Religion and Diversity in Canada (Religion and the Social Order)

Religion and Diversity in Canada

Religion and the Social Order An Official Publication of the Association for the Sociology of Religion

General Editor

William H. Swatos, Jr.

VOLUME 16

Religion and Diversity in Canada Edited by

Lori G. Beaman and Peter Beyer

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Religion and diversity in Canada / edited by Lori G. Beaman and Peter Beyer. p. cm. — (Religion and the social order, ISSN 1061-5210 ; 16) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-90-04-17015-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Canada—Religion. 2. Multiculturalism—Religious aspects. 3. Multiculturalism—Canada. I. Beaman, Lori G. II. Beyer, Peter, 1949– III. Title. IV. Series. BL2530.C2R25 2008 200.971—dc22

2008019542

ISSN 1061-5210 ISBN 978 90 04 17015 5 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS Preface: Canada, Eh? ................................................................. William H. Swatos, Jr.

vii

Introduction: Religion and Diversity in Canada ....................... Lori G. Beaman and Peter Beyer

1

1. From Far and Wide: Canadian Religious and Cultural Diversity in Global/Local Context ....................................... Peter Beyer

9

2. Québec and Reasonable Accommodation: Uses and Misuses of Public Consultation ............................................. Pauline Côté

41

3. Fearing Planes, Trains, and Automobiles: Sociophobics and the Disincentive to Religious Diversity ................................. Douglas E. Cowan

67

4. Two by Two: Religion, Sexuality and Diversity in Canada ................................................................................... Pamela Dickey Young

85

5. Does Religion Matter? Canadian Religious Traditions and Attitudes Toward Diversity ............................................ Sam Reimer

105

6. Canadian Religious Diversity Online: A Network of Possibilities ............................................................................. Christopher Helland

127

7. Old Structures, New Faces: The Presence of Wicca and Neopaganism in Canadian Prison Chaplaincies ........... Mireille Gagnon

149

vi

contents

8. Between Law and Public Opinion: The Case of Québec ................................................................................... Solange Lefebvre

175

9. A Cross-National Comparison of Approaches to Religious Diversity: Canada, France and the United States ................ Lori G. Beaman

199

Afterword: Religion, Diversity, and the State in Canada .......... John H. Simpson

217

Contributors ................................................................................

225

PREFACE: CANADA, EH? William H. Swatos, Jr. By my mid-teens I had developed a fascination with French Canada, and at the end of my first year of undergraduate school, my parents and I made Québec the site of what would turn out to be our last “family vacation.” I don’t really remember a great deal of the trip except that, in retrospect, it was the occasion of my first visit to a “real” religious pilgrimage site—Sainte Anne de Beaupré—and that I was fairly disgusted at the time with the “low” churchmanship at the Anglican cathedral in the city of Québec. I had a lot to learn. And I’m not sure I got my lessons right the first time. Since then I have had the opportunity to return to Canada a number of times for professional meetings that we have held there, as well as in connection with research on what I came to call—borrowing the phrase from the indefatigable American Unitarian missionary T.B. Forbush—“my Icelanders” in Winnipeg and the Lake Winnipeg settlements. Indeed, this was so much so at one point that my friend and colleague Peter Kivisto officially situated me at the University of Manitoba in an article in The Sociological Quarterly that we coauthored. “The University of Manitoba!?!,” I said. “Well, they wanted some place for you, and well, you were there,” he replied. And so I was. And the TSQ crowd must have thought it was ok, because they made him editor. And now the Midwestern Society has elected him President. In any case, to that university, and more especially St. John’s College, I remain deeply grateful and happy to return any time the opportunity should arise. I remember, too, that son Giles and I got to drive from that summer of teaching and research that gave Peter his “siting” of me at Manitoba to the ASR meeting in San Francisco, where we—and some of you—had the opportunity to live through an earthquake! Icelandic volcanoes earthquakes are not, but it was at the same time a fitting end for me to a summer of immersion in a bit of the lives of early Icelandic immigrants and their New World experiences. As I read Peter Beyer’s opening chapter in particular here, I also remembered during my time there perusing the data of Statistics Canada and being

viii

preface

enlightened by them in ways that, as someone familiar only with U.S. Census data, I had never realized could be possible. I also met yet another Canada, entirely by accident, by going to live on the west coast of Florida in 1995. A late, only child, I moved where I did simply to be near my elderly mother. But I discovered that I had also moved into an area that was one of several “little Canadas” in Florida. My immediate neighbors across the street were Canadian, but so were thousands of others, mostly from one or another urban area of Ontario. More than coincidentally, the Toronto Blue Jays also wintered nearby. I eventually learned that Hollywood, on the east coast, was a “little Québec.” And indeed, virtually all the shops on the beach speak French as well as English. Things changed a bit where I lived after Canada tightened up its requirements with respect to its health insurance eligibility—one could not stay away the whole winter without spending significant additional dollars to buy short-term U.S. healthcare insturance. But it was an opportunity to interact for at least part of the year, every year, with a “Canadian perspective.” Our Florida Canadians were, of course, a self-selected population—they were comfortable with being in the U.S. (and property owners in the U.S.) year after year. Those Canadians who saw Canada as both exceptionally importantly and favorably different from the U.S. would likely have selected themselves out of the Floridian option from the first. My own take is that Canadians in general emphasize differences between the two societies more than those in the “lower 48,” who tend to think that Canada is basically the same as the U.S., except colder. We both share issues surrounding aboriginal populations, whom both of us have treated badly in the past. We also have—though from quite different circumstances—linguistically distinct populations, who make special demands upon the dominant culture. And we are certainly both “a nation of immigrants.” We share a common heritage in the English parliamentary tradition, and we share common contemporary problems. Much of what is written in this volume applies directly to the United States as well as to Canada. In a lifeworld derived from and lived through globalization, this could hardly be otherwise. Yet the differences between the two societies, signaled in and through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, can be a way for “Americans” on both sides of the border to evaluate proposals for social change. As simply one example, that civil unions of same-sex partners is legal in Canada means that churches do not have to debate this issue in a politico-social “rights” context. The state itself has provided the legal means for it to

preface

ix

take place. Churches (and other religious bodies) are free to make their own decisions on the basis of theology, not civil rights. In the context in which I live and work from day to day in the continuously imploding and exploding Episcopal Church on the one hand, and “the biggest little diocese in the world” on the other, it has come as something of a breath of fresh air to see how the state could relieve us of an enormous burden by separating civil from sacred issues. At a completely different level, that Lori and Peter should offer this volume at this time unfortunately also reminds me that I am aging, as not only do I remember when they were each graduate students, but now also because they have both advanced so significantly in their careers to hold Research Chairs at one of Canada’s finest universities and to have their own series with Brill as well. That happened neither overnight nor without both gifts and efforts on their own part, but I should also like to think that one of the vehicles through which those gifts and efforts were advanced was a combination the intellectual and moral support of the ASR—for which we endured even the earthquake. It is to that end that the Religion and the Social Order series was conceived by our colleague David Bromley and that I am privileged to continue to offer these volumes to you. The collection of chapters that Lori and Peter bring us is scholarship on the cutting edge of diversity issues with contributions from colleagues who offer first-rate scholarship from which all of us can draw important practical insights applicable to our own social settings. I thank them for it and am happy to have been a part of bringing it to publication.

INTRODUCTION

RELIGION AND DIVERSITY IN CANADA Lori G. Beaman and Peter Beyer In early 2007 the town of Hérouxville, Québec (population 1338) made international news by publishing an “immigrant code of conduct” for new immigrants who might wish to move to the community. The code included some directives clearly aimed at religious minorities and clearly based on misunderstandings of a variety of religious traditions. The following is a sampling of what appeared in the code: Our immense territory is patrolled by police men and women of the “Surete du Québec.” They have always been allowed to question or to advise or lecture or to give out an infraction ticket to either a man or woman. You may not hide your face as to be able to identify you while you are in public. The only time you may mask or cover your face is during Halloween, this is a religious traditional custom at the end of October celebrating all Saints Day, where children dress up and go door to door begging for candy and treats. All of us accept to have our picture taken and printed on our driver’s permit, health care card and passports. A result of democracy.1

The town’s attempt to “manage” diversity was met with both horror and support and was one of a number of incidents that inspired the province of Québec to undertake a public commission on the subject of reasonable accommodation of minorities (see the chapters by Pauline Côté and Solange Lefebvre in this volume). Québec and Canada are situated within a global context that is increasingly immersed in debates about how to mange shifting population demographics that bring together people of diverse cultural backgrounds. These shifting demographies have prompted reactions ranging from celebration, to concern, to confusion. Or, in the case of Hérouxville, Québec, the creation of a provocative community statement that was clearly counterposed to an imagined set of religious beliefs and practices of a religious 1 “Publication of Standards,” Municipalité Hérouxville, http://municipalite.herouxville .qc.ca/Standards.pdf, accessed December 3, 2007.

2

lori g. beaman and peter beyer

“other.” While some people like to dismiss the events in Hérouxville as an isolated incident that has nothing to do with prevalent attitudes in Québec, and those outside of Québec have largely pretended that this incident has nothing to do with them, the issues raised by the Hérouxville Manifesto are symptomatic of a simmering and potentially volatile situation in Canadian society which is rooted in the question of diversity and its limits. Canada prides itself on being a multicultural nation, a status which has to some extent been solidified under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. More broadly, diversity too is enshrined in the Charter, with the protection of citizens from discrimination on any number of grounds, including race, sexual orientation, and religion. This volume seeks to explore the intersections of diversity while foregrounding religion as the primary focus of analysis. In this context, the following questions provide the central focus for this book: What does diversity mean in Canada? What power relations does diversity imply? What is the cultural context in which diversity is worked out? What Does Diversity Mean in Canada? For the purposes of analysis some of the authors in this book employ a static definition of diversity, however we take as a beginning point instead that the meaning and implications of the term diversity are contested. By this we mean that there is no single way to conceptualize diversity, and further, that there are consequences to naming diversity as something to be studied. We try to avoid a read of diversity as “difference,” which sets up one group as the norm against which others are measured. Yet, we are also aware that this is often the sense in which diversity is employed. Certainly in the realm of public policy discussions there is a sense that diversity implies a problem and an “other” that is the source of that problem. In part this is explained by the rapidly shifting demographics of Canadian society (Statistics Canada has just released data that shows that one in five Canadians is now “foreign born”) against a strong historical presence of Christianity in Canadian society and institutions. Thus there is a strong pull to conceptualize diversity in terms of difference, especially “non-Christian” difference. The historical and present-day dominance of Christianity in Canadian society has tended to overshadow the very important point that religious minorities have a long history of presence in Canada. Multi-

religion and diversity in canada

3

religious and multi-cultural statements cannot be simplistically assessed as political wish lists or strategies. Canada is a multicultural nation. The importance of this as a fundamental cornerstone of national identity is underscored by the statement in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that the rights and protections included therein shall be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with Canada’s multicultural heritage.2 And, despite the dominance of Christianity, Canada is a multi-religious country, a fact that is also recognized in human rights legislation, including the Charter, which protects religious freedom in Canada. Statistical data maps religion since the late 1800s (although critical note must be taken of who was considered “worth measuring” at various points in Canadian history). Sikhs, Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus have all been present in Canadian society at least since the first census. The Canadian Jewish community has roots that date to the 1700s. Despite the historical fact of diversity, Canada finds itself immersed in the discourse of “reasonable accommodation”, which implies that there is an “us” who can give accommodation to “them.” In addition to Hérouxville, some of the incidents which have triggered these discussions include: 11-year-old Asmahan (Azzy) Mansour was called off a soccer field in Montréal by a referee who ruled her hijab violated Rule 4 of the International Football Association Board. Law 4 stipulates that “a player must not use equipment or wear anything that is dangerous to himself or any other player (including any kind of jewelry)” (Toronto Star, 27 February 2007). In Saskatchewan, civil servant Orville Nichols refused to marry a same sex couple, citing his religious beliefs and his conviction that “God hates homosexuality” as reason for his refusal (CBC, 31 January 2007). A Montréal day care refusal to accommodate the beliefs of a Muslim couple by serving halal meat to their child has come before the Québec Human Rights Commission (CTV, 4 April 2007). In Alberta, the Court of Appeal has supported the claim by Hutterites that they be exempt from photo identification on their driver’s licenses (CBC, 17 May 2007). The proposal to implement sharia law for Muslims resolving family law matters in Ontario was met with a storm of debate that resulted in a government commissioned

2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter, accessed 22 February, 2008.

4

lori g. beaman and peter beyer

report.3 The Boyd Report recommended allowing sharia, however the sudden announcement of the Ontario premier that sharia would not be allowed in Ontario put an end to the discussion. During the last provincial election the issue of funding for religious schools proved to be the undoing of one party’s chance of attracting a majority vote. Peter Beyer’s chapter sets the context for understanding diversity as a continuing theme in Canada’s history. Beyer examines the critical shifts during the 1960s and 1970s that resulted in a sea change in national identity in relation to diversity. It was during those decades that the story of Canada as a multicultural and tolerant nation was born. Beyer situates Canada’s diversity as a “glocal” phenomenon, rendering it all the more complex. Beyer’s chapter leads, of course, to the question of the management of diversity, a topic that is currently bring framed in Canada as a matter of reasonable accommodation and tolerance. What Power Relations Does Diversity Imply? While the issue of accommodation seems to be most heated in the province of Québec, the debate over accommodation is nationwide, and its resolution has profound implications for the entire country. The meaning of diversity and its reasonable accommodation has been the central focus of the public hearings of the Bouchard-Taylor commission taking place in Québec as we write this volume. In the following pages Pauline Côté holds that a public commission is not the appropriate forum for working out the boundaries of diversity. Côté insists that such a process is too politicized to provide a useful contribution to an understanding of diversity and its limits. Côté argues that a politicized process gives too much voice to prejudices of all sorts and that these voices do not accurately reflect the cultural context nor do they build a foundation for a positive resolution of the challenges of diversity. Côté’s chapter raises an important challenge: how to avoid creating a problem where none exists in the process of managing diversity. Doug Cowan’s exploration of the relationship between religion and fear offers some insight into the cultural context in which sometimes

3 Marion Boyd. 2004. “Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion.” Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, http://www.attorneygeneral .jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/, accessed 22 February, 2008.

religion and diversity in canada

5

vitriolic voices emerge. The fear that feeds extreme reaction to religious difference is an important factor in understanding the possibilities for theorizing diversity. Cowan uses three historically situated examples to underscore the fact that fear is not a new phenomenon in this social context. Cowan’s examples provide a counter-history to the dominant narrative of Canada as a tolerant nation. Further, he argues that most Canadians form their opinions about religious minorities based on sensationalized media reports, a situation that does little to facilitate an equitable working out of religious diversity or a response that is not rooted in fear. Fear is also part of the backdrop of the reaction within religious groups to the ordination of gay and lesbian clergy and to the celebration of same-sex marriage. In the context of some religious worldviews challenges to the so-called “traditional family” threaten to disrupt the seeming order of social life. Differences within religious traditions around these issues cause schisms and tensions within religious groups which also impact on the broader society. So, for example, the Anglican Church of Canada finds itself torn over the issue of same-sex marriage and the ordination of gay priests. Sexuality as a flashpoint in the intersection of religion and diversity is explored by Pamela Dickey Young in this volume. She explores diversity both within and between religious traditions as they respond to the issue of same-sex relationships. Sam Reimer picks up on the themes in Dickey Young’s chapter and asks how traditional religious groups respond to diversity. Reimer engages in some precise empirical reflection on the ways in which religious traditions impact on attitudes toward diversity, but more importantly, he explores the complex relationship between religious participation and support for diversity. Given the dominance of Christianity in Canada’s history, and given the support for multiculturalism and for equality on numerous bases, including sexuality, in Canada’s constitution, Reimer’s findings are especially salient. Ultimately, it is the diversity issue in question that is most relevant, and it is on issues of family that the religiously active are most likely to challenge diversity. Chris Helland’s work plays on another angle of the diversity theme by exploring the ways in which religious groups are deploying new technologies. Helland argues that the very structure of the Internet supports diversity religious traditions because of its non-hierarchical and open access based approach. Websites provide groups with an opportunity to present themselves as they want to be perceived, an especially important opportunity for religious minorities. One of the themes that

6

lori g. beaman and peter beyer

emerges again in this chapter is the notion of diversity within religious groups, as Helland talks about power struggles in presentation of self that occur behind the scenes of internet sites. Like Beyer’s chapter, Helland’s work also raises the important point that religious diversity within Canada is intimately connected to a global religious community for which the boundaries of the nation state have limited meaning. This poses interesting new challenges for the definition and limiting of religious expression. Mireille Gagnon’s case study of an emerging Wiccan chaplaincy in Canadian prisons is an interesting microstudy of the possibilities and challenges involved in integrating diverse religious groups into institutional contexts that have traditionally seen religion in relatively narrow terms. Gagnon’s chapter shows the promise of diversity in a rather conservative institution, the Correctional Services of Canada. Her work touches on the challenges of such initiatives as well, raising questions about the most effective strategies for the practical implementation of policies that attempt to address a new religious landscape. Solange Lefebvre’s chapter takes up a similar theme, but from the perspective of broader institutional changes in the definition and understanding of religion vis-à-vis religious minorities. She reviews some important court and human rights tribunal decisions that have generated a great deal of discussion and debate, and which have in part inspired the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission on reasonable accommodation. Her chapter raises questions about the manner in which societies respond to diversity, and the ways in which seemingly new approaches reify hegemonic patterns. Lefebvre reflects on the differences between secularization and la laïcité, arguing that the two are not interchangeable. Also important is the fact that in its attempt to sort through claims by religious minorities the legal system often misunderstands or essentializes religious groups. The turn to a subjective understanding of religion may have the deleterious effect of eroding the meaning of the term “religion”, thus further undermining the protection of religious freedom. Is It Possible to Build a Peaceful Society with a Rapidly Changing and Diverse Population? In some measure, Canada has a long history of creating and maintaining a society in which diverse groups have peacefully co-existed. But, of

religion and diversity in canada

7

course, this version of Canada’s history excludes the numerous stories of persecution, inequality and near-cultural annihilation that are also part of the fabric of this nation. Beaman picks up on this theme in her chapter, which outlines possible strategies for thinking about diversity. She presents three possible approaches to diversity, including Canada’s emerging discourse of reasonable accommodation, and argues that the language of tolerance and reasonable accommodation must be replaced by an approach that begins with the language of equality. She argues that, using existing human rights legislation and court interpretations of it, it is possible to find a way to build social relations among members of a diverse population by focusing on equality.4

4 We wish to express our appreciation to Heather Shipley at the University of Ottawa for her careful editorial assistance throughout the drafting and compilation of this volume.

CHAPTER ONE

FROM FAR AND WIDE: CANADIAN RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL/LOCAL CONTEXT Peter Beyer The main title of this chapter is a quote from the official English version of the Canadian national anthem. It is a phrase that is specifically intended to signal that Canadians come from everywhere in the world and that this diversity is an important aspect of what Canada is supposed to be. Perhaps equally as significant as the meaning, is that the phrase does not appear in older, more traditional English versions of the anthem. Only in 1968 did a government commission suggest this addition and notably also the insertion of the words “God keep our land” in front of “glorious and free,” thus adding a religious reference to a verse that had none before. When the Canadian parliament adopted O Canada as the official English national anthem in 1980, these changes were both included.1 During the same period, roughly from the mid-1960s to the end of the century, the governments of the day established various policies and legislations that mark a sea change in matters of official Canadian identity and practical Canadian realities (with parallel, but also rather different, changes in Québec). In 1965, the country designed and adopted its current flag, one that no longer included any British symbols. The year 1967 saw the beginning of the current immigration policy that put great stress on the language abilities, educational attainment, and employment prospects of potential new arrivals; but eliminated all national, religious, racial, and ethnic criteria that had hitherto especially favored people coming from the British Isles and 1 The official French version of the anthem, Ô Canada, is very different from the English version. The French lyrics have not been changed since its composition in 1880. It is the original version, and like many national anthems, it has an archaic quality to its lyrics that in this case reflect the kind of French Canadian self-identity that was strong in the Québec society of that time. The French and English versions were both adopted as the official Canadian national anthem in 1980 on the centenary of the composition of the French version (see www.pch.gc.ca).

10

peter beyer

Europe. It thereby opened the door for immigration from everywhere in the world. In 1971, on the heels of legislation that made the country officially bilingual at the federal level, Pierre Trudeau’s government embraced multiculturalism as official policy. In 1982, Canada “patriated” the British North America Act, an 1867 act of the British parliament which had previously served as the equivalent of a Canadian constitution. This final severing of formal ties to Britain took the form of the Constitution Act, which included a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that enshrined bilingualism, multiculturalism, and religious freedom.2 This act was followed in 1988 with the Multiculturalism Act, declaring cultural diversity to be both a symbolic and practical aspect of Canada as a country. Canada, it seems, was articulating its official identity as an entirely independent country dedicated to the promotion and incorporation of cultural diversity, linguistic duality, and somewhat less explicitly, religious pluralism. These legislative, policy, and symbolic changes are, of course, only part of a much larger picture of transformation in Canadian society during the post-World War II era. Moreover, they do not take place in some sort of splendid isolation, as if Canada were finally cutting its colonial ties and venturing off in its own, internally generated and independent direction. In fact, rather the opposite is closer to the mark: these changes, and the concrete transformations within Canada to which they correspond, are a particularly Canadian expression of what has been happening all around the world during the same period. Canada’s declaration of a new identity is a reflection and manifestation of global developments, and the particular content of the transformations only makes proper sense with reference to the wider global context. This parallelism also extends to the ambiguities inherent in the whole process of “national” identity construction in a globalized world: what composes the ideal contains contradictions, both in the sense of the Canadian reality not living up to its own declared ideal, and in the sense of including elements that are apparently mutually exclusive. Elucidating these general observations in the remainder of this chapter occurs in three parts. The first takes a historical view to show

2 One significant link remains: the British monarch, currently Queen Elizabeth II, is still the official Head of State in Canada, but the Governor General of Canada, appointed de facto by the Canadian federal government, fulfils virtually all ceremonial and legal functions associated with this office. Queen Elizabeth is thus formally the Head of State of the United Kingdom and, separately, of Canada.

from far and wide

11

how late twentieth-century Canada is the outcome of its own history and how that history has always been a reflection of the global context. A subsequent section examines some of the concrete consequences of the recent changes with specific reference to the issue of religious diversity in contemporary Canada. The third section then focuses even more narrowly on how these questions of identity and diversity manifest themselves in the lives of a specific portion of the Canadian population, namely second generation youth from post-1970 immigrant backgrounds. In each part, the question of how the Canadian story is also a global one will form an important aspect of the discussion. Imagining and Managing Religious and Cultural Diversity in Canadian History History leaves traces in the present, but the present also imagines history. The decennial Canadian census may be one of the less obvious places to look for evidence of this relation, but it is thereby perhaps one of the more suggestive. Governments in Canada have been conducting censuses since the 18th century and regularly since the 1840s. Three of the sorts of questions that have been asked consistently over the last 150 years concern religious identification, what we now call ethnic or cultural origin, and language. As a matter of public policy, religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity have therefore always been important enough to measure. The details of that measurement are revealing because they indicate not just what happened to be present in Canada in any given period, but more importantly which differences the dominant discourses of the time recognized as significant and how they understood them. During the census century from 1871 to 1971, religious differences as measured were overwhelmingly in terms of varieties of Christianity, especially the distinction between Catholics and Protestants, and among Protestant identities. Cultural differences were for the most part European differences, with French (Canadian) and British (English, Irish, Scots, etc.) dominating. The French/English distinction also dominated the linguistic field. Moreover, for much of this period, the three measures overlapped substantially, and this demographic reality reflected itself in prevailing public understandings: Canada contained mainly the FrenchCanadian Catholics and the British Protestants. If we can speak of a corresponding Canadian “national identity” during the latter half of

12

peter beyer

the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, this religious, cultural, and linguistic duality would be its core feature. To be sure, it was far from amicable and uncontested, and it would indeed be more accurate to call it a “duality” rather than an “identity.” Throughout this period, elite French Canadians developed and institutionalized a separate and explicitly national identity centred on an ultramontane and devotional Catholicism, the French language, and a kind of messianic vision of themselves as the defenders of the true religion in a religiously, culturally, and linguistically threatening North American sea of Anglo-Protestant apostasy. The Anglo-Protestants, by contrast, regarded Canada not as some kind of partnership between themselves and the French Canadians, but much more as British North America, as an outpost and expression of the Protestant British Empire and not as a separate nationality. To the transnational ultramontanism of the French speakers thus corresponded the equally transnational British imperial connection of the English speakers. Canada was in this religio-cultural, as well as in an economic, political, and demographic sense, an expression of European global expansion and had been since it started being called Canada during the French colonial regime of the 17th and 18th centuries. Canadian religious and cultural diversity was not, however, exhausted in this real and imagined duality. In both dimensions, transnational migration of the 18th to 20th centuries cross-cut and even contradicted the dominant dualism. American Methodists, Baptists, and Congregationalists arrived in the late 18th century. Scots Presbyterians and British Methodists immigrated in significant numbers in the earlier 19th century. They did not just appear in the censuses, they also contested the official hegemony of the Church of England and led the Canadian manifestation of the wave of evangelicalism that transformed Protestantism throughout North America and in Great Britain. The challenge resulted in the disestablishment of the English church in favor of a Protestant pluralism eventually dominated by Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, and to a lesser extent Baptists. On the Roman Catholic side, the mid-19th century arrival of large numbers of destitute Irish Catholics in the wake of the potato famine not only dramatically swelled the number of Catholics, but also spread throughout Canada what was for the increasingly dominant “duality” a categorical anomaly: English-speaking Catholics. In the late 19th and early 20th century, the largest waves of immigration Canada had ever seen again became much more than a matter of

from far and wide

13

simply incorporating new arrivals. The population from 1881 to 1911 swelled by more than two-thirds, but the number of significant ethnic and religious categories recorded in the censuses almost doubled.3 New ethnic identities included origins such as Polish, Ukranian, and Japanese, with corresponding linguistic diversity. Among the many additional religious categories were not just new varieties of Christians like Greek Orthodox, Salvation Army, Mennonites, and Doukhobors, but also nonChristians, namely Jews, Buddhists, and Confucians (Statistics Canada 1949, 1980).4 By this time, the descendants of the earlier waves had integrated into the dominant society to a greater or lesser extent, but these different newcomers falling under new headings were met with a certain amount of consternation. That was the case for southern and eastern Europeans, but much more so for Asians. The dominant Canadian identities could with some reluctance and suspicion accommodate the presence of Russian Doukhobors and eastern European Jews, but not Japanese Buddhists, Chinese Confucians, or Punjabi Sikhs (these last commonly referred to as “Hindoos” and not reported in the censuses at all except as “other”). From the time of the first Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 to the second of 1923, government policy progressively made it more difficult and then virtually impossible for people from above all India, China, and Japan to enter Canada. The dominant attitude was that such people were just too unalterably foreign ever to be assimilated. In effect, even though Canada was thoroughly woven into the by then global imperial and transnational network, the dominant consciousness remained quite exclusionary, extending if necessary to all of Europe and European-settler societies like the United States, but not to the “non-white” regions of the world. In this, again, Canadians were not alone. It was at that time an attitude shared by most Europeans and their descendants, no matter where in the world they lived. These sharp limits to the inclusion of religious and cultural diversity were no more evident than in how Euro-Canadians of virtually all stripes viewed those whose forebears were in Canada well before any Europeans even set foot on the continent: aboriginal people. Before

3 Official Canadian census publications generally only report new categories if the numbers reach a certain arbitrary and variable threshold, otherwise new responses are included in residual categories like “other.” 4 Jews had already appeared on previous censuses, but only registered significant numbers for the first time during this period.

14

peter beyer

the 19th century, aboriginal societies in Canada were still economically, politically, and culturally viable, and the relationships between the two civilizational groups took more the form of (unequal) economic and political alliances. Progressively thereafter, however, as more and more Europeans arrived, as the agricultural frontier spread west and the industrial economy took hold, aboriginal people effectively found that their land and their social bases had, as it were, been “migrated” out from under them. By the end of the 19th century, although the census always tried to count them, Canadian governments were pursuing a concerted policy whose aim was to assimilate aboriginal people completely, to dissolve their separate identities both culturally and religiously. The Indian Act of 1876 was the cornerstone and provided the blueprint for this policy. It effectively made aboriginal people wards of the state, proscribed their religious practices, suppressed their distinct and highly varied forms of social and political organization, and attempted to socialize their children in residential schools run by Christian churches and designed to eliminate all distinct aboriginal cultural features, including language. In the minds of the Canadian majority, aboriginal religious and cultural diversity, like Asian varieties, could not be tolerated. These Euro-Canadians, again like their counterparts in other global regions, were very aware of the range of religious and cultural diversity that existed around the world and in their own backyard; but they understood these differences in an explicitly dichotomous and hierarchical fashion. There were the white, European, Christian, and civilized peoples, some of whom were admittedly “more equal than others”; then there were the unalterable “others” who had to be kept apart or, to the extent deemed possible, “civilized.” The post-World War II era has witnessed significant shifts in precisely this dichotomous understanding of diversity, especially on the part of the hitherto dominant Europeans. One can speculate as to the reasons; they probably had to do with the unprecedented levels of destruction that this war brought and the way that exclusionary attitudes directly informed the horrors perpetrated. Whatever the precise reasons, the dominant in Canada as elsewhere gradually changed their orientation to religious and cultural differences, in terms of how they understood them and through concrete institutional developments. Global manifestations include events ranging from the founding of the United Nations and the emergence of over 100 newly independent states in regions hitherto under direct European colonial domination, to a significant upsurge of

from far and wide

15

global migration and various international declarations espousing the equality of all the world’s peoples along with their distinct modes of religious and cultural expression. In Canada, the corresponding signs of change were many. They included the gradual lifting of restrictions on the entry of those previously deemed unalterably foreign, and the halting but steady increase in the “recognition” of internal “others”—including those newly arrived—precisely in their differences and their “right” to be and remain different (cf. Taylor 1992). The symbolic, policy, and legislative changes discussed at the beginning of this chapter are all manifestations of the particularly Canadian version of the global transformations. They concern above all the multiplication of diversity, the French/English duality, and the status of aboriginal peoples. The postwar Canadian censuses can again serve as a bellwether for what has been happening. There we notice, first of all, a steady increase in the number and kind of ethno-cultural and religious categories reported. Jumping the gap from 1911 to 2001, ethnic categories increased from 30 to 232, and religious categories from 32 to 124.5 In both cases, the majority of the increase is a reflection of the arrival of new identities through immigration, and most of these appeared only in the last three censuses since 1971. Thus, for example, what was just “other Asiatic races” until after the war became “Indo-Pakistani” or “Other East Indian” by 1971, and by 2001 had mushroomed into 13 separate categories ranging from Bangladeshi to Tamil. In 1971, only “West Indian” indicated the presence of people whose origins were in the Caribbean; by 2001, nineteen Caribbean categories were reported. On the religion side, before the war, the only Catholics reported were Roman Catholics. By 1971, “Ukrainian Catholic” had appeared, and by 2001 these had given way to the listing of 12 varieties of Catholic. Where as late as 1971 the only possibility for Eastern Christianity was “Greek Orthodox,” by 2001 there appeared 14 possibilities ranging from Armenian and Coptic to Ukranian and Serbian Orthodox. For non-Christians, the three previously mentioned possibilities reported as early as 1901 were still the only ones in 1971. By 2001 Muslims (including 4 sub-varieties), Hindu, Sikh, Baha’i, Shinto, Zoroastrian,

Statistics Canada 1949. Here and in the rest of this chapter, unless otherwise stated, census data for the years 1971–2001 are taken from customized data prepared for the author in 2003 (see Statistics Canada 2003). 5

16

peter beyer

Jain, Taoist, Rastafari, “Native Indian or Inuit,” Pagan, and Wicca had been added. Perhaps equally as important as the sheer variety is that the great majority of all these new categories included relatively few people. For instance, in 2001, only 600 people indicated that they were Syrian Catholic, compared with almost 13 million identifying as Roman Catholic. Although there were from 300–600 thousand each of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, Jains numbered only 2,500 and Rastafarians only about 1,100. Reporting so many categories with relatively small numbers indicates that, for official Canadian policy purposes at least, differences themselves had become increasingly important by the end of the 20th century: to the vastly increased and regular arrival of “others” from all around the world corresponded an increased positive recognition of the particular differences. This feature is perhaps no more clearly expressed than in the following example: in 1971 there were probably at least 19,000 Muslims, 15,000 Sikhs, and 16,000 Hindus in Canada, but they were not reported as separate categories.6 By 1981, when the numbers in each group had increased four- or five-fold, they were. It is this combination of changed Canadian reality and changed Canadian perception that characterizes the Canadian situation in the early 21st century. And both these aspects reflect the changing global context in which the country finds itself. In 1971, the decennial Canadian census just happened to coincide with the declaration of Canada’s first official multiculturalism policy. Immediately one could ask therefore, why the policy was adopted first and the recognition—and even celebration—of diversity as just outlined happened only later. The Multiculturalism Act, for instance, was passed only in 1988, close to two decades after the initial policy adoption. As it happens, the policy of multiculturalism was an almost accidental outcome of the renewed attempt in the 1960s to deal with the centuries-old and uniquely Canadian French/English divide, and

6 I arrive at the minimum figures by taking all Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus in 1981 who reported having immigrated to Canada before 1971 or who were born in Canada and at least 10 years old. I take these data from Statistics Canada 2003, which includes all available categories for the 1971 census as well. I say, “available,” because finding out how many people actually indicated their adherence to these religions in 1971 would have necessitated reprogramming the census database, a costly service. The accuracy of these figures is supported by the fact that, using the same calculation, there would have been about 16,000 Buddhists in Canada in 1971, and this corresponds rather well to the 16,500 that were actually reported, Buddhism having been a reported religious category since 1901, as noted above.

from far and wide

17

not a way of addressing the “worldwide” diversity that is such an important feature of the (at least urban) Canadian population today. In 1971, that sort of diversity—as contrasted to the older “European” diversity—was still demographically and visibly insignificant. Addressing Canadian “duality” became urgent in the 1960s in the light of what is generally known as Québec’s “Quiet Revolution”. In a global context where independence and nationalist movements were blossoming, most French Canadians in Québec in effect abandoned their previous national self-image centred on language and Roman Catholicism in favor of a more secular and political nationalism centred on language, the state, and therefore on territory. In this new context, language politics became critical. For the new elite of Québécois nationalism, the Québec state, and not the church, had become the essential instrument for the protection and development of the Québec people; and the ability to live in French became a prime practical and symbolic indicator of how effective the state was in this regard. Responding to this reorientation, the Canadian federal government of the day sought a clearer recognition and therefore better accommodation of French throughout Canada. The idea was to institutionalize and symbolize Canadian identity further as French/English duality. It was the mandate of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism of the 1960s to recommend ways of realizing this goal. In the process, however, what became known as the “Third Force,” namely those Canadians who did not fit on either side of the “bi,” asserted itself: people who identified themselves as, for instance, Ukranian, Italian, or Jewish insisted and demonstrated that effective linguistic duality did not correspond to cultural duality in Canada, that culturally—and indirectly thereby, religiously—the identity in Canadian diversity could not be captured within the old French/English duality. While on the “French” side a new unified vision of the Québécois nation was rapidly solidifying, on the “English” side the old British imperial identity had faded without even an inchoate successor. Trying to include the French Canadians more clearly was part of an impetus toward a new Canadian identity, but the logic of this move could not for practical reasons lead to a revamped version of the old duality. The upshot was the official idea and policy that Canada was bilingual and multicultural. Although these measures in no way satisfied Québécois nationalists, and indeed were seen by many of them as a cynical move precisely to deny them recognition, multiculturalism as an official Canadian identity-marker was born and subsequently took on a life of its own.

18

peter beyer

Already in 1951, the Canadian government began lifting some of the more draconian restrictions on the performance of aboriginal cultural and religious practices. By the 1960s, aboriginal people could claim full Canadian citizenship without thereby forfeiting their “Indian status.” This special status had been conferred with the 1876 Indian Act, but then it had come at the cost of effective marginalization and cultural destruction. Now, in the postwar period, the idea of equal recognition and inclusion as aboriginal people had begun to set in. What such recognition actually implied, however, both in principle and in terms of concrete institutional arrangements remained about as unclear as the idea of Canadian identity as such. As in the cases of immigrants from all regions of the world and of French Canadians/Québécois, the ideal of egalitarian inclusion did not come ready-formed with details about how that inclusion was to be expressed in everyday social reality. Many French Canadians, for instance, in resonance with the numerous national independence movements that were successively creating new sovereign states all around the world, came to the conclusion that their “recognition” by other Canadians could only mean the political and territorial sovereignty of Québec. Others, of course, such as those promoting a bilingual and multicultural Canada, disagreed. Similarly, among Canada’s aboriginal people beginning in the 1960s, social movements arose that were part of a more globally generalized assertion of aboriginal peoples as a distinct social and cultural category that had the “right” to be included and recognized as such. This movement expressed itself in a multitude of ways in Canada— prime among them being through the notions of “land claims,” “treaty rights,” and “self-government.” In a nutshell, aboriginal people, or, in the currently dominant parlance, First Nations, have more or less successfully established that they own the territories on which they have traditionally lived; that the extinction or continuation of that ownership has to be translated into specific treaties between Canadian governments and these First Nations; and that the latter are entitled to govern their own affairs. Although translating these ideas into specific arrangements has over the last decades been difficult and highly contested, it is also difficult in contemporary Canada to deny them publicly. The legitimated ideals in Canada with respect to First Nations people thereby correspond to what has been happening concurrently and globally, namely the creation and recognition of the distinct cultural category of

from far and wide

19

“indigenous peoples,” most recently formally expressed in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.7 Contemporary Canadian Religious Diversity in Global Context The three dimensions of Canadian religious and cultural diversity stressed in the previous section thus have a long history in Canada, and each has always been a localized expression of how difference asserted itself and was understood more globally. Like so much else about Canada, internal diversity has been structurally and symbolically local and global at the same time. At the beginning of the 21st century, those dimensions of religious and cultural diversity are as, and perhaps even more, salient than ever. Again, this situation is reflected at the official level in various ways, including in the kinds of questions asked in the Canadian census and in the way these questions are asked. In 2001, the last decennial census, a distinct section is devoted to “sociocultural information” (Statistics Canada 2001). One question asks about the ability to speak French and English and the census questionnaire is available only in French and English. These two languages are clearly privileged and officially treated equally. Separate language questions allow for responses that include “non-official” languages; another question asks about the cultural ancestry of a person, permitting multiple responses; and a further question asks, in effect, about subjective racial identity. These three sets of questions together are most clearly aimed at the “multicultural” dimension. The last one, however, refers to what Canadian public discourse currently often calls “visible minority” status. It is the most recent addition (in 1996), and evidently seeks to track the sorts of Canadians who were explicitly excluded from Canada before the change in immigration policies during the 1960s. In this question, people of European ancestry, the previously dominant 7 Canada was actually one of four countries (with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) to vote against the adoption of the Declaration in September 2007. Its objections, like those of the other three, concerned, not the general principles of indigenous rights and recognition, but rather that the Declaration granted indigenous people the right to self-determination, a concept that has since the beginning of the 20th century implied the right to sovereign state formation (see United Nations General Assembly 2007).

20

peter beyer

immigrant groups, are clearly encouraged to indicate that they are “white.” Moreover, the question is preceded by a question that asks for aboriginal identity, and respondents who answer in the affirmative are told explicitly to skip the “visible minority” question. Much as French and English are languages whose status is much greater than that of a “cultural” characteristic (French, Québécois, English, Canadian/canadien or similar cultural identities are treated like any other), aboriginal identity is deemed to be a status category sui generis and not a “racial” one. This again reflects the special status of being indigenous that has received global recognition. Indigenous people and “visible minorities” are thus not the same in Canada, even though aboriginal people are very often treated and feel themselves to be quite “visible.” Nonetheless, the cultural ancestry question and the language usage questions clearly include all these category sets, French/English, varieties of European-ness, non-European global, and indigenous. In terms of cultural diversity, the census therefore seeks to keep the three dimensions separate, but cannot in the final analysis deny the ambiguities inherent in this Canadian attempt to structure such cultural diversity more clearly: the words used to express linguistic, cultural, indigenous, and racial differences overlap to a significant degree, with different terms often being simply groupings. For example, “Chinese” refers to an ancestry, a language, and a visible minority group; “Latin American” is a visible minority category that simply groups the ancestry/ethnic names from Mexican to Argentinian and a great many of those who speak Portuguese and Spanish. “Cree” is a language, an ancestry, and an aboriginal category. And so on for most other categories. In this light, the final “sociocultural” identity question is significant: it asks about religion, permitting a single, entirely subjective response. Notably, the religion question is the last one of this set. It is the only one that permits only one answer. It is also the only one that is asked only once every 10 years and not every 5 years like all the rest, and it uses an almost entirely separate sets of identity terms (the two exceptions are “Jewish,” which is both an ancestry and a religious identification, and “Native Indian or Inuit,” which is an indigenous, linguistic, as well as ancestry term). From this fact, one can surmise that Canada is less clear about how to think about religious diversity, let alone how to structure it in public discourse and in public policy. Religion, one might suspect, hovers somewhere between being a problem, a regular and important aspect of Canadian reality, and an irrelevance. This again reflects what is happening more globally. Religious and cultural diversity,

from far and wide

21

as in the rest of the world, are ambiguously related. Religion seems to oscillate between being problematic and being essential. One might almost say that religion is a kind of orthogonal and unavowed—every decade Statistics Canada seriously considers dropping the religion question from the census entirely, but so far has always ended up keeping it—fourth dimension of cultural diversity, cross-cutting the others as uneasily as it ever has in Canadian history and in the modern history of the world. In the remainder of this chapter, I will concentrate on Canadian diversity as it relates to this fourth dimension. Since each of the four is rather different in its details, space does not permit to examine all four with equal attention. Nonetheless, the fact that they are interrelated and that they overlap considerably, both historically and today, both in Canada and in other parts of the world, means that in focussing on contemporary religious diversity, the other three dimensions will inevitably have to be treated to some extent as well. The religious situation in Canada today and the trends that have established themselves over the last few decades are at one and the same time a reflection of the more global context and a manifestation of Canadian particularity. This is the main thread of this chapter. Demographically, this “glocalism” is evident in the religious composition of the Canadian and world populations. The global religion with the most nominal adherents is and has been for much of the 20th century Christianity, and at least half of those Christians are Roman Catholic. In Canada, Christianity is also the largest religion and around half of Canadian Christians are Roman Catholics. Yet, in light of Canada’s history of restricting immigration for all intents and purposes to parts of the world where Christianity has been overwhelmingly dominant, namely Europe, this religion is by far the largest in Canada today, its nominal adherents still constituting about 75% of the current population. Globally, the second largest religion is Islam. By 2001, Islam was also the second largest religion in Canada but, again because of the history of immigration policies, a very distant second. In 2001, only about 2% of the Canadian population was Muslim, but as recently as 1981, 90% of the population was Christian and less than one-half of one percent was Muslim. By 1991, the Muslim population had increased to 1%. Although one cannot expect the doubling per decade to continue, a defensible estimate of the number of Muslims in Canada by the next decennial census in 2011 would be from 1 to 1.3 million, constituting

22

peter beyer

some 3–4% of the total population. It is a defensible estimate because the region of the world that is home to the majority of the world’s Muslims, namely the broad territory from North Africa through the Middle East into South Asia, supplied about 27% of Canada’s 1.8 million immigrants between 1991 and 2001, and about 34% of the 1.1 million from 2001 to 2006. The proportions are reversed for the eastern portion of Asia, from China to Southeast Asia, from which broad region about 33% of Canada’s immigrants originated during the last decade of the 20th century, and about 28% since then. The regions of the world where Christianity constitutes the majority religion, namely Latin America and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, the United States, and Australasia (including the Philippines) have been the origin of the remaining roughly 40%, a steadily decreasing proportion of which came from Europe—16% from 2001–6, down from almost 20% during the previous decade (see Statistics Canada 2003; 2007a; 2007b). Just on that basis alone, non-Christian religions should continue to benefit from immigration to Canada relatively more than Christianity, something that has increasingly been the case since the 1980s. Before 1961, 85% of immigrants were Christian, and only 4% were of other religions, at that time mostly Judaism. That proportion shifted progressively over the next decades such that, during the decade from 1991 to 2001, only 40% of immigrants were Christians, 32% were adherents of other world religions, with the remainder being mostly people who professed no religious adherence (see Beyer 2005). Accordingly, the number of Muslims and Buddhists in Canada increased six fold between 1981 and 2001, and the number of Hindus and Sikhs fourfold. Together, these four religions claimed over 6% of the Canadian population, with Islam recording the greatest absolute growth simply because there are so many more (at least nominal) Muslims in the world than there are adherents of the other three. The only other religious identification with comparable growth in numbers has been “no religion,” which proportionately has been benefiting as much from immigration—especially from East Asia—as from the drifting away from religious identity among the longer established Canadian population. Assuming the continuation of Canada’s current policy of high levels of immigration without regard to global region of origin (the current official target is 1% of the overall population per year, or as many as 3 million per decade), the proportional religious composition of the world’s population and of Canada’s population will continue to converge, albeit quite gradually. This observation means that Canada will

from far and wide

23

for the foreseeable future continue to be an overwhelmingly Christian country in terms of the dominant religious identity within its population. Yet this Christianity is itself changing and becoming more and differently diverse as immigrants reconstruct for the Canadian context the different versions of this religion that they bring with them and as they introduce new culturally inspired variations into longstanding Christian organizations in Canada (see e.g. Wilkinson 2006). The already mentioned new varieties of Roman Catholicism and Eastern Christianities would be examples of the latter; the upsurge over the past two decades of Christians that identify with none of the already present denominations is in significant measure a manifestation of the former. Thus, the 2001 census revealed that people who simply identified themselves as Christian or who said they belonged to small Protestant groups, mostly without a previous history in Canada, had grown much more rapidly over the decade (~30%, from about 1 to 1.3 million) than the Roman Catholics, the mainline Protestants (who declined by 10%), the established conservative Protestant denominations, or even the Eastern Christians. Those among these “other Christians” who were born in non-Western countries increased by over 100%, commensurate with the growth in non-Christian religions over the same period. Analogously, although Roman Catholics increased by only 4%, their absolute numbers increased by around 600,000; and people born in non-Western countries accounted for over one-third of this growth. Therefore, as global Christianity is demographically becoming more and more a religion of the “south” ( Jenkins 2007), so can we expect that Canadian Christianity will continue transforming in a corresponding fashion. If we look at this changing Canadian Christianity in greater detail, two aspects are perhaps the most salient, aside from the sheer increase in varieties. One is that the Protestant component is restructuring so as to reduce the dominance of the older and established mainline denominations like the Anglicans, the Presbyterians, the Lutherans, and the United Church. These churches are all declining in terms of percentage of the population and in absolute number of affiliates. The Presbyterians declined by one-third from 1991 to 2001 alone. Somewhat smaller but still historically important Protestant denominations like the Salvation Army, the Mennonites, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and even the Pentecostals also declined in number of adherents during this decade. Only the Baptists and certain smaller and conservative Protestant groups like the Seventh-day Adventists and the Christian and Missionary Alliance

24

peter beyer

showed a significant increase in adherents. In addition, very few new Protestant groups appeared in the 2001 census, and some previously reported even disappeared from the lists. By contrast, in tune with the upsurge in “generic” Protestants and Christians, non-denominational categories like “born again Christian,” “Apostolic,” “Church of God,” or “Evangelical,” all without further specification, made their appearance. What is more, the conservative Protestant groups as a whole, like the “generic” classifications, gained disproportionately from immigration, whereas the percentage of foreign-born people in the large mainline denominations actually declined. The upshot is therefore that, to a large degree because of immigration, Protestant Christianity in Canada is progressively favoring smaller, usually independent, and very often congregational forms of organization rather than the hitherto established denominational form (see, e.g. Li 2000; Cho 2004; Nagata 2005). Additionally, and this is the second important aspect of the transformations under way, the more conservative forms of Protestant Christianity—which in the modern era tended to be suspicious of overarching denominational organization anyway—have gained disproportionately from this change. It is, for instance, quite likely that the majority of those who identify themselves as generic Christians or Protestants are in fact conservative and, broadly speaking, evangelical Christians. Significantly, the “generic” category has gained from immigration more than any identifiable denominational groups, and this has been the case for the past twenty years in Canada. Again, if we look at global Christianity, there has been a similar trend: the Roman Catholic Church has grown steadily in terms of adherents, especially in the global south; and among Protestants, it is the conservative variety organized into local congregations and new and still relatively small transnational groups that has increased more than the larger and older transnational denominations. The increase in pluralization has been such that no other trend can be expected. The impact and transformation of religions other than Christianity in Canada, and the relation of those transformations to global developments, are rather more difficult to discern at the moment. Although the other world religions like Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism do have a substantial history in Canada, dating back at least to the later 19th century, with the exception of Judaism, the more recent newcomers so outnumber the older cohorts that the longer-standing Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist institutions and populations are unlikely to have much influence on contemporary and future develop-

from far and wide

25

ments, nor even to act as the foundation upon which transformations will take place. Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists were just too few in Canada before the 1970s. Nonetheless, two examples of historical adaptation, among Canada’s Jews and people of Japanese ancestry, including Japanese Buddhists, may give insight into two dimensions of the issue, that of positive religious adherence and the degree of denominational dominance. Jews and people of Japanese ancestry are the only two sizeable non-Christian or non-European populations in contemporary Canada (330,000 and 85,000 respectively in 2001) that consist mostly of the Canadian born. In 2001, only about 30% of both Jews and Japanese ancestry people were immigrants, compared to, for instance, the ethnically Chinese, Muslims, or Hindus, of whom 70–75% were immigrants.8 The involvement of Jews and Japanese with religion and the form that religion has taken are similar in some respects but also sharply different in others. The vast majority of ethnically Jewish people in Canada also identify as religiously Jewish, and probably something in the order of one half to two thirds of these them are synagogue affiliated. Even though, like Christian Canadians with respect to church attendance, most of the synagogue affiliated do not actually attend with any regularity, most Jews engage in at least occasional Jewish ritual at high holidays (Weinfeld et al. 1981; Brodbar-Nemzer et al. 1993; Weinfeld 1993). Somewhat in contrast, most Japanese Canadians are not religiously practicing at all (see Makabe 1998), a little less than half of them declaring that they have “no religion”—a figure that doubled between 1971 and 2001. In both cases, the institutional religious form that still prevails is the denomination, corresponding to the dominance of this sort of organization in Canada during the era when the non-immigrant cores of these groups established themselves, namely the 20th century period up to the 1960s. For Jews, this is the still prevailing tripartite division into Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox, with a good minority identifying with none of these. The denominational face of Japanese religion in Canada expresses itself rather differently. A declining percentage of ethnically Japanese identify with the large Protestant mainline denominations, especially the United Church, yet in 2001, this figure was still 8 By contrast, people of Western European ancestry were only about 10% immigrants, and people who identified only as Canadian in terms of ancestry were a mere 3% immigrants. The overall national figure in 2001 was about 18% immigrant and this had increased to 20% by 2006 (Statistics Canada 2007b).

