The Army Air Forces in World War II Volume One

Volume One

PLANS AND EARLY OPERATIONS JANUARY 1939 TO AUGUST 1942

T H E ARMY A I R F O R C E S I n World War I 1 PREPARED UNDER T H E E D I T O R S H I P OF

WESLEY

FRANK

CRAVEN Princeton University

JAMES

LEA

GATE University of Chicago

New Imprint by thc Office of Air Force History Washington, D.C., 1983 .-

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Oface Washington. D.C. 20402

THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Published 1948. Manufactured by the VANREES PRESS,New York. Fifth Impression 1964 by THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

Copyright registration renewed 1975 This work, first published by the University of Chicago Press, is reprinted in its entirety by the Office of Air Force History. With the exception of editing, the work is the product of the United States government.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title : The Army Air Forces in World War 11. Vol. 1 originally prepared by the Office of Air Force History; v. 2, by the Air Historical Group; and v. 3-7, by the USAF Historical Division. Reprint. Originally published : Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1948-1958. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Contents: v. 1. Plans and early operations, January 1939 to August 1942-v. 2. Europe, torch to pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943-[etc.]-v. 7. Services around the world. 1. World War, 1939-1945-Aerial operations, American. 2. United States. Army Air ForcesHistory-World War, 1939-1945. I. Craven, Wesley Frank, 1905. 11. Cate, James Lea, 1899. 111. United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. IV. United States. Air Force. Air Historical Group. V. United States. USAF Historical Division. D790.A89 1983 940.54’4973 83-17288 ISBN 0-912799-03-X (v- 1)

11

T O THOSE WHO DID NOT COME BACK

United States Air Force Historical Advisory Committee (As of May 1, 1983)

Lt. Gen. Charles G. Cleveland, Maj. Gen. Robert E. Kelley, USAF Superintendent, USAF Academy USAF Commander, Air University, ATC Mr. DeWitt S . Copp The National Volunteer Agency Dr. Warren W. Hassler, Jr. Pennsylvania State University Dr. Edward L. Homze University of Nebraska Dr. Alfred F. Hurley Brig. Gen., USAF, Retired North Texas State University

iv

Dr. Joan Kennedy Kinnaird Trinity College Mr. David E. Place, The General Counsel, USAF Gen. Bryce Poe 11, USAF, Retired Dr. David A. Shannon (Chairman) University of Virginia

FOREWORD to the New

Imprint

N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget ordering each war agency to prepare < < an accurate and objective account” of that agency’s war experience. Soon after, the Army Air Forces began hiring professional historians so that its history could, in the words of Brigadier General Laurence Kuter, “be recorded while it is hot and that personnel be selected and an agency set up for a clear historian’s job without axe to grind or defense to prepare.” An Historical Division was established in Headquarters Army Air Forces under Air Intelligence, in September 1942, and the modern Air Force historical program began. With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for writing and publishing a seven-volume history. In December 1945, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander of Army Air Forces, asked the Chancellor of the University of Chicago to “assume the responsibility for the publication” of the history, stressing that it must “meet the highest academic standards.’) Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Frank Craven of New York University and Major James Lea Cate of the University of Chicago, both of whom had been assigned to the historical program, were selected to be editors of the volumes. Between 1948 and 1958 seven were published. With publication of the last, the editors wrote that the Air Force had “fulfilled in letter and spirit” the promise of access to documents and complete freedom of historical interpretation. Like all history, The Army Air Forces in World War 11 reflects the era when it was conceived, researched, and written. The strategic bombing campaigns received the primary emphasis, not only because of a widely-shared belief in bombardment’s con-

