Southeast Asian Warfare, 1300-1900 (Handbook of Oriental Sudies Handbuch Der Orientalistik)

SOUTHEAST ASIAN WARFARE, 1300-1900

HANDBOOK OF ORIENTAL STUDIES HANDBUCH DER ORIENTALISTIK SECTION THREE

SOUTH-EAST ASIA EDITED BY

V. LIEBERMAN · M.C. RICKLEFS · D.K. WYATT

VOLUME SIXTEEN SOUTHEAST ASIAN WARFARE, 1300-1900

SOUTHEAST ASIAN WARFARE, 1300-1900 BY

MICHAEL W. CHARNEY

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2004

This book is printed on acid-free paper On the cover: Elephant hunting in Ava. From a plate in Symes 1800.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available on http://catalog.loc.gov

ISSN 0169-9571 ISBN 90 04 14240 1 © Copyright 2004 by Koninklijke Brill N.V., Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

To Atsuko

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations Acknowledgements Introduction

viii xi xiii

Chapter One Culture and Warfare

1

Chapter Two Personal Weaponry

23

Chapter Three Firearms

42

Chapter Four Fortifications and Sieges

73

Chapter Five Sea and River Warfare

104

Chapter Six Elephants

131

Chapter Seven Horses and Cavalry

164

Chapter Eight Supply and Transport

190

Chapter Nine Soldiers

213

Chapter Ten The Nineteenth Century

243

Conclusion

276

Appendices Appendix I Map of Western Southeast Asia Appendix II Map of Eastern Southeast Asia Bibliography Index

282 283 284 310

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Makara Vyuha

7

Figure 2: Various types of Javanese spears

27

Figure 3: Different examples of Javanese kris blades

31

Figure 4: Eighteenth-century Burmese warrior with sword and shield

32

Figure 5: Javanese bow and various types of arrows

35

Figure 6: Javanese shields and various other weapons

39

Figure 7: Swivel guns (without pivot) on display in Singapore

50

Figure 8: Sixteenth-century musketeer on an internal corridor of the Shitthaung-para at Mrauk-U

52

Figure 9: Muzzle of cannon at Mandalay

60

Figure 10: Walls at Pomphet fortress in Thailand

81

Figure 11: Late sixteenth-century Trӏnh warships

109

Figure 12: Internal view of gun aperture

113

Figure 13: ‘Draw’ boats in a fifteenth-century temple mural painting at Pagan

114

Figure 14: River boats at Amarapura in early nineteenth century temple mural painting

115

Figure 15: Close-up of oarsmen on late eighteenth-century Burmese boat

117

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

ix

Figure 16: Hind side of one of two giant guardian elephant statues before the Mingun pagoda north of Mandalay

134

Figure 17: Elephant hunting in Ava

141

Figure 18: Mounted Khmer war elephant and warriors at Bayon, western side, northern half

157

Figure 19: Trӏnh horsemen practicing their skills with the Lance

178

Figure 20: Burmese cart and draft animals in an early nineteenth-century temple mural at Amarapura

205

Figure 21: Thai ‘solid’ wheel cart

209

Figure 22: Wall of one of three Italian fortresses built on the Irrawaddy River for King Mindon

256

Figure 23: A British steamship in an attack on Rangoon in 1852

258

Figure 24: British outpost based on Burmese stockade model

272

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My interest in warfare owes much to two graduate advisers/instructors, William H. Frederick at Ohio University and Victor B. Lieberman at the University of Michigan. While pursuing an M.A. in Asian History at Ohio, Bill Frederick introduced me to Sudjoko’s eye-opening Ancient Indonesian Technology: Ship Building and Firearms Production Around the Sixteenth Century and supervised my 1993 M.A. thesis. In the process of writing the latter, which focused on armed conflict between the Arakanese and the Portuguese in the early seventeenth century, I became acquainted with Vic Lieberman’s published research on warfare in the context of broader social and political developments in Burma. While serving as my dissertation adviser at the University of Michigan, Vic also read and commented on my initial publications, providing an early basis for my understanding of some of the features of Southeast Asian warfare that I examine in the present study. More recently, the author has benefited from participation in several collaborative events related to early modern Southeast Asian warfare. In the April 2002 Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, I participated, along with Gerrit Knaap, Felice Noelle Rodriguez, and Vic Lieberman (as discussant) in a panel organized by Barbara Watson Andaya, entitled “Aspects of Warfare in Pre-Modern South East Asia.” These papers were published as a special issue of the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (2003) edited by Barbara Andaya. Following the 2002 panel, I organized a workshop entitled “The International Workshop on Pre-Colonial Warfare in Monsoon Asia,” held at the School of Oriental and African Studies on 10-11 January 2003. In addition to papers presented by William Clarence Smith, Sunait Chutintaranond, Ulrich Kratz, William Womack, Tobias Rettig, and Sun Laichen, four participants, Barbara Andaya, Leonard Andaya, Hans Hagerdal, and John K. Whitmore contributed their papers to a special issue of South East Asia Research (2004) entitled “Warfare in Early Modern South East Asia.”

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Gratitude is also owed to George Dutton, Peter Boomgaard, Atsuko Naono, Wil Dijk, William Clarence Smith, Ian Brown, Vic Lieberman, Chris Goscha, Andrew Goss, and Pax Bobrow who shared forthcoming publications, read chapters, helped with details, or provided useful advice and encouragement.

INTRODUCTION

Among the most famous of early European-Southeast Asian military contests was that waged by various Burmese states against the Portuguese enclave at Syriam (1601-1613), ruled by Filippe de Brito y Nicote. One of the main sources for these campaigns is the personal account of Salvador Ribeyro, a Spanish captain in De Brito’s service, who had returned to Spain after falling out with De Brito. Far from being biased in his consideration of the quality of indigenous warfare, Ribeyro described Burmese forces with a respect that would have seemed odd to his nineteenth century counterparts. Ribeyro, like many Iberians of his day, was not preoccupied with issues of technological superiority over non-Europeans.1 As he relates in his account, the Burmese possessed the same kind of warfare technology as the Portuguese, for they too had cannon, muskets, and powder jars. Burmese were also innovative in their reaction to Portuguese tactics, at one point erecting a complicated system of nets to toss Portuguese powder jars back away from their walls and onto the Iberian assailants. Indeed, rather than technological superiority, Ribeyro indicates that divine intervention was his salvation. As he describes the fighting at one point when all seemed lost: Our side was in very truth in notable peril, but as the cause they defended was God’s, His help could not fail them. As the fiery column guided the people of Israel, and killed the saucy soldiers sent by King Ahab to take the holy Prophet Elias, even so near midnight, when the enemy’s attack was hottest and our men stood bravely to their ramparts, the Divine Majesty caused to appear above the Fort a wheel of fire equal to the circuit of the walls. Little by little it rose, growing ever larger, and then settled down with bright and burning flames upon the machines and the encampment of the enemy, to their great fear, and great comfort of our men, who seeing in the marvel the mercy of God’s pitiful hand, gave thanks and discharged their carbines and cannon with 1

Adas observes that Iberians in the early centuries of European exploration believed in the technological superiority of their ships, but had little to say about other kinds of technology. Adas 1989, 27.

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loud cries of joy and gladness. The assailants, interpreting the sign for a sure and veritable token of their own destruction, in the greatest terror abandoned their proud machines and their encampent with all their munitions, which our soldiers burned…2

On another occasion, again when all seemed lost, a mysterious horseman saved Ribeyro’s men: The Fort was in danger of being lost, had not the Divine favour guarded it; for – as the enemy tells – a tall Horseman, on a horse whiter than ermine, and having round about him a brightness too dazzling to behold, smote and slew them piteously, and wrought such destruction that they desisted from the fight, leaving more than a thousand tried soldiers, of their best and bravest, lying dead around the little Fort… When the Lord keeps the city, the watchman may sleep in peace.3

Ribeyro fit his victory into a moral system in which his faith helped him to defeat seemingly impossible odds. Superior technology or skill thus did not determine the outcome of events and, indeed, were secondary to Ribeyro’s account. It might seem odd to begin a study of warfare in Southeast Asia with a look at how one European interpreted his victories over Southeast Asians. However, the account raises two useful points concerning Southeast Asian warfare that will inform the present survey. First, firearms were important as weapons but they never exercised the same hegemony in indigenous warfare in the region as they did in Europe.4 The effectiveness of firearms reflected the potency of spiritual forces governed by the rules of a moral system in which certain cultural practices and not skill or technological superiority determined the outcome of combat.5 Second, as Ribeyro indicates repeatedly in his narrative, his achievement in defeating Southeast Asian armies at Syriam was so great because Southeast Asian warriors, far from being backward, cowardly, or technologically inferior, were a significant adversary. Again, at several places in his account, Ribeyro stresses that all would have been lost had it not been for divine intervention. In his eyes, and in those of many of his 2

Ribeyro 1926, 130. Ribeyro 1926, 121. 4 Parker 1996, 4. 5 See, for example, L. Andaya 1994, 387. 3

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contemporaries, Southeast Asian armies were powerful and impressive. Numerous studies of indigenous warfare in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia have appeared in the last few years. No comprehensive survey of indigenous warfare in Southeast Asia, however, has been offered for at least a half-century, that is, since H. G. Quaritch-Wales’ 1952 study, Ancient South-East Asian Warfare, despite numerous country-specific studies. This is a major lacuna in the literature, as early modern Southeast Asia’s unique geographical and commercial position between the major warfare traditions of East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe meant that ‘indigenous’ warfare in the region evolved not in isolation but with substantial participation in developments in warfare across Eurasia. Firearms entered Southeast Asia from all four regions and were integrated into an already mature local system of warfare. The ability to choose technology based on local necessity and to adapt it according to indigenous perceptions of warfare meant that foreigners found Southeast Asian warfare to be both familiar and somehow different. As warfare between Southeast Asians and Europeans, South Asians, and Chinese would demonstrate, outsiders who considered Southeast Asians easy prey for conquest were easily proven wrong.

The Region While there is general agreement today on what constitutes the region, it is becoming less clear whether the region is a valid unit of analysis, especially regarding warfare. Technologies, ideas, and people moved in numerous circuits across Eurasia, especially from the fourteenth century during a period of increasing global commerce, and this movement was not limited by, and equally unaware of, the regional boundaries that appear so clearly to contemporary scholars. ‘Southeast Asia,’ as is frequently pointed out by both historians and political scientists, is a relatively recent term. Even earlier terminologies grouping the region, or parts of the region, together in an abstract whole, such as ‘the lands below the winds,’ were external identifications. A sixteenth century Burmese king, for example, would have seen his kingdom in relation to Mazzimadesa or ‘Middle Earth,’ that is, India. Vietnamese Confucian literati saw their world in relation

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INTRODUCTION

to the Chinese Empire and, certainly, Muslims of the archipelago would have been more familiar with membership in the ummat, the world Muslim community stemming from Spain to the eastern Archipelago and centred on the Middle East, than with kinship to the peoples of Laos, Cambodia, or Chiengmai. The problem with focusing on Southeast Asia as a region involves more than simply indigenous perspective. In practice, certain aspects of warfare in the region were widely divergent across cultures and societies. Headhunting, for example, was common throughout parts of the Indonesian archipelago (and Australasia) into the twentieth century, while its presence in the mainland was limited, at least within the historical period. The kris, sometimes raised as an example of a defining weapon of Southeast Asian culture, was generally limited to the Malay world and among some coastal peoples of the mainland, such as the Chams. Further, however much Vietnamese warfare shared with other Southeast Asian cultures prior to the classical period, early modern Ĉҥi ViӋt armies and their successors experienced a degree of bureaucratization and specialization, in tandem with military developments in China, that separated it from the rest of the region. Thus, in an important sense, the use of ‘Southeast Asia,’ to set the boundaries for a study of warfare is artificial and external. Despite the limitations of the regional scheme, certain aspects of Southeast Asian warfare favour a regional approach. The geographic, demographic, and climactic contexts -- the hot tropics, monsoons, low population base, and difficult terrain favoring river and coastal travel - all helped to influence the trajectory of martial developments. As discussed in later chapters, Southeast Asian warfare was not dominated by the major field contests found in other areas of early modern Eurasia, especially Europe and China. Military campaigns tended to concentrate in certain seasons and were avoided in others, particularly when the rains came. Maritime warfare played perhaps a more significant role in connection with land campaigns than in Eurasian warfare in general. A reliance on war elephants was shared with numerous other areas of the world in different periods, from the Roman Empire to classical India, but elephants remained more important (and for longer) in Southeast Asia than perhaps anywhere else. Although scholars debate the finer points of periodization, there is also general agreement on the major episodes of state rise, decline,

INTRODUCTION

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and collapse over the course of Southeast Asian history. The classical or charter period, beginning from about the fifth to eighth centuries and ending in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries witnessed the emergence of large-scale armies in the region, the rise of several mega-states, warfare on a grand geographical scale, and substantial epigraphic and monumental records. This period also established the standards for models of warfare that early modern Southeast Asians would heed and attempt to live up to for centuries to come. The early modern period’s beginnings are murkier and mark a transition rather than a clear break. The collapse or decline of the classical states of Pagan, Angkor, and Sri Vijaya was followed and perhaps encouraged by the emergence of numerous smaller polities. From about 1340 until 1820, twenty-three mainland states warred with each other in a contest that resulted in a handful of winners, namely Burma, Siam, and Vietnam. In the archipelago, on a reduced time scale, two European entities, the Spanish Philippines and the Dutch East Indies consolidated a similarly diverse political landscape.6 While this political consolidation was due to many factors, warfare played an important role in determining the victors.

Periodization The present volume focuses on indigenous warfare in Southeast Asia from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century. These termination points were not determined easily. On the one hand, indigenous warfare in the middle of the fourteenth century was probably not very different from that waged a few centuries earlier. In the last few decades of the nineteenth century and, in some cases, for many decades earlier, warfare was fought between Southeast Asians and Europeans (and Americans) and thus cannot be seen as wholly indigenous in nature. Moreover, some of these end-of-the-century conflicts spilled over well into the twentieth century, as in the case of the Philippines. Despite these drawbacks to the periodization scheme adopted here, it also affords important advantages. First, source material for the region as a whole increases rapidly over the course of the fourteenth century, soon supplemented 6

Lieberman 2003, 2.

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INTRODUCTION

by foreign traveller accounts. Second, the Euro-American campaigns against Southeast Asians at the end of the nineteenth century mark not the end of ‘indigenous’ warfare, but rather a return to it, after several decades in which some Southeast Asian states sought to westernize their armies. Finally, in several cases, this periodization scheme is used flexibly, when necessary, to further elucidate points being made.

Structure of the Book This book is divided into chapters on the basis of topics or themes. Chapter One examines aspects of warfare that were peculiar to the region or, at the very least, make it unique from other regions more familiar to military historians, such as Europe and East Asia. Chapters Two and Three each examine one of two categories of weaponry. The first category consists of weapons that were owned and used as personal weapons by the average soldier or warrior. The bearer would have learned how to make such weapons as a child, would have used them as tools in addition to their martial functions, and frequently identified in social or cultural ways with the weapon. The second category of weaponry, firearms, was very different. These were monopolized by the state, were not generally used in everyday life, and the skills in making them were not as widespread. Chapters Four and Five examine the two major spheres of Southeast Asian mass warfare, on water and in sieges. The importance of maritime connections to the region and the spread of river systems throughout the mainland and some areas of the archipelago meant that warfare on water was very common in early modern Southeast Asia. A rugged terrain and a Southeast Asian commitment to holding one’s ground and protecting one’s resources also made the siege and related efforts at fortification the major form of land combat throughout the mainland and frequently in the archipelago. Malay warfare, however, sometimes diverted from this general tendency in focusing more on surprise attacks and short-term defense works. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight focus on the role of animals in warfare. The elephant is perhaps the best-known symbol of warfare in Southeast Asia, and it was highly effective against outsiders with no experience in facing these large and powerful pachyderms. Horses and cavalry were also critical to the military success of some states, but

INTRODUCTION

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less so in others. Like the elephant, the horse was connected to elite status in various ways. While elephants gradually disappeared as instruments of war in the region, the cavalry experienced a short-lived revival in the eighteenth century. Finally, the buffalo, the ox, and the mule, but especially the former two, were all important to supply and transportation demands in Southeast Asian warfare. Chapter Eight also includes a discussion of the related topic of transportation infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, as well as the ubiquitous two-wheeled cart. Chapter Nine analyzes the problems with relying on the mobilization of local farmers for military campaigns and explains how mercenaries and royal bodyguards represented attempts to resolve these problems. Ultimately, Southeast Asian courts turned to betterorganized, permanent standing armies, in some cases modeled on those of the West, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Chapter Ten examines Southeast Asian warfare in the nineteenth century. It is argued that the arrival of the steamship, naval guns, and European monopolization over the flow of firearms to Southeast Asia, combined to weaken even the most powerful Southeast Asian armies. In a number of campaigns fought out against European armies in the 1820s and 1840s to 1860s, even very powerful states such as Burma and Vietnam fell victim to river wars in which Europeans held hegemony over mainland river systems for the first time in local history. In the archipelago, several coastal campaigns paralleled the mainland river wars. During the last decade and a half of the nineteenth century, after their defeats in the river and coastal campaigns, some Southeast Asians fared better in warfare when Westerners were forced to abandon their ships and naval guns and campaign deep in the interior. Here, indigenous stockading, skirmishing, and decentralized command worked, at least in the short term, to delay the Western conquest.

CHAPTER ONE

CULTURE AND WARFARE Jeremy Black suggests that an “understanding of cultural suppositions” peculiar to local societies is necessary if we are to understand warfare as more than a test of weapons and weapon systems.1 Scholars of Southeast Asia have frequently attempted to demonstrate Southeast Asia’s uniqueness as a region and how Southeast Asians saw things in very different ways than their European, and even Chinese and Indian contemporaries. This chapter focuses on several important cultural aspects of early modern Southeast Asian warfare: bloodshed, headhunting, invulnerability, and the role of women.

Prowess, Headhunting, and Women Early Southeast Asians believed in a special kind of quantifiable charismatic power, what O. W. Wolters calls ‘soul stuff,’ that animated everything from people to trees in different measure. This power was transferable and one could amass it by accumulating it from fallen enemies or by associating with someone who had greater amounts of it. The possession of greater or lesser amounts of this power, and the recognition of this possession by one’s peers, determined one’s place in the order of things. Those with an inordinately high amount of ‘soul stuff,’ ‘men of prowess,’ were natural leaders and those with lesser amounts, natural followers. This belief was given a new vocabulary with the arrival of Brahmanism and later universal salvation religions such as Buddhism and Islam, but nonetheless remained critical to Southeast Asian views of power and the arrangement of power in society. Recognition of superior charismatic power and its cultivation continued to play an important part in Southeast Asian leadership, in both peace and war, 1

Black 1999, 674.

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encouraging many early modern rulers to seek numerous ways to demonstrate it, through their sexual prowess and fertility, their physical strength, or the size and success of their armies.2 Warfare in particular was the unequivocal test of charisma, for a leader who was successful in battle or war legitimated his claim to superior charismatic power. Among Burmese, the mythological ruler Pyu-zàwhtì was invoked as a model of kingship based on prowess demonstrated in war. Armed with the bows and arrows given him by his father, the sun king, Pyu-zàw-htì defeated in combat the six great enemies: the bird, the pig, the ogre, the gourd, the flying squirrel, and the tiger. This myth was carried on in texts and in court symbolism until the end of the early modern period and after.3 The outcome of warfare was believed to be influenced in part by the charismatic power of the leader and not necessarily by the martial skills of the accompanying warriors. One function of the leader was to recognize signs indicating whether a prospective warrior would be killed or wounded if they engaged in the fighting, and to transplant signs of defeat from his own people to the enemy. Warriors who had become stricken with fear would be shaken by the leader or pricked “with a sharp bamboo” to bring them to their senses. In Malay warfare, the leader was perceived to be so important to the outcome of the battle that when he fell, the rest of the army frequently fled the field.4 The belief in soul stuff was crucial to the emergence of headhunting, for it was concentrated in the head. Even Southeast Asian societies that did not, or no longer, practiced headhunting considered beheading as the most effective way of dealing with an enemy. Examples of taking the heads of masses of both the slain and the wounded can be found among lowland Burmese and highland Shans from the beginning of the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, and among the Wa into the twentieth.5 In 1563-64, for example, King Bayín-naung honoured with meat and alcohol those of his soldiers who had succeeded in taking Siamese heads while men who had not

2

Wolters 1999, 18-19, 93-95. Zei-yá-thin-hkaya 1957, 55. 4 Quaritch Wales 1952, 4-5, 15; Knaap 2003, 169; SM 1952, 97, 123, 177. 5 Harvey 1926, 88, 109, 230, 232, 236, 247, 251, 344. 3

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3

were shamed in ritual fashion.6 Commanders who failed in their orders on the battlefield were decapitated and their severed heads impaled. In the eighteenth century, Alaùng-hpayà also required his men to bring back the heads of enemy soldiers to demonstrate their participation in battle and was even said to have piled up one thousand decapitated heads from southern rebels on a raft.7 Taking heads, however, had much more meaning in headhunting societies. Probably the earliest European account of headhunting in Southeast is the Itinerario of Nicolo di Conti, a Venetian who visited parts of the mainland and archipelago in c. 1430. He observed that the people of Sumatra were constantly engaged in warfare with their neighbours and eate the fleshe of their enemies that they doe take, and keepe their heades for treasure, and use them in steade of money, which they do buy anye thing, in giving moste heades for the thing that is most worth, and he that hath moste heades of the deade men in his keeping, is esteemed to be most rich.8

In headhunting societies, by taking and consuming the enemy’s flesh, their power was transferred to oneself and one’s own village. For this reason, when a fellow villager was slain in battle significant attempts would be made to hide the corpse and thus prevent an enemy from taking his head. Sometimes beheading was delayed until the captives reached their captor’s camp. In early seventeenth century Ambon, for example, prisoners were sometimes kept on board ship until the moment it reached the village beach, whereupon they were immediately beheaded.9 As Quaritch Wales explains, however, a head taken in battle was usually taken back immediately to the war camp for drying and preparation for hanging in the village temple. What remained would be scraped, the skulls discarded, and at home, all the villagers would eat a mixture of the latter and food, so that all could share in the transference of power. Sometimes this mixture would be ‘fed’ to amulets to increase their protective power. Battles were also 6 At Ayudhya, for example, Bayín-naung ordered the construction of a structure, instructing those men with captured heads to stand on top and those who had not to stand below. Water was then poured on the hands of the honoured and allowed to pour over the shamed men below. Cushman 2000, 34. 7 Cushman 2000, 36, 37; Harvey 1926, 232, 236. 8 Conti 1929, 129. 9 Quaritch Wales 1952, 16-17; Knaap 2003, 169.

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fought, simultaneously, with the aid of ancestor spirits. Particularly potent warriors joined the ranks of the village ancestors after death and were worshipped in the village temple or shrine. Here they were called upon for aid during times of trouble and through rituals participated in the fighting. For this help, an accusation was needed to justify village feuds and the fighting that would follow. If an accusation were legitimate, it would bring the aid of these ancestor spirits. In battle, warriors would also bring a string of seashells, carrying with it the ancestor spirits, and this string needed corpses to ‘eat.’10 In her recent analysis of headhunting in monsoon Asia, Barbara Andaya correctly observed that Southeast Asian warfare has been discussed mainly in terms of the male experience. Scholarship on Southeast Asian warfare is not unique in this way, warfare is usually seen as preserve of the male, in part because of their overwhelming domination of the battlefield and monopolization of the weapons of war.11 Even so, Southeast Asia provides numerous examples of female participation in warfare. Women were certainly not strangers to early modern Siamese and Burmese warfare, for example, and Siamese and Vietnamese sources record that some elite women even mounted elephants and commanded troops in battle. When the Portuguese assaulted Melaka in 1511, women of the town left their homes and contributed to the town’s defense.12 The Hikayat Patani records that in Aceh, the wives of ministers and officers performed guard duty in the royal palace and that one ruler established formal turns of duty for these female guards.13 The Hikajat Potjut Muhamat also refers to a female pirate leading a group of sixty to seventy armed men “far and wide.”14 These examples may have represented merely momentary exceptions to the kind of fighting that is described in the indigenous and European sources. When attention is shifted to less apparent (in terms of the standard historical sources), but no less fundamental aspects of warfare, more durable female participation in Southeast Asian warfare can be identified. 10

Quaritch Wales 1952, 3, 6, 17; Reid 1982, 2; Wolters 1999, 19. B. Andaya 2004, 18. 12 Nieuhoff 1732, 2.177; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 80; Dutton 2004, 30; Li 1992, 51. 13 Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.188. 14 HPM 1979, 79. 11

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Barbara Andaya suggests that women played a significant role in headhunting. Again, headhunting, as one encounters it in the numerous early modern and colonial accounts of the region, is described in male-oriented or in the non gender-specific terms of a community activity, thus requiring new methodologies, generally derived from anthropology, to rectify the imbalance. Although men physically fought the battles, the ritualized nature of headhunting provided a significant space for female participation. Certainly, women (and children) were already involved, for headhunting was directed against them as much as against men.15 Women played a more important role, however, in the ritual aspects of headhunting. Andaya makes two generalizations about headhunting in the early modern period that bring this role into better focus. First, participation in headhunting represented part of the rites of manhood that were prerequisites for marriage. Tattooing, headdresses, shields, and the trophies of the hunt were linked to the demonstration of male prowess. The number of heads accumulated also determined a man’s place in the leadership hierarchy of the village. Second, Andaya, drawing upon recent research that has challenged the notion of male domination in headhunting, also argues that women played crucial roles in the rites of headhunting that emphasized fertility rather than simply victory by men in battle. Not only did participation in the hunt mark a male’s passage into manhood, he was also aware that his performance in the hunt would determine a woman’s assessment of his suitability for marriage. Skulls in one way or another were associated with the different stages and spheres of the male-female relationship, from copulation to funerals. Since a husband’s success in the hunt determined a woman’s place in the community as well, they had a strong incentive to participate fully in the various rituals associated with headhunting. As mothers, older women also schooled their sons in the values of the community and the importance of headhunting.16 Women also participated in headhunting rituals that maintained the balance between the physical and spiritual world and were critical to the outcome of the battle being fought far away. Women participated in war dances that summoned the aid of powerful ancestor spirits before the hunt and provided departing warriors with amulets and 15 16

Knaap 2003, 189; B. Andaya 2004, 23-24. B. Andaya 2004, 19, 25-28, 30-36, 38-39.

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other kinds of protective objects. During the hunt, a woman maintained her husband’s ritual responsibilities in taking care of his collection of skulls while he was away and had to observe taboos on her behavior, such as abstention from weaving or sexual intercourse. Her behavior would influence her husband’s success in battle and, if she acted correctly, this behavior could prevent his death.17 Older women who were no longer fertile had perhaps a more important role to play. Success in fighting depended upon a shaman who served chiefly as a link between combatants and the ancestor spirits. This shaman communicated with the ancestor spirits in the temple in order to gain their support prior to the fighting. Other spiritual preparations included amulets, the selection of a propitious day, the correct interpretation of dreams, the special preparation of food, careful personal behaviour in both actions and speech in order to prevent bad luck, and a watchful eye on the behaviour of animals while on the way to the enemy village and battle. Finally, the shaman was subject to dietary constraints during the fighting in order to avoid foods that would work against the concentration of his or her own power. As Barbara Andaya points out, although both men and women could be shamans, older women were considered to be especially potent and better able to transcend the division between the human and spiritual worlds.18

Battlefield Formations, Oaths, and Rituals In open battles, Southeast Asian armies made use of a number of fixed formations. Frequent mention in chronicles and in European accounts of these formations suggests that careful order and organization were important and that an analytical template for conducting war was passed on from one generation to the next. In the case of the Bugis in seventeenth century Boné, soldiers from specific territories organized themselves under different banners that identified them and these units took up different positions in the pre-battle formation according to their banners.19 In Java, banners identified elite warriors who brought 17

Quaritch Wales 1952, 185; B. Andaya 37-38, 42-43, 46. Quaritch Wales 1952, 4-5, 6-7, 9; Knaap 2003, 169; B. Andaya 2004, 39-40. 19 L. Andaya 2004, 72. 18

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personal retinues of soldiers and porters with them into battle. These groups would be assigned specified places in the opening battle formation as indicated in Figure 1. The commander, frequently the ruler, was usually positioned in the centre of the formation for both symbolic and practical purposes: “so that he can see better what is going on [with] His deputy general and some captains and lieutenants … by his side so as to carry and execute his orders promptly wherever necessary.”20

Figure 1 Makara Vyuha from illustration in Raffles 1817. The numbers correspond to different elite warriors and units of troops.

20

Gervaise 1998, 95-96.

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Indian models of warfare also provided a vast repertoire of battlefield arrays and tactics, named after animals or mythological creatures that were used frequently in the indigenous chronicles to describe battles.21 The armies of Mataram, for example, were said to employ the Makara array, which on paper appears as a giant monster (see Figure 1). Siamese armies also made use of the eagle, garuda, buffalo, lion, and other arrays.22 It is possible that Loubère did not appreciate such models when he described a Siamese battlefield formation in the late seventeenth century: They range themselves in three lines, each of which is composed of three great square battalions; and the King, or the General whom he names in his absence, stands in the Middle Battalion, which he composes of the best Troops, for the security of his Person. Every particular Captain of a Battalion keeps himself also in the midst of the Battalion which he commands; and if the nine battalions are too big, they are each divided into nine less, with the same symmetry as the whole body of the Army.23

According to Ù Tin, Burmese armies derived their formations from three kinds of battle arrays from the Theravada Buddhist cannon (lotus, wheel, and cart), as well as sixteen formations derived from the Sanskrit texts, including the bull, scorpion, cloud, and other arrays.24 Chinese models also influenced Vietnamese field formations, although the stress on order before combat remained the same. Initial formations might simply have been used to set the proper conditions for commencing a battle, and were then forgotten in the fighting. In other cases, formations were utilized for tactical purposes. As Leonard Andaya points out in the case of Bugis and Makassar warfare, however, no available account indicates the relationship between these formations and the tactical operations of different units on the battlefield although they do provide information about the importance of order in the army prior to battle.25 Generally, texts from other areas of Southeast Asia are similarly silent on the application of 21

Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 48. Quaritch Wales 1952, 198-206. 23 Loubère 1986, 91-92. 24 Tin 1931-1933, 4.256-257. 25 L. Andaya 2004, 72. 22

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battle formations to tactical purposes, with some important exceptions. Chiengmai armies, for example, employed one called the ‘Crow’s Wing’ in battle with some success.26 Symbolic field formations, however, were not as important to holding an army together as the oath. Prior to the rise of nationalism in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asians generally fought either in the interests of their village or for their patron, either a local lord or the king. The oath was a means of emphasizing these bonds before entering battle. Before some attacks, such as in sixteenth century Lower Burma, the king or commander would feast the soldiers and get their oath that “they would fight to the last.”27 Sometimes the oathtaking ceremony was part of other rituals such as feasting and dancing. The ritual use of blood was common and, in most cases, at least in the earlier centuries of the early modern period, alcohol was involved. In the case of South Sulawesi, for example, warriors sacrificed animals and smeared their blood on the banners they would carry into battle. The actual oath-taking ceremony took place on the battlefield, when the armies had assembled and were prepared to fight. Warriors drank a fermented palm wine and nobles would perform a dance, weapon in hand, before the ruler and swear loyalty. In addition to bonding warriors to their ruler or leader in preparation for battle, these activities also placated or summoned the participation of ancestor spirits.28 As Raffles describes the oath-taking ceremony among the Makassars: When the price in council has decided upon war, the assembled chiefs, after sprinkling their banners with blood, proceed to take a solemn oath, by dipping their krises into a vessel of water, and afterwards dancing around the blood-stained banner, with frantic gesture and a strange and savage contortion of the body and limbs, so as to give the extended kris a tremulous motion, each severally imprecating the vengeance of the deity against his person, if he violates his vow to exterminate the enemy, to conquer or die.29

26

Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 48. Banyà-dalá n.d., 65. 28 L. Andaya 2004, 58-60. 29 Raffles 817, 2.clxxxv. 27

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Rituals of peace making after the fighting complemented the prebattle oath-taking ceremony. Those defeated in battle made offerings of symbolic gifts including females, jewelry, or ornate krisses, and in the case of South Sulawesi, these gifts were made in groups of three, a sacred number. This would be followed by a treaty that established the political relationship, sometimes put in terms of vassalage and sometimes of kinship, between the defeated and the victors for the future. New oaths of allegiance and, again, the drinking of alcohol stirred by weapons, validated these treaties binding the spiritual protectors of each side.30 As Legaspi noted in the late sixteenthcentury Philippines: “In making peace each man takes two or three drops of blood of his arme or brest and mixe both in some vesell together, which is drunke with Wine and Water.”31 If one violated the treaty, they would be subject to retribution from the ancestor spirits as the latter had given their guarantee to the treaty through these rituals.32 Generally, such peace-ensuring rituals were more common in the archipelago and among some highland groups on the mainland, where warfare usually led to conquest or a stalemate that could endure for generations. The mainland had its own rituals marking conquest, including the act of the victorious ruler riding his elephant around the walls of the conquered town to mark his overlordship. Evidence of the same kinds of rituals associated with making peace in the Malay world can also be found in the first few centuries of the early modern period on the mainland. Nevertheless, a greater emphasis on orthodox Theravada Buddhism by the more powerful courts on the mainland led to their decline. The sixteenth century Mon text, NidƗna RƗmƗdhipatƯkathƗ, for example, provides an early example of the beginning of this process. In 1540, when the saw-bwà of Mohnyin and the ruler of Taung-ngu, Tabin-shwei-htì, prepared for an oath of allegiance, they slaughtered cattle and buffaloes. The saw-bwà also prepared jars of rice spirit, into which he had weapons dipped, and the alcohol was poured into a golden bowl from which the two rulers were to drink. Tabin-shwei-htì, evidently guided by Buddhist admonitions against imbibing alcohol at this time, refused, and suggested replacing the alcohol with water for the purposes of the ceremony. The saw-bwà, 30

L. Andaya 2004, 76-77. Legaspi 1906, 12.150. 32 L. Andaya 2004, 77-78. 31

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however, insisted on drinking alcohol, claiming, “for it is our invariable custom, and we Shans only trust an oath taken on liquor and meat.” Tabin-shwei-htì would not budge on the issue, and the prospective alliance was abandoned.33 Moved by his devotion to Buddhism, Bayín-naung also attempted to end the Shan practice of burying the dead with alcohol in late 1550s. This did not spell the absolute end of the use of alcohol in Burmese warfare, for it continued to be important, as Alaùng-hpayà allowed its use to placate the spirits of his cannon in the mid-eighteenth century. Nevertheless, in the nineteenth century, particularly under King Mindon, the use of alcohol (as well as the eating of meat) by Burmese soldiers brought swift and severe punishment including public beatings in the case of drunkenness.34

Bravery and Stimulants In battle, rushing an enemy without fear of death, what Raffles refers to as a “frenzied attacked,” was another important element of Southeast Asian warfare. Noblemen and elite warriors were expected to have this commitment to fight to the death whether as part of an army, on the battlefield, or as an individual, in a duel.35 As Pires explained, Amocos means men who are determined to die. Some of them do it when they are drunk, and these are the common people; but the noblemen are much in the habit of challenging each other to duels, and they kill each other over their quarrels; and this is the custom of the country. Some of them kill themselves on horseback, and some of them on foot, according to what they have decided.36

In the late seventeenth century, Forbin reported that the Makassars were raised from childhood with “the point of honour” which meant never submitting to an enemy and that no Makassars had ever been known to violate this point. As he explained: 33

Banyà-dalá n.d., 46. Banyà-dalá n.d., 97; Harvey 1926, 232; Langham-Carter 1937, 265. 35 Raffles 1817, 2.298; Pires 1944, 1.176, 2.266. 36 Pires 1944, 1.176. 34

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Being full of these notions, they never beg quarter nor give it, and ten Makassars, with their drawn daggers, will attack ten thousand men; and no wonder, for men who have such principles engrafted in their very nature are void of all fear, and are very dangerous people to deal with.37

The persistence with which an amok warrior could carry on the fight is found in one account of an encounter between a European armed with a lance and a Makassar: I plunged my lance into his stomach; nevertheless, the Makassar, as if he had no sense of feeling, advanced upon the weapon which I held fast in his body, and made incredible efforts to come at me in order to run me through; and he would infallibly have done it, if the hilt of the blade had not hindered him. I found that my best way was to retreat a little, still keeping the lance in his stomach, without venturing to repeat my thrust, till at length I was relieved by others of the lancemen who laid him dead upon the spot.38

When Sultan Agung of Mataram besieged Madura in 1624, his forces experienced a significant defeat when some two thousand Madurese wheeled around after feigning a retreat and then ‘ran amuck’ against Agung’s fifty thousand men, killing six thousand of the latter as well as seventeen of Agung’s most important commanders. Sultan Agung was defeated later at Surabaya by a force of eight hundred men in the same manner.39 Similarly, in a 1680 Javanese battle between the army of Mataram bolstered by VOC troops and the forces of PanČmbahan Mas of Giri, the former were put to flight by the amoks: …they did not bother with shooting or wounding in the struggle but, at the constant cry of amokan … of the aged panČmbahan … they fell upon our men from all sides at once, with such violence that after the loss of six Europeans and ten Javanese as well as a number of wounded, the Madurese and Javanese fell into so much confusion that they grew panicky and took flight…40

37

Forbin 1997, 113. Forbin 1997, 105. 39 Schrieke 1957, 2.132. 40 Quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.133. 38

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The amok attack may have left many enemy dead on the field, but was frequently less costly for the attacker. Nieuhoff observed an amok attack in Sumatra in the early 1660s in which many Dutch seamen were killed, but not as many as among the amok fighters.41 Bravery could be further strengthened by drinking alcohol or taking opium. Alcohol numbed the body from pain. When combined with the adrenalin and excitement or fear of going into battle, such warriors could wreak devastation on an enemy with seemingly inhuman strength.42 Opium was also a means of inducing both courage and great strength. In the seventeenth century, the Malays generally and the Makassars in particular took opium for courage, as was the case of Makassars in the royal guard of Ayudhya in the 1690s. Wrestlers were known to take opium to achieve feats “beyond their strength” and this may be one reason why some Burmese warriors also bolstered themselves with opium.43 This effect of opium was indicated when a Dutch vessel captured a Malay boat and encountered its angry crew in the Straits of Bangka in 1819: Her crew…had added to the natural ferocity of their temper, by a free use of opium, combined with the juice of a root called bang, these stimulants, when associated with their Mohamedan persuasion of the doctrine of predestination, render them totally exempt from fear, produce the most ungovernable rage and desecration, and stimulate them to deeds of the most savage and diabolical barbarity.44

Southeast Asian warriors used opium for other reasons as well. When a seventeenth century ruler of Aceh fell seriously ill, the armed men and elephants posted around the palace were given opium thrice daily “to animate them in the highest degree.”45 Accounts of Burmese warriors on opium refer to their energetic dancing before the troops and during battle.46 As Snodgrass observed “the infatuated wretches,

41 42

Nieuhoff 1732, 2.187.

Pires 1944, 1.176. 43 Loubère 1986, 92, 97; Fryer, 111, quoted in Bowrey 1905, 312, n. 1; Snodgrass 1827, 95. 44 White 1972, 18-19. 45 Bowrey 1905, 312. 46 Snodgrass 1827, 64, 96.

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under the excitement of opium…frequently continued the ludicrous exhibition.”47

Invulnerability Special protective medicines, tattoos, amulets, and charms also granted invulnerability. Spells and mantras, for example, were used on both warriors and on their weapons. Seventeenth-century Acehnese and Siamese were said to have achieved invulnerability with charms. IbrƗhƯm claimed in the late seventeenth century that no one he had encountered were more proficient in it than the Makassars, although he probably meant Malays generally.48 Before the 1680 battle between the Mataram army and PanČmbahan Mas of Giri mentioned above, the latter made his family invulnerable by speaking with the king of the spirits of the smoke while burning a basinful of benzoin. As he informed his children: “a thousand spirits will watch over each of you my sons, so that no enemy will be able to injure him…”49 In Malay warfare, there were various kinds of invulnerability (kČbal). Some forms of invulnerability included hardening the skin (kČbal kulit) or covering it with a kind of armour by rubbing quicksilver into it (kČbal pČnimbul). KČbal minyak referred to effecting slippery skin, so that it became like oil (minyak), and all weapons, whether blades or bullets, slid off.50 This is indicated in the case of the ‘invulnerable’ Acehnese warrior Pang Peureuba. He was claimed to have been protected by God by means of such a charm, and that even bullets could not penetrate him: …the invulnerable Pang Peureuba, was hit. His skin was as slippery as oil, so that one saw the bullets slide off. Pang Peur[eu]ba was invulnerable because of his secret peungimbǀ charms; God himself looked after him. He continually moved up and down, in order to steep himself in the charm.51 47

Snodgrass 1827, 65. HPM 1979, 217, 249; IbrƗhƯm 1972, 136. 49 Quoted in Schrieke 1957, 132. 50 Gardner 1936, 131. 51 HMP 1979, 229. 48

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This kind of invulnerability seems to have been induced in some cases by the actual application of certain oils. During the siege of Pasuruhan by DƟmak forces, when the besieged decided to counterattack: most of them began to anoint themselves with minhamundy, which is a certain preparation of fragrant oil used by these people in cases like this, as final proof of their determination to die, and those who anoint themselves this way are called amucks by the common people.52

Invulnerability could also be obtained by making use of certain objects that had talismanic properties. Gardner offers the example of a jacket made by removing the necks of forty-four jackets and having seven virgins sew the remnants together on seven consecutive Fridays.53 Embroidering a jacket or piece of cloth with religious texts also granted invulnerability. Before going off to battle, Makassar warriors consulted shamans who provided them with “letters written in magic characters which they tied to their arms, and assured them that as long as they wore them they would be invulnerable.”54 Similarly, an Acehnese prince ensured invulnerability in the following way: He took a kerchief and put it on his head, especially applying the amulet ‘two sections (of the Qo’rƗn)”. First of all he applied the amulet “Sea of Prophethood’, which guaranteed safety even if people wanted to gouge his eyes. Then the amulet ‘Inverted Joint of Ratan’, which he tied somewhere to his breast.55

Certain drugs also conferred invulnerability. The Hikayat Patani records that in preparation for a revolt, one party of forty men drank ‘magic water’ to make themselves invulnerable.56 The Malays also had spells placed on their weapons so that the enemy’s weapon would break or his arm would become paralysed. Moreover these spells prevented one’s kris from being stolen or if so, brought misfortune on the thief. This protection was called pakan and, 52

Pinto 1989, 386. Gardner 1936, 129. 54 Forbin 1997, 112, see also 117. 55 HPM 1979, 221. 56 Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.173. 53

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as Gardner explained, it was not completely reliable. The charm had to be provided by a shaman who understood the specific nature of the metal of the weapon. Some metals, such as majapahit iron, were known by no one, so weapons made of this metal could not be protected against. Each metal fit into a hierarchy, common metals such as iron at the bottom and gold and silver at the top, and it took more time and the shaman charged more money, to charm metals in ascending order. Thus, charms tended to focus on the common metals most people could afford, which meant the charm would be useless against more expensive daggers or other kinds of weapons. These limitations were also valid with gunpowder weapons, for bullets were also charmed, and one might find that their invulnerability failed if they were hit with a silver bullet. If no other explanation for failure was available, blame could be directed at the weapon’s peculiar spirit whose strength was greater than that of any charm.57 On the mainland and in the archipelago alike, warriors also carried around metal balls or had them inserted under the skin to provide protection.58 As Pires reported: The cabees … have given everyone to understand that they cannot die by the sword. The cabees are men who carry a round piece of steel or other metals as big as chickpeas on the thick of the right arm, and when they receive it they swear to die like knights. There are few cabaees, and they are much feared. The land where the best cabaees come from are the islands of Linga, and next to these [come those[ from Brunei (Burnee) and Pahang, and those from Melaka are not so good.59

Burmese invulnerables were also said to be “best known” for their “bits of gold, silver, and sometimes precious stones in their arms” inserted under the surface of the skin.60 The protective functions of such amulets could also be highly specialized. Cambodians, for example, carried amulets representing a seated decapitated body with the head resting on the lap as protection from headhunters.61 There were also invulnerability-inducing preparations for battle. The 57

Gardner 1936, 131-132; IbrƗhƯm 1972, 136; HPM 1979, 121. Quaritch Wales 1952, 134. 59 Pires 1944, 2.266. 60 Snodgrass 1827, 64. 61 Quaritch Wales 1952, 134. 58

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Burmese and Siamese used the tattoo to provide invulnerability. Burmese invulnerables, for example, were tattooed with images of tigers, elephants, and other fierce animals on their arms and legs.62 European armies encountered many groups of such men in their battles with indigenous armies, as in the case of the forty Balinese champions who led indigenous forces against Dutch guns in the 1840s.63 As in the archipelago, “invulnerables” in mainland armies also specialized in the surprise attack, usually made at night. In their attacks, they would yell and fire their guns, in an apparent attempt, to increase the shock element of their attacks.64 The invulnerables were by no means a small force in Southeast Asian armies. In 1624, Sultan Agung’s army of thirty thousand men were said to include seven thousand “said to be impervious to shot or thrust.”65

Bloodshed As Gerrit Knaap suggests, a sharp line cannot be drawn between peace and warfare in Southeast Asia because practices such as headhunting “was part of the fabric of society and, hence, violence was endemic.”66 Given the bloody nature of headhunting, it raises questions about the validity of some current ideas about Southeast Asian warfare. It is true that Southeast Asian warfare was not simply about killing, but also about population deportations to one’s homeland. As Loubère observed of Siamese and Burmese warfare in the late seventeenth century: They busie themselves only in making Slaves. If the Peguins, for example, do on one side invade the lands of Siam, the Siameses will at another place enter the Lands of Pegu, and both Parties will carry away whole Villages into Captivity.67

62

Snodgrass 1827, 64, 95. Pires 1944, 1.176, 2.266; Kraan 1995, 87; Snodgrass 1827, 64, 69. 64 Wilson 1827, 70. 65 Schrieke 1957, 2.131. 66 Knaap 2003, 189. 67 Loubère 1986, 90. 63

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Certainly, one important goal of warfare was to take war captives, especially women and children, who would supplement a state’s or a village’s human resources.68 In places and times where there was a market for human captives, as in the seventeenth century archipelago, captives would also be taken to sell. In early seventeenth century Ambon, for example, those captives who were not beheaded were auctioned off to cover the costs of the raiding expedition.69 Obtaining captives in war appears to have been more important as the scale of the state increased, with large entities such post-fifteenth century Ayudhya, Burma, and Vietnam pursuing large-scale wars for war captives. Early European visitors to Southeast Asia, however, frequently underestimated the “bloodiness” of indigenous warfare. Simon de La Loubère and his contemporaries in the late seventeenth century may have overestimated the ‘peaceful’ influence of Theravada Buddhist religious precepts on the mainland. This appears to have influenced his dismissive approach to the Southeast Asian will to fight: The opinion of Metempsychosis inspiring them with an horror of blood, deprives them likewise of the Spirit of War…if the Armies meet, they will not shoot directly one against the other, but higher; and yet as they endeavour to make these random Shots to fall back upon the Enemies, to the end that they may be overtaken therewith, if they do not retreat, one of the two Parties do’s not long defer from taking flight, upon perceiving it never so little to rain Darts and Bullets. But if the design be to stop the Troops that come upon them, they will shoot lower than it is necessary; to the end that if the Enemies approach, the fault may be their own in coming within the reach of being wounded or slain. Kill not is the order, which the King of Siam gives his Troops, when he sends them into the Field: which cannot signifie that they should kill absolutely, but that they shoot not directly upon the Enemy.70

IbrƗhƯm, a Persian visitor to Ayudhya in the late seventeenth century, also observed: The fixed custom is that when two factions have lined up before one another, a group from each side comes forward, beating kettle drums 68

Reid 1988, 1.122; Quaritch Wales 1952, 17. Knaap 2003, 169. 70 Loubère 1986, 90. 69

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and playing flutes and the infantry and the horsemen on both sides begin dancing and shouting and raising all the noise they can. Every so often one army advances and the other retreats and in that way the one that has some luck manages to catch the other off guard. They rush up and surround their rivals and when the victorious group like a pair of compasses draws a line around the other army, the vanquished, being the dot in the centre, admit defeat and lace their will in the circle of obedience.71

Some later European accounts sometimes made a similar point. Anderson, writing in 1823, suggested of one village in Sumatra “they are continually engaged in war; but their battles are never very sanguinary. There is a great deal of bravado, but not much fighting.”72 Anthony Reid has suggested that Southeast Asian warfare was far from European warfare, with professional soldiers trained and committed to kill and a heavy rate of casualties, putting Southeast Asians at a disadvantage in land fighting with European forces.73 Certainly, in some fighting, as in Europe, few casualties occurred. When outnumbered, Southeast Asians are said to have typically determined on flight to jungle cover rather than stand and defend their villages.74 The attacking party as well had little interest in wasting manpower in “bloody pitched battles” and sought instead to intimidate, use surprise, and demonstrate with early victories that resistance was futile. Anthony Reid argues, for example, that one reason for the low casualties was that as aristocrats were the ones who levied soldiers, they were hesitant to lose ‘their’ human resources in battle.75 Reid also claims, “[s]ince wars were fought to increase the available manpower, commanders were naturally reluctant to waste the manpower they had in bloody frontal battles.”76 Similarly, Quaritch-Wales, dealing with 1950s ethnographic material on an archipelagic population who still practiced headhunting in his time, suggested that as this kind of fighting was a trial by ordeal, only low casualties would be expected, lesser if the village was not taken and

71

IbrƗhƯm 1972, 91. Anderson 1971, 274-275. 73 Reid 1982, 5; Reid 1988, 1.124. 74 Reid 1988, 1.122. 75 Reid 1982, 1. 76 Reid 1982, 1. 72

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higher if the village was actually entered. Quaritch-Wales also asserts that this kind of warfare never led to the extermination of villages.77 The several observations and arguments mentioned above are difficult to reconcile with a wider range of indigenous and foreign sources. As they indicate, face-to-face battles were common in Southeast Asia and according to the indigenous sources, extremely bloody.78 The SƟjarah MƟlayu describes one battle between Melaka and Pasai in such terms: “[A]ll the … men of Malaka… charged the Pasai troops, killing every man they encountered. And the men of Pasai broke and fled in disorder, leaving many dead on the field.”79 As we find of warfare between the Alifuru and the Sultan of Mindanao in the 1680s, they Skirmish… every Day in small Parties, and sometimes surprizing a Breast-Work; and whatever side is like to be worsted, if they have no probability to escape by flight, they sell their lives as dear as they can; for there is seldom any quarter given, but the Conqueror cuts and hacks his Enemies to pieces.80

European accounts providing contrary views appear to have also been ignored by supporters of the “low casualty” thesis. Portuguese accounts fully captured the bloodiness of mainland campaigns in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Other, later accounts also rejected the role of Buddhism in reducing war deaths altogether: The abhorrence of shedding blood inculcated in theory by the worship of Buddha has had no influence whatever in elevating and humanizing the character of its votaries; for the history of the Singalese, the Burmans, the Peguans, and Siamese, abounds in acts of the utmost cruelty and ferocity;--in a word, there are no countries in Asia in which human life is held so cheap as in those in which the shedding of blood is considered sacrilege.81

77

Quaritch Wales 1952, 16. Cushman 2000, 34; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.160, 164, 182, 190; Ras 1968, 413, 433; HMP 1979, 235. 79 SM 1952, 106. 80 Dampier 1906, 1.344. 81 Crawfurd 1828, 371-372. 78

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More recent scholarship has challenged the “labour-scarcity” argument proffered by Reid. Gerrit Knaap argues that it is difficult to imagine warriors in the field being as rational and calculating about the exigencies of labour demand as Reid suggests. Evidence from Ambon, where thirty percent of its population may have been killed in the 1650s, suggests that killing “was of prime importance.”82 Among both islanders and mainlanders alike, petty squabbles led to expeditions directed at burning villages and destroying plantations as much for power and loot as for captives.83 Rather than view a difference between European and Southeast Asian views of killing, it would be more accurate to suggest that new technology imported from Europe increased the scale of the killing, as new weapons were more effective in bringing down higher numbers of the enemy with greater ease. As Knaap explains, for example, the expansion of Dutch power, more aggressive than had been that of the Portuguese, and the spread of firearm technology, meant that the scale of death and destruction escalated in the centuries that followed.84 Nevertheless, into the seventeenth century, European weaponry still had far to go before it would prove decisive in this respect. This chapter has examined some of the unique features of Southeast Asian culture that shaped indigenous warfare. One common feature that emerges is that killing and death was fundamental to warfare in the region, throughout the early modern period and earlier. Headhunting centred on killing and the ritual consumption of human flesh. In less ritualistic fashion, armies of lowland societies in the mainland and in the archipelago also went out as much to kill as to plunder. There is evidence of the shaming of soldiers who came back from the field without a trophy head. Another common cultural feature of warfare in the region was the importance of women. While women on occasion participated in field battles and acted as commanders, their more fundamental participation in warfare was their place in the rituals that attended it. The misbehaviour of a woman was just as likely to lose a battle as that of a man. Unfortunately, the available historical sources and accounts, European, Chinese, and indigenous, were mostly written by men in 82

Knaap 2003, 190. Knaap 2003, 172. 84 Knaap 2003, 190. 83

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the early modern period, and the important role of women in warfare is not always made clear. Barbara Andaya and others have shown that such obstacles can be overcome in part by turning to alternative methodologies. While this chapter has focused on cultural factors in Southeast Asian warfare, other cultural aspects of Southeast Asian warfare will continue to be discussed in later chapters. On the one hand, weapons, mounts, and other tools of warfare were used for their practical military purposes, as elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, however, Southeast Asians gave these ‘tools’ special meanings. Thus, new technology did not change the system of indigenous belief, but rather new technology was reconceived within the framework of Southeast Asian cultural values.

CHAPTER TWO

PERSONAL WEAPONRY There were two main categories of hand weapons in Southeast Asian warfare. As we shall see in the following chapter, Southeast Asian courts were generally able to monopolize access to firearms and their distribution. Firearms were acquired, controlled, dispersed, and, significantly, repossessed by the court after a campaign. In other words, gunpowder and firearms were state weapons temporarily possessed by the bearer in wartime, or on a regular basis only among limited numbers of standing troops in the capital. Moreover, and probably to ensure the state monopoly over them, the use of firearms was sometimes limited to mercenaries or special groups of hereditary royal servicemen themselves frequently descended from European, Indian, or Chinese captives. This chapter will examine another category of weapons, probably best described as personal weapons. This category included swords, daggers, spears, and other weaponry, representing technology that was widespread in indigenous society. Blacksmiths could be found everywhere, in villages as well as in towns, although disparities in local resources, such as iron, and the degree of excellence in metalwork by some villages, as with any craft, determined the availability of metal weaponry from one region to another. Even in such cases, however, substantial inter- and intra-regional trade encouraged the widespread circulation of weapons throughout the early modern period. Further, the manufacture of some weapons, bows and arrows, for example, were less demanding in terms of specialist materials or forging skills, for bamboo, wood, and feathers could be found almost anywhere. Even the most powerful and oppressive royal tyrant would have found the exertion of royal control over such technology problematic. Some classical-era rulers did attempt to control blacksmiths, as indicated in the case of a late thirteenth century ruler of Chiengmai. The main purpose, however, was to introduce better metalworking into his domain rather than sequester

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artisans from local society.1 Generally, there appears to be little or no evidence that royal courts sought to monopolize supplies of nongunpowder weaponry. The differences between personal weaponry and firearms involved more than questions of supply and royal control. The weapons of the latter category were personal because they were everyday weapons. The earliest inhabitants of Southeast Asia were hunter-gatherers who depended heavily upon organic materials and stone implements not only to fight, but also to provide the necessities of life. Weapons used against man were just as easily used to hunt animals for food, to clear away jungle growth, and a range of other daily tasks. Evidence from the early modern period suggests that Southeast Asians depended mostly upon weapons that could be used to perform such tasks as well. Many were used to meet the demands of daily life, whether to clear jungle growth, cut food, or as all-purpose tools. In the fourteenth century, for example some Dai Viet military units were armed solely with scythes, although this probably refers to the halberd. Along with bows and arrows, bladed weapons were used for hunting as well. Some Siamese and Bugis soldiers were armed with sČrampang or fouannes, a trident-like weapon, which they also used to spear fish. Noort’s description of the use of “forkes” in Borneo would appear to refer to the same kind of weapon. Early Southeast Asian weapons such as the axe, which can be traced to the first millennium BCE and its descendant, the shafted halberd also had other functions useful in daily life.2 Skill in using such weapons cum tools was thus far better developed than that involving the handling of firearms, as many early modern sources point out. As Trant observed of some Southeast Asian highlanders in the 1840s, they were generally unfamiliar with firearms “and seem to hold them in great awe; their own weapons are the spear, dah, and the cross-bow….”3 This factor, as well as the expense involved in making, purchasing, and maintaining firearms and gunpowder, may thus explain why such personal weapons remained 1 Chiengmai’s bronze-smiths and ironsmiths were said to have been given by Pagan to Chiengmai in the late thirteenth century—the bronze-smiths sent to Chiengsen and the ironsmiths to Kum Kam by the Chiengmai king. Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 38. 2 Gervaise 1998, 95; Gardner 1936, 87; Noort 1906, 2.203; Whitmore 2004, 125; Dutton 2004, 14-15; Maspero 2002, 17. 3 Trant 1842, 1149-1150.

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the main weaponry of Southeast Armies, as least among the peasant levies, well into the nineteenth century.

Metal Weaponry Because of its tropical environment, epigraphic and other written sources for the early history of Southeast Asia are of a much later date than for many Eurasian and North African cultures. Palm-leaf and bark manuscripts crumble or are eaten by white ants. Even stone inscriptions date at the earliest from the fourth century and in not any great number until roughly the eighth century in even the most powerful kingdoms of the time. Much of what we know about Southeast Asia before the classical period depends upon archaeological evidence and, as Charles Higham cautions in his The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia, even this evidence does not provide clear answers for the dating of such important developments as the initial start of iron implements or contact with India. Even with foreign accounts, Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya equally caution that problems with the sources allow nothing more than tentative reconstructions of the Malay Archipelago’s historical past prior to 1400. Indeed, in his major survey of early Southeast Asian warfare, H. G. Quaritch Wales found it necessary to open his study with anthropological data gathered on headhunters in the twentieth century, before turning to meager evidence on early Chinese contacts, Indian influence, and archaeological evidence from the Ĉông Sѫn period.4 The poor state of the sources for the pre-classical period does not prevent hypotheses or even more reliable generalizations of broader developments concerning settlement patterns, agricultural strains, or even commercial goods. Nevertheless, problematic sources do rob the student of warfare of the quick, but powerful moments in which one people or state introduced a new technology to another in battle. At Ĉông Sѫn in the Red River Valley, bronze working was underway throughout the first millennium BCE and various bronze weapons have been unearthed, including swords and daggers from the last half of that millennium. Higham observes that, while archaeological 4

Higham 1989, 190; B. Andaya & L. Andaya 1982, 8; Quaritch Wales 1952, 1-22.

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evidence suggests that iron began to be used in Southeast Asia at roughly the same time, from 600 to 400 BCE, as in India and China, it can only be hypothesized that Southeast Asian bronze-workers may have accidentally encountered iron in the process of smelting copper ore. Whether this contributed to the emergence of chiefdoms by giving advantage to one locale over another through possession of powerful iron weapons can, again, only be guessed at. More confidence can be placed, however, in the wide spread of iron smelting and forging (as in India) between 400 and 200 BCE, and the later, more geographically circumspect technology (the Red River Valley) of iron casting.5 Whether or not Southeast Asians developed iron working independently or borrowed the technology from China, the evidence is insufficient to make any specific assertions regarding the nature of warfare, beyond encouraging as yet anonymous and slightly more powerful chiefdoms. It is significant, however, that iron, compared to other metals such as copper and tin, is more widespread in the region and thus the potential to use iron was similarly widespread. Even so, the availability of metals was still sufficiently imbalanced to encourage trade within the region. Early suppliers of iron, for example, included the Sarawak Delta, which exported smelted iron to other areas of the archipelago from the seventh century.6 Ternate in 1515 imported both metal and metal weapons from external sources: “A great deal of iron comes from the outside, from the islands of Banggai, iron axes, choppers, swords, knives…”7 Both the Alifuru and the Ambonese as well imported broad swords and machetes from Tambuko in Sulawesi as late as the early eighteenth century.8 The spear and lance were found everywhere in the mainland and the archipelago.9 Pires observed in 1515 that “every man in Java, rich or poor” had a lance in his house (among other sorts of weapons).10 One possible application of the spear was to throw it at the enemy, but 5

Higham 1989, 191-192, 195. B. Andaya & L. Andaya 1982, 11. 7 Pires 1944, 1.215-216. 8 Knaap 2003, 172. 9 Ricklefs 1993, 14; HPM 1979, 213; Ras 1968, 251, 299, 303, 317, 411, 433; Gardner 1936, 87-89; Schrieke 1957, 2.123; Pigafetta 1906, 2.107; Symes 1800, 322; Raffles 1817, 2.clxxxvi. 10 Pires 1944, 1.179. 6

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in many cases this meant that it would be unrecoverable and thus a quickly wasted resource. A more common application, as in Europe, was in hand-to-hand fighting and for stabbing at an enemy at farther reach. In this later capacity, the spear was irreplaceable and even when other, more sophisticated weapons were available, we find even some members of the imperial guard in NguyӉn Vietnam bearing spears in 1804.11 The Balinese were well known for their determined massed lance attacks in battle as the Dutch found in the late 1840s.12

Figure 2: Various types of Javanese spears. From an illustration in Raffles 1817.

Lances could vary significantly in size, composition, and manner of application, frequently within the same society. In the sixteenth century, spears were made of either wood or of cane in Tenasserim and Aceh; of charred wood among the Chams; of “gleaming iron” in Sumatra; of cane among some archipelagic populations; of wood with a steel or iron head among the Filipinos and the Malagans near 11 12

Guest 1996, 11; Lamb 1961, 130. Kraan 1995, 139.

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Melaka, the Filipino lances having an iron head a “handful and halfe long;” and the Siamese were said to have used a paired-spear. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Buleleng troops on Bali were mainly armed with lances and these were made of very light wood and were mounted by double-edged 20.32 to 25.40 centimetres long iron heads.13 The pike or long lance was preferred by cavalry, but its most common use in both the archipelago and on the mainland (in both the highlands and the lowlands) was among foot soldiers.14 Among the Kha in the late 1870s, the type of pike used consisted of a very wide iron tip in the form of a spatula with a quadrangular base, solidly attached on a stick of wild areca palm or a big rattan, with the help of an ingenious device which merits special mention. They take a ring of skin with its hair from the tail of a recently slaughtered wild cow, and attach it at the point of insertion of the iron in the lance. When it shrinks, it constitutes some kind of immovable collar which is good against any cracking of the wood. They are very ugly and not interesting.15

Although European observers sometimes questioned the quality of Southeast Asian pikes, their continued use suggests that they were well suited to the demands of warfare in Southeast Asia.16 The javelin was also fairly well distributed across the mainland and the archipelago. We find its use among the Siamese, Burmese, Chams, Vietnamese, Achenese, Javanese, Filipinos, the Alifuru, and among the peoples of Borneo in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.17 Unlike the spear, the javelin’s main purpose was to be thrown, to “bridg[e] a 13

Kraan 1995, 30, 51-52; Cushman 2000, 33, 371; Byron 1964, 129; Legaspi 1906, 12.150; Dias 1565, 99; Varthema 1928, 75; HPM 1979, 147; Pigafetta 1906, 2.107; Pinto 1989, 74. 14 Banyà-dalá n.d., 10; Ras 1968, 251, 297, 303, 317; Cushman 2000, 33; Ricklefs 1978, 91; Ricklefs 1993, 14; Cushman 2000, 33; HPM 1979, 117; E. Scott 1906, 2.441, 484-485; Schrieke 1957, 2.126, 127, 134; Nieuhoff 1732, 2.166; Dampier (1686) lists the lance as one of the three main weapons, alongside the kris and the sword, in the Sultanate of Mindanao. Dampier 1906, 1.344. 15 Harmand 1997, 202. 16 Fedrici 1588, 29. 17 Symes 1800, 322; Cushman 2000, 33, 120; Maspero 2002, 17; Knaap 1993, 172; Davis 1906, 2.321; HPM 1979, 197; Schrieke 1957, 122; Pigafetta 1906, 2.107; Dutton 2004, 16; Noort 1906, 2.203; Nieuhoff 1732, 2.166.

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short distance between adversaries,” and it has been estimated that its range was less than one hundred meters.18 Like the spear, javelins also varied in composition. The Alifuru, for example, used both simple bamboo javelins and some of better wood.19 By far, the most common bladed weapon of the Malay world was the dagger or kris, and was to be found among peoples of the archipelago and some of the coastal areas of the mainland. Pinto claimed in the mid-sixteenth century, with some exaggeration, that the kris was the only weapon used by the Chams.20 A dagger may have been preferred among maritime peoples because it could be tucked away conveniently without interfering with maritime tasks. As Varthema observed, this limited the range of weapons used in the hinterlands of such areas, such as interior Java: “They do not use many arms, because those only fight who go to sea.”21 In the Malay world, from the Bay of Martaban to Mindanao, no man was complete without his kris. As Pires found in 1515: every man in Java, whether he is rich or poor, must have a kris in his house, …And no man between the ages of twelve and eighty may go out of doors without a kris in his belt. They carry them at the back, as daggers used to be in Portugal, because arms are cheap in Java, and this is the custom of the country.22

William Dampier observed that in Mindanao in the 1680s “they always wear [it] in War or Peace, at Work or Play, from the greatest of them to the poorest, or the meanest Persons.”23 The secretary to the Persian embassy to Ayudhya, IbrƗhƯm, even claimed in the seventeenth century that among the Makassars, both men and women carried the kris.24 The kris could range in size and girth, but a not uncommon example would be thirty centimetres in length and 3.81 centimetres in breadth above the hilt. The razor-sharp, double-edged, steel blade was 18

Symes 1800, 322; Knaap 2003, 175. Knaap 2003, 172; Noort 1906, 2.203. 20 Varthema 1928, 75; Pinto 1989, 74. 21 Varthema 1928, 91. 22 Pires 1944, 1.179. 23 Dampier 1906, 1.344. 24 IbrƗhƯm 1972, 135. 19

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crooked and “waved and pointed like an adder’s tongue.”25 As one observer describes a kris he saw at BantƟn in 1602: Their ordinary weapon which they weare, is called a Crise, it is about two foot in length, the blade being waved, and crooked to and fro, Indenture like, and withal exceeding sharpe... The handles of these weapons, are either of horne or wood, curiously carved in the likenesses of a Divell, which many of them doe worship.26

Typically, three krisses would be worn, reflecting the importance of kinship, as one sword was the bearer’s, another was inherited from his ancestors, and one was received from his father-in-law when he married.27 The kris was feared as an instrument of assassination and, in the Malay world, although one could bear his kris when entering the royal palace if he wore it exposed and in front, bearing a hidden kris was a crime punishable by death. Perhaps this also explains the practice of taking one’s kris along when bathing. Similarly, it was useful in surprise attacks on an approaching enemy. The Balinese in fighting with the Dutch waited in hiding and struck out suddenly at Dutch soldiers who passed by. Early modern sources indicate that the kris was manufactured in Java and exported to areas as far away as Bengal through the port of Melaka.28 As with other aspects of early modern Southeast Asian warfare, there were general attempts to reflect social status. Certain kinds of weapons, such as the spear, do not seem to have been favoured by warrior elites, while others, such as the kris, were. Decoration also allowed a means of demonstrating elite warrior status. Elites frequently decorated their spears and lances with horsehair or peacock feathers. The kris and its accoutrements could also denote status. According to the SƟjarah MƟlayu, commoners were not allowed to have kris-sheaths with a metal casing. Royal Javanese krisses were also subject to traditions that required “certain fittings” indicating royal status. Similarly, swords were subject to status differentiation and those used by village chiefs were carried in golden or silver 25

Forbin 1997, 104, 113; Schrieke 1957, 2.122. E. Scott 1906, 2.441. 27 Garnder 1936, 121. 28 SM 1952, 54; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.172, 173; Kraan 1995, 139; Pires 1944, 1.93. 26

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sheaths, sometimes further decorated with gems. A gold plate sometimes covered shields used by nobles.29

Figure 3: Different examples of Javanese kris blades. From illustration in Raffles 1817.