26

peter beyer

higher than any other positive religious identity, including Buddhist.9 In tune with the previous dominance but recent decline of the large denominations, in 1971, over 40% of Japanese in Canada identified with the liberal Protestant mainline; in 2001 a still healthy 18% did so, more than the percentage of Buddhists, of Roman Catholics, conservative, or other Christians. With regard to these other categories, Roman Catholics and other, “generic” Christians have both increased modestly in percentage terms, and this corresponds to the growth of both categories in the general Canadian population. Similarly, conservative denominational Christians have remained about the same. The percentage of Buddhists has declined from 28% in 1971 to 16% in 2001. Organizationally, for people of Japanese ancestry, the Buddhist Churches of Canada have historically been a small Japanese denomination founded mostly after the First World War. The BCC has remained small but remarkably stable in terms of the number of congregations that belong to it. Before the 1960s, there were 18 congregations and today there are 19, mostly the same ones and mostly in British Columbia and Alberta (see www .bcc.ca; Mullins 1989). In both the Jewish and Japanese cases, therefore, the trend among these predominantly non-immigrant groups has been in tune with the direction taken by the overall non-immigrant population, notwithstanding the also unique character of both stories. In light of these two examples, the question can thus be posed as to whether the other world religious populations will follow suit. Will they, for instance, follow the pattern of a high degree of organization at the local level combined with modest national denominational organizations that are perhaps Canadian versions of larger transnational movements within each religion? Will they show an increasing level of “no religion” identification over time? Will they exhibit a high percentage of nominal identification of which only a substantial minority is actively involved in regular religious practice? A solid answer to each of these questions will obviously have to await the passage of a few more decades. That a positive answer to the first is a real possibility, however, is already evident from developments that have happened by the end of the first decade of the 21st century. The

9 Virtually no Japanese people list their religious identity as “Shinto,” this category evidently not considered as a religion to which one belongs. Both in 1991 and 2001, only about 500 people in Canada indicated their religion as Shinto.

from far and wide

27

major cities of immigration, but most especially the greater Vancouver and Toronto regions, are now dotted with new temples, gurdwaras, “ethnic” churches, and mosques, an increasing number “purpose-built” and thus visibly identifiable for what they are. Immigrant populations in these cities are large enough that different organizations can and do cater to different subdivisions within the major religions: for example, Shi’a, Ahmadiyya, Sunni mosques, and Ismaili Jamaat Khanas; Vaishnavite and Saivite, North Indian and South Indian, predominantly Tamil and Guyanese Hindu temples; Vietnamese, Chinese, Laotian, Cambodian, Sri Lankan, and Korean Buddhist temples; Latin American, Korean, Ghanaian, and Eritrean Pentecostal churches; Chinese Baptist, United, and Presbyterian churches; and so on. Not only are these globalized religious and cultural distinctions recreating themselves in organizational form in Canada, so too are transnational and global religious movements and organizations establishing themselves in Canada, predominantly among these more recent immigrant populations. Examples include the following: the Hindu Ramakrishna Math and Mission, the Sai Baba movement, the Swaminarayans, the Arya Samaj, and the Vishva Hindu Parishad; the Chinese Buddhist Fo Guang Shan, Dharma Drum Mountain, and True Buddha School; and various Muslim Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandi and the Chishti. In quite a number of cases, this presence is minimal, but in other cases it is already solid and substantial. Together, these developments show that the establishment of new religious diversity in Canada by way of post-1960s immigration inevitably implies that the form that these “new” religions take in Canada will be significantly influenced by the forms that these religions take in other parts of the world. If we can regard these local and transnational religious movements and organizations as a kind of incipient congregational and denominational organization for the religions in question, then they seem already to be exhibiting that typically glocal characteristic of being localized versions of their globalized and transnational versions. As concerns the second question about the trend toward “no religion” identification, the post-1970 immigrant populations and their second generations seem also to be following suit with the overall population, although in certain respects somewhat ambiguously. In this case, one has to look at groups whose origins are in eastern Asia separately from those who come from other parts of the world. For historic reasons having to do with how modern “religion” came to be understood in eastern Asian countries, a comparatively large

28

peter beyer

percentage of people in countries like Japan, Korea, China, and Vietnam do not identify with a particular religion even when they also engage in what others might call regular religious practices. These patterns are reflected, in differing degrees, among the Canadian immigrant populations with origins in these countries. In 2001, 57% of Canadians with Chinese origins and 46% with Japanese origins declared that they had no religion. Among Southeast Asians (mostly Vietnamese) and Koreans, this figure stood at about 22%—much lower, but still higher than the 16% in the overall population. No other sub-populations exhibit such high percentages. Yet, as interesting as this static picture are the trends over time and from one generation to the next. Among the ethnically Chinese, “no religion” identification is decreasing. For example, people who immigrated between 1971–80 were 57% “no religion” in 1981, but only 45% so in 2001; and those born in Canada consistently identify somewhat less frequently as “no religion” than do those born elsewhere. Among the other eastern Asian groups, however, the trend seems to be very slightly toward more “no religion” identification over time and generation rather than less. It may well be that the Chinese case is more one of people understanding the questions differently over time rather than changing belief and behavior, because the trend is the same for Chinese who come from the Peoples Republic, where religion has been suppressed, as for ethnically Chinese who come from Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Southeast Asia, where it is not. In all these eastern Asian cases, therefore, there seems to be a gradual movement toward the overall Canadian trend: greater “no religion” identification over time, but a moderate one that tends toward a minority of the population. Briefly, and in contrast, immigrants from other parts of the world, whether Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, West or South Asia, or Europe have been arriving in the country with a lower than national average level of identification as “no religion,” but these percentages, in all cases, have increased with length of stay in Canada and from one generation to the next, although, again, modestly and gradually. Of course, these identification figures say nothing about how serious the involvement with religion is among the majorities who do positively identify. Among the established, nominally Christian population, it is clear that, while over 80% of them have a positive religious identity, probably only something in the order of about 30% can be called in any sense regularly practicing. The situation for the more recent immigrant populations remains to be investigated more thoroughly. As a partial

from far and wide

29

indicator, however, I turn to the results of recent research that several colleagues and I have carried out among Canadian second-generation youth of Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist backgrounds.10 Involvement in Religion among Canadian Second Generation Youth: A Select Example One of the more common conclusions from research among immigrants to Western countries like Canada and the United States is that those who have arrived in a country relatively recently will often find in their religious faith an important anchor and orientation for their ability and effort to establish themselves in their new homes (see, from a vast literature, Yang 1999; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000; Nayar 2004; Nagata 2005). That same research, however, often questions whether it is at all the same for the second generation offspring of these immigrants, people who, in the present context, have grown up or been socialized in Canada. They do not face the same sorts of transitional challenge since, for the most part, they are culturally and linguistically “from here,” albeit also potentially “different” precisely because of their family backgrounds. Just how and to what extent they will affect this difference is an open question, including as concerns religion. Specifically, it is no more likely that they will carry on just as their parental generation has as it is that they will blend seamlessly into the patterns of the overall population, however either is understood. What they will do is nonetheless quite important in terms of Canadian religious diversity and in global context because, as a group, their growth in numbers is outpacing the rate of new immigrant arrivals.11 How, and even if, they express the religions of their heritages will therefore have

10 “Religion among Immigrant Youth in Canada,” a research project funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The author was the principal investigator, with the collaboration of Rubina Ramji, Shandip Saha, Lori Beaman, Nancy Nason-Clark, Marie-Paule Martel Reny, John H. Simpson, Arlene Macdonald, Carolyn Reimer, and Leslie Laczko. For a partial report of results, see Beyer 2007. 11 For example, between 1981 and 2001, the percent of Sikh, Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist Canadians who were born in Canada increased from 24% to 26%. In absolute numbers, however, this represents an increase from about 68,000 to 375,000. The latter number increases by about another 100,000 if we include the so-called 1.5 generation, those who arrived as immigrants when they were children (for example, at less than 10 years old) and therefore grew up in Canada even though they were

30

peter beyer

an increasing influence on the institutional fate of those religions in Canada. Moreover, because the religions they represent have their dominant presence outside Canada, and because they have historically unprecedented connections to that outside world through their families and globalized communication networks, such religious reconstruction for the Canadian context as they undertake is likely to be as influenced by the global context as it is by more domestic factors. They embody, even more than do their immigrant parents, that combination of the global and the local that I have been stressing. As one might expect, our research into a portion of this Canadareared generation of more recent immigrants presents a highly mixed picture in this regard. Three conclusions or patterns are of particular relevance, however. They concern individualization, global connections, and the very different patterns exhibited by people from the three religious backgrounds. First, irrespective of which religious background one is considering, the approach to religion of this population is for the most part highly individualistic, meaning that they base the extent and content of their religious involvement or lack thereof on their own decisions, their own searches, their own experience. They then evaluate traditional, collective authority such as that of religious texts, their parents, religious organizations, or religious leaders on that basis. They do not simply carry on traditions without selectively appropriating them for themselves. This means that what they will do cannot be derived straightforwardly by looking at their parents. Here is how one highly practicing Buddhist participant put it: What I don’t like is when people say . . . if you’re a Buddhist you have to do this, this, this, and this. From what I understand, that’s not essential in Buddhism. For me, what’s essential is that you understand, and that you have a thirst, a curiosity for learning and to do your best . . . I think that you have to try all the time to advance, to always question, always think for yourself, that is, not just accept what is told us . . . (BF06)12

not born here. These four religions are those whose adherents are overwhelmingly of recent immigrant origin, either first or second generation. 12 Participants were generically coded according to category of religion, gender, and what order the transcriptions were finished, not the order in which the interviews were conducted. BF06 is therefore the 6th Buddhist female interview to be transcribed, and so on for all other quotations.

from far and wide

31

Another, even more forceful example comes from one of the Muslim participants: I sat through too many seminars where people really . . . just want to say “this is the way we’ve always done it, and this is the way it will stay.” And I find that really off-putting . . . So for me, I’ve come to a point in my life where many of the sort of value judgments I make are not necessarily based on what I find in the Qur’an or anything else, it’s just what I personally think is right. And, you know, if it’s wrong religiously, well then God will judge me one day (MF33).

For others, the individualistic appropriation of responsibility for deciding on one’s faith or lack thereof develops only as they grow older. Here is the way one Hindu participant put it: Hinduism wasn’t really something that I questioned . . . it was automatic, it was a given, right? But then, after that, I [started asking] well is god really there or is he not, or is Hinduism really the right way or is it not and then it became . . . easier to explore outside of it. . . . I’m still [in a] confused phase, there are certain things I have decided, like I do believe there is some form of higher form or some form of God, but I really don’t know if . . . this fixed form of religion is the best way to go . . . I think there are other ways to discover spirituality (HF32).

In this characteristic of individual responsibility the participants in our research mimic the dominant pattern of the overall Canadian population, which also tends to locate the locus of religious authority and authenticity in the individual self (Grenville 2000). In consequence, it also implies that those of more recent immigrant background are likely contributing to the further pluralization of religion in Canada, not only in that they represent different religions such as Buddhism or Islam, but also in that they will introduce more “internal” diversity within each of these broad traditions, a trend that corresponds to the decline of the salience of larger denominational organizations as the dominant form for institutionalized religion. In fact organizational membership of any kind seemed important to only a small minority of the participants from all three religious backgrounds. This pattern corresponds to the global situation of the three religions: they do not have a strong history of the dominance of organized forms, and large, especially globally extended, organizations in contemporary Islam, Hinduism, or Buddhism, while definitely present, are not nearly as common as they are, for instance, in Christianity. An individualized orientation, however, does not mean that there is no coherence in approach. This is where the second widespread

32

peter beyer

characteristic enters the picture, namely the consistency in the kinds of influences that have shaped the orientation of these young adults to their religious tradition (or lack thereof ) and through which they have arrived at or are searching for what they feel is the correct religious understanding. Unsurprisingly, their parents and their families are, on the whole, a very strong influence, but this is in various ways, to various degrees, and very rarely uncritically. Much depends on how capable the parents are of explaining the religion in a way that meets the rationalistic demands of their children; little from this source is taken on faith, as it were. It has to make sense. As one Buddhist participant put it: I find that I definitely have to look at books because if I ask my mom something about Buddhism . . . it’s very hard for her to explain because I don’t think it was formally taught to her. . . . But I find myself gravitating towards books . . . because that’s the way I’ve been taught to learn (BF03).

By contrast, significant numbers acknowledge a direct link between what they are religiously and the way that their parents raised them. One Muslim participant put this common relation succinctly: “[G]rowing up, born and raised in Canada . . . my parents have always taught us culture, religion, traditions. . . . We’ve always been taught that religion and culture and traditions are important” (MF20). Generally, however, the influence of how parents and family went about practicing their religion is an important but critically filtered source. One Muslim participant expressed this relation with reference to his second-generation status: I think I have an advantage over people who live in [my family’s country of origin] all their lives because I can see from the dominant culture, which I consider to be the Christian Canada, I can see from their vantage point as well as what happens at home and what my parents believe. So there’s much more of a basis for comparison, and I think that makes my choice more genuine (MM05).

Beyond their families, two other influences or sources are consistent. One of these is print media, books ranging from comic books relating the stories of gods and goddesses for Hindus and the Qur’an or Hadith collections for Muslims, to books by various representative writers, both popular and learned, and not infrequently texts read in the context of taking postsecondary courses, these latter being relevant especially for Hindus and Buddhists. A second source is electronic media, which include video recordings such as of the Hindu Mahabharata and Ramayana, television programs as are available especially via satellite,

from far and wide

33

and the internet, this latter a resource used most often by Muslims. One Hindu woman, when asked how she learned about her religion, said, “when I was younger, I was hooked on those Mahabharata tapes and Ramayana . . . that’s how I learned about it and when I wanted to learn more, . . . I would look up stuff and we had books at home and I would just flip through them” (HF09). The way that local and Internet sources often combine is expressed in this example of a Muslim man: A lot of leaders of the mosque in [the city] are representatives of scholars back home. But even then, personally, if I have a question about a certain aspect, I wouldn’t go to the ones [here]. I’d ask the ones back home . . . because they have more knowledge. . . . I do it on line. They have websites and . . . a list of regular questions. . . . If your answer’s not posted there, you can always send them an e-mail and they’ll reply. . . . I think the longest it’s taken me is two weeks (MM06).

One Hindu participant, the initiate along with her family members of a particular guru, explains the combination of sources and the transnational connection like this: I guess I am very fortunate that the guru we have now, I can keep in touch with him through e-mail and through writing letters; that’s for the bigger questions I have, but for the day to day questions . . . I go to my cousins and my brother and other friends that are [particular Hindu god] devotees that I know here and devote themselves to religion the way that I do (HF02).

Thus, the sources of influence are both local and global. Yet, what is relatively absent from these sources of influence is local and global religious movements and organizations, such as the local temple or mosque and national or transnational organizations like the ones discussed above. Although those among these young adults who are religiously involved do usually participate with some regularity in the local organizations and may avail themselves of the resources that local and transnational movements offer—for instance through the internet, on satellite television, or as a source of publications—their religious orientations are not predominantly formed by these. Commensurate with the way religion seems to be transforming in Canadian society more generally and perhaps globally, there is a relative absence of consistent, let alone exclusive, subgroup or “confessional” identification and orientation. A strong caveat, however, does obtain, and that is that the participants in this research, like the second generation as such, is still overwhelmingly in early adulthood and may well change their approach to religion in

34

peter beyer

the future as they establish their families and enter upon their diverse life tasks and professions. In that context, another strong commonality that the interviews show is that the participants have often already gone through one or more major transitions in their religious lives and attitudes. It is likely that there are more to come. A third conclusion has to do with the differences among the religions, especially globally. There are significant differences with respect to how this generation relates to religion depending on which religion is at issue. The level and kind of religious involvement, of religious understanding are sharply different for people of different religious backgrounds. The Muslim youth in this study, for example, displayed an almost standardized understanding of what was fundamental to the religion of Islam, whether they identified personally with Islam or distanced themselves from it. This “orthodox” model of Islam almost always included the so-called “five pillars” of Islam (confession of faith in one God, daily scheduled prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, almsgiving, and pilgrimage to Mecca), plus a moral orientation that included dietary regulations (no pork or alcohol), sharp limitations on sexual contact, and a variety of virtues such as honesty, peace, kindness, and striving to improve oneself and make the world a better place. Here is how one Muslim participant put it when asked what the chief characteristics of Islam were: I would say it’s modesty and being humble. Those are one of the main characteristics of somebody who should be Muslim. And there’s of course the five pillars where you have to pray five times a day, to believe in God, and Mohammed was the last prophet of God, fasting during the month of Ramadan, paying charity which is zakat, and going for hajj which is pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, if you can afford it. So those are the five pillars which you should follow, but there’s also things about being humble, being modest, being honest. Honesty is, like personally to me, honesty’s a huge thing (MF05).

Another said: “Belief in Allah, the ultimate creator; belief in Muhammad his messenger; belief in basically praying regularly, practicing regular charity and showing compassion and doing good deeds towards other human beings, any moment that you can” (MF14). This understanding of Islam is significant because it also represents a global Islam, a model that is extremely widespread around the world. As just discussed, a great many of the Muslim participants in the study conducted their personal searches about Islam relying not only on sources in Canada (especially their parents, relatives, friends), but also

from far and wide

35

on globalized sources like television and the Internet. Authentic Islam for them can be found anywhere. The only really consistent sources for most of them are the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet (Sunna), but this is also a key aspect of the global model. The story is not at all the same for those of Hindu or Buddhist background. No globalized or even consistent model seemed to operate among these participants, and indeed the majority of them did not engage in much religious practice of any kind, the Buddhist-background people generally knowing little about what exactly constituted Buddhism. The Hindus, when they were religiously involved, reflected the tremendous variety that characterizes Hinduism globally: some simply carried on the particular traditions, including in some case organizational affiliations, of their families; some portrayed a globally widespread Neo-Vedantic vision of Hinduism; some simply stress the variety that Hinduism is supposed to include in the context of detailing what beliefs and practices are most important to them. The majority of the Hindu-background youth, however, engaged in very little religious practice of any kind and identified with being Hindu more in a cultural than a religious sense. Often this attitude emerged when they spoke about how they would want their children to grow up. One participant put it like this: “I think it would be really important to me that they understand where I come from and [that] they have a certain degree of knowledge of Hinduism and, more importantly, Indian Bengali culture” (HF07, emphasis added). Another, who does not practice Hinduism, does not consider himself to be a religious person, and is not particularly concerned with passing things on to the next generation; nevertheless felt he should maintain aspects of Indian culture: “[I am] a film student [and] I realize that there is a lot of crap coming out of Bollywood, but I think as an Indian I shouldn’t forget where I came from, I shouldn’t denounce my culture and I should retain certain elements of it, if not all” (HM09). Buddhist-background people, somewhat in contrast, rarely showed any consistent involvement in matters religious at all; but perhaps oddly, the majority considered themselves in some way spiritual, engaging in their spiritual pursuits on what they felt was a Buddhist basis and with reference to a Buddhism that they admitted not knowing much about. As one person put it: [A]fter I finish my BA, I want to travel [and] take a plane to Cambodia. And I’m thinkin’ it might be fun to get initiated as a monk . . . just to

36

peter beyer learn and see what I have to offer. . . . my father didn’t give me anything Buddhist. Just the family rituals. . . . So I want to see for myself, first hand, what it’s all about (BM03).

Another, rather amusing admission of ignorance with respect to things Buddhist took this form: I’ve been given pamphlets when I was at the temple, just about the history of Buddhism, I don’t remember. I think it’s originally from India; and then a person with a pretty long last name he went on a journey, all across Asia or something. I think there was a tree involved. I hardly remember anything (BM04).

A number of other characteristics dovetail with the three that I have just outlined. Among these, two deserve particular mention in the present context. Although a minority of participants were highly critical of Canada as a multicultural country, stating that this policy was either superficial or simply a sham, the vast majority from all three religious backgrounds, including especially those that were highly involved in their religion, had a positive orientation to both the official policy and the concrete reality—and to both multiculturalism and religious diversity in Canada. What is noteworthy in this majority attitude is its reasons: multiculturalism represents for many of them an effort by people from all over the world to learn how to live together while respecting their differences; multiculturalism ideally makes Canada a microcosm of the world more broadly. Here is how one Muslim participant expressed this idea: Give it a couple of . . . generations for people to get . . . out of the shell of their own culture, to mix with the world. Because I believe what we have in Canada is an opportunity that a lot of the world doesn’t have, I mean, don’t get me wrong, there’s a lot of blood on the hands of everybody who lives in this country. But we have an opportunity for people to start fresh. We have people from all different backgrounds, all over the world. We are a representation to the world. . . . There are certain points into staying and understanding your own culture and appreciating your own culture. But to be able to evolve and to move on with the times . . . we can show the world here how to live amongst people from all different backgrounds (MM26).

Accompanying this generally positive attitude is a second common characteristic, an almost universal rejection of politicized religion, the idea that religion should be the basis of political action involvement in any other way than as a general moral basis for deciding how to vote. In concrete terms, this means that the Muslim participants, without

from far and wide

37

exception in the case of our sample, rejected political Islamism, and especially the idea that religious precepts should be imposed by the state or anyone else. And as concerns the Hindu participants, very few of them were even very aware of Hindu nationalism and its ideology, let alone approving of it. Underlying the positive attitude to Canada as a multicultural society in a diverse global world was one that insisted on religious tolerance, the acceptance (if not always approval) of the fact that people are religiously different and should be allowed to be so. Conclusion The country that is today known as Canada is a direct outcome of globalizing processes. It began as a European imperial project, and even before it started on the road to political independence from those powers, it already had a long history of immigration as the main way to populate the country. That process has continued to a greater or lesser degree ever since then, creating a society that is highly connected and dependent on its connections with the rest of the world, and one characterized through ever changing patterns of cultural and religious plurality. This diversity has formed the country in very specific ways, has been the source of more or less constant contestation, and has been instrumental in structuring the power relations within the society. Each successive period of major migration has recast the central question of how the “natives” would receive the “newcomers,” how the natives would change and the newcomers adapt, and how long it would take for the newcomers to reach native status in both identity and power terms. This has produced a perpetually shifting understanding of “otherness,” the latest chapter of which is the post-1960s development of the interrelated policies of multiculturalism, bilingualism, and the acceptance of indigenous peoples as First Nations. Perhaps the most significant feature of this latest phase is that it marks the abandonment of the overt expectation that the transition from newcomer to native requires the effective abandonment of otherness, that integration means assimilation to dominant patterns as perceived by the native population. Although the social reality in Canada may in fact still favor those who assimilate rather than insist on the reciprocal integration of their differences, the stated ideals do have an effect, especially in public discourse. The characteristic consequences of that latest chapter are beginning to manifest themselves, and in this chapter I have focussed on these in

38

peter beyer

two ways. First the new immigration is changing the kind of religious diversity in Canada not only in that it has shifted it from a largely Christian diversity to one that includes a variety of other religions with their own subdivisions, but also in that it is helping to transform the Christian diversity itself. At the same time, there are signs that the institutional religious structure of Canada is shifting away from the previous domination of denominationalism, and the new immigration is both mimicking and making its contribution to this shift as well. Some of the concrete ways that this is happening can be seen from the way that the second generation of this most recent immigration is relating to the religions that they and their parents brought to Canada. Globally these religions do not have a history of the kind of denominational organization that has characterized 19th and 20th century Christianity in Canada and elsewhere around the world. Therefore it is not surprising that this second generation is reconstructing these religions accordingly for the Canadian context. In addition, however, the highly individualistic style of these reconstructions and the insistence on rational understanding of their religions as opposed to simply carrying on the traditions as received from their elders resonates with the already dominant orientation to religion of the longer established and dominant population. Here, as in all other aspects, the global and the local dovetail with one another. Overall, one can therefore conclude that the consequences of immigration for religious diversity in Canada is in its latest chapter much as it has been in times past: the “newcomers” arrive and adapt to the local styles and forms that are dominant among the “natives,” but at the same time the global specificity of the “newcomers” helps to transform the religious diversity of the “natives.” References Beyer, Peter. 2005. “The Future of Non-Christian Religions in Canada: Patterns of Religious Identification among Recent Immigrants and Their Second Generation, 1981–2001.” Studies in Religion/Sciences religieuses 34: 165–96. ———. 2007. “Can the Tail Wag the Dog? Diaspora Reconstructions of Religion in a Globalized Society.” Norwegian Journal of Religion and Society 1: 39–61. Brodbar-Nemzer, Jay, Stephen Cohen, Allan Reitzes, Charles Shahar, and Gary Tobin. 1993. “An Overview of the Canadian Jewish Community.” Pp. 39–71 in The Jews in Canada, edited by R.J. Brym, W. Shaffir and M. Weinfeld. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

from far and wide

39

Cho, Kyuhoon. 2004. “Religion in Diaspora: The Transformation of Korean Immigrant Churches in Global Society.” MA dissertation, Religious Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa. Ebaugh, Helen Rose, and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, eds. 2000. Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira. Grenville, Andrew. 2000. “ ‘For by Him All Things Were Created . . . Visible and Invisible’: Sketching the Contours of Public and Private Religion in North America.” Pp. 211–27 in Rethinking Church, State, and Modernity: Canada between Europe and America, edited by D. Lyon and M. Van Die. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Jenkins, Philip. 2007. The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity. New York: Oxford University Press. Li, Qiang. 2000. “Ethnic Minority Churches: The Cases of the Canadian Chinese Christian Churches in Ottawa.” PhD dissertation, Department of Classics & Religious Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa. Makabe, Tomoko. 1998. The Canadian Sansei. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Mullins, Mark R. 1989. Religious Minorities in Canada: A Sociological Study of the Japanese Experience. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. Nagata, Judith. 2005. “Christianity among Transnational Chinese: Religious versus (Sub)ethnic Affiliation.” International Migration 43: 99–130. Nayar, Kamala Elizabeth. 2004. The Sikh Diaspora in Vancouver: Three Generations amid Tradition, Modernity, and Multiculturalism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Statistics Canada. 1949. Canada Yearbook 1948. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. ———. 1980. Canada Year Book 1978–79. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. ———. 2001. Census 2001—2B Questionnaire. http://www.statcan.ca/english/sdds/ instrument/3901_Q2_v2_E.pdf. Consulted 30 November 2007. ———. 2003. 1971, 1981, 1991 & 2001 Census Custom Tabulations. DO0324. CD-ROM. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Advisory Services Division. ———. 2007a. Citizenship (5), Place of Birth (35), Sex (3) and Immigrant Status and Period of Immigration (12) for the Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, 2006 Census—20% Sample Data. Catalogue Number 97-557-XCB2006008. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. ———. 2007b. Immigrant Status and Place of Birth (38), Sex (3) and Age Groups (10) for the Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, 2006 Census—20% Sample Data. Catalogue Number 97-557-XCB2006013. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Taylor, Charles. 1992. Multiculturalism and the “Politics of Recognition”: An Essay. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. United Nations General Assembly. 2007. General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm. Consulted 30 November 2007. Weinfeld, Morton. 1993. “The Jews of Québec: An Overview.” Pp. 171–92 in The Jews in Canada, edited by Robert J. Brym, William Shaffir and Morton Weinfeld. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Weinfeld, Morton, William Shaffir, and Irwin Cottler, eds. 1981. The Canadian Jewish Mosaic. Toronto: Wiley. Wilkinson, Michael. 2006. The Spirit Said Go: Pentecostal Immigrants in Canada. New York: Peter Lang. Yang, Fenggang. 1999. Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, Assimilation, and Adhesive Identities. University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press.

CHAPTER TWO

QUÉBEC AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: USES AND MISUSES OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION Pauline Côté On February 8, 2007, following months of controversy over religion and the “reasonable accommodation” of minority groups, the Premier of Québec, Jean Charest, announced the establishment of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences. The choice for commissioners fell to two well-known intellectuals—historian and sociologist Gérard Bouchard and author and philosopher Charles Taylor—and a process of “consultation” was begun. Outside the public education sector, the number of religious controversies has been remarkably low in Québec since the 1960s. Compared to other jurisdictions, the government of Québec’s response to episodes of religious violence has been measured (Côté 2004; Richardson 2004; Richardson and Introvigne 2001; Bouchard 2001). Québec’s record on equality rights—the infringement of which forms the basis of a valid “reasonable accommodation” claim—is sound and renowned ( Jézéquel 2007; Côté and Gunn 2005). How did so marginal an issue gain prominence? What are the options available to governments in such circumstances? How do those options carry into the Commission’s terms of reference? How are these appropriated by the commissioners? Is public consultation therein a valid exercise? From a first analysis of agenda building and setting, as the consultation process is unfolding, a few preliminary answers may be offered. For a number of technical reasons that will be examined in detail, the public consultation organized by the Commission on Accommodation Practices is failing in its task to “pave the way to a more serene, fruitful reflection” (CCPARDC 2007: 17). Settlement of such difficult and complex questions requires a competent mandate, clear terms of reference, open processes, either focus or issue maturity, and a chance for success. The Charest government has been unclear on its views. The Commission’s criteria for staffing, research projects, and expertise are unknown. The commissioners raised the stakes beyond reasonable

42

pauline côté

accommodation in a legal sense and opted to favor expressive over reflective deliberations. A dense yet superficial policy narrative—which pits fuzzy notions of identities against undefined conspicuous differences—is being taken on a large consultative tour. How Did So Marginal an Issue Gain Prominence? Paths to government agendas are many. Political limbs are full of just causes, genuinely pressing problems, right solutions and sound policies. Initiative, priority setting, mediating and log-rolling seem to be the prerogative of political incumbents, opponents and stakeholders in representative politics, while mediatized moral indignation, outrage, and panic are the staple of contentious politics. Governments rely on public administration to devise policy blueprints to set priorities and to implement legislation. In all instances, agendas and issue formulation are critical, since the definition of the situation determines the appropriate resource for the resolution of the identified problem. Religious issues have long commanded civil authorities’ attention. They are also exceptionally sensitive, whether they are denominational schooling, divorce, or same-sex unions—to name some of the most pressing in the Canadian case. Wherever these are put on the agenda at the initiative of governments, care is usually taken to travel some safe institutional path: electoral mandate, built-in consensus over a policy cycle, and legal obligations. But like other issues, they might travel the spectacular, yet riskier, path of media-friendly contentious politics. Political entrepreneurship and timing makes it possible for opportunities for marginal actors to voice their views. Should they be successful in drawing attention long enough to divert the government from its course or for other parties to see potential gains for themselves, the issue will make it to the more public agenda (Soroka 2002; Kingdon 2003). The path to the governmental agenda most travelled by religious issues has not been studied thoroughly. But there is no question that they are a powerful ingredient of contentious politics (Tilly 2004; Keane 2000; Simpson 2000). Ever since the Iranian revolution and the Jonestown massacre, public opinion is polarized over the “religious factor” on the international scene. But what makes for what we have called the “new religious question” is an unforeseen backlash against religious diversity, whether it is endogenous or exogenous to national societies, in a context of globalization and human rights revolution (Côté 2001;

québec and reasonable accommodation

43

Côté and Gunn 2006). Some common features are traceable to the new religious question. They mark public debate and agenda setting. Policy options and processes are path dependent on political regimes, but similarities are to be found in input and outtakes. Each one will be discussed briefly before we come to the Québec situation. First, the public debate: Since the 1970s among long-established democracies, the most prevalent forms of tension and conflict to emerge among government officials, religious individuals and marginalized religious groups have centred around “body politics”: personal capacity, consent, will, and religious exemptions as they pertain to the physical body (e.g., medical exemptions, wearing of religious garb, and dietary constraints).1 Broadly speaking, two waves of public debates may be identified. Driven by spectacular and highly mediatized crimes and abuses perpetrated by religious authorities and “fanatics” like the Solar Temple and Aum Shinrikyo, moves were made to adopt more restrictive laws and policies in education, health, immigration, tax control and incorporation. In largely secularized societies, counterclaims to religious exemptions in law were met with incredulity. Existing religious exemptions to laws were questioned. Risk started (again) to be associated with religion. Misperceptions, contested notions (such as “brainwashing” and “mind control”), and lack of basic and accurate facts on religious diversification became and continue to be prevalent in these discussions. Official reports on so-called “sects” have been produced with flawed and alarmist statistics, relying on amateur and contested sources, while discarding more reliable sources and evidence. Fear of a religious takeover, initially from sects, since the mid-1990s by Islam and by the religions of immigrants more generally have become common. In the wake of September 11, 2001 came severe restrictions adopted in transportation, civil service, intelligence and security. In the media, public opinion, and even among some official representatives, religious controversy is being seen as evidence of increased religiosity, even of the social and renewed political salience of religion. Religion specialists love to debate the topic of secularization, especially its “proper definition.” But there is little dispute that secularization is

1 I adopt a different focus here from Simpson’s notion of the “politics of the body” (2000: 269), which targets the relative influence of religious publics in the United States and Canada on abortion and same-sex unions.

44

pauline côté

alive and well in the West.2 How can religion be marginalized and yet be so present in public debates? As early as 1985, James Beckford pointed to the paradox of religious behavior and attitudes being more controversial as they become socially less salient but also more visible against the secular norm. A second common feature of the new religion question involves agenda setting. Issues involving religion were put on the governmental agenda in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy and Germany. Distinctions need to be made between public regulation patterns toward sects and those toward Islam (especially, the headscarf issue in France). As for sects, most issues have been pushed to the forefront by marginal political actors, heterogeneous and improbable ideological coalitions in close association with self-appointed victims’ helpers.3 On these questions, the political establishment is reactive: first caught unawares and then ready to embark on consensual politics against unpopular minorities. A different aspect of agenda setting is presented by the public regulation of Islam, where public officials themselves play a larger role. In the instance of the 2004 French law prohibiting “ostensible” religious symbols in schools, President Chirac himself set the agenda. There are some indications that being opposed in the second round of presidential elections by Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National prompted President Chirac to try and regroup the right around “true values” threatened by immigration. Analysts differ on the role played by religion itself as a substantive issue. Chélini-Pont, for example, sees in French law evidence of a gradual, though uneasy, adaptation of the principle of laïcité to religious diversity, while Gunn sees religion (Islam) as a proxy to reviving French nationalism (ChéliniPont and Gunn 2005). There have been a variety of processes involved in dealing with religion. Parliamentary commissions, governmental and other official reports, and administrative boards were put to the task, as well as public inquiries and advisory commissions. Information centers, public and private, have been set up and subsidized. Laws pertaining to so-called 2 See Davie 2007 and Pace 2008 for the latest developments in this complex and lively debate. 3 In France, rationalists together with Catholic intégristes: the former fighting religion as an aberration, the latter wishing to denounce unfair competition; communists together with catholic intégristes, united against materialism, dirty money and capitalism. See the chapters by Luca, Duvert, and Beckford in Richardson 2004; Richardson and Introvigne 2001; Côté 2006b.

québec and reasonable accommodation

45

sects, and then implicitly to Islam, often led to the promulgation of regulations that reflected public anxiety over religion and religious diversity. As far as is known from these experiences at the policy process level, recommendations for better law enforcement were called for in the case of “sects,” as well as the need for more objective and reliable information (Côté 2006a). Canada and Québec are no strangers to the “new religious question.” The Hill report (1980), commissioned by the Ontario government in the Jonestown aftermath, was the first of his kind in the West. What is striking in the Québec case is the cautious yet efficient approach adopted. In the case of the Solar Temple, for instance, police and social workers successfully relied on knowledgeable expertise in order to prevent further incidents. In 2004, the Ontario Premier reacted to strongly voiced protests on “sharia courts” and mandated a consultation commission, headed by Marion Boyd, to take stock of existing practices on the issue of religious arbitration in family matters. Some of Boyd’s (2004) recommendations were hotly contested, most notably the ones on regulation and supervision of existing practices. The Ontario legislature eventually enacted a law to the effect of banning religious arbitration in the province (Bill 27).4 Yet, the public consultation process itself caused little controversy. So, where does reasonable accommodation stand? As an issue, a short time ago, it was nowhere on political party platforms and government agendas. Religion had not been on the agenda since the formal ending of denominational structures in the Ministry of Education in 2000, the subsequent adoption of Bill 95 in 2005 putting an end to denominational instruction in public schools, and its replacement by a new Ethics and Religious Culture mandatory course to be fully implemented in the Fall of 2008.5 According to available data compiled by the Commission

4 Ontario, Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006, Annual Statutes of Ontario, c. 1, available at: www.e-laws.gov.on.ca. 5 National Assembly (Québec) Parliamentary Proceedings. Committee on Education, 37Th Legislature, 1st Session, http://www.assnat.qc.ca/eng/37legislature1/ commissions/ce/index.shtml (accessed Jan. 13, 2008); National Assembly (Québec) 1st Session, 37th Legislature, Bill 95 An Act to amend various legislative provisions of a confessional nature in the education field (2005, c. 20), http://www2.publicationsduQuébec.gouv .qc.ca/home.php (accessed Jan. 13, 2008). Bill 95 most noticeably amended section 41 of the Québec Charter of Rights to the effect of transforming parents’ rights to religious and moral education in keeping with their convictions into a balance between parents’ rights and children’s rights. Parents now have the right to give their children a religious and moral education in keeping with their convictions “and with proper regard

46

pauline côté

des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse prior to the Bouchard-Taylor consultation process, reasonable accommodation claims accounted for a third of discrimination complaints on grounds of religion between 2000 and 2006 (Commission 2007a: 54–56). Contentious politics pushed reasonable accommodation onto the governmental agenda. The Head of the Liberal Party of Québec, exfederal conservative minister Jean Charest, was first elected Premier in 2003, seizing power from Bernard Landry’s Parti Quebecois. The 2003 electoral defeat left the PQ in disarray, quarrelling over the best strategy to achieve sovereignty. Its election of a new leader: young, urbanite, human-rights and business-oriented André Boisclair could not stop membership losses to third parties both to the left (the newcomer Québec Solidaire) and to the right (the more experienced and popular Action Démocratique du Québec). To the right of both the PQ and the Liberals on economic and social issues, ever since banking on constitutional weariness among Québecers, ADQ leader Dumont has carved his third-party a niche as “autonomist” (a halfway position between federalism and sovereignty). In the wake of the Canadian Supreme Court March 2006 kirpan decision,6 seizing upon a few mediatized “faits divers,” Mr. Dumont denounced “unreasonable compromises.” He has been quite successful at making “reasonable accommodation” an issue—first with public opinion monitoring, along with strong reactions and comments to media stories, then through dramatized protest by way of an Open Letter to Québécois in which he hinted at threats posed to national identity—and to Québec values primarily founded on religious tradition—by unreasonable claims at accommodation made by community leaders.7 He denounced “absurd decisions” which he claimed as evidence of a generalized malaise caused by a lack of clear guidelines on reasonable accommodation. This self-assigned role of collective identity protector made him an effective challenger to PQ’s standing, and his popularity surged. for their children’s rights and interests.” It appears that Catholic parents’ associations were bandwagoning on the Bouchard-Taylor Commission in order to make up for a failed mobilization in June 2005. 6 Multani c. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 R.C.S. 256, available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/fr/vn/2006/volume1.html. 7 Lettre ouverte de Mario Dumont aux Québécois, January 16, 2007, available at: http://communiques.gouv.qc.ca/gouvqc/communiques/GPQF/Janvier2007/16/ c6157.html.

québec and reasonable accommodation

47

What Are the Available Options to Governments in Such Circumstances? As leaders of the executive branch responsible to elected assemblies, governments are entitled and equipped to resolve controversies, research issues, decide on policy recommendations, pass laws and regulations, control implementation through public administration and services, and supervise law enforcement. Their daily business is devoted to making use of instruments such as parliamentary committees, consultant reports, expert committees, advisory councils, and government sponsored policy institutes. As a matter of choice or constraint, the primary function of public inquiries “is to get issues out into the open, to bring evidence to light in a very public domain.” By definition, they include ideas of free discussion and public participation. So too is the notion of lifting “the routine, and not so routine, business of government out of the closed world of government departments and their regular consultants, and transform this business into a matter for public debate” (Salter 2007: 293). Yet, due to their assigned tasks, composition and expected contribution, all such inquiries are not public (in terms of transparency and deliverables, for instance) and not open (with reference to format and selected audience or public). As policy guidance instruments, public inquiries in Canada are a heterogeneous lot. Investigative commissions, for instance, have been delegated quasi-judicial authority with respect to fact finding on events and circumstances leading to a public catastrophe of proportions such as contamination, environmental, road and transportation accidents. Their main recommendations are hard to ignore for they touch upon governments’ responsibilities and obligations. Research commissions and task forces usually call for specific, tailored mandates with respect to policy formulation in a given public intervention sector (economy, health, education, aboriginal issues for instance). Their recommendations may be put aside by governments, but they become reference documents in public administrations as they give strong, long-lasting impetus to the carrying on of public missions. Consultation commissions have a less formal and more exploratory character than most public inquiries. Their status is somewhat equivalent to that of an advisory committee with less continuity in purpose and less access to decisionmakers and resources. Their influence is dependant on several factors among which timing, the commission chair’s notoriety, and clear and unambiguous terms of reference. And compared to other forms of

48

pauline côté

public inquiries, their best advantage often lies at being exemplars of deliberative democracy in practice (Salter 2007: 311). Even when the government’s mind is set on an inquiry, its choice is informed by the anticipated contribution, whether it is on resolving controversy, thoroughly researching an issue, or being provided with implementable policy recommendations. In this context, religious controversies are hardly new. Ensuring peaceful coexistence among groups of different religious persuasions has been one crucial element of modern constitutions. Combined or not with public consultation, thorough examination of all legal aspects of the question is an option. Reinforcement of existing institutional mandates and resources such as the Commission des droits de la personne et de la Jeunesse represented an obvious choice for the Québec government.8 Working through existing channels of representative democracy by way of a parliamentary commission or committee represents a second option. Yet, with reference to the reasonable accommodation controversy, the impending elections seem to have stacked the options in favor of a consultation commission. With the announcement of a commission, Premier Jean Charest more than anything else wanted to put the controversy to rest, to seize the agenda from Mario Dumont, and to begin campaigning on his party’s platform. The co-presidents were also known figures on both sides of the constitutional debate and happened to exemplify contrasted integration models of cultural differences: Québec’s interculturalisme and Canadian multiculturalism. In his official announcement, Premier Charest indicated that the report was to be handed to the government within a year. With work starting in March 2007, and a bit of luck, the issue would leave the headlines.

8 A debate is under way in the judicial community on the role of the Commission itself, with some experts arguing for direct access to the Québec Human Rights Tribunal for claimants. While making his announcement of the Commission at the beginning of 2007, Prime Minister Charest referred to the Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse. Paradoxically, as he was making known the need for a consultation commission, he was simultaneously noting the creation of an information service by the human rights commission in order to provide needed expertise to decision-makers on reasonable accommodation. Easily accessed information might have reduced polarization and helped avoiding “Hérouxville”—the case with which the Introduction to this volume began.

québec and reasonable accommodation

49

The Commission’s Terms of Reference Terms of reference for a commission create enabling language. In the context of public policy formulation, they identify procedural as well as substantive issues that deserve attention. Legal obligations or known policy orientations to be examined or reflected upon usually inform the setting of objectives, scope and deliverables. With respect to procedural issues on reasonable accommodations, the Charest government opted for a consultation commission—the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences.9 With reference to substantive issues, the Commission was established on the recommendation of the Québec Premier with the following mandate: accurately take stock of accommodation practices related to cultural differences and analyse the attendant issues bearing in mind, in particular, experience outside Québec; conduct an extensive consultation among individuals and organizations that wish to intervene in respect of the question of accommodation practices related to cultural differences; formulate recommendations to the government aimed at ensuring that accommodation practices related to cultural differences conform to Québec’s values as a pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian society (CCPARDC 2007: 39).

There are a number of points to note about such a formulation. The use of the phrase “accommodation practices related to cultural differences” first deserves mention. Extensiveness is a second notable characteristic. As an obvious extension to the legal concept of reasonable accommodation, “accommodation practices related to cultural differences” represents a rather fuzzy notion. While consonant to the former concept, it has no constitutional or quasi-constitutional import. Yet, formal similarity brings confusion. It rhetorically elevates “cultural differences” to the Charter’s “equality rights” and fundamental freedoms’ objectivity and status.10 Third, cultural assumptions become an

9 Speech from the Premier. Press Release, Available at: http://www.premier.gouv .qc.ca/salle-de-presse/discours/2007/fevrier/2007–02–08–en.shtml 10 “WHEREAS Québec society is attached to core values such as equality between women and men, the separation of church and State, the primacy of the French language, the protection of rights and freedoms, justice and the rule of law, the protection of minorities, and the rejection of discrimination and racism; WHEREAS Québec society has chosen to be an open society; WHEREAS accommodation practices related to cultural differences stem from choices made by society reflected, in particular, in the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (R.S.Q., c. C-12), the Charter of the French language (R.S.Q., c. C-11), government policy respecting equality between women

50

pauline côté

integral part of the terms of reference, whereas majority and minorities cultural differences, rights, freedoms and values might be presumed to be on a collision course.11 These parameters give the Commission entry into uncharted territories so far as the general public is concerned. Even the Commission’s name itself seems to reflect stakeholders in bureaucratic politics. Objectives as to what is to be taken stock of, analyzed, consulted about and recommended upon are left to the Commission. Their report is due to be submitted against the deadline of “within a year.” The work structure and schedule have otherwise been left to the Commission. As for deliverables, on the occasion of the Commission’s announcement, the head of government signalled his intention that the Commission’s recommendations be debated by all parties in the National Assembly. The Process of Appropriation As a general presumption, public inquiries are places for open mindedness, reflection, accessibility, and a reciprocal exchange of views among equals. Though not all public inquiries would claim to foster deliberative democracy, all of them are required to serve the public and inform public debate. Provided certain safeguards, they appear well suited to resolving controversies. These may be traced back to mandate appropriation per se, that is to procedural and substantive choices made, but also to trade-offs between different conceptions they hold of “the public.”12 Procedural and substantive choices will be addressed here, after a brief description of the Commission’s process.13

and men, and regulations and programs concerning immigration and integration. . . .” (CCPARDC 2007: 39). 11 “WHEREAS certain accommodation practices related to cultural differences might call into question the fair balance between the rights of the majority and the rights of minorities; WHEREAS the government deems the integration and full participation by citizens in collective life to be a priority; WHEREAS there is good reason to take stock of accommodation practices related to cultural differences and conduct a consultation among individuals and organizations wishing to express themselves in this respect. . . .” (CCPARDC 2007: 39). 12 This last original indicator I take from Salter’s suggestive chapter on public inquiries in Canada (Salter 2007: 305–9). 13 Trade-offs and conceptions of “the public” will be developed in the fourth section.

québec and reasonable accommodation

51

Work at the Bouchard-Taylor Commission started in the aftermath of the general election, which Mr. Charest had called for March 26, 2006 and won by the thinnest of margins ahead of the ADQ , the party led by the self-appointed champion of Québec identity and the reasonable accommodation controversy, Mario Dumont. The PQ came last. Amidst this unprecedented minority government situation, little media scrutiny attached to the Commission staffing except for a few protests on the absence of women and members of other minorities among the commissioners. Set up and operation of the Commission relied on a secretariat of thirteen people. Staff, existing consultative committee advisors, and working groups were brought in primarily from the departments of Immigration, Education, Culture and Communication and Justice. Trusted aides were appointed by the commissioners as expert analysts, while commissioners themselves put their minds to issue formulation. Input on “problem identification” drew upon many commissioned polls, focus groups, group discussions and interviews with invited experts, health and education professionals, and stakeholders (CCPARDC 2007: 4).14 At the beginning of the summer, twenty associate researchers and assistants contributed to this formulation. No public calls for intention letters or research initiatives were issued. Research themes were not made public until the opening of the Website.15 Drafts of the consultation document were circulated, though not widely. As for the remaining procedural choices on the part of the Commission, still important decisions had to be made as to how best work through the mandate, of which each component was conceived as a phase in policy formulation: “a) clarify the existing situation; b) provide a reference framework for the managers of institutions; c) formulate recommendations concerning the integration model [and] the future of interethnic relations” (CCPARDC 2007: 6). In this perspective, incorporating public consultation could be done either at the beginning of the process, or in light of comparative experiences and with an overview of actual “accommodation practices” survey data. The Commission

14 Gouvernement du Québec, Travaux de la Commission Bouchard-Taylor-Pratiques d’accommodement: les citoyens seront consultés dès septembre (Communiqué). Available at: http://communiques.gouv.qc.ca/gouvqc/communiques/GPQF/Juin2007/07/ c9933.html. 15 http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/projets-recherche-en.html (accessed Jan. 15, 2008).

52

pauline côté

opted for the first alternative, with the view of making the process an exercise at deliberative democracy. Accordingly, the Commission elected to conceptualize public consultation in as open a manner as possible. In addition to briefs, modes of public participation were devised to include less formal interventions such as testimonies and citizens’ forums, the focus of which were “on what sets Québecers apart but, above all, on what draws us together and unites us” (CCPARDC Participation Guide 2007: 5). Expressive deliberations were favored over reflective deliberations: We had to make a difficult decision in this respect. We could have formulated our questions very frankly and directly, by going to the nub of the matter, at the risk of occasionally arousing very strong responses. Or, we could have opted for caution and rectitude by organizing a very quiet, restrained debate. We have opted for the first course. The information that we have collected until now has, indeed, convinced us that broad segments of the population have for a long time suffered from not genuinely or sufficiently expressing themselves on the themes covered by our mandate. Much has remained unsaid and a wellspring of disagreements, discontent, dissatisfaction or even frustration has built up. Nothing is to be gained by perpetuating this situation. We believe, to the contrary, that it is urgent to afford citizens whose voices have not been heard sufficiently an opportunity to express themselves. This will pave the way to more serene, fruitful reflection (CCPARDC 2007: 17).

The Commission’s rationale was that putting these questions to democratic debate might “give rise to frank, open discussions that are tempered by reason and civility” (CCPARDC 2007: 6). The consultation document was made public on August 14, 2007 along with a fifteen-member panel of experts, a participation guide, and the unveiling of a Website platform.16 Experts come from various disciplines and professional backgrounds.17 Most are knowledge brokers and are experienced government consultants or advisers on the various issues developed in the consultation document. In response to critics, the Commission belatedly included outside expertise from a research chair on Women’s Studies.18 The consultation paper is a forty-four page long document divided into three autonomous parts. Under the heading “The Commission,” http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/communiques/2007–08–14–en.html. http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/commission/comite-conseil-en.html (accessed Jan. 15, 2008). 18 Chaire Claire-Bonenfant from Laval University. 16 17

québec and reasonable accommodation

53

Part I is devoted to a discussion of the mandate, problem identification, the Commission’s objectives, public consultation setting and terminology. Part II is designed as background information to prospective participants in the public consultation—aiming first at Québec’s demographic profile, and then at principles and basic texts underlying citizenship. Part III covers various dimensions of the broad range of concerns raised by reasonable accommodation, as having been identified in the first part of the document. Each of these dimensions is prefaced by a brief overview that introduces a list of questions intended to guide reflection and structure debate. This last part ends on a survey questionnaire aiming at the general public’s perception and attitudes toward actual decision making on accommodation. The Commission’s choices of substantive issues are examined here in turn with respect to mandate appropriation per se, issue characterization, diagnostic and policy narratives. Their perspective on mandate appropriation is made explicit at the outset: “to analyze the basic questions underlying accommodation, i.e. the relationships between cultures and the nature of togetherness” (CCPARDC 2007: 3). This represents a rather broad interpretation of the terms of reference that has two consequences. One component of the three-part assignments is substantially modified. To “formulate recommendations to the government aimed at ensuring that accommodation practices related to cultural differences conform to Québec’s values as a pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian society” becomes: “formulate recommendations concerning the integration model [and] the future of interethnic relations” (CCPARDC 2007: 6). In this reformulation, understanding of “cultural differences” as pertaining to a given society “integration model” as well as to “the future of interethnic relations” figures prominently. The scope of the second assignment is enlarged, from “analyse the attendant issues” to reframing of the issue as “management of diversity . . . especially religious diversity.” As a matter of justification, this broad interpretation elaborates on the “accommodation practices related to cultural differences” motif included in the terms of reference: We could have confined our deliberations solely to an examination of reasonable accommodation as such by endeavouring to ascertain in what way it represents for some Québecers a source of anxiety but quickly realized that this problem masks another, much more basic one. It is true that some protests targeted only one kind of accommodation linked to certain religious practices, but what numerous critics appear to call into question, at least indirectly, is the sociocultural integration model adopted in Québec

54

pauline côté in the 1970s. This perspective compels us to reexamine interculturalism, relations with the cultural communities, immigration, secularism and the theme of Québec’s identity as part of the French-speaking countries and communities of the world. In a word, it is, in particular, the management of diversity, especially religious diversity that appears above all to pose a problem. We therefore felt it was necessary to interpret our mandate in a broad perspective, perfectly aware of the enormous difficulties the task implies (CCPARDC 2007: 3).

