Terrorism's Unanswered Questions

Terrorism’s Unanswered Questions Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regent...

Author: Adam B. Lowther | Beverly Lindsay

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Terrorism’s Unanswered Questions

Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Terrorism’s Unanswered Questions

Edited by Adam B. Lowther and Beverly Lindsay

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL

Westport, Connecticut

•

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Terrorism’s unanswered questions / edited by Adam B. Lowther and Beverly Lindsay; p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–313–35322–2 (alk. paper) 1. Terrorism. 2. World politics—21st century. I. Lowther, Adam. II. Lindsay, Beverly. HV6431.T45695 2009 363.325—dc22 2008023725 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2009 by Adam B. Lowther and Beverly Lindsay All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008023725 ISBN: 978–0–313–35322–2 First published in 2009 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Prefacing Our Current Journey on Terrorism (Beverly Lindsay and Adam B. Lowther) Chapter 1: Introduction (Adam B. Lowther)

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PART I: UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

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Chapter 2: Terrorism: Its Goals, Targets, and Strategies (Craig Stapley)

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Chapter 3: Measuring the Enemy: Social Support for Islamist Terrorism (Gordon L. Bowen)

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Chapter 4: Terrorism and International Law: Past, Present, and Future (John M. Czarnetzky)

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PART II: THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF TERROR

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Chapter 5: Targeting: Terrorism and Nongovernmental Organizations Collide (Craig Stapley)

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Chapter 6: The Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat to the United States (Adam B. Lowther)

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Chapter 7: Purifying the Heart: Suicide . . . or Jihadi Acts? (Russ Rodgers)

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CONTENTS

PART III: SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL VARIABLES

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Chapter 8: A Social Psychological Perspective on Terrorist Behavior (Daniel B. Kennedy and Robert J. Homant)

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Chapter 9: Democracy, Terrorism, and University Engagement (Beverly Lindsay)

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PART IV: MOVING TOWARD THE FUTURE

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Chapter 10: Multidisciplinary Perspectives and Policy Research on Terrorism: Creating Authentic Solutions or Lingering Intellectual Debates? (Beverly Lindsay)

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Selected Bibliography

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Index

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About the Editors and Contributors

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Prefacing Our Current Journey on Terrorism

Falsehoods continually masquerading can appear to be truths.1 Paraphrase of Bernard Lewis, 2008 (Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus, Princeton University)

Like an unchecked cancer, hate corrodes . . . and causes [one] to describe the beautiful as ugly and the ugly as beautiful . . . and confuse the true with the false and false with the true.2 Martin Luther King, Jr.

In a country situated on a separate continent and cultures apart far from our original home state of Texas, we met in Israel. Our early socialization and education focusing on the Lone Star State receded into the background, yet lingered. While exploring different political, social, and religious features, we interacted in a nation that the media leads us to believe has confronted terrorism continuously since its founding in 1948. We, along with other academic fellows, pondered and explored the various inescapable facets of terrorism, which are often not captured via media outlets or in the cultural milieus of home states. How to capture our previous scholarship, fellowship experiences, and the subsequent knowledge generated—for our students, colleagues, policymakers, and international communities—grasped our attention. Why not develop a volume devoted to one of the most pressing international challenges of our day? As our ideas germinated, we embarked upon an intellectual journey that moved us into uncharted waters, due, in part, to disciplinary boundaries and previous positions. Yet facets were already charted or being altered by our peer academic fellows who represented other disciplines. The planning, designing, researching, and writing of our chapters

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PREFACING OUR CURRENT JOURNEY ON TERRORISM

and other publications moved us beyond our ‘‘comfort knowledge’’ as we raised new questions of our colleagues and ourselves. At times, we did not know precise questions to enunciate, while at other times our colleagues suggested questions that we had examined years earlier. In the process, still new questions were posed which elevated all to a higher plane of intellectual, policy, and applied discourse—as Terrorism’s Unanswered Questions took shape. While we were in Israel during summer 2006, our questioning sharpened through engagements with a range of individuals representing diverse demographic backgrounds. Beverly Lindsay arrived in Israel, weeks before other academic fellows, and she interacted constantly with students, faculty, and administrators at Tel Aviv University. Of special note were those in the Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, a site that seeks to understand and prevent violence and terrorism. During that time, Tel Aviv University was celebrating its 50th anniversary; hence she was able to interact with alumni and community representatives who shared knowledge, along with those who typically spend time at the university. Discussions ensued wherein she recalled aspects of her past visits to Israel and the university so that she juxtaposed previous observations with the then present ones. Appreciation is expressed to dozens of individuals from her encounters, including those posing penetrating questions after her invited address to the Faculty of Education. As we portray in Chapter 1, we mingled with a range of citizens during the official and unofficial aspects of our academic fellowship. We spent time having discussions with young Ethiopian women training to become police officers. Their parents migrated to Israel via the November 1984 to January 1985 Operation Moses and May 1991 Operation Solomon airlifts of Jewish Ethiopians to their religious homeland. In some cases, parents and relatives had sojourned in the United States. Perhaps needless to say, they voiced unique perspectives on Israeli society. So too did young women naval officers who, like male counterparts, are serving required military assignments; they articulated perspectives concerning women, children, and families. At other times, we listened to a military colonel who migrated to Israel from South Africa prior to the former nation’s gaining independence. Hearing illustrations of terrorism and violence about a country then seeking independence, compared to one that had become a new nation only about 60 years earlier, contributed to insights. We are grateful for their perspectives. While the origins of this volume commenced in Israel, we built upon our years of experience via our diplomatic, scholarly, and military assignments on six continents. Diplomats in American embassies and consulates ranging from London to Pretoria, Seoul, Sydney, and Maputo, Mozambique shared their insights. Moreover, former American, Australian, and German ambassadors who spent decades in the diplomatic corps contributing to ‘‘soft power’’ (that is, diplomatic solutions to problems) offered background knowledge leading to our current work. We recognize and appreciate the myriad of perspectives expressed regarding the multifaceted phenomenon of terrorism. Other facets are examined in other titles published by Praeger Security International, the publisher of this volume. Hence we trust that readers will


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view other Praeger Security International books, along with those from other scholarly and policy sources, as preventive measures and solutions are posited. Profound appreciation is extended to the professionals who contributed their immense time and talent by penning chapters for our volume. The professor of law enables us to begin comprehending the myriad of dimensions involved in international law pertaining to terrorism, while sociologists and criminologists help us refine our thinking on ‘‘groupthink.’’ Professors of political science explicate nuances of defining terrorism, while others assist us in sorting complexities of social and political components affecting personal attitude formations and public expressions. Certainly, in our preface, we could cite extensively what we have gleaned from each author. All contributions are valuable. Still other individuals contributed, beneath the radar, to the fruition of this volume. Numerous students, professors, government officials, and civic leaders voiced comments and questions during our national and international conference and embassy presentations. The talented doctoral assistant, Suzanne M. Hickey, further honed her research and editorial skills while engaging in extensive logistics for us from compiling the bibliography to engaging in background research. The Praeger and BeaconPMG editors, Adam Kane, Asha Ravi, and Anne Beer provided guidance and editorial assistance during various phases of this project. David Silverstein and other professionals, formerly of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy (which funded our academic fellowships in Israel) assisted us before and during our Israeli sojourn. Of course, we are forever grateful to our immediate and extended families who have supported our intellectual development from our Texas childhoods through graduate school days to current positions. They were bedrocks as we spent countless days on the production of this volume. We truly hope that our volume, Terrorism’s Unanswered Questions, will enhance scholarship, policy formation, and program applications of domestic and international university sectors, diplomatic communities, government officials, and peace and security apparatus. Illuminating realities and envisioning that which does not exist will contribute to our communities, so we are not bound by falsehoods which both the eminent Princeton University scholar Bernard Lewis and the iconic Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. voiced. Consequently, as we raise questions and pose responses, we seek to ensure that authentic truths and solutions prevail as the journey continues. Beverly Lindsay Professor and Senior Scientist Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania Adam B. Lowther Research Professor Air Force Research Institute Maxwell Air Force Base Montgomery, Alabama

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NOTES 1. Bernard Lewis, ‘‘Studying the Other: Different Ways of Looking at the Middle East and Africa,’’ Keynote Address, Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, Annual Conference, Washington, DC, April 25, 2008. 2. ‘‘Quotes by Martin Luther King, Jr.,’’ http://www.quotationpage.com (accessed June 27, 2008).

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Introduction Adam B. Lowther Like many Americans I still remember exactly where I was and what I was doing when the World Trade Center was attacked on the morning of September 11, 2001. I was at home reading for an upcoming class when a friend in California called and said, ‘‘Adam, you are not going to believe this, but a plane just flew into the World Trade Center.’’ Surely my friend was joking. Why would anyone fly a plane into a skyscraper? When I turned the television on, it was a shock to see that it was true. For the rest of the day, the television was my constant companion as the events of 9/11 unfolded. In the days and weeks that followed, the American people discovered that it was at the behest of Osama bin Laden, now a household name, that nineteen jihadis boarded planes in the United States for the purpose of striking a devastating blow at the ‘‘Great Satan.’’1 While Osama bin Laden was responsible for attacking American interests overseas on a number of occasions, this was the first attack on the homeland. The ‘‘paper tiger’’ that, in Osama bin Laden’s eyes, had failed to respond to six previous attacks took less than a month to begin a campaign that would destroy al Qaeda’s base in Afghanistan and topple the Taliban regime supporting it.2 Osama bin Laden and Mullah Muhammad Omar made a critical error in judging that the United States would not respond with overwhelming force to the 9/11 attacks, and in judging that if it did respond, American troops entering Afghanistan would have an experience similar to the Soviet Union. Their miscalculation of American resolve is understandable. In every previous instance when al Qaeda attacked American interests (Mogadishu 1993; World Trade Center 1993; Dar al Salaam 1997; Nairobi 1997; USS Cole 2001) the president’s response was muted. This was due, in part, to President Clinton’s approach to terrorism which he saw as criminal activity rather than an act of war.3 Throughout his presidency, Bill Clinton devoted much of his foreign policy agenda to bringing Israel and the Palestinian Authority together for a final peace agreement. An aggressive response to perceived peripheral attacks against American interests abroad was thought to be a threat to this effort. Bin Laden mistook the

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American approach for weakness. Thus, it was thought that promoting future attacks against the United States would further the political objectives of al Qaeda.4 The attacks of September 11, 2001 were the culmination of a decade-long campaign of strikes against the United States and its interests abroad. Neither bin Laden nor Mullah Omar understood the nature of politics in the United States, where the election of a president can lead to significant change in the direction of American foreign policy. This was certainly true of the 2000 election when George W. Bush was elected President of the United States. With the new president’s foreign policy circle dominated by neoconservatives seeking to reshape the Middle East, a more aggressive approach to violent Islamic fundamentalism5 and attacks against the United States and its interests was to be expected.6 (Distinctions between Islamic extremism and Islamic fundamentalism are explicated in endnote 5.) For the American public, however, it was only after the single most devastating attack on American soil in the nation’s history that terrorism became a problem of concern for every citizen. American priorities changed. Security became a paramount concern, and the rather small cadre of terrorism experts in the United States began to swell as academics shifted their focus to look at this ‘‘new’’ phenomenon. The modest number of terrorism analysts at the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), and other intelligence agencies began to dramatically expand. A newfound interest in an old form of warfare took the nation by storm as newspapers, magazines, books, and television devoted much more of their coverage to terrorism. The GWOT (Global War on Terror) became an American obsession. PURPOSE Our purpose is twofold. First, we seek to use the diverse talents of scholars in criminology, military history, political science, sociology, and strategic studies to develop an improved understanding of key elements of terrorism where there is a lack of consensus. These include addressing questions of: defining terrorism, public support for Islamic fundamentalism, international law, target selection, terrorist’s likely use of WMD (weapons of mass destruction), jihad, terrorist psychology, and the role of universities in preventing terrorism. Second, we offer innovative alternatives to the dominant way in which terrorism is understood, limited, of course, to the specific areas we address. For example, the discussion of WMD and their likely use by terrorists against the United States calls into question the alarmism that dominates the current literature on the subject. The chapter discussing the role of university engagement in reducing the appeal of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism is a topic absent in the literature. Providing innovative understandings of terrorism is a theme that is prevalent throughout the work. This is an edited volume of original pieces whose roots lie in a majority of the contributors’ participation in the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy’s Academic Fellows program, which sent us to Israel in the summer of 2006 to examine Israeli counterterrorism tactics. Our experience had dual purposes. During the official portion of our journey, we examined Israeli counterterrorism efforts. For the state of Israel, the prevention of

INTRODUCTION

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attacks against its civilian population is a core responsibility for which its successes are evident in the world. While not successful in stopping every attempted attack, no country in the world is as good at preventing would-be suicide bombers from carrying out their deadly missions. It was for this reason that Israel was our destination. In our ‘‘free’’ time we observed the impact of terrorism on the lives of ordinary Israelis. We visited a bar on the Tel Aviv beachfront, next door to the American embassy, called Mike’s where we sat in the same spot where a suicide bomber blew himself and others up a little more than a year earlier. Mike’s is still open and serving the only pepperoni pizza in town, but now with security at the entrance. A lighter form of security that Americans typically experience in airports is standard for entering a mall or other public buildings throughout the country. Fortunately for Americans, that level of security is not yet required in this country. We also visited a Tel Aviv beachside memorial for the 5th anniversary of the Dolphinarium discothe`que bombing. A Tel Aviv hot spot for teenagers looking to dance the night away, the Dolphinarium bombing killed 21 and wounded more than 100. While the burned-out shell of the discothe`que has not reopened, a similar club opened next door. Despite numerous attacks and the constant threat of more, Israelis continue to live their lives. The highlight of our trip was the extensive interaction we had with various elements of the Israeli government, who spoke extensively with the group about the strategy and tactics each counterterrorism organization employs. This part of the trip included visits to military bases, training centers, and a prison that houses inmates convicted of terrorism-related offenses. The candid discussion we had with senior commanders gave us a new perspective on the problem of terrorism. In order to better explain the origins of this project, it may help to explain a bit further about FDD. The organization’s mission statement says, The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) is a nonpartisan policy institute dedicated to promoting pluralism, defending democratic values, and fighting the ideologies that drive terrorism. FDD was founded shortly after 9/11 by a group of visionary philanthropists and policymakers to engage in the worldwide war of ideas and to support the defense of democratic societies under assault by terrorism and Militant Islamism. FDD uniquely combines policy research, democracy and counter-terrorism training, strategic communications, and investigative journalism.7

Our yearlong fellowship (2006–2007) and the research trip to Israel in the summer of 2006 assisted us in advancing this mission, articulated by board directors, including Republican and Democratic strategists and policymakers. STRUCTURE AND FORMAT There are a number of questions the average American asks when thinking about terrorism. Who would do such a thing? Why? What do they possibly hope to achieve? These are questions anyone would ask in the wake of a terror attack. They are, however, not the focus of our work. Instead, we attempt to explain what terrorism is, where it poses the greatest threat, and how it can be countered.

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The work is divided into four parts, with those chapters sharing similar themes placed in the same part. The three chapters in Part I address questions that examine the nature of terrorism. How do we define terrorism? Is there broad support for Islamist terrorism in the Middle East, South, and Southeast Asia? And, why has international law failed to reach consensus on terrorism? Each chapter strives to answer the question posed in a simple and straightforward fashion without losing the rigor of scholarly work. Part II shifts the focus to questions of strategic and tactical impact. The questions asked in this section include, who do terrorists target? Are terrorists likely to use WMD against the United States? To what extent is there really a threat to the West posed by Islamic terrorism? Part III examines group psychology and university engagement asking, how do we understand the psychology of terrorism? And, might university engagement thwart violence? Part IV, which is composed of a single chapter, concludes the book by offering a number of solutions to the ever-present problem of terrorism. It also attempts to synthesize the varied perspectives introduced throughout the book. PART I—UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF TERRORISM How Do We Define Terrorism? (Craig Stapley) Chapter 2 looks at the phenomenon of terrorism: its definition, characteristics, history, and goals. With no single accepted definition in either academia or government, this research establishes terrorism as a phenomenon with four defining characteristics. First is the threat or use of violence. Terrorism is a subclassification of political violence. As such, the threat or use of violence is essential to an act being considered terrorism. The threat or use of violence is the means by which terrorists seek to achieve their objective. Second, in terrorism, violence is used for a political purpose. Terrorism is fundamentally a political phenomenon. Whether you accept the definition of politics as the control of state structures, or Laswell’s definition of ‘‘who gets what, where, when and how,’’8 or Easton’s definition of ‘‘the authoritative allocation of values within a society,’’9 terrorists conduct violence in order to alter political outcomes. Third, terrorism is the use or exploitation of fear. Terrorist groups seek to harness that primeval emotion in order to affect or control the actions of others—whether it is a political entity, like a government, or the general population. Finally, terrorism targets civilian noncombatants. Certainly attacks against combatants outside of the context of formal war fit into the definition of political violence. However, one of terrorism’s unique characteristics is the fact that its targets are not usually the final target, or the target which is intended to be affected. As a result, those being physically attacked serve to send a message to political actors. There are, however, other characteristics of terrorism discussed in the chapter. An exploration of the term ‘‘terrorism’’ as a value statement is undertaken. Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

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as a transnational and international phenomenon is also discussed, as well as terrorism in terms of unconventional warfare and the historical evolution of the term. The question of whether terrorism can be a rational act is also considered. Finally, this chapter looks at the actors perpetrating terrorist acts. Is There Broad Support for Islamist Terrorism in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia? (Gordon L. Bowen) Chapter 3 examines public support for Islamic fundamentalism within the Muslim world. By analyzing a number of public opinion polls taken in a number of Muslim countries, since 2001, the author challenges the optimistic outlook of the United States Department of State and the Bush administration, who suggest that Islamic fundamentalism has failed to garner anything more than minimal public support in the Muslim world and that its threat to secular regimes and the United States may be overstated. Looking closely at the nature of the questions asked in periodic public opinion polls, Bowen places poll results within the theoretical framework of revolutionary theory, which suggests that broad support for revolutionary movements is rare.10 Failure to garner support from a majority of the citizenry has not, however, served as a sufficient restraint on past revolutionaries who may or may not ultimately achieve their objectives. Often failing and sometimes succeeding, revolutionaries nonetheless continue their attempts to topple regimes they oppose. Ultimately, the chapter argues that the genuine enemy is far broader than is commonly suggested. Changing percentages into raw numbers, Bowen demonstrates that the support of a small minority for Islamic fundamentalism in a nation of 50–150 million Muslims equates to the support of millions of sympathizers and supporters. A nation with five, ten, or even twenty million supporters of Islamic fundamentalism should give rise to concern. Why Has International Law Failed to Reach Consensus on Terrorism? (John M. Czarnetzky) Placing terrorism within the context of international law is a difficult task, as is articulated in Chapter 4. Other than the long-standing prohibition of piracy, there is no comprehensive international convention concerning terrorism. To be sure, international law, through several international conventions, prohibits certain terrorist techniques such as hostage taking or hijackings. Moreover, terrorists are subject to the domestic law of countries who have defined terrorism for themselves. Nevertheless, the difficulty in defining what constitutes terrorism, which must ultimately reflect a political consensus that does not yet exist, means that a general convention on terrorism will remain elusive in the near future. Other efforts such as the newly formed International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague have avoided the issue of terrorism, preferring to concentrate on crimes such as genocide, where a consensus on the elements of the crime have been easier to achieve.

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Chapter 4 surveys the current status of terrorism under international law, to include: the status of UN efforts to achieve an international convention against terrorism; arguments that terrorism may be punished under existing international-law norms; whether terrorists can be tried in the existing ICC; etc. It then concludes with some suggestions as to how the international community should proceed in order to achieve a comprehensive international legal solution to the problem of terrorism. PART II—THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF TERROR Who Do Terrorists Target? (Craig Stapley) Chapter 5 creates a set of targeting imperatives used by terrorist organizations when evaluating and selecting future targets. After reviewing a database of terrorist attacks and further refining the hypotheses in later interviews, a theoretical framework outlining the reasons terrorist groups might target organizations, institutions, and individuals is created.11 The theoretical framework is then broken into five targeting imperatives which serve as the focus of the chapter. First, terrorists may perceive that a relationship exists between a potential target and a political entity. Often, traditional political targets are too difficult to attack. As a result, terrorists might target a nonpolitical entity that is associated with one that is political and a true target. Second, actions by entities which are political in nature might bring them into the targeting equation of a terrorist group. In the complex world that exists today, even nonpolitical groups may have political ramifications that are opposed by a terrorist group. Third, a terrorist organization may attack an entity based on what it feels are the polluting influences (social, cultural, or religious) of the organization. One of the main goals of a terrorist group is to control the values of a given population. Potential targets are often a vehicle by which new values are introduced. Fourth, terrorist groups are engaged in activities in an environment of scarce resources. As such, some of the terrorist group’s activities must be directed toward the securing of logistic support: both financing and supplies. Terrorist groups may target organizations due to the fact that those targets have access to the resources the terrorists need. Fifth, terrorists may target an organization because it is a ‘‘soft’’ target. Due to past terror attacks, traditional targets have been hardened (made difficult to attack). The fact exists, however, that the world is a target-rich environment. One of the classic problems that counterterror operations face is the conundrum that when you harden one target, terrorists simply shift to a new, soft one. Are Terrorists Likely to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction against the United States? (Adam B. Lowther) In Chapter 6 the author examines the four types of WMD, delivery systems, and the scenarios where their use may be most likely. Much has been written in recent years

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about the development and delivery of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Federal, state, and local governments, as well as private industry, have run a number of scenarios in which one or more types of WMD are used against a major American city or high-value target. For the average American, it is not a conventional attack against the homeland that generates the greatest fear, but an attack where, for example, a dirty bomb explodes in Times Square, a nuclear device is detonated during the Super Bowl, or a biological agent is released into a city’s water supply. Chapter 6 illustrates the difficulty of developing and deploying WMD and the low casualty counts, with the exception of a nuclear detonation, that are the likely result. As history has shown, conventional attacks are exponentially easier to carry out and far more costly in human lives. Rather than perpetuating the climate of fear that surrounds WMD, which is an inappropriate name for all but nuclear weapons, this chapter seeks to inform readers about the actual threat posed by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Suicide Bombers: Suicide or Jihadi Acts? (Russ Rodgers) Chapter 7 explains that operations against Islamic warriors have been frustrated by the failure of policymakers in the West to accurately define what we are fighting. In an effort to divide the Islamic community from the tactics these warriors use, policymakers have used terms like ‘‘suicide operations,’’ ‘‘insurgents,’’ and ‘‘terrorism.’’ However, these confuse the issue and make it more difficult for operational leaders and intelligence analysts to understand the mind and worldview of America’s enemies. According to some perspectives, the time has come for the West to face the fact that the United States and the West are dealing with a return to early Islam, the Islam as laid down by particular interpretations of the Prophet and his companions. Some contend, what the West is currently facing is jihadi operations designed to make this early form of Islam the dominant ideology not only in the Middle East, but throughout the entire world. It is not an issue whether or not such an effort can succeed, but rather that those engaging in such operations believe they can succeed. PART III—SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL VARIABLES How Do We Understand the Psychology of Terrorism? (Daniel B. Kennedy and Robert J. Homant) Due to the heinous nature of terrorist acts, the general public is inclined to believe that terrorists are psychotic, psychopathic, or otherwise disordered, as is described in Chapter 8. Many psychologists and other social scientists provide support for these impressions by constructing personality typologies and other descriptions that emphasize the personal pathology of terrorists. Reality, however, does not generally comport with these presumptions. Research tends to demonstrate that terrorist personalities fall within the normal population ranges of a society.

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The behavior of terrorists can be better understood by utilizing the precepts of social psychology, which view terrorism primarily as a group phenomenon subject to social dynamics similar to those of nonterrorist groups. Pressure to support group goals in a collectivist society can, for example, lead to the socialization of Palestinians to support terrorism. Expatriate groups and European first-generation youth of North African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian extraction can become alienated from their host societies. Affiliating needs may be met in small groups of other disaffected Muslims whose members may fall prey to ‘‘groupthink,’’ wherein even irrational decisions are supported in order to maintain group consensus and solidarity. In conjunction with radical theology, groupthink can thus incline group members toward jihad and suicide terrorism. It is within this social psychological framework that Chapter 8 examines terrorist psychology. Might University Engagement Thwart Violence? (Beverly Lindsay) Chapter 9 maintains that various acts of terrorism have been witnessed in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States throughout the previous decade. During the summer of 2006 the world observed the devastating effects of the war between Israel and Hezbollah including the impacts on universities and colleges in northern Israel and Lebanon. In the fall of 2006, gunmen kidnapped dozens of academics and other professionals from the Ministry of Higher Education in Baghdad. Although there are multiple causes of war and violent acts of terrorism, such destructive endeavors affect a multitude of social institutions and organizations. On the one hand, military personnel view the damages to universities as collateral damage; while on the other hand, civilians view the kidnappings as terrorist acts. Regardless of the perspective, a central issue emerges concerning the roles that universities and other social institutions can play—via public engagement—in decreasing chances for such conflicts and/or devising means to end them. Given the aforementioned perspectives, precisely what is the nature of contemporary university public engagement in a new century dominated by globalization? Based upon the literature reviews of multitrack diplomacy and university engagement, plus participant observations of educational and social sectors in Israel during 2006, Chapter 9 seeks to: (a) articulate modes for university public engagement rather than merely advocating additional scholarly inquiry, and (b) link engagement to overarching principles of democracy to help ensure equity and social justice so that terrorism and wars will not appear to be viable options. PART IV—MOVING TOWARD THE FUTURE Multidisciplinary Perspectives and Policy Research on Terrorism (Beverly Lindsay) Chapter 10 synthesizes the previous chapters by positing alternative frameworks for problems emerging from and linked to terrorism. Moreover, it seeks to identify aspects of terrorism that are beyond the scope of our volume and/or raise new concerns presented by the evolving nature of terrorism and current solutions. In essence, we strive to contribute to future policy and programmatic research and solutions.

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THE BROADER CONFLICT On September 20, 2001 President Bush stood before the United States Congress, with more than 150 million Americans watching, to explain the nature of the threat facing the country. Little more than a week after the deaths of over 3,000 Americans the president stood resolutely before the world and said: Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way. We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power— they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies. Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.12

It was with the full support of Congress and the American people that President Bush delivered this address to the nation and the world. In response to the President’s speech Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) said, The President gave a very strong statement of American principles and demonstrated absolute leadership and resolve in his speech. I think the entire country is united, as united as we

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have ever been. And we have to face up to the challenges that the President outlined, both abroad in our fight against terrorism and here at home. I’m especially grateful for the President’s strong support for New York and for the rebuilding of New York City.13

Little more than a week earlier, Senator Clinton joined the rest of the Senate in giving their support to the President. She, perhaps better than any other member of Congress, understood the difficult job that was before the President and the nation after eight years as first lady. In supporting the President, Senator Clinton stood on the floor of the U.S. Senate and said, We will also stand united behind our President as he and his advisors plan the necessary actions to demonstrate America’s resolve and commitment. Not only to seek out an exact punishment on the perpetrators, but to make very clear that not only those who harbor terrorists, but those who in any way aid or comfort them whatsoever will now face the wrath of our country. And I hope that that message has gotten through to everywhere it needs to be heard. You are either with America in our time of need or you are not.14

Where the nation was united in its support for a strong response to the attacks of 9/11 in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, it is now divided over the Iraq War which has shifted the focus of the President and Congress and confused the American effort to eliminate al Qaeda as an effective threat to the United States. No longer can it be said that Republicans and Democrats share a similar vision of American security policy. Nor can it be said that Senator Clinton continues to support President Bush’s foreign policy. She is now one of his staunchest critics. The American people are more divided than at any point since the Vietnam conflict, with blue and red states differing significantly on their support for the Iraq War and the broader war on terror. Ultimately, history will judge the actions of the present. It is yet to be determined whether the destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan was a success or failure just as the war in Iraq is yet to prove an American triumph or a political failure similar to Vietnam. Unfortunately, the devastation of the 9/11 attacks has faded to distant memories for many Americans as the focus on the Iraq War clouds the present. For this reason alone it is necessary that Americans are reminded of the nature of terrorism and one of its current iterations, Islamic terrorism. This pernicious tactic is as old as warfare. As Caleb Carr illustrates, the use of terrorism spans for more than two millennia.15 Time alters the actors and motivations for terrorism, but its central tenets remain much the same. Rather than being discovered for the first time in the next great work on the subject, the lessons of terrorism are rediscovered again and again as new generations of Romans, Britons, Germans, or Americans find themselves in opposition to the latest disaffected group willing to take the lives of noncombatants. America’s current fight against Islamic fundamentalism is no different. In June 2002, al Qaeda’s spokesman, Abu Geith wrote, ‘‘The entire earth must be subject to Allah . . .to no ideology and to no path except for the path of Allah. . . America is the head of heresy in our modern world, and it leads an infidel democratic regime that is based upon separation of religions and state, and on ruling the people

INTRODUCTION

11

by the people.’’ It is a goal of the text to provide readers with a better understanding of the motivations, tactics and countermeasures that are part of the GWOT in which the United States now finds itself. The contributors make no pretense to the discovery of immutable truths or never-before-seen insights. Instead they hope to offer a new take on terrorism for the reader previously uninterested in terrorism, because it is the right place at the right time to give the reader a solid understanding of the nature of terrorism. The importance of understanding the threat terrorism poses to the United States is best illustrated with the words of Osama bin Laden who said, . . .we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy Mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of the holy lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, ‘‘and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,’’ and ‘‘fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.’’16

While Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism associated with it is the focus here, it is not suggested that terrorism is unique to Islam. As a tactic of the weak it has been used by Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Shinto, Buddhists, Nihilists, Communists, and many more over the preceding centuries. One of its current forms, however, is centered on the war between Islamic fundamentalists and the secular—Muslim— regimes they oppose, and the Western states that, according to the fundamentalists, support and sustain them. At the top of that list of supporters is the United States; its prominent position in the world makes it a prime target. Twenty-five years ago discussions of terrorism focused on communist movements in Europe. Twenty-five years from now it is probable that Islamic fundamentalism will have disappeared from prominence and the next iteration of violence against civilians will have taken its place.

NOTES 1. For an archive of television and print stories related to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks visit: http://www.september11news.com/. 2. In a May 1998 interview, Osama bin Laden called the United States a paper tiger, unwilling to fight. John Miller, Greetings, America. My Name is Osama bin Laden, Interview with Osama bin Laden, Public Broadcasting Corporation—Frontline (May, 1998) available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/binladen/who/miller.html. 3. For an insider’s view of President Clinton’s approach to terrorism, see Richard A. Clarke, Against all Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2004). 4. Miller, Greetings, America. 5. While it is common to use the term ‘‘Islamic extremism’’ rather than ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism,’’ the latter term is used here because it is a more accurate description of the

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literalist interpretation of the Qur’an, Hadith, and other Islamic religious texts taken by Osama bin Laden and other terror groups. The term ‘‘Islamic extremism’’ is largely a pejorative term used to discredit modern Islamists and separate them from Islamic fundamentalists who do not employ violence. It is, however, a less precise description of al Qaeda and other terror groups. 6. For an understanding of the Neoconservative agenda, see Gary Rosen ed., The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 7. For more on the organization that brought this cohort of scholars together, see www.defenddemocracy.org. 8. Harold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936). 9. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965). 10. For a more detailed discussion of revolutionary theory, see Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Robert Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971). 11. C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (New York: St. Marten’s Press, 1998). 12. George W. Bush, ‘‘Address to the Nation’’ (Joint Session of Congress, Washington, DC, September 20, 2001). 13. Hillary Clinton, ‘‘Senator Clinton’s Reaction to President Bush’s Speech to the Nation, Given on September 20, 2001,’’ available at http://clinton.senate.gov/news/statements/ details.cfm?id=235653&&. 14. Hillary Clinton, ‘‘Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Statement on the Floor of the United States Senate in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks’’ (U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, September 12, 2001). 15. See Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians (New York: Random House, 2003). 16. Walter Laqueur, Voices of Terrorism (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 412.

Part I

Understanding the Nature of Terrorism

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Terrorism: Its Goals, Targets, and Strategies Craig Stapley Intrinsic to answering the unanswered questions of terrorism is the concept of terrorism itself. One of the difficulties facing researchers in the field is the fact that there is considerable disagreement as to the very definition of terrorism. A quick review of the literature shows that there is no accepted definition in government or in academia. Kushner notes, ‘‘There are as many definitions for the word terrorism as there are methods of executing it; the term means different things to different people, and trying to define or classify terrorism to everyone’s satisfaction proves impossible.’’1 The U.S. government itself has had up to ten different definitions of terrorism.2 This leads to confusion and misuse, which only makes the study of the phenomenon more difficult. Louise Richardson noted: The widespread usage of the term terrorism, in many contexts, has rendered the word almost meaningless. Today, it’s only universally understood connotation is so pejorative that even terrorists don’t admit to being terrorists any more. A glance at the current usage reveals child abuse, racism, and gang warfare all incorrectly described as terrorism.3

Given this confusing state, it is not surprising that the study of terrorism has struggled over the very definitional aspect of the central topic of research. This chapter provides and justifies a clear, concrete, measurable definition of terrorism. A clear definition of terrorism is essential for many reasons. First, in any systematic study of a phenomenon, it is necessary to have discrete definitions of the items being studied in order to ensure consistent and valid conclusions. It is especially important to have a concrete definition when there is no clear consensus as to what is or is not terrorism. To that end, the definition used in this chapter focuses on what distinguishes terrorism from other phenomena. Each aspect of terrorism, then, is accompanied by a related aspect of the other, similar phenomenon, and the distinguishing or differentiating traits are explained. The result is a clarification of what the author feels is and is not terrorism. Again, noting that there is no

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real consensus, it should be pointed out that by no means is the definition used in this chapter the final word in terrorism definitions or even the definition shared by the rest of the authors of this work. It is the author’s hope, however, that a consensus can be built for further study of the phenomenon. The definition of terrorism chosen here is: the threat or use of violence on noncombatant populations or property with the express goal of creating or exploiting fear in a larger audience for political or ideological reasons.4 This definition consists of four primary points. First is the threat or use of violence. Second is the use of that violence on noncombatant targets. Third is the creation or exploitation of fear in a larger audience than the specific target group. And last is the political or ideological reason for which this violence is being committed. To better explicate this definition, the aspects of the definition are treated separately. The reasons for including each of the definitional characteristics are also explained. Finally, additional characteristics of terrorism are explained and explored.

DEFINITION AND ILLUSTRATION OF TERRORISM Use of Violence First and foremost, the author considers terrorism to be a subclassification of political violence, which in turn is a subclassification of violence. This relationship is illustrated by Figure 2.1. Political violence can be defined as the use or threat of violence for political purposes. Terrorism also requires the threat or use of violence for political purposes. As such, terrorism and political violence have two common defining characteristics. Terrorism and political violence are different, however, in the choice of targets and the creation and exploitation of fear. While all terrorism is political violence, not all political violence is terrorism. The use or threat of violence is integral to the definition of terrorism. The threat of violence is all that is necessary for an act to be terrorism. For example, a threatened bombing, which is done to create fear in noncombatants for political reasons, need

Figure 2.1 Concentric Violence

TERRORISM: ITS GOALS, TARGETS, AND STRATEGIES

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never explode for the act to be considered terrorism. In a similar vein, the initial violent act need not be successful for the strategic goal to be accomplished and terrorism to have occurred. In other words, if the September 11 planes had all crashed into Pennsylvania fields, the acts would have been successful due to the threat that hijackings posed on the security of the United States as well as the safety of the transportation system. This aspect is further explored in a later section. If the defining point of terrorism were the creation or exploitation of fear alone, then Stephen King, a noted author of horror novels, would be a terrorist. Hoffman notes this in his criticism of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of terrorism, ‘‘While accurately communicating the fear-inducing quality of terrorism, the definition is still so broad as to apply to almost any action that scares (‘terrorizes’) us.’’5 The carefully orchestrated and directed use of force is more than just the vehicle by which people are terrorized. It is the means by which the terrorists demonstrate the powerlessness of governments to keep order. In other words, since governments cannot keep violence from the citizenry, they lose credibility and legitimacy. The violence against citizens further destabilizes the social fabric of society, furthering the basic goals of terrorist groups. The use or threat of violence is also important as a defining characteristic due to the heavy reliance of terrorism on bringing the act before the world stage.6 The use of violence and the press coverage that it garners become integral to the terrorist act. Indeed, recent work seems to indicate a ratcheting up of the level of violence in order to capture the media attention. The goal is to shock and provoke, thus calling attention to the cause of the perpetrators. This differs from other political dissent by literally becoming ‘‘propaganda of the deed.’’ This aspect of terrorism is further explored in the targeting chapter of this work. Certainly, the threat or use of force does not, a priori, constitute terrorism. As Weber noted, a state is the entity with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.7 Government power, then, is the exclusive threat or use of force on its own citizens. While governments may engage in terrorism against their own population or other states’ citizens, clearly, the use or threat of force alone does not constitute terrorism. The threat or use of force can also be used to define a criminal act. Threatening force in order to gain money is the hallmark for such criminal activities as armed robbery or extortion. While these activities may threaten force and even terrorize the victims, they do not reach the critical definitional aspects of terrorism. Clearly, something else is needed to reach that benchmark. Targets of Terrorism The target of the terrorist act is also an important distinction in creating the definition of terrorism used in this research. This definition states that the target must be people or property that is noncombatant in nature. At the heart of this distinction is the central aspect of terrorism—creating or exploiting fear through violence in a population greater than that specifically targeted by the act. If the target of the attack were

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only combatant personnel or property, then it would limit the scope of violence and inhibit the generation of fear in the general population. As Cockburn noted in his work on Spanish anarchists, ‘‘there are no innocents.’’ 8 If a French tourist happens to die in a mass attack bombing of a bus in a public square in Jerusalem, it is justified by the terrorists that the tourist was equally as ‘‘guilty’’ because he or she was supporting the Israelis by visiting. Certainly the perpetrators of the terrorism consider those they attack to be legitimate targets. Common acceptance, however, does not. The noncombatant distinction is important when faced by the ever-present statement in terrorism: one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist. Many definitions of terrorism would include all involved in guerrilla warfare or insurrection as terrorists. Indeed, using that definition, the Americans fighting the British in the Revolutionary War would have been terrorists. This seems too expansive. Therefore, the definition utilized in this work will exclude those actors who are carrying out violence against government combatants as in revolution. The question still remains, what about those people who carry out violence on combatant personnel or property, but also hurt civilians in the process? Timothy McVeigh targeted a government building full of government employees. Whether the occupants of the building consisted of combatants is the central question. Despite this problem, the acceptance of collateral damage casualties may constitute terrorism. To McVeigh, the civilian casualties, including the children in the day care, were an unfortunate byproduct or collateral damage.9 While the primary target may have been government property, the willingness of McVeigh to create the sheer amount of collateral damage, which then created an environment of fear in the general public, moves the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building from a guerilla act of revolt to an act of terrorism. Further, while the Murrah Federal Building was owned by the government of the United States housing arguably combatant personnel, it was not just a government building. The building housed a credit union as well as the much-publicized childcare center. Brian Jenkins noted that the act of terrorism is similar to a play acted out on a stage.10 People may be watching the action from different perspectives including those on the stage itself. However, the primary message is for those who are indeed in the audience rather than those whom the actors are interacting with physically. This relationship is illustrated by Figure 2.2. The figure shows more than one psychological target. As Drake pointed out, in the course of a terrorist attack, there may be many targets of attack: the physical target and perhaps many other psychological targets.11 Indeed, the definitional characteristic of terrorism for Drake is that ‘‘the succession of attacks is meant to create a psychological reaction in a person or group of people—the psychological target or targets—to make them act in a way that the attacker desires.’’12 Certainly, both state and nonstate actors may wish to create and exploit fear in noncombatant populations. When doing these acts, both would be engaged in terrorism. The fact that a government commits a terrorist act does not remove the labeling of the act. Stalin was a master of creating and exploiting fear in the agrarian population of Russia. His acts were most certainly terrorism.


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Figure 2.2 Physical and Psychological Targets

When state actors engage in war, they may elect to try to create fear in the noncombatant populations of their adversaries. The central question of motivation now becomes important. In most cases, states engage in this type of exercise in order to gain economic or military advantage, not necessarily for the creation and exploitation of fear. This type of activity could be labeled terrorism. While nonstate actors may also engage in this type of behavior, the motivation in the target selection and attack becomes defined in terms of labeling an act as terrorism. Thus, both states and nonstate actors can engage in terrorism. This concept is explored later. If the war of ideas is centrally important to the perpetrators of terrorism, then the selection of targets becomes paramount. Too much violence and wanton destruction could, in fact, erode support for the cause, while too little may not garner the necessary publicity to carry the act before the larger stage and create fear in the larger population.13 Targets are selected carefully for symbolic or ideological effect. It is important to note that the rationale for selecting a certain target need not make sense to the general public. The rationale need only make sense to the members. The rationality of terrorist acts is addressed later. C.J.M. Drake notes that there may be many types of targets for terrorists. In other words, people or property may be targeted for a number of different goals. The types of targets in Drake’s targeting typology are distinguished by purpose of the attack. He includes four types of targets: symbolic, functional, logistical, and expressive. Symbolic targets are meant to trigger a psychological reaction in the greater audience. The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center are good examples of symbolic attacks. In targeting the World Trade Center, al Qaeda attacked a symbol of the United States’ economic might. Functional targets are attacks against targets that constitute a threat to the organization. Attacks against police or intelligence assets would constitute this type of attack. Logistical targets are designed to protect or provide logistical assets to the terrorists’ movement. Kidnapping for ransom is an example of a logistical attack. Drake’s final target type is an expressive target, which is an emotional response to events rather than a planned strategy.14 The killings following the explosive attack that destroyed the Askariya Mosque in Samarra, Iraq would fall into this classification. Attacks may be employed to accomplish more that one goal at a time.

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An example could be the kidnapping of American businessmen in Colombia by FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) insurgents. While the immediate goal might be logistical (fund-raising), this kidnapping could also accomplish other acts such as discrediting the Columbian government and their ability to keep order as well as dissuading American businessmen from coming to Columbia (symbolic and expressive targets). Drake’s targeting typology is most helpful in research such as this. However, it is relatively new in the literature. Martha Crenshaw also created a targeting typology based on the psychological response the act is hoping to evoke in a larger, secondary target population. Until recently, that has been a benchmark in targeting literature. Drake classifies his typology in terms of strategic targeting. Crenshaw’s first category in her typology is the elimination of threats, which is analogous to Drake’s functional targets. The second is compliance or the attempt to force a target population to act in a certain way. Next is disorientation, which is aimed at eliminating the stability of everyday life through the removal of stabilizing institutions. Also included in the typology are attrition attacks or the removal of targets with a psychological value in order to wear down the will of the target population. Provocation is also a targeting imperative that attempts to make the psychological target act in a way that alienates the target from sympathizers. Advertisement is attempted by groups who wish to call attention to their movement through the act itself. Finally, the endorsement imperative is the attempt to garner support from potential sympathizers through the action.15 Terrorist organizations are also constrained by the tactical environment within which they are operating. The relative danger of carrying out the attack in terms of the threat the attack poses for the perpetrators certainly affects the target selection. Also, the relative ease in terms of cost, resources, and target hardening helps to determine who or what is targeted.16 In the end, the final target selection is made through a series of constraints forced upon the terrorists by their ideology, strategy, and tactics.17 If those constraints force an attack on noncombatants for ideological reasons, then the attack reaches the benchmark for terrorism. As was discussed previously, terrorism and political violence share the use or threat of violence for a political or ideological purpose as defining attributes. One of the aspects of terrorism that separates terrorism from the larger grouping of political violence is the choice of targets. Political violence can be perpetrated against any target—combatant or noncombatant alike. However, terrorism can only be committed on noncombatants. This concept will be enormously helpful in creating a definition of terrorism that is discrete and testable. Use/Exploitation of Fear Another important aspect of defining terrorism is the creation or exploitation of fear. This becomes an additional differentiating factor between terrorism and political violence. Terrorism is the use or threat of violence on noncombatant populations to create and exploit fear in a larger population for political or ideological reasons. However, political violence is the use or threat of violence on any target for political


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or ideological reasons. Certainly both are conducted by groups for ideological or political reasons. The distinction emerges when considering the targets and the methods. The target aspect was considered above. The more problematical of the defining aspects of terrorism will now be considered. The distinction between terrorism and political violence is in the methods employed by the perpetrators. Specifically, terrorists conduct their violence or threat of violence in order to create and exploit fear in a larger population than the specific target groups. However, political violence has no such requirement. The secondary and psychological targets that are created and exploited in a terrorist act have been discussed in previous sections. The difficulty lies in determining the motivation of the perpetrators. It is extremely difficult to know if the goal of the violence is the creation and exploitation of terror on a larger audience. Because of these difficulties, this definition treats all violence on civilian targets by groups for a political or ideological reason the same as terrorism. While it is true that terrorist groups often claim responsibility for the act of terrorism, thus reinforcing their ideological message and heightening media exposure, it is not always the case. The difficulties inherent in assigning motive to actors were explained by Fowler: One major difficulty in creating a rigorous and consistent operational definition of terrorist acts is the necessity of attributing certain motives to violent acts. What distinguishes a political bombing from a bombing by, say, someone who is simply criminally insane is the motivation of the bomber.18

Ideology One of the difficulties of defining terrorism is determining whether the act was terrorism, spurred by an ideological strategy, or an act of violence, perpetrated by simple criminals, for other causes. It is for this reason that ideology plays such an important role in the definition. Terrorism is intrinsically linked with politics. While there are many definitions of politics, each definition captures an aspect of terrorism. Often politics is described by the control of state structures. Insurgent terrorists may be engaged in terrorism in order to gain control of those state structures. Another definition is that of Laswell: ‘‘who gets what, where, when, and how.’’19 Terrorists may strive for control of the allocation of resources. A third definition of politics is Easton’s: ‘‘the authoritative allocations of values within a society.’’20 We are aware of Easton’s intent when he used the term ‘‘values,’’ however, a more expansive use of that term can be illustrative when addressing terrorism. Terrorists may be engaged in the struggle to control the social, cultural, or religious values of a population. The random attacks by snipers John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, except for the lack of ideological foundations, could be labeled terrorism. However, without the ideological roots, the shootings are simply criminal acts. Laqueur notes that this definitional problem has existed throughout the history of terrorism in his explanation of the sicarii, ‘‘Josephus doubted their idealistic motivation and claimed that they were listai, robbers, out for personal gain and manipulated by outside

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forces, with patriotism and the demand for freedom a mere ideological cloak.’’21 While the terrorist act is, a priori, a criminal act, both governments and scholars have struggled over whether terrorism should be treated as a criminal act or, if perpetrated by an extra-national entity, as an act of war. Certainly, groups that have engaged in terrorist acts have also engaged in criminal acts for gain and tried to justify the acts through ideology. Kidnappings by FARC and Abu Sayyef may have crossed the line from terrorism and have become criminal acts for gain. These groups have been financing their insurrections through the proceeds of ransoming hostages. It is certainly up for debate whether this, then, crosses the line into terrorism. However, when the acts of violence are perpetrated solely for the purpose of getting money, the ideological underpinnings of the movement are eroded. The war of ideas is central to most terrorist movements. Money itself may also be important to the ideological movement. A terrorist campaign requires logistical support. As such, terrorist groups may engage in activities designed solely to obtain money. Johan Most noted that money was a more potent and essential weapon than dynamite.22 As discussed previously, there can be many goals of a single terrorist act. The act may not only secure logistical support but also erode a financial system’s stability. The difficulty is once again determining the goals of the act itself. As a result, violence perpetrated on noncombatants as a means of gaining logistical support, such as money for ideological reasons, may be characterized as terrorism. Essentially, terrorism is the means by which some individuals or organizations pursue a political or ideological end. The end is important enough to justify means that would typically be taboo to groups within society. Thus, the murder of innocent children could be justified as the only means of accomplishing a political end for groups that may not have the resources to accomplish the end in any other way. Terror for Hire In a similar but subtly different vein, some groups have engaged in what may be termed, ‘‘terror for hire.’’ As was previously discussed, one of the classes of the targeting priorities for terrorist groups is the group of targets that will provide logistical support to the terrorist organization. The funding of an ideological movement through criminal acts for hire may attain the definitional criteria of terrorism. Terrorist groups have commonly funded their violent activities through extortion, kidnapping, and bank robbery. The difficulty arises when the line between funding an ideological movement and funding the individual actors gets blurred. As mentioned previously, the activities of the Abu Sayyef Group in the Philippines may have gotten muddied to the point that they exist as an organized crime syndicate. The Japanese Red Army may have become a mercenary group, willing to carry out terrorist attacks for whomever, regardless of ideology. Kirk actually creates a separate type of terrorism for those who conduct it for economic profit.23


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CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM Terrorism or Terrorist An additional aspect of terrorism that is related to the target of the violence is the pitfall of defining the act by the perpetrators. Terrorism is defined by the act itself. Laqueur notes, ‘‘Terrorism is no more than one of several strategies, and usually a subordinate one.’’24 Brian Jenkins argued, ‘‘Terrorism should be defined by the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.’’25 In other words, terrorism is ‘‘a kind of weapons-system.’’26 While a group that engages in terrorism may be labeled terrorists, any group can engage in terrorism. Conversely, all actions engaged in by groups or organizations that are labeled as terrorists may not necessarily be terrorism. A good example of this may be the terrorist group Hamas. Hamas may engage in acts of political violence on noncombatants with the express goal of creating fear in a general populace for political purposes. These acts, according to the definition used in this chapter, are terrorist acts. However, Hamas engages in more than terrorist acts. The organization known as Hamas is now part of a ruling coalition in Gaza. They also provide food, monetary relief, and supplies to the poor. They educate children. While critics of Hamas might classify this type of behavior recruiting for later terrorist engagements, an argument can be made that Hamas is simply trying to serve the humanitarian needs of people who have no other protector. Further explanation is necessary. Entities that primarily are tasked with nonterrorist types of behavior, such as governments, may engage in terrorism if they commit violence on noncombatant populations with the express purpose of creating fear for political goals. Indeed, much of the terrorism committed in the history of conflict has been state sponsored. The term terrorism is derived from the systems of intimidation engaged in by the French government led by Robespierre during the time following the French revolution. ‘‘The system or regime de la terreur of 1793–94—from which the English word came—was adopted as means to establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprisings of 1789. . .. It was designed to consolidate the new government’s power by intimidating counter-revolutionaries, subversives and all other dissidents whom the new regime regarded as ‘enemies of the people.’’’27 Hoffman also notes that by including this aspect into the definition of terrorism, it becomes difficult to distinguish the acts of terrorism and the acts of governments while fighting wars. He equates the ‘‘allied fire bombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and the atomic bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War, and indeed the counter-value strategy of the postwar superpowers’ strategic nuclear policy, which deliberately targeted the enemy’s civilian population—with the violence committed by substate entities labeled ‘terrorists’ since both involve the infliction of death and injury on non-combatants.’’28 The violence or threat of violence, further, need not be overt. Regimes such as that of Stalin quickly learned the effectiveness of famine and starvation as a means of establishing political control through fear. H. E. Vanden documented this

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phenomenon with regard to Central and South America, ‘‘The culture of violence is not new to Central America. The masses have been brutalized since the time of the conquest, if not long before. Violence, if not terror, became a means of ensuring the domination—or at least the acquiescence—of the common people. . .it is employed by governments and guerillas alike, but not always to the same degree.’’29 Because the term terrorist has become such a value-laden term which has far reaching connotations for the success of both state and nonstate actors, it is important that care be taken to separate the actor from the act. Both state and nonstate actors can engage in terrorism. History has demonstrated the use of terrorism by states as a means of control within the state. Additionally, states have sponsored terrorism abroad. However, it seems that only nonstate actors receive the terrorist label. Perhaps this is due to a deep-seated bias that anything a state does is moral.30 However, this diminishes the scope of the phenomenon. Care must be taken to separate terrorists from acts of terror—regardless of actor. The value-laden aspect of the word terrorism is addressed in the next section. Use of the Term Terrorism—Value Statement Another definitional problem is the fact that terrorism has become a pejorative word, which has been used by various groups to win ideological cachet through its use. Vanden addresses this point. ‘‘Terrorism lends itself to subjective definition. It can be ‘used entirely as a pejorative term to refer to the actions of some opposing organization,’ or it can be used as a means of identifying certain types of action irregardless [sic] of who is committing them.’’31 Thus labeling or mislabeling an act as terrorism may afford governments tremendous political capital. This is an important aspect to the study of terrorism, as the communicative properties of a word can lend to or erode the legitimacy of that phenomenon.32 Indeed, this is most certainly a case of whoever controls the discourse gains an enormous advantage. This can impact a group’s ability to recruit, obtain logistic resources, and usher in political change. Further, when part of the purpose of the terrorist act is the gaining of notoriety or publicity, it could be said the act itself is a struggle for the control in the discourse.33 Transnational/International Terrorism Terrorism is not only a transnational phenomenon. Certainly, the Oklahoma City bombing was terrorism, and the fact that it was carried out domestically or without international or transnational influence, does not reduce its impact as terrorism. Terrorism can exist anywhere in any number of contexts. For the purposes of this chapter, and to simplify the terms used, both transnational and international terrorism will be referred to as international terrorism. Certainly there are differences in the two terms. Strictly speaking, transnational terrorism is terrorism that is perpetrated against targets that are not of the same nationality of the perpetrators.34 Actual physical crossing of borders is not necessary.


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The acts can be committed against expatriates within the borders of a state, and they can be attacks by foreign groups on citizens of a different state; all fall within this category. Transnational terrorism can also be terrorism that has its causes or consequences based in another country. The aggressors or victims need not necessarily be from different states. However, there must be an extra-national component. Attacks on people of the same nationality due to an extra-national association, e.g., employees of a foreign-owned company, would also be transnational terrorism. Technically, international terrorism is terrorism that requires a state actor.35 Typically, it is perpetrated by one state upon the citizens of another. The act itself is typically not carried out by the state, but by nonstate surrogates. International terrorism can also be more indirect. Funding or providing resources from international sources may also make terrorism international.36 Like the term terrorism itself, what really constitutes international, and what constitutes transnational terrorism is up for debate.37 For the purposes of this chapter, international terrorism can occur in any state or system for any of a multitude of goals. International terrorism can be differentiated from other types of terrorism by the addition of any international aspect. For example, if the immediate, physical target is a citizen of another country, then the terrorism becomes international. Similarly, if the perpetrators or secondary psychological targets of the terrorism were from a different country then that too would become international. An attack ‘‘carried out across international frontiers’’ would also be considered ‘‘international terrorism.’’38 Nonconventional Warfare Another typical aspect of terrorism seems to be the willingness of terrorists to ignore the established rules of warfare. Certainly, if the terrorist group had the weapons, resources, and/or people to meet its foes on an even ground in open warfare, they probably would. However, most often, terrorism is typically carried out by groups that have no hope of winning a conventional engagement. This type of lopsided conflict is often referred to as asymmetric warfare. Most often, asymmetric warfare takes the form of unconventional warfare or low intensity conflict. If a continuum exists with conventional war on one side and peace on the other, asymmetric warfare exists somewhere in between. This concept is illustrated by Figure 2.3. This is a concept that has deep historical roots. Sun Tsu noted the worth of what would later become known as guerrilla warfare. 39 Wilkinson noted the

Figure 2.3 Continuum of Violence

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unconventional methods utilized by terrorists as a defining aspect of terrorism, ‘‘Political terror can be differentiated from other forms of violence, agitation, intimidation and coercion by virtue of its extreme and ruthlessly destructive methods.’’40 This study disagrees with Wilkinson. The method does not make the terrorism. Many of the terrorist groups go beyond unconventional warfare and are willing to ignore the recent conventions of warfare. Indeed, the definitional aspect of terrorism, the targeting of noncombatant populations, goes against the modern conventions of war. The psychological implications of an enemy that is willing to ignore the rules of war help to put terrorist acts on the public stage as well as heightening the creation and exploitation of fear. It is important to note, however, that ignoring the ‘‘rules of war’’ alone does not necessarily constitute terrorism. It is also important to understand that states can and do engage in unconventional warfare. States may be hesitant to openly engage in conventional war and thus use unconventional means. While the use of unconventional warfare may be a tactical characteristic of terrorism, it is not a defining aspect. Thus, the fact that unconventional methods are used alone does not constitute terrorism. Terrorism requires all of the definitional aspects in order to reach that benchmark. Historical Evolution of the Term Part of the difficulty in defining terrorism may stem from the fact that the nature of terrorism has changed through time. Walter Laqueur, in his seminal work on the history of terrorism notes that writing a comprehensive history or a general theory of terrorism is all but impossible.41 Indeed, as discussed previously, one of the central problems to the study of terrorism is the fact that the term terrorism has meant so many different things. Lacquer noted, ‘‘the term terrorism . . .has been used in so many different senses as to become almost meaningless, covering almost any, and not necessary political, act of violence.’’42 The definition used in this study has some important distinctions from those used by previous authors. The distinction requiring the violence be perpetrated on noncombatant targets or property has historically not been included in many definitions. Indeed, the first group typically labeled with the term terrorist, the sicarrii, often targeted Roman soldiers as well as civilians. This definition would label those attacks against civilians as terrorism, but the attacks on soldiers as warfare, albeit unconventional. The Hindu cult known as the Thugee is often referred to as a historical terrorist group.43 While it is true that the Thugee did use and threaten violence on noncombatant populations, it was not done for political reasons or for a larger audience (aside from Kali herself ). Granted, the worship of Kali, the goddess of death, may have been an ideological motivation, but that ideology was inward based, rather than outward based. Further, taking the discussion of means and ends described previously, the strangling deaths of innocents was essentially a sacrament for the Thugee: the end rather than the means for accomplishing their religious goal. Using the definition put forth in this work, the lack of a political ideology meant for a greater audience relegates the Thugee as a nonterrorist entity.


