The American Expeditionary Fqrces in World War I
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Lieutenant Colonel JOHN F VOTAW (US Army, Retired) is the Executive Director of the Cantigny First Division Foundation, Wheaton, Illinois. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy (1961), commanded US Army cavalry and armored units through the battalion level and served in Vietnam in 1966-67. He completed graduate studies in history at the University of California, Davis (MA, 1969), and Temple University (PhD, 1991). 'He is currently Adjunct Associate Professor of History at Dominican University, River Forest, Illinois.
O SPREY
Battle Orders · 6
PUBLISHING
The American Expeditionary Forces in World War I
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Series editors Marcus Cow per and Nikolai Bogda novic
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Acknowledgments
First published in 2005 by O sprey Publishing.
Midland House,West Way, Botle y, Ox ford OX2 OPH, UK 443 Park Avenue South, Ne w York. NY 100 16. U SA
I have believed for some time that the history of the American Expeditiona ry Forces in World War I was the st o ry of a rem arkable achievement of intellect. o rganizational skill. and raw determ ination on the part of the Ame rican military establ ishment. Although blunders in execution and bureaucratic snaggling took some of the luste r off that achievement, the work of General John J. Pershing st ill sta nds as an impo rta nt instructive chapter in Ame rican military histo ry.The scholarship of others has made it possible for me to make this small contribution of illuminat ing the AEF for the large. non -academic group of reader s. Professors Edward M. Coffman, Russell F.Weigley.Allan R. Millett and others have blazed a well-marked trail th rough the literature of World Wa r I. Dr.Timothy K. Nenninger and his colleague Mitchell Yockelson at the College Park. Maryland, facility of the National Archives have provided immeasurable help in understanding the documentary reco rds of the AEF in their custody. My family and friends have patiently, though anxiously watched the hatching of this small book. My museum and library colleagues at the First Division Museum at Cantigny and its collocated Colonel Robert R. McCormick Research Center, particularly Eric Gillespie and Andrew Woods' have helped find relevant materials in their very useful archival and photograph collections. Finally. to my AEF friend Private Max Ottenfeld, a signal wireman of the 18th Infantry Regiment now gone to his reward, well done good and faithful soldier. To all. thank you. The remaining infelicities of expression and any errors of fact and interpretation are mine alone
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Key to military symbols
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Contents Introduction
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Mission
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Preparation for war
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Training in the US • Training in France' Schools in France
Command, control, communication, and intelligence
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Command and control' Communication' Intelligence
Organization
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The AEF General Headquarters and staff' The First Army· I Co rps The division' The division infantry brigade' The division artillery brigade' The Air Service The Tank Corps' The Services of Supply (SOS) • The engineers' Medical services American Expeditionary Forces, North Russia;American Expeditionary Forces , Siberia; American Forces in France;American Forces in Germany
Tactics
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Cantigny: a regimental attack supported by the division Soissons : a divisional attack as part of a French corps The tactics of aerial ccrnbat - Tank tactics
Weapons and equipment
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Equipment· Individual weapons' Automatic weapons' Artillery Armored fighting vehicles' Rail and truck transport > Aircraft
Armistice, occupation, recovery, and demobilization
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Retrospective
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Chronology
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Bibliography
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Source notes
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Index
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Introduction Unlike th e British, French, an d Ger man armies prior to 1917, th e United Stat es Army did n ot h ave a perman en t field army organization or an operational staff to suppo rt it . Th ere were no com bat divisions, army corps, or armies-only regimen ts. This is partl y a conse que n ce of the infrequenc y of US involvement in fore ign wars req uiring an expeditionary army and the n avy to carry it to the theater of operations. It is also a resu lt of the way th at th e American armed forces developed afte r the creat ion of th e Republic at the end of the 18th century. Through out it s his tory th e army, and to a lesser degree the n avy, deve loped with two strong eleme nts : a sma ll but capable standing, professional force, and a "n at ion in arms" citizen force that mobilized as threats developed. Of the two, th e latter force was more consi stent with the values of a democratic "
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Sketch map of the Western Front in 1917
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republic, but it also was harder to maintain professional competence within an exclusi vely conscripted or volunteer army. At the end of the Civil War in the United States, advocates for both approaches to maintaining an armed force argued their positions. Emory Upton, a veteran Union Army officer, wrote of a military policy for the United States th at relied on a small, professional standing army that could be expanded in times of emergency. Others, notably John McAuley Palmer who was to serve in World War I, believed that the citizen army, or militia, could effectively protect th e nation . The war with Mexico in 1846-48, the Civil War (1861- 65), and the Spanish-American War (1898 ) were waged with mostly volun teer regiments. In 1887 Til e Volullteer Soldier ill America by Major Gen eral John Logan , an Illin ois veteran of th e Civil War, argued against a standi n g regular arm y in favor of the volunteer citizen-soldier as the m ain line of defense for Ameri ca. Alth ough the wars waged by the United States in the 19th century were bloody an d involved large field armies , it was not until World War I that the United States was confronted by modern technology combined with mass armies in an extremely large theater of operations. In 1917 most Ame rican men of military age had not traveled far beyond th e homes wh ere th ey were raised. Many soldiers came fro m rur al comm un ities and had atta ined som e seconda ry education . Th ey cert ainly were not wo rldly or even cosmo po litan in their outlook. In many instances, th eir service in the army was th eir first group experien ce. African -Americans served in signifi cant numb ers, but their service was clouded partly by the prevailing racial discrimination of the era. Some recent histories have argued that th e arriva l of two million largely untr ained and untested American doughboys in Fran ce at th e very tim e that European armies, including the German ene my, were on th e wane , tipp ed th e balance of victory to the Allies. Thi s is on ly partly tru e, as no sing le factor produced Allied victory. It ma y also be said th at the enor mo us sacrifices of the British and Fren ch field armies prevented a German victory before th e sprin g of 1918. This hyper-national way of viewing the largest military involvement of nati ons in mod ern h istory up to that point does n ot explain the success of either th e Allied nation s or th e Ame rican Exped itionary Forces. Th is sh or t book presents th e eleme n ts of the AEF that permitted rapid organi zati on and trainin g th at ultimately led to its making a signi fican t con tribution to Allied victory in World War I. There are four distinct but interrelated phases in the dev elopment of th e AEF as an effective fighting force. First, the successful mobilization an d movement of units to the debarkation ports so that they could be transported to France efficien tly was essen tial. Second, the reception at th e French ports of arrival and smooth movement to th e training areas in n ortheast ern France had to be accomplished with minimal disruption to on goin g Allied operations. Th ird, the AEF had to be trained quickly and made read y for combat operations compatible with the needs of the Allied high command. And finally, the AEF had to develop increasingly effective systems of com mand, control, and support as its strength increased from divisions to armies. Throughout this progressive devel opment, th e high command of the AEF had to find ways to integrate its efforts with those of the othe r Allies while remaining politi cally independent and faithful to th e intent of th e Ame rican president, th e US Cong ress, and th e Americ an people. All of this was achi eved in a remarkably short time with minimum shortfalls. If the AEF did not win the war in France for the Allies, it certain ly had a m ajor part in making that victory possible.
Officers of the 26th French Division. Chasseurs Alpins. who instructed the 1st Division at Gondrecourt, France. in t he fall of 1917. (US Signal Co rps . 80066)
Portrait ofGeneral John J. Pershing by John Doctoroff, oil on canvas. 30 by 24in.. 1938. in the collections of the 1st Division Museum at Ca ntigny. Wheaton. Illinois. (FD M)
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ABOVE General Pershing reading telegram at Issoudun aviation field, February 1918. (US Signal Corps. 7840) Born in Missouri in 1860. John Joseph Pershing. first captain of his West Point class of 1886, was not the most apparent choice to command the AEF in France , but he was the best choice. Captain Pershing. a cavalry officer on duty in Japan as a military attache, had been advanced to the rank of brigadier general in 1906 over many other more sen ior officers in the army. His father- in-law,Senator Francis Warren of Wyoming, assisted in bringing his son-in-Iaw's name to the attention of those who could help him, then the chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee shepherded the appointment through the government bureaucracy. Pershing's assignment to command the 8th Infantry Brigade, first at the Presidio of San Francisco then in Texas in April 19 14, was attended by the tragedy that forever changed his personal life. In August 1915. his family had been trapped and killed in a quarters fire at the Presidio . Only his six-year-old son Warren had survived . In 1916 he was appointed to head a punitive expedition into Mexico to find and capture Francisco "Pancho" Villa.In September 1916, President Woodrow Wilson promoted Pershing to major general. By this time the tall, good-humored "Sparta n" general had made his mark with his superiors and the American public.The audience he had to persuade, however. were the Allied nations fighting in Europe .
