 (Opladen, 1997), 312–77. 178 This expression was used by Pieck at the 8th meeting of the PV, 22/23 January 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/14. 179 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 253. 173


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Soviet Union’, with Fechner calling for ‘close economic and cultural co-operation with the Soviet Union’ and warning the delegates that the pursuit of ‘German policies’—to which the SED was formally committed—must not degenerate into ‘anti-Soviet propaganda’. His praise for the motherland of socialism was echoed by Grotewohl, who declared that the ‘new democratic order’ which had emerged in Eastern Europe and in the SBZ owed its strength to the fact ‘that it enjoys the support of the Soviet Union’. The most vivid demonstration of the SED’s growing proximity to Moscow was given when, on the third day of the congress, Matern rose to his feet and reciprocated the greetings to the SED of Mikhail Suslov, the secretary of the CPSU(b)’s Central Committee, by exclaiming: ‘Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! Long live its Central Committee! Long live its leader, Stalin!’180 The SED’s creeping transformation into an ordinary communist party prompted criticism from within the PV. At the 2nd/16th meeting of the PV (i.e., the 2nd PV meeting after the SED’s 2nd Congress and the 16th overall), in October 1947, Paul Szillat complained that in the discussions at the congress, ex-communists had been unfairly given preference over ex-social democrats, creating the impression that an attempt had been made to ‘push back’ one faction of the party’s membership. He also argued that the SED should have refrained from stressing its close links to the Soviet Union ‘in order not to endanger the struggle for German unity through . . . accusations that we are not serving our own interests but the interests of the occupying power’.181 However, the top SED leaders remained unimpressed by these complaints. Responding to Szillat’s criticism before the same audience, Ulbricht insisted that only comrades who had failed to give up ‘old positions’ and were eager to tread on ‘old paths’ could have gained the impression of being shunted aside. The purpose of the congress, Ulbricht explained, had been to rally the SED’s morale by reminding the party’s membership that the ‘democratic’ regime established in the SBZ was ‘superior to the conditions in the other parts of Germany’— something which, he claimed, many comrades had previously forgotten when they had slipped into a ‘mood of panic’ after deciding that the SED’s problems, especially over food, were insurmountable. Confidence, Ulbricht added, was warranted, because the SED enjoyed the support of the mighty Soviet Union—a power which, as he explained to 180

Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 578–80. 2nd/16th meeting of the PV, 15/16 October 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/30. 181

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applause and calls of ‘hear, hear!’, was unbeatable and capable of dealing with any problem, including the West’s ‘nuclear diplomacy’, just as well as it had previously been able to deal ‘on all fronts with the armies of Hitler’.182 Expressing the same confidence in the SED’s ultimate success, Pieck claimed that in any comparison between the two halves of Germany, the workers in the SBZ were doing well, despite the existing difficulties. The SED’s task would, therefore, be ‘to concentrate in particular on providing evidence for the growing deterioration of the situation in the West against the backdrop of the steady improvement of the situation in the East’. As if he wanted to prove accusations that the SED leadership was out of touch, he gave the following word of advice to the SED’s disillusioned membership: ‘He who only looks at the difficulties loses sight of the enormous opportunities that exist for the achievement of our tasks and goals.’183

THE ‘PEOP LE’S CONGRESS FOR U NIT Y A ND A J US T P EA C E ’ In spite of growing evidence to the contrary, the SED leaders believed that the German masses could not fail to be convinced by the benefits of their policies if these benefits were properly explained. At the 11th meeting of the PV, in May 1947, Pieck had insisted ‘that our struggle will end in a resounding triumph’. He had called for a greater communist propaganda effort in the Western zones in order to make it plain to the masses that Germany’s future was at stake and that the only way to end Germany’s plight would be to build a new Germany that was not only ‘democratic’ and ‘free’ but also ready to embark on the future ‘struggle for socialism’. And he had proclaimed to loud applause: ‘If we make this clear to the masses, we will—of that I am convinced— . . . achieve our goal in the West.’184 Similarly, Ackermann, who was more rational than Pieck and less easily carried away, had maintained that the SED’s message would eventually get through. He had insisted that what mattered in politics was not the size of a party’s membership but ‘whether [or not] one develops the right policies and finds the lever that can mobilize millions of people’, 182 2nd/16th meeting of PV, 15/16 October 1947, SAMPO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV, 183 Ibid. 2/1/30 184 11th meeting of the PV, 21/22 May 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/20.


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and he had boldly proclaimed: ‘We’ve got that lever, but we must learn how to use it.’185 The SED leaders knew that they had to take action themselves and could not expect much help from the KPD. At the first Land elections in the Western zones, held in November–December 1946 (in the American zone) and in April–May 1947 (in the British and French zones), the KPD had again failed to galvanize the masses and rarely won more than 10 per cent of the vote, the main exception being North-Rhine-Westphalia— the key industrial state in the British zone—where the party’s share of the vote had been 14 per cent. What was more, the strong showing of the bourgeois parties, in particular the CDU (who had managed to beat the SPD into second place in North-Rhine-Westphalia), meant that in all three Western zones even a unified workers’ party would have failed to win an absolute majority.186 Nor was the creation of such a party in sight, despite rumours about the emergence of a ‘Marxist wing’ within the SPD in protest against Schumacher’s attempts ‘to pursue an American—i.e. capitalist—policy . . . ’. An AG memorandum of August 1947 concluded that nowhere in the Western zones had it been possible to trigger ‘a genuine mass movement in support of the SED’.187 Similarly, Fechner told the 12th meeting of the PV that attempts at founding the SED in the Western zones had ‘in effect not progressed organizationally beyond the establishment of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED–KPD’. He blamed this disappointing development on the British and the Americans, whose resistance against the establishment of the SED in their zones had ‘stiffened considerably’.188 The result, as Sperling, the Bavarian KPD chairman, explained at the 13th meeting of the PV, was a feeling of utter despair among the KPD membership, with many comrades privately saying: ‘We can try as hard as we like, we will never have an SED . . . ’, and ‘We are the KPD today and [we] will still be the KPD tomorrow.’ Compounding the frustration felt by the Western comrades was the impression that they were not treated as equals by the SED leadership. Addressing the same audience, Karl Hauser, a KPD functionary from the American zone, made it clear that the Western comrades regarded themselves ‘not as the fifth wheel Ibid. Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 110, 112. Richard Schachtner, Die deutschen Nachkriegswahlen, 22–68. 187 ‘Zur Lage in den westlichen Besatzungszonen’, memorandum by the Central Bureau of the AG, 4 August 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/646. 188 12th meeting of the PV, 1/3 July 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/22. 185 186

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on the cart, but as equal partners’, and that they resented being treated as ‘lackeys of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft’ by the SED leaders, who were happy to use them for ‘small tasks’ but [who] would always insist: ‘We alone determine the policies [of the German comrades]!’189 The SED leaders responded to these complaints with a renewed pledge of support as well as organizational changes designed to strengthen SED– KPD links. In particular, they secretly appointed the 50 members of the AG’s steering committee (who included 30 comrades from the Western zones) to membership of the PV in an effort to circumvent the restrictions on KPD–SED co-operation imposed by the Western military authorities. They also gave assurances to the Western comrades that every Tuesday before a scheduled meeting of the PV (usually held on the second Wednesday and Thursday of each month) would be reserved for talks between them and the members of the ZS (an arrangement that had been agreed before but, as Pieck was forced to admit, ‘not always implemented correctly’).190 Finally, they dissolved the seemingly ineffectual Zonenleitung, making the task of guiding the KPD the joint responsibility of the SED’s other internal departments.191 At the same time, however, they reaffirmed their decision not to admit KPD representatives to membership of the ZS,192 thus indicating that full equality between East and West German comrades was not on the cards. Convinced that nationwide working-class unity would not be on the agenda for some time to come, the SED leaders decided to turn their attention to the unresolved national question.193 At the 12th meeting of the PV, Fechner explained that the SED must renew its bid for a broadbased patriotic platform, stressing—in an apparent deviation from the SED’s previous position—that this platform (whose task would be to demand the setting-up of a ‘German central administration’ as well as the ‘re-establishment of the political and economic unity of Germany’) 189 13th meeting of the PV, 20/21 August 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/24. 190 1st/15th meeting of the PV, 25 September 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/28. 191 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am 6. 10. [19]47’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/2.1/137. ‘An alle Abteilungen!’, memorandum drawn up by Dahlem and Gniffke, dated 10 October 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/5/242. 192 See ZS minutes ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats vom 27. 3. 1947’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/75. ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats vom 19. 8. 1947’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/118. 193 Klaus Bender, Deutschland einig Vaterland? Die Volkskongressbewegung fu ¨ r deutsche Einheit und einen gerechten Frieden in der Deutschlandpolitik der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 82–9.


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should include not only representatives of ‘the big parties, the trade unions’ and ‘the other mass organizations’ but ‘if necessary also the minister-presidents and the speakers of the diets of all the German La¨nder . . . ’.194 A formal request to the ACC for the admission of such an initiative, submitted by the Soviet-zone minister-presidents on 4 July 1947, stated that the proposed platform—referred to as an ‘all-German council’—should include not only delegates from ‘the large democratic parties, the trade unions [and] the large anti-fascist organizations’ but also ‘representatives of the big cities’ as well as ‘the speakers of the diets and the minister-presidents of the La¨nder’.195 Loth has construed this apparent concession to federalism as a sign that the SED leaders were ready to soften their line in an effort to halt Germany’s slide into a formal division.196 However, nothing could have been further from the SED leaders’ minds. Instead, Fechner expressed the hope that the new initiative would enable the SED ‘to emerge from the struggle against Western federalism and the obstructive bizonal policies of Dr. Schumacher with greatly enhanced prestige’. Similarly, Ulbricht left his fellow comrades in no doubt that the purpose of the proposed platform was to whip up anti-federalist feelings in Germany and unleash ‘the mass protest of the people, especially in the Rhineland and in Southern Germany, against the bizonal Economic Council, against the breaking-up of Germany by the bizonal agencies . . . ’.197 Underpinning the SED’s new initiative was the belief—based on earlier communist plans for the creation of a German ‘national front’— that the SED could win over the German masses by seizing the patriotic high ground and casting itself as the sole defender of national unity. As Ulbricht explained at the 12th meeting of the PV: We believe that if during the coming weeks and months the minister-presidents of the Sov[iet] occupation zone state our case in this fashion before the [Allied] Control Council, the entire German people will be convinced [that] the representatives of the Sov[iet] occupation zone and the SED are the staunchest and [indeed] the only genuine champions of German unity.198

That way, it was hoped, the German workers would come to understand their ‘national duty’—a term used by Dahlem199—and flock to 194

12th meeting of the PV, 1/3 July 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/22. Um ein antifaschistisch-demokratisches Deutschland. Dokumente aus den Jahren 1945–1949 (Berlin, 1958), 474–5. 196 Wilfrid Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 91–2. 197 12th meeting of the PV, 1/3 July 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/22. 198 Ibid. 199 Ibid. 195

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the SED. At the same time, so the theory went, the bourgeois parties would be forced by their own grass roots—who were deemed not only more ‘democratic’ but also more patriotic than their ‘reactionary’ leaderships200—to co-operate closely with the SED, thereby paving the way for the nationwide triumph of the SED’s Blockpolitik. However, the SED leaders acknowledged that this was a long-term perspective, and that the envisaged patriotic movement could not be built overnight. Ulbricht told the 12th meeting of the PV, to mutterings of assent, that Blockpolitik in the Western zones could not begin with a formal alliance between the communists and the other parties because ‘we are not yet able to achieve that’.201 Similarly, Grotewohl told the 3rd/17th meeting of the PV that Germany had already been prized apart ‘to the point where the political forces operating in Germany no longer have the skill and the determination [required] to speak for Germany with one voice’.202 By that time, in mid-November 1947, the SED’s patriotic offensive had already run into difficulties. As before, the SPD had refused to participate in any initiative sponsored by the SED, and had even disciplined one of its leading members, former Reichstag speaker Paul Lo¨be, for supporting a non-partisan—albeit SED-backed—platform for German unity floated in early November 1947 by Karl Geiler, a Heidelberg professor, and Ferdinand Friedensburg, a prominent member of the Soviet-zone CDU.203 SED leaders like Pieck were unperturbed by the subsequent collapse of the Geiler–Friedensburg scheme, arguing that it had actually benefited the SED by highlighting both Schumacher’s subservience to monopoly capitalism and the SED’s commitment to cross-party talks.204 However, they were unhappy about the fact that their own bid for a patriotic platform—which had culminated, on 2 November 1947, in the publication in Neues Deutschland of an open letter to the ACC effectively calling for the extension of the Soviet-zone regime to the Western zones205—had also come to grief after failing to secure the backing of the Anti-Fascist Bloc.206 Grotewohl summed up the 200 Claims that a struggle was going on within the bourgeois parties between ‘democratic and reactionary forces’ had been made before by SED leaders, in particular by Ulbricht. See 5th meeting of the PV, 18/19 September 1946, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/8. 201 12th meeting of the PV, 1/3 July 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/22. 202 3rd/17th meeting of the PV, 12/13 November 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 203 Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser, 179–80. 30/IV 2/1/32. 204 4th/18th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 26 November 1947, SAPMO205 Neues Deutschland, 2 November 1947. BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/34. 206 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 167–8. Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser, 180–1.


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SED’s disappointment when, on 26 November 1947, he told the 4th/ 18th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV: ‘Today we have to face up to the fact that the German people is [sic] politically rudderless. The [German] political parties have voluntarily relinquished their basic duty, [namely] to give the people [political] leadership.’207 The main stumbling-block— from the SED’s point of view—had been Jakob Kaiser, the chairman of the Soviet-zone CDU, who had rejected the SED’s initiative—after consultations with leading West German Christian Democrats—on the ground that it would ‘only reinforce’ the picture of German disunity.208 To make matters worse, Kaiser had publicly criticized the SED’s domination of the Anti-Fascist Bloc, convincing Grotewohl ‘that Kaiser has finally chosen to nail his colours to the mast of the American occupation authorities in Germany’.209 Determined to see their initiative through, the SED leaders decided to act on their own. On 26 November 1947, one day after the opening of the London CFM, they issued an invitation to a so-called ‘People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace’. Scheduled to meet in Berlin on 6 and 7 December 1947, the congress was billed as an opportunity for ‘all anti-fascist democratic parties, trade unions and other mass organizations, works councils and workforces of large companies, peasants’ organizations, [and] representatives of the sciences and the arts from all over Germany’ to ‘raise their voice in unison on behalf of Germany’.210 Privately, the SED leaders acknowledged that their timing was anything but ideal. Responding to Reimann’s complaint that, in view of the KPD’s unpreparedness, the congress had been scheduled too soon, Pieck admitted that he and his colleagues would have preferred a later date but had been forced to act by the opening of the London CFM: ‘For if we came along with our People’s Congress three weeks into the London conference, people would say: Here they come, they have finally woken up!’211 None the less, the SED leaders persuaded themselves that, in the long run, the congress would be judged a success. Grotewohl claimed—to the applause of his fellow comrades—that the event would mark a ‘turning-point’ in the attitude of the working class 207 4th/18th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 26 BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/34. 208 Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser, 175–8, 181–6. 209 4th/18th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 26 210 Werner BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/34. 211 4th/18th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 26 BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/34.

November 1947, SAPMONovember 1947, SAPMOConze, Jakob Kaiser, 185–6. November 1947, SAPMO-

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towards the national question. Echoing Grotewohl’s optimism, Pieck asserted that, by condemning the other parties’ refusal to join a national front, the SED would galvanize the masses and be able to ‘win over even those who are still wavering’.212 The results of the SED’s efforts, although not spectacular, were sufficient to keep these hopes alive. A massive SED propaganda campaign, strongly supported by the SMAD, ensured that the People’s Congress was attended by 2,215 delegates, 664 of whom had come from the Western zones in defiance of a ban imposed by the Western military authorities.213 More importantly, the congress was attended by a sizeable number of non-communists—including 253 LDP members, 219 CDU members, 91 social democrats, and 373 non-partisan delegates—even though it was clearly dominated by communists (with 849 delegates being members of the SED/KPD and 440 belonging to the mass organizations).214 The SED leaders were not blind to the congress’s shortcomings. Pieck admitted that the SED’s control over the event had been grossly inadequate, with non-communist speakers having been picked from the audience sight unseen. And he added: ‘We can count ourselves lucky that there were no major hiccups, [and] that we didn’t suffer serious blows.’ The SED leaders were also unhappy about the fact that most of the West German delegates (9 out of 10, according to Fisch) had been communists. There was tension within the PV when Heinrich Hoffmann, an SED leader from Thuringia, suggested that the SED should have secured the presence of more prominent noncommunists from the Western zones, prompting Lehmann to interject: ‘Tell us how!’215 None the less, the SED leaders believed that the momentum unleashed by the congress would give a powerful boost to their party and enable it to resume the initiative. Addressing the PV on 8 December 1947, Gniffke declared that the People’s Congress had ‘swept away all our doubts at a stroke’ and convinced every 212 4th/18th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 26 November 1947, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/34. 213 Manfred Koch, ‘Volkskongreßbewegung und Volksrat’, SBZ-Handbuch, 349–50. 214 These figures add up to a total of 2,225 delegates (10 more than the official number), which suggests that some communist delegates were counted twice as a result of dual membership (of the SED/KPD and the mass organizations). See ibid. See also Otmar Jung, ‘Die Volkskongreßbewegung: Festhalten an der deutschen Einheit und Vorbereitung der staatlichen Spaltung’, IWK 31/2 (1995), 191–201. 215 5th/19th meeting of the PV, 8 December, 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/36.


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comrade: ‘now the party is no longer on the defensive, now it has really begun to attack.’ His view was shared by Dahlem, who believed that the national question was ‘the catchphrase’ that would ultimately enable the SED to ‘unite’ all the people in Germany regardless of their background and, in doing so, ‘overcome’ the difficulties the party had encountered during the previous two years. He argued that the presence at the congress of non-communist delegates from both halves of Germany had demonstrated the possibility of splitting the SED’s rivals, vindicating the SED’s belief ‘that the national question will become a powder-keg for the [other] major parties in Germany’.216

216

Ibid.

4 Unity Postponed: The SED and the Founding of the GDR THE GER MA N Q U EST I ON IN TH E A FTER MA TH OF THE LONDON CFM The year 1948 began inauspiciously for the SED, with Grotewohl telling the 6th/20th meeting of the PV that the ‘breaking up of Germany into two zones’ could no longer be in doubt.1 A few weeks before, on 15 December 1947, the London CFM had ended in acrimony after failing to agree on a political settlement for Germany. Once again the Soviets had demanded the setting up of a German central government in accordance with the decisions of Potsdam, while refusing to make concessions on contentious issues (such as the extent of Germany’s social transformation and the size of its reparations payments), effectively blocking all bids for a compromise.2 Shortly afterwards, on 7 and 8 January 1948, the notion of German unity had suffered a further blow when, at a meeting in Frankfurt between the American and British Commanders-in-Chief (Generals Lucius D. Clay and Sir Brian Robertson) and the German heads of the bizonal administrations, a reorganization of the Bizone had been announced. At its heart was a variety of far-reaching measures designed to establish a formal government for the Bizone, including: the doubling of the number of delegates (from 52 to 104) in the Bizone’s embryonic parliament (the Economic Council); the establishment of a second chamber (the La¨nderrat) made up of representatives of the Bizone’s eight federal states; the formation of a cabinet (the Administrative Council) comprising the directors of the 1 6th/20th meeting of the PV, 14/15 January 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/38. 2 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 139–56. FRUS: 1947, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria (Washington, DC, 1972), 676–810.

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various bizonal administrations under the chairmanship of a Supreme Director; and, in particular, the creation of a central bank (to be based in Frankfurt) for all three Western zones.3 The new situation profoundly worried ordinary SED members, for whom the failure of the London CFM had come as a great shock. PV member Fred Oelßner left his fellow comrades in no doubt that the collapse of the negotiations on Germany’s future had given rise to ‘a certain degree of pessimism among our party members and, to some extent, also among our functionaries’. There was a growing feeling within these circles, he explained, that in view of the latest developments in the Western zones the ‘struggle for the unity of Germany’ no longer made any sense, with some members openly saying: ‘we should leave the West to its own devices (man soll den Westen Westen sein lassen) and confine ourselves to the Eastern zone!’4 In the same vein, PV member Wilhelm Koenen pointed out that as soon as the failure of the London CFM had become clear ‘a degree of uncertainty’ had gripped the SED, not only at local level but also further up, in the leaderships of the party’s Land organizations. He admitted that some comrades had ‘almost been seized by panic’. These comrades, he explained, had anxiously told their colleagues: ‘the masses demand to know what will happen if the London conference fails’, thereby revealing ‘their own insecurity’.5 There was even greater anxiety among the Western comrades, who were afraid of suffering further marginalization. At the 6th/20th meeting of the PV, Karl Hauser, a communist functionary from Frankfurt, begged the East German comrades to avoid giving the impression that the division of Germany was a ‘fait accompli’, adding that Grotewohl’s analysis of the situation had been ‘very depressing indeed’. He was particularly upset by Grotewohl’s suggestion—based on an article in Ta¨gliche Rundschau, the official Soviet newspaper for the SBZ—that the failure of the CFM might be followed by the collapse of the ACC and the demise of four-power rule in Berlin, and he expressed the hope that the SED chairman was ‘utterly wrong’. Similarly, Fisch, the Hessian KPD chairman, condemned what he saw as a whiff of defeatism spread by comrades who were asking: ‘is the game already up

Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 222–4. Wolfgang Benz, Gru¨ndung, 73–4. 6th/20th meeting of the PV, 14/15 January 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/38. 5 7th/21st meeting of the PV, 11/12 February 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/40. 3 4

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and can the situation no longer be changed?’ And he warned against suggesting ‘that it is all over now’.6 However, comrades who feared a formal division of Germany were offered little comfort by the SED’s top brass. Oelßner calmly predicted that the bizonal experiment would ‘gain further momentum during the coming weeks and months’, while Grotewohl insisted that the new situation must be assessed ‘completely soberly’ and that the party must beware of the temptation to ignore the ‘really existing political facts created by [the events in] London and Frankfurt’. The SED leaders made no effort to hide the fact—frankly admitted by Grotewohl—that the collapse of the London CFM had come ‘as no surprise to us’.7 PV members had indeed been warned during the summer and autumn of 1947 not to expect any miracles from the next round of inter-Allied talks. Thus Ulbricht had advised the 12th meeting of the PV: ‘We should openly tell the people: [the] London [CFM] will achieve whatever will be achieved by the German people itself [through its own struggle], not much more!’8 Similarly, Grotewohl had told the 3rd/17th meeting of the PV: ‘There appears to be complete agreement between Marshall and Bevin that whatever Molotov will propose in the course of the [London] conference must be turned into a source of friction in order to pave the way for plans leading to a division of Germany.’9 The low level of expectations with which the SED leaders had approached the London CFM reflected the rise of Soviet–Western antagonism, which had reached new heights during the spring and summer of 1947 with the unveiling of the American Truman Doctrine and the proclamation of a Soviet ‘two-camp’ doctrine by Zhdanov, whose rise in the Kremlin’s hierarchy was a measure of Moscow’s growing hostility to the West.10 Addressing a secret six-day meeting (22–7 September) of top communist functionaries from eight European countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, France, and Italy) in Szklarska Poreba, near Warsaw, Zhdanov had warned that the United States, ‘the mainstay of the imperialist camp’, was striving for ‘the consolidation of imperialism’ and ‘the preparation of a new imperialist war’, a development that

6 6th/20th meeting of the PV, 14/15 January 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 7 Ibid. 30/IV 2/1/38. 8 12th meeting of the PV, 1/3 July 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/22. 9 3rd/17th meeting of the PV, 12/13 November 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 10 Gavriel D. Ra’anan, Policy Formation, 28–36. 30/IV 2/1/32.


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would have to be resisted by the ‘anti-imperialist and democratic camp’ and its leading power, the Soviet Union. He had argued that Washington’s ambitions were all the more dangerous because they relied heavily on the restoration of Germany’s economic pre-eminence in Europe and the revival of ‘German imperialism’.11 The SED had not been invited to Szklarska Poreba and was not a member of the new communist organization set up at the meeting, the so-called Communist Information Bureau (or Cominform).12 Yet this does not mean that the SED leadership had been kept in the dark about the change in the Kremlin’s line, which had been personally approved by Stalin.13 On the contrary, notwithstanding Gniffke’s claim that ‘no clue’ and ‘no hint’ had prepared the SED leaders for the new situation and that he and his colleagues first heard of the new Soviet line through press reports,14 there is evidence to suggest that the top SED leaders had been tipped off by Karlshorst. Thus Pieck had hinted as early as May 1947 that a reactionary backlash was under way. Citing what must have been well-placed Soviet sources, he had added: ‘This is happening not only to us in Germany, but we have learnt that attempts are being made worldwide to step up the struggle against the Soviet Union.’ His warning had been echoed by Grotewohl, who had stated a few weeks later that the SED must now adopt a more openly pro-Soviet line and ‘destroy’ the ‘childish’ notion peddled by Jakob Kaiser, namely that Germany could be a ‘bridge between East and West’.15 Indeed, the final communique´ of the SED’s 2nd Congress (which stated, among other things, that the ‘American monopoly-capitalists’ were bent on spreading their influence ‘around the entire globe’ with the help of the reactionaries in ‘Southern and Western Germany’ and that they could be stopped only by the ‘free peoples’ of the world under the leadership of the Soviet Union)16 had correctly anticipated the new Soviet line—a point made by Pieck, who, in October 1947, in response Quoted in Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 186. Jan Foitzik, ‘Die Bildung des Kominform-Bu¨ros’, 1111–21. 13 Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin, 534–5. 14 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 264. 15 11th meeting of the PV, 21/22 May 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/20. 1st/15th meeting of the PV, 25 September 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/28. The view that the launch of the Cominform did not catch the SED leadership off guard has also been taken by Thomas Friedrich. See Thomas Friedrich, ‘Das Kominform und die SED’, BzG 33/3 (1991), 327–8. 16 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des II. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 20. bis 24. September 1947 in der Deutschen Staatsoper zu Berlin (Berlin, 1947), 528–9. 11 12

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to criticism of the ‘Warsaw’ meeting by the KPD’s Karl Hauser, had mockingly told the PV: I don’t want to hurt Comrade Hauser, but I fear that when he was reading the Warsaw declaration he had already forgotten the content of the first part of the communique´ issued by our [2nd] Party Congress . . . The Warsaw declaration says broadly the same thing as our communique´, albeit with different words.17

In those days, the SED leaders had firmly refused to be drawn into speculation about a possible formal division of Germany, aware that this would have weakened party morale and fuelled accusations from rankand-file comrades—especially from former social democrats—that they were ‘not serious about [the] unity [of] G[ermany]’.18 However, after the collapse of the London CFM the SED leaders abandoned their reticence, satisfied that, in view of the events in London and Frankfurt, the demise of German unity would be blamed not on them and their Soviet backers but on the German ‘reactionaries’ and their foreign allies, contemptuously referred to by Grotewohl as ‘the Anglo-American conspirators’.19 Comrades who had difficulty accepting ‘that for many years to come we will have to think and read in German in two fatherlands’, such as the KPD’s Karl Hauser,20 were bluntly told that there was no alternative. Fechner went out of his way to reject the ‘widespread belief’ that German unity could be achieved quickly ‘through the accession of the Eastern zone to the Bizone’, and he strongly condemned the suggestion that any failure to restore German unity soon would be the fault of the SED. His comments were backed by Grotewohl, who appealed for patience while warning: ‘ . . . in the present circumstances the struggle for a united Germany will definitely take years . . . ’.21 THE SED’S VIEW OF THE MARSHALL PLAN The SED leaders were keen to stress that, in spite of the new situation, the struggle for German unity had lost none of its relevance. At the 17 2nd/16th meeting of the PV, 15/16 October 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/30. 18 See Pieck’s notes of the 1st/15th meeting of the PV, 25 September 1947. SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/656. 19 6th/20th meeting of the PV, 14/15 January 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/38. 20 10th/24th meeting of the PV, 12/13 May 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/46. 21 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/42.


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6th/20th meeting of the PV, Grotewohl told his fellow comrades to loud applause that Germany’s fate would be decided not by the Allied powers but by the ‘living power of the people’—another way of saying that the Western Allies could not stay in Germany indefinitely. Similarly, Oelßner insisted that it would be all but impossible ‘to turn back the wheel of history by a hundred years’ and pretend that there had never been a united Germany.22 The view in Berlin was that a formal division of Germany would generate popular opposition23 and, in doing so, strengthen the SED/ KPD as the most vociferous champion of national unity. Dahlem, for one, was in no doubt that ‘the healthy forces of national resistance against the breaking up of Germany and its colonization’ were growing. He claimed that this growth was currently concealed, as he put it, by ‘chauvinistic propaganda’ against some of the SED’s less popular policies, namely those on Germany’s Eastern border, German POWs in Soviet captivity, and Germany’s relations with the Soviet Union. However, he was adamant that the SED would benefit from this trend as a result of being ‘the only all-German party’ that had consistently advocated German unity.24 To assist this development, the SED leaders convened a 2nd People’s Congress, scheduled for 17 and 18 March 1948, the centenary of the revolution of 1848.25 Launched in the autumn of 1947, the SED’s patriotic offensive had yet to produce results. The 1st People’s Congress had bolstered the SED’s morale, but its political impact had been negligible. A seventeen-strong delegation hastily appointed to convey the Congress’s message (essentially the SED’s familiar call for the creation of a unified and ‘democratic’ Germany) to the London CFM had been cold-shouldered by the Allied foreign ministers—against the wishes of Molotov—and barred from entering Britain by the British government.26 The Congress’s bid to galvanize the German masses had also made limited progress, not least because in most parts of West Germany the organization had been swiftly 22 6th/20th meeting of the PV, 14/15 January 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/38. 23 It was the KPD’s Walter Fisch, who, at the 6th/20th meeting of the PV, defiantly proclaimed: ‘The division of Germany will never become popular.’ See ibid. 24 ‘Konferenz der Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED-KPD am 19. und 20. September 1947 im Zentralhaus der Einheit zu Berlin’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01.56. 25 As Pieck admitted before the PV, the date was no coincidence but had been picked for its propaganda effect. See 7th/21st meeting of the PV, 11/12 February 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/40. 26 Manfred Koch, ‘Volkskongreßbewegung’, 349–50.

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banned by the Allied military authorities and, as Grotewohl admitted before the PV, succeeded in holding meetings outside the SBZ only in Bremen, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein.27 There was no suggestion that the 2nd People’s Congress would succeed where its predecessor had failed. Grotewohl cautioned his fellow comrades against unwarranted expectations, telling the 8th/22nd meeting of the PV: ‘We will not be presented with a united Germany on the next day—that would be an illusion.’ His warning was echoed by the KPD’s Walter Fisch, who told the same audience: ‘It would be pointless to ignore the facts and pretend that we can unleash a mass movement over there [in the Western zones] [simply] via the slogan ‘‘People’s Congress’’. One should say that openly . . . ’.28 However, there were hopes that the SED’s struggle for German unity would be boosted by future economic developments. At their meeting with Semenov, on 27 October 1947, Pieck and Grotewohl had maintained that there would sooner or later be ‘an intensification of the conflict between England and the USA’. At the same time, ‘the economic and political situation in the Soviet zone’ would ‘improve’ and there would ‘probably’ be ‘a rapprochement between Great Britain and the USSR’. These ‘changes in the political situation’, the German comrades had argued, were likely to have ‘beneficial effects for the democratization of Germany, for the German working class, but also for the achievement of a democratic and lasting peace’.29 Similarly, Grotewohl had told a meeting of the AG in September 1947—to calls of ‘hear, hear!’—that there was no point in worrying about the outcome of the forthcoming London CFM because the ‘coming global economic crisis’ (‘anrollende Weltwirtschaftskrise’) might soon result in a ‘totally different global situation’.30 This view was shared by the SED’s foreign affairs analysts. On 13 October 1948, two of them gave a lecture attended by the members of the ZS, the heads of the SED’s internal departments, the leadership of the SED’s Berlin organization, and the editors of the SED-controlled newspapers. The first speaker was Hermann Budzislawski, a radio broadcaster at the SED-controlled Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk and a former editor of Die Neue Weltbu¨hne, who had only recently returned to Germany after spending eight years in exile in the United States. The 27 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 28 Ibid. 2/1/42. 29 Quoted in Jochen Laufer, ‘Auf dem Wege’, 54. 30 ‘Konferenz der Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED-KPD am 19. und 20. September 1947 im Zentralhaus der Einheit zu Berlin’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01/56.


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second speaker was Joseph Winternitz, an economics professor at Berlin University and a former KPD functionary, who had survived the Third Reich in Britain (where he had been born and raised before the First World War as the son of a German professor).31 Commenting on the situation in the United States, Budzislawski claimed that the Americans had made the leap from capitalism to monopoly capitalism and were now facing a crisis of over-production that was likely to put them on a collision course with their old ally, Britain. He maintained that there was ‘a contradiction in the capitalist development that will make itself felt in a few years time . . . ’.32 Winternitz, the expert on Britain, agreed. He argued that, while Britain’s situation was slightly less awkward than that of the smaller capitalist countries, it was still true ‘that British imperialism is gripped by a serious and irresolvable crisis that cannot be overcome with the means of capitalism’; a crisis that had already manifested itself in the fact that Britain was ‘virtually bankrupt’.33 As for the timing of capitalism’s melt-down, Budzislawski revealed that ‘we had all expected it for this spring . . . ’. Unperturbed by the fact that he had been wrong, he insisted that everybody—including ‘the entire bourgeoisie, the people on Wall Street, the stockbrokers, and [the] bankers’—realized ‘that the crisis has only been postponed’.34 Suggestions that capitalism was in decline originated in Moscow, where they had found expression in a fierce debate among leading economists over the projected date of capitalism’s collapse. The leftward shift in the Kremlin and the subsequent rise of Zhdanov had favoured theorists who emphasized capitalism’s weakness. Foremost among them was N. A. Voznesenskii, who, in 1947—in an awardwinning tract, ‘The Wartime Economy of the U.S.S.R. during the Great Patriotic War’—had attacked Varga’s assertion that during the Second World War the Western nations had successfully introduced a degree of state regulation into their economies that would delay their economic demise.35 Claims that the capitalist world was vulnerable had also been made by Zhdanov, who, in a speech given on 6 November 1946, on the eve of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, had declared that—in 31 For details on Budzislawski and Winternitz, see Wer war wer in der DDR? Ein biographisches Lexikon; ed. by Helmut Mu¨ller-Enbergs, Jan Wielgohs, and Dieter Hoffmann, new edn., revised and expanded (Berlin, 2000), 121–2, 922. 32 ‘Sonderbesprechung (Berichte u ¨ ber die Lage in Amerika und England) am Mittwoch, dem 13. Oktober 1948, 10 Uhr im Zentralhaus der Einheit zu Berlin’, 33 Ibid. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/20/16. 34 Ibid. 35 Gavriel A. Ra’anan, Policy Formation, 40–1, 62–74.

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contrast to the capitalist countries, who had suffered from ‘an acute narrowing of markets, a drop in the production standard, the closing down of factories and a growth in unemployment’—the Soviet Union had emerged from the war ‘firm and strong’ as a result of having ‘none of the anarchy in production characteristic of capitalism’.36 In his address to the Cominform’s founding conference, Zhdanov had gone one step further by suggesting that capitalism’s weakness would enable communists to thwart Western ambitions in Europe through skilfully staged mass protests. Far from holding out a hand to the Western Allies, as one interpretation suggests,37 he had accused the French communists (who, like their Italian comrades, had recently been evicted from their country’s coalition government) of being too soft, and he had claimed that if only 2 million people had ‘cried out [in protest]’ they would have been able ‘to chase the Americans and the English away’.38 The outbreak in November/December 1947 of communist-led strikes in both France and Italy39 must have strengthened Soviet hopes that the Marshall Plan could be sabotaged, even though in both countries the outbreak of civil unrest was swiftly contained. These hopes were also alive in Berlin. Addressing the 6th/20th meeting of the PV, Fisch put it thus: The people [in the Western zones] . . . will soon discover that there can be no [economic] recovery in the colony that is Bizonia. . . . We do not welcome the impoverishment of the masses, but we know that poverty can also be a lesson. . . . That is why we remain optimistic with regard to our struggle for German unity.40

Similarly, Grotewohl told a meeting between the ZS and the Western comrades that ‘the Marshall Plan and its consequences’, born as they were of capitalist ‘stinginess’, would bring the Western zones ‘just as little luck’ as the establishment of the Bizone and the Economic Council had done. He urged his fellow comrades to be ready for ‘an era of increasing class conflicts in West Germany’, insisting: ‘Today we are standing at the threshold of this era.’41 His colleague Dahlem had argued as early as autumn 1947 that the Western zones would soon 37 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 113. Quoted ibid., 41. Quoted in Jan Foitzik, ‘Die Bildung des Kominform-Bu¨ros’, 1116. 39 Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 188–9. 40 6th/20th meeting of the PV, 14/15 January 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/38. 41 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats mit den Westdelegierten am Dienstag, dem 13. Januar 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01/73. 36 38


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witness ‘an escalation of the class struggle of the workers for the improvement of their material living conditions’, and he had added that if previous demonstrations had involved ‘tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of workers’ the next rounds of protests would mobilize ‘millions’.42 Communist doubts about the political stability of the Western zones were by no means far-fetched. For, although the West German economy had successfully overcome the crisis of winter 1946/47 (when transportation bottlenecks and the ensuing shortage of coal had induced a severe recession) and expanded rapidly since the autumn of 1947, the population had hardly benefited from the recovery and was still suffering from chronic shortages of food (the only exception being the miners, the most favoured consumers under the new rationing system introduced in January 1947). The upshot was a new wave of hunger strikes and demonstrations that had erupted in January 1948 and involved up to 460,000 workers in the engineering and metal-working industries of North-Rhine-Westphalia, as well as some 10,000 dockers in the port of Hamburg (but not the miners, in contrast to previous hunger strikes).43 In the event, the outbreak of social unrest in the Western zones was swiftly contained, with most strikes ending within weeks or even days.44 More embarrassingly from a communist point of view, the issue that drove the protests was the shortage of food and not, as the communists had hoped, popular outrage against the Marshall Plan and the prospective creation of a West German state. However, the SED leaders held on to the view that worse was to come for the Western zones and that their predictions would eventually come true. After all, they knew of complaints by senior West German officials—such as the head of the Bizone’s Economic Administration, Vollrath von Maltzan—about attempts by the West European countries to protect their markets against West German exports, and they had been given to understand ‘that the current export situation will inevitably result in a worsening of the economic crisis in the West’.45 Ulbricht was adamant that the Bizone would never be economically viable ‘because Germany is a country with an extremely complex 42 ‘Konferenz der Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED-KPD am 19. und 20. September 1947 im Zen-tralhaus der Einheit zu Berlin’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01.56. 43 Alan Kramer, The West German Economy, 80–3, 91–5. 44 Ibid., 84–5. 45 ‘Wirtschaft im Westen’, undated memorandum [early 1948], SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/865.