According to the Commission’s diagnostic, management of diversity can be satisfactorily resolved neither from nor through legal reasoning alone. For reasonable accommodation represents only an epiphenomenon masking the essence of the problem: generalized anxiety, malaise and indirect calling into question of Québec society’s integration model. With the “grasping the problem at its source” (CCPARDC 2007: 4) approach, the whole of sociocultural integration is being brought under examination. Following this all-encompassing diagnostic, management of diversity is to be explored in relation to immigration. Conformity to societal values becomes a burden to be shouldered by “newcomers” and has to be ensured potentially and primarily around and within ethnocultural minorities (CCPARDC 2007: vi). On the other hand, management of diversity needs to be explored in relation to the culture of a “founding people” given that several “Québecers of French Canadian origin” are discontented with reasonable accommodation (CCPARDC 2007: 4). Management of diversity is to be explored in relation to the social integration of those “long-established cultural communities” which have seen their social integration hampered by discrimination, inequalities, marginalization, radicalization and cultural retrenchment (CCPARDC 2007: vi). Finally, management of diversity is to be explored in relation to everyone due to “considerable uncertainty, indeed, a malaise in Québec society, concerning our relationship with religion.”19

19 “At the same time, Québecers of French-Canadian origin strongly support the rights stipulated in the Québec and Canadian Charters, but they also continue to be deeply attached to their identity, traditions and heritage. If the legal and identity dimensions have coalesced fairly harmoniously in recent decades, some friction now seems apparent” (CCPARDC 2007: 4). Presumed friction might as well have been attributed to recent legislative history. For more than twenty years, for the sake of protecting tradition, both Liberal and PQ governments have resorted to parliamentary use of “notwithstanding” clauses in order to protect exclusive privileges to denominational

québec and reasonable accommodation

55

Identification of management of religious diversity as a public problem is hardly original. It has been part of a struggle for issue ownership among various Québec departments and consultative agencies for the past ten years. We shall return to it later. But along with this diagnostic come two additional themes to the terms of reference: secularism and Québec identity (CCPARDC 2007: v, 3–4). For different reasons, occurrences of both themes deserve mention. Mention of secularism as such is unprecedented.20 The occurrence of the latter theme is even more surprising, for Québec identity, particularly in relation to religion and collective status (majority and minority), was just being instrumentalized in the context of the reasonable accommodation controversy. Given their backgrounds, expertise and interests, this added theme bears both commissioners’ imprint, though it also gives the impression of having been borrowed from Mr. Dumont’s rhetoric. With reference to management of diversity, the consultation paper brings into the debate many complex policy narratives: interculturalism as contrasted to multiculturalism, for instance. Some notions (harmonization, concerted adjustments and reasonable accommodation practices) are being expressly devised in view of the consultation (CCPARDC 2007: 7–8). Others, such as radical and open secularism, are barely formulated or known outside small groups of public administration consultants and agencies to which the Commission has turned to for inspiration and expertise (CCPARDC 2007: 11–15). Laïcité has been in the institutional policy mill for a while as a peripheral issue. Along with those of pluralism and diversity, the notion, with reference to an inclusive model of integration in public schools, as well as to State neutrality with respect to school institutions, is mentioned in the French version of a report of the Québec Advisory Council on the Status of Women (Conseil femme 1995: 39).21 Two years later, in public schooling and then, of denominational instruction in public schools, the latter with a scheduled ending in June 2008. 20 “Discontent over reasonable accommodation has revived debate on secularism (laïcité) in Québec society. The notion of secularism is complex and can be understood in several ways, which directly affect the rules governing togetherness. When defined as the principle of separation between church and State, secularism can sometimes be linked to the neutrality of the State in respect of various religions or world views and sometimes to the more or less complete elimination of the religious life from the public sphere” (CCPARDC 2007: vi). 21 The English summary of the same report makes no mention of either “laïcité” or “secularism.” Instead, it analyzes the issue of religious garb (veil) in public schools,

56

pauline côté

1997, the same Council presented laïcité as an essential condition to the pursuit of pluralism and as a prominent value of the feminist movement.22 Starting in the mid-nineties, the Conseil des relations interculturelles, an advising council to the Immigration and Citizenship Minister, seized upon the common language and integration motif developed in the Québec Charter of the French Language as a way to develop extensive positions on public education, which it conceived as common, civic, and laïque (Conseil interculturelles 1999: 4–5; CCPARDC 2007: 13). In 1997, the Conseil exhorted the Immigration Minister to extend to school institutions its affirmed lead on laïcité (Conseil interculturelles 1997: 63–64; 1999: 5).23 The notion of “open, secular schools” (in French: laïcité ouverte) figured prominently in the Proulx Report on the place of religion in schools (Groupe de travail 1999: 49).24 Yet, laïcité is noticeably absent from the Education Act 2000, which implemented several of the report’s recommendations and ended denominational control over religious education in public schools.25 It is also absent from ensuing Education guidelines and orientations (Ministère de l’Éducation 2000: 6–10; 2005). At this point, issue ownership over management of religious diversity shifted noticeably from Education to Immigration and Culture. In a brief submitted in 1999 to the Commission on Education of the Québec National Assembly, convened a few months after the Proulx report release, the Conseil des relations interculturelles made use of the forum to appeal for laïcisation of the public school system.26 But Education has which the Council condones as cultural and religious diversity management, for the sake of integration. The Conseil used to report to the Minister of Culture, Communications and the Condition of Women. 22 See Conseil Femme 1997a: 16. Again, pluralism and diversity are the main elements of the English version (1997b). 23 As it occurs, the Énoncé de politique referred to contains no mention of laïcité but several mentions of pluralism (Ministère de Communautés 1990). 24 “2. We recommend that legislation be enacted to establish a secular system of public schools dispensing preschool, elementary and secondary education” (Groupe de travail 1999: 82). (“Nous recommandons que la loi instaure un système scolaire public laïque, à l’éducation préscolaire et à l’enseignement primaire et secondaire.”) Recommendation 2 of 14. In the task force understanding, “secular” simply qualified schools and religious instruction with “no connection to any one religion.” 25 National Assembly (Québec) 1st Session, 36th Legislature, Bill 118, An Act to amend various legislative provisions respecting education as regards confessional matters (2000: ch. 24). 26 The substantive contours of which are not detailed although the Council insists on substituting civic nationalism to the ethnocultural nationalism presumed to be

québec and reasonable accommodation

57

strong stakes in the issue and remains a contender. In a brief to the Education Minister in March 2003 on the place of rites and religious symbols in public schools, the Comité sur les affaires religieuses rejected the notion of secularism on grounds of its negative connotations (Comité 2003: 20). At the same time, building upon the Education department’s own Énoncé de politique on educational integration and intercultural education, published in 1998, the Comité points to the “emergence” of a Québec model of open secularity (2003: 20).27 In March 2004 ( January 2005 for the English version), the Conseil des relations interculturelles pressed the issue of laïcité in its own Report to the Minister of Citizen Relations and Immigration. The report’s explicit purpose is of devising a so-called “Québec approach” to the management of religious diversity. It includes extensive recommendations addressed to the government as a whole, the Education Minister, the Municipal World and the Minister of Health. One of its recommendations calls for a “governmental declaration on laïcité [or secularism]) in the Québec context” (Conseil interculturelles 2005: 35, 20).28 No such recommendation figures in the Comité sur les affaires religieuses’ October 2006 brief to the Education, Recreation and Sports Minister, but reiteration of its option for secularity (as contrasted to secularism) as well as an urgent request to providing schools, teachers, staff and the general public with the necessary support and resources to overcome the “lack of understanding, uncertainty and resistance observed with respect to the model of open and secular schools promoted in government orientations . . .” (Comité 2006: 20, 49).29 incorporated in the public education structures (Conseil des relations interculturelles 1999: 6–8; 12–16). 27 The Comité opts for the term “secularity” as the best English equivalent to laïcité (2003: 5). It seems then that the passage from the adjective “secular” to the substantive, and then the contrast between two substantives: “secularism” and “secularity” illustrate philosophical differences on political socialization’s nature and role in contemporary societies. 28 One must question the assumed necessity of such declaration since, according to the report’s own analysis, the vast majority of countries having secularized civil societies as present-day characteristics have reached this level without constitutional laïcité (Conseil interculturelles 2005: 11). Historically, on the other hand, the notion of secularism, as well as its corresponding French term “laïcité” does refer to anticlerical and sometimes antireligious ideologies, much as “secular humanists” have been denounced in the contemporary U.S. from Ronald Reagan to Mike Huckabee, not to mention Newt Gingrich. 29 Pursuant to the adoption of Bill 95, in June 2005, the Comité sur les Affaires religieuses’s mandate has been reduced to advisory committee on the religious aspects of the mandatory program on ethics and religious culture to be implemented in the

58

pauline côté

The Conseil’s 2005 report is the most probable source for the Commission’s own broad notion of secularism which encompasses constitutional principles—such as “separation between church and State”—subject to varied, contested and sometimes contradictory interpretations of political regimes, public administration and services, ideologies as well as political socialization as they apply to religion, religions and religious expression.30 Above all, secularism’s status is unclear and more akin to a paradigm or episteme since its ideologies, according to the consultation document, “directly affect the rules governing togetherness” (CCPARDC 2007: vi). Such elevation of the stakes is hard to reconcile with the more concrete objectives set by the Commission for the “listening to the public stage” phase of its deliberations work (CCPARDC 2007: 6): “to dissipate the disinformation and confusion surrounding the topic.” The difficulty could have been lessened, though not alleviated, through procedural means as in organizing work so that the independent research could be fed back directly into the consultation process. Public “sweeping consultation” (CCPARDC 2007: 6) began on September 10, 2007 with a series of regional meetings culminating with Montréal sessions at the end of November and beginning of December. On any given point of the consultative tour, the Commission staff held hearings of either briefs or testimonies from pre-registered institutions, groups and individuals. The evenings were dedicated to a third, less formal mode of expression and reaction, the so-called pre-registered “regional citizen’s forums. Province-wide citizens’ forums were organized as well.

Fall 2008. Upon then presenting its position before the Committee on Education, in June 2005, the Comité was insisting on the necessity of prevent intolerance with specific reference to the kirpan controversy raging at the Commission scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys. It reiterated its position in October 2006 as the Québec public was engulfed in the “reasonable accommodation” controversy. 30 The Glossary inserted at the end of the consultation document includes the following terms and definitions: “Open secularism A form of secularism aimed at banishing religion from State institutions while allowing certain religious expression, e.g. in schools and hospitals, among students or patients. [. . .] Radical secularism A form of secularism aimed at banishing all religious expression from State institutions or in the public sphere overall and confining such expression to the private sphere. [. . .] Secularism (translates the French Laïcité. Of course, this is not an exact translation.) The separation between church and State. [. . .] Secularization The act or process of eliminating any confessional spirit from State institutions.” (CCPARDC 2007: 43–44).

québec and reasonable accommodation

59

From there on to early December 2007, the Commission’s public forums were aired live on national television. Their occasional drifting into intolerance, xenophobia, islamophobia and antisemitism has been highly mediatized.31 To the most optimistic analysts, this cathartic phase in the process is deemed as a “necessary evil.” In the first weeks of the consultation tour, it had become commonplace to blame the general public for intolerance. It was assumed that by reaching “diverse cities” and (presumably) more educated people, more enlightened participants would manifest themselves. Although more diverse points of view have been aired, optimism has subsided. Drifting has not been confined to the general public. It has extended to veterans of public consultations. Calls have been made and heeded on the necessity to implement some hierarchy of rights. Seeking an opportunity for decisive action, the government announced its intention to legislate on the primacy of equality between men and women ahead of the Commission’s recommendations.32 Then, faced with opposition, predominantly from legal experts, the government backtracked and set its promised legislation on a more symbolic plane.33 The Commission’s forums are being caricatured in year-end reviews as “each and every nut’s minute of fame.” The Commissioners’ choice of themes and modes of consultation have been seriously questioned by editorialists of all major printed press. The Commission itself has become part of the controversy. To some, this is proof that sensitive subjects, and especially religious and human rights issues, should never be made part of public debate. Others see proof of an even greater malaise in Québec society than first diagnosed. In the end, one can argue that a consultation document is just what it is. After all, the Commission explicitly profiled its more substantial developments to potential brief writers. It spared no effort at trying

31 On October 30, the Québec Premier took the unusual step of publishing an open letter calling for respect and reason in all major newspapers. Among others, the Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse felt it necessary to intervene and call for a focus on the fundamental issues of religious pluralism, rights and freedoms (Commission 2007a, 2007b). 32 Excerpt from the inaugural speech, La Presse, May 10, 2007, p. A28. 33 The proposed bill adds an interpretative clause to the Québec Charter that reiterates section 28 of the Canadian Charter on the equal guarantee to women and men. See: National Assembly (Québec) Bill 63 An Act to amend the Charter of human rights and freedoms. Available at: http://www.assnat.qc.ca/eng/38legislature1/Projets-loi/Publics/ 07–a063.htm (last accessed: January 13, 2008). Critics included the Ligue des droits et libertés and le Barreau du Québec. La Presse, Dec. 11, 2007. p. A6.

60

pauline côté

to establish a common vocabulary in order to facilitate discussions (CCPARDC 2007: 7, 41–44). Is Public Consultation a Valid Exercise? Many criteria, procedural as well as substantive, may be used for evaluation. The choice has been made from the start to examine agenda building and agenda setting on procedural grounds, that is, to relate already made decisions to options generally available to decisionmakers, and to evaluate conformity of those pursued objectives and means publicly considered by them. This was then applied first to the Commission’s own objectives and then to its choice of procedural and substantive issues as they translate into issue characterization, diagnostic and policy narratives. Public inquiries are considered serious and effective instruments of policy making. Public inquiries are often a rare opportunity “for wellstructured, well-informed conversations about policy” (Salter 2007: 292). Yet, in liberal democracies, public inquiries on human rights issues require good links to the electoral process and to the rule of law. Fundamental issues are settled by elected and responsible governments. But fundamental issues may be referred to Courts by governments in Canada, as well as legal actions claiming fundamental freedoms and human rights protections. Most are settled at this point. Others are analyzed, reformulated and left by judges for elected representatives to decide, while others, such as settled issues on reasonable accommodations, are politicized. Yet, even held in proper institutional settings, these debates can be intense. Almost anywhere immigration, religion, legal and collective identity issues are good candidates for polarization and stereotyping. As new evidence is brought to light or new formulations are found which could defuse polarized debates, dialogue can make a difference. Progress may be made in seeking common ground. The respective merits of integration models may be debated in academic forums. But in order to be effective, public debate of the proportions envisioned by the commissioners either needs focus or issue maturity, both of which, in turn, must materialize into realistic or tested options being put forward for judgment and evaluation. The consultation document lacks both. The focus has been scattered among a wide array of issues. Investigation into the legal debate on reasonable accommodation alone

québec and reasonable accommodation

61

would have revealed competing and compelling perspectives, each one linked to some procedural or substantive integration model.34 Conflating norms, core values and cultures, the notion of “accommodation practices related to cultural differences” chips away common ground on which to stand for reciprocal exchange of views among people and groups treated as equals. Reasonable accommodations aiming at equality rights on various grounds become a form of cultural adjustment of differences. Cultural differences then drift into religious and mainly to ethnocultural differences (CCPARDC 2007: 7). Religious affiliation is being seen as evidence of believing and belonging in a traditional culture, either native or foreign born (CCPARDC 2007: 35). Culturally implicit assumptions contained in the consultation paper become evidence of principled opposition between fundamental human rights, reified majorities, minorities’ cultures and societal values. Overall, the assumed collective dimension to the integration problem put immigration, secularism and Québec identity on a collision course not accounted for by past or actual intercultural frictions, tensions and conflicts between legal norms, identity, traditions and heritage. As for issue maturity, there is a strong case to be made that bureaucratic politics fed into public debates, with elected representatives caught unprepared for substantive discussion and resolution. As a public issue, laïcité had almost no notoriety outside of the public education sector before the start of the reasonable accommodation controversy.35 Even there, it did not reach the status of a specialized policy narrative. Although it has started to be promoted as secularism in some quarters, and figures prominently in the consultation paper, it lacks substance and coherence as a policy narrative. For the sake of public policy formulation so far, the Commission’s substantive input is minimal.36 Immature as a public issue and contested as a policy narrative, laïcité runs the risk of alienating the very disaffected people the Commission wanted to integrate. The resurrection of laïcité may also contribute to reviving religious cleavages by fuelling them with an air of social protest. Alternatively, the process may be assessed by comparing the Commission’s own objectives at fostering deliberative democracy against conflicting even contradictory views it held of the public. With respect Multiethnicity or communitarianism and republicanism (CCPARDC 2007: 23). The notion is absent from Québec and Canadian legal framework, and foreign to their political cultures of “elite accommodation.” 36 A few well-researched briefs may be found on the Commission’s Website. 34 35

62

pauline côté

to set the objectives to dissipate disinformation and confusion, the public consultation phase has been a failure. Dense yet superficial policy narratives have been the product thus far under intense media exposure. Whether or how the Commission can meet raised expectations for deep reflection and dialogue remains to be seen. The Commission itself held contradictory and conflicting views of the potential for public input. In the pre-consultation phase, validation of already made orientations seemed to have been sought more than intellectual deliberation. Restrictive input processes as well as occasional airing of commissioners’ strong pre-existing views on issues defined the beginning.37 From the chosen course of action, one may infer a view of the public as non-expert in need of information and education, with polls and focus groups geared at identifying those perceived needs, and group discussions and interviews with invited experts and professionals as part of the process of contracting research. With its decision to engage first in a wide public consultation, the Commission gave strong indications of its view of the public as a disaffected population and of its mission as going deeper into public opinion. Yet, as the Website platform and general questionnaire give indication of the Commission’s view of the public as interchangeable with public opinion (at least those most vocal and motivated), the consultation paper’s substantive sections are addressed, in turn, to various sections of the public as stakeholders. In the end, the public consultation process does not seem to have paid off. The consultation phase resulted at best in increased frustration for all segments of the population and at worst in furthering alienation of members of so-called minorities.38

37 In the initial stages of the Commission, Bouchard and Taylor quip to the media about problem identification and solutions threatened to destabilize the whole process. See Le Devoir, March 10, 2007, p.a 1; Voir, Vol. 21, no 13, March 29, 2007, p. 16; La Presse, August 28, 2007, p. A-12; The Gazette, August 22, 2007, p. A1, A20, A21. 38 In its own assessment, the Commission notes the “absence of a notable divide between Montréal and the rest of Québec” and feels satisfied that less than 15% of interventions made in the directly televised citizens forums over a period of four months qualified altogether as “[P]otentially offensive remarks that reflected ignorance, stereotypes or prejudices” (12%) or as “openly racist or xenophobic remarks” (1.8%). http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/communiques/2007-12-19-en.html.

québec and reasonable accommodation

63

Concluding Remarks The reflections in this chapter provide some understandings of process that will, in turn, provide insight into the end results of the Commission. Proper and sympathetic appreciation of cultural and religious diversity in view of social integration is crucial. So too is dialogue. The lack of clear, grounded and unequivocal terms of reference have hampered the Commission’s work. But until now, the Commission has failed in providing elements to structured, focused public deliberation and mature issues as illustrated here with reference to the appropriation of terms of reference and then to the issue of laïcité. As they retreat from public view to take stock of data on accommodation practices, analyze the attendant issues in light of “experience outside Québec,” and formulate recommendations to the government, commissioners must ponder whether and how their inquiry might be an adequate and useful exercise at deliberative democracy. Given the prominence of religious diversity as a public problem in their reflection, this in itself would make for a valuable contribution. References Beckford, James A. 1985. Cult Controversies: The Societal Response to New Religious Movements. London: Tavistock. Bouchard, Alain. 2001. “Drame religieux et gestion de crise: l’Ordre du Temple Solaire à St-Casimir.” Pp. 97–112 in Chercheurs de dieux dans l’espace public, edited by Pauline Côté, Ottawa: Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa. Boyd, Marion. 2004. Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion. www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf. CCPARDC 2007. Accommodation and Differences. Seeking Common Ground: Québecers Speak Out Accommodation and Differences. Seeking Common Ground: Québecers Speak Out. Commission de Consultation sur les Pratiques d’Accommodement Reliées aux Différences Culturelles (Québec). www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/documentconsultation-en.html. CCPARDC Participation Guide 2007. Accommodation and Differences. Seeking Common Ground: Québecers Speak Out. Commission de Consultation sur les Pratiques d’Accommodement Reliées aux Différences Culturelles (Québec). www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/guide-participation-en.html. Chélini-Pont, Blandine, and Jeremy Gunn. 2005. Dieu en France et aux États-Unis: quand les mythes font la loi. Paris: Berg. Comité. 2003. Rites et symboles religieux à l’école. Les défis éducatifs de la diversité./Religious Rites and Symbols in the Schools: The Educational Challenges of Diversity. Comité sur les affaires religieuses. Brief to the Minister of Education. Québec. www.meq.gouv .qc.ca/affairesreligieuses/CAR/PDF/Avis_LaiciteScolaire_a.pdf. ———. 2006. La laïcité scolaire au Québec. Un nécessaire changement de culture institutionnelle/Secular Schools in Québec: A Necessary Change in Institutional Culture. Comité sur

64

pauline côté

les affaires religieuses. Brief to the Minister of Education, Recreation and Sports. Québec. www.mels.gouv.qc.ca/affairesreligieuses/CAR/PDF/Avis_LaiciteScolaire_a.pdf. Commission. 2007a. La ferveur religieuse et les demandes d’accommodement religieus: une comparaison intergroupe. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. Research paper Cat. 2.120–4.21. ———. 2007b. Accommodements raisonnables: éviter les dérapages. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/fr/publications/docs/accommodements_eviter_derapages.pdf. Conseil femme. 1995. Réflexion sur la question du port du voile à l’école, document de réflexion. Conseil pur le Statut de la Femme, Marie Moisan. (English summary: Analysis of the Issue of Wearing Veils in School). http://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/fr/english. Conseil interculturelles. 1997. Un Québec pour tous ses citoyens. Les défis actuels d’une démocratie pluraliste, Avis présenté au ministre des Relations avec les citoyens et de l’Immigration. Montréal: Conseil des relations interculturelles. ———. 1999. La place de la religion dans l’école commune: intégrer la diversité religieuse dans un Québec démocratique et pluraliste. Québec: Conseil des relations interculturelles. ———. 2004. Laïcité et diversité religieuse. L’approche québécoise. Québec: Conseil des relations interculturelles. ———. 2005. Laïcité and Religious Diversity: Québec’s Approach. Québec: Conseil des relations interculturelles. Côté, Pauline, ed. 2001. Chercheurs de dieux dans l’espace public/Frontier Religions in Public Space, Ottawa: Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa. ———. 2004. “Towards Technocratic Pluralism? Public Management of Religious Diversity in Canada.” Pp. 419–40 in Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe, edited by James T. Richardson. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. ———. 2006a. “La politique religieuse des États: Considérations sur l’émergence et la formulation de lois portant sur les sectes en France et en Belgique.” Pp. 285–342 in La nouvelle question religieuse. Régulation ou ingérence de l’État?, edited by Pauline Côté and T. Jeremy Gunn. Bruxelles: Peter Lang. ———. 2006b. “Politiques religieuses et exercice de la raison publique en France et au Canada.” Éthique publique 8: 29–43. Côté, Pauline, and T. Jeremy Gunn. 2005. “Canada Limitations Clause Analysis for Freedom of Conscience and Religion.” Emory International Law Review 2: 101–63. ———, eds. 2006. La nouvelle question religieuse: Régulation ou ingérence de l’État? Brussels: Peter Lang. Davie, Grace. 2007. The Sociology of Religion. London: Sage. Dobuzinskis, Laurent, Michael Howlett, and David Laycock, eds. 2007. Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Groupe de travail. 1999. Laïcité et religions: perspective nouvelle pour l’école québécoise/Religion in Secular Schools: A New Perspective for Québec. Groupe de travail sur la place de la religion à l’école. Ministère de l’Éducation, Gouvernement du Québec. Hill, Daniel. 1980. Study of Mind Development Groups, Sects and Cults in Ontario. A Report to the Ontario Government. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Jézéquel, Myriam, ed. 2007. Les accommodements raisonnables: quoi, comment, jusqu’où? Des outils pour tous. Cowansville, Québec: Éditions Yvon Blais. Keane, John. 2000. “Secularism?” Political Quarterly 71: 5–19. Kingdon, John W. 2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. New York: Longmans. Ministère des Communautés. 1990. Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble. Énoncé de politique en matière d’immigration et d’intégration. Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l’Immigration du Québec, Gouvernement du Québec.

québec and reasonable accommodation

65

Ministère de l’Éducation. 2000. Québec’s Public Schools: Responding to the Diversity of Moral and Religious Expectations. Ministère de l’Éducation, Gouvernement du Québec. http://www.mels.gouv.qc.ca/sections/publications/index.asp?page=brochures. ———. 2005. Establishment of an Ethics and Religious Culture Program: Providing Future Direction for All Québec Youth. Ministère de l’Éducation, Gouvernement du Québec. http://www.mels.gouv.qc.ca/sections/publications/index.asp?page=brochures. Pace, Enzo, ed. 2008. “Secularity and Religious Vitality,” Social Compass 55: 105ff. Richardson, James T., ed. 2004. Regulating Religion: Case Studies from around the Globe. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Richardson, James T., and Massimo Introvigne. 2001. “ ‘Brainwashing’ Theories in European Parliamentary and Administrative Reports on ‘Cults’ and ‘Sects’.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40: 143–68. Salter, Liora. 2007. “The Public of Public Inquiries.” Pp. 291–314 in Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, edited by Laurent Dobuzinskis, Michael Howlett, and David Laycock. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Simpson, John H. 2000. “The Politics of the Body in Canada and the United States.” Pp. 263–282 in Rethinking Church, State, and Modernity, edited by David Lyon and M. Van Die. Toronto, University of Toronto Press. Soroka, Stuart N. 2002. Agenda-Setting Dynamics in Canada. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Tilly, Charles. 2004. Contention & Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER THREE

FEARING PLANES, TRAINS, AND AUTOMOBILES: SOCIOPHOBICS AND THE DISINCENTIVE TO RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY Douglas E. Cowan Surely few people in the world remain unaware of the events of September 11, 2001, when members of al-Qaeda hijacked four American airliners, and flew two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the west wall of the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., while the fourth crashed in the Pennsylvania countryside. Thousands of people were killed that day, many thousands more wounded, and a nation was traumatized in ways not seen in half a century. Airport security tightened to a point unimagined in American travel history. A variety of civil liberties were quietly but firmly revoked as “homeland security” became the watchword of the land. The U.S. government took the 11 September attacks as a clear mandate to wage war on enemies real and imagined. And, despite President George Bush’s bland protestations that the United States was not at war with Islam, the popular and unambiguous equation between “Muslim” and “terrorist” was cemented as a foundational component of the cultural, political, and military discourses that followed. On 3 March 2004, a series of coordinated bombings on Madrid commuter trains killed nearly two hundred people and wounded more than two thousand. Just over a year later, on 7 July 2005, three bombs exploded on trains in the London underground, while a fourth was detonated on a bus in Tavistock Square. More than fifty people were killed in these attacks, and about seven hundred injured. While no evidence of direct al-Qaeda involvement has been demonstrated in either case, a variety of Islamic extremist groups claiming to be either linked with or inspired by al-Qaeda were quick to claim responsibility, and popular discourse equally quick to accept these admissions without question. As I write this paragraph, car bombs are in the news in many places around the world. In Yemen today nine people, most of them tourists,

68

douglas e. cowan

were killed following a visit to the Queen of Sheba temple, one of the oldest religious sites on the Arabian peninsula. A suicide bomber drove a car filled with explosives into their convoy. In Britain, authorities are working frantically to put together information about two attempted car bombings in London and an attack on the main terminal of the Glasgow Airport last week. While the two car bombs were located and removed before they could be detonated, suicide attackers drove a burning Jeep into the Glasgow terminal area and crashed it into the front entrance. Yelling “Allah,” one of those responsible then doused himself with gasoline and set himself ablaze. In the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, hardly a day goes by without news of an IED, often a car bomb, taking the lives of dozens of civilians and soldiers. In the past few months alone, car bombs have been detonated in marketplaces, outside mosques, and in the midst of pilgrim throngs, claiming many hundreds of lives. Obviously, these are only examples of the fact that we have cause now to fear planes, trains, and automobiles—well known examples, perhaps, but only because they impact the news regime within which Canadian media operate. They resonate with Canadian audiences more than any number of similar tragedies occurring almost daily in less well-known parts of the world, and are reported to us for that reason. In Canada, we are both connected to and disconnected from these events. Very often, American news becomes our news; we are connected to it by virtue of geographic proximity and economic ties, but live somewhat secure in the knowledge that we are not the United States. Our international reputation has, until recently, made us less of a target than our neighbors to the south. Because so many Canadians still treasure our connection to the Commonwealth, we shudder to think of attacks in Britain. I would be lying if I said the Glasgow airport attacks did not give me pause, given my plans to attend conference—and did attend—in Liverpool less than two weeks later. At the same time, though, we recognize that for a variety of reasons Great Britain has a history of violence that is very different from Canada’s. Comparatively speaking, religiously or politically motivated violence is rare in the Great White North. Finally, every news report linking “car bomb” and “Afghanistan” reminds us that we are connected to the men and women of our armed forces serving as part of the multinational contingent in that country. We are connected to them as a nation, but also disconnected because they are, after all, in a war zone, and we are not.

fearing planes, trains, and automobiles

69

We became connected in a much more visceral way in early June 2006, when a series of coordinated raids by RCMP officers and Canadian Security Intelligence Service agents arrested seventeen members of what was described almost immediately as a group of “like-minded Islamic extremists” (Bell 2006: A1), and repeatedly in the days that followed as a brand of “‘home-grown’ Islamicist fanaticism” (Editorial 2006b). Using homemade explosives similar to that employed by Timothy McVeigh in the Oklahoma City bombing, their plan was to attack a number of targets in the Greater Toronto area, including the CN Tower, and perhaps extend their action to a hostage-taking in Parliament. Some reports indicated they contemplated beheading the Prime Minister. In the days that followed, the story became both clearer, in terms of the actual plot and the level of threat it represented, but also more problematic in terms of the latent sociophobic it surfaced. According to most reports, there was little actual danger —the RCMP and CSIS had been monitoring the group for as long as two years (Canadian Press 2006; Shephard and Leeder 2006) and, prior to the arrests, had even replaced with a harmless substitute the three tons of potentially dangerous ammonium nitrate fertilizer the group purchased. Following the well-known protocols of media production, though, which are driven in part by a need for concision, a requirement for resonance with the target audience, and a demonstrated penchant to present the worst news first (cf. Cowan and Hadden 2004), the perception of danger escalated considerably. Aware that “one natural, frightened reaction, for many people, will be to focus blame, and fear, on all ‘fairly ordinary Canadians’ of Muslim belief or culture,” a Montréal Gazette editorial urged us “to remain vigilant without descending into vigilante-ism” (Editorial 2006b: A18)—a rather unsubtle nod to attacks within the U.S. on Muslims and those suspected of being Muslims in the days and weeks following 11 September. Headlines, soundbites, and clipped quotes in the flood of reporting that followed, however, indicated how difficult that might be. A number of reports repeated American charges that “Canada is a haven for a ‘disproportionate’ number of al-Qaida members and sympathizers”—though “disproportionate” to what is never disclosed. Broadcast news in both Canada and the United States aired comments by Congressman Peter King (R-NY), who warned that “there is a large al-Qaida presence in Canada” (Blanchfield and Woods 2006). Once again, “large” in comparison to what is never made clear, but in this kind of political rhetoric ambiguity reigns. News of

70

douglas e. cowan

possible al-Qaeda training camps north of Toronto and on the Niagara peninsula were traded back and forth between newspapers—some vehemently denied by authorities, others not. Whether denied or not, though, without doubt many motorists cast a wary eye at farms and acreages as they drove through southern Ontario on their way to work, the cottage, or Sunday services. Entitled “Sanctuaries of Terror,” an editorial in the influential Investor’s Business Daily (Editorial 2006a: 12), which is printed in the U.S. but readily available in Canada, began, “Time and time again, the mosque connection shows up in plots against Western targets. Yet authorities remain reluctant to do much about it.” Reprising the fact that a number of those arrested frequented the same Islamic centre in Mississauga, the author continues, “[M]osques aren’t churches as we know them. Yes, most are places of worship by devout Muslims who wish none of us harm. But mosques are also used as fundraising centers for jihad, recruiting stations for jihadists, military planning headquarters and even weapons depots.” The author’s pallid disclaimer notwithstanding, this explicit connection of the language of religion (“mosque,” “church,” “worship”) with what Robin Wagner-Pacifici (1994: 55–56, 136–138) calls the “discourses of war”—“recruiting stations,” “military planning headquarters,” “weapons depots”—only reinforces the basic sociophobic relationship between fear of terrorist attack and Islam in the west. Citing a number of cases in which mosques have allegedly been used for these purposes in other countries, the editorial closes on a chilling note: The unpleasant truth is the enemy uses mosques for terrorist activities. They are hubs connecting a terror network stretching from London to Toronto and even to Washington. There are more than 1,200 in America, and eight of 10 of them are controlled by Saudi Arabia and espouse its hateful, anti-Western Wahhabist dogma. One may be in your neighborhood, or under construction there.

Ten days after the arrests, a panel of scholars, Muslim leaders, and journalists was convened at the University of Toronto to discuss some of the issues raised. Called “Terrorism in Toronto: What Does it Mean for Canadian Multiculturalism?” as one reporter wrote, “the only thing the panelists and their audience seemed to agree on was that the alleged terror plot uncovered in Toronto had nothing to do with multiculturalism” (Patrick 2006: A6). By this, we can only hope the panelists meant the link that is often made between multiculturalism

fearing planes, trains, and automobiles

71

and an alleged laxity in Canada’s immigration policies. If not, then “dismissing Canada’s multicultural policies as a root cause of homegrown terror” (Patrick 2006: A6) reveals a textbook exercise in asking entirely the wrong question in a time of crisis. Indeed, one participant, the founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, saw the event as little more than grandstanding in favor of groups who would use the concept of multiculturalism to further darker political agendas. “Reverberations from news of the alleged Toronto terror threat had barely subsided,” opined Tarek Fatah the next day, “when the merchants of multiculturalism were out with their begging bowls asking for government funding to find the ‘root cause’.” Fatah’s critique was directed largely at Muslim groups that seek program funding while advocating non-integration with Canadian society. “They now want money to develop a cure for the ills they created,” he continued (Fatah 2006). Even as the “Toronto terror plot” faded from the media radar, forced from the screen by other concerns—the brief 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, for example, or the deadliest day to date for Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan—hints of the backlash surfaced from time to time. Reflecting on some of the questions she was asked in the wake of the arrests—“ ‘Why do you have some really crazy people back home?’ ‘I am really surprised to learn how much hate against the West there is in your country’ . . . [and] ‘Isn’t Osama bin Laden in Pakistan?’ ”—a Pakistani-Canadian pointed out what should be obvious to everyone, but often isn’t: “Many Canadians have formed their conclusions based on sensationalized television coverage of grand-scale terror” (Rana 2006). Indeed, surveys conducted by the Association for Canadian Studies indicated, again somewhat obviously, that “international events can have a profound impact on opinion on Muslims, Christians, and Jews” ( Jedwab 2006b; cf. Jedwab 2006a, 2006c). A poll conducted less than two months later showed that 37 percent of Canadians thought a terrorist attack on Canada was likely in the near future, while 63 percent feared such an attack would take place in the United States (Leger Marketing 2006a). In a follow-up survey, slightly more than two-thirds of respondents believe that the 11 September attacks “were primarily the result of a reaction of Islamic fundamentalism against the West” (Leger Marketing 2006b). While the latter may be accurate, the former is a function of the sociophobic generated in significant measure by media coverage of “grand-scale terror” (on this, see, for example, Altheide 2002; Furedi 2006; Glassner 1999).

72

douglas e. cowan

In the midst of Canada’s much-vaunted commitment to multiculturalism—our mosaic as opposed to the American melting pot, our Charter of Rights and Freedoms that guarantees “to such reasonable limits prescribed by law” (Art. 1) such “fundamental freedoms” as “conscience and religion,” and “thought, belief, [and] opinion,” (Art. 2)—events such as these disclose how often and how easily fear can function as a countervailing pressure on diversity. However many people may be unaware of it, though, this is not new in our country. Although it is often lauded as a bedrock Canadian value, multiculturalism is a relatively recent and hotly contested concept, one with a varied pedigree and which often takes the form of a political football. We do, in fact, have quite a history of fearing and, therefore, marginalizing religious groups different from “our own,” whatever “our own” might be—though, for the most part, this means white, Anglophone, and Christian. The Hidden Will to Homogeneity: Three Less-Obvious Examples Fear, not surprisingly, is a natural disincentive to multiculturalism, and though something Canadians are often loath to admit, our history is hardly free from it. From the systematic disenfranchisement of Canada’s First Nations by both church and state to the fear in the 1950s that Sons of Freedom arson would spread beyond the borders of isolated Doukhobor communities (Time 1947; Holt 1964), from our history of suspicion when it comes to new religious movements to the multitude of issues that constellate around religious prerogatives ranging from the Sikh kirpan in a public school to the Muslim hijab in a voting booth, we have a latent sociophobic of new or non-dominant religious cultures—that is, a culturally constructed, managed, and reinforced fear (Scruton 1986)—that runs through our history as a country and is counter to our proudest claims to diversity. Though there are numerous other examples from which we could choose, consider these three: the Komagata Maru incident in 1914; the banning and imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witnesses during World War II; and the moral panic in recent years over fundamentalist Latter-day Saints living polygamously in southern British Columbia. Each illustrates aspects of Canada’s history (and present) that many of those most concerned with the promotion of diversity and multiculturalism would rather forget.

fearing planes, trains, and automobiles

73

Fear and Exclusion: The Komagata Maru Incident Rather than simply leaving Burrard Inlet on 23 July 1914, it is as though the Komagata Maru sailed into oblivion, carrying with her not only the more than three hundred Sikhs who had come to Vancouver hoping for a new home and a new life, but also one of the darker moments in Canada’s immigration history. Given the controversy it generated at the time, surprisingly little has been written about the incident—an occasional book (Ferguson 1975; Johnston 1989), a well-received play by noted Canadian playwright Sharon Pollock (1978), and a few articles, most of which discuss Pollock’s work (e.g., Northof 1995). Indeed, a quick check of a dozen basic Canadian history texts reveals only one that even lists the “incident” in its index, and the actual discussion is limited to little more than a mention on the page. The Komagata Maru and her passengers remain part of Canada’s history of fear-driven intolerance, which is largely hidden beneath our protestations to multiculturalism and diversity. Early in 1914, a Japanese steamer, the Komagata Maru had taken on mostly Sikh passengers at a number of points in Asia, and made her way across the Pacific. The day she arrived in Vancouver, though, the tenor of her advent was already clear. Reprinting a small item from London’s Pall Mall Gazette, The Globe (now The Globe and Mail) reported, “concerning the trouble threatened over the landing of Hindu [sic] immigrants,” that though they were all citizens of the British Empire “the yellow races are not wanted and cannot be introduced without endangering white settlers’ livelihoods” (“Yellow Races Not Wanted” 1914). That is, in a refrain common to anti-immigration discourse in many countries, an influx of people from one place was perceived to threaten the welfare of those who had already immigrated from another place. Indeed, less than a decade before, an anti-immigration rally organized by the Vancouver chapter of the Asiatic Exclusion League—prominent among whose founding members were the mayor, Alexander Bethune, and a number of his city councilors—turned into a riot that ravaged Chinatown and led to two days of fighting between whites and Japanese. Making little practical distinction between East Asians and persons from the Indian subcontinent, the white population of Vancouver was no more prepared to accept the passengers of the Komagata Maru than they were the influx of would-be immigrants from China, Japan, or Korea.

74

douglas e. cowan

The Komagata Maru anchored in Burrard Inlet on 23 May 1914. There she remained for two months, her passengers forbidden to land, her supplies rapidly diminishing, fresh water a constant concern, disease and starvation a distinct possibility—all within sight of land less than half-a-kilometer away. The government began immediate proceedings to deport the would-be immigrants and force the ship from the harbor, “never to return,” as The Globe’s front page put it (Canadian Press Despatch 1914a). After an unsuccessful attempt at this by local police, the government brought in the cruiser HMCS Rainbow to keep peace and ensure compliance with the deportation order. According to The Globe, work stopped in the office buildings lining the water as people gathered “in the windows waiting to see the battle of Burrard Inlet” (Canadian Press Despatch 1914b). In an unsigned letter to the editor a month later, somewhat paradoxically entitled “A Case for Calm Consideration” (1914), the writer feared that mishandling the Komagata Maru situation could precipitate a repeat of the 1857 Indian Mutiny, which ended the hegemony of the British East India Company. Although he believed “it would be calamitous to leave [the Japanese crew] exposed to assassination by Hindu fanatics, if the vessel permitted to depart under a Japanese naval escort”—a possibility that was being discussed—“Great Britain will by every Indian in Hindustan be held responsible for whatever happens.” Although there was fear that violence would break out in both Vancouver and Victoria, there was no climactic battle. Shortly after dawn on 23 July the Komagata Maru steamed out of the harbor, and, for the most part, over the historical horizon. While the Vancouver Sikh community has not forgotten—as historian Hugh Johnston points out, a picture of one local participant “still hangs prominently” in one of the Sikh temples (1989: 136)—it is likely that the majority of Canadians are entirely unaware of the incident. A quick check of a hundred undergraduates in my classes this semester at the University of Waterloo revealed only one who had heard of the Komagata Maru, though she identified the would-be immigrants as Chinese. Fear of Sedition: Jehovah’s Witnesses In the introduction to the 1960 edition of his classic work of countercult apologetics, The Chaos of Cults, Christian Reformed minister Jan Karel van Baalen wrote,

fearing planes, trains, and automobiles

75

Mormonism, Christian Science, Unity, and similar non-Christian cults are allowed to list their services and hours of worship on the same bulletin boards at the entrance of cities and towns, and in hotel lobbies, with evangelical churches whose every tenet these cults not merely deny, but combat. This writer believes that it would be well to stop this practice (1960: 6).

Van Baalen was then pastoring a church in Edmonton, and his book had been a bestseller since its first edition in 1938. Indeed, as Irving Hexham points out, he arguably “did more than any other writer to shape contemporary attitudes towards new religions by identifying them as ‘cults’” (2001: 281). One of the groups van Baalen criticized, and which has struggled for legitimacy since its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, is Jehovah’s Witnesses. For many Canadians, Jehovah’s Witnesses are an annoyance at best, sincere, almost invariably polite men and women who insist on coming to the door at inopportune moments. At least, that is the caricature with which they have had to live for much of their post-war history. What many people do not know, however, is that, prior to and during the Second World War, Witnesses suffered “legal repression of a kind never before imposed on any religious group in Canadian history” (Penton 1976: 137; cf. 94–155), part of a systematic persecution they endured in many countries. In the early 1930s, the Witnesses had been declared illegal in both Italy and Germany, while in Canada and the United States efforts were made to prohibit their leader, Judge Joseph Rutherford, from making his regular religious radio broadcasts. It is well known that Jehovah’s Witnesses were among those groups specifically targeted and sent to concentration camps by the Nazis. Like the Komagata Maru, however, what is less well known is that for a few years during the war, the Witnesses were banned in Canada as a seditious organization, and a number were imprisoned for their beliefs. As any soldier will tell you, traitors are always more dangerous than enemies. We fear far more those who would betray us from within than those who would attack from without. While Jehovah’s Witnesses never plotted to blow up buildings or storm Parliament, the fear they excited in the Canadian imagination in the years leading up to World War II is similar to that of the “home grown terror” of the Toronto seventeen more than sixty years later. Their treason? They would not salute the flag, sing the national anthem, or participate in other so-called patriotic exercises, and their religious beliefs prevented them from supporting

76

douglas e. cowan

Canada’s participation in the war. As a result of this, Witnesses were arrested and charged with “having fascist sympathies,” their publications were described as “flagrantly subversive” and confiscated (Penton 1976: 129, 132), boys and girls were suspended from school, and fear mounted in the Witness community that their children could be taken away and made wards of the state. As historian M. James Penton recounts (1976: 138–140), appeals to politicians such as “Bible Bill” Aberhart, Alberta’s Social Credit premier and former dean of the Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute, went largely unheard. In a letter to one parent, Aberhart affirmed the right of school boards to discipline children who refused to participate in patriotic exercises, concluding in what must have seemed a particularly chilling manner: “If the military authorities decide to intern the parents, the children would of necessity be taken care of and be sent to school under the authority of those who would look after them.” That is, while their parents languished in jail, against their most deeply held religious beliefs, the children would be made to salute the flag and to sing “God Save the King” with their more patriotic classmates. Misunderstanding the problem in arguably the most fundamental way possible, Aberhart urged the woman not to “make a mountain out of a mere trifle.” If only “a mere trifle,” though, why were government officials so upset about Witness non-compliance? Indeed, they were upset, and a number of Witnesses were jailed, charged with the possession of banned literature, membership in a prohibited organization, or holding illegal meetings. Tons of Witness literature were confiscated in various places across the country, and much of it destroyed. In London, Ontario, one Witness couple had their children taken away, and spent nearly two weeks in jail without charge before coming to trial for “advocating the principles of Jehovah’s Witnesses . . . and having made statements intended or likely to cause disaffection to the King” (Penton 1976: 141). Each was sentenced to four months in jail and a one hundred dollar fine, though they were freed on bail after a month and their sentences overturned on appeal. Its repeal fueled by fears that continued repression would gain sympathy with Canadians and turn the Witnesses into martyrs, the ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses as a seditious organization lasted only a few years, but it remains, nonetheless, another landmark chapter in Canada’s history of intolerance.

fearing planes, trains, and automobiles

77

Fear and Fundamentalism: Polygamy in British Columbia My first career was as a minister in the United Church of Canada, and my first pastoral charge was Cardston and Magrath in southwestern Alberta, part of the area to which many Latter-day Saints came in the 1880s and 1890s when they left Utah seeking to escape the strictures of the Edmunds and Edmunds-Tucker Acts, both of which declared polygamy a felony (cf. Godfrey and Card 1993). Indeed, until 1990, Cardston was the only LDS Temple city in Canada. Although polygamy had been officially repudiated by the Church in 1890 as one part of the price for Utah’s statehood (Bushman and Bushman 2001: 66–75), it has never been completely absent from the Latter-day Saints’ community. While in Cardston I met a number of people who were members of “plural families.” They were unassuming about their family life; the various elements of the family lived in different homes in different parts of the town. They stood out, really, in no way at all, and unless they admitted their family situation, few outside the family circle would know. Not so the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Living in what media reports often describe as “a secretive commune” (Dawson 2000) near Lister, British Columbia, four hundred kilometers west of Cardston and just north of the U.S. border, members of the group continue to practice polygamy in defiance both of Canadian law and repudiation by the larger Church. Indeed, with the 2007 trial of Warren Jeffs, the American leader of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, media interest in the Canadian polygamous community at Bountiful rose dramatically, and outraged calls for its investigation (read: closure) appeared in newspapers across the country. Jeffs was convicted of being an accomplice to rape for his part in arranging the marriage of an underage girl to a member of his polygamous community. Picking up the cue as the trial began, one Edmonton Sun editorial—which was reprinted in Sun papers across Canada—was slugged “Bountiful horror show,” (Cockburn 2007), while another two weeks earlier cried, “Religious rape?” and urged readers to “Save your girls from a life of polygamy” ( Jacobs 2007). In each case, either implicitly or explicitly, polygamy was equated with sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, usually of young teenaged girls. In fact, for many, abuse and exploitation define the practice of polygamy, a conceptualization that will likely inform a series of investigations slated for the community at Bountiful.

78

douglas e. cowan

While there is a regrettable lack of information on the Komagata Maru and the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses, no such paucity exists when it comes to the issue of polygamy among the Latter-day Saints, although to date there has been no systematic empirical examination of polygamous families in Canada. Numerous books and articles—both popular and academic—have examined the practice, as well as its history, both legal and theological. A series of articles and rejoinders in Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions highlight one of the major fault lines in the debate, and the particular sociophobic it implicates. In 2004, scholars Martha Bradley and Lori Beaman both published articles analyzing the cultural contours of polygamous communities in Utah, Colorado, and British Columbia. Two years later, sociologist Stephen Kent responded with an article criticizing the stance taken by Bradley and Beaman, and arguing instead that if contraventions of human rights exist in polygamous communities, “then they are serious and systemic” (2006: 8). While the former is axiomatic, Kent provides no real evidence for the latter. Not insignificantly, Kent’s article is entitled “A Matter of Principle”—that is, the principle reiterated in news media across the country that polygamy is ipso facto abusive. While he framed his article in terms of the legal implications of underage girls forced into polygamous relationships, and argued that this was a “maladaptive” strategy that would ultimately lead to the demise of polygamous communities, not unlike much of the media reporting, Kent’s analysis was underpinned by this belief that polygamy is abusive by definition. While each of these articles contributes important insights to the discussion, two of Beaman’s points deserve particular consideration. First, the contentious issue of Mormon polygamy in Canada is not new, but goes back to those nineteenth-century immigrants from Utah, many of whose descendants now populate the mixed farmland of southern Alberta. Indeed, citing Hansard from 1890, she points out that the parliamentary debates of the time “revealed ignorance about religious practices and ambivalence about Mormons as immigrants, who were recognized to be industrious and frugal, but whose sexual practices mitigated against enthusiasm about their immigration” (2004: 24). Important here is the phrase “ignorance about religious practices”—and by implication the theological and cultural constructions of reality by which such practices are conceptualized by adherents—since it appears that little has changed in more than a century. Second, in an invited reply to Kent, she pointed out that “polygamy does not inherently lead to abuse, any more than celibacy does”—referring to the ongoing

fearing planes, trains, and automobiles

79

revelations of sexual abuse by Roman Catholic clergy—adding, “My concern is that stories of abuse overshadow stories of women who have chosen to live in polygamous relationships who are not abused” (2006: 44). Each of these examples is, of course, considerably more complex than these brief précis can hope to adduce. That the passengers on the Komagata Maru were Sikh—despite the media’s consistent misidentification of them as Hindu—was no less an issue than that they were not white. Racism simply exacerbated the religious intolerance. Jehovah’s Witnesses were, in some ways, a threat to a rather unpopular war. Their refusal to participate in patriotic exercises could easily have persuaded others to similar “sedition.” That there is evidence of sexual abuse in polygamous communities seems clear. Separating the specific crimes of abuse, though, from the larger moral panic about polygamy in general is problematic. As I have also pointed out, a number of other situations in Canadian history could easily have been included in this chapter—and, indeed, should be explored by scholars in far more systematic fashion. These three, though, at least remind us that the concept of diversity is contested space, and that no claim to the value of multiculturalism comes free of vested interest and hidden agendas, deeply embedded power relationships, and a certain measure of anxiety about the other groups gathering around the cultural table. Sociophobics: Fear as a Disincentive to Religious Diversity Rather than simply the product of individual psychology, for more than two decades now sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural critics have conceptualized fear as a social phenomenon, an affect as conditioned by culture as it is established by personality and manifest in physical response. In his introduction to the study of sociophobics, David Scruton writes that “fearing is an event that takes place in a social setting; it is performed by social animals whose lives and experiences are dominated by culture” (1986: 9). Put differently, our culture teaches us in a variety of ways what to fear, how to fear, and through a variety of cultural products reflects and reinforces the fears we have been taught. The social and cultural mechanisms by which fear is both taught and reinforced, then, ought to be of considerably more interest to social scientists and other scholars of religion than they have been to this point. While a “culture of fear”—à la Furedi (2006) or Glassner

80

douglas e. cowan

(1999)—may be overstating the case, since it appears that relatively few people live their lives in a state of proactive agitation or anxiety, that fear drives us should be more carefully examined than it is. Fear, wrote the Roman novelist Petronius in Satyricon, brought the first gods into being. While fear of the gods may not give us pause in our daily lives now, fear of their followers almost certainly does. Whether it is a fear that those believers will bring a foreign war to our shores, or that they will refuse to participate in the wars our government deems appropriate, diversity has always balanced on the fine edge of a will to homogeneity. The evangelical Christian church growth movement, for example, which was most active in the late 1980s and early 1990s, predicated much of its activity on what it dubbed the “homogeneous unit principle,” the belief that people were more likely to worship in churches populated by others of similar social class, cultural background, political views, and religious beliefs (see Wagner 2000: 455). The diametric opposite of the diversity many of us so proudly claim for Canada in the early twenty-first century, the homogeneous unit principle is an evangelistic strategy unabashed in its appeal to the power of similarity. Implicitly, however, it highlights the fear of those who are different, the concern that difference will interfere with the ability of one group to achieve or maintain religious dominance in a society. As I have written elsewhere, though in a considerably different vein (Cowan 2008), fear of change in the sacred (or social) order is one of the most powerful incentives to reinforce homogeneity in a society. This fear manifests itself in three principal modes: fear of invasion (that one dominant order will be replaced by another); fear of inversion (that the principles of the dominant order will be changed or challenged from within); and fear of insignificance (that the power of the dominant order to maintain a particular construction of reality will decline). We see each of these in the three examples above: the “invasion” of immigrants different from ourselves, the inversion of accepted values by those who do not share them, and the perceived insignificance of dominant religious and social beliefs when practices such as polygamy are not actively excluded from society. As I finished writing this chapter, two items in the National Post demonstrated just how difficult the path to an acceptable diversity continues to be in Canada, and just how powerful these three sociophobic modes are. A front-page article detailed how some Quebecers think that accommodation of religious diversity has gone too far. Making their case to a

fearing planes, trains, and automobiles

81

provincial commission on “reasonable accommodation” for minorities, one woman complained that she was forced to use the same sink in which a Muslim co-worker washed her feet prior to daily prayer. “ ‘I understand it’s a religious obligation for them, but I’m sorry, I find it disgusting,’ she said, adding: ‘Religious accommodations are going too far’.” (Hamilton 2007: A1). Another contributor, who had lived in Egypt in the mid-1950s, was unequivocal. “As far as I am concerned,” he said, “there should be zero accommodation” (Hamilton 2007: A5). A week earlier, criticizing the decision of a Roman Catholic college in London, Ontario, to acquire and display “a vivid green neon artwork of Islamic provenance,” conservative columnist Barbara Kay opined sarcastically, “Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists—and, hey, atheists!—believe in their truths too, no? Diversity! It’s all good!” While her fear of Islamic encroachment is less obviously displayed than in the editorial for Investor’s Business Daily, it is no less deeply rooted. “Muslims cherish their dogmas far more than Christians do,” she writes, displaying an appalling ignorance of the complexities found in the two religions that make up more than half the human race. Though she castigates Edward Said, describing him as “one of Christian civilizations most censorious critics”—and seemingly unaware that he himself was a Christian—she engages in precisely the kind of insular, fear-based orientalism that Said critiqued (Kay 2007). In many ways, the concept of diversity is predicated on recognition and refusal—recognizing aspects of sameness in difference, and refusing to surrender to the orientalising impulse that renders differences stark and exotic. We realize that not all Muslims desire the death of Westerners—millions are Westerners themselves. We recognize that the planes, trains, and automobiles that feature so prominently in the social construction of our fearing are the exception rather than the rule. Those social constructions of fear, on the other hand, refuse precisely this level of recognition. Homogenizing social relations in a very different way—the way of racism, sexism, and classism—all Hindus become potential Thuggees, all Jehovah’s Witnesses a threat to state security, and all polygamists sexually abusive. Similarly, every plane, every train, every automobile becomes a potential threat. None of this is to say that there are not real threats abroad in the world, that there are no real reasons for fear. That would be absurd. What I am suggesting is the continuing need to look beneath the surface of why we fear (e.g., sociophobics), how the objects of our fearing are

82

douglas e. cowan

constructed and reinforced (e.g., media and propaganda studies), and what social, political, and religious interests are served by those fears (i.e., the logics of power). With the help of these ongoing analyses, social scientists can more precisely map the contours of diversity in Canada, and come to understand more completely a nation in process. References “A Case for Calm Consideration.” 1914. The Globe, June 19: 6. Altheide, David L. 2002. Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Beaman, Lori G. 2004. “Church, State and the Legal Interpretation of Polygamy in Canada.” Nova Religio 8: 20–38. ———. 2006. “Response: Who Decides? Harm, Polygamy and Limits on Freedom.” Nova Religio 10: 43–51. Bell, Stewart. 2006. “Toronto Terror Suspects Arrested.” Calgary Herald, June 3: A1. Blanchfield, Mike, and Allan Woods. 2006. “More Arrests Likely in Toronto Terror Plot.” Vancouver Sun, June 5: A1. Bradley, Martha. 2004. “Cultural Configurations of Mormon Fundamentalist Polygamous Communities.” Nova Religio 8: 5–19. Bushman, Claudia Lauper, and Richard Lyman Bushman. 2001. Building the Kingdom: A History of Mormons in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Canadian Press Despatch. 1914a. “Hindus Quit Fight: Will Return Home.” The Globe, July 8: 1. ———. 1914b. “Vancouver on Tip-Toe for Outbreak of War.” The Globe, July 22: 1. Canadian Press. 2006. “Bomb Would Have Been Catastrophic.” Guelph Mercury, 5 June: A7. Cockburn, Lyn. 2007. “Bountiful Horror Show.” Edmonton Sun, Aug. 17: 11. Cowan, Douglas E. 2008. Sacred Terror: Religion and Horror on the Silver Screen. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. Cowan, Douglas E., and Jeffrey K. Hadden. 2004. “God, Guns, and Grist for the Media’s Mill: Constructing the Narratives of New Religious Movements and Violence.” Nova Religio 8: 64–82. Dawson, Fabian. 2000. “Child Abuse Alleged at Commune: U.S. Girls Becoming Teen Brides in B.C. Polygamous Community?” Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 25: B1. Editorial. 2006a. “Sanctuaries of Terror.” Investor’s Business Daily, June 9: A12. ———. 2006b. “Let’s Keep Calm in Reaction to Toronto Terror Arrests.” Montréal Gazette, June 5: A18. Fatah, Tarek. 2006. “Hypocrisy Masquerading as Diversity.” National Post, June 14: A27. Ferguson, Ted. 1975. A White Man’s Country: An Exercise in Canadian Prejudice. Toronto: Doubleday. Furedi, Frank. 2006. Culture of Fear Revisited. 4th ed. London: Continuum. Glassner, Barry. 1999. The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things. New York: Basic Books. Godfrey, Donald C., and Brigham Y. Card. 1993. The Diaries of Charles Ora Card: The Canadian Years, 1886–1903. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. Hamilton, Graeme. 2007. “Accommodation Has Its Limits, Panel Told.” National Post, Sept. 12: A1, A5.

fearing planes, trains, and automobiles

83

Hexham, Irving. 2001. “New Religions and the Anticult Movement in Canada.” Nova Religio 4: 281–88. Holt, Simma. 1964. Terror in the Name of God: The Story of the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Jacobs, Mindelle. 2007. “Religious Rape? A Trip to Bountiful: Save Your Girls from a Life of Polygamy.” Edmonton Sun, Aug. 3: 11. Jedwab, Jack. 2006a. “Arrests of Suspected Terrorists Provokes Immigration Policy Backlash in Canada?” Association for Canadian Studies, June 22; retrieved from www.acs -aec.ca, Aug. 12, 2007. ———. 2006b. “Christians, Muslims, and Jews in Canada: Perceptions, Partnerships and Perspectives.” Association for Canadian Studies, July 21; retrieved from www.acs -aec.ca, Aug. 12, 2007. ———. 2006c. “Muslims and the West: Relationships, Respect and Democracy.” Association for Canadian Studies, July 24; retrieved from www.acs-aec.ca, Aug. 12, 2007. Johnston, Hugh. 1989. The Voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh Challenge to Canada’s Colour Bar. 2nd ed. Vancouver: UBC Press. Kay, Barbara. 2007. “At a ‘Catholic’ College, the Writing’s on the Wall.” National Post, Sept. 5: A19. Kent, Stephen. 2006. “A Matter of Principle: Fundamentalist Mormon Polygamy, Children, and Human Rights Debates.” Nova Religio 10: 7–29. Leger Marketing. 2006a. “Are Other Terrorist Attacks Imminent: September 11 from the Point of View of Canadians: 5 years Later—Part 1.” Leger Marketing Survey Report for the Association for Canadian Studies (August); retrieved from www.acs-aec.ca, Aug. 12, 2007. ———. 2006b. “The Causes of the Attacks: September 11 from the Point of View of Canadians: 5 years Later—Part 2.” Leger Marketing Survey Report for the Association for Canadian Studies (September); retrieved from www.acs-aec.ca, Aug. 14, 2007. Northof, Anne. 1995. “Crossing Borders: Sharon Pollock’s Revisitation of Canadian Frontiers.” Modern Drama 38: 475–87. Patrick, 2006. A6. Penton, M. James. 1976. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Canada: Champions of Freedom of Speech and Worship. Toronto: Macmillan. Pollock, Sharon. 1978. The Komagata Maru Incident. Toronto: Playwrights Co-Op. Rana, Anas. 2006. “Stereotypes Chip Away at Canadian Mosaic.” Kitchener-Waterloo Record, Sept. 1: A10. Scruton, David L. 1986. “The Anthropology of an Emotion.” Pp. 7–49 in Sociophobics: The Anthropology of Fear, edited by David L. Scruton. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Shephard, Michelle, and Jessica Leeder. 2006. “Toronto Terror Plot Details Emerging.” Kitchener Waterloo Record, June 6: A1. Time. 1947. “Trouble in Kootenay.” Time Magazine, 8 Sept. http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,804178,oo.html, retrieved Aug. 12, 2007. van Baalen, Jan Karel. 1960. The Chaos of Cults: A Study in Present-day Isms. 3rd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Wagner, C. Peter. 2000. “Homogeneous Unit Principle.” Pp. 455 in Evangelical Dictionary of World Missions, edited by A. Scott Moreau. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. Wagner-Pacifici, Robin. 1994. Discourses and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus MOVE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. “Yellow Races Not Wanted,” 1914. The Globe, May 23: A27.