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Rationality It may seem that terrorism, or the use or threat of violence on civilians for ideological reasons with the goal of creating and exploiting fear is, a priori, irrational.44 Indeed, some have studied the phenomenon of terrorism from the perspective that terrorism is a psychological or sociological pathology.45 However, this chapter echoes Martha Crenshaw’s 1998 article, which treats terrorism and terrorist justification as a rational phenomenon utilizing a strategic choice model.46 Specifically, this work assumes that terrorists resort to terrorism as a product of ‘‘willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than as the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors.’’47 The assumption of rationality is also important when investigation of the goals and objectives of terrorists, as the terrorists’ pursuit of strategic goals is, in essence, a rational process. Indeed, historical analysis of terrorist action ‘‘reveals similarities in calculations of ends and means.’’48 Hoffman noted in his definition of terrorism that, ‘‘it is a planned, calculated, and indeed systematic act.’’49 Indeed, the early terrorists attempted to justify their actions based on rational arguments. Laqueur used Hassan Sibai, the first leader of the Assassins, to illustrate this point, ‘‘Hassan Sibai seems to have realized early on that his group was too small to confront the enemy in open battle but that a planned, systematic, long-term campaign of terror carried out by a small, disciplined force could be a most effective political weapon.’’50 In this case, terrorism is nonconventional warfare, or low intensity conflict that allows the terrorist group to fight a war with an opponent against whom it has no hope of winning if the engagements are fought utilizing open, traditional methods. This concept is further illustrated by Sun Tzu in The Art of War, ‘‘If you are equal, then fight if you are able. If you are fewer, then keep away if you are able. If you are not as good, then flee if you are able.’’51 Certainly this is a rational concept. Hoffman also described this concept, Terrorists further argue that, because of their numerical inferiority, far more limited firepower and paucity of resources compared with an established nation-state’s massive defense and national security apparatus, they have no choice but to operate clandestinely, emerging from the shadows to carry out dramatic (in other words, bloody and destructive) acts of hit-and-run violence in order to attract attention to, and attract publicity for, themselves and their cause. The bomb-in-the-rubbish-bin, in their view, is merely a circumstantially imposed ‘‘poor man’s air force’’: the only means with which the terrorist can challenge—and get the attention of—the more powerful state. ‘‘How else can we bring pressure to bear on the world?’’ one of Arafat’s political aides once enquired. ‘‘The deaths are regrettable, but they are a fact of war in which innocents have been involved. They are no more innocent than the women and children killed by the Israelis and we are ready to carry the war all over the world.’’52

This concept of strategic choice is again demonstrated by Sun Tzu, ‘‘kill one, frighten ten thousand.’’53 This form of conflict is rational for those that lack the resources to fight a war conventionally or who wish to control large populations of

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people without a leadership mandate. The concept of terror as taken from the French Revolution was a way to control populations through the exploitation of fear. ‘‘The word ‘terrorism’ derives from the era of French Revolution and the Jacobin dictatorship which used terror as an instrument of political repression and social control.’’54 Stalin also used this concept of control masterfully. This use of terror in Central America actually became institutionalized as the method of controlling the peasant population in rural areas.55 Showing rationality is also important for the terrorists themselves, expressly for the reason that ideology is a definitional aspect of terrorism. As a result, justification of the reasons for violence becomes essential. Narodnaya Volya was very careful to publish the justification for its use of violence. It claimed that the acts of the tyrant justified its use of violence. Romanenko, described this when he explained, ‘‘It was wrong to regard systematic terror as immoral, since everything that contributed to the liberating revolution was a priori moral.’’56 In the end, while the logic may be suspicious, the perpetrators of terrorism justify their actions by displacing the responsibility to the entity they are trying to attack. Timothy McVeigh’s attempt to justify the killing of children in the Murrah Federal Building as ‘‘collateral damage’’ and his further attempt to blame the government for their deaths by saying it was ‘‘family convenience’’ that led the government employees to put their children so close to a legitimate target is an example of this kind of displacement.57 Most explain that it is the fault of the civilian women and children when they are hurt by terrorist attacks. ‘‘Some ‘innocents’ were bound to get hurt but this did not bother him unduly, it was not their business to be in places where a bomb was likely to explode.’’58 Finally, the fact that terrorism entails violent or criminal behavior alone does not necessarily equate it with irrationality. Sandler et al. created an economic method of studying terrorism based on rational choices made by the terrorists. They conclude that a rational, economic model provides valuable insights into the way terrorists operate. They note that the willingness of terrorists to put their lives at risk does not prove, a priori, irrationality, ‘‘Policemen and firefighters, to name but two groups, are willing to face an increased probability of death, provided that their remuneration compensates them for the added risks that employment entails.’’59 Sociologists have further concluded that criminal behavior can be rational.60 In the end, the justification used to show that a fundamentally violent act is rational relates primarily to the justification that the means adopted to achieve an end are acceptable. Systematic Versus One-time Acts Many of the definitions of terrorism include systematic violence as one of the definitional aspects of terrorism. This chapter does not. While systematic violence may be a facet of some terrorism, a one-time act should be considered also. The bombing of the Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995 in Oklahoma City most certainly attains the criteria of terrorism. While the Oklahoma City bombing was an isolated act (even considering the criminal acts that went into the preparation of the bombing), it meets all of the other criteria for a terrorist act and should be treated as such.


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CONCLUSION What is terrorism? More than anything in the field of terrorism research, this is the most important unanswered question. This chapter has outlined and justified a working definition of terrorism. Namely, a political phenomenon by which attackers threaten or use violence on noncombatants with the intent of creating and exploiting fear. It is not a new phenomenon and has been practiced since antiquity. It is carried out as if on a stage, the targets being both the physical victims of the terrorists and the larger audience. The perpetrators can be either state or nonstate entities, and there may be any number of goals, from state control to the authoritative distribution of values to deciding who gets what, where, when, and how. The act of terrorism can be seen to be rational given the goals and objectives of the groups engaged in it. Terrorism is usually perpetrated by groups utilizing unconventional warfare, due to the fact that they are unable to gain advantage while using conventional methods. This definition is careful to distinguish between the act of terrorism and the perpetrator of the act itself due to the value-laden meaning attached to the term. While terrorism may occur within a nation-state, it is also waged between national lines and boundaries. While this definition may not be the only answer, it is hoped that a greater consensus can develop that will aid in the future research of this phenomenon.

NOTES 1. Harvey W. Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (London: Sage Publications, 2003), xxiii. 2. Alex P. Schmidt and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), Appendix B. 3. Louise Richardson, ‘‘Global Rebels: Terrorist Organizations as Trans-National Actors,’’ Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (Guilford, CT: McGraw Hill, 2003). 4. This definition, while sharing aspects of other definitions, is the product of the author’s experience and research. 5. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 14. 6. Brian Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, P-6563 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June 1981). 7. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1958), 126–127; also in Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, edited (Oxford University Press, 1947), 156. 8. Alexander Cockburn, ‘‘There Are No Innocents,’’ Nation, October 25, 2004. 9. Timothy McVeigh, ‘‘An Essay on Hypocrisy,’’ Media Bypass, June 1998. Reprinted on ‘‘The Outpost of Freedom’’ Web site, http://www.outpost-of-freedom.com/mcveigh/ okcaug98.htm (accessed May 27, 2008). 10. Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism, P-6563 . 11. C.J.M. Drake, Terrorist’ Target Selection (New York: St. Marten’s Press, 1998). 12. Ibid., 2. 13. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 162.

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14. Drake, Terrorist’ Target Selection, 8–15. 15. Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria 1954– 1962 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 41–85. 16. Drake, Terrorist’ Target Selection, 175–182. 17. Ibid. 18. William Warner Fowler, Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods and Systems (Santa Monica, CA: RAND publication, 1981), 12; also Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968–1974, R-I597-DOS/ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publication, 1975). 19. Harold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936). 20. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965). 21. Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 8. 22. Johann Most, Freiheit, January 12, 1884; September 13, 1884. 23. Richard M. Kirk, ‘‘Political Terrorism and the Size of Government: A Positive Institutional Analysis of Violent Political Strategy,’’ Public Choice 40 (Spring 1983): 41–52. 24. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 7. 25. Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism, 2. 26. Ibid. 27. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 15. 28. Ibid., 33 29. H.E. Vanden, ‘‘State Policy and the Cult of Terror in Central America,’’ Contemporary Research in Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (Aberdeen, UK: Aberdeen University Press, 1987) 259. 30. Such sentiments have been expressed by Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, 2nd ed., trans. and ed. R.M. Adams (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), 42; see also G. Botero, Della Ragione di Stato (Paris: Chaudie`re (1589) 1599. 31. Ibid., 267. 32. R.D. Crenlinsten, ‘‘Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled,’’ in Contemporary Research on Terrorism, eds. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (Aberdeen, U.K.: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 16–17. 33. See also discussions by Alexander Wendt on constructivism. 34. Laqueur, A History of Terrorism. 35. Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Stephen Sloan, ‘‘International Terrorism: The Nature of the Threat,’’ in Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management, ed. Richard S. Shultz and Stephen Sloan (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 1–17. 36. Wilkinson, Contemporary Research in Terrorism, xii 37. Kent Layne Oots, A Political Organizational Approach to Transnational Terrorism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 9–12. 38. Paul Wilkinson, Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen, U.K.: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), xii. 39. Sun Tsu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala, 1988); also Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 55; and Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997). 40. P. Wilkinson, ‘‘Pathways Out of Terrorism for Democratic Societies,’’ in Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen, U.K.: Aberdeen University Press, 1987).


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41. Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001). 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid.; also Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism, xxiii. 44. Seymore Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1977, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 45. Annamarie Oliverio, The State of Terror: SUNY Series in Deviance and Social Control (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998). 46. Martha C. Crenshaw, The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a product of Strategic Choice, 1998; also Denardo, Powers in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). 47. Crenshaw, The Logic of Terrorism. 48. Ibid. 49. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 15. 50. Lacquer, A History of Terrorism, 8. 51. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 75. 52. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 34., quoting Alex P. Schmid, et al., Political Terrorism: A new Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction books, 1988), 12. 53. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. 54. Robert A. Friedlander, ‘‘The Origins of International Terrorism,’’ in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), 31. 55. H.E. Vanden, ‘‘State Policy and the Cult of Terror in Central America,’’ in Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen, U.K.: Aberdeen University Press, 1987). 56. Romanenko as cited by Laqueur, A History of Terrorism, 36. 57. Timothy McVeigh, ‘‘An Essay on Hypocrisy,’’ 1998. 58. Most, Freiheit. 59. T. Sandle et al., ‘‘Economic Methods and the Study of Terrorism,’’ in Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987). 60. Gary S. Becker, ‘‘Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach,’’ Journal of Political Economy 78 (March/April 1968): 169–217; M.K. Block and J.M. Heineke, ‘‘A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice,’’ American Economic Review 65 (June 1975): 314–325; Issac Erlich, ‘‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,’’ Journal of Political Economy 81 (May/June 1973): 521–565.

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Measuring the Enemy: Social Support for Islamist Terrorism Gordon L. Bowen How shall we understand the meaning of the level of sympathy for terrorists that exists among Muslims? This is the central concern of this chapter. U.S. policy has assumed that only slender social support exists for the militant Islamists and their terrorist acts. Much public diplomacy has focused on mobilizing among Muslims what has been perceived to be the silent majority against terrorism. This chapter presents evidence that challenges both of these key assumptions. It examines poll data on Muslim publics’ receptivity to key goals of the militant jihadist movement, attitudes toward its leaders, suicide bombing, personal financial support to terrorist organizations, and also attitudes toward family members joining organizations committed to violent action against the United States. Support levels are depicted cross-nationally and, when possible, are charted over time. Ultimately, it is argued that the social foundation that supports the global militant Islamist movement resembles that of historically successful revolutionary movements. INTRODUCTION Before the United States can fashion an effective GWOT in response to threats posed to its interests, we first must understand who the enemy actually is. The features of the adversary encountered on September 11, 2001, once seemed clear: an al Qaeda organization of Muslim extremists with a finite membership, an address (i.e., Afghanistan), and a state sponsor (i.e., The Taliban regime). About these nineteen hijackers, their mentors, and their Taliban friends, we soon would know much;1 and within days of the attacks, the United States formally authorized the use of military force. Under U.S. Senate Joint Resolution 23 (September 14, 2001), the United States authorized the President ‘‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the

MEASURING THE ENEMY: SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIST TERRORISM

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terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.’’2 Yet, the task to ‘‘prevent any future acts’’ remains problematic, and a growing consensus within the U.S. government and beyond has come to perceive the terrorist threat to have evolved into something quite different. As Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff summed it up in April 2007, ‘‘We are at war with a global movement and ideology whose members seek to advance totalitarian aims through terrorism. . . al Qaeda and its ilk. . . adapted to the 21st century global network. . . [to become] a militarized and networked foe.’’3 These views have echoed perceptions in U.S. military communities: in a 2006 article by one U.S. Army War College scholar, Shawn Brimley, the U.S. was seen to face ‘‘an enemy that is both a transnational organization and a growing ideological movement.’’4 Inspired by a common creed, apparently autonomous, home-grown, self-starter cells of jihadists have given elusive form to the threats with which the West and its allies confront. In the words of Brigadier General Russell Howard, ‘‘the new terrorism resembles a virus that morphs as its environment changes. Individual cells and nodes evolve their own strategy.’’5 To advance shared ideological aims, practitioners of the jihadists’ tactics have targeted Western interests from Bali to Casablanca, Istanbul to Madrid, London to Karachi. Quintessentially, the nineteen 9/11 hijackers each were indoctrinated in training camps, madrassas, and mosques. A coherently organized al Qaeda in 2001 still sent ‘‘recruiters [to] locate raw talent in a seminary or a mosque’’ to be trained subsequently in camps in Afghanistan.6 The new generation of post-9/11 terrorists, on the other hand, has been less likely to be inculcated in their hateful ideology by these same methods. In the quiet anonymity of Internet chat-rooms, accessed privately via bedroom computers, not in easily targeted camps, a new generation is apparently learning who to hate and how to kill them. In these discreet ways global jihad has evolved: inspired by, but no longer closely directed by Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, the West and its friends face ‘‘jihad metastasised.’’7 A loose league of affiliated groups, home-grown terrorist cells, and even fanatic individuals form its nodes. These changes have had important implications for counterterrorism policies and Western strategy. Since terrorist trainees no longer can be observed en route to Osama bin Laden’s Afghanistan camps, policies focusing on monitoring suspicious travelers may lead to fewer arrests. Moreover, ‘‘clean skin’’ terrorists—individuals with spotless records and travel documents unlikely to arouse suspicion—have found it possible to literally fly under even attentive security systems’ radar. Nor is nationality profiling of young men of Middle Eastern or South Asian ethnicity a policy well fitted to the changing forms of terrorism. Convicted ‘‘shoe bomber’’ Richard Reid, and Jermaine Lindsay, the most deadly of the four 2005 London transit suicide bombers, did not fit such a nationality profile.8 Neither man had been born Muslim, but when each converted as adults it was to an extreme version of Islam. The new terrorists learn the tradecraft of terrorism in lessons standardized on CDs and DVDs, distributed through Web sites, or hand-to-hand. They find community through Internet message boards, or via circles of friends made in mosques and community

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centers. They undertake training as innocuously as by playing paint ball, virtually under our noses in places such as the suburban woods of Northern Virginia.9 This evolving view of the enemy reflects careful analysis of prevented and actual terrorist attacks worldwide since September 11, 2001. It has emerged in government, academia, and think tanks concurrently with other hard lessons learned in attempting to defeat jihad terrorism by way of two relatively large-scale military occupations of states once believed to be key havens for terrorists, Afghanistan and Iraq. If the heavy footprint of military occupation of states that served as safe havens for terrorists appeared to be the necessary response in 2001–2003, a ‘‘Long War’’ against the dispersed fighters of this evolving jihadist enemy now appears to require the lighter touch of more extensive electronic surveillance, the quieter feet of covert operatives, and the more nimble hands of the Special Forces. Informed by intelligence targeted closely onto microscopically small terrorist cells and even individuals, tactics appropriate to this emerging vision of the enemy are being made smaller in scale. Thus, by being more sharply focused on the military components of counterterrorism policy, large-scale occupations that alienate uninvolved publics in occupied lands can be minimized. While this conception of the enemy has the air of a consensus, 10 some wellinformed analysts—for example, the former head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit at its Counterterrorism Center, Michael Scheuer and former National Security Council official Bruce Riedel—have continued to place additional focus on al Qaeda and the dynamic elements in its new generation of leadership.11 Others would draw our attention less to the autonomous jihadist cells and more to the subcontracting by al Qaeda of jihadist tasks to affiliated but still organized terrorist groups, well illustrated by a series of terrorist attacks across North Africa in 2007.12 But we must take care that it is evidence, not misplaced hopes, that guides us to adopt in its entirety any of these fairly narrow ways of conceptualizing the enemy. A tiny, granular enemy may suggest more limited demands on Western military forces than the high costs associated with the large-scale foreign occupations undertaken in the 2000s. Similarly, no politician committed to his/her national security can be indifferent to occupation policies whose chief effects are to divide the United States from its allies, and to exhaust vital U.S. military institutions.13 Moreover, by conceiving the enemy principally as a small scale, self-starter terrorist threat, we may play into fears likely to arouse publics: ‘‘the threat has emerged within established democracies with strong social and political institutions’’14 (emphasis added). There is no doubt that, as bombers have mounted a changing stage, the composite enemy presented there has differed in important ways from the one seen on September 11, 2001. On that occasion, nineteen suicide terrorists were financed and closely directed by Osama bin Laden’s chief of operations, KSM (Khalid Sheikh Muhammad). The killers entered the United States as aliens no more than fifteen months prior to the attack, and several of these ‘‘muscle hijackers’’ were unable to speak English. This quintessential operation did not arise from a ‘‘threat within’’ the U.S. population but was a stealthy form of invasion conducted by al Qaeda.15 While bin Laden’s wealth apparently played no key financial role in these attacks known


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to al Qaeda as ‘‘The Planes Operation,’’16 a relatively significant sum of between $400,000 and a half million dollars in organizational resources was devoted to the project.17 Command and control were present: in Spring 2000, bin Laden himself ordered the elimination of a second set of attacks KSM had scheduled for that day. These were to have been airplane attacks, which the notorious operations planner earlier had designed to hit cities in the western United States and various U.S. allies in East Asia. An organizational chart of this operation would be recognizable using standard models of revolutionary organizations, as is depicted in Appendix B. In contrast, cells have become less alien in appearance, more self-reliant, and more deeply hidden in the midst of Western societies. As will become clear from brief summaries (below) of the attacks on the key urban centers of Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004), and London (2005), the changing face of terrorism has required only small numbers of direct supporters for the operations to succeed. But those small numbers of direct supporters exist within a broader social milieu that is conducive to the creation of safety for the terrorists to plan, recruit operatives, conduct surveillance, and commit further acts of terrorism. The Istanbul, Madrid, and London attacks, much like the attacks of 9/11, occurred in ‘‘swarms’’ of four or more simultaneous operations. Unlike 9/11, each was orchestrated largely by long-term residents (if not always by citizens) who possessed more substantial ties to, and cover within, the societies they assaulted.18 Two additional trends are evident when looking at this set of attacks: close operational direction by al Qaeda personnel has been declining; and financial dependence on al Qaeda has been diminishing over the decade of the 2000s. Turkey: In November 2003, two Jewish and two British sites were attacked in Istanbul. Al Qaeda in this case was connected: Louai al-Sakka, a Syrian national, convicted and sentenced to life in prison in February 2007 for leading and financing these suicide truck bombings, was an al Qaeda member. But Mr. al-Sakka led a fairly large cell of 73, composed almost entirely of Turkish jihadists, several of whom later fought against the United States and coalition forces in Iraq and were captured there.19 The Turkish bombers were men who saw themselves as part of an international revolutionary vanguard entirely consistent with the neo-Leninist Islamist theory outlined more than four decades ago by (the late) Sayyid Qutb, who once argued: ‘‘Islamic belief should at once materialize into a practical movement. . .. Only such a revivalist movement will eventually attain to the status of world leadership. . .. It is necessary that there should be a vanguard. . .that this vanguard should know the landmarks and the milestones of the road toward this goal.’’20 The Istanbul bombings operation cost approximately $170,000, and some of this came from al Qaeda. Fifty-seven were killed in the four bombings.21 Despite these deaths and hundreds of injuries to Turks in these attacks, a small but significant stratum in Turkish society seems to have sympathized with the stated aims of the bombers. When surveyed a year before the bombings, about one in eight Turks (13 percent) expressed support for suicide bombings ‘‘in defense of Islam,’’ and over the years since the November 2003 attacks, that level of support has remained relatively constant: 15 percent in 2004, 14 percent in 2005.22

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Spain: While evidence is far from uniform, no reliable proof of direct al Qaeda financing, direction, or even prior knowledge of the March 11, 2004, Madrid railroad stations attacks has appeared that connects a group of at least twenty-eight Muslim males (and at least one Spanish non-Muslim), largely Moroccan residents of Spain, to the March 11, 2004 bombings. This event differed from other major ‘‘swarming’’ attacks in that IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), rather than suicide bombers, were used in this incident. The IEDs were placed in backpacks on ten trains by two cell members, and were detonated remotely by cell phones. Some bombs failed to detonate. This more imprecise method also meant that no cell members seemed to have been required to commit suicide. Later, seven did perish at their own hands when setting off bombs to resist a subsequent arrest attempt by Spanish authorities. The al Qaeda connection to Madrid is hazy at best. A Spanish prosecutor in the subsequent criminal case, Olga Sanchez, alleged that the attack was inspired by an October 2003 bin Laden speech televised on Al Jazeera.23 The examining magistrate in the case, Juan de Olmo, enlarged on this indirect tie to al Qaeda, formally linking the cell to a North African group known as Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, an al Qaeda affiliated organization.24 Evidence introduced at the 2007 trial confirmed that personnel overlapped with the Moroccan group, including connections to a series of May 2003 attacks in Casablanca, Morocco. However, in testimony at the bombers’ trial on April 17, 2007, the Syrian-born Spanish citizen and jailed al Qaeda chief in Spain, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, alias ‘‘Abu Dahdah’’—who was already serving a twelve-year sentence for other terrorism offenses— stated that it was not al Qaeda per se but a cell affiliated with the ‘‘al-Takfir Wal Hijra’’ tendency in jihadist Salafism that was behind the Madrid attack.25 Takfiris believe in complete withdrawal from society, self-purification, and then action to destroy society, and they countenance any deception to this end. Thus, Takfiris have been known to shave, to drink alcohol, and to blend in other ways into Western contexts. Other Takfiri groups in Egypt often financed themselves through criminal activities,26 and the Spanish cell apparently obtained its explosives when an outwardly impious Muslim drug-dealing cell member traded hashish with a Spanish (Christian) miner who had stolen from his mine the explosives ultimately used in the Madrid train attacks. For purposes of this analysis, it must be emphasized that all these tendencies within jihadism guide groups that pursue substantially parallel aims,27 and it is well known that Takfiri methods of deception—drinking in Las Vegas, for example—were also employed by al Qaeda’s 9/11 hijackers in the weeks preceding the 2001 attacks. The Madrid cell seems to have been led by a Tunisian (the late) Serhan Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, and an Egyptian, Rabei Ousmane Sayed Ahmed. They coordinated a multinational group: nine Spaniards, two Syrians, a Lebanese, an Egyptian and an Algerian, but mostly it was composed of Moroccans living in Spain, fifteen of whom survived to stand trial (along with fourteen others).28 While court documents allege that some cell members trained in bomb making and detonation at non-al Qaeda jihadist groups’ training camps in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, most held


37

jobs, had families, and were otherwise apparently well integrated into Spanish society. For expenditures of approximately $15,000, the bombers were able to kill 191.29 Though few in Spain support al Qaeda, many Muslims do exhibit varying degrees of estrangement from the wider Spanish culture. When polled, virtually no Spanish residents expressed support for Osama bin Laden (2 percent in 2003, 1 percent in 2005).30 If those fragments of support were to be concentrated in minority Muslim communities, it might indicate a base of substantially less than a half million sympathizers.31 Spain, by and large, has welcomed North African workers and immigrants before and after the attacks, with two in three (67 percent) Spaniards responding in 2005 that they thought it was a ‘‘good thing’’ that people from the Middle East and North Africa come to work in Spain, and only 26 percent expressing that they thought it a ‘‘bad thing.’’ Still, significant estrangement between Spanish and Muslim communities has occurred. In 2005, more than eight in ten Spaniards were found to believe Islam to be the ‘‘most violent’’ of all religions, a level of suspicion topped only in France and the Netherlands among all European and North American states. Three in four Spaniards in 2005 saw growing Islamic identity among Muslim residents to be a ‘‘bad thing,’’ and that sum rose to 82 percent in 2006. Conversely, in 2006, 75 percent of Spanish Muslims thought rising Islamic identity among Spanish Muslims was a ‘‘good thing.’’32 Seventy-seven percent of Spaniards in 2005 also reported themselves ‘‘worried’’ about Muslim extremism in Spain, and 29 percent believed that it will lead to further violence.33 This growing suspicion is built atop different conceptions of identity in the Christian and Muslim communities in Spain. Non-Muslim Spaniards have no difficulty describing themselves as citizens of Spain first and foremost. When asked in a 2006 poll ‘‘Do you think of yourself first as Spanish or Christian?’’ 60 percent responded ‘‘Spanish,’’ and only a small minority of Spaniards (14 percent) described themselves as Christian first (21 percent responded ‘‘both equally’’). Spanish Muslims, on the other hand, conceived their identity differently: 69 percent responded that they think of themselves first as Muslim, with only 3 percent responding ‘‘Spanish.’’ One in four (25 percent) viewed the Spanish and the Muslim elements of their identity to be equal.34 Thus, even though a majority of Spanish Muslims (53 percent) state that they have come to Spain to ‘‘adopt the customs’’ of the majority culture, more than 65 percent in each of two 2005 and 2006 polls of Spanish Christians believe that the Muslims of Spain ‘‘want to be distinct’’ from the majority culture.35 London: Even less of a connection to organized international jihadism has been established in the London transit system bombing cases of July 7, 2005. The British terrorists were not aliens at all: three of the four British Muslims implicated in the suicide attacks were born of Pakistani parents in Britain; the fourth, a Jamaican by birth and a convert to Islam, had lived in the U.K. since childhood. All held British citizenship. Ties to terrorist hubs in South Asia and the Middle East also existed in this case, but the trail of specific evidence appears thin: two of the four London bombers had traveled to Pakistan prior to attacks, one in 2003, and two together for four months in 2004–2005. Contact with terrorists there has been assumed by British authorities (‘‘it is assessed as likely that they had contact with some al Qaida

38


figures’’), and while hard evidence of actual operational training in the craft of terrorism there is sketchy, British ‘‘[a]gencies believe that some form of operational training is likely to have taken place while Khan and Tanweer were in Pakistan.’’36 The London bombers spent no more than $2,000 to create their deadly, homemade organic peroxide bombs, but that was sufficient to kill fifty-six.37 In this instance we may be closest to a genuine self-starter cell, i.e., an informal group of Islamist amateurs sympathetic with, but with limited connections to, any specific militant Islamist organization on whose behalf they loosely sought to associate their efforts to kill and intimidate Western civilians. In September 2005, Al Jazeera aired a prerecorded ‘‘martyr’s video’’ made by Siddeque Khan, one of the dead London bombers. In it he praised al Qaeda’s leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, referred to Muslims everywhere as ‘‘my people,’’ and threatened British citizens in general, saying ‘‘you will be our targets.’’38 The speaker was educated, employed, and a married father who apparently had discarded his British sense of self in favor of a purely Muslim one, before he blew himself up on a subway train. Thus, it is pertinent that we understand that it is militant Islamist identity, more than any specific aggrieved nationality, more than membership in any organization, which has accompanied terrorism as it has moved beyond the Middle Eastern and South Asian regions to become truly global in its range of targets. Though they later took credit for each of these operations, a focus on al Qaeda simply can no longer account adequately for all of these attacks. The question of greatest relevance, therefore, is whether the central problem truly is these tiny clusters of similarly angry men already present within Western societies, or whether the central problem in the West and beyond is a substantially broader social subgroup that agrees with their immediate aims, gives legitimacy to their ultimate goals, and approves of the methods used by the militants of jihadist terrorism. Some in the West have few doubts. Writing in September 2006 in the respected Atlantic Monthly of which he was then senior national correspondent, James Fallows said, ‘‘An even deeper problem for al Qaeda and the self-starter groups is an apparent erosion of support where it would be most likely and necessary: in the Arab and Moslem worlds.’’39 Apparently, a multinational jihadist plot uncovered a month earlier, one that planned to bomb New York bound airplanes over the Atlantic ocean, could not stop Fallows’ rush to ‘‘declare victory’’ already had been won by the United States. Even in Britain the social support base for Islamist terrorism at that time was larger than one might think. While more than eight in ten Muslims of all age groups there do not admire al Qaeda, and while no age subgroup over age 25 expressed more than 6 percent support for al Qaeda, the fact that al Qaeda was admired by 13 percent of young British Muslims should cause optimists such as Fallows to pause for some further thought.40 Moreover, this small minority of jihadist sympathizers among British Muslims persistently has turned up in studies done by other reliable polling organizations. Shortly after the July 2005 bombings, 6 percent in a small (n=526) YouGov sample of British Muslims stated that they found the bombings to be ‘‘justified,’’ and 24 percent said ‘‘yes’’ (either ‘‘a lot’’: 13 percent; or ‘‘a little’’: 11 percent) when asked, ‘‘do you personally have any sympathy with the feelings and motives of those who


39

carried out the attacks?’’41 Further, a 2006 Pew survey of British Muslims’ views found 15 percent of a sample of 412 to believe that suicide bombing in ‘‘defense of Islam’’ is justified (either ‘‘often,’’ 3 percent; or ‘‘sometimes,’’ 12 percent).42 Fortunately, hardly any of these sympathizers in the West have themselves chosen to become suicide bombers. But the interplay of acts of terrorism with even relatively low levels of public sympathy for jihadism warrants close study. Where suicide bombings have become more frequent (i.e., in parts of the Muslim world), the social foundations from which bombers emerge are doubly important to investigate. How should we best understand the meaning of the levels of terrorist sympathizers that exist in particular states will be the central issue addressed in the rest of this chapter. U.S. policy in the Muslim world has been built around the supposition that there are only small numbers of terrorists and their sympathizers. From the outset, the George W. Bush Administration embraced the thinking of Michael Doran (Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs for the National Security Council). Doran argued that jihadist terrorism enjoyed little general social support, was a manifestation of a ‘‘civil war’’ among Muslims, and that in such a conflict the weight of U.S. policy could be a force to help the moderating voices to prevail.43 Insurgencies against U.S. preemptive wars in Afghanistan and, especially, in Iraq, did little to undermine continuing expressions of this view. In early 2006, for example, U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee: An important part of Al-Qaeda’s strategy is to encourage a grassroots uprising of Muslims against the West. Emerging new networks and cells. . .reflect aggressive jihadist efforts to exploit feelings of frustration and powerlessness in some Muslim communities, and to fuel the perception that the United States is anti-Islamic. Their rationale for using terrorism against the United States and establishing strict Islamic practices resonates with a small subset of Muslims44 . . .most Muslims reject the extremist message and violent agendas of global jihadists.45 (emphasis added)

U.S. policy also has been built around the idea that a supportive but silent majority opposed to the jihadists exists within Muslim communities. In the volatile Middle East, the heyday of this way of thinking coincided with the demise of the Saddam Hussein regime, which was removed by the U.S. Armed Forces and its allies in Spring 2003. As President George W. Bush put it in November 2003, ‘‘ . . .Iraqi democracy will succeed—and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran—that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.’’46 Put simply, democracy would stop terrorism. The strategy adopted, therefore, aimed to divide what were perceived as publics unsupportive of jihad terrorism from the militants. It was assumed that, even as the United States conducted unpopular counterinsurgency campaigns against terrorists in Afghanistan, 2001–2008, and Iraq, 2003–2008, ‘‘most Muslims’’ would remain unreceptive to the global jihadists’ appeal. Respected voices from the academy added

40


an additional wrinkle. Not only were the jihadists ever more isolated, we also were told that they had taken to internecine feuding. In 2005, Fawaz Gerges perceived ’’multiple internal wars tearing the jihadist movement apart,’’ a movement he perceived to then be in ‘‘terminal decline and decay.’’47 In 2006, Australian irregular warfare expert (Lt. Col.) David Kilcullen, recommended that to win the ‘‘global counterinsurgency,’’ disparate elements in the jihadist movement needed to be further ‘‘disaggregated’’ from one another.48 He recommended accommodating some demands made by strictly local extremists, an approach embraced with a measure of success by U.S. Gen. David Petraeus in parts of Iraq in 2007–08.49 Some have retained doubts, however. In 2005, the late General Wayne Downing suggested that the emerging problem was not one of a couple terrorist-infected safe havens, or of tiny numbers of cells of dead-ender jihadists warring among themselves. The jihadists, Downing argued, should best be understood as the shock troops of a ‘‘remarkably resilient’’ enemy coming out of something far broader: ‘‘Sunni Salafist Islam.’’50 Downing’s way of thinking demands a wider analytic focus, one that includes attention to broad publics’ attitudes, and that is what will follow in this chapter. When informed by a clear understanding of the history of revolutions, these latent supporters must be understood to play a role as important as that of active militants in the revolutionary equation. Contrary to the emphasis placed on majority opinion in democratic theory and in stated Bush Administration policy, comparative analysis of revolutions has shown lesser thresholds to have been needed in order to form the ‘‘critical mass’’ necessary for successful revolutions.51 Fidel Castro’s revolutionary army likely contained no more than 2,000 fighters, in a Cuba of seven million.52 Lenin and his Bolsheviks polled a mere 23.7 percent of the popular vote (winning 24.7 percent of the seats) in a November 1918 election for a constituent assembly to write a new Russian constitution,53 but that level of passive public support, when paired with no more than 100,000 Red Guards, proved sufficient to seize and ultimately hold power over a country of more than 130 million.54 It is not the ability of revolutionaries to gain active involvement of popular majorities that has mattered. In a world largely passive about public life in most forms, what matters is the ability of revolutionaries to articulate popular themes around which to construct a sufficiently attractive narrative that can induce small numbers of committed people to join them in identifying clear enemies and targeting them for violence. THE GOALS OF MILITANT ISLAMIST TERRORISM What then, are these popular themes in the jihadists’ narrative? Violence against the West is central to, but not the sole goal of, the global jihadist movement. Broadly speaking, the movement follows ideological premises first articulated by the martyred Egyptian theoretician Sayyid Qutb,55 the ‘‘founding father of the jihadist movement.’’56 Qutb made a case that had great influence on the leadership of al Qaeda, notably on strategist Ayman al Zawahiri, on Osama bin Laden through his mentor Abdullah Azzam,57 and on the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi through his


41

mentor Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdisi.58 Qutb’s theory rests on an attractive methodology: his truths profess to rely on his own reading of a single source, the Qur’an, as his guide. Not mediated by clerics, but distilled alone, at times alone in the ‘‘decadent’’ West (i.e., in Greeley, Colorado, in 1949),59 Qutb found blazing insights that the reader is told he/she now also can find, alone, reading just the Qur’an, guided, perhaps, by a study group of similarly inclined peers. In this light, contemporary jihadists follow Qutb’s thought and seek first and foremost to transform the states of the Muslim world by eliminating all vestiges of secular authority. They then associate with traditional nationalist and Pan-Arabist themes by seeking to expel the West from the region. They link up to a sense of history and pride by announcing they seek to reconstruct a Caliphate of all Muslim peoples. Finally, they invoke ‘‘end times’’ references by expressing that it is their goal to seek to bring Islam to all unbelievers. In this ideologically charged context, the jihadists’ embrace of violence is not just a choice of one method among several options. It is also an end unto itself. As the sagacious Brian Jenkins put it in 2006, ‘‘the jihadists’ strategy, therefore, is neither linear nor sequential. There is no jihadist ‘road map’ to victory. Strategic objectives do not dictate action—action is the objective. Allah is the strategist.’’60 Militant jihadist Islamism sets these values at the core of a political program. It is a clear program that has come to unite fighters (i.e., terrorists) of many nationalities with substantial numbers of sympathizers and supporters, both active and latent (for an illustration, see Appendix C). Thus conceived, militant jihadist Islamism should be understood as a broadly scattered ideological movement that exists in dozens of countries. Some branches are well organized, some hide in secrecy; some are linked to legitimate political parties, others are autonomous cells. But everywhere it exists, militant jihadist Islamism is more than a political label, more than a vehicle through which competing elites vie for the authority to select who among them is to rule. In other words, the ideological movement of militant jihadist Islamism differs in form and function from the narrow tasks political parties fulfill within any single democratic society through elections. Joined to goals clearly incompatible with democratic norms are action arms incompatible with democratic processes. Qutb’s final important insight is that a force of full-time professional revolutionaries is needed, an Islamic ‘‘vanguard’’ directly corresponding to Lenin’s foremost enlargement on Marxist theory.61 Qutb stated, ‘‘Islamic belief should at once materialize into a practical movement. . .. Only such a revivalist movement will eventually attain to the status of world leadership. . .. It is necessary that there should be a vanguard . . .that this vanguard should know the landmarks and the milestones of the road toward this goal.’’62 It must be stressed, most Muslims do not embrace all aims of this movement, or its tactics.63 But since successful revolutions almost never have required active participation by popular majorities, the important question is how much support is enjoyed? How many Muslims back the jihadists’ goals, the movement’s leaders, and their grisly tactics? How willing are publics to donate money or their sons to this cause? How widely are its acts sanctified by socially influential ‘‘norm entrepreneurs,’’64

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or legitimized by others not directly involved in committing the violent acts that are the emerging hallmarks of jihadist terrorism.65 A clearheaded view of these essential elements in Muslim opinion is the foundation from which a better design for U.S. strategy should proceed. The rest of this chapter draws together responses collected in several other researchers’ studies of Muslims’ opinions. The body of evidence assembled here will suggest that a social support base exists that is adequate to sustain indefinitely the militant jihadist terror movement. It is neither ‘‘a small subset’’ of the community, nor are the goals of the terrorists’ fringe ideas without appeal. Their chief tactic of suicide terrorism is supported by tens of millions. Once these facts are digested, it should be clear why a U.S. strategy of primarily targeting terrorist cells is inadequate. SUPPORTERS: THE SOCIAL BASE OF JIHADIST TERRORISM From Morocco to Indonesia, Osama bin Laden is not widely feared; he and his central goals enjoy a substantial popular following. Suicide bombing may in the West appear to be a wretched break from traditions of civilian neutrality during warfare fitfully developed over many hundreds of years. But, under some circumstances, suicide bombings nonetheless are popular all across Arab North Africa and in the Middle East, as well as in Pakistan and in parts of Southeast Asia. The attacks on the twin towers—three thousand dead Americans—are no embarrassment because the men who attacked the United States are heroes. Support for the Leaders of Militant Islamism Careful polling by the Pew Center for Research repeatedly has shown that across the Muslim world Osama bin Laden is a popular, not a reviled, figure. We begin with a poll released in June 2003, in which the question was asked about leaders who could be counted on to ‘‘do the right thing.’’ When that was asked about Osama bin Laden, 71 percent of Palestinians, 58 percent of Indonesians, 55 percent of Jordanians, 49 percent of Moroccans, and 45 percent of Pakistanis stated that they regarded Osama bin Laden as a leader in whom they have confidence he will ‘‘do the right thing.’’ Some ambiguity may seem to surround that phrasing ‘‘do the right thing,’’ but other questions in the same poll gave focus to the normative framework in which right and wrong were assessed by these respondents. For example, no fewer than three in four respondents in every single one of these Muslim countries were disappointed that the Iraqis had not resisted the 2003 United States invasion more. Table 3.1 illustrates both the percent of the public and the corresponding real numbers of people holding such positive views of bin Laden in 2003–2006.66 As social scientists, we like to see replication and trends. But not all states permit opinion polling to be conducted as freely or as often as others; and in some areas, polling can be too dangerous for replication of all studies in all years. Thus, Pew asked Palestinians the bin Laden question in 2003 alone, when 71 percent stated they had a lot or some confidence in him. For different reasons, Egyptians were asked the


Table 3.1

43

Public Confidence that Osama bin Laden Will ‘‘Do the Right Thing’’ 2003

2005

2006

Real number represented by the highest poll (in boldface)

45%

51%

38%

75.68 million

Jordan

55%

60%

24%

3.18 million

Morocco

45%

26%

n/a

13.54 million

Lebanon

14%

2%

n/a

0.31 million

Indonesia

58%

35%

33%

124.41 million

Turkey

15%

7%

4%

10.60 million

Pakistan

bin Laden question only in 2006, when 26 percent expressed a lot or some confidence in him. It would have been preferable to have repeated these exact questions with a sound sample in each of these places each year. But despite the limitations created by the absence of such data, our understanding of the problem nevertheless is expanded by both the full and the partial Pew data sets: i.e., Palestinians and Egyptians respond on this question in ways that closely mirror other Arabs’ views. In 2004, a poll of Saudis—commissioned by the Saudi monarchy—asked ‘‘Do you agree or disagree with the sermons and rhetoric of Osama bin Laden most of the time?’’67 A second question solicited how Saudis felt about the United States. Summarized in Table 3.2, it is clear that at the time Osama was more popular than the United States. In 2007, a further study of Muslim attitudes was conducted by the PIPA (Program on International Policy Attitudes) at the University of Maryland. It also surveyed attitudes toward bin Laden, examining samples in four Muslim states: Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The specific question was ‘‘Overall would you say your feelings about Osama bin Laden are positive, mixed, or negative?’’ Twentyone percent of Indonesians, 27 percent in Pakistan and Morocco, and a stunning 40 percent of Egyptians responded that they had positive feelings about bin Laden.68 Among the related concerns PIPA addressed were attitudes toward al Qaeda. Respondents were asked if they supported al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States, and whether they agreed with al Qaeda’s attitudes toward the United States. An average of 15 percent of the population in these four countries was shown to both support the attacks and to agree with al Qaeda’s attitude toward the United States. A further 23 percent opposed the attacks but agreed with al Qaeda’s attitude toward the United States. Breaking it down by countries, the United States was found to Table 3.2 Saudis’ Opinions Regarding bin Laden and the United States How do you feel about the sermons and rhetoric of Osama bin Laden (2004)

Real number

Do you favor strong and close relations with the United States (2004)

Agree with

48%

10.8 M

41%

Disagree with

37%

8.3 M

57%

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have its biggest problem in Egypt, where one in four (25 percent) supported al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States, and an additional 31 percent shared al Qaeda’s attitude toward the United States. In Morocco and Pakistan small but significant numbers of people supported al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States (9 percent), a figure that surprisingly was somewhat higher in Indonesia (15 percent).69 Reviewing these findings, it is clear that consistent majorities do not hold attitudes favorable toward bin Laden or al Qaeda. But significant minorities do. The top leadership of the most prominent militant Islamist organization enjoyed substantial support across the Middle East, in its core the Arabian Peninsula, in its periphery (Morocco), and beyond. Moreover, this phenomenon cannot be said to be about national pride or pan-Arab solidarity alone; support for the leader of al Qaeda has remained disturbingly high in the two non-Arab and most populous Muslim countries, Pakistan and Indonesia. Indeed, support for al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States was higher in Indonesia than in most (but not all, e.g., Egypt) of the Muslim Middle East. Support for a Key Goal of Militant Islamists: Instituting Islamic Law Since the leader of al Qaeda is not unpopular, how broad is public sympathy for some of the key goals articulated by militant Islamists such as Osama bin Laden? Let us turn first to the Middle East, where recent surveys have revealed broad support for Islamization of society. Public attitudes in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories were examined late in 2004 by a research unit sponsored by the University of Jordan at Amman, and was released in February 2005.70 In this study, the original authors’ principal concerns were to explore differences in attitudes toward different Western states, and a chief finding they emphasized throughout their interpretative commentary accompanying the study was that France and its leader, Jacques Chirac, were not nearly as reviled as were U.S. and British policies and leaders. Some of these observations echo findings in many other studies.71 But among the topics also explored were questions that addressed the preferences of several comparative national samples toward transforming their societies to more closely adhere to the rules set down in shari’a, or Islamic law. It is pertinent here to remind the reader that, following Qutb, one of the key critiques made by militant Islamist terrorists is that contemporary Muslim states inadequately embrace Islamic teachings as the sole basis of law and governance. This has specific relevance when examining the transition of individual Islamists from mere supporters to direct participation in jihadist terrorism. ‘‘Self-starter’’ terrorists—men such as the London bombers Mohammed Siddique Khan and his fellow bomber Shahzad Tanweer—often personally seek to impose shari’a on their families as a transitional step that moves them closer to becoming a fully operational actor on behalf of militant Islamist ideology. Khan underwent such a transformation in the years prior to his attack, founding an all-male Islamic-oriented gymnasium, requiring his British-born spouse to wear clothing dictated by Islamists’ codes of modesty, and in other ways reflecting a passion for shari’a norms to be enforced. Tanweer


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began wearing a beard after visiting Pakistan. Such transitions elicit approval in much larger segments of the Muslim community in Britain than do expressions of support for terrorist groups. The preference to be ruled by shari’a, and not by the British Common Law, is shared by more than a fourth (i.e., 28 percent) of British Muslims, and among younger British Muslims, 37 percent would prefer to live under shari’a. More disturbingly, 36 percent of these same young British Muslims believed (2007) that a Muslim who converts to another religion should be killed.72 This is, of course, a key—and highly intolerant—feature of shari’a law. Levels of pro-shari’a attitudes are higher still in the Middle East. In the 2005 University of Jordan study, approximately two-thirds of Muslim respondents polled in Egypt, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan agreed that shari’a should be the sole source of law in their country. A further 30–35 percent in each state affirmed the slightly more moderate position that shari’a should be ‘‘a source’’ of law among other sources.73 Very few respondents subscribed to a Western ideal of separating governmental from religious authority. Levels of support for shari’a were somewhat lower among Muslims in Lebanon and among Syrians, but only in Lebanon did even as many as 30 percent of Muslims oppose the use of shari’a as a basis for law. Somewhat more encouraging was another finding that the Jordanian authors of the study emphasized; publics across the region embrace an elastic view of what constitutes Islamic law (Ijtihad), with less than 10 percent in each country holding to the extreme fundamentalist view that the final meaning of Islamic law is settled, and has been settled for all time. These attitudes have persisted, as is demonstrated when support for shari’a, was examined again in the 2007 PIPA poll of four Muslim nations. The basic finding in the 2005 University of Jordan poll again emerged. When asked for agreement or disagreement with the goal of requiring ‘‘strict application of shari’a, law in every Muslim country,’’ majorities in each country agreed either strongly or somewhat. In Pakistan, 54 percent strongly supported imposing shari’a, in 2007, and an additional 25 percent favored this goal somewhat, for a total of 79 percent favorable. In Morocco, 76 percent favored the goal overall, with 35 percent ‘‘strongly’’ endorsing it. An even higher percentage, 50 percent ‘‘strongly’’ favored requiring shari’a, law in Egypt, with an additional 24 percent favoring it somewhat. Even in Indonesia, a majority (53 percent overall) supported the goal of requiring shari’a, law, though there only 17 percent supported this view strongly and 36 percent are ‘‘somewhat’’ in favor of it.74 Social role partly can explain varying levels of support for a religious basis for law, and there may be reasons to hope a clerical rule of law can be shaped into less extreme forms than those modeled by al Qaeda’s allies, the Taliban, in Afghanistan. But among none of the national samples in the 2005 University of Jordan poll did a majority among social elites—the group often postulated to be the secular element among ‘‘norm entrepreneurs’’—support keeping Islamic rules entirely separate from legal codes. When attitudes of various elite groups in the core nations of Egypt, Palestinian territories, and Jordan were compared to the overall sample, less ardor for shari’a as the sole source of law turned up. In Jordan, for example, two-thirds of the national sample supported the ‘‘shari’a as the sole source’’ position, but only

46


28 percent of media elites did, and around 40 percent of business elites did. In Egypt, over 60 percent of the national sample supported the ‘‘shari’a as the sole source’’ position, but only slightly more than 30 percent of media elites did, and about 35 percent of business elites did. In the Palestinian territories, about 65 percent of the national sample supported the ‘‘shari’a as the sole source’’ position, but only about 20 percent of media elites did. A majority among Palestinian business elites, however, supported exclusive use of shari’a law.75 Considerable U.S. effort in the Middle East and Afghanistan has gone into founding secular schools and sponsoring improved performance by national education departments. The efficacy of this approach can be questioned. Levels of education do not correlate with attitudes toward ‘‘shari’a as the sole source’’ of legislation. Whether an Egyptian, a Jordanian, a Lebanese, or a Palestinian had minimal, high school, or collegiate levels of education, only small variances turned up in levels of support for instituting shari’a law in their countries. In reporting this data, the Jordanian authors pooled these states’ samples, stating ‘‘58 percent of the respondents with low education, 59 percent of those with moderate education, and 56 percent with higher education believe that shari’a must be the only source of legislation in their countries’’ (emphasis in original).76 Unlike the growing support for shari’a among young British Muslims, age in this Middle Eastern study did not explain the upsurge in support for instituting Islamic law as the sole basis for national legislation: a majority in each age group favored it, and only 10–13 percent in each age group in these states entirely opposed direct religious influence either as a sole source, or one source among others, shaping the law. Thus, one of the key elements of the militants’ program enjoys broad support. Support for Suicide Bombing Tactics as Used by Militant Jihadists Levels of support for the chief tactic militant jihadist terrorists have employed, suicide bombing, offer the best indication of the breadth of the problem confronting the West. This issue will be explored by examining responses to several different hypothetical phrasings of the issue offered to the respondents. The first wording (in Table 3.3), comes from a 2005 poll administered through the Pew Center for Research, and it shows significant minorities in diverse Muslim countries to support Table 3.3

Suicide Bombing in Defense of Islam: Is It Justified in ‘‘Our Country’’?77 Found it justified in 2005

% as number of citizens

Turkey

12%

8.4 million

Pakistan

25%

37.1 million

Jordan

30%

1.59 million

Morocco

9%

2.7 million

Lebanon

25%

.55 million

Indonesia

16%

34.3 million


47

suicide terrorism in the respondents’ own countries. (In every version of these charts where real numbers corresponding to the percentages are given, the Lebanese real number, only, has been reduced by one half to reflect the fact that these questions were asked of, and responses can be extrapolated to, only the Muslim portion of the national census which, while it probably exceeds 50 percent, cannot be determined exactly.) To simplify the range of tendencies expressed in these responses into broad pro and con clusters for each of the countries, the affirmative responses shown in the tables are the sum of those who answered that ‘‘often’’ or ‘‘sometimes’’ suicide bombing is ‘‘justified.’’ When the question is put more generically, support for suicide bombing ‘‘in defense of Islam’’ rises further. Since this precise question was asked several times (though not in every year in every country), a general trend over several years is shown in Table 3.4. Consider again the absolute numbers involved here (see Table 3.5), and not merely the percentages or the trend line. Millions in the abstract support both the leadership and the tactics of the militant jihadist movement. Assuredly, the actual number of potential suicide terrorists is small. But political scientists who engage in the study of comparative revolutionary movements—a subfield of study often curiously unconnected to the modern study of terrorism—long ago demonstrated that it never has been necessary to have most of the population become actual combatants. A generation ago, after reviewing the literature about revolutionary movements of the left, right, peasants, workers, etc., Thomas Greene put this point sharply: ‘‘But even revolutionary movements that succeed are based on a small percentage of the total population. A revolution involves minorities fighting minorities.’’79 Thus, a focus on the absence of majorities in favor of this or that leader, or this or that tactic, substantially misses a key point. Consider the real numbers involved. The 2007 PIPA study also asked about these same issues without using the potentially loaded term ‘‘suicide bombing,’’ inquiring whether it is ‘‘justified’’ when ‘‘an attack in which a Muslim blows himself up while attacking an enemy’’ takes place. Compressing here the respondents who answered ‘‘often,’’ or ‘‘sometimes’’ as positive responses (and the two negative responses ‘‘rarely’’ and ‘‘never’’ as ‘‘not justified’’), PIPA found Indonesia again to emerge as the relatively bright spot. Only 15 percent Table 3.4

Is Suicide Bombing in Defense of Islam Justified?78 Found it justifiable in 2002

Found it justifiable in 2004


Turkey

13%

15%

14%

Pakistan

33%

41%

25%

Jordan

43% 40%

13%

Morocco

57%

Lebanon

73%

39%

Indonesia

27%

15%

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Table 3.5 200580

Real Numbers of Supporters of Suicide Bombing ‘‘in Defense of Islam’’ in

Turkey (2005) had 9.9 million who supported suicide bombing ‘‘in defense of Islam.’’

Pakistan (2005) had 37.1 million who supported suicide bombing ‘‘in defense of Islam.’’

Indonesia (2005) had 32.1 million who supported suicide bombing ‘‘in defense of Islam.’’

Jordan (2005) had 3 million who supported suicide bombing ‘‘in defense of Islam.’’

Morocco (2005) had 3.9 million who supported suicide bombing ‘‘in defense of Islam.’’

Lebanon (2005) had .85 million who supported suicide bombing ‘‘in defense of Islam.’’

of Indonesians found such attacks justified, and of the 81 percent disinclined to justify, a full 68 percent said they ‘‘never’’ were justified. Still, 15 percent of Indonesians favoring ‘‘attacks’’ amounts to 32 million people. Support was also small in Pakistan in 2007 (17 percent), whereas 73 percent opposed (62 percent saying ‘‘never’’). But in the Arab Middle East, the 2007 PIPA study reinforced the troubling picture that emerged from the earlier Pew studies. In Morocco, more than one in three (35 percent) thought such ‘‘attacks’’ justified either ‘‘often’’ (16 percent) or ‘‘sometimes’’ (19 percent); and in Egypt a large 60 percent majority supported such attacks with 41 percent saying they ‘‘often’’ are justified and an additional 19 percent saying they ‘‘sometimes’’ are.81 Since the wording of questions can affect the results, Pew also has asked about suicide bombings of Israelis, a nationality broadly disliked in the Muslim world. Attitudes toward suicide bombings against Israelis are built atop a generalized dislike of Jews and Judaism among Muslim Middle Easterners. When Pew (2005) asked Europeans, Muslim Middle Easterners, and others ‘‘what religion do you think of as most violent,’’ scarcely any Europeans (i.e., less than 4 percent in any European country) found Judaism to be the most violent religion, but across the region of the Middle East, significant percentages believed the exact opposite: 98 percent of Jordanians, 83 percent of Moroccans, 66 percent of Lebanese Muslims, 63 percent of Indonesians, and 51 percent of Pakistanis believed Judaism to be the ‘‘most violent’’ religion. Interestingly, Turks thought Christianity (46 percent) more violent than Judaism (20 percent). 82 The percentages that concurred that suicide bombing of Israelis was ‘‘justified often’’ or ‘‘sometimes’’ appear in Table 3.6. Now, consider what these percentages represent in real numbers, as shown in Table 3.7. The movement of militant jihadist Islamism calls for targeting all Jews, not just Israelis.84 This has not been without effect, as the congregants of Neve Shalom congregation, Istanbul, must appreciate. Neve Shalom has been attacked three times (September 6, 1986, March 1, 1992, and November 15, 2003), and yet the congregation never has had ties to Israel. The swarm of November 15, 2003 attacks in Turkey (discussed above) targeted Neve Shalom, and another Jewish congregation (Beth El), then two British targets in Istanbul were hit five days later. While these


Table 3.6

49

Is Suicide Bombing against Israelis Justified? (percentages)83 Found it acceptable in 2004

Turkey

24

Pakistan

47

Jordan

86

Morocco

74

four attacks may have been inspired, directed, and funded by an al Qaeda member, the four suicide bombings occurred with substantial local assistance. Thus, the practical meaning of nearly 17 million Turks sympathetic with suicide bombings against Israel can be seen. It resided in the rubble of Neve Shalom and Beth El. It is pertinent to recall that Osama bin Laden in 1998 declared his war to be on all Americans: ‘‘To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible. . ..’’85 That was not just hot talk. Yet, even as the facts of 9/11 remain clear in the United States, they are not in the Muslim world. PIPA (2007) found broad doubt to remain among Muslims about the responsibility for those attacks. Remarkably, in 2007, only 2 percent of Pakistanis, 26 percent of Indonesians, 28 percent of Egyptians, and 35 percent of Moroccans believed al Qaeda committed the 9/11 attacks.86 Given this situation, it should not surprise us that significant segments in Muslim publics readily justified attacks on Americans in Iraq, as Table 3.8 illustrates. The troubling figures in Table 3.8 reflected attitudes at a time of a major U.S. military operation in Iraq, and confidence in them should grow inasmuch as these come from repeated samplings in major states. However, those were only moments in time, and some of the 2007 PIPA findings present a sharply different picture from the one reported in Table 3.8. PIPA in 2007 found only tiny portions of its samples to support attacking American civilians, European civilians, or Westerners doing civilian work in the Muslim world. They also reported large majorities to believe that ‘‘attacks on civilians’’ were not justified at all: 57 percent of Moroccans, 77 percent of Egyptians, 81 percent of Pakistanis, and 84 percent of Indonesians. Yet, PIPA (2007) found 7 percent of Egyptians still ‘‘strongly supported’’ attacks on civilians, which was equivalent to 4.6 million people. A follow-up question stated: ‘‘Groups that use violence against civilians, such as al Qaeda, are violating the principles of Islam. Islam opposes the use of such violence.’’ PIPA then asked for agreement or disagreement. The worrisome minority among Egyptians reappeared: 7 percent Table 3.7 Is Suicide Bombing against Israelis Justified? (real numbers)

Turkey in 2004 had 16.9 million who justified suicide bombing of Israelis.

Pakistan in 2004 had 69.7 million who justified suicide bombing of Israelis.

Jordan in 2004 had 4.6 million who justified suicide bombing of Israelis.

Morocco in 2004 had 22.2 million who justified suicide bombing of Israelis.

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Table 3.8

Is Suicide Bombing against Westerners in Iraq Justifiable?87 Found it justifiable in 2004


Real number in 2005

Turkey

31%

24%

16.9 million

Pakistan

46%

29%

43 million

Jordan

70%

49%

2.6 million

Morocco

66%

56%

16.8 million

Lebanon

49%

1 million

Indonesia

26%

55.7 million

disagreed; but so did more Moroccans (19 percent), Indonesians (21 percent), and Pakistanis (35 percent).88 Majority support for attacking Americans may be absent, but the social support base has remained substantial from which to find the few to replace those who necessarily die in pursuit of the goals of militant jihadist Islamism. If new suicide bombers remain few, their cheerleaders apparently are many. One in four Egyptians (25 percent) admitted to PIPA (2007) that they ‘‘sometimes speak favorably’’ to friends and family about groups that attack Americans.89 At a minimum, such discourse must be viewed as helping sustain a social climate supportive of those who contemplate giving safe lodging to some armed jihadists for a night, or more. Attitudes are not behavior, of course; few in any era take direct violent action themselves. But, given that a significant minority subculture that is sympathetic with the leaders, goals, and tactics of militant jihadist Islamism has been shown to exist, is it reasonable to assume that members of this subculture will never take action, or will always isolate or shame those who reach in their pockets to donate to a jihadist charity? We need not speculate: these also are threshold issues on the transition from attitudes to behavior about which PIPA polled. When asked (2007), ‘‘Would you consider contributing money to an organization that may send some of its funds to a group that attacks Americans?,’’ 5 percent of Moroccans, 7 percent of Pakistanis, and 8 percent of Indonesians said yes. Finally, 3 percent of Moroccans, 4 percent of Pakistanis, and 5 percent of Indonesians would approve if a member of their own family joined such a group.90 CONCLUSION Students in American colleges often are taken aback when shown a picture of a cheering crowd in Lebanon on September 11–12, 2001, a spontaneous gathering of Beirut residents who took to the streets elated at the fall of the Twin Towers. In a form of national collective dissonance, Americans simply could not understand the information conveyed in that picture, and were spared having to wrestle much with such a conundrum because few news editors had the courage to publish it.91 But, in years of bombings, beheadings, and worse, the boundaries of good taste have evolved. In a world still able to be enraged by cartoons, social scientists need to look with open eyes for meaning in Muslims’ opinions.