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division of labour, with a single economy that cannot function without Berlin and the Eastern zone’. He argued that the economic recovery of the Western zones would also be hampered by American efforts to impose ceilings on German exports in a bid to keep foreign competition at bay. Another impediment to economic growth in West Germany, he claimed, would be the failure to implement radical socio-economic reforms, since this would undermine the morale of the masses and reduce productivity and output—including the production of food—at a time when, despite Marshall Aid, food imports were set to stagnate.46 Ulbricht’s views were echoed by Grotewohl, who told the 8th/22nd meeting of the PV that ‘nobody should have any illusions about the economic pressure under which West Germany will have to live’.47 While conceding that ‘the people in the West’ had been heartened by the prospect of Marshall Aid, he claimed that their optimism would wane once they realized that this aid was a vehicle for exploitation, rather than a key to prosperity. Fellow members of the PV agreed and burst into laughter when, to illustrate his point, the SED chairman brandished a pair of old trousers—part of a delivery of working clothes distributed from American army surpluses48—which he claimed had been sold to the German people ‘for dear money’ under the terms of the Marshall Plan. When, later during the same meeting, Ulbricht poured scorn on gullible comrades who believed that Germany’s economic problems could be solved by American deliveries of ‘eggs, foodstuffs, and all sorts of things’, Pieck haughtily shouted ‘torn trousers!’, prompting another burst of laughter from fellow members of the PV.49 The depth of Grotewohl’s scepticism about West Germany’s economic prospects is revealed in his private notes, which predict that the Marshall Plan—‘the great hope of the West’—would be a grave ‘disappointment’ because of the impending ‘capitalist crisis’, a crisis that would be aggravated by West Germany’s inability to find a suitable ‘channel for exports’.50 46 7th/21st meeting of the PV, 11/12 February 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/40. 47 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 48 Alan Kramer, The West German Economy, 84–5. 2/1/42. 49 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/42. 50 Undated notes by Otto Grotewohl [spring 1948], SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/471.


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SED economists were equally dismissive of the Marshall Plan. A DWK memorandum, drafted on 5 July 1948, stated confidently: A lot of noise is currently being made about the inclusion of Germany’s Western occupation zones in the Marshall-Plan . . . Only one thing is certain, [namely] that the Dollars promised to Western Germany will hardly suffice to meet the population’s current requirements for food. As far as industry and external trade are concerned, no progress can be observed in Germany’s Western zones. They have [both] reached a standstill, [and] their development is being held back artificially. Germany’s Western zones will continue to be suppliers of raw materials, but not of finished goods. And the English economic press . . . openly says that Germany’s Western zones have no prospect at all of selling their industrial products, and that they will encounter growing difficulties as a result of having to compete against American and British goods.51

Another internal SED report cited a catalogue of alleged mishaps connected with Marshall Aid—such as the delivery and distribution of ‘5,000 crates’ of rotten herrings ‘from England and Norway’, and of ‘2,000 tons’ of worm-ridden dates (allegedly part of an Iraqi payment for American arms supplies)—before stating that it was ‘an illusion’ to think that capitalist countries could reach a lasting agreement on the exploitation of a region’s raw materials or the distribution of its manufactured goods, and that ‘the idea of a united Europe under the conditions of capitalism’ was just as absurd as theories from the 1920s about ‘organized capitalism’.52 SED hopes for a failure of the Marshall Plan were keenly fuelled by the SMAD. In a speech given to SED functionaries on the eve of the SED’s 2nd Congress, an unidentified Soviet official, presumably Tiulpanov, had warned the German comrades against overestimating the Marshall Plan, reminding them that American aid programmes for Europe had existed after the First World War but had come to nothing, and he had added: ‘This time they will fail again.’ Citing Lenin’s views on foreign policy, as expressed in his last conversations with Stalin in 1923, he had argued that the capitalist countries deeply hated each other as a result of their greed and would inevitably come into conflict, and that this would mean: ‘We don’t have to hurry. Our approach is correct . . . ’.53 51 ‘U ¨ ber den Plan zur Wiederherstellung und Entwicklung der Friedenswirtschaft in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands und u¨ber die Aussichten fu¨r die Jahre 1949/50’, survey compiled by the DWK, 5 July 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 036/687. 52 ‘Marschall-Plan’, draft memorandum, 21 April 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/647. 53 ‘Undatiertes Redemanuskript (Ende August/Anfang September [1947])’, SAPMO-Barch, ZPA, NY 4036/734.

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The SED and the Founding of the GDR THE SED AND THE PUSH FOR A PLANNED EC ONOMY IN THE SBZ

The SED leaders could draw further encouragement from the fact that Moscow was gradually allowing them to take greater control over the affairs of the SBZ, thus enabling them to promote their policies more effectively. Paving the way for this change was the Soviet-sponsored reorganization of the DWK, the SBZ’s embryonic government. Established in June 1947 in response to the creation of the bizonal Economic Council, the DWK had been a damp squib due to a lack of formal powers and a resulting inability to assert its authority over the fourteen German Central Administrations, who had themselves been hampered by a lack of authority over the La¨nder governments. The SMAD’s ‘Order No. 32’, of 12 February 1948, rectified this by affirming the DWK’s right to issue binding instructions to these administrations, while at the same time strengthening them and incorporating them into the DWK as ‘Main Departments’.54 Ulbricht, whose portfolio made him the ZS member in charge of overseeing this reform,55 could hardly contain his joy at the thought that ‘the period of the consolidation of the Eastern zone’, as he called it, had finally begun.56 In his memoirs, Gniffke gives the impression that the other SED leaders were horrified at Ulbricht’s gung-ho attitude and ill-concealed eagerness to turn the SBZ into a proper state.57 More recently, a similar picture has been painted by Loth.58 However, this account is somewhat misleading. For, although the doctrinaire Ulbricht might have embraced the division of Germany far more readily than his colleagues, other SED leaders shared his view that the only answer to the events in the Western zones was the transformation of the SBZ into a self-governing entity. At the 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, in March 1948, Grotewohl declared that the Soviet zone would soon be unable to withstand the pressure ‘to act like a state herself . . . ’ (‘von sich aus staatsrechtlich zu handeln . . . ’), even though this would put ‘the dot over the i’ of 54 Wolfgang Zank, ‘Wirtschaftliche Zentralverwaltungen’, 256–7, 262–3, 265–6. Christoph Boyer, ‘Die Kader entscheiden alles . . . ’, 18–28. Bernd Niedbalski, ‘Die Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission in der SBZ 1947–1949: Ihre Rolle bei der Heranbildung der Wirtschafts- und Staatsorganisation’, PolZG B37/1984, 27–35. 55 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 276. 56 7th/21st meeting of the PV, 11/12 February 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 57 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 278–9. 30/IV 2/1/40. 58 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 129–35.


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Germany’s division. Addressing the same audience, Fechner praised the DWK’s reorganization as a crucial step towards ‘the construction of the peacetime economy in the Eastern zone that is now under way’.59 The SED leaders were anxious to play down this development, aware that loose talk of separatism would undermine their patriotic credentials and upset their party’s nervous grass roots. Stressing the need to boost the SED’s propaganda, especially in the West, Fechner strongly rejected suggestions that the reorganization of the DWK was aimed at creating ‘a separatist Eastern state’, while PV member Wilhelm Koenen declared: ‘We will continue our all-German policy and not jeopardize, let alone abandon, our claim to leadership of the entire nation.’60 The challenge facing the SED, as Grotewohl told the PV to calls of ‘hear, hear!’, was therefore to ‘draw up programmes that are programmes for the whole of Germany (Gesamtdeutschland ) . . . whose content is such as to help us advance the political and economic developments in the Eastern zone along our lines’.61 This delicate balancing act was performed by the 2nd People’s Congress, whose 1989 delegates (including 512 from the Western zones) had gathered as planned on 17/18 March 1948 and resolved to establish a German People’s Council comprising 400 members (including 100 from the Western zones).62 Publicly, the SED leaders denied that the new body—which boasted an elected executive, a secretariat, and several special committees, and which superseded the much smaller Permanent Committee set up by the 1st People’s Congress—was a parliament for the SBZ, a suggestion which Grotewohl denounced at a meeting of the Anti-Fascist Bloc as late as August 1948.63 Privately, however, the SED leaders took a different view. Addressing the 7th/21st meeting of the PV, Pieck described the People’s Council as ‘a broad-based parliamentary body’ designed ‘to make decisions on important political, economic and cultural issues at short intervals’.64 Similarly, Grotewohl told the 8th/22nd meeting of the PV to calls of ‘hear, hear!’ ‘that the German 59

8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/42. 7th/21st meeting of the PV, 11/12 February 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/40. 61 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948; SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 62 Manfred Koch, ‘Volkskongreßbewegung’, 351. 2/1/42. 63 Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1949: Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Zentralen Einheitsfront-Ausschusses, ed. by Siegfried Suckut (Cologne, 1986), 262. 64 7th/21st meeting of the PV, 11/12 February 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/40. 60

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People’s Council must of course become a [political] tool that works like a parliament’.65 Of course, a parliament for the SBZ already existed in the form of the Anti-Fascist Bloc. Yet this institution, operating as it did under a unanimity rule, had failed to rein in the bourgeois ‘bloc’ parties, whose independence, however limited, was a thorn in the SED’s flesh. At the 12th meeting of the PV, in July 1947, Grotewohl had reminded his fellow comrades that Blockpolitik implied undisputed political leadership by the working masses—in other words: by the SED—and was not to be confused with cross-party co-operation under a bourgeois democratic regime (‘Koalitionspolitik’), which rested on the ascendancy of the old social élites.66 That the SED had not yet succeeded in bringing the bourgeois parties to heel had been highlighted by Kaiser’s outspoken attacks on the Anti-Fascist Bloc as well as his refusal to back the 1st People’s Congress. Addressing the PV in late November 1947, Pieck had warned that there were ‘vacillations’ in the leaderships of the bourgeois parties owing to ‘the rise of reactionary forces’.67 The People’s Council was expected to change that. With its inbuilt communist majority and lack of a unanimity rule,68 the new assembly offered the prospect of unchallenged SED control. Addressing the 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, Grotewohl left his fellow comrades in no doubt that the SED would not allow ‘the workings of the People’s Council’ to be disturbed—as had happened in the case of the Anti-Fascist Bloc—by ‘a few disgruntled individuals’.69 Significantly, the SED leaders still believed that, despite recent setbacks, their policies had the potential of winning genuine democratic support. Ulbricht insisted that the prospects for Blockpolitik remained good, due to a growing division within the bourgeois parties between the patriotic grass roots and their reactionary leaderships, who were putting the ‘class interest of the big capitalists’ above the ‘national interest of the German people’.70 His colleague Grotewohl stressed that the SED must seek to accommodate the bourgeois parties wherever possible and, far from relying on its ability to outvote these parties in 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/42. 12th meeting of the PV, 1–3 July 1947, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/22. 67 4th/18th (extraordinary) meeting of the PV, 26 November 1947, SAPMO-BArch, 68 Manfred Koch, ‘Volkskongreßbewegung’, 351–2. ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/34. 69 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/42. 70 7th/21st meeting of the PV, 11/12 February 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/40. 65 66


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the People’s Council, ‘develop an approach that will enable us . . . to divide the bourgeois groups and split their votes’. While he conceded that this was no easy task, he insisted—to cheers from his fellow comrades—that the prospects were favourable because, unlike the SED, the bourgeois parties were ‘not a homogenous and uniform political movement or force’ but organizations where ‘everybody is an individualist and makes his own boots . . . ’.71 To deepen the perceived splits within their opponents’ ranks, the SED leaders decided to broaden the party spectrum in the SBZ. According to Wolfgang Leonhard, Ulbricht advised his fellow comrades, in the spring of 1948, that the SED must continue to co-operate with the bourgeois ‘bloc’ parties, adding: ‘It might be a good idea to set up a few new ones.’72 This idea took shape in March 1948 during a week-long trip to Moscow by Pieck and Grotewohl,73 who told Stalin, at a meeting on the evening of 26 March, that the SED’s problems with the two bourgeois parties—which they blamed on the ‘influence of the West[ern] occ[upying] powers’—could be overcome through the ‘establishment of a 4th party’ and ‘perh [aps] [of a] 5th party’.74 This discussion paved the way for the establishment (between April and June 1948) of two new parties, both of which were tightly controlled by the SED and run by SED-sympathizers: the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD); and the Democratic Peasants’ Party of Germany (DBD). The first of these parties was designed to absorb former members of the NSDAP (known as Parteigenossen, or PGs for short), whose political rights had been fully restored through the release on 26 February 1948 of the SMAD’s ‘Order No. 35’ (which had decreed the end of denazification in the SBZ). The second party was aimed at the mass of poor peasants and conceived as a counterweight to the VdgB, the peasants’ mass organization, which, in the eyes of the SED leaders, was too heavily influenced by rich peasants and unduly sympathetic towards right-wing elements within the CDU and 71 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 72 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 593. 2/1/42. 73 The trip took place between 25 March and 1 April 1948. See Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen, 189–202. See also Bernd Bonwetsch and Gennadij Bordjugow, ‘Die SED und die guten Erfahrungen der Sowjetunion: Pieck und Grotewohl informieren sich in Moskau, 25. 3.–1. 4. 1948’, Deutsche Studien 31 (1994), 95–107. 74 ‘Gespra ¨ch bei Stalin in Moskau vom 26. 3. 1948’, SAPMO-Barch, ZPA, NY 4036/695.

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the LDP.75 As Grotewohl explained before the PV, the SED leaders were hoping that the existence of the new parties—both of which were subsequently admitted to the People’s Council and the Anti-Fascist Bloc76—would make it easier for them to refute accusations that they were trying to create ‘a one-party regime’, enabling them to silence their critics in the SBZ as well as boost their ‘propaganda in the West’.77 There were indeed signs that Blockpolitik could be made to work and that the bourgeois parties’ resistance to the setting up of a communistdominated regime in the SBZ was crumbling. In particular, communists could take heart from the fact that the 1st People’s Congress had been backed not only by the LDP—whose chairman, Wilhelm Ku¨lz, had told Pieck that Germany’s political orientation must be directed ‘towards the East’—but also by the CDU’s Land organizations, which had openly defied their staunchly anti-communist leadership.78 Similarly, the 2nd People’s Congress had been attended by a sizeable number of bourgeois delegates, and bourgeois representatives sat on all committees of the newly established People’s Council, including the Constitutional Committee, which had begun to draw up a constitution for a post-war German state.79 During their visit to Moscow in March 1948, Pieck and Grotewohl proudly told Stalin that the SED was making good progress in its attempts ‘to counter the reactionary tendencies within the bourg[eois] parties’, and they had cited as ‘proof’ the success of the ‘people’s congress movement’.80 While this development owed much to SMAD pressure—which had found stark expression on 20 December 1947 in the enforced dismissal 75 Dietrich Staritz, ‘National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NDPD)’, SBZ-Handbuch, 574–83. Bernhard Wernet-Tietz, ‘Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands’, ibid., 584–94. Bernd Gottberg, ‘Die Gru¨ndung und die ersten Jahre der NDPD 1948–1954’, Bu¨rgerliche Parteien in der SBZ/DDR, 73–87. Konrad Ku¨hne, ‘Die Anfa¨nge der DBP’, ibid., 89–102. 76 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 166–9. 77 9th/23rd meeting of the PV, 14/15 April 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/44. 78 ‘Besprechung zwischen Pieck, Kaiser und Ku ¨ lz am 17. 7. 1947 vormittags um 10 Uhr im Bu¨ro von Kaiser’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/719. Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser, 185–201. 79 Of the 1989 delegates who attended the Congress, only 504 were members of the SED/KPD, with 410 being members of either the CDU or the LDP. However, the presence of 814 representatives of the mass organizations (many of whom were also members of the SED) ensured that the communists enjoyed a rock-solid majority. See Manfred Koch, ‘Volkskongreßbewegung’, 351–2. 80 ‘Gespra ¨ch bei Stalin in Moskau vom 26. 3. 1948, 7.00–8.15 Uhr’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695.


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of Kaiser and his deputy, Ernst Lemmer81—it also reflected a genuine desire for collaboration among some representatives of the bourgeoisie. Communist leaders like Pieck believed that this desire would grow once the benefits of the SED’s policies had become clear to all. Reminding his colleagues that the SED was a ‘democratic party’ that aimed to pursue its policies ‘on the basis of a parliamentary-democratic regime’, he explained that the party must concentrate on winning a democratic mandate: ‘Our task is to gain sufficient influence over the labouring masses to win an absolute majority in elections and [thus be able to] force the other parties to support our policies.’82 The transformation of the SED into a party of the majority—which had thus far made little progress—was to be boosted by economic means. Efforts were already under way to tackle the problem of low productivity and output that had dogged the East German economy throughout 1947 and severely dented the population’s morale as well as the SED’s popularity. The SMAD’s ‘Order No. 234’, of 9 October 1947, had introduced special incentives for workers to increase production (by shifting to a piecework system for wages as well as offering workers who met their production targets a daily hot meal and extra supplies of rationed goods such as clothes and shoes). At the same time, preparations had begun—in keeping with the decisions of the SED’s 2nd Congress—to organize the economy on the basis of an integrated plan (in the form of a one-year plan for 1948 and a two-year plan for 1949/50), while Soviet dismantling was slowly being phased out.83 A few months later, in early 1948, both the industrial expropriations and the land reform—which had involved not only the breaking up of the large estates but also the lengthy process of helping their new peasant owners, many of them refugees from the East, to settle into their new routine—had finally been completed, putting the main elements of the SED’s programme in place and raising the prospect of a degree of economic stability unknown during the previous three years.84 Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser, 201–10. 10th/24th meeting of the PV, 12/13 May 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/46. 83 Wolfgang Zank, ‘Wirtschaftliche Zentralverwaltungen’, 263–4. Jochen Laufer, ‘Politik und Bilanz der sowjetischen Demontagen’, 56–62. Matthias Judt, ‘Die Demontagen und die Bildung von Sowjetischen Aktiengesellschaften als Potentialverluste’, ‘Provisorium fu¨r la¨ngstens ein Jahr’: Protokoll des Kolloquiums ‘Die Gru¨ndung der DDR’, ed. by Elke Scherstjanoi (Berlin, 1993), 218–23. 84 Wolfgang Mu ¨ hlfriedel, ‘Zur Wirtschaftspolitik der alliierten Siegerma¨chte in Deutschland bis 1948’, ibid., 269–74. Siegfried Kuntsche, ‘Bauern im Interessenkonflikt: Die Situation vor der Staatsgru¨ndung’, ibid., 231–5. Werner Matschke, ‘Die wirtschaftliche 81 82

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This was indeed the conclusion reached at the time by East German economists. A DWK survey on the SBZ’s economy compiled on 5 July 1948 noted that productivity had risen sharply in the second half of 1947—in some enterprises by up to 30 per cent—as a result of the SMAD’s ‘Order No. 234’, the result being that industrial output had also grown rapidly and reached 83.8 per cent of the level of 1946 (which had subsequently collapsed as a result of the harsh winter). The report pointed out that economic growth in the SBZ had continued in the first four months of 1948, with production being 30 per cent higher than during the same period in the previous year. The report added that other sectors of the economy had also grown, in particular agriculture (where there was now almost as much land under the till as in 1936, despite severe flooding in Brandenburg in the spring of 1947, which had caused the temporary loss of 50,000 hectares) and transport (with 20 per cent and 47.5 per cent more goods being transported, respectively, by rail and on inland waterways). More importantly, the report claimed that the supply of the population with consumer goods, though still inadequate, was ‘better than in Bizonia’.85 Against this background, the SED leaders had no difficulty in persuading themselves that their day would come. Addressing the PV in May 1948, Pieck predicted the emergence of two German states, each of which would ‘evolve in accordance with its own rules’. On the one hand, there would be an enslaved and impoverished West German state that would be hampered in its economic development by brutal exploitation from foreign as well as indigenous capitalists and therefore be prone to ‘great social tensions’. On the other hand, there would be an East German state whose economy would have ‘excellent prospects’ (‘eine außerordentlich gu¨nstige Perspektive’) as a result of being run by the workers themselves as well as enjoying close links to the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, who would provide not only a ready market but also easy access to vital raw materials and foodstuffs. The SED chairman went on to predict that East German standards of living would soon begin to rise, vindicating the SED’s policies and making ‘a great impact on the masses in the Western state’.86 His Entwicklung in der SBZ: Vorgeschichte—Weichenstellungen—Bestimmungsfaktoren’, Studien zur Geschichte der SBZ/DDR, 107–9. 85 ‘U ¨ ber den Plan zur Wiederherstellung und Entwicklung der Friedenswirtschaft in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands und u¨ber die Aussichten fu¨r die Jahre 1949/50’, survey compiled by the DWK, 5 July 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/687. 86 10th/24th meeting of the PV, 12/13 May 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/46.


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optimism was echoed by Ulbricht, who told his fellow comrades in late June 1948: The implementation of the two-year plan will prove to the German people that the democratic approach of the People’s Council leads to success, that the economic regime established in the Eastern zone is superior to the economic anarchy of West Germany and thus sets a vivid example for the whole of Germany.87

The SED leadership remained unimpressed by signs that its message was not getting through. The 2nd People’s Congress’s call for the nationwide completion of the revolution of 1848, the creation of Berlin-based German Central Administrations, and the ‘democratization’ of the German economy had not been heeded,88 while its campaign for a referendum on German unity—‘one of the most important political initiatives thus far undertaken by us . . . ’, according to Grotewohl89—had failed to get off the ground. A petition to hold such a referendum, launched between 23 May and 13 June 1948, had attracted a total of 13 million signatures, according to SED sources, but was none the less an embarrassment for the communists, since a mere 1 million of these signatures were from the Western zones (where the petition had been allowed only in the British zone).90 None the less, ZS member Paul Merker claimed—to the applause of his fellow comrades—that this result ‘does not reflect the true mood among the masses of the population’, insisting: ‘By skilfully combining our great efforts for the implementation of the two-year plan with the struggle for German unity . . . we will be able to achieve the change in the people’s mood which we require for this enormous task.’91 Other SED leaders agreed. Thus even a moderate figure like Grotewohl backed the view that the SED’s policies were based on ‘the real possibility of gradually improving our standard of living’ and would find ‘a strong echo in all sections of the working masses’. Addressing a meeting of the ZS on 10 June 1948 (at which the proposed two-year plan was discussed), he brushed aside sceptical noises made by fellow ex-social democrat August Karsten, arguing that the

87 11th/25th meeting of the PV, 29 June 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 88 Manfred Koch, ‘Volkskongreßbewegung’, 351–2. 2/1/48. 89 8th/22nd meeting of the PV, 20 March 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 90 Gu ¨ nter Braun, ‘Wahlen und Abstimmungen’, 390. 2/1/42. 91 11th/25th meeting of the PV, 29 June 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/48.

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success of the two-year plan would strengthen the SED not only in the SBZ but throughout Germany by providing ‘the greatest boost for our stance on the national question’. He was joined by Matern, SED party chief in Berlin, who expressed the belief that, while production in the Western zones would fall, the SBZ would gradually establish itself as ‘an industrial country capable of standing on its own feet’. This prospect so excited FDGB chief Hans Jendretzky, who was attending the meeting, that he exclaimed: ‘German Plan versus Marshall Plan!’92 THE ‘PARTY OF THE NEW TYPE’ AND THE DEMISE OF THE ‘SPECIAL-GERMAN-ROAD’ DOCTRINE The SED leaders acknowledged, albeit not publicly, that the division of Germany into two states was not a development which they had foreseen and that it represented a failure of their carefully crafted nationwide strategy. At the 13th/27th meeting of the PV, in September 1948, Pieck declared that the SED’s hopes for success throughout Germany had remained unfulfilled because of the treacherous Western Allies, who had, as he put it, ‘turned their back on the Potsdam Agreement and adopted a policy that ran completely contrary to the terms of that agreement, initially in the form of opposition to the establishment of working-class unity, and later also with regard to economic developments’, a betrayal that had led to ‘the preservation of capitalism in the West’ and given rise to a situation that was ‘very different from the one [that had existed] in 1946’.93 PV member Paul Wandel was even more forthright in admitting that there had been ‘profound illusions’ after 1945, on the part of himself and many of his colleagues, about ‘a fundamental change in the balance of power in Germany’ as a result of the country’s defeat in the Second World War. His words were echoed by the KPD’s Walter Fisch, who also owned up to ‘illusions within our own party’ with regard to the possibility of achieving ‘a democratic development in Western Germany’, illusions that had been shattered only by ‘the brutal reality of the Marshall Plan and all its consequences’.94 These consequences had meanwhile begun to take shape, as moves towards the establishment of a West German state had gained pace. Following the failure of the London CFM, representatives of six Western 92 ‘Beratung des Wirtschaftsplans 1949/50 im Zentralsekretariat am Donnerstag, dem 10. Juni 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/206. 93 13th/27th meeting of the PV, 15/16 September 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 94 Ibid. 30/IV 2/1/52.


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nations—the three Western Allies and Germany’s Western neighbours (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg)—had gathered in London for two rounds of talks (from 23 February to 5 March and from 20 April to 2 June 1948) on the economic and political consolidation of Germany’s Western zones. Soviet protests—reinforced by Sokolovsky’s walk-out from the ACC (20 March 1948) and by gratuitous SMAD interference with the traffic to and from West Berlin—had fallen on deaf ears.95 As well as overcoming French objections to closer economic co-operation between the three Western zones and their inclusion in the American Marshall Plan, the six-nation discussions in London had produced recommendations for the drafting of a West German constitution, formally communicated to the West German minister-presidents on 1 July 1948 and accepted by them, after some wrangling, at a meeting with the Western military governors on 26 July 1948.96 Shortly afterwards, on 1 September 1948, the Parliamentary Council (an elected constituent assembly made up of La¨nder representatives) had held its first meeting in the university town of Bonn under the presidency of Konrad Adenauer,97 the single-minded septuagenarian chairman of the West German CDU who had already attracted communist loathing for being a fierce opponent of socialism or, in the words of the KPD’s Max Reimann, a representative of the CDU’s ‘heavy-industry wing’.98 Particularly alarming from a communist point of view was the fact that this capitalist backlash had come at a time when the SED’s hold on the SBZ was still far from secure. When Pieck and Grotewohl had met with Stalin on 26 March 1948, they had been forced to admit that the SED was still facing numerous problems, including ‘confusion among the masses’ (prompted by endless Western propaganda against the ‘alleged dangers of communism’) and equally dangerous ‘vacillations’ within its own ranks,99 which had found expression in a number of ‘resignations’ and a slight fall in the party’s membership.100 95 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, 285–90. Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (London, 1950), 343–57. 96 Wolfgang Benz, Gru ¨ ndung, 98–109. Werner Bu¨hrer, ‘Auftakt in Paris: Der Marshallplan und die deutsche Ru¨ckkehr auf die internationale Bu¨hne 1948/49’, VfZG 97 Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung, 483–90. 36/3 (1988), 532–7. 98 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am Mittwoch, dem 25. September 1946’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/35 99 ‘Gespra ¨ch bei Stalin in Moskau vom 26. 3. 1948, 7.00–8.15 Uhr’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. 100 According to the figures presented by Pieck and Grotewohl, the SED’s membership had fallen by 12,549—from 1,796,763 to 1,784,214—between July and December 1947. See ibid., 202.

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Faithful communists had no trouble in reconciling their belief in the ultimate failure of the Marshall Plan with the conviction that the current developments in the West posed a threat to the SED in the short term. Tiulpanov had told SED leaders on 8 May 1948 that ‘doomed imperialism’ had become more aggressive and was fighting more fiercely ‘than at any time in the history of the workers’ movement’, and he had advised the German comrades to draw the necessary conclusions. He had made it clear that, with the ‘division of Germany into two parts that will develop along different lines’ now being a fait accompli, all future developments in the SBZ would have to mirror those in the ‘new democracies’ (the countries of Eastern Europe, where the broad-based coalition governments of 1945 had already been transformed into regimes that were formally dominated by communists).101 To this end, the SED would have to achieve ‘a sharp increase in the level of both its organizational and ideological work’ by creating ‘a firm [and] disciplined party cadre’ as well as publicly embracing Leninism ‘as a new stage in the evolution of Marxism’.102 In keeping with these prescriptions, the PV complemented its endorsement of the proposed economic plan with a decision to speed up the SED’s Stalinization. This decision, taken in three stages during the summer of 1948 (at the PV’s 11th/25th, 12th/26th, and 13th/27th meetings), was further encouraged by the break between Stalin and Tito, which had led to Yugoslavia’s exclusion from the Cominform (on 28 June 1948).103 This gave the SED leadership a chance to prove its pro-Soviet credentials by joining in the Cominform’s denunciation of Tito and stressing the importance of turning the SED into ‘a party of the new type that stands firmly and unequivocally on the basis of Marxism–Leninism’.104 Within a few months, the SED’s transformation into a hardline communist party—a process that had begun soon after the SED’s formation but remained largely hidden until the party’s 2nd 101 This had happened in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary in 1946/7 and in Czechoslovakia—via a Soviet-backed coup d’e´tat led by Clement Gottwald—in February 1948. See Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 151–5, 193–4. 102 ‘Schriftliche Fassung eines Vortrages von Tulpanow vom 8. 5. 1948’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/735. 103 Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 2: Beschlu ¨ sse und Erkla¨rungen des Parteivorstandes, des Zentralsekretariats und des Politischen Bu¨ros (Berlin, 1951), 193–4. Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 195–7. 104 Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 623–7. Quoted in Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 175–6.


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Congress105—was complete. There was a formal switch to Marxism– Leninism as the basis for the SED’s ideological training, with Stalin’s ‘History of the CPSU(b)—Short Course’ becoming compulsory. More importantly, there was a rigorous purge of the party’s membership, which had grown to nearly 2 million—more than 10 per cent of the SBZ’s adult population—without achieving a corresponding growth in ideological discipline. A Soviet-inspired Central Party Control Commission (ZPKK), set up in September 1948 under the chairmanship of Matern, led the fight against ‘hostile and deviant elements’ and SED members guilty of ‘antiSoviet propaganda’, all of whom were threatened not only with exclusion from the party and (in the case of employees of the SBZ’s administrations) dismissal from work but also with legal prosecution as foreign ‘agents’.106 The SED members hardest hit by this clamp-down were the former social democrats, some 400 of whom were arrested as ‘agents’ of the SPD’s Eastern Bureau between September 1948 and January 1949. Other ex-social democrats abandoned the SED voluntarily and fled to the Western zones, the most famous example being ZS member Erich Gniffke, who defected in late October 1948.107 Those ex-social democrats who remained in the SED lost the privilege of parity (the rule whereby all SED posts had to be filled with one ex-communist and one ex-social democrat), which had been steadily undermined for some time and which was formally waived at the 1st Party Conference, an extraordinary SED congress held in late January 1949. Other measures agreed at this conference included: the inauguration of ‘democratic centralism’ (a key Leninist principle designed to enforce strict party discipline); the introduction of a probationary period for new party members (one year for workers, two years for all others); and, crucially, the creation of two new party bodies designed to establish ‘a collective operational [party] leadership’—in plain language: to rein in the parity-based ZS. These two bodies—both of which were dominated by ex-communists—were a Politburo (which met on Tuesdays and comprised seven full members and two non-voting 105 Andreas Malycha, Die SED: Geschichte ihrer Stalinisierung 1946–1953 (Paderborn, 2000), 136–277. Hermann Weber, ‘Die Wandlung der SED und ihre Rolle im Parteiensystem’, DA 26/2 (1993), 259–60. 106 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 176–81. 107 Peter Grieder, The East German Leadership, 17–25. Frank T. Sto ¨ ßel, Positionen, 334–43. Detlev Eckert, ‘Die Liquidierung der SED als Einheitspartei: Zu den Vera¨nderungen in Organisation und Personalstruktur im Jahr 1949’, ‘Provisorium’, 285–92. Ulrich Ma¨hlert, ‘ ‘‘Die Partei hat immer recht!’’ Parteisaüberungen als Kaderpolitik in der SED (1948–1953)’, Terror, 353–60.

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members, or ‘candidates’) and a Little Secretariat (KS) (which met on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays and comprised five members, two of whom were required to be members of the Politburo).108 There is little doubt that the driving force behind these reforms was Ulbricht, the most hard-line member of the SED leadership and the one who stood to gain most from the eclipse of the ZS (as chairman of the KS and one of only two SED leaders—the other one being Dahlem—to combine membership of the KS with membership of the Politburo). However, there is no evidence to suggest that these reforms were pushed through against Moscow’s will. After all, the Kremlin itself had led the attack on moderate socialists and social democrats, whom the final communique´ of the Cominform’s founding conference had denounced as ‘ever reliable agents of imperialism’.109 More importantly, throughout their party’s Sovietization, the SED leaders co-operated closely with the Soviet leadership. On 16 October 1948, word went out from the SMAD that ‘Pieck, Grotewohl, [and] Ulbricht’ had been invited to a ‘meeting in Moscow with Stalin’, where they would be expected to present a ‘report [and an] assessment of the situation’.110 When the three top SED leaders and their interpreter, fellow comrade Fred Oelßner, finally met Stalin on 18 December 1948, they learned to their satisfaction that the Soviet dictator fully supported the SED’s ongoing transformation into a ‘party of the new type’ anchored in ‘Marxism–Leninism’. All organizational changes envisaged by the SED leaders and subsequently approved by the 1st Party Conference were discussed at this meeting and thus endorsed by the Soviet dictator, the only exception being the ‘issue of parity’, which merited no discussion because, as Pieck noted, it was generally understood to be ‘obsolete’.111 108 The members of the Politburo were: Wilhelm Pieck (ex-KPD), Otto Grotewohl (ex-SPD), Walter Ulbricht (ex-KPD), Helmut Lehmann (ex-SPD), Franz Dahlem (ex-KPD), Friedrich Ebert (ex-SPD), and Paul Merker (ex-KPD). The two candidates were Anton Ackermann (ex-KPD) and Karl Steinhoff (ex-SPD). The members of the LS were: Walter Ulbricht (ex-KPD), Franz Dahlem (ex-KPD), Alfred Oelßner (ex-KPD), Edith Bauman (ex-SPD), and Paul Wessel (ex-SPD). See ‘Sitzung des Politbu¨ros des Zentralkomitees am 28. 1. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/1. ‘Sitzung des Kleinen Sekretariats am 31. 1. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/1. Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 2, 193–9, 23–17. See also 109 Quoted in Thomas Friedrich, ‘Das Monika Kaiser, ‘Die Zentrale’, 67–75. Kominform’, 324. 110 ‘Besprechung am 16. 10. 1948 um 6 Uhr abends mit G. L. Russkich, G. M. Semjonov, Tulpanov’ [sic], SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/735. 111 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. This trip had been scheduled for the end of November 1948 but


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Further praise for the German comrades came from the hard-line secretary of the CPSU(b)’s Central Committee, Mikhail Suslov, who attended the SED’s 1st Party Conference and afterwards confided to Pieck that he had gained a ‘positive impression’. Far from being concerned about the SED’s growing orientation towards the East, he was pleased with what he regarded as the ‘consolidation of the anti-imp[erialist] camp’ that had been achieved through the SED’s ‘vow of loyalty to the S[oviet] U[nion]’, and he offered his ‘applause for the elimination of parity’.112 Contrary to Gniffke’s account,113 it appears that Ulbricht’s bid for a more hard-line approach also enjoyed considerable support from within the SED leadership,114 where it was opposed primarily by figures who had long ceased to matter, such as Otto Meier115 as well as Gniffke himself (whose increasingly rare appearances as a speaker at PV meetings in 1947–8 reflect his dwindling authority among the SED’s top brass). Thus Grotewohl drew cheers from his fellow comrades when he told the 11th/25th meeting of the PV that bourgeois hopes of turning the SBZ into a ‘bridge between East and West’ were pie in the sky, since they could only be realized by reintroducing capitalism, something that was ‘not a political goal sought by us’, and that the SED’s orientation must therefore be ‘directed firmly and unequivocally towards the East’.116 Similarly, the 13th/27th meeting of the PV erupted in loud applause when Pieck claimed that by purging itself of ‘dangerous elements’ the SED would ensure . . . that we will prevail in the fierce battles that lie ahead and, above all, that we can enter . . . the international revolutionary battle front which we need in order to clinch victory in the great class struggle that pits global imperialism against the progressive forces, in particular against the Soviet Union . . . 117 apparently suffered a delay and did not take place until mid-December (12–24) 1948. See Thomas Friedrich, ‘Antworten der SED-Fu¨hrung auf Fragen Stalins 1948’, BzG 33/3 (1991), 364–5. Gennadij Bordjugow, ‘Das ZK der KPdSU(B), die Sowjetische Milita¨radministration in Deutschland und die SED 1945–1951’, Terror, 299–303. 112 ‘Besprechung mit Suslow im Politbu ¨ ro am 28. 1. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, 113 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 318–21. NY 4036/735. 114 See also Andreas Malycha, ‘Die SED’, 280–1. Volker Sieger, ‘Die Entwicklung der SED zur ‘‘Partei neuen Typus’’: Zu Ursachen, Verlauf und Auswirkungen des innerparteilichen Wandels 1948’, BzG 37/4 (1995), 92–3. 115 Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 324–5. 116 11th/25th meeting of the PV, 29 June 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/48. 117 13th/27th meeting of the PV, 15/16 September 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/52.

