Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion

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Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion Series Editors RALPH L. PIEDMONT ANDREW VILLAGE

VOLUME 22

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.nl/rssr.

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion Volume 22

Edited by

Ralph L. Piedmont Loyola University Maryland and

Andrew Village York St. John University, UK

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011

Published with the kind support of Loyola University Maryland, USA. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data LC control number 89650738

ISSN 1046-8064 ISBN 978 90 04 20727 1 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

CONTENTS Preface ................................................................................................. Acknowledgements ............................................................................ Manuscript Invitation .......................................................................

ix xiii xv

A Spiritual Getaway: The Motivations, Experiences, and Benefits of a Silent Retreat ........................................................... William L. Smith and Pidi Zhang

1

Beyond Meaning: Spiritual Transformation in the Paradigm of Moral Intuitionism. A New Direction for the Psychology of Spiritual Transformation. Introduction ................................................................................... Part 1: Beyond Meaning-System Analyses ................................ Part 2: A Moral Intuitionist Approach to Spiritual Transformation ......................................................................... G. Michael Leffel

25 29

A Good Man Is Hard to Find: Forgiveness, Terror Management, and Religiosity ...................................................... Keith M. Wilson and Ronan Bernas

126

Three Applications of the Theory of Postformal Thought: Wisdom, Concepts of God, and Success in College ................ Liza Benovenli, Elizabeth Fuller, Jan Sinnott, and Sarah Waterman

77

141

SPECIAL SECTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND CHRISTIAN MINISTRY Introduction to Special Section: Psychological Type and Christian Ministry ......................................................................... Andrew Village

157

Jungian Typology and Religion: A Perspective from North America ............................................................................... Christopher F. J. Ross

165

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contents

Psychological Type Profile of Clergywomen and Clergymen Serving in the Presbyterian Church (USA): Implications for Strengths and Weaknesses in Ministry ..................................... Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins, and Keith Wulff

192

All are Called, but Some Psychological Types Are More Likely to Respond: Profiling Churchgoers in Australia ...................... Mandy Robbins and Leslie J. Francis

212

Gifts Differing? Psychological Type among Stipendiary and Non-stipendiary Anglican Clergy ............................................... Andrew Village

230

Psychological Type Preferences of Male and Female Free Church Ministers in England ...................................................... Leslie J. Francis, Michael Whinney, Lewis Burton, and Mandy Robbins Imagining Themselves as Ministers: How Religiously Committed Baptist Youth Respond to the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS2) ............................................... Bruce G. Fawcett, Leslie J. Francis, and Mandy Robbins Apprentice Clergy? The Relationship Between Expectations in Ministry and the Psychological Type Profile of Training Incumbents and Curates in the Church of England ............... David Tilley, Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins, and Susan H. Jones Do Introverts Appreciate the Same Things as Extraverts Within a Ministry Team? A Study Among Leaders Within the Newfrontiers Network of Churches in the UK ................. Mandy Robbins, Leslie J. Francis, and Andrew Ryland The Role of Archetypes and Jungian Personality Typology in Building Religious Community: Applying John Beebe’s Eight Process Archetypal Model through a Case Study of the Extraverted Intuitive Type with Introverted Feeling (ENFP) ............................................................................................ Christopher F. J. Ross

251

264

286

306

315

contents Authors’ Biographies ......................................................................... Manuscript Reviewers ....................................................................... Subject Index ...................................................................................... Names Index .......................................................................................

vii 347 351 353 358

PREFACE The study of religion and spirituality continues to move forward at a quick pace. A tremendous amount of research has been done over the past 15 years across a wide array of topics. Such a vast literature necessitates the field to begin to digest this information and to reflect on its value and meaning. This year, 2011, will see the appearance of a number of new text books, including two handbooks on the psychology of religion that will provide syntheses of the literature from a variety of perspectives. This is an important movement in the field because it recognizes the need for larger conceptual models for understanding numinous constructs. Over the years, the field has addressed issues of measurement and construct validity. It is clear that spirituality and religiousness can be adequately measured and that scores from such scales are useful for predicting a wide array of mental and physical health outcomes. The larger conceptual issues of meaning and interpretation now present themselves for consideration. How do numinous constructs fit in the larger psychological system of the individual? What does spirituality represent about an individual? What are those psychological systems that are involved in the development and experience of the sacred? Thus, the field now begins to search for the integration of spiritual and religious constructs within established psychological models of functioning. The current volume presents a number of studies that address such questions. In reviewing this year’s offerings, all the reports aim to contextualize numinous functioning within the stream of experience. The authors provide a wide perspective on this endeavor, and it is hoped that the reader will come away from this volume thinking more paradigmatically about religion and spirituality. For the field to move forward, it will need to provide a context for discussing and understanding its constructs. Their role, function, and purpose will need to be explicated within larger models and processes of experience. The general section opens with a paper by Smith and Zhang, who attempt to identify the personal motivations that lead individuals to seek personal growth through a directed retreat experience. The psychospiritual value of such an experience is also explored.

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An interesting set of papers is presented by Dr. Leffel. His work represents an important effort at conceptualizing spiritual transformation within a moral intuitionist model. His work is significant for at least three reasons. First, it represents a new force in the field for understanding spirituality as a component of a larger cognitive-personality system. Second, his work is comprehensive and intriguing, which is why two related papers are presented in this section. Third, although theoretical in nature, Dr. Leffel’s work is careful in outlining specific testable hypotheses, which are presented for each element of his proposed model. Thus, his work should stimulate and support empirical research in the field. He provides a seamless approach for matching research to theory. Wilson and Bernas examine spirituality within the terror management framework (TMF). TMF is a model of understanding human behavior from an analytical perspective that stresses humans’ need to manage the reality of our mortality. The reality that one is fated to die creates significant levels of anxiety that needs to be managed. Research has shown that when mortality is made salient, individuals (and groups) will alter their behavior in ways that will affirm a sense of personal security. It would seem natural that any consideration of death anxiety should include some consideration of spirituality or religiousness as either a mediator or moderator of the TMF effect. Further, TMF provides another conceptual model for interpreting the psychological value of the numinous. Dr. Jan Sinnott and colleagues present another paper on Postformal Thought, which reflects an ability to use complex cognitions to interpret, understand, and cope with one’s environment. Complex thinking patterns allow for an individual to consider multiple perspectives concerning an event, allowing for the development of a more sophisticated and nuanced perspective. The end product of this cognitive structuring is an ability to more effectively manage real events. This cognitive style is hypothesized to influence how individuals conceptualize the transcendent, operationalized as one’s Image of God (IOG). One’s ability to think in a more differentiated manner about God may allow individuals to construct spiritual relationships that are more robust and emotionally satisfying. Or, perhaps one’s involvement with a transcendent reality provides a stimulus to perceive the world in a more sophisticated manner, thereby promoting cognitive and emotional growth. Whatever the outcome of such an analysis, the current study

preface

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does show the value of applying cognitive models to understanding how individuals perceive the God of their understanding. The special section was edited by Andrew Village and presents a series of studies examining the role of psychological type as a useful conceptual model for understanding Christian clergy and their work in ministry. These researchers argue that Jung’s psychological theory of type provides a useful theoretical model for understanding individuals and how they approach their spiritual and religious motivations. As these papers will demonstrate, there are distinct personality types that appear relevant to ministerial involvement and satisfaction. No doubt personal motivations, or personality styles, carry with them motivational implications for how spirituality interests will be expressed. Readers interested in this type of analyses may wish to contrast these findings with those employing other personality models, such as the trait-based Five-Factor Model (FFM). Earlier issues of Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion (RSSSR) have outlined the value of the FFM for understanding spiritual motivations and behaviors. Future research may wish to compare directly the interpretive and predictive value of these two models. Ultimately, though, research will need to determine whether numinous constructs are the product of particular personality styles or traits, or whether they represent their own sources of motivation independent of these established constructs. This is a very exciting volume because it provides a variety of conceptual models for understanding, studying, and empirically describing spiritual and religious constructs. The articles here attempt to infuse numinous variables within cognitive, personality, analytical, and social models. These different theoretical approaches provide conceptual details that can be quite important for promoting new understandings of numinous constructs in ways that facilitate their integration within the mainstream of the social sciences. We have argued before that spirituality and religiousness are essential, unique aspects of the individual that any model of the mind ought to include if it is to be comprehensive. The papers presented here demonstrate how easily numinous constructs can be reconciled with established paradigms. That spirituality can be interpreted as a significant construct from multiple perspectives (e.g., cognitively, affectively, etc.) underscores its centrality in the psychic system. The papers presented here begin to provide the conceptual scaffolding essential for the development of a comprehensive model of

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spiritual/religious functioning. Most importantly, though, is that this theory development can be empirically informed. The presence of so much theory-driven data will allow for substantive dialogue as these ideas develop. It is hoped that this volume of RSSSR will continue to stimulate your own thinking and serve as a platform for new, innovative research on spirituality and religiousness.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The editorial staff and I are grateful for the contributions and cooperation of a large number of people without whom publication of RSSSR would not be possible. Most obvious among them are the authors and coauthors of the published articles. There were a number of researchers, scholars, and clinicians who have served as anonymous reviewers of the manuscripts that were received for current publication. These individuals are noted at the end of this volume. They not only have functioned as professional referees evaluating the appropriateness of the respective manuscripts for publication, but they also have given the authors significant suggestions to improve the quality and scope of their future research in this area. Their efforts helped to insure a high quality among those reports that are published. I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Dr. Andrew Village for his wonderful work in managing the Special Section on Psychological Type and Christian Ministry. The series of papers presented here make a significant, and substantial, contribution to the literature. The variety of topics is very relevant for both researchers and clinicians. The articles presented here are informative and should provide highly stimulating reading. Teresa Wilkins has served as the editorial assistant for this volume. Her experience, talent, and painstaking work contributed immeasurably to the high standards of production. Throughout this process, she was always patient and quick to smile. Although the work load got very heavy at times, her commitment and diligence were always in evidence, and she maintained a very high level of professionalism. Thank You, Teri! My own academic institution has provided many critical necessities for the production of this volume. Loyola University Maryland, especially its graduate Department of Pastoral Counseling, has provided office space, funds for the editorial assistant, telephone services, computer technology, postage, access to its admirable support infrastructure, and related services. I am very grateful for both the Department’s and Graduate Administration’s support for this worthy endeavor. I am grateful, too, to the production staff of Brill Academic Press who have efficiently published this attractive and useful volume. Brill’s

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acknowledgements

Sales department (www.brill.nl or e-mail brill@turpin-distribution. com for R.O.W. and [email protected] for North America) is eager to fill orders for either single volumes or on-going subscriptions to RSSSR. Please recommend RSSSR to your professional and academic colleagues. Also support its addition or continuation in your academic, religious, research, and public libraries for its rich contents are relevant to everyone, both lay and professional, who is interested in keeping up with the rapidly expanding frontiers of scientific knowledge about spirituality and religion. Ralph L. Piedmont, Ph.D., Co-Editor

MANUSCRIPT INVITATION For future volumes we welcome the submission of manuscripts reporting on research which contributes to the behavioral and social science understanding of religion, whether done by members of those disciplines or other professions. RSSSR is an annual interdisciplinary and international volume that publishes original reports of research, theoretical studies, and other innovative social scientific analyses of religion. (However, we do not include studies that are purely historical or theological.) Manuscripts should be original contributions (not reprints) based upon any of the quantitative or qualitative methods of research or the theoretical, conceptual, or meta-analytical analysis of research on religion in general or on any specific world religion. They should not be under consideration for publication by any other journal or publication outlet and should comply with the professional ethical standards of psychology, sociology, and other social science professions. Manuscripts may be submitted at any time during the year, although those received within the calendar year have the best chance of inclusion in the next volume. Manuscripts must conform to the style guidelines of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, Publication Manual 6th edition. Papers not in APA style will be returned to the author un-reviewed. (Authors who lack access to the Publication Manual may contact Dr. Piedmont for sample materials to help in the final preparation of their papers.) Send three copies, double spaced on standard paper to: Ralph L. Piedmont, Ph.D., Editor Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion Department of Pastoral Counseling Loyola University Maryland 8890 McGaw Road, Suite 380 Columbia, MD 21045 USA Questions about suitability can be directed to Dr. Piedmont or Ms. Wilkins electronically ([email protected] or [email protected]). Manuscripts that are judged by the editors as relevant to the coverage of RSSSR are reviewed anonymously for quality and then either

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manuscript invitation

accepted (usually along with constructive suggestions for revision) or rejected. Manuscripts relevant to our subject that are not accepted for publication also receive the benefit of critiques and suggestions that can aid their improvement for submission elsewhere. Authors will be required to complete a copyright transfer form giving Brill the rights to publish the work. RSSSR is also interested in developing “special topic sections” for inclusion in future editions. Special topic sections would include a series of papers (5–7) on a specific theme. These sections would be “guest edited” by a single individual who would be responsible for the solicitation of the manuscripts and their review. If you have a suggestion for a special topic section or would be interested in editing such a section, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Piedmont for details.

A SPIRITUAL GETAWAY: THE MOTIVATIONS, EXPERIENCES, AND BENEFITS OF A SILENT RETREAT William L. Smith* and Pidi Zhang Abstract Retreatants at a Jesuit retreat center in the Southeast were surveyed to assess their motivations for going on retreat, the retreat experience itself, their evaluation of the retreat, and its effect on them. The retreats were based on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius which is a collection of prayers and contemplative practices designed to enhance one’s spirituality. Meditating and spirituality were the most highly rated motivations for going on retreat, and one-quarter of respondents indicated that as a result of the retreat they gained knowledge about God. Factor and regression analyses were used to further explore the relationships between background information, motivation factors, and outcomes.

Sociologists of religion lack a well-developed framework for studying religion and spirituality (Roof, 2003). A potential remedy or analytical approach that addresses this deficit is to focus on lived religion or how “religion and spirituality are practiced, experienced, and expressed by ordinary people” (McGuire, 2008, p. 12). Lived religion is the result of the practices people use to make sense of their everyday lives, and these practices affect spiritual development (McGuire, 2008). A spiritual retreat, such as the Spiritual Exercises, is one example of lived religion. Lived religion is also a topic of interest to theologians, particularly among those who see theology as a practical rather than a theoretical science (Volf, 2002). Theologians who are interested in lived religion see the value in theorizing or thinking about God as well as the necessity of understanding the ways in which religion is practiced. Theologians

* Author Note: William L. Smith, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Georgia Southern University; Pidi Zhang, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Georgia Southern University. The authors are grateful for the assistance provided by Tina Hook. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to William L. Smith, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA 30460-8051. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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william l. smith and pidi zhang

who use this approach define practices as “the human activities in and through which people cooperate with God in addressing the needs of one another and creation” (Dystra & Bass, 2002, p. 22). Practices and beliefs are integrally connected to the extent that “Practices are essentially belief-shaped, and beliefs are essentially practice-shaping.” For most people, practices lead to beliefs in part because beliefs are interwoven within practices (Volf, 2002, p. 256). The Spiritual Exercises created by St. Ignatius of Loyola facilitates “a living religion in us” (Rahner, 1965, p. 11). Psychologists have concluded that behavior precedes attitudes, and practices influence beliefs (Festinger, 1954). Religious practices serve as a form of reinforcement that strengthen commitment to religious worldviews, have beneficial consequences that have been linked positively to “life satisfaction, quality of life, general well-being, and purpose in life,” and which aid people in “coping with life” (Spilka, 2005, p. 372). For example, in the Spiritual Exercises, St. Ignatius presented a “behavioral plan” or set of practices that could influence one’s attitudes and beliefs which, in turn, could influence one’s religious practices or behavior (Gomez, 2001). The Spiritual Exercises can be viewed as one man’s inner struggle, conversion experience, and his view about reality (Meissner, 1992). Various religious communities and traditions have fostered the development of particular practices that nurture a “way of life that supports spirituality” (Nelson, 2009, p. 392). One venue where religion and spirituality are practiced, experienced, and expressed is at retreat centers. Retreats for many people are spiritual quests which also provide a restorative experience (Ouellette, Kaplan, & Kaplan, 2005). Ouellette et al. studied retreatants at a Benedictine monastery in Quebec, Canada and their motivations for taking a retreat, the activities they participated in, and the effects of the retreat on them. Their study in part influenced the focus and direction of this study. By investigating people’s motivations for taking a retreat, the activities they participated in, and the effects of the retreat on their lives, we can begin to assess the role retreats play in fostering the relationship between practice and belief. This paper was an attempt to study one example of lived religion, and it investigated retreatants at Ignatius House Jesuit Retreat Center in Atlanta, Georgia. The research questions answered were: (a) What were the retreatants’ motivations for going on retreat? (b) What did they do during the retreat? (c) What was their evaluation of the retreat? and (d) What was its effect on them?

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Research on Spirituality A spiritual marketplace has developed in the decades following World War II, contributing to the changing face of spirituality and religion in America (Cox, 2009; Dillon & Wink, 2007; McCartin, 2010; Roof, 1993, 1999, 2003; Wuthnow, 1998, 2005, 2007; Zinnbauer et al., 1997). The contemporary religious landscape is transitioning from what Cox (2009, p. 14) described as “an expiring Age of Belief into a new but not fully realized Age of the Spirit” where spirituality replaces formal or institutionalized religion. According to the General Social Survey which is a large, nationally representative survey of American adults, among those with a religious preference, two-thirds were both religious and spiritual, while 15% of those with no religious preference were at least moderately religious, and 40% were at least moderately spiritual (Hout & Fischer, 2002). Since the 1950s, spirituality has come to mean “spiritual seeking” and religious as “church-centered religiousness” (Dillon & Wink, 2007, p. 121). While it is common for people to indicate that they are spiritual but not religious, “religion and spirituality are not mutually exclusive” (Cunningham, 2002, p. 26). In theory, religion and spirituality may not be mutually exclusive, but in practice “spirituality has become decoupled from religion” (Flory & Miller, 2007, p. 203). Recent sociological studies of spirituality revealed the strong impact individualism has on American culture and the pursuit of a “private, individualistic, and non-institutionalized form of spiritual fulfillment where the individual spiritual quest for fulfillment takes precedence over membership in, or commitment to, the religious community” (Flory & Miller, 2007, p. 203). In contrast to these studies, Flory and Miller (2007) found an emerging form of spirituality labeled expressive communalism that emphasized the blending of spiritual seeking and church-centered religiousness. Expressive communalism may be more reflective of an earlier era prior to the 1950s and 1960s than a new form of spirituality. As Cunningham (2002) stated: Being a member of a religious tradition like Catholic Christianity, in fact, nurtures a person who desires to become more spiritual. Contrary to what many think, being religious is the larger concept, and being spiritual but not religious is its pale cousin. (p. 26)

Religion has the capacity to nurture the spiritual and to broaden our limited and narrow private lives (Jamison, 2006).

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william l. smith and pidi zhang Dwelling, Seeking, and Practice-Oriented Spiritualities

While some people on a spiritual journey tend to distance themselves from religious organizations and focus on developing spiritual practices which enhance a personal style of faith, not everyone finds it necessary to decouple spirituality from religion. Because Ignatian spirituality is rooted in the Christian tradition it can offer those on a spiritual journey potentially something that other types of spirituality do not offer. A practice-oriented spirituality, like Ignatian spirituality, offers spiritual seekers what a dwelling-oriented spirituality and a seekingoriented spirituality do not, engagement “in activities that deepen their relationship to the sacred” (Wuthnow, 1998, pp. 168–169). A dwelling-oriented spirituality focuses on “a traditional spirituality of inhabiting sacred spaces,” while a seeking-oriented spirituality focuses on “seeking partial knowledge and practical wisdom” of the sacred (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 3). While these three styles of spirituality are not necessarily mutually exclusive, Wuthnow (1998) argued that a dwelling-oriented spirituality and a seeking-oriented spirituality are not satisfactory on their own or in combination with each other. A dwelling-oriented spirituality will remain an important choice for those wanting a nonthreatening “safe haven” in a post-modern society, while a seeker-oriented spirituality will become even more appealing than a dwelling-oriented spirituality as people “make their own choices about how to understand the sacred,” but neither style offers the depth and breadth of a practiceoriented spirituality like Ignatian spirituality (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 15). Ignatian Spirituality and the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Ignatian spirituality can be summarized in four brief statements: “finding God in all things,” “becoming a contemplative in action,” “looking at the world in an incarnational way,” and “seeking freedom and detachment” (Martin, 2010, p. 10). Ignatian spirituality, like monastic spirituality (see Carette & Ouellette, 2007; Hillery, 1992; Jamison, 2006; Merton, 1978; Nouwen, 1981; Ouellette et al., 2005; Smith, 2006; Wilkes, 1999), provides viable time-tested practices that lead to a deeper relationship with the sacred. The best known monastic rule or set of practices is The Rule of St. Benedict (Meisel & del Mastro, 1975). The incorporation of monastic practices (e.g., obedience, lectio divina [sacred reading], stability, conversatio [reassessment of one’s

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life], etc.) into one’s life is the responsibility of the individual, not the community. Similar practices are contained in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola (Tetlow, 1987). Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556), author of the Spiritual Exercises and founder of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), wrote the Exercises in medieval Spain while recuperating from battle wounds incurred in 1520. Ignatius understood spirituality to mean an interior and personal search rather than the more public expressions of organized, institutionalized religion (Jamison, 2006). The Exercises “fashioned for the first time what is now popularly known as a retreat” (Hansen, 2008, p. 32). The Spiritual Exercises is a manual for spiritual growth that assists retreatants in “ways of meeting God and of discerning in our experience what is of God and what is not of God” (Barry, 1991, p. 14). It is often thought of as a “book on spirituality” but it is a “book of spirituality” (Meissner, 1992, p. 87). Included within the Exercises are the Rules of Discernment which are merely guides by which Christians might discern whether the inner and outer movements that are a part of their lives are moving toward greater love of God, neighbor and the world or are edging them toward isolation and apathy. (Mueller, 1996, pp. 52–53)

In the first annotation or introductory commentary of the Exercises, Ignatius stated that spiritual exercises include, “every method of examining the conscience, of meditating, of contemplating, of praying vocally and mentally, and of other spiritual activities” (Tetlow, 1987, p. 3). The Spiritual Exercises is a series of meditations on select scripture passages which the retreatant reads, ponders, and prays over, in order to be informed, impressed, moved, and affected by them. The aim is to come (a) to understand Christ’s mission: what it is for and what it fights against (“to know him more clearly”), (b) to admire him (“to love him more dearly”), and (c) to feel drawn to him in his struggle and to follow him on his mission (“to follow him more nearly”). (Byron, 2000, p. 5)

The Exercises is a silent retreat that is usually conducted over 30 days and in a condensed or modified version over an 8, 3, or 2 day period or at home over several months. The 30 days are divided into 4 weeks (not calendar weeks) or periods devoted to a particular theme. Retreatants do not usually progress through these periods at the same pace. The first week deals with developing a sense of trust with God based on the

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revelation of one’s sins. Week two builds on week one and retreatants seek to know Jesus better. Week three focuses on the passion and death of Christ and week four on the resurrection (see Mariani, 2002 for his reflections on a 30-day retreat). The Exercises is “an oral tradition, intended to be ‘given,’ not read” (Silf, 2002, p. 180). A silent retreat is one example of an odyssey experience. At its core, an odyssey experience consists of “temporary withdrawal from one set of routines and structures, a period of fluidity, and then an immersion either in a new structure or with a different orientation to structure” (Smelser, 2009, p. 209). The Exercises is, in essence, a developmental process where retreatants are involved in a process of destructing, unstructuring or transforming, and restructuring their everyday lives. Another way of looking at this experience is that the Exercises, like culture, is a “tool kit” people use to “solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). Method Participants There are 24 Jesuit retreat centers in the United States, and Ignatius House, which is sponsored by the Jesuit’s New Orleans Province, is the only one in Georgia. Since one of us had previously studied the monastic spirituality of lay Cistercian groups (Smith, 2006), it seemed only natural to move beyond monastic spirituality and do a study of Ignatian spirituality. Ignatius House was selected for this study because it was the only Jesuit retreat center in Georgia (where the authors reside) and the executive director, staff, and board of directors were enthusiastic about participating in the research project. Ignatius House is located on 20 wooded acres on a bluff overlooking the Chattahoochee River. The Jesuits have been conducting retreats at Ignatius House since 1961, and about 40 weekend group retreats are held annually. Private or directed retreats are held in July. Approximately 1,300 people attend retreats annually at Ignatius House, 45 of them in privately directed retreats. The 2-day silent retreats usually include seven 30-minute talks or conferences based on the Spiritual Exercises. Morning prayers and Mass are offered daily, and resident priests are available for confession and spiritual direction. The retreats are theme oriented, and most of them are sponsored by Catholic parishes and Catholic organizations such as the Knights of

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Columbus. Some retreats are designated specifically for women, men, married couples, young adults, Spanish speakers, or AA (Alcoholics Anonymous) members. The retreats for women are conducted by the Cenacle Sisters. Retreat themes are often reflective of the various liturgical seasons of the year. For example, a retreat conducted during Advent was titled “Hope in the Midst of Darkness,” while a retreat during Lent was titled, “Journey into the Desert,” and another during Holy Week was titled, “Following the Whole Jesus.” Some of the other retreat themes conducted during this study included: “Do Not Be Afraid,” “Ignoring Our Inner Hurts,” “They Gathered Together,” and “Come Follow Me.” Although the retreats might vary by theme, in essence the structure and content of the retreats are very similar. Only 23.2% of respondents were first-time retreatants. Most (76.8%) were repeat visitors, which included 14.8% who went on a retreat two times, 43.2% who visited from 3 to 9 times, 13.3% who visited 10 to 19 times, and the remaining 4.3% who visited 20 times or more. Most were over 45 years of age, and the largest age group (40.1%) was 60 years and over. There were twice as many females (67.3%) as males (32.7%). A large majority (61.4%) were married, although there were 13.1% who were divorced, 9.1% widowed, and 14.5% never married. Only .9% were separated. Most retreatants were well educated, with 27.5% having college degrees, 30.0% having graduate degrees, and another 10.4% with graduate school experiences. Measures and Procedure A five-page, 25 question survey was delivered to Ignatius House on August 28, 2008. The survey consisted of both closed-ended and openended questions including demographic questions (e.g., race/ethnicity, age, sex, religious preference, marital status, education, occupation) and those measuring respondents’ motivations for taking the retreat (e.g., How much did the following items [items such as contributes to my spirituality; be far from daily responsibilities; allows me to feel the presence of God, etc.] influence your decision to go on a retreat? ), the retreat experience itself (e.g., During your retreat, how often did you pray, meditate, rest, read, study, and do nothing?), their evaluation of the retreat (e.g., How helpful were the talks based on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius in assisting you to “know him [Christ] more clearly,” “to love him more dearly,” and “to follow him more nearly?”; How satisfied are you with this retreat?), and its effect on them (e.g.,

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william l. smith and pidi zhang Table 1. Retreatant Demographics

Variable Age 18–29 30–45 46–59 60+ Sex Male Female Race White Black Indian/Native American Asian/Pacific Islander Hispanic Multi-Racial Other Marital Status Never Married Married Living Together Separated Divorced Widowed Education Elementary School Some High School High School Diploma/ GED Post-Secondary School Some College College Degree Some Graduate School Graduate Degree Occupation Religious Professional Managerial Manual Clerical Retired Other

N

%

23 142 251 278

3.3 20.5 36.2 40.1

225 463

32.7 67.3

531 93 1 17 29 8 7

76.5 13.4 0.1 2.4 4.2 1.2 1.0

100 423 7 6 90 63

14.4 61.0 1.0 0.9 13.0 9.1

3 5 49

0.4 0.7 7.1

18 141 191 72 208

2.6 20.3 27.5 10.4 30.0

18 181 114 59 24 175 102

2.6 26.1 16.4 8.5 3.5 25.2 14.7

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Has something dramatic and important happened to your spiritual life as a result of this retreat? For example, did you gain any insights about God, yourself, and your relationship with God and others?). Staff members distributed the survey along with a cover letter which explained the project and assured the respondents of their anonymity on each of the Sunday mornings of the retreat beginning September 14, 2008 and ending July 12, 2009. The staff strongly encouraged retreatants to complete the survey in the privacy of their own rooms at the retreat center and deposit it in a sealed envelope in a designated drop box before departing Ignatius House later that afternoon. Staff members mailed the completed surveys on Monday. Eight hundred and fifty surveys were distributed at 26 retreats (11 during 2008 and 15 during 2009) from September 14, 2008 until July 12, 2009 and 694 retreatants completed and returned the survey for an 82% response rate. Results Motivations for the Retreat Motivations for going on a retreat were assessed by a questionnaire with 23 items using a 4-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all through 4 = very much. Table 2 provides detailed results from factor analysis. Two items (Relieves stress and Affordable cost of the retreat) were dropped because they did not meet the factor loading requirement. Six factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1, accounting for 67.4% of the total variance. Meditating (μ = 3.72) and Spirituality (μ = 3.71) were the two factors with the highest means followed by Beauty (μ = 3.35) and Being away (μ = 3.02). Fascinating (μ = 2.54) and Solution (μ = 2.75) had the lowest means. Spirituality had the highest rated items: Contributes to my spirituality (μ = 3.84), Allows me to feel the presence of God (μ = 3.82), and Replenishes spirituality (μ = 3.76). Although the Varimax rotated principal components were the highest for Being away from daily responsibilities (factor loading = .88) and Not have to be responsible for anyone (factor loading = .81), the actual means of these two items were among the lowest (μ = 2.87 for Being away, μ = 2.45 for Not responsible). Six clusters, according to the number of factors, were imposed in a K-Mean cluster analysis. The clusters essentially recaptured the factors that emerged in the factor analysis. A composite measure was

10


ati ng cin Fas

n tio Sol u

aw ay ing Be

Be

aut

y

ion Me dit at

Spi rit

Motivations

ual ity

Table 2. Factor Loadings of Motivations

Replenishes spirituality Feel the presence of God Contributes to my spirituality Know myself better

.79 .70 .66 .54

.20 .09 .35 –.10

.16 .11 –.11 .39

.01 .08 .03 .13

.03 .22 –.15 .10

–.02 –.08 .29 .38

Provides an opportunity to meditate Provides an atmosphere of contemplation Devote time to prayer

.08

.77

.10

.07

.11

.21

.22

.73

.09

.12

.02

.08

.47

.51

.11

–.01

.28

–.23

Be close to nature Appreciate the beauty of the setting Provides rest Explore a wonderful place Experience a moment of silence

.12 .13

.06 .16

.77 .77

.19 .22

.17 .12

.26 .14

.03 .15 .17

.20 –.03 .49

.63 .60 .49

.43 .25 .25

.11 .25 .02

.05 .47 –.08

Be away from daily responsibilities Not responsible for anyone Take time for myself Removes me from agitation and turmoil

.04

.11

.17

.88

.09

.13

–.06 .13 .11

.02 .05 .18

.16 .31 .22

.81 .76 .55

.16 .01 .33

.22 .14 .04

.06 .09 .12

.03 .15 .02

.11 .24 .04

.20 .04 .21

.83 .78 .57

.20 .14 .42

Do something fascinating Gives a sense of unity with the world

–.04 .04

.09 .18

.20 .23

.26 .13

.22 .26

.74 .73

Mean Variance Cronbach’s α

3.02 .20 .83

3.35 .10 .83

3.71 .04 .66

2.75 .04 .77

2.54 .02 .77

3.72 .01 .64

Ask a favor of the Lord Pray for those in need Provides a solution to a problem

Note: Two items were dropped because they did not meet the factor loading requirement, although the communalities were close to an acceptable level (.49 for “Relieves stress” and .48 for “Affordable cost of the retreat”). Loadings greater than .30 are in bold.

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constructed for each of the clusters from the included items to explore the reasons responsible for deciding to go on a retreat. Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the independent variables that might be predictors for each of the motivation factors. Retreatants were asked to report how often they engaged in religious/spiritual activities. On a scale ranging from 1 = not at all through 7 = daily, Prayer displayed the highest mean of 6.48. The activities with the next highest means were Attend religious services (μ = 5.25), Selfreflection (μ = 5.13), and Reading sacred texts (μ = 5.00). In the middle were Meditation (μ = 4.68), Other reading on religion/spirituality (μ = 4.86), and Religious singing/chanting (μ = 3.83). Yoga, Tai Chi, or similar practice displayed the lowest mean of 1.91. These activities along with education, occupation, and demographic measures were used as predictors in the multiple regression analyses. As correlations between some predictors were high (ρ = .58 between Reading sacred texts and Other reading on religion/spirituality, ρ = .52 between Selfreflection and Meditation), Self-reflection and Other reading on religion/spirituality were dropped from the list of predictors. The results from multiple regression analyses are reported in Table 3. Religious/spiritual activities varied in predicting retreatants’ motivations for going on retreat. The activities positively related to Spirituality were Prayer (b = .25, β = .16, t = 3.57, p < .01) and Reading sacred texts (b = .11, β = .13, t = 2.54, p < .05). Reading sacred texts (b = .13, β = .18, t = 3.74, p < .01) was positively related to Meditation. Reading sacred texts and Other reading on religion/spirituality were highly correlated, while those who were very engaged in Other reading on religion/spirituality appear to be seeking Spirituality, Fascination, and Beauty in their retreat experience to a greater degree than those who were very engaged in Reading sacred texts. On another dimension, Prayer seemed to be only positively related to Spirituality, negatively related to Fascinating (b = –.15, β = –.08, t = –1.85, p < .10, but when Other reading on religion/spirituality was controlled the statistics improved: b = –.21, β = –.11, t = –2.58, p < .05), and unrelated to Meditation. It should be pointed out that (a) the composite measure of meditative motivation for going on the retreat, (b) Meditation activities before the retreat, and (c) Meditation activities during the retreat were not highly correlated (ρa,b = .18, df = 658; ρa,c = .34, df = 667; ρb,c = .34, df = 667), so using Meditation before the retreat as a predictor for the motivation theme of Meditation should be methodologically

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White

–.20 –.09 –.29 (–.05) (–.03) (–.04) Male –.26* –.08 –.70** (–.08) (–.03) (–.10) Age –.01* –.01 –.01 (–.10) (–.08) (–.03) .07 Married .04 –.22 (.02) (.01) (–.03) Catholic .12 –.01 –.46 (.03) (–.00) (–.05) Repeat retreatant –.02 .27** .72** (–.01) (.08) (.09) Education (Less than college degree as comparison group) College degree –.08 –.03 –.34 (–.02) (–.01) (–.05) Graduate degree –.14 .20 –.88** (–.04) (.07) (–.12) Occupation (Manual and others as comparison group) .06 .22 –.08 Religious (.00) (.02) (–.01) –.09 .14 .03 Professional (–.01) (.04) (.01) –.18 .33 .03 Managerial (–.02) (.08) (.01) –.60 .06 –.15 Retired (–.08) (–.05) (.02) Religious/Spiritual Activities Before Retreat Prayer .25*** .07 –.20 (.16) (.05) (–.06) Meditation .00 .06** .08 (.00) (.09) (.04) .02 Yoga, Tai Chi, etc. .02 .28*** (.02) (.02) (.14) Religious singing –.04 –.05* –.06 (–.05) (–.08) (–.03) Reading sacred texts .11** .13*** .04 (.13) (.18) (.02) Attend religious services .01 .04 –.10 (.01) (.04) (–.04) N R2 F

643 .08 2.84†

644 .10 3.74†

639 .08 2.99†

nat in g Fas ci

Sol uti on

Aw ay

Be aut y

tat ion Me di

Predictor Variable

Spi ritu alit y

Table 3. Multiple Regression Models of Motivation Factors a

–.67* (–.08) –1.05*** (–.14) .00 (.00) .24 (.03) –.36 (–.04) –.09 (–.01)

–1.3*** (–.21) –.12 (–.02) .01 (.05) –.46** (–.09) .47 (.07) –.14 (–.02)

–.81*** (–.17) .11 (.03) –.01 (–.03) –.17 (–.04) .12 (.02) –.13 (–.03)

–.29 (–.04) –.70* (–.09)

–.36 (–.07) –.55** (–.10)

–.13 (–.03) –.39* (–.09)

–.27 (–.01) .06 (.01) .18 (.02) –1.13** (–.14)

–.25 (–.02) –.10 (–.02) .08 (.01) –.17 (–.03)

.08 (.01) –.05 (–.01) –.16 (–.03) –.29 (–.06)

–.20 (–.06) .09 (.05) .13 (.06) –.05 (–.03) .03 (.02) –.10 (–.04)

–.12 (–.05) .13** (.10) .09 (.06) .01 (.01) .04 (.03) –.01 (–.00)

–.15* (–.08) .14*** (.14) .26*** (.22) –.04 (–.04) –.02 (–.02) –.07 (–.05)

647 .09 3.20†

629 .09 3.06†

645 .14 5.29†

Notes: a The dependent variables are the composite measures of each motivation factor/cluster. Reported are unstandardized and standardized (in parentheses) regression coefficients. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 † Model is significant at the 99.9% level.

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acceptable. Yoga, Tai Chi, or similar practices tended to stand out by playing a particularly large role in the motivation themes of Beauty (b = .28, β = .14, t = 3.34, p < .01) and Fascinating (b = .26, β = .22, t = 5.57, p < .01). However they were not related to Spirituality and Meditation, suggesting that they were less about spirituality or meditation-related experiences for the respondents. The motivation themes of Beauty and Fascination shared a similar positive relationship with Yoga, Tai Chi, or other similar practices and Other reading on religion/spirituality but not with Reading sacred texts. Two activities with high means (Attend religious services with a mean of 5.25, Self-reflection with a mean of 5.13) before going on the retreat were not related to any of the motivation themes. Other predictor variables displayed some distinct patterns. The level of educational attainment was negatively related to most of the motivation themes except Meditation and Spirituality. The pattern appears rather consistent with statistically significant regression coefficients for Graduate degree and the lack of significance for College degree. Whites were negatively related to all the motivation themes, with Solution (b = –1.30, β = –.21, t = –4.99, p < .01), Fascination (b = –.81, β = –.17, t = –4.17, p < .01), and Being away (b = –.67, β = –.08, t = 1.91, p < .10) statistically significant. Males also displayed negative relationships with some of the themes, with Being away (b = –1.05, β = –.14, t = –3.51, p < .01), Beauty (b = –.70, β = –.10, t = –2.39, p < .05), and Spirituality (b = –.26, β = –.08, t = –1.82, p < .10) statistically significant. Occupation failed to be significantly related to any of the themes with the exception of the retired, who displayed a substantially reduced need to be away compared with others (b = –1.13, β = –.14, t = –2.55, p < .05). Repeat retreatants were more attracted by Beauty (b = .72, β = .09, t = 2.12, p < .05) and Meditation (b = .27, β = .08, t = 2.00, p < .05). Retreat Experiences and Their Impact The retreatants were asked how often they prayed, meditated, rested, read, studied, and did nothing during the retreat on a 4-point scale from 1 = not at all through 4 = very often. Pray (μ = 3.51) and Meditate (μ = 3.37) attained the highest mean scores, followed by Read (μ = 3.19) and Rest (μ = 3.13). Study (μ = 2.63) and Do nothing (μ = 2.10) displayed the lowest mean scores. Relatively high correlations existed between Read and Study (ρ = .53, df = 676, p < .001), and Rest and Do nothing (ρ = .43, df = 665, p < .001). To avoid multicollinearity,

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Study and Do nothing were dropped from the activities that were used as independent variables to assess the effect of the practice-oriented retreat at Ignatius House. Other independent variables included the religious/spiritual activities before the retreat and the demographic measures used in Table 3. The retreatants were also asked to rate on a 4-point scale from 1 = not at all helpful to 4 = very helpful the helpfulness of the Spiritual Exercises in assisting them “to know him (Christ) more clearly,” “to love him more dearly,” and “to follow him more nearly.” The three measures were highly correlated (with all the Pearson correlation coefficients close to .8), but they were still used as dependent variables separately. In addition to the personal activities during the retreat, also used as independent variables were retreat type, religious/spiritual activities before the retreat, education, occupation, and demographic measures. The results of regression analysis are reported in Table 4. Also reported in this table are the results of the measure of satisfaction regressed on the same independent variables. As can be expected, the three models with highly correlated dependent variables displayed great similarities. It should be pointed out that similar behaviors such as praying (ρ = .26, df = 683, p < .01), meditation (ρ = .34, df = 674, p < .01), or reading (ρ = .02, df = 674, non-significant) before and during the retreat did not display excessively high correlations. Religious/spiritual activities before the retreat and personal activities during the retreat were used separately as well as simultaneously as independent variables to avoid possible complications caused by potential multicollinearity. However, separate and combined regression analyses yielded similar results. In contrast to the general lack of significance for religious/spiritual activities before the retreat with the exception of Reading sacred texts or Other reading on religion/spirituality, personal activities during the retreat played an important role (see Models 1, 2, and 3 of Table 4). Pray (b = .15, β = .14, t = 3.07, p < .01 for To know him more clearly; b = .14, β = .13, t = 2.89, p < .01 for To love him more dearly; b = .11, β = .11, t = 2.48, p < .05 for To follow him more nearly) and Meditate (b = .12, β = .14, t = 3.04, p < .01 for To know him clearly; b = .13, β = .15, t = 3.29, p < .01 for To love him more dearly; b = .07, β = .09, t = 2.03, p < .05 for To follow him more nearly) during the retreat achieved strong positive relationships with the three dependent variables. Read during retreat was also strongly related to the dependent variable To know

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Table 4. Multiple Regression Models of Helpfulness a and Satisfactionb at the End of Retreat c Independent Variable

(1) To know him more clearly

(2) To love him more dearly

(3) To follow him more nearly

White –.08 (–.05) –.06 (–.03) –.11 (–.08)* Male –.06 (–.04) –.02 (–.02) –.05 (–.04) Age .00 (.02) .00 (.03) –.00 (–.03) Married .02 (.01) –.07 (–.05) .02 (.02) Catholic .21 (.11)** .34 (.19)*** .21 (.12)*** Education (Less than college degree as comparison group) College degree –.05 (–.04) –.05 (–.04) –.06 (–.05) Graduate degree –.12 (–.08) –.14 (–.10)* –.08 (–.06) Occupation (Manual and others as comparison group) Religious .05 (.01) –.01 (–.00) –.02 (–.00) Professional .04 (.02) .04 (.03) .06 (.04) Managerial –.03 (–.01) –.05 (–.03) –.08 (–.05) Retired .07 (.05) .06 (.04) .08 (.06) Retreat Type By a Jesuit –.07 (–.05) –.11 (–.08)* –.09 (–.07) By a Cenacle Sister –.08 (–.04) –.02 (–.01) .01 (.01) Repeat retreatant –.07 (–.04) –.11 (–.07) –.06 (–.04) Personal Retreat Activities Pray .15 (.14)*** .14 (.13)*** .11 (.11)** Meditate .12 (.14)*** .13 (.15)*** .07 (.09)** Rest .06 (.07)* .05 (.07) .06 (.08)* Read .10 (.12)*** .04 (.05) .05 (.07)* Religious/Spiritual Activities Before Retreat Prayer .01 (.01) –.00 (–.00) .02 (.04) Meditation –.01 (–.03) .00 (.00) –.01 (–.02) Yoga, Tai Chi, etc. .02 (.05) .03 (.08)* .02 (.06) Religious singing –.01 (–.02) .01 (.03) .00 (.01) Reading sacred .05 (.15)*** .03 (.08) .05 (.15)*** texts Attend religious –.02 (–.03) .01 (.01) –.01 (–.01) services N R2 F

624 .13 3.64†

622 .14 3.72†

621 .12 3.22†

(4) How satisfied .01 (.01) –.01 (–.01) .00 (.06) .08 (.08)* –.04 (–.03) –.05 (–.05) –.08 (–.08) –.14 (–.05) .01 (.01) .00 (.00) –.02 (–.02) –.16 (–.17)*** –.16 (–.13)*** –.01 (–.01) .06 .03 .03 .02

(.09)* (.05) (.05) (.04)

.00 (.01) –.01 (–.03) .02 (.06) .00 (.01) .02 (.06) .01 (.04) 651 .06 1.71††

Notes: a The first three dependent variables are the Likert measures from the question “How helpful were the talks based on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius in assisting you (1) to know him more clearly, (2) to love him more dearly, and (3) to follow him more nearly?” b Likert scale measure from the question “How satisfied are you with this retreat?” c Reported are unstandardized and standardized (in parentheses) regression coefficients. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 † Model is significant at the 99.9% level. †† Model 4 is significant at the 95% level.

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him more clearly (b = .10, β = .12, t = 2.91, p < .01). It is interesting to note that although religious/spiritual activities before the retreat in general did not seem to affect the retreat outcomes, Reading sacred texts before the retreat appeared almost as important as Read during the retreat for To know him more clearly (b = .05, β = .15, t = 2.99, p < .01) and for To follow him more nearly (b = .05, β = .15, t = 2.86, p < .01). This is a strong indication that, probably more than anything else, a reading of religious/spiritual materials contributed to an intellectual rather than an emotional attachment to God, as indicated by the lack of significance of the variable for the model of To love him more dearly. Being Catholic had a significant positive relationship with the dependent variables (b = .21, β = .11, t = 2.53, p < .05 for To know him more clearly; b = .34, β = .19, t = 4.15, p < .01 for To love him more dearly; b = .21, β = .12, t = 2.76, p < .01 for To follow him more nearly), although Catholics did not display any higher level of satisfaction with the retreat. Consistent with the finding that those with advanced degrees reported less motivation to take the retreat, the education variable displayed a tendency toward negative relationships with the retreat outcome measures although almost all regression coefficients for education failed to be significant. The variable Graduate degree (b = –.14, β = –.10, t = –1.90, p < .10) was significant with the dependent variable To love him more dearly. This finding may strengthen the argument that reading religious/spiritual material contributes to an intellectual rather than an emotional attachment to God. As a matter of fact, most of the retreatants were well educated. Over 40% had at least some graduate education or a graduate degree. Interestingly, better educated retreatants had a greater tendency to attend retreats even though they rated motivational items lower. Retreatants were also asked to describe themselves at the end of the retreat using a 4-point scale from 1 = not at all through 4 = very much in relation to the listed adjectives. The mean score for Alert was 3.33, Tormented 1.13, Efficient 2.51, Irritable 1.11, Rested 3.44, Clear-headed 3.46, Comfortable 3.57, Disorganized 1.19, Attentive 3.30, Positive 3.70, Distracted 1.26, Patient 3.29, Relaxed 3.62, and Competent 3.17. A factor analysis yielded three factors that reflected three differing combinations of two broad conditions: (1) Effective and Not Troubled that included those who scored high on the items that indicated intended outcomes: Alert, Efficient, Rested, Clear-headed,

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Comfortable, Attentive, Positive, Patient, Relaxed, and Competent but scored low on the items that reflected troubled feelings: Tormented, Irritable, Disorganized, and Distracted; (2) Ineffective but Not Troubled that included those who scored low on both the items for intended outcomes and the items for troubled feelings; and (3) Effective but Troubled that included those who scored high on both the items for intended outcomes and troubled feelings. With a K-Mean cluster analysis, the adjectives were then classified into three categories, which were then coded into three mutually-exclusive dummy variables used as additional measures of the effect of the retreat in logistic regression analyses. As the three dependent dummy variables were coded from the same variable that contained these three categories, the comparison group for each dummy variable consisted of the remaining two categories. One open-ended question at the end of the survey asked about whether anything dramatic had happened in the retreatant’s spiritual life as a result of the retreat. The responses from 77% of the respondents who answered the question were classified into eight categories: “feel renewed/love/peace” (18.9%), “gained knowledge about God” (24.2%), “connected with God” (12.1%), “gained insight about relationships with others” (9.5%), “not certain/no” (6.1%), “prayer” (1.0%), and “other” (1.6%). Three dummy variables, Renewed, Closer to God, and Uncertain, were coded also to be used as measures of the effect of the retreat in logistic regression analyses. The comparison group for the dummy variable Renewed consisted of the response of Closer to God, Uncertain, as well as the other responses. Similarly the comparison group for the dummy variable Closer to God included Renewed, Uncertain, and the other responses. The comparison group for Uncertain included Renewed, Closer to God, and the other responses. The results of all logistic analyses are provided in Table 5. Again, personal activities during the retreat played a large role in attaining the intended outcomes. Pray, Meditate, Rest, and Read during the retreat were all strongly related to Effective/Not Troubled, meaning that those who engaged in these activities were likely to have achieved the intended retreat outcomes and were not likely to have troubled feelings at the end of the retreat. Praying during the retreat had the greatest relationship with Effective/Not Troubled (b = .53, Wald = 11.72, odds ratio = 1.70, p .05: Model is significantly different from the null-model. †† Goodness of fit < .05: Model is not significantly different from the null-model.

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by Rest (b = .40, Wald = 13.56, odds ratio = 1.50, p < .01 for Effective/ Not Troubled; b = –.42, Wald = 14.47, odds ratio = .66, p < .01 for Ineffective/Not Troubled), Read (b = .30, Wald = 7.86, odds ratio = 1.35, p < .01 for Effective/Not Troubled; b = –.37, Wald = 11.95, odds ratio = .69, p < .01 for Ineffective/Not Troubled), and Meditate (b = .26, Wald = 4.15, odds ratio = 1.30, p < .05 for Effective/Not Troubled; b = –.30, Wald = 5.54, odds ratio = .74, p < .05 for Ineffective/Not Troubled). Professional occupations were positively related to Effective/Not Troubled (b = .72, Wald = 8.88, odds ratio = 2.06, p < .01) and negatively related to Ineffective/Not Troubled (b = –.66, Wald = 7.26, odds ratio = .52, p < .01). Retired was positively related to Effective/Not Troubled (b = .66, Wald = 5.36, odds ratio = 1.94, p < .05) and negatively related to Ineffective/Not Troubled (b = –.78, Wald = 7.16, odds ratio = .46, p < .01). Whites were negatively related to Effective/Not Troubled (b = –.39, Wald = 2.96, odds ratio = .68, p < .10) but positively related to Ineffective/Not Troubled (b = .47, Wald = 4.11, odds ratio = 1.60, p < .05) when Other reading on religion/spirituality was controlled, but the significance levels diminished, as shown in Table 5, when the variable was replaced with Reading sacred texts. To a substantial degree, the signs of the regression coefficients for the independent variables are exactly the opposite for the two models, and even the regression coefficients and statistical significance levels mirrored each other between the two models. The third model with Effective/Troubled as the dependent variable stood out by itself. The religious/spiritual activities before the retreat, which displayed little impact in the first two models that stood in striking contrast to each other, had more pronounced impact on Effective/Troubled. Attend religious services (b = –.49, Wald = 5.74, odds ratio = .61, p < .05) had a negative relationship with Effective/ Troubled, which indicates that those who attended more religious services tended to feel that the retreat was not very effective but that they were less likely to leave with troubled feelings. It is interesting to note that Yoga, Tai Chi or similar practices (b = .38, Wald = 9.80, odds ratio = 1.46, p < .01) was strongly related to Effective/Troubled, meaning retreatants who engaged in those activities tended to report the retreat brought about those intended outcomes discussed above, but at the same time they were also likely to have troubled feelings at the end of the retreat.

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Findings about Renewed, Closer to God, and Uncertain provided additional information to complement the picture. Repeat retreatants were less likely to feel renewed (b = –.54, Wald = 4.61, odds ratio = .58, p < .05) probably because retreats for them were no longer a novelty, and the retired were also less likely to feel renewed (non-significant) probably because of their age and most (85.7%) of the retired were also repeat retreatants. Religious singing or chanting (b = .15, Wald = 5.72, odds ratio = 1.16, p < .05) before the retreat was positively related to Renewed. The most dramatic difference made by Other reading on religion/ spirituality and Reading sacred texts was that the former had a strong relationship (b = .13, Wald = 5.45, odds ratio = 1.14, p < .05) with Closer to God whereas the latter failed to reach significance. Meditating (b = .39, Wald = 9.08, odds ratio = 1.45, p < .01) during the retreat was related to feeling closer to God. Meditating (b = –.40, Wald = 2.87, odds ratio = .67, p < .10) was also related to being less uncertain. It is interesting that meditation (b = –.13, Wald = 6.24, odds ratio = .88, p < .05) outside of the retreat seemed to be negatively related to Closer to God, in contrast to the positive relationship of meditation during retreat. Other variables that seemed to reduce feelings of uncertainty included Catholic (b = –.83, Wald = 3.37, odds ratio = .43, p < .10) and Religious singing/chanting outside of the retreat (b = –.16, Wald = 3.35, odds ratio = .85, p < .10). Males (b = .63, Wald = 2.80, odds ratio = 1.88, p < .10) had a greater tendency to have feelings of uncertainty. Those whose retreats were directed by Cenacle Sisters (b = 1.25, Wald = 5.53, odds ratio = 3.50, p < .05) were more likely to have feelings of uncertainty. Discussion This study contributes to the scholarly literature primarily by examining what Ignatian spirituality offers those on a spiritual journey. As mentioned earlier in this paper, a practice-oriented spirituality like Ignatian spirituality offers spiritual seekers “activities that deepen their relationship to the sacred” (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 3). The present study investigated an example of lived religion and found that personal retreat activities including prayer, meditation, and studying played a major role in retreatants knowing him (Christ) more clearly, loving him (Christ) more dearly, and following him (Christ) more nearly.

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Personal retreat activities also influenced how satisfied retreatants were with the retreat, whether at the end of the retreat they described themselves as effective/not troubled, ineffective/not troubled, or effective/troubled, and if they felt renewed, closer to God, and/or uncertain. Nearly 20% of the respondents felt renewed, loved, and at peace, and almost 25% of them indicated that they gained knowledge about God as a result of the retreat. While there are many similarities between our study and Ouellette et al. (2005), their study was psychological, focusing more on the restorative benefits of the monastic environment, whereas our study was sociological and focused more on the relationships between background, motivations, and outcomes. Both studies found a high satisfaction level with retreats: theirs found a mean of 4.75 on a 5-point scale, while this study found a mean of 3.82 on a 4-point scale. Theirs found four factors (Spiritual, Beauty, Compatibility, and Being away) in their analysis of the motivation to go on a retreat, while this study found six factors (Spirituality, Meditation, Beauty, Being away, Solution, and Fascinating). The factor analysis of this study strongly indicated that Meditation was a separate factor distinctive from Spirituality and that Fascinating was a separate factor distinctive from Beauty or Being away. There are several major differences between these two studies, besides the fact that the present study included both men and woman, whereas Ouellette et al. (2005) surveyed only men. The first major difference between the studies was that the present study was concerned with the effect of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius on the retreat outcomes. The activities conducted during the retreat had a much more significant effect than the religious/spiritual activities before the retreat on the outcomes. Another difference was that in their study, stress relief (among other items) was an important motivation for going on retreat, while it was not in the present study. As previously mentioned, overall the respondents were very satisfied (μ = 3.82 on a 4-point scale) with the retreat whether it was conducted by a Jesuit, a Cenacle Sister, or a lay person. That said, the data revealed that respondents who participated in retreats led by lay persons (90.9%) were slightly more likely than those who participated in retreats led by the Jesuits (82.4%) or the Cenacle Sisters (81.7%) to indicate that they were very satisfied with the retreat. What might explain this outcome? We have no data that directly answers this question, but we can

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offer one plausible explanation. Retreatants might have just felt more comfortable with lay leaders because almost all of the retreatants were lay people. The lay leaders might have simply just related better to the retreatants. Some retreatants might have expected more from the Jesuits and Cenacle Sisters just because they were clergy and vowedreligious, while some retreatants might have been intimidated in some way because they were clergy and vowed-religious. Again, we want to reiterate that retreatants were very satisfied with their retreat experience no matter who conducted it. It might be worth noting that 34.4% of the retreatants preferred that the Jesuits conduct the retreats, 11.2% preferred a joint effort between the Jesuits, Cenacle Sisters, and lay persons, 8% preferred the Cenacle Sisters, 4.4% preferred lay persons, and 41.9% had no preference. As previously mentioned, nearly 20% of the respondents felt renewed, loved, and at peace, and almost 25% of them indicated that they gained knowledge about God as a result of the retreat. Some people might consider these proportions very low, but one should remember that these proportions are indicative of the responses to an open-ended question that asked whether anything dramatic and important had happened in the retreatant’s spiritual life as a result of the retreat. If this question had been in a closed-ended format with response categories, it is quite possible these proportions and the other ones reported earlier in the paper would have been higher. One other issue might have impacted how people responded to the question. The choice of the word “dramatic” as in whether anything dramatic and important had happened in the retreatant’s spiritual life as a result of the retreat might have been misconstrued by some of the respondents and thus influenced them to omit commenting on less than dramatic happenings. Conclusion A limitation of the present study was that retreatants were asked to report on the outcomes of the retreat during the closing hours of the retreat. Some of the respondents probably did not have sufficient time to reflect on the effect of the retreat on their spiritual lives. More accurate data could be collected on the effect of the retreat on their spiritual lives after some time has passed. To compensate for this concern, we are in the process of conducting a follow-up study of retreatants,

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including those who participated in the present study and those who attended retreats at Ignatius House prior to the present study. Future research will investigate the relationship between religiosity and spirituality and their influence on retreat outcomes. In addition, the effect of retreatants’ self-reported religiosity and spirituality on retreat outcomes will be investigated. References Barry, W. A. (1991). Finding God in all things. Notre Dame, IN: Ave Maria Press. Byron, W. J. (2000). Jesuit Saturdays: Sharing the Ignatian spirit with lay colleagues and friends. Chicago, IL: Loyola Press. Carette, R., & Ouellette, P. (2007). Today Christ knocks on monastery doors, but under what disguise? A profile on guests at the Abbaye Saint-Benoit-Du-Lac. The American Benedictine Review, 58, 3–24. http://www.osb.org/abr/ Cox, H. (2009). The future of faith. New York, NY: HarperOne. Cunningham, L. (2002). Stairways to heaven: Some cautionary thoughts for those who say they are spiritual but not religious. Notre Dame Magazine, 31, 25–29. http:// magazine.nd.edu/ Dillon, M., & Wink, P. (2007). In the course of a lifetime: Tracing religious belief, practice, and change. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Dykstra, C., & Bass, D. C. (2002). A theological understanding of Christian practices. In M. Volf & D. C. Bass (Eds.), Practicing theology: Beliefs and practices in Christian Life (pp. 13–32). Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Erdmans Publishing Company. Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Flory, R. W., & Miller, D. E. (2007). The embodied spirituality of the post-boomer generation. In K. Flanagan & P. C. Jupp (Eds.), A sociology of spirituality (pp. 201– 218). Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Gomez, L. O. (2001). When is religion a mental disorder? The disease of ritual. In D. Jonte-Pace & W. B. Parsons (Eds.), Religion and psychology: Mapping the terrain (pp. 202–226). New York, NY: Routledge. Hansen, R. (2008). The pilgrim: Saint Ignatius of Loyola. In G. W. Traub (Ed.), An Ignatian spirituality reader (pp. 24–44). Chicago, IL: Loyola Press. Hillery, G. (1992). The monastery: A study in freedom, love, and community. Westport, CT: Praeger. Hout, M., & Fischer, C. S. (2002). Why more Americans have no religious preference: Politics and generations. American Sociological Review, 67, 165–190. doi:10.2307/3088891 Jamison, C. (2006). Finding sanctuary: Monastic steps for everyday life. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press. Mariani, P. (2002). Thirty days: On retreat with the exercises of St. Ignatius. New York, NY: Viking Compass. Martin, J. (2010). The Jesuit guide to (almost) everything: A spirituality for real life. New York, NY: HarperOne. McCartin, J. P. (2010). Prayers of the faithful: The shifting spiritual life of American Catholics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McGuire, M. B. (2008). Lived religion: Faith and practice in everyday life. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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Meisel, A. C., & del Mastro, M. L. (1975). The rule of St. Benedict. Garden City, NY: Image Books. Meissner, W. W. (1992). Ignatius of Loyola: The psychology of a saint. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Merton, T. (1978). The monastic journey (Brother P. Hart, Ed.). Garden City, NY: Image Books. Mueller, J. (1996). Faithful listening: Discernment in everyday life. Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward. Nelson, J. M. (2009). Psychology, religion, and spirituality. New York, NY: Springer. Nouwen, H. J. M. (1981). The Genesee diary: Report from a Trappist monastery. Garden City, NY: Image Books. Ouellette, P., Kaplan, R., & Kaplan, S. (2005). The monastery as a restorative environment. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 25, 175–188. doi:10.1016/j.jenvp .2005.06.001 Rahner, K. (1965). Spiritual exercises (K. Baker, Trans.). New York, NY: Herder and Herder. Roof, W. C. (1993). A generation of seekers: The spiritual journeys of the baby boom generation. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers. Roof, W. C. (1999). Spiritual marketplace: Baby boomers and the remaking of American religion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Roof, W. C. (2003). Religion and spirituality: Toward an integrated analysis. In M. Dillon (Ed.), Handbook of the sociology of religion (pp. 137–148). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Smelser, N. J. (2009). The odyssey experience: Physical, social, psychological, and spiritual journeys. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Silf, M. (2002). Going on retreat: A beginner’s guide to the Christian retreat experience. Chicago, IL: Loyola Press. Smith, W. L. (2006). Monastic spirituality beyond the cloister: A preliminary look at lay Cistercians. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 16, 17–39. http:// www.brill.nl/rssr Spilka, B. (2005). Religious practice, ritual, and prayer. In R. F. Paloutzian & C. L. Park (Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality (pp. 365–377). New York, NY: The Guilford Press. Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review, 51, 273–286. doi:10.2307/2095521 Tetlow, E. M. (1987). The spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc. Volf, M. (2002). Theology for a way of life. In M. Volf & D. C. Bass (Eds.), Practicing theology: Beliefs and practices in Christian life (pp. 245–263). Grand Rapids, MI: William Erdmans Publishing Company. Wilkes, P. (1999). Beyond the walls: Monastic wisdom for everyday life. New York, NY: Doubleday. Wuthnow, R. (1998). After heaven: Spirituality in America since the 1950s. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Wuthnow, R. (2005). America and the challenges of religious diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wuthnow, R. (2007). After the baby boomers: How twenty- and thirty-somethings are shaping the future of American religion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zinnbauer, B. J., Pargament, K. I., Cole, B., Rye, M. S., Butter, E. M., Belavich, T. G., & Kadar, J. L. (1997). Religion and spirituality: Unfuzzying the fuzzy. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 36, 549–564. doi:10.2307/1387689

BEYOND MEANING: SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE PARADIGM OF MORAL INTUITIONISM A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION INTRODUCTION: CATALYZING A NEW SCIENCE OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION PART 1: BEYOND MEANING-SYSTEM ANALYSES PART 2: THREE COGNITIVE SYSTEMS OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION: A MORAL INTUITIONIST MODEL G. Michael Leffel* Introduction: Catalyzing a New Science of Spiritual Transformation Within the psychology of religion, the study of spiritual transformation has always been a major area of theory and research (e.g., Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003; Paloutizian & Park, 2005). At the present time, meaning-system analyses dominate the empirical approach to the study of spiritual transformation (e.g., Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, especially Chapter 2). In brief, meaning-system analyses argue that the primary function of spiritual transformation is epistemic, i.e., the formation and transformation of a frame of reference (perhaps “story”) in which to situate one’s life, prioritize one’s beliefs and values, and direct one’s personal strivings. Typically, meaning-system models have emphasized upper- and mid-level personality domains related to * Author Note: G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene University, 3900 Lomaland Drive, San Diego, CA 92130. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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meaning (e.g., purpose, personal identity, life narrative, beliefs, values, personal strivings), more than lower-level constructs related to motivation (e.g., moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues and vices), although in principle they do not exclude them. Thus, by most reviews, the meaning-system approach as presently conceived is not sufficient to capture the dynamics of “moral motivation” as understood in contemporary moral psychology (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Nor is it entirely consistent with the objective of most religious meaning-systems themselves, i.e., the prescription of particular virtues and practices for acquiring those virtues (e.g., Armstrong, 2009). Consequently, in the psychology of religion today, we do not possess a theoretical model of spiritual transformation that synthesizes two of the most important sociomoral functions of religion: moral meaning (what to do and why to do it) and moral motivation and capacity (how to do it). This conceptual disjunction between meaning and motivation is one reason that Emmons and Paloutzian (2003) urged the development of “a new multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm” (p. 396; emphasis in original) that might provide a more comprehensive framework for integrating constructs in the psychology of religion with theory and research in cognate fields. They described their vision of a multilevel interdisciplinary framework this way: “This paradigm recognizes the value of data at multiple levels of analysis while making nonreductive assumptions concerning the value of spiritual and religious phenomena” (p. 395). They suggested such an approach would draw on fields such as evolutionary biology, neuroscience, philosophy, anthropology, and cognitive science so that “developments in the psychology of religion take into account and build upon advances in these related scientific disciplines” (p. 395). In response to this recommendation, this two-article series has two primary objectives: a) to argue the need and rationale for an alternative framework for conceptualizing the nature and processes of spiritual transformation than the presently dominant meaning-system approach, and b) to outline a moral intuitionist approach that derives from but also extends the “Social Intuitionist Model” of morality (Haidt, 2001). Specifically, these articles propose that recent thinking in the “new paradigm of moral personhood” (Frimer & Walker, 2008, p. 333) offers a useful resource for conceptualizing a multi-domain, personalitybased, process model of spiritual transformation. At the heart of the proposed approach is the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) first offered by University of Virginia moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt

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and recently expanded to incorporate contemporary virtue theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). Within the literature on spiritual transformation, while the SIM has been commended as a potentially helpful way to re-conceptualize the nature and processes of spiritual change (Markham, 2007), it has not yet been systematically applied. The central assumption of the proposed moral intuitionist approach, in distinction from but not opposition to meaning-system analyses, is that spiritual transformation is less a “search” (Pargament, 2006, p. 21) for a health- and happiness-enhancing meaning system than it is a “quest” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 219) to embody the virtues that motivate and enable the capacity for “moral sociability” (Casebeer, 2003, p. 121). While the latter objective likely has been implied in the former, virtue formation itself has yet to become a focus for programmatic research in the psychology of spiritual transformation, despite recent calls in the literature to do so (e.g., Worthington & Berry, 2005). In an effort to achieve these aims, the overall objective of Beyond Meaning is to help catalyze a new empirical approach to the study of spiritual transformation that places moral motivation (more than meaning) at the heart of the process. Part 1 first reviews and critiques the dominant meaning-system approach, and it outlines central features and potential contributions of a moral intuitionist approach. Part 2 then outlines a personality-based, process model of spiritual transformation conceptualized within a moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm. The eventual goal of this project is a practical model of intentional spiritual transformation that has implications for character education theory and praxis, emotion-focused psychotherapy, and practical theologies centrally concerned with virtue formation. References Armstrong, K. (2009). The case for God. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Casebeer, W. D. (2003). Natural ethical facts: Evolution, connectionism, and moral cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Emmons, R. A., & Paloutzian, R. F. (2003). The psychology of religion. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 377–402. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145024 Frimer J. A., & Walker, L. J. (2008). Towards a new paradigm of moral personhood. Journal of Moral Education, 37, 333–356. doi:10.1080/03057240802227494 Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814–834. doi:10.1037//0033295X.108.4.814 Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, Fall, 55–66. doi:10.1162/0011526042365555

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Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2007). The moral mind: How five sets of innate intuitions guide the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich (Eds.), The innate mind, Vol. 3 (pp. 367– 392). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2005). Identity as a source of moral motivation. Human Development, 48, 232–256. doi:10.1159/000086859 Hood, R. W., Hill, P. C., & Spilka, B. (2009). The psychology of religion: An empirical approach, 4th Edition. New York, NY: Guilford Press. MacIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Markham, P. N. (2007). Rewired: Exploring religious conversion. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications. Paloutzian, R. F., & Park, C. L. (2005). Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Pargament, K. L. (2006). The meaning of spiritual transformation. In J. D. KossChioino & P. Hefner (Eds.), Spiritual transformation and healing: Anthropological, theological, neuroscientific, and clinical perspectives (pp. 10–24). Lanham, MD: AltmaMira Press. Worthington, E. L., & Berry, J. W. (2005). Virtues, vices, and character education. In W. R. Miller & H. D. Delaney (Eds.), Judeo-Christian perspectives on psychology (pp. 145–164). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

BEYOND MEANING: SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE PARADIGM OF MORAL INTUITIONISM A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION PART 1: BEYOND MEANING-SYSTEM ANALYSES G. Michael Leffel* Abstract This article highlights a conversation at the interface of the psychology of spiritual transformation (cf. Paloutzian & Park, 2005) and the emerging paradigm of moral intuitionism in contemporary moral psychology (Shweder & Haidt, 1993). It argues the need and rationale for an alternative framework for conceptualizing the nature and processes of spiritual transformation than the presently dominant meaning-system approach (e.g., Paloutzian, 2005), and it outlines central features and potential contributions of a moral intuitionist model. At the heart of the proposed approach is the “Social Intuitionist Model” (SIM) of moral functioning first offered by moral psychologist Haidt (2001) and recently expanded to encompass contemporary virtue theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). The article first proposes an alternative social functionalist definition that re-conceptualizes spiritual transformation as intentional expansion of one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability, understood primarily in terms of Erikson’s (1964) construct generative care. Second, it critiques the prevailing meaning-system approach, offering five conceptual and empirical reasons to doubt the sufficiency of high-level meaning to motivate moral sociability. Third, it introduces a moral intuitionist model of spiritual transformation that synthesizes three sociomoral functions (dimensions of moral functioning) and corresponding cognitive systems (types of knowledge) that are hypothesized in spiritual transformation: a) an Intuitive System (serving the function referred to as motivation and capacity); b) a Reasoning System (responsible for moral direction); and c) a third system called Ideological Narrative (responsible for existential meaning). This model is further detailed in Part 2 of this article series. Keywords: Spiritual transformation, multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm, meaningsystem analyses, moral intuitionism, Social Intuitionist Model, moral sociability

* Author Note: G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene University, 3900 Lomaland Drive, San Diego, CA 92130. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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g. michael leffel True spirituality gives attention to the moral dimension in our lives. It is false thinking then to separate morality from spirituality; there can be no moral development without a spirituality to sustain it and deepen it, and a spirituality divorced from morality only fosters the illusion of righteousness. —N. Symington, Emotion and Spirit, p. 48 If anything is going to answer to the name moral psychology, it ought to be an inquiry into how the formations (and transformations) of the psyche help one to lead a good life in a world with others. —J. Lear, Radical Hope, p. 104 To really understand how human morality works . . . it may be advisable to shift attention away from the study of moral reasoning and toward the study of intuitive and emotional processes. —J. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, p. 825

In recent years, the relationship between religion and morality has received a great deal of popular and scientific attention, particularly the role that religion may play in promoting or obstructing the development of prosociality. For example, Norenzayan & Shariff (2008) concluded their review of the literature on the origin and evolution of religious prosociality with the recommendation that: “the relation between religious prosociality and moral intuitions and reasoning is ripe for further investigation” (p. 62). Likewise, in their recent review of moral psychology, Haidt & Kesebir (2010) proposed that in the years to come “the psychology of religion should become an important part of the psychology of morality” (p. 821). While this recommendation very well may be a constructive direction for future theory and research, Beyond Meaning argues the merits of an inverse strategy: The psychology of morality should become an important part of the psychology of religion. Why so? For one, if recent evolutionary (Boyer, 2001) and game theoretic (Wright, 2009) analyses of religious progress are even partially on target in suggesting that the “moralizing big gods” of religion “evolve” as the human beings who interpret their Gods make moral progress, then it would seem that the mechanisms of moral development should be a fundamental focus for the psychology of religion. For example, Wright’s recent book The Evolution of God (2009) provided a number of illustrations of how evolution of the Godconcept in the three Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity,

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and Islam seems to follow from “non-zero-sum” moral progress made by the people. Second, and more germane to the present project, there is reason to believe that the emerging new paradigm of moral intuitionism (see Shweder & Haidt, 1993 for an overview) could offer an important new theoretical tool for modeling the nature and processes of spiritual transformation. Specifically, as outlined in this article and further detailed in Part 2, this emerging paradigm promises to offer the psychology of spiritual transformation “a new multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm” (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003, p. 396; emphasis in original) that could integrate constructs historically emphasized in the psychology of religion (related to meaning) with new constructs highlighted in intuitionist models (related to motivation). In an effort to achieve that aim, the current article draws on some of the most promising empirical and theoretical trends in moral psychology today to articulate: a) the need and rationale for an alternative framework for conceptualizing the nature and processes of spiritual transformation than the presently dominant “meaning-system” approach (Paloutzian, 2005), and b) a moral intuitionist approach that derives from the “Social Intuitionist Model” of morality (SIM: Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). The present article addresses a central question in spiritual transformation theory: What is the goal of spiritual transformation? That is, what is the nature or “ultimate concern” (Emmons, 1999) of spiritual transformation? The article begins by framing the central issue under discussion, re-conceptualizing the nature and processes of spiritual transformation within a moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm. Second, it offers a new construct, moral sociability, and a revised definition of spiritual transformation that follows from this construct. Next, as further background for the proposed model, the third section reviews recent developments in the “new paradigm of moral personhood” (Frimer & Walker, 2008, p. 333), particularly in social intuitionist theory, in order to offer a new direction for theory and research in the psychology of spiritual transformation. In light of these trends, a fourth section then provides a more extended critique of the prevailing meaning-system approach that focuses on its conceptually “thin” theory of moral motivation (i.e., factors hypothesized to motivate prosociality and diminish selfishness). Five conceptual limitations of the meaning-system approach are offered, including empirical reasons to doubt the sufficiency of high-level meaning to motivate prosocial action. Finally, a fifth section sketches a moral intuitionist model of spiritual transformation to be described more systematically

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in the second article. Part 2 then outlines a personality-based, process model of spiritual transformation that details specific processes and empirical hypotheses for future theoretical development and research. The overall objective of Beyond Meaning is to suggest how this moral intuitionist and social functionalist framework could be translated into a systematic program of empirical research. But, first consider why the psychology of spiritual transformation might be interested in a moral intuitionist approach. Framing the Issue: Re-Conceptualizing the Nature of Spiritual Transformation Recently, scholars in the psychology of religion have joined personality and social psychology (e.g., Bauer & McAdams, 2004), moral philosophy (e.g., MacIntyre, 1999), religious ethics (e.g., Herdt, 2008), and moral psychology (e.g., Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009) in the interdisciplinary effort to define the “goods” that constitute and promote “a good life in the world with others” (Lear’s epigraph above). Emmons (1999) has referred to this renewed interest in subjective and psychological well-being as “the psychology of ultimate concerns.” With this designation, Emmons follows existential theologian Paul Tillich (1963) in suggesting that religion, in its broadest sense, is the pursuit of an “ultimate concern.” Tillich defined faith as the state of being focused on concerns that have a sense of urgency unparalleled by other motivations: “the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of our life” (p. 4). Among the old issues resurrected in this new debate is the question of moral telos: What is the ultimate goal of a good (“flourishing”) life, and what is the role of religion in this pursuit? By various reviews, in the psychology of religion today, the “need for meaning” is regarded as a central if not the ultimate concern to which human beings aspire, a good “that religion is uniquely capable of helping to provide” (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, p. 12). A definition of religion representative of the meaning-system approach is offered by Baumeister (1991): Religion deals with the highest levels of meaning . . . it can interpret each life or each event in a context that runs from the beginning of time to future eternity. Religion is thus uniquely capable of offering high-level meaning to human life. (p. 205; emphasis added)


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Consistent with this definition, meaning-system analyses argue that the central function of religion is global meaning formation and transformation; that is, the acquisition and development of a frame of reference (“story”) in which to situate one’s life, to order one’s beliefs and values, and to give direction to one’s personal strivings. In the most recent edition of their textbook on the psychology of religion, Hood et al. (2009) offer three reasons that meaning is believed to be so fundamental to religion, and they liken religious conversion or spiritual transformation to a “search” for these three inter-related goods: a) the cognitive search for meaning (the epistemic functional need to know and experience transcendent truth); b) the motivational search for meaning (the intrapsychic functional need for mastery and for control of life’s ambiguities); and c) the social embeddedness of meaning (the social functional need for relationships and moral community). At the present time, meaning-system analyses dominate the empirical study of spiritual transformation or religious conversion (see Hill, 2002; Paloutizian & Park, 2005 for examples). As described below, meaning-system analyses argue that the central function of religion is the provision of “high-level meaning,” and that “the thing that undergoes transformation in a religious conversion is the person’s meaning system” (Paloutzian, 2005, p. 333). In these articles, as in Paloutizian’s (2005) discussion of meaning-system research, the terms “religious conversion” and “spiritual transformation” are considered “functionally equivalent” (p. 333). Typically, meaning-system analyses have emphasized global- and mid-level personality constructs related to meaning (e.g., narrative identity, life purpose, beliefs, values, personal strivings) more than lower-level constructs related to motivation (e.g., moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues and vices), although in principle they do not exclude them (cf. Park, 2005). The objective of this article, however, is to offer arguments against the primacy of meaning as the central locus of spiritual change and to propose a theoretical strategy for development of an alternative approach. Thus, the importance of the question: If not primarily about meaning, how else could we conceptualize the ultimate concern of spiritual transformation? This section introduces two general arguments for re-considering the central telos (aim, objective) of spiritual transformation from the perspective of a social functionalist approach. The first argument derives from Haidt and Kesebir’s (2010) recent discussion of different types of functionalism, and the second argument from historian of religion Armstrong’s (2009) discussion of the moral core of religious meaning. The next section then outlines a social

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functionalist construct and definition of spiritual transformation that follows from these two arguments. Which Functionalism and Why? A first way to understand the logic of the meaning-system approach is to consider the type of functionalism favored in these models. Haidt & Kesebir (2010) outlined three kinds of functionalism that can be observed in psychology generally (p. 808), and in the psychology of religion (also see Graham & Haidt, 2010). They argued that a first step in any functionalist analysis is to specify the larger structure within which a component and its effects are implicated. In epistemic functionalism the larger structure is a person’s “representation” of the world and one’s place in it. Applied in the psychology of religion, epistemic functionalism thus suggests that the central objective of religion is to improve the accuracy and completeness of one’s knowledge of the Sacred and how to approach the Sacred. Corresponding to this emphasis, theory and research in the psychology of spiritual transformation has emphasized this epistemic function, and this can be seen in the favored definitions and research programs in the psychology of religion. For example, this epistemic focus is apparent in the literature on “intrinsic” religiosity (focusing on individual practices and beliefs) versus “extrinsic” religiosity (encompassing social aspects such as collective rituals). Another example is the research on religiosity as “quest” (Batson, Denton, & Vollmecke, 2008) in which religious belief is sometimes characterized as a personal existential struggle often marked by disengagement from the community in order to find one’s own understanding of the sacred. While these meaning-related approaches certainly do not deny the importance of other aspects of religiosity, such as communal worship and ritual practices, they do seem to suggest that meaning comes first and is the central function of the practices. Thus, the primary goal of a meaning-system analysis is to explain how “global meaning” (Park, 2005, p. 299) is formed and transformed across the life course and how “meaning making” (p. 298) works to restore global life meaning when it has been disrupted or violated by some unpleasant life event. In brief, an epistemic functionalist approach suggests (or at least implies) that beliefs, rituals, and other aspects of religious practice are best understood as means (methods) for finding meaning (perhaps “truth”).


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In intrapsychic functionalism, the larger structure is the psyche, and religion serves the function of procuring intra-personal “goods” such as minimizing intrapsychic conflict or maintaining positive moods or self-esteem (Cialdini et al., 1987; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Many models in the psychology of religion take this approach, attempting to explain how a meaning system, once formed, functions to provide personal benefits such as health- and happiness-enhancement. For example, belief in God has been studied as a way to experience a sense of security and affiliation with God, who may serve as a substitute or “compensatory” attachment figure (Kirkpatrick, 1998). Belief in God, or in an afterlife, has also been studied for other palliative effects, for example, as a way to explain injustices in this world or to understand existential fears about death and meaninglessness (e.g., Kay et al., 2008; Jonas & Fischer, 2006). Other intrapsychic functionalist research has focused on the religion-health connection, such as studies that documented the reciprocal relationships between religion and coping (e.g., Pargament, Ano, & Wachholtz, 2005), stress and immune system functioning (e.g., Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001), and mental health and psychopathology (e.g., Miller & Kelley, 2005). In brief, intrapsychic functionalists suggest that beliefs, rituals, and other aspects of religious practice are best understood as means to achieve some ideal of subjective wellbeing, and (perhaps) also for finding meaning. Third, in a social functionalist approach, the larger structure is the social agent embedded in a still larger social order, and religion serves the function of strengthening the moral community (e.g., Dunbar, 1996). Consistent with this approach, Haidt and Kesebir (2010) recently offered this social functionalist definition of morality: “Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanism that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (p. 800). Haidt suggested that religion should also be studied as a complex system with many social functions, one of which is to “bind people together into cooperative communities organized around deities” (Graham & Haidt, 2010, p. 140). In this view, meaning and beliefs about God are important but primarily as they serve to strengthen moral bonds in one’s family, the religious community, and in the larger world. In their article, Graham and Haidt summarized a variety of empirical findings that collectively suggested that while religious meaning systems do serve epistemic and intrapsychic

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functions, most of the well-being benefits of religion appear to come from participation in a religious congregation (i.e., the social functionalist hypothesis). For example, measures of social support have been found to consistently mediate the relationship between religiosity and well-being (Salsman, Brown, Brechting, & Carlson, 2005). Additionally, studies of “social capital,” measured by self-reported trust of those in the immediate community, such as neighbors, co-workers, fellow church congregants, etc., have demonstrated that it positively predicted amounts of both religious and secular charitable giving (Wang & Graddy, 2008). In brief, the social functionalist approach to religion suggests that beliefs, rituals, and other aspects of religious practice are best understood as means to create moral community and are not simply ways to understand the Sacred or to procure personal benefits. What’s the “Meaning” of Religious Meaning? Historian of religion Armstrong (2009) seems to favor the third approach, and in her recent book The Case for God argues for a return to and greater appreciation of the social functionalist understanding of spiritual transformation (although she did not use the language of functionalism). She began by observing that a strange irony and surprising paradox surrounds the study of religion. The irony is that religious meaning systems, ostensibly about the Sacred and one’s relation to the Sacred, turn out to be, upon further review, far less about the Sacred Other and far more about the nature of inter-human moral interactions than the seeker may have expected (see Chapters 1 and 5). In particular, she noted that most religious meaning systems are fundamentally concerned to teach believers, primarily through narratives, exemplars, and other practices, how to transform less noble and lower (perhaps innate) motives and vices into higher motives and virtues. Armstrong observed that moral philosophers, comparative religious mythologists, and theologians from diverse wisdom traditions seem to express near-unanimous agreement that mature religion contains a moral core at the heart of its teachings. These teachings prescribe a set of precepts and practices that promise to elevate the devotee to a higher plane of moral consciousness and action (also see Smith, 1992). They consist not only of prohibitions against immoral (vice-related) actions but also offer prescriptions for moral relationships and practices for the development of virtues required for such relationships. In brief, Armstrong argued that religious meaning has far more to do with human moral interac-


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tions than it does with doctrinal knowledge about the Sacred or how to attain some experiential sense of the Sacred. This is where the surprising paradox of religious meaning becomes evident. As Armstrong suggested, believers begin to discover that: The [epistemic] truths of religion are accessible only when you are prepared to get rid of the selfishness, greed, and self-preoccupation that, perhaps inevitably, are ingrained in our thoughts and behavior but are also the source of so much of our pain. (2009, p. 20)

In other words, epistemic knowledge follows from social functional moral progress, not (necessarily) the other way around. For example, one comes to discover the truth of the profound love of God for all the world as one more fully experiences love for and from human others, and also from the profound difficulty of attempting to love “the stranger” as oneself (Riceour, 1992). Thus, Armstrong noted that in many pre-modern religious traditions, dogmatic “knowledge” (scientia) about the Sacred and practical “wisdom” (sapientia) about moral relationships could not be bifurcated in the manner that we sometimes observe today; that is, presumed distinctions between morality, spirituality, and religion (see Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, especially Chapter 1). She suggested that religion, at least before the Enlightenment, was not primarily something that people believed in and reasoned about but rather something they did. It was a practice-based craft or “way” which guided persons in the formation and transformation of “new capacities of mind and heart” (p. xiii), where these capacities were understood as necessary means for living a good life in a world with others. Thus, in pre-Enlightenment religion, moral skill-making was the ultimate concern of most religious meaning systems, not conceptual knowledge that promised dogmatic clarity about God or how to cope with life’s ambiguities and absurdities (e.g., see Mitchell, 1989 on the apophatic wisdom of the book of Job). To summarize, the suggestion here is that meaning-system models have tended to favor the epistemic and intrapsychic functionalist definitions of religion to the relative exclusion of the social functionalist perspective. A social functionalist approach, in distinction from but not necessarily in opposition to current meaning-system accounts, would focus less on the formation and transformation of high-level meaning per se, and it would place greater emphasis on the development of what we might refer to as moral sociability. A clear definition of the construct of moral sociability is therefore needed.