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Comparative study of revolutions has established that majorities rarely, if ever, have participated to make fundamental political changes, or even supported revolutionary changes. Revolutionary leaders envision a changed future, articulate a revolutionary ideology, attract militants to their cause, and draw on supportive populations—almost always a minority of the total population—to change history. This context is what makes it of central importance to recognize that a politically meaningful section of nearly all Muslim societies has come to identify with essential parts of the militant jihadist narrative and the movement it has spawned. This chapter has established that the goals of militant Islamists and leaders of the movement are viewed favorably by hundreds of millions. While this support is greatest in the Arab Middle East, it is also substantial in Indonesia, Pakistan, and parts of Europe. Though there is significant cross-national variation, minorities amounting to many tens of millions of people in the 2000s justify militant Islamic jihadists’ use of tactics of suicide terrorism, with support levels varying depending on how the question is phrased. Substantially smaller minorities espouse willingness to support the movement directly with financial contributions, and smaller minorities still would approve it if family members joined a militant organization. Militant jihadist Islamic terrorists enjoy sufficient social support when targeting Americans. They may not represent majorities across the Muslim world, but the minorities that do support them are large enough to pose an enduring and direct threat to all Americans. NOTES 1. Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2002); Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Thomas Kean, et al., The 9/11 Report (New York: St. Martin’s, 2004); Peter Bergen, The Osama I Know: An Oral History of the Making of a Global Terrorist (New York: The Free Press, 2006); Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006). 2. Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:S.J.RES.23.ENR. 3. Michael Chertoff, ‘‘Make No Mistake: This is War,’’ Washington Post, April 22, 2007, B7. 4. Shawn Brimley, ‘‘Targeting Transnational Support Networks,’’ Parameters 36, 2 (Summer 2006): 43. 5. Russell D. Howard (Brig. Gen., U.S. Army - retired), ‘‘Understanding al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism—The Key to Victory in the Current Campaign,’’ in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, ed., Russell Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 2nd ed. (Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 100. 6. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper/ Collins, 2003), 259. 7. International Institute for Strategic Studies (hereafter: I.I.S.S.), ‘‘The Jihad: Change and Continuation,’’ Strategic Comments 11, 7 (September 2005), available at http://www.iiss.org. 8. ‘‘Clean-skin Terrorist,’’ Time, April 12, 2007, 17, which credits the term’s first use in regard to modern terrorists to the U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. The term originated in law enforcement circles in the 1990s in the context of identification of drug smugglers.

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9. Mary Beth Sheridan, ‘‘Judge Convicts Three In ’Va. Jihad’ Case; U.S. Linked Defendants to Terrorists,’’ Washington Post, March 5, 2004, 1. 10. In addition to Brimley, Howard, and I.I.S.S. above, see Martin J. Muckian (Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy), ‘‘Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary,’’ Parameters 36, 4 (Winter 2006–2007): 14–25. 11. Michael Scheuer, ‘‘Al-Qaeda’s Next Generation: Less Visible and More Lethal,’’ Terrorism Focus 2 (October 4, 2005); Bruce Riedel, ‘‘Al Qaeda Strikes Back,’’ Foreign Affairs 86 (May/June 2007), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86304/bruceriedel/al-qaeda-strikes-back.html, who advocates that a winning strategy needs to be ‘‘focused on both attacking al Qaeda’s leaders and ideas and altering the local conditions that allow them to thrive.’’ 12. Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Studies/S.P.I. Books, 2004). 13. E.g., see the yearly reports by German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006 [and yearly: 2000–2005]): http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/. 14. I.I.S.S., ‘‘TheJihad: Change and Continuation.’’ 15. ‘‘Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Muhammad),’’ 17–19; in which Muhammad states, at 18: ‘‘2. I was responsible for the 9/11 operation, from A to Z;’’ (accessed June 23, 2008), available at http:// defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf. See also: Thomas Kean, et al. The 9/11 Report (New York: St. Martin’s, 2004). Dates of entry of the United States are supplied in Appendix A, based on Kean. 16. Kean, et al., The 9/11 Report, 221–231. 17. Ibid., 245. 18. Swarming refers to multiple nearly simultaneous attacks in which by the very nature of the confused situation terrorists more easily can escape by fleeing in multiple, separate directions; see John Arquilla, et al. ‘‘Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,’’ in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 53. 19. Erdem, ‘‘Turkish Truck-bombers given life,’’ The Times, London: February 17, 2007, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1399446.ece; Karl Vick, ‘‘Suspect in Al-Qaeda Bombings Disrupts Trial in Turkey,’’ Washington Post, March 21, 2006, 11. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/20/ AR2006032000802.html). 20. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Cedar Rapids, IA: The Mother Mosque Foundation, 1981), 41, 9–10. 21. Vick, ‘‘Suspect in Al-Qaeda Bombings Disrupts Trial in Turkey,’’ 11. 22. Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, (July 2005): 38: available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/248topline.pdf. Respondents answering that suicide bombing ‘‘often’’ or ‘‘sometimes’’ is justified have been combined to produce the figures cited here. 23. Elizabeth Nash, ‘‘Madrid Bombers were ‘inspired by bin Laden address’,’’ The Independent, London, November 7, 2006, http://news.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ madrid-bombers-were-inspired-by-bin-laden-address-423266.html. 24. Agence France Presse, September 27, 2006 and September 25, 2006. 25. BBC Monitoring, ‘‘Al Qa’idah leader in Spain Links Train Bombings to Iraq War,’’ (April 18, 2007).


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26. Walter Laqueur, ‘‘The Origins of Islamic Terrorism,’’ in No End to War (New York: Continuum Books, 2003), 33–35. 27. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘‘A Genealogy of Radical Islam,’’ in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, ed. Russell Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 2nd ed. (Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 207–229, especially: ‘‘This is not to argue that [differences in] theology is completely irrelevant [but jihadist thinkers]. . .adapted. . .often stretching them to their logical conclusion in a way that increased the scope of permissible violence,’’ 208. 28. ‘‘Madrid Bombing Suspects,’’ BBC News online, March 10, 2005, available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3560603.stm; Agence France Presse, September 25, 2006. 29. Mark Rice-Oxley, ‘‘Why terror financing is so tough to track down,’’ Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 2006, 4. 30. Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics (July 2005): 45. 31. Figure calculated from a Spanish population of 39.5 million in 2001: World Bank, Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World: World Development Report 2003 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003), 235. 32. Pew Center for Research, Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity, July 6, 2006: 29, available athttp://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/254 topline.pdf. 33. Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics (July 2005): 41–42, 44–45. 34. Pew Center for Research, Muslims in Europe, 26. 35. Pew Center for Research, Muslims in Europe, 28. 36. Intelligence and Security Committee of the House of Commons, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (U.K. Government: Crown Copyright, May 2006), 12; see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_06_isc_london_attacks_report.pdf. 37. Rice-Oxley, Christian Science Monitor, 4; Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks, 11. 38. Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks, 12. The tape itself can be viewed at the SITE Institute: http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications116605&Category=publications&Subcategory=0. 39. James Fallows, ‘‘Declaring Victory,’’ The Atlantic Monthly 298, 2 (September 2006): 65. Fallows is not alone in asserting this conclusion. John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed,in Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), presented a 165-page argument to support their highly selective reading of evidence to conclude ‘‘Muslims and Americans are equally likely to reject attacks on civilians as morally unjustified’’ (xii), and that a mere seven of Muslims worldwide actually support terrorism (70). 40. Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran, and Zein Ja’far, Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism (London: The Policy Exchange, 2007), 62. 41. YouGov online, available at http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/TEL050101030_1.pdf. YouGov, a British polling firm, contracts with major media outlets to conduct a broad variety of consumer and political surveys. It must be emphasized that Mirza’s text cited several other polls of British Muslims that included far higher levels of support for extremism among British Muslims, but the author here has less confidence in their validity than in the cases of the Mirza/ Policy Exchange and YouGov polls cited. 42. Pew Center for Research, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, June 22, 2006: 57, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253.

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43. Michael S. Doran, ‘‘Somebody Else’s Civil War,’’ Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002). It is not my intent to suggest that this view is wrong. I only argue that the emphasis on the smallness of the jihadists’ support is in error. In fact, substantial evidence indicates that a struggle between factions continues within nearly all Muslim communities. See, for example, Kim Ezra Shienbaum and Jamal Hasan, Beyond Jihad: Critical Voices from Inside Islam (Bethesda, MD: Academica Press, 2006). 44. John D. Negroponte (U.S. Director of National Intelligence), Annual Threat Assessment, statement to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 28, 2006: 5, available athttp://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/February/Negroponte%2002-28-06.pdf. 45. Negroponte, Annual Threat Assessment, 6. 46. George W. Bush, ‘‘President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East: Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy United States Chamber of Commerce,’’ November 6, 2003, available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html. 47. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Middle East Studies, 2005), 217. 48. George Packer, ‘‘Knowing the Enemy,’’ New Yorker, December 18, 2006, 62. 49. David Kilcullen, ‘‘Countering Global Insurgency,’’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no.4, (August 2005): 597–618. Kilcullen certainly was not alone in this view, for example, see I.I.S.S. who that same year stated: ‘‘A more coherent strategy would aim to isolate radicals by delegitimating their methods and answering the grievances they purport to remedy. Only by separating them from coreligionists who have not made up their minds about the appropriateness of a violent response is the momentum of the movement likely to be slowed. Of urgency here is the pursuit of diplomacy aimed at resolving the local conflicts that fuel the jihad, the use of economic incentives and influence to induce autocratic Middle Eastern regimes to more genuinely share power, and the better treatment of Muslim minorities around the world—particularly in Europe, where some Muslims remain economically and materially disadvantaged’’ (emphasis added). 50. Gen. (ret.) Wayne A. Downing, ‘‘The Global War on Terrorism: Refocusing the National Strategy,’’ in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, ed. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 2nd ed. (Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 435–453. It is not claimed here that Downing was the first influential U.S. official to hold such a view, only that his conception of the enemy substantially broadened the conversation about an enemy others earlier had seen in similarly broad terms. See, for example, R. James Woolsey, ‘‘The Elephant in the Middle East Living Room: Watching Wahhabis,’’ National Review, December 14, 2005; and more comprehensively: Rachel Ehrenfeld and R. James Woolsey, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed—and How to Stop It (Los Angeles: Bonus Books, 2003). 51. Thomas Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974), 39, 46–48. 52. Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), 190; Richard Fagen, ‘‘Revolution: For Internal Consumption Only,’’ in Cuban Communism, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Trans-action Books, 1970), 38. 53. Oliver H. Radkey, The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 21, 78–80. 54. D.N. Collins, ‘‘A Note on the Numerical Strength of the Russian Red Guard in October 1917,’’ Soviet Studies 24, 2 (October 1972): 270–280.


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55. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Cedar Rapids, IA: The Mother Mosque Foundation, 1981). See also Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: the theory of jahiliyyah (New York: Routledge, 2006). Other religious authorities, some well established, some activists, also played important roles in shaping and legitimizing these broad innovations in militant Islamist ideology. Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, instigator of the 1989 Sudanese coup d’etat, served as a spiritual guide to (the Saudi) Osama bin Laden and (the Egyptian) Ayman al Zawahiri, the leaders of al Qaeda, during part of their exile in Sudan. Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, with whom Osama in the 1980s would form the Bait-ul-Ansar (‘‘Mujahideen Services Bureau’’) in Peshawar, Pakistan (a root organization from which al Qaeda emerged), also was an ideological influence on the young Osama. Tapes of Azzam’s sermons seem to have fascinated the young Osama during his period of study at Abdul Aziz University (Saudi Arabia). But both al-Turabi and Azzam substantially adhered to the broad outlines of Qutb’s thought. Essentially, they adapted tenets of Qutb’s thinking for actions on political programs. Thus, modern militant Islamism stems, in large ways, from Qutb’s precepts and from his analysis. See, Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 27–36. See also, Peter Bergen, The Osama I know: An Oral History of the Making of a Global Terrorist (New York: The Free Press, 2006); Yonah Alexander, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: profile of a terrorist network (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001); Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2002); and Thomas Kean, et al. The 9/11 Report, 55, available athttp://www.911commission.gov/report/ 911Report.pdf. An accessible short biography of Azzam is Jonathan Fighel’s, ‘‘Sheikh Abdullah Azzam: Osama bin Laden’s Mentor,’’ Institute for CounterTerrorism, (Israel: September 27, 2001), available at http://www.ict.org.il/. Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 107–108 dissents in part from this interpretation. Gerges depicts a testy relationship between Turabi and bin Laden during Osama’s Sudan years, and charges that Turabi may even have informed authorities about bin Laden’s activities in Sudan. 56. Gerges, The Far Enemy, 150. 57. Wiktorowicz, ‘‘A Genealogy of Radical Islam,’’ 210–213. 58. Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda (New York: Other Press, 2005), 33, states that the Palestinian, Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdisi ‘‘one of the most conspicuous theoreticians of jihad in the early 1990s’’ taught Zarqawi that ‘‘democracy. . .is the religion of pagans.’’ 59. See Robert Siegel, Sayyid Qutb’s America, National Public Radio transcript, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1253796. 60. Brian M. Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006). 61. V.I. Lenin, ‘‘What is to be Done (1902),’’ in Lenin on Politics and Revolution, ed. James E. Connor (New York: Pegasus/Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 31–78, especially 62: ‘‘. . .the organization of the revolutionaries must consist first and foremost of people who make revolutionary activity their profession. . .. Such an organization must not be extensive and must be as secret as possible.’’ 62. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Cedar Rapids, IA: The Mother Mosque Foundation, 1981), 41, 9–10. 63. See Kim Ezra Shienbaum and Jamal Hasan, Beyond Jihad: Critical Voices from Inside Islam (Bethesda, MD: Academica Press, 2006). 64. The concept of social leaders as ‘‘norm entrepreneurs’’ in the context of terrorism was introduced by Steven Simon and Jeffery Martini in ‘‘Terrorism: Denying al Qaeda Its Popular

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Support,’’ The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004/2005. Discussion of religious authorities in Islam playing an inciting role in this regard is found in Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 65. E.g., ‘‘There is evidence [Taliban leader Mohammad] Mullah Omar initially opposed a major al Qaeda operation against the United States in 2001,’’ Thomas Kean, et al. The 9/11 Report, 251, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 66. Pew Center for Research, 2003 figures Views of a Changing World (June 2003): 3, available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf (attitudes about Iraqi resistance to the United States, at 4); 2005 figures: Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, (July 2005): 46, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/ display.php?PageID=811; 2006 figures: population figures computed from: World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 256–257. 67. Poll, Washington Post, June 8, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ world/daily/graphics/saudipoll_060804.html; Population: World Bank, World Development Report 2005 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 256–257. 68. Steven Kull, et al., ‘‘Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda,’’ PIPA, 2007 (College Park, MD: Program on International Policy Attitudes, April 24, 2007): 16. Hereinafter: PIPA. 69. PIPA, ‘‘Muslim Public Opinion,’’ 12. 70. Center for Strategic Studies (C.S.S.), Revisiting the Arab Street: Research from Within (Amman, Jordan: Center for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan-Amman, February 2005). 71. E.g., for allies’ attitudes toward all of the major Western states, see the yearly reports by German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends (Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006 [and yearly: 2000–2005]), available at http://www. transatlantictrends.org/trends/. 72. Mirza, et al., Living Apart Together, 5. 73. C.S.S., Revisiting the Arab Street, 52. 74. PIPA, ‘‘Muslim Public Opinion,’’ 21. 75. C.S.S., Revisiting the Arab Street, 52. 76. C.S.S., Revisiting the Arab Street, 52–53. 77. Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics (July 2005): 37, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/248topline.pdf; World Bank, World Development Report 2005 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 256–257. 78. Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, (July 2005): 38, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/248topline.pdf. We might seek to glean hope from these results. Such a reading could generate statements from these polls such as: ‘‘While support for suicide bombing is rising in Turkey and Jordan; it has fallen in Pakistan, Indonesia and Morocco.’’ Indeed, the interpretative commentary Pew offered with the 2005 study included some phrasings not too different from that one (which has been created for the purpose of effect here). The 2005 Pew report itself spun the story with a somewhat misleading subtitle: ‘‘Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics,’’ even though that conclusion was entirely inconsistent with parts of the report itself, for example, the Jordanian subsample. 79. Thomas Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974), 47.


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80. Note: the Lebanese real number figures in this and subsequent real number tables have been reduced by half to reflect the fact that these questions were asked of, and responses can be extrapolated to, only the Muslim portion of the national census. 81. PIPA, ‘‘Muslim Public Opinion,’’ 11. 82. Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, (July 2005): 42. 83. Pew Center for Research, A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Higher than Ever, Muslim Anger Persists, (accessed March 16, 2004), available at http://people-press .org/reports/pdf/206.pdf, 34. 84. On February 23, 1998, when the London Arabic-language daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi published bin Laden’s declaration of Jihad, the document that is widely regarded as the Declaration of War on the West, it called for the killing of Americans, Jews, and their allies and referred to this as ‘‘a commandment for every individual Muslim.’’ Full text is available: see ‘‘The World Islamic Front’’ in Messages to the World: Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence (New York: Verso, 2005), 58–62. More broadly, anti-Semitism is a frequent theme in discourse in the Muslim world; see Middle East Media Research Institute, ‘‘Contemporary Islamist Ideology Justifying Authorizing Murder,’’ MEMRI Special Report 25, January 27, 2004, available at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR2504. 85. Quoted in Bernard Lewis, ‘‘License to Kill,’’ Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998. 86. PIPA, (2007): 17. 87. Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, (July 2005): 38, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/248topline.pdf, 38. 88. PIPA, (2007): 10. 89. PIPA, (2007): 19. 90. PIPA, (2007): 19. 91. Washington Post, September 12, 2001, A25.

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APPENDIX A: DATES OF ENTRY OF SUICIDE HIJACKERS IN THE 9/11 ATTACK Flight 11: Boston to North Tower WTC

Flight 175: Boston to South Tower WTC

Flight 77: Dulles to Pentagon

Flight 93: Newark to Pennsylvania Field

Pilot

Atta: 6.3.00

Al-Shehhi: 5.27.00

Hanjur: 12.8.00

Jarrah: 6.27.00

Muscle

Omari: 6.29.01

Banihammad: 6.27.01

Al Mihdhar: 1.15.00

Ghamdi: 6.27.01

Al Suqami: 4.23.01

M. al Shehri: 5.27.00

Moqed: 5.2.01

Al Nami: 5.28.01

Wail Al Shehri: 6.8.01

A. al Ghamdi: 5.2.01

N. Al Hazmi: 1.15.00

Al Haznawi: 6.8.01

Waleed Al Shehri: 4.23.01

H. al Ghamdi: 5.28.01

S. Al Hazmi: 6.29.01

APPENDIX B: THE PYRAMID OF TERROR

Source: Adapted from Madeline Gruen, ‘‘Terrorist Indoctrination and Radicalization on the Internet,’’ in Russell Howard, and Reid L. Sawyer, eds., Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 2nd edition (Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 355.


APPENDIX C: A MODIFIED PYRAMID OF TERRORISM

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4

Terrorism and International Law: Past, Present, and Future John M. Czarnetzky1 Terrorism unfortunately has a long and shameful pedigree. The international community has attempted a variety of responses, including what one commentator calls a ‘‘rush to law.’’2 After World War II, scholars, diplomats, and intellectuals expended enormous energy and resources on the effort to build international institutions— both legal and political—to enhance peace and prevent needless bloodshed. The problem of terrorism, though particularly intractable, is no exception to this trend. Indeed, there are numerous international treaties dealing with different, specific manifestations of terrorism.3 This piecemeal approach yielded some substantial agreement concerning the elements of a definition of terrorism, but a binding international convention defining and outlawing terrorism has proved elusive.4 In this chapter, I begin by summarizing briefly the international legal response to the problem of terrorism. From this base, I argue that the main obstacle to an international legal response to terrorism is one that permeates international law, both in the real world and in scholarship—confusion about the nature of law and its limits in solving problems that are inherently political in nature.5 Law is an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by the person or persons who have the care of the community.6 John Finnis defines the ‘‘common good’’ as the ‘‘set of conditions that enables the members of a community to attain for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively or negatively) in a community.’’7 To be a ‘‘law,’’ therefore, a pronouncement must serve a higher purpose—establishment of the common good of the community from which it emerges, which in turn means the good of the individuals of which it is a part. ‘‘Law’’ which is not reasonable or which does not serve the common good or which does not emanate from legitimate authorities who have responsibility for the common good may be enforceable, but it is not law, properly understood.

TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

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Law is, moreover, the servant of politics, not the master of, or a substitute for politics. Against the modern pejorative sense of the term, politics is best understood as the method by which a body politic resolves difficult ethical questions where different virtues arguably are in conflict in a particular situation. Politics is the method through which a body politic renders justice in all its forms—commutative, distributive, legal, general, and social. Politics is not only, therefore, the progenitor of law and legal justice, but of social and general justice as well. In a healthy body politic, the domestic criminal law ordinarily subsumes all considerations of social justice. Criminal offenses threaten the order of society in addition to the harm they visit upon victims of crime. History reveals what acts must be outlawed to prevent the breakdown of society, and thus to ensure peaceful relations among citizens. By prohibiting such acts, the criminal law helps to achieve a society properly ordered to the common good of its members. When criminal acts inherently challenge the legitimacy of a political regime, then the good of the body politic becomes part of the equation in a much more explicit fashion. A person who steals an automobile at gunpoint from an innocent bystander to sell for drugs commits an ordinary crime; a person who steals an automobile at gunpoint from a border guard in order to flee across the border from a tyrannical regime is another story. How should the latter case be viewed: a crime or an act of heroism? The answer depends upon a judgment which is political, not legal in nature—were the acts justifiable, proportionate, and necessary given the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the regime in which they occurred? In such a situation, where the survival of a regime and the good of an entire body politic might be at stake, authority to make such decisions must be lodged carefully in the proper organ of government, lest the legitimacy of those decisions be rejected. If those decisions foster the common good and are made by the legitimate authorities with the power to decide on the common good, the decision has the force of law which demands respect. If not, the decisions have the force of will alone, and the illegitimacy that comes with it. This chapter examines these general questions in the context of a specific problem— how should the international community respond to international crimes, in particular, terrorism? This does not purport to be an exhaustive treatment of the international antiterrorism legal regime. Instead, I sketch the outlines of that legal regime in an effort to discern the prospects for current legal efforts to combat terrorism. To that end, I summarize early efforts to outlaw terrorism in international law, efforts to draft a comprehensive antiterrorism convention, and the various international conventions and United Nations Security Council resolutions dealing with terrorism. I then seek to put these developments in context by comparing the parallel international efforts that resulted in the establishment of the ICC .8 I argue that of the two different approaches to excruciating matters of true international concern—terrorism on the one hand, heinous crimes of an international nature on the other—the emerging approach to terrorism holds the most promise for success.

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EARLY EFFORTS TO OUTLAW TERRORISM The first truly international attempts to grapple with terrorism are of fairly recent vintage, and were met with limited success. Although the notion of terrorism dates at least as far back as revolutionary France and the Reign of Terror, it was probably not until 1931 at the Third Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Brussels that a definition of terrorism was proposed in international law: [T]he intentional use of means capable of producing a common danger that represents an act of terrorism on the part of anyone making use of crimes against life, liberty or physical integrity of persons or directed against private or state property with the purpose of expressing or executing political or social ideas. . ..9

In a similar vein, the Sixth Conference in 1935 defined terrorism as: International acts directed against the life, physical integrity, health or freedom of a head of state or his spouse, or any person holding the prerogatives of a head of state, as well as crown princes, members of governments, people enjoying diplomatic immunity, and members of the constitutional, legislative or judicial bodies [if the perpetrator creates] a common danger, or a state of terror that might incite a change or raise an obstacle to the functioning of public bodies or a disturbance to international relations.10

These early definitions well capture the essential elements of the crime of terrorism as reflected in most subsequent international negotiations. It seems that the elements of the crime are, like other legal questions, easy to enumerate; the difficulty is in applying them in concrete situations.11 When these proposals failed, there were several subsequent efforts in the League of Nations to define and outlaw terrorist acts. One example is the League of Nations’ Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937 Convention)12 and a related convention whose purpose was the creation of an international criminal tribunal exercising jurisdiction over the substantive convention.13 The 1937 Convention defined ‘‘acts of terrorism’’ as ‘‘[c]riminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.’’14 The 1937 Convention was only ratified by one nation, and the effort died in the face of World War II.15 POST-WORLD WAR II CONVENTIONS ON TERRORISM The first successful international treaty relating to terrorism was the 1963 Tokyo Convention, which authorizes commanders of aircraft to restrain and to take into custody any person who the commander believes has or intends to commit an act representing a threat to an aircraft.16 States have an obligation to turn over such persons and return the aircraft to its lawful owners.17 The Tokyo Convention was not drafted in response to any particular threat or series of events, but rather simply


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codified customary law. Nevertheless, very few countries became parties to the convention. The hijacking of aircraft became an increasingly important problem in the 1960s and 1970s, however, and it is no surprise that additional international agreements were drafted to meet the challenge. Under the 1970 Hague Convention, it is unlawful to ‘‘by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] seize or exercise control of that aircraft’’ or to attempt to do so.18 States agree to either prosecute such persons or extradite them, and to make such acts punishable by local criminal law.19 The 1971 Montreal Convention prohibits acts of violence against persons on board an aircraft in flight or against the aircraft.20 States must make such acts punishable by ‘‘severe penalties,’’ and promise to either prosecute or extradite offenders.21 A series of conventions aimed at additional specific acts or potential victims of terrorism followed. The 1973 Diplomatic Agents Convention prohibits the intentional murder, kidnapping, or violent act against certain protected persons or their official premises, private accommodations, or means of transport. 22 Persons protected include heads of state, representatives of a state, heads of international organizations, and their families.23 The 1980 Nuclear Materials Convention prohibits the unlawful possession, use, transfer, or theft of nuclear material as well as threat to use it to cause death, bodily injury, or serious property damage.24 States further undertake to cooperate to recover smuggled or stolen nuclear material and to secure facilities where such materials are stored and used.25 Mirroring the conventions on civil aviation, the 1988 Maritime Convention prohibits taking control of a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation or acts of violence against persons aboard or against the ship.26 The 1988 Fixed Platforms Convention largely adapts the Maritime Convention to fixed platforms at sea.27 The 1988 Montreal Airports Protocol extends the requirements of the Montreal Protocol to airport facilities.28 Negotiated after the 1988 Lockerbie plane bombing, the 1991 Plastics Explosives Convention requires states to exercise substantial control over the manufacture and movement of ‘‘unmarked’’ plastic explosives.29 States agree to undertake several specific measures including the destruction of supplies of such explosives within certain time guidelines, whether the explosives are held by individuals, the military, or police.30 The 1997 Bombings Convention creates universal jurisdiction over the use of explosives in certain defined public places with the intent to kill, cause bodily injury, or cause severe destruction of such public place.31 The 1979 Hostages Convention prohibits the detention or kidnapping of any person with the intent to force any state, intergovernmental organization, juridical person or persons to take or to refrain from taking any act as an implicit or explicit condition of the hostage’s release.32 The 1999 Financing Convention prohibits persons from collecting or providing funds to cause death or serious bodily injury against any civilian or any other person not actively involved in an armed conflict with the intention to intimidate a government, international intergovernmental organization, or population to do or to abstain from doing any act.33 The Nuclear

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Terrorism Convention, which was opened for signature in 2005 and has not yet been ratified by the requisite 22 states, covers a broad range of acts and potential targets of nuclear terrorism.34 States agree to either prosecution or extradition of violators, and to cooperate before, during, and after any incident of nuclear terrorism, including sharing information and in extradition of offenders.35 In short, the past forty years has seen a slow but persistent stream of prohibitions against typical terrorist techniques. This process, whereby the world community gathers and reaches consensus around individual acts constituting terrorism, is often disparaged as ‘‘piecemeal’’ lawmaking that does not tackle the overall problem of terrorism with a general definition and prohibition.36 On the other hand, the process bears some resemblance to the painstaking, common-law reasoning of American and British courts. Judges begin with general propositions, such as ‘‘harms deserve remedies.’’ They then must apply that general norm in specific cases to derive elements of civil tort actions that permit courts to sort out who owes what duties in a car accident, for example. Similarly, starting with the propositions that terrorism and terrorist acts are wrong and deserve a remedy, and that those who participate in terrorism should be punished, the multilateral terrorism conventions seek to outlaw specific acts of terrorism about which there can be little cavil. In the process, some common elements emerge when the conventions are viewed as a body of law. First, most of the conventions prohibit specific acts of terrorist violence as an offense under the convention, such as violence against diplomats; second, parties to the conventions undertake to make such acts illegal under domestic law; third, most of the conventions define how and by whom jurisdiction will be asserted by states for prosecution of prohibited acts; and, finally, in most cases, the conventions contain a requirement that a state in which a suspect is found either prosecute the suspect or extradite him to another state with jurisdiction over the offense, i.e., no safe haven for terrorists.37 It is a mistake to carry the analogy to common law too far, however. Perhaps a better way to view this process is that it is communal—in this case, the international community—ethical reasoning from a general, widely accepted norm (terrorism is wrong) to specific determinations of the contours of that norm. For such ‘‘determinatios’’ to have any meaning in the real world—i.e., in order for them to be more than merely hortatory statements—they must be made by persons responsible for the common good of the societies sought to be bound.38 The treaty process makes this possible by binding states to these conventions once they are ratified, and permitting dissenting states to consider themselves not bound. The greater the number of ratifying nations, the more important the treaty will be in the real world. Thus, through years of multilateral treaty making, the international community has developed a significant body of ‘‘law,’’ in the sense of binding and authoritative ‘‘determinations’’ of aspects of the international common good. This approach, however, has some of the flaws of common-law reasoning in Anglo-American courts. In particular, the lacunae left by such ‘‘piecemeal’’ treaties have whetted the appetites of those who yearn for a comprehensive solution to the problem of international terrorism.


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MODERN EFFORTS TO DRAFT A COMPREHENSIVE TERRORISM CONVENTION A distinguished commentator on international criminal law, M. Cherif Bassiouni, summarized the case for a comprehensive international treaty on terrorism as follows: A comprehensive convention which combines all existing conventions pertaining to terrorism into a single updated text would significantly advance the overall objectives of these conventions. Such a comprehensive text could contribute to the elimination of overlaps, gaps, and ambiguities which currently exist . . .. It would also eliminate the need to consult multiple legal sources in order to enforce State Party obligations. If this piecemeal subject-matter approach trend continues, there is no end to the number of conventions likely to be developed over the years to come, and there is no hope to make the legal mechanisms contained within each convention more effective.39

Not surprisingly, the UN has attempted for years to produce a comprehensive antiterrorism convention. After the 1972 Munich massacre, the General Assembly established an ad hoc committee on terrorism, which failed to make progress. Eventually, the responsibility for terrorism was lodged with the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, where it has remained. Despite considering draft conventions on terrorism in the years since, the United Nations has failed to date to produce a comprehensive convention on terrorism.40 However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall came a renewed international interest in the issue. In 1994, the General Assembly issued the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism of 1994 (1994 Declaration), which states that: 2. Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may pose a threat to international peace and security, jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder international cooperation and aim at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic bases of society; 3. Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. . ..41

The General Assembly formed another ad hoc committee in 1996 to attempt once again to draft a terrorism convention.42 This committee produced a Draft Comprehensive Treaty on the Prevention of Terrorism.43 The Draft Comprehensive Treaty would make it an offense for any person intentionally or unintentionally to cause the death or serious bodily injury to any person, serious damage to public or private property (including some nonexclusive examples of such property), or damage to such property that would result in major economic loss.44 To constitute an offense, such injuries to persons or property must be done with the purpose of intimidating

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a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.45 The Draft Comprehensive Treaty also requires state parties to prosecute or extradite, as other terrorism treaties do as well, and further provides: None of the offences referred to in article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole legal ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.46

Moreover, ‘‘criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other similar nature.’’47 The Draft Comprehensive Treaty, therefore, arguably takes an absolutist approach to terrorism—there can be no ‘‘political offense’’ defense to terrorism, at least for purposes of extradition of terrorist suspects. In the event, two issues apparently have deadlocked the negotiations on the Draft Comprehensive Treaty—first, whether acts committed to fight ‘‘foreign occupation’’ should be covered by the treaty and second, whether the actions of armed forces should be covered despite the separate body of the law of armed conflict.48 THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ANTITERRORISM REGIME Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter permits the Security Council to adopt resolutions that bind UN member states when the Security Council determines that there is a threat to international peace and security. Pursuant to this power, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions which condemn specific acts of terrorism and further delineate specific measures to be taken in response to the threat.49 For example, before September 11, Resolutions 1267 and 1333 called upon the Taliban to cease supporting and training terrorists and turn over Osama bin Laden for prosecution, froze Afghani assets, cancelled flights to Afghanistan, prohibited military sales, and established a sanctions regime for violation of the resolutions, including a committee to oversee that regime.50 This sanctions regime has continued after the defeat of the Taliban.51 Following September 11, the Security Council took a number of actions to respond aggressively to the terrorist threat, most prominently Resolution 1373, issued on September 28, 2001.52 This resolution attacked terrorism and terror financing by, among other things: criminalizing all aspects of terrorist financing, requiring states to freeze all funds of those involved in the financing of terrorism, requiring states to prevent their nationals from providing terrorist financing, and requiring states to add a number of substantive and procedural provisions to domestic law.


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Resolution 1373 was an unprecedented exercise of the Security Council’s power to take measures necessary to secure international peace.53 For example, Resolution 1373 established a ‘‘CTC’’ (the Counter Terrorism Committee) comprising all members of the Security Council.54 The CTC’s primary role is to monitor and to report to the Security Council on the efforts of member states to implement their obligations under Resolution 1373. The CTC has no enforcement authority, though presumably the Security Council can always act as appropriate in cases where the CTC reports noncompliance on the part of member states. In 2004, the Security Council passed a resolution, which called for the establishment of a CTC Executive Directorate—i.e., a full-time staff—to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373, to provide technical assistance to member states seeking to implement the resolution.55 The net effect of Resolution 1373 was to make many of the provisions of the Terrorism Financing Convention obligatory on all member states of the United Nations pursuant to the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers. The Security Council’s Resolution 1373 framework is not free from controversy concerning its validity under the United Nations Charter.56 Nevertheless, the Security Council followed up that same year with Resolution 1540, which obliges states to prevent nonstate actors—including terrorist groups—from obtaining weapons of mass destruction.57 Resolution 1540 set up a committee on the model of the CTC to monitor member nations’ compliance. In a third resolution in the same year, the Security Council passed Resolution 1566, which applies to groups and organizations engaged in terrorist activities that were not subject to Resolution 1267, and moreover established yet another committee on the model of the CTC to recommend what actions should be taken against such individuals and groups, and to explore the possibility of funding for the victims of terrorism.58 Importantly, Resolution 1566 Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. . ..59

Whether this language will become the international definition of terrorism remains to be seen, but it is at a minimum a significant step towards such a universal definition. Finally, Resolution 1624, which was passed in connection with a high-level meeting of heads of state in September 2005, condemned all acts of terrorism regardless of the reasons for the acts, and further condemned the incitement to such acts.60 Once again, this resolution is to be implemented by changes to the domestic laws of UN member states.

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The Security Council, especially since September 11, 2001, has exercised quasilegislative powers when it comes to international terrorism.61 In its post-9/11 resolutions, the Security Council has set up a number of specific duties that member states of the United Nations must fulfill or, theoretically, face some sort of sanction by the Security Council. The core of these resolutions is that domestic legal responses to terrorism are monitored, aided, reported upon, etc., by a series of committees consisting in each case of the entire Security Council itself. In short, the Security Council has devised a political mechanism for tackling the problem of international terrorism. Time will tell whether or not this mechanism will lead to concrete results such as the Security Council sanctioning states or groups that violate the letter or intent of its resolutions. It is far from certain whether these initial efforts will continue to develop organically or wither away. Nevertheless, the international community now has some mechanism to coordinate an international response to terrorism. THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON TERRORISM— WHAT NEXT? The organic development of international law on terrorism is proceeding in a predictable and largely salutary fashion. It is predictable because there is a fundamental, intractable problem at the heart of the problem of terrorism which suffuses other problems of international criminal law; salutary because the international community’s response has been more sophisticated in this area than in other fields, and continuing developments along existing lines hold the promise of, if not a solution, a considerably more sensible legal regime than exists in some other areas of international law. The intractable problem is the fact that international terrorism almost always has a significant political dimension. To repeat the most hoary of aphorisms, ‘‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’’ It is extraordinarily difficult for a court to apply the elements of a criminal law when those elements depend in part in a political judgment. Indeed, courts are ill-suited for making such judgments. When they do, it is not just the legitimacy of the particular judgment that is at stake, but more fundamentally, the legitimacy of the judiciary itself. This problem is not unprecedented in international law. The ICC has four types of crimes within its jurisdiction—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.62 Though it would be an astonishing proposition under domestic criminal law, over 100 nations have become parties to the ICC without a definition of one of the four crimes within the court’s jurisdiction—the crime of aggression. Thus, much of the world community has bound itself to a criminal ‘‘statute’’—in reality, an ordinary multilateral treaty—wherein one of the crimes is undefined. In any event, the problem with defining a ‘‘war of aggression’’ for the ICC is the same as defining ‘‘terrorism’’ for purposes of any comprehensive antiterrorism convention— one country’s ‘‘war of aggression’’ is another’s ‘‘war of legitimate self-defense.’’


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It is easy to visualize the extremes of this debate. To some, only a war that displaces entirely the government of another sovereign nation without provocation and with the intent to establish a tyranny over another people would constitute a ‘‘war of aggression.’’ Anything short of that would be a war or police action with some legitimate aims, which should not be a subject of legal sanction. Other nations might see the issue very differently. Given the elastic definition of ‘‘aggression’’ in modern parlance, another nation might claim that an economic boycott that has any significant effect in another country is an aggressive act that, having caused harm, constitutes a declaration of ‘‘war.’’ Indeed, many assert that the United States forced Japan into World War II because it stopped selling Japan oil in 1940. It is not difficult to discern what the legal elements of a ‘‘war of aggression’’ might be in a criminal statute, but it is not easy to see how such a definition could distinguish between the two examples above without the type of political calculation that courts normally eschew. Any legal definition of ‘‘terrorism’’ suffers from the same problem—there are situations where it will be difficult to distinguish between terrorism and legitimate freedom fighting or political dissent. Roberta Arnold, in her excellent book on the use of the ICC and the Rome Statute to prosecute terrorists,63 frames this issue in terms of ‘‘ordinary crimes,’’ ‘‘licit political crimes,’’ and ‘‘illicit political crimes.’’ To adapt an example from Arnold, commandeering an aircraft to blackmail the airline for money would be labeled an ‘‘ordinary crime,’’ albeit with some political content. At the other extreme would be the hijacking of an aircraft of a country’s flag carrier in order to intimidate that country into releasing political prisoners aligned with the hijackers. This would be an ‘‘illicit political crime,’’ both in common parlance and by virtue of being prohibited by existing antiterrorism conventions. However, the terrorists might insist that their actions were a just and proportionate response to their political grievances. Finally, a person might hijack an aircraft in order to flee to the safety of a third country in order to escape the potentially lethal oppression of a despotic regime. Arnold labels this third category a ‘‘licit political crime,’’ as long as the actions of the hijacker were proportionate and not indiscriminate.64 Arnold devised this framework with reference to European extradition law with its prudential elements of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination.65 Regardless of the merits of any given set of circumstances, there will be persons who argue that an alleged terrorist simply was acting proportionally through the only means available to redress a political injustice. The absolutely critical point is that any exercise of discretion in deciding between competing claims regarding proportionality, necessity, and discrimination in the use of force or intimidation is an inherently political decision. An inherently political decision requires a legitimate political, not judicial, decision maker. By a political decision, I mean a decision that requires the decision maker to render a prudential judgment on an ethical question where competing virtues arguably are at stake. Depending on the circumstances, whether one country has committed an illegitimate ‘‘crime of aggression’’ is one such decision and the question of whether a terrorist act has occurred potentially is another. It is a tremendous mistake to

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presume that the political/prudential dimension of these issues can be eradicated through careful legal drafting. The elements of the crime of murder are well established, and carry no wider political significance in the run-of-the-mill domestic murder case. When a death occurs in the midst of a political struggle between peoples, the decision to prosecute or not may, due to its political significance, imperil the legitimacy of the particular legal institution prosecuting the case, and perhaps the entire political system of which that court is a part. Such high political stakes require authoritative, prudential political decision making—the term for it is ‘‘statesmanship’’—to ensure the legitimacy of any legal sanctions meted out in any given situation. The ICC, for example, not only lacks, but ostensibly prohibits such a mechanism for such prudential political reasoning, and that is the ICC’s fundamental flaw.66 Instead, the decision to prosecute a case in the ICC proceeds on the model of ordinary criminal cases. The prosecutor has discretion to bring a case, though the Security Council also may refer cases to the court. A panel of ICC judges must confirm the prosecution. If confirmed, the prosecution will go forward if domestic legal systems either cannot or will not prosecute a crime within the court’s jurisdiction. The ICC and its prosecutor may not recognize amnesties granted by domestic political authorities even if they are part of a national settlement that results in the transition from tyranny to democracy. The only political check is prosecutorial (and, in the decision to confirm or reject jurisdiction, judicial) discretion, although the Rome Statute is written in absolutes which seem to cabin significantly even that discretion. The Rome Statute elevates obedience to law above all other considerations, including peace, social justice, and reconciliation, values that can only come from political, not legal, decision making. The situation regarding terrorism is more heartening. This is unfortunately due in large part to the tragic events of September 11, and to the continuous stream of terrorist actions over the past several decades. Unlike the case of the ICC, which seeks to impose a top-down judicial solution, the international law of terrorism has not been ‘‘codified’’ in a comprehensive statute. Instead, there have been two more humble, but ultimately more fertile, international responses.67 First, the piecemeal, ‘‘common-law’’ approach is vital to establish those acts that are by definition ‘‘illicit political crimes’’—i.e., terrorism—in the eyes of a significant proportion of the international community. Indeed, it is surprising that the international community has reached a consensus concerning such a significant number of terrorist acts. These conventions draw the baseline for the types of acts that are condemned as terrorism in all cases by, if not all, then much of the international community. The international community, through consensus, already has made the political decision that certain activities are illegal manifestations of terrorism and are illegitimate. Beyond those acts around which a consensus has formed, there must be a means to make the calculus on proportionality, necessity, and discrimination that inheres in a decision to label an act ‘‘terrorist.’’ The emerging international apparatus for dealing with terrorism outside of existing conventions gives reason to hope for a better


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solution. The reason is that the emerging Security Council response to terrorism comports with the principle of subsidiarity,68 which teaches that it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.69

The fundamental aspect of subsidiarity is that it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community and that lower level communities should not be usurped or absorbed by higher level communities, up to and including the international body politic. Importantly, assistance should come from the intermediate association closest to the problem, with less involved and more detached associations only involved when absolutely necessary to remedy a deficiency, which the lower level institution (or the individual himself or herself ) cannot remedy on their own. Professor Robert George has noted that in the modern world, there is a need to recognize a crucial international component of the ‘‘common good’’: ‘‘. . .theorists are coming to view the territorial or national state as crucially ‘incomplete,’ that is to say, incapable of doing all that can and must be done to secure conditions for the all-round flourishing of its citizens.’’70 If Professor George is correct that the international community has a role in promoting the common good of human beings, the watchword for those efforts must be prudence and the primary prudential instrument must be subsidiarity. When a higher level association takes over a function from a lower one, the stakes are extremely high. As Jacques Maritain famously noted, The quest [for]. . .a Superstate capping the nations is nothing else, in fact, than the quest of the old utopia of a universal Empire. This utopia was pursued in past ages in the form of the Empire of one single nation over all others. The pursuit, in the modern age, of an absolute World Superstate would be the pursuit of a democratic multinational Empire, which would be no better than the others.71

Thus, in order to secure the common good, the doctrine of subsidiarity suggests that nation states should do as much as possible on their own behalf to tackle even transnational problems such as terrorism. Any organ of the international community should step in only when necessary due to an inability of sovereign nations to secure fully the good of its citizens. This not only ensures that problems are handled with a sense of context at the level closest to the problem, thus enhancing the possibility of peaceful solutions to difficult political questions, but also that the national polity in individual countries develops the type of political and juridical institutions necessary for the ultimate flourishing of its members. The system of justice becomes ‘‘thicker’’ closer to the roots, which should not simply be plowed under in favor of a one-sizefits-all solution.

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Since World War II, the international community has attempted to build multilateral institutions to foster peaceful cooperation in helping each nation and its body politic develop fully. There has been tremendous success in that effort, all accomplished with no world government, no world legislature, no world executive. The closest approximation—and it is a very crude approximation—is the United Nations which, as a multilateral treaty organization, is really no government at all. However, the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the United Nations Charter, at a minimum serves a coordinating role in the case of threats to international peace and security. Although the Security Council is not a ‘‘world legislature,’’ it is the one organ of the only (nearly) universal treaty organization with the power to take action in cases of threats to peace and security. It is thus the Security Council that is, at present, the only potentially legitimate political actor with the power to take action. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Security Council has begun to set up the apparatus described above regarding terrorism. With Resolution 1373 and its progeny, the Security Council takes its role as a coordinating and monitoring organization regarding terrorism to its logical ends. The Security Council, in enforcing its resolutions regarding terrorism, is a political organ with the power and legitimacy to make the type of political decision necessary to identify instances of terrorism. It is in this sense that the Security Council rightly can be said to be ‘‘legislating’’ in the area of international terrorism. We are left, therefore, with the following system of the international law of terrorism. There are a number of specific conventions defining certain acts as terrorism per se as a result of substantial consensus in the international community. When acts are not within one of those conventions, the Security Council has several options, some more desirable than others. First, through its committees set up in the various resolutions, the Council can pressure member states to live up to their obligations as imposed by the Security Council resolutions to outlaw certain acts in domestic law, to extradite suspected terrorists to states exercising jurisdiction over them, and to establish proper administrative and legal apparatuses to deal with terrorism. If states refuse, the Security Council could, presumably, explore other approaches. The Security Council might set up an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute terrorists, or, as some have suggested, refer such cases to the ICC, though obviously the flaws in the ICC process make this option problematic. Alternatively, the United Nations could impose sanctions on offending nations or, in the extreme, the Council theoretically could authorize military action to stem terrorist activities. Whether the Security Council will have the will to develop this embryonic antiterrorism regime to its logical ends remains to be seen. As of today, the ‘‘reporting, monitoring, and capacity-building approach’’ has yielded some results, most notably compliance with the reporting requirements of Resolution 1373 by all member states of the United Nations. The main obstacles to the Security Council developing further institutional responses to terrorism lie in the political legitimacy and structure of the Security Council itself. The Security Council is not a ‘‘representative’’ institution, nor is the United Nations, at least in the sense of democratic representative institutions. Rather, the Security Council is a group of powerful, permanent member nations— arguably no longer truly representative of the world powers of today—each of which


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can veto any initiative, plus a group of rotating member nations. The Security Council’s structure is, therefore, easy to criticize as granting too much power to too few nations, some of which do not merit inclusion among the great powers of today. It is no surprise that there is a continuous campaign to restructure the Security Council or, at least, to add some permanent members more representative of today’s world. The structure of the Security Council has some advantages, however, which might explain its continuing crucial role in international affairs. Perhaps most important, given the extremely high stakes when an international organ usurps national sovereignty, is the fact that it is very difficult for the Security Council to act because of the veto power. The very thing which frustrates many nations and observers about the Security Council is its strength, at least from the perspective of subsidiarity. The Council can only act if there is a consensus among the permanent members, each of which has its own national interests and those of its allies to consider in reaching any negotiation. Subsidiarity teaches that the higher the level of government which acts in a particular situation, the greater the prudential responsibility not to usurp the legitimate sphere of lower levels of government to act for their own common good. An act is only a legitimate ‘‘law’’ if it is promulgated by the appropriate authority in accord with the common good of the community and individuals within it. Although the Security Council is nothing like a ‘‘representative’’ organ of a democratic world government, the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members gives initiatives of the Security Council some legitimacy as ‘‘law’’ that, for example, pronouncements of the General Assembly do not have. In acting to coordinate the international response to terrorism, rather than imposing a judicial superstructure enforcing its own ‘‘law’’ on the subject, the Security Council has demonstrated the type of restraint and trust in the nations of the world, which seemingly is required by the doctrine of subsidiarity. In cases where this coordinating role fails, the Security Council could and should, with prudence at every step, move beyond its present approach of condemnation of discrete acts of terrorism, imposition of counterterrorism obligations on all states, capacity building, and imposition of sanctions to some sort of individual legal process. The ad hoc international tribunals set up in the wake of the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tragedies provide a blueprint for this type of formal legal response, if it were necessary. All of this should be contrasted with the Rome Statute, which empowers an unelected, permanent court untethered from any meaningful international political mechanism to decide whether or not to prosecute crimes under its jurisdiction, regardless of the will of the nations involved, if necessary. The political and legal decisions are vested in a court rather than divided between a political body such as the Security Council and a judicial structure. Divesting the political decision making from any prudential concern for the overall common good of the peoples involved—indeed, pretending that there is no political dimension at all in such cases—imperils the legitimacy of the institution and the ‘‘laws’’ it seeks to enforce. Compounding this misplaced faith in law to solve political problems, the ICC violates the doctrine of subsidiarity by displacing local decision making with an international superstructure without the type of prudential balance required by subsidiarity.

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In short, the international community has devised two different solutions to essentially the same problem—how to punish and deter international crimes that have inherent political dimensions. The current international legal response to terrorism, which combines legal conventions and political mechanisms that comport with the doctrine of subsidiarity, is preferable to a top-down, legal solution with no regard for subsidiarity or statesmanship. The stakes in bloodshed and human misery are too high to put all hope of eradicating international terrorism in the hands of lawyers and judges. NOTES 1. Professor, Mitchell McNutt and Jessie Puckett Lecturer in Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. All opinions expressed here are solely those of the author, as are all errors. Thanks to the Lamar Order of the University of Mississippi School of Law, and the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law at the University of Mississippi for funding in support of this project. 2. J. Craig Barker, The Politics of International Law-Making: Constructing Security in Response to Global Terrorism, 3 Journal of International Law and International Relations 5 (2007): 5. 3. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (opened for signature September 14, 2005), available at http:// untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/ English_18_15.pdf[hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106–49, G.A. Res. 54/109, UN GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A/54/49 [hereinafter Financing Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 249 [hereinafter Bombings Convention]; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, U.S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-8, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359 [hereinafter Plastic Explosives Convention]; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 685 [hereinafter Fixed Platforms Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-1, 27 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter Maritime Convention]; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation [supplement to the Montreal Convention], Feb. 24, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-19, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474 [hereinafter Montreal Airports Protocol]; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter Nuclear Materials Convention]; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostages Convention]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Diplomatic Agents Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 546565, 974 U.N.T.S. 178 (Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter Montreal Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter The Hague Convention]; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention].


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4. On the many attempts to define terrorism in international law, see Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006). 5. For an attempt to unravel some of the confusion and controversy surrounding the attempt to promulgate a binding code of ‘‘international’’ criminal law, see John M. Czarnetzky and Ronald J. Rychlak, ‘‘An Empire of Law?: Legalism and the International Criminal Court,’’ 79 Notre Dame Law Journal 55 (2004). 6. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First of the Second Part, Q. 90, Art. 4. 7. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 155. 8. The ICC was set up pursuant to an international treaty which misleadingly is labeled a ‘‘statute’’ presumably to enhance its legitimacy as criminal ‘‘law.’’ See Rome Statute of the ICC, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm, [hereinafter, the ‘‘Rome Statute’’]. 9. Reuven Young, ‘‘Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation,’’ 29 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 23, 35 (2006). The discussion which follows concerning the history of terrorism conventions and resolutions is based to a large extent on Prof. Young’s excellent summary. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. This fact led one student commentator to entitle an article on the subject ‘‘Terrorism: I Know It When I See It.’’ Aaron J. Noteboom, Comment, ‘‘Terrorism: I Know It When I See It,’’ Oregon Law Review 81 (2002): 553. The reference in the title is, of course, to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions which attempted to define ‘‘pornography’’ in a way that excluded works of aesthetic merit which contained erotic elements, a problem analogous to the problem of defining terrorism in international law. One Justice famously opined that pornography is difficult to define in a way that did not sweep legitimate art into the definition, but that he knew when he saw it. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 12. See Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, League of Nations Doc. C.94M.47 1938 V (1938). 13. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 16, 1937, League of Nations Doc. C.547(1)M.384(1) (1937). 14. 1937 Convention, art. 1(2). 15. Young, Defining Terrorism, 37. The ratifying state was India. The lack of enthusiasm for the 1937 Convention is attributed to the broad definition of terrorism and concern about overlap with existing domestic law. Ibid. 16. Tokyo Convention, art. 1(b). 17. Ibid., arts. 11–13. 18. Hague Convention, art. 1(a). 19. Ibid., arts. 2, 4, and 8. 20. Montreal Convention, art. 1(1). 21. Ibid., arts. 5–8. 22. Diplomatic Persons Convention, art. 2(1). 23. Ibid., art. 1. 24. Nuclear Materials Convention, art. 7. 25. Ibid., arts. 3–5 and annex I. 26. Maritime Convention, art. 3(1).

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27. Fixed Platforms Convention, art. 2. 28. Montreal Airports Protocol, art. II. 29. Plastics Explosives Convention, arts. II–III. 30. Ibid., art. IV . 31. Bombings Convention, art. 2(1). 32. Hostages Convention, art. 1(1). 33. Financing Convention, art. 2(1). 34. Nuclear Terrorism Convention, art. 2. 35. Ibid., arts. 7, 9–14. 36. Of course, it is not just the entire international community which has engaged in this type of law making. Regional antiterrorism efforts have yielded several multilateral agreements on the subject. These regional conventions are beyond the scope of this chapter, but should not be ignored in any comprehensive study of the issue of terrorism in international law. Additional information on Regional Conventions on terrorism (including some texts) is available at the United Nations Treaty Collection: Conventions on Terrorism, http://untreaty.un.org/ English/Terrorism.asp. The following regional conventions on terrorism have been deposited with the United Nations: Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Cairo, April 22, 1988). Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism (Ouagadougou, July 1, 1999). European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Strasbourg, January 27, 1977). OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Person and Related to Extortion that are of International Significance (Washington, D.C., February 2, 1971). OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (Algiers, July 14, 1999). SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (Kathmandu, November 4, 1987). Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism (Minsk, June 4, 1999). 37. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Overview – Conventions Against Terrorism, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_overview.html (accessed June 10, 2007). 38. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, Ind.: Christian Classics, 1981), pt. I-II, q. 90, art. 4 In the original Latin: ‘‘quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata.’’ 39. M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., International Terrorism: Multilateral Conventions (1937– 2001) (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001), 7. 40. See, e.g., Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, Sept. 25, 1972, UN Doc. A/C.6/L.850. 41. G.A. Res. 49/60, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60 (December 9, 1994). 42. See G.A. Res. 56/88, ¶ 16, UN Doc. A/RES/56/88 (Jan. 24, 2002) (renewing G.A. Res. 51/210); G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 9, UN Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996).


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43. General Assembly, Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, 6th Sess., UN Doc. A/57/37 (2002 [hereinafter Draft Comprehensive Convention]. 44. Ibid., art. 2(1). 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid., art. 14. 47. Ibid., art. 14. 48. Measures to eliminate international terrorism: Report of the Working Group, UN GAOR 6th Comm., 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 148, 4, UN Doc. A/C.6/59/L.10 (2004). Needless to say, these issues are related directly to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 49. S.C. Res. 1333, UN SCOR, 4251st mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000); S.C. Res. 1269, UN SCOR, 4053rd mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999); S.C. Res. 1267, UN SCOR, 4051st mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999); S.C. Res. 1214, UN SCOR, 3952nd mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1214 (1998); S.C. Res. 1189, UN SCOR, 3915th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1189 (1998); S.C. Res. 1054, UN SCOR, 3660th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1054 (1996); S.C. Res. 1044, UN SCOR, 3627th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1044 (1996); S.C. Res. 748, UN SCOR, 3063rd mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/748 (1992); S.C. Res. 731, UN SCOR, 3033rd mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/731 (1992); S.C. Res. 687, UN SCOR, 2981st mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); S.C. Res. 635, UN SCOR, 2869th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/635 (1989); S.C. Res. 579, UN SCOR, 2637th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/579 (1985). 50. S.C. Res. 1267; S.C. Res. 1333. 51. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, The Prevention and Prosecution of Terrorist Acts: A Survey of Multilateral Instruments (New York: 2006), 10. 52. S.C. Res. 1373, UN SCOR, 57th Sess., 4385th mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001). 53. See Paul Szasz, ‘‘The Security Council Starts Legislating,’’ 96 American Journal of International Law 901, (2002). 54. The Security Council previously had set up a similar committee made up of all members of the Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1267. 55. S.C. Res. 1535, UN SCOR, 58th Sess., 4936th mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/1535 (2004). 56. See, e.g., Matthew Happold, ‘‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations,’’ 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 593 (2003) (asserting that in enacting Security Council Resolution 1373, the Council acted ultra vires); Paul C. Szasz, ‘‘The Security Council Starts Legislating,’’ 96 American Journal of International Law 901 (2002); see also Statement by Vijay Nambiar, Representative of India, to the United Nations, UN SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 23, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004) (expressing ‘‘concern about the increasing tendency of the Security Council in recent years to assume new and wider powers of legislating on behalf of the international community, with its resolutions binding on all States’’); Statement by Rezlan Ishar Jenie, Permanent Representative of Indonesia, to the United Nations, UN SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 31, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004); Statement by Permanent Representative of Iran, to the United Nations, UN SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 32, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004); Statement by Kishore Mahbubani, Representative of Singapore, to the United Nations, UN SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 25, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004) (questioning whether the Security Council can assume the role of treaty making or legislate rules for Member States); Statement by Permanent Representative of South Africa, to the United Nations, UN SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 22, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004); Statement by Permanent Representative of

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Switzerland, to the United Nations, UN SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 28, UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004). 57. S.C. Res. 1540, UN SCOR, 58th Sess., 4956th mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/1540 (2004). 58. S.C. Res. 1566, UN SCOR, 59th Sess., 5053rd mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/1566 (2004). 59. S.C. Res. 1566, para. 3. 60. S.C. Res. 1624, UN SCOR, 60th Sess., 5261st mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/1624 (2005). 61. See Eric Rosand, ‘‘The Security Council as ‘Global Legislator’: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative,’’ 28 Fordham International Law Journal 542 (2005); see also Rosand, ‘‘The Security Council’s Effort to Monitor the Implementation of Al Quaeda/Taliban Sanctions,’’ 98 American Journal of International Law 745 (2004); Curtis A. Ward, ‘‘Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations Security Council,’’ 8 Journal on Conflict and Security Law 289 (2003). 62. For a brief summary of the ICC, see Czarnetzky and Rychlak, ‘‘An Empire of Law?,’’ 85–99. 63. Roberta Arnold, The ICC as a New Instrument for Repressing Terrorism (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2004). 64. Ibid., 49–51. 65. Ibid. 66. Czarnetzky and Rychlak, ‘‘An Empire of Law?’’; Ronald J. Rychlak and John M. Czarnetzky, ‘‘The International Criminal Court and the Question of Subsidiarity,’’ 2000–2003 Third World Legal Studies (2003):115, 119, 121 . This situation could easily be remedied in the ICC by making the Court’s jurisdiction dependent upon a referral by the Security Council, which currently is only one of several ways in which the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction. 67. I do not discount the importance—indeed the absolutely crucial role—that national prosecutions under domestic law play as part of the global legal regime against terror. Indeed, the doctrine of subsidiarity requires that the power of nations to act against terrorists only should be displaced by the international community in cases where the nation is incapable of acting, and thus requires assistance. As the subject of this chapter is the international response to terrorism, domestic legal regimes are beyond the scope of this work, but the importance of domestic prosecutions should in no way be discounted on that account. 68. Subsidiarity is a familiar principle in international law, and it is enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224/1) 191 (1992), at art. 3(b) (stating that the principle of subsidiarity provides that when the EU does not have exclusive jurisdiction, the EU will act only if the Member States cannot achieve the objectives of the proposed action); see also Larry Cata´ Backer, ‘‘Harmonization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An Essay on the Dynamics of Opposition Within Federative and International Legal Systems,’’ 4 Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 185 (1997): 211 (stating that the interests of the supranational unit prevail when the interests of member states conflict). 69. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno [On Reconstructing the Social Order], 79 (1931), reprinted in Contemporary Catholic Social Teaching 47 (Washington, D.C.: Nat’l Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Catholic Conference, 1991). Professor Finnis characterizes subsidiarity as ‘‘one important development of the Aristotelian political science, drawing on but going well beyond Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s communism.’’ John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 159. See also Kyle Duncan, ‘‘Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States Constitution,’’ 52 Villanova Law Review 67 (2007); Robert K. Vischer, ‘‘Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution,’’ 35 Indiana Law Review 103 (2001); Rychlak and Czarnetzky, ‘‘The ICC and Subsidiarity’’; Paolo G. Carozza, ‘‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of


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International Human Rights Law,’’ 97 American Journal of International Law 38 (2003): 40–46; Ken Endo, ‘‘The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors,’’ Hokkaido Law Review, 43/6 (March 1994): 553–652. 70. Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 235. In a similar vein, Professor John Finnis provides an argument for the legitimacy of supra-national political mechanisms designed to foster the common good: If it now appears that the good of individuals can only be fully secured and realized in the context of international community, we must conclude that the claim of the national state to be a complete community is unwarranted and the postulate of the national legal order, that it is supreme and comprehensive and an exclusive source of legal obligation, is increasingly what lawyers would call a ‘‘legal fiction.’’ John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 150. 71. Jacques Maritain, Man and State, New edition (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1998), 204.