CHAPTER FOUR

TWO BY TWO: RELIGION, SEXUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN CANADA Pamela Dickey Young Canada is a nation that prides itself on being a mosaic rather than a melting pot, upholding the ideal that people do not have to conform to any single definition of what a Canadian is. That ideal is not just an abstract hope. It is supported by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and other legislation, by Human Rights Commissions, and by policies on employment and pay equity, among others. We want to value diversity by allowing varying cultural identities to flourish side by side—whether those identities are informed by race or ethnicity, religion, gender, sex, sexuality, geographical provenance, language, or other cultural variables. Yet we also struggle with whether or how diversity has limits. It certainly has limits when it impinges on the rights and welfare of others. It has limits when it seeks to go beyond the guarantees in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and impose itself on all other Canadians. In theory, diversity means that we both permit and value a broad range of ways of being, thinking and acting. But it is not always observed that our claims to value diversity often sit over against an (unstated) assumption that diversity is set in relation to a hegemonic view of what is normative. That is, there is a normative “Canadianness” over and against which others are judged to be “diverse.” I will not make an attempt to explore this idea of the normative Canadian fully here, but only in relation to religion and sexuality. In relation to religion, the normative Canadian is Christian (even if he or she never goes to church). In relation to sexuality, this normative Canadian is heterosexual. And, overwhelmingly, even despite the increase of the cohabitation of unmarried couples in the last 25 years, this normative Canadian is married (Statistics Canada 2001a), hence the “two by two” of the title. In Canada, freedom of conscience and religion as enshrined in the Charter guarantees that people can both practice the religion of their

86

pamela dickey young

choice and believe what they will. There is no expectation that everyone who is not born Christian will convert to Christianity. People have a wide range of religious adherence or no religion at all. But Canada is also a country where almost 77% of people claim to be Christian (Statistics Canada 2001b). Although there is no established religion, at Canada’s founding both Anglicans and Roman Catholics were given certain religious rights. Many parts of Canada have Roman Catholic school systems and, until recently in Ontario, the “public” school system functioned as a Protestant school system where Protestant clergy could come and go to teach their brand of religion. As Lori Beaman convincingly argues (2003), Canadian legal attitudes to religion are shaped by a broadly Christian way of understanding what religion is and how it ought to function in human life. From the point of view of expectations of nondiscrimination, diversities are equal, but they are not the same in terms of the degree to which they are attributed or chosen. Many religious traditions are partly or fully chosen by their adherents, all the more so if the religious tradition is a tradition of conversion (e.g., Christianity, Islam) than if it is a tradition of birth (e.g., Judaism). There is debate at present over the degree of choice one has in the matter of sexual diversity. What both sexual and religious diversity have in common, however, is that there are usually no publicly visible physical markers of either diversity. Thus, unlike some other marks of diversity, unless the individual chooses to display his or her religious or sexual preference publicly, it might not be known. Both religious and sexual diversity are made more complex by the fact that those in the position of “normative” religion and sexuality sometimes argue that religion and sexuality are private matters that really do not need to have a public face, thus permitting the hegemonies of Christianity and heterosexuality to go unchallenged. Diversity and Sexuality The Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Since 1995 sexual orientation has also been read into the Charter as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Nonetheless, social norms have not changed to the point where women are represented as fully equal to men in all parts of society (board rooms, for instance). Sexual minorities, that is, those who do not fit the heterosexual norm, are a relatively small part of the population who are all but invisible

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

87

in Canadian society. Members of sexual minorities are often told that as long they don’t make a big deal of their sexual preferences, they will be accepted. Diversity in terms of sexuality might mean a wide variety of things. For many, it might simply mean the assumed differences between males and females or differences in norms about heterosexual practices. And, indeed, in terms of many religious traditions, heterosexual sex is only licit within marriage, and intercourse, rather than other sexual activity, is the presumed and preferred means of sexual expression. In common parlance these days, however, the term “sexual diversity” is usually used to indicate and encompass a wide range of sexual desires, preferences and practices. Some of the shorthand ways of expressing (at least some of ) these are LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/transsexual, Queer) or LGBTTQQ (add Two-spirit[ed] and Questioning). Here, “transgender” means that one chooses to live outside the given roles of one’s assigned gender. “Transsexual” usually means that one is taking medical steps toward sex reassignment. “Twospirited” designates sexual and gender diversity among First Nations peoples. In relation to persons, “queer” is usually a broad category used to encompass anyone who does not fit or want to be seen to fit into the perceived (heterosexual) norm. Interestingly enough, designations like LGBTQ leave aside “heterosexuality” except when seen to be encompassed by “queer,” thus allowing the assumed normative of “heterosexual” to continue, which is why some, seeking to name this complexity, simply use “sexual diversity” or “sexual and gender diversity” and allow that term to be as broadly encompassing as possible. None of these terms to indicate diverse sexualities (including heterosexual) is univocal. All of these terms are problematized in a number of ways. For instance, is one lesbian because one is a woman who is sexually attracted to or desires women? Is one lesbian if one has acted on that desire with at least one other woman? Is one lesbian because one lives in a life partnership with another woman? Is it “lesbian” to prefer the company of women to the company of men? Can “lesbian” be a political label to name oneself outside the mainstream? Is being “lesbian” an inherent state, a given? Is it a chosen reality? Does it change with time? Is one a lesbian if one names oneself a lesbian regardless of practices or desires? Is lesbian a name given to one by others? Today, for the most part, theorists are content to let people name themselves and their own realities. But the upshot of this is great variability in the meaning of terms.

88

pamela dickey young

Discussions of sexual diversity are further complicated by contemporary discussions of both sex and gender. It is now commonplace to assume that gender roles are socially constructed; that we learn how to act either in accordance with or in opposition to what are considered to be appropriate ways of being male or female in our society. As Westerners we assume maleness and femaleness from the very beginning as a decisive division of humanity and then we use it as a sorting mechanism to provide categories into which to put people. Most people today take this to be self-evident in the same way that students with whom I studied thirty years ago took there to be essentially different masculine and feminine character traits. As Christine Delphy says: “we now see gender as the content with sex as the container” (2001: 414). Contrary to this notion of the naturalness of biological bifurcation into male and female, an increasing number of theorists argue that it is the fact that we see gender divisions as important that pushes us to place so much emphasis on the biological difference between male and female. For Delphy, for instance, gender precedes sex. She does not deny the biological characteristics for reproduction. But she does question why sex rather than say, eye color, should have given rise to the bifurcated division on which so much social difference has been predicated. We emphasize sex, she argues, because so much has depended and still continues to depend on gendered views of the human world. Sex is not entirely self-evident. How for certain does one decide what counts as male or female—by penis or lack thereof ? By ability to bear children? By chromosomal exploration? For Delphy sex, like gender, is socially, not biologically, constructed. Why is the sex difference emphasized as bifurcated and binary? Delphy’s suspicion, shared by a number of others, is that these binary differences are seen to be important in order to keep certain social values in place–social values that still give males priority over females and that value heterosexuality above same-sex relationships. Until the last few decades, human sexuality was usually understood as a fixed phenomenon. It was thought to endure over time in roughly the same form, with the same properties. But recently we have come to see in sexuality, as in other areas of human existence from forms of energy to the organization of space, that our categories for classification are not naturally occurring, but the result of human artifice (Gudorf 2000: 45).

Much theory about sex and gender today contends that sex, like gender, is a matter of interpretation—that the idea of sex bifurcated as male

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

89

and female is not an unquestionable matter of natural importance, but an interpretation. As Georgia Warnke (2001: 134) notes in response to the argument that procreation is what shows us how important and natural this bifurcation is: how often do we really want to reproduce? In other words, for most of our lives we are non-reproductive: why is reproduction seen to be the key to understanding human categories? In terms of our current understanding of gender roles in the West, it would seem that for virtually everything else besides human reproduction, sex is purportedly seen as relatively unimportant. That is, if most of us claim that sex is irrelevant to education, employment or domestic duty, why do we want to hold so firmly on to the categorical distinction between male and female? If we ask the question about who benefits most from the organization of society into males and females, the answer is: males in heterosexual relationships—that is, those who have the unquestioned and normative right to be at the top of the pyramid of power and authority in society. (This analysis does not mean to discount all the other factors that also would be relevant to greater and lesser power and authority such as class, ethnicity, and so on, just to bracket them for the purposes of this discussion.) If sex is socially constructed, so, too, is the notion of “sexual orientation.” Sexual orientation as a concept depends on a stable idea of sex. If the category “sex” is unstable or fluid, the whole notion of orientation on the basis of “same” or “opposite” sex becomes meaningless. Michael Foucault (1978) argues that the term “homosexual” was invented in the 19th century as a way to pathologize people who engaged in certain sexual behaviors. This does not mean that no one engaged in homoerotic thought or activity until the 19th century, nor does it mean that there might not have been the possibility of constructing a view of oneself or one’s identity based on one’s sexual attraction (Clark 2002: 249). But it does mean that the notion of a stable orientation that is given in “nature,” persists over time, and is considered one of the most important indicators of a person’s identity, is a relatively recent invention. The 19th century view of “homosexuality” brought together a psychiatric notion of orientation; a psychoanalytic notion of sexual object choice and a sociological notion of deviance (Halperin 2002: 57). From its beginnings as a term, “homosexuality” was meant to mark something stable, negative, and non-normative. Alongside this notion of orientation is a heteronormative value judgment that “homosexuality” is a lesser way of being alongside “heterosexuality.” Jeffrey Weeks notes that “The notion that ‘a homosexual,’ whether male or

90

pamela dickey young

female could live a life fully organized around his sexual orientation is consequently of very recent origin.” New categorizations arose in the late 19th century which had the effect of seeing a homosexual man as “the archetypal sexed being, a person whose sexuality pervaded him in his very existence, threatened to corrupt all around him and particularly the young” (1989: 107, 109). So, historically speaking, the question of “homosexual identity” is relatively recent. “The idea that there are only two (or three) sexual identities, and that everyone must decide which is most appropriate for himself or herself, is very recent as the dominant mode of structuring sexuality. Late too is the notion that sexual object choice is defined by biological sex: a heterosexual desires member of the “opposite sex,” a homosexual desires members of the “same sex,” and a bisexual may desire either. By viewing sexualities in historical perspective, the relative novelty of such ideas quickly becomes apparent. Thus, “ ‘heteronormativity’ becomes the ‘heterosexual imaginary’ ” (Phillips and Reay 2002: 3). Much recent theory, then, challenges the notion that there are stable, inherent sexual identities. In light of this challenge, the notion of diversity in regard to sexuality becomes more complex. One’s identity may be fluid and variable over time. And even the “identity” itself may be fragmented as the social construction of the idea of sex renders our categories of same and opposite less useful. That said, however, most of the discussions of sexual diversity that take place in the Canadian mainstream, including the courts, depend on certain understandings of group belonging to make their case against (or for?) discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation. Whether “gay” and “lesbian,” for example, name stable groupings of people, whether or not sex is a social construct, the attribution of rights and responsibilities on the basis of sex and sexual orientation depend on the ability to categorize people as part of a group for specific purposes. Such attributions of rights and responsibilities also depend on a system where such defined groups have already historically been seen as groups and have already been denied certain rights and responsibilities on the basis of assumed belonging to such a group.

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

91

Sexual Diversity and Religious Diversity Most religious traditions in Canada, like most of Canadian society, assume a basic division of humanity into male and female. Further, religious traditions usually place great weight on that division in terms of assigning appropriate gender roles and in terms of determining licit sexual conduct.1 Religious traditions are certainly not monolithic. There is no single opinion or point of view that can be said to hold sway for all members of a given religious tradition. Nonetheless, there are certain historic trajectories that do dominate the way particular religious traditions tend to see specific topics, in this case sex and sexuality. Attitudes to sexual diversity are often connected to what a religious tradition understands to be the purposes of sexuality as well as to its traditional understandings of the roles of males and females. In Orthodox Judaism, for example, gay and lesbian relationships are condemned on the basis of religious texts that give certain roles to men and others to women, to violate which would be a confusion of important categories. Sexuality, within traditional Judaism, is highly valued as a means to procreation. Thus, non-procreative sexuality is traditionally seen as problematic, especially for men to whom the commandment to procreate is explicitly given. Conservative, Reform and Reconstructionist Jews, however, have reinterpreted these texts in ways that allow, for example, for broader access to contraceptives and thus open the way to the possibility that non-procreative sexuality, including gay and lesbian sexuality, can be seen as good. Hinduism, like Judaism, values sex for procreation and, for the most part, has no place at present for discussions of sexual diversity as a mainstream option. Also, women and men have historically been seen to have very different roles. Hinduism is a vast set of traditions, however, with much variance and there are, in India, some important examples of sex/gender diversity such as hijras (sometimes called third gender [see Nanda 2002]). For the most part, this diversity has not informed North American Hinduism. Islam has placed a similar stress on procreation and on married sexuality. Men and women, for the most part, are considered to have 1 For more information on how sex is seen in various religious traditions, see Manning and Zuckerman 2005. For more information on how various religious traditions have seen non-heterosexual sexuality, see Alpert 1997; Cabézon 1992; Comstock and Henking 1997; Magonet 1995; Swidler 1993.

92

pamela dickey young

very specific religious roles. In Canadian Islam, these roles are often reinforced by the cultural origins or dependencies of particular Muslim communities. There have been very few moves, however, within any forms of Islam in North America to accept gay and lesbian sexuality.2 In Buddhism, sex is one of many things that can get in the way of enlightenment. Procreation has not been seen as religiously important. As Buddhism has come to North America and been embraced by converts already steeped in North American values, it has often adapted to the values and lifestyles of its converts, many of whom have been gay and lesbian. North American Buddhism has also tried to downplay differences based on sex, although it would be fair to say that in many Buddhist sub traditions, being female is considered one of the hindrances to enlightenment. The remainder of this chapter will look at sexual diversity and Canadian Christianity because it is within Christian churches in Canada that most religious discussion of sexual diversity has taken place. Christianity, like all other religious traditions that have survived for any length of time, is diverse. There are, however, dominant themes in the tradition that inform much of the current Canadian discussions on sexual diversity. Christian attitudes to sexual diversity are founded on Christian views of sexuality. Christianity has often been called a “sex negative” religious tradition (Manning and Zuckerman 2005: 2). Christianity is a religion of converts, not of birth and so procreation as a means to religious growth was not a priority. Indeed, the earliest Christians thought that the second coming of Jesus would happen in their lifetimes, so there were no real plans for the continuity of the church until late in the 1st Christian century. Also, early in Christianity (influenced by neoPlatonism) there tended to be a split between bodies and spirits, where spirits were valued for their relationship with God, while bodies were seen as hindrances to that relationship. Thus, several forces converged to put a stress on chastity, rather than on procreation. From about the 3nd century on, chastity was commonly seen as the preferred Christian state. The best Christians were those who controlled their bodily

2 One exception to this would be “Salaam Canada: Queer Muslim Community,” http://www.salaamcanada.org/study3.html, a Canadian Muslim Community dedicated “to social justice, peace and human dignity . . . [in] a world free from injustice including . . . discrimination . . . homophobia and transphobia.”

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

93

(especially sexual) urges. Sexual activity was a second-best option, meant to keep lust in check. Unlike in Judaism, sexuality was not a good in and of itself. It was, rather, a necessary evil. Thus, the only potentially redeeming value that the leaders of the Christian church could envisage for sexuality was the value of procreation. So within Christianity the entire weight of sexuality was focused on procreation. This focus become more and more developed throughout the early church and into the Middle Ages and it became the dominant point of view until the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century. Protestant Reformers thought that everyone should marry, but this viewpoint was not as much a wholehearted endorsement of sexuality as it was a calculated assessment of the realities of lust and the dangers into which one could be led without an outlet for that lust. The traditional Roman Catholic preference for celibacy as the optimal lifestyle (fully enforced on priests and religious after the Middle Ages) has a direct effect both on the official Roman Catholic position against artificial birth control and the official position that homosexual “inclination” is “objectively disordered” (Catechism 2000: Sec. 2358). The Roman Catholic Church and many of the Protestant churches emphasize the notion of “complementarity,” which means that men and women are opposites who are meant to be together to constitute a fully human whole. In the Roman Catholic tradition this stands alongside the ideal of celibacy. In Protestantism this replaces the ideal of celibacy. For both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, the norm has developed that sexuality is meant to be expressed only within marriage. Outside marriage, chastity is the desired sexual norm. Since most are not called to permanent chastity, heterosexual pairing for procreative purposes became the norm and the expectation. This does not mean that the norm was never violated; the history of sexuality and the churches is replete with the formulation of rules of sexual conduct, indicating that there must be practices that necessitated the forming of those rules in the first place (Wiesner-Hanks 2000). Thus, officially, within traditional forms of Christianity, acceptable sexual diversity has been very limited—chastity or marriage. Relatively recently, some Protestant churches have begun to rethink those traditional norms in various ways. Because of the historic wariness of sexuality in general, and because of the strong emphasis on sexuality for procreation, the Christian

94

pamela dickey young

tradition has, for the most part, not been able to find any officially approved place for other sorts of sexual desire, relationships, or performance. This does not mean that there were no such relationships. Sexual diversity can take a wide variety of forms, from explicit genital activity, to specific commitments to a long-term relationship, to unenacted desire, to forms of dress and action, and so on. In various eras of the church the number and types of prohibitions against what we would call sexual diversity varied (Wiesner-Hanks 2000; Boswell 1980). In monasteries and convents, “special friendships” were prohibited. Certain forms of clerical dress might be seen as gender-bending. Sublimated sexuality abounded in certain eras, as when, for example, in the medieval church, there was a large-scale production of sermons on the biblical book Song of Songs, where the lovers in the text are read as allegories of the love of God for the church. Sexual Diversity and Christianity in Canada Sexual diversity arises for the Christian churches in Canada as the issue of “homosexuality.” From the 1960s onward, Christian churches had to begin to grapple with changing sexual mores. Cheap, reliable birth control methods meant that sexuality was more and more decoupled from the threat of pregnancy. Increasing numbers of heterosexual couples began to live together before or without marriage. Gay men and lesbians began to be somewhat more visible. By the 1980s, gay men and lesbians began more publicly and vocally to resist discrimination because of their sexuality. Québec was the first province to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 1975. Others followed suit in the 1980s. In 1995 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that “sexual orientation” should be read into Article 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a prohibited ground of discrimination. In 1996 (Bill C-33), discrimination was prohibited on the ground of “sexual orientation” under the federal Human Rights Act. In the historic M.v.H. ruling in 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that, under Section 15 of the Charter, same-sex couples had the same spousal rights as unmarried, common law, male-female couples. In 2003, same-sex marriage became legal in some parts of Canada, and in 2005, Bill C-38 was passed defining marriage in Canada as between “two persons.” Over this same period of time more attention also began to be paid to other forms of sexual diversity, from bisexuality to trans issues of a variety of sorts.

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

95

For the churches, the main issues that arose around sexual diversity were: the question of the ordination of gay men and lesbians, the question of how to minister to sexually diverse congregants, the question of same-sex marriage. During the 1980s and 1990s many Protestant churches in Canada set themselves on a course of studying and making new statements about sexuality. Canadian churches vary widely on their current attitudes to sexual diversity. For the most part, churches have dealt only with issues of gay and lesbian sexuality. Churches have not really ventured into thinking much about bisexuality or trans issues. For the Roman Catholic Church, as mentioned above, “homosexuality” is “objectively disordered.” There is no way in which same-sex activity can be condoned, and although there had, in the relatively recent past, been some variability on whether an individual’s “orientation” is problematic (if not acted upon), there is every indication that, under the current Pope, even inclinations toward same-sex relationships are to be condemned whether acted on or not. Because priests are expected to be celibate, the question of sexual “orientation” had not been seen as a problem for ordination until recently when, under the current Pope, seminaries are being investigated with a view to removing “homosexuals.” Although the Catholic Church professes to be against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the church opposed the move to read Sexual Orientation into Article 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a prohibited ground of discrimination (Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops 1996). In terms of meeting the pastoral needs of sexually diverse members, this is possible only as long as that does not include condoning their sexuality or their relationships. Indeed, in the United States recently a nun and a priest were disciplined for their pastoral ministries among members of sexual minorities (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1999). It should come as no surprise, then, that the Roman Catholic Church opposes same-sex marriage on grounds that it is opposed in scripture and tradition, as well as on the assumption that it violates the natural order of things—that the basic purpose of sexuality is and can only be procreative. Within most evangelical Christian churches, gay and lesbian issues are seen in ways parallel to how they are seen in Roman Catholicism.3 The

3 The Evangelical Fellowship of Canada is an umbrella organization for many evangelical churches in this country. For a list of member churches, see: http://www .evangelicalfellowship.ca/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?&pid=848&srcid=384.

96

pamela dickey young

Evangelical Fellowship of Canada also opposed the reading of “sexual orientation” into the Charter as a prohibited ground of discrimination (Evangelical Fellowship of Canada 1996). Marriage, not celibacy, is seen as the best calling, and married, procreative sexuality is celebrated (EFC 2007). The Bible is interpreted as being in total opposition to gay and lesbian sexuality. Other arguments against same-sex sexuality are also made on the basis of the procreative nature of marriage (as a relationship where two become “one flesh”) and on the basis of an assumed natural order. Usually a distinction is made between the “sinner” and the “sin” so that gay and lesbian members are welcome so long as they are not in sexual relationships. The Evangelical Fellowship of Canada posts links on its Website to New Direction Ministries of Canada, an organization seeking to help gays and lesbians who want to change their sexual orientation.4 Ordaining an openly gay or lesbian minister would not be possible. Unanimously, evangelical churches are opposed to same-sex marriage. The Metropolitan Community Church was founded in 1968 to minister to the religious needs of gays and lesbians who had been disenfranchised and called sinners by other churches. It is founded on the premise that gays and lesbians are as much children of God as anyone else. The biblical texts that are used against same-sex sexuality are read by the Metropolitan Community Church as historical, contextualized documents. They are also read in relation both to church tradition and to human reason and experience. Thus, the Bible does not “answer” all the issues of the contemporary world (West 2005). The Bible has very few passages that are thought to deal with “homosexuality,” making it a very marginal biblical theme. Stress is placed on the welcoming nature of Jesus and his commitment to love and justice for all (Eastman 1990). Since 2000, the Metropolitan Community Church Toronto sought to register marriages performed in its church, after reading banns the prescribed number of times, as legal marriages. Once same-sex marriage was legalized, those previous marriages were officially registered. The United Church of Canada claims that it takes the biblical texts seriously but not literally. It reads the biblical texts that are understood by others as condemning homosexuality in light of its broader understanding of the biblical message as one of love and reconciliation and

4

http://www.newdirection.ca.

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

97

in recognition that the present context of discussions of sexuality is far different from the biblical context (United Church of Canada 1989; United Church of Canada 2003b). The Genesis text about the creation of male and female is not read as a text about complementarity and procreation. Rather, it is read to affirm every individual’s wholeness in the image of God. Biblical understandings are placed alongside experience and knowledge in the contemporary world. Social justice for the oppressed is a major theme in United Church decision-making. In the 1980s the United Church embarked on a series of studies of sexuality that opened the way for its current understanding. In 1984, the United Church it argued against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and urged all members of the church to work against such discrimination (United Church of Canada 1984: 79). In 1988, it decided that sexual orientation was not in and of itself a basis on which to deny ordination to otherwise-qualified individuals and it did not enjoin celibacy on gay and lesbian Christians as most Canadian denominations had done (United Church of Canada 1988). In 2000 the United Church affirmed that sexual orientation, whatever it is, is recognized as a gift from God (United Church of Canada 2000). The United Church has an official position in favor of same-sex marriage although individual congregations are allowed to make their own decisions about whether they will perform such marriages in their congregations (United Church of Canada 2003a). Thus, the view of the United Church is that gay men and lesbians are called to the same kind of fidelity in their relationships as all other Christians. Relationships should be faithful, responsible, just, loving, health giving, healing, and sustaining of community and self (United Church of Canada 2005). Canadian Unitarians and Quakers are also officially supportive of sexual diversity in relation to ordination, pastoral care and same-sex marriage. In the mid-1990s, The Presbyterian Church in Canada adopted a Statement on Human Sexuality that assumes male and female complementarity based on Genesis 1 as the fullness of creation. It affirms that the proper context of sex is marriage and that the purpose of marriage is procreative and unitive. The assumption in this statement is that, although there are various ways to interpret the scriptural passages that seem to be about homosexual activity, most clearly the passage from Romans 1 condemns all homosexual activity (Presbyterian Church in Canada 1996). This statement reads homosexual activity as part of creation distorted by sin. It is not a “Christian option” (Presbyterian

98

pamela dickey young

Church in Canada 1996: 6.20). Nonetheless, the church must “repent of its homophobia and hypocrisy” (Presbyterian Church in Canada 1996: 6.23). In 2003, the church’s Special Committee on Sexual Orientation explored and reported on varying biblical, theological, and cultural views of sexual orientation and decided that any “definitive recommendation concerning the roles of homosexual people in the church would be divisive, regardless of the direction taken” (Presbyterian Church in Canada 2003). Thus, no such recommendations were made. In looking at candidates for ordination, for example, the Presbyterian Church clearly draws a line between what it understands to be homosexual orientation and acting on that orientation. Thus, celibacy or chastity is expected of gays and lesbians in its clergy and elsewhere in the church (Presbyterian Church in Canada 1996). The position of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada is very similar to that of the Canadian Presbyterians in that they have studied issues of sexuality and homosexuality for several years and they acknowledge the diversity of opinions on the Bible and on church tradition (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada 2004a). Officially, the church affirms that marriage is for heterosexual couples only and enjoins chastity for gays and lesbians. In 2005 they declined to pass a motion that local congregations could choose to bless same-sex partnerships, and in 2007 they rejected the possibility of blessing same-sex unions (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada 2007). Yet, they oppose discrimination against gay men and lesbians in law and society and the church wants to be a welcoming place for gay and lesbian Christians (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada 2004b). Although it has national autonomy, the Anglican Church of Canada is part of a worldwide communion of Anglican churches and in recent years it has come under attack for what Anglicans in other parts of the world as too permissive an attitude to gay and lesbian sexuality. There is not a general agreement in the church about what the Bible says about gay and lesbian sexuality and how to apply that to the present. Nor is there agreement about how to apply the church’s tradition to the present. In 1997 the Canadian Bishops issued a statement that although they accept all persons regardless of sexual orientation that this “is not an acceptance of homosexual activity” (Anglican Bishops of Canada 1997). Theologically, the Anglican Church declares that “homosexual persons are created in the image and likeness of God and have a full and equal claim with all other persons upon the love, acceptance,

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

99

concern and care of the church” (Anglican Bishops of Canada 1997). Officially the Anglican Church has “condemned bigotry, violence and hatred directed toward any due to their sexual orientation” (Anglican Bishops of Canada 1997 [quoting General Synod 1995]) and it has supported the move to read sexual orientation into the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a prohibited grounds of discrimination. The Anglican Church understands marriage to be only for heterosexual couples and bases this understanding on its interpretation of complementarity in Genesis 1. But where disagreement arises is in whether gay and lesbian couples should be able to seek a church blessing. Although the House of Bishops does not authorize such blessings, the diocese of New Westminster has in the past made it possible for clergy to offer such blessings, although it is not clear if the diocese will continue to do so given recent Anglican rulings. In 1997, the House of Bishops enjoined chastity on all those who were not married. By 2004, however, there was some movement on this as the General Synod of the Anglican Church passed a motion affirming “the integrity and sanctity of committed adult same sex relationships” (Anglican Church of Canada 2004). In 2007, however, the General Synod ruled that blessing same-sex relationships was not a matter of core doctrine and thus could be possible, but then narrowly defeated a motion that would have permitted local dioceses to begin offering blessings for same-sex couples (Anglican Church of Canada 2007). Many Canadian churches were active in the debate over same-sex marriage. In the public discussions, the main opposition to same-sex marriage came from the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada. The main church support for same-sex marriage came from the United Church of Canada and the Metropolitan Community churches. All of the above- mentioned groups were intervenors in various court cases and testified in various federal hearings about the extension of benefits and, ultimately, of the right to marry to gay and lesbian couples.5 Within the diversity of Canadian churches there is a wide variety of opinion on sexual diversity. Here I have outlined only the official policies of some churches. But within these churches there is also much variability. Within churches that find sexual diversity problematic there

5 For a discussion of what these churches said and did in the public policy debate about same-sex marriage, see Young 2006.

100

pamela dickey young

are often organizations (such as Dignity in the Roman Catholic church and Integrity in the Anglican Church) to support those in their midst who are marginalized on the basis of their sexuality.6 Most Canadians agree that any discrimination against people on the basis of sexuality is wrong, and a majority of Canadians supports same-sex marriage. Since more than 75% of Canadians identify as Christian, there is clearly some overlap between those who identify as Christian and those who support members of sexual minorities, indicating that there are many Canadians who disagree with their own churches in matters of sexual diversity. None of the Canadian churches has begun to grapple with the implications for their positions of more recent theories about the fluidity of sex and sexuality. The Canadian churches assume that the categories “male” and “female” mark real and important differences within humanity and that one’s sexual orientation is a given. At present, most Canadian churches are not places where one could be fully open about one’s sexuality if it did not meet either the norms of chastity or heterosexual marriage. Protestations of churches that all are welcome may well ring hollow when many churches refuse to affirm people in all their sexual diversity and in their relationships, and when the possibility of marriage is not open to them. Nonetheless, the variance of Christian responses to sexual diversity indicates that there is no single “Christian” opinion on the matter that holds sway in Canada today. As poll results indicate, Canadians overwhelmingly support rights for members of sexual minorities and support for gay and lesbian marriage has increased since the legalization of same-sex marriage.7 Views of sexuality are changing among Canadians, so that even those churches most opposed to “non-traditional” expressions of sexuality might well have to shift their rhetoric so that they will not be seen as speaking negatively about Canadians whose sexual expression does not accord with their specific church views. Thirty years ago when our view of women’s “proper” place began to change, we had only an inkling of the See www.dignitycanada.org; www.integritycanada.org. An Environics Poll released in June 2006 finds that 59% of Canadians support same-sex marriage while only 32% oppose it (see http://www.equal-marriage .ca/resource.php?id=514). These numbers are up from numbers in earlier years. For survey results from a variety of organizations over several years, see: http://www .religioustolerance.org/homssmpoll06.htm; http://www.religioustolerance.com/ homssmpoll05.htm; http://www.religioustolerance.com/homssmpoll04.htm; http://www .religioustolerance.com/homssmpoll04.htm. 6 7

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

101

changes that would result, both in women’s lives and in social attitudes toward women as normative citizens of Canada. In a similar way, the instability of our views about sexuality means that over the next few decades there will be huge changes in the way society views those who are now considered members of sexual minorities. I entitled this chapter “Two by Two” to indicate that, just as in the biblical story of Noah’s Ark, the currently accepted norm that is held by most religious traditions in Canada today is that people ought to be coupled into heterosexual, procreative pairs. Many social forces are causing this normative view to shift. Relationships come in many forms. Religious traditions will have to grapple with these social changes if they want to remain relevant to the vast majority of Canadians. References Alpert, Rebecca. 1997. Like Bread on the Seder Plate: Jewish Lesbians and the Transformation of Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press. Anglican Bishops of Canada. 1997. Human Sexuality: A Statement by the Anglican Bishops of Canada. http://www.anglican.ca/faith/identity/hob-statement.htm. Anglican Church of Canada. 2004. “Synod ‘Affirms’ Same-sex Relationships.” Anglican Journal, 2 June. www.anglicanjournal.com. ———. 2007. “Synod Narrowly Defeats Same-Sex Blessings.” http://www.anglicanjournal .com/nc/100/article/synod-narrowly-defeats-same-sex-blessings. Beaman, Lori G. 2003. “The Myth of Pluralism, Diversity, and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege of Protestantism in the United States and Canada.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42: 311–25. Boswell, John. 1980. Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cabézon, José, ed. 1992. Buddhism, Sexuality and Gender. Albany: State University of New York Press. Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops. 1996. Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops concerning Bill C-33 and the Government’s Proposal to Amend the Canadian Human Rights Act so as to Include Sexual Orientation as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination. May 2. http://www .cccb.ca/PublicStatements_Print.htm?CD=207&ID=765. Catechism. 2000. Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. Vatican City: Libreria Editirce Vaticana. Clark, Anna. 2002. “Anne Lister’s Construction of Lesbian identity.” Pp. 247–70 in Sexualities in History: A Reader, edited by Kim M. Phillips and Barry Reay. New York: Routledge. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 1999. Notificazione della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede Riguardante Suor Jeannine Gramick, SSND, e Padre Robert Nugent, SDS. http://212.77.1.245/news_services/bulletin/news/5274.php ?index=5274&po_date=13.07.1999%20%20&lang=ge. Comstock, Gary, and Susan Henking, eds. 1997. Que(e)rying Religion. New York: Continuum.

102

pamela dickey young

Delphy, Christine. 2001. “Rethinking Sex and Gender.” Pp. 411–23 in Feminism in the Study of Religion: A Reader, edited by Darlene Juschka. New York: Continuum. Eastman, Don. 1990. “Homosexuality: Not a Sin, Not a Sickness.” http://www.mccchurch .org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Sexuality_Spirituality&Template=/CM/ HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=629. Evangelical Fellowship of Canada. 1996. Submission to the Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Persons with Disabilities on Bill C-33 An Act to Amend the Canadian Human Rights Act. www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/resources. ———. 2007. “Sexual Orientation.” http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/Net Community/Page.aspx?&pid=614&srcid=576. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada. 2004a. “Considering the Matter of SameSex Blessings.” http://www.elcic.ca/docs/2005/essays.html. ———. 2004b. “Human Sexuality: Related National Church Council and Convention Motions.” http://www.elcic.ca/docs/04context4.html. ———. 2007. “Motion to Encourage Synods to Develop Ways to Best Minister to People Living in Committed Same-Sex Relationships Defeated.” http://www.elcic.ca/news .cfm?article=67. Foucault, Michel. 1978. The History of Sexuality, vol. 1. New York: Pantheon. Gudorf, Christine. 2000. “The Social Construction of Sexuality: Implications for the Churches.” Pp. 863–92 in God Forbid: Religion and Sex in American Public Life, edited by Kathleen Sands. New York: Oxford University Press. Halperin, David M. 2002. “Forgetting Foucault: Acts, Identities and the History of Sexuality.” Pp. 42–68 in Sexualities in History: A Reader, edited by Kim M. Phillips and Barry Reay. New York: Routledge. Magonet, Jonathan, ed. 1995. Jewish Explorations of Sexuality. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books. Manning, Christel and Phil Zuckerman, eds. 2005. Sex and Religion. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. Nanda, Serena. 2002. “The Hijras: An Alternative Gender in Indian Culture.” Pp. 137–63 in Religion and Sexuality in Cross-cultural Perspective, edited by Stephen Ellingson and M. Christian Green. London: Routledge. Phillips, Kim M. and Barry Reay. 2002. “Introduction.” Pp. 1–23 in Sexualities in History: A Reader, edited by Kim M. Phillips and Barry Reay. New York: Routledge. Presbyterian Church in Canada. 1996. Statement on Human Sexuality. Toronto: Presbyterian Church in Canada. ———. 2003. “Final Report of the Special Committee on Sexual Orientation.” Pp. 526–47 in Acts and Proceedings of the One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada. Toronto: Presbyterian Church in Canada. Statistics Canada 2001a. 2001 Census Analysis Series: Religions in Canada. http://www 12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/analytic/companion/rel/pdf/ 96F0030XIE2001015.pdf. ———. 2001b. Canada E-Book. http://www43.statcan.ca/r000_e.htm. Swidler, Arlene, ed. 1993. Homosexuality and World Religions. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press. United Church of Canada. 1980. In God’s Image . . . Male and Female. Toronto: Division of Mission in Canada. ———. 1988. “Membership, Ministry and Human Sexuality: A New Statement of the United Church of Canada.” Record of Proceedings 32nd General Council. Toronto: United Church of Canada. ———. 1989. The Authority and Interpretation of Scripture. Toronto: United Church of Canada. ———. 2000. Record of Proceedings 37th General Council. Toronto: United Church of Canada.

religion, sexuality and diversity in canada

103

———. 2003a. Record of Proceedings 38th General Council. Toronto: United Church of Canada. ———. 2003b. Of Love and Justice: Towards the Civil Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage. Toronto: United Church of Canada. ———. 2005. “Marriage: A United Church of Canada Understanding.” http://www.united -church.ca/files/exploring/marriage/understanding.pdf. Warnke, Georgia. 2001. “Intersexuality and the Categories of Sex.” Hypatia 16: 126–37. Weeks, Jeffrey. 1989. Sex, Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality since 1800. London: Longmans. West, Mona. 2005. “The Bible and Homosexuality.” http://www.mccchurch.org/AM/ Template.cfm?Section=Sexuality_Spirituality&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay .cfm&ContentID=583#bibleandhomosexuality. Wiesner-Hanks, Merry. 2000. Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern world: Regulating Desire, Reforming Practice. New York: Routledge. Young, Pamela Dickey. 2006. “Same-Sex Marriage and Christian Churches in Canada.” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 35: 3–23.

CHAPTER FIVE

DOES RELIGION MATTER? CANADIAN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD DIVERSITY Sam Reimer In modern societies, religious commitment and pluralism are unlikely bedfellows. The absolutist claims of many religions seem incompatible with embracing diversity, and when religious boundaries are threatened, religiously motivated tension and violence is too often the result (Huntington 1998; Jurgensmeyer 2000). Canada, however, seems mostly immune to these sorts of tensions. While some of the demographic fault lines seem to be perpetually important—like race/ethnic and FrenchEnglish differences—religious fault lines seem to be losing importance. Should scholars expect religion to affect diversity? On the one hand, there are good reasons to believe that religion has and will have little effect on Canada’s vision to be a pluralistic, multicultural society. First, religious participation is down considerably. Canadians attend church at only one-third the rate they did 60 years ago, and roughly one in six claims to have no religious affiliation at all. If commitment is down, then the salience of religious identities and the strength of religious exclusivity are likely down as well. According to MacKinnon and Luke (2002: 318), “the general decline in the status and power of religious identities . . . reflects the growing secularization of Canadian society and the decreasing relevance of religion in the everyday lives of Canadians.” Put simply, because most Canadians aren’t very religious, they don’t care enough about religion to fight over it. Second, religion is generally viewed as a private matter, a personal preference. In a marketplace of ideas, religion is seen as a choice, like the choice of brands in a supermarket or entrées at a buffet (Bibby 1987). As such, things religious are kept out of public life and political debate. The decline of participation in and privatization of religion in Québec is a good example. The Catholic-Protestant tensions that used to divide French and English Canada have been transformed into a secular nationalism after the Quiet Revolution. Third, religious Canadians of all stripes have bought into the late Prime Minister Pierre Elliott

106

sam reimer

Trudeau’s vision of a multicultural society, and as such, they seem to be more devoted to ideals of civility and pluralism than to ideals of religious exclusivity. On the other hand, religion may have an important effect on diversity because religion is salient to millions of Canadians. In fact, there is evidence that church attendance is no longer declining (Bibby 2002, 2006). Religion, for many, is not merely a matter of personal taste. Religions claim to be the sole source of absolute truth, and demand ultimate sacrifice and devotion for ultimate rewards. As a result, many Canadians refuse to privatize their faith. Conservative Christians, for example, have been aggressively resistant to gay rights and same-sex marriage legislation in Canada. The complex relationship between religion and diversity deserves a second look, which it is the purpose of this chapter to provide through an examination of data collected in Project Canada 2005 (ProCan 05) under the direction of Reginald Bibby. Do the religiously committed in Canada bolster tension or peaceful coexistence? Are religious groups accepting of differences based on race, religion and sexual orientation? Prejudice, Tolerance, Diversity and Pluralism Attitudes toward diversity are related to notions of prejudice and tolerance. Prejudice can be defined as an inappropriate negative valuation of a category of people (Allport 1950). Recent reviews of the literature on religion and prejudice (e.g., Baston and Burris 1994; Hunsberger 1995; Hood et al. 1996; Jackson and Hunsberger 1999; Hunsberger and Jackson 2005) reveal inconsistent findings. Some studies show that religion reduces prejudice, while others show the opposite. This has resulted in more detailed explorations of the mechanisms within religion that may promote or inhibit prejudice. Early studies distinguished between intrinsic (a more mature, committed, “sincere” faith that reduced prejudice) and extrinsic (an immature, consensual, externalized faith that increased prejudice) religious orientations (Allport and Ross 1967), but this division has been severely criticized and also shows inconsistent results. More recently, several studies show that religious fundamentalism (close-mindedness, certainty of religious beliefs, belief in absolute truth) and right-wing authoritarianism (authoritarian submission, aggression, and conventionalism) exacerbate prejudice, while a quest religious orientation (marked by an open,

does religion matter?

107

questioning, flexible religiosity) reduces prejudice. Important to this research is the finding that group identification and group proscription/non-proscription seem to influence prejudice. That is, evidence shows that attitudes vary greatly depending on the type of prejudice analyzed—whether toward racial/ethnic groups, gays/lesbians, or other religious groups. It follows that religious groups may promote positive views of certain groups and negative views of others ( Jackson and Hunsberger 1999). The relationship between tolerance and religion is equally complex. Since John Stuart Mill, tolerance has been seen as necessary for the preservation of liberty in diverse societies. Most research on tolerance stems from the work of Samuel Stouffer (1955) that looks at an individual’s willingness to grant civil liberties to unpopular groups. Stouffer’s questions have been enshrined in the U.S. General Social Surveys, which ask whether or not racists, atheists, communists, homosexuals, etc., should be allowed to teach in schools, give a speech, or have a book in the library that promotes their views. Based on these items, the religiously committed, and particularly conservative Protestants, have consistently been found to be more intolerant (Nunn et al. 1978; Reimer and Park 2001; Burdett et al. 2005). However, Stouffer’s items have been critiqued for their liberal bias (Smidt and Penning 1982; Woodberry and Smith 1998) and their inability to distinguish between permissiveness and tolerance. Sullivan et al. (1982; see also Marcus et al., 1995; Busch 1998) argue that by definition, tolerance requires that people dislike the group in question in order to “put up with” or “tolerate” it, and since Stouffer does not measure dislike for the group, a person who is tolerant by Stouffer’s measures may simply be apathetic or permissive. These authors insist that measures of tolerance should ask the respondent to choose (from an extensive list) the group(s) that he/she dislikes the most. Based on this “least-liked” strategy, they found that tolerance has not increased over time as the Stouffer items consistently have shown. More important, those religious measures that are commonly associated with intolerance—fundamentalism, orthodoxy, biblical literalism, etc.—were not significant once demographic controls are added (Green et al. 1994). In fact, Beverly Busch argues that “religion is not related to political tolerance,” nor is it “related to the predispositions which do affect political tolerance” which are primarily “psychological traits and political attitudes” (1998: ii). For Busch, the purported intolerance of conservative and committed Christians is simply an artifact of Stouffer’s measures.

108

sam reimer

Added to these mixed findings on tolerance and prejudice are the equally inconsistent findings related to social capital, encapsulation, and U.S.-Canada differences. Social capital, the individual and corporate value found in social networks (Bourdieu 1983; Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000), provides and important theoretical link between religion and diversity. In Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam discusses two dimensions of social capital: bridging (networks spanning diverse social groups) and bonding (networks within homogeneous groups) capital. Religious involvement is an important source of social capital, but conservative Protestant religiosity seems to facilitate more bonding social capital, whereas Catholic and mainline Protestant traditions promote more bridging capital.1 Obviously, bridging capital is more important in discussions of diversity, thus there is reason to believe that conservative Protestant groups may have more negative views of diversity. Bridging capital is closely related to whether or not a religious tradition is encapsulated. Encapsulation refers to the degree to which affiliates interact solely or primarily with co-religionists, eschewing relationships with outgroups. Stark and Bainbridge (1985) argue for significant encapsulation of more sectarian religious groups, while Smith et al. (1998) argues that evangelicals are not more encapsulated than more liberal religionists. Finally, most of the research on tolerance, social capital, and encapsulation has been done in the U.S., and evidence suggests that Canada is not like the U.S. in attitudes toward diversity and tolerance. Bibby (1987, 2002) argues that Canadian religious groups tend toward peaceful co-existence, while U.S. groups are comparatively more competitive and aggressive. In my own prior research (2003), I have shown that one of the ways evangelicals in Canada differ from their American counterparts is that they are more irenic and civil. Both Bibby and I base this difference on national milieu, where the northern country celebrates the diversity and pluralism of their cultural “mosaic,” while the southern “melting pot” perpetuates greater cultural conformity. All this terminology requires some definitional clarity, at least for the purposes of this study. Diversity simply means that people of different backgrounds coexist in close proximity. Pluralism, on the other hand,

1 Robert Wuthnow (2002: 670) further divides bridging capital into identity-bridging (capital that “spans such culturally defined differences as race, ethnicity, religious tradition, sexual preference, and national origin”) and status-bridging (which refers to “networks that span vertical arrangements of power, influence, wealth and prestige”). Thus, it is most precisely identity-bridging social capital that is of interest here.

does religion matter?

109

“is when people from different backgrounds seek mutual understanding and positive cooperation with one another” (Patel 2007). Obviously, a mere lack of prejudice (unfair negative valuations) or an abundance of tolerance (willingness to grant civil liberties to disliked groups) among Canadians falls short of pluralism by this definition. More will be said about pluralism in the conclusion section, but for now it is important to note that the quantitative data in this chapter look at attitudes toward diversity (which overlap with notions of prejudice and tolerance for certain survey items), not pluralism. Data, Methods, and Findings Unfortunately, there is not a vast array of survey items available in Canada to test all the concepts discussed above, but ProCan 05 offers some relevant items. The ProCan 05 data were generated through mail surveys sent out to Canadian adults (18 and over), randomly selected within certain communities using telephone directories. These data are weighted to match the Canadian Census, resulting in a sample size of 1600 (for more information, see Bibby 2006: 225). In the analysis below, respondents are divided into religious traditions based on the religious and denominational affiliation questions available in the data. The religious traditions are mainline Protestants, conservative Protestants, Catholics in Québec, Catholics outside Québec, those who claim another religious affiliation (Other), and those who claim no affiliation (Nones).2 Throughout, the effect of congregation attendance is examined. We would expect the attitudes of active affiliates to best reflect of attitudes that are promoted—whether overtly or covertly—by the religious tradition in question. In these data, church attendance is the best indicator of active participation. Table 1 gives an overview of some of the general items related to diversity and pluralism from the ProCan 05 survey. It is not surprising that most Canadians, regardless of their religious tradition, are toler2 Mainline Protestants include Anglicans, Lutherans, Presbyterians and the United Church. Conservative Protestants include Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Pentecostals, Mennonites, and many smaller denominations. “Other” is a catch-all category, including Christian “others” (who claim no denominational affiliation), Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, Hindus, and so on. Unfortunately, the sample size does not allow for these traditions to be analyzed separately. The “none” category refers to those who claim no religious affiliation.

110

sam reimer

ant (94.2% claim to be), and believe diversity (82.4%) and immigration (78.0%) is good for Canada. However, few Canadians (14.3%) disagree with the statement that “immigrants are obligated to learn Canadian ways.” A majority agrees that Canada should have two official languages (64.0%). Québec Catholics seem the least supportive of the first three items in the table, but differences are not large enough to distinguish them statistically from English Christian traditions. It is only in support of language diversity that Catholics in Francophone Québec outpace English Canadians. More Canadians think Canada should be a “mosaic” (49.7%)—“where people are loyal to Canada yet keep many of the customs of their previous countries”—than a “melting pot” (31.4%), but it is not a large majority. Overall, the support for diversity is strong and increasing over time, but it is not overwhelming. Bibby argues that Canadians are seeing some the drawbacks of diversity—such as increased tensions based on competing individual rights—but little of the mutual enrichment that multiculturalism promised. This, he suggests, leaves some Canadians calling for the “melting pot” alternative (Bibby 2006: 32–33). Table 1

Attitudes Toward Diversity by Religious Tradition

% Agree

Mainline Cons Catholic Catholic Other None Total Prot PQ Eng

I am willing to tolerate how others live Racial/ cultural diversity is good for Canada Immigration is a good thing for Canada Immigrants are obligated to learn Canadian ways (% disagree) Canada should have two official languages

97.0

94.8

85.1

96.1

93.0

96.9 94.2

81.8

81.2

76.3

83.0

85.6

86.3 82.4

78.0

75.9

72.4

77.4

80.9

82.9 78.0

10.0

10.2

15.8

13.6

22.6

16.0 14.3

54.1

52.5

89.4

61.0

61.5

69.0 64.0

Favor mosaic Favor melting pot

44.6 40.4

43.0 37.1

41.4 34.6

51.7 31.9

60.5 23.5

57.9 49.7 20.8 31.4

does religion matter?