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To underline their Eastern orientation, the SED leaders abandoned their ‘special-German-road’ doctrine—at the same time as the East European communist parties were abandoning their commitment to ‘special roads’, and less than a year after Wolfgang Leonhard had first heard rumours that such a change was afoot.118 Ackermann, the author of the offending doctrine, was forced to recant under humiliating circumstances and in spite of his protestations that he had developed his theory under instructions and ‘after discussions within the Secretariat of the [then] KPD’.119 Writing in Neues Deutschland, on 24 September 1948, under the caption ‘On the Only Possible Road to Socialism’, he accepted that his theory was ‘dangerous’ because it contained ‘an element of separation from the working class and from the Bolshevik party of the Soviet Union’.120 Again, this about-turn was not the sole product of Ulbricht’s whims. Rather, there was a widespread realization within the PV that the possibility of a ‘democratic road to socialism’ had been created, to use Ackermann’s words, ‘only by the victory of the Red Army’ and only ‘because the Soviet Union exists as a global power that has significantly altered the international balance of power . . . in favour of the progressive forces’.121 Much as the SED leaders might have preferred a ‘special German road’, they recognized that the conditions for such an approach were simply not there. Thus Pieck admitted: ‘ . . . the only force upon which we can rely in our bid for democracy, for the transformation of the economy and for the promotion of socialism in Germany is the Soviet Union . . . ’, while Oelßner concluded: ‘Without the existence of the Soviet Union there would be no people’s democracies.’122 This realization seems to have struck the SED leaders relatively late. For, while they frankly admitted that the ‘special-road’ doctrine had been conceived with a purpose (namely to make the KPD–SPD merger more palatable for sceptical social democrats), PV members agreed that the whole episode had a deeper significance in that it highlighted their initial illusions about the SED’s prospects. Thus an embarrassed Wolfgang Leonhard, Revolution, 627–32. 13th/27th meeting of the PV, 15/16 September 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/52. 120 Neues Deutschland, 24 September 1948. See also Gerd Dietrich, ‘Ein Mitbu ¨ rger’, 113–15. 121 13th/27th meeting of the PV, 15/16 September 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 122 Ibid. 30/IV 2/1/52. 118 119


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Wandel explained that the idea of a ‘special German road to socialism’ had been based not only on the desire to make ‘concessions’ to noncommunists but also ‘on an assessment of the [political] situation in Germany and of the prospects for future development in Germany that was perhaps always unrealistic (illusorisch) and that is, in any event, now out of date’. His colleague Lehmann stressed that in drafting their ‘Principles and Aims’, which incorporated the ‘special-road’ doctrine, the future SED leaders had been thinking primarily about ‘the conditions in the Eastern zone’, which had been different from those in West Germany even in those early days. However, he too owned up to failed hopes, stressing that the ‘Principles and Aims’ had been inspired by a shared feeling ‘that we regard ourselves as an all-German party and intend to become one’, a feeling that had since evaporated ‘because the situation has changed somewhat since the spring of 1946, when this [document] was phrased’.123

THE WESTERN COMRADES AND THE WEST GER M A N C U R R E N C Y R E F O R M Nothing illustrated the failure of the SED’s bid for a nationwide role more poignantly than the fate of the West German KPD. Like their East German comrades, its leaders had initially been brimming with hopes, including the hope of achieving working-class unity on the coattails of a successful two-party merger in the SBZ. However, it had since become clear that the conditions for working-class unity did not exist in the Western zones, and that this situation was unlikely to change. Summing up the results of the latest talks between the Western comrades and the ZS, Grotewohl told the PV, in April 1948, that the prospects for a KPD–SPD merger in the Western zones remained bleak. He blamed ‘faults in the [KPD’s] co-operation with those social democratic comrades who support a merger’, and he complained that the KPD still had no clear idea of how it was possible ‘to strengthen and support the opposition that exists in the SPD . . . ’.124 KPD leaders unwittingly backed these accusations through their own words. Thus communists from Hamburg wrote to Berlin a few months 123

Ibid. ‘Minutes of the 9th/23rd meeting of the PV’, 14/15 April 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/44. 124

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later to say that ‘after three years of working for unity’ they had ‘very few contacts’ with social democrats, and that this state of affairs was to blame for their failure to obtain information on the SPD’s recent Du¨sseldorf Conference (11–14 September 1948).125 There were persistent claims that the SPD was ‘by no means’ a solid ‘ideological unit’. However, a survey carried out among West German SED sympathizers cautioned against undue hopes, stressing that even dissident SPD members had strong reservations about the KPD—allegedly because they had been subjected to ‘the wildest anti-Soviet propaganda’—and regarded the ‘Western solution’ (i.e., West Germany’s orientation towards the West) as ‘a lesser evil’.126 The KPD’s hopes of becoming a party of government had been similarly dashed. Despite being only sparsely represented in the new local administrations (not least because of active discrimination by the Western military authorities), the KPD had initially held posts in nearly all Land governments, whose members had been appointed (prior to the first elections in the Western zones) in accordance with each party’s notional strength as based on the 1932 Reichstag election results. However, by mid-1948 these posts had all disappeared—partly because of the KPD’s failure to live up to electoral expectations and partly because of dismissals by Allied and, later, German officials, who were becoming increasingly anti-communist.127 When Pieck and Grotewohl met Stalin on 26 March 1948, they admitted that, in spite of the recent ‘strikes’ in the Western zones, the KPD’s ‘pol[itical] position’ was ‘as yet poorly developed’, not least because of the Allied ban on the AG and a KPD membership figure which stood at a mere ‘312,576’ and had recently shown a ‘slight drop’. The SED chairmen further acknowledged that the KPD’s ‘representation in the Land parliaments’ was ‘poor too’ as a result of the party having received a mere 9.5 per cent of the votes in the West German 125 ‘Hamburg, den 15. 9. 1948: SPD-Parteitag in Du ¨ sseldorf vom 11.–14. 9. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/237. 126 ‘Zentralsekretariat der SED, Abt. Werbung, Presse, Schulung: Allgemeine Information—Bericht u¨ber Briefe aus den Westzonen’, 15 September 1948; SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/5/299. The participants in the survey were West Germans who subscribed to SED newsletters. A total of 73 replies was received in response to a questionnaire prepared by the SED’s Propaganda Department. There were 27 replies from the British zone, 25 replies from the American zone, and 21 replies from the French zone. 127 Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 81–5. Dietrich Staritz, ‘Kommunistische Partei’, 1767–8.


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Land elections (1,720,229 votes out of a total of 20 million votes cast, compared with 7.2 million votes cast for the SPD).128 Nor was there any sign that the KPD’s electoral prospects were about to improve. At the 10th/24th meeting of the PV, in May 1948, Fisch was forced to admit that the recent Gemeinde elections in Hesse had seen a drop in the KPD’s vote (which now stood at 7.9 per cent, as against 9.3 per cent in the 1946 Gemeinde elections and 10.7 per cent in the 1946 Land elections). He concluded—to calls of ‘hear, hear!’—that the ‘anger of the masses’ had been absorbed by the right rather than by the KPD— not least because of the KPD’s consistently poor reputation, summed up in the accusation that the party was ‘Moscow’s stooge’ (‘eine Befehlsempf a¨ngerin Moskaus’).129 An attempt was launched by the delegates of the KPD’s Herne Conference (27 April 1948) to brush up the KPD’s tarnished image by changing the party’s name to Socialist People’s Party of Germany, or SVD, but this manœuvre was quickly abandoned—amidst widespread confusion among the KPD’s rankand-file—after being banned by the Western military authorities.130 The KPD therefore relinquished its anti-fascist alliance strategy in favour of outright opposition to the prevailing bourgeois democratic regime. Pieck had bluntly told the Western comrades as early as January 1948 that they would be able to beat the forces of reaction ‘only via armed struggles (in bewaffneten Ka¨mpfen)’, while Ulbricht had similarly explained: ‘We can talk as much as we like about the dictatorship of the proletariat and armed struggles, unless we have the support of the masses this is all meaningless. But we can only win over the masses in real struggles . . . ’.131 In mid-1948, the KPD finally took up these recommendations and announced that ‘in West Germany the democratic reconstruction can be achieved only via a revolutionary mass struggle’.132 Confirming this 128 ‘Gespra ¨ch bei Stalin in Moskau vom 26. 3. 1948, 7.00–8.15 Uhr’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. 129 ‘Minutes of the 10th/24th meeting of the PV’, 12/13 May 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/46. 130 Ulrich Hauth, Die Politik, 177–85. Werner Mu ¨ ller, KPD, 381–6. Michael Kubina, ‘ ‘‘Was in dem einen Teil verwirklicht werden kann mit Hilfe der Roten Armee’’ ’, 436–44. 131 ‘Stenographische Niederschrift u ¨ ber die Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats mit den Westdelegierten am Dienstag, dem 13. Januar 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01/73. 132 Dokumente der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands 1945–1956. Mit einem Vorwort des Ersten Sekreta¨rs des ZK der KPD Max Reimann (Berlin, 1965), 141–2.

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reversal of strategy, Fisch told the 13th/27th meeting of the PV that in the Western zones the promotion of ‘the democratic rights and freedoms of the people’ was no longer a question of exercising political power through the existing parliaments and governments but ‘a question of the daily mass struggle’.133 There were hopes that the long-expected currency reform in the Western zones134 might prompt a dramatic change in the public mood in favour of the KPD. Addressing the PV in mid-May 1948, Pieck claimed that the economic reforms due to be carried out in Westernoccupied Germany would deliver ‘an extremely sharp weapon’ into the hands of the communists: This is true in particular for the currency reform associated with the Marshall Plan, which will result in high unemployment, price increases, and a decline in real wages. . . . The consequences of these measures, but above all the breaking up of Germany and the creation of a Western state, will confirm what we have been predicting. This will increase our authority among the masses and make it easier for us to influence the working masses in the Western state . . . .135

According to Fisch, similar hopes were rife within the ranks of the KPD, where the general feeling was: ‘the currency reform will put an end to the lethargy [that exists] within the party, since social tensions will rise.’136 These hopes were fed by fresh allegations that the West German economy was in dire straits. An anonymous East German comrade who had recently visited Hanover reported to Berlin in June 1948 that the Western zones presented a picture of chaos and misery, with black marketeers thronging Hanover’s main railway station and going about their business shamelessly and ‘under the eyes of the police’. He claimed to have encountered ‘a mood of resignation’, with many people privately saying ‘that everything is in vain’ and ‘that it will not be long before the Russians are on the Rhine’. Citing a conversation he had had with the president of Hanover’s Chamber of Artisans, the 133 13th/27th meeting of the PV, 15/16 September 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/52. 134 At a meeting between the ZS and the Western comrades in January 1947, Gniffke had hinted at the possibility of a currency reform in the Western zone. See ‘Stenographische Niederschrift u¨ber die Besprechung mit den Delegierten aus der britischen und amerikanischen Zone, Dienstag, den 21. Januar 1947, 15 Uhr im Zentralhaus der Einheit zu Berlin’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1.01/32. 135 10th/24th meeting of the PV, 12/13 May 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/46. 136 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber die Sitzung des Parteivorstandes der SVD (KPD) vom 26. bis 28. 8. in Frankfurt/Main’, SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/865.


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informant insisted that the economic situation for artisans in the Western zones was ‘catastrophic’ and would become even worse as a result of the impending currency reform, which would lead to ‘at least 50 per cent of the entire Mittelstand’ (the hugely important mediumsized businesses) being forced into bankruptcy.137 Yet, once again, the predictions made by the top German comrades turned out to be wrong. Far from ushering in economic chaos and social strife, the replacement, on 20 June 1948, of the old Reichsmark with the new, American-backed D-Mark—carried out at two days’ notice and after the breakdown of inter-Allied talks on a nationwide currency reform138— laid the foundation for a prolonged period of economic growth and rising prosperity in West Germany.139 To be sure, this transition was not achieved without pain, caused in particular by massive price hikes which far outstripped wage increases (14 per cent for food, 35 per cent for clothes and 500 (!) per cent for eggs), a steep rise in unemployment (from 442,000 in June 1948 to 937,000 in January 1949), and a sharp reduction of private savings (converted into the new currency at a rate of 10 to 1).140 A report drawn up in early November 1948 by the SED’s Western Department gleefully noted that ‘the gap between prices and wages’ in the Western zones was growing fast as a result of the ‘continuous price increases’ triggered by the currency reform. The report went on to explain that real wages were falling ‘not only because of price increases’ but also because of the abolition of the lavish subsidies paid before the currency reform.141 Another report echoed these observations, noting: Mobile goods (consumer goods) are on average 200–300 per cent more expensive [than before]. At the same time, wages have risen by only 137 ‘Bericht von der Mittelstandstagung am 29. und 30. Mai 1948 in Bremen’, report to the SED’s Economics Department, 3 June 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/865. 138 Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung, 432–4. Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 132–6. Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, 336–7. 139 Anthony J. Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, 206–33. Wendy Carlin, ‘Economic Reconstruction in Western Germany, 1945–55: The Displacement of ‘‘Vegetative Control’’ ’, Reconstruction in Post-War Europe: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945–55, ed. by Ian D. Turner (Oxford, 1989), 37–65. Albrecht Ritschl, ‘Die Wa¨hrungsreform von 1948 und der Wiederaufstieg der westdeutschen Industrie: Zu den Thesen von Mathias Manz und Werner Abelshauser u¨ber die Produktionswirkungen der Wa¨hrungsreform’, VfZG 33/1 (1985), 136–65. 140 Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung, 434–5. Adolf, M. Birke, Nation, 134–5. Christoph Buchheim, ‘Die Wa¨hrungsreform 1948 in Westdeutschland’, VfZG 36/2 (1988), 229–30. 141 ‘Zur Lage in den westlichen Besatzungszonen Deutschlands’, memorandum by the SED’s Western Department, 8 November 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/631.

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10–15 per cent. . . . And it will soon get worse for the workers. Unemployment is taking hold on a large scale and has reached enormous proportions in some industries. Thus, despite the existing strong demand for all consumer goods, there are for example 3,000 [unemployed] in the building industry, [while] in the leather industry—centred on Offenbach—90 per cent are out of work.142

What even these highly biased reports were unable to deny, however, was that the currency reform had produced tangible benefits for consumers, the most obvious one being that shopkeepers were no longer hoarding goods—as they had done previously—but putting them up for sale.143 The SED’s Western Department was forced to admit: The fact that after the currency reform people have been able to buy food and other consumer goods is having an influence on large parts of the population, including the workers. The people are hoping that the range of goods available will be maintained or even increased and are expecting price-cuts that will enable them to purchase goods which they had to do without for many years.144

Alarmingly, from the point of view of the SED, these changes had given rise to a feel-good factor that was enticing even dedicated left-wingers. Thus, one West German SED sympathizer, a certain comrade Luebbers, shocked the SED’s Propaganda Department by expressing what was described as ‘an extremely bizarre view’, namely one of intense satisfaction with the currency reform! Writing to Berlin from Go¨ttingen, he explained: ‘We all have the impression: things are improving, albeit slowly. The worst seems to be behind us. This is making us happy and grateful.’145 In these circumstances, the KPD’s mantra-like denunciation of the currency reform as a financial racket for ‘war profiteers’ and a curtainraiser for an ‘outright attack by the entrepreneurs’ (‘Generalangriff der Unternehmer’) struck no chord with the West German public. On the contrary, it compounded the KPD’s political isolation by creating the impression that the party wanted a ‘worsening of the situation’.146 142 ‘Lage in Westdeutschland’, undated memorandum [early 1949?] by the SED’s Western Department, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/66. 143 Christoph Buchheim, ‘Wa ¨hrungsreform’, 222–6. 144 ‘Zur Lage in den westlichen Besatzungszonen Deutschlands’, memorandum by the SED’s Western Department, 8 November 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/631. 145 ‘Zentralsekretariat der SED, Abt. Werbung, Presse, Schulung: Allgemeine Information—Bericht u¨ber Briefe aus den Westzonen’, 15 September 1948, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/5/299. 146 Dokumente der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands, 156–8. ‘Zur Lage in den westlichen Besatzungszonen Deutschlands’, memorandum by the SED’s Western Department, 23 December 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/220.


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The latest election results (for the Kreis and Gemeinde elections in the British zone, held in October 1948) showed another drop of support for the KPD,147 while the party was making no progress in its attempts to mobilize extra-parliamentary support. To be sure, strikes did break out in the Western zones in response to the currency reform, culminating on 12 November 1948 in a twenty-four hour general strike. However, organized by the West German trade unions (which were firmly controlled by the SPD, and which in November 1947 had officially distanced themselves from the trade union movement in the SBZ), these strikes were directed against the recent price increases, rather than against the currency reform as such.148 The SED’s Western Department angrily noted ‘that the SPD and the reformist trade union leaders are prepared to do anything to ensure that the implementation of the Marshall Plan policy is not endangered by wage disputes’, while the Western comrades grimly acknowledged that the KPD had ‘not’ been ‘the leading force’ (‘nicht der organisierende Faktor’) in the recent strikes, which the party had followed ‘more or less like an interested spectator’.149 From late 1948, the prospect of social tensions in the Western zones slowly receded as the currency reform began to bear fruit, with production rising sharply and the gap between prices and wages starting to close.150 The SED leaders were forced to conclude that another great opportunity had slipped by and that the KPD was obviously ‘not getting through to the masses . . . ’.151 Worse still, the KPD itself was showing signs of strain. KPD leaders registered ‘signs of paralysis and ideological vacillations even among leading comrades’ as well as ‘a certain feeling of panic in some organizations’, not least because the issuing of the D-Mark had badly hit the KPD’s finances, which had hitherto relied on a steady flow of cash from Berlin.152 Further evidence 147

Richard Schachtner, Die deutschen Nachkriegswahlen, 22–68. Theodor Eschenburg, Jahre der Besatzung, 435. Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 145. Lothar Berthold, ‘SED und Volkskongreßbegwegung fu¨r Einheit und gerechten Frieden bis zur Gru¨ndung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik’, Zum deutschen Neuanfang, 53. 149 ‘Zur Lage in den westlichen Besatzungszonen Deutschlands’, memorandum by the SED’s Western Department, 8 November 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/631. ‘Bericht u¨ber die Sitzung des Parteivorstandes der SVD (KPD) vom 26. bis 28. 8. [1948] in Frank-furt/Main’, SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/865. 150 Christoph Buchheim, ‘Wa ¨hrungsreform’, 229–30. Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 146–7. 151 ‘Lage in Westdeutschland’, undated memorandum [early 1949?] by the SED’s Western Department, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/66. 152 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber die Sitzung des Parteivorstandes der SVD (KPD) vom 26. bis 28. 8. [1948] in Frankfurt/Main’, SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/865. See also Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 62–3. 148

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of the KPD’s mounting problems was provided by the decline in the party’s membership and the renewed rise of ultra-leftist views, which together prompted complaints about ‘an increasing degeneration of the party as a result of resignations and factionalism’.153 These developments confirmed the SED leaders in their view that they could no longer maintain the fiction of an all-German communist party pursuing a single, nationwide strategy. As early as spring 1948, the AG had been quietly disbanded following the realization that workingclass unity in the Western zones was not on the cards.154 When Pieck and Grotewohl had met Stalin, on 26 March 1948, they had been given permission for a ‘strengthening of the leadership for the Western zones’ and for the setting up of a special ‘bureau’ designed to maintain ‘close contact’ between the KPD and Berlin.155 In keeping with these instructions, the delegates of the KPD’s Herne Conference had appointed a KPD Parteivorstand, to be based in Frankfurt and chaired by Max Reimann, with Walter Fisch and Kurt Mu¨ller acting as deputies. To ensure its close liaison with Berlin, the SED had subsequently established a Western Department (Westabteilung) within its party headquarters, after rejecting a liaison via instructors as impractical.156 By late 1948, the conviction was growing in communist circles that a more dramatic change in the relationship between East and West German comrades was called for as a result of what Pieck described as the ‘Special situation in the West’ created by the imminent establishment of a ‘so-c[a]ll[e]d Western state’, which the KPD had evidently failed to prevent.157 Briefing the ZS (at its meeting on 27 December 1948) on the advice given to him by Stalin during his recent visit to Moscow, the SED chairman explained that the new political situation demanded the ‘resignation [of the KPD leaders] from the PV’ and a ‘Publ[ic] declaration by the KPD [to the effect] that no link exists with [the] SED’.158 Such a declaration was duly issued on 3 January 1949 by the KPD’s Parteivorstand and subsequently confirmed by the 153 ‘Lage in Westdeutschland’, undated memorandum [early 1949?] by the SED’s Western Department; SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/66. 154 Ulrich Hauth, Die Politik, 174–7. 155 ‘Gespra ¨ch bei Stalin in Moskau vom 26. 3. 1948, 7.00–8.15 Uhr’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. 156 ‘Sitzung des Zentralsekretariats am 31. 8. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV2/ 2.1/226. On the KPD’s Herne Conference, see also Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 60–2. Dietrich Staritz, ‘Kommunistische Partei’, 1775–6. Michael Kubina, ‘ ‘‘Was in dem einen Teil verwirklicht werden kann mit Hilfe der Roten Armee’’ ’, 444–6. 157 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 158 Ibid. 4036/695.


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SED (at the 16th/30th meeting of the PV, 24 January 1949, and at the 1st Party Conference, 25–8 January 1949).159 However, the SED leaders were determined to continue their fight against capitalism as best they could and had no intention of completely abandoning the KPD. In early 1949, they established a Western Commission (Westkommission)—chaired by Dahlem and fellow PV member Karl Schirdewan—to replace the newly formed but much smaller Western Department.160 Top KPD functionaries continued to visit Berlin for political meetings, albeit in smaller numbers and less regularly than before.161 Addressing the 16th/30th meeting of the PV (the first not to be routinely attended by the KPD leaders), Matern made it clear that the SED would ‘of course’ continue to be ‘most closely linked to the KPD, its policies and its struggle . . . ’. His words were echoed by Pieck, who told the same gathering: ‘Of course the [SED’s] organizational separation from the KPD does by no means imply a complete ideological and political separation. . . . We don’t have to spill the beans on how we are going to support the KPD, but that we are obliged to do so is perfectly obvious.’162 THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE FORMAL D I V I S IO N O F G E R M A N Y Convinced that the division of Germany was a fait accompli, the SED leaders decided to concentrate on attempts to tighten their hold on the SBZ. Addressing the PV in May 1948, Pieck hinted that the SED would soon perform ‘a strategic change in the direction of our struggle’, the aim of which would be to turn the SBZ into ‘an independent, state-like political entity (selbsta¨ndiges staatliches Gebilde) endowed with a planned economy [and] based on socialist principles’.163 Similarly, Ulbricht told 159

Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 2, 217. ‘Sitzung des Kleinen Sekretariats am 2. 2. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV2/ 3/2. ‘Zur Lage in den westlichen Besatzungszonen Deutschlands’, memorandum by the SED’s Western Department, 23 December 1948; SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/220. See also Patrick Major, The Death of the KPD, 68–71. Michael Kubina, ‘ ‘‘Was in dem einen Teil verwirklicht werden kann mit Hilfe der Roten Armee’’ ’, 484–8. 161 Patrick Major, ‘Big brother und little brother: Das Verha ¨ltnis SED-KPD 1948–1951’, ‘Provisorium’, 157–8. 162 16th/30th meeting of the PV, 24 January 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/59. 163 10th/24th meeting of the PV, 12/13 May 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/46. 160

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the PV four months later that from now on the SED’s task would be ‘to advance on the path of the complete eradication and elimination of the capitalist elements’ in the SBZ, a task which he bluntly described as ‘that of establishing socialism’.164 The SED’s bid for a communist-led East German state was firmly endorsed by the SMAD. In a lecture given on 8 May 1948, exactly three years after the end of the war, Tiulpanov described the SED as being ‘effectively in power’, and he urged the party to continue ‘the struggle for the consolidation of the [Soviet] zone as a whole . . . ’.165 His instructions were confirmed by Marshall Sokolovsky, whom Pieck and Grotewohl visited on 30 October 1948. Setting out the ‘prospects’ for the future ‘development of the int[ernational] situation’, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief stated bluntly: ‘Western powers—Western state/Sov[iet] zone—/independence (Selbsta¨ndigkeit)/government—parliament.’166 Efforts were already under way to create an effective police force loyal to the SED-led regime. The communist-dominated German Administration of the Interior (DVdI), founded on 30 July 1946 via a secret order of the SMAD, had brought the police forces of the various East German La¨nder—themselves dominated by communists—under a central command. At the same time, following the lifting of the Allied ban on armed German police units (1 January 1946), these forces had been issued with firearms and new uniforms.167 In 1948, the SED’s bid for a communistdominated security apparatus was reinforced—with the full backing of the SMAD. When Pieck, Grotewohl, and Dahlem visited Karlshorst on 14 May 1948, they were told that there was a need for ‘barracked police units’. Such units, initially known as ‘Alert Police’, were duly set up in the following months (reaching a strength of 50,000 in 1949), while the regular ‘People’s Police’ and the ‘Border Police’ were also strengthened 164 13th/27th meeting of the PV, 15/16 September 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/52. 165 ‘Schriftliche Fassung eines Vortrages von Tulpanow vom 8. 5. 1948’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/735. 166 ‘Besprechung beim Marschall am 30. 10. 1948’, ibid. 167 Dieter Marc Schneider, ‘Innere Verwaltung/Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern ¨ berwachungs(DVdI)’, SBZ-Handbuch, 207–13. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die Urspru¨nge des U staates in Ostdeutschland: Zur Bildung der Deutschen Verwaltung des Innern in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone (1946)’, Die Ohnmacht der Allma¨chtigen: Geheimdienste und politische Polizei in der modernen Gesellschaft, ed. by Bernd Florath, Armin Mitter, and Stefan Wolle (Berlin, 1992), 146–61. Norman M. Naimark, ‘ ‘‘To Know Everything and to Report Everything Worth Knowing’’: Building the East German Police State, 1945–1949’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 10 (August 1994), 5–6, 19–20. Torsten Diedrich and Ru¨diger Wenzke, Die getarnte Armee: Geschichte der Kasernierten Volkspolizei der DDR 1952 bis 1956 (Berlin, 2001), 20–38.


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and issued with new equipment including ‘carbines’, ‘mach[ine] pistols’, and ‘radios’.168 By that time, in late 1948, Germany’s slide into a formal division had gained further momentum. Within weeks of its inauguration, on 1 September 1948, the West German Parliamentary Council had unveiled the first draft of a ‘Basic Law’, as it had chosen to call its draft constitution for a West German state. Meanwhile, the Western Allies had drawn up two documents designed to ensure their control over the proposed West German state: a Ruhr Statute, which provided for ownership of the Ruhr industries to be vested in appointed German trustees, raising the prospect of these industries remaining in the hands of Germany’s old social élites; and an Occupation Statute, which enshrined the Western Allies’ right to keep troops on West German soil and pass judgement on future West German policies.169 During those months, the inter-German border had lost its informal character and become a tightly policed security zone, with the DVdI issuing instructions in November 1948 for the ‘behaviour of the Border Police in the event of shootings from the Western occupation zones’.170 Hardening the SED’s stance were the latest developments in Berlin, where the collapse in June 1948 of inter-Allied negotiations on a currency reform had triggered a string of dramatic events: a Soviet walkout from the Kommandatura (16 June), the introduction of the D-Mark in the city’s Western half (23 June), and the replacement of the SMAD’s restrictions on traffic to and from West Berlin with a full-scale blockade (24 June). These events had highlighted the SED’s weakness in the German capital, whose overwhelmingly anti-communist Magistrat, a product of the October 1946 elections, had backed the introduction of the D-Mark in a free vote. SED-orchestrated protests, in the form of violent demonstrations by working-class mobs, had failed to prevent this decision and resulted only in the breaking up of the Magistrat as well as a resounding defeat for the SED in the scheduled 168 ‘Besprechung mit Tulpanow, Nasarow, Grotewohl, Pieck und Dahlem vom 14. 5. 1948, 11 Uhr’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/735. See also Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 369–74. Dieter Marc Schneider, ‘Innere Verwaltung’, 213–15. Wolfgang Eisert, ‘Zu den Anfa¨ngen der Sicherheits- und Milita¨rpolitik der SED-Fu¨hrung 1948 bis 1952’, Volksarmee schaffen—ohne Geschrei! Studien zu den Anfa¨ngen einer verdeckten Aufru¨stung in der SBZ/DDR 1947–1952, ed. by Bruno Thoß (Munich, 1994), 178–83. 169 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, 366–74. 170 Gu ¨ nther Glaser, ‘‘Neuregelung der Polizeifragen’’ oder getarnte Bewaffnung der SBZ im Kalten Krieg? Nachdenken u¨ber Probleme und Wirkungen der sicherheits- und milita¨rpolitischen Vera¨nderungen in Ostdeutschland 1948/1949 (Berlin, 1994), 8–9.

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Magistrat elections (held on 5 December 1948, though only in the Western sectors due to a boycott by the SMAD).171 The SED leaders concluded that the time had come to nail their colours firmly to the Soviet mast. A detailed memorandum which the German comrades submitted to Stalin prior to their visit to Moscow in December 1948 characterized the SBZ’s regime as a ‘higher democratic order’ and recommended the ‘nationalization’ of all enterprises with more than 50 employees as a means of accelerating the ‘transformation [of the SBZ] into a people’s democracy’. The paper also mapped out the route to a separate East German state, suggesting that a ‘German Government for the Soviet Zone of Occupation’ be set up (‘As soon as the creation of a government in the west has occurred . . . ’) and requesting that the SED be admitted to membership of the Cominform.172 These proposals failed to impress Stalin, who clearly favoured a more cautious approach. When Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, and Oelßner met the Soviet dictator on 18 December 1948, they were told to hold their fire. According to Pieck’s account of the meeting before the ZS, given on 27 December 1948, the German comrades were advised that it was ‘still too early for expropriation[s]’ and that, rather than launching an all-out anticapitalist crusade, they must take action ‘only against individuals engaged in sabotage’. As for the SED’s request for admission to the Cominform, Pieck and his colleagues were told that their party was ‘not yet mature enough’ and should therefore ‘refrain from [submitting an] application’.173 In criticizing the German comrades, the Soviet dictator did not mince his words. According to one account, he complained: You German communists are like your ancestors, the Teutons. You always fight with an open visor. That may be brave, but [it] is often very foolish. Despite the extremely difficult situation in Germany, some of your comrades are talking about a democratic people’s regime, are debating whether [there is] a dictatorship of the proletariat or a bourgeois democratic regime. This discussion is extremely silly and damaging, [and] it has to stop. What kind of regime there was is a question we can ask ourselves afterwards, once we have triumphed in Germany. Now it would be better to get down to work.174 171 Wolfgang Benz, Gru ¨ ndung, 16–22, 34–8. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die UdSSR und die Urspru¨nge der Berlin-Blockade 1944–1948’, DA 31/4 (1998), 564–79. 172 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 173 Ibid. 4036/695. 174 Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, ‘Zwischen Ostintegration und nationaler Verpflichtung’, 283. See also Dietrich Staritz, ‘Die SED, Stalin und die Gru¨ndung der DDR’, 7, n. 20.


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According to Pieck’s notes, Stalin urged the SED leaders to move ‘towards socialism’ via a ‘cautious’ and ‘opportunistic’ policy—‘in a zigzag’—and refrain from fighting ‘with [a] naked chest’, so as to avoid the ‘example [of the] Teutons’, who for all their courage had been defeated by the ‘Romans’.175 There is further evidence to suggest that in 1948 disagreements arose between the Kremlin and the SED leaders, who were backed by officials at the SMAD. In his account of this period, Gniffke recalls being told by Semenov ‘that some measures initiated by Tiulpanov and Ulbricht’ had gone beyond Moscow’s instructions and were threatening ‘to further complicate the already difficult situation’ in Germany.176 Soviet documents discovered by Norman Naimark reveal that Tiulpanov’s ideological zeal made him the subject of an inquiry by the CPSU(b)’s Central Committee, which, in March 1948, accused him of being excessively harsh in his dealings with non-communists as well as premature in his attempts to introduce socialism in the SBZ.177 As has long been known, Tiulphanov’s star began to fall shortly afterwards (a development hastened by the death of his mentor, Zhdanov, in August 1948), although he remained at his post when General V. I. Chuikov replaced Sokolovsky in March 1949 and was not recalled to the Soviet Union until October 1949.178 Tensions between Moscow and Berlin reflected the Kremlin’s lack of enthusiasm for the establishment of a separate East German state. Stalin himself admitted as much when, at his meeting with the SED leaders on 18 December 1948, he reminded the German comrades that the situation in Eastern Germany was ‘not the same as in the countries of the people’s dem[ocracy]’ because the ‘working class (Arbeiterschaft) was not yet in power (noch nicht an [der] Macht)’ and because there was ‘no unif[ied] [German] state’.179 Soviet hostility to a formal division of Germany had increased as a result of recent changes in Western defence policy. The Western Allies had responded to the collapse of the London CFM not only with recommendations for a West German constitution but also with attempts to create a Western security bloc. On 17 March 1948 the 175

‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/

695. Erich W. Gniffke, Jahre, 298. Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 341–2. 178 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 185–6. Bernd Bonwetsch, ‘Die Affa ¨re Tjulpanow: Die Propagandaverwaltung der Sowjetischen Milita¨radministration im Kreuzfeuer der Kritik 1945–1949’, Deutsche Studien 31 (1994), 247–72. 179 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. 176 177

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‘Brussels Pact’ had been signed, committing Britain, France, and the Benelux countries to closer economic co-operation as well as mutual assistance in the event of a military attack. On 11 June 1948 the ‘Vandenberg Resolution’ had been passed by the American Senate, paving the way for talks on a transatlantic Western alliance (which had duly begun on 6 July 1948)180 and convincing the Kremlin that the proposed West German state was a potential threat to Soviet security.181 Stalin acknowledged that it might be too late to prevent the breaking up of Germany. In January 1948, he had told a delegation of Bulgarian and Yugoslav communists: ‘The West will make Western Germany their own, and we shall turn Eastern Germany into our own state.’182 The Soviet chief was determined, however, to raise the stakes in his bid to foil the Western Allies’ plans. In a series of talks with the Western ambassadors held in July and August 1948, he and his right-hand man, Molotov, had hinted that the blockade of West Berlin would be lifted if the Western Allies withdrew the D-Mark from the German capital and abandoned their bid for a West German state in favour of new negotiations by the Allied foreign ministers, yet this offer had failed because an American-led Western airlift had successfully breached the blockade183 (a fact which no doubt surprised the Kremlin no less than the SED leaders, who had confidently predicted that with the approach of winter ‘the insufficiency of the airlift’ would make itself felt ‘ever more painfully’).184 Stalin’s next step was to initiate a propaganda campaign that played heavily on fears of another war (culminating in April 1949 in the ‘First World Congress of the Friends of Peace’, an event held simultaneously in Paris and Prague and chaired by communist intellectuals who claimed to be representing 600 million men and women from all parts of the world).185 The Kremlin’s view was that the issue of peace would 180 Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 218–29. Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, 305–10. Ludolf Herbst, Option fu¨r den Westen: Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutsch-franzo¨si-schen Vertrag (Munich, 1989), 50–7. 181 The Kremlin’s fears were acknowledged by Pieck, who, after returning from Moscow, warned his comrades against the threat posed by West Germany’s ‘colonization’ and possible ‘use in the [coming] war’. See 17th/31st meeting of the PV, 9/10 March 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/61. 182 Milovan Djilas, Conversations, 139. 183 FRUS: 1948, Vol. II: Germany and Austria (Washington, DC, 1973), 995–1099. Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, 341–53. 184 ‘Werbekampagne gegen die Berliner Wahlen–Situation’, internal SED memorandum dated 8 November 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/755. 185 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 184–5. Angelika Klein, ‘Das Deutsche Komitee der Ka¨mpfer fu¨r den Frieden’, ‘Provisorium’, 172–4.


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make for a powerful rallying cry and stand a good chance of uniting the masses—in both Europe and Germany—against the Western Allies’ policies. This was spelled out by Stalin himself, who told the SED leaders on 18 December 1948 that the best way for them to win over the ‘work[ing] masses’ would be to step up the ‘struggle for [the] unity [of] G[ermany] a[nd for] peace’.186 The SED leaders, who had obviously misread Stalin’s intentions, hastened to change course. In an interview published in Neues Deutschland on 30 December 1948, Pieck dismissed as ‘completely false’ the suggestion that a people’s democracy already existed in the SBZ. He stressed that, far from being designed to create an independent government for the SBZ, the People’s Council was fighting ‘for the unity of Germany and for a just peace’ and would ‘continue this struggle until this aim has been reached’.187 His words were echoed by Grotewohl, who shortly afterwards told the SED’s 1st Party Conference—one of whose themes was the ‘struggle for peace and against warmongering’—‘that not even the most perfect East Germany (kein noch so scho¨nes Ostdeutschland)’ could be a substitute for a ‘unified, progressive and peace-loving and democratic Germany’, for only the latter would ensure peace in Europe.188 There followed a new SED campaign for the establishment of a unified German state. At its 6th meeting, on 18/19 March 1949, the People’s Council formally approved a draft ‘Constitution for a German Democratic Republic’ (unveiled at the Council’s 5th meeting in October 1948). Modelled on the SED’s eponymous draft constitution of 1946, the document was presented as an all-German alternative to the proposed West German Basic Law. In another development, the People’s Council called on the two leading political institutions in West Germany—the Parliamentary Council and the Economic Council—to receive an East German delegation and enter into negotiations on the promotion of German unity.189 The People’s Council also resolved to convene a 3rd People’s Congress in the hope, as the SED leaders had previously hinted to Stalin, that the holding of such an event would send a strong signal ‘against the Occupation Statute in the West’.190 186 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 187 Neues Deutschland, 30 December 1948. 4036/695. 188 Protokoll der Ersten Parteikonferenz der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. 25. bis 28. Januar 1949 im Hause der Deutschen Wirtschaftskommission zu Berlin, 2nd 189 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 55–62. edn. (Berlin, 1950), 55, 356. 190 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695.

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Privately, the SED leaders were sceptical whether their new initiative would achieve anything. At the 17th/31st meeting of the PV, in March 1949, Ulbricht complained that many ordinary Germans wanted ‘to stay neutral in the struggle waged against the Soviet Union by American imperialism’, a problem compounded by a widespread tendency ‘to exaggerate the strength of USA-imperialism’.191 Ulbricht’s words were echoed by Merker, who acknowledged before the 18th/32nd meeting of the PV that the German masses were unaware of ‘the superiority’ which ‘the democratic forces in the world’ enjoyed over ‘Anglo-American imperialism’.192 These problems were highlighted by the elections to the 3rd People’s Congress. Confined to the SBZ and the Eastern half of Berlin, where they were held on 15/16 May 1949, these elections—the first to be based on an all-party list which enshrined the SED’s domination—produced 34.2 per cent ‘no’ votes, despite the fact that they doubled up as a referendum on German unity and were rigged in the final count.193 Meanwhile, the Kremlin had launched a last-ditch attempt to prevent the breaking up of Germany. On 5 May 1949, after several weeks of talks between the Soviet and the American representative at the UN Security Council, Jacob Malik and Philip C. Jessup, the two sides had agreed to lift the Soviet blockade of Berlin (as well as the Western counter-blockade) and hold another meeting of the Allied CFM.194 The view among Soviet officials appears to have been that this meeting— which was due to open in Paris on 23 May 1949—might pave the way for a deal over Germany. That, at least, was the impression gained by Pieck, who was in Moscow for medical treatment between 14 and 21 May 1949 and who was given to understand that the forthcoming conference presented an excellent ‘opportunity’ for Germany, namely the chance of getting ‘[a] peace treaty—no occupation statute/[a] unif[ied] Germany . . . no Western state—no Western government’.195 191 17th/31st meeting of the PV, 9/10 March 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/61. 192 18th/32nd meeting of the PV, 4/5 May 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/63. 193 Gu ¨ nter Braun, ‘Die Delegiertenwahlen zum 3. Deutschen Volkskongreß: Anmerkungen zur Funktion und Manipulation der ersten Einheitslisten Abstimmung im Mai 1949’, ‘Provisorium’, 362–8. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die SED und die Wahlen (1948–1950). Untersuchung zu den politischen Entscheidungsprozessen’, ibid. 101–6. 194 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, 354–6, 387–9. Joachim Mitdank, ‘Blockade gegen Blockade: Die Berliner Krise 1948/49’, BzG 36/3 (1994), 50–1. 195 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 14. 4.–21. 5. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695.