Elite preference for the kris was related to the social importance of honour. As one Makassar responded to a Frenchman who expressed surprise that he would come so armed when in peace: “…the kris … which I have by my side, and which is the weapon we all wear, is such a mark of honour among us, that ‘tis infamous for us to be without it.”30 Leonard Andaya views the kris as a “repositor[y] of spiritual power, and the pitting of one kris-wielding leader against the other was in essence a battle of spiritual potency.”31 Thus, even the arrival of firearms could not replace the kris as the weapon of choice among the elite. When fighting against the Dutch in the 1840s, while peasant soldiers bore guns and lances, the nobility used only the kris and one observer of Aceh in 1613 even likened the king’s kris to a royal scepter.32 The most common weapon among early modern mainland states and, after the kris, in the archipelago was the sword, and usually the broad sword. This sword was generally both a tool of life and a 29 SM 1952, 54, 82; Alexander 2000, 19-20; Gardner 1936, 123; White 1972, 269; Ras 1968, 297, 317. 30 Forbin 1997, 103. 31 L. Andaya 1994, 1.387. 32 Kraan 1995, 87; Copland 1906, 4.150.

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weapon of war. Swords were used like machetes to cut away at jungle growth, to construct houses, to prepare food, and to fight.33 As Symes explains, it was used by the Birmans not only as an implement of war, but is likewise applied to various purposes as an instrument of manual labour; with this the peasant fells trees, shapes timbers, cuts bamboos, or defends himself against an enemy, and wild beasts; he never travels without it...34

Figure 4: Eighteenth-century Burmese warrior with sword and shield. From illustration in Symes 1800.

33

Ricklefs 1993, 14; Symes 1800, 322; Garnier 1996b, 48; Alexander 2000, 19; Ras 1968, 251, 299, 303; Gardner 1936, 67, 71, 73, 75; Schrieke 1957, 2.122; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 47. Raffles 1817, 2.clxxxvi. 34 Symes 1800, 322.

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The Battas in eastern Sumatra made a variety of different kinds of swords, some with iron handles and others with ivory handles. The Acehnese made substantial use of the sword and the ruler of Aceh in 1599 kept on his person not only two krisses on his back and two on his front, but also a sword across his lap.35 In Jambi in the 1820s, swords were used rarely and did not leave a favourable impression on some observers: Swords are not common; and their shape being wide and thick in the blade, and also aukwardly constructed in the handle, must render them little better adapted for combat than the common parang or cleaver.36

The sword, however, played a more important role on the mainland. In the 1560s, swords found in Pegu were described as worse than the pike “made, like long knives without pointes.”37 By the late sixteenth century and from that point on, descriptions of local swords refer mainly to large sabre-like weapons. Early seventeenth century Portuguese sources, for example, refer to the “broad cutting swords” used by Burmese warriors.38 These broad swords remained the standard sword of Burmese soldiers into the nineteenth century in part because it could allow a greater concentration of strength on the hilt: Both the handle and the blade were of equal proportions “so that they can hold it with one or both hands, and strike a powerful blow with it.”39 Larger and more powerful was the two-handed sword. Reportedly, King Naresuan of Ayudhya carried a two-handed sword when mounted on an elephant.40 Two-handed swords may have been especially important for Vietnamese combatants, as Chinese soldiers were equipped with thick coats that apparently deflected low calibre bullets as the Burmese discovered. Generally, two-handed swords were, as in Europe, necessary for combat with opponents using armour.41 Likewise, early sixteenth-century NguyӉn forces in southern 35

Anderson 1971, 328; HPM 1979, 117; Davis 1906, 2.319, on general usage in Aceh, see also 2.323. 36 Anderson 1971, 404-405. 37 Fedrici 1588, 29. 38 Ribeyro 1926, 121. 39 Alexander 2000, 19. 40 Morga 1970, 1.80. 41 Guest 1996, 49.

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Vietnam were armed with “great store of Swords and Cemiters … which are of an excellent temper” imported from Japan.42 Vietnamese soldiers certainly wielded two-handed swords in the early nineteenth century.43 Although the use of armour, and thus two-handed swords, disappeared in Western Europe after the eighteenth century, both persisted in Southeast Asia well into the nineteenth century.

Projectile Weaponry Southeast Asia’s tropical environment also encouraged weapons that could be fashioned from even more readily available organic materials and animal products. The bow and arrow, for example, were commonly used throughout the region and many societies in the archipelago, with the exception of Java from the seventeenth century, made use of the bow and arrow. Bows and arrows were among the chief non-gunpowder weaponry in some societies in the sixteenthcentury Philippines, and among the early modern Acehnese, Sulawesi, and the peoples of early modern Borneo. The Alifuru made use of large bows and used arrows with bamboo points. They were common among early Cham warriors in the classical period and fourteenth century Vietnamese forces were also equipped with a bow, along with a mandatory seven arrows, and they were certainly in use among the general populace in Southern Vietnam up through the nineteenth century. Indeed, training in Vietnam in the use of the crossbow as well as the bow was mandatory for military officers. By the beginning of the early modern period, they were used significantly by Siamese and Burmese soldiers as well.44 Skill in the use of the bow may also have been an early rite of leadership in war. A mid-twelfth century bas-relief at Angkor Wat shows a procession of Siamese soldiers marching before King

42

Borri 1633, 53. White 1972, 222. 44 Maspero 2002, 17; Whitmore 2004, 125; Dutton 2004, 16; Lamb 1961, 34; Varthema 1928, 75; Fedrici 1588, 29; Ras 1968, 251, 299, 303; Ricklefs 1993, 324; Legaspi 1906, 12.150; Davis 1906, 2.321; Knaap 2003, 172; HPM 1979, 207; Schrieke 1957, 2.123; Noort 1906, 2.203; Pigafetta 1906, 2.107; Nieuhoff 1732, 2.166; Raffles 1817, 2.clxxxvi. 43

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Suryavarman II; while the foot soldiers carry pikes, their chief, on elephant back, stands holding a bow, with the arrow drawn back.45

Figure 5: Javanese bow and various types of arrows. From an illustration in Raffles 1817.

In the early modern period, the bow was mainly used by specialized contingents of archers in major states or by the average combatant in smaller-scale polities. The bow and arrow survived as a standard weapon into the nineteenth century in large part because its accuracy and range were better than many of the early small arms when firearms were introduced, especially since outdated firearms remained in use up to the end of the nineteenth century. While a musketeer took time to load a shot that was not likely to hit its mark, a bowman could strike an opponent with little preparation time and with an effective range of one hundred metres. There is no evidence, however, that Southeast Asian bowmen armed themselves with the equivalents of the longer, distance “flight” arrows and the heavier “shaft” arrows used in European warfare.46 Arrows were also very useful as missiles for incendiaries that could be sent against wooden fortifications or more commonly against houses of the enemy.47 There is some disagreement over the origin of the crossbow. Some scholars suggest that it was developed among early Austro-Asiatic peoples who introduced it to the Chinese. Other scholars, however, 45

The bas-relief is provided in Wyatt 1982, 29. Knaap 2003, 175; Guest 1996, 49. 47 E. Scott 1906, 2.447. 46

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hold that it was a Chinese military innovation developed during the warring states period and introduced to Southeast Asians. In support of the latter case, archaeologists have identified Han style crossbow triggers and bolts in Ĉông Sѫn period graves.48 Whatever its origins, it was a widely used weapon in early modern Southeast Asia. The Chams appear to have used them in the classical period. Symes believed the crossbow to be one of the “proper indigenous weapons” among the Burmese and in Lower Burma, and, as early as the 1430s, crossbows were fired from the saddles of elephants in battle and figured prominently in warfare between the Siamese, Burmese, and Khmer. The crossbow remained in use up through the end of the nineteenth century in the mainland, particularly among the highlanders of Laos.49 Certainly, the Kha were known to have used them in the 1870s and some observers, writing in the early 1880s, believed that the Kha “possessed no weapons other than crossbows.”50 The bamboo blowpipe and the dart were also used throughout early modern Southeast Asia. Pires noted that the local warriors used the blowpipe and “small arrows of black hellebore” against the Portuguese during their attack on Melaka in 1511.51 Borri observed that among NguyӉn forces in the 1630s, they “fight with darts” while on horseback, and “exercise themselves daily therein.”52 Some observers considered the blowpipe to be especially effective in a culture that depended as much on water as land travel for it was light, versatile, and could fell an enemy at a distance. In the sixteenth century, for example, Varthema characterized the blowpipe as one of the weapons carried by people who “go to sea.”53 It seems likely that the blowpipe might have been carried by seafaring peoples to use when they landed on shore. At sea, however, it would be difficult to use because of the poor performance of blowpipes in a windy environment, due to the lightness of the dart. The blowpipe was more effective in the jungle, however, where there is no wind to blow the 48

Keith Taylor, cited by Dutton 2004, 15; Higham 1989, 291 Symes 1800, 322; Conti 1929, 130; Harmand 1997, 202; Cushman 2000, 130, 148; Maspero 2002, 17. 50 Neis 1997, 34. 51 Ras 1968, 411, 413, 433; Ricklefs 1993, 14; Reid 1982, 2-3; Hägerdal 2004, 88; Fedrici 1588, 29; Schrieke 1957, 2.123, 134; Pires 1944, 2.233; E. Scott 1906, 2.441, 484-485; Noort 1906, 2.203; Pigafetta 1906, 2.107; Raffles 1817, 2.clxxxvi. 52 Borri 1633, 53. 53 Varthema, 1928, 91. 49

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dart astray.54 Based on European accounts, Schrieke suggests that the blowpipe, along with the bow and arrow, may have fallen out of use as a standard weapon among Javanese armies by the 1590s, although he offers no explanation of why this should have been the case.55 One wonders whether the increasing campaigns by Mataram against coastal areas, with windy environments, may have played some role in reducing the attractiveness of the blowpipe. Another possible explanation is that the blowpipe compared unfavourably with new and better firearms, which may also explain the fact that lowland Burmese armies no longer used the blowpipe by the sixteenth century (just as small arms were making substantial inroads). The real strength of the blowpipe, however, was the application of poison to the dart or small arrow. In the early sixteenth century, Pires noted of the orang asli blowpipes used against at Melaka, that “as they touch blood, [they] kill.”56 Varthema explained that the Malay blowpipes “throw poisoned darts…and however little they draw blood, the (wounded) person dies.”57 European accounts also refer to poisoned arrows, but are unclear if these were true arrows or simply darts, for “arrow” was used to describe both. The indigenous population of Ambon, for example, poisoned the “arrows” they shot from blowpipes: Their weapons [include] … darts. They have also a kind of hollow pipes, out of which they shoot great numbers of small poison’d arrows; the wounds made with them prove commonly mortal, unless the poison be removed immediately by cutting it out.58

When the Portuguese survivors of the São Paulo, wrecked off the coast of Sumatra in the mid-sixteenth century, attempted to board an Acehnese vessel, they were greeted by “showers” of poisoned “arrows.” Evidently, the poison failed in this case, for there were

54

Gardner 1936, 101-102. Schrieke 1957, 2.123. 56 Ras 1968, 411, 413, 433; Ricklefs 1993, 14; Reid 1982, 2-3; Hägerdal 2004, 88; Fedrici 1588, 29; Schrieke 1957, 2.123, 134; Pires 1944, 2.233; E. Scott 1906, 2.441, 484-485; Noort 1906, 2.203; Pigafetta 1906, 2.107. 57 Varthema, 1928, 91. 58 Nieuhoff 1732, 2.166. 55

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herbs that could serve as an antidote.59 The use of poisoned arrows among some highland societies on the mainland continued up through the nineteenth century. As one observer noted: The [arrows] are made of bamboo, with the point hardened by fire, and doubly barbed. They are deeply poisoned, and the slightest touch inflicts instant death. This poison is vegetable and procured by making an incision in the bark of certain trees, and collecting the liquor which exudes.60

Armour Along with offensive weapons, protective gear was important in Southeast Asian warfare as well. Since warfare in Southeast Asia was intended as much to kill as to capture, protecting the head and the body from arrows, darts, swords, and other weaponry was important. Of course, there were other means of protection. Charms, amulets, and a variety of other supernatural means were also made use of, as discussed in Chapter One. As in any early modern Eurasian army, Southeast Asian helmets or other forms of headgear were worn everywhere and varied considerably. The Hikajat Potjut Muhamat refers to Acehnese soldiers donning iron helmets for battle. In Vietnam, soldiers wore squared, sewn leather helmets in the tenth century, red-dyed woven headgear made from water thorns in the fourteenth century, and lacquered wood helmets in the 1750s. Siamese levies donned helmets made of leather in 1680s Ayudhya.61 As hand-to-hand fighting was expected in battle, warriors were not complete without shields of one kind or another. Even with the arrival of firearms, useful mainly for distance fighting, hand-to-hand combat remained the key component of fighting, especially in sieges of stockades and fortresses. Southeast Asian shields, however, were used for more than hand-to-hand combat. As in Europe, another application 59 Dias 1565, 92; HPM 1979, 85; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 83; Pinto 1989, 4041; Pigafetta 1906, 2.107, 10. 60 Trant 1842, 1149-1150. 61 HPM 1979, 213; White 1972, 269; Whitmore 2004, 124; Gervaise 1998, 95; Dutton 2004, 36.

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of the shield was as one increment to the shield wall. Every fourteenth century Ĉҥi ViӋt soldiers were expected to carry a shield and shields were commonplace among the Burmese, Siamese, Javanese, Acehnese, Malays, Filipinos, and almost every other Southeast Asian society for which we have evidence throughout the early modern period.62

Figure 6: Javanese shields and various other weapons. From illustration in Raffles 1817.

Shields, however, varied so much between societies and indeed within them, that it is difficult to generalize about their construction. Further, the materials used to make the shields also varied. In sixteenth century Sumatra, some shields were made of “gleaming iron.” In coastal areas of the central archipelago, local rattan circular shields were from sixty-one to ninety-one centimetres in width. The Alifuru and the Ambonese used wooden, metre-long, rectangular shields. From the late sixteenth century until the early nineteenth century, there are references to the use among Javanese and Malays of 62 Guest 1996, 10, 47; Whitmore 2004, 125; Legaspi 1906, 12.150; Pires 1944, 1.179; Ricklefs 1993, 14; White 1972, 269; Ribeyro 1926, 121; Cushman 2000, 33, 36; Conti 1929, 130; Davis 1906, 2.321; HPM 1979, 57, 213, 219, 231, 235; Ras 1968, 251, 299, 303; Gardner 1936, 123; Symes 1800, 322; E. Scott 1906, 2.441; Nieuhoff 1732, 2.166; Raffles 1817, 2.clxxxvi.

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light leather shields, consisting of basketwork covered by buffalo skin.63 The mainland also had its share of diverse shields. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, for example, the population of Tenasserim used shields made of tortoise-shell, although some used shields similar to those of India. In the 1630s, the southern Vietnamese had light weight, long, round shields that covered the entire body and were carried around without great burden. In the 1680s, Siamese levies made us of leather shields.64 Similarly, Vietnamese soldiers encountered at Gia-Ĉӏnh in 1820 were observed holding “shields covered with indurated buffalo hides, highly varnished, and studded with iron knobs.”65 Body armour was similarly diverse and ranged from very light cover to metal cuirasses. In the sixteenth century, Peguan soldiers wore very light and weak armour, while in Tenasserim, the soldiers went into battle wearing padded armour. The early Chams wore armour made of woven rattan plates and some Javanese made use of armour made of buffalo hide in the seventeenth century. Europeans who visited Southeast Asia did not always see the armour worn by Southeast Asians and it appears that armour may have been used more against indigenous opponents than against Europeans. Few European sources mention Siamese armour, for example, but the indigenous chronicles refer to their use in battle into the seventeenth century.66 While Davis records that in late sixteenth century Aceh, no armour was worn into battle at all, for “they have no defensive Armes, but fight naked,” the Hikajat Potjut Muhamat mentions that Acehnese soldiers wore padded fighting coats into battle.67 Elite warriors also wore hot, heavy, expensive, and ornate mail armour, which embellished their grandeur.68 When Bayín-naung began his campaign against Ayudhya in 1563, for example, he donned

63

Varthema 1928, 75; Davis 1906, 2.321; HPM 1979, 221; Dias 1565, 99; Knaap 2003, 172; Pires 1944, 1.179; Schrieke 1957, 2.123; Anderson 1971, 405. 64 Varthema 1928, 75; Borri 1633, 56-57; Gervaise 1998, 95. 65 White 1972, 222. 66 Maspero 2002, 17; Fedrici 1588, 29; Varthema 1928, 75; Cushman 2002, 127, 193; Schrieke 1957, 2.127. 67 HPM 1979, 87, 117. 68 L. Andaya 1994, 1.388; Ricklefs 1993, 266; Banyà-dalá n.d., 10.

PERSONAL WEAPONRY

41

his excellent nine-jewelled chest chains, and a sash suspended from his left shoulder, in the style of the leading kings of the Raman country when dressed for great victory on the battlefield…69

In 1695, only the personal bodyguard of Arung Palakka, a Bugis prince, wore chainmail armour out of an army of twenty-five thousand men that he had assembled and in Vietnamese armies as late as the 1820s, only the officers wore chainmail.70 Javanese warrior elites, however, made frequent use of chainmail, especially among the cavalry. In 1678, for example, hundreds of Javanese horsemen were encountered wearing armour and most of Trunajaya’s cavalry at Kediri wore chainmail.71 The Hikajat Potjut Muhamat also refers to an Acehnese prince wearing chainmail, covered by a copper cuirass, in preparation for battle. Southeast Asian warrior elites used iron chainmail or bronze ring-mail armour for personal protection, as war commanders and warrior-princes alike were specifically targeted on the battlefield. As Leonard Andaya suggests, there may be a relationship between the use of iron or chainmail armour among warrior elites and an emphasis in local efforts to acquire metalpenetrating firearms.72 The continued use of chainmail after the introduction of firearms appears to suggest that hand-to-hand combat remained a critical concern for warrior elites or that the primary function of armour was to serve as a mark of elite status. The weapons discussed in this chapter were personal because Southeast Asians identified with them, used them in everyday life, and because they were not monopolized by the court. Firearms could not have been more different, as discussed more fully in the following chapter. It should be no surprise that Southeast Asians were much better skilled in using traditional indigenous weaponry and many Southeast Asians continued to rely on the sword, the spear, and the bow and arrow as the chief weapons taken into battle until the end of the nineteenth century.

69

Cushman 2000, 31. L. Andaya 1994, 1.388; Ricklefs 1993, 266; White 1972, 269. 71 Schrieke 1957, 2.127. 72 Davis 1906, 2.321; HPM 1979, 131, 147, 221, 231, 235; Knaap 2003, 175, 187; L. Andaya 1994, 1.388; Ricklefs 1978, 45; Ricklefs 1993, 266; Schrieke 1957, 2.125. 70

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FIREARMS This chapter examines the role of firearms in the evolution of indigenous warfare. Southeast Asian warfare was altered (and in some ways not) by the introduction of firearms. The prevailing view of the impact of firearms on early modern state formation in Southeast Asia is that the balance of power was tilted in favour of states that had access to firearms, as well as foreign mercenaries, and, in the end, they contributed to long-term trends of political centralization and territorial consolidation. There indeed was something about the introduction of firearms that ‘made a difference.’ However, their importance was not significant in their introduction in itself. Firearms were frequently impractical, unpredictable weapons and, sometimes, as dangerous to the men who fired them as to those whom they targeted. Indeed, almost as soon as firearms were introduced, indigenous combatants found numerous ways to counteract their effect. This chapter will first look at the evolution and introduction of firearms, bifucated into the categories of ‘heavy’ and ‘small’ arms, and then turn to their acquisition, manufacture, and deployment.

Heavy Arms Early modern Southeast Asians believed that firearms had always been part of indigenous warfare and that they were possessed of the same qualities in the fourteenth century as they were in the sixteenth or after. The chronicles of Ayudhya, for example, refer to the use of cannon against Chiengmai in the late fourteenth century, which succeeded in knocking down a substantial portion of the wall.1 The dating and nature of early pyrotechnic devices, including mines, fire-tubes, and what are described as crude cannon, is a subject of considerable controversy. Although frightening to opponents 1

Cushman 2000, 13.

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unfamiliar with them, early gunpowder devices had only a marginal impact on the actual fighting. Accounts of such early devices suggest that such weapons were fired at random and were not directed toward specific targets. Long bamboo tubes employing explosive powder are said to have been in use in China by 1132 and these tubes fired small round metal projectiles by 1259. The bamboo barrel is claimed to have been replaced by a metal one in 1275 and, in 1236, there is reference to the casting of what may have been a rudimentary form of metal cannon.2 As some scholars caution, however, exaggerated claims for the early emergence of firearms in China are sometimes made based on overly generous interpretations of vague references in thirteenth century Chinese sources. What are accepted as ‘cannon’ were more likely merely engines similar to the trebuchet that threw stones or incendiaries. Chinese sources also make curious references to the Chinese obtaining their first cannon from His Yü (the West), but do not specify from where or of what nature these weapons were.3 The Mongols, whose wars to expand and maintain their transcontinental, Eurasian Empire, played the key role in the early spread of Chinese gunpowder and incendiaries from the early thirteenth century. The nature and dating of this technology wave is subject again, however, to problematic source materials. Firearms may have been used by the Mongol expedition against Japan, dispatched in 1274. Chinese experts in fireworks and incendiaries may also have found their way to northern India in the mid-thirteenth century because of Mongol expansion.4 Cannon made their appearance in Europea early in the fourteenth century. Among the earliest reliable references are the production of gunpowder and cannon in Florence in 1326 and, from the late 1330s, references to the use of firearms throughout Western Europe accelerate rapidly. The first cast guns appeared in 1339 and were made from bronze because it was tough and because of its low melting point. Most early generation cannon, however, consisted of metalbanded wooden staves, just like a barrel and, over time, the wooden staves were replaced with iron bars. Even after the introduction of metal cannon, wooden cannon would continue to be represented 2

Khan 1977, 28; Goodrich & Feng 1946, 123; Wang Ling 1947, 173; Partington 1999, 270-271. 3 Partington 1999, 264-265, 267-278. 4 Goodrich & Feng 1946, 123; Khan 1977, 22-25, 27.

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alongside them in Southeast Asian arsenals throughout the early modern period, examples being found in Java, Burma, and Vietnam.5 By the reign of Ming-Tai-tsu, the founder of the Ming dynasty (13651644), the Chinese were also producing various kinds of rudimentary firearms, probably fire-tubes and something similar to the European bombard discussed further below.6 Extant cannon made in China can be dated to the 1350s and 1370s, one bearing the interesting inscription “to pierce one hundred thicknesses and produce a sound shaking the nine heavens.”7 The Chinese Chronicle Ming Shi claims that after the Chinese invaded Vietnam, they acquired the knowledge of how to make cannon. However, the reference to these cannon, shen chi ch’iang (‘metal-machine gun’) is now believed to have referred to a special type of cannon and not to cannon per se.8 The Burmese may have first encountered Chinese firearms at the Battle on Ting-pien on 6 May 1388. Details of the battle come from Chinese sources. Problems with the Burmese seem to have begun in 1387, for on 28 May 1387 the Chinese emperor ordered his troops in forts on the Burmese border to raise their walls higher and dig their moats deeper. As a precaution, measures were to be taken to make gunpowder over night in case of an attack. The following year, on 6 May 1387, the Burmese arrived with an estimated 300,000 men in order to take Ting-pien. The Burmese were armed with bamboo tubes and darts, were clad in armor and bore shields, and were preceded by one hundred war elephants. The Chinese commander, Mu Ying, divided his thirty thousand cavalry, armed with huo-p’ao, which may have been either a cannon or a kind of trebuchet, as well as crossbows, into three lines. They fired as they galloped towards the Burmese, hitting and routing the elephants.9 Rudimentary gunpowder technologies spread to Southeast Asia first from both India and China. Ma Huan, the Chinese pilgrim, writing in 1406, found that a kind of early firearm, the ban, was an export item from Bengal. The Burmese chronicler, Ù Kalà, claims that Indian mercenaries used an early pyrotechnic device, possibly a ban, 5

Partington 1999, 104, 271; L. Andaya 1994, 1.393; Wilson 1827, 38; Halberstadt 2002, 11; 217. 6 Goodrich & Feng 1946, 123. 7 Li 1992, 37-38; Goodrich & Feng 1946, 123; Goodrich 1964, 193. 8 Li 1992, 37-38; Wang Ling 1947, 175. 9 Goodrich & Feng 1946, 121-122; Wang Ling 1947, 175.

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45

at Bassein in 1404.10 The ban, according to an eighteenth description, was an iron tube of about one foot long and an inch in diameter, fixed to a Bambu rod of ten or twelve feet long. The tube being filled with combustible composition, is set fire to and being directed by the hand, flies like an arrow to the distance of upwards of 1000 yards.11

Clearly, this is a rocket and Kalà’s description of a ‘gun’ at Bassein may be due to confusion in terminology. The research of Liew Foon Ming (1996) and later Sun Laichen (2003) into the Ming-shilu and Maw Shan Chronicle regarding the rise of the Maw Shans in the midfifteenth century indicates that firearms had reached northern mainland Southeast Asian states as well.12 This was likely the first time that Southeast Asians were engaged in a battle in which both sides possessed firearms. Somewhat more sophisticated but problematic cannon from the Middle East entered the remainder of the mainland and the western archipelago in the fifteenth century as well.13 Chinese and Indian firearms, however, compared poorly to new European imports in the sixteenth century and after. Cannon made in India before the sixteenth century were difficult to transport or use in field battles. Large and cumbersome, consisting of iron bars hammered into shape, they could send heavy stones against an enemy from a wall. In the case of Chinese firearms, Chinese writers in the Ming dynasty complained that neither Chinese cannon nor Chinese skill in handling them was as good as that of the Portuguese. Portuguese cannon were introduced to the Chinese when the former arrived at Canton in a year variously dated as 1517, 1520, or 1521. From 1529, the Chinese began to make cannon on the Portuguese model, calling their new cannon fo-lang-chi p’ao (lit. Portuguese cannon).14

10

Khan 1977, 26-27; Charney 1997, 55. Major Dorim’s description, quoted in Khan 1977, 27. 12 Sun 2003; Liew 1996, 179, explains that Ming forces captured guns and cannons from the Maw Shan forces in September 1441. 13 Boxer 1965, 157. 14 Symes 1800, 321-2; Boxer 1965, 168; Goodrich 1948, 64; Partington 1999, 278279. 11

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Primitive cannon, the bombards, made their appearance in Western Europe from the mid-fourteenth century. They were short, fat, and heavy. Some bombards were cast in pieces, although later they had a cast iron core, requiring an outer cover of wrought iron bands to prevent them from bursting. Since projectiles were not standardized, which meant that the full expansive potential of the ignited gunpowder could not be harnessed, it was difficult to calculate where the projectile would go. Its low carrying power meant that its heavy projectiles could only be fired from a short distance, having an effective range of only a few hundred metres. Their low range meant that they had to be fired very close to the enemy, thus making it a very dangerous enterprise for the bombarb crew.15 Despite gradual improvements, loading and firing the weapon took considerable time, from several hours per round in its early days to about a half hour later on. The ‘cannon’ found at Melaka in 1511 by the Portuguese were mainly bombards, although some scholars have suggested that swivel guns and culverins (see below) were found there as well. Pires also notes that Vietnam possessed small bombards in 1515. In both cases, these bombards, like the bombard bearing a date of 1421 found on Java, were probably Chinese in origin and introduced in the early fifteenth century.16 The development of cannon in Europe followed two trajectories, the emergence of extremely large and immobile siege guns, on the one hand, and lighter, mobile field cannon, on the other. In 1364, Europeans were joined by the Ottoman Turks, who had begun to make cannon as good as those in Europe, and used them as field artillery at Kosovo in 1389. From the mid-fifteenth century, however, Turkish gun-founding focused on large siege guns. The Ottoman interest in siege cannon was initiated by the fact that in 1453, the Ottoman ruler Mohammed II faced a seemingly impregnable system of fortifications at Constantinople. Reportedly, an artisan called Urban, who was hired by Mohammed II in 1452 to make siege cannon, produced by the following year the largest cannon ever made. This large cannon had an 8.1 metres long barrel and was capable of throwing a ball weighing over 453.59 kilograms a distance of over 1.61 kilometres, reportedly 15

Halberstadt 2002, 12; Gibson-Hill 1953, 147, 170n; Partington 1999, 110. Gibson-Hill 1953, 147; Pires 1944, 1.115; Ricklefs 1993, 13; Boxer 1965, 162, 168. Partington 1999, 275; L. Andaya 1994, 1.384-5. 16

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47

causing miscarriages as far as nineteen kilometres away. Other, similarly gargantuan guns were also cast for the same siege.17 Although Constantinople’s outer walls were wrecked within a week, it took five more weeks of continual pounding for Constantinople to fall. Nevertheless, the siege had, in the end, demonstrated to the Turks the value of large cannon. In the centuries that followed, the Turks retained their emphasis on “enormous and unmanageable cannon” while Europeans developed lighter and better field artillery, leading to a decline in the strength of Turkish armies.18 The fall of Constantinople also made Turkish cannon development more relevant to Southeast Asia. Initially, the possession of Constantinople gave the Turks a major shipbuilding centre and initiated Turkish competition at sea with European states for control of the eastern Mediterranean. Later, as Europeans spread into the Indian Ocean, the Turks feared that Europeans might try to outflank them and even ally with the Persians against them. This prompted Selim I (1512-1520) to pay more attention to the Middle East and to seek allies in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere, leading to an alliance with Gujarat in 1526 and a Turkish naval siege of Portuguese Diu in 1538. More importantly, for the present survey, the Turks began to seek closer links with Muslim states in Southeast Asia and to supply them with gun founders and cannon. At least some large cannon made their way to Southeast Asia first through India, for Melaka in 1511 had one large cannon that had come from Calicut, although it is unclear if this was on par with large Turkish cannon.19 Thereafter, however, Turkish (Rum) gun founders and large guns also appeared in different Malay sultanates. The Acehnese had Turkish founders who cast cannon for them and the Acehnese appear to have adopted from the Turks a love for extremely large guns.20 As Davis commented in 1599, the guns he saw at Aceh were “the greatest that I have ever seene.”21 The Hikayat Patani also includes an account of how the ruler of Patani, who was challenged by one Chinese ship-master’s gift of a huge eight-gallon basket-sized cannonball, was so embarrassed by his own lack of a large gun to fire it, that he employed a Turkish gun founder, 17

Halberstadt 2002, 14; L. Andaya 1994, 1.380; Montgomery 1968, 248. Halberstadt 2002, 13-14; Partington 1999, 127; Montgomery 1968, 250, 261. 19 Montgomery 1968, 250-257; Boxer 1965, 162. 20 Boxer 1965, 162-163; L. Andaya 1994, 1.383-384. 21 Davis 1906, 2.321. 18

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Abdussamad, to cast such a cannon. Although the first attempt failed, because the walls of the large copper gun were too thin, three new huge cannon were successfully cast three years later. Other Southeast Asian states followed suit, and King Narai of Ayudhya, for example, cast a similarly huge gun in the late seventeenth century. When the Dutch took Portuguese Melaka in 1640, they also found a ‘great cannon,’ presumably one of the sixteen hundred pieces of artillery taken from Johore in 1608, which fired a twenty-nine kilogram shot. These Southeast Asian ‘monster cannon,’ however, were partly intended as much for their psychological value as their practical use, for Southeast Asian transport had difficulty in moving such cannon for siege purposes and used them instead to defend their cities and towns, mainly by encouraging their own soldiers and frightening the enemy.22 From the mid-fifteenth century, new breech-loading cannon suitable for field battles began to supplant the bombarb. Early breechloaders were time-consuming as they consisted of a main barrel and a rear section that was unscrewed and removed to load, and realigned and screwed back into place before being fired. Even so, it offered a faster process than the loading of a bombard. A new breech-loader, the culverin, appeared in 1470, which reduced the time necessary to load. Culverins of this period were long and narrow and had a detachable metal container filled with the projectile and the powder, was inserted and clamped into the breech on the topside of the rear of the gun. These were much more speedily loaded and fired guns, but were frequently of small calibre. The sixteenth century English ‘base’ fired 170 to 227 gram shot and the Portuguese berço, of similar vintage, fired balls up to 1.36 kilograms. A significant advantage over the old bombards was that they fired standardized projectiles made to fit the bore of the barrel, allowing the full expansive force of ignited gunpowder to be harnessed, giving the ball a greater range, force, and accuracy.23 By later standards, however, these remained crude instruments. Despite their reputation, for example, the Portuguese use of cannon did not always leave a favorable impression. In the 1560s, when Portuguese ships fired cannon upon the city of Martaban for some four days “[it was] … all in vaine, for the shott never hit the 22

L. Andaya 1994, 1.383-384, 392-393; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.152-154; Nieuhoff 1732, 2.178, 181. 23 Halberstadt 2002, 12-15; Boxer 1968, 80, n. 1; Partington 1999, 112-116; Gibson-Hill 1953, 147.

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Citie, but light on the top of a small hill neere unto it, so that the citie had no harme…”24 As late as 1628, the Javanese were still reluctant to use their cannon to hit enemy walls and in the following year only effected light damage to Batavia’s walls.25 The culverin was popular in sixteenth century Southeast Asia. Pinto claimed that culverins and bronze musketry were the only firearms in use in the interior of the mainland in the mid-sixteenth century.26 Likewise, when the Spanish took Manila in 1570, they found the indigenous population armed with “very many bronze culverins and other pieces of larger bore.”27 Larger culverins, extremely long guns, also appeared and were sometimes referred to as serpents or serpentines (not to be confused with the serpentin discussed below). Although the date of its casting is unknown, Burmese armies found a gun in Arakan in 1784 that was 254-millimetre calibre, 760 millimetres in diameter at the muzzle, and was some 9.14 metres long.28 Southeast Asians had been firing cannon from fixed mounts or from earthen mounts from the sixteenth century. As Davis observed of Aceh in the late sixteenth century: they “hath great store of Brasse Ordnance, which they use without Carriages, shooting them as they lye upon the ground.”29 Boxer further suggests that the absence of carriages among Acehnese artillery may explain why they were relatively ineffective. References to the general use of field carriages in Burmese armies also do not appear until the nineteenth century. At least some new developments in gun carriages were reflected in other parts of Southeast Asia. Trӏnh cannon, for example, were mounted on carriages like those in Europe in the late 1680s, but European observers considered the carriages badly made and not properly replaced when they had become too old to perform well.30 The Southeast Asian version of light field artillery was the small swivel-gun, which became a common firearm of the mainland and the archipelago. As in India, it was sometimes referred to in Southeast 24

Fedrici 1588, 26. Schrieke 1957, 2.134. 26 Pinto 1989, 402. 27 Morga 1970, 1.49. 28 Gibson-Hill 1953, 170; Partington 1999, 226. 29 Davis 1906, 2.321. 30 Boxer 1965, 163; Fytche 1868, 14; Dampier 1906, 2.4. 25

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Asia as jinjal or gingall (from the Hindi janjal), although this term could also mean a musket that was rested on a stand when fired. It was light and could be maneuvered easily. The Malay swivel guns were all breechloaders. A removable powder holder sat in the breech and was wedged in place. There were two main types of swivel guns in use in Southeast Asia, and versions of both were found when Melaka fell to the Portuguese in 1511. Esmerils and related types were small, iron guns. Swivel guns of this type equipped the Burmese army in 1825 and fired balls weighing 170 to 340 grams.31

Figure 7: Swivel guns (without pivot) on display in Singapore. Photograph by Atsuko Naono.

The falconet (or falcon) paralleled the Malay lela and was larger than the esmeril. This was mainly a bronze or brass, 180 centimetres long, 1.13 to 1.36 kilogram gun with a range of over 360 metres. Some falconets were double-barreled or sometimes their barrels were mounted by miniature cannon to use if the enemy attacked before the gun could be reloaded. To turn, raise, or lower the muzzle, a handle, fitted into a fifteen centimetres long hollow tube connected to the gun, was manipulated. The gun was mounted on a ‘forked’ pivot with a 31

Wilson 1827, 40.

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51

spike underneath that was fitted into the walls or into the railings of a boat.32 Dampier, describing their placement in stockade walls on Mindanao, referred to them as “little guns…small brass guns suspended by withes from wooden crutches.”33 The swivel guns were frequently located at the corners of a fort, so that they could be turned to cover alternately two different walls.34

Small Arms Primitive handguns made their first appearance in Europe in the 1350s. These early handguns consisted of short tubes sealed at one end and loaded with gunpowder through a touchhole.35 Larger handguns required up to three men to fire it, weighed between 4.54 and 7.26 kilograms, and required a stand.36 A wooden stock was soon added because of the effect of their recoil and the excessive heat of the metal when fired several times. To load the gun, a charge of gunpowder and a rag or straw wad were inserted into the barrel and stuffed down with a ramrod, followed by a ball and a second wad to keep the barrel’s contents in place. The gun was ignited by touching a hot iron brand to additional powder that was sprinkled into the pan-shaped end of a vent that led to the charge of powder at the bottom of the barrel. This system meant that the gunner was relatively immobile, because he could not move far beyond a fire or hot coals. Later, a better match was found in hemp twine, doused with saltpeter to slow and steady the speed of ignition. It made the gunner more mobile, because he could now move around as the long match burned. In the late fifteenth century, the serpentin offered a better, mechanical solution. This matchlock derived its name from the “s”-shaped clamp that attached the match to the gun. The clamp pivoted on a pin fixed into the gun and when the lower end was raised, the upper end with the match was lowered into the pan of priming powder. At this point, in Gibson-Hill’s words, “god-willing, the gun 32

L. Andaya 1994, 1.394-385, 388, 389; Ras 1968, 251, 295, 317; Gibson-Hill 1953, 164-165; Garnder 1936, 94-95; Boxer 1968, 80, n. 1; 33 Dampier 1906, 1.344, n.1. 34 Gardner 1936, 95. 35 Peterson 1962, 39. 36 Gibson-Hill 1953, 170.

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fired.”37 Managing the ignition by hand denied the shooter both hands with which to steady and aim the gun. To rectify this problem the pivot of the clamp was now connected to a sear in the stock, which in turn was connected to a trigger. When the trigger was pulled, the match was pushed into the pan, firing the gun, and when the trigger was released a spring pushed the sear and pulled up the match.38

Figure 8: Sixteenth-century musketeer on an internal corridor of the Shitthaung-para at Mrauk-U. Photograph by author.

The matchlock at this stage in its evolution represented the first handguns introduced into Asia by the Portuguese, but Southeast Asians were already armed with Chinese fire lances or firing tubes. Pires noted in 1515 that Vietnam possessed “countless musketeers,” who were probably armed with Chinese fire lances introduced in Vietnam at least by the early fifteenth century. Gibson-Hill suggests that the first matchlocks encountered by the Portuguese in Southeast Asia, at Melaka, were also probably simple firing tubes similar to late fifteenth century serpentines, for the true matchlock was only in the process of being developed and even the Portuguese who attacked 37

Peterson 1962, 42-43; Gibson-Hill 1953, 170n; Hogg 1984, 14-15. Peterson 1962, 44-45, 47; Hogg 1984, 15; Partington 1999, 118; L. Andaya 1994, 1.380. 38

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Melaka are not mentioned as having had them. Whether or not the latter characterization is flawed, the ‘matchlocks’ in use in Melaka, and likely elsewhere in parts of Southeast Asia, were probably relatively crude firing tubes. Along with the true matchlock, the serpentin also found its way to Southeast Asia and remained in use into the seventeenth century.39 Some care must be taken not to overestimate the superiority of the new European muskets relative to other available weaponry. Though deadly, they remained slower and less accurate than the bow. The early matchlock was highly effective against unsuspecting targets, such as apes and crocodiles, but against a wary enemy, it was too slow to be very effective. Leonard Andaya suggests that while these handguns were effective in the opening salvo, because of its shock effect, the length of time required to load the gun and its poor performance in moist conditions soon reduced its advantages. It also required considerable care in a moist environment. Malay soldiers and Trӏnh Vietnamese soldiers rolled bamboo covers over their barrels and bound them with rattan to keep them dry when marching in the rain. The Trӏnh also had a smaller piece of bamboo to put over the barrel when it was kept on the rack at home to keep it from accumulating dust.40 These early matchlocks tended to misfire, were aimed only with difficulty, and the power behind the shot left much to be desired. In a region in which rulers sought in firearms a way to counter the strength of the enemy’s main front-line weapon, the war elephant, these weapons had limited effect. Fedrici, for example, claimed in the 1560s “the Skinne of this Eliphant is so harde, that any Harquebusse will not pierce it, unlesse it bee in the eye, temples, or some other tender place of his body.”41 Even so, the Vietnamese used such matchlocks to harass a Spanish armada off shore in the late sixteenth century, apparently with some success.42 Some developments in the matchlock were reflected in firearms technology used in Southeast Asia relatively quickly. Early sixteenth century Europeans relied on relatively light matchlocks such as the 39

Boxer 1965, 168; Pires 1944, 1.115; Peterson 1962, 44-45; L. Andaya 1994, 1.380; Gibson-Hill 1953, 147, 170n; Hogg 1984, 15. 40 Peterson 1962, 49; Ricklefs 1993, 324; Dampier 1906, 2.5; Dias 1565, 94; L. Andaya 1994, 1.389; Gardner 1936, 100. 41 Fedrici 1588, 29. 42 Morga 1970, 1.89.

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caliver, which was shot from the shoulder, and the petronel (from the French poitrine for chest), in which the butt of the gun was braced against the chest. The recoil, however, was felt entirely by the hands in the case of the former and the chest in the case of the latter. New matchlocks that incorporated developments in the butt of the gun quickly replaced these guns. The Spanish introduced a broader butt that could be braced against the shoulder when fired and became the main fashion for matchlocks by the end of the sixteenth century. Another Spanish innovation was the mosquete, or musket, which was used to quell rebels in the Spanish Netherlands in 1550. Early examples of the musket had six- to eight-gauge bores. They were heavier than the caliver and the petronel, weighing as much as 9.07 kilograms, and the barrel had to be supported with a forked rest. The musket’s forked rest was also soon abandoned as new, lighter versions were introduced.43 As Filipinos had not yet acquired matchlocks, those they picked up from fallen Spanish soldiers meant that they had stateof-the-art weaponry, which they used to deadly effect against a Spanish assault on Mindanao in the late sixteenth century.44 Southeast Asian states that had adopted earlier versions of the musket or other handguns, however, continued to rely on these older technologies, for they were either too expensive or difficult to replace with newer models, or found that skills developed in using older technology died hard. In the late seventeenth century, for example, musketeers in the Trӏnh army still used muskets of excessive length, the barrels alone being between 1.2 and two metres long, and heavy weight: “The Bore is about the bigness of our Horse Pistols, they are all Match-locks [by match instead of percussion], and they are very thick and heavy.”45 They were carried on a man’s back, fired 124 gram shot, and had to be placed on a stand in order to be fired. This stand consisted of a piece of wood from 1.83 to 2.13 metres long: One end of the Carriage is supported with two Legs, or a Fork of three Foot high, the other rests on the Ground. The Gun is placed on the top, where there is an Iron Socket for the Gun to rest in, and a Swivel to turn the Muzzle any way. From the Britch of the Gun there is a short stock

43

Peterson 1962, 45-48, 63. Morga 1970, 1.95, 95n. 45 Dampier 1906, 2.5; L. Andaya 1994, 1.392. 44

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for the Man who fires the Gun to traverse it withal, and to rest it against his Shoulder...46

Even in the late eighteenth century, NguyӉn musketeers relied on long matchlocks with swivels and three-legged stands. One also wonders about the age of the handgun that one Chao Somana, brother of the Governor of Nan (Siam), picked up in 1786 to fire at his nephew, the governor’s son. The gun misfired on the first shot and despite attempting to fire the gun again, pulling the trigger three times, the gun did not fire, forcing Somana to flee with his would-be victim in hot pursuit.47 From the mid-sixteenth century, another kind of musket, the flintlock, was on its way. In this gun, a spring swung a clamp bearing a piece of flint against a steel bar, sending sparks into the priming pan. The earliest example was the Dutch schnapp-hahn (snaphaen or snaphaan), which was soon corrupted into the English snaphaunce. The flintlock was simpler and much more reliable than the matchlock had been. A matchlock could fire at best one shot per minute, but a snaphaunce could fire twice. Other independent versions of snap-locks also emerged about the same time, especially the miquelet developed by the Spanish (and the Italians), which had even fewer parts, was less expensive, and more reliable. The flintlock that had the biggest impact, however, was the French model introduced by Marin le Bourgeoys in the early 1610s, which integrated the best features of the snaphaunce and the miquelet and replaced the sear’s lateral with vertical action, allowing a half-cock position that was safe and reliable. This version slowly, but steadily became the main handgun in European armies by the end of the seventeenth century.48 The Dutch played a crucial role in circulating new versions of the flintlock to Southeast Asia because of the region-wide activities of the VOC. Indeed, Southeast Asians adopted the same Dutch terminology (Malay sƟnapang). The VOC began replacing matchlocks with flintlocks from the 1680s and indigenous rulers soon began to seek out the new guns quickly, the Javanese requesting them from the 1690s. The standardization of the flintlock by the French and then others from the 1710s also speeded up and made less expensive the 46

Dampier 1906, 2.7-8. Lamb 1961, 54; NC 1966, 49; Peterson 1962, 47. 48 L. Andaya 1994, 1.394; Ricklefs 1993, 324; Peterson 1962, 80-81, 93. 47

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manufacture of flintlocks, meaning that more were available for sale to indigenous states. The new flintlocks thus began to replace matchlocks in Southeast Asian armies over the course of the century. Flintlocks began to appear in Javanese arsenals in the first decade of the eighteenth century and the Dutch began to supply flintlocks to the rulers of Surabaya in the 1710s and 1720s. By the 1860s, Burmese handguns had been largely replaced by flintlocks.49 Early modern Southeast Asian kings had various means to procure firearms for their disposal. Firearms were often purchased from foreign sources. Mercenaries often brought their own weaponry when they were hired. Indian mercenaries who served Burmese rulers prior to, and after, the Portuguese entry into Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century, for example, brought their own cannon and muskets. Weapons acquisition through capture was also a significant source of firearms for the Southeast Asians until the end of the pre-colonial period. One striking example is that of the Balinese who used a Dutch howitzer they had captured in 1848 against the Dutch themselves at the Second Battle of Jagaraga in April 1849.50 The frequency of shipwrecks in the archipelago and along the coasts of the mainland also made salvage an important source of new guns. Borri heard in the early 1630s, for example, that the NguyӉn lord rebelled against the Trӏnh because hee saw himselfe suddenly furnished with divers Pieces of Artillery, recovered and gotten out of the Ship-wracke of sundry Ships of the Portugals, and Hollanders against the Rockes, which men afterwards gathered up by those of the Countrey.51

Certainly, elsewhere in Southeast Asia, heavy European sea traffic and the danger of shoals made shipwrecks a region-wide, though perhaps only occasional, source. Cannon were taken by one Minangkabau lord in 1563 after the Portuguese ship, the São Paulo, was wrecked on the western Sumatran coast. The Makassars were also able to obtain cannon from the De Walvis and the De Leeuwin which 49 Gibson-Hill 1953, 170n; Ricklefs 1993, 324; L. Andaya 1994, 1.394; Lieberman 1993a, 228; Peterson 1962, 97; Fytche 1868, 12. 50 Langham-Carter 1937, 262; Lieberman 1980, 207; Banyà-dalá 1970, 328; Morga 1970, 1.71; Kraan 1995, 107. 51 Borri 1633, 52.

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were wrecked off South Sulawesi in 1662 and 1663, contributing ultimately to the 1667 war that reduced that kingdom, when they refused to hand the cannon back over to the Dutch.52 Foreign traders introduced indigenous kings to guns in the first instances as gifts. Acquisition of firearms as presents from traders, when these gifts are considered together, probably served as an important supply of firearms for local rulers.53 Portuguese and English traders gave firearms as gifts to the Makassar court and in the 1630s, the ruler of Makassar requested cannon from Goa. By contrast, to the NguyӉn, the Trӏnh relied more heavily on support from the Dutch. Perhaps in response to the growing firearm capacity of the NguyӉn, and the fact that they were aided by the Netherland’s Catholic enemies, the Trӏnh received a Dutch gift of two cannon in 1637.54 Although Europeans had introduced the best weapons of the day, Southeast Asian states initiated the construction of local foundries that could produce their own supplies of European cannon and muskets. In many ways, Southeast Asians were prepared to make the transition to founding European cannon and manufacturing muskets. Vietnam, for example, already had long experience in making earlier Chinese gunpowder weaponry. Other skills in working metal, such as swordmaking, drum-making, or casting metal Buddha images, were also found in many other areas of the region.55 As one observer noted of the Trӏnh in 1688: “the Tonquinese understand how to run Metals, and are very expert in tempering the Earth, wherewith they make their Mould.”56 In Europe, the transition from externally supplied arsenals to selfproduced firearms was a major step towards sustaining a permanent gunpowder army. This transition took place later in mainland Southeast Asia, first in Vietnam. In the early fifteenth century, the Vietnamese leader and later ruler Hӗ Quý Lý set up four ammunition factories and employed skilled artisans to make weapons. In the NguyӉn lands of Southern Vietnam, the French and Portuguese tended to have a greater influence in the seventeenth century and it was one 52

Boxer 1965, 163-164; Dias 1565, 100-102. Dalrymple 1808, 1.52, 82-83, 107, 125; RFSGLFSG 1932, 9-10; LanghamCarter 1937, 262. 54 Boxer 1965, 164; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 196. 55 L. Andaya 1994, 1.385. 56 Dampier 1906, 2.4-5. 53

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Jean de la Croix who helped to set up the NguyӉn arsenal in 1614. Just a decade-and-a-half later, in 1631, the NguyӉn had their own cannon foundries, including one at Thuұn Hóa staffed with eighty craftsmen. In 1651, the NguyӉn sent three thousand kilograms of copper to Macao and asked the Portuguese to make cannon for them. The Vietnamese may have adopted Portuguese techniques for making cannon afterwards. As Boxer explains, the NguyӉn were eager to acquire cannon from a foundry in Macao in the 1670s, which produced what were the best bronze guns in Asia. The services of one Portuguese gun-founder were so important to the NguyӉn court that he successfully championed the cause of Catholic missionaries for a time.57 This appears to be the same man whom Domingo Navarette described as “an able officer, an excellent founder, and very curious at making chain bullets, and other warlike instruments,” during the latter’s stay in NguyӉn Vietnam.58 In the 1670s, the Trӏnh were said to have cast a great brass cannon weighing 3,628.74 to 4,082.33 kilograms. The tapered barrel, small at the breech and thirty centimetres wide at the mouth was described as “an ill-shaped thing.” This gun, highly esteemed by the Vietnamese, was so large that they needed the help of Europeans to mount it on a carriage “where it now stands more for a show than service.”59 A cannon foundry was set up by a man named Linh in Quҧng Ngãi, although he rebelled with the help of these cannon in 1695. In the 1790s, NguyӉn Ánh opened iron mines, constructed iron smelts, and set up a cannon foundry at GiaĈӏnh and later one at HuӃ, which was still casting brass cannon of various calibe in 1819. NguyӉn Ánh also had thousands of matchlocks fabricated. In the 1820s, the Vietnamese were producing their own cannon, “of beautiful workmanship,” cannon balls, shells, and grapeshot.60 Siamese chronicles make the seemingly dubious claim that the Siamese were casting cannon and hammering out guns before the mid-fourteenth century.61 The main reliable references to gun founding in Ayudhya come from the seventeenth century. According to Leonard Andaya, a seventeenth-century Dutchman provided a 57

Li 1992, 41-42; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 135, 190, 194, 196; Boxer 1965, 167. Navarette 1732, 1.308. 59 Dampier 1906, 2.4-5. 60 Li 1992, 42; White 1972, 94, 236; Barrow 1806, 275; Lamb 1961, 54, 191, 195. 61 Cushman 2000, 5. 58

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treatise which describes “the composition of the metal, provides a diagram of the proportions of the weapon, explains the methods of loading and firing, and has sketches of ramrods, cleaning rods, and gun mounts” to the Governor of Sukothai.62 By the 1690s, the Siamese were hammering cannon out of cold iron. European contemporaries remained unimpressed. Loubère, for example, questioned “whether they know how to make any moderately good” and Gervaise complained that the Siamese were “not good at founding … cannon…because they have never learned the correct mixture and proportions to use to ensure a successful result.”63 For better guns, the Siamese court turned to a Portuguese from Macao to cast cannon in the late seventeenth century.64 There was significant local gun founding in the archipelago as well. In 1511, for example, Affonzo D’Albuquerque was impressed with the founding of bombards in Melaka, the founders being comparable in his view to those of Germany. When the ruler of Aceh determined to attack Portuguese Melaka in the 1560s, the Ottoman Empire sent five hundred men, including gunners and gun founders to aid him, although only a small number appear to have survived the journey. By 1585, however, the Portuguese found Turkish gunners, bronze cannon, and fortress-engineers. Davis noted that Aceh possessed gun-founders in 1599, but did not mention whether they were Turkish. As Europeans spread across the archipelago, they came across foundries in diverse places, such as those found in 1570 in Luzon, including one “large foundry” at Manila, that were casting bombards. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Makassars may also have manufactured small arms, small bronze cannon were possibly produced at Blambangan in eastern Java by 1681, and, in the eighteenth century, both the Bugis and the Minangkabau were said to produce fine guns with well-tempered barrels.65 Leonard Andaya suggests that Javanese skills involved in making the kris were easily lent to manufacturing guns. The foundry at Surakarta, for example, which began to cast bronze cannon and later muskets in the early seventeenth century, also produced krisses. 62

L. Andaya 1994, 1.381-382. Loubère 1986, 91; Gervaise 1998, 92. 64 Loubère 1986, 91. 65 L. Andaya 1994, 1.383-385; Davis 1906, 2.321; Gibson-Hill 1953, 146-147; White 1972, 107; Ricklefs 1993, 325. 63

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GamČlan-makers were also summoned to help the blacksmiths make one cannon called GunturgČni in the mid-1640s. The Javanese apparently cast their cannon like the Europeans, but they were also casting the same type of large cannon found in other areas of Southeast Asia. The heaviest, weighing 8600 kilograms, was cast in the 1620s. However, over the course of the rest of the seventeenth century and after, the Javanese produced smaller, more mobile artillery and by the middle of the century, it was reported that in three months the foundry had produced in addition to numerous small iron cannon, some eight hundred muskets and iron cannon balls.66

Figure 9: Muzzle of cannon at Mandalay. Photograph by author.

For unclear reasons, Burma appears to have lagged behind the rest of Southeast Asia in producing its own firearms. This was certainly not due to a disdain for firearms, for, as it was said that in the late eighteenth century, they were “very fond of their arms, of which they take great care.”67 Even in the late eighteenth century, the Burmese relied on war captives taken from Manipur in the 1760s to serve as gunsmiths, even though “they are in general so bad as to be out of the power of art, to render [the guns] serviceable.”68 A probable explanation is that early modern Burma, more so than other major states in the region, engaged in frequent and successful campaigns 66

Ricklefs 1978, 45; Ricklefs 1993, 13-14; L. Andaya 1994, 1.384. Symes 1800, 319. 68 Symes 1800, 319. 67

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against its neighbours that yielded a rich harvest in captured firearms. If this were indeed the case, Burma’s firearms would necessarily begin to represent older technologies during long lapses between successful campaigns.

Gunpowder Knowledge on the production of gunpowder reached Vietnam first, due to its proximity and intercourse with China. By 1515, and apparently much earlier, the use of gunpowder was relatively common in Vietnam and used for peace as well as war. As Pires explains: A very great deal of powder is used in [this] country, both in war and in all [their] feasts and amusements by day and night. All the lords and important people in [this] kingdom employ it like this. Powder is used every day in rockets and all other pleasurable exercises…69

In the late seventeenth century, the “grandees” in northern Vietnam were said to “all make their own Powder.”70 Moreover, the average soldier also made his own powder at that time. As Dampier describes this process: They have little Engines for mixing the Ingredients, and make as small a Quantity as they please. They do not know how to corn it, and therefore it is in unequal lumps, some as big as the top of a Man’s Thumb, and some no bigger than a white Pea: neither have I seen any Powder well corn’d that has been made in any of these Eastern Nations.71

In the 1820s, it was said that the Vietnamese produced very high quality gunpowder.72 Other mainland states could certainly make their own gunpowder by the eighteenth century and the Burmese court placed its main manufactory for gunpowder in one village, whose inhabitants were solely devoted to this work.73 One suspects that a 69

Pires 1944, 1.115. Dampier 1906, 2.30. 71 Dampier 1906, 2.5. 72 Lamb 1961, 195. 73 Symes 1800, 276. 70

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broader section of the general Burmese population had this knowledge, and probably from the sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries. Wil Dijk, for example, has found evidence that Burmese levies were required to bring their own flints and gunpowder when they were mobilized for war in the 1670s.74 The Javanese gradually learned how to make their own gunpowder over the course of the seventeenth century. In 1596, for example, the BantČnese depended for gunpowder on the mill at Melaka, and latterly from the English, and there is no evidence elsewhere of local powder manufacture in Java at that time.75 Although it is possible that Mataram learned how to make gunpowder in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, it was introduced to Portuguese techniques no earlier than the 1620s.76 Although Mataram produced gunpowder that impressed Dutch observers by the 1650s, in 1671, the Mataram court still asked the Dutch for information on how gunpowder was made. By 1705, Mataram had a gunpowder mill at Kartasura.77 Other areas of the archipelago, including South Sulawesi and Blambangan in eastern Java (by 1681), also learned how to make gunpowder in the last half of the seventeenth century.78 The use of gunpowder had to be precise, lest the gun burst or the ball not be sent as far as necessary. Some Southeast Asians adopted the Turkish practice of inscribing the amount of powder for the ball on the cannon.79 For small arms, Southeast Asians began to use bamboo cartridges containing the correct measure of powder from the seventeenth century.80 As one account of the Trӏnh explained in 1688: The Soldiers have each a Cartridge Box covered with Leather, after the manner of the West-Indian Privateers; but instead of Paper Cartridges, these are filled with small hollow Canes, each containing a load or charge of Powder; which they empty out of the Cane into the Gun; so that each Box has in it, as it were, so many Bandoleers.81

74

Dijk 2004, 1.37. Schrieke 1957, 2.123. 76 Ricklefs 1993, 13, 265. 77 Ricklefs 1993, 13; Schrieke 1957, 2.123. 78 Schrieke 1957, 2.123; Ricklefs 1993, 325. 79 L. Andaya 1994, 1.382, 386-387. 80 Gardner 1936, 99. 81 Dampier 1906, 2.5. 75

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Bamboo cartridges had a significant advantage over paper cartridges used by the Europeans in Southeast Asia’s wet, tropical climate.82 Keeping gunpowder and firearms dry was a general concern. In Southeast Asian fortifications, sheds were built to keep the ordnance and powder dry, but this was not without danger. In the Dutch attack on Palembang in 1662, Dutch ship-based artillery succeeded in hitting the gunpowder magazine of one fort and it “blew up with … the greatest part of the fort.”83

The Royal Arsenal and Training It was sometimes masses of firearms rather than their actual use that was intended to cow an enemy into submission. As the governor of Bassein warned British commanders in January 1852: the soldiers at Bassein “have cannon, and blunderbusses, and bombs, and muskets, swords and spears, gunpowder, bullets, flints, and, in fact, all the munitions and appurtenances of war, and all placed on guard around.”84 As a result, a general feature of firearms in early modern Southeast Asia was that royal courts tended to horde them, frequently indiscriminately. The major limitation on the transformation of firearms from mere accoutrements of royal power to effective instruments of actual destruction on the battlefield was the reliance on the relatively indiscriminate hording of firearms. Ricklefs warns that in the Javanese case, for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries care must be taken not to overestimate the technical superiority of the VOC over the Javanese, and this would appear to hold true in the comparisons of European and other Southeast Asian arsenals as well. Ricklefs, for example, finds little “significant technological differences” between VOC forces and those of the Javanese leader Trunajaya in terms of land warfare. Rather, Javanese tended to adopt new technologies shortly after the Dutch obtained them.85 Such new technologies, however, were not so much adopted as they were merely accumulated. The incredible diversity and age of firearms captured by the Dutch from the Makassars in 1669 and those taken by the Burmese 82

Ricklefs 1993, 324. Grant 1853, 46; Nieuhoff 1732, 2.187. 84 FPRHB 1853, 71. 85 Ricklefs 1993, 37-38. 83

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from Ayudhya in 1767, underscore this weakness.86 In 1819, an observer at Gia-Ĉӏnh reported: [W]e passed a large bungalow, under which were arranged two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, of various calibers and fashions, many of them brass, and principally of European manufacture, generally mounted on ship-carriages in different states of decay. Among them we noticed a train of about a dozen pieces of field artillery, each marked with three fleurs de lis, and bearing an inscription, importing that they were cast in the reign of Louis XIV., in tolerable preservation. Near this place was a sham battery of wooden guns for exercise…87

This meant that older technology remained in use, or at least in the arsenal, long after it had become outdated, and relatively state-of-theart cannon might be used in the same battle as cannon cast one or two centuries earlier, sometimes longer. Wise rulers acquired state of the art weapons and set up foundries to mimic them. Certainly, in the sixteenth century, Southeast Asians acquired some of the best weaponry coming from Europe. In the 1560s, King Bayín-naung of Burma was said to have had “Harquebussses … most excellent … he hath great ordnance made of very good metall…”88 These efforts, however, tended not to be followed up or renewed on a regular basis, so that, as with accumulated weapons, firearm technologies current in 1600 might still be reproduced for Southeast Asian armies in 1700, or even 1800 for that matter. As one observer noted of artillery in the Vietnamese arsenal at the capital in 1822: “Some of the guns were cast by Portuguese, but in Cochin China or Cambodia, as far back as 1664.”89 There were additional reasons for hording artillery, as guns represented in Southeast Asian society and warfare something more than simply accurate weaponry. Firearms were also important for intensifying the aura of power of rulers. Gunfire was used, for example, to mark special religious celebrations, to announce the ascendancy to the throne of a new king or queen or even as a salute

86

L. Andaya 1994, 1.382-4. White 1972, 224. 88 Fedrici 1588, 29-30. 89 Lamb, 1961, 191, no. 148. 87

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marking the arrival of honoured visitors.90 This was partly due to the spread of the noise. As one observer found in Gia-Ĉӏnh in c. 1819: the arrival of the viceroy was announced by the discharge of a few guns, and by the display of the Anamese flag at the citadel; the guns upon this, and other occasions of ceremony, being placed vertically with their muzzles pointing to the zenith, for the purpose, as they told us, of diffusing the sound through the surrounding country.91

At least some Southeast Asians saw firearms as lingam, the phallic representation of male prowess.92 Leonard Andaya also suggests that the accumulation of frequently useless cannon and their emplacement around the royal palace was intended to gather their spiritual powers and utilize them for the safety of the kingdom. Some cannon were used only for summoning the community when a god was angry. Thus, a cannon’s effectiveness was not only measured in terms of its practical worth on the battlefield, but rather in its role in amassing spiritual power, reflecting the Southeast Asian belief in the “interrelationship between the material and spiritual spheres of life.”93 Evidently, the size of a piece of cannon was one reflection of its capacity to amass spiritual power. As Nieuhoff commented of the Malay reverence for cannon at Palembang in 1662: It is worth taking notice of that these Indians seemed to have paid a peculiar reverence to their great cannon, which we found covered with scarlet cloth lined with rambourins, and so perfumed with incense that the smell thereof stuck a great while after to our fingers.94

Such spiritual powers were valuable on the battlefield as well, for an individual spirit also animated each cannon. Cannon in Southeast Asia, for example, received individual names, such as the “Nang Liuliu” in Patani or the cannon Anak Mangkasar (“Child of Makassar”), the latter cast in 1669 in South Sulawesi, which were inscribed in a special ceremony. The spirit who lived in the cannon would lend 90

Bowrey 1905, 312; IbrƗhƯm 1972, 51; Ras 1968, 251, 301. White 1972, 304. 92 Gibson-Hill 1953, 152-153. 93 L. Andaya 1994, 1.392-3, 395; Symes 1800, 415. 94 Nieuhoff 1732, 2.188. 91

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protection to the walls of the city on which the cannon was mounted. In 1767, the failure to ignite the Dvaravati cannon was interpreted as signifying the end of the gun’s protective function. 95 Propitiating the spirit of the gun was an essential preparation for battle. In 1755, for example, Alaùng-hpayà had offerings of meat and liquor offered to one cannon during fighting near Prome and as late as the 1870s, Malays would gather around a cannon and pray for its success before firing it.96 One of the best examples of the role of the spirit of the gun in battle is found in the Hikayat Patani. When the King of Patani saw that all was lost in a sixteenth-century campaign against the Siamese, he ordered his brother to take the court women back to Patani in a riverboat while the king made his last stand. The prince also took a cannon, named Nang Liu-liu, which was placed at the stern of the boat and was used to fire on the Siamese boats that chased after them. At one point, the prince spoke to the spirit of the gun: “Nang Liu-liu, if you let me escape safely to Patani I shall have the drums beaten for you for seven days.” The cannon then began to sink many of the pursuing craft and the remainder held off, allowing the prince to return to Patani. The prince became the new king of Patani, Sultan Manzur Syah. Before his installation, however, the Nang Liu-liu cannon was given a fringed parasol and for three days and nights drums were beaten for it alone. Even the beating of the king’s drums was delayed until after this period, at which time the king’s drums were beaten and he was installed as king.97 In their efforts to amass cannon, some Southeast Asian courts possessed surprisingly large numbers of such firearms. The Sultan of Melaka was said to have had eight thousand cannon when the Portuguese took the city in 1511, of which the Portuguese captured three thousand at that time and another three hundred near Melaka in 1518. Nan-dá-bayin of the First Taung-ngu dynasty was reported to have insufficient numbers of men to manage all of his cannon in 1581 and in 1596 he was said to have accumulated some three thousand cannon, including one thousand brass guns. This was not unusual, for, in the early seventeenth century, Sultan Iskander Muda of Aceh had an arsenal of two thousand cannon, including twelve medium calibre 95

Gibson-Hill 1953, 145; L. Andaya 1994, 1.382, 384, 392-393; L. Andaya 1981, 132; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.161, 164. 96 L. Andaya 1994, 1.393; Parkinson 1960, 45. 97 Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.161-163.

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bronze cannon. The sultan of Johore had likewise accumulated at least fifteen hundred brass cannon by 1608, for this was the number captured by the Portuguese. The NguyӉn had two hundred cannon in 1642, twelve hundred in 1750, and, by 1822, the arsenal at HuӃ included some two thousand pieces of artillery.98 The percentage of soldiers armed with muskets also became significant over the course of the early modern period. Musket-bearing troops in Javanese armies increased from two percent in 1515 to ten to thirteen percent in the mid-seventeenth century. By 1624, Mataram had at least four thousand musketeers while smaller BantČn had ten thousand musketeers by 1673. Twenty to twenty-five percent of Siamese soldiers were armed with muskets in the 1680s.99 While the eighty thousand muskets cited for First Taung-ngu armies is probably a wild exaggeration, some scholars estimate that one-half to one-third of Bayín-naung’s mid-sixteenth century troops were armed with muskets. The number of troops armed with muskets increased in Burma in the late eighteenth century, but not as rapidly as in the nineteenth. Of one Burmese force of sixty thousand men described in 1825, fifty percent were armed with muskets. By the 1860s, of five thousand infantry encountered at the Burmese royal palace, eighty percent were armed with muskets. Vietnam also went through a similar acceleration in the nineteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, for example, ten percent of Vietnamese infantry were armed with muskets. By 1830, however, at least in some units, fifty percent of Vietnamese soldiers bore firearms. Other units may not have been so well endowed with firearms, for of the thirty-two thousand Vietnamese troops facing the Franco-Spanish expedition in 1858, only five thousand were armed with firearms.100 Firearms in arsenals, however, tell us very little, other than that they might be handed out to local, untrained levies on a temporary basis in campaigns. The utility of firearms in strengthening central control on a permanent basis had more to do with who held the firearms, how they were organized, and what their relationship to the 98

Partington 1999, 279; Balbi 2003, 31; Pimenta 1906, 10.214; Li 1992, 42; Lamb 1961, 191; Nieuhoff 1732, 2.181; L. Andaya 1994, 1.383-384. 99 Gervaise 1998, 95; Schrieke 1957, 2.129, 131. 100 Lieberman 1993a, 228; Wilson 1827, 40; Fytche 1868, 13; Pires 1944, 1.175176; Ricklefs 1993, 14; L. Andaya 1994, 1.387, 390; Crawfurd 1828, 494; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 234; Fedrici 1588, 29; Trѭѫng Bѭu Lâm 1967, 6.