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g. michael leffel Moral Sociability as Ultimate Concern of Spiritual Transformation

Various ideas in moral philosophy, personality-social psychology, and social cognitive neuroscience suggest a conceptual convergence around a construct that moral philosopher Casebeer (2003) has referred to as “moral sociability” (p. 121). This section selectively reviews several constructs related to moral sociability and then offers a more precise definition of moral sociability and spiritual transformation in terms of Erik Erikson’s (1964) concept of generative care. The Construct of Moral Sociability: A Selective Review of Related Concepts Casebeer (2003) defined moral sociability as “both our basic desire to be with other human beings and our ability to skillfully infer what others are thinking so as to engage in social cooperative action” (p. 121). He suggested that the former refers to our primal and basic wish to be with others and not merely because their presence is instrumental to the satisfaction of our functional needs. The latter refers to our ability to theorize about other persons’ minds in order to build cooperative, mutually satisfying relationships with one another (i.e., a theory of mind). Likewise, Wright’s (2009) recent account of the evolution of religion offered the term non-zero-sum as a related idea that refers to the moral capacity to engage in win-win, interdependent, and cooperative relationships with other persons, both ingroup and outgroup others. He argued that this human moral capacity is the causal mechanism responsible for the (perceived) moral growth of the God of the Abrahamic religions. Each of these terms is similar to Goleman’s (1996) construct emotional intelligence. Goleman has argued that self-awareness and empathy (along with self-mastery and social skills) are moral capacities essential for flourishing relationships and family life, as well as success in work and leadership. Likewise, these three constructs overlap with Emmon’s conception of spiritual intelligence (1999, especially Chapter 8), defined as “competencies and abilities” (p. 177) that facilitate adaptive problem solving in the social world. Notably, included on Emmons’ list of the “core components of spiritual intelligence” is “the capacity to be virtuous” (p. 164). Several other constructs are even closer in meaning to moral sociability as envisioned in this social functionalist approach. Mindsight


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is the core construct in Siegel’s (2010) interpersonal neurobiology approach to the science of personal transformation. He argued that moral relatedness requires the capacity for both intra- and inter-personal attunement, understood as the ability to be attentive in hereand-now interactions with others, and to regulate the shape and flow of our emotional exchanges with others. He proposed that “feeling felt” by another person is the subjective experience of attuned interpersonal exchanges, and it is likely the emotional environment in which new skills and capacities are developed (also see Stern, 2004). Siegel regards mindsight as a learnable skill that allows us to see into the internal workings of our own minds, and as “the basic skill that underlies everything we mean when we speak of having social and emotional intelligence” (p. xii). He argued that the cultivation of this practical moral capacity is at the heart of nearly all religious traditions, and it is central to the process of spiritual transformation (see his discussion of “transpiration” on pp. 255–261). Like the concept of mindsight, Westen (1991) offered the construct emotional investment capacity as the central telos of moral formation. He defined emotional investment as: “a capacity to endow shared goals with personal significance such that one’s emotional state becomes a partial function of the relative attainment or nonattainment of those goals” (p. 437). In another place, he defined it as “the ability to care about another person for more than what that person can give or what desires that person can gratify” (Westen, Gabbard, & Blagov, 2006, p. 351). In other words, to emotionally invest in another person means to care about another person’s goals, or goals shared with another, in such a way that the attainment of those goals becomes a motivating end; unsatisfactory attainment leads to negative affect like sadness, and relative success leads to positive affect such as joy. Westen’s concept of emotional investment posited the central importance of a sociomoral developmental process involving a shift away from needgratifying relational representations to more mature representations of others that are based on respect and concern for the well-being of others. Westen’s approach emphasizes that what often accounts for the lack of caring is not the absence of explicit-declarative (conceptual, propositional) knowledge about the right values or rules of interaction (e.g., “I should be empathic”); rather, it is often that a person is diminished in his or her capacity to emotionally invest in the feelings, rights, and interests of others due to deficits in the necessary

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procedural (“how-to”) skills. In other words, the dilemma is about motivation and capacity (how to do it), not high-level meaning (what to do or why to do it). Finally, virtue ethicist MacIntyre (1999) referred to (something like) mindsight and emotional investment with his term “independent practical reasoning” (p. 99). Like Siegel and Westen, he argued that such a capacity enables persons to care for one another in a complex social world. But, MacIntyre also followed the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition in suggesting that human flourishing depends upon the development of a complex capacity for phronesis (i.e., practical “howto” wisdom). And, like Erikson’s position reviewed below, MacIntyre argued that this higher-order human capacity is both motivated and enabled by virtues, understood as “wise emotions” of character (Sherman, 2000, p. 319). To summarize, what these concepts seem to share in common is some understanding of moral sociability as an emergent capacity for moral relatedness, whereby one person acts to facilitate the good of another and where that good is understood as the other’s unrealized potential. Therefore, it is not just sociability (e.g., cooperation) but moral sociability (i.e., cooperation aimed at development of the other’s potential) that these constructs are seeking to capture. However, what these concepts do not clarify is the central place of virtues in “energizing” (the issue of motivation) and “enabling” (the issue of capacity) moral sociability. Moreover, none of these constructs approaches the kind and quality of moral interaction to which Erikson (1964) gave the name generative care. Therefore, in the discussion below, the construct generative care is offered as a more precise conception of moral sociability, and as an ultimate concern of spiritual transformation. Generative Care as Model of Moral Sociability Recent ethical analyses of generativity posit that Erikson’s theory of moral formation offers a more relational (less stage- and age-related) understanding of caring and virtue formation than subsequent theory and research have yet to capture (Browning, 2006; Leffel, 2008). In particular, in his article entitled “The Golden Rule in Light of New Insight” (Coles, 2000) Erikson offered a normative principle for mature moral relationships that might be referred to as mutual strengthsdevelopment (pp. 454–456):


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I would call mutuality a relationship in which partners depend on each other for the development of their respective strengths . . . Understood this way, the [Golden] Rule would say that it is best to do to another what will strengthen you even as it will strengthen him—that is, what will develop his best potentials even as it develops your own.

In his commentary on this passage, Erikson suggested two things: a) generative caring (irrespective of age) should be understood, fundamentally, as the motivation and capacity to invest in the strengthsdevelopment of others, and b) virtues are biologically-based but socially-constructed capacities which emerge (or not) in the life course that facilitate such caring (Erikson’s model of phase-specific psychosocial virtues). Based on Erikson’s interpretation of generativity, and in light of Westen’s idea of emotional investment, the following definition of generative care has been proposed: Generative care is the motivation and capacity to emotionally invest in the strengths-development of others (Leffel, 2008, p. 174). Accordingly, in Erikson’s model of relational morality, what Browning (1987) referred to as “generative mutuality” (p. 228), each person in the relationship is obligated (hence, the morality of the model) to participate in the creation of a relational environment (social ecology) where one another’s strengths are cultivated, not simply a place where subjective happiness is sought. In this model of morality, caring is the master skill that is required to craft such an environment. Second, caring interactions depend upon and necessarily recruit the virtues that have accrued in the course of each partner’s development, and they are the principal means by which persons build each other’s strengths (i.e., through trusting, empathic, compassionate, forgiving, etc. interactions). Thus the significance of the question: Which virtues, and why? However, despite impressive advances in generativity theory and research in recent years (de St. Aubin, McAdams, & Kim, 2004), researchers have yet to articulate and empirically document a set of virtues that may be constitutive of and instrumental to generative care. To this end, Part 2 in this article series proposes a specific model of virtues that current theory and research suggests (but has not yet demonstrated) may prove fundamental to a flourishing capacity for moral sociability; that is, an emergent capacity for generative care. To summarize, the proposal here is to adopt the construct moral sociability as a central goal (outcome variable) of spiritual transformation. Conceptualized as generative care, moral sociability is not simply

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about mindful cooperation with others but has a more specific moral telos: to emotionally invest in and “take care of ” the strengths-development of others (Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986, p. 50). Likewise, conceived in this manner, moral sociability has a moral objective that extends beyond the mere enhancement of happiness for self and others (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005). Re-Defining Spiritual Transformation in View of Moral Sociability Spiritual transformation conceptualized in a moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm thus suggests the need for a revised definition, one less concerned with meaning formation (i.e., what to do and why to do it) and more concerned with moral motivation and capacity (i.e., how to do it). The following working definition is proposed: Spiritual transformation encompasses intentional movement toward a moral ideal, aimed primarily at the expansion of one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability, as envisioned within some meaning system, and whether or not that meaning system is explicitly religious.

While a more complete description of the advantages of this definition must await future conversations, the following preliminary commentary is offered. By this definition, spiritual transformation is not primarily: a) a quest to “know” or subjectively “experience” the Sacred (epistemic function), or b) a way to “cope” and enhance happiness and wellbeing (intrapsychic function), or c) simply an evolved technology for creating a less selfish moral community (Haidt’s social functionalist definition). Rather, it is conceived as intentional, practice-based movement toward a narrative-informed moral ideal that equips persons to become increasingly capable of enacting the moral sociability that most (if not all) religious meaning systems prescribe (also see Needleman’s, 2007 discussion of intermediate morality). Envisioned in this definition, spiritual practices would emphasize three central objectives: a) developing one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability; b) strengthening the virtues that energize and enable moral sociability, and diminishing the vices that obstruct or inhibit enactment of the virtues; and c) practicing virtue mimesis as a central causal mechanism of virtue acquisition; that is, intentionally imitating virtuous persons (see Zagzebski’s, 2004 exemplarity virtue theory). Note that in this approach, meaning is still important, but it is secondary to the


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task of expanding one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability (generative care) itself. Further, a central assumption of this approach, perhaps in distinction to meaning-system models, is that meaning formation and moral motivation are not the same processes, and they likely require different practices. The following section, as further background for the moral intuitionist model introduced below and detailed in Part 2, reviews four recent trends in contemporary moral psychology that suggest a new trajectory for a social functionalist approach to spiritual transformation, one that takes moral sociability (more than meaning) as its ultimate concern. Recent Trends in Moral Psychology And Why They Matter for Spiritual Transformation The study of morality is not what it used to be (see Blasi, 2009; SinnottArmstrong, 2008 for overviews). By most reviews, the field is undergoing a multi-disciplinary renaissance in an intellectual climate of “consilience” (Wilson, 1998) that Haidt (2007; 2008) refers to as the “new synthesis” in moral psychology. But moral psychology is also a discipline between conceptual paradigms. While it is now generally recognized that Kohlberg’s Rationalist moral psychology has proved inadequate for bridging the “judgment-action gap” (roughly, why persons do not act congruently with their stated moral principles), the construction and implementation of a “new paradigm of moral personhood” (Frimer & Walker, 2008) remains a work in progress. Since moral intuitionism and the SIM are relatively new developments in psychology, and have only recently drawn the attention of moral philosophers (e.g., Flanagan, 2007) and theological ethicists (e.g., Browning, 2010), this section reviews four recent developments in moral psychology with an eye for what they might contribute to spiritual transformation. Each of these developments is then integrated into the moral intuitionist model introduced later in the article and elaborated in Part 2. The Centrality of Moral Motivation Moral psychology through the 1970s focused on the study of moral judgment and the roles played by factors such as moral values and other “cold” cognitive abilities (Kohlberg’s “stages” of reasoning) that were believed important for motivating moral choice and action (e.g., Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). In general, the Rationalist approach followed

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the Kantian-Kohlbergian dictum that assumes good moral judgment and behavior are achieved primarily through the process of conscious, language-based reasoning and reflection (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). However, in a series of articles over the past ten years, Haidt (2001, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) and others have argued that recent empirical research no longer unequivocally supports this assumption. In view of these critiques, several important conceptual shifts have begun to emerge in moral psychology. A first shift is an increased recognition that moral motivation processes must play a more central role in theories of moral functioning (Blasi, 2001; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Shulman, 2002). Moral motivation is a relatively new area of theory and research that addresses the question of what personality factors energize or provide “sources of moral motivation” (Shulman, 2002, p. 499) for prosocial action. This literature endeavors to describe the nature and functioning of distinct but inter-related component processes (domains) of motivation, which collectively enable persons to act congruently with their self-endorsed moral values and beliefs (Batson et al., 1997). In recent theorizing, the focus has moved away from moral meaning and reasoning to encompass questions about the complex relationships among other domains, including moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues and vices, moral identity, and moral willpower (see Bergman, 2002; Frimer & Walker, 2008 for reviews). In particular, recent thinking in the “positive psychology of morality” (Haidt, 2003a) gives greater priority to the role of positive and moral emotions in motivating prosocial action (e.g., Emmons & McCullough, 2004; Fredrickson, 2004; Keltner, 2009). New empirical research has begun to document that certain “emotions/virtues” (Emmons & McNamara, 2006, p. 11), such as gratitude, function as “moral motives” for prosocial action (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larsen, 2001, p. 252). The goal of this new direction in theory and research is a clearer understanding of these multiple motivational sources, and the implications they hold for practices of moral formation and character education (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Rimm-Kaufman, 2008). In particular, one new topic in moral motivation is an interpersonal phenomenon referred to as prorelationship motivation (Finkel & Rusbult, 2008). Since the moral intuitionist model described in Part 2 may be seen as a model of prorelationship motivation (i.e., variables that “energize” and “enable” moral action), a brief description of this idea is in order. Finkel and Rusbult define prorelationship motivation as


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“behavioral preferences that are driven by the desire to benefit one’s relationship or partner, despite the fact that enacting such behavior conflicts with one’s immediate, gut-level behavioral impulses” (2008, p. 547); for example, Haidt’s moral intuitions. The desire to forgive provides an example of prorelationship motivation. Forgiveness becomes relevant in a relationship when, for example, one partner betrays the trust of the other, betrayal defined as “the perceived violation by a partner of an implicit or explicit relationship-relevant norm” (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002, p. 957). Because the betrayed partner likely experiences such norm violations as moral transgressions, immediate intuitions for retaliation and revenge are activated. Thus, to move beyond immediate, intuitive retaliatory impulses, a capacity for forgiveness is required, defined as “the tendency to forgo vengeance and other destructive patterns of interactions, instead behaving toward the perpetrator in a positive and constructive manner” (Finkel et al., 2002, p. 958). Prorelationship motivation theory predicts that while betrayal naturally leads to retaliatory impulses (the intuition to enact revenge), prorelationship motivational factors can override these impulses in favor of forgiving intuitions and responses. Thus, an important question for the psychology of spiritual transformation is this: Do we have an account of spiritual transformation that models those processes and corresponding practices that might promote growth in prorelationship motivation? The suggestion here is that moral intuitionism offers one conceptual approach that could move us in that direction. “Two-System Morality” Second, deriving from the literature on dual-process models of information processing, another development in moral psychology argues that there are two kinds of moral cognition—moral intuition and moral reasoning—and that each system is important in moral formation. Haidt and Kesebir (2010) recently suggested that the “modal view” in moral psychology today is that: “reasoning and intuition both matter, but that intuition matters more” (p. 18). They refer to this assumption as the principle of “intuitive primacy (but not dictatorship)” (p. 801). This principle elsewhere is referred to as “two-system morality” (Gilovich, Keltner, & Nisbett, 2006, p. 562) or “multiplex” morality (Appiah, 2008, p. 145). Since the proposed model of spiritual

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transformation builds on the principle of intuitive primacy, further clarification is in order. It is now widely accepted in social and cognitive psychology that there are two systems involved in cognitive functioning, higher or “cold cognitive” and lower or “hot cognitive” (affect-laden) processes, and these two systems are often at work when a person makes judgments or solves problems. Because these two systems a) may run in parallel with each other, b) can be dissociated from one another, and c) likely have different biological bases, these models are usually called dual process models (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Dual-process explanations of behavior posit that the “affective” and “cognitive” (Zajonc, 1980) or “hot” and “cool” (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) systems are to some extent separate systems and that this dual system architecture can be explained in evolutionary terms. It is important to note, however, that the contrast between these two systems is not primarily between “cognition” and “emotion,” rather between two cognitive processes, one of which usually has an affective component (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, pp. 800–802). Westen (1998) summarized the significance of this view when he suggested: “nothing guarantees that an individual’s wishes, fears, values, or goals will be in harmony, because these motives, or components of them, may be processed by relatively independent neural circuits” (p. 345). Specifically, what are these two systems? Haidt (2001) referred to moral intuition as fast, automatic, and usually affect-laden (“hot”) processes in which an evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike about the actions or character of a person appears in consciousness without any awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. Moral reasoning, in contrast, is a controlled and “cooler” (less affective) process; it is conscious mental activity that consists of manipulating information about people and their actions in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. Thus, in the moral intuitionist paradigm: “moral intuition is a kind of cognition, but it is not a kind of reasoning” (p. 814). There is now growing empirical evidence that moral judgment and moral motivation work like other kinds of cognitive processes, in which most of the action lies in the “hot” automatic, affect-laden system (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010 for a summary of 10 empirical literatures that support the idea of intuitive primacy). For example, in terms of moral judgment, research has demonstrated that many morally relevant behaviors, such as altruism, racism, or rudeness, can be caused by automatic processes that


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are triggered by subtle environmental cues of which people have little or no awareness (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). In terms of moral motivation, recent research has revealed that nonconscious activation of desired behavioral states, including morally-relevant goals such as helping and understanding the other, promotes motivated activity to accomplish these states, a phenomenon referred to as “automatic goal pursuit” (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). Until quite recently, dual process models have had little impact on theory and research in morality, mostly because most researchers have focused their efforts on understanding the reasoning process. But this distinction is now being integrated in various models of moral functioning. For example Lapsley and Narvaez (2004) have proposed a social-cognitive model of morality that, although diverging from Haidt on several points, distinguishes “deliberative” versus “automatic” moral judgment. Margolis (1987) has also described the difference between these two systems as “reasoning-why” (deliberative) and “seeing-that” (automatic). The challenge for the psychology of spiritual transformation is to model an approach that appreciates and incorporates the contributions of each system, but (perhaps) highlights the priority of intuitive processes. One model that further clarifies the nature of these intuitive domains is Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model, and these domains are incorporated into the moral intuitionist model introduced below. Haidt’s “Social Intuitionist Model” (SIM) In his clever 2001 article entitled “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail,” Haidt offered the SIM as one version of the emerging new synthesis in moral psychology. The SIM outlines a model of moral judgment that links together theoretical insights and empirical findings from several fields, particularly social psychology, social cognitive neuroscience, and (selective aspects of ) evolutionary theory. Following research on the automaticity of social judgment and behavior and dual process models (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Zajonc, 1980), Haidt’s theoretical objective was to relocate the central causal locus of moral judgment from the cold cognition of moral reasoning to the hot cognition of intuitive processes. With this shift of emphasis, Haidt effectively challenged much traditional moral psychology, claiming that it had been pursuing the wrong mechanism of moral judgment and development (i.e., language-based moral reasoning).

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It is important to note that the original SIM was designed to capture the phenomenology and causal processes of moral judgment, not moral motivation and action. However, in recent writings Haidt and colleagues acknowledged that the SIM may be expanded to address questions about the complex relationships between moral intuitions, moral emotions, and moral virtues (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). They outlined three conceptual tools that are necessary to build an intuitionist model of moral motivation: first, the notion of moral intuition as affectladen cognition; second, moral emotions as prosocial motivators; and third, virtues as social skills (especially see Haidt & Joseph, 2007, pp. 385–388). Here is a synopsis of their account of how moral intuitions, moral emotions, and moral virtues interact to motivate prooscial action. First, various features of a sociomoral situation activate consciously or unconsciously a moral intuition. The output of an intuition is an affect-laden experience (like or dislike) that sensitizes the person to various features of a situation. This perception provides first information about whether the object in question should be approached or avoided (Frijda, 1986). Thus, moral intuitions provide the first link in the chain of moral motivation, providing perceptual sensitivity to opportunities for (and moral violations of ) prosociality. But at this point in the temporal sequence, persons are not necessarily conscious of what features have evoked a perception, or why they intuitively reacted the way they did. Note, too, intuitions are rather non-specific (i.e., they do not spell out how one should approach or avoid). Thus, while a moral expert is one who has the proper perceptual sensitivity to ethically relevant events and states of others, one still needs knowledge of how to interact in particular situations (i.e., the notion of virtues as social skills). Second, intuitions are then amplified by moral emotions. In many situations, an intuitive affective flash will “trigger” the firing of other facets of a moral emotion or set of moral emotions, such as physiological reactions, facial expressions, subjective experiences, and “cold” cognitive appraisals (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 60). Thus, through the amplifying effects of these processes, moral emotions boost the intensity of an initial intuition and set in motion some behavior that is expressive of the initial intuition. Through this process of emotion amplification, the likelihood that a person will engage in moral action


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is thus strengthened. Moral emotions, therefore, are responsible for the sociomoral function referred to as motivational intensity. Third, moral emotions set in motion the enactment of an intuitionrelated social skill (i.e., procedural knowledge that scripts “how-to” act in a particular situation). In the SIM, these intuition-expressive, emotion-related social skills are referred to as moral virtues. Consistent with the connectionist understanding of neural systems (Churchland, 1998; Westen, 2002), the virtues that are activated in a particular situation are those chronically accessible, defined as the activation potential of available procedural knowledge (see Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005 for a similar account). The more frequently a virtue has been activated, the more accessible it is for use. Thus, while moral intuitions “trigger” non-specific action tendencies to approach or avoid, and moral emotions “amplify” motives, virtues (and virtue complexes) shape how the object in question will be interacted with. Moral virtues thus provide a third sociomoral function that can be referred to as procedural action skills. Finally, the SIM posits that these three domains then interact with other “cold” cognitive domains: moral values, moral reasoning, moral will, and moral identity. These “higher-level” meaning domains provide additional direction (but not primarily motivation and capacity) for moral action. And, in some cases, these colder directional domains can also act back on old intuitions so as to modify the potency of initial intuitions and/or help build new intuitions (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). Thus, an important implication of the SIM is that moral development is accomplished by tuning-up (activating) moral intuitions, amplifying (intensifying) moral emotions, and strengthening (expanding) moral virtues, more than by “learning” explicit rules or principles. This approach conceptualizes moral competence as a set of skills that are cultivated gradually by real-world practice, and helped along by moral stories (narrative) and role models (in vivo virtue exemplars). Therefore, a third direction for future theory in spiritual transformation is to model how these moral intuitions, moral emotions, and virtues are strengthened in order to build the capacity for moral sociability. Part 2 offers specific and testable hypotheses about how each of these domains may promote spiritual transformation, understood as “expansion of one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability” (definition above).

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g. michael leffel “Connectionist” Model of Virtue

Implied in the above discussion, a fourth trend concerns how to conceptualize a moral virtue. Recent social intuitionist virtue theory suggests a new way to think about the nature of a virtue, and this understanding, in turn, sheds further light on the motivational significance of virtues (and vices). It commends the adoption of the “connectionist” approach to virtue (Casebeer, 2003; Churchland, 1998; Westen, 2002) that conceptualizes virtues as biologically-prepared but socially-constructed prosocial capacities, rather than as global tendencies to act in a particular way across varying circumstances (“traits”). Three ideas summarize this new social cognitive neuroscience model of virtue. First, virtues are understood as multi-faceted capacities that link together skills related to perception, emotion, and action. For example, to be capable of compassion is to have an acquired inclination: 1) to see certain features of sociomoral situations (perceptual sensitivity), 2) to feel and be moved by these perceptions (motivational intensity), and 3) to act in particular ways in response to these feelings (procedural skills as “how-to” knowledge). In other words, a virtue is a superordinate construct that connects a moral intuition, moral emotion, and procedural skill. Neurophilosopher Churchland (1998) conceptualized these neurological connections as neural systems or moral associative networks in the brain-mind that link together perceptions, emotions, and procedural skills (also see Flanagan, 2007). These affectively valenced knowledge systems are hypothesized to comprise the core of the moral self and to provide the most immediate and proximate causal mechanisms for moral motivation and action. Thus, a central claim of connectionist virtue theory is this: Virtue-related actions (procedural skills) are activated to “go on line” when persons are energized by the emotions connected to (associated with) these skills in the network, not primarily by a conscious motive to duty or by force of willpower. Second, virtues are biologically-prepared in the sense that human beings come equipped with an innate preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving other human beings; that is, innate moral intuitions. One model of these moral intuitions, “moral foundations theory” (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), posits Care/Harm (the intuition to alleviate suffering and provide care) as one of perhaps five evolutionary ancient, automatic, emotion-laden intuitions that humans are biologically pre-


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disposed to “moralize” in social communities (along with intuitions to Fairness/Reciprocity, Hierarchy/Respect, In-group/Out-group, and Purity/Sanctity). This model argues that culture-specific virtues related to each of these systems emerge from and are shaped by these five innate intuitions. Third, consistent with classical Aristotelian theory, connectionist virtue theory argues that while virtues are biologically-prepared, they are socially-constructed in moral communities, through exposure to and efforts to emulate exemplars of the virtues valued by a particular culture and narrative. This kind of virtue formation cannot be replaced with top-down learning, such as adherence to a principle (e.g., the Golden Rule or Kant’s “categorical imperative”) or to a specific narrative and rational deduction of specific responses from it. To summarize, this fourth trend highlights the need for a model of moral motivation that emphasizes the centrality of intuition-expressive, moral emotion-related, procedural action skills (e.g., virtues), understood not simply as behavioral dispositions (traits), but as biologically-prepared, socially-constructed capacities that energize and enable prosocial action. Thus, an additional question for future theory and research in spiritual transformation is this: Which virtues and why? A specific model of Virtues of Moral Sociability is offered in Part 2. The next section of this paper, now in light of these developments, further considers the logic and limitations of meaning-system analyses as presently conceptualized in the psychology of spiritual transformation. Meaning-System Analyses: Review and Critique for Redirection There can be no doubt that the meaning-system approach has inspired important research that demonstrates how religion provides “global life meaning” (Park, 2005, p. 299) to its adherents and confers significant health and mental health advantages to those who endorse a meaning system. But, the meaning-system approach, with its root metaphor of spirituality as “search,” can be critiqued on a number of conceptual, methodological, and empirical grounds, particularly the issue of how high-level meaning actually energizes and enables the moral action prescribed by one’s meaning system. Thus, to further argue the need for a moral intuitionist approach, this section does three things. It briefly reviews: a) the meaning-system approach as

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presently conceived, especially b) the “levels” (domains) of personality highlighted in meaning-system models and empirical research, and it then offers c) five conceptual and methodological limitations of the meaning-system approach, including empirical reasons to doubt the sufficiency of high-level meaning to motivate prosocial action. Spiritual Transformation in the Meaning-System Approach Hill and colleagues (2000) proposed the following definition of spirituality, some version of which seems to have become the modal view in the psychology of religion (see Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, pp. 12–17): Spirituality refers to the search for the sacred, where the term “sacred” refers to “a person, object, principle, or concept that transcends the self ” (p. 64). Following from this epistemic functionalist definition, related conceptions of spiritual transformation based on the search for high-level meaning have been offered. For example, Paloutzian (2005) defined a meaning system as a “dynamic set of mental processes whose operation cannot be understood as independent from some element of faith” (p. 335), and spiritual transformation as “a change in the meaning system that a person holds as a basis of self-definition, the interpretation of life, and overarching purposes and ultimate concerns” (p. 334). Likewise, Pargament (2006) suggested that spiritual transformation “refers primarily to fundamental change in the place of the sacred or the character of the sacred as an object of significance in life, and secondarily to a fundamental change in the pathways the individual takes to the sacred” (p. 21). Pargament further conceptualized spiritual transformation as a life-long process that involves three movements: a) an initial “search,” b) efforts to “conserve” or sustain a relationship with the sacred once discovered, and then c) continuing efforts to “transform” that relationship in response to internal or external trauma and transition (p. 21). In sum: The ultimate concern of spiritual transformation in the meaning-system approach is taken to be the formation, and subsequent conservation and transformation, of high-level meaning across the course of a person’s life. Notably absent in this understanding, however, is any reference to: a) how meaning is activated to “go on line” to motivate moral action and b) a model of the processes and corresponding practices by which persons could develop the moral virtues prescribed by a meaning system. A clearer understanding of the logic of the meaning-system approach


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is achieved by further considering the levels of personality typically highlighted in these models. “Levels” of Personality in Meaning-System Models A fundamental tenet of the “integrative science of personality” (McAdams & Pals, 2006, p. 204) is the assumption there are three qualitatively distinct levels of personality. Level 1, the lowest level, consists of dispositional traits understood as global, de-contextualized characteristics such as those measured in the Five Factor Model (e.g., Agreeableness) that can be assessed with little regard for what else is going on in a person’s life. Level 2 refers to characteristics adaptations which, in contrast to Level 1 traits, are contextualized and conditional. In McAdams’ model these include: values, goals, attachment styles, defense mechanisms, personal and moral strivings, conditional patterns, and domain-specific skills and talents. These constructs are often empirically related to Level 1 traits. For example, religious strivings for “spiritual purity,” the fifth foundation in Haidt’s moral foundations theory, might be stronger for a person who has a high score on disgust sensitivity than another person (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). The third and highest level of personality is comprised of what McAdams called “integrative life stories” or “narrative identity” (p. 209). Among other things, McAdams and Pals noted that these stories often describe the reasons (cosmological or theological beliefs) a person may hold for believing it is important to be a moral person, and thus these stories influence a person’s behavior (further described below). To date, one of the most comprehensive reviews of the empirical literature on spiritual transformation was organized around the central question: Does religious conversion cause personality change? (Paloutzian, Richardson, & Rambo, 1999). These authors reviewed existing literature in terms of these levels of personality, and concluded that meaning-system analyses tend to emphasize constructs related to Level 3 (overall purpose, self-definition and identity, life narrative, beliefs and attitudes, ultimate concerns, self-definition) and Level 2 (personal strivings, specific goals, values and attitudes) more than lower-level constructs (like those emphasized in the SIM). To get a clearer sense for what these constructs mean, Paloutzian provided the following examples (p. 332). Level 3 includes the domains of overall purpose (“to fulfill God’s mission”), self-definition and

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identity (“before I was agnostic, now I am a Jew”), and life narrative (a story that highlights how an important turning point in one’s life has had positive consequences). Level 2 includes the domains of personal strivings (“to minister to other people in order to bring them into the family of faith”), specific goals (“to do my job well as evidence of faith”), and values and attitudes (“I want to be a good Muslim”). Level 1 includes “core” traits, especially as measured by the Five Factor Model (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism). In terms of the impact of spiritual practices on personality change, what does the existing empirical literature suggest? Again, for purposes of their review, these authors regarded the overlapping concepts of religious conversion and spiritual transformation as distinct but “functionally equivalent” (Paloutzian, 2005, p. 333). Their general conclusion was that some levels of personality seem to change following religious conversion and spiritual transformation, while others do not. First, they suggested that data do not support the idea that religious conversion results in changes to the whole person. Specifically, there is little evidence that “core personality traits” (Level 1) change across time, whether a person converts from no religion to some religion or from one religion to another. They concluded that present data seem to indicate that there is little substantial change in one’s core (FFM) characteristics over and beyond normal and expected developmental shifts (Costa & McCrae, 1994). Other reviews indicate that the size of the associations between religion and Five Factor traits is usually weak; for example, not exceeding .20 for the FFM factor of Agreeableness (e.g., McCullough & Worthington, 1999). Second, what does seem to change following religious conversion is not the magnitude of Level 1 traits (e.g., from less to more Agreeable), but the tradition-specific way these traits may be expressed (i.e., consistent with one’s new religious belief system). For example, following religious conversion, one’s characteristic level of Agreeableness may be extended to those in one’s immediate circle of faith but not necessarily to outgroup others. Notably, there is no evidence that persons become more Agreeable (or lower in Neuroticism, etc.), even toward one’s own ingroup, than they were before conversion. Saroglou’s (2006) review of the literature also concluded while there is reason to believe religious persons may be more prosocial, it is a rather selective and restrictive “minimal prosociality” that is normatively limited to those closest to us and only rarely “extended to universal and unconditioned altruism” (p. 2). Third, with respect to


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the other levels of personality, Paloutzian’s review suggested that the personality domains that seem to change are global-level (Level 3) and mid-level (Level 2) constructs. For example, goals and behaviors consistent with Emmon’s construct of “personal strivings” (1999) appear to change. Likewise, converts to religion sometimes report changes in specific goals, such as problematic behaviors related to addictions, use of tobacco, sexual activity, and other moral behaviors (see Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, Chapter 12 for a review). In a later comment on this review, Paloutzian (2005) argued that since these data seem to indicate it is a person’s high-level meaning, not “what the person is like in some basic sense” (p. 332) that is most likely to change, present empirical research supports the view that meaning-system models best describe the outcome studies on spiritual transformation. This conclusion is consistent with other research that seems to question religion’s potential to motivate non-egoistic prosocial behavior (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; McCullough & Willoughby, 2009; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Saraglou et al., 2005 for reviews). For example, while correlational studies sometimes reveal an association between self-reports of religiosity and prosociality, experimental designs that measure religiosity and actual prosocial behavior suggest that this association emerges primarily in a context where reputational concerns are heightened (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Similarly, while some research seems to support the general hypothesis that religiosity predicts enhanced prosociality, particularly when using standard self-report measures, there are many counter-indications, or at least findings that imply an “intriguing discrepancy” (Saraglou, 2006, p. 2) between the values espoused by believers and their observable prosocial action. Brief Statement of the Problem and Rationale for New Direction Viewing these data and conclusions from the vantage point of religious meaning-systems, these findings do not come as good news. This is so primarily because as many religious (Armstrong, 2009) and some “naturalistic” (Flanagan, 2007) meaning systems argue, one of the ultimate concerns of spirituality is to change lower-level motivational domains; that is, to strengthen moral virtues that facilitate prosocial action and to weaken vices that maintain selfishness. Thus, what does it mean that FFM Agreeableness, a scale designed to measure (something like) the trait of compassion (NEO-PI subscales of Altruism and

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Tender-mindedness), does not appear to change as a result of involvement in spiritual practices? Further, in terms of negative traits, since FFM Neuroticism loads heavily on nearly everything undesirable in relationships, why would we not find at least some relative change as a result of spiritual practices, over and beyond mean-level stability shifts across the adult years? While these questions raise both methodological and conceptual issues, the following discussion is intended to draw attention to the lack of systematic measurement of lower-level motivational constructs, not to the psychometric issues involved in the assessment of traits. In response to this question, five alternative interpretations of the Paloutzian’s conclusion are offered below, including conceptual and empirical reasons to doubt the sufficiency of meaning to effect changes to prosocial action. Argued below, the issue is not the veracity of the extant empirical findings but rather that existing research, as Paloutzian (2005) himself acknowledges, is only “as good as far as it goes” (p. 332) in addressing the multiple processes that are likely involved in spiritual transformation. The central idea proposed here is that future research should focus on a different kind of lower-level personality construct than traits and that a moral intuitionist model of these constructs could help us conceptualize such an approach (i.e., moral intuitions, moral emotions, and moral virtues/vices). The working hypothesis would be that spiritual practices that focus on intuitions, emotions, and virtues/vices will more reliably produce the behavioral changes expected than will interventions that target global- and midlevel personality domains. However, before reviewing these arguments, it should be noted that several authors of the meaning-system approach have already anticipated this issue, and they have urged the development of multi-layered models of personality that better capture lower-level motivation domains in their nomological networks. After describing the logic of the meaning-system approach, Paloutzian & Park (2005) commented: Of course, the meaning-system approach is not without limitations. For one, the role of emotions may get short shrift in this framework . . . it is true that human beings may be more ruled by their passions than by their intellects. A broad perspective on meaning can encompass both emotions and cognitions . . . Therefore, researchers must be careful not to yield to the temptation of applying a purely cognitive framework to phenomena within the psychology of religion. (p. 556)


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Conceptual and Methodological Limitations of the Meaning-System Approach This discussion focuses on five limitations of meaning-system models as presently conceived. Because each issue raises a conceptual, methodological, or empirical issue not fully addressed by existing data, the following critique is offered only as a guide for thinking about how meaning and motivation could be integrated better in models of spiritual transformation. 1. Methodological “restriction of range.” The first and most obvious observation is that empirical research conceived within the meaningsystem approach may have focused too much on high-level meaning and not enough on lower-level motivation constructs. In so doing, they may have missed a central concern of many religious meaning systems, namely, that virtue formation is a major objective of spiritual transformation. Thus, it could be argued that a primary reason the extant empirical data appear to fit best a meaning system explanation is that investigators have not adequately modeled important motivational sources that are likely involved in spiritual transformation, particularly those highlighted in the SIM. It is possible that researchers have yet to adequately design and conduct intervention and outcome studies that could demonstrate real-time motivational changes that do occur in the process of spiritual transformation. To facilitate such research, what is needed is a theoretical model that more systematically describes multiple domains of meaning and motivation, and then delineates processes and related practices that differentially target these domains of personality. Part 2 offers such a model. 2. The question of spiritual praxis. Another way to interpret the above conclusion relates to the nature of spiritual practices. It may be that religious or spiritual persons are not really “practicing” to promote expansion of their motivation and capacity for prosocial action (e.g., to strengthen one’s capacity for empathy). Existing studies of spirituality, especially those based on outcome measures that primarily assess frequency of religious behaviors (e.g., prayer, attendance, reading Sacred texts) do not make it clear what level of personality development persons are practicing (i.e., whether on upper- and mid-level meaning or lower motivational domains). This is important because, as discussed below, there is growing reason to believe that meaning formation and motivation activation are not the same processes, and they likely require different practices. For example, Fredrickson (2002)

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has hypothesized that religious practices work because of the positive moral emotions they likely activate and amplify. Drawing on her “broaden-and-build” theory of the positive emotions, she outlined the multiple links that lead to efficacious religious practices in this manner: religious practices—positive meaning—positive and moral emotions— broadened mindsets—augmented personal resources—improved health and well-being (2002, p. 211). If this is true, it suggests that religious practices (e.g., prayer) that involve activation of positive and moral emotions should become an important part of religious disciplines, practiced primarily because moral emotions function as prosocial motivators (#4 below), not simply as means to search for or to sense the Sacred. Thus, future research should give greater attention to the primary focus of particular practices, whether they target changes to the motivational or meaning domains of personality. 3. The “judgment-action gap.” Third, even if we knew persons were systematically practicing to strengthen meaning-system domains (e.g., personal strivings that express their religious beliefs), there is reason to hypothesize that these practices alone are not sufficient to energize and enable moral action (#4 below). Thus, in focusing on upper- and mid-level constructs, meaning-system models may commit (or imply) the “rationalist fallacy,” the Platonic-Kantian assumption that “to know the good is to do the good.” In moral philosophy, this problem is referred to as the “Thought/Action” problem, and it is described by philosopher Locke (1983) as: “the problem at once philosophical and psychological, of explicating the relationship between what a person says he ought to do, or even what he thinks he ought to do, and what he actually does” (p. 160). In moral psychology the problem of akrasia (weakness of will or the failure to conform one’s behavior to one’s moral principles) is known as the judgment-action gap (Blasi, 1980). As discussed by Haidt and others, Rationalist models in moral psychology that have emphasized the role of reasoning and deliberation (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969) have been unable to account for this gap, which is believed to exist in most people to some degree (Baumeister, 1997). Moral psychology today is nearly univocal in recognizing that more than right judgment (meaning) and moral willpower is necessary in order to hold moral thought and action together in a causal way (Lapsley, & Power, 2005). Thus, it is now addressing the judgmentaction gap with new theories and research concerned with a variety of motivational variables, and this research may have important implications for how persons practice to enhance moral sociability. Therefore,


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if not right moral reasoning and strong willpower, what motivates moral action? 4. The moral emotion-action link. One of the most important literatures to emerge in recent years concerns the role of moral emotion in motivating prosocial action. Haidt (2001, p. 823) summarizes this principle as follows: Moral action covaries with moral emotion more than with moral reasoning (also see Batson, 1987; Blasi, 1980; Haidt, 2003b; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007 for reviews). Various literatures in social and moral psychology and social cognitive neuroscience now converge to argue for the primacy of emotion; that is, that emotional processes are necessary to order to energize higher meaning and motivate prosocial action. First, there is a literature that directly examines the relationship between moral reasoning and prosocial action. In general, it concludes that there is a rather weak link between moral reasoning and positive moral action (e.g., helping). For example, while Blasi (1980) found some support for the claim that high-scorers on Kohlberg’s scales of moral reasoning were more likely to help others, recent studies have raised doubts about such findings (Thoma, Narvaez, Rest, & Derryberry, 1999). The general consensus today is that the relationship between moral reasoning ability and prosocial behavior appears to be weak and inconsistent, especially when the variable of intelligence is partialed out. Emotional and self-regulatory factors, such as the ability to delay gratification, seem to be more powerful determinants of actual behavior (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; McCullough & Willoughby, 2009). Second, in social cognitive neuroscience, there are literatures that have examined what happens when moral reasoning and moral emotions become dissociated, either through inadequate psychosocial development (in the case of sociopaths; Hare, 1993) or through brain damage (in the case of frontal lobe damage; Damasio, 1994). For example, Damasio and colleagues have found a consistent pattern of changes associated with damage to the ventromedial area of the prefrontal cortex (VMPFC, the area behind the bridge of the nose). Patients with damage restricted to the VMPFC show no reduction in their reasoning abilities and seem to retain full knowledge of moral rules and social conventions. But when faced with real life decisions, they show poor judgment, are indecisiveness, and appear irrational in their behavior (e.g., the case of Phineas Gage). Damasio referred to this pattern of affect loss combined with intact reasoning as “acquired sociopathy.” His research demonstrated that when emotion is removed

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from decision-making people do not become more reasonable or ethical; they become unable to “feel” the rightness and wrongness of simple decisions and judgments. He concluded that higher (“cold”) reasoning processes seem to require affective (“hot”) channeling mechanisms, and moral emotions provide this source of motivation. Likewise, other neuroimaging research is beginning to offer a brain-based account of moral reasoning and motivation that emphasizes the critical role of positive and moral emotions as motivators of moral action (see Gazzaniga, 2005; Greene & Haidt, 2002 for reviews). A third literature documents a strong link between specific moral “emotions/virtues” (Emmons & McNamara, 2006, p. 11) and prosocial action. The most frequently cited illustration of this effect is the empathy-altruism hypothesis which states that moral emotions (e.g., compassion) aroused by the perception of someone’s suffering evokes an altruistic motive (i.e., a moral intuition) that is directed toward reducing the other’s suffering (e.g., Batson, 1987). More recent research shows that other moral emotions likewise motivate prosocial action, such as moral elevation (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), trust (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001), gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2004), and compassion (Crocker & Canevello, 2008). For example, Crocker & Canevello (2008) found that when friends self-consciously enacted (relatively) more “compassionate goals” (actions intended to care for the wellbeing of the other) versus “self-image goals” (to enhance the self ), both friends over time displayed increased levels of mutual trust and support of each other. Further, these persons were found to have a “non-zero-sum” view of relationships (win-win interactions), greater self-compassion, secure attachment style, and to exhibit less narcissism. Likewise, for gratitude, Algoe and Haidt (2009) found that the characteristic response to the experience of gratitude was a felt desire to return the favor to the benefactor (reciprocity), and second, a desire be closer to and to emulate the virtuous actions of the other (also see Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Tsang, 2006). Collectively, these literatures suggest that high-level meaning alone (i.e., upper- and mid-level constructs) cannot motivate prosocial action, and may require the energizing effects of positive and moral emotions. These findings, in turn, argue that the psychology of spiritual transformation is in need of a conceptual model that gives greater attention to the role of positive and moral emotions “both as motivators of change and potential consequences of change” (Emmons, 2005, p. 247). The notion that high-level meaning and low-level motivation


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can and should be integrated into a more comprehensive approach is precisely what the Social Intuitionist Model is intended to do, but, to date, we have not yet applied this model to the analysis of spiritual transformation. The model outlined below and detailed in Part 2 offers one way to do so. 5. Distinctions between declarative/procedural knowledge and automatic/controlled processing. There is perhaps an even more compelling reason to argue that high-meaning cannot energize and enable moral action: Recent theory and research in social cognitive neuroscience suggests that “cold” meaning and “hot” motivational domains may represent different types of knowledge in the brain-mind. In recent literature, two important distinctions are made (e.g., Siegel, 2007; Westen, 2002). First, the declarative/procedural distinction refers to the manner in which knowledge is represented in the brain (as a concept encoded in a linguistic mode or as a skill encoded in a sensory-motor mode). Declarative knowledge, knowledge of facts (events, abstractions, details), is information that can be “declared” and is usually conscious (or can be made conscious). Juxtaposed is procedural knowledge that encodes skills that are usually expressed without conscious awareness, and they may even be disrupted if the person tries to perform them using conscious control (e.g., skilled musicians producing notes faster than they can consciously read them). Current thinking holds that declarative and procedural knowledge may be represented in two separate, parallel, and partially independent systems (e.g., Westen, 2002). In this light, it is important to note that many classical approaches to virtue (e.g., Aristotle and Mencius) compared the acquisition of virtue to the slow practice needed to develop “virtuosity” on a musical instrument (Aristotle, 1893/2004; Flanagan & Williams, 2010), not to the rote learning of conceptual principles and rational calculation of behavioral responses from it. A second distinction refers not to the type of knowledge but to the way knowledge is accessed and activated. Bargh (1994) has recast dual process models as a continuum from fully “automatic” to fully “controlled” processes. Automatic processes cause cognitive and behavioral changes in response to the environment without any need for conscious reflection or even awareness. Automatic processing can involve declarative knowledge (such as words that are used to prime subjects), but more often involves nonconscious activation of procedural knowledge (e.g., environmental cues that prime the moral intuition to Care/harm and associated moral emotion of compassion). Controlled processes,

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in contrast, are mental processes that occur more slowly, are more conscious, and are more easily separated from perception. Controlled processing can involve procedural knowledge (such as coping strategies, which are skills for regulating emotions), but more often involves declarative knowledge (such as thinking about moral quandaries). How are these distinctions important to spiritual transformation? In recent theory, values are often conceptualized as a type of “declarative” (know-what) knowledge (e.g., Westen, 1985), while virtues are instances of “procedural” (how-to) knowledge (e.g., Casebeer, 2003). Thus, while a person may consciously declare that he/she “values” a particular virtue, it is not necessarily the case that the person possesses the capacity to enact the procedural skill signified by the word “virtue” (e.g., empathy). Further, it is likely that different kinds of knowledge structures are acquired through different processes. One of the central tenets of virtue theory is that the virtues are acquired inductively, both through exposure to narratives and exemplars (persons) that represent the virtue in question, and through efforts to emulate the virtue in real-world practice (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Narratives and virtuous persons embody information about many aspects of a sociomoral situation, including the motivations of the protagonists, how they perceive the situation, what emotions have been elicited (compassion, gratitude, anger, etc.), and the specific skills they have employed in response to the situation. By observing and emulating more experienced others, the moral learner over time comes to recognize what information is important to notice and how to respond (Haidt & Keseber, 2010). In short, one of the more important insights to emerge from this recent literature can be stated as follows: Declarative knowledge cannot empower that which procedural memory has not acquired. That is, declarative propositional knowledge about the moral good (know-what knowledge), even accompanied by a command and will to do it, is not sufficient to enable the value without the procedural skills (virtues) which make it possible (how-to knowledge). These procedural skilllike virtues, first embodied in moral others, likely become embedded within procedural memory through virtuous interactions experienced with others (Garrels, 2006; Iacoboni, 2008). To summarize this section, the foregoing trends in moral intuitionist thought, together with the above limitations of the meaningsystem approach, argue for the importance of an alternative approach. Consistent with Emmons and Paloutizian’s (2003) proposal for a new


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multilevel and interdisciplinary paradigm, the model outlined below offers a framework that synthesizes constructs related to higher-level meaning and lower-level motivation into a single comprehensive model. Overview of Three Cognitive Systems of Spiritual Transformation As described above, in general, the psychology of religion has followed social psychology in treating spirituality and/or religiosity as a meaningsystem comprised of constructs such as beliefs, values, and strivings. But, argued here, high-level meaning is only one kind of knowledge system that is involved in the complex multi-dimensional process of spiritual transformation, especially when viewed from the social functionalist perspective. The central idea of the proposed moral intuitionist approach is straightforward: Spiritual transformation encompasses the systematic, intentional expansion of moral sociability (the motivation and capacity to emotionally invest in the strengths-development of others), as envisioned within some religious or “naturalistic” meaning system. Thus, in this model, both higher-level meaning and lower-level motivation are important, but they play different roles in promoting the ultimate concern of moral sociability. This section provides an overview of the proposed model and preliminary definitions of basic terms, to be followed by a more detailed description in Part 2. Figure 1 presents a schematic representation of the framework. Overview of the Model The primary objective of this framework is to conceptualize the relationships between three sociomoral functions (dimensions of moral functioning), corresponding cognitive systems (types of knowledge), and domains of moral personality (sources of motivation and meaning) that comprise each system. The central assumption of this approach is that growth in moral sociability optimally arises from the interaction between three qualitatively different cognitive systems or levels of personality that are likely involved in spiritual transformation. The three sociomoral functions are designated: a) motivation and capacity for moral sociability (the issue of how-to); b) moral direction (the issue of know-what); and 3) existential life meaning (the issue of what-for).

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System 1: Intuition (Motivation) Spiritual Transformation

System 3: Ideological Narrative (Meaning)

Moral Sociability

System 2: Reasoning (Direction)

Figure 1. Three-System Model of Spiritual Transformation in the Moral Intuitionist Paradigm. The model hypothesizes three sociomoral functions (dimensions of moral functioning) and corresponding cognitive systems (types of knowledge) are involved in forming and transforming moral sociability: 1) the Intuitive System (primarily) responsible for motivation and capacity; 2) the Reasoning System responsible for moral direction; and 3) the Ideological Narrative responsible for existential meaning.

The corresponding cognitive systems that subserve these functions are referred to as Intuition, Reasoning, and Ideological Narrative. These terms are intended to capture contrasts between different cognitive systems made by various moral philosophers and psychologists in recent years (e.g., Lowenstein & Small, 2007). Consistent with the SIM, Intuition, Reasoning, and Ideological Narrative are all forms of cognition, but are different types and modes of knowledge that differentially contribute to the “moral functioning of mature adults” (Blasi, 2009). Further, as in McAdams’ multilevel model, each system is comprised of various domains of moral personality that provide a more specific function in the system. In overview, the Intuitive System is comprised of moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices, and these domains are hypothesized to provide motivation and capacity for moral sociability. Three domains comprise the Reasoning System, and are believed to provide moral direction: moral values, moral reasoning, and moral willpower. The third cognitive system, Ideological Narrative, is comprised of a single domain referred to as moral identity, and is believed to provide existential meaning for moral sociability.


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Table 1. Three Cognitive Systems and Associated Moral Functions of Spiritual Transformation System System 1: Intuition

Function

Type of Knowledge

Mode of Knowledge

Moral motivation and capacity

how-to knowledge

automatic-quasiprocedural

System 2: Moral direction know-what knowledge Reasoning System 3: Narrative

Moral meaning

what-for knowledge

automaticdeclarative controlled-Ideological declarative

Table 1 summarizes each system in terms of its hypothesized sociomoral function, type of knowledge, and mode of knowledge (i.e., distinctions between automatic/controlled and declarative/procedural reviewed above). Since each system is conceptualized as an essential and complementary domain of moral sociability, this model argues that spiritual transformation must encompass practices that differentially target the formation (and transformation) of each system. Thus, it must be stressed that the proposed model is not anti-meaning: It simply says that moral choice and action is likely not the direct result of conscious, language-based processes (Reasoning and Ideological Narrative Systems), and that the transformation of moral motivation and capacity (Intuitive System) is the more central and (likely) more difficult task in spiritual transformation. The following discussion summarizes the model in terms of three theoretical propositions. The specific domains that comprise each system are described in Part 2. Proposition 1: The Intuitive System Provides “Motivation and Capacity” for Moral Sociability In the proposed framework, the Intuitive System is comprised of four domains of moral personality that collectively provide motivation and capacity for moral sociability: moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices. Together these domains comprise a cognitive system that provides the “hot” cognitive (how-to) knowledge necessary to enact the moral meaning prescribed by one’s meaning system (and, in the case of vices, obstruct enactment of the virtues). The contrast between Intuitive and Reasoning systems, it must be

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repeated, is a contrast between two cognitive processes, one of which usually has an affective component (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, pp. 801–802). It is hypothesized that this system represents procedural or “quasi-procedural” (Westen & Gabbard, 2002, p. 80) knowledge that is typically activated by “automatic” (implicit) processes, more than controlled processes. The term quasi-procedural denotes that moral intuitions (“feelings of knowing,” p. 80) and moral emotions have content or meaning (they are a “what”), but they are also automatic procedures (they are a “how”). Moral intuitions and moral emotions are the automatic processes that “push” the person to express his or her moral virtues. Without this system, a person may know and even value particular meaning-system religious precepts (e.g., “love one another”) yet may not possess the motivation and capacity to perform the principle. Proposition 2: The Reasoning System Provides “Direction” for Moral Sociability The second system, termed the Reasoning System, is comprised of three domains that collectively provide direction for moral sociability: moral values, moral reasoning, and moral will. Together these domains comprise a cognitive system that provides “cold” cognitive know-what knowledge that prioritizes one’s moral values, and it provides direction about when to apply one’s principles in various life circumstances. It is hypothesized that this system represents declarative knowledge that is sometimes activated by automatic processes (e.g., values can be nonconscious) but that also requires considerable controlled (deliberative) processing (e.g., “what should I do in this situation?”). Moral reasoning and moral willpower are the controlled processes that contextualize and then “pull” the person to express his or her moral values. In the language of meaning-system models, the Reasoning system correlates with middle-level personality constructs (e.g., beliefs, values, and personal strivings). However, conceptualized in this model, this system alone cannot motivate and enable moral sociability. A person may possess know-what knowledge (direction), but still may not possess the how-to knowledge (motivation and capacity) to enact contextspecific prosocial virtues.


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Proposition 3: Ideological Narrative Provides “Existential Meaning” for Moral Sociability Third, Ideological Narrative represents a third cognitive system involved in spiritual transformation. Depicted in Figure 1 as the circle surrounding the other two systems, this system provides a “narrative envelope” (Browning, 2006, p. 25) that clarifies and informs the other two systems. A person’s ideological narrative is comprised of language-based, declarative knowledge that is often structured in the form of a narrative. The term “ideological narrative” as used in recent social intuitionist theory (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009) is similar to McAdams’ integrative life stories but “are grander than life stories, often reaching back centuries or millennia for their ‘once upon a time,’ casting larger groups and forces as the actors” (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, p. 115). In the present model, Ideological Narrative is hypothesized to provide existential (cosmological) meaning about one’s place and significance in the universe. Its unique role in spiritual transformation is to provide what-for knowledge (i.e., what moral sociability means in terms of some ‘big picture’ narrative, and why it is important for a good life and the common good). Because such knowledge provides an additional reason to move toward moral sociability, it is modeled as a major dimension of spiritual transformation. In comparison to meaning-system models, Ideological Narrative corresponds to upper-level meaning constructs; that is, narrative meaning, life purpose, self-definition. However, conceived in this model, this system is the basis for an eighth domain of moral personality, termed moral identity, or more precisely moral identity situated in a cosmological story. This system represents declarative knowledge that is typically activated by controlled (deliberative) processes, more than automatic processes. However, as with the Reasoning System, the assumption is that this system alone cannot motivate and enable moral sociability. That is, a person may know what-for (existential meaning), yet may not possess know-what knowledge (moral direction) necessary to navigate complexities of the social world, nor possess howto knowledge (motivation and capacity) to perform the necessary prosocial skills. Thus, a fundamental claim of this model is that while upper-level (Ideological Narrative) and mid-level (Reasoning System) domains can provide meaning and direction for moral sociability, they cannot alone provide the motivation and capacity to enact the skills required of moral sociability.

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g. michael leffel What Then is Spiritual Transformation?

To summarize, in an effort to complement (not contradict) meaningsystem analyses, this model conceptualizes spiritual transformation as the integration of three systems that work together to motivate and enable moral sociability. From this perspective, the spiritually matureing person is one who acts from existential meaning (Narrative), with deliberative direction (Reasoning), and is increasingly motivated and enabled by prosocial capacities (Intuition) that motivate and enable moral sociability. However, consistent with research that suggests emotions/virtues function as critical “moral motives” for prosocial action (McCullough et al., 2001), this model places greater theoretical and practical priority on the multiple domains that energize and enable moral sociability (i.e., the Intuitive System). Stated in terms of virtue ethics, this model proposes that when these three inter-related systems interact in an ideal fashion, we observe an approximation to the Aristotelian eudaimonic ideal of a person who does the “right things and with the right aim, in the right way and at the right time” (Lear, 2000, p. 63). Thus, these systems and their constitutive domains may be seen to articulate a vision of the “teleologically structured life that exemplifies distinctively human flourishing” (MacIntyre, 2004, p. 34). This moral ideal, while always a work-in-progress, nevertheless provides an organizing framework for the selection and implementation of practices of spiritual transformation that differentially target each sociomoral function and system of spiritual transformation. Specifically, as further detailed in Part 2, this three-system model of spiritual transformation offers an expanded social intuitionist model that encompasses eight domains of moral personality, and related processes: 1) tuning-up moral intuitions, 2) amplifying moral emotions, 3) strengthening moral virtues, 4) weakening moral vices, 5) clarifying moral values, 6) sharpening moral reasoning, 7) building moral will, and 8) integrating moral identity. Further, with respect to the Intuitive system, this model delineates four hypotheses about how to practice expanding one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability (generative care): “tuning-up” moral intuitions (selective attunement hypothesis); “amplifying” moral emotions (emotion amplification hypothesis); “strengthening” moral virtues (skill rehearsal hypothesis); and “weakening” moral vices (expressive disclosure hypothesis).


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Summary The primary goal of this article was to argue the need and rationale for an alternative framework for conceptualizing the nature of spiritual transformation than the presently dominant meaning-system approach (Paloutzian & Park, 2005) and then to outline general features of an alternative moral intuitionist approach. First, it outlined arguments for the more systematic integration of contemporary moral psychology with the psychology of spiritual transformation and suggested that moral psychology should become an important part of the psychology of religion and spirituality. In particular, it offered a social functionalist definition of spiritual transformation that places the construct moral sociability (more than meaning) at the heart of spiritual transformation. Following Erikson’s (1964) interpretation of the Golden Rule, moral sociability was defined as the motivation and capacity to emotionally invest in the strengths-development of others and the wider world, and spiritual transformation as intentional movement toward this moral ideal. Second, as background for an alternative model, the article outlined four recent trends in moral psychology: the centrality of moral motivation, two-system morality, the SIM model of moral motivation, and a connectionist model of virtue. Third, in light of these developments, it provided a more systematic critique of the logic and assumptions of meaning-system analyses. Specifically, it sketched five conceptual and methodological limitations of the meaning-system approach, including empirical reasons to doubt the sufficiency of high-level meaning to motivate prosociality. The article concluded with the suggestion that what is required to build a model of moral personality that is useful for theory and research in spiritual transformation is a multilevel framework that better captures the interplay between the multiple sources of meaning and motivation that likely work together to “energize” (the issue of motivation) and “enable” (the issue of capacity) moral sociability. Finally, the article sketched three propositions that outline a specific model of spiritual transformation that derives from but also extends the Social Intuitionist Model. This model suggests that spiritual transformation involves changes to three sociomoral functions and corresponding cognitive systems: a) an Intuitive System (primarily responsible for moral motivation and capacity); b) a Reasoning

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System (responsible for moral direction); and c) an Ideological Narrative (responsible for existential meaning). This three-system model argues that spiritual change requires practices that target different types of knowledge systems, which collectively motivate and enable moral sociability: how-to knowledge (motivation and capacity), knowwhat knowledge (direction), and what-for knowledge (existential or cosmological meaning). While each level or system is important, this model places greater theoretical and methodological priority on the Intuitive System. The purpose of Part 2 in Beyond Meaning is to spell out more systematically the domains that comprise each system and to outline corresponding spiritual transformation processes (not yet specific practices). For each system, suggestions for continued theoretical development of the model and for empirical research are offered. Collectively, then, these systems and processes promise to offer a new multilevel interdisciplinary model of spiritual transformation as conceived within the moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm. References Algoe, S. B., & Haidt, J. (2009). Witnessing excellence in action: The “other-praising” emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4, 105–127. doi:10.1080/17439760802650519 Appiah, K. A. (2008). Experiments in ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Aristotle (1893/2004). Nichomachean ethics. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books. Armstrong, K. (2009). The case for God. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and control in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition, Vol. 1 (pp. 1–40). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1994. Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 230–244. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.71.2.230 Bartlett, M. Y., & DeSteno, D. (2006). Gratitude and prosocial behavior: Helping when it costs you. Psychological Science, 17, 319–325. doi:10.1111/j.14679280.2006.01705.x Batson, C. D. (1987). Prosocial motivation: Is it ever really altruistic? Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 20, 65–122. http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/ bookdescription.cws_home/BS_0152/description#description Batson, C. D., Denton, D. M., & Vollmecke, J. T. (2008). Quest religion, anti-fundamentalism, and limited versus universal compassion. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 47, 135–145. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5906.2008.00397.x Batson, C. D., Kobrynowicz, J. L., Dinnerstein, J. L., Kampf, H. C., & Wilson, A. D. (1997). In a very different voice: Unmaking moral hypocrisy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1335–1348. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.72.6.1335


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BEYOND MEANING: SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE PARADIGM OF MORAL INTUITIONISM A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION PART 2: THREE COGNITIVE SYSTEMS OF SPIRITUAL TRANSFORMATION: A MORAL INTUITIONIST MODEL G. Michael Leffel* Abstract This article outlines a personality-based, process model of spiritual transformation conceptualized within a moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm. Following from the three-system model of spiritual transformation introduced in Part 1 (Intuition, Reasoning, Ideological Narrative), this article more systematically details the domains (facets) of moral functioning that comprise each system. It outlines eight domains of moral personality and corresponding developmental processes that derive from but also extend the “Social Intuitionist Model” (Haidt, 2001) of morality: 1) tuning-up ethical intuitions, 2) amplifying premoral emotions, 3) strengthening moral virtues, 4) weakening moral vices, 5) clarifying moral values, 6) sharpening moral reasoning, 7) building moral will, and 8) integrating moral identity. In particular, this model highlights the critical motivational roles played by the Intuitive System and its constitutive domains: ethical intuitions, premoral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices. For each Intuitive System domain, a testable empirical hypothesis about the process of spiritual transformation is stated and an example of representative research is reviewed. The article discusses this model as a multilevel interdisciplinary (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003) framework that offers five contributions to spiritual transformation theory. Specific questions for continued theoretical development and empirical research on the model are suggested throughout the article. Keywords: Multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm, moral intuitionism, domains of moral personality, intentional growth processes

The virtues, then, come neither by nature, nor against nature, but nature gives the capacity for acquiring them, and this is developed by training. —Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, p. 25 * Author Note: G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to G. Michael Leffel, Department of Psychology, Point Loma Nazarene University, 3900 Lomaland Drive, San Diego, CA 92130. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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g. michael leffel True religion is right tempers [virtues] towards God and man. It is, in two words, gratitude and benevolence; gratitude to our Creator and supreme Benefactor, and benevolence to our fellow-creatures. In other words, it is in loving God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. This is religion, and this is happiness, the happiness for which we were made. —J. Wesley (in Hildebrandt & Beckerlegge), p. 269 Does gratitude, over time, build people’s skills for loving? Does it build their skills for expressing love and kindness so that, even outside the context of gratitude, people who have been frequently grateful know how to show their love and compassion? —B. Fredrickson, Gratitude, Like Other Positive Emotions, Broadens and Builds, p. 160

As hinted in the epigraphs above, despite other differences, virtue ethics, religious moral psychology, and the positive psychology of religion sometimes share a common assumption about the motivational dynamics of the moral life, namely that certain “emotions/virtues” (Emmons & McNamara, 2006, p. 11) such as gratitude act as causal mechanisms for benevolent (loving) action. But how do persons “practice” in order to develop such virtues? In an effort to better organize and highlight the growing “consilience” (E. O. Wilson, 1998) between morality, spirituality, and religion, particularly the study of psychological processes that mediate spiritual transformation, Emmons & Paloutzian (2003) urged the development of “a new multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm” (p. 396; emphasis in original) that would provide a framework for integrating constructs in the psychology of religion with theory and research in cognate fields. They described their vision of a multilevel interdisciplinary framework as one that: “recognizes the value of data at multiple levels of analysis while making nonreductive assumptions concerning the value of spiritual and religious phenomena” (p. 395). They suggested such an approach would draw on fields such as evolutionary biology, neuroscience, philosophy, anthropology, and cognitive science such that “developments in the psychology of religion take into account and build upon advances in these related scientific disciplines” (p. 395). In light of their recommendations, the objective of this article is to propose one version of such a framework. Specifically, the article outlines a moral intuitionist model of spiritual transformation that derives from Haidt’s original “Social Intuition-

part two: moral intuitionist model

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ist Model” (SIM: Haidt, 2001) of moral functioning, and from recent updates of social intuitionist theory made by Haidt and colleagues over the past ten years (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). The theoretical yield is an expanded conceptual framework that synthesizes multiple sources of meaning and moral motivation hypothesized in the complex process of spiritual transformation. The first section of this article offers working definitions of morality, moral intuitionism, and spiritual transformation, and it provides background for the moral intuitionist model described herein. The second section provides an overview of the proposed model that encompasses three sociomoral functions (dimensions of moral functioning) and corresponding cognitive systems (types of knowledge) hypothesized to be involved in spiritual transformation: a) an Intuitive System (primarily responsible for the function referred to as motivation and capacity); b) a Reasoning System (responsible for moral direction); and c) a third system referred to as Ideological Narrative (responsible for existential meaning). This three-system model argues that spiritual transformation requires the intentional formation and transformation of three types of knowledge (not just “meaning”) and that these systems work together to motivate and enable moral sociability: how-to knowledge (motivation and capacity), know-what knowledge (moral direction), and what-for knowledge (existential or cosmological meaning). A central assumption of this model, perhaps in distinction to meaning-system models, is that global meaning formation and moral motivation are not the same processes, and they likely require different practices. The next three sections of the article then successively describe each system. The third section describes the domains of the Intuitive System, followed by abbreviated discussions of the Reasoning System and Ideological Narrative. The sixth section then discusses the proposed model as a multilevel interdisciplinary framework and offers five potential contributions of the model to spiritual transformation theory and research. Framing the Issue: Strengthening the Role of Moral Motivation in Spiritual Transformation Part 1 in this series addressed the issue of how to re-conceptualize the nature (goal, objective) of spiritual transformation in light of recent developments in moral psychology, especially the Social Intuitionist

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Model. The present article now addresses a second related question: What processes mediate spiritual transformation? The overall objective of Beyond Meaning is to strengthen the role of moral motivation in theory and research on spiritual transformation. In an effort to achieve this aim, there are three subsidiary aims. A New Definition of Spiritual Transformation Moral psychologist Haidt has recently proposed a new social functionalist definition of morality as a tool for theory and research in moral psychology and in the psychology of religion (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010): “Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanism that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (p. 800). Haidt suggested that religion should be studied as a complex system with many social functions, one of which is to “bind people together into cooperative communities organized around deities” (Graham & Haidt, 2010, p. 140). In effect, Haidt’s definition of religion places moral formation (“to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible”) at the heart of religious practices, while it does not reduce religion only to moral development (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Following from Haidt’s definition and recommendation, in place of the presently dominant meaning-system definition of spiritual transformation as “search for the Sacred” (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, p. 64), Part 1 offered the construct “moral sociability” as a central goal of spiritual transformation and a new definition of spiritual transformation: Spiritual transformation encompasses intentional movement toward a moral ideal, aimed primarily at the expansion of one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability, as envisioned within some meaning system, and whether or not that meaning system is explicitly religious.

This definition proposes three things. First, it suggests that a central objective of spiritual transformation is growth toward some prescribed moral ideal. Moral sociability, defined primarily in terms of Erikson’s construct of generative care, was proposed as one such moral ideal. Thus conceived, spiritual transformation involves intentional, systematic efforts to expand one’s motivation and capacity to emotionally invest in the strengths-development of others (see Part 1, section entitled Moral Sociability as Ultimate Concern of Spiritual Transformation). Second, this definition proposes that spiritual transformation


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would focus on expansion of one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability. This places the locus of spiritual growth on the formation and transformation of how-to knowledge (motivation and capacity), more than know-what knowledge (moral direction), or what-for knowledge (existential meaning). Third, it acknowledges that some meaning-system (religious or naturalistic) will likely be required to give existential (cosmological or theological) meaning to one’s conception of moral ideal. Thus, as detailed below, while the meaning-system approach is adequate to conceptualize the high-level meaning components of spiritual transformation (what to do and why to do it), it is not sufficient to insure that persons have developed the motivation and capacity to actually enact meaning-system values (how to do it). This is where moral intuitionist theory, particularly the Social Intuitionist Model, can help. A Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Motivation As described in Part 1, “moral motivation” refers to the processes by which a person is “energized” (motivation) and “enabled” (capacity) to enact the moral percepts prescribed by one’s meaning-system. The premise of this article is that moral intuitionism in general, and the Social Intuitionist Model in particular, offers an important new model of critical “sources of moral motivation” (Shulman, 2002, p. 499). What is moral intuitionism, and how could it contribute to the psychology of spiritual transformation? Described by Haidt (2001), moral intuitionist approaches in moral psychology argue that, in contrast to previous Rationalist approaches which have emphasized language-based meaning and reasoning (especially Kohlberg and Piaget), moral intuitions and moral emotions come before reasoning, and they directly cause moral judgments, choices, and actions (also see Kagan, 1984; J. Q. Wilson, 1993). Haidt and Joseph (2007) stated the central premise of moral intuitionism this way: The first draft of the moral mind has diverse moral content that was specified in advance of experience, but this innately given content gets revised and greatly extended during the course of development as children actively construct their moral knowledge within a cultural context that uses narrative to shape and guide the development of specific virtues. (p. 391)

In psychology today, the SIM is the foremost representative of the moral intuitionist hypothesis (Flanagan & Williams, 2010). It argues that

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moral choice and action is best explained in terms of intuition-based moral foundations, conceptualized as evolutionary ancient, fast acting, affect-laden input-output programs, that are energized more by moral emotions and less by language-based reasoning than previously thought. One model of these moral intuitions, “moral foundations theory” (MFT: Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009), posits Care/harm (the intuition to alleviate suffering and provide care) as one of perhaps five automatic, emotion-laden intuitions that humans are biologically predisposed to “moralize” in communities, congregations, and families (along with intuitions to Fairness/reciprocity, In-group/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity). Care/harm is conceptualized as a perceptual-emotional-behavioral system that equips human beings to detect signs of suffering in others and then moves persons to relieve that suffering and to otherwise provide for the development of others. Further, recent thinking in social intuitionist theory argues that both moral judgment and moral action are grounded in and subserved by different innate moral intuitions, moral emotions, and moral virtues, where virtues are understood as procedural skills or capacities not simply as traits (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). In this view, virtues are prosocial capacities that possess characteristics like other procedural skills that have been modeled as instances of the modular mind (Sperber, 2005), such as language, basic emotions, and multiple intelligences. An important assumption and practical implication of this approach is that moral formation is accomplished primarily by shaping motivation-related intuitions, emotions, and virtues, more than by the rote learning of meaning-related principles or beliefs. Stated in briefest form, then, the significance of moral intuitionism for spiritual transformation is that it offers a new way to conceptualize certain sources of moral motivation that may prove critical for motivating and enabling moral sociability; that is, the “domains” of moral intuitions, moral emotions, and moral virtues (and vices). The purpose of this article is not to debate the veracity of this view, since there are now a number of excellent critiques of moral intuitionism (Appiah, 2008; Blasi, 2009; Browning, 2010; Frimer & Walker, 2008). Rather, the goal is to discuss how this approach might complement the presently dominant meaning-system approach and offer new direction about how persons acquire the motivation and capacity to fulfill the moral ideal prescribed by one’s meaning-system.


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A Multi-domain, Multi-process Model of Spiritual Transformation The Social Intuitionist Model suggests a corresponding process model of transformation but one that has yet to be systematically developed. Historically, in the psychology of spiritual transformation, the notion of a process approach to the study of religious conversion or spiritual transformation is not new (e.g., Rambo, 1993). For example, in Rambo’s multidimensional model: “conversion is approached as a series of elements that are interactive and cumulative over time” (p. 17). His model consists of seven “stages” or elements (context, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, commitment, and consequences) that endeavor to describe interrelated processes involved in spiritual transformation. However, what may be new in the literature on spiritual transformation is a model of spiritual transformation that derives its processes from the multiple levels or domains that comprise moral personality. In moral psychology today, much theoretical and empirical attention is being given to the construction of models of moral personality that synthesize multiple domains of functioning (see Bergman, 2002; Frimer & Walker, 2008 for reviews). There are now a number of multidomain models that might prove useful for modeling spiritual transformation. For example, Rest (1994) argued that moral action consists of a least four different domains of moral functioning: a) moral sensitivity (interpreting the situation), b) moral judgment (judging which action is morally right/wrong), c) moral motivation (prioritizing moral values relative to other values), and d) moral character (having courage, persisting, overcoming distractions, implementing skills). However, until recently, most research has focused mainly on the second component, moral reasoning, while other components have received relatively little attention. Thus, a limitation of even some of the multidomain models is that they still tend to under-emphasize the critical roles of moral motivation processes, such as those highlighted in the SIM (see Part 1, section entitled Recent Trends in Moral Psychology for a more complete discussion of moral motivation). In light of this limitation, the major objective of Beyond Meaning is to integrate the moral intuitionist and meaning-system approaches in order to offer an integrative model that more systematically delineates how meaning and motivation may be related. This article details a multi-domain, multi-process model of moral personality that synthesizes eight sources of meaning and motivation discussed

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in contemporary moral psychology: moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues, moral vices, moral values, moral reasoning, moral will, and moral identity (cf. Frimer & Walker, 2008; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). However, for limitations of space, the present article highlights the critical motivational roles played by the first four domains (moral intuitions, moral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices). For each of these Intuitive System domains, in order to provide a guide for future empirical research, a theoretical proposition about the development of the domain is stated in the form of a testable conceptual hypothesis and an example of representative research is offered. Overview of a Multi-domain Model of Moral Functioning (for Spiritual Transformation) Figure 1 (top panel) depicts a new moral intuitionist model of moral personality. It is similar in kind to Berkowitz’s model of moral anatomy (Berkowitz, 1997) described as “an attempt to tease apart the constituent parts of moral personhood” (Berkowitz, Sherblom, Bier, & Battistich, 2006, p. 690). Corresponding to each domain, the bottom panel

Personality Domains Ethical Intuitions

Moral Virtues (Skills)

Premoral Emotions

Moral Values

Moral Reason

Moral Will

Moral Identity

Moral Vices

1. Tuning-Up

8. Integrating 3. Weakening

Developmental Processes

7. Building

5. Clarifying

2. Amplifying

6. Sharpening

4. Strengthening

Figure 1. A moral intuitionist model of eight domains of moral personality and corresponding developmental processes.


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(Eliciting Situation)— System 1

Ethical Intuitions—Premoral Emotions—Moral Virtues— Moral Vices—

System 2

Moral Values—Moral Reasoning—Moral Will—

System 3

Moral Identity— (Moral Sociability)

Figure 2. A Three-System, Multi-domain Model of Eight Domains of Moral Personality.

of Figure 1 names a developmental process hypothesized to facilitate meaning and motivation for moral sociability (generative caring). In overview, these domains and associated developmental processes are designated: 1) “tuning-up” ethical intuitions; 2) “amplifying” premoral emotions; 3) “strengthening” moral virtues; 4) “weakening” moral vices; 5) “clarifying” moral values; 6) “sharpening” moral reasoning; 7) “building” moral willpower; and 8) “integrating” moral identity. Consistent with the logic of Haidt’s (2001) original model of moral functioning, these eight domains are hypothesized to describe a temporal sequence leading from situation perception (eliciting situation) to moral action (moral sociability) that can be diagrammed as follows (Figure 2): There are three preliminary things to notice about this model. First, consistent with the “connectionist” approach to moral personality (e.g., Casebeer, 2003; Churchland, 1998; Westen, 2002), each system (or level) relates to and subserves a different sociomoral function of personality. System 1 domains, referred to as ethical intuitions, premoral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices, designate moral motivational sources hypothesized to provide motivation and capacity for moral sociability. System 2 domains, designated moral values, moral reasoning, and moral will, are believed to provide moral direction for moral sociability (more than motivation and capacity). And, the System 3 domain designated moral identity is hypothesized to provide existential (or cosmological) meaning for moral sociability (more than motivation and capacity and moral direction). Following Westen (1985), these inter-related systems and domains are understood as “constellations of functionally related processes” (p. 97) that collectively enable three sociomoral functions of personality.

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A second objective of this model is to describe these systems and domains in terms of the type of knowledge and mode of cognitive processing which they likely represent; that is, distinctions between declarative versus procedural “types” of knowledge and automatic versus controlled “modes” of processing (Westen & Gabbard, 2002, especially pp. 73–92). Following recent discussions of these contrasts (see Part 1, sub-section entitled Distinctions between Declarative/Procedural Knowledge and Automatic/Controlled Processing), each of these domains can be described as (relatively) more automatic-procedural or more controlled-declarative in nature. In the proposed model, System 1 motivational domains (“how-to” knowledge) are hypothesized as the most automatic-procedural in nature. More precisely, following Westen and Gabbard’s discussion, ethical intuitions (“feelings of knowing,” p. 80) and premoral emotions can be considered quasiprocedural. They are declarative in that they have content or meaning (they are a “what”), but they are also automatic procedures (they are a “how”). The same can be said for moral virtues and vices, although Westen did not treat virtues in his discussion (but see Casebeer, 2003 for a description of virtues as procedural). Second, System 2 directional domains (“know-what” knowledge) are those believed to be automatic-declarative in nature. For example, a moral “value” may function without awareness yet may be declared when persons are asked to describe one’s values. And, the System 3 existential meaning domain (“what-for” knowledge) referred to as moral identity is hypothesized to be the most controlled-declarative in nature, as it is dependent upon conscious deliberation for its continued formation and transformation. These domain distinctions are important because they carry major implications for how one practices spiritual transformation (i.e., whether one is practicing to expand motivation and capacity, to gain direction, or to find meaning). However, since these knowledge distinctions remain relatively new to theorizing in moral psychology (see Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005 for related discussion), and even more so in the psychology of religion, they should be regarded as working hypotheses rather than as established facts. Third, readers familiar with social intuitionism will notice two variances in terminology between the present model and the SIM, related to the terms ethical intuitions and premoral emotions. Haidt and colleagues sometimes used the term “ethical intuitions” (cf. Haidt & Joseph, 2004) but more often “moral intuitions” (cf. Haidt & Joseph, 2007) in reference to innate intuitions of the moral mind. And, they


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always used the term “moral emotions” when discussing emotions believed to intensify the intuitions. However, in the present model, the terms ethical intuitions and premoral emotions replace their preferred terms. Why so? One of the recent criticisms of the SIM is that it may confuse important distinctions between ethics and morality (Appiah, 2008; Browning, 2010). Following the moral anthropology of Riceour (1992) and others, Browning has proposed that we maintain a distinction between ethics (strivings to attain certain “premoral” goods of life) and morality (the concern to adjudicate inevitable conflicts between these goods). He argued that while moral intuitionism may well describe certain psychobiological needs and tendencies that make up the fundamental nonmoral or premoral goods of life (e.g., Haidt’s moral intuitions and moral emotions), these goods are not necessarily fully moral goods, and they cannot themselves resolve conflicts between goods and the persons seeking these goods (see Browning, 2010, especially Chapter 3). Browning suggested that moral reflection does this by employing “deontological tests” (p. 75) about which of the biologically-based foundational goods, emotions, and related virtues are universalizable, such as Kant’s categorical imperative, the Golden Rule, or principle of neighbor love (also see Flanagan & Williams, 2010 on the normativity of Haidt’s moral foundations). Thus, in terms of the present model, intuitions and emotions are referred to as premoral (not moral) goods (i.e., they are ethical goods necessary to motivate and enable moral sociability), but they depend upon the higher “moralizing” influence of tradition-shaped values and practical reasoning to provide direction (i.e., the Reasoning System). Moral virtues (and vices) thus begin the domain of morality proper, since in attempting to develop certain virtues, cultural and religious meanings have already adjudicated and prioritized the virtues to be prized and vices to be avoided. The proposal here is that this distinction between ethics and morality does not necessarily discourage Haidt and colleagues’ “relentlessly” descriptive (Graham & Haidt, 2010, p. 140) strategy for exploring the full array of moral concerns (beyond caring and justice), and it allows us to better conceptualize the potential role of narrative-shaped traditions to re-form innate ethical intuitions (see Haidt’s, 2003c discussion of how “old dogs learn new tricks”). In the next three sections, each system is detailed.