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An immediate unification of Germany on the basis of a bourgeois democratic regime would, of course, have spelled the end of the SED’s hold on power and consigned the party to the political wilderness. This was frankly admitted by Pieck, who suggested that if the proposal to establish a united Germany via the accession of the SBZ to the three Western zones were to be put to a vote, ‘an overwhelming majority would declare in favour of this united Germany’.196 Nothing suggests that this was an option which the Kremlin was willing to contemplate. After all, during the negotiations at Paris, which took place between 23 May and 20 June 1949, Andrei Vyshinskii, the new Soviet foreign minister, swiftly rejected American suggestions that German unity could be achieved by simply attaching the SBZ to the three Western zones197—a fact which convinced Grotewohl that the establishment of German unity under Western auspices would ‘under no circumstances’ constitute a solution to the German Question.198 Nor does it seem that the Soviets were much happier with the idea of a neutral Germany. To be sure, at the Paris CFM, Vyshinskii proposed the withdrawal of all occupation troops within one year of the signing of a peace treaty with Germany.199 However, Grotewohl was certain that the Soviets would not be satisfied with a formal neutralization of Germany—an idea floated by various groups of West German politicians and intellectuals, such as the ‘Godesberg Circle’ (chaired by Ernst Lemmer, formerly of the Soviet-zone CDU, and Rudolf Nadolny, a former German ambassador to Moscow) or the ‘Nauheim Circle’ (led by Wu¨rzburg professor Ulrich Noack).200 In his address to the 19th/33rd meeting of the PV, Grotewohl dismissed Noack’s scheme as a ‘pipe-dream’ (‘Utopie’), insisting that neutralization without the removal of the influence of foreign capital from West Germany would be ‘no neutralization’. He argued that Germany’s size and location were 196 20th/34th meeting of the PV, 20/21 July 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/67. 197 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 191–2. FRUS: 1949, Vol. III: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria (Washington, DC, 1974), 913–1040. 198 19th/33rd meeting of the PV, 27 May 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 199 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 203–4. 2/1/65. 200 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945–1949 (Neuwied, 1966), 354–84. Gu¨nter Wollstein, ‘Rudolf Nadolny: Außenminister ohne Verwendung’, VfZG 28/1 (1980), 47–93. Reiner Dohse, Der Dritte Weg: Neutralita¨tsbestrebungen in Westdeutschland zwischen 1945 und 1955 (Hamburg, 1974), 41–61. Alexander Gallus, Die Neutralisten: Verfechter eines vereinten Deutschlands zwischen Ost und West 1945–2000 (Du¨sseldorf, 2001), 153–69.

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such that the country would always be a springboard for future aggression in Europe—a strategic ‘highway’ (‘Hauptstrasse’), as he put it—and that, as a consequence, the question of whether Germany belonged to the Anglo-American ‘war camp’ or the Soviet-led ‘peace camp’ could not be dodged via a neutrality pact, which would, in fact, be ‘totally meaningless’.201 That these comments reflected not just Grotewohl’s private opinion but official Soviet thinking is borne out by the fact that Karlshorst was secretly warning the SED leaders against too close an involvement with the champions of German neutrality, in particular Nadolny and Lemmer.202 Soviet officials were slightly more tolerant towards Noack, who was subsequently given the opportunity to present his ideas in seminars with East German political leaders and whose ‘Call for the Preservation of Peace through the Neutralization of Germany’ was published in Ta¨gliche Rundschau, the SMAD’s mouthpiece, in March 1949.203 However, Soviet support for Noack was a mere smoke-screen. At a meeting with Dahlem and leading KPD functionaries on 12 May 1949, Tiulpanov scolded the German comrades for being too sympathetic to Noack, paving the way for Noack’s abrupt fall from grace only a few months later.204 Far from being designed to pull the rug from underneath the SED’s struggling regime, the Soviet proposals submitted at Paris—which provided for the revival of the ACC and the Kommandatura, the withdrawal of the D-Mark from Berlin, the re-establishment of a unified Berlin Magistrat, and the setting up of a ‘State Council’ based on the existing central agencies of the two halves of Germany205—were an attempt to return to the agreements of Potsdam, which gave the Soviets a veto in matters affecting Germany as a whole while ensuring their exclusive control over the SBZ. As Grotewohl pointed out before the PV, the Kremlin’s scheme conceived of German unification not as a shot-gun marriage but as a gradual and limited transfer of power to a German

19th/33rd meeting of the PV, 27 May 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/65. ‘The SMA[D] warns against Nadolny–Lemmer’, handwritten annotation, dated 7 April 1949, on a memorandum (‘Nadolny, der ‘‘Godesberger Kreis’’ und die deutsche Frage’) circulated to Pieck. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/762. 203 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 223–4. 204 Alexander Gallus, Die Neutralisten, 169–79. Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die KPD als Instrument der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik: Festlegungen 1949 und Implementierungen 1952’, DA 27/8 (1994), 816–29. 205 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 189–202. 201 202


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central authority, a transfer that could be controlled by Moscow at every stage through the requirement of inter-Allied unanimity.206 The Soviets apparently thought that such an arrangement would put them in a strong position,207 especially if they simultaneously managed to win the propaganda war within Germany, something they hoped to achieve by donning the mantle of German nationalism. The first hint of this new approach had come from Semenov, who had instructed the SED leaders in June 1948 to introduce a ‘new line of argument’ based on the ‘issue [of] nationhood’ (‘Begriff Nation’). The purpose of this initiative was to give rise to a ‘N[ational] F[ront]’, a new organization designed to achieve a ‘strengthening of the struggle for nat[ional] liberation’ by targeting not only the German workers but all Germans, including ‘form[er] Nazi[s]’ and ‘form[er members of the German] military’.208 These instructions were given fresh urgency in May 1949, when Semenov informed Grotewohl—who in turn informed the SED’s Politburo—that ‘St[alin]’ wanted to take a ‘step beyond’ the campaign for the People’s Congress by launching a ‘National Front for [German] unity’, and that the Soviet dictator had demanded that the agenda for the 3rd People’s Congress, scheduled for 29/30 May 1949, be changed accordingly.209 The SED leaders duly obliged. As well as adopting the constitution approved by the People’s Council, the 2,000 delegates of the 3rd People’s Congress (who allegedly included some 500 delegates from West Germany, where the elections to the Congress had been banned)210 issued a manifesto that called for a widening of the struggle for peace via the creation of a ‘National Front for Unity and a Just Peace’. A similar call had been issued by the People’s Council on 9 May 1949.211 The German comrades felt no great enthusiasm for the new approach demanded by Moscow. While they fully supported its aims— ‘Germany’s liberation from American imperialism’, to use Dahlem’s 206 19th/33rd meeting of the PV, 27 May 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/65. 207 This was also the opinion of West German CDU leaders, who were convinced, according to reports received in Berlin, that a return to the agreements of Potsdam would constitute a ‘victory’ for the Russians. See ‘CDU zur Demontage in der britischen Zone und zur Aussenministerkonferenz in Paris’, report by the SED’s Western Commission, 15 June 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/198. 208 ‘Besprechung mit Semjonow vom 10. 6. 1948, 20 Uhr’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/735. 209 ‘Bericht Grotewohl vom 23. 5. 1949 im Polbu ¨ ro’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. 210 Manfred Koch, ‘Volkskongreßbewegung’, 352–4. Jochen Meiners, Deutsch211 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 188–9. landpolitik, 64–5.

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words, or ‘the defeat of American imperialism’ and ‘its expulsion (Verjagung) from Europe’, to quote Pieck212—they had no clear idea of how the proposed National Front could be built. When the idea of a National Front was first put to him by Karlshorst, Pieck privately wondered: ‘What is this?’, adding that the SED was ‘not prepared’ for such an initiative and that the ‘PV’ had ‘not [been] informed’.213 Nor were there any hopes for a quick breakthrough. Warning his fellow comrades against false expectations, Oelßner hinted that the new strategy would determine the SED’s line not only for the immediate future but ‘for a long period [of time]’. His calls for patience were echoed by Pieck, who cited the failure of the People’s Congress to mobilize the masses in the West as evidence of ‘the weaknesses of our movement’.214 There was a feeling among the SED leaders, however, that the prospects for the National Front might soon begin to improve. Oelßner took the lead in arguing that West Germany’s economic recovery was built on sand. Quoting from a new set of economic statistics, he claimed that the volume of West German imports was now 37 per cent higher than before the war, while the volume of exports was 47 per cent lower. Compounding the problems resulting from this imbalance, he argued, was the fact that West German exports were now based mainly on raw materials (whose share of the total had risen from 0 to 48 per cent) as opposed to finished goods (whose share had fallen from 82 to 27 per cent).215 Convinced that Germany’s export industry was being ‘strangled by the practices of American imperialism . . . ’, captured in his opinion in the recent resumption of selective industrial dismantling by the British and the Americans,216 Oelßner maintained that there was ‘a huge crisis’ (‘eine ungeheure Notlage’) in West Germany. Lavish displays in shops, he insisted, were a ‘charade’ (‘falscher Schein’) that disguised ‘huge unemployment and short-time work’ as well as the economic ruin of the peasants and artisans.217 212 20th/34th meeting of the PV, 20/21 July 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/67. 213 ‘Notizen Piecks vom 23. 5. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. 214 20th/34th meeting of the PV, 20/21 July 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 215 Ibid. 2/1/67. 216 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die A ¨ ra Adenauer: Gru¨nderjahre der Republik 1949–1957 (Stuttgart, 1981), 62–3. 217 20th/34th meeting of the PV, 20/21 July 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/67.


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Other SED leaders shared Oelßner’s views. Pieck declared that the SED’s task would be ‘to highlight specifically’ the effects American economic policy was having on West Germany—namely ‘unemployment, falling wages, [and] inflation’—and to explain to the German public how German ‘entrepreneurs, businessmen, [and] shop-owners’ were being systematically ruined. The SED chairman had no doubt that the West German bourgeoisie would eventually realize ‘that American imperialism is their enemy and that it has to be fought’, even though they were currently in favour of a West German state. His words were echoed by Albert Norden, another member of the PV, who claimed that the West German bourgeoisie was bound to wake up to the fact that the West German state would be ‘a sham (Scheinstaat) that exists [only] through the grace of the dollar’, not least because it would ‘further reduce opportunities for trade, in particular with regard to trading opportunities with the East’.218 Non-economic factors too were thought to work in the SED’s favour. Oelßner, in particular, argued that German culture was increasingly threatened by ‘the expansion of the American way of life in Western and Southern Germany . . . ’. He claimed that the emerging West German culture—which he dismissed as ‘a cheap copy (Abklatsch) of [American] boogie-woogie culture, chewing-gum aesthetics, [and] gangster morals’—was an insult to the German people, as a result of which feelings of ‘outrage and opposition against the policy of imperialist enslavement’ would seize ‘an ever larger section’ of the population.219 While the SED leaders acknowledged that these developments would take time, they drew encouragement from the belief that the international balance of power was slowly shifting in their favour. Oelßner argued that claims about the superiority of the pro-Soviet ‘antiimperialist’ camp over the West were not a question ‘of some mathematical calculation’ but a reflection of the fact that the former represented ‘the future of mankind’ and was founded on unity, while the latter was being ‘torn apart by internal contradictions and therefore reduced in its effectiveness’. At a time when the Chinese communists under Mao were routing their bourgeois and American-backed opponents,220 Oelßner was thrilled by ‘the great liberation movements in the colonies’ and in particular by the developments in China, which he claimed had ‘already united 270 million people within the People’s Republic of China and just launched a new offensive against the China 218

Ibid.

219

Ibid.

220

Boris Meissner, Rußland, 205–6.

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of old’.221 Similarly, Koenen believed that the day was approaching ‘when the victories in China herald the defeat of the dollar, when . . . the Marshall Plan proves a failure in Europe, when an economic crisis erupts in West Germany’.222 When these comments were made, in the summer of 1949, the division of Germany was almost complete. Soviet efforts to make the Western Allies reconsider their policies had been to no avail. On 4 April 1949 the negotiations on the creation of a Western security bloc had resulted in the founding of NATO, the ‘North Atlantic Treaty Organization’ that from now on linked the defence of twelve West European countries to that of the United States. This event had ushered in the final preparations for the establishment of a West German state. Agreements had been reached on the fusion of the three Western zones (8 April) and on West Germany’s future level of industry (13 April), which had been raised above the ceiling laid down in the 1946 Level of Industry Plan. The two instruments of Allied control over West Germany—the Occupation Statute and the Ruhr Statute—had been signed, respectively, on 10 and 28 April 1949. Finally, on 23 May 1949, the Parliamentary Council had formally approved the Basic Law.223 The Paris CFM had failed to reverse these developments. Although the negotiations had been less acrimonious than on previous occasions, and despite the fact that the Allies had made some progress towards the signing of a peace treaty with Austria (which had been restored as a separate country at the end of the war and placed under a joint Allied occupation regime), there had been no breakthrough on the question of Germany. As before, even minor issues had been mired in discord. Thus, the Western Allies had, once again, turned down a Soviet request that representatives of the People’s Congress be allowed to address the foreign ministers.224 Soviet officials were by no means displeased with this outcome. At a meeting with Pieck on 19 July 1949, Semenov opined that although the ‘main questions [concerning] Germany [had not been] resolved’ the Paris CFM had been a ‘triumph for the diplomacy of the S[oviet] U[nion]’ and a ‘victory for the friends of peace’. While he expressed regret that in the case of the ‘German Question’ it had been impossible 221 20th/34th meeting of the PV, 20/21 July 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/67. 222 Ibid. 223 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 183–4. Wolfgang Benz, Gru ¨ ndung, 109–21. 224 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror, 389–97.


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to achieve ‘similar res[ults] as [on the question of] Austria’, he suggested that—in keeping with a ‘directive [from] Stalin’—the struggle for Germany’s ‘econ[omic] a[nd] pol[itical] unity’ would be resumed at the ‘next conference of [Allied] for[eign] min[isters]’.225 The holding of such a conference in the autumn of 1949 was one of the things upon which the foreign ministers had agreed at Paris. Soviet officials may also have drawn encouragement from rumours within the CSU (the CDU’s Bavarian sister party) ‘that the English [military authorities] take the view that the Bonn constitution will in any event only be in force for three months because a solution to the German problem on an allGerman basis will be found in the [new] East-West negotiations’.226 However, the Western Allies were in no mood for back-tracking and the agreed talks never took place. Instead, Germany’s slide into a formal division finally ran its course. Following a decision to make Bonn the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany, as the new West German state was called, the first elections to the federal West German parliament, the Bundestag, were held on 14 August 1949. The outcome of these elections amounted to a vote for the status quo, with the two main pillars of West German political life, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, winning respectively 139 and 131 of the 402 seats, as against a mere 15 seats won by the KPD (the equivalent of 5.6 per cent of the votes cast).227 Despite the KPD’s poor track-record, this result came as a shock to the comrades in Berlin. At a post-mortem held by the SED’s Politburo, Ackermann conceded that ‘I and many others had expected a different election result’.228 Surprise at the KPD’s poor performance was also expressed by Karl Schirdewan, the deputy chairman of the SED’s Western Commission, who told the 21st/35th meeting of the PV that the election result constituted ‘a strengthening of the bourgeois parties and a shift towards the right’, a phenomenon which he found difficult to reconcile with the propitious circumstances in which he believed the elections had taken place (namely unemployment, short-time work, and 225 ‘Besprechung am 19. 7. 1949, 10.20 Uhr mit Semjonow’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/735. 226 ‘Einige Informationen aus Bayern’, report by the SED’s Western Commission, 6 May 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/198. 227 Wolfgang Benz, Gru ¨ ndung, 121–34. Herbert Mayer, ‘Die Bundestagswahlen 1949, die SED und die KPD’, ‘Provisorium’, 212–19. 228 ‘Sitzungen des Pol[it]Bu ¨ ros am 19., 20. und 22. 8. [19]49’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/39.

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other ‘signs of an economic crisis’ that ought to have tarnished ‘the fact that there are full shops’).229 The SED leaders reacted swiftly to these developments, which convinced Ulbricht that the post-war years had reached ‘some kind of conclusion’ (‘einen gewissen Abschluß ’).230 On 16 September 1949—nine days after the inaugural session of the Bundestag and one day after the election of Konrad Adenauer as Federal Chancellor231—Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, and Oelßner travelled to Moscow for consultations (lasting until 28 September) with the CPSU(b)’s Politburo.232 At a meeting with Stalin, Pieck denounced the Bundestag elections as a dangerous ‘mass deception’ that highlighted the threat posed by the Western Allies as well as ‘the need to press ahead with the establishment of a German government in the Soviet zone of occupation’, and he requested Stalin’s advice on the question of how the SED should proceed.233 Leaving nothing to chance, the German comrades had already drawn up a detailed plan for the founding of an East German state, to be carried out ‘in the first half of October’ 1949. Submitted to Stalin in a letter dated 19 September 1949, and subsequently endorsed by the Soviet chief without major changes,234 this plan provided for the establishment of a parliament (via the transformation of the People’s Council into a ‘Provisional People’s Chamber’), the enactment of the constitution adopted by the 3rd People’s Congress (at a joint meeting of the Provisional People’s Chamber and a second chamber made up of Land representatives, the ‘La¨nderkammer’), and the election of Wilhelm Pieck (at the same meeting) as president of the new state, the ‘German Democratic Republic’ (GDR). Unsurprisingly in view of earlier developments in the SBZ, the plan also provided for the SED’s domination of the new government, which was to be headed by an SED minister-president, Otto Grotewohl (with the SED’s Walter Ulbricht, the CDU’s Otto Nuschke, and the LDP’s Hermann Kastner acting as deputies) in addition to having an inbuilt SED majority (with 8 of the 18 ministers being SED members and another 2 belonging to the newly established SED front organizations, the NDPD and the BDB). The new government, whose ministries were based 229 21st/35th meeting of the PV, 23/24 August 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/69. 230 ‘Sitzungen des Pol[it]Bu ¨ ros am 19., 20. und 22. 8. [19]49’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/39. 231 Wolfgang Benz, Gru ¨ ndung, 134–6. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die A¨ra Adenauer, 27–42. 232 Dietrich Staritz, ‘Die SED, Stalin und die Gru ¨ ndung der DDR’, 8–9. 233 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 16.–28. 9. 1949 einschl. Vorschla ¨ge des Politbu¨ros’, 234 Ibid. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695.


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upon the departments of the DWK, was to take over its responsibilities from the SMAD, which was to be scaled down and transformed into a supervisory body, the ‘Soviet Control Commission’ (SKK).235 The SED leaders were not denying that the GDR, which was founded as planned at a meeting of the People’s Council on 7 October 1949,236 fell far short of the ideal of a unified German state. Addressing the PV on 4 October 1949, Pieck explained that the government the SED was about to set up would be ‘a German government that will, of course, be based only on the organs of the Eastern zone’.237 The same point was made by Grotewohl, who bluntly told the PV a few days later: There is too much talk of a unified German government. Comrades, we are not setting up a unified German government, but . . . the government that will be created will be the government of the German Democratic Republic. . . . We shall have to get used to using the right words, so as not to give rise to expectations for which the conditions currently do not exist.238

However, while they acknowledged the failure of their attempts to create a unified German state, the SED leaders still believed that they could win nationwide political influence. Dahlem expressed the belief that the ‘entire public and political life of the Eastern zone’ would in due course become ‘a convincing example of the possibility of a broad union of all German patriots fighting for a united Germany’, while Pieck argued that the GDR would establish itself as a ‘hub’ (‘Zentrum’) capable of representing and promoting the ‘national, political, economic, and cultural interests of the [entire] German people’.239 Echoing these words, Grotewohl made it clear that the SED’s goals had not changed, and that the party’s task was ‘to develop a practical policy of such magnetism and persuasiveness that even our fiercest opponents in the West will one day be forced to concede that we represent the political forces that are truly capable of leading Germany once again towards a good and hopeful future’.240 235 Ibid. See also Bernd Niedbalski, ‘Die kaderpolitischen und staatsorganisatorischen Voraussetzungen fu¨r die Bildung der DDR-Regierung 1949’, ‘Provisorium’, 305–12. 236 Heinz Heitzer, ‘Die Bildung der Provisorischen Regierung der DDR’, ibid., 313–21. 237 22nd/36th meeting of the PV, 4 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/72. 238 23rd/37th meeting of the PV, 9 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/74. 239 22nd/36th meeting of the PV, 4 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/72. 240 23rd/37th meeting of the PV, 9 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/74.

5 Retreat and Retrenchment: The SED and the German Question in the Early 1950s T H E S E D ’ S 3 R D CO N G R E S S AN D T H E EL ECTIONS OF OCTOBER 1950 The founding of the GDR elicited little enthusiasm from the East German public. A survey conducted by the SED’s Propaganda Department suggested ‘that parts of the workforce and the population are showing no interest in the appointment of a German government’.1 An SED functionary from Berlin-Friedrichshain reported that ‘most people have adopted a wait-and-see attitude (eine abwartende Haltung)’, while an SED shop-steward from Oberscho¨neweide, near Berlin, noted ‘that for the time being the indifferent population is waiting to see what action the new government will take’.2 Some reactions were openly hostile, with one worker declaring: ‘The new government should have been elected, for we already had a dictatorial government under Hitler.’ Another man ‘denounced the new government’, calling it ‘a communist racket and a Russian scam’. However, at this early stage many people were clearly willing to give the GDR the benefit of the doubt, their main worry being food rather than politics. ‘Let’s wait and see if the [new] democratic government will achieve more than the one in Bonn’ was one reaction, another one being: ‘ . . . whichever government performs better will be the victor and that is something which the two must settle between themselves.’3 1 ‘Argumente zur Bildung einer deutschen demokratischen Regierung’, Abt. Massenagitation, 14 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/768. 2 ‘Weitere Stimmen zur Bildung der Deutschen Demokratischen Regierung’, Abt. Massenagitation, 14 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/768. 3 Ibid.

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The SED leaders needed no reminding of their limited popularity, which had already been cast into sharp relief by the 1946 Berlin elections—an event later described by Pieck as a ‘salutary lesson’ for the SED.4 In early 1948, according to a statement by Pieck, the ZS had resolved to postpone the Gemeinde and Kreis elections due in the autumn of that year ‘because of the enduring economic difficulties’. PV member Otto Buchwitz had warned his colleagues that, as a result of the continuing shortage of consumer goods, the benefits of the SED’s policies were not being recognized by large sections of the population, although he had expressed the belief that the conditions for an SED victory at the polls would be much better ‘in a year’s time’.5 In the absence of a visible change in the public mood, the SED leaders had subsequently concluded that it would be unsafe to hold the Land elections due in the autumn of 1949. On 2 October 1949, the Politburo decreed that the elections for the Land, Kreis, and Gemeinde assemblies be held together with the first elections for the People’s Chamber—a decision confirmed three days later, when a joint meeting of the executives of the People’s Council and the Anti-Fascist Bloc tentatively agreed to hold all elections on 15 October 1950.6 Shortly afterwards, on 17 October 1949, the KS took a secret decision which effectively turned the GDR’s entire government machine into an adjunct of the SED. At its heart was the stipulation that no law must be passed by the People’s Chamber and adopted by the new government without prior approval by either the Politburo or the KS, and that all directives issued by government agencies must be vetted by the relevant department of the PV.7 However, while all of these measures were apparently taken at the initiative of the SED, there is no evidence to suggest—as has sometimes been done8—that they were at odds with Soviet plans for the GDR. Thus, the decision to postpone the elections was firmly supported by Stalin, who, at his meeting with the German comrades in December 1948, had granted the SED’s request that ‘elections’ be held ‘not before 4 16th/30th meeting of the PV, 24 January 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/59. 5 7th/21st meeting of the PV, 11/12 February 1948, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/40. 6 ‘Sitzung des Politbu ¨ ros vom 2. 10. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/47. Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR, 513–20. 7 ‘Sitzung des Kleinen Sekretariats [des Politbu ¨ ros] am 17. Oktober 1949’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/58. See also Siegfried Suckut, ‘Innenpolitische Aspekte der DDR-Gru¨ndung. Konzeptionelle Differenzen, Legitimations- und Akzeptanzpro8 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 166. bleme’, ‘Provisorium’, 91–2.

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spring 1950’ and that these elections be run not as a free contest between the various political parties but on the basis of a ‘unif[orm] Bloc list’.9 As Jochen Laufer has shown with the help of Soviet documents, the postponment of the elections was also backed by Semenov, who had advised the Soviet Foreign Ministry in March 1949, in response to an inquiry, that the conditions for the holding of elections in the SBZ did not yet exist.10 That the consolidation of the GDR had priority over other matters was confirmed by Semenov at a meeting with Pieck on 14 February 1950. The encounter left the SED chairman and GDR president in no doubt that a ‘New phase in the internal development of the GDR’ had begun—a phase that could be summed up with the words: ‘We are moving towards/socialism—/but [in a] zigzag/we are not talking about/it.’11 Nor is there much evidence to support claims12 that many PV members, including Grotewohl, were unhappy with their party’s undemocratic approach. At the 22nd/36th meeting of the PV, in early October 1949, Gerhart Eisler, a former Comintern official who had recently arrived in Berlin from exile in the United States, drew applause for a speech which culminated in the remark: ‘if we set up a government, we will never give it up, not through elections and not through other means’.13 Far from being a rebuff to dissident colleagues, Ulbricht’s interjection that ‘Some people have failed to understand this!’ appears to have been directed at ‘the right-wing elements within the bourgeois parties’ attacked by Eisler for their persistent attempts to thwart the SED’s policies.14 Ulbricht’s outburst was certainly not aimed at Grotewohl, who underlined the SED’s refusal to give up power—to massive applause from his audience—when he told the 23rd/37th meeting of the PV: The task facing our party with regard to Blockpolitik is to differentiate between our opponents, which means co-operating well and effectively with the progressive and benign elements while separating the reactionary circles . . . and probably ensuring that they will get bashed over the head in the not-too-distant future, in order to obtain a firm political basis for co-operation.15 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die SED und die Wahlen’, 105, n. 12. 11 ‘Besprechung mit Semjonow am 14. 2. 1950, 8 Uhr abends’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 12 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 167. 13 22nd/36th meeting of the PV, 4 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 14 Ibid. 2/1/72. 15 23rd/37th meeting of the PV, 9 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/74. 9

10


197

Half a year later, Grotewohl reiterated his contempt for bourgeois democracy, advising the 25th/39th meeting of the PV: ‘We take it for granted that we did not conduct Blockpolitik for five years only to stand by and watch the destruction of everything we have laboriously achieved . . . in the sixth year.’16 The SED leaders had by no means abandoned the hope that their policies would one day command broad popular support, not least because they remained optimistic about the long-term economic outlook.17 At their meeting with Stalin in September 1949, the German comrades had argued that the elections in East Germany should be held ‘after further developments in West Germany have clearly revealed that the situation over there continues to worsen, in contrast to the progress [made] in the Eastern zone’.18 Addressing the PV in early October 1949, Pieck claimed that the postponment of the elections would enable the SED to consolidate the ‘upswing’ (‘Aufwa¨rtsentwicklung’) that was now under way, thereby showing the masses ‘concrete results’ and convincing them ‘that only the policies jointly pursued by the [antifascist] parties at the initiative of the SED will bring benefits to the German people’.19 Similarly, if more dramatically, Ulbricht told the PV three months later—to calls of ‘hear, hear!’—that the SED’s priority must now be ‘to increase the pace of economic development to the point where it exceeds that of the capitalist Germany of old’. He insisted that if the party succeeded in meeting this challenge it would have proved ‘that our approach is the right one’, and it would then be able ‘to win a majority in West Germany too’.20 Boasts such as these—as well as Ulbricht’s famous claim, made in an interview with Neues Deutschland, that the ‘era of success’ (‘Zeit der Erfolge’) had finally begun21—were seemingly vindicated by the success of the two-year plan, which had surpassed the SED’s own expectations. This plan had been aimed at reaching 81 per cent of East Germany’s pre-war (1936) output by 1950, but a level of 95 per cent had already 16 25th/39th meeting of the PV, 14/15 March 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/78. 17 For the view that the SED’s policies were aimed at gaining popular support by improving the living conditions of the East German population, see also Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949–1989 (Oxford, 1995), 29. 18 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 16.–28. 9. 1949 einschl. Vorschla ¨ge des Politbu¨ros’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. 19 22nd/36th meeting of the PV, 4 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/72. 20 24th/38th meeting of the PV, 10/11 January 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ 21 Neues Deutschland, 26 April 1949. IV 2/1/76.

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been reached in the early months of 1949, climbing to 103 per cent a year later. The SED leaders saw this rapid recovery as proof of the superiority of their economic regime (rather than as evidence of the fact that the war had not significantly reduced Germany’s capital stock)22 and were unaware that the recovery was unbalanced (with the production of finished goods fast outgrowing that of iron and coal).23 Reflecting their hopes for further economic triumphs were attempts to link the founding of the GDR—through a string of factory visits by government ministers in October 1949—with the first anniversary of the launch of the ‘Hennecke Movement’ (the SED’s campaign for higher productivity modelled on the Soviet ‘Stakhanov Movement’ and named after the miner Adolf Hennecke).24 In the spring of 1950, the mood among the SED leaders plummeted following a warning by Heinrich Rau, the minister for economic planning and a candidate member of the Politburo, ‘that having almost reached the pre-war production level . . . we will encounter major difficulties this year, that it is no longer quite so easy to fulfil the economic plan, that the challenges have become greater . . . ’. A damning report on the state of the transport and mining industries by Fritz Selbmann, the minister for industry, prompted a reaction from some PV members that looked distinctly ‘like panic’, forcing Grotewohl to deny rumours that there was ‘a serious threat to our planned economy’.25 In other respects, too, the SED’s expectations had not been fulfilled. The two bourgeois parties, the CDU and the LDP, had made no secret of their unhappiness with the decision to postpone the elections (Grotewohl hinted that ‘a revolution’ had broken out within them),26 although they had eventually backed down. The SED had responded by waging a campaign of intimidation against these two parties, culminating in the dismissal of Hugo Hickmann, the deputy chairman of the CDU.27 This 22 Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt?, 44–7. Jo ¨ rg Roesler, ‘Unerwartet hohes Wirtschaftswachstum im Zweijahrplan 1949/50—objektive Ursachen und zeitgeno¨ssische Interpretation’, ‘Provisorium’, 274–7. 23 Horst Barthel, ‘Sachzwa ¨nge und Freiraüme in der SBZ-Wirtschaftsentwicklung’, ibid., 212–17. Dietrich Staritz, Gru¨ndung, 124–5. 24 Ibid., 135–6. Gottfried Dittrich, ‘Staatsgru ¨ ndung und Aktivistenbewegung’, ‘Provisorium’, 189–94. 25 25th/39th meeting of the PV, 14/15 March 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/78. 26 23rd/37th meeting of the PV, 9 October 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/74. 27 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 203–6. Siegfried Suckut, ‘Innenpolitische Aspekte’, 84–91, 95–6.


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campaign had been sanctioned by Semenov, who had told the SED leaders, on 24 December 1949, that they must now ‘defeat [the] reactionaries within the bourg[eois] parties’ (confirming instructions issued by Stalin in late 1948, when the Soviet dictator had ordered the German comrades to defeat the ‘right wing of [the] bourg[eois] parties’ and strengthen the ‘progr[essive] forces’ prepared to collaborate with the SED).28 However, while the SED had subsequently succeeded in silencing critical voices within the CDU and LDP leaderships, it had made little progress in endearing itself to the bourgeois parties’ grass roots.29 In March 1950, Heinrich Rau warned the PV that, instead of gathering momentum, ‘the initially very successful campaign’ waged against the opponents of Blockpolitik was showing signs of ‘abatement and decline’.30 Similarly, PV member Hermann Axen was forced to conclude three months later ‘that this struggle [i.e., the struggle for the promotion of Blockpolitik] has recently waned’.31 Adding to the SED’s problems with the two bourgeois parties was the plight of the so-called ‘National Front of the Democratic Germany’. Designed to replace the ailing People’s Congress, the new movement had been launched in October 1949, parallel to the founding of the GDR. On 7 January 1950, the Secretariat of the People’s Congress had reconstituted itself as the Secretariat of the National Front. Shortly afterwards, on 15 February 1950, the newly formed ‘National Council’ of the National Front had issued a programme demanding the creation of a ‘united, democratic, peace-loving and independent Germany’ as well as the ‘re-establishment of the political and economic unity of Berlin as the capital of Germany’.32 The German comrades had been hoping that, with its staunchly patriotic rhetoric, the new movement would succeed in attracting support from outside the confines of the working class. Oelßner had insisted ‘that even non-democrats, even large entrepreneurs, even supporters of a free market economy can, shall, and will join the National Front’. His colleague Dahlem had entertained similar thoughts, arguing that the SED’s new initiative 28 ‘Besprechung am 24. 12. 1949 um 5 Uhr mit Semjonow’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 12. 12.–24. 12. 1948’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. 29 Siegfried Suckut, ‘Zu Krise und Funktionswandel der Blockpolitik in der Sowjetisch Besetzten Zone Deutschlands um die Mitte des Jahres 1948’, VfZG 31/4 (1983), 683–90. 30 25th/39th meeting of the PV, 14/15 March 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/78. 31 26th/40th meeting of the PV, 3 June 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/80. 32 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 187–8.

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would eventually win over and unite ‘all Germans who are opposed to American imperialism’.33 However, these predictions had failed to come true, as the SED leaders were subsequently forced to admit. Addressing the PV in March 1950, Heinrich Rau warned that the National Front lacked a clear sense of purpose and was in danger of losing sight of the ‘big issues of [our] political work’. In the same vein, Pieck conceded that it was ‘no secret’ ‘that we have lost much of the political thrust that we had in our People’s Congress movement, [and] that we do not have the same thrust in the National Front’.34 A similar conclusion was reached by the SED’s Soviet minders, whose role had changed little since the replacement of the SMAD by the SKK.35 Semenov, who was carrying on in his job as chief political adviser, complained that the transformation of the local committees of the defunct People’s Congress into committees of the National Front was proceeding ‘very slowly’, and he angrily noted: ‘Some organizational units of the SED are doing nothing to promote the National Front.’36 General V. I. Chuikov, the SKK’s head, was equally unhappy and described the National Front as ‘weak’.37 Another cause for concern among Soviet officials and their German allies was the development of the SED itself. SKK members complained that the party’s ‘fighting spirit’ (‘Kampfgeist’) was conspicuous by its absence and that the quality of its work was ‘extremely poor’.38 In an internal report drawn up in January 1950, Semenov noted that many SED organizations were failing to hold regular meetings and that attendance at ideological training seminars was low. It was a sign of the party’s malaise, he explained, ‘that in 1949 12,732 people left the party in Saxony-Anhalt, of whom nearly half were workers and peasants’.39 Pieck and Ulbricht were warned that there was a certain ‘nervousness’ born of uncertainty among the SED’s rank and file, a feeling which 33 20th/34th meeting of the PV, 20/21 July 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/67. 34 25th/39th meeting of the PV, 14/15 March 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/78. 35 Wilfriede Otto, ‘Deutscher Handlungsspielraum und sowjetischer Einfluß. Zur Rolle der Sowjetischen Kontrollkommission’, ‘Provisorium’, 138–44. 36 ‘Bericht Semjonows vom 24. 1. 1950’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 37 ‘Besprechung am 6. 4. 1950 mit Tschui[kow] u[nd] Ilj[itschow]’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 38 ‘Besprechung am 23. 1. 1950 um 8 Uhr bei Tsch[uikow], Sem[jonow], Puschk[in], Iljitsch[ow], Semitschastnow, Ulbricht, Pieck’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 39 ‘Bericht Semjonows vom 24. 1. 1950’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736.


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invoked a ‘comparison [with a] ride in a car/[where] only [the] chauffeur knows the destination’.40 The SED leaders responded by pushing their party further down the road of Stalinization. The SED’s 3rd Congress (20–4 July 1950) abandoned the party’s ‘Principles and Aims’ (which enshrined the right of the party’s members to ‘democratic determination’) and resolved to draft a new party statute based on the notion of ‘democratic centralism’ (i. e., total obedience to the party leadership), while replacing the SED’s 80-strong PV with a communist-style ZK made up of 50 members and 30 candidates. Ulbricht’s role was further enhanced through his election as ‘secretary-general’ of the SED, while the number of ex-social democrats within the SED’s Politburo (which now comprised 9 full members and 6 candidates) was reduced (to 2 full members and 1 candidate). Finally, the fading ZS, which had not held a meeting since February 1949, was disbanded and formally replaced by the Politburo and the ‘Secretariat’, as the KS was now called.41 All of these changes, which made the SED look increasingly like the CPSU(b), were fully endorsed by Moscow. The SED leaders had been explicitly briefed about the CPSU(b)’s organizational structure at a meeting with Suslov in late January 1949, shortly after the SED’s 1st Party Conference.42 On the eve of the SED’s 3rd Congress—between 3 and 6 May 1950—Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, and Oelßner had paid another visit to Stalin during which the ‘situation and tasks of the SED’ had been discussed at length, including the need for a new party statute.43 The SED’s 3rd Congress ushered in a massive propaganda campaign designed to drum up support for the party’s policies (advertised under the label of the National Front, whose ‘National Congress’ was held in Berlin on 26–7 August 1950) in the crucial run-up to the scheduled elections. To exclude the possibility of another fiasco, the SED complemented its rhetoric—which played heavily on the issue of peace and 40 ‘Besprechung am 23. 1. 1950 um 8 Uhr bei Tsch[uikow], Sem[jonow], Puschk[in], Iljitsch[ow], Semitschastnow, Ulbricht, Pieck’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 41 Monika Kaiser, ‘Die Zentrale’, 72–3, 80–1. Andreas Malycha, Die SED, 354–5. 42 ‘Besprechung mit Suslow im Politbu ¨ ro am 28. 1. 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/735. 43 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 3. 5.–6. 5. 1950’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/696. Pieck travelled to Moscow earlier than his three colleagues (on 16 April) and stayed on after their return (until 23 May) to receive further treatment by Soviet doctors. See his diary entries, ibid. See also Bernd Bonwetsch, ‘Stalin und die Vorbereitung des 3. Parteitags der SED: Ein Treffen mit der SED-Fu¨hrung am 4. Mai 1950’, VfZG 51/4 (2003), 575–607.