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court was. Since the court generally had the ability to monopolize access to foreign sources of firearms and because firearms accentuated royal strength, Southeast Asia’s early modern rulers had both the opportunity and motive to limit access to firearms within the kingdom.101 The seventeenth century court of Ayudhya held on to its firearms and during campaigns supplied gunpowder, shot, blunderbusses, and cannon to the troops, and in Japara, its army of 1576 “fighting men” only had access to its seventy-nine guns in war, for they were otherwise “kept under guard by the ruler.”102 The eighteenth century Burmese court kept some twenty thousand firelocks in its magazines for release in wartime. For this reason, the royal arsenal was kept in visible proximity to the royal palace. In late seventeenth century northern Vietnam, all the cannon were kept in the royal magazine on one side of the parade ground in front of the Trӏnh palace.103 When war did come about, rulers should not have been surprised that their troops handled guns poorly. The limited opportunities for indigenous soldiers to develop expertise in handling artillery certainly lessened the effectiveness of indigenous heavy guns. From the late sixteenth century, however, this problem was offset to a varying degree among the Southeast Asian states by the employment or captivity of European and Indian artillerymen, many of whom brought with them skills in handling these guns. King Anauk-hpet-lun, for example, made the artillery corps of Burma the hereditary preserve of the descendants of Portuguese and Indian captives, supplemented at intervals by new European captives, frequently from French or English ships. From 1613 until 1885, these foreign experts and their descendants allowed the court to maintain skilled artillerymen without abandoning royal control over the guns themselves. The Cambodian court similarly relied on smaller numbers of Portuguese and Indian gunners into the eighteenth century. In some areas of the archipelago, Dutch captives performed the same functions, as in the case of Dutch artillerymen forced into the service of DČmak against Mataram in the early seventeenth century.104

101

L. Andaya 1994, 1.383-384; Reid 1993a, 224; Dijk 2004, 1.37. Gervaise 1998, 95. 103 Symes 1800, 319; Dampier 1906, p.2.4. 104 Schrieke 1957, 2.124. 102

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In the case of musketry, however, which required large numbers of troops to be effective in battles, Southeast Asian rulers were forced to strike a balance between royal control of firearms and the encouragement of marksmanship among their soldiery. Some rulers increased training to refine skills in handling firearms. In the 1560s, one European noted that in First Taung-ngu Burma, “the King will have them shoot every day at the Planke, and so by continuall exercise they become most excellent shot.”105 Nevertheless, the quality of training and practice, and thus marksmanship, was not sustained across reigns, for we find a very different picture in the 1580s, after the transition from Bayín-naung’s to Nan-dá-bayin’s reigns, when the Burmese were said to “have gunnes, but shoot very badly in them.”106 The Javanese were also said to have used their muskets ineffectively in the 1590s: “The inhabitants of that Country have no dexterity in the use of Muskets…”107 At the Second Siege of Batavia (1629), however, the Javanese were said to have “hit the mark quite accurately.”108 By 1726, the Javanese were paying special attention to how muskets should be handled and had largely abandoned their traditional weapons in favour of firearms.109 The Vietnamese, for unclear reasons, seem to have fared better than did the Burmese in maintaining the quality of their musketeers. The fledgling NguyӉn state probably survived its contest with the Trӏnh north in the seventeenth century in large part due to firearms. As Domingo Navarrete observed in the seventeenth century, the NguyӉn skill in firearms is the reason they have always the better in their continual wars with the king of Tunquin, though this last exceeds the other in all respects, not only in numbers of men, but in wealth, and the multitude of elephants he carries to war.110

In their first battle with the Trӏnh in 1627, NguyӉn forces killed many of their opponents with cannon and, in 1631, they established musket 105

Fedrici 1588, 29. Fitch 1906, 10.189. 107 Schrieke 1957, 2.124. 108 Schrieke 1957, 2.123. 109 Schrieke 1957, 2.124. 110 Navarrete 1732, 1.308. 106

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(and presumably artillery) ranges and training grounds.111 Borri, who lived in southern Vietnam at the time, claimed that NguyӉn soldiers were “so expert” in the use of cannon that they were better shots than the Europeans of their day: For indeed they did little else every day, but exercise themselves in Shooting at a Marke: Whereupon they became so fierce, and so glorious, and to have so great an opinion of their owne valour, that as soon as they perceived any of our Ships of Europe to come towards their Ports, the King’s Cannoniers presently presented them with defiance: But ours understanding now that they were not comparable unto them, avoyded the Tryall as much as they could, knowing well by experience, they were growne more certaine to hit where they would with their Artillary, then others are with the Harquebusse; which also they are ready and well practiced in, going out daily by troopes into the Field, to exercise it.112

The seventeenth century account of Navarrete also includes a favourable description of the practice of their soldiery in firearms: The soldiery of this kingdom is the best in all those parts, is welldisciplin’d, and most days the king keeps forty thousand men at court to shoot at a mark, and those that aim best are rewarded with pieces of silk. I have several times heard Spanish and Portugueses say, they are all excellent marksmen...113

Similar observations were made of the Trӏnh in the north by the 1680s, for Trӏnh soldiers were said to be not only agile with their weapons but also very good shots due to their frequent target practice. Dampier’s remarks on the Trӏnh army made in 1688 also provide some insight into other aspects of royal encouragement of marksmanship: the Foot Soldiers are very dexterous in using their Weapons, and shoot very well either in Gun or Bow; for they are often exercised at Marks. The King orders a shooting Match once a Year, and rewards the best Marks-man with a fine Coat, or about 1000 Cash, as ‘tis called, which 111

Li 1992, 39; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 190. Borri 1633, 52-53. 113 Navarrete, 1732, 1.308. 112

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is a Summ about the value of a Dollar. The Mark is a white earthen Cup, placed against a Bank. The distance they stand to fire at is about 80 Yards. He who breaks the first Cup has the finest Coat; for there are others also of less worth and finery for the rest, that have the good Fortune to break the other Cups, or Cash in lieu of them. This is all at the King’s Charge, who incourages this exercise very much, as a means to make them good Marks-men; and they generally prove such. They will load and fire the quickest of any People. They draw the Rammer at one Motion, and pouring down the Powder and Bullet, they ram all down at one Motion more. Then they withdraw the Rammer, and put it into its place at 2 Motions more. All the 4 Motions are performed very dexterously and quick: and when they shoot at a Mark, they level, and fire at first Sight, yet very successfully.114

We can expect, however, that such training was not maintained at the same level across reigns in all cases and that skills would weaken over time. There was a decline, for example, in the quality of NguyӉn artillery in the early eighteenth century. When the NguyӉn recovered some cannon from a European ship in 1714, it became apparent to the survivors that the former were unfamiliar with how to handle cannon.115 As Poivre also noted in the 1740s: the NguyӉn “did not know how to make the cannons useful, each cannon had not got six shots to fire and most of the cannon balls were not of the right calibre.”116 After the Tây Sѫn defeated both the Trӏnh and the NguyӉn in the late eighteenth century, NguyӉn Ánh developed institutions that could provide for more sustainable firearms skills among his troops in his attempt to defeat the Tây Sѫn. In 1797-1798, he set up military schools for officers in which the curriculum included “the doctrine of projectiles and gunnery by European masters...”117 Certainly by the 1820s, Europeans commented on the high degree of care with which the Vietnamese maintained their firearms.118 Firearms were introduced relatively early in this survey because crude versions of guns became a feature of Southeast Asian warfare by the late fourteenth or early fifteenth centuries in different parts of the region, within a century of the starting point of this book’s 114

Dampier 1906, 2.6-7. Boxer 1965, 167-168. 116 Li 1992, 43. 117 Barrow 1806, 275; White 1972, 94. 118 Crawfurd 1828, 494. 115

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coverage. Over the course of the next few centuries, firearm technology improved and had an increasing impact on warfare, not so much in transforming it, but rather in adding more instruments of death to Southeast Asian arsenals. Leonard Andaya suggests that “[b]ecause of the nature of warfare in the archipelago, only firearms which contributed to existing tactics were readily adopted.”119 In general, however, Southeast Asians appear to have found ways to include different types of firearms in nearly every area of preexisting combat. There thus appears to have been no true gunpowder “revolution,” since the gun did not generally transform warfare and its possession was generally limited to a very small segment of society, the royal court. Firearm technology would have a greater impact in the nineteenth century, when, coupled with the steamship, it made European armies a nearly irresistible force in the region.

119

L. Andaya 1993, 1.388.

CHAPTER FOUR

FORTIFICATIONS AND SIEGES Certain factors related to the human and physical environment of Southeast Asia conditioned warfare in two ways. Relatively low concentrations of population, difficult terrain, the flooding of lands during monsoons, and the importance of river transport, for example, all worked to make waterborne warfare, especially on rivers, more important than was the case in other parts of the world. Second, when warfare did occur on land, it focused on the siege. Here, warfare focused on fortified positions and attempts to bring them down. A low population to land ratio and the ubiquity of jungle terrain made it relatively easy for rural populations to abandon their villages and seek refuge in the forests. Likewise, these same factors meant that central political control rested upon the control of outlying towns, usually located at strategic points throughout the kingdom. As it was impossible to control an evaporating rural population and there would be insufficient manpower to physically occupy extensive territories, military contests focused mainly upon maintaining or wresting control over towns rather than upon field battles, which were remarkably few in Southeast Asia than elsewhere, such as in early modern Japan, China, or Europe. Those battles that did occur in the field usually amounted to the striking of supply lines, usually in support of forces besieging an enemy fortification. Despite its importance in early modern Southeast Asia, indigenous siege warfare has not received significant attention in the literature.

The Importance of Siege Warfare Some confusion has emerged in the general literature on fortifications in early modern Southeast Asia. One misconception is that early modern Southeast Asians did not seek to defend fortifications against an enemy more powerful than themselves (and, logically, no army

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would attempt to besiege a more powerful one) and thus siege warfare was rare. Using the examples of Aceh and Ayudhya, Reid argues that: For small centres attacked by large marauding forces, the logical response was to flee into the surrounding forest, and wait for the invader to depart…Since there was little in them to defend, towns and villages did not develop a defensive strategy based on stone walls and moats… temporary flight made better sense than a stubborn defence of a town in the tropical conditions of Southeast Asia.1

The available evidence does not agree with this general characterization of Southeast Asian warfare. Southeast Asians furiously resisted attempts to seize their homes, possessions, and themselves. Similarly, besiegers would wait months, and return repeatedly to capture the prospective booty. One is struck by the stubbornness of indigenous defenders of villages and towns throughout the archipelago and on the mainland. Certainly, some parts of the defenses might be abandoned temporarily. While European accounts regarded these withdrawals as acts of cowardice, a careful examination of the evidence suggests not ‘flight rather than fight,’ but instead strategy and tactics. At Palembang in 1662, for example, while the Malays, “under favour of a violent rain,” did abandon one of their forts in the face of a Dutch attack, the Malays attempted three times to recapture the lost stronghold from the Dutch. These counterattacks appear to have been very determined, for although statistics on Malay casualties on these specific occasions are not available, the Dutch, backed by superior firepower and occupying a well-defended position, still lost two killed and six wounded and “were forced to stand to … arms all the rest of the night.”2 When the Dutch finally reached the inner defenses of the town, the fighting was bloody: Here they met with a brave opposition from the inhabitants, who, according to the custom of these nations, under the sound of their Amuch, fell couragiously upon these three [companies of Dutchmen], of whom they killed 18, among which were a lieutenant, an ensign, and a sergeant, but not without a much greater loss on their side…3 1

Reid 1982, 1. Nieuhoff 1732, 2.187. 3 Nieuhoff 1732, 2.187. 2

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Nieuhoff claims that the Dutch withdrew because of “the violent rains.” Although the defenders tried to resist another Dutch assault the following day, they were finally beaten and forced to withdraw from the town, but not without demonstrating that flight had not been their first choice. While Reid lauds the fortification techniques of Europeans in Southeast Asia, he remains rather dismissive of Southeast Asian efforts: Temporary stockades of tree-trunks or bamboo were frequent, but there was little development of fortress-building or siege techniques.4

Both the Acehnese and Siamese, Reid explains, claimed that they did not build fortifications either due to their reliance on skilled warriors instead, or to a fear that if they lost fortifications it would be difficult to regain them from an enemy.5 Southeast Asians eventually did begin to build substantial fortifications, Reid suggests, because of the European example: By introducing to Southeast Asia the new European ideas of defense behind low but thick walls surmounted by batteries of guns, with bastions projecting to provide a field of fire along the walls, the Portuguese made themselves impregnable … Local rulers responded by building forts more substantial than any traditional defense works, but these proved ultimately incapable of defending their major ports against sustained Dutch offensives.6

Indigenous sources, however, explain that far from being unaware of fortifications, some archipelagic peoples, such as the Acehnese, were well skilled in them. While fortification building was relatively uniform in the mainland, in the archipelago, there was considerable variation in skills and methods of warfare. As the Hikayat Potjut Muhamat related one warrior’s exasperation: Fighting in Pidië is quite different from fighting in Acheh, bear that in mind! 4

Reid 1982, 1. Reid 1982, 1. 6 Reid 1993b, 14. 5

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Fighting in Acheh is attended by a lot of stratagems; they hide behind fortifications. Outside and inside these they dig trenches, and it is very difficult to surmount the palisades and mantraps. These fortifications are half a coconut palm high, whitewashed and plastered. What are you to do if you do not take with you chisels and saws? You will not gain your object, and the people will be slain without the enemy making an appearance. You had better go to war here in Pidië, my son…7

As we also find of warfare on Mindanao between the Alifuru and the Sultan of Mindanao in the 1680s, They do never meet each other so as to have a pitcht Battle, but they build small Works or Forts of Timber, wherein they plant little Guns, and lie in the sight of each other 2 or 3 Months, skirmishing every Day in small Parties, and sometimes surprizing a Breast-Work.8

As Ricklefs further explains of Java: indigenous fortress warfare in Java was comparable to that in Europe. Trunajaya’s fortifications at Surabaya in 1677 and Kediri in 1678 and Narud’s at Mesir in 1681 seem not to have been inferior to contemporary European fortresses…the only significant innovation introduced in Java by the VOC with regard to siege warfare was the hand- …mortar. …9

The goals of siege warfare in Southeast Asia were manifold. As rural populations could not be gathered easily, and low manpower availability hindered the regular occupation of rural areas, Southeast Asian sieges were intended to culminate with the seizure of local noncombatants as captives for resettlement. Tabin-shwei-htì’s 1534 attack on Pegu, for example, led to his deportation of “a large part of the population.”10 The seizure or reduction of a town also represented an absolute reduction in an opponent’s power. At the same time, the 7

HMP 1979, 181. Dampier 1906, p. 1.344. 9 Ricklefs 1993, 131. 10 Banyà-dalá n.d., 45, 86, 109. 8

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weak structure of early modern Southeast Asian states meant that there was some risk, especially since kings themselves commanded major sieges, of rebellion at home. Bayín-naung, for example, was forced to withdraw from his siege of Prome after a month for this reason. Siege warfare thus involved heavy stakes for both the besieger and the besieged, the former trying to reduce a town as quickly as possible and the latter holding out until some event forced the former to withdraw. As a result, a strong defense usually made it easier for defenders to negotiate easier terms of surrender. During Bayínnaung’s attempt to assert his succession upon Tabin-shwei-htì’s death, for example, he was forced to negotiate a surrender of Taung-ngu after a seven or eight month siege failed to bring down the town.11 Although defenders benefited from holding out as long as possible, one can imagine that both the besieger and the besieged viewed the prospects of a long siege with concern. Hunger, disease, and attrition encouraged the defenders to abandon the safety of their walls and hopefully inflict a fatal blow to besieging forces when any opportunity arose or when new developments within defending ranks required desperate measures. At the Siamese siege of Patani in the early seventeenth century, the Queen of Patani determined on an attack against the besiegers after the ruler of Johore and his commanders abandoned the defence of the town and escaped through Siamese lines. Presumably out of the fear that their ranks would dwindle further in this way and realizing that the Siamese suffered from starvation, the defenders determined on a mass, and what proved to be successful, assault. Sometimes, fighting would precede the siege, as the Spanish discovered on Mindanao in the late sixteenth century. The local population, learning of the approach of the Spanish, fortified the largest settlement, but then laid in wait for the Spanish to come ashore. When the Spanish did land, they were subject to an immediate and prolonged assault. Although Morga writes that the Spanish cut them to pieces, he also admits that the Spanish were confused, the commander was mortally wounded, and the Spanish expedition was forced to withdraw.12 Further assaults similarly failed. As Morga writes, the Spanish

11 12

Banyà-dalá n.d., 62, 63. Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.183; Morga 1970, 1.91.

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spent many days in making a few incursions into their land and attacks on their forts, but without any notable result, for the enemy were many and all good soldiers…and had fortified themselves in a strong position. They had many other fortifications inland and went from one to the other with impunity, wherever they wished, and greatly harassed the Spaniards, who were little used to so swampy a country.13

The onset of the monsoon presented serious challenges to the besieging force. Disease could be debilitating to an army exposed in temporary shelter. As roads and bridges washed out, and travel became difficult, it would be impossible to maintain supply or communication lines back home, essentially stranding an army and its commanders in hostile territory and leaving the homeland more vulnerable to enemy attack. As most major towns were located along rivers and in floodplains, it was also likely that the land occupied by a besieging force would be flooded as well. Thus, many sieges were called off or suspended, or nearly so, when the monsoons began.14

Building Materials Before examining the arms and tactics of Southeast Asian siege warfare, a look at the ways in which Southeast Asian fortifications were built is necessary. Some Southeast Asian fortifications were made of stone, and examples can be found well into the nineteenth century. In 1599, for example, Aceh’s harbor was protected by a stone fortress, although its low walls did not command respect from visiting Europeans.15 Similarly, one Portuguese prisoner observed in 1616 that Ava was “surrounded by a low laterite wall, of no great thickness.”16 Mrauk-U, the royal city of early modern Arakan, was also surrounded by ‘massive’ and thick stone walls. Some Vietnamese fortresses in the late eighteenth century were also built of stone. The Burmese went to great lengths in the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826) to resurrect any ancient fortified position they could in a short time. Filippe de Brito y Nicote's old fortress which Anauk-hpet-lun had 13

Morga 1970, 1.95-96. Damrong 2001, 18, 114, 345, 352. 15 Davis 1906, 2.318. 16 Fonseca 1925, 31. 14

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besieged and captured in 1613, was rapidly returned to a defensible state. Likewise, they also repaired Mrauk-U’s old stone walls, piling wood up to fill in the holes. Pegu’s fortifications consisted of stone walls, wooden turrets, and an extensive moat surrounding it. In 1868, the town walls at Momein consisted of granite slabs, 1.22 metres long and 0.30 metre thick, with brick turrets.17 Generally, however, stone fortresses were not common, or had not survived very far into the early modern period. Aside from occasional exceptions, some mentioned above, stone fortifications do not appear to have been favored after the classical period. Some Southeast Asian states moved their capitals frequently out of strategic and cosmological concerns. Even should they remain in the same general location, new, more auspicious sites were pursued, hence the shift in the capital of Pegu from the old town to the new town in Bayín-naung’s reign, and the various capitals of the SagaingAmarapura-Mandalay-Ava zone. Building stone walls was timeconsuming and probably expensive. The stone was difficult to procure and to work, whereas brick was much more readily produced. A transition from stone to brick in temple building from the classical period into the early modern period was thus accompanied by the same general shift in fortification building. By contrast, the Europeans who entered Southeast Asia from the early sixteenth century focused on single strategic points from which to dominate trade, and preferred stone fortresses. Early modern Southeast Asia was soon dotted with Portuguese stone fortresses, the first being the Portuguese fortress at Melaka. Later in the century, the Spanish initiated their fortress building in the region with a stone fort at Manila.18 The difference in materials between Southeast Asian and European fortifications by this time was observed by Mendez Pinto, who commented that the fortresses in interior mainland Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century had

17

Wilson 1852, 04, 155-6; Lamb 1961, 39; Sladen 1870, 134; Fitch 1906, 10.186187. In the case of Pegu, the town walls were described in the 1670s as consisting of stacked, unmortared iron-stone walls, about three metres high. Dijk 2004, 1.38. 18 Morga 1970, 1.62.

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walls, moats, and ramparts very similar to ours, except that the materials used were different, for in those parts they are not accustomed to using stone and lime as we do, just bricks and mud.19

Perhaps taking a lead from Pinto’s observations, Anthony Reid argues that Europeans in Southeast Asia took the step of building their fortresses out of stone, which made them nearly invulnerable to Southeast Asian attacks, while many Southeast Asians never seem to have taken up this practice.20 In actuality, Southeast Asians had generally abandoned them. Brick was an obvious material used for building fortifications and was used for fortifications quite early in Southeast Asia. Chinese sources indicate the existence of fortifications in Champa by the fourth century CE and later Cham fortifications included brick walls and stone towers at the flanks. In the case of one fortification, it consisted of a brick base, six metres high, a brick palisade three metres high, perforated with loop-holes on top of the base, and then wooden walls on top of this, parts of the defenses standing up to 24.4 metres high. Pegu (sixteenth century), Dagon (1520), BantČn (1602), Kartasura (1640s), Ayudhya (1680s) Ava (1750s), Prome (1750s), Myede (1825), Mandalay (1868) Minhla (1868), Sanda (1680s), and Lawksawk (nineteenth century), were all encircled by brick walls. Such walls could be very high, sometimes as much as fifteen metres from the base and were typically loop-holed for musketeers or bowmen to fire on the enemy.21 These walls were also extremely strong. Southeast Asians had significant experience in making bricks and mortar and applying them to constructing durable structures learned from building temples.22 European reports on the quality of the brick used in Southeast Asian defenses are uneven. Gervaise commented favourably on the bricks in use at Ayudhya in the 1680s:

19

Pinto 1989, 402. Reid 1982, 4. 21 Higham 1989, 210, 304; Maspero 2002, 17-18; Bouchon & Thomaz 1988, 340; Mousinho 1936, 3-4; Scott & Hardiman 1901, pt. 2, v. 2, 32-33; Snodgrass 1827, 191; E. Scott 1906, 2.439; Ricklefs 1978, 53; Damrong 2001, 22; Gervaise 1998, 31-33; Sladen 1870, 99; Neis 1997, 149; Pemberton 1966, 188-189; Trant 1842, 1139; Dalrymple 1808, 1.74, 77; Fytche 1868, 13-14; Oertel 1892, 12. 22 Wyatt 1975, 77, 85, 86. 20

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There are no better bricks in the world than those made in Siam. They are harder than ours and the mortar which is used in the construction of the buildings is also of better quality than in France, because their lime is soaked in a certain red liquid in which a quantity of buffalo hides and the bark of trees has been broiled and to which they add sugar so as to make it more binding. The masons apply the mortar with a wooden towel and they have no other utensils except a hammer to press down the bricks and a kind of billhook to trim off the edges. As the mortar dies very quickly in the heat of the sun, they have a pot of water at hand to keep it damp. Moreover, they are so accurate in their measurements and their calculations that, before they begin building, they know exactly the number of bricks needed and they are very seldom mistaken.23

Figure 10: Walls at Siamese Pomphet fortress. Photograph by author.

Bricks made in some other areas of Southeast Asia were also noted for their toughness and durability. The burnt blue bricks used at Momein in 1868, for example, were described as “so hard and perfect in construction that the wear and tear of three centuries has not availed to 23

Gervaise 1998, 92.

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roughen their surface, or blunt their keen sharp edge.”24 In the 1840s, however, Burmese bricks were described as small, “very soft and bad,” and the Burmese, it was suggested, were “not clever in the preparation of mortar.”25 Royal capitals continued to depend on brick fortifications in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries. After the fall of Ayudhya, the execution of King Taksin at the capital at Thonburi, and the establishment of the new capital at Bangkok, Rama I fortified the latter in the 1780s with brick gathered from Ayudhya’s ruined walls and by demolishing those of Thonburi. These walls included towers, with four hundred metres between each wall. Fortificationbuilding continued at the city for years and after a rumor in 1797 that the British would come upriver and attack the city, additional brick fortifications were built at Samut Prakan at the entrance of the Chaophraya River.26 Another problem with brick and stone fortifications was that once they were built, it would take considerable time to expand them. This was not a problem during times of peace, but when a town was under attack and townspeople and villagers took shelter behind the walls, it meant overcrowding, sickness, and, due to limited storage space for food supplies, starvation. The citadel of sixteenth century Pegu experienced such problems during several late sixteenth century sieges and as a result, saw defenders flee and even the expulsion of noncombatants outside of the walls.27 In forested areas, wood was a natural, effective, and readily available resource for fort building. Timber stockades could range from small and simple constructions to very large and complex ones. At one end of this range were rapidly constructed makeshift defenses. The SƟjarah MƟlayu records that Malays preparing to resist the Portuguese near Melaka in the early sixteenth century felled a kƟmpas tree. Cutting it into three pieces, they formed a makeshift fort behind which they resisted a Portuguese bombardment for three days, although many were killed.28 More extensive deployment of tree

24

Sladen 1870, 134. Grant 1853, 32. 26 Wenk 1968, 19, 20. 27 Banyà-dalá n.d., 64, 65, 68, 115-6. 28 SM 1952, 200. 25

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stumps appears to have been undertaken in the defense of Palembang in 1662. Nieuhoff recalled that the town was fortified with vast trunks of trees put close together, upon which are placed a vast number of cannon. So that it seemed impossible to be taken by so small a number [as those in the Dutch expedition], being besides this invironed with a deep and miry ditch.29

Blockhouses or log redoubts might be built, if time was on one’s side, for small-scale defense-works. One such redoubt, at Sempang Linggi in the 1830s, was described as a “sort of hall … resembling a shed, the sides of which were about” 0.91 metre thick and 1.37 to 1.52 metres high, made out of wooden logs, and mounted with small swivel guns.30 Europeans apparently had such temporary fortifications in mind when they downplayed the Southeast Asian commitment to permanent defense works. According to one European account in the 1690s, Southeast Asians were hesitant to build permanent fortifications because it would only be difficult to remove an enemy who had gained control over them: the Siamese would not hitherto have places well fortified for fear of losing them, and not being able to retake them; and this is the reason they gave me thereof. The Castles they have would hardly sustain the first shock of our Soldiers; and though they be small and ugly, because they would have them such, yet it is necessary to employ the skill of Europeans to delineate them.31

This was hardly true, as we shall see below. At the other end of the range of wooden fortifications were stronger, and permanent or semi-permanent, fortresses and stockades. Such fortifications were a regular feature of early modern Southeast Asian warfare. Some, such as the stockade at Makam Tongkah in 1600, were as much as 12.19 metres high. Another example is that of the Burmese stockade at Thantabain in 1824, which was 182.88 metres long and 45.72 metres wide, built of 4.57 metre-high logs, and capable of protecting two thousand men. On the inside of the wall was 29

Nieuhoff 1732, 2.187. Begbie 1834, 399, quoted in Gibson-Hill 1953, 163. 31 Loubère 1986, 91. 30

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a platform 2.44 metres off the ground and 1.52 metres across, to support cannon and swivel guns. Stockades that were more sophisticated mobilized additional materials to strengthen the walls. A brick or earthen backing sometimes bolstered timber palisades, such as at Danubyu, in the First Anglo-Burmese War. At the time of the Spanish conquest of Manila in 1570, indigenous settlements in Luzon were fortified with stockades made of wooden posts, the spaces between them packed with earth. In the 1830s, the wooden stockade at Sempang was backed by earthen ramparts several metres thick, enclosing an area 161.54 by sixty-four metres. The Balinese defenses before Singaraja consisted of a four-metre thick, two-metre high, four hundred metres long earthen wall. In Laos in 1882, the inner wall consisted of an earthen embankment perforated with loopholes and topped with a wall made of tree trunks and towers. Although Newbold described the stockade at Bander in the 1830s as being of “low mud walls,” these appear to have been earthen backing for the strong and much higher wooden walls that surrounded them, with six high wooden towers for mounting cannon. When building their earthen works at Buleleng in the 1840s, in anticipation of a Dutch attack, the Balinese employed tens of thousands of peasants in the task.32 The choice of stone, brick, or timber fortifications depended on the degree of urgency for defenses, for they typically required a significant amount of time to erect. Thus, while these materials were useful for the defensive purposes of a fixed site, such as a town or a village, armies on the move had to make use of other, readier materials. Stockades could be erected quickly, almost anywhere, by cutting bamboo or palm trees and forming walls out of them.33 This appears to have been the case at Kelampang in the early seventeenth century. Attacked by a Siamese force before the town’s walls were finished, a state minister put the town’s defenses in order by using wood from fencing: “he gave orders to take all the fences of the 32

Banyà-dalá n.d., 94; Skinner 1985, 13-14; Alexander 2000, 14; Dalrymple 1808, 1.136, 174; Gardner 1936, 127; Morga 1970, 1.48-49; Wilson 1827, 38; Snodgrass 1827, 165; Sheppard 1936, 50 and Newbold 1839 2.129, both quoted in Gibson-Hill 1953, 164; Kraan 1995, viii, 81; Neis 1997, 39. 33 Damrong 2001, 55, 56, 353; Banyà-dalá n.d., 130; Damrong 2001, 224; 225; Banyà-dalá n.d., 64, 65. Alexander 2000, 40; Furnivall 1915, 142. Later in the text, it is claimed that this camp was protected by seven ramparts made of thorny bamboo.” Furnivall 1915, 145-6.

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houses there and put them in the gaps in the walls; there were about ten layers.”34 The Siamese attack that followed focused on these now filled in gaps, although the Siamese were repulsed by gunfire before they could reach them. Bamboo could also be grown and left in place as a natural obstacle, as Gervaise claimed in the 1680s: The Siamese plant bamboo round their properties to form hedges, and these act as a better defence than the strongest walls. It is said that the palace of the king of Cochinchina has no other enclosure than a triple row of these bamboos and that this prince feels more secure than if he was surrounded by the thickest walls that we could make.35

Apparently more extensive were similar defenses ‘planted’ by the local population of Mindanao in the early eighteenth century and probably much earlier: They have fortified their Mountains and Vallies so well with thick Hedges of Bambows, that the Spaniards cannot easily molest them, tho they have secret Ways to sally out and disturb their Enemy.36

Burmese defensive positions by the time of the First Anglo-Burmese War generally consisted of simple bamboo stockades. In the engagement at the Surma River in early January 1824, for example, a deep 4.27-metre wide ditch with a bamboo fence along the outer edge surrounded the Burmese stockade. Vietnamese and Lao villages also depended upon bamboo walls at least into the 1880s. Bamboo alone, however, was not very effective. On one occasion during the Acehnese reductions of the fortresses of Djeumalǀjalam, the besiegers rushed the barricades, apparently made of bamboo, which they destroyed, pulling them apart and dragging them away to an open field. In the assault on a Burmese stockade at Simbike in late 1825, the British decided not to use scaling ladders, instead engaging in a massive assault, and during the rush pulled apart the bamboo defenses. In siege warfare elsewhere in Southeast Asia, bamboo defenses similarly proved better at protecting defenders from arrows and bullets than at withstanding the pressure of an enemy who had physically 34

Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.182. Gervaise 1998, 24. 36 Hamilton 1930, 2.158. 35

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reached them. The Balinese also used the local coconut palm for some of their fortifications, some quite sophisticated. In preparation for the Dutch invasion in the late 1840s, the Raja of Buleleng had a 548.64 metres long, 3.66-metre high wall built along the beach consisting of a double row of coconut palm trunks packed with earth and mounted with sixty pieces of artillery.37 European views of Southeast Asian fortifications changed over the course of the sixteenth century, reflecting perhaps the development of better European firearms. It is also possible that late sixteenth century Europeans increasingly encountered fortifications in the interior, further from the coast, than their earlier counterparts. It appears that coastal fortifications were constructed with greater familiarity with firearms than those in the interior. In 1520, for example, Portuguese described the coastal port of Dagon as “encircled with … ramparts studded with redoubts and loop-holes which compared favourably with those found in Portugal.”38 Yet another European, this time in 1599 and in landlocked Taung-ngu, was less generous in his account. The walls, he claimed, were not very high, had no gun batteries, and were in very poor shape.39 Most Southeast Asian fortresses remained four-sided, usually forming an exact square or rectangle. The fortifications of the town of Lopburi in the 1680s consisted of a square formed by earthen walls with several brick bastions at intervals, while the palace was surrounded by a strong and presumably brick wall. In the 1790s, the fortress at Amarapura was an “exact square,” and each 2.2 kilometrelong wall had a central gate, flanked by two smaller ones. On each corner was a large, projecting, quadrangular bastion, in addition to smaller bastions on each wall. Balinese fortifications in the late 1840s were either square or rectangular. The fortress walls of Mandalay also formed a square wall, with 7.32-metres high walls that were 0.91 metre in depth and backed by an earthen rampart as well as projecting square bastions. Inside the fortress was another, smaller one, with 6.10-metres high teak posts and another brick wall behind it. Rangoon was defended by a square stockade with parapets on the inner side of the wall for musketeers. The fortress at the town of Phrae in northern 37

Maw 1832, 92-93, Wilson 1827, 15, 37; Harmand 1997, 195-6; HMP 1979, 231; Kraan 1995, 30; Neis 1997, 39; Alexander 2000, 40; Ras 1968, 431. 38 Bouchon & Thomaz 1988, 340. 39 Guerreiro 1930-1942, 1.294.

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Siam (1882) was an old four-gated square structure, with each wall being seven to eight hundred metres wide.40 European aid was sought in building fortifications in several instances. In the late seventeenth century, for example, the King of Ayudhya attempted to appoint a European to build a fort on the frontier with Burma. At about the same time, a fort was built on French plans across the river from Bangkok.41 The Vietnamese had several (reportedly) Vauban-style fortresses built, including one at Gia-Ĉӏnh built in 1790, as well as four others.42 There were also two European-style stone forts on the Bay of Cӱa Hà built under European supervision in order to protect the town of Cӱa Hà from a maritime attack and to command the harbor.43 As Frédéric Mantienne has suggested in his research on technology transfer in southern Vietnam in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Vietnamese adopted numerous French Vauban-style fortifications, which were mainly hexagonal or pentagonal in shape and fortified by numerous towers to maximize the power of the defenses. He also makes the suggestion that the numerous rectangular or square-shaped fortifications that were erected afterwards represented not a return to the “Chinese traditional square or rectangular design,” but rather the fact that Vietnamese engineers were keeping up with the most recent developments in European fortress-design.44 The construction of stockades for defensive purposes likely had its origins in the prehistorical period and the practice was spread throughout mainland Southeast Asia. All lowland societies made use of stockades. Stockades emerged out of village traditions of erecting barriers around village limits to defend against bandits or predatory animals. Peter Boomgaard suggests, for example, that village defenses on Java were built in part to protect villagers from tigers. For such reasons, a thorny bush or bamboo hedge typically surrounded villages.45 40

Gervaise 1998, 35-36; Neis 1997, 139; Oertel 1892, 11, 12; Kraan 1995, 54; Symes 1800, 205, 394. 41 De la Loubère 1986, 91; Hamilton 1930, 2.92. 42 Marr 1980, 27; Langlet 1998, 270. 43 De la Loubère 1986, 91; Hamilton 1930, 2.92. 44 Mantienne 2003, 524-527. 45 Boomgaard 2001, 44; Ferrars 1901, 77; See the example of a stockade built by the King of Lanchang. Banyà-dalá n.d., 138.

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There were generally two types of stockades in Southeast Asia, formed in the context of two different kinds of warfare. In parts, but not all, of the Malay world, the stockade was a temporary structure, closer to the kind of impermanent fortification Reid has in mind. This type of stockade, or kubu, was a semi-permanent fort made in a square, with one open end facing the jungle or the side of a mountain and the remaining three walls consisting of rows of earth-filled bamboo trunks. This kind of stockade was peculiar to warfare along rivers in the jungle. Gardner explains that its origins were that Malays needed places to land their boats along the rivers and these spots had to be fortified to defend them. The unfortified rear of the kubu was not as vulnerable as might be supposed. It was difficult to move quickly in dense jungle and defenders would usually place men in the trees above to shoot with arrows and bullets any enemy that tried to circle around. The kubu was intended only as a temporary redoubt and, as Leonard Andaya explains, not for long-term resistance. If the enemy were too powerful, the defenders could attempt to escape through the unfortified rear.46 As C. A. Gibson-Hill, who offered one of the first scholarly analyses on the subject of fortifications in Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, and Borneo, explained: All the local chiefs of any importance … developed fixed fortifications, of a kind, in the years following the introduction of cannon to the east, but [something] at all times notable about these stockades and blockhouses… is that they were seldom adequately manned, and in the fighting rarely held with any tenacity…Clearly the value of these forts was the prestige that they imparted. No doubt, they over-awed smaller neighbours, and could keep limited local forces at bay, but they were of little use as real fighting units. A Study of their history suggests that they were not meant to be employed in open conflict: they were facades to be respected, or taken by treachery.47

The more common form of stockade, that used by both lowland and highland peoples in the mainland and in parts of the archipelago, such as Java, were indeed meant to be defended and do not fit the model suggested by Reid. This kind of stockade was more common than fortresses, in large part because both the besieger and the besieged 46 47

L. Andaya 1994, 1.388; Gardner 1936, 125, 126. Gibson-Hill 1953, 147.

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made heavy use of them. Siege works usually included a ring of stockades encircling the defending town. Southeast Asians began their sieges by first building entrenchments and stockades, as the Dutch witnessed in Mataram’s sieges of Batavia in the late 1620s and the Portuguese as well when the Burmese surrounded Syriam in 1601. Unlike the Malay kubu, stockades used elsewhere in siege warfare were intended to be strong, durable, and defended. A Burmese stockade built in 1601 by the Burmese in their siege of Portugueseheld Syriam, for example, was enclosed by a massive palisade of wood, bound by two courses of timber and filled in with earth, and was so strong between the courses that it threw back the balls of cannon which battered it.48

Turrets could also be added to such stockades and they were of such great military value that even besieged towns erected additional stockades outside their walls for further defense. In preparing defenses for Ayudhya in the 1560s, for example, the Siamese built additional stockades outside of the city walls forty metres from each other. Stockades also played an important role in cutting off lines of supply. During the Burmese campaign against Prome in 1826, as the Burmese advanced, they surrounded the British position with stockades at key points to cut off communications and the flow of supplies.49 To gain maximum advantage, strategic spots were carefully selected for stockades. In the mid-sixteenth century, for example, the Mon ruler, Smin Dhaw, was advised upon Bayín-naung’s accession to the Burmese throne to move his base from Pegu to Dagon because it is protected by creeks on the north, west, and on the east as well, all round, in fact. You could not find a more impregnable position. If you put up a strong stockade there, and have your floats, war boats, canoes, and barges ready in the river, how is the attacker to deploy?50

Stockades were also frequently built on top of hills, which created some problems because pagodas also tended to be built on the same hills. The Shwei-gu-gyì Pagoda at Pegu was ruined when Mon rebels 48

Ribeyro 1926, 120. Damrong 2001, 50; Alexander 2000, 38; Banyà-dalá n.d., 64, 103, 108. 50 Banyà-dalá n.d., 52. 49

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fighting Bayín-naung erected a stockade around it to use as a base to launch small strikes against royal forces. The Burmese were obligated to attack the fort and the temple could not be spared.51 The size of the stockade depended upon its purpose. If a stockade were to be built as the sole defensive fortification of the town, attempts would be made to build one large enough to accommodate the entire noncombatant population, although at least part of the actual settlement would be left outside of the stockade. One advantage of the stockade was that the easy availability of building material meant that its potential size was practically unlimited, unlike stone or brick fortifications. Such stockades could be quite large, as a look at the stockade built by the Burmese besiegers at Syriam in 1601 indicates. According to Salvador Ribeyro, the Burmese fort was actually larger than the wooden Portuguese fort that was being besieged. Ribeyro likened it to a city with wide roads, great open courts, and buildings for commanders and administrators alike. Stockade walls also varied greatly in height, although the reasons for this are unclear.52

Siege Weaponry and Tactics Spears and lances were a necessary weapon for assailants targeting defenders on the walls. The spear was hurled by assailants at defenders on the walls. A long lance would not be thrown, but rather held and driven up, piercing defenders. The latter weapon could also be used to rip apart bamboo upper works of the walls.53 An assortment of other tools was also necessary in siege warfare. Perhaps the most important was the scaling ladder. Marsden claimed in 1811 that the light scaling ladders used by the Acehnese in earlier wars with the Portuguese were the same as the notched pieces of timber or bamboo that the Sumatrans of his own day used to ascend their houses. They preferred this ladder to steps, he suggested, probably because of fear of predatory animals. This may indeed have been the case and the general practice of building houses on stilts would suggest that the scaling ladder is another example of how early modern Southeast 51

Alexander 2000, 32, 38; Ferrars 1901, 77; Banyà-dalá n.d., 117-118. Banyà-dalá n.d., 64, 65, 68, 85, 105; Ribeyro 1926, 119-120; Alexander 2000, 14, 15, 39. 53 Ribeyro 1926, 129; Alexander 2000, 19; Banyà-dalá n.d., 95. 52

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Asians applied the technologies of daily life to their mode of warfare. They were used in sieges throughout early modern Southeast Asia. The Burmese, for example, took Singu in 1554 with significant use of scaling ladders. Scaling ladders were erected at the edge of moats and were used by besiegers to mount the walls of their opponents. Of course, to be effective, many scaling ladders had to be used simultaneously and there is some evidence of the use of gunfire to screen mass scalings of defending walls. Other tools included battering rams, crowbars, mattocks, shovels, and baskets.54 Clearly, the besieged would try as much as possible to prevent their opponents from getting close to the walls. Defense works were sometimes surrounded by a moat. Sometimes an irrigation ditch created these, but, as at Lawksawk, natural springs often fed the moats. The proximity of the stockades to the defending city depended upon the breadth and depth of the moat. When the moat or encircling rivers were deep and broad, stockades would be built on the inner shore or edge. The eastern wall of Patani’s defenses, for example, was narrower than the others because it had to follow the course of the moat. The moats were often quite deep; the moat around the stockade at Sempang (1830s), for example, was 6.40 metres deep and in the late 1840s, the Balinese dug one 7.62 metres deep moat to prevent the Dutch from moving between their fortifications.55 In the midseventeenth century, Aceh’s defenses made use of moats, the river, and marshland: The royal palace … is very large, of an oval figure, surrounded by a ditch, and in some places defended by very large pieces of ordnance; the ditch is guarded by palisades … On the left side of the river is a fort to defend its entrance, and several other redoubts are erected in the marshes, round about the city of Achin, for its defense.56

54

Marsden 1975, 58; Fonseca 1925, 30; Banyà-dalá n.d., 86, 95, 109, 129; Damrong 2001, 353, 354; Cushman 2000, 13; Schrieke 1957, 2.135; Ribeyro 1926, 129. 55 Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.164; Sheppard 1936, 50, quoted in Gibson-Hill 1953, 164; Kraan 1995, 54; Banyà-dalá n.d., 85, 94, 128; Ribeyro 1926, 107; Balbi 2003, 30; Scott & Hardiman 1901, pt. 2, v. 2, 33. 55 Scott & Hardiman 1901, pt. 2, v. 2, 33 56 Nieuhoff 1732, 2.189.

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The main purpose of the moat was to make the attackers more vulnerable to archers, and later musketeers, on the walls. Such moats were deep, so they would have to be waded across, giving archers or musketeers a slow, exposed target.57 In the early seventeenth century Siamese attack on Kelampang, the Siamese were prevented from exploiting gaps in the walls by the moat and musketeers on the walls: The Siamese came in order to attack the gap in the walls. Some of them had already come down halfway, wading through the moat of Kelampang, when the people of Patani fired at them, and a large number of Siamese were killed … and no matter how much they were urged on by their officers, the Siamese soldiers did not manage to get across. Then the Siamese retreated…58

Where a moat was not available, or if it had dried up, the thorny bush, pits full of sharpened bamboo stakes, and other obstructions could guard the base of fortress walls and ward off or slow down attackers with similar effect. The thorny bush and bamboo stakes were very old forms of defense and remained common in Southeast Asian villages into the nineteenth century and after. According to Quaritch Wales, the fear of attack upon the village led to hidden pits, bottomed out by sharpened bamboo stakes. With an intimate knowledge of their effectiveness at home, it should be no surprise that they were included in siege warfare. A Burmese stockade encountered in Assam in 1824 and Balinese defenses at Singaraja in the 1840s included ditches or pits filled with stakes. Parkinson likened the sharpened bamboo stakes to a “Malay equivalent of barbed wire,” but the thorny bush may more appropriately fit this description. While thorny bush could be burnt or cut through in small-scale sieges of any duration, they slowed the approaching enemy and provided an effective barrier between them and the village for a short period. Thorny bush was also immediately available and required a very limited input of labor. Thorny bush and sharpened bamboo stakes were also frequently used together. In Laos in 1877, for example, a ‘fort’ fashioned out of tree trunks was strengthened by a thick thorny bush hedge and surrounded by an open area full of bamboo traps. Europeans also found the thorny bush a convenient and quick resource for defense-works and the Dutch in 57 58

Damrong 2001, 51. Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.182.

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Bali in the mid-1840s filled up the dried up moat around their fortress with thorny bush to add an additional layer of protection. In the same conflict, the Balinese did the same with their filled moats, adding thorny bush, bamboo stakes, and cactus so that the Dutch could not cross them.59 If attackers were still able to come close enough to begin scaling the walls, or attempted to mine under them, stones, pieces of wood, and other objects could be dropped on the enemy. More effective was oil or tree resin that could be boiled and then poured onto the enemy below. Scalding delayed scaling, removed at least some soldiers from the fighting, and may have spread fear among the ranks of the enemy yet to approach the walls. If a moat or a river surrounded the walls, specially built rafts that were set on fire could frighten off waders.60 Firearms became an important part of siege warfare in Southeast Asia, although at different times and in varying ways. While the use of cannon in siege warfare had become generalized in the mainland and parts of the archipelago in the sixteenth century, this was not the case in Java until later in the seventeenth century. Schrieke, for example, notes that cannon were not used in the first siege of Batavia (1628) by the armies of Mataram and even in the second siege (1629) Mataram soldiers did not begin to use them against the walls until a month after the commencement of the siege.61 In most cases, cannon were used by both the besiegers and besieged, the latter in the fortress, but both also placed artillery in stockades built outside the walls. The Balinese equipped their fortifications with cannon in fighting with the Dutch in the late 1840s. To position cannon, these fortifications included salients. The Siamese used heavy and small ordnance in their defense of Ayudhya in the 1560s, heavy ordnance being placed in the forts surrounding the walls of city, twenty metres apart, and small ordnance, ten metres apart, and small ordnance in encampants outside of the city walls and forts as well. Cannon had to be mounted on foundations sturdy enough to tolerate the recoil. Further, due to the general absence of true field artillery and reliance by besiegers on fortifications, both provided for cannon mounting in the same way. 59 Quaritch Wales 1952, 14; Wilson 1827, 37; Ras 1968, 433; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.182; Kraan 1995, 40-41, 54, 81, 95; Parkison 1960, 287; Cushman 2000, 38; Harmand 1997, 190. 60 HMP 1979, 207, 231; Dalrymple 1808, 1.372; Banyà-dalá n.d., 108, 127. 61 Schrieke 1957, 2.134.

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Earthen masses were added to back walls intended to support cannon and we find massive brick walls built for this purpose at Rangoon in the 1830s. In some cases, multiple walls were built, the rear higher than the fore, in order to allow for two tiers of cannon, thus bringing more firepower to bear upon the enemy. Even in sieges of long duration, there were obvious obstacles to the construction of brick supports by besiegers, who tended to rely instead on quickly erected earthen ramparts facing the besieged town or stockade to support their artillery. There were exceptions. During their defense of the stockade at Danubyu in 1825, the Burmese scaffolded a tree and erected around it three tiers of guns. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether this structure effectively supported the guns intended to be fired from it. Frequently, cannon were also mounted on high temple grounds, giving them elevation to bombard the defending city better.62 Gun-towers and high mounds of earth also allowed besiegers to fire into the city, or at least part of it. Inhabitants would thus be forced to leave their houses and seek shelter in holes, sometimes covered with wood. Like siege towers, fighting towers would be built and with sufficient supports for the cannon fixed to them, assailants would fire cannon into the grounds of the defending fortress or stockade. Sometimes earthworks would be built at an elevation higher than city walls; the besiegers would then fire into the city.63 To some extent, cannon were used to effect breaches in the walls and otherwise deal structural damage to defensive works. This appears to have been a difficult task. There are reports that the balls fired from European cannon bounced off the walls of wooden stockades and in fact that few breaches were actually made in defending walls by cannon. When holes were made in fortress walls, a temporary repair would be made either by filling in the hole with earth or by covering the hole with woven split bamboo screens, as at Chiengmai in the late fourteenth century.64 In Arung Palakka’s siege of Tosora in 1670, the Bugis leader favoured starving the city into submission in what turned out to be a three-month enterprise. However, victory was only achieved because Dutch artillery steadily brought down Tosora’s

62

Alexander 2000, 28, 38; Ribeyro 1926, 127; Banyà-dalá n.d., 85, 94, 108, 141; Grant 1853, 46; Damrong 2001, 12, 51, 307, 310, 346, 347; Kraan 1995, 54, 55, 95. 63 Banyà-dalá n.d., 107; Damrong 2001, 92, 226, 338, 351, 353. 64 Banyà-dalá n.d., 94-5; Ribeyro 1926, 214; Cushman 2000, 13.

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walls and hurt the morale of those inside.65 Bombardments during sieges, for example, did great damage to those within the walls, destroying buildings and killing and wounding combatants and noncombatants alike. This appears to have been a terrifying experience. During the bombardment of Ava in 1554, for example, the residents in the town had to “take refuge in holes, [although] stupas, image halls, and monasteries were safe.” Sometimes the bombardment alone was so intense that the city would surrender.66 The greatest advantages regarding muskets were to the defenders of fortified positions. To defend the sharpshooters on the walls, loopholes were cut into fortress walls. Attackers were susceptible to being shot by muskets fired by the defenders. As a result, besiegers were sometimes assembled just out of musket-range, keeping them much further from their goal. Muskets could thus afford significant staying power to the besieged. One example is that of the rebel general who held Ava in 1760. Although Ava retained its walls, these walls were low and there was no ditch or moat. The rebel general had no cannon, heavy or light, while facing the cannon-armed armies of the king, Naung-daw-gyì. Despite these disadvantages, the rebel general held out for months, mainly due to effective musket fire from the walls.67 The most dramatic example, however, is that of Arung Palakka during his defense of the Bontoala fort in South Sulawesi in 1668 against Makassar forces. The Makassars had been driven back to their own stronghold on earlier occasions, but after one attack, Arung Palakka and his men were lured into the woods. As Makassar warriors surrounded them in what turned out to be a carefully prepared ambush, it appeared that Arung Palakka would be killed. He and his men were freed, however, by the steady aim and vollies of musketeers from Ternate who had been provided by the Dutch to guard the life of the Bugis lord.68 The benefits of muskets to a besieging force are also obvious. Firing muskets at defenders perched on the walls was far 65

L. Andaya 1981, 140. Damrong 2001, 39, 310, 347; Banyà-dalá n.d., 85-86, 107. 67 Kraan 1995, 54, 95; Banyà-dalá n.d., 100, 110, 127; Dalrymple 1808, 1.372; HMP 1979, 225; Alexander 2000, 39. In the engagement at the Surma River in early January 1824, the Burmese did nothing during the British bombardment and waited until the British had reached their ditch full of bamboo stakes. At that point, the Burmese opened fire, forcing the British to call off the attack, leaving 155 British and Indian dead on the field. Wilson 1827, 15. 68 L. Andaya 1981, 125. 66

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easier than running up to those walls and hurling spears or jabbing at the defenders on the walls above. From higher elevations, such as from a hill or tower, besiegers could even hurl a “rain of bullets” into a besieged city.69 Some gunpowder technologies were specifically devised for siege warfare. Amongst these were pyrotechnic devices directed at the superstructure of defensive fortifications. During his siege of Chiengmai in 1557, Bayín-naung’s forces used incendiary devices to set fire to the upper works of the defenses. Rockets were also let off in great numbers to aid the siege. Rockets were an unreliable resource, however, and were easily rendered useless by rain while being transported to a siege. During the Burmese attack on Syriam in 1601, Ribeyro writes that the Burmese used “bombs of fire” in their assault.70 Southeast Asians sometimes took precautions to repel such powder-jars and other incendiaries. In preparation for one Portuguese attack, for example, a Burmese commander set up a line of posts inside his wall, standing higher than the wall itself, so that the jars might rebound entire and burst among our soldiers who had thrown them, and so burn them with their own fire.71

As it turned out, the fire-jars were not able to get through the nets, fell back and killed some of the Portuguese, and the Portuguese who scaled the walls attempted to cut the nets to let the fire-jars fall through. In the 1760s, the Siamese, lacking ammunition, formed rudimentary powder-jars, tossing them at assailing Burmese boats.72 Assailants might set fires at the base of walls to bring a wall down, but mines were more threatening to defensive positions. The use of mines appears to have been a specialty of Burmese warfare throughout the early modern period, using mines extensively to reduce enemy 69

Banyà-dalá n.d., 107; Ribeyro 1926, 129. Ribeyro 1926, 95, 129, 130, 132, 133; European forces used similar devices to set fire to defended towns. Nieuhoff records how Dutch forces used “granados” in their attack on Palembang in 1662: “advancing boldly to the very gun-holes of the enemy, they threw their granados through them into the city, which setting the adjacent houses on fir, the enemy were so terrified thereat, that they quitted their post and thereby gave opportunity [for the Dutch to] break thro’ the fortifications into the city by three several ways.” Nieuhoff 1732, 2.187. 71 Ribeyro 1926, 121, 125. 72 Ribeyro 1926, 126; Damrong 2001, 350. 70

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positions and the Burmese used mines to end successfully their siege of Chiengmai in 1557. Mines were intended to create breaches in the walls, upon which the besieger was free to send in assaulting forces.73 As firearms became a normal part of siege warfare, the direct frontal assault became more complicated. In the past, the danger of stones, pieces of wood, arrows, and oil thrown or spilled from defending walls could be averted by the use of the shield, which explains in part its continuity in Southeast Asian warfare into the nineteenth century. Even mantraps, such as thorny bush or pits of sharpened stakes could be covered with shields and crossed over, as was the case in Acehnese siege warfare. After the introduction of firearms, however, defenders, firing muskets from protected positions, could wreak terrible damage on an enemy in the open field outside fortress walls. The logical reaction was for besiegers to provide as much protection as possible for their foot soldiers. Some soldiers could find ready cover behind tree trunks or on the inner slopes of dykes, but this would obviously pin a soldier down and prevent a complete rush to the walls.74 Mobile field defenses to provide safety from musket shots included broad shields, ‘walking forts,’ and wooden mantles, the ‘deathrepellers’ of Acehnese soldiery. If wooden shields were thick enough, they could catch the lead fired at them and if not, at the very least it made it difficult to target the men who ran behind them, allowing them to get to the base of the walls. In their assault on the walls of Chiengmai in 1557, the Burmese were protected by a “breastwork of planks” when they advanced to lay mines under the walls.75 Dutton notes that the Tây Sѫn warrior king, the emperor Quang Trung, developed a special kind of ‘portable wall’ which he used to protect his men against the incendiaries sent against them by Chinese forces at the Battle of Ngӑc Hӗi in 1789. These portable walls consisted of long wooden boards carried by ten men. While Dutton’s example is not specifically drawn from a siege, it represents the same technology applied in sieges elsewhere in Southeast Asia and, one must assume, drew from Vietnamese experiences in sieges in the past.76 73

Damrong 2001, 353; Banyà-dalá n.d., 95. HMP 1979, 223, 231. 75 HMP 1979, 223; Ribeyro, 1926, 120; Banyà-dalá n.d., 95. 74

76

Dutton 2004, 35.

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More threatening to the besieged were the walking, or rolling, forts employed to move attackers closer to the walls and, if they amounted to towers, to aid them in scaling the walls or firing over them. During their second series of attacks on the fortress at Syriam in 1601, for example, the Burmese constructed many huge cars of three and four storeys, supported on the strongest axles with enormous wheels, to be pushed along, or pulled with ropes, by a great number of men protected by long thick shields to enable them to lay the machines close alongside our Fort wall in spite of carbines and burning powder-jars. These tall towers were made of very dry timber, and stuffed with pitch, tar, and powder, so to blaze freely when set on fire close to the walls of the Portuguese Fort, which likewise were of wood. Machines such as this kind were employed by the King of Calicut against the Portuguese.77

The strength of such mobile forts was so great that when the Portuguese hit them with cannon balls, they were hardly damaged, although one was stopped because the Portuguese had hit the wheel. Only trenches filled with piles finally stopped the mobile forts. Another tactic was to create two parallel bamboo walls up to the moat, protecting the flanks of charging besiegers from musket fire from the defending fortress. When all else failed, a besieger could also dig a canal and drain the defending moat.78 The most important consideration was to shrink the distance between the attacker and defender in which assailing forces would be most vulnerable to defending fire. Among Southeast Asian societies, the Burmese, perhaps due to their more frequent invasions of neighbouring states and perhaps more frequent domestic rebellions, developed the most sophisticated techniques in field cover. From the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, indigenous and foreign accounts refer to complicated trench works and tunnels that provided cover for besieging forces. These could be very extensive and elaborate works. After the successful British defense of Rangoon in December 1824, for example, the British found about ten kilometres of Burmese trench works, extending from Kemmendine to Poojadown.79 77

Ribeyro 1926, 128-9. Ribeyro 1926, 130; Damrong 2001, 165, 353. 79 Damrong 2001, 56; Alexander 2000, 23. 78

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Trench works may have initially been intended simply to provide cover for assailing troops. The early sieges of Batavia (1628 and 1629) by Mataram, in which little or no effective use of artillery was applied by the Javanese, indicate that the Javanese were still using their trench works for this purpose. They dug their trenches at night and brought them forward towards the Dutch fortifications, adding bamboo and wood to protect the soldiers from Dutch cannon fire. When the Javanese had come close enough, they rushed forward in a full frontal assault on the walls: …they attacked the Redoubt Holland fiercely the whole night … they brought the ladders they had made to climb the walls, battering rams to break down the walls, and firebrands to burn our warriors out.80

Although the Javanese used muskets to provide cover fire, the attack failed and little damage was done.81 Better fortifications encouraged by the challenge of gunpowder technologies, however, also changed the purpose of trench works. As brick walls and earthen ramparts became more substantial, strengthened to withstand cannon balls, they could no longer be rushed so easily as in the past. The goal now was to protect men who would lay mines under the walls or to establish close positions for musketeers to take more accurate shots at defenders from a closer distance. More attention was now paid to forming bridges across the moats and breaching the walls, for otherwise a frontal assault was doomed to failure. Earthen mounds and trenches were useful for bringing besieging forces close enough to construct siege works right against defending walls. A good example of this can be found in Bayín-naung’s siege of Ayudhya. Initially, Bayín-naung had earthen breastworks made in order to provide cover so that yet more earth could be brought up to help form causeways across the moat. Once siege works, including siege towers and stockades, were built against defending walls, they would be mounted with cannon and musketeers. When Bayín-naung’s causeways reached the Siamese ramparts at Ayudhya, he had stockades and siege towers, mounted with artillery, erected face-to-face with the defending walls. This allowed for face80 81

Dagh-Register quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.136-137. Schrieke 1957, 2.137.

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to-face battles between cannon and musketeers on siege works and defensive fortifications. When Bayín-naung’s siege towers and stockades directly faced Ayudhya’s walls, Burmese sharpshooters were sent up to exchange fire. At this point, the besiegers were also able to hurl incendiaries, including fagots and torches, with their pikes into the fortress or set fire to the defending turrets. This diverted some Siamese from the fighting, as they rushed to put the fires out or to erect new turrets to replace those that had been destroyed.82 Tunnels were also used to give cover to workers building stockades closer to the besieged fortress. Such protection also aided the construction of causeways, usually out of material at hand, such as bamboo, across the moat. Trench works, tunneling, and planked breastworks became even more important when mining operations became inseparable from siege warfare.83 Ships and ship-based artillery were prominent features of Southeast Asian siege warfare and played very important roles in victories over coastal and river strongholds. The Javanese constructed fortifications on boats to block the river passage to Batavia in 1628 and 1629, presumably for the same purpose, although both sieges failed. One of the key factors in Anauk-hpet-lun’s victory at the siege of Syriam in 1613 was his deployment of ships south of Syriam, which prevented vital reinforcements and new supplies of gunpowder from reaching the fortress in the last months of the siege. On some occasions, European ships in ports either joined in, or were forced to participate, providing additional cannon to the defenses.84 Artillery also provided new ways for land-based forces to defend against maritime assaults. One of the first applications of firearms in Burma seems to have been to defend the Mon fortress at Bassein from an Avan flotilla in 1404. During naval assaults on land fortresses, great damage on besieging ships could be done with musket and artillery fire from shore. The Burmese evidently fired cannon at the Portuguese when the latter first reached Bassein, Alaùng-hpayà’s soldiers used cannon from their fortress against a British boat at Negrais in 1759, and the Burmese cannonaded English war boats in 1825. Defenders thus had to devise additional ways to defend their fortresses. The Siamese, for example, 82

Banyà-dalá n.d., 129. Damrong 2001, 57, 338, 353; Alexander 2000, 39. 84 Kalà 1960-1961, 2.140-141, 180, 185; Lieberman 1980, 219; Schrieke 1957, 136; Banyà-dalá n.d., 109, 110. 83

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placed watchtowers ten metres high into the moats to prevent the Burmese using their boats against the walls 85 Just as ship-based artillery and muskets could provide sheltering fire to one’s soldiers fighting on land, land-based artillery and muskets could provide sheltering fire to one’s forces fighting on the river. The threat to land forces from ship-borne artillery was thus met by the application of firearms to positions which commanded rivers and close coastal seas. In the early nineteenth century, for example, the Burmans used swivel guns and cannon placed in stockades to hit approaching Malay-Siamese boats during the battle for Junk Ceylon. Strong contingents of cannon-armed war boats guarded major ports on the seacoast. By at least the eighteenth century, fortified piers, armed with cannon also protected entrances to the rivers.86 The use of boats may have increased the value of firearms in siege warfare. Although monsoons made it difficult for besieging forces to assault defending walls by ground, boats allowed them to move their cannon more rapidly and at a greater height against defending walls. During other parts of the year, however, boat-borne cannon were mainly useful to the defenders of a besieged town, as they could prevent assailants from getting too close to the defending walls, or could be fired upon the assailants’ camp or stockades. Neutralizing boats armed with cannon thus became a necessary step toward investing the walls.87 There were two ways to assault a fortification during the siege, a noisy way and a quiet way. If the besieging force were sufficiently convinced of its strength and the weakness of enemy firepower, they would announce their impending assault with cannonades, yelling, the beating of drums, gongs, and so on, in order to terrorize the enemy into submission or weaken their resolve in their defense. The Javanese launched this kind of assault against Batavia in 1628 and 1629, as well as at Kediri in 1678 and against the Makassars in 1679. The DaghRegister includes a description of this festival of noise:

85 Banyà-dalá 1970, 328; Kalà 1960-1961, 1.367; Wilson 1852, 112, 145, 198; Dalrymple 1808, 133; Castenheda 1979, 2.475; Damrong 2001, 51. 86 Banyà-dalá n.d., 126; Skinner 1985, 107; Furnivall 1915, 53; Sarkar 1907b, 421; Manrique 1927, 1.285; RFSGCCM 17; Cox 1971, 6; Ma Kyan 1979, 133f. 87 Damrong 2001, 17, 34, 38, 39, 115, 328.

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The enemy sounded alarm unceasingly from dusk to dawn of day around the town and the castle, in all quarters, making a great hubbub, beating drums and shouting, as if he meant to launch a general attack.88

Schrieke suggests that the firing of cannon and muskets also served this purpose in 1678 and 1679. If the besieging force was less confident and there was a fear of enemy firepower, the besieging force would attempt to creep silently to the defending walls. The Javanese and Burmese were well known to take advantage of nights and thunderstorms in the daytime to use as cover for their attacks so that defenders could not easily aim their muskets or locate a target for their powder-jars.89 Horses and elephants were kept in reserve for the point at which openings in the walls appeared. At that point, elephants and cavalry would pour into the opening and through physical force overwhelm defending soldiers, both on foot and on horses themselves. There is also evidence that elephants were charged up to defending walls even when breaches were not available.90 Presumably, the elephant was used to give sufficient height for the musketeers seated on its back to target defenders on the walls. This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that strong fortifications and the long-term defense of them were far more important to precolonial Southeast Asian warfare than previously thought. Moreover, both fortifications and sieges cannot be attributed to the European impact. Rather, they were durable, and fundamental, aspects of Southeast Asian warfare that persisted from the classical period and, possibly far earlier, if archaeological evidence of substantial Cham fortifications from the pre-classical period is any guide. Evidence that appears to suggest major changes in fortifications appear to reflect instead selective glances at different localities, for construction materials depended mostly upon the availability of time and local materials. As we shall see, in the nineteenth century, European steamships and naval guns convinced Southeast Asian courts that traditional-style defenses were of little worth. Although some courts turned briefly to European or Chinese style fortifications, the traditional stockade, the mud or brick wall, and even the stone wall 88

Quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.136. Ribeyro 1926, 120; Schrieke 1957, 2.135-137. 90 Banyà-dalá n.d., 86, 95, 129, 134. 89

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resumed its place in indigenous warfare in indigenous resistance to European expansion in the late nineteenth century.

CHAPTER FIVE

SEA AND RIVER WARFARE1 Early modern Southeast Asian boats consisted of a myriad of different types suited to different functions. This chapter will concentrate mainly upon those whose main purpose was for battle either at sea or on rivers, although the same boats might be used in both cases. The importance of river transportation in mainland Southeast Asia and of sea transportation in the archipelago, meant that even by 1300, there were already well developed local boat-building traditions. These construction techniques were so effective that they survived, with a few exceptions (such as the jong), the European naval challenges of the sixteenth to early nineteenth centuries.

Fleet Size and Shipbuilding The size of early modern Southeast Asian fleets varied considerably. While boats were a feature of everyday life, along rivers as well as in delta areas, the numbers of larger state craft expanded in wartime.2 According to Maspero, in the classical period, Champa deployed fleets of over a hundred vessels to support its land forces.3 In its own invasion of Champa in 1465, the Vietnamese fleet was said to have numbered five thousand galleys. In 1607, an Arakanese fleet, reportedly including 100,000 men loaded on some three thousand galleys and 150 prows, sailed to Lower Burma to besiege Syriam. The size of the NguyӉn fleet fluctuated between over one hundred ships in the early 1630s, 230-240 galleys in 1642, 131 galleys in 1685, and some two hundred large and five hundred small galleys in 1695. In the 1820s, the Vietnamese fleet consisted of one hundred large galleys, about five hundred small galleys, two hundred gunboats, and a few 1

Some of the discussion in this chapter found earlier form in Charney 1997, 16-63. Li 1982, 45. 3 Maspero 2002, 17. 2

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Western-style ships. The King of Ayudhya was said to possess three thousand boats in the 1540s. The fleets of archipelagic states were comparable in number even though they frequently consisted of larger vessels than those on the mainland. An Acehnese fleet of only 130 vessels, for example, was strong enough to terrify the Portuguese commander of Melaka in 1545.4 Shipbuilding depended first upon a reliable source of good wood. Teak supplies in Lower Burma and in southern Vietnam appear to have privileged these two areas for boat building from the sixteenth and into the eighteenth centuries. Certainly, in early seventeenth century Vietnam, Trӏnh ships were built of wood provided as tribute from the NguyӉn in the south.5 Riverboat construction technologies were widespread in Southeast Asia and were a common feature of everyday life for much of the indigenous population. Small boats were also built in villages along rivers. Not only could boats be built domestically, throughout the kingdom, at a rapid pace, but Southeast Asian armies fighting abroad, in foreign areas, and with different types of wood available, could build large numbers of boats when required to do so. In 1569, while attacking Lanchang, Bayín-naung ordered his men to cut wood and build numerous barges of twenty-six to twenty-eight metres in length and dugouts in a matter of days. Late eighteenth century observers, such as Cox and Symes, noted the same spread of shipping technologies and geographical location of shipbuilding. Special riverboats, such as royal barges, however, required intricate decoration and numerous specifications regarding religious or mythological symbolism, as was true of the construction of palaces and temples, and these boats were thus built carefully in certain towns, such as Dala in the case of Burma.6 Obtaining new supplies of riverboats was not a significant problem. In Mataram, the construction of boats was demanded of some villages. Some requests were quite extraordinary, such as the call for forty

4

Li 1982, 44, 46, 47; Borri 1633, 55; Crawfurd 1828, 493; Pinto 1989, 312, 400; Dijk 2004, 1.62. 5 Borri 1633, 53. 6 Manrique 1927, 1.134, 205, 208, 350, 382; IbrƗhƯm 1971, 47; Laurie 1853, 121; Balbi 2003, 163; Castanheda 1979, 5.20; Banyà-dalá 1970, 311; Banyà-dalá n.d., 102, 138-139; Cox 1971, 49, 425; See entire discussion in Heine-Geldern 1956.