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The story of the AEF is mostly the story of the progressive development of a large field army and its many supporting organizations. Part of the story is the contribution of airpower and another part is the role of the US Navy in moving men and materiel to France. The former will be addressed in this book, but the latter is at the periphery, with the exception of the 4th Brigade, 2d Division (the Marine Brigade). The essence of an effective field army is the sum of trained and motivated soldiers, flexible and, resilient organization, inspired and competent leadership, appropriate doctrine and functional logistics. When the AEF landed in France not one of those elements was fully developed. The American field army was unprepared for combat. "Black Jack" Pershing dominated that situation as commander-in-chief of the AEF and imposed h is personality, style and, some would say, his stubbornness, as he shaped and prepared his fighting forces to take their place in the line and in history. He was the forceful opponent of sloth, age, infirmity, and obstinacy. Pershing would accept no interference in his command prerogatives, and, as a result, some judged him as aloof and uncaring. The instrument he fashioned to bring the weight of the American nation to bear in France was powerful, potentially lethal, and often unwieldy. But one thing was absolutely certain: the AEF was General Pershing's army. Since no effective staff system for the control of field operations and training of a large force existed in 1917 , Pershing and his "coterie" created one from whole cloth. Most of those officers were graduates of the School of the Line and/or the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas . The AEF staff controlled all American military activities in the theater of operations, except the work of the military attaches and others assigned to various missions and embassies. Intelligence staff work was a "stovepipe," or vertical system whereby the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff (WDGS) had a direct lin e to the G-2 (intelligence staff section) of the AEF, for matters of h igher intelligence. Tactical intelligence that was immediately useful for continuing combat operations remained the purview of the field commanders. Dentistry, medicine, and nursing, although organized activities of the AEF, were handled in an ancillary way for most of the war in cooperative efforts with the French and British . The achievement of this imperfect system was all the more remarkable in that it worked, even if in a flawed way. All American divisions, with the exception of the Air Service, in France were infantry divisions of roughly 28,000 men and 6,600 animals each. A staff officer at General Headquarters AEF and operations units at army, corps, and division level repr esented the American Air Service. Armies usually fight as they have trained. In most instances the armies of the World War I era had a solid base of doctrine that governed training and combat. In the case of the AEF, that tactical-operational doctrine was inchoate and largely untested in 1917 . General Pershing wanted his army to fight in "open warfar e" style. He knew what that meant and his major subordinate commanders and staff officers professed to know what he meant, but in action the AEF divisions fought mostly as their French, and in some cases British, trainers had taught them. The American soldiers, however, were imbued with an offensive spirit that often carried them forward in the face of withering fire from enemy machine guns, mortars, and artillery. Beginning with Cantigny in May 1918, Belleau Wood in June, Soissons in July, St. Mihi el in September, and the Meuse-Argonne from late September to mid-November, the fighting divisions of the AEF sustained in creasing casualties. By the time of the final campaign of the war, those divisions were infused with replacements to such an extent that the character of the original divisions had been changed. Many junior officers and noncommissioned officers had been killed , wounded, or promoted, leaving the AEF with a new training problem right in the m idst of its sternest combat test . Pershing and others expected that the war would last well into 1919 before the Allies would finally pre vail.
Mission At the time President Woodrow Wilson asked the United States Congress to declare war on Germany and the other Central Powers on April 6, 1917, the US Army was a small provincial force recently engaged in coastal defense and field operations against Mexican irregulars. In May 1916 the army consisted of 65 regiments of infantry, 25 of cavalry, and 21 of artillery, with a total strength of 108,399 officers and men. The National Defense Act of 1916 had authorized a regular army of 175,000 soldiers in peacetime to be expanded to 286,000 in wartime. The National Guard was to be built up to 400,000 men and be supervised federally. The following year, on the threshold of America's entry into the war, the army had expanded by nearly four times, but still numbered und er 500,000 men. This was the instrument to be wielded by the United States in forming its expeditionary forces for service in France. A new Secretary of War, Ohio lawyer and politician Newton D. Baker, and 19 officers to man the department's general staff seemed woefully inadequate to wage modern war. When Major General John Pershing's forces were withdrawn from Mexico in February 1917, they had learned important lessons in transportation, logistics, and aviation, despite their failure to defeat Pancho Villa. At the moment of declaration of war, it was not clear that the United States intended to send a mass army to Europe. Some thought that the limited affront of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany might be met with a limited response rather than commitment to general war. Clearly the United States was initiating measures to prepare for war, not implementing existing plans and policies. President Wilson and Secretary Baker knew full well that volunteering of the sort used to deal with the emergencies of the 19th century would not suffice in France. When the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany in February, the president quietly told Baker to prepare a conscription bill for Congress . The resulting Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, recommended volunteering to raise a million men for the duration of the war, but authorized conscription to accomplish it if there were shortfalls in recruiting.
President Woodrow Wilson photographed in the East Room of the White House on June 3. 1918. by Lt. E. DeBerri of the Signal Corps. (US Signal Corps. 12078)
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker with members of his inspection party and members of the AEF staff at the Hotel Crillon , Paris. in April 1918. Front row. left to right, General Pershing. Secretary Baker. US Ambassador to France W illiam G. Sharp. and Major General William M. Black. chief of engineers. (US Signal Co rps. 7555)
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Major General Hugh L. Sco tt, chief-of-staff, United Stat es Army. November 16. 1916. to Sept ember 2 1. 1917. General Scott accompani ed for mer Secretary of Wa r Elihu Root o n an inspect io n tour of Russia in 1917. This pho to was ta ken at Camp Dix, New Jer sey.when Scott comman ded the post in 1918. (US Signal Corps. 84778 )
When Majo r General Hugh Scott , the ch ief-of-staff of the army from Novem ber 16,1914, to September 21,1917, notified General Pershing on May 2, 1917, that he was to orga n ize four regim ents of in fan try and one of artill ery from forces th at he had commanded in the Southwest, he added that "if plans are carried ou t, you will be in command of the entire force." Pershing took that to mean a provisional division; the War Department meant t he entire expeditionary army! There was only a rudimentary set of organizational documents and the effort was largely personal and ad hoc. On May 26 Secretary Baker forw arde d Persh ing a note containing the following instructions: 1. The Presid ent designates you to command all the land forces of the United States op erating in Continental Europe and in the United Kin gdom of Great Britain and Ireland, induding any part of the Marine Corps wh ich ma y be detached for service there with the Army . From yo ur com ma n d are exce pted the Military Attaches and others of the Army who ma y be on duty directly with our several embassies.
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In add ition to the usual administrative instructions, Pershing was to cooperate with the other countries operating against the Germans, with the "underlying idea" that th e US forces "are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved." Clearly, General Pershing was to organize, train, and employ hi s forces in the general effort to defeat the Central Powers. Exactly how he was to do that was left up to him. Pershing judged that his instructions were "both admirable examples of th e powers that should be invested in a comm ander in the field an d were never changed or amplified in any essential."