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System 1: The Intuitive System (Motivation and Capacity) Considered in the nomenclature of “two-system morality” (see Part 1, section entitled Recent Trends in Moral Psychology), the Intuitive System is comprised of four domains of moral personality: ethical intuitions, premoral emotions, moral virtues, and moral vices (left side of Figure 1). These four domains and corresponding developmental processes form the core of the proposed moral intuitionist model. Again, these domains are hypothesized to subserve the sociomoral function referred to as moral motivation and capacity. In current social cognitive neuroscience models, this system is believed to consist of quasi-procedural knowledge (Westen & Gabbard, 2002, p. 80). The term quasi-procedural (or quasi-declarative) denotes that while such knowledge may not be immediately conscious (in active “working” memory), it can be made conscious and reflected upon if attention is focused on the domain. It is sometimes also referred to as the experiential system (Schultheiss, 2002). Because the Intuitive System is the focus of the proposed approach, more must be said about how these domains work together to energize and enable prosocial action (especially moral sociability defined as generative care). Domain 1: Ethical Intuitions What is the primary motivational unit of moral personality? In the SIM, ethical intuitions provide the first link in a chain of events that motivate prosocial action as they function to sensitize persons to ethical features of social situations. Haidt’s most recent definition of an ethical intuition reads: The sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. (Haidt & Bjorkland, 2008, p. 188)

In most cases, this flash of feeling (affect) leads directly to the conscious condemnation (or praise) of the person in question, often including declarative thoughts (“That was rude; I can’t believe he said that”). This experience of affect, together with a felt conviction of the rightness or wrongness of the act, is what Haidt referred to as the moral judgment (or evaluation). However, this is not an evaluation arrived at by moral reasoning but rather through a more tacit intuitional process.


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A first claim of the SIM, then, is this: People form initial intuitive evaluations of persons and situations almost instantly, and these evaluations are difficult to inhibit or change by conscious willpower alone (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). According to the SIM, ethical intuitions are believed to occur rapidly and without awareness of their causes, or assistance from conscious reasoning, and convey information about the moral rightness or wrongness of certain human behaviors. Furthermore, even when people engage in moral reasoning after the onset of these initial evaluations, they do so “in a mental space that has already been prestructured by intuitive processes, including affective reactions which prepare the brain to approach or avoid the person or proposition being considered” (p. 803). To illustrate, upon perceiving a child in distress or fear, most persons will automatically generate a good-bad evaluation, which in turn activates an associated action tendency to approach. In other words, the Care/harm ethical intuition will be activated, thus beginning the process of energizing prosocial action. Haidt and Joseph (2004) suggested that in “strong cases” (p. 60) an intuition will also “trigger” activation of other facets of the moral emotion, such as facial expressions, physiological changes, subjective feelings, and “cold” cognitive appraisals. In this example, the moral emotion of compassion would likely be triggered, thus intensifying the initial action tendency to respond to the perceived suffering of the child (i.e., the person would feel “energized” to act). Empirical evidence for the speed and ubiquity of affect-laden ethical intuitions can be found in the following reviews (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Lieberman, 2000). Moral foundations theory. What are some of these ethical intuitions? There are now a number of methodological strategies and systems that seek to identify and classify ethical intuitions or moral “heuristics” (see Blasi, 2009 for a review). One approach, “moral foundations theory” (MFT: Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), conceptualizes ethical intuitions as the basic building blocks of the moral mind (also see Haidt & Joseph, 2007). According to MFT, five perceptual categories provide the foundation for evaluating the character and actions of others: Care/ harm (issues related to harm, suffering, and care); Fairness/Reciprocity (equality, fairness, and justice); Ingroup/Loyalty (in-group affiliation and preferential favor); Authority/Respect (hierarchy, authority, and obedience); and Purity/Sanctity (issues related to the purity and sanctity of the human body and “sacred” spaces of meaning). Haidt and Joseph (2004) likened these ethical intuitions to “bits of input-output

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programming” (p. 60) connecting the perception of a pattern in the social world (often a virtue or vice) to an evaluation and, in many cases, to a specific moral emotion (e.g., anger, contempt, admiration). A second way to think about the moral foundations is like an audio equalizer with five slider switches (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Each switch—Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority, and Purity—can be thought of as an independent parameter of moral functioning, thus producing a wide variety of patterns depending on the settings of each of the switches. Applying this analogy, these authors have used their Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) to assess individual life stories, as well as collective narratives about political ideologies, like right-wing authoritarianism (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). More recently, Graham and Haidt (2010) have commended moral foundations theory as a way to study both individual- and group-level moral preferences within different religions. Thus, one appealing feature of MFT, and potential application to the psychology of spiritual transformation, is that it claims to offer a universal psychosocial baseline for comparing and contrasting moral orientations across cultures, religions, and (perhaps) even interpretive traditions within a particular religion (see Flanagan & Williams, 2010 for an illustration of this approach). A second implication of MFT for spiritual transformation rests on its assertion that these innate but modifiable mechanisms (Marcus, 2004) are the perceptual foundations upon which other domains of moral personality are constructed, especially virtues and values. For example, in the case of the intuition to Care/harm, the SIM posits that the virtues of empathy, compassion, and love become constructed on top of (“connected to”) the intuition to relieve suffering and provide care (Graham, Haidt, & Rimm-Kaufman, 2008). Thus, ethical intuitions provide the perceptual ground or floor for moralspiritual development. How are these ethical intuitions practiced so as to better sensitize persons to important sociomoral cues in the environment? Consistent with MFT, the following hypothesis concerning the role of ethical intuitions in promoting moral sociability is suggested. Selective attunement hypothesis: “Tuning-Up” ethical intuitions. Prosocial motivation and action is facilitated through practices that tune-up (activate) ethical intuitions related to moral features of social situations (e.g., Care/harm). In the SIM, a primary function of ethical intuitions is to provide “perceptual sensitivity” to certain features of sociomoral


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situations (Haidt & Joseph, 2007, p. 386). Therefore, in the proposed model of spiritual transformation, a first process is “tuning-up” ethical intuitions that a particular family, culture, or religious narrative (meaning system) wishes to reinforce in its members. Haidt (2001) thus suggested that the SIM account of moral development begins with something of an unexpected twist. It posits that since ethical intuitions are innate, the most important developmental question is not: “How do they get into the child?” but rather, “How do they get out?” (p. 826). Drawing on the work of Fiske (1991), Haidt argued that sociomoral development should first be thought of as a process of externalization (not internalization) of innate intuitions that naturally manifest themselves as part of normal maturation (also see Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). In the connectionist model of moral character (Churchland, 1998), ethical intuitions can also be viewed as part of a moral associative network in the brain-mind that gets tuned up gradually by experience (Haidt & Joseph, 2007, pp. 375–376). Over time, and with appropriate training, the brain-mind does a progressively better job of recognizing important patterns of input and then responding with the appropriate pattern of output. By extension, applied to spiritual transformation, a first task in expanding one’s motivation and capacity for moral sociability is to assist the tuning-up of innate ethical intuitions through their activation and repetition in real-world experiences. Consistent with both classical (Aristotle) and contemporary “connectionist” theory (Churchland, Casebeer), this kind of tuning-up cannot be replaced with top-down learning, such as the rote learning of rules (deontological principles). Rather, moral development of this sort calls for the immersion of persons in environments rich in virtue exemplars (persons) and in narratives that embody the ethical intuitions valued by a culture, religious tradition, and family. Representative research. In the extant empirical literature, is there any evidence for the plausibility of this hypothesis? One line of research and empirical strategy that may prove useful for exploring the selective attunement hypothesis has examined the impact of attachment security on prosocial motivation and action (see Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005 for an overview). In the SIM, the attachment motive is considered an expression of the innate intuition to Care/harm (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Based on applications of Bowlby and Ainsworth’s attachment theory, Shaver and Mikulincer

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(2001) have demonstrated that styles of attachment and experimentally manipulated activation of the sense of having a secure base are systematically related to compassion and altruism. For example, activating a secure base (both through conscious stimuli and subliminal priming) has been shown to increase cognitive openness to others (i.e., to “hear” others) and to increase the salience of Schwartz’ (1992) selftranscendent values “benevolence” and “universalism” (Mikulincer et al., 2005). Second, different forms of insecure attachment (anxious and avoidant) were related to deficiencies in empathy and altruism. For example, people with an avoidant attachment style scored lower on measures of self-transcendent values, while persons with an anxious style felt more threatened by members of out-groups and were more likely to express hostility toward them (Mikulincer et al., 2005). Third, experimentally enhanced security has been found to attenuate negative reactions to out-group others as well as negative reactions to people who express negative or critical opinions about aspects of the other’s worldview, such as national identity (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001). Collectively, this research demonstrates that the activation of an ethical intuition related to Care/harm (i.e., attachment security) may at least temporarily tune-up one’s motivation and willingness to help others. Future research employing this paradigm could extend such methods to explore other motives (intuitions) hypothesized to motivate virtues related to caring; for example, reciprocity (related to gratitude; Emmons & McCullough, 2003) and reparation (related to forgiveness; McCullough, 2008). Domain 2: Premoral Emotions Recent reviews of the psychological literature concerned with the affective basis of spiritual transformation (e.g., Emmons, 2005) suggest that while the role of emotion has long been acknowledged, there has been no consensual model of how emotion facilitates spiritual development and by what means. Proposing one direction, Emmons suggested that future theory and research might profitably focus on the nature and function of the positive and moral emotions, viewing them as both “motivators of and consequences of spiritual transformation” (p. 247). Consistent with this proposal, in the SIM, moral emotions provide the essential motivational function of amplifying ethical intuitions (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 60). They provide the second link in a chain of events that energize and enable moral action. Therefore, a second


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major claim about moral motivation is this: Moral domain-specific actions (e.g., actions that express Care/harm) are activated to “go on line” when persons are energized by the moral emotions connected to these actions, not primarily by “duty” or by force of willpower. Three important issues in contemporary moral emotion theory serve to clarify this hypothesis. Moral emotions theory. First, what are moral emotions? Haidt (2003b) defined moral emotions as emotions “that are linked to interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other then the judge or agent” (p. 276). Moral emotions provide the motivational force (the power or energy) to do good and avoid doing bad (also see Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Therefore, in referring to certain emotions as “moral,” the suggestion is not that some emotions are better than others, rather that certain emotions typically amplify action tendencies (Frijda, 1986) intrinsic to the emotion. In other words, moral emotions put the person into a motivational and cognitive state in which there is an increased tendency to engage in (or inhibit) prosocial goal-related actions. There are now a number of slightly differing taxonomies of the moral or (sometimes) “social emotions” (Damasio, 2003; Fredrickson, 2004; Haidt, 2003b). For example, Haidt categorizes moral emotions into four major families or categories: Other-Condemning emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust); Self-Conscious emotions (shame, embarrassment, and guilt); Other-Suffering emotions (empathy, compassion/sympathy); and Other-Praising emotions (gratitude and moral elevation). A second question: Do moral emotions in fact motivate prosocial action? Recent empirical research in social psychology and affective neuroscience strongly argues for the primacy of moral emotions— more than moral reasoning and high-level meaning—as central determinants of prosocial action (see Part 1, section entitled The Moral Emotion-Action Link). The emerging picture seems to be that these emotions are part of a moral judgment-making and motivational apparatus which facilitates prosocial action, and that emotional deficits lead to “moral motivation deficits” in prosociality (Shulman, 2002, p. 509). For example, there is evidence that the moral emotion of trust activates an innate action tendency (motive) to affiliate or attach to other persons (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001); gratitude to reciprocate the other’s actions (Emmons & McCullough, 2003); empathy to engage in altruistic action (Batson, 1987); and guilt to repair or restore disruptions to the relationship (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Other empirical

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evidence for the role of moral emotions as motivators of prosocial action can be found in the following reviews (e.g., Haidt, 2001; 2007; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Keltner, 2009). A third question: How do moral emotions act as motivators of prosocial action? One response to this question proposes that moral affects serve as moral motives for prosocial action, providing a critical link between moral judgments and moral behavior (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larsen, 2001). In the SIM version of the emotion as moral motive hypothesis, persons are moved to moral action when an eliciting stimulus situation activates the multiple components or “facets” that comprise a moral emotion (e.g., facial musculature, physiological changes, and feelings). Thus, activating (and intensifying) a moral emotion can trigger a cascade of affective (feeling), motivational, cognitive, and behavioral processes. A second related response to this question is that moral emotions function as “amplifiers” of innate action tendencies (Tomkins, 1970, p. 101). Tomkins argued that innate motives (“drives”) have insufficient motivational strength and require “concurrent amplification” provided by the emotions. A third response to this question, suggested by Fredrickson’s (2004) “broaden-and-build” theory of positive emotions, is that emotions activate prosocial actions by broadening the array of thought-action tendencies (e.g., gratitude makes one more mindful of the other) and by building personal and social skills that enhance the quality of relationships (e.g., gratitude energizes behavior to return the gift). Empirical research has confirmed both the “broaden” and more recently the “build” hypotheses (cf. Fredrickson, 2004; Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, & Pek, 2008). How are these moral emotions amplified so as to “energize” moral action? Consistent with these assumptions, the following hypothesis about the role of moral emotions in promoting moral sociability is suggested. Emotion amplification hypothesis: “Amplifying” moral emotions. Prosocial motivation and action is facilitated through practices that amplify (intensify) moral emotions associated with ethical intuitions (e.g., compassion related to Care/harm). In this model, a second process of spiritual transformation is “amplification” of the moral emotions that energize prosocial action. The emotion amplification hypothesis predicts that through the systematic intensification of moral emotions, over time, persons will more frequently and perhaps more quickly feel


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the appropriate moral emotions in response to perceived Care/harm situations, and therefore, be more likely to express caring actions. This is so because in the connectionist understanding of emotion, various facets of emotion (preconscious thoughts, physiology, facial expressions, feelings, action tendencies, “cold” cognition) are believed to be connected in such a way that the activation of any facet in the network may activate other facets, a kind of cascade or reverberation that ripples throughout the network once it is activated (cf. Frijda, 1986; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Consistent with this explanation, in the SIM, an ethical intuition is hypothesized to trigger other facets of a moral emotion or set of moral emotions and, through this amplification, to strengthen the probability that a person will engage in moral behavior (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Thus, it is an ethical intuition plus the intensifying actions of a moral emotion that is the primary motivator of moral action. Note this hypothesis also restates the position of emotion theorist Tomkins (1970) who over 40 years ago argued that emotions act as amplifiers of innate action tendencies. This hypothesis is also consistent with research that demonstrates people frequently rely on their moods and momentary flashes of feeling as guides to moral judgments and decisions (e.g., Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994) and with cognitive neuroscience findings that moral judgment-making and behavior is disrupted when persons have certain deficits in emotional information processing (e.g., Damasio, 2003). Representative research. One empirical strategy for exploring the emotion amplification hypothesis has been demonstrated recently by Fredrickson and colleagues (2008). Their study was designed to document how compassion (and other positive emotions) might help build resources related to love (epigraph above). It tested Fredrickson’s build hypothesis by assessing the impact of practicing loving kindness meditation (LKM) on various psychological skills. Specifically, the build hypothesis predicts that, over time, as persons experience positive emotions they will “build consequential personal resources” (p. 1045) that enhance social functioning. They categorized these resources as: cognitive (ability to mindfully attend to the present moment), psychological (ability to maintain a sense of mastery over environmental challenges), social (ability to give and receive emotional support), and physical (ability to ward off the common cold). Over a period of 7 weeks, participants engaged in daily practice of a tradition-neutral LKM which involved: a) focused attention on the heart region and b) thoughtful awareness of people toward whom the individual had warm feelings.

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Participants were asked to direct these warm feelings first toward themselves and then expand these warm feelings to an ever-widening circle of others. Results showed that daily LKM practice increased the experience of positive emotions which, in turn, produced increases in a wide range of personal resources from each category (e.g., cognitive: mindfulness, savoring the future; psychological: self-acceptance, purpose in life; social: social support received, positive relations with others; and physical: decreased illness symptoms). In turn, these increments in personal resources predicted increased life satisfaction and reduced symptoms. Thus, this study provided one demonstration that engaging in emotion amplifying practices can enhance positive moral emotions which, in turn, may promote building skills that facilitate moral sociability. Future research employing this paradigm could assess other skills related to Care/harm (e.g., empathy), as well as other practices that amplify moral emotions. Domain 3: Moral Virtues It is widely recognized that each of the major world religions, as well as many secular spiritual traditions, teaches that authentic spiritual transformation must result in prosocial virtues such as compassion, love, forgiveness, gratitude, etc. (Vaillant, 2008). But what is a moral virtue? In the SIM, ethical intuitions, moral emotions, and moral virtues stand in critical inter-relationships with each other. Specifically, a) while ethical intuitions tell a person whether he or she likes or dislikes a person or situation, and therefore whether to approach or avoid, and b) a moral emotion amplifies the intuition, thereby strengthening the likelihood that a virtuous (or vicious) action will ensue, c) it is a moral virtue that scripts how the person will act in a particular situation. To be compassionate, for example, is not just to see certain features of situations (intuition), or to feel compassion at the right time (emotion), but also involves how-to respond in various situations (skills). In the SIM, while ethical intuitions and moral emotions energize prosocial action, they are not themselves the skills that are motivated. Thus, a third major claim of recent social intuitionist theory is this: While ethical intuitions and moral emotions underwrite the virtues, they are not virtues but are “essential tools in the construction of virtues” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 63). Relevant to present discussion, the SIM offers three insights about the nature and functioning of moral virtues important for spiritual transformation theory and research.


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Social intuitionist virtue theory. First, in the SIM, virtues are not regarded simply as traits (Doris, 2002), understood as global tendencies (dispositions) to act in a consistent way across varying circumstances. Rather, following connectionist models (Casebeer, 2003; Churchland, 1998), moral virtues are modeled as quasi-procedural (skill-like) knowledge structures that function like scripts that specify how-to act in particular situations (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; 2007). They are implicit associational networks in the brain-mind that connect episodic knowledge (remembrance of specific events) and procedural knowledge (how-to knowledge or skills). Stated another way, virtues are not semantic-declarative qualities that persons “have” or know; but rather interactive skills that persons “do” or perform (Cantor, 1990). These intuition-expressive, moral emotion-related procedural skills make up a person’s nonconscious repertoire of prosocial abilities. Without action skills in a particular ethical domain, a person may comprehend the meaning of and even value certain moral principles (to be “benevolent”), yet he or she may possess only a minimal ability to perform the skills that express the value (e.g., empathy). Second, the kinds of virtues that persons are likely to develop in moral communities are “partly constrained” and shaped by the nature of the ethical intuitions (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 62). Virtues therefore are understood as biologically-prepared in the sense that human beings come equipped with an innate preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving other human beings (i.e., the ethical intuitions). Ethical intuitions thus provide the foundations upon which virtues are constructed. Third, consistent with classical Aristotelian theory, social intuitionist virtue theory argues that while virtues are biologically-prepared, they are socially-constructed in moral communities, primarily through exposure to and efforts to emulate exemplars of virtues that have come to be valued by a particular culture and narrative. Thus, virtues and virtue complexes are regarded as social constructions: “cultural achievements built on and partly constrained by deeply rooted preparedness-es to construe and respond to the social world in particular ways” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, pp. 62–63). A virtue complex denotes a set of virtues that are highly valued by the culture at large or sub-culture (family) and therefore are likely to vary between different local settings and cultures. As noted, with respect to Care/harm, social intuitionist virtue theory suggests that empathy, compassion, and love

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are normatively developed in nearly all societies. But perhaps there are other virtues instrumental to caring, especially when the meaning of caring is broadened to encompass Erikson’s understanding of generative care. Virtues of moral sociability: A provisional model. One of the criticisms of virtue models has been that they do not always articulate a clear conceptual rationale for inclusion of their virtues (Kohlberg’s “bag of virtues” criticism). In light of this criticism, and the SIM assumptions outlined above, a critical question about the virtue domain is this: Are there particular moral emotion-related virtues that enable generative care? Recent research suggests indeed there may be a specific suite of emotions-virtues instrumental to caring action. Among the candidates for inclusion in such a model are: trust (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2001); love (Fredrickson, 2004); elevation (Haidt, 2003a); empathy (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995); self-compassion (Neff, 2008); compassion (Keltner, 2009); gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2003); positive pride (Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007); guilt (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007); forgiveness (Worthington, Sharp, & Lerner, 2006); and humility (Sandage, 1999). Note that some of these virtues retain the name of their associated moral emotions (e.g., compassion, gratitude), while others imply the presence of a moral emotion(s) but are not named by the emotion itself (e.g., forgiveness and humility). Each of these emotions-virtues is sometimes referred to as an other-regarding virtue (McCullough & Snyder, 2000) or warmth-based virtue (Worthington & Berry, 2005). While each virtue has its own literature, and has been studied in the context of its contribution to subjective well-being (typically, happiness as the outcome variable), far less research has explored its utility as a facilitator of caring. But, to illustrate the value of this model to generate empirical research, a recent study demonstrated that gratitude—over and beyond the motivational role of positive affect—significantly predicted generative concern (a global measure of generative identity), as well as generative caring in young adult friendships (a relationship-specific measure of generative actions) (Oakes Mueller & Leffel, manuscript in progress). The proposal here is that each of these virtues represents a biologically-prepared, socially-constructed moral “good” that forms part of the psychological foundation for an emergent master capacity for generative care (not simply Care/harm as Haidt describes it). Consistent with this suggestion, moral emotion researcher Tangney (2002) has suggested that some such constellation of moral emotion-


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related capacities may “form the core of a person’s moral motivational system” (p. 97) and could provide a fruitful agenda for programmatic empirical research. How are moral virtues strengthened so as to expand one’s capacity for moral sociability? The following hypothesis concerning the role of moral virtues in promoting moral sociability is suggested. Skill rehearsal hypothesis: “Strengthening” moral virtues. Prosocial motivation and action is facilitated through practices that strengthen (expand) intuition-related procedural skills (e.g., virtues related to Care/harm). In the proposed model, whereas the first process involves assisted externalization of innate ethical intuitions, and a second process involves amplification of moral emotions connected to the intuitions, a third process involves “strengthening” skills (virtues) that are expressive of an ethical domain (i.e., how-to express Care in particular situations). In the SIM, this is accomplished primarily through internalization of moral exemplars and narratives that represent the skills. Thus, to effect the formation and embodiment of intuition-specific skills, the SIM argues it is helpful to espouse (deontological) rules and principles about the behavior but only as an adjunct to more indirect approaches that facilitate imitation and internalization of procedural skills (i.e., virtue mimesis). In support of this hypothesis, Fiske (1999) reviewed evidence from anthropology that suggests children are declaratively taught surprisingly little in most cultures and that they acquire most of their cultural knowledge and procedural expertise by observing and imitating the practice of older children and adults. He also suggested that researchers have generally underestimated the importance of motor schemas and implicit knowledge in moral education. Similarly, Westen (1986) has examined six separate meanings of and processes related to moral internalization and suggested that researchers more carefully model practices related to each of these processes (also see Blasi, 2001). Representative research. One line of line of research suggestive of the skill rehearsal hypothesis concerns the virtue of empathy and related skill of mindfulness (e.g., Baer, 2003) or mindsight (Siegel, 2010). In Siegel’s cognitive neuroscience approach, empathy is conceptualized as a capacity to create “images of other’s people’s minds” (p. 28), and involves “focusing skills” (p. xii) that are part of mindful reflection or mindsight. The capacity for empathy, sometimes erroneously depicted as a moral emotion (see Haidt’s, 2003b distinction) is more accurately

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described as a complex automatic-procedural skill. For example, Feshbach (1975) defined empathy as a holistic response comprised of three inter-related procedural skills: a) the ability to take another person’s perspective (role-taking or perspective-taking); b) the ability to discriminate or accurately read cues regarding another person’s particular emotional experience (affective cue discrimination); and c) the ability to experience a range of emotions (because empathy involves the sharing of another’s affective experience in one form or another). As noted in Part 1, Siegel (2010) conceptualized mindfulness as a “learnable skill” that allows us to see into the internal workings of our own minds, and as “the basic skill that underlies everything we mean when we speak of having social and emotional intelligence” (p. xii). Consistent with this hypothesis, the empirical literature on various mindfulness practices (see Baer, 2003 for a review), reminiscent of some methods of contemplative prayer or meditation, demonstrates that persons can improve their capacity for self-reflection and become more attuned to their own emotions and therefore to the emotional states of others (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003, study 3). Moreover, some have argued that mindfulness represents an essential, if not the critical procedural skill, that underlies all virtuous activity, and therefore it is fundamental to the process of spiritual transformation (e.g., Goodenough & Woodruff, 2001; Siegel, 2010). Thus, one important area for continued theoretical development and empirical research is the modeling of procedural skills that are constitutive of particular emotions/virtues. For example, Emmons (2007) argued that gratitude is more than a feeling, and it fundamentally involves the ability to perceive that one has been the recipient of “undeserved merit” (p. 7). Other emotions/virtues likewise could be modeled in terms of their component procedural skills, and doing so may suggest virtue-specific practices. Domain 4: Moral Vices In the proposed model, a fourth domain of moral personality and spiritual transformation is moral vice. The notion that certain vicelike dispositions of personality, or states of mind (Siegel, 2010), may function to inhibit or obstruct one’s ability to express virtue has long been an important assumption of religious wisdom traditions, both religious and secular (Schimmel, 1997). For example, in the Buddhist tradition, certain deadly emotions (Goleman, 2003) are conceived as


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obstructions to the enactment of karuna (compassion). Similarly, various Judeo-Christian traditions have attempted to identify the principia vitia that obstruct love (e.g., DeYoung, 2009). But what is a vice? Aristotelian scholar Lear (2000) has cleverly coined the term “neurtue” (neurotic virtue; p. 65) to represent the opposite of a virtue. He conceptualized vice as a nonconscious tendency to perceive and respond to persons and situations in a way that “distorts” present reality on the basis of past experience and that obstructs the functioning of a virtue. Likewise, Symington (1994) defined vice as “negative emotional activity” (p. 149) that inhibits the expression of love for self and neighbor. These notions are consistent with connectionist theory (Casebeer, 2003; Churchland, 1998; Flanagan, 2007; Westen, 2002) which re-defines vices (and virtues) as neural systems that act as “attractor sites” which prime persons to perceive, to feel, and to act towards self and others in terms of past prototypes (neural patterns). Understood in this manner, a moral vice can be provisionally defined as an intuition-specific, emotion-related state of mind that obstructs the expression of a virtue. For example, with respect to Care/harm, if empathy is conceived as a virtue that facilitates “feeling with the other,” then a vice could be viewed as a state of mind that inhibits or obstructs this process, either a “deficit” (e.g., inattention to the other’s feelings) or “excess” (too much distress at the other’s distress). Thus, the importance of the next question: Which vices and why? Vices of moral sociability: A provisional model. The present model thus suggests that a useful next step in building a moral intuition approach to spiritual transformation, one in keeping with the current interest in the positive psychology of religion, would be the exploration of emotion-related processes that oppose or inhibit specific virtues (cf. Chang & Sanna, 2003). Specifically, future theory could attempt to model some of the intuition-specific, emotion-related states of mind (vices) which function to inhibit or obstruct virtues related to moral sociability. Some of the vice-virtue antinomies which can be found in the literature include: insecurity vs. trust (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001); contempt vs. love (Haidt, 2003b); disgust vs. elevation (Algoe & Haidt, 2009); personal distress vs. empathy (Eisenberg et al., 1989); self-condemnation vs. self-compassion (Neff, 2008); entitlement vs. gratitude (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2008); hubris vs. positive pride (Lewis, 2000); shame vs. guilt (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek 2007); and revenge vs. forgiveness (McCullough, 2008). For example, Exline et al. (2008) found that narcissistic entitlement

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(expectations of special treatment and preoccupation with defending one’s rights) impedes forgiveness in ways not captured by other robust predictors (e.g., offense severity, apology, relationships closeness, religiosity, and Big Five personality factors). These authors proposed that entitlement seems to “directly oppose” (p. 910) humility and/or a grateful disposition. How are moral vices weakened so as to permit greater freedom of expression for the virtues? Consistent with the above theoretical assumptions, the following hypothesis concerning the importance of diminishing moral vices as a means for promoting moral sociability is proposed. Expressive disclosure hypothesis: “Weakening” moral vices. Prosocial motivation and action is facilitated through practices that diminish (weaken) the affective power of vices that inhibit expression of the virtues. This model proposes that a fourth process of spiritual transformation is “weakening” intuition-specific, emotion-related vices that act to inhibit or obstruct virtues. In connectionist terms, weakening a vice involves diminishing the affective power of various nonconscious associative networks that inhibit prosociality, particularly: (a) those that trigger problematic emotional reactions (e.g., out-group prejudice), (b) those that trigger problematic defensive strategies that obstruct identification with others (e.g., dismissive avoidance), and (c) those that underlie dysfunctional interpersonal patterns (e.g., entitlement). Gabbard and Westen (2003) suggested that altering the functioning of negative associational networks involves both strengthening connections in some networks (virtues) and weakening connections in the other networks (vices). Concerning the weakening of vice, diminishing the affective power of vice means weakening the links (“nodes”) in the network that have been activated together, thus lowering their accessibility to activation (i.e., the tendency to assimilate new experiences and thus to influence present reality). Weakening thus refers to the relative deactivation of problematic links in associational networks such that a person will tend to find new, adaptive interactions and persons more available. It is assumed that structural change of this nature does not completely eliminate or replace old networks, which is likely neurologically impossible (Westen & Gabbard, 2002). Rather, it is understood that structural change of this nature is never final, is always a matter of degree, and depends upon the regressive pull of present circumstances, the pervasiveness of previous associative


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networks, and the person’s capacity for conscious self reflection (see Gabbard & Westen’s, 2003 discussion, pp. 827–829). Representative research. One empirical strategy potentially useful for exploring how to weaken moral vices is illustrated by the narrative self-disclosure paradigm (cf. Pennebaker, 1997). This research program has demonstrated that expressive writing about one’s negative life experiences and emotions, such as worst life experiences, helps reduce the impact of negative unexpressed emotions. In brief, Pennebaker found that writing about problematic, unresolved episodes in one’s life, especially in story form, has both long-term mental and physical health benefits. Text analyses of the words used in these narratives revealed that these benefits were predicted by increasing use of insight and causal words, indicating that participants were deriving narrative meaning from the events over the course of the study (Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997). This explanation suggests that self-disclosure may facilitate the amplification (intensification) of emotions, especially negative emotions, which then through the practice of insight-oriented disclosure are integrated into a more coherent life story. Again, since most of this research has relied on subjective outcome measures (i.e., happiness or physical well-being: Eid & Larsen, 2008), it is not clear whether these interventions will be relevant to weakening intuitionspecific vices and to strengthening their virtue opposites. However, it is reasonable to hypothesize, for example, that insight-oriented disclosure of hurt and resentment, over time, will activate the intuition to forgive, intensify the emotion of compassion, and thus motivate persons to exercise procedural skills to repair the relationship (e.g., McCullough, 2008). System 2: The Reasoning System (Moral Direction) Recently, Haidt and Kesebir (2010) have argued that the modal view in moral psychology is that reasoning and intuition both matter, “but that intuition matters more” (p. 807). They noted, however, that even in the social intuitionist account, where intuitions have primacy, there is room still for conscious reasoning to exert some “direction” (p. 807) on moral action. In the proposed model, the Reasoning System is comprised of three “cold” (less affect-laden) domains that subserve the sociomoral function termed moral direction. These domains are designated moral values, moral reasoning, and moral will (middle of

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Figure 1). In current social cognitive neuroscience models (e.g., Westen, 2002), a moral value is believed to consist of semantic-declarative knowledge that can be activated automatically (without awareness) but that often requires the assistance of controlled processes to apply in specific life situations (reasoning and will). This system is also sometimes referred to as the verbal-symbolic system (Schultheiss, 2002). In the following discussion, less space is devoted to describing these domains, since they have been the focus of much research in moral psychology (e.g., Pizarro & Bloom, 2003) and in the psychology of religion (e.g., Paloutzian & Park, 2005). Domain 5: Moral Values Most models of moral personality emphasize that persons acquire propositional values about what is good and acceptable in terms of how to treat others as well as other objects in the environment. In the present model, following recent thinking, moral values are defined as standards, rules, and goals (SRGs: Lewis, 2000) that guide such conduct. Collectively, they are hypothesized to provide direction for moral sociability (i.e., knowledge about “what-to” do). Standards represent abstract principles about relations with others (e.g., the Golden Rule or categorical imperative); rules represent specific guidelines (e.g., moral prohibitions and prescriptions) that provide specific details; and goals represent concrete ways that persons try to express or realize their values (e.g., personal strivings; Emmons, 1999). Westen (1985) referred to these constructs as a constellation of “functionally related processes” which are involved in “imparting meaning to one’s life and providing ideals to live by” (p. 97). In terms of the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge, moral values represent semantic-declarative knowledge that one has acquired through socialization (Westen, 1985), especially through the process of observing and imitating significant others (Blasi, 2001). In empirical research, moral values represent the kind of self-related (schematic) information elicited in standard self-report measures that ask persons to: “Describe yourself” or “How much are each of these statements true or not true about you?” For example, Schwartz’s (1992) approach to values asked the respondent to endorse the degree to which each of 10 primary values is self-descriptive: Benevolence, Universalism, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, and Tradition.


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Corresponding to this domain, a fifth process of spiritual transformation therefore can be referred to as “clarifying” (prioritizing) moral values. Clarifying and prioritizing moral values is what Kohlbergianstyle moral education attempts to do when students are presented with moral dilemmas and asked to confront any contradictions between their answers and universal principles of fairness (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971). Much religious education is modeled (if only implicitly) after this value-based approach to moral development. However, the proposed model argues that while standards, rules, and goals set the direction for moral action, values alone cannot enable the realization of these directives without a functional (procedural) capacity to do so (i.e., virtues). Moreover, it predicts we should not be surprised to discover a value-behavior discrepancy (even) in religious people (cf. Saraglou, 2006), since the values that direct and the virtues that motivate and enable likely represent different kinds of knowledge and therefore may require different practices. Domain 6: Moral Reasoning A second domain of the Reasoning system is the ability to think and reason about a particular course of action, particularly in light of one’s moral values. In moral philosophy, this skill is referred to as practical moral reasoning (e.g., Flesher & Worthen, 2007, pp. 195–199). Practical moral reasoning thus comprises a second component in the directional system of moral personality, providing the person with an ability to deliberate about what-to-do in various sociomoral situations (e.g., ethical decision-making, choices about alternative courses of action in relationships, etc.). In contrast to intuitive evaluations, the SIM defines moral reasoning as “conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about people (and situations) in order to reach a moral judgment” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). Bargh (1994) conceptualized moral reasoning as a conscious process that is intentional, effortful, and controllable, where the reasoner is aware of what is going on. Kohlberg believed that moral reasoning was the central mechanism by which moral values lead to moral action and argued that “moral reasoning is the conscious process of using ordinary moral language” (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983, p. 69). In contrast, the SIM says that moral reasoning is rarely the direct cause of moral judgments and moral motivation (Haidt, 2001). But it also acknowledges three ways (“links” in the 2001 model) that “old

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dogs can learn new tricks” (Haidt, 2003c, p. 197) and thus override their immediate (perhaps erroneous or biased) intuitive responses and build new intuitions (also see Haidt, 2007). First, we can use conscious verbal reasoning such as considering the costs and benefits of each course of action (“reasoned judgment” link; Haidt, 2001). Second, we can reframe a situation and see a new angle or consequence, thereby triggering a second flash of intuition that may compete with the first (“private reflection” link). And, third, we can talk with people who raise new arguments, which then trigger new flashes of intuition followed by various kinds of reasoning (“social persuasion” link). The SIM argues that the first two paths are rarely used and that most change happens as a result of social interaction. Corresponding to this domain, a sixth process of spiritual transformation can be referred to as “sharpening” moral reasoning. Following Haidt, the present model suggests that old intuitions can be modified, and perhaps new ones formed, by practicing each of the above three processes. But the questions of which method is more typical and which is more effective remain issues for future empirical research. In the present model, as with moral values, the primary contribution of moral reasoning is hypothesized to be directional, not motivational, just as the steering wheel in one’s automobile can direct but it cannot empower. Domain 7: Moral Will A third domain of the Reasoning system is referred as moral “will” or “self-control” (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009, p. 72). There are two ways to view the construct of moral will: a) the ability to inhibit negative actions (the “stop” function), and/or b) the ability to initiate positive actions (“go” function). Historically, Rationalist psychology has tended to equate moral will with the “go” function, suggesting that the primary locus of moral action lies in the ability to choose among alternative courses of action (e.g., to help and not hurt others). But the rationalist approach (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971) is prone to commit the “rationalist fallacy” of assuming that “where there is a will, there is necessarily a way” (i.e., that because I will it, I am capable of doing it). Thus, in contrast to some authors who argue that selfcontrol constitutes “the master virtue” (Geyer & Baumeister, 2005, p. 413) of spiritual transformation, the proposed model posits a more limited role to willpower, emphasizing instead the priority of the Intu-


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itive System (not Reasoning) to motivate and enable moral sociability. As with moral values and moral reasoning, the primary contribution of moral will is believed to be directional, not motivational. For example, while a person can “will” to be empathic (e.g., to listen attentively and compassionately), willpower cannot energize and enable skills that the person has not sufficiently acquired. In the proposed model, what then is the role of moral will in spiritual transformation (conceptualized as intentional movement toward moral sociability)? In recent social and moral psychology, “willpower” is more often defined as the “ability to inhibit an impulsive response that undoes one’s commitment” to a higher-order goal (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999, p. 3). Similarly, “self-control” has been defined as “the internal resources available to inhibit, override, or alter responses that may arise as a result of physiological processes, habit, learning, or the press of the situation” (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004, p. 86). Defined in this manner, moral will refers primarily to one’s capacity to inhibit or suppress negative emotions and actions, not to initiate positive moral emotions and actions (i.e., the “stop” function). The generic capacity for bringing one’s behavior back in line with a standard, termed self-regulatory strength (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004), has been likened to a muscle that can be weakened through acute exertion but that can also be strengthened through repeated use over time (Geyer & Baumeister, 2005). A recent review of the literature on religion, self-regulation, and self-control (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009), offered three conclusions relevant for present discussion (especially pp. 66–68). First, there is some evidence that involvement in religious communities (perhaps through their role as moralistic audience) promotes self-monitoring and the inhibition of negative behavior (i.e., the “stop” function of willpower). For example, studies show that some forms of meditation affect the cortical regions that subserve self-monitoring. Second, there is also some evidence that some religious rituals (meditation, prayer, religious imagery, and scripture reading) can promote the “go” function of moral will. They found several experiments that support the idea that religious cognition promotes self-monitoring, and perhaps through the effect of self-monitoring, promotes behavioral change in the direction of prosocial goals (e.g., honesty and generosity). Third, these authors suggested there are few studies that demonstrate how religious practices promote and enhance willpower. They encouraged further research that addresses the question of which religious practices

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build self-regulatory strength over time and how enhanced strength promotes prosocial skills. Thus, in the present model, a seventh process of spiritual transformation is designated “building” moral willpower, and refers to an intentional process by which persons build self-regulatory strength, both to “stop” and to “go.” Future Research on the Reasoning System What could the study of the Reasoning System, conceptualized in a moral intuitionist and social functionalist paradigm, contribute to the psychology of spiritual transformation? Haidt and Kesebir (2010) suggested that the precise roles played by intuition and reasoning cannot be established on the existing empirical evidence and that more work on everyday moral judgment and motivation, compared to situations involving moral quandaries (Pincoffs, 1986), is needed. A major assumption of most religious education is that values-based moral reasoning results in “higher-order” deliberations (judgments) that effectively suppress or override the influence of initial “first-order” evaluations involving intuitions and emotions (see Appiah, 2008, pp. 116–120). For example, it is assumed that reasoning about fairness/justice in relation to out-groups will result in moral justifications that attenuate one’s innate in-group bias and thereby motivate “expanding the circle” of care to the wider world (Singer, 1981, pp. 139–140), but important questions surrounding this assumption remain. Do higher-order values really attenuate the prepotency of innate, intuitive evaluations? Through what processes are initial intuitive evaluations revised? When evaluations are revised, are first-order, affect-laden intuitions merely suppressed only to return in the form of implicit attitudes (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) communicated through non-verbal channels (e.g., disgusted facial expressions and voice intonations)? How stable are these higher-order reasons once formed? These questions offer an exciting new frontier for future research in the psychology of spiritual transformation. System 3: Ideological Narrative (Existential Meaning) In the proposed approach, following recent social intuitionist thought (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009), the term Ideological Narrative refers to a third cognitive system involved in spiritual transformation. As with the Reasoning System, Ideological Narrative is modeled as a sys-


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tem that provides semantic-declarative information about the meaning of moral goodness. Conceived here, Ideological Narrative goes beyond the Reasoning System to provide more than moral direction. It offers a response to the “higher” questions concerned with existential or cosmological meaning (e.g., why be good?). Thus, it is more than a set of principles that prescribe what-to do in order to act morally (the province of the Reasoning System); it offers a “big” explanation for why a particular set of virtues and values are important for a good life and for the common good. Specifically, Ideological Narrative serves three critical functions in moral personality. First, it provides a tradition-informed rationale for prioritizing one’s virtues (Intuitive System) and values (Reasoning system). Second, it offers a hermeneutic that permits one to adjudicate conflicts between intuitions, virtues, and values that may occur in everyday sociomoral situations (e.g., why should Care take precedence over Fairness in this situation?). Third, this system provides the basis for one’s moral identity, or more precisely, moral identity situated in a cosmic (existential) story. Domain 8: Moral Identity Situated in a Cosmic (Perhaps) Sacred Story Three ideas are central to this domain. The first is that existential meaning is typically transmitted to persons in the form of some metanarrative, some story about life, that holds together and offers justification for why some ethical intuitions, virtues, and values are to be sought more than others. Drawing on the concept of narration in the moral philosophy of Riceour (1992), religious ethicist Browning (2006) referred to this dimension of moral personality as the “narrative envelope” (p. 25), and argued that some kind of narrative envelope or meaning framework surrounds each person’s conception of the moral good. Conceived in this manner, ideological narrative is nearly identical to the notion of global meaning referred to in meaning-system analyses (e.g., Park, 2005), and it corresponds to Level 3 in McAdams’ (1995) “life story” model of personality. Most recently, this construct has been referred to as “ideological narrative” (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, p. 115). As these authors used the term, a person’s ideological narrative is like McAdams’ life story in some ways, but it is different in other ways. Like a life story, an ideological narrative incorporates a reconstructed past and imagined future, often telling a story of progress or decline, like the “redemption” or “contamination” narratives

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common in the stories of adults in midlife (McAdams, 2009). But, as Haidt and colleagues view them, ideological narratives are grander than life stories, often reaching back centuries or millennia for their “once upon a time,” casting larger groups and forces as the actors, and justifying epic actions, reforms, and even violence as the way to reach the denouement. (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, p. 115)

Such a grand story need not be theistic, but in a religious context, it would say something about the nature and action of God in relation to the world and stipulate why one should, for example, follow some version of the Golden Rule. Likewise, in a non-theistic framework, an ideological narrative likewise would describe why a moral life is good and offer its own principles and prescribed virtues for moral living. For example, in Flanagan’s (2007) naturalistic spirituality, an ecological narrative of human flourishing derived from Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia provides the explanation for what is good and why. In brief, what is central to an ideological narrative is that it gives the person some “final meaning to our means-end actions, our if-then actions, our plans of life, and our images of the good life” (Browning, 2006, p. 51). Second, an ideological narrative offers the person a traditioninformed rationale (story) that allows one to adjudicate between conflicting intuitions (e.g., between caring and justice; Batson, et al., 1995). Since this issue has not been systematically addressed by the SIM, and it is the focus of recent criticism of intuitionism (cf. Appiah, 2008), the following contribution to the conversation is offered. Moral foundations theory makes both descriptive and normative claims about moral systems. Descriptively, it argues persons possess (at least) five innate intuitional foundations that are likely activated in most social environments and cultures, that these foundations can be developed, and that they provide the basis for other moral constructs (e.g., virtues). Normatively, MFT offers the minimal claim that we ought to recognize the importance of all moral foundations and that doing so would improve our comprehension and tolerance for differing religious and political ideologies. A slightly stronger claim is that normal social competence involves developing each of the foundations and integrating them. One of the questions MFT raises is how to resolve conflicts that arise between intuitions, virtues, and values as they arise in everyday life. For example, what should one do when called upon to be compassionate (Care) and just (Fairness) to a “stranger” when at the same


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time powerful Ingroup or Purity intuitions and emotions have been activated? This is where one’s ideological narrative becomes important in the moral life. Browning (2010) suggests that each religious system and culture already contains implicit (or explicit) principles or metaphors that prioritize which intuitions should be tuned-up and practiced, relative to the others. For example, the Judeo-Christian principle of “neighbor love” is often interpreted to highlight the priority of Care/ harm over that of Ingroup/loyalty and Purity/sanctity (e.g., Christ’s story of the Good Samaritan). More importantly, the story offers a justification for why caring should be favored. Neighbor love is to be preferred because all persons are “children of God” (an inversion of the traditional meaning of the Ingroup foundation) and therefore are deserving of respect (Authority). Note that whether or not this theological claim is objectively true, and whether human beings are in fact capable of “habituating” this higher-order motivation, is quite another matter; these issues are secondary to the significance of the story. The importance of the story may be its ability to activate and emphasize particular ethical intuitions (e.g., Care/harm), premoral emotions (e.g., compassion), and moral virtues (e.g., kindness even to the “stranger”), as well as to reinforce prohibitions against certain moral vices (e.g., out-group indifference or hatred). The third idea suggested by the construct Ideological Narrative is that when particular intuitions become central to one’s identity, it heightens one’s sense of obligation and responsibility to live consistent with these intuitions. In current moral psychology, moral identity is hypothesized to be an important source of moral motivation (see Hardy & Carlo, 2005 for a review). It is typically conceptualized as the degree to which persons base their self-concepts on moral qualities (e.g., being generous, compassionate, kind) and the degree to which they find important moral versus non-moral values (e.g., being funny). Further, moral identity is believed to be one of the components of personality that enables persons to assume personal responsibility and moral agency. For example, Blasi, (1995) suggested that a moral identity integrates various moral concerns (principles, values, goals) “with one’s motivational and emotional systems; [and] are made the object of agentic processes, including responsibility; and are finally taken as a basis for the construction of one’s self-concept and identity” (pp. 233–234). Other theorists also assume moral identity entails the unity of self and moral systems (Colby & Damon, 1992), and involves “an explicit theory of yourself as a moral agent—as one who acts on the

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basis of respect and/or concern for the rights and/or welfare of others” (Moshman, 2005, p. 121). Thus, the prevailing assumption in moral psychology is that persons who self-consciously identify with some set of preferred values are more likely to conform their behavior to those moral directives; conversely, persons with a less differentiated and conscious identity are more likely swayed by implicit, automatic, and situation-specific influences (also see McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989 on motive-behavior consistency). Accordingly, in the proposed approach, an eighth process of spiritual transformation can be designated “integrating” moral identity (right side of Figure 1). Future Research on Ideological Narrative The psychology of religion has long recognized that one of the functions of a religious belief system is to provide “an ultimate vision of what people should be striving for in their lives” (Pargament & Park, 1995, p. 15). So what could the study of ideological narrative (moral identity) conceptualized in a moral intuitionist and social functionalist perspective further contribute to the psychology of spiritual transformation? Recall that one of the distinguishing features of a social functionalist perspective is its concern to understand how religions “bind individuals into moral communities” (Graham & Haidt, 2010, p. 140). In future empirical work on ideological narratives, researchers may want to consider the following inter-related questions: a) How do religious and cosmological narratives, such as the belief that all humans are “children of God” work to tune-up intuitions and amplify emotions, if at all? b) Do different religious ideological narratives interpret the five moral foundations the same way? For example, with respect to Care/harm, is Buddhist compassion (karuna) different from Christian love (caritas)? c) How do differing religious narratives prioritize the “moral settings” of the five foundations? And what is the moral principle used to prioritize one ethical foundation over another? d) Do differences between interpretive traditions, even within the same religious narrative, prioritize the moral settings differently and thus build a different kind of moral community? McAdams and colleagues (2008) study of liberal and conservative Christians is suggestive here. Their study used qualitative methods to code the narrative statements offered by Christians who were asked to narrate important events in their lives (McAdams et al., 2008). In brief, they found that


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conservatives told stories in which authorities enforce strict rules and persons learn the value of self-discipline and personality, whereas liberals recalled autobiographical scenes in which main characters develop empathy and learn to open themselves up to new people and foreign perspectives. (p. 987)

Haidt and Kesebir (2010) suggested what researchers may find is that different religious communities “are trying to build different kinds of moral systems using different but overlapping sets of moral intuitions” (p. 822). Research of this nature promises to help us shed further light on how moral foundations influence the development of different ideological narratives and, in turn, how narratives may differentially prioritize the moral foundations (also see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009, study 4). Catalyzing a New Science: Contributions and Future Directions The moral intuitionist approach to spiritual transformation described in Beyond Meaning is more complex and comprehensive than many models. Is the extra complexity necessary? Does the model do a better job of describing some of the processes that mediate spiritual transformation and relationships between such processes? These are questions that future research must decide. The following discussion offers five contributions of the model and future directions for theory and research in the psychology of spiritual transformation. A “Multilevel Interdisciplinary” Model First, this model offers one version of a multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm as encouraged by Emmons and Paloutzian (2003). It is interdisciplinary in that it integrates insights from a variety of fields of study: the meaning-system approach in the psychology of religion (e.g., Park, 2005), the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2001) in moral psychology, recent thinking about domains of moral personality (e.g., Frimer & Walker, 2008), and the social cognitive neuroscience literature concerned with different types and modes of cognition (e.g., Siegel, 1999). Second, it is multilevel in that it outlines a model that synthesizes multiple sources of meaning (“cold” cognition) and motivation (“hot” cognition) believed to be involved in multilevel personality change (Gabbard & Westen, 2003). This model is also consistent with

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McAdams’ (1995) multilevel framework for personality description. Further, while it has not been a central focus of discussion in these articles, this model highlights domains of personality emphasized in various religious and philosophical anthropologies (e.g., moral emotions, virtues, and vices in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition; Browning, 2010). Third, this model situates the study of spiritual transformation in an emerging new paradigm, moral intuitionism, that is at the heart of the multi-disciplinary renaissance in the “new science of morality” (Hauser, 2006). A Personality-based, Process Model of Spiritual Transformation Second, this model outlines a multi-process model of intentional spiritual transformation that is comprised of eight processes or developmental pathways (depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1). To summarize, four of these processes focus on the (relatively more) automatic-procedural domains that enable moral motivation and capacity: (1) tuning-up ethical intuitions; (2) amplifying premoral emotions; (3) strengthening (or expanding) moral virtues; and (4) weakening moral vices. Three processes relate to the automatic-declarative domains that provide moral direction: (5) clarifying moral values; (6) sharpening moral reasoning; and (7) building moral willpower. One process relates to the controlled-declarative domain that provides existential meaning, referred to as: (8) integrating moral identity. Recent thinking concerned with intentional self-development (Brandtstadter, 1999) suggests there are different dimensions of personality development and practices specific to each type of growth. For example, Bauer and McAdams (2004) defined “growth goals” (p. 115) as things that people want in their lives and how they intend to obtain them. They identified different growth goals related to the “social-cognitive maturity” and “social-emotional well-being” dimensions of personality development. Relating this idea to the present model, the domain-specific processes identified above can be understood as complementary, inter-related intentional growth processes that collectively facilitate growth toward moral sociability. Thus, a first challenge for a new generation of psychologists of religion is to specify which practices facilitate growth in each domain of moral personality. A first step would be to identity tradition-informed practices that relate to each of these domains; for example, centering prayer in Christianity (Keating, 2000), Buddhist mindfulness


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meditation (Kornfield, 1993), etc. For example, there is now an active research program which seeks to mine the riches of various religious traditions for such spiritual practices, referred to as “mindful awareness practices” (MAPS), at the Mindful Awareness Research Center at UCLA (Siegel, 2007, especially Chapter 12). Identifying specific MAPS related to the conceptual hypotheses outlined above promises to be an exciting new area for theory and research. Spiritual Transformation as Inter-systemic Integration A third contribution of this model is its ability to distinguish three fundamental functions (movements) of the spiritual life that may have been blurred in previous thinking, namely, distinctions between moral motivation and capacity (Intuitive System), moral direction (Reasoning System), and existential meaning (Ideological Narrative). One benefit of making these distinctions is that it allows us to avoid the “rationalist fallacy” of assuming higher-level meaning can enable moral action without proper development of lower-level motivational sources. While the proposed model continues to affirm with the meaning-system approach that directional domains do indeed shape and give meaning to actions, it asserts that these domains alone cannot motivate and enable moral sociability. Thus, a third implication of this model for continued theoretical development is the notion that spiritual transformation necessarily involves intentional integration of the three systems that collectively promote moral sociability: motivational sources (Intuitive Domains 1–4), directional sources (Reasoning Domains 5–7), and existential meaning (Ideological Narrative Domain 8). Following Siegel’s (2010) “mindsight” approach to personal transformation, moral-spiritual transformation can be conceptualized as “neural integration” of the processes that subserve these three functions (see Siegel’s discussion on pp. 40–44). Siegel defined neural integration as “the linkage of anatomically or functionally differentiated neural regions into an interconnection of widely distributed areas of the brain and body proper” (p. 41). These interconnections represent synaptic linkages between different functional sub-systems that create coordination and balance between systems. A new frontier for research in the psychology of religion could be identifying which practices facilitate integration of the various domains and sub-systems of moral personality.

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g. michael leffel The Centrality of Virtues (and Vices)

Fourth, consistent with classical Aristotelian and recent social intuitionist virtue theory, this model proposes that intuition-expressive, moral emotion-related virtues (and vices) represent the fundamental motivational units of moral personality. As described, virtues and vices are conceptualized as biologically-prepared but socially-constructed social skills that motivate and enable (or inhibit) prosocial action. Thus, this model posits that without proper development of virtues related to Care/harm, persons may value moral sociability but may not yet embody the skills necessary to enact their moral convictions. Further, this model commends the adoption and continued development of a connectionist account of moral virtue that conceptualizes virtues and vices as neural networks in the brain-mind that energize and enable prosocial action (Churchland, 1998; Flanagan, 2007). On the connectionist view, a central task of spiritual transformation is the automatization of intuition-related prosocial capacities (virtues) and the relative deactivation of inhibitory vices. Thus, a further direction for future theory and research is the task of identifying specific practices that facilitate strengthening of virtue networks and weakening vice networks. For example, Siegel (2007) suggested that mindfulness practices strengthen the resonance circuits in the brain (mirror neurons plus the insula and superior temporal regions) responsible for the procedural skills involved in empathy. One important assumption of a virtue-based approach is that virtues are habituated not primarily through teaching standards and rules but by shaping intuitions, emotions, and associated procedural skills (cf. Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). This prioritizes the importance of real-world practice, rather than rote learning of propositional knowledge and deliberative reasoning (cf. MacIntyre, 1999). Thus, it emphasizes it is primarily through repeated exposure to narratives and the intentional imitation of virtue exemplars that persons come to internalize a culture’s favored virtues. Processes of Mimetic Virtue Thus, consistent with the social emphasis in the SIM, a fifth contribution of this model is the suggestion that the process of virtue mimesis (imitation) should become a more central focus of study (e.g., Herdt, 2008). Religious ethicist Herdt’s proposal for a re-constructed theory of spiritual transformation, one congenial both to religious and naturalistic forms of theorizing, is a return to the mimetic virtue tradition


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as found within some of the great religions of the world, such as the Erasmian-humanist virtues of philosophia Christi (Herdt, 2008) and the Confucian virtues of jen (Keltner, 2009), as well as some secular models of spirituality; for example, philosopher Flanagan’s (2007) virtues of “naturalized spirituality” as envisioned in project eudaimonia. The central notion in a mimetic approach is that spiritual transformation must encompass virtue formation and that virtue formation takes place primarily through the emulation and internalization of virtue exemplars, as represented in communities and narratives of moral goodness, whether or not such persons and narratives are explicitly religious. Therefore, another direction for future theory and research would involve integration of new scientific knowledge about mimetic processes (e.g., Garrels, 2006) into our models of spiritual transformation. Among the phenomena relevant to such a project are four automatic nonconscious influence processes that relate to the “social persuasion link” in the SIM, and to the Intuitive System described above: a) the “chameleon effect” (mimicry of the postures and facial expression of interaction partners, related to activation of ethical intuitions; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999); b) “emotional contagion” (“catching” the good or bad emotional states of others, related to emotion amplification; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994); c) “goal contagion” (mimicry of the intentions and goal states of others, related to strengthening virtues as social skills; Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004); and d) the role of mirror neurons in connecting us to the thoughts and intentions of other persons (Iacoboni, 2008). Conclusion The primary goal of Beyond Meaning was to outline a personalitybased, process model of spiritual transformation that derives from but also expands the Social Intuitionist Model of morality. In response to the challenge posed by Emmons and Paloutizian (2003) to construct a multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm that could guide future theory and research, these articles offered three primary contributions: a) a social functionalist definition of spiritual transformation that places moral sociability (more than meaning) at the heart of the process; b) a conceptual and empirically-based rationale for integrating the moral intuitionist approach with the meaning-system approach to form a model that better synthesizes the dimensions of meaning and

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motivation; and c) a specific moral intuitionist model that re-conceptualizes processes of spiritual transformation in terms of the multiple domains of moral personality. Epistemic functionalism and its implementation in the psychology of religion in the form of meaning-system analyses was popular during the “first cognitive revolution” in psychology (Westen, 2002), when theorists assumed that the mind must first create accurate maps of the world before it can decide upon a course of action. With recent advances in the emerging science of morality, perhaps it is time once again to restate the challenge Haidt (2001) issued over 10 years ago: Now we know much cognition occurs automatically and outside consciousness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999); now we know the moral mind is not simply a blank slate upon which culture writes its story, but is “organized in advance of experience” (Marcus, 2004, p. 40) and contains innate ethical foundations upon which virtues and values are socially constructed; and now we know emotions are not irrational (Frank, 1984) but are indispensable for motivating moral action (Damasio, 2003). Perhaps we should take another look at what some of the ancient wisdom traditions have been telling us for a long time: “The mind of the moralist is located in the heart, which is, paradoxically, a cognitive organ, and it is through the heart that we come to know moral truth(s)” (Shweder & Haidt, 1993, p. 364). To that end, the moral intuitionist approach proposed in this article series offers a new direction for theory and research in the psychology of spiritual transformation that may further our scientific knowledge of how persons deepen the quality and extend the range of their care for others and for the wider world. References Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursuing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 23–37. doi:10.1037/00223514.87.1.23 Algoe, S. B., & Haidt, J. (2009). Witnessing excellence in action: The “other-praising” emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4, 105–127. doi:10.1080/17439760802650519 Appiah, K. A. (2008). Experiments in ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Aristotle (1893/2004). Nichomachean ethics. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books. Baer, R. A. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and empirical review. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10, 125–143. doi:10.1093/ clipsy/bpg015


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A GOOD MAN IS HARD TO FIND: FORGIVENESS, TERROR MANAGEMENT, AND RELIGIOSITY Keith M. Wilson* and Ronan Bernas Abstract Forgiveness has often been associated with religiosity, and a few terror management theory studies have suggested a link between existential anxiety and religiosity. In the present study, 123 Midwestern University undergraduates were reminded of their mortality and then asked to give their judgment of forgiveness in 10 different hypothetical scenarios. Individuals higher on intrinsic religiosity exhibited more forgiveness when reminded of their mortality than when they were not. This effect of mortality salience was not evident among those lower on intrinsic religiosity. These results extend the generality of a previous finding regarding forgiveness and existential anxiety and demonstrate forgiveness as a religious value for the intrinsically religious Christian. They also replicate findings that mortality salience can, in some circumstances, lead to an increase in prosocial behavior and attitudes.

‘She would have been a good woman,’ The Misfit said, ‘if it had been somebody there to shoot her every minute of her life.’ Flannery O’Connor—A Good Man Is Hard To Find, p. 23

Forgiveness has increasingly become an area of interest in psychology, including the psychology of religion and applied fields such as clinical psychology. Indeed, research has found that forgiveness may be associated with factors related to positive physical health, particularly sympathetic arousal and cardiovascular reactivity (Witvliet & McCullough, 2007), and mental well-being, such as depression and life-satisfaction (Toussaint & Webb, 2005). Additionally, a relationship between forgiveness and religiosity would seem to be an obvious one, and indeed it has received interest in the empirical literature over the past few decades. * Author Note: Keith M. Wilson, Department of Psychology, Eastern Illinois University; Ronan Bernas, Department of Psychology, Eastern Illinois University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Keith M. Wilson, Department of Psychology, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL 61920. Email: [email protected]

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Forgiveness is generally reported to be a positive value in many religions, especially Christianity (Rye, et al., 2000). Findings have been mixed, but dispositional measures of forgiveness typically correlate positively with religiosity, while transgression-specific measures usually fail to reveal a relationship (McCullough & Worthington, 1999). Transgression-specific measures ask the person to recall a particular offense. Dispositional measures of forgiveness are more varied. For example, some have measured participants’ valuing of forgiveness (e.g., Poloma & Gallup, 1991; Gorsuch & Hao, 1993). More recently, two studies have measured individuals’ likelihood of forgiving hypothetical offenses (Berry, Worthington, Parrot, O’Connor & Wade, 2001; Cohen, Malka, Rozin & Cherfas, 2006); these too are considered to be dispositional measures. However, Brown, Barnes, & Campbell (2007) demonstrated that dispositional measures may not be interchangeable. Interestingly, these studies, particularly the studies of dispositional forgiveness, have utilized general measures of religiosity, such as the frequency of church attendance (e.g., Berry et al., 2001). Such general measures have unknown or limited reliability; moreover, in all likelihood it is more informative to know how people are religious than whether they are religious (see Hill & Pargament, 2003). Few forgiveness studies have explored the relationship between forgiveness and different religious orientations, such as the frequently used Allport and Ross (1967) extrinsic and intrinsic motivations: intrinsic motivation denoting religion as something around which one’s life is organized and extrinsic religiosity denoting religion as a means (e.g., solace or sociability). Few studies have explored intrinsic religiosity and forgiveness. Tate and Miller (1971) found that in active Methodists’ rankings of various values, those high in intrinsic religiosity ranked forgiving higher than those high in extrinsic religiosity. Moreover, forgiveness was ranked second for the intrinsic group and third for the extrinsic group. Meek, Albright, and McMinn (1995) examined self-ratings of forgiveness of one’s self and forgiveness by God following an imagined transgression. Those high in intrinsic religiosity had higher estimations of likelihood of forgiveness by God and higher ratings of self-forgiveness than those high in extrinsic religiosity. However, as with Tate and Miller (1971), none of the measures involved forgiving others. Thus although there is reason to believe that intrinsic religiosity is related to forgiveness, nothing is directly known regard-

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ing the relationship between intrinsic religiosity and dispositional forgiveness. Moreover, little is known about how motivational or contextual variables would impact the relationship between religiosity and forgiveness. It is conceivable that dispositional measures that measure self-ratings of forgiveness in various scenarios may be influenced by motivational variables. One such potential motivational variable may be existential anxiety. It is generally recognized that religion deals with the overall meaning of our lives and existence (e.g., Burke, 1996). Moreover, it has often been proposed that for many persons, religion serves to alleviate existential concerns (e.g., Durkheim, 2001; Batson & Stocks, 2004). Additionally, studies have found that religiosity is inversely related to fears of personal death (e.g., Spilka, Stout, Minton, & Sizemore, 1977). Indeed, terror management theory (TMT) suggests that religion serves to reduce existential anxiety brought about by awareness of one’s mortality by providing the believer with a sense of meaning and, for many religions, hope of immortality. According to TMT, mortality salience increases the tendency to defend, embrace, and act upon one’s worldview; one’s worldview serves to provide a sense of meaning and a possible means for either symbolic or literal immortality. Hundreds of studies have documented a variety of mortality salience effects, such as responding more positively to others who support one’s worldview and responding more negatively to those who challenge it (see Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004 for a review). For example, in a classic study, individuals who viewed prostitution as a moral offense set a higher bond for an alleged prostitute when reminded of their own mortality (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). In another study, mortality salience increased the tendency to aggress against others who had disparaged one’s political views by determining the amount of the hot sauce they were to consume (McGregor et al., 1998). Finally, studies such as Greenberg et al. (1994) have demonstrated that this effect takes place when thoughts of mortality are no longer conscious (i.e., several minutes after the individual is reminded of his mortality). TMT research has typically, but not always (see Burling, 1993), found a link between religiosity and terror management. For example, Norenzayan and Hansen (2006) found that people reminded of their mortality reported more religiosity and belief in God and divine interventions. Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, and Solomon


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(1995) found that Christians reminded of their mortality were less likely to use a crucifix as a tool in a problem solving situation. Finally, Vess, Arndt, Cox, Routledge, and Goldenberg (2009) found that for fundamentalists with heightened concerns about their mortality, affirmations of the legitimacy of divine interventions in medical treatment functioned to solidify a sense of existential meaning. Starting with the premise that religion serves different functions for different persons, Jonas and Fischer (2006) hypothesized that not all religious beliefs would serve terror management functions. For those high in intrinsic religiosity, religion is their master motive (Allport & Ross, 1967). Jonas and Fischer thus reasoned that intrinsic religiosity is particularly likely to serve a terror management function. For example, they reasoned that individuals who were able to affirm their intrinsic values would experience less existential anxiety and thus would be less inclined to engage in world view defense when reminded of their mortality. Indeed, individuals who scored high on intrinsic religiousness did not react with worldview defense (giving reduced ratings to authors of essays critical of their worldview) when reminded of their mortality if provided with an opportunity to affirm their beliefs prior to the mortality salience induction. As predicted, the effect was not evident for those high in extrinsic religiosity. Moreover, Jonas and Fisher found that affirming intrinsic religiousness prior to mortality salience reduced death thought accessibility. Overall, Jonas and Fischer concluded that individuals intrinsically vested in their religion derive terror management benefits from religious beliefs. Terror management theory has shown that under conditions of mortality salience, people act upon or defend only those domains that are important to them (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002; Jonas & Greenberg, 2004). Given the above TMT findings, the centrality of forgiveness in Christian religious teachings, and the correlation between forgiveness and religiosity (including the finding that Christians report valuing forgiveness highly), it seems reasonable to posit that highly intrinsically religious individuals would be more forgiving following mortality salience. This is not likely to be true for those who score high in general religiosity, often measured as frequency of church attendance, in that this measure will reflect a variety of religious motivations, such as extrinsic religiosity, and as suggested by Jonas and Fischer (2006) extrinsic religiosity may not serve a terror management function.

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In the following study, the relationship of religiosity to forgiveness under conditions of mortality salience was explored. It was predicted that individuals with the highest self-reported intrinsic religiosity would demonstrate a heightened level of forgiveness under conditions of mortality salience compared to those with high intrinsic religiosity who were not exposed to their own mortality. The influence, if any, of mortality salience on the forgiveness of those with less intrinsic religiosity was less certain. Although to a lesser extent than the highly intrinsically religious, forgiveness could conceivably be increased even amongst the less intrinsically religious. However, given their lower religiosity it was conceivable that the value of forgiveness would be insignificant and thus under conditions of mortality salience their behavior would be governed predominantly by the general tendency to punish others whose transgression was in violation of their world view. However, mortality salience could conceivably have no impact if the transgressions were not judged to be in violation of their world view, such as someone spilling a drink upon them. Finally, it was predicted that mortality salience would not impact the forgiveness of those high in general religiosity as such measures are both weak and do not reflect how people are religious but simply measures whether or not they are religious. Method Participants One hundred twenty-three introductory psychology students at a Midwestern university participated in the study (59 men and 64 women; mean age = 19.3). Seventy-nine percent were Caucasian (white, nonHispanic), and 15% and 3% were African-American or Chicano/ Latino, respectively. The remainder identified themselves as either Asian or “other.” Eight percent of participants reported no religious faith; 3% reported being agnostic. Eighty-three percent were Christian, and “other” was reported by 6%. Participants were randomly assigned to either a mortality salience or dental pain condition. All received partial course credit and were tested in small groups.


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Measures/Procedure At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were informed that they would be participating in a series of unrelated studies. The first study was purportedly a study of personality and involved completing a packet containing a demographic questionnaire, a simulated personality inventory, and then either a dental pain or mortality salience questionnaire. The latter consisted of open-ended questions asking participants to describe what would happen to them when they die or when they experienced dental pain. After turning in that packet, they were given the three-questionnaire packet for the second study, a study of attitudes which consisted first of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS: Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a brief word search task. The PANAS is used to ascertain if the experimental and control conditions are equivalent in their general effect on affect. The two typically took 5 to 6 minutes to complete (TMT research has shown that worldview defense takes place when death related thoughts are accessible but outside of one’s focus of attention [e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994]). The final item in the packet was a forgiveness questionnaire which consisted of 10 questions randomly selected from the Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire (Kanz, 2000). The FAQ consists of 26 items that describe situations in which some interpersonal transgression has occurred, and it has demonstrated preliminary evidence of internal consistency and construct validity. Each question posed a hypothetical situation and asked the participant to rate its likelihood of forgiving the transgression on a 1 to 7 Likert scale (1 = definitely not forgive and 7 = easily forgive); for example: “A person spent several years as a member of a group where he/she committed many hate crimes. After several years, the person realizes the error of his/her ways and asked forgiveness of several people hurt during this person’s time in a group. If this person committed a hate crime against you, how would you respond?” Other scenarios included seeing a girlfriend/boyfriend kissing another and a waiter spilling juice on you at an important meeting. The next and final “study” (a study on attitudes toward the mentally ill) allowed for the delayed measurement of religiosity so that its measurement would not affect the forgiveness measure nor would the measure of religiosity be affected by the mortality salience manipulation itself. It first consisted of another filler task of 20 minutes, which was comprised of a videotaped psychiatric interview and then

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a questionnaire related to attitudes towards the mentally ill. Subsequently, the participants related how frequently they attended church services (the measure of general religiosity) and completed the fiveitem Religious Belief Salience scale (Blaine & Crocker, 1995). Blaine and Crocker reported that the Religious Belief Salience scale items correspond closely to five of the eight items in the intrinsic subscale of the religious orientation scale (Allport & Ross 1967). Several studies (e.g., Gauthier, Christopher, Walter, Mourad, & Marek, 2006) have documented the reliability and validity of this instrument which measures the importance of one’s religious beliefs in regard to one’s everyday life and worldview. Items are answered on a 1 to 7 Likert-type scale and consisted of questions such as “My religious beliefs are what lie behind my whole approach to life.” Finally, participants were debriefed. Results Preliminary analyses showed that the forgiveness measure (the amended Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire) was internally consistent (alpha = .65) and correlated positively with the intrinsic religiosity measure (r = .15, p < .05 [one-tailed]) and the general religiosity measure (r = .23, p < .01 [one-tailed]). The two correlations were not significantly different (z = –.64, p > .05). The two religiosity measures were also correlated (r = .53, p < .001). T-tests were used to see if the mortality salience condition impacted the two PANAS scores and the two measures of religiosity. There was no difference in PANAS scores between the experimental and control group (positive affect = 31.3 & 31.2, respectively; t[121] = .02, p > .025; negative affect = 17.6 and 18.6, respectively; t[121] = –1.04, p > .025). Intrinsic religiosity scores between the mortality salience and dental pain groups revealed no significant differences (19.7 and 21.7, respectively; t[121] = –1.25, p > .025) nor did the general religiosity measure of services attended per year (11.8 and 20.7, respectively; t[121] = –2.14, p > .025). Finally, preliminary analyses reported no significant gender main effect or interactions, thus the following analyses were collapsed across gender. A median split formed the low and high intrinsic religiosity groups (high religion > 22 and low religion ≤ 22). A mortality salience by intrinsic religiosity (2 X 2) ANOVA revealed no main effect for mortality salience (F[1,119] = 0.12, p > .05) or intrinsic religiosity (F[1,119] = 0.84, p > .05) and a significant interaction for mortality salience by

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39.50

39

38.00

38

Forgiveness

37

36.10

36

35.40

35

Mortality Salience Dental Pain (Control)

34 33 32 31 30 Higher Intrinsic Religiosity

Lower Intrinsic Religiosity

Figure 1. Interaction effect of mortality salience and intrinsic religiosity on forgiveness.

religiosity (F[1,119] = 6.08, p < .05). This interaction can be explored further by examining the differential impact of mortality salience for the higher and lower intrinsic religiosity groups (i.e., the simple effect of mortality salience depending on intrinsic religiosity). Comparisons supported the (one-tailed) hypothesis that highly religious individuals would be more forgiving under conditions of mortality salience (M = 39.50, SD = 8.10) compared to the highly religious control group (M = 36.10, SD = 5.90), (t[116] = 1.96, p < .05). There was no statistically significant difference (two-tailed) between low religiosity participants under mortality salience conditions (M = 35.40, SD = 6.50) compared to the low religiosity/dental pain group (M = 38.00, SD = 6.10), (t[116] = -1.09, p > .05). See Figure 1. The same interaction can also be depicted by examining how higher and lower intrinsic religiosity individuals differed under the two conditions of mortality salience (i.e., the simple effect of intrinsic religiosity depending on the mortality salience condition). When made aware of their mortality, the high intrinsically religious group was more forgiving (M = 39.50, SD = 8.10) than the low intrinsically religious group

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(M = 35.40, SD = 6.50), (t[116] = -2.41, p < .05, one-tailed). No statistical difference (one-tailed) existed between these high intrinsically (M = 36.10, SD = 5.90) and low intrinsically religious groups (M = 38.00, SD = 6.10) under the dental pain condition, t(116) = -1.52, p > .05. A median split was used to create the low and high general religiosity groups (high > 4 and low ≤ 4). A mortality salience by general religiosity (2 x 2) ANOVA revealed no main effects for mortality salience (F[1,119] = 0.06, p > .05) or general religiosity (F[1,119] = 0.40, p > .05) and no significant interaction (F[1,119] = 0.86, p > .05). Discussion Previous investigations have linked religiosity and forgiveness by correlating valuing forgiveness with religiosity and correlating religiosity to self-reported tendency to forgive others. The present study found intrinsic religiosity to be correlated with forgiveness. The present investigation also found that mortality salience increased the self-reported tendency toward forgiveness of only the more intrinsically religious individuals. Thus, this study extended previous findings linking religiosity and forgiveness and suggested a motivational underpinning of this relationship. Previous research on the relationship between forgiveness and religiosity has used a variety of measures. These studies have typically used a general measure of religiosity such as frequency of church attendance. The present findings extended and replicated previous findings to the construct of intrinsic religiosity. It might be noted that the correlation between intrinsic religiosity and dispositional forgiveness was relatively small compared to the correlation with general religiosity and then one might conclude that the correlation between intrinsic religiosity and forgiveness was less robust. However, the correlation between forgiveness and intrinsic religiosity was not statistically less than the correlation between forgiveness and general religiosity. Moreover, the typical correlation between general religiosity and forgiveness ranges from .2 to .3 (e.g., Cohen, et al., 2005 and Hammond, Banks, & Mattis, 2006, respectively) but has been reported as low as .11 (Exline, Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, & Witvliet, 2008). However, the present investigation did yield a significant difference between general religiosity and intrinsic religiosity as they relate to forgiveness.


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This study demonstrated how existential anxiety could moderate the relationship between religiosity and forgiveness in that existential anxiety increased the forgiveness of only the most intrinsically religious individuals. Terror management theory has shown that under conditions of mortality salience, people act upon or defend only those domains that are important to them (e.g., Arndt, et al., 2002; Jonas & Greenberg, 2004), and in this study, the most intrinsically religious persons became more forgiving under conditions of elevated mortality salience. In that the intrinsically religious became more forgiving under conditions of existential anxiety, and persons act upon domains that are important to them under such conditions, this suggested the particularly religious nature of forgiveness for some individuals. For intrinsically religious individuals, it appeared that forgiving may at times be a religious act. Pargament & Rye (1998) stated that religion may influence forgiveness by providing religious role models and rationale, as well as religious coping strategies. Under conditions of existential anxiety, taking actions that enable one to identify oneself with the sacred, such as Godlike attributes like forgiveness, may increase self-esteem and decrease mortal anxiety. Moreover, Christianity indicates a blessed immortality for those who follow religious prescriptions, a powerful motivation for the religious when reminded of one’s corporeal impermanence. On the other hand, given Norenzayan & Hansen’s (2006) finding that mortality salience increased religiosity, it is possible that the impact on forgiveness was due to an increased level of religiosity of the participants. However, if that is the case, then arguably the less religious participants should also have increased their forgiveness as their religiosity increased under conditions of mortality salience (almost all participants reported some level of religiosity). This was not the case. The lack of a significant interaction between mortality salience and general religiosity suggests several points. First, it seems that not all highly religious individuals necessarily become more forgiving under conditions of mortality salience. People attend religious services for many reasons (e.g., comfort or sharing a covenant with others). Although these individuals may be more forgiving than those who are less generally religious, they may hold these beliefs differently so that they do not provide solace when confronted with their own mortality. For example, teachings on forgiveness may not be as seminal for them as others and thus not as intensely tied to their self-esteem and sense of worth.

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This investigation demonstrated that under at least some conditions, intrinsically religious individuals are more likely to self-report a tendency to forgive. Allport and Ross (1967) conceptualized religiosity as being comprised of extrinsic and intrinsic orientation. Would extrinsically religious individuals increase their forgiveness while experiencing existential anxiety? Jonas and Fischer (2006) found that extrinsic religiosity did not mitigate worldview defense nor did it reduce accessibility of death related thoughts. The present investigation did not find more generally religious individuals to be more forgiving under conditions of mortality salience, although the highly intrinsically religious were. These findings suggest that the present relationship may not hold for those whose religiosity is primarily extrinsic. However, some individuals high in extrinsic religiosity are also high in intrinsic religiosity so this bears empirical investigation. Further studies on forgiveness and existential anxiety could explore this and other aspects of religiosity, such as questing (Batson, 1976) and religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Unfortunately, although most would report that they know forgiveness when they see it, there is no generally accepted definition of the construct (Worthington, 2005). Additionally, this investigation utilized a self-report measure of forgiveness in hypothetical situations; thus the generality of these findings to other measures of forgiveness, including other measures of dispositional forgiveness, such as valuing, is unknown. Given the still unresolved nature of forgiveness, additional studies looking at constructs such as decisional or emotional forgiveness (Worthington, Witvleit, Pietrini, & Miller, 2007) would be worthy. Finally, examining the influence of mortality salience on the relationship between religiosity and transgression-specific forgiveness would be useful since studies typically fail to reveal a link between religiosity and transgression-specific measures. Transgression-specific measures of forgiveness may yield a link between religiosity and forgiveness under powerfully motivating conditions such as mortality salience. The present investigation extends the findings of a recent, and only, TMT study of forgiveness. Although TMT studies typically find that mortality salience increases negative or destructive behaviors, Schimel, Wohl, and Williams (2006) demonstrated that mortality salience can increase forgiveness. They found that young adult Canadians who were reminded of their mortality were more likely to forgive a person who committed an act of inter-group aggression (a foul during a hockey


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game) only if he was a member of the in-group (the regional hockey team). However, the second experiment revealed that hockey fans with high trait empathy were more likely to forgive following mortality salience regardless of the transgressor’s group (team) membership. The present investigation extends Schimel et al.’s (2006) findings by showing the moderating influence of religiosity on the relationship between terror management and forgiveness of others. Moreover, the present findings extend Schimel et al.’s (2006) dependent variable from forgiveness of a sports infraction against another to forgiveness of acts committed against oneself. Many people debate to what extent one can attribute Western cultural values or practices, such as our legal code, to Western religions. This study and others (e.g., Gorsuch & Hao, 1993; Berry, et al., 2001) suggest that for many people in the U.S., forgiveness is, at least in part, a religious practice and a possibly deeply held one. The present methodology may offer a means of investigating the religious underpinnings and motivational influences of other common prosocial values and practices such as charity and compassion. On a final note several public intellectuals have recently criticized the role of religion in public life. For example, Hitchens (2007) argued that religion incites people to violence. The present study suggests that under trying circumstances (i.e., confrontation with one’s own mortality) a religious worldview may foster the nobler instincts of our species. There may indeed be some grandeur in this view of life. References Allport, G. W., & Ross, J. M. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 432–443. doi:10.1037/h0021212 Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (1992). Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 2, 113–133. doi:10.1207/s15327582ijpr0202_5 Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., & Cook, A. (2002). Mortality salience and the spreading activation of worldview-relevant constructs: Exploring the cognitive architecture of terror management. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 307–324. doi:10.1037//0096-3445.131.3.307 Batson, C. D. (1976). Religion as prosocial: Agent or double agent? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 15, 29–45. doi:10.2307/1384312 Batson, C. D., & Stocks, E. L. (2004). Religion: Its core psychological functions. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.). Handbook of experimental existential psychology (pp. 141–155). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Berry, J. W., Worthington, Jr., E. L., Parrot III, L., O’Connor, L. E. & Wade, N. G. (2001). Dispositional forgivingness: Development and construct validity of the

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transgression narrative test of forgivingness (TNTF). Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1277–1290. doi:10.1177/01461672012710004 Blaine, B., & Crocker, J. (1995). Religiousness, race, and psychological well-being: Exploring social psychological mediators. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1031–1041. doi:10.1177/01461672952110004 Brown, R. P., Barnes, C. D., & Campbell, N. J. (2007). Fundamentalism and forgiveness. Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1437–1447. doi:10.1016/j. paid.2007.04.025 Burke, T. P. (1996). The major religions: An introduction with texts. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Burling, J. W. (1993). Death concerns and symbolic aspects of the self: The effects of mortality salience on status concern in religiosity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19 (1), 100–105. doi:10.1177/0146167293191011 Cohen, A. B., Malka, A., Rozin, P., & Cherfas, L. (2006). Religion and unforgivable offenses. Journal of Personality, 74, 85–117. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00370.x Durkheim, E. (2001). The elementary forms of religious life. New York, Oxford University Press. Exline, J. J., Baumeister, R. F., Zell, A. L., Kraft, A. J., & Witvliet, C. V. O. (2008). Not so innocent: Does seeing one’s own capability for wrongdoing predict forgiveness? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 495–515. doi:10.1037/00223514.94.3.495 Gauthier, K. J., Christopher, A. N., Walter, M. I., Mourad, R., & Marek, P. (2006). Religiosity, religious doubt, and the need for cognition: Their interactive relationship with life satisfaction. Journal of Happiness Studies, 7, 139–154. doi:10.1007/ s10902-005-1916-0 Gorsuch, R., & Hao, J. Y. (1993). Forgiveness: An exploratory factor analysis and its relationships to religious variables. Review of Religious Research, 34, 333–347. http:// rra.hartsem.edu/reviewof.htm Greenberg, J., Porteus, J., Simon, L., Pyszczyski, T., & Solomon, S. (1995). Evidence of a terror management function of cultural icons: The effects of mortality salience on the inappropriate use of cherished cultural symbols. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1221–1228. doi:10.1177/01461672952111010 Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M. (1994). Role of consciousness and accessibility of death-related thoughts in mortality salience affects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 627–637. doi:10.1037/00223514.67.4.627 Hammond, W. P., Banks, K. H., & Mattis, J. S. (2006). Masculine ideology and forgiveness of racial discrimination among African American men: Direct and interactive relationships. Sex Roles, 55, 679–692. doi:10.1007/s11199-006-9123-y Hill, P. C., & Pargament, K. I. (2003). Advances in the conceptualization and measurement of religion and spirituality: Implications of physical and mental health research. American Psychologist, 58, 64–74. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.58.1.64 Hitchens, C. (2007). God is not great: How religion poisons everything. New York, NY: Hachette Book Group USA. Jonas, E., & Fischer, P. (2006). Terror management and religion: Evidence that intrinsic religiousness mitigates worldview defense following mortality salience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 553–567. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.3.553 Jonas, E., & Greenberg, F. (2004). Terror management and political attitudes: The influence of mortality salience on German’s defense of the German reunification. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 1–9. doi:10.1002/ejsp.178 Kanz, J. E. (2000). How do people conceptualize and use forgiveness? The Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire. Counseling and Values, 44, 174–189. http://www .counseling.org/Publications/Journals.aspx


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THREE APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF POSTFORMAL THOUGHT: WISDOM, CONCEPTS OF GOD, AND SUCCESS IN COLLEGE Liza Benovenli,* Elizabeth Fuller, Jan Sinnott, and Sarah Waterman Abstract The ability to use complex cognition may be relevant in many aspects of life. These present studies are a follow up to a recent study by Griffin et al. (2009) of the relationship between postformal thought and complex concepts of god. These studies are also a further exploration of postformal thought, wisdom, and college performance. The first study reported here tested the relationship between postformal thought, as measured by the Postformal Thought Scale (Sinnott, 1998), concepts of god, as measured by the Concepts of God Scale (Griffin et al., 2009), and academic achievement, measured by grade point average (GPA). The second study examined wisdom, as measured by Ardelt’s scale (Ardelt, 2003), complexity of god concept, as measured by the Concepts of God Scale, and postformal thought as measured by the Postformal Thought Scale. It was predicted that participants with high levels of postformal thought would have more complex concepts of god, higher GPAs, and greater levels of wisdom. In Study 1, results indicated a significant positive relationship between postformal thought and the complexity of concepts of god. In Study 2, we found significant relationships between some sub-dimensions of wisdom and postformal thought and between concepts of god and postformal thought but no relation between postformal thought and GPA. Results overall suggested that complex cognition may be to some degree an influential component of several dimensions of thought and behavior. Image of God is discussed.