Part II

The Strategy and Tactics of Terror


5

Targeting: Terrorism and Nongovernmental Organizations Collide Craig Stapley Central to answering the question of who terrorists will attack is understanding the process by which terrorist groups choose their targets. This assumes that terrorist groups are rational actors as has been discussed in the chapter on definitions. Understanding the targeting process through empirical means is a difficult endeavor. In order to establish a reasonable sample group which controlled for extraneous variables, the author chose to study nongovernmental organizations (hereafter referred to as NGOs). NGOs provided a concrete sample with similar characteristics that allow the researcher to create a targeting framework. Additionally, the targeting of NGOs is counterintuitive. If NGOs are targeted, there must be a reason. Thus, this chapter uses the targeting by terrorist groups of NGOs as a means for determining terrorist targeting strategies. Hoffman noted that NGOs were targeted because of tactical reasons: specifically that the nature and operations of NGOs make them easy targets. However, if terrorist groups are rational, one must go beyond just the relative ease of carrying out an attack on a given target. As stated before, there must be a rationale. INTRODUCTION TO/REVIEW OF THE DATABASE This chapter creates and justifies the framework that explains why terrorist groups might target NGOs, which may then be generalizable to the larger populations of terrorist attacks. It establishes the terrorist’s targeting rationale. In order to institute this framework, a comprehensive study of attacks on NGOs was carried out. For the purposes of this study, various databases that contained records of these types of attacks were consulted. After consulting the various databases, the central data for this research was compiled. It contains approximately 500 cases of terrorist attacks on NGOs and religious groups from 1970 to 2000.

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Determining the actual process by which targets were chosen is a task fraught with intellectual pitfalls. Obviously, it is impossible to know exactly what the terrorist groups were thinking or what emphasis they placed on which targeting parameters to finally arrive at the selected target. However, after careful study of the databases, various patterns emerged. The purpose of this study was not to create empirically testable statistics. This is a preliminary study in the field of target selection which focuses on NGOs in particular. While a database is typically used to statistically test hypotheses, the database compiled for this study has a primary purpose of providing a large pool of like phenomena through which patterns could be established. As such, readers should not be disappointed when statistical testing is not conducted for each of the framework parameters. The main source materials used are the RAND/St. Andrews Terrorism Database as well as the RAND/MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Terrorism Database, both of which have been compiled primarily from news publications worldwide. These databases include information as to number of deaths; number of injuries; the nationality(s) of the target; the alleged perpetrator(s); the incident date; the tactics used; the country that the attack occurred in; the source of the information; and finally a brief summary of the attack. These databases ‘‘were compiled by the RAND Corporation, of which the RAND Terrorism Chronology Database records international terrorist incidents that occurred between 1968 and 1997, while the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database records domestic and international terrorist incidents that occurred from 1998 to present.’’1 Information used as secondary sources include the U.S. government reports Political Violence Against Americans, Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans, and the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000–2002, which are government reports of violence against Americans. All of these sources are in the public domain and are readily obtainable by the general public. RAND is a nonprofit think tank originally set up by the Air Force to undertake contract research. This research is often conducted for the U.S. government but not necessarily so.2 The RAND database contains over 8,000 cases detailing acts of international terrorism in general, and since 1998, it has detailed incidents of domestic terrorism as well. From this database, approximately 500 cases of terrorist acts on NGOs and religious organizations since 1978 have been chronicled. This database is important in that it provides large numbers of data that can be compared and examined to see if similarities and differences exist between attacks. In other words, the data set can be examined for correlations between the variables, which could then be hypothesized as ‘‘cause-effect relationships.’’3 Again, while theory testing will not be executed, this database analysis will be conducted as a controlled comparison.4 One of the benefits of the data retrieved from the RAND/St. Andrews and the RAND/MIPT databases is the fact that much of the data was retrieved from journalistic sources. As a result, much of the information is ‘‘thick’’ in nature. In other words, the database contains descriptive information rather than just names and dates. This is especially helpful in the task of creating the theoretical framework.

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Specific details as to the actions of the victims, the tactics of the attackers, as well as other relevant information are contained within the database. The RAND databases have received both positive and negative reviews. On the positive side, Edward S. Herman describes the RAND database as ‘‘a relatively large and scholarly operation for the terrorism field.’’5 Work testing the internal validity and correlation of available databases found all to be highly correlated and internally valid.6 On the negative side, Herman comments on how the disparate definitions serve to create a weakness in the database: (It) exhibits a fundamental bias that fits and supports the Western model of terrorism. It focuses on terrorist incidents of ‘‘violence waged outside presently accepted rules and procedures of international diplomacy and war. . .designed to attract worldwide attention to the terrorists and to inspire fear.’’ Incidents are included only if information is ‘‘publicly available.’’ As government acts of violence very often are not designed to ‘‘attract worldwide attention and inspire fear,’’ but only to inspire fear (and decimate an opposition), the Rand principle of selection excludes a large part of wholesale terror from the start. Furthermore, government violence very often does not yield ‘‘publicly available information’’ (e.g., the work of death squads and government torturers), and is claimed (often falsely) by the terrorist states to be within the ‘‘presently accepted rules’’ of warfare.7

Thus, instances of state terrorism against their own citizens are excluded based on the definition of terrorism used by RAND.8 Similarly, instances of ‘‘terrorist events taking place on the frontiers of neighboring states at war are excluded.’’9 Another criticism of the RAND database is the fact that it ignores the greater number of domestic terrorism acts.10 RAND itself concedes to these weaknesses. In a RAND Note dated March 1981, William Warner Fowler stated: ‘‘The major problems in the collection of terrorism data are the definition of terrorism itself and the determination of the scope and content of the data.’’11 Fowler also admits that the RAND database might also have the weakness of a ‘‘lack of rigor in incident sampling.’’12 Neither would justify using other available databases to rectify the problem. The RAND database, similar to other terrorism databases, is a chronological database. Most of the other databases are also chronological. Fowler notes: For the most part, data-gathering efforts are centered on the development of chronologies of recent terrorist activities. This means that there is an overlap in the information content of the currently available data bases [sic]. It has been estimated that there would be 90 percent agreement among the chronologies containing data on any given sample of incidents.13

Another weakness relates to the difficulties in assessing motivation to perpetuate violent acts. Brian Jenkins explained, ‘‘The borderline separating political motives from highly personal motives and purely criminal motives is not always clear. Where all of the details of an incident were not known, it was included if it had the earmarks of an international terrorist incident.’’14 Jenkins allows that some incidents might

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not necessarily be terrorist acts. Conversely, there may be instances where acts were not included: Terrorist data bases [sic] are more like census data bases [sic] (which attempt to collect data on every person) and less like public opinion polls (which generally select a specially defined ‘‘sample’’ of individuals that represent a larger universe). This means that sampling methods have not been used and missing incidents have been inadvertently omitted. Detailed data-selection criteria are not usually publicly available, so precise estimates of omission rates can not [sic] be calculated.15

The RAND database also suffers from limitations in data collection. As a nongovernmental database intended to be available to the general public, classified information available only to government sources is missing from the database. Furthermore, the primary data sources were journalistic news sources. As such, there might be an emphasis on incidents that are ‘‘newsworthy.’’16 There are also difficulties with the RAND database inherent in all databases. When using secondary data, mistakes made by the data collectors are passed on to the researcher. This weakness was noted by Ballard, ‘‘such analysis extends any faulty methodology originally done by the data collection agencies and compounds these mistakes.’’17 That is not to say that the RAND and other similar databases should be abandoned. Weimann and Winn minimize the RAND weaknesses: No database can ever be fully above question. It is fair conjecture to wonder if the RAND data might overrepresent slightly incidents involving U.S. victims and/or interests as a result of the unintentional omission of incidents not involving U.S. Nationals or interests. The dataset is exceptionally large. For this reason, any omissions are apt to be proportionally very small in number. However, nonrandom or skewed they might be, any conjectured omissions are therefore unlikely to exercise a trifling impact, if any, on overall conclusions.18

Certainly there are problems with the RAND and other databases. However, the advantages such tools provide, justify their use, warts and all. JUSTIFICATION OF CASES IN THE DATABASE The use of secondary information available in the RAND/St. Andrews and RAND/MIPT databases for the purpose of this research is invaluable. However, it must be conceded that these databases were not created for the explicit use in this research. Data was initially gathered for a purpose other than the specific research that is being conducted herein. As such, the weaknesses described above relating to definitions of terrorism and the inclusion of incidents within the research database may perhaps be exacerbated. Fowler concedes that an inherent bias enters data when being collected due to the ‘‘organizational mission for which the data are collected. . .


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the availability of sources of information and budgetary constraints.’’19 As a result, there are undoubtedly incidents that were included in the original databases that do not fit the definition of terrorist acts used in this research. Further, there must also be incidents that were not included in the original databases that would have been included in this research had that data been available. THE FRAMEWORK: WHY NGOS BECOME THE TARGETS OF TERRORISTS As was introduced in the chapter on definitions, this research assumes that terrorist groups are rationally constructing targeting imperatives for both strategic or ideological reasons as well as tactical reasons. Drake creates a targeting funnel with the total available targeting options at the top or widest point of the funnel. A hypothetical group would have options ranging from mass attacks on the general public to specific attacks on government or symbolic targets. The targeting options are first refined based on ideology.20 The ideology ‘‘sets out the range of people and things which it is legitimate for the terrorists to attack.’’21 Let us suppose the hypothetical group is a French ethnic separatist group operating in Quebec. Its basic ideology is based on creating a Quebec independent from the rest of Canada. The group members would refine their targeting options based on their ideology. They might assume that an attack on a massed civilian population might be counterproductive to their cause, as French Canadians might becomes casualties. This might alienate the general populace of Quebec and slow the creation of an independent Quebec, thus being counterproductive to the group’s cause. A religious fundamentalist group, which considers all who are not members of the group to be infidels and hence, fair game, might be more willing to inflict mass casualties as it is not concerned with alienating a large, external population. A good

Figure 5.1 Targeting Constraints22

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example of this type of group is the Aum Shinrikyo, which carried out the sarin gas attack in the subway system of Tokyo. The Aum sect’s main goal was the bringing about of Armageddon, or the end of the world. This nihilism and desire to inflict mass casualties opened options that might be taboo for other political terrorist groups. As a result, the Aum carried out attacks on the general population with weapons of mass destruction hoping for indiscriminate and mass casualties. The targeting selection is next refined based on the strategy of the group. In other words, what attack would bring about a reaction that would be beneficial to the group’s cause? Drake noted, ‘‘A terrorist group’s strategy can be quite crude and simple. However, by determining what the terrorists wish to achieve by their use of violence, it provides a further refinement to the framework for target selection set by the group’s ideology.’’23 The strategy of a group can be determined based on the group’s internal dynamics as well as the role of external opinion in accomplishing their goals.24 After the targeting parameters have been delineated by the group’s strategy, the targeting selection would be further restricted based on tactical reasons. These reasons might include the group’s capabilities, the security environment, and the protective measures used by potential targets. The manufacture and deployment of sarin as a means of inflicting mass casualties is, thankfully, beyond the capabilities of most terrorist groups. Indeed, it was beyond the capabilities of the Aum sect, despite their own judgment of their capabilities. Certainly the ability of a group to hijack a plane and fly it into a skyscraper became much more difficult once security measures were put into place following the attacks of September 11. That is not to say that a hijacking and suicide collision is impossible, just that the security environment changes the relative difficulty of successfully carrying out a given attack. The protective measures taken by potential targets must also be taken into account. If a government building campus is designed to make a truck bomb attack impossible (through use of barriers and parking lot placement), a terrorist group which has decided to use the truck bomb tactic must find a target that is less hardened. All of these refinements affect the final target selection. It is also understood that the attack itself will bring a reaction which will then bring about a change in the targeting criterion for the next attack.25 The framework advanced by this research expands on Drake’s targeting process due to the fact that it contains ideological, strategic, and tactical reasons that terrorist groups might target NGOs. It is an expansion on Drake’s targeting refinement process in that it identifies five terrorist targeting imperatives relating to NGOs specifically. These imperatives are: first, that terrorist groups perceive a real or imagined association between the NGO and a political entity (whether state or nonstate); second, that the NGO, or its agents, engage in political activities that bring them into conflict with the terrorist group; third, that the NGO either actively or solely by virtue of being what it is represents a threat to the social, cultural, or religious environment considered important to the terrorist organization; fourth, that NGOs become competitors for resources that the terrorists desire; and fifth, that NGOs are relatively soft in terms of ease of attack, and as such, are desirable targets.


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Association The first targeting imperative that might explain why terrorists target NGOs is that terrorist organizations may perceive that an NGO has an association with a political entity. It is important to point out that this association need not necessarily exist in real life, only that the terrorist group perceives that it exists. A terrorist group may target an American business based on the fact that it is American and as such has political ties to the United States. It may not matter that the business is multinational as long as the terrorists associate the business with the United States. This association may be even more tenuous when looking at religious or humanitarian NGOs. The fact that the NGO may be based in the United States creates a relationship to the United States. American students traveling outside the United States have understood this association for years. Occasionally, American students will sew a Canadian flag onto a backpack in order to avoid ill will that may be associated with Americans. Hoffman noted this kind of terrorist threat: ‘‘Clearly, then, a variety of American citizens traveling, living and working overseas—but who have no ostensible or official connection with the U.S. government—are indeed already firmly in the terrorists’ cross-hairs.’’26 Shaffert captured this targeting imperative when he noted that a terrorist victim is, ‘‘representative of a target group that is strategically involved in the terrorist’s political goals.’’27 Shaffert cited the 1985 murder of a U.S. serviceman on TWA’s flight 847. He noted that the target was not necessarily the serviceman, but ‘‘the American public who observed the atrocity through the international media.’’28 As long as an association can be established linking the immediate target with the larger audience, then the targeting selection is justified in the mind of the terrorists. Indeed, perhaps the more ‘‘innocent’’ the better as an innocent victim might garner more of the attention of the larger target audience. In order to demonstrate this associational parameter, cases contained in the database are introduced. Attacks against the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (also referred to as the LDS Church) in Latin America prove to be illustrative. Latin America during the 1980s was rife with terrorism and political violence. During that time and in that area, there were 211 attacks against NGOs or religious organizations recorded in the database. By far the majority of the attacks (66.8 percent or 143 incidents) targeted the people or property of the LDS Church. The LDS Church is an international church based in Salt Lake City, Utah in the United States. The church is expressly apolitical, going to great lengths to proclaim itself to be politically neutral. Indeed, instruction to general authorities of the church as well as local leadership expressly emphasizes that political activities for or against any given issue by church officers in their official church capacity will not be tolerated, nor will the church take a political stand on political issues except in cases of moral questions such as the abortion issue or legalization of gambling. If this is the case, then the question must be asked as to why the majority of the terrorist attacks in Latin America targeted the LDS Church. This research theorizes that the LDS Church was targeted due to the perceived association by terrorists groups between the church and the United States rather than for political activities engaged in by the church or its officers.

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Cases in the database help to explain some of the attacks on the LDS Church. Twenty-six percent of the attacks on the LDS Church were accompanied by either literature in the form of pamphlets or slogans painted on buildings proclaiming the attack as an attack not necessarily on the church but one on the United States. Interviews of church officials who were present after some of the attacks confirm that in most of those cases, anti-U.S. literature or slogans were left at the sites. Examples of this type of attack include 1983 attacks executed by the ELN (National Liberation Army) of Columbia. In those attacks, the ELN conducted dynamite attacks on entities associated with the United States in Bacaramanga. The entities were the Columbo-American Cultural Institute, the International Bank of Columbia (an affiliate of Citibank), and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.29 A series of incendiary attacks in 1985 in Chile had pamphlets left at the scene proclaiming, ‘‘Yankees get out of Easter Island.’’30 A slogan painted on a wall after a 1987 molotov cocktail attack in Santiago, Chile stated, ‘‘Out of the common people’s territories Yankee invaders.’’31 A 1989 attack conducted by the Tupac Amaru group warned ‘‘Mormons and DEA agents’’32 to leave the upper Huallaga Valley.33 The terrorist groups associated the LDS Church with the United States and launched attacks on that basis alone. Indeed, attacks seem to increase based on U.S. foreign policy. If the attacks on the LDS Church in Latin America are studied, it can be seen that attacks increased after significant U.S. foreign policy action. This is described in Figure 5.2. Terrorist attacks on the LDS Church prior to 1983 are relatively rare. However, after 1983, attacks on the LDS Church significantly increase. It can be theorized that the U.S. invasion of Grenada as well as U.S. activities with the Contras in Nicaragua were behind the increased attacks which occurred in 1984–89. Similarly, attacks on the LDS Church increased significantly after the U.S. invasion of Panama. Figure 5.2 also shows that the attacks diminish three to four years after the foreign policy action. Statistical analysis of the database tends to confirm that the terrorists increased attacks on the LDS Church after the Panama invasion. Prior to the Panama invasion, attacks on the LDS Church made up 54.8 percent of all terrorist attacks in Latin America. After the Panama invasion, attacks on the LDS Church made up 74.4 percent of all terrorist attacks in Latin America. The LDS Church engaged in no significant changes in policy or doctrine during that period of time. It can thus be theorized that the increase was due to some other reason. To help derive causation for the increased attacks, the evidence of the attacks themselves must be studied. In the two years following the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, 26.5 percent of the LDS Church attack sites in Latin America had evidence left by the attackers which contained references to the recent U.S. invasion. 34 In these cases, the terrorists gave voice to why the attacks were occurring. In their own words, the attacks were meant as a means of conveying a message to the U.S. government: ‘‘U.S. out of Panama.’’35 Examples of this type of attack include the 1989 assassination of two LDS missionaries. In that attack, the Zarate Wilka FAL (Armed Forces of Liberation) sent a


Figure 5.2

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Terrorist Attacks on the LDS Church in Latin America

letter to the local newspaper denouncing, ‘‘Yankee invaders and their lackeys.’’ The attack coincided with the arrival of U.S. military personnel in Potosi who would be constructing a new airport.36 Six attacks on LDS buildings following the U.S. invasion of Panama claimed the attacks were in retaliation for the invasion.37 Similar attacks were conducted against LDS buildings following the attendance of President Bush at the Cartagena Drug Summit in 1990, the first Gulf War, the invasion of Haiti, and the deployment of U.S. Army Engineers to Columbia in 1994.38 Certainly, recent events in Iraq seem to bolster the theory that, at times, terrorists select targets simply based on the nationality of the victim and that the victim’s actual connection to the government of his or her home nation is irrelevant. If, in fact, Jenkins’s supposition is correct, that terrorists are conducting activities for a larger audience in an attempt to use the media attention garnered by the act to influence the larger population, then the more ‘‘innocent’’ the victim(s), the better.39 The graphic representations of an ‘‘innocent’’ journalist or truck driver being beheaded to the cries of ‘‘God is great,’’ make much more of an impact on a watching audience than the execution of a captured soldier or government official. This associational danger seems to be acknowledged by the U.S. government. After the September 11 attacks, embassy officials told one U.S. expatriate ‘‘to refrain

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from doing anything that would label him American.’’40 This is especially true since September 11 and the call to attack Americans wherever they are located. An association need not be solely with a government entity. Indeed, if an NGO is associated with a nonstate entity such as the United Nations, any assumptions made about the general organization may be transferred to the NGO associated with that organization. Eighty-four percent of all attacks on NGOs associated with the United Nations or the Red Cross occurred in the time period following the United States and coalition invasion of Iraq in the First Gulf War. Before that time, attacks on NGOs associated with the UN or Red Cross made up 3.8 percent of all terrorist attacks. After the Gulf War, attacks on UN or Red Cross NGOs made up 17.9 percent of all terrorist attacks. Certainly, by their own propaganda, many fundamentalist terrorist groups have begun to associate the Red Cross and the United Nations Security Council with Western domination. Some NGOs rely on the real association that exists with government entities. Many NGOs rely on government funding in order to accomplish their goals. Clearly, as Edwards and Hume documented, many NGOs are beholden to governments for their existence. The question must then be raised, ‘‘can an NGO really be nongovernmental if a government is a stakeholder in the NGO?’’ Some NGOs rely on governments for security as well. Additionally, governments provide NGOs with legitimacy and ideological capital with which to carry out missions. In these cases, an NGO may reap positive benefits from a government association, but the negative aspects cannot be ignored. As stated at the beginning of this research, it would not be the purpose of the database to construct statistical tests with which to measure the ability of the framework to predict the targeting priorities of terrorist groups. However, 15.38 percent or 68 incidents had explicit statements by the terrorist groups that the attacks were committed on targets associated with a political entity. Additionally, incidents where details allow the inference of the targeting strategies allow the researcher to determine that an additional 196 incidents or 59.7 percent of terrorist attacks have an associational component. Political Activity It must be noted that terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon. As such, political motives must help guide a terrorist group in selecting targets. Hence, the second way that NGOs might be brought into the cross-hairs of terrorist groups relates to activities that an NGO might be engaged in that are in conflict politically with the terrorist group. The difficulty arises in actually defining what political activity is. Some definitions focus on the mechanisms of government—the apparatus of state. As such, terrorists might target NGOs in order to gain control of the mechanisms of government. While many NGOs are apolitical in the way they organize and carry out their various missions, many are not. A group engaged in political struggle might be moved into the ‘‘legitimate’’ target category. It is important to note that political activity


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might bring about terrorist attacks by both traditional nonstate terrorists as well as state sponsored terrorism. The general political activity category can be divided into two general subtypes. The first is traditional political activity, which might be considered work for or against governments or programs by an NGO. The second type is much more nebulous. This political activity is any activity, which may not be political in nature, but one that subverts the terrorists program for control. Put another way, the first type is traditional political activity that goes against the terrorist group’s ideological or strategic plans. The second type is any activity that goes against the terrorist group’s strategic or tactical plans. The first type is at the top of the funnel; the second is farther down. Overt political activities are considered first. NGOs may engage in the traditional political process. This may put them at political odds with terrorists. For example, an NGO, which chooses to promote a free market, democratic form of government, may find itself afoul of a Marxist terrorist group. Once again, the database is illustrative for this concept. About 7.6 percent or thirty-four terrorist incidents out of all terrorist attacks were on targets engaged in overt political activities.41 Certainly, the definition of overt political activity is open to interpretation. This study defines overt political activity as an NGO working for or against one political entity that is engaged in political struggle. For example, an NGO working in a country engaged in civil war, which chooses to support, either by material or endorsement, one of the combatant sides would be considered to be engaged in overt political activity. This type of situation was cited by Randolph Martin when describing the threats to NGOs. Adding to the threat level is ‘‘the erosion of the accepted neutrality of aid groups, who are seen by some belligerents as partisan, interventionist and generally an undesirable presence.’’42 Perhaps a good example of this type of activity is another religious organization, the Roman Catholic Church. Compared to the first example, the Catholic Church is vastly larger in terms of total membership as well as demographic proportion of the population. This is especially true in Latin America where much of the terrorist activity took place until the mid-1990s. By virtue of its population and history in Latin America, the Catholic Church has become part of the Latin culture and society. However, of the total number of terrorist attacks in Latin America, 11.4 percent were against the agents or property of the Catholic Church. All told, 78.2 percent of all terrorist attacks against NGOs in Latin America were against the LDS and Catholic Churches. One of the factors, which set the Catholic Church apart from the LDS Church, is the fact that the Catholic Church and or its agents have been willing to engage in political struggle. In order to understand the justification that terrorists might use to bring the Catholic Church into the cross-hairs, it is important to understand the history and policies pursued by those of the Catholic Church. Initially, the Catholic Church was seen as a bastion of conservativism, oftentimes providing legitimacy to governments. Anciently, the Church was the means by which kings could claim divine right, and thus, justify any action—good or bad. Claiber notes that, ‘‘the church legitimated

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the colonial order.’’43 He goes on to point out that, ‘‘The church was the only colonial corporation that could confer religious legitimacy on persons and institutions, and that legitimacy in turn gave those persons a privileged status.’’44 In modernity, the support of the church provided similar legitimacy. Berryman recognizes that political leaders in Latin America were sometime seen as ‘‘holy men,’’ granting legitimacy beyond politics.45 A news article by Kevin G. Hall, a Knight Ridder correspondent, reinforces this concept. In his story dated August 21, 2004, titled ‘‘Sites of Che’s Death Now a Tourist Draw,’’ he discusses the transformation of Che Guevara from revolutionary to Saint. Revolutionary Ernesto (Che) Guevara, an atheist, has almost been reborn a saint in the desolate Bolivian village where he was captured and executed nearly 37 years ago. . .. Today his handsome mug appears on the walls of homes and in market stalls in remote La Higuera, where he died, and in Vallegrande, where he was secretly buried. In many homes, his face competes for wall space with Jesus, the Virgin Mary and a host of Catholic saints. ‘‘They say he brings miracles,’’ said Susana Osinaga, 70, who was a young nurse on Oct. 9, 1967, when she washed the blood off Guevara’s corpse in Vallegrande’s small hospital.. . . ‘‘It’s like he is alive and with us, like a friend. He is kind of like a Virgin for us. We say, ‘Che, help us with our work or with this planting,’ and it always goes well,’’ said Manuel Cortez, a poor La Higuera farmer who lived next door to the schoolhouse where Guevara was executed.46

In recognizing the legitimizing power of the church, terrorist groups seek to harness that power for themselves and against those they are fighting. In 1977, two French nuns were kidnapped in Buenos Aires, and communique´s by the Montonero guerrillas demanded that the Catholic Church repudiate the military government of Argentina.47 Clearly, the terrorists felt that the support given by the Catholic Church to the military government was integral to legitimizing the government in the eyes of the general population. The kidnapping was meant as a means of forcing the church to withdrawal support for the government, thus reducing the government’s power. A brief discussion of legitimacy is appropriate. Weber discusses legitimacy and authority in Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. He first defines authority as legitimate domination, or domination where the subordinates accept the domination of those exercising power. Weber outlines three types of legitimate authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational or legal. Traditional authority is where authority is vested in traditionally dominant or powerful groups or individuals. These groups gain their legitimacy through the consent of the subordinates over time. The acceptance by the subordinates and the exercise of authority by the dominants over time creates the legitimacy. Often, these types of legitimacy are bound together with sacred or religious entities, tribal or clan structure, or established culture. In addition, the legitimate authority is exercised by patriarchs, clan leaders, or priests. As Weber noted, the authority ‘‘rests upon a belief in the sanctity of everyday routines.’’48


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The second form of legitimate authority is charismatic authority. Charismatic authority is where the authority of those exercising power is derived from extraordinary gifts, talents, sanctity, or nature of a specific person. Weber stated: The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must perform miracles; if he wants to be a war lord, he must perform heroic deeds. Above all, however, his divine mission must ‘‘prove’’ itself in that those who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. If they do not fare well, he is obviously not the master sent by the gods. The subjects may extend a more active or passive ‘‘recognition’’ to the personal mission of the charismatic master. His power rests upon this purely factual recognition and springs from faithful devotion. It is devotion to the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is strange to all rule and tradition and which therefore is viewed as divine.49

The third form of legitimate authority is rational or legal authority. In rational or legal authority, those accepting the authority believe in the rationality of following and obeying a structure of laws or rules. As Weber stated, this type of authority was derived from ‘‘rational grounds—resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.’’50 In all of these cases, legitimacy lies with those being governed or those that are being dominated. Thus, if those being governed refuse to accept the authority of those governing, there is no legitimacy. In the case of Latin America, the Catholic Church exercised traditional authority. Over time, they had exercised power, and therefore were looked to as a legitimizing influence. For example, the Catholic Church played a legitimizing role with rightist governments. Tan notes that the Catholic Church was willing to support rightist governments in order to protect its preeminent religious position within the state.51 Indeed, he cites the willingness of the Catholic Church to condone the actions of the Marcos government in the Philippines to protect its tax-exempt status. There also seemed to be an ideological conflict between the Catholic Church and leftist governments. Marxist governments stressed the concepts of solidarity and class struggle over religion. Indeed, Marx’s labeling of religion as the ‘‘opiate of the masses’’ was seen as a direct attack on the power of the church.52 As a result, many leftist groups and governments found themselves at opposition to the church. Finally, the Catholic Church provided means by which the powerful, conservative, upper classes could remain in power over those in the lower classes. This is the argument proposed by Phillip Berryman. He states, ‘‘The war in Central America is a religious and theological war, a struggle between gods situated on both sides of the conflict.’’53 It is between the ‘‘powerful (who) seek to prevent God’s realm from arriving. . .(and) the poor (who) have discovered that ‘the God of Western Christian Society was not the God of Jesus, but rather an idol of the Empire.’’’54 That is not to say that the church remained the central legitimizing influence. As the concepts of democracy and human rights began to flourish and the church did not respond, it began to lose this divine legitimizing authority.55 Indeed,

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‘‘the church came seriously close to finding itself marginalized in the wake of these great changes, which were sweeping over Latin America.’’56 In order to bring the church back to the center of its people’s lives and avoid marginalization, the church changed. ‘‘It ceased to be a bulwark of the established order and turned into a force for social change.’’57 This change did not occur quickly. However, by 1968, and through such conventions as the Second Vatican Council and the Episcopal Conference in Medellin, the Catholic Church had transformed itself into an organization which championed democracy, socia,l and human rights.58 Indeed, this change has come to be known as ‘‘liberation theology.’’ In a Doctrinal Note released by the Vatican, the Catholic Church explains the implications of Vatican II and Medellin: Democracy must be based on the true and solid foundation of non-negotiable ethical principles, which are the underpinning of life in society. As the Second Vatican Council teaches, the protection of ‘‘the rights of the person is, indeed, a necessary condition for citizens, individually and collectively, to play an active part in public life and administration.’’ In addition, there is the right to. . .the development of an economy that is at the service of the human person and of the common good, with respect for social justice, the principles of human solidarity and subsidiarity, according to which ‘‘the rights of all individuals, families, and organizations and their practical implementation must be acknowledged.’’59

In this way, the Catholic Church moved from conservative to liberal, which was to have a profound affect on its status as a terrorist target. The Catholic Church changed the traditional stance where it had lent its legitimizing power to rightist governments and began to legitimize leftist or democratic governments. Under the system that saw the Catholic Church as the conservator of upper class power and right-leaning dictatorships, it is not inconceivable that revolutionary terrorist groups might have targeted the Catholics as a way of attacking the legitimacy of the regime they were trying to undermine. Marxist groups might have targeted the church for ideological reasons. But in the end, it was the church after Medellin that entered the gunsights of terrorists. The Catholic Church changed the traditional stance where it had lent its legitimizing power to rightist governments and began to legitimize leftist or democratic governments. This change on the political spectrum was significant in that revolutionary terrorists who had previously looked at the Catholic Church as an enemy now saw it as a potential ally. However, regimes which had seen the church as an ally now saw a potent tool for building legitimacy eroding. Attacks on Catholic personnel in general did come about. However, attacks on specific agents who took the counsel of Medellin to heart and who became activists for human rights and social change now found themselves in danger. In 1998, Bishop Juan Gerardi was, ‘‘beaten to death two days after presenting, as coordinator of the Archbishop’s Human Rights Office, a report on human rights violations and crimes committed during the 36-year domestic conflict that concluded in 1996.’’60


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In some cases, the political activity is the actual advocacy of one side or another in a political struggle. In 1997, A Canadian priest was killed while officiating in a Mass, apparently in retaliation for helping Tutsis escape the massacres in 1994.61 Father Timothy Majic was sent a letter bomb after contributing to a Croatian language newspaper, which advocated a free Croatia in 1979. In 1987, Father Guido Peeters, a parish priest of the worker’s district of La Legua, one of the poorer slums in Santiago, was kidnapped, stripped naked, beaten, threatened and photographed. His parish has been the site of frequent demonstrations against Pinochet’s government. Father Peeters’ parish was also fired upon in 1985. Father Stanley Rother was executed by people dressed in the uniform of the Guatemalan Army after sending letters to the government documenting atrocities conducted by the army on people in the village in which he worked. Father Rother, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, stated that he was on a list of people that would be killed. The choosing of one side in a civil war (or even a genocide) led these priests to be targeted by the other side. The political action need not be so clear. Neither need the choosing of sides be involved. In some cases, the political action could be involvement as an intermediary. In 2000, the ELN of Colombia kidnapped soon-to-be ordained Jesuit priest, Alejandro Matos Castro as he was trying to negotiate the release of FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) captives.62 The Ecuadorian Bishops Conference was letter-bombed in 1998 after they took on the task of preparing the census, which, in turn, would determine who got subsidies. In 2002, the parish priest of Nuestra Senora de la Asuncion was killed. He had been on the President of Florencia’s Peace Board and had ‘‘helped with efforts to release hostages and to avoid killings by both guerrillas and paramilitary groups.’’63 Also in 2002, the home of Caracas Archbishop Ignacio Velasco, who was advocating talks between the Chavez government and the opposition, was bombed. In these cases, involvement in nonpartisan political endeavors brought agents of the Catholic Church into the gunsights of terrorists. The second type of political targeting is the result of activities which may not seem be political in nature. However, a return to the competing definitions of politics may be useful. Harold Laswell’s definition of politics, being ‘‘who gets what, where, when, and how,’’64 describes activities that are much less traditionally ‘‘political’’ in nature. Indeed, NGOs may be engaged in activities, which may seem expressly nonpolitical, such as humanitarian aid or human rights promotion. However, those activities may bring an NGO into political conflict nonetheless. An explication of this principle may be helpful. Certainly much of what a terrorist group is concerned with is political power. Indeed, it is one of the definitional characteristics of a terrorist group. Terrorist groups attempt to change power dynamics through the threat of violence. Any other phenomenon that has the ability to change the power dynamics, or even reinforce the old dynamic, can bring itself into conflict with a terrorist organization which is trying to do the same in an opposite direction. One of the methods that insurrectionist terrorists use to gain political power is the subversion of governmental power. One of the chief means by which governments maintain power, especially in difficult times, is through legitimacy.65 This aspect of political legitimacy goes directly to the heart of terrorist goals. If the terrorist group

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can convince the general population that the current regime type is not able to handle the current situation, or that it is not the ‘‘most appropriate or proper ones for the society,’’66 then it has seriously weakened the government. A terrorist group might reduce government power by reducing the legitimacy the citizenry feel the government possesses. If a terrorist group can make the citizenry feel that the government cannot maintain order or basic rights, then this can help to reduce the legitimacy of the government. An NGO working to establish peace and prosperity thus might work against the aims of a terrorist group bent on de-legitimizing government. Hence, the NGO becomes a target for the terrorist group. Political power can also be put in terms of influence. It can be theorized that terrorist groups might target NGOs that threaten the terrorists’ influence with a group of people. It can be seen that NGOs have also been targeted because of a struggle for influence over nonstate ethnic entities. The power of an ethnic group or subgroup to influence its members cannot be overstated. Thus, when NGOs work with ethnic groups, tribes, and other substate actors, they place themselves at risk due to competition for the influence of that group. For example, in 1999, the FARC kidnapped and later killed three Americans who had been working for an NGO dedicated to working with the U’wa, a tribal community that had resisted outside interference or development.67 Similar attacks by FARC have targeted the NGO Maya Foundation as well as other groups working with indigenous peoples. The terrorist group Tupac Amaru has attacked groups in Peru working with Amazon tribes as well as indigenous peoples of the Andes.68 NGOs could put themselves at risk if they become the agent of stability. Starvation, famine, and terror have been used effectively by dictators in order to keep control of potentially restive populations. This concept is captured in the historical foundations of terrorism. As mentioned previously, the very word terrorism is derived from the French state sponsored program of inducing fear among the population in order to control it.69 Stalin’s programs against the peasant populations of Russia are another good example of this concept. Controlling the food supply or mechanisms for basic sustenance guarantees the ability to control the population that depends on it to survive. Thus, NGOs dedicated to humanitarian aid and simply feeding starving people may find themselves at odds with governments willing to engage in terrorism. NGOs engaged in nonpolitical efforts, such as humanitarian aid or human rights promotion, may find themselves targeted by terrorists because they become a threat to the strategies or tactics used by the terrorist group. If the goal of terrorists is to promote a chaotic environment, then those that are engaged in stabilization operations become targets. In the assembled database, 197 terrorist incidents or 44.6 percent of NGOs targeted by terrorists were involved in stability operations. While examples of this type of target selection are legion, a few examples may help to understand this targeting imperative. Three nuns and an American lay volunteer were kidnapped, raped, and shot to death in 1980 in El Salvador. They had been working to help feed the poor in the countryside. The brutal rapes and executions could not but send a message to any considering helping the poor in the area to cease and desist.70 In 1991, Sendero


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Luminoso guerrillas killed an Italian priest who had been running social programs in Northern Peru. 71 The sole ‘‘crime’’ of this Catholic priest was providing poor Peruvians with access to job training, clean water, and limited access to healthcare. Perhaps the best illustrations of this targeting imperative in action are those attacks that only disrupt the humanitarian activities of NGOs rather than attacking the personnel or property of the NGO specifically. These attacks are especially illustrative in that the attacks were directed at the relief supplies themselves rather than at the workers or their organization. In 1993, the United Revolutionary Front attacked a Red Cross convoy and burned the trucks carrying aid.72 Similar attacks in Iraq in December of 1992 destroyed eight UN aid trucks, and implanted bombs were discovered planted in several more.73 Again, attacks in Ethiopia in 1985 specifically targeted the trucks carrying food supplies, and in one attack, 24 trucks carrying almost 450 tons of food were burned.74 Nor is this tactic unsuccessful. Attacks on aid agencies or humanitarian groups have led to well-known and well-respected groups such as the Red Cross, various UN humanitarian agencies, and Action Aid to completely suspend operations and withdraw personnel from the regions or countries in question. Aid organizations suspended operations due to terrorist attacks seven times in the ten-year period from 1985 to 1995. In one case in 1996, attacks against UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) in Afghanistan caused a halt to a vaccination campaign.75 Clearly, there was some strategic or tactical reason the terrorists targeted the food supply as well as other humanitarian projects. In these cases, it is hypothesized the terrorists were trying to capitalize on the chaos caused by the lack of basic necessities. It can be theorized that the terrorists hoped that this chaos would evolve into either decreased legitimacy for those in power or an increase in power for those who would be able to control the access to food and basic humanitarian needs. Finally, terrorists may find some actions carried out by NGOs politically unacceptable. A Marxist group, for example, could find entrepreneurial infrastructure building activities politically objectionable, and as such may target NGOs engaged in such activities. This type of targeting can be illustrated by the 1988 incident in Peru, where Sendero Luminoso took control of an isolated village in the Andes. Sendero Luminoso then arrested ‘‘lackeys of imperialism and enemies of the revolution’’ which included a young French man and woman who were working in the village with the Committee for the Development of Agriculture. The young French workers were then executed along with three other villagers by having their throats cut. 76 Another attack occurred in 1991 where Sendero Luminoso attacked a Canadian-financed alpaca-breeding project’s vehicles and killed eight people.77 Sendero Luminoso, a Marxist group opposed to private enterprise, foreign aid and investment, targeted foreign NGOs promoting these things. Similar attacks have also been carried out by other terrorist organizations. In one case, a Mexican national attached to the International Labor Organization of the United Nations was kidnapped, beaten, and left to die on a roadway in the Guatemalan countryside. She had been previously threatened due to her work with a group that marketed local crafts. Another Maoist group attacked the Asian

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Development Bank in Kerala, India in 1992, destroying computers and files.78 In these cases, NGOs were attacked for activities which were politically contrary to those of the terrorist group. Ironically, attacks have also taken place due to a lack of action. In 1978, the ZANU (Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union) staged an attack in which guerillas shot and killed a German Jesuit priest for not providing a higher education to locals.79 Competition for Resources Returning to the definition of politics, some activities may bring an NGO into the targeting cross-hairs based on a third definition of politics: conflict over scarce resources. While this is related to the other definitions of politics, and as such, aspects of terrorist targeting strategies, there are some subtle but important differences. This targeting imperative draws more on the work of Cooley and Ron, which describes the conflict that has emerged among NGOs as they strive for resources in an increasingly scarce marketplace.80 Cooley and Ron argue that due to the constraints forced on NGOs by a scarce resource marketplace, NGOs may act in ways that are in conflict with their stated mission.81 Granted, terrorist organizations are not typical NGOs. However, there are certainly aspects of these groups that allow for such a characterization. Drawing from Cooley and Ron, it can be theorized that terrorist organizations must also compete for resources in an increasingly competitive marketplace. In the post-September 11 world, the major powers have combined to target and remove the financing pipelines that terrorists counted on for support. Further, countries that supported terrorism in the past have frozen that support due to outside pressure. It can thus be theorized that as scarcity increases, so will attacks for resources. The targeting imperative that causes terrorists to conduct attacks for the purpose of gaining resources may be analogous to Drake’s logistical strategy. Indeed, Drake defines logistical targets as: ‘‘Those which are attacked in order to provide or safeguard the group’s resources.’’82 Resources can be defined in many different ways. In order for a terrorist group to be successful, it requires many things. Most important are money and weapons. However, like most things, if you have the money, you can get anything else you need. In the chapter on definitions, painstaking steps were taken to differentiate between terrorists and organized criminals. However, conducting a terrorist campaign can be costly. Further, money is definitely a scarce resource. While an attack solely for the purpose of garnering money is not a political act, and as such, not terrorism, combining an attack in a way that allows a terrorist organization to further one or more of its political goals while still obtaining resources is simple multitasking. The purity of the ‘‘politicalness’’ may be in doubt, but it fits the definition on those grounds. The domestic terror event perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh began with criminal activities intended to procure financing and supplies.83 Without the supplies, the actual attack meant for the broader stage could never have occurred. Again, while many operations meant to obtain financing for an actual attack are not terrorism, some of them may be.


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If terrorist groups may select targets based on the ability of the attack on that target to obtain resources, then it stands to reason that terrorist might target NGOs on the basis that the NGO has access to resources that the terrorists want. Kidnappings by the Muslim militant ASG (Abu Sayyef Group) in the Philippines have targeted competing religious groups, driving away heretical or infidel influences. However, they have also tapped into the monetary resources that those religions or the adherents of the religion can access. That these types of attacks also have an associative and political result is simply icing on the cake. To the victim, the differentiation of groups between terrorist and criminal is purely academic; the result is the same. As far as the ASG is concerned, the majority of their attacks entailed kidnapping for ransom. Indeed, 27 incidents or 6.1 percent of all attacks on NGOs were accompanied by demands for ransom. Financing for executing operations is not the only resource needed by terrorist groups. For an organization to be successful, groups need safe havens and access to recruits. Often, NGOs are targeted because they put terrorist’s access to these resources at risk. How NGOs engaged in humanitarian work might incur the wrath of terrorist groups was described previously. Cragin and Chalk, in their work on how social and economic development can reduce support for terrorists, describe another aspect of terrorist resource scarcity. Terrorist groups thrive in an environment of chaos, lawlessness, and poverty. Poor, hopeless, starving people might feel less inclined to support those in power. They, in fact, might be inclined to support terrorists in their attempts at overthrowing the status quo. As a result, terrorists rely on these types of populations for recruits, safe houses (concealment), and other resources.84 Takeyh and Gvosdev document the recent movement away from terrorists’ reliance on strong state support towards failed states precisely for those reasons.85 If NGOs are working to eliminate this kind of environment, terrorists might target the NGO in order to protect its lines of supply. There is evidence that terrorists conduct some operations precisely due to their need for recruits. Alcides Jimenez, a parish priest in Columbia, was killed while saying Mass. He had advocated neutrality to his parishioners in the Columbian civil war.86 In this case, the advocacy of neutrality, or Jimenez telling his people not to support either side, could reduce the likelihood for those parishioners to support the terrorists. Another example is perhaps more illustrative. In 1977, three Jesuit Priests and four Dominican nuns at the Masumi Catholic Mission in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) were killed when gunmen attacked the mission seeking recruits. The mission was a boarding house for four hundred students. The terrorists took three hundred of the students across the border to Botswana after the attack.87 Thus, it can been seen that if NGOs put resource supply lines at risk, threatening finances, safe havens, or recruitment, those NGOs could find themselves in the cross-hairs. Social, Religious, or Cultural Conflict Another strategy, which helps to explain why terrorists might target NGOs, relates to Easton’s definition of politics, ‘‘the authoritative allocation of values for a society.’’88

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In this case, the terrorist groups desire to control the ‘‘authoritative allocation of values’’ for a given population. In other words, the terrorist groups desire to set the agenda for what a population thinks, what they should believe, and how they should live. This type of targeting could be described as the cultural/social/religious imperative. Cultural/social/religious targeting is especially good at explaining the actions of fundamentalist terrorist groups. Many of the fundamentalist groups are promoting a value system, and they will brook no dissent or argument when it comes to those values. In the case of fundamentalist terrorists, they desire to control the religious beliefs of a population, which then becomes associated with the structures of government to include interpretations of human rights as well as the judicial structure. Particularly in the case of fundamentalists, any incursion by someone bringing a culture or viewpoint different than that of the fundamentalists could be considered to be a polluting influence. In the case of communities where standards of dress and morality are highly regulated, simply the presence of those living a different standard could be considered to be threatening. Let us consider the example of the Armed Islamic Group (known by its French acronym GIA) attacks on non-Algerian ‘‘polluters’’ during their campaign to eject all foreign influences from Algeria. From their perspective as fundamentalist Muslims, all foreigners, whether they be NGOs with personnel from the West, or Western press, not only represented evil, but were evil. The Westerners, by the fact of who they were, brought non-Muslim influences that were antithetical to the GIA. As a result, the GIA then went on to cleanse the rest of the country of those influences: education, music, literature, and drama. Westerners listen to popular artists on their stereos; they wear Western clothing that does not cover the body the way clothes should; they promote ideas like equal rights for women, and separation of church and state that go against the fundamentalist interpretations of the Qur’an. Foreign personnel, even those working for a cause that is nominally acceptable, were polluting their country. Often, traditional authorities within a society decry the corrupting influence of outsiders. This is especially true of Western outsiders due to the spread of the dominant world culture. This research chooses to call this ‘‘cultural imperialism.’’ Often, NGOs are the vehicle by which Western culture is transmitted. This is the case both overtly, through organizational goals, and covertly, by means of unconscious messages sent by the personnel themselves. The replacement of traditional food, music, and clothing by those from outside the country are all part of what some societies might term cultural imperialism. In the end, anything that goes against the accepted conception of the world could pose a threat to groups attempting to authoritatively control the distribution of values in a society. Thus, NGOs that champion human rights may challenge the terrorists’ worldview. Groups trying to empower women in areas where fundamentalists wish to limit women’s rights may incur the terrorists’ ire. There are specific examples of this type of targeting in attacks which were perpetrated on Afghani women in late 2002. In three cases in two months, terrorists targeted Afghani women who were working for international NGOs. Statements left at one site warned all women to abandon


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working for Western aid groups.89 Women who worked for foreign aid groups had subjected themselves to foreign influence and polluted themselves. In those cases, terrorists were willing to take action to halt this kind of cultural pollution. Terrorist groups can target NGOs, especially religious NGOs, if the terrorist groups feel that the NGO is supplanting the religious values that the terrorist groups are espousing. Certainly, one aspect of the GIA offensive against the French in Algeria was the ‘‘polluting’’ influence that was encroaching on the religious as well as cultural worldview of Algerians. This targeting imperative is illustrated by the GIA attack on four Catholic priests killed in their mission in Tizi-Ouzou. In claiming credit for the attack, the GIA stated the attack was part of their campaign of ‘‘annihilation and physical liquidation of Christian crusaders.’’90 The murder of a Catholic nun and priest who had run a library inside Algiers was justified by the GIA as part of their effort to rid Algeria of ‘‘Jews, Christians, and miscreants from the Muslim land of Algeria.’’91 In 1994 alone, seventy-four foreigners were killed. The GIA justified the killings by closing the ‘‘main coronary artery’’ of the colonizing influence of ‘‘non-Muslim unbelievers.’’92 This phenomenon is not unique to Algeria. The SPLA (Sudan Peoples Liberation Army) has attacked Catholic missionaries and nuns charging them with ‘‘spreading Christianity.’’93 Attacks in 1992 in Afghanistan and 1994 in Somalia also targeted Christian NGOs on the basis that they either were infidels and were polluting holy land or that the NGOs promoted Christianity.94 Formal religion aside, terrorists might target anyone challenging their social or cultural views. Indeed, the GIA targeted anyone that deviated from their version of proper thought. Drake documents the murder of feminists, educators, entertainers, and writers.95 The GIA was especially concerned with the role education played in forming the worldview of students in Algeria. Again, Drake documents ‘‘over eighty teachers were killed and 600 schools had been attacked. . .three universities and nine training institutes were burned. . .three heads of Algerian universities and over fifty academics were killed.’’96 This phenomenon is also evident in recent events in Iraq. Nancy A. Youssef documented recent attacks on hair salons and music stores, in short, anything that the fundamentalists considered to be inappropriate under their version of correct thought and action.97 Beyond traditional values, the prevalence of Northern NGOs engaged in work in the global South has led some to question the motives of the Northern NGOs. Skjelsbaek describes this phenomenon when third world countries feel pressures to adapt to Northern influence. Indeed, he labels the phenomenon ‘‘neo-colonialism.’’98 Certainly, groups in the global South might feel the need to resort to violence to protect their way of life. The NGO database records seventy-three incidents, or 16.5 percent of all attacks on NGOs, which can be attributed to attacks on the culture, religion, or society that the attacked NGOs represent. Soft Targets The final reason why terrorists might target NGOs is the reason that Hoffman noted when discussing this topic: it has to do with the relative ease of carrying out

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an attack and the security environment within which the NGOs and terrorists reside.99 Drake theorizes that, ‘‘where there is a number of potential targets, attacking any of which would yield a roughly equivalent strategic benefit, there is a likelihood that the terrorists will choose to attack the softest target, as carrying out such an attack represents the least risk to the terrorists.’’100 It must be conceded that suicide attacks do not fit this assertion. However, in terms of likely targets, even suicide attacks choose targets that will allow the greatest opportunity for destruction. While hardened targets would allow for the perpetrators of the attack to carry out one of their goals, namely suicide, the more important of the goals would not be abetted by a hardened target. Thus, even those not concerned about personal risk will pursue softer targets. Recent antiterrorism programs have served to ‘‘harden’’ or increase the difficulty of successfully carrying out an attack. Hoffman described the recent security environment as being a much more difficult place for terrorists to target indiscriminately. He noted that while the primary target of terrorists had been government officials and installations, as security increased and protective measures were engaged, terrorists began to shift targets. Hoffman stated: The main problem that we face in this critical area of protecting American citizens and interests abroad from both current and future threats rubs up against one of the fundamental axioms of terrorism: hardening one set of targets often displaces the threat onto another ‘‘softer’’ target. In other words, security measures may successfully thwart planned or actual terrorist operations or even deter terrorists from attacking: but they do not eliminate the threat entirely, which may mutate into other, perhaps even more deadly forms. Determined terrorists, accordingly, will simply identify another range of vulnerabilities and hence potential targets; perhaps in turn adjusting or modifying their means and method of attack and executing a completely different kind of operation that still achieves their goal. As we harden the range of American diplomatic and military targets long favored by terrorists—hardening existing embassies and consulates worldwide and building stronger, less vulnerable structures in particularly dangerous foreign posts while increasing the force protection afforded to our military personnel deployed overseas—we doubtless will not eliminate the terrorist threat completely, but risk displacing it onto ‘‘softer,’’ more vulnerable and accessible, unofficial, non-governmental targets—e.g., ordinary American tourists and travelers, business people and otherwise ordinary citizens.101

The shifting of targeting from hardened targets to softer targets may be abetted by NGOs themselves. Given the mission of most NGOs, taking measures to reduce the exposure to terrorism may be counterproductive to their goals. Religious NGOs may feel it necessary to welcome all comers to organizations and facilities. Humanitarian groups may need to be working away from cities with the poor and suffering. The end result is that many of these organizations find typically prudent security measures hard to adopt. Martin notes that for many NGOs there is, ‘‘a conspicuous lack of security among many NGO workers combined with a skeptical, if not averse attitude towards the need for security and other protective measures.’’102 Added to


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this is the fact that, given the nature of the missions for many of these groups, they conduct their work in places that are generally more dangerous and thus present more of an opportunity for attack. Again, Martin notes that in many of these locations, there is, ‘‘a general absence of rules of war or rules of conduct among the belligerents themselves, many of whom are irregular fighters and may also include criminals and bandits interested as much in plunder as in the realization of a particular political agenda.’’103 CONCLUSION It has been shown that the permutations of target selection carry factors from ideology to tactics. Drake delineated a selection process by which terrorists start at all possible attack permutations and then refine and limit the target through ideological, strategic, and tactical inputs. In the end, target selection is a process with many inputs, and the final selection may simply be the easiest target to attack out of many possible. Terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon. As was stated previously, there are no innocents to terrorists. It seems that there is nothing apolitical to a terrorist either. Due to the many selection inputs, NGOs can enter the target selection environment of terrorists. They can be targeted based on a perceived association with a government or intergovernmental entity. NGOs can be targeted due to political activities in which they are engaged. It must be emphasized that any activity, overtly political or not, can have political ramifications, and as such, can provide the political motivation for a terrorist attack. Hence humanitarian aid or infrastructure building has the potential of affecting the political environment of a given area. These too, then, could be considered political activities. Terrorists could target NGOs based on a perceived threat to the social, cultural, or religious environment considered important to the terrorist group. Terrorists could target NGOs based on the fundamental scarcity of resources in the environment in which the terrorists operate. NGO activities that put the resources of safe haven and an ample recruit pool at risk could put NGOs in danger of terrorist attack. The scarcity of financing to terrorist groups might also lead terrorists to attack NGOs as a means of securing money and resources. Finally, the apparent ‘‘softness’’ of NGOs in terms of ease of attack might lead terrorists to attack nongovernmental groups. Certainly the targeting imperatives are not equal in priority. Neither are they considered independently of each other, for an attack will ideally accomplish more than one goal at the same time. They are also not necessarily considered at the same point in the target determination process. Often they are considered as the refinement process ensues. Again, in the targeting process, refinements are continually being made. As such, one or more of the NGO targeting imperatives might move back or forth along the targeting timeline. The framework proposed is heuristic and is derived from the data. However, it has not been tested empirically. The purpose of this research is to introduce a specific topic and present a potential theory as to the phenomenon. However, for a theory

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to be credible, it must make sense. In that vein, by using the database inputs, a simple test was performed by which the theory can be judged. Based on the limited information in the database, dummy variables were created for attacks in the database in which a ransom demand was made. It is theorized that in these cases the terrorist group is engaged in activities designed to obtain scarce resources. An additional dummy variable was created for an attack in which the terrorist group left evidence which indicated they were targeting the NGO based on an association with another country or governmental entity. In this case the evidence was usually statements in which the groups themselves explained the attacks were against a government entity that they associated the targeted NGO with. Dummy variables were also created for attacks on groups engaged in stabilization operations (humanitarian aid/infrastructure building) as well as groups engaged in overtly political activities. While there may certainly be coder bias as to what indeed meets the criteria for overt political activities or any other of the dummy variables, in most cases coding was relatively easy. If an NGO representative was actively protesting a government policy, that case was considered political activity. Some of the cases could have been interpreted many ways. The authors attempted to be conservative and did not attribute motive that did not seem clearly evident. This is especially true for the associative variable. Only cases where the terrorist groups left an indication towards motive were included. In some cases, the data entry had more than one dummy indicating influence. In those cases, a blended category was created. The theoretic framework lent itself to these dummy variables. However, the targeting imperative dealing with the relative softness of a target could not be accounted for. Despite this fact, and as illustrated by Figure 5.3, the framework accounted for 81 percent of all attacks on nongovernmental groups. This seems significant, especially given the missing variables.

Figure 5.3 Attacks Accounted for by Framework104


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If this is the targeting rubric used by terrorist groups when refining their targeting selections, then perhaps measures can be taken which would lessen the threat to these nongovernmental groups. In this chapter’s introduction, the author explained the selection of NGOs as the sample for the creation of the targeting framework. As noted above, the framework seems successful in describing the targeting parameters terrorist groups might be constrained by when selecting NGOs as targets. However, the question remains whether a model based upon the targeting of NGOs can be generalized to the greater population. This becomes a question of basic theoretical debate. Certainly the model applies to NGOs. As terrorist groups might face similar constraints when targeting other groups, it seems reasonable that it would also apply to intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and private individuals.