Preparati on for war Everyaspect of preparation was uphill for the AEF following the declaration of war. Rudimentary planning had been underway at the War Department since Pershing's punitive expedition was operating in the Southwest and Mexico in 1916, but no decisions regarding how the expeditionary field army was to be organized and equipped, nor about the tactical doctrine that was to govern its employmen t, had been taken. The AEF would be built stone by stone based on the experience of a few general staff officers, the accumulated "lessons" of earlier field operations of the US Army and Navy in the war with Spain, and the advice of military missions from France and Great Britain. Additionally, a US military mission headed by Colonel Ch au ncey B. Baker, Quartermaster Co rps, traveled to Belgium, France , and Great Britain in June and July 1917 to visit "training camps and other military establishments, both in the zone of the interior and the zone of operations." It is hard to avoid the image of an ad hoc process of mobilization, training, and deployment of an American field army to France, but the few professionals who had experienced earlier mobilizations were makin g reasonable efforts in 1917 . It is a commonplace, however, that the United States was dramatically unprepared for entry into a major land war against European nations hardened by two-and-a-half years of grinding trench warfare . In notes prepared after the war, Brigadier General Fox Conner, the G-3 (operations officer) of the AEF, observed that on the threshold of US entry into the war German morale was high and an air of defeatism haunted the French. The Italians, as well as the Russians, might very well have been forced out of the war in 1917. Both England and France had spent their "best blood" and had their backs to the wall. "Black, indeed, were the Allied prospeets-except for America!" General Pershing had noted in his final report to the Secretary of War in 1919, that "Prior to our entrance into the war, the regiments of our small army were very much scattered, and we had no organized units , even approximating a division, that could be sent overseas prepared to take the field." The preparedness movement had by the fall of 1915, "become a popular fad and a craze, riding the progressive currents of nati on al efficiency and individual duty. " But the preparedness movement was not to "get the United States ready to intervene in World War I;" rather it "was almost purely defensive. Its thrust was isolationist, not interventionist." It began as an effort by Leonard Wood and like-minded colleagues to reform the army and by the end of 1916 had "evolved into a drive for a universal military training which had previously been unthinkable," But, without doubt, the crusade that America launched across the Atlantic in the summer of 1917 was inchoate, a patchwork quilt of enthusiastic raw-boned youths, untrained but strong in numbers. Pershing arrived in London with a small staff on June 9, 1917, and in France on June 13. The 1st Expeditionary Division was created from existing infantry, artillery, and engineer regiments and shipped to France, where their organization and training would take place near the field of battle. The 1st Division was Pershing's point of the spear and the base upon which he would build his army. He believed he would need a force of about one million men in order to achieve a "complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organization"
General Pershing (left) and General Tom Bridges, British Army, inspe cting the Gua rd of Honor upon Pershing's arrival at Liverpool, England, in June 1917. Bridges was a member of the British Mission to the United States. (US Signal Corps, 95567)
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Brigadier Ge ne ral Paul B. Malone. "Follow Me" Malone wa s t he initial AEF training chief. He later commanded a regim ent and a brigade in the 5th Division . (US Signal Corps, 40 143)
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to conduct offensive operations in 1918; the future, he noted, might require three times that number. It is clear that the new commander-in-chief understood that there was more to effective emp loyment of his AEF than doctrine and training. He also needed, amongst other things, motivated officers at all levels, an experienced GHQ staff, and a functioning logistic system. Major General Hanson Ely, whose 28th Infantry Regiment made the successful attack on Cantigny, noted, "Many of our soldiers had received but little training before going into battle, a fact which swelled our casualties. Most of them were still, in a large measure, untrained when the war ended." Pershing believed that American doctrine, that is the standard procedure for how American combat units would train and fight, should be based on the principle that "the rifle and the bayonet remain the supreme weapons of the infantry soldier and that the ultimate success of the army depends on their proper use in open warfare ." The "how we should fight" doctrine was published in two key documents: Infantry Drill Regulations, 1911 and Field Service Regulations, 1914 . The Infantry Drill Regulations explained how infantry units from platoon to brigade should train and fight, while the Field Service Regulations provlded similar guidance for divisions and larger units . Both manuals were revised several times to keep pace with organizational changes and the tactical lessons from battlefield experience. Based on his own observations, and those of his staff, of the French and British, Pershing knew that he needed to establish a formal system of training schools to impart this basic concept to newly inducted officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The training was to be based on the experience of the 1st Division in a progressive, three-stage program . The exigencies of the war, however, were to thwart this orderly plan. The 1st Division barely completed the program and none of the following divisions came close to being fully prepared for battle. Secretary of War Baker and his War Department General Staff of 19 officers faced an enormous task in April 1917. The February 14, 1903, act of Congress created th e general staff but did not cancel the very powerful service department bureaus. The nation, with its robust manufacturing capabilities, had been supporting Britain and France but at the expense of building up the American armed forces. When Baker took over from acting Secretary of War Major General Hugh Scott on March 9, 1916, there was no plan to send American forces to France . President Wilson had been angry when he learned in the fall of 1915 that the general staff had been doing some contingency planning for a war with Germany, bu t he clearly misunderstood the nature of that speculative th inking by his military profess ionals. Prior to the declaration of war in April 1917, the president was consistently looking for ways to avoid American involvement in the European war. Given the unsettled nature of political and diplomatic activity in the months prior to April 1917, it is not surprising that the army did little to prepare for overseas service. Wilson was acutely aware of the preparedness advocates and the domestic political danger posed by their criticism. The officer training camps established at Plattsburg, New York, and several other places were initiatives of these political adversaries . There was no formal training structure for a large mass army in existence at the point of American entry into the war. It all had to be created at the same time as the first contingent-the 1st Expeditionary Division-was pulled together from the Texas-Mexico border area and literally assembled aboard ship on the east coast . The 2d Division was formed by adding to units already organized and in transit to France. The 5th Marine Regiment was attached to the 1st Division for movement, but attached to the 4th Brigade, 2d Division, in France. The 3d Infantry Brigade, with the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments, was also moving toward the theater of war. What remained was to gather up the units to make up the 4th Infantry Brigade at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, but the War and Navy Departments decided to form a Marine Brigade instead. The 2d Division headquarters opened
at Bourmont in the Department of Haute Marne on October 26, 1917. Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, USMC, assumed temporary command until Major General Omar Bundy, US Army, relieved him on November 8. And so it went as units were knitted together into fighting divisions. Private Herbert 1. McHenry, later assigned as a machine gunner in the 16th Infantry Regiment, recalled his arrival for basic training at Camp Lee, Virginia, on May 29, 1918. Sixty-two percent of the inductees in McHenry's cohort were rejected for physical reasons. The new soldiers received their Enfield rifles after about ten days of drill and other processing activities. McHenry and his fellow soldiers destined for France left Camp Lee on July 17 and marched to City Point, Virginia, to board a river boat for Newport News where they boarded the Czatitza, an old Russian passenger ship . The 5,000 soldiers arrived at Brest, France, on July 29. After a ride in a "Forty and Eight" boxcar to Tours, the logistical headquarters of the AEF, McHenry traded his Enfield for a Springfield rifle and received some bayonet drill. After several more days of marching and train riding, the new 1st Division men reached their destination. lt was probably that way for most of the American boys joining the AEF.
Training in the US Lieutenant Joseph Dorst Patch was in the 26th Infantry Regiment stationed at Texas City, then a part of the 2d Division commanded by Major General J. Franklin Bell. He remembered that training consisted of "marksmanship (rifle and pistol), drill (close and extended order) and long hard marches in heavy marching order." Patch's battalion sailed on the Momus, late of the United Fruit Line, on June 14, where the machine gunners were issued the troublesome Benet-Mercie machine guns, "complicated pieces of air-cooled mechanisms, which almost required a jeweler to strip and assemble." The troops had never seen or fired those guns and fortunately received "better guns overseas." While the units of the Regular Army and the National Guard in federal servicewere available within the four continental departments, Hawaii and the Philippines, the total of 9,693 officers and 203,864 enlisted men would provide only seven divisions if every soldier was mobilized for overseas service . The Selective Service system brought more than 2.8 million men to the training camps during America's period of belligerency, most co-located with army posts. Additional housing had to be constructed at the existing camps and an additional 32 camps-16 each for the National Guard and the Regular Armywere built . Many of the new camps were built in the South or the Southeast, mostly because of the favorable weather and training conditions. Each camp was designed for about 40,000 trainees, but General Pershing's reorganization proposal of July 10, 1918, raised the strength of infantry companies from 150 to 250 soldiers, and so the barracks were too small! But it was not the barracks problem that slowed the commencement of training until September 1917. The culprits were the slow and somewhat cumbersome induction process and the shortages of equipment and supplies. Nonetheless, the temporary camps sufficed to gain the necessary momentum to raise, equip, and train the initial troop cohorts of the army. The acquisition and training of officers was a bit more complicated. The National Defense Act of 1916 made provisions for reserve forces for the regular establishment and the National Guard. However, the nation never came close to recruiting those numbers that were authorized. On the day that the United States entered World War I, 5,960 officers were present for duty; but this was 1,292 officers short of authorized strength. Moreover, reports from France showed that attrition within the infantry units required additional manpower above authorized strength to absorb what the British called "wastage." Ultimately General Pershing decided to designate a handful of arriving divisions in France as support or "depot" divisions. The 41st Division fulfilled this role in General Hunter Liggett's I Corps, mostly because Colonel
Brigad ier General Harold B. Fiske fo llowed Malone as AEF training chief. Fiske was responsible for developing and implementing the AEF traini ng program in France. (US Signal Corps. 24 359)
II
Dougla s Mac.u tbur, the ch ief-of-staff of the newly ar rived 42d Division (Rainbow), argued strenuo usly that his division sho uld not be pa rceled o ut as rep lacement s for o the r divi sion s. At th e Armistice on Novem ber II , 191H, th ere were 203 ,786 officers in a total force of 3,685,45 8 or about 5.5 percen t. Th e first 16 traini ng cam ps for officers ope ned on May 15,1 91 7, patt ern ed o n th e Platt sburg mod el. Platt sburg Barracks (NY), Fort Benj am in Harr ison (IN), and Fort Sheridan (lL) eac h hos ted two cam ps, and ten o the r army posts eac h suppo rted o ne ca m p. The first train ing cycle ended o n August 11, with 27,3 4 1 men com miss ion ed. Th ree more cycles , the last end ing in February 191 9, produced mor e office rs whil e training was first decentralized to div isions , th en re-centralized to ta ke th e bur den off deploying d ivisio ns. A training cam p for African-Am erican officers was in o peration at Fort Des Moines (lA) from June 18 to Octo ber 18, 1918, resulting in 639 comm issio ned office rs from an ad m itt ed group of 1,250 candida tes . Several other speci al office r-trai ning cam ps were cond ucted in 1918. Th e tot al number of officers co mmissio ned from all cam ps was 80 ,568, with 48,968 of th ose in th e infantry and 20,29 1 in th e arti llery. In o rde r to susta in div isions th at had mob ilized an d ' v'ere beginn ing to deploy in th e last ha lf of 191 7, th e United States acce pted the offers of Fran ce and Britain to supply officers and non commission ed officers to tra in Amer ican soldiers in th e US cam ps. In Sept ember 191 7, th e Third Bureau of th e French Gene ral Staff commented o n the substa nce of th e training program and noted th at it sho wed onl y a battalion sector and greatly sim plified the com plex tasks of organi zing the position of an infantry division for trench warfare. 111e relation ship between realistic traini ng and actual combat was em phasized by the idea that in organi zing positions "Bloody losses [will bel sustained by ign orance. error, or laziness." Althou gh th is depende nce o n foreign trainers relieved the strain o n deplo ying divis ions and those already in France who did no t have to suppl y stay-behind deta ch ments of officers and no ncommi ssioned office rs, th e French an d British traine rs had th eir ow n agenda . Ins tead of ad heri ng to the US doc trine based on op en warfare and rifle ma rksman ship , the tra ini ng pro gram was based on fighti ng from tren ch es. The two foreig n missio ns persuaded the US wa r Department that the approach was sou nd , which im mediately put the program in the Unit e,-' State s in conflict wit h General Pershin g's th ree-ph ase training program in Fran ce. In realit y, Fren ch ins tructors steeped in the do ctrine of tren ch warfar e a lso dominated th e program in France. Persh ing did reali ze that he must depend o n the host trainers. at least in th e early stages of preparing soldiers a nd un its up to batt alion st rength, to toughen th e tro op s to th e rigors of warfa re o n th e w ester» Front.