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thousand warships, “ten from each place,” in 1656.7 Similarly, when the Burmese king Alaùng-hpayà required a large river fleet to fight the Mons, he simply ordered villages along the Irrawaddy to build him hundreds of boats. Within a short period of time, Irrawaddy villagers and townspeople provided Alaùng-hpayà’s forces with five hundred vessels. As George Baker observed in 1755: [W]hen finding it necessary to provide himself with more fighting Boats...and as he passed by every Place, gave orders, for them respectively, to call in the former Inhabitants, and obliged them to build a number of fighting Boats, in proportion to the number of the People; many of which I saw in my way down...8

By the mid-1670s in Mataram and in the late eighteenth century in Burma, however, there were efforts to regularize the supply of ships from villages, in the former case the order being given for every one thousand men in coastal areas to supply one large warship. The Vietnamese capacity to build large numbers of warships quickly paralleled that of Burma and in 1797-1798, NguyӉn Ánh produced five luggers, a frigate, and three hundred war galleys in southern Vietnam in a relatively short span of time.9 The construction of large deep-sea boats was generally limited to the main coastal ports. Although some European artisans were involved in shipbuilding in eighteenth century Syriam, the architects and workers were generally indigenous. European observers found indigenous boat-builders of high quality. As one observer noted of the Vietnamese ship-builders at Gia-Ĉӏnh in c. 1819, they were “certainly the most skilful naval architects, and finish their work with great neatness…”10 Some Western-style ship-building commenced in eighteenth and nineteenth century Vietnam and Siam was the location of Chinese junk-building for the Siamese court. In the 1830s, ‘all’ of Siam’s junks were built at Bangkok, to the number of six to eight large junks per year. The decks and planks were made of teak while

7

Schrieke 1957, 2.140. Dalrymple 1808, 1.70. 9 Symes 1800, 320; Schrieke 1957, 2.141; Barrow 1806, 274. 10 White 1972, 236. 8

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the framework was made of marbao wood. The workers were Siamese but the head carpenter in such projects was Chinese.11

Sea and River Vessels The intended purpose of watercraft determined their construction. Deep-sea ships intended to carry cargo, like the jong, were flimsy, lashed boats with flexible hulls not well designed for moving up narrow and shallow rivers or against the current. Maintaining control of sea-lanes, commodities, and local waters required powerful warships. Pierre-Yves Manguin has already drawn attention to the decline of the jong in sixteenth century Southeast Asia. This type of vessel was common in Southeast Asia, prior to the end of the sixteenth century and was designed for deep-seas transportation of commodities.12 The Acehnese also possessed large sea-going galleys in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, carrying as many as four hundred men. Davis describes them as “very large and open, without Decke, Fore-castell, Chase, or any upper building.”13 While sea-going deep-sea fleets were common in the archipelago, on the mainland they were not. As Li Tana suggests, there does not seem to have been any significant attempt to ‘control the seas’ or venture out into deeper ocean waters and most references to Southeast Asian fleets in warfare describe them as moving along the coasts or along rivers rather than far out to sea.14 A few maritime-oriented states, such as Arakan (in what is today western Burma) and the NguyӉn domain in southern Vietnam maintained large sea-going fleets and certainly Arakanese fleets swept through the eastern Bay of Bengal and the Bay of Martaban in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries and even raided the coasts of Lower Burma as far as Pegu in the 1740s. However, First and Restored Taung-ngu Burma and the Trӏnh domain in northern Vietnam did not, presumably due their focus on the interior, domestic economy rather than on a nearly exclusive focus on maritime trade. Throughout the sixteenth century, for

11

Crawfurd 1828, 411. Manguin 1993, 197-213. 13 Davis 1906, 2.321. 14 Li 1982, 45. 12

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example, European observers saw little Burmese strength at sea.15 Ayudhya relied upon junks for overseas trade with China and elsewhere, but it does not seem to have produced a large naval armament that abandoned the coasts in the early modern period.16 Vessels intended to be used in shallow coastal and river waters, which hid submerged pilings and sandbars, and narrow channels where turning was difficult, were shallow-draft and usually powered by oars. Such coastal and river craft were more solidly built than were their deep-sea counterparts. Thus, these boats could accommodate small numbers of cannon and were able to withstand the shock of firing firearms. The basic shipbuilding features included the following: single-piece, hollowed keels, with the remainder of the hull built up by adjoining a slight number of planks attached together with wooden dowels, rather than iron nails; the shallow draft nature of the hulls; the long and narrow shape of the hull and midsection; the symmetrical stern and prow; the use of outriggers on some vessels; and the prevalent use of oars (and often sails as well). The Burmese also covered some of their hulls with iron-plates, which helped prevent aging and corrosion, but also had defensive properties.17 Indigenous Southeast Asian coastal and riverboats were usually shallow-draft, a feature commonly mentioned by observers from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. This gave early modern indigenous river and coastal vessels an advantage over European craft on rivers and along coasts. During the First Anglo-Burmese War, the English were certainly surprised at how easily Burmese shallow-draft boats made use of the myriad of side creeks and channels in the Irrawaddy Delta to move reinforcements around, out-of-the-sight of the British gunboats on the main channels.18 The narrowness of these boats also gave them great speed because as they cut through a channel, they displaced a smaller proportion of water than did wider boats. As White observed of narrow Philippine boats in 1819:

15

Fedrici 1588, 30. Gervaise 1998, 96. 17 Banyà-dalá 1970, 295, 300, 308; Let-wè-naw-yahta 1971, 351, 355, 374, 410; Kalà 1961, 1.346, 370, 2.81, 171, 171n, 438; 3.24, 143, 163. 18 Li 1982, 46; Lewis 1973, 250; McCrae & Prentice 1930, 25; Dalrymple 1808, 1.17-18; Symes 1955, 139-140; Maw 1832, 83; Varthema 1928, 78; Yule 1858, 7. 16

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their velocity is proportionably accelerated, and they sail faster than perhaps any vessels in the world. I know of no other advantage that this contrivance imparts to them, to obtain which many others are necessarily sacrificed.19

Southeast Asian coastal and riverboats were often double-ended, which allowed oarsmen to row these boats backwards away from an enemy, just as they had rowed towards their opponent. Solid hulls were the most common feature of indigenous river and coastal craft of the early modern era. A tree trunk was excavated by the use of fire and axe, and this solid hull would be extended with ribs and strong planking.20 The artificial extension of the hull after the hollowing of the hull could produce an eight-foot wide boat.21 As White described the panco boats in the Philippines in 1819: “They are made of the trunk of a single tree, scooped out, and are generally about twenty feet long, by three and a half feet broad, and quite deep.”22

Figure 11: Late sixteenth-century Trӏnh warships. Note the single piece of artillery emanating from the prow. From an illustration in Baron 1732.

Barges, much wider than typical indigenous boats, and sometimes bearing miniature palaces or temples, also followed the tradition of the dugout hull. In the case of these barges, a platform was built over two such hulls. As Christopher Winter described a Burmese barge in 1857: 19

White 1972, 153. Yule 1858, 6; Sarkar 1907b, 420; Maw 1932, 92; Varthema 1928, 79; Ngamsanga 1992, 11-43; Quaritch Wales 1931, 112-113; Malinowski 1961, 125; Scott 1981, 8; Garnier 1996b, 42. 21 Symes 1800, 320-321. 22 White 1972, 153-154. 20

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These barges are formed by two canoes lashed together, on which is placed a floor of planks, and on this a frame of bamboo is raised, open at the sides, and supporting a roof thatched with the leaves of the waterpalm; a most effectual protection from the fierce rays of a tropical sun. Each barge is towed by two canoes full of Burman rowers.23

Nevertheless, there was also a range of smaller craft not hollowed out from tree trunks, but instead assembled in several sections. The Laotian pirogue is one example. As Garnier described it in the 1860s: There were none of the big pirogues hollowed out from the trunk of a tree… The inhabitants constructed their boats … from three components. One part, very wide, formed the base of the skiff. The other two parts formed the sides. Holes were made … to correspond to the two connecting lines and a piece of rattan was passed through them so that the base of the boat appeared to be sewn to the two lateral pieces. Stuffing and resin were used to caulk the seams.24

Other variations, in use in the mainland and archipelago, too numerous to list here, were also used, but mainly for trade or in other non-combative roles.25 In certain contexts, shallow-draft boats sometimes required the use of outriggers. The narrow construction and shallow-draft nature of river and coastal vessels meant that some boats would otherwise easily tip over, or be swamped by the onset of tidal flows. To offset this, Southeast Asians attached outriggers made of bamboo, forming a long platform six or seven foot away, on one or both sides of the boat. Because of the light weight and air inside of the hollow cane, they were buoyant.26 The outriggers kept the boat steady and prevented it from tipping over, since the boat would right itself as one or the other platform hit the water. Outrigger platforms also allowed oarsmen to ‘ply their oars’ or to use the platform as a walkway as they poled boats

23

Winter 1858, 69-70. Garnier 1996b, 42-43. 25 See the excellent discussion of seventeenth-century Burmese boat-types in Dijk 2004, 1.87-89. See also the discussion in Ivanoff 2000, 199-228; Gansser & Ivanoff 2000, 329-370; Sather 2000, 177-197. 26 White 1972, 154. 24

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out of the shallows.27 As one European observor described outriggers in 1819: The science of naval architecture among these people is, in comparison with that of many other Eastern nations, in a very imperfect state. All the vessels of native invention are furnished with the clumsy and inconvenient outriggers, so universal in the Eastern islands. These outriggers are formed of two or more bamboos, in length proportionate to the size of the vessel. They cross the hull at right angles, over the gunwale, and project far out on each side, where they are lashed with rattan or coiar. At the ends of these bamboos are others, placed parallel to the sides of the vessel, and secured to them by lashings as before; from the extremities of the cross pieces, ropes or shroud re-extended to the head of the mast, where they are secured. Their vessels are very narrow and crank, and without these outriggers, a very slight breeze would overset them.28

The rudders of river and coastal boats were designed for use in shallow waters where special circumstances required a sturdier and more complex instrument of direction. Southeast Asians used a side rudder. These were typically simple, large paddles or long oars, or, as in the case of one nineteenth century Malay sloop, two large slabs of timber, one of each side of the boat. Southeast Asian rudders were lashed, or inserted through a fixed clamp, to one side of the boat. Helmsmen steered the rudder with a short tiller that passed over the backbench, and by manipulating the tiller, the helmsmen rotated the blade of the rudder at an angle, determing the direction of the craft.29 The light materials used for decks, frequently consisting of split bamboo, allowed for some experimentation. In the early fifteenth century, Hӗ Quý Lý initiated a change in the deck structure of Vietnamese galleys by creating two decks, one for the oarsmen and one for soldiers to fight on. Multiple decks appear to have been developed within the next two centuries in Lower Burma as well. This flexibility above the hull was critical for the introduction of cannon. Below the deck, the hull structure remained generally the same. This was in sharp contrast to hull adaptations by Asian shipping elsewhere. 27

Symes 1800, 320; Scott 1981, 8; Cox 1971, 23; Cerre 1987, 52. White 1972, 152. 29 Casson 1971, 224-226; White 1972, 60; Cerre 1987, 52; Yule 1858, 4, 6, 52, 53; Bruce 1973, illustrations between 52 & 53; Byron 1964, 131. 28

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Indo-Arab sewn boats, for example, had lashed and flexible hulls, which could not easily accomodate cannon.30 Due to their strong hulls, Southeast Asian river and coastal boats were suitable for the use of small cannon. As one observer noted in the seventeenth century, such indigenous boats were “so strongly made of timber with a hard core...that balls of zumburaks and small cannons cannot pierce them.”31 The earliest “naval guns” were merely carried on board to be transported for use by land forces rather than being fixed into the structure of river-craft. Fifteenth century descriptions of indigenous boats, for example, indicate that artillery was carried on boats, not for use onboard, but rather to transport them for use on land. In the 1420s, Vietnamese galleys were armed with eighty small arms, twenty medium- and large-sized guns, as well as a giant wooden- or bamboobarreled gunpowder weapon, although it is also unclear in this case if the weapons were fixed into the ship structure. Portuguese traders claimed that early sixteenth century Mon ships were ‘armed’ with cannon, including swivel guns and wooden cannon.32 Mediterranean fastening techniques were introduced by the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and were gradually introduced in the ships of Southeast Asian insular war fleets. These techniques may also have gradually influenced the way in which cannon were introduced into the structure of coastal and riverboats as well. As late as the early sixteenth century, however, the boats of mainland fleets were still lashing their cannon to logs.33 Soon after, however, mainland river boats began to include a porthole cut into the prow one or a few feet above the waterline. The gun’s barrel extended out through this hole and behind it there was room between the oarsmen and the hole in order for a crew to operate the gun.34 By the late eighteenth century, Southeast Asians fixed their cannon to the structure of the boat with a gun carriage which was lashed to bolts on 30

Byron 1964, 131; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 135; Banyà-dalá n.d., 163-164; Chaudhuri 1985, 149-151. 31 Sarkar 190b, 420. 32 Manguin 1988, 621; Bouchon & Thomaz 1988, 343. 33 Banyà-dalá n.d., 10; Bouchon & Thomaz 1988, 343; Li 1992, 44; RFSGCCM 1912, 17; Tin 1967, 1.95; Royal Order 9 July 1638 in Than Tun 1983, 1.382-3; Kalà 1961, 2.140, 141, 203-204. 34 Anonymous 1981, 187-90; Van Vliet 1910, 22, 25-6, 30; Gervaise 1989, 96, 112, 213-215; Ngamsanga 1992, 11-43, 75-93; Vivadhanajaya 1959, 187, 216-220.

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both sides of the boat. Swivel guns would also be attached to the stern.35 In the 1820s, the Vietnamese fleet consisted of two hundred gunboats bearing sixteen to twenty-two guns, one hundred large galleys bearing a twelve to twenty-four pounder on the prow and swivel guns, and about five hundred small galleys bearing a four to six pounder on the prow as well as swivel guns.36

Figure 12: Internal view of gun aperture. Photograph by author.

Some early modern boats had two-person teams to operate the cannon at the prow. Such cannon could only have low-level projection, so they were presumably used to fire at opposing boats or at close shore positions. In addition to the cannon at the prow, a swivel gun could also be attached on the sides of the boat or at the prow or stern. Larger boats were armed with up to three pieces of cannon. Such boats needed a good deal of deck space, and many riverboats afforded potential room for other pieces of naval guns. By the sixteenth century, for example, mortars were included on some boats, in addition to other cannon. Mortars would be placed in the middle of the

35 36

Symes 1800, 320. Crawfurd 1828, 493.

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boat, for balance. Mortars would be able to send projectiles upwards, against targets at a greater distance than other cannon on the boat.37

Oars and Sails Various means of propulsion were utilized, including oars, poles, sails, or any combination thereof. Oars were the most common means of propulsion on Southeast Asian rivers since they were necessary for upriver travel against the current and anywhere during times of unfavorable winds. Some riverboats, including royal floats and fire rafts did not include an independent means of propulsion. Nevertheless, they still required specialized oar-propelled ‘draw’ boats or were otherwise pulled by pairs of canoes. This was achieved through chains or ropes that hooked up underneath the floats or fire rafts and connected them to canoes or oared-barges.38

Figure 13: ‘Draw’ boats in a fifteenth-century temple mural painting at Pagan. Photograph by author.

37 38

HNY 1957, 2.408; Tin 1967, 1.95; Vivadhanajaya 1959, 217. Winter 1858, 69-70; Banyà-dalá n.d., 30; Banyà-dalá 1970, 311; Cerre 1987, 52.

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Davis’ description of Acehnese oars in 1599 is curious, but unclear regarding the materials of their construction: “Their Oares are like Shovels of foure foote long, which they use only with the hand not resting them upon the Galley.”39 White’s description of “long elastic oars” used by Vietnamese galleys is similarly silent on their composition.40 White provides a clearer description, referring to the panco boats of the Philippines in 1819: Their oars are similar to those of almost all the Asiatics; the looms, or shanks, are of bamboo, with flat, oval palms, or blades, made of hard wood, and secured to their extremities with coiar or rattan ligatures.41

Figure 14: Riverboats at Amarapura in early nineteenth century temple mural painting. Photograph by author.

Some early modern oars were made of cane split at the end to hold a flat board fastened to it by rope. By the beginning of the early modern period, however, solid wood oars seem to have become standard. Oars could be manipulated freely or on a spindle. The number of oars used on an indigenous boat depended upon the size of the boat. On larger vessels the number of oars could range from twenty to 150 sets of oars.42 In order to move a vessel at maximum speed, oarsmen used various devices to coordinate their rowing. Some early modern 39

Davis 1906, 2.321. White 1972, 60, 327-328. 41 White 1972, 154. 42 Li 1982, 46; Maw 1832, 92; Crawfurd 1828, 493; Dalrymple 1808, 1.viii, 1.138; Balbi 2003, 151; Yule 1858, 4; Symes 1800, 320; Symes 1955, 150; Varthema 1928, 78; Cerre 1987, 52; Paris 1941, 358-359; White 1972, 327-328. See also the very good illustrations of oars and oarsmen on Angkor-period Khmer boats in JacqHergoualc’h 2000, 404-405, 408. 40

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Vietnamese boats carried a man who would beat a piece of wood to provide a cadence: “All the sailors follow its time to turn either to the left or the right, without any mistake.”43 Drummers, trumpeters, singing, or the beating of a gong or small bell also synchronized the rowing motion of the oars.44 As one observer noted of southern Vietnamese fisherman transporting their fish to market in 1819: Several boats, each with nine rowers, passed us with amazing rapidity, on their way to Saigon; and the uniformity in … their mode of rowing... These people do not, as our seamen term it, keep stroke, but push in regular succession, beginning with the oar nearest the stern, and progressing alternately, on each side, to the bowman, when the stern rower again commences, and so on; by this constant impulse, an uninterrupted momentum is produced, and they travel with great velocity, frequently making a passage from the sea to Saigon in one tide.45

Poivre also mentions that in the mid-eighteenth century, the master of the oarsmen on NguyӉn royal galleys gave oral commands “which they all repeat together.”46 The use of oars on boats with a prow and stern equally capable of cutting through the water meant that on narrow rivers, indigenous boats could change directions quickly, giving them great versatility in narrow waters and in difficult battles. For this purpose, indigenous boatmen were well-practiced in rowing backwards as well as forwards.47 Oars also allowed for fast and easy maneuvering while sailed-vessels remained dead in the water in unfavorable winds. As one European vessel found during an assault by Malay pirates in the Straits of Bangka in 1819 “It being nearly calm, they possessed a great advantage over us by means of their oars in point of maneuvering, and kept their heads or barricades constantly presented to us…”48

43 44

Ĉa Shan quoted in Li 1982, 45. Balbi 2003, 151; Banyà-dalá n.d., 31; Symes 1800, 320; White 1972, 60, 327-

328. 45

White 1972, 211. Li & Reid 1993, 72. 47 Symes 1800, 321; Symes 1955, 227; Quaritch Wales 1952, 109; Dalrymple 1808, 1.viii; Laurie 1853, 174-175. 48 White 1972, 14. 46

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Sails made of cotton cloth or matting were used in addition to oars on some of the larger river and coastal boats in order to harness favourable winds and allow oarsmen to reserve their strength. The sails were let out when winds were fair and when they were adverse, these sails were pulled in and the oarsmen would recommence their rowing.49 Sails also helped to offset the reverse force of downstream currents on journeys upriver during the rainy season and, in Burma, allowed river craft to take advantage of the winds of the southwest monsoon at the same time.50

Figure 15: Close-up of oarsmen on late eighteenth-century Burmese boat. From an illustration in Symes 1800.

Crews and Oarsmen Oarsmen made up the largest portion of a boat’s crew. Of the seventythree men in a Vietnamese galley’s complement in 1685, sixty were oarsmen.51 Control of manpower was thus critical to maintaining large river fleets. The small boats used by most people in early modern society were small enough not to require more than one or a handful of rowers. Rich merchants could hire more oarsmen. A ruler, of course, could command royal servicemen or could hire men from among the general population for this task due to their greater access 49

White 1972, 154. Wilson 1852, 285, n.10; Banyà-dalá n.d., 163-164; Pinto 1989, 333; Dalrymple 1808, 1.51; White 1972, 155. 51 Li 1982, 46. 50

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to cash revenues as the early modern period progressed. The control of manpower, or the ability to hire large numbers of men, was thus an important contributing factor to the strength of mainland Southeast Asian river fleets until the nineteenth century. War boats and other royal craft needed large numbers of men to provide muscle to such fleets, and without privileged access to manpower reserves, such fleets could not be used to guarantee royal control over the coasts and river outlets of the royal domain. This control in turn helped local rulers to maintain greater control over such reserves and to assure the stability that would encourage demographic growth. A growing population permitted the expansion of royal fleets throughout the early modern period, although this was subject to periodic reversals.52 Warfare proved to be double-edged in terms of obtaining captives to row the boats. While generally Southeast Asians were equipped with skills in handling boats, there were substantial differences between manning different types of sea craft on the one hand and riverboats on the other. In 1615, for example, before its push into the northern coastal areas, Mataram was said to have had “no power at sea. [The ruler] is very mighty on land and has excellent means and materials for constructing fine galleys, but he lacks seamen…”53 Certainly, in terms of rowed vessels, captives were just as effective in rowing boats at sea as in those used on the river. Nevertheless, coastal areas produced the best seamen and the best sea fighters. Burmese conquests of Lower Burma, and the dispersal of the coastal Mons throughout the region, represented a major decline in seafaring in Lower Burma. Similarly, Sultan Agung’s bloody campaigns against the northern coastal Javanese ports appear to have caused significant casualties among the populations of the latter and thus deprived Mataram of seamen, even after these areas were brought under control.54 Because river skills were more widely distributed, it was easier to procure men for river fleets through warfare. During at least one of the Burmese invasions of Ayudhya, for example, Siamese royal boatmen were particularly sought out as captives and were taken back to Burma in order to serve on royal boats. According to one source, after the fall of Ayudhya to the Burmese in 1767, the “first officers of 52

Symes 1955, 174; Yule 1858, 4; Lieberman 1984, 48, 50, 52, 237-238, 250-254; Lieberman 1993b, 493; Koenig 1990, 107-118. 53 Coen quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.140. 54 Lieberman 1993a, 225; Schrieke 1957, 2.140.

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the [Siamese] kingdom were loaded with irons, and condemned to row the Burman war-boats.”55 Because oarsmen were supposed to fight as well as to row, unlike some of their European counterparts, Southeast Asian kingdoms had to have a reliable force at the oars. This was true of NguyӉn shipping. One early seventeenth century observer explained that the reason for NguyӉn strength on the water was the way in which they procured oarsmen: the Cochin-Chinese use not to make Galli-slaves of their delinquents or others; but when they are to put themselves to fight at Sea, they furnish their Gallies with as many men as are required in this manner. They send out secretly and suddenly many Serjants and Commissioners, who going throughout all the Kingdome ere men are aware with the Kings authority, doe seise and presse all such as they find fit to handle an Oare, and bestow them in the Gallies, unlesse by reason of their borth and extraction, or for some other consideration, they be exempted and privilidged. And that course must not be thought so hard and difficult, as at first it may seemse, because, they are as well intreated in the Gallies as anywhere else: and better payd: and besides, their Wives, their Children, and all their Familie, is maintained at the Kings charge, with whatsoever is needfull according to their rancke and condition, during all the time that their Husbands are thus absent. And they serve not onely to tug at the Oare, but also to fight upon occasion: To which purpose they have every one his Harquebusse and Musket given to him, with Darts, Coutelasse, and Cemeters: and as the Cochin-Chinois are hardie and valiant in their approaches, with their Oares, and with their Muskets and Javelins, they are no lesse in the encounter and close medley; where they make rare proofes of their valour.56

In some port towns, a local labour market for boat-crews emerged. In the early nineteenth century, the coasting trade in the Gulf of Siam employed mixed Chinese and Siamese crews, while long distance trade employed “almost exclusively Chinese…”57 In the case of royal boats, crews had to be changed at regular intervals due to the exhaustion among the oarsmen of rowing up against the current. As one European passenger remembered:

55

Crawfurd 1828, 403. Borri 1633, 55-56. 57 Crawfurd 1828, 415. 56

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[I]ndeed it must be confessed, that there could scarcely be any other method used to forward the Boat with the Guns, (as she was full manned with Oars and provided with a very large Sail) except that of having People ready (for her Crew was changed at almost every Town) at each stage to go on board her, as soon as she should arrive at it...they generally sent a light Boat a-head, to get the People ready against she came.58

In battle, screens afforded protection for the oarsmen. In early Cham and Khmer naval battles, long, rattan, lattice shields with a hole in the centre through which the oars passed, performed the same function.59

Blockades and Maritime Sieges Major Southeast Asian sea campaigns were generally limited to the pre-eighteenth century period, although raiding and other small-scale operations took place at sea well into the nineteenth century. The last major Javanese action at sea, for example, occurred in 1676, when Mataram dispatched a land and sea force against the Makassars at DČmung.60 Schrieke suggests that Javanese fleets had two functions. One was to transport armies and the other was to blockade an enemy port in order to prevent supplies or weapons reaching the defenders.61 This appears to have been true for Southeast Asian sea campaigns in general, although boats had many additional functions in river warfare as discussed in the following section. Some of the most spectacular Southeast Asian blockades and sieges of port towns occurred in the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, and Portuguese (and from 1641, Dutch) Melaka was an especially frequent target. Melaka’s strategic position in the straits between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula and its role as the preeminent trade entrepôt in the region made it a rich prize. The most important indigenous sea force engaged in the area in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was Aceh. As Manguin explains, in most of these sea actions, Southeast Asians held the initiative, for 58

Dalrymple 1808, 1.51. Guerreiro 1930-1942, 3.78; Quaritch Wales 1952, 108. 60 Schrieke 1957, 2.141. 61 Schrieke 1957, 2.139. 59

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Portuguese attacks on Southeast Asian ports were few and weak at best and in some cases, the fighting was not between the Portuguese and Southeast Asians. Fighting took place on land as well as at sea. In the 1568 blockade and siege of Melaka, for example, the Acehnese deployed the land forces and cannon they had brought and built stockades on shore to fortify their positions. As a result, the same factors that influenced warfare on land could influence the fortunes of the fleet. In the 1568 case, the cannon used by the fleet was not effective in delivering serious damage to Melaka’s walls, nor were the Portuguese much more successful against the fleet. After the Sultan’s son fell in the fighting, the soldiers were withdrawn from shore along with the cannon, and the fleet departed, after only ten days’ of fighting. Acehnese fleets would continue to attack Melaka unsuccessfully into the seventeenth century.62 Such blockades and sieges continued into the first decades of the seventeenth century, including a siege by the ruler of Johore in which he brought an estimated sixty thousand men. Ultimately, however, the Dutch took the port after a blockade and siege lasting six months.63 The expanding activities of the VOC in the region and the strength of their sea fleets presented a more serious challenge to Southeast Asians than had the Portuguese. This impact was mainly felt by the archipelagic states. Anthony Reid suggests that Burma and Ayudhya were involved in this struggle as well. As he explains: During the second half of the 17th Century … the Dutch Company (VOC) established not merely naval superiority, but also a form of maritime hegemony over all the major international ports of the region. By 1700 Burma and Thailand had turned away from the struggle to keep their sea lanes open, and had thereby isolated themselves from subsequent technical advances. The states most anxious to resist Dutch claims to commercial monopoly, Aceh, Banten, and Makassar, had had a similar isolation forced upon them by the VOC. How had the few Dutchmen in Southeast Asia, never rising much above 12,000 in the 17th Century been able to achieve this feat?64

62

Manguin 1988, 619-625; Manguin 1993, 205-206. Nieuhoff 1732, 2.178. 64 Reid 1982, 7. 63

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Since Burma proper put no large fleets to sea on par with those of the archipelago, save for limited actions in the early nineteenth century, Reid must refer to Arakan (in what is today western Burma), which, like many archipelagic states, witnessed a decline over the course of the seventeenth century in its ability to wage major sea campaigns. Although coastal states on the mainland and in the archipelago still engaged in occasional battles with each other and Europeans afterwards, these were by no means of the same scale as those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Southeast Asian fleets were more effectively deployed to prevent the enemy from landing or to guard river entrances and deny the enemy access to the river. In the late thirteenth century, for example, Ĉҥi ViӋt ships were posted at potential landing spots along the Red River to guard against Chinese invaders.65 Southeast Asian commanders also took advantage of the narrow rivers or the mouth of a river, and the dependence upon river systems for the transport of food to towns and fortresses by cutting of river access to such towns. As Li explains, the Trӏnh rulers of northern Vietnam stationed sixtyeight galleys at the entrance of the Ca River on a regular basis.66 One of the key factors in the 1613 siege of Syriam by Anauk-hpet-lun involved the application of his ships south of Syriam, preventing vital reinforcements and new supplies of gunpowder from reaching the fortress in the last months of the siege. Such boats could be stationed closely to one another, forbidding the passage of enemy supply boats, or could even link themselves together with their oars or ropes and thus again prevent passage by the enemy.67 A similar tactic was to pull an iron chain across rivers or harbours to serve as a barrier to incoming vessels. This was done at Sri Vijaya as a defense against pirates. Tarsillo Barberis, an Italian captain in Thibaw’s army, also reported that the Burmese attempted to use chains in order to prevent British ships from ascending the Irrawaddy beyond Minhla in 1885.68

65

NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 109. Li 1982, 45. 67 Lieberman 1980, 219; Kalà 1960-1961, 2.140-141; Tin 1967, 1.95; Quaritch Wales 1952, 113. 68 B. Andaya & L. Andaya 1982, p. 28; Banyà-dalá 1970, 328-39; Kalà 1960-1961, 1.367; Castanheda 1979, 2.475; Dalrymple 1808 1.133; Wilson 1852, 112, 145, 1989; Barberis 1890, 156. 66

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Due to the threat to land forces of ship-based guns, efforts were also made to deploy heavy and small arms on land in ways that would command river and coastal waters. The Arakanese and Burmese, for example, made significant use of guns to fend off potential assaults by water. In the early seventeenth century, the Arakanese maintained their control over the trading port of Chittagong on the Bay of Bengal by rotating every year a new garrison of soldiers armed with small arms, but also relied on royal servicemen, former Portuguese captives, who used both guns and indigenous-style boats. The Burmese also defended the entrances to rivers, at least by the eighteenth century, with cannon placed on fortified piers.69 Of the early nineteenth century: [at the entrance to the Rangoon River] is a very good wooden pier, with a crane, and steps for landing goods, & c. Here also is placed the saluting battery, on which is mounted sixteen old iron guns, four or six punders, which are run out through portholes, in a wooden breastwork, like a ship’s side...70

The Burmese still defended their river entrances in this way when British forces invaded Lower Burma during the First Anglo-Burmese War.71

River Tactics As with other war arms, both literati and military men composed texts on naval strategy or tactics frequently based on older Indian or Chinese texts. Often, the strategies and tactics outlined were impractical in actual fighting. Li Tana cites the example of a Vietnamese officer who proposed three styles of fighting in addition to six others accepted by the Vietnamese emperor in 1465. These three additional styles were unsuccessfully attempted in 1467, and when the

69

Banyà-dalá n.d., 126-127; Skinner 1985, 107; Sarkar 1907b, 421; Manrique 1927, 1.285; Furnivall 1915, 53; RFSGCCM 1912, 17. 70 Cox 1971, 6. 71 Maw 1832, 86; Wilson 1852, 68.

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officer failed to carry them through with success afterwards, the emperor removed him from his post.72 Southeast Asian crews of war boats were often armed with five to six and a half metres long grappling hooks.73 Grappling allowed for boarding and a consequent battle on the two ships thus linked together. Quaritch Wales, referring to Cham and Khmer naval battles in an earlier period, noted the following scene displayed on a basrelief on the Banteay Chmar: two men have thrown grappling irons from the prow of the Khmer barge, which have taken fast hold of the Cham boat’s stern. While these men haul on the rattans the first of the Khmer soldiers springs aboard the enemy craft.74

Li Tana suggests that in fighting between the Dutch ships and NguyӉn galleys in the 1640s grappling hooks may have done more harm to the former than the latter’s firearms.75 Narrow rivers also provided the possibility of using fire rafts to destroy an enemy fleet. Sending ships laden with burning straw against enemy ships was a consistent tactic used by indigenous naval strategists throughout the pre-colonial period.76 This tactic was particularly successful in forcing into retreat large European ships that lacked the ability to maintain their position by outmaneuvering fire rafts quickly and safely on rivers.77 In the late sixteenth century, for example, a Spanish fleet moored in the Lower Mekong was forced to withdraw out to sea to escape the fire rafts the Vietnamese sent against them.78 In 1662, during the Dutch attack on Palembang, the Dutch flotilla faced a similar problem on the Palembang River: The enemy sent four or five very large fire engines, being Boats of timber with wood on houses filled with combustible matter on the top 72

Li 1992, 44. Li 1992, 47. 74 Quaritch Wales 1952, 109. 75 Li 1992, 47. 76 Wilson 1852, 98, 113; Banyà-dalá n.d., 70-71, 108, 126-127; Dalrymple 1808, 1.103-104; Lieberman 1980, 211; Maw 1832, 19, 46, 50, 53, 95; Snodgrass 1827, 105-106. 77 Castanheda 1979, 2.475. 78 Morga 1970 1.89. 73

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of them, which took almost the whole breadth of the river; the [Dutch] yachts … had much ado to escape their fury, being forced to cut their cables; but the Molucca yacht had her fore-castle set on fire, and was with much ad saved by the help of many boats that were sent to her assistance … so that these fire engines were forced down the river by the current, and soon after vanished into smoak.79

Similarly, when a Mon flotilla, including several European ships, attacked Alaùng-hpayà’s forces at Dagon in the 1750s, the Burmese having set fire to a Jungodo [boats fastened together] of Boats, these driving down towards the Fleet, compelled them to weigh and fall down the River, by which means they avoided the danger, though the French Ship very narrowly escaped being burnt...80

Ramming and boarding tactics were relatively common in early modern Southeast Asian river warfare.81 Frequently, metal tusks or blades were fixed on either side of the prow. Groslier argued that the “curved blades” attached to the prows of Khmer and Cham boats in classical Cambodian bas-reliefs were not purely ornamental and instead served as important armaments.82 The protruding metal blades probably dug into the side or the ends of an enemy boat. Quaritch Wales, however, criticizes Groslier’s observations. He suggests that such blades did not serve the same purpose as rams used in early European warfare. The European rams, he argues, were pointed at the waterline of enemy boats, while the blades on Khmer and Cham war boats were turned upwards. Instead, these blades were part of the Makara figurehead and provoked terror in the enemy. Quaritch Wales, however, had assumed incorrectly that an attacker would drive towards the low center of an enemy boat when attempting to ram it. In many Southeast Asian river battles, masses of boats raced headlong against each other on relatively narrow rivers, met each other prow on prow. Further, the examples of these blades found in the Khmer basreliefs as provided in sketch form in Groslier, were not all curved up at a great angle. War-boats with metal blades or hooks were 79

Nieuhoff 1732, 2.187. Dalrymple 1808, 1.103-104. 81 Cipolla 1965, 123-124. 82 Groslier 1921, 112. 80

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particularly designed to use their metal-blades as offensive weapons. Boat blades were used to damage enemy boats, but also to capture them. Once an enemy boat had been impaled, it could be dragged back towards one’s own armada.83 Blades and hooks also had a symbolic function as well, and were designed to fit into the image carved into the prow of the boat.84 Another tactic was to sweep the enemy’s oars, or otherwise deny the enemy oars for their boats, for, given the primacy of oars for propulsion in river war boats, without oars, a boat was defenseless. After Tabin-shwei-htì destroyed some of the war boats of the seven Shan saw-bwàs, the Shan boatmen fled ashore at Prome and mixed with the land army. The Shans could not flee Prome by water, however, because Tabin-shwei-htì’s forces had seized their oars.85 River fleets were also by no means immune from tactics applied by land forces. In 1388, for example, Ĉҥi ViӋt land and naval forces attacked the Cham king ChӅ Bӕng Nga. While ChӅ Bӕng Nga held the land forces down, he opened up a dam whose released water “jumped forth in raging torrents, carrying away a great number of” the Ĉҥi ViӋt boats.86 The defeat was so severe that remaining Ĉҥi ViӋt naval forces used a ruse to abandon the expedition altogether: they moored their boats and unfurled their flags in order to trick the Chams into thinking that they remained in wait and when night came, the Vietnamese fled in their lightest boats, abandoning the rest of their fleet to the Chams.87 In river battles, it was easy to identify the boats of royal and noble commanders. Each had distinctive parasols or flags of colours peculiar to their rank or position in the court. An enemy thus had little difficulty in spotting an important target. In the case of one Burmese commander, for example, the flag on his boat: “stood out like a hut in a rice-field.”88 Vessels could also be identified in battle from the peculiar symbolism of the prows. As one observer commented on the galley used by the Viceroy of Gia-Ĉӏnh 1819:

83

Groslier 1921, 110; Kalà 1960-1961, 2.171n; Quaritch Wales 1952, 112. Quaritch Wales 1952, 112. 85 Kalà 1960-1961, 2.140-141. 86 Maspero 2002, 108. 87 Maspero 2002, 108. 88 Skinner 1985, 151. 84

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Her quarters and bows were ornamented with various carved figures, and a profusion of gilding and red paint. Her beak was intended to represent the head of some animal, while the painted eyes, which they always place on their boats, corresponded to that organ in the head of the carved figure.89

The carved images and the figurehead of the prow differed dramatically from boat to boat depending on the boat’s mythological theme.90 As Nieuhoff described local boats in the area of Ambon in 1659: They make use of certain small vessels in time of war. .. They call these vessels Korrakore, and are shaped like a dragon, the head representing the forecastle, and the tail the stern.91

The introduction of cannon into the structure of indigenous vessels in the early sixteenth century was directly responsible for new tactics in river combat. The most obvious change was that boats did not have to grapple together before the real killing began. Now they could fire from a distance and win (or lose) battles without closing the distance between themselves and the enemy. During a 1755 naval battle fought near Dagon between the river fleets of Pegu and Ava, the ships were too far apart to commence boarding operations. Nevertheless, Peguan muskets and cannon forced the Avan crewmen to abandon their boats, while the Avan guns convinced European ships accompanying the Mon fleet to seek shelter elsewhere. The Hikayat Patani also relates that at least in one case, a cannon was placed at the stern of one Malay boat to maintain fire against pursuing Siamese as it fled down the river.92 Muskets were also an especially effective means to scare off exposed oarsmen in enemy boats, which often served to decide naval battles on Southeast Asian rivers even before the opposing forces had come into physical contact. Muskets were also very useful during grappling, when an enemy boat was dragged alongside one's boat with 89

White 1972, 327-328. Quaritch Wales 1931, 114-115; Paris 1941, 336-337; Gansser & Ivanoff 2000, 360-364 (note the symbolic design in figures16-20); Bogani & Ivanoff 2000, 13-16; Jacq-Hergoualc’h 2000, 403-406 (including figures 2-6). 91 Nieuhoff 1732, 2.166. 92 Symes 1800, 321; Dalrymple 1808, 1.87; Tin 1967, 1.95; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.161. 90

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grappling hooks and ropes. The grappled boats would then become a small battleground in which small arms could play an important role in the fighting.93

European Competition From the early sixteenth century, Southeast Asian fleets faced a substantial challenge from the arrival of European war fleets. The Portuguese and Spanish were the main sixteenth century challengers and the Dutch in the seventeenth century, while the French and English had their greatest impact from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. European vessels had special strengths and weaknesses relative to Southeast Asian vessels. European ships had a greater structural capacity for higher numbers of cannon than did indigenous vessels and with a sturdier hull, were more than able to match any Southeast Asian vessel at sea.94 The main European weakness was that their deeper draft reduced their operability in shallow waters, just as their bulk made it difficult for them to change direction on narrow rivers. European vessels were thus generally unable to exploit local river systems. The time necessary for European deep-sea ships to travel along Southeast Asian rivers was excessive.95 To avoid shallows or running aground on sandbars, such ships had to be led into river channels by indigenous riverboats. While on the river, difficulties in turning a European ship at any great speed, the lack of oars in a realm of ephemeral winds, and an adverse river current, would leave European deep-sea vessels on rivers vulnerable to hostile indigenous craft. From the beginning of their arrival in India and Southeast Asia, for example, the Portuguese introduced vessels they had used in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean waters, including the caravel, the galleon, and the nao. The Portuguese soon found out, however, that their larger vessels could not operate well in local shallow, coastal seas and rivers. Since most of the European ships were of larger bulk and of much deeper draft than were most Southeast Asian craft, they were effective 93

Maw 1832, 20, 23, 25; Dalrymple 1808, 1.87; Faria y Sousa 1696, 3.228; Quaritch Wales 1952, 109. 94 Cipolla 1965, 81, 122, 138; see also Lieberman 1980, 210-211. 95 Lester 2004, 112, 114, 124.

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on the open seas, and least so on the rivers. Running on sandbanks or submerged objects could easily lodge a European ship and make it subject to effective assaults by indigenous shallow-draft vessels. By contrast to such European vessels, English observers in the First Anglo-Burmese War commented favourably on the effectiveness of indigenous war boats on rivers.96 To counter their disadvantages on rivers and in coastal areas, the Portuguese and others adopted the use of indigenous vessels when traveling in coastal areas and on rivers. Initially, the Portuguese turned to building smaller naos and the use of Indian dhows as well. Over time, they began to experiment with indigenous design in their own shipbuilding efforts. The Portuguese also used both indigenous jalias as well as ships built on the model of Mediterranean galleys that allowed for coastal navigation and compensation for unstable winds. However, regardless of the scale of the forces involved, the Portuguese often lost a higher percentage of their ships engaged in battles with indigenous fleets on rivers than at sea. Further out at sea, larger and deeper draft European ships could move more freely without fear of running aground. Southeast Asian fleets thus sometimes hugged the shallows along the coasts, where Portuguese vessels would be in great danger of running aground.97 Over the centuries that followed, Southeast Asian waters generally bifurcated into deeper waters dominated by Dutch, English, French, and Spanish warships, and rivers and coastal shallows where indigenous vessels still held sway. The problems for larger European craft in the latter context appear not to have changed significantly until the nineteenth century. Since they were designed with European competition in mind, which would be fought on the high seas and not on Southeast Asian rivers, such European ships remained deep draft and sailed. When Europeans moved against the large mainland empires in the nineteenth century, however, they gave more attention to utilizing mass numbers of small, oared, and shallow-draft gunboats as well as steamships. Technology made the latter possible, but the shifting context of European naval warfare in Southeast Asia, from open ocean to narrow, shallow rivers made the former necessary. 96

Stephen 1997, 62, 66; Scott 1981, 10; Manguin 1988, 621; Thomaz 1966, 65, 107, 164, 190; Maw 1832, 92. 97 Stephen 1997, 66, 67; Manguin 1988, 621; Guerreiro 1942, 3.78-81; Symes 1800, 320-321.

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Prior to the nineteenth century, then, European naval hegemony at sea was more of a problem for the archipelago than for the mainland. Certainly, European naval power would offer no serious threat to Vietnam, Siam, or Burma until the emergence of the steamship in the early nineteenth century. Nevertheless, early European victories against coastal states in the archipelago already indicated one weakness of Southeast Asian warfare. Control of Southeast Asian seas gradually passed over to the Europeans, which was a major problem for a region defined not by a single land mass, but rather by maritime interconnectedness.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ELEPHANT The Asian elephant, or Elephas Maximus, has long been represented in Southeast Asian warfare, the first documented use being by Vietnamese armies against the Chinese in the third century BCE. Although once found throughout the northern rim of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, from modern Iraq to Java and northwards to the Yangtze, it gradually disappeared from these further extensions and is limited today mainly to the Indian Subcontinent, mainland Southeast Asia, parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, and Yunnan.1 In 1811, William Marsden painted a bleak picture of the relationship between the elephant and society in Sumatra. Although the elephants “abound in the woods,” he observed, its domestication was generally limited to Aceh, which used some for court ceremony. Elsewhere on the island, the elephant was a nuisance to agriculturalists who had to resort to inserting arsenic in split cane in order to poison elephant herds that crossed fields and destroyed or ate the crops.2 Indeed, elephants were a problem wherever expanding agriculture intersected with wild herds. Despite its faults, however, the elephant held an important, but changing place in Southeast Asian society and its mode of warfare. Elephants were a feature of everyday life in many Southeast Asian societies and it was even claimed of seventeenth century Ayudhya, incorrectly, that they were the “sole domestic animal.”3 While common throughout the mainland, elephants were an important part of warfare in parts of the archipelago, including the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java. Wild elephants were generally absent elsewhere in the archipelago in the early modern period as it is today, and although the Javanese apparently made use of elephants in warfare at least until 1628 against 1

Dutton 2004, 30; R. Sukumar, 1989, 1. Marsden 1975, 116. 3 Loubère 1986, 39. 2

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Dutch Batavia, their application in warfare on the island declined afterwards, probably due to the absence of wild elephant herds.4 Elephants remained far more important in early modern warfare on the Malay Peninsula, where wild herds were accessible.5 Over time, elephants gradually disappeared from the ranks of precolonial Asian armies except for India and mainland Southeast Asia. This continuity is due partly to undeniable ecological pressures, but also to the adaptation of the elephant to the changing context of warfare over the course of the early modern period and into the colonial era. It has been suggested that the elephant was the early modern version of the modern ‘tank,’ but it was also found to be useful for transport and other support functions.6 The elephant also had a number of ceremonial functions critical to pre-colonial South and Southeast Asia that helped to bolster its claim as the single most important animal to indigenous states and warfare in these areas. The far reach of firearms, more powerful ships, and the evolution of the early modern fortress in some ways complicated the role of the elephant in early modern Southeast Asian warfare. The immense power of the war elephant, as we shall see, no longer afforded the high degree of security on the battlefield it once offered royal and high status combatants. Even so, elephants and indeed other animals became more important in additional ways (and less important in others), in large part due to increasing transportation demands of gunpowder armies. This chapter focuses upon the ways in which the use of elephants was adapted to the changing circumstances of early modern Southeast Asian warfare. This adaptation varied between geographical contexts and, to a lesser extent, cultures.

Elephants and Society No animal was more closely identified with kingship in Southeast Asia than the elephant. Large and powerful, courts found numerous 4

Indeed, in Java, elephants were so rare and expensive that they were not even used in animal tournaments held in the court. Boomgaard 2001, 111, 155. In the fourteenth century, however, they appear to have been more common. See Prapañca 1995, 39, 67, 68. 5 SM 1952, 18, 44; Clarence Smith, 3-4, 8; Schrieke 1957, 2.126. 6 Clarence Smith 2003, 2.

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ways to identify the ruler with the elephant. In Kòn-baung Burma, the elephant monopolized the motif of the base of the royal throne (razapallin). Kòn-baung kings also rode elephants in a ‘saddle’ which was believed to replicate that which had been given to the legendary king Pyu-zàw-htì by his father the sun king, which in turn was made in the image of Indra’s saddle when the latter rode the Erawun elephant. On some occasions, Vietnamese rulers bedecked the walkways to important state buildings with rows of live elephants, in Sukothai elephant statues stood watch over major thoroughfares, and in Kònbaung Burma, two giant stone elephants guarded the steps from the Irrawaddy River up to the location of the Mingun Pagoda. Among the Shans, elephants, along with horses, figured prominently in elite burials, although beginning with Bayín-naung in the sixteenth century, Burmese kings attempted to drive out such ‘heretical’ practices in the name of Buddhist orthodoxy. In northeastern Siam, some temple images included deities mounted on elephants, while their sons and courtiers were seated on horses.7 In some early modern Southeast Asian states, the elephant was closely connected with the investiture of legitimacy to rule. Rulers assumed sovereignty over captured towns or their own thrones by riding an elephant in a circuit outside the walls. The appointment or recognition of new vassal rulers in outlying towns was often sanctified by the provision of a token supply of elephants. Royal conference of elite status, or recognition of such, was sometimes associated with gifts of elephants, as in the case of the saw-bwà of Lawksawk, or elephant paraphernalia, such as the red-roofed, gilded elephant howdah given to the ‘White Crow’ Prince of Chiengsen, when they accepted the Burmese king as their overlord. King Naresuan of Ayudhya also made gifts of elephants to other rulers, such as the pair he sent to the Governor of Spanish Luzon.8 Generally, early modern chronicles make a point of including numerous references to personal royal participation in elephant hunting. There indeed appears to be some evidence that ruler-ship was associated with skill in elephant hunting. The thirteenth century King Mangrai, who later founded Chiengmai, built his palace adjoining the 7

Zei-yá-thin-hkaya 1957, 43, 99; Lamb 1961, 130; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 67; Banyà-dalá n.d., 97; Pruess 1976, 40. 8 Banyà-dalá n.d., 36; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 125; Scott & Hardiman 1901, pt. 2, v. 2, 27; Morga 1970, 1.80.

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elephant kraal. King Chakkraphat of Ayudhya went on yearly elephant hunting excursions in the late 1550s, taking between forty and sixty elephants each time.9

Figure 16: Hind side of one of two giant guardian elephant statues before the Mingun pagoda north of Mandalay. Photograph courtesy of Atsuko Naono.

Southeast Asian rulers also carried their connection with the elephant ‘into the streets’ by travelling on elephants when they moved about the capital or beyond.10 For this reason, throughout the mainland and in some cases the archipelago, courts also kept a fully ‘harnessed and ready to mount’ war elephant stationed within the confines of the royal palace for the immediate use of the sovereign.11 In early 9

Banyà-dalá n.d., 51; Cushman 2000, 31, 72, 405-406, 425-426, 457-458; SM 1952, 20; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 31; Wyatt 1975, 120. 10 Pruess 1976, 31; NC 1966, 13. 11 Loubère 1986, 40; Bowrey 1905, 308. In the Burmese court, the space between the buildings of the royal palace was continually guarded by a trusted minister who stood by with a saddled war-elephant. (Zei-yá-thin-hkaya 1957, 29).

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seventeenth-century Aceh, for example, the privilege of riding one of the royal elephants was reserved for the ruler, nobles, and favoured guests: “for none may have an Elephant, nor ride on them, but those whom the King doth honour.”12 The royal elephant also necessitated respect from pedestrians in its path. When ridden by the sovereign, or when taken out on official duties by a minister or official, no one was to stand in the way. A slow or oblivious pedestrian had more to fear than simply being trampled to death by the elephant. In Aceh, armed footmen preceded it through the streets, bearing flags, drums, and wind instruments, and if anyone failed to move aside, they would be lanced to death as disrespect for the royal elephant was tantamount to disrespect for the ruler.13 The ruler’s mount and other royal elephants thus required eminent decoration. In the 1430s, the royal elephant mount of Burma wore a great golden chain, decorated with precious stones, around its neck, which hung all the way down to its feet. Aceh’s state elephant was said to be “richly adorned” and its tusks gilded in copper according to some and gold according to others.14 In the case of a royal elephant in late seventeenth century Ayudhya, its harness is of extraordinary magnificence [on the elephant’s] back is the throne, all glittering with gold and precious stones, on which the king sits very comfortably, holding in his hand a golden hook with which to spur it.15

Elephants also enhanced the aura of kingship when it intersected with connections between the ruler and guardianship over the religion. In late sixteenth-century Aceh, in addition to the royal mount, an elephant was prepared with a small golden castle, for the ‘Messiah.’ This probably referred to the Imam Mahdi who would fight the Antichrist (the Dajjal) before the return of Nabi ‘Isa (Jesus Christ) for the last judgement. Each year, this special elephant was brought to the 12 Best 1906. 4.140. For examples of high Acehnese officials riding state elephants, see Copland 1906, 4.150. On the nobility and the king riding elephants, see Davis 1906, 2.323. 13 Bowrey 1905, 308. 14 Bowrey 1905, 308; Copland 1906, 4.152; Conti 1929, 131; Hamilton 1930, 2.94; Balbi 2003, 31; Banyà-dalá n.d., 57; Cushman 2000, 119. 15 Gervaise 1998, 180.

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mosque to see if the Messiah had returned. After ceremonies were performed and the Messiah having not yet arrived, the Acehnese ruler would dismount the royal elephant and ride the Messiah’s elephant back to the royal palace for rituals that were held for the remainder of the day.16 In Buddhist Southeast Asia, the white elephant was esteemed above all other elephants as a sign of kingship. In Burma, for example, the acceptance of the white elephant was treated with significant ceremony and ritual. The king first had to leave through a special gate devoted to the purpose to the south of his palace, where he would pour libation water from a golden kettle and then go to another special gate to the north of the palace to take possession of the animal. Not surprisingly, competition for white elephants drove many courts to war.17 As Fedrici observed of King Bayín-naung in the 1560s, This king amongest all other his Titles, hee is called the King of the white Elephants, and it is reported that if this King knew any other King that had any of these white Elephants, and would not send them unto him, that he woulde hazarde his whole Kingdome to conquer them.18

This was the case when Bayín-naung attacked Ayudhya in the late 1560s. In 1296, the kingdom of Champa sent a white elephant to the ruler of Ĉҥi ViӋt as part of its tribute, just as the latter had sent domesticated elephants to China as tribute in 966 and 1284. When Ban-la Tratoan (r. 1460-1471) of Champa came to the throne, however, he demanded of the same court that it send him a white elephant in recognition of his greatness.19 Even the Mughals were reported to have invaded Arakan in the second decade of the seventeenth century in order to “seize the white elephant” of the King of Arakan in order “to send it to the sublime Court.”20 The white elephant was thus an especially prized ‘catch’ in elephant hunting, and the dispatch and receipt of an elephant from the hunter to the court 16 Davis 1906, 2.323. The author is grateful to Professor Clarence Smith for clearing up the details for this reference. 17 Zei-yá-thin-hkaya 1957, 40-41; Cushman 2000, 42-3, 290-291, 325, 357, 430431. 18 Fedrici 1588, 28. 19 Maspero 2002, 56, 82, 85, 116; Linschoten 1885, 1.102. 20 Mirza 1936, 1.404.

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figures prominently in indigenous chronicles. As the Nan Chronicle describes such an event: In [1816] an elephant catcher … captured a male white elephant at Muang Ngim. He brought it to Chao Sumon Thewarat for riding in the palace grounds. Later Chao Sumon Thewarat with his family and the princes of Chiang Khong, Muang Phukha, and Chiang Khaeng, took the white elephant to Bangkok to present it to the King. The Siamese King was very pleased, and rewarded Chao Sumon Thewarat with … money … and many fine gifts [and] ceremonies [were held].21

Numbers and Supply Understandably, given its association with royal power, seemingly wild and exaggerated claims were made of the number of elephants a king had, such as the claim by King Narai of Ayudhya to ownership of some ten thousand elephants. Conti’s belief that the King of Ava also had ten thousand war elephants in the 1430s was almost certainly informed by local claims. One fourteenth century European traveller even claimed that the Cham ruler had fourteen thousand domesticated elephants, all kept under close guard. As a result, determining the actual numbers of war elephants mobilized by early modern Southeast Asian states is problematic. It is also difficult to reconcile claims that Bayín-naung mobilized only seven hundred war elephants in 1563 with those that refer on other occasions to five thousand elephants in Tabin-shwei-htì’s army, four thousand in Bayín-naung’s service on another occasion, or even the five thousand war elephants attributed to Nan-dá-bayin. Sixteenth century estimates, such as the one hundred war elephants possessed by the ruler of Tenasserim, the twenty-six war elephants mustered by the north Sumatran state of Aru, the five hundred war elephants mustered by Mohnyin to use against Bayínnaung in 1557, the five hundred war elephants mobilized by Bayínnaung in his 1563 campaign against Lanchang, and the eight hundred war elephants fielded by Naresuan of Ayudhya; and seventeenth century references to between 160 and six hundred war elephants mobilized by Aceh, are probably more accurate. Maspero’s estimate of as many as one thousand war elephants in Cham royal service in 21

NC 1966, 62.

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the classical period is probably not far from the truth. In reality, elephants never made up more than a small proportion of the fighting forces. During his campaign against Ayudhya in 1563, Bayín-naung reportedly fielded 300,000 men, seven hundred war elephants, and three thousand cavalry.22 The elephant corps of some states also fluctuated during periods of significant warfare. This is indicated by the changing numbers of war elephants in use by Trӏnh forces during their struggle with the NguyӉn in the seventeenth century: one hundred elephants in the 1610s, seven hundred in the 1640s, three hundred in the 1650s, five hundred in the 1680s, and three to four hundred in the 1690s. Similarly, although sources are not as revealing in the case of NguyӉn elephants, the available sources do indicate dramatic changes over the course of a longer period: six hundred elephants in 1642, two hundred in 1800, and eight hundred in 1830.23 Despite their immense strength, the elephant’s constitution is remarkably fragile. Over-exertion, lack of water, and disease could wreak havoc on elephant stocks and they required considerable and knowledgeable care.24 During campaigns, the demands and the ignorance of elite commanders could easily whittle away at the supply of elephants. Thus, the stock had to be replenished, especially during wartime, domestically from the wild or purchased abroad. Many states derived their elephants from their own territories. Southeast Asian methods of capturing elephants varied according to the scale of the state involved and the limitations of the terrain. The most common method involved corralling, the capture of small numbers of elephants in stockades. The aggressive empires of mainland Southeast Asia in particular needed elephants in large numbers and sometimes quickly, to replenish stocks lost in battle or to prepare for major campaigns involving tens or even hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Unexpected attacks on some armies sometimes led to the loss of all of an army’s elephants (and horses). The Burmese experienced this after the siege of Ayudhya in the mid-1580s and

22

Loubère 1986, 89; Conti 1929, 130; Maspero 2002, 17, 91; Fitch 1906, 10.188; Fedrici 1588, 28; Banyà-dalá n.d., 91, 105, 119, 122, 378; Bowrey 1905, 312; Varthema 1928, 74; Pinto 1989, 39; Copland 1906, 4.153; Cushman 2000, 31; Li 1992, 50. 23 Crawfurd 1828, 492; Li 1992, 31, 50; Dutton 2004, 31; Baron 1732, 6.7. 24 Garnier 1996b, 55-56; Evans 1961, 31-32.

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again at Martaban in the mid-1590s.25 The losses from elephants killed in battle could also be significant.26 These losses likely explain otherwise confusing reports that states normally known for healthy supplies of elephants sometimes had none.27 Elephants were hunted in the early dry season and in smaller numbers in the hot and rainy seasons. In the dry season hunt, wild elephants descended from hill and forested areas into the fields and valleys to eat newly grown grass. One Siamese chronicle describes independent elephant-catcher groups, numbering between twenty and thirty men, who went out in pursuit of elephant herds and sent the captured elephants to the king. According to the seventeenth century account of the Persian secretary IbrƗhƯm, however, who evidently witnessed one such hunt, the king of Ayudhya would bring thousands of hunters to search for the herds. Following an approach reminiscent of the great Mongolian game hunts, the king’s men would block off all possible routes for escape and then proceed to beat drums, fire off guns and cannon, and light fires to drive the elephants towards a central corral. This corral would consist of a fenced cul-de-sac constructed from timber firmly planted into the ground. When the elephants were close enough, the elephant keepers would mount horses and surround the elephants, driving them into it. IbrƗhƯm also claims that Siamese riders roped the wild elephants inside the corral by throwing lassoes around the elephants’ feet, and then tying them together with thick rope. The wild elephant would then be tied by the neck between two tame elephants while being pushed along by a tusked elephant from behind.28 There were variations to this approach. In some cases, tame elephants would be sent into the forest to attract wild elephants and as the tame elephants returned, the wild ones would be lured into the trap.29 In mid-seventeenth century Patani, for example, wild elephants were reported to have been caught as they wrestled with the tame ‘bait’ elephants: 25

Pimenta 1906, 10.212-213. Sixty war elephants were lost, all killed in battle, presumably by the Chams during a Vietnamese expedition against them in 1044. Maspero 2002, 60. 27 In 1508, for example, Pegu was said to “have not many elephants.” Varthema 1928, 81. Likewise, Chiengmai and Lao forces, who would normally bring substantial numbers of elephants into battle, had none in one battle in the 1540s. Pinto 1989, 400. 28 Wyatt 1975, 157; Bowrey 1905, 274; IbrƗhƯm 1972, 78-80. 29 Bowrey 1905, 274. 26

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They ride on the back of a tame large elephant into the woods, whom they let loose there: as soon as he meets with a wild elephant he engages him, and whilst their snouts are entangled, some come from behind the wild elephant and twist a rope round his hind legs, and so keep him either to render him useful for the wars, or else kill him for his teeths sake, which are in great esteem in China.30

In Kedah, elephant hunters would surround elephant herds in the forest and capture them in small groups.31 According to some Southeast Asian texts, specialists in using charms could also catch elephants. The Hikajat Potjut Muhamat includes the story of Panglima Keudah, a famous hunter of elephants and deer, who was summoned by a party of Acehnese elephant hunters to capture a herd of seven large elephants at Djeumpa: After his arrival he applied a great number of charms. When the herd of elephants saw Panglima Keudah, the biggest of them grew angry… Panglima Keudah then applied a charm, a smart incantation of great efficacy. Further he recited the prayer Peurabǀn, whereupon the elephant all by himself came out of the jungle. What a clever man Panglima Keudah was! He caught elephants without hobbling them. He caught elephants by means of charms, which had the effect of hobbling them. He was a clever hunstman! The elephants came to him out of the jungle.32

Once in the fencing, Bowrey tells us that the elephant hunters would “fall upon” the elephants and “beat them severely, untill the Keepers come and put theire leggs in the Stocks, by which means, and having the tame elephants with them…they alsoe in the Space of 30 or 40 days become tame…”33 The stocks would be cut cross-sections of large trees, hollowed out to allow the elephant’s foot to be stuck

30 31

Nieuhoff 1732, 2.183.

Wilson 1827, 14. 32 HPM 1979, 171. 33 Bowrey 1905, 274.

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through it. To tighten the fit, wedges would also be driven through between the elephant’s skin and the edge of the grate.34

Figure 17: Elephant hunting in Ava. From a plate in Symes 1800.

At Pegu, elephant-hunters trained female elephants to catch wild, male, elephants. Fedrici claims that the hunters developed a kind of scent that was used to attract the males to the females. Going into the woods, each hunter would bring five or six of the females and lure the male elephants to a stockade. The elephant stockade had a door at the end of a pathway flanked by trees, tricking the elephant into thinking that it was still in the woods. After the door was shut and the females were removed, elephant trainers would use canes to prick the elephant and force him into one of several long and narrow halls connected to the stockade. The narrowness of the hall prevented the elephant from turning around. In some cases, the trainers, standing above in the loft would bind the immobilized elephant with rope, or approach it with 34

Bowrey 1905, 275.

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snares and bind its feet. The elephant was then left in this state with no food or water for four or five days. At the end of this period, food and water would be supplied, a female elephant would be provided, the elephant was untied, “and in eight dayes he is become tame.”35 Copland noted that in 1613, Acehnese wild elephants were domesticated by “set[ting] one wild betweene two tame to tame them.”36 At Dala, captured wild elephants were held and tamed in some eighteen to twenty “very great and long houses” built for the purpose.37 Other states and even those with a significant but still insufficient domestic supply, however, imported elephants as well. As with horses, the Shan (and Lao) states, such as Möng Nai, were a wellknown source of elephants for lowland kingdoms. The Nan chronicle suggests that some Shan states were merely intermediaries between one source of elephants and the lowland state to which the elephants were to be sent. In 1821, it explains, a delegation to Bangkok was sent by Sipsong Panna and Chiangtrung with four ponies and a variety of goods to trade for six male elephants, which would then be sent as tribute by these states to the King of Burma. As Burma and Siam were no longer at war at this time, the King of Siam approved the trade and dispatched his ministers to find six elephants with “good characteristics” in the area around Nan. The SƟjarah MƟlayu appears to suggest that other rulers also sought out the elephants of Pahang. Sri Lanka was another source and was reputed to have the best elephants, which were more easily trained than were those of Southeast Asia. In the seventeenth century, the NguyӉn bred elephants in almost all of their provinces.38 Nevertheless, in the 1630s, Borri claimed that although there were many elephants in the forests, the Vietnamese did not use them because they have not the skill to catch them and to make them tame, but they have some brought unto them from a neighbouring counterey called Cambogia, which are instructed and disciplined before.39 35

Fedrici 1588, 28-29; Conti 1929, 130-131. Copland 1906, 4.151. 37 Fitch 1906, 10.186. 38 Banyà-dalá n.d., 91-92; NC 1966, 67; SM 1952, 150; Bowrey 1905, 180; Li 1992, 50. 39 Borri 1633, 20. 36

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In the eighteenth century, the Trӏnh and later the Tây Sѫn obtained elephants through tribute and trade from the Lao, just as the Vietnamese in earlier centuries had obtained them from the Chams.40 Likewise, other Southeast Asian kingdoms, including Arakan and Ayudhya, were also important exporters of elephants in the early modern period, out of ports such as Mrauk-U (Arakan), Junk Ceylon (Ayudhya), and Tenasserim (Burma and Siam). Exporting elephants was not without its difficulties. Transporting a prospective war elephant, for example, was a major and potentially dangerous task. Fortunately, we have a good description of the procedure from Thomas Bowrey. As he explains, ships would be brought up to the docks and a walkway made of wood planks and logs would run up to the ship’s side, with the upper works of the ship removed down to the deck. Loose planks would then be arranged as a kind of seesaw. As the elephant and his keepers proceeded on the loose planks, they would tip downwards and the elephant “slides downe into the Ships hold” where another set of elephant keepers would meet it. If the elephant was especially fierce, the keepers would block the elephant’s neck so that it could not move, but if it was relatively tame, “onely his leggs Seized a foot asunder with rattans.”41 When removing the elephant at the next port of call, keepers would use a capstan, runners, and tackles to hoist the elephant onto the shore or dock, or, if too far away, onto a large flat-bottomed boat.42 In late eighteenth century Vietnam, when Tây Sѫn leaders built special, large galleys to transport large numbers of their elephants quickly by sea to attack the NguyӉn in the south and the Chinese to the north, they probably would have had to rely on similar methods.43 In addition to catching or purchasing elephants, kings could threaten war to secure elephants as tribute or capture enemy stocks in battle after warfare had broken out. The demand for ‘skilled’ elephants, such as those that fought well with their tusks, sometimes preceded campaigns. On the mainland, warfare typically led to the capture of elephants, sometimes in significant numbers. The Vietnamese brought back mainly elephants as the result of successful warfare against their Lao and Cham neighbours. After one 40

Li 1992, 49, 50. Bowrey 1905, 74. 42 Bowrey 1905, 75. 43 Li 1992, 52; Dutton 2004, 31. 41

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engagement between the Siamese and Burmese in the 1590s, Naresuan of Ayudhya left the field with three hundred large and five hundred smaller elephants that he had taken from his defeated enemy. Tabin-shwei-htì increased his elephant stocks by capturing many elephants at Pegu in 1534 and the entire stock of elephants of one Mon army in 1537. In 1547, Tabin-shwei-htì took many elephants from the Siamese on his way to attack Ayudhya and Bayín-naung made certain to acquire ‘good elephants’ while campaigning in the Shan states before moving against Mohnyin in 1557.44 An important problem in the application of the elephant in long-distance campaigns was that once an army was routed, many of the elephants would be dispersed and were thus lost to the enemy who had taken the field. This was revealed in the first Arakanese assault on Bhalwa in 1609, in which the Mughals soundly defeated the Arakanese, although this was partly due to duplicitous Portuguese mercenaries. In addition to losing five hundred captives, as well as many dead, the Arakanese lost “a large number of elephants.”45 Forced from the field, the Arakanese were unable to recover their scattered elephants.

Transport War elephants were useful for transportion and were known to be dependable mounts. Chronicles and European sources, for example, both frequently speak of kings escaping battles or court coups on elephant and not on horseback. Elephants could carry their human riders far across branches of the sea, useful in delta areas, as far out from land as a half league. The elephant was also known for its natural ability to find its way and to travel on treacherous topography without stumbling, thus making it the preferred mount for jungle travel. Although swampy terrain could bewilder the driver, the elephant, it was believed, could always find the correct path. Along the way, the elephants would break the branches, wade through rivers, and clear a path without hurting its riders. Likewise, the elephant could negotiate slippery mountain slopes. In the case of especially steep slopes, the 44

Cushman 2000, 40, 43, 100, 109, 110, 131, 138, 268; Maspero 2002, 51; Banyàdalá n.d., 45, 48, 91-92; Ricklefs 1978, 89; Li 1992, 49. 45 Mirza 1936, 1.335.