The theory of complex postformal thought has been described and validated in a considerable body of work and has been applied to behavior such as couple, friend and family intimate relationships, work roles, clinical interventions, teaching and learning, aging, and many others. These ideas are summarized in a general way in Sinnott’s 1998 book and more specifically, for purposes of this paper, in work such as Sinnott, 1992, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2004ab, 2005, and Sinnott

* Author Note: Liza Benovenli, Psychology Department, Towson University; Elizabeth Fuller, Psychology Department, Towson University; Jan Sinnott, Psychology Department, Towson University; Sarah Waterman, Psychology Department, Towson University. Authors are listed alphabetically. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jan Sinnott, Psychology Department, Towson University, 8000 York Road, Towson, MD 21252. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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and Berlanstein, 2006. The idea is that complex cognitive operations may be present as a cognitive basis for complex behaviors of all sorts, although other factors such as emotions, personality, developmental tasks, and social relations certainly play a crucial part. The general question addressed in this paper is in what way complex cognition, specifically postformal thought, may be related to other aspects of adult behavior. The more specific questions revolve around considerations of complex postformal thought as a positive concomitant of wisdom, concepts of god, and success in college classes. We have seen suggestions that postformal theory can be applied to spirituality. Piaget’s theory describes how an individual moves through four stages of cognitive development from infancy to adolescence. The stages are as follows: sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational. Cartwright (2001) relates this theory to spirituality and spiritual development. She outlines how an individual’s spirituality is determined by his or her current level of cognitive development. She also incorporates the theory of postformal cognitive development into her discussion. Stages of Piaget’s original theory can be applied to the development of spiritual understanding. An external power is abstract and not observable through sensory or perceptual means. Because individuals in the sensorimotor stage understand their world primarily through their senses, such abstract thoughts are not recognizable at this stage. Therefore, a concept of spirituality cannot be expressed or incorporated into their reality. The preoperational stage is characterized by “reasoning that is not yet governed by conventional logical principles” (Cartwright, 2001, p. 217). Individuals, usually children, at this level believe that events are caused by mythical powers and miracles. They believe that an unexplainable Higher Power exists, but they are unable to ask how or why. Once they are in the concrete operational stage, individuals are able to address the how and why questions of spirituality. They look for conventional logical explanations when attempting to understand their relationship with a Higher Power. Individuals in the formal operational stage focus on the abstract principles which drive their behavior in their relationship with a Higher Power. For example, instead of focusing on the specific act of helping the needy, they focus on the abstract ideas of benevolence and love for all humanity. Originally conceived by Sinnott (1998), postformal thought is characterized by the ability to consider and coordinate multiple logical systems of thought rather than simply considering a single logical system

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that characterizes formal operational thought (for example, see Galupo, Cartwright, & Savage, 2009). Individuals capable of the cognitive operations of postformal thought would be able to consider multiple concepts of spirituality and decide which view is appropriate for them. Logically, this would likely be shown in the complexity of their concepts of god. A recent study conducted by Griffin et al. (2009) examined how postformal thought relates to various non-cognitive factors: personality, concepts of god, political opinions and social attitudes. Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a list of adjectives describing concepts of god, using Gough and Heilbrun’s (1965) adjective checklist methodology as a model (Griffin et al., 2009). No significant correlation was found between postformal thought and concepts of god. Because the closed-ended scale questions limited participants’ responses, investigators wondered whether that type of scale was an accurate measure of respondents’ concepts of god. The following two studies address this limitation by allowing participants to elaborate on their concepts in response to an open ended question. In both studies, we predicted that individuals with higher levels of postformal thought would demonstrate more complex concepts of god. Postformal thought has appeared to facilitate complex learning. Therefore Study 1 also was designed to determine whether there is a positive correlation between an individual’s level of postformal thought and his or her level of academic achievement as measured by GPA. Previous studies have linked academic achievement to many factors, especially those related to cognition. For example, Sadowski and Sami (1996) found that students who were high in need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) were more likely to be academic achievers than those low in need for cognition. A more recent study on academic underachievement found that underachievers tended to have low levels of need for cognition, achievement motivation, and conscientiousness (Preckel, Holling & Vock, 2006). Pru, Abraham, and Bond (2003) found that a student’s intention (or motivation) to succeed is the strongest direct predictor of performance on university level exams. The same study showed that openness to experience and conscientiousness were direct predictors of intention and therefore indirect predictors of academic achievement. High openness to experience and high conscientiousness are also positively correlated with high levels of postformal thought (Griffin et al., 2009). It makes sense then, that as these two factors are linked to both postformal thought

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and academic achievement, students who are postformal thinkers might also be more likely to be academic achievers. Wisdom has always been considered to reflect a complex view of the world. Therefore Study 2 addressed the potential three-way relationship between postformal thought, wisdom, and concepts of god. Wisdom can be viewed in a variety of ways and often has multiple definitions. Wisdom is defined by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary as the “accumulated philosophic or scientific learning; ability to discern inner qualities and relationships; good sense” (Merriam-Webster, 2010). According to Csikszentmihalyi and Rathunde, wisdom has three basic dimensions of meaning: a cognitive process or a particular way of obtaining and processing information; a virtue or socially valued pattern of behavior; and a good personally desirable state or condition (Sternberg, 2003). Ardelt created a scale based on qualitative and quantitative interviews of an older population of adults (aged 52 and older) to assess wisdom. Using Ardelt’s scale, wisdom can be divided into three subcategories: cognitive, affective, and reflective. The cognitive measure can be interpreted as one’s ability to fully grasp the meaning of life which includes finding and comprehending the true significance of the complexities in life (Ardelt, 2003). Ardelt describes the affective measure as including positive emotions and behaviors towards others, such as sympathy and compassion. The reflective dimension is considered a prerequisite for the development of the cognitive dimension of wisdom (Ardelt, 2003). Reflective thinking involves developing self-awareness and self-insight by approaching situations with an open mind and looking at them through different perspectives. Ardelt found that the three dimensions of wisdom were correlated with each other which indicates that the Wisdom Scale is a valid scale, coherent and descriptive of the concept of wisdom. We chose in the present study to use a younger adult population and theory based on the idea of the Crystallized model of wisdom discussed by Jordan (Sternberg & Jordan, 2005). The Crystallized model appears to describe the most accurate depiction of wisdom across the lifespan in terms of empirical research. This model predicts that older adults and younger adults can possess wisdom and that wisdom does not systematically increase over the lifespan (Sternberg & Jordan, 2005). Simply stated, the population of the present study should have an equally likely chance of obtaining the same level of wisdom as an older population using Ardelt’s scale.


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Some theorists have viewed wisdom as extending Piagetian concepts and have used it interchangeably with postformal-operational thinking. Thus, these researchers have proposed that wisdom is in fact a level above Piaget’s formal operational stage. The present study seeks to examine relations between the two (wisdom and postformal thought) and, in addition, represent them as separate entities if warranted. We predicted that the two would be related. Study 1 Study 1 examined the relationship between postformal thought, concepts of god, and academic achievement. We predicted that individuals with high levels of postformal thought would have more complex concepts of god and higher GPAs. Method Participants. The study sample consisted of 97 participants: 79 females and 18 males, with an average age of 20, dispersed between the 4 academic years as follows: 19 freshmen, 30 sophomores, 24 juniors, and 24 seniors. All participants were Towson University undergraduate students with an age range of 18–28. Psychology was the predominant major among the participants; however, there was an array of majors. Materials. The resources included surveymonkey.com, a website that allows users to post and participate in various surveys, and Towson University’s Psychology Research Pool, a resource joining Psychology Department research studies and Psychology Department study participants. The scales used were the Postformal Thought Scale and the Concepts of God Scale (derived from content analysis of responses obtained by Griffin et al., 2009). The Concepts of God Scale was based on reliable content analysis of open-ended responses to the question “If you have a concept of ‘god’ what is it?” The Postformal Scale (Sinnott, 1998) was composed of degree of respondents’ endorsement of 10 statements reflecting 10 cognitive operations that together indicate postformal thought. A short survey was given in addition. This survey consisted of nine questions regarding each participant’s age, gender, major, current academic year, current GPA on a 4.0 scale, total number of credit hours, and grades in the following classes: English, math, science, computer science, communications, social sciences, and

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art (visual and performing). The study was approved by the Towson University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Research Participants. Procedure. The participants were recruited using both surverymonkey .com and Towson University’s Psychology Research Pool. Before being given the survey, participants viewed a short information letter describing the details of the study. Proceeding on to the survey signified that they understood their role and rights as participants and gave consent to participate in the study. The first section of the survey asked the participants to indicate their gender, age, current academic year, total number of credit hours, major, and current GPA. They were then asked to indicate what their typical grade (on letter scale of A–F, with “not applicable” as an option) would be in the following subject areas: math, computer science, science, social sciences, English, communications and visual and performing arts. An open-ended question that asked the participants to describe their concept of god followed, and the Postformal Thought Scale completed the survey. A message appeared after the survey thanking the participants for their involvement. Results Pearson Product Moment Correlations with 95 degrees of freedom were calculated to determine the relationship between scores on the Postformal Thought Scale (and its component items), scores on the Concepts of God Scale, and cumulative GPAs. We found a significant positive correlation between total score on the Concepts of God Scale and total score on the Postformal Thought Scale (r [95] = .231, p = .018 one-tailed). We also found significant positive correlations between total score on the Concepts of God Scale and Postformal Scale question 4 (“There are many right ways to define a problem. I must make a final decision on how I see the problem.”) (r [95] = .217, p = .025 one-tailed) and Postformal scale question 8 (ability to create multiple solutions) (r [95] = .240, p = .025 one-tailed). Pearson Product Moment Correlation analyses were run again controlling for word count in respondents’ answers to the open-ended god question, and that analysis yielded a significant relationship between the total score on the Concepts of God Scale and Postformal Thought Scale question 8 (ability to create multiple solutions) only (r [95] = .225, p = .021 one-tailed). The decision was made to exclude the freshmen participants from the analysis of GPA and postformal thought because, since the study was conducted before the conclusion of the fall semester, no college


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GPA could be obtained for freshmen. After excluding the freshmen, the study consisted of 78 participants, 64 females and 14 males. The age range was 18 to 28 with an average age of 20.5, and the average GPA was 3.13. When analyzing the data using Pearson Product Moment Correlations, we found no significant correlation between postformal thought and GPA. Discussion The results indicated that, as predicted, younger people with higher levels of postformal thought have more complex concepts of god. This makes sense because people with more complex concepts of god must be capable of abstract thinking and understanding multiple viewpoints, both characteristics of postformal thinkers. It is important to mention that Postformal Scale question number 8, but only question number 8, had a significant relationship with total god score, when controlling for word count. Postformal question 8 stated, “I often see that a given problem has several good solutions.” This relationship could be attributed to the idea that individuals with higher levels of postformal thought, specifically dealing with the ability to approach a problem from different angles, have the capacity to think abstractly. This in turn contributes to the complexity of their god concept and therefore their total god score. No relationship between postformal thought and GPA was found when freshmen were excluded. This indicated that people with higher levels of postformal thought do not necessarily have higher GPAs or obtain better grades in their college courses. This was the most surprising result. We had strongly believed that individuals with higher levels of postformal thought would be more successful in an academic environment because of the more sophisticated problem solving abilities and conceptual thought processes that are characteristics of a postformal thinker, supposedly essential in academic environments. Possible reasons for the absence of this relationship could be the small sample size used, the age of the participants tested, or other extraneous variables. The age of the participants is important because postformal thought processes might not develop until later in life. The human brain is not fully developed until approximately the age of 24, and the average age of the participants was only 21. It is noteworthy to mention that an individual’s level of motivation could also be a contributing factor to one’s academic success. Another possible and disappointing explanation could be that the college courses being taken

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did not require more complex thought for success. Since the Postformal Thought Scale was validated in earlier studies, it does not seem likely that the Scale is invalid overall. The most parsimonious explanation may be that postformal thinking is not useful for college level class work. There are many possible modifications to this research that could enhance future studies and could produce more significant results. One possibility is to use a larger sample size as well as an older population. An older population may be critical because it would allow testing of individuals with more developed brains and more extensive learning experience. One possible sample might be graduate students because they would satisfy the need for an older population as well as have a greater range of ages. Another modification could be to alter the concepts of god question to include a word count minimum and maximum. Word count was problematic and finding a way to control word count would help to eliminate an extraneous variable. A future study might examine how postformal thought is related to IQ and wisdom, knowledge of which would be beneficial when studying a more mature population. It could be hypothesized that individuals with higher IQ and wisdom scores will also have higher levels of postformal thought. A comparison of wisdom scores and postformal thought in the present younger sample is presented below in Study 2. An examination of IQ and postformal thought will be addressed in future studies. Study 2 The second study further elaborates on Study 1 and on earlier research by examining the variables of postformal thought, wisdom, and concept of god. In Study 1, a significant correlation was found between postformal thought and complexity of concept of god. It was hypothesized that the same significant relationship would be replicated in Study 2. It was also hypothesized that postformal thought would yield a significant positive correlation with wisdom. Method Participants. The present study had 61 participants: 46 females, 14 males, and 3 participants who did not specify gender. Forty-five participants completed the survey in its entirety. All of the participants


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were between the ages of 20 and 60+ and were enrolled in a graduate program at Towson University. The predominant Graduate Programs were Master of Education in Reading and Master of Occupational Therapy. Materials. The resources used in this study included Towson University’s Psychology Research Pool and a survey posted on surveymonkey.com. The survey was comprised of Ardelt’s Wisdom Scale as well as two used in Study 1, the Postformal Thought Scale and a part of the Concepts of God Scale. The survey first asked eight questions, this time questions regarding each participant’s age, gender, number of graduate credits, and graduate program. Then the Wisdom Scale and Postformal Thought Scale were given. Last was a short, open-endedanswer question that asked the participants to describe their concept of god. The study was approved by the Towson University Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Research Participants. Procedure. Before the participants were able to see the survey, they viewed a short information letter describing the details of the study. Proceeding on to the survey itself signified that they understood their role and rights as participants and gave consent to participate in the study. The first section of the survey asked the participants to indicate their age, gender, number of graduate credits and graduate program. They were then asked to describe their concept of god, if they had one. The Wisdom Scale was the next part of the survey, and it comprised two sections; section 1 had 15 questions, and section 2 had 24. The 10 question Postformal Thought Scale completed the survey. A message appeared after the conclusion of the survey thanking the participants for their involvement. Results Pearson Product Moment Correlations with 59 degrees of freedom were calculated to determine the relationship between scores on the Postformal Thought Scale, scores on the Concepts of God Scale, and scores on the Wisdom Scale. The results were complex. Regarding the Concept of God Scale, in contrast to Study 1 we found no significant correlation between total scores on the Concepts of God Scale and total scores on the Postformal Thought Scale. However, we did find a significant positive correlation between total score on the Wisdom Scale and Concepts of God Scale question 2 (r [59] = .470, p = .002 one-tailed.) We also found a strong

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significant positive correlation between total score on the Concepts of God Scale and the affective sub-scale of the Wisdom Scale (r [59] = .390, p = .005 one-tailed). The affective sub-scale of the Wisdom Scale was correlated with total Concept of God Scale score (r [59] = .402, p = .008 one-tailed), and the Concept of God Scale score for question 2 (r [59] = .395, p = .009 one-tailed). Concept of God Scale question 2 was correlated with the cognitive sub-scale of the Wisdom Scale (r [59] = .373, p = .014 one-tailed) and the cognitive sub-scale of the Wisdom Scale was correlated with degree of agreement with Postformal Scale question 4 (“There are many right ways to define a problem. I must make a final decision on how I see the problem.”) (r [59] = .316, p = .020 one-tailed.) We found no significant correlation between total score on the Wisdom scale and total score on the Postformal Thought Scale. Discussion A primary goal for Study 2 was to control some of the previously mentioned extraneous variables from Study 1. We were not able to control the first extraneous variable of sample size; however, both the age of the participants and word count were addressed. By using participants in graduate school, we were able to collect potentially more meaningful data from an older population with an age range of 20 to 60+. Word count was controlled by giving the participants a minimum and maximum of 30 to 75 words for their response to the open-ended concept of god question. It is important to note that some of the participants did not follow these guidelines and either fell short of or exceeded the minimum or maximum word count requirements. Our first hypothesis, stating that in this sample an individual’s level of wisdom and postformal thought would be positively correlated, was not supported. However, after performing a finer-grained analysis by breaking down each variable into smaller components (individual Postformal Thought Scale questions and sub-scale dimensions of the Wisdom Scale), we found some significant relationships. Our second hypothesis stating that an individual’s level of wisdom and complexity of concept of god would be positively correlated was also supported after dividing each variable into smaller items or sub-scales. There was a significant relationship between god score question 2 and the total wisdom score, as well as between the affective and cognitive sub-scale dimensions of wisdom. The cognitive and affective dimensions of wisdom are associated with increased intellectual maturity and therefore


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related to a larger wealth of knowledge. This wealth of knowledge contributes to an individual’s ability to specify abstract thoughts and further elaborate upon ideas. A higher score on the cognitive dimension of wisdom can also be interpreted as accepting many possible outcomes for a given problem, hence the correlation with Postformal Scale question 4 (“There are many ‘right’ ways to define a problem; I must make a final decision on how I see the problem.”). The affective dimension of wisdom also had a strong correlation with total god score. Individuals who scored high on the affective dimension of wisdom seemed to have a more benevolent and intangible concept of god. Our third hypothesis, stating an individual’s level of postformal thought and his or her complexity of concept of god would be positively correlated was not supported. It is a strong possibility that our results again were skewed by the insufficient sample size and that a larger sample is needed. It is important to note in the previous study, postformal thought and complexity of concept of god were significantly related; however, in the present study, no significant correlation was found. A possible explanation for this discrepancy could be the subjectivity (in spite of acceptable reliability) of the scale used to assess each participant’s answers to the concept of god question. Another problem that arose while analyzing the data was that 10 participants (nearly one fourth of the total participants who completed the survey) selected more than one answer on the Wisdom Scale for one or more questions. When evaluating the data, it was decided by the researchers to average the participant’s choices in these instances; however, this could create inconsistency in the data analysis. Averaging these responses potentially skewed our analysis and allowed for the creation of false responses. In future studies, it should be stressed to participants that only one choice should be given per question. General Discussion and Conclusions In general, we found mixed results when measuring the relations among each pair of the three variables of interest to us: postformal thought, concepts of god, and wisdom. Examining sub-scale relations both clarified and confused the interpretation of our results. Our hypotheses were only partially supported. In each of the two studies, it was possible to suggest some future changes that might clarify these mixed results.

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Right now we are left with the conclusion that the pair relations among the three variables of interest highlight certain aspects of postformal thought, wisdom, and concepts of god that relate to one another in the cognitive domain. Given that emotional, personality, age, experience, and other factors do influence all three of the variables of interest, this is not surprising. Future work using a longitudinal design might help clarify how and when the several factors, items, and subscales just listed might be related to the shared underlying cognitive factors leading to postformal thinking ability, complex concepts of god, and wisdom. Dimensions of postformal thought may relate differently to behavior in varied domains. What do results suggest about Image of God (IOG)? An underlying supposition of this research was that the ability to think in complex postformal ways, using a complex postformal logic, would be related to having a complex IOG. It seems self-evident that any level of thinking ability would be likely to generalize across many concepts, including the IOG. There is no special reason to believe that an individual would think in complex ways except as related to IOG. If there is utility in being able to relate to others and to objects in cognitively complex, creative, and wise ways, rather than having an inflexible, simplistic set of potential responses, complex thought should be a bonus feature of cognition. Metaphorically speaking, the individual with complex thought is like a painter with a color palette that includes a wide variety of colors from which that artist can select, rather than a palette with one or two colors. While a cognitively complex individual can choose to hold a simple IOG, it is a choice for that person. There would be no choice for a cognitively simpler person. This brings us to the question, what is the psychological value, beyond having choices, of having a complex postformal IOG? It would seem that the individual with a complex IOG would be able to have a more multifaceted relationship with any transcendent figure. This ability is suggested in the work of those who study moral/ethical development and discuss the decision- making of individuals facing moral/ethical dilemmas. The person with a more simplistic reward/punishment ethical concept is not able to use the more nuanced reasoning of one able to use universal ethical principles. If my IOG is more complex, I can have a relationship with the divine on multiple levels. This flexibility, in turn, lets me integrate and grow with the inevitable conflicts that can occur among three main sets of emotionally salient relationships: relations among my multifaceted sides-of-self; relationships with others; and relationship with God (Sinnott, 2006).


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Of course IOG involves variables other than cognition. Emotion, attachment history, cultural practices, and personality, as well as the depth of one’s psychological and spiritual journey, also intersect with IOG. One’s cultural choice of religious practices to observe may be lived on a superficial or on a deep level. Having a postformal ability to conceptualize IOG may mean that there is overarching coherence between what would seem to be the conflicted spiritual realities of living in the world of mystical spirituality while being “of the world” in everyday life (Sinnott, 2000). The concept of postformal thought advances the field of understanding of IOG by potentially explaining the complexity of an IOG and connecting it with the full functioning of the relational person. References Ardelt, M. (2003). Empirical assessment of a three-dimensional wisdom scale. Research on Ageing, 25(3), 275–324. doi:10.1177/0164027503025003004 Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116–13 I. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.42.1.116 Cartwright, K. D. (2001). Cognitive development theory and spiritual development. Journal of Adult Development, 8(4), 213–220. http://www.springer.com/psychology/ journal/10804 Galupo, M. P., Cartwright, K. B. & Savage, L. S. (hardcopy in press; electronic version 2009). Cross-category friendships as a context for Postformal cognitive development. Journal of Adult Development. doi: 10.1007/s10804-009-9089-4 Gough, H. G., & Heilbrun, A. B., Jr. (1965). The Adjectives Checklist Manual. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Griffin, J., Gooding, S., Semesky, M., Farmer, B., Mannchen, G., & Sinnott, J. (2009). Four brief studies of relations between Postformal thought and non-cognitive factors: Personality, concepts of “god,” political opinions, and social attitudes. Journal of Adult Development, 16(3), 173–182. doi:10.1007/s10804-009-9056-0 Preckel, F., Holling, H., & Vock, M. (2006). Academic underachievement: Relationship with cognitive motivation, achievement motivation, and conscientiousness. Psychology in the Schools, 43(3), 410–411. doi:10.1002/pits.20154 Pru, P., Abraham, C., & Bond, R. (2003). Personality, cognition, and university students’ examination performance. European Journal of Personality 17(6), 435–448. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1099-0984 Sadowski, C. J., & Sami, G. (1996). Elaborative processing mediates the relationship between need for cognition and academic performance. The Journal of Psychology, 130(3), 303–307. doi:10.1080/00223980.1996.9915011 Sinnott, J. D. (1992). The use of complex thought and resolving intragroup conflicts: A means to conscious adult development in the workplace. In J. Demick (Ed.), Development in the workplace (pp. 155–175). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Sinnott, J. D. (l994). Development and yearning: Cognitive aspects of spiritual development. Journal of Adult Development, 1(2), 91–100. doi:10.1007/BF02259675 Sinnott, J. D. (1998). The development of logic in adulthood: Postformal thought and its applications. New York, NY: Plenum. Sinnott, J. D. (2000). Cognitive aspects of unitative states: Spiritual self-realization, intimacy, and knowing the unknowable. In M. Miller & A. West (Eds.), Spirituality,

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ethics, and relationship in adulthood: Clinical and theoretical explorations (pp. 177– 198). New York, NY: International Universities Press/Psychosocial Press. Sinnott, J. D. (2001). A time for the eagle and the condor to fly together: Relations between spirit and adult development in healing techniques in several cultures. Journal of Adult Development, 8, 241–248. http://www.springer.com/psychology/ journal/10804 Sinnott, J. D. (2004a). Learning as a humanistic dialogue with reality; new theories that help us teach the whole person: Complex Postformal Thought and its relation to adult learning, life span development, and the new sciences. In T. Hagestrom (Ed.), Stockholm Lectures: Adult development and working life (pp.109–152). Stockholm, Sweden: University of Stockholm Press. Sinnott, J. D. (2004b). Learning as a humanistic dialogue with reality; new theories that help us teach the whole person: Context of learning and complex thought: Implications for modern life. In T. Hagestrom (Ed.), Stockholm Lectures: Adult development and working life (pp.78–108). Stockholm, Sweden: University of Stockholm Press. Sinnott, J. D. (2005). Spirituality as “feeling connected with the transcendent”: Outline of a transpersonal psychology of adult development of self. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 16, 287–308. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Sinnott, J. D., & Berlanstein, D. (2006). The importance of feeling whole: Learning to “feel connected,” community, and adult development. In C. H. Hoare (Ed.), Oxford handbook of adult development and learning (pp. 381–406). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Sternberg, R. J. (2003). Wisdom, intelligence, and creativity synthesized. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J., & Jordan, J. (2005). A handbook of wisdom: Psychological perspectives. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Wisdom. (2010). In Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved from http://www .merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wisdom

SPECIAL SECTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND CHRISTIAN MINISTRY

INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL SECTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND CHRISTIAN MINISTRY Andrew Village* This special section of RSSSR is devoted to the issue of psychological type and religion and especially how psychological type can increase our understanding of Christian ministry. As such it illustrates how the social scientific study of religion is of interest not only to academics and theoreticians but also to those who may use research to help them understand their profession or practice. The papers in the section range from reviews of the field to reports of research on specific religious groups. Together they give an insight into how psychological type models of personality have made a significant contribution to the field of religion and psychology. That people differ in their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors is not a disputed fact: Trying to explain these differences has kept philosophers, theologians, biologists, and social scientists busy for a long time. Among the many different ways of understanding human variation, the idea of personality has proved to be both widely understood and heuristically useful. Most people recognize that individuals have stable characteristics that can be categorized in some way, even if they find the array of variation rather overwhelming and difficult to describe. Psychologists have attempted to simplify the variation by looking for a few basic characteristics that together might adequately (if not comprehensively) describe human personality. The model of psychological type first suggested by Carl Jung (1921) arose from observations of the differences between people but before the days of complex statistical modeling and the quantification of psychological method. Jung drew on a wide range of historical sources and his own experience to identify different personality types, and he tried to explain these in terms of differences in psychological functioning. * Author Note: Andrew Village, Theology and Religious Studies, York St. John University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Andrew Village, York St. John University, Lord Mayor’s Walk, York YO31 7EX, UK. Email: A.Village@ yorksj.ac.uk Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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In its current form, as developed by Katherine Briggs and Isabel Briggs Myers (Myers, 2006; Myers & Myers, 1980), the model includes two orientations (introversion and extraversion), two perceiving functions (sensing and intuition), two judging functions (feeling and thinking), and two attitudes toward the outer world (judging and perceiving). Each orientation, function, or attitude is associated with characteristic patterns of behavior and interaction, and the combination of four independent pairs (E/I, S/N, F/T and J/P) gives 16 possible personality types (ENFJ, INTP, etc.). The two orientations are concerned with where individuals prefer to function psychologically. Extraverts (E) are orientated toward the outer world; introverts (I) are orientated toward their inner world. The two perceiving functions are concerned with the way in which people gather and process information. Sensing types (S) prefer to process the realities of a situation as perceived by their senses; intuitive types (N) prefer to process the possibilities of a situation as perceived by their imaginations. The two judging functions are concerned with the way in which people make decisions and judgments. Thinking types (T) prefer to process information objectively; feeling types (F) prefer to process information subjectively. The two attitudes toward the outer world indicate which of the two sets of functions (that is, Perceiving S/N or Judging T/F) is preferred in dealings with the outer world. Judging types (J) actively judge external stimuli rather than passively perceive them; perceiving types (P) passively perceive external stimuli rather than actively judging them. The conceptual basis of psychological type lies in the notion that although these various aspects of psychological functioning are present in everyone, different individuals tend to prefer some over others. The analogy of “handedness” is often used to describe the way that individuals draw on psychological functions: Most people can write with either hand, but they tend to do so with only one. Writing with our preferred hand seems easy and natural; writing with our nonpreferred hand requires more concentration and effort. In the same way, it is argued, individuals have preferred orientations, functions, and attitudes to the outer world that define their psychological type. This is not the only way they operate, but it is the way that is preferred and more prevalent. Typological models such as this are often contrasted with traitbased models such as the Five Factor Model (FFM) or “Big Five” (Costa & McCrae, 1985) and the three-dimensional model developed

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by Hans Eysenck and others (H. J. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975, 1991; H. J. Eysenck & Wilson, 1991; S. B. G. Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985). These models were developed using factor analyses of selfreported questionnaire data to isolate independent dimensions that are considered to be the minimum required to explain human personality. Each person can fall anywhere along any of five or three dimensions (depending on the model), and this helps to explain the rich diversity of personality. Psychological type models are not as favored in some circles as are models based on factor analysis, and there may be several reasons for this (Bayne, 1997; DeVito, 1985; Leech, 1996; Lloyd, 2007, 2008). Some of these relate to the origins of the psychological type or to its widespread use in the commercial world in the guise of the Myers Briggs Personality Inventory (MBTI®). Others relate to the underlying theoretical assumptions made about the relationship between types and psychological functioning. While a detailed analysis of these issues would not be appropriate here, a few points are worth considering in relation to the validity and utility of the psychological type model of personality. Those who use trait models often criticize the theory that Jung and others have used to explain the observed differences in types. The core of this theory is that the psyche is responsible for functions related to acquiring and evaluating information (which Jung called the irrational and rational functions respectively). Few would dispute that these are basic functions of the brain, and cognitive science has studied both the perception of information and the mechanisms by which individuals make judgments and decisions. The idea that perception can operate either through the senses or through the imagination is widely understood and is part of the definition of the word itself. Similarly, the notion of making decisions through rational decisions or through value judgments (the “head” versus the “heart”) is also widely understood. While this might seem a flimsy justification for recognizing the possibility of such function differences, it is broadly similar to the theoretical basis used to formulate the FFM, which was built upon items derived from terms widely used to describe personality (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1992; John, Angleitner, & Ostendorf, 1988). Factor analyses have been used to group the items into domains, but the stability of these is variable across a range of samples. The theoretical understanding of the neurological origin of the five domains is very poorly understood, but this has not stopped the model being accepted for its utility in describing personalities. So a fully understood psychological

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basis for a personality model is not necessary for it to be useful as an explanatory or predictive tool. This is certainly true of psychological type models. Lloyd (2008) made a powerful argument for the utility of the psychological type classification, even if its theoretical basis is poorly understood. Second is the criticism that the binary classification of the dimensions of psychological type are unwarranted and that dimensions should be understood as continuous traits (McCrae & Costa, 1989). Some psychological type theorists have recognized the possibility of using the dimensions in this way (Kummerow & Quenk, 1992), but others have resisted the notion of using MBTI scores as a measure of strength of preference (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Using type scores can be justified, especially for research purposes, but it is important to recognize the difference between theoretical and statistical arguments for the use of dichotomies or continua. Theoretical arguments relate to the nature of the different type dimensions and to the idea that individuals generally develop preferences for particular modes of functioning. For example, if the extraversion/introversion orientation relates to the location of processing, then it is difficult to see how this can be anything other than a dichotomy: It makes no sense to refer to processing somewhere between the interior and the exterior world, any more than a light switch can be other than on or off. Preference in this case would be indicated by the frequency with which an individual operated in these two modes. The statistical issue relates to whether it is justified to dichotomize continuous scores and thereby lose information (DeCoster, Iselin, & Gallucci, 2009). While this may be poor statistical practice, there might be good reasons for choosing to do this such as making it easier to use the model outside academic circles. There is no doubt that this has been a great strength of psychological type models but perhaps one that makes them objects of suspicion in a psychological discipline dominated by quantitative empiricists. These criticisms need to be set alongside evidence that the dimensions of the psychological type model correlate well with a number of domains of the FFM (Bayne, 1994; Crump, Furnham, & Moutafi, 2003; Furnham, 1996; MacDonald, Anderson, Tsagarakis, & Holland, 1995; McCrae & Costa, 1989) or Eysenck (Francis & Jones, 2000) models. All three models seem to refer to the same dimension of extraversion/introversion, despite the different theoretical formulations of this construct. In addition, there have been several studies demonstrating correlations between the psychological type judging functions and the


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FFM dimension of agreeableness, between the psychological type attitude to the outer world and the FFM dimension of conscientiousness, and between the psychological type perceiving functions and the FFM dimension of openness. The one dimension in trait models that is not covered by type models seems to be that of neuroticism. This might be seen as an argument for abandoning type in favor of the FFM (McCrae & Costa, 1989), but others have argued strongly against this. The factorial structure of trait-based personality models is still uncertain, and abandoning psychological type as a tool for research would risk separating the academic study of personality from those who might benefit from it most. Psychological type is not without its problems and weaknesses, but these may be no more serious than those present in most models that try to capture the diversity and complexity of human personality. The contributors to this special section are well aware of these problems, but they are also aware that using psychological type in the study of religion has proved a rich and useful field of study. The collection of papers presented here show that psychological type makes predictions about the sorts of people who might participate in different kinds of religious activity or organizations and that these predictions are often supported by empirical evidence. The papers originate mainly from studies in North America and the United Kingdom. Observant readers will notice that one name, Leslie Francis, appears more than once in author lists, and this is no accident. Professor Francis has championed the application of psychological type to the study of religion for many years, and he has worked with Mandy Robbins and others to test theories in a wide range of Christian denominations and other religious traditions. Examples reported here are the study of Presbyterian Church clergy in the United States of America (Francis, Robbins, & Wulff, 2011), of Free Church ministers in the United Kingdom (Francis, Whinney, & Robbins, 2011), of Anglican clergy in England (Village, 2011), and of churchgoers in Australia (Robbins & Francis, 2011). Such studies show that congregations tend to have distinctly different profiles from the populations to which they belong, and clergy can have distinctly different profiles from the congregations from which they are drawn. Studies of this kind not only raise theoretical questions about what factors predispose people to particular kinds of religious expression, but they also raise practical questions about the ways in which religious organizations may unwittingly exclude people with particular personality profiles.

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Other papers show how psychological type can help to explain interactions between people in religious contexts. Tilley, Francis, Robbins, and Jones (2011) show how type is associated with different expectations between trainee ministers and their mentors. Fawcett, Francis, and Robbins (2011) show that young people’s perceptions of ministry might be shaped by their own psychological type preferences. Robbins, Francis, & Ryland (2011) demonstrate that extraverts and introverts may have different perceptions of what makes a good ministry team. Studies of this sort show how psychological type preferences can help us to understand the way that religious people interact and why people with similar beliefs and values may nonetheless perceive ministry in quite different ways. Most of the papers deal with dimensions of psychological type individually, rather than looking in detail at the interaction of preferences in each dimension (usually referred to as type dynamics). This perhaps represents the way in which the application of type to research in religion has concentrated on observable correlations rather than on the more theoretical aspects of Jungian psychology. The special section begins and ends with papers from Chris Ross, who has studied type and religion for many years in Canada and North America. His contributions anchor the use of type in the thought of Carl Jung. His first paper (Ross, 2011a) gives an overview of the development of type theory, and it summarizes a wide range of studies from a North American perspective. His second paper (Ross, 2011b) builds on the work of John Beebe to show how a specific type can contribute to building religious communities. Taken together, these papers provide a snapshot of studies in psychological type and ministry as they now stand. The gradual accumulation of studies from different religious groups in different cultures is enabling researchers to detect emerging patterns and clarify our understanding of how personality shapes religious expression. Psychological type has proved a surprisingly durable model of personality that has helped many individuals and organizations to understand themselves better. It is certainly not an all-embracing or sufficient explanation of personality, but study after study has shown that it does have some power to predict religious affiliation and preferences. I thank all the contributors for their work in this area and trust that this collection will serve to spur further social scientific studies into psychological type and religion.


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References Bayne, R. (1994). The Myers-Briggs versus the “Big Five.” The Psychologist, 7(1), 14–16. http://www.thepsychologist.org.uk/ Bayne, R. (1997). The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: A critical review and practical guide. Cheltenham: Stanley Thornes. Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1985). The NEO personality inventory. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Crump, J., Furnham, A., & Moutafi, J. (2003). The relationship between the revised NEO-personality inventory and the Myers-Briggs type indicator. Social Behavior and Personality, 31(6), 577–584. doi: 10.2224/sbp.2003.31.6.577 DeCoster, J., Iselin, A.-M. R., & Gallucci, M. (2009). A conceptual and empirical examination of justifications for dichotomization. Psychological Methods, 14(4), 349–366. doi: 10.1037/a0016956 DeVito, A. J. (1985). Review of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. In J. V. Mitchell Jr. (Ed.), Ninth Mental Measurements Yearbook (pp. 1030–1032). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model. Annual Review of Psychology, 41(1), 417–440. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.41.020190.002221 Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (adult and junior). London, England: Hodder & Stoughton. Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1991). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Scales (EPS adult). London, England: Hodder and Stoughton. Eysenck, H. J., & Wilson, G. D. (1991). The Eysenck Personality Profiler. Brisbane, Australia: Cymeon. Eysenck, S. B. G., Eysenck, H. J., & Barrett, P. (1985). A revised version of the psychoticism scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 6(1), 21–29. doi: 10.1016/01918869(85)90026-1 Fawcett, B. G., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2011). Imagining themselves as ministers: How religiously committed Baptist youth respond to the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS2). Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 264–285. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Francis, L. J., & Jones, S. H. (2000). The relationship between the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire among adult churchgoers. Pastoral Psychology, 48(5), 377–386. http://www.springer.com/psychology/ journal/11089 Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., & Wulff, K. (2011). Psychological type profile of clergywomen and clergymen serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA): Implications for strengths and weaknesses in ministry. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 192–211. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Francis, L. J., Whinney, M., & Robbins, M. (2011). Psychological type preferences of male and female Free Church ministers in England. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 251–263. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Furnham, A. (1996). The Big Five versus the Big Four: The relationship between the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and NEO-PI five factor model of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 21(2), 303–307. doi: 10.1016/01918869(96)00033-5 Goldberg, L. R. (1992). The development of markers for the Big Five factor structure. Psychological Assessment, 4(1), 26–42. doi: 10.1037/1040-3590.4.1.26 John, O. P., Angleitner, A., & Ostendorf, F. (1988). The lexical approach to personality: A historical review of trait taxonomic research. European Journal of Personality, 2(3), 171–205. doi: 10.1002/per.2410020302 Jung, C. G. (1921). Psychologische typen. Zurich, Switzerland: Rascher Verlag.

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Kummerow, J. M., & Quenk, N. L. (1992). Interpretive guide for the MBTI Expanded Analysis Report. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Leech, K. (1996). Myers-Briggs: Some critical reflections. Croydon, UK: The Jubilee Group. Lloyd, J. B. (2007). Opposition from Christians to Myers-Briggs personality typing: An analysis and evaluation. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 28(2), 111–123. doi: 10.1080/13617670701485672 Lloyd, J. B. (2008). Myers-Briggs theory: How true? How necessary? Journal of Psychological Type, 68(6), 43–50. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-typejournal.htm MacDonald, D. A., Anderson, P. E., Tsagarakis, C. I., & Holland, C. J. (1995). Correlations between the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and the NEO Personality Inventory Facets. Psychological Reports, 76(2), 449–450. http://ammons.ammonsscientific. com/php/toc.php McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1989). Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator from the perspective of the Five-Factor Model of personality. Journal of Personality, 57(1), 17–40. doi: 10.1111/j.1467–6494.1989.tb00759.x Myers, I. B. (2006). MBTI manual: A guide to the development and use of the MyersBriggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Myers, I. B., & Myers, P. B. (1980). Gifts differing. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Myers, I. B., & McCaulley, M. H. (1985). Manual: A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Robbins, M., & Francis, L. J. (2011). All are called, but some psychological types are more likely to respond: Profiling churchgoers in Australia. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 212–229. Robbins, M., Francis, L. J., & Ryland, A. (2011). Do introverts appreciate the same things as extraverts within a ministry team? A study among leaders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the UK. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 306–314. Ross, C. F. J. (2011a). Jungian Typology and religion: A perspective from North America. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 165–191. Ross, C. F. J. (2011b). The role of archetypes and Jungian personality typology in building religious community: Applying John Beebe’s eight process archetypal model through a case study of the extraverted intuitive type with introverted feeling (ENFP). Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 315–345. Tilley, D., Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., & Jones, S. H. (2011). Apprentice clergy? The relationship between expectations in ministry and the psychological type profile of training incumbents and curates in the Church of England. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 286–305. Village, A. (2011). Gifts differing? Psychological type among stipendiary and nonstipendiary Anglican clergy. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 230–250.

JUNGIAN TYPOLOGY AND RELIGION: A PERSPECTIVE FROM NORTH AMERICA Christopher F. J. Ross* Abstract This analysis reviews the development of Jungian typology and the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). It provides a survey of empirical studies of Jungian personality type and religious phenomena and issues that use the Myers Briggs Type Indicator. It documents a) how individuals relate to and experience religion, b) what they expect from religious participation, c) how likely they are to affiliate with religious groups, and d) suggests that the sensing/intuitive preference-set is the most salient to religion. Sensing preferences were associated with sharper religious boundaries and discomfort with religious doubt and change, judging preferences with attraction to the structure of religion, and perceiving with religious experience. Sensing, feeling, and judging preferences were more common among religious joiners. A history of the development of Jung’s typology is provided. Keywords: Jung, MBTI, Myers-Briggs, psychological type, religious expression

Swiss psychiatrist Jung (1875–1961), founder of analytical psychology, developed a personality typology based on the assumption that consciousness has a variety of orientations: Humans are always aware with something as well as aware of something. The value of cherishing and amplifying difference, a value that underlies Jung’s typology, was also reflected in the title that Briggs Myers chose for her classic text on her type indicator: Gifts Differing. Although Jung’s psychological reformulation of a religious orientation to life that permeates and underlies his analytical psychology has received attention in the sub-field of religious studies known as “psychology and religion,” his work has been largely ignored in mainstream psychology, including the psychology of religion. This may partly be because of the emphasis * Author Note: Christopher F. J. Ross, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid Laurier University. The author wishes to thank colleagues and friends who read earlier drafts of the chapter and particularly to Alexa Winchell who also assisted with the bibliographic search, to Leslie Francis for later revisions, and to Lauren Price for final revisions. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Christopher F. J. Ross, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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within the psychology of religion on quantitative empirical methods, which are largely absent from Jung’s studies, apart from his early word-association experiments (Jung, 1904). Since the publication of Jung’s Psychological Types in 1921, a number of measures have been developed based on his seminal formulations of personality differences. Of these, the instrument developed by Briggs Myers has generated the most empirical research, and many type frequency studies have been of people in religious settings. The purpose of the present survey was threefold: a) to review the development of Jung’s original theory of psychological types and connect this to the work of Myers and Briggs Myers that led to the development of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), b) to review empirical studies that have used the MBTI in religious contexts, and c) to demonstrate the contribution that Jungian typology makes to our understanding of religion and personality differences. Such an understanding has potential to reduce conflict about religious issues within individuals, religious groups, and society at large. The body of research and theory reviewed here shares common ground with the postmodern concern for diversity and poststructuralist attention to the construction of multiple subjectivities. Jung’s Theory of Psychological Types Jung published over a 60 year period from the heyday of European modernist scientific optimism to the decade which saw the rise of social liberation movements that are foundational to postmodern concern over the complexities of difference. His work was immense and diverse, ranging from the methods of experimental psychology employed in his early word association studies to arcane studies of alchemical symbolism in his middle and later years. Jung’s personality typology proved to be the part of his oeuvre that most influenced mainstream psychology (Shamdasini, 2000), not least because it drew on extremes that colored both his work and personality: intuitive speculation combined with an analytic orientation. Indeed, one measure of the impact of Jung’s typology is the fact it can be used to understand his own work: Jung’s scientific training strengthened his critical thinking function, but it could not subdue his stronger intuition. Typologies, such as those from Hippocrates and Galen regarding the four humors, have long attracted attention because they are a way of both intuitively summarizing clusters of characteristics and providing a framework for classification which spawns fresh predictions.

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There were many typologies at the start of the twentieth century. James (1890) thought that Galton’s study of individual differences in scientists’ mental imagery broke the mold of the uniformity assumption in psychology, and in 1895, Binet founded the journal L’Anee Psychologique, inaugurating individual psychology as a new branch of psychology. Jung’s book Psychological Types, published in 1921, was 17 years in the making. The earliest elements of his typology are traceable to his word-association studies published in 1904 where, following Binet’s lead, Jung applied Wundt’s experimental methods to investigate individual differences. He classified individuals into objective types who associated to a word’s objective meaning and subjective-predicate types whose associations were affective. Jung first used the term introversion in a paper on his own daughter (Jung, 1910) that he prepared for the conference on child psychology organized by Hall at Clark University, which he attended with Freud on their first visit to the United States. In 1915, Jung re-engaged with issues of typology, realizing these might answer some of the questions about the workings of the unconscious that had not been addressed by his explorations of comparative mythology published 2 years earlier in Symbols of Transformation. He engaged in vigorous correspondence with analysts Schmid-Guisan and Spielrein in Geneva, in which he continued to conflate introversion with thinking and extraversion with feeling. Jung’s first use of the term intuition was in 1916, when he dismissed Speilrein as an intuitive-extravert who was too arbitrary. However, it was analyst Moltzer who introduced the term “intuition,” as Jung acknowledged (Jung, 1921, p. 454) and contrasted it to sensation at a presentation to the Psychological Club in Zurich in 1916. The articulation of these additional functions, alternative ways of perceiving, enabled Jung to develop his full theory of type, in which any of the four functions could be used either with an introverted attitude of consciousness, where the object of consciousness is drawn into the subject and momentarily reflected upon, or with the extraverted attitude of consciousness where the experiencing subject is drawn into the object (Shapiro & Alexander, 1975). In October of 1919, Jung wrote to Spielrein that he had completed his book, and in it she would find her questions answered (Baire, 2003). Jung’s typology of personality was founded on the notion that humans differ in relation to their preferences regarding two sets of contrasting cognitive processes: the irrational, perceiving processes of sensation and intuition and the rational (Jung, 1921), judging (Myers & Myers, 1980), or evaluative (Beebe, 2004) processes of thinking and

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feeling. Furthermore, Jung considered that each process or function of consciousness, the term he preferred that stems from the Latin word fungor and Sanskrit root wood bhuni, meaning “to enjoy” (Hillman, 1979), had an extraverted and an introverted form, yielding eight personality types distinguished by one of eight psychological functions. More frequent use of one function accustoms individuals to experience different pleasures which, in turn, foster particular personal characteristics. For instance, the frequent use of the thinking function in an introverted direction to make novel internal distinctions produces someone likely to be described as analytical. Jung considered the predisposition to use one function rather than another to be genetic. Research in the psychology of individual differences confirms a genetic component for most personality features that can be reliably measured (Plomin & Avshalom, 1999), including those related to Jungian typology, such a sociability (extraversion-introversion), openness to experience (intuition-sensing), agreeableness (feeling-thinking), and conscientiousness (judging-perceiving) (McCrea & Costa, 1989). The sensation function is concerned with “what is” (Jung, 1961, p. 219). Introverted sensing resonates to the subjective impact of what is perceived and reflectively compares and orders specific experiences. With extraverted sensation, the sensing subject is drawn into the sensed object and is associated with “compelling, often shared, experiences of the textures, smells, sights, sounds and tastes of the world,” according to Jungian analyst Beebe (2004, p. 96), who drew on both his clinical experience and familiarity with theory and research associated with the MBTI. The thinking function operates with language and concepts to name, label, or define an experience which then becomes another object of awareness in its own right. Extraverted thinking is interested in definitions that hold true for everyone and proceeds to organize that external world with that public definition, whereas introverted thinking reflects on whether a particular construction accords with the conviction of inner truth, regardless of what the received opinion might be (Beebe, 2004). The feeling function is concerned to make valuations, judgments, and decisions based on what the subject holds to be of value; in short, “How do these phenomena agree with what I value here?” Introverted feeling concentrates on values that matter most to the individual, while extraverted feeling readily seeks connection and harmony with the feeling of others. Lastly, the intuitive function cognizes wholes (in contrast to details, which are the focus of the sensation function) and works with patterns of meaning, which along


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with the thinking function, often involves language and other symbol systems. Beebe distinguished extraverted intuition as: involved in picking up what was going on in other people’s minds, and seeing possibilities that others might not have imagined; whereas introverted intuition looked at the big picture in the unconscious, where the gestalts that moved nations, religions, and epochs lay, even in the midst of apparently “individual” experience. (Beebe, 2004, p. 96)

The subtitle of the 1923 English translation of Psychological Types was The Psychology of Individuation. According to Baire (2003), a recent biographer of Jung, Psychological Types was the main therapeutic guide for Jungian analysts for the next 20 years: By 1930 . . . there was one major constant: his work on typologies became the starting point for both his writing and practice. The first stage in therapy for anyone who made the pilgrimage to Zurich was to leave “no doubt about [the analysand’s] personality type and function.” (p. 376)

However, following Jung’s increased attention to the collective unconscious after World War II, Jungian analysts’ interests shifted from how individuals became conscious toward a phenomenology of unconscious contents and their cross-cultural expressions (Beebe, 2004). Edinger (1984) and Beebe (2004), bucking neglect of consciousness by the Jungian mainstream, argued that Jung’s formulations regarding individual differences in conscious orientations provided direction for understanding how best to access what is unconscious. Beebe elaborated Edinger’s exposition of consciousness as knowing with (derived from the Latin “cum,” “with,” and “scire,” “to know”). He argued that Jung’s genius resided first in realizing that consciousness is always knowing with something as well as knowing about something and second in articulating the distinct ways in which individuals become conscious of things. Jung charted the diverse ways and order in which what is unconscious may most fruitfully be encountered in psychotherapy (Beebe, 2004). Katherine Briggs, Isabel Myers, and the Development of the MBTI Two other measures of Jungian personality typology have been developed by Jungian analysts, Gray and Wheelwright (1946) and Singer and Loomis (1984). Kirsch (2000) noted that the Gray Wheelwright

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type test is still used in some training institutes of Jungian analysts; reliability and validity studies are unavailable. The Singer-Loomis Inventory of Personality (SLIP) shed the assumption of bi-polarity in Jung’s typology (Loomis & Singer, 1980). Reliability and validity studies are lacking, as are empirical studies relating SLIP to religion. However, Loomis (1991) speculated about Jungian typology in relation to North American Aboriginal religions. Most researchers and practitioners interested in Jung’s typology since the Second World War have been associated with the MBTI. Briggs’ interest in personality sprang from her aspiration to create convincing characters in the novels she wrote, as well as her desire to figure out Clarence Myers with whom her beloved daughter, Isabel, had fallen in love. In 1923, when Briggs read the English translation of Psychological Types, she had already developed her own ideas regarding personality differences. However, as Briggs’ biographer lamented, “A woman ahead of her time, Katherine was caught in a restraining net woven of sexism, cultural conditioning, and her own brilliance,” and “burned her notes” when “she recognized the completeness of Jung’s formulations of what she had only partially devised” (Saunders, 1991, p. 59). Jung and Briggs corresponded from 1927, and, when they met in New York in 1937, Jung expressed his regret that she had destroyed her promising manuscript. It was left to her daughter, Isabel Briggs Myers, to pioneer what would become the world’s most frequently used personality instrument, with 2.5 million administrations annually since 2000 (M. Segovia, personal communication from Consulting Psychologist Press, 2004). In 1943, Briggs Myers copyrighted the MBTI, the product of her resolve in the wake of Pearl Harbor, to contribute a people-sorting test to the anti-fascist war effort, a test that would also be useful in the eventual troop demobilization. The structure and assumptions of the MBTI, however, differed from prevailing psychometric principles, and thus only in 1975 did it become widely used following its transfer to Consulting Psychologist Press from Educational Testing Services, which had classified it as a research instrument only. Jung explicitly suggested three distinctions foundational to human personality difference: a) the introverted or extraverted attitude; b) perceiving through the functions of sensing or intuition; c) judging or evaluating using the functions of feeling or thinking. His final distinction, the fourth preference set of the MBTI, is implicit in distinctions b) and c): Jung termed the perceiving functions of sensing


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and intuition as irrational processes by which he meant “not ordering,” and designated the two ordering or judging functions of thinking and feeling as rational processes. The structure of the MBTI follows Jung’s distinctions, with E and I standing for extraversion and introversion respectively, S and N for sensing and intuition, and T and F for thinking or feeling. The principal innovation that Myers made to Jung’s own formulation of individual differences was to designate which process or kind of function was extraverted for an individual: J represents the preference for externally deploying a judging, evaluating, or rational kind of function, while P refers to the preference for the external deployment of a perceiving or irrational function. Jung’s Personality Typology and Religion Jung made few explicit applications of his typology to religion, understandable perhaps in view of the pervading syncretic conflation of religion and psychology in his analytical psychology. While still sifting through many typologies, Jung met James in 1909, during the last months of James’ life. However, while Jung would draw on James’ (1890) distinctions between logical and symbolic thinking (Jung, 1912) and between tough and tender minded (Jung, 1913), his conversations with James centered on “the importance of para-psychology in providing access to the unconscious.” They also covered other topics in the psychology of religion such as “spiritualism, faith healing, and other non-medical applications of psychotherapy,” but they did not include a discussion of their typologies in relation to these issues (Baire, 2003, p. 167). Most studies relating Jung’s typology to religion have used the MBTI, although recently some studies have been reported using the Kiersey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978) and the Francis Psychological Type Scale (Francis, 2005). The Gray-Wheelwright type test has been widely used only with trainee Jungian analysts. Loomis (1991), the co-developer of the Singer-Loomis Inventory of Personality (SLIP), has written about Jungian typology in relation to North American Aboriginal religions, but the SLIP has not been used in empirical studies of religious groups and issues. Studies of type frequency using the MBTI among religious groups are reviewed first, followed by studies using type preferences as independent variables to investigate religious orientation, beliefs, and practice.

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christopher f. j. ross Type Frequency Studies of Religious Groups

Myers operationalized Jung’s typology as a dichotomous set of four preferences, and recording the pattern of type frequencies for specific groups has been the prevailing method of applied research employed by users of the MBTI, including those who have consulted and studied religious groups. Religious Affiliation Carskadon (1981) found a sensing preference among Mississippi college students associated with affiliation to conservative religious groups such as Baptists and found an intuitive preference with affiliation to more liberal ones such as Episcopalians or Anglicans. Ross and Francis (2006) replicated this relationship with Welsh students, further establishing that those of no religious affiliation were associated with combined preferences for intuition and thinking. In their study, extraverted intuitives with auxiliary introverted thinking (ENTPs) were the most frequent specific Jungian type and four times more frequent than in the general population. Table 1 indicates a) the percentage of type-related preferences for active members of particular Christian denominations, b) the most frequent specific Jungian type, and c) Keirsey and Bates (1978) temperament cluster, alongside norms for the US, UK and Canada. Keirsey, in Please Understand Me (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), following Galen’s classification of the four humors, down-played the importance of extraversion and introversion as determinants of personality and concentrated on four temperaments. The pattern of preferences among Christian denominations, with the exception of the Canadian Anglican group and US Unitarian groups, resembled that of the respective national samples, with introversion more frequently preferred than extraversion; sensing than intuition; feeling than thinking among women, thinking more frequent than feeling among men; and with judging a more frequent preference than perceiving. However, the Christian denominational groups included an even higher proportion of introverted sensing types with auxiliary extraverted feeling (ISFJs): 31% of female Canadian evangelicals, 10% of male Canadian evangelicals, compared to Canadian norms of 11% and 5% respectively (Bramer, 1996). ISFJs (20%) also predominated among Canadian Catholic women (Ross, 1995) and among Catholic priests (18%, see Table 2) (MacDaid, McCaulley, & Kainz, 1986).

60 66

40 34

58 64

42 36

43 53

71

29

57 47

54 54

46 46

53 55

56 54 59

44 46 41

47 45

62 61

I

38 39

E

58 62

79 73

71 64

70 63

88

54 51

55 50 22

36 85

S

42 38

21 27

29 36

30 37

12

46 49

45 50 78

64 15

N

54 76

30 65

39 69

26 60

62

25 59

22 57 52

31 35

T

46 24

70 35

61 31

74 40

38

75 41

78 43 48

69 65

F

66 59

62 55

61 55

82 62

62

61 59

72 78 67

59 92

J

34 41

38 45

39 45

18 38

38

39 41

28 22 33

41 8

P

ISTJ ISTJ

ISFJ ISTJ

ISFJ ISTJ

ISFJ ISTJ

ISTJ

ISFJ ISTJ

ISFJ IxTJ INTJ

INFJ ISFJ

Preferences Summary

ST 32 ST 50

SF 55 SF 50

SF 44 ST 47

SF 52 ST 42

ST 58

SF 40 ST 34

SF 45 ST 34 NF 40

NF 48 No Data

SJ 45 SJ 42

SJ 54 SJ 44

SJ 50 SJ 43

SJ 62 SJ 49

SJ 56

SJ 41 SJ 36

SJ 47 SJ 45 NF 40

NF 48 No Data

Most Most Frequent Frequent Keirsey Function Pair Temperament

Note: E = Extroversion; I = Introversion; S = Sensing; N = Intuition; T = Thinking; F = Feeling; J = Judging; P = Perceiving

General Populations Norms U.S. (Hammer & Mitchell, 1996) – Females – Males UK (Kendall, 1998) – Females – Males Canada Francophone (Casas, 1990) – Females – Males

Active Church Members Anglicans Canada (Ross, 1993) Wales (Craig et al., 2003) England (Francis et al., 2007): – Females – Males Unitarians: USA (Gerhard, 1983) Catholics: Canada (Ross, 1995) – Females – Males Evangelical Protestants: Canada Francophone (Delis-Bulhoes, 1990) Anglophone (Bramer, 1996) – Females – Males

Group

ISTJ 16 ISTJ 23

ISFJ 18 ISTJ 20

ISFJ 16 ISTJ 19

ISFJ 31 ISTJ 21

ISTJ 27

ISFJ 20 ESTJ 15

ISFJ 22 ISTJ 17 ENTJ 14

INFP 18 ISFJ 30

Most Frequent Specific Jungian Type

Table 1. Meta Analysis of Percentage Jungian Type Preference among Active Members of Christian Denominations and Adult Norms for USA, UK, and Canada

jungian typology and religion 173

14 13.5 12 11 9 8

10 13 16 14 10 4

18 14 11 12 10 8

(N = 1298)

(MacDaid et al., 1986)

US Catholic Priests

Welsh Anglican Priests

8 14 15 8 10 8

(N = 319) 19 13 16 9 6 10

(N = 427)

(Greenfield, 1969) (Francis et al., 2001)

US Rabbis

Note: The expected percentage would be 6.5 if all 16 types were equally represented.

ISFJ ESFJ ENFJ ENFP INFJ ISTJ

(N = 1,554)

Averaged Type US Frequency across Protestant the Four Clergy Ministers Groups (MacDaid et al., 1986)

UK Males

6 5 2 6 2 19

(N = 599)

7 6 2 5 2 19

(N = 748)

(Hammer & (Kendall, 1998) Mitchell, 1996)

US Males

Table 2. Percentages for the Most Frequent of the 16 Jungian Types among Male Christian Clergy and Rabbis

174 christopher f. j. ross


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In terms of Keirsey temperaments, sensing-judging (SJs), designated guardians, were the most frequent temperament among the Christian groups as in the general population, outnumbering artisan sensingperceivers (SP), idealist intuitive-feelers (NF), and rationalist intuitivethinkers (NT). SJs were also the most frequent temperament among Christian lay leaders in the UK (44%: Francis & Robbins, 2002) and members of the western Hindu Hare Krishna group (78%: Poling & Kenney, 1986). In contrast to the general population, the second most frequent temperament among the church groups was the NF idealists, rather than SP artisans who, along with NT rationalists, were under-represented. Indeed, anecdotes from type and spirituality workshops I have conducted in local churches indicated that an important dynamic within a congregation is the tension between the large SJ guardian group oriented to religious rules, conduct, and tradition and the NF idealist group oriented to spirituality and personal growth. The few SP artisans present were not vocal but wondered about all the fuss NF idealists were making, while the few NT rationalists, often sympathetic to the concerns of the NF group, played an important mediating role by developing strategies to put the conflict in perspective. The presence among the female Canadian Catholics of a considerable extraverted intuitive group with auxiliary feeling (ENFP), the second largest group after the ISFJ women, constituted an important difference between the Catholic and evangelical Protestants congregations. Temperament theorist Keirsey (1987) designated the ENFPs and INFPs as idealist role informers. Furthermore, in a study of Anglicans the INFPs, whose dominant function of introverted feeling is balanced by an auxiliary function of extraverted intuition, were the largest type in this liberal protestant denomination (Ross, 1993). Intuitives outnumbered sensers in two liberal Protestants groups: Unitarians in Texas (Gerhardt, 1983) and Anglicans in southern Ontario (Ross, 1993). This may reflect a particular liberal church culture attracting intuitives, a minority in society at large but even more of a minority in most evangelical congregations. Other studies reporting on active members of Christian denominations included Francis, Duncan, Craig, and Luffman (2004); Francis, Butler, and Craig (2005); Craig (2005); Francis, Craig, and Hall (2008); and Village, Francis, and Craig (2009).

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christopher f. j. ross Ordained Christian Clergy and Members of Religious Orders

The clergy of a particular religion or denomination constitute an important group who define the general ambience and character of that religious group. Therefore, type proportions of the clergy may play an important part in determining and maintaining a distinct religious orientation and culture. Table 2 shows the percentage frequency of the six most frequent types among four clergy groups, ranked by percentage frequency averaged over clergy groups and compared to population norms. In terms of Keirsey’s temperaments, three were sensing judging guardian types who derive meaning from loyalty to tradition. The ISFJ type was the most frequent among both the Anglican (19%) and Roman Catholic priests (18%). Quiet kindness, conservatism, and practical dependability characterize this type; these values and orientation toward religion likely resonate with the numerous ISFJ members of their congregation. In those congregations with ISFJ clergy, an ISFJ axis between clergy and congregation may make for a distinct type culture of quiet kindness and firm rules, which may feel claustrophobic to and deter other types. The next most frequent clergy type was the closely related ESFJ, extraverted feeling type with introverted sensing (Catholic priests 14%, Rabbis 14%, Anglican ministers 13%), which corresponds to the stereotype of the warm, friendly, practical, and well-organized minister or rabbi. After this sensing-feeling judging cluster, came a second cluster of ordained men with a combined intuitive-feeling (NF) preference that is three times more frequent among male clergy than in the general male population. The most frequent specific Jungian types within this cluster were extraverted feeling types with introverted intuition (ENFJs, 16% of US protestant clergy, and 15% of rabbis, and 2% of US males) who have been described as warm, articulate leaders concerned with harmony, followed by extraverted intuitives with introverted feeling (ENFPs) who have been described as “spontaneous, flexible innovators guided by inspirations often related to helping others,” and may correspond to the “rebel” clergy stereotype (Pedersen, 1993, p. 62). Because of their concern for holistic growth and personal development (Richardson, 1996), NF clergy offer a contrasting approach to the rule oriented disposition of their colleagues and of that large segment of their congregation with SJ preferences. This contrast between members and leader may constitute a creative tension in the religious community, and it may also lead to conflict in times of stress.


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A total of 49% of the clergy in the four samples had extraverted feeling as a dominant or auxiliary function, paralleled in their congregations by 44% of Canadian Catholics (Ross & Jackson, 1993) and 52% of Welsh Anglicans (Craig, Francis, Bailey, & Robbins, 2003). Seven studies of nuns and monks, reviewed by Ross (1993), indicated those in Catholic religious orders have an even larger predominance of feeling and judging types than clergy, with a clear majority of introverts and sensing types. The friendliness and social support reported as one of the psychological and health benefits of membership in a religious group (Miller & Thoresen, 2003; Scheurich, 2003) may be associated with the prevalence of the function of extraverted feeling with its concern for harmony. The preferences for feeling over thinking among both clergy, lay leaders, and professed nuns and monks, those who might be expected to be exemplars of their religious faith, is congruent with the interpretation that the core of the Christian message is about loving relationships. However, studies of rabbis by Greenfield (1969) indicated that the preference for feeling extends beyond the Christian tradition. Indeed, the concern of extraverted feeling for relationship with others is reflected in the Golden Rule found in most world wisdom traditions. In view of this, it would be interesting to determine if extraverted feeling predominates among those actively participating in other religions. However, the finding of a clear, four-to-one proportion of thinking to feeling types among members of the Hare Krishna group suggested that there may be significant exceptions to the predominance of feeling types in religious groups (Poling & Kenney, 1986). Charismatic Christians, for example, tend to prefer thinking over feeling (Francis & Jones, 1997). Other studies reporting on ordained Christian clergy, bible college students, missionary personnel, and lay church leaders included Craig, Francis, and Robbins (2004); Craig, Horsfall, and Francis (2005); Francis, Craig, Horsfall, and Ross (2005); Craig, Duncan, and Francis (2006); Francis, Craig, and Butler (2007); Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007); Francis, Nash, Nash, and Craig (2007); Francis, Robbins, Williams, and Williams (2007); Francis, Wulff, and Robbins (2008); Kay and Francis (2008); Kay, Francis, and Craig (2008); Francis, Gubb, and Robbins (2009); Francis, Hancocks, Swift, and Robbins (2009); Francis, Robbins, Kaldor, and Castle (2009); and Francis, Robbins, and Village (2009).

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christopher f. j. ross Jungian Typology and the Psychology of Individual Religious Differences

The earlier type frequency studies of religious groups together with numerous pastoral books on Jungian typology and Christian spirituality (listed in Francis & Jones, 1999b) have suggested specific associations between type categories and religious variables that have more recently been studied directly. Sensing-Intuition and Religious Differences Ross, Weiss, and Jackson (1996), using the MBTI to explore the relationship of Jungian typology to religious differences, found the preference for sensing or intuition the most salient of the four preferences to religion. Subsequent studies confirmed that perceiving with the sensing function which preserves sensory details, or with the function of intuition which clusters patterns and cognizes wholes, may influence how individuals approach a range of religious orientations. Comfort with Complexity Ross (1992) predicted from Jungian theory: Intuitives are intrigued by complexity and are likely to have greater facility in construing phenomena in different ways. Therefore, doubting the truth of religious beliefs or the value of certain religious practices is less likely to be seen as a crisis. (pp. 92–93)

Intuitives were found to be more likely to accept “God is a mystery” and as “not completely knowable” and to be more tolerant of religious doubt compared to sensers, who endorsed such statements as “Doubts about one’s faith should be avoided if at all possible” and “When it comes to religion or spirituality it is very simple: either you believe in God or you do not” (Ross, Weiss, & Jackson, 1996, p. 271). Francis & Jones (1999a) found that intuitives accepted a higher degree of uncertainty regarding key Christian beliefs. Religious Boundaries Sensers drew clearer boundaries between what is sacred and what is not, affirming more strongly that “there are particular things that are holy” (Ross, Weiss, & Jackson 1996, p. 271). This sensing tendency toward clear demarcation is understandable because sensing is directed


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toward identifying specific contents within a known context but linking them only within that context (Francis & Ross, 1997; Van der Hoop, 1937). Intuition has a wider focus, experiencing elements not only in the immediate context but aware also of the variety of contexts in which the immediate context occurs. Equipped with such awareness of contextual layering, intuitives are disinclined toward fixed dichotomous judgments based on sharp contrast. Triggers for Religious Experience Francis and Ross (1997) asked participants about triggers to their religious experiences. Sensing types identified more obvious religious triggers: attending a church service, hymn singing, and personal prayer; intuitives endorsed more items on the Scale of Experiential Spirituality such as a fine sunset, looking at a painting, and reading poetry. Change in Religious Contexts Ross (1992) argued that intuitives, because of more permeable boundaries between the sacred and secular, are more likely to discern a spiritual dimension in secular phenomena, and they recognize worldly aspects in conventionally religious phenomena. Such realism on the part of intuitives about the human cultural element in religious forms may render them less susceptible to over-idealizing a given religious form and therefore make them less orthodox (Francis & Ross, 1997; Lee, 1985; Meyer, 1966). By the same token, because they may be less prone to idealize a facet of their religion, intuitives may be more open to religious change, both at a personal and institutional level. In fact, the intuitives among Canadian Anglicans (Ross, Weiss, & Jackson, 1996, p. 271) and Catholics (Ross & Jackson, 1993) were more likely to agree that “For my personal faith to stay fresh I must be able to find new meaning and insights; otherwise I feel my faith is sterile.” Bremeier (1967) found among theological students that sensers tended to stress spiritual ideas and resort to the authority of the Christian Bible, whereas intuitives referred to contemporary theological sources to support their opinions. Different time orientations may explain variations in sensing and intuitive attitudes toward change. Sensing is oriented to the present, to what is (Jung, 1961). Moreover, introverted sensing types, with their precise registration and strong memory of details, orient to a present reality that is constantly compared to past happenings. However,

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intuitives, delighting in the play of different scenarios mediated and enhanced through the exercise of metaphor, orient to possibilities that have not yet occurred. Hence intuition is phenomenologically oriented toward, and comfortable with, the future. In fact, intuition moves freely back and forth between past, present, and future. Thus, for intuitives, these time zones are not separate categories; change, therefore, is in a real sense nothing new, for the intuitive has already imagined such change. Conflict over change is a problem in many religious groups, in part perhaps because of the prevalence of introverted sensing which resonates to what is by comparing the present to what has been. The role of intuitives in these religious groups is crucial. The intuitives in these groups are able to interpret the new in terms of principles and beliefs more familiar to the introverted sensing types, since SJs, because of their concern for loyalty, are less likely to dismiss the opinions of intuitives who belong to their religious group. NTs, with their facility for abstraction and ability to withstand criticism, may be particularly helpful as mediators. Their low frequency in most religious groups should, therefore, be of concern. However, my experience is that NTs are retained by religious groups when offered opportunities to apply their specific competencies: gifts for abstraction, policy, strategy, and education. Furthermore, large religious groups, such as the Catholic Church and major Protestant denominations, may be able to survive crises on account of a small but critical mass of NTs at higher echelons in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Thinking-Feeling and Religious Differences Jung (1913) observed that, when making judgments and decisions, feeling and thinking types use their contrasting processes to order and regulate their perceptions (derived from either intuition or sensing): “In the same way that thinking organizes the contents of consciousness under concepts, feeling arranges them according to value” (p. 435). Whereas thinking distinguishes and discriminates, deploying separative conceptual criteria to make decisions, feeling for its part gathers subject and object into close proximity and then applies pertinent overlapping values to reach a decision. Feeling types, therefore, must be personally engaged in order to bring the appropriate stack of values to the phenomena that require decision. Thinking types, however, require detachment, carving out conceptual space in which to see


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which criteria are most relevant. Because religious practices involve making judgments, feeling and thinking types will likely differ in a range of orientations to religious life. Experiences of Suffering Thinking types reported more struggles with cynical feelings, whereas feeling types were more disturbed spiritually by insensitivity in and conflict with others (Ross, Weiss, & Jackson, 1996). Because the feeling function brings order by engaging with what is experienced, interpersonal disruptions to the blending and harmonizing of experiences were reported as producing additional suffering of a spiritual nature for feeling types. Cynicism may be more common among thinking types because it is a mere accentuation of the customary distance between subject and object required for thinking to comfortably operate. Experiences of Prayer Ross, Weiss, and Jackson (1996) also found thinking types reported more difficulty praying to a higher being, understandable because of thinking types’ more frequent consciousness of themselves as separate from others and perhaps from divinity. Feeling types claimed that asking for help for self and others was an important part of praying. On the other hand, there were no differences for feeling and thinking types in regard to the practice of meditation, a religious practice less wedded to awareness of a personal transcendental power. Values and Religious Forms Thinking types emphasised the need for rigorous analysis of sacred texts, and for sermons to be “clear, reasoned, and articulate” (p. 273). Feeling types’ concern for the personal emerged in their reported preference for narrative in sermons. They also chose sensitivity over objectivity as a spiritual value. Thinking types claimed “desire for clarity as an important part of my spiritual life” (p. 273) more strongly than feeling types, who emphasised the personal implications of faith for human relationships.

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christopher f. j. ross Mystical Orientation

Francis and Louden (2000), using a mysticism scale based on James’ formulations, found feeling and intuitive types more open to mystical experience than the other types. A larger study replicated the association with feeling (Francis, 2002). The thinking function’s attention to separation, difference, and critique makes it harder for thinking types to experience mystical states that involve ego-suspension. Moreover, since those thinking types with intuition (INTPs and ENTJs) were as open as the other types to mystical experiences, the separating effect of dominant thinking seems potentiated when paired with sensing (oriented to detail) and mitigated when paired with intuition. This analysis with regard to the auxiliary function underlined the value of larger studies, which permit the interpretation of type dynamics that are considered important by Jungian analysts and type practitioners. Judging-Perceiving and Religious Differences Ross, Weiss, and Jackson (1996) found judging types oriented to the structure provided by religion. Judging types acknowledged that “religion offers a sense of security,” that “following a routine is helpful in regard to prayer and worship,” and that chaos and disorder are aversive (p. 276). Judgers, compared to perceivers, favored discipline more highly as a part of spiritual life. Perceivers considered “experience should come before rules in religious matters” (p. 276), were more likely than judgers to see freedom as something religion should foster, and considered development of spontaneity a spiritual value. Compared to perceiving types, those facing the outside world with a judging function seemed to have different needs and expectations regarding religion and spirituality. Sensers and judgers rated structured prayer more highly than intuitive-feelers (Ware, Knapp, & Schwarzin, 1989). Studies indicated, however, that religious organizations and their representatives are markedly judging rather perceiving in their preferences, with the exception of some liberal protestant congregations and clergy and a cluster of extraverted intuitives with feeling (ENFPs) among Catholic women. Extraversion-Introversion and Religious Differences The extraversion-introversion preference has the fewest reported associations with religion-related variables. Ross, Weiss, and Jackson


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(1996) found that introverts reported being spiritually refreshed from time alone, and extraverts reported being recharged from fellowship with others. Introverts acknowledged difficulty with people who did not respect their need for privacy, while also confessing the need for encouragement to participate. Sensitivity and caution may be needed in dealing with introverted congregants on the part of the three large groups of extraverted clergy (ESFJ, ENFJ, and ENFP). Emphasis on fellowship and evangelizing may be oppressive to introverts, while the cultivation of interiority featured in Catholic spirituality may be more challenging for extraverts, especially in view of the difficulty extraverts reported with being alone for a long time. Jungian Typology and Religious Orthodoxy Sensing and judging preferences were associated with doctrinal adherence (Meyer, 1966), orthodoxy, and more frequent church attendance (Lee, 1985), and sensing preferences with traditional or conservative Christian belief (Francis & Jones, 1998). These findings accord with the high frequency of SJs found in Canadian evangelical churches (Bramer, 1996). Jungian Typology and Religious Orientation Few studies have been made of Jungian typology in relation to Allportian approaches to religious motivation. Preliminary findings merit further investigations: Burris and Ross (1996) found that SJs scored higher on extrinsic religiosity than NPs, a finding that is consistent with the characterisation by Thorne and Gough (1991) of SJs’ values as pragmatic and functional and of extrinsic religious motivation as oriented to comfort and status. Extraverted feeling types with sensing (ESFJs) were particularly high on the extrinsic scale, while the introverted feeling types with intuition (INFPs) scored lowest. Regarding intrinsic religious motivation, commonly associated with devout personal commitment and unselfishness, ISFJs scored highest and the ISTJs and ESTPs lowest. In view of the large number of ISTJ males and ESFJ and ISFJ females in Catholic and evangelical protestant congregations, more studies are needed to clarify whether the three types, despite sharing the SJ guardian temperament, may be high religious affiliators but for vastly different reasons.

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NPs scored higher than SJs on a scale of religious immanence. The Immanence scale of Burris and Tarpley (1998) conceptualized an orientation toward religious immanence as “the mindful acceptance of present experience” (pp. 56–57). NPs may be expected to be disposed toward the experience of religious immanence, for they combine intuition, which transcends categories of time and space to form patterns of meaning, with a perceiving preference that orients to the ever-changing flow of experience. NPs also scored higher than SJs on Quest religiosity, predictable in view of Quest religiosity’s association with readiness for change and facing existential questions. Discussion Empirical studies of Jungian typology in relation to religious issues indicate that Jung’s approach to personality differences, based upon how individuals habitually orient their consciousness, has implications for how individuals relate to and experience religion, what they expect from religious participation, and how likely they are to affiliate with religious groups. Thus, there is some empirical foundation for the widespread use of Jungian typology in religious settings (workshops on spirituality and the MBTI are popular) and the proliferation of pastoral books mentioned by Francis and Jones (1999b) that relate Jungian typology and the MBTI to religion and spirituality (e.g. Richardson, 1996). There are differences regarding the type composition of Christian groups, the general population, and those with no religious affiliation. Compared to the general population, evangelical Protestant and Catholic groups tend to have more sensing-judging guardian types and liberal Protestants more intuitive-feeling idealist types. The intuitive-thinking rational types predominate among the religiously unaffiliated. The perceiving preference set of sensing/intuition has the strongest and widest-ranging connection to religious issues. Sensing types tend toward sharper religious contrasts: They draw clearer boundaries between what is sacred and what is not, associate religious experiences with conventionally religious forms, and are more troubled than intuitives by religious doubt. By way of contrast, intuitives have more permeable boundaries between the sacred and the secular, are more comfortable with doubt and change in their religious forms, and more readily identify nature and art as sources of religious experience.


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The judging-perceiving preference set, which indicates whether an individual faces the external world with a judging or perceiving function, is the preference next most salient to religion, both as a separate variable and in combination with sensing-intuition preferences. Judging types seem attracted to the structure religion may provide, and they value discipline as a spiritual value. Perceiving types orient to the experiential aspects of religion, value spontaneity in religious practice, and are under-represented in Christian religious groups. Some relationships have been found regarding individuals’ preference for feeling or thinking judgment. Feeling types tend to be more open to mystical experiences, espouse sensitivity as a spiritual value, experience disharmony as a source of spiritual suffering, and enjoy religious narratives. Thinking types, less frequent in religious groups generally, struggle with feelings of cynicism. The fewest associations have been found between religious variables and differences regarding individuals’ extraverted or introverted source of energy. Combined preferences seem to play a role in individual religious differences. Most formal religious groups have a significant core of members with introverted sensing combined with an extraverted form of judgment, most frequently feeling. This is the case even among liberal Protestant groups in which intuitive-feelers predominate. Sensingjudging tends to be associated with a variety of indicators of religious conservatism: doctrinal orthodoxy, reliance on biblical authority, membership in an evangelical Protestant church. The effects of the combination of all four preference sets and the role of the auxiliary function may have significant religious import. For example, extraverted intuitives with auxiliary introverted feeling (ENFPs) are often the most common intuitive type in religious groups, whereas the extraverted intuitives with introverted thinking (ENTPs) are among the rarest in religious groups, and the most frequent specific type found among the religiously unaffiliated. Intuitive-thinking types, introverted thinking types, and sensingperceiving types are under-represented in religious groups compared to the general population. Awareness of, and taking into account the contrasting needs of these types, particularly the perceiving minority, may enhance the satisfaction that these types derive from organized religious groups and attract more of these types to religious groups. There are few studies connecting Jungian type with other fields of the psychology of religion, and in view of the reported relationship of type with a number of important religious variables, studies should

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be made, for example, that intersect with issues raised by research on god-images from psychoanalytic object relations perspectives, Allportian measures of religious motivation, and attribution theory from social psychology. Type studies of religious groups other than Christian ones are also needed. Because individuals with different Jungian type preferences seem to have different needs, type awareness may be used to facilitate conflict resolution within religious groups and indirectly between groups with different ideologies. For example, sensing-judging types who may tend toward polarization on a social issue, such as gay and lesbian marriage, may be open to influence by “the facts of type” and listen to their intuitive religious compatriots who may be better cognitively equipped to interpret the society-wide debate and, in so-doing, may prevent isolation of the religious group as a whole and the development of some of the negative characteristics associated with religious extremism. Jungian typology may be used to optimize interfaith and ecumenical dialogue by selecting participants who stand on common ground regarding the orientation of their consciousness. Intuitive-perceivers types, such as the ENFPs with their tolerance for complexity, porous religious boundaries, and enthusiasm might be chosen from different religious groups to start the dialogue. Finally, with regard to methodology, empirical studies of Jungian typology have used traditional tests of differential frequency of psychological types or analyses of variance attributable to personality type as an independent variable. In the future, qualitative methods to analyze religious narratives generated by different psychological types may replicate or modify the variety of associations between Jungian typology and religious variables, while the possibility of experimental manipulation of some of these variables should be also explored and may attract the attention of a wider range of personality researchers and psychologists of religion. Conclusion Jungian typology, in view of the empirical validation for aspects of the theory, and the attendant belief that all eight ways of knowing, and the qualities they nourish, are valuable and deserve development, contributes toward an empirically based post-modernism. Regarding religion, Jungian typology encourages diversity and sympathy for the “other,”


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both among those within formal religion, as well as those who pursue the sacred ex ecclesia under the sobriquet of spirituality. The studies reviewed both validate and challenge those who are religious and the scholars who study them. They confirmed that individuals approach the sacred in markedly different ways and for different purposes. It should be a matter of concern for those attached to the religious groups studied here that too few of the sixteen types are well represented. For a start, more sacred celebration of the delights of the senses may interest those with extraverted sensing, while a more welcoming attitude to critical analysis may attract those with intuitive thinking and introverted thinking. Finally, Jung saw his typology not as a means of “slotting” people but as a critical psychology (Shamdasini, 2000, pp. 83–88) that would help him and others understand the “personal equation” (p. 50) that when not understood can impair good communication and rip relationships apart. It was not enough to explain conflict by reference to trauma and unresolved neuroses. Understanding the profoundly different ways people differ in cognitively processing their world can help prevent new trauma, perhaps both personal and cultural. It is fitting, therefore, that his theory of personality type has gained acceptance and been applied in the domain of religion, which Jung saw as so healing as well as potentially so destructive. References Baire, D. (2003). Jung: A biography. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company. Beebe, J. (2004). Understanding consciousness through the theory of psychological types. In J. Cambray & L. Carter (Eds.). Analytical psychology: Contemporary perspectives in Jungian analysis (pp. 83–115). New York, NY: Brunner Routledge Press. Bramer, P. (1996). Frequency of Jungian personality types among active evangelical protestants. Paper presented to American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto. Breimeier, K. H. (1967). Relationships between various psychological measures in use at theological seminaries. Washington: Ministry Studies Board. Occasional Papers, 1, 1–48. Burris, C. T. & Ross, C. F. J. (1996). Jungian type and religious orientation: extrinsic, intrinsic, quest or immanence. Paper presented to the Convention of the American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto. Burris, C. T., & Tarpley, W. R. (1998). Religion as being: Preliminary validation of the Immanence scale. Journal of Research in Personality, 32, 55–79. doi:10.1006/ jrpe.1997.2201 Carskadon, T. G. (1981). Psychological type and religious preferences. Research in Psychological Type, 4, 73–78.