Training in France
/2
The 1st Division led th e first group of American div isions into th e th eat er of war. As the troop unit s were a rrivi ng, th e AEF sta ff began o pe ratio ns in Pari s before moving to th e new Gene ral Headquarters (GHQ) at Chaumo nt o n Septe mbe r I, 191 7. It co m prised 1,342 officers, clerk s, and en listed men . The training sectio n had been added to th e staff o n Augu st 11. Lieutenant Co lo nel Paul B. Malone head ed th e AEF training sect io n (G-5). Wh en he was tran sferr ed to th e 3d Division in February 1918 to co m ma nd a brigade, hi s assistan t, Co lo ne l Haro ld B. Fiske, wh o remain ed th e chie f AEF train er until th e en d of th e war, repl aced him . Malon e and Fiske shaped th e J\ EF training and ed uca tio n programs. Like all th e primary staff, Pershing handpi cked th em . Clus te red in French villages a round Cha umont, th e arriving divi sions , less th eir artill ery brigades. whic h were sen t to Valdah on in th e so ut he ast of Franc e, took up the routi ne of training th eir sold iers and th eir unit s up through battali ons.
The Ist Division estab lishe d the training pattern . Harold Fiske had begun hi s service in th e 16th In fan try Regiment sh ortly before it arrived in France wit h the l st Division. He recall ed in a m em o adter the war that : 1\ large part of the com pa ny officers had been recen tly .. . co mm issio ned;
many had on ly just fin ished the thr ee mon ths co urse at [Forti Leavenworth. DivisionalTr ain ing Ar eas. AEF t
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Thismap depicts the divisional train ing areas assigned to the AEF in northeastern Fra nce .Also shownare the areas of operation fo r First Army (organi zed August 10. 1918) and Second Army (crganaed October 10,19 18) and the Armistice line of November II. 1918 .AEF GHQ is shown in OII~ 20 at Chaumont. The lst Division HQ is in area I at Gondrecourt , the 2d Division HQ is in area 9 0!It ChateauviliOllin and the 42d Division was assigned to th e Sth training area at vaucculeurs. Not all numbers coincide with division s of th e same numbers.The 21 tra ining are as wer e princ ipally infantry tr.lining areas.The field art illery t rained at Le Valdahcn to t he so utheast near the Swiss border.
" I
"
II
"
13
A thousand recruits had been received a day or two before my arrival, and others were continually arriving in the effort of the War Department to bring the regiment to its new strength. None of these recruits seemed to have had any instruction ... No machine guns were at hand .. . The Infantry of the 1st Division sailed for France about June 12th. As usual no arrangements for overstrength [that is, to include first replacements] had been made; so that each company sailed from six to 15 men short of its complement. I think the experience of the 16th Infantry can be taken as in every way like that of each of the other infantry regiments . The 1st Division received no training in the United States. Its time in th United States was one of reorganization, re-armament, change and confusion. A memorandum governing divisional training was issued by Fiske's office on July 18, 1917. It described "fundamental principles" of training for th e 1st Division and other divisions th at were to follow into the theater of opera tions. It confirmed that the principles of "discipline, command and combat" set forth in the Drill, Small Arms and Field Service regulations "remain unchanged," that is rifle marksmanship and open warfare remained at the core of training guidanc e for American division s. It also confirmed th at offensive, not defensive (meaning tren ch) warfare was "the basis of instruction." Three months would be devoted to "Preliminary" train ing, th at is ind ividual and small unit training. This would be followed by one month of "Divisional" training that emphasized "th e perfection of team work in actua l fighting." Thus , Pershing and his training staff believed that American divisions could be readied for effective combat operations in four months. The (Colonel Chauncey) Baker board reported its findings on July 11,191 7. One of the recommendations stated "That the United States make no essenti al change in its system of physical training, close order and disciplinary drills and musketry." Closely associated with the progressive training of divisions as they arrived in France was the establishment of professional schools, both for the AEF at large, but also within corps and divisions to continue the education of officers and noncommissioned officers. It is clear that Pershing anticipated that he would need to replace the French and British trainers, both in France and in the camps in the United States, as soon as practicable so that the Americans
14
Li eutenant Colo ne l George S. Patton, Jr., co mmande r of t he Amer ican tank traini ng school and center at Bo urg, France. He is standing in fro nt of a Renault light tank. (US Signal Co rps. 17592)
could take charge of their own training and impart the "American style " of combat rather than the defensive, trench warfare doctrine favored by the French and to, a degree, by the British.
Schoo ls in France Training schools, both at the level of the AEF and within divisions and corps, were essential to disseminate doctrine and to raise the skill levels of officers and noncommissioned officers. General Pershing pulled Brigadier General Robert L. Bullard from command of th e 2d Brigade of the 1st Division in July 1917 and assigned him as commanding general, AEF schools. Bullard's task was to train infantry officers for combat. Pershing was well acquainted with Bullard's capabilities as a trainer, having known him at West Point and in Texas before the war. His confidence was not misplaced and by November Bullard had his infantry school staffed and operating. The bugaboo that plagued the AEF schools was the necessity to detach officers from line divisions to attend as students and to serve as faculty -all at the expense of the fighting power of the line divisions. It was a left pocket, right pocket decision as to where experienced officers and noncommissioned officers were needed most. This was one of the several most important choices that Pershing made in organizing, training, and fighting his AEF in France . American officers, officer candidates, and noncommissioned officers were sent to existing British and French schools as the Americans brought their own fad lities up to speed. In addition to AEF level schools, Fiske anticipated that schooling would have to occur at army, corps, and division levels in order to sustain the movement of experienced personnel into the combat divisions, the tip of the fighting machine. During the transition from British/French schoo ls to AEF schools, the Americans depended upon the British for expert instruction in the Stokes mortar, sniping, scouting, use of the bayonet, and musketry (marksmanship). The French instructors tutored their American pupils in tactics, grenades, automatic rifles, 37mm guns, machine guns, and field fortifications. The courses varied from two to seven weeks in lengt h. While the schools were centralized to make the best use of meager resources, training was based on the division. The critically important relationship between educated leaders and the combat effectiveness of the divisions was proved in the fighting of the spring and fall of 1918.The center for AEF schools was established at Langres, an old fortress town with plentiful barracks situated 22 miles southeast of the AEF headquarters at Chaumont; Colonel James A. McAndrew was appointed commandant on October 10, 1917, and Brigadier General Alfred W. Bjornstad served as the first directorof the staff college. Forty-two officers, of a class of 75, graduated from the first three-month course and were qualified for staff duty with divisions and corps. Afull array of schools, patterned on the school system in the United States, came into operation in the fall of 1917. Artillery, aviation, military police, engineering, machine gunner y, intelligence, gas operations, and even musicians and dentists had their own schools. Fiske intended to have the various corps headquarters supervise their own schools, but soon discovered that those organizations were on the move too frequently. He placed the corps schools under AEF control. Most of the instruction at the corps schools was of four weeks' duration. In May 1918, the aviation sections of the corps schools were consolidated in the II Corps area. As noted earlier, the only division to complete its intended four-month training cycle was the 1st Division. General Pershing relied heavily on the training ofthe 1st Division to set the framework for the training of all AEF divisions as they arrived in France. On October 4, 1917, he wrote to Secretary Baker and reported "A tentativesystem of instruction and training has been outlined, based upon the best information obta inable, and schools of instruction have been organized to provide instructors. The French have helped us train the 1st Division, while the British are taking as many young officers as they can accommodate in their schools." He continued to explain his ideas of offensive warfare and his policy of
15
rejecting senior officers who were ph ysically unfit or not in accord with his philosoph y o f com ma nd in co mbat. li e closed by asking th e support of the War Departm ent in recogn izin g h is o fficers with prom oti o ns. The co m mander-i n-c hief was pleased with th e progress of the 1st Division and judged it to be efficient and "later to becom e fam ou s amo ng th e armies Oil the Western Front. "
Strate gic features influ encing sel ection of the Lorrain e front for th e Am erican Army
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This map shows some of the strategic consi derations fo r locati ng th e AEF in northeastern Pra nce. As a late arrival to the theater of o perations th e AEF had to be accommodated in an area where it would not interfere with the o perations of the British in the north and French in the center of the We stern Fro nt. There had to be adequate training space to rec eive, o rganize and tra in the Americans in a relatively quiet sec to r.The northeast was a terminus for the AEF line of communication from the arri val ports in western France and so uth of Paris. The rail lines doser to the fro nt wer e all fully occupied. The coun tr yside could provide food and dra ft animals to suppo rt the training.