NOTES 1. Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism Database, http://db.mipt.org/ index.cfm (accessed August 2, 2004). This database ceased operations on March 31, 2008, and elements of the system were merged with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. The START database can be accessed at http://www .start.umd.edu/data/gtd/ (accessed May 22, 2008). 2. Bruce Hoffman and Donna K. Hoffman, The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terror (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994). 3. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 4. Ibid., 68–69. 5. Edward S. Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan, The Terrorism Industry: the Experts and Institutions that Shape Our View of Terror (New York: Random House, 1989). 6. Jeffery Scott, ‘‘Terrorism Databases: An Empirical Comparison,’’ Working paper, December 2003. 7. Herman, The Terrorism Industry, 86. 8. See also James David Ballard, ‘‘A Preliminary Study of Sabotage and Terrorism as Transportation Risk Factors Associated With the Proposed Yucca Mountain High-Level Nuclear Facility,’’ Working paper, July 1998. 9. Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism (White Plaines, NY: Longman Publishing Group, 1994). 10. Ballard, A Preliminary Study of Sabotage and Terrorism. . .; See also Hoffman and Hoffman, The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terror; Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, The Impact of Economic, Political, and Social Variables on the Incidence of World Terrorism, 1970– 1997, NIJ Grant Proposal 1–41, (2002); and Philip Windsor, ‘‘Book Review of Current Perspectives of International Terrorism,’’ in Terrorism and Political Violence,1, (1989): 272–276. 11. William Warner Fowler, Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods and Systems (Santa Monica, CA: RAND publication, 1981), v. 12. Ibid., vi. 13. Ibid., 1; also Richard Falkenrath, ‘‘Analytic Models and Policy Prescription: Understanding Recent Innovation in U.S. Counterterrorism,’’ Journal of Conflict and Terrorism 24,

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(2001): 159–181 ; Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988); Albert J. Jongman, ‘‘Trends in International and Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968–1988,’’ in Western Responses to Terrorism, ed. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (London: Frank Cass, 1993); and Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. 14. Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, ‘‘International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968– 1974,’’ R-I597-DOS/ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publication, 1975). 15. Fowler, Terrorism Data Bases, 14. 16. Falkenrath, ‘‘Analytic Models and Policy Prescription.’’ 17. Ballard, ‘‘A Preliminary Study of Sabotage and Terrorism.’’ 18. Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism (White Plaines, NY: Longman Publishing Group, 1994). 19. Fowler, Terrorism Data Bases, 10–11. 20. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 175–176. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid., 176. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses and Non-Governmental Organizations.’’ Testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, (April 3, 2001): 10. 27. R. W. Schaffert, Media Coverage and Political Terrorists: A Quantitative Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992) 44. 28. Ibid. 29. Database. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Drug Enforcement Administration, the United States agency tasked with elimination and regulation of illicit drug trafficking. 33. Database 34. This number is based on recorded details in the database. 35. Database. 36. Database. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Brian Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, P-6563 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, June 1981). 40. Erik Tryggestad, ‘‘Missionaries More Conscious of Being Americans Abroad,’’ The Christian Chronicle, October 22, 2001. 41. Database. 42. Randolph Martin, ‘‘FMR 4 April 1999: NGO Field Security,’’ New York: International Rescue Committee, available at http://www.irc.org. 43. Jeffrey Claiber, The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998) 4. 44. Ibid., 4.


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45. Phillip Berryman, Stubborn Hope: Religion, Politics and Revolution in Central America (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994). 46. Michael G. Hall, ‘‘Site of Che’s Death Now a Tourist Draw,’’ Detroit Free Press, August 27, 2004, http://www.freep.com/news/nw/che20e_20040820.htm (accessed August 27, 2004). Can now be accessed on Lexis-Nexis Academic Database, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/ results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T3798512360&format=GNBFI&sort =RELEVANCE&startDocNO=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T3798512363&cisb=22_T3798512362 &treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=222065&docNo=1 (accessed May 22, 2008). 47. Database. 48. Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 1958) H33 W3613 1958. 49. Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 249–250. 50. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968). 51. Michael L. Tan, ‘‘Religion and Politics, Faith and Government,’’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 5, 2004, http://www.inq7.net/opi/2004/may/05/opi_mltan-1.htm (accessed July 17, 2004). Can also be accessed at Lexis-Nexis Academic Database (accessed May 22, 2008). 52. Karl Marx, ‘‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction,’’ in Marx/Engles Reader, 2nd edition, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1978), 53–54. 53. Phillip Berryman, Stubborn Hope: Religion, Politics and Revolution in Central America (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994)206. 54. Ibid., 205–206. 55. Claiber, The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America, 5. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, ‘‘Doctrinal Note on some questions regarding The Participation of Catholics in Political Life,’’ Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith. Approved by John Paul II November 21, 2002, available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20021124_politica_en.html (accessed July 17, 2004). 60. Database. 61. Ibid. 62. Database. 63. Ibid. 64. Harold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936). 65. Seymore Martin Lipset, ‘‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,’’ American Political Science Review 53, (1959): 86. 66. Ibid. 67. Database. 68. Ibid. 69. Laqueur, A History of Terrorism. 70. Database 71. Ibid. 72. Database. 73. Ibid.

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74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Database. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘‘The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action,’’ in International Security 27, no. 1, (Summer 2002): 5–39. 81. Ibid. 82. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 12. 83. United States District Court for the District of Colorado. United States Versus Terry Lynn Nichols Court Transcripts, http://www.cnn.com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/ (accessed May 22, 2008). 84. Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, ‘‘The Role of Social and Economic Development,’’ available at http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.08.02/role.html (accessed June 22, 2004). 85. Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, ‘‘Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?’’ The Washington Quarterly 25, no.3, (Summer, 2002): 97–108. 86. Database. 87. Ibid. 88. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice Hall, 1965). 89. Database. 90. Database. 91. ‘‘Algerian Islamists Admit to Killings,’’ The Independent, May 16, 1994. 92. ‘‘Muslim Extremists Target Foreigners in War of Unbelievers,’’ The Times, December 27, 1994. 93. Database. 94. Ibid. 95. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 51. 96. Ibid., 52. 97. Nancy A. Youssef, ‘‘Day at the Salon Turns Dangerous,’’ Knight Ridder Newspapers, Posted on Friday, September 03, 2004. 98. Kjell Skjelsbaek, ‘‘The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century,’’ PRIO publication, 22–14. 99. Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses and Non-Governmental Organizations.’’ Testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, April 3, 2001, 7–8. 100. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 179. 101. Hoffman, Protecting American Interests Abroad, 7–8. 102. Randolph Martin, ‘‘FMR 4 April 1999: NGO Field Security,’’ New York: International Rescue Committee, available at http://www.irc.org. 103. Ibid. 104. As documented in the research database.

6

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat to the United States Adam B. Lowther

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: PAST AND PRESENT For most Americans the attacks of September 11, 2001 shattered the perception that terrorism is reserved for distant lands where Americans have no business going. Instead, the shocking images of the Twin Towers as they collapsed into a giant heap of ash and rubble and the tearful families frantically searching for loved ones shook the nation to its core. While terrorism was not unheard of for most Americans, it had not touched but a very few in a personal way. When fellow Americans hurled themselves from the rooftop of the World Trade Center to avoid being engulfed in the inferno raging below them every person watching the scene unfold on television was deeply moved. What no previous terror attacks could do, 9/11 did almost instantly. When it comes to understanding terrorism, something as simple as defining what it is is far more difficult than it might at first appear. Among scholars, policymakers, diplomats, and terrorists, a single definition of terrorism remains hotly debated. The White House, State Department, Pentagon, and Department of Homeland Security each define terrorism differently. At the United Nations no single definition of terrorism can be agreed upon. Since this chapter examines the threat nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons pose to the United States and its allies, this debate is purposefully avoided. Instead, I suggest that terrorism has four basic characteristics. First, it employs violence or the threat violence. Second, acts of terror are designed to create a psychological state of fear in the target population. Third, terrorism is a tactic of the weak designed to accomplish a political objective.1 Fourth, noncombatants are specifically targeted. 2 With these characteristics in mind, an examination of terrorism and the prospective use of WMD becomes less complicated.

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Advances in weaponry during the 20th century are often considered an important element in the rise of modern terrorism. Without automatic weapons, high explosives, and WMD, terrorists would lack the tools to carry out devastating attacks on civilian populations. This attitude illustrates a basic misunderstanding of terrorism and its more than two-millennia history. One need look no further than the Old Testament kingdom of Judah where, more than 2,000 years ago, Mattathias the Hasmonean struck terror into the hearts of the Seleucid Dynasty’s Judean supporters by assassinating fellow Jews who worshipped the Hellenic gods as the Seleucids commanded. Throughout the Revolt of the Maccabees (165–63 B.C.), 3 which was sparked by Mattathias’s acts of terror, the Jewish rebels utilized a combination of terrorism and guerrilla warfare to frustrate and defeat the Seleucids for over a century.4 Terrorism was not first employed by Jewish rebels in the 2nd century B.C. Long before the Revolt of the Maccabees, kings and emperors considered their cup bearers among the most trusted men of their household. This was not simply because the cup bearer brought food and drink to the royal family. It was the cup bearer who insured that any attempt to intimidate, blackmail, or terrorize the royal family, through the threat of poisoning, failed. Nehemiah, for whom the book of the Old Testament is named, served as the cup bearer to Artaxerxes I (465–424 B.C.), Emperor of Persia, who later allowed Nehemiah to lead the Jewish people back to Jerusalem and rebuild the walls of the old city. Nehemiah’s years of protecting the Emperor’s life enabled him to garner the trust and support he needed to restore Judah to some semblance of its former glory. The alchemist’s poison was among the earliest forms of chemical weapons, which were used on a small scale for millennia to assassinate monarchs, poison wells, and weaken armies. A brief look at the lineage of Roman emperors illustrates that the use of chemical weapons was often successful. The ranks of assassinated emperors include Augustus (14 A.D.), Claudius (54 A.D.), and Heraclones (641 A.D.) to name a few.5 While the ever-present threat of the assassin’s poison was often directed toward royalty, it was also a tactic that spread to disaffected groups of citizens seeking to alter the status quo. As technology has advanced over time, the development and use of chemical and biological weapons has advanced as well. Where poisons blended by local alchemists were the standard for more than 2,000 years, the range of chemical agents developed in the 20th century greatly expanded the ability of nations or terrorist organizations to wage chemical warfare on a new and larger scale. Where the use of biological weapons was once restricted, in the middle ages, to the catapulting of plague infested corpses over castle walls, scientists have developed new and devastating strains of biological organisms. No longer is biological warfare restricted to passing out smallpox infested blankets to an unsuspecting enemy. Harnessing the power of the atom may be the most significant accomplishment of the 20th century, although it is with this achievement that the most powerful weapons in the world are created. Much like with chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons technology has advanced and spread. In the era of the GWOT the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is of serious concern to the United States and other industrialized countries who may be the target of their

THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

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use. It is with this concern in mind that the threat WMD pose to the United States and its allies is examined in this chapter in terms of real and hypothetical situations that may arise. Thus, I seek to answer the question: does the United States face the imminent threat of a WMD attack on American soil? The combination of science and security that follows is designed to provide the reader with a general understanding of the difficulty facing terrorists as they consider future attacks. Contrary to the doomsday picture painted by many terrorism analysts and government officials, WMD are likely to prove more difficult to develop and use, and with less destruction, than we are often led to believe. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS Graham Allison, Director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, paints an alarming picture of the nuclear threat facing the United States and its allies in his recent work, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. For adversaries of the United States, acquiring nuclear weapons is becoming a top priority as they are seen as a way to protect against American intervention or invasion, or as a decisive strike against a regional adversary. Iran, North Korea, al Qaeda, and Hezbollah are but a few examples of state and nonstate actors actively pursuing offensive nuclear weapons. Some countries, such as India and Pakistan, are not concerned with any threat the United States may pose, but that of a rival state with whom they share a border. For some states, it is this threat that drives the development of nuclear weapons. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and President Bush’s designation of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as members of the ‘‘Axis of Evil,’’ Iran and North Korea were quick to violate international agreements restricting their nuclear programs to the peaceful production of energy. Both countries claim their actions are a response to increased fears that, without nuclear weapons, they would find themselves in a serious conflict with the United States they cannot win. Additionally, al Qaeda and other terror networks are known to be actively seeking one or more functioning nuclear devices and the radiological material needed for a dirty bomb, which can be used against a number of targets such as the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.6 Each of these developments is of serious concern to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), the United States, and the world. Before continuing, it is important to point out that nuclear weapons are a tactical asset. They do not constitute a strategy, but are part of a broader strategy which may include diplomacy, international law, and nuclear deterrence. All WMD share this characteristic because they are tools used to achieve an objective that may be part of a broader military or political strategy. The detonation of a nuclear device or dirty bomb in New York, Washington, D.C., or Tel Aviv is but one of many ways a terror network or hostile state, for example, may decisively strike an adversary. To date, the United States is alone in using nuclear weapons when it dropped a 15–20 kiloton bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and a second bomb on Nagasaki three days later.

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As the GWOT remains the focus of security policy in the decade to come, the use of nuclear weapons is likely to come at the hands of nonstate actors such as al Qaeda or other terror networks who, lacking geographic restraints and feeling the increased pressure of international counterterror efforts, can move undetected in and out of states that are the target of their animus. States such as Iran and North Korea are less likely to use nuclear weapons in an offensive capacity because the United States has the capacity and will to respond decisively. A nation-state offers a ready target for retaliation, which cannot be said of an amorphous terror network that lacks state sponsorship. MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), the result of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, played a major role in preventing the two superpowers from initiating a nuclear holocaust during the Cold War. This same concern does not exist for terror networks and substantially increases the threat of a nuclear or radiological attack against the United States or its allies. In an effort to illustrate the effects of a nuclear attack against the United States, I now turn to four possible scenarios. 7 In the first scenario, a nuclear device is smuggled into the port of New York in a cargo container by an al Qaeda cell operating in northern New Jersey. The one-megaton bomb is then detonated as it sits inside a van on a busy Manhattan street. Everything within a one-quarter mile radius is instantly vaporized. All buildings within 4.5 miles are destroyed or heavily damaged. Moderate damage exists to buildings and homes up to 7.4 miles from the epicenter of the blast.8 Depending on wind conditions, fallout will cause serious internal injuries to humans and animals up to 160 miles from the site of the blast with the severity of injuries increasing as the blast site is approached. As many as one million New Yorkers would perish as the city becomes uninhabitable for a decade or more. Should the same weapon be detonated while in a helicopter or small plane flying over Manhattan, even greater destruction and loss of life would be the result. Interestingly, this scenario is one the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and Defense ran both before and after 9/11 as they sought to determine the destructive power of a nuclear detonation.9 As Graham Allison remarks in his recent work, ‘‘In my own considered judgment, on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.’’10 American nuclear policy has long maintained that a nuclear attack against the United States will result in a counterstrike.11 The difficulty in this scenario is in determining responsibility. In the aftermath of an attack, an effort must be made to determine how the bomb entered the country, the bomb’s place of origination, the source of the fissile material, and the bomb’s designer and creator. This is no easy task, particularly when terror networks are adept at operating covertly.12 If the culprit can be determined, the United States must determine whether it would respond with its own nuclear weapons against a terrorist group within a country that may or may not have provided assistance in the attack. In a second scenario, the United States is in the opening phase of a Middle East invasion when a short-range ballistic missile carrying a low-yield nuclear warhead strikes the center of the American advance. Given the probable density of American forces, 5,000–10,000 casualties are taken instantly and the invasion is halted as


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troops are forced to withdraw from a contaminated battlefield. Military intelligence was taken by surprise in the first attack making it difficult for the president and battlefield commanders to determine whether a second strike is likely if the invasion continues. Since the first strike was on foreign soil, retaliation with nuclear weapons is difficult for the president to justify. The failure to predict the first strike also leaves open the question of the adversary’s long-range strike capability, which could place regional allies and their civilian populations in danger of a nuclear strike should the United States determine that the advance should continue.13 Such a scenario appears increasingly likely as Iran continues to violate international agreements in the development of its nuclear program while also continuing to support Hezbollah and its aggressive stance toward Israel, as the conflict between the two in July and August of 2006 exemplifies.14 IRGC (Iran’s Revolutionary Guards) remains an active participant in international terrorism with it activity focused on eliminating opponents of the regime in Tehran. The IRGC was linked to the terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers (1996), which killed nineteen Americans.15 Neither overt nor covert use of nuclear weapons against the United States or Israel appears likely, but the escalating rhetoric of Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his calls for the destruction of the United States and Israel are of grave concern to American and Israeli leaders. Iran’s active support of Iraqi insurgents and recent revelations that insurgents planned on carrying out attacks in the United States suggests that American troops may find themselves in a conflict with a nuclear Iran in the near future.16 This gives the scenario described above greater credence, although the probability of such an attack remains low. The third scenario envisions the United States Air Force Space Command detecting an object launched from the Middle East, North Korea, or China and heading for the United States. While the object is in the upper atmosphere somewhere over Kansas it explodes. Commercial aircraft filled with passengers lose electronic control and navigation with some aircraft failing to safely land, the North American power grid is severely damaged, and computer circuitry is damaged or destroyed in homes, businesses, and government offices by the EMP (electromagnetic pulse) generated in the blast. If the explosion occurs in the Van Allen belt, the electrons released will positively charge the belt and knock commercial and military satellites out of service.17 While there are few casualties from the explosion and no city is laid waste, billions of dollars in damage and a degraded military capability are, however, the result as the American economy and the nation’s military suffer a severe blow. Once again, the president must decide how to respond. Without Los Angeles, New York, or Washington, D.C., in ruins, the president is left with a difficult decision in selecting a response. Few states currently possess the necessary intercontinental ballistic missile technology to launch an attack like the one described.18 North Korea is, however, continuing to improve its Tae Po Dong class ballistic missiles. The willingness of the cashstrapped North Koreans to sell advanced weapons technology to American adversaries (Iran) increases the threat an EMP attack poses to the United States as the number of states with ballistic missile technology increases in the years to come. Iran’s rapidly

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improving Shahab class ballistic missiles and its successful enrichment of uranium, announced in April 2006, may soon add one more state to the number of countries capable of launching an EMP attack against the United States or Europe. This scenario is, however, the least likely of the scenarios discussed. Technology requirements are substantial as an attacker would need advanced intercontinental ballistic missile technology and nuclear weapons. Neither is possessed by more than a handful of states and even fewer possess both. States such as China and North Korea whose arsenals include intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental United States are unlikely to seek open conflict because of the devastating consequences of such a conflict. An EMP attack, while possible, remains unlikely. The final scenario poses the greatest threat because it requires little more than radioactive material and a conventional bomb. In the near future, al Qaeda is successful in stealing: medical gauges containing cesium, cobalt from a food irradiation facility, or uranium from a research lab at a major American university. Although the radioactive material cannot be used in a nuclear weapon, it can be used in a dirty bomb, which consists of conventional explosives laced with radioactive material. If the small amount of cesium, cobalt, or uranium is detonated with a bomb containing ten pounds of TNT in the financial district of Manhattan or near the Capital building in Washington, D.C., the immediate devastation would be limited, but as the radioactive cloud created by the conventional blast settled, it is likely that a radius of five blocks or more would be contaminated and require a lengthy period of decontamination. This process would disrupt economic activity on Wall Street or daily operations at the White House, Capital, Supreme Court, and many government departments in the area. While few people would die in such a blast, the fear, insecurity, loss of productive activity, and decontamination costs would enable al Qaeda to achieve the financial and psychological effect it sought.19 By striking at the heart of American commerce or the seat of government al Qaeda would illustrate the inherent insecurity of life in the United States. Such a message would have a devastating effect on the psyche of millions of Americans. Each of the four scenarios above presents a disturbing view of the future and what may be, as Graham Allison suggests, inevitable. For rivals such as India and Pakistan, who both possess nuclear weapons, their use would lead to devastating consequences for the two states. In rivalries where one adversary has nuclear weapons and the other does not, a nuclear strike is untenable in an international system that would condemn such an act. Nonstate actors like al Qaeda are, however, restrained in their use of nuclear weapons for very different reasons. Terror networks lack the weapons grade uranium or plutonium necessary to assemble a workable nuclear device. While the design of a nuclear bomb, such as the one dropped on Hiroshima, is simple and the plans are available on the Internet, obtaining highly enriched uranium-235 or plutonium-239 in a subcritical or supercritical state is exceedingly difficult.20 Developing the facilities necessary to enrich uranium-238 using a gas centrifuge is expensive and difficult.21 An effort by al Qaeda scientists to undertake uranium enrichment is unlikely to occur without a host nation discovering the activity. Thus, terror networks seeking to develop nuclear weapons are likely to


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attempt to acquire a working nuclear device or weapons grade material that is easily integrated into a working bomb. Former Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and the Bush administration are particularly concerned about the threat nuclear terrorism poses to the United States.22 As al Qaeda and other terror networks increase their independence from state sponsorship, the ease with which a nuclear strike can be carried out in anonymity increases. Deterring a nuclear attack by a terror network depends on the success of the United States, Russia, and other countries possessing nuclear weapons or civilian nuclear power programs denying terrorists access to fissile material. The Nuclear NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), which went into effect in 1996, is the international community’s primary tool in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Key provisions of the treaty require that signatories grant the IAEA oversight authority of nuclear programs, limit research to peaceful purposes, and avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons material and technology.23 In addition to the NPT, the United States has provided the Former Soviet Union with financial and technical assistance in disabling and destroying its nuclear weapons and material. In 2002, the Department of Energy created the Fissile Materials Disposition program to provide greater assistance to Russia as it continues to dispose of nuclear material which, if it fell into the wrong hands, could be used in a nuclear weapon.24 If the past is any indicator of the future, the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology is likely to continue. Despite the best efforts of the United States, Russia, and the United Nations, countries and nonstate actors are likely to continue in their pursuit of the ultimate weapon. International treaties and bilateral agreements may slow proliferation, but a state determined to acquire nuclear weapons is likely to do so. The security of the United States and its allies may depend upon preventing al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terror networks from acquiring nuclear weapons and material. CHEMICAL WEAPONS: DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT In August 2002, a CNN correspondent, Nic Robertson, journeyed to a remote region of Afghanistan where he purchased sixty-four video tapes that turned out to be a treasure-trove of al Qaeda training material, interviews, and, most importantly, a chronicle of the terror network’s ongoing development of nerve gas, which the tapes show being tested on dogs.25 The discovery of an advanced chemical weapons capacity caught many terrorism analysts off guard. Few thought al Qaeda possessed such an advanced capability. The discovery did, however, serve to underscore the threat chemical weapons continue to pose. In the triangle of destruction formed by WMD, which includes biological, chemical, and nuclear/radiological weapons, the least effective yet easiest to produce are chemical weapons. While biological and chemical agents share a number of characteristics, they also vary significantly in fundamental ways that make chemical agents generally less lethal. Chemical and biological weapons serve much the same strategic purpose: to

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act as a deterrent, delay an invasion, or strike terror into a civilian population. Chemical weapons are not, however, equal to biological or nuclear weapons in their destructive capacity. For the novice, chemical and biological weapons are often thought of interchangeably. Both rely on microscopic killers that are invisible to the naked eye, and both cause their victims to die a painful and prolonged death. Associating the two weapons too closely is a mistake because they differ greatly in their composition, lethality, and production. Providing an understanding of chemical weapons and the threat they pose is the focus of the pages that follow. The best place to begin is with an examination of two cases in which chemical weapons were deployed in combat and one case in which an apocalyptic terrorist organization attacked civilians. On April 22, 1915, entrenched German forces near the Belgian village of Ypres released chlorine gas into a west wind, which covered the Allied line in the choking agent. More than 160 tons of gas was released from 6,000 artillery shells killing approximately 5,000 men in what was the first use of chemical weapons in modern warfare. Throughout the course of World War I (1914–1918) more than 113,000 tons of chemical agents were weaponized and deployed by both sides, resulting in approximately 92,000 of the 1.3 million combat deaths during the war.26 Despite German efforts to break the war’s stalemate by introducing more lethal chemical agents, such as the blister agent Mustard and the nerve agent Soman, chemical weapons failed to turn the war in favor of either side. For American and British soldiers, the probability of surviving a gas attack was much greater than that of surviving a frontal assault on German lines. With World War I lasting for more than four years, both sides sought to break the stalemate by employing chemical agents to turn the tide of war. The strategy failed miserably and the telling failure of chemical weapons lay in the casualty figures. Out of more than 1 million injuries caused by chemical attacks, approximately 92,000 men died. With a kill ratio of less than 10 percent, chemical weapons failed to turn the war and proved far less lethal than conventional weapons. A second instance in which chemical weapons were used on the battlefield occurred three-quarters of a century later when Iraq began deploying Mustard agent to halt the Iranian human wave attacks during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Between August 1983 and February 1986, approximately 16,000 unprotected Iranian soldiers were killed in Mustard attacks. When Iraq weaponized the nerve agent Tabun in 1984, more than 10,000 ill-equipped Iranian soldiers perished when Tabun-filled bombs were dropped on their positions. By the war’s end fewer than 30,000 Iranian soldiers had perished in chemical attacks.27 When it is considered that Iran suffered between 500,000 and 950,000 casualties, the number of soldiers killed in chemical weapons attacks is quite small. As in World War I, introduction of chemical weapons on the battlefield failed to change the course of the war. The final case is not drawn from the battlefield, but from a scenario that greatly concerns the United States and other countries fighting the GWOT. After its founding in 1988, the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo began a long-term attempt to develop a biological and chemical weapons capacity. Scientist-members of Aum


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ordered precursor chemicals and biological agents, which were then used in the cult’s development programs. After years of setbacks and failure, cult scientists were finally successful in making a small quantity of sarin, a deadly nerve agent. When members of Aum dispersed the deadly nerve agent in a crowded Tokyo subway during rush hour on March 10, 1995, 12 people died and 6,000 suffered minor injuries, with few suffering long-term complications.28 Sarin, one of the deadliest nerve agents in the world, was dispersed in an enclosed space where unprotected civilians were tightly packed and completely unaware of the danger, yet the surprise attack killed only twelve people. Had a single gunman entered the same subway station and begun firing wildly into the crowd, far more deaths would have been the result. After investing large sums of money into almost a decade of chemical weapons research and development, Aum failed to topple the Japanese government and install the cult’s founder, Shoko Asahara, as King of Japan. The terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway left many analysts with a set of important lessons. First, it is difficult for a terrorist group to successfully develop a biological or chemical weapons program. This is made more difficult when the terror network is forced to operate covertly. Recent nonproliferation efforts have made the acquisition of precursor chemicals more difficult, adding to the already complex technical tasks that took a team of highly trained Aum scientists almost a decade to achieve modest results. Second, while it may be possible to attack an adversary with chemical weapons on the open battlefield and cause significant casualties among unprotected troops, the prospect of a terrorist organization dispersing a large quantity of a chemical agent in an urban area is highly unlikely.29 In order to cause serious casualties in a densely populated metropolitan area, the aerial delivery of a chemical agent, whether aerosol or powder, would require numerous low level flights over the target area.30 To kill approximately 125,000 civilians in a city such as New York, it would take more than 14,000 thousand pounds of VX under ideal weather conditions. When it is considered that a large capacity crop duster holds up to 400 pounds of a chemical, it would require a terrorist make 35 flights over a target area to disperse enough VX to cause the desired casualties. Such an attack is, however, highly unlikely. Improved awareness among first responders, particularly those in cities where terrorists are most likely to strike, has increased dramatically since 9/11, making it highly unlikely that a terror cell could carry out an attack of the magnitude required above before police, fire, and disaster response teams could terminate an attack in progress and begin recovery efforts. Third, a high casualty count is unlikely the primary result of a chemical attack against a civilian population. Widespread anxiety, fear, and a sense of helplessness would be the most devastating outcome from a chemical attack. The psychological affects of an al Qaeda sponsored chemical weapons attack against civilians in the United States, Israel, or Europe would work to sow a sense of insecurity, as the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) illustrate, which led to the subsequent election of the antiwar Premier of Spain and the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. As the examples above show, developing and deploying chemical weapons for use on the battlefield or against civilians has proven less successful than the use of

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conventional weapons. The one advantage chemical weapons may possess is the psychological effect their use generates, an effect which is largely based on the prolonged and horrific death such weapons cause. When regimes seeking to develop chemical weapons compare the costs of developing an advanced capacity to the already existing detection and denial systems of the United States and other advanced countries, the attraction of chemical weapons is substantially diminished. If the effectiveness of chemical weapons is included in the equation and compared with the destructive capacity of conventional weapons, chemical warfare becomes an expensive and ineffective counter to the offensive military capabilities of the United States, Israel, and other advanced states. Chemical agents are, however, less volatile and less susceptible to degradation than biological agents, which make them a better battlefield weapon. Their limited effectiveness does require significantly greater quantities of an agent to achieve the desired effect.31 For example, it would take 3,809 pounds of sarin to produce a 50 percent casualty rate among unprotected infantry in a typical formation spread over 0.8 miles.32 This assumes ideal weather conditions and a target force that is completely unprepared for such an attack. They are also proving less than ideal for use by terrorists, but remain a threat against which civil and military leaders must prepare.33 The United States was quick to learn from its experience with chemical weapons in World War I and developed civilian and military counterchemical warfare capabilities, which it continues to maintain. Responsibility for responding to a chemical attack is dispersed among first responders (local fire and police), state emergency management agencies, the National Guard, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), DHS (Department of Homeland Security), and the military. In the event of an attack against civilian or military targets, the appropriate response would be taken, and contaminated areas would be safely decontaminated. Emergency management officials in large metropolitan areas receive significantly greater training in hazardous material response than do their rural counterparts, leaving them more prepared for a chemical attack then at any previous time. It should be noted that training and preparation for disaster response of all varieties is arguably at an all time high among state and local governments both large and small. In the wake of 9/11, funding under the Nunn-Luger-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program has increased dramatically, enabling first responders to improve the equipment and training needed in the event of a terrorist attack that might include nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons.34 Hospitals are also receiving funding to improve identification of symptoms related to chemical agents and the proper care of patients in the event of a chemical attack with mass casualties. Thus, if al Qaeda were to detonate an explosive device in Manhattan, spreading a fine particulate of VX, city, state, and federal officials would be able to respond by isolating the contaminated area, warning the public of the hazard, and beginning to decontaminate the area while treating casualties. International concern over the use of chemical weapons is certainly not a recent phenomenon. On the contrary, the first international prohibition of chemical weapons came in 1675 when Germany and France signed a bilateral agreement


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prohibiting the use of poisoned bullets. Not until 1874 was chemical warfare addressed again when the Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of War prohibited the use of all poison weapons. Two decades later, the Hague Conference of 1899 led to an agreement that prohibited the use of projectile weapons filled with poison gas. World War I, however, saw the use of more than 100,000 tons of chemical agents and the death of 92,000 men from chemical attacks. The horrific deaths that resulted from blister and nerve agent attacks were responsible for the passage of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925). Another 75 years would pass before the international community again addressed chemical weapons. Currently, the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention), which went into effect in 1997, is the international community’s effort to prohibit the use of chemical weapons and control the proliferation of precursor chemicals used to create them. With the ratification of the CWC came the creation of the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), which is responsible for monitoring the chemical industries of member countries.35 By the time the CWC was ratified, the United States and two dozen advanced countries were already monitoring the purchase of dual use chemicals and working to prohibit the production of chemical weapons under the auspices of the Australia Group, which was formed in 1984.36 Despite the efforts of the United States, Russia, and other countries seeking to limit the proliferation of chemical weapons, a number of states and nonstate actors are actively pursuing chemical weapons programs. One major concern of the United States is the large number of underemployed scientists in the Former Soviet Union whose knowledge and skills have been sought by countries and terror groups alike. The rapid economic decline that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse left more than 10,000 scientists with significant knowledge of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons production living in or near poverty. Efforts to limit the dissemination of information needs improvement, and it is unknown if Russia’s scientists have shared their knowledge of WMD production with those who seek to harm the United States.37 If recent trends in the dissemination of knowledge and technology are an indicator of the future, it is likely that chemical weapons proliferation will continue. The failure of chemical agents to prove decisive in past conflicts has, however, led countries currently pursuing WMD programs to focus their efforts on developing biological and nuclear weapons. While this may offer faint hope for nonproliferation, it will not be enough to discourage a determined proliferator. Among nations that currently possess a WMD capacity, chemical weapons are the most prolific. This is largely because of the relative ease of producing simple chemical agents such as Mustard, Chlorine, and Soman and the ease of delivering them to the battlefield. Production of the most lethal chemical agents is more difficult. Developing delivery systems that disperse chemical agents in a fine aerosol is also proving difficult, making their use far less desirable. For nonproliferation efforts, the difficulty of overcoming technological barriers may be the best hope.

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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THREATS AND PROLIFERATION When American SOF (Special Operations Forces) raided a number of al Qaeda compounds during OEF’s (Operation Enduring Freedom) ground campaign in October and November of 2001, they discovered what turned out to be the chilling evidence of a biological weapons program that was rapidly moving toward the successful development of a lethal biological agent the United States government has yet to publicly disclose.38 With the discovery of an al Qaeda biological weapons program, intelligence officials began to understand the threat these deadly agents pose to the United States and its allies.39 For more than a dozen countries and a handful of terrorist groups, the lure of waging biological warfare is too strong to resist. These weapons are inexpensive to produce and require a lower level of technical expertise and advanced equipment to create than do nuclear weapons, yet they serve much the same deterrent effect. In spite of the 1972 BWC (Biological Weapons Convention), a number of signatory states have chosen to actively pursue secret weapons programs that they believe will provide a strategic advantage. For nations that find themselves increasingly at odds with the United States, possessing biological weapons is viewed as an effective deterrent to possible American intervention or invasion. Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks, however, seek to use biological weapons against unsuspecting civilian populations in the United States and elsewhere. After briefly examining the danger biological weapons pose, the question remains, what are they and how are they different from chemical weapons? A biological weapon is comprised of two basic components. The key component is the biological agent, which is a given quantity of a naturally occurring microorganism (bacteria, fungi or virus) or toxin that can cause death or disease if internalized by the target population. Once a biological agent is weaponized it must then be delivered to the target. Thus, the delivery system serves as the second component. A delivery system may be something as complex as an intercontinental ballistic missile or something as simple as a terrorist spreading a biological agent at a buffet restaurant. In these two respects, biological weapons are very similar to chemical weapons. Where they differ, however, is in the level of danger they pose. Biological weapons offer some significant advantages to a proliferator. First, the seed stock used to grow lethal biological agents can be found in nature or, with some restrictions, acquired for legitimate use and then diverted to illicit weapons development. Since all seed stock used in biological weapons production have a legitimate commercial or medical use, it is difficult for BWC member countries to ensure that seed stock ordered by commercial firms or research institutions is not used in violation of international agreement.40 Second, production of biological agents requires much less infrastructure than the production of chemical or nuclear weapons. As the United States discovered in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein possessed the ability to develop biological agents in trailers, which were converted into mobile weapons labs.41 Third, an individual handling a biological agent does not require the protective clothing needed when working with or transporting a chemical agent. With the proper vaccination, a deadly biological agent can be


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handled without the fear of infection. This makes it easier to discreetly transport a lethal biological agent, which could offer a distinct advantage to a terrorist attempting to bring a deadly agent into the United States. Fourth, a much smaller quantity of a biological agent is needed to cause heavy casualties. For example, 10 grams of anthrax is as deadly as one ton of sarin. Where it is extremely difficult for a terrorist organization to successfully launch a large-scale chemical attack because of the vast quantities of a chemical agent necessary, the same is not true of a biological attack. Fifth, biological weapons offer their user greater lethality and transmission through secondary infection, which makes it more difficult to isolate infected individuals and increases the number of casualties. Given the benefits listed above, it should come as no surprise that biological weapons are a greater threat than their chemical counterpart. There is also a down side to the development and deployment of biological weapons. Tactically, biological agents are difficult to weaponize because they are highly volatile, degrade quickly, and are susceptible to heat and light. This makes it very difficult to use biological agents in missiles and projectiles where heat and lengthy storage periods work to degrade the agent. The same difficulties arise when considering their use against civil targets. Biological agents are difficult to widely disperse and are quickly degraded by the elements. Since they are most effectively dispersed as a 1–10 micron aerosol, efficient delivery is extremely difficult. The weaknesses of biological weapons have rarely deterred their use as the history of biological warfare illustrates. Biological warfare has played a significant role in the history of conflict for more than 2,000 years. The earliest recorded use of biological weapons dates back to the 5th century B.C. when Scythian archers dipped their arrow tips in feces and putrefying corpses. In the middle ages, besieging Mongols attempted to cripple the Black Sea city Kaffa by catapulting the corpses of plague victims into the city. During the French and Indian War (1754–1760), British troops attempted to eradicate Indian allies of the French by spreading smallpox among them.42 The 20th century was no exception when it came to the use of biological weapons. Despite the 1925 Geneva Protocol which banned the use of biological and chemical weapons, Japan dropped plague-infested fleas over parts of China during its conquest of that country (1934–1945), which ultimately led to the deaths of 20,000–200,000 Chinese. Although never confirmed, it is also believed that the Red Army used tularemia to assist in breaking the Nazi siege of Stalingrad. The success of the Soviet Union’s first use of biological weapons led them to develop the most advanced biological weapons program on earth. Despite being signatories to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the Soviet Union, under the control of Biopreparat, carried out extensive biological weapons research and development. Soviet scientists focused on developing strains of pathogens that were resistant to known antibiotics. Doing so would increase the lethality of a biological weapons attack.43 With President Nixon’s declaration that the United States would not pursue a biological weapons program, the United States fell dramatically behind the Soviet Union in its understanding of biological agents.

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Because a number of Middle East countries, including Egypt and Syria, were allied with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, biological weapons technology was often transferred to these nations. This and a continued pursuit of biological weapons assist in explaining why Syria, for example, possesses one of the most advanced biological weapons programs in the world today. When terror-supporting states with advanced biological weapons programs are coupled with thousands of unemployed and impoverished biological weapons scientists from the Former Soviet Union, the danger that the United States and its allies are currently facing is evident.44 Terror networks are proving to be very interested in the purchase and development of biological weapons. Many of the same scientists willing to work for Iran, Iraq, and North Korea after the Soviet Union’s collapse may have been willing to sell biological agents to al Qaeda and other terror networks.45 Whether such transactions have actually occurred is not known, but a definite threat exists. If history is any indicator, biological weapons will be used again. According to Anthony H. Cordesman, biological weapons will likely be used to target ‘‘infantry concentrations, air bases, ships, ports, staging areas, command centers, munitions depots, cities, key oil and electrical facilities, and desalinization plants.’’ Cordesman also notes that biological weapons are ‘‘potentially far more effective against military and civil area targets than chemical weapons.’’46 When used against military units, biological weapons rarely cause large numbers of casualties. They do, however, force troops to don protective gear, which degrades offensive combat capabilities and slows an advance. A biological attack against American forces could, at best, hope to temporarily stall the mission.47 Attacking a civil target will likely result in casualties because the general public lacks the training and equipment to properly defend against biological agents. In a biological attack a high casualty count is not the objective. Instead, it is economic and social disruption as well as generating fear that determine the attack’s effectiveness. During the anthrax attacks that occurred in the United States (2001), the U.S. Capital was closed and vacated for more than a week and the House and Senate office buildings for even longer after a single anthrax-laden letter was sent to Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD).48 In addition to the cleanup effort, which cost millions of dollars, senators, representatives, and their staffs were given a sixty-day treatment of cyprofloxacin. From the anthrax-laden letters sent to Senator Daschle, a Florida based tabloid, and elsewhere, there were five casualties. Most important, however, was the fear and disruption these attacks created (along with the economic costs of cleanup and the development of detection programs). As the low casualty count from the 2001 anthrax attacks indicates, biological weapons have not, as yet, proven to be an effective mass casualty weapon against any target. This may offer the United States its greatest advantage in combating future threats. For al Qaeda and other terror networks, biological weapons are clearly viewed as the most viable WMD option. Since they are relatively simple and inexpensive to produce and, once dispersed, can be spread from person to person, biological weapons are preferred to less effective chemical weapons and more difficult to acquire nuclear weapons. The fact that many biological agents are highly contagious also


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increases the ‘‘fear factor,’’ which is highly valued by those who would resort to bioterrorism.49 Thus, as the United States and its allies continue to wage the GWOT for years to come, Americans should expect terrorists to adapt to the challenges they face. If conventional weapons fail to prove effective, biological weapons are a logical choice. CONCLUSION As the preceding pages suggest, carrying out a terrorist attack on American soil may prove more difficult than anticipated. Technological difficulties, along with human factors such as lack of commitment, fear of failure or capture, the deterrent effect of antiterror measures, fear of American response, and Clausewitz’s fog of war (uncertainty in war) are all working to thwart a terrorist-led WMD attack in the United States. Failed terror attacks are more than embarrassing to those who rely on terrorism. Where the successful terror attack can score a dramatic political victory for a terrorist organization, failure can lead to a loss of credibility among the public and within the organization’s own membership. Thus, as the prospects of failure increase, the less likely an attack becomes. WMD have the potential to provide the psychological impact terrorists seek, but the high risk of failure makes them a less than desirable tool in the terror arsenal. This is likely to change in the coming years and decades, but, at present, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are proving technologically difficult with a high level of risk to success. It should never be forgotten that terrorists, in this case Islamic fundamentalists, are not the crazy fanatics many Americans believe them to be. Instead, they are rational individuals who carefully plan their acts of terror to achieve political objectives. As Bruce Hoffman notes, ‘‘International terrorism disdains any concept of delimited areas of combat or demarcated battlefields, much less respect for neutral territory.’’50 Where states seek to fight wars that are largely conventional, because it is in military might that they possess a distinct advantage, the terrorist is fully aware of his limited capacity to wage a conventional conflict. Thus, terrorism is the tactic of the weak, not the lunatic. The sooner the American public comes to understand the nature of the threat America faces, the sooner victory may be achieved in the GWOT in which the United States finds itself. NOTES 1. By this, it is meant that terrorism is used by groups that lack the capability to challenge a government or invasion force with more direct military tactics, such as open combat. 2. For a discussion of terrorism’s characteristics, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr., The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (New York: Prentice Hall, 2002) and Cynthia Combs, Terrorism in the 21st Century (New York: Prentice Hall, 2004). 3. For the reference of time, the classical B.C., before Christ, is used. 4. Edgar J. Goodspeed, ‘‘I Maccabees,’’ The Apocrypha (Toronto: Random House, 1959).

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5. For the reference of time, the classical A. D., Anno Domini, is used. 6. For a detailed discussion of al Qaeda’s ties to A. Q. Khan, former head of the Pakistani nuclear program, see Bill Powell, ‘‘The Man Who Sold the Bomb,’’ Time, February 14, 2005. 7. McKenzie, The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Q.D.R., 20. 8. 1-Megaton Surface Blast: Pressure Damage (WGBH, 2004 [cited September 14, 2004]); available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/sfeature/1mtblast.html. 9. See Lynn Davis, ‘‘Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear and Biological Terrorist Attacks,’’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002). Homeland Security Planning Scenarios (GlobalSecurity.org, June 1, 2005 [cited December 15, 2005]); available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-1.htm. Charles Ferguson, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005). 10. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 15. 11. Donald Rumsfeld, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002). 12. R.A. Falkenrath, ed., America’s Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). 13. Patrick M. Hughes, ‘‘Future Conditions: The Character and Conduct of War, 2010 and 2020,’’ in Seminar on Intelligence, Command, and Control (Cambridge, MA: Center for Information Policy Research-Harvard University, 2003), 28–32. 14. ‘‘Security Council Calls for End to Hostilities Between Hizbollah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701.’’ United Nations Security Council, New York (August 11, 2006). 15. Kenneth R. Timmerman, Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Crisis with Iran (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006) 183–189. 16. Thom Shanker and Steven Weisman, ‘‘Iran is Helping Insurgents in Iraq, U.S. Officials Say,’’ (New York Times, 2004 [cited February 1, 2007]); available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2004/09/20/politics/20iran.html?ex=1253419200&en=52175bf604ad3190&38;ei =5090&38;partner=rssuserland. Pierre Thomas, ‘‘Suspects, Reportedly Tied to al Qaeda in Iraq, Sought Student Visas,’’ (ABC News, 2007 [cited February 1, 2007]); available at http:// abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=2813235&page=1. 17. R. C. Webb et al., ‘‘The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,’’ Defense Electronics 24 (1995). 18. Norman Friedman, ‘‘Russians Offer E.M.P. Counter,’’ Proceedings 123, (1997). 19. Henry Kelly, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 107th Congress, March 6, 2002. 20. Mark Carson and others, ‘‘Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?’’ Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C. (2006). 21. ‘‘All Spun Up: Tutorial on Gas Centrifuges’ Role in Proliferation,’’ Federation of American Scientists, available at http://www.fas.org (2004). 22. Sam Nunn, ‘‘Nuclear Terrorism: Unite against the Gravest Threat,’’ International Herald Tribune, May 28, 2003. For more information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, visit the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Web site at www.nti.org. 23. ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,’’ Federation of American Scientists, available at http//:www.fas.org (2006). 24. ‘‘Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Programs in the Former Soviet Union,’’ Department of Energy, Washington, D. C. (2002).


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25. Nic Robertson, Tapes Shed New Light on Bin Laden’s Network (CNN, 2002 [cited April 15, 2006]); available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/08/18/terror.tape.main/. 26. Biological and chemical weapons have long been used in warfare, but not until World War I were chemical weapons used on a massive scale. ‘‘Biotechnology and the Future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’’ (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2001). 27. John Pike, Chemical Weapons Programs: History (Federation of American Scientists, 1998 [cited April 15, 2006]); available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/ program.htm. 28. Many of the injuries caused in the Aum attack were from a rush to exit the subway. 29. Kenneth Jr. McKenzie, ‘‘The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Q.D.R.,’’ in McNair Paper (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University, 2000), 81–83. 30. Victor A. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991). 31. Anthony H. Cordesman, Military Balance in the Middle East Xiv: Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), 80–83. 32. Ibid., 82. 33. Al Qaeda did have a crude chemical weapons program in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban’s defeat in 2001. See Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Copernicus Books, 2002). 34. ‘‘City Commission Workshop Fire-Rescue Department Planning’’ (Fort Lauderdale, FL: Fort Lauderdale City Commission, 2002). 35. Randall Forsberg, Nonproliferation Primer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). 36. Available at http://www.australiagroup.net. 37. John Parachini, ‘‘Diversion of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union’’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005). 38. Al Qeda’s Bio Weapons (CBS News, 2005 [cited April 15, 2006]); available at http://www .cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/31/terror/main684449.shtml. 39. R.J. and R.P. Kadlec Larsen, Biological Warfare: A Post Cold War Threat to America’s Strategic Mobility Forces (Pittsburgh, PA: Matthew B. Ridgeway Center for International Security Studies–University of Pittsburgh, 1995). 40. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, September 7, 1999. 41. United States: Mobile Labs Found in Iraq (CNN, April 15, 2003 [cited April 15, 2006]); available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/14/sprj.irq.labs/. 42. Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Copernicus Books, 2002). 43. Ken Alibek, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999). 44. Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘‘Military Balance in the Middle East XIV: Weapons of Mass Destruction’’ (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999). 45. George Tenet, ‘‘Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernmental Experts’’ (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2000), 34. 46. Cordesman, ‘‘Military Balance in the Middle East Xiv: Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ 81. 47. Kenneth Jr. McKenzie, ‘‘The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Q.D.R.,’’ in McNair Paper (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University, 2000), 81–85.

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48. The fear and disruption is, however, the same. Anthrax Reaches the Senate (Fox News, October 15, 2001 [cited September 16, 2004]); available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 0%2C2933%2C36527%2C00.html. Congress to Reconvene Tuesday Despite Continuing Anthrax Tests (CNN, October 22, 2001 [cited September 16, 2004]); available at http:// www.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/conditions/10/22/anthrax/. 49. See Jonathan B. Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 50. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) 28.

7

Purifying the Heart: Suicide. . . or Jihadi Acts? Russ Rodgers Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts. Sura 13:11

Within the context of the current war effort against what is typically called Islamic extremism, a repeated question has been raised about the permissibility of suicide operations within the religion of Islam. The Qur’anic injunction from Sura 4:29 is often quoted: ‘‘and kill not yourselves. Lo! Allah is ever Merciful unto you.’’1 Additionally, there are a number of hadith, or sayings of the Prophet, that deal with this issue. ‘‘A man was inflicted with wounds and he committed suicide, and so Allah said: My slave has caused death on himself hurriedly, so I forbid Paradise to him.’’2 Another hadith tells us that, Whoever purposely throws himself from a mountain and kills himself, will be in the (Hell) Fire falling down into it and abiding therein perpetually forever; and whoever drinks poison and kills himself with it, he will be carrying his poison in his hand and drinking it in the (Hell) Fire wherein he will abide eternally forever; and whoever kills himself with an iron weapon, will be carrying that weapon in his hand and stabbing his abdomen with it in the (Hell) Fire wherein he will abide eternally forever.3

While these passages are quite clear about the issue of suicide, the problem persists as to the justification for what are called suicide operations made by some in Islamic circles. However, this issue has more to do with the terminology than with the operations themselves, for what the West calls suicide operations, are actually not suicide operations from the Islamic worldview, nor do they even call them such.4 Instead of asking, does Islam support suicide operations, the question should be reframed as follows: does Islam support an individual surrendering his life in pursuit of a worthwhile military objective? When framed in this fashion, current jihadi ‘‘suicide’’

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operations take on a new meaning and context. Moreover, these operations highlight a serious tension within the Islamic community itself regarding the righteous and lapsed believer alike. In fact, the very concept of evil within Islam nurtures the future ‘‘suicide’’ operative. SACRIFICING FOR HEART AND SOUL5 In Western cultures it has been commonly accepted for many years that it is worthwhile to give one’s life in defense of one’s country. Even the Latin poet Horace wrote that ‘‘it is a sweet and proper thing to die for one’s fatherland.’’ Western history is replete with examples of individual soldiers, even entire combat units, fighting to the death to inflict serious loss on an enemy, even though they knew their own situation was hopeless. For that matter, one of the tactical principles enumerated by Sun Tzu was the notion that a commander should leave an escape route for a trapped enemy, thus allowing the enemy to break and flee rather than stiffen their resolve and fight to the death if trapped.6 In the United States we have a name for some of those who fought to the death—Medal of Honor recipients. Concurrently, there is no difficulty within the Islamic worldview that one should die for the ummah, or Islamic community. By rephrasing the question, we can now examine the nature of jihadi attacks that cost the life of the attacker to determine whether or not Islam supports such a concept. When looking at such military operations, one must keep in mind the worldview construct that is held by those engaging in these attacks. It is necessary to understand that the modern jihadi movement is an outgrowth of what is often called the Islamic revival, or Salafist, movement. Salafism, by literal definition of the term, is a movement that calls the Muslims to return to the ways of Prophet Muhammad and his companions.7 Yet, even the term Salafism has some hidden dangers in it, for it has often been misunderstood as a mere outgrowth of an earlier Wahhabi revival from the latter half of the 18th century. This can lead many to accept the idea that Salafism is just an aberration of Islam, because it is merely an extension of the Wahhabi movement. Even one as learned in Arabic culture as Lawrence of Arabia made this type of error, calling the Wahhabi movement ‘‘a fanatical Moslem heresy.’’ 8 Yet, other observers would see in the movement ‘‘a revivalist campaign based on the puritan Hanbalite school,’’9 indicating by implication that such revivals are actually based on the literal use of the Qur’an, hadith, and sunnah. As for Salafism, it has a varied and interesting background that helps to highlight the challenge presented by the so-called ‘‘suicide’’ bomber. The movement is often traced to Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, an Iranian-born revivalist of the late 19th century who adopted India as his home.10 Al-Afghani’s philosophy was particularly shaped by the British colonialism of the day, and was surely inspired by the Afghan uprising that virtually destroyed the British colonial occupation force of Maj. Gen. William Elphinstone outside of Kabul in 1842. He was a teacher at the Al-Azhar school in Cairo in the late 1870s, where he had a tremendous influence on two distinguished pupils. One, Muhammad ‘Abduh, became a close associate and assisted al-Afghani

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in his efforts to build a united Islamic ummah. The other, Muhammad Ahmad, departed for Sudan, where he declared himself al-Mahdi, and led an uprising against British, Ottoman, and Egyptian rule, culminating in the fall of Khartoum and the death of its British commander, General Charles ‘‘Chinese’’ Gordon.11 The revolt in Sudan, though focused on a sect of Sufis who are typically considered heretical by Sunni Islam, followed al-Afghani’s thought in that they saw such outside rule as an assault on the decrees and ways of true Islam. Muhammad Ahmad was the ideal candidate for the role of al-Madhi—‘‘devout, eloquent, virtuous, learned in Islamic lore, [and] descended from the Prophet.’’12 Al-Afghani himself was always encouraging various types of political action, which included revolts and assassinations. In the 1890s, he regularly railed against the Shah of Iran, Nasir ad-Din, and convinced one of his followers to assassinate him in 1896. 13 He consistently taught the concept, held only by a small minority of Muslims in India, of the right of Islamic revolt against Western influences and occupation, and urged the ummah to fight to accomplish these goals as a fundamental principle of the Islamic faith.14 At one point both he and ‘Abduh plotted the assassination of the Khedive of Egypt, but backed off on the plan as they were unable to find someone to actually carry out the plot.15 One scholar noted that al-Afghani’s entire life was focused on such actions, in that ‘‘he was primarily a man with a taste for quick and violent action; assassinations, wars, intrigues, or revolts were means to his ends.’’16 Both al-Afghani and ‘Abduh were men who pushed the Salafist doctrine, the notion that true Islam is to follow the ways of the Prophet and his closest companions.17 This is counter to what many think of it today, often seeing in it merely an extension of Wahhabism or part of a natural evolution within religious concepts, rather than a true return of early Islamic thought and practice.18 Typically, such analysis sees so-called reform movements as harkening back to medieval scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah or Ibn Qayyim, but not to the thought and teachings of the Prophet himself. This does not imply that the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah and others are not important, but rather it points out a critical deficiency in the analysis that often occurs. How far such lack of accurate analysis has gone can be seen in a recent paper endorsed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in which the author states that an appeal to the thinking of al-Afghani and ‘Abduh could provide a moderate voice of ‘‘reformers’’ in the midst of growing radicalism.19 One of the key aspects of the Salafist doctrine is the revival of the practice of ijtihad, or personal interpretation of the Prophet’s own life and ideas and its application to one’s current circumstances. The revival of ijtihad has had a tremendous influence on modern Islam, and has moreover created a tension within the ummah. For many years, the majority of Muslim scholars considered ijtihad closed by the consolidation of Islamic law within the major schools of law.20 While defined in various ways, the essence of ijtihad is the ability of an individual to judge the merits of a course of action on their own reasoning based on the Qur’an, hadith, sunnah, and judgments from the madhhabs, or schools of law. This stands in contrast to the concept known as taqlid, which is the imitation or strict following of the rulings of a particular

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madhhab without any reference back to the earliest sources, such as the Qur’an, hadith, and sunnah.21 Through the renewal of ijtihad, the typical rank and file Muslim believer can now depart, at least partially, from the control of his mentors and embark on the great adventure of self-discovery through the earliest sources of Islam. This process of ijtihad can cause virtually any Muslim anywhere to become a Salafist. Thus, it would be best to examine our redefined principle regarding ‘‘suicide’’ attacks in light of the life and acts of the Prophet himself, as well as his companions. Interpreted another way, would Muhammad have supported a modern jihadi ‘‘suicide’’ attacker? To investigate this proposition it will be worthwhile to briefly examine examples in the life and teachings of the Prophet and his companions, followed by an examination of this issue as viewed in Islamic law, or shari’a, and Islamic jurisprudence known as fiqh. Were there examples of ‘‘suicide’’ attacks during the days of the Prophet? Indeed there were, but these are often missed by the casual observer, and even some adroit biographers of the Prophet, for they are actually looking for a suicide, and not combat losses incurred during a campaign or mission. Again, we must remind ourselves of the initial premise: is it legitimate in Islam to die in battle while attempting to accomplish a worthwhile military goal? Several examples of this very thing stand out in early Islam, and four shall be reviewed here as illustrations. One of the most obvious is the Battle of Mu’tah, a relatively minor engagement even for the days of the Prophet in which only eight Muslims were killed in action. However, this battle fought in 629 A.D. offers an excellent glimpse into the world of the jihadi self-immolator. While preparing for his campaign to conquer Makkah, Muhammad felt it necessary to punish a tribe to the north who served as a buffer for the eastern fringe of the Byzantine Empire, for this tribe had ambushed and killed one of his envoys to the Byzantines.22 He organized a force of 3,000 men led by his adopted son Zayd bin Harithah. Aware that they may encounter serious odds, Muhammad ensured that a clear chain of command existed through three levels. From Zayd it went to Ja’far bin Abu Talib and from there to Abdullah bin Rawahah. If the army’s commander was killed in action, the next in line was to assume the role and continue the mission. The army departed Madinah amidst much fanfare, and headed north, even as Abdullah prophesied his own death in lurid and bloody terms.23 An orphan child who accompanied Abdullah heard him recite poetic verse about his coming death, and the boy began to weep bitterly. Abdullah tapped him gently with the handle of his whip and chided him: ‘‘What’s wrong, little fellow? God is going to reward me with martyrdom . . ..’’24 They finally encountered the enemy army just south of the Dead Sea at the small stone village of Mu’tah. This army was a combined force of Byzantine, Lakham, Judham, and other allied Arab troops, numbering close to 100,000 men. Needless to say, Zayd’s force was grossly outnumbered, even though only initially facing the vanguard of the enemy army.25 The three officers conferred for two nights as their diminutive force sheltered on a reverse slope. They argued whether or not they should withdraw or dispatch a messenger to appeal to Muhammad to send reinforcements, a prospect that would involve several weeks’ delay. Finally, Abdullah, the third in command, spoke up.