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Casas, E. (1990). The development of the French version of the MBTI in Canada and France. Journal of Psychological Type, 20, 73–78. http://www.capt.org/research/ psychological-type-journal.htm Craig, C. L. (2005). Psychological type preferences of rural churchgoers. Rural Theology, 3, 123–131. http://www.rural-theology.org.uk/ Craig, C. L., Duncan, B., & Francis, L. J. (2006). Safeguarding tradition: psychological type preference of male vergers in the Church of England. Pastoral Psychology, 54, 457–463. doi:10.1007/s11089-005-0010-1 Craig, C. L., Francis, L. J., Bailey, J., & Robbins, M. (2003). Psychological types in Church in Wales congregations. The Psychologist in Wales, 15, 18–21. http://www .bps.org.uk/welsh/psyc_wales.cfm Craig, C. L., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2004). Psychological type and sex differences among church leaders in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 25(1), 3–13. doi:10.1080/1361767042000199004 Craig, C. L., Horsfall, T., & Francis, L. J. (2005). Psychological types of male missionary personnel training in England: a role for thinking type men? Pastoral Psychology, 53(5), 475–482. doi:10.1007/s11089-005-2588-8 Delis-Bulhoes, V. (1990). Jungian psychological types and Christian beliefs in active church members. Journal of Psychological Type, 20, 25–33. http://www.capt.org/ research/psychological-type-journal.htm Edinger, E. F. (1984). The creation of consciousness. Toronto, Canada: Inner City Press. Francis, L. J. (2002). Psychological type and mystical orientation: Anticipating individuals’ differences within congregational life, Pastoral Sciences, 21, 77–93. Francis, L. J. (2005). Faith and psychology: Personality, religion and the individual. London, England: Darton, Longman, and Todd. Francis, L. J., Butler, A., & Craig, C. L. (2005). Understanding the Parochial Church Council: dynamics of psychological type and gender. Contact, 147, 25–32. Francis, L. J., Butler, A., Jones, S. H., & Craig, C. L. (2007). Type patterns among active members of the Anglican church: A perspective from England. Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 10, 435–443. doi:10.1080/13694670600668382 Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Butler, A. (2007). Psychological types of male evangelical Anglican seminarians in England. Journal of Psychological Type, 67, 11–17. http:// www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Hall, G. (2008). Psychological type and attitude toward Celtic Christianity among committed churchgoers in the United Kingdom: An empirical study. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 23, 181–191. doi:10.1080/13537900802024543 Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Horsfall, T., & Ross, C. F. J. (2005). Psychological types of male and female evangelical lay church leaders in England compared with United Kingdom population norms. Fieldwork in Religion, 1, 69–83. http://www.equinoxjournals.com/FIR Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Whinney, M., Tilley, D., & Slater, P. (2007). Psychological profiling of Anglican clergy in England: Employing Jungian typology to interpret diversity, strengths, and potential weaknesses in ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology, 11, 266–284. doi:10.1515/IJPT.2007.17 Francis, L. J., Duncan, B., Craig, C. L., & Luffman, G. (2004). Type patterns among Anglican congregations in England. Journal of Adult Theological Education, 1(1), 65–77. doi:10.1558/jate.1.1.65.36058 Francis, L. J., Gubb, S., & Robbins, M. (2009). Psychological type profile of Lead Elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 30, 61–69. doi:10.1080/13617670902784568 Francis, L. J., Hancocks, G., Swift, C., & Robbins, M. (2009). Distinctive call, distinctive profile: The psychological type profile of Church of England full-time hospital chaplains. Journal of Practical Theology, 2, 269–284. doi:10.1558/prth.v2i2.269


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Francis, L. J., & Jones, S. H. (1997). Personality and charismatic experience among adult Christians. Pastoral Psychology, 45, 421–428. doi:10.1007/BF02310642 Francis, L. J., & Jones, S. H. (1998). Personality and Christian belief among adult churchgoers. Journal of Psychological Type, 47, 5–11. http://www.capt.org/research/ psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., & Jones, S. H. (1999a). Psychological types and tolerance for religious uncertainty. Pastoral Psychology, 47, 253–259. doi:10.1023/A:1021395211229 Francis, L. J., & Jones, S. H. (1999b). The scale properties of the MBTI Form G (Anglicised) among adult churchgoers. Pastoral Sciences, 18, 107–126. Francis, L. J., & Louden, S. H. (2000). Mystical orientation and psychological type: A study among student and adult churchgoers. Transpersonal Psychology Review, 4, 36–42. http://www.bps.org.uk/tps/tpr.cfm Francis, L. J., Nash, P., Nash, S., & Craig, C. L. (2007). Psychology and youth-ministry: psychological type preference of Christian youth workers in the United Kingdom. Journal of Youth Ministry, 5(2), 73–90. Francis, L. J., Payne, J. V. & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male Anglican clergy in Wales. Journal of Psychological Type, 56, 19–23. http://www.capt.org/ research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2002). Psychological type among male evangelical church leaders. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 17, 217–220. doi:10.1080/1361767022000010860 Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., Kaldor, P., & Castle, K. (2009). Psychological type and work-related psychological health among clergy in Australia, England and New Zealand. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 28, 200–212. Frances, L. J., Robbins, M., & Village, A. (2009). Psychological type and the pulpit: An empirical enquiry concerning preachers and the SIFT method of biblical hermeneutics. HTS Theological Studies 65(1) article 161, 7 pages. Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., Williams, A., & Williams, R. (2007). All types are called, but some are more likely to respond: the psychological type profile of rural Anglican churchgoers. Rural Theology, 5, 23–30. 123–131. http://www.rural-theology.org.uk/ Francis, L. J., & Ross, C. F. J. (1997). The perceiving function and Christian spirituality: Distinguishing between sensing and intuition. Pastoral Sciences, 16, 93–103. Francis, L. J., Wulff, K., & Robbins, M. (2008). The relationship between workrelated psychological health and psychological type among clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA). Journal of Empirical Theology, 21, 166–182. doi:10.1163/157092508X349854 Gray, H., & Wheelwright, J. B. (1946). Jung’s psychological types, their frequency of occurrence. Journal of General Psychology, 34, 29–36. http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/00221309.asp Gerhardt, R. (1983). Liberal religion and personality type. Research in Psychological Type, 6, 47–53. Greenfield, M. (1969). Typologies of persisting and non-persisting Jewish clergyman. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 16, 386–372. doi:10.1037/h0027708 Hammer, A., & Mitchell, W. D. (1996). The distribution of MBTI types in the US by gender and ethnic group. Journal of Psychological Type, 37, 2–14. http://www.capt. org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Hillman, J. (1979). The feeling function. In M.-L. von Franz & J. Hillman (Eds.) Jung’s typology (pp. 73–82). Irving, TX: Spring Publications. James, W. (1890/1950). The principles of psychology. Vol II. Boston, MA: Dover. Jung, C. G. (1953–1979). The collected works of C. G. Jung (20 vols). R. F. C. Hull (Ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jung, C. G. (1904). The reaction time ratio. In Collected works, Vol. 2, 1973. Jung, C. G. (1910). The psychic conflicts of a child. In Collected works, Vol. 17, 1954. Jung, C. G. (1912). Symbols of transformation. In Collected works, Vol. 5, 1956.

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Jung, C. G. (1913). A contribution to the study of psychological types. In Collected works, Vol. 6, 1971, pp. 499–509. Jung, C. G. (1921). Psychological types. In Collected works, Vol. 6, 1971. (German edition 1921). Jung, C. G. (1961). Symbols and the interpretation of dreams. In Collected works, Vol. 18, 1976, pp. 185–266. Kay, W. K., & Francis, L. J. (2008). Psychological type preferences of female Bible College students in England. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 29, 101–105. doi:10.1080/13617670801928324 Kay, W. K., Francis, L. J., & Craig, C. L. (2008). Psychological type preferences of male British Assemblies of God Bible College students: Tough-minded or tenderhearted? Journal of the European Pentecostal Association, 28, 6–20. Keirsey, D. (1987). Portraits of temperament. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis Press. Keirsey, D., & Bates, M. (1978). Please understand me. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis. Kendall, E. (1998). Myers Briggs type indicator European English edition manual supplement. Oxford, UK: Oxford Psychologists Press. Kirsch, T. B. (2000). The Jungians: A comparative and historical perspective. London, England: Routledge. Lee, S. W. (1985). The orthodoxy of Christian beliefs and Jungian personality types. Dissertation Abstracts International, 47, 474. A. Ann Arbor, MI. Loomis, M. E. (1991). Dancing the wheel of psychological types. Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications. Loomis, M., & Singer, J. (1980). Testing the bipolarity asumption in Jung’s typology. Journal of Analytical Psychology 25, 351–356. doi:10.1111/j.1465-5922.1980.00351.x MacDaid, G. P., McCaulley, M. H., & Kainz, R. I. (1986). Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: Atlas of type tables. Gainesville, FL: Center for Applications of Psychological Type. McCrea, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1989). Reinterpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator from the perspective of the Five Factor Model of Personality. Journal of Personality, 57, 17–40. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1989.tb00759.x Meyer, P. G. (1966). Factors related to adherence to denominational patterns among Missouri Synod Lutheran College students. Dissertation Abstracts International, 27, 1679-A. (University Microfilms 66–10,080). Miller, W. R., & Thoresen, C. E. (2003). Spirituality, religion, and health [Special section]. American Psychologist, 58, 24–63. doi:10.1037/0003–066X.58.1.24 Myers, I. B., & Myers, P. B. (1980). Gifts differing. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist Press. Pedersen, L. E. (1993). Sixteen men: Understanding masculine personality types. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications. Plomin, R., & Avshalom, C. (1999). Behavioral genetics and personality. In L. A. Pervin and O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality theory and research (2nd ed.), (pp. 251–276). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Poling, T. H., & Kenney, J. F. (1986). The Hare Krishna character type: A study of the sensate personality. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. Richardson, P. T. (1996). Four spiritualities: Expressions of self, expressions of spirit, a psychology of contemporary spiritual choice. Palo Alto, CA: Davies Black Publishing. Ross, C. F. J. (1992). The intuitive function and religious orientation. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 37, 87–103. doi:10.1111/j.1465-5922.1992.00083.x Ross, C. F. J. (1993). Type patterns among active members of the Anglican Church: Comparisons with Catholics, evangelicals, and clergy. Journal of Psychological Type, 26, 28–36. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Ross, C. F. J. (1995). Type patterns among Catholics: Four Anglophone congregations compared with Protestants, Francophone Catholics, and priests. Journal of Psychological Type, 33, 33–42. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm


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Ross, C. F. J., & Francis, L. J. (2006). Psychological type and Christian religious affiliation among female undergraduates in Wales. Journal of Psychological Type, 66, 69–78. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Ross, C. F. J., & Jackson, L. (1993). Orientation to religion and Jungian type preference among Canadian Catholics. Paper presented to the Convention of the American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto, Canada. Ross, C. F. J., Weiss, D., & Jackson, L. (1996). The relation of Jungian psychological type to religious attitudes and practices. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 6, 263–279. doi:10.1207/s15327582ijpr0604_3 Saunders, F. W. (1991). Katherine and Isabel: Mother’s light, daughter’s journey. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist Press. Scheurich, N. (2003). Reconsidering religion and medicine. American Medicine, 78, 13–16. Shamdasini, S. (2000). Jung and the making of modern psychology: The dream of a science. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Shapiro, K. J., & Alexander, I. E. (1975). The experience of introversion: An integration of phenomenological, empirical, and Jungian approaches. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Singer, J., & Loomis, M. (1984). The Singer Loomis inventory of personality manual. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist Press. Thorne, A., & Gough, H. (1991). Portraits of type: An MBTI research compendium. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist Press. Van der Hoop, J. H. (1937/1979). Conscious orientation: A study of personality types in relation to neurosis and psychosis. Darby, PA: Darby Books. Village, A., Francis, L. J., & Craig, C. L. (2009). Church traditions and psychological type preference among Anglicans in England. Journal of Anglican Studies, 7, 93–109. doi:10.1017/S1740355309000187 Ware, R., Knapp, C. R., & Schwarzin, H. (1989). Prayer form preferences of Keirsey temperaments and psychological types. Journal of Psychological Type, 17, 39–42. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE PROFILE OF CLERGYWOMEN AND CLERGYMEN SERVING IN THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA): IMPLICATIONS FOR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN MINISTRY Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins, and Keith Wulff * Abstract This study draws on two theoretical frameworks provided by the theology of individual differences and by the Jungian notion of psychological type. Renewed interest in the application of psychological type theory and empirical research among church leaders and clergy in the UK from across diverse traditions has drawn attention to three main findings: the distinctive psychological type profile of clergy compared with the general population norms; the differences in psychological type profile between clergymen and clergywomen; and the differences in psychological type profile between Christian denominations. Building on this tradition, the present study discusses the psychological type profiles of 561 clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) who completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales (FPTS). The data confirmed significant difference between male and female clergy, demonstrated significant difference between clergy profiles and the population norms for men and women in the USA, and aligned the profile of clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) with the profile of clergy serving in the Anglican Church in England (as relatively liberal denominations). Among both clergymen and clergywomen in this sample, preferences were recorded for introversion (I), intuition (N), feeling (F), and judging (J). Attention is given to those areas of ministry which may prove to be particularly difficult or draining for clergy who display these psychological preferences. Keywords: clergy, personality, population norms, Presbyterian, psychological type

During the latter part of the 20th century, a small number of studies, conducted mainly within the USA, began to explore the application of Jungian psychological type theory for illuminating the personality profile of religious professionals. For example, Greenfield (1969) reported on a sample of 319 Jewish rabbis, Cabral (1984) reported on a sample

* Author Note: Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Keith Wulff, Presbyterian Research Services. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leslie J. Francis, Warwick Religions & Education Research Unit, Institute of Education, The University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0)24 7652 2539, Fax: +44 (0)24 7657 2638. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

clergy in the presbyterian church (usa)

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of 150 professed Roman Catholic sisters, Harbaugh (1984) reported on a sample of 60 Lutheran seminarians, Holsworth (1984) reported on a sample of 146 Catholic seminarians, Bigelow, Fitzgerald, Busk, Girault, and Avis (1988) reported separately on two samples of 47 and 641 Roman Catholic sisters, Nauss (1989) studied 310 Lutheran parish pastors, and Irvine (1989) studied 147 Presbyterian ministers from Scotland. Renewed interest in this field of research emerged in the twenty-first century with a cluster of studies, conducted mainly in the UK. These studies included data provided by samples of 427 Church in Wales clergymen (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001), 278 male and 213 female Bible College students (Francis, Penson, & Jones, 2001), 57 evangelical church leaders (Francis & Robbins, 2002), 164 male and 135 female evangelical church leaders (Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), 92 male missionary personal (Craig, Horsfall, & Francis, 2005), 130 male and 192 female evangelical lay church leaders (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, & Ross, 2005), 79 Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), 155 male and 134 female Christian youth workers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007), 626 clergymen and 237 clergywomen serving within the Church of England (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007), 81 evangelical Anglican seminarians (Francis, Craig, & Butler, 2007), 190 male Assemblies of God theological college students (Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008), 122 female Assemblies of God theological college students (Kay & Francis, 2008), 134 lead elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches (Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009), 389 experienced preachers (Francis, Village, & Robbins, 2009), 154 members of the leadership team within the Newfrontiers network of churches (Ryland, Francis, & Robbins, in press), 101 Anglican healthcare chaplains (Francis, Hancocks, Swift, & Robbins, 2009), 622 clergymen serving in the Church of England (Francis, Robbins, Duncan, Whinney, & Ross, 2010), 83 clergywomen serving in the Church of England (Francis, Robbins, & Whinney, in press), 148 male and 41 female Free Church ministers in England (Francis, Whinney, Burton, & Robbins, 2011), 693 male and 311 female Methodist circuit ministers in Britain (Burton, Francis, & Robbins, 2010) and 231 clergymen serving in the Church in Wales (Francis, Littler, & Robbins, 2010). Three main empirical findings emerge from this growing family of studies. First, the data draw attention to the distinctive psychological type profile of religious professionals compared with the general population. Second, the data draw attention to significant differences

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in psychological type profile between clergymen and clergywomen. Third, the data draw attention to significant differences in psychological type profile between Christian denominations. These findings carry implications for understanding strengths and weaknesses as well as challenges and opportunities within Christian ministry and mission. Psychological type theory provides an attractive tool for exploring Christian ministry for three reasons: the theory is well established within the psychological literature; the theory has been successfully operationalized by a set of psychometric instruments; and this psychological theory has been clearly integrated within a broader theologically-grounded discussion of individual differences. These three issues will be examined in turn. Psychological type theory has its roots in the pioneering and original thinking of Jung as set out in his classic book Psychological Types (Jung, 1971). The theory has been subsequently developed and modified in dialogue with the family of measures that have extended and operationalized Jung’s ideas. In the present extended form, psychological type theory is concerned with four key aspects of the human psyche that are defined as the orientations, the perceiving processes, the judging processes, and the attitudes. The orientations are concerned with identifying the sources of psychological energy. In this area, the two discrete types are defined as extraversion and introversion. For extravert types, the source of energy is located in the outer world of people and things. Extraverts are exhausted by large periods of solitude and silence, and they need to re-energize through the stimulation they receive from people and places. Extraverts are talkative people who feel at home in social contexts. For introvert types, the source of energy is located in the inner world of ideas and reflection. Introverts are exhausted by long periods of social engagements and sounds, and they need to re-energize through the stimulation they receive from their own company and tranquility. The perceiving processes are concerned with identifying ways in which individuals take in information. For Jung, the perceiving processes were described as irrational processes because they were not concerned with data evaluation but simply with data gathering. In this area, the two discrete types are defined as sensing and as intuition. For sensing types, the preferred way of perceiving is through the five senses. Sensers are motivated by facts, details, and information.


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They build up to the big picture slowly by focusing first on the component parts. They are more comfortable in the present moment rather than in exploring future possibilities. They are realistic and practical people. For intuitive types, the preferred way of perceiving is through their imagination. Intuitives are motivated by theories, ideas, and connections. They begin with the big picture and gradually give attention to the component parts. They are more comfortable planning the future than making do with the present. They are inspirational and visionary people. The judging processes are concerned with identifying ways in which individuals evaluate information. For Jung, the judging processes were described as the rational processes because they were concerned with data evaluation and with decision making. In this area, the two discrete types are defined as thinking and as feeling. For thinking types, the preferred way of judging is through objective analysis and dispassionate logic. They are concerned with the good running of systems and organizations and put such strategic issues first. They are logical and fair-minded people who appeal to the God of justice. For feeling types, the preferred way of judging is through subjective evaluation and personal involvement. They are concerned with the good relationships between people and put such inter-personal issues first. They are humane and warm-hearted people who appeal to the God of mercy. The attitudes (often more fully expressed as the attitudes toward the outer world) are concerned with identifying which of the two processes (judging or perceiving) individuals prefer to use in the outer world. In this area, the two discrete types are defined by the name of the preferred process, either judging or perceiving. For judging types, their preferred judging function (either thinking or feeling) is employed in their outer world. Because their outer world is where the rational, evaluating, judging, or decision-making processes are deployed, judging types appear to others to be well-organized, decisive people. For perceiving types, their preferred perceiving function (either sensing or intuition) is employed in their outer world. Because their outer world is where the irrational, data gathering process is deployed, perceiving types appear to others to be laid-back, flexible, even disorganized people. Most current models of personality work in terms of locating individuals at points along a set of psychological continua, as illustrated by the Sixteen Personality Factors operationalized by Cattell, Cattell, and

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Cattell (1993), by the Big Five Factor model operationalized by Costa and McCrae (1985), and by the Major Three Dimensions operationalized by Eysenck and Eysenck (1991). The distinguishing feature of psychological type theory is that it conceptualizes the four key aspects of the human psyche (orientations, perceiving processes, judging processes, and attitudes toward the outer world) in terms of polar opposites. This distinguishing aspect of the theory has been operationalized in a series of psychological tests, the best known of which in terms of empirical research among religious professionals are the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Kiersey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005). Each of these three instruments has its own distinctive strengths. The application of this kind of psychological theory and measurement within the field of Christian ministry has been located by Francis (2005) within a broader consideration of the theology of individual differences. Beginning with a strong doctrine of creation grounded in a reading of Genesis 1:27, Francis (2005) argued that the divine image reflected in sex differences may be equally reflected in ethnic differences and in psychological type differences. According to this account, introversion and extraversion, sensing and intuition, thinking and feeling, and judging and perceiving are as strongly rooted in the intentionality of the divine creator as sex differences and ethnic differences. Francis (2005) proceeded to distinguish between the notion of psychological type and the notion of character. According to this account, it is character that is damaged by the fall and transformed by the saving work of Christ. While it is appropriate for the pious Christian soul to repent, to seek forgiveness, and to pray for transformation of character, it is not appropriate to repent of one’s biologically given sex, ethnicity, or psychological type. According to this account, psychological type theory offers profound insight into what it means to be human, into the God in whose image men and women are created, and into leadership within the Church of God. Against this background, the aim of the present study was to profile the male and female clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA). This aim extended previous research in two ways. It extended recent research conducted largely within the UK to the USA, and it extended recent research conducted across a number of denominations to the Presbyterian Church. Building on the insights generated by the recent studies, it was hypothesized that there would be significant differences


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between the personality profile of clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) and the wider USA population, and male and female clergy would share many psychological type characteristics in common. It was also hypothesized that there would be features in common between the personality profile of these clergy and the personality profile of Anglican clergy serving in the Church of England, since, in their different ways, both groups of clergy represent fairly broad and liberal church traditions. Method Participants As part on an on-going representative panel study, 561 clergy serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) responded to the invitation to complete a measure of psychological type. The respondents comprised 413 clergymen and 148 clergywomen. Among the clergymen, 12% were under the age of forty, 25% were in their forties, 41% were in their fifties, 20% were in their sixties, and 2% were aged seventy or over; 95% were currently married, and 5% were not currently married. Among the clergywomen, 18% were under the age of forty, 34% were in their forties, 35% were in their fifties, 12% were in their sixties, and 1% were aged seventy or over; 63% were currently married, and 37% were not currently married. Measures Psychological type was assessed by the Francis Psychological Type Scales (FPTS: Francis, 2005). This is a 40-item instrument comprising four sets of 10 forced-choice items related to each of the four components of psychological type: orientations (extraversion or introversion), perceiving processes (sensing or intuition), judging processes (thinking or feeling), and attitude toward the outer world (judging or perceiving). Recent studies have demonstrated that this instrument functions well in church-related contexts. For example, Francis, Craig, and Hall (2008) reported alpha coefficients of .83 for the EI scale, .76 for the SN scale, .73 for the TF scale, and .79 for the JP scale.

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francis, robbins and wulff Data analysis

The research literature concerning the empirical investigation of psychological type has developed a distinctive method for analyzing, handling, and displaying statistical data in the form of type tables. This convention has been adopted in this paper in order to integrate these new data within the established literature and to provide all the detail necessary for secondary analysis and further interpretation within the theoretical framework afforded by psychological type. Type tables have been designed to provide information about the 16 discrete psychological types, about the four dichotomous preferences, about the six sets of pairs and temperaments, about the dominant types, and about the introverted and extraverted Jungian types. Commentary on this table will, however, be restricted to those aspects of the data strictly relevant to the research question. Type tables are also designed to test the statistical significance of differences between groups (in the present study specifically between clergy and the general population). This is calculated by means of the selection ratio (I), an extension of the chi-square. Results Table 1 presents the type distribution for the 413 clergymen who participated in the survey. These data demonstrated that clergymen serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) displayed preferences for introversion (53%) over extraversion (47%), for intuition (55%) over sensing (45%), for feeling (66%) over thinking (34%), and for judging (74%) over perceiving (26%). In terms of dominant types, 32% were dominant feeling, 31% dominant intuition, 24% dominant sensing, and 13% dominant thinking. The most frequently occurring types were ESFJ (13%), INFJ (12%), ISFJ (11%), and ENFJ (10%). Table 1 also compares the type distribution for the clergymen with the type distribution for males in the USA national representative sample (N = 1,478) published by Myers, McCaulley, Quenck, and Hammer (2003). These data demonstrated that the clergymen displayed a significantly higher preference for intuition than men in general (55% compared with 28%), a significantly higher preference for feeling (66% compared with 44%), and a significantly higher preference for judging (74% compared with 52%). Clergymen and men


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Table 1. Type Distribution for Clergymen Serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA), Compared with the USA Male Population Norms N = 413 The Sixteen Complete Types ISTJ n = 41 (9.9%) I = 0.61*** +++++ +++++

ISTP n=2 (0.5%) I = 0.06*** +

ESTP n=2 (0.5%) I = 0.09*** +

ESTJ n = 21 (5.1%) I = 0.46*** +++++

ISFJ n = 44 (10.7%) I = 1.32 +++++ +++++ +

INFJ n = 50 (12.1%) I = 9.42*** +++++ +++++ ++

ISFP n = 11 (2.7%) I = 0.35*** +++

ESFP n = 10 (2.4%) I = 0.35*** ++

ESFJ n = 53 (12.8%) I = 1.71*** +++++ +++++ +++

Jungian Types (E) n % E-TJ 43 10.4 E-FJ 94 22.8 ES-P 12 2.9 EN-P 45 10.9

Dichotomous Preferences

INFP n = 28 (6.8%) I = 1.64* +++++ ++

ENFP n = 35 (8.5%) I = 1.32 +++++ ++++

ENFJ n = 41 (9.9%) I = 6.11*** +++++ +++++

I 0.75 2.49*** 0.23*** 1.05

INTJ n = 34 (8.2%) I = 2.48*** +++++ +++

INTP n=9 (2.2%) I = 0.45* ++

ENTP n = 10 (2.4%) I = 0.61 ++

ENTJ n = 22 (5.3%) I = 1.97** +++++

Jungian Types (I) n % I-TP 11 2.7 I-FP 39 9.4 IS-J 85 20.6 IN-J 84 20.3

Note: + = 1 % of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

E I

n = 194 n = 219

(47.0%) (53.0%)

I = 1.02 I = 0.98

S N

n = 184 n = 229

(44.6%) (55.4%)

***I = 0.62 ***I = 1.96

T F

n = 141 n = 272

(34.1%) (65.9%)

***I = 0.60 ***I = 1.51

J P

n = 306 n = 107

(74.1%) (25.9%)

***I = 1.42 ***I = 0.54

Pairs and Temperaments IJ IP EP EJ

n = 169 n = 50 n = 57 n = 137

(40.9%) ***I = 1.41 (12.1%) ***I = 0.48 (13.8%) ***I = 0.60 (33.2%) ***I = 1.44

ST SF NF NT

n = 66 n = 118 n = 154 n = 75

(16.0%) ***I = 0.38 (28.6%) I = 0.95 (37.3%) ***I = 2.77 (18.2%) I = 1.23

SJ SP NP NJ

n = 159 n = 25 n = 82 n = 147

(38.5%) I = 0.89 (6.1%) ***I = 0.21 (19.9%) I = 1.03 (35.6%) ***I = 3.99

TJ TP FP FJ

n = 118 n = 23 n = 84 n = 188

(28.6%) (5.6%) (20.3%) (45.5%)

IN EN IS ES

n = 121 n = 108 n = 98 n = 86

(29.3%) ***I = 2.17 (26.2%) ***I = 1.77 (23.7%) ***I = 0.59 (20.8%) ***I = 0.67

ET EF IF IT

n = 55 n = 139 n = 133 n = 86

(13.3%) ***I = 0.57 (33.7%) ***I = 1.50 (32.2%) ***I = 1.53 (20.8%) ***I = 0.63

I 0.20*** 0.81 0.84 4.42***

Dominant Types n % Dt. T 54 13.1 Dt. F 133 32.2 Dt. S 97 23.5 Dt. N 129 31.2

I = 0.85 ***I = 0.24 I = 0.81 ***I = 2.46

I 0.48*** 1.55*** 0.64*** 2.08***

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Table 2. Type Distribution of Clergywomen Serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA), Compared with the USA Female Population Norms N = 148 The Sixteen Complete Types ISTJ n=6 (4.1%) I = 0.59 ++++

ISTP n=2 (1.4%) I = 0.57 +

ESTP n=0 (0.0%) I = 0.0*

ESTJ n=3 (2.0%) I = 0.32* ++

ISFJ n = 23 (15.5%) I = 0.80 +++++ +++++ +++++ +

ISFP n=2 (1.4%) I = 0.14*** +

ESFP n=4 (2.7%) I = 0.27** +++

ESFJ n = 13 (8.8%) I = 0.52** +++++ ++++

INFJ n = 25 (16.9%) I = 10.34*** +++++ +++++ +++++ ++

INFP n = 16 (10.8%) I = 2.33*** +++++ +++++ +

ENFP n = 20 (13.5%) I = 1.40 +++++ +++++ ++++

ENFJ n = 16 (10.8%) I = 3.31*** +++++ +++++ +

Jungian Types (E) E-TJ E-FJ ES-P EN-P

n 9 29 4 22

% 6.1 19.6 2.7 14.9

Dichotomous Preferences INTJ n=9 (6.1%) I = 7.16*** +++++ +

INTP n=1 (0.7%) I = 0.38 +

E I

n = 64 n = 84

(43.2%) (56.6%)

S N

n = 53 n = 95

(35.8%) ***I = 0.48 (64.2%) ***I = 2.55

T F

n = 29 n = 119

(19.6%) (80.4%)

I = 0.80 I = 1.06

J P

n = 101 n = 47

(68.2%) (31.8%)

**I = 1.21 **I = 0.72

Pairs and Temperaments

ENTP n=2 (1.4%) I = 0.56 +

ENTJ n=6 (4.1%) I = 4.43*** ++++

IJ IP EP EJ

n = 63 n = 21 n = 26 n = 38

(42.6%) (14.2%) (17.6%) (25.7%)

ST SF NF NT

n = 11 n = 42 n = 77 n = 18

(7.4%) ***I = 0.40 (28.4%) ***I = 0.50 (52.0%) ***I = 2.71 (12.2%) **I = 2.05

SJ SP NP NJ

n = 45 n=8 n = 39 n = 56

(30.4%) (5.4%) (26.4%) (37.8%)

***I = 0.61 ***I = 0.21 *I = 1.43 *I = 5.68

TJ TP FP FJ

n = 24 n=5 n = 42 n = 77

(16.2%) (3.4%) (28.4%) (52.0%)

I = 1.08 *I = 0.35 I = 0.83 **I = 1.26

IN EN IS ES

n = 51 n = 44 n = 33 n = 20

(34.5%) ***I = 3.88 (29.7%) ***I = 1.83 (22.3%) ***I = 0.58 (13.5%) ***I = 0.37

ET EF IF IT

n = 11 n = 53 n = 66 n = 18

(7.4%) (35.8%) (44.6%) (12.2%)

Jungian Types (I) I 0.85 0.97 0.21*** 1.23

I-TP I-FP IS-J IN-J

n 3 18 29 34

*I = 0.82 *I = 1.20

% 2.0 12.2 19.6 23.0

Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

***I = 1.48 I = 0.76 *I = 0.70 I = 0.94

I = 0.59 I = 0.90 *I = 1.25 I = 1.02

Dominant Types I 0.49 0.83 0.74 9.26***

Dt. T Dt. F Dt. S Dt. N

n 12 47 33 56

% 8.1 31.8 22.3 37.8

I 0.72 0.91 0.57*** 2.60***


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in general displayed similar levels of preference for introversion (53% and 54% respectively). In terms of dominant types, compared with men in general, among the clergymen there were higher levels of dominant feeling (32% compared with 21%), higher levels of dominant intuition (31% compared with 15%), lower levels of dominant sensing (24% compared with 37%), and lower levels of dominant thinking (13% compared with 27%). In terms of the 16 discrete types, compared with men in general, among the clergymen there were significant overrepresentations of INFJ (12% compared with 1%), ENFJ (10% compared with 2%), INTJ (8% compared with 3%), ESFJ (13% compared with 8%), and ENTJ (5% compared with 3%). Table 2 presents the type distribution for the 148 clergywomen who participated in the survey. These data demonstrated that clergywomen serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA) displayed preferences for introversion (57%) over extraversion (43%), for intuition (64%) over sensing (36%), for feeling (80%) over thinking (20%), and for judging (68%) over perceiving (32%). In terms of dominant types, 38% were dominant intuition, 32% were dominant feeling, 23% were dominant sensing, and 8% were dominant thinking. The most frequently occurring types were INFJ (17%), ISFJ (16%), and ENFP (14%). Table 2 also compares the type distribution of the clergywomen with the type distribution for females in the USA national representative sample (N = 1531) published by Myers, McCaulley, Quenck, and Hammer (2003). These data demonstrated that the clergywomen displayed a significantly higher preference for intuition than women in general (64% compared with 25%), a significantly higher preference for judging (68% compared with 56%), and a significantly higher preference for introversion (57% compared with 48%). Clergywomen and women in general displayed similar levels of preference for feeling (80% and 76% respectively). In terms of dominant types, compared with women in general, among the clergywomen there were higher levels of dominant intuition (38% compared with 15%) and lower levels of dominant sensing (22% compared with 40%), but there were comparable levels of dominant feeling (32% and 35% respectively) and comparable levels of dominant thinking (8% and 11% respectively). In terms of the 16 discrete types, compared with women in general, among the clergywomen there were significant over-representations of INFJ (17% compared with 2%), INTJ (6% compared with 1%), INFP (11% compared with 5%), ENFJ (11% compared with 3%), and ENTJ (4% compared with 1%).

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Table 3. Type Distribution of Clergymen Serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA), Compared with Clergywomen N = 413 The Sixteen Complete Types ISTJ n = 41 (9.9%) I = 2.45* +++++ +++++

ISTP n=2 (0.5%) I = 0.36 +

ESTP n=2 (0.5%) I = 0.0

ESTJ n = 21 (5.1%) I = 2.51 +++++

ISFJ n = 44 (10.7%) I = 0.69 +++++ +++++ +

ISFP n = 11 (2.7%) I = 1.97 +++

ESFP n = 10 (2.4%) I = 0.90 ++

ESFJ n = 53 (12.8%) I = 1.46 +++++ +++++ +++

INFJ n = 50 (12.1%) I = 0.72 +++++ +++++ ++

INFP n = 28 (6.8%) I = 0.63 +++++ ++

ENFP n = 35 (8.5%) I = 0.63 +++++ ++++

ENFJ n = 41 (9.9%) I = 0.92 +++++ +++++

Jungian Types (E) E-TJ E-FJ ES-P EN-P

n 43 94 12 45

% 10.4 22.8 2.9 10.9

Dichotomous Preferences INTJ n = 34 (8.2%) I = 1.35 +++++ +++

INTP n=9 (2.2%) I = 3.23 ++

E I

n = 194 n = 219

(47.0%) (53.0%)

I = 1.09 I = 0.93

S N

n = 184 n = 229

(44.6%) (55.4%)

I = 1.24 I = 0.86

T F

n = 141 n = 272

(34.1%) (65.9%)

***I = 1.74 ***I = 0.82

J P

n = 306 n = 107

(74.1%) (25.9%)

I = 1.09 I = 0.82


ENTP n = 10 (2.4%) I = 1.79 ++

ENTJ n = 22 (5.3%) I = 1.13 +++++

IJ IP EP EJ

n = 169 n = 50 n = 57 n = 137

(40.9%) (12.1%) (13.8%) (33.2%)

I = 0.96 I = 0.85 I = 0.79 I = 1.29

ST SF NF NT

n = 66 n = 118 n = 154 n = 75

(16.0%) (28.6%) (37.3%) (18.5%)

**I = 2.15 I = 1.01 **I = 0.72 I = 1.49

SJ SP NP NJ

n = 159 n = 25 n = 82 n = 147

(38.5%) (6.1%) (19.9%) (35.6%)

I = 1.27 I = 1.12 I = 0.75 I = 0.94

TJ TP FP FJ

n = 118 n = 23 n = 84 n = 188

(28.6%) (5.6%) (20.3%) (45.5%)

**I = 1.76 I = 1.65 *I = 0.72 I = 0.87

IN EN IS ES

n = 121 n = 108 n = 98 n = 86

(29.3%) (26.2%) (23.7%) (20.8%)

I = 0.85 I = 0.88 I = 1.06 *I = 1.54

ET EF IF IT

n = 55 n = 139 n = 133 n = 86

(13.3%) (33.7%) (32.2%) (20.8%)

I = 1.79 I = 0.94 **I = 0.72 *I = 1.71

Jungian Types (I) I 1.71 1.16 1.08 0.73

I-TP I-FP IS-J IN-J

n 11 39 85 84

% 2.7 9.4 20.6 20.3

Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Dominant Types I 1.31 0.78 1.05 0.89

Dt. T Dt. F Dt. S Dt. N

n 54 133 97 129

% 13.1 32.2 23.5 31.2

I 1.61 1.01 1.05 0.83


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Table 3 compares the psychological type profiles of the clergymen with the psychological type profiles of the clergywomen. The remarkable feature of this table concerns the lack of statistically significant differences. In terms of the binary constructs, clergymen and clergywomen shared comparable levels of preference for introversion (53% and 57%), for intuition (55% and 64%) and for judging (74% and 68%). The statistically significant difference concerns the higher preference for feeling among clergywomen (80% compared with 66%). Table 4 displays the binary psychological type preferences of the clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) with the data provided by Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) on the psychological type preferences of 626 clergymen and 237 clergywomen serving in the Church of England. There were broad similarities between the two groups of clergy serving in different denominations and on different continents. In both groups, both clergymen and clergywomen displayed clear preferences for introversion, for intuition, for feeling, and for judging. The statistical tests demonstrated that there were no significant differences between the clergywomen serving in the two churches. Among the clergymen, however, there were higher proportions preferring feeling and judging in the USA and higher proportions preferring intuition in the UK. Discussion The present study set out to extend a growing body of research concerned with exploring the application of Jungian psychological type theory for illuminating the personality profile of religious professionals by focusing on clergywomen and clergymen serving in The Presbyterian Church (USA). Data were provided by 561 clergy participating within a representative panel survey. These data enabled three hypotheses to be explored. The first hypothesis was that religious professionals comprise a highly distinctive subgroup of the population. Comparison with the USA population norms provided by Myers, McCaulley, Quenck, and Hammer (2003) supported this view. Four main features of the distinctive psychological type profile of clergy were of particular note. First, both clergymen and clergywomen were much more likely to prefer intuition than is the case among men and women in general. This

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Table 4. Comparing Psychological Type Preferences of Clergy in The Presbyterian Church (USA) and in the Church of England (UK) clergymen USA % Orientations Extraversion Introversion Perceiving process Sensing Intuition Judging process Thinking Feeling Attitudes Judging Perceiving

UK %

clergywomen I

USA %

UK %

I

47.0 53.0

43.1 56.9

1.09 0.93

43.2 56.8

46.0 54.0

0.94 1.05

44.6 55.4

38.3 61.7

1.16* 0.90*

35.8 64.2

35.4 64.6

1.01 0.99

34.1 65.9

46.5 53.5

0.73*** 1.23***

19.6 80.4

26.2 73.8

0.75 1.09

74.1 25.9

68.2 31.8

1.09* 0.81*

68.2 31.8

64.6 35.4

1.06 0.09

Note: * p < .05, *** p < .001

finding is consistent with the view that religious ideas, principles and visions for the future are more likely to attract intuitives. Second, both clergymen and clergywomen were more likely to prefer judging than is the case among men and women in general. This finding is consistent with the view that organized religion and church life are more likely to attract judgers. Third, in terms of the judging processes, clergymen were much more likely to prefer feeling than men in general. Given that feeling is par excellence a feminine characteristic (preferred in the population as a whole by 44% of men and 76% of women), this finding is consistent with the view that Christian ministry attracts men who value the feeling or feminine judging function. Fourth, in terms of the orientations, clergywomen were more likely to prefer introversion than women in general. Given that introversion is a masculine characteristic (preferred in the population as a whole by 54% of men and 48% of women) this finding is consistent with the view that the preferred ministry style of clergywomen emulates the longer-established introverted ministry style of clergymen. The second hypothesis was that male and female clergy would share many psychological type characteristics in common. The data supported this view. In terms of the perceiving process, both clergymen


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and clergywomen were much more likely to prefer intuition than men and women in general. In this sense, in ministry both sexes shared this visionary characteristic. In terms of the judging process, both clergymen and clergywomen were much more likely to prefer feeling than to prefer thinking (and for male clergy this was a significant departure from the profile of men in general). In this sense, in ministry both sexes shared a calling to pastoral care and to building communities of harmony and peace. In terms of the attitudes toward the outer world, both clergymen and clergywomen were more likely to prefer judging than men and women in general. In this sense, in ministry both sexes shared a commitment to structure, to order, and to discipline. In terms of the orientations, both clergymen and clergywomen were more likely to prefer introversion than to prefer extraversion (and for female clergy this was a significant departure from the profile of women in general). In this sense, in ministry both sexes showed a preference for an introverted style. The view that, overall, men and women may bring significantly different gifts to ministry was not given much support from this empirically-based perspective grounded in psychological type theory. The third hypothesis was that there would be significant features in common between the personality profiles of those clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) and the personality profiles of clergymen and clergywomen serving in the Church of England, since, in their different ways, both groups of clergy represent fairly broad and liberal church traditions. In an earlier study, Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) reported on the psychological type profiles of 626 clergymen and 237 clergywomen serving in the Church of England. The similarities between the two groups were pronounced. In both groups, both clergymen and clergywomen displayed clear preferences for introversion, for intuition, for feeling, and for judging. This distinctive profile distinguishes The Presbyterian Church (USA) and Church of England clergy from other religious professionals in interesting ways. The perceiving process seems to be the key function in distinguishing between the more liberal and the more conservative church traditions. For example, while 55% of male and 64% of female Presbyterian clergy, and 62% of male and 65% of female Church of England clergy preferred intuition, Kay, Francis, and Craig (2008) found just 26% intuitives among male students attending British Assemblies of God

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theological college, and Kay and Francis (2008) found 38% intuitives among female students attending the British Assemblies of God theological college. The judging process seems to be the key function in distinguishing between pastoral and evangelistic ministry. For example, while 66% of male and 80% of female Presbyterian clergy, and 54% of male and 74% of female Church of England clergy preferred feeling, Craig, Horsfall, and Francis (2005) found 70% thinkers among male missionary personnel, and Ryland, Francis, and Robbins (in press) found 60% thinkers among leaders within the Newfrontiers network of churches. The orientations seem to be the key function in distinguishing between the more contemplative traditions and the traditions that emphasize an outgoing fellowship-focused approach. For example, while 53% of male and 57% of female Presbyterian clergy, and 57% of male and 54% of female Church of England clergy preferred introversion, Francis, Gubb, and Robbins (2009) found that the proportion of introverts fell to 48% among male lead elders in the Newfrontiers network of churches, and Francis, Robbins, and Kay (in press) found that the proportion of introverts fell to 30% among male leaders within the Apostolic network of churches. The attitude toward the outer world seems to be the key function in distinguishing how tightly church communities are structured. In some ways, The Presbyterian Church (USA) and the Church of England may occupy middle territory on this issue. Thus, 74% of male and 68% of female clergy in The Presbyterian Church (USA), and 68% male and 65% of the female clergy in the Church of England preferred judging. The proportion rose even higher to 78% among male lead elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches (Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009) and fell to 53% among male Christian youth ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007). Conclusion The present study has enabled the psychological type profile of clergy serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) to be set alongside the normative type profile for the population of the USA and alongside the type profile of religious professionals serving within other traditions. In common with clergy serving within the Church of England,


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both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) display clear preferences for introversion, for intuition, for feeling, and for judging. Such preferences among the clergy may help to explain distinctive strengths and weaknesses within the mission and ministry strategies supported by these churches. Recognizing these strengths and weaknesses, an understanding of type theory can also identify ways in which clergy may be helped to play to their strengths and also be better equipped to manage their weaknesses. First, both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) prefer introversion over extraversion. On the one hand, introverted clergy may be energized by many aspects of ministry such as private study and preparation, one-to-one encounters in counseling and in spiritual direction, silent prayer and reflection, and focusing deeply on interior spiritual issues. On the other hand, introverted clergy may be drained by many other aspects of ministry, such as attending social events, speaking in public (especially without preparation), talking with strangers as part of evangelism or parish visiting, and assuming a high profile within the parish. Since many aspects of the clerical profession tend to require an extraverted approach to life, introverted clergy may need to be properly prepared during their initial ministerial training and during their continuing ministerial education to develop effective coping strategies that enable them both to fulfill extraverted expectations and then afterwards to create the personal space necessary to re-energize. Second, both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) prefer intuition over sensing. On the one hand, intuitive clergy may be energized by many aspects of ministry, such as the opportunity to speculate about meanings and possibilities in scripture, drawing inspiration from the symbols and teachings of the Church, welcoming change and experimentation in liturgy, and developing a vision for the future of their church. On the other hand, intuitive clergy may be drained by other aspects of ministry, such as the value placed on tradition, encountering resistance to change, the need to focus on practical realities, and the importance of details and accuracy in church administration. Since many aspects of the clerical profession tend to require a sensing approach to life, intuitive clergy may need to be properly prepared during their initial ministerial training and during their continuing ministerial education

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to develop their less preferred sensing function and to appreciate how sensers perceive their environment. Third, both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) prefer feeling over thinking. On the one hand, feeling clergy may be energized by many aspects of ministry, such as spending time caring for others through visiting, counseling or pastoral care, needing to support and empathize with those in need, and the importance of interpersonal values in Christian teaching, such as love, harmony, peace, and compassion. On the other hand, feeling clergy may be drained by other aspects of ministry, such as having to look at problems objectively and logically, the need to make tough decisions which affect other people’s lives, the need to be critical when necessary, and parish management. Since many aspects of the clerical profession tend to require the detached and impartial stance characteristic of a thinking approach to life, feeling clergy may need to be properly prepared during their initial ministerial training and during their continuing ministerial education to develop their less preferred thinking function and to appreciate how thinkers assess their environment. Fourth, both clergymen and clergywomen serving within The Presbyterian Church (USA) prefer judging over perceiving. On the one hand, judging clergy may be energized by many aspects of ministry, such as the need for organization both in their own lives and in the life of their parishes, arranging services and events well in advance, maintaining efficient administrative systems, and managing local affairs. On the other hand, judging types may be drained by other aspects of ministry, such as the need to think on their feet, responding effectively to unanticipated crises, and adapting to changing situations. Since many aspects of ministry tend to require the flexibility, spontaneity, and responsiveness characteristic of a perceiving approach to life, judging clergy may need to be properly prepared during their initial ministerial training and during their continuing ministerial education to develop their less preferred perceiving attitude toward the outer world and to develop strategies which enable them to function confidently in situations for which they have not had time to prepare in advance. One effective way of addressing these issues during initial ministerial training and during continuing ministerial education is through enhancing self-awareness by means of psychological type workshops. Such workshops need to be operated, however, by staff


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fully conversant with the theology of individual differences and with the broader contexts of personality psychology, as well as with an indepth understanding of psychological type theory and the relevant related research. References Bigelow, E. D., Fitzgerald, R., Busk, P., Girault, E., & Avis, J. (1988). Psychological characteristics of Catholic sisters: Relationships between the MBTI and other measures. Journal of Psychological Type, 14, 32–36. http://www.capt.org/research/ psychological-type-journal.htm Burton, L., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2010). Psychological type profile of Methodist circuit minister in Britain: Similarities with and differences from Anglican clergy. Journal of Empirical Theology, 23, 64–81. doi: 10.1163/157092510X503020 Cabral, G. (1984). Psychological types in a Catholic convent: Applications to community living and congregational data. Journal of Psychological Type, 8, 16–22. http:// www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Cattell, R. B., Cattell, A. K. S., & Cattell, H. E. P. (1993). Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire: Fifth edition (16PF5). Windsor, UK: NFER-Nelson. Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1985). The NEO Personality Inventory. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Craig, C. L., Duncan, B., & Francis, L. J. (2006). Psychological type preferences of Roman Catholic priests in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 27, 157–164. doi:10.1080/13617670600849812 Craig, C., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2004). Psychological type and sex differences among church leaders in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 25, 3–13. doi:10.1080/1361767042000199004 Craig, C. L., Horsfall, T., & Francis, L. J. (2005). Psychological types of male missionary personnel training in England: A role for thinking type men? Pastoral Psychology, 53, 475–482. doi:10.1007/s11089-005-2588-8 Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1991). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Scales. London, England: Hodder and Stoughton. Francis, L. J. (2005). Faith and psychology: Personality, religion and the individual. London, England: Darton, Longman and Todd. Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Butler, A. (2007). Psychological types of male evangelical Anglican seminarians in England. Journal of Psychological Type, 67, 11–17. http:// www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Hall, G. (2008). Psychological type and attitude towards Celtic Christianity among committed churchgoers in the United Kingdom: An empirical study. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 23, 181–191. doi:10.1080/13537900802024543 Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Horsfall, T., & and Ross, C. F. J. (2005). Psychological types of male and female evangelical lay church leaders in England, compared with United Kingdom population norms. Fieldwork in Religion, 1, 69–83. http://www .equinoxjournals.com/FIR Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Whinney, M., Tilley, D., & Slater, P. (2007). Psychological profiling of Anglican clergy in England: Employing Jungian typology to interpret diversity, strengths, and potential weaknesses in ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology, 11, 266–284. doi:10.1515/IJPT.2007.17

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Francis, L. J., Gubb, S., & Robbins, M. (2009). Psychological type profile of Lead Elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 30, 61–69. doi:10.1080/13617670902784568 Francis, L. J., Hancocks, G., Swift, C., & Robbins, M. (2009). Distinctive call, distinctive profile: The psychological type profile of Church of England full-time hospital chaplains. Practical Theology, 2, 269–284. doi:10.1558/prth.v2i2.269 Francis, L. J., Littler, K., & Robbins, M. (2010). Psychological type and Offa’s Dyke: Exploring differences in the psychological type profile of Anglican clergy serving in England and Wales. Contemporary Wales, 23, 240–251. Francis, L. J., Nash, P., Nash, S., & Craig, C. L. (2007). Psychology and youth ministry: Psychological type preferences of Christian youth workers in the United Kingdom. Journal of Youth Ministry, 5(2), 73–90. Francis, L. J., Payne, V. J., & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male Anglican clergy in Wales. Journal of Psychological Type, 56, 19–23. http://www.capt.org/ research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Penson, A. W., & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male and female Bible College students in England. Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 4, 23–32. doi:10.1080/13674670010011616 Francis, L. J. & Robbins, M. (2002). Psychological types of male evangelical church leaders. Journal of Belief and Values, 23, 217–220. doi:10.1080/1361767022000010860 Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., Duncan, B., Whinney, M., & Ross, C. (2010). Confirming the psychological type profile of Anglican clergymen in England: A ministry for intuitives. In B. Ruelas & V. Briseño (Eds.), Psychology of intuition (pp. 211–219). New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers. Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., & Whinney, M. (in press). Women priests in the Church of England: Psychological type profile. Francis, L. J., Village, A., & Robbins, M. (2009). Psychological type and the pulpit: An empirical enquiry concerning preachers and the SIFT method of biblical hermeneutics. HTS Theological Studies, 65 (1), article 161, 1–7. Francis, L. J., Whinney, M., Burton, L., & Robbins, M. (2011). Psychological type preferences of male and female Free Church Ministers in England. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 251–263. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Greenfield, M. (1969). Typologies of persisting and non-persisting Jewish clergymen. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 16, 368–372. doi:10.1037/h0027708 Harbaugh, G. L. (1984). The person in ministry: Psychological type and the seminary. Journal of Psychological Type, 8, 23–32. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Holsworth, T. E. (1984). Type preferences among Roman Catholic seminarians. Journal of Psychological Type, 8, 33–35. http://www.capt.org/research/psychologicaltype-journal.htm Irvine, A. R. (1989). Isolation and the parish ministry. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews. Jung, C. G. (1971). Psychological types: The collected works, volume 6. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kay, W. K., & Francis, L. J. (2008). Psychological type preferences of female Bible College students in England. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 29, 101–105. doi:10.1080/13617670801928324 Kay, W. K., Francis, L. J., & Craig, C. L. (2008). Psychological type preferences of male British Assemblies of God Bible College students: Tough minded or tender hearted? Journal of the European Pentecostal Theological Association, 28, 6–20. Keirsey, D., & Bates, M. (1978). Please understand me. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis. Myers, I. B., & McCaulley, M. H. (1985). Manual: A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.


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ALL ARE CALLED, BUT SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES ARE MORE LIKELY TO RESPOND: PROFILING CHURCHGOERS IN AUSTRALIA Mandy Robbins* and Leslie J. Francis Abstract A sample of 1,527 churchgoers (591 males and 936 females) from a range of different Christian denominations completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales within the context of the Australian National Church Life Survey. Compared with the data held by the Australian Archive of the Psychological Type Research Unit, both male and female churchgoers displayed significantly higher levels of preference for sensing, for feeling, and for judging. Male churchgoers displayed significantly higher levels of preference for introversion. The two predominant types among female churchgoers were ISFJ (23%) and ESFJ (22%), compared with 13% and 8% respectively in the wider population. The two predominant types among male churchgoers were ISTJ (29%) and ESTJ (15%), compared with 21% and 16% respectively in the wider population. In principle, churches proclaim their invitation to worship to all psychological types. In practice, some psychological types appear more willing to respond. Keywords: psychological type, religion, psychology, churchgoers, congregations, Australia

The potential connection between personality and religion has long been a topic of interest within the empirical psychology of religion, as discussed by Argyle (1958). Integration of empirical research findings in this field was frustrated, however, for a number of years by the way in which individual studies employed widely diverse operationalizations and measures both of personality and of religion. The review of the literature undertaken by Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975) concluded that there was insufficient evidence from extant studies to draw any firm conclusions. Two decades later in their subsequent review, Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997) demonstrated just how much the field of enquiry had matured, largely in light of a series of studies that * Author Note: Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leslie J. Francis, Warwick Religions & Education Research Unit, Institute of Education, The University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0)24 7652 2539, Fax: +44 (0)24 7657 2638. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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systematically explored the association between religion and the three dimensions of personality identified and measured by the Eysenckian model that conceptualized individual differences in terms of the three orthogonal dimensions styled extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). This body of studies routinely demonstrated the connection between lower psychoticism scores and higher levels of religiosity. A second model of personality that has more recently emerged as a powerful tool within the social scientific study of religion and empirical theology is psychological type theory, as originally proposed by Jung (1971). Recent introductions to, and reviews of, this body of research were provided by Francis (2005, 2009). In its current form, developed from Jung’s original model, psychological type theory distinguishes between four aspects of personality: the two orientations, styled introversion and extraversion; the two perceiving functions, styled sensing and intuition; the two judging functions, styled feeling and thinking; and the two attitudes toward the outer world, styled judging and perceiving. In Jung’s theory, the orientations are concerned with the primary source of psychological energy. People who prefer introversion focus their attention on the inner world of ideas and draw their energy from that inner world. When introverts are tired and need energizing, they look to the inner world. Introverts are reflective, may consider deeply before acting, and they probe inwardly for stimulation. Introverts like quiet for concentration. Introverts work best alone and may resent distractions and interruptions from other people. People who prefer extraversion focus their attention on the outer world of people and things and draw their energy from that outer world. When extraverts are tired and need energizing, they look to the outer world. Extraverts like variety and action. Extraverts like to have other people around them in the working environment, and they enjoy the stimulus of sudden interruptions and telephone calls. Extraverts like to act quickly and decisively, even when it is not totally appropriate to do so. The meaning of the terms extravert and introvert differ from the layperson’s view, as they are often taken to mean sociable and shy, respectively. In Jung’s theory, extraversion and introversion are concerned with the direction of psychological energy rather than sociability. In Jung’s theory, the perceiving functions are concerned with the way in which individuals take in information. People who prefer sensing are practical people. They make good use of all of their five senses.

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They attend to practical and factual details, and they are in touch with physical realities. They observe the small details of everyday life and attend to step-by-step experience. They prefer to let the eyes tell the mind. People who prefer intuition are imaginative people. They make good use of their memory and seek to find patterns and associations with previous experience. They see patterns and meanings and assess possibilities. They are good at reading between the lines and projecting possibilities for the future. They prefer always to go for the “big picture.” They prefer to let the mind tell the eyes. In Jung’s theory, the judging functions are concerned with the ways in which individuals make decisions and form judgments. People who prefer to make judgments using feeling place people, relationships, and interpersonal matters high on their agenda. They develop good skills at applying personal priorities. They are good at weighing their own values and motives, as well as the values and motives of other people. They are characterized by qualities of empathy and sympathy. They prize harmony and trust. People who prefer to make judgments using thinking place justice, truth, and reason high on their agenda. They develop good powers of critical analysis. They use objective and impersonal criteria in reaching decisions. They follow rationally the relationships between cause and effect. They develop characteristics of being firm-minded and prizing logical order. They may sometimes appear skeptical. In developments of Jung’s theory, the attitudes towards the outer world distinguish between individuals who extravert their preferred perceiving function (sensing or intuition) and individuals who extravert their preferred judging function (thinking or feeling). People who use their preferred judging process in the outer world present a planned and orderly approach to the life. They prefer to have a settled system in place and display a preference for closure. They schedule projects so that each step gets done on time. They like to get things finished and settled, and they like to know that the finished product is in place. They work best when they can plan their work in advance and follow that plan. Judging types use lists and agendas to structure their day and to plan their actions. They may dislike interruption from the plans they have made and are reluctant to leave the current task even when something more urgent arises. People who use their preferred perceiving function in the outer world present a flexible and spontaneous approach to life. They prefer to keep plans and organization to a minimum and display a preference for openness. They adapt well to

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changing situations. They make allowances for new information and for changes in the situation in which they are living or acting. They may have trouble making decisions, feeling that they have never quite got enough information on which to base their decision. While psychological type theory begins by introducing the building blocks of the four bipolar preferences, the real interest and power of the theory comes from the way in which these four bipolar preferences generate 16 discrete psychological types. For example, one of the authors of the present paper (Leslie J. Francis) prefers introversion over extraversion, intuition over sensing, thinking over feeling, and judging over perceiving. In terms of the typology, he is therefore described an INTJ. In terms of type dynamics, an INTJ’s strongest characteristics are described as dominant introverted intuition and auxiliary extraverted thinking. Psychological type theory has given rise to the development of a family of psychological instruments capable of measuring preferences for introversion or extraversion, for sensing or intuition, for thinking or feeling, and for judging or perceiving. Three of these instruments in particular have begun to generate fruitful streams of empirical research concerned with applying psychological type theory to areas of church life and the Christian community. There are the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005). One stream of research has focused on charting the psychological type profile of religious professionals training for ministry or serving in ministry within a range of different denominations in the United Kingdom. These studies included, for example, Anglican Church in Wales clergymen (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001; Francis & Payne, 2002; Francis, Littler, & Robbins, 2010), male and female Bible college students (Francis, Penson, & Jones, 2001), evangelical church leaders (Francis & Robbins, 2002; Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), male missionary personnel (Craig, Horsfall, & Francis, 2005), evangelical lay church leaders (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, & Ross, 2005), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), youth ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007), evangelical Anglican seminarians (Francis, Craig, & Butler, 2007), Assemblies of God theological college students (Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008; Kay & Francis, 2008), Newfrontiers lead elders (Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009), Newfrontiers leaders (Ryland, Francis, & Robbins, in press), Anglican health-care chaplains

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(Francis, Hancocks, Swift, & Robbins, 2009), male and female Anglican clergy in the Church of England (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007; Francis, Robbins, Duncan, Whinney, & Ross, 2010; Francis, Robbins, & Whinney, in press), Free Church ministers in England (Francis, Whinney, Burton, & Robbins, 2011) and Methodist circuit ministers in Britain (Burton, Francis, & Robbins, 2010). Compared with the research invested in religious professionals, currently much less is known about the psychological type profile of church congregations. The nine published studies in this area have all been conducted among relatively small samples, and integration of the findings is made difficult by four features of these studies. The studies have been conducted among different denominational groups. The studies have been conducted in different countries. Some of the studies present information for males and females separately, while others analyze the two sexes together. The samples have been constituted in very different ways and may not be properly representative of congregations as a whole. Research in the United States of America was reported by Gerhardt (1983) and by Rehak (1998). Gerhardt (1983) studied a sample of 83 adult Unitarian Universalists. Among this sample, the data revealed preferences for introversion (59%), for intuition (78%), and for judging (67%). The balance was close between thinking (52%) and feeling (48%). Rehak (1998) studied Evangelical Lutherans with a sample of 76 active members. Among this sample, the data revealed preferences for introversion (68%) and for feeling (74%). Even balances were found between sensing (50%) and intuition (50%) and between judging (51%) and perceiving (49%). Research in Canada was reported by Delis-Bulhoes (1990) and by Ross (1993, 1995). Delis-Bulhoes (1990) studied Francophone Roman Catholics and Evangelical Protestants, with samples of 48 Catholics and 154 Protestants. Among the Protestants, the data revealed preferences for introversion (71%), for sensing (88%), for thinking (62%), and for judging (62%). Among the Catholics, the data revealed preferences for introversion (65%), for sensing (72%), for feeling (57%), and for judging (67%). Ross (1993) studied Anglicans, with a sample of 116 individuals. The data revealed preferences for introversion (62%), for intuition (64%), for feeling (69%), and for judging (59%). Ross (1995) studied Anglophone Roman Catholics, with a sample of 175 individuals. The data were analyzed by sex. The women displayed preferences

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for introversion (53%), for sensing (54%), for feeling (75%), and for judging (61%). The men displayed preferences for introversion (54%), for thinking (59%), and for judging (59%), and a balance between sensing (51%) and intuition (49%). Research in England was reported by Francis, Duncan, Craig, and Luffman (2004) and by Francis, Butler, Jones, and Craig (2007). Francis, Duncan, Craig and Luffman (2004) profiled five typical Anglican congregations in central England and reported on the data provided by 116 men and by 211 women separately. Among the women, there were preferences for introversion (56%), for sensing (74%), for feeling (73%), and for judging (67%). Among the men, there were preferences for introversion (66%), for sensing (68%), and for judging (70%), and a balance between thinking (48%) and feeling (52%). Francis, Butler, Jones, and Craig (2007) profiled 93 female and 65 male active members of the Church of England. Among the women, there were preferences for introversion (56%), for sensing (55%), for feeling (79%), and for judging (72%). Among the men, there were preferences for introversion (54%), for thinking (57%), and for judging (79%), and a balance between sensing (49%) and intuition (51%). Research in Wales was reported by Craig, Francis, Bailey, and Robbins (2003) and by Francis, Robbins, Williams, and Williams (2007). Craig, Francis, Bailey, and Robbins (2003) profiled 101 churchgoers from three Church in Wales benefices. The data recorded preferences for introversion (61%), for sensing (85%), for feeling (65%), and for judging (92%). Francis, Robbins, Williams, and Williams (2007) reported on data provided by 52 men and by 133 women separately. Among the women, there were preferences for sensing (84%), for feeling (76%), and for judging (87%), and a balance between introversion (51%) and extraversion (49%). Among the men, there were preferences for sensing (77%), for feeling (63%), and for judging (90%), and a balance between introversion (50%) and extraversion (50%). Attempts to draw these disparate findings together suggest that there may be significant differences not only between male and female congregants but also between denominations and countries. At the same time, however, there are two major weaknesses with this growing body of research concerned with exploring the psychological type profile of churchgoers. The first weakness is that each study is based on a relatively small number of individuals. The second weakness is that only one of these studies (Francis, Robbins, Williams, & Williams, 2007)

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made a direct comparison between the type profile of churchgoers and wider population studies. Such comparison is crucial in order to establish whether churchgoers are a distinctive subgroup of the population or broadly representative of the population as a whole. Francis, Robbins, Williams, and Williams (2007) compared their sample of rural Anglican churchgoers in Wales (N = 185) with the United Kingdom population norms for men (N = 748) and for women (N = 865) provided by Kendall (1998). Their data drew attention to the significant over-representation of the combined preference for SFJ among churchgoers and to the consequent under-representation of other types. Among women, ISFJ accounts for 32% of churchgoers, compared with 18% of the general population (p < .001), and ESFJ accounts for 28% of churchgoers, compared with 19% of the general population (p < .01). Among men, ISFJ accounts for 19% of churchgoers, compared with 7% of the general population (p < .001), and ESFJ accounts for 27% of churchgoers, compared with 6% of the general population (p < .001). Against this background, the aim of the present papers is to build on and to extend previous research concerned with the psychological type profiling of church congregations in three ways. First, existing studies in this field have been based in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America: The present study was based in Australia. Second, existing studies have relied on relatively small samples (the largest involving 327 individuals): The present study aimed for at least 1,500 participants. Third, only one existing study compared the profile of churchgoers with wider population profiles: The present study drew on wider data available in Australia. Three aspects of the context of the present study require further clarification: the nature of the sample, the measure of psychological type, and the provenance of the wider population data. First, the opportunity to sample a broad range of church congregations within Australia was made possible through the Australian National Church Life Survey (NCLS) which has facilitated regular survey work among church congregations over two decades (Kaldor, Bellamy, Correy, & Powell, 1992; Kaldor et al., 1995; Kaldor, Bellamy, Powell, Castle, & Hughes, 1999; Kaldor, Bellamy, Powell, Hughes, & Castle, 1997; Kaldor et al., 1999). The method employed by NCLS is to design a number of different questionnaires that are randomly distributed throughout the participating congregations. While the different questionnaires

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incorporate the same body of core questions, each variant also contains a number of distinctive questions. In the 2001 round of the NCLS, one of the variants included a recognized measure of psychological type. Second, the measure of psychological type included in the questionnaire was the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005). This instrument was selected because, unlike the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) and the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), it had been designed specifically for application within the self-completion questionnaire-style survey. This questionnaire has already been used extensively in surveys among religious professionals (Francis & Robbins, 2002; Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004; Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009; Ryland et al., in press; Francis, Hancocks, Swift, & Robbins, 2009; Burton, Francis, & Robbins, 2010; Francis, Littler, & Robbins, 2010), as well as in pioneering surveys among church congregations (Craig, Francis, Bailey, & Robbins, 2003; Francis, Robbins, Williams, & Williams, 2007). Third, there has been no normative psychological type published for Australia comparable with the norms published for the United Kingdom by Kendall (1998). In the absence of such data, the Australian Archive held by the Psychological Type Research Unit at Deakin University provides a useful point of reference (Ball, 2008). Currently, the Archive holds data on 12,645 males and 9,513 females who have completed Forms G, K, or M of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Method Participants In 2001, a total of 18 denominations participated in the Australian National Church Life Survey. Of the male respondents, 7.9% were under the age of 20, 10.2% were in their 20s, 14.3% were in their 30s, 20.8% were in their 40s, 17.2% were in their 50s, 16.3% were in their 60s, and 13.3% were aged 70 or over. Over half of the male respondents attended either a Catholic church (30.7%) or an Anglican church (23.5%). Other churches attended included the Uniting Church (14.2%), Baptist (9.7%), Church of Christ (4.2%), Assemblies of God (3.8%), and Lutheran (3.4%). Of the female respondents, 6.9% were under the age of 20, 11.8% in their 20s, 16.1% were in their 30s, 19.2% were in their 40s, 16.1% were in their 50s, 16.3% were in their 60s, and 13.5% were aged 70

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or over. Over half of the female respondents attended either a Catholic church (30.7%) or an Anglican church (23.5%). Other churches attended included the Uniting Church (14.2%), Baptist (9.7%), Church of Christ (4.2%), Assemblies of God (3.8%), and Lutheran (3.4%). Measure Psychological type was assessed by the Francis Psychological Type Scales (FPTS: Francis, 2005). This is a 40-item instrument comprising four sets of 10 forced-choice items related to each of the four components of psychological type: orientation (extraversion or introversion), perceiving process (sensing or intuition), judging process (thinking or feeling), and attitude toward the outer world (judging or perceiving). Recent studies have demonstrated that this instrument functions well in church related contexts. For example, Francis, Craig, and Hall (2008) reported alpha coefficients of .83 for the EI scale, .76 for the SN scale, .73 for the TF scale, and .79 for the JP scale. Procedure Twenty different forms of the Australian National Church Life Survey questionnaire were distributed among participating congregations, and version U included a measure of psychological type. Data Analysis The research literature concerning the empirical investigation of psychological type has developed a highly distinctive method for analyzing, handling, and displaying statistical data in the form of type tables. This convention has been adopted in this paper in order to integrate these new data within the established literature and to provide all the detail necessary for secondary analyses and further interpretation within the rich theoretical framework afforded by psychological type. Type tables have been designed to provide information about the 16 discrete psychological types, about the four dichotomous preferences, about the six sets of pairs and temperaments, about the dominant types, and about the introverted and extraverted Jungian types. Commentary on this table, however, will be restricted to those aspects of the data strictly relevant to the research question.

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Results The type distribution for the 936 female Australian churchgoers is presented in Table 1. These data demonstrated preferences for sensing (81%), for feeling (62%), and for judging (87%), with similar levels of preference for introversion (52%) and for extraversion (48%). The predominant types among the female churchgoers were ISFJ (23%) and ESFJ (22%). In other words, the SFJ preference accounted for 45% of the female churchgoers. The second most strongly represented types among the female churchgoers were ISTJ (16%) and ESTJ (13%). In other words, the STJ preference accounted for 28% of the female churchgoers. The type distribution for the 591 male Australian churchgoers is presented in Table 2. These data demonstrated preferences for introversion (59%), for sensing (78%), for thinking (60%) and for judging (88%). The predominant types among the male churchgoers were ISTJ (29%) and ESTJ (15%). In other words, the STJ preference accounted for 44% of the male churchgoers. The second most strongly represented types among the male churchgoers were ESFJ (14%) and ISFJ (13%). In other words, the SFJ preference accounted for 27% of the male churchgoers. Greater meaning is given to these figures when they are contextualized against the Australian Archive of the Psychological Type Research Unit. Four main features emerge from the contextualization of the binary preferences. First, in terms of the perceiving process, there is a significantly higher proportion of sensers in church congregations than in the wider population. Among female churchgoers, 81% prefer sensing, compared with 52% in the wider population; among male churchgoers, 78% prefer sensing, compared with 58% in the wider population. Second, in terms of attitude toward the outer world, there is a significantly higher proportion of judgers in church congregations than in the wider population. Among female churchgoers, 87% prefer judging, compared with 59% in the wider population; among male churchgoers, 88% prefer judging, compared with 66% in the wider population. Third, in terms of the judging process, there is a significantly higher proportion of feelers in church congregations than in the wider population. Among female churchgoers, 62% prefer feeling, compared with 56% in the wider population; among male churchgoers, 40% prefer feeling, compared with 22% in the wider population. Fourth, in terms of the orientations, the findings are not so clear cut.

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Table 1. Type Distribution for Female Churchgoers in Australia, Compared with Wider Female Population Norms N = 936 The Sixteen Complete Types ISTJ n = 148 (15.8%) I = 1.63*** +++++ +++++ +++++ +

ISTP n=9 (1.0%) I = 0.35*** +

ISFJ n = 217 (23.2%) I = 1.82*** +++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ +++

ISFP n = 19 (2.0%) I = 0.42*** ++

Dichotomous Preferences INFJ n = 38 (4.1%) I = 0.68* ++++

INFP n=8 (0.9%) I = 0.10*** +

INTJ n = 36 (3.8%) I = 0.73 ++++

INTP n = 11 (1.2%) I = 0.29*** +

ESTP n = 13 (1.4%) I = 0.54* +

ESFP n = 32 (3.4%) I = 0.89 +++

ENFP n = 25 (2.7%) I = 0.30*** +++

ENTP n=5 (0.5%) I = 0.10*** +

ESTJ n = 117 (12.5%) I = 1.63*** +++++ +++++ +++

ESFJ n = 204 (21.8%) I = 2.66*** +++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ ++

ENFJ n = 34 (3.6%) I = 0.75 ++++

ENTJ n = 20 (2.1%) I = 0.46*** ++


I 1.19* 1.95*** 0.75 0.22***


I 0.31*** 0.22*** 1.74*** 0.70**

Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

E I

n = 450 n = 486

(48.1%) (51.9%)

I = 1.04 I = 0.96

S N

n = 759 n = 177

(81.1%) (18.9%)

***I = 1.55 ***I = 0.40

T F

n = 359 n = 577

(38.4%) (61.6%)

*I = 0.91 *I = 1.06

J P

n = 814 n = 122

(87.0%) (13.0%)

***I = 1.47 ***I = 0.32


n = 439 n = 47 n = 75 n = 375

(46.9%) (5.0%) (8.0%) (40.1%)

***I = 1.39 ***I = 0.25 ***I = 0.38 ***I = 1.58

ST SF NF NT

n = 287 n = 472 n = 105 n = 72

(30.7%) (50.4%) (11.2%) (7.7%)

***I = 1.36 ***I = 1.70 ***I = 0.40 ***I = 0.40

SJ SP NP NJ TJ TP FP FJ

n = 686 n = 73 n = 49 n = 128 n = 328 n = 38 n = 84 n = 493

(73.3%) (7.8%) (5.2%) (13.7%) (34.3%) (4.1%) (9.0%) (52.7%)

***I = 1.91 ***I = 0.56 ***I = 0.19 ***I = 0.66 ***I = 1.26 ***I = 0.27 ***I = 0.34 ***I = 1.66

IN EN IS ES

n = 93 n = 84 n = 393 n = 366

(9.9%) (9.0%) (42.0%) (39.1%)

***I = 0.42 ***I = 0.37 ***I = 1.40 ***I = 1.76

ET EF IF IT

n = 155 n = 295 n = 282 n = 204

(16.6%) (31.5%) (30.1%) (21.8%)

**I = 0.82 ***I = 1.22 I = 0.94 I = 1.00

Dominant Types n % I Dt. T 157 16.8 0.88 Dt. F 265 28.3 1.08 Dt. S 410 43.8 1.52*** Dt. N 104 11.1 0.43***

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Table 2. Type Distribution for Male Churchgoers in Australia, Compared with Wider Male Population Norms

The Sixteen Complete Types

Dichotomous Preferences

ISTJ n = 172 (29.1%) I = 1.37*** +++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ ++++

ISFJ n = 76 (12.9%) I = 3.27*** +++++ +++++ +++

ISTP n =13 (2.2%) I = 0.39*** ++

ISFP n=7 (1.2%) I = 0.61 +

INFP n = 10 (1.7%) I = 0.53* ++

INTP n=8 (1.4%) I = 0.21*** +

ESTP n = 13 (2.2%) I = 0.47** ++

ESFP n=7 (1.2%) I = 0.83 +

ENFP n = 10 (1.7%) I = 0.42** ++

ENTP n=6 (1.0%) I = 0.15*** +

ESTJ n = 88 (14.9%) I = 0.94 +++++ +++++ +++++

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ESFJ n = 82 (13.9%) I = 4.45*** +++++ +++++ ++++


I 0.74*** 3.28*** 0.55** 0.25***

INFJ n = 29 (4.9%) I = 1.90*** +++++

ENFJ n = 18 (3.0%) I = 1.49 +++

INTJ n = 34 (5.8%) I = 0.66** +++++ +

ENTJ n = 18 (3.0%) I = 0.36*** +++


I 0.30*** 0.56* 1.67*** 0.94

Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

E I

n = 242 n = 349

(40.9%) (59.1%)

**I = 0.88 **I = 1.10

S N

n = 458 n = 133

(77.5%) (22.5%)

***I = 1.34 ***I = 0.53

T F

n = 352 n = 239

(59.6%) (40.4%)

***I = 0.77 ***I = 1.81

J P

n = 517 n = 74

(87.5%) (12.5%)

***I = 1.33 ***I = 0.37

Pairs and Temperaments IJ IP EP EJ ST SF NF NT

n = 311 n = 38 n = 36 n = 206 n = 286 n = 172 n = 67 n = 66

(52.6%) (6.4%) (6.1%) (34.9%) (48.3%) (29.1%) (11.3%) (11.2%)

***I = 1.44 ***I = 0.38 ***I = 0.36 **I = 1.19 I = 1.02 ***I = 2.79 I = 0.96 ***I = 0.37

SJ SP NP NJ

n = 418 n = 40 n = 34 n = 99

(70.7%) (6.8%) (5.8%) (16.8%)

***I = 1.60 ***I = 0.49 ***I = 0.28 **I = 0.77

TJ TP FP FJ

n = 312 n = 40 n = 34 n = 205

(52.8%) (6.8%) (5.8%) (34.7%)

I = 0.97 ***I = 0.29 ***I = 0.54 ***I = 2.97

IN EN IS ES

n = 81 n = 52 n = 268 n = 190

(13.7%) (8.8%) (45.3%) (32.1%)

***I = 0.66 ***I = 0.41 ***I = 1.39 ***I = 1.28

ET EF IF IT

n = 125 n = 117 n = 122 n = 227

(21.2%) (19.8%) (20.6%) (38.4%)

***I = 0.59 ***I = 1.86 ***I = 1.77 I = 0.91

Dominant Types n % I Dt. T 127 21.5 0.59*** Dt. F 117 19.8 1.92*** Dt. S 268 45.3 1.45*** Dt. N 79 13.4 0.60***

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Among male churchgoers, there is a significantly higher proportion of introverts (59% compared with 54% in the wider population). Among female churchgoers, and among the wider population, there are similar proportions of introverts, 52% and 54%. These significant differences that emerge from the binary comparisons lead to some strong differences in the levels of certain psychological types present in church congregations and in the wider population. The two preference sets that are most visible in this regard are SFJ and STJ: SFJ preferences account for 45% of the female churchgoers (compared with 21% of the wider female population) and for 27% of male churchgoers (compared with 17% of the wider male population); STJ preferences account for 28% of the female churchgoers (compared with 17% of the wider female population) and for 44% of the male churchgoers (compared with 37% of the wider male population). Conclusion The present study set out to establish the psychological type profile of churchgoers in Australia and to compare the profile of churchgoers with available data on the wider population. The data provided by 591 male and 936 female churchgoers within the context of the 2001 Australian National Church Life Survey suggest the following conclusion. While in principle churches proclaim their invitation to worship to all psychological types, in practice some psychological types appear more willing to respond. Looking at the key binary preferences, within church congregations there are large over-representations of sensers and of judgers and a more modest over-representation of feelers. These main findings are broadly consistent with the cumulative picture that emerged from the nine earlier studies reported in the introduction. Detailed comparison with these earlier studies would not be particularly fruitful, however, in the light of their small sample sizes and in the light of their general failure to distinguish between the profiles of male and female churchgoers. The over-representation of preference for sensing characterizes a community concerned with continuity, with traditions, with stability, and with a God grounded in divine changelessness. Here is a community concerned with guarding what has been handed down by previous generations. Such a community may tend to espouse conservative social and moral values. However, a community shaped by such a

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pronounced preference for sensing may be quite alien to individuals who view the world through the lens of intuition. For this reason, some intuitives may find it more difficult to access their local churches. The over-representation of preference for judging characterizes a community concerned with organization, with discipline, with structure, and with a God who welcomes a regular pattern of worship (whatever that pattern may be). Here is a community concerned with valuing regular commitment, advanced planning, and respect for guidelines (implicit as well as explicit). Such a community may tend to reject spontaneity and flexibility. However, a community shaped by such a pronounced preference for judging may be quite alien to individuals who view the world through the lens of perceiving. For this reason, some perceivers may find it more difficult to access their local churches. The over-representation of preference for feeling characterizes a community concerned with human values, with interpersonal relationships, and with a loving and caring God. Here is a community concerned with peace and with harmony. Such a community may tend to project a feminine profile, given the significantly higher levels of preference for feeling reported among women than among men in many national population studies (Kendall, 1998). However, a community shaped by a preference for feeling may be quite alien to individuals who view the world through the lens of thinking. For this reason, some thinkers may find it more difficult to access their local churches. Looking at the discrete psychological types, where men and women are counted together, the combined SFJ preferences account for almost two out of every five churchgoers (38%). In her booklet Introduction to Type, Myers (1998, p. 7) provided insightful profiles of the SFJ types: ISFJ and ESFJ. The ISFJ profile was as follows: Quiet, friendly, responsible and conscientious. Work devotedly to meet their obligations. Lend stability to any project or group. Thorough, painstaking, accurate. Their interests are usually not technical. Can be patient with necessary details. Loyal, considerate, perceptive, concerned with how other people feel.

The ESFJ profile was as follows: Warm-hearted, talkative, popular, conscientious, born co-operators, active committee members. Need harmony and may be good at creating it. Always doing something nice for someone. Work best with encour-

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mandy robbins and leslie j. francis agement and praise. Main interest is in things that directly and visibly affect people’s lives.

The combined STJ preferences account for one out of every three churchgoers (34%). The ISTJ profile provided by Myers (1998, p. 7) was as follows: Serious, quiet, earn success by concentration and thoroughness. Practical, orderly, matter-of-fact, logical, realistic and dependable. See to it that everything is well organized. Take responsibility. Make up their own minds about what should be accomplished and work towards it steadily, regardless of protests or distractions.

The ESTJ profile was as follows: Practical, realistic, matter-of-fact, with natural head for business or mechanics. Not interested in abstract theories; want learning to have direct and immediate application. Like to organise and run activities. Often make good administrators; are decisive, quickly move to implement decisions; take care of routine details.

The present paper has reported the first large-scale published study (N = 1527) concerned with establishing the psychological type profile of churchgoers and comparing their profile with available data on the wider population. There remain two important weaknesses with this study. First, in spite of being the largest psychological type study of churchgoers so far published, the database is not sufficiently large to facilitate robust comparison between the wide range of denominations included in the survey. Second, although the data on the wider population provided by the Australian Archive maintained by the Psychological Type Research Unit at Deakin University has provided a convenient basis against which the psychological type profile of churchgoers can be assessed, no claims can be made that this database is, in fact, representative of the Australian population as a whole. Building on the foundations laid by the present study, the need now is for a further study to conduct a larger survey of church congregations within a cultural context for which psychological type population norms have been established. Given the data published by Kendall (1998), the United Kingdom would provide a good context for such a study.