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Major General \Villiam L. Sibert, \·..h o h ad deployed the 1st Division to France, comma nded th em du ring th is period of intensive train in g. ,\ s was to be expected, General Persh in g closely observed the division 's progress and occasionally provided corrections . Lieute nant Colonel George C. Marshall, the division operations officer, reco u n ted th at "Like an only child, we suffered from too much attention, and fo und o urse lves often irr itated hy the frequent visits of investigators, ins pec tors and others fro m th e h igh er co mm and." During the period o f tra inin g in early Sep tem be r 191 7 n ear Go nd reco ur t, Georges Cleme nce au, soo n to be Prem ier o f Fran ce, visited th e 1st Division, After watch ing a boxing match at th e 26 th Infantry Regime nt's Field Day, h e was. imp ressed by the o ffensive sp irit and "rugged fight ing q ua lities" disp layed by the regimen t. Clemenceau. unable to me..-et with General Pers hing, returned with General Noe l Marie Joseph Edward de Curte res de Castelnau, his chief-ofstaff, to discuss the en try of the l st Division into the line in a quiet sector in about ten days. Sibert demurred and explained that only Ge neral Pershing could make tha t decision. Clemenceau, spea king in English, argued that th e time for actio n was at h an d. The Frenc h army, he said , "was exhausted " and it was imperativ e th at traini ng sched ules m ust be su bord ina ted to th e overa ll needs of th e war. Ge ne ral Sibert, accordin g to Marsh a ll, tactfull y b ut force fully explained that to co m m it th e 1st Division before it was p rop erly tra ined "would be takin g a ve ry grave risk, t he unfo rtun at e results o f which wo u ld react as heavily again st the Fren ch and Eng lish" as aga ins t th e Americans. Th e lst Division, assu med by man y to be th e "pick of th e Regu lar Army," was in fact "an entirel y new o rga nization and its ran ks wer e filled with recruit s." To risk a defeat would "have a calamitous effect on the morale of the Ameri can soldier and on th e Allies as well. " The 1st Division , n o net h eless, mo ved ahead with its training and in mid-October was occupyi ng positions on the Lorraine fron t between Luneville and Nancy. This sector of rolling coun trys ide h ad been q uie t since 191 5. Th e first battalions of th e four in fant ry regiments of th e d ivision (16, IS, 26, 2~J,
School ofAv iar.ion arVineuil. 1917,
by Henr i Fa-re. Ther e are twO villages in France that bear the name Vineul that could have been the site of Pan-e's painting.The first is near the classification center (or the AEF at Blois (where failed commanders were sent) .The more likely location. however. is 28km west and slightly south of the major AEF flying field at Issoudun. near Chateauroux. Farre was a well-know painter of aviation scenes. ( Ist Divisio n Museu m)
17
eac h wi th a m ach ine-gun co m pa ny, and det ach me n ts of engi ne ers an d signa' troops, jo ined the lSth Fre n ch In fant ry Divisio n in the line. On e batta lion each from th e three a rtille ry regime nts of the di vision left thei r tra in in g site al Valda hon a nd join ed t he ir fello w do ughboys during th e n igh t of Oct ob er 22 Th e next morn in g, C Ba tte ry, 6t h Field Artille ry fired "t he first shot from an Ameri ca n -m anned gun ." Du ring th e n ight of No ve mber 2-3, the Ge nna ro co nd ucted it tren ch ra id o n th e po sit io n s of F Com pa n y, 16th Inf a n t ry, and within m in ut es three do ughboys were lyin g d ead in th e t renc h bottom and 11 ot he rs wer e bein g march ed in to ca ptiv ity. Trai ning was evo lvin g in to co m bat Alth ough co m bining th e gen e ral staff fu nc tions of o pera tions a nd t rai ni ng in to a single section su per vised by o ne chief would he lp ensure tha t troop! wou ld be trai n ed " in accordance with the sa me doctrine to be used in fig h t in~ the m," Ge ne ral Pershi ng decid ed to est ablish t h e two fu nctions in to se pa rate staff sect ions beca use o f spa n o f co n trol and th e pr im acy of both fun ctiorn for success in co mb at. Ge ne ra l Fiske in itia lly thought se par ate sections were 3 bad idea , bu t as th e AEF sta ff de velo ped he saw the wisd om of h is ch ien decisio n . In or de r to tra in co ntinua lly w hil e hattie rage d , the AEF need ed an ovcrst reng tb of at least 50 percen t in o ffice rs and men . A corps was det erm ined to need six d ivisio ns, two o f wh ich wou ld be depo t or replacem en t d ivisions. One of th ese feede r d ivision s wou ld be located im medi ately to t h e rear of th e four com bat di vision s to "hold a nd train rep lace me n ts in officers and m en all the way from the div ision co m mander to th e priva te soldier." The ot her div ision was locat ed n ea r the por ts o f en tr y in to Fra nce to rece ive n ew men from th e Un ited Stat es, give t hem so me in d ivid ua l tra ining to incl ud e ma rksm an ship, th en to pass th ese men for wa rd to th e repl acem e n t di vision in the zone of operat ions for the rest of th eir prepar at io n . Ult im ate ly the port-sta tioned divis io n ide a was aba ndone d in favor o f la rger troop adm ln istra tlve cen ters . The n atur e o f the replaceme n t process, Fiske poi nt ed out, governed t he ent ire sc hool system for th e AEF. As co m ba t o pera tions began in t h e sp ring of 1918, "o ur wasta ge in officers was enorm ou s fro m the begi nn in g a nd beyo nd all of OUi a n ticipat ions." Bu t the dema nd s of officers an d nonco m missione d office rs for th e schools a n d for service in the rap id ly ex pa ndi ng logistics org a niz a tio n , the 50 S, also prod uced " wastag e" fro m th e line d ivisions an d from t h e availab le pool o f n ew men arrivi ng from the Uni te d States. Nea rly 11,000 new offi cers emerged fro m the can d idate schools in th e va rio us ar ms up to th e ti me of the Arm istice, In th e Un ited States , the class ificat io n syste m was sh unting th e ve ry best officer prosp ect s into the Air Service a nd t h e othe r specia lty arms at th e very ti me that in fa n try leaders were n eed ed in th e lin e d ivisio ns . "Th is co mbing of d ivisions robbed th em of office r ma teria l a nd grea tly delayed th eir p repara tio n for ba tt le." Mo bilizatio n an d training co n tin ued to p rop el the eng ine o f t he AEF from the rea r. In Franc e find ing a way to accommoda te Fren ch trai ning m et h od s and do ctrine, find ing en ough Frenc h-speakin g doughboys, a nd securing adeq uate billets an d transport con tin ua lly challen ged the AfF staff. Th e win te r of 19 17- 18 p resented ar d uo us trai n ing co ndi tions, inclu d ing in ade q uate col d wea ther clo t hi ng and eq uipme n t for th e troops. After th e war a nd the ret urn o f the AU to th e Uni ted States, Ma jor Genera l Jam es "V. ~v1cA n d rew, form er ch ief-of-staff of th e AEF, wrote of th e mi lita ry lesson s of the \Vorld War. lie sa id that :
18
If unp repa red whe n war co mes , it tak es more than a year to ca ll out , orga ni ze , eq ui p, and t rai n a rmies to mee t th e trai n ed sol diery o f o ur ene mies ... we kn ow t h at t h e tra ini n g o f th e officers to or gan ize, ins t ruc t, su pply and lead ou r co mb at u nit s in battl e is a matter not of weeks or of mont h s, but of yea rs .. , th a t hi gh er leaders in wa r and th e sta ff o ffice rs to w h om must fall th e ha rd est problems to so lve , m ust be t h e prod ucts of a lifc-t tm c stu dy o f t he ir professio n ... t he fact re ma ins t ha t .. . it was 14 m ont h s af te r o u r en t ry into th e wa r befo re th e America n Army bec a me a rea l fact o r in the st ruggle.
Command, control, communication, and intelligence The raising and support of a field army and its effective battl e employme n t are related, but qui te different. Th e form er is based on recruiting and per sonnel policies, tables of orga n ization and eq ui pme n t, and logist ical orga n izatio n . The latter is very mu ch a matt er o f doctrine, trainin g. and lead ersh ip. In this rega rd General Pershing's AEF in Fran ce and the \Var Dep ar tm ent in w ash ington were often at odds abo ut matt ers of co m mand and co n trol.