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German unity—with practical measures aimed at depriving the electorate of any real choice. Thus the elections featured an all-party list (complete with quotas for the distribution of parliamentary seats), an arrangement which the bourgeois parties had been forced to swallow after being reminded of their support for the use of an all-party list in the elections to the 3rd People’s Congress. To ensure a high turn-out on polling day, East Germans were press-ganged into casting their vote, with unenthusiastic voters being called on at home by SED activists and, in some cases, frog-marched to their local polling station to the sound of brass bands. Despite a turn-out of more than 90 per cent and more than 90 per cent ‘yes’ votes, the SED could not resist the temptation to rig the results in the final count, when both figures were raised, respectively, to 98.73 and 99.72 per cent.44 The SED leaders knew perfectly well that the level of actual support commanded by their regime was much lower. At the 26th/40th meeting of the PV, in June 1950, Pieck had declared that it was important for the party ‘to bring to bear its influence on the masses even more strongly than [has been the case] thus far’, and he had shown his frustration by adding: ‘This is clearly no mean task.’ Addressing the same audience, Axen had driven home the same message, arguing that it would be wrong ‘to mistake the incipient change in the people’s mood (den beginnenden Stimmungsumschwung) for a major ideological breakthrough among the population’.45 These warnings were echoed by Ackermann, who told the newly established ZK in the aftermath of the elections that although the voting results constituted ‘a great triumph’ for the SED they did not mean ‘that 98 per cent of the population of the German Democratic Republic have now been freed from the influence of Western imperialism’.46 However, while acknowledging that their hold on power was far from secure, the SED leaders remained hopeful that their regime would be strengthened by the future decline of capitalism, whose post-war resurgence was dismissed by communists as an economic ‘false bloom’ (‘Scheinblu¨te’).47 Ulbricht was adamant that the five-year plan unveiled 44 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 239–40. Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 191–5. Jochen Laufer, ‘Die SED und die Wahlen’, 109–12, 123–4. Siegfried Suckut, ‘Die Entscheidung zur Gru¨ndung der DDR: Die Protokolle der Beratungen des SED-Parteivorstandes am 4. und 9. Oktober 1949’, VfZG 39/1 (1991), 134–7. 45 26th/40th meeting of the PV, 3 June 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/80. 46 3rd meeting of the ZK, 26/27 October 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/89. 47 ‘Zur Lage in Westdeutschland’, draft memorandum based on the results of a special two-day seminar on the situation in West Germany held by the SED’s Politburo, dated 23 August 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/642.


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at the SED’s 3rd Congress would compare favourably with ‘the deteriorating economic situation in the capitalist countries’ and thus provide the SED with a superb propaganda weapon. His optimism was shared by Axen, who had previously declared: ‘The popularization of the five-year plan is of utmost importance, because [it will prove that] we are the only ones who are capable of showing the German people a realistic and peaceful path to rising prosperity.’48 It did indeed look as if the massive boom enjoyed by the West German economy in the aftermath of the currency reform had finally run out of steam. The continuous strength of the D-Mark in spite of a modest devaluation in September 1949—a result of a sharp devaluation of sterling against the dollar and the subsequent refusal by Britain and France to allow the West Germans to peg their currency at a competitive rate—had led to a steep fall in West German industrial production between late 1949 and early 1950.49 The upshot was a rise in West German unemployment from 8.8 to 13.5 per cent, a development closely watched by the SED leaders, one of whom, PV member Herbert Warnke, advised his colleagues with more than a hint of glee . . . that today there are already 45 million unemployed in the capitalist countries according to official statistics, which means in practice that the number of unemployed people is much higher . . . What is important for us as Germans is this: If we compare the unemployment figures for the different countries, we have [a figure of] 4.6 million unemployed for the United States according to official figures. . . . In Italy we have 2.05 million unemployed, [whereas] in West Germany we have 1.9 million unemployed, a figure which we know is set too low. This means that with regard to unemployment, West Germany ranks third in the world, and even second in Europe.50

The SED’s Western Commission also drew encouragement from the sudden nose-dive of the West German economy. ‘As the effects of the Marshall Plan become visible, the first illusions of the masses . . . are slowly beginning to fade’, one of its reports crowed.51 The commission 48 ‘Information Ulbrichts an Pieck u ¨ ber einen Plan September–Oktober 1950 vom 7. 9. 1950’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 26th/40th meeting of the PV, 3 June 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/80. 49 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die A ¨ ra Adenauer, 61–2, 77–86. Friedrich Jerchow, ‘Der Außenkurs der Mark 1944–1949’, VfZG 30/2 (1982), 275–98. Volker Hentschel, ‘Die europaïsche Zahlungsunion und die deutschen Devisenkrisen 1950/51’, VfZG 37/4 (1989), 715–18. 50 26th/40th meeting of the PV, 3 June 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/80. 51 ‘Konkrete Form der nationalen Politik’, report by the SED’s Western Commission dated 10 August 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/649.

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also claimed that the crisis on the West German labour market would ‘deteriorate further’ (‘eine weitere Verscha¨rfung erfahren’) as a result of the ‘evolving crisis of capitalism’.52

T HE PR A GU E D ECLAR A TI ON A ND THE SED ’S N E W L I N E O N T H E G E R M A N Q UE S T I O N In the first few months after the founding of the GDR, the SED leaders wasted little thought on the issue of German unity. Instead, according to Pieck, their main concern was the ‘consolidation’ of their new state ‘in close/collaboration with [the] S[oviet] U[nion] a[nd the] p[eople’s] d[emocracies]’ (which, in contrast to the Western countries, had granted the GDR diplomatic recognition within weeks of its proclamation).53 Rejecting a call for the holding of all-German elections issued by John McCloy, the American High Commissioner for Germany, Ulbricht haughtily told the PV in January 1950 ‘that the struggle for the restoration of German unity is identical with [the struggle for] the democratization of Germany as a whole’, confirming Dahlem’s view ‘that we are largely preoccupied with our own troubles within the territory of the German Democratic Republic and that we look at the events in West Germany and [West] Berlin as something that is very interesting indeed but of no immediate consequence to us’.54 Attempts to shore up the fledgling East German state were not confined to economic measures, such as the new five-year plan. In February 1950, a Ministry of State Security (MfS) was formed. Headed by Wilhelm Zaisser, a former deputy president of the DVdI, the new ministry took over control of the secret political police that had evolved from the ‘K-5’ (the 5th department of the Criminal Police), working closely with Soviet intelligence and becoming, in effect, an SED-controlled domestic spying agency. Meanwhile, steps had been taken towards the setting up of an East German army. The GDR’s ‘Border Police’ and the more recently formed Alert Police (subsequently renamed ‘Barracked People’s Police’, or KVP) were already holding 52 ‘Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung und die Kommunisten’, memorandum by the SED’s Western Commission, 27 January 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/867. 53 ‘Notizen 16.–28. 9. [1949] in M[oskau] betr. Reg[ierungs]bildung, Oktober/ November 1949’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/695. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 217. 54 24th/38th meeting of the PV, 10/11 January 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/76.


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regular field exercises with Soviet instructors, while being issued, albeit on a limited scale, with mortars, machine guns, and other weapons of war.55 Indeed, at a meeting between Pieck, Ulbricht, and SKK-chief Chuikov in early February 1950, it was agreed that for training purposes the East German security forces would be supplied with a consignment of heavy weapons, including ‘15 tanks [type] T-34’.56 The SED leaders maintained that progress on the German Question would be achieved without further efforts on their part as a result of growing sympathy for the ‘core state’ (‘Kernstaat’) GDR among the West German masses.57 At their meeting with Stalin in May 1950, Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, and Oelßner argued, somewhat smugly, that the ‘good result’ which they expected in the October elections would make a ‘strong impact on the West’.58 Similarly, Dahlem was pinning his hopes on ‘the tension and discontent’ which, he suspected, lay ‘beneath the surface’ of both the West German bourgeois parties and the SPD, while Pieck reassured the delegates of the SED’s 3rd Congress: ‘Deep down the West German masses are in ferment, their discontent, their [sense of] outrage is growing. It is bound to erupt, although [perhaps] not immediately, not today.’59 It was by no means unreasonable to question West Germany’s longterm stability. After all, the newly elected government in Bonn had to battle not only with severe economic problems but also with an unruly parliament and widespread political apathy. The atmosphere within the new Bundestag was marred by regular scenes of chaos and rowdiness that reminded many observers of the moribund Weimar Republic. In an opinion poll carried out among West Germans in January 1950, only 32 per cent of the respondents said they were happy with the work 55 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians, 355–74. Karl-Wilhelm Fricke, ‘Das Ministerium fu¨r Staatssicherheit als Herrschaftsinstrument der SED’, Sozialismus und Kommunismus im Wandel, 399–414. Torsten Diedrich and Ru¨diger Wenzke, Die getarnte Armee, 97– 223. Jens Gieseke, ‘Das Ministerium fu¨r Staatssicherheit (1950–1990)’, Im Dienste der Partei: Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR, ed. by Torsten Diedrich, Hans Ehlert, and Ru¨diger Wenzke, 2nd edn. (Berlin, 1998), 373–5. 56 ‘Besprechung im Schloß am 4. 2. 1950 um 5 Uhr’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 57 ‘Kernstaat ist sowj[etische] Bes[atzungszone]’. See Pieck’s notes: ‘Max Reimann 19./ 20. 8. 1949 [ . . . ] bei mir zu Hause’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/643. 58 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 3. 5.–6. 5. 1950’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/696. 59 26th/40th meeting of the PV, 3 June 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/ 80. Protokoll der Verhandlungen des III. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 20. bis 24. Juli 1950 in der Werner-Seelenbinder-Halle zu Berlin (Berlin, 1951), 45.

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of the Bundestag, with 21 per cent signalling dissatisfaction and a stunning 47 per cent expressing indifference. West Germany’s political parties, too, had yet to find their feet. All of them had suffered a significant drop in membership in the aftermath of the currency reform and, according to another opinion poll conducted around that time, a mere 51 per cent of West Germans believed that the policies pursued by the parties would succeed in bringing about an economic recovery.60 The reports from the West arriving in East Berlin were in many respects encouraging for the SED. In April 1949, KPD functionaries attending a ceremony to mark the fourth anniversary of the liberation of the Buchenwald concentration camp had reported a sharp rise in ‘antiAmerican feeling’ in the Western zones.61 A few weeks before, according to a report received by the SED’s Western Commission, Gu¨nter Gereke—the deputy minister-president of Lower Saxony and a prominent member of the West German CDU (who was later to defect to the GDR)62—had told a communist delegate in the diet of Lower Saxony that Adenauer’s policy of subordinating Germany’s interests to those of the Western Allies carried the risk of a nationalist backlash. Stressing that ‘nobody’ could foresee how Germany would evolve, he had hinted at the possibility of a massive shift in West German public opinion that would leave the West German political leaders with no choice but ‘to devote themselves to [seeking] an accommodation with the political forces in the Eastern zone’.63 However, not even the SED leaders considered such a dramatic turn of events to be imminent. Ulbricht had warned the PV as early as August 1949 ‘that the patriotic consciousness of the West German workers has been greatly impaired’. Fellow PV member Fritz Wagner had agreed, arguing ‘that the shop-window of the Marshall Plan has completely clouded the brains of the people in the West’, before conceding: ‘The issue of the National Front, which has been given strong emphasis . . . in the [Bundestag] election campaign of the Communist Party, has not received the echo we had expected. The issue of national unity . . . plays no role over there.’64 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die A¨ra Adenauer, 86–7. ‘Aussprache mit Genossen der KPD anla¨sslich des Buchenwaldtages am Sonntag, dem 10. 4. 1949 in Weimar’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/643. 62 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 292–3. 63 ‘Unterredung mit Dr. Gereke’, undated [March 1949], SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/10.02/198. 64 21st/35th meeting of the PV, 23/24 August 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/69. 60 61


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The ineffectiveness of the KPD’s patriotic appeals highlighted the robustness of anti-communist feelings in West Germany—feelings which, according to information received by the SED’s Politburo, were finding expression in criticism of the GDR’s ‘totalitarianism’ as well as in denunciations of the Soviet Union (especially over the Oder–Neiße border and the fate of the German POWs, many of whom were still being held in Soviet captivity despite a joint decision by the Allied foreign ministers to release all POWs by December 1948).65 Things were not helped, from the SED’s point of view, by the fact that the KPD was showing no signs of growth—‘ideologically and organizationally’—and had thus far failed in its efforts to cultivate ‘a left wing within the SPD’.66 By that time, in mid-1950, the SED leaders had come round to the view that they needed a different approach if they were to influence the events in West Germany. Addressing the 26th/40th meeting of the PV, Pieck hinted that the KPD’s failure to make progress in West Germany was partly due to a lack of support from the SED, and he made it clear that ‘from now on’ all SED departments would have to ‘support the [party’s] work over there [in West Germany] far more strongly than [has been the case] thus far’. His words were echoed by Dahlem, who argued that it would be necessary to ‘increase two-, [and perhaps] tenfold’ the attention which the SED had been giving to West Germany.67 This rare bout of self-criticism by the SED’s top brass culminated at the SED’s 3rd Congress, which resolved to carry out ‘a major U-turn’ (‘eine ernsthafte Wendung’) aimed at reinforcing the ‘peace movement’ as well as the National Front in West Germany and West Berlin, after concluding that the SED’s policies and methods were ‘insufficiently geared to [the job of] finding solutions to the [party’s] all-German tasks’.68 It would seem that this change in the SED’s tactics was the result of Soviet prompting. For not only did it take place within weeks of Pieck’s and Ulbricht’s latest visit to Moscow but it also incorporated new instructions issued by Karlshorst. Thus the SED leaders had been 65 Beate Ihme-Tuchel, ‘Die SED und die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion zwischen 1949 und 1955’, DA 27/5 (1994), 490–503. 66 ‘Zur Lage in Westdeutschland’, draft memorandum based on the results of a special two-day seminar on the situation in West Germany held by the SED’s Politburo, dated 23 August 1949, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/642. 67 26th/40th meeting of the PV, 3 June 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/80. 68 Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 3: Beschlu ¨ sse und Erkla¨rungen des Parteivorstandes, des Zentralkomitees sowie seines Politbu¨ros und seines Sekretariats (Berlin, 1952), 90–1.

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advised by Semenov shortly after returning to Berlin that as part of their bid to stamp out their party’s weaknesses they must initiate a ‘broad-based peace campaign’ capable of drawing in the ‘ent[ire] population [not only in the GDR but] also in the West’. On another occasion, the SED leaders had been informed by SKK officials that the ‘struggle for peace’ demanded in what was described as a recent ‘Stalindirective’ was still ‘very weak in [both] West Berlin/[and] West Germany’ and that the suspected cause of this problem was the SED’s ‘fear’ and ‘cowardice’.69 When these instructions were issued, efforts were under way to anchor West Germany in the fledgling Western bloc. On 31 March 1950, the Allied High Commission for Germany, the supreme authority in West Germany under the terms of the Occupation Statute,70 had invited West Germany to become an associate member of the Council of Europe, a new supranational body founded in May 1949 as a political arm of the 1948 Brussels Pact. Shortly afterwards, on 9 May 1950, a plan for the economic integration of the French and West German coal and steel industries, the so-called ‘Schuman Plan’, had been unveiled to the world—at a time when politicians in London and Washington had begun to consider the possibility of levying West German troops in order to strengthen Western Europe’s security.71 The Soviet leadership had responded by stepping up the international peace campaign unleashed in late 1948. At a meeting in Stockholm held between 15 and 19 March 1950, the permanent committee of the pro-Soviet World Congress of the Friends of Peace had demanded the banning of the atomic bomb, paving the way for a communist-sponsored petition that allegedly attracted 500 million signatures (including 2.5 million in West Germany, according to Reimann) during the following months. Supporting Moscow’s attempts to whip up popular opposition to the policies of the West was the World Trades Union League (WTUL), whose executive had 69 ‘Besprechung am 12. 6. 1950, 8 Uhr abends mit Semjonow’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. ‘Besprechung am 3. 7. 1950 mit Tschuikow, Semjonow, Semitschastnow, Dawidow um 8 Uhr abends’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 70 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die A ¨ ra Adenauer, 42–8. 71 Ludolf Herbst, Option, 57–86. Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 278–84. Norbert Wiggershaus, ‘Effizienz und Kontrolle: Zum Problem einer milita¨rischen Integration Westdeutschlands bis zum Scheitern des EVG-Vertragswerkes’, Westdeutschland 1945– 1955, 254–57. Ulrich Lappenku¨per, ‘Der Schuman-Plan: Mu¨hsamer Durchbruch zur deutsch-franzo¨sischen Versta¨ndigung’, VfZG 42/3 (1994), 405–38.


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endorsed the Soviet-orchestrated peace campaign at a meeting in Budapest held between 10 and 24 May 1950.72 Communist functionaries were evidently concerned about Western intentions. Warnke, who had attended the Budapest meeting of the WTUL and who was familiar with the mood in the Soviet camp, warned the PV in June 1950 that the ‘so-called Schuman Plan’ was ‘nothing but a continuation of Hitler’s old plan of bringing the entire military potential of capitalist Europe into one hand’ with the aim of using it ‘against the East’. His colleague Dahlem agreed, denouncing the Schuman Plan and West Germany’s proposed association with the Council of Europe as ‘a decisive step towards the realization of the Atlantic war pact’.73 It was against this background that the Kremlin floated the idea of a rapprochement between the two German states via a national dialogue. On 20–1 October 1950, a month after a meeting between the American, British, and French foreign ministers in New York had failed to reach an agreement on West Germany’s future military role,74 the foreign ministers of eight East European countries—the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the GDR, which only a few weeks before had signed a treaty with Poland confirming the sanctity of the Oder–Neiße border75—gathered in Prague to demonstrate the unity of the Soviet bloc and regain the diplomatic initiative. Denouncing the recent meeting of the Western foreign ministers as a threat to world peace, the East European foreign ministers issued a declaration demanding a return to the agreements of Potsdam, while simultaneously calling for the creation of an ‘allGerman constituent assembly’—on the basis of parity between East and West Germany and with the possible option of a referendum by the German people—as the first step towards the appointment of a German central government.76 The release of the Prague declaration was swiftly followed by a readjustment of the SED’s line on the German Question; only weeks after the party had vowed to pay greater attention to the events in the West. Addressing the ZK in late October 1950, Ackermann explained that if the SED insisted on the establishment of a GDR-style regime in 72 Dietrich Staritz, ‘Kommunistische Partei’, 1721–2. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 233–4, 258–9. 73 26th/40th meeting of the PV, 3 June 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/80. 74 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 232–3. 75 Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 409–10. 76 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 243. Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 332.

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West Germany, as it had done so far, its commitment to German unity would be but ‘an empty phrase’ (‘eine leere Deklaration’). He hinted that, as a consequence, the party was ready for ‘a peaceful dialogue’ and willing to drop all conditions ‘that could make the opening of negotiations more difficult or endanger their successful conclusion’.77 His words were echoed by Politburo candidate Rudolf Herrnstadt, who urged his colleagues to abandon the view ‘that the coming unified, [and] democratic Germany will simply be an enlarged copy of the current German Democratic Republic’, as well as by Ulbricht, who in a major departure from his earlier statements now rejected suggestions ‘that the regulations, the laws, [and] the regime now installed in the German Democratic Republic . . . must be mechanically adopted as the laws of the future united Germany’, and who explained that ‘when representatives of West and East Germany sit down together some compromises will certainly have to be made . . . ’.78 The Kremlin was evidently keen to break the impasse that had been reached over Germany. However, it is doubtful whether the new Soviet offer envisaged the establishment of a neutral Germany, as Loth has claimed.79 After all, at a meeting in Budapest held in late 1949 (16–19 November), the Cominform had condemned the idea of neutrality between East and West, prompting the SED to silence Professor Noack as soon as it had become clear, in early 1950, that the arch-advocate of German neutrality was unwilling to join the SED-led National Front.80 More importantly, fierce hostility to German neutrality permeated the atmosphere of the Prague Conference. At a reception hosted by GDR president Pieck for the members of the returning GDR delegation, Foreign Minister and CDU-member Georg Dertinger spoke at some length of ‘the spontaneous congratulations’ he had received at Prague from members of the other delegations ‘on the result of our elections of 15 October [1950]’, and he expressed the view that it was only because of the positive—i.e., pro-Soviet—outcome of these elections that a German delegation had been invited to the conference and treated as an equal partner by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the East European states. His assessment was shared by Grotewohl, who had accompanied him to Prague and who was equally certain that the 77 3rd meeting of the ZK, 26/27 October 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 78 Ibid. 79 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 171–4. 2/1/89. 80 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 223–4. Boris Sabarko, ‘Das Kominformbu ¨ ro—ein Ru¨ckblick’, BzG 32/4 (1990), 454–5.


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presence at the conference of a German delegation was ‘the result of the elections of 15 October [1950]’.81 Indeed, the SED leaders did not regard the offer of Prague as a bid for a neutral Germany. Ackermann argued that its purpose was to expose ‘the role of American imperialism, its aggression, [and] its policy of dividing Germany’ and, in doing so, generate ‘new sympathies for the Soviet Union’ as well as assist the SED in its efforts to draw the German masses into the National Front. He hinted that while attending the meeting at Prague he had ‘learned a few more lessons’ concerning the behaviour required towards non-communists, namely ‘absolute firmness in all matters of principle’ coupled with flexibility on all other issues, and he reminded his colleagues that, ‘not by accident’, the Prague declaration had criticized ‘not a single German [political] party and not a single German government agency’, instead directing ‘its entire barrage’ (‘das ganze Feuer’) against ‘American, English, and French imperialism’. Explaining that the SED must now wage a campaign for the proposed all-German constituent assembly, Ackermann made it clear that the new policy would have to be developed ‘step by step’ so as to win over the masses and that the question of ‘with whom and on what basis’ the proposed assembly could actually be formed was entirely academic, since ‘in West Germany in particular’ the conditions for a negotiated settlement did not yet exist.82 Other SED leaders agreed. Thus Herrnstadt declared that the creation of an all-German constituent assembly ‘would constitute the first major step towards overcoming the division of Germany, the first move towards the establishment of a united Germany, and an anti-imperialist Germany at that’, for the creation of the proposed assembly could occur only against American opposition and would result in the ‘undermining of American influence in West Germany’ as well as the ‘liberation of the broad masses in West Germany from their ideological dependence on American imperialism’. His words were echoed by Ulbricht, who told the same audience that the SED’s struggle would not end with the appointment of an all-German constituent assembly but would return to its old agenda once the Western Allies had been forced out of Germany. ‘Right now’, he explained, ‘we must direct our entire struggle 81 ‘Berichterstattung der Delegation von der Außenministerkonferenz in Prag beim Pra¨sidenten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik’, minutes of a formal reception held on 23 October 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/459. 82 3rd meeting of the ZK, 26/27 October 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/89.

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against the warmongers (Kriegsinteressenten), both the American and the English ones; as for the other class enemies, we will surely get a chance to have a word with them later on.’83 There were signs that the West German masses might be susceptible to the new signals coming from Moscow and East Berlin. Opinion polls indicated a sharp drop in public support for Adenauer’s policies (from 31 to 24 per cent), while the Land elections held in the autumn of 1950 resulted in severe losses for the CDU/CSU (whose share of the votes fell by 12 per cent in both Hesse and Wu¨rttemberg-Baden, and by as much as 25 per cent in Bavaria). At the heart of this rise in anti-government feeling lay the debate on a possible West German defence contribution, a controversy fuelled by the outbreak of war in the Far East following a surprise attack on 25 June 1950 by Soviet-backed North Korea on South Korea, an ally of the United States.84 Protestants, led by the fiercely patriotic pastor and former concentration camp inmate Martin Niemo¨ller, were especially hostile to plans for West Germany’s military integration into the Western alliance. Their flirtation with pacifism strengthened the SPD, a party with an anti-militarist tradition, while triggering a crisis within the predominantly Roman Catholic CDU/ CSU, whose tenuous links with Protestantism were further weakened by the resignation, in October 1950, of one its leading Protestant members, the West German minister of the interior Gustav Heinemann. At the same time, the slogan ‘Ohne mich’ (‘Count me out!’) captured the public imagination and looked set to become the rallying cry of a large anti-government protest movement.85 The SED leadership watched these events with relish and gathered new hope. A memorandum drawn up by the SED’s Western Commission in October 1950 concluded that, while the people in West Germany had until recently been unaware of the growing threat to world peace, there had been ‘a shift’ (‘ein Umschwung’) in West German public opinion ‘following the American [act of] aggression in Korea’. Ordinary West Germans, the report claimed, were viewing the events in the Far East as a portent of what might happen to them, the standard argument being: ‘Korea [was] divided—now [it is engulfed in] war; Germany [is] divided—[which] means that there will almost certainly 83

3rd meeting of the ZK, 26/27 October 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/89. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die A¨ra Adenauer, 119–26. On the outbreak of the Korean War, see Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 266–72. Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War, 85–97. 85 Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 280–93. Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, From Shadow to Substance, 272–91. Alexander Gallus, Die Neutralisten, 76–9. 84


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be a war [here] too.’86 West German worries had been exacerbated, the authors of the report explained, by the stunning Blitzkrieg-style victories won by the North Korean army at the start of the war: The people [in West Germany] were gloating at the defeats suffered by the Americans . . . Conversely, they witnessed the strength enjoyed by a people fighting for its [own] freedom, while generally attributing this strength to the support provided by the Soviet Union . . . This further increased their fear of being dragged into a war with the Soviet Union.87

Reports on the rise of pacifism in West Germany had reached East Berlin even before the outbreak of the Korean War. Thus, as early as April 1950, the SED’s Western Commission had claimed that West Germans were deeply afraid of a military confrontation between East and West due to a general feeling ‘That the Soviet Union would advance triumphantly in the event of a war and that West Germany would be the battlefield . . . ’.88 Similarly, a report sent to Ulbricht had hinted that the West German public expected ‘a defeat of the Americans’ in Korea and was prepared to do anything—even ‘endorse the Eastern ideologies’ (‘sich mit den o¨stlichen Ideologien einverstanden zu erkla¨ren’)—if this meant ‘that Germany will not again become a war theatre’.89 The view in East Berlin was that fears of a new European war, while not directly resulting in greater support for the communists, would trigger a wave of anti-Western feeling across Germany, strengthening the appeal of the National Front and thus paving the way for the German people’s orientation towards the East. Ackermann was convinced that the bid for the ‘remilitarization’ of West Germany had given rise to ‘a new situation’ by showing the West German masses ‘that the imperialist policies of America, England, and France are a road to war’. His optimism was shared by Herrnstadt, who insisted that, for the first time in recent history, there was evidence ‘of a genuine national consciousness, of genuine national outrage’ in both East and West Germany.90 Indeed, according to intelligence gathered by SED 86 ‘Material u ¨ ber die Friedensbewegung in Westdeutschland’, memorandum by the SED’s Western Commission, 4 October 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/ 87 Ibid. 10.02/211. 88 ‘Zur Lage in Westdeutschland und zu einigen aktuellen Aufgaben der Partei’, memorandum by the SED’s Western Commission, 24 April 1950; SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/300. 89 ‘Ulbricht zur Information [von Matern]’, 26 July 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/1305. 90 3rd meeting of the ZK, 26/27 October 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/89.

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informers, even non-communists thought that the SED had real grounds for hope, with one West German social democrat privately voicing concern ‘that in the long run the overwhelming majority of the population will be unable to resist the lure of slogans such as ‘‘Are you in favour of peace[?]’’ and ‘‘Are you in favour of German unity[?]’’ ’.91 THE 1 951 ‘REFERENDUM’ AND THE SED’S CAMPAIGN FOR A LL-GERMAN ELEC TIONS The SED’s campaign for a national dialogue was launched without delay. On 15 November 1950, in his official opening address to the newly elected People’s Chamber, Grotewohl called for the creation of an all-German constituent assembly as the first step towards the establishment of a German central government and the signing of a peace treaty with Germany. Widening the offer contained in the Prague declaration, the GDR’s minister-president suggested that the proposed assembly might also arrange the holding of elections to an all-German parliament, or ‘national assembly’.92 Two weeks later, on 1 December 1950, a formal letter signed by Grotewohl on behalf of the East German government was delivered to Adenauer. In it, Grotewohl repeated the proposals made in his speech of 15 November and called for immediate negotiations between the two German governments.93 It would seem that the East German comrades did not expect a positive reply, for they had learned from secret sources in Bonn that Adenauer would make ‘so-called liberal and democratic demands’ with a view to bringing about ‘the collapse (ein Scheitern) of the talks on the G[rotewohl]-letter’.94 When, on 15 January 1951, the West German chancellor duly rejected Grotewohl’s plea and demanded the holding of 91 ‘Parteien in Westdeutschland (Vertrauliche Information . . . ): SPD’, report by the SED’s Western Commission dated 3 August 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/867. 92 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 343–4. Grotewohl’s offer was endorsed by the SMAD, whose members were also discussing the idea of establishing an all-German constituent assembly in conjunction with the issue of possible ‘elections to a national ass[embly]’. See ‘Besprechung am 21. 2. 1951, 8 Uhr abends, bei mir im Hause mit Tschuikow, Semjonow’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 93 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 345–6. Michael Lemke, ‘Eine deutsche Chance? Die innerdeutsche Diskussion um den Grotewohl-Brief vom November 1950 auf der Entscheidungsebene’, ZfG 44/2 (1996), 25–40. Heike Amos, Die Westpolitik der SED, 67–73. 94 ‘Aus Bonner Regierungs- und Parlamentskreisen erfahren wir’, confidential report dated 29 December 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/653.


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free all-German elections prior to negotiations between the two German governments,95 the SED leaders initiated a formal appeal by the People’s Chamber to the West German Bundestag. Published in Neues Deutschland on 31 January 1951, the appeal reiterated East Berlin’s commitment to the idea of an all-German constituent assembly while promising negotiations within this assembly on the ‘establishment of a regime based on the rule of law (einer rechtsstaatlichen Ordnung) and of a liberal system of government (einer freiheitlichen Regierungsform) throughout Germany’.96 Soviet officials in Karlshorst were confident that, despite its failure to meet Adenauer’s conditions, East Berlin’s offer of negotiations would not be turned down. At a meeting with Chuikov and Semenov on 21 February 1951, Pieck was told that the Bundestag ‘will not say no’, although it might try to ‘procrastinate’.97 The SED leaders themselves were more sceptical, with Pieck advising the ZK in January 1951—in what was described as ‘a confidential message from the Politburo’—that ‘in all likelihood’ the appeal to the Bundestag would ‘yield no results’.98 Pieck’s low expectations were the product of rumours suggesting that American officials had advised Adenauer against negotiations and that, egged on by Schumacher, the SPD leadership too was urging the chancellor to stand firm.99 These rumours were tempered by simultaneous reports of growing opposition to Adenauer’s policies. There were suggestions ‘that the Grotewohl-letter has created grave difficulties within the [West German] cabinet and has prompted Adenauer himself to have second thoughts about his stance’. Other sources claimed that there was strong disaffection with both the policy of rearmament and ‘the autocratic behaviour of Schumacher’ among the SPD’s grass roots.100 There were also doubts over the personal future of Adenauer, who was alleged to suffer from ‘bone marrow tuberculosis’ and to have been advised by his doctor to quit politics.101 However, these reports were not given much Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 362–3. Neues Deutschland, 31 January 1951. 97 ‘Besprechung am 21. 2. 1951, 8 Uhr abends, bei mir im Hause mit Tschuikow, Semjonow’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 98 4th meeting of the ZK, 17–19 January 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/91. 99 ‘Zum Zustandekommen der Antwort Adenauers’, 10 January 1951, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4090/654. ‘An den Genossen Otto Grotewohl: Bericht!’, 22 January 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/654. 100 ‘Zum Zustandekommen der Antwort Adenauers’, 10 January 1951, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4090/654. ‘Aus Bonner SPD-Kreisen erfahren wir’, 5 February 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/654. 101 ‘Ulbricht zur Information [von Matern]’, 26 July 1950, NY 4182/1305. 95 96

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weight by the SED leaders, who, in any event, did not believe that German unity could be restored solely through talks. Far more important than its impact on Bonn, from the SED’s point of view, was the effect which East Berlin’s offer would have on the German masses. Pieck had informed the ZK in January 1951 that if, as was likely, the Bundestag rejected the appeal made by the People’s Chamber, the SED’s next step would be to hold a referendum, as suggested by the Prague Conference.102 When, on 9 March 1951, the Bundestag did what Pieck had predicted, the SED was prepared. Neues Deutschland swiftly stepped up its attacks on the alleged war plans of Adenauer and the Americans (already one of the paper’s favourite topics) while calling for all-German round table talks (under the slogan ‘Deutsche an einen Tisch’) as well as a nationwide referendum on the twin-issue of remilitarization and peace treaty.103 In doing so, the paper followed instructions from the SED’s Politburo, which had earlier ruled that the ‘entire democratic press and the radio must do more than they have done up to now to unmask Adenauer’, the declared aim being ‘to carry the demand for the resignation of Adenauer into the West German population’.104 As ever, this approach was backed by the KPD, which, under pressure from the comrades in East Berlin, had thrown its weight behind the SED’s new campaign at its recent Munich conference, held between 2 and 4 March 1951.105 Attempts were already under way to strengthen the communist-led peace movement. On 4–5 November 1950, the ‘First Congress of the German Fighters for Peace’ had been held in East Berlin.106 Attended by some 1,600 delegates from all parts of Germany, the congress— which had no formal links with the SED, but was chaired by the communist poet and head of the Cultural League, Johannes R. Becher—had led the way in promoting the struggle against ‘the American war-mongers and their stooges’.107 A series of similar events 102 4th meeting of the ZK, 17/19 January 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/91. 103 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 209–49, 364–8, 388–93. Heike Amos, Die Westpolitik der SED, 73–6. 104 ‘Sitzung des Politbu ¨ ros am 13. 2. 1951’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/ 133. In keeping with standard procedure, this decision was taken at the recommendation of the ZK’s Secretariat. See ‘Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK am 12. Februar 1951’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/174. 105 Patrick N. Major, The Death of the KPD, 147–8. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 263–4. 106 ‘See Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK am 30. Oktober 1950’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/149. Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 340–1. 107 Angelika Klein, ‘Das Deutsche Komitee’, 174–7. Manfred Ja ¨ger, Kultur und Politik in der DDR 1945–1990 (Cologne, 1995), 5–28. Neues Deutschland, 9 November 1950.


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had followed. On 9 December 1950, the ‘German Peace Committee’, an SED-controlled body appointed by the recent ‘peace congress’, had held its first official meeting and had drafted a ‘Law for the Protection of Peace’ (which effectively banned all pro-Western activities in the GDR and which was subsequently passed by the People’s Chamber). Between 21 and 26 February 1951, the so-called ‘World Peace Council’ (established in Warsaw only a few weeks before by the ‘Second World Congress of the Friends of Peace’) had gathered in East Berlin in the presence of an 85-strong all-German delegation, and called on the masses in all countries threatened by West Germany’s remilitarization to urge their leaders to sign a peace treaty with a unified and demilitarized Germany.108 A few weeks later, communist efforts to trigger anti-Western mass protests moved into a higher gear. On 14 April 1951—while a treaty for a ‘European Community for Coal and Steel’ (incorporating the Schuman Plan) was about to be signed and talks were continuing on a Western defence initiative—an Essen-based and KPD-sponsored ‘Committee against Remilitarization’, acting under orders from East Berlin, issued a formal call for the referendum sought by the SED. An immediate ban imposed by the government in Bonn meant that the referendum—which asked German voters to register their opposition to remilitarization as well as their support for a peace treaty—was forced underground in West Germany and could be held openly only in the GDR, where voting took place between 3 and 5 June 1951 and where pressure by the SED-led government ensured a 99.2 per cent turn out and 95 per cent ‘yes’ votes.109 The ban on the referendum in West Germany had been expected by the SED leaders, with Pieck predicting it at the 4th meeting of the ZK. Indeed, the ban played an important role in the SED’s strategy, as Pieck had explained by suggesting that attempts to block the referendum would further inflame anti-Western feelings throughout Germany and ensure ‘that we can at least slightly spoil (versalzen) the soup which the Americans and the English are cooking for us right now’.110 Several of Pieck’s colleagues had echoed this view. Thus Ulbricht had claimed that 108 See ‘Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK am 30. Oktober 1950’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/149. Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 359–60. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 259–60. 109 Ibid., 263–4. See also ‘Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK am 26. April 1951’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/190. 110 4th meeting of the ZK, 17/19 January 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/91.