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References Argyle, M. (1958). Religious behaviour. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. doi:10.4324/9780203001271 Argyle, M., & Beit-Hallahmi, B. (1975). The social psychology of religion. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ball, I. L. (2008). Australian data on the distribution of psychological types. Bulletin of Psychological Type, 31, 53–55. http://www.aptinternational.org/bpt.aspx Beit-Hallahmi, B., & Argyle, M. (1997). The psychology of religious behaviour, belief, and experience. London, England: Routledge. Burton, L., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2010). Psychological type profile of Methodist circuit minister in Britain: Similarities with and differences from Anglican clergy. Journal of Empirical Theology, 23, 64–81. doi: 10.1163/157092510X503020 Craig, C. L., Duncan, B., & Francis, L. J. (2006). Psychological type preferences of Roman Catholic priests in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 27, 157–164. doi:10.1080/13617670600849812 Craig, C. L., Francis, L. J., Bailey, J., & Robbins, M. (2003). Psychological types in Church in Wales congregations. The Psychologist in Wales, 15, 18–21. http://www .bps.org.uk/welsh/psyc_wales.cfm Craig, C., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2004). Psychological type and sex differences among church leaders in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 25, 3–13. doi:10.1080/1361767042000199004 Craig, C. L., Horsfall, T., & Francis, L. J. (2005). Psychological types of male missionary personnel training in England: A role for thinking type men? Pastoral Psychology, 53, 475–482. doi:10.1007/s11089-005-2588-8 Delis-Bulhoes, V. (1990). Jungian psychological types and Christian belief in active church members. Journal of Psychological Type, 20, 25–33. http://www.capt.org/ research/psychological-type-journal.htm Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (adult and junior). London, England: Hodder and Stoughton. Francis, L. J. (2005). Faith and psychology: Personality, religion and the individual. London, England: Darton, Longman, and Todd. Francis, L. J. (2009). Psychological type theory and religious and spiritual experience. In M. De Souza, L. J. Francis, J. O’Higgins-Norman, & D. G. Scott (Eds.), International handbook of education for spirituality, care, and wellbeing (pp. 125–146). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9018-9_8 Francis, L. J., Butler, A., Jones, S. H., & Craig, C. L. (2007). Type patterns among active members of the Anglican church: A perspective from England. Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 10, 435–443. doi:10.1080/13694670600668382 Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Butler, A. (2007). Psychological types of male evangelical Anglican seminarians in England. Journal of Psychological Type, 67, 11–17. http:// www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Hall, G. (2008). Psychological type and attitude towards Celtic Christianity among committed churchgoers in the United Kingdom: An empirical study. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 23, 181–191. doi:10.1080/13537900802024543 Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Horsfall, T., & and Ross, C. F. J. (2005). Psychological types of male and female evangelical lay church leaders in England, compared with United Kingdom population norms. Fieldwork in Religion, 1, 69–83. http://www .equinoxjournals.com/FIR Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Whinney, M., Tilley, D., & Slater, P. (2007). Psychological profiling of Anglican clergy in England: Employing Jungian typology to interpret

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diversity, strengths, and potential weaknesses in ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology, 11, 266–284. doi:10.1515/IJPT.2007.17 Francis, L. J., Duncan, B., Craig, C. L., & Luffman, G. (2004). Type patterns among Anglican congregations in England. Journal of Adult Theological Education, 1, 66–77. doi:10.1558/jate.1.1.65.36058 Francis, L. J., Gubb, S., & Robbins, M. (2009). Psychological type profile of Lead Elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 30, 61–69. doi:10.1080/13617670902784568 Francis, L. J., Hancocks, G., Swift, C., & Robbins, M. (2009). Distinctive call, distinctive profile: The psychological type profile of Church of England full-time hospital chaplains. Practical Theology, 2, 269–284. doi:10.1558/prth.v2i2.269 Francis, L. J., Littler, K., & Robbins, M. (2010). Psychological type and Offa’s Dyke: Exploring differences in the psychological type profile of Anglican clergy serving in England and Wales. Contemporary Wales, 23, 240–251. Francis, L. J., Nash, P., Nash, S., & Craig, C. L. (2007). Psychology and youth ministry: Psychological type preferences of Christian youth workers in the United Kingdom, Journal of Youth Ministry, 5(2), 73–90. Francis, L. J., & Payne, V. J. (2002). The Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS): Ministry styles and psychological type among male Anglican clergy in Wales. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 13, 125–141. Francis, L. J., Payne, V. J., & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male Anglican clergy in Wales. Journal of Psychological Type, 56, 19–23. http://www.capt.org/ research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Penson, A. W., & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male and female Bible College students in England. Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 4, 23–32. doi:10.1080/13674670010011616 Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2002). Psychological types of male evangelical church leaders. Journal of Belief and Values, 23, 217–220. doi:10.1080/1361767022000010860 Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., Duncan, B., Whinney, M., & Ross, C. (2010). Confirming the psychological type profile of Anglican clergymen in England: A ministry for intuitives. In B. Ruelas & V. Briseño (Eds.), Psychology of intuition (pp. 211–219). New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers. Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., & Whinney, M. (in press). Women priests of the Church of England: Psychological type profile. Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., Williams, A., & Williams, R. (2007). All types are called, but some are more likely to respond: The psychological profile of rural Anglican churchgoers in Wales. Rural Theology, 5, 23–30. http://www.rural-theology.org.uk/ Francis, L. J., Whinney, M., Burton, L., & Robbins, M. (2011). Psychological type preferences of male and female Free Church Ministers in England. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 251–263. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Gerhardt, R. (1983). Liberal religion and personality type. Research in Psychological Type, 6, 47–53. Jung, C. G. (1971). Psychological types: The collected works, volume 6. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kaldor, P., Bellamy, J., Correy, M., & Powell, R. (1992). First look in the mirror: Initial findings of the 1991 National Church Life Survey. Homebush West, New South Wales, UK: Lancer. Kaldor, P., Bellamy, J., Moore, S., Powell, R., Castle, K., & Correy, M. (1995). Mission under the microscope: Keys to effective and sustainable mission. Adelaide, South Australia: Openbook Publishers. Kaldor, P., Bellamy, J., Powell, R., Castle, K., & Hughes, B. (1999). Build my Church: Trends and possibilities for Australian churches. Adelaide, South Australia: Openbook Publishers.

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Kaldor, P., Bellamy, J., Powell, R., Hughes, B., & Castle, K. (1997). Shaping a future: Characteristics of vital congregations. Adelaide, South Australia: Openbook Publishers. Kaldor, P., Dixon, R., Powell, R., Bellamy, J., Hughes, B., Moore, S., & Dalziel, J. (1999). Taking stock: A profile of Australian church attenders. Adelaide, South Australia: Openbook Publishers. Kay, W. K., & Francis, L. J. (2008). Psychological type preferences of female Bible College students in England. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 29, 101–105. doi:10.1080/13617670801928324 Kay, W. K., Francis, L. J., & Craig, C. L. (2008). Psychological type preferences of male British Assemblies of God Bible College students: Tough minded or tender hearted? Journal of the European Pentecostal Theological Association, 28, 6–20. http://www .eptaonline.com/ourjournaljepta.htm Keirsey, D., & Bates, M. (1978). Please understand me. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis. Kendall, E. (1998). Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: Step 1 manual supplement. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Myers, I. B. (1998). Introduction to type. Gainesville, FL: Center for Applications of Psychological Type. Myers, I. B., & McCaulley, M. H. (1985). Manual: A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Rehak, M. C. (1998). Identifying the congregation’s corporate personality. Journal of Psychological Type, 44, 39–44. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-typejournal.htm Ross, C. F. J. (1993). Type patterns among active members of the Anglican church: Comparisons with Catholics, Evangelicals and clergy. Journal of Psychological Type, 26, 28–35. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Ross, C. F. J. (1995). Type patterns among Catholics: Four Anglophone congregations compared with Protestants, Francophone Catholics and priests. Journal of Psychological Type, 33, 33–41. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal. htm Ryland, A., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (in press). Called for leadership: Psychological type profile of leaders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom.

GIFTS DIFFERING? PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AMONG STIPENDIARY AND NON-STIPENDIARY ANGLICAN CLERGY Andrew Village* Abstract This paper tests the idea that clergy in different kinds of ministry have different psychological profiles that relate to the kinds of jobs they may be required to do. Psychological type preferences of 529 male and 518 female clergy ordained in the Anglican Church in the United Kingdom from 2004 to 2007 were assessed using the Francis Psychological Type Scales. Overall, clergy showed a preference for introversion over extraversion, feeling over thinking, and judging over perceiving, but they showed no preference between sensing and intuition. After allowing for differences between the sexes and between clergy of different church tradition, theological orientation, and charismatic practice, there were significant differences in the psychological profiles of stipendiary ministers (SMs), Non-Stipendiary Ministers (NSMs), and Ordained Local Ministers (OLMs). SMs showed a stronger preference for intuition than NSMs or OLMs, while OLMs showed a stronger preference for feeling than SMs or NSMs. Implications of these findings for the changing nature of Anglican ministry are discussed. Keywords: Anglicans, Church of England, ministry, personality, psychological type

One of the key changes in many churches over the last few decades has been a decline in the number ordained ministers. In the Church of England, for example, there were 13,080 full-time stipendiary clergy in 1970 but only 8,720 in 2000, a decline of a third (Brierley, 1999). Declines of this magnitude, or more, are apparent in several other denominations in England over this period. In the last few decades, the overall decline in full-time ministers has been offset to some extent by a growth in different sorts of voluntary or part-time ordained ministry. In the Church of England, such clergy are generally referred to as Non-Stipendiary Ministers (NSMs), if they can be deployed within * Author Note: Andrew Village, Theology and Religious Studies, York St. John University. I thank Leslie Francis and Mandy Robbins for generously allowing me to work on a dataset that we collected together and Leslie for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Andrew Village, York St. John University, Lord Mayor’s Walk, York YO31 7EX, UK. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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and between dioceses, and Ordained Local Ministers (OLMs), if they are licensed to a single benefice (Etherington, 2001; Heskins & Torry, 2006; Hodge & Mantle, 2001). Not all English dioceses have used OLMs and, in some that have in the past, the distinction between these two forms of ministries is rapidly diminishing in the face of demands for flexible deployment. Figures published by the Church of England suggest that part-time stipendiary clergy, NSMs and OLMs, made up 29% of the total clergy in 2007 (The Archbishops’ Council, 2007). This compares with a figure of 23% recorded in 2004 (The Archbishops’ Council, 2005), suggesting that these sorts of ministries are becoming increasingly important in maintaining the life of the church. Given that the type of ministry seems to be changing, it would be useful to know what impact this might have on the church. The main emphases in the debate to date seem to have been on the decline of full-time clergy and how this will impact on the availability of ministers for tasks that only clergy can do. Rather little has been said about whether there are differences between clergy in different sorts of roles. As might be expected, figures suggest that non-stipendiary forms of ministry tend to attract older people, especially those who are at or near retirement. In 2007, the average age of clergy in the Church of England was 51 for stipendiary clergy, 53 for part-time stipendiary clergy, 57 for NSMs, and 61 for OLMs (The Archbishops’ Council, 2007). There is also a difference in the sex ratio between ministries: In the same year, 18% of stipendiary clergy were women compared with 54% of part-time stipendiary clergy, 48% of NSMs, and 53% of OLMs. This difference may partly be historical because both the ordination of women and the rise of non-stipendiary or part-time ministry are comparatively recent phenomena. Thus, while only 25% of incumbents in post in 2007 were women, this figure rose to 37% for assistant curates, most of whom were likely to have been ordained within the previous 4 years (The Archbishops’ Council, 2007). The sex difference might also be related to women having different opportunities or constraints from men in relation to different ministries. For example, married men may be more able than married women to move their families to take up a stipendiary position, whereas unpaid part-time ministry may be more possible for wives with working husbands than vice versa. Differences in the structure of ordained ministry suggest that the profile of the typical Anglican priest is changing. Whereas in years gone by the typical parish priest was a young or middle-aged man who trained full time in a theological college, now the typical parish priest

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is not so easily stereotyped. The ministry has become older, more female, and more diverse. Alongside these changes we might expect changes in the average personality profile of clergy. It is well known that some personally traits or types are associated with a particular sex (Ashmore & Sewell, 2004; Feingold, 1994). In terms of trait models of personality, women generally tend to be less emotionally stable than men but more tender-minded (Lynn & Martin, 1997). In terms of psychological type, the most marked and consistent difference is that women are more likely to prefer feeling over thinking than are men (Kendall, 1998; Myers, 2006). The empirical data seem to confirm what most people might recognize in everyday life: Women tend (and it is only a tendency) to have a greater capacity for empathy towards others than do men. Given these widespread sex differences, it might be assumed that this is also true for clergy. The evidence is that while these population differences do hold for many groups of clergy, the difference among Anglican clergy is reduced somewhat by the tendency for male clergy to display rather feminine characteristics and female clergy to display rather male characteristics, compared to the general population (Francis, 1991, 1992; Robbins, Francis, & Rutledge, 1997). The strength of these trends should not be overplayed, and in the case of women, it may be a temporary finding that reflects the need for the pioneers of women’s ordination to show tough-minded masculinity in order to survive in what was then a very masculine environment. Even allowing for these factors, women clergy do have a different sort of personality to their male counterparts, so the average psychological profile of the clergy should be changing simply by virtue of the change in sex ratios. Despite the fact that many male Anglican clergy seem to be somewhat feminine in personality, the increase in the number of ordained women means that Anglican ministry is likely to become even more feminized. In some ways this is to state the obvious: Perhaps a more interesting question is to ask if there are changes in psychological profile that cannot be accounted for by the changing sex ratio of clergy. In particular, do different sorts of ordained ministry attract or select people of different psychological type? This paper sought to answer this question by examining the psychological profiles of recently ordained Anglican clergy from the United Kingdom. Association of certain psychological profiles with certain sorts of ministers might arise because psychological preferences influence candidates to apply for particular ministries or because the church


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preferentially assigns or selects people with particular psychological preferences to certain ministries and not others. Psychological profiling is rarely if ever used in selection to ordained ministry in the Anglican church in the UK, but this does not exclude the possibility that particular characteristics associated with psychological type criteria are used to select ministers or assign them to particular sorts of ministry. In general, selection processes for SM and NSM have been different from those for OLM, with the latter involving more discernment and training at the local level, so selection might be one way in which people of particular psychological profiles become linked to particular sorts of ordained ministry roles. The model of psychological type first suggested by Jung (1921) and developed by others has proved a fertile way of explaining differences between clergy and lay people or between different sorts of clergy (Francis, 2001, 2005). The model seeks to describe various modes of psychological functioning and how this functioning results in different sorts of personalities. In its current form, as developed by Briggs and Briggs Myers (Myers, 2006; Myers & Myers, 1980), the model includes two orientations, two perceiving functions, two judging functions, and two attitudes toward the outer world. The two orientations are concerned with where individuals prefer to function psychologically. Extraverts (E) are orientated toward the outer world, and much of their psychological functioning is done by interaction with others, which they find stimulating and energizing. They are usually open, sociable people who enjoy having many friends. Introverts (I) are orientated toward their inner world, and much of their psychological functioning is done in periods of solitude, silence, and contemplation, which they find stimulating and energizing. They may prefer to have a small circle of intimate friends rather than many acquaintances. The two perceiving functions are concerned with the way in which people gather and process information. Sensing types (S) prefer to process the realities of a situation as perceived by their senses, attending to specific details rather than the wider picture. Their interests lie mainly with practical issues, and they are typically down to earth and matter of fact. Intuitive types (N), on the other hand, prefer to process the possibilities of a situation as perceived by their imaginations, attending to wider patterns and relationships rather than specific details. Their interests lie mainly with abstract theories, and they are typically imaginative and innovative.

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The two judging functions are concerned with the way in which people make decisions and judgments. Thinking types (T) prefer to process information objectively, attending to logic and principles rather than to relationships and personal values. They value integrity and justice, and they are typically truthful and fair, even at the expense of harmony. Feeling types (F) prefer to process information subjectively, attending to their personal values and relationships rather than abstract principles. They value compassion and mercy, and they are typically tactful and empathetic, even at the expense of fairness and consistency. The two attitudes toward the outer world indicate which of the two sets of functions (that is, Perceiving S/N, or Judging T/F) is preferred in dealings with the outer world. Judging types (J) actively judge external stimuli rather than passively perceive them, so they tend to order, rationalize, and structure their outer world. They enjoy routine and established patterns, preferring to reach goals by following schedules and using lists, timetables, or diaries. Perceiving types (P) passively perceive external stimuli rather than actively judging them, so they tend to avoid imposing order on the outer world. They enjoy a flexible, open-ended approach to life that values change and spontaneity, preferring to attend to the moment rather than plan too far into the future. Psychological type theory has been thoroughly criticized and evaluated in terms of psychological conceptualization, empirical operationalization, and theological implications (Bayne, 1997; Francis, 2005; Leech, 1996; Lloyd, 2007, 2008). In terms of psychological conceptualization, type theory describes a limited but core range of individual differences. Although not as comprehensive a description of individual differences in human personality as offered by the Eysenck threedimensional model (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991) or the Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1985), the areas it does deal with have been shown to be correlated with trait-based personality measures (Bayne, 1994, 1997). In terms of empirical operationalization, type scales provide reliable measures in terms of the continuous scale scores underpinning the categorization procedures. Type sorters are less reliable at assigning individuals to dichotomous categories, but using scores and categories in research often yields similar results. Although a trait-based approach may be a better way of describing the underlying psychological processes (Bess & Harvey, 2002; Garden, 1991), the


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advantage of categories is that they conform to the way the model is most widely used, thereby allowing comparisons between studies based on different instruments. Some aspects of psychological type show strong correlations with religious affiliation or religious practice (Francis, 2005). Those people who attend church frequently, or who self-affiliate with a Christian denomination, tend to be more likely to favor introversion over extraversion compared with the population at large (Delis-Bulhoes, 1990; Francis, Duncan, Craig, & Luffman, 2004; Ross, 1993, 1995). This may reflect the fact that religious life often involves attention to an inner spiritual reality, and introverts are more comfortable functioning in their inner world. The other consistent difference is that Christian affiliates or attendees tend to have a more marked preference for judging over perceiving compared with populations at large (DelisBulhoes, 1990; Francis, et al., 2004; Ross, 1993, 1995). This may reflect the fact that the preferences associated with judging the outer world tend to align with the demands of a belonging to church that requires order, discipline, and routine. Other differences between religious people and populations at large may be marked but less consistent. For example, male congregation members of the Church of England have a higher preference for feeling over thinking than expected for the general population, but among women (who have a higher preference for feeling anyway) the difference is less obvious (Francis, et al., 2004; Kendall, 1998). The perceiving function shows the most variation among religious groups, and this may be because it is related to different types of Christian spiritual expression. For example, Francis and Ross (1997) found that a preference for sensing was associated with more traditional or orthodox beliefs, whereas a preference for intuition was associated with a more ethereal spirituality gained from less directly “religious” experiences such as watching a sunset or a starry night sky. Similarly, Village, Francis, and Craig (2009) found that Anglo-catholic congregations in the Church of England tended to show a greater preference for intuition than their evangelical counterparts, perhaps reflecting the different role of the imagination in these two traditions. Studies on Anglican clergy have shown that in some preferences, they tend to show even more marked deviations from population norms than do congregations. Comparing figures for the UK population (Kendall, 1998), Church of England congregations (Francis, et al.,

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Table 1. Psychological Type Preferences of the UK Population, Church of England Congregations, and Church of England Clergy

(a) Men I N F J (b) Women I N F J

Population %

Congregations %

Clergy %

53 27 35 55

66 32 48 70

64 67 56 73

43 21 70 62

56 26 73 67

54 65 74 65

Note: Figures for population norm from Kendall (1998), for congregations from Francis et al. (2004), and for clergy from Francis et al. (2007).

2004), and Church of England clergy (Francis, Robbins, Duncan, Whinney, & Ross, 2010; Francis, Robbins, & Whinney, in press) illustrates this point (Table 1). Clergy of both sexes are similar to congregations in being more introverted than the population at large and in having a stronger preference for judging. In these aspects, clergy are similar to congregations, but in the perceiving functions, they are very different. Although congregations show slightly greater preference for intuition compared with the population generally, they are still overwhelmingly people who prefer sensing. Clergy, however, show a strong preference for intuition over sensing, in marked contrast to their congregations. In the judging process, the difference between clergy and congregations varies between the sexes. Around 70% of women in the general population, in congregations, and among clergy show a preference for feeling over thinking, whereas in men, there is a progressive increase in preference for feeling from 35% in the population, to 48% in congregations, to 56% among clergy. These figures suggest that the church, in selecting a particular subset of people from congregations for ordained ministry, may have (perhaps unwittingly) been selecting people who display different psychological types from their congregations and different again from the population at large. This paper sought to examine whether this trend was likely to be continued, reversed, or exacerbated by the move to


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more reliance on ministry from priests who are not full-time and stipendiary. In particular, it built on previous research by demonstrating a clear link between psychological type preference and particular sorts of ministries among ordained clergy. Method Participants Questionnaires were posted to all 2190 Anglican clergy ordained between 2004 and 2007 in the United Kingdom, and 1061 (48%) were returned, mostly from the Church of England. Of these, 1047 gave answers to all the variables used in this study. The sample included 507 stipendiary ministers (SMs), of which 57% were men and 43% women. In 2007 in the Church of England, there were 1273 stipendiary assistant curates serving titles, of which 63% were men and 37% were women (The Archbishops’ Council, 2007). These two figures are not entirely comparable because the present sample included some curates from outside England, but they are sufficiently close to suggest the sample was reasonably representative in terms of sex ratio. The age distribution of stipendiary ministers in the sample could also be compared with age distribution for all stipendiary curates in 2007, and there was no statistically significant difference (χ2 = 12.2, df = 6, NS). This suggests that this portion of the study sample at least was likely to be representative of newly ordained clergy. The remaining study sample consisted of NSMs and OLMs. Exact sex and age comparisons were not possible for these groups because the Church of England published age data for these groups as a whole, combining newly ordained and long-standing ordained clergy. However, the age distributions in each case were similar but with slightly more older clergy in the published data, as might be expected if some had served for longer. This again supports the idea that the study sample was reasonably representative of all newly ordained clergy over this period. Dependent, Predictor, and Control Variables The dependent variable was type of ministry, specified as either stipendiary (SM), non-stipendiary (NSM), or ordained local ministry (OLM) and coded 1–3 respectively.

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The questionnaire included the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2004, 2005). These consist of 40 forced-choice items with 10 related to each of the four dimensions (E/I, S/N, F/T and J/P) of the psychological type model. Items were presented in pairs and respondents were asked to select the one in the pair that was closest to their preference. Selecting one of a pair scored one for the function or attitude it represented, while the unselected function or attitude scored zero. Reliability estimates for this instrument have been published for 248 Anglican clergy where alpha coefficients were .83 for the EI scale, .76 for the SN scale, .73 for the TF scale, and .79 for the JP scale (Francis, Craig, & Hall, 2008). In the current sample, alpha coefficients were .85 for the EI scale, .77 for the SN scale, .72 for the TF scale, and .81 for the JP scale, suggesting good internal reliability. Choices were summed to give a score for each preference, and type preferences were assigned according to which of the pair scored highest, with the few cases of ties assigned to I, N, F, or J. Using ties made no substantial difference to the overall ratios but increased the valid sample size by 16%. Categorized type preferences were used to compare findings of this study with previous studies, while scores for I, N, F, and J were used as predictor variables in a multiple regression to test the relationship of type preference to ministry type. Sex was included as a control variable because it was known to be related to both psychological type preferences in the judging process and to ministry type. Type preferences have been shown to be related to preferences for religious expression and church tradition. There may have been some relationship between these variables and ministry type because stipendiary ministry seemed to be more frequent among evangelicals than among those from other traditions. Type preferences therefore might have been related to ministry type in this dataset solely because type influenced religious expression, and different forms of religious expression were related to different forms of ministry for reasons unconnected with psychological type. To control for this, respondents were asked to self-identify their church tradition using a bipolar scale employed in a number of other studies of Anglicans (Francis, Robbins, & Astley, 2005; Randall, 2005; Village & Francis, 2009, 2010). This 7-point scale is anchored at one end as catholic and at the other as evangelical and seems to be the most efficient way of assessing tradition among Anglicans. The scale was used to categorize respondents as Anglo-catholic or evangelical, using the two outer responses at either end of the scale (1–2 = Anglo-catholic,


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6–7 = evangelical ). Those responding to the middle three categories were classed as broad and probably represented what are sometimes referred to as “middle of the road” Anglicans. Some of these may have veered towards more Anglo-catholic or evangelical practice or beliefs, but most probably embraced features of both traditions. Church tradition in Anglicans is related to a number of other factors. In particular, there is some correlation with liberal and conservative beliefs because some sections of Anglo-catholic tradition are associated with liberal theological beliefs, whereas most evangelicals tend to be theologically conservative (Village & Francis, 2009, 2010). Liberal–conservative theological belief was assessed on a similar bipolar scale to church tradition, and the results used to assign individuals as liberal (score 1–2), broad (score 3–5) or conservative (score 6–7). Charismatic practice was based on responses to five items related to the frequency of practices that included speaking in tongues, giving words of prophecy, and the laying on of hands (Village, 2005, 2007). Items were summed to give a score which was then categorized into three equal-width bands labeled low, medium and high. Analysis Differences in the distributions of preferences against control and predictor variables were tested using contingency analyses and the chi-squared statistic. Multinomial regression was used to test for the effects of psychological type preferences on ministry type independently of sex, theological orientation, church tradition, or charismatic practice. This type of regression model is used where the dependent variable (in this case type preference) is categorized into more than two groups. It uses the odds ratio to test the probability that particular independent variables change the distribution of categories from that seen in the overall data, after allowing for all other variables in the model. Controls in the regression analysis were sex (categorized as 0 = male and 1 = female) and uncategorized scores for church tradition, theological orientation, and charismatic practice. Predictor variables were the uncategorized scores for introversion, intuition, feeling and judging.

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andrew village Results Associations Among Predictor Variables

The sex ratio in the sample was close to unity, with 51% being men and 49% being women. SMs accounted for 48% of the present sample, NSMs 39%, and OLMs 13%. Equivalent figures for the Church of England 2006 ordinands were 47%, 42%, and 11% (The Archbishops’ Council, 2006), suggesting the overall sample was likely to be representative of the ministry types ordained by Anglican churches in the UK during the study period. The sex ratio of ministers in the study sample varied significantly with type of ministry, with women comprising 43% of SMs, 55% of NSMs, and 59% of OLMs (χ2 = 17.1, df = 2, p < .001). In terms of church tradition (as categorized from the bipolar scale), 27% were classed as Anglo-catholic, 44% as broad, and 29% as evangelical. In terms of theological orientation, 31% were liberal, 51% broad, and 18% conservative. In terms of the frequency of charismatic practice, 19% were classed as low, 42% as medium, and 38% as high. As might be expected, there were significant associations between these various categories, with around 60% of Anglo-catholics being classed as liberal compared with less than 10% of evangelicals (Table 2a, χ2 = 290.4, df = 4, p < .001). There was also an association between church tradition and the frequency of charismatic practice, with evangelicals being much more likely to engage in charismatic practices than were Anglo-catholics (Table 2b, χ2 = 160.4, df = 4, p < .001). Table 2. Associations Between Church Tradition and (a) Theological Orientation and (b) Charismatic Practice N=

Anglo-catholic 282

Broad 464

Evangelical 301

% 60 27 13

% 28 65 7

% 9 52 40

% 31 54 15

% 19 45 36

% 8 28 65

(a) Theological orientation Liberal Broad Conservative (b) Charismatic frequency Low Medium High


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Table 3. Differences in the Type of Ministry by Church Tradition, Theological Orientation, and Charismatic Practice N

SM %

NSM %

OLM %

(a) Church tradition Anglo-catholic Broad Evangelical

282 464 301

45 42 62

41 44 28

14 14 10

(b) Theological orientation Liberal Broad Conservative

327 531 189

45 47 59

44 39 30

11 14 12

(c) Charismatic practice Low Medium High

200 441 406

45 43 56

42 42 34

13 15 10

Note: SM = Stipendiary Ministers, NSM = Non-Stipendiary Ministers, OLM = Ordained Local Ministers.

The frequency of the three different sorts of ministries varied with church tradition, with stipendiary ministry being more frequent among evangelical (Table 3a, χ2 = 31.1, df = 4, p < .001), conservative (Table 3b, χ2 = 13.1, df = 4, p < .01) and charismatic (Table 3c, χ2 = 17.2, df = 4, p < .01) clergy than among others. This might have been because evangelical churches (in which clergy and people are more likely to be conservative and charismatic than in other traditions) tend to be large and found in urban or suburban areas, and these sorts of churches are more likely to have stipendiary curates than rural churches, which also happen to be more likely to be broad-church rather than evangelical or Anglo-catholic. This suggested that it was necessary to control for these factors because previous studies have shown links between psychological type preferences and these different facets of Anglicanism (Francis & Jones, 1997; Village, 2005, 2007; Village, et al., 2009). Psychological Type Preferences Distributions of preferences among the four dimensions of the type sorter are shown in Table 4 for men and women. Overall, clergy showed a preference for introversion (59%) over extraversion (41%),

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andrew village Table 4. Psychological Type Preferences for All Clergy and for Men and Women Compared Previous studyc Men Women 626 237 % %

N=

Botha 1047 %

This study Men 529 %

E I

41 59***

42 58

40 60

36 64

46 54

S N

50 50

52 48

48 52

33 67

44 56

F T

61 39***

54 46

68 32***

56 44

74 26

J P

79 21***

80 20

78 22

73 27

65 35

Womenb 518 %

Note: a Overall difference from unity tested with chi-squared with df = 1. b Differences between sexes tested with chi-squared with df = 2. c Figures for clergy taken from sources in Table 1. *** p < .001

feeling (60%) over thinking (40%), and judging (79%) over perceiving (21%), but they showed no overall preference between sensing (50%) and intuition (50%). These trends were true in both men and women, but clergywomen showed a significantly stronger preference for feeling over thinking compared with clergymen. In terms of the 16 types, the three most frequent overall were ISFJ, ISTJ, and INFJ, which together accounted for 40% of the clergy in the sample. Psychological Type and Ministry Two statistically significant effects of psychological type preferences on ministry type were apparent in both the overall data and in the regression model after allowing for variations between ministries in sex ratio and preferences in church tradition, theological orientation, or charismatic practice (Table 5). First, SMs showed a greater preference for intuition than for sensing when compared with other ministers. In the overall data, the proportion that preferred intuition to sensing was 57% for SMs, 45% for NSMs, and 39% for OLMs (χ2 = 19.0, df = 2, p < .001). The equivalent


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Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of Ministry Type Ministry Type (reference = Stipendiary) NSM OLM Exp(B) Exp(B) Sex (female = 1) Evangelical Conservative Charismatic Introversion Intuition Feeling Judging

.69* .92 .93 .95*

.54** .91 1.05 .93

1.00 .88*** 1.08* 1.03

1.00 .85*** 1.25*** 1.02

Note: Figures are the odds ratio, Exp(B), with stipendiary ministry as the reference category for the dependant variable. Values > 0 indicate independent variable was higher compared with stipendiary ministry, values < 0 indicate independent variable was lower compared with stipendiary ministry. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

figures for men were 56% SMs, 39% for NSMs, and 36% for OLMs (χ2 = 16.7, df = 2, p < .001), and for women they were 58% for SMs, 51% for NSMs, and 42% for OLMs (χ2 = 6.5, df = 2, p < .05). The multiple regression analysis showed that this was not simply an effect of different church traditions or theological stance in the different ministries and that the most striking pattern was the high number of intuitive SMs. Second, SMs showed a reduced preference for feeling than for thinking compared with other ministers. In the overall data, the proportion that preferred feeling to thinking was 56% for SMs, 62% for NSMs, and 76% for OLMs (χ2 = 17.6, df = 2, p < .001). The equivalent figures for men were 50% for SMs, 53% for NSMs, and 77% for OLMs (χ2 = 14.1, df = 2, p < .01), and for women they were 64% for SMs, 68% for NSMs, and 75% for OLMs (χ2 = 3.1, df = 2, NS). The multiple regression analysis showed that this was not simply due to variations in sex ratio between the different ministries and that the most striking pattern was the high number of preferred feelers among male OLMs.

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andrew village Discussion Type Preferences in Comparison with Previous Studies

This study of a large sample of Anglican clergymen and clergywomen allowed some comparison with previous studies that have examined psychological type preferences of Church of England clergy. Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) examined 626 clergymen and 237 clergymen (see Table 4) while follow-up studies among 622 clergymen (Francis, Robbins, Duncan, et al., 2010) and 83 clergywomen (Francis, Robbins, & Whinney, in press) confirmed the findings of the original study. Comparing these findings with those studies mostly, but not entirely, confirmed the patterns previously observed. First, the findings in this study were similar to the previous ones with regard to orientation to self and attitude to the outer world. In all these studies, both clergymen and clergywomen showed a preference for introversion over extraversion and for judging over perceiving. In this regard they appear to be typical of the congregations from which they are drawn in showing stronger preferences for introversion and for judging than the population as a whole. Anglican clergy seem to be typical of religious people who belong to Anglican churches: They respond to the call to foster the inner life of prayer and contemplation, and they fit well into a religious denomination that is ordered and structured. The figures in this study differed from previous studies in showing a slightly weaker preference for introversion in men and a slightly stronger preference in women and in both sexes a stronger preference for judging. This may reflect the difference between the instruments used to measure type preferences. Second, the findings of this study confirmed the patterns found in the judging functions, where both sexes showed a preference for feeling over thinking. For women this reflects the same sort of preference found among congregations and among women generally in the UK. Clergywomen seem to be typical of their sex in showing high levels of empathy and a strong dependence on personal values when making decisions. Clergymen, however, are unusual in showing a preference for feeling, even though the preference is slight and the balance between preferred thinkers and feelers fairly even. The preference for feeling seems to be more marked among clergymen than among men in congregations, where it is in turn more marked than in UK men generally. This might suggest that the process of joining the church


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and becoming more active in its ministry involves an increasing selection for those men who demonstrate a more typically feminine style in their judging process. This tendency is strong, but the number of preferred thinkers among clergymen is still relatively high compared to clergywomen because of the low preference for feeling compared to thinking among men generally. Third, the present study seemed to contradict the earlier findings, where clergy of both sexes showed a preference for intuition over sensing in their perceiving process, especially among men. In the present study there were no significant preferences for sensing or intuition in either sex. The even split nonetheless represented a much stronger preference for intuition compared with that found in congregations or in the UK population generally. In this regard, these findings supported the notion that ministry in the Anglican Church seems to attract an unusually high proportion of preferred intuitives. The church hierarchy and congregations may place high value on the ability of intuitives to see the wider issues of church life, rather than to get lost in details. They may also value the ability of intuitives to imagine a different future and act as the prophets and seers for the church. Letting vicars preach their visions might be better use of their time than asking them to organize the church fete. Type Preferences and Type of Ministry A key finding of this study was that Anglican clergy in different sorts of ministry have different psychological profiles and preferences. The two key differences were associated with the perceiving and with the judging processes. In the perceiving process, stipendiary clergy showed a stronger preference for intuition over sensing than their non-stipendiary or locally ordained colleagues. This trend was present in both sexes, but it was particularly strong in men. This result might explain the disparity between this study and earlier studies, which were probably based mainly on stipendiary clergy, and where a preference for intuition was more marked (Francis, et al., 2007; Francis, Robbins, Duncan, et al., 2010). When only stipendiary ministers were included from the present sample, the results looked much more comparable with earlier studies. This implies that the kind of visionary, prophetic role that might be associated with intuitives is more characteristic of stipendiary clergy than others. NSMs and OLMs are more like the congregations from which they emerge in showing a greater propensity for sensing.

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This might be because these different ministries appeal to different sorts of people, or it might be related to the way they are selected and trained by the church. Uprooting self and family to train full time for full-time ministry requires a willingness to break out of familiar patterns and launch into an uncertain future. Intuitives are likely to find this easier than sensors, which might explain why they appear to be so frequent among stipendiary clergy. It may also be that the leadership demands of incumbents appeal more readily to intuitives, whereas the practical ministry of NSMs and OLMs that requires them to “roll up their sleeves and get stuck in” is preferred by sensors. The second key difference between ministry types was associated with the judging process, where OLMs showed a much stronger preference for feeling over thinking than their stipendiary or NSM colleagues. This was true in both sexes, but statistically significant only in men, possibility because women had such a generally high preference for feeling anyway. Although there were only 56 male OLMs in the sample, 77% preferred feeling over thinking, a remarkably high proportion compared with the 35% measured in the UK population as a whole (Kendall, 1998). The trend is in line with a ministry that is particularly focused on pastoral care rather than theological teaching or executive leadership. The evidence is that this ministry is attracting distinctive types of people who may find it easier to relate to parishioners than their stipendiary or even non-stipendiary colleagues. The association between psychological type preferences and ministry roles reported here is probably due to a combination of candidate choice and church selection. Association of psychological profile and ministry might also occur if those whose profiles do not match their ministry tend to drop out at a higher rate than those whose profiles make them more suited to their ministry roles. The growing literature on clergy stress indicates that mismatch between psychological type preferences and clergy roles might increase work-related stress (Francis, Robbins, Kaldor, & Castle, 2009). If stressed clergy are more likely to leave ministry, then this might in the long term produce an association between psychological profile and ministry roles. Any such association in this study of recently ordained clergy is unlikely to be caused by this effect because there would have been relatively little time for stress to develop to the point of causing dropout. Consequently, any associations discovered are likely to be the result of candidate preference or selection. However, the results do imply that the different kinds of roles in Anglican ordained ministry are associated with


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different sorts of psychological profile, and putting ministers in roles for which they are psychologically unsuited may be detrimental to their well-being. If this is so, then a study of the psychological profiles of clergy who leave ministry might show they are different to the profiles of those who remain in ministry for longer. Conclusions This study has confirmed earlier findings that Anglican clergy generally tend to display introverted, intuitive, feeling, and judging psychological types. The key conclusions, however, relate to the way these preferences are distributed between different sorts of ministers. The idea that Anglican ministry is an intuitive ministry needs some qualification: This is certainly true for stipendiary ministry but not necessarily so for other types of ministry. Furthermore, the trend for male clergy to include a high proportion of feeling types is particularly true among those ordained to local ministry. If these findings are confirmed, then some important conclusions follow if the proportion of stipendiary, non-stipendiary, and local ordained ministry continues to change in the Anglican Church. First, the overall psychological makeup of the clergy will change. This will happen anyway with the growth in the number of women because they will increase the proportion of feeling types among the clergy. However, this move will be further heightened if NSMs and OLMs make up a larger proportion of clergy. Although such a change is not wrong in itself, it needs to be recognized, and the consequences understood. In a church that is already perceived by many as rather “feminine,” with two-thirds of the members being women, increasing numbers of women clergy, and many clergymen with a feminine psychological profile, some men may find it increasingly hard to relate to the way that faith is expressed and decisions made in Anglican churches. Greater efforts may be needed from clergy to prevent the marginalization of men from within and beyond congregations. Second, the roles of different sorts of ministry may diverge if people are recruited to them with particular psychological profiles. This may be a sensible way of using the gifts and abilities of different sorts of people. Stipendiary clergy seem to have the sort of profile that might enable them to offer the visionary leadership so urgently required of incumbents in times of rapid change. NSMs and OLMs seem to

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have the sorts of profiles that might enable them to work alongside lay people in getting tasks done and offering sensitive pastoral ministry. This is not simply a case of whether a minister is full-time or part-time, male or female: Different sorts of men and different sorts of women seem to be filling these roles and psychologically they seem to be suited to them. Third, it may be wrong for the church to imagine that the main barriers to a merging of these three sorts of ministry are practical or theological. Not so many years ago there was a sharp divide between stipendiary and non-stipendiary ministry, which were treated practically and theologically as two different sorts of vocation. The trend today is to make the transition between stipendiary and non-stipendiary ministry a matter of deployment rather than vocation. In a parallel way, the rise of the OLM movement has been accompanied by a great deal of theological work that sought to justify this kind of ministry and make it distinctive from other ministry, be it stipendiary or nonstipendiary (Etherington, 2001; Heskins & Torry, 2006; Jordan, 2008). Recent moves on pragmatic grounds to merge OLMs and NSMs have met with dismay in some quarters where such theological work seems to be being undermined. Studies such as this would seem to suggest that, either by design or self-selection, clergy in different ministries in the Anglican Church in the UK have different psychological make-ups associated with different gifts. A wise church would ensure that clergy are in roles that allow them to use these gifts and that the gifts available span the needs of the whole church. References The Archbishops’ Council. (2005). Church statistics 2003/4. Retrieved from http:// www.cofe.anglican.org/info/statistics/churchstats2003/statisticsfront.html The Archbishops’ Council. (2006). Church statistics 2005/6. Retrieved from http:// www.cofe.anglican.org/info/statistics/churchstats2005/statisticscontent.html The Archbishops’ Council. (2007). Church statistics 2006/7. Retrieved from http:// www.cofe.anglican.org/info/statistics/churchstats2006/statisticscontent.html Ashmore, R. D., & Sewell, A. D. (2004). Sex/gender and the individual. In D. F. Barone, M. Hersen & V. B. V. Hasselt (Eds.), Advanced Personality (pp. 377–408). London, England: Springer London. Bayne, R. (1994). The Myers-Briggs versus the “Big Five.” The Psychologist, 7(1), 14–16. http://www.thepsychologist.org.uk/ Bayne, R. (1997). The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: A critical review and practical guide. Cheltenham, UK: Stanley Thornes. Bess, T. L., & Harvey, R. J. (2002). Bimodal score distributions and the Myers-Briggs type indicator: Fact or artefact? Journal of Personality Assessment, 78(1), 176–186. doi: 10.1207/S15327752JPA7801_11


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Brierley, P. (1999). Religious trends 2. London, England: Christian Research. Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1985) The NEO personality inventory Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Delis-Bulhoes, V. (1990). Jungian psychological type and Christian belief in active church members. Journal of Psychological Type, 20, 25–33. http://www.capt.org/ research/psychological-type-journal.htm Etherington, F. (2001). Local ministry and ordained local ministry. In G. W. Kuhrt (Ed.), Ministry issues for the Church of England: Mapping the trends (pp. 224–228). London, England: Church House Publishing. Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1991). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Scales (EPS adult). London, England: Hodder and Stoughton. Feingold, A. (1994). Gender differences in personality: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 116(3), 429–456. doi: 10.1037/0033–2909.116.3.429 Francis, L. J. (1991). The personality characteristics of Anglican ordinands: Feminine men and masculine women? Personality and Individual Differences, 12(11), 1133– 1140. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(91)90076–N Francis, L. J. (1992). Male and female clergy in England: Their personality differences, gender reversal? Journal of Empirical Theology, 5(2), 31–38. http://www.brill.nl/jet Francis, L. J. (2001). Personality type and communicating the Gospel. Modern Believing, 42(1), 32–46. http://www.modernchurch.org.uk/publications/mb/index.htm Francis, L. J. (2004). Francis Psychological Type Scales (FPTS): Technical manual Bangor, UK: Welsh National Centre for Religious Education. Francis, L. J. (2005). Faith and psychology: Personality, religion and the individual. London, England: Darton, Longman & Todd. Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Hall, G. (2008). Psychological type and attitude towards Celtic Christianity among committed churchgoers in the United Kingdom: An empirical study. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 23(2), 181–191. doi: 10.1080/13537900802024543 Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Whinney, M., Tilley, D., & Slater, P. (2007). Psychological profiling of Anglican clergy in England: Employing Jungian typology to interpret diversity, strengths, and potential weaknesses in ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology, 11(2), 266–284. doi: 10.1515/IJPT.2007.17 Francis, L. J., Duncan, B., Craig, C. L., & Luffman, G. (2004). Type patterns among Anglican congregations in England. Journal of Adult Theological Education, 1(1), 66–77. doi: 10.1558/jate.1.1.65.36058 Francis, L. J., & Jones, S. H. (1997). Personality and charismatic experience among adult Christians. Pastoral Psychology, 45(6), 421–428. doi: 10.1007/BF02310642 Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., & Astley, J. (2005). Fragmented faith? Exposing the faultlines in the Church of England. Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster Press. Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., Duncan, B., Whinney, M., & Ross, C. (2010). Confirming the psychological type profile of Anglican clergymen in England: A ministry for intuitives. In B. Ruelas & V. Briseño (Eds.), Psychology of intuition (pp. 211–219). New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers. Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., Kaldor, P., & Castle, K. (2009). Psychological type and work-related psychological health among clergy in Australia, England and New Zealand. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 28(3), 200–212. Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., & Whinney, M. (in press). Women priests in the Church of England: Psychological type profile. Francis, L. J., & Ross, F. J. (1997). The perceiving function and Christian spirituality: Distinguishing between sensing and intuition. Pastoral Sciences, 16(1), 93–103. Garden, A. (1991). Unresolved issues with the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Journal of Psychological Type, 22, 3–14. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-typejournal.htm Heskins, J., & Torry, M. (Eds.). (2006). Ordained Local Ministry: A theological exploration and practical handbook. Norwich, UK: Canterbury Press.

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Hodge, M., & Mantle, J. (2001). Non-stipendiary ministry. In G. W. Kuhrt (Ed.), Ministry issues for the Church of England: Mapping the trends (pp. 219–223). London, England: Church House Publishing. Jordan, E. A. (2008). The place of Ordained Local Ministry in the Church of England. Practical Theology, 1(2), 219–232. Jung, C. G. (1921). Psychologische typen. Zurich, Switzerland: Rascher Verlag. Kendall, E. (1998). Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: Step 1 manual supplement. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Leech, K. (1996). Myers-Briggs: Some critical reflections. Croydon, UK: The Jubilee Group. Lloyd, J. B. (2007). Opposition from Christians to Myers-Briggs personality typing: An analysis and evaluation. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 28(2), 111–123. doi: 10.1080/13617670701485672 Lloyd, J. B. (2008). Myers-Briggs theory: How true? How necessary? Journal of Psychological Type, 68(6), 43–50. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-typejournal.htm Lynn, R., & Martin, T. (1997). Gender differences in extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism in 37 nations. The Journal of Social Psychology, 137(3), 369–373. doi: 10.1080/00224549709595447 Myers, I. B. (2006). MBTI manual: A guide to the development and use of the MyersBriggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Myers, I. B., & Myers, P. B. (1980). Gifts differing. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Randall, K. (2005). Evangelicals etcetera: Conflict and conviction in the Church of England’s parties. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Robbins, M., Francis, L. J., & Rutledge, C. (1997). The personality characteristics of Anglican stipendiary parochial clergy in England: Gender differences revisited. Personality and Individual Differences, 23(2), 199–204. doi:10.1016/S01918869(97)00042–1 Ross, C. F. J. (1993). Type patterns among active members of the Anglican church: Comparisons with Catholics, Evangelicals and clergy. Journal of Psychological Type, 26(1), 28–35. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Ross, C. F. J. (1995). Type patterns among Catholics: Four Anglophone congregations compared with Protestants, Francophone Catholics, and priests. Journal of Psychological Type, 33(1), 33–41. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-typejournal.htm Village, A. (2005). Christian belief about the bible and the Holy Spirit in relation to psychological type. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 16(1), 1–16. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Village, A. (2007). The Bible and lay people: An empirical approach to ordinary hermeneutics. Aldershot & Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Village, A., & Francis, L. J. (2009). The mind of the Anglican clergy: Assessing attitudes and beliefs in the Church of England. Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press. Village, A., & Francis, L. J. (2010). An anatomy of change: Profiling cohort-difference in beliefs and attitudes among Anglicans in England. Journal of Anglican Studies, 8(1), 59–81. doi: 10.1017/S1740355309990027 Village, A., Francis, L. J., & Craig, C. L. (2009). Church tradition and psychological type preferences among Anglicans in England. Journal of Anglican Studies, 7(1), 93–109. doi: 10.1017/S1740355309000187

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE PREFERENCES OF MALE AND FEMALE FREE CHURCH MINISTERS IN ENGLAND Leslie J. Francis,* Michael Whinney, Lewis Burton, and Mandy Robbins Abstract A sample of 148 male and 41 female Free Church ministers in England (Methodist and Baptist) completed the MBTI Step One. Among both sexes, the data demonstrated preferences for intuition (60% among the men and 68% among the women) and for judging (74% among the men and 73% among the women). In terms of the orientations, preference for introversion was expressed by 51% of the men and 59% of the women. In terms of the judging process, preference for feeling was expressed by 45% of the men and 66% of the women. These data confirmed the findings of earlier research among male and female Anglican ministers in England that there is less variation between the psychological type profiles of male and female clergy than between the psychological type profiles of men and women in the general population. Keywords: psychology, religion, clergy, Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, Baptist, Methodist

Psychological type theory, as introduced by Jung (1971) and developed through instruments like the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005), distinguishes between the two opposite poles of four psychological processes: two orientations distinguishing between introversion and extraversion; two perceiving processes distinguishing between sensing and intuition; two judging processes distinguishing between thinking and feeling; and two attitudes toward the outside world distinguishing between judging and perceiving.

* Author Note: Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Michael Whinney, St. Mary’s Centre, Wales; Lewis Burton, St. Mary’s Centre, Wales; Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leslie J. Francis, Warwick Religions & Education Research Unit, Institute of Education, The University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0)24 7652 2539, Fax: +44 (0)24 7657 2638. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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According to psychological type theory, orientation refers to the area from which psychological energy is drawn. Extraverts (E) draw their energy from the outside world of people and things, and they focus their attention on that outer world. Introverts (I) draw their energy from the inner world of ideas and reflections, and they focus their attention on that inner world. The perceiving process refers to the way in which people receive and process information. Sensing types (S) focus on perceptions received through the senses, and they are concerned with the actual, the real, and the practical. Intuitive types (N) focus on perceptions received through intuition, and they are concerned with possibilities, meanings, and relationships. The judging process refers to the way in which people make decisions and judgments. Thinking types (T) make judgments based on objective, impersonal logic, and they tend to value integrity and justice. Feeling types (F) make judgments based on subjective personal values, and they tend to value compassion and mercy. Attitude toward the outside world is determined by which process (judging T/F or perceiving S/N) is preferred for dealing with the outside world. Judging types (J) seek to order, organize, and structure their outside world, as they actively judge external stimuli. Perceiving types (P) are flexible, adaptable, and open, as they more passively perceive external stimuli. Jung’s theory of psychological type has generated important insights and theories relevant both to pastoral psychology and to the empirical psychology of religion. In terms of pastoral psychology, psychological type theory has been applied to discussions concerning prayer (Michael & Norrisey, 1984; Keating, 1987; Duncan, 1993), ministry and leadership (Oswald & Kroeger, 1988), Christian growth (Goldsmith & Wharton, 1993), communicating the gospel (Butler, 1999), preaching (Francis & Atkins, 2000, 2001, 2002; Francis & Village, 2008), congregations (Edwards, 1993; Baab, 1998), and faith (Francis, 2005). In terms of the empirical psychology of religion, psychological type theory has been employed to examine the psychological profiles associated with distinctive expressions of the Christian faith, including charismatic experience (Francis & Jones, 1997; Jones, Francis, & Craig, 2005), styles of believing (Francis & Jones, 1998), religious attitudes (Jones & Francis, 1999; Fearn, Francis, & Wilcox, 2001; Francis et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2004), tolerance for religious uncertainty (Francis & Jones, 1999), mystical orientation (Francis & Louden, 2000; Francis, 2002; Francis, Village, Robbins, & Ineson, 2007), religious orientations (Francis & Ross, 2000), dogmatism (Ross, Francis, & Craig, 2005),

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biblical interpretation (Village & Francis, 2005), belief about the Bible and the Holy Spirit (Village, 2005), prayer preferences (Francis & Robbins, 2008), cathedral visiting (Francis, Williams, Annis, & Robbins, 2008), and Celtic Christianity (Francis, Craig, & Hall, 2008). A particularly fruitful application of psychological type theory within the context of the empirical psychology of religion in the United Kingdom has focused on the exploration of the profile of those engaged in various forms of leadership within Christian ministry. These studies have focused on Presbyterian Church of Scotland ministers (Irvine, 1989), male and female Bible College students (Francis, Penson, & Jones, 2001), Church in Wales clergymen (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001; Francis & Payne, 2002), evangelical church leaders (Francis & Robbins, 2002; Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), male missionary personnel (Craig, Horsfall, & Francis, 2005), evangelical lay church leaders (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, & Ross, 2005), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), youth ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007), Church of England clergymen and clergywomen (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007), evangelical Anglican seminarians (Francis, Craig, & Butler, 2007) and Assemblies of God theological college students (Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008; Kay & Francis, 2008). One main conclusion to emerge from these studies concerns the way in which the psychological type profile of religious professionals differs from the psychological type profile of the population as a whole. According to the United Kingdom population norms published by Kendall (1998), there are significant differences in the psychological type profile of men and women. The most obvious difference is visible in the judging function, where just 35% of men express a preference for feeling, compared with 70% of women, and where just 30% of women express a preference for thinking, compared with 65% of men. The second clear-cut difference is visible in the orientations where 47% of men express a preference for extraversion, compared with 57% of women, and where 53% of men express a preference for introversion, compared with 43% of women. Although less pronounced, there are also differences between the two sexes in terms of the perceiving process and in terms of the attitudes toward the outside world. While just 27% of men prefer intuition, the proportion is lower, at 21% among women. While 45% of men prefer perceiving, the proportion is lower, at 38% among women.

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According to a recent study conducted among 626 clergymen and 237 clergywomen serving in the Church of England, the clear differences between the psychological type profiles of men and women in the general population are not so clearly replicated among Anglican clergy. While in the general population the preference for feeling stands at 35% among men and 70% among women, among Church of England clergy, the gap is narrowed to 54% among clergymen and 74% among clergywomen. In this sense, clergymen are much more likely to prefer the “feminine” judging function of feeling than men at large. While in the general population the preference for introversion stands at 53% among men and 43% among women, among Church of England clergy, the gap is narrowed to 57% among clergymen and 54% among clergywomen. In this sense, clergywomen are more likely to prefer the “masculine” orientation of introversion than women at large. While in the general population the preference for judging stands at 55% among men and 62% among women, among Church of England clergy, the gap is narrowed to 68% among clergymen and 65% among clergywomen. In this sense, clergymen are more likely to prefer the “feminine” attitude toward the outer world of judging than men at large. The most startling difference between the psychological type profile of Church of England clergy and the general population occurs in respect of the perceiving process. While 27% of men at large prefer intuition, the proportion rises to 62% among Church of England clergymen. While 21% of women at large prefer intuition, the proportion rises to 65% among Church of England Clergywomen. Once again, however, the difference between clergymen and clergywomen is small (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007). During the 1990s when the Church of England was debating the case for and against the ordination of women to the priesthood, one of the issues considered concerned ways in which women might bring different personal qualities to ministry (Francis & Robbins, 1999). In the first study to explore this issue scientifically from the perspective of psychological type theory, the data provided by Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) suggested that, at least as far as the first generation of Church of England clergywomen are concerned, the ordination of women to the priesthood has done little to challenge or to change the psychological type profile of the Anglican clergy.


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Against this background, the aim of the present study was to explore whether the similarity in type profiles of Church of England clergymen and clergywomen was replicated among male and female ministers serving in the Free Churches in England where there has been a somewhat longer established acceptance of women in ministry. Specifically, the study would focus on men and women engaged in the Methodist Church and in the Baptist Church in England. The histories of the recognized ministry of women within the Methodist Church and the Baptist Church in England have followed somewhat different paths, partly as a consequence of the different polities of the two denominations. Methodism has a central national authority, in the form of the Methodist Conference, which determines the practices and the discipline that is binding on each local Methodist congregation. Each local Baptist church, however, is autonomous, and the authority lies with the members’ meeting. Local congregations may or may not choose to affiliate with the Baptist Union of Great Britain. Agreements and policies promulgated by the Union are advisory only, leaving local churches free to respond to their understanding of how God is calling them. According to Woodman (2010), a Deaconess movement was established in the Baptist Church in 1890, exercising the roles of pastoral work in visiting and social outreach. Women seem to have been serving as recognized ministers in Baptist churches since the 1920s. When a Special Committee to consider the Admission of Women to the Baptist Ministry was appointed by the Baptist Union Council meeting of 1924, it was reported to that committee that three women had been received as accredited ministers. This committee attempted to regularize the position of women ministers and formulated the decision that “The committee is clear that it would be contrary to Baptist belief and practice to make sex a bar to any kind of Christian service” (Woodman, 2010, p. 4). Although it was clear that authority to call a woman to ministry rested with the local church, discussion remained open as to whether women should be placed on the national accredited list of ministers. Although the deaconesses called by a local church were fulfilling the role of minister, the situation did not find full recognition until 1957, when the Baptist Union Council gave deaconesses accreditation as pastors. Even then they were placed on a separate list and only fully absorbed into the regular list of ministers in 1975. In spite of this potential for recognition since the 1920s, by 2008 just 12% of

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serving Baptist ministers were women (Woodman, 2010, p. 2). In the same year, 25% of ministerial students were women. Within some streams of Methodism, women exercised the ministry of preaching from the early days of the movement, although mainly in the Methodist Churches other than the main Wesleyan body (Vickers, 2000). The Wesley Deaconess Order was established in 1890 as a separate organization to enable the Church to engage in service to the poor and needy in its general ministry (Aitchinson, 2003). Although from 1937 there was a form of ordination for deaconesses, they were classed as layworkers until 1988 (Vickers, 2000). The Wesleyan Church, under the pressure of the shortage of male local preachers, opened its pulpits to women with equal standing to men in 1918 (Milburn & Batty, 1995). Discussions about the admission of women to ordained ministry had taken place before the outbreak of war in 1939. The war deferred further action. The Methodist Conference of 1945 decided to refer the issue to the District Synods, but although further discussion took place, no decision was made. There was also delay created by the unwillingness of the Conference to make a decision in the matter due to hesitation over what would be the result of the Anglican-Methodist unity proposals in the late 1960s. When these failed, the Conference of 1972 decided to admit women to the ministry of word and sacraments in the Church. The first women ministers were ordained in 1974 and came to work as equals with men in the circuits (Vickers, 2000,). There was something of a floodtide of women entering the ministry in the years after 1972, including many Deaconesses who felt called to presbyterial ministry. Since 1972, the proportion of women within the ordained ministry of the presbyterate has grown steadily. In 2009, women accounted for 52% of those ordained for ministry. In the same year, women accounted for 75% of those who candidated for ministry (Minutes of Conference, 2009). Method Procedure Methodist and Baptist ministers serving in the West Midlands were invited to complete the MBTI Step One (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998). This is a self-completion questionnaire employing forced-choice responses to distinguish between preferences for intro-


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version and extraversion, sensing and intuition, thinking and feeling, and judging and perceiving. From a total of 197 Methodist ministers, the invitation was accepted by 78 men and 31 women, making a response rate of (55%). From a total of 202 Baptist ministers, the invitation was accepted by 70 men and 10 women, making a response rate of (40%). Data analysis The scientific literature concerned with psychological type has developed a highly distinctive way of presenting type-related data. The conventional format of the type table has been employed in the present paper to allow the findings of this study to be located easily alongside other related studies in the literature. The main method of significance testing employed in type tables is the selection ratio index (I) as an extension of the basic chi square statistic. Results Table 1 presents the type distribution for the 148 male Free Church ministers serving in England. These data demonstrated preferences for intuition (60%) over sensing (40%), for thinking (55%) over feeling (45%), and for judging (74%) over perceiving (26%). There were almost equal preferences for introversion (51%) and for extraversion (49%). The most frequently represented type was ISTJ (14%), followed by INTJ (12%), ENFJ (11%), and ENFP (10%). Table 2 presents the type distribution for 41 female Free Church ministers serving in England. These data demonstrated preferences for introversion (59%) over extraversion (42%), for intuition (68%) over sensing (32%), for feeling (66%) over thinking (34%), and for judging (73%) over perceiving (27%). The most frequently represented types were INFJ (17%), followed by ENFJ (15%), ENFP (12%), INTJ (12%), and ISFJ (12%). Table 2 also presents the selection ratio significance test for the differences between the psychological type profiles of male and female Free Church ministers. These data demonstrated that there were no significant differences between the preferences of male and female ministers in terms of the orientations (introversion and extraversion), the perceiving process (sensing and intuition), and the attitude

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Table 1. Type Distribution of Male Free Church Ministers in England N = 148 The Sixteen Complete Types ISTJ n = 20 (13.5%) +++++ +++++ ++++

ISTP n=2 (1.4%) +

ESTP n=2 (1.4%) +

ESTJ n = 14 (9.5%) +++++ +++++

ISFJ n = 13 (8.8%) +++++ ++++

ISFP n=2 (1.4%) +

ESFP n=0 (0%)

ESFJ n=7 (4.7%) +++++


INFJ n=8 (5.4%) +++++

INFP n=5 (3.4%) +++

ENFP n = 15 (10.1%) +++++ +++++

ENFJ n = 16 (10.8%) +++++ +++++ +

Dichotomous Preferences INTJ n = 18 (12.2%) +++++ +++++ ++

INTP n=7 (4.7%) +++++

n = 73 n = 75

(49.3% (50.7%)

S N

n = 60 n = 88

(40.5%) (59.5%)

T F

n = 82 n = 66

(55.4%) (44.6%)

J P

n = 110 n = 38

(74.3%) (25.7%)


ENTP n=5 (3.4%) +++

ENTJ n = 14 (9.5%) +++++ +++++

Jungian Types (I) n % I-TP 9 6.1 I-FP 7 4.7 S-J 33 22.7 IN-J 26 17.6

E I

IJ IP EP EJ

n = 59 n = 16 n = 22 n = 51

(39.9%) (10.8%) (14.9%) (34.5%)

ST SF NF NT

n = 38 n = 22 n = 44 n = 44

(25.7%) (14.9%) (29.7%) (29.7%)

SJ SP NP NJ

n = 54 n=6 n = 32 n = 56

(36.5%) (4.1%) (21.6%) (37.8%)

TJ TP FP FJ

n = 66 n = 16 n = 22 n = 44

(44.6%) (10.8%) (14.9%) (29.7%)

IN EN IS ES

n = 38 n = 50 n = 37 n = 23

(25.7%) (33.8%) (25.0%) (15.5%)

ET EF IF IT

n = 35 n = 38 n = 28 n = 47

(23.6%) (25.7%) (18.9%) (31.8%)

Dominant Types index n % Dt. T 37 25.0 Dt. F 30 20.3 Dt. S 35 23.6 Dt. N 46 31.1

Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001


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Table 2. Type Distribution of Female Free Church Ministers in England Compared with Male Ministers N = 41 The Sixteen Complete Types ISTJ n=3 (7.3 %) I = 0.54 +++++ ++

ISTP n = 10 (0.0 %) I = 0.00

ESTP n=1 (2.4 %) I = 1.80 ++

ESTJ n=3 (7.3 %) I = 0.77 +++++ ++

ISFJ n=5 (12.2 %) I = 1.39 +++++ +++++ ++

ISFP n=0 (0.0 %) I = 0.00

ESFP n=0 (0.0 %) I = 0.00

ESFJ n=1 (2.4 %) I = 0.52 ++

Jungian Types (E) n % I E-TJ 3 7.3 0.39 E-FJ 7 17.1 1.10 ES-P 1 2.4 1.80 EN-P 6 14.6 1.08

INFJ n=7 (17.1 %) I = 3.16* +++++ +++++ +++++ ++

INFP n=3 (7.3 %) I = 2.17 +++++ ++

ENFP n=5 (12.2 %) I = 1.20 +++++ +++++ ++

ENFJ n=6 (14.6 %) I = 1.35 +++++ +++++ +++++

Dichotomous Preferences INTJ n=5 (12.2 %) I = 1.00 +++++ +++++ ++

INTP n=1 (2.4 %) I = 0.52 ++

ENTP n=1 (2.4 %) I = 0.72 ++

ENTJ n=0 (0.0 %) I = 0.00*

Jungian Types (I) n % I I-TP 1 2.4 0.40 I-FP 3 7.3 1.55 IS-J 8 19.5 0.88 IN-J 12 29.3 1.67

E I

n = 17 n = 24

(41.5 %) (58.5 %)

I = 0.84 I = 1.16

S N

n = 13 n = 28

(31.7 %) (68.3 %)

I = 0.78 I = 1.15

T F

n = 14 n = 27

(34.1 %) *I = 0.62 (65.9 %) *I = 1.48

J P

n = 30 n = 11

(73.2 %) (26.8 %)

I = 0.98 I = 1.04


n = 20 n=4 n=7 n = 10

(48.8 %) (9.8 %) (17.1 %) (24.4 %)

ST SF NF NT

n=7 n=6 n = 21 n=7

(17.1 %) I = 0.66 (14.6 %) I = 0.98 (51.2 %) **I = 1.72 (17.1 %) I = 0.57

SJ SP NP NJ

n = 12 n=1 n = 10 n = 18

(29.3 %) (2.4 %) (24.4 %) (43.9 %)

TJ TP FP FJ

n = 11 n=3 n=8 n = 19

(26.8 %) *I = 0.60 (7.3 %) I = 0.68 (19.5 %) I = 1.31 (46.3 %) *I = 1.56

IN EN IS ES

n = 16 n = 12 n=8 n=5

(39.0 %) (29.3 %) (19.5 %) (12.2 %)

ET EF IF IT

n=5 n = 12 n = 15 n=9

(12.2 %) I = 0.52 (29.3 %) I = 1.14 (36.6 %) *I = 1.93 (22.0 %) I = 0.69

Dominant Types n % I Dt. T 4 9.8 0.39 Dt. F 10 24.4 1.20 Dt. S 9 22.0 0.93 Dt. N 18 43.9 1.41

Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

I = 1.22 I = 0.90 I = 1.15 I = 0.71

I = 0.80 I = 0.60 I = 1.13 I = 1.16

I = 1.52 I = 0.87 I = 0.78 I = 0.78

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toward the outer world (judging and perceiving). There was, however, a significant difference between male and female ministers in terms of preference for the judging functions. While 45% of male ministers preferred feeling, the proportion rose to 66% among female ministers. While 55% of male ministers preferred thinking, the proportion fell to 34% among female ministers. In terms of temperaments, this difference was reflected in a much higher population of NFs among the female minsters (51%) than among the male ministers (30%). Conclusion This study set out to test whether the psychological type profiles of male and female Free Church ministers in England reflected the sex differences reported in the UK population by Kendall (1998) or whether they reflected the findings of Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) among Anglican clergymen and clergywomen in England, where the sex differences were much less pronounced than among the general population. The data were much closer to the profile of Anglican clergy than to the profile of the population as a whole. According to the present data, no significant sex differences emerged among Free Church ministers in terms of preferences for introversion or extraversion, in terms of preferences for sensing or intuition, or in terms of preferences for judging or perceiving. While significant sex differences emerged in terms of preferences for thinking or feeling, these differences were considerably less pronounced than among men and women in the population as a whole. In the population as a whole, preference for feeling was expressed, according to Kendall (1998), by 35% of men and by 70% of women. Among Free Church ministers, preference for feeling was expressed by 45% of men and by 66% of women. Taken together, the findings of the present study and the findings presented by Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, and Slater (2007) suggest that the ministry of women may not have enriched greatly the range of psychological types engaged in Christian ministry within the Anglican Church and within the Free Churches in England. Rather, Christian ministry, at least within these denominations, seems to appeal to similar personality types within both sexes.


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IMAGINING THEMSELVES AS MINISTERS: HOW RELIGIOUSLY COMMITTED BAPTIST YOUTH RESPOND TO THE REVISED PAYNE INDEX OF MINISTRY STYLES (PIMS2) Bruce G. Fawcett,* Leslie J. Francis, and Mandy Robbins Abstract A sample of 545 religiously committed Baptist youth (who were participating in a week-long mission and service program) were invited to imagine themselves serving as ordained ministers and to rate their approach to ministry on the revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles (an instrument based on Jungian psychological type theory). The data demonstrated two main findings. First, while the young people’s own psychological type colored their perception of ministry, this influence was not strong. Second, ministry was conceived more strongly in extraverted terms than in introverted terms. On the basis of these findings, the recommendation is made that religious vocations among young people should be fostered by encouraging them to recognize that there is room within ministry for different personality types to bring different gifts and to exercise different ministry styles. Keywords: psychological type, clergy, ministry roles, Baptist, Canada

A number of Christian denominations within the developed world are experiencing difficulties in recruiting young candidates into ordained ministry (see Astley & Francis, 2009). Even those denominations such as the Convention of Atlantic Baptist Churches in Canada that maintain thriving youth ministries, capable of recruiting significant numbers of young people to participate in mission and service programs, struggle to convert such participation into sufficient numbers of young adults preparing for ordained ministry (Fawcett, McDonald, & Nylen, 2005). Against this background, the aim of the present study was to assess how religiously committed Baptist youth imagine the role of the

* Author Note: Bruce G. Fawcett, Acadia Divinity College, Acadia University; Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bruce G. Fawcett, Acadia Divinity College, Acadia University, 31 Horton Avenue, Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada B4P 2R6. Telephone (902) 585-2210, Fax (902) 585-2233. E-mail: bruce. [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

imagining themselves as ministers

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minister and to place their assessment within the theoretical framework of ministry styles proposed by Francis and Payne (2002) and operationalized by the Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS). Within the sociological literature, there is a long-established research tradition concerned with the variety of roles that clergy fulfill. This tradition is generally traced back to the pioneering work of Blizzard (1955, 1956, 1958a, 1958b) who distinguished between six clergy roles: teacher, organizer, preacher, administrator, pastor, and priest. Blizzard’s analysis was adopted, among others, by Coates and Kistler (1965), Jud, Mills, and Burch (1970), Towler and Coxon (1979), and Brunette-Hill and Finke (1999). Other sociological analyses have been advanced by Nelson, Yokley, and Madson (1973) who identified five roles; by Reilly (1975) who identified six roles; by Davies, Watkins, and Winter (1991) who identified seven functions; by Ranson, Bryman, and Hinings (1977) who identified seven functions; by Francis and Rodger (1994) who identified seven roles; by Tiller (1983) who identified eight roles; by Lauer (1973) who identified 10 roles; and by Robbins and Francis (2000) who identified 10 roles. Not only does the sociological literature fail to agree on the number and definition of clergy roles or functions, it also fails to generate a clear conceptual framework within which these functions or roles can be differentiated. In their discussion of the variety of ways in which ministers, clergy, and priests express and fulfill their ministry, Francis and Payne (2002) rooted their analysis not in the sociological literature but in the psychological literature. They defined their concern to be with neither ministry roles nor ministry functions but with ministry styles, and they grounded their understanding of ministry styles within the Jungian framework of psychological type. Psychological type theory has its roots in the observations of Jung as documented in his classic volume Psychological Types (1971). The theory has also been developed and extended by a series of self-completion psychological tests, most notably the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005). The core of Jung’s theory resides in the identification of two key psychological processes, generally defined as the perceiving process and as the judging process. The perceiving process is concerned with the gathering of information. Jung termed this the irrational process, since it is not concerned with evaluating or applying the information.

266

fawcett, francis, and robbins

The judging process is concerned with the evaluation and application of information. Jung termed this the rational process. The two functions of the perceiving process are defined as sensing and as intuition. People who prefer and develop sensing gather information by focusing on the facts of a situation, relying on and trusting their five senses. Sensing types begin with the specific details rather than with the overall picture. They are concerned with the actual, the real, and the practical. They tend to be down to earth and matter of fact. They may feel that particular details are more significant than general patterns, and they prefer to stay with the traditional and with the conventional. They tend to be reluctant to trust their hunches, to resist following inspiration, and to stay with the known rather than the unknown. They tend to live for today rather than for tomorrow. In contrast, people who prefer and develop intuition gather information by focusing on wider meanings and relationships, using their imagination and their ability to draw disparate insights together. Intuitive types tend to focus on the overall picture rather than on specific facts or details. They follow their inspirations with enthusiasm, if not always with realism, and they tend to be attracted to ideals, to possibilities, and to long-term goals. They often aspire to bring about innovative change and to challenge established conventions. They tend to live for tomorrow rather than for today. The two functions of the judging process are defined as thinking and feeling. People who prefer and develop thinking make decisions by using objective, analytical logic. Thinking types value integrity and justice, and they are often recognized for their truthfulness and for their desire for fairness. They consider standing by principles to be of more importance than cultivating harmony. They are often good at making difficult decisions since they are able to analyze problems to reach an unbiased and reasoned solution. When working with others, they may consider it to be more important to be honest and correct than to be tactful. They strive for truth rather than for peace. In contrast, people who prefer and develop feeling make decisions by using subjective personal values and taking interpersonal relationships into account. Feeling types value compassion and mercy, and they are often recognized for their tactfulness and for their desire for peace. They are more concerned to promote harmony, than to adhere to abstract principles. They may be thought of as “people persons” since they are able to take into account other people’s feelings and values in decisionmaking and in problem-solving, trying to reach a solution that satisfies


267

everyone. They may find it difficult to criticize others, even when it is necessary to do so. They find it easy to empathize with other people, and they tend to be trusting and encouraging of others. Alongside the two key psychological processes of perceiving (sensing and intuition) and judging (thinking and feeling), psychological type theory also distinguishes between two orientations and two attitudes toward the outer world. The orientations are concerned with the source and focus of psychological energy. The attitudes toward the outer world are concerned with identifying the preferred spheres in which the preferred perceiving process (either sensing or intuition) and the preferred judging process (either thinking or feeling) are exercised. The two orientations are defined as extraversion and introversion. Extraverts focus their energy on, and gain their energy from, the outside world of people and things. They enjoy communicating and thrive in stimulating and exciting environments. They prefer to act in a situation rather than to reflect on it and tend to vocalize a problem or an idea rather than think it through privately. They may be bored and frustrated by silence and solitude. They tend to focus their attention on what is happening outside themselves. They are usually open people, and they are easy to get to know. They enjoy having many friends. In contrast, introverts focus their energy on, and gain energy from, their inner world of ideas and reflections. They may feel drained by events and people around them, and they prefer to reflect on a situation for some considerable time before acting on it. They enjoy solitude, silence, and contemplation, and they tend to focus their attention on what is happening in their inner life. They may appear reserved, detached, and difficult to get to know. They may prefer to have a small circle of intimate friends, rather than many acquaintances. The two attitudes toward the outer world are defined as judging and perceiving. Judging types use their preferred judging function (either thinking or feeling) in the outer world. They present a systematic, ordered approach to life. They prefer to follow schedules in order to reach an established goal, and they tend to make good use of lists, timetables, and calendars. They tend to be punctual, organized, and tidy, and they may find it difficult to deal with unexpected disruptions of their plans. They prefer to make decisions quickly and to stick to their conclusions once formulated. In contrast, perceiving types present a spontaneous, explorative attitude toward the outer world. They enjoy change and spontaneity, and they prefer to leave projects

268


open in order to adjust and improve them. They may find plans and schedules restrictive, and they tend to be easy going about matters like punctuality, deadlines, and tidiness. They may consider last minute pressure to be a necessary motivation in order to complete projects and to bring things to fruition. They are often good at dealing with the unexpected, although at times their behavior may appear to be impulsive and unplanned. Drawing on psychological type theory, Francis and Payne (2002) suggested that diversity within approaches to ministry could be coherently and cogently summarized in terms of the two orientations, the two perceiving functions, the two judging functions, and the two attitudes toward the outside world. The Payne Index of Ministry Styles was designed to provide seven examples for each of the eight psychological type preferences. The seven items concerned with an extraversion ministry style concentrated on gaining energy, being vitalized, or being refreshed from outward stimulation, including visiting groups of people, preaching to large congregations, meeting new people in the parish, leading large group meetings, leading worship in large congregations, and being out and about in the parish. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.76. The seven items concerned with an introversion ministry style concentrated on gaining energy, being vitalized, or being refreshed from inward stimulation, including spending time alone in prayer, giving time to preparing sermons, reading around a theological topic, writing in the study, engagement with a contemplative style of prayer, praying for people, and conducting worship in small groups. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.62. The seven items concerned with a sensing ministry style concentrated on the practical aspects of ministry (such as getting on with the things that need doing and giving a hand in decorating the church), giving attention to detail (such as keeping accounts, ordering or reordering the church, and ensuring that the fabric is kept in order), and resisting change for change’s sake. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.59. The seven items concerned with an intuition ministry style concentrated on having a vision for the future, finding solutions to new problems, thinking up new ways of doing things in the parish, exploring new angles on the faith, questioning religious traditions, and rais-


269

ing questions in people’s minds rather than trying to leave them with settled answers. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.61. The seven items concerned with a thinking ministry style concentrated on pursuing what is fair and just in dealing with parishioners, being objective in pastoral crises, analyzing things in a logical manner, settling disputes with parishioners objectively, and exploring the logical consequences of actions. The thinking ministry style is able to take tough decisions in the parish and believes that it is more important to be effective than liked. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.63. The seven items concerned with a feeling ministry style concentrated on getting alongside and becoming involved with parishioners’ lives, trying to consider the needs of parishioners above all else, and dealing with parishioners’ emotional problems. The feeling ministry style wants to deal sensitively with people, likes being in fellowship with others in worship, and tries to respond to God in compassionate acts. The feeling ministry style needs to work in a harmonious parish atmosphere. The scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.69. The seven items concerned with a judging ministry style concentrated on a commitment to planning an organization and ensuring that things are planned down to the last detail, that services are well thought through in advance, and that changes in the parish should be carefully planned. The judging ministry style prefers to run the parish according to a strict schedule and relies on drawing up and working to lists. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.79. The seven items concerned with a perceiving ministry style concentrated on having a commitment to flexibility and openness, preferring worship not always to be tied to time and order, liking unpredictability in pastoral ministry, enjoying having the routine disturbed, and appreciating new and unexpected experiences in ministry. The perceiving ministry style likes variety and values freedom in ministry. This scale produced an alpha coefficient of 0.79. The Payne Index of Ministry Styles offers three particular strengths for developing further research concerning perceptions of ministry. The first strength concerns the way in which the analysis is rooted in a well-established psychological model of individual differences. Such a model should be able to transcend theological and ecclesiological differences and provide a valid point of comparison across traditions. Such a model recognizes that the broad sociological definitions of

270


roles or functions are open to multiple interpretations or implementations. For example, Blizzard’s (1955, 1956, 1958a, 1958b) role of pastor might be practiced very differently by introverts and extraverts, by sensers and intuitives, by thinkers and feelers, and by judgers and perceivers. In other words, the Payne Index of Ministry Styles may get much closer to what is really the case in the minds and hearts of clergy themselves. The second strength concerns the way in which the analysis is consonant with a much broader empirical research tradition that is drawing on the insights and evidences of psychological type theory to illuminate aspects of religious vocation and ministry. This research tradition was established in the latter part of the 20th century with studies among Jewish rabbis (Greenfield, 1969), Catholic religious sisters (Cabral, 1984; Bigelow, Fitzgerald, Busk, Girault, & Avis, 1988), Catholic seminarians (Holsworth, 1984), Lutheran seminarians (Harbaugh, 1984), Lutheran parish pastors (Nauss, 1989), and Presbyterian ministers (Irvine, 1989). This research tradition was revitalized and extended at the beginning of the 21st century with studies among Anglican clergy (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001; Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007), Bible College students (Francis, Penson, & Jones, 2001), evangelical church leaders (Francis, & Robbins, 2002; Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), missionary personnel (Craig, Horsfall, & Francis, 2005), lay church leaders (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, & Ross, 2005), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), Christian youth ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007), Anglican seminarians (Francis, Craig, & Butler, 2007), Pentecostal theological college students (Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008; Kay & Francis, 2008), lead elders within the New Frontiers network of churches (Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009), experienced preachers (Francis, Village, & Robbins, 2009), and Anglican health care chaplains (Francis, Hancocks, Swift, & Robbins, 2009). The third strength concerns the way in which the analysis may help to illuminate discrepancies between the ways in which ministry is conceptualized and the personal preferences and strengths of individuals either engaged in ministry or invited to contemplate a call to ordained ministry. For example, if ministry were to be conceptualized largely in extraverted terms, introverts already ordained may find the exercise of ministry particularly stressful, and introverts contemplating a call to ordained ministry may decide that the demands of the job are inappropriate for their preferred skills and disposition.


271

The major limitation with the Payne Index of Ministry Styles concerns its brevity, with each of the eight styles operationalized by just seven items. There is value, therefore, in building on the pioneering work reported by Francis and Payne (2002) by developing and extending this instrument. Informed by this review of the research field, the broad aim of the present study (to assess how religiously committed Baptist youth imagine the role of the minister) has been refined into three research objectives. The first objective was to refine an expanded version of the Payne Index of Ministry Styles in order to provide a richer and fuller description of the ways in which Christian ministry may be conceptualized and expressed within the framework of Jungian psychological type theory. The second objective was to examine how religiously committed Baptist youth imagine the role of the minister within the categories provided by the expanded Payne Index of Ministry Styles. The third objective was to assess the extent to which the psychological type preferences of the young people themselves color their perception of the role of the minister and the extent to which their perception is set by external rather than internal constraints. The opportunity to operationalize these three research objectives was provided by Tidal Impact, a biennial weeklong mission and service experience sponsored by the Convention of Atlantic Baptist Churches, a denomination of approximately 500 Baptist churches in Canada’s four eastern-most provinces. Tidal Impact invites young people, 12 to 18 years of age, to give up a week of their summer vacation, and pay several hundred dollars, to serve the children and the marginalized populations of communities in and around the small cities of Atlantic Canada. The event has grown from 69 to 1,300 participants over its two decades of existence. The event aims to allow young people to grow in their faith through service, gift discovery, worship, and fellowship with Christian youth from other communities. Method Participants The present analysis was based on the 545 participants attending Tidal Impact 2002 who completed the last battery of items in a detailed questionnaire. The sample comprised 190 males, 353 females, and two participants of undisclosed sex; 195 were under the age of 15, 191 were

272


between the ages of 15 and 18, 157 were over the age of 18, and two participants did not disclose their age. The majority of the participants self-identified as Baptist (95%) and as weekly churchgoers (92%). Measures Psychological type was assessed by the adolescent form of the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Fawcett, Francis, & Robbins, in press). This 40-item instrument comprises four sets of 10 forced-choice items related to each of the four components of psychological type: orientation (extraversion or introversion), perceiving process (sensing or intuition), judging process (thinking or feeling), and attitude toward the outer world (judging or perceiving). Fawcett, Francis and Robbins (in press) reported alpha coefficients of 0.82 for the EI scale, 0.67 for the SN scale, 0.69 for the TF scale, and 0.79 for the JP scale. Ministry styles were assessed by a battery of 191 items designed to reflect and to extend the theory introduced by Francis and Payne (2002) in the Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS). These items were designed to present distinctive ministry styles consistent with all eight Jungian functions (extraversion, introversion, sensing, intuition, thinking, feeling, judging, and perceiving). Each item was rated on a 5-point scale: agree strongly, agree, not certain, disagree, and disagree strongly. In the present study the young people were asked “to imagine that you have responded to God’s call to become a minister. How would you feel working as a pastor in a church? Read each sentence carefully and think, ‘Do I agree with it?’ ” Procedure All the young people attending Tidal Impact 2002 held in New Brunswick, Canada, were invited to complete a detailed questionnaire as part of their participation at one of six afternoon Concerts of Prayer held during the weeklong program. Following an explanation of the nature of the survey and assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, the young people were given the opportunity to excuse themselves from the exercise. The overall level of interest with the topic meant that the majority of participants completed the main body of the questionnaire.