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He blurted out that ‘‘what you loathe is the very thing you came out to seek— martyrdom. We do not fight the enemy by number, strength, or multitude; we fight them only by this religion with which God has honored us. Go forward, for it is one of two good things: victory or martyrdom.’’26 Indeed, it is a sweet and proper thing to die for the ummah. The next morning, the commanders led the army forward, but the evidence indicates that no general engagement took place. Instead, the commanders, who at this time fought on foot, seized the battle flag and charged forward into the mass of the enemy. One by one in turn, each commander pushed his way into the mass, falling victim to innumerable blows and thrusts of swords and spears.27 Zayd was the first to die, struck down by a spear. Ja’far dismounted his horse and hamstrung it, indicating to all he had no intention of retreat or return, and himself charged into the fray, armed only with his spear after he had discarded his armor and other weapons.28 When his body was later examined it had over ninety wounds, but the fatal one was when he was literally cut in half by a Byzantine blade.29 Abdullah was the third to charge into the enemy, after he had been given something to eat by his cousin to give him strength only to throw it away crying of himself, ‘‘you are still in this world!’’ When he fell unconscious to the blows of the enemy, his sister who had accompanied the army wept bitterly while crying across the battlefield extolling his virtues.30 At this point the Muslim army began to flee the field, and an unknown Muslim soldier of the Ansar, the helpers of the Prophet from Madinah, took the battle flag, planted it, and called on the men to rally. Khalid bin al-Walid, who was not even slated for succession of command, took the flag by acclamation of the men and fought the rear guard action, breaking nine swords in his hand before the Muslim army could escape the onrush of the Byzantine troops.31 Exhausted by their ordeal, the army began its march back to Madinah, being met on the outskirts by the women of the city who threw dust at them and mocked them, crying out ‘‘O you who have fled! You fled from the way of Allah.’’32 Muhammad himself understood that the sacrifice of his army in this battle was pointless and calmed them down, instead offering praise and prayers for the eight, especially the commanders, who had been martyred.33 Moreover, his court poet, Hassan bin Thabit recited poetic verse to extol their virtues in death: I saw the best of the believers follow one another to death, Though some held back behind them. May God receive the slain at Mu’tah who went one after another. Among them Ja’far now borne on wings, And Zayd and Abdullah when they too followed When the cords of death were active On the day they went on with the believers, The fortunate radiant one leading them to death.34

Another example that is useful involves the ambushing of one of the Prophet’s missions to a tribe in the Najd region to bring them to Islam. Dispatched four

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months after the defeat at Uhud, the Prophet sent seventy men with a promise of security to speak to the leaders of the tribe. One man, sent on ahead with a letter from the Prophet, was cut down before he could even deliver the message, while most of the remaining men who followed were soon surrounded by a vastly superior force. The Muslims could have surrendered, but instead drew their swords to fight it out. After almost all of them were killed, the attackers offered the leader of the Muslim team, al-Mundhir bin Amr al-Sa’idi, safe conduct if he would surrender. Al-Mundhir looked over the body of the dead messenger and refused to surrender, fighting until he too lay dead.35 Two of the party who had previously departed to pasture some of the camels realized that something serious had happened when they saw vultures circling the area near their camp. They returned to find the bodies and to see the enemy not far away. One suggested that they quickly take news to the Prophet, but the other said that he could not retreat from where al-Mundhir had died. As a consequence, he charged the enemy horsemen and fought them until he too was killed.36 As for al-Mundhir’s conduct, the Prophet offered curses against his attackers and prayers for his soul, stating that ‘‘he walked quickly to die’’37 and that he and Allah were pleased with his conduct.38 A third example involved another mission of Muhammad’s men to bring the doctrines of Islam to a tribe near Makkah. This mission only involved 7–10 men, and one source indicates that it was actually an espionage operation.39 They were not far from Makkah when they were set upon by about 100 men of the Banu Lihyan, who had been stalking them on their route. The Muslims were caught off guard and ambushed, taking a position on a low hill in preparation to fight off the attackers. Instead of immediately attacking, the men of the Banu Lihyan told them it was not their intention to kill them, but instead to negotiate a deal by which they could avenge themselves on the Makkans, and therefore promised them no harm if they came down from the hill. Despite being heavily outnumbered, one of the leaders of the Muslims, Asim bin Thabit, declared, ‘‘I will never come down on the security of an infidel’’40—a stance agreed to by his companions. The attackers quickly dispatched them with a shower of arrows, leaving only two alive who at last surrendered. It is interesting to note that Asim bin Thabit had previously taken a pledge of purity that no infidel should ever touch him, and was therefore already disposed to fight to the death should he ever find himself in such a situation.41 Moreover, there is no evidence that the Muslims inflicted any losses on the Banu Lihyan, despite their intention to die trying. Finally, there is the case of the failed umrah, which culminated in the Prophet’s retreat back to Madinah and the signing of the Treaty of al-Hudaybiyah. In January of 628, the Prophet decided to conduct the umrah, or small pilgrimage, to Makkah. He set out with about 1,400 men and proceeded south, attempting to take a circuitous route to avoid any forces the Quraysh of Makkah might deploy against him and prepared to fight if need be.42 Just north of the holy city he was met by the overwhelming forces of the Quraysh who refused him entrance. As the Prophet took stock of his situation and that he was outnumbered, he took steps to ensure that


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his companions would fight with him, not realizing at the time that the Quraysh had already determined on a negotiated truce rather than fighting for victory. Assembling by a small acacia tree, the 1,400 men took the pledge of al-Ridwan, the pledge of the angel who admits one to paradise. This was a pledge not to flee if attacked, and thus took a pledge of death to fight with the Prophet to the last man.43 As it turned out, the Quraysh were more than willing to negotiate an agreement, and the resulting Treaty of al-Hudaybiyah placed Muhammad’s ummah on an equal footing with the Quraysh. While militarily a defeat, politically it was an astounding victory, and the Prophet moved quickly to develop the public relations campaign necessary to win over many of the tribes in al-Hijaz. Just two years later he was able to march triumphantly into Makkah at the head of a 10,000-man army, the Makkans offering virtually no resistance. Through a willingness to die against overwhelming odds, the ummah later gained the ultimate victory, a fact not lost on Muslim historians.44 These combat actions as related in the early Islamic documents demonstrate that the Islamic warrior would fight to the death against incredible odds if he even had only a marginal chance of doing damage to an enemy. With these examples one can delve into aspects of Islamic jurisprudence to see how so-called ‘‘suicide’’ attackers would be viewed by many in the Muslim ummah today. While Islam indeed condemns suicide in no uncertain terms, what these companions of the Prophet did was not suicide or potential suicide. For this reason, within Islamic shari’a it is perfectly legitimate to lose one’s life in battle if he may or will do damage to the enemy. A modern day Muslim, using itjihad and buttressed by judgments of a madhhab, can extrapolate these circumstances to themselves, and thus find ready justification for conducting martyrdom, or shahid, operations. In a classic work on Islamic law written around 1350, we find that ‘‘there is no disagreement among scholars that it is permissible for a single Muslim to attack battle lines of unbelievers headlong and fight them even if he knows he will be killed.’’45 Another scholar, al-Mawardi, who wrote treatises on Islamic governance around 1050, noted that while withdrawal in battle was legitimate in some cases, one school of Islamic law ‘‘ruled out withdrawal, even if one is certain to get killed.’’46 While Islamic jurisprudence rejects suicide, it does not reject operations in which one is killed while killing many, or even attempting to kill many. These Islamic scholars are consistent with early sayings and deeds of the Prophet and his companions and thus provide fertile ground for the would-be Islamic warrior. JIHAD AND HEART PURIFICATION Having reviewed the notion of shahid operations, it can be seen that from a purely logical perspective, the attacks on 9/11 were some of the most successful military operations ever carried out in the modern age. From the perspective of the jihadist, 3,000 of the enemy died at the cost of but 19 of their own. In the lexicon of any field commander, this would be considered a bargain. Whether or not the 3,000 were truly enemies or noncombatants is irrelevant. Applicability is in the eyes of the

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attacker; and in the eyes of the Islamic jihadist, all of those who refuse to give Islam are enemies worth fighting.47 Even whether some Muslims died that day in the World Trade Center is irrelevant as well, for there are aspects of fiqh that indicate a jihadist operation can be conducted and cause casualties even if some Muslims were with the enemy, for it would be seen as ‘‘unintentional [killing] (khata).’’48 As noted by the Islamic scholar Abu Hanifa: [I]f there are in the hands of the polytheists some Muslim traders who entered [into the enemy’s territory] with a pledge of security (aman), it is permissible to shoot at them with the mangonel, to burn their fortresses with fire, and to drown them with water. . .. If the Muslims were to stop the shooting, the burning, and the drowning because of the Muslims among [the enemy], the Muslims could not attack the enemy people since there are always with them some of those whom we have named from among the Muslims, children, women, elderly, and the blind.49

The critical issue with these cases was the intent of the attacker, being that they were not purposely targeting fellow Muslims.50 In essence, so long as the intent was to strike the enemy, if others, both Muslims and what are often referred to as noncombatants, should be killed accidentally, this was considered collateral damage. Furthermore, the interpretation within Islam as to what truly constitutes a noncombatant is so vague as to leave enough room to slate any civilian who is actively engaged in promoting Western ideals and disbelief in Islam, whether philosophical or economic, as a propagandist against Islam and thus worthy of being fought and killed in battle.51 For this reason, numerous writers, both Western and Islamic, can honestly say that Islam does not support suicide, and yet still write glowing praise for jihadist ‘‘suicide’’ attackers. In their eyes, these are martyrdom, or shahid, operations and this is indeed the term they use when describing them. What makes this even more dangerous is the notion that such a martyrdom operation, as a jihadi act, can provide a Muslim with immediate elevation to paradise. Even a jihadi act accomplished without the death of the perpetrator is an important step toward gaining acceptance with Allah, and of quickly gaining paradise by outweighing previous deeds of evil.52 In the Islamic worldview, when a believer dies he will typically spend a period of time in the hellfire before he is released to paradise. Entering paradise is dependent on the will of Allah, who judges the believer on the basis of how much he did that was good according to the shari’a, or how often he neglected or violated it. After burning off some of the evil through a period of time, the scales will tip in favor of the good, and the soul will be released to paradise. A jihadi act that leads to martyrdom is almost a certain way to immediately achieve paradise, and in particular, to purify the heart of previous evil committed by the Muslim, and thus allow the believer to avoid the torment of the hellfire. Purification of the heart is a major issue within the Salafist movement, with a number of devotional type books written on the subject. It is also a reason why the Salafist movement accepts the writings of Imam Ghazzali, the great Sufi scholar of the early


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12th century, within those considered essential for study.53 As Salafism is normally hostile to the Sufi ideology, this is an interesting concession. For a Muslim, heart purification is dependent on the forgiveness of Allah, but also on the Muslim doing certain things that would please Allah, such as maintaining the five daily prayers, paying the obligatory zakat, or charity tax, and doing the hajj, or pilgrimage to Makkah, once in his lifetime. As Sura 11:114 states, ‘‘Establish worship at the two ends of the day and in some watches of the night. Lo! Good deeds annul ill deeds.’’54 In Islam the issue of faith, or Iman, is a matter of doing the right things, and not a mere mental assent or belief. Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah, writing around 1300 A.D., noted that certain deeds constitute true faith, citing a hadith of Muhammad that ‘‘Iman has over seventy branches, the highest of which is saying: ‘There is no god but Allah,’ and the lowest is the act of removing what is perilous from the road.’’55 Concurrently, it is dependent on them to not do certain things, such as engaging in other activities while they should be performing prayer during the holy months, where their sin is multiplied. This revival of heart purification is a key ingredient to the first, or early, stage of creating a viable Islamic ummah within a foreign land, and also opening the door for jihadi acts. It is important to note that some observers would state that right intention is the critical issue within Islam, and not just acts. This is not in dispute here. However, there is a massive body of evidence in the earliest documents of Islam that points to the importance of doing the right things and performing deeds, and not merely having the right intent alone. It is for this reason that great pains are taken within the extensive writings of the madhhabs to explain in detail what the typical Muslim should do regarding methodology in salat (prayer), the giving of zakat (charity), participation in and actions during the hajj (pilgrimage), and a host of other rites and duties.56 The compilations of materials by the founders of the various madhhabs are merely echoing what has been studied and memorized for years within the hadith and sunnah of the Prophet. What is even more interesting is to compare the doctrines contained in what are considered the ‘‘orthodox,’’ or ‘‘mainstream,’’ materials of these schools of law with that of the writings of the founder of the Wahhabis, Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab. It is not without reason that the Wahhabis were exonerated of heretical teachings by a religious council in Makkah in 1766, prior to the Wahhabi uprising.57 At this point it is also necessary to address the concept of the ‘‘greater versus the lesser’’ jihad. This is important because of the notion that the ‘‘greater’’ jihad, that being to strive against evil within one’s own soul, has somehow nullified the ‘‘lesser’’ jihad. The issue in question revolves around a particular hadith supposedly uttered by the Prophet when returning from battle, probably the expedition to Tabuk, just prior to the conquest of Makkah. As his men entered Madinah, he is reported to have said, ‘‘We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad’’58 and then noted how the greater jihad was to struggle against one’s inner evil. There are several problems associated with this hadith. The first and foremost is its authenticity. Within the scholarship of hadith there are four primary categories of sayings that have been established. The first, sahih, being sound or pure, is considered to be absolutely

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genuine. The second, hasan, being fair, is believed to be reasonably genuine, but has minor problems in the transmission of the saying, or in some of the wording. The third, da’if, is considered to be weak, typically having a problem with a break in the chain of transmission. The last is mawdu, or a forgery.59 Regarding the hadith in question, it was classified da’if, or weak, by Islamic scholars. This does not mean it was not truly said, but that the evidence for its authenticity is under serious question. Thus, this passage never appears in the sahih and hasan volumes of hadith, particularly al-Bukhari, Imam Muslim, Abu Dawud, Ibn Maliki, Ibn-e-Majah, and al-Tirmidhi, nor does it appear in Ibn Sa’d’s al-Tabaqat or al-Tabrizi’s Mishkat. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah considers it an outright forgery, noting that it ‘‘has no basis and it has not been reported by anyone who has knowledge of the sayings and actions of the Prophet.’’60 Nevertheless, even if this saying is genuine, to recite it today to say that Islam does not support physical jihad obfuscates the text itself, for it never denies the applicability of physical jihad. In fact, it creates an interesting conundrum for Islam. The Tabuk campaign, labeled as a jihad by the Prophet, was an offensive operation against a northern neighbor, thus violating the notion that jihad is only defensive.61 This certainly flies in the face of the point often made that jihad is only a defensive operation, and indeed, there are numerous hadith that do indicate that jihad is also an offensive operation to bring neighbors into submission. Regarding the contrast of the ‘‘greater versus lesser’’ jihad, it simply says that military campaigning is ‘‘lesser’’ than the jihad within oneself to fight evil as defined by Islam. In this context, even if the Prophet had uttered this saying it still correlates to the general philosophy of Islam, in that a mujahid, or warrior for Allah, should strive to purify his heart so that his intentions and motives are true. Connected to this concept is the point that within Islam one should engage in jihad with all of one’s abilities. Abu Sa’id remarked: I heard the Messenger of Allah saying: That who amongst you sees something abominable should modify it with his hand; and if he does not have the strength to do it, then he should do it with his tongue; and if he does not have the strength to do it, (even) then he should (abhor it) with his heart, and that is the weakest faith.62

The concept of jihad does not necessitate violent acts in and of itself, for it is much more than simply warfare. But such can be the result of one who wages jihad in the heart in an effort to purify that heart and soul, for the Prophet had warned that ‘‘when people see the evil and do not make efforts in changing it, soon will Allah cover them all with a punishment from Himself.’’63 However, while purification of the heart is important for engaging in military jihad, it is not a mandatory prerequisite for doing so. A pure heart makes the deed of jihad and martyrdom more effective in bringing the soul to paradise, but it is not necessary for taking part in jihad and to still reap some eternal benefits from such an act. The very act of jihad can be cathartic in its own right. As Jamaal al-Din M. Zarabozo noted after listing a series of acts that


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can cleanse the soul, which included fighting the enemies of Islam, ‘‘all of these acts fall under the most general usage of the term jihad and all of them can be beneficial in purifying the soul.’’64 ANALYSTS PERPLEXED It has been shown that Islamic doctrine provides an incentive for licentious young men to pursue the course of the shahid in order to purify their hearts of sinful excess. Furthermore, this means there is no typical profile of the ‘‘suicide’’ attacker, for the person could be a man of outward righteous appearance, or somebody who was living a wasted, reckless life just prior to the jihadi act. Regarding the former, he may see the jihadi act as the final culmination of a righteous life that will earn him paradise. For the latter, he may see the jihadi act as a way to alleviate himself of the heavy weight of guilt that he feels for his past evil, making this person even more dangerous than the former. While the former may choose to do his act in a cool and calculated fashion, the latter may suddenly and unexpectedly decide to charge into battle to inflict as many casualties as possible before his own life comes to an end. This concept of guilt versus righteousness is also one of the reasons why Western prisons are fertile ground for the recruitment of jihadi fighters. An incarcerated criminal will find the jihadi road a tempting path to follow to expiate their previous evil. Both types are very dangerous to tactical operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to noncombatants in the West; and each presents a unique challenge to security forces as they prepare to counter them. For the righteous shahid, his cool deliberation means he will patiently and persistently plan and work to his objective. Consequently, his operation can be interdicted and disrupted by good intelligence work that can track the predictable nature of his act. What makes this type of operation deadly is its scope and extent, for it takes patient planning to pull off spectacular operations such as the attacks of 9/11. Thus, the high-profile attacks will almost invariably be planned by this type of shahid. However, the guilt-ridden shahid is in some ways more deadly for his act may come with a lightning-like blow, like the flash of a scimitar during an ambush, with little or no warning. In particular, they are more deadly to soldiers in the field, or average civilians at home, for these present a ready target of opportunity. Such a shahid, distraught over his past evil, could quickly move to make a seemingly trivial but deadly attack on small groups or individuals. While the scale of their operations would be small, the psychological impact could be even greater than the large-scale attacks, as their actions would spread general uncertainty and fear. Had such an individual carried out an attack in Kabul, the impact would have been tactical. But when carried out in the streets of Los Angeles or Chicago the impact is operational, or even strategic. After 9/11, many people decided that it was too dangerous to fly. Their solution to this threat was to take to the roadways in the millions. The reason for this is simple. They understood quickly that the safest way to ensure one’s own security was to travel in small groups or individually. By avoiding what they saw as potential high

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priority target situations, people sought to make themselves less vulnerable. But this only provides some protection from the righteous shahid. This individual is interested in the large, spectacular, strike to inflict incalculable damage at little cost. But the guilt-ridden shahid will target small groups and individuals, which could lead to an overall disruption of life and daily activities. In this context we see the case of a Muslim in Seattle who, apparently with a troubled life, decided to shoot six Jewish women at a community center. Then we have the incident of the despondent Muslim in San Francisco who purposely raced his SUV through the city streets, striking people in crosswalks and on sidewalks. While neither of these were ultimately martyrdom operations for the perpetrators, they do illustrate the point of the guiltridden shahid. Seeing that their life was a shambles according to the shari’a and the ways of the Prophet, they thus chose to perform a jihadi act in a desperate attempt to purify their hearts, notwithstanding the claim of local authorities that these acts had nothing to do with what we call terrorism. But even more dangerous is when both types of shadids manage to coalesce. A righteous shahid, determined to carry out a breathtaking plan, would require foot soldiers to assist in the operation. Thus, he can enlist guilt-ridden men and women, who are desperately seeking a way to purify their hearts. In this desperate moment, they can become the actual perpetrators of some of the most costly attacks on their enemies, and this could very well have been the case with the 9/11 attackers. After all, were not some of the men engaged in that attack seen dancing and drinking in a nightclub just the night before? However, it was the cool careful planning of the righteous shahid that brought the operation to its fruition. This situation presents a double challenge to the intelligence community. While attempting to track a martyrdom cell, analysts might be thrown from the trail by the presence of personnel who do not fit the righteous shahid’s profile. They could fail to pick up the trail of the cell and the personnel who actually carry out the attack. They might even fail to identify the one who is training these men as his disciples and thus fail to stop the creation of new cells. The consequence of such confusion is only discovered when one hears the breaking news story. GHAZIS FOR THE PROPHET The time has come for our policymakers to face facts. Much of what fighters in the Islamic world use to justify their operations comes directly from early Islam. It is not misused or misread. Nor does it come only from the medieval Islamic scholars. Rather, these warriors pride themselves on being possessors of the earliest ideas of the Prophet as expressed in the Qur’an and the sunnah. Many moderates in the Muslim world and the West try to say that Islam has been hijacked by these men, but a close examination of the life of the Prophet, his thoughts, and teachings reveal that these warriors are truly closer to the wellspring of Islamic ideology than the moderates. While the moderates may be arguing for a reformed Islam that sees many of the acts of the Prophet as historical ideas rooted only in the past,65 the warriors see themselves as the true banner of Islam, carrying the literal thoughts and ideas of the Prophet into fruition in a


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modern world of ignorance. We cannot understand the way they think simply by studying others. We must understand the thoughts and actions of the Prophet and his closest companions. We have tried to lay the blame for what is happening in the Islamic world at the wrong feet. We blame the economic exploitation of colonialism; we blame radical thought coming out of the writings of Abdul-Wahhab; we blame medieval Islamic jurists like al-Mawardi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Qayyim; we even blame the Crusades.66 But, have our policymakers ever read Ibn Taymiyyah or Ibn Qayyim? Have they ever read al-Mawardi’s treatise The Ordinances of Government? And then have they studied the hadith and the sunnah? Groping in ignorance, much like a lost man stumbling in the darkest regions of the deepest forest, we do everything but place the accountability where it truly belongs. Is it because we are more determined to be loved by our enemies than respected by them? We have failed to understand the worldview of our enemies because we are too afraid to be politically incorrect. We are afraid that somebody with a major Muslim organization in the West will not like us, or that they will be offended, or that they will even file lawsuits. But what are we truly afraid of? Are we afraid of seeing our own intifada right here in our own cities? Are we afraid of having the same type of riots as occurred recently in France? It is time we come face to face with our enemies and learn of their worldview and how they think. They are not suicidal maniacs, nor are they crazed criminals, nor are they terrorists. They are soldiers—ghazis67—warriors for Islam as established by the Prophet Muhammad. They know for what they fight and they are willing to die and kill to achieve it. They understand, as the Prophet did, that the true object of war is to make an enemy conform to their will.68 They see themselves as holy shahids, or martyrs, carrying on the traditions of their cause as set forth by the Prophet and his companions, and not ‘‘suicide’’ bombers. Even Muhammad himself said that he wished he could be martyred in battle, and then come back to life numerous times to be martyred again.69 Does Islam support an individual surrendering his, or her, life in pursuit of a worthwhile military objective? Because of the Salafist movement harkening the true believers back to the true ways of the Prophet and his companions, along with the call for the heart purification of the faithful, the door has been opened that has led to an upsurge in so-called ‘‘suicide’’ and other jihadi operations. Indeed, it is a sweet and proper thing to die for the ummah. Like following the course of unrestrained water, the ability to track such jihadists on the basis of any vague profile is nebulous at best. Intelligence agencies and personnel must understand the mind of the enemy to be able to truly shadow them and interdict their operations before they can be launched. Unfortunately, our use of such words as ‘‘suicide bomber’’ and ‘‘terrorism’’ has warped our thinking and created a false image of what to look for. By not looking for the right type of target, the jihadi shahid, the warrior of Islam, we have opened ourselves up to intelligence and security gaps that could be exploited by enemies to bring about another 9/11. Or less dramatic but just as deadly to those involved, one could see a string of completely disconnected incidents: a grenade attack here, a car bombing there, a shooting somewhere else, which is ultimately the byproduct of jihadi acts by desperate men intent on purifying their hearts.

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NOTES 1. All Qur’anic quotations are from the translation by Maraduke Pickthall. 2. Sahih al-Bukhari, II (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1987 reprint), #445. 3. Ibid., VII, #670. 4. For examples see Brad K. Brenner, The World According to Al Qaeda (Booksurge, LLC, 2005), 130–133, 206. 5. During this overview, the terms ‘‘heart’’ and ‘‘soul’’ will be used interchangeably. 6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), Bk VII, 31. 7. John L. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), 274–275; for early examples of the Salafist view, see Tafsir Al-Qur’an Al-‘Azim, (Tafsir Ibn Kathir), ed. Shaykh Safiur-Rahman al-Mubarakpuri (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 2003), II, 498; V, 129–130; VII, 133; also see al-Bukhari, V, #476, which stresses the purity of the earliest believers; for later examples of the Salafist view, see Muhammad ‘Abduh, Risalat al-Tauhid (The Theology of Unity), trans. Ishaq Musa’ad and Kenneth Craig (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2004), 153–154, and Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: the Most Critical State Through Which the Umma Will Pass, trans. William McCants (Boston: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 2006), 3. 8. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Co., 1938), 148. 9. H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 114. 10. While using the kunyah, or nickname, al-Afghani, he never claimed Afghanistan as his home. See Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din ‘‘al-Afghani’’ (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968), 7. 11. Sheikh Jameil Ali, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the West (New Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors, 2002), 16. 12. Charles Chenevix Trench, The Road to Khartoum: A Life of General Charles Gordon (New York: Dorset Press, 1979), 188. 13. An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 31–32. 14. Al-Afghani and the West, 42, 65. 15. Ibid., 55. 16. An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 33. 17. Ibid., 157, 173; Al-Afghani and the West, 67; ‘Abduh, Risalat, 126–127, 153–154. 18. Mohammedanism, 122; Caesar E. Farah, Islam (Hauppauge, NY: Barron’s, 1994), 234. 19. Ling Wee Lee, ‘‘The War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World,’’ in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition, Essays 2004 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), 68. 20. Abu Ameenah Bilal Philips, The Evolution of Fiqh: Islamic Law and the Madh-habs (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: A.S. Noordeen, 2005), 103; Mohammedanism, 66. 21. Evolution of Fiqh, 105, 108. 22. Ibn Sa’d, Kitab al-Tabaqat al-Kabir, trans. S. Moinul Haq (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, n.d.), II, 159. 23. Abu Ja’far Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-rusul wa’l-muluk (The History of al-Tabari), VIII, trans. Michael Fishbein (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997), 1611. 24. Ibid., 1613. It is important to note here that while a number of Western translations of Muslim works will translate Allah as ‘‘God,’’ there is ample indication that Allah is a proper


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noun and not to be translated. See Edward W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon in Eight Parts, (Beirut, Lebanon: Librarie Du Liban, 1968), I, 83. Compare this with Lane’s examination of ilah on page 82; also see Abdul Mannan Omar, Dictionary of the Holy Qur’an (Hockessin, DE: NOOR Foundation, 2005), 28–29. 25. al-Tabaqat, II, 159. 26. al-Tabari, 1612. 27. al-Tabaqat, II, 160. 28. Ibid., 161. 29. al-Bukhari, V, #560; al-Tabaqat, II, 160. 30. al-Bukhari, V, #566. 31. Ibid., #565. 32. al-Tabaqat, II, 160. 33. al-Tabari, 1618. 34. Ibn Ishaq, Sirat Rasul Allah (The Life of Muhammad), trans. Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 537. 35. al-Tabaqat, II, 62. 36. Ibn Ishaq, Sirat, 433–434. 37. al-Tabaqat, II, 62. 38. al-Bukhari, V, #419. 39. al-Tabaqat, II, 66–68; al-Bukhari, V, #412. 40. al-Bukhari, V, #412 41. Ibn Ishaq, Sirat, 427. 42. Ibn Ishaq, Sirat, 500; al-Tabaqat, II, 119, 128; it is interesting to note that one hadith referenced by Ibn Sa’d states that the umrah was actually a ghazwah, or military expedition. 43. al-Bukhari, V, #485, #487; al-Tabaqat, II, 125. There is some minor disagreement in the sources about the nature of the pledge, but its very name itself intimates that it involved fighting to the death. 44. Muhammad H. Haykel, The Life of Muhammad, trans. Isma’il Raji al-Faruqi (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2002), 355–356; Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, The Life of Muhammad (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 1999), 234–235; Muhammad Hamidullah, The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2003), 81–82; Safi-ur-Rahman al-Mubarakpuri, Ar-Raheeq al-Makhtum (The Sealed Nectar) (Al-Madinah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic University, 1979), 346–349. 45. Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri, Umdat as-Salik (Reliance of the Traveller) (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1994), q2.4 (4). 46. Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya w’al-Wilayat al-Diniyya (The Ordinances of Government), trans. Wafaa H. Wahba (Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 1996), 49. 47. Sura 9:1-7; Tafsir Ibn Kathir, IV, 347–348; 369–379; also see The World According to Al Qaeda, 51–52. 48. Abu Ja’far Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari, Kitab al-Jihad (The Book of Jihad), trans. Yasir S. Ibrahim (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), Section 2, 2.1, 62. 49. Ibid., 64. 50. Ibid., 65; Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery, trans. William McCants (Cambridge, MA: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, 2006), 26. 51. Ibn Kathir, 1, 131–132, 532; Ibn Taymiyah, On Public and Private Law in Islam (Beirut: Khayat Book & Publishing Co., 1966), 140–141. 52. Sura 9:111; Tafsir Ibn Kathir, IV, 520.

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53. Imam Ghazzali, Ihya Ulum-id-Din (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2005), I, 62–65, 149–159; IV, 354–356. 54. Tafsir Ibn Kathir, V, 123–126. 55. Ibn Taymiyyah, Kitab al-Iman (The Book of Faith) (Bloomington, IN: Iman Publishing House, 1999), 23. The hadith in question is from Imam Muslim, I, #35R1. 56. A prime example of this body of material is Burhan al-Din al-Farghani al-Marghinani, Al-Hidayah (The Guidance), I (Bristol: Amal Press, 2006). In particular, see Chapter 11, ‘‘The Description of Prayer,’’ in which 25 pages are used to precisely describe how to physically pray. 57. John Sabini, Armies in the Sand: The Struggle for Mecca and Medina (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1981), 40. Wahhab’s analysis of the fundamentals of Islam are generally in line with the madhhabs. Moreover, Wahhab’s own key writing on the oneness of Allah tracks evenly and precisely with the hadith and sunnah. See Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab, Kitab at-Tauhid (The Book of The Oneness) (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 1996); moreover, the Wahhabis demonstrated their own version of the ‘‘suicide’’ fighter during the Battle of Bissel, when many of the defeated Wahhabis were found dead in vast rows, their legs tied with ropes. See Sir Richard F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah, II (New York: Dover Publications, 1964), 89 fn 1. 58. Reliance of the Traveller, o9.0. 59. While there are other subcategories, only these need concern us here. The issues related to the quality and validity of hadith is an entire field of study in Islam. See Ibn al-Salah al-Shahrazuri, Kitab Ma’rifat anwa ilm al-hadith (An Introduction to the Science of the Hadith), trans. Dr. Eerik Dickinson (Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 2006). 60. Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Furqan bayna Awliya ar-Rahman wa Awliya ash-Shaytan (The Friends of Allah and the Friends of Shaytan [Satan], trans. Abu Rumaysah (Birmingham, UK: Daar us-Sunnah Publishers, 2005), 144. The translator notes that two Hadith masters (hafiz) cited this hadith, but as Ibn Taymiyyah was also a hafiz it begs the question as to which compilation of hadith this passage was in. It was clearly unknown to him. 61. While Ibn Sa’d indicates that the Prophet claimed the Byzantines were massing in Syria, there is no evidence that this preparation, even if real, was directed at the Muslims. If anything, the evidence would strongly suggest that the entire Byzantine effort would have been focused on their old enemy of Persia, for Islam at that moment presented no threat. The rumor could have even referenced the return from the east of the victorious Byzantine army. On the other hand, Ibn Kathir, in his sira, indicates that the rationale for Tabuk was to bring the Byzantines to Islam, as they were nearest to the Muslims geographically. See Ibn Kathir, Al-Sira al-Nabawiyya (The Life of the Prophet Muhammad), trans. Trevor Le Gassick, (Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 2000), IV, 1. Ibn Ishaq makes no mention of the Byzantines massing whatsoever. See Sirat, 602–604. 62. Imam Muslim, I, (New Delhi: Idara Isha’at-E-Diniyat Ltd., 2001), #49. 63. Al-Tirmidhi, 3059, as quoted in al-Hafidh adh-Dhahabi, Tashabbuh al-Khasis bi Ahlil-Khamis fi-r-Radd at-Tashabbub bi-l-Mushrikin (Imitating the Disbelievers) (Birmingham, UK: Daar us-Sunnah Publishers, 2002), #16. 64. Jamaal al-Din M. Zarabozo, Purification of the Soul: Concept, Process and Means (Denver, CO: al-Basheer Company for Publications and Translations, 2002), 351. 65. For an example of this effort at reform, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 49–56.


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66. It is worth noting that the famed Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun cites Muslim raids in Southern Europe as the spark that ignited the Christian European counteroffensive that we now call the Crusades. See Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, I–III, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), II, 41–42. 67. ‘‘Warrior’’ is a loose and somewhat incomplete way to translate ghazi. A ghazi is one who goes forth on an expedition or excursion, being essentially a raid, established by the Prophet. Thus, the raids were called ghazwa and one going on the raid a ghazi. See the Dictionary of the Holy Qur’an, 402. 68. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (London: Penguin Books, 1982), Bk I, Chap. I, Sec. 2, 101. 69. al-Bukhari, IV, #54.


Part III

Sociopsychological and Educational Variables


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A Social Psychological Perspective on Terrorist Behavior Daniel B. Kennedy and Robert J. Homant One of the predictable consequences of 9/11 was an intensified academic interest in terrorism. Academic researchers from the various social sciences have focused on understanding terrorist individuals and organizations, identifying terrorists and potential terrorists, and anticipating, preventing, and recovering from terrorist activities.1 A major theoretical issue that ties these concerns together is the motivation of the individual terrorist. Who is a terrorist? What sort of background does he (or she) come from? What accounts for the intensity of his commitment and the extremes of his behavior, even to the point of suicidal attacks? Three types of answers have been offered to these questions. One possibility is that terrorism is a rational response to a real injury or problem; the asymmetrical nature of the conflict between radical Islamists and ‘‘Westernized’’ governments requires drastic measures by individuals devoted to a just or at least a reasonable cause. A second type of answer suggests that individuals with unrealistic worldviews, developmental pathologies, and various emotional conflicts involving intense anger, identity confusion, and suicidal motivation are displaced to a political arena where the acting out of their individual pathologies can at least earn them some praise and satisfaction (even to the point of material rewards for their families in the case of many suicide bombers).2 A third type of answer points to the ability of common social psychological processes, especially those involving group dynamics, to produce extreme behavior that would typically be thought to stem from personal pathology. It is this third type of answer that we will explore in this chapter: what are those processes that have been found to produce extreme behaviors in otherwise rational, healthy people, and how might these processes function in the context of a terrorist organization?

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‘‘ONE MAN’S TERRORIST. . .’’ It has become a cliche´ to say that ‘‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’’ The point of this statement is that definitions of and judgments about terrorism are problematic.3 The perceived reasonableness of the cause and suitability of the tactics greatly impact our judgment of the mental health of the participants. One example that comes to mind is the French Resistance of World War II, which is seldom considered to have been a form of terrorism, yet which might fit certain definitions thereof. We certainly do not claim moral equivalence between La Resistance and al Qaeda; ‘‘moral equivalence’’ is hardly a question for social science. However, because of the support that the French Resistance had (both then and now), we do not search for character flaws that distinguish the joiners from the nonjoiners. The PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) represents a more ambiguous case with regard to the reasonableness of its cause and the psychological health of its members. Some historical justification for its cause can be provided. Also, its tactics, though brutal, are typically designed not to alienate world opinion, and especially not to alienate its own domestic support.4 Given widespread support for the PIRA in some communities and families, it is not so unimaginable that a Belfast Catholic youth might be eager to join. However, when nineteen people engage in and carry out a plot to kill themselves along with countless anonymous others in a distant land, using a tactic in which their own death is crucial to the desired outcome, an outcome that is difficult to see as rationally desired, then the question of individual motivation quickly arises. TERRORISM AS A ‘‘RATIONAL’’ RESPONSE Islamist terrorism is rooted in a number of religious beliefs.5 Some of these are of a historical or factual nature, and thus can at least be subjected to some verification. But many of the core beliefs involve religious ideology. Consider three of them: Islam is the one true religion; Muslims have certain moral obligations, including maintaining Islam in any area that was ever Muslim ruled and imposing Muslim law (shari’a) in Muslim areas; and dying in battle for one’s faith is a guarantee of immediate entry into paradise. One might add to these a few further ideas that would be difficult to assess empirically: bombing a busload of noncombatants is a reasonable means of influencing people’s decisions, and ‘‘sacrificing oneself’’ is either a more effective way of carrying out the bombing or at least makes the bombing more politically effective. If one grants all of the preceding ideas, then one explanation of terrorism and terrorist behavior is simply that it is a rational approach to asymmetrical warfare.6 While it might seem strange (within a moderate Muslim worldview as well) to think that blowing oneself up is a sure route to paradise, we know of no objective way of disproving it. We would also add that such a route to paradise is no less extreme than the stories of many early Christians, such as Saint Polycarp (d. 155), or more recent Christians, such as Rose of Lima (d. 1617) or Anthony Bobula (d. 1657), who prayed to be granted the privilege of martyrdom. Distinctions must be made, however, between the traditional Christian

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORIST BEHAVIOR

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martyrs who die for their faith and the radical jihadist martyrs who see to it that others die along with them. The latter has been referred to as ‘‘predatory martyrdom.’’7 While suicidal behavior in the service of entering paradise is arguably rational to some, given the premises, we should not leave the impression that such a belief system is a precondition for the commission of suicide terrorism. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers were very ‘‘successful’’ at motivating their followers to engage in suicidal attacks even without any promises of eternal reward.8 In the 1980s and 1990s, the Tamil rebels employed hundreds of suicide bombers against the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan army, all acting without any apparent belief in their personal immortality. In concluding this section, one further point needs to be made. Even if terrorist behavior, whether suicidal or not, can be considered a rational response, it remains true that some members of a group or culture engage in it and some do not. It should also be stressed that to deem behavior as rational is not the same as to deem it moral. THE TERRORIST AS ACTING OUT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY9 Some authors, such as Post and Lester, Yang, and Lindsay, have located the origin of terrorist behavior primarily in the pathological make-up of the individual, typically in a personality disorder such as ‘‘authoritarian personality,’’ ‘‘paranoid personality,’’ or ‘‘borderline personality,’’ although a full-blown psychotic diagnosis, such as paranoid schizophrenia may also be implicated.10 More commonly, however, authors citing psychological causes point to character traits that fall short of a diagnosable mental illness.11 Grimland et al. review a number of theorists who link terrorist acts to a narcissistic rage that may arise from a variety of threats to the self-esteem of the individual.12 A person may be vulnerable to such threats because of loss or conflict within one’s own family or because of humiliation of the national or ethnic group with which one has overidentified. These individuals are then seen as seeking out the terrorist group as a vehicle for committing the acts of violence that they are motivated to commit because of their own rage.13 While agreeing with this basic formulation, Pearlstein believes that it applied more to terrorists of the 1970s and early 1980s, rather than to the religion-based terrorism that arose in the late 1980s.14 Miller offers a typology of terrorist roles that one may play, based on eight different types of personality disorder.15 Miller is careful to state that these personality types might not rise to the level of a diagnosable mental illness (i.e., they may be ‘‘subclinical’’), and that some individuals without any mental disorder may also participate in violent political acts. The clear implication, though, is that a person’s underlying personality disorder draws him to terrorism and shapes his involvement in it. Schbley distributed 405 questionnaires to participants in a military exhibition parade for Hezbollah in Beirut, Lebanon.16 From this group of Shia militants, 341 responded. Several of the items on the questionnaire were designed to measure various DSM-IV-R diagnostic categories. In addition to the 341 questionnaire respondents, Schbley qualitatively analyzed the audio (and occasionally video) declarations of some 933 ‘‘zealots about to commit self-immolation’’ (p. 110) by engaging

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in a suicide bombing. Based on his analysis, Schbley concluded that Hezbollah religious terrorists often suffer from oppositional defiant disorder, impulse control disorder, or antisocial personality disorder. More importantly, these personality disorders are then ‘‘aggravated by dogma-induced critical/psychotic depression’’ (p. 120), which leads in turn to the suicide terrorism. Hypothesizing various forms of psychopathology as being behind the behavior of the typical terrorist may have a certain heuristic value. However, if one wishes to be at all parsimonious, then there must be some evidence beyond the terrorist act itself to confirm the diagnosis. Given that the terrorists themselves are seldom available for clinical interviews, one would need to find preexisting data sources documenting relevant symptoms. For example, writings by the individual himself might show paranoid ideas, loss of reality contact, or emotional conflicts. Others—family members, coworkers, classmates—may have observed disturbed or at least eccentric behavior.17 The individual may have sought mental health intervention or expressed concern about his own stability. There could be documented suicide attempts, or a history of criminal activity (for diagnosing antisocial personality, for example). At the very least, there could be a history of inadequate or self-defeating behavior leading to a series of social failures—in vocational life, in relationships, in achieving other goals—in situations where similarly situated persons are readily able to achieve success. Thus, the task of documenting psychopathology, while challenging, is not insurmountable. For example, journalistic accounts and FBI profilers seem to have no difficulty uncovering evidence of significant psychopathology on the part of serial sexual killers.18 Attempts, however, to uncover convincing evidence of pathological motivation in Islamist terrorists as a group have so far been largely unsuccessful.19 The common complaint of critics is that no particular symptom or cluster of symptoms is objectively noted across a terrorist sample, nor is any attempt made to determine if such symptoms are more prevalent among terrorists than among the populations from which they are drawn. In any large sample of individuals, one would expect to find evidence of mental illness: 26.2 percent of a random cross-section of American society show enough symptoms to qualify for a diagnosable mental illness in any given year.20 One further issue should be highlighted with respect to psychological explanations. Many writers, including those who claim to reject a psychopathological explanation of terrorism, point to identity or self-esteem problems as playing a key role in motivating someone to join a terrorist organization.21 Basically, circumstances conspire to undermine the person’s sense of self. He or she is unable to actualize core values, feels humiliated or unaccepted (perhaps in a new country), or lacks opportunity in an impoverished country. The rejection or at least lack of acceptance of his core Islamic faith by the dominant majority may further exacerbate a sense of humiliation. Such a person is naturally drawn to a group of like-minded people who place the blame for their humiliation on a decadent Western society and a degraded Islam that they believe has largely sold out to Western governments and values. This description echoes the writings of many terrorists themselves, and thus has some empirical support. But is such an explanation ‘‘psychological’’? That is, does it identify significant psychopathology on the part of the budding terrorist?


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Those writers who reject psychological explanations as unfounded generally portray these identity and self-esteem problems as being of the normal, developmental variety.22 They imply that a richer environment would provide such individuals with healthier outlets for dealing with these normal developmental issues. Often a ‘‘marginal man’’ problem is identified.23 That is, a Muslim immigrant to a Western country may in fact be more Westernized than others in his family, but because he has adopted Western goals he finds the subtle prejudice against him and his lack of complete social acceptance to be much more galling than would a more traditional Muslim. This lack of acceptance, in turn, is seen as a failure on his part and drives him to accept a worldview that rejects the rejecters. Although such a scenario would not account for a majority of terrorists, it does seem to be a common theme to account for ‘‘home-grown’’ Islamist terrorists in Western lands. While one could easily see this as a manifestation of psychopathology (because of the underlying feelings of inadequacy), it probably does not indicate a level of pathology that is significantly out of the ordinary. Some individuals just happen to be situated in environments where involvement with extremist groups provides the initial solution to their identity problem. An analysis of group processes, to which we turn next, then provides an explanation for how this initial group involvement may evolve into a willingness or even an eagerness to blow oneself up in a blaze of glory. Finally, it should be pointed out that some writers who have put forth a psychological approach to understanding terrorism specifically reject ‘‘psychopathology’’ as playing a significant role.24 Their approach is ‘‘psychological’’ in the sense that it examines the motivation and worldview of the terrorist, but not in the sense that something psychologically amiss is the cause of the terrorism. A passage from Horgan’s The Psychology of Terrorism captures this well: We might consider what the group dynamics were that bonded the 9/11 hijackers together. . .. It has been widely suggested, and seemingly corroborated by Osama Bin Laden himself, that not all of the hijackers were aware of their impending deaths. . .. [W]hat group dynamics would have been important or necessary for the cell leader to maximize psychological cohesion and mutual solidarity in the face of self-doubt, wavering commitment or a partial lack of focus during the stressful events on the aircraft? It has been suggested that shared rituals. . .may have been. . .important. . .before and during the attacks. . .. [S]uch activity can enhance group solidarity and shield individual members from considering alternative courses of action.25

In other words, Hogan’s ‘‘psychology of terrorism’’ relies on basic social psychological processes to account for the behavior, and it is the exposition of this perspective that constitutes the balance of this chapter. THE TERRORIST AS A PRODUCT OF NORMAL SOCIAL PROCESSES In his compelling history of the events leading up to 9/11, Lawrence Wright concluded that there is no evidence that psychopathology played a significant role in

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motivating the initial wave of organizers and recruits that formed al Qaeda.26 Wright believed, however, that once it was established, some individuals with various emotional problems were drawn to al Qaeda, as happens with any political movement, however positive or negative the movement’s original goals and methods. The issue for us here, then, is neither whether some mentally ill individuals become terrorists, nor even whether some nondiagnosable (i.e., subclinical) forms of psychopathology may play a role in terrorists’ career paths. Rather, the issue here is how psychologically healthy one can be and yet become a terrorist, and even more particularly, a suicide terrorist. Further clarification is in order on what it means to be a ‘‘suicide terrorist.’’ While acknowledging some connection to suicide missions in a military context, such as Japanese Kamikaze pilots in World War II, Grimland et al. maintain that the suicide bombing tactics of current terrorist groups trace back to Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1970s.27 Regardless of its roots, suicide terrorism as a major tactic of terrorist organizations is a relatively modern phenomenon. The reason we focus on suicide terrorism is that this behavior is in many ways the most frightening and disturbing. The willingness or even eagerness to die shows the depth of commitment of the foe and, as a tactic, suicide terrorism claims a significant number of lives per attack. If the suicide terrorist is not necessarily mentally ill, then the notion of mental illness need not be invoked to account for the behavior of others in the terrorist organization. Is it appropriate, however, to call bin Laden, Ayman Al Zawahiri, and other leaders of al Qaeda or Hamas suicide terrorists? It would seem that there are two ways to look at this question. If the leaders of a terrorist group sincerely believe that a suicidal action is the best route to paradise but they postpone their own immolations because the cause has a need for them alive, then their worldview is that of a suicide terrorist and their behavior and cognitions need to be evaluated as such. If, however, they are merely playing on the gullibility of some of their adherents in order to manipulate them into a useful role, then their personalities become nothing but Machiavellian. This might make them more rational but less ‘‘admirable.’’ Given what these and other leaders have sacrificed and endured for their cause, there is little doubt that they are ‘‘true believers.’’28 We raise here only the issue of whether they would be eager suicides should they believe it would help their cause. The comparison of the leaders of terrorist organizations with their foot soldiers provides a glimpse of the complexity of the terrorist organization. Victoroff has provided a heuristic model of all of the roles involved in a terrorist organization.29 Victoroff presents a typology of some six different types, within which there are eighteen different roles. Each of the roles calls for different characteristics. Thus, under the ‘‘middle management’’ type, social and psychological processes that produce an effective ‘‘strategist/technocrat’’ might not be relevant for someone fulfilling the role of ‘‘trainer/dispatcher.’’ Regardless of this complexity, our focus here remains the extent to which normal group processes can lead reasonably psychologically healthy individuals to engage in the extreme, self-destructive, and murderous actions of the suicide terrorist as well as the other roles to be played in such organizations.


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THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR How, then, should the behavior of the suicide terrorist be viewed? This is essentially a question of attribution, a conclusion about the causes of others’ (and our own) behavior. Attribution theory, in turn, is an area of research in social psychology that examines how people make attributions, or judgments, about the causes of behavior.30 If we conclude that terrorists’ behavior reflects their own inner motives and dynamics, then we are said to make an ‘‘internal attribution.’’ Conversely, seeing terrorists’ behavior as reflecting the complex social situation that they are in would constitute an ‘‘external attribution.’’ It has become axiomatic in social psychology that the ‘‘fundamental attribution error’’ is the tendency to make external attributions of others’ behavior in general, but especially when the behavior seems contrary to how we believe people ought to behave.31 Applied to terrorism, the fundamental attribution error is not so much an explanation as a caution that we should try to avoid the natural tendency to view terrorists as acting out inner psychopathology rather than responding to situational, especially group, phenomena. The observation that people tend to overestimate others’ internal motives as the explanation for their behavior can be traced to seminal work by Fritz Heider.32 However, the real impetus for exploring the power of the situation to override personal motivation came from Stanley Milgram’s studies of obedience, to which we now turn. SITUATIONAL VERSUS DISPOSITIONAL DETERMINATION: MILGRAM’S STUDIES IN OBEDIENCE Milgram’s studies in obedience are one of the most widely cited and described research programs in the history of social science.33 Briefly, the research put unwitting subjects in situations where they were ordered by an experimenter, a stranger in a white lab coat, to deliver an escalating series of extremely painful and seemingly life-threatening shocks to a fellow subject (actually a confederate of Milgram’s). Although the shocks were phony, it is clear that subjects believed that they were delivering real shocks. Originally, the purpose of the procedure was to identify a very small group of people who exhibited an ‘‘authoritarian personality,’’ a character structure thought to underlie attraction to fascism.34 The ex-Nazi Adolph Eichmann, once head of Hitler’s concentration camps, had recently (i.e., in May, 1960) been seized in Argentina by Israeli agents and transported to Israel for a war crimes trial. This trial renewed interest in the ‘‘Nuremberg Defense,’’ the claim by several top Nazis during the Nuremberg (Nu¨rnburg) war crimes trial that they had only been following the legal orders of a legitimate state and should not be held legally accountable for their behavior. In Eichmann’s case, some fifteen years later, defense attorneys could also add the observation that the defendant had led a blame-free life since the end of the war, an observation that would become increasingly common as an assortment of lesser Nazis were found living peaceful lives in various American suburbs in the

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1970s and 1980s. At least initially, Milgram did not ‘‘buy’’ the Nuremberg defense. He believed that there was some special character flaw—Adorno et al.’s Authoritarian Personality—that rendered some individuals so susceptible to authority that they willingly suspended their own moral values and became capable of anything. By identifying a few such people—those who would deliver deadly shocks—Milgram hoped to study their background and personality in order to discover the ingredients of this syndrome. Much to Milgram’s surprise, twenty-six of his initial forty subjects went all the way to the highest level of shock, a potentially deadly 450 volts. In following up on this finding, Milgram found that no one came close to predicting (i.e., postdicting) the outcome of his experiment.35 Most famously, when the experimental procedure was described in detail to a group of psychiatrists—who were not told that the procedure had already been carried out—they estimated that virtually none of the subjects would proceed to the final shock level. Likewise, virtually all potential subjects claimed that they would quit such an experiment early on. Milgram and others followed up this research by trying several variations on the conditions of the experiment. The degree of subjects’ compliance was eventually found to range from a low of 10 percent to a high of 91 percent.36 The lowest degree of compliance occurred in a design where subjects observed two confederates refusing to continue with the shock series; the highest rate occurred in a design where subjects were specifically ordered to press a special red button at the end of the sequence. These variations in compliance have generally been taken to support the conclusion that variations in the situation—rather than the personality of the subjects—are the main factor in determining subjects’ behavior. After Milgram’s research, it became axiomatic in social psychology that normal people, the average members of a society, could be placed in situations where they would engage in extreme behavior, not only contrary to their own values, but contrary to their own expectations about how they would behave. In his review of the Milgram research, Blass made an important point that should be mentioned here.37 Although the research clearly supported the power of the situation to determine behavior, in most of the outcomes there remained a good deal of variation within each group of subjects (i.e., some complied and some did not). This variation within subjects is likely attributable to personality (i.e., dispositional) differences that subjects bring to the situation. Several variables have been implicated in various studies as leading to more conformity to the experimenter: authoritarianism, lower moral development, high interpersonal trust, external locus of control, lower social intelligence, and higher hostility. Blass hypothesized that some types of situations are more likely than others to allow a role for these individual dispositions: a situation that is ‘‘strong,’’ in the sense of requiring the attention of the subject to a narrow range of choices, should limit the role of personality. Likewise, personality should play more of a role in situations that are chosen by, rather than imposed on, the subject. Applying the implications of the Milgram research to terrorism, we believe that it clearly establishes the power of the interpersonal situation to compel the average individual to engage in extreme behavior that is contrary to the person’s basic values.38 At the same time, there is clearly room for the individual to affect the


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initial decision to join a particular group, and a variety of more or less normal level personality traits may affect the amount of power the group has over the individual. One other classic research study that strongly reinforced the power of situational over dispositional explanations of extreme behavior is Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study.39 For this study, the researchers specifically screened potential subjects for any indicators of pathology and included in their study sample the twenty-four psychologically healthiest subjects drawn from an original pool of seventy. A random drawing led to half of the group being assigned to play the role of prisoners and half to be guards. Zimbardo was hoping that over a two-week period he would eventually learn something about how the prisoner and guard roles affected the subjects. Zimbardo built several features into his research design to try to heighten the reality of the situation, for fear that otherwise he would find nothing of interest. He was amazed to find that after only a single day one subject was so into his character that he had to be released from the study. After six days the entire study had to be ended because of the emotional strain on the subjects. While many commentators have put their own spin on the meaning of this research, it strongly reinforced the key finding of Milgram’s research: an unusual situation, even an artificial one, can produce extreme, value-conflicting behavior in psychologically normal subjects. THE POWER OF THE GROUP: THE ASCH CONFORMITY STUDIES Well before the Milgram studies, Solomon Asch had explored the power of group pressure to induce conformity.40 Virtually every social psychology text for the past fifty years has had a picture of a befuddled subject puzzled by the strange choices of his fellow group members. The basic task was for the subject to identify which of three lines matched the length of a target line. On certain preselected trials, all of the other group members made an obviously wrong choice. Subjects were clearly stressed and confused by this. Over the course of the experiment, about 75 percent of subjects conformed to an obviously wrong answer at least once. Although many of Asch’s subjects showed clear doubts about their own ability to judge lines, their conformity did not extend beyond the immediate group situation. That is, they did not internalize the group norm that led to their false judgments. When repeating the task in isolation, they had no trouble giving correct judgments. An even earlier study by Muzafer Sherif, however, showed that sometimes group pressure can lead to a subject internalizing the group norm.41 In Sherif ’s experiment, the judgmental task was much more difficult: estimating the amount of movement by a small, distant light in an otherwise dark room. The light, in fact, did not move, but to perceive some movement is normal (the ‘‘autokinetic effect’’). Sherif found that after a few trials in a group setting, subjects in the group adopted a group norm for estimating the distance the light moved. Later, when subjects were tested individually, they tended to give estimates close to what their group had done, rather than to revert to the estimates that they had made individually, prior to their group experience. More recently, Baron, Vandello, and Brunsman integrated some of the results of conformity research into a pair of studies in which they varied both task difficulty

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and task importance.42 The task was to identify a drawing from a lineup. Task difficulty was manipulated by varying the exposure to the stimulus material; task importance was varied by giving subjects a $20 incentive for a high score. The group consisted of the subject and two confederates who gave wrong answers according to a schedule. Although there was no group pressure to conform, subjects frequently did so. Conformity was highest when the task was difficult and when the incentive was high. It should be noted that ‘‘common sense’’ would call for less conformity with high incentive—there was more reason to go against the group if an individual reward was at stake. But when ‘‘truth’’ is a bit ambiguous, the more motivated subjects became more unsure of their perceptions and increased their reliance on the group, even though there was no reason to think the others were giving correct answers. Because subjects were motivated to be correct, we can conclude that this condition produced internalization rather than mere compliance.43 Emergent Norms A key example of the power of the group to produce conformity comes from the study of ‘‘emergent norms.’’44 This concept applies to unusual or unanticipated situations. For example, one of the authors of this chapter worked at a prison where the guards abruptly went on strike. There had been some warning this could happen, and most of us expected a large increase in inmate misconduct. Instead, the prison experienced one of the safer, more orderly periods in its recent history. According to emergent norm theory, early in the situation the inmates did not know how to behave—there were no established norms for behavior during a guard strike. More or less by chance, the situation started off in a cooperative fashion and the idea quickly spread that being orderly was the thing to do. There were, to be sure, some incentives to behave in an orderly way: it would avoid the threat of a lockdown, and it would make the striking guards look bad, or at least unnecessary. But had some significant act of disorder occurred early on, the same situation could just as easily have produced a wave of disorder and rioting—as happened a year later during a guard strike at a similar prison. Terrorist groups, of course, do not typically come together spontaneously. They must, however, begin by constructing a set of norms that provide themselves and eventual new members with a way of looking at reality and responding to it. As with our inmates, the same personality can be found in either a rioter or a ‘‘good inmate,’’ depending on the tone the group takes. Diffusion of Responsibility Besides providing the individual with a way of interpreting reality, there are other social psychological features of groups that encourage more extreme and risky behavior. These related features include diffusion of responsibility, ‘‘risky shift,’’ deindividuation, and ‘‘groupthink.’’ The concept of diffusion of responsibility first arose as an explanation of ‘‘mob psychology.’’45 It has long been observed that people do things in certain types of unruly crowd situations that they would not otherwise do. This has been


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attributed to the idea that the crowd is a disinhibiter; by egging each other on, we can all give in to impulses we would typically suppress. Then, the fact that ‘‘everyone else is doing it’’ is taken to mean that the behavior must be acceptable. Diffusion of responsibility is the general tendency of group members to feel less obligated to conform to general social norms or values. In effect, any potential disapproval would be distributed across all members of the group, thus negating the impact on any one individual. In ‘‘bystander intervention’’ research, for example, a person is more likely to intervene to help an injured or distressed stranger if the person is alone than if there are others present.46 Note that this is a bit counterintuitive: if it is compliance to social norms that compels me to help the stranger, then having people around to observe should increase my helping behavior. Instead, their presence means that I do not need to help, either because others are equally able to or because I follow their example of not helping. Thus, the group provides both normative guidance, or modeling (help/do not help), and also an excuse to indulge my preference: if they do not see a need to help, then I do not feel so bad about not helping; the moral responsibility is diffused. Risky Shifts The risky shift phenomenon shows that the group may do more than merely diffuse responsibility; it may encourage irresponsibility. Risky shift refers to the frequent—though not universal—finding that a group’s decision making reflects willingness to take a greater risk than one would expect from the original preferences of all of the group members taken singly. It is not simply a matter of the risk takers in the group being more persuasive, since the risky position advocated by the group is sometimes more extreme than the original position of any of the group members.47 Nor is the risky shift simply another aspect of diffusion of responsibility, because the group sometimes shifts to a position that is more extreme on the conservative side. If the group members originally favor a somewhat cautious approach to some task, then the group process may lead to an even greater level of caution. This is explained as a ‘‘polarization effect,’’ usually seen as the result of higher prestige flowing toward those who are closer to the group’s ideal.48 In the context of Islamist terrorism, a person more willing to take an extreme, risky action would likely be seen as more devoted, and this would encourage the group as a whole to move to a more daring position, thus offering encouragement to the original high risk taker to move to a still riskier stance. Suicide terrorism is one instance where religiosity is a risk factor rather than a protective factor against destruction of self and others.49 A classic finding in the psychology of groups that combines elements of risky shift and emergent norms involved World War II research by Kurt Lewin, the ‘‘father of group dynamics.’’ The U.S. government was having little luck in persuading housewives to use various ’’organ meats’’ (spleen, kidney, etc.) in the family diet to help deal with a meat shortage. Called upon to help with needed attitude change, Lewin reasoned that social norms were interfering with the desired attitude change, and he experimented with various persuasive communications aimed at the individual and

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stressing patriotism.50 When this general approach did not work, he tried an early version of a focus group to see what he could learn about the source of the resistance. To his surprise, he found that most housewives were perfectly willing to try organ meats, but had been resisting in doing so because they did not want to be thought poor homemakers by their families and friends. As soon as they became aware that most other women were willing to give organ meats a try, a new norm was established and consumption of organ meats increased. This early, real-world study showed the power of the group to overcome individual resistance and establish new norms. The Groupthink Phenomenon Besides taking riskier positions and establishing new norms, groups have also been found at times to isolate themselves from reality and to make poorer decisions than one would expect, given the makeup or expertise of the group. Irvin Janis coined the term ‘‘groupthink’’ to describe a certain type of group process in which a group’s sincere attempt to come up with a realistic solution to a problem is thwarted by perceived pressure for unanimity and consensus.51 The result is that the group establishes its own version of reality and acts accordingly. One of Janis’ key examples is the functioning of the Kennedy administration leading up to the failed invasion of Cuba, known as the Bay of Pigs; this is contrasted with that same group confronting the Cuban Missile Crisis, where groupthink was avoided. While there is certainly a danger in judging group process by its results, no doubt most historians would concur with Janis’ analysis of the two occasions. Using this and numerous other examples, Janis proceeds to list some fourteen structural, situational, and group process conditions that contribute to groupthink. It would be instructive to study terrorist organizations in depth to see how many of the groupthink characteristics apply; for our purposes, however, we will focus on a few selective examples. Under ‘‘structural faults,’’ Janis lists ‘‘insulation of the group’’ and ‘‘homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideology.’’52 Homogeneity of background is virtually assured in most terrorist groups, since their personal and ethnic backgrounds typically provide the common cause that brings them together. While such groups might not have an intrinsic desire for insulation, as soon as they become identified by authorities, such insulation becomes de rigueur as a result of the external threat. Under the heading of ‘‘situational context,’’ Janis lists ‘‘high stress from external threats’’ and ‘‘low self-esteem temporarily induced by. . .moral dilemmas: apparent lack of feasible alternatives except ones that violate ethical standards.’’53 In the case of al Qaeda, the inability to have any impact on various Muslim governments, especially in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, created a great deal of angst for its founding members. Given the sacredness of the cause and the lack of viable alternatives, resort to terrorism became quite easy to rationalize. Suicide terrorism, for which there was abundant precedence in Lebanon, Iran, the West Bank, and the Tamils of Sri Lanka, then became rather easy to rationalize.54 Under ‘‘symptoms of groupthink,’’ Janis lists eight specific group process variables that facilitate groupthink. Some of the more telling ones here are: ‘‘illusion of