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‘the peace-loving and democratic forces in West Germany’ held ‘a superb position’ because of the war-scare triggered by the conflict in the Far East,111 while Herrnstadt had similarly boasted that ‘the enemy’ was living ‘in terrible fear’ of the growing strength of German patriotic resistance.112 Yet, not for the first time, events did not live up to the SED’s hopes. By late July 1951, only 1.7 million West Germans, or 6.7 per cent of the West German electorate, had taken part in the referendum according to figures disclosed in Karlshorst.113 At the 7th meeting of the ZK, in October 1951, Friedrich Ebert, a Politburo member and former social democrat, who, in 1949, had been appointed mayor of East Berlin, grimly admitted that, far from having been a resounding triumph, the referendum campaign in West Germany and West Berlin had ‘stayed on track only with considerable difficulty’ (‘nur sehr zo¨gernd in Gang geblieben’). He was joined by Pieck, who declared: ‘we are linked to the Soviet Union with every fibre of our being. The same cannot be said for the broad masses in the West!’114 Worse still, the SED leaders were forced to concede that in East Germany too support for their policies was still well below their original expectations. Ebert warned that many ordinary citizens were tired of the National Front and its endless propaganda for the GDR, and he added: ‘the great decision of 4 October 1949 has disappeared [from view], it no longer features in the discussion, it has little impact, [and] sometimes none at all.’115 Even the SED’s greatest optimist, Ulbricht, was somewhat subdued because there were several places in the GDR where the referendum had produced ‘a considerable number of ‘‘no’’ votes’.116 The SED’s renewed failure to impart to the German masses ‘the ¨ berzeuscientifically proven belief (die wissenschaftlich begru¨ndete U gung) . . . that the imperialist camp will lead mankind into disaster while the democratic camp affords it a glimpse of a better future’, to use Oelßner’s words,117 prompted a bout of soul-searching in East Berlin. 4th meeting of the ZK, 17/19 January 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/91. 5th meeting of the ZK, 15/17 March 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/93. 113 ‘Besprechung am 30. 7. 1951, abends 8 Uhr, in Karlshorst’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 114 7th meeting of the ZK, 18/20 October 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/ 115 Ibid. 1/97. 116 6th meeting of the ZK, 13/15 June 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/95. 117 7th meeting of the ZK, 18/20 October 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/97. 111 112


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Ebert pointed the finger of blame at what he saw as his party’s ‘deficient ideological work’ and resurgent ‘sectarianism’, dramatically highlighted by those ex-communists within the SED’s ranks who were willing to cooperate ‘with the [other] old communists . . . but not with the social democrats’. Ebert’s criticism was echoed by ZK member Paul Verner, who declared: ‘The [main] causes [of our difficulties] lie essentially with us, with the work of our party and that of the mass organizations affiliated to us.’118 Inevitably, a large portion of blame was attributed to the KPD, whose deficiencies had been cast into sharp relief by the losses the party had suffered in the 2nd West German Land elections, held between June 1950 and May 1951.119 A lengthy report drawn up in January 1951 by the SED’s Western Commission had warned that sectarianism was rife among the West German comrades, many of whom were refusing to work with non-communists on the grounds that the ‘liberation of West Germany’ would be achieved ‘through an invasion (Einmarsch) by the Soviet army or the [GDR’s] People’s Police’.120 Frustration with the West German comrades had also been voiced by the SED’s top brass, with Pieck concluding in May 1951, after talks with senior Soviet officials, that the KPD was ‘separated from the masses’ and that Germany was ‘now divided’.121 The KPD’s only excuse was that it had been impossible during the short time available to implement the ‘correct line’ embraced by the party’s recent Munich conference.122 The SED leaders responded to these developments with a decision to tighten party discipline, vowing, at the 7th meeting of the ZK, to step up their campaign for ‘the improvement of the ideological work of the party and [for] the raising of the level of ideological consciousness’.123 118

Ibid. In the key Land of North-Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the KPD’s share of the votes had fallen from 14 to 5.5 %. See Richard Schachtner, Die deutschen Nachkriegswahlen, 22–68. 120 ‘Einscha ¨tzung der Lage in der SPD . . . /Stand der Aktionseinheit . . . /Einscha¨tzung der Bewegung gegen Remilitarisierung . . . / . . . /Ferner Berichte der Instrukteure . . . ’; series of reports by the SED’s Western Commission, 8 January 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/868. 121 ‘Besprechung am 11. 5. 1951, 9 Uhr abends, im Hause bei mir [ ¼ Pieck] mit Tschuikow, Iljitschow, Puschkin—Walter verreist’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/ 736. ‘Besprechung am 16. 5. 1951, 10 Uhr abends im Hause bei mir’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 122 ‘Sitzung des Politbu ¨ ros des Zentralkomitees am 22. 5. 1951’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/149. 123 Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Vol. 3, 571. 119

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That campaign had been under way since the SED’s 3rd Congress, which had ushered in a sweeping purge of the party’s membership resulting in the expulsion of approximately 150,000 comrades (including many who, like Paul Merker, had lived in Western exile during the war). Aimed at sealing the SED’s transformation into a ‘party of the new type party’, this purge had taken place against the backdrop of similar purges in the East European communist parties (culminating between 1949 and 1952 in a string of show-trials of prominent communists on charges of ‘Trotskyism’ or spying).124 Complementing the SED’s final push towards Stalinization was a rigorous purge of the KPD, which had led to the arrest by the MfS of some of the party’s most senior figures, including Mu¨ller and Sperling, before peaking, on the eve of the KPD’s Munich conference, in the dismissal of the heads of all KPD Land organizations.125 At the same time, in early 1951, the Politburo had dissolved the ineffectual Western Commission, making the task of guiding the KPD the joint responsibility of the SED’s internal departments, a situation which lasted until November 1951, when the Politburo set up the so-called ‘Bureau for All-German Work’ (‘Bu¨ro fu¨r gesamtdeutsche Arbeit’) as a new control agency for the KPD.126 The SED leaders maintained that there was still a chance of mobilizing the German masses against the West. At the 6th meeting of the ZK, in June 1951, Ulbricht claimed that the Adenauer government ‘would not stay in power for a single day’ once the protests got off the ground in West Germany, while Dahlem insisted that the results of the referendum did not accurately reflect the mood among the West German masses and that the ‘actual battle front’ was much broader than the one witnessed thus far.127 Yet these statements could not conceal the fact that SED hopes for a leftward shift in German public opinion were dwindling, a 124 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 200–1. Dietrich Staritz, Gru ¨ ndung, 159–63. Jan Foitzik, ‘Die stalinistischen ‘‘Saüberungen’’ in den ostmitteleuropaïschen kommu¨ berblick’, ZfG 40/8 (1992), 737–49. nistischen Parteien: Ein vergleichender U 125 Patrick N. Major, The Death of the KPD, 95–105. Patrick N. Major, ‘Big brother und little brother’, 159–62. 126 ‘Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK am 8. Januar 1951’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/165. ‘Sitzung des Politbu¨ros des Zentralkomitees am 9. Januar 1951’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/125. ‘Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK vom 5. November 1951’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/245. ‘Sitzung des Politbu¨ros des ZK am 6. November 1951’; SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/175. ‘Besprechung am 11. 5. 1951, 9 Uhr abends, im Hause bei mir [ ¼ Pieck] mit Tschuikow, Iljitschow, Puschkin—Walter verreist’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 127 6th meeting of the ZK, 13/15 June 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/95.


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process reflected in the increasingly sombre mood within the ZK, whose meetings no longer saw the impassioned displays of optimism—in the form of laughter, cheers, and spontaneous applause—that had been the hallmark of ZK/PV debates in the past. Having tried unsuccessfully to galvanize the West German population via radio broadcasts, leaflets, and (SED-inspired) letters from ordinary East German citizens,128 the SED leaders pinned their hopes on efforts to win over prominent West German critics of Adenauer. West German Protestants were an obvious target, all the more since rumours had reached East Berlin that ‘Niemo¨ller and his circle’ were keen on holding a dialogue with GDR officials and were convinced ‘that without close cooperation with the S[oviet] U[nion], including [co-operation] in the economic field, there would be no escape from West Germany’s misery’. The same rumours suggested that it would be pointless to woo the Roman Catholic Church, since its representatives were interested primarily ‘in the creation of a European bloc of states’ (which would be almost exclusively Catholic) rather than in the ‘reunification of Germany’ (whose Wastern half was, after all, predominantly Protestant).129 Other reports received in East Berlin also suggested that the SED had not yet exhausted all propaganda avenues. Reimann indicated that the veteran social democrat and former Prussian interior minister Carl Severing was prepared to co-operate with the KPD and speak out against Schumacher, and that, in doing so, he might be able to carry with him ‘many influential people within the SPD’ who privately shared his views but had thus far kept quiet.130 A number of bourgeois representatives also seemed ready to join the fray on the side of the SED. The most important of these was Josef Wirth, a veteran of the Catholic Centre party and a former Reich chancellor in the Weimar Republic,131 who was known by the East German comrades to harbour ‘an impotent rage against Adenauer’.132 128 For the details of the SED’s 1950/51 propaganda campaign in West Germany, see Siegfried Suckut, ‘Innenpolitische Aspekte’, 99–100. For details on the decisions behind this campaign, see ‘Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK am 30. Oktober 1950’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/149. ‘Sitzung des Politbu¨ros des Zentralkomitees am 31. Oktober 1950’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/116. 129 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber den evangelischen Ma¨nnertag in Frankfurt’, confidential report by the SED’s Western Commission dated 19 October 1950, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/756. 130 ‘Protokoll aus dem Geda ¨chtnis u¨ber meine Unterredung mit Karl [sic] Severing’, report by Reimann dated 15 October 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. 131 Alexander Gallus, Die Neutralisten, 253–6. 132 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber meinen Besuch bei Dr. Josef Wirth’, confidential report by an unnamed SED go-between dated 24 October 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751.

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Wirth was believed to be backed by Erwin Respondek, a former Reichstag member who had been Wirth’s press secretary133 and who was convinced, according to SED reports, ‘that thousands of German patriots in West Germany are now waiting for the signal to take action on a broad front . . . against the fateful policies of Adenauer’.134 The feeling in East Berlin, as Dahlem admitted, was that West German ‘establishment figures’ (‘Perso¨nlichkeiten’) might be persuaded to back the SED’s call for all-German elections.135 First issued in November 1950 in Grotewohl’s address to the People’s Chamber (and reiterated in his letter to Adenauer), this call had been renewed in the autumn of 1951, after the failure of the communist-sponsored referendum had become clear. On 15 September 1951, a new appeal by the People’s Chamber to the West German Bundestag (incorporating an official statement by Grotewohl) demanded the holding of talks between the two German states in preparation for free elections to a German ‘national assembly’. Seemingly undeterred by Bonn’s opposition to negotiations with East Berlin, the SED leadership subsequently launched further initiatives in support of all-German elections, including another appeal by the People’s Chamber (10 October) and an official letter by GDR president, Wilhelm Pieck, to Theodor Heuß, his West German counterpart (2 November). Meanwhile, the rules under which the proposed elections were to take place were being drafted by a special committee of the People’s Chamber, to be unveiled formally, after being discussed at length on the pages of Neues Deutschland, on 10 February 1952.136 In taking these measures, the SED leaders, who were being advised by the SKK, in particular by Semenov,137 made further concessions to Bonn in what looked like a desperate bid for a positive response. The election law passed by the People’s Chamber on 10 February 1952 was modelled on the Reich election law of 1924, under which voting had to take place in conditions of freedom, equality, and secrecy. Furthermore, the East German comrades dropped their insistence on parity in the Alexander Gallus, Die Neutralisten, 257–8. ‘Betreffend Dr. Josef Wirth: Notizen und Material fu¨r Genossen Walter Ulbricht’, 30 December 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. ‘Neueste Lage betreffs Dr. Wirth’, letter by Franz Dahlem [to Otto Grotewohl] dated 6 January 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/665. 135 ‘Lieber Walter’, letter by Franz Dahlem [to Walter Ulbricht] dated 31 December 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4182/870. 136 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 425–81. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 273–8. Heike Amos, Die Westpolitik der SED, 88–9. 137 ‘Besprechung mit Semjonow am 1. 11. 51 im Hause abends 10 Uhr bei mir’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 133 134


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proposed all-German assembly (in which the election procedures were meant to be discussed and agreed).138 Claims that East Berlin’s offer of free elections was a genuine opportunity for German reunification on the basis of a Western-style regime139 are unconvincing. For although all-German elections might have been held if Bonn had come round, they would not have led, as West Germans would have found out to their cost, to the dismantling of SED rule in the East. As has long been appreciated by some historians,140 the GDR’s election law differed—slightly but crucially—from Western notions of a democratic ballot. Not only did it provide for the participation in future elections of GDR-style mass organizations, but it raised a question mark over the admission of the main West German parties (through its insistence that only ‘democratic’ organizations and individuals—a concept open to interpretation—must be allowed to stand). Furthermore, it provided for each Land to be treated as a separate constituency, thus all but guaranteeing a communist victory on the territory of the GDR (through the combined forces of the SED and the mass organizations) and ensuring that the German Question could not be settled against the SED’s will. A clear indication that the SED’s views on elections differed from those of Western observers was given by Grotewohl, who, at a press conference held on 22 September 1951, explicitly ruled out the readmission of the SPD in the GDR.141 Nothing reveals the intentions of the East German comrades more clearly than their demand that the proposed elections be monitored by an Allied-approved all-German commission, rather than by a UN commission as demanded by the Bundestag and the West German government.142 At the 7th meeting of the ZK, Pieck explained ‘that such a [UN] commission can never establish (unmo¨glich pru¨fen kann) if free elections are guaranteed over here in the GDR’, and he added that the German masses had yet to be educated about the difference between ‘freedom in the interest of the working population’ and ‘freedom in the interests of the capitalists’. Stressing that the difference between the two concepts was huge, he strongly denounced those who wanted German unity ‘on the basis of Anglo-American militarism’ Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 425–81. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 273–8. Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 177–8. 140 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 425–81. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 273–8. 141 Hermann Graml, ‘Die Legende von der verpaßten Gelegenheit: Zur sowjetischen Notenkampagne des Jahres 1952’, VfZG 29/3 (1981), 312–13. 142 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 425–81. Boris Meissner, Rußland, 273–8. 138 139

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(‘auf englisch-amerikanischer Kriegsbasis’). He also had a word of advice for comrades unsure about the SED’s tactics, reminding them that it was ‘a political question to what extent we can manage, in situations like these, to weaken and confuse the front of the enemy by joining forces with people who are separated from us by [their] ideology’.143 There is further evidence to suggest that the purpose of East Berlin’s election scheme was to stop West Germany’s integration into the Western bloc without risking SED control of the GDR. Commenting on the mass movement which the SED was trying to unleash in West Germany, Dahlem stressed the need to ensure that this movement would be ‘guided by us’ (‘von uns gelenkt’) and ‘not be pushed to the right by any other elements’. The challenge facing the party, he added revealingly, would be to infiltrate the new movement with ‘reliable people’ who were not immediately identifiable as communists, such as veterans of the referendum campaign and members of the defunct committees of the National Front.144 However, like previous SED initiatives, the campaign for all-German elections ended in failure after a string of blunders and misunderstandings. Talks in November 1951 between Grotewohl and Otto Dibelius, the Bishop of Berlin (who also met SKK officials), produced no results. At the same time, a member of the Niemo¨ller circle, Pastor Mochalski, warned Dahlem that any movement suspected of being ‘Eastern-oriented’ or ‘communist-led’ would be isolated in West Germany and would not win the backing of the Protestant Church.145 Informal contacts to Severing (via Reimann) were equally disappointing from the SED’s point of view since no amount of enthusiasm could gloss over the fact that the veteran SPD leader was ill and ‘very run down physically’.146 Hopes that Wirth might rally Adenauer’s opponents were dampened by reports that the former chancellor was an alcoholic, who was spending most of his time in the Oberkirch, a wine bar in his native 7th meeting of the ZK, 18/20 October 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/97. ‘Betreffend Dr. Josef Wirth: Notizen und Material fu¨r Genossen Walter Ulbricht’, 30 December 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. 145 Elke Scherstjanoi and Christian Stappenbeck, ‘ ‘‘Dibelius war in Karlshorst . . . wollte Mittelsmann sein zwischen SKK und Adenauer . . . ’’: Ein geheimes Gespra¨ch zwischen Bischof Dibelius, Armeegeneral Tschujkow und Politberater Semjonow im November 1951’, DA 28/10 (1995), 1031–47. ‘Bericht u¨ber eine Unterredung mit Herrn Pfarrer Mochalski (Niemo¨ller-Kreis)’, 19 December 1951, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. 146 ‘Protokoll aus dem Geda ¨chtnis u¨ber meine Unterredung mit Karl [sic] Severing’, report by Reimann dated 15 October 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. 143 144


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Freiburg.147 Although Wirth travelled to East Berlin in December 1951 and held talks over several days with top SED functionaries (including Pieck, Ulbricht, Dahlem, and Grotewohl), he apparently lost interest in further co-operation only a few weeks later, when the assistance he had been promised failed to materialize (a consequence of what Dahlem described as ‘the unbelievable passivity of the comrades in the KPD’).148 In another setback for the East German comrades, Respondek was caught redrafting an SED-sponsored manifesto due to be published under Wirth’s name. Respondek’s version of the document, whose publication was prevented only at the last minute by two vigilant comrades, stated that the East German government was ready to hold elections under international supervision and ‘without the involvement of the People’s Police’, a gross misrepresentation of the GDR’s actual position that led to Respondek being unceremoniously dumped by his SED handlers and denounced as a ‘scoundrel’.149 Meanwhile, Soviet opposition to UN inspectors, expressed in no uncertain terms at a UN General Assembly meeting in Paris in December 1951, had sealed the rejection of East Berlin’s election offer by Bonn and the other Western governments, highlighting the impossibility of an East–West compromise over Germany. The only positive result, from the SED’s point of view, was the UN’s decision to hear East Berlin’s case from an official GDR delegation led by NDPD member and GDR deputy minister-president Lothar Bolz (and including Nuschke, Ebert, and Ackermann).150 This event was encouraging for the SED not because it showed the way forward towards German unity, but—as the East German comrades noted— because the UN had implicitly recognized the GDR ‘as a political reality’ in stark contradiction to ‘the current theory and practice of the Western Allies and the government in Bonn’.151 147 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber meinen Besuch bei Dr. Josef Wirth, Freiburg/Brsg. am 19. Oktober 1951’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. 148 ‘Betreffend Dr. Josef Wirth: Notizen und Material fu ¨ r Genossen Walter Ulbricht’, 30 December 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. ‘Zur Angelegenheit Dr. Wirth’, report by Dahlem dated 20 March 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. 149 ‘Zur Angelegenheit Dr. Wirth’, report by Dahlem dated 25 February 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/751. 150 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 425–81. Ludolf Herbst, Option, 122–3. 151 ‘Betrifft: Beschlu ¨ sse des politischen Ausschusses der UN in Sachen gesamtdeutscher Wahlen’, undated report [December 1951], SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/654.

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THE 1952 ‘ STALIN NOTE’ AND THE QUESTION OF SOVIET AIMS IN GERMANY Signs that the SED was unable to achieve the ‘peaceful resolution of the German Question’ in 1951—a task given to the party by Ulbricht152— led to increased diplomatic activity in Moscow. The Kremlin’s desire to prevent the emergence of a Western bloc (presumably strengthened by the successful Western counter-offensive on the Korean peninsula, which had only been halted by the intervention of communist China)153 could not be in doubt. It was in response to intense Soviet lobbying that a meeting of the Allied deputy foreign ministers had taken place in Paris in the spring of 1951 (5 March–21 June), although the usual East–West disagreements over the Potsdam accord and America’s military involvement in Europe (formalized through the appointment of General Eisenhower as supreme commander of NATO) had ensured the collapse of the talks and the cancelling of a planned meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in Washington.154 In late February 1951, as documents discovered by Gerhard Wettig reveal, officials in the Soviet foreign ministry had begun to consider the possibility of fanning the debate on the German Question by specifying the terms of the peace treaty demanded by Moscow.155 There were signs that the issue of West Germany’s remilitarization could be used to drive a wedge between the United States and the West European countries (in particular France, the least likely champion of German soldiers in view of its bad experience). Preparations for a European Defence Community (EDC)—a West European army incorporating West German troops at battalion level and precluding the West German army favoured by Washington—had made little progress since the idea had been floated by French Prime Minister Rene´ Pleven in October 1950, while Churchill’s return to office following the 1951 Conservative general election victory pointed to a possible withdrawal from Europe by Britain.156 152

4th meeting of the ZK, 17/19 January 1951, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/91. Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 266–72. Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War, 104–10. 154 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 249–54. 155 Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. Ma ¨rz 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Außenministeriums: Die Hypothese des Wiedervereinigungsangebots’, DA 26/7 (1993), 791–8. 156 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 271–80. Ludolf Herbst, Option, 87–98. Wilfried Loth, Teilung, 284–90. 153


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Rumours picked up by the SED—and almost certainly known to the Kremlin—reinforced the impression that the Western camp was divided and in danger of losing its way: ‘ . . . only the Americans are demanding ‘‘a firm line’’ towards the S[oviet] U[nion], while England is dithering and France is even pressing for a compromise’, an SED report on the general political situation pointed out, before adding that in Eisenhower’s own estimation the remilitarization of West Germany would be ‘extremely difficult’ and that, under those circumstances, the chance of defending Western Europe would almost certainly ‘fall to zero’ (‘auf den Nullpunkt sinken’).157 It was against this background that the Kremlin submitted a detailed offer for a peace treaty with Germany better known as the ‘Stalin note’ (appropriately, because, as is now clear, Stalin was personally involved in the drafting of the note).158 Released on 10 March 1952, in response to an urgent call for a peace treaty issued by Grotewohl on 23 February, the document offered the reunification of Germany within its post-Potsdam borders in exchange for its neutralization (via a ban on membership in alliances directed against Germany’s former enemies) and the withdrawal of all Allied occupation troops. While these conditions (as well as the ritual demand for a ban on parties and organizations opposed to ‘democracy and peace’) marked no change from the Kremlin’s previous position, there were a few added sweeteners for the German population: notably an offer to grant full civil rights to all Wehrmacht soldiers and former Nazis (with the exception of convicted war criminals); an offer to allow Germany to have its own land, air, and naval forces for the purpose of self-defence; and an offer to permit the domestic production of weapons to meet Germany’s defence requirements.159 The official response of the Western governments, which demanded free all-German elections as a prerequisite for a peace treaty and German unity, prompted a second Soviet note (9 April 1952), which highlighted the gap between the two sides by rejecting the West’s insistence on UN election monitors. A third and a fourth Soviet note (24 May and 23 August 1952) bore all the hallmarks of a rearguard action, repeating as they did earlier Soviet demands for the restoration of four-power rule in Germany and for the inauguration of all-German 157 ‘Fragen aus Westdeutschland (Zusammengestellt aus vertraulichen Informationen)’, memorandum dated 28 May 1951, NY 4182/1305. 158 Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, 791–8. Gerhard Wettig, Bereitschaft zu Einheit in Freiheit?, 215–27. 159 Boris Meissner, Rußland, 291–2. Jochen Meiner, Deutschlandpolitik, 540–1.

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round-table talks. Meanwhile, the West German government, spurred on by Adenauer’s fierce hostility to the idea of neutrality, had taken a decisive step towards joining the Western alliance as a full member by signing the so-called ‘General Treaty’ (26 May 1952), which ensured the lifting of the Occupation Statute in exchange for a West German promise of participation in the EDC.160 There has been an apparently endless debate among historians over Stalin’s intentions, focusing on the question of whether the Soviet offer was an opportunity for Germany’s reunification under a bourgeois democratic—perhaps Weimar-style—regime, or merely a propaganda coup designed to ensure that Germany’s division would be blamed on the West.161 Loth, in particular, has interpreted the March 1952 note and the surrounding events as proof that the Kremlin wanted a ‘compromise’ over Germany.162 However, the sources that seem to support this theory are anything but conclusive, and most of them can be used to back up the opposite view.163 To support his theory, Loth has cited an interview with Daniil Melnikov, a Germany specialist in Stalin’s 160 Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 296–318. Hermann Graml, ‘Die Legende’, 331–40. Michael Lemke, ‘Chance oder Risiko? Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952 im außenpolitischen Konzept der Bundesregierung’, ZfG 39/2 (1991), 115–29. 161 For an overview of this debate, see Gerhard Wettig, Die sowjetische Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952—Wiedervereinigungsangebot oder Propagandawerkzeug? (Cologne, 1981). Die Legende von der verpaßten Gelegenheit. Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952, ed. by Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart, 1982). Rolf Steininger, Eine Chance zur Wiedervereinigung? Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952: Darstellung und Dokumentation auf der Grundlage unvero¨ffentlichter britischer und amerikanischer Akten (Bonn, 1985). Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952 als geschichtswissenschaftliches Problem: Ein gewandeltes Problemversta¨ndnis’, DA 25/2 (1992), 157–67. Elke Scherstjanoi, ‘Zu Gerhard Wettig, ‘‘Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952 als geschichtswissenschaftliches Problem’’ ’; DA 25/8 (1992), 858–62. Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952—Antwort auf Elke Scherstjanoi’, DA 25/8 (1992), 862–5. Hermann-Josef Rupieper, ‘Verpaßte Chancen? Ein Ru¨ckblick auf die deutschlandpolitischen Verhandlungen 1952–1955’; Die deutsche Frage, 195–213. Ruud Van Dijk, ‘The 1952 Stalin Note Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunity for German Unification?’, CWIHP, Working Paper No. 14 (May 1996). Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Interessen der Ma¨chte angesichts der StalinNote vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952: Stand der Ost-West-Konfrontation in Deutschland 1952’, DA 35/2 (2002), 231–6. 162 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 178–84. Based on the discovery of new Soviet documents on the drafting of the Stalin notes, Loth has recently reiterated his views. See Wilfried Loth, ‘Die Entstehung der ‘‘Stalin-Note’’ ’, 19–115. Wilfried Loth, ‘Das Ende der Legende’, 653–64. 163 Hermann Graml, ‘Eine wichtige Quelle—aber missverstanden. Anmerkungen zu Wilfried Loth: ‘Die Entstehung der ‘‘Stalin-Note’’: Dokumente aus Moskauer Archiven’, Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952, 117–37. Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952 im Kontext von Stalins Deutschland-Politik seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, ibid., 139–96.


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entourage, in which the latter suggests that the March 1952 note was ‘not an attempt to push Germany away from the West’. Yet the same interview contains an admission that the Kremlin had no plans to abandon the GDR (‘We were [there] with our guns and tanks . . . ’), and that Stalin would undoubtedly have tried to draw the whole of Germany into his sphere of influence if there had been ‘a moment of Western weakness (eine Ohnmacht der Westma¨chte), a revolution in Germany, or whatever else might have happened . . . ’.164 A lot of attention has been paid to claims by SED functionaries that in April–May 1952 Wilhelm Zaisser, the head of the MfS and a member of the Politburo spoke to colleagues about the possibility of the GDR being sacrificed by the Kremlin in a bid for a peace treaty and a settlement of the German Question.165 However, the fact that these claims were made during the internal SED investigation that followed Zaisser’s fall points to a smear campaign and raises doubts about their credibility. These doubts are exacerbated by the timing of Zaisser’s purported remarks, since most historians would argue that in April–May 1952—after the rejection of the original Stalin note—the window of opportunity for a Western acceptance of the Soviet offer was already closed.166 Similarly, alleged comments on the Kremlin’s intentions by Pietro Nenni, a leading Italian socialist who visited Stalin in July 1952, must be treated with caution. According to rumours picked up by George F. Kennan, the American ambassador to Moscow, officials in Stalin’s entourage had told Nenni that ‘the present interchange of notes’ was ‘completely phoney and futile’, implying that the March 1952 note might indeed have been serious. To add to the mystery, Nenni told Kennan’s informer about an earlier meeting with Pieck and Grotewohl at which the SED leaders had expressed their concern that the ‘policies being pursued by [the] Sov[iet] Gov[ernmen]t were ones which would call for great sacrifice from them and that they might soon be forced into a position in Ger(many) comparable to that of Nenni in Italy, by which they presumably meant that of a left-wing minority in a parliamentary system’.167 It is possible that the East German comrades harboured fears of a sudden betrayal by Moscow. After all, they had 164 Daniil E. Melnikow, ‘Illusion oder eine verpaßte Chance? Zur sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1952’, Osteuropa 41 (1991), 599, 601. 165 Michael Lemke, ‘Die DDR und die deutsche Frage 1949–1955’, Die deutsche Frage, 163–4. 166 Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, 787–8. 167 Hermann-Josef Rupieper, ‘Zu den sowjetischen Deutschlandnoten 1952: Das Gespra¨ch Stalin-Nenni’, VfZG 33/3 (1985), 554.

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been informed of the terms of the Soviet offer only one day in advance, on 9 March 1952.168 Yet communication failures had led to misunderstandings between the Soviet and German comrades before169 and do not prove that Pieck’s and Grotewohl’s fears—if they really existed—were justified. SED records from the time in question shed little light on this episode, with no proper discussion taking place within the ZK and Pieck’s notes largely confining themselves to matters concerning the GDR,170 but Soviet documents discovered by Wettig contradict the assertion that the Stalin note was a bid for a compromise with the West. These documents include a first draft of the note which contained all the main elements of the final version but stressed that the ‘democratic transformation’ carried out in the GDR—on the basis of the ‘democratic reforms in industry, in agriculture and in other areas of the economy’—would have to be transferred to West Germany if reunification was to take place. They also imply that the absence of this demand from the official Soviet offer was due to tactical considerations, suggesting that the demand itself had not been dropped.171 The same point is made in the personal reminiscences of Molotov. Recalling comments by Soviet interior minister L. P. Beria after Stalin’s death that ‘[All] we want is a peaceful Germany’ and that ‘it makes no difference whether or not it is socialist’, Molotov reminded his interviewer that such thoughts would have been unthinkable in Stalin’s days.172 In view of the Soviet Union’s success in becoming a nuclear power and closing the military gap with the United States (in August 1949, with the development of a Soviet hydrogen bomb being well under way by 1952) Stalin’s intransigence should not be surprising, for the Soviet dictator knew that the West could no longer force his hand via the threat of a military strike.173 The files studied by Wettig leave little doubt that the Kremlin did not expect the West to accept the terms of the Stalin note, and that 168 ‘Besprechung am 9. 3. 1952, Sonntag, ab 10.30 abends’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 169 On this issue, see also Norman M. Naimark, ‘Die Sowjetische Milita ¨radministration in Deutschland und die Frage des Stalinismus: Vera¨nderte Sichtweisen auf der Grundlage neuer Quellen aus russischen Archiven’, ZfG 43/4 (1995), 302–3. 170 8th meeting of the ZK, 21/23 February 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 171 Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, 794–5. 2/1/101–103. 172 Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev, ed. by Albert Resis (Chicago, 1993), 334. 173 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven Conn., 1994), 196–223, 294–319.


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Soviet hopes for progress on the German Question hinged exclusively on the possibility of the West being pushed into making concessions by the German masses. Moscow-based Soviet officials dismissed Adenauer’s government as a ‘dictatorship of the imperialist German bourgeoisie’, and an American puppet regime, but were equally unimpressed with the SPD as the main opposition party. Other opposition groups, such as the pacifists gathered around Heinemann, were viewed with some sympathy, but were regarded as unreliable and as rivals to the ‘democratic forces in Germany’—in other words: the KPD. Despite its parlous state and pathetic track record, that party was still seen in Moscow as having a genuine chance of becoming a ‘mass party’ and assuming a ‘leading role’ in West Germany.174 On balance, it would seem that the Stalin note was just another attempt by the Kremlin to extend a left-wing and pro-Soviet regime across the whole of Germany.175 Although the note was underpinned by a realization that this regime would differ from the one set up in the GDR, since it would include a larger number of non-communists, there is no evidence to suggest that the Kremlin would have settled for a bourgeois democratic Germany even on the basis of formal neutrality. In order to understand the decisions that led to the Stalin note, one should remember that, for much of the post-war period, Soviet officials had wildly inflated hopes about their ability to exploit German patriotic feelings. In a memorandum reviewing the situation in Germany three years after the end of the war, the SMAD’s Department of Information had expressed surprise at the apparent refusal of the German masses to side with the Soviet Union, stressing The key issue in our propaganda regarding Germany was the issue of German unity. The levers for the propaganda in favour of German unity were always in our hands. This was a popular demand supported by progressive and democratic forces from all sections of German society.176

By his own admission, Tiupanov believed—wrongly, as it turned out— ‘that in trying to achieve German unity we could count on the active collaboration of the German people itself as well as the assistance of the west German minister-presidents . . . ’.177 174

Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die Deutschland-Note’, 799–802. This view is shared by Jochen Laufer, ‘Der Friedensvertrag mit Deutschland als Problem der sowjetischen Außenpolitik: Die Stalin-Note vom 10. Ma¨rz 1952’, VfZG 176 Quoted in Jochen Laufer, ‘Auf dem Wege’, 29. 52/1 (2004), 117–18. 177 Sergej I. Tiulpanov, Deutschland nach dem Kriege, 301. 175

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Nor should one be surprised about these delusions, since they were shared to a large extent by the SED leaders, even though, as Germans, they had a better understanding of the situation in Germany. This is illustrated by a confidential report on a tour of several West German cities (Du¨sseldorf, Bonn, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Kassel) made by Heinz Willmann, a senior member of the German Peace Committee, between 14 and 22 May 1952. In this report, which was marked with the words ‘very interesting’ by its recipient, Pieck, Willmann warned against delusions in the GDR about the mood in West Germany. He explained how, after returning to East Berlin, he had been struck by the fact that the newspapers, especially Neues Deutschland and Ta¨gliche Rundschau, were portraying the situation in West Germany as if there was already ‘a very broad popular movement against the General Treaty’ and as if the workers were ‘[standing] united against the national treason [committed] by Adenauer’. In a comment that highlights the discrepancy that still existed between communist perceptions and German realities, Willmann added: ‘I did not gain that impression [while I was] in West Germany’.178

T H E S E D ’ S 2N D P A R T Y CO N F E R E N C E AN D THE MOVE TOWARDS SOCIALISM The impact of the Stalin note did not meet the SED’s expectations. Although the Soviet offer prompted a passionate debate on the General Treaty in the West German Bundestag, Adenauer’s opponents in parliament (both outside and inside his government) were unable to derail his policies. A formal SED offer for ‘unity of action’ extended to the SPD leadership in late March 1952 produced no results.179 Nor did ordinary West Germans take to the streets—as the SED leaders had hoped (and demanded in Neues Deutschland)180—in mass protests against Adenauer and the Western Allies. An SED opinion poll carried 178 ‘Heinz Willmann an . . . Genossen Wilhelm Pieck’/‘Bericht u ¨ ber eine Reise nach Westdeutschland’, dated 26 May 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/782. 179 Adolf M. Birke, Nation, 306–18. Heinz Heitzer, ‘Entscheidungen im Vorfeld der 2. Parteikonferenz der SED (Februar bis Juli 1952)’, BzG 34/4 (1992), 24–5. 180 Neues Deutschland, 17 April 1952. In his private notes, Pieck suggested that elections could be turned into a ‘mass struggle for the overthrow of the Adenauer government’. See ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 29. 3.–10. 4. 1952’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/696.


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out in several East German cities (in Schwerin, Rostock, Potsdam, Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz, and Halle) went some way towards explaining why. It suggested that while two-thirds of the population knew of the Stalin note and broadly welcomed its support for ‘a peaceful solution to the German Question’, one-third of the people in this group did not believe that the Soviet offer would have any effect. More alarmingly, the poll revealed that a considerable number of Germans—even in the GDR—was still hostile to the Soviet Union and susceptible to ‘anti-Soviet rhetoric’.181 The SED leaders discovered that harnessing the Stalin note to their propaganda was no easy task. The note’s implicit guarantee for the Oder– Neiße border was extremely unpopular and sparked off a fresh debate on the issue of Germany’s lost Eastern territories (especially in Mecklenburg, which was home to a large number of refugees). An even fiercer controversy erupted over the Soviet offer to permit German armed forces. Statements such as ‘Why do we need a military?’, ‘Now Prussian jackboot-discipline (Kadavergehorsam) will take hold once again!’, and ‘This shows that Adenauer is right in carrying out [West Germany’s] remilitarization!’ were not uncommon, and pointed to the existence of ‘pacifist tendencies’ among the East German population at large as well as the membership of the SED.182 Some of the non-pacifist views were equally worrying since they smacked of old-style German militarism and nationalism. Thus one officer in the GDR’s People’s Police welcomed the idea of a new German army by saying ‘that he could have a great career in the air force’ since he had notched up ‘200 combat sorties’ in Hitler’s Luftwaffe. In another embarrassing incident, workers at the Soviet-owned Wismut uranium mines—one of the key SAGs—inquired whether the Stalin note meant that Germany would in future be allowed to mine uranium for its own use in ‘atomic energy’ and ‘atomic bombs’.183 Some reactions, however, were encouraging for the SED. Reports ‘from all La¨nder’ suggested that most people saw the Soviet offer as a 181 ‘Streng vertraulich—Gesamtdeutsche Fragen/Note der Sowjetunion vom 23. August 1952’, opinion poll conducted by the SED’s ‘Abteilung Agitation’, 3 September 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/9.02/74. For other surveys with similar results, see SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/9.02/72–73. 182 ‘Erster Bericht u ¨ ber die Popularisierung der Note der Regierung der Sowjetunion . . . ’, report by the SED’s ‘Abteilung Agitation’, 12 March 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/782. 183 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber den Stand der Aufkla¨rungsarbeit zur Note der Sowjetunion . . . ’, report by the SED’s ‘Abteilung Agitation’, 24 March 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/782.

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positive sign and that there had been an increase in the SED’s popularity. SED hopes were fuelled in particular by the countless pledges (Selbstverpflichtungen) made by East German workers in response to the official campaign for the Stalin note. These pledges involved workers in all sectors of the economy, ranging from the engineers at Bitterfeld power station (who promised to complete boiler repairs ahead of schedule and thus provide the GDR’s economy with an additional 1,500,000 kwh of energy) to the peasants in the village of Rothenschirmbach (who vowed to deliver 1,000 eggs and 10,000 litres of milk before the end of March).184 There was a feeling in SED circles that, regardless of its effect on West Germany, the Stalin note would give the SED ‘an opportunity to draw wider sections [of the East German population] into the struggle for . . . the consolidation of our anti-fascist [and] democratic regime’.185 This feeling was not tantamount to an admission that nothing could be done about the division of Germany. On the contrary, the East German comrades had still not abandoned the hope that the GDR would emerge as the more successful of the two German states and thus pave the way for German unification under SED auspices. At the 8th meeting of the ZK, in February 1952, Ulbricht emphasized what he saw as the great achievements of the GDR since the adoption of the 1950 five-year plan: an increase in industrial production by 22 per cent; an even bigger rise in the production of food and basic consumer goods; and savings for the GDR’s population to the tune of 2 billion marks as a result of price cuts in the state-owned Handelsorganisation retail stores. Ulbricht reminded his colleagues towards the end of the meeting that, far from being relevant only to the GDR, these achievements were an important weapon ‘in the struggle for the unity of the democratic Germany’.186 Nor were the SED leaders wrong to think that the GDR was still seen as the more modern and progressive Germany by many people, especially younger ones. This was underlined by the enormous success of the so-called ‘3rd World Festival Games of Youth and Students for Peace’, 184 ‘Bericht u ¨ ber den Stand der Aufkla¨rungsarbeit zur Note der Sowjetunion . . . ’, report by the SED’s ‘Abteilung Agitation’, 24 March 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/782. 185 ‘Protokoll der Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK am 17. Ma ¨rz 1952/Beschluß des Sekretariats’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/275. 186 8th meeting of the ZK, 21/23 February 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/101–103.


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an SED-sponsored two-week event held in East Berlin in August 1951 and attended by some 2 million youths, including some 35,000 from West Germany (who had travelled to East Berlin in defiance of border closures and other measures designed to stop them).187 Even the West German press was struck by the confidence and enthusiasm exuded by the festival’s (mainly communist) participants and warned ‘Time is working for the East’. Echoing this verdict, reports received in East Berlin in early 1952 suggested that visitors from West Germany were showing ‘growing faith (ein wachsendes Zutrauen) in the GDR’.188 Determined to press ahead with the GDR’s consolidation, the SED leaders acted swiftly. The 8th meeting of the ZK resolved to convene a 2nd Party Conference (a somewhat arbitrary measure, since the event that should have been convened under the 1950 SED statute was a regular (biannual) Party Congress). Leaving his fellow comrades in no doubt about the significance of this step, Ulbricht made it clear that the purpose of the proposed conference was to move the SED forward on the road to becoming ‘a party of the new type’ of the kind represented by ‘the party of Lenin and Stalin’.189 The more than 1,500 SED functionaries who gathered as planned in East Berlin’s ‘Werner-Seelenbinder Hall’ between 9 and 12 July 1952 (accompanied by more than 2,500 guests, including some 500 from West Germany) did not let their leadership down. Without a proper debate, they passed several secretly drafted motions (providing for the replacement of the five East German La¨nder with fourteen districts controlled directly by East Berlin; the establishment of regular East German armed forces; and the introduction of collective farming in the GDR), and they erupted into thunderous applause when Ulbricht unveiled a secret decision by the ZK to the effect ‘that socialism will be established according to schedule in the German Democratic Republic’.190 There can be little doubt that the proclamation of the accelerated construction of socialism in the GDR—a measure that was bound to 187 Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 417–24. Patrick N. Major, The Death of the KPD, 224–5. 188 ‘Es muss etwas passieren’, article in Der Spiegel, 15 August 1951, read and collected by Pieck. NY 4036/640. ‘Streng vertraulich—III. Wintersportmeisterschaften der DDR: Argumentation der westdeutschen Ga¨ste’, reports by the SED’s ‘Abteilung Agitation’ dated 29 February and 1 March 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/9.02/71. 189 8th meeting of the ZK, 21/23 February 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/101–103. Heinz Heitzer, ‘Entscheidungen’, 21–2. 190 Protokoll der Verhandlungen der II. Parteikonferenz der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. 9.–12. Juli 1952 in der Werner-Seelenbinder Halle zu Berlin (Berlin, 1952), 58–9. Dietrich Staritz, Gru¨ndung, 9–35.