tribution to victory, but also because of its importance in establishing the United States Air Force as a military service independent of the Army. The huge investment of men and machines and the effectiveness of the combined Anglo-American bomber offensive against Germany had not been subjected to the critical scrutiny they have since received. Nor, given the personalities involved and the immediacy of the events, did the authors question some of the command arrangements. In the tactical area, to give another example, the authors did not doubt the effect of aerial interdiction on both the German withdrawal from Sicily and the allied landings at Anzio. Editors Craven and Gate insisted that the volumes present the war through the eyes of the major commanders, and be based on information available to them as important decisions were made. At the time, secrecy still shrouded the Allied code-breaking effort. While the link between decoded message traffic and combat action occasionally emerges from these pages, the authors lacked the knowledge to portray adequately the intelligence aspects of many operations, such as the interdiction in 1943 of Axis supply lines to Tunisia and the systematic bombardment, beginning in 1944, of the German oil industry. All historical works a generation old suffer such limitations. New information and altered perspective inevitably change the emphasis of an historical account. Some accounts in these volumes have been superseded by subsequent research and other portions will be superseded in the future. However, these books met the highest of contemporary professional standards of quality and comprehensiveness. They contain information and experience that are of great value to the Air Force today and to the public. Together they are the only comprehensive discussion of Army Air Forces activity in the largest air war this nation has ever waged. Until we summon the resources to take a fresh, comprehensive look at the Army Air Forces’ experience in World War 11, these seven volumes will continue to serve us as well for the next quarter century as they have for the last.

R I C H A R D H . KOHN Chief, Ofice of Air Force History vi

FOREWORD

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T HAS become a truism that no war in history was so well reported

as that which the United States entered on 7 December 1941.The reference is, of course, to the legion of correspondents, radio broadcasters, and feature writers who chronicled its daily progress. With equal appropriateness, the judgment might be referred to less widely publicized efforts to provide a more permanent historical record. Surely no such concerted effort has ever been made by the historical profession in America as that which was carried out under the auspices of the various armed services and of civilian governmental agencies during the war years. Of the appropriateness of such an effort the editors of this history, whether as professional historians or as citizens, can have little doubt. Twice within a single generation the country has been forced into a world conflict; in each case the major enemy was the same, but, as the second war opened, no adequate record of the experiences of the first had as yet been provided for either official or public use. The need for a history has seemed especially urgent in the case of the Army Air Forces. Younger than the other military arms, it had in 1941 barely outlived its growing pains. It had no tradition of historical scholarship within or without the service-no Mahan or Freeman. Much of what had been written about the Air Service in World War I had been episodic, personalized, apologetic. Authors who popularized the idea of air power were not trained historians: between the wars they wrote of the future; during the recent conflict they had no choice but to draw their conclusions from incomplete evidence. Today a considerable portion of the American public is air-minded, but amid discussion of the role of air power in plans for national security there exists no balanced synthesis of available knowledge of modern aerial warfare to which that public can turn. It is in an attempt to satisfy this want that the present work has been undertaken. One of the better histories of the Air Service, AEF, is prefaced with the statement that “the primary purpose of this book is to Vii

T H E A R M Y AIR FORCES I N WORLD W A R I1

demonstrate the necessity of a preparedness program for our air force.” * The present history has no such dogmatic aim. Its authors believe with one of the wisest military leaders of our generation that “in our democracy where the government is truly an agent of the popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion” and that the historian can render “the most essential service in determining the public policy relating to National Defense.” But they have taken to heart also his warning that historians “have been inclined to record victories and gloss over the mistakes and wasteful sacrifices” and that with6,834 aircrafr. It was expected that these planes, other than the 4,000-mile-radius type, would be based in the United Kingdom and the Suez region; and that since the latter type would not be available before 1944, an interim 148