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invulnerability,’’ ‘‘belief in the inherent morality of the group,’’ ‘‘stereotypes of outgroups,’’ and ‘‘self-appointed mindguards.’’55 A sincere belief that God/Allah is on one’s side, a belief in one’s own good faith, and the disparagement of the other as pagan, infidel, or kafir (unbeliever) pretty much cover the first three on Janis’ list. The mindguard concept refers to the self-censorship of the group as reinforced by a strong leader (or at times by someone specifically responsible for maintaining ‘‘correct’’ thinking) who serves to prevent any serious challenge to the goals and means of the group. In the Soviet military, for example, the zampolit (political commissar) had the power to induce compliance (but not ‘‘identification’’) with the party line. In the Islamist terrorist group, internalization of the group beliefs is facilitated by the leader being imbued with a special sanctity. What makes Janis’ analysis more compelling, we believe, is that the model was developed to account for group decision making in more or less normal political and wartime situations. There is no reference to terrorism or terrorist groups anywhere in Janis’ book. We apply the theory here more with a view toward understanding the ‘‘normalcy’’ of the individuals involved, not to suggest that various terrorist groups will necessarily exhibit the poor tactical decision making that Janis found to flow from groupthink. Even if groupthink proves to be useful for understanding why a terrorist would engage in objectively irrational behavior (killing oneself and others in a doubtful cause), it would be premature to take comfort from this by expecting terrorist groups to self-destruct in tactically irrational decision making. Balancing Processes: Cognitive Dissonance Although not a group process, per se, cognitive dissonance plays a critical role in the relationship between the individual and the group. Cognitive dissonance refers to the motivational state that arises in the individual when one is aware of some lack of balance or fit in one’s makeup.56 To simplify slightly, an individual can be seen as possessing a set of attitudes and values and also a repertoire of behaviors. One can have inconsistency within one’s value-attitude system, within the various behaviors one exhibits, or, most commonly, between an attitude and a behavior. Much of the original cognitive dissonance research involved devising various clever ways to induce introductory psychology students to behave in ‘‘attitude discrepant behavior,’’ such as writing an essay defending a position one did not agree with. Even though the subject could easily rationalize such behavior (‘‘it was only an exercise’’), there was still presumably some dissonance experienced. Since one cannot change one’s past behavior, consistency could be obtained only by changing one’s attitude. There is a counterintuitive aspect to cognitive dissonance theory that made it a highly popular research area. A simple Pavlovian analysis, based on association with reward, would predict that the more reward someone received for (say) writing an essay one did not agree with, the more one would have positive feelings about the ideas in question. Contrary to reinforcement theory, however, cognitive dissonance theory holds that the less incentive one has for engaging in attitude discrepant behavior, the greater the dissonance and hence the greater the change.57 Thus, according to

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cognitive dissonance theory, a person with less rationale for attending a group meeting has more need to justify his behavior and will change more. This idea was tested directly by Aronson and Mills, who manipulated the amount of stress and embarrassment female subjects experienced prior to joining in a group discussion.58 The more stressful the entrance to the group, the more positively the subjects rated their group experience, even to the point of characterizing a (deliberately) boring discussion as interesting. In a similar vein, fraternities with the toughest initiation rites have been found to have the highest level of group cohesion.59 The above research would seem to have direct application to membership in a terrorist group. One pays a tremendous price for joining such a group. For example, the leaders of al Qaeda often had their commitment deepened by a torture experience at the hands of Egyptian security forces.60 The fear that one is throwing one’s life away on a lost cause would be frightening indeed. The way to resolve dissonance is to be fully committed, to allow no doubts to one’s religious beliefs, and to idealize the other group members. The privilege of being selected for a suicide mission then becomes the confirmation of the rightness of one’s behavior leading up to this point. Moghaddam uses a ‘‘stage’’ model to describe the deepening commitment and involvement that take place within Islamist terrorist groups; while such deepening does not appear to be inevitable (most supporters do not actually become terrorists), the need to resolve doubts and see oneself as consistent provides a reasonable theoretical explanation for why such deepening of commitment occurs for many.61 The more risks one has taken and the more one has sacrificed, the greater the need to deepen the commitment in order to avoid an intolerable price-value discrepancy. The need for consistency does not always operate. ‘‘Compartmentalization’’ refers to the ability of the individual to ignore the types of contradictions that normally give rise to dissonance motivation. It is mainly when the inconsistency is brought to a person’s attention and the person is made aware of the ‘‘salience’’ of the issue for his/her basic identity that value and attitude change begins to occur in order to increase the consistency in one’s value-attitude-behavior system.62 Group membership increases the likelihood that one will not be able to compartmentalize, since group membership typically conveys certain limits on how one can behave and on the opinions one can express, whether it be a fraternity or a terrorist cell. This, then, raises the question of why individuals are drawn to terrorist cells in the first place. After all, the subjects in the classic experiments of Milgrim, Zimbardo, Asch, Festinger, and others mentioned above did not choose to be in the situations that shaped their behavior. For most group members, however, the conformity induced by their groups is experienced as a positive rather than a negative feature. To put it another way, it is precisely a group’s function in shaping and maintaining its members’ identity that gives a group its drawing power. Groups and Identity Formation In his classic treatment of the development of the individual, Erik Erikson defined a series of developmental tasks that the individual will face as she/he matures.63


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Each task is framed in terms of a specific crisis to be overcome. The crisis that is relevant to us here is that of adolescence: identity versus role confusion. In order to avoid role confusion, individuals need to be part of a group that will give them feedback as to how they fit into the group and the larger society. Frequent testing of each other’s identity is the norm. As Erikson put it: The readiness for such testing also explains the appeal which simple and cruel totalitarian doctrines have on the minds of the youth of such countries and classes as have lost or are losing their group identities (feudal, agrarian, tribal, national) and face worldwide industrialization, emancipation, and wider communication.64

This description seems especially prescient of the types of stresses placed on the youth of countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s, where globalization not only of the economy but of culture posed a threat to a traditional way of life anchored in Islamic beliefs. The need to define who I am and what I believe creates a natural attraction to those who have developed a strong, charismatic personality and seem to have removed any of their own doubts. Turning to Erikson once again: It is the ideological outlook of a society that speaks most clearly to the adolescent who is eager to be affirmed by his peers, and is ready to be confirmed by rituals, creeds, and programs which at the same time define what is evil. . ..65

The idea that the need for an identity is what draws new recruits to extremist, terrorist groups in the first place walks the line between ‘‘normal development’’ and a psychopathological explanation of terrorism. We would make two observations on this point. First, identity issues constitute a statistically normal part of adolescent development and it does not presume a foundation in an earlier emotional conflict or ego weakness. If the individual lives in a culture that is under stress and provides relatively few productive roles for its youth, such as the Palestinian culture, then the individual may actively seek out a terrorist group. If the individual is a ‘‘marginal man,’’ for example living in an Islamic community in France, there may be a more gradual recruitment and deepening process that takes the person from role confusion to confirmed terrorist. But, in either case, the pathology is more so in the culture or situation than in the individual, per se. Should that same individual be transported to a healthier situation, then there may never be any evidence of social or psychological maladjustment. A second—equally important—observation, however, is that identity confusion is more likely with someone who has not fully resolved the earlier stages of development. For example, unresolved anger would make any violence-oriented group (whether a youth gang involved in drug distribution or a right wing neo-Nazi group) more appealing. Low self-esteem and unresolved dependency needs would make a religious cult more appealing. Suicidal ideation might be channeled through a group that promotes suicide terrorism. Even normal attitudes and normal vocational choice

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can be linked to underlying psychological needs or conflicts. In a classic formulation, Daniel Katz refers to the overdetermination of attitude formation.66 Katz sees attitudes as satisfying four different functions: instrumental/utilitarian, ego-defensive, value-expressive, and knowledge/structure. While no attitude needs to satisfy all functions, the more functions that it satisfies the more central and powerful the attitude will be in the person’s makeup. If we apply these four functions to a terrorist group and its ideology, the group may appeal to a person because it provides rewards, such as education and training for its members, travel opportunities, and even cash payments to families of suicide bombers. For ego defense, the group assures the new member of his value, removes self-esteem doubts, and provides rationalizations for angry or even suicidal impulses. The value expressive function of the group is probably its most obvious. By confirming one’s cherished values, whether nationalistic or religious, value expressive attitudes ‘‘not only give clarity to the self-image but also mold that self-image closer to the heart’s desire.’’67 This should be especially comforting when those basic beliefs are felt to be under siege from an alien culture. Finally, a group’s ideology can be seen ‘‘to give meaning to what would otherwise be an unorganized chaotic universe. People need standards or frames of reference for understanding their world, and attitudes help to supply such standards.’’68 While the ego-defensive function may suggest individual psychopathology, the other functions are a normal, healthy part of an identity development and are sufficient for explaining the terrorist’s commitment to the group.69 The group identity that results first shores up the individual identity and then becomes a part of or even replaces it.70 THE FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION HYPOTHESIS It has long been noted that the blocking of any goal-directed activity, such as maintaining a positive identity, is a stimulus to aggressive behavior. The first formal statement of this relationship was the ‘‘frustration-aggression hypothesis’’ put forth by the ‘‘Yale Group’’ of social and clinical psychologists.71 Coincidently, one of the first tests of this hypothesis involved a form of domestic terrorism, namely the lynching of Negroes mostly in the southern United States. Hypothesizing that this sort of scapegoating aggression was in response to general frustration, Hovland and Sears predicted that there would be a negative correlation between the price of cotton and the number of lynchings in any given year.72 Hovland and Sears looked at both total lynchings (n=4,761) and Negro (n=3,386) lynchings over a forty-nine–year period, 1882 through 1930. An index of overall economic conditions in the entire country proved to be an excellent predictor of total lynchings: −0.65; looking only at Negro lynchings, deviations in the price of cotton in Southern states proved to be an even stronger predictor: −0.72.73 Hovland and Sears did not claim that it was the most frustrated individuals who participated directly in the aggression against Negroes. But, if we adopt the reasonable assumption that lynching was a form of terrorism designed to ‘‘keep the Negro in his place,’’ then a predisposition to act aggressively in response to frustration


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would be one factor (out of many) that draws an individual to a terrorist group (in this case, the lynch mob). The original frustration-aggression hypothesis has been adapted to a more modern cognitive-behavioral formulation.74 In this updated version, frustration does not lead directly to aggression, but to an attribution process in which the frustrated individual first attempts to understand the cause of the frustration. Several attributional types or styles have been identified, four of which are especially relevant for our discussion. Two of these attributional styles involve internal, self-blaming attributions.75 In ‘‘characterological self-blame,’’ one’s inability to reach one’s goals (i.e., the frustration) is seen as due to one’s own personal shortcomings. This attribution leads naturally to depression and helplessness. ‘‘Behavioral self-blame,’’ on the other hand, refers to a simple mistake that is not a part of one’s character. Therefore, behavioral self-blame can still leave one with a sense of being in control, which leads to the motivation to change those aspects of behavior that are problematic. The other two attributional styles of interest here are both external. Attributing frustration to chance, fate, an arbitrary God, or other forces generally beyond anyone’s control leads to anxiety and withdrawal. However, attributing frustration to the unwarranted, unfair behavior of others leads to anger and aggression, both for retaliation and also instrumentally, to improve things.76 This last type of attribution, a ‘‘hostile attribution,’’ has been identified as a personality trait, though not necessarily one with high consistency across all situations.77 Whether or not a tendency to make hostile attributions is a pathological trait depends on the reasonableness of the attribution. Thus, a victim of frequent discrimination or unfair treatment may have a realistic basis for a preference for hostile attributions. Besides its implications for behavior, a hostile attribution is to some extent ego defensive.78 That is, it protects a person’s self-esteem by locating the source of the frustration outside of the person and by implying that some sort of retaliation is appropriate. We hypothesize, then, that low or vulnerable self-esteem, especially as found in someone undergoing an identity crisis, combined with a hostile attribution style, creates a predisposition to be attracted to a terrorist group. The prevalence of such predispositions in a population, interacting with opportunity and cultural support for joining a terrorist group, would then determine the percentage of people likely to enter the first stage of terrorist group involvement—after which the group’s deepening processes would gradually convert the individual into a full-fledged terrorist, capable of both suicide and homicide.79 UNDERSTANDING SUICIDE Townsend has recently reviewed the literature on suicide terrorists. Townsend found five studies that met her criteria of being empirical studies of individuals who had committed or attempted to commit an act of suicide terrorism.80 For those who had actually completed their suicide mission, the data were based on psychological autopsies. These autopsies typically involve interviews with family members

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and notes or videotapes left by the terrorist.81 In cases where the mission had been thwarted by arrest, the terrorists themselves were interviewed in Israeli prisons.82 In some cases, interviews were conducted with subjects who stated their willingness to undertake such a mission but had not yet been called upon to do so.83 Townsend’s focus in conducting her review of these studies was to look for any commonalities with what is known about other suicidal populations. Townsend found little evidence that suicide terrorists felt any of the negative emotions, such as anger, hopelessness, depression, or ‘‘the psychological features of entrapment, defeat, and unbearable mental pain’’ (p. 42) that are characteristic of most suicides. Some have suggested that suicide terrorists could be classified, following Durkheim, as altruistic suicides.84 While not totally discounting this, Townsend85 argues: ‘‘Most classic examples of altruistic suicide do not involve the death of others in the altruistic act.’’ It is the linkage, then, of the suicidal act with homicidal intent that for Townsend at least separates the suicide terrorist from the classic idea of the altruistic suicide. Indeed, this is in keeping with the outlook of the terrorists themselves who typically insist that their behavior is not suicide—strictly forbidden by the Qur’an —but rather an act of martyrdom or ‘‘shahada.’’86 Townsend’s conclusion was that the various terrorists do not show any particular evidence, as a group, of psychological disorder, nor do they have any personality traits in common other than ‘‘enmeshment with religion.’’87 Rather, ‘‘indoctrination and group processes [are] the commonly cited motivations.’’ 88 A key point that Townsend stressed throughout is that a terrorist’s suicidal behavior is instrumental rather than an end in itself. The individual is not so much trying to end his or her own life, or to avoid negative feelings, but is trying to accomplish a political goal and concurrently enter paradise. Group processes reinforce this belief and keep the individual committed to his or her path. The belief that one is entering paradise appears to be sincerely held by Muslim terrorists.89 If so, then judging their affect by how they appear at the time of the mission seems to us to be an invalid way of assessing possible underlying psychological motivation. Indeed, in his psychological autopsy of Mohammed Atta, one of the leading 9/11 terrorists, Meloy finds rather extensive symptomatology in Atta’s background.90 Atta’s conflicted relationship with his father and his excessive dependency on his mother would provide any Freudian with ample evidence of an unresolved Oedipal complex. Meloy himself concludes that Atta’s immersion in extremist religious doctrine and his decision to martyr himself were driven by repressed sexuality and displacement of intense anger toward his perfectionist father. The idea that deep religious involvement functions as an outlet for strong emotional conflict echoes Shbley’s concept, referred to earlier, of ‘‘dogma-induced critical/psychotic depression.’’91 So, is the preterrorist personality of a Mohamed Atta the exception or the rule? It may well be that underlying psychopathology for suicide terrorists could be found if sufficient information is available for a meaningful psychological autopsy.92 We are not arguing here for the psychological normalcy or mental health of most suicide terrorists. We are stating and feel that we have established a much more modest


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claim: a normal level of frustration and identity confusion, combined with a variety of situational/group processes, may be sufficient to produce a suicide terrorist. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In this chapter, we have set forth the outline for a social psychology of terrorism. It is our contention that the routine processes present in social interaction, especially group dynamics, can be sufficient for converting an otherwise psychologically healthy person into a terrorist, including the 9/11 bombers as well as suicide terrorists in general, whether or not motivated by a religious ideology. It is not our contention that all or even most terrorists are psychologically healthy. Three other possibilities should be kept in mind. First, some may be attracted to terrorism as an outlet for inner conflict—the basic psychopathology model. Second, some may become unhealthy as a result of the group processes involved in terrorism.93 Finally, in some cases the idea of a cultural neurosis might be relevant;94 that is, the normal beliefs and practices of a culture, while producing someone who functions well in that culture, may at the same time produce an unhealthy person, psychologically speaking. Perhaps it is time to revisit this classic concept, delicate though it may be in an age of diversity, multiculturalism, and political correctness.95 The concept of identity formation is especially useful because it can subsume all of the routes to terrorism that we outline above. Are there any practical implications for determining the relative percentages of individuals in a particular terrorist movement or organization who arrive at their destinations by the various routes—even simplified to primarily social processes versus primarily psychopathological motivations? Is there any practical way of making such an assessment? Would assessing the determining motivation of a particular terrorist aid in predicting his general strategy and decision making? These are challenging questions that must remain beyond the scope of the present inquiry. We do hope, however, to have provided herein a helpful social psychological platform from which to begin searching for the answers to these questions. Perhaps in these answers lie some suggestions that may be used by national policymakers as they attempt to vitiate the contemporary scourge of terrorism. NOTES 1. A. Gordon, ‘‘Terrorism as an Academic Subject After 9/11: Searching the Internet Reveals A Stockholm Syndrome Trend,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, (2005): 45–59. 2. From the terrorist’s point of view, these rewards are not inconsiderable. For example, the shaheed, or martyr, receives forgiveness for his sins and is granted immediate entry into paradise. In some communities, his family is honored and given a large cash payment. He can intercede with Allah on behalf of his relatives’ entry into paradise as well. The (male) martyr has also been told that he will enjoy the company of seventy-two ‘‘houris,’’ or beautiful young women. F. Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005); A. Oliver and P. Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs’ Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

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3. B. Ganor, ‘‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’’ Police Practice and Research 3, (2002): 287–304; and J. Goodwin, ‘‘A Theory Of Categorical Terrorism,’’ Social Forces 84, (2006): 2027–2046. 4. M. P. Arena and B. A. Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat (New York: New York University Press, 2006). 5. M. Grimland, A. Apter, and A. Kerkhof, ‘‘The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing: A Review of Psychological and Nonpsychological Factors,’’ Crisis 27, (2006): 107–118. 6. M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006). 7. H. Barlow, Dead for Good: Martyrdom and the Rise of the Suicide Bomber (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2007). 8. Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity. 9. Because some writers refer to terrorists as ‘‘psychopaths,’’ it will be useful to distinguish the concepts of psychopathology and psychopathy. ‘‘Psychopathology’’ refers to symptoms of mental illness. Hallucinations would be an extreme example; unwarranted anxiety or depression would also constitute psychopathology. Psychopathology is a measure of the (poor) mental health of the person. ‘‘Psychopathy’’ refers to the traits or qualities thought to characterize the psychopath: a personality disorder that represents an extreme form of antisocial personality. The antisocial personality (and a fortiori the psychopath) is a type of ‘‘personality disorder,’’ and in that sense a diagnosable mental illness. However, there is typically no loss of reality contact, nor is there any unpleasant emotional state (except when one is ‘‘caught’’); and antisocial personality is usually specifically excluded as the basis for an insanity defense claim. Because the psychopath is said to lack any moral restraints and to engage in extremely destructive behavior, some writers have characterized the suicide terrorist as a psychopath. Most authors, however, argue that the psychopath is unlikely to fit into the discipline required in a terrorist organization, except possibly in a few specialized niches. J. Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 47–53; L. Miller, ‘‘The Terrorist Mind: II. Typologies, Psychopathologies, and Practical Guidelines for Investigation,’’ Ineternational Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 50, (2006): 255–268; J. Victoroff, ‘‘The Mind of The Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, (2005): 3–42. 10. J. Post, ‘‘When Hatred is Bred to the Bone: Psychological Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism,’’ Political Psychology 26, (2005): 615–636; D. Lester, B. Yang, and M. Lindsay, ‘‘Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, (2004): 283–295. 11. Victoroff, The Mind of the Terrorist. 12. Grimland, Apter, and Kerkhof, The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing. 13. J. M. Post, ‘‘Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorism as the Product of Psychological Choices,’’ in Origins of Terrorism, ed. W. Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 25–40. 14. R. Pearlstein, The Mind of the Political Terrorist (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1991). 15. Miller, The Terrorist Mind. 16. A. Schbley, ‘‘Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological Profile,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, (2003): 105–134. 17. J.R. Meloy, ‘‘Indirect Personality Assessment of the Violent True Believer,’’ Journal of Personality Assessment 82, (2004): 138–146.


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18. R.J. Homant and D.B. Kennedy, ‘‘Serial Murder: A Biopsychosocial Approach,’’ in Serial Crime, ed. Wayne Petherick (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2006), 189–224. 19. Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism; W. Loza, ‘‘The Psychology of Extremism and Terrorism: A Middle-Eastern Perspective,’’ Aggression and Violent Behavior 9, (2006): 1–15; M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); A. Silke, ‘‘Chesire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research,’’ Psychology, Crime and Law 4, (1998): 51–69; Victoroff, The Mind of the Terrorist. 20. R.C. Kessler, et al., ‘‘Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of 12-month DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication,’’ Archives of General Psychiatry 63, (2005): 617–627. 21. F.M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); M. R. Pynchon and R. Borum, ‘‘Assessing Threats of Targeted Group Violence: Contributions from Social Psychology,’’ Behavioral Sciences and the Law 17, (1999): 339–355. 22. Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity; Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism; Victoroff, The Mind of the Terrorist. 23. T. Ahmed, ‘‘The Muslim Marginal Man.’’ Policy 21, (2005): 35–41; Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity; R. Patai, The Arab Mind (Long Island, NY: Hatherleigh Press, 2002). 24. Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism; Loza, The Psychology of Extremism. 25. Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 34. 26. L. Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: KNOPF, 2006). 27. Grimland, Apter, and Kerkhof, The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing. 28. E. Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951). 29. Victoroff, The Mind of the Terrorist. 30. H.H. Kelley, ‘‘The Process Of Causal Attributions,’’ American Psychologist 28, (1973): 107–128. 31. J.D. Delamater and D.J. Myers, Social Psychology, 6th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007). 32. F. Heider, ‘‘Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality,’’ Psychological Review 51, (1944): 258–374. 33. S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1974); T. Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 34. T. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950). 35. S. Milgram, ‘‘Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority,’’ Human Relations 18, (1965): 57–76. 36. T. Blass, ‘‘Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and their Interactions,’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60, (1991): 398–413. 37. Ibid. 38. Participation in a suicide bombing is most likely the result of a combination of motives that would include a desire to avenge perceived individual and collective humiliation, a desire to conform to terrorist group pressures, and also a wish to fulfill a perceived religious duty. See M. Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); and W. Phares, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against

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America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) for a comprehensive analysis of jihadist theological constructions. 39. C. Haney, W.C. Banks, and P.G. Zimbardo, ‘‘Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison,’’ International Journal of Criminology and Penology 1, (1973): 69–97. 40. S.E. Asch, ‘‘Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments,’’ in Groups, Leadership, and Men, ed. H. Guetzkow (Pittsburg, PA: Carnegie Press, 1951), 177–190. 41. M. Sherif, ‘‘A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception,’’ Archives of Psychology 27 (1935): 53–54. 42. R.S. Baron, U.A. Vandello, and B. Brunsman, ‘‘The Forgotten Variable in Conformity Research: Impact of Task Importance on Social Influence,’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, (1996): 915–927. 43. H. Kelman, ‘‘Compliance, Identification, and Internalization,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 2, (1958): 51–60. 44. R.H. Turner and L.M. Killian, Collective Behavior, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1987). 45. Delamater and Myers, Social Psychology. 46. J. M. Darley and B. Latane, ‘‘Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility,’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8, (1968): 377–383. 47. Delamater and Myers, Social Psychology. 48. J.M. Levine and R.L. Moreland, ‘‘Small Groups,’’ in The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th ed., ed. D. Gilbert, S. Finske, and G. Lindzey (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 415– 469. 49. E. Townsend, ‘‘Suicide Terrorists: Are They Suicidal?’’ Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 37, (2007): 35–49. 50. K. Lewin, ‘‘Group Decision and Social Change,’’ in Readings in Social Psychology, ed. T.H. Newcomb and E.L. Hartley (New York: Holt, 1947), 330–344. 51. I.L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). 52. Janis, Groupthink, 244. 53. Ibid. 54. Wright, The Looming Tower. 55. Janis, Groupthink. 56. L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957). 57. Ibid. 58. E. Aronson and J. Mills, ‘‘The Effects of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group,’’ Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 59, (1959): 177–181. 59. M. Walker, ‘‘Organizational Type, Rites of Incorporation, and Group Solidarity: A Study of Fraternity Hell Week,’’ Dissertation Abstracts 29, (2-A), (1968): 689–690. 60. Wright, The Looming Tower. 61. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View. 62. R.J. Homant and M. Rokeach, ‘‘Value for Honesty and Cheating Behavior,’’ Personality 1, (1970): 153–162; M. Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (New York: The Free Press, 1973). 63. E.H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1950); E.H. Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crises (New York: Norton, 1968).


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64. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 262. 65. Ibid., 263. 66. D. Katz, ‘‘The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes,’’ in Current Perspectives in Social Psychology , ed. E.P. Hollander and R.G. Hunt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 340–350. 67. Ibid., 348. 68. Ibid., 349. 69. Pynchon and Borum, Assessing Threats of Targeted Group Violence. 70. V. Taylor, ‘‘Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance,’’ American Sociological Review 54, (1989): 761–775; K. Deaux and D. Martin, ‘‘Interpersonal Networks and Social Categories: Specifying Levels of Context in Identity Processes,’’ Social Psychology Quarterly 66, (2003): 101–117; E.R. Smith and S. Henry, ‘‘An In-Group Becomes Part of the Self: Response Time Evidence,’’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 22, (1996): 635–642. 71. J. Dollard and others, Frustration and Aggression (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939). 72. C.I. Hovland and R.R. Sears, ‘‘Minor Studies of Aggression: VI. Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices,’’ The Journal of Psychology 9, (1940): 301–310. 73. Technically, Hovland and Sears (1940) correlated the deviations in lynching and economic well being and only took into account whether the deviations were positive or negative, rather than the amount of deviation (a tetrachoric correlation). While this may have inflated their correlations somewhat, the data plot that they present leaves little doubt about the strength of the relationship. 74. R.W. Novaco, Anger Control: The Development and Evaluation of an Experimental Treatment (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1975); R.W. Novaco, ‘‘The Cognitive Regulation of Anger and Stress,’’ in Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions: Theory, Research, and Procedures, ed. P. Kendall and S. Hollon (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 241–285. 75. R. Janoff-Bulman, ‘‘Characterological vs. Behavioral Self-blame: Inquiries into Depression and Rape,’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, (1979): 1798–1809. 76. L. Berkowitz, ‘‘On the Difference Between Internal and External Reactions to Legitimate and Illegitimate Frustrations: A Demonstration,’’ Aggressive Behavior 7, (1981): 83–96. 77. R.J. Homant and D.B. Kennedy, ‘‘Hostile Attribution in Perceived Justification of Workplace Aggression,’’ Psychological Reports 92, (2003): 185–2003. 78. Such a predisposition has also been termed a ‘‘diathesis’’: a vulnerability that may manifest itself if the ‘‘right’’ stresses and opportunities should happen to come along. M. Zuckerman, Vulnerability to Psychopathology: A Biosocial Model (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1999). See Homant and Kennedy, ‘‘Serial Murder’’ For the Application of this Concept to Sexual Sadistic Killing. There is also some evidence for a culture pattern that emphasizes the role of evil conspiracies in explaining current events. See M. Dwairy, Counseling and Psychotherapy with Arabs and Muslims (New York: Teachers College Press, 2006); D. Pipes, Conspiracy: How the Paranoia Style Flourishes and Where it Comes From (New York: The Free Press, 1997); P. Robins and J. Post, Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997). 79. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View. 80. Townsend, Suicide Terrorists. 81. R.M. Fields, S. Elbedour, and A.F. Hein, ‘‘The Palestinian Suicide Bomber,’’ in The Psychology of Terrorism: Clinical Aspects and Responses, ed. C.E. Stout (Westport, CT: Praeger,

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2002), 193–223; N. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the ‘Human Bombs,’’ New Yorker, November 19, 2001, 36–41; Meloy, ‘‘Indirect Personality Assessment.’’ Schbley, ‘‘Defining Religious Terrorism.’’ 82. J.M. Post, E. Sprinzak, and L.M. Denny, ‘‘Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists.’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 15, (2003): 171–184. 83. Hassan, An Arsenal of Believers; Schbley, Defining Religious Terrorism. 84. D. B. Kennedy, ‘‘A Prećis of Suicide Terrorism,’’ Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 3, no. 4/2, (June 2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/ vol3/iss4/2 (accessed June 6, 2006); A. Leenaars and S. Wenckstern, ‘‘Altruistic Suicides: Are They the Same or Different from Other Suicides?’’ Archives of Suicide Research 8, (2004):131–136. 85. Townsend, Suicide Terrorists, 38. 86. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. 87. Townsend, Suicide Terrorists, 38. 88. Ibid. 89. Recall the discussion earlier in this chapter that a belief in a personal afterlife is not a necessary ingredient for creating a suicide bomber; strong nationalistic feelings were apparently sufficient for the Tamils. See Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity. 90. Meloy, Indirect Personality Assessment. 91. Schbley, Defining Religious Terrorism, 120. 92. Grimland, Apter, and Kerkhof, Defining Terrorism. 93. D. Weatherston and J. Moran, ‘‘Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is There a Relationship?’’ International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 47, (2003): 698–713. 94. E. Fromm, ‘‘Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis,’’ American Sociological Review 9, (1944): 380–384. 95. A related topic is the idea of national character. D. Martindale, ‘‘The Sociology of National Character,’’ Annals 370, (1967): 30–35. An early ’’orientalist,’’ R. Patai, purported to explain the ‘‘Arab mind.’’ R. Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1973); R. Patai, The Arab Mind (Long Island, NY: Hatherleigh Press, 2002). His efforts have certainly generated both criticism and praise. For criticism, see G. Gregg, The Middle East: A Cultural Anthropology (New York: Oxford University Press 2005) and E. Hagopian, ‘‘Review of the Arab Mind,’’ Journal of Palestinian Studies 6, (1977): 122–130. For praise of Patai’s Work, see C. Quigley, ‘‘The Arab Mind,’’ American Anthropologist 76, (1974): 396–397. Nevertheless, many people believe that certain personality configurations are modal for certain cultures, even though empirical validation is elusive. R. McCrae and A. Terracciano, ‘‘National Character and Personality,’’ Current Directions in Psychological Science 15, (2006): 156–161); I. Charny, Fighting Suicide Bombing: A Worldwide Campaign for Life (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007).

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Democracy, Terrorism, and University Engagement Beverly Lindsay History should be studied so that we may repeat, at least, selective parts of it.1 Terrorism is a mode of action for those who perceive that they have no other viable options.2 On a sweltering summer day in 2006, I walked into a men’s prison in Israel where a notable number of the inmates had been convicted of horrific acts of terrorism. When colleagues and friends often ask about my fear of entering such an institution, my reply is that I was not afraid. Perhaps there was a certain level of naivety or comfort because there were numerous measures to protect our group of academic fellows. Moreover, I sensed that the inmates were eager to converse with outside visitors who were university faculty. This comfort quickly turned to extreme mental anguish when I saw a number of the young men who appeared similar to students in my graduate university classes. Why would such men engage (in) and be found guilty of unbearable acts when, in fact, some had been in the midst of university studies? As I fast-forward to April 2007, the aftermath of the thirty-three young people who tragically lost their lives in a hail of gunfire from a student peer at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) is portrayed incessantly in the national and international media. If this had occurred in the Middle East, Afghanistan, or perhaps Indonesia, it is quite possible that the act would have been immediately labeled as a wanton act of terrorism. After all, what possible motives, other than a cause larger than himself, could drive a twenty-three-year-old senior to massacre others? When pondering this query, I read accounts of students at Baghdad Technology University in Iraq who immediately expressed their profound sympathy to the families and friends of those who died tragically at Virginia Tech. The Baghdad Technology University students hung a banner near their main campus gate which

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exclaimed, ‘‘We, the students of Technology University, denounce the attack at Virginia Tech. We extend our condolences to the families of the victims who faced a situation as bad as Iraq’s universities. The sanctity of campuses must be protected around the world.’’3 Expressing solidarity with ‘‘our brothers in humanity and in pursuing knowledge’’ was a rationale as voiced by the student union president who stated that ‘‘We want to let the whole world know that we do not support terrorism (emphases added) anywhere.’’4 Dying friends and professors in the Middle East is a common reality that should become an uncommon situation. Interestingly enough, another Baghdad Technology University student contended that many reclusive students and young people have become suicide attackers and bombers.5 In essence, he was speculating about the mental and psychological conditions of students who might opt to undertake suicide missions, not unlike what was discovered about the Virginia Tech student. Yet, we cannot argue definitely that various young suicide attackers engage in terrorism due to mental illnesses. Various acts of terrorism have been witnessed in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States throughout the previous decade, which extend far beyond the university boundaries. Universities and other educational institutions have been the direct targets as portrayed later in this chapter. During summer 2006, the world observed the devastating effects of the war between Israel and Hezbollah including the impacts on universities and colleges in Northern Israel and Lebanon. Although there are multiple causes of war and violent acts of terrorism, such destructive endeavors affect a multitude of social institutions. On the one hand, military personnel view the damages to universities as collateral damage. On the other hand, university students and civilians may view the acts as terrorism, since they are not engaged in armed combat. Regardless of the perspectives, a central issue emerges concerning the roles that universities and other social institutions may play—via public engagement—in decreasing chances for violent conflicts and terrorism and/or devising means to end conflicts. Given the aforementioned perspectives, what may be the nature of contemporary university public engagement in a new century where terrorism is a global phenomenon? Based upon literature reviews containing illustrations of terrorism and violence and sociopolitical concepts of terrorism, and participant observations of educational and social sectors in Israel during summer 2006, this chapter aims to: (1) articulate modes for university public engagement and the advocating of scholarly inquiry; and (2) link engagement to overarching principles of democracy to help ensure equity and social justice so that terrorism and wars will not appear as viable options. To achieve these aims, this chapter: (a) explicates various conceptual frameworks of terrorism in order to begin postulating university features vis-a`vis terrorism; (b) provides portraits of violence and terrorism, especially in universities and other educational venues; (c) analyzes how fundamental purposes of universities—teaching/instructing, scholarship/research, and public service/ engagement—can become integral parts of solutions; and (d) envisions future policy and programmatic directions regarding terrorism and violence with special reference to educational sites.

DEMOCRACY, TERRORISM, AND UNIVERSITY ENGAGEMENT

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INITIAL CONCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE Several years ago, I attended a national conference of professionals engaged in international affairs, which featured four African American ambassadors in the opening plenary sessions. These ambassadors had reached the highest ranks of the diplomatic corps and some then occupied endowed chairs at prestigious universities such as Columbia and Howard Universities. The audience was somewhat startled by the opening comments of the panel chair who stated that the ambassadors were authorities who could speak on terrorism and address the White House on the strategic and psychological affects of terrorism and violence. The audience could imagine readily their strategic knowledge. Yet, statements concerning the psychological comprehension struck a chord since Americans of color had been the historical victims of unspeakable terrorism, which is often forgotten in the contemporary era.6 Various news commentators and government leaders who attended the 2006 funeral of Coretta Scott King (widow of civil rights icon, Martin Luther King, Jr.) aptly voiced illustrations of terrorism which she and her family had experienced. She and other African Americans of her generation had endured psychologically, despite harsh conditions. What, then, is an initial definition of terrorism? Based upon various sources, terrorism encompasses violent measures, whether physical or psychological, to cause extreme harm or death to an individual or group of people in order for the perpetrator(s) to maintain and/or advance his/her mission or goals. This definition can be further illuminated by noting concepts of Pape,7 Council on Foreign Relations,8 and Kimhi and Even,9 who maintain that terrorism utilizes violence to obtain goals whether political, religious, cultural, or economic. Suicide terrorism, in particular, uses the human body as a ‘‘walking bomb’’ to activate explosives at a chosen time and place to inflict damages and high casualties.10 Suicide terror is viewed as a planned act of civilians against civilians. According to some experts, attacks against military personnel are not terrorist attacks since a fundamental purpose of the military is to engage in combat; hence, it has been contended that they are ‘‘legitimate’’ targets.11 Gordon asserts that since terrorism is a relatively new area of academic research, there are problems with definition, as observed in the following illustrations.12 Some would seriously question former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s statement that former South African President, Nelson Mandela, was a terrorist when he helped his country struggle for democracy.13 Or during the 1950s, when Kenya and other African nations were fighting for independence, their actions were characterized as that of terrorists. In the United States, the actions of Timothy McVeigh, who bombed a Federal building in Oklahoma, were characterized as terrorism.14 Iraqi students have stated that, if the actions of the university student who killed students, faculty, and himself at Virginia Tech had occurred in the Middle East, those actions would have been characterized as terrorism.15 Based upon Kimhi,16 Lindsay,17 and Post, Sprinzak, and Denny,18 terrorism can be classified as political, religious, political-religious, religious-political, psychological, economic, and/or a combination of the aforementioned. The Irish Republic

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Army and Palestine Liberation Organization are examples of political terrorism, while the Islamic Brotherhood is viewed as religious. The bombings in Chechnya are of a political-religious nature. Lynchings of Americans of color during the 19th and 20th centuries were economic and psychological terrorism.19 To these categories, academic terrorism is added, because universities during the Vietnam War, the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other venues experienced violence directed toward faculty, schools, and postsecondary institutions. Certainly, there could be mixed modes of violence, as we shall note later in this chapter, where a variety of factors contribute to terrorism. PORTRAITS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS In April 2007, the UNESCO (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization) published a critical monograph, Education Under Attack,20 vividly portraying violence in educational sectors in countries acutely affected such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Thailand, Nepal, and Columbia. In addition, territories simmering in continuous domestic and international conflict were depicted. According to O’Malley’s definition, violent attacks entail injury or damage by force such as killing, torture, injury, abduction, and the use of land mines in or near educational sites.21 The generic features are that such violence interrupts access to and the provisions of formal education. In January 2007, a number of terrorist and violent encounters were witnessed in Iraq, which included: the shooting and killing of an assistant dean of the College of Law; gunmen kidnapping the Deputy President of the University of Technology; and the detonation of explosives that killed more than 70 students and injured about 179 others at Mustansiriya University. Reportedly, the suicide bomber was a woman clothed in traditional attire near the entrance gate of the business administration department as students prepared to take midterm examinations. Throughout January 2007, over 100 students were killed. During November 2006, Western world academicians were shocked when gunmen in police uniforms kidnapped about one hundred men from the Ministry of Education in Baghdad. While we recognize that a state of domestic and international war exists in Iraq, the country has witnessed the killing of over 280 academics, including 186 university faculty since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in April 2003.22 According to Education Under Attack,23 in the Palestinian Autonomous Territories over 299 incidents of shelling and breaking into universities and schools occurred from September 2000 to June 2004. About 200 university students were killed by January 2007. While the aforementioned illustrative descriptive data are presented, there is no comprehensive international database which can provide a complete picture of attacks in educational environments. For example, the TKB (Terrorism Knowledge Base) provides various figures indicating that since 2000, attacks on universities and other educational sites are continually rising, evidencing a six-fold increase in


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2005 and 2006.24 Nevertheless, given varying regional and national definitions of violence and terrorism, the statistics often reflect individual, group, or organizational reporting methods. TKB statistics would include attacks by Hamas or Taliban, but often not the use of state or national mechanism that harm educational students and personnel. Or, for example, since Hamas is now the official government in the Palestinian territories, would this mean that the TKB no longer cites violence by this party? Statistics from American think tanks and national organizations such as the Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Cato Institute, Council on Foreign Relations, American Association of Universities, and the like are basically absent with regard to terrorism and education, particularly postsecondary education. Some additional statistics can be gleaned from comprehensive news media such as CNN (Cable News Network), BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), and similar international outlets. These, however, are usually of an anecdotal or descriptive nature. For example, in April 2007, CNN correspondents reported on the impact of the ongoing war and its contribution to terrorism as it affects universities in Iraq.25 This report featured students who expressed their continuing fear of commuting to universities and entering the buildings where they could be targets of terrorism. NPR (National Public Radio) has featured a number of articles regarding terrorism in the Middle East with several focusing on Iraq. One was especially poignant as it carried a succinct profile of an eighteen-year-old woman, who under normal conditions might be a typical university student.26 The woman became romantically involved with a young man who persuaded her to try to assassinate a member of parliament. Because her suicide bombing attempt was foiled, she is now imprisoned with little likelihood of becoming a postsecondary education student. The young woman is one of 351 suicide terrorists in Iraq since the American invasion of 2003.27 According to Hafez, approximately 44 percent targeted security forces, 23 percent civilians, and 11 percent targeted government officials and parties.28 Of the 23 percent who were civilians, the precise percentage who were postsecondary students, faculty, and administrators is unknown. According to descriptive statistics by Pape, during the 1980s in select Middle Eastern nations, about 61 percent of male suicide attackers were nineteen to twenty-three years of age and 22 percent were over twenty-four years of age.29 For female suicide attackers, about 40 percent were nineteen to twenty-three years of age and about 43 percent were over twenty-four years of age. In short, we note that a very substantial percentage were ages of typical postsecondary students. Kimhi and Even indicate that in the 1990s and early 2000s, about 81 percent of the suicide perpetrators in Israel were between seventeen and twenty-three.30 That is, they were the age of traditional postsecondary students. Moreover, about 32 percent had higher education. In short, their educational profiles illustrated more formal education than many Palestinians have. During my visit to an Israeli prison, I asked several men about their educational backgrounds and why they decided to engage in terrorism. One man who was in his mid to late twenties, stated that he had been a student at a Palestinian university

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when he opted to engage in violent ‘‘activities to help Palestinians.’’ According to him, he had been a young boy during the first El-Aksa Intifada of the late 1980s and observed how his mother, sisters, and other women were humiliated and treated harshly by the ‘‘occupiers.’’ He never forgot this initial exposure to extreme degradation and humiliation, which festered for years through his time at the university. During his university years, he had two sets of friends, one set consisted of traditional students engaged in study and planning their future careers. The other very small set envisioned ways to initiate violent changes through very careful secret plans. As an academic fellow and professor, I kept thinking, ‘‘Were there not ways that his university could possibly have engaged the young man and his peers in academic and cocurricular activities that would have prevented his extreme actions?’’ Conversations with a middle-age man yielded information about his educational background. A master’s degree in political development was earned. While serving his several sequential life sentences totaling about 300 years, he was studying English as a Second Language. He anticipated being released from prison, as part of a political compromise at some future date, and having the opportunity to communicate with people in various parts of the world who understood English. Again, I pondered what roles might his alma mater have played in presenting alternative options to violence. Such ponderings lead to the examination of the roles of universities, particularly with reference to public engagement, as we consider conceptual and programmatic aspects of universities. FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF UNIVERSITIES It is widely recognized that three fundamental purposes undergird college and university life: teaching and instruction; scholarship and research; and public service and engagement to enhance societal development, including democratic principles of equity and fairness. Students are keenly attuned to the first purpose, while faculty (especially those seeking tenure and/or promotion) are cognizant of the second principle. Considerable lip service is given to the third principle but the actual portrait may be quite different, as voiced by eminent scholars decades ago.31 Almost seventy years ago, professor and future Nobel Peace Laureate Ralph Bunche maintained that universities have a great responsibility in trying times. Windows of truth must be at the center of university endeavors; yet he declared, ‘‘too often our search for ‘Truth’ becomes an escape device. . .. We may come to conceive of the quest after ‘Truth’ as an end in itself, and fall into the unconscious error of assuming that there is no connection between the ‘Truth’ and the practical and that it is not academically respectable to tackle the practical.’’32 Bunche was essentially espousing a nexus between the life of the university and the necessity of addressing and positing policy and programmatic solutions to concrete challenges through public service functions of postsecondary education. Helping to void threats by preparing students for their careers and the mantles of leadership is a salient university role.33 Engaged students would challenge adverse society conditions rather than


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remaining complacent. In essence, university education would be fostering public services roles for students. According to one chancellor of an American university, the quest for truth is a component of an intellectual formula so that postsecondary institutions should not be disconnected from humane world responsibilities. Posing difficult queries, undertaking assessments, and determining what research and services are needed in various communities and regions to address pressing problems are mandatory endeavors. Hence, a quest for the truth is not the only objective; if it is, then a false state of euphoria may emerge from engaging primarily in basic research and scholarship.34 When shifting to the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, we observe changing perspective from public service to public engagement. As stressed in the 2004 conference of the American Sociological Association, ‘‘Public sociology should transcend the academy and engage wider audiences to be inclusive and democratic’’ by constructing bridges that bond various communities and civil societies.35 Prominent international elected officials and policymakers have spoken on this subject, including former President of Ireland Mary Robinson, who presented a keynote speech on public roles of universities encompassing modes of contributing to democracy and civil society. Two years later, in 2006, the theme of the American Educational Research Association Conference was ‘‘Educational Research in the Public Interest.’’ Again, emphases are on the linkages between scholarship and challenges facing students vis-a`-vis fairness in both the educational milieu and the larger democratic society. In 2007, two major educational conferences stressed the critical need for university and student engagement. For instance, the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (2007) hailed its theme of ‘‘From Vision to Action’’ so university teacher/educators and school professionals would make direct connections to the educational problems of students and those which they may face on the national and international stages. The Comparative and International Education Society Conference (2007) structured its panels around the theme, ‘‘Engaging Our Differences.’’ Panelists from various nations sought to explicate different sociocultural and educational challenges ranging from ethnic to racial to religious to gender distinctions so that some common ground could be identified. The common ground could provide a foundation for university scholars and public policymakers to link research with ongoing challenges by recognizing that postsecondary engagement could present solutions to disparities. Thus, democratic principles would be evident continually in the academy and larger society. Salient questions emerge: (1) To what extent do and might colleges and universities undertake basic and applied research in order to prevent and/or address problems of terrorism?; (2) To what degree might there be curricular alterations and cocurricular programs so that factors contributing to terrorism are prevented or lessened?; and (3) What are the modes for involving faculty in the process of such engaged research and curricular endeavors in light of traditional tenure and promotion requirements? To help examine the first two questions, we illuminate the endeavors of centers and institutes at three world-renowned universities: University of St. Andrew’s in

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Scotland; the University of Chicago in the United States; and Tel Aviv University in Israel. These sites are selected due to their establishment and/or enhancement of scholarly and research centers designed to respond to pressing practical problems by direct engagement with the pressing global problems of terrorism and violence. Each exemplifies a different approach to terrorism and violence. The University of St. Andrews, founded in 1423, making it the third oldest university in the United Kingdom, has 6,799 students: 5,746 are undergraduates and 1,053 postgraduates. As a world class university, it seeks to remain abreast (of ) and engage in cutting-edge scholarship. Thus, in 1994, the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence was established. Under the chairmanship of a professor from the School of International Relations and another professor who was a former United Nations officer who addressed terrorism prevention, the Centre has six professionals whose interests include political terrorism, psychology, violence, economics, terrorism, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and failed states. The Centre strives to provide educational experiences to university students and the public through its seminars, conferences, and internships.36 Curriculum development in terrorism studies and innovative training become part of the undergraduate and graduate programs in international relations and political science. Of particular interest for undergraduate students are cocurricular internships designed in light of two major objectives. First, students are to engage in learning by doing work on various projects via data collection from primary and secondary sources. Understanding how information is assembled, used, and disseminated is important as students develop research and work skills. Second, interaction with other interns, faculty, and professionals in the fields enables students to understand the dynamic nature of terrorism and violence. Accompanying senior professors and fellows to media interviews and presentations is part of the internship.37 As another means of engagement, a Certificate in Terrorism Studies was implemented largely via e- (electronic) learning through virtual classrooms and online communications. The e-learning program is geared toward professionals in police, military, customs, emergency services, transportation services, private security companies, contingency planners, and the like. Obtaining illustrations from the professionals on actual and possible terrorism and violence are part of the curriculum. Hence professionals should enhance their knowledge and sharpen their applied skills in light of the latest research findings and technology.38 Established in 1890 by the American Baptist Education Society and John D. Rockefeller, the University of Chicago now has 13,400 students. At its inception, an American liberal arts curriculum characterized undergraduate study, while a German research-focused model characterized graduate study. Although established by Baptists, its nondenominational status from inception was unique as was the immediate matriculation of minorities and women. It is further atypical of American universities because the majority of students are in graduate and professional schools— 9,000—compared with 4,400 in baccalaureate programs.39 From 1981 to 2001, there were about 187 worldwide suicide attacks. Alarmingly, an astounding 128 were committed from 2001 to 2003. Such dire statistics led


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Robert Pape, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, to assemble an interdisciplinary team from economics, history, Near Eastern languages and civilization, political science, and other social and human sciences to investigate suicide terrorism from the emergence of the tactic in Lebanon by Hezbollah in the early 1980s to the present. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism is the result; the University of Chicago provided initial funding and continues administrative support.40 Through other funding and a partnership with the Argonne National Laboratory, the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism continues to unearth data in newspapers and media from various languages throughout the world and to develop computer models. Such models may help anticipate where next acts will occur. Various graduate and professional students are able to incorporate the research into their theses and dissertations and to prepare for professional careers. An immediate public engagement role of the project consists of testimonies and presentations by Pape and other project professionals to U.S. House and Senate committees, Cabinet secretaries, and their Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense. In addition, UN Secretary Generals have utilized the findings. The Washington Post, New York Times, National Public Radio, and other major media outlets have covered findings from the project, hence demonstrating the project’s and the university’s dissemination and engagement with global problems. In 1956, Tel Aviv University was established from the Tel Aviv School of Law and Economics, the Academic Institute of Natural Sciences, and the Academic Institute of Jewish Studies in the new nation’s largest city. Now, the largest university in Israel and the largest primarily Jewish university in the world, about 30,000 students are enrolled.41 The University declares that learning without limits, addressing social concerns, and contributing to the peace process are fundamental principles of educational endeavors for students via curricular offerings in nine faculties (colleges) and ninety research institutes.42 Of particular concern are those centered around peace processes. The University Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation was founded in 2002 by the University and the Peres Center for Peace (initiated by former Israeli Prime Minister and Nobel Peace Laureate Shimon Peres in 1996). Concentrating on research and discussion of diplomacy via regional cooperation in the Middle East, the institute is part of the Faculty of Social Sciences. Hence it concentrates on interdisciplinary social science disciplines and paradigms. In order to avert violent means of addressing acute contemporary problems, often vested in historical animosities, the institute’s goals include: undertaking research on diplomacy and regional cooperation; convening conferences, colloquia, and workshops; and funding research for graduate students, faculty members, and professionals. The University Institute is headed by a senior professor of sociology who also holds an appointment at the University of Illinois (Chicago), thus enabling the institute to engage in international cross-fertilization of ideas. Moreover, the institute’s Executive Committee includes the Tel Aviv University president, thus lending cache to its endeavors. Preventing terrorism and violence through contributions of current research is key as noted in the research projects, which range from cooperation

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between Israelis and Palestinians in agriculture, to competing pathways to peace, to regional air transportation in the Middle East, and to the mediating activities of Ralph Bunche in the late 1940s.43 Of note is the last topic—the institute’s research still focuses on the 1950 Nobel Peace Laureate Ralph Bunche to help ascertain if there are paradigms applicable to contemporary conditions. Conferences and workshops convened by the University Institute have focused on research just cited as well as topics such as Israeli-Jordanian peace assessments, regional cooperation through local governments, and social and psychological factors in conflict resolution. Sociopsychological strains of school students have been examined in order to help pupils deal with inordinate stress, so violent options are not pursued. While the illustrations from the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, and the University Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation portray the role of universities in public engagement, the former president of the Salzburg Seminar44 maintains that university public engagement is often impeded by faculty allegiances to their disciplines rather than the university, per se.45 That is, faculty views of their national and international colleagues are more important than local university mission and cultural pronouncements. Hence, there may be disconnections when the university attempts to advocate public engagement while the disciplinary allegiances are paramount.46 To move toward remedies, it is recommended that close congruence be established in the faculty tenure, promotion, and raise processes so that public engagement is, indeed, given comparable weight as teaching, scholarship, and research. In short, faculty would be rewarded for public engagement in their disciplines. Phrased in another fashion, faculty members could be engaged as public intellectuals, that is, they undertake cogent reflection, take action, and are ensconced in their communities and regions. Thoughtful analysis and reflection coupled with concrete action characterizes public intellectual engagement. The public aspects of the action may be undertaken directly by the actor and/or by her/his role in ensuring that others do so. Herein lies a dilemma. A solution can produce a problem, because some terrorism and violent attacks are specifically directed toward public school professionals and university faculty and students who initiate public engagement roles. SILENCING DEMOCRATIC AND FAIR PROCESSES When South Africa was struggling for its democracy and political independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were frequent scrimmages around educational institutions, and individual families and young men were attacked if they belonged to the wrong political party. Or they were attacked if they were suspected of collaborating with the Afrikaan government. A number of children, teachers, and local residents had to run to elementary and secondary schools and teacher training colleges for sanctuary as fighting ensued.47 Although there were attacks on educational institutions, the belief existed that they were not to be attacked because they were vital to an envisioned new South African democracy.


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Contrast the aforementioned with various dismal incidents described by O’Malley in Education Under Attack.48 In Afghanistan and Pakistan, offensives against girls’ schools and their teachers were rooted in Islamic groups believed to be allied with the Taliban or al Qaeda. On one occasion in Zabul province, the headmaster of a co-educational school was beheaded. According to some, co-educational sites should not exist. Ideological perspectives dictated limited educational and social exposure for girls. By thwarting their elementary and secondary study, it would then be arduous for young women to continue to postsecondary education and assume careers as teachers and other professionals who would perpetuate the wrong ideology. Further, O’Malley reports that furtive night letters forbade the principal of a girls’ high school to continue endeavors for young women. Menacing telephone messages and other communications had warned her to close the 7,000-body school because girls should not leave home. If not adhered to, the principal would be killed. In another instance, a land mine was found in a classroom. Even if schools are to exist, the curricular content is scrutinized so that Western modes of instruction and content are obliterated, although, in this case, the ministry had been consulted extensively before the curriculum design was implemented. The curtailment of education affects future lost generations, somewhat akin to that in South Africa when large numbers of youth, for a variety of reasons, did not attend or complete public education in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, their skills are lost as the nation seeks to engage in democratic practices and national development. The situation in Afghanistan and parts of the Middle East could be similar in 15–20 years. As documented by Pape, suicide terrorism in Iraq escalated after 2001 and particularly after 2003.49 Militants have heightened their efforts to annihilate Baghdad’s remaining intellectual and middle classes with rounds of intimidations, bombings, and assassinations.50 For example, in January 2007, the corpses of three Sunni professors and a student were found after their car had been ambushed several days earlier after it drove away from the law school. Since 2003, about 40 percent of Iraqi professionals have fled and the number of fleeing school teachers doubled. One might assume that violence would be directed primarily toward students and faculty in the social sciences and education. An adviser to the Iraqi president on scientific matters maintains that nearly every academic discipline and university has been targeted. Cleansing universities of collaborators with the other political and social parties, as well as attacking perceived Western modes of postsecondary education, ideology, and curriculum have been rationales for attacks. When academic posts such as department chairs, deans, and university presidents or rectors are still occupied by conscientious professionals, opposition political and religious opponents may attack because incumbents ostensibly favor one group over another.51 In short, even when sound academic practices are attempted that include addressing social and scientific problems of the region, the efforts are thwarted. That is, public engagement becomes a huge liability when political and cultural allegiances are paramount. Such problems are further compounded since some Iraqi universities had ties with British and American universities where thousands of professionals had earned doctoral degrees. As Iraqi professionals flee, the universities are coping with extensive

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infrastructure problems while still bulging with students. According to an Iraqi deputy minister for higher education, 85 percent of all university infrastructures have been destroyed as the Western forces and the new government seek to gain and maintain governmental control. Rebuilding has been difficult even though the United States Agency for International Development allocated $20 million to partner Iraqi and American universities; funds were late to arrive and professionals failed to appear. Many university professionals fled as Qatar and South Korea were still pledging funds.52 One university president stated that only 10 percent of the fiscal resources promised actually materialized on site; thus the financial allocations were insufficient to help stem the tide of departures. If such problems exist, how might universities stem the tide of terrorism via public engagement and democratic methods? Thoughtful policies and programmatic directions provide some cues. FUTURE POLICY AND PROGRAMMATIC DIRECTION As a featured speaker at an international luncheon sponsored by the Women’s Foreign Policy Group in July 2006, University of Notre Dame Middle East scholar Asma Afsaruddin voiced the quote cited at the beginning of this chapter. The larger context of the quote is ‘‘History it is commonly stated [in Western World] should be studied so that one may not be condemned to repeat it. In the Islamic context, there is a great deal of justification to state the opposite: History, we may say, should be studied so that one may repeat, at least, selective parts of it.’’53 Her profound quote illustrates a major problem or root of terrorism. The phenomena of history—we also may add other sociopolitical dynamics—are viewed in fundamentally different ways. Hence, solutions as violent as terrorism emerge. What Afsaruddin postulates is that a basic comprehension of others’ social and cultural communities is indispensable in university curriculum. While this is comprehended as a first step, it is an indispensable prerequisite for subsequent policies. Second, while the academic community believes that objectivity and neutrality are integral to universities, significant segments of the community often hold opposite views. For example, the provision of quality education may be limited (for) or denied to certain groups whether students, faculty, or administrators. As particular ethnic or political groups are in university power positions as senior professors, deans, vice presidents, and president, their decision making and roles in curriculum design are not deemed neutral or objective. Selective programs are institutionalized and become normative. Hence, various ethnic and cultural segments must be fairly represented in transparent processes so that authentic input characterizes the university. Third, educational sites need to be viewed as safe places to learn, instruct, and research. In essence, my research on South Africa demonstrates that, when violence ensues, schools and universities should be sanctuaries, rather than fortresses or sites of attack.54 Attacks from both insurgents and the military on educational sites should not be evident. Various South African schools and teacher training colleges were not attacked because they were viewed as vital to a future democratic society.