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destroy all hopes for a negotiated settlement of the German Question— owed much to Ulbricht’s ideological zeal. Indeed, Ulbricht’s announcement went beyond the decision actually taken by the ZK (at the suggestion of the Secretariat and the Politburo), namely to adopt the slogan ‘Forward towards peace, unity, democracy and socialism’ as the motto of the forthcoming party conference.191 A letter to Stalin making the case for the GDR’s transition to socialism—dispatched by the SED’s Politburo on 2 July 1952—suggests that the Kremlin was not the driving force behind Ulbricht’s coup. The absence of Soviet officials from the audience of the party conference (a break with precedent) is another sign that there may have been disagreements between Moscow and East Berlin.192 When Semenov visited Stalin, in October 1952, the Soviet dictator allegedly criticized Ulbricht, describing him as a loyal communist and true friend of the Soviet Union but a poor tactician whose fist was ‘larger than his head’.193 However, claims that in 1952 a rift had opened up between the Soviet and the East German comrades, and that the SED’s decisions were taken against Moscow’s will,194 are unconvincing. Indeed, there is clear evidence that these decisions had been fully endorsed—at least in principle—by both the Kremlin and Karlshorst. The SED’s policies were discussed at length during talks held in Moscow, where Pieck, Ulbricht, and Grotewohl travelled between 29 March and 10 April 1952.195 At a first meeting (1 April) with the CPSU(b)’s Politburo (attended by ‘Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Bulganin’, according to Pieck’s notes), the SED leaders were advised that they must ‘establish [a] people’s army—without [making] noise’ (‘Volksarmee schaffen—ohne Geschrei’), because the ‘pacifist period’ was now ‘over’. East Germany was to have its own ‘airmen’, ‘infantry divisions’, and ‘submarine service’, while, as part of its militarization, the FDJ was to ‘learn how to shoot’ (‘schießen lernen’). Pieck and his colleagues were 191 See 9th meeting of the ZK, 8 July 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/ 105. ‘Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK am 30. Mai 1952’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/3/294. ‘Sitzung des Politbu¨ros des Zentralkomitees am 24. Juni 1952’, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/2/217. 192 Dietrich Staritz, ‘Die SED, Stalin und der ‘‘Aufbau des Sozialismus’’ ’, 698–9. Dietrich Staritz, Gru¨ndung, 183–4. Dietrich Staritz, ‘Zwischen Ostintegration und nationaler Verpflichtung’, 287–8. 193 Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 279. 194 See Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 188. Wilfriede Otto, ‘Deutschlandnote 1952. Stalin und die DDR: Bisher unvero¨ffentlichte handschriftliche Notizen Wilhelm Piecks’, BzG 33/3 (1991), 379. 195 ‘Reise nach Moskau vom 29. 3.–10. 4. 1952’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/696.


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urged to demonstrate ‘fighting spirit’ (‘Kampfgeist’) and promised: ‘we will help you’.196 At a second meeting with the CPSU(b)’s Politburo held a few days later (7 April), these instructions were confirmed. While the SED leaders were told to continue their propaganda for ‘[German] unity, [and a] peace treaty’, they were advised that the ‘demarcation line’ between the two German states was a ‘dangerous border’ and that ‘weapons stocks (Bewaffnung) must be created’ immediately. Furthermore, Pieck and his colleagues were told to begin with the setting up of collective farms (‘Produktiv-Genossenschaften im Dorfe’) in order to ‘encircle the rich peasants’. While this was to be done via persuasion rather than force (‘Niemand zwingen’), the point of the exercise was, as the Soviet leaders made clear, to open up the ‘road to socialism’.197 A few days before, in another discussion that foreshadowed the SED’s future policies, Pieck and his colleagues had been briefed by Kremlin officials on the workings of the Soviet government, with special attention being given to the Soviet Union’s administrative division into ‘180 districts’ accountable to the CPSU(b)’s Politburo.198 During the following weeks—i.e., well in advance of the SED’s 2nd Party Conference—preparations got under way for the implementation of the measures proposed by the Soviet leadership. The GDR’s militarization (which had been going on for more than two years) was accelerated and made public in Neues Deutschland, while an administrative reform designed to promote centralization was being prepared and steps were taken to encourage collective farming (which was deemed more efficient by many ‘poor’ peasants and had already been introduced in some villages on a voluntary basis). Measures were also taken to seal the inter-German border (via the establishment of a patrolled security zone), the official reason being the need for protection against Western espionage and sabotage.199 Pieck’s notes make it clear that, in addition to having been approved by Stalin, these measures were implemented in close collaboration with the SKK,200 whose members were not only holding regular talks with the SED leaders in Karlshorst but were also attending the meetings of 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. Ibid. Jochen Meiners, Deutschlandpolitik, 595–614. Elke Scherstjanoi, ‘Die DDR im Fru¨hjahr 1952: Sozialismuslo¨sung und Kollektivierungsbeschluß in sowjetischer Perspektive’, DA 27/4 (1994), 360–1. 200 ‘Besprechung am 14. 4. 1952, abends bei mir Tschuikow, Semjonow und 3 (Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht)’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. ‘Besprechung am 196 199

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the SED’s Politburo.201 It is therefore misleading to suggest that in promoting East Germany’s consolidation along socialist lines the SED leaders acted on their own. Indeed, in an article in Ta¨gliche Rundschau published on 22 July 1952, the Kremlin formally declared its support for the SED’s new policies, announcing: ‘J. V. Stalin called the establishment of the peace-loving German Democratic Republic a ‘‘turning point in the history of Europe’’. His verdict is even more valid with regard to the scheduled construction of socialism in the GDR.’202 Nor should this be surprising. The failure of the Stalin notes had ruled out an early reunification of Germany. In these circumstances, both German states had no option but to press ahead with their domestic consolidation in the hope of proving their superiority. In their letter to Stalin of 2 July 1952, the members of the SED’s Politburo argued that, against the background of this trial of strength, the GDR’s transition to socialism was important because it would inspire the masses and demonstrate to the workers as well as the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie ‘that people can live better over here than in West Germany’.203 This view was apparently shared by Stalin, who, according to a report by Richard Crossman, a British Labour parliamentarian, told Nenni of his willingness to risk a ‘cold war’ lasting ‘ten or fifteen years’ in the hope ‘that the Eastern bloc can bear the resulting economic tensions more easily than the West’.204

T H E 1 9 5 3 C RIS IS —A N O P PO RT U N ITY FOR GERMAN REUNIF IC ATION? The SED’s decision to embark on the ‘accelerated construction of socialism’205 prompted a wave of radical changes in the GDR that were soon to prove disastrous. Foremost among these changes was a push for the development of heavy industries, such as chemicals and steel, at 18. 4. 1952, 9 Uhr abends bei Tschuikow’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. ‘Besprechung am 7. 5. 1952 abends 10 Uhr bei Tschuikow’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. ‘Besprechung am 26. 5. 1952, 9 Uhr abends in Karlshorst’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4036/736. 201 Ernst Wurl, ‘Entscheidung ‘‘gegen das Konzept Stalins’’? Zu Wilfriede Ottos Dokumentation von Notizen W. Piecks, BzG 3/1991’, BzG 33/6 (1991), 768, n. 3. 202 Ta ¨ gliche Rundschau, 22 July 1952. 203 Quoted in Dietrich Staritz, ‘Die SED, Stalin und der ‘‘Aufbau des Sozialismus’’ ’, 699. 204 Quoted in Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 190. 205 Protokoll der Verhandlungen der II. Parteikonferenz der SED, 491–2.


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the expense of the other sectors of the economy. Aimed at making the GDR autonomous from West Germany (the traditional home of Germany’s heavy industries, but now largely cut off from the GDR despite the existence of an inter-German trade agreement), this measure caused widespread supply shortages and an acute lack of consumer goods.206 The SED’s militarization programme, which resulted in the KVP being expanded from 90,000 to 113,000 men between late 1952 and mid-1953, added to the pressure on the GDR’s scarce economic resources. This pressure was reinforced by the campaign for collective farming, which turned into an open confrontation with the rich peasants by the end of 1952.207 At the same time, there was a marked increase in repression in East German society, with the SED trying to rein in the churches, the universities, and the artists (who were forced to subscribe to ‘socialist realism’), while cracking down on the bourgeois parties (a process that culminated in several high-profile arrests, including that of foreign minister and CDU member Georg Dertinger).208 Even at this stage, many East German comrades still believed in the superiority of their policies, a fact that may be easier to understand if one remembers that the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’—the ‘economic miracle’ that finally made West Germany’s economic development eclipse that of the GDR—was still in its infancy.209 In November 1952, Dahlem asserted that ‘the strong appeal’ (‘die werbende Kraft’) of the GDR as the potential core of a united Germany was slowly beginning to have an 206 Christoph Buchheim, ‘Wirtschaftliche Hintergru ¨ nde des Arbeiteraufstandes vom 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR’, VfZG 38/3 (1990), 418–27. Detlev Nakath, ‘Zur politischen Bedeutung des innerdeutschen Handels in der Nachkriegszeit (1948/49– 1960)’, Wirtschaftliche Folgelasten, 221–44. 207 Torsten Diedrich, Waffen gegen das Volk: Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR (Munich, 2003), 8–46. Volker Koop, Der 17. Juni 1953: Legende und Wirklichkeit (Berlin, 2003), 15–69. Lothar Schro¨ter, ‘Zwischen Wirklichkeit und Klischee—Bedrohungsvorstellungen in der DDR-Fu¨hrung in den 50er Jahren’, BzG 34/1 (1992), 5– 6. Joachim Piskol, ‘Zur sozialo¨konomischen Entwicklung der Großbauern in der DDR 1945 bis 1960’, ZfG 39/5 (1991), 426–9. 208 Leo Haupts, ‘Die Blockparteien in der DDR und der 17. Juni 1953’, VfZG 40/3 (1992), 384–8. Jochen Franke, ‘Der Fall Dertinger und seine parteiinternen Auswirkungen: Eine Dokumentation’, DA 25/3 (1992), 286–98. 209 Christoph Klessmann, Die doppelte Staatsgru ¨ ndung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945– 1955 (5th, rev. edn., Go¨ttingen, 1991), 223–6. Christoph Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945–1958 (Munich, 1990), 180–1. Klaus Megerle, ‘Die Radikalisierung blieb aus: Zur Integration gesellschaftlicher Gruppen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland wa¨hrend des Nachkriegsbooms’, Der Boom 1948–1973: Gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Europa, ed. by Hartmut Kaelble (Opladen, 1992), 107–26.

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effect on the masses in West Germany.210 Nor was he the only SED leader to think so. Half a year later, Heinrich Rau told the ZK—to applause from the audience—that the thorough implementation of the SED’s policies would help to raise the standard of living in the GDR and, in doing so, encourage the workers in West Germany to join ‘the struggle for a united, democratic and peaceful Germany’.211 All the evidence from the Soviet archives suggests that these views were shared by Soviet officials in Moscow, who were unaware of the magnitude of the crisis brewing in East Germany. It was not until May 1953 that the Kremlin—still shaken by the death of Stalin a few weeks before (5 March)—became genuinely concerned. The change seems to have come in response to a detailed report by Semenov, who had been recalled from Berlin at short notice.212 On 27 May 1953, the Presidium of the Soviet Council of Ministers (the body that now determined Soviet foreign policy) met to discuss the latest events in the GDR and, after concluding that the situation was serious, arranged for the SED leaders to travel to Moscow for urgent talks.213 Meanwhile, the SED’s bid for socialism was foundering. Early in 1953, industrial production had fallen below the target set in the economic plan, while crop failures in the previous autumn (exacerbated by the collectivization of agriculture) had caused food shortages of a kind not seen since the end of the war. New taxes on small businesses and radical welfare cuts failed to plug the growing hole in the GDR’s budget (as did Soviet subsidies).214 Instead, these measures triggered a sharp rise in so-called ‘flights from the republic’ (with some 120,000 people fleeing the GDR for West Germany during the first four months of 1953),215 210 10th meeting of the ZK, 20/22 November 1952, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/ IV 2/1/107–109. 211 13th meeting of the ZK, 13/14 May 1953, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/115. 212 Gerhard Wettig, ‘Zum Stand der Forschung u ¨ ber Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Fru¨hjahr 1953’, DA 26/6 (1993), 678–9. 213 James Richter, ‘Re-examining Soviet Policy towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 3 (June 1992), 12–17. Elke Scherstjanoi, ‘ ‘‘Wollen wir den Sozialismus?’’ Dokumente aus der Sitzung des Politbu¨ros des ZK der SED am 6. Juni 1953’, BzG 33/5 (1991), 658, n. 1. 214 Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, Untergang auf Raten: Unbekannte Kapitel der DDR-Geschichte (Munich, 1993), 27–45. Manfred Hagen, DDR—Juni ’53: Die erste Volkserhebung im Sozialismus (Stuttgart, 1992), 24–31. Christian F. Ostermann, ‘The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 11 (December 1994), 4–5. 215 Heinz Brandt, The Search for a Third Way: My Path between East and West (Garden City, NY, 1970), 185–6. Rolf Sto¨ckigt, ‘Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953’, BzG 32/5 (1990), 651–4.


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paving the way for the GDR’s Council of Ministers to tighten the economic squeeze—at the suggestion of the SED’s ZK—by decreeing a 10 per cent increase in work norms (28 May 1953).216 There followed a month of confusion and turmoil. On 2 June 1953, Ulbricht and Grotewohl—accompanied by Oelßner as their interpreter—arrived in Moscow, where Pieck had been staying for several weeks to receive medical treatment after suffering a stroke.217 A meeting on the same day between the three East German visitors and representatives of the new Soviet leadership—headed by the powerful interior minister L. P. Beria, Central Committee secretary N. S. Khrushchev, as well as Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Molotov—concluded that the rapid Sovietization of the GDR had been a mistake and must be halted immediately. Following a meeting with Pieck (4 June) and their return to Berlin (5 June) in the company of Semenov, the East German comrades launched a ‘New Course’ which—based on a document they had been given in Moscow—curbed the level of repression in the GDR and annulled the decisions relating to the construction of socialism, except for the collectivization of agriculture and the 10 per cent norm hike.218 Shortly afterwards, on 16–17 June, the combination of total confusion within the SED’s ranks and continuing anger among the East German workers triggered a wave of GDR-wide protests that turned into a spontaneous uprising against the SED-led regime. The Politburo’s decision to rescind the norm hikes failed to quell the revolt, which briefly plunged the GDR into chaos and was checked only by the intervention of Soviet tanks.219 216 Christoph Buchheim, ‘Wirtschaftliche Hintergru ¨ nde’, 415–16. Rolf Steininger, 17. Juni 1953: Der Anfang vom Ende der DDR (Munich, 2003), 19–41. 217 Rolf Sto ¨ ckigt, ‘Ein Dokument’, 648–51. On Pieck’s illness, see Ernst Wollweber, ¨ ber einen ‘Aus Erinnerungen’, 360. Franz Dahlem, ‘Nachgelassenes. Ausgelassenes: U Prozeß und die Schwierigkeiten seiner richtigen Beurteilung’, BzG 32/1 (1990), 22–3. 218 Handwritten notes by Otto Grotewohl, 1953, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/ 699. See also Christian F. Ostermann, ‘The Limits’, 6–7. Gerhard Wettig, ‘Sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsbemu¨hungen im ausgehenden Fru¨hjahr 1953? Neue Aufschlu¨sse u¨ber ein altes Problem’, DA 25/9 (1992), 946–7. Elke Scherstjanoi, ‘ ‘‘In 14 Tagen werden Sie vielleicht schon keinen Staat mehr haben’’: Vladmir Semenov und der 17. Juni 1953’, DA 31/6 (1998), 907–37. 219 Torsten Diedrich, Waffen gegen das Volk, 53–133. Volker Koop, Der 17. Juni 1953, 73–287. Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, Untergang, 62–110. Manfred Hagen, DDR—Juni 53, 35–123. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk and Stefan Wolle, Roter Stern u¨ber Deutschland: Sowjetische Truppen in der DDR (Berlin, 2001), 167–79. Gary Bruce, Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany, 1945–1955 (New York, 2003), 174–94.

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Meanwhile, Ulbricht, who had been deeply shocked by this turn of events and briefly overcome by apathy,220 was fighting for his survival at the helm of the SED after being heavily criticized—first by Soviet officials in Moscow and then by his fellow comrades in East Berlin— for his arrogance and authoritarian leadership style. Thrown onto the defensive within the Politburo, he was forced to cancel the triumphalist celebrations planned for his sixtieth birthday (30 June 1953) and was left with no choice but to wind up the Secretariat (his main power base). In a further blow to his authority, he was attacked over the treatment of Dahlem, his long-standing rival who had recently been expelled from the Politburo and the ZK (for his past criticism of the Nazi–Soviet pact) during the purge that had swept through the European communist parties in the wake of the Czechoslovak ‘Slansky’ trial.221 For a few days, it looked as if Ulbricht might be ousted and replaced as head of the SED’s Politburo by Herrnstadt, the cerebral yet unpopular editor of Neues Deutschland (incidentally a former member of the ‘Ulbricht Group’) who was strongly supported by MfS-chief Zaisser (a general in the Spanish Civil War, who was close to Dahlem, another ex-Spanienka¨mpfer). It was not until the downfall of Beria (who was arrested on 26 June after having aroused fears that he might turn himself into a dictator) that Ulbricht recaptured the initiative, regaining, gradually, the support of the Kremlin and the backing of the majority within the SED’s Politburo.222 By denouncing Herrnstadt and Zaisser as allies of Beria, who was accused by his Soviet opponents of being a power-hungry careerist and an enemy of the party, Ulbricht managed to launch a successful counter-attack, which resulted in a resounding triumph over his critics at the 15th meeting of the ZK (24–6 July 1953).223 His victory meant that Herrnstadt and Zaisser were Ernst Wollweber, ‘Aus Erinnerungen’, 358. For a detailed account of the conflicts within the SED leadership during those days, see Peter Grieder, The East German Leadership, 66–85. See also Elke Scherstjanoi, ‘ ‘‘Wollen wir den Sozialismus?’’ ’, 658–80. Wilfriede Otto, ‘Dokumente zur Auseinandersetzung in der SED 1953’, BzG 32/5 (1990), 655–72. On the Slansky trial, see Georg Hermann Hodos, Schauprozesse: Stalinistische Saüberungen in Osteuropa 1948–54 (Berlin, 1990), 124–44. 222 Peter Grieder, The East German Leadership, 66–85. Jan Foitzik, ‘ ‘‘Hart und konsequent ist der neue politische Kurs zu realisieren’’: Ein Dokument zur Politik der Sowjetunion gegenu¨ber der DDR nach Berijas Verhaftung im Juni 1953’, DA 33/1 (2000), 32–49. 223 15th meeting of the ZK, 24/26 July 1953, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/ 119–120. 220 221


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expelled from the Politburo and the ZK for alleged factionalism, while Ackermann, Jendretzky, and Elli Schmidt, who had been among Ulbricht’s fiercest critics in the preceding weeks, were removed from the Politburo.224 Fechner, who in his capacity as GDR justice minister had publicly defended the workers’ right to strike in the aftermath of the June protests (and who had already been arrested by the MfS), was expelled from the party.225 There has long been speculation among historians that a removal of Ulbricht from power in June 1953 might have altered the course of history by providing an opportunity for an early reunification of Germany through a negotiated settlement. Proponents of this view, such as Loth,226 have cited allegations by a former Soviet spymaster to the effect that Beria wanted an East–West rapprochement that could have led to the creation of a ‘neutral, unified Germany run by a coalition government’.227 Their claim that Beria was prepared to abandon the GDR has been supported by former Soviet officials, in particular Semenov.228 The same claim was made by Beria’s opponents at a plenary meeting of the CPSU(b)’s Central Committee held in early July (2–7) 1953, shortly after Beria’s arrest. At this meeting, Malenkov accused Beria of having dropped the idea of installing socialism in the GDR and of having attempted to steer Soviet foreign policy towards the creation of ‘a bourgeois Germany’—a charge repeated by Krushchev and Molotov, who claimed, respectively, that Beria had been ready to establish ‘a neutral, democratic Germany’ and willing ‘to give German imperialism free rein, not only in West Germany but in East Germany too’.229 Whether or not this was Beria’s intention is impossible to ascertain, but largely irrelevant in view of the fact that the other members of the Soviet leadership were firmly opposed to his purported plan, which he 224 Peter Grieder, The East German Leadership, 66–85. Fred Oldenburg, Konflikt, 44–45. Andrea Go¨rldt, Rudolf Herrnstadt und Wilhelm Zaisser: Ihre Konflikte in der SEDFu¨hrung im Kontext innerparteilicher Machtsicherung und sowjetischer Deutschlandpolitik (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), 419–32. See also Das Herrnstadt-Dokument. Das Politbu¨ro und die Geschichte des 17. Juni 1953 (Hamburg, 1990), 57–254. 225 Karl-Wilhelm Fricke and Roger Engelmann, Der Tag ‘X’ und die Staatssicherheit. 17. Juni 1953: Reaktionen und Konsequenzen im DDR-Machtapparat (Bremen, 2003), 226 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 198–216. 217–21. 227 Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 363–4. 228 Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 290–300. 229 Der Fall Beria: Protokoll einer Abrechnung. Das Plenum des ZK der KPdSU Juli 1953. Stenographischer Bericht, trans. and ed. by Viktor Knoll and Lothar Ko¨lm (Berlin, 1993), 36, 66, 80.

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would almost certainly have been unable to carry out.230 Indeed, contrary to claims that Beria’s alleged hostility to socialism in the GDR played no role in his downfall,231 the issue featured prominently in the resolution on Beria adopted by the CPSU(b)’s Central Committee (which stated that the former Soviet interior minister’s ‘hostile’ character had become most apparent ‘in the discussion of the German Question’).232 Beria’s opponents were in no doubt about why German unification on the basis of bourgeois democracy was unacceptable to the Kremlin. Krushchev explained that such a move would be tantamount to ‘handing over 18 million Germans to American imperialist rule’.233 He added that a German vow of neutrality would be worthless for the Soviet Union unless it was backed up by force, while another comrade warned that winding up the GDR would also mean giving the United States access to the German uranium mines.234 It is unclear whether Herrnstadt and Zaisser wanted to abandon the GDR, as their opponents alleged at the 15th meeting of the SED’s ZK (where both men owned up to mistakes but professed their innocence on this count).235 There can, however, be little doubt that if Herrnstadt and Zaisser had entertained such a plan they would have faced complete isolation within the SED leadership, whose other members were all strongly opposed to German unification on anything other than their party’s terms. Even former social democrats such as Ebert and Grotewohl declared in the highly charged Politburo meetings of early June 1953 that their complaints were directed only against the accelerated construction of socialism—and not against the construction of socialism as such (which they wanted, as Ebert put it, ‘With all our being’).236 Echoing this opinion, another ex-social democrat, Lehmann, told the 15th meeting of the ZK that German unification could take place only ‘on a democratic [i.e., pro-SED] basis’, since the SED wanted to build ‘a Germany controlled by the workers’ (‘ein Deutschland der Werkta¨tigen’)

230 James Richter, ‘Re-examining Soviet Policy towards Germany’, 17–26. Gerhard Wettig, ‘Berija und das Problem der deutschen Einheit im Fru¨hjahr 1953’, DA 36/4 231 Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind, 209. (2003), 599–614. 232 Der Fall Beria, 335. 233 Ibid., 66. 234 Ibid., 257–8. 235 15th meeting of the ZK, 24/26 July 1953, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/ 119–120. 236 Handwritten notes by Otto Grotewohl, 1953, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/ 699. See also Elke Scherstjanoi, ‘ ‘‘Wollen wir den Sozialismus?’’ ’, 658–80.


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and not a Germany run by ‘stock exchange speculators’, ‘large landowners’, and ‘Nazi generals’.237 On balance, it does not seem that, in the summer of 1953, the desire in Moscow and East Berlin for a negotiated settlement of the German Question was stronger than before. Ulbricht and Grotewohl, who made another visit to Moscow in early July 1953 to attend a briefing on the Beria affair, were told by their Soviet hosts that ‘no concessions’ must be made to the West out of weakness since the Soviet Union now had access to the ‘atomic bomb’ (‘Atomwaffe’) and was on the brink of acquiring the even more powerful ‘hydrogen bomb’. This meant, the German comrades learned, that the Soviet Union could always set off ‘a few explosions’ to assert itself—‘if necessary’.238 The Kremlin’s efforts to bring the German Question back on the international agenda during the summer of 1953 should be seen as a fresh attempt to destabilize West Germany ahead of the September 1953 Bundestag elections (by inciting the German masses against Adenauer and the Western Allies) rather than as evidence of a more accommodating Soviet line. As Gerhard Wettig has shown, with the help of Soviet documents, the diplomatic note released by the Kremlin on 15 August 1953 (which called for the establishment of a provisional all-German government based on the parliaments of the two German states) was not interpreted by Soviet officials as an offer to abolish the GDR. Indeed, by that time—before Adenauer’s renewed triumph at the polls—the Kremlin was already pressing ahead with the GDR’s consolidation (through a decision to cancel all further reparations payments and grant the GDR sovereignty).239 It was now becoming clear what some SED leaders had realized long ago: namely that Germany’s reunification could not be achieved through a compromise. There was, as Ulbricht explained at the 15th meeting of the ZK, ‘no 3rd way’ between East and West.240

237 15th meeting of the ZK, 24/26 July 1953, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/ 119–120. 238 Handwritten notes by Otto Grotewohl, 1953, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NY 4090/699. 239 Gerhard Wettig, ‘Die beginnende Umorientierung der sowjetischen DeutschlandPolitik im Fru¨hjahr und Sommer 1953’, DA 28/5 (1995), 497–500, 503–4. 240 15th meeting of the ZK, 24/26 July 1953, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/IV 2/1/ 119–120.

Conclusion The German communists who resumed their work in Soviet-occupied eastern Germany in the dying days of the Second World War did so full of hope. Determined to exploit the existing power vacuum and seize— with Soviet help—the key posts in the new administrations, they believed that they would be able to set up a communist-led German government. Crucially, they also believed that this government could win a democratic mandate. Their plan was to absorb Germany’s proud but weakened Social Democratic Party into a communist-led Socialist Unity Party and thus win control of the German workers’ movement, destroy the power of Germany’s upper bourgeoisie through a series of radical economic reforms promoted under the guise of anti-fascism, and win the support of the German middle classes by protecting their interests and rejecting calls for an immediate transition to socialism. This strategy worked well until, in the autumn of 1945, opposition to the communists from Germany’s other political parties, which had earlier been non-existent because of the post-war chaos, increased. The unexpected rise of a staunchly anti-communist Social Democratic Party in Western-occupied Germany ruled out a nationwide merger of the communist and social democratic party organizations, and persuaded the communists to press ahead with the establishment of working-class unity in Eastern Germany. The events that surrounded the founding of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) showed that the communists insisted on total control and championed democratic methods only when they were confident of victory. None the less, the founding of the SED, in April 1946 (which took place under pressure from the Soviet military authorities), was a success for the communists at a time when few things were certain in Germany. In keeping with the general thrust of Soviet occupation policy, the communists’ main aim was to gain a firm foothold in Eastern Germany. Indeed, the communists always preferred control over Germany’s Eastern half to marginalization in a united Germany. However, they supported German unity in principle and regarded the SED as a party for the whole of Germany. They continued to work for nationwide working-class unity even after the first attempt to merge the communist and social democratic party organizations in Western Germany had

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failed. They were also undaunted by the palpable weakness of the communist party organizations in Western Germany (which could be blamed on anti-communist prejudice among the population, discrimination by the Western military authorities, and the incompetence of the Western comrades), and they expected the anti-capitalist reforms initiated in Eastern Germany in the aftermath of the war to become increasingly popular throughout Germany. By mid-1946, it had become clear that the SED-led regime established in Eastern Germany could not be swiftly extended across the whole country because of the growing confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. However, the SED leaders were confident that events in Germany would eventually turn in their favour. In particular, they believed that the newly formed Anglo-American Bizone would fail because of economic difficulties arising from the shortage of food, which was believed to turn East Germany into a ‘magnet’ for the West. The SED’s poor showing in the 1946 elections in eastern Germany came as shock to the party’s leaders and prompted them to turn their attention to the consolidation of their regime. The Soviet Union’s reluctance to authorize the establishment of an East German state at this early stage forced the SED leaders to renew their efforts to gain nationwide political influence—via a fresh bid for nationwide workingclass unity in early 1947, and through the launch of a ‘People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace’ towards the end of the year. The SED leaders were aware of the difficulties their party was facing in Eastern Germany, where its control was by no means assured, but thought that still greater problems were waiting for their opponents in Germany’s Western zones—in the form of economic problems that could result in social ‘explosions’ and in the form of resurgent German nationalism that could be exploited by an overtly patriotic SED. The SED leaders had no interest in serious negotiations with West German representatives (as is clear from their behaviour in June 1947 at the Munich minister-presidents’ conference). Nor was their stance solely the product of Ulbricht’s whims. On the contrary, it was backed by Soviet officials, as well as many former social democrats within the SED leadership, who, despite being less radical than Ulbricht, fully shared his loathing for capitalism. When the Allied foreign ministers met in London in December 1947, the SED leaders were already resigned to the formal division of Germany into two states. However, they were still optimistic about their party’s long-term prospects, believing as they did that capitalism would eventually

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Conclusion

collapse and, in doing so, wreck the economic recovery that was under way in Germany’s Western zones. The SED leaders were full of contempt for the Marshall Plan, which they dismissed as a capitalist scam, and genuinely believed in the superiority of their planned economy, which they thought would boost the SED’s popularity and ultimately ensure the party’s triumph throughout Germany. The SED leaders also pinned great hopes on the West German currency reform on the grounds that this measure would create great social tensions (by causing mass unemployment and mass bankruptcies) and revive the flagging fortunes of the West German communists. When these hopes failed to materialize, the SED leaders decided to press ahead with the creation of an East German state (which they viewed as the model for a united Germany) but were given the green light only after the failure of the 1949 Paris Council of Foreign Ministers and the West’s decision to set up a West German state. The Soviet leadership tried to restrain the SED in an attempt to focus its efforts on a new campaign for German unity. However, the aim of this campaign was to wrest Western Germany out of the hands of the Western Allies (via an SED-sponsored ‘National Front’) rather than establish a neutral Western-style Germany. After the founding of the GDR, as East Germany was officially called, the SED leaders initially concentrated almost exclusively on the consolidation of their new state (still hoping that it would outperform West Germany economically and thus pave the way for reunification under SED auspices) until, in mid-1950, Soviet concern over the proposed integration of West Germany into the fledgling Western bloc forced them to change course. There followed a massive SED campaign for an all-German dialogue and an all-German constitutional assembly made up of representatives from both German states, but the SED leaders saw none of this as a step towards a united bourgeois democratic Germany. Rather, they were trying to destabilize West Germany and woo the German masses, who were believed to have become more hostile to the Western Allies as a result of opposition to West Germany’s proposed remilitarization and fears of a new European war. Their failure to galvanize the German masses through a communistsponsored ‘referendum’ on German unity was a setback for the SED leaders which was compounded by the low calibre and dubious character of the West German personalities who were prepared to collaborate with them. After the 1952 ‘Stalin note’ had failed to unleash the expected anti-Western mass protests, the SED leaders pinned their

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hopes on the construction of socialism in East Germany, believing it to be a logical step in the trial of strength that was under way with West Germany. Their hopes of turning the GDR into a beacon for the masses throughout Germany suffered a massive blow in 1953 through the East German uprising. But not even then did the SED leaders waver in their commitment to socialism and opposition to Western-style forms of government. Nor were they (or Soviet officials in Moscow, with the possible exception of Beria) prepared to accept German unification on the basis of bourgeois democracy and formal neutrality. There could be, as they saw it, no compromise over Germany since there was ‘no 3rd way’ between East and West.

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Index Ackermann, Anton 202, 225 and Bundestag elections 191 and confident of success 134–5 and denazification 59–60 and dialogue with West Germany 209–10 and hope for German independence 53 and Initiative Group 26 and instructed to complete ‘bourgeois democratic revolution’ 30 and loyalty to Moscow 19 and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947) 121 and opposes founding of AG 115 as part of out of touch leadership 128 and patriotic stance of 63, 64 and Prague Declaration (1950) 211 and programme for democratic people’s republic 13 and ‘remilitarization’ of West Germany 213 and removal of 243 and ‘Special German Road to Socialism’ 52, 55 forced to recant 168 Action Programme of the Bloc of Militant Democracy 16–17 and Pieck on 17–18 Adenauer, Konrad 163 and decline in support for 212 and election as Federal Chancellor 192 and hostility to neutrality 228 and rejection of Grotewohl letter 214–15 Allied Control Council (ACC) 33, 163, 186 and French veto of German Central Administrations 69 and rejection of all-German political parties 71, 110 and Soviet rejection of common economic policy 70 Allied High Commission for Germany 208

anti-communism: in Berlin 41–2 in Western Germany 74–5, 207 Anti-Fascist Bloc 155, 195 and communist plans for 37 and establishment of (1945) 36 and rally for national unity 62 and SED criticism of 156 and SED’s patriotic initiative (1947) 138–9 Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED-KPD (AG) 112–13, 135 and Ackermann’s opposition to 115 and disbandment of 176 Austria, and communist electoral failure 45–6 Axen, Hermann 199, 202 and five-year plan 203 Badoglio, Marshall Pietro 24 Baumgarte, Kurt 79, 80 Bavaria 95 Becher, Johannes R 216 Beria, L P 230, 241, 242, 243, 244 Berlin: and anti-communist backlash 41–2 and autonomous SPD 49–50 and blockade of 179, 182 and currency reform 179 and division into zones of occupation 33 and elections (1946) 101–3 and German Central Administrations, KPD domination of 37 and readmission of political parties 33 and return of KPD: communist domination of administrations 27–8 Initiative Groups 27–8 need to retrain/change party members 28–9 Berlin Airlift 182 Berne Conference (1939) 50 Bevin, Ernest 90, 117, 130 Bidault, Georges 117, 130 Bizone (Anglo-American):

280

Index

Bizone (Anglo-American): (contd.) and creation of 90 and establishment of Economic Council 119 and establishment of formal government 142–3 and social unrest 114–15, 151 Bloc of Anti-Fascist Democratic Parties, see Anti-Fascist Bloc Boepple, Willy 79–80 Bokov, General F E 41, 47–8, 54, 82–3 Bolz, Lothar 225 Brandenburg: and elections (1946) 101 and Soviet establishment of La¨nder in 31 Brill, Hermann 55 Brussels Conference (1935) 12 Brussels Pact (1948) 181–2, 208 Buchwitz, Otto 195 Budzislawski, Hermann 148–9 Bulgaria 20 Bundestag: and elections to (1949) 191 and indifference to 205–6 and People’s Chamber’s appeal to 215, 216, 222 Buttlar, Walrab von 4 Byrnes, James 88 and proposals for German national council 105–6 capitalism: and SED’s prediction of crisis in 148–9 and Soviet prediction of crisis in 149–50 Casablanca Conference (1943) 15 Catholic Centre Party 36 central bank, and creation of West German 143 Central Committee (ZK) of the Communist Party of Germany 12 and calls for unified workers’ party 45 and instructed to issue manifesto 30 and Soviet Union’s control of 56 Central Party Control Commission (ZPKK) 165 Central Secretariat of Socialist Unity Party (ZS) 51–2 and disbandment of 201

and elections in SBZ, Gemeinde (1946) 97–8 and exclusion of Communist Party of Germany (KPD) 136 and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947): divisions over 121 sabotage of 121–2, 123–4 in western zones 77 China, and Oelßner on developments in 189–90 Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 43 and ‘Ahlen Programme’ (1947) 82 and elections: Berlin (1946) 101 Bundestag (1949) 191 Land (1950) 212 in SBZ (1946) 98 Western Germany (1946) 103 Western Germany (1946–7) 135 and rightward movement of 103–4 and rise of 103 and SED’s intimidation of 198–9 and Soviet founding of 36 Christian Social Union (CSU) 191, 212 Chuikov, General V I 181, 200, 205 Churchill, Winston 226 and Casablanca Conference (1943) 15 and Stalin on 66 and Teheran Conference (1943) 31 Clay, General Lucius D 88, 110, 142 collective farming 235, 237, 239 Cominform, see Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) Comintern, see Communist International (Comintern) Committee against Remilitarization 217 Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) 145 and exclusion of SED 180 and rejects German neutrality 210 and Yugoslavia’s exclusion from 164 Communist International (Comintern): and 5th World Congress (1924) 18 and 6th World Congress (1928) 11 and 7th World Congress (1935) 11, 63 and ‘Bolshevization’ of foreign communist parties 18 and disbandment of 20 and pre-war strategy 11 and promotion of bourgeois democracy 11–12

Index and Second World War 14 see also Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) Communist Party of Germany (KPD): and anti-communist backlash 41–2 and Anti-Fascist Bloc, use of 37 and Aufruf (new programme, 1945) 32–3, 81 positive reception of 36 and Berne Conference (1939) 13 and Brussels Conference (1935) 13 and Committee against Remilitarization 217 and concentration on Soviet zone 72 and Dahlem’s assessment of position of (1945) 41–4 and delusions about popularity of 53 and division of Germany 58 and elections: Bundestag (1949) 191–2 poor performance in 170–1, 175 Western Germany (1946) 96–7, 103 Western Germany (1946–7) 135 Western Germany (1950–51) 219 and expropriations 81–4 and land reform 35–6 controversy over 43 in Nazi period 10 n1 and organization of: contact with Western zones 60–1 national basis of 60, 61 and patriotic stance of 62–4 and post-war strategy: Action Programme of the Bloc of Militant Democracy 16–18 anticipates strong position for party 38–9 anxiety over Western control of Germany 22–3, 30–1 ‘Work Commission’ on (1944) 16, 21–2, 63 and pre-war united front strategy 10–11 adoption of 12 failure of 14 origins of 11–12 plan for a ‘democratic republic’ 13 and promotion of bourgeois democracy 10–11, 21–2, 25–6 Action Programme of the Bloc of Militant Democracy 16–18 conditional nature of 53–5 pre-war origins of 11–14 relations with bourgeois parties 43