111

The percentages in this table do not tell us if differences between religious groups are statistically significant, or what factors explain these differences. In order to answer these questions, the second (diversity is good for Canada) and third (immigration is good for Canada) items in Table 1 were chosen for a least-squares multiple-regression analysis, presented in Table 2. The analyses examine the predictive power of religious tradition, church attendance, and demographics on these measures of diversity. The diversity and immigration questions were reverse coded (strongly disagree=1 to strongly agree=4), so positive regression coefficients indicate greater support for racial/cultural diversity or immigration in Canada. Standardized coefficients (Betas) are given, which allow one to compare the relative strength of each variable in the regression. I entered each religious tradition as a dichotomous independent variable (Nones are the excluded group) along with variables that test the interaction effect of congregation attendance for each religious tradition (Mainline attend, etc.). These interaction terms can tell us if church attendance within each tradition affects attitudes toward diversity. A set of demographic variables were included as controls: marital status (married=1, non-married=0), race (white=1, nonwhite=0), sexual orientation (heterosexual=1, non-heterosexual=0), age (in years), gender (female=1, male=2), size of residence (scale ranging from 1 (farm) to 6 (city of over 400,000)), and education (scale ranging from 1 (grade school) to 6 (doctorate). Several variables, like income and a “devotionalism” variable (a combination of prayer and Bible reading that was to tap intrinsic religiosity) were removed from the analyses because they never reached standard levels of significance (and because the income variable lowered the sample size unnecessarily). In the first regression, we see that Mainline Protestants, Conservative Protestants, and English Catholics are significantly less pro-diversity than those with no religious affiliation (Nones). However, church attendance has the opposite effect of increasing pro-diversity attitudes, as the positive coefficients show. The attendance interactions show that attending Mainline Protestant and Catholics outside Québec are more supportive of diversity, when the main effects of affiliation are controlled. (The conservative Protestant attend effect just misses standard levels of statistical significance.) Married and older Canadians are less likely to view diversity as good, whereas those who live in heavily populated areas and those with higher education are more likely to see diversity as positive for Canada.

112

sam reimer Table 2

Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward Diversity Diversity Good

Immigration Good

Mainline Prot Cons Prot Catholic PQ Catholic Eng Other

–.135** –.130* –.101 –.159** –.035

–.064 –.209*** –.119* –.082 –.083

Mainline attend Cons Prot attend Cath PQ attend Cath Eng attend Other attend

.122** .090 .035 .135** –.017

.023 .168** .014 .065 .088

Marital status Race Sexual orientation Age Gender (male) Size of Residence Education

–.103*** –.050 .014 –.165*** –.049 .074** .131***

–.077** –.049 –.007 –.035 .038 .089** .164***

R2

.108

.079

N

1462

1483

Significance: .05* .01** .001***

In the immigration regression, we again see opposite effects of affiliation and attendance. Conservative Protestant and Québec Catholic affiliates are less supportive of immigration, but Conservative Protestant attendees are more likely to support it. As a result, the competing effects of affiliation and attendance weaken overall differences between religious traditions, so that religious tradition seems to matter little in Table 1. However, regular participation in an English Christian religious tradition, in the main, increases pro-diversity attitudes, even if the effect is not always strong. This suggests that there is something about religious participation that is good for diversity attitudes in Canada, at least in comparison to non-attending affiliates. Religious participation may neutralize negative effects of religious affiliation, but is congregational attendance always good for diversity? Not in all cases, as we see below. Bibby asks respondents their “immediate reaction”—whether they would feel (1) at ease, (2) a bit uneasy, or (3) very uneasy—if they were

does religion matter? Table 3

113

Comfort Meeting Certain Types of People by Religious Tradition

% “At ease” meeting a

Mainline (N=407)

Cons Cath Cath Other None Total Prot PQ Eng (N=244) (N=227) (N=1600) (N=162) (N=240) (N=292)

Drug user Ex-convict Sex offender Drug addict Alcoholic Former mental patient Average

11.2 8.7 2.2 6.0 24.8 33.3

22.6 20.0 7.6 18.1 30.6 36.0

35.0 22.3 8.4 26.8 38.9 49.8

15.4 5.9 2.8 6.2 22.8 25.4

25.3 16.0 3.7 9.8 36.7 32.8

31.7 18.5 4.4 18.0 33.3 47.4

22.0 14.0 4.4 12.8 28.7 36.6

14.4

22.5

30.2

13.1

20.7

25.6

19.8

Jew Native Asian Black East Indian Muslim Average

96.8 92.9 95.8 93.8 89.7 81.7 91.8

96.9 86.9 94.3 94.3 87.4 81.1 90.2

89.1 82.9 87.0 86.3 78.9 72.7 82.8

94.1 89.6 93.0 91.3 87.8 83.0 89.8

95.9 92.2 96.7 93.8 90.9 85.0 92.4

96.0 91.6 94.7 93.4 92.1 87.2 92.5

94.9 89.8 93.8 92.2 88.0 81.8 90.1

Male homosexual Female homosexual Average

73.6

52.2

75.0

71.8

67.3

89.0

72.6

76.0

58.1

75.5

75.6

73.3

90.8

75.8

74.8

55.2

75.3

73.7

70.3

89.9

74.2

80.6 92.1

77.6 93.1

80.2 84.2

76.9 87.9

74.2 92.6

64.5 87.8

76.2 89.7

64.0

90.7

79.2

70.5

69.2

50.4

69.0

49.5

47.5

43.3

43.4

51.2

70.2

50.5

Police Person in wheelchair Born-again Christian Person with AIDS

to meet a broad array of people. These survey items can be placed in three groups based on factor analysis: (1) the “deviant” group (drug user, ex-convict, sex offender, drug addict, alcoholic, former mental patient); (2) the “race-religion” group ( Jew, Native, Asian, Black, East Indian, Muslim); 3) and the “homosexual” group (gay, lesbian).3 Those who feel “at ease” meeting each type of individual are presented in Table 3.

3 The groupings are consistent across rotation methods (varimax, equamax, oblimin). The remaining survey items did not load well with any of these factors. The Crombach’s alpha scores for each scale show high reliability: deviant=.825, race-religion=.864, and homosexual=.862.

114

sam reimer

Only about 1 in 5 (total average, 19.8%) feel “at ease” meeting the individuals in the “deviant” group, and comfort with these types of people appears to be declining slightly over time (Bibby 2006: 24). Looking at the averages for each religious tradition, mainline Protestants and Catholics in English Canada are slightly less comfortable with people in this grouping than Québec Catholics and Nones. Conservative Protestants are close to the national average. By contrast, 90% of Canadians are at ease meeting racial and religious minorities, and comfort with racial diversity is increasing over time (Bibby 2006: 18). The least popular group among them are the Muslims, but still approximately 80% of Canadians claim to be “at ease” meeting them, in spite some negative portrayals in the media. Here the religious group that is least comfortable with race-religion minorities is the Québec Catholics. Based on results from Table 1 and Table 3, then, Québec Catholics are less comfortable with cultural/racial diversity than other traditions. However, they were the most comfortable meeting individuals in the “deviant” group. The “homosexual” percentages show that roughly three-quarters (74.2%) of Canadians are comfortable meeting gays and lesbians, a massive increase from 25 years ago, when only one-third of Canadians said they were “at ease” meeting homosexuals (Bibby 2006). The conservative Protestants are least comfortable meeting homosexuals, while the Nones are most comfortable. However, the Nones are not comfortable with all types of individuals. They are least comfortable with the Police and Born-again Christians. In fact, Canadians as a whole are less comfortable meeting a Born-again Christian than meeting a Muslim, Jew, gay or lesbian. Finally, only half of Canadians are at ease meeting a person with AIDS. From these results it is clear that the type of individual in question matters. All religious traditions appear both open and closed to diversity depending on what type of people they hypothetically meet. To the degree that these questions indicate acceptance of these types of people, Mainline Protestants and English Catholics are least accepting of the “deviant” group, Québec Catholics are least accepting of race-religion diversity, and conservative Protestants are least accepting of sexual diversity. On the surface, it appears that religious tradition may affect diversity, particularly in the area of sexual orientation. Do the differences between groups hold up under more rigorous statistical analysis?

does religion matter? Table 4

115

Regression Analysis of Comfort Meeting Certain Types of People Deviant scale

Race-religion scale

Homosexual scale

Mainline Prot Cons Prot Catholic PQ Catholic Eng Other

–.172*** –.011 .120* –.198*** –.052

–.057 .027 –.125* –.106 –.013

.005 –.090 .071 .003 .022

Mainline attend Cons Prot attend Cath PQ attend Cath Eng attend Other attend

.017 –.028 –.079 .024 –.017

.057 –.068 –.026 .066 .012

–.156*** –.134* –.170*** –.140** –.197***

Marital status Race Sexual orientation Age Gender (male) Size of Residence Education

–.034 –.007 .030 –.023 .155*** .021 .099***

.063* –.021 .072** –.110*** –.069** .037 .052*

.001 –.010 .038 –.096*** –.087*** .059* .140***

R2

.087

.055

.119

N

1451

1486

1502

Significance: .05* .01** .001***

Again, multiple regression was used to analyze the factors that influence comfort toward certain types of people. The dependent variable in each regression was formed by adding together the individual survey items in the “deviant,” “race-religion,” and “homosexual” groups separately to form three scales. Positive regression coefficients indicate that respondents were more at ease with the group. The results are given in Table 4. Looking first at the coefficients in the “deviant” column, we find that mainline Protestants and Catholics outside Québec are significantly less comfortable with this grouping than the Nones, even when controls are added. Catholics in Québec are slightly more at ease meeting these sorts of people than are the Nones. The church attendance interactions are not significant. Although women are normally more pro-diversity, they are less comfortable with this deviant group, probably because they can be seen as a safety threat. As usual, educated respondents are more comfortable across all three groupings.

116

sam reimer

Whereas Catholics in Québec are more at ease with those in the deviant group, they are less at ease with those in the race-religion scale, possibly because some embrace a somewhat exclusive Catholic identity. The differences are not large, however, even though they are significant. Surprisingly, church attendance does not have a significant effect on any religious tradition, even though one might expect active Christians to feel some discomfort with Jews and Muslims. Married, heterosexual, younger, female, and educated respondents are more at ease with people of other races and religions. Regarding the final column, the most notable finding is that church attendance increases discomfort in meeting homosexuals for all major religious groupings. In other words, it matters less which group one is affiliated with, and it matters more whether or not one actively participates in a religious tradition. While it is true that conservative Protestants (controlling for church attendance) are less at ease meeting homosexuals than affiliates of other traditions, this difference does not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Religious participation decreases comfort with sexual diversity, but tradition matters less than participation. Again, younger, female, and educated respondents are more comfortable meeting gays and lesbians. In this regression, size of residence matters for the first time. Not surprisingly, those who live in metropolitan areas and cities are more comfortable meeting homosexuals. Thus, religious participation produces mixed results. Attendees have more positive diversity and immigration attitudes than their less active co-religionists, but this does not hold true when more specific groups of people are considered. Attitudes toward sexual diversity are negatively affected by church attendance, while race-religion diversity seems largely unaffected by it. Fortunately, the PC2005 data have other items related to homosexuality that allow us to pinpoint more precisely areas of intolerance or discomfort. In Table 5, four items from the ProCan 05 probe attitudes toward homosexuals. In light of the fact that congregation attendance was particularly important in the regression analysis, percentages are given for all affiliates and for those who attend nearly every week or more. The first row shows that 81% of Canadians agree (agree or strongly agree) that “homosexuals are entitled to the same rights as other Canadians,” and there are modest differences between religious traditions. The superscript letters indicate which tradition’s percentage is statistically different from that group’s percentage. For instance, Mainline Protestants are significantly more likely to agree with this statement

all

att

57.9

46.0

62.5

32.4CP N

34.3 57.0

6.1

42.7 62.0

37.6

85.9

63.9

17.6CP 39.9CP N 14.8M 72.4All 40.3

34.9

96.0All 86.7

95.2All 81.0

Total

65.1

85.2 N 68.2

77.9 N 54.0

all

None

3.2M CE 32.1CP N

69.8

63.6

att

Other

42.3CP N 36.0CP O 16.4All

69.0 81.2N

50.0 75.6N

att

Catholic Eng

1.1M CE 51.3CP CE N 12.1 38.7CP CQ N 19.8CP 45.0CP N 13.2M 79.9All 47.6

86.2N

80.5CP N

All

Catholic PQ

46.9CP N 35.1CP O 17.3All

72.6

79.5N

84.3

88.5N

Att

70.8M CQ N 62.7

all

82.8CP N 76.0

att

Cons Prot

Attitudes toward Homosexuality by Religious Tradition

*Combines strongly agree and agree percentage. Superscript letters indicate where there are statistically significant differences between the percentages in that row: M=Mainline Protestant, CP=Conservative Protestant, CQ=Catholics in Québec, CE=Catholics outside Québec, O=Other, N=None.

Agree* that homosexuals are entitled to equal rights Agree* that gays and lesbians who marry are entitled to divorce Approve and accept same-sex couples marrying Approve and accept same-sex couples adopting Average

all

Mainline

Table 5

does religion matter? 117

118

sam reimer

than Conservative Protestants, while Mainlines are significantly less likely to agree than Nones. Similarly, Conservative Protestants are less likely to support homosexual equal rights than are Mainline Protestants, Catholics in Québec and Nones. All groups are significantly less supportive of homosexual equal rights than Nones. While those who attend church regularly (“att” columns) are somewhat less likely to support homosexual equal rights, there are no significant differences between traditions.4 A surprisingly low percentage (50%) of attending Catholics in Québec support equal rights for homosexuals, although this is based on a small sample size (N=33). The second row gives the percentages of Canadians who agree that “gays and lesbians who marry should be entitled to divorce.” There is majority agreement across all traditions, and only the Nones differ significantly from the religious traditions. Again, there are no significant differences between attending affiliates in the traditions. These two questions seem to tap a “human rights” response from most Canadians. Based on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, equal human rights are cherished by the majority of Canadians, regardless of religious tradition. The next two questions ask respondents if they would “approve and accept,” “disapprove but accept,” or “disapprove and do not accept” same-sex couples marrying or adopting children. Unlike the previous two questions, Conservative Protestants distinguish themselves in their disapproval of same-sex marriage and adoption, while Nones are most accepting of these behaviors. Church attendance further reduces support for gay marriage and adoption. Regression results, shown in the first column of Table 7, once again confirm that religious participation influences sexual diversity. All four items in table five were combined into an additive scale (alpha=.796) ranging from 4 (anti-gay) to 14 (pro-gay). The effect of attending a congregation in all traditions decreases support for these pro-gay questions, while affiliation does not have a significant effect (except for the moderate negative effect for Mainline Protestants). Not surprisingly, the effects of church attendance are particularly strong from Conservative Protestants (.317) and English Catholics (.347), who are least supportive of gay 4 Note that part of the reason differences are not significant in the attending (“att”) columns is due to reduced sample size. Sample sizes for each attending column are: Mainline Protestants (N=77), Conservative Protestants (N=94), Catholics in Québec (N=33), Catholics outside Québec (N=121), Other (N=53).

Average

Protestants and Roman Catholics Protestants and Jews Jews and Roman Catholics Christians and people of other faiths

Whites and Blacks Whites and Asians Whites and Aboriginals Whites and East Indian/ Pakistani Average

% Approve of marriages between

89.5

94.0

89.5

77.1

93.5CP 87.8CP O 63.3ALL

90.2CP

90.3CP

92.9

88.8

84.3

90.7

89.9

90.3

all

65.8

91.0

93.3

93.3

89.5

All

90.0

88.2 94.8CP 89.4

93.2

94.0CP 88.6CP 92.5CP 80.9

94.6CP 91.1CP 92.6CP 80.4

96.5CP 93.2

91.6

98.2

98.2CQ

97.8CE

94.8

92.3

90.8

93.4

93.4

91.6

Total

99.1CP CQ 92.2

99.1CP CQ 92.6

99.1CP

98.2

91.7CQ 98.2CQ

88.2

86.3

86.5

att

None

74.6

94.7

90.8

92.1

78.6

99.1

92.4

74.3CP 93.6CP 90.2CP O 88.5CP 63.6M CE 99.1CP O 90.0

72.7

68.8

82.4

76.2

94.4

94.4

91.9

all

Other

89.4CQ 92.2

91.2

91.4

87.9

Att

Catholic Eng

63.3All 90.4

81.3

84.4

75.8

att

Catholic PQ

44.2M CQ CE 90.7CP

68.5CE

68.9M CE

79.5ALL

90.6

92.7CP 87.7

91.9

91.7

87.5CQ

89.1

78.8ALL

91.8CQ

90.7

91.6

92.4

90.4

94.2CP 89.3CP

93.2

92.2

91.0

88.4

Att

86.9M CQ O N 81.5

93.2

92.9

89.8

all

Cons Prot

Attitudes toward Diversity in Marriage by Religious Tradition

95.5CP 93.3

89.2

att

90.8

all

Mainline

Table 6

does religion matter? 119

120 Table 7

sam reimer Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, Interracial, and Inter-religious Marriage Homosexual Attitudes

Interracial Marriage

Inter-religious marriage

Mainline Prot Cons Prot Catholic PQ Catholic Eng Other Mainline attend Cons Prot attend Cath PQ attend Cath Eng attend

–.108* –.051 .033 .030 –.025 –.101** –.317*** –.236*** –.347***

–.046 .004 –.023 –.039 .019 .014 –.071 –.074 –.011

–.003 .117 .049 .056 .050 –.071 –.409*** –.178*** –.122*

Other attend

–.244***

–.061

–.158***

Marital status Race Sexual orientation Age Gender (male) Size of Residence Education

–.092*** .032 –.019 –.167*** –.136*** .112*** .195***

.012 –.014 .027 –.278*** .001 –.057* .151***

.008 –.039 .017 –.085** .024 –.011 .114***

R2

.322

.112

.124

N

1369

1460

1440

Significance: .05* .01** .001***

rights. Unmarried, younger, female, urban, and educated respondents have more pro-gay attitudes. The findings parallel those in the final column of Table 2, which also show that church attendance matters much while affiliation matters little for sexual diversity. Attending Conservative Protestants, but not all Conservative Protestant affiliates, are distinctively anti-gay particularly in their disapproval of same-sex marriage and adoption. Thus, the sizeable differences between Conservative Protestants and other traditions found in Table 2 and Table 5 are mostly due to the fact that Conservative Protestants are much more likely to attend church than, e.g., Mainline Protestants or Catholics in Québec (although demographic differences matter as well). Conservative Christians are the stalwart protectors of the “traditional family” and provide the main support for lobby groups with conservative social agendas. Therefore, it is also not surprising that the effects

does religion matter?

121

of church attendance seem particularly strong for the last two items in Table 5, which are specific to recent legislation that has redefined marriage and family to include same-sex relationships. Since this is the case, Conservative Protestants and Catholics, and possibly all frequent attendees, are less accepting of marital diversity more broadly. Table 6 looks at approval for interracial and inter-religious marriages. The first five rows show that there is overwhelming support for interracial marriage across all traditions, and there are almost no statistically significant differences (save that Nones are more supportive of interracial marriages than Catholics on a few occasions). As expected, the regression analysis in the second column of Table 7 indicates that religion—whether affiliation or congregation attendance—does not affect support for interracial marriage. The dependent variable, interracial marriage, combines all four items from table six into an additive scale (alpha=.947) ranging from four (disapprove of interracial marriages) to eight (approve of interracial marriages). The only variables that reach standard levels of significance are age, size of residence, and education.5 However, religion and attendance significantly decreases support for inter-religious marriages. For nearly all the items in the bottom half of Table 6, Conservative Protestants are less supportive of marriages between religious traditions, particularly between Christians and nonChristian religions. Once again, a regression was performed where the dependent variable combined the four inter-religious marriages items to form a scale (alpha=.916) from four (against inter-religious marriage) to eight (approve of inter-religious marriage). The final column of Table 7 shows that church attendance is the most important factor affecting attitudes toward inter-religious marriage, and this is true for all groups except mainline Protestants (although attendance effects are particularly strong for conservative Protestants). Again, affiliation is not significant once the effects of attendance are included.

5 As usual, younger and educated Canadians are more pro-diversity, but unlike previous regressions, those in less populated areas are more supportive of interracial marriages. I am not sure how to interpret this. Possibly interracial marriage is less appealing to urban dwellers because of the ethnic enclaves in big cities provide spaces where ethnic differences are more easily maintained and where social/physical distance between races is greater. Also note that the data for the interracial and inter-religious marriages are skewed, since nearly 85% support all types of interracial or inter-religious marriages in the table.

122

sam reimer Conclusion

In the U.S., eminent sociologist Robert Wuthnow emphatically argues that religion has an important impact on diversity. In America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity (2005: 190ff.), he finds that 31% of Americans are “spiritual shoppers” (who embrace diversity because they espouse an eclectic mix of religious views and minimal institutional loyalties), 23% “Christian inclusivists” (who identify with a specific brand of Christianity, yet accept diversity because they emphasize inclusiveness), and 34% “Christian exclusivists” (who resist diversity because of they believe in absolute truth and the uniqueness of their religious tradition). After examining data from his representative sample of nearly 3000 Americans, he concludes that “[i]t is hard to imagine any clearer evidence that religious diversity—and how we think about it—matters.” He goes on to say: How Americans feel about new immigrants with religions different from their own is deeply influenced by their thoughts about religious truth. Seeing how casually people sometimes think about religion and knowing how private people are about religious convictions, we might not have expected these thoughts about religious truth to matter very much. But they do.

Furthermore, views about diversity are “closely aligned . . . with how Americans view America itself ” (2005: 228–29). Christian exclusivists tend to believe that America’s greatness is a direct result of its Christian foundations and that religious diversity threatens its moral fiber. Wuthnow argues that religious identities create “moral orders” that shape values, attitudes and practice (2005: 95ff.). Thus, religious identities and religious belief influence attitudes toward diversity. However, he recognizes that all three groups—shoppers, inclusivists and exclusivists—tend to deal with religious diversity through avoidance. This avoidance, on the one hand, can take the form of disinterested liberalism that views all religions as basically the same, or on the other hand, it can take the form of encapsulation. In his interviews, he found that Americans evince a tension between a commitment to civic pluralism and religious commitment. The pragmatic solution to this tension is not necessarily a diminished belief in God or general secularization, but a softening of the exclusive and absolutist claims of religion. Even though the commitment to pluralism may trump religious commitment more often in Canada than the U.S., and even if there is a smaller percentage of exclusivists north of the border, the tensions

does religion matter?

123

between religious commitment and pluralism likely work themselves out in similar ways in Canada. Religiosity clearly affects diversity attitudes, but its effects are muted by avoidance, privatization, and the softening of religious exclusivity. Although religiosity affects diversity attitudes, it is incorrect to conclude that religion is good or bad for diversity as a whole. The relationship is more nuanced than that. First, religious participation matters more than religious affiliation in Canada. Regression analyses consistently show that the effects of church attendance are stronger than the effects of religious affiliation on the diversity attitudes tapped by the ProCan 05 data. This means it is not correct to disparage a certain religious tradition (like the Conservative Protestants or Catholics) as anti-diversity, since active participants in all Christian traditions in Canada hold distinctive attitudes, depending of the type of diversity in question. Inactive affiliation to Catholicism or Protestantism may not matter much because civil pluralism trumps whatever Christian commitment they may have. Inactive affiliates seem to be inclusivists. Second, the religiously active are less supportive of diversity when it is related to the defense of the traditional family. This protection of “traditional family values” diminishes support for inter-religious and same-sex marriage, and also seems to spill over into greater discomfort meeting homosexuals. The religiously active are not resistant to all types of diversity, but seem to be selectively exclusive and inclusive. They are more likely to support immigration or racial/cultural diversity than their less active co-religionists, who espouse lower support for these types of diversity than do non-affiliates. The net result is little difference between religious traditions and religious “Nones” in support for racial/cultural diversity. Regular participants in religious institutions give evidence of a tension between inclusive and exclusive sensibilities, or the tension between religious commitment on the one hand and civic pluralism on the other. This evidence suggests that it is only in areas of sexual diversity and inter-religious marriage that religion poses a threat to peaceful coexistence in diverse Canada. An unlikely threat, however, since it is reasonable to surmise that Canadians deal with diversity with at least as much civility, privatization and avoidance as the Americans Wuthnow studied. If peaceful coexistence is the goal, then tolerant avoidance, or a “live and let live” approach to diversity, will suffice. But this approach falls short of pluralism. Pluralism is mutually enriching when people seek understanding and cooperation across demographic

124

sam reimer

fault lines. The common strategies of avoidance and privatization are incompatible with pluralism because pluralism develops only through dialogue and cooperation among demographically diverse peoples. Whether religion will promote pluralism in Canada is unclear. Since religiosity can increase inclusiveness (through bridging capital) on the one hand, yet it can increase exclusivity on the other, its relationship with pluralism and diversity is likely to continue to be complex. What we do know is that religion matters.6 References Allport, Gordon W. 1950. The Individual and His Religion: A Psychological Interpretation. New York: Macmillan. Allport, Gordon W. and J. Michael Ross. 1967. “Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5: 432–43. Bibby, Reginald. 1987. Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada. Toronto: Irwin Publishing. ———. 2002. Restless Gods: The Renaissance of Religion in Canada. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing. ———. 2006. The Boomer Factor: What Canada’s Most Famous Generation is Leaving Behind. Toronto: Bastian Books. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1983. “The Forms of Capital.” Pp. 241–58 in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, edited by J.G. Richardson. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Burdette, Amy M., Christopher G. Ellison, and Terrence D. Hill. 2005. “Conservative Protestantism and Tolerance toward Homosexuals: An Examination of Potential Mechanisms.” Sociological Inquiry 75: 177–96. Busch, Beverly G. 1998. “Faith, Truth, and Tolerance: Religion and Political Tolerance in the United States.” Unpublished Dissertation, University of Nebraska. Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of Sociology 94: S95–120. Green, John C., James L. Guth, Lymon A. Kellstedt and Corwin E. Smidt. 1994. “Uncivil Challenges? Support for Civil Liberties Among Religious Activists.” Journal of Political Science 22: 25–49. Hood, Ralph W., Jr., Bernard Spilka, Bruce Hunsberger, Richard Gorsuch. 1996. The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach, 2nd ed. New York: Guilford Press. Hunsberger, Bruce. 1995. “Religion and Prejudice: The Role of Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Right-wing Authoritarianism.” Journal of Social Issues 51: 113–29. Hunsberger, Bruce, and Lynne M. Jackson. 2005. “Religion, Meaning and Prejudice.” Journal of Social Issues 61: 807–26. Huntington, Samuel. 1998. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone.

6 I would like to thank Reginald Bibby for making available his 2005 Project Canada dataset.

does religion matter?

125

Jackson, Lynne M., and Bruce Hunsberger. 1999. “An Intergroup Perspective on Religion and Prejudice.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 38: 509–23. Jurgensmeyer, Mark. 2000. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press. MacKinnon, Niel J., and Allison Luke. 2002. “Changes in Identity Attitudes as Reflections of Social and Cultural Change.” Canadian Journal of Sociology 27: 299–337. Marcus, George E., John L. Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Sandra L. Wood. 1995. With Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nunn, Clyde Z., Harry J. Crockett, Jr. and J. Allan Williams, Jr. 1978. Tolerance for Nonconformity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Patel, Eboo. 2007. “Affirming Identity, Achieving Pluralism: Insights from Interfaith Youth Work.” Review of Faith & International Affairs 5: 21–7. Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Touchstone. Reimer, Sam. 2003. Evangelicals and the Continental Divide 0 RQ W UpDO 0 F*LO O4 XH HQV University Press. Reimer, Samuel H., and Jerry Z. Park. 2001. “Tolerant (In)Civility? A Longitudinal Analysis of White Conservative Protestants’ Willingness to Grant Civil Liberties.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40: 735–45. Smidt, Corwin E., and James M. Penning. 1982. “Religious Commitment, Political Conservatism, and Political and Social Tolerance in the United States: A Longitudinal Analysis.” Sociological Analysis 3: 231–45. Smith, Christian S. with Michael Emerson, Sally Gallagher, Paul Kennedy, and David Sikkink. 1998. American Evangelicals: Embattled and Thriving. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stark, Rodney, and William Sims Bainbridge. 1985. The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Stouffer, Samuel. 1955. Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Sullivan, John L., James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1982. Political Tolerance and American Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Woodberry, Robert D. and Christopher S. Smith. 1998. “Fundamentalism et al: Conservative Protestants in America.” Annual Review of Sociology 24: 25–56. Wuthnow, Robert. 2002. “Religious Involvement and Status-bridging Social Capital.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41: 669–84. ———. 2005. America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER SIX

CANADIAN RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY ONLINE: A NETWORK OF POSSIBILITIES Christopher Helland Welcome to the homepage of the Hutterian Brethren. The Hutterites are a religious group originating back in 1530. They live communally in rural North America. Learn about our unique lifestyle, religion, customs, traditions, and history. Discover how we earn our living, and what we do in our leisure time. Find out what our schools are like and learn about Hutterian health related issues. Above all, enjoy your visit and be sure to come again. www.hutterianbrethren.com November 11, 1998

When thinking about the World Wide Web and the Internet, the last thing that may come to mind would be a site created in the early days of the Web by members of a Hutterite community in Manitoba. For the most part, the Internet is viewed as a cutting edge communication tool used by the modern and technologically elite to stay connected with a global network. However, it has also become an essential component of religious minorities and a medium that embodies the diverse religious mosaic of the Canadian society. In this chapter, I will use several case studies to examine three issues related to the unique ways Internet technology is utilized within Canada by religious minorities. I will first explore the way the World Wide Web is employed by diverse religious groups to communicate information about themselves and their religious beliefs and practices to the general public. In the varied religious environment of Canada, the Internet has provided a unique opportunity for minority religious traditions to have public representation and a voice, despite their smaller affiliation numbers and traditionally lower public profile. I will then show how Internet technology is being used to connect members of geographically dispersed religious groups, allowing for networks to be developed and maintained between immigrant and diaspora religious members that have been located throughout the country. And finally, I will explore the cutting

128

christopher helland

edge of religion and Internet usage, which is now being employed to connect people in diaspora with a homeland, sacred site or place of religious origins that was left behind when the group or membership immigrated to Canada. Incorporating this new technology is not value free, and in each situation, accommodation and innovation is undertaken by the group in order to embrace the Internet. Religious groups are responding differently to this new technological opportunity. In some cases, the technology is being embraced wholeheartedly, while in other situations there is significant debate within the religious tradition concerning the speed at which this technology should be incorporated and the repercussions this form of modernization will have upon the movement. In each situation, the outcome and the implications are different, often based upon the structure of authority within the movement, the education level of the membership, and the group’s historical relationship with modern technology. In many ways, the very structure of the Internet caters to supporting diverse religious traditions. The World Wide Web was created to allow for non-hierarchical communication, “open access,” and the unrestricted sharing of information. There are no restrictions placed upon a religious group when it presents itself online because it is marginal to the community in which it is located or it has statistically lower membership than another group, each religion within the country has equal access to this medium, and because of that access they have the potential for equal representation. Within Canada, the Internet itself has become a tool for constructing and maintaining religious diversity. No religious group can be censored or suppressed by another religious group on the World Wide Web, and because of this, the online environment has become a unique map of Canada’s religious mosaic, constantly being updated and transformed as religious groups and religiously motivated individuals create Websites, blogs, and bulletin boards. Recognizing the Religious Potential of the Internet The Internet is a term that is used to identify interconnected networks of computer networks. In reality, a person can’t “do” anything on the Internet; rather people use the Internet to do things on computers that are connected to this network. For many people in Canada, the Internet has become a part of their lives, a tool they use to connect with

canadian religious diversity online

129

the world around them. In relation to the global community, Canada has a very high percentage of its population actively involved with the Internet and the World Wide Web. For example, Canadian students ranked among the highest in the world in terms of computer access from home and at school. In 2005, 61% of Canadian households had home computers with Internet access (most with high-speed connections), and two-thirds of the population were regular Internet users. It can be estimated that now over 67.8% of Canadians use the Internet on a regular basis and that most of this usage will be for personal rather than business related reasons (Statistics Canada 2006). It may come as a surprise, but many of the personal activities undertaken by people using the Internet involve religion and spirituality. In the year 2000, more people were using the Internet for religion and spiritual purposes than were using the medium for online banking or online dating services. The first large scale studies examining Internet usage patterns in the United States found that 21% of the users went online to undertake some form of religious activity. Within one year this number had increased to 25%, from two million people a day using the Internet for religious or spiritual purposes in 2000 to over three million a day in 2001 (Pew 2001). Despite the continued increase in total overall Internet users, in a detailed study conducted on users in the United States between March and May of 2003, it was found that 29% of the people online had used the Internet to look for religious or spiritual information. The most recent study, conducted by the Pew Internet and American Life Project has found that “64% of wired Americans have used the Internet for spiritual or religious purposes” (Pew 2004). Although there are no comparable studies done in Canada, these numbers are most likely reflective of North American Internet activity. While Canada is an extremely “wired” nation, it is important to recognize that access to the Internet and the World Wide Web is not universal within the country, and there is a digital divide. Statistics Canada has noted that there are several factors that affect Internet access. First and foremost, issues of household income play a significant role in determining whether or not a home will have a computer with Internet access. The higher the household income, the higher the chance the home will be wired. Education is also a factor, and Statistics Canada found that 80% of adults with some post-secondary education are regular Internet users compared to 49% of adults with less education. People living in rural areas were much less likely

130

christopher helland

to have Internet access than people living in urban settings. Age also plays a factor in the digital divide: people between the ages of 18 and 44 are one-and-a-half times more likely to be regular Internet users than people 45 or over.1 These are important factors affecting Internet usage within the Canadian population, and they also impact upon religious organizations and their decisions concerning how they should utilize the Internet and the World Wide Web. For example, if a religious organization has a membership base with lower income families will they try to use the Internet to connect with them, even though statistically their membership is less likely to be online? Similarly, if a vast majority of the religious membership of the group is elderly, will the organization bother to have a Website? On the surface, the answer to these questions will most likely be in the negative. Nevertheless, in today’s wired environment almost all religious movements have an online presence, but they may be online for a number of different reasons. Communicating Religion via Mass Media Religiously motivated individuals and organized religions alike have chosen to use the available communication media to spread their message. It has been argued that the Reformation would not have succeeded if it were not for the manner in which Martin Luther effectively utilized the printing press. Although that argument is debatable in its details, there is no doubt that the printing press fueled the Reformation and that mass printed books challenged the control and authority of the dominant religious institution of the West. Indeed, the Catholic Church was so defied by the mass printing that began in Europe in the sixteenth century that they developed the Index Librorum Prohibitorum to control what could be read by their followers. By the eighteenth century, the printing and mass distribution of pamphlets was a given among the numerous Protestant movements competing for adherents in Europe and the New World. Being labeled a “radical pamphleteer” was an insult, yet it was also an apt description of the manner in which the printed word became an essential component of diverse and marginalized

1 For a complete listing of the Statistics Canada study on Internet Usage see “Canadian Internet Use Survey,” The Daily, Tuesday, August 15, 2006; www.statcan.ca.

canadian religious diversity online

131

religious movements that were competing for adherents and defending their beliefs against the dominant traditions. In the nineteenth century, a close and intertwined connection appeared between developing media technology and the expansion of an evangelical belief system in North America. As David Morgan (1999) has argued, the “new mass culture of printed material” became an inseparable component of organizations such as the American Tract and Bible Societies, and it was not only employed to expand their evangelization abilities but also became woven into the very beliefs and structure of the movements themselves. These Evangelical Christian societies were so actively involved in printing that they can in some respects be credited with the invention of mass media in the United States (Morgan 2002; Nord 1984). The first public radio broadcast began in November of 1920, and within a matter of months, religious broadcasting was commonplace. Many of the most popular radio broadcasts in the twentieth century were religious sermons; individuals like Father Charles Couglin and Charles Fuller had weekly radio audiences estimated to be in the millions (Mitchell 1999: 145). The radio sermon within Canada became a unique environment to present diverse Christian religious beliefs to the public. Moving beyond the normal constraints of the “big three” Christian traditions (Catholic, United, and Anglican), individuals such as a “Bible Bill” (William Aberhart) used the radio to present the “Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute” (a mix of Pentecostal and Baptist theology) to the masses. Bible Bill utilized the medium so effectively for preaching that he garnered enough social and political support to help found the Social Credit Party of Alberta and become the Premier of that province in 1935 (Elliott and Miller 1987). With the invention of the television, religion flowed seamlessly into this new medium as well. Archbishop Fulton Sheen’s “Life is Worth Living” was broadcast on 123 ABC affiliate stations around the United States and by 1956 had an estimated 30 million viewers a week. The history of the relationship between religion and mass media shows that it should come as no surprise that the Internet would quickly be adapted as a tool for communicating religion to the masses. However, in the 1970s and 1980s many academics missed the influx of religion online because they were under the assumption that the world was becoming a secular place and that religion and religious beliefs were being moved to the private sphere of the individual, if not disappearing altogether. For most scholars, there was a strong assumption that being

132

christopher helland

modern and technological or scientific equaled being nonreligious. However, nothing could have been farther from the truth. In fact, by 1996 Time Warner estimated that there were three times as many Websites concerning religion and spirituality as there were concerning sex.2 The World Wide Web had quickly become an environment where religious organizations could broadcast information to their membership and the world at large and where religiously motivated individuals could climb upon a global soapbox and preach to anyone that would listen (see, e.g., Campbell 2005; Cowan 2005; Helland 2005; Brasher 2001; Dawson 2000; Helland 2000). Diverse Religions and the Online Environment Diverse religious groups and religious minorities within Canada may have received the greatest benefit from the creation of the World Wide Web. Due to the relatively inexpensive cost of building and maintaining a Website, these groups gained a unique opportunity to present information about themselves to the communities in which they lived and also the world at large. Religions such as The Church of Scientology and the International Raelian Movement quickly developed an online presence and embraced the medium as a tool that could present their religion to the world without being filtered through any form of media censorship or negative bias (see e.g., Cowan 2004; Mayer 2000). Although the World Wide Web has also been utilized by “counter-cult” groups to attack and criticize religious minorities, it has still provided the opportunity for these religions to present information about themselves to the general public. In this case, rather than being filtered through traditional forms of mass media (television news, news papers, magazines, etc.) that assume the dominant mainline forms of Christianity are the norm and others’ beliefs are somehow deviant, the World Wide Web is structured to allow for equal representation of all the religious groups that care to use it. Although Christianity is the dominant religion on the Internet, this in no way limits how other groups can be

2

www.time.com/time/godcom/home.html.

canadian religious diversity online

133

represented online. There is no Internet orthodoxy setting a standard for online religious representation.3 The Hutterian Brethren citation at the introduction to this chapter is a good example of this type of activity. Their website was developed as a student project undertaken to create an online presence so that the Hutterite community could present information about themselves to the world. They were not using the Internet to communicate to various Hutterite communities in North America, which would have been ineffective, since most members of the community did not have Internet access in 1996; rather they were trying to communicate to outsiders. The teacher at the Hutterite school that initiated the project felt strongly that this was a unique opportunity to educate Hutterite children in computer skills and also to communicate information about their beliefs and their culture to others. As he stated to me in an interview: Originally the Hutterites.org Website was designed to tell others about Hutterites, our religion, lifestyle and so on. We feel it’s important to have this information available to people because we are a fairly closed society and the less people know about us, the “scarier” we become. One of the purposes [of the Website] is to dispel misconceptions.

Although the Website removed its “hit counter” in 2004, over an eightyear period (1996–2004) it had been viewed by almost 400,000 people. The current site begins with a definition of “Hutterites.” This is actually a technologically savvy maneuver, since it places the Website at the top of search engine pages such as Google and Yahoo when people look online for information about this religion. This is followed by a brief description of their beliefs and also their history: Hutterites are a communal people, living on scattered brunderhöfe or colonies throughout the prairies in North America. This communal lifestyle finds its roots in the biblical teachings of Christ and the Apostles. Emerging as a distinct culture and religious group in the early 16th century, this non-resistant Anabaptist sect endured great persecution and death at the hands of the state and church in medieval Europe. However, the Hand of God remained on the shoulders of these people, and their descendents survive to battle on to this very day. . . .4

3 For current religious affiliation numbers and representations, see the Google Open Directory Project (DMOZ) at http://www.dmoz.org/Society/Religion_and_Spirituality. 4 www.hutterite.org, retrieved July 29, 2007.

134

christopher helland

Since the Website is maintained by the community itself, there is no concern that the movement or its religion will be misrepresented. Everything on the site is carefully presented so that the group can disseminate information about its practices and beliefs to the public. The site contains contact information, the movement’s history and a FAQ section that has answers for most general questions people may have about the movement. This includes questions about dress codes, property ownership, languages and customs, the role of women in the community, dating, and even information about joining the movement. The site functions on two levels, in that it presents a brief overview and it also provides in-depth information and links for those that desire more than just a cursory explanation of the movement. Previously, it may have been difficult for the average person to find out information about the Hutterite religion. Although there are a number of academic publications and ethnographic studies of the Hutterian Brethren in North America, information about the group may have also been circulated by nonmembers in the form of rumors and unfunded gossip (see Flint 1975). Historically, the movement itself has always tried to create good public relations with their neighbors and the communities in which they are located. For example, while I was an elementary student in the 1970s, growing up in Southern Alberta, we took a field trip to the Wilson Colony and had a tour of their premises. It was an educational experience. As an adult when I wanted information about the movement, however, the first place I looked was online. Wikipedia on the Web has an entry for the movement, but this is information that has been “edited” by whoever feels fit to update the entry. This can make the information extremely problematic and open to bias and disinformation (for an assessment of religious information presented on Wikipedia, see Helland 2006). By having their own Website there is never a question of being improperly “edited,” but there may be internal issues concerning the information the site itself chooses to present. In the case of the Hutterian Brethren there are three main groups (Schmiedeleut, Dariusleut, and Lehrerleut), and there was a split within the Schmiedeleut group in 1992 over leadership issues that resulted in two subgroups. The information on the Website was presented by a school from the original Schmiedeleut group and may therefore have a different view over leadership issues than the “Gibb Hutterites” (the other Schmiedeleut subgroup). For example, in the section describing the division that occurred, they state: “These allegations [initiating the split] ranged

canadian religious diversity online

135

from misuse of church funds to his not being conservative enough to disagreement over church decisions among other things. Many of these allegations are chronicled in a fraudulent book, pieced together by Donald Gibb, hence the name, Gibb Hutterites.”5 This Website is controlled by the original Schmiedeleut group, and there may also be issues between this group and some of the other much more conservative Hutterite communities; however, for the most part the site provides a general overview that is representative of the Hutterian religion, which all communities share. Over time the Website has developed in several ways. One interesting feature has been the addition of a number of audio files containing hymns sung by different Hutterian choirs. This music is presented online as a sample, and the Website sells CD recordings of full choir concerts and Hutterian Songs (the community songbook). These features are provided to sell products to the public and are a good example of technology being used by the community if it assists with business dealings. Unlike other communal religious communities, such as the Amish, which shun most modern advancements, the Hutterites will allow the community to use new technology if it helps the community function. This can be seen with the incorporation of everything from cutting-edge farming technology to fax machines (Peter 1987). What appears to be creating some controversy within the Hutterite community is that the Website also allows members to request their own email address and an email account. For the most part, this service has been developed to help business dealings with the public and sharing of information among members. Although most people in Canada would consider having an email address as standard as having one’s own phone number, in the communal settings of the Hutterian Brethren there is no personal property, but there is a “community of goods” available to be used as needed (see, e.g., Bennett 1967). Although there are changing attitudes concerning the acquisition of personal property and different communities maintain different standards, theoretically members do not “own” their own phones but have access to the telephone services they need through the community itself. Members responsible for certain business dealings and community management have their own phone numbers, but this would be viewed as a necessity required for work and not “their own” communications device. Because of this, having

5

www.hutterites.org/92churchsplit.htm, retrieved July 29, 2007.

136

christopher helland

an email account is controversial, and some of the more conservative Hutterian communities restrict Internet access and do not allow their members to have an email account at all. In most cases, controls have been put in place so that an email account cannot be obtained without the community leader’s knowledge or permission. Although the managers of various departments on many colonies have email for doing business, it is controversial and it appears that the progressive groups are more supportive of this new technology and its benefits. In some ways this may be related to the educational changes that are underway in the different Hutterian communities. Traditionally, a very small percentage of Hutterite children graduated from high school with a grade twelve diploma. Children often continued with their education until they were fifteen or sixteen, and then stopped going to school (regardless of the grade attained) and began working within the community (Hostetler 1974; Hostetler and Huntington 1980). More recently, a number of Elders have recognized that within the modern agricultural and livestock business, a high school education is not sufficient, and there have been noted shifts to have children complete high school and even obtain some form of post-secondary education. Indeed, a past criticism of the Hutterite communities has been that due to their lack of higher education and technical agricultural skills their farming output has not been maximized (see Bennett 1967: 192). A number of members within the Manitoba Hutterite colonies have also gone on to university to receive their teaching degrees so that they can return to the community as licensed educators and work within Hutterite schools; in fact, Brandon University has even established a special Hutterian Education Program for this purpose. Having computer skills and an email address are now required if a person wishes to go to college or university. In dealings with the “modern world” email and computer skills are becoming necessary, and some Hutterite communities ensure their members have these abilities. However, this primarily occurs within the less conservative communities, particularly within the Schmiedeleut group. As an individual in another interview stated: I would suggest that even the more conservative communities will eventually allow limited use of email because of its speed, availability and necessity. For example, to the best of my knowledge, all Hutterite colonies have access to fax machines, because they’ve become part of doing business. The same, I expect, will happen with email and perhaps Internet use.

canadian religious diversity online

137

The Hutterian Website, originally developed to communicate information about the group to the general public, is beginning to have an impact on the community itself, even though most people in the Hutterite community do not have Internet access and are not online getting information or “surfing the Web.” In the case of Hutterites, the Website is primarily for communicating to outsiders. In some ways this is a unique case and is not representative of the manner in which the World Wide Web and the Internet are utilized by diverse religious traditions within Canada. In most situations, religious Websites are used for communicating to the public and also for providing information and services to members of the group itself. This allows members of the religious community to remain connected to the religion’s social network even if they are geographically dispersed or unable to attend traditional forms of religious worship. In this type of situation, the World Wide Web is truly acting like a web, in that it creates significant social connections between the religious organization and its members. A World Wide Web of Belonging and Meaning The World Wide Web is a very dynamic environment, and it can be used by different people in different ways. For a large number of individuals actively engaged in using the Internet, there is no question that it is a valuable tool for maintaining social networks. They may use email, instant messaging, Facebook, and blogs to stay connected to their friends, family, work, and even hobbies and interests. However, not everyone utilizes the Internet to maintain social networks. In some cases, people may have very limited Internet interaction, and they may view the World Wide Web as simply a tool for obtaining information. In a detailed ethnographic study of Internet participation, Annette Markham (1998) found that people viewed the Internet as a tool, a place, or a state of being—and each level of perception affected the interactions of the individuals with the Internet environment. This has a significant impact upon the manner in which individuals will attempt to use the World Wide Web for religious and spiritual activity (Campbell 2005; Helland 2002). In many cases, individuals may use the Internet as a tool to look for religious information. This use can include trying to find answers to theological questions or simply meeting times and places for worship. In other instances, people may go online to seek

138

christopher helland

more meaningful religious interactions, recognizing the environment as a place that can provide significant religious social networks. They could go online to chat with other members of their faith, to discuss topics and issues, or even to request prayers or religious rituals to be conducted for them. In some cases, people may take this one step further and use the medium to undertake a virtual pilgrimage or to participate in “virtual reality” religious rituals. Each of these different levels of interaction requires that the person employing the Internet views the World Wide Web in unique ways. For example, many people do not perceive the World Wide Web as an environment where authentic religious ritual can take place. These people then would not engage in this type of activity or support it online. A good example of this situation can be seen in Second Life (an online virtual reality environment), where some individuals are actively participating in events such as an online celebration of Hanukah. For those participants, there is no doubt that they are engaging in an authentic religious experience, and their narratives attest to this. However, many members of the Jewish community do not believe that this type of religious celebration can be facilitated in cyberspace. In this situation, it all comes down to the individual participant’s perception concerning what the environment can be used for. Since the World Wide Web is still a relatively new addition to our social and cultural world, people’s perceptions may change over time, and as they become more “Internet savvy” they may begin to engage in more online activities where this form of religious activity is occurring. It is also important to recognize that there often is a generational divide in that many people that have been exposed to the Internet at an early age are more actively participating in things like online community and virtual reality interactions, particularly online gaming and online social networking (Pew 2006). This individual perception of the Internet also appears to be reflected in the manner in which different religious organizations use the medium. In most cases, the religious authorities of the church or organization are the “gate keepers” that control how that organization will utilize Internet technology. It is the people in charge of the group who decide if they need a Website, what the Website will contain, how it will be developed, and so forth. Some religious organizations are more dynamic than others, and the leadership may be responding to the religious community, recognizing that their membership wants (and will use) not only a “Website” but things like “godcasts” (sermons that are downloaded from the website

canadian religious diversity online

139

for MP3 players), online blogs and discussion groups, church news feeds and updates, flash player images and music, and a myriad other technologically savvy tools that are available online. A clear example of this type of dynamic online activity being used by a diverse religious tradition within Canada can be seen at the website www.durka.com (the Toronto Sri Durka Hindu Temple), where, if you enter through the “main door,” you are treated to a virtual puja ceremony. In other cases, the authorities of the religious organization may be more conservative in their approach to the World Wide Web and its uses for their membership. For example, many of the most impressive religiously-based websites, such as that of the Vatican (www.vatican.va), have harnessed the medium to communicate in much the same manner in which they had earlier used the radio, television, and even the printing press (Helland 2004, 2000). The Vatican disseminates information and communicates to their members and the general public, but it has not allowed the environment to be used as a social space. The Vatican Website, designed in 1995 by a group of Benedictine Monks from Northern New Mexico, has millions of internal Web pages hosted on three super computers named Raphael, Michael, and Gabriel. It is a stunningly impressive site. Available in six languages, it contains a massive archive, information on doctrine and beliefs, the church’s history, and just about everything one might want to know regarding the Catholic tradition. However, there are no interactive areas like chat rooms, no bulletin boards where one can post information and ask questions, and no way to communicate through the Website. The site also lacks external links (Helland 2002; Zaleski 1997). The Vatican and many other official religious Websites use the Web for one-to-many communication. Much like preaching from a mountaintop to the world below, most religious organizations have developed closed Websites that communicate their message and their information but do not allow for interaction (classified as religion-online, see Helland 2000). In many ways they break the two cardinal rules of the Internet. First, they rarely provide external links to other Websites; and second, they do not allow for many-to-many communication or the open exchange of information (Zaleski 1997). On Websites structured in this way, the Web traveler is given information about religion; this includes everything from doctrine and policy to information about practices and beliefs, ethics and morals, religious books and articles, as well as other paraphernalia related to religious pursuit. However, when people go online for religious and spiritual

140

christopher helland

purposes, they often want to do more than just get information about religion. As the Pew Internet and American Life Project found in 2003, “higher percentages of the online faithful report online activities related to personal spirituality and religiosity than activities more related to involvement in traditional religious functions or organizations” (Pew 2004). In my research I have found that in cases where the Internet is being used to its full potential—in that it allows for many-to-many, non-hierarchical communication and interaction among participants, a new form of computer-supported religious participation appeared to arise (classified as online-religion, see Helland 2000). Individuals engage in social activities, they interact with the religious belief systems presented on the Internet; they contribute their personal beliefs and receive personal feedback. In this new use of the online environment, participants are not simply passive recipients of information; rather, they become actively involved in a dialectic process. In the early stages of the Web, the most active and dynamic online religious environments were those that provided information about the religion, such as history, ethics, myths, etc., and also allowed people to come together from across the globe to discuss the religion being presented. These types of sites provided both religion-online and onlinereligion, creating a unique religious environment (Helland 2005). A primary example of this activity can be seen at the Website called “The Global Hindu Electronic Network” (www.hindunet.org). The site was started in November of 1996 and provided people with a massive amount of information concerning Hinduism and also other religions in India. The site also catered specifically to Hindus in the diaspora by providing information about temples in different countries and their locations, information about Indian food and lifestyle, news concerning human rights issues, and up to date news from India. Along with providing this information, the Website also hosted a vibrant discussion area where people could talk about their religious beliefs and practices. Many other diaspora religious groups also developed Websites that contained information about their beliefs and practices and discussion areas where people in diaspora could go online to talk to other members of their tradition. For example, very early in the development of the World Wide Web, a number of Tibetan Buddhist groups used the technology to create online areas where people could meet, talk about their tradition, their situation in diaspora, and also be kept informed about the situation in their homeland. The Canada Tibet Committee

canadian religious diversity online

141

(founded in 1987) developed a Website in the late 1990s to inform the Canadian public about issues occurring in Tibet and also to allow Tibetan Buddhists (whether they were converts to the religion or immigrants to Canada from Tibet and India) to get important information and develop social networks in the communities in which they live. Along with providing current news and information, the site also has information on the different Tibetan communities in Canada, Dharma centers, women and youth association information, Tibetan businesses in Canada, and Tibetan restaurants. Through links, people going to the Website have the opportunity to find out about ongoing activities in different cities. They have the opportunity to get in touch with other members and can even watch Webcasts from the Dali Lama. It is a dynamic online environment being utilized to help a diverse religious tradition maintain its identity in the face of an ongoing struggle in its homeland. In effect, the Website is becoming a social environment that allows for people anywhere in Canada (or the world for that matter) to enter into a network developed especially for maintaining their religion and culture. This allows for Website to play a unique role in uniting people of a minority group or diverse religious tradition. Through the Website itself, people can stay connected to the religious organization and the belief system. Historically, when people immigrated or relocated, they were challenged with the difficulty of maintaining their religious beliefs and culture in the face of a population base that recognized them as being “outsiders,” others, or a minority. Within Canada, many immigrants were able to maintain their traditions and their cultural identity by developing social networks with other members of the tradition that had also relocated. However, the religious traditions associated with immigrant groups often lost followers as members intermarried and as the second and third generations became assimilated into the Canadian culture (Bibby 1993; 2002). With the development of the World Wide Web, new social networks are emerging online that may be keeping the younger members of these religious traditions connected to their faith. In effect, religious traditions are adapting the medium, not just to communicate their message, but also to keep their members connected with each other and the belief system itself. A good example of this type of activity is the website for BAPS Swaminarayan Sanstha (www.swaminarayan.org). The movement has a large center in Toronto which has recently expanded to an extremely impressive new Mandir (House of God). The group is developing and

142

christopher helland

promoting a “Global Network” which is based upon their view that the mandirs and centers they have developed act as “nodes”—creating not only places to worship but also “permanent sources of peace and reformation for people of all ages, backgrounds and beliefs.”6 This movement is taking full advantage of the Internet to keep these nodes connected with each other and also to connect their membership to the organization. Although the International headquarters for the movement is in India, in many ways, the Website itself is the central authority for maintaining this network, which is now established in 45 different countries across the globe. For this group, the online network has developed to such an extent that they are not an isolated diverse religious movement within Canada. In effect, through their online connectedness they are not a minority religion within different countries. Instead, they are a global religion that has representative places of worship located throughout the planet. This is a form of transnational connectedness that ensures each “node” has a viable existence in the country they are located due to their network, not their relative size within the country. Despite the fact that their membership numbers are less than one percent of the Canadian population, they have a very strong and viable presence within Canada because of their connectedness with the BAPS religion itself, and this connectedness is maintained through the Internet. The Website for the group is enormous and impressive. First developed in 1997, it was originally created as a “service to the Satsangies.” It contains information on the origins of the belief system, the chain of leadership and authenticity of the current leader, the philosophy of the movement and its scriptures, essays, current news and events, and an FAQ page containing categories on everything from BAPS to Hinduism, to the rituals that should be done during and after an eclipse. There are a number of publications available on the Website in “book form” and also as audio and video files. The site also contains an online teaching area, where individuals can learn about the belief system through modules, audio books, and essays. Members may then undergo “Satsang Examinations” to verify their knowledge and increase in levels (or grades) within the organization.