273

Results and Discussion The first step in data analysis concerned examining the 191 ministry style items (crafted to develop and to extend the 56 items of the Payne Index of Ministry Styles) in order to generate an extended instrument, the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS2). Factor analyses, correlational analyses, and reliability analyses were employed to select 13 items exemplifying each of the eight ministry styles (extraversion, introversion, sensing, intuition, thinking, feeling, judging, and perceiving). The psychometric properties of these eight scales are presented in Table 1. Seven of the eight scales achieved an alpha coefficient of internal homogeneity reliability in excess of the threshold of 0.65 proposed by DeVellis (2003), although the scale of sensing ministry style fell just below this threshold. Each set of items has clear face validity mapping onto Jungian psychological type theory. The second step in data analysis concerned examining the image of the role of the minister held by these religiously committed Baptist youth as brought into visibility through the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS2). Each of the eight ministry styles will be examined in turn. First, it was clear from the data that ministry was conceived in extraverted terms rather than introverted terms. Many aspects of the extravert ministry styles (Table 2) were endorsed by around threequarters of the young people. They maintained that meeting and talking with people would put new life into their ministry (77%); that they would like to discuss and share their ministry with other people (75%); that they would be energized by meeting many new people in their ministry (74%); that Table 1. Reliabilities and Mean Scale Scores Recorded on the PIMS2

PIMS2 Extraversion PIMS2 Introversion PIMS2 Sensing PIMS2 Intuition PIMS2 Thinking PIMS2 Feeling PIMS2 Judging PIMS2 Perceiving

Alpha

Mean

SD

.82 .66 .63 .71 .70 .77 .80 .76

49.1 45.4 46.2 48.2 47.5 47.8 44.6 39.1

6.7 5.7 5.0 5.3 5.3 6.0 6.7 6.9

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Table 2. Index of Extraverted Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and Percentage Item Endorsement

I would gain energy from leading worship among large groups of people I would be energized by meeting many new people in my ministry Meeting and talking with people would put new life into my ministry I could re-energize by getting out and putting ministry into practice I would gain energy from preaching sermons to full churches I would rather be doing things in my ministry than thinking about them I would be energized by ministering to a large number of people at the same time I would like to discuss and share my ministry with other people I would find it energizing to go out visiting people in my ministry Fellowship with others would recharge me spiritually I would like to find the congregation talking with each other before the service begins I would enjoy fellowship with others in worship services In my ministry I would like to be involved in social events

r

yes %

? %

no %

.39

56

26

18

.48

74

20

6

.53

77

19

4

.47

71

24

6

.40

51

34

15

.45

61

29

10

.50

51

33

16

.53

75

21

4

.43

59

32

6

.52

73

22

7

.40

73

21

7

.49

73

21

6

.42

66

26

9

fellowship with others would recharge them spiritually (73%); that they would like to find the congregation talking with each other before the service begins (73%); that they would enjoy fellowship with others in the worship services (73%); and that they could re-energize by getting out and putting ministry into practice (71%). None of the items in this section was endorsed by fewer than half the young people. By way of contrast, only two of the 13 introverted ministry style items (Table 3) were endorsed by more than 70% of the young people: 73% maintained that they would gain energy from quiet prayer on their own, and 72% said that they would gain energy from spending time alone in prayer. Four of the 13 items in this section were endorsed by fewer than half the young people: 49% considered that they would pre-


275

Table 3. Index of Introverted Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and Percentage Item Endorsement

I would be refreshed in my ministry by spending time alone On public occasions in church life I would prefer to be working in the background I would gain energy from quiet prayer on my own I would gain energy from spending time alone in prayer I would gain energy from giving time to prepare sermons on my own Reading and writing in my study would put new life into my ministry I could re-energize by reading books about ministry and theology I would be energized by ministering to a small number of people in depth I would like to have my talk well prepared before speaking in public I would like the atmosphere in church to be quiet and reflective before the service begins I would like people to leave me in peace when I arrive to lead the service I would gain energy from working with a small group of people whom I know well I would prefer to talk with church members individually rather than in a crowd

r

yes %

? %

no %

.40

55

26

19

.12

36

28

36

.44

73

18

8

.45

72

17

11

.29

55

32

13

.43

57

30

13

.34

52

32

16

.29

64

28

8

.20

68

24

8

.19

30

32

38

.11

27

36

37

.25

64

28

8

.23

49

34

16

fer to talk with church members individually rather than in a crowd; 36% considered that on public occasions in church life they would prefer to be working in the background; 30% considered that they would like the atmosphere in church to be quiet and reflective before the service begins; and 27% said that they would like people to leave them in peace when they arrive to lead the service. Second, in terms of the perceiving process, the data suggested that the young people conceived of ministry as requiring both skills of sensing and intuition. In terms of the sensing perspective (Table 4), around three-quarters of the young people imagined that in their ministry they would like to focus on the things that need to be done here and now (79%); that when preaching sermons they would like to leave

276

fawcett, francis, and robbins Table 4. Index of Sensing Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and Percentage Item Endorsement

In my ministry I would like focus on the things that need to be done here and now Practical action would be what counts in my ministry What would really count in my ministry is getting the practical things done When preaching sermons I would like to leave people with something practical I would like to be involved in the day-to-day details of running the church I would keep an eye on the church building to ensure everything would be in good shape I would prefer to work to concrete goals rather than abstract visions in my ministry When preaching I would like to concentrate on the specifics in the Bible passage I would want to help people become clear about the basics of their faith I would like to give practical guidance in a specific situation I would like to keep a regular pattern to the services I lead I would like to stick to what I have found works in my ministry I would notice quickly when things were out of place in my church

r

yes %

? %

no %

.22

79

15

6

.25

48

42

11

.25

45

38

17

.33

72

22

6

.24

53

30

18

.30

60

27

13

.30

43

43

15

.20

51

38

11

.29

71

27

3

.38

62

32

6

.22

37

38

25

.23

41

43

16

.32

54

32

14

people with something practical (72%); and that they would want to help people become clear about the basics of their faith (71%). In terms of the intuition perspective (Table 5), around three-quarters of the young people imagined that in their ministry they would like to focus on how things can be improved in the future (85%); that they would like to show how the Christian faith could respond to new challenges (81%); that they would like to stimulate and encourage change and experimentation in their church (77%); and that they would like finding new solutions to problems in their ministry (72%). Third, in terms of the judging process, the data suggested that the young people conceived of ministry as requiring both the skills of


277

Table 5. Index of Intuitive ministry style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and Percentage Item Endorsement

In my ministry I would like to focus on how things can be improved in the future I would like to stimulate and encourage change and experimentation in my church I would like to show how the Christian faith could respond to new challenges What would really count in my ministry is getting the vision right for the future I would prefer to work in my ministry to a broad vision rather than to specific goals My job would be to reinterpret the gospel truth in new ways I would like stimulating people to discover new meanings and insights for their faith I would be confident to trust my hunches and inspiration in my ministry I would like providing insights into difficult situations for people I would like finding new solutions to problems in my ministry I would like to try many new patterns to the service I lead I would enjoy raising questions of faith others which others find difficult to answer I would like to experiment with new ways of doing things in my ministry

r

yes %

? %

no %

.30

85

12

4

.38

77

18

5

.34

81

16

3

.31

62

31

7

.16

39

40

21

.30

48

39

14

.41

69

26

5

.23

43

42

15

.39

64

30

6

.38

72

23

6

.38

58

33

9

.35

48

39

13

.41

62

30

8

thinking and the skills of feeling. In terms of the thinking perspective (Table 6), at least three-fifths of the young people maintained that they would really enjoy challenging people through their ministry (80%); that they would like helping people to confront their doubts (68%); that it would be most important for them to deal truthfully with people in their ministry (68%); that they would want to be respected for their principles in their ministry (68%); that they would try to respond to God by calling people to act fairly (66%); and that they would work hard to promote fairness and justice through their ministry (65%). In terms of the feeling perspective (Table 7), at least three-fifths of the young people maintained that they would try to respond to God

278


Table 6. Index of Thinking Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and Percentage Item Endorsement

To be at my best I would need to think issues of truth and justice were being faced in my church I would find it most rewarding to settle disputes with people with justice I would try to respond to God by calling people to act fairly When people were living immoral lives, I would believe in confronting them with truth I would preach frequently about God’s call for truth and justice I would really enjoy challenging people through my ministry I would approach pastoral problems by analyzing things in a logical manner I would like helping people to confront difficult relationships I would like helping people to confront their doubts It would be most important to me to deal truthfully with people in my ministry It would be as important to think about theology and doctrine as to serve the needs of others I would work hard to promote fairness and justice through my ministry I would want to be respected for my principles in my ministry

r

yes %

? %

no %

.29

54

39

8

.22

44

41

16

.26

66

27

7

.30

59

33

8

.38

51

40

10

.37

80

16

4

.23

46

41

13

.41

65

25

10

.39

68

24

7

.40

68

26

6

.19

43

43

14

.39

65

30

5

.43

68

27

6

by showing compassion to people (86%); that they would find it very easy to show sympathy to others in their ministry (69%); that they would work hard to promote peace and harmony through their ministry (63%); that they would approach pastoral problems by finding out how other people felt (62%); that their ministry would be really improved when they felt that others appreciated it (62%); and that opening their heart to others is what ministry is about (61%). Fourth, in terms of the attitudes toward the outer world, the data suggested that overall, the young people were somewhat more likely


279

Table 7. Index of Feeling Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and Percentage Item Endorsement

I would try to respond to God by showing compassion to people I would find it most rewarding to deal with people’s emotional problems I would preach frequently about God’s call for mercy and compassion I would try to consider feelings of other people above all else I would find it very easy to show sympathy to others in my ministry My ministry would be really improved when I felt others appreciated it I would approach pastoral problems by finding out how other people felt I would like to concentrate on human feelings and interpersonal values in my preaching Being an example of sensitivity to others would be the heart of my ministry Opening my heart to others is what ministry is all about In my ministry I would become easily involved with people and their problems It would be most important to me to deal sensitively with people in my ministry I would work hard to promote peace and harmony through my ministry

r

yes %

? %

no %

.34

86

11

3

.34

55

30

15

.39

54

39

7

.36

53

27

20

.46

69

22

9

.41

62

31

7

.38

62

30

9

.46

53

35

13

.46

58

34

8

.45

61

28

11

.36

54

36

10

.39

59

33

8

.32

63

30

7

to endorse a judging model of ministry than to endorse a perceiving model of ministry. In terms of the judging perspective (Table 8), over half of the young people maintained that they would like to see that everything is well-organized and kept in the proper place (65%); that to be effective, changes in the church should be carefully planned (65%); that they would like to help people see the value of a structured prayer life (64%); that they would like to arrange the details of the worship services well in advance (58%); that in their ministry they would want to have important decisions settled well in advance (57%); and that good leadership means careful planning in church life (53%).

280


Table 8. Index of Judging Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and Percentage Item Endorsement

In my ministry I would like to plan things carefully down to the last detail Being good and careful at administration would hold the key to successful ministry I would like to arrange the details of worship services well in advance I would like to see that everything is well organized and kept in its proper place To be effective, changes in church should be carefully planned I would prefer to organize my ministry according to a strict schedule I would like to structure my day with fixed times of prayer and worship I would like to prepare my sermons well in advance I would like to help people see the value of a structured prayer life In my ministry I would want to have important decisions settled well in advance I would like to list things that need to be done each day in my ministry and stick to the list Good leadership means careful planning in church life Reliable and regular routines would be trademarks of my ministry

r

yes %

? %

no %

.50

52

25

24

.37

40

42

18

.51

58

28

13

.54

65

22

13

.41

65

26

10

.47

23

33

44

.32

50

30

19

.49

49

34

17

.32

64

30

6

.39

57

32

11

.43

42

35

23

.42

53

37

10

.40

36

43

21

In terms of the perceiving perspective (Table 9), only two of the 13 items received endorsements by at least half of the young people: 66% maintained that in their ministry they would like to be flexible and not tied down by routine and plans, and 51% said that freedom and flexibility would be trademarks of their ministry. The third stage in data analysis concerned examining the association between the psychological type preferences of the young people and their perception of the role of the minister as reflected in the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles. The Adolescent Form of the Francis Psychological Type Scales achieved satisfactory levels of internal con-


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Table 9. Index of Perceiving Ministry Style: Item Rest-of-scale Correlations and Percentage Item Endorsement

In my ministry I would like to be flexible and not tied down by routine and plans I would rather leave it to others to see that things are well organised in the church Changes in the church often happen most effectively on the spur of the moment After a while, having fixed times for personal devotions each day would be boring I would dislike having to think ahead and having always to organize things in advance I would feel too constrained if I always had to prepare my sermon well in advance I would like the unpredictability of pastoral ministry I would be happy to live with many loose ends in my ministry I would dislike having so much of my ministry scheduled I would not mind leaving important decisions to last minute in my ministry Good leadership means being able to get things sorted out at the last minute Freedom and flexibility would be trademarks of my ministry It would not bother me to leave letters and messages unanswered

r

yes %

? %

no %

.31

66

19

15

.40

36

23

41

.37

27

42

32

.40

28

25

48

.50

28

25

47

.48

31

34

36

.25

40

42

18

.39

21

33

46

.47

29

41

30

.45

23

34

44

.37

38

35

27

.28

51

39

11

.36

22

30

49

sistency reliability with the following alpha coefficients: for extraversion and introversion .83; for sensing and intuition .67; for thinking and feeling .69, and for judging and perceiving .78. Although the associations between personal psychological type preferences and the scales of the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles were not generally strong, they were sufficient to indicate that personal psychological type did help to shape how young people conceived of ministry. Extraverts were more likely to emphasize the extravert ministry style (r = .23, p < .001). Introverts were more likely to emphasize

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the introvert ministry style (r = .31, p < .001). Sensors were more likely to emphasize the sensing ministry style (r = .23, p < .001). Feelers were more likely to emphasize the feeling ministry style (r = .33, p < .001). Judgers were more likely to emphasize the judging ministry style (r = .50, p < .001). Perceivers were more likely to emphasize the perceiving ministry style (r = .49, p < .001). On the other hand, there was no significant association between thinking and the thinking ministry style (r = .01, NS), and the association between intuition and the intuition ministry style was weak (r = .11, p < .05). Conclusion The present study set out with three research objectives and has achieved these goals. The first goal has been the development and testing of the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles, providing 13 exemplars for each of the eight styles proposed by Jungian psychological type theory. The instrument is now ready for further conceptual critiques and for further empirical testing. The second goal has been the examination of how religiously committed Baptist youth imagine the role of the minister within the categories provided by the Revised Payne Index of Ministry Styles. The most striking finding from this examination concerns the way in which ministry is conceived more strongly in extraverted terms than in introverted terms. If the ideal minister is held to be an extravert, this may prove to be a real disincentive against introverts hearing and responding to a call to vocational ministry. The fact that the more introverted aspects of ministry identified by the Payne Index of Ministry Styles do appeal more to introverts than to extraverts confirms the view that introverts may bring distinctive and complementary skills to ministry. If these introverted aspects of ministry were to be accorded a higher profile within the Church, introverts may be afforded greater opportunity to imagine themselves as ministers. The third goal has been the assessment of the extent to which the young people’s own psychological type colors their perception of the role of the minister. The most striking finding from the assessment concerns the limited impact of personal type preferences on the conceptualization of ministry. If ministry is not seen to provide opportunities for individuals to play to their personal strengths and to develop their personal gifts in the service of God, the sense of being overawed


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by or being inadequate for the task may prove to be a real disincentive against some young people hearing and responding to a call to vocational ministry. If the insights of psychological type theory are accepted, and if it is recognized that there is room for a diversity of gifts within ministry, the nurturing of vocations among young people may perhaps be best advanced in the following way. The aim should be helping young people to deconstruct their stereotypes of the ideal minister and to explore how their own personality and psychological type preferences could equip them to bring highly distinctive and highly valuable gifts to an increasingly pluriform and diverse church. References Astley, J., & Francis, L. J. (2009). Young vocations to ordained ministry in the Church of England: A qualitative study. Journal of Practical Theology, 2, 253–267. Bigelow, E. D., Fitzgerald, R., Busk, P., Girault, E., & Avis, J. (1988). Psychological characteristics of Catholic sisters: Relationships between the MBTI and other measures. Journal of Psychological Type, 14, 32–36. http://www.capt.org/research/ psychological-type-journal.htm Blizzard, S. W. (1955). The roles of the rural parish minister, the Protestant seminaries and the science of social behaviour, Religious Education, 50, 383–392. doi:10.1080/0034408550500607 Blizzard, S. W. (1956). The training of the parish minister. Union Seminary Quarterly Review, 2, 45–50. Blizzard, S. W. (1958a). The parish minister’s self-image of his master role. Pastoral Psychology, 89, 25–32. doi:10.1007/BF01743571 Blizzard, S. W. (1958b). The Protestant parish minister’s integrating roles. Religious Education, 53, 374–380. doi:10.1080/0034408580530416 Brunette-Hill, S., & Finke, R. (1999). A time for every purpose: Updating and extending Blizzard’s survey on clergy time allocation. Review of Religious Research, 41, 47–63. doi:10.2307/3512426 Cabral, G. (1984). Psychological types in a Catholic convent: applications to community living and congregational data. Journal of Psychological Type, 8, 16–22. http:// www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Coates, C. H., & Kistler, R. C. (1965). Role dilemmas of Protestant clergymen in a metropolitan community. Review of Religious Research, 6, 147–152. doi:10.2307/3509615 Craig, C. L., Duncan, B., & Francis, L. J. (2006). Psychological type preferences of Roman Catholic priests in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 27, 157–164. doi:10.1080/13617670600849812 Craig, C., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2004). Psychological type and sex differences among church leaders in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 25, 3–13. doi:10.1080/1361767042000199004 Craig, C. L. Horsfall, T., & Francis, L. J. (2005). Psychological types of male missionary personnel training in England: a role for thinking type men? Pastoral Psychology, 53, 475–482. doi:10.1007/s11089-005-2588-8 Davies, D., Watkins, C., & Winter, M. (1991). Church and religion in rural England. Edinburgh, UK: T and T Clark.

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DeVellis, R. F. (2003). Scale development: Theory and applications. London, England: Sage. Fawcett, B., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (in press). The scale properties of the adolescent form of the Francis Psychological Type Scales (FPTSA) among Canadian Baptist youth. Fawcett, B., McDonald, M., & Nylen, R. (2005). Mission tour: Successfully leading youth on a short-term mission experience. Saint John, New Brunswick: Convention of Atlantic Baptist Churches. Francis, L. J. (2005). Faith and psychology: Personality, religion, and the individual. London, England: Darton, Longman and Todd. Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Butler, A. (2007). Psychological types of male evangelical Anglican seminarians in England. Journal of Psychological Type, 67, 11–17. http:// www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Horsfall, T., & and Ross, C. F. J. (2005). Psychological types of male and female evangelical lay church leaders in England, compared with United Kingdom population norms. Fieldwork in Religion, 1, 69–83. http://www .equinoxjournals.com/FIR Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Whinney, M., Tilley, D., & Slater, P. (2007). Psychological profiling of Anglican clergy in England: Employing Jungian typology to interpret diversity, strengths, and potential weaknesses in ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology, 11, 266–284. doi:10.1515/IJPT.2007.17 Francis, L. J., Gubb, S., & Robbins, M. (2009). Psychological type profile of Lead Elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 30, 61–69. doi:10.1080/13617670902784568 Francis, L. J., Hancocks, G., Swift, C., & Robbins, M. (2009). Distinctive call, distinctive profile: The psychological type profile of Church of England full-time hospital chaplains. Journal of Practical Theology, 2, 269–284. doi:10.1558/prth.v2i2.269 Francis, L. J., Nash, P., Nash, S., & Craig, C. L. (2007). Psychology and youth ministry: Psychological type preferences of Christian youth workers in the United Kingdom. Journal of Youth Ministry, 5(2), 73–90. Francis, L. J., & Payne, V. J. (2002). The Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS): Ministry styles and psychological type among male Anglican clergy in Wales. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 13, 125–141. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Francis, L. J., Payne, V. J., & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male Anglican clergy in Wales. Journal of Psychological Type, 56, 19–23. http://www.capt.org/ research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Penson, A. W., & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male and female Bible College students in England. Mental Health, Religion, and Culture, 4, 23–32. doi:10.1080/13674670010011616 Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2002). Psychological types of male evangelical church leaders. Journal of Belief and Values, 23, 217–220. doi:10.1080/1361767022000010860 Francis, L. J., & Rodger, R. (1994). The influence of personality on clergy role prioritization, role influence, conflict and dissatisfaction with ministry. Personality and Individual Differences, 16, 947–957. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(94)90237-2 Francis, L. J., Village, A., & Robbins, M. (2009). Psychological type and the pulpit: An empirical enquiry concerning preachers and the SIFT method of biblical hermeneutics. HTS Theological Studies, 65 (1), article 161, 1–7. Greenfield, M. (1969). Typologies of persisting and non-persisting Jewish clergymen. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 16, 368–372. doi:10.1037/h0027708 Harbaugh, G. L. (1984). The person in ministry: Psychological type and the seminary. Journal of Psychological Type, 8, 23–32. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm


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Holsworth, T. E. (1984). Type preferences among Roman Catholic seminarians. Journal of Psychological Type, 8, 33–35. http://www.capt.org/research/psychologicaltype-journal.htm Irvine, A. R. (1989). Isolation and the parish ministry. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of St. Andrews. Jud, G. J., Mills, E. W., & Burch, G. W. (1970). Ex-pastors: Why men leave the parish ministry. Philadelphia, PA: Pilgrim Press. Jung, C. G. (1971). Psychological types: The collected works, volume 6. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kay, W. K., & Francis, L. J. (2008). Psychological type preferences of female Bible College students in England. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 29, 101–105. doi:10.1080/13617670801928324 Kay, W. K., Francis, L. J., & Craig, C. L. (2008). Psychological type preferences of male British Assemblies of God Bible College students: Tough-minded or tender-hearted? Journal of the European Pentecostal Theological Association, 28, 6–20. http://www .eptaonline.com/ourjournaljepta.htm Keirsey, D., & Bates, M. (1978). Please understand me. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis. Lauer, R. H. (1973). Organisational punishment: Punitive relations in a voluntary association: A minister in a Protestant church. Human Relations, 26, 189–202. doi:10.1177/001872677302600205 Myers, I. B., & McCaulley, M. H. (1985). Manual: A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Nauss, A. H. (1989). Leadership styles of effective ministry. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 17, 59–67. https://wisdom.biola.edu/jpt/ Nelson, H. M., Yokley, R. L., & Madson, T. W. (1973). Ministerial roles and social actionist stance: Protestant clergy and protest in the sixties. American Sociological Review, 38, 375–386. doi:10.2307/2094360 Ranson, S., Bryman, A., & Hinings, B. (1977). Clergy, ministers, and priests. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Reilly, M. E. (1975). Perceptions of the priest role. Sociological Analysis, 36, 347–356. doi:10.2307/3710522 Robbins, M., & Francis, L. J. (2000). Role prioritisation among clergywomen: The influence of personality and church tradition among female stipendiary Anglican clerics in the UK. British Journal of Theological Education, 11, 7–23. Tiller, J. (1983). A strategy for the church’s ministry. London, England: Church Information Office Publishing. Towler, R., & Coxon, A. P. M. (1979). The fate of the Anglican clergy. London, England: Macmillan.

APPRENTICE CLERGY? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS IN MINISTRY AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE PROFILE OF TRAINING INCUMBENTS AND CURATES IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND David Tilley,* Leslie J. Francis, Mandy Robbins, and Susan H. Jones Abstract This study examined the relationship between the ministry expectations experienced by newly ordained clergy in the Church of England and both their personal psychological type profile and the psychological type profile of the training incumbent alongside whom they were apprenticed to learn the practice of ministry. Data were provided by 98 curates who completed the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and a set of items designed to map their perception of the expectations placed on them by their training incumbent. Analysis of these items generated the Tilley Index of Training Expectations (TITE). The MBTI was also completed by the training incumbent. The data demonstrated that the ministry expectations placed on curates were significantly related to the psychological type profile of the training incumbents but not of the curates. The implications of incumbents shaping curates in their own image (rather than developing the curate’s own preferred predisposition for ministry) are discussed for the long-term work-related psychological health of trainee clergy. Keywords: Anglican Church, curates, MBTI, psychological type, training

Psychological type theory as introduced originally by Jung (1971) and as developed through a series of self-report type measures, including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005), proposes four fundamental individual differences distinguishing between two orientations (introversion and extraversion), two perceiving processes (sensing and

* Author Note: David Tilley, Diocese of Coventry, UK; Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Susan H. Jones, Glyndŵr University. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leslie J. Francis, Warwick Religions & Education Research Unit, Institute of Education, The University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0)24 7652 2539, Fax: +44 (0)24 7657 2638. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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intuition), two judging processes (thinking and feeling), and two attitudes toward the outer world (judging and perceiving). Psychological type discusses individual differences not in terms of traits, dimensions, or continuous factors, as employed in the models of personality advanced by Costa and McCrae (1985), by Eysenck and Eysenck (1991), or by Cattell, Cattell, and Cattell (1993), but in terms of clearly defined types. Taken together, these four bipolar preferences generate 16 discrete psychological types. The two orientations are defined as introversion (I) and extraversion (E). Introverts draw their energy from the inner world of ideas, while extraverts draw their energy from the outer world of people and things. Extraverts are energized by people and drained by too much solitude, while introverts are energized by solitude and drained by too many people. The two perceiving processes are defined as sensing (S) and intuition (N). Sensers perceive their environment through their senses and focus on the details of the here and now, while intuitives perceive their environment by making use of the imagination and inspiration. Sensers are distrustful of jumping to conclusions and of envisioning the future, while intuitives are overloaded by too many details and long to try out new approaches. The two judging processes are defined as thinking (T) and feeling (F). Thinkers reach their judgments by relying on objective logic, while feelers reach their judgments by relying on subjective appreciation of the personal and interpersonal factors involved. Thinkers strive for truth, fairness, and justice, while feelers strive for harmony, peace, and reconciliation. The two attitudes toward the outer world are defined as judging (J) and perceiving (P). Judgers use their preferred judging process (either thinking or feeling) to deal with the outside world. Their outside world is organized, scheduled, and planned. Perceivers use their preferred perceiving process (either sensing or intuition) to deal with the outside world. Their outside world is flexible, spontaneous, and unplanned. A growing body of empirical research has begun to document the power of psychological type theory to account for individual differences in the expression and practice of Christian ministry (Francis, 2005, 2009). One set of recent studies has mapped the similarities and dissimilarities between individuals either serving in or training to serve in a variety of Christian denominations. These studies have included Presbyterian Church of Scotland ministers (Irvine, 1989),

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Anglican Church in Wales clergymen (Francis, Payne, & Jones, 2001), male and female Bible College students (Francis, Penson, & Jones, 2001), evangelical church leaders (Francis & Robbins, 2002; Craig, Francis, & Robbins, 2004), male missionary personnel (Craig, Horsfall, & Francis, 2005), evangelical lay church leaders (Francis, Craig, Horsfall, & Ross, 2005), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), youth ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007), evangelical Anglican seminarians (Francis, Craig, & Butler, 2007), Church of England clergy (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007), Assemblies of God theological college students (Kay, Francis, & Craig, 2008; Kay & Francis, 2008), and Newfrontier lead elders (Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009). Another set of recent studies has helped to illuminate how different psychological type profiles are reflected in different approaches to ministry or in different expressions of personal spirituality among clergy. For example, Francis and Payne (2002) described a model of ministry preferences, based on psychological type theory and styled the Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS). To develop this index, Francis and Payne selected seven statements from a wider initial pool to operationalize each of the eight functions proposed by psychological type, as illustrated by the following examples: I am energized by meeting new people in the parish (extraversion); I feel energized by giving time to prepare sermons (introversion); I examine the church fabric carefully to ensure that it is kept in order (sensing); I like to think up new ways of doing things in the parish (intuition); I am usually objective in pastoral crises (thinking); Dealing with emotional problems of parishioners I find rewarding (feeling); I prefer to run my parish according to a strict schedule (judging); I enjoy being spontaneous in services (perceiving). Building on the research traditions illustrated by Francis and Payne (2002), Francis and Robbins (2008) described a model of prayer preferences based on psychological type theory. To develop a set of prayer preference scales, Francis and Robbins selected seven statements from a wider initial pool to operationalize each of the eight functions proposed by psychological type theory, as illustrated by the following examples: Belonging to a prayer group energizes me (extraversion); I am energized by praying in silence (introversion); My prayer life is enhanced by an awareness of my posture (sensing); My prayer life is enhanced by using my imagination (intuition); My prayer life is shaped in my mind (thinking); My prayer life is shaped in my heart

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(feeling); I often follow a set pattern of praying (judging); I often pray what comes into my mind at the time (perceiving). Against the background of this research tradition, the aim of the present study is to test the power of psychological type theory to illuminate a crucial aspect of the way in which Anglican clergy are generally trained for parish ministry. Following initial training, either within a full-time residential seminary or on a part-time non-residential training course, the classic Anglican model is for the newly ordained deacon to be located within a training parish and to be licensed as a curate to learn from working alongside a training incumbent. This is the apprenticeship model of clergy training. In spite of the significance of this formative period in the lives of Anglican clergy, little empirical research has been invested in this area. The small amount of research evidence currently available, however, suggests that for many newly ordained clergy, the experience of the training parish and working alongside a training incumbent has been far from wholly successful. The first major study concerning the experience of curates was reported by Burgess (1998), based on a series of in-depth interviews with 20 curates who had trained at Lincoln Theological College between 1989 and 1994. It is difficult to know just how representative this sample was of clergy trained at Lincoln Theological College during this period, or indeed how representative ordinands trained at Lincoln Theological College were of ordinands trained across the diverse range of colleges and courses supported by the Church of England over this period. The stark conclusion drawn by Burgess from his interviews was that half of his sample believed that they had experienced an unsatisfactory relationship with their respective training incumbents. In order to interpret the basis for this failure in relationships, Burgess identified what he described as five fundamental pathologies of training: a lack of preparation before, and feedback by the incumbent after, a task; a lack of personal organization and professionalism on the part of incumbents; unwillingness to share tasks or recognize curates’ abilities; the inability of incumbents to create close personal relationships with a colleague; and inappropriate attitudes in an adult colleague relationship. In a subsequent study, analyzing written observations from more than 50 curates, Tilley (2007) found continuing evidence for Burgess’ catalogue of pathologies but set alongside such evidence a wide range of positive comments made by curates regarding the relationship with their training incumbents.

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In order to illuminate a key aspect of the relationship between curates and their training incumbents, the present study proposed to develop an index of training expectations based on psychological type theory and then to examine the relationship between the curates’ perceptions of their expectations and both their own psychological type profile and the psychological type profile of their training incumbent. It was hypothesized that a link between the curates’ own psychological type profile and the expectations in training would suggest that the training experience was emphasizing the ideal of enabling individual curates to find their own preferred ministry style. On the other hand, a link between the training incumbents’ psychological type profile and the curates’ perceived expectations in training would suggest that the training experience was emphasizing the ideal of shaping the curate in the image of their training incumbents’ preferred ministry style. Method Participants The sample of 98 curates on whom the analyses were based compromised 45 clergymen and 53 clergywomen; 71 had been ordained into stipendiary ministry and 27 into non-stipendiary ministry; 76 were married, three divorced, three divorced and re-married, one widowed, and 15 single; at the time of ordination, nine were under the age of 30, 33 in their 30s, 31 in their 40s, 19 in their 50s, and six aged 60 or over. Measures Psychological type was assessed by the 126-item Form G (Anglicized) of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI: Myers & McCaulley, 1985). This instrument uses a forced-choice questionnaire format to indicate preferences between extraversion or introversion, sensing or intuition, thinking or feeling, and judging or perceiving. Broad support for the reliability and validity of the instrument is provided in the international psychological literature, including studies by Tzeng, Outcalt, Boyer, Ware, and Landis (1984), Thomson and Borrello (1986a, 1986b), Uhl and Day (1993), Tischler (1994), Saggino and Kline (1995), and Francis and Jones (1999). In the most recent of these studies, Francis and Jones (1999) reported on the scale properties of Form G (Anglicized) among 429 adult churchgoers. Reliability was supported by the fol-

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lowing alpha coefficients: extraversion, 0.80; introversion, 0.79; sensing, 0.87; intuition, 0.82; thinking, 0.79; feeling, 0.72; judging, 0.85; and perceiving, 0.86. Expectations in ministry were assessed by a pool of 115 items designed to map onto the eight psychological type functions: extraversion and introversion, sensing and intuition, thinking and feeling, judging and perceiving. The items were introduced by the phrase “My training incumbent expected me to. . . .” Each item was rated on a 5-point scale: agree strongly, agree, not certain, disagree, and disagree strongly. Procedure Between 2000 and 2003, a detailed questionnaire was sent to curates serving within the Dioceses of Oxford, Worcester, Leicester, and Coventry whose personal psychological type profile, and generally also whose training incumbents’ psychological type profile, was already known from their participation in recent training events. Generally the questionnaire was sent at the end of each curate’s first post or during the first year of his or her second post in ministry. Participants in the project were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. A total of 108 questionnaires were distributed, and 106 usable responses were returned. After omitting the responses of one minister in secular employment (MSE) and seven ordained local ministers (OLM), due to their relationship with a training incumbent being quite different from that of curates serving in conventional stipendiary ministry or nonstipendiary ministry, the analysis was based on the responses made by 98 curates. Psychological type profiles were available for all 98 curates and for 97 of their training incumbents. Data Analysis The data were analyzed by means of the SPSS statistical package, employing the reliability, correlation, and factor routines. Results The psychological type literature has developed a highly distinctive method for displaying type data in the format of type tables. The present data are presented in this way in Tables 1 and 2 in order to facilitate clear comparison with other studies in the field.

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tilley, francis, robbins, and jones Table 1. Type Distribution for Curates

N = 98 The Sixteen Complete Types ISTJ n=3 (3.1%) +++

ISTP n=2 (2.0%) ++

ESTP n=0 (0.0%)

ESTJ n=5 (5.1%) +++++

ISFJ n=9 (9.2%) +++++ ++++

ISFP n=1 (1.0%) +

ESFP n=1 (1.0%) +

ESFJ n=9 (9.2%) +++++ ++++

Jungian Types (E) n % E-TJ 9 9.2 E-FJ 24 24.5 ES-P 1 1.0 EN-P 12 12.2 Note: + = 1% of N

INFJ n = 14 (14.3%) +++++ +++++ ++++

INFP n=8 (8.2%) +++++ +++

ENFP n=9 (9.2%) +++++ ++++

ENFJ n = 15 (15.3%) +++++ +++++ +++++

Dichotomous Preferences INTJ n = 11 (11.2%) +++++ +++++ +

INTP n=4 (4.1%) ++++

ENTP n=3 (3.1%) +++

ENTJ n=4 (4.1%) ++++


E I

n = 46 n = 52

(46.9%) (53.1%)

S N

n = 30 n = 68

(30.6%) (69.4%)

T F

n = 32 n = 66

(32.7%) (67.3%)

J P

n = 70 n = 28

(71.4%) (28.6%)


n = 37 n = 15 n = 13 n = 33

(37.8%) (15.3%) (13.3%) (33.7%)

ST SF NF NT

n = 10 n = 20 n = 46 n = 22

(10.2%) (20.4%) (46.9% (22.4%)

SJ SP NP NJ

n = 26 n=4 n = 24 n = 44

(26.5%) (4.1%) (24.5%) (44.9%)

TJ TP FP FJ

n = 23 n=9 n = 19 n = 47

(23.5%) (9.2%) (19.4%) (48.0%)

IN EN IS ES

n = 37 n = 31 n = 15 n = 15

(37.8%) (31.6%) (15.3%) (15.3%)

ET EF IF IT

n = 12 n = 34 n = 32 n = 20

(12.2%) (34.7%) (32.7%) (20.4%)

Dominant Types n % Dt. T 15 15.3 Dt. F 33 33.7 Dt. S 13 13.3 Dt. N 37 37.8

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According to Table 1, the sample of 98 curates showed preferences for introversion (53%) over extraversion (47%), for intuition (69%) over sensing (31%), for feeling (67%) over thinking (33%) and for judging (71%) over perceiving (29%). The two predominant types were ENFJ (15%) and INFJ (14%). Together the NFJ preferences accounted for 30% of the curates. According to Table 2, the main differences between the type preferences of training incumbents compared with curates concerned a significantly higher preference for thinking among training incumbents (51%) compared with curates (33%) and a significantly lower preference for feeling among training incumbents (50%) compared with curates (67%). In drawing up items to access expectations of ministry in terms of each of the eight psychological type functions, it was anticipated that some items would be found to work better than others. From an initial pool of 115 items, factor analysis and rest-of-test correlation analyses were employed to select the best 10 items within each of the eight sets. These resulting 10-item scales are presented in Tables 3 to 6, together with the item rest-of-test scale correlations and percentage endorsements. The item rest-of-test scale correlations (r) express the relationship between each individual item and the sum total of the other nine items. In order to simplify the presentation of data, the two responses “agree strongly” and “agree” have been collapsed into the category “yes,” the two responses “disagree” and “disagree strongly” have been collapsed into the category “no,” and the response “not certain” has been expressed as “?” The alpha coefficients demonstrated that all but one of the eight 10-item scales functioned with satisfactory internal consistency reliability in excess of the threshold of 0.65 proposed by DeVellis (2003): introversion, 0.81; extraversion, 0.79; sensing, 0.82; intuition, 0.80; thinking, 0.64; feeling, 0.81; judging, 0.92; perceiving, 0.83. The items selected to comprise the eight 10-item scales were named the Tilley Index of Training Expectations (TITE). Tables 7 to 10 examine the association between the scores recorded on the eight scales of ministry expectations against the relevant personality constructs profiling both the curates and their training incumbents. The association was tested by comparing the mean scale scores recorded on the ministry experience scales against the dichotomous preferences recorded by the type indicator. This method was chosen

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Table 2. Type Distribution for Training Incumbents Compared with Curates N = 97 The Sixteen Complete Types ISTJ n=9 (9.3%) I = 3.03 +++++ ++++

ISTP n=0 (0.0%) I = 0.00

ESTP n=2 (2.1%) I = 0.00 ++

ESTJ n=9 (9.3%) I = 1.82 +++++ ++++

ISFJ n=7 (7.2%) I = 0.79 +++++ ++

ISFP n=3 (3.1%) I = 3.03 +++

ESFP n=3 (3.1%) I = 3.03 +++

ESFJ n=6 (6.2%) I = 0.67 +++++ +

Jungian Types (E) n % I E-TJ 17 17.5 1.91 E-FJ 16 16.5 0.67 ES-P 5 5.2 5.05 EN-P 14 14.4 1.18

INFJ n=3 (3.1%) I = 0.22** +++

INFP n=7 (7.2%) I = 0.88 +++++ ++

ENFP n=9 (9.3%) I = 1.01 +++++ ++++

ENFJ n = 10 (10.3%) I =0.67 +++++ +++++

Dichotomous Preferences INTJ n = 12 (12.4%) I = 1.10 +++++ +++++ ++

INTP n=4 (4.1%) I = 1.01 ++++

ENTP n=5 (5.2%) I = 1.68 +++++

ENTJ n=8 (8.2%) I = 2.02 +++++ +++

E I

52 45

(53.6%) (46.4%)

I = 1.14 I = 0.87

S N

39 58

(40.2%) (59.8%)

I = 1.31 I = 0.86

T F

49 48

(50.5%) (49.5%)

**I = 1.55 **I = 0.73

J P

64 33

(66.0%) (34.0%)

I = 0.92 I = 1.19


31 14 19 33

(32.0%) (14.4%) (19.6%) (34.0%)

I = 0.85 I = 0.94 I = 1.48 I = 1.01

ST SF NF NT

20 19 29 29

(20.6%) (19.6%) (29.9%) (29.9%)

*I = 2.02 I = 0.96 *I = 0.64 I = 1.33

SJ 31 SP 8 NP 25 NJ 33

(32.0%) (8.2%) (25.8%) (34.0%)

I = 1.20 I = 2.02 I = 1.05 I = 0.76

TJ TP FP FJ

38 11 22 26

(39.2%) (11.3%) (22.7%) (26.8%)

*I = 1.67 I = 1.23 I = 1.17 **I = 0.56

IN EN IS ES

26 32 19 20

(26.8%) (33.0%) (19.6%) (20.6%)

I = 0.71 I = 1.04 I = 1.28 I = 1.35

ET EF IF IT

24 28 20 25

(24.7%) (28.9%) (20.6%) (25.8%)

*I = 2.02 I = 0.83 I = 0.63 I = 1.26

Jungian Types (I) n % I I-TP 4 4.1 0.67 I-FP 10 10.3 1.12 IS-J 16 16.5 1.35 IN-J 15 15.5 0.61

Note: + = 1% of N; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Dominant Types n % I Dt. T 21 21.6 1.41 Dt. F 26 26.8 0.80 Dt. S 21 21.6 1.63 Dt. N 29 29.9 0.79

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Table 3. Training Expectations Indicative of Orientation Preferences

Items conforming to extraversion My training incumbent expected me to . . . easily and quickly turn embarrassment into a joke easily form friendships with many different people enjoy taking the spotlight in parish ministry find it easy to meet a lot of new people be an enthusiast have an active social life to recharge my batteries help to get things going socially remember names and faces easily show interest in social interactions talk easily to almost anyone in informal situations alpha: Items conforming to introversion My training incumbent expected me to . . . work well in solitude be private and self-contained be careful about sharing my ideas and thoughts be energized by my inner resources find things out by myself (for example reading alone) keep a certain distance from him/her be hard to get to know in depth prefer writing to talking think deeply before formulating my answers be slow to reveal my feelings alpha:

r

Yes %

? %

No %

0.37

30

39

31

0.72

57

25

18

0.33 0.44 0.40 0.47

28 55 58 36

35 27 27 28

37 19 15 36

0.50 0.37 0.46 0.60

49 36 66 74

19 37 19 13

32 28 16 26

0.54 0.66 0.48

59 36 40

28 16 22

41 48 38

0.23

57

55

12

0.26 0.64 0.69 0.57 0.22 0.59

77 39 21 8 33 30

10 14 25 31 37 29

12 46 54 61 30 42

0.79

0.81

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tilley, francis, robbins, and jones Table 4. Training Expectations Indicative of Perceiving Preferences

Items conforming to sensing My training incumbent expected me to . . . be conventional rather than original be meticulous be practical in discussing ministry take detailed interest in the fabric of the Church focus on one thing at a time have a common-sense rather than a visionary approach pay attention to detail prefer to understand by starting with facts respect Church regulations in pastoral situations take a step-by-step approach alpha: Items conforming to intuition My training incumbent expected me to . . . admire original and individual people be imaginative and speculative be original be primarily concerned with transforming the world enjoy exploring ideas and possibilities preach in an inventive and tentative way welcome visions for change start from the overall idea first then look at the parts think in abstract rather than concrete terms use images and symbols with ease alpha:

r

Yes %

? %

No %

0.43 0.65 0.45 0.44 0.59 0.55

26 40 74 21 15 39

10 23 19 15 25 24

64 37 7 65 65 37

0.57 0.42 0.49 0.50

64 41 71 49

13 40 17 32

22 19 11 19

0.48 0.63 0.57 0.29

43 61 58 19

32 19 24 26

25 21 18 55

0.53 0.43 0.52 0.47

76 41 65 44

14 33 19 37

10 26 15 20

0.42 0.42

15 49

41 29

44 22

0.82

0.80

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Table 5. Training Expectations Indicative of Judgment Preferences

Items conforming to thinking My training incumbent expected me to . . . be clear about principles be comfortable with skeptical analysis be wary rather than trusting be more focused on justice than peace communicate truth more than enthusiasm enjoy persuading people by arguments not be influenced by my feelings about people make judgments objectively be more concerned with people’s rights than their feelings think in a detached and logical way alpha: Items conforming to feeling My training incumbent expected me to . . . be attentive to building good relationships with people as a first priority be gentle rather than tough-minded with people be more aware of people’s strengths than their limitations be more interested in people’s feelings than their ideas be naturally gentle and understanding with people be pastoral more than prophetic be always empathetic towards others enjoy pleasing others have a clear awareness of my personal feelings value compassion above frankness alpha:

r

Yes %

? %

No %

0.12 0.26 0.21 0.37 0.24 0.28 0.39 0.30 0.50

63 42 26 20 26 29 45 66 15

25 30 22 52 40 39 22 20 49

12 29 53 29 34 32 33 13 37

0.48

52

29

19

0.56

69

9

22

0.57 0.43

58 45

19 33

23 22

0.43

30

27

44

0.79

68

21

11

0.41 0.58 0.25 0.32 0.59

49 53 67 46 46

31 32 32 35 36

20 15 1 19 18

0.64

0.81

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tilley, francis, robbins, and jones Table 6. Training Expectations Indicative of Attitude Preferences

Items conforming to judging My training incumbent expected me to . . . be methodical be organized and systematic have things decided and settled in advance keep to a schedule I had created list and order the things to be done plan a special job carefully in advance be punctual about appointments give him/her plenty of advance notice of agreed plans work best when there were clear schedules find daily routine a comfortable way to do things alpha: Items conforming to perceiving My training incumbent expected me to . . . be comfortable with a degree of chaos be comfortable with postponing decisions behave in an easy-going laid back way discover what I needed to do as I went along feel comfortable with unplanned supervision sessions pull things together well at the last minute respond quickly to the unexpected or unplanned event not be upset by last minute changes work flexibly and spontaneously be prepared to change my plans alpha:

r

Yes %

? %

No %

0.73 0.73 0.72 0.62 0.69 0.60 0.67

46 63 36 39 36 68 78

27 19 22 22 24 15 8

27 19 42 40 40 16 14

0.74 0.76 0.67

44 47 41

19 25 35

37 29 24

0.72 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.53

51 38 33 63 54

17 17 30 52 17

33 35 37 37 30

0.51 0.34

57 78

20 17

24 5

0.61 0.68 0.36

77 77 87

13 8 7

10 15 6

0.92

0.83

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Table 7. Mean Scores of Introvert and Extravert Ministry Expectations by Incumbents’ and Curates’ Orientation Preferences TITE Scales

Extraversion Mean SD

Introversion Mean SD

Incumbents’ preferences introverted expectations extraverted expectations

29.1 34.3

5.4 4.4

32.0 31.3

5.6 5.7

2.5* 2.8**

Curates’ preferences introverted expectations extraverted expectations

31.4 32.7

5.1 5.5

29.5 33.1

6.2 5.0

1.6 0.4

t

Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001

Table 8. Mean Scores of Sensing and Intuition Ministry Expectations by Incumbents’ and Curates’ Perceiving Preferences TITE Scales

Sensing Mean SD

Intuition Mean SD

Incumbents’ preferences sensing expectations intuition expectations

32.7 29.0

5.7 5.5

30.1 34.4

5.7 4.6

2.1* 5.1***

Curates’ preferences sensing expectations intuition expectations

29.5 33.9

5.3 3.6

31.9 31.7

6.1 6.2

1.8 1.7

t

Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 Table 9. Mean Scores of Thinking and Feeling Ministry Expectations by Incumbents’ and Curates’ Judging Preferences TITE Scales

Thinking Mean SD

Feeling Mean SD

t

Incumbents’ preferences thinking expectations feeling expectations

32.6 31.5

3.7 6.9

30.0 34.1

4.4 4.1

3.1** 2.3*

Curates’ preferences thinking expectations feeling expectations

31.8 32.8

4.5 7.0

31.0 32.8

4.2 5.2

0.9 0.0

Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01

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Table 10. Mean scores of judging and perceiving ministry expectations by incumbents’ and curates’ attitude preferences TITE Scales

Judging Mean SD

Perceiving Mean SD

Incumbent’s preferences judging expectations perceiving expectations

35.2 33.2

6.9 6.2

27.4 37.7

6.0 4.9

5.2** 3.5***

Curates’ preferences judging expectations perceiving expectations

32.0 35.7

7.6 5.8

33.4 32.7

8.4 6.8

0.7 2.2*

t

Note: * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001

because it is consistent with the basic principles of personality typology and displays in an accessible way the differences between contrasting personality types. The evidence generated by these four tables was unambiguous. In every case, the ministry expectations experienced by the curates were significantly related to the personality preferences of their training incumbent. In other words, extraverted incumbents were more inclined to place extravert expectations on their curate, while introverted incumbents were more inclined to place introvert expectations; sensing incumbents were more inclined to place sensing expectations on their curate, while intuitive incumbents were more inclined to place intuitive expectations; thinking incumbents were more inclined to place thinking expectations on their curates, while feeling incumbents were more inclined to place feeling expectations; judging incumbents were more inclined to place judging expectations on their curates, while perceiving incumbents were more inclined to place perceiving expectations. At the same times, Tables 7 to 10 demonstrate that in every case, the ministry expectations experienced by the curates were not positively related to the curates’ own personality profile. Indeed, the only statistically significant association between the curates’ ministry expectations and their own personality profile was in the opposite direction. In other words, perceiving curates were less likely to feel that they had placed on them expectations that were consistent with a perceiving ministry style.

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Discussion and Conclusion By drawing on psychological type theory, as originally proposed by Jung (1971) and developed and operationalized by a series of selfcompletion psychometric tests, including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985), the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1978), and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005), the present study has advanced the empirical assessment and psychological understanding of the experience of those engaged in the apprenticeship model of ministry in the early years after ordination in two ways. The first advance concerns offering a new model for assessing diverse ministry expectations in terms of the eight constructs derived from psychological type theory. Drawing on data provided by 98 Anglican curates during their initial years in ordained ministry, this study has proposed a series of eight 10-item scales designed to assess the emphasis placed on different aspects of ministry. Together these eight scales form the Tilley Index of Training Expectations (TITE). On the basis of satisfactory alpha coefficients, this instrument can be confidently commended for further application and development. In terms of the two orientations, introverted ministry expectations are characterized by working well in solitude, being private and self-contained, being careful about sharing ideas and thoughts, being energized by inner resources, finding things out independently, and thinking deeply before formulating answers. Extraverted ministry expectations are characterized by easily forming friendships with many different people, talking easily to almost anyone in informal situations, easily and quickly turning embarrassment into a joke, enjoying the spotlight in parish ministry, helping to get things going socially, and finding it easy to meet a lot of new people. In terms of the two perceiving processes, sensing ministry expectations are characterized by taking a step-by-step approach, being conventional rather than original, being practical in discussing ministry, taking detailed interest in the fabric of the church, paying attention to detail, and preferring to understand by starting with facts. Intuitive ministry expectations are characterized by using images and symbols with ease, preaching in an inventive and tentative way, being imaginative and speculative, welcoming vision for change, starting from the overall idea first then looking at the parts, and enjoying exploring ideas and possibilities.

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In terms of the two judging processes, thinking ministry expectations are characterized by being more concerned with peoples’ rights than their feelings, enjoying persuading people by arguments, being more focused on justice than peace, being comfortable with skeptical analysis, being clear about principles, and communicating truth more than enthusiasm. Feeling ministry expectations are characterized by being gentle rather than tough-minded with people, being pastoral more than prophetic, being always empathic towards others, having a clear awareness of personal feelings, valuing compassion above frankness, and enjoying pleasing others. In terms of the two attitudes, judging ministry expectations are characterized by finding daily routine a comfortable way to do things, working best when there are clear schedules, being punctual for appointments, having things decided and settled in advance, giving plenty of advance notice of agreed plans, and being methodical. Perceiving ministry expectations are characterized by working flexibly and spontaneously, not being upset by last minute changes, pulling things together well at the last minute, being comfortable with postponing decisions, behaving in an easy-going laid-back way, and being prepared to change plans. The second advance concerns the clear and unequivocal demonstration that the way in which curates perceive the ministry expectations placed on them by their training incumbent reflects the personality profile of their training incumbent but not of the curates themselves. This finding suggests that, during the formative years of apprenticeship ministry, training incumbents seem to be shaping their curate in their own image rather than enabling their curate to develop and to express his or her own distinctive approach to ministry in harmony with his or her own psychological type profile. This finding raises important questions about the apprenticeship model of clergy training and formation in the early years after ministry. These questions must start from the observation that there is currently clear diversity in the way in which ministry is construed by training incumbents, as reflected in the high standard deviations on all eight scales of the Tilley Index of Training Expectations. While the evidence suggests that training incumbents may be setting out to shape curates in their own image, there is no evidence to suggest that all training incumbents are looking to the same model of ministry. In other words, a variety of training incumbents are inclined to shape curates in the variety of their own images.

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Two somewhat different lines of argument could follow from these observations. On the one hand, if training incumbents are indeed required by the apprenticeship model to mould apprentice clergy in their own image, they might well find this approach met with greater success if they were assigned curates who shared their own psychological type preferences. At the same time, such a strategy might lead to fewer curates feeling misunderstood and misdirected by their training incumbent. Such a strategy, however, might lead to the unhelpful reinforcement of type preferences without the critical challenge that is capable of developing the less preferred aspects of the self. On the other hand, if training incumbents are required by the apprenticeship model not to mold apprentice clergy in their own image but to draw out the distinctive strengths of each individual apprentice entrusted to their charge, then training incumbents may require a highly specialized form of training to achieve this end. Such training might well profitably include programs designed to enhance self-awareness in terms of personal psychological type preferences and programs designed to broaden training skills in working with individuals reflecting diverse psychological type profiles. In other words, psychological type awareness programs might play a very crucial part in preparing training incumbents to fulfill the training functions entrusted to them. The present study proposed an innovative model of research designed to test the usefulness of psychological type theory to illuminate the experiences of curates during their initial years of ordained ministry. The findings have been illuminating and could lead to improving current practice. The study was, however, limited by the facts that it drew on a small number of curates (98), drawn from a small number of dioceses (3), over a few years (4). The appropriate scientific response to these limitations would be to seek to replicate the study with a larger and more representative sample. The findings from the present study also pose another research question. The evidence suggests that at present the psychological type profile of the training incumbent is crucial in shaping the ministry expectations placed on the curate. These ministry expectations would be consonant with the preferences of the curate if the curate shared the same psychological type profile as the training incumbent. The overall experience of curacy would be most satisfactory, therefore, for those curates who were in the situation of being matched (usually

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unintentionally) with the psychological type preferences of their training incumbent. Here is a research problem that could be subjected to empirical investigation. The research hypothesis would be that curates who were in the situation of being matched with the psychological type preferences of their training incumbent would be more satisfied with the overall experience of their curacy than curates who were not in this situation. References Burgess, N. (1998). Into deep water: The experience of curates in the Church of England. Rattlesden, UK: Kevin Mayhew. Cattell, R. B., Cattell, A. K. S., & Cattell, H. E. P. (1993). Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire: Fifth edition (16PF5). Windsor, UK: NFER-Nelson. Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1985). The NEO Personality Inventory. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Craig, C. L., Duncan, B., & Francis, L. J. (2006). Psychological type preferences of Roman Catholic priests in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 27, 157–164. doi:10.1080/13617670600849812 Craig, C., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2004). Psychological type and sex differences among church leaders in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 25, 3–13. doi:10.1080/1361767042000199004 Craig, C. L. Horsfall, T., & Francis, L. J. (2005). Psychological types of male missionary personnel training in England: a role for thinking type men? Pastoral Psychology, 53, 475–482. doi:10.1007/s11089-005-2588-8 DeVellis, R. F. (2003). Scale development: Theory and applications. London, England: Sage. Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1991). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Scales. London, England: Hodder and Stoughton. Francis, L. J. (2005). Faith and psychology: Personality, religion, and the individual. London, England: Darton, Longman and Todd. Francis, L. J. (2009). Psychological type theory and religious and spiritual experience. In M. De Souza, L. J. Francis, J. O’Higgins-Norman, & D. G. Scott (Eds.), International handbook of education for spirituality, care, and wellbeing (pp. 125–146). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9018-9_8 Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Butler, A. (2007). Psychological types of male evangelical Anglican seminarians in England. Journal of Psychological Type, 67, 11–17, 2007. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Horsfall, T., & and Ross, C. F. J. (2005). Psychological types of male and female evangelical lay church leaders in England, compared with United Kingdom population norms. Fieldwork in Religion, 1, 69–83, 2005. http:// www.equinoxjournals.com/FIR Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Whinney, M., Tilley, D., & Slater, P. (2007). Psychological profiling of Anglican clergy in England: Employing Jungian typology to interpret diversity, strengths, and potential weaknesses in ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology, 11, 266–284. doi:10.1515/IJPT.2007.17 Francis, L. J., Gubb, S., & Robbins, M. (2009). Psychological type profile of Lead Elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 30, 61–69. doi:10.1080/13617670902784568

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Francis, L. J., & Jones, S. H. (1999). The scale properties of the MBTI Form G (Anglicized) among adult churchgoers. Pastoral Sciences, 18, 107–126. Francis, L. J., Nash, P., Nash, S., & Craig, C. L. (2007). Psychology and youth ministry: Psychological type preferences of Christian youth workers in the United Kingdom, Journal of Youth Ministry, 5(2), 73–90. Francis, L. J., & Payne, V. J. (2002). The Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS): Ministry styles and psychological type among male Anglican clergy in Wales. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 13, 125–141. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Francis, L. J., Payne, V. J., & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male Anglican clergy in Wales. Journal of Psychological Type, 56, 19–23. http://www.capt.org/ research/psychological-type-journal.htm Francis, L. J., Penson, A. W., & Jones, S. H. (2001). Psychological types of male and female Bible College students in England. Mental Health, Religion, and Culture, 4, 23–32. doi:10.1080/13674670010011616 Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2002). Psychological types of male evangelical church leaders. Journal of Belief and Values, 23, 217–220. doi:10.1080/1361767022000010860 Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2008). Psychological type and prayer preferences: A study among Anglican clergy in the United Kingdom. Mental Health, Religion, and Culture, 11, 67–84. doi:10.1080/13674670701619445 Irvine, A. R. (1989). Isolation and the parish ministry. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of St Andrews. Jung, C. G. (1971). Psychological types: The collected works, volume 6. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Kay, W. K., & Francis, L. J. (2008). Psychological type preferences of female Bible College students in England. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 29, 101–105. doi:10.1080/13617670801928324 Kay, W. K., Francis, L. J., & Craig, C. L. (2008). Psychological type preferences of male British Assemblies of God Bible College students: Tough minded or tender hearted? Journal of the European Pentecostal Theological Association, 28, 6–20. http://www .eptaonline.com/ourjournaljepta.htm Keirsey, D., & Bates, M. (1978). Please understand me. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis. Myers, I. B., & McCaulley, M. H. (1985). Manual: A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Saggino, A., & Kline, P. (1995). Item factor analysis of the Italian version of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Personality and Individual Differences, 19, 243–249. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(95)00023-Y Thompson, B., & Borrello, G. M. (1986a). Construct validity of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 46, 745–752. doi:10.1177/ 0013164486463032 Thompson, B., & Borrello, G. M. (1986b). Second-order factor structure of the MyersBriggs Type Indicator: A construct validity assessment. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 18, 148–153. http://mec.sagepub.com/ Tilley, D. R. (2007). Are curates trained properly? Following up Burgess’s pathologies. Journal of Adult Theological Education, 4, 149–164. http://www.equinoxjournals .com/JATE Tischler, L. (1994). The MBTI factor structure. Journal of Psychological Type, 31, 24–31. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Tzeng, O. C. S., Outcalt, D., Boyer, S. L., Ware, R., & Landis, D. (1984). Item validity of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 255–256. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_4 Uhl, N., & Day, D. (1993). A cross-cultural comparison of MBTI factor structure. Journal of Psychological Type, 27, 3–10. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm

DO INTROVERTS APPRECIATE THE SAME THINGS AS EXTRAVERTS WITHIN A MINISTRY TEAM? A STUDY AMONG LEADERS WITHIN THE NEWFRONTIERS NETWORK OF CHURCHES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM Mandy Robbins,* Leslie J. Francis, and Andrew Ryland Abstract The aim of this study was to identify the characteristics of a ministry team valued by extravert leaders and to assess whether these characteristics were equally valued by introvert leaders. Data were provided by 154 leaders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the UK who completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales with a list of 55 qualities attributed to good ministry teams. These data identified nine key characteristics that were rated highly by extravert leaders but less highly by introvert leaders. These nine items cohered to produce a reliable scale of extraverted perceptions of a good ministry team (alpha = .71). The data supported the view that ministry teams formed to work well for extraverts may appeal less strongly to introverts. Keywords: extraversion, leadership, ministry, Newfrontiers Church, psychological type

Psychological type theory, as originally proposed by Jung (1971) and subsequently developed through instruments such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) and the Kiersey Temperement Sorter (Kiersey & Bates, 1978), has in recent years begun to make a useful contribution to pastoral and practical theology, through both conceptual and empirical studies. The conceptual approach has included studies of prayer (Michael & Norrisey, 1984), ministry (Oswald & Kroeger, 1988), congregations (Baab, 1998), and preaching (Francis & Village, 2008). The empirical approach has included studies of Anglican clergy (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley, & Slater, 2007), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan, & Francis, 2006), youth

* Author Note: Mandy Robbins, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Leslie J. Francis, Institute of Education, University of Warwick; Andrew Ryland, Beacon Church, Runnymede, UK. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leslie J. Francis, Warwick Religions & Education Research Unit, Institute of Education, The University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0)24 7652 2539, Fax: +44 (0)24 7657 2638. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

introverts and extraverts within a ministry team 307 ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash, & Craig, 2007) and lead elders serving within the Newfrontiers network of churches (Francis, Gubb, & Robbins, 2009). Psychological type theory distinguishes between two orientations (introversion and extraversion), two perceiving processes (sensing and intuition), two judging processes (thinking and feeling), and two attitudes toward the outer world (judging and perceiving). All four distinctions have been shown to be related to certain key aspects of church life or ministry. As the following review demonstrates, the orientations may be of particular interest in the area of ministry studies. The two orientations are concerned with where energy is drawn from; energy can be gathered either from the outside world or from the inner world. Extraverts (E) are orientated toward the outside world; they are energized by the events and people around them. They enjoy communicating and thrive in stimulating and exciting environments. They prefer to act in a situation rather than to reflect on it. They may vocalize a problem or an idea rather than think it through privately. They may be bored and frustrated by silence and solitude. They tend to focus their attention on what is happening outside themselves and may be influenced by the opinions of others. They are usually open people, easy to get to know, and enjoy having many friends. In contrast, introverts (I) are orientated toward their inner world; they are energized by their inner ideas and concepts. They may feel drained by events and people around them. They prefer to reflect on a situation rather than to act on it. They enjoy solitude, silence, and contemplation, as they tend to focus their attention on what is happening in their inner life. They may appear reserved and detached as they are difficult to get to know, and they may prefer to have a small circle of intimate friends rather than many acquaintances. In a study among 191 Anglican clergymen in Wales, Francis and Payne (2002) demonstrated a significant link between the orientations and preferred ways of doing ministry as conceptualized and assessed through the Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS). Extraverted clergy were significantly more likely than introverted clergy to value parish visiting, visiting groups of people, preaching to large congregations, meeting new people in the parish, leading large group meetings, leading worship with large congregations, and being out and about in the parish. In a study among 1,476 newly ordained Anglican clergy from England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, Francis and Robbins (2008)

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demonstrated a significant link between the orientations and preferred ways of praying as conceptualized and assessed by a specially constructed prayer preference inventory. Introverted clergy were significantly more likely than extraverted clergy to value praying alone, praying in silence, listening to God in silence, and developing personal stillness in prayer. Introverted clergy were significantly more likely than extraverted clergy to give preference to meditative prayer over open shared prayer. In a study among 3,715 clergy from a variety of denominations in Australia, England, and New Zealand, Francis, Robbins, Kaldor, and Castle (2009) demonstrated a significant link between the orientations and professional burnout as conceptualized and assessed by the Francis Burnout Inventory (FBI). Compared with clergy who prefer introversion, clergy who preferred extraversion displayed both higher levels of satisfaction in ministry and lower levels of emotional exhaustion in ministry. A key aspect concerning the differentiation between introversion and extraversion involves the interaction between the individual and other people. In essence, introverts may often do their best work alone, while extraverts may often do their best work alongside other people. Introverts may need to get away from other people in order to think clearly about their choices and strategies, while extraverts may need to talk things through with other people in order to clarify their choices and strategies. When things need to get done, introverts may prefer to tackle the task alone, while extraverts may need to do so with the support of and in the company of others. Such fundamental differences may carry profound implications for ways in which individual church leaders function as part of a leadership team and for the characteristics that they would find most desirable in a leadership team. No previous research has as yet addressed this specific issue. Church leadership functions in very different ways within different understandings of Church life. The Newfrontiers network of churches provides an interesting example of an emerging stream of growing congregations in which church policy places high emphasis on identifying, forming, and nurturing ministry or leadership teams. Two recent studies have employed psychological type theory to profile the personality of those called into leadership roles within Newfrontiers. In the first study, Francis, Gubb, and Robbins (2009) set out to examine the psychological type profile of Lead Elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom and to compare this profile

introverts and extraverts within a ministry team 309 with the established profile of clergymen in the Church of England. A sample of 134 Lead Elders completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales. The study showed that Newfrontiers Lead Elders displayed slight preferences for extraversion over introversion, for sensing over intuition, and for thinking over feeling and a strong preference for judging over perceiving. In the second study, Ryland, Francis, and Robbins (under review) turned attention to the psychological type profile of the wider leadership team. Data provided by 154 leaders suggested that the leadership teams reflected rather than complemented the strengths of the lead elders. Once again there were preferences for extraversion over introversion, for sensing over intuition, for thinking over feeling, and for judging over perceiving. Within the leadership team, the combined STJ preference accounted for 40% of the leaders, indicating a church that is well equipped with practical, organizational management rather than inspirational pastoral care. Extraverts may carry a particularly influential role in shaping the way in which ministry teams function, and this is for two reasons. Teams, and the social interaction on which they are based, are clearly located in the outer world, the domain in which extraverts are most comfortable. The processes and interactions from which teams derive their identity are fields in which extraverts naturally display skills. Against this theoretical background, the aim of the present study was to identify the characteristics of a good ministry team valued by extravert Newfrontiers leaders and to assess whether these characteristics were equally valued by introvert Newfrontiers leaders. Method Participants A total of 262 questionnaires were distributed to individuals serving in leadership roles within local churches associated with the Newfrontiers network, including elders, staff, volunteer leaders, and highly committed members sharing in leadership. The 154 respondents represented the satisfaction response rate of 59%. Of these respondents, 68 were male, 84 were female, and two failed to disclose their sex; 16 were under the age of 30, 27 were in their 30s, 49 were in their 40s, 37 were in their 50s, 17 were in their 60s, 7 were aged 70 or over, and two failed to disclose their age.

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Team perceptions were assessed by a set of 55 statements generated to reflect different perceptions of what constitutes a good ministry team. The items were generated by reflection on psychological type theory and experiences of ministry teams by individuals engaged in various ministries. Each item defined one proposed characteristic of a “good team” to which participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale: agree strongly, agree, not certain, disagree, and disagree strongly. Psychological type was assessed by the Francis Psychological Type Scale (FPTS: Francis, 2005). This 40-item instrument comprises four sets of 10 forced-choice items related to each of the four components of psychological type: orientation (extraversion or introversion), perceiving process (sensing or intuition), judging process (thinking or feeling) and attitude toward the outer world (judging or perceiving). Recent studies have demonstrated this instrument to function well in church-related contexts. For example, Francis, Craig, and Hall (2008) reported alpha coefficients of .83 for the EI scale, .76 for the SN scale, .73 for the TF scale, and .79 for the JP scale. Results The items of the orientation scale demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency reliability generating an alpha coefficient of .81 (Cronbach, 1951). Since the purpose of the present study was to examine the correlation between the preferences for introversion over extraversion and another continuous variable (perceptions of a good team), the continuous scale for the two orientations was employed rather than the discrete type categories that can be derived from this underlying continuous score. This orientation scale score can range from 0 (high introversion) to 10 (high extraversion). The other three scales also generated satisfactory alpha coefficients: perceiving process (sensing and intuition), .75; judging process (thinking and feeling), .76; attitude toward the outer world, .80. Step two of the data analysis correlated scores on the orientation scale with each of the 55 items concerned with perception of the characteristics that constitute a good ministry team. Nine of these correlations were statistically significant. These nine items were then combined to generate an index that distinguished between ways in which introverts and extraverts perceive teams. These items, comprising the new Scale

introverts and extraverts within a ministry team 311 Table 1. Scale of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team: Item-rest-of-test-correlations and Alpha Coefficient r Team meetings are always purposeful in a good team Internal team relationships are always warm and happy in a good team There is frequent social contact among team members (outside the team’s formal meetings) in a good team Decisions are made almost unconsciously by consensus in a good team Although really committed to the vision, there is always laughter and joking together in a good team Team members express truthfully what they really think and feel in a good team Team members enjoy working through details of implementation in a good team Possible solutions to new threats and opportunities are investigated and reported in writing in a good team There’s no negativity among team members, and everyone is positive and enthusiastic in a good team

.43

alpha

.71

.45 .35 .44 .32 .32 .19 .45 .35

of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team, are displayed in Table 1, together with the item-rest-of-test correlations and the alpha coefficient. The alpha coefficient of .71 demonstrated a satisfactory instrument. Step three in the data analysis confirmed the correlation between the new Scale of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team and the orientation scale generated by the Francis Psychological Type Scales (r = .329, p < .001). At the same time, no significant correlations were found between scores recorded on the new Scale of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team and the perceiving process (r = –.045, ns), and the attitude toward the outer world (r = .015, ns), although there was a significant negative correlation with the judging process (r = –.206, p < .05). Discussion and Conclusion The present study set out to examine the hypothesis that views on what constitutes a good ministry team varies between introverts and

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extraverts. This hypothesis was supported by the data. Two main conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the new Scale of Extraverted Perceptions of a Good Ministry Team helps to clarify those characteristics of a team that are more likely to be valued by extraverts than by introverts. Compared with leaders within the Newfrontiers network of churches who prefer introversion, leaders who prefer extraversion give greater emphasis: to team meetings being purposeful; to warm and happy internal team relationships; to frequent social contact among team members outside the teams formal meetings; to decisions being made almost unconsciously by consensus; to laughter and joking accompanying real commitment to the vision; to team members expressing truthfully what they really think and feel; to team members enjoying working through the details of implementation; to possible solutions to new threats and opportunities being identified and reported back; and to team members being positive and enthusiastic without any negativity. Second, the fact that these characteristics are less likely to be recognized and endorsed by introverts as key qualities of a good ministry team indicates that extraverts cannot expect their introverted colleagues to warm to the same experiences as they value themselves. As a consequence, extraverted team leaders may need to be cautious about building and nurturing teams entirely in their own extraverted image. The problem is that introverts, by their very nature, may be reticent about challenging extraverted leaders and then grow slowly and silently in their discontent regarding the ways in which the ministry team is going and developing. In other words, not everyone will see the strengths of the team in the same way, and the Jungian theory regarding the two orientations (introversion and extraversion) clearly goes some way to explaining why this discrepancy may be the case. There were clear limitations with the present study, however, which need to be addressed by future research building on these foundations. Further thought needs to be given to extending the scale of extraverted perceptions of a good ministry team and to developing a larger and more richly nuanced instrument. The association between the Jungian orientations (introversion and extraversion) and perceptions of the characteristics of a good ministry team demonstrated in the present study among a relatively small sample of leaders within the Newfrontiers network of churches needs to be tested among larger and more diverse samples of church leaders.

introverts and extraverts within a ministry team 313 While the present study set out to examine the specific issue regarding the extent to which introvert leaders valued the same things as extraverts within a ministry team, a comparable study is now needed to examine a parallel research question from the perspective of introvert leaders. References Baab, L. M. (1998). Personality type in congregations: How to work with others more effectively. Washington, DC: Alban Institute. Craig, C. L., Duncan, B., & Francis, L. J. (2006). Psychological type preferences of Roman Catholic priests in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 27, 157–164. doi:10.1080/13617670600849812 Cronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 16, 297–334. doi:10.1007/BF02310555 Francis, L. J. (2005). Faith and psychology: Personality, religion and the individual. London, England: Darton, Longman, and Todd. Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., & Hall, G. (2008). Psychological type and attitude toward Celtic Christianity among committed churchgoers in the United Kingdom: An empirical study. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 23, 181–191. doi:10.1080/ 13537900802024543 Francis, L. J., Craig, C. L., Whinney, M., Tilley, D., & Slater, P. (2007). Psychological profiling of Anglican clergy in England: Employing Jungian typology to interpret diversity, strengths, and potential weaknesses in ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology, 11, 266–284. doi:10.1515/IJPT.2007.17 Francis, L. J., Gubb, S., & Robbins, M. (2009). Psychological type profile of Lead Elders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom. Journal of Beliefs and Values, 30, 61–69. doi:10.1080/13617670902784568 Francis, L. J., Nash, P., Nash, S., & Craig, C. L. (2007). Psychology and youth ministry: Psychological type preferences of Christian youth workers in the United Kingdom. Journal of Youth Ministry, 5(2), 73–90. Francis, L. J. and Payne, V. J. (2002). The Payne Index of Ministry Styles (PIMS): Ministry styles and psychological type among male Anglican clergy in Wales. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 13, 125–141. http://www.brill.nl/rssr Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. (2008). Psychological type and prayer preferences: A study among Anglican clergy in the United Kingdom. Mental Health, Religion, and Culture, 11, 67–84. doi:10.1080/13674670701619445 Francis, L. J., Robbins, M., Kaldor, K., & Castle, K. (2009). Psychological type and work-related psychological health among clergy in Australia, England, and New Zealand. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 28, 200–212. Francis, L. J., & Village, A. (2008). Preaching with all our souls. London, England: Continuum. Jung, C. G. (1971). Psychological types: The collected works, volume 6. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Keirsey, D., & Bates, M. (1978). Please understand me. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis. Michael, C. P., & Norrisey, M. C. (1984). Prayer and temperament: Different prayer forms for different personality types. Charlottesville, VA: The Open Door. Myers, I. B., & McCaulley, M. H. (1985). Manual: A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

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Oswald, R. M., & Kroeger, O. (1988). Personality type and religious leadership. Washington, DC: The Alban Institute. Ryland, A., Francis, L. J., & Robbins, M. Called for leadership: Psychological type profile of leaders within the Newfrontiers network of churches in the United Kingdom. Manuscript submitted for publication.

THE ROLE OF ARCHETYPES AND JUNGIAN PERSONALITY TYPOLOGY IN BUILDING RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY: APPLYING JOHN BEEBE’S EIGHT PROCESS ARCHETYPAL MODEL THROUGH A CASE STUDY OF THE EXTRAVERTED INTUITIVE TYPE WITH INTROVERTED FEELING (ENFP) Christopher F. J. Ross* Abstract Beebe’s eight process archetypal model for Jungian type development is described and applied in a religious context through a portrait of an extraverted intuitive dominant type with auxiliary introverted feeling (ENFP). The defining features of each mental process in its most developed form are outlined. The eight developmental archetypes are described in order of their developmental role and in terms of the inflexion given to the mental process in that developmental position. The contributions and limitations of ENFPs to a religious group are explored, including the dependability of their enthusiastic connectivity, the nurturing aspect of inner valuing, the fluctuating nature of their ability to organize, and the deepening significance afforded by attention to specifics and details. Keywords: archetypes, Jung, psychological type, type dynamics, religion

Jung’s theory of archetype does not conform to the empiricist assumptions of mainstream American psychology and may in large measure account for the neglect of his Analytical Psychology in that mainstream. By contrast, Psychological Types (Jung, 1921/1971) has become the “acceptable face” of Analytical Psychology because it provided the intellectual and descriptive foundation, along with the observations of Myers and test development skills and insight of Briggs Myers, of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), the most widely used personality measure in the world today. Jungian analyst Beebe’s archetypal model of type development is important because it brings together

* Author Note: Christopher F. J. Ross, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid Laurier University. The author is indebted to Leslie Francis who first imagined and suggested a project with this scope and to Lauren Price who assisted with the final editing of the text. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Christopher F. J. Ross, Department of Religion and Culture, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Email: [email protected] Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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two aspects of Jung’s analytical psychology. The purpose of this article is to show how an archetypal approach to Jungian type development may enhance application of Jungian typology to religious issues and in particular to the development of community in a religious context. This article outlines a) the eight psychological processes foundational to Jung’s personality typology that the MBTI assays to measure; b) the eight archetypes that Beebe claimed have a distinct influence upon the role that a process may play in a particular personality type; and finally c) the application of the model in a religious context through an exploration of the functioning of an extraverted intuitive with introverted feeling (ENFP) in a religious community. Eight Mental Processes Foundational to Personality Psychology Because each of the eight mental processes (referred to by Beebe as function attitudes) are most recognizable when they are the dominant mental process, following the approach of Haas and Huniker (2006), each mental process will be described when manifested at that more differentiated level of development. According to Beebe’s model, the dominant mental process is deployed by the archetype of the hero enabling an individual to walk confidently down the path of life, reliably solving most of the problems encountered, especially those met in the early part of the human life cycle. In the third section with the portrait of the ENFP, each process will be described where, depending on the order of development into consciousness, the effect of the pertinent archetype may be illustrated for each of the eight mental processes. The Perceiving Processes There are two kinds of perceiving, sensing and intuition, that may operate in both the introverted and extraverted direction. Perceiving processes are, according to Jung, irrational in that they have no ratio (Latin for “order”) or ordering properties. Perceiving processes merely register what is there: “They do not proceed selectively according to principles, but are simply receptive to what happens. But ‘what happens’ is essentially irrational” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 539). Furthermore, as Haas and Huniker explained in Building Blocks of Personality Type: “Perception is considered to be irrational because no intentional

the role of archetypes

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editing process is involved in selecting the information to be taken in” (2006, p. 19). Sensing Perceiving Sensing is the function that “ascertains that something is there” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 371). Sensing contributes clarity and simplicity to consciousness: Well developed sensation is a comprehensive impression of life as filtered through the five senses. When well developed, this sensing occurs with a purity and clarity that is accurate and clear . . . It is far more in depth than a sheer interest in facts. (Anchors, 1989, p. 12)

It “is especially useful in relating to immediate reality” (Detloff, 1972, p. 67). Intuitive Perceiving Intuition is a form of perceiving that allows us to “see” the unseen (Ross, 1992, p. 84) by fading sensing details and drawing lines and patterns between the dots. As Jung put it, “we must be grateful unto heaven that we have such a function which gives a certain light on those things which are around the corner” (Jung, 1966, p. 16). Intuition orients to the context and cognizes wholes, the overall configuration that has some kind of meaning, and is concerned with possibilities. There is an involuntary aspect to intuition: “You do not make an intuition. On the contrary it comes to you; you have a hunch, it has to come by itself ” (Jung, 1958, p. 41). Briggs Myers described intuitions as “coming up from the unconscious with enticing visions of possibilities” (Briggs Myers, 1980, p. 57). Often language is involved unconsciously in the process of a natural clustering that forms in the perceiving awareness of the individual. Extraverted Sensing (Se) Through extraverted sensing, an individual is drawn to and energized by the external object, person, or situation just as a person when outdoors is warmed by the sun (Haas & Huniker, 2006). Extraverted sensing specifically connects individuals to the surrounding physical world, enabling delight in the sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and textures of the five senses. Jungian analyst Loomis wrote:

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christopher f. j. ross With extraverted sensation, individuals connect to the physical aspects of life, to the aromas and tastes, to the visual, tactile, and audible elements of our environment. It is through extraverted sensation that we enjoy or abhor music, sexuality, food, weather, décor. It is allows one to note details and to discriminate, for example, a pelican from a swan or burnt toast from hot apple pie, without judging one to be better than the other. (1991, p. 81)

For all personality types, extraverted sensation grounds individuals in the physical aspects of life: “All interactions in the physical realm are dependent upon the extraverted sensation function [which] keeps our feet on the ground and our mind in the here and now” (Loomis, 1991, p. 82). Introverted Sensing (Si) Introverted sensing is involved when an external stimulus is transformed into a mental content. To explain introverted sensing, Si, Jung used the example of several painters who paint the same garden but produce a different picture. The subjective factor is at the core of introverted sensing because the reactions of the perceiving subject are elevated above the properties of the object that is perceived: “[B]esides the sensed object, there is a sensing subject who adds his [sic] subjective disposition to the objective stimulus” ( Jung, 1921/1971, p. 378). Thomson amplified this subjective element in Si: “Only some things strike us as important, useful, familiar, or exciting [emphasis added] enough to convert into mental content—that is into facts that we retain over time” (1998, p. 169). Briggs Myers regarded introverted sensing as providing stability because it anchors the impression of the external object in the familiar field of previous impressions and makes comparisons. “They habitually compare past and present situations” (1980, p. 105). Thus, she concluded that those in whom Si is dominant “base their ideas on a deep solid accumulation of stored impressions” (1980, pp. 104–105). Thomson again underscored the hidden subjective element in Si: “[T]he facts we acquire by way of Introverted Sensation are more than information. They’re part of our self-experience. They define the specific nature of our passions and interests. They become our basis for taking in new data” (1998, p. 170). Thomson added: Knowing what matters provides a sense of continuity and security . . . [a] direction in the midst of crisis [helping us] weather a loss of faith that immediate feelings would not equip us to handle. All things flow away like water; the ground of our self experience remains. (1998, p. 171)


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She reminded us that through introverted sensation we are able to “reconcile new impressions with enduring beliefs and commitments” (1998, p. 171). Extraverted Intuition (Ne) Extraverted intuition, Ne, envisions possibilities in the external world and experiences their irresistible pull (Briggs Myers, 1980). Ne “strives to apprehend the widest range of possibilities inherent in the objective situation in contrast to extraverted sensation that ‘seeks the highest pitch of physical realism’ ” (Sharpe, 1987, p. 60). For Jung, extraverted intuition seeks out “new possibilities, [whereas] stable conditions suffocate,” and it has “a nose for anything new and in the making” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 368). Ne grasps “the sensory data as a pattern of changing [emphasis added] relationships” (Thomson, 1998, p. 197). Projects are for extraverted intuition what responding to facts is for introverted sensing. Extraverted intuition orients to the future, to what is “not yet”: “it conjures up a future before we know very much about the present” (Thomson, 1998, p. 197). Extraverted intuition is driven to build future possibilities from the tangible data at hand and to explore what could be. Every fact is explored for the potential embedded within it: Through a series of associations triggered by the external world, new possibilities are created. For example, given enough elements to suggest a star . . . we have a hard time not filling in the blanks and seeing the complete image of the star. [However] intuition can be dead wrong and still feel like knowledge. (Thomson, 1998, pp. 197–198).