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elephant would secure itself to branches and roots with its trunk, allowing it to ascend or descend with care. Even so, there were limits. When Rama I crossed the mountains to attack Tavoy in 1787, both elephants and their drivers fell from mountain slopes and as a precaution, the pack saddles of the remaining elephants ultimately had to be unharnessed and carried by Siamese soldiers on foot.46 There were many ways to mount the elephant. On the command of the driver, elephants would kneel into position for riders to climb up and down.47 In 1633, Borri described this procedure in Vietnam: at the command of the Nayre, [the elephant] maketh his body in manner of a Ladder, for the greater commodity of those that are to enter into the Litter: For the first step, he offereth his Foot, which is distant enough from the ground; for the second he presenteth his Pasterne, at a convenient distance from the first; and for the third, he boweth his Knee; the fourth step, is on the bone of his Flanke which is cast somewhat outward for the purpose; and from thence he receiveth you on his trunke, and carrieth you to a chaine fastned to his Litter.48

Rulers also had special platforms that allowed them to walk to the top of the elephant and mount it. The royal elephant mount in Ayudhya stood by a small scaffold that allowed the king to walk from the palace buildings and easily ascend his elephant. On occasions when the king did not want to be seen on foot by his subjects, porters would carry a chair, presumably veiled, that would transport him from a window or terrace directly to the elephant’s platform.49 Elephant mounts were subject to status differentiation. In Ayudhya in the 1680s, officials and commanders had to sit bareback on the elephant in the king’s presence. When the king was not around, however, such officers were able to use a howdah. In peacetime, elites rode on elephants in special ‘boarded houses’ which protected them from both sun and rain. Elephant howdahs were strapped to the back of the elephant by means of ropes or chains that were fastened under the elephant’s belly.50 Gervaise and Loubère, commenting on 46

Loubère 1986, 40; Borri 1633, 21-22, 25; Gervaise 1998, 82; Bowrey 1905, 243; Wenk 1968, 69. See also the discussion in Terwiel 1998, 52. 47 SM 1952, 62; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.171. 48 Borri 1633, 22. 49 Cushman 2000, 128; Loubère 1986, 40. 50 Gervaise 1998, 82; Dampier 1906, 2.7; Borri 1633, 21.

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Ayudhya in the 1680s, differ regarding the number of riders on the elephants of their day. The former observes that Siamese elephants frequently carried four people, two seated in the howdah, and one each on the elephant’s neck and rear, while the latter indicates that in Siamese battle formations a war elephant was typically mounted by only three men. Available information on howdahs used by the NguyӉn and references in the SƟjarah MƟlayu to elephants used in early modern Malay warfare indicate that war elephants were mounted by three to four people, in part to balance the howdah. Elephant howdahs carried the central rider, the mahout, who would ride on the elephant’s rear or neck, armed with a long hooked instrument to help manage the animal.51 The elite rider could sit casually in the saddle, either to ride or to concentrate on combat, as the handling of the elephant and the management of all others allotted to the elephant’s service were entrusted to the elephant driver. The elephant driver sat bareback on top of the elephant’s neck and sometimes on its rear, without a saddle. In order to command the elephant to move in one direction or another, or to speed up or slow down, or to stop altogether, the elephant driver used an iron or silver instrument, culminating in a sharp hook, with which he pricked or hit different parts of the elephant’s head in conjunction with oral commands. Elephant drivers in mid-sixteenth century Burma used nooses around the elephant’s neck to control them.52 In addition to war elephants devoted to fighting, many expeditions brought along elephants as baggage animals as well. The great strength of the elephant allowed it to carry heavy guns that would have been immovable otherwise, as well as smaller arms, cannon balls, and gunpowder. In Tabin-shwei-htì’s 1546 campaign against Sandoway, sixty percent of his elephant forces were devoted to carrying baggage and only forty percent were for battle.53 Elephants could also slow the army down during distant campaigns requiring maritime transport. While the control of entire river and 51

Gervaise 1998, 82; Loubère 1986, 92; SM 1952, 56, 179, 180; Cushman 2000, 32-33; Li 1002, 51. Dutton 2004, 30. 52 Loubère 1986, 40, 41; Borri 1633, 4; Gervaise 1998, 82, 180; Roberts 1837, 255; Conti 1929, 131; Cushman 2000, 33; Banyà-dalá n.d., 66. 53 Borri 1633, 23; Bowrey 1905, 254-255; Loubère 1986, 92; Banyà-dalá n.d., 61; Pruess 1976, 31, 58; Pinto 1989, 378.

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extended coastlines in the latter part of the early modern period allowed mainland Southeast Asian rulers to transport land forces, including cavalry, swiftly, on boat, elephants, especially large numbers of them, could be mobilized in this way only with great difficulty and expenditure of time. In one campaign against Sandoway in 1546, for example, Tabin-shwei-htì successfully sent a large land force along the coast to within sight of Sandoway, but it had to wait six days after disembarking for the elephants to march overland before the entire force moved on to assault the town. Similar problems were encountered in 1547 in the crossing from Moulmein to Martaban, for although men, horses, and oxen could cross a bridge of boats fastened together for the purpose, the heavy elephants had to be separately ferried across on rafts or taken upriver to be swum across.54

Training The Southeast Asian elephant, like its Indian counterpart, was useful in ritual and transport, and in warfare, because of its intelligence and trainability. Southeast Asians found it to be an intelligent creature of great value in war and in peace. Certainly, seventeenth-century observers of Southeast Asian elephants agreed. Bowrey claimed in the seventeenth century that elephants were “the most Sensible Animal in the Universe in many respects, and not onely for what action they are trained Up to, but the Affection they beare one another after beinge Civilized…”55 Loubère claimed that seventeenth-century Siamese “speak of an elephant as of a Man, they believe him perfectly rational, and they relate such rational things of him, that he only wants Speech.”56 Indeed, elephants were given personal names. However exaggerated the elephant’s intelligence this reputation won it respect in both peace and war. Making use of the elephant required certain 54

Banyà-dalá n.d., 48; Pinto 1989, 378. Bowrey 1905, 76. Borri even claimed that some elephants understood the Cambodian and Vietnamese languages. “yet nothwithstanding hee doth ordinarily rile and direct him with words, in such sort, that hee seemeth to understand his language: And there are of them, that understand three or foure, according to the Countreyes where they have lived. So it seemed that hee on which I travelled, understood the Language of Cambogia, whence he was brought, and that of Cochin-China, where he served…” Borri 1633, 4. 56 Loubère 1986, 45. 55

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skills. Early modern rulers held in high regard those with especially strong skills in training and handling elephants. The SƟjarah MƟlayu refers to one such elephant expert who was solicited by the local ruler to teach these skills to his courtiers.57 As mentioned above, the Hikajat Potjut Muhamat also includes a story of how a party of Acehnese elephant catchers sought out the aid of a famed deer and elephant hunter named Panglima Keudah, who knew how to apply charms to bring elephants into captivity.58 To be effective in peace or in war, the elephant needed to be trained as well. Some discretion was exercised in selecting an elephant with ‘good characteristics’ for training. One Siamese chronicle refers to a treatise on elephantry which described these characteristics and presumably the handling of elephants as well. Training an elephant for any purpose, however, was a long and arduous task, for which purpose a devoted trainer was provided, as well as other keepers. The number of keepers could vary, but Loubère suggests that at least three men were required to service each elephant in the royal forces, as well as additional officers who commanded them.59 In addition to these factors, elephants properly kept required continual maintenance: “The duties of the keepers, who look after the elephants night and day, are quite unbelievable; they have to stay with them to look after their needs and to chase away any flies that might disturb them.”60 To be appointed the ‘Master of Elephants’ was a high honour, but some of those under his command were not looked upon favourably. Ironically, given the elephant’s importance to Southeast Asian courts and armies, the responsibility of feeding the royal elephants was viewed as an especially degrading task in early modern Southeast Asian society. Men not deemed worthy of respect were placed under the head grooms in the elephant stables and one who was thus relegated to life in these stables was regarded as being of extremely low status. This appears, however, to be consistent with other cases in which captives were devoted to socially important institutions, such as the case of pagoda slaves on the mainland. Domesticated elephants were said to have been fed grass, butter, or rice, and wild ones fed on grass and trees in early modern Burma. In the sixteenth century, 57

Toke Gale 1974, 124; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.202; SM 1952, 62, 94. HPM 1979, 171. 59 NC 1966, 67; Wyatt 1975, 162; Loubère 1986, 89. 60 Gervaise 1998, 32. 58

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references are made to elephants eating sugar cane, which they appear to have favoured. Royal elephants in Bangkok in the 1830s were fed freshly cut grass and bananas.61 In addition to the usual training received by all elephants, war elephants required additional training for service in military campaigns. Unfortunately, the sources on this training are sparse, but we do have some indications. In the eighteenth century, for example, the NguyӉn used life-sized dummies to train their elephants to kill men. As one European observed: Several war elephants were brought into an area fronting the verandah where some figures of soldiers were placed in ranks. These the elephants attacked with great fury, seized them with their trunks, loosed them in the air and stamped them under their feet.62

Even earlier, in the late sixteenth century, Ĉa Shan observed NguyӉn elephant drills in which elephants fought with live soldiers: In the eastern part of the ground stood 500 soldiers with knives, spears and guns in their hands. The soldiers were [five hundred to one thousand metres] away from the elephants. As soon as the signal was given the soldiers ran towards the elephants and fired, but the elephants stood still. Then the bronze drums began beating, the [driver] poked the elephants’ heads with their hooks, and the soldiers sitting on top poked the elephants’ flanks. The elephants then charged forward furiously towards the soldiers who all started running to escape from them. The elephants bowled over some soldiers, and the other soldiers riding the elephants then jabbed these poor soldiers with hooks and spears, causing them to bleed. Some could not even get up. This battle enabled the court to distinguish the best and the worst elephants.63

Fights were also staged with other animals. These types of court fights, however, were part of court ritual and display, as in the case of the tiger-buffalo fights or the tiger-leopard sticking held in Mataram’s ‘tournament square.’ While elephants were too expensive to use in the Javanese case, they were used in such spectacles in both Aceh and 61

SM 1952, 128; Banyà-dalá n.d., 41, 121; Conti 1929, 131; Banyà-dalá n.d., 100; Roberts 1837, 255, 258; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 79. 62 Lamb 1961, 54. 63 Li & Reid 1993, 56-57.

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Ayudhya in the seventeenth century.64 In seventeenth century Aceh, for example, war elephants were brought into the courtyard where they assaulted buffaloes and fought among themselves; they fought so fiercely that “hardly sixtie or eightie men could part them, fastening ropes to their hinder legges, to draw them asunder.”65 As Copland described such a fight in Aceh in 1613: they were entertained with a fight of foure Elephants, with a wylde Tygre tied at a stake, which yet fastening on their Trunks and legges, made them to roare and bleed extreamely.66

On a separate occasion in Aceh in the same year, a fight was also held between wild elephants at the court: before the King [there was] a fight of wild Elephants, which would quickly kill each other, but that some tame are made fast to them, which draw them backe, sometime eighty or an hundred men helping.67

One wonders, however, if the use of elephants in the latter case might also represent an example of improving or at least studying the elephant’s potential performance in battle. This appears to have been the case of a fight observed in the Ayudhyan court in the 1680s: For this kind of sport, the elephants have their head and trunk covered with leather padding. Then the elephant keepers drive their elephants into the enclosure, surround the tiger and the fight begins. The elephants are specially trained to use their tusks with skill and whenever they can, they catch the tiger, lift him up on their tusks and toss him through the air. In this way from all four sides they checkmate the tiger with their bold manoeuvres.68

Southeast Asian armies included both male and female war elephants. While the male was fiercer, he was less easy to control and manage on the battlefield. Male elephants were known to turn against their own riders when they were wounded, a serious problem in military 64

Boomgaard 2001, 146-147, 151, 152, 162. Bowrey 1905, 310; Best 1906, 4.138. 66 Copland 1906, 4.151. 67 Copland 1906, 4.151. 68 IbrƗhƯm 1972, 71. 65

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campaigns. In one case, when opponents stabbed the elephant mounted by the Burmese hero Mìn-yè-kyaw-swa in 1417, the man survived the fall only to have the wounded and confused animal step directly on his thigh. Unable to move any great distance, he was captured and died soon after. Even warrior kings such as Bayín-naung were known to ride female elephants into battle, presumably because they were more amenable to the commands of the driver and thus more effective in battle.69 Another problem with male elephants was that they were almost uncontrollable when musthing. Musthing refers to the madness an elephant goes through each year as part of its reproductive cycle. Its temples begin to swell; its penis enlarges and remains almost constantly erect and continually dripping a white discharge. During this period, glands located between the eyes and ears secrete a dark oily substance, musth, which increases in volume throughout this period and flows into its mouth. The elephant appears listless, but will strike madly at anyone or anything. Forbin observed in late seventeenth century Ayudhya that, during musthing, male elephants “grow outrageous.”70 As Borri also describes musthing in Vietnam in the 1630s: There is onely one occasion wherein [the elephant] will not be ruled by the [trainer] nor by any other man, which is, when on the suddaine he entret into Rut: for then being beside himselfe, as if he were mad, he endureth no body; but taketh his Litter with his trunke, battering and breaking all to pieces.71

Dealing with a musthing male elephant was difficult, but certain means were available. In Bangkok in 1833, the white elephant was confined during the mating season for three months each year. This elephant grew so unruly that he had to be “secured by a cable around his right fore leg; the two fore feet [we]re also well secured.”72 Even so, a musthing elephant might still break free of its fetters and run

69 Kalà 1960-1961, 2.35; Loubère 1986, 92; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 50, 51; Cushman 2000, 117, 127; Banyà-dalá n.d., 94. 70 Toke Gale 1974, 45-46; Forbin 1997, 79. 71 Borri 1633, 27-28. 72 Roberts 1837, 241-242.

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off.73 In early seventeenth century Vietnam, the trainers who sensed the rut coming on, got off the elephant and removed its litter. They then left “him in some close corner alone till his heat be overpassed: after which, as if he were ashamed of his disorder, he goeth holding downe his head, submitting himselfe to the blowes and bastinadoes which he seemeth to himselfe to have well deserved.”74 To tame them further, elephant keepers brought female elephants to accompany the males in their daily routine, as was the case when male elephants were taken to water to wash themselves. In this case, the female elephant would be ridden by a man in front of the war elephant. In a manner similar to the warning given to pedestrians of the royal elephant, a horn would be blown and those in the path of the male elephants would move out of the way.75 Dampier observed a similar approach to the Le emperor’s elephants in Vietnam, referring to those ones that were more unruly than the others were, and presumably, these were musthing elephants: The number of the King’s Elephants are about 150 or 200. They are watered and washed every day in the River. Some of the Elephants are very gentle and governable, others are more indocil and unruly. When these rude one are to pass through the Streets, though only to be watered, the Rider or Dresser orders a Gong or Drum to be beaten before him, to warn People that an unruly Elephant is coming; and they presently clear the Streets and give a passage for the Beast, who will do Mischief to any that are in the way, and their Riders or Keepers cannot restrain him.76

Male elephants do not musth at the same time and some musthing elephants do not become completely uncontrollable. Campaigns were sometimes of such duration that musthing must have been a significant concern for early modern Southeast Asian armies. It was probably for the elephant’s particular keeper to judge whether a male elephant was suitable for mounting. Even so, some clearly musthing elephants were used in battle, perhaps as a sign of bravado or possibly a belief that the elephant would be especially damaging to the enemy. If such hopes 73

Hamilton 1930, 2.58. Borri 1633, 28. 75 Loubère 1986, 46; Forbin 1997, 79. 76 Dampier 1906, 2.3-4. 74

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were entertained, they were misguided. In one early fourteenth century engagement in the Chiengmai area, for example, one warrior’s musthing elephant left him vulnerable to attack because the animal could not be controlled. An opponent drove his own elephant into the musthing one, wounding its neck and pushing it back; ultimately, the musthing elephant fled, carrying his riders with him.77

Field Application Elephants were important on the battlefield in part because of their psychological effect, especially when directed against foreigners unfamiliar with Southeast Asian warfare. George Dutton suggests, for example, that Vietnamese elephants were intimidating to Chinese armies who did not use them. In response, some Ming cavalry put lion masks on their horses to frighten these otherwise intimidating animals and at least one Qing general took pains to instruct his forces to use guns and swords to wound them, because they would then flee.78 At the Battle of Nga-zaung-kyàn (mistakenly called by Marco Polo, the Battle of “Vochang” or Yung-ch’ang) in 1277/1281,79 fought between the Burmese and a Mongol-Chinese army, the Mongol cavalry was initially driven off of the field when their horses came face-to-face with these intimidating beasts: when [the Burmese] were near and nought remained but to begin the fight, the horses of the Tartars took such fright at the sight of the elephants that they could not be got to face the foe, but always swerved and turned back…80

The mounted warrior could also spur his elephant to make it trumpet, unleashing a furious and frightening noise.81 77

Toke Gale 1974, 52-54; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 50. Dutton 2004, 30-31. 79 G. E. Harvey points out that Polo’s Vochang (Yung-ch’ang) is 112.65 kilometres from the actual battle site, at Nga-zaung-kyàn. Harvey 1926, 336n. Polo, whose account was written from memory years later, gives the year as 1277 and Ù Kalà, whose dates are frequently off for the Pagan period, as 1281. See Kalà 19601961, 1.299-300. 80 Polo 1993, 2.102. 81 Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.182-183. 78

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Southeast Asian armies emphasized careful organization of the elephant corps for battle. Siamese chronicles refer to divisions of their elephants into different categories for battle, including shield, hinder, and ordinary war elephants. Likewise, in the organization of military units to be deployed in a campaign, Burmese and Siamese armies allotted specified numbers of elephants to each force and Loubère observed that each of Ayudhya’s nine field battalions included sixteen elephants kept in the rear.82 In military terms, the elephant was considered the most important part of the armed forces at the throne’s disposal.83 As one observer commented on the late sixteenth century ruler of Aceh: “The trust of his land force standeth upon his Elephants” and Loubère suggested of the late seventeenth century Siamese, “they very much rely upon the Elephant, in Combats…”84 In 1797, it was even claimed that the Tây Sѫn relied solely on elephants. According to European accounts, Southeast Asians saw the elephant as more suitable for war than the horse. Indeed, some accounts, such as that of Loubère of late seventeenth-century Ayudhya, found so little reference to, or sight of, cavalry that they assumed, incorrectly, that Ayudhyan armies consisted only of infantry and elephants and that “they have no horse.”85 A wise ruler thus always kept an eye on the status of his elephants in the royal compound and in Kòn-baung Burma, the royal elephant sheds were specifically built so that they could be viewed easily by the king. Of all the war arms, the elephant corps was that most intimately connected with elite participation in the fighting. Although both Bayín-naung and Naresuan were known to ride a horse into battle, both rode elephants more frequently. The main usefulness of the elephant on the battlefield was to carry commanders, princes, nobles, and even rulers. When seventeenth-century Trӏnh armies went on campaign, for example, the commander and his officers typically mounted elephants. The reason for this was that from an elevated

82

Cushman 2000, 298, 372; Loubère 1986, 92. Loubère 1986, 89. 84 Davis 1906, 2.321; Loubère 1986, 92. 85 Li 1992, 51; Loubère 1986, 40, 91. 83

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position, warrior elites could survey the battle more easily and issue orders from atop them on the field.86 Elephants were also crucial to duels between elite men on the battlefield. One noble or prince would hunt out his counterpart on the opposing side to engage in personal combat on elephant-back. Duelling on elephants was conducted in the context of an overall battle. Royalty proved their war prowess by driving their elephant directly towards an equal, also on elephant. The two warriors would then fight elephant against elephant and man against man. In one 1433 duel near the Nan River, for example, Chao Intakaen’s elephant dug into the mouth of his opponent’s elephant, while he himself slashed his opponent with a lance, sending the unfortunate rider off of his elephant and to his death below. As fighting between the Ayudhyans and the Lao in 1463 proved, however, this did not mean that other combatants would not become involved and in one case, the duel was broken off by the arrival of up to four additional Lao elephants against an Ayudhyan prince. On at least one occasion in sixteenth century Burma, rival kings even determined their conflict by duel rather than commit their armies to a bloody battle. Malay chronicles also indicate that in some cases, the failure of a ruler in an elephant duel might lead his forces to abandon the field. Frequent elephant duels were possible because elites were easily identified on the battlefield. In addition to riding specially ornamented elephants, royalty, nobles and commanders rode under their own special parasols. During Bayínnaung’s invasion of Ayudhya in 1563, two Siamese princes, Ramesuan and Mahin, were captured because the Burmese saw the golden canopies of their elephant and recognized them as the mounts of important commanders. Burmese forces thus cut their way through to the commanders and took them.87 As references in the chronicles indicate, riding an elephant provided little security from being killed. From a distance, an enemy was easily spotted from the saddle, but up close, the size of the elephant’s back provided an obstacle to the rider’s line of sight. An elephant-rider was thus vulnerable to the jabs of lances or swords 86 Zei-yá-thin-hkaya 1957, 42; Dampier 1906, 2.7; Cushman 2000, 30, 33, 34, 38, 81, 126, 130; SM 1952, 50, 53, 56, 122, 123, 158, 167-169, 179-180, 185; Wyatt 1975, 145; NC 1966, 13; Dutton 2004, 30; Fytches 1868, 11. 87 NC 1966, 14; Pimenta 1906, 10.211-212; SM 1952, 18, 56; Cushman 2000, 17, 31, 32, 38, 39; Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.182, 183.

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from men who could hide out of sight below. The high probability of a member of the warrior elite engaging in a duel on the battlefield thus encouraged additional measures. Preparing elephants for battle sometimes involved covering the elephant with oil on both its front and rear, presumably when a howdah or a castle were saddled (oil on the sides would have caused them to slip), and on all sides when a rider sat bareback. Clearly, the oil may have prevented the enemy from scaling the elephant. There were other considerations. Some Southeast Asians believed, for example, that the oil would allow the elephant to make “great strides due to the power of the oil,” and there is some reference to the smell of the oil scaring away or otherwise repulsing opposing elephant mounts. According to some accounts, elephants were active in defending the rider and a good elephant was able to distinguish between friend and foe in battle, using its trunk to place its master on its back or to strike down an enemy. War elephants were also believed to be capable of pulling the spears away from the enemy, to prevent them from hurting the warriors on their backs. Further, the warrior could also depend on other men who rode with him on the same elephant by stabbing at opposing warriors with a lance or spear. In at least one case, an elephant rider drove his elephant prod into the head of his rider’s elephant-mounted opponent.88 As with fighting men, Southeast Asians sometimes gave alcohol or tonic herbs to their elephant mounts, presumably to make them fearless in battle. It is unclear from the available sources just how successful this measure was in the field. The Burmese chronicles record an attack by Shans on the town of Sagaing in the midfourteenth century in which the defenders gave an elephant a fermented drink and then sent it out of the gates to wreak havoc among their besiegers. The Shans ‘fired’ and ‘pierced’ the elephant (the weapons used are not clearly indicated) and the drunken elephant wheeled around and then laid waste to the town instead, forcing the defenders to flee the town.89

88

Teeuw & Wyat 1970, 2.170, 200; Cushman 2000, 30, 116, 123, 129, 130; Banyà-dalá n.d., 67; Conti 1929, 131; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 50, 79; Loubère 1986, 40; SM 1952,126. 89 Cushman 2000, 495; Kalà 1960-1961, 1.337.

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Figure 18: Mounted Khmer war elephant and warriors at Bayon, western side, northern half. Photograph courtesy of Atsuko Naono.

The elephant’s tusks were an important battle weapon. As the Nan Chronicle describes an elephant duel in a battle fought near the Nan River in 1433: Chao Intakaen, riding [his elephant named] Khwan Phet, crossed the Nan River in pursuit [of his enemy]. Chao Peng could not assuage his elephant’s hurt feelings. Intakaen urged Khwan Phet on, and the tips of his tusks stabbed into the mouth of his opponent [‘s elephant], and the latter lost all taste for battle.90

In the 1560s, iron pikes were fastened with rings to the tusks of some war elephants, because elephants used these in battle. Bowrey claimed of Sumatran elephants that their sole weapon was a long chain, 5.5 to 6.10 metres in length, tied to one of the two front legs, which the elephant coiled around its trunk. When the enemy approached, the elephant would fling the chain out, laying low both men and horses, 90

NC 1966, 13-14.

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bringing disorder to the enemy. There was thus considerable concern for preventing the breaking of the war elephant’s tusks in battle, although this frequently occurred. This may help to explain the copper gilding of tusks mentioned above and likely, the rings put around tusks on sixteenth century Burmese elephants.91 The sheer physical strength of the elephant made it useful for a range of applications in battle. In the 1480s, the Lawa released a mad elephant against Chiengmai troops, presumably to sow disorder among the attackers. The Chiang Mai Chronicle refers to another possible use of the elephant against the Vietnamese during their attack on Nan in 1480. During discussions on how to beat the invaders, the defenders discussed possible tactics. One of these was to tie logs to the tails of pairs of elephants and then set them against Vietnamese formations; these logs would kill many as they struck Vietnamese heads. Although discussed, it is unclear if such a tactic was ever applied. The Cham warrior-king ChӅ Bӕng Nga, however, certainly sent his elephants in force in a surprise attack on Ĉҥi ViӋt forces in 1383, trampling the Vietnamese with terrible effect and bringing a Cham victory.92 Elephants were useful in siege warfare as well. For breaking down gates, doors, and destroying other wooden structures, nothing was more thorough than the elephant. Elephants were used against troublesome Portuguese desperados at Martaban secure in their godowns in one 1560s confrontation. As Borri described them in 1630s Vietnam: “this beast is exceedingly strong … they will throw downe and overturne Houses, beat downe whole Streetes, when they are commanded in the Warres, to endamage the enemie…”93 Further, when breaches were made in defending walls, elephants, as well as cavalry, would be rushed in to crush continuing resistance.94 Elephant castles were another continual feature of the battlefield application of elephants throughout the early modern period. The nature of the available sources does not allow us to determine when their use began, although Burmese forces used them against the 91

Fedrici 1588, 28; Bowrey 1905, 274-275; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 79; SM 1952, 180, 181; Banyà-dalá n.d., 48. 92 Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 98, 102; Maspero 2002, 107. 93 Borri 1633, 23. 94 Bayín-naung sent in elephants when he breached the walls of Chiengmai in 1557, leading to his victory over the town. Banyà-dalá n.d., 95.

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Mongols in the Battle of Nga-zaung-kyàn in 1277/1281. Borri claimed that in early seventeenth century Vietnam, the war castle was formed by removing the “cover of the litter,” but this appears to be an oversimplification. The elephant castles were made of wood and were bound to the elephants by bands tied under their bellies. They could also be of varying size and capacity and there are references to some castles carrying four, six, eight to ten, and thirteen to fourteen men, in addition to the driver on the neck or rear.95 Weaponry used by the soldiers in the castle changed over the course of the early modern period. Reports from the thirteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries mention that the men in Burmese elephant castles used spears, lances, bows and arrows, darts, and cross-bows to fight. From the sixteenth century, some elephant castles were armed with musketeers as well as small swivel guns. In both Tabin-shwei-htì’s and Bayín-naung’s campaigns, their soldiers fired oversized muskets and small bronze cannon from elephant castles and these were used to great effect in the former’s 1548 siege of Ayudhya. Vietnamese soldiers reportedly used muskets in their castles in the 1630s. In late seventeenth century Ayudhya, the war elephants were practiced in having small 0.91 metre-long artillery fired from their backs and carried 45-centimetre balls.96

Declining Use The elephant gradually fell out of general use in Southeast Asian combat, although they remained important for transporting supplies in warfare. Certainly, their weaknesses was identified quite early. The Chinese had demonstrated the problem of panicking elephants during fighting with the Chams in 605. At that time, the Chinese general Liu Fang had driven the Chams south of the Do Le River. The Chams had planned on an ambush to reverse their defeat and hid in preparation for the arrival of the pursuing Chinese land forces. When the Chinese reached them, the Chams, mounted on large elephants, charged out from all directions. Liu Fang, however, ordered his archers to 95

Polo 1993, 2.101; Conti 1929, 130; Fedrici 1588, 29; Borri 1633, 21, 23. Fedrici 1588, 29; Borri 1633, 23; Cushman 2000, 32-33; Conti 1929, 130; Loubère 1986, 92; Pinto 1989, 414. 96

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concentrate their arrows on the elephants, stopping them and sending them fleeing back against the Cham foot soldiers, trampling them. After a determined Chinese counterattack, the Cham ruler Shambhuvarman (d. 629) fled, having lost many men killed as well as ten thousand captured.97 The Mongols rediscovered elephant vulnerability in 1277/1281, at the Battle of Nga-zaung-kyàn against the Burmese. Although the Burmese elephants had initially broken the Mongol cavalry, mainly because the elephants frightened the horses, the Mongols countered with an effective shower of arrows, aimed from better bows and with skilled marksmanship: They … plied their bows stoutly, shooting so many shafts at the advancing elephants that in a short space they had wounded or slain the greater part of them as well as of the men they carried … when the elephants felt the smart of those arrows that pelted them like rain, they turned tail and fled, and nothing on earth would have induced them to turn and face the Tartars. So off they sped with such a noise and uproar… And then too they plunged into the wood and rushed this way and that, dashing their castles against the trees, bursting their harness and smashing and destroying everything that was on them.98

Fire too could be used to frighten the elephants off of the field. As Borri observed in the early seventeenth century: These beasts … have beene of great use in the Warres, and such Armies as came into the field with great bands of them, were much feared. But since the Portugals found out the invention to incounter them with Torches and Fire-brands, they have rather beene hurtfull then profitable, because being not able to abide those fiery flames before their eyes, they furiously fled away, putting their owne Armies in disaray, killing and overthrowing all that stood in their way.99

Gunpowder technology became perhaps the most important factor in the declining field application of elephants. The terror among elephants caused by the sounds and sparks of firearms was demonstrated repeatedly throughout the early modern period. As one 97

Maspero 2002, 43. Polo 1993, 102-103. 99 Borri 1633, 28. 98

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observer noted in the late seventeenth century: the elephant “exceedingly dread[ful]” of gunfire never becomes accustomed to it.100 Once frightened and routed by the noise of artillery, it was impossible to bring the same elephants back into battle. The Vietnamese and Lao made significant attempts in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries to train their elephants to ignore the sounds and sparks of gunpowder weapons.101 Such efforts, however, seem to have achieved little in stemming the tide away from their use in battle. Gunpowder weaponry became a more serious problem for war elephants as they became more accurate. Elephants were extremely large and lumbering creatures, making them easy targets for firearms, as technologies improved. This was not as much of a problem in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when the matchlocks in use in Southeast Asia were slow to load and weak in accuracy. It took a group of soldiers firing in concert to bring down a ‘mad’ elephant dispatched against them by the enemy in the late fifteenth century.102 From a distance, the weak shot of sixteenth-century matchlocks was even far from effective in penetrating the skin of Elephants, except “it be in the eye, temples, or some other tender place of his body.”103 Cannon could have a more significant impact, especially when it could be brought about easily to bear upon the enemy. At the battle of Pa Mok in 1585, for example, Naresuan’s barges delivered heavy cannon fire from ‘great guns’ on Chiengmai elephants and cavalry, killing many and resulting in a decisive victory.104 The elevated riders, especially those bearing colourful parasols, were easy targets for even clumsy weapons. This was demonstrated at Ayudhya in 1570, when Burmese gunners stationed there fired cannon at an invading Khmer army, killing the commander of the Khmer vanguard, on the neck of his elephant. Datuk Pangkalan Pauh, using a matchlock, also felled the ruler of Patani while the later was mounted on an elephant. The impact of firearms, however, was not decisive and available accounts suggest that the apparently random success of gunfire did not yet displace the importance of other weaponry used in fighting between elephant-mounted warriors. In several elephant “duels” with Burmese 100

Loubère 1986, 92. Pinto 1989, 415; Clarence Smith 2003, 11; Baron 1732, 6.32. 102 Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 102. 103 Fedrici 1588, 29. 104 Cushman 2000, 107. 101

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commanders during battles in the 1590s, Naresuan and his opponents fought with the scythe and sword, although Naresuan was wounded as well by a bullet-wound in his right hand on one occasion. On another occasion, Naresuan cut down his scythe-armed opponent with his sword, while a bullet killed Naresuan’s driver.105 The introduction of flintlocks over the course of the eighteenth century allowed foot soldiers to fire both quickly and accurately. It seems likely that although Southeast Asians resisted abandoning the elephant in warfare in the earlier stages of the emergence of firearm technology, that newer technology made the continued use of the elephant as a war-mount unwise. Elephants thus rapidly disappeared from the front lines of battle by the late eighteenth century in most areas of Southeast Asia. Elephants, however, continued to be used for transporting supplies and for hauling artillery. Indeed, during all three Anglo-Burmese wars, both sides, Burmese and British, made significant use of elephants for supply purposes. In the Second AngloBurmese War, for example, one hundred elephants were gathered or purchased by the British at Tenasserim for use at Rangoon, 150 were brought over from Bengal across the Arakan Yoma, and Lord Dalhousie recommended that a force of three hundred elephants should be acquired for the campaign into Upper Burma.106 This chapter has examined the place of the elephant in Southeast Asian warfare. Although not common in the archipelago, the elephant played a major role in warfare on the mainland and in northern Sumatra. This role changed over the course of the early modern period, as the elephant’s utility in combat, already challenged by archers, was rapidly brought to a close as quicker and more accurate firearms appeared. The elephant’s role in carrying supplies and heavy equipment, however, remained important into the twentieth century. In the following two chapters, we will see that the horse, unlike the elephant, proved more adaptable to the introduction of firearms, while the buffalo and ox remained critical for transport and supply. The elephant also represents the only tool of Southeast Asian armies to disappear completely from the battlefield (but not from campaigns) before the end of the nineteenth century. This is not to say, however, that elephants disappeared from Southeast Asian 105 106

Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.200; Cushman 2000, 77, 123, 131. FPRHB 1853, 87.

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perceptions of warfare, for the elephant lingered in texts and in tactics, in much the same way as the chariot.

CHAPTER SEVEN

HORSES AND CAVALRY Prior to nineteenth century, horses in the archipelago, and likely on the mainland as well, were used, as Peter Boomgaard suggests, for war, hunting, tournaments, and noble mounts, not as beasts of burden, that is, as “the peasant cultivator’s little helpers.”1 Although the elephant may have held predominance as the symbol of kingship, and frequently as a mount by kings and commanders in battle, the horse played no less a significant role on the battlefield. More importantly, long after the elephant ceased to be an effective force in warfare, the horse’s relevance became more important as it was adapted to indigenous gunpowder armies or turned against them by invading Europeans. The important place of the horse in Southeast Asian warfare is demonstrated by early modern Southeast Asian texts. The horse provided the main force of two of the four classical war branches referred to by Southeast Asian literati who borrowed from the ideas of classical Indian warfare, the chariots and the cavalry.2 The former branch was rarely used in Southeast Asian warfare. Horse-drawn chariots were used in court ceremonies and their ever-presence in the form of allusions in indigenous texts and in temple iconography made them an important part of the image of the court and its warriors.3 Even in court ceremonies, horse-drawn carriages filled the place of chariots. The only early modern Southeast Asian ruler who made a sincere attempt to introduce the horse-drawn chariot for warfare purposes was King Bò-daw-hpayà of Kòn-baung Burma.4 Apparently, this attempt was given up within that king’s own reign. The second of the two war branches involving horses, cavalry, played a crucial role 1

Boomgaard 2004, 3. Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 161. 3 See the temple stele of Vishnu, fighting on chariot at Baphuon in Cambodia in Briggs 1999, 173, fig. 31. 4 Cushman 2000, 31; Zei-yá-thin-hkaya 1957, 13, 108. 2

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in indigenous warfare and this role changed in relationship to broader changes in Southeast Asian warfare over the course of the early modern period.

Horsemanship and Society War horses were critical to the sociology of warfare. Elite men of both the archipelago and the mainland rode horses both into battle and in important court ceremonies, particularly in Aceh and Makassar. Bowrey, for example, refers to the impressive bits, stirrups, and saddles displayed by horsed noblemen in Aceh.5 This compares to Pinto’s description of the cavalry of the Burmese king, Tabin-shweihtì, wearing for battledress “cuirasses, breastplates, and skirts of mail, as well as lances, swords, and gilded shields.”6 Siamese chronicles refer to the images of thoroughbred horses and of deities mounted on horses placed at temples.7 Visitors to Vietnam in the seventeenth century also noted the presence of images of horses in temples throughout rural Vietnam, apparently in both the south and the north, a reflection of Taoist influence from China. Apparently not seen by Europeans were the graves of highland peoples on the mainland who included horses in their tombs. Highland elites also ate horsemeat and in one unusual case, a sixteenth century king of Chiengmai died because the meat had spoiled.8 Among the Minangkabau in early modern central Sumatra, horseflesh was the most favoured and expensive of meats. Likewise, in eastern Sumatra, when Battas gave their daughters in marriage to Malay chiefs, they included horses as their contribution to the marriage and likely as tribute. Both the presence of horses in tombs and the eating of horsemeat were clear indications that horses were a part of the ‘conspicuous consumption’ of highland elites in early modern Southeast Asia. As with elephants, though to a lesser extent, white horses were especially sought after by

5

Bowrey 1905, 326; Entji’ Amin 1963, 213. Pinto 1989, 317. 7 Pruess 1976, 36, 40. 8 Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 108. The author also benefited from information personally communicated by Clarence Smith of the eating of horsemeat in equestrian societies. 6

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some Southeast Asian rulers. In 1062, the Cham king even successfully asked the Chinese imperial court for a white horse.9 Early modern court culture connected together elite status and martial horsemanship. Tabin-shwei-htì mounted his military officers on horseback. Kings and noblemen alike demonstrated their horsemanship and combat abilities in court festivals. Schrieke suggests that Javanese cavalry made the mistake of fighting the Dutch in the same way that they competed amongst each other in the Saturday Tournament. This tournament was intended to allow warrior elites to hone their skills in warfare, but the pageantry and code of behaviour ill prepared them for an enemy that did not follow the same rules. During the Burmese festival of Myin-khin, warriors competed, demonstrating their martial skills on horse and elephants. After targetwheels were set up, the elite men of the court galloped up and threw their spears at the wheel’s bull’s eye. Chiengmai elites were also skilled in fighting on horseback as well and in 1586, one Chiengmai king personally engaged in combat on horseback with Burmese troops, fighting them back with his lance.10 The place of horsemanship among Siamese elites was more dynamic. In the 1590s, Siamese armies under Prince Naresuan made significant use of cavalry against Burmese invaders. After a long history of Siamese kings and nobles riding elephants into battle, Naresuan’s application of cavalry stands out in the Siamese chronicles, suggesting that some sort of tactical or attitudinal change had taken place. As Clarence-Smith observes, Naresuan had been raised in the pony-breeding north where horsemanship was perhaps more important than in the central plains. Naresuan also had been taken as a captive to Pegu and he may have become familiar with Burmese cavalry tactics. The Chronicles of Ayutthaya claim that Naresuan himself rode a ‘lance horse’ into battle against the Burmese on several occasions, fighting alternately with sword and lance.11 Even so, after becoming king, Naresuan exchanged his horse for an elephant when leading his forces into battle. By contrast with their 9

Dobbin 1983, 50; Anderson 1971, p. 315; Budiansky 2002, 63-64; Maspero 2002, 62. 10 Pinto 1989, 316; Schrieke 1957, 2.131; Zei-yá-thin-hkaya 1957, 42; Cushman 2000, 114. 11 Clarence Smith 2003, 6; Cushman 2000, 119-120.

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predecessors, elite men in seventeenth-century Ayudhya were said to have looked down upon horsemanship and as a result, were “not very good horsemen.”12 Horsemanship was “too mean” and offered “too little defence” in combat.13 Indeed, Siamese nobles were reputed to be bad at riding horses, and one observer suggests that they rode only with their slaves beside them, to “prevent them from falling.”14 The seventeenth century Persian visitor IbrƗhƯm was shocked by the treatment of riding horses by the Siamese and observed, “it is not the custom in Siam to train horses to run at different paces or to perform any of the manoeuvres of finer horsemanship.”15 According to IbrƗhƯm, the Siamese trained their horses, by means of a rope, tying the horse’s head to its forelegs, to keep its head lowered at all times, as “a sign of respect for the rider” until “he learns to walk about like an old draft horse.”16 It was also suggested, perhaps unfairly, that Siamese nobles used short rope stirrups on their horses because they sat in their poor saddles “as if in a chair,”17 and did not shod their horses. At the same time, royal attendants and royal guardsmen were devoted to riding on horseback, whether during royal hunts, or accompanying the king when he moved about outside of the palace.18 Many of the royal guard were also contingents of mercenaries from well-known horse-riding peoples, including the Laos, Mughals, and interestingly, “Tartars armed with bows and arrows.”19 The last category may be the same as the ‘Ho Chinese’ cavalry in Siamese employ, referred to in The Chronicles of Ayutthaya.20 Elite guards mounted horses not only to keep up with the king, but also because the guardsman on horse was an imposing figure who could easily intimidate a crowd.21 Thus, mounted guardsmen remained important to Southeast Asian courts.

12

Gervaise 1998, 82. Loubère 1986, 40. 14 Gervaise 1998, 82. 15 IbrƗhƯm 1972, 85. 16 IbrƗhƯm 1972, 85. 17 Gervaise 1998, 82. 18 Loubère 1986, 70, 97-98; IbrƗhƯm 1972, 70; Gervaise 1998, 180. 19 Loubère 1986, 97-98. 20 Cushman 2000, 372. 21 They were not always successful, however. See, for example, the failure of mounted guards to hold back a mob in 1540s Lower Burma. Pinto 1989, 324. 13

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One suspects that the poor state of horsemanship among Siamese nobility in the seventeenth century was not completely the invention of hostile foreign observers. It may be possible that a long period of relative peace, as compared with the volatile sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, made horse riding less important in maintaining the security of the kingdom. It seems more likely, however, that this was a peculiar Siamese twist to a region-wide redefinition of elite practices. This redefinition occurred in the context of a highly stratified court culture, in which different social groups were specializing in different kinds of labour. Among mid-sixteenth century Burmese court elites, for example, one’s mount signified one’s relative status, for nobles were said to ride elephants, horses, or to have walked “according to their rank.”22 The SƟjarah MƟlayu records a similar ranking system: [I]f he was of the rank to be borne by elephant he was brought by elephant: if he was of the rank to be borne by horse, he was brought on horseback. If he was not of the rank to be borne by horse, he came on foot…23

Among the Siamese elite, the evolution of the relationship between status and mounts may have followed a different trajectory, one that viewed the mundane aspects of horse riding as something unbefitting nobility. It may also be the case that with Ayudhya’s greater involvement in maritime trade at this time, Siamese nobles were attempting to enhance their status to higher levels than their Burmese counterparts would have dared and abandon the accoutrements of mid-level status. This may help to explain why the Ayudhyan court was reluctant to purchase Persian horses in the 1680s, leading IbrƗhƯm to claim that the Siamese had “no interest in good Arabian and Indianbred horses.”24 Significantly, a sport in the court of Ayudhya at this time was the bait and chase game played out in an ‘arena’ (apparently being a hastily demarcated field) before the king. Two men would compete, one on a ‘chase elephant’ and the other on a ‘bait horse,’ with the elephant charging on the heels of the horse, while the horse22

Banyà-dalá n.d., 57. SM 1952, 56; See also a similar observation for the Trӏnh in Baron 1732, 6. 12. 24 IbrƗhƯm 1972, 85; Loubère 1986, 39 23

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rider tried to avoid being trampled. The game was a clear representation of the two beasts’ battle roles, the aggressive and powerful elephant versus the nimble but evasive horse. The latter hardly fit the image of kingship or that of unswerving warrior-ship cultivated among warrior elites. It seems likely that this sport reinforced or at least reflected Siamese elite preference for the elephant over equine mounts.25 Despite these developments, martial horsemanship persisted among Siamese elites. Even King Narai, despite the claims of foreign visitors, rode horses, but presumably only on rare occasions. As was the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the elephant was giving way to the horse, a development discussed more fully below, as the practical mount of battle. After the fall of Ayudhya, Taksin, who resurrected Siamese power, led his armies against the Burmese on horseback and not on elephant and on one occasion combined a small contingent of Siamese cavalry and a larger force of foot soldiers to rout Burmese cavalry, indicating both more effective use of cavalry and greater attention to Burmese cavalry tactics.26

Supply and Breeds Early European visitors frequently emphasized the equestrian side of Southeast Asian warfare. In the sixteenth century, Tome Pires, writing in 1515, asserted that the men of Arakan, Burma, Cambodia, and Ayudhya were ‘horsemen’ and he refers to numerous horses in Vietnam. Over a century later, one observer claimed that Javanese warriors fought on horseback but not on foot. Horse riders were a general feature of Southeast Asian armies in both the mainland and much of the archipelago from early on. Nevertheless, there was a major disparity in the size of cavalry contingents and in the scale of their application to battle. Again, Pires referred to substantial supplies of horses in sixteenth-century Vietnam, although in the following century the NguyӉn only had some two hundred horses, used solely as

25 26

Cushman 2000, 268. Cushman 2000, 308, 311, 515.

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mounts for commanders.27 Such mainland states fielded cavalry numbering in the thousands and although estimates clearly were given to hyperbole, such as the eight thousand cavalry attributed to King Mangrai of Chiengmai in the mid-thirteenth century, the twelve thousand cavalry attributed to Chiengmai forces in 1559, or the ten thousand Burmese cavalry mobilized by Nan-dá-bayin in the late sixteenth century.28 Even so, such references indicate their importance to mainland warfare. On some occasions, mainland Southeast Asian states were only able to mobilize a select number of cavalry, such as the three to four thousand horsemen brought by Bayín-naung against Ayudhya in his 1563-64 campaign, or the reportedly paltry force of two thousand horsemen maintained by cash-strapped King Narai of Ayudhya. Even so, such numbers remained impressive by comparison to archipelagic cavalry contingents.29 Mataram may be an exception, at least in the first half of the seventeenth century, when it controlled the major horse-breeding districts on Java (see below). In 1678, one Dutchman encountered a force of 240 Javanese horsemen and Trunajaya used hundreds of cavalry at the siege of Kediri in 1678. In the rest of the archipelago, horses were utilized in war in small cavalry contingents useful in support functions or as mounts for the nobility. Certainly, in the 1540s, the northeastern Sumatran state of Aru only fielded fifty or so cavalry, and Tuban in Java could only muster, albeit in a short time, a force of five hundred cavalry. The modest cavalry contingents fielded by the geographically challenged Shan states on the mainland paralleled these small numbers. In 1557, Mohnyin could only muster a force of three hundred cavalry, forty percent smaller than its force of five hundred elephants, to fight against the Burmese king, Bayín-naung, and in 1568, it gathered a force of four hundred cavalry to aid their former nemesis’ siege of Ayudhya.30 27

Schrieke 1957, 2.122; Crawfurd 1971, 153; Dutton 2004, 32; Pires 1944, 1.96, 1,111; According to Pires, there were many horses in Arakan, Burma, Ayudhya, Cambodia, and Cochinchina. Pires 1944, 1.89, 96, 111, 112. 115. 28 Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 47, 120; Cushman 2000, Pinto provides the unrealistic estimate of forty thousand cavalry to Chiengmai and allied Lao forces in the 1540s. Likewise, he estimates the cavalry forces of Luang Prabang in the 1540s at 350,000. Pinto 1989, 363, 400. 29 Cushman 2000, 31; Loubère 1986, 91, see also 39; Banyà-dalá n. d., 105. 30 Schrieke 1957, 2.127; Pinto 1989, 39; Meilink-Roelofsz 1962, 284; Banyà-dalá n.d., 91, 138.

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Clarence-Smith suggests that one feature of the cavalry in the Indian Ocean was that many of the areas where the demand was greatest for field cavalry were also areas unsuitable for breeding horses. Indeed, this was the case in India. Although Hindu rulers used horses to fend off Muslim expansion, southern India did not breed horses, and thus depended upon the importation of horses from Persia and Arabia. Hormuz, the main port of Persia, and Cambaya exported thousands of horses to southern India in the sixteenth century. If this were true for Southeast Asia as well, it would help to explain in part the disparity of cavalry forces between mainland and archipelagic states. The wet, tropical climate of coastal Arakan, Burma, Ayudhya, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the western Archipelago, where rainfall is heaviest, did not favour horse health or longevity. The marshland of south-eastern Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, and Borneo may have discouraged the horse altogether for much of the early modern period, although even in Borneo cavalry were present by the early nineteenth century at the latest.31 In the seventeenth century, it was suggested that the ‘choleric’ nature of locally-bred horses was due to the coarseness and moorishness of coastal pastures that did not “give Courage and Mettle to their Horses.”32 Marshland grasses and green grasses generally were later identified as a source for some horse diseases, such as kumri, in mainland Southeast Asia. Others suggested that a diet of grass deprived such horses of stamina and thus they could not make long overland journeys. The practice of feeding horses green fodder, especially grass, was seen as the probable cause of the death of almost half of the over two thousand horses brought by the British against the Burmese in 1886-1887.33 By contrast, the dryer soils of upper Burma and highland areas produced a potentially healthier range of fodder. Upland grass was better than marshland grass, especially if dried out first.34 As a British cavalry officer noted of upper Burma in 1887, it was possessed of “excellent forage nearly everywhere obtainable throughout the year, whether kurbee, or grass, green or dry.”35 The best local fodder for 31

Meilink-Roelofsz 1962, 121, 357, n.22; Clarence Smith 2003, 6; Crawfurd 1971, 153; personal communication from Clarence Smith. 32 IbrƗhƯm 1972, 78; Loubère 1986, 39. 33 Gervaise 1998, 82; Heyland 2004, 31, 38. 34 Heyland 2004, 38. 35 Heyland 2004, 31.

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equines and bullocks was jowar (androposon sorghum). This was a dry zone and not a deltaic crop and could produce two harvests a year. If early twentieth century crop distribution is any guide, the main concentrations of jowar cultivation were located in the same areas where Burmese cavalry were deployed in the Kòn-baung period: Myingyan, Pakokku, Sagaing, Meiktila, and Lower Chindwin districts, and two of these, Myingyan and Pakokku, were known in the colonial period to produce the best specimens of the Burman pony.36 Horses were fed the dried stalk, finely chopped. Indeed, the commitment of Burmans to supplying good fodder to their mounts on a regular basis impressed British observers in the Third AngloBurmese War: “Our cavalry and transport drivers might well take lessons from the Burmans in the care of their … ponies, for indeed a thin animal, the property of a Burman, is rarely, if ever, seen.”37 Of course, disease was not the only concern. Horses, along with elephants and foot soldiers, suffered heavy casualties in early modern warfare.38 Heavy losses due to climate and war required constant replenishing of equine stocks. The upper Irrawaddy Valley was known as a land “replete with all kinds of horses” as early as the late thirteenth century.39 There has been some confusion as to the differences between the Burman and the Shan pony, for today, the two breeds are incorrectly considered as one and the same. The true Burman pony (also known as the Pegu pony) was a low set breed, standing at between twelve and thirteen hands high. It was a strong, long distance mount, and could tolerate both poor fodder and hot weather well.40 Its close cousin, the short Shan pony (about twelve to thirteen hands high as well) was a highland breed in use among Shan states such as Möng Nai, Mohnyin, and Hsenwi which were well known to maintain moderate contingents of cavalry and to produce ‘good’ horses.41 Its high stamina made it effective in travelling long distances, although it was not especially fast. Indeed, it was suggested at the end of the 36

Cartwright & Breakspeare 1910, 199, 201. Heyland 2004, 31. 38 Cushman 2000, 30. 39 Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 38. 40 Ferrars 1901, 139-140; Cartwright & Breakspeare 1910, 201. 41 Banyà-dalá n.d., 92, 97, 138. Banyà-dalá refers to the Mohnyin horses as “thorough bred” in 1568. Banya Dala n.d., 138. 37

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nineteenth century that Shan ponies were weaker and slower than Burman ponies, particularly when compared to specimens of the latter from the Mount Popa area. Its usefulness in Burmese and Siamese warfare of the sixteenth century, covering an expanse from Arakan to Cambodia and Laos, including numerous mountain ranges and hill areas, was clear. Perhaps frequent warfare against Ayudhya, or even in the Shan hills themselves, encouraged lowland Burmese and Siamese rulers to import Shan Ponies. Whether through trade, tribute, or capture, lowland Burmese rulers made certain to acquire significant numbers of new Shan ponies before and during their sixteenth century campaigns.42 In southern Vietnam, the NguyӉn relied most heavily on small ponies from the highlands. The local breed was very short and stood ten to eleven hands high (at the bottom end being approximately the size of a Shetland pony).43 Borri, writing in 1633, had a favourable opinion of this breed and suggested that although NguyӉn mounts were small, they were “very serviceable and generous.”44 The Trӏnh apparently relied less upon the highland ponies, seeking instead taller mounts, perhaps imports of Arabian horses or captured Chinese horses. In the seventeenth century, for example, the Lê emperor, under the control of the Trӏnh, maintained stables of hundreds of horses thirteen or fourteen hands high.45 Small ponies remained the rule in Vietnamese armies in the nineteenth century. European visitors, for example, complained of the small size of Vietnamese cavalry mounts. As one observer complained in 1830: “…There is no cavalry in the [Vietnamese] army, the puny horses of the country being unfit for this service...”46 The Chams reportedly began to use cavalry from 1171 after a shipwrecked Chinese officer taught them cavalry tactics and how to dispatch arrows from horseback. He was subsequently dispatched to gather local horses, but either could not meet the new Cham demand or found local horses too small. Thus, in 1172, the Cham ruler, Jaya Indravarman, sent a mission to purchase horses on Hainan Island. 42

Clarence Smith 2003, 2; Scott & Hardiman 1901, pt. 2, vol. 2, 263; Banyà-dalá n.d., 91, 92, 97. 43 Dutton 2004, 32; Personal communication, Clarence Smith. 44 Borri 1633, 53. 45 Dampier 1906, 2.3. 46 Crawfurd 1828, 492. See also Lamb 1961, 208-209.

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When the local population apparently refused to sell them, the Chams began to loot and seize every person they came across, leading the local population to agree to sell their horses to the Chams. When the Chinese court heard of this, it renewed the prohibition against horse exports in 1175. A subsequent Cham embassy to the imperial court in 1176 was told that the prohibition would not be annulled and horses in Hainan could not be treated as a special case. According to Maspero, the Cham ruler thus abandoned his plans for a land campaign against Angkor and determined instead on a maritime expedition upriver against the Khmer state. Presumably, the Chams again turned to local horse supplies, for in 1470 the forces sent by the Cham king Ban-la Tratoan (1460-1471) into the province of Hoa-chau in 1470 included a ‘large’ force of cavalry.47 As in the mainland, archipelagic breeds tended to consist of rather short ponies. The basic stock of archipelagic horses, like those of mainland breeds, was Tibetan, Mongol, or affiliated breeds probably introduced from either China or India before the availability of written sources. Connections with Indian Ocean trade led to gradual interbreeding with Arabian stocks and this was intensified with the arrival of the Dutch. However, the local breeds have generally remained short, stocky, and hardy, allowing them to perform well in both resource poor environments and in the intense tropical heat. Parts of the archipelago emerged as centres of horse breeding in the seventeenth century and probably earlier, for sale through maritime trade, including European colonial and mainland markets. The largest concentration of horses in the archipelago, however, was on Java. Grise, for example, emerged as an important horse breeding and saddler centre and supplied the VOC with horses, bridles, and saddles, while in the northeastern Javanese state of Tuban, horse breeding was the main industry. Batavia also became a centre for supplying the mainland with horses and sent small numbers of horses to the court of Mataram as tribute. In the late seventeenth century, the King of Ayudhya attempted, with some success, to purchase hundreds of Javanese horses at a time from Batavia. By 1842, it was estimated that Java as a whole contained 291, 578 horses in total. The Javanese pony, standing at 1.27 metres (or 12.2 hands) high, was known as 47

Maspero 2002, 78-79, 117.

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being small, brisk, and “resty.” Crawfurd described two different kinds of Javanese pony, a sluggish lowland horse, consisting of the overwhelming majority of Javanese equines, and a smaller and more spirited highland pony.48 Other pony breeding centres in the archipelago included Sulawesi, Japara, Pariaman in western Sumatra, Sumbawa and Timor in the lesser Sundas, and Luzon.49 Outside of Java, the second most significant population of ponies in the archipelago was in Sulawesi, which produced a good, well-balanced breed. Early seventeenth century accounts inform us that there were good, though expectedly small, ponies near Aceh. However, this local supply may have disappeared as later seventeenth century visitors make no mention of them, leading Peter Boomgaard to suggest that perhaps the slim pastureland available outside the town walls had given way to rice fields. Ponies were also plentiful among the Minangkabau in central Sumatra and Batak ponies were an important export item to western Java. Anderson also reported that these horses were brought down into eastern Sumatra as well “in considerable numbers” and that good horses could be procured in eastern Sumatra near Sirdang, Batubara, and in villages along the Kuala Padang River. In the early nineteenth century, the Padri leader Peto Sarif (Imam Bonjol) established a breeding centre for horses as part of his efforts to make Bonjol a populous and prosperous settlement. Like the Javanese pony, the Sumba/Sumbawa stands at about 1.27 metres (or 12.2 hands) high and the Timor pony (the region’s shortest) standing at 1.22 metres (or 12 hands). The great agility of these breeds is probably due to the infusion of Arab and Barb stocks. Archipelagic horses thus appeared to be odd creatures to visiting Europeans, very small, but capable of carrying extremely heavy loads, and able to perform light, even elegant movements. Even at the present time, such Indonesian ponies are highly effective in lance-throwing competitions in Indonesia, which may be a throwback to elite martial competitions of the early modern period. European and Middle Eastern visitors to Southeast Asia seem to have agreed that local small ponies were unsuitable by their standards for warfare, although it seems that they had heavy 48

Meilink-Roelofsz 1962, 271, 272, 284; Loubère 1986, 39, 40; Edwards 2000, 204-209, passim; Crawfurd 1971, 153; Ricklefs 1978, 81. 49 Meilink-Roelofsz 1962, 102, 110, 113, 286-287.

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cavalry mounts in mind. Nevertheless, their endurance and stamina coupled with their quickness and agility made them excellent as light cavalry mounts. Although Crawfurd claimed that Sumatran ponies, of both the Aceh and Batubara breeds, were “better adapted to draught than the saddle,” local supplies of these ponies allowed the Padris to sweep through the valleys of central Sumatra with surprising speed during the Padri War. The Philippine pony, larger than those breeds of the western Archipelago, was considered by some as “the best breed of the whole Archipelago,” although its origins are unclear.50 States, especially on the mainland, exchanged horses across the region through both trade and warfare. As mentioned above, Ayudhya sought ponies from Java, and, although depending mainly upon Shan sources, mid-seventeenth century Burma also imported horses from Aceh. It is unclear if Sumatran ponies were sought, for Aceh was also importing Persian horses, as late as c. 1700, which may have then been transhipped to Pegu.51 Horse purchases, however, probably provided far fewer horses for mainland armies than the spoils of battle. Mainland states increased their supplies of warhorses through military victories and depleted them because of defeats. Tabin-shweihtì captured many horses in his 1534 sacking of Pegu, captured the entire horse stock of one Mon army at Nan Ruih in 1537, and seized even more Siamese horses in a 1547 campaign. After one especially serious defeat of the Burmese in 1592, the Siamese victor, Naresuan, reportedly left the field with two thousand horses captured from the Burmese, apparently a serious blow the First Taung-ngu military resources.52 Clearly, defeated states would suffer from a lack of horses for a considerable period, until new horses could be trained, captured, or purchased. Chinese seizures of Vietnamese horses in the early fifteenth century seems likely. During the Chinese campaign in Vietnam in 1429, after several decades of Chinese control, the Vietnamese appear to have suffered from a lack of cavalry. In the battle of Chi Lӽng Gate (18 September 1427), Vietnamese forces had to depend upon a ruse to deal with the Chinese cavalry: they pretended to flee, leading about one hundred Chinese cavalry into the marshes at 50

Crawfurd 1971, 153; Boomgaard 2004, 2; Dobbin 1983, 15, 71, 163, 182; Loubère 1986, 39; Edwards 2000, 204-209, passim; Anderson 1971, 305, 308, 312. 51 Boomgaard 2004, f. 2. 52 Banyà-dalá n.d., 45, 48; Cushman 2000, 72, 100, 104, 131.

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Dao Ma Pha mountain where they were bogged down, ambushed, and slaughtered.53 After the Chinese withdrew, and Vietnamese supplies of horses recovered, the Vietnamese re-developed their cavalry. The Trӏnh and the NguyӉn certainly used cavalry in their seventeenth century contests: NguyӉn forces included “a great number of horses” (1630s) and the Trӏnh some eight to ten thousand (1690s).54

Field Application As Clarence-Smith has suggested, prior to the classical period, Southeast Asian horsemen may have amounted more to mounted infantry than true cavalry, that is, they dismounted to fight rather than fighting from the saddle.55 Nevertheless, from the early classical period, true cavalry entered the field. According to a Chinese account, the Chams began fighting on horseback in 1171, after learning about Chinese cavalry and cavalry tactics from a shipwrecked Chinese officer. At the time of his arrival, the Chams and the Cambodians had found themselves so evenly matched in all other martial resources that they were locked in a stalemate. The Chinese officer reportedly taught the Cham ruler, Jaya Indravarman, mounted archery and cavalry manoeuvres, so impressing the king that he ordered the officer to search out horses in Champa. With the aid of cavalry, the Chams then broke their deadlock with the Khmer.56 Similarly, according to a 1622 account of Javanese cavalry: They are particularly skilled at using the long pike on horseback, for they are fine horsemen, and excel our riders in this respect, for they have both hands at their disposal, as they guide the horse with their knees and body. Around their waists they wear a girdle on the front part which is fixed a copper hook, in which they fasten the rein, so that they keep both hands free, manipulating the long pike … so cleverly that anyone who had never seen it before would be astonished.57

53

NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 154. Borri 1633, 53. The Trӏnh estimate is taken from Baron 1732, 6.7. 55 Clarence Smith 2003, 2. 56 Maspero 2002, 17, 78. 57 Quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.122. 54

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In Vietnam, there appear to have been regional differences in the weapons used by cavalry. In the seventeenth century, Trӏnh soldiers used lances. In the south, however, NguyӉn cavalry were also noted for practicing in shooting darts from their horses on a daily basis, which made them skilled warriors on horseback.58

Figure 19: Trӏnh horsemen practicing their skills with the lance. From an illustration in Baron 1732.

. The mobility of cavalry made them excellent for a range of military and support tasks. Chronicle descriptions of such battles, however, sometimes do not provide enough information to allow full comprehension of such tactics. In The Chiang Mai Chronicle, for example, the forces of Chiengmai applied the ‘crow’s wing’ tactic, in which elephants drove the enemy into a thick body; while cavalry then fought with the enemy and held them down, archers directed arrows 58

Borri 1633, 53.

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into the enemy, which had no room to manoeuvre or escape.59 It is unclear, however, whether or not the Chiengmai cavalry were vulnerable to ‘friendly fire’ as well. Similarly, although Makassars clearly made use of mounted warriors in fighting in South Sulawesi in the 1660s, a Malay poem describing the fighting, which refers to heads chopped off or smashed in, tells us little about the actual tactics applied or their formations.60 Other accounts allow a better understanding of general cavalry tactics. Cavalry were especially effective in surprise attacks and raids, because, when charging from a covered position, they gave no warning of the impending attack. Reportedly, a fifteenth century king of Ava used a special force of cavalry to apprehend the queen of Pegu while she was on a pilgrimage to a temple. Taking position in the forest, they hit the queen’s guards, inflicted heavy casualties, routed them, and seized the queen together with her elephant.61 Javanese cavalry effectively exploited the element of surprise on Dutch troops, attacking “like madmen, with streaming hair, shaking their heads, with their lances in their hands.”62 Cavalry inflicted the greatest damage when the enemy was in confusion. As Schrieke observes, porters were sometimes the preferred target of Javanese cavalry because of the confusion they would create. Cavalry also captured or blocked the way of retreating or deserting troops in the field.63 Such rear assaults by spear- and sword-wielding horsemen could have a bloody effect on confused, fleeing troops: when Bayín-naung dispatched cavalry against retreating Lanchang troops after the Battle of Lotus Lake (1565), “corpses were strewn over the road for two or three leagues where the cavalry had ridden them down.”64 This slaughter was possible in part, because the Lanchang troops at this time, unlike the Burmese, lacked cavalry.65 Burmese cavalry pursuing fleeing Siamese troops in the 1563-1564 siege of Ayudhya also “cut them down in great numbers in hand-to-hand fighting.”66 Cavalry were also effective 59

Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 48. Entji’ Amin 1963, 171. 61 Banyà-dalá n.d., 1, 2. 62 Quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.132. 63 Schrieke 1957, 2.132; Banyà-dalá n.d., 104, 123. 64 Banyà-dalá n.d., 132-133. 65 Banyà-dalá n.d., 122. 66 Cushman 2000, 34. 60

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in preventing the enemy from foraging for food, an essential means of maintaining a campaign.67 One early battle tactic, found repeatedly in the chronicles, was the use of lightly armed and rapid cavalry to lure enemy troops into ambushes. The Chiang Mai Chronicle refers to an impending Chinese attack on Chiengsen in 1402/1403, presumably consisting of tributary Tai forces. The defenders dug a series of trenches, one being an arm deep, filled it with sharpened spikes, and others much deeper, and covered them so that they could not be detected. They then deployed a small contingent of five horsemen to lure the enemy’s elephants and horses across the trench works, leading to the capture, and presumably the death, of many. In one mid-sixteenth century contest between Burmese and Mon troops, Burmese cavalry was also deployed in this way, luring the Mon troops on until a force of elephants crushed them. In another case, the less reliable specimens among the elephants and cavalry were posted in the open, while the main force remained hidden, to lure the enemy into an ambush.68 The success of this kind of ambush relied heavily upon coordination between foot soldiers and cavalry. When coordination was poor, the results would obviously be disappointing, but when it was successful, the result could produce a decisive victory. Bayínnaung demonstrated this at the engagement at Phraya Chakri’s stockade in 1563. Siamese forces under Phraya Chakri had built a stockade on the Lumphli Plain and waited for Bayín-naung’s attack. Bayín-naung had succeeded in a matter of days in routing Siamese forces and overrunning their stockades before arriving on the Lumphli Plain. Bayín-naung stood up on top of his elephant, a high beast painted red, making himself sufficiently visible to his own troops to allow him to direct the Burmese attack on Phraya Chakri’s stockade. He first had his foot soldiers hide in the tree cover on both sides of the plain and then, using arm movements to communicate his orders, directed a force of five hundred cavalry to advance up to the walls of the stockade and ‘mock’ the Siamese. Phraya Chakri responded as expected and led his men out of the stockade and into the plain to begin battle. The Burmese foot soldiers then came out of hiding, 67 68

Cushman 2000, 35. Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 72-73; Banyà-dalá n.d., 66, 117.

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moved out on the flanks of the enemy in an ‘encircling attack.’ apparently blocking off the Siamese forces from the protection of the stockade. The Burmese cavalry then charged into the enemy, killing many, and sent them in a rout towards Ayudhya, abandoning their stockade. According to the Chronicles of Ayutthaya, eighty percent of the Burmese soldiers returned to their own stockade with severed Siamese heads. On Java, Trunajaya also dispatched numerous cavalry attacks during the siege of Kediri in 1678.69 The most important application of horses during sieges, however, was the final assault, after artillery breached the defending walls and cavalry (and elephants) rushed into the city quickly to reduce the defenders inside. This application of cavalry and elephants sealed the fate of Ayudhya in 1568, when the Burmese repulsed the final counterattacks of the defenders after a traitor inside had opened the city’s gate to Bayín-naung. Cavalry were important for siege warfare in other ways as well. On one night during the siege of Kamphaengphet in 1663, Bayín-naung deployed five or six hundred of his best cavalry on the town’s riverbank under cover. The next day, Bayín-naung brought his boats up to the town walls and when several thousand of the Siamese garrison came out to fight them, the boat guns kept them under fire while the hidden cavalry swept forward, the latter killing as many as five hundred of the defenders. Bayín-naung also found during this siege that cavalry were also effective in preventing a besieged enemy from foraging for food outside of fortress or stockade walls. In one case, one of Bayín-naung’s Shan commanders led his three or four hundred cavalry across a stream, “holding on to the horses’ neckstraps,” to capture a body of Siamese who had snuck outside of the defences at Kamphaengphet.70 Cavalry also had support functions such as intelligence gathering and field communications. Bayín-naung appears to have relied heavily upon cavalry for such purposes. During his campaign in Ayudhya in 1563-1564, Bayín-naung left a body of five hundred cavalry in the rear to watch for approaching armies that might try to cut the main force off. If an approaching army were seen, riders were to be sent to inform the main force. In other cases, he used cavalry for other reconnaissance, such as scouting out the enemy’s disposition in 69 70

Cushman 2000, 34; Schrieke 1957, 2.127. Banyà-dalá n.d., 18, 95, 105, 134.