6

http://www.swaminarayan.org/globalnetwork/index.htm

canadian religious diversity online

143

The Website is continually updated with pictures of the current leader and new temples, words of wisdom and inspiration, music and devotional songs, video clips, and even a quote for the day. People can sign up to receive cell phone updates and news alerts and the website has a significant amount of information available to assist people if they wish to utilize this type of technology. Although the Website does have a guest book where people can leave small messages and comments, for the most part the it is providing “religion-online”—one-way communication from the religious organization to its membership. Despite this one-way flow of dialogue, the site has a very dynamic feel to it, and by offering cutting edge options such as XML/RSS news feeds, an e-greeting cards service, and BAPS podcasting, the participants can feel a strong connection with the online environment. This then translates into a connection with their local temple and the BAPS network on a scale that is truly hard to imagine. Receiving email updates, daily devotional clips to one’s cell phone, and a new picture of the movement’s leader every day along with some of his words of wisdom is an amazing example of how this technology can keep people immersed within a religious social network. Despite the opportunity for the Website to act as a net, keeping people connected to the religious movement, it is important to recognize that the social network cast on the World Wide Web is ineffective if the membership is not online. When I interviewed a priest from the Vedanta Ashram Society, he was very clear about the impact their Website has upon their temple membership. First and foremost, he recognized that most of the elderly members of the temple were not Internet users. One key restriction keeping them offline is a language issue, in that many of the members do not know how to use the English-based keyboard of a computer. The priest said that his temple has no plans to offer computer lessons to this group of members. To ensure that they do not alienate this demographic, they continue to publish the temple newsletter in paper format. In this situation, the temple organization recognizes that it is targeting a certain type of person with its online presence. For the most part, they are connecting to the younger members of the community, who have a university education. Due to the new and evolving nature of the Internet, it is still not possible to determine if they are successfully connecting with this targeted demographic, or if they are keeping the younger members actively engaged in the religious tradition.

144

christopher helland Real Temples, Virtual Connections

Along with utilizing the Internet to provide information about a religious tradition and to keep members connected within a social network, people are using the technology to get in touch with their sacred homeland itself. In effect, the World Wide Web has become a medium that allows for new relationships to develop between people and places. An early example of this form of activity occurred in 1998, when the World Wide Web was still relatively new. At that time, 20,000 people a day were going online from outside India to witness Durga Puja in Calcutta (Bannerjee 1998). In advertising for the event, the company that provided the online service stated, “no matter what part of the world a Bengali might be in, a strong tug at the heart strings around Durga Puja time is inevitable.” In 1999 Hinduism Today stated: Come September, every expatriate Bengali falls homesick, longing to make the rounds of the puja mandals, the giant temporary temples erected in Calcutta’s streets and byways for the five-day celebration of Durga Puja. It’s not quite like being there, but www.westbengal.com/puja/puya98/ is close. This elegant web site takes you on a visual journey through the days of hectic preparation, the markets overflowing with eager shoppers, the busy designers, the lights, the glitter, even the sound of drums.7

This online broadcasting of religious festivals became so popular that in January of 2001, the Kumbha Mela festival was broadcast online in an even larger scale, not particularly for people in India but rather for those in the UK and North America (Beckerlegge 2002). The live broadcasting of the event was sponsored by the Himalayan Institute and used to promote its own religious Website. Within a number of diaspora traditions, the Internet and World Wide Web is also being utilized to not just travel in virtual reality to sacred sites, but to also to tangibly connect with their sacred homeland. One group where this activity is becoming particularly significant is within the Hindu tradition. Several years before most religious traditions recognized the appeal of developing online virtual pilgrimage, the website saranam. com was created to “do whatever it takes to help Hindus around the world meet their own needs in the realm of religion, spirituality, morality and the Hindu value system” (emphasis added).

7 Hinduism Today, April 1999. The Website address listed in the above quote, while the site for the Durga Puja in 1999, is no longer maintained by Hinduism Today.

canadian religious diversity online

145

One of the primary ways in which this is accomplished is by allowing people to connect with hundreds of the most sacred temples in India, with the ability to request specific rituals that would be conducted especially for them. Although the Website provides a number of other services and items, including gifts, music, and books, their primary goal is to allow for Hindus to have access to sacred temples from any place on Earth. This site has become extremely popular and has thousands of people using the service on a regular basis. To help with this service, Saranam.com also provides scholars that answer ritual and religious questions and also a “Puja wizard” program, which helps determine the proper ritual and sacrifice for a particular situation or event. Due to the overwhelming numbers of people using the site, Saranam.com now has enough “customers” that they can request very sacred and specific rituals to be conducted specifically for their clients. A new feature called “exclusive temple events” also provides saranam.com clients with the opportunity to partake in rituals that they may have been excluded from in the past, due to caste or other social factors. In many ways, the temples are now catering to religious and spiritual needs of Hindus in the Diaspora due to their online activity. One concern of Saranam.com is to ensure that people receive the rituals they are paying for and that they get an authentic ritual event, even though they are only present at the temple through their computer connection. Addressing this issue, saranam.com states: You can be assured of the authenticity of the offering and the puja. Customer satisfaction is paramount at Saranam.com. If for any reason you feel you are not satisfied with the puja offerings that you received, Saranam. com will refund the entire amount you spent—no questions asked.8

To confirm that the ritual has been conducted, the puja receipt given from the temple is mailed to the customer. In the case of homams, it is easier to verify because they are allowed to videograph the ritual and the video CD is sent along with the offerings. Although this is done by the company to insure authenticity, it also provides a tangible connection between the online participant and the sacred temple and ritual activity. In this case, the web surfer can connect through the Internet to almost any temple in India. They can chose a specific ritual and

8

http://www.saranam.com/company/authenticity.htm

146

christopher helland

have it conducted specifically for them. It is a unique online experience, because after the ritual has taken place, the prasad (vibuthi, kumkum, chandan, or turmeric), flowers used in the ritual, puja certificate, or sacred ash, or even a video recording of the event is sent to the customer. For an extra fee the material can be shipped special delivery and received within days. The Internet is acting as a very powerful tool to connect the individual with the sacred temple and also with the ritual. Although they are not there in person, their Web presence is certainly being felt and through the Internet they are conducting an authentic religious activity—and receiving the benefits of that activity. Tens of thousands of people would not use this service on a regular basis if they did not feel that it was genuinely meeting their religious or spiritual needs. Within Canada, the Hindu temple itself has become a manifestation and a representation of the sacred homeland. The Hindu temples within the community go to great lengths to insure their authenticity and present an “authentic” religious environment to the practitioners (Waghorne 2004). The temple in diaspora is a unique space that is often made with material brought from India. In some cases, the entire building may be taken from India and shipped to a location in North America or Europe. The statues of the deities are from India, and the priests are from India. Because of this, the environment becomes a manifestation of the sacredness of the homeland within the diaspora. For those who have never been to India, the temple is like bringing India to them. There is concern, of course, that when individuals use the Internet to connect with some of the most sacred temples in India they may decide to have the rituals conducted for them there rather than at the temple in their community. By having a puja wizard and scholars available to answer questions, sites such as saranam.com are certainly intruding upon the activities normally conducted by the diaspora temple. However, at this point it is too early to determine if temple participation in the diaspora is decreasing due to online ritual activities. Hinduism has a rich tradition of home worship, and I believe that the home computer may be turning into a new form of home altar. If this is the case, then this type of online religious activity will become a significant supplement to Hindu religious life within Canada, rather than an event that lowers offline religious participation.

canadian religious diversity online

147

Conclusion The World Wide Web has provided diverse religious groups and religious minorities within Canada with a number of unique opportunities. First and foremost, it provides these religious traditions with the ability to have the same level of representation in the online world as larger and more dominant religious groups. Every religion has the opportunity to tell their own story with their own voice. The Internet was created to allow for non-hierarchical communication and interaction, and because of this structure each tradition is given the opportunity to present themselves to the community and the country without being filtered through media biases. The Internet is also playing a unique role in developing and maintaining network ties. This has strengthened religious community relationships and may be maintaining diverse religious identities by allowing for members of these groups to stay connected with each other and also their religious tradition. In this situation, the Internet and the World Wide Web promote and maintain religious diversity by providing an environment that allows for connectedness and also uniqueness. This online environment has become a new mirror that reflects the religious diversity of Canada and also promotes and maintains that diversity at the same time. Due to the newness of this online activity and the constantly developing and changing world of computer-mediated communications, the full implications of the World Wide Web on religious diversity within Canada have yet to be determined, but it appears to be having a positive impact upon the complex religious fabric of the country.9 References Bannerjee, R. 1998. “Victory Parade.” India Today International. Oct. 12: 32–34. Beckerlegge, Gwilym. 2002. “Computer-Mediated Religion: Religion on the Internet at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century.” Pp. 219–64 in From Sacred Text to Internet, edited by Gwilym Beckerlegge. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Bennett, John. 1967. Hutterian Brethren: The Agricultural Economy and Social Organization of a Communal People. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Bibby, Reginald. 1993. Unknown Gods: The Ongoing Story of Religion in Canada. Toronto: Stoddart. ———. 2002. Restless Gods: The Renaissance of Religion in Canada. Toronto: Stoddart.

9 Some of the material contained in this chapter has been revised from Helland (2007a).

148

christopher helland

Brasher, Brenda. 2001. Give Me that Online Religion. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Campbell, Heidi. 2005. Exploring Religious Community Online: We are One in the Network. New York: Peter Lang. Cowan, Douglas E. 2004. “Contested Spaces: Movement, Countermovement, and E-Space Propaganda.” Pp. 255–71 in Online Religion: Finding Faith on the Internet, edited by Lorne Dawson and Douglas E. Cowan. New York: Elsevier. ———. 2005. Cyberhenge: Modern Pagans on the Internet. New York: Routledge. Dawson, Lorne. 2000. “Researching Religion in Cyberspace: Issues and Strategies.” Pp. 25–54 in Religion on the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises, edited by Jeffrey K. Hadden and Douglas E. Cowan. New York: Elsevier. Elliott, David Raymond, and Iris Miller. 1987. Bible Bill: A Biography of William Aberhart. Edmonton: Reidmore Books. Flint, David. 1975. The Hutterites: A Study in Prejudice. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Helland, Christopher. 2000. “Religion Online/Online Religion and Virtual Communitas.” Pp. 205–24 in Religion on the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises, edited by Jeffrey K. Hadden and Douglas E. Cowan. New York: Elsevier. ———. 2002. “Surfing for Salvation.” Religion 32: 293–302. ———. 2004. “Popular Religion and the World Wide Web, a Match Made in [Cyber] Heaven.” Pp. 23–35 in Online Religion: Finding Faith on the Internet, edited by Lorne Dawson and Douglas E. Cowan. New York: Routledge. ———. 2005. “Online Religion as Lived Religion. Methodological Issues in the Study of Religious Participation on the Internet.” Online—Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet 1. http://www.online.uni-hd.de/ ———. 2006. “Using the Internet for Religious Studies Research: An Introduction,” Religious Studies Review. 32: 215–16. ———. 2007. “Diaspora on the Electronic Frontier: Developing Virtual Connections with Sacred Homelands.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communications 12(3), art. 10. Hostetler, John. 1974. Hutterite Society. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Hostetler, John, and Gertrude Enders Huntington. 1980. The Hutterites in North America. Philadelphia: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Markham, Annette. 1998. Life Online: Researching Real Experience in Virtual Space. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. Mayer, Jean-François. 2000. “Religious Movements and the Internet: The New Frontier of Cult Controversies.” Pp. 249–76 in Religion on the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises, edited by Jeffrey K. Hadden and Douglas E. Cowan. New York: Elsevier. Mitchell, Jolyon 1999. Visually Speaking: Radio and the Renaissance of Preaching. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press. Morgan, David. 1999. Protestants and Pictures: Religion, Visual Culture, and the Age of American Mass Culture. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 2002. “Protestant Visual Practice and Mass Culture.” Pp. 37–62 in Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media: Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture, edited by Stewart Hoover and Lynn Schofield Clark. New York: Columbia University Press. Nord, David. 1984. “The Evangelical Origins of Mass Media in America 1815–1835.” Journalism Monographs 88: 1–30. Peter, Karl. 1987. The Dynamics of Hutterite Society: An Analytical Approach. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. PEW Internet and American Life Project. 2001. Cyberfaith: How Americans Pursue Religion Online. www.pewinternet.org. ———. 2004. Faith Online. www.pewinternet.org. ———. 2006. Generations Online. www.pewinternet.org. Statistics Canada. 2006. “Canadian Internet Use Survey.” The Daily. Aug. 15. Zaleski, Jeffrey P. 1997. The Soul of Cyberspace: How Technology is Changing Our Spiritual Lives. San Francisco: Harper Edge.

CHAPTER SEVEN

OLD STRUCTURES, NEW FACES: THE PRESENCE OF WICCA AND NEOPAGANISM IN CANADIAN PRISON CHAPLAINCIES Mireille Gagnon I was attracted to this work [of working as a chaplain for Wiccans and Pagans in prison] as it gave me an opportunity to fulfill this mandate [making Paganism public]. Of course, I personally believe that followers of Wicca and other Pagan paths need to have the same resources as other faith paths. . . . I am continuing with the work because I enjoy it and because I have come to believe that it does have an impact, however small, on the inmates, and so, on society in general. Wiccan Chaplain Canadian Prison System

In the past thirty years, prison chaplaincies in North America have been transformed by the arrival of people belonging to religions different from Christianity. This introduction of new belief systems and their presence in the penitentiary population can be seen as a reflection of Canada’s larger general population (CSC 2006: 3). In fact, when we look at data from Statistics Canada for religion in the 2001 census, Roman Catholics and Protestants still dominate, even they are only 72% of the population as compared to 80% in 1991 (Statistics Canada 2003: 5). On the other hand, the presence of other religions, including non-Christian groups and those who profess no religion, has increased. According to Statistics Canada, this is due to two major factors, namely the increase in immigration and the decrease of young people declaring themselves Christians. The religious identities of the general population can be compared with those whom we find in penitentiary institutions during the same year. Their Christian faiths represented between 69% and 92% of the inmate population depending of the region (CSC 2002a: 2–6).1

1 The Correctional Service of Canada (henceforth CSC) divides the country into five regions: Atlantic, Québec, Ontario, Prairies, and Pacific.

150

mireille gagnon

As observed by James Beckford (1998: 265–66), sociologists of religion do not usually study the prison context. Prisons do, however, provide the opportunity for understanding religious practices and their accommodation in a context where restrictive rules and regulations apply. The question of accommodation, whether in prisons or not, is presently at the center of a public debate in Québec, especially through the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (the Bouchard-Taylor Commission). Among other purposes, this commission has the mandate to gather and analyze information about religious and cultural accommodation practices within the province and hold public consultations on the matter. The very existence of the Consultation Committee, however, serves to show that the question of reasonable accommodation and the acceptance of religious minorities by the general population are not always as clear and simple as one may think. Given that the penitentiary context faces these same issues but within a confined environment, researchers in religious studies could gain some much needed insight by studying them. In response to the variety of faiths present in the penitentiary system, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has sought to provide interfaith chaplaincy services within its institutions. This has been done to accommodate one of the few rights that inmates still have, and to represent better the mosaic of the contemporary inmate population. To this effect, the different traditional Christian faiths have had to modify their approaches and create chaplaincy teams that include representatives of non-Christian faiths as well. Today, Pagan volunteers and employees, mostly Wiccans, form part of these chaplaincy teams. Wiccans are practitioners of Wicca, a syncretistic reconstruction of a naturebased witchcraft religion rendered public by Gerald B. Gardner in England in the 1950s. Wicca is considered a nature religion within the Pagan mindset. It is one of many neo- Pagan traditions, such as Druidry, Asatru and Goddess Worship, which see nature as sacred and view the divine as immanent in nature. They can be polytheistic, animistic, or pantheistic. Wicca does not have a set of unified beliefs or dogmas, nor does it have a central institution. Most Wiccans follow similar beliefs and practices, such as the Wiccan wheel (sabbats celebration), the threefold law, and the Wiccan Rede.2 They

2 The Wiccan Rede is an ethical guide that forms the premise of a Wiccan’s work and beliefs. It consists of the following eight words: “An Ye Harm None, Do What Ye

old structures, new faces

151

also attribute both feminine and masculine aspects to the divine, often represented as the Goddess and the Horned God. As one might imagine, Wiccans’ growing presence within chaplaincy teams is not always welcomed by the general public and some local groups. This is sometimes seen in newspaper articles such as “Witch Way to Prison” by Michael Coren (2003) of the Toronto Sun, for example, who wrote: Fascinating news: Wicca priests and priestesses are to be chaplains in our prisons. Just like representatives of Christianity, Judaism, Islam and other faiths, Canadian law and the Canadian Charter will give witches full access to our incarcerated criminals. . . . My experience has been that such people tend to have a little too much time and money on their hands and a feeling they are superior to the “ordinary people” around them “who don’t quite understand.” Also a contempt for and crass ignorance of what is referred to as “organized religion” and a total lack of contextual knowledge of ancient and medieval history. A liking for dark makeup and black clothes often mingled with Hollywood witch fashion and Celtic jewellery. A habit of staring a lot and speaking in a slow, deliberate manner that is supposed to indicate authority and wisdom. Oh, and a fair helping of middle-class neurosis. In all seriousness, this absurd situation could be problematic. While nobody would allege that all Pagans break the law, people proudly calling themselves Pagans have been involved in child abuse circles and grotesque dark cults. One can only hope they won’t be teaching them how to make the cell doors disappear or the warders invisible.

The problem with such articles is that they prey on the reader’s fears by emphasising negative stereotypes that are largely unfounded. Reinforcing these stereotypes can sometimes incite angry reaction by members of the public. Examples have occurred in the United-States. In December 2001, Jamyi Witch became the first Wiccan to be a prison chaplain at the Wanpun prison in Wisconsin. As such, she was now being paid for work that she used to do as a volunteer. For more than a year after her appointment, members of the local community, journalists, and as Will.” This includes avoidance of self-harm as well as harm to others. Some Wiccans take this as a mandate that indicates the need to be vegetarian, or it can be taken to the extent of avoiding harming any life, including ants and houseflies. This rede combines with the threefold law, which decries that anything you do returns to you threefold, which makes for an ethical environment where the Wiccans must always be mindful of their actions. The Rede and the threefold law can be very significant for prisoners to accept responsibility for their personal predicaments, as well as promoting caution regarding their actions and the consequences associated with their choices.

152

mireille gagnon

well as some members of the government, harassed her and tried to get her fired because she was not Christian (see Kottke 2002; Smith 2001; Toosi 2001a, 2001b). The goal of this chapter is to offer a glimpse of the relationships between Wiccan chaplaincy workers and the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) as well as between chaplains and prisoners. These relationships give us insights into religious rights and freedoms in the unique atmosphere of the prison, which has less extensive rights protections than the broader society. I will also explore the impact of Wicca on the chaplaincy programs as well as the impact on the inmates and on the broader Wiccan community itself, since Wicca was not developed with the idea of doing chaplaincy work. In the first section of the chapter, I will briefly describe the CSC and its chaplaincy services. This will be followed by a description of the legal obligations of the CSC and the chaplaincy services. Then, I discuss why and how Wicca and other Pagan groups managed to be integrated within chaplaincy interfaith teams. Finally, drawing on interviews with Wiccan prison chaplains from three provinces, I will explore the ways Wiccan chaplains view their experiences of working with inmates, other chaplains and the CSC. The Correctional Service of Canada The prison system in Canada owes its existence to a religious group which presented theirs as an alternate religion when they arrived in the New England colonies in the seventeenth century. The Quakers of Philadelphia introduced a prison system in 1789 in order to offer an alternative to other forms of punishment being used at that time. Isolation, work, and contemplation were judged as the most efficient way to reform a delinquent (Dulièpre 2006: 4; Laplante 1991: 20). This is known as the Pennsylvania model. Rapidly, this method was adopted by the state of New York, where it was thought that it would diminish the criminality rate (CSC 2003). This type of imprisonment spread rapidly beyond the borders making its way to Europe, and especially England. In 1835, the first penal establishment of its kind in Upper Canada, the Provincial Penitentiary of the Province of Upper Canada, was created in Kingston, Ontario (Curry et al. 2003: 141; Laplante 1991:

old structures, new faces

153

20).3 At the time prisons fell under provincial jurisdiction. The Kingston penitentiary was soon to be followed by two other facilities: one in Saint John, New Brunswick and the other in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Thirty-two years later the British North American Act (1867), divided responsibilities for matters of justice between the new provincial and federal governments (CSC 2003; Laplante 1991: 25). A year later, the federal Penitentiary Act (1868) was adopted. This Act gave the federal government responsibility for the penitentiary centers for inmates sentenced for a minimum of two years and a day, charging the provincial governments with the responsibility for shorter sentences (CSC 2003; Curry et al. 2003: 141). This policy is still in effect today. In 1930, following a prison riot, the Archambault Royal Commission Inquiry was created. Eight years later, it published a report that concentrated on the prevention of crime and the rehabilitation of inmates instead of punishment, truly an innovative approach for its time (Topping 1938: 551). The application of the recommendations was delayed until after the World War II, when in 1956, the Fauteux Committee, using some of the 400 pages of Archambault’s recommendations, proposed changing the very nature of prisons. Gerald Fauteux proposed that vocational training and creative and interesting activities should be offered to inmates in order to modify their basic behavior and attitudes (CSC 2003). Though changes reflecting the recommendations of the Fauteux Committee and the National Parole Board were made, abuse problems persisted, even with the passing of the Parole Act in 1959. Consequently, in 1976, the CSC decided to be more accountable to the public, and granted them more access to the penitentiary centers and allowed them to participate in the elaboration of policies (CSC 2003). In 1992, the Penitentiary Act (1961) and the Parole Act (1959) were replaced by the Correctional and Conditional Release Act (CCRA). According to this Act the mission of the CSC now included two main goals: (a) carrying out sentences imposed by courts through the safe and humane custody and supervision of offenders; and;

3 The penitentiary changed its name to “Provincial Penitentiary of the province of Canada” in 1841 and later on, after the British North American Act in 1867, to “Kingston Penitentiary.” It is now a maximum security penitentiary.

154

mireille gagnon (b) assisting the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law-abiding citizens through the provision of programs in penitentiaries and in the community (Dulièpre 2006: 5; CCRA, section 3).4

Since then, the task of social reintegration of inmates has been under CSC jurisdiction. Subsequently, the CSC would be more open, more subject to outside influence, and more linked to their environment (Delièpre 2006: 24). Presently, the CSC manages 58 institutions ranging in security level from minimal and multilevel to medium and maximum. Together, they hold approximately 13,200 inmates (CSC 2007: 11).5 Since 2001, the CSC and the National Parole Board (NPB) developed a computerized case management file system, known as the Offender Management System (OMS). Among other information, the system registers an inmate’s religious affiliation when she or he first arrives within the CSC’s institutions. This tool aids institutions to accommodate the needs of inmates, such as religious diet. As mentioned earlier, Christian groups represent the largest inmate population (69% to 92% depending on the region). Included in this category are Roman Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants, and Jehovah Witnesses. We also find in lesser numbers atheists, Muslims, Jews, practitioners of Aboriginal Spirituality, Sikhs, Hindus, Buddhists, Rastafarians, Wiccans, people belonging to other minority faiths, and those without stated affiliation. Chaplaincy Services and Obligations Typically, each institution has one or two chaplains who are usually affiliated with a Christian faith and who serve the inmate community. Other faiths are sometimes represented by a contract chaplain and in some provinces, such as Ontario, a multifaith council can provide and assist with chaplaincy services. The increasing numbers of inmates with a religious identity other than Christian brought about a modification in chaplaincy services

Corrections and Conditional Release Act (1992, c. 20; last version September 26, 2007). They also manage 16 Community correctional centers, 71 parole offices and 4 aboriginal healing lodges holding a total of 19,500 offenders in the year 2006–2007. Among the 58 institutions, 5 are for women. Departmental Performance Report, 2006–2007, CSC. 4 5

old structures, new faces

155

as early as the 1980s (CSC 2002b: 7).6 As stipulated in the CSC updated document “Religious and Spiritual Accommodation in CSC Institutions”: The Interfaith chaplaincy services mandated in CCRR 101(a) indicate the responsibility of chaplains to exercise their profession in a multi-faith setting in co-operation with representatives of religious expressions different from their own, and to seek to provide pastoral care to persons of different faith communities with the same commitment as to members of their own community. These services are intended to strengthen the participation of offenders in the faith life of their own communities (CSC 2006: 6).

Chaplains are therefore encouraged to find ways to meet the religious and spiritual needs of the inmate population, and this has resulted in cooperation among chaplains of different faiths and multi-faith chaplaincy teams. These teams work together to accommodate the religious and spiritual needs of the inmate population. The Interfaith Committee on Chaplaincy (IFC) represents 30 confessional groups, and a little more than 100 confessional groups have contracts in order to bring their ministries within the correctional facilities (CSC 2002c: 9). Wiccan representatives form part of this latter group. In a 2002 document entitled, “Toward a Strategic Direction for Chaplaincy,” the chaplaincy services state their mission as follows: “Chaplaincy embraces a restorative justice analysis of criminal justice as an authentic application of spiritual values. Chaplaincy will contribute to the objectives of the CSC Mission in support of relevant legislation and ensure the provision of spiritual and religious care in accordance with the highest standards of Canada’s faith communities” (CSC 2002c: 5). This statement clearly sets out the spiritual support obligations of chaplaincy services in a multifaith setting. With a multicultural population expressing a variety of religious affiliations under its wings, the CSC must manage both the needs and the rights of its inmates. To do so, they must respect the rules and laws that were elaborated and integrated in the Memorandum of Understanding

6 According to the CSC (2006: 3), the statistics concerning inmates religious affiliations were the following in April 2005: There was a total of 21,702 inmates, among those: 9,194 were Catholic; 4,519 Protestant; 761 Muslim; 150 Jewish; 753 Native spirituality; 387 Buddhist; 102 Sikh; 4,286 No religion; 1,437 Other. Inmates who identify themselves as Wiccan are counted among the “Other” category.

156

mireille gagnon

between the IFC and the CSC.7 This memorandum, which is renewed every five years, is guided by the following human rights statements: a. Paragraph 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees everyone the fundamental freedom of conscience and religion; b. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948);8 c. The U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, sections 41 and 42. In essence, article 41 states that the establishment is to offer a qualified representative of a religion, if the number of inmates belonging to that religion or spirituality is sufficient. Article 42 states that an inmate is permitted to have in his possession religious instructional books of his/hers faith and should be able to participate in services organized by the establishment; d. Sections 75 and 83 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and Regulations 98 to 101 underline the importance of the spiritual dimension of life (CSC, 2002b: 1); e. The Mission Statement of the CSC commits the CSC to “accommodate the . . . religious needs of individuals” (Core Value 1, Guiding Principles) and “to respect the . . . religious differences of individual offenders” (Strategic Objective 1.7), all the while “actively encouraging and assisting offenders to become law-abiding citizens” (CSC 2002b: 2). The need to respect these statements is noted in the Strategic Direction document where, in the 2002 report, the ICF observed some shortcomings when it comes to religious minorities and religious accommodations: There is a legal obligation to respect the religious and spiritual needs of offenders. However, a recent audit on offender access to religious and spiritual programs and services in CSC revealed shortcomings in addressing concerns of religious minorities in general. In addition, CSC

7 Memorandum of Understanding between the Interfaith Committee on Chaplaincy and the Correctional Service of Canada—May 1, 2002; http://www.csc-scc .gc.ca/text/prgrm/chap/mou_e.shtml. 8 It states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” 1948–1998 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nation Organization. http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.

old structures, new faces

157

has lost several complaints of religious discrimination that went before the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC). The CHRC has ruled that, in general, CSC should make every effort to accommodate religious needs unless there is policy preventing approval of a specific request (CSC 2002c: 17).

This observation prompted the creation of a committee on the satisfaction of religious needs in order to help the CSC to respond to this demand, but also to elaborate a service policy. Another passage from the strategic plan illustrates some of the concerns that the CSC had regarding religious minorities and the chaplaincy service: A Religious Accommodation Advisory Committee has been established at NHQ to co-ordinate CSC’s response to address this issue and to develop corporate policy. On its agenda are the costs involved in providing religious diets and chaplaincy contracts for representatives of minority religious traditions. As well, it must manage the adjustments required on an operational level when it comes to accommodating different religious holidays, dress, times for worship, and the design and use of “sacred space.” When done properly, religious accommodation promotes increased respect for people, contributes to spiritual growth in the offender and develops partnerships with faith groups to assist in the reintegration process. While there is a small possibility that some persons may see the accommodation of other beliefs as a lack of respect for their own, on the whole the obligation to accommodate presents opportunities to develop new educational resources promoting greater acceptance and respectful tolerance (CSC 2002c:18).

In response, the CSC has created a chaplaincy manual, which has a description of religious minorities and spiritualities, including dietary requirements according to different religions. These documents were written with the help of different religious representatives.9 Input was received from the Pagan Federation/Fédération Païenne du Canada (PFPC), which has since created a new branch of their services, Pagan Pastoral Outreach (PPO). Even with all these tools in place, some inmates have brought the failure of the CSC to respect their religious rights before the courts. In Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General), an inmate sought to have his rights to a vegetarian diet respected even though he was no longer a member of the Hare Krishna faith.10 Since 1998, Jack Maurice, at the time an inmate at the minimum security Ste-Anne des Plaines correctional 9 10

Most of these documents about the CSC are available on their Internet site. Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 69 (CanLII).

158

mireille gagnon

facility in Québec before he was transferred to Alberta, had requested a vegetarian diet on numerous occasions, but was repeatedly turned down because special diets are reserved for religious or medical purposes only.11 He filed a series of grievances challenging the decision as an infringement of his rights under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. The judge in the case noted that special diets available under the CSC Religious Diet General Guideline included vegetarian ones and that he believed Maurice held a strong belief regarding the consumption of animal products, therefore Maurice’s rights had been infringed, hence he was entitled to a vegetarian diet. Another such case is David v. Canada (Attorney General) in which the inmate, Duane David, a Muslim incarcerated in the medium security Joyceville Institution in Kingston, Ontario, demanded a meat substitute for bacon in accordance with halal dietary prescriptions.12 This request was denied by the institution. After a grievance was filed internally and denied at all levels, a commission was brought in to investigate the complaint. Even though the establishment accommodates halal diets, they do not offer substitutes for food items that are forbidden in the Muslim diet, they simply exclude that portion of the meal (e.g. bacon) to Muslim prisoners. As no substitute for the bacon was made available, this could constitute a denial of the inmate’s rights. Since the Commission could not provide a tenable explanation for their conclusion and failed to address allegations of discrimination, Mr. David’s request for a judicial review of the decision was allowed, and the Attorney General was ordered to pay Mr. David $2,000. The case is awaiting the report of a new investigator, and therefore a final resolution is as yet unavailable. The case of R. v. Chan in Alberta, the inmate, Chan, contested a decision denying him rights to a vegetarian meal as a Buddhist, Chinese Taoist and Confucian.13 He also asked for access to religious items such as incense and prayer beads. Though Chan was an inmate in Albertan provincial facilities (Calgary Remand Centre and the Red Deer Remand Centre) and not with the CSC, his case still illustrates the sort of religious accommodation requests made by inmates. In this case, the inmate did not declare his religious affiliation when he started his first

11 12 13

The precise institution at the time of the 2002 hearing is not mentioned. David v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 887 (CanLII). R. v. Chan, 2005 ABQB 615 (CanLII).

old structures, new faces

159

incarceration, nor was he asked his affiliation when he was admitted a second time two years later. Thus, according to the Deputy Director of Administration and Finance, Chan was not eligible to have access to a special diet or to have special religious items, since conversion after the initial incarceration is not recognized. As noted in the comments, the correctional authorities do have the right to question the validity of the dietary request for religious or health reasons, but they do not have the “right to tell to an inmate that they do not recognize religious conversion.”14 As a result, the judgement was in favor of Chan on the dietary issue but not with respect to the religious items.15 The security concerns regarding prayer beads (which can be used as a projectile) and incense (a fire hazard with impact on air quality) were the main consideration in this latter decision.16 These cases are just some examples of possible infringement on the religious rights of inmates while incarcerated. As demonstrated in R.v. Chan, these rights can be denied for security and safety reasons in the prison context. The accounts of some of the Wiccan chaplains discussed later in this chapter provide further instances. Wicca and Paganism in the Chaplaincy Services Now that we have a basic idea of the context in which the chaplaincy services developed, we are in a better position to look at the roles of Wicca priestesses and priests in those services and how they have evolved. The data presented here were collected through questionnaires and interviews with Wiccans and Pagans who work in the prison chaplaincy programs in the federal and provincial prisons and youth detention centers. Across the country there are approximately 20 Wiccans and Pagans, mostly women, who do chaplaincy work.17 Of the four people I interviewed, three are part of the founding members of the PPO and of the PFPC.18 These interviews were either conducted

R.v.Chan, 2005 ABQB 615 (CanLII), at para 65. R.v.Chan, 2005 ABQB 615 (CanLII), at paras 167–169, 223. 16 R.v.Chan, 2005 ABQB 615 (CanLII), at paras 164–165. 17 This number is an estimate made by different Wiccan chaplains. 18 The PPO is not the only organization, apart from the WCC, which has prison chaplains. The Aquarian Tabernacle Church of Canada in (ATC) British Columbia has been doing some chaplaincy as well. My sample does not have any of them as 14 15

160

mireille gagnon

by telephone or e-mail. The interviewees are chaplains in British Columbia or Ontario. Given their own backgrounds and the limited number of Wiccan/Pagan chaplains in Canada, this small group of interviewees is able to offer valuable insight into the Wicca/Pagan chaplaincy. Though most of them have been Wiccan for over twenty years, one of them was initiated nine years ago, but considers herself as Pagan only. As mentioned earlier, Wicca is considered a Pagan religion; therefore some Wiccans identify themselves as both Wiccan and Pagans. Others prefer to use only the broader term Pagan to distance themselves from the popularity of Wicca or to signal an inclusion of other Paganism traditions.19 Wiccans were introduced to the chaplaincy services in 1991 under the wing of the Wiccan Church of Canada in Toronto (WCC), which opened a branch in Ottawa in 1992. Though the WCC is not an official representative of the whole Wiccan community, the CSC approached it as such in response to requests made by inmates. One Wiccan person I interviewed, who at one time represented the WCC in Ottawa, was concerned at that time about the WCC claim that it spoke for all Wiccans and Pagans, since there is no centralized institutional body within Wicca nor any such body that Wiccans recognize. “The only specific before starting was a concern that in 1991, the Wiccan Church of Canada had claimed the right to speak for all Wiccans/Pagans in prison. I co-wrote a letter to CSC at that time, stating that while we supported WCC becoming involved in prison ministry, no one Pagan group could claim to speak for all others” (PC3 2005–07–01), inasmuch as Wicca has no set of unified dogmas, no common institution that dictates correct practices, and has two major types of practitioner, those who belong and practice in a coven (group) and those who are solitaries. If we add to this the existence of hundreds of different traditions in Wicca and the idea that each person has her or his own path to follow, then it makes it quite difficult for one group to represent all Wiccans and Pagans.

informants since they are working at a more local level (provincial, detention centers, etc.). As for the WCC, I was not able to make contact with some of their chaplains. 19 For a discussion of self-identification among Wiccans see Gagnon, 2003: 67–68.

old structures, new faces

161

In 1994 a volunteer-based program for prison visits was established, initially as part of the PFPC.20 Since 2002, this program has evolved so much that it has detached itself from its founding organization to become an organization with its own identity, known as the Pagan Pastoral Outreach (PPO).21 While still maintaining a link with the PFPC, it could now develop its own chaplaincy program. Although concentrating primarily on the Kingston Penitentiary and institutions in the Ottawa region, the PPO also offers services to nine other prisons across Canada on a permanent basis and eight other institutions on occasion. In addition, since March 2000, in federal establishments in Ontario prison chaplains are under contract with the CSC chaplaincy services for that region, meaning that, depending of the nature of their work, some Wiccan representatives are now compensated and reimbursed for their expenses. The Wiccan and Pagan Inmate Population As already mentioned, Wiccans and Pagan chaplains are not available in all CSC institutions. Depending on the situation and presence of Pagan inmates, the need for a chaplain will vary. But exactly how many Wiccans and Pagans are incarcerated within the CSC? Since 2001, Wicca and Paganism among inmates have increased. Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown by region and shows a dramatic increase, especially in the Ontario region where the number went from 18 inmates in 2001 to 41 in 2007. A number of factors are involved, including a better presence of Wiccan and Pagan chaplains, more Pagan literary resources because of the PFPC and the WCC, and more contact between Pagan and non-Pagan inmates through the local prison “grapevine,” though it is difficult to know precisely to what extent awareness of Wicca and Paganism has impacted these measures.

20 As mentioned by Dr. Lucie DuFresne during an interview, the PFPC was created by a group of five people for different reasons, but mostly as a response to a possible sexual abuse problem in the Kingston prison between an inmate and a volunteer, and to make sure that Wicca and other Pagan groups are defined by Pagans and not by a government representative who knows little about them. The CSC approached one of the informants since she was already doing ecumenical work in Ottawa, and the PFPC became an alternative to the WCC and a mediator between the authorities and the public (TCP2, 200710–1). 21 They also include chaplaincy for the military, the hospitals, universities, and offer information about dying and green burial practices.

162

mireille gagnon Figure 1: Wiccan Inmates in CSC 2001–2007

60

Nbr of inmates

50 40 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007

30 20 10 0

ATL

QUE

ONT Region

PRA

PAC

Overall, in 2001, there were 25 inmates registered as Wiccans or Pagans. Six years later, in 2007, there are 67 Wiccans and 10 Pagans within CSC institutions and communities (see Figure 2). Since 2005–2006, the CSC has reported Pagans and Wiccans separately. The reasons for this change have not been stated. It may be simply that a larger number of inmates started to identify themselves as Pagan (for instance, Asatru, Druidry), rather than as Wiccans, or perhaps the chaplaincy services developed a better understanding of the differences between Wicca and Paganism in general. Types of Activities The nature of chaplaincy work for Wiccan chaplains from the PPO includes the following activities: Wiccan chaplains provide ritual assistance to the prisoners, aimed at helping inmates hold rituals such as sabbat observances. This ritual assistance is also related to a series of courses provided to inmates, as well as supervising correspondence programs between inmates and pagans that are not in prison and have volunteered to provide guidance to inmates. As some prisoners cannot have visitors, the correspondence program allows connection to a “community” of sorts and gives the opportunity for volunteers to become engaged even if they cannot participate in the chaplaincy programs. The Wiccan/Pagan chaplains also provide consultation services, not

old structures, new faces

163

Figure 2: Wiccan and Pagan Inmates in CSC 2001–2007 80 70

Nbr of inmates

60 50 Wiccans Pagans

40 30 20 10 0

2001–2002

2002–2003

2003–2004

2004–2005

2005–2006

2006–2007

only to inmates but also to other religious chaplains to foster a better sense of the faith and paths of Wiccans and Pagans. Wiccan chaplains have created The Sabbat Lessons Program, which is a multi-traditionbased correspondence program aimed at developing the inmate’s own path and notion of Wiccan and/or Paganism. Though their main activities occur in the context of their visits to inmates, Wiccan and Pagan chaplains also respond to requests for information and support from different chaplains and inmates across the country. They do not proselytize, nor do they initiate inmates. Consequently no inmate is a priest or teacher and the PPO encourages equality and collaboration among inmates at rituals. The PPO has also developed a correspondence program between inmates and Pagans outside the prison, and has contributed to the Prison Chaplaincy manual and the CSC Restorative Justice Week. Chaplains also work to publish articles and poems written by the inmates. Since the PPO is not only Wiccan, but includes a variety of Pagan traditions, it has developed a generic Pagan tradition for inmates, called the Green Man Tradition.22 Since they started the tradition and programs, three of the penitentiary institutions in Ontario (Bath, Joyceville and Kingston) now have a green patch of land next to the chapel where

22

Cf. http://www.ppo-canada.ca/prison/greenman.htm.

164

mireille gagnon

inmates have planted bulbs of flowers.23 These green areas become places where Pagan inmates can conduct their sabbat rituals.24 Motivations Chaplaincy work takes time and energy. What motivates those who choose to do this work? My interviews with this group of chaplains indicate that one motivation is the desire to make Wicca and Paganism a publicly available religious choice. Further, these chaplains feel that Wiccan and Pagan practitioners need to have the same resources that other religious traditions do within the prison system. One of the informants mentioned that she is also a member of the Quakers (Society of Friends), and this had a hand in her motivation. Since the Quakers are concerned with the de-humanising nature of prison and the concept of punishment, the fit for this chaplain was quite natural.25 She was attracted to the idea that it was possible for prisoners to “turn their lives around” through the Restorative Justice aspect of the CSC, which she thinks “needs to become a much more viable and ‘used’ option” (PC3, 200507–1: 4). Another participant stated that she was motivated in part by the commitment of her particular tradition to make Paganism public. Chaplaincy work helps her to fulfill this mandate (PC2, 200506–1). The other informant also spoke about this goal of public recognition: I don’t think that I had any specific assumptions when I first started. It was simply a case of a body of Wiccans who seemed genuinely seeking a spiritual path, in the very difficult circumstances, and being aware that help was needed to continue visitation for them. I was semi-aware that getting recognition in a federal prison would add to public acceptance of Wicca as a valid faith—but that was very secondary at first. In general, I

23 Bath and Joyceville already had green spaces in these locations and simply allowed Pagans to access them. In 2002 the Kingston facility allowed the creation of a green patch of land inside the maximum institution’s walls. This patch of land has been reworked by the Pagan inmates, using their own money to purchase what was needed for bulbs and grass. Green areas, depending on the penitentiary, may also be used by aboriginal groups. 24 Most of the rituals last about 2 hours. The exceptions are the two most important Sabbats of the Pagan wheel calendar, Beltain and Samhain, which are day-long rituals. 25 The Quakers had created a Quaker Committee on Jails and Justice in the 1980s. They have the abolition of prisons as a long term goal. Cf. http://cfsc.quaker. ca/qcjj.

old structures, new faces

165

felt that Wicca was one avenue for exploring a more spiritual approach to their “rehabilitation” and that all such valid measures should be available to them (PC3, 200507–01).

Another aspect which motivates Wiccans for chaplaincy work is thus the belief that it can have a beneficial effect on the inmates, and that it will help their social readaptation and thereby society in general: It is important for anyone exploring a spiritual path to have input from those who “have walked the path before them.” Developing spirituality really changes things, for anyone, especially people with a lot of time on their hands. I want to assist with that. The changes the inmates effect in their lives are theirs. We only facilitate what they are doing. We also give them a reflection of a part of the outside world that is not completely down on them; that maybe there is a chance for them on the outside. We also give them ways of coping while they are inside. Not psychological tricks, but a trust in Divinity presented in forms which they can embrace (PC2, 200506–1).

One of the respondents mentioned that it was the restorative justice measures that motivated her to embark along this path. She specifically described her desire to do chaplaincy work as a calling that emerged when she visited a prison in 1992 (PC3, 200507–1). As mentioned by Lucie DuFresne, a professor at the University of Ottawa and one of the PFPC’s administrators, doing prison chaplaincy work is not an easy task. The person doing this sort of work must have a strong will and be able to keep their personal concerns in check. If they have ego problems, they are unlikely to last long in this kind of environment, since they have to deal with inmates who can have a very strong will and temperament and who would like to take control over the group (TPC1, 200709–1). She noted that more Pagan women than men are doing chaplaincy work, although this may be a reflection of the higher number of female Pagans generally. Relations with the Chaplaincy Services In order to have an idea of how Wiccans have been received in prison chaplaincy services, I asked them how they perceived their relationship with the CSC. In general, it seems that they have been welcomed and received support from Christian chaplains when needed. Three of my interviewees have written about Pagan groups for the CRC chaplaincy booklet. They each mentioned that they have received excellent support from the chaplain in charge of the project. As one of them put it, they

166

mireille gagnon

are all seeking to solve problems, not make them (TPC2, 200710–1). Nevertheless, there were stories of unsupportive chaplains who made Pagan chaplains’ work difficult and even sometimes impossible. Such a situation was often the result of a new prison director or a new chaplain (TCP2, 200710–1). Tensions that exist between the CSC and the chaplaincy service generally serve to exacerbate problems faced by minority-religion chaplains. Confusion over Pagan and Wiccan practices has also occasionally caused problems. A genuine and well-intentioned desire to respond to the needs of religious minorities by chaplaincy services has sometimes resulted in their abuse. For example, one inmate allegedly demanded 1000 incense sticks, an amount that would far exceed the personal needs for daily practice. As one of the participants noted, these phenomenal quantities can be used to mask the use of drugs or as money in exchange with other inmates. She observes: I believe that CSC has a fear of appearing ‘prejudiced’, and has (in some cases) been going ‘out of their way’ to appear supportive to Wiccans/Pagans. This has not always been to our benefit in the end—for example, inmates demanding (and receiving) ‘religious rights’ that they didn’t have and/or abuse of ‘religious rights’ because the chaplain was not clear as to what they would be for Wiccans/Pagans; allowing situations to evolve that broke prison policies and/or actually endangered visitors and/or chaplaincy itself, etc. (PC3–200507–01).

Pagan and Wiccan religious character as a non-centralized belief/practice has also caused special challenges when representation is needed to deal with CSC. Such matters are among the reasons that the PFPC and, later, the PPO were created. They are areas in which they have intervened and worked with the CSC chaplain services, including assistance with the CSC chaplaincy booklet and the creation of as dietary food guide for Wiccans and Pagans. In the process, some accommodations have been made; for example, inmates are now allowed only one incense stick at a time. In some institution they cannot burn it in their rooms, but only in the chapel (TCP2, 200710–1). DuFresne recalled that when the PFPC first began, it would receive calls every week concerning particular problems, accommodation issues, or even Pagan and Wiccan chaplain and visitor safety issues (PC3–200507–04). She thinks that at the time inmates and the CSC chaplain services were seeking to understand the limits of religious rights and chaplaincy visitations where Pagans were concerned. Today, almost thirteen years later, most of the work is

old structures, new faces

167

done, and the few issues that arise are simply other versions of initial problems and are quickly resolved (TCP2, 200710–1). The lack of formal training in chaplaincy and counselling is a major obstacle for Wiccans and Pagans. One participant felt that this lack of training has an impact on their credibility as a legitimate faith in terms of their relations with other chaplains and with CSC. Often they need to talk and I would like to make better use of the limited time we have with them. This leads in to our lack of “credentials” and the Powers that Be not taking our faith group seriously. I believe that as we get more formal training, this will change (PC2, 200506–1).

This participant also mentioned the Pagan Ministry training program online at the Cherry Hill Seminary. This seminary is located in Vermont in the United States. It offers training public ministry and Pagan pastoral counselling.26 In Canada, there is the Canadian Association for Pastoral Practice and Education (CAPPE/ACPEP), a multi-faith organization.27 It offers training, but not an online program. Nevertheless, training of Pagans to do pastoral work is not common at the moment, although the PPO does try to offer help in this matter. Relations with the Administration Another facet of this research is to explore the relationship between Wiccan chaplains and penitentiary administrations. For the most part these relations are positive, although direct interactions with administration are few. Requests by Wiccan chaplains are channelled through chaplaincy services or the guards at either the entrance or around the chapel. Sometimes guards who are not familiar with the Wiccan chaplain can be problematic: Again, it does depend on the particular guard—some are more openminded; others, less. Again, this does create some degree of problem because, for example, there are no clear standards as to what we are allowed to bring in and how—so the difficulty of getting it approved can change even within one prison, depending on who the guards are. For the most part, however, they take the word of the chaplain (PC3, 200507–01). Cf. http://www.cherryhillseminary.org. One of the problems with this group is accessibility of the classes, since they are not held everywhere in Canada, and not all of the teachers are open to accepting Pagans in their classes. Cf. http://www.cappe.org/members/index.html. 26 27

168

mireille gagnon

Sometimes Wiccan chaplains must rely on their relationship with the CSC chaplains to be able to do their work. Security requirements, limitation of physical environments and restrictions on visiting time also impose limitations, but for the most part no more so on Wiccan/Pagan chaplains than on others. Respondents did note that they were often uniformed about situations that could affect a visit such as a lock-down. Relations with the Inmates Relations with inmates are at the center of Pagan chaplaincy work. Respondents noted that inmates feel lucky to receive visitors and to have contact with the outside world. Many inmates are in maximumsecurity facilities that are sometimes located in relatively remote areas, thus restricting their accessibility to visitors. Thus, they are inclined to respond positively to the opportunity to have visitors. However, there are some inmates who will try to take control of a situation or will try to influence the Wiccans who visit them. By trying to do so, the inmates put in doubt the authority of Wiccan chaplains, and this can have a devastating affect on the group as a whole. For example, at one point the PPO had to refuse to go to a certain penal institution because one of the inmates abused his religious rights and constantly questioned the authority of different providers, including the CSC chaplaincy services (PC3, 200507–01). But this is only one case. In general, during the last 16 years, it seems that relationships between Wiccan and Pagan chaplains and inmates who meet on regular basis are unproblematic. Though sometimes inmates do try to push boundaries, interactions are generally positive. Nevertheless, the situation can be difficult for Wiccan inmates, since most of them have not had any experience with Paganism before their incarceration.28 Therefore, they base their knowledge on the books they find in the penitentiary library

28 The informant estimates that 75% of the inmates chose Wicca once incarcerated and discovered it from the inside, while 10% of them heard of Wicca prior to going in. Though this is only an estimate, it does raise the question of what kind of information and how much information is circulating within the penitentiary about Paganism and Wicca. According to the same informant, since prison facilities are far from one another in Canada, the “prison grapevine” does not work as well as in the U.S., where inmates more frequently learn about Wicca from other inmates.

old structures, new faces

169

and apply them literally.29 Because external leadership is not always available, the CSC does allow some inmate Pagans to form chapel groups in an unsupervised setting. While some inmates have tried to use Wicca and Paganism to their advantage over other inmates during their incarceration either for privileges or for standing, others are “reluctant of making religious rights demands for fear that it might be used against them at their parole hearings” (PC3, 200507–01). This makes it harder for the Wiccan chaplains to provide adequate services to them if needed, since the inmates have to request this service in order to receive it. By contrast, when asked about positive experiences with the inmates, one of the people I interviewed said: There are many (I actually quite enjoy working with most of them), but perhaps the most profound was when we had a “good-bye/getting out” ritual for an inmate who was one of the “wise-guy/enforcer” types, and served his whole sentence in a maximum security prison: he turned to me, put his head on my shoulder and cried, because he was so scared of the “outside” (i.e. that the group had allowed him the safety to cry openly). Otherwise, I would say doing a dedication rite for an inmate who I had “high hopes” for, with three chaplains and the regional chaplain in attendance (this was the inmate’s choice of participants). More than a decade later, this inmate is still out and in touch with me—and remains a dear brother (PC3, 200507–01).