Secretar y of Wa r Newton D. Baker and his party view ing actio n at the fron t in March 19 18.T hey used a railway flat car as an o bservation
platfor m. (7776)
lEFr Secretary of War Newton D. Baker wi th Major Gen eral Jame s G. Harbord at HQ. Services of Supply. Tours. reviewing Quart ermaster t roops. (US Signal Co rp s, 23779)
ABOVE Secretary of W ar Newton D. Baker and Private Ca rlisle Babcoc k. ld Division, March 20, 1918, taken .....hlle Baker and Gene ral Persh ing were making an inspectio n of the lines o f Communication . (US Signal Corps, 8-1 S3) On March 6, 1917, Presid ent Wo odrow Wilson selected the former mayor o f Cleveland to succeed UndJey M. Garrison as secretary of war. Newton D. Baker was desc ribe d by his biogra pher as"a slim little man with a fight ing jaw
and a whim sical eye ." Major General John Persh ing called o n the new secretary of war in Wa shingto n in May 1917."1 was sur prised t o find him much younge r and co nsiderably smaller than I had ex pected :' The soon to be co m mande r-in-c hief of th e AEF quickly changed his impressio n after Baker explained why he selected Pershing ahead of a number of mo re se nior officers t o comma nd in France ." He was courteous and pleasant," recalled Pershing."and impressed me as being frank, fair.and business- like." Still under the impre ssion that he was to com mand a division. Pershing returned to Secretary Baker's office seve ral days later and learned th at he was to com mand the entire AEF.
Newton D. Baker was a strong supporte r of War De partment reform and of General Peyto n C. March. the army's chief-of-staff. Baker was able to st eer a course between the animos ities and jealo usies that sprouted in both the War Depa rtment General Staff and in the AEF Gen eral Staff, Moreover. President Wils on had confidence in his judgment and manage rial skills. Not just an office warrior, Mr. Baker traveled to the theater of war in France tw ice. He arri ved in Septembe r 1918 in time to view the attack against the St. Mihiel salient by the new ly esta blishe d Ame rican First Army.Accompanied by Count de Chambrun, re lated to Lafayett e, Baker walked th ro ugh the streets of the city t hat was the home of bo th the marqu is and the pres ident of France. Raymond Po incare.Acco rding t o his biograp he r. the diminutive secretary o f war had a goo d lo o k at America's army at war.
19
Newton D. Baker had replaced Lind ley M. Ga rriso n at the \ Va TDepartment h el m o n March 9 , 19 16, after a short careta ker period u nd er th e di rect io n of Ma jo r Ge ne ral Hugh L. Scott, chief-of-staff of the army. Baker ha d wa n ted Ma jor Gene ral Peyto n C. March fo r ar m y ch ief after Scott ste pped do wn in Septe mber 191 7 an d Major Gene ra l Tasker H. Bliss left for France an d service with th e Sup reme War Co unc il in May 19 18 . General Persh ing in stead sen t his frien d Ma jor Ge neral John Biddl e to \Vashi n gt on where till' co m pe ting in te rests, both civ ilia n a nd m ilitary, qu ickly ove rwhelmed h im . March replaced h im and arr ived fro m f rance to take u p h is du ties o n May 19, 1 91 ~ , giving Baker a you nger, m or e vigo rou s leader o f th e army who set to making h is new ju risd iction m ore efficie nt. It is impo rta n t to note th is civil- m ilita ry arrangement because it lies at th e h eart o f th e Amer ica n system o f co mmand and cont ro l of the armed forces. A major disp ute as to who com ma nded the a rmy- the civilian sec reta ry o r the senior u niformed officer-had bee n sett led in 1903 wi th the passage o f th e General Staff legis latio n. The Overma n Act ( ~ 1ay 20, 1918 ) confirmed till' p reside nt 'S au thori ty to act in emergencies and solidified the pr im acy of th e executi ve bra nch of th e go vernment in d irecting the na tion's war time efforts.
Command and control Field co m ma n d of the army in France was th e excl usive responsi bili ty of Ge ne ral Persh in g, an d Secreta ry Baker co n firme d that o n seve ral occasions. Persh in g exercised co nt ro l of th e army by ca reful selectio n of hi s su bo rdi nate com man de rs an d staf f office rs. Th e evo lutio n o f th e Ge ne ral Headq uart ers, ;\ EF, at Cha umo n t solid ified th at co n tro l. But the ch allenges were larger an d more num erou s th an mer ely creati ng a general h eadq uarters and staff. Th ere were co rps and di visions, and even tually two field arm ies, whi ch had to be organized and trai ned at the same time. Persh ing relied aga in o n tru sted subor d ina tes for thi s work, no tabl y Majo r Generals j ames G. Harb o rd , Robert L. Bu llard, james W. McAnd rew, Hunt er l.lggett , jo sep h T. Dickman , an d Brigadier Gene rals Ha ro ld B. Fiske, Paul H. Malone an d, importan tly, Fox Co n n er. Persh ing 's style o f co m mand was d irect, personal, and o ften in trusive. The re was no q uestion as to wh o the bos s was and wha t h e wa nt ed in th e ' ...'ay of perform ance and efficiency. Co lonel Geo rge C. Ma rsha ll, durin g the dar ker day s o f the Meu se-Argonn e cam paign, no ted that the com mand er-In -chief "ca rried him self wit h an ai r of relent less de term ina tio n to pu sh the o peration to a decisive
Organization of the W a r D e pa rtm e n t . A p r il 6, 1911
I
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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I
ADJUTANT GENEJIAl.
CH iEf Of COAST ARnWRY
,
, IOUARTERMAS'TtR, I GENERAl I
I
GH'EFOF
ORDNANCE
I I ras ARMY
20
INSPECTOR GENERAL
, SURGEON GENERAL
II
I I
JUDGE ADVOCATt GENERAL
CHIEFOF ENGINEERS
II
I I
CHIEF SIGNAL OfFICER
BUREAU OF INSULAR AFFAIRS
II
, PAHAMA CANAl
I
I
Side view of the same railway flat car as seen on page 19. (US Signal Corps , 7777)
victory. ' His bearing and demeanor "inspired co nfide nce" hut mad e clear that he would truck no slacking o r "weak-hearted" efforts. Major Gene ral Hunt er liggett, perhaps Pershin g's favorit e cor ps, and later army. comma nder said of his senior, "General Pershing had absolute authority, and his sta ndards were dra stic, to the great good fortune of th e American Army: ' Regarding his abil ities to work with those over whom he had no authority. Major General Jam es G. Harb ord . hismost trusted chie f-of-staff. said o n th e occasio n of th e American s' visit to th e Baker Board in London in early Ju ly 1917. "Gene ral Pershing sho wed mu ch tact and patience" in dealin g with a group of offi cers that had expressed disagreement with his views. He won them over and Influenced th eir report to Washington regarding policies to govern the AEF. Charles 1'. Summerall, who had been a mem ber of the Raker Board. assumed command of the 1st Divisio n o n Ju ly IS. 19 18, at th e o utset of the Sotssons campaign to redu ce th e Marn e salient. He was an extraordinary com bat leader. Late in life he wrote a n autobiog rap hical "diary" of his m ilita ry caree r. Speaki ng of the challenges to leade rsh ip in th e Soissons cam paign , he co mm ented o n the stress of combat: At anoth er tim e. the divi sion was to attack by orders of the Fren ch Corps at 4:30pm. At 4:25pm th e colo nel of a regiment called m e and
ABOVE General Tasker H. Bliss YlSlting II Corp HQ at Fruges.July 19. 191 8.( USSignal Co rps. 17226)
GeneralTasker Howa rd Bliss was viewed as a competitor by Pers hing, but the fo rmer army chief-of-staff was the ideal choice to re pres ent the United States on the Supreme War Counci l forme d at the Rapallc Confe re nce in November 1917. Bliss had been acting chief-of-staff of the army while General Hugh Seen accompanied the Root Mission to Russia in 1917. Uke Pershing and March, Bliss had been a military attache. His serv ice in Madrid during the Spanish-Am erican war was uneventful. mosdy because o f the secretive behavior of his hosts and the sho rt perio d of hostilities. but Bliss learned the ways o f the diplo mat that were to ser ve him well in France. Bliss enjoyed the co nfidence of both Secretary of War Newton Baker and pres idential envoy
"Colonel" Edward House. the political re prese ntative of the United States at the Supreme War Council. When General Pershing found himself at odds with the othe r senior commanders in France over issues that were part military and part political, such as the amalgamation controv e rsy, it was General Bliss who provided the iron hand in the velvet glove at the Supreme War Council to preserv e his field commander's prer ogatives and independence of action. Per shing respected Bliss and welco med his suppor t dur ing diffi cult times. Bliss occasionally was frustra ted by Pershing's htgh-handed behavio r with his peers but believed that the comman der-in-chief must be suppo rted. It was a good partnership.
21
said tha i h e co u ld n o t obey th e order a n d wou ld n o t atta ck . I told him as calm ly as po ssible tha i h e mu st not say an ything to h is ba ttalion command ers wh om I kn ew would attack. He sho wed himself un suited to be a co m bat reg im ental co m m an d er. Th e batta lion com man ders led t h ei r troops to ta ke th eir object ives. I fo u n d that th e co lo n el's co n n ectio ns wer e suc h that it wou ld be best n ot to relieve h im, but aft er the ba ttl e h e \,.....as t ran sfe rred o u t o f the division . Th us, th e two co lo n els in a brigad e stated they cou ld not obey a n atta ck ord er a nd the br iga de co m m an d er wa s too worn a nd m en tall y co nf use d to fo rce th e attac k. Suc h wa s the terri b le ordea l of batt le on offi cer s.