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CORPS PREPARES FOR

WAR,

1939-41

program utilizing duplicate bombardment crews for the other types should be initiated in 1943. For protection of the air bases, 1 0 pursuit groups were to be located in the United Kingdom, 6 in the Near East. To avoid overcongestion in those areas, the 4,000-mile-radius planes, when available, would be based elsewhere, as in Newfoundland, Greenland, Africa, or India. T h e success of the whole program was predicated upon the ability of American bombers to conduct daylight missions far into Europe. In spite of earlier German and English experience, it was concluded that “by employing large numbers of aircraft with high speed, good defensive fire power, and high altitude,” it would be feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany by day. But to guard against expected improvements in German fighter defense, it was suggested that experiments be begun immediately to develop a heavily armed and armored escort fighter with long-range T h e planners considered it improbable that a large-scale invasion of Europe could be made before spring of 1944, which would coincide with the climax of the bomber attack, and they believed that “if the air offensive is successful, a land offensive may not be necessary.” Complete victory through air power alone, however, could not be assured, and provision was made for close support of ground forces in that assault. T h e tactical air force should include 13 groups each of light bombers (A-zo) and dive bombers, z photo reconnaissance groups, I 08 observation squadrons, and 19 transport groups.’46Pursuit units would include 5 groups set up as reserve for the British Isles and such of the interceptor units there as might be spared. Separate provisions were included for aircraft for training and for the transport of air materie1.l4’ Estimates were made for the requirement in pilots (103,482) and in total personnel (2,164,916),~~* and some general statements were given as to the methods of training. T h e President in his directive had stated that he was “not suggesting a detailed report,” but the air planners had, in effect, drawn up a blueprint for the approaching war. From the vantage point of the present it is easy to find flaws in this plan. Actual experience in the war showed that the forces allocated for strategic defense in the Pacific were inadequate, those for hemisphere defense too abundant. T h e qualified faith in the ability of air power alone to conquer Germany proved ungrounded, and the force scheduled for support of the invasion was weak in fighters. But viewed solely as a program for the ‘49

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strategic bombardment of Germany, AWPD/I was on the whole a remarkable document. True, neither the B-29, B-32, or longer-range models were utilized, but in other major respects the pattern set in 1941was sound. The timing was most accurate. The tactics advocated did prove feasible once the escort fighter was developed. The selection of target objectives was almost identical with that suggested by the postwar analysis of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 14’which is to say that, if the analysis was well founded, the program suggested in 1941 was more realistic than that which was later followed , The several plans which have been described and the meetings in which they were discussed were accorded a secret classification, but security was less than perfect. Newspaper versions of the President’s confidential report to administration leaders on the Atlantic conference were followed in November by scattered references to the Victory Program which gave evidence of further leaks.150 O n 4 December, a summary of the Joint Board Estimate, with verbatim extracts, was published in the Chicago Daily Tribune and other newspapers. Congressional critics of the administration, on the very eve of Pearl Harbor, registered protest against this “secret war plan,” now no more secret than any other item emblazoned in headlines and entombed in the Congressional Record. Regardless of the political issues with which these plans were involved, from the military point of view there is hardly room for debate. It was not an American tradition to enter a war with a carefully conceived strategic concept. For once, in this respect, the nation was prepared. But as General Arnold later put it, “we had plans but not planes.” AWPD/I could be rushed through in a week of frenzied work by a handful of staff officers; it would take a nation at arms several years to produce the aircraft and crews, the bases and technicians called for in the plan. In the summer of 1941, there seems to have been an impression among some of the military that war would not ’come until the following spring. In such case our preparations, still far from perfect, would have been more nearly adequate than they were when the Japanese struck suddenly on that Sunday morning in December. Yet in spite of the time element the defense measures which had been taken since the beginning of 1939 allowed us to absorb our initial losses and to begin, within less than a year, a limited offensive. 1 50

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in the North Atlantic, but the total mission was much more comprehensive and the means of accomplishment were dangerously inadequate. The First Air Force, with headquarters at Mitchel Field, New York, was acting as a major source of supply in the initial garrisoning and defense of North Atlantic bases. T o the normal responsibilities of the I Interceptor Command was added the task of planning for the air defense of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; detector sites were selected in co-operation with Canadian authorities, and representatives of the two nations worked toward a standardization of aircraft warning procedures in the area." The first movement of U.S. troops into Newfoundland occurred in January 1941 when a garrison arrived a t St. John's to form the nucleus of the Newfoundland Base C~mmand.'~ The command was ordered to defend U.S. military and naval installations in Newfoundland, to co-operate with Canadian and British forces defending Newfoundland and Canadian coastal zones, to support U.S. naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground forces encountered.15Command difficulties arising from the presence of several nationalities at first hampered American forces in accomplishment of their mission; but unity of command for all forces on the island, which might have alleviated the difficulties, was obviously impossible so long as Canada was at war and the United States was not. Initial plans for Army air garrisons called for a composite group,* numbering 263 officers and 2,842 enlisted men, to be stationed at the Newfoundland Airport at Gander Lake, but only one squadron had reached the station by the end of November 1941. A pursuit squadron was scheduled to be stationed a t Argentia, site of a U.S. naval base on Placentia Bay, while Army airways detachments were planned for St. John's airport on the eastern coast and for Harmon Field, Stephenville, in the western part of the island. In May 1941, the First Air Force sent the zrst Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with six B-18's, to the Newfoundland Airport, and in the following month eleven transport planes were allotted to the base command for moving supplies and men to the island. In August, when a few heavy bombers became available for transfer to Newfoundland, the 4 I st Reconnaissance Squadron replaced the 21st Squadron, and the defending air * A composite group was made up of squadrons equipped with different types of planes.