281 and purge of membership 220 and referendum (1951) 217 and rejection of Soviet dictatorship in Germany 11 and return to Germany: bid for political leadership 30 establishment of local administrations 27–8 Initiative Groups 26–30 instructed to complete ‘bourgeois democratic revolution’ 30 need to retrain/change party members 28–9 optimism of 246 organization in Berlin 27 and Second World War 14 and sectarianism within 43–4, 79–80, 113, 219 and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): ballot on amalgamation 54 cooperation with 12–13, 40 fusion within Soviet zone 45–50 hopes to eclipse 39 hostility to merger with 39, 40–1 social democrat victims of fusion with 50 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): campaign for national dialogue 216 cooperation with 136 criticism by 112–13 danger of zonal nature of 58 organizational separation from 176–7 resentment of 135–6 ‘Special German Road to Socialism’ 52 and Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) 33–4 and Soviet Union’s control of 12, 18–19, 56 in Western Germany: advocates revolutionary mass struggle 171–2 campaign for socialist fusion 76–8 currency reform 172–5 difficulties in 58–9, 72–5 failure of socialist fusion 78–9, 169–70 mounting problems of 175–6 optimism about 75–6

282

Index

Communist Party of Germany (KPD): (Cont.) parliamentary representation of 169–70 self-deception over 76 see also Central Committee (ZK) of the Communist Party of Germany; Politburo of the Communist Party of Germany Communist Party of the Soviet Union (bolshevik) (CPSUb): and consolidation of GDR 236–7 and post-war strategy 16 and Tjulpanow inquiry 181 Council of Europe 208 Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM): and London meeting (1945), failure of 69 and London meeting (1947) 247 failure of 142–4 and Moscow meeting (1947) 109, 112, 117 and New York meeting (1946) 109 and Paris meeting (1946) 88–9 and Paris meeting (1949) 184, 185, 190, 248 Soviet proposals 186–7 Crossman, Richard 238 Cultural League 42–3 and elections in SBZ (1946) 98 currency reform, West German 172–5, 248 Curzon Line 23–4 Dahlem, Franz: and Communist Party of Germany (KPD): assessment of progress (1945) 41–4 Western Allies’ attitude to 59 in Western zones 60, 75 and denazification 59 and division of Germany 58 growth of opposition to 147 and expropriations 82 and expulsion of 242 and German Democratic Republic: as example 193 preoccupation with 204 superiority of policies 239–40 and Germany’s Eastern frontiers 132 and hopes for anti-fascist regime 38 and National Front of the Democratic Germany 199–200

as part of out of touch leadership 128 and People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace (1st, 1947) 141 and prediction of class struggle in Western zones 150–1 on referendum (1951) 220 on Schuman Plan 209 and self-deception 76 and SPD-KPD fusion 40–1, 49 campaign in Western zones 76 failure in Western zones 78 and West Germany 207 and Western Commission 177 Dahrendorf, Gustav 44 and returns to Hamburg 73–4 de Gaulle, General Charles 24 democratic centralism, and Socialist Unity Party (SED) 51, 165, 201 Democratic Peasants’ Party of Germany (DBD) 192 and establishment of 157–8 denazification: and expropriations 82 and Soviet/Western differences over 59–60 Dertinger, Georg 210, 239 Dibelius, Otto 224 Dimitrov, Georgi 22 and Communist Party of Germany (KPD): Action Programme of 19 orders focus on post-war regime 16 on German patriotic feeling 63 and popular front strategy: pre-war 11–12 in wartime 14–15 on self-deception 128 Djilas, Milovan 20, 76 Dresden 99 Dumbarton Oaks 65 East Prussia, and control handed to Poland 65 Ebert, Friedrich 218, 219, 225 and accelerated construction of socialism 244 Economic Council: and established in Bizone 119 and reorganization of 142 economy: and East Germany 92 accelerated construction of socialism 238–9

Index crisis in (1953) 240–1 difficulties forecast 198 economic planning 159 expropriations 81–6 growth of 160 ‘New Course’ 241 SED’s optimism 160–1, 202–3, 248 success of two-year plan 197–8 Ulbricht on achievements of 234 and West Germany 114–15 currency reform 172–5 recovery of 151 SED’s assessment of 92–4, 108, 115, 151–2, 172–4, 188–9, 247 unemployment 203–4 Eden, Anthony 31 Ehard, Hans 120 Ehrenburg, Ilya 32 Eisenhower, Dwight D 23, 226, 227 Eisler, Gerhart 196 ELAS resistance movement (Greece) 20 elections: in Berlin: 1946 101–3 1948 179–80 in German Democratic Republic: election law 223 postponement of 195–7 rigging of (1950) 202 and implications of 102–3 and referendum on remilitarization/ peace treaty (1951) 217–18, 248 and SED’s campaign for all-German (1950–51) 214, 222–5 in Soviet zone of occupation (SBZ): 3rd People’s Congress (1949) 184 Gemeinde (1946) 97–9 Kreis (1946) 101 Land (1946) 101 in Western Germany: Bundestag (1949) 191–2 Bundestag (1953) 245 Gemeinde (1946) 96–7, 103 KPD performance 170–1, 175 Kreis (1946) 103 Land (1946–7) 135 Land (1950) 212 Land (1950–51) 219 European Advisory Commission (EAC) 16 and Allied zonal protocol 24, 33

283

European Community for Coal and Steel 217 European Defence Community (EDC) 226, 228 Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) 11 and popular front strategy 14–15 expropriations 16 and KPD policy 13, 17, 81–4 and Saxony referendum 84–6 Fechner, Max 44, 57, 90, 109 and expulsion of 243 and German unity 100, 146 and patriotic initiative (1947) 137 and pro-Soviet stance 133 and reorganization of DWK 155 and SED in Western Germany 135 and Soviet-Western differences 118 Federal Republic of Germany: and anchoring in Western bloc 208 and anti-communism in 207 and debate on defence contribution of 212 and economy 203–4 and elections: Bundestag (1953) 245 Land (1950) 212 Land (1950–51) 219 and establishment of 191 and political apathy in 205–6 and rise in anti-government feeling 212 and Stalin note (1952), reaction to 232–3 and Western alliance 228 First World Congress of the Friends of Peace 182 Fisch, Walter 77, 80, 115, 176 and condemns defeatism in SED 143–4 and electoral performance of KPD 171 and illusions of 162 and Marshall Plan 150 and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947) 122 and People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace (2nd, 1948) 148 Fischer, Alexander 4 Fischer, Kurt 122 Florin, Wilhelm: and death of 27 and loyalty to Moscow 19

284

Index

Florin, Wilhelm: (cont.) and post-war strategy: fear of Western control of Germany 22–3, 25 promotion of bourgeois democracy 21–2, 25–6 on Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 39 and warns of anti-communist opposition 35 food shortages: and German Democratic Republic 240 and West Germany 93–4, 114, 151 France: and pre-war communist-socialist pact 11 and vetoes German Central Administration 69 Free German Trade Union Association (FDGB) 42 and elections in SBZ (1946) 98 and struggle for control of 49 Free German Youth (FDJ) 236 and elections in SBZ (1946) 98 Friedensburg, Ferdinand 138 Fuhrmann, Bruno 60, 74 Geiler, Karl 138 Gereke, Gu¨nter 206 German Administration of the Interior (DVdI) 178, 179 German Central Administrations: and French veto of 69 and incorporation into German Economic Commission (DWK) 154 and KPD domination of 37 and merger of 119 and Soviet hopes for national role of 64–5 German Democratic Republic: and accelerated construction of socialism 235–6, 248–9 economic consequences of 238–9 reversal of (‘New Course’) 241 Soviet support for 236–8 and anti-Soviet feeling in 233 and consolidation of 204, 236–8, 248 and East German uprising (1953) 241, 249

and economy: accelerated construction of socialism 238–9 crisis in (1953) 240–1 difficulties forecast 198 ‘New Course’ 241 optimism over 202–3, 248 success of two-year plan 197–8 Ulbricht on achievements of 234 and elections: election law 223 postponement of 195–7 rigging of (1950) 202 and establishment of 192–3, 248 little popular enthusiasm for 194 and government as adjunct to SED 195 and militarization of 236, 237 economic consequences of 239 and perception as modern/ progressive 234–5 and repression in 239 curbing of 241 and security forces 204–5 German Economic Commission (DWK): on East Germany economy 160 and establishment of 119 and Marshall Plan 153 and reorganization of 154–5 German Fighters for Peace, First Congress of (1950) 216 German Officers’ League 15 German Peace Committee 217 German People’s Council 155, 183 and bourgeois support for 158 and convenes 3rd People’s Congress 183 and draft ‘Constitution for a German Democratic Republic’ (1949) 183 and National Front for Unity and a Just Peace 187 as parliamentary body 155–6 and SED control of 156 ‘German Question’ 1 and communist assumptions 6 and historiography of 1–2 Loth’s interpretation 4–5 role of Western powers 4 Soviet strategy 3–4 Germany: and anti-communism in Western 74–5

Index and division into zones of occupation 33 and drift toward division 88–90 and formal division of 191 and fusion of Anglo-American zones 90 and moves to establish West German state 162–3 and Potsdam Agreement 37–8 see also Bizone; Federal Republic of Germany; German Democratic Republic; Soviet Zone of Occupation Gniffke, Erich 44, 56–7, 76, 121, 167, 181 and 1st People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace (1947) 140–1 and anti-Soviet feeling 125 and defection of 165 and dissent within SED 126 Godesberg Circle 185 Greece 20 Grotewohl, Otto 44, 62, 192, 210–11 and accelerated construction of socialism 244 and arrogance of 129 and Blockpolitik 156, 196–7 and bourgeois democracy: bourgeois parties 156–7 contempt for 196–7 and calls for negotiations between German governments 214 and calls for peace treaty (1952) 227 and division of Germany 91–2, 142, 154–5 on draft constitution (1946) 108 and economy, optimism over 161–2 and elections: Berlin (1946) 102 implications of 103 in SBZ (1946) 98, 99 and establishment of GDR 193 and establishment of new parties 157 on German People’s Council 155–6 and German unity 100, 147, 183 doubts possibility of 90 proposes national referendum on 111–12, 161 and hopes for working-class unity 114 on London CFM (1947) 144 and ‘magnet theory’ 94 and Marshall Plan 150, 152

285 and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947) 121 on neutralization of Germany 185–6 and patriotic initiative (1947) 138–9 and People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace: 1st Congress (1947) 139–40 2nd Congress (1948) 148 and predicts Anglo-American conflict 148 and predicts global economic crisis 148 and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 113 claims for role of 45 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): aims of 107 Eastern orientation of 167 problems within 163 SPD tendencies within 127 and Soviet Union: cooperation with 166 pro-Soviet stance 133, 145 and SPD-KPD fusion 45, 47, 51 and suggests central agency for SBZ 109 on United States’ German policy 120 and West German KPD 169, 170

Hauser, Karl 135–6, 143, 146 Heinemann, Gustav 212, 231 Hennecke, Adolf 198 Hennecke Movement 198 Hermes, Andreas 43 Herne Conference (1948) 171, 176 Herrnstadt, Rudolf 210, 213, 218 and all-German assembly 211 and denounced by Ulbricht 242 and expulsion of 242–3 and German unification 244 Hesse 95 Heuß, Theodor 222 Hickmann, Hugo 198 Hoffmann, Heinrich 140 Hu¨bener, Erhard 121 hunger strikes, in Western Germany 151 Initiative Groups 26–30 Jendretzky, Hans 162, 243 Jessup, Philip C 184

286

Index

Kaisen, Wilhelm 80 Kaiser, Jakob 62, 103, 120, 145 and attacks on Anti-Fascist Bloc 156 and dismissal of 158–9 rejects SED’s patriotic initiative (1947) 139 Kaiser, Monika 7 Kaplan, Karel 4 Karsten, August 101, 126, 161 Kastner, Hermann 192 Kennan, George F 229 Khrushchev, Nikita 72, 241, 243, 244 Klimov, Gregory, on Potsdam Agreement 68 Koch, Waldemar 43 Koenen, Wilhelm 143, 190 and German unity 155 Ko¨nigsberg 65 Korean War 212–13 Kostov, Traicho 20 Ku¨lz, Wilhelm 62, 158 Kursk, battle of 15 land reform, and KPD 13, 35–6 controversy over 43 Laufer, Jochen 70, 110, 196 League of Democratic Socialists 55 Lehmann, Helmut 140 and German unification 244–5 and predicts disintegration of SPD 113 and Soviet-Western differences 118 and ‘Special German Road to Socialism’ 169 on United States’ German policy 106 Leipzig 99 Lemmer, Ernst 158–9, 185, 186 Lenin, V I 18 Leonhard, Wolfgang 28, 45, 168 and expropriations 82 and morale in SED 96 and SPD-KPD fusion 49 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 43 and elections: Berlin (1946) 101 in SBZ (1946) 98 and People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace (1st, 1947) 158 and SED’s intimidation of 198–9 and Soviet founding of 36 Little Secretariat (KS) 166 and makes GDR government adjunct to SED 195

Litvinov, Maksim 89 Lo¨be, Paul 138 London talks (1948), and West Germany 162–3 Loth, Wilfried 5, 53, 85, 110, 137, 228 Lublin Committee of National Liberation 68 McCloy, John 204 ‘magnet theory’ 94 and ridicule of 115 Main Political Administration of the Red Army (GlavPURKKA) 26, 34 Maisky, I M 21 and economic disarmament 87 Malenkov, G M 90, 236, 241 and accusations against Beria 243 and economic disarmament 70 Malik, Jacob 184 Maltzan, Vollrath von 151 Marshall, George 117 see also Marshall Plan Marshall Plan 129–30 and German Economic Commission on 153 and SED’s view of 130, 152–3, 248 and Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) 153 and Soviet Union: hopes for failure of 150 rejected by 130–1 Marxism-Leninism: and influence of ideology 6 and SED’s adoption of 164–5 Matern, Hermann 57, 133 and Berlin elections (1946) 102, 103 and economic optimism of 162 and purge of membership 165 Mecklenburg 233 and Eastern frontiers 132 and Soviet establishment of La¨nder in 31 Meier, Otto 126, 167 Melnikov, Daniil 228–9 Merker, Paul 38 n98, 161, 184, 220 Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw 21 Mikoyan, A I 29, 91, 241 Ministry of State Security (MfS) 204 and purging of KPD 220 Mochalski, Pastor 224 Molotov, V M 30, 66, 241 and accusations against Beria 243

Index and accuses Western Allies of bad faith 88–9 and Berlin blockade 182 and future regime in Germany 95–6, 99 desire for unified state 89, 109 opposition to federalism 117 and Marshall Plan 130, 131 and reparations 88 and Stalin note (1952) 230 Morgenthau Plan 96 Moscow Conference of Allied Foreign Ministers (1943) 16 Mu¨ller, Kurt 176, 220 Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947): and SED’s hostility to 120–1 and SED’s sabotage of 121–2, 123–4 Nadolny, Rudolf 185, 186 Naimark, Norman 181 National Committee ‘Free Germany’ (NKFD) 15–16, 34 and Initiative Groups 26 and patriotic stance of 63 National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) 192 and establishment of 157 National Front for Unity and a Just Peace 187–8 National Front of the Democratic Germany, and failure of 199–200 nationalization 17, 40, 180 see also expropriations Nauheim Circle 185 Nazi Germany: and invasion of Soviet Union 14 and Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact (1939) 14 and Soviet attempts to foster domestic opposition 15–16 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact (1939) 14 Nenni, Pietro 229 neutrality: and Germany 185–6, 210 and Stalin note (1952) 227 Niemo¨ller, Martin 212, 221 Noack, Ulrich 185, 186, 210 Norden, Albert 189 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 226 and founding of 190

287

North-Rhine-Westphalia 135 Novikov, N V 66, 67 on United States’ German policy 87, 88, 95 Nuremberg trials 59 Nuschke, Otto 192, 225 Occupation Statute 179, 190, 208, 228 Oder–Neiße line 93, 132, 207, 209, 233 Oelßner, Fred 109, 166 on China 189–90 and crisis in West German economy 188 and division of Germany 144 threat to German culture 189 and German unity 147 on imperialist camp 218 and National Front for Unity and a Just Peace 188 and National Front of the Democratic Germany 199 and pessimism in SED 143 on Soviet Union 168 and superiority of Soviet-camp 189 Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) 116 Ollenhauer, Erich 50 Paris Peace Conference (1946) 105 Parliamentary Council: and Basic Law (draft constitution) 179, 190 and first meeting of 163 peace campaign: and Soviet Union 208–9 and strengthening of communistled 216–17 Peasants’ Mutual Aid Association (VdgB) 98 People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) 126 People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace: and 1st Congress (1947) 139–41, 147–8, 158, 247 and 2nd Congress (1948) 147, 148, 155, 161 bourgeois support for 158 and 3rd Congress (1949) 183, 184, 187 People’s Council, see German People’s Council

288

Index

Pieck, Wilhelm 12, 109, 202, 222 on Action Programme 17–18 as outdated 22 and aim of democratic mandate 159 and blames social democrats for Hitler 54 and calls for unified workers’ party 45 and Communist Party of Germany (KPD): anticipates strong position for 38–9 support for 207 west German 170 and concentration on Soviet zone 72 and confident of success 134 and consolidation of SBZ 108 and creation of east German state 177 and different concepts of freedom 223 and division of Germany 92 blames treacherous West 162 and economic optimism of 160–1 and elections: Berlin (1946) 101–2 Bundestag 192 postponement in GDR 197 in SBZ (1946) 101 and Federal Republic of Germany 206 banning of referendum (1951) 217 and German Democratic Republic: elected president 192 establishment of 193 on German People’s Council 155, 183 and hope for German independence 53 and land reform, political motivations for 36 and Marshall Plan 130 and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947) 120, 121, 122 and National Front for Unity and a Just Peace 188 and National Front of the Democratic Germany 200 as out of touch leader 134 and patriotic stance of 62–3 and People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace (1st, 1947) 139, 140 and predicts Anglo-American conflict 148 and promotion of bourgeois democracy 11 and records of 8

and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): concessions to 51 cooperation with 12–13 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): Eastern orientation of 167 problems within 163 tactics of 224 and Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) 34 and Soviet Union: attachment to 218 cooperation with 166 loyalty to 19 reliance on 168 and Soviet-Western differences 118 and SPD-KPD fusion 46, 75, 127 danger of zonal nature of 58 and warns of anti-communist opposition 34–5 and warns of Western intentions 30 and West Germany: currency reform 172 economic crisis 189 elections in (1946) 97 and Western balance of power 66–7 Pleven, Rene´ 226 Poland: and Oder–Neiße border 93, 132, 207, 209, 233 and Soviet recognition of ‘Lublin Committee’ 68 police force 178–9, 204 Politburo of the Communist Party of Germany 12 and post-war strategy: Action Programme of the Bloc of Militant Democracy 16–17 ‘Work Commission’ on (1944) 16, 21–2 Pomerania, and control handed to Poland 65 Potsdam Conference (1945) 35 and Potsdam Agreement 37–8, 65, 87 and Soviet achievements at 68 Prague Conference (1950): and calls for all-German assembly 209, 211 and hostility to German neutrality 210 and Prague Declaration (1950) 209, 211 prisoners of war (POWs) 74, 147, 207 Protestants 212, 221, 224

Index Rau, Heinrich 198, 199 and National Front of the Democratic Germany 200 and superiority of GDR policies 240 Red Army, and German hostility to 42 Reimann, Max 78–9, 114, 176, 221 on Adenauer 163 on Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 103–4 reparations 21, 42 and change in Soviet policy 70 and disagreements over 87–8 and economic disarmament 70, 87 Zhdanov’s criticism of 90–1 and ‘Level of Industry Committee’ 87 and ‘Level of Industry Plan’ 87–8 and Potsdam Agreement 68, 87 and suspension of deliveries from US zone 88 repression, in German Democratic Republic 239 curbing of 241 Respondek, Erwin 222, 225 Roberts, Frank 71 Robertson, Sir Brian 142 Roman Catholic Church 221 Roosevelt, Franklin D: and Casablanca Conference (1943) 15 and death of 30 and Stalin on 66 and Teheran Conference (1943) 31 and United Kingdom 68 and Yalta Conference (1945) 89 Rudolph, Vladimir 70, 90 Ruhr Statute 179, 190 Saxony: and referendum of expropriations 84–6 and Soviet establishment of La¨nder in 31 Saxony-Anhalt: and elections (1946) 101 and land reform 35, 84 and Soviet establishment of La¨nder in 31 Schirdewan, Karl 177 and Bundestag elections 191–2 Schmidt, Elli: and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947) 121 and removal of 243 Schreiber, Fritz 51

289

Schreiber, Walther 43 Schumacher, Kurt 73, 215 and growing influence of 46–7 and ‘magnet theory’ 94 Schuman Plan 208, 217 and Warnke on 209 Second World War 14 and development of KPDs post-war strategy 16–18 and impact of military situation (March-May 1945) 23 and Soviet fostering of German domestic opposition 15–16 and Soviet popular front strategy 14–15 security forces, and German Democratic Republic 204–5 Selbmann, Fritz 198 self-deception: and communist leaders 76, 128 and SED leaders 126 Semenov, V S 35–6, 100, 148, 181, 187, 236 and criticism of SED 200–1 and National Front of the Democratic Germany 200 and Paris meeting of CFM (1949) 190–1 and peace campaign 208 and postponement of GDR elections 196 and SED’s campaign against bourgeois parties 199 Severing, Carl 221, 224 show-trials 220 Silesia, and control handed to Poland 65 Smirnov, A A 125 Sobottka, Gustav: and Initiative Group 26 and instructed to complete ‘bourgeois democratic revolution’ 30 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): and Communist Party of Germany (KPD): ballot on amalgamation 54 cooperation with 12–13, 40 fusion within Soviet zone 45–50 growing resentment of 41–3 hopes for outcome of fusion 51 merger proposal rebuffed 39, 40–1 and elections: Berlin (1946) 101

290

Index

Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): (cont.) Bundestag (1949) 191 western Germany (1946) 103 and growing confidence of 104 and growth of 44, 246 and re-establishment of 36, 39–40 and rejection of socialist fusion 76–7 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): hopes to control 51 patriotic initiative (1947) 138 and split in 46, 49–50 in Western Germany, growth of 46–7 social unrest, in Western Germany 114–15, 151 Socialist People’s Party of Germany (SVD) 171 Socialist Unity Party (SED) 1 and 2nd Congress of (1947) 161 bourgeois support for 158 internal criticism of 133 praise for Soviet Union 132–3 preparations for 127 and 3rd Congress of (1950) 201, 207 and 1st Party Conference (1949) 165, 166, 183 and 2nd Party Conference (1952) 235 accelerated construction of socialism 235–6, 248–9 and all-German assembly 214, 215 and anticipates crisis of capitalism 148–9 and anti-Soviet feeling in 125 and Arbeitsgemeinschaft SED-KPD (AG) 112–13, 135 Ackermann’s opposition to 115 disbandment of 176 and archives of 6–8 and assumptions of 6 and blames German masses 129 and bourgeois democracy 5 contempt for 196–7 criticism of approach 104 intimidation of bourgeois parties 198–9 and campaign for national dialogue (1950–51): campaign for all-German elections 214, 222–5 communist-led peace movement 216–17 cultivation of Adenauer’s critics 221–2

dwindling hopes for 220–1 failure of 218–19 Grotewohl’s call for inter-German negotiations 214 impact on German masses 216 People’s Chamber appeal to Bundestag 215, 216, 222 referendum (1951) 216, 217–18, 248 and communist domination of 56–7 and Communist Party of Germany (KPD): cooperation with 136 criticism of 112–13 organizational separation from 176–7 and division of Germany 154–5 acceptance of 146 failure to anticipate 162 and draft constitution for ‘German Democratic Republic’ (1946) 106–8 and east German state, establishment of 177–8 disagreements with Soviet Union 180–1 plans for 192 recommendations for 180 and economy 92 assessment of west German 92–4, 108, 113–15, 151–2, 173–4, 188–9, 203–4, 247 economic planning 159 nationalization 180 optimism over 160–1 success of two-year plan 197–8 and elections: 3rd People’s Congress (1949) 184 Berlin (1946) 101–3 Berlin (1948) 179–80 Gemeinde (SBZ, 1946) 97–9 KPD in Bundestag (1949) 191–2 Kreis (SBZ, 1946) 101 Land (SBZ, 1946) 101 postponement in GDR 195–7 rigging of (1950) 202 and establishment of new parties 157–8 and expropriations, Saxony referendum 84–6 and Federal Republic of Germany: assessment of political situation in 205–7

Index change in approach to 207–8 delusions about support in 232 proposes dialogue with 209–10 and formation of 48, 49, 246 danger of zonal nature of 58 social democrat victims of 50 and founding committees in Western zones 77 and German Democratic Republic: consolidation of 204 domination of government 192 and German People’s Council: bourgeois support for 158 control of 156 as East German parliament 155–6 and German unity: campaign for 99–101 campaign for (1949) 183–4 continued relevance of struggle for 146–7 economic basis of hopes for 92–4, 108, 148 potential political cost of 185 proposes national referendum on 111–12, 161 and Germany’s Eastern frontiers 132 and hopes for working-class unity 113–14 and ideological training 131 and impact of failure of London CFM (1947) 143–4 and impact of Soviet ‘two-camp’ doctrine 145–6 and leadership out of touch 126, 128, 134 and Marshall Plan 130, 150, 152–3, 248 and Marxism-Leninism 6, 165 and membership: declining morale of 126–8, 131, 143 purge of 165, 220 and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947): hostility to 120–1 sabotage of 121–4 and National Front for Unity and a Just Peace 187–8 and National Front of the Democratic Germany, failure of 199–200 and national role of 61–2 failure to attain 91–2 Soviet hopes for 71–2

291 and patriotic stance of 62–4 patriotic initiative (1947) 136–9, 147 and People’s Congress for Unity and a Just Peace: 1st Congress (1947) 139–41, 147–8, 158, 247 2nd Congress (1948) 147, 148, 155 3rd Congress (1949) 187 and police force, establishment of loyal 178–9 and Prague Conference (1950) 209, 210–11 all-German assembly proposal 211 and ‘Principles and Aims’ 63 and problems within 163 and proposed constitutional framework for Germany 100–1 and reaction to Byrnes’ proposals (1946) 106 and requests advice/support from Stalin 128–9 and social democrats hope to control 51 and Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) 72 relationship with 124–5 and Soviet Union: cooperation with 166 criticism by 127, 200–1 and Soviet zone of occupation (SBZ): central agencies for 109–10 concentration on 80–1 concessions to 247 consolidation of 118 and ‘Special German Road to Socialism’ 52 abandonment of 168–9 and Stalin note (1952) 229–30 East German domestic reaction to 233–4 West German reaction to 232–3 and Stalinization of 131–3, 164–6, 201, 219–20 democratic centralism 165, 201 support for 167 and structure of 51–2 hierarchical 2 and tensions between social democrats/ communists 126–7 and transformation into hard-line communist party 164–5 and uprising against (1953) 241

292

Index

Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): (cont.) and Western Commission 191 dissolution of 220 establishment of 177 on impact of Korean War 212–13 sectarianism within KPD 219 on West German economy 203–4 on West German pacifism 213 in Western Germany: failure of socialist fusion 79 failure to establish in 116–17, 135, 247 recognition refused 116–17 see also Central Secretariat of Socialist Unity Party (ZS) Sokolovsky, V D 110, 123, 163, 178 Soviet Control Commission (SKK) 193 and criticism of Socialist Unity Party (SED) 200–1 and ‘struggle for peace’ 208 Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) and Communist Party of Germany (KPD) 33–4 bias in favour of 42–3 and dismissal of Kaiser and Lemmer 158–9 and economic reform 159 and elections in SBZ (1946) 98 and establishment of 33 and expropriations 83, 84 and German Economic Commission (DWK) 119 reorganization of 154 and German unity 231 and land reform 43 and Marshall Plan 153 and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947) 121 and need for central agency 119 and not in favour of zonal government 109 and restrictions on political parties 55 and role of 33–4 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): faith in 72 relationship with 124–5 and SPD-KPD fusion 47–8 and transformation into Soviet Control Commission (SKK) 193

Soviet Union: and division of Germany: attempts to prevent 184–5 attitude towards 31–2 rejection of neutrality 185–6 and Federal Republic of Germany, proposes dialogue with 209 and German Democratic Republic: consolidation of 236–8 economic crisis (1953) 240–1 policy towards 243–5 supports postponement of elections 195–6 uprising (1953) 241 and German invasion of 14 and Germany: delusions about support in 231 desire for unified state 99–100, 109–10 Paris meeting of CFM (1949) 186–7, 190–1 promotes National Front for German unity 187 shape of future regime 95–6 and international peace campaign 208–9 and Marshall Plan: hopes for sabotage of 150 rejection of 130–1 and Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact (1939) 14 and occupation policy: anti-Soviet feeling 125–6 German unity 64–5 Potsdam Agreement 68 primacy of zonal control 69–70 rejection of common economic policy 70 rejection of national political parties 71 Western German hostility to 74–5 and post-war strategy 2–3 anticipation of peaceful transition to socialism 24 anxiety over Western control of Germany 22–3, 30–1 desire for German unity 32 favourable international position 23–4 historiography of 3–4 need for peace 19 no appetite for world revolution 19–20

Index security against future German threat 21 strengthening of Allied alliance 21–2 and Prague Declaration (1950) 209 and reparations 21, 42 change in policy 70 Potsdam Agreement 68 in Second World War: assumption of German defeat and occupation 16 fostering domestic opposition in Germany 15–16 popular front strategy 14–15 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): disagreement over East German state 180–1 hopes for national role of 71–2 and Stalin note (1952) 227 debate over Soviet intentions 228–31 East German domestic reaction to 233–4 West German reaction to 232–3 and two-camp doctrine 144–5 and United States, suspicion of 87 and Western Allies: differences over reparations 87–8 disagreements with 142 growing antagonism between 88–9, 105–6, 144–5, 181–2 hopes for continued cooperation 65–6 opportunities presented by tensions between 66–8 Soviet zone of occupation (SBZ): and anti-communist backlash 42 and anti-Soviet feeling in 125–6 and central agencies: need for 119 Soviet-SED views on 109–10 and consolidation of 69, 70, 118 SED’s draft constitution (1946) 107–8 and economy: economic planning 159 growth of 160 reduced viability of 65 reform of 92 SED’s optimism 160–1 and elections: Gemeinde (1946) 97–9 Kreis (1946) 101

293

Land (1946) 101 and establishment of local administration 27–8 and establishment of provincial government 31 and expropriations 83 and fusion of KPD-SPD 45–50 and German Economic Commission (DWK) 119 and political parties: creation of new 157–8 readmission of 33 and reparations 70 criticism of economic disarmament 90–1 Soviet-owned Stock Corporations (SAGs) 91 and restrictions on political parties 55–6 and transformation into state 177–8 Soviet-owned Stock Corporations (SAGs) 91 ‘Special German Road to Socialism’ 52 and abandonment of 168–9 Sperling, Fritz 80 and arrest of 220 and frustration of Western communists 135 on United States’ German policy 120 Stalin, Josef: and Berlin blockade 182 and criticism of Ulbricht 236 and death of 240 and division of Germany 182 and East German state: caution over establishing 180–1 formation of 192 and elections, postponement in GDR 195–6 and expropriations 83–4 and ‘German Question’ 5 and National Front for German unity 187 and post-war strategy: anticipates division of Germany 31 anticipates German recovery 21 anticipates peaceful transition to socialism 24 attitude towards division of Germany 31–2 desire for German unity 32 hostility to communist revolution 19–20

294

Index

Stalin, Josef: (cont.) promotion of bourgeois democracy 30 unease over Western strategic goals 23, 30–1 and preference for single German government 109–10 and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 39 readmission into SBZ 109–10 and socialism in one country 19–20 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): campaign against bourgeois parties 199 support for 111 transformation of 166 and SPD-KPD fusion 48 and Western Allies: antagonism towards 66 hopes for continued cooperation 65–6 propaganda campaign against 182–3 Stalin note (1952) 227 and consequences of failure of 238 and debate over Soviet intentions 228–31 and East German domestic reactions to 233–4 and West German reaction to 232–3 Stalingrad, and German defeat at 15 Staritz, Dietrich 71 strikes, in Western Germany 151, 175 Suslov, Mikhail 133, 167, 201 Szillat, Paul 133 Szklarska Poreba, and secret communist meeting at 144–5 Teheran Conference (1943) 16, 19 and dismemberment of Germany 31 and Soviet gains at 23–4 Tha¨lmann, Ernst 10 n1, 122 Thuringia, and Soviet establishment of La¨nder in 31 Tito, Marshal (Josip Broz) 24 and break with Stalin 164 Tjulpanow, Colonel S I 34, 121, 123, 153, 186 and collaboration of German people 231 and CPSU inquiry on 181 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): changes needed in 164 criticism of 124–5

as effectively in power 178 ideological shortcomings of 131 trade unions: and Communist Party of Germany (KPD) 49 in Western Germany 175 see also Free German Trade Union Association (FDGB) Truman, Harry S 87 Truman Doctrine 130, 144 two-camp doctrine, and Zhdanov 144–5 Ulbricht, Walter 5, 12, 22, 109, 192 and 2nd Party Conference (1952) 235 and accelerated construction of socialism 235–6 and aim of establishing socialism 178 and commitment to national party 61 and Communist Party of Germany (KPD): anticipates strong position for 38 sectarianism within 113 and debate over possible removal of (1953) 243–5 and distrust of non-communists 54 and divisions within bourgeois parties 156 on draft constitution (1946) 107 and economy: optimism over 161, 202–3 as priority in GDR 197 reform of 92 unviability of West German 151–2 and elections in SBZ (1946) 97–8 and establishment of new parties 157 on expropriations 85 and Federal Republic of Germany: pacifism in 213 prepared to compromise with 210 and fights for survival (1953) 242–3 and German Democratic Republic, achievements of 234 and German masses: complains about 184 mobilization of West German 220 and German unity 122 no compromise over 245 and Initiative Group 26 in Berlin 27–8 communist domination of administrations 27–8 need to retrain/change party members 28–9

Index and instructed to complete ‘bourgeois democratic revolution’ 30 and lack of radical change 83 on London CFM (1947) 144 and Munich minister-presidents’ conference (1947) 121, 122 and patriotic initiative (1947) 137 and reform of German Economic Commission (DWK) 154 and rise of 122–3 on Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 40 and Socialist Unity Party (SED): elected secretary-general 201 ideological shortcomings of 131 reform of 166 and Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) 34 and Soviet Union: cooperation with 166 loyalty to 19 praise of 133–4 and SPD-KPD fusion: failure in Western zones 78, 79 as inspiration to Western zones 75 priority of Soviet zone 80 and Stalin’s criticism of 236 United Kingdom: and Bizone 90 establishment of Economic Council 119 in Second World War 15 and United States: fusion of occupation zones 90 tensions between 68 United Nations 68 and Dumbarton Oaks conference 65–6 and implicit recognition of GDR 225 United Nations Security Council: and Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) 69 and establishment of 69 United States: and Bizone 90 establishment of Economic Council 119 and construction of a federal Germany 95 and Marshall Plan 129–30 and proposals for German national council 105–6

295 in Second World War 15 and Soviet suspicion of 87 and United Kingdom: fusion of occupation zones 90 tensions between 68 and Vandenberg Resolution (1948) 182

Vandenberg Resolution (USA, 1948) 182 Varga, Eugen: and capitalism’s demise 67 and forecasts Western economic slump 24 Verner, Paul 219 Voznesenskii, N A 149 Vyshinskii, Andrei 185 Wagner, Fritz 206 Wandel, Paul 162 and ‘Special German Road to Socialism’ 168–9 Warnke, Herbert 203, 209 West Germany, see Federal Republic of Germany Western Commission 191 and dissolution of 220 and establishment of 177 on impact of Korean War 212–13 and sectarianism within KPD 219 on West German economy 203–4 and West German pacifism 213 Wettig, Gerhard 226, 230, 245 Willmann, Heinz 232 Winternitz, Joseph 149 Wirth, Joseph 221–2, 224–5 Wolff, General Karl 23 Women’s Committee, and elections in SBZ (1946) 98 World Congress of the Friends of Peace 208 and World Peace Council 217 World Festival Games of Youth and Students for Peace 234–5 World Peace Council 217 World Trades Union League (WTUL) 208–9 Wu¨rttemberg-Baden 95 Yalta Conference (1945) 22, 67–8, 89 and dismemberment of Germany 32 and economic disarmament 87

296

Index

youth, and World Festival Games of Youth and Students for Peace 234–5 Yugoslavia 164 Zaisser, Wilhelm 204, 229 and denounced by Ulbricht 242 and expulsion of 242–3 and German unification 244 Zentralausschuß (ZA, Social Democratic Party of Germany): and formation of 39–40 and increasing assertiveness of 44–5 and SPD-KPD fusion 46–50

Zhdanov, A A 30 and criticism of economic disarmament 90–1 and death of 181 on French communists 150 and political comeback of 69 and ‘two-camp’ doctrine 144–5 and vulnerability of capitalism 149–50 Zhukov, Marshal G 48, 71 and recall of 122–3 and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 51 and withdrawal of Ulbricht 51

The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda 1945-1953 (Oxford Historical Monagraphs)

The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda 1945-1953 (Oxford Historical Monagraphs)

Germany and the European East in the Twentieth Century (German Historical Perspectives, 17.)

Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom

Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom

The Historical Imagination of G.K. Chesterton: Locality, Patriotism, and Nationalism

Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: Remembering the International Brigades 1945-1989 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany

Under The Map Of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918-1945

The Bismarck Myth: Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945 (Cinema and Society)

Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945 (Cinema and Society)

Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda

Migration and Inequality in Germany 1870-1913 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

East German Distinctiveness in a Unified Germany

Propaganda and Mass Persuasion. Historical Encyclopedia

Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941-1953 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Imperial Germany 1871-1918 (The Short Oxford History of Germany)

Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany (Harvard Historical Studies)

The Politics of the Poor: The East End of London 1885-1914 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

Historical Dictionary of the Philippines, 2nd Edition (Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East)

Economic Development and the Division of Labor

Patriotism

Patriotism

Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China) (Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East)

Agricola and Germany (Oxford World's Classics)

East Germany and Detente: Building Authority after the Wall

Patriotism and Other Mistakes

The Structure of German (Oxford Linguistics)

Training Socialist Citizens: Sports and the State in East Germany

The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda 1945-1953 (Oxford Historical Monagraphs)