Ge neral Pershing with Marshal Hen ri Petain. commander of the French Army and hero of the epic fighting at Verdun in 1916. at Chaumon t. january 14. 1919. (US Signal Corps. 39676)
22
Officer s of the G·2 (intelligence) section of the 5th Division general staff studying the battle maps in the Bois de Tuilerie near Momfaucon duri ng the Meuse-Argonne campaign. (US Signal Corps. 283 14)
Gen eral Sum me rall's philo soph y of co mba t leadership was di rect and to the point. In stead of pu ni shing officers and so ld iers for cowa rd ice, he dea lt with what he called "cases of neurosis" by appealing to th e sh irker's sense of duty. "The great m ass of officers and men \.. -ill overcome th eir fears and the further th ey are to th e fro nt the less th ey fea r." When th e "Division Judge" presented h im with ch arges for co ward ice, Sum merall said "I told h im to destroy th e ch arges and sen d the men to th ei r co lonels who wou ld at o nce place th em in the fro nt line s where their fears v.. 'ould disappear or the other men wou ld take GHe of them . The difficulty disappeared as th e men h ad more experience in battle." Gen eral Sum merall believed that failure in combat is att rib utable more to "a state of mi nd of officers and men wh ich depr ives th em of a desire to fight " than to "the resista nce of the ene my." Leaders m ust "by person al contact and assura n ce incu lcate and maintain a will to win in every member of his comma nd ," he said. "I nev er tried a man for cowa rdice." Later in the war, General Summerall's own judgm en t was called into question wh en h is vague or ders to hi s beloved Ist Division, th en com mand ed by Brigadier General Frank Parker. to seize Sedan caused a n ear disaster as the 1st mar ch ed acro ss th e fronts of th e 77th and 42d Divisio ns, "captur ing" Brigadier Gen eral Douglas Mac/trthu r and several o f his officers. As it turn ed out, Su m me rall's understan ding of the m ission fro m General Persh ing, and the desire of both to have th e Americans in at the finish, led to tilt' pro blem . George Marsh all recalled th at th e First Army's chief-of-Staff, Brigadier General Hugh Dru m, a pprov ed the d raft prepared by Ma rshall to carry ou t the commander-inch ief's desire that th e First Arm )' be the first Allied troo ps to en ter Sedan . Drum inserted the co n troversial sen tence "Bou nda ries will not be co nside red b ind ing." Hunter Liggett said of Parker's handling o f the mi ssion that he "marched the div ision in seven colu mns-hand ling 2S,(X)() men like a battalion- right thro ugh th e First Arm y Corps upon Sedan ." Persh ing, perh aps recogni zing hi s own mistak e, sh rugged th e incident off, but Gen erals Dickman, th en com m and ing I Cor ps, and Su m me rall, V Cor ps com ma nder, carried th e grudge well in to the postwa r years.
ABOVE General (4-scar) Peyton Conway March. chief-of-staff. US Army. (US Signal Corps . 31190) Peyton Conway March. Lafayette College class of 1884 and West Point class of 1888. was in many respects similar to John J. Pershing-a "grim countenance."
straight milicary bear ing and a "stnct disciplinarian but a fair one ." An artillery officer. Major March served in the Philippines as aide-decamp to Major General Arthur MacArthur and on the First Army general scaffin that theater. Brigadier General March deployed to France in June 19 17 in co mmand of the arti llery brigade of the 42d Divisio n. was prom oted to major general . and. late r in November. was assigned to co mmand the AEF artillery at vafdabcn.!n February 1918. Major Gen eral March was selected by Secretary o fWar Newton D. Baker to become chief·of-scaffof the army. His prom oti on to four-star rank in May 1918 placed him. along with former army
chief. General Tasker H. Bliss. in that small group of officers of equivalent ra nk and often competing o bjectives. In Wash ington. Baker and March overhauled the creak ingWar Department administration and endeavored to improve its efficiency. Realignment of the genera l staff along functional lines supplanted many traditional bureau respo nsibilities and created the Chemical Warfare Service. the Air Service. th e Tank Corps. and severa l supply branches. He abolished the three categories of Regular Army. Nationa l Guard . and National Army in favor of a single unified army.John Pershing believed that March was dismand ing army traditi ons .
LEFT Major Ge nera l Jose ph T. Dickman with Brigadier Ge nera l Matin Cra ig and Co lone l A.C.Voris. O ctober 23. 1918. (US Signal Corps. 28332)
regiment. More schoo ling and service with the War Depart ment General Staff prepa red him for his appo intm ent to the rank of general officer in 1917. He took co mmand of the regular 3d Division and deployed with them to France in April and May 1918. In ear fyJune General Dickman deployed his division south o f the Marne River near Chateau·Thierry and blunted the German drive in the Aisne-Marne salient. The 3d Division earned its nickname. "Rock of the Mar ne ," during that operation. O n Oc to ber 12. Dickman took over command of I Co rps fro m Major General Hunter Liggett,and. on November 15. he was promoted to comm and Third Army.
Majo r General Joseph T. Dickman commanded consecutively the 3d Division. IV Co rps and. after the Armsitice. Third Army. He was one of the most effective officers in the AEF.A West Point grad uate. class of 1881. he began his caree r in the cavalry with service on the western frontier and in army schoo ls unt il 1898. In the Spanish-American war he se rved on Majo r General Jo e Wheeler's scaff in Cuba . then in the Philippines commanding an infanuy
The point is th at in h igh co m mand, persona lity an d style always matt er. Virtually all of the senio r co m manders of th e AEF were gradua tes of the relevan t amI)' schoo ls and kne w each o the r reason ably well. As Timoth y Nenninge r pointed out , however, it \\'35 not so mu ch th e co m ma nde rs th em selves. hu t rather "the process of co m mand" that had been lea rned and cod ified in the AEF that mat tered . Here was a ma jor vu lnerab ility of the expan di ng AEF- it was untested up unt il th e serious fighting in the Alsne-Mame salient in Jul y and August 19 18. This is probably explained by th e ra pid mobili zation, organization, train ing. a nd em plo yme n t of the American comba t and logistical uni ts up to th at po int.
Sergeant W B. Prince o f the G·2 (intelligence) topographical section plotting the fro nt lines of the 5th Division between Cuisy and Mo ntfauco n during the Me use- Argonne fight ing. (US Signal Cor ps. 28295)
Communicat ion Critical to com ma nd of th e ar m)' and its units in combat was control from top to bott om and reporting from bottom to top . Again, th e fledgling American field army was learn ing wha t worked and what d id not in the schoo l of trial and erro r. At th e co m pany and battalion levels, where th e action changed rapidl y o n the battlefield. con trol often de pe nded o n th e strength
23
Fiel d Sign al Battal io n
0
... ••
bd
15
I
~ 21
OUTPOST
17
I
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..
••
res
..
WIRE
I
.
••
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78
I
••
..
AEF Fiel d S ignal Battali o ns (Based on TO &Eof June 26. 1918)
Personn el Uni t/Secti on
26 Jun '18
Battalion HQ
Strength 15
Supply Section
17
Radio Company
78
W ire Company Outpost Compan y
78 285
Total C omba tants
473
Medical Dept.
15
Battalion Aggre gate
488
Outpost Company Headquarte rs Outpost Company Section Compa ny Aggregate
21 4
66 ea
285
Ani m a ls Draft Horses
12
Riding Ho rses
14 [incl. 5 with Outpost Co .]
Total Horse s
26
Major Eq uip m ent It e m s Esco rt Wagons (2-horse) Water Carts
2
Reel Carts (2-horse )
6
Ration Carts
2
Roll ing Kitchens
2
Combat Trucks ( 11IJ_ton. -t-wheel drive]
5 [incl. , with Outpost Co.]
SupplyTrucks ( I Ill-to n. -l-wheel drive)
5
Motor Cars 24
4 [incl. I with Outpost Co .]
(continued on page 25)
/
78
Motorcycles with Sidecar Motorcycles withou t Sidecar Pistols
IS rind. 2 with Medical Detach. & 5 with Outpost Co.] 6 [incl. I with Outpost Co.] 473 rind. 285 with Outpost Co.]