Haas and Huniker (2006) defined extraverted intuition as 1) an information gathering process that 2) focuses on the external world, 3) seeking connections and relationships between the objects, people and events in the environment, with a view to 4) generating “realworld possibilities” (2004, p. 53). Introverted Intuition (Ni) Introverted intuition orients to inner images, metaphors and other patterns of meaning and conveys a sense of the backdrop of accumulated human experience. The images are triggered by external objects but become immediately and decisively detached from them (Jung, 1921/1971). Introverted intuition “searches for grand patterns, themes, and systems in order to understand the meaning and significance of everything” (Haas &

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Huniker, 2006, p. 68). For Jung, the inner images were laid down in what he called the collective unconscious, and they were mediated by archetypes that represent the distillation of intense experiences repeated since time immemorial. “[T]hese images of the unconscious, [are] produced in such inexhaustible abundance by the creative energy of life . . . [Such images] represent possible views of the world which may give life a new potential” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 400). Experiences arising from Ni carry great conviction of their own truth, giving rise to accusations of arrogance from those who do not share the intuition. Introverted intuition brings an inner vision of what may be possible (Myers, 1980) and, in contrast to extraverted intuition, is not concerned with “external possibilities but with what the external object has released within [emphasis added]” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 399). Introverted intuition provides an inner vision that transcends the present moment and puts present trials and triumphs into a wider context. Haas and Huniker (2006) defined introverted intuition as (1) an information gathering process that (2) focuses on the subjective, internal world of the unconscious (3) seeking connections and relationships between the contents of the unconscious, in order to (4) discover underlying significance, systems and meaning. The Judging Processes For both Jung and Briggs Myers, there were two ways of coming to a conclusion or closure about what is perceived, one based on thinking and one based on feeling. Furthermore, each was capable of expression in the introverted or extraverted direction. Often we use these conclusions in order to make a decision or to form a judgement. Accordingly, Briggs Myers called these judging processes. Jung described these four processes as rational processes because following the Latin etymological root—ratio (order)—he considered that each of these processes operated in different ways but with the shared aim of bringing order to perceptions. Thinking Judgment The thinking function operates with language and concepts to name, label, or define an experience which then becomes another object of awareness in its own right (Ross, 2010). In describing thinking judgment, Briggs Myers (1980) emphasised the impersonal and purely


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logical basis on which thinking operates to bring order to perceptions. Jung wrote: “[B]y thinking I mean the function of intellectual cognition and the forming of logical conclusions” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 518). Thomson described thinking as organizing multiple objects of consciousness to “establish logical relationships between them” (1998, p. 254). For Beebe (2004), defining by naming was the key activity of the mental process of thinking. Feeling Judgment Jung described feeling as “a process, moreover, that imparts to the content [of consciousness] a definite value . . . Valuation by feeling extends to every content of consciousness, of whatever kind it may be” (Jung, 1957/1977, p. 435). Feeling orders perceptions by assigning them value in a particular context (Briggs Myers, 1980). Thus, feeling is a general ordering function that extends beyond contents that have an obvious affective or emotional component (Ross, 1992). Extraverted Thinking (Te) Extraverted thinking operates when a logical external orientation predominates (Jung, 1957/1977) and organizes the external world in a logical way. Briggs Myers described Te as “naturally organizing or regulating the external situation through the methodical application of critical analysis” (1980, p. 85). Extraverted thinking proceeds by inductive logic: a) evaluates the past: When “this” happened, then “that” resulted. Therefore, now b) if I/we do “this,” “that” will happen again. If the “that” is a good (i.e., a chosen goal), then the “if we do this” is transformed by our extraverted thinking into an “ought,” a “should,” or even a “must.” Extraverted thinking enjoys developing relevant standards to guide decisions, and for this reason feels a drive to structure and organize the external world through a common system of guiding rules. The most universal example might be the law of reciprocity or golden rule that is expressed in most religions, including Christianity: “Do to others what you would like them to do to you” (Matthew 7: 12). Te pushes for equality with regard to basic universal moral principles: “Equal treatment before the law” is a sine qua non of extraverted thinking. Te is more concerned with maintaining systems that effectively take care of people than with direct one-on-one care. For extraverted thinking, it is a matter of “responsibility, honor, and knowledge to

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keep faith with certain principles of order” (Haas & Huniker, 2006, p. 74). Haas and Huniker (2006) defined extraverted thinking as (1) a decision making process (2) directed toward the external world, that seeks (3) to institute systems of organization in order to (4) assign information within an appropriate system, through (5) a process of comparison based on objective and preferably quantifiable criteria. Introverted Thinking (Ti) Jung emphasised the role of the subjective element at the start of his description of introverted thinking: “Introverted thinking is primarily oriented by the subjective factor” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 380). Beebe amplified the subjective aspect of Ti: “Introverted thinking has to reflect on whether a particular construction really accords with the conviction of inner truth, regardless of what the received opinion might be” (Beebe, 2004, p. 96). When thinking is introverted, principles are distilled from a network of logical relationships. These principles form the foundation of the analytic framework, and they are applied to a range of phenomena. Isabel Briggs Myers described Ti as “primarily interested in the underlying principles.” These principles organize concepts and ideas when paired with intuition as the auxiliary or organize facts when paired with sensing. Ti’s mode of operating is “analytical and impersonal.” “Introverted thinkers use their thinking to analyze the world, not to run it” (Briggs Myers, 1980, p. 89). Sharpe also contrasted introverted and extraverted thinking: [W]here extraverted thinking seeks to get the facts straight and then think about them, introverted thinking is concerned with the clarification of ideas . . . Both excel at bringing order to life; one works from the outside in, the other [introverted thinking] works from the inside out.” (1987, p. 70)

Haas and Huniker (2006) defined introverted thinking as (1) a decision making process, (2) focused on the subjective, internal world of precisely intersecting underlying principles and truths, and to that end (3) creates original categories and systems, (4) assigning all information to a place within an appropriate framework (5) based upon logical analysis.


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Extraverted Feeling (Fe) Extraverted feeling, like extraverted thinking, is a rational, ordering mental process oriented to the external world, that seeks to organize whatever is perceived there (Sharpe, 1987). Both extraverted rational processes help construct and, in turn, “adapt us to consensual reality—the standards of reason that characterise a particular society, which determines its conventions and expectations” (Thomson, 1998, p. 317). However, unlike extraverted thinking which proceeds on the basis of detached cause-effect analysis, the priority for extraverted feeling is to make judgments and determinations in harmony with “generally accepted values of some kind” on the basis of human relatedness (Thomson, 1998, p. 317). According to Jung, Fe automatically adjusts us to the social situation (1921/1971), and so without extraverted feeling, “a ‘civilized’ social life would be virtually impossible” (Sharpe, 1987, p. 50). Indeed Jung claimed: “This kind of feeling is very largely responsible for the fact that so many people flock to the theatre or concerts, or go to church, and do so with their feelings appropriately adjusted” (Jung, 1921/1971, p. 354), especially in relation to the feelings of other people. Extraverted feeling actively “seeks to connect with the feelings of others” (Beebe, 2004, p. 96) and “value[s], above all, harmonious human contacts” and is invaluable “in situations where needed co-operation can be won by good will” (Myers, 1980, p. 93). Haas and Huniker (2006) defined extraverted feeling as a (1) decision making process, (2) focussed on the objective external world, that (3) creates and draws upon systems of cultural values in which (4) everything is assigned an appropriate place (5) based on a qualitative and relational basis, so that (6) choices can be made and actions initiated that optimize harmony in the outer world. Introverted Feeling (Fi) “Still waters run deep” captures the hidden warmth that forms the core of introverted feeling for Briggs Myers and is how Jung introduced introverted feeling (1921/1971, p. 388). Briggs Myers was herself an introverted feeling type and wrote: Introverted feeling types have a wealth of warmth and enthusiasm, but they may not show it until they know someone well. They wear their warmth inside, like a fur-lined coat. Reliance on feeling leads them to judge everything by personal values; they know what is most important to them, and they protect it at all costs. (1980, p. 97)

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According to Haas and Huniker (2006) introverted feeling is the most subjective of the four decision making processes and the only one of the eight mental processes that has a non-negotiable element. The beliefs held by our introverted feeling are personal and not influenced by the established value systems of their culture. Introverted feeling cherishes inner harmony above all else. Work and other activities are required to accord with basic values, with what really matters as understood by the individual. Fi is loyal to inner values and the ideals they inspire. These values are non-negotiable, and provide an inner certainty that is foundational to life, supplying it with great direction, power, and purpose. Haas and Huniker (2006) defined introverted feeling as (1) a decision making process, that is (2) focussed on the subjective internal world of absolute personal value systems, and (3) assesses all things based upon whether they uphold these values, conflict with them, or have no impact, in order to (4) create and maintain inner harmony and to be true to themselves. Eight Archetypes Associated with Levels of Type Development The genius of Beebe’s eightfold archetype theory of type development has been to draw on his 40 years of clinical experience as a Jungian analyst and to reflect, over the course of his life cycle, on the intimate disclosures and dreams of his clients and his own struggles toward the Jungian vision of individuation, the human process of becoming un-divided. Beebe selected eight archetypes that he believed best conveyed the nuance and nature of each level of function-attitude development as each became differentiated from the unconscious through conscious orientation. Each selected archetype epitomizes the role played when a mental process is differentiated at a particular stage in the life cycle. The process is used to respond and adapt creatively to the demands of an individual’s internal and external environments at that life-stage. As Beebe so eloquently put it, “the functions are carried into consciousness on the backs of the archetypes” (Beebe, 2006b, p. 40). Beebe’s assumption was that patterning capacities deep within the human psyche and laid down through the collective unconsciousness register repeated human experience, and in turn organize and


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shape the unfolding of eight core cognitive processes. The archetype that carries the cognitive process into consciousness in this way will give inflection and atmosphere to the unfolding of that process at a particular point in the individual’s life cycle. The Conscious Personality The conscious personality is the term that Beebe applied to the psychological functional system described by traditional Jungian type theory in terms of the dominant, auxiliary, tertiary, and inferior functions. The Hero Carries the Dominant Function-Attitude (Mental Process) In the western cultural tradition, humans are required to be singular, unified individuals, and by the end of childhood and the transition to adolescence, one of the eight psychological functions has been drawn or commandeered into a heroic coping role. Life is frequently experienced as a challenge, and part of the journey of the school-age child is to come to rely on one function attitude to meet the challenge. The stabilization of a dominant function enables the school-age child to be seen as competent and gifted, and, in an acknowledging family, to feel remarkable. Nonetheless, the heroic dominant mental process is reliable rather than romantic (Beebe, 2007a). This also the period of life when the child is not only told the heroic stories, of King Arthur, St George, or the Biblical Ruth but develops the narrative memory to recall them (Fowler, 1976). The dominant process has usually stabilized by late childhood. The heroic dominant function-attitude is appreciated by self and others because it can be relied upon to cope with many of life’s challenges. Beebe stated “the heroic archetype is that part of the psyche that welcomes facing challenges, that takes pleasure in recalling its past successful exploits, that revels in its unflagging reliability” (Beebe 2007a, p. 3). However, the dominant process may succumb to megalomania, thinking itself to be the “only game in town”; that is, the only mental process available to consciousness. The hero entertains the fantasy that it can function on its own and be a recipe for complete stability in the face of any event or trial. Indeed, according to Beebe, the heroic process can be somewhat of a bore: Prone to grandiosity, it insists on being consulted at all times. Yet because it is always around, the dominant process becomes invisible and so often goes unnoticed.

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Asking an individual to experience or “see” our dominant function is akin to asking a fish about water. What water? It is invisible because it surrounds and permeates psychological life. The Auxiliary Function-Attitude Acts as a Nurturing Parent The second or auxiliary function balances out the effect of the dominant function (Myers 1980). Whereas Beebe regarded the dominant as forming part of our psychological spine around which forms our sense of personal identity, the auxiliary process, for its part, constitutes the “right arm: of our personality” (Beebe, 2007b, p. 22). The auxiliary function gives us something helpful to offer others. The archetype that carries the auxiliary function is best described as the “good” or nurturing parent. This second function to differentiate into consciousness, usually in adolescence, is the means by which an individual reaches out to others through relationship: how she or he nurtures, illuminates, or protects others. The mental process that develops second, usually in adolescence, tends to have the quality of the emerging individual’s own inner nurturing parent, enabling greater functional autonomy from the actual parents (Beebe 2007b). The nurturing parental qualities of empathy, understanding, compassion, and caring coalesce in personalized form in the collective unconscious and find common imagined expression in varying forms in otherwise disparate cultures, such as the White Buffalo Woman among North American First Nations and Mary the Mother of Jesus in Christian Catholic and Orthodox cultures. By the same token, the now slowly changing archetype of the good father is incorporating the qualities of both care and protection. The auxiliary process provides psychological balance. If the dominant function is in the introverted attitude, then the auxiliary will be extraverted, and vice versa. Furthermore if the dominant is a perceiving function, then the auxiliary will be a judging function, and vice versa. The auxiliary mental process fills out the personality not only because of its cognitive contrast (a judging versus perceiving process) and direction (extraverted versus introverted) to the dominant function but also in regard to the archetypal energy that enfolds it. Finally, whereas the dominant function anchors the individual’s identity, the sense of self, auxiliary provides a basis for relationality: positive connection to others (Myers & Kirby, 1998).


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The Tertiary Function Is Carried by the Archetype of the Eternal Child The tertiary function attitude is the mirror opposite of the auxiliary function, and as such it forms the “other arm” of an individual’s psychological relational life. Since the tertiary usually needs to follow on from the development of the auxiliary, the earliest opportunity for its differentiation into consciousness is usually when individuals are in their 20s. Beebe considered that the psychological space or temenos in which this third function develops is fostered by the archetype of the eternal child, what Carl Jung and subsequent Jungian analysts referred to as the puer aeturnus and puella aeterna (Von Franz, 1981). The manner of development whereby this third process differentiates into consciousness resembles that of a child who oscillates between woundedness on the one hand and creativity on the other hand (Beebe, 2006). Thus, the process in this position within the human psyche has a complex bi-polar demeanor wherein delightful innocence mixes with vulnerability. Often the tertiary process functions as if it needs the protection and the nurturing approval of another person’s good parental auxiliary function (Beebe 2007b). The tertiary process is painfully aware of its need for admiration guidance and external strength, and use of the tertiary function can also trigger regression to a wounded child that has not fully healed from earlier trauma. Though brilliant and winning, compared to the two previous more experienced and conscious functions, the tertiary is quite volatile: sometimes divine, frequently wounded, like Icarus in the Greek legend, for whom Daedelus, his father, fashioned wax wings that melted when overly enthusiastic Icarus flew too close to the sun and plummeted (Beebe 1988). For an ENFP (an extraverted intuitive type with auxiliary introverted feeling), the tertiary function will be extraverted thinking. The Fourth or Inferior Function Is Carried by the Archetype of the Soul-mate or Soul-friend The fourth process to differentiate into consciousness, traditionally known as the Inferior Function, is the mirror opposite of the dominant function, both in regard to function and the direction of expression or attitude (Jung 1921/1971; Von Franz 1979; Quenk 1993). This fourth function is embedded in an archetype of contra-sexual energy, what Jungian analysts have referred to as the anima in men and the animus in women. According to Jung, particular images of the opposite sex

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that vary from individual to individual possess the power to evoke a certain energy that has been described as soul, reflected in such terms as soul-mate or soul-friend, and they are associated with a sense of profound connection that transcends mere contact between the egos of two individuals. In Beebe’s eight process model of personality type, the role of the fourth function is elevated. In his view, the fourth process, when eventually made conscious, is no longer merely the inferior of the dominant. The fourth, through its dynamic connection and conscious connection to the dominant function, provides the foundational structure, the psychological spine, for the whole conscious personality (composed of the first four functions). Familiarity with the mental process that occupies this basal position in the psyche, together with awareness of the powerful currents of the contra-sexual archetypes, transforms the personality. The rejected inferior becomes the foundation, as Jesus declared: “The stone that the builders rejected has become the head of the corner” (Mark 12:10, Psalm 118:22–23). The hitherto neglected inferior function provides a sense of mission that has the capacity to inspire the integration of the four functions of the conscious personality and provide passage to the shadow personality. For the extraverted intuitive dominant with auxiliary introverted feeling, the fourth mental process to develop will be the mirror opposite of the dominant: introverted sensing, which will be described in the final section of the article. The Shadow Personality Four mental processes (function-attitudes) make up the shadow personality. As with the four function attitudes that comprise the conscious personality, each function attitude tends to be embedded within, and affected by, a particular archetypal pattern. The four archetypes of the shadow personality contrast those of conscious personality. Until these shadow function attitudes are identified and brought into awareness and used to orient an individual’s consciousness, these shadow processes are known only indirectly, manifesting as problems with other people, through the operations of the defense mechanism of projection. Thus, during the first half of human life, these archetypes of an individual’s later-to-emerge function-attitude operate in their shadow aspect, tending to mislead and “fight dirty” to use Beebe’s phrase (Beebe, 2004, p. 105).


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The fifth mental process is the same function as the heroic dominant function but directed in the opposite attitude. This process is drawn into consciousness by the archetype of the opposing personality, and it is often experienced as an adversary, opposed to how an individual routinely operates, often manifesting as a clash of wills with another person. The sixth function is managed under the archetypal auspices of the forbidding or negative parent resembling the traditional Jungian senex-witch archetype, which is the shadow aspect of the auxiliary function that is managed by the nurturing or good parent. The psychological location of the seventh function is imbued with the archetype of the trickster, who helps individuals escape double binds. This function parallels the tertiary function associated with the eternal child, but it is expressed in the opposite energetic direction. The last and most challenging function is mediated by the archetype of the demon/daemon (angel) and is the opposite function of dominant function but operates in the same directional world as the dominant function attitude. In its unintegrated aspect, the eighth function attitude serves to undermine the individual’s dominant way of operating. The Opposing Personality: The Archetype that Manages the Function-Attitude that Parallels the Dominant Function but Is Expressed in the Opposing Attitude The archetypal character of the opposing personality influences the mental process that has the same function as the dominant but is expressed in the opposite attitude or direction. The function attitude in this position falls “into the blind-spot” of the dominant function. Because of its obscured position it is hard to see in ourselves and so tends to be projected onto others and their “bad” behavior. It acts as an adversary toward the heroic dominant function, often embarrassing it. Von Franz wrote: Jung has said that the hardest thing to understand is not your opposite type—if you have introverted feeling it is very difficult to understand an extraverted thinking type—but it is even worse to understand [extraverted feeling] the same functional type with the other attitude! There one feels that one doesn’t know how the wheels go round in that person’s head, one cannot feel one’s way into it. (1979, p. 52)

As with the soul-figures that carry the fourth or inferior function, the opposing personality is often represented in dreams and dramas as a contra-sexual figure. However, the figure is oppositional and is

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anything but soulful: It may be avoidant, passive-aggressive, and even paranoid. The mental process in the opposing position in an individual’s psyche tends to be triggered when our heroic dominant function and “its most cherished values is [perceived to be] under attack” (Beebe, 2007a, p. 5), or simply when the features of the function in that position are called forth by the requirements of a particular situation. The Forbidding Negative Parent archetype, Senex or Witch, Carries the Sixth Mental Process into Consciousness The mental process that is usually the sixth one to be developed is carried into consciousness by the archetype of the negative or forbidding parent. This process shares the same cognitive function as the auxiliary but is expressed in the opposite attitude, and so it lies in the shadow of the auxiliary function that is influenced by the archetype of the good or nurturing parent. If the auxiliary is expressed in the introverted attitude, the sixth function will be extraverted and vice versa. The function of the mental process in this position in the individual’s psychological economy is to block and immobilize threats to survival in the face of new energy and change, often by demoralizing the inspirations of the soulful energy associated with the anima or animus. At its most benign, the process occupying this archetypal position presents and projects a protective wisdom that knows best. Shaming, blaming, and other morally questionable methods of setting limits and boundaries may be ruthlessly deployed. There is a “witch-like” part in most individuals that is willing to use power, casting spells or curses, if need be, in order to immobilize forces that seem to threaten that individual’s survival. The equivalent male archetypal figure to the female witch is the senex, an old man who dogmatically clings to the tried and true and is even willing to arrogantly pull rank in order to resist any change that is experienced as threatening to the status quo in general and to his own personal privilege in particular. Pompous condescension thwarts youthful exploits and creativity (Beebe, 2004; 2006b; 2007b). The effect on those who are experienced as threatening is for them to “doubt the prudence of everything that they are doing” (Beebe, 2007b, p. 25) as result of physical menacing, overt criticism, or cold silence displayed by a senex figure.


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The Trickster Archetype Nuances the Mental Process in the Shadow Position of the Tertiary Function The trickster archetype influences the expression of the mental process that shares the same function as the mental process in the tertiary position but is oriented in the opposite direction, extraverted when the latter is introverted and vice versa. The trickster archetype breaks cultural rules: a) norms of “seriousness” by being playful, humorous, or simply unpredictable; b) rules of ownership by stealing (fire, for example, by Prometheus in Greek myth); c) customs of fidelity (e.g., Judas kissing Jesus); or of d) gender by Coyote morphing between male and female in the myths of the First Nations of the North American Plains. The mental process under the archetypal influence of the trickster is employed to help the individual escape double binds, which are themselves tricky situations that trap an individual and are often recognizable by a thought such as “Someone or something is taking advantage of me in this situation!” The mental process is used to turn the tables and “reverse expectations” to foil compliance that is manipulatively engineered (Beebe, 2007b, pp. 24–25). The mental process in the trickster position may also actively lead an individual into tricky situations. The process in this archetypal position tends to be even less consistent and trustworthy than the already volatile and unreliable child-like tertiary function. The trickster process is able to deceive an individual into thinking something is important and worth our attention when it is not (Berens & Nardi, 2004). By the same token, it can mislead individuals into skipping over something when serious attention should in fact be given. The Demonic/Daemonic Archetype Carries the Mental Process That Is Usually the Last to Be Brought Into Consciousness The mental process that has the opposite function of the dominant mental process but shares the same attitude as the dominant is the mental process that is most troublesome to the individual and to those in that individual’s world. Beebe claimed: “The Demonic Personality is usually the locus of our most unyielding and uncompromising flaws of character. When we act beastly, it is often through this archetype and its associated function attitude” (2007a, p. 5). As the opposite of our dominant mental process but expressed in the same attitude, our eighth function attitude clashes directly with the operation of our dominant mental process. In its demonic aspect, the

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eighth function-attitude directly undermines whatever is encountered. Haas and Hunziker stated: “It is capable of great distortion, causing confusion and chaos, and disrupting trust” (2006, p. 179). The effect of the mental process deployed in this position is often destructive and the source of regret in that person’s life. Occasionally a daemonic or angelic aspect of the mental process emerges effecting a surprising transformation (Berens & Nardi, 2004). Sometimes the impact of the demonic mental process is softened, when the function expressed in its opposite orientation, the fourth mental process, becomes integrated with the help of the contra-sexual soulful energy of the anima/us. The hitherto demonic mental process transforms into a daemon and “becomes a source for the infusion of redemptive spirit” (Beebe, 2006b, p. 42). Beebe interpreted the fairy tale of Beauty and the Beast as depicting the dynamic relationship that Beauty, the soul-connecting fourth function, has with our often oaflike eighth function, the Beast. An Archetypal Type Portrait: What the Extraverted Intuitive Leader with Introverted Feeling (ENFP) Brings to Building Religious Community The Conscious Personality 1st process: Heroic extraverted intuition, Ne (the dominant). When Ne is the dominant mental process, it occupies the archetypal heroic position in the psychological life of that individual. ENFPs rely on their extraverted intuition, depending on their capacity to see patterns and possibilities, and they use this mental process as an essential means for coping with life, including their paid and volunteer activities. These are usually extensive and may include religion; this type was the most frequent intuitive type in a study of four Catholic congregations (Ross, 1995) and the fourth most frequent type among clergy (Ross, 2011). For these types, Ne is a source of stability, a part of feeling normal, and is so integral to everyday functioning that it is only noticed when its use is stymied. Extraverted intuitives make ideal leaders for building community in a religious context, especially in changing circumstances, readily connecting with people, emerging situations, and the possibilities these bring. They are “in the moment” (Thomson, 1998, p. 215), and definitely not guardians of the status quo, and so they serve as a natural


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foil to the perspectives and priorities of the sensing-judging (SJ) guardian types that often constitute the largest Keirsey temperament subgroup (Keirsy, 1987) in Christian communities or in any religious community (Poling, 1986). ENFP ministers will automatically see the big picture for their church community. This will feel like a “breath of fresh air” to other NF “idealists,” the next largest temperament subgroup in liberal protestant and Catholic congregations. ENFP clergy may be particularly appreciated by church members who are themselves ENFPs and also to INFPs, both of whom form significant subgroups in all but conservative evangelical congregations (Ross, 1993, 1995). Since ENFP leaders habitually use imagination to handle the world, there may be pride, or even arrogance, that this is the only open, natural way to face life’s challenges: to look beyond the immediate facts of the situation and anticipate the implications. Berens and Nardi (2004) warned that “they may overdo interpretations and read other people’s minds without checking” for accuracy. They may become “too fragmented with flights of ideas or want continuously to make changes [in order] to incorporate their [emphasis added] latest insights not settling on any long enough to see their ideas brought to fruition” (p. 48). To other types, extraverted intuitives may seem to lack realism and to underestimate the time, patience, and attention to detail required for lasting change. They tend to become bored and restless, especially in committees when they cannot envisage or implement change. They pass over or pass on details of administration, much to the frustration of the many in a religious community with SJ preferences, especially the STJs who may think her/him irresponsible. This sentiment may be shared by those in the church hierarchy, such as presbytery chairpersons and bishops who tend to be STJs, thus producing conflict and resistance. This may restrict their impact and potentially immense contribution of adaptation and response to emerging trends, much to the detriment of the religious institution as a whole. Meanwhile, their peers, while sympathetic to their creative projects, feel that their ENFP colleagues lack the maturity or patience to deal with the frustrations of the politics involved in renegotiating the rules and dealing with others insecurity concerning change. 2nd process: Nurturing with introverted feeling, Fi (the auxiliary process). For ENFPs, introverted feeling (Fi) is their auxiliary function. As the second mental process to develop, it is associated with the archetype of the “good” or nurturing parent. Berens and Nardi

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(2004) described the nurturing role introverted feeling in ENFPs in these terms: “Like a supportive parent, they are helpful when they key in on their values and stay with what is important to themselves and other individuals” (p. 48). Fi enables individuals to reflect upon their emotions and use them to identify what matters to themselves and others and to connect these to universally held values that transcend external conventions (Berens & Nardi, 2004). When developed into consciousness, which usually occurs in adolescence, Fi can function as the right arm of their personality, a way to reach out to others in a positive manner. Fi enhances their role in a religious community since Fi enables ENFPs to hone in upon their own and others’ deeply held values and nurture others by quietly cherishing and respecting what each congregant holds dear. The integration of introverted feeling provides stability and an inner compass to the extraverted intuitive: It helps ENFP leaders develop and maintain a firm inner integrity whereby their values are used to guide their decisions. When auxiliary introverted feeling is adequately developed, the welter of ideas, attitudes, and possible behaviors that swirl in their extraverted intuition are able to be judged against inner values. Without this inner compass, their heroic extraverted intuition ENFP ministers may stray off into “the sky blue yonder” or a daring inner city project started without sufficient funding or political support. Through this mental process of deep sensitivity, ENFP ministers give to others. Many congregants will be grateful for the deep caring of a quiet presence that they feel one-on-one with an ENFP minister whom hitherto they had only known through her or his effusive imaginative enthusiasm. In fact, this deep valuing that is the essential process of introverted feeling is what sustains a modulated and adaptive response to all the myriad of possibilities picked up by the radar- like antennae of the heroic ENFP’s extraverted intuition. This will be particularly appreciated by the introverted feeling types in the community, a significant subgroup in Canadian Anglican (especially INFPs: Ross, 1993) and Catholic congregations (especially ISFPs: Ross, 1995). However, these introverted feeling types may feel disconcerted when the intense feeling focus is jerked away by the ENFPs’ extraverted intuitive radar at the periphery of their minister’s vision. 3rd process: Extraverted thinking, Te, influenced by the eternal child archetype (the tertiary). For extraverted intuitives with introverted feeling, the third or tertiary process to develop is usually extraverted


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thinking. In this third position of psychological development, it is influenced by the archetype of the eternal child, puer or puella energy. This archetype complements the archetype of the auxiliary function, the good parent; whereas a nurturing parent is usually consistent, the mark of children is a winning energy that oftentimes rapidly fades, sometimes producing “unforgivable” behavior in its wake (Beebe, 2006b, p. 40). Extraverted thinking, therefore, in this position is quite charming, but it is subject to fatigue, with its productivity being unreliable. Thus, volatility may characterize the use of Te by the ENFP leader, at least until Te becomes more fully integrated into consciousness. This archetypal energy means that the use of extraverted thinking by ENFP leaders often has a disarming, even endearing, innocence but can be exasperating in its unreliability. Berens and Nardi (2004, pp. 48–49) described how Te emerges in ENFPs. Sometime in their 20s or 30s, ENFPs start to “enjoy organizing data, space, or clutter to make life flow better,” detect when something is not working, and “know where they are in a process.” They show a renewed respect for testing their ideas, and they accept the needs of others to have evidence and explanations for even small decisions. Such patience may be particularly welcomed by community members with TJ type preferences, those who have extraverted thinking as their dominant or auxiliary process: a subgroup forming up to a third of the general church community (Bramer, 1996) or as high as 44% among male Canadian Catholic men (Ross, 1995). Those with extraverted thinking preferences will likely appreciate the ENFP leader for the newfound concern for order and consistency regarding some projects and will be impressed at the written plan that the inspirational ENFP has put together. However, because tertiary Te is under the bipolar influence of childlike archetypal energy, these same TJ parishioners may be dismayed at the sudden wane of interest on the part of their ENFP leader, for example, when the time comes for revisions to the plan, successive budget submissions, details of implementation, or requests for periodic review and accountability. TJs’ trust is not deepened when they sense or actually hear from the ENFP the impatient reaction “Why don’t you trust me?” Thomson amplified the double-edged aspect of ENFPs’ extraverted thinking. When they use Te well: [it] helps them set priorities and to respect the priorities of others. Marshaled to protect an Intuitive [heroic] function under siege, however, Extraverted Thinking is egocentric. It convinces ENFPs that others

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christopher f. j. ross should respect their priorities. From an Intuitive standpoint, of course, a priority is whatever the ENFP is responding to right now. (1998, p. 220)

However, when Te is deployed non-defensively, it allows the ENFP leaders to bring more of their community members along with them on their new project. When integrated, Te provides a second string to their assertiveness, based on reason as well as inspiration. 4th process: Magically connective introverted sensing, Si (carried by the contra-sexual anima or animus archetype). For extraverted intuitives with introverted feeling, the fourth or inferior process to develop is introverted sensing, Si, characterized by a concern for facts and details, and the mirror opposite of their dominant process (Quenk, 1993). In this fourth position of psychological development, Si is influenced by the contra-gender archetype of the animus in women and anima in men. Before Si is integrated, it is usually experienced as a reaction to stress (Quenk, 2000) and can be the source of shame (Beebe, 2007). ENFPs are stressed by routine and attention to detail, along with over-close supervision and rules that stifle intuition. Un-integrated Si comes into play as a compensation for the overuse of intuition in mid-life, giving rise on occasion to un-realistic yearning for absolute stability and security by ENFP (Thomson, 1998): a “future life that is set, with conventional trappings” (Berens & Nardi, 2004, p. 49). When in the grip of un-integrated inferior introverted sensing, the usually positive and flexible ENFP leader may become a caricature of an ISFJ or ISTJ, exhibiting an uncharacteristic pessimism, narrow focus, and tunnel vision, described by one ENFP as “[a] sense of feeling numb and frozen with no way out” (Quenk, 2000, p. 42). Other signs of being “in the grip” are a) obsession with a few unrelated facts which are catastrophized as blocking all future developments, and b) “vacillation between over activity and withdrawal” (Quenk, 2000, p. 43). ENFP leaders may become so preoccupied with their projects that they neglect their physical health. They may then veer to the other extreme of hypochondriasis, imagining any physical ache or pain as a sign of a fatal disease. Changes occur as introverted sensing becomes more conscious and less shameful to the dominant extraverted intuitive. For example, whereas before ENFP leaders may have neglected detailed work like record keeping, they may gradually develop more “patience for careful data gathering”. They may start to see some value in tradition, includ-


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ing using “the work, ideas and examples of others who have come before” and even develop a nostalgia for certain previously passedover customs or objects from their past that may now be suffused with attractive mystery (Berens & Nardi, 2004, p. 49), and they may assign a larger place and deeper significance for the components of ritual in worship. When integrated, the development of Si carries with it the possibility of establishing a robust stability for the whole conscious personality, in which a profound connection is made with the unconscious. This provides a sense of mission that is able to sustain the trials of exploring the shadow side of the personality. When an extraverted intuitive minister is able to access the contribution of introverted sensing, s/he becomes grounded and rooted in facts and less stressed by details. The capacity for profound connection opens up even with congregants, colleagues, and superiors who are quite different from him/her, particularly the numerous SJs who constitute an important sub-group of most churches. A beneficial effect of this broadening and deepening into sensing perceiving with an expanded capacity for and patience with specifics is to make inspiring projects far more effective and more sustainable. With such increased institutional support, the minister’s energy becomes more directed and less rebellious yet without sacrificing any of the intensity and integrity that s/he feared earlier in his/her development and career. The intensity involved in the process of integration of introverted sensation is worthwhile, increasing the trust in the community on the part of the large subgroup with introverted sensing preferences that they may have for their inspiring and often activist ENFP leader. The Shadow Personality The shadow personality of the ENFP leaders is composed of the same four functions that comprise their conscious personality, but each process operates in the opposite or shadow direction. Introverted processes of the conscious personality will manifest extravertedly in the shadow personality, and vice versa for extraverted processes. While there is variability in the emergence of the shadow processes into consciousness, shadow processes are seldom integrated before an individual is in mid-life. Until such integration into consciousness occurs, ENFP leaders rarely identify their shadow process as having

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anything to do with themselves. On the contrary, the characteristics of the shadow processes initially show up as problematic features of other people and in their “bad” behavior. Extraverted intuitive leaders do not have to wait for mid-life, for even cognitive awareness of how each shadow function operates will facilitate relational understanding and community building and will reduce defensiveness when issues raised by engagement with these shadow processes are triggered for each leader. 5th process: The opposing personality of introverted intuition, Ni. The fifth process to develop for extraverted intuitive types tends to be introverted intuition. Introverted intuition, Ni, lies in the shadow of the dominant mental process, sharing the same function but expressed in the opposite attitude. According to Berens and Nardi, ENFPs have difficulty foreseeing implications and eventual effects, and “they may become stubborn about their perceptions of how the future will be” (2004, p. 49). In this position Beebe (2006b), described the fifth mental process as falling under the influence of the archetype opposing personality that, like the anima and animus, usually has a contragender quality to its expression. Introverted intuition, therefore, tends to show up in the psychological life of the ENFP with adversarial, passive aggressive, or paranoid qualities that are particularly triggered by members of the opposite sex. Until introverted intuition is assimilated into consciousness, these aspects are not acknowledged as part of the extraverted intuitives themselves but are projected onto others who are experienced as being difficult or even persecutory. Such projections are more frequent in encounters with those types who have introverted intuition as their dominant mental process (INTJs and INFJs), who form a larger part of most Christian church communities compared to the general population (9% of Canadian Catholics: Ross, 1995; and 12% of Canadian Evangelicals: Bramer, 1996). INTJs and INFJs are the most independent of all types, and they may seem to the extraverted intuitives as obstinate and uncooperative. The extraverted intuitive may feel persecuted by the obscure vision that introverted intuitives seem to “go on-and-on about” in community meetings, oblivious to the eyerolling incomprehension of many in the audience. ENFP ministers may become furious that these usually subdued people hijacked and ruined the church meeting causing, heaven forbid, members to leave before the ENFPs had the opportunity to present their new project. From the perspective of the introverted intuitive types in the commu-


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nity, extraverted intuitive leaders may be seen as unstable and flaky, because the latter’s extraverted intuition orients to the most promising possibility in the changing external environment. Early on in their careers, ENFP leaders in a religious context may be able to shake off these occasional difficult encounters because they have the energy and outward orientation that allows them to pursue their projects. However, when the need for more long term planning is realized with the onset of mid-life, along with hints of mortality (e.g., a peer dying), the very long term view afforded by introverted intuition may still be experienced as oppressive and alien but is harder to avoid. With patience and persistence, intuition in its introverted aspect may come to feel less strange, and some of its benefits may be experienced and appreciated. For example a) less dependence on the external environment for stimulation; b) more acknowledgment by others who discern an inner stability and depth of insight in the ENFP leader; c) increased self-awareness because intuition inwardly directed can yield profound insights; and d) appreciation by the ENFP leader that adopting a longer term time-perspective reduces the need to rush toward immediate results. 6th process: Extraverted feeling, Fe, influenced by the critical parent archetype, the senex or witch. In ENFP leaders, the sixth process to develop is usually extraverted feeling, Fe. It lies in the shadow of the second or auxiliary process that is influenced by the archetype of the good or nurturing parent. By this token, then, the process in the sixth position falls under the influence of the negative or forbidding parent that has been described in Jungian psychology in terms of the senex archetype in male form and the witch archetype in female form. Fe, therefore, often exhibits features of the critical and forbidding parent, whose role is to block threats to survival by using shaming, blaming, put downs, and other morally questionable tactics that are intended to stop hostile force in its tracks (Beebe, 2007b). At first blush, the activity of Fe in the critical parent mode seems contradictory, for Fe is the mental process that attunes to how others feel, their needs and those of the group: its culture, norms, and values, and it seeks to satisfy these needs, automatically adjusting their own bearing and behavior, as well as their own needs (Hartzler & Hartzler, 2005). Fe simply knows what is right and appropriate in a particular social context. However, Fe under the aegis of the critical parent archetype becomes perplexing. According to Berens and Nardi, until

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integrated into consciousness, the operations of extraverted feeling Fe often take the form of being “disgruntled about the expectations and norms of the group to the point of completely disengaging or rebelling” (2004, p. 49). By the same token, extraverted feeling from others who stress harmony with customs and convention may be experienced by ENFP leaders or ministers as a threat and as blocking their work and projects. They feel provoked to strong criticism. This may surprise and offend not only the extraverted feeling types but others in the group or congregation, especially when intractable argument deteriorates into an “I will fix them” attitude by one or both parties. Unless swiftly detected and diffused, this activity by the ENFP leader can undermine the feeling of community. Extraverted feeling types (ESFJs and ENFJs) are most likely to trigger this reaction in the ENFP leader, which may happen quite often since extraverted feeling types may comprise from 15% to 25% of women active in Christian churches. The conflict may be mitigated between ENFPs and ENFJs because both are NFs and share a concern for personal growth, facility with personal communication, and an interest in a wider, more inclusive vision. These shared gifts may enable them to contextualize their conflict and dialogue their way through misunderstanding. However, ESFJs are more frequent in Christian communities (10% among both Evangelical and Catholic Canadian women: Bramer 1996; Ross, 1995) and as sensing-judging types are tradition-oriented and, therefore, are often already defensive in response to the changeoriented programming pouring forth constantly from ENFP leaders. A similar challenge may come from those with Fe as their auxiliary process, especially the large number of ISFJs who constitute the largest female group in many Protestant and Catholic congregation. There is, therefore, good reason for ENFPs leaders to consciously engage with this critical part of their personality. Extraverted feeling can be an ally for the innovative ENFP minister. With eventual awareness and conscious development of this process, Berens and Nardi stated that such types can at times “magically connect with the group and move it to a new place” (2004, p. 49). When ENFP leaders integrate their Fe process, they become able to combine their imaginative grasp of the project and the possibilities of the situation, with a concern and consideration for the culture and customs of the group. Their enhanced awareness of the human implications of any change that they are proposing will further build community sup-


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port for their proposals among a variety of types for whom change is not an automatic virtue. 7th process: “Trickster” introverted thinking, Ti. For ENFPs, introverted thinking occupies the trickster position in psychological structure of type development. Under the influence of the trickster archetype, mistakes, error, and mischief accompany the operations of Ti among ENFP leaders, especially before it is integrated from the unconscious into consciousness. Such integration seldom starts before individuals are 50, and it is rarely completed. For ENFP leaders, Ti will often get them into, but also out of, tricky situations. Berens and Nardi (2004) described how ENFPs who are not usually interested in identifying principles or in abstract categorization may under stress resort to following or defending some abstract principles, deceiving themselves that this will solve the problem. Ti is likely to be triggered in two ways for the ENFP leader: a) when the demands of work or ministry require the services of this process (i.e., logical categorization based on formal rather than personal considerations) and b) when the ENFP leader directly encounters introverted thinking types (INTPs and ISTPs). However, there are few situations when introverted thinking is called for amidst the routines of Christian ministry, and, by the same token, there are relatively few introverted thinking types in Christian communities (7% of Catholics: Ross, 1995; 10% of Evangelical Protestants: Bramer, 1996). Therefore, introverted thinking remains a neglected mystery for most in Christian communities. And so, as with most other types and their introverted thinking, for most ENFPs leaders in a Christian context, learning to deal with their tricksterish introverted thinking process is usually an internal matter. Often ENFP ministers and leaders have a naive view of this introverted judging process. However, unlike the other introverted judging process, that of introverted feeling that is usually well developed in this type and used to nurture self and others, the use of abstract principles for categorization and analysis—the quintessence of Ti—is poorly understood and clumsily misapplied. For example, the ENFP leaders may offer rationales that are irrelevant to the proposals being made or else may supply evidence contradictory to the argument they are trying to make. Nevertheless, when attention is given to introverted thinking, ENFPs may find that it helps them escape tricky situations where they

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feel caught in a double bind. For example ENFPs may feel trapped between conforming to prevailing norms in order to please the many in the community with extraverted feeling preferences, while still honoring their own introverted feeling inner ideals. Their introverted thinking, with its concern simply for detached consistency across comparable situations, may provide a suitable rationale that will facilitate an original solution to the situation. Introverted thinking may enable ENFP religious leaders to both satisfy their inner ideals and to articulate a rationale that is acceptable or at least comprehensible to others. Gradually, ENFP leaders may become more familiar with how introverted thinking operates if they take leisure moments to simply play with abstract ideas and frameworks (Berens & Nardi, 2004), and so learn to discriminate when these may be more useful, when devising constitutional by-laws for example, and when more rarely appropriate, as in a sermon. 8th process: The demon/angel of extraverted sensing, Se. The eighth and last mental process that is likely to be integrated into conscious for extraverted intuitives is extraverted sensing, Se. Extraverted sensing clashes directly with the ENFP leaders’ dominant process of extraverted intuition: Both processes operate in the same extraverted world, but they are opposing ways of perceiving and taking in information. We can either see the roses or resonate to what roses open and portend. However, one way of perceiving wipes out the other, at least in that simultaneous moment. Beebe (2007a, pp. 5–6) found that the undermining quality of the eighth process gave credence to the idea of a “devil” or “demon” in every human psyche. It often is revealed as an oaf or beast in dreams. Extraverted sensing is the mental process that delights in a singularly “here and now” focus which allows us to “absorb tangible details . . . through the senses of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch” (Hartzler & Hartzler, 2005, p. 11) without evaluation. Through the operations of Se we naturally adapt to, work with, and take pleasure in the physical world as it is. Beebe, himself a dominant extraverted intuitive, described his own demonic extraverted sensing: The demonic personality, then, is that part of ourselves that operates in the shadow to undermine others and ourselves. Certainly in my own case that is extraverted sensation. My body language is often the opposite of what I mean to convey. My relation to physical geography is such that, when trying to find my way along an unfamiliar route, the opposite of where I think I should be going is almost always the correct way. (2004, p. 30)


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By the same token, when the leader in a Christian community is an ENFP, the physical side of life can be undermining, whether it is neglecting physical care, unacknowledged sexual desire, or inattention to physical hazard on a youth field trip. Berens and Nardi explained the situation of extraverted sensing for the ENFP in this way: When really stressed they [ENFPs] may get caught up in a binge of being in the physical moment. This can result in excessively seeking stimulation or following the urge to sleep or do nothing. They zero in on isolated details, hastily acting on them in a chaotic disjointed way. (2004, p. 49)

Specifically in a Christian religious context, there is little wisdom about the extraverted sensing world from which to draw in Christian life and thought, just as there are few extraverted sensing types in Christian communities. For example, ESFPs comprised only 2.3% and ESTPs 1.7% of four evangelical churches in north Toronto (Bramer, 1996). Thus, as with the previous shadow process, trickster-like Ti, the journey to consciousness of this process for the ENFP leader will receive little external institutional support in terms of the surrounding Christian cultural ethos. This makes problematic acting out of Se more likely and also increases the likelihood that the community’s response and way of dealing with it will be destructive or at least divisive. Nevertheless, extraverted sensing, while often neglected, defamed, or denied, when acknowledged and allowed to contribute can be transformational and can provide stability to a community structure. The relaxed at-homeness-in-their-body of extraverted sensing types, along with their casual flexibility, can help defuse tensions and mitigate the overweening intensity that occurs from time to time in a community led by an ENFP. This possibility was the basis for Beebe’s hopeful surmise: The archetype associated with the most unconscious of regions of the mind can deliver insights that are of the highest value, as well as depreciating and undermining ones. It is truly an area of ourselves that is both Devil and Angel. (2007a, p. 5)

Berens and Nardi optimistically concluded their portrait of devilish extraverted sensing in ENFPs: “Yet on occasion they can tune in to what’s tangible, using the physical world to transform and change” (2004, p. 40).

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christopher f. j. ross Conclusion

Most applications of Jung’s personality typology to the psychology of religion have used the traditional Jungian assumption of there being four levels of type development. Because there are, in fact, eight processes in Jung’s typology, this has led to a neglect of the four less developed processes within an individual or within a religious community and a failure to differentiate different components of what Jungians refer to as the shadow. Some intractable conflict experienced within religious communities may be attributable to community members projecting onto other community members of a particular type the shadow aspects of their own poorly developed and un-integrated mental processes. Beebe’s use of key developmental archetypes helped to articulate those characteristics of a mental process that may vary with different levels of development and with the life cycle stage at which the mental process undergoes most conscious development. The detailed developmental portrait of the extraverted intuitive type with introverted feeling (ENFP), one of the more frequent intuitive types in a variety of Christian congregations, illustrates how Beebe’s eight function archetypal model of type development may provide ways of reducing type related defensive sources of community conflict. In particular, the model differentiates the shadow into more specific descriptive terms and allows us to sense the flavor of what disturbs, and, in so doing, it may act as an antidote to divisive projection-fuelled hostility that saps energy from community building and meaningful outreach. References Anchors, S. (1989). Type development and different types. Bulletin of Psychological Type, 21, 10–12. http://www.aptinternational.org/bpt.aspx Beebe, J. (1998). A New Model of Psychological Types. Recorded workshop. Evanston, IL: C. G. Jung Institute of Chicago. Beebe, J. (2004). Understanding consciousness through the theory of psychological types. In J. Cambray & L. Carter (Eds.), Analytical psychology: Contemporary perspectives in Jungian analysis (pp. 83–115). New York, NY: Brunner Routledge Press. Beebe, J. (2006a). Psychological types. In R. Papadopoulos (Ed.): The handbook of Jungian psychology (pp. 130–152). New York: Brunner Routledge Press. Beebe, J. (2006b). Evolving the eight-function model. Australian Psychological Type Review, 8(1), 39–43. http://www.ausapt.org.au/thereview.php Beebe, J. (2007a). Type and archetype. Part 1: The spine and its shadow. Australian Psychological Type Review, 9(2), 1–6. http://www.ausapt.org.au/thereview.php


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Beebe, J. (2007b). Type and archetype. Part 2: The arms and their shadow. Typeface, 18(3), 22–27. Berens, L. V., & Nardi, D. (2004). Understanding yourself and others: An introduction to the personality type code. Huntingdon Beach, CA: Telos Publications. Bramer, P. (1996). Frequency of Jungian personality types among active evangelical Protestants. Paper presented to American Psychological Association Convention, Toronto. Detloff, W. (1972). Psychological types: Fifty years after. Psychological Perspectives, 3(1), 62–73. http://www.junginla.org/words&images/psychological_perspectives Fowler, J. W. (1976). Stages of faith: The psychology of human development and the quest for meaning. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Haas, L., & M. Huniker. (2006). Building blocks of personality type: A guide to using the eight process model of personality. Huntingdon Beach, CA: Telos Publications. Hartzler, G., & Hartzler, M. (2005). Functions of type. Huntingdon Beach, CA: Telos Publications. Jung, C. G. (1953–1979). The collected works of C. G. Jung (20 vols). R. F. C. Hull (Ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jung (1921/1971). Psychological types. In Collected works, Vol. 6, 1971. (German edition 1921). Keirsey, D. (1987). Portraits of temperament. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis Press. Loomis, M. E. (1991). Dancing the wheel of psychological types. Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications. Myers, I. B., & Myers, P. B. (1980). Gifts differing. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist Press. Myers, K. D., & Kirby, L. K. (1994). Introduction to type dynamics and development. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. Poling, T. H., & Kenney, J. F. (1986). The Hare Krishna character type: A study of the sensate personality. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. Quenk, N. L. (1993). Besides ourselves: Our hidden personality in everyday life. Palo Alto, CA: Davies Black Publishing. Quenk, N. L. (2000). In the grip: Understanding type, stress, and the inferior function. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Ross, C. F. J. (1992). Orientation to religion and the feeling function in Jung’s personality typology. Studies in Religion, 21(3), 305–320. http://sir.sagepub.com/ Ross, C. F. J. (1993). Type patterns among active members of the Anglican Church: Comparisons with Catholics, evangelicals, and clergy. Journal of Psychological Type, 26, 28–36. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal.htm Ross, C. F. J. (1995). Type patterns among Catholics: Four Anglophone congregations compared with Protestants, Francophone Catholics, and priests. Journal of Psychological Type, 33, 33–42. http://www.capt.org/research/psychological-type-journal. htm Ross, C. F. J. (2011). Jungian typology and religion: A perspective from North America. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 22, 165–191. http://www.brill .nl/rssr Sharpe, D. (1987). Personality types: Jung’s model of typology. Toronto, ON: Inner City Books. Thomson, L. (1998). Personality type: An owner’s manual. Boston, MA: Shambhala Books. Von Franz, M. L. (1979/1998). The inferior function, in M. L. von Franz and J. Hillman (Eds.), Lectures on Jung’s typology (pp. 1–72), Woodstock, CT: Spring Publications. Von Franz, M. L. (1981). Problem of the Puer. Santa Monica, CA: Sigo Press.

AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES Liza J. Benovenli graduated from Towson University in 2009 with a Bachelor of Science degree in psychology. During her undergraduate career, she gained experience in the field by volunteering at several different units at the Sheppard Pratt Mental Health Facility in Towson, MD and also participated in two research projects in 2006 and 2009. Currently she works at Kennedy Krieger Institute in Baltimore, MD as a Program Aide, working one-on-one with children with various neurological disorders and learning disabilities. Her future plans are to continue her education by pursuing a master’s degree in either experimental or clinical psychology, focusing on research concerning Autism Spectrum Disorders. Ronan Bernas, Ph.D., is Professor at the Department of Psychology of Eastern Illinois University. He received his Ph.D. in Psychology (Committee on Human Development) from The University of Chicago. He also received graduate training from the Committee on Research Methodology and Quantitative Psychology and was a research assistant at the Methodology Research Center of the National Opinion Research Center. His current area of research is on mindfulness, the dialectical self, wisdom, and well-being. Lewis Burton, Ph.D., is a retired Methodist minister who holds doctorates from the University of London, University of Leeds, and University of Wales. Throughout his ministry, he has had an interest in the sociology of the local church and has completed research projects on this topic. He is a Research Fellow of St Mary’s Study Centre, Wales and has recently been engaged in research projects concerning the Methodist presbyterate and the diaconate, concerning the rural church. Bruce Fawcett, Ph.D. (Wales), is Academic Dean, Director of Doctoral Studies, and Associate Professor of Leadership at Acadia Divinity College of Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada. His research interests revolve around Christian adolescents and their youth leaders, including their spiritual practices and views on moral and ethical issues and practices. Leslie J. Francis, Ph.D., is Professor of Religions and Education at the Warwick Religions and Education Research Unit at the University of Warwick, Coventry, England, and Canon Theologian at Bangor Cathedral, Wales. He received his Ph.D. and Sc.D. from the University of Cambridge, his D.D. from the University of Oxford, and his D.Litt. from the University of Wales. His recent books include Faith and Psychology: Personality, Religion and the Individual (2005), British Methodism: What Circuit Ministers Really Think (2006), and Preaching with All Our Souls (2008). Elizabeth Fuller graduated Magna Cum Laude from Towson University in Spring 2010 with a Bachelor of Science in Psychology. She gained a variety of experience in the field through volunteer opportunities and internships with Johns Hopkins Hospital, as well as a substance abuse treatment facility at Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center. She also participated in two primary research projects spanning 2008–2010, which presented at Towson University’s Graduate Student Research Expo. She is currently pursuing her Master’s degree in Psychology, with a concentration in Neuropsychology, at American University in DC and planning to specialize in Traumatic Brain Injury research. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 22 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011

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authors’ biographies

Susan H. Jones, Ph.D., is Canon Missioner at Bangor Cathedral, Director of the St Seiriol Centre for Christian Discipleship and Ministry and Visiting Research Fellow at Glyndŵr University, Wales. Her research field is concerned with the psychology of Christian ministry, with special reference to psychological type theory. G. Michael Leffel, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology at Point Loma Nazarene University in San Diego, CA. His teaching, research, and writing interests include topics in moral psychology and in the psychology of religion: generativity theory, virtue formation, spiritual transformation, and practical religious ethics. He also specializes in the integration of psychodynamic therapeutic theory and spiritual transformation. He received his Ph.D. (Personality and Social Ecology) from the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. Mandy Robbins, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer in Psychology, Division of Psychology, Glyndwr University, Wales, UK. She has a doctorate from the University of Wales. Her current research interests include psychology of religion and the impact of individual differences on the ministry and wellbeing of clergywomen. Her recent publications include Clergywomen in the Church of England: A Psychological Study (2008) and an edited volume (with Leslie Francis and Jeff Astley) Empirical Theology in Texts and Tables: Qualitative, Quantitative and Comparative Perspectives (2009). Christopher F. J. Ross, Ph.D., C. Psych., is Associate Professor in the Psychology of Religion in the Department of Religion and Culture at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. His principal research interests are religion and personality and the psychology of individual religious differences. Recent publications include “The relationship of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religious orientations to Jungian psychological type among churchgoers in England and Wales” in Mental Health Religion and Culture (2009), with L. J. Francis; “Principles of cultural psychology and the Hindu avatar tradition: A study of Mother Meera through personal narratives” in Culture and Religion (2010), with Lauren Price. Andrew N. Ryland, graduated from Durham University with a degree in English Literature. He has been in pastoral ministry for 24 years in the Newfrontiers family of churches. He has served on leadership teams and led a church leadership team himself for fifteen years. He now serves a group of churches west of London as part of an apostolic team. He lectures on Newfrontiers training courses and serves as a reader for the Newfrontiers Theological Forum. Andrew received his MA from Bangor University. Jan Sinnott is a Professor of Psychology at Towson University in Baltimore, MD, where she has taught since 1978. She has worked to bridge the worlds of spirituality, teaching, research, and clinical practice since her workshop and Mystery School experiences, her Postdoctoral Fellow and Guest Scientist experiences at the National Institutes of Health, and her work with businesses and government as a consultant. She is author of more than 100 publications, including a dozen books based on her decades of research to create her theory of the development of Complex Postformal Thought. Her latest scholarly books are The Development of Logic in Adulthood: Postformal Thought and Its Applications, published in 1998 (Plenum/Kluwer), Reinventing the University (with Lynn Johnson), published in 1997 (Ablex, now ElsevierHolland), and The Interdisciplinary Handbook of Adult Lifespan Learning, published in l994 (Greenwood). She has been interviewed by many popular publications, for example, Newsweek and the Washington Post. She is currently working on a book and research related to the study of complex thought and development of the Self through feeling connected in intimate relationships.


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William L. Smith, Ph.D., is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Georgia Southern University. His latest research focuses on Irish American identity, spiritual retreatants, and the academic attitudes of college students. He is the author of Families and Communes: An Examination of Nontraditional Lifestyles (Sage Publications, 1999), Irish Priests in the United States: A Vanishing Subculture (UPA, 2004), and numerous articles in a variety of academic journals. David R. Tilley was Continuing Ministerial Education Adviser in the C of E Diocese of Coventry for nearly 20 years. He has worked with psychological type theory in most of that time particularly in the in-service training of clergy. His research on type in the supervisory relationship—a study of training incumbents and their curates—earned him an M. Phil. in 2006 from the University of Wales. The findings of that research are reported in Supporting New Ministers in the Local Church (SPCK 2007) which he co-authored with Keith Lamdin. Andrew Village, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer in Practical and Empirical Theology at York St. John University, UK. He holds doctorates from the University of Edinburgh and the University of Bristol. His current research interests include clergy and the bible, beliefs about Creation and environmentalism among churchgoers, prejudice and personality, and psychology and religion. His recent books include The Bible and Lay People (2007), and (with Leslie Francis) Preaching with All Our Souls (2008) and The Mind of the Anglican Clergy (2009). Sarah J. Waterman graduated from Towson University in 2009 with a Bachelors of Science degree in Psychology and English. During her undergraduate career, Sarah participated in two ongoing research projects between 2007 and 2009. In 2009, she received Towson University’s Psychology department’s award for Creativity and Social Consciousness. She is also a member of Psi Chi, the national honors society for psychology. She currently works for the United States federal government. Michael Whinney has retired from full time ministry but is still active as an Honorary Assistant Bishop in Birmingham. In 1981, as a mature student, he studied for his Sacred Theology Masters (STM) at General Theological Seminary New York. This included the study of psychological type, which he has used throughout his episcopal ministry in the church, with students, the medical profession, and local authorities. His research on type with clergy and ministers in the West Midlands was published in 2004, and he continues research on the psychological type of church leaders with St Mary’s Centre, Wales. Keith M. Wilson, Ph.D., is a professor in the psychology department at Eastern Illinois University and a licensed clinical psychologist. In addition to the psychology of religion, his research interests include terror management theory, the impact of timing of sexual abuse on sexual cognitions, and help-seeking behavior. Keith Wulff, Ph.D., is the past President of the Religious Research Association and recently retired as Director of the Research Office of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). He holds a doctorate from The University of Texas at Austin. He is currently looking at how change in the content of clergy sermons may have affected denominational membership. His recent journal publication was coauthored with Neil Krause. It is “Church-Based Social Ties, A Sense of Belonging in a Congregation, and Physical Health Status.” International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, Vol. 15, No. 1: pages 73–93.

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Pidi Zhang, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Georgia Southern University. His research interests include network exchange theory, the economic performance of ethnic groups, the transition from high school to college, and religion & spirituality.

MANUSCRIPT REVIEWERS In addition to the preceding authors, many scholars and scientists have made significant contributions to the publication of this volume. They have anonymously screened the initial versions of these and other submitted manuscripts for methodological rigor and scientific significance. They also have provided the authors with invaluable suggestions for improving their papers prior to the authors making their final revisions. Both myself and the authors appreciate their expert services. Not only have they improved the quality of the research reported here, they also have contributed to the quality of the field of the social scientific study of religion. Chris J. Boyatzis Bucknell University

Anthony Scioli Keene State College

Mark Cartledge University of Birmingham, UK

Katarzyna Skrzypińska University of Gdańsk

Gayle Civish University of Denver

William J. Sneck, S. J. Loyola University Maryland

Leslie J. Francis University of Warwick

Joseph Stewart-Sicking Loyola University Maryland

William Kay Glyndŵr University, Wales

David Walker Glyndŵr University, Wales

Mark J. Krejci Concordia College

Everett L. Worthington, Jr. Virginia Commonwealth University

John Lloyd Keele University, UK

David Wulff Wheaton College

Ralph L. Piedmont Loyola University Maryland

Andrew Village York St. John University

Jaroslaw Piotrowski University of Gdańsk

Magdalena Zemojtel-Piotrowska University of Gdańsk

SUBJECT INDEX affiliation, religious 162, 172, 184, 191, 235 age 7–8, 12, 15, 146–150, 197, 219, 271–272, 309 agreeableness 53–54, 161, 168 alpha coefficients 238, 268–269, 273, 293, 301, 310–311 Anglican churches 188, 219–220, 227, 229, 233, 240, 244, 247 Anglican clergy 209–210, 227–228, 232, 237–238, 244–245, 262, 284–285, 305–306 Anglican clergywomen 210, 228, 249 Anglican congregations in England 188, 228, 249 Anglican ministry 230, 232, 247 Anglicans 172–173, 175–176, 191, 230, 238–239, 246, 250 Anglo-catholic 238–241 archetypes vi, 315–317, 319–321, 323–331, 333, 335, 337–339, 343–345 critical parent 339 Australian National Church Life Survey 212, 218–220, 224 auxiliary 172, 185, 215, 315, 322, 325–328, 330, 334 auxiliary function 175, 177, 182, 185, 326–327, 329–330, 333, 335 beauty 9–13, 21, 332 behavior x–xi, 2, 46–48, 55, 58–59, 94–5, 119–120, 141–142 beliefs 2–3, 23–25, 333–6, 209–210, 227–29, 261–263, 283–285, 304–305 boundaries, religious 165, 178, 186 Catholics 12, 15–16, 173, 190, 216, 229, 250, 345 character 40, 46, 52, 71, 75, 119–120, 122–123, 196 charismatic practice 230, 239–242 Christian communities 333, 340–341, 343 church congregations 216, 218–219, 221, 224, 226 church leaders 177, 188, 192–193, 209, 227, 261, 283–284, 304 Church of England 188, 193, 204–206, 216–217, 230–231, 235, 237, 249–250

Church of England clergy 205, 236, 244, 253–255, 288 church tradition 191, 230, 238–243, 250, 285 churchgoers 161, 212, 217–218, 224, 226, 272, 348–9 female 212, 221–222, 224 male 212, 221, 223–224 clergy 176–177, 192–193, 197–198, 201–207, 229–233, 236–237, 241–242, 245–251 apprentice vi, 164, 286–287, 289, 291, 293, 295, 297 see also curates distinctive psychological type profile of 192, 202 female vi, 192–194, 196–197, 201–208, 230, 244–245, 253–255, 348 stipendiary 231, 245–247 clergy roles 246, 265 community 5, 23, 34, 36, 224–225, 271, 337–338, 342–343 moral 33, 35–36, 42, 51, 72, 97, 112, 121 congregations 161, 175–177, 229, 235–236, 244–245, 268, 274, 306–307 consciousness 88, 167–169, 316–317, 321, 324–327, 329–331, 334–335, 337–338 curates vi, 164, 237, 286, 289–294, 299–300, 302–305, 349 dominant function 175, 325–330 dominant types 198–202, 220, 222–223, 258–259, 293–294 dual process models 46–47, 61 emotions 50, 56, 59, 71–72, 87, 92–100, 103, 111–118 self-conscious 93, 122, 124–125 empathy 38, 57, 62, 71, 90, 92–94, 96–101, 113 ethical intuitions 77, 84–92, 94–97, 99, 109, 111, 114, 117 evangelicals 190, 215, 229, 238–241, 243, 250, 253, 288 existential anxiety 126, 128, 135–136 existential meaning 29, 64–65, 67–68, 70, 79, 81, 86, 108–109, 114–115

354

subject index

experience ix, 5–6, 100–101, 143, 168, 180–182, 303–304, 319–320 mystical 182, 185 odyssey 6, 24 religious 165, 179, 184, 235 extraverts vi, 183, 194, 213–214, 281–282, 287, 306–313 faith 4, 23, 52, 54, 125, 178–179, 181, 276–277 personal 139, 179 religious 130, 177 feeling types 158, 177, 180–181, 185, 195, 234, 247, 252 FFM (Five-Factor Model) xi, 54, 158–161, 163 forgiveness v, 45, 72, 92, 98, 101–102, 126–131, 133–40 dispositional 127–128, 134, 136 measures of 131–132, 136 forgiving 41, 129, 133, 135–136, 140 formation, moral 39–40, 44–45, 80, 82, 91 Francis Psychological Type Scales (FPTS) 192, 196–197, 212, 215, 219–20, 249, 284, 309–310 Free Church ministers 216, 258 Free Churches 161, 216, 255, 260 functions, psychological 137, 158, 168, 325 gender 132, 139, 145–146, 148–149, 188–189, 249–250, 331 God Scale 141, 145–146, 149–150 gratitude 60, 70–72, 76, 78, 92–94, 98, 120–121, 123 psychology of 71–72, 121 Ideological Narrative 29, 64–65, 67, 70, 77, 79, 108–109, 111–112 Ignatian spirituality 4, 6, 20, 23 imagining vi, 163, 264–265, 267, 269, 271, 273, 275 incumbents 231, 247, 289, 299–300 Index of Feeling Ministry Style 279 Index of Intuitive Ministry Style 277 individual differences 138, 163, 167–169, 234, 249–250, 261–262, 287, 348 inferior function 325, 327, 329, 345 intrinsic religiosity 34, 126–129, 132–134, 136 introversion 171–173, 196–198, 204–205, 215–217, 243–244, 272–273, 290–291, 293, 307–310

introverts 158, 183, 213, 224, 270, 281–282, 287, 306–313 intuition 48–51, 108–111, 170–173, 178–180, 194–198, 213–217, 245, 251–254 Intuitive System 29, 64–65, 68–70, 77, 79, 84, 88, 109 intuitive types 158, 182, 195, 233, 252, 266, 315 IOG (Image of God) x, 141, 152–153 judging processes 194–197, 204–206, 220–221, 245–246, 251–252, 265–266, 287, 310 Jung 159, 165–171, 187, 189–191, 194–195, 265–266, 315–323, 345 Jungian psychology 162, 339, 344 Jungian types 164–179, 183–187, 189–191, 199, 222–223, 258–259, 292, 294, 344–345 knowledge 1, 21–22, 29, 61–67, 79, 86, 97, 99, 104–105, 151 local ministry, ordained

237, 249–250

MBTI (Myers-Briggs Type Indicator) 163–166, 168–172, 184, 209–211, 248–251, 263, 285–286, 305–306 meaning system, religious 35–36, 57 meaning-system analyses v, 25, 27, 29, 33–34, 51, 53, 68–69 meaning-system approach 26, 29, 31–32, 34, 51–52, 56–57, 62, 69 meaning-system models 25, 37, 43, 52–53, 55, 57–58, 66–67, 79 mental process, dominant 316, 325, 331–332, 338 ministers 231–233, 242–243, 247–248, 255, 264–265, 271–273, 279–283, 285 female 255, 257, 260 male 259–260 ordained 230, 264 stipendiary 230, 237, 241, 245 ministry 207–210, 230–233, 237–243, 245–250, 254–256, 268–270, 273–284, 301–302 non-stipendiary 248, 250, 290 ministry roles 231, 241, 245–248, 264–265 ministry styles vi, 228, 262, 264–265, 271–273, 284, 305, 313 ministry team vi, 164, 306–307, 309–313

subject index moral action 44, 48–49, 51–52, 58–61, 71, 82–83, 85, 92–95, 103–106 moral development 30, 49, 74, 80, 91, 105, 119, 122 moral direction 29, 63–65, 67, 70, 79, 81, 85, 103, 109, 114–115 moral education 27, 72, 99, 105, 121–122 moral emotions 44, 48–50, 58–60, 64–66, 68, 73–74, 81–82, 92–99 moral identity 44, 49, 65, 67–68, 77, 84–86, 109, 111–112, 114 moral intuitionism, paradigm of 29, 46, 64, 69 moral intuitionist 27, 31–32, 42–47, 70, 77, 83, 108, 112 moral intuitionist approach v, 26–27, 31–32, 51, 63, 81, 113, 117–118 moral intuitionist model x, 25, 43–44, 79, 84, 88, 118 moral intuitions 44–6, 48–50, 60–61, 64–66, 68, 81–82, 84, 86–87, 113 moral judgment 27, 43, 46–48, 73, 81–83, 88, 93–95, 105, 108 moral motivation 26–28, 42–44, 47–48, 50–51, 65, 69–71, 79–83, 114–115 moral personality 64, 67, 69, 83–85, 104–105, 109, 114–116, 118–119 domains of 63, 65, 68, 77, 85, 88, 90, 113 moral psychology 29–32, 43–45, 58–59, 69, 73, 75–76, 79–81, 121–124 moral reasoning 30, 45–47, 49, 59–60, 65–66, 83–85, 89, 103–107 moral sociability 29, 37–38, 40–43, 63–70, 79–82, 85, 87–88, 90–91, 94, 96, 98–99, 114–116 moral values 43, 49, 66, 68, 77, 84–85, 93, 104–107 moral vices 64–5, 68, 77, 84–85, 88, 100–103, 111, 114 morality 30–1, 41, 43–44, 47, 73–74, 77–80, 87, 121–123 mortality salience 126, 128–130, 132–139 motivation 1–2, 9–11, 31–33, 40–44, 57, 62–71, 79–86 motives 36, 46, 92, 94, 214 Myers-Briggs Type Indicator see MBTI National Church Life Survey (NCLS) 218–219, 228 Newfrontiers network of churches 188, 193, 206, 210–211, 228–229, 284, 306–308, 312–314

355

Non-Stipendiary Ministers see NSMs NSMs (Non-Stipendiary Ministers) 230–231, 233, 237, 240–243, 245–248 OLMs (Ordained Local Ministers) 230–231, 233, 237, 240–243, 245–247, 291 Ordained Local Ministers see OLMs ordained ministry 230–233, 236, 246, 256, 264, 270, 283, 301 orientations 158, 194, 196–197, 204–206, 213, 251–253, 267–268, 307–308 theological 230, 239–242 participation, religious 165, 184 pastoral ministry 269, 281, 348 Payne Index of Ministry Styles see PIMS Revised 163, 273, 280–282 perceiving ministry style 269, 281–282, 300 perceiving processes 194, 196–197, 204–205, 220–221, 251–254, 265–266, 310, 316 personality 52–58, 70–76, 118–124, 137–139, 152–153, 161–164, 187–190, 261–262 personality characteristics 249–250 personality domains 55, 57, 84 personality types 157–158, 168–169, 186–187, 189, 191, 260–264, 313–314, 345 PIMS (Payne Index of Ministry Styles) 228, 262, 264–265, 268–273, 284, 288, 305, 307 population norms 176, 192, 235–236 positive psychology 70, 73, 75, 118, 121, 124 Postformal Thought Scale 141, 145–146, 148–150 prayer 10–15, 17–18, 23–24, 57–58, 181–182, 261, 263, 279–280 praying 5, 14, 17, 181, 268, 288–289, 308 prosocial action 31, 44, 52, 55–57, 59–60, 68, 88, 93–94 prosocial behavior 55, 59, 70, 75–76, 91–92, 95, 99, 119–120 psychological profiles 188, 209–210, 227–228, 230, 232, 245–247, 249, 284 psychological type preferences 162–163, 210, 228–230, 236–239, 241–242, 262–263, 283–285, 303–305

356

subject index

female 190, 210, 229, 263, 285, 305 Roman Catholic 209, 227, 261, 283, 304, 313 psychological type profile of Anglican clergy 210, 228, 249 psychological type profiles of men and women 251, 254 psychological type theory 192, 194, 196, 213, 215, 251–254, 264–265, 286–290 religion, psychology of 24–28, 30–35, 71–73, 75, 78, 112–113, 120–123, 348–349 religiosity v, 23, 34, 36, 55, 63, 75, 126–139 extrinsic 34, 127, 129, 136, 183 religiosity measures 132 religious belief system 54, 112 religious communities 3, 35, 107, 113, 162, 164, 333–334, 344 religious conversion 28, 33, 54, 75, 83, 123 religious expression 161–162, 165, 238 religious groups 133–134, 157, 162, 165–166, 171–172, 176–178, 180, 184–187 religious meaning-systems 26, 42, 55 religious orientations 127, 139, 165, 171, 178, 183, 187, 190 religious practices 2, 24, 34–36, 58, 80, 107–108, 137, 181 religious professionals 192–193, 196, 202, 205–206, 216, 219, 253 religiousness ix–xii, 138 retreat 1–2, 5–7, 9, 11–24 retreatants 1–2, 5–6, 9, 11–17, 20, 22–23 role models, religious 135 sacred 34, 36–37, 42, 58 sacred texts 11–16, 18–20, 57, 181 self-concepts 111, 123 self-control 74, 106–107, 121, 123 self-definition 52–53, 67 selfishness 31, 35, 37, 55, 80 sensing types 158, 177, 179, 184, 194, 233, 252, 266 sermons 181, 275, 280–281, 288, 342 silence 10, 194, 233, 267, 288, 307–308 SIM (Social Intuitionist Model) 26–7, 29, 31, 47–49, 77–78, 81, 86–97, 105–106 SMs (stipendiary ministers) 230, 237, 240–243, 245

Social Intuitionist Model see SIM solitude 194, 233, 267, 287, 295, 301, 307 spiritual getaway v, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 spiritual journeys 4, 20, 24, 153 spiritual practices 42, 54, 56–57, 115, 347 spiritual transformation 25–29, 31–34, 41–43, 51–57, 61–65, 67–70, 77–84, 112–118 meaning of 28, 75 models of 46, 57, 68–69, 77, 83, 91, 117 multi-process model 83 processes of 26, 29, 31, 39, 57, 77, 100, 105 psychology of 27, 29, 31–32, 34, 45, 47, 108, 112–113 spiritual transformation theory 31, 77, 79, 97 spirituality ix–xii, 1–5, 9–13, 23–24, 30, 75, 119–121, 142–143 dwelling-oriented 4 monastic 4, 6, 24 practice-oriented 4, 20 seeking-oriented 4 St. Ignatius 1–2, 4–5, 7, 15, 21, 23 see also Ignatian spirituality temperaments 172–173, 190, 198–199, 201, 203, 222–223, 258–260, 292, 294 terror management v, 73, 126–129, 131, 133, 135, 137–139 terror management theory (TMT) 128–129, 135, 139, 349 thinking types 158, 180–182, 185, 188, 195, 209, 227, 234 TITE (Tilley Index of Training Expectations) 286, 293, 301–302 TMT see terror management theory training incumbents vi, 164, 286, 289–293, 294–298, 300, 302–304, 349 type distribution 198–200, 221, 257 type models, psychological 157, 159–160, 233, 238 type patterns 188, 190, 227–229, 249–250, 345 type preferences 210, 238–239, 281, 285, 291, 303 types 61–5, 162, 173–177, 182–183, 185–187, 237–242, 340–341, 344–345 discrete 194–195, 200 typologies 166–167, 169, 171, 187, 215, 345

subject index value systems, absolute personal 324 values 53–55, 104–105, 109–111, 209–210, 227–229, 261–263, 283–285, 304–305 interpersonal 208, 279 psychological x, 152 spiritual 181–182, 185 vocations, religious 264, 270 Wisdom Scale 144, 149–151 women, ordination of 231, 254

357

women clergy 232, 247 work-related psychological health 189, 249, 313 worldview 73, 92, 128–129, 132, 138 worship 182, 212, 224–225, 268–269, 271, 274, 279–280, 307 yoga 11–13, 15, 18–19 youth ministers 215, 253, 288 youth ministry 189, 210, 228, 262, 284, 305, 313

NAMES INDEX Ardelt, M. 141, 144, 153 Argyle, M. 212, 227 Armstrong, K. 26–27, 36–37, 55, 70 Arndt, J. 129, 135, 137, 139 Astley, J. 238, 249, 283, 348

Emmons, R. A. 25–27, 31–32, 38, 44, 71–72, 77–78, 92, 120–121 Erikson, E. 29, 38, 40–42, 71–72, 80 Eysenck, H. 159–160, 163, 196, 209, 227, 249, 287, 304

Bargh, J. A. 47, 61, 70, 72, 105, 119–120 Batson, C. D. 34, 44, 59–60, 70, 94, 98, 119, 136–137 Baumeister, R. F. 32, 58, 71, 102, 120–121, 124, 134, 138 Bayne, R. 159–160, 163, 234, 248 Beebe, J. 162, 167–169, 187, 315–316, 321–328, 330–332, 335–336, 342–345 Bellamy, J. 218, 228–229 Benovenli, L. J. v, 141, 347 Berens, L. V. 331–332, 334, 336–337, 342 Berkowitz, M. W. 84, 119 Berry, J. W. 28, 125, 127, 137 Bjorklund, F. 48–49, 73, 79, 91, 94, 97, 121 Blasi, A. 43–44, 58–59, 64, 71, 82, 89, 99, 119 Blizzard, S. W. 265, 270, 283 Boyatzis, C. J. 351 Bramer, P. 172–173, 183, 187, 335, 338, 340–341, 343, 345 Briggs, K. 158, 165–166, 169–170, 315, 317–323 Browning, D. S. 40–41, 43, 67, 71, 82, 87, 110, 119 Burgess, N. 289, 304 Burris, C. T. 183–184, 187 Burton, L. vi, 251, 347 Butler, A 175, 177, 188, 193, 217, 227, 252–253, 261

Fawcett, B. G. vi, 264, 347 Finkel, E. J. 44–45, 72, 102, 120 Foresman, S. 122 Francis, L. J. 188–193, 209–213, 215–220, 227–230, 249–254, 260–265, 283–288, 304–310 Franz, Von M. L. 189, 327, 329, 345 Fredrickson, B. 44, 57, 72, 78, 93–95, 98, 121 Fuller, E. v, 141, 347 Furnham, A. 160, 163

Cartwright, K. D. 142–143, 153 Castle, K. 177, 189, 218, 228–229, 246, 249, 308, 313 Craig, C. L. 177, 188–191, 209–210, 215–217, 227–229, 252–254, 260–263, 304–307 Damasio, A. 59, 71, 93, 95, 118, 120 Duncan, B. 188, 193, 209–210, 215–217, 227–228, 235–236, 244–245, 249

Girard, R. 72, 121 Graham, J. 34–35, 67, 72–73, 79–80, 87, 89–91, 108–110, 112–113, 121 Greenberg, J. 128–129, 131, 137–139 Griffin, J. 141, 143, 145, 153 Haas, L. 316, 319–320, 322–324, 332, 345 Haidt, J. 26–31, 42–50, 72–73, 77–82, 85–101, 121–122 Hill, P. C. 25, 28, 32–33, 37, 52, 55, 73, 80 Hook, T. 1 Horsfall, T. 177, 188, 193, 209, 215, 227, 253, 261 Hughes, B. 218, 228–229 Huniker, M. 316, 319–320, 322–324, 345 Jackson, L. 178–179, 181–182, 191 James, W. 167, 171, 182, 189 Jamison, C. 3–5, 23 Johnson, L. 348 Jonas, E. 73, 129, 136, 138 Jones, S. H. 162–164, 177–178, 183–184, 188–189, 227–228, 252–253, 261–262, 305 Joseph, C. 27–29, 48, 67, 81–82, 89–91, 97–98, 108–110, 121–122 Jung, C. 165–171, 187, 189–191, 194–195, 265–266, 315–323, 327, 345

names index Kaldor, P. 177, 189, 218, 228–229, 246, 249, 308, 313 Kaplan, R. 2, 24 Kay, W. 177, 190, 205–206, 210, 229, 263, 285, 305 Kendall, E. 190, 218, 225, 229, 235, 246, 250, 253 Kesebir, J. 30, 34, 44, 46, 55, 66, 80, 89 Knopf, A. A. 27, 70 Kohlberg, L. 43–44, 58, 74, 81, 98, 105–106, 122 Krause, N. 349 Lamdin, K. 349 Lapsley, D. K. 47, 58, 74–75, 122–123 Lloyd, J. 159–160, 164, 234, 250, 351 Loomis, M. 169–171, 190–191, 318, 345 MacDaid, G. P. 172, 174, 190 MacIntyre, A. 27–8, 32, 40, 68, 74, 116, 122 McAdams, D. P. 41, 53, 64, 71, 109–110, 112, 114, 122 McCullough, M. E. 35, 44, 68, 71–74, 102–103, 120–121, 123, 139 McNamara, P. 71, 120 Mikulincer, M. 91, 123 Myers, C. 170 Myers, I. 164, 171–172, 190, 210–211, 225–226, 229, 250, 345 Nardi, D. 333, 335, 338–341, 343 Narvaez, D. 47, 59, 71, 74–76, 119, 122–124 Nash, P. 177, 189, 193, 206, 210, 215, 228, 253 Nash, S. 177, 189, 193, 206, 210, 215, 228, 253 Ouellette, P.

2, 4, 21, 23–24

Paloutzian, R. F. 24–29, 31, 52–56, 71–72, 75, 77–78, 120–121, 123 Pargament, K. I. 24, 27–28, 35, 52, 73, 75, 123, 138–139 Park, C. L. 24, 28, 33–34, 51, 71, 75, 120–121, 123 Payne, V. J. 189, 228, 262, 265, 270–272, 284, 288, 305 Pennebaker, J. W. 103, 123–124 Piedmont, R. L. xiv–xvi, 351 Powell, R. 218, 228–229 Price, L. 165, 315, 348 Pyszczynski, T. 128, 131, 137–139

Quenk, N. L. 336, 345

359 164, 211, 256, 263, 327,

Robbins, M. 161–164, 177, 188–189, 193, 209–211, 215–219, 227–229, 261–262 Ross, C. J. 164–165, 172–173, 177–179, 181–183, 187–191, 215–216, 227–229, 332–335 Rusbult, C. E. 44–45, 72 Ryland, A. N. vi, 306, 348 Schimel, J. 136–137, 139 Shaver, R. 74, 91, 123 Shweder, R. A. 29, 31, 118 Siegel, D. J. 39–40, 61, 76, 100–101, 113, 115–116, 124 Simon, L. 128, 131, 138–139 Sinnott, J. v, x, 141, 348 Smith, W. L. v, 1, 349 Sneck, W. J. 351 Solomon, S. 128, 131, 138–139 Tangney, J. P. 59, 76, 93, 98, 101, 124–125 Thomson, L. 290, 318–319, 321, 323, 332, 335–336, 345 Thoresen, C. E. 139, 190 Thornes, S. 163, 248 Tilley, D. R. vi, 286, 349 Vickers, J. A. 256, 263 Village, A. 161, 164, 175, 177, 241, 250, 252–253, 262–263 Volf, M. 1–2, 23–24 Walker, D. 27, 72, 121, 351 Walker, L. J. 26–27, 31, 43–44, 72, 82–84, 113, 121 Waterman, S. J. v, 141, 349 Weiss, D. 178–179, 181–182, 191 Westen, D. 39–41, 46, 49–50, 61–62, 76, 101–102, 104, 125 Whinney, M. 193, 209–210, 216, 227–228, 236, 244, 249, 260–261 Wilkins, T. xiii, xv Wilson, K. M. v, 126, 349 Woodman, S. 255–256, 263 Worthington, E. L. 28, 74, 98, 125, 127, 136–137, 139–140, 351 Wulff, K. vi, 192, 349 Wuthnow, R. 3–4, 20, 24

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 18

Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion: Volume 15 (2004)