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Lanchang. During Burmese campaigns near Ayudhya in the reign of Bayín-naung’s successor, Nan-dá-bayin, the latter’s son and chief military commander, entitled Maha Upparat, continued to rely on large columns of hundreds of cavalry to race across the terrain ahead and report on Siamese positions. Although the Burmese used cavalry in this way extensively, this kind of task was likely common among all Southeast Asian armies using cavalry. Certainly, Siamese commanders under Taksin utilized mounted reconnaissance after the fall of Ayudhya in 1767. Related to such functions, cavalry were clearly the quickest way to communicate with allied forces at a distance, in order to coordinate campaigns.71

Eighteenth-century Revival The quality of cavalry in Southeast Asia, at least on the mainland, appears to have declined in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The case of horsemanship in late seventeenth century Ayudhya has been discussed above. In Burma as well, indigenous cavalry fared poorly against Yunnanese horsemen in 1659. On several occasions, on the Salween in 1659 and in the Mu River Valley in 1739, Yunnanese and Manipuri horsemen respectively ran freely about the country without fear of Burmese cavalry.72 The eighteenth century, however, also witnessed an increasing emphasis on cavalry across the mainland. The NguyӉn, for example, regularized the training of cavalry with the establishment of a school devoted to this purpose in 1700 and in 1794, NguyӉn Ánh made the sale of horses to foreigners a crime punishable by death.73 As mentioned above, Taksin began to use Siamese cavalry to challenge Burmese invaders. This greater interest in cavalry on the mainland does not appear to have been paralleled by a similar trend in the archipelago. While reasons for this remain unclear, a possible explanation is that the supply of prized Arabian mounts to the archipelago may have declined because of the seventeenth century trade crisis. In two of the archipelago’s 71

Banyà-dalá n.d., 123; Cushman 2000, 38, 124, 516; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995,

72

Dijk 2004, 1.118-119; Lieberman 1984, 210. Scott 1927, 503; Dutton 2004, 32.

48. 73

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major centres for horse breeding, related factors may have played a role as well. In Java, for example, as Dutch rule expanded, Batavia became the major source of supply for new elite mounts. In the 1680s, as well, the Dutch had destroyed the state of Makassar on South Sulawesi, removing a major archipelagic centre for cavalry. Further research, however, is needed to support these suggestions. Part of the growing importance of cavalry was due to the difficulties of using elephants in battle against improved firearms and marksmanship. The flintlock, introduced in the early eighteenth century, could be fired with a trigger, rather than the awkward lighting of a match in the old matchlock muskets, making it easier to target and hit even a fast-moving elephant. Certainly, cavalry were also more vulnerable, as Burmese cavalry discovered in one engagement with Siamese forces in their mid-eighteenth century invasion of Ayudhya, in which the Siamese had cleverly placed sharpshooters on a stockade wall to provide cover fire for their men to defend them against the dreaded Burmese cavalry.74 Nevertheless, unlike elephants, horses could be trained not only to hold steady in fire fights, but also to accommodate with more success than the elephant, firing from the saddle.75 The Burmese appear to have led the way in advances in firearm-bearing cavalry, perhaps because the 1740-1757 war with Peguan rebels worked as a catalyst for integrating new and old warfare technologies. Indeed, over the course of the last half of the eighteenth century, Burmese began arming their cavalry with matchlocks, in addition to other weaponry. In one case, Burmese cavalry fired guns from horseback as they chased retreating Chinese volunteers fighting for Ayudhya across a river, killing many and pushing the rout of the Chinese. In a later engagement, the Burmese applied the old tactic of using soldiers feigning retreat to lure the enemy into an ambush. Once drawn forward, the Burmese drove forward against the Siamese and circled around to their rear. The Burmese cavalry, however, also added gunfire to their normal javelin throwing and slew large numbers of confused Siamese soldiers, routing them.76

74

Cushman 2000, 505. Clarence Smith, personal communication. 76 Alexander 2000, 20; Cushman 2000, 482, 506. 75

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Perhaps a more important change in cavalry on the mainland in the late eighteenth century was the shift towards even faster and lighter mounts. The strongest efforts in this direction were made by the Kònbaung Burmese court, which replicated the major, region-wide campaigns not seen since the fall of the First Taung-ngu Dynasty. The Kòn-baung court could not abandon the mountain ponies, for they were desperately needed for campaigning across the mountains separating Burma from Ayudhya. These were supplied as tribute from Mainglon and Lanchang in the early 1760s. Such supplies of presumably Shan ponies were further increased indirectly through Ayudhya after its 1767 conquest by the Burmese, for ponies were included in the tribute it paid to the Burmese court.77 Even before the successful siege of Ayudhya in 1767, the Kònbaung court pursued supplies of Manipuri ponies and horsemen. The Manipuri pony was small (about twelve hands high), strong, tough, and, in appearance, was similar to the Burman pony, but was also especially fast and agile. Manipuri cavalry had earlier demonstrated their effectiveness in a series of raids throughout Upper Burma in the 1730s and 1740s. In one campaign, Manipuri horsemen swept across the north and down the Mu River valley, stopping short of the Burmese capital due to the unavailability of boats to cross the Irrawaddy River. Admittedly, the Restored Taung-ngu court was too weakened by internal problems to resist them effectively, leading to a rebellion in the South as well from 1740, which ultimately ended the dynasty in 1751. Nevertheless, the impressiveness of Manipuri light cavalry movements across the north was not lost on local inhabitants of the Mu River Valley, especially Alaùng-hpayà and his sons, who resurrected a Burmese state under their rule from 1752 onward. From 1759, the acquisition of Manipuri cavalry and horsemen was made possible by a series of punitive expeditions, in which tens of thousands of Manipuris, including their horsemen and horses, were deported to the royal capital. In the 1764 campaign against Manipur alone, the Kòn-baung court brought back thousands Manipuri horsemen.78

77 78

Tun Nyein 1899, 17. West & Little 1884, 48; Tun Nyein 1899, 17; Quaritch Wales 1952, 142.

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The Manipuri cavalry were the elite among Burmese cavalry. While of less use against Siam or Arakan, for Shan horses remained the best option for mountain crossings, Manipuri cavalry were essential to maintaining central control over the Irrawaddy Valley. In the nineteenth century, the Manipuri cavalry were used to secure outlying districts and tributary Shan statelets from rebellions and local conflicts. One thousand Manipuri cavalry, for example, were dispatched to reinforce the saw-bwà of Lai Hka in fighting against the Karenni.79 The Manipuri cavalry were also mobilized for the court’s general protection, for its battle forces, and its ceremonies. For this reason, Europeans who visited Burma during this time, only having the opportunity to see cavalry in these contexts, believed incorrectly that Burmese cavalry consisted solely of Manipuri horsemen. Other cavalry units included the royal servicemen of the Myin district of what would later become Yamethin district in colonial times. By the nineteenth century, the Myin cavalry served on a rotational basis, with only ten percent of their number on active duty in the royal capital, while the other ninety percent remained in their home district, working their lands. As the Burmese army became a salaried force, these horsemen received a monthly wage, as well as immunity from restrictions on travel to other areas of Burma and immunity from prosecution by any officials but those of their own district.80

Nineteenth-century Decline European cavalry do not appear to have made a significant impression on contests with indigenous forces in Southeast Asia until relatively late. On Java, the confrontation between Indian and indigenous mounts was fought out between British and French dragoons in 1811, not among Southeast Asians. In early nineteenth century contests between the Dutch and Indonesians, indigenous forces indeed made good use of ponies in attacks on the Dutch. The Dutch cavalry, however, compared unfavourably with archipelagic horsemen and the former won out in the long-term by other means. During the Java War 79 80

Scott & Hardiman 1901, Pt. 2, v. 2, 3. Wilkie 1934, 106.

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against Dipanagara and later against the Padri in western Sumatra, Dutch mobile columns consisted of mounted infantry, field artillery, baggage animals, and some cavalry, but it is unclear if Dutch cavalry operated as a separate force in battle. As late as 1850, the Dutch mainly used their horses to pull field artillery and the small squads of cavalry they deployed, such as the thirty cavalrymen under Major de Vos on Bali in the late 1840s, were used for rear-guard duties, to protect communications and the baggage train. The only genuine Dutch cavalry unit stationed outside of Java was on South Sulawesi where indigenous cavalry presented a very real challenge. In the case of Vietnam, the French do not appear to have used cavalry in their early campaigns against coastal and southern Vietnam, relying instead on boat batteries and marine assaults on coastal positions. By the 1870s or 1880s, however, horses and mules were being used by the French in Vietnam and possibly in Cambodia.81 They would also play a role in several French actions in the early 1890s against the Vietnamese, although details are not as readily available as those for the British campaign in upper Burma.82 In the First Anglo-Burmese War, British forces generally relied more on waterborne forces and sieges of fortified positions, rather than on open field contests. Even so, detachments of British cavalry were deployed in 1824 in Assam, Arakan, and Manipur in order to provide cover for advancing troops. Likewise, the Burmese deployed contingents of Manipuri cavalry (the ‘Cassay Horse’), in one case composing a body of seven hundred cavalry attached to one Burmese army in 1824.83 Thus, minor cavalry engagements were numerous and indicated that the results of contests between indigenous and British Indian cavalry were not a foregone conclusion. In Assam in 24 May 1824, British cavalry successfully cut off a Burmese cavalry retreat to a river leading to a minor disaster for Burmese forces: [S]ome escaped …Many of the enemy on horseback attempted to escape by swimming their horses, but they were thrown from their saddles in the middle of the stream; the horses, or rather tattoos, 81

Crawfurd 1971, 154; Clarence Smith 2003, 12; Kraan 1995, 53, 54; Personal communication, Clarence Smith. 82 Nguyen 1964, 290. 83 Wilson 1827, 40, 44, 49, 52.

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swimming back, fell into our hands, together with a number of old muskets…84

Yet, at Ramu in Arakan in mid-May 1824, Burmese cavalry inflicted no less complete a defeat on British forces, completely routing them. Although British forces had advanced on Burmese trenches with covering fire, the provincials and Mug Levy who were supposed to guard the tank fled, requiring a general retreat. British officers and hundreds of soldiers were lost when the Burmese gave chase: [A] small body of Horse attached to their force, by whom the men that fell off from the main body were instantly cut to pieces, filled [our] troops with an ungovernable panic, which rendered the exertions of their officers to preserve order unavailing.85

The Burmese court thus continued to include a sizeable cavalry force among its armies at least into the 1870s. Nineteenth century European military men had a poor opinion of indigenous cavalry. In the early 1830s, Pemberton referred to ‘halfstarved’ and ‘unfortunate’ ponies in Burmese service. He suggested that Ten of our cavalry would ride down a thousand such rips both horse and man, and I have heard that the eating propensities of some of the up-country horses of the Governor-General’s bodyguard have left a very deep impression upon the minds of the Burmese cavalry.86

In European eyes, indigenous cavalry represented more of a rabble than an organized threat. In 1868, one European observed of Burmese cavalry that they dressed generally in red jackets and trowsers, a few wearing a red jerkin over these, and still fewer dressed in the full uniform of the cavalry, shoulder-pieces, gilt helmet, with ear-pieces and embroidered jerkin; all had the white saddle-flap and high-peaked pummel and cantle. The men were armed with a spear and a sword each, with the latter being, as a

84

Wilson 1827, 36. Wilson 1827, 21, 38, 41, 42. 86 Pemberton 1960, 72. 85

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rule, a Burmese dha, but some few had a sword of European shape with a scabbard of brass or steel.87

The threat of European cavalry, however, was looming over the mainland when European expansion from the mid-nineteenth century gave them significant footholds. Southeast Asian states that remained by this time began to ban the export of ponies. Burma did so in 1871 and Manipur by the late 1870s. At about the same time, Siam recast its two cavalry squadrons into two separate forms, one on perhaps an older Chinese model, but the other drawing upon the model of European cavalry.88 Burma might have followed the same path had it not been for two Italian captains, Tarsillo Barberis and one Molinari. When a French captain, Travelek, proposed forming a 250-man cavalry unit for Thibaw’s army, the two Italians refused. They had spent the previous year campaigning for Thibaw on the Salween River at Mone and Takau and witnessed Burmese cavalry forces disintegrate because of difficulty in foraging in the area. The horses, as well as the elephants, were ‘dying of hunger’ when the Burmese commander finally decided to send back his surviving horses, with the exception of indispensable courier and officer mounts. Even these were shortly “reduced to skeletons.”89 Cavalry, it was assumed, were not suitable for campaigns in Burma, at least in those areas outside of the fertile lowlands. Travelet’s plan was thus rejected. We will return to cavalry again in Chapter Ten, regarding late nineteenth century European and Southeast Asian military contests. By that time, however, European and not indigenous cavalry held the field. Afterwards, Southeast Asian cavalry permanently lost its place in indigenous warfare. Horses were relegated to service as draftanimals. In some areas, such as Sumatra, Southeast Asians had to contract with the government for their use even in commercial activities. During the colonial period, good ‘war’ ponies disappeared. The Manipuri ponies so important to Kòn-baung armies suffered from indiscriminate breeding, being allowed to wander about freely in herds. In the late nineteenth century, colonial officials attempted to 87

Fytche 1868, 12. West & Little 1884, 45; Clarence Smith 2003, 11. 89 Barberis 1890, 156. 88

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breed them with Arab stock, but the climate was adverse to such efforts, and after a few years, all of the resulting mixed Arab-Manipuri ponies had died. Other attempts led to careless interbreeding between Arab and Indian horses and the Burman pony in an attempt to “get long-legged high standing animals for use as gharry ponies and trappers in the large towns,” leading to the gradual disappearance of true Burman ponies.90 However, horsemanship remained an important intellectual category of Southeast Asian martial traditions. Twentieth century Southeast Asians continued to write about cavalry, but as part of the pre-colonial past, not the colonial or independent present.

90 Dobbin 1983, 232, 239; West & Little 1884, 48-49; Cartwright & Breakspeare 1910, 201.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT Although the movement of armies in the field and the task of supplying them played significant roles in early modern warfare in Southeast Asia, these topics have generally been neglected in the literature.1 It is unclear why this should be the case. One possible explanation is that the sources on these seemingly mundane factors are sparser than for other, perhaps more colourful ones. The baggage train was not a ‘front-line’ tool in the actual fighting. Nevertheless, it was a deadly business. Rugged terrain, sickness and disease, famine and thirst, and predatory animals could inflict more casualties than enemy arrows or bullets. In some cases, over half of the army might die before seeing battle.2 Men who cleared paths through the jungle, built bridges, and scoured the countryside for food kept Southeast Asian armies moving and fighting. The ox and the buffalo carried vital cannon and ammunition that helped determine the outcome of battle. Further, for many Southeast Asians it was raids for food and women by opposing (and just as frequently their own) armies and not battles that devastated their villages, broke apart families, and ruined personal economies for years after the fighting had stopped. Without much exaggeration, the efforts by Southeast Asian armies to live off the land, as elsewhere, might be likened to a war within a war.

Timing the Campaign As mentioned earlier (Chapter One), Southeast Asians depended upon shamans and various other means to determine auspicious and inauspicious timing, which was expected to decide the outcome of battles. However, the timing of overland campaigns was also clearly 1 2

Clarence Smith 2003, 13. Schrieke 1957, 2.139.

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influenced, at least generally, by more mundane climate and terrain factors. Southeast Asian armies, such as those of the Trӏnh and Mataram, avoided marching in the dry season, for the rainy season would present almost insurmountable obstacles to the movement of masses of troops and animals.3 Almost as worrisome as sluggish forces was the breakdown of communications between a commander and far-flung detachments. This was demonstrated in 1564, when Bayín-naung could not communicate with his forces in Lanchang with the onset of the rainy season, hampering the progress of his campaign.4 During the rainy season, peasant levies would be released to return home, as they were of little use, but potentially a danger to their commanders, if they sat around too long with little else to do but wait for the end of the rains. Without porters and restricted by the muddy terrain, even the royal guard and European contingents could not move either. War campaigns conducted by land were timed so that they did not coincide with the rainy season. If armies were already in the field when the rains arrived, food supplies would fall short and expeditions would have to withdraw or establish a base and attempt to wait out the rains.5 If an army were lucky enough to seize a city and its food stores, this could be averted. However, such a feat was more difficult to achieve in the mud of the rainy season, which favoured the defender. Even then, there was always the likelihood that the food stores of a defending town would be destroyed in the fighting or burned by the inhabitants to deny a means of sustenance. Another option was to attack an enemy column in order to steal its food stores. Invading armies, such as the Burmese invasion force that entered Ayudhya in 1563, followed rice fields, as the pools of water could supply men and animals. Lê Lӧi’s tactics in the 1420s involved attacking Ming supply lines and avoiding confrontation with strong units. He also placed Vietnamese troops to command roads and sever the Chinese lines of supply. A Trӏnh expedition faced a very different tactic when invading Mҥc territory. It took five or six days to pass through areas without water, aside from certain rivers that had been

3

Dampier 1906, 2.7; Schrieke 1957, 2.129. Banyà-dalá n.d., 118. 5 Remmilink 1994, 20; Cushman 2000, 36, 78, 118, 120, 122; Banyà-dalá n.d., 156; NC 1966, 42, 43. 4

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poisoned by the Mҥc. As a result, men and horses that drank the water died, forcing Trӏnh forces to withdraw.6 In the early modern period, Southeast Asian armies travelled at night when hard-pressed or in order to deliver a surprise attack. This was especially true of small-scale attacks in the archipelago. Nevertheless, larger armies usually did not travel at night when they were able to avoid it. A campaigning army may have been a powerful force in the daylight, but at night, predatory animals, traps, dangerous topography, and the chance of losing one’s way in the jungle presented unnecessary challenges. Such armies thus made camp at night and prepared for travelling again the following day.7 Soldiers who were prepared to move quickly and lightly could move with greater speed in difficult terrain. According to European accounts, at least some Trӏnh armies travelled lightly in their land campaigns, only bringing “necessary Arms, Ammunition, and Provender,” reportedly to allow them to retreat easily when necessary. Kartasura also discovered to its dismay the advantages of lightly equipped soldiery in the 1740s, when Cakraningrat’s Madurese forces, equipped much more lightly, were able to manoeuvre. The Madurese were thus able to sweep the eastern Javanese salient and take Kartasura by surprise in November 1742.8

Supply Access to water was the first consideration of Southeast Asian societies, in both peace and war. In the tropical heat, no one could survive for long without water. Dehydrated villagers or warriors would not last long in the hot tropical environment. During sieges, water was also needed to put out fires set by enemy torches or ‘burning brands’ thrown in by besiegers. At night, defenders would frequently sneak out to gather water supplies.9 Southeast Asian towns and villages were thus built next to rivers or other bodies of water, or, where possible, irrigated artificial lakes. This was not necessarily only 6 Borri 1633, 54; Cushman 2000, 37-38; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 150; Trѭѫng Bѭu Lâm 1967, 59. 7 In the 1680s it was said the Ayudhyan army never marched at night when on campaign, making camp instead each evening. Gervaise 1998, 96. 8 Dampier 1906, 2.8; Remmilink 1994, 20. 9 Quaritch Wales 1952, 15-16.

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for people, but also for the animals, both war mounts and beasts of burden. In the late thirteenth century, Chiengmai was built next to a swamp that could supply “elephants, horses, cattle, and buffalo…to bathe and drink.”10 In the 1670s, King Narai of Ayudhya even engaged the services of French and Italian hydraulic engineers to build a water tank in the palace at Lopburi to supply it with water, although it remained incomplete a decade later. When a town’s water supply ran out, due possibly to a gradual change in the course of a river or stream or the drying up of springs, a town might even be moved to an entirely new location. During sieges, one tactic was to dam up the river or otherwise cut off the water supply to the town. Invaders, however, were just as likely to suffer from a lack of water supplies. On the war march, some areas, such as the road from the Irrawaddy Valley to Talak in Arakan were dangerously deficient of water availability, for even occasional pools of water could not supply more than a score or so of men. One solution was to carry bamboos filled with water. In 1543, men under several Shan saw-bwàs, who had marched to Prome and begun to besiege it, suffered greatly from a lack of water after they had been attacked by Tabin-shwei-htì.11 Tabin-shwei-htì himself was later forced to withdraw from Ayudhya in 1547 both because of his extended “lines of communication and the scarcity of water.”12 After water, food was the next consideration. An army, whether mobile or stationary, could forage for food for themselves and their elephants, horses, and draft animals. Armies attempted to live off the land as much as possible. Indeed, while some states like Mataram supplied their soldiers with clothing and food, many did not. In Ayudhya, for example, levies were expected to bring their own provisions and to pay or barter for more when they ran out.13 In the 1680s, it was reported that Siamese officers brought elephants and carts loaded with provisions to dispose of as they saw necessary. They would hold markets at night and sell food to soldiers who had run out of supplies and charge so high a price that “the poor soldier can only

10

Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 42. Gervaise 1998, p. 36; NC 1966, 11; Trant 1842, 1139-1140; Banyà-dalá n.d., 46; Schrieke 1957, 2.135. 12 Banyà-dalá n.d., 49. 13 Schrieke 1957, 2. 128; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 70; Cushman 2000, 62; Gervaise 1998, 95. 11

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afford to buy just enough to prevent him dying of hunger.”14 The dismal situation of the average Southeast Asian soldier surprised European observers. As Fedrici commented of Bayín-naung’s soldiers, [the] maintenaunce of his armie, which is a thing incredible to consider the victualles that shoulde mainteine such a number of people in the Warres, but he that knoweth the nature and qualitie of that people, will easily believe it, I have seene with my proper eyes, that those people and souldiers have eaten of all sort of Wilde beastes, that are on the earth, whether it be very filthie or otherwise all serveth their mouthes, yea, I have seene them eate Scorpions and Serpents, also they feede of all kinde of hearbes and grasse. So that if such a great armie want not Water and salt, they will maintain themselves a long time in a bush with rootes, flowers and leaves of trees, they carie rice with them for their voyage, & that serveth them in stead of comferts: it is so daintie unto them.15

Food supply was a serious matter and frequently determined the outcome of campaigns, as was the case when Sultan Agung’s forces withdrew from their sieges of Surabaya and of Batavia in 1628 and 1629.16 Southeast Asian armies also exploited villagers and wreaked devastation on local economies in pursuit of food or the fulfilment of other needs. Any village along the way was a likely target. Sometimes this fear was directed at the foreign auxiliaries that accompanied large armies. In seventeenth-century Java, the local population was afraid of Balinese, Bugis, Madurese, and Makassar troops employed by Mataram or the VOC, because these troops burned down villages and stole whatever they wanted.17 Even indigenous troops treated local villages in the same way as those of the enemy. Numerous Burmese villages, for example, suffered severely at the hands of Burmese armies in the First Anglo-Burmese War. As Pemberton reported of local accounts in the years after the conclusion of the conflict: They say that the mischief was done during the late war by the troops, which were sent from the capital to oppose us, who caught and carried 14

Gervaise 1998, 95. Fedrici 1588, 29. 16 Schrieke 1957, 2.135. 17 Schrieke 1957, 2.129-130. 15

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away the women and girls with them, and killed for eating the buffaloes and bullocks of the different villages in the neighbourhood of the bank, through which they travelled, doing infinitely more mischief than was perpetrated by our troops in countries they had subdued. These excesses were so great that, superadded to the terror occasioned by our advance, the people deserted their villages en masse, many thousands died of distress and starvation, and very few have since returned. An intelligent man, a friend of one of my Munipooree followers, told him that they were only now beginning to recover from the effects of the war and to resume their cultivation, that rice was still very scarce and high priced, and he sincerely hoped my coming was not likely to lead to anything unpleasant.18

A besieged town or an army in the field could survive without new supplies of food for a considerable period. Preparing a town’s defences usually included the construction of granaries to store up rice to feed the defenders should the enemy cut off their external supplies. The value of the granaries depended on the state of local supplies of rice. During the late seventeenth century revolt of Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat) against Ayudhya, continual warfare prevented the local population from working the fields. In such cases, food supplies would be depleted, starving either the defenders or the besiegers. When hunger became intolerable, horses, elephants, and even carrion could be considered for consumption as a last resort. In 1422, after his defeat, Lê Lӧi and his men spent two months in Chí Linh eating grass and over time ate their elephants and horses.19 While campaigning against Lanchang in the 1560s, Bayín-naung’s commanders also turned on their elephants and horses after five or six days without food, feeding the meat to their soldiers.20 During the Burmese siege of Chiengmai in 1775, the defenders ate “all their elephants, horses, cattle, buffalo, ducks, chickens, pigs, dogs, tubers, and bananas” before turning to reptiles and insects, including crickets, grasshoppers, and lizards, which they completely consumed as well.21 By far the worst effects of a siege were experienced at Surabaya in the 1620s and in Pegu in the late sixteenth century. As the Dagh Register records the results of the former siege: “In Surabaya not more than 500 of its 50 to 18

Pemberton 1960, 38. Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 52; Cushman 2000, 115, 146, 346; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 150; Schrieke 1957, 2.135. 20 Banyà-dalá n.d., 142. 21 Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 146-147. 19

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60,000 people were left, the rest having died or gone away because of misery and famine.”22 In the Second Siege of Pegu (1598-1599), starvation became such a problem that it “made the forren Souldiers leave the Citie” and led Nan-dá-bayin to send orders to Taung-ngu to gather the harvests and send both the rice and the population of Taung-ngu to Pegu to help relieve the siege, but was refused. The famine became so severe that people killed and did eate each other. The King caused the people to be numbred, and there finding seven thousand Siamites, caused them all to be slaine, and divided the provision to the rest, of which there were not of all ages and sexes above thirty thousand remayning.23

Indeed, Alaùng-hpayà’s plans to reduce Pegu in 1757 did not include storming the town, but rather bringing his army up to its walls, blockading the town, and starving it into submission.24 Armies confident of their own food supplies might also send troops ahead to trample down or burn enemy crops before the main force arrived. Before attacking Surabaya in the 1624, for example, Sultan Agung dispatched a force of twenty to thirty thousand men “to destroy the crops and produce in the fields and to despoil the land.”25 Defensive tactics thus included gathering in the harvest in advance of approaching armies, preventing the enemy from foraging, or otherwise denying food to the enemy.26 The Hikayat Patani explains that Siamese forces that besieged Patani in the early seventeenth century suffered from starvation because the Siamese were not able to use ships to carry supplies and they had to rely only on the limited amount of food they had carried themselves. Even these stores were reduced in a curious way: [W]hen [the Siamese] had only been staying in Patani for seven days, the Siamese officers returned [home] in view of the fact that their subjects were suffering from lack of food, because at the time many people from Patani mixed with the Siamese and ate rice with them, without the Siamese noticing it.27 22

Quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.148. Pimenta 1906, 10.214. 24 Dalrymple 1808, 1.151. 25 Schrieke 1957, 2.132, 146-147. 26 Cushman 2000, 115; Schrieke 1957, 2.134. 27 Teeuw & Wyatt 1970, 2.183. 23

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This version of events may be slightly flexible with the details of what was probably real and covert pilfering of Siamese stores that rapidly reduced food supplies available to the besiegers. Although the account does not suggest that the defenders gathered in food before the Siamese arrived, the fact they could only depend upon supplies they had brought with them also suggests that this defensive measure did precede the siege. The use of such defensive tactics is clearer in other cases. Lanchang troops successfully prevented Burmese troops from foraging for food in the late 1560s, driving them to starvation. In the late sixteenth century, Naresuan sent out orders to scattered forces and villagers along the Burmese invasion route to attack Burmese patrols and prevent them from foraging.28 In the First Siege of Pegu (1596), conducted by the Ayudhya, the Siamese attacked Pegu during the harvest but left just enough time for “some of their fruits [to be] hastly inned [by the defenders], the rest burned by the Kings command.”29 Even in the First Anglo-Burmese War, Burmese attempts to ‘cut up’ British grass-cutters provoked one battle in Assam in 1824. In 1594, the Khmers at Phratabong were saved from a Siamese attack because the rice fields had been ruined and the Siamese, unable to procure local paddy, were forced to withdraw. At least one Khmer commander ordered patrols to go out and burn paddy to deny them to the Siamese. Naresuan appears to have learned from this experience and when he prepared for the invasion of Burma shortly after, he sent forces ahead to Moulmein to build granaries and direct the local inhabitants to sow and harvest paddy before the main army was scheduled to arrive. The Burmese responded by sending out ‘thief armies’ to attack Siamese patrols gathering rice which forced Siamese forces to speed up the harvesting and threshing of the paddy and position units to guard harvesting parties. Ultimately, Siamese forces succeeded in gathering two thousand cartloads of rice for the granaries in their stockades. Naresuan’s armies also broke two sieges of Taung-ngu in the late 1590s after supplies became scarce and large numbers of Siamese warriors died of starvation. Javanese forces at the 1628 siege of Batavia almost ‘disintegrated’ because they ran out of food.30 In 1662, the Siamese were forced to withdraw from Burmese territory, because

28

Banyà-dalá n.d., 143; Cushman 2000, 103. Pimenta 1906, 10.214. 30 Wilson 1827, 36; Schrieke 1957, 2.126; Cushman 2000, 144, 147, 161, 166-168, 178. 29

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the area had been hit by a famine and very little rice could be procured: the brigades of the Thai armies were famine stricken, lacking food supplies. Men having been conscripted to go around and make a thorough search for food in the small villages and large municipalities…they obtained some—a little in each place—but not enough to distribute to the soldiers … Many were the fighting men starved dreadfully, ill and suffering, and falling dead.31

Similarly, when King Phumintharacha (r. 1709-1733) of Ayudhya dispatched forces by land and sea against Cambodia in 1720 in order to reinstall a friendly ruler on the throne, his army encountered substantial difficulties. The Cambodian population had reportedly withdrawn to their capital and burned whatever they could not carry, preventing the Siamese from feeding off of the land: The Land Army finding all the Country desolate, as they marched into the borders of Cambodia, soon began to be in Distress for Want of Provisions, which obliged them to kill their Carriage Beasts, and their Elephants and Horses which they could get no sustenance for, and the Soldiers being obliged to eat their Flesh, it being a Diet thy had never been used to, an epidemick Flux and Fever seized the whole Army, so that in two Months one Half was not left, and those were obliged to retreat towards their own Countrey again, with the Cambodian Army always at their Heels.32

Such tactics continued to be effective up through the nineteenth century. The Raja of Buleleng on Bali, for example, sent forces off in secret to cut off the Dutch line of supply during the latter’s invasion in the late 1840s.33

Roads and Bridges With the widespread availability of river access in the lowlands, Southeast Asian rulers frequently preferred to avoid the expenses of road building. As one observer commented of the difficult route 31

Cushman 2000, 282. Hamilton 1930, 2.105. 33 Kraan 1995, 99. 32

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between Mergui and Tenasserim: “If the Siamese wanted to construct one straight road it would cost more than all the present state revenues … and still there would never be any comfort in travelling that way.”34 Many areas of Southeast Asia, especially in the highlands, however, did not provide suitable river access. The torrents of mountain streams were appealing only to the brave or foolhardy and some areas offered no river passage at all. Travelling overland was difficult in heavy jungle terrain. The generally flat and lightly vegetated dry zone in upper Burma did not necessitate major clearage efforts, but more heavily jungled areas of Southeast Asia required substantial efforts to clear a path for an army to move. The route between Mergui and Tenasserim, for example, was said to be “impossible to travel overland by horse or on foot.”35 Even when roads, perhaps better termed paths, were forged in mountainous areas, they remained treacherous. The road from the Irrawaddy Valley to Talak in Arakan, for example, was known to be “naturally so very bad” due to the steep hills it traversed.36 Even so, difficult roads were a lesser problem for Southeast Asians than for European armies, which depended upon wagons and carriages for their field artillery. As one observer remarked of the lan-ma-daw-gyì or king’s road between the Chindwin and the Mu rivers, I dare say [it is] very passable to a Burmese army, who have no commissariat, and whose artillery is not the most extensive, and is often moved by manual labor, assisted by elephants.37

‘Roads’ in early modern Southeast Asia were of varying quality. Some were quite good, such as the roads built in Angkor that remained in use for centuries afterward. Possibly the royal ‘highway’ and other roads attributed to fourteenth century Java in the NƗgarakrtƗgama were as impressive.38 Frequently, however, Southeast Asian roads were no more than cart tracks. Some scholars misinterpreted this to mean that there were no roads.39 It seems 34

IbrƗhƯm 1972, 47. IbrƗhƯm 1972, 47. 36 Trant 1842, 1139-1140. See also Schendel 2002, 187 on impact of rainy season. 37 Richardson 1833, 67. It was said Alaùng-hpayà rode on it in a carriage. 38 Prapañca 1995, 38; 48; Clarence Smith, personal communication. 39 Harvey, speaking of the Pagan period, for example, mentions the “entire absence of roads” in classical Burma. See Harvey 1926, 332. 35

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probable that more substantial roads were built in the wetter soils of the major river deltas, perhaps using gravel or sand in places, and possibly even some sort of drainage works. When building roads of one kind or another, royal courts and armies alike employed the services of specialists. To clear a road for his army to march on through the jungle terrain ahead, King Tabin-shwei-htì dispatched some sixty thousand sappers to cut through the ‘thick jungle growth’ and Bayín-naung apparently did the same for his march into Arakan when he was a military commander under that king in 1546-1547.40 When one early seventeenth-century ruler sought to expand Ayudhya’s ‘imperial highway’ in the early seventeenth century, he employed two brigades of Europeans who “cut a … passage for a land route all the way straight to the boat landing, to cut down the jungle with knives and to pound (the surface) level so it was pleasingly smooth.”41 Southeast Asian armies were especially dependent on roads, to bring reinforcements and supplies up from the rear, to maintain communications, and, likely, to provide a quick path for retreat if the campaign failed. Roads were also critical to early modern courts as one means of holding their kingdoms together and to move troops quickly to suppress rebellions or reinforce defences against invaders. The armies of Mataram were moved on foot and on buffalo cart along any one of three main roads during their seventeenth century expeditions, lugging cannon, for example, all the way from Madiun to Batavia in 1629.42 In seventeenth century Vietnam, the Trӏnh had a good system of dry dirt roads in the countryside.43 The NguyӉn may have lacked a similar system of roads, perhaps due to the relatively recent acquisition by Vietnamese of southern districts when compared to the north. In the late eighteenth century, however, NguyӉn Ánh improved the movement of troops and supplies in southern Vietnam by building a system of canals and roads between important towns and outposts. Reportedly, he also had trees planted alongside the roads to provide shade. In Burma, the first two kings of the First Taung-ngu Dynasty, Tabin-shwei-htì and Bayín-naung, secured their grip on upper and lower Burma through a network of roads such as the Banyà’s road used in the 1560s. Tabin-shwei-htì maintained two main 40

Pinto 1989, 413; Harvey 1926, 158. Cushman 2000, 210. 42 Schrieke 1957, 2.107. 43 Dampier 1906, 2.22. There were also tea-stalls alongisde them. Baron 1732, 6.4. 41

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roads, both from Pegu, one to Taung-ngu in the eastern Irrawaddy Valley and another to Prome in the western Irrawaddy Valley. King Song Tham (r. 1610-1628) of Ayudhya also maintained an ‘imperial highway’ presumably at least in part for military purposes.44 Rivers were an immediate obstacle for early modern land transportation. For especially wide or deep rivers, ferryboats could be used. However, the most convenient means of crossing rivers was the bridge. Building bridges was time consuming, not only because of the physical labour necessary to construct them, but also because materials had to be found and gathered. In the fifteenth century, Chiengmai forces had to gather bamboo from three different districts to make the slats necessary for a planned suspension bridge across the Ping River. A more serious challenge was building bridges across rivers when armies had to move rapidly. The Chinese probably introduced ‘floating bridges’ to the Vietnamese when the former attacked the fortress at Thӽng Long in the late thirteenth century. The Burmese appear to have devised a similar solution. In 1547, for example, the governor of Martaban was ordered by Tabin-shwei-htì to build a bridge of boats from Martaban to Moulmein “which would take a horseman at a gallop.” A horseman then tested this Southeast Asian version of pontooning.45 The news that an enemy had constructed bridges across rivers and thus sped up their advance would also be greeted as a warning to mobilize defences quickly.46 Bridge building was also important to investing a city. During Tabinshwei-htì’s preparations for assaulting the defenders during his siege of Ayudhya, his armies made “a network of bridges of bamboo slats sewn with rattan across all the rivers, streams and canals so the troops and horses could walk anywhere.”47 Permanent bridges could be built from various materials. The bridges of northern Vietnam included those made of brick, stone, or wood. To prevent erosion, tiled roofs were usually placed on them.48 In the 1870s, Trѭѫng Vƭnh Ký’s observation that “the best bridges [in Vietnam] are to be found in the southern provinces,” may at first 44

White 1972, 94. Barrow 1808, 273; Banyà-dalá n. d., 120; Harvey 1926, 157; Cushman 2000, 210. 45 Dampier 1906, 2.22; Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 78; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 109; Banyà-dalá n.d., 47. 46 Cushman 2000, 124. 47 Cushman 2000, 47. 48 Trѭѫng Vƭnh Ký 1982, 93.

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glance appear as a reference to early French efforts in building transportation infrastructure in Cochinchina, but the comments seem more likely to refer to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century road building projects of NguyӉn Ánh.49 By contrast, Mataram’s main military roads appear to have been deficient in bridges, at least in the seventeenth century.50 The Javanese probably moved their buffalo carts and artillery across rivers on ferries at river crossings. Bridges were valuable military assets. Bayín-naung defended his outlying bridges by posting guards. Such bridges became the immediate targets of vassal rulers who sought to break away from Pegu, as was the case of the attack by the saw-bwà of Möng Nai on the Burmese bridge across the Anuma River in 1557.51 In battle, the destruction of bridges was sometimes a critical part of foiling an enemy’s prospective assault.52 In Java, and elsewhere, a common tactic was to fell trees to block the roads and halt or delay the enemy’s baggage train.53 During the tense years between the First and Second Anglo-Burmese Wars, the Burmese had expected a British attack from Arakan over the mountains on one occasion. To prevent this, they determined on entirely destroying this medium of communication, and accordingly scarped part of the road, in others felled trees across it, and so completely closed the passage that for more than two years not a single individual had passed that way.54

Extended supply lines thus became an important target for Southeast Asian strategists when facing a host whose advantages argued against an open battle alone. Invading Mongol-led Chinese troops had begun to withdraw from northern Vietnam, leading to the Second Battle of the Bҥch Ĉҵng River in 1288, after their supply and communication lines back to China had been cut off by Vietnamese forces.55 Early seventeenth century attempts by the Mughals to invade Arakan were thwarted by Arakanese stockades and fortresses. After the second defeat at Bhalwa and the Mughal campaign that followed, the 49

Trѭѫng Vƭnh Ký 1982, 93. Schrieke 1957, 2.118. 51 Banyà-dalá n.d., 96; Harvey 1926, 165. 52 Cushman 2000, 124. 53 Schrieke 1957, 2.134. 54 Trant 1842, 1139-1140. 55 NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 118-119. 50

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Arakanese responded by strengthening their defences at Chittagong, bolstering it with thousands of infantry and war-boats, as well as four hundred elephants, under the commander of the royal bodyguard. They also began to build fortifications in advance of the Mughals at Katghar. Using crossbows, cannon, guns, rockets, and ballistas (throwing stones), the Arakanese staved off the Mughal advance. Mughal hopes to apply siege strategies such as a ring of trench works, were thwarted because the fort was built next to a high hill on one side. While the Mughals were so delayed, the Arakanese built lines of stockades that cut off communications and food supplies from the Mughal besiegers. During the impending rainy season, the Mughals knew that they would quickly use up their reserve stores and thus decided to withdraw. Unable to move their artillery out quickly enough, “especially some big cannon,” the Mughal magazine officers detonated almost five hundred maunds of gunpowder, destroying their magazine and several Mughal soldiers in the process.56

The Baggage Train Although elephants and horses receive the greatest share of attention in the indigenous chronicles and the European accounts, the water buffalo and his cousin the ox, both hidden in the background of these texts, were also important for large-scale Southeast Asian warfare. Ironically, their most well-known role, serving as the main animal of early nineteenth century NguyӉn cavalry, ‘the buffalo cavalry,’ when elephants and horses were in short supply, was perhaps their only venture as cavalry mounts.57 One of the earliest wartime uses of buffaloes and cattle was in rituals securing oaths of alliance and fealty or to guarantee success in battle. In 1540, the saw-bwà of Mohnyin prepared for his oath to the Burmese ruler Tabin-shwei-htì by slaughtering both buffaloes and cattle and then dividing the meat into equal portions for both the sawbwà and Tabin-shwei-htì to eat. Buffaloes and oxen lugged soldiers across difficult terrain wherever Southeast Asian armies went. There is even speculation that the Cham army that invaded Angkor in 1177 56

Mirza 1936, 1.405-408. NguyӉn armies used “water buffalo to transport troops” when horses and elephants were lacking, and even sent twenty-four squadrons, a total of six thousand men on buffalo, into battle. Dutton 2004, 32. 57

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was transported on carts.58 More commonly, carts were used to keep moving and encamped armies supplied and ready for battle. In his attack against Arakan in 1545, Tabin-shwei-htì brought pack mules along with the fleet for use when his army disembarked.59 As the scale of Southeast Asian war campaigns increased and supply demands grew heavier, baggage trains became quite large. During Tabin-shweihtì’s 1548 campaign against Ayudhya, for example, half of the eight thousand draft animals that accompanied his forces consisted of “oxen for carrying provisions.”60 Sultan Agung also used eight thousand carts when he mobilized his army in 1624.61 Draft animals (in addition to the elephant and the horse) were an important part of daily life in early modern Southeast Asia. Water buffaloes held undisputed sway in working rice fields and were considered stronger and able to draw heavier loads than oxen. Oxen or bullocks tended to work better on dry land and were especially important for hauling trade goods.62 There are also occasional references to pack mules in the lowlands, at least from the sixteenth century, and more frequently in the highlands.63 Mules were usually associated with the caravans coming down from Yunnan and most lowland kingdoms on the mainland seem to have procured theirs from Yunnan or the Shan states. Indeed, when arranging transport in the late nineteenth century, Burmese employed Chinese to handle mules and Burmese to handle elephants.64 Generally, however, availability and not the type of animal per se determined the choice of draft animal for transport purposes, with the exception of travel in mountainous areas in which the mule or the Shan pony would have been desirable, if not essential.

58

Banyà-dalá n.d., 45; Quaritch Wales 1952, 90, 142. Banyà-dalá n.d., 47. 60 Pinto, 1987, 412. 61 Schrieke 1957, 2.131. 62 Zimmerman 1999, 20, 145-146, 154; Nisbet 1901, 1.370; Scott 1927, 80. For reference to the use of buffaloes in pulling mainland Southeast Asian carts, see the following: in mid-nineteenth century Cambodia, Mouhot 1864, 2.38; for reference to central Siam, see Thompson 1987, 193; Nisbet 1901, 1.370; Rajadhon 1987, 176; Pires 1944: 1.178; Loubère 1986, 39. 63 Banyà-dalá n.d., 47. 64 Barberis 1890, 151. 59

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Figure 20: Burmese cart and draft animals in an early nineteenth-century temple mural at Amarapura. Photograph by author.

Cart driving in wartime required no special training because it was ubiquitous in daily life. Most agricultural families throughout Southeast Asia possessed a cart. Carts connected villages when boats could not be used, during certain seasons or when rivers and canals were not available.65 According to Carl Bock, among the Lao in the 1880s, “rude carts are used for one purpose only, that of transporting the rice from the river-side to [state] stores.”66 Nevertheless, carts were also used to carry bricks and stones, felled timber, and other heavy items.67 The introduction of gunpowder technologies made cart transport even more important. A Mon account of the late sixteenth century includes a statement by the King of Lanchang to Bayín-naung, which

65

Young 1982, 184; Thompson 1987, 193. Phya Anuman explains that carts were used to take rice and ‘forest products to market.’ See Rajadhon 1987, 173; See also Mouhot 1864, 2.40; Ferrars 1901, 139. 66 Bock 1986, 175. 67 Zimmerman 1999, 20, 145-146, 154; Nisbet 1901, 1.370; Scott 1927, 80. For reference to the use of buffaloes in pulling mainland Southeast Asian carts, see the following: in mid-nineteenth century Cambodia, Mouhot 1864, 2.38; for reference to Central Thailand, see Thompson 1987, 193; Nisbet 1901, 1.370; Rajadhon 1987, 176; Pires 1944: 1.178; Loubère 1986, 39.

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indicates that the former carried rockets in carts with his army.68 The primary concern, however, was the movement of heavy artillery. Although Southeast Asian rulers on occasion received gun carriages as gifts from Europeans, gun carriages were generally not adopted by Southeast Asian armies until relatively late in the nineteenth century.69 Southeast Asian artillery tactics required only small guns that could be carried by man or elephant and larger guns were intended to be fixed in place on a wall or on heavy lumber in the field. Since artillery did not have to be moved about quickly in a battle, the main consideration was how to move heavy artillery from home or from an arsenal to the battlefield. Ox- or buffalo-drawn carts could perform this task well and required no additional labour to produce devoted field carriages. In Tabin-shwei-htì’s 1548 campaign against Ayudhya in 1548, he transported one thousand of his cannon with the help of four thousand buffaloes and Ayudhyan armies did the same when hauling artillery across rivers.70 A mid-nineteenth century Siamese source implied that the bulk of a Siamese army’s firearms and ammunition was usually transported on baggage-carts.71 Although there is little available information on how large and heavy artillery were actually loaded into such carts, the complex calculations required for loading timber, however, may shed some light on this question. In the case of loading timber onto carts, for example, Nisbet explains: Loading takes place by the laborious though ingenious method of raising the butt end of the log by means of a chain suspended to stout poles attached to the yoke at the end of the cart-shaft and resting on the wooden block above the axle-tree. The end of the shaft is raised high up in the air when the chain is passed under the head of the log; and on men pulling it down again the leverage obtained with the axle as fulcrum enables the head of the log to be brought on the cart. It is then easily levered forward with poles so as almost to balance, when it is lashed down to the shaft. A huge well-balanced log can thus easily be carted by a pair of buffaloes.72

The average Southeast Asian was also likely familiar with the demands of moving in a baggage train because of experience in cart 68

Heavy rains, however, rendered these rockets useless. Banyà-dalá n.d., 133. Loubère 1986, 92. 70 Pinto, 1987, 412; Loubère 1986, 92. 71 Bowring 1969, 2.365. 72 Nisbet 1901, 1.370. 69

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caravans in everyday life. Travelling in caravans when going on longdistance journeys was necessary because of the continual threat of banditry on lonely trails in both peace and war. The chief strategy to fend off highwaymen was for travellers to form their carts into a circle like an African laager, “with the high backs outward,” and the bullocks would be kept, unyoked, in the middle of the circle. Some caravans numbered thirty carts, as was the case of a group of carts carrying rice from western Cambodia westward to Siam in the midnineteenth century. On caravans, carts took turns leading the caravan, so that the leading driver would stay awake and guide the caravan, while the others slept at the reins.73 This was not generally a hazardous practice, as the carts were only moving at a little over three kilometres an hour anyway, and even when the lead driver fell asleep, “the bullocks wander on just as they list.”74 Early modern Southeast Asian carts were designed to be both strong and durable. Two long poles formed the shaft of the cart. These poles moved in an upward curve, lashed together on the front end, forming a somewhat inverted “V.” Further, the sides of the carts curved outward toward the top. The body of the cart was oblong shaped, lengthy but narrow and the body-railings gave the vehicle an ornate curve, when viewed from the side. Inside, the levelling of the bed shifted as one moved toward the rear of the cart.75 The framework was constructed in such a way that it absorbed much of the weight and thus spared the wheels. As one observer noted: “by an ingenious system of bars the weight is distributed, and partly applied to a frame outside the wheels, thereby greatly lessening the chance of a breakdown.”76 The framework began from the yoke, worked its way down to the axletree at a slope, and was attached to the front part of the shaft by means of a leather thong. From the axletree, the poles of the framework bent up behind the cart at a curve. The sides of the framework helped to protect the cart and its wheels from entangling undergrowth.77 Early modern Southeast Asian carts were made entirely of organic materials such as wood, bamboo, and rattan. No iron or other metals 73 Nisbet 1901, 1.379; Mouhot 1864, 2.39-40; Rajadhon 1987, 173-175; Scott 1927, 82. 74 Nisbet 1901, 1.379. 75 Scott 1927, 81; Nisbet 1901, 1.377; Thompson 1987, 193; Cuming 1897, 76. 76 Thompson 1987, 193. 77 Nisbet 1901, 1.377; Young 1982, 187.

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were used until the nineteenth century, aside from decorative pieces added to royal carriages. The kind of wood used was specific to the piece of the cart being made and its function, hinging on such concerns as durability, weight, and appearance. The advantage of using organic materials as opposed to metal in the construction of the cart was that repairs could be made anywhere and thus blacksmiths or wheelwrights were not needed.78 Early modern Southeast Asian carts generally rolled on solid or fastened slab wheels. The slab wheel was either solid or was fastened out of several pieces of wood (sometimes two pieces, more frequently three, perhaps more) cut in the shape of a circle.79 Solid or fixed-slab, Scott’s suggestion that “[o]ccassionally in the old days to save trouble the carter started with a square wheel, and trusted to time to round it for him,” is doubtful. The relationship between the breadth of the tower of the wheel and the outer edge was determined by the terrain. The slab wheel was convex-sided, being thickest at the centre, and then ‘tapered’ out to the thinner edges of the wheel.80 For this reason, the slab wheel was superior to the spoked wheel during rainy and muddy conditions, especially when roads were in actuality muddy wheel-tracks. Since the wheel was thinner around the edges and there were no crevices as a spoked wheel would provide, such wheels moved through mud much more easily than would spoked wheels. Depending upon the size of the cart, the size of the wheel could vary from one to 2.5 metres in diameter. The spoked wheel is often incorrectly attributed to European influence in the nineteenth century. The spoked wheel has a long history in mainland Southeast Asia and from European travel accounts, we know that such wheels were sometimes used on mainland Southeast Asian carts. The spokes were fastened to the wheel by the insertion of a wedge-slat into a slit in both the hub of the wheel and the outer frame. These wheels were steadied by long hubs, but did not turn on axles or in boxes.81 As metalled 78

Thompson 1987, 193; Ferrars 1901, 138-139; Nisbet 1901, 1.378; Zimmerman 1999, 154. 79 Nisbet 1901, 1.377; Scott 1927, 81. As Scott explains: “They were the only wheels to be seen in Upper Burma in 1885-1886.” Scott 1906, 317; They were also the only wheels seen by Carl Bock among the Laos were solid: “each wheel being simply a huge solid wooden cylinder without spokes.” Bock 1986, 175. 80 Scott 1906, 317; Scott 1927, 81; Nisbet 1901, 1.377. 81 Ferrars 1901, 139; Scott 1906, 81, 317; For the three feet estimate (he says circumference, but I am fairly certain that he meant diameter) see Nisbet 1901, 1.377. For the observation of six-seven feet wheels, see Thompson 1987, 193.

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roads appeared in Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century, solid and fastened wheels damaged such roads, as “the tendency of cart bullocks to follow in a worn track causes the road surface to be worn in two deep furrows, while the metalled surface in the middle remains intact.”82 At the same time, the new metalled roads obviated some of the need for wheels that did not get stuck in mud. Thus, except in ‘remoter parts,’ spoked wheels, however little they may have represented indigenous wheels in the past, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries slab wheels were quickly replaced by spoked wheels on Southeast Asian carts. Even so, the main body of the cart generally retained the same structure and, aside from the wheels, a major and visible structural change was not discernible.83

Figure 21: Siamese ‘solid’ wheel cart. Photograph by author.

The wheels had to raise the cart relatively high off the ground “for often the way lies through swamps or flooded marshes so deep that only the heads of the buffaloes can be seen above the mud and water.”84 These carts had an ungreased wooden axle (there were no metal bearings) and the sound of the scraping of the axle on the 82 Scott, 1906, 316; A. H. Williams had the same experience in the early twentieth century: “. . . The first hindrance came . . . where the ruts were so deeply cut in the road that the hub of one wheel jammed on the road surface.” Williams 1922, 136. See also the observation in Nisbet 1901, 1.378. 83 Scott 1906, 317; Ferrars 1901, 138. 84 Young 1982, 187.

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wooden frame, if the carts were numerous, could be deafening, leading at least one observer to suggest that the noise was sufficient to keep even wild animals away. Draft animals were yoked to a crossbar that allowed them to pull the cart. Straight pieces of wood were aligned on each side to prevent the yoke from slipping. The driver’s box gave the driver full access to the rear of the animal for the purposes of easier prodding. In addition to his prod-stick, the driver directed the draft animals by means of a rope rein that was tied to the beast’s harness. The harness or bridle itself consisted of a cord inserted through the nostrils and tied behind the draft animal’s horns.85 In 1688, Gervaise witnessed the preparation of the animals for the harness in Ayudhya: “Oxen that have reached the age of three years have their nostrils pierced with a red-hot iron. A rope is then passed through the hole and acts as a bridle.”86 Clearly, carts were more useful in some seasons than in others. During the rainy season, for example, carts could hardly be expected to be of much use as lowlands flooded, roads became rivers of mud, expanded rivers and creeks crossed over roads and even bridges, and boats offered more convenient and accessible means of transportation. Further, there could be no long distance travel overland in the rainy season, because all hands were needed for “plowing and sowing” the fields. However, travel by cart during the dry season depended upon the length of the journey and whether the journey would be made through the highlands or the lowlands. Long trips were made by cart in the dry season. According to Phya Anuman, in Siam, however, long distance travel could not be made in the middle of the dry season (late March and April) because of the heat. Short distance travel to the market, however, had to be made by cart during the dry season; the canals and rivers would dry up and thus prevent the use of boats to carry trade goods.87 Such conditions also made the application of the cart easier: During the dry season, when the grain is being carted from the fields, the ground is hard, and carts can make tracks for themselves anywhere.88 85

Cuming 1897, 76, 78; Thompson 1987, 193; Young 1982, 187-188; Zimmerman 1999, 153; Bock 1986, 175; Scott 1927, 81-2; Nisbet 1901, 1.378. 86 Gervaise 1998, 97. 87 Williams 1922, 137; Rajadhon 1987, 173, 176. 88 Scott 1906, 316; Ferrars 1901, 139.

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Travel by caravan during the hot season was difficult, as mentioned, but it was done. The most effective strategy to protect both people and animals was to travel at night. In order to prevent exposure to the sun or from low-hanging branches, Southeast Asian carts were built to allow the use of a canopy, an elevated bamboo mat, or even a solid roof in the shape of a semi-circle. Regardless of season, Southeast Asian ox-carts were extremely slow. Examining similar conveyance technologies in the 1920s, Williams estimated their speed at about 3.22 kilometres an hour and sixteen kilometres a day.89 Indeed, in the 1860s, it was suggested that on a flat plains, such carts took twice as long (in one case, twelve days as opposed to six) as elephants.90 Unlike elephants, cavalry, or boats, fewer changes are evident in the problems of supply and land movement over the course of the early modern period. One reason for this is that the determining factors of land movement and supply, climate and terrain, remained constant. Muddy cart tracks remained muddy cart tracks and jungle terrain remained jungle terrain throughout the early modern period. A more important factor is that the technology that would change land transport everywhere in the world in the nineteenth century was generally a phenomenon of Europe and North America until the late nineteenth century. With the commencement of colonial rule, substantial changes began to take place. Metalled roads, preferred by Europeans, led to legislation requiring the rim of cartwheels to be ringed with an iron tyre to prevent damage to the roads. The introduction of the steam locomotive dramatically increased the ability of the state to move large amounts of supplies from one end of the colony to another. Most importantly, the gasoline engine and motorcars rapidly, but not completely, replaced the role of animals in state transport. It could also be conjectured that the situation of intelligence gathering was dependent upon the measures taken for land transport and supply. The quick flow of information from outlying districts depended upon the same river and overland routes that would serve the movements of troops and the baggage train in wartime. Even when campaigning abroad, new routes and rivers overtaken by one’s troops would have to be utilized by royal or military messengers. When an 89 Zimmerman 1999, 145-46, 153; Nisbet 1901, 1.378-379, Thompson 1987, 193; Young 1982, 187; Williams 1922, 140; Other sources verify the 3.22 kilometers an hour speed. Nisbet 1901, 1.378. 90 Mouhot 1864, 2.40.

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army’s supply lines were cut, so too were its communication lines and its access to food, water, and reinforcements, and, even worse, its route for escape. Building a road, fortifying river-mouths and points further upriver, and establishing reliable systems of communication were thus as important to war campaigns as they were to state administration in times of peace.

CHAPTER NINE

SOLDIERS Large numbers of cavalry, elephants, and weapons helped to give some Southeast Asian armies the edge in early modern conflict, but it was the supply of men, foot soldiers in particular, who made sustained conflict possible. The challenge of mobilizing human resources for battle presented a chronic and serious problem for indigenous rulers. Despite the portrayal of royal absolutism in both indigenous chronicles and European travel accounts, Southeast Asian societies were complex organizations in which labor and land, the bases of power, were internally divided among competing elites, and among whom the ruler was often simply the primus inter pares. Southeast Asian states represented what scholars frequently refer to as mandalas, concentric rings in which royal power was strongest at the centre and grew weaker with distance from the court. Especially in the earliest centuries of the early modern period, outlying or tributary lords were frequently local rulers in their own right, replicating, on a lesser scale the same kinds of palaces, ministers, and armies that one would find at the royal centre. As the early modern period wore on, and political centralization led to the replacement of such outlying powerful men with centrally appointed officials, manpower resources were again divided, this time amongst ministers governing powerful central institutions. Moreover, in Buddhist countries of the region, monastic orders offered a continuing refuge to men who sought to escape royal or other private service. It was for this reason that the great warrior kings of the region emerged during interregnums, when governing or social institutions had broken down or weakened sufficiently to release large supplies of manpower now available to be harnessed by a warrior-cum-king. An examination of many of the inner workings of political and social institutions and their organization of manpower is largely outside the scope of this survey, for it would necessitate a social history of the region. In this chapter, concentration is focused on matters directly related to organization and mobilization of the armies of early modern Southeast Asia.

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In the latter portion of the early modern period, especially in the nineteenth century, a number of indigenous developments and foreign models helped to encourage efforts to pay soldiers, create a separate officer class, to standardize (and even introduce) military uniforms, and to develop more formalized military organization. These efforts were intended in part to make armies more effective, but also to help stave off European expansion by impressing the Europeans.

Manpower In most of Southeast Asia, the population was broadly divided into free and service (sometimes referred to as slaves) populations. In no state were these divisions completely the same and were subject to considerable local variation. In early modern Ayudhya, for example, the general population was divided into royal and noble servicemen, while in Burma, there were substantial bodies of both asis (free people) and ahmú-dàn (servicemen). Other divisions complicated this picture. Monks, for example, fell outside of both categories and monastic slaves were not subject to either royal or noble service. The main population category that determined the health of royal armies, however, was the royal servicemen. Royal service populations were generally hereditary groups allotted to specified tasks, many of them non-military in nature. Some groups specialized in supplying the court with metal tools or with certain kinds of clothing, or in performing certain tasks, such as tea-serving or dancing. Many royal service groups, however, were military in nature and frequently consisted of specialists in certain kinds of weaponry, such as swordsmen or archers, or supplied the court with cavalry. Ideally, such groups were supposed to maintain their skills, pass these down from father to son, and thus remain in a state of constant preparedness for mobilization in times of war. In practice, such skills frequently deteriorated. Unhappy servicemen attempted to escape royal service by hiding themselves among the free population, seeking service under a noble, or joining the monastic order. The flight of servicemen or free people liable to military service to the monastic order was a major problem for early modern Buddhist states in the region. Monks were immune from service obligations, whether military or non-military. Giovanni Andreino, the Italian

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consul to Burma in the early 1870s, viewed monastic immunity as the chief reason for varying numbers in the amount of Burmese who could be mobilized for military service in times of war.1 In NguyӉn Vietnam, this also appears to have been the case. As Ĉa Shan complained in the late seventeenth century: [Conscription] encouraged parents to send their sons to become Buddhist monks when they were still teenagers out of fear that they would otherwise be captured [and forced into service] by the army. This resulted in Buddhist everywhere [having] very little knowledge of the principles of Buddhism… What is more, immoral conduct was more widespread in the temples than in secular society.2

This may have changed by the 1820s. Crawfurd explains, for example, that in Vietnam the indigenous population was not allowed a “pecuniary commutation” which made conscription a greater burden for the Vietnamese than for the Siamese.3 Chronicles and royal orders indicate that the flight of servicemen to the free population, noble service, and monasteries caused early modern courts considerable concern. The loss of servicemen meant a decline in the court’s revenue base, but more importantly, it might cause disturbances in the balance of power in the court or the kingdom in general. Technically, the loss of men to noble service did not reduce the absolute numbers a ruler could mobilize in war, for nobles were required to bring their own servicemen into battle alongside royal servicemen. In practice, however, servicemen were seen as personal resources, and a cunning noble could easily see that it was better for other nobles or the king to expend their resources in battle than his own.4 The flight of men to the monasteries, however, did mean an absolute reduction in the potential numbers that could be fielded for a campaign. Thus, kings attempted whenever possible to investigate service lists and, on occasion, purge the monastic order, although this was not usually possible. The purification of the monastic order began by claiming that it was corrupt. This meant that donations made to it in the past had not provided merit. Elites who had donated slaves and 1

Ba 1970b, 66. Li & Reid 1993, 56. 3 Lamb 1961, 208. 4 IbrƗhƯm 1972, 90-91. 2

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lands to the monasteries in order to gain merit and thus improve their karma were reluctant to allow monastic purges to take place. When the royal command of service lands and populations was weak relative to that of the nobles and the monastic order, there was little that the king could do. In such a situation, the throne found itself unable to resolve the imbalance, leading to the gradual political demise of some states, as occurred in the case of Pagan.5

Levies The bulk of any indigenous army consisted of peasant levies. During wartime, they might be conscripted based on district or vassal allotments. Throughout the early modern period, larger states depended to a significant extent on their ability to field large masses of local levies during times of war. As Symes observed: the Birmans may be denominated a nation of soldiers, every man in the kingdom being liable to be called upon for his military services; and war is deemed the most honourable occupation.6

The mass mobilization of levies gave Southeast Asian armies the impression of massive hordes of warriors. Indeed, European and indigenous sources alike attribute to Southeast Asian armies extremely large numbers of troops. In c. 1508, the ruler of Tenasserim had an army of 100,000 ‘infantry’ and cavalry. Both European and indigenous sources attributed extremely large armies to the sixteenth century Burmese king Bayín-naung: 1,060,000 men or “one of ten” from among his subjects; 1,400,000 to 1,500, 000 men as well as an additional 500,000 sent to take the places of those killed in the siege; and 900,000 during his 1563 campaign against Lanchang. His son and successor, Nan-dá-bayin, was said to have fielded 300,000 men during one campaign against Ayudhya, including 30,000 men who formed his ‘guard,’ and some 900,000 men in his campaign against Ayudhya in c. 1584. Nieuhoff suggested in 1662 that Patani on the Malay Peninsula could bring, if it needed to, 180,000 soldiers to the field. It 5 6

See Aung-Thwin 1985. Symes 1800, 317-318.

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was said that Sultan Agung employed ninety percent of his subjects against Batavia in the late 1620s. By the middle part of the century, estimates of Mataram’s army ranged from 150,000 to 300,000, while it was suggested that if necessary, 920,000 men could be mobilized. In Vietnam in the 1630s, Borri, estimated that the NguyӉn could put 300,000 men into the field, while the Trӏnh had an army of four times as many. Even more territorially and demographically circumspect states were said to possess large forces of fighting men. BantČn on Java’s western coast, for example, was able to field an army of only 55,000 men in 1673. The Lao were said to have fielded an army of 200,000 men against Siam (c. 1579), and the Arakanese some 300,000 infantry in their attack on Bhalwa in 1609.7 Such numbers were clearly beyond the capacity of early modern Southeast Asian states, if not because such army sizes far out-numbered the entire population, as in Arakan, because, as Harvey has pointed out, such armies were clearly beyond the logistical and supply capacities of early modern Southeast Asian states.8 Hyperbole was, at least in part, a literary device used to enhance or lessen the stature of a king whose behavior warranted merit or demerit. However, the massing of peasant levies for military campaigns also helped to give credence to such hyperbolic estimates.9 A possible reason for these excessively high estimates was the lack of reliable data on Southeast Asia outside of the trading ports and perhaps the attempt of some European travelers to convey exciting stories of the “East” to a European public enthralled by Mendez Pinto’s hyperbolic account of his experiences. Indigenous sources may have overestimated such armies as an indication of royal strength and legitimacy, as discussed in greater depth elsewhere. From the 1630s, however, as Europeans became more knowledgeable about Southeast Asia and its demographic resources and as the intense warfare of the sixteenth century gave way to a more docile period, estimates of Southeast Asian armies became more modest. As was claimed of Ayudhya in the 1630s: “When the ruler goes out…the companies of his foot-guards are supported by troops of cavalry 7 Borri 1633, 53; Ricklefs 1993, 14; Varthema 1928, 74-75; Fedrici 1588, 20, 30; Fitch 1906, 10.189; Banyà-dalá n.d., 105; Pimenta 1906, 10.211-212, 220; Mirza 1936, 1.332; Schrieke 1957, 2.129, 138, 139; Nieuhoff 1732, 2.184. 8 Harvey 1926, 333. 9 See Charney 2003a.