Source: United States Army InThe World War 1917-1 919 .Volume I: Organ ization of the American Expeditionary Forces (Washington: Historical Division, Deportment of the Anny, 1948)
of character and intuit ive ability of th e jun ior officers an d no ncommiss ioned officers. Orders prior to battl e were routine ly com munica ted in writ ing by th e five-paragraph field ord er learn ed in th e arm y schools and detailed in th e army 's few manuals. Often tim e interven ed , or the en emy did, and writt en ord ers were overtaken by verbal inst ructio ns from batta lion to co mpany co mmanders in person. There were no effective, reliable tactical radto s. bu t th ere was wire and lots of it. Wire worked well in defensive positions, but not i ll the att ack. Moving forward amidst th e din of artillery, machine-gun , and morta r fire meant th at platoon and company leaders had to rely o n hand and arm signa ls, an d runners. On the modern battl efield th at tech niqu e could soo n collapse, and did. For example, the operatio ns officer of the AEF, Brigadier General Fox Co n ner, reported at the end of the wa r th at as a result of the 1st Division 's operatio ns in the Sotssons coun tero ffen sive of July 19 18, 60 percen t of the division's in fantry officers were killed or woun ded . This sort of disrup tio n to the cha in of command had a far-reach ing effect o n the capabil ity of infant ry un its to receive andexecute combat orders simp ly because of th e loss of experienced perso nnel. Training does not compensa te for th at sort of trauma. Replacements, even wh en immediately available. requi re time to absorb th e sta nda rd o perating procedures of their new unit. In th e mean time , th e un it suffers degradat ion in combat effectiveness. Above th e company and battalion , th e com ma nders and staffs did their best to gather useful int elligen ce, formu late clear ord ers, and provid e th e necessary support to en sure success in battl e. They freq uen tly fell short of th e mark due to inexp erience and incom plete traini ng. Co mmunicatio n depended on wire supplemented by pigeon co uriers and visual signaling wit h flares, flags, and lights. George Marshall recounted in his memoirs tha t during th e final phase of o perations in th e Meuse-Argon ne, several of h is capta ins and lieutenants in the First Army operations sect ion of GHQ wanted a cha nce to see
Sergeant Swanker of the Signal Corps pigeon sec ucn ho lding the
first bird to carry a message during an attac k near Co rnieville, France . May 2. 191B. (US Signal Corps, 1200 I)
I S' "', D"I'" ,
-e.... ~ m iJ:/If,-S In ". :':"rs • ..
Recru iting pos ters for the Signal Corps Pigeo n Service . (US Signal
CO"" . 67598)
25
some actio n. Marshall dispatched four of the m as liaison officers and ha d the chief signa l officer instruct th em o n how to sen d messages by pigeon courier. Each had an orderly with six pigeons and ins tr uctio ns to sen d messages at 0700l1rs and 090011 rs, 1200h rs, and ISOOhrs on Novem ber 1, then agai n at 0900 l1 r5 and 1300h rs o n Novem ber 2. As the hatt ie un fo lded, the sta lwart pigeons Winged the ir way to First Army GHQ at Souilly with status repor ts and sketches. Marshall was able to turn thi s information aro und to the corps and d ivision HQ hy air plane d rop before th e repo rts ha d made t he ir way from the fron t lines co ming from lower to h igh er HQ! Duri ng this last ph ase of the fighting, "battle com m un ication between Army Headq uarters an d the corps and div isio ns was difficu lt to manage, d ue to the rapid ity of the ad vance," said Marshall. It too k mo torcycle messengers four to five hour s to make thei r way forw ard over congested, to rn-u p roa ds. Wire co mmu nic ations had been dis rupted dur in g the co urse of the batt le and th e signal corps troo ps co uld not replace poles and lint's q uickly enough .
In telligence
Soldier demon strating the use of the field signal project o r lamp. August 27.19 17. (US Signal Corps. I7258)
26
Telegraph tra iler at First Army headquarte rs. So uilly. France. being moved out of danger from incoming fire durin g the Meuse-Argonne campaign. October 30. 19 18. (US Signal Co rps. 284 13)
Intelligcnce is th e processed product of informatio n analyzed by expe rienced staff officers and non comm issio ned officers. Int ell igence ope ratio ns of the AEf were of two types. The first was tac tical, or batt lefield, int elligence. This was admi nistered by glea ning in form ation from th e Allied headqu a rters by means of military attac hes a nd liaiso n officers. It usually W
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"
o~
an independent co m bat a rm was close at han d.
Tank tactics
74
Ta n ks, like artill ery, were infantry sup po rt units in the \Vorld \Var. In th e French tank forces, a rtillery nomenclature wa s u sed to ident ify the h eavy tank un it s- grollpcmt'l1t in stead of co mpa ny and group instead o f battalio n . In bo th early batt les at Can tigny (May 191 H) and Solsso ns (luly 19tH). Fren ch tan ks with Frenc h crew s su ppor ted th e Ameri can o pera tions. AI Ca n ng n y th e 5th Grou p (batta lion) o f 12 Sch neider h eavy tanks, orga n ized in to three " ba tte ries" (,groupc",,,,,t o r company-sized u nl rsj of -l tanks each. attacked from west to east o n th e left (n or th) of the American infan try lin e. The ir advance wa s o n either side o f th e Village cem etery 011 the nor th side of Ca n tigny. In thi s ea rly act ion the French tanks were an
appe n d age to the infantry format ion s, n ot integ rated with th em. "The American In fan try furnis h ed 12 men to eac h Battery for Liaiso n . These men perform ed th eir duti es pcrtect ty-c-z wou nd ed ." The co m man der of th e Fren ch g rolll'CI/ /Cll t was an officer n am ed For san z. He reported th at the artil lery and the tan ks were mutua lly su pport tng . bu t the tanks had ext reme co n t ro l difficulti es wh en ope rati ng in low ligh t level s. Mo reov er th e approach march to th e line of departure "cou ld no t he co m pletely masked from observa tio n" by th e ene my, Th e ea rly morning fog rising from a creek plus the d ust raised by th e sh elling did give th e tanks som e conceal men t. Fora nz observ ed th at " th e American In fan try showed a remarkab le kn ovvledge of how to usc Tank assistance, following th em closely without allowing th emselves to be held up by the m, and sticking close to th eir barr age." Experime nts du ring the battle with a ta n k-towed fue l traile r and periscopes showed th at m ore wor k was needed to make th e techni qu es fully success ful. Lat er, in th e St. Mih iel and xt cu sc-A rgo nn c fight in g, th e American tank format ions were more closely coordi nat ed with the in fant ry assau lt. The tech n iqu e wo rked ou t was to USt' heavy ta nk s in th e van to crush the ene my wire, crea te lan es for th e in fa n try, and de stroy e ne my me ctun c-gun emplace me n ts. Th e tank s mov ed closel y be hi nd a ro lling barrage, hut th en waited for the infa n try and light tanks to co me forwa rd before co ntinui ng th e advance. At 51. xt tht ct (Sep te mbe r 12- 16, 191 8) th e Ame ricans di sco vered t he difference bet ween tra in ing a nd com bat. Th e resu lts we re d isap po inti ng. In order to be effecti ve, th e tanks m ust be ab le to maneuve r. Hea vy rains began to fall in th e o peratio na l are a the wed: p rior to til l' jump-of f da te crea ting a Stt-dcc p gela tino us slime in places. Sma ll streams we re over th ei r banks . Addit iona lly, th e Ge rman tren ches we re wide r than the 6ft span ca pa bi lity o f the Renau lts. The well- coord inated att ack tha t Patt on h ad p lan ne d soon broke down into sma ll fight s in volvi n g o ne or two tanks and very det erm in ed crewmcm bcrs. At thi s poin t, l' atto n 's emphasis on tra ining for his jun ior officers and non commissioned o ffice rs paid off. The American soldie r was at his best whe n im pro vising o n th e battl efield in th e face o f cha ngi ng cond itio ns. In add it ion to maneuverabilit y, tan k, relied o n the firep ower o f their ca n n o n a nd mach in e guns wit h th e crew pro tected by th e armor plate. The tank s st ill in ac tio n we re ru n n in g out of fuel and am m un ition, necessitat ing so m e m or e battlefield inn ov atio n to brin g th e supplies for ward . Commu n icatio n between tan ks a nd in fan try so ld iers was lin e of sigh t, all hampe red by th e smoke and noi se o f battle. In th e evening of Sep te m ber 14, t he Tank Corps was a ler ted for redeployme n t to th e Mouse-A rgonn e a rea to the n orth, part o f Colonel George Marshall's ma st erful realignment o f First Arm y from o ne battl e area to ano ther while still enga ged. Losses to enemy act io n were ligh t. Three tan ks h ad bee n destroyed by enemy artille ry fire, bu t -to we re stu ck in th e mu d or b roken down . Th e Germans had begun a ge nera l wit hd rawal from th e St. Mih icl sa lient at the beginnin g of th e Amer ican att ac k so a test o f th e tanks in the face of determi ned ene my resista nce still lay ahea d in th e diffi cu lt terra in between th e heights o f th e xt eu se River and th e Argonn e Forest. At the e nd of the wa r Ma jor General Ja mes ~l cAndr e w. AEF chid of staff, argue d that th e tan k forces must "train wit h t he infa nt ry and becom e part o f the inf an tr y" in o rder to assist the infantry with that mos t dif ficu lt ta sk of "actual closin g with the ene my a nd th e occu patio n o f the enem y's posit io n ." Rockenba ch , Patton, and their fellow tankers had made a good start.
Three stalwart flying officers of the Amer ican Air Service. Left to right.: ISt Lieut enant E.V. Rickenbacker; I st Lieutenant Do uglas Campbell (the first American ace) and Capta in Kenneth Marr. Photo taken near Tour, France , o n June 14, J 918 . (US Signal Co rp s. 158 19)
75
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Patton 's use o r armo r a t St . Mihi el
Verdun
000
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