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force was then composed of 8 B-I~B's,5 3 officers, and 449 enlisted men, plus an air base squadron." Under the guidance of Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Brant, Army commander in Newfoundland, policies on joint operations were arranged for the new B-17's and for B-IS'S operated by Royal Canadian Air Force units stationed at the Newfoundland Airport. Air operations were confined largely to reconnaissance, but occasional attacks were made against German submarines which approached the island shores.'? An increase in submarine activity in November brought a request from the Navy for more Army air units a t the Newfoundland Airport in order to afford greater protection for Allied shipping and to insure the safety of essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December 1941 the 49th Bombardment Squadron, with nine B- I 7B's, was preparing to depart from the United States for Newfoundland, and the AAF was attempting to obtain a small supply of depth bombs which were needed for attacks on submarines.*' Air defense preparations in Greenland were not so far advanced as those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring and summer of 1941 had failed to disclose any site suitable for an airfield on the eastern coast, but a promising site was found on the southern tip of the island at Narsarssuak, about thirty-five miles northeast of Julianehaab.20In west Greenland a suitable location for a staging field was found in the Holstensborg district, and top priority was given to the building of runways and air base facilities in order to speed delivery of aircraft to Great Britain.'l Plans were made to develop the Narsarssuak site into a major air base as rapidly as possible, the Secretary of W a r having directed in the spring that establishment of a Greenland air base be accelerated." Proposed sites for other military installations were investigated during the fall of 1941 by Col. Benjamin F. Giles, an Air Corps officer who had been designated to head the Greenland Base Command." T h e planned Army air garrisons for Greenland, approved by the W a r Department in October, comprised one heavy bombardment squadron, one interceptor pursuit squadron, an air base squadron, weather and communications detachments, and air service units totaling 921 officers and men. 2 4 Only a few weather, communications, and aviation engineering troops had arrived by December 1941;tactical squadrons could not be sent until construction of airfields and housing had been completed. Two stations in the Army airways communications system were in operation I57

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in Greenland by this time, and two companies of aviation engineers were hurriedly constructing the facilities necessary for air defense of G~eenland.’~ American defense preparations in Iceland were accorded a degree of urgency not given to those in Greenland, even though more than 2 5 , 0 0 0 British troops were protecting the island. On 5 July 1941 President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, directed that one Army pursuit squadron with the necessary maintenance and administrative detachments be sent to Iceland as soon as practicable. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was immediately prepared for shipment, and on 2 5 July the air echelon, with thirty p-40’~and three primary training planes, boarded the carrier Wasp a t Norfolk, Virginia. T w o days later an air base squadron sailed from New York for Iceland, and American planes shortly were operating from the Reykjavik airdrome in southwestern Iceland. The air service contingent was augmented in November by 2 I officers and 336 enlisted men from the First Air Force, comprising ordnance, weather, aircraft warning, and materiel units.” American ground forces were also arriving in Iceland, but complete relief of British forces was not expected to be accomplished before May 1942; until that time the defense of Iceland was the joint responsibility of all air, ground, and naval forces stationed there. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in December 1941,American forces in Iceland were operating under orders which stipulated that the approach of any Axis forces to within fifty miles of the island would be deemed “conclusive evidence of hostile intent” and would justify attack by the American defenders. The mission of Army aviation, operating under the Iceland Base commander, included independent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land and naval forces in offensive and defensive operations, aerial reconnaissance and photographic operations, and transportation of supplies and personnel. The 33d Pursuit Squadron was of course incapable of carrying out all phases of the mission, and plans were being made for shipment of a bombardment squadron, an observation squadron, and an additional pursuit squadron.“ Reinforcement was delayed both by the shortage of trained squadrons in the United States and by the lack of proper aviation facilities in Iceland. British forces had prepared two airfields for limited operations and had formed a coastal observation network of thirty-nine I 58