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consisting in all of between twelve and thirteen thousand men”10 Similarly, in 1688, the Trӏnh army was said to number only between sixty and eighty thousand men. Of these men, some thirty thousand were stationed in the capital, always about the Trӏnh lord’s person, and always prepared to move. Estimates for the NguyӉn army were smaller, the thirty to forty thousand men estimated in the 1670s appear reasonably close to the 22,740 cited for 1653 in a Vietnamese register. More modest estimates remained the rule into the nineteenth century.11 A major problem facing early modern Southeast Asian courts was the low value of general conscripts, who made up the bulk of military forces at their disposal. Certainly, villagers were brave enough for war and skilled in the use of personal weapons, many of which were used normally as tools in daily life. They were certainly valuable for logistical and support activities, whether as porters, diggers of trenches, or builders of fortress walls. In Java, the royal guard units used the peasant levies mainly as supply porters.12 Similarly, conscripts were directed towards a number of tasks that were essentially non-military in nature. As one observer described the situation in Vietnam in the 1820s: The conscripts are denominated soldiers, and wear a military uniform, every one being duly enrolled in a battalion or regiment; but the services they are called upon to perform are far from being exclusively of a military nature. They serve alike as soldiers and as sailors, are employed in rowing the King’s galleys, in navigating the vessels which convey the tributes and taxes to the capital, as artificers in the arsenal, and as labourers in the construction of roads, canals, bridges, and public edifices. They are also constantly employed as domestics and menial servants to the public officers. One of the French gentlemen excused himself one day from visiting us, according to appointment, by stating that he had no soldiers at hand to carry his palanquin. Such a system invariably makes bad soldiers, as well as bad labourers, artificers, and domestics.13

10

Gervaise 1998, 179. Dampier 1906, 2.5, 7; Li 1992, 36-37n; Lamb 1961, 195, 208. 12 Remmilink 1994, 19. 13 Crawfurd 1828, 491-492; see also Lamb 1961, 208. 11

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Levies also served to enhance the impressiveness of a military host, providing numbers to the quality of better-trained warrior elites. Prior to the eighteenth century, the rule of thumb was that the larger the size of the army, as opposed to training or other factors, the greater the likelihood of a successful outcome of a military campaign. Bayínnaung is reported to have considered that an earlier campaign against Ayudhya failed because of a lack of men, so for his 1563-1564 campaign, he determined to take against the city a force ten times larger.14 Levies continually proved themselves highly unreliable both on and off the battlefield. In battle, conscripts had to be forced onto the field. Desertion was a continual problem and hunger, military reverses, and the fears of an enemy attack were typical causes. During the siege of SČmarang in November 1742, for example, most of the Javanese peasant levies supporting the Chinese dispersed. Remmilink suggests that episodes such as this indicate that Javanese peasant levies at this time had very little military value.15 According to Symes, to ensure the loyalty of conscripts, their families were treated as hostages for their good behavior and in case of desertion or treachery, the innocent wife, children, and parents of the guilty person are dragged to execution without the least remorse or pity; even cowardice subjects the family of the delinquent to capital punishment. This barbarous law, which is rigorously enforced, must have a powerful effect in securing the allegiance of the troops, and of impelling them to vigorous exertion, and it is, perhaps, the only sure mode of inciting to enterprises of danger, men who are not actuated by any innate sense of honor, and who do not feel any national pride.16

Peasant levies could also be almost as dangerous to the ruler as the enemy before him or his armies. Within the Southeast Asian mandala, a king’s reach lessened as one moved beyond the inner circle of the royal city. In outlying villages, loyalty was strongest between the local patron and his clients, the villagers in his immediate vicinity. Rulers could not afford to train such men in ‘special’ weaponry, lest these skills be turned against the royal court by an upstart nobleman or 14

Cushman 2000, 31. Remmilink 1994, 19; Koenig 1990, 118; Schrieke 1957, 2.128. 16 Symes 1800, 317-318. 15

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prince. New technologies, such as firearms, were thus kept locked up in the royal city. Peasant levies were more than fodder for battle, however, and a loss of significant numbers meant a loss of a variety of resources in the kingdom. In part, this was because peasants ‘belonged’ to local lords and to the court and were thus personal resources. In the 1590s, in Java, for example, it was noted, “most of the soldiers belong to noble-men, or rich merchants.”17 As a result, it was far better to have someone else waste their peasants in battle. As one Persian observer explained of seventeenth century Ayudhya: It should be mentioned that in all the countries of Below the Winds the peasantry and the army are one and the same and if the army suffers the country itself falls into ruin. Consequently, when the natives of this region wage war, they are extremely careful and the struggle is wholly confined to trickery and deception. They have no intention of killing one another or inflicting any great slaughter because if a general gained a victory by real conquest, he would be shedding his own blood, so to speak.18

More importantly, unlike the professional units, general peasant conscripts were essentially farmers called away from their fields for seasonal campaigns.19 This could affect field campaigns, for peasant levies would ‘simply melt away’ with the outbreak of the rainy season in order to plant crops.20 Likewise, a long campaign that kept peasants far from home or left large numbers of them dead meant that there would be insufficient labour to work the fields at home. Dramatic losses of peasants in war could spell agricultural disaster in the years ahead. Moreover, it could have long-term implications for royal or elite manpower reserves in future wars. Losses of peasants in battle could be offset in part by the deportation of war captives to agricultural zones at home. Nevertheless, in cases of defeat, few captives were available for resettling. In Vietnam, Lê Lӧi (ruling as Lê Thái Tә, r. 1428-1433) found one solution in balancing out on-duty levies with off-duty ones. 17

Quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.128. IbrƗhƯm 1972, 90-91. 19 Schrieke 1957, 2.147. 20 Remmilink 1994, 19; Schrieke 1957, 2.128. 18

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After decreasing the army from 250,000 to 100,000 troops, he established a new system whereby twenty percent of his soldiers remained on duty, while eighty percent were allowed to work their fields at home. This was followed up under the Trӏnh with a formalized division of the army into a small standing army in the capital and a provincial militia that could remain in the countryside and aid in local agricultural work.21

Conscription Southeast Asian courts raised levies or conscripted soldiers in various ways. Aside from six hundred ‘volunteers,’ the recruits in Ayudhya’s army in the late seventeenth century were raised in the outlying provinces. In Kòn-baung Burma, the High Council (hlut-daw) established township quotas for conscripts based on their register of taxable houses. Township officers would then set a sub-quota for each village and village headmen would then determine who would actually be conscripted.22 Some provinces supplied more soldiers than others. One reason was that levies might be raised on an ad hoc basis in local areas for campaigns in nearby vicinities. During the Burmese attacks against Chiengmai and Lamphun in 1767, the Siamese forces that resisted them were raised on the spot in both towns and for the Siamese campaign against Chiengtrung in 1854, the soldiers mobilized were peasants raised for this purpose in towns in northern Siam, including Luang Prabang, Lom, Loei, Nan, Phrae, Lampang, Lamphun, and Chiengmai. Another possible reason could be the close relationship between the dynasty or a king with a particular powerbase in the provinces.23 Conscription in early modern Vietnam shared some of these features. In the late seventeenth century, for example, the numbers of conscripts depended in part on how many, and where, young men could be pressed into service. As Ĉa Shan described this method:

21

NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 158, 186. Gervaise 1998, 95; Symes 1800, 317-318. William Koenig traces this system back to the Pagan period. Koenig 1990, 117. 23 NC 1966, 43, 75. 22

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Every March and April the army officials went to the villages to round up soldiers. They captured all of the fit men over 16 years old, tied them to bamboo yokes and took them to the army. The yoke was like a ladder but slightly narrower…24

In the north, the Trӏnh army in the 1680s relied heavily upon soldiers drawn from NghӋ An province.25 Some provinces were reputed to be better sources of hardy recruits than others were. One observer described, or misunderstood, the selection process of Trӏnh forces in the 1680s as follows: The Soldiers are most of them lusty strong well-made Men; for ‘tis that chiefly recommends them to the King’s Service. They must also have good Stomachs, for that is a greater recommendation than the former; neither can any Man be entertained as a Soldier, that has not a greater stroke than ordinary at eating; for by this they judge of his strength and Constitution. For which Reason, when a Soldier comes to be listed, his Stomach is first proved with Rice, then common Subsistence of the ordinary People in this Kingdom; and according as he acuits himself in the first Tryal or his Manhood, so he is either discharged or entertained in the Service, ‘Tis reported, that at these Tryals they commonly eat 8 or 9 Cups of Rice, each containing a pint, and they are ever afterwards esteemed and advanced, according to the first Day’s Service: and the greatest eaters are chiefly employed as Guards to the King, and commonly attend on his Person. The Province of Ngean breeds the lustiest Men, and the best eaters: for that reason those of that Prince are generally imployed as Soldiers.26

Similarly, in the 1820s, only the best of the general conscription were entered into regular service.27 Nevertheless, in general, the system of conscription appears to have been more highly bureaucratized and standardized in the Vietnamese case, at least from the late eighteenth century. Under the Tây Sѫn ruler Quang Trung, conscription was limited to one-third of the men between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five. In both early nineteenth century Vietnam and Siam, recruitment was based on age and was 24

Li & Reid 1993, 56. Dampier 1906, 2.6. 26 Dampier 1906, 2.6. 27 Lamb 1961, 208. 25

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universal. Service could amount to a substantial portion of a soldier’s life. In the case of conscripts in the Trӏnh army in the 1680s, for example, service amounted to thirty years. When the term of service had ended, a soldier could petition to be released from service. If this were granted, the soldier’s home village would have to send a replacement. Similarly, in the 1830s, when a Vietnamese soldier died, was promoted, or deserted, the soldier’s home village also had to supply a replacement.28 Southeast Asian courts, especially after commercial fluctuations in the seventeenth century, had to consider the costs of maintaining large standing armies. In theory and frequently in practice, a court was not responsible for paying, housing, feeding, and sometimes even arming its soldiers, for the ruler was entitled to their service. Compensation could be made by granting tax exemptions for conscripts and their families as in the case of late seventeenth century Ayudhya. Without pay, Siamese soldiers were forced to lodge in their own homes in Lopburi and Bangkok. This system worked well for a modest-sized army, but if substantial numbers of troops were required, and recruits were thus brought in from the provinces, other arrangements had to be made to accommodate them. By the early nineteenth century, both Burma and Vietnam adopted rotational service for its soldiers. Only a modest percentage of the full complement of some military units was expected to serve a tour on duty in the capital at any one time. In Vietnam, one-third of the men in each unit served a tour of three years on-duty and was then rotated with another third of the unit’s full force. This system allowed soldiers to maintain their homes and fields in the provinces and reduced the time during which they had to make ends meet while on service. In the north, which at this time was reportedly considered to be and treated as a ‘conquered country,’ fear of local resistance led to ‘less rigorous’ conscription rates of one out of every seven men qualified for military service.29 Such fears may also explain Burmese attempts in the late eighteenth century to restrict recruitment for at least some military units to Burmans, rather than conscript Shans or members of other non-Burman minorities.30

28

Dampier 1906, 2.5; Crawfurd 1828, 494; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 214; Lamb 1961, 208. 29 Loubère 1986, 91; Crawfurd 1828, 491; Schrieke 1957, 2.128. 30 Maung Maung Tin 1975, 1.209-211.

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Mercenaries The ability to apply firearm technologies on the battlefield in any meaningful way depended upon the trained, professional warriors. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many of the professional soldiers kept on a permanent footing by Southeast Asian courts were mercenaries. Portuguese expansion during the same period provided European professional soldiers and desperados who frequently pursued either escape from the control of officials or quick fortunes. In many cases, Europeans and Indians were pressed into royal service after they had been captured from ships or fallen ports. In the sixteenth century, the King of Sunda had a personal bodyguard of forty Portuguese who surrounded him in the field and defended his life while on campaign, while the ruler of DČmak had Acehnese, Dutch, Turkish, and Malabari mercenaries. Mons, Christian Japanese, Makassars, Bugis, and others also served as mercenaries in varied locations in the next few centuries. The large numbers of foreigners available for hire meant that many early modern Southeast Asian courts were not desperate for new recruits. Europeans and Asians competed with each other for employment and sometimes attempted to sabotage one another’s repute. In the seventeenth century, for example, Muslim mercenaries cast doubt in the Arakanese king’s mind concerning his Portuguese mercenaries stationed at Syriam and in Ayudhya, one Englishman attempted to outdo a Frenchman by demonstrating that he could drill more Siamese troops in the same way as the French incumbent.31 One solution for preventing the problem of royal guards becoming too involved in court politics and cliques was to hire mercenaries or foreign captives.32 Because they were not part time warriors, their skills were kept up through practice. Finally, they brought with them warfare skills and more recent technologies sometimes not found in the local society. Such advantages were two-sided. Lieberman argues that although the Portuguese and Muslim mercenaries had been useful to First Taung-ngu courts, “they had also been politically fickle, expensive, 31

Pinto 1989, 387, 389; Remmilink 1994, 20; Loubère 1986, 91; Hamilton 1930, 2.71; Pimenta 1906, 10.215; Schrieke 1957, 2.124. 32 Remmilink 1994, 20.

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and available on a short-term basis.”33 Their status as professional warriors, special skills, technologies, and lack of local loyalties meant that they sometimes sought more than a meager court stipend. As they were not rooted in local society or culture, they frequently saw themselves as sojourners and adventurers who had both the freedom and, one suspects, the seeming obligation to take advantage where opportunity was offered. Unbounded by cultural constraints regarding the place of the ruler in society or even the rulers’ claims to royal legitimacy, such men viewed and sometimes treated Southeast Asian rulers as equals or less. As Dutchmen pressed into the service of DČmak at the beginning of the seventeenth century claimed of indigenous perceptions of them: We are … very much feared here and there is no Javanese who would be so brave as to dare arouse our anger. They say we are not men but devils.34

Further, mercenaries, when guarding rich ports and portages or consulting the king in the royal court, had a better idea of the state of the king’s military power and wealth than did almost anyone else. Moreover, armed with the best weapons of the day, they could easily sweep aside, at least in the short-term, the king’s other defenses. In several well-known cases, foreign mercenaries made their own bids for the throne or for autonomous power. Filippe de Brito y Nicote and Sebastião Gonsalves y Tibao, for example, both rebelled and set up rival petty kingdoms on the Arakanese and Burmese coasts at the beginning of the seventeenth century where they defeated local rulers and bewildered more powerful ones for almost a decade-and-a-half. The seventeenth century saw many such episodes in Ayudhya. Some six hundred Japanese Samurai warriors, for example, interfered with Siamese court politics in the early part of the century and seized control of at least one important town. In the later part of the century, the King of Ayudhya was considerably concerned that just as he had been aided by the Iranians in taking the throne, they might challenge him later in favor of his brother. In 1686, as well, Makassar warriors

33 34

Lieberman 1993, 228. Quoted in Schrieke 1957, 2.124.

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also made their own attempts to seize control of royal court and set themselves up as kings.35

Royal Guard to Standing Army While mercenaries represented one version of the professional soldier in early modern Southeast Asia, indigenous soldiers and foreign captives also served in modest contingents of royal guards, or palace troops. These professional warriors surrounded the royal palace and the person of the king and protected his life as much as they served as dependable units on the battlefield. They were better armed and trained than the levies and served as the main force of early modern courts up through the eighteenth century and, in many cases, into the nineteenth century. Europeans were so impressed by the guardsmen that they sometimes claimed that they were the only troops maintained by the court.36 As Poivre described the NguyӉn guard in 1749-1750: The elite of the king’s soldiers makes up the palace guard, guarding both inside and outside. They form two companies, each of a hundred men, called the Golden Swords and the Silver Swords. This militia is the first in the kingdom and the most distinguished; these are the bodyguards who ever leave the king’s side and who carry out his orders…. The rest of the militia [presumably the provincial militia] is not worthy of any attention. It serves tin times of war and shows no discipline in times of peace.37

While the provincial militia (as well as wartime levies) was thus viewed as unreliable or even useless in battle, the guardsmen were noted for their discipline. As the guardsmen of Ayudhya were described in the 1680s: … at their posts they remain squatting on their heels, for it is a mark of disrespect to remain upright in the palace of he king, even when he is not there. They maintain a profound silence and the smallest breaches

35

IbrƗhƯm 1972, 101-102; Loubère 1986, 97; Forbin 1997, 97-98. Remmelink 1994, 19; Loubère 1986, 91. 37 Li & Reid 1993, 20. 36

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of their prescribed discipline are severely punished on the spot by their officers, who almost never let them out of their sight…38

While the royal guard was continually employed, individual soldiers were rotated in part for relief. As the above-mentioned account also explains: The royal guard is composed of several companies of young gentlemen and private soldiers. The number is not fixed as in France; on some days there are more men than on others, and there are many fewer when His Majesty is in his palace than when he goes forth. The private soldiers are on guard in the outer courtyards of the palace for a month, while the mandarins who guard the other courtyards and the rooms nearest to the king’s apartments, each one according to the importance of his office and his rank in the kingdom, serve only for three days in succession. Both officers and men are divided into two squads so that they are all free at certain hours of the day and night to attend to the necessities of life.39

In the 1690s, however, after the turbulent 1680s, the royal guard in Ayudhya was rotated for six-month periods.40 A probable explanation for this was that the continual presence of the same armed men in the royal capital on a permanent basis had the potential of allowing them to get involved in royal and ministerial politics.41 Certainly, in Kònbaung Burma, different units within the royal guard were suggested by Sangermano to be “protect[ed]” by an official at the royal court, an apparent reference to their interconnection with ministerial cliques.42

Organization The organization of the army differed across the region and substantially within each state, sometimes changing from reign to reign. Even when formal organizational structures were in place in name, these were sometimes merely symbolic. This was especially 38

Gervaise 1998, 179. Gervaise 1998, 179. 40 Loubère 1986, 91. 41 Remmelink 1994, 20. 42 Sangermano 1995, 98. 39

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true on campaigns, for it was easier to maintain group coherence on the parade ground, but an entirely different matter when trekking across hundreds of kilometres through unfriendly country. Even so, the latter part of the early modern period witnessed considerable efforts by royal courts to develop more effective military organization. A brief look at Vietnamese and Burmese armies should provide some idea of the kinds of changes that were taking place. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Vietnam, the Trӏnh and the NguyӉn organized their armies in similar ways, although there were terminological differences. The Trӏnh army, for example, was formally divided into the elite and reserve units. The elite units composed the standing army and were stationed in the capital. They were recruited mainly from the Thanh Hóa and NghӋ An provinces. The reserve units served as a local provincial military, and engaged in local agricultural duties, such as reaping the harvest.43 NguyӉn soldiers were divided into those of the regular army (chanh binh) and the tho binh and thuoc binh (local and auxiliary troops). The NguyӉn regular army was organized into a hierarchy of units. The smallest unit was the thuy͉n, amounting to thirty to one hundred soldiers; three to five thuy͉n made up a d͡i, consisting of 220 to five hundred men; six (doi?) formed a co, including as many as 2,100 men, and the highest unit was the dinh, of which there were twelve in the eighteenth century.44 In the late eighteenth century, NguyӉn Ánh, with the aid of European (mainly French) advisers, developed an “entire system of military organization,” dividing his forces into regiments.45 This organization endured under NguyӉn Ánh’s successor, Minh Mҥng. Woodside suggests that the nineteenth century Vietnamese army, by contrast with the civil bureaucracy, was not as interested in following Chinese models, indicated by the Christian conversions among soldiers in the 1830s.46 Although European advisers were no longer present, Minh Mҥng’s army was said to be “dressed, equipped and disciplined after the European manner.”47 Aside from the royal bodyguard of thirty thousand men, the regular army was divided into 43

NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 186. Li 1992, 36-37, 54; Li & Reid 1993, 147-148. 45 Barrow 1806, 275; Lamb 1961, 209-210. 46 Woodside 1988, 286. 47 Lamb 1961, 208-210; Crawfurd 1828, 495. 44

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two main groups. Crawfurd has provided a breakdown of these two forces, although he made a computational error. He suggests that the first class of soldiers were divided into forty-eight regiments, but his description of these forces yields only forty regiments. Perhaps he left one increment out or miscalculated the overall number, the latter case appearing more probable. According to Crawfurd, sixty men made up a company and ten companies a regiment. The five first class divisions (columns) each consisted of eight regiments and the five second class divisions (legions) consisted of five regiments each. In addition, there were provincial forces, also organized into regiments, although the number of regiments varied from province to province. Crawfurd provides the example of Gia-Ĉӏnh, whose provincial force consisted of sixteen regiments. These soldiers were said to be possessed of endurance, order, and obedience and that failure to maintain discipline or errors in maneuvers would bring swift and strict punishment.48 The army of Kòn-baung Burma was also divided into regiment-like divisions but these were not regularized to the degree found in Vietnam. While a Vietnamese regiment consisted of fortyeight hundred men, a Burmese regiment’s full complement could range from a few hundred to nine thousand men. In the late eighteenth century, regiments were bifurcated into two wings of five hundred soldiers (on duty) with a full complement of several thousand each. These wings bore the regimental name but were differentiated by the addition of north and south, left and right, and various other oppositional terms.49 As Burney described them in the early 1830s: “The Regiments called atsoo are innumerable, named usually from some Pali terms, and divided chiefly into two battalions of five hundred men each, and distinguished as North and South.”50 Burney, however, was probably misinformed by Symes’ account, for the wings were now treated as separate, full-fledged regiments (su), although the prefixes remained. Hence, the North Marabin regiment, for example, was no longer deployed in conjunction with the South Marabin regiment. The re-ordered Burmese regiments (su) were classified into first class (su-gyì) regiments and three different categories of support regiments (su-kyàn, su-thè, and su-nu). Most 48

Crawfurd 1828, 492, 494. Yule 1858, 249f; Symes 1800, 99, 318. 50 Burney 1995, 88. 49

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second-class units were only mobilized in wartime and remained in different areas of the country as a kind of reserve. The standing army was generally equivalent to the first class regiments, many of which were either cavalry units or those who guarded the gates. Among the first class units, however, was the royal guard, represented by twelve regiments, divided into two brigades, the exterior and interior brigades. From Bò-daw-hpayà’s time (r. 1782-1819), these twelve regiments consisted mostly of men drawn from the Lower Chindwin, the king’s old princely appanage. Another difference between the royal guard regiments and other regiments of the standing army was that the former was controlled by the household or Privy Council (byè-daik) and the latter by the High Council (hlut-daw). This had significant implications for Burmese politics as the nineteenth century wore on, for the royal guard played a crucial role in several court coups and was critical for the 1879 coup that returned full royal powers to King Thibaw after several months of domination by reform-minded ministers.51 Within the regiments, there were smaller units. The main subregimental division was the ngà-ya-tat or ‘company of five hundred’ which consisted of five tats of one hundred men each. Each tat consisted of two thwè-thauk of about fifty men; a thwè-thauk-su consisted of five kyat (squads), which in turn consisted of two ta-òzàs (‘eating from one pot’) or simply ò-zà (a mess), of five men each. As Europeans discovered, the soldiers of these select first-class regiments were highly disciplined and on parade conducted themselves in formations similar to those of soldiers in Europe.52 Burma also had small contingents of provincial troops. These consisted of locally raised men who were not integrated into the overall military structure. Further, their order and equipment depended upon the whim of local officials. As one observer commented on the Pegu myó-wun’s guard of five to six hundred men: [they were] wretchedly armed, and equipped; many had muskets that appeared in a very unserviceable state, with accoutrements not in a more respectable condition; some were provided with spears, others with sabers ...53 51

Burney 1995, 87; Tin 1931-1933, 4.265-267; Langham-Carter 1937, 271-273. Tin 1931-1933,4. 258, 260-261; Koenig 1990, 117; Langham-Carter 1937, 268. 53 Symes 1800, 168-169. 52

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Pay Details on the remuneration of soldiers are not as readily available for early modern Southeast Asia as elsewhere, but there is some data that sheds light on this topic. Levies remained a constant feature of early modern warfare, for their numbers and labour as discussed above, but also because they were cheap. In most of Southeast Asia, levies were not paid and frequently even their daily sustenance was not supplied by the court. Cham soldiers, for example, received no pay, only a monthly supply of rice and three to five articles of clothing.54 By contrast, foreign mercenaries could be very expensive and some could command their own wages. In Ayudhya in the 1680s, for example, each member of the royal guard received high quality weaponry and horses, but also a large sum of cash, the amount based on separate arrangements made between the court and a mercenary contingent. One visitor to Ayudhya described this differentiation as follows: each Muslim guardsman was paid 540 livres, each Muslim captain 840 livres, each ‘Chinese Tartar’ forty-five livres, and the ‘Chinese Tartar’ captain 112 livres, ten sols per year. The pay received by foreign mercenaries also changed as they became indigenized over the course of several generations of settlement. In his early eighteenth century account, Hamilton refers to Portuguese mestizos settled in Cambodia, for example, whose stipends from the court were so small, that they were forced to take their guns into the woods to kill wild elephants and sell the ivory to foreigners.55 The standing army fell at different points in the range between free and paid service. In the eighteenth century, indigenous guardsmen in Mataram and Kòn-baung Burma did not represent a “true stipendiary force,” for they received income from land allotments, and sustenance from the food grown on these lands, but were not paid directly by the court.56 Koenig makes the point for Burma, which must also have been valid in the Javanese case, that this reliance on land allotments meant that the standing army was just as affected by droughts and famines as the general population.57 54

Maspero 2002, 17. Loubère 1986, 97-98; Hamilton 1930, 2.106-107. 56 Remmelink 1994, 19; Symes 1800, 317-318; Koenig 190, 118. 57 Koenig 1990, 118. 55

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At the other end of the spectrum was Vietnam. Like levies elsewhere, Vietnamese serving in the local militia received no pay, but were exempt from taxation. Vietnamese soldiers in the regular army, however, had been paid a salary from the early seventeenth century at the latest. European accounts sometimes dismissed this pay as inadequate. As one observer noted of NguyӉn soldiers in 1749-1750: “These soldiers are poorly fed and even more poorly paid. They waste away in slavery until the whim of the prince raises them to some dignity.”58 Recent research, however, has demonstrated that soldiers of both the NguyӉn and the Trӏnh armies were paid quite well, perhaps following the example of Ming and, later, Qing China. As Li notes, one mandarin even complained that the high pay enjoyed by the Vietnamese soldiery in the 1750s was “one of the three evils in contemporary society.”59 During the earlier years of the Tây Sѫn rebellion, the Trӏnh may not have been able to maintain their soldiers properly. When Trӏnh forces were temporarily able to occupy part of the NguyӉn lands in the south in the mid-1770s, the latter even believed that these forces could not be an army because of their small numbers and because “the generals [were] only dressed in black cotton gowns, and the soldiers dressed very shabbily.”60 Military salaries continued into the nineteenth century. In the 1820s, for example, Vietnamese troops received both food and pay when on actual duty, although no pay was received when soldiers were on leave. Non-commissioned officers received the same pay as the common soldier. A common soldier was paid one quan and about twenty-nine kilograms of rice per month; a ‘second captain,’ two quans and about fifty-eight kilograms of rice per month; a ‘first captain,’ three quans and about eight-seven kilograms of rice per month; a ‘colonel,’ eight quans and about 232 kilograms of rice per month; and a ‘brigade commander’ received thirty quans and 871 kilograms of rice per month. A ‘regular pensionary system’ was also in place and the Vietnamese emperor paid the costs of the funeral for every soldier. In some cases, such as especially long service or ‘particular merit,’ as in the case of soldiers who accompanied the NguyӉn exile to Siam, pay might also be increased, even doubled, and 58

Li & Reid 1993, 20. Li 1992, 54, 57-58. 60 Li & Reid 1993, 100. 59

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as a rule, soldiers of the imperial guard were paid more than those of the regular army.61

Uniforms Uniformed clothing was one solution to the problem of distinguishing between friend and foe once lines were crossed. In European warfare, uniformed clothing became essential for identifying army membership earlier than in most of Southeast Asia. In much of early modern Southeast Asia, however, other means of identification, sometimes consciously and sometimes inadvertently, performed the same function. ‘Ethnic’ markers, for example, appear to have been useful. In the great 1740-1757 War in which Burma was torn apart between northern and southern rebels and courts, Mon hairstyles were an immediate way to identify those who fought for Pegu, just as Burman tattoos identified those who fought for Ava. Tattooing was more common and, in the case of Burma, remained the chief identifying mark for much of the soldiery even when Western-style uniformed clothing had been introduced by royal decree in 1832, until the end of the dynasty.62 Indeed, with the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Burmese War in late 1885, Burmese forces unconvinced by the loyalty of ‘bandits’ they had hired, made a special tattoo on their arms to make them easier to identify.63 Evidence from elsewhere is Southeast Asia indicates that tattooing was, or had been, important outside of Burma as well for similar reasons. Interestingly, during the period of military reforms that more firmly regulated military training and officer selection, and probably required uniformed clothing as well, the Vietnamese court also suppressed traditional body tattooing. Tattooing and soldiery were important in Vietnam at least until the 1280s, when Ĉҥi ViӋt soldiers tattooed their arms with “Sái Ðát” signifying their commitment to repel Chinese invaders. Soon after, Trҫn Nhân Tông (r. 1293-1314) discouraged the practice and his successor Trҫn Mihn Tông (r. 13141329) outlawed it. Tattooing for military purposes appears to have 61

Lamb 1961, 208-209; Crawfurd 1828, 493-494. Langham-Carter 1937, 258-261. 63 Barberis 1890, 156. 62

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disappeared from that time in Vietnam.64 Certainly, this was partly the influence of Chinese culture, but it seems likely that if Chinese military models were being drawn upon as well, the adoption of Chinese practices in dressing troops would also have made body tattooing less important in identifying soldiers. In Southeast Asia, the emergence of uniformed clothing that was used to identify membership in the army or different branches within it was an evolutionary process and emerged out of both the ‘dressing up’ of the royal guard and the influence of European armies in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Levies essentially wore what they brought with them from the provinces. Moreover, outside the royal capital local commanders and officials were unwilling to cover the expenses necessary to supply such luxuries. As Symes observed of the myó-wun’s guard at Pegu in the late eighteenth century: their dress was as motley as their weapons. Some were naked in the middle, having only a Kummerband, or waistcloth, rolled round their waist, and passed between their legs; some were dressed in old velvet, or cloth coats, which they put on regardless of size or fashion, although it scarce covered their nakedness or trailed on the ground…Some wore Dutch board brimmed hats, bound with gold lacer, others the crowns of hats, without any brim at all…65

The practice of uniforming was reserved for the royal guard in much of Southeast Asia until the nineteenth century. In the late seventeenth century, for example, Siamese levies wore no uniform at all, while royal guardsmen were said to wear a red muslin robe, “resemble[ing] a short tunic” and “hats made of wood and reeds.”66 Although Siamese chronicles refer to units wearing different coloured tunics earlier, in the sixteenth century, these may have been later interpolations.67 Red uniforms, however, were popular in early seventeenth century BantČn, where all the king’s guard were “clothed in red Coates,” and when the Dutch encountered the Raja of Buleleng

64

NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 108-109, 123, 125. Symes 1800, 168-169. 66 Loubère 1986, 91; IbrƗhƯm 1972, 57. 67 Cushman 2000, 32. 65

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in battle in 1849, the latter’s soldiers wore red uniforms as well.68 Such uniforms, however, were usually donned only on special occasions, such as royal ceremonies or upon the arrival of important visitors. As foreigners typically visited the palace on such occasions, their accounts of the royal guard frequently, but not always, included descriptions of such uniforms. On most other occasions, however, because of the tropical heat and perhaps the expense to the crown of replacing such robes, even guardsmen abandoned their use for that of a small cloth garment and hat, one to cover genitalia and the latter to protect against the sun, as well as other modest accoutrements. As one Persian observer noted of the same royal guards in the same period: They were content with a scanty loincloth, just large enough to cover up their private parts, and a few of them were wearing a kind of hat made of woven reeds and wood. This is the kind of hat Franks wear also…they wore belts of woven reed around their waists.69

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Southeast Asian states began to pay more attention to standardizing uniforms among rank-and-file troops. Aside from Vietnam, among the earliest examples of Southeast Asians connecting uniforms with the idea of the soldier were rebels such as Chin Pyan, who dressed his warriors in red British army tunics in his war on Kòn-baung forces in early nineteenth century Arakan. Likewise, at least soldiers assigned to guard Paknam in Siam were dressed in “royal red uniform” by the early 1830s. Vietnamese troops were dressed in different kinds of uniforms in earlier years. In the late sixteenth century, NguyӉn troops were described as wearing “red and gold helmets on their heads and green flannelette uniforms on their bodies” and in the 1750s, they wore uniforms comprising trousers and a tunic bearing characters or letters.70 As Poivre described them in the latter case: …They were drawn up in battle formation, with swords drawn, forming a sight which had something grand and majestic about it. Their clothing is a sort of flowered black silk or gauze domino [or cape] with an insignia in red satin front and back, where there are Cochinchinese 68

Kraan 1995, 51; E. Scott 1906, 2.487. IbrƗhƯm 1972, 62. 70 Roberts 1837, 232; Dutton 2004, 36; Li & Reid 1993, 56. 69

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letters embroidered in gold and silver. They were small round hats, lacquered red and wrought with gold and silver filigree, ending in a tinplate or beaten copper point. Their shoes are half-boots of quilted white satin, with a cord brocaded in gold around the knee-piece, and flat shoes or slippers revealing the instep…71

Those characters or letters appear to have designated a soldier’s membership in a specific unit.72 Nevertheless, in the 1820s, the Vietnamese also began to import large amounts of British woolens, especially “strong coarse scarlet broad cloth, and a small quantity of yellow and green of the same texture with a few serges” to uniform some forty thousand soldiers.73 Information on Burmese uniforms is seemingly contradictory. Symes claimed at the end of the eighteenth century that the regular Kòn-baung army was “not uniformly clothed.”74 Yet, on another occasion, during a royal procession, Symes reported that the soldiers “were uniformly clothed and accoutred…” and there were “three companies of musqueteers, one clothed in blue, another in green, and a third in red….”75 Symes also notes that while Kòn-baung officers wore no uniform, only their daily clothing, rank-and-file troops wore: a loose convenient frock of strong English scarlet broadcloth, which reaches down to the knee. The headdress is a small conical cap of basket-work, lackered over, ornamented at the peak with a plume of cocks’ feathers, and tied under the chin. This article is certainly neither becoming nor convenient. The dress of the lower part of the body consists of a pair of loose drawers, reaching a little below the knee. The legs and feet are entirely naked...76

Burmese uniforms are described in the late 1860s as consisting of red striped pasos, green jackets, and red helmets. However, regular infantry wore only the same white jacket worn by the rest of the population. Thus, some uniforming was present at least on occasion in the Burmese army. Again, it is likely that, given the hot climate, 71

Li & Reid 1993, 20. Dutton 2004, 36. 73 Lamb 1961, 204-205. 74 Symes 1800, 318. 75 Symes 1800, 358-360. 76 Crawfurd 1828, 494. 72

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soldiers in the Burmese army, and probably elsewhere in Southeast Asia, wore uniforms only on special occasions, for there are numerous references to soldiers of the standing army wearing no uniform at all throughout the 1870s. This does not mean that they were unidentifiable as soldiers, for instead of a uniform, the normal means of indicating their status were tattoo marks on the backs of their necks. Such uniforms as were worn were provided by the court and a new uniform was supplied each year.77

Command and Tactology Early modern Southeast Asian armies generally lacked a regularized and trained officer class. On occasion, Europeans or Muslim Indians might be appointed as officers. In late eighteenth century Kòn-baung Burma, officers of personal guards of important officials were sometimes Christian Portuguese mestizos.78 Contemporary European accounts also sometimes refer to what appear to be highly organized command hierarchies. The Siamese army command in the 1680s, for example, was described by Gervaise as consisting of a “commanderin-chief, a deputy general, several captains with their lieutenants and some subalterns.”79 In actuality, members of the nobility through ad hoc appointments led Southeast Asian armies. These men were usually personal favorites of the ruler or one of his relatives, or were outlying lords obligated to bring local levies to participate in campaigns. One reason for this was the concern that otherwise a regular officer class on a permanent footing would become part of the court and ministerial politics that plagued early modern Southeast Asian states. As a result, Southeast Asian kingdoms lost the potential benefits of a regular officer class to political centralization. Ad hoc commands and the irregular appointments of most officers meant that central forces were not that different from the local armies maintained by outlying officials and vassals alike.80

77

Fytche 1868, 10, 12, 13; Wheeler 1871, 49, 57; Crawfurd 1828, 494. Symes 1800, 168-169. 79 Gervaise 1998, 95. 80 Maspero 2002, 17; Remmelink 1994, 20-21. 78

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Only Vietnam developed a true officer class, based on merit, prior to the nineteenth century. In the thirteenth century, during the Trҫn Dynasty, a regularized military examination system was instituted, drawing upon the model of the civil service examination system, which in turn was modeled on that of China. A prospective officer would have to demonstrate his ability in weaponry before being allowed to study tactology and the other abstract aspects of warfare.81 Later examples make it clear that officers were raised from among the regular troops. In the 1470s, Lê Thánh Tông ordered that at the end of three years of army training, an examination would be used to determine who would become officers.82 Ĉa Shan claimed that in the late sixteenth century, NguyӉn officers and soldiers were promoted based on their performance in fighting with wild elephants, during elephant drills, but this was probably only an indication that performance in battle in general, amongst other factors, may have contributed to promotion to a higher rank.83 Over time, the military had become a separate and complex bureaucracy, headed by the Board of War which decided not only troop deployments, but also “promotions, demotions, and assignments of military officers.”84 In addition to selecting officers and putting them into command positions, these officers would also have to be trained in tactology and in other aspects of warfare. What amounted to “training” differed throughout Southeast Asia. Again, only in Vietnam did a true meritbased officer class emerge in the early modern period and it should be no surprise that until the nineteenth century, regularized officer training was generally limited to Vietnam. By contrast with Vietnam, in many Southeast Asian societies, ‘training’ was constituted by rituals and mock battles that honed warrior skills and by participation in actual fighting. Elites in many parts of Southeast Asia were also trained in the court, formally by specialists in warfare and informally through frequent royal tournaments where elites demonstrated their prowess and learned different battle tactics. In South Sulawesi, for example, warriors, common recruits, and hereditary slaves formed differentiated parts of the army. Spiritual teachers taught the elite among them, the warriors, about bravery and warfare, while the 81

Dutton 2004, 5. NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 167; Dutton 2004, 6. 83 Li & Reid 1993, 57. 84 Woodside 1988, 68. 82

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children of nobles were also instructed on how to make the shields that would be used in battle.85 Further, the high incidence of literacy and the strong emphasis on literature among Southeast Asian elites in many areas of early modern Southeast Asia meant that those who were placed in positions of military authority were no less knowledgeable about military tactics and the history of warfare in their societies than were their counterparts in Vietnam. In many areas of Southeast Asia, formations and tactics were either adopted or recast according to models provided by India or China. While Southeast Asians generally drew upon Indian texts on warfare for war tactics and strategies, Chinese texts were also influential. Local literati, including those of both Siam and Vietnam, for example, also translated into indigenous languages Chinese texts on warfare, including Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.86 In the case of Vietnam in particular, literati continued to draw on Chinese models in composing new texts on warfare in Vietnamese throughout the early modern period. Outside of Vietnam, Indian texts played a similar role. Such texts discussed warfare in South Asia, especially that which occurred on the Gangetic Plains. When rendered into Southeast Asian languages, or were drawn upon in texts produced by local learned men, to whom we may also refer as ‘literati,’ Indian concepts of warfare were translated onto the Southeast Asian terrain. This approach was not questioned, as much Southeast Asian court ritual and military pageantry had already inculcated South Asian traditions. The best example is that of the ‘four war arms’ of kings, which included foot, horse, elephant, and chariot as the main branches of royal armies.87 The last, the chariot, as mentioned earlier, was, with a few exceptions, never used in Southeast Asian warfare, although it did exist in court martial pageantry. Formation or tactical models drawn from China and India also provided models for writing about warfare when Southeast Asians critically examined the performance of their warriors in the field. A good example is that of Let-wè-thondara, a veteran of early Kònbaung conflicts and later a poet and commentator on Burmese warfare. Let-wè-thondara adapted information from an Indian treatise 85

L. Andaya 2004, 56, 57, 65. For a discussion of the introduction of the Art of War and Chinese military theory to Siam, see Battye 1974, 52-53. 87 Wyatt & Wichienkeeo 1995, 161. 86

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on warfare, the Senanga Vyuha, especially its material on battlefield arrays, and even borrowed the title calling his first work on warfare (1785) Thenanga Byuha-sit-thamaìng (“Senanga Vyuha—History of War”). He later produced another work on Burmese warfare entitled Byuha-sakki-pyó (1790), which analyzed incidents in Burmese battles mainly from the sixteenth century.88 Javanese texts provided similar information to that found in Let-wè-thondara’s 1785 work. Ayudhya also had its own texts on warfare from the early sixteenth century, beginning with the first “Treatise on Victorious Warfare” written by order of King Ramathibodi in 1518 and derived from Khmer texts, which in turn were probably derived from Sanskrit texts.89 Two sixteenth-century Indian texts on warfare, Vaisampayana’s Nitiprakasika and Sukranitisastra were also influential.90 New treatises followed, including a different “Treatise on Victorious Warfare” in 1798. Quaritch Wales suggests that this text drew upon two sources for its information: the Ramathibodi treatise and knowledge on Burmese warfare brought back by Naresuan after his residence at the First Taung-ngu court. As Quaritch Wales explains: The original work of RƗmƗdhipati II had formed the basis which had been modified or added to for the first time by King Naresuen. Subsequent modifications were all in the same direction, that of reducing ceremonial and ritual content, and adding to the stratagems and other practical considerations that formed the substance of the realistic warfare which continued to be employed in Siam after its first introduction by Naresuen…I am prepared to believe that most of this dates from no earlier than Naresuen’s reign and was largely derived from Burma.91

Other Southeast Asian literati similarly produced texts based on local (and often their own) experiences in warfare, although the Vietnamese, after the Khmers, were among the earliest to do so. The thirteenth century Vietnamese admiral, Trҫn Hѭng Ĉҥo (d. 1300), for example, discussed warfare in his “The Essentials of the Military Arts.” Although Trҫn Hѭng Ĉҥo drew upon various Chinese texts, he 88 Let-wè-thondara 1943, p. “tha.” This book contains both of the relevant texts. See also the discussion of both in Myo 1978. 89 Cushman 2000, 19; Quaritch Wales 1952, 121, 198. 90 Battye 1974, 52. 91 Quaritch Wales 1952, 121.

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explains that he “assembled tactics from several dynasties” of Vietnam, and information gained from his own experiences resisting Yuan expansion into Vietnam to write a manual to train military officers.92 In Vietnam, such texts were used formally to school officers and elsewhere to informally educate those elites who, by virtue of their social status, were the main candidates for command in times of war.93 In addition to the battlefield formations discussed in Chapter One, many other aspects of officer training included activities such as horseriding, the use of firearms and other weapons, the organization of soldiers and elephants on the field, and the mastery of ships. This education was formalized in the case of Vietnam and became more regulated in the centuries that followed. In 1225, the Vietnamese established a training school for officers in military tactology and strategy. In the latter part of the fifteenth century, the emperor Lê Thánh Tông established various rules for officer training. Although neither officer training schools nor military examinations were emphasized in the south under the NguyӉn, the Trӏnh in the north maintained both, with a military school from 1721 and a regularized officer examination system from 1724. As Dutton explains, the examination was of three parts, focusing on Chinese military knowledge, horseriding and skill in weaponry, and military strategy.94 Commanders in other areas of Southeast Asia learned such skills informally, since the bifurcation of state administration into ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ spheres was in practice a phenomenon of Vietnam. Princes and the sons of nobles accompanied their fathers and grandfathers onto the battlefield or at least practiced such skills in yearly tournaments held at the court, for being a warrior was indistinguishable from elite status.95 This remained true throughout the early modern period until the nineteenth century, when some attempts were made by the courts of large Southeast Asian states to experiment with European officer training. European influence on officer training in Southeast Asia reflected the professionalization of the officer corps in European armies by the late eighteenth century and afterwards. Unlike the freebooters and 92

Trѭѫng Bѭu Lâm 1967, 49, 52. Dutton 2004, 5, 6. 94 Dutton 2004, 5-7. 95 See, for example, the case of the Siamese elite. Battye 1974, 51. 93

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exiles of the sixteenth century and the adventurer-soldiers of the seventeenth century, new, better-trained military men began to bring the newest innovations in military organization. Their influence and the demonstration of improving Western weaponry were accompanied by military manuals that were part of everyday officership in the context of growing popular literacy in Europe. NguyӉn Ánh, for example, introduced new military training schools using European manuals translated into Vietnamese in the late eighteenth century, and in one of these, Frenchmen taught Vietnamese naval officers European naval tactics.96 In the mid-nineteenth century, King Mindon of Burma began sending students abroad to various European educational institutions based on what he saw as each country’s natural abilities. France, for example, had been seen as the military equal of Britain and he decided to send six Burmese to France to be educated as military commanders. After the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, however, Mindon changed his opinion and saw Prussians as the best authority on military skills, proposing to send three Burmese to be educated in Prussia, as a general, an admiral, and a politician, respectively.97 Whether these efforts would have been decisive in the end is difficult to determine, because European conquests followed soon after, largely determined by collusion with court factions rather than field contests in the 1880s. In the short term, however, they did yield fruit. As Andreino commented of the Burmese army in 1872, for example, the “army is set up like our own, namely with a generalissimo; each regiment having a general, colonel, officials, sergents; corporals...”98

96

Lamb 1961, 76; Barrow 1806, 275; White 1972, 93-94; Dutton 2004, 8. Wheeler 1871, 43. 98 Ba 1970b, 66. 97

CHAPTER TEN

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY The nineteenth century witnessed long if desultory European efforts to bring what remained of independent Southeast Asia under their rule. This was no simple feat. Aside from the northern and central Philippine Islands, parts of Java, Sumatra, Timor, and several other islands of the archipelago, Southeast Asia at the beginning of the nineteenth century remained free from direct European control. By the end of the century, this situation had changed. Outside of Siam, most of Southeast Asia had fallen, including two of its most powerful empires, Burma and Vietnam. As early as the 1820s, some Europeans argued that Southeast Asian attempts to westernize their manner of conducting warfare were critical to their poor showing in conflicts with European forces. As Crawfurd remarked in 1828: …While barbarous nations depend upon civilized ones for the munitions of war, and abandon the modes and habits of warfare natural to their condition, the former are only the more at the mercy of the latter; and … no Indian nations have been so speedily subdued as those who have attempted to imitate European tactics…1

In several ways, Crawfurd was correct. In Burma, for example, attempts to westernize the army led to a confusing combination of European instructors who drilled the troops according to French or Prussian models and the indigenous equivalent of non-commissioned officers who directed their troops along earlier indigenous lines as soon as European officers were out of sight. The expenses of arming, uniforming, and paying soldiers in imitation of western armies proved costly and armies diminished in size so that very few were prepared when European forces arrived. As rulers such as Mindon sought to compete with Europeans on their own terms, by acquiring substantial 1

Crawfurd 1828, 547.

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fleets of steamboats and constructing large European-style river fortresses, there was little effort to convince indigenous soldiers that these would be effective against European naval forces. Furthermore, this commitment to competition with European naval strength was not paralleled by a simultaneous effort to maintain traditional defense works and tactics in case the western-style ones failed. Crawfurd, however, missed one critical aspect of the relationship between the Westernization of indigenous warfare and the failure of indigenous armies. Reliance on purchasing weapons from the West allowed Europeans to restrict the flow of advanced Western technology or cut off the supplies of such arms altogether. This chapter will look more closely at these developments. It will also examine the difficulties Europeans faced when Southeast Asians abandoned river valleys and coastal areas, as well as Western-style tactics and military organization, and returned to indigenous methods of waging war.

Small Arms In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Southeast Asians had continued to show an interest in acquiring new firearm technologies. As White records of his arrival in Gia-Ĉӏnh in 1820: the king wished us to contract to furnish him with a quantity of artillery, …fire and side arms of fine temper and exquisite workmanship; …scientific European works generally, etc; …A few days afterwards, the commissary came on board with official overtures from the king, accompanied with a large roll of papers containing mathematical drawings, very neatly executed, of cannon of various calibers and dimensions, --none however heavier than five pounders…2

As technologies became more complex, however, it became more difficult to reproduce them by relying on traditional founding techniques. As Crawfurd remarked in 1828: In 1823, when Resident of Singapore, I presented to the Minister of Elephants…a highly finished double-barreled English fowling piece: it was sent from Turan to Hue…In the course of a fortnight it was 2

White 1972, 343-344.

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returned, along with another double-barreled gun, fabricated, within that short time, in the King’s arsenal. The imitation was so perfect, that it was very difficult, at first sight, to distinguish the copy from the model. ..But, in truth, the imitation was more in appearance than in reality; for the Cochin Chinese artists are ignorant of tempering iron and steel: they are quite incapable of manufacturing an useful gun-lock; and therefore, with all their dexterity in imitation, they depend wholly upon European nations for a supply of fire-arms.3

As Pemberton also reported of the response of one Southeast Asian to whom he showed his double-barreled gun in the early 1830s: I never saw so beautiful a gun as this before, and tho’ we Burmahs may make many pretences, I know well enough that we can never compete with you in arms, and that all we had had [are guns and] they are come from your country and the other nations near you.4

Southeast Asians could only keep up with the fast pace of changing Western warfare technology with great difficulty, and frequently not at all.5 Leonard Andaya suggests that Southeast Asians gave up on keeping up with the newest firearm and gunpowder technologies, because it was difficult to gain access to the state-of-the-art knowledge necessary to make them. Southeast Asians instead became increasingly dependent on European supplies.6 Andaya thus characterizes the early nineteenth century as the “beginning of a European technological monopoly in arms production and supply in the region.”7 As dependence on Western arms increased, Europeans gained significant advantage in dealing with indigenous states and in cutting off the flow of arms when they desired. From the early eighteenth century, for example, Europeans frequently thwarted Southeast Asian efforts to obtain supplies of the newest arms, in part because they were hesitant to give Southeast Asians weapons that could easily be turned against them. After the VOC became alarmed 3

Crawfurd 1828, 483. Pemberton 1960, 36. 5 The Balinese met this problem half-way. While they continued to make most of the pieces of their muskets, including the barrels which they decorated, they purchased European-made locks to complete them in the early nineteenth century. Raffles 1817, 2.ccxxxiv. 6 L. Andaya 1994, 1.386, 387. 7 L. Andaya 1994, 1.394. 4

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by the fact that Javanese had generally abandoned the use of traditional weapons and were now mostly armed with firearms, it forbade the sale of any kind of firearm to non-Christians among the indigenous population of Java.8 A Kòn-baung attempt to rely on a sustained supply of new weapons from the West through trade arrangements failed for similar reasons. Rather than charge fees for permission to trade on the Irrawaddy, from the 1780s, the Burmese court demanded the payment of substantial supplies of flintlocks, ammunition, and gunpowder, in exchange for trading licenses. The benefit of this system was that a steady supply of firearms could be expected, rather than the occasional present of a few token firearms from a trading company or even damaged weaponry gained through the occasional capture of European vessels. This system ultimately failed, however, because of commercial calculations. New weapons were expensive and old, while outdated ones were cheap. As was also the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Western merchants dumped cheap, outdated firearms in Burma and perhaps came out better on the deal than had they paid a straight fee. The Burmese court was thus left with a ‘new’ supply of firearms that were perhaps no better than the arms they already had.9 As Symes found in the 1790s, aside from French arms, Burma’s twenty thousand muskets consisted of “condemned muskets from the English arsenals in India.”10 Without a more reliable source of firearms, Southeast Asians would be doomed to the diminution of their firing power relative to the Europeans. From the 1810s and 1820s, however, the British, the French, and the Americans began to compete to sell large numbers of firearms and gunpowder to Southeast Asian states. In 1819, the French supplied ten thousand firearms to the Vietnamese court. In two years in the early 1820s, Americans supplied Siam with thirty thousand small arms and in the late 1820s, they were supplying small arms to Sumatra’s pepper coast as well. Among the biggest arms exporters in Southeast Asia, however, were the British. From the 1820s, they began exporting large numbers of muskets and gunpowder out of Singapore to Southeast Asian states as indicated in the case of some early statistics provided by Crawfurd. According to his numbers, the British exported twelve 8

Schrieke 1957, 2.124. Lieberman 1993a, 232; L. Andaya 1994, 1.386. 10 Symes 1800, 319. 9

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thousand muskets in 1823, 14,411 muskets in 1824, 6,432 muskets in 1825, and 2,402 muskets in 1826, as well as 2,271 kilograms of gunpowder in 1823, 17,509 kilograms in 1824, 33,392 kilograms in 1825, and 19,685 kilograms in 1826.11 As a result, when Europeans did move to seize control of Southeast Asia’s remaining independent states, they frequently faced their own guns, or those of a rival European power. The Burmese used British muskets, for example, against the British in 1824 and the Balinese used British guns and powder against the Dutch in the late 1840s.12 As European interest in acquiring the remainder of Southeast Asia increased in the last half of the nineteenth century, controlling the flow of firearms became a significant concern. Initial conquests helped to make this control possible. In 1822, for example, the Dutch attempted to control the flow of firearms into Java and in other areas under their administration by making the import of firearms a government monopoly and requiring the purchase of permits to own them. Due to smuggling, this measure seems to have been less successful than hoped. One must assume that it became more effective after the end of the Java War in 1830, especially since the Dutch periodically rounded up weapons in Sumatra and elsewhere over the course of the century.13 From 1852 in Burma and by 1867 in Vietnam, the British and French were also better able to cut off both states from external sources of firearms. While the French were expanding their control in the Mekong River Delta, the situation of the Burmese court was more precarious, as the British controlled the Irrawaddy River Delta and the court thus had to ask the British for permission to import arms. In the first few years after the British occupation in 1852, the British were adamant that no gunpowder or firearms should be imported by the Burmese court until it had signed a formal treaty. Weapons were supplied, however, to indigenous populations hostile to independent Burma. Commissioner Arthur P. Phayre had requested five hundred flint muskets and two thousand replacement flints in 1853, although he later received one thousand flintlock muskets and four thousand replacement flints, for distribution among the Karens who appeared to support the British in the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852-1853). Phayre, however, did agree to limited weapons 11

Lamb 1961, 205; Crawfurd 1828, 547. L. Andaya 1994, 1.394; Wilson 1827, 74; Kraan 1995, 40, 107-108. 13 Boomgaard 2001, 135. 12

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purchases by Burma in 1855, such as the one thousand muskets purchased at Penang on behalf of the Burmese court in that year.14 Increasing European restrictions on Southeast Asian imports of new small arms were important, because the technology was moving beyond the matchlocks and flintlocks that Southeast Asian states possessed and with which they were still supplied by the Europeans. At the same time, any estimation of the damage that could be inflicted by controlled transactions in European arms should be considered within the context of trial and error in the process of firearm evolution in Europe. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, European small arms were frequently not much better than those in Southeast Asian possession. They were all smoothbore, muzzleloading, muskets. They misfired frequently, neither their range nor their accuracy were considerable (only about two hundred yards on average) and they took a considerable amount of time to load and fire, with a rate of fire of only about two to four rounds per minute under the best circumstances. New developments in firearm technology over the course of the nineteenth century, however, meant that the Europeans who faced indigenous armies were increasingly better armed and more effective. A critical development was the percussion cap, a small copper cylinder containing a chemical preparation, which was detonated by the strike of a hammer. This virtually eliminated the problem of misfiring and percussion cap guns began to be adopted for military use in 1834. From the late 1830s, rifles, in which grooves in the barrel spun the projectile, giving it greater range and accuracy due to its aerodynamic properties, began to be designed for military use. Captain Delvigne created an early rifled barrel in 1826, in which a ramrod drove the lead ball into the grooves of the rifling and Claude Minié added an iron plug to the base of the Delvigne ball, which expanded into the grooves as it was pushed against the ball. The Minié rifle was adopted by the French for tirailleur regiments in 1846 and by the British in 1851, although the latter adopted in 1853 the smaller and lighter Enfield, which had an effective range of 250 yards. Further developments were already underway. The Prussian army had been armed with the needle gun in 1843, which was the first effective breech-loading musket. It dramatically improved the firing ability of the infantry. Since it did not require a ramrod, the gun could be fired 14

DPC 1932, 10, 12, 386, 399.

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while lying down and it increased the rate of fire over the rifled muzzle-loader from two to eight rounds per minute. However, it tended to overheat and the needle frequently broke. In 1886, in response to the needle gun, the French introduced another breechloading rifle, the chassepot, which was a bolt-action needle gun with a range of 1,600 yards.15 Small arms representing these new technologies, took some time to reach even European armies in Southeast Asia. Although flintlocks had been replaced by percussion guns in the Dutch army by 1841, they did not appear in Java until as late as 1854. Rifles appeared more quickly, the Dutch being armed with them by 1860, and the British garrison in Rangoon was armed with Enfield rifles by 1870. In the 1860s, Europeans in Southeast Asia were also armed with breechloading guns as well as new cartridges, which combined in one shell the former three-part combination of primer, ball, and powder.16 Usually, one Western power or another sought to close off the supply of guns to the remaining independent states of Southeast Asia. On occasion, however, Europeans permitted Southeast Asians to acquire limited numbers of the new weapons under special circumstances. In 1867, for example, after signing a commercial treaty, the British allowed King Mindon to import two thousand of the new rifles, which he gained through the good services of Dr. Clement Williams. Mindon wanted eight thousand more, however, to push the numbers of rifle-bearing troops in his army to ten thousand men, all of whom would be stationed near the royal court. Although Colonel Albert Fytche appeared to be agreeable to the request, he was uncertain if the Burmese were capable of maintaining them. As their conversation is related: Colonel Fytche replied that rifles could be furnished, but that the kind of rifle wanted should be settled, A conversation ensued regarding smooth-bores, rifles, and breech-loaders, and it was explained to the King that to use rifles or breech-loaders, the men had to be well instructed, and then to take great care of their arms. The King replied— ‘In time no doubt my men would learn all that,’ and it was arranged that

15 16

Glover 1980, 24-25, 49-50, 73-4, 132; Lacombe 1870, 27, 252-253, 256. Boomgaard 2001, 133; Wheeler 1871, 18.

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His Majesty should decide and let Colonel Fytche know what kind of arm he desired to have.17

The British also exerted pressure on European competitors to prevent them from breaking their own control over the flow of firearms into Burma. The British caused considerable delay and inconvenience by the exaction of heavy fines and the seizure of some goods when a European officer, one D’Orgini, brought a party of French gunpowder, gun founding, and ammunition specialists into Burma through Britishheld Rangoon in 1859. In 1871, the Burmese had tried to acquire new firearms from Italy and even signed a treaty of friendship that year with the latter in order to establish the terms by which arms sales would be conducted. The treaty stipulated, for example, that Italian arms would be sold only to the court and to no one else in Burma without the court’s permission. In 1872, however, the British legation to Italy threatened embargo if the Italians supplied new arms and ammunition to the Burmese army. Such efforts did not completely cut of the supply of new firearms. Some Burmese soldiers, for example, were armed with percussion-cap rifles from the 1870s. Nevertheless, older flintlocks, remained standard issue for Burmese troops in the royal capital.18

Coasts and Rivers European expansion in the nineteenth century was limited in many cases to coastal areas, especially river deltas. Until the First AngloBurmese War demonstrated otherwise, indigenous naval forces, at least of the mainland, had remained formidable in the eyes of Europeans. This was mainly due to their ability to move quickly in river delta systems and their deployment in large numbers. European navies could not operate everywhere in force and thus as European possessions expanded, they became potentially more vulnerable to indigenous navies along the coasts and in the major river systems, both in Southeast Asia and in neighbouring areas. The British 17 18

1.37.

Fytche 1868, 14. Ba 1970a, 15, 42, 52, 54; Ba 1970b, 69; Wheeler 1871, 55; HTBW 1887-1889,

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certainly had their share of problems with the Burmese over transgressions of the Bengal-Burma border from the late eighteenth century, but these were downplayed or ignored by the Indian government until the 1820s. It was not until the Burmese occupation of Assam that the British became very worried about a Burmese military challenge. The possession of Assam, it was believed, would allow the Burmese to use armed riverboats on the Brahmaputra River and pose a threat to British possessions, including Calcutta. Further, Europeans were soon shocked into the realization that the realities of Southeast Asian geography and climate meant that their campaigns, even on the mainland, would depend upon shipping. In the First Anglo-Burmese War, the British found that their forces could not live off the land as elsewhere and that troops would have to be moved and fed by boats.19 Indigenous interest in Western naval technology and tactics grew from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Southeast Asian river and coastal vessels had experienced few major changes in hull structure, and only minimally in the superstructure, from the fifteenth to late eighteenth centuries. These boats, used in the great river fleets and in coastal campaigns, continued to retain the basic features of ship construction, based on the requirements of their function in military campaigns and the geographical context in which they operated. The end of the eighteenth century did bring new attempts to integrate European style square-rigged vessels into Southeast Asian fleets. In the case of Vietnam, the Tây Sѫn challenge prompted such efforts. With the aid of French ‘naval experts,’ NguyӉn forces in the south were able to draw upon French organization, tactics, and, in some cases, equipment. French vessels also served as models for Vietnamese shipwrights. One European-style frigate was built at Gia-Ĉӏnh in the late eighteenth century and two corvettes were rebuilt by copying the original one piece at a time. The largest of these could mount sixteen to eighteen guns and was placed under French commanders. NguyӉn Ánh’s shipbuilders also experimented with hybrid ships, including a junk whose upper works were fashioned in ‘the European manner,’ complete with European style rigging. These vessels, as well as the large war-junks of NguyӉn Ánh’s fleet, were built at the naval yard in the northeastern section of Gia-Ĉӏnh, the 19

Peers 1995, 57, 148, 193-194.

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former under the supervision of French officers.20 As one European observed of this yard in 1819: “[t]his establishment does more honour to the [Vietnamese] than any other object in their country; indeed it may vie with many of the naval establishments in Europe.”21 Like Southeast Asian collections of firearms, however, Southeast Asian war fleets consisted of a variety of different kinds of vessels. NguyӉn Áhn’s fleet in the late 1790s of twelve hundred vessels included European vessels and Chinese-style junks, as well as numerous indigenous-style galleys, most lug-rigged, narrow vessels some twenty-one to twenty-four metres long, rowed by forty oars, and each armed with up to ten small cannon.22 NguyӉn Ánh also appears to have been the first Vietnamese ruler to consider seriously European naval tactics. New military schools were opened and Frenchmen taught Vietnamese naval officers European naval tactics, including the use of signals.23 European observers were impressed with the results, relating that NguyӉn Ánh’s fleet drop[ped] down the river in the highest order, in three separate divisions, forming into lines of battle, in close and open order, and going through a variety of maneuvers by signals as they proceeded along.24

NguyӉn Ánh’s new model navy was critical to breaking Tây Sѫn naval power and sailors remained well trained and organized for decades afterward. In the 1820s, one European commented on “the extraordinary degree of good order and systematic discipline which was maintained in them.”25 Vietnamese interest in Western navies also continued, for as one European visitor to Gia-Ĉӏnh in c. 1819 remembered of his meeting with the Vietnamese viceroy having heard that I held a commission in the naval service of my country, he was very particular in his enquiries on the subject of naval

20

Lamb 1961, 86-87, 141, 209, 234; Barrow 1806, 274-275. White 1972, 235. 22 Barrow 1806, 275; Lamb 1961, 209. 23 Lamb 1961, 76, 86-87, 274-275; Barrow 1806, 275; White 1972, 93-94; Dutton 2004, 8. 24 Barrow 1806, 274. 25 Lamb 1961, 209. 21

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tactics and maritime warfare…with an emotion of mortified pride, [he] deplored the comparatively barbarous state of his native country.26

The emperor Minh Mҥng believed there were no useful Vietnamese books for instructing officers in naval warfare. Thus, in 1838, he ordered his scholars to study Western naval tactics and write books based on them that could be used to train Vietnamese sailors. In 1840, Minh Mҥng also obtained European plans for naval warfare and circulated these among members of his court. Nonetheless, Woodside suggests that Minh Mҥng misunderstood the substantial gap between European and indigenous technologies. Minh Mҥng suggested that a combination of relatively simple sea maneuvers and an already adequate Vietnamese coastal defense were sufficient to prevent a European invasion.27 This faith was misplaced, however, as a new technology was gradually beginning to change the nature of naval warfare in the West and had already been applied in warfare elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The steamship was developed in Europe in the early nineteenth century. France and Britain were the chief competitors in the early age of the steamship, but Britain benefited the most. Britain had access to the world’s best steam coal from Wales and she possessed a worldwide network of fuel stations that made it possible to send steamships around the globe. The first steam warship, developed by Robert Fullerton, appeared in New York in 1815. Although the British navy obtained a steam-assisted tug in 1821, the East India Company led the way in the British use of steam warships. For this reason, the first steam warships used in battle were those mobilized for the First Anglo-Burmese War in 1824. The development of the steamship allowed Europeans to match the advantages of indigenous shipping in coastal and river waters. With sufficient fuel, steam-ships could ply a strong, adverse current or winds on a continuous basis and make headway, whereas Southeast Asian oarsmen would soon tire and would have to be replaced once they reached a royal checkpoint. The early steamships were still deep draft, but soon the application of small steam engines to gunboats allowed European forces to move up through the same coastal shallows and narrow rivers as indigenous craft, removing the traditional advantage of indigenous riverboats. In 26 27

White 1972, 313. Trѭѫng Bѭu Lâm 1967, 4; Woodside 1988, 225, 282, 292.

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addition to Malay boats, shallow-draft gunboats, and flatboats, including sampans, the British also used one small steamship for their assaults on Burmese river positions in the First Anglo-Burmese War. When the English steamship succeeded in going upriver without oars, the Burmese abandoned their boats, for fear that the strange vessel would cut through them.28 From the 1840s, the Burmese had kept a careful watch on new shipping innovations in Western fleets that could be applied to river and coastal waters, especially Western steamships that they termed mi-thin-baw (lit. “fire-boat”). The Burmese purchased their first steamship from a Calcutta trader in 1844 and in the Burmese chronicles, lists of riverboats used by the court gradually began to include references to steamships. Realizing the changing nature of British naval strength, the Burmese court tried to compete with it by acquiring more steamships. Two small steamships, presumably devoted to commercial traffic between Amarapura and Rangoon, were in use by the late 1850s. Mindon also had three steamships built in Italy and brought to Burma.29 Mindon found steamers extremely useful in the failed coup attempt of 1866. As he remembered: “as soon as [the steamers] appeared the rebels dispersed everywhere…”30 In 1867, Mindon asked about the cost of new British steamers and requested that the British sell him two additional steamers, one of which was to be armed. The Burmese seem to have discovered the greater capacity of steamships for ordnance, and on the king’s steamship, instead of the two to three cannon that was the maximum allotment to a traditional indigenous river or coastal boat, they supplied it with six pieces of artillery. By 1870, the Burmese had eight to ten steamships, and this number was increased by the later arrival of six more. In addition, just prior to the 1885 war with the British, Thibaw purchased a steamship from the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company and Thibaw made it his personal war boat, arming it with six artillery 28

Glover 1980, 56-57, 65; McCrae & Prentice 1930, 45; Furnivall 1922, 27; Maw 1832, 62, 67, 70; Havelock 1828, 287; Snodgrass 1827, 172; A prophecy was supposed to have been made. “[T]he King of Ava’s sages informed him that, when a vessel should proceed up the Irrawaddy without sails or oars, then, and not until then, would his glory begin to depart. The prediction, was partly fulfilled by the Diana, and the eventual treaty which was signed...” Laurie 1853, 152; This prophecy was commonly talked about in Prome in 1825. See Havelock 1828, 241 29 Tin 1967, 3.41, 74, 372; Pollak 1979, 121. 30 Fytche 1868, 23.

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pieces.31 The Burmese fleet that ultimately faced the British in November 1885 consisted of twelve steamships, ten steam launches, and five gunboats. The British force that came up the Irrawaddy against Burma in November 1885 included at least twenty-three steamships.32 Another factor that, along with the steamship, would increase European advantages against Southeast Asian land defenses, was the development of more accurate, powerful, and longer range artillery. British artillery replaced the slow match on its field cannon and the flintlock on its naval cannon with the percussion tube, in which a hammer struck percussion caps, in 1845. By the Second AngloBurmese War, however, all British cannon were still smoothbores. Rifled cannon barrels could be accurate twice as far as smoothbores. Although the British experimented with breech-loading Armstrong guns for its land forces from 1859 to 1860, this was abandoned in favor of a return to muzzle-loaders in 1860, and the British did not fully shift to breech-loading artillery until 1885. European naval guns also improved and became more efficient and accurate. By the 1860s, European ships were making general use of rifled cannon that could send projectiles ten thousand yards. The British force that came up the Irrawaddy against Burma in November 1885, included a “Heavy Siege Fleet” consisting of three steamships pulling barges bearing a total of four forty-pounder (18.14 kilogram) guns, twelve sixteen centimetre rifled howitzers, and twelve 13.97 centimetre mortars. By contrast, cast iron smoothbore cannon supplied Burma’s river fleets and forts until the fall of Mandalay to the British in late 1885.33

River Wars When campaigns were fought within close reach of naval artillery, Southeast Asians found it difficult to stand their ground. Southeast Asian faith in fortifications, particularly stockades, declined over the course of the nineteenth century, because of changing European warfare technology. The First Anglo-Burmese War, for example, 31

Fytche 1868, 23; Ma Kyan 1979, 133; McCrae & Prentice 1930, 65; Pollak 1979, 121. 32 HTBW 1887-1889, 1.30-31, 37. 33 Glover 1980, 70, 75-76, 165; HTBW 1887-1889, 1.30-31, 37.

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revealed the limitations of the stockade. At first, stockades were very successful. In 1825 at Danubyu and again at Wuttygaon, British forces that attempted to assault Burmese stockades were repulsed and suffered heavy casualties. Nevertheless, building a stockade every one to two kilometres on an advance prevented the Burmese from following up victories and chasing down retreating British forces, allowing British troops time to regroup. Moreover, when British naval guns could be brought into action, such stockades fell easily.34 During the Second Anglo-Burmese War, Burmese quickly abandoned their stockades rather than defend them in the face of cannon-armed steamships. The Vietnamese case was even worse. Although the Vietnamese had a Vauban-style fortress at Gia Ĉӏnh, built in 1790, Minh Mҥng had this razed in 1835 after a local rebellion and replaced by a smaller and more vulnerable fort in 1837.35

Figure 22: Wall of one of three Italian fortresses built on the Irrawaddy River for King Mindon. Photograph by Atsuko Naono.

The Siamese learned from the lessons of the First Anglo-Burmese War more quickly than the Burmese or the Vietnamese. Realizing that it was better to prevent steamships from entering the Chaophraya 34 35

Alexander 2000, 28, 39; Snodgrass 1827, 228-229; FPRHB 1853, 38-39. Marr 1980, 27.

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River than defend against them at the capital, they built strong fortifications at Paknam, including two hundred pieces of heavy artillery. As Crawfurd described them: “In the hands of a people of any courage or military skill, these fortifications would render the access to the capital impregnable...”36 Apparently relying on the defenses at Paknam, however, the walls at Bangkok remained less formidable and were not mounted with artillery.37 The Burmese response did not come until later in the century, when King Mindon sought European-style fortifications and employed an Italian engineer to construct three such fortresses along the Irrawaddy near the royal capital in the 1860s. These fortresses, however, never saw action. As mentioned, the first stage of the Third Anglo-Burmese War, from the outbreak of hostilities to the collapse of Mandalay, both in November 1885, amounted to a British river expedition. Heavy British guns on barges drawn by steamships pounded Burmese entrenchments at Pakokku, Nyaungu, and Sinbaungwe and swept away Burmese gun batteries on shore at Myingyan. Mandalay surrendered before the British even arrived at the capital. After reading the royal order for surrender, the thousands of Burmese defending the Italian fortresses abandoned their weaponry and fled, allowing the Anglo-Indian troops and a company of sailors to take possession of them with few casualties.38 European steamships and naval officers played a significant role in determining the outcome of European campaigns in Southeast Asia. With steamships and powerful naval guns, Europeans easily neutralized fortified positions close to the river or to the sea. The Dutch included steamships armed with new naval guns in their fleets sent against the Raja of Buleleng on Bali in 1848 and again in 1849. In the first campaign, the Dutch fleet included four steamships, each with ten cannon, and out of the eighty-nine ships in the second expedition, seven Dutch steam gunboats were deployed. The Dutch vessels successfully swept the Balinese from their coastal fortifications with a bombardment of the coast. Although the Dutch lost the campaign, this was because the Balinese had withdrawn to the

36

Crawfurd 1828, 77. Crawfurd 1828, 397. 38 HTBW 1887-1889, 1.38; Barberis 1890, 156, 159. 37

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interior out of reach of Dutch naval guns. The Dutch returned with more troops and defeated the Balinese in the following year.39

Figure 23: A British steamship in an attack on Rangoon in 1852. Note the Burmese royal "western-style" ship (left) and the stockade of Rangoon in the background. From an illustration in Baker 1852.