As noted in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, though change and impact may be small and only a few of the Pagan inmates continue their practices once outside, they seem to appreciate the work chaplains do. “I am continuing with the work because I enjoy it and because I have come to believe that it does have an impact, however small, on the inmates, and so, on society in general” (PC2, 200506–1). Chaplains feel that their work has an immediate and local impact, as well as far-reaching consequences.

29 These books are not written for the prison context, so some of the ritual tools that inmates request on the basis of these books are not accessible for security purposes. In this regard, the PFPC helped the prison libraries by giving them a list of relevant books that could be purchased (TCP1, 200710–2).

170

mireille gagnon

The Future of Pagan and Wiccan Prison Chaplaincy I asked the respondents what they thought the future holds for prison chaplaincy services. They feel that, because Wicca and Paganism are growing in popularity, more inmates will dedicate themselves to this path, thus the demand for prison chaplaincy services for Wiccans will grow. Finding Wiccans to serve in this capacity is a challenge since it does not reflect a traditional Wiccan path. Interestingly, during the last two years, during the Gaïa Gathering (National Canadian Pagan Conference), Wiccan and Pagan chaplaincy has been a subject of discussion. Participants also mentioned that the CSC must make some changes to the way it functions in order to accommodate the increasing numbers of religious minorities. One of the Wiccan chaplains said: CSC chaplaincy is probably going to have to change pretty drastically over the next decade to deal with the rise in minority religion requests. PPO has proposed to CSC that “staff chaplains” become “chaplaincy organizers and advocates” with a specific multi-faith background, rather than the usual Catholic and Protestant chaplains—in order to deal with the rise in requests from minority religions. This new/replacement role would ensure that the person running the chaplaincy would have more knowledge about various religious traditions, including Wicca/Paganism (PC3, 200507–01).

In 2005, the PPO representative indicated that, with the help of other religious groups’ representatives, they have started to work with the CSC on the elaboration of a mentoring program for prison chaplaincy work in order to prepare chaplains better for the prison environment. Different traditions, different forms of Paganism, and the resistance to any form of “centralized organization” are some of the obstacles that they encounter in trying to recruit Wiccan chaplains. As one of the informant mentioned: What is more important, I think, is for the smaller groups to be willing to associate with PPO (or rather, individual members of those groups who are interested in prison ministry, since PPO operates on individual accountability)—in order to make it easier for them to gain access to the prisons, and to ensure that the precedents being set aren’t problematic or inconsistent. The PPO “associate” status was specifically set up to meet this kind of need, but so far, the odd “smaller” group who is doing prison ministry has chosen to remain autonomous (although one definitely does regularly report to and ask for advice from us) (PC3, 200507–15).

old structures, new faces

171

With the growing popularity of Wicca and the growing number of Wiccans and Pagans doing chaplaincy work, a support system has been created between American and Canadian Wiccans and Pagans in the form of a discussion group online. Conclusion At first glance, the impact of Wicca in the prison system might seem minimal. However, if we consider the impact of Wicca and other religious minorities as a whole, we can see the effects it has had on the shifting approach to religious minorities in prison. The creation of an interfaith chaplaincy service; the establishment of a food guide according to one’s religious affiliation; the creation of multi-confessional rooms to be used by different religious groups or even in some cases, like in Kingston, a green patch outdoors for Pagan and aboriginal rituals; the creation of laws and rules to ensure the respect of the religious rights and freedom of inmates; and the elaboration of a prison chaplaincy guide; these are just some of the changes brought by the arrival of religious minorities. To be sure, those who work as Wiccan and Pagan chaplains in the prison system experience challenges: inmates are not always forthright about their motives or needs, communication among chaplains and between chaplains and administration is sometimes less than perfect, and the decentralized and individualistic nature of Wiccan and Pagan practice all contribute to the sometimes challenging job of providing services to Wiccans and Pagans in prison. Overall, relationships between inmates, chaplains, and administration are positive as the shifting and diverse religious needs of prisoners are addressed. Correctional facilities are, in a way, a representation of the general population, within the confines of a limited setting for security purposes. The populations within its walls are composed of a variety of ethnic, cultural, political and religious individuals. Although Christians dominate the general inmate population, the rise in numbers of people with non-Christian affiliations gives us an indicator of possible trends and changes within the composition of the Canadian general population. To study transformations within this context permits us to view and analyze what is happening in the society that surrounds it. The recognition of the rights of religious minorities and their accommodation

172

mireille gagnon

in the prison context indicates not only the correctional facilities are showing openness and respect in this regard, but also that governments recognize these same rights outside of these institutions. The example of Wicca in the penitentiary system is just one of many which can give us a glimpse into the ways in which religious diversity is shifting perceptions and practices about religion and spirituality. The presence of Wiccan and Pagan chaplains in prisons, the fact that their beliefs and practices are included in the chaplaincy manual, and the creation of space, whether physical (for example, outdoor green spaces) or social, points to the possibilities for the positive management of diversity. Though the old structures of the traditional Christian faiths are still present, new faces are gradually appearing within chaplaincy teams, reflecting a Canadian society which is itself increasingly religiously diverse. References Beckford, James A. 1998. “Ethnic and Religious Diversity among Prisoners: The Politics of Prison Chaplaincy.” Social Compass 45: 265–77. CanLII. 2002. Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 69. Canadian Legal Information Institute. ———. 2005. R.v.Chan, 2005 ABQB615. Canadian Legal Information Institute. ———. 2007. David v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 887. Canadian Legal Information Institute. Coren, Michael. 2003. “Witch Way to Prison?” Toronto Sun, Aug. 2: 15. CSC 1992a. “Corrections and Conditional Release Regulation” (Oct. 29). Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada. ———. 1992b. “Corrections and Conditional Release Act (1992, c. 20)” [last version Sept. 26, 2007]. Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada. ———. 2002a. “The Review of Offender Access to Religious and Spiritual Programs and Services,” ( June) 378–1–249. Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada. ———. 2002b. “Memorandum of Understanding between the Interfaith Committee on Chaplaincy and the Correctional Services of Canada,” (May 1). Ottawa: Correctoinal Service of Canada. ———. 2002c. “Toward a Strategic Direction for Chaplaincy” (Feburary). ———. 2003. “Penitentiaries in Canada.” Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada. ———. 2006. “Religion and Spiritual Accommodation in CSC Institutions.” Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada. ———. 2007. “2006–2007 Performance Report,” Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada. Curry, Ann, Kris Wolf, Sandra Boutilier, and Helen Chan. 2003. “Canadian Federal Prison Libraries: A National Survey.” Journal of Librarianship and Information Science 35: 141–52. Dulièpre, Béatrice. 2006. “Analyse des espaces de visites du service correctionnel du Canada.” Paper presented at the University of Québec at Montréal (15 May). www.unites.uqam.ca/grieva/les%20ressources/DocumentsDeRessources/ TravauxDeRecherche/grievatextebeatriceduliepre.pdf.

old structures, new faces

173

Gagnon, Mireille. 2003. “La mouvance wiccane au Québec: Portrait d’une religion de sorcellerie contemporaine.” Master’s thesis, Laval University (Québec). Kottke, Colleen. 2002. “Wiccan Chaplain targeted by Attacks” Northeast Council of W.I.C.C.A. (Nov. 24). Laplante, Jacques. 1991. “Cent ans de prison: Les conditions et les ‘privilèges’ des détenus, hommes, femmes et enfants.” Criminologie 24: 11–32. Smith, Susan Lampert. 2001. “Wicca Religion of New Prison Chaplain Stirs up Concern, Outrage and Hostile Comments” (Dec. 6). Wisconsin State Journal. Statistics Canada. 2003. “Les religions au Canada,” Recensement de 2001. Ottawa: Statistics Canada 96F0030XIF2001015. Toosi, Nahal. 2001a. “Rite of Passage: Wiccan is New State Prison Chaplain” (Dec. 5). Mil waukee Journal-Sentinel. www2.jsonline.com/news/metro/dec01/ witch061220501a.asp. ———. 2001. “Wiccan Defends Right to be Chaplain” (Dec. 8). Milwaukee JournalSentinel. Topping, C.W. 1938. “Report of the Royal Commission on the Penal System of Canada.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 4: 551–59.

CHAPTER EIGHT

BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION: THE CASE OF QUÉBEC Solange Lefebvre It will come as no surprise that many academic discussions about the “return of religion” since the end of the 1970s have focused on relationships between politics and religion. In quick succession, we witnessed the rise of Khomeini in Iran, the accession of John Paul II as head of Catholicism, and the activism of the Dalai Lama, the exiled head of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. Evangelical and Islamist movements have been expanding, and liberation theologies have made their mark. More recently, China has had its troubles with Falun Gong, and several members of this persecuted spiritual movement now form a critical diaspora. The same can be said for the Baha’is. Having been persecuted in Iran since their appearance there in the 19th century, they are now scattered in many countries around the world. In the midst of all this, Christian churches have continued to pursue their social and political commitments in the many countries where they have taken root. Sociologists in particular have been busy writing books on these new religious manifestations in the public sphere. In the wake of this spate of writings, one of the interesting theses developed is that of José Casanova who turns his attention to the “deprivatization” of religions (1994). In carrying out his analysis, Casanova still gives credence to the theory of secularization which, in light of renewed worldwide public declarations and demands from religions, has now been revisited and revised by a good many sociologists. Following David Martin (1978) and Karel Dobbelaere (1981), Casanova makes his revision by clarifying the distinct levels of secularization: privatization of religion, decline in practices and beliefs, and separation between the spheres of science, politics, and religion. In the latter, he finds a normative meaning: these spheres must indeed be differentiated, yet this will not prevent, and may even authorize, public assertions by religions which now feel strengthened by their new-found independence.

176

solange lefebvre

But these theories on the public role of religions do not reflect the types of claims religions are now making in the public sphere: rights to wear various religious symbols and demands to accommodate certain religious practices in public places. In fact, orthodox believers, that is, those desiring to live in compliance with the dictates of their own religious groups, suffer the effects of this close association between religion and politics which, over recent years, has been dominating academic and media debates. The matter becomes even more complex in countries experiencing large influxes of immigrants, such as Canada. Here, as models for integrating these new arrivals are being debated, the religion question has imposed itself more forcefully than ever before. This chapter reflects on the current state of affairs in the province of Québec, which stands out as a region whose population is more homogeneous than elsewhere in North America (Bibby 2002; Forsé and Langlois 1995; Gauvreau 2005; Olson and Hadaway 1999). The vast majority of people in this province are of French stock and claim Roman Catholic affiliation (Lefebvre 2007, 2008; Statistics Canada 2003). According to recent Canadian statistics, only a minority of Québec residents either declare that they have no religion or that they belong to a different Christian or other religious group. Several studies have observed the close relationship between Catholicism and the culture of this homogeneous core, while also noting within it a low rate of religious practice and a privatization of faith. As is the case elsewhere in Canada, the religious “other” has been appearing more frequently in Québec since the 1980s. And as everywhere else in the world, Québec has been feeling the pressure of the post-9/11 context, which has brought into the open secret fears of the religious “other” as well as complex expressions of assertive loyalty to a specific identity. We shall try to examine all of this more completely by analyzing the recent debate about what in Québec is being called the “reasonable accommodation” of religious expressions. To put it briefly, when it comes to granting religious accommodations to members of minority religions, Québeckers are reacting more strongly and publicly than people in other parts of North America. The minority religions at issue are, in particular, Sikhism, Judaism, and Islam. This chapter focuses on these three religious groups, drawing on legal decisions related to each. The first section gives a brief account of the current situation. It also takes note of the recent debate on religious diversity in Québec, as expressed through the creation of a commission on reasonable accommodation. The second section compares Catholic cultures with those

between law and public opinion

177

where Protestantism or religious pluralism is stronger. The concepts of secularization and laïcité are central to this discussion. The third section brings to light the principal elements defining religious freedom in certain decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. The final section reflects upon the problems posed by this reading of the law. Tensions over Religious Symbols Three successive judgments on accommodation for certain religious practices will serve to illustrate the current tensions in Québec society. The first is a 2004 judgment by the Supreme Court of Canada authorizing the construction of a “succah” on the balcony of one of Montréal’s luxury condominiums whose by-laws forbid the installation of any such conspicuous structures. The second judgment from the Supreme Court of Canada, also in 2004, confirmed the right of a Sikh youth to wear a kirpan under his clothing in a public secondary school (attended by 12 to 16 year olds). In the third case, Québec’s Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse in 2006 granted a group of more than one hundred young Muslim men access to free space in a university to do their prayer ritual. In its reasoning with respect to the the Amselem case, which dealt with the succah controversy, the Supreme Court of Canada describes the facts concerning it as follows: The appellants [. . .], all Orthodox Jews, are divided co-owners of units in luxury buildings in Montréal. Under the terms of the by-laws in the declaration of co-ownership, the balconies of individual units, although constituting common portions of the immovable, are nonetheless reserved for the exclusive use of the co-owners of the units to which they are attached. The appellants set up “succahs” on their balconies for the purposes of fulfilling the biblically mandated obligation of dwelling in such small enclosed temporary huts during the annual nine-day Jewish religious festival of Succot. The respondent requested their removal, claiming that the succahs violated the by-laws, which, inter alia, prohibited decorations, alterations and constructions on the balconies. None of the appellants had read the declaration of co-ownership prior to purchasing or occupying their individual units. The respondent proposed to allow the appellants to set up a communal succah in the gardens. The appellants expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposed accommodation, explaining that a communal succah would not only cause extreme hardship with their religious observance, but would also be contrary to their

178

solange lefebvre personal religious beliefs, which, they claimed, called for the setting up of their own succahs on their own balconies.1

This description evokes both a religious group, termed Orthodox, and an orthodox religious attitude. By orthodox, we mean norms established by a clergy and a religious institution (ortho—right and correct; doxa—opinion). An “orthodox” religious group is one that defends “the true doctrine” as well as the religious attitude of willing obedience to its norms. In the Amselem case the building of a succah was a matter of obeying a duty imposed by the Torah, the source of orthodoxy for Orthodox Jews. However, the Supreme Court introduces a conception of orthodoxy which, in fact, accords little importance to the orthodoxy of the group itself: “Since the focus of the inquiry is not on what others view the claimant’s religious obligations as being, but what the claimant views these personal religious ‘obligations’ to be, it is inappropriate to require expert opinions.” The Court was commenting on the fact that the two rabbis consulted did not share the same view on this religious obligation. Let us now look at the second case. In the Multani case, which involved a Sikh schoolboy wearing a kirpan, the facts were the following: In 2001, G accidentally dropped the kirpan he was wearing under his clothes in the yard of the school he was attending. The school board sent G’s parents a letter in which, as a reasonable accommodation, it authorized their son to wear his kirpan to school provided that he complied with certain conditions to ensure that it was sealed inside his clothing. G and his parents agreed to this arrangement. The governing board of the school refused to ratify the agreement on the basis that wearing a kirpan at the school violated art. 5 of the school’s Code de vie [code of conduct], which prohibited the carrying of weapons. The school board’s council of commissioners upheld that decision and notified G and his parents that a symbolic kirpan in the form of a pendant or one in another form made of a material rendering it harmless would be acceptable in the place of a real kirpan.

As in the previous case, a legal saga ensued. The Superior Court declared the decision of no force or effect and allowed G to wear his kirpan provided that certain conditions were met. The Court of Appeal overturned this judgment; and the Supreme Court of Canada then upheld the decision made by the Superior Court.

1

Northcrest Syndicat vs. Amselem 2004 SCC 47.

between law and public opinion

179

In its decision on the Multani case, the Supreme Court defines the orthodoxy of the adolescent in this way: “G and his father B are orthodox Sikhs. G believes that his religion requires him to wear a kirpan at all times; a kirpan is a religious object that resembles a dagger and must be made of metal . . .”2 Here orthodoxy means that the believer is obedient to his religion in the manner of observant Sikhs. The kirpan is one of five core symbols of faith of observant Sikhs, but Sikhs wear it in a variety of ways; some, for example, wear a small kirpan around their necks. The Supreme Court does place conditions on the wearing of the kirpan, thus accepting an earlier decision of the Superior Court of Québec, which was contested in the Court of Appeal. The kirpan must be wrapped in sturdy material and sewn into the clothing of the wearer. In the final case, some Muslim students at Québec’s École de technologie supérieure (ETS), asked for the allocation of a private space in the school where they could perform their ritual prayers, thus making it unnecessary to use less appropriate places, like stairwells and corridors. They also asked for the removal of a sign forbidding the use of sinks for ritual foot washing (a practice adopted by some but not most of them), and that the refusal to accredit a student association based on religious affiliation be declared discriminatory. When the administration refused to accede to any of their requests, 113 students then went through an organization called the Centre de recherche-action sur les relations raciales to lodge a complaint before Québec’s Commission des droits de la personne et du droit de la jeunesse (CDPDJ). As reported in its press release in March 2006, the CDPDJ, after having examined all the facts and arguments, concluded the following: [ T]he ETS should accommodate the Muslim students in their need to pray on a regular basis and in conditions that respect their dignity; they suggest that the refusal to accredit a student association based on religious affiliation is not discriminatory; and also that the signs forbidding the use of sinks to wash feet is not discriminatory.3

This decision, which seemed quite moderate, nevertheless stirred public controversy. The Commission’s interim chairman, Marc-André Dowd, recalls that, following the publication of its report on the subject in June

Multani vs. Marguerite-Bourgeoys School Board 2006 1 S.C.R. 256 SCC 6. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, Québec, Resolution COM-510–5.2.1. 2 3

180

solange lefebvre

2005, the CPDPJ launched the idea of a public debate on the question of religion in the public sphere (Bosset 2005). This public debate was not long in coming, but it came in an unexpected manner. When the Supreme Court’s decision on the right to wear a kirpan at school was made public in March 2006, the debate on reasonable accommodation for religious practices began, but it grew significantly in intensity with the approach of the provincial election campaign in the spring of 2007. Mario Dumont, leader of Action Démocratique (a party previously rather poorly represented in the Québec National Assembly), turned the debate into a political issue when he called for an amendment to Québec’s Charter of Rights to prevent religious practices from entering into conflict with citizens’ fundamental values, especially as concerns the equality between men and women. Québec’s homogeneous core of French and, above all, Catholic origin was being reaffirmed with the use of the words like nous (us) and chez nous (at home). Notably, because of the stance that it took on this issue, Dumont’s party came very close to winning the election, and the two parties which had been sharing power for more than thirty years, the Liberal Party and the Parti québécois, lost hold on their voting blocks just about everywhere in Québec. Jean Charest, the leader of the ruling Liberal Party of Québec during the campaign, must have already sensed the problems when he set up the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences on February 8, 2007. The public’s reaction was to reproach him for shirking his responsibilities as a political leader by creating a commission that would not only postpone decisions but that might end up making recommendations which had no teeth. Faced with such reactions, and even before the Commission had finished its work, Québec’s main political parties were vying with each other as to which was the best defender of its national identity and strongly held common values.4 The situation in Québec may be usefully compared to that in Ontario, Québec’s largest neighboring province, where inter-religious relations seem to be calmer. Jews in Ontario keep various practices without arousing any animosity; Sikhs wear their kirpans if they so wish ( just as they

4 See J. Legault. 2007. “PQ’s Constitutional Proposal just Confuses the Debate: Charest and Marois add to the Perception that Québec’s Identity is Under Siege.” The Gazette, 19 October: A21.

between law and public opinion

181

do in Western Canada). Some Toronto universities provide their Muslim students with sinks for ritual foot washing and allow associations based on religion. In June 2006, seventeen young Muslim men between the ages of 17 and 43 were arrested in Toronto on suspicion of plotting terrorism. Some of these suspects were graduates of universities in the area. When I talked with colleagues from these universities after this incident and asked them if they had any second thoughts about the various adaptations to religious practices made in their universities, they replied rather nonchalantly: “It is never an issue.” When traveling in other Canadian provinces in recent years, I have been asked (and always with astonishment) about the strong reaction to various minority religious expressions in Québec. Yet, in these other parts of Canada, there are perhaps embers smoldering beneath the ashes. According to an article by Bill Curry in the Globe and Mail: Federal officials have privately warned the Conservative government that Québec’s debate over reasonable accommodation of minorities is spreading across Canada and could trigger “alarming” divisions in the country. Internal government documents show Jason Kenney, the federal secretary of state for multiculturalism and Canadian identity, personally requested a comprehensive briefing on the issue earlier this year. “There is now a sense of urgency to more clearly define and explain the principle of reasonable accommodation, as alarming shifts regarding the split between ‘them’ and ‘us’ may occur,” the briefing says. “This is of particular concern in Québec, at a time when the government is putting programs in place to close gaps affecting minority groups.” The document notes that while the debate is focused on Québec, it is also taking place in the rest of Canada, “albeit on a smaller scale for now.” The paper informs Mr. Kenney that the “politicisation” of the debate in Québec suggests “a certain split in Québec between the French Republican model of managing religion in the public sphere and the traditional Canadian multiculturalism model.”5

This excerpt brings us to the theoretical issues: the difference between two forms of secularity, the one based on Anglo-Saxon sociopolitical relations and the other on French Republican principles. Curry is right to remind us of the divergence between the French Republican model and the Canadian multicultural one. Let’s have a closer look at

5 Bill Curry. 2007. “ ‘Them’ and ‘Us’ Split Spreading Nationwide, Federal Officials Warn.” The Globe and Mail, 19 October: A1.

182

solange lefebvre

this divergence, since Québec is in the interesting situation of being influenced by both models. The Logic of Laicization in Québec: Models and Applications European sociologists have been reflecting on the singular dynamics at work in “Christian” countries, whether those with a Catholic majority or those which are more pluralist (Anglican, Protestant and Catholic). These distinctions become clearer in light of the various uses of the concepts of “laicization” and “secularization.” One of the meanings of the concept of secularization refers to the autonomous nature of the political and religious spheres. Karel Dobbelaere speaks of “institutional differentiation-specialization” in terms of laicization: “All in all, secularization is a result of manifest and latent processes of laicization, and the reaction they provoke” (1981: 7). He lends two other meanings to the concept of secularization: the decline or waning of religious commitment and religious change that leans towards adaptation to the world. In 1978, David Martin observed that, among these processes, one could distinguish a Latin, Catholic and French model of secularization in which “religion as such is frequently a political issue. Coherent and massive secularism confronts coherent and massive religiosity. One ethos confronts an alternative ethos, particularly where the elite culture of the secular Enlightenment acquires a mass component and achieves a historicized ideology, i.e. Marxism” (Martin 1978: 5). In his comparison of Canadian provinces, Martin points out that majority Catholic cultures are more territorially based, whereas in Protestant cultures feelings of belonging are more interiorized. Territorial identity creates the sense of forming a “complete subsociety.” That being so, a reform like the one undertaken by the Catholic Second Vatican Council will have major consequences for such a society: “Once the Second Vatican Council shifted some of the markers of difference, many of the other markers collapsed at the same time [. . .] Everything was thrown into turmoil, and not just the sector of everyday living defined as religious.” (Martin 2000: 24–25). This “turmoil” can perhaps be related to the current strong reaction to the symbols of the religious “others” in Québec. Françoise Champion (1993) continues in this comparative perspective: in Europe, she observes two very different patterns of the emancipation of societies with respect to religion, that of laicization and that

between law and public opinion

183

of secularization. There are “different types of ideal-typical logic” at work in countries with a dominant Catholic tradition as contrasted to those with a dominant Protestant one. The difference is rooted in the language itself, since Catholic countries use concepts of “laicization,” “laity,” “laïcité ” which are practically unknown in Anglo-Saxon and Germanic countries, which use words referring to the concept of secularization: “secular,” “secularism,” “secularity.” Champion observes that, in academic milieux, these concepts circulate rather freely and even sometimes interchangeably, but she insists on the fundamental distinctions to which they refer. According to the logic of laicization, the Catholic Church claims for itself a vocation, which gives it charge over all aspects of social life, hence it stands as a rival to the state. In such circumstances, emancipation mobilizes political power to extricate individuals and society from the “hold” of the Church, against a background of conflict between clerical and anticlerical forces. Laicization criticizes Catholicism and religion in general. Anticlericalism took shape in the political struggles national states waged against the transnational interference of Roman Catholicism. The dynamics of secularization proved to be very different, since the Protestant churches do not appear as rivals to the state, but as institutions within the state. They play very well-defined roles, and to them secularization means a weakening of the meaning of these roles. Initially formed within nation-states struggling to free themselves from Roman Catholic authority, Protestant churches do not constitute transnational bodies. Their structure is more synodal than clerical, and this invites fewer power struggles in the process of modernization. These models can serve as a backdrop for the distinction between the way Québec and the rest of Canada respond to expressions of religious diversity. The conception of law in Québec and in Canada is certainly equally influenced by Anglo-Saxon liberal philosophy, in the sense that it gives precedence to individual liberties. But the recent backlash of public opinion shows that, as regards religion, other forces are also at work in Québec, which is in fact the only territorially delimited society in North America with a historically strong Catholic majority, hence is comparable to such European countries as France and Spain. In linguistic terms, the way the concept of laicization has emerged in this province since 1999 is very symptomatic. Up to 1999, only a handful of academics bothered to debate the concept of laïcité, mainly taking note of its absence in North America. Let us look at two main positions in this regard.

184

solange lefebvre

Jacques Zylberberg reviews the German, Canadian, American, and British models and concludes that these states and their respective civil laws show no evidence of a strict conception of laïcité, and they all maintain various ties with religious majorities and minorities. Three features correspond to this conclusion: the state is autonomous; it can ensure its own cultural reproduction in schools; and it has authority over life-cycle events (birth, marriage, divorce, and death). “This minimal legal ‘laïcité ’,” Zylberberg explains, “is inversely proportional to the rights of the Churches, to their legal powers, to their financial resources, but also to their symbolic resources.” (1995: 38) In Québec, the Catholic Church in particular still has a strong foothold, notably in public confessional school boards. Louis Balthasar reflects on the peaceful laicization of Québec institutions and mores (1990). He prefers the concept of secularization when treating the issue in North America, with its characteristic “ideological consensus,” as opposed to Europe, which is more marked by ideological divisions. On this side of America, he observes, people have avoided strong ideological debates about laicization. In Québec, one encounters no orchestrated fundamentalist or anticlerical movements, and one finds few traces of an Ancien Régime, whose roots in Europe are, by contrast, astonishingly resilient. Balthasar credits the persistence of parochial schools to the “pragmatism” of Québecers, to their attitude of conciliation. However, Québec’s system of confessional schools is proving to be more and more outdated, especially in a context where new arrivals are being obliged to attend French Catholic schools. And indeed, since Balthasar published his article in 1990, legislation has effectively undermined Québec’s confessional school system. I reported on these new developments in 1998 in a special issue of the journal Théologiques, entitled Autres regards sur la laïcité. At that time a task force set up by the Québec government was about to propose other ways of incorporating religion in public schools, ones that would replace the confessional system (Catholic/Protestant) discussed by Balthasar. In 1999, this task force published a voluminous report titled, Laïcité et religions: Perspective nouvelle pour l’école québécoise, proposing the abolition of the confessional public schools and of religious instruction in such schools (Proulx 1999). One member of the task force, Micheline Milot, developed a perspective on laicization that she introduced in this special issue. Adopting the distinction between secularization and laïcité proposed by Jean Baubérot (1994: 280), Milot wrote, “laïcité was first presented as a political utopia. It wished to base the social bond

between law and public opinion

185

on political rather than community loyalty. Secularization, for its part, was more a cultural phenomenon entailing a separation of civil society and religions, and notably marked by the autonomy of knowledge and morality” (1998: 12). This is the vision that was later espoused by the government of Québec (Therrien 2005). Other sociologists believe that it is possible to extirpate the concept of laïcité from its anti-clerical, ideological breeding ground. The Belgian sociologist, Jean Rémy, suggests looking beyond the vision of laïcité as the political resolution of a conflict between religion and society and, literally, “secularizing” the concept by emptying it of its anti-clerical and anti-religious content. Laicization could simply be defined as the “framework guaranteeing pluralism, not only of private opinions but also of collectively organized currents of thought” (1993: 365–79). The concept of “open laïcité” adopted for public schools in Québec mirrors this view. The foreword of the Proulx report, defines “open laïcité” like this: In a school setting inspired by values common to all citizens, this perspective will make room for cultural views of religions and for secular visions of the world; it will recognize the spiritual dimension of the person and thus allow any schools so inclined to set up programs on religious and spiritual life which will be applicable to the student body as a whole. In line with its community-service mission, this perspective will also accept that, after its regular classes and depending on its priorities, the school can make its premises available to any religious group wishing to organize services on its own for its members.6

There has been no lack of reservations about the use of the concept of laïcité, particularly in the North American and Québec context. As seen above, Balthasar feels that the dynamics of secularization is characterized by a healthy pragmatism. In the same issue on laïcité mentioned above, sociologist Jacques T. Godbout (1998) develops a strong argument for the advantages that francophone culture in Québec gains from the Anglo-Saxon influence and its penchant for indirect democracy, which tends to be more respectful of custom and less hostile to the development of particularisms in its midst. In his analysis of the tension between British common law and French-style Republicanism,

6 Proulx 1999, p. vii. As regards the introduction of this concept into French-speaking Québec, another recent publication worth mentioning is an opinion from the Comité sur les affaires religieuses (2006), which develops the building blocks of an institutional culture suitable for a public school founded on open laicization.

186

solange lefebvre

he draws attention to the fact that tolerance for different attitudes is more characteristic of the less centralizing nature of common law. I also have reservations about introducing this concept into the debates in Québec. Yet, the concept of laïcité keeps gaining ground, for various reasons. Here are a few of them. A certain French-speaking Québec élite values its comparison with France, notably for nationalistic reasons. Establishing laïcité in Québec, be it “open” or “integral,” helps to set it apart from the rest of North America. Recent immigrants have been selected primarily on the basis of their knowledge of French, and this has increased the number of immigrants from former French colonies such as Morocco and Algeria, which have been strongly influenced by Republican education and ideas. The debates surrounding France’s Stasi Commission on banning ostentatious religious symbols received a great deal of media attention in French-speaking newspapers. The wearing of the Muslim veil in public schools was central to these debates and served to channel opposition to “ostentatious” symbols in public institutions.7 Some experts on French laïcité have expressed their disapproval of such rigidity. Although it is to be hoped that Remy’s conception of a secularized concept of laïcité will eventually win out, the univocal use of the concept by secularists could undermine its more open meaning. In the wake of the events that took place in New York in September 2001, fear of Islamist terrorism is strengthening this mobilization around the concept of the laicization and laïcité of the state.8 From what I have observed, the term laïcité in the French-speaking world often tends to give rise to expressions of “symbolic orthodoxies” that profess an ill-defined opposition to any type of religious expression in the public sphere. The affirmation of laïcité often implies a privatized conception of religion. Consequently, one wonders whether it is possible to “secularize” the concept by simply establishing several types of more or less “open laïcité.” Nonetheless, the concept is certainly of practical use in defining what we mean by the “religious neutrality” of the state. In its consultation document, the Commission on 7 Chaired by Bernard Stasi, the commission was set up on 3 July 2003 and reported its conclusions on 11 December 2003. See Stasi 2003. 8 There is a petition on the Internet in favor of laïcité signed by more than 2000 intellectuals (mostly of French and Muslim extraction). It states that any state deprived of the principle of laïcité is violating human rights and the equality between men and women. The attitude it expresses could be characterized as laicism or secularist. See www.laïcité.info.

between law and public opinion

187

Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences suggests a distinction between an “integral secularism,” which it describes as, “the more or less complete elimination of the religious life from the public sphere” and an “open secularism.”9 In any event, the concept “secular” or “secularism” is only rarely translated into French (e.g., as sécularité or séculier) to define the separation between the state and religion—for example, in some European Union documents. France’s laicized regime nevertheless makes many compromises with the religions established on its territory, especially with the Christian religion. A historically established religion, however, almost wears a cloak of invisibility in a society where it still enjoys majority status: Liberal democratic societies with relatively homogeneous religious populations are less likely, of course, to have such controversy—not because religion is always excluded from the sphere of public debate, but because, having few rivals, its inclusion in the debate remains largely invisible and uncontested. In highly pluralistic democratic societies, however, the appeal to values viewed as religiously esoteric or “sectarian” will surely be contested by those who do not share those values. This poses the perennially unresolved dilemma in liberal democratic theory—between the rights of majorities to decide fundamental political questions, and the rights of minorities to live in accord with their particular values.10

In this context, any public religion that contrasts noticeably with the surrounding milieu becomes suspect, such that, in common speech, daily conversations, and the media, orthodox minority religious attitudes are often called radical, extremist, and fanatical. In the first section, I drew attention to the fact that, in most cases, the attitudes so described are simply orthodox. An orthodox attitude expresses willing obedience to certain rules and precepts. The term fanaticism can more explicitly be applied to an uncontrollable and threatening religious attitude; some authors use extremism in an equivalent sense. Radicalism could be considered an ultimate orthodox attitude. In this sense, most religious demands can probably be called either radical or orthodox. Canadian law speaks of religious demands for accommodation as deriving from an

9 CCAPRCD, Accommodation and Differences. Seeking Common Ground: Québecers Speak Out. Consultation Document, Government of Québec, 2007, p. vi. The English version of the document does not translate “laïcité” with laicity but with “secularism,” since there is not as yet any official translation of the concept. 10 Brunk 2005: 355. On this score, I fully agree with the argument developed by my colleague Lori Beaman (2003), who maintains that Canada most favors those religious faiths resembling Christianity.

188

solange lefebvre

orthodox religious attitude. The very individualistic approach exhibited by the law does, however, pose certain problems which will be taken up in the third section and which may partially explain the intensity of the debates in Québec. Religious Freedom in Canadian Law From a social scientific perspective, how does Canadian law interpret religious freedom? Below I discuss three cases from the Supreme Court of Canada that have established precedents for the complex interpretation of individual rights and religious freedom. These judicial interpretations deal with the fundamental definition of religion. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd. 1985 The 1985 judgment in Big M. Drug Mart Ltd. provides a now famous definition of religious freedom. The judgment came in response to a complaint that a business in the province of Saskatchewan had violated the Sunday closing law by opening its doors on that day. The Supreme Court concluded that the law was unconstitutional, as it exerts “a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter. The Act gives the appearance of discrimination against non-Christians. Religious values rooted in Christian morality are translated into a positive law binding on believers and non-believers alike.” The Court defined religious freedom in this way: The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than that. Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint (at para 94–95).

Note that the coercion and constraint possibly exerted on the individual practicing a particular religious expression can come not only from the majority but also from a minority religious group, which might decree that such-and-such a practice is or is not orthodox. However, according to the same judgment, there are numerous limits to this freedom of religion: “Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental

between law and public opinion

189

rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience” (at para 95). This implies that accommodations made for religious practices or expressions are contingent on a prior evaluation of their ethical and normative compatibility with the state’s judicial order (Bosset and Eid 2006). In more precise terms, the accommodation must result in any “excessive constraints,” that is, costs, organizational constraints or conflicts with other fundamental rights, in accordance with the well known formula: “all rights must be limited in order to preserve the social structure in which each right can be protected without unduly endangering the others.”11 This dual facet of the law is important: on the one hand, it recognizes the individual’s right to believe what he or she wants; on the other, it limits this freedom by respecting the broad rules governing collective democratic life, the general welfare, and the rights and freedoms of others. Moreover, this dual facet is fundamental to human rights legislation in general. Freedom of religion is fundamentally affirmed but important limits are imposed upon it. Northcrest Syndicate vs. Amselem 2004 Amselem is another important judgment on religion and freedom of religion. Note that in this case, four out of nine judges wrote dissenting opinions. In the first section of this chapter, I reported the facts of the Amselem case: the construction of a Jewish succah on the balcony of a luxury condominium. Here we will take a look at the definition of religion developed in this decision: Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship. In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to his or her self-definition and spiritual fulfillment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith.

11 O’Malley and the Ontario Human Rights Commission vs. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536: 554–555. It is in this text that the notion of reasonable accommodations was introduced in Canada.

190

solange lefebvre

The definition of freedom of religion cited below refers to the distinction just made between a general and an essential definition, the Supreme Court claiming jurisdiction over the essential aspect, namely, the individual’s willing convictions, without claiming any jurisdiction over the system of dogmas and practices as a basis for determining the exercise of that right: Freedom of religion under the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) consists of the freedom to undertake practices and entertain beliefs connected to a religion, beliefs and practices which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or exercises in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials.12

In order to specify this sincere exercise or manifestation on the believer’s part, the Supreme Court introduces a subjective conceptualization of religion: This understanding is consistent with a personal or subjective understanding of freedom of religion. As such, a claimant need not show some sort of objective religious obligation, requirement or precept to invoke freedom of religion. It is the religious or spiritual essence of an action, not any mandatory or perceived-as-mandatory nature of its observance that attracts protection. The State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of religious dogma.

What then does that leave as criteria for discerning the legitimacy of a religious demand, if the dogma and doctrine of the group are not to be taken into account? Sincerity of belief simply implies an honest belief and the court’s role is to ensure that the asserted belief is in good faith, neither fictitious nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice. Assessment of sincerity is a question of fact that can be based on criteria including the credibility of a claimant’s testimony, and whether the alleged belief is consistent with his or her other current religious practices. Since the focus of the The Supreme Court pronounced itself in very precise terms, since, by using the terms doctrine and dogma, it refers to the common root dek, meaning “to acquire or teach knowledge,” from which the Greek terms didaskein (to teach) and dokein (to think) are derived; and from whence come dogma (opinion, doctrine, decree) and doxa (already mentioned in the discussion on orthodoxy). The Latin terms discere (to learn) and doctrina (teaching and doctrine) also derive from the same root. 12

between law and public opinion

191

inquiry is not on what others view the claimant’s religious obligations to be, but what the claimant views these personal religious “obligations” to be, it is inappropriate to require expert opinions. It is also inappropriate for courts to study or focus on the past practices of claimants in order to determine whether their current beliefs are sincerely held. Because of the changeable nature of religious belief, a court’s inquiry into sincerity, if anything, should focus not on past practice or past belief but on a person’s belief at the time of the alleged interference with his or her religious freedom. It is important to note that these principles are stated in the specific context of a disagreement between two rabbinical authorities concerning the construction of a succah on the balcony of the orthodox Jews who lodged the complaint. One considered the obligation in objective or doctrinal terms, the other did not. Before discussing this individualistic conception of freedom of religion, let us look again at the Multani decision. Multani v. the Marguerite-Bourgeois School Board 2006 This case concerned the wearing of the kirpan in public school. The Supreme Court discussed the fact that religious practices can be variable: The fact that different people practice the same religion in different ways does not affect the validity of the case of a person alleging that his or her freedom of religion has been infringed. What an individual must do is show that he or she sincerely believes that a certain belief or practice is required by his or her religion. (par. 35, cf. Amselem, at para. 52) . . . Furthermore, Gurbaj Singh’s refusal to wear a replica made of a material other than metal is not capricious. He genuinely believes that he would not be complying with the requirements of his religion were he to wear a plastic or wooden kirpan. The fact that other Sikhs accept such a compromise is not relevant, since as Lemelin J. mentioned at para. 68 of her decision, [ TRANSLATION ] “[w]e must recognize that people who profess the same religion may adhere to the dogma and practices of that religion with varying degrees of rigor” (at para 39).

However, to demonstrate the sincerity of his conviction, the Court sought the opinion of the Sikh chaplain, Manjit Singh, who confirmed that: “orthodox Sikhs must comply with a strict dress code requiring them to wear religious symbols commonly known as the Five Ks: (1) kesh (uncut hair); (2) kangha (a wooden comb); (3) kara (a steel bracelet worn on the wrist); (4) kaccha (a special undergarment); and (5) the

192

solange lefebvre

kirpan (a metal dagger or sword).” Furthermore, Manjit Singh explained in his affidavit that the Sikh religion teaches pacifism and encourages respect for other religions, that the kirpan must be worn at all times, even in bed, that it must not be used as a weapon to hurt anyone, and that Gurbaj Singh’s refusal to wear a symbolic kirpan made of a material other than metal is based on a “reasonable religiously motivated interpretation” (at para 36). Freedom of Religion and the Doctrine of a Religious Group All three judgments raise important issues. The Amselem judgment was a turning point in the Canadian judicial view of freedom of religion, bestowing upon it a purely subjective definition. Yet, the Multani judgment on the kirpan which followed did not dispense with this expertise, as the last extract quoted shows. Consulting the Sikh chaplain and referring to objective rules of the orthodox Sikh religion are part of the process of evaluating the sincerity of the belief. Reference to the religious group and its orthodoxy is thus not excluded, even though they are neither the only nor the most decisive authorities. From the perspective of religious studies, the Jewish succah and the Sikh kirpan are not unusual religious symbols; they are accepted as important by the orthodox members of these two traditions. The Amselem case is interesting, in that it shows the institutional decentralization of Judaism. Judaism does, however, draw on a common heritage rooted in the law and in certain precepts, even though Jews conceive their tradition in various ways, giving rise to numerous distinct movements, from the most liberal to the most fundamentalist. In this light, it is probably logical that, in the final analysis, the Amselem decision should give precedence to the conviction of a practicing orthodox Jew and not to Jewish orthodoxy. Moreover, the Supreme Court did take doctrine into account in its deliberations and hearings, since the construction of a succah where a family can sleep and eat during the feast of Succoth does in fact belong to the Jewish tradition. I would even say that this tradition is part of mainstream Judaism, although not in the sense that all Jews will feel obliged to observe it strictly. Some Jewish families will, for example, put up a small symbolic succah in their house instead of constructing a shelter where they can eat and sleep. The central question in the case, however, as glimpsed in the position of the dissenting judges, is not the construction of the succah as such, but rather the conception of what constitutes a fundamental

between law and public opinion

193

obligation. The dissenting judges deem that the succah could have been built elsewhere without violating this obligation. They define religion in other terms: [ T ]his Court has interpreted freedom of religion as protecting both religious beliefs, which are considered to be highly personal and private in nature, and consequent religious practices. However, a religion is a system of beliefs and practices based on certain religious precepts. A nexus between personal beliefs and the religion’s precepts must therefore be established . . . It is one thing to assert that a practice is protected even though certain followers of the religion do not think that the practice is included among the religion’s precepts and quite another to assert that a practice must be protected when none of the followers think it is included among those precepts (par. 135).

Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens (2007) argues that there is a climate of apprehension settling over the legal world as it witnesses an explosion of religious demands in an era of religious supermarkets and do-it-yourself religion. He reminds us that the “traditional paradigm” for understanding freedom of religion refers to the duty to protect dissidents against the great orthodoxies and minority religious groups against historical majority religions. But it seems to him that the Amselem judgment is based on a change of paradigm that endorses the religious supermarket where individual freedom of religion receives absolute deference. By giving such weight to religious subjectivity, the Supreme Court creates a “fundamentalism” of rights. How Do We Get Out of This Predicament? This last section considers two important dimensions that seem to demand deeper reflection. First, I draw attention to the difficulties posed by the very subjective definition of religion in recent case law. Second, I reflect on the fate of the “majority.” Québec’s resistance to the judicial decisions mentioned is partially an outcome of these difficulties. The Limits of Religious Subjectivity What is striking in the Amselem and Multani judgments is the relative contradiction between affirming the secondary nature of dogma, doctrine and orthodoxy, while persistently referring to them to evaluate the sincerity and non-frivolous nature of a particular belief. In the case of

194

solange lefebvre

both the succah and the kirpan, legal recourse is founded on a verifiable orthodox conception of a religious practice (one which is in fact, as already mentioned, rather mainstream). From a theological point of view, the Amselem judgment contains a certain contradiction: it takes into account the religious orthodoxy of a biblical precept to support the fact that a succah can be placed on the balcony and then goes on to relativize the importance of this prescription. In other words, the Court has to deal with a regulated religious practice and does not treat it as such. It evokes this regulation as an integral part of the demand and then acts as if it had no effect. We can thus be rightly astonished by the qualitative leap the Court takes in the Amselem case in delivering its hypersubjective definition of religion. The judgment does take objective doctrine into account to support its evaluation of sincerity. The Amselem judgment opens up the possibility of allowing the Court to evaluate what is in fact a totally subjective belief. It seems that founding religious subjectivity solely on sincerity while invalidating reference to the group’s experts or to a tradition could lead the legal milieu to an impasse. What will happen when the legal system has to deal with a sincere practice that is not regulated by any tradition or even when this system is confronted with a very loosely organized group? Rarely will anyone go to court to defend a belief without referring to a tradition, to a memory, or to the transmission of some form of illumination. According to some studies on religion, the phenomenon of consistent beliefs and practices (even in this age of the individualized supermarket of religion) is often accompanied by some reference to a more or less fictional lineage (Hervieu-Léger 1993). For the legal world, choosing to define religion as a belief referring back to a lineage of belief would no doubt be judicious. It would avoid having to depend solely on the on the advice of an expert or religious official and at least give a framework for interpreting the sincerity of the belief. Finally, we must go back to the difference between orthodoxy, radical religious commitment, extremism, and fanaticism. The latter must be taken seriously in this era where fundamentalisms can coalesce into violent struggles (something that is not particularly new [see Vaillancout and Campos 2006]). But it is precisely the subjective definition of religion that prevents the courts from checking for these possible combinations and for their possible instrumentalization in the form of legal demands by religious groups.

between law and public opinion

195

The Case of Québec: A Revelation Québec seems to be facing a low threshold of tolerance for public expressions of minority religions. As we have seen, French-speaking peoples are influenced by a certain French and Republican conception of the public sphere. It seems to me that neither wearing a kirpan, under safe and well-defined conditions, nor constructing a succah, to be kept up only during the nine days of the Feast of Succoth, for sincere religious reasons imposes excessive constraints on the organizations involved. It would be interesting if all concerned would examine the socio-religious or ideological source of their opposition: Is it a radically secular vision of society? Is it a very modern conception of religion as a private realm or as an irrational world that must be subordinated to other rights? Is it a fear of the religion of others? Is it a confusion of extremisms with all forms of religious orthodoxy? Meanwhile, questions about the rights of the majority to preserve certain “reasonable” religious expressions have been shelved. There is a great legal void concerning these rights in Canada. In this respect, the legal world in Québec seems, so far, to have shown itself zealous in defending individuals against any religious expressions coming from the historical majority. In the case of prayers before municipal assemblies, for example, Ontario’s courts have not come down with decisions as clear-cut as those rendered by Québec’s human rights tribunal. The City of Laval contested a decision made by the Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse on this matter. It lost before the tribunal, which judged that saying any prayer, even a non-confessional one, would discriminate against the plaintiff and his atheistic convictions.13 The prayer was as follows: “Deign, Lord, we beseech Thee, to grant us Thy grace and the light needed to guide our assembly and the proper administration of our city. Amen!” Comparing the two decisions rendered in Ontario, in 1999 the Ontario Court of Appeals ordered the Penetanguishene municipal assembly to drop its prayer, but in this case, the prayer being said was the Lord’s Prayer, an explicitly Christian prayer which the assembly had refused to change.14 In 2004,

Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse c. Laval (Ville de); 2006 QCTDP 17 (CanLII). 14 Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), 1999 CanLII 3786 (ON C.A.). 13

196

solange lefebvre

the Superior Court granted another municipality the right to continue with its prayer, for it appeared to be non-confessional.15 Another case that involves the majority is the whole question of religion in schools. Québecers of French origin have experienced the impact of the laicization of the public school system since 2000. Until that time, for a good many of them, so-called “school” religion helped to maintain their (partially cultural) identification with Catholicism (Lefebvre 2008; Lemieux 1990; Milot 1991). In the midst of this process of laicization (which will have been completed once common courses in ethics and culture are up and running in the fall of 2008), expressions of religious diversity in the public sphere have started stirring the debates we have discussed above. Might not that coincidence also conceal (or reveal?) the fact that some people in Québec are reacting to the fact that the law is apparently willing to protect the religious freedom of individuals but rarely that of groups? Conclusion The questions raised here are, in various guises, being posed everywhere in the West. In Holland, the assassination of Theo Van Gogh by a Muslim extremist set off national debates about Dutch multiculturalism. Since the attacks on London’s public transit system, England has been pondering the excesses of its communitarianism. Granted, in their ways and means of handling diversity the various nations and regions of the West are guided by very different histories and mentalities. But they must all meet at the crossroads marking a strong growth of religious diversity in countries of immigration and a shared perplexity in the face of religious fanaticisms. Canada’s experience is, in this respect, a remarkable one, owing both to its multicultural model and to the diversity displayed in its provinces and territories. This chapter has considered only the provinces of Ontario and Québec, but the differences between these two already raise fundamental questions that are common to all states governed by the rule of law.

15

Allen v. Renfrew (Corp. of the County), 2004 CanLII 13978 (ON S.C.).

between law and public opinion

197

References Balthasar, Louis. 1990. “La laïcisation tranquille du Québec.” Pp. 31–42 in La laïcité en Amérique du Nord, edited by Jacques Lamaire. Brussels: Édition de l’Université de Bruxelles. Baubérot, Jean, ed. 1994. Religions et laïcité dans l’Europe des douze. Paris: Syros. Beaman, Lori. 2003. “The Myth of Plurality, Diversity and Vigour: Constitutional Privilege of Protestantism in the United States and Canada.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42: 311–46. Bibby, Reginald. 2002. Restless Gods: The Renaissance of Religion in Canada. Toronto: Stoddart. Bosset, Pierre, and Paul Eid. 2006. “Droit et religion: de l’accommodement raisonnable à un dialogue internormatif.” Pp. 63–95 in Actes de la XVIIe Conférence des juristes de l’État. Cowansville, PQ: Édition Yvon Blais. Brunk, Conrad. 2005. “Neutralité des politiques publiques et de la loi à l’égard des valeurs religieuses.” Pp. 355–376 in La religion dans la sphère publique, edited by Solange Lefebvre. Montréal : Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Casanova, Jose. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Champion, Françoise. 1993. “Les rapports Église-État dans les pays européens de tradition protestante et de tradition catholique: essai d’analyse.” Social Compass 40: 589–609. Comité sur les affaires religieuses. 2006. La laïcité scolaire au Québec: un nécessaire changement de culture institutionnelle. Avis du Ministère de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport, Québec: Gouvernement du Québec. Dobbelaere, Karel. 1981. Secularization: A Multidimensionnal Concept. London: Sage. Forsé, Michel, and Simon Langlois, eds. 1995. Tendances comparées des sociétés post-industrielles. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Gauvreau, Michael. 2005. The Catholic Origins of the Québec’s Quiet Revolution. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Gaudreault-Desbiens, Jean-François. 2007. “Quelques angles morts du débat sur l’accommodement raisonnable à la lumière de la question du port de signes religieux à l’école publique: réflexions en form de points d’interrogation.” Pp. 241–86 in Les accommodements raisonnables: quoi, comment, jusqu-òu?, edited by Myriam Jézéquiel. Cowansville, QC: Édition Yvon Blais. Godbout, Jacques. 1998. “Qui a peur de la communauté?” Théologiques 6: 29–38. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 1993. La religion pour mémoire. Paris: Cerf. Lefebvre, Solange. 1998. “Origines et actualité de la laïcité: Lecture socio-théologique.” Théologiques 6: 63–79. ———. 2007. “International Report: Disestablishment of the Church: Discussion with Jose Casanova from a Canadian Point of View.” International Journal of Practical Theology 11: 285–309. ———. 2008. “The Francophone Roman Catholic Church.” Pp. 101–37 in Christianity and Ethnicity in Canada, edited by Paul Bramadat and David Seljak. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Lemieux, Raymond. 1990. “Le catholicisme québécois: une question de culture.” Sociologie et société 22: 145–64. Martin, David. 1978. A General Theory of Secularization. New York: Harper and Row. ———. 2000. “Canada in Comparative Perspective.” Pp. 23–33 in Rethinking Church, State and Modernity, edited by David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

198

solange lefebvre

Milot, Micheline. 1991. Une religion à transmettre? Le choix des parents. Essai d’analyse culturelle. Sainte Foy: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. ———. 1998. “La laïcité: une façon de vivre ensemble.” Théologiques 6: 9–28. ———. 2002. Laïcité dans le nouveau monde: The Case of Québec. Turnhout: Brepols. Olson, Daniel V.A., and C. Kirk Hadaway. 1999. “Religious Pluralism and Affiliation among Canadian Counties and Cities.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 38: 490–508. Proulx, Jean-Pierre. 1999. Rapport du groupe de travail sur la place de la religion à l’école: Laïcité et religions. Perspective nouvelle pour l’école québécois. Québec : Gouvernement du Québec. Rémy, Jean. 1993. “Laïcité et construction de l’Europe.” Pp. 365–79 in Religions et transformations de l’Europe, edited by Gilbert Vincent and Jean-Paul Willaime. Strasbourg: Presses de l’Université de Strasbourg. Stasi, Bemard. 2003. Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité. Paris. http:// www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/034000725/index.shtml. Statistics Canada. 2003. Ethnic Diversity Survey: Portrait of a Multicultural Society, Content Overview. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Therrien, Sophie. 2005. “La diversité religieuse et les institutions publiques: quelques orientations.” Pp. 70–90 in La religion dans la sphère publique, edited by Solange Lefebvre. Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Vaillancourt, Jean-Guy, and Élizabeth Campos. 2006. “La régulation de la diversité et de l’extrémisme religieux au Canada.” Sociologie et sociétés 38: 113–37. Zylberberg, Jacques. 1995. “Laïcité, connais pas: Germany, Canada, United States, United Kingdom.” Pouvoirs 4: 37–52.