DEPLOYMENT ON T H E EVE O F HOSTILITIES

posts, all provided with telephone communications. But new airfields, improvements in existing airfields, and large quantities of aircraft warning equipment were required to complete the basic defense of the island. For stations not immediately adjacent to seaports, the supply problem was extremely difficult; there were no railroads, and many roads were closed during the winter. Utilities such as electric power and water were not available in sufficient quantities to supply the needs of the armed forces. In spite of the necessarily slow development of facilities, the first Army air units gained valuable experience in operating with the Royal Air Force at the Reykjavik and Kaldadarnes airdromes. An alert system was in use twenty-four hours a day, and air operations were carried out in accordance with procedures tested and established by the British during two years of war against the Axis.28 In October, when weather conditions began to interfere seriously with the operation of Navy patrol bombers in Iceland, the Chief of the Army Air Forces directed that a heavy bombardment squadron and the necessary service troops be sent immediately to Iceland, prepared to operate in lieu of naval air forces in protection of shipping as well as to operate in defense of the island.*’ The decision represented a great concession on the part of the AAF, for a t that time the Air Force Combat Command had a total of only thirty-four heavy bombers which were not earmarked for overseas stations and the transfer of eight planes to Iceland would have left only twenty-six heavy bombers in the United States. The proposed move was not made because of the poor condition of runways and the lack of base facilities in Iceland.30 Transfer of a medium bombardment squadron, equipped with eighteen B-~sB’s,was being held up for the same reasons, and the first week in December found the AAF seeking approval of an extensive program of air base construction for Iceland. A study of the situation indicated the desirability of sending a complete heavy bombardment group to the island for operation against surface and undersea craft in conjunction with the Navy and for protection of shipping in the North Atlantic. There was likewise need for two medium bombardment squadrons to collaborate in the work, especially prior to development of facilities for heavy bombers. Addition of a pursuit group and construction of an air base on the east coast of the island were regarded as essential to thorough defense operations, for German aircraft at that time could fly without too much

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risk over the greater part of Iceland.31But despite the recognized need for Army air units at all North Atlantic bases, only token forces were deployed in the area by 7 December 1941.

The Caribbean The concept of far-flung air defense was receiving wide application in the Caribbean area, with new air bases, nests of antiaircraft guns, and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Distributed among the military fields and installations were I , I I z officers and 14,974 enlisted men of the AAF and approximately 137 pursuit planes, 77 bombers, z z attack aircraft, and 9 observation planes. Combat effectiveness, however, was not assured by numerical strength, for a majority of the men were incompletely trained and most of the aircraft were obsolete. Partially trained forces were expected to complete their training while performing basic defense duties, but the shortage of modern aircraft and the necessity of erecting barracks and other base facilities acted as deterrents to the program. More significant than the number and status of troops deployed in the area were the broader aspects of air force organization and planning and the position of air units in relation to other forces in the Caribbean Defense Command. Under the guidance of Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, the scattered Caribbean units had been welded into an integrated air force which was essentially a task force, complete within itself, capable of both independent and co-operative action, and commanded only by air officers.32 The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked structural advance over the force which previously had been depended upon for the air defense of the Panama Canal. Although military aviation had been a part of canal defenses since 1917, until late in 1939 Army air units, then organized under the 19th Wing, had occupied a subsidiary position in the Panama Canal Department. During the early months of 1940 the whole subject of canal air defense was reexamined by the War Department, and with Air Corps expansion the 19th Wing developed into "the Panama Canal Department Air Force, which in turn provided a nucleus for the Caribbean Air Force in the spring of 1941. The capabilities of modern aircraft, as demonstrated in the European war, led American military commanders in tbe Canal Zone to * See maps, pp. I 60

300, 543.