The steamship was also effective in river operations. In the Second Anglo-Burmese War, the British flotilla consisted of four steam-ships, as well as numerous ‘flats,’ and gunboats. After seizing control of the major river mouths at Bassein, Martaban, and Rangoon, the steamers, some towing gunboats behind them, penetrated Burma’s major rivers and established naval hegemony on them.40 British cannon were directed with effect against indigenous river vessels and stockades on the riverbanks alike. As a result, Burmese resistance dissipated rapidly. As one account records: Steamers have penetrated up the Bassein branch … and again up the main stream … None of these steamers have been able to hear of any 39 40

Kraan 1995, vii-viii, 44-45, 48, 53, 55, 58-59, 61, 69, 108, 184. McCrae & Prentice 1930, 41; Wilson 1852, 174, 199.

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troops anywhere remaining in the Delta. The great stockades at Donabew, so conspicuous in the last war, have been found in utter ruin. Whenever any of the smaller stockades along the riverbanks have been approached by the steamer, they have instantly been abandoned by the garrison, and have been destroyed by us. And when the little vessel came upon a body of troops … the whole body, amounting, it was said, to 5000 men, retired before the vessel, and retreated into the jungle, as soon as a few shells had been thrown among them.41

The French navy nearly conducted French expansion in southern Vietnam on its own. In 1858, steamships formed part of a FrancoSpanish fleet that landed troops at Cӱa Hà (Da Nang) on 31 August 1858, although they were forced to withdraw after a year without success. When the campaign shifted to Gia Ĉӏnh in the south, in the Mekong Delta, they could make greater account. French warships were able to push their way up the Cҫn Giӡ River and to destroy Vietnamese fortifications on the way up to Gia Ĉӏnh with ease. A combination of French military outposts protected by river flotillas prevented the Vietnamese from pushing them out of Gia Ĉӏnh and the land between it and the Mekong River. When French infantry attempted to move beyond the range of their naval guns, however, they failed to do so. As a result, steamers and gunboats supported French land units in assaults on further Vietnamese positions, leading to a treaty in 1862, although fighting with local armed bands continued for years afterwards.42 Under the terms of the Treaty of Saì Gòn (5 June 1862), France not only gained major sections of the delta, including Gia Ĉӏnh, and access to three treaty ports (Cӱa Hà, Ba Lat, and Quҧng Yên), French merchant ships now had access to Cambodia. A treaty signed in 1874 established a French resident consul and personal guard at Hà Nӝi and Vietnamese recognition of French sovereignty over southern Vietnam.43 The British seizure of Lower Burma and French control of parts of southern Vietnam represented serious blows to both states. Lower Burma and southern Vietnam were the ‘bread baskets’ of more 41

FPRHB 1853, 38; as Lord Dalhousie later remarked: “Large bodies of [the Burmese] retire at the mere sight of a steamer, or in the presence of a few Europeans, so soon as they are landed.” FPRHB 1853, 65. 42 NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 264-265, 267-270; Trѭѫng Bѭu Lâm 1967, 32; Marr 1980, 27, 33-35. 43 NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 267-270; Cady 1967, 272-294, passim.

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heavily populated northern provinces.44 There was also the problem of security. In the past, indigenous vessels designed for use on the coasts and on major river-systems had been a source of security for indigenous rule, but this was now lost. Although Vietnam was not dominated by a single river system, the Mekong was the main river system in the south and its control determined river access to Vietnam’s tributary states in Cambodia and Laos. In the case of Burma, the loss of the entire coast ended the court’s hopes of maintaining the Irrawaddy as a safe internal system of transportation, trade, communication, and defense. As Lord Dalhousie remarked on Burma’s situation in August 1852, “We are masters of the sea-coast from east to west. We control by our steamers the whole of the streams of the Irrawaddy, from Prome to the Sea.”45 King Mindon thus went so far as to consider having the Irrawaddy declared an international river in order to reduce British control over Burma’s maritime connections with the outside world.46 Early European successes also reflected and contributed further to the decline of Southeast Asia’s standing armies. As mentioned in the previous chapter, because of royal reforms, armies across the mainland diminished in size and devoted resources from the 1810s onward. By 1830, the Siamese royal army numbered only about thirty thousand men. The Burmese army was estimated in 1856 to number 100,000 men and in 1872, only twenty thousand on duty with an additional thirty to fifty thousand under full mobilization. NguyӉn forces, which amounted to a standing force (including the navy) of 150,000 men at the time of the Tây Sѫn defeat were reduced to forty to fifty thousand by 1830. Reductions in military manpower continued. In 1833, Minh Mҥng noted that the British army numbered no more than fifty or sixty thousand men, and decided that he would further reduce the number of men in his army.47 The increasing reliance of mainland courts on relatively small standing armies helped political centralization and solved some of the problems of unreliable levies. They were effective in dealing with relatively minor rebellions by villagers or outlying officials. Smaller armies also helped to resolve the problem of monastic immunity from conscription. Rama II 44

NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 266. FPRHB 1853, 65. 46 Pollak 1979, 121. 47 Crawfurd 1828, 397, 493; Woodside 1988, 283; Ba 1970b, 66, 67. 45

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(r. 1809-1824), for example, had faced an insurrection which began when monks resisted an attempt by the king to “fill the ranks of the army from among their numbers.” Some seven hundred monks were confined, but released soon after, although a few were defrocked and “condemned to cut grass for the royal elephants.”48 However small, the standing army still put a heavy financial drain on state resources, especially as mainland courts made a transition from reimbursement through tax alleviation to monthly cash payments. Royal coffers could support the rising cost so long as they possessed substantial trade revenues. However, unlike unpaid levies, financial constraints meant that standing armies had to remain small. Lord Dalhousie’s claim that Burma in 1852 only had three thousand trained troops in the standing army is an understatement. Nevertheless, he was correct in observing that Ava’s treasury could not support many troops ‘on a paid footing.’49 This was partly a result of European expansion. From the mid-nineteenth century, two of the three main mainland states, Burma and Vietnam, lost their most profitable coastal sectors, putting additional constraints on maintaining a substantial standing force. A Lord Dalhousie explained in 1852, one expected benefit of the British annexation of Lower Burma was that it would prevent Burma from waging a serious war against the British again in the future: The Loss of Pegu will cut off from the Court of Ava its richest province, whereby its treasury will be impoverished and the sinews of war will be shriveled up. It will deprive them of the resource which they had for bringing an army into the field, by the operation of that tenure which made each man a soldier liable to take the field as a conscript whenever he was summoned to do so. However bitter, then, their feelings of hostility against the British may continue to be, the mere occupation of Pegu will greatly curtail their means of indulging it, both in men and money. Thus, our security for peace will be found in their being deprived of half the power they possessed for making war. The power that is left to them is little likely to be capable of real war…Thus, the Government of Ava, deprived of Pegu, has not the means of protracting war against us.50

48

Crawfurd 1828, 405. FPRHB 1853, 91. 50 FPRHB 1853, 91. 49

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The small standing army proved insufficient to handle major and multiple tasks, especially in a war against a substantial and wellorganized foreign army. As a result, war meant that mainland courts were again forced to rely substantially on levies, often as front-line troops, who were unwilling to face the dreaded European steamships and naval guns, as demonstrated in the Second Anglo-Burmese War.51

The Interior From 1881-1885, the French attempted to exert their control over all of Vietnam, leaving them in control of the coasts and major river deltas. In 1885, however, both the French and the British seized, respectively, the Vietnamese and Burmese capitals and, afterward, found themselves in a situation in which they would have to move into the interior. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Americans found themselves in a comparable situation in the Philippines. After defeating Filipino forces on rivers and in coastal areas, they too became bogged down. Steamships and naval guns had given Europeans a decisive edge in dealing with river and coastal defenses. The interior, however, was a different matter. The 1848-1849 Dutch expeditions in Bali, for example, had demonstrated that indigenous armies and fortifications in the interior remained formidable against European land forces operating alone without the support of steamships and naval guns. After Dutch naval guns destroyed their coastal fortifications, the Balinese built new fortifications further inland out of their reach. In the fighting that followed, indigenous troops fought surprisingly well, refused to abandon the walls, and the Dutch eagerly sought out details on the fortifications before them from Balinese captives. The Dutch lost the subsequent First Battle of Jagaraga (9 June 1848) miserably.52 The Dutch campaigns on Bali also demonstrated that defeating Southeast Asians away from coasts and rivers depended upon mobile artillery and counter-fortifications. One year after their defeat at Jagaraga, the Dutch won the Second Battle of Jagaraga (15-16 April 1849). After the battle, the Dutch General who surveyed the fortress 51 52

FPRHB 1853, 91. Kraan 1995, vii-viii, 44-45, 48, 53, 55, 58-59, 61, 69.

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found that little damage had been done to the earthen walls of the Balinese fort, but had massacred the defenders inside, leaving six thousand Balinese and only thirty-three Dutch killed. The Dutch had won in part because they had brought mobile field artillery guns and prepared their own fortifications. Victory was still elusive, however, for the Dutch were soon forced to abandon the expedition. Their campaign had encountered setbacks further south and a disaster was only avoided by the intervention of a Danish trader. Dutch intervention in Bali would remain limited until the 1880s.53 Interior campaigns were thus something that European commanders sought to avoid. In the Aceh War (1873-1900), for example, the Dutch commenced with a campaign against a specific fortification. Again, as in Bali, the Dutch failed miserably in the first expedition and took their prize in the second. Rather than pursue the Acehnese resistance, however, the Dutch declared Aceh annexed and relied on a combination of extended fortifications at Aceh and a coastal blockade. As the conflict continued for three more decades, and the Acehnese began raiding other areas of Sumatra, the Dutch developed a more aggressive approach.54

Tactics As the Dutch found on Bali, Java, and Sumatra, the Americans, British, and French discovered in the Philippines, Burma, and Vietnam that Southeast Asians waged war much more effectively in the interior. Here, they could apply the same tactics that they had been using throughout the early modern period without the fear of steamships and naval guns. The main tactic was to make surprise attacks at night on European patrols or on unfriendly villages.55 The British and the French both faced a difficult problem in trying to suppress resistance across a vast territory. Increasing troop numbers alone did not help, for large columns were no more effective against ‘mobile guerrilla tactics’ than small contingents of soldiers were.56 It was not the small ‘western-style’ standing armies that proved 53

Kraan 1995, 107-110, 184; Ricklefs 2001, 174-175. Ness & Stahl 1977, 24; Reid 1969, 102, 103, 106-108. 55 HTBW 1887-1889, 1.52-53, 69. 56 Ricklefs 2001, 152. 54

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effective. Rather, it was the autonomous or semi-autonomous armed bands, whose ideas of warfare were far less influenced by the West and who fought in time-tested, traditional ways suited to local terrain. European armies were unprepared to deal effectively with them, in part because earlier campaigns, limited to the coasts and rivers, did not require Europeans to engage with such men and their capacity for warfare was significantly underestimated. As one British account claimed, these armies were quickly defeated and scattered. Although small bands continued to harass British positions in small-scale encounters and small European forces, apparently remaining close to the river, were able to repulse them: “Such bands can hardly be called troops; and this Government has discouraged the exposure of our troops in petty expeditions for the purpose of dislodging them.”57 In 1886, after a similar band repulsed British soldiers at Madaya, inflicting serious losses, however, opinions changed quickly. Burmese resistance, as one observer noted, had slowed down British expansion across upper Burma significantly.58 The Dutch found in the Aceh war that although the central court could be taken, this did not bring an end to the conflict because outlying chiefs were highly autonomous.59 Leadership in Burma and Vietnam was similarly diverse. Burmese resistance leaders possessed almost no collective identity, many pursuing individual claims to kingship. Many had already been resisting the Burmese court before the British invasion. The Shans at Mogaung stood fought against the British not to regain Burmese independence, but instead because they feared British seizure of the ruby mines.60 They, and others, had similarly resisted royal control in the past. Although Vietnamese leaders had some semblance of unity as part of the Cҫn Vѭѫng movement, they acted separately and some operated outside the scope of Cҫn Vѭѫng altogether, such as the Black Flags in northern Vietnam. In the short term, a decentralized, localized leadership strengthened Burmese and Vietnamese bands against the Europeans. Local connections helped persuade the population to support indigenous leaders with recruits, supplies, and intelligence. As David Marr explains in the case of Vietnam, this gave ‘backbone’ to the 57

FPRHB 1853, 38. Barberis1890, 167. 59 Ness & Stahl 1977, 24. 60 Barberis 1890, 167. 58

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resistance, but, in actuality, contributed to their defeat in the longterm: ….it enabled French and native colonial units to partition the movement gradually, crushing one segment at a time. Lack of a central command, lack of a common strategy, and even the breakdown under stress of elitist bonds of loyalty proved more important in defeating the Can Vuong warriors than the more obvious geographical hindrances and technological deficiencies.61

In both Burma and Vietnam, resistance also included the construction of traditional stockades and fortresses in order to slow down the British and French advance and to cut them off from local supplies of food and information. Vietnamese did so by fortifying villages around the lowland towns occupied by the French.62 Indigenous forces had to rely upon old muskets and early model rifles, but there were exceptions. Southeast Asians still procured some of the best examples of European arms through traditional means, such as capture. In 1848, for example, the Balinese captured a 30.48 centimetre howitzer from the Dutch and used it against its former owners, loaded with shrapnel, in 1849.63 By February 1887, some Burmese were also using Martini-Henry and Snider rifles that they had presumably taken from dead British soldiers.64 Another interesting exception occurred in Vietnam. One resistance leader, Cao Thҳng, captured 1874 model French rifles, disassembled them, and had Vietnamese artisans make as many as 350 copies. Although they were not perfect duplicates, they remained effective in killing French combatants.65 As Captain Gosselin recalled: They are equiped with rifles of 1874 models, made in enormous quantity secretly in unknown places which we could never have discovered. I have brought to France several samples of these weapons; they are similar to those made by our factory in many respects. Those rifles astonished our Officers; the little difference between their weapons and our relies on two points: 1. The coil spring was 61

Marr 1980, 53. Kleinen1998, 200. 63 Kraan 1995, 95, 107. 64 HTBW 1887-1889, 3.10. 65 Marr 1980, 64. 62

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insufficiently tempered; 2. Lack of rifling in the barrel. The bullets thus did not go far enough, nevertheless, they have killed a great number of our men, French Officers as well as local soldiers.66

The Vietnamese were also able to secure some firearms from Yunnan through trade, but their quality was unclear.67

The Machine Gun By contrast to the outdated weaponry available to indigenous forces in general, European and American soldiers could rely on the newest Western firearm technology in an attempt to shift the balance in their favour. The machine gun, for example, was a new weapon that showed promise but had serious drawbacks in jungle warfare. The Gatling gun remained the American machine gun of choice ever since its first use in the American Civil War.68 Emplaced on such steamships as the Laguna de Bay, Gatling guns were effective in reversing attacks from the jungle against American coastal positions in the Philippines, as demonstrated at Santa Ana in 1899.69 The French developed another early machine gun, the Mitrailleuse, which shared the common defect of being inaccurate when fired at a long range. The British adopted the Nordenfeldt, which could run through three thousand rounds in just over three minutes, soon after. However, these heavy, multi-barreled, rapid-fire guns were inconvenient for land armies, and were most effective on lighter naval craft. It was the Royal Navy that purchased Britain’s first Gatling and Nordenfelt guns. Later, during the Filipino War, the Americans used the Gatling gun primarily, at least at first, as a naval weapon. Machine-guns did not become effective for land armies until the invention of the first automatic machine gun in 1884 by Hiram Maxim, which was redesigned in 1885. This single-barreled machine gun harnessed the recoil force, eased by a barrel that sat in a series of bearings, and the

66

Quoted in Nguyen 1964, 257. Marr 1980, 69. 68 Glover 1980, 164. 69 Faust 1899, 253-255. 67

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sliding force cranked the next cartridge into place. However, this gun was not adopted by the British army until 1888.70 Instead, British forces in Burma used the cumbersome, doublebarreled Gardner gun which was chambered for a 1.14 centimetre Martini-Henry cartridge. Although technically reliable, that is when fired from a stationary position for a long period, perhaps on a gunboat deck, it was less reliable when attached to mobile land forces in the field. The Gardner gun broke down easily and its unsteady tripod and jolting caused inaccurate aiming. Unlike artillery or rifles, it was difficult to determine where the bullets went.71 As one report on the Burma campaign complained: it is impossible to see where the bullets strike; therefore, unless men are seen to drop, it is hard to tell whether the bullets are falling short or going over their heads.72

The gun’s mobility could not be taken advantage of, because wheeled transport was difficult in jungle areas. Ultimately, the British, just as the Burmese, relied on animal transport, in their case by mounting the Gardner gun on mules. In the context of guerrilla-style attacks under jungle cover, however, the machine gun was useful in other ways.73 The Gardner gun was effective in firing against an enemy coming out from jungle cover and in bringing down Burmese retreating after surprise attacks. In both cases, the quantity of bullets was more important than the accuracy of one’s aim. This impressed the Burmese, a British report citing one of the gun’s advantages as its “moral effect at all times with their half-civilized enemy.” The two main incidents in the Burma Campaign in which machine guns had a noticeable effect occurred at Injauk on 24 December 1886 against Shan sharp-shooters and at Mainglon in March 1887 against a Burmese stockade garrison. Whether anyone was killed at Injauk is unclear, but a description of the engagement at Mainglon is available: … at the relief of Mainlung, the machine guns opened fire with effect upon the enemy, outside their stockades, at 1,200 yards range. When a 70

Glover 1980, 164; HTBW 1887-1889, 3.29; Hogg 1984, 62, 67, 80-81. HTBW 1887-1889, 3.228-229; FCRB 1886, 55; Hogg 1984, 67. 72 HTBW 1887-1889, 3.229.. 73 HTBW 1887-1889, 3.228-229. 71

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few of them dropped, the remainder quickly sought cover in the stockades, and here the Gardner became useless, and the want of a field gun sorely felt.74

Cavalry There were limitations to the usefulness of British cavalry in the Burmese context. British cavalry formations, for example, found it difficult to pursue the Burmese through jungle. They were not needed to counter enemy cavalry strength, since the Burmese did not deploy cavalry during this war, with some exceptions. Although three hundred Burmese cavalry were encountered near Meiktila on 21 April 1886, for example, there are relatively few references to indigenous cavalry in Burma afterwards. While the Burmese resistance did employ ponies as mounts for commanders, small contingents of Burmese cavalry mainly fought as auxiliaries to British forces in the field. British cavalry thus became almost a general-purpose force during the war, used wherever mobility was necessary. They were frequently employed in guard activities, especially in patrolling telegraph lines or in protecting supply columns.75 Intimidation worked in favour of British cavalry and mounted infantry deployed against the Burmese resistance after 1885. Unlike the Burmese, and the early contingents of British cavalry deployed at the beginning of the campaign, most formations from 1886 were mounted on larger Arabian, Persian, and Indian horses (as well as Australian mounts). Their imposing size and height (some fifteen hands high) intimidated indigenous fighters, whether mounted or not. As British reports relate, ‘big horses’ had a serious moral effect on the Burmese who referred to the Indian cavalry as ‘devils on big horses’ or ‘great-horse devils.’76 Burmese forces were said to have fled panicstricken at the sight of such cavalry, “long before the cavalry were close enough (two hundred yards) to suffer from the effect of their fire.”77 In some cases, however, indigenous panic and flight did allow small British and Indian horsed detachments to inflict heavy casualties 74

HTBW 1887-1889, 3.228-229. HTBW 1887-1889, 2.8; FCRB 1886, 55, 60, 65, 72, 100-101. 76 Heyland 2004, 31; 37; HTBW 1887-1889, 1.73. 77 HTBW 1887-1889, 1.73. 75

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on much more numerous Burmese forces at Tebya on 5 December 1886, Alègyun on 12 December 1886, Taungdwingyi on 1 April 1887, and numerous other occasions.78 As one British account described the engagement at Alègyun: 50 lances attacked over 700 dacoits who had taken up a strong position within a walled enclosure; at the approach of the cavalry at a gallop the dacoits at once took to flight in all directions, and the result recorded was over 200 dacoits killed and wounded, and subsequent enquiries have proved that this number was by no means over-estimated.79

The effectiveness of cavalry in slaughtering fleeing or retreating Burmese soldiers made them useful for the British strategy of radically increasing the scale of killing in order to reduce the potential for the Burmese to continue resistance. As brigadier-generals and other officers were instructed in an early 1887 “general plan” issued by order of the Commander-in-Chief of India: When there is an enemy in arms against British rule, all arrangements must be made, not only to drive him from his position, but also to surround the position to inflict the heaviest loss possible. Resistance overcome without inflicting heavy punishment on the enemy only emboldens him to repeat the game, and thus, by protracting operations, costs more lives than a severe lesson promptly administered, even though that lesson may cause some casualties on our side. Arrangements should be made to surround villages and jungle retreats with cavalry, and afterwards to hunt them closely with infantry. In the pursuit the broadest margin possible will be drawn between leaders of rebellion and the professional dacoit on the one part, and the villagers who have been forced into combinations against us…80

As the British campaign became more aggressive by late 1887, the campaign focused on first driving a wedge between Burmese resistance leaders and the hills and then pushing the Burmese resistance back towards the Irrawaddy where they would presumably

78

Heyland 2004, 32; FCRB 1886, 61. Heyland 2004, 32. 80 HTBW 1887-1889, 3.8. 79

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be more vulnerable to gunboats and naval artillery. Cavalry were essential to these operations.81

The Fortress System In Vietnam and Burma, the French and the British eventually adopted similar solutions to defeating indigenous resistance. Gayl Ness and William Stahl argue that technological differences did not prove decisive in the struggle between Europeans and Asians on land. The shift from maritime to land operations was won only by the mobilization of European organizational superiority. As they explain in the case of the Third Anglo-Burmese War: …organizational superiority ultimately proved decisive. The capacity of the British to organize operations in a high decentralized and flexible manner allowed them to prosecute the guerilla war successfully. The operation of pacification was carried out by small units of 100 to 1,000 troops.82

While the European armies in Southeast Asia had the organizational capacity to win, they still lacked an overall strategic approach to prosecuting their ‘pacification’ efforts. The limitation of French and British positions to major river ports prevented them from taking the initiative in the interior, where most of the resistance was based, and the latter was allowed to rely on regular supplies of soldiers, supplies, and information from the local population. As General White complained: It will be observed that our troops have been unsuccessful as yet in capturing any of the chiefs who are fighting against us. These men never expose themselves in action, and are the first to make off at the slightest sign of danger. The country people are still afraid to give information which would lead to their capture, and do all in their power to assist their escape. They have excellent information of our movements; and should at ay time our troops accidentally succeed in getting near them, being thoroughly acquainted with the country, which 81 82

HTBW 1887-1889, 39. Ness & Stahl 1977, 22.

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in most places affords good cover for fugitives, they have little difficulty in getting away on fast ponies, while their adherents scatter, to re-unite on a future day, after the departure of our troops...83

At least at first, both the French and the British appear to have missed the lessons of the Java War (1825-1830) for unclear reasons. The Javanese prince Dipanagara, based in the interior, waged a war whose tactics and difficulties for the Dutch sound remarkably similar to the cases of Burma and Vietnam after 1885. To solve their problem, the Dutch developed the bentengstelsel or ‘the fortress system.’ Operations were decentralized and individual commanders were given autonomy in their decision-making in local areas. European forces operated in ten small, independent, mobile groups, the ‘flying columns,’ rather than in large formations and each column included its own artillery, cavalry, infantry, and engineers. These groups were attached to strategic fortified points (the bentengs). To prevent the enemy from gathering large numbers of soldiers, they were hit quickly in order to keep them from remaining in any area for too long. As operations expanded, so too did the network of strategic points. By 1827, the Dutch had turned the tide of the Java War against Dipanagara and captured him in 1830. 84 The British and French, facing a similar challenge in fighting armed resistance in upper Burma and highland Vietnam after 1885, also developed their own versions of the fortress system, but only after a long delay. The British, for example, did not look at the example of Dutch operations in the Java War (perhaps due to the dismal results of Dutch strategies in the ongoing and seemingly interminable Aceh War), which were successful in very similar circumstances, but instead studied the details of General Hoche’s pacification of La Vendée in 1795, for clues as how to deal with the Burmese.85 Based on Hoche’s experiences, the British decided to expand operations further into the interior, sever the connection between the resistance and local villages, and disarm the general population.86 By March 1887, British columns were limited to:

83

HTBW 1887-1889, 2.4. Ricklefs 2001, 152; Ness & Stahl 1977, 23-24. 85 HTBW 1887-1889, 2.51-5 86 HTBW 1887-1889, 3.10. 84

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(1)…striking blows, as opportunity occurred, at the various gangs assembled within reach of the posts, and not allowing any one gang to become too powerful; (2)…maintaining lines of communications; (3) …escorting convoys of provisions.87

Figure 24: British outpost based on Burmese stockade model. From HTBW 1887-1889, facing p. 3.144.

A British version of the fortress system, however, was emerging. This included important fortified positions in towns along major rivers. The British also took advantage of the plains in the lowlands, spotted by low hills, to maintain signal stations between outposts and moving columns of troops. Further, between the larger posts were smaller, secondary fortified outposts and lookout stations that could maintain the flow of communications and information. Interestingly, the British, in the latter outposts, imitated indigenous stockade building, 87

HTBW 1887-1889, 1.54.

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using local labour to construct them. An 1886 report by the Field Engineers also found that thorny bush and bamboo stakes, “the pointed ends being charred to harden and preserve them,” added additional security when placed in the ditches around the stockade walls.88 As operations expanded, resistance leaders were gradually captured, although sporadic warfare continued into the 1890s. At first, the French also delayed in coming to terms with resistance in the interior. They had initially succeeded in taking the Vietnamese forts at Ĉӗng Hӟi and Vƭnh Long during the confusion after the emperor’s flight from HuӃ the day after fighting broke out. After encountering difficulties in maintaining supply and suffering from local ambushes, however, the French erected small forts as bases in the lowlands where they were able to persuade Catholic communities to relocate. Like the Dutch and the British, they too began to use a network of local forts in central Vietnam to seal in such resistance leaders as Cao Thҳng to cut them off from local villages, and, along with them, supplies and intelligence.89 Local villages that fortified themselves in opposition to the French were subject to being burned and some villagers executed.90 A related but more aggressive approach was applied in northern Vietnam. At least until 1890, the French, finding the hills too dangerous had focused instead on controlling lowland towns and scattered strategic points, including Cao Bҵng and Lҥng Sѫn. As in Burma, a major part of the effort was directed to preventing the resistance from cutting of supply and communication routes from the interior to the river, in this case, the Red River Delta. Things changed, however, in December 1892, when Colonel Joseph Gallieni was put in charge of an area covering Cao Bҵng and Lҥng Sѫn. Gallieni first attempted to prevent the involvement of Chinese soldiers in the north by building powerful fortresses along the Chinese border. Then he put a ‘spreading oil-spot’ strategy into action. This consisted of an expanding network of forts and supply posts that surrounded the army of Hoàng Hoa Thám, hitting Vietnamese positions and pushing French outposts ever closer to enemy positions. Military roads were also built as the French progressed and with the acquisition of each new valley, a fort was built and the local population persuaded to sever its ties 88

HTBW 1887-1889, 1.72, 2.35; 3.144. Marr 1980, 53, 54, 65. 90 This is suggested indirectly in Kleinen 1998, 200. 89

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with Hoàng Hoa Thám’s army.91 Simultaneously, Gallieni’s troops focused on capturing or destroying ‘impregnable’ fortresses one after another, beginning with Lung Lat in December 1893.92 The French strategy was slow and costly. To counter it, the Vietnamese developed effective responses. Realizing that the French could be defeated easily if cut off from supply and communication linkages, Vietnamese now avoided direct fighting with the French and instead made raids on their supply depots. Some resistance leaders also targeted rail lines and blew up trains. At Lung Lat, on 10 December 1893, the Vietnamese torched French supplies Gallieni had stored within easy reach on the edge of combat zones, forcing Gallieni to delay his assault on Lung Lat for several weeks. Ultimately, the fortress was taken when the Vietnamese withdrew troops from their extended positions to bolster defenses against a French thrust. Some French units then wheeled around to the Vietnamese rear positions and caught them in a trap. Although the French were able to destroy most of the resistance over the course of the next few years, some indigenous leaders, such as Hoàng Hoa Thám (who was not killed until 1913) remained active in one way or another into the twentieth century.93 As the Vietnamese and Burmese demonstrated in the 1885-1890s period, indigenous warfare had not been invalidated by European victory earlier in the century; it had only been temporarily forgotten or ignored, to different degrees, by central courts. While these courts and their armies collapsed within days in one case and weeks in the other, indigenous soldiers freed from steamships and coastal fortresses fought campaigns that saw indigenous tactics and weaponry occasionally countered, but were usually successful in bogging down European armies with, in European terms, better weapons and more sophisticated tactics and organization. In order to win, Europeans sometimes drew upon indigenous technologies, including the outposts that copied Burmese stockades, but also had to develop new tactics that fit the local context. The late nineteenth century campaigns were generally determined by supply and as European armies encircled resistance leaders and cut them off from sources of supply (as well as 91

Nguyen 1964, 286; Marr 1980, 72, 74; NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 307. Nguyen 1964, 288-289. 93 NguyӉn & NguyӉn 1958, 307; Nguyen 1964, 289, 290-291. 92

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intelligence and recruits), their strength declined. One wonders in these circumstances to what degree the decline of traditional indigenous cavalry affected, if not the outcome, at least the duration of these campaigns. So too, the diminishing size of pre-1885 land armies trained in traditional ways may also have been crucial. Although those who did join the resistance leaders clearly fought well, their numbers were never large enough to be decisive in the post-1885 conflicts.

CONCLUSION

The place of Southeast Asia in Eurasian warfare is frequently ignored. This can partly be attributed to the fact that most of Southeast Asia was conquered by the end of the nineteenth century by colonial armies, thus making Southeast Asian societies part of a much larger ‘colonial’ collective, in which the region’s uniqueness was forgotten in the polarization between the West and the non-Western worlds.1 Yet one more factor is the old misconception, still lingering, that Southeast Asia was solely an importer and not an innovator of ideas, technologies, and so on. In this view, ‘ancient’ Southeast Asian warfare reflects the overlap of the Indian and Chinese (and later, European) shadows. Certainly, Southeast Asian texts, as mentioned, and their mobilization of Indian and Chinese models of warfare have contributed to this misperception. The nature and impact of ‘Indianization’ has since been challenged and qualified and the Eurocentrism of current scholarship on early modern warfare has also come under fire.2 Until relatively late, Southeast Asian armies did not compare unfavourably to their foreign counterparts. The account of Salvador Ribeyro discussed in the introduction makes this point clear. While Southeast Asia eventually did fall to European armies (although most of these conquests did not occur until the nineteenth century), Southeast Asian armies, especially of Burma and Vietnam, repeatedly defeated those of China, including several victories in the last half of the eighteenth century.3 In the case of India, the Arakanese conquered and exercised suzerainty over southeastern Bengal until Mughal forces finally drove them out in the early seventeenth century. Even then, Mughal forces were unable to push their arms into Southeast Asia once they had taken southeastern Bengal. Europeans of the pre1

Sudjoko 1981, 14. On Euro-centrism in current historiography on warfare, see Goscha 2003, 492. 3 This is not to say that Southeast Asians did not see these victories as remarkable achievements. Baron, for example, refers to six or seven battles in which Chinese were routed by the Vietnamese as if this point had been pressed upon him by Vietnamese informants. See Baron 1732, 6.19. 2

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nineteenth century period also had their fair share of military defeats at the hands of Southeast Asians.4 Since Europeans did bring all of Southeast Asia under their control, with the exception of Siam, the quality of indigenous warfare in the region is frequently judged by comparison with European armies. It is no mistake that Reid’s 1982 study on Southeast Asian warfare is entitled “Europe and Southeast Asia: The Military Balance.”5 Numerous factors must be considered in attempting to explain why Europeans were able to defeat Southeast Asians at the end of the early modern period. Scholars such as Ricklefs and Sudjoko, in their studies of early modern Java, caution us against anachronistically reading European technological superiority into the early modern period.6 Nevertheless, the notion that Europeans possessed such an advantage from the beginning of their presence in the region has been difficult to shake.7 Technology became an important factor in limited aspects of warfare in the region, but until the nineteenth century, its impact was often equivocal. Dutch ships may have had the capacity to overwhelm archipelagic fleets from the seventeenth century, but it was only the combination of new naval guns and steamships that allowed European armies to break the indigenous hold over Southeast Asian coasts, deltas, and rivers two centuries later.8 It is difficult to make a similar claim for small arms, whose impact was rarely decisive in Southeast Asian warfare, either between European and indigenous armies, on the one hand, or between two opposing indigenous armies, on the other. However much they added to the killing power of European and indigenous armies in the region, technology transfer (even among Europeans) was slow and uneven, the numbers of soldiers armed with new guns remained small (and European forces sent to the region remained so until the nineteenth century), and in close quarters, often 4

Sudjoko 1981, 17, 23-24. Reid 1982. 6 Ricklefs 1993, 130-131. As Sudjoko explains: “Part of being Western these days is to feel economically, technologically and militarily superior in the world. The 16th and 17th century European in Indonesia, however, did not have such complexes. True, they felt themselves superior in certain things, such as in architecture and religion, but not in material wealth, military strength, and technological achievement.” Sudjoko 1981, 20. 7 Sudjoko 1981, 24. 8 Ness & Stahl 1977, 20, 23. 5

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in jungle terrain, pre-gunpowder weaponry frequently remained more accurate and deadlier. As discussed in Chapter Ten, even the machine gun was a problematic weapon in the late nineteenth century. Europeans during the last decades of that century were sometimes forced to adopt certain indigenous technologies and tactics, including indigenous-style stockades and small, autonomous guerrilla-style formations. In other words, technological ‘inferiority’ does not explain the eventual fall of Southeast Asia. Ness and Stahl, Sudjoko, and Black similarly suggest that technology alone could not be the determining factor. Indeed, Black warns against “any simple theory of gunpowder triumphalism.”9 As Sudjoko commented on the place of indigenous technology in early modern Indonesia, [Indonesians] too, were outwitted by Western science and technology. [U]nwittingly, the argument has stepped unto loose ground. For it is one thing to prove that a nation is technologically superior, and another thing to assume that such superiority must bring military victory over a technologically weaker nation.10

Rather, Black suggests, an examination of the way in which firearms were integrated into indigenous weapons systems, culturally and organizationally, would be more fruitful.11 Southeast Asians had unique interpretations of the role of firearms in warfare and society, as discussed in Chapter One and at different points elsewhere in this survey. Again, Leonard Andaya argues that indigenous tactics were not changed, at least generally, by the introduction of firearms.12 Rather, Southeast Asians selectively adopted firearms that fit into an already existing framework of indigenous warfare. In short, as indicated by these scholars and in the present survey, there is significant reason to question the automatic impact of firearms, especially small arms, even to the end of indigenous rule. Similarly, Ness and Stahl argue that while naval technology was important in defeating Southeast Asians at sea and on coasts, thus 9

Black 1999a, 678. Sudjoko 1982, 14. 11 Black 1999a, 678. 12 L. Andaya 1994, 387. 10

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opening up corridors for penetration into the interior, different organizational regimes or capacities ultimately determined European victory on land.13 As Ness and Stahl explain: the rational orientation of the [European] military enabled specific organizational patterns to be altered to fit new conditions. European organizational superiority included the ability to reorganize, to deconcentrate, to decentralize, as well as to concentrate and centralize, as the British in upper Burma and the Dutch in Java showed so well.14

Black adds that Western militaries were more systematic in the planning of their operations, including “the analysis of goals and problems and a process of planned stages designed to give effect to the resulting solution.”15 Although Southeast Asians could adopt western technologies and adopt the visible forms of Western armies (uniforms, drill, and pay), the former were still unable to adopt the less visible organizational logic of the latter. A half-century later, Southeast Asians combined new organizational models with traditional ‘guerrilla’ style tactics to expel Europeans in a number of anti-colonial conflicts. The issue of organization in the region is complicated. Standing armies had remained small throughout much of the early modern period. In wartime, however, much larger forces were mobilized, most armed with everyday weapons with which levies were intimately knowledgeable. Rationalization and standardization of military organization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, led to dependence in wartime on the standing army, which had adopted the pretences of westernization. The role of warrior elites and the local levies they mustered became less important to indigenous courts. More research is needed into the social aspects of warfare before it can be asserted that there was a concurrent decline in the timehonoured traditions of elite skills in warfare. It can be asserted, however, that the small armies of nineteenth century Southeast Asia were not equal to the task of resisting European armies of the period. They fared poorly in battle, were insufficient in number to handle a number of simultaneous military challenges, and more often involved 13

Ness & Stahl 1977, 3, 4, 20, 23, 25 Ness & Stahl 1977, 26. 15 Black 2001, 179. 14

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themselves in court factional infighting than in presenting a realistic threat to prospective European invaders. In keeping with Ness and Stahl’s observations, these armies do not appear to have had the same organizational capacity to react to new contingencies flexibly, that is to decentralize and regroup at will, as the Europeans. It is interesting that these armies broke up relatively quickly in 1885 and that it was actually locally raised ‘bands’ of men (and women) who held Europeans at bay for years after the courts of Vietnam and Burma had given up on resistance. Southeast Asians would use the same guerrilla tactics and command structures (again, in combination with new organizational models) to defeat Europeans a half-century or so later and end colonial rule. However effective the return to traditional styles of fighting and command, and the application of some indigenous technologies, other long-term developments discouraged Southeast Asian victory at the end of the nineteenth century. As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, elephants and cavalry had fallen into decline by the nineteenth century or at some point during it. While the British were able to use cavalry to great effect after 1885 in Burma, the Burmese had nothing to counter it. While much larger Indian cavalry formations failed against the British at Plassey (1757),16 the decentralized and mobile combat in Burma was more conducive to the application of cavalry and mounted infantry. Indigenous cavalry in such conditions were superior to those of European armies in India and this would probably have been the case for Southeast Asian cavalry as well, had they survived into the late nineteenth century. At the very least, European victory would probably have been further delayed. Southeast Asians were able to capture arms from European forces and there were several successful attempts to reproduce European firearms, although certain elements such as rifling were left out of such copies. Southeast Asians nevertheless lost their ability to make up-to-date heavy arms by the end of the century. Europeans were thus free to use heavy artillery to pound indigenous fortifications with impunity. In the long-term, Southeast Asians fought bravely and effectively, but more flexible organization allowed Europeans to exploit their own technological advantages and adopt indigenous-style

16

Ness & Stahl 1977, 9, 11.

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tactics and technology (such as stockades) in a systematic way that gradually wore away at Southeast Asian resistance.

APPENDIX I: MAP OF WESTERN SOUTHEAST ASIA

APPENDIX II: MAP OF EASTERN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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INDEX Abdussamad 47 Aceh/Acehnese 4, 13, 14, 15, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 47, 49, 59, 74, 75, 78, 85, 90, 91, 97, 105, 107, 120, 121, 131, 134-136, 137, 142, 149, 150, 154, 165, 176, 224, 263 Agung, Sultan of Mataram 12, 17, 118, 194, 196, 204, 216 ahmú-dàn (Burmese royal servicemen) 214 Alaùng-hpayà, King of Burma (r. 1752-1760) 3, 11, 66, 100, 106, 125, 184, 196 alcohol 9, 10, 11, 13 Alègyun 269 Alifuru 20, 26, 28, 29, 34, 39, 76 Amarapura 79, 86, 254 Ambon 3, 18, 21, 26, 37, 39, 127 American Civil War 266 Americans xvi, 246, 262, 263, 266 amok 12, 13 amulets 3, 5, 6, 14, 16, 38 Anauk-hpet-lun, King of Burma (r. 1606-1628) 68, 78, 100, 122 ancestor spirits 4, 6, 9, 10 Andaya, Barbara Watson 4, 5, 6, 22, 25 Andaya, Leonard Y. 8, 25, 31, 41, 58, 59, 65, 72, 245, 278 Andreino, Giovanni 214, 242 Angkor xvi, 174, 199, 204 Angkor Wat 34 Anglo-Burmese Wars, 1st (18241826) 78, 84, 85, 108, 123, 129, 186, 194, 197, 202, 250, 251, 253, 254, 256; 2nd (18521853) 162, 202, 247, 256, 257, 258, 262; 3rd (1885) 171, 172, 233, 254, 255, 257, 267, 270 Anuma River 202 Arabia 171

Arakan/Arakanese 49, 78, 104, 107, 122, 123, 136, 143, 169, 171, 173, 184, 186-187, 193, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 217, 224, 235, 276 Arakan Yoma 162 Armour, see also chainmail, 34, 3841 Aru, Kingdom of 137, 170 Arung Palakka 41, 94, 95 The Art of War 239 Assam 92, 186, 197, 251 assassination 30 assi (free people) 214 Atlantic Ocean 128 Ava 78, 80, 95, 100, 127, 137, 179, 233, 261 axe 24, 26 Ayudhya 13, 18, 29, 33, 38, 40, 42, 48, 58, 64, 68, 74, 80, 82, 89, 93, 99, 100, 105, 108, 118, 121, 123, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139, 143, 145, 146, 150, 151, 154, 155, 159, 161, 167168, 169, 171, 174, 176, 179, 181, 183-4, 191, 193, 195, 197, 198, 200-201, 204, 206, 210, 214, 216, 219, 220-221, 223, 224, 225-6, 227, 231, 237 Bҳc Ninh (province) Bҥch Ĉҵng River, Second battle of (1288) 202 Ba Lat 259 baggage train 203-207 Bali/Balinese 17, 27, 28, 30, 56, 84, 86, 91, 92, 93, 194, 198, 247, 257, 262, 263, 265 bamboo stakes 92-93, 273 Ban 44-45 Banggai 26 Bangka, Straits of 13, 116

INDEX

Bangkok 82, 87, 106, 142, 149, 151, 223, 257 Ban-la Tratoan, King of Champa (r. 1460-1471) 136, 174 banners 6, 9 Banteay Chmar 124 BantČn 30, 62, 67, 80, 217, 234 Banyà’s Road 201 Barberis, Tarsillo 122, 188 Bassein 45, 100, 258 Batavia 49, 99, 100, 101, 132, 174, 183, 200, 217 Batavia, 1st siege of (1628) 93, 194 Batavia, 2nd siege of (1629) 69, 89, 93, 194, 197 Battas 33, 165 Bayín-naung, King of Burma (r. 1551-1581) 2, 11, 40, 64, 67, 69, 77, 79, 89, 90, 96, 99, 100, 105, 133, 136-137, 138, 144, 151, 154, 155, 159, 170, 179, 180, 181, 182, 191, 195, 200, 202, 206, 216, 219, 251 Bengal 30, 44, 107, 144, 162, 276 Berço, see artillery Bhalwa 144, 203, 217 Black, Jeremy 1, 278 Blambangan 59, 62 blood 9, 10, 11, 13 blowpipes 36, 37 Bò-daw-hpayà, King of Burma (r. 1782-1819), 164, 230 Bock, Carl 205 bombards, see heavy arms Boné 6 Bonjol 175 Bontoala 95 Boomgaard, Peter 87, 164, 175 Borri, Christoforo 36, 56, 70, 217 Borneo 24, 28, 34, 88, 171 Bourgeoys, Marin le 55 bows and arrows 2, 23, 24, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41 Boxer, Charles Ralph 49, 58 brahmanism 1 Brahmaputra River 251 bravery 11, 13 bridges, 201-202

311 Britain/British 57, 68, 98, 100, 122, 123, 128, 129, 162, 171, 185, 187, 197, 202, 235, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273. bronze working 25, 26, 43 Buddhism 1, 10, 11, 18, 20, 133, 213215 Buddhist canon 8 “buffalo cavalry” 203 buffaloes 8, 10, 204, 206, 209 Bugis/Buginese 6, 8, 24, 41, 59, 94, 194 Buleleng 28, 84, 86, 198, 234, 257 bullets 16 Burma/Burmese xvi, xviii, 2, 4, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 28, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 44, 49, 50, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69, 78, 82, 85, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 106, 107, 108, 112, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125, 133, 144, 154, 160, 164, 166, 169, 173, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182-183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 194, 195, 197, 202, 203, 215, 221, 223, 227, 229, 233, 235-6, 239, 242, 243, 246, 247, 248, 251, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 274, 276, 280 Burney, Henry 229 byè-daik (Burmese Privy Council) 230 Byuha-sakki-pyó 240 Ca Chao, see Hà Nӝi Ca River 122 Cakraningrat 192 Calcutta 251, 254 Calicut 47 Caliver 54 Cambaya 171 Cambodia/Khmers xv, 16, 36, 64, 68, 120, 124, 125, 161, 169, 171,

312 173-174, 177, 186, 197, 198, 207, 231, 260 Cҫn Giӡ River 259 Cҫn Vѭѫng (“Rescue the King”) movement 264 cannon, see heavy arms Canton 45 Cao Bҵng region 273 Cao Thҳng 265, 273 captives (war) 18 carts 204-212 Cassay Horse 186 cavalry, see horses, 28, 41, 164, 165, 268-270, 280 chainmail 41 Chakkraphat, King of Ayudhya 134 Champa, Kingdom of, xv, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, 40, 80, 102, 104, 120, 124, 125, 126, 136, 137, 143, 144, 158, 159, 166, 173-174, 177, 204, 231 Chaophraya River 82, 257 charms 14, 16, 38 Chassepot, see small arms ChӅ Bӕng Nga 126, 158 Chi Lӽng Gate, Battle of (18 September 1427) 176 Chí Linh prefecture 195 Chiangmai Chronicle 158, 178, 180. Chiengmai xv, 9, 23, 42, 94, 96, 97, 133, 158, 161, 165-6, 170, 178-9, 193, 195, 221. Chiengsen 133, 180 Chiengtrung 142, 221 Chin Pyan 235 China/Chinese xv, 8, 26, 33, 35, 36, 42, 44, 45, 47, 57, 61, 73, 87, 102, 106, 107, 108, 119, 122, 123, 136, 143, 153, 165, 166, 167, 173, 176, 177, 180, 183, 188, 191, 201, 202, 204, 219, 228, 233-234, 238-239, 241, 276 Chindwin River Valley, 172, 199, 230 Chittagong 123, 203 Chronicles of Ayutthaya 166, 167, 181 choppers 26

INDEX

Clarence Smith, William Gervaise 166, 171, 177 Cochinchina, French 202 Constantinople, siege of (1453) 46-47 Conti, Nicolo di 3 Cox, Hiram 105 Crawfurd 228, 229, 243-244, 246, 257 Croix, Jean de la 57-58. crossbows 24, 34, 36 “crow’s wing” formation 9 Cӱa Hà (Da Nang), Bay of & port for HuӃ 87, 259 Ĉa Shan (Chinese monk) 149, 215, 221, 238 Ĉà Nҷng, see Cӱa Hà dagger 16 Dagon 80, 86, 89, 125, 127 Ĉҥi ViӋt xv, 39, 122, 126, 136, 158, 233 Dala 105, 142 Dalhousie, Lord 162, 260, 261 Dampier, William 29, 51, 61, 70, 152 dancing 5, 9, 13 Danubyu 84, 94, 256 Dao Ma Pha Mountain 177 Darts 36, 37, 38 Davis, John 40, 47, 49 De Brito y Nicote, Filippe xii, 78, 225 De Vos, Major 186 Delvigne, Captain 248 DČmak 15, 68, 224, 225 DČmung 120 Dijk, Wil 62 Ĉinh Bӝ Lƭnh, Ruler of Vietnam (from 968) Dipanagara 185, 271 Diu 47 Djeumalǀjalam 85 Do Le River 159 Ĉӗng Hӟi 273 Ĉông Sѫn culture 25, 36 Duel 11 Dutch, see Netherlands Dutton, George 97, 153, 241 East India Company (Dutch), see VOC

313

INDEX

elephants 4, 10, 13, 17, 35, 102, 131163 England/English, see Britain/British Esmerils 50 “Essentials of the Military Arts,” 240. Europe/Europeans xiii, xiv, xvi, 27, 33, 35, 37, 40, 43, 45, 46, 47, 53, 55, 58, 68, 73, 79, 80, 86, 87, 102, 103, 119, 175, 187, 193, 206, 211, 217, 224, 225, 228, 234, 237, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 253, 255, 260, 266, 270, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280 falcon/falconet 50 Filipino War 266 fire-lance 52 fire rafts 93 fire-tubes 42, 53 flintlock muskets, see small arms Florence 43 Forbin, Claude de 11 formations 6, 7, 8 fortifications 73-103; Vauban-style 256 fortress system (and related strategies) 270-274 fortresses, see fortifications fouannes 24 France/French 31, 55, 57, 68, 129, 185, 193, 202, 228, 242, 243, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 259, 262, 263, 265, 266, 270, 271, 273, 274 Franco-Prussian War 242 Franco-Spanish expedition (1858) 67, 259 Fullerton, Robert 253 Fytche, Colonel Albert 249 Gallieni, Col. Joseph 273, 274 Gardner, G. B. 15, 16, 88 Gardner gun, see machine guns Gatling gun, see machine guns Germany/Germans 59, 242, 253, 248 Gia-Ĉӏnh (Saì Gòn) 40, 58, 65, 87, 106, 126, 229, 244, 251, 252, 256, 259 Ʀia Long, see NguyӉn Ánh

Gibson-Hill, C. A. 88 Giri 12, 14 Goa 57 Gosselin, Captain 265 Great Britain, see Britain Grise 174 Groslier, George 125 guerrilla warfare 267, 278, 279 Gujarat 47 gunpowder 16 Hà Nӝi 259 Hainan Island 173, 174 halberd 24 Hamilton, Alexander 231 Han Chinese 36 Hanthawaddy, see Pegu Harvey, G. E. 217 heavy arms, bombards 45-46, 59; Folang-chi p’ao (“Portuguese cannon”) 45; Culverins 46, 48, 49 headgear/headdresses 5, 38 headhunting 2, 3, 5, 17, 19, 21, 25 Higham, Charles 25 Hitajat Potjut Muhamat 4, 38, 40, 41, 75, 140, 148 Hikayat Patani 4, 15, 47, 66, 127, 196 hlut-daw 221, 230 Hӗ Quý Lý (sometimes Hӗ Quí Ly), earlier known as Lê Qúi Ly. 57, 111 Hoa Chau, province of 174 Hoàng Hoa Thám 273-274 Hoche, General 271 horses, 102, 164-189; Arabian 268; Indian 268; Persian 168, 176, 268 Hormuz 171 Hsenwi 172 HuӃ (Phú Xuân) 58, 67, 273 hunter-gatherers 24 Huo-p’ao 44 IbrƗhƯm 14, 18, 29, 139, 167-168 India, Government of, see Britain India/Indians 36, 40, 44, 68, 123, 237, 239, 257, 268, 280

314 Indian model 8, 164, 276 Indian Ocean 47, 128 Indra 133 Injauk 267 Iran/Iranians, see Persia/Persians iron 26 invulnerability 14, 15, 16, 17 Iraq 131 Irrawaddy Flotilla Company 254 Irrawaddy River 106, 122, 133, 172, 184-185, 199, 201, 247, 255, 260 Iskander Muda, sultan of Aceh 66 Islam xv, 1 Italy/Italians 55, 193, 250, 254, 257 Jagaraga, 1st Battle of (9 June 1848) 262 Jagaraga, 2nd Battle of (15-16 April 1849) 56, 263 Jambi 33 Japan/Japanese 34, 43, 73, 224-225 Japara 68, 175 Java/Javanese 6, 12, 26, 30, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44, 46, 48, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 69, 76, 87, 88, 93, 99, 100, 101, 102, 118, 120, 131, 166, 169, 170, 176, 179, 181, 183, 185-186, 192, 194, 197, 199, 202, 218, 225, 231, 240, 243, 246, 247, 249, 263, 271, 277 Java War (1825-1830) 185, 247, 271 javelins 28, 29 Jaya Indravarman, Cham ruler 173, 177 jewelry 10 Johore 48, 67, 77 jong 107 jowar 172 Junk Ceylon Island 101, 123, 143 Kalà, U 44, 45 Karenni 185 Karens 247 Kartasura 62, 80, 192 Katghar 203 Kedah 140

INDEX

Kederi, siege of (1678) 41, 101, 170, 181 Kelampang 84, 92 Kemmendine 98 Kha 28, 36 Khamphaengphet 181 Khorat, see Nakhon Ratchasima kinship 10, 30 Knaap, Gerrit 17, 21 Koenig, William 231 Kòn-baung Dynasty, see Burma Kosovo (1389) 46 Kris xv, 10, 15, 29, 30, 31, 33 Kuala Padang River 175 Kubu 88, 89 Kumri 171 Laguna de Bay 266 Lai Hka 185 Lampang 221 Lamphun 221 Lan-ma-daw-gyì (“king’s road”) 199 lances 12, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31 Lanchang 105, 137, 179, 182, 184, 191, 195, 197, 206, 216 Lҥng Sѫn 73 Laos, see Luang Prabang, xv, 36, 84, 85, 92, 110, 143-4, 155, 167, 173, 205, 217, 221, 260 Lawa 158 Lawksawk 80, 91 Lê Lӧi, reigned as Lê Thái Tә (r. 1428-1433) 191, 195, 220 Lê Qúi Ly, see Hӗ Quý Lý Lê Thái Tә, see Lê Lӧi Lê Thánh Tông (r. 1460-1497) 238, 241 Legaspi, Michael Lopez de 10 Lela 50 Let-wè-naw-yahta, see Let-wèthondara Let-wè-thondara (aka Let-wè-nawyahta) 239, 240 levies 216-221, 262 Li Tana 107, 122-124, 232 Lieberman, Victor B. 224 Liew Foon Ming 45 Liu Fang, Chinese general 159 Loei 221

INDEX

Lom 221 Lopburi 86, 193, 223 Lotus Lake, Battle of (1565) 179 Loubère, Simon de la 8, 17, 18 Luang Prabang, see Laos/Lao Lumphli Plain 180 Lung Lat 274 Ma Huan 44 Mҥc, rulers of Vietnam 191-192 Macao 58, 59 Macassar, see Makassar machetes 26 machine guns: 266-268; Gardner gun 267; Gatling gun 266; Miltrailleuse 256; Nordenfeldt 266. Madaya 264 Madiun 200 Madura 12, 192, 194 Maha Upparat 182 Mainglon 184, 267 Majapahit iron 16 Makam Tongkah 83 Makara vyuha (Makara array) 7, 8 Makassar 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 29, 31, 56, 57, 59, 63, 95, 101, 165, 179, 183, 194, 225 Mekong River/delta 247, 259, 260 Malabar 224 Malacca, see Melaka Malagans 27 Malay xv, 2, 10, 13, 14, 15, 29, 30, 37, 39, 53, 65, 74, 82, 88, 92, 116, 165, 171, 254 man of prowess 1 Mandala 219 Mandalay 79, 80, 86 Mangrai, King of Chiengmai 133, 170 Manguin, Pierre-Yves 107, 120 Manila 49, 59, 79, 84 Manipur 60, 182, 184-185, 186, 188 Mantienne, Frédéric 87 Mantras 14 Manzur Shah, sultan 66 Marr, David 265 marriage 5 Marsden, William 132

315 Martaban 29, 48, 107, 138, 147, 158, 201, 258 Martini-Henry rifle, see small arms Maspero, Georges 137, 174 Mataram 8, 12, 14, 37, 62, 67, 68, 89, 93, 99, 105, 106, 118, 120, 149, 170, 174, 191, 193, 200, 202, 217, 231 matchlock musket, see small arms Maw Shans 45 Maw Shan chronicle 45 Maxim, Hiram 266 medicine 14 Mediterranean Sea 47 Meiktila 172, 268 Melaka 4, 20, 28, 30, 37, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 59, 62, 66, 79, 82, 105, 120, 121 Menam River, see Chaophraya River Mergui 199 metal balls 16 Middle East xiv, xv, 45, 47, 175 Miltrailleuse, see machine guns Mìn-yè-kyaw-swa, ruler of Ava 151 Minangkabau 56, 59, 165, 175 Mindanao 20, 29, 51, 54, 76, 77, 85 Mindon, King of Burma 11, 242, 243, 249, 254, 257, 260 Minié, Claude 248 Ming Dynasty, China 45, 191, 232 Ming-shi 44 Ming-shilu 45 Ming Tai-tsu 44 Mingun Pagoda 133 Minh Mҥng, 228, 253, 256, 260 Minhla 80, 122 Miquelet, see small arms moat 91, 92 mobility, 192 Mogaung (Momeik) 264 Mohammed II, Ottoman ruler 46 Mohnyin 10, 144, 170, 172, 203 Mok-hsò-bo (Shwebo) Momeik, see Mogaung Momein 79, 91 Mon: texts10; Mons 112, 118, 125, 127, 180, 224 (check to see if really 229), 233 Mone 188

316 Möng Nai 142, 172, 202 Mongols 43, 139, 153, 160, 202 Morga, Antonio de 77 Moulmein 147, 197, 201 Mrauk-U 78, 79, 143 Mt. Popa 173 Mughal Empire/Mughals 136, 144, 167-203, 276 Mu River Valley 182, 184, 199 Mu Ying 44 Mug Levy 187 mules 204, 267 muskets, see small arms Myanmar, see Burma Myede 80 Myin district 185 Myin Khin 166 Myingyan 172, 257 NƗgarakrtƗgama 199 Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat) 195 Nan 142, 155, 156, 221 Nan Chronicle 136, 142, 157 Nan Ruih 176 Nan-dá-bayin, King of Burma (r. 1581-1599) 66, 69, 170, 182, 196, 216 Narai, King of Ayudhya 48, 137, 169, 170, 193 Naresuan, King of Ayudhya 33, 133, 137, 144, 154, 161, 166, 197, 240 Naung-daw-gyì, King of Burma (r. 1760-1763) 95 Navarrete, Domingo 58, 69, 70 needle gun, see small arms Negrais 100 Ness, Gayl 270, 278, 279, 280 Netherlands, 13, 17, 21, 27, 30, 31, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 68, 74, 75, 84, 86, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 99, 121, 124, 128, 129, 166, 183, 185-186, 198, 224, 225, 234, 247, 249, 257, 258, 262, 263, 265, 271, 274, 277 New York 253 Nga-zaung-kyàn, Battle of (1277/1281) 153, 159, 160 NghӋ An 222, 228

INDEX

Ngӑc Hӗi, Battle of (1789) 97 NguyӉn Ánh, Emperor of Vietnam (as Ʀia Long, r. 1802-1820) 58, 71, 106, 182, 202, 228, 242, 251, 252 NguyӉn HuӋ, see Quang Trung NguyӉn, southern Vietnam (15581774) 27, 33, 36, 55, 6, 57, 58, 67, 69, 70, 71, 104, 105, 107, 116, 119, 124, 138, 142, 149, 169, 173, 177-178, 182, 200, 215, 217-218, 226, 228, 232, 235, 238, 241, 251, 260 Nieuhoff, John 13, 65, 216 Nitiprakasika 240 Noort, Oliver 24 Nordenfeldt, see machine guns North America 211 Nyaungu 257 oaths 9, 10, 11, 203-204 opium 13 Ottoman Empire/Turks 46-47, 59, 62, 224 outrigger 110-111 oxen 204, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211. Pa Mok, Battle of (1585) 161 Padris 175, 176, 185 Pagan, Kingdom of xvi, 216 Pahang 142 Pak Nam 235, 257 Pakan 15 Pakkoku 172, 257 Palembang 63, 65, 74, 83, 124 Panco boats 109 PanČmbahan Mas 12, 14 Pang Peureuba 14 Panglima Keudah, the elephant hunter 140, 148 Pasai 20 Pasuruhan 15 Patani 65, 66, 77, 91, 139, 196, 216 Pegu 33, 40, 76, 79, 80, 89, 107, 127, 141, 144, 166, 176, 179, 183, 195, 201-202, 230, 233-234 Pegu, 1st Siege of (1596) 197 Pegu, 2nd Siege of (1598-1599) 196 Pemberton, Robert Boileau 245

INDEX

Persian/Persians 18, 29, 47, 225, 167, 171 Peto Sarif 175 Phayre, Arthur P. 247 Philippines xvi, 10, 27, 28, 34, 39, 54, 59, 108, 109, 115, 133, 175, 243, 262, 263 Phrae 86, 221 Phratabong 197 Phraya Chakri 180 Phú Xuân, see HuӃ Phumintharacha, King of Ayudhya (r. 1709-1733) 198 Phya Anuman 210 pikes 28, 35, 36 Ping River 201 Pinto, Mendez 49, 79, 80, 165, 217 Pires, Tome 11, 16, 26, 29, 46, 52, 61, 169 Plassey, Battle of (1757), 280 poison 37, 38 Poivre, Pierre 71, 226, 235 Polo, Marco 153 Pomphet fortress 81 Ponies, see horses Poojadown 98 porters 7 Portugal/Portuguese 4, 20, 21, 33, 37, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 66, 67, 68, 78, 79, 82, 86, 89, 90, 96, 98, 100, 112, 120, 121, 123, 128, 129, 144, 158, 224, 231, 237 prisoners 3 Prome 66, 77, 80, 89, 126, 193, 260 Prussia, see Germany punishment 11 Pyu-zàw-htì 2, 133 Qing, Dynasty of China 232 Quang Trung (NguyӉn HuӋ, Tây Sѫn emperor, r. 1788-1792) 97, 222 Quҧng Yên, port of 259 Quaritch Wales, H. G. xiv, 3, 19, 20, 25, 92, 124-125, 240 Raffles, Stamford 9, 11 Rama I, king of Siam 80, 145

317 Rama II, King of Siam (r. 1809-1824) 261 Ramathibodi, King of Ayudhya 240 Ramu 187 Rangoon 86, 93, 98, 162, 249, 250, 254, 258 Red River Valley 25, 26, 122, 273 Reid, Anthony 19, 21, 74, 75, 80, 88, 121-122, 277 Remmilink, Willem 219 Ribeyro, Salvador xii-xiii, 90, 96, 276 Ricklefs, Merle 63, 76, 277 rifles, see small arms ritual 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 21 roads, 198-201 rockets 96 rudder 111 Sagaing 172 Saì Gòn, see Gia-Ĉӏnh Saì Gòn, Treaty of (5 June 1862) 259 Salween River Valley 182, 188 Samut Prakan 82 Sanda 80 Sangermano, Vincenzo 11, 35, 227 Sanskrit 8 Santa Ana 266 São Paulo 37, 56 Sarawak Delta 26 Saw-bwas 10, 126 scaling ladders 91 Schrieke, B. 37, 102, 120, 166, 179 Scythes 24 Sejarah Melayu 20, 30, 82, 142, 146, 148, 168 SČmarang, siege of (1742) 219 Senanga Vyuha 240 Serămpang 24 Shaman 6, 15, 16 Shans 2, 11, 126, 133, 142, 144, 156, 170, 173, 181, 184-185, 193, 204, 264, 267 Shen chi ch’iang (“metal machine gun”) 44 shields 2, 38-40 Shwei-gu-gyì 89 Siam/Siamese xvi, 2, 4, 8, 14, 17, 34, 39, 40, 59, 67, 75, 77, 84, 85, 87, 89, 92, 93, 96, 99, 100,

318 106, 107, 118, 119, 127, 144, 146, 154, 165, 166-8, 169, 173, 179, 180-181, 182-183, 188, 193, 196-197, 206-207, 210, 217, 222, 232, 235, 239, 243, 246, 256, 260 Siam, Gulf of 119 Simbike 85 Sinbaungwe 257 Singaraja 84, 92 Singapore 246 Singu 91 Sipsong Panna 142 small arms: Serpentin 49, 51, 53; matchlock musket, 248, 250; Miquelet 55; petronil 54; Snaphaunce 55; flintlock muskets 247, 248, 250, 255; rifles 265; percussion cap 255; needle gun 248; chassepot 249; Enfield rifle, 248; Martini-Henry rifle 265, 267; Minié rifle 248; Snider rifle 265 Smim Dhaw, King of Pegu (c. early 1550s) 89 Snaphaunce, see small arms Snider rifle, see small arms Snodgrass, Major 13 Song Tham, King of Ayudhya (r. 1610-1628) 201 soul stuff 1, 2 South China Sea 131 Spain/Spanish 49, 54, 55, 77, 84, 124, 128, 129 spears 24, 26, 29, 30, 41 spells 14 Sri Lanka 142 Sri Vijaya xvi, 122 Stahl, William 270, 279, 280 starvation, 193-198 steamboats/steamers 102, 244, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 262 stockades, see fortifications 256, 258, 274, 278, 281 Subjoko 277, 278 Sukothai 59, 133 Sukranitisastra 240

INDEX

Sulawesi 9, 10, 26, 34, 57, 62, 65, 95, 175, 179, 183, 186 Sumatra, 13, 19, 27, 33, 37, 39, 88, 90, 131, 137, 157, 162, 165, 170, 171, 175-176, 185, 188, 243, 246, 247, 263 Sumbawa 175 Sun, Laichen 45 Sun Tzu 239 Sunda, ruler of 224 supply 192-198 Surabaya 12, 56, 194, 195, 196 Surakarta 59 surprise attack 17, 30 swivel guns 46, 49-51, 113 swords 26, 31, 33, 34, 38, 41 Symes, Michael 32, 216, 219, 234, 236, 246 Syriam xiii, 78, 89, 90, 96, 98, 100, 122, 224 Tabin-shwei-htì, King of Burma (r. 1531-1550), 10, 11, 76, 77, 126, 137, 146-7, 159, 165166, 176, 193, 200-201, 203204, 206 Takau 188 Taksin 82, 169, 182 Talak 193, 199 Tambuko 26 Taoism 165 tattooing 14, 17, 233-234, 237 Taung-ngu 10, 77, 86, 201 Taungdwingyi 269 Tavoy 145 Tây Sѫn 71, 97, 143, 154, 222, 232, 252, 260 Tenasserim 27, 40, 137, 143, 162, 199, 216 Ternate, Sultanate of 26 Thailand, see Ayudhya, Siam Thanh Hóa 228 Thӽng Long (and fortress of ) 201 Thantabain 83 Thenanga Byuha-sit-thamaìng 240 Thibaw 123, 188, 230, 254 Thonburi 82 thorny bush 92, 97, 273 Tibao, Sebastião Gonsalves y 225

319

INDEX

tigers 17 timing of campaigns, 190-192 Timor 175, 243 Tin, Ù 8 Ting-pien, Battle of (6 May 1388) 44 Tokugawa Shogunate, see Japan Toungoo, see Taung-ngu Tourane, see Cӱa Hà Trebuchets 43, 44 Trҫn Hѭng Ĉҥo 40-241 Trҫn Mihn Tông (r. 1314-1329) 233 Trҫn Nhân Tông (r. 1293-1314) 233 Trant 24 Travelek, Captain 188 Treatise on Victorious Warfare (Thai) 240 Trӏnh (fl. 1545-1786), 8, 49, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 62, 68, 69, 70, 71, 105, 107, 122, 138, 143, 154, 177-178, 191-192, 200, 217218, 221-222, 228, 232, 241 Trunajaya, of Madura 41, 170, 173, 181 Trѭng sisters Trѭѫng Vƭnh Ký 202 Tuban 170, 174 Turks/Turkish, see Ottoman Empire ummat xv Urban 46 Vai Sampayana 240 Varthema 29, 36 La Vendée 271 Vietnam/Vietnamese xiv, xvi, xviii, 8, 18, 28, 33, 34, 38, 40, 41, 44, 46, 52, 57, 61, 64, 78, 85, 87, 97, 104, 106, 112, 113, 116, 117, 123, 131, 143, 152, 158, 165, 169, 171, 176-177, 186, 201-202, 223, 236, 239, 241, 246, 247, 251, 252, 253, 256, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 270, 271, 274, 276, 280 Vƭnh Long 273 VOC (Dutch East India Company) xvi, 12, 55, 63, 121, 174, 194, 246

Vochang, Battle of, see Nga-zaungkyàn, Battle of Wa 2 Warring states period 36 Water, supplies of 192-193 White, General 270 Williams, Dr. Clement 249 women 4, 5, 6, 10, 18, 21 Wuttygaon 256 Yamethin district 185 Yangtze River 131 Yunnan 182, 204, 266 Zumburak 112