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The challenge is for colleges and universities to be viewed as critical ingredients of fair and equitable procedures, perhaps through initial community engagement in ‘‘safe’’ areas and then proliferating to other sites. Fourth, in recent presentations to the Council on Foreign Relations, the presidents of four American universities discussed, ‘‘American Universities in the Middle East: Agents of Change in the Arab World.’’55 The presidents of American University of Beirut, American University of Cairo, Lebanese American University, and American University of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates) maintain that their institutions are change agents through the inculcation of fairness and equity values in their curriculum and the acceptance of various demographic groups. Their alumni later assume key university, professional, and governmental positions wherein they may contribute to social development and democracy via engaged lives. A practical endeavor for these universities could be engagement by provisions to enable students from regions and countries affected by terrorism and war to matriculate at the American university sites. This practice was successful in many American universities in the United States that permitted special matriculation options for students after Hurricane Katrina devastated their universities. Fifth, since university infrastructures have been curtailed, the universities may initiate learning and communication by electronic modes or e-learning. While it is recognized that e-learning and instruction may be difficult, it may be one of a very few viable alternatives versus no instruction, since dozens of university faculty have fled. With e-learning and instruction, cross-fertilization of ideas can occur via intellectual migration in lieu of physical movement. Hence, Iraqi universities that had partnerships with British and American universities might see these linkages reestablished through electronic modes of engagement by academies in the northern hemisphere. For instance, the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews could extend its e-learning to select universities in nations experiencing massive terrorism. Sixth, the Tel Aviv University Institute of Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation may portray a viable prototype for direct engagement with the surrounding community and Middle Eastern nations. The research topics that have been pursued have direct application to the region. Including and funding scholarship by Iraqi, Jordanian, Palestinian, or Egyptian students and scholars on terrorism alternatives via peace and reconciliation are critical. Part of this effort could include gathering and compiling statistics on terrorism at educational sites in conjunction with international bodies, since incomplete data exists. Having accurate portraits contributes to modes of preventing terrorism, hopefully, before it occurs. Seventh, we return to an initial quote that terrorism is a mode of action when people perceive they have no other viable options. The overwhelming challenges for universities are: to be placed in positions where they do not experience violence, and to help ensure institutional and democratic processes that decrease violent options. The first challenge entails the commitment by local and national governments and genuine security forces to protect the academy. The second returns us to the fundamental purposes of universities—teaching and instruction, research and

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scholarship, and university and public engagement. Despite all odds, universities must seek to keep their doors open so that the three functions can continue. As this occurs, we will less often hear statements like that of the young Palestinian prisoner convicted of terrorism who believed that he had to engage in violent activities. Instead, we will hear and read statements like that of a young Palestinian student who stated in his doctoral application to a top-tier American research university that, ‘‘A university houses the hope of the future. Its buildings house the future leaders of tomorrow. Universities provide the opportunities and create the environments that these leaders will take with them as they step out into the world. The university is to create the best possible environments and provide the greatest plethora of opportunities’’ built upon democratic processes of fairness and equity and engagement with societal challenges. NOTES 1. Asma Afsaruddin, ‘‘Islamic Perspectives on Democratic Virtues, Pluralism, and the Common Good’’ (Lecture, Women’s Foreign Policy Group, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2006). 2. Beverly Lindsay. ‘‘Democracy, Terrorism, and University Engagement’’ (Lecture, Comparative and International Education Society, Baltimore, MD, February 25–March 1 2007). 3. Bushra Juhi, ‘‘Iraqi Students Saddened by Virginia Tech,’’ Yahoo!News, April 23, 2007, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070423/ap_on_re_mi_ea/virginia_tech_iraq (accessed April 24, 2007). 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Beverly Lindsay. ‘‘Transitioning Through Hurricanes,’’ International Mosaic 6, no. 1, (2002): 21. 7. Robert Pape, ‘‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,’’ American Political Science Review 97, (2003): 343–361; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Robert Pape, ‘‘The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism,’’ The University of Chicago, available at http://jtac.uchicago.edu/conferences/05/ resources/pape_formatted%20for%20DTRA.pdf, n.d. (accessed May 9, 2007): University of Chicago, ‘‘Dying To Win – Unexpected New Data About Suicide Terrorists,’’ Chicago Changes The World: The University of Chicago 2005 Annual Report (Chicago: University Publications Office, 2006) 11–13. 8. Council on Foreign Relations, ‘‘Terrorism Issues in Brief,’’ Council on Foreign Relations Region/Issue Brief, July 2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8274/terrorism_issue _brief.html (accessed on February 9, 2006). 9. Shaul Kimh and Shemuel Even, ‘‘What are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4, (2007): 815–816. 10. Ibid. 11. Shaul Kimh and Shemuel Even, ‘‘What are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4, (2007): 815–840: Anwar Alam, ‘‘The Sociology and Political Economy of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Egypt,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4, (2003): 114–142; Avishag Gordon, ‘‘Terrorism and the Scholarly Communication System’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4, (2001): 116–124.


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12. Avishag Gordon, ‘‘Terrorism and the Scholarly Communication System,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4, (2001): 116–117. 13. Glenn Frankel, ‘‘Mandela, Thatcher Express Mutual Admiration; In ‘Warm and Cordial’ Meeting, Leaders Agree to Disagree on Sanctions, Violence,’’ The Washington Post, July 5, 1990, available at http://proquest.umi.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/pqdweb?index=0 &did=72601363&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309 &VName=PQD&TS=1181666045&clientId=9874 (accessed May 31, 2007). 14. Lisa Anderson, ‘‘U.S. executes its worst terrorist some feel cheated by ‘easy’ death,’’ Chicago Tribune, June 12, 2001, available at http://proquest.umi.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/ pqdweb?index=1&did=73972023 (accessed May 31, 2007). 15. Bushra Juhi, ‘‘Iraqi Students Saddened by Virginia Tech,’’ Yahoo!News, April 23, 2007, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070423/ap_on_re_mi_ea/virginia_tech_iraq (accessed April 24, 2007). 16. Shaul Kimh and Shemuel Even, ‘‘What are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4, (2007): 815–822. 17. Beverly Lindsay. ‘‘Democracy, Terrorism, and University Engagement’’ (Lecture, Comparative and International Education Society, Baltimore, MD, February 25–March 1, 2007). 18. Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, ‘‘The Terrorists in Their Own Worlds: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1, (2003): 175. 19. John Seigenthaler, ‘‘Son of the South,’’ in When Race Becomes Real: Black and White Writers Confront Their Personal Histories, ed. Bernestine Singley (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2002), 51–69; Bradley, David, ‘‘To Make Them Stand in Fear,’’ in When Race Becomes Real: Black and White Writers Confront Their Personal Histories, ed. Bernestine Singley (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2002), 111–137. 20. Brendan O’Malley, Education Under Attack: A Global Study on Targeted Political and Military Violence Against Education Staff, Students, Teachers, Union and Government Officials, and Institutions (New York: UNESCO, 2007). 21. Ibid. 22. Mike Shuster, ‘‘Spate of Suicide Bombings Threatens Iraq Surge,’’ National Public Radio (NPR), May 2, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=9966084 (accessed May 2, 2007). 23. Brendan O’Malley, Education Under Attack: A Global Study on Targeted Political and Military Violence Against Education Staff, Students, Teachers, Union and Government Officials, and Institutions (New York: UNESCO, 2007), 8–9. 24. Ibid., 10. 25. Kyra Phillips, ‘‘Bombings Rattle Classroom, United Students.’’ CNN.com, April 13, 2007, available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/04/12/btsc.phillips.baghdad/ index.html (accessed May 31, 2007). 26. Mike Shuster, ‘‘Spate of Suicide Bombings Threatens Iraq Surge,’’ National Public Radio (NPR), May 2, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=9966084 (accessed May 2, 2007). 27. Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 19, (2007): 95–115; Mike Shuster, ‘‘Spate of Suicide Bombings Threatens Iraq Surge,’’ National Public Radio (NPR), May 2, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId =9966084 (accessed May 2, 2007).

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28. Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 19, (2007): 97. 29. Pape, Robert, ‘‘The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism,’’ The University of Chicago, available at http://jtac.uchicago.edu/conferences/05/resources/pape_formatted%20for %20DTRA.pdf, n.d. (accessed May 9, 2007), 17; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 211–218. 30. Shaul Kimh and Shemuel Even, ‘‘What are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4, (2007): 817–818. 31. Ernest Boyer, Campus Life: In Search of Community (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990); Ernest Boyer, Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997); Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001); Clark Kerr, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949– 1967: Volume Two: Political Turmoil (University of California Press, 2003); D. Watson, The University and Civic Engagement (London: Association of Commonwealth Universities–The ACU Benchmarking Programme, 2004). 32. Ralph Bunche, ‘‘The Role of the University in the Political Orientation of Negro Youth,’’ Journal of Negro Education 9, no. 4, (1940): 571–579. 33. Ralph Bunche, ‘‘The Role of the University in the Political Orientation of Negro Youth.’’ Paper presented at the Howard University Summer School Conference on the Needs of Negro Youth, Washington, D.C., 1940; Ralph Bunche, ‘‘The Role of the University in the Political Orientation of Negro Youth,’’ Journal of Negro Education 9, no. 4, (1940): 571–579. 34. Beverly Lindsay, ‘‘Educational and Diplomatic Influences at Public Research Universities,’’ in Ralph Johnson Bunche: Public Intellectual and Nobel Peace Laureate, ed. Beverly Lindsay (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 79–94. 35. American Sociological Association, ‘‘Public Sociologies’’ Program, Annual Meeting Program of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 14–17, 2004. 36. Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, ‘‘About the Centre,’’ Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, http:// www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/research/cstpv/pages/about.html (accessed May 11, 2007). 37. Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, ‘‘About the Centre,’’ Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/research/cstpv/pages/about.html (accessed May 11, 2007); Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, ‘‘Internship Programme Policy Statement,’’ Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/research/cstpv/documents/ CSTPV%20Intern%20Policy%20Statement.pdf (accessed May 11, 2007). 38. Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, ‘‘Certificate in Terrorism Studies,’’ Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews, available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/research/cstpv/pages/new.html (accessed May 11, 2007). 39. University of Chicago, ‘‘University of Chicago Fact Sheet,’’ University of Chicago, available at http://www-news.uchicago.edu/resources/facts/ (accessed May 11, 2007). 40. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 11–13. 41. Suzanne Hickey, email message to Admissions, Tel Aviv University, June 12, 2007. 42. Tel Aviv University, ‘‘Introduction to TAU,’’ Tel Aviv University, available at http:// www.tau.ac.il/intro-eng.html (accessed May 11, 2007).


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43. The University Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, ‘‘About UIDRC.’’ Tel Aviv University, available at http://www.tau.ac.il/institutes/diplomacy/about.html (accessed May 11, 2007). 44. Salzburg Seminar, ‘‘Biography of Dr. Olin Robison,’’ Salzburg Seminar, available at http://www.salzburgseminar.org/orcomments/bio.cfm (accessed June 16, 2005). 45. Beverly Lindsay, ‘‘Intellectual and Diplomatic Imprints at Liberal Arts Colleges,’’ in Ralph Johnson Bunche: Public Intellectual and Nobel Peace Laureate, ed. Beverly Lindsay (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 95–107. 46. Beverly Lindsay, ‘‘Dismantling Educational Apartheid: Case Studies From South Africa,’’ Educational Foundations 6, no. 2, (1992): 71–88; Beverly Lindsay, ‘‘Toward Conceptual, Policy, and Programmatic Frameworks of Affirmative Action in South African Universities,’’ The Journal of Negro Education 66, no. 4, (1997): 522–538. 47. Brendan O’Malley, Education Under Attack: A Global Study on Targeted Political and Military Violence Against Education Staff, Students, Teachers, Union and Government Officials, and Institutions (New York: UNESCO, 2007) 16–41. 48. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Pape, Robert, ‘‘The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism,’’ The University of Chicago, available at http://jtac.uchicago.edu/conferences/05/resources/ pape_formatted%20for%20DTRA.pdf, n.d. (accessed May 9, 2007). 49. Brendan O’Malley, Education Under Attack: A Global Study on Targeted Political and Military Violence Against Education Staff, Students, Teachers, Union and Government Officials, and Institutions (New York: UNESCO, 2007) 18–21. 50. Ibid., 18–19. 51. David Jobbins, ‘‘UNESCO in Action Education: Precarious Future For Iraqi Universities,’’ The New Courier, May 2005, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=26888&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed May 7, 2007). 52. Asma Afsarruddin, ‘‘Islamic Perspectives on Democratic Virtues, Pluralism, and the Common Good’’ (Lecture, Women’s Foreign Policy Group, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2006). 53. Beverly Lindsay, ‘‘Toward Conceptual, Policy, and Programmatic Frameworks of Affirmative Action in South African Universities,’’ The Journal of Negro Education 66, no. 4, (1997): 522–538; Salzburg Seminar, ‘‘Biography of Dr. Olin Robison,’’ Salzburg Seminar, available at http://www.salzburgseminar.org/orcomments/bio.cfm (accessed June 16, 2005). 54. David Arnold, et al., American Universities in the Middle East: Agents of Change in the Arab World, 2007: (MP3 Audio File). From Council on Foreign Relations Meeting, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/12991/american_universities_in_the_middle_east.html (accessed March 29, 2007). 55. The Salzburg Seminar was founded after World War II by Harvard University so that the students from formerly warring nations and the United States could discuss critical topics and start devising solutions.


Part IV

Moving Toward the Future


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Multidisciplinary Perspectives and Policy Research on Terrorism: Creating Authentic Solutions or Lingering Intellectual Debates? Beverly Lindsay As I began to research and write this chapter, three illustrations of terrorism loomed on the horizon. The first materialized in late December 2007, while undertaking online research, when headlines such as ‘‘Pakistan in Turmoil: Roots of the Crisis’’1 suddenly surfaced, vividly describing the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in the midst of her campaign. She sought to become the Prime Minister, again, if her People’s Party received a majority of the seats in Parliament. I quickly rushed to a television and turned on CNN and MSNBC channels and viewed the devastating news. Whether she was killed by an assassin’s bullet, a suicide bomber, or a combination thereof, terrorism took her life and those around her in an effort to thwart what appeared to be a democratic process for electing legislators. An earlier effort in October 2007 had failed, yet about 150 others were killed by a suicide bomber.2 For many, the assassination was especially troubling due to her gender, since devout Muslims and other conservative religious groups do not believe in harming women or that women should engage in violence. Only weeks later, nearly 100 individuals were obliterated in Baghdad pet markets as two Muslim women suicide bombers blew up. The Friday bombing, occurring only hours before the Muslim Sabbath began, initially seemed to illustrate that women had little hesitancy in using their bodies as bombs. The brutality of the suicide bombings was revealed when it was discovered later that the two women, who were mentally disabled and/or mentally ill, had, in fact, been killed by remote detonations.3 Apparently, women would not be immune as select individuals or organizations eliminate their lives in an effort to advance political and/or religious goals. While many in the United States and other Western nations focused on such international acts of terrorism, violence struck America’s major research universities.

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In February 2008, six masked intruders attempted to invade the home of a University of California, Santa Cruz faculty member engaged in cancer research. The intruders tried to beat her and her family so that she would cease experimentations with animals. The research, funded by the university and grants from a federal agency, attempts to follow protocols so that animals are treated in a humane manner.4 This incident was one of several during the 2007–2008 academic year at the university wherein residential vandalism occurred, intimidating telephone calls were made, and written messages were directed to faculty, staff, and graduate students undertaking scientific research involving animals. One student remarked, ‘‘It’s really scary to hear that people are willing to confront science with violence.’’5 A psychology professor stated that while animal rights protests have occurred previously that, ‘‘by going to someone’s personal residence, it becomes a personal invasion and not a protest against certain kinds of activities.’’ Another states, ‘‘its terrorism!’’6 Similar attacks occurred at other sites such as the University of Utah. University presidents, political leaders, and national associations have condemned such violence. The NASULGC (National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges—comprised largely of flagship public research and comprehensive doctoral universities) issued a statement declaring: Academic researchers in California and Utah have recently been the victims of violence in their homes as well as the workplace. The recent violence against academic research scientists is outrageous. Universities support honest and open dialogue on the issues of animal-rights and the use of animal subjects in research projects. Members of the university community and the general public. . .have the right to express their views in a reasoned and appropriate manner. . . .However, violent aggression, on campus or at a private residence, is not free speech and we condemn it.7

In Utah, the state Senate passed a bill forbidding the publication of faculty names engaged in animal research. Salt Lake City officials have banned protests within 100 feet of private homes.8 It remains to be observed how effective such laws will be, given the relative openness of state universities where considerable public information is the policy and informal norms enable information sharing of so-called restricted information. In these three illustrations spanning three continents in less than three months, the overarching aims are to intimidate, to arouse fear, to kill, in order to halt what select groups deem as undesirable aims and actions of others. Variations of these comprehensive goals are elucidated in our chapters. The authors raise fundamental questions concerning terrorism as we seek to define terrorism, articulate the nature of terrorism, identify legal aspects of terrorism, explicate phenomena contributing to historical and contemporary violence, describe manifestations of terrorism via various modes (for example, the use of different types of weapons), delineate sociopsychlogical variables affecting individuals and groups, explicate roles of social and educational institutions via terrorism, and present methods of addressing terrorism. Rather than summarize each chapter, we present key highlights to glean insight on

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the multifaceted phenomenon of terrorism, examine the conditions in relation to select scholarly and journalistic literature, and posit critical matters contributing to future policy and programmatic research and solutions. MULTIFACETED ASPECTS OF TERRORISM To many in the American general public, comprehensive illustrations of terrorism (often covered in electronic and print media) generally connote violent acts in the Middle East and/or to those attributed to Muslim groups. 9 For the expanding scholarly and policy community who concentrate on terrorism, it is critical to define and/or provide working concepts of the phenomenon. Otherwise, most violent acts —from domestic abuse to armed robbery to killings by paramilitary groups—could be viewed as terrorism, which they certainly may appear to affected individuals. Indeed, various concepts and illustrations of terrorism are presented in chapters by Craig Stapley, John Czarnetzky, Adam Lowther, and Beverly Lindsay. All concur that contemporary terrorism consists of violent acts directed toward noncombatant civilians, a facet not always recognized or understood by the general populace, in order to instill or continue fear and intimidation. Stapley further refines the concept of terrorism and distinguishes between terrorism and terrorists, terms which have been used synonymously. For the former, according to Stapley, political rationales or missions are at its core, although what is viewed as political can have varying meanings. Via a variation of a basic definition of politics, political missions mean exerting power to achieve desired results that could range from acquiring a homeland, halting democratic processes, preventing individuals from voting, ensuring a predominant religious perspective in a state or territory, inhibiting individuals from working, or precluding students and professionals from matriculating or participating in educational endeavors. Particular international difficulties, emerging from concepts and definitions of terrorism and/or the prosecution of terrorists are elucidated in John Czarnetzky’s chapter. For instance, how are acts deemed criminal versus those which lie under the umbrella of terrorism? Domestic abuse or bank robbery are criminal acts normally covered by state/provincial or federal/national laws. Yet banks have been robbed to fund terrorism, and prosecutions occur under criminal statues. American domestic terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh or the Weathermen have been tried and incarcerated under existing regulations. At the international and transnational levels, the purpose of the ICC (International Criminal Court—a tribunal of the UN established in 2002) is to prosecute crimes of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Defining what constitutes aggression versus crimes against humanity, for instance, poses challenges, since currently the Court cannot address the former crime—likely covering various acts of terrorism—and can prosecute the latter. Moreover, the challenges are compounded since the ICC, composed of about sixty nation states, does not include major countries such as the United States, China, and India. Hence, determining and prosecuting actions are compounded by political realities caused

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by the absence of the world’s three largest nations. In essence, transnational political realities linked with the ascertainment of what constitutes terrorism and criminal acts and the subsequent prosecution and penalties cloud legal matters. Religious and cultural foundations for violence and terrorism and perceptions thereof are foci of chapters by Gordon Bowen and Russ Rodgers. Comprehending what Durkheim10 would term the social and cultural ethos of a society helps elucidate some of the findings of Bowen’s chapter. That is, the rationales and tactics of terrorists are at variance with what Americans might anticipate. Hence, Americans appear surprised when there is rejoicing at acts of terrorism directed toward Western individuals, organizations, and governments. Bowen’s statistical analyses, however, indicate that notable percentages of the population in Palestine (71 percent), Indonesia (58 percent), and Pakistan (45 percent) expressed favorable views (in a 2003 poll by the Pew Center for Research) of the statement that Osama bin Laden would ‘‘do the right thing.’’ The percentages had declined in a 2006 Pew Poll; yet over one-third of those polled still expressed similar views as in the 2003 poll.11 Some negative perceptions from the Arab and Muslim worlds were further exacerbated by the Iraqi War, as Zogby discovered that an overwhelming majority of those polled in the Middle East believed that the United States could not be helpful in supporting democracy in their particular country.12 Within the United States, a 2007 Zogby poll portrayed that Arab Americans were essentially evenly split (44 percent agree and 49 percent disagree) when asked if they believed that the U.S. policy was respectful toward the Islamic faith. Among young adults 18–29 years of age, however, only 31 percent agreed, while 76 percent disagreed. This is troubling since this age cohort will be in leadership and professional positions during the next 30–40 years. Such illustrative poll findings from the Middle East, Islamic nations, and Arab Americans in the United States suggest that different American policies toward combating terrorism and promoting democracy will need to be formulated. Historical cultural differences regarding Islam, suicide, and transnational religious impositions, highlighted in Russ Rodgers’s chapter, further illustrate fundamentally diverse worldviews in relation to American strategic tactics and policies toward terrorism. Chapters by Craig Stapley and Adam Lowther help us understand the multiple dimensions of tactics employed by terrorists from the selection of targets to the possible use of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) to improvised explosive devices. Based upon data from the RAND/St. Andrews University research and related sources, Stapley articulates fundamental reasons why NGOs and churches or particular religious groups may be targets for terrorism. Moving beyond the basic ease of access to NGOs that have limited physical security, Stapley contends that the ideology of the target group, the perceptions and likely reactions of the audiences beyond the target group, feasible strategies, and tactical means such as financial resources are all part of the equations influencing the selection of the target. What should be borne in mind is that the targeted group may be the actual object or it can be a proxy for another entity that has an undesirable ideology or policies that may not be attacked easily. For example, it may be difficult to attack a large multinational corporation or an American or British embassy due to intense security. Nevertheless, the


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philanthropic foundation of a multinational corporation may fund local NGOs, which also receive grants from the American or British governments.13 The Catholic Church and its related endeavors may be actual and proxy targets given the wealth of the Church and ties to affluent families. The Catholic Church may also be attacked for precisely the opposite reason, declares Stapley, since it may struggle for equitable conditions for the poor and disenfranchised. Lowther’s chapter focuses on concrete tactics utilized for terrorist attacks. Descriptive accounts and types of destructive weapons from pre-Christian periods to the current era are outlined. Many students and scholars, for instance, would not readily associate poisoning, from centuries before the birth of Christ, as a mode of terrorism and destruction. Poisoning, a chemical weapon, and biological, radiological, and nuclear devices are four major types of WMD. Of special concerns are the immediate and long-range effects of nuclear weapons, which can kill instantly thousands, several thousand, and even millions more in the weeks following an attack, depending upon the radius of dispersion. Equally troubling are the tangible effects, which are witnessed years or decades later resulting in the absence of individuals to rebuild physical, financial, health, educational, and various political and social infrastructures. Believing that only ‘‘lunatics’’ would try to employ WMD is fallacious since logical individuals and groups are likely to attempt acts. Limited resources, rather than irrational thinking, might be the actual reason that WMD may not be employed. An alternative option is IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) that are gaining in popularity, especially for those with limited resources. IEDs are relatively inexpensive, can be assembled fairly easy, and can be situated in a variety of locales. Aligned with rationality are the sociopsychological and educational factors affecting individuals. Dan Kennedy’s and Robert Homant’s chapter examines social and psychological factors that contribute to young Muslim adults engaging in suicide attacks and other violent tactics. Precipitated by particular events or conditioning, groupthink is a salient part of the process that founds and solidifies violence. Or the recounting of past injustices can serve as a catalyst, as observed in Beverly Lindsay’s chapter, where young Palestinian male prisoners recalled negative experiences during the first El-Aska Intifada of the late 1980s. Reportedly, perceived unjust treatment of their families continued from childhood through university study. While groupthink may be associated with cults and students and individuals at the fringes of society, it would be difficult to argue that university students or middle age professional men who completed graduate degrees, as described in Lindsay’s chapter, would be marginalized. Multiple mental compartments assigned to their family, professional, and university lives were witnessed; thus associations with separate groups provided avenues for violence and terrorism. SYNTHESIZING SCHOLARLY AND JOURNALISTIC LITERATURE Although we could still present conceptual frameworks from various authors based upon the multiple disciplines represented in this volume, three salient works are now examined. One is a classical work, Suicide, by French sociologist Emile

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Durkheim, which is a landmark study of suicide utilized for over a century by a range of social scientists. The second is a quite contemporary treatise, The Roots of Terrorism, penned by Louise Richardson, a Harvard executive dean who is a transplanted Irish scholar and now an American citizen. The third perspective emerges from sections of the volume, The World Is Flat, by New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman, which appeals to the academic community and the general public. At the beginning of one of my graduate seminars, students viewed podcasts from the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley featuring the aforementioned Louise Richardson (Executive Dean of the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University and recently designated as Principal of the University of St. Andrew’s in Scotland). Richardson shared her negative childhood and youth perceptions of the British and her exposures to actions of the IRA (Irish Republican Army). As a college student at Trinity University in Dublin, her perspectives of terrorism were altered as she recognized that terrorists could be individuals just like members of her family, friends, and university peers. Moreover, the British ‘‘occupiers’’ were similar individuals to their families and friends. University studies helped her begin to comprehend how ‘‘the very same people interpret the same events so differently.’’14 The graduate students, in my seminar, reacted with utter surprise since their views of terrorism and terrorists were largely shaped by contemporary American media. That is, it has been difficult to fathom the social and psychological facets of people who commit terrorism, akin to what Kennedy and Homant articulate in their chapter. Students’ comprehension expanded as Richardson explained that ordinary individuals deliberately use terrorism as a violent tactic directed toward noncombatant citizens. ‘‘People with legitimate goals have used terrorism’’ to achieve their aims such as gaining autonomy and democracy in Northern Ireland.15 Richardson further discussed the results of research studies (in which she had also participated) wherein academic personnel and activists were not noticeably different in their proclivity toward violence under similar circumstances. The resort to tactics of terrorism is often used when there are asymmetrical power relations.16 That is, the absence of symmetry necessitates unconventional responses since the playing field is not level. Ordinary Irish young men did not have the power, resources, infrastructure, and the like of the British army; hence terrorism became a tactic of the IRA. According to Richardson, three overarching goals, which she deems as the three ‘‘R’s’’—revenge, renown of glory, and reaction—are at the forefront. Revenge entails retribution or the avengement for wrongs or atrocities inflicted upon the self, an identifiable group, or community and/or state. Avenging the deaths of previous individuals who died for a particular cause or those who were killed unjustly are reasons for revenge. The actions of Timothy McVeigh and some endeavors of the IRA are illustrations of revenge. Renown of glory via terrorism is undertaken to address humiliation inflicted by the enemy and to exalt the actions for the individual, a religious group, or a political party. Part of the actions of the September 11 attacks may be viewed as renown of glory, since the terrorists believed that they would be glorified in an afterlife. Or, the actions of the IRA led to their being glorified and receiving accolades in sectors of the Irish community. Reaction, activities directed toward the


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enemy that demonstrate the terrorists’ ability to respond, can cause humiliation or capitulation. The assassination of Benazir Bhuto aimed to prevent her supporters from voting in parliamentary elections is a form of capitulation. One or a combination of the three ‘‘R’s’’ could be at play in examining acts of terrorism.17 Certainly, it may not be readily apparent how or which of the three ‘‘R’s’’ may be operational. For example, when masked intruders attacked a university faculty member in her home, they likely did not desire renown of glory since their masks concealed their identities. It could be argued that revenge was the motive since they believed the animals were harmed physically, especially because it is difficult to envision that animals are humiliated. While intruders’ actions may be aimed at halting research on animals, there is little, if any, evidence to indicate that federal agencies and various private funding agencies have ceased funding research that involves animal subjects. Moreover, the individual faculty would still need to consider the same or comparable research at the University of California, Santa Cruz, or a similar university, in order to earn academic tenure with continuous professional employment. Comprehending the three ‘‘R’s’’ is essential to determining policies and programs to prevent or thwart terrorism, which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. Emile Durkheim’s seminal study, Suicide: A Study in Sociology asserted that the interplay between societal factors (including the physical environment) and individual psychological characteristics are comprehensive phenomena helping to explain suicide.18 Further, he contended that there are social forms of suicide, vis-a`-vis the larger society. Readers, for over a century, have been captivated by his classifications of individual suicides as egotistic, altruistic, and anomic types,19 as discussed in recent works such as Robert Pape’s Dying to Win20 and Rosemarie Skaine’s Female Suicide Bombers.21 While such authors have some varying explications of Durkheim’s three types, they generally concur that altruistic suicides appear to be prominent reasons for various suicide bombings. That is, suicides are committed for the greater good of the community, the religious group, or the implementation of the envisioned mission whether political or religious. Similar perspectives are described in Russ Rodger’s chapter in this volume. Altruistic suicide in the contemporary era does not preclude anomic suicide, as possibly observed when some women suicide bombers have been bereft of family ties due to divorce or perceived moral or social deficiencies causing dishonor to their families. Thus, taking one’s life alleviates the family and the woman of a social burden.22 In the process, the woman might believe in the greater good of her death via altruistic suicide. Building upon Durkheim’s analysis that in ‘‘each moment of history. . .each society has definite aptitude for suicide,’’23 why and how suicide might be undertaken varies from society to society so that what appears to be an egotistical suicide (wherein Durkheim asserts that the individual may be excessively isolated from society and cannot cope with psychological trauma and opts to end his or her life) in one region may be perceived as altruistic in another. For instance, this may very well explain why many Americans cannot begin to comprehend why individuals would commit suicide bombings or volunteer for a no-return paramilitary venture.

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When reading Durkheim, Pape, Rodgers, and others, one may think of the philosophical premises and explanations of Joseph Campbell through his works, The Power of Myth and The Masks of God.24 Campbell explains how myths are everpresent throughout societies from ancient to modern periods. The myths help determine individual and cultural perceptions and delineate subsequent actions. Although the term suicide, per se, is not central to Campbell’s analysis, it is present in the interpretation of what contemporary Westerner’s might view as sacrifices. In prior centuries, indigenous American, Middle Eastern, and Asian individuals volunteered to be human sacrifices or were raised for sacrificial roles. The saliency of phenomena is manifested in particular times and places that are socially determined. To many students, sacrifices are tantamount to what Durkheim or Pape might term altruistic suicide. In essence, the myth or belief of the individual or group determined that the ultimate positive contribution is being made, whether in prior epochs or contemporary eras. In contrast, one American university executive stated that if life is taken, then that leaves no room for options or for bargains.25 To one sacrificing his or her life, alternative options are not desired. Hence, we turn to the ponderings of Thomas Friedman in his journalistic volume, The World Is Flat.26 Friedman, who has traveled throughout the world on assignments for the New York Times and electronic outlets, outlines positive and negative aspects of globalization. Positive results include the ability to communicate instantly via the Internet, to see and talk simultaneously with someone thousands of miles away, to travel to almost any part of the world in a day or so, to share medical supplies and findings within hours to save lives, and to access national and international markets. In this sense, the world is being flattened, or a level playing field is surfacing. Yet adverse globalization features encompass: huge income gaps among nations (which are readily noticeable via global media coverage), shifts to new cultural norms without the transmission or acceptance of the new norms, marginalization between those without access to physical and material resources and those with them, and the desire to cling to traditions that provided social cohesion within a finite environment. For some, according to Friedman, daily marginalization and humiliation may be erased via a return to glories of the past, where a particular religion—often Islam— facilitated social cohesion and connectivity with God.27 In essence, dreams of the past supercede dreams of the future. This is akin to Lindsay’s chapter that quotes an Islamic scholar from the University of Notre Dame, ‘‘history should be studied so that we may repeat, at least, selective parts of it.’’28 The desire to repeat the past —even through death to ensure a glorious past—and the desire to have a wife were expressed by young Arab men with whom Friedman interacted.29 Kennedy’s and Homant’s chapter might argue that cognitive dissonance is present and needs to be eliminated. The question is, which route will be used to eliminate dissonance? Will one engage in terrorist actions leading to death or engage in a life leading to a future wife and family? Hence ultimate unanswered questions may include: how does one preserve positive historical features and simultaneously move forward so that desirable outcomes of a flat globalized world lessen the need for terrorism?


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FUTURE POLICY AND PROGRAMMATIC RESEARCH AND SOLUTIONS Our chapters seek to present careful analytical and applied perspectives of terrorism ranging from historical antecedents and dimensions to contemporary manifestations. Examinations occur at the individual, group, organizational, societal, and transnational levels. Each chapter focuses on central issues in our attempts to address unanswered questions. We certainly recognize that our volume is not the sole comprehensive work on terrorism—explicating paradigms from multiple disciplines. Terrorism was present centuries before the birth of Christ, has been manifested on six continents, and, unfortunately, will continue in the future. Our responses can be integrated with additional current and future dimensions and questions. As we posit alternative issues, these require attention in the quest to eliminate terrorism. First, in the minds of the general public, often questions emerge regarding the weapons of choice used in terrorism. Lowther’s chapter examines WMD, along with mention of IEDS. An unconventional weapon heretofore is that of cyberterrorism.30 While electronic and cyber infrastructures have advanced lives, the opposite is true when used for nefarious purposes. Hence, continued applied research and subsequent policy decisions and programs need to be explored continually to prevent manifestations of terrorism. Second, Czarnetzky’s chapter examines complexities regarding international legal aspects of terrorism, where it is difficult to reach consensus about the definition and scope of terrorism. This issue can be further explored when we consider that regional blocs or organizations are concerned about impeding terrorism. For instance, blocs include inter alia: the EU (European Union); ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations—consisting of 10 Asian nations from Indonesia to Singapore to Vietnam); Africa Union; and OAS (Organization of American States—comprised of nations in North, Central, and South America). The current EU will decide whether additional nations in Eastern and Southern Europe will become members. Since potential new EU members have recently been affected by war crimes, violence, and terrorism, thorny legal issues are still being worked out on how to address such atrocities. Plus there is notable variance in legal systems among nations. Similar illustrations are present in the Africa Union consisting of member countries from North Africa and the Middle East to Southern African nations such as South Africa, Namibia, and Mozambique, which have experienced wars of liberation, civil wars, and terrorism. Again, prickly legal issues abound. In organizations such as OAS, nations are at various levels of socioeconomic development, where illegal activities through drug-cartels are present. Such groups also engage in terrorism; and member states exemplify diverse methods of addressing terrorism emanating from various roots. Third, gender and women’s roles are affected directly and indirectly by terrorism. Gabaudan and Richardson cite how mothers and sisters provide sustenance for male terrorists. Gabaudan, a regional executive with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, outlines particular challenges for women resulting from war and

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terrorism.31 While general problems of refugees are acknowledged, the cumulative effects on women as caregivers and nurturers are particularly arduous since there are long-range ramifications like posttraumatic stresses. Dismal conditions in refugee camps, where women and their families reside, pose extreme physical struggles. Moreover, in countries such as Jordan and Syria, refugees are dispersed in urban areas and marginalized without ties to their home communities and ethnic groups; hence another source of alienation arises contributing to terrorism. Although Muslim women are not to engage in violence, their living conditions and some difficulties in recruiting men may lead to increases in women as terrorists. Fourth, a range of views are portrayed about the over five-year Iraqi war. Regardless of viewpoints, Hafez documents that the rate of suicide attacks in the Iraqi insurgency has surpassed the number of suicide bombings by all the previous insurgent groups combined.32 These include those by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (who were some of the first groups to utilize suicide attacks), Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Israel. The empirical data portrays the need for senior decision makers to assess options and the likely outcomes. Eliminating one set of problems while creating another like terrorism means a zero sum game or perhaps one step forward and one back almost simultaneously. Policymakers are encouraged to review results of decisions in ascertaining the next actions to avoid people engaging in terrorism due to revenge, renown, or reaction. Fifth, interestingly, in March 2008, the Vatican identified new sins that Catholics and world citizens and organizations should avoid such as destruction of the environment, pollution, and social and economic injustices. A Vatican official declared that due to globalization sins now have a societal resonance.33 While we are not espousing the views of particular religious groups, the new sins had been identified by the United Nations, Council on Foreign Relations, and the Institute for Multitrack Diplomacy as areas requiring urgent attention in order to avoid terrorism and war. The abuse (of ) or failure to protect natural resources contributes to scarcity, leading to bleak conditions that may be ripe for breeding terrorism. Hence, new opportunities for terrorism arise absent other alternatives to acquire basic necessities of livelihood. Sixth, public diplomacy has been advocated by a range of diverse voices as one method to prevent or halt the development of terrorism. General Wesley Clark stated that to win the war on terrorism, ‘‘we must defeat an ideology of terrorism depriving angry young people of their ability to justify their hateful actions.’’34 Dialogues need to be created with individuals and governments in the Middle East and other areas. Such perspectives are further expounded by Richardson and Friedman.35 Richardson maintains that a long-term goal is to delegitimize terrorism as a means of change and to reduce opportunities and incentives.36 Reducing the reservoir of resentment toward the United States, Western nations, and religious or political groups entails preventive measures and public diplomacy. Public and educational diplomacy provides avenues to engage moderates and marginalized individuals, while isolating extremists. Hence, as Lindsay’s chapter suggests, universities and other educational sites have a vital role to play as part of their mission is to engage with the public to prevent and/or solve problems.


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Friedman cites the illustration of an Indian professional who migrated to the United States, earned degrees at New York University, started a software firm, and earned a vast fortune. Throughout his stay in the United States, he remained concerned with the lowest socioeconomic groups of Indians and with violence in communities. He sold his firm and returned to India where he started a journalism college and an elementary school in a rural locale for extremely poor students. His idea was to ‘‘thwart martyrs in waiting’’ so that terrorism would not burst forth years later. Communications via electronic means with fellow Indian students and those in other nations were part of their educational experiences, that is, a form of cultural and educational diplomacy.37 Seventh, redefined and new areas of university scholarship regarding terrorism are necessary. Indeed, this volume is an example. University faculty, as part of their research and scholarly roles, should continue to undertake basic and applied research on multifaceted aspects of terrorism. Careful analytical perspectives among American and international colleagues would further help us comprehend historical, current, and future components of terrorism.38 The impact of short- and longterm consequences of policies to thwart and eliminate terrorism is central. Often an immediate or short-term solution produces the fertilizer for future terrorism. Finally, while recognizing that knowledge is the currency for the 21st century, we can use such knowledge in positive ways to halt terrorism via cooperative endeavors with colleagues in various domestic and international environments. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell asserts that terrorism is a borderless actuality requiring transnational responses.39 In essence, a Janusian approach is required. Named after the Greek god who sees in dual directions, paradigms and policies must consider multiple analytical and applied phenomena. As such, we will move beyond mere intellectual debates. Instead, positing authentic solutions to one of the most pressing challenges of our time could be the reality. NOTES 1. Eric Calvin, ‘‘Pakistan in Turmoil: Roots of the Crisis,’’ SFGate, December 27, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2007/12/27/international/ i114453S93.DTL (accessed March 24, 2008). 2. Sadaqat Jan, ‘‘Al-Qaida Suspect Arrested Over October Assassination Attempt on Bhutto That Killed 150,’’ The Associated Press, February 26, 2008, available at http:// www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?risb=21_T3351190072&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T3351190076&cisb =22_T3351190075&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=304478&docNo=1 3. Kim Gamel, ‘‘Female Bombers Strike Markets In Baghdad,’’ ABCNews.com,February 1, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=4226818 (accessed March 25, 2008); Richard A. Oppel, ‘‘Files For Suicide Bombers Show No Down Syndrome,’’ nytimes.com, February 21, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/world/ middleeast/21iraq.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Files+For+Suicide+Bombers+Show+No+Down +Syndrome&st=nyt&oref=slogin (accessed March 25, 2008).

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4. Jennifer McNulty, ‘‘Campus Reacts To ‘Heinous’ Incident at Professor’s Home,’’ UC Santa Cruz News/Events, March 3, 2008, available at http://www.ucsc.edu/news_events/ text.asp?pid=1996 (accessed March 6, 2008). 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. NASULGC, ‘‘NASULGC Statement on Recent Attacks on Academic Researchers,’’ A Public Voice NASULGC’s Online Newsletter, February 27, 2008, available at http:// www.nasulgc.org/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=874&srcid=836(accessed March 24, 2008). 8. Richard Monastersky, ‘‘Animal Researchers’ Homes Are Attacked,’’ The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 7, 2008, sec. A, p. 1. 9. James Zogby, ‘‘Can the U.S. Have a Role in Promoting Democracy in the Arab World?’’ Arab American Institute, July 3, 2006, available at http://www.aaiusa.org/washington-watch/ 2196/w070306 (accessed March 24, 2008); James Zogby, ‘‘The Gulf’s Middle Class: A Closer Look,’’ Arab American Institute, March 5, 2007, available at http://www.aaiusa.org/ washington-watch/2794/the-gulfs-middle-class-a-closer-look (accessed March 24, 2008); Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005). 10. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, 1897 original trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, ed. with an introduction George Simpson. (Glenco, IL.: Free Press, 1951). 11. 2003 figures: Pew Center for Research, ‘‘Views of a Changing World’’ (June 2003), 3, available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf (attitudes about Iraqi resistance to U.S., at 4); 2005 figures: Pew Center for Research, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics (July 2005), 46, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/ display.php?PageID=811 ; 2006 figures: population figures computed from: World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A better investment climate for Everyone (Oxford University Press, 2004), 256–257. 12. James Zogby, ‘‘Good News in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon,’’ Arab American Institute, January 2, 2006, available at http://www.aaiusa.org/washington-watch/132/w010206 (accessed March 24, 2008); Zogby, ‘‘Can the U.S. Have a Role in Promoting Democracy in the Arab World?’’; Zogby, ‘‘The Gulf’s Middle Class: A Closer Look.’’ 13. Beverly Lindsay, ‘‘Transforming African and African-American Sociopolitical and Educational Realities: Possibilities Or Pipe Dreams?’’ African Studies Quarterly 7, no. 4, (2004), available at http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i4a4.pdf. 14. Louise Richardson and Harry Kreisler. Conversations With History. What Terrorists Want: Conversations With History podcast (California: University of California, September 19, 2007), available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people7/Richardson/index.html (accessed March 24, 2008). 15. Ibid.; Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006). 16. Jeffrey Ross, Political Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2006). 17. Ibid.; Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006), 88–100. 18. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, 1897 original trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, ed. with an introduction George Simpson (Glenco, IL: Free Press, 1951). 19. We recognize that there are a number of critiques of this seminal work that focused on suicide in primarily Protestant societies. Nevertheless, his typology is useful in examining


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contemporary underlying sociological norms, which help explain suicide in contemporary Protestant and Muslim societies. 20. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005). 21. Rosemarie Skaine, Female Suicide Bombers (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2006). 22. Ibid. 23. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, 1897 original trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, ed., with an introduction, George Simpson (Glenco, IL: Free Press, 1951) 48. 24. Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth (New York: Anchor Books, 1991); Joseph Campbell, The Masks of God (New York: Penguin, 1962). 25. Beverly Lindsay, ‘‘Educational and Diplomatic Influences at Public Research Universities,’’ in Ralph Johnson Bunche: Public Intellectual and Nobel Peace Laureate, ed. Beverly Lindsay (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 79–94. 26. Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005). 27. Ibid. 28. Asma Afsarruddin, ‘‘Islamic Perspectives on Democratic Virtues, Pluralism, and the Common Good’’ (Lecture,Women’s Foreign Policy Group, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2006). 29. Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005). 30. Ibid. 31. Michel Gabaudan, ‘‘The UN’s Expanding Role In Iraq’’ (Lecture, The Council of Organizations of the United Nations Association of the USA and the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., March 11, 2008); Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006). 32. Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers In Iraq (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007). 33. Associated Press, ‘‘Vatican Lists New Sinful Behaviors,’’ CNN.com, March 12, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/wayoflife/03/10/vatican.updates.sins.ap/ index.html?iref=newssearch (accessed March 25, 2008). 34. Wesley Clark, ‘‘Al-Qaeda Has Changed; Bush Strategy Also Needs to Shift,’’ SecuringAmerica.com, July 11, 2005, available at http://securingamerica.com/articles/usatoday/2005–07–11 (accessed March 25, 2008). 35. Louise Richardson and Harry Kreisler, ‘‘Conversations with History,’’ What Terrorists Want: Conversations With History podcast (University of California, September 19, 2007). http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people7/Richardson/index.html (accessed March 24, 2008); Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006); Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005). 36. Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006). 37. Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005). 38. Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006). 39. Colin Powell, Statement on International Education Week (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, November 12, 2003); NASULGC Task Force on International Education, A Call to Leadership: The Presidential Role In Internationalizing the University (Washington, D.C: The National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC), 2004).


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Index

Abduction, 176 Abu Dahdah, 36 Abu Sayyef Group, 22, 101 Afghanistan, 10, 32–46, 66, 99, 103, 117, 139, 173–183 Afsaruddin, Asma, 184 Allison, Graham, 113–116 al-Maqdisi, Abu Mohammed, 41 al-Qaeda, 1–2, 9–10, 19, 32–50, 113–124, 150–162, 183 al-Sakka, Louai, 35 al-Takfir Wal Hijra, 36 Altruistic suicide, 166–172, 199–200 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 40 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 38–40, 154 American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 179 American Association of Universities, 177 American Educational Research Association, 179 American Sociological Association, 179 Anthrax, 123–124 Antiterrorism conventions, 69 Argonne National Laboratory, 181 Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 102 Armed robbery, 17, 195 Arnold, Roberta, 69

Asch Conformity Studies, 157 Assassination, 90, 131, 183, 193, 199 Assassins, 27 Association, 25, 71, 88–92, 105–107, 161– 162, 177–179 Attitude formation, ix, 164 Attributional styles, 165 Attrition, 20 Aum Shinrikyo, 88, 118 Authoritarian personality, 151, 156 Azzam, Abdullah, 40 Baghdad, 8, 173–174, 183 Behavioral self-blame, 165 Beirut, Lebanon, 50, 152, 185 Beth El, synagogue (Istanbul), 48–49 bin Laden, Osama, 1–2, 11, 33–49, 153– 154, 196 Biological weapons, 7, 112, 117–121, 122; Weapons Convention, 123 Bombings, 35–39, 48–51, 176, 183, 194, 199, 202 Borderline personality, 151 Brookings Institution, 177 Bunche, Ralph, 178–182 Bush, George W., 2–10, 39–40, 91, 113, 117

232

INDEX

Bystander intervention, 159 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 177 Castro, Fidel, 40 Cato Institute, 177 Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, 180–185 Characterological self-blame, 165 Charismatic leader, 195 Chechnya, 176 Chemical weapons, 112, 117–121; Weapons Convention, 121 Chertoff, Michael, 33 Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, 181–182 Chlorine, 118, 121 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 89–90 ‘‘Clean skin’’ terrorist, 33 Cognitive dissonance, 161–162 Collateral damage, 8, 18, 28, 136, 174 Columbia, 20, 90–91, 101; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), 20– 21, 97–98 Combatant, 4, 18 Compartmentalization, 162 Competition, 98–100 Conformity, 156–162 Constraints, 20, 87, 100 Council on Foreign Relations, 175–177, 185 Criminal acts, 21–22, 28, 61, 65–67, 196 Cuba, 40, 160 Cultural neurosis, 167 Deindividuation, 158 de Olmo, Juan, 36 Department of Defense, 111, 114, 120, 181 Department of Homeland Security, 111, 114, 120, 181 Department of State, 111, 114, 120, 181 Developmental pathologies, 149 Developmental tasks, 152 Diffusion of responsibility, 158 Dirty bomb, 7, 113, 116

Disorientation, 20 Doran, Michael, 39 Downing, Gen. Wayne, 40 Education, 7–8, 46, 100, 102–103, 147, 176 Egypt, 9, 36–50, 124, 131 el-Aksa Intifada, 178 Endorsement, 20, 93 Emergent norms, 158 Europe, 8–11, 37, 48–51, 69, 116, 119, 174 Expressive target, 19–20 External attribution, 155 Extortion, 17, 22 Fakhet, Serhan Ben Abdelmajid, 36 Fallows, James, 38 Fear, 4, 17–29 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 120 Financing, 6, 22, 35–36, 63, 66–67, 100 Finnis, John, 60 French Resistance, 150 French Revolution, 23, 28 Frustration-aggression hypothesis, 164 Functional target, 19–20 Fundamental attribution error, 155 George, Robert, 71 Gerges, Fawaz, 40 Global War on Terror (GWOT), 2, 9–10, 202 Greene, Thomas, 47 Grenada, 90 Group dynamics, 149, 153, 159, 167 Group pressure, 157–158 Groupthink, 8–9, 158, 160–161, 197 Guerrilla warfare, 18, 25, 112 Hamas, 23, 117, 154, 177, 202 Hezbollah, 8, 113, 115, 117, 154, 174, 181, 202 Hijacking, 5, 17, 63, 69, 88 Hostile attribution, 165 Human rights, 65, 95–98, 102 Humanitarian activities, 99

INDEX

Hurricane Katrina, 185 Ideology, 7, 10, 20–22, 26, 28, 33, 44, 51, 87–88, 105, 137, 140, 150, 160, 164, 167, 183, 196, 202 Ijtihad, 45, 131–132 Indonesia, 42–51, 173, 196, 201 Innocent, 18, 22, 26–28, 61, 89, 91, 105 Insurgent, 7, 20–21, 115, 184, 202 Intelligence, 2–3, 7, 9, 19, 34, 39, 115, 122, 139–141, 156 Internal attribution, 155 International, 1–9, 24–25, 33, 35, 37, 43, 60–69, 71–74, 84–85, 89–90, 99, 102, 113–117, 120–122, 125, 173, 175–182, 184–185, 193, 195, 198, 200–201, 203; Atomic Energy Agency, 113; Criminal Court, 5, 195; law, 60–73 Iran, 113–124 Iraq, 9–10, 19, 34–50, 90–99, 113–124, 139, 173 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 150, 198 Islamic Brotherhood, 176 Islamist terrorism, 5, 35–42, 159 Israel, 1–27, 48–51, 113–115, 119–120, 155, 166, 173–180 Istanbul bombing (2003), 35 Jalalabad, 36 Japanese Red Army, 22 Jenkins, Brian, 18, 23, 41, 85 Jihadism, 36–39 Jihadist, 32–50, 135–151 Jordan, 9, 42–50, 185, 202 Justification, 27–28, 86, 93, 129, 135–150, 184 Kenya, 175 Khan, Siddeque, 38 Kidnapping, 8, 19–22, 63, 101, 176 Kilcullen, Lt. Col. David, 40 King, Coretta Scott, 175 King Jr., Martin Luther, 175 Latin America, 89–95 Lebanon, 8, 43–50, 151, 160, 174, 181, 202

233

Legal authority, 95 Legitimacy, 17, 24, 38, 61, 70–74, 92–99 Lenin, V. I., 35, 40, 41 Logistical target, 19, 100 London bombing (2005), 33–38 Low intensity conflict, 25, 27 Madrid bombing (2004), 33–36 Malvo, Lee Boyd, 21 Mandela, Nelson, 175 Marginal man, 153, 163 Maritain, Jacques, 71 McVeigh, Timothy, 18, 28, 100 Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), 84 Middle East, 2–8, 33–51, 114–115, 124, 173–186, 195–202 Milgram’s studies in obedience, 155 Ministry of Education, 176 Mob psychology, 158 Morality, 102, 161 Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, 36 Most, Johan, 22 Motivation, 10–11, 19–27, 85, 105, 149–167 Muhammad, John Allen, 21 Muhammad, Khalid Sheikh, 34 Muhammad, Prophet, 130–132, 134–135, 137, 141 Murrah Federal Building, 18 Mustard, 118–122 Narcissistic rage, 151 Narodnaya Volya, 28 National Liberation Army (ELN), 90 National Public Radio (NPR), 177, 181 Negroponte, John, 39 Nepal, 176 Neve Shalom, 48–49 New York, 10, 200–203 Noncombatant, 23 Norm entrepreneur, 41, 45 North Korea, 113–116 Nuclear, 7, 23, 63–74; material, 63, 117; weapon, 7, 112–122 Nuremberg Defense, 155–156

234

INDEX

Oedipal complex, 166 Oklahoma City bombing, 24, 28 Operation Enduring Freedom, 122 Organized crime, 22 Palestine, 177, 196 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 176 Panama invasion, 90 Paranoid personality, 151 Peres, Shimon, 181 Personality disorder, 151–152 Petraeus, Gen. David, 40 Planes Operation, 35 Polarization effect, 159 Political violence, 4, 16, 20–23, 84, 89 Predatory martyrdom, 151 Propaganda of the deed, 17 Provisional Irish Republican Army, 150 Provocation, 20, 69 Psychological autopsies, 165 Psychological targets, 18–19, 21, 25 Psychopathology, 151–155, 161–164 Public engagement, 8, 174–186 Public intellectual, 182 Public opinion, Muslim, 5, 86 Qatar, 184 Qutb, Sayyid, 35–44 Radiological weapon, 117 RAND Corporation, 84–86 RAND/St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 84, 86 Rationale, 19, 39, 83, 162, 174, 183, 195 Rationality, 27–29, 195 Red Guards (Russia), 40 Reid, Richard, 33 Religiosity, 159 Revolution, 62, 99 Riedel, Bruce, 34 Risky shift, 158–159 Robespierre, Maximilien, 23 Robinson, Mary, 179 Roman Catholic Church, 93 Salafism, 36, 130, 137

Salafist, 40, 130–137 Salzburg Seminar, 182 Sanchez, Olga, 36 Sarin, 88, 119–123 Scheuer, Michael, 34 Self-esteem, 152, 160–165 Senate Joint Resolution 23 (2001), 32 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), 98–99 September 11 attacks, 1–3, 10, 19, 32–36, 49, 58, 111, 135, 153–154, 191, 198 Shahada, 166 Shahid, 135–141 Shari’a, 45–46, 132–140 Social psychological processes, 149, 153 Soft target, 6, 103 South Africa, 175, 182–185 South Korea, 184 Stalin, 18, 28, 98 Stanford Prison Study, 157 State terrorism, 85 Strategy, 6, 19, 21, 33, 39, 41, 81, 88, 100, 113, 118 Subsidiarity, 71–74 Suicide bombing, 32–51, 152, 154, 193 Suicide terrorist, 32, 47, 154, 165–167 Sun Tsu, 25 Symbolic target, 19, 87 Tactic, 6–7, 10–11, 20, 41–42, 46–51, 81, 83–105, 112, 123, 139, 150, 154, 196–197 Takfiri, 36 Taliban, 1, 10, 32, 45, 66, 177, 183 Tamil Tigers, 151, 202 Tanweer, Shahzad, 38, 44 Target hardening, 20 Targeting, 6–7, 19–20, 26, 39, 42, 48, 51, 83–107 Target selection, 2, 19–20, 84, 88, 98, 105 Teacher, 103, 130, 179, 182–184 Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) 176 Terrorist, 2, 4–5, 8–12, 15–29, 32–51, 62– 72, 83–107, 112–125, 141, 149–167, 175, 182 Thailand, 176 Thatcher, Margaret, 175 Threat, 2–11, 16–17, 20–21, 27, 29,

INDEX

32–34, 38, 51, 62–63, 66, 72, 89, 93, 98–107, 111–125, 151, 158, 163, 178 Thugee, 26 Tupac Amaru, 90, 98 Unconventional warfare, 5, 25–29 UNESCO, 176 United Nations, 61, 65–73, 92, 100, 111, 117, 176, 180; Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 99; Security Council, 34, 39, 61, 66–71 United States, 1–11, 18–23, 32–51, 69, 89–92, 111–125, 130–131, 164, 174– 175, 180, 184–185 United States Agency for International Development, 184 Universities, 193–194 Van Allen belt, 115

235

Vatican II, 96 Violence, 8–12, 16–29, 37, 40–41, 50, 63– 64, 84–85, 99, 103, 112, 151, 163, 174–185 VX, 119–120 War, 193–202 Washington, DC, 113–116 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 6, 67, 88, 111–125, 196 White House, 111, 116, 175 World Trade Center, 1, 19, 111, 136 Yarkas, Imad Eddin Barakat, 36 Zarate Wilka, 90–91 Zealot, 151 Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union, 100


About the Editors and Contributors

ADAM B. LOWTHER, Ph.D., is a member of the Research Faculty at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), Maxwell Air Force Base. He is the author of Americans and Asymmetric Conflict: Lebanon, Somalia, and Afghanistan and has published articles in political science and military journals. Before joining AFRI, Dr. Lowther taught international relations and security studies at two state universities. He also served aboard the USS Ramage (DDG-61) and at various commands during his six years of service in the U.S. Navy. BEVERLY LINDSAY, Ph.D., Ed.D., recently completed a Distinguished Senior Fulbright Specialist Fellowship at the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo, Mozambique. She taught a graduate course in administration, planning, and budgeting; briefed diplomatic and policy officials; and engaged in research. She was the first American to become a Senior Fulbright Specialist in South Korea and Zimbabwe, where she engaged in peace and conflict resolution, initiated executive and faculty leadership development models, and fostered strategic planning and program evaluation processes. She is a former dean at Hampton University and Penn State University for international education and policy studies and international programs, respectively, and she is a professor and senior scientist at the latter university. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was an Executive Fellow of MultiTrack Diplomacy and International Policy Administration at the Institute for MultiTrack Diplomacy in Washington, D.C., and was a president of the Comparative and International Education Society. After being an American Council on Education Government Fellow, Dr. Lindsay wrote over 90 articles, chapters, and essays and

238

ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

produced five books, which include Ralph Johnson Bunche: Public Intellectual and Nobel Peace Laureate, The Quest for Equity in Higher Education (with Manuel J. Justiz), and African Migration and National Development. GORDON L. BOWEN, Ph.D. (University of California, Santa Barbara, 1978), is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, Virginia. His research on U.S. foreign policy, public opinion, and terrorism has appeared in a broad range of popular and professional journals, including Commonweal, Armed Forces and Society, and PS: Politics and Political Science. JOHN M. CZARNETZKY is Professor of Law at the University of Mississippi. He is the author of several articles on international criminal law and terrorism. Professor Czarnetzky has served as a legal advisor to the Holy See Mission to the United Nations and was a 2006–2007 Fellow of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Before law school, Professor Czarnetzky served as an intelligence analyst in the U.S. Army. ROBERT J. HOMANT has a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from Michigan State University. He is chair of the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of Detroit Mercy where he teaches courses in deviant behavior, psychology and law, corrections, and intelligence analysis. His research interests include workplace violence, suicide by cop, and perceptions of the terrorist threat. DANIEL B. KENNEDY, Ph.D., is a forensic criminologist specializing in security, police, and terrorism issues. Before joining the sociology and criminal justice faculty at the University of Detroit Mercy in 1976, he was employed as an urban renewal worker, probation officer, and police academy director. Dr. Kennedy has served as an expert witness throughout the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. He is Board Certified in Security Management and has published widely in various issues of Security Journal, Journal of Security Administration, Journal of Criminal Justice, Crime and Delinquency, Criminal Justice and Behavior, Justice Quarterly, Professional Psychology, Victimology, and Security Management. RUSS RODGERS has served with armor, infantry, and military intelligence during a varied U.S. Army career. He received his Master’s degree with honors in Land Warfare from the American Military University and is currently an Army staff historian and Adjunct Professor of History at American Military University. He is the author of Historic Photos of General George Patton and has a forthcoming book from The Edwin Mellen Press, titled Fundamentals of Islamic Asymmetric Warfare: A Documentary Analysis of the Principles of Muhammad. CRAIG STAPLEY, Ph.D., worked as a loss prevention specialist in the insurance industry in Oklahoma and was exposed to terrorism when he worked on losses stemming from the Oklahoma federal building bombing. Spurred by this experience,

ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

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he returned to school and completed a Master of Public Administration (2001) and a Ph.D. (2004) from the University of Oklahoma in Political Science. Dr. Stapley directs the Security Studies Master and Doctoral programs at Kansas State University. His scholarship has appeared in peer-reviewed journals such as Contemporary Security Policy (2006). He is also contributor to The Handbook of Security (2006) and the Encyclopedia of International Security Studies (forthcoming). Dr. Stapley’s research and teaching interests focus generally on international relations and security, and on terrorism and nongovernmental organizations specifically.

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