CONSTRUCTION OF ALASKAN LANDING FIELD, AUGUST 1941 CONSTRUCTION AT A CAMP IN ICELAND, NOVEMBER 1941

P-26 P-35

DEPLOYMENT O N T H E EVE O F HOSTILITIES

the conclusion that an air assault on the locks and other vital installations would be the most likely form of attack by an enemy in the area. T h e importance of air defense was consequently heightened, although the mission of Army air forces in the Canal Zone remained unchanged. A Joint Board report in 1937 had specified the joint mission of Army and Navy forces in the Panama Canal Department as “protection of the Panama Canal in order that it may be maintained in continuous operating condition,” obviously for passage of the fleet. The Army mission was to protect the canal against sabotage and against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission was to support the Army in defending the canal and to protect shipping in the coastal zones. Local defense plans gave Army aviation the responsibility of air defense of the canal, with the understanding that naval patrol planes would carry out distant reconnaissance, patrolling, reporting, and tracking. T h e two major tasks of the Army air component consisted of furnishing an offensive or striking force to destroy enemy vessels encountered and of furnishing a defensive force to combat air attacks. Similar missions were assumed by other Army air contingents as bases were established throughout the Caribbean and by the Caribbean Air Force upon its activation in May 1 9 4 1 . ~ ~ Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico presented the most advanced stage of development in air defenses by December I 941, primarily because preparations had begun early in 1939. T h e Air Corps had previously been unable to secure approval of an air base in Puerto Rico, for the W a r Department regarded such a development as purely a wartime measure. A site in the Punta Borinquen area was selected for a major air base, and seven sites were chosen for auxiliary airfields. In December 1939 the 27th Reconnaissance Squadron arrived from the United States to begin the air defense of Puerto Rico. One year later, approval had been granted for creation of a composite wing in Puerto Rico, to consist of an interceptor pursuit group, one heavy and one medium bombardment group, two air base groups, two reconnaissance squadrons, and one observation squadron. Cadres for some of the units were sent from the United States early in 1941, and by subdividing they furnished the skeleton forces needed for activation of other units. T h e 13th Composite Wing, under the command of Brig. Gen. Follett Bradley, became the initial unifying agency for military aviation in Puerto Rico, while a provisional air defense command was established to

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direct the operation of antiaircraft artillery, aircraft warning services, passive defense measures, and interceptor aviation. The last element was conspicuous by its absence throughout most of 1941, but the plan for unified air defense was keeping pace with developments in the Zone of the Interior. The aircraft strength of the 13th Wing by the end of April 1941, consisting of only three A-17’s and twentyone B-I~A’s,was not sufficient to meet either defense or training needs of the 27th Reconnaissance Squadron, the 25th Bombardment Group (H), and the 40th Bombardment Group (M), which made up the tactical component of the wing. The Army air garrison in Puerto Rico was therefore not called upon at that time to assist in establishing air defense units on other islands of the Caribbean.34 In Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, British Guiana, and the Bahamas, Army engineers were constructing facilities a t each base to permit operations by one heavy bombardment group and one long-range reconnaissance squadron. An airfield in Trinidad was being furnished with similar facilities, along with provisions for one interceptor pursuit group.35Bermuda, while not in the Caribbean area, was related to both Caribbean and continental defense, and airfield construction on the leased site was being designed to accommodate one composite group of the AAF.36Accommodations a t the new bases did not necessarily determine the size of garrisons, for tactical units were not available in sufficient numbers to be stationed at all of the fields. The approved peacetime garrisons called for one heavy bombardment squadron and a group headquarters at Bermuda, an airways detachment a t Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, and British Guiana, and a composite wing of one heavy bombardment group, one pursuit group, and one reconnaissance squadron at Trinidad. 3 7 Considerable importance was attached to early garrisoning of the Piarco airport at Trinidad. In the latter part of April 1941 a base force sailed from New York, while an air contingent of some 400 officers and enlisted men with six B-18A’s moved from the Canal Zone to Trinidad.3* In July other Caribbean bases began to receive garrisons, when airways detachments and infantry units were shipped from New York to British Guiana and St. Lucia. Similar forces were sent to Antigua in September and to Jamaica in the following month.39 Despite the attention given to new bases, the Canal Zone continued to be the focal point of Caribbean defenses. France Field on the Atlantic side of the Zone and Albrook Field on the Pacific side were 162

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air bases of long standing, while a third permanent base, Howard Field, was nearing completion three miles from Albrooli. Scattered throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were ready for immediate use, and a number of emergency landing fields which did not require extensive improvements. By the first week of December 1941 a total of 183 planes, as opposed to an authorized strength of 396, were assigned to bases in the Canal Zone. A t Albrook Field were I 14 aircraft of all types, including 7 I P-~o’s,while France Field had 49 planes, most of them obsolete, and Howard Field had t o aircraft, including 1 2 A-ZOA’S.Such outmoded types as the P-26 and the A-17 made up a large part of the strength; their value in protecting the canal was negligible.4o Of eight B- I 7’s, which comprised the heavy bombardment force of the entire Caribbean area, four had been sent to Trinidad and four were in Panama b y November, but the growing crisis in the Far East resulted in a move to concentrate the planes in the Canal Zone b y December. Tactical units defending the canal included the 6th and 9th Bombardment Groups ( H ) , the 59th Bombardment Squadron (L), the 16th, 32d, and 37th Pursuit Groups, the 7th and 44th Reconnaissance Squadrons, and the 39th Observation Squadron. Three air base groups, an air depot, and signal and ordnance units performed the necessary service functions in the Canal Zone.41 Steps toward co-ordination of defense efforts in the Caribbean area had been taken early in 1940. Joint Army and Navy war plans, recognizing the possibility of enemy action in the region, had defined the bounds of a Caribbean theater, and Army plans provided for designation of the commanding general of the Panama Canal Department as commanding general of the theater. In the spring of 1941 the plans were put into action with formation of the Caribbean Defense Command; organization of a single air force as a part of the command was a natural Concomitant to the action. T h e defense command was divided into Panama, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad sectors, the commanders of which were responsible for defense of the respective areas and for training of all assigned personnel except those of the Caribbean Air Force. T h e air force, organized on a theater-wide basis and subdivided into bomber, interceptor, and service commands, was charged with planning, training, and execution of plans for air operations and defense against air attack throughout the Caribbean. T h e basic principle of its organization was the concentration of force

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under one command in order that the full weight of available air power could readily be thrown against an enemy at whatever point he might appear. Operational planning in the Caribbean took on a new note of realism during the months just prior to American entry into the war. Joint plans for armed assistance to certain South and Central American republics, in the event of attack by a non-American state or by “fifth columnists,” provided for action by Caribbean defense forces and also troops in the United States. Essential features of the plan called for the occupation on forty-eight hours’ notice of strategic interior points by Caribbean-based troops transported by air, the prompt occupation of seaports by naval forces, and the reinforcement of these forces by Army expeditionary troops dispatched from the United States. It was clear that the security of the Panama Canal would be menaced by the successful overthrow of recognized governments in countries near the canal and the establishment of regimes opposed to the principles of Pan American solidarity. Although there was no occasion to invoke these plans, their existence gave the Caribbean Air Force a high priority in the delivery of transport planes from the United States and enabled Caribbean defense forces to experiment with airborne operations in the fall of 1941. Following activation of an infantry airborne battalion at Howard Field and arrival of a parachute battalion from the United States, co-operative exercises were carried out by ground and air forces in the Canal Zone, and subsequent reassignment of the airborne units from the Panama Canal Department to the Caribbean Air Force for training purposes made possible a higher degree of co-ordination. Of the overseas departments of the Army, the Caribbean Defense Command was unique in the possession of airborne forces on the eve of hostilities. Local planning for armed assistance to Latin-American republics served to emphasize the need for closer Army-Navy co-ordination in the Caribbean. A considerable body of evidence indicated that