CHAPTER NINE

A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF APPROACHES TO RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY: CANADA, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES Lori G. Beaman The three dominant approaches to diversity and religion in western culture are illustrated by the case studies of France, Canada and the United States. These approaches exist in multiple variations (Britain, India and Turkey come to mind as other interesting case studies), usually within the boundaries of a particular nation-state. I say “usually” because, as is the case in Canada, there may be provincial or state variations in the management of diversity. By management of diversity I mean those strategies used by nation-states to regulate the ways in which religious groups are able to express their religious beliefs, especially in what is commonly referred to as “the public sphere.” However, the notion of the “public” sphere is nebulous at best, and thus the discussion in this chapter is grounded in an understanding of the permeability of the relationship between public and private. State regulation or management of religion pushes past such constructions, despite claims to the contrary. The first of the three approaches is the American approach, which constitutionally promises free exercise of religion and separation of church and state, but which manages diversity by expecting citizens to have a religion that looks somewhat Christian. The second approach is exemplified by France, which constitutionally declares its secularism and relegates religion to the domain of the private. The French approach reveals the shifting boundaries of the public/private distinction. Religion, even when banished to the so-called private sphere oozes into the domain of the public Thus, while it would seem that France and the Unites States are perhaps not so different after all, I will maintain them as separate models which hold to different ideals, despite their similar practices. The third approach is the accommodation approach, which is emerging in Canada as the dominant way of thinking about religion and diversity. This approach employs aspects of the first two, in

200

lori g. beaman

that religion is more likely to be tolerated or accommodated if it looks Christian, or in is impact on “public” discourse. This model purports to recognize diversity, acknowledges the importance of religion to its believers (as opposed to acknowledging religion’s value for its own sake) and thus manages religious diversity by accommodating it. Each of the models presents challenges that must be explored in the context of the culture in which it has emerged. The final section of this chapter considers an inclusive model in which religious symbols and voices are visible in the public sphere, capturing the spirit of diversity and multiculturalism as it is protected in provincial human rights codes and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The U.S. Approach One place to begin exploring religious diversity and its management is the manner in which a country deals with religion in its founding documents—but this is only a beginning point, as law as it is written and law as it plays out in the day to day lives of citizens and courts are very often quite different matters. The United States has constitutionally protected religious freedom and a constitutionally separated church and state. The actual meaning and varieties of interpretations have been the subject of ongoing discussion which has focused on such issues as the founders’ intentions, the possible limits on religious expression, the idea of sincerity of belief, and the notion of a compelling state interest to name but a few of the issues. Despite the grand claims of the Constitution, there is little doubt that government and policy in the United States has been dominated by a version of what is simplistically described as right wing Christianity. The extent to which political rhetoric invokes religion, specifically Christian religion and God, in the United States would indicate a much closer relationship between church and state than the Constitution would imply (cf. Berman 1986; Choper 1995; Feldman 1997; Audi 2000). So, what of religious diversity and its management in the United States? There are certainly those who maintain that it is a nation in which religious diversity is fully protected, and that it is in fact one of the most religiously diverse, religiously free countries on earth. Some scholars have described the situation as one in which it doesn’t matter what someone believes, as long as he or she participates regularly in some sort of religious institution (see Warner 2005). The constitution

canada, france and the united states

201

is often cited as proof positive that the United States is a religiously diverse nation with freedom of religious expression for all. The existence of a constitutional guarantee, its implementation, and its interpretation are three different things, however, as has been pointed out by a number of U.S. commentators. Others point to the existence of a Christian hegemony which shapes the ways in which religion can be practiced (cf. Beaman 2003a). Despite this, scholars such as Stephen Carter (1993) and John Witte (2000) argue that in fact religion—and they are almost exclusively speaking about Christian religion—has been excluded from the public square, a position usually taken in opposition to so-called secularism or secular humanism, but which may increasingly be mobilized as a fear-based reaction to the “other” prompted by the events of September 11, 2001. Daniel Conkle points out the contradictory and complex facets of the American constitutional order when it comes to religious diversity. He argues that despite its seeming incoherence, there is a discernable logic in the American approach, which can be characterized as “benevolent neutrality” (2006: 3). He summarizes the facets of this approach by turning to the constitution: “First, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment generally forbids governmental expression that has the purpose or effect of promoting or endorsing religion. Second, and conversely, private religious expression is broadly defined and is strongly protected by the Free Speech Clause. Third, as an implicit exception to the first principle, the government itself is sometimes permitted to engage in expression that seemingly does promote and endorse religion, but only when the governmental practice is noncoercive, nonsectarian, and highly traditional in a historical sense” (2006: 417). This latter aspect is the most confusing, as it has allowed what might sensibly be interpreted as action that supports Christian hegemony as somehow being neutral or benevolent. For example, “a city might include a Christian crèche in a Christmas display not to promote or endorse Christianity, but merely to acknowledge or recognize the religious origins of this public holiday” (2006: 423). As I have argued elsewhere (2003b), such a blurring of the sacred and the secular is really an attempt to dress up the wolf in sheep’s clothing. Calling a crèche something other than Christian is a diversionary tactic that fools no one, least of all religious minority groups. This same tactic has been used by courts in relation to Sunday closing laws, which the courts have argued have nothing to do with the Christian day of rest. Similarly, to argue that “one nation under god” does not mean the Christian God is a tactic that fools no one.

202

lori g. beaman

Suffice it to say, the management of religious diversity in the United States is a complex phenomenon worthy of volumes rather than a few paragraphs. However, we can say that at least in theory religious expression is protected, which would presumably facilitate some measure of religious diversity, and church and state are theoretically separated, which might mean that citizens cannot be forced to participate in a particular religion. Canada differs from the approach of the United States to religious diversity in several important respects. First, there is no constitutional separation of church and state in Canada. Interestingly, we might anticipate that there would be more, rather than less, discussion of “god” in the public square in such a circumstance, but this is simply not the case. Indeed, Canadians seem to be especially cautious about the invocation of religion as a motivator for government action. There is no sense that “god is on our side” in Canada, or that Canada is in any way a “chosen” nation. This in some measure leaves the field more open for minority religious voices to find space. Moreover, there is no sense that one must have a faith, which is again in contrast to at least some interpretations of the situation in the United States. This perhaps means that there is less pressure to have a Christian-looking religion in Canada. Further, as tired as the Canada-as-mosaic UnitedStates-as-melting pot theory may be, the constitutional emphasis on multiculturalism in Canada may well translate into legal and policy imperatives at least to try to figure out a mechanism for allowing diverse groups greater opportunities to preserve their own cultures. This brief discussion of differences is admittedly a gross oversimplification of the differences between Canada and the United States in relation to religious diversity, but it highlights some of the major cultural contrasts. The French Approach to Religious Diversity France has a historically complex strategy for managing religious diversity through the conceptual lens of laïcité, implemented as part of the Revolutionary reaction to the hold of the Catholic Church on the French nation-state and its citizens.1 Determining the meaning of

1 Bowen (2007: 1006) argues that “the key term in French accounts of their regime of Church-State relations is laïcité or secularity. Most historians of laïcité emphasise its continuity: the Revolution laid down the basic principles; the Third Republic extracted

canada, france and the united states

203

laïcité, both definitionally and in effect, is not easy. Often mistranslated and misunderstood as “secular” or “secularization” in English (and outside of France generally), as Solange Lefebvre has pointed out in the previous chapter, it can neither be simply translated nor transposed to other cultures. To complicate matters further, Much as some would see laïcité as a guiding concept in French history, the word does not appear in the very law (of 1905) that is celebrated as its embodiment. Its legal status rests on its inclusion in a key phrase in the Constitution of 1946, repeated in that of 1958: La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale—“France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic” (Bowen 2007: 1007).

In effect, the management of religion in France remains a quagmire of Roman Catholic establishment and so-called secular or neutral strategies. Interestingly, and probably accurately, Frederick Gedicks (2006) points out that through its policies France actively seeks to protect citizens from the excesses of religion. We might postulate that “excesses” are more likely to be feared or seen when the religions involved are not part of the established Roman Catholic mainstream. Susan Palmer’s work (2005, 2008) on the persecution of new religious movements in France provides ample evidence in support of this argument. She has documented the hostile approach of the French government to new religious movements or “cults,” as they tend to be termed there. Coupled with this persecution of religious minorities is a Roman Catholic establishment with which France remains in a sort of love-hate relationship. Jeremy Gunn argues that: There are many startling exceptions to France’s supposedly strict secularism and separationism. For example, the president of France is the only head of state in Europe (with the exception of the Pope) who has the authority to appoint Catholic bishops. The French state directly financed the construction of the Paris Mosque. The French state owns all of the churches in France that were constructed before the year 1905—including the famous cathedrals of Paris, Chartres, and Reims—and it establishes the terms under which the Catholic Church may use them. The French state also directly subsidizes sectarian religious schools, the vast majority of which are Catholic, where children are taught by nuns and priests (2005: 89–90).

the Church from the schools; the Assembly ratified laïcité in 1905 (Baubérot 2000). Some philosophers and historians underscore the long process of secularisation that made possible this evolution,” but other views are possible, including the idea of laïcité as a religion itself.

204

lori g. beaman

All might have remained in happy tension were it not for an increasing cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in France that has worked to move the discussion of the place of religion in French culture to the foreground during the past two decades. A controversy over the wearing of the hijab in public schools prompted a series of decisions by school authorities, the government and the courts that have served only to stir resentments. The result has been what some argue is a narrowing of religious freedom and a limiting of religious diversity, at least in terms of public visibility. Gunn argues that the 2004 ban on religious attire and other symbols is in fact not part of French practice, but rather it is a new prohibition targeted specifically at Muslims, specifically to deal with Muslim girls wearing of headscarves in schools (2005/6: 92). Religious hegemony in France, which takes the form of a Roman Catholic establishment, remains largely unacknowledged in this officially secular state. Diversity is thus managed by forcing religious expression into the background. The French approach is seen as a desirable alternative for those who are struggling to understand the management of religious diversity in other countries (cf. Troper 2000; Baubérot 2001; Carbonneau 2001; Gunn 2004; Garay 2006). As we have seen in the chapters by Pauline Côté and Solange Lefebvre in this volume, there is a movement in Québec to emulate the notion of a secular state and have it embedded in legal and policy documents. Québec is a complex culture in which the struggle for nationhood has been a dominant motif. An influx of immigrants has caused some people concern about how to maintain a sense of nationhood among those who are citizens. Many in Québec thought they had dealt with the “problem” of religion—more specifically the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church, which until the late 1960s was in essence an established church in Québec—by creating a clearly secular state. Seeing immigrants who are fervently and publicly engaged in any religion resonates in negative ways for those who have so steadfastly rejected a place for religion in the public sphere. The relationship remains complex, though, as the majority of those in Québec continue to cite their religious affiliation as Roman Catholic. Thus, like France, Québec retains a shadow establishment of Roman Catholicism even as it rejects institutional religion. The desirability of an approach of laïcité must surely be called into question by recent violent events in France, which saw riots in many parts of the country that were precipitated by feelings of exclusion and

canada, france and the united states

205

alienation among the immigrant population.2 To be sure, to assess the sole cause of that violence as resting in the explanation of religious oppression would be entirely too simplistic (clearly economic disadvantages were a significant contributing factor as well), but nonetheless the tension between the largely invisible Roman Catholic establishment and the struggles of (in this instance) Muslim minorities to express their religious beliefs cannot be overlooked. Moreover, laïcité represents an approach to equality that is largely based in formal equality or a “sameness” strategy. Such a strategy has been heavily criticized, especially by feminist scholars, as being woefully inadequate for dealing with issues of equality (Rhode 1989, 1990; Scott 1990; Sheppard 1990). Specifically, the sameness approach fails to account for structural inequalities that inevitably impact on the ways in which individuals and groups experience discrimination. This approach is an inappropriate strategy in Canada for a variety of reasons. First, it is a contradiction to multiculturalism both as it exists and as an ideal. Diversity is not the sameness promoted by the ideal of laïcité. Secondly, if the goal is to develop strategies to promote integration without assimilation, the approach taken in France is highly unlikely to succeed in the Canadian context for a variety of reasons, most especially because of the embedded nature of Christian ideals in Canada’s public square and social institutions. A “secular” ideal would not, and indeed could not, be devoid of religion for this reason. Space does not permit a detailed comparison of France and the United States, but a few points are worth mentioning here. Despite the declarations of each that religion and state are separate, both have an underlying religious hegemony that shapes the ways that religions can be expressed. Gedicks argues that “Whereas ‘religious freedom’ in the United States typically suggests freedom of religion from state interference, in France laïcité often connotes the state’s ‘protecting citizens from the excesses of religion’ and this makes all the difference” (2006: 476). 2 In October and November of 2005 riots swept France, spreading to 300 towns and cities. The riots began after the electrocution of two youths in a substation attempt to evade a police checkpoint. Rioters were largely second-generation immigrants to France, with parents born in Africa. They claimed their actions were a protest to the French government’s immigration policy, racial discrimination and poor housing in “ethnic ghettos.” BBC World News, “Mid-East Press Mull France Riots,” Nov. 8, 2005. http://news.bbc.cl.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4418256.stm, accessed Feb. 22, 2008.

206

lori g. beaman

Certainly Susan Palmer’s work (2005, 2008) would support this contention in that there is a proactive policing of new religious movements in France ostensibly to protect French citizens from harmful religious groups. The United States experience is not quite the same, and although there is a religious hegemony in the form of a civil religion that is decidedly Christian, there is no ministry set up specifically to police new religious movements. Nonetheless, incidents like that at Waco, Texas highlight the suspicion about groups which fall outside of mainstream Christian traditions.3 Conkle (2006: 442) argues that “the American tradition permits a narrow but conceptually significant exception for certain nonsectarian religious expression, expression that permits the government to affirm the competing and overlapping sovereignty of religious authority. The French tradition, with its more categorical rejection of religious sovereignty in the public sphere, seems to require no such exception.” The exceptions identified by Conkle mean that it is possible for the state in the U.S. to affirm Christian religious hegemony in subtle yet important ways. Thus “faith based initiatives,” for example, can be condoned by government and those who hold public office are not only not forbidden, but are expected to mention “God.” The Emerging Canadian Approach: Tolerance and Reasonable Accommodation Like France and the United States, the primary mechanism for the management of religious diversity in Canada is found within the constitutional regime. Interestingly, and unlike the United States and France, there is no constitutional establishment of a secular state. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes a number of provisions that refer to religion, including the preamble, in which Canada is

3 Stuart A. Wright’s edited collection, Armageddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives on the Branch Davidian Conflict, offers an analysis of the events surrounding the U.S. government’s action and subsequent raid on a Branch Davidian religious community in Waco, Texas, which resulted in the death of seventy-four men, women and children associated with the movement, as well as four federal officers. “Although this was a very complex and difficult problem for federal authorities to manage, particularly after the disastrous assault by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), the truth is that efforts at damage control took precedence over factual candor and accuracy as officials scrambled to erect legitimations for their actions” (1995: xiv).

canada, france and the united states

207

noted to have been founded on the “supremacy of God and the rule of law”; section 2(a), which includes “freedom of conscience and religion” as a fundamental freedom; section 15, which prohibits discrimination of the basis of religion; and section 27, which calls for an interpretation of the Charter in accordance with Canada’s multicultural heritage; and the “schools” section (29), which is evidence of a quasi-establishment rather than separation of church and state: “Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of denominational, separate or dissentient schools.” As is the case in France and the United States, the provisions take on a much more nuanced meaning as they are interpreted through law and policy. However, what seems to be emerging in Canada are two approaches that can be identified as the “accommodation” or “tolerance” approach and the “equality” approach. At present the discourse of accommodation is most pervasive, in part led by the establishment of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission in Québec. As we have seen in the chapter by Côté, the new religious question is embedded in political processes that are unique to each region depending on the religious groups involved and the multiple strands that shape the direction of the conversation. But, the language of what constitutes a “reasonable compromise” or accommodation has become the framework within which most of the discussion of religious diversity in Canada is taking place. Despite the fact that the proceedings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission have received limited coverage outside of Québec, it is not a stretch to argue that they represent the current situation in Canada as regards religious (and cultural) diversity. The negotiation of difference is a core issue in Canadian public life at this moment, made more pressing by the rapidly changing demographic caused by a large influx of immigrants who come from nations whose pervasive cultural/religious history is not Christian. It is therefore important to take seriously the framing of the issues as they arise during the proceedings. Indeed, the Commission has structured its mandate within the parameters of accommodation. The Commission’s mandate is set to: • take stock of accommodation practices in Québec; • analyse the attendant issues bearing in mind the experience of other societies; • conduct an extensive consultation on this topic; and

208

lori g. beaman

• formulate recommendations to the government to ensure that accommodation practices conform to the values of Québec society as a pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian society4 While the issues have been framed as extending beyond religion, much of the debate and discussion centers around religious diversity and the challenges it presents in Québec society. The situation is complicated by the fact that some of the political forces in that province have a strong sense of laïcité and see it as a potential solution to the question of accommodation. The concern I am raising in this chapter is that the framing of the question—the boundaries of accommodation—will not lead to a productive solution to the tensions that religious diversity can bring. The language of reasonable accommodation has been drawn from a specific context in which it was developed to address the challenges faced by employers when faced with the requests of employees whose religious commitments led to a conflict between their obligations as employees and their religious beliefs. Typically, such conflicts centered around “days of rest”—that is, an employer might require an employee to work on a Saturday, which was the employee’s Sabbath. The law developed the notion that employers should, where possible, extend reasonable accommodation to the employee. The test of reasonable accommodation was thus developed in a labor context for which there is a clearly defined context of inequality (employer and employee) as a way to respect the dignity of the employee and to protect an employee’s religious freedom in the context of a situation in which people are often especially vulnerable. It was not intended to be a discursive framework for talking about religious diversity more generally. Shelagh Day and Gwen Brodsky point to the problems inherent in the reasonable accommodation framework in the labor context, which can be broadened to include its use in relation to diversity more generally, as has the application of the concept itself. They note that: the developing reasonable accommodation framework lacks the capacity to effectively address inequality and foster truly inclusive institutions. It is flawed by its implicit acceptance that social norms should be determined by more powerful groups in the society, with manageable concessions

4 Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux differences culturelles, Bouchard-Taylor Commission Mandate, http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/commission/mandat-en.html, accessed Nov. 30, 2007.

canada, france and the united states

209

being made to those who are “different.” As long as this is the framework for accommodation, less powerful groups cannot expect much from it, since accommodation discourse will serve primarily as a means of limiting how much difference “the powerful and the majority” must absorb (1996:435).

Day and Brodsky get to the heart of the problem with accommodation, but they cast the solution as one of rethinking accommodation rather than abandoning it. I propose moving away from it as a conceptual tool for thinking about diversity because of its inherent reliance on sedimentations of power that maintain the relations. How does it do this? By using accommodation or tolerance as a point of reference for mediating religious difference, minority religious groups are inevitably cast as “less than” other religious groups. Using the word tolerance has an “othering” effect that positions one group in a “giving” capacity and another in a receiving capacity. This bifurcation inevitably privileges the giver and diminishes the receiver, who has rights only because of the good will of the giver. Richard Day situates the creation of the notion of multiculturalism as a rational-bureaucratic intervention in the “problem” of diversity, which is itself, he argues, a socially constructed phenomenon. It is out of this tension between the “problem” of diversity and the “solution” of multiculturalism, that the language of accommodation is both possible and (in the view of some) necessary. Using the language of “tolerance,” which is analogous to “accommodation,” Day notes (2000:104): “Selves, of course, do not need to be tolerated: no special provisions need to be made for them, they are not even noticed. It is only when one is in the presence of what appears to be intolerable difference that tolerance become necessary and, in many cases, manifests itself as a gloss on hidden resentments.” These are not mere linguistic niceties, but rather go to the core of the discursive construction of power relations between individuals and groups. If religious freedom is to be meaningful, concepts like tolerance and accommodation will need to be abandoned. The tolerance model purports to recognize diversity, acknowledges the importance of religion to its believers (as opposed to acknowledging religion’s value for its own sake) and thus manages religious diversity by accommodating it. But, we must ask, accommodation of what, from whom, for what reason? Using the language of accommodation allows “us” to retain an ultimate authority over who stays and on what conditions. Minority religious groups are aware of their “less than” status, which can, as it has in France, prompt the use of strategies of violence and resistance.

210

lori g. beaman

The use of the modifier “reasonable” in reasonable accommodation is also problematic. Reasonableness is like the idea of “common sense,” which relies on an assumption of shared meaning and vision of what constitutes the boundaries of normal belief and behavior (see Beaman 2008). Reason is not, however, universal (Goldberg 1993). Reasonableness becomes, like tolerance and accommodation, part of the discourse of domination because inevitably the “reason” being used relies on a particular understanding of an appropriate order that maintains a particular hegemony ( Jiwani 2006; Wong 2007). Moreover, there is a sense in which those whose actions or desires are being judged for their “reasonableness” are not entitled to be a part of the decision-making process. Thus reasonableness works with accommodation to produce a discourse of exclusion even as it seems to present an opportunity for inclusion. The issues brought to the forefront of public discourse by the Bouchard-Taylor commission raise some interesting questions about the conceptualization of religious diversity in Canada. It is interesting that the rest of Canada has largely ignored the debates, assuming a sort of immunity from the tensions posed by religious diversity. Yet questions of “accommodation” have arisen in the other provinces with persistent regularity: debates about religious education, sharia law, photographs on driver’s licenses and polygamy are some of the topics that have attracted attention and debate.5 Each of these debates has drawn on the language of reasonable accommodation to frame the issue of religious diversity and freedom. All of these discussions are ultimately linked to the reasonable accommodation framework with very little debate about what this phrase actually means. There is a certain taken for granted-ness about the casting of “requests” to exercise religious freedom as exceptions to something that remains largely unexamined. As I have already argued, that “something” is a Christian hegemony that underlies the legal and social structure of Canada. And yet this is not the language of the Charter and of human rights legislation, which emphasizes equality. The language of accommodation, however, needs to be shifted to reconceptualize the possibility of equality rather than a focus on tolerance or accommodation or the casting of those who request equality as “special interest groups.” In Canada the law very clearly guarantees everyone certain rights and protections. Requesting that those rights

5

With respect to religious education, see Miller 1986, Schoenfeld 1999.

canada, france and the united states

211

or protections be enforced or be able to be exercised is not asking for special permission or special treatment. Equality: A Possible Alternative to Tolerance I propose that in order to recast the debate over how “minorities” should be “accommodated” we must reframe the language being used to describe what it is we want to achieve. While it is true that what many might like to achieve is indeed the preservation of a certain type of hegemony, this is not the intention of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the provincial human rights codes. In these documents there is the promise of equality that cannot be achieved using a linguistic toolbox that describes the process as one of accommodation and tolerance. The beginning place of human rights legislation is equality, and it is around this notion, as difficult as it has proved to be, that the discussion of diversity must be reframed. To be sure, equality is not a quick or easy fix. The language of equality has been the subject of great debate, most productively in feminist scholarship, which has challenged the straightjacket of formal equality to press for a substantive equality that accounts for systemic disadvantage and difference. The latter idea itself is fraught with problems of interpretation, including the ever-present “normal” or standard against which difference is established and measured. In this case the normative is mainstream Christianity, all else being held up in that light to illuminate the “difference.” In short, then, used thoughtlessly, equality can be as dangerous as the language of accommodation and tolerance. We can see a simplistic application of equality and its complicated results in the use of laïcité in France, which is based on a premise of the equality of citizenship that fails to recognize the strong tradition of Roman Catholicism and its implication in the very fabric of the French nation. Although it may not be possible to avoid all of the pitfalls of the equality framework, it offers an important place from which to begin the diversity discussion. In one of the early key post Charter cases on religious freedom in Canada—Big M. Drug Mart—Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court (Canada’s highest court) considered the dilemma of religious freedom in relation to the existence of many religious groups. Despite the fact that he used the word accommodate in his reasoning, Justice Dickson shifts the discourse in important ways

212

lori g. beaman

that are not reflected in the use of accommodation currently being used in the Bouchard-Taylor Commission discourse or in the broader discussion of religious diversity and its management in Canada. Justice Dickson stated: “A truly free society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct.”6 Here Justice Dickson diffuses the idea of a giving group and a taking group by abstracting the notion of accommodation from a subject/actor. The playing field, as it were, is evened out in that Dickson’s statement implies a beginning place of equality from which all citizens begin. This is not a naïve imposition of equality—Justice Dickson is cognizant of structural inequality—but is linking the idea of freedom with multitude of possibilities: “what may appear good and true to a majoritarian religious group, or to the state acting at their behest, may not, for religious reasons be imposed upon citizens who take a contrary view.” The Charter safeguards religious minorities from the threat of the “tyranny of the majority.”7 Justice Dickson’s acknowledgment of the possibility of a majoritartian group is not a reinforcement or acceptance of it. By positioning citizens as equal he does not give the right to one group to tolerate or reasonably accommodate another. Justice Dickson’s model effectively displaces a normative beginning point, something that reasonable accommodation and tolerance are unable to do. Moreover, Justice Dickson is clear that a society of possibilities is not imposed by the Charter: “A free society is one which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and I say this without any reliance upon s. 15 of the Charter.”8 Hence, in Justice Dickson’s view, human rights legislation is simply a way to support the fact of equality, rather than creating it, in a “truly free” society. Is it possible, in practice, to achieve an equality approach that avoids the pitfalls of reasonable accommodation and tolerance? A recent event in Canadian politics illustrates the difficulties of working through diversity. In the summer of 2007 the Elections Act of Canada was amended to include a provision that voters should present photo identification to the electoral officer when voting. This, in turn, raised questions about how Muslim women who were veiled would be identified. The Chief

6 7 8

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para 94. Big M Drug Mart at para 96. Big M Drug Mart at para 95.

canada, france and the united states

213

Electoral Officer included an exemption for women who were veiled as a reasonable accommodation. The government at that time refused to accept this proposal. There was no sense of equality in either the proposed solution or the response of the government. Both were based on the reasonable accommodation or tolerance approach. The Chief Electoral officer made assumptions about the wants and needs of Muslim women; the government refused to accept the line of what is “reasonable” drawn by the CEO. As the Canadian Muslim Women’s Association noted, no one thought to ask Muslim women what they wanted. Thus neither side began with a view of Muslim women as equal. Rather they were positioned as a group to be accommodated or tolerated. An equality approach would not, indeed could not, have conceived of approaching such an issue without a consultative partnership with those at whom the “exception” was being proposed. And, of course the language of exception draws us back into the notion of tolerance, accommodation, and special interest. Thus, beginning with a firm stance on equality and seeing the objective as achieving equality, rather than creating exceptions, is key. There are some key considerations in moving to an equality approach that are central to its achievement. First, as is apparent from the Elections Act incident, religious groups themselves need to be a cornerstone in the dialogue about law and public policy. This is made particularly challenging in that religion is lived, and for that reason is not monolithic within groups. Thus to seek partnership with religious groups in achieving equality is necessarily a delicate balancing act. In-group diversity is rendered all the more complex by life course and generational position. For example, research has shown that first generation Muslim women immigrants often reject the hijab as a symbol of their faith however their daughters may embrace its wearing as a symbol of their religious and cultural belonging (see Sajida, Hoodfar, and McDonough 2003). Peter Beyer’s research has pointed to the important differences within religious groups between generations (Beyer 2007). Oddly, one of the greatest obstacles to the achievement of a discourse of equality is the insistence by some, including the courts, that we live in a secular society. This position fails to acknowledge the impact of Canada’s predominantly Christian heritage on religious groups that are not Christian. By recognizing the privileged place of Christianity in Canadian history, we acknowledge a systemic positioning that must be addressed in considerations of equality. The taken for grantedness of how religion looks, for example, is deconstructed and reconsidered

214

lori g. beaman

when our starting place is an acknowledgment of privilege and the impact of Christianity on Canadian institutions and way of life, whether it is the early and profound infiltration of colonial religious ideology on aboriginal communities (Anderson 2007) or the bold acknowledgement of the supremacy of god in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Christianity is so embedded in Canadian culture that a wholly secular society is impossible. Denying this subverts the process of reshaping the discourse in terms of equality by implying that there is no significant obstacle for religious minorities. Canada has a unique opportunity to work through the challenges of balancing the interests of many religious traditions (and I include here new religious movements) in a manner that is truly egalitarian. This opportunity can only be realized by moving from the notions of reasonable accommodation and tolerance to a conceptual grounding in equality that is actualized in day-to-day practices. Because equality is situated in the context of human rights protections it is in some measure insulated from accusations of cultural relativism (see Brown 2007; Fournier 2008) or differentiated citizenship, in which minority communities are given jurisdictional autonomy over certain areas of life, including family and education (see Schachar 2001). The challenges of this approach are real, but it offers an important opportunity to fully recognize and value religious diversity. References Anderson, Emma. 2007. The Betrayal of Faith: The Tragic Journey of a Colonial Native Convert. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Audi, Robert. 2000. Religious Commitment and Secular Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press. Baubérot, Jean. 2000. Histoire de la laïcité francaise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 2001. “La laicité Francaise face au pluralisme et a ses mutations.” Pp. 169–182 in Chercheurs de dieux dans l’espace public/Frontier Religions in Public Space, edited by Pauline Côté. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. Beaman, Lori G. 2003a. “The Myth of Pluralism, Diversity, and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege of Protestantism in the United States and Canada.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42: 311–25. ———. 2003b. “The Courts and the Definition of Religion.” Pp. 203–19 in Defining Religion: Investigating the Boundaries between the Sacred and the Secular, edited by Arthur L. Greil and David G. Bromley. Oxford: Elsevier Science. ———. 2008. Defining Harm: Religious Freedom and the Limits of the Law. Vancouver: UBC Press.

canada, france and the united states

215

Berman, Harold. 1986. “Religion and the Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective.” Emory Law Journal 35: 777–93. Beyer, Peter. 2007. “Can the Tail Wag the Dog? Diaspora Reconstructions of Religion in a Globalized Society.” Norwegian Journal of Religion and Society 1: 39–61. Bowen, John R. 2007. “A View from France on the Internal Complexity of National Models.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33: 1003–16. Brown, Donald. 2007. “A Destruction of Muslim Identity: Ontario’s Decision to Stop Shari’a-based Arbitration.” North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 32: 495–546. Carbonneau, André. 2001. “La liberté religieuse dans une société sécularisée: l’Expérience Québécoise.” Pp. 183–192 in Chercheurs de Dieux Dans L’espace Public/ Frontier Religions in Public Space, edited by Pauline Côté. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. Carter, Stephen. 1993. The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion. New York: Basic Books. Choper, Jesse H. 1995. Securing Religious Liberty: Principles for Judicial Interpretation of the Religion Clauses. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Conkle, Daniel O. 2006. “Religious Expression and Symbolism in the American Constitutional Tradition: Governmental Neutrality, But Not Indifference.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 13: 417–43. Day, Richard. 2000. Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Day, Shelagh and Gwen Brodsky. 1996. “The Duty to Accommodate: Who Will Benefit?” Canadian Bar Review 75: 433–73. Feldman, Stephen M. 1997. Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and State. New York: New York University Press. Fournier, Pascale. (2008). “In the (Canadian) Shadow of Islamic Law: Translating Mahr as a Bargaining Endowment.” Pp. 155–176 in Law, Religion and Citizenship: Essays on the Relationship between Law and Religion in Canada, edited by Richard Moon. Vancouver: UBC Press. Garay, Alain. 2006. “Régulation étatique et groupes religieux en France.” In La nouvelle question religieuse: régulation ou ingérence de l’état?/The new religious question: state regulation or state interference?, edited by Pauline Côté and T. Jeremy Gunn. New York: Peter Lang. Gedicks, Frederick Mark. 2006. “Religious Exemptions, Formal Neutrality, and Laïcité.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 13: 473–92. Goldberg, David Theo. 1993. Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning. Cambridge: Blackwell. Gunn, T. Jeremy. 2004. “Under God but Not the Scarf: The Founding Myths of Religious Freedom in the United States and Laïcité in France.” Journal of Church and State 46: 7–24. ———. 2005. “French Secularism as Utopia and Myth.” Houston Law Review 45: 89–90. Hammond, Phillip E. 1998. With Liberty for All: Freedom of Religion in the United States. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press. Jiwani, Yasmin. 2006. Discourses of Denial: Mediations of Race, Gender and Violence. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press. Mazur, Eric Michael. 1999. The Americanization of Religious Minorities: Confronting the Constitutional Order. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mazur, Eric Michael, and Phillip E. Hammond. 1998. “The Market Paradigm and the Future of Religious Organizations.” Pp. 67–82 in Religion, Mobilization and Social Action: Religion in the Age of Transformation, edited by Anson Shupe and Bronislaw Misztal. New York: Praeger Publishers.

216

lori g. beaman

Miller, Ralph M. 1986. “Should There Be Religious Alternative Schools within the Public School System?” Canadian Journal of Education 11: 278–92. Moir, J.S., ed. 1967. Church and State in Canada, 1627–1867: Basic Documents. Toronto: McClelland and Steward. Palmer, Susan J. 2005. Aliens Adored: Rael’s UFO Religion. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. ———. 2008. The New Heretics in France. Leiden: Brill. Rhode, Deborah L. 1989. Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———, ed. 1990. Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sajida, Sultana Alvi, Homa Hoodfar, and Sheila McDonough. 2003. The Muslim Veil in North America: Issues and Debates. Toronto: Women’s Press. Schachar, Ayelet. 2001. Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schoenfeld, Stuart. 1999. “Transnational Religion, Religious Schools, and the Dilemma of Public Funding for Jewish Education: The Case of Ontario.” Jewish Political Studies Review 11: 1–2. Scott, Joan. 1990. “Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism.” Pp. 134–49 in Conflicts in Feminism, edited by Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn F. Keller. New York: Routledge. Sheppard, Colleen. 1990. “Equality in context: Judicial Approaches in Canada and the United States” UNB Law Journal 39: 111–25. Troper, Michael. 2000. “French Secularism or Laicite,” Cardozo Law Review 21: 1267–84. Warner, R. Stephen. 2005. A Church of Our Own: Disestablishment and Diversity in American Religion. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Witte, John. 2000. Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment: Essential Rights and Liberties. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Wright, Stuart A., ed. 1995. Armageddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives on the Branch Davidian Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wong, Alan. 2007. “The Winter of Our Discontent: ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ and the 2007 Québec Election.” Unpublished research paper, Concordia University (Montréal).

AFTERWORD: RELIGION, DIVERSITY, AND THE STATE IN CANADA John H. Simpson There are several ways to read this book. It can be glossed as a methodological text, an example of a kaleidoscopic, social scientific exploration of the problem of religion and diversity in the West as manifested in Canada. The methods include demographic analysis interwoven with qualitative research, survey research, comparative institutional and national/societal analysis, critical approaches to legal construction and public administration, organizational analysis, historical reconstruction, and ethnography. Most readers will be drawn to the substance of the chapters: accounts of sources, events, issues, attitudes and controversies linking religion and diversity in the public arenas of Canada, today. What may surprise some readers, especially those accustomed to thinking within the frameworks of values, utility, choice, and the calculus of freedom and liberty, is the central role the state plays in Canada as a reflexive actor in the field of religion and diversity, an actor that is both a “cause” of diversity and a putative source of solutions to problems arising therefrom. Of course, that centrality will not surprise everyone. But what may give pause are the different ways that constitutions and state rules are structured across the democracies of the West and the consequences they have for the shape of contestation and conflict, the focus of Lori Beaman’s concluding chapter. “May give pause” because, despite the work of David Martin (1978) and others, the spirit of social transference (contra the sensibility of this book) has a tendency to inform popular and scholarly discourse (see, for example, Bruce 2002). The thought is: “Isn’t here, the place where I live, move, and have my scholarly being really the model for how things are (can be) done there, too?”1 Not so—as the reader who is sensitive to on-ground facts and constructions discovers.

1 A high profile, recent example (not directly anchored in the academy): the projected collective fantasy of the President of the United States and his advisors that the

218

john h. simpson

Apprehended disparities between the U.S. and Canada are not only attributable to the narcissism of small differences. For starters the post1960s women’s movement in Canada enjoyed a certain quasi-official public status as funds flowed from the federal government to various organizations. Popular sentiment was girded by the state. Cooptive recognition was in full play. In Canada things don’t always await the passion-laden press of party politics to come about (Simpson 2000; also see Christiano 1994). The Fundamentals and Their Embellishment The fundamental elements of sociological analysis are found in population structure and dynamics. State-mandated, geographically-bounded counts mapped into categories are the things that mark the social habitat and describe the elements of life and history in a given place and time. The state requires self-attributions. Are you male or female? How old are you? Where were you born? What is your mother tongue? How much education do you have? . . . And in Canada: What is your religion? These “state-sponsored” categories and the counts in them enable the calculation of sameness and difference in a population. Prior to World War II the net increase in the population of Canada from immigration was attributable to mostly British and European sources. It was overwhelmingly Christian. Those in non-Christian categories were present but the counts were small, proportionately and absolutely. Restrictive legislation and prejudicial administrative decisions determined the course of things (Abella and Troper 1982). That began to change in the 1960s. Immigration policy did away with criteria that favored those from Europe and the British Isles. Relative ethno-religious homogeneity was displaced by increasing heterogeneity. In 1911 there were 30 ethnic and 32 religious categories in the census. By 2001 there were 232 ethnic ‘bins’ and 124 state-recognized religious identities with most of the increases occurring between 1971 and 2001, as Peter Beyer notes. Numerically Canada remains a majority Christian and white nation, but that observation can be a somewhat misleading demographic

people and tribes of Iraq were awaiting liberation and freedom in order to establish a Western-style liberal democracy.

afterword: religion, diversity, and the state in canada 219 abstraction if it suggests that there is a homogenous proportionate distribution of difference across the nation. Inflows of immigrants seen as “visible minorities” and/or from outside the bounds of Anglo-European religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity are not uniformly spread across the land. The end points of relocation and settlement in recent years have been for the most part major urban agglomerations—Toronto, Vancouver, Montréal. Today, the attribution of the duality of otherness (“I’m not you, and you know that you’re not me”) on ethnic, religious, linguistic, and racial dimensions is an inescapable fact of daily life in Canada’s cities. That, of course, is not unique in the globalized urban worlds of the 21st century. What is different in the Canadian case is the timing and course of nation building that coincided with fundamental shifts in demographic diversity. Unlike relevant comparators in other respects such as the U.K., the United States, and France, Canada lacked a complete, sovereign, Westphalian state until the 1980s. Before that Canada existed in fact, if only nominally in practice, as the Dominion (not nation-state) of Canada, formally a unit in the British Empire and then in the British Commonwealth, a constitutional entity by virtue of the British North American Act (1867), whose highest court was the House of Lords in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. By simultaneous acts of the British and Canadian parliaments in 1982, Canada became a fully sovereign, “grown up” state. The constitution as is said was “patriated.” And there was a bill of rights joined to the Canadian constitutional act, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Statemaking was encapsulated in the state-backed “promise” to recognize and protect rights and freedoms as they had come to be understood in the last quarter of the 20th century. This promise included the injunction of discrimination on grounds of religion, ethnicity, or gender. All of this occurred in the context of significant increases in the religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of the Canadian population as well as in the contexts of the feminist and gay rights movements. In 1985 the Canadian Multiculturalism Act was passed, an act for the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism in Canada ensuring, among other things, that all citizens can keep their identities, the identities that are ascribed by national origin and/or descent. According to the preamble of the act, this secures the equality of all Canadians.2 2 A skeptic might wonder whether or not those who drafted the act had ever read John Porter’s (1965) The Vertical Mosaic.

220

john h. simpson

One should always say “Canada” advisedly. Although Canada is a constitutionally bilingual state (French and English) and the mythology of two founding, partnered nations is rampant, the reality of “Canada” is that Québec is an institutionally complete, distinct, culturally vibrant, homogenous national society. So there is Québec and, as we say, “R.O.C.”—the rest of Canada. The implications of that for questions of cultural and religious diversity within Québec are spelled out in the chapters by Pauline Côté and Solange Lefebvre. Their work constitutes the most important thematic contribution of the volume: the dynamics and management of religious diversity in the context of a linguistic and (almost) religiously homogenous population that is at once a majority in its homeland and a minority in the confederation of which it is still a part. Politics (Côté) and the courts (Lefebvre) play no small role in sorting out what “reasonable accommodation” means in that context. And as the discussion makes clear there is something strange operating—strange, that is, to the Anglo-American mind-set regarding church and state. In Québec neither the model of strict separation of church and state (American) nor the church as distinct from the state but a corporate subject of the state (Anglican) applies. Those well-known modes of secularization do not fit Québec’s “Quiet Revolution.” Major institutions—education, health care, social welfare—devolved from (Roman Catholic) Church control within the province to provincial control after the 1950s. However, for operational purposes schools (until very recently), hospitals, and the work of charity (social welfare) remained in the hands of “the religious”—a term now broadened to include Protestant as well as Roman Catholic secondary control. Thus, a religious ethos and culture pervaded the on-the-ground organization and implementation of functions (education, etc.) that were now officially controlled outside the bounds of the Church (and the churches, too). And functions were carried on within a collective memory of the once operative unity of the Church as the magisterial apex of doctrinal, liturgical, and functionally instrumental subsystems of action. This form of secularization has historically evoked two responses: (1) anti-clericalism where the secondary control of the Church is attacked and its culture and ideology publicly liquidated; (2) nostalgic memory that recognizes the once powerful symbolic and institutional fabric of the Church and sublimates that memory in secular symbols that paradoxically point to both the total immanence of modern life (no God references required) and a diffuse aesthetic sensibility

afterword: religion, diversity, and the state in canada 221 of transcendence. This response, rather than the harshness of Latin anti-clericalism, tended to characterize the Quiet Revolution and its aftermath. Readers who want to understand the complexities of these forms of secularization and be entertained at the same time should watch a performance of Puccini’s Tosca, read Graham Greene’s The Power and the Glory, and enjoy a screening of Denys Arcand’s Invasions les Barbares. The Icing and The Cake The construction of Canada as a completed Westphalian state with late modern standards of non-discrimination and equity provided a comfort zone for the tide of immigrants who poured into the country in the latter years of the 20th century. It also was a resource for the sexually diverse in their skirmishes with religious hostility, an underlying theme of Pamela Dickey Young’s contribution. It, too, enabled the new (but in another sense, old) religion of Wicca to become a routinized part of a Canadian government bureaucracy, a recognized religion that was free to offer its chaplaincy in the prisons of the Correctional Service of Canada, as Mirelle Gagnon describes. And it provided legal possibilities that would stimulate varieties of religious adherence to oppose or welcome the expressions of diversity made possible by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its interpretive extensions, summarized in the statistics that form the basis of Sam Reimer’s contribution. I did miss, at the same time, a thoughtful, nuanced, well-written chapter on religion in Canada and the broad feminist phenomenon, the positive role of religion (if any) in that surge of discontent in the 1960s that soon morphed into remarkable intent, and then went on to change things, certainly culturally and more or less structurally, too (depending on what is examined). The Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution failed to become law. On the other hand, discrimination on the basis of gender is specifically enjoined in Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. What role (latent or manifest) did religion play? It would be useful to know. Were the answer, “No positive role, indeed, only resistance,” that would be useful (if somewhat conventional) knowledge. But would a thorough examination of sources reveal a positive link between feminist voices and religious voices mixed together as a force in Canada to help secure the welcome changes that did occur? We don’t know yet, but help may be on the way (Zwissler forth).

222

john h. simpson

In social science one should always eschew single-factor perspectives and explanations. Only the simple-minded think that the ownership of capital, private on the one hand, public on the other, is the source of all human misery (private) or the salvation of humankind (public). Nor is the belief that the spread of modern markets everywhere will solve all (or most) problems either a reasonable, fundamentally humane or scientifically adequate thought. That having been said, I hope that my single factor interpretive emphasis—the reflexive centrality of the state in matters of religion and diversity in Canada—will be taken for what it is intended to be: a corrective lesson in a sea of voluntaristic theory that can, itself, be right about some things but not all things, always. That, obviously, is not a lesson that the contributors to this volume need to learn. But there are principalities and powers within the broad profession who do. So there it is. A Concluding Unscientific (?) Postscript In reading Cowan and Helland, I was struck by things that seem to go together in a complementary way (not that their excellent chapters should be held accountable for what follows), a way that suggests that a psychodynamic framework (old, but, possibly, intriguingly new) may provide an interpretive opening for understanding our responses to the event that had it not happened would, arguably, have left us without this volume in our hands. I refer, of course, to 9/11 and the subsequent acts of realized or apprehended terror in the West. In fact I am not sure yet how to piece together in a satisfactory and rigorous way what came to mind as I read the chapters of Cowan and Helland except to note that what did come has an affinity with certain elements of the Freudian theory of psychodynamics. Thus, where religion is viewed as a source of moral and ritual enforcement we can see in the categories of on-line religion and religion-on-line the presence of the superego in the medium of the Internet. Where the superego inhibits the organism, the ego enables it to steer a course through the realities of life, including making reference to the wisdom and knowledge of civilizations, the product of sublimated urges. The flexibility and speed of the Internet steers post-modern egos through a vast electronic warehouse of culture. Yet neither the analogy of the Internet as superego nor as ego captures the most stunning and, indeed, frightening aspect of the medium.

afterword: religion, diversity, and the state in canada 223 That honor belongs to the id, the churning sea of desire seeking the fulfillment of pleasure any way that it can be obtained. The Internet more than any other medium in history has unleashed the raw power of the erogenous zones. It is not difficult to see 9/11 as a horrifying yet entrancing aesthetic event (Simpson 2003). Nothing, it seems, is as disturbing and as beautiful as the TV images of the towers and their fate on that clear blue-sky day. Nor is it difficult to attribute anatomical symbolism to the event, the phalli of triumphant American global capitalism sliced off. But what accounts for the palpable curtain of fear—public and private—that covers the events of 9/11 and the bombings in London and Madrid, etc.? 9/11 suggests the fear of irreparable, aggressively imposed impotence, a decisive mutilation of the future, the absence of our kind then. Cowan’s language is suggestive, too—“planes, trains, automobiles”—moving shaft-like things bearing explosive stuff. Thus, the fear of penetration, the rage of violation as the means of destruction part the air, go down the road, flow through the underground tubes and do the job of annihilation (cf. Newland 1962; Reiser 1984). Perhaps it’s worth a try, fitting these things together: TV, the worlds of the Internet and the primary processes of the human psyche, processes that have always been a major object of religion—and a source, too. References Abella, Irving, and Harold Troper. 1982. None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe. Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys. Bruce, Steve. 2002. God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Christiano, Kevin J. 1994. Pierre Elliot Trudeau: Reason Before Passion. Toronto: ECW Press. Martin, David. 1978. A General Theory of Secularization. Oxford: Blackwell. Newland, Constance. 1962. My Self and I. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. Porter, John. 1965. The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Reiser, Morton F. 1984. Mind, Brain, Body: Toward a Convergence of Psychoanalysis and Neurobiology. New York: Basic Books. Simpson, John H. 2000. “The Presence of the Medieval: Gubernaculum and Jurisdictio.” Pp. 136–45 in Medievalism: The Future of the Past, edited by Joseph Goering and Francesco Guardiani. Ottawa: Legas. ———. 2003. “Varieties of Imagination and Nothingness in the Global Village.” Canadian Journal of Sociology 28: 235–44. Zwissler, Laurel. forth. “Demonstrations of Faith: Religious and Political Identity among Feminist Political Activists in North America.” Ph.D. thesis, Centre for the Study of Religion, University of Toronto.

CONTRIBUTORS Lori G. Beaman is Canada Research Chair in the Contextualization of Religion in a Diverse Canada and Associate Professor in the Department of Classics and Religious studies at University of Ottawa. She is author of Defining Harm: Religious Freedom and the Limits of the Law, editor of Religion and Canadian Society: Traditions, Transitions and Innovations, and co-editor, with Peter Beyer, of Religion, Globalization and Culture. Her research on religious freedom is regularly funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Her secondary research interest is on religious ritual and tourism, especially labyrinths, about which she has written in volume 12 of the Religion and the Social Order series. Peter Beyer is Professor of Religious Studies in the Department of Classics and Religious Studies at the University of Ottawa. His publications include Religion, Globalization, and Culture, (also co-edited with Lori Beaman), Religions in Global Society, Religion and Globalization, and the edited volume Religion in the Process of Globalization. His research specializations include religion and globalization, social theory of religion, religion and transnational migration, and religion in Canada. He is currently completing research into the religious lives and attitudes of second generation Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist youth in Canada. Pauline Côté is Professor of Political Science at Université Laval, Québec. Her research interests include the interactions of the rule of law and minority religious cultures. Her current studies focus on the policy process and agenda setting on religion in comparative perspective. She has been Visiting Fellow at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris and Visiting Professor at both the Université Libre de Bruxelles and the Doctoral School of Social Sciences of Eastern Europe. She has published extensively in English and in French language scholarly journals. Among her recent books is The New Religious Question: State Regulation or State Interference?, with T. Jeremy Gunn. Douglas E. Cowan is Associate Professor of Religious Studies and Social Development Studies at Renison College, University of Waterloo.

226

contributors

The author of numerous books, articles, and chapters, his most recent works include Cyberhenge: Modern Pagans on the Internet, Cults and New Religions: A Brief History (co-authored with David G. Bromley), and Sacred Terror: Religion and Horror on the Silver Screen. He is currently completing a companion volume to Sacred Terror entitled Sacred Space: The Quest for Transcendence in Science Fiction Cinema and Television. Mireille Gagnon is a Ph.D. candidate in Religious Studies at Laval University in the city of Québec. She has been working on Wicca in Québec since 2001, from which she recently published La Wicca au Québec: portrait d’une religion de sorcellerie contemporaine, and an article on the nature of spirits in neo-shamanism in Québec. Her current research focuses on institutionalization of Wicca in Québec. Other interests include paganism, counter-cultural movements, and religious innovations. Christopher Helland is Assistant Professor of Sociology of Religion at Dalhousie University. His primary area of research examines religious activity on the Internet and World Wide Web. He has several book chapters and journal articles on this topic, the most recent being “Diaspora on the Electronic Frontier: Developing Virtual Connections with Sacred Homelands” in a special issue on Religion and the Internet of Journal of Computer Mediated Communication in 2007. Solange Lefebvre is Professor and holds the Chair of Religion, Culture and Society in the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies of the University of Montréal. She has edited books like La religion dans la sphère publique, Religion et identités dans l’école québécoise, and has just published the monographic study Cultures et spiritualités des jeunes. She is working notably on public policies and religious pluralism, Catholicism, and secularization. She is also a member of the advisory committee for the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, which as we write this continues to hold public hearings on the subject of “reasonable accommodation” in Québec. Sam Reimer is Professor of Sociology at Atlantic Baptist University in Moncton, New Brunwick. He has also been visiting scholar at Baylor University in Waco, Texas. Sam is the author of Evangelicals and the Continental Divide and has published over a dozen articles and book chapters. Among others periodicals, his articles have appeared in the Journal for the

contributors

227

Scientific Study of Religion and Political Research Quarterly, and he was guest editor and contributor to the Journal of Ecumenical Studies. John H. Simpson is Professor Emeritus of Sociology in the University of Toronto. In addition to his scholarly articles, book chapters, occasional papers, reference entries, and reviews he is the co-editor (with Howard Adelman) of Multiculturalism, Jews, and Identities in Canada. He is a former chair of the Department of Sociology, director of the Centre for the Study of Religion, and director of research, Hitachi Survey Research Centre, in the University of Toronto. He was president of the Association for the Sociology of Religion, 1994–95, and is a citizen of the United States and Canada. William H. Swatos, Jr., has served as Executive Officer of the Association for the Sociology of Religion since 1996, prior to which he served for six years as editor of Sociology of Religion, the ASR’s official journal. He is also executive officer of the Religious Research Association, adjunct professor of sociology at Augustana College (Illinois), and senior fellow of the Center for Religious Inquiry Across the Disciplines at Baylor University, serving as managing editor of the Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion. A doctoral alumnus of the University of Kentucky, Bill is author, co-author, editor, or co-editor of over twenty books including the Encyclopedia of Religion and Society. His current research centers on pilgrimage religiosity, secularization, and resacralization, reflected in his most recent book, On the Road to Being There: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Late Modernity, published as volume 12 in the Religion and the Social Order series. With Kevin Christiano and Peter Kivisto he has written the text Sociology of Religion: Contemporary Developments, to appear in a second edition this year. Pamela Dickey Young is Professor of Religious Studies at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario. She is the author of several books and many articles. Her latest book, co-edited with Leona Anderson, is entitled Women and Religious Traditions. She is currently doing research on Canadian churches’ reactions to same-sex marriage and on freedom of religion issues in light of the legalizing of same-sex marriage in Canada. She does research and writing in the areas of religion and sexuality, women and religion, feminist theology, religion and culture, and contemporary Christianity.

Religion and the Social Order Edited by William H. Swatos, Jr. ISSN 1610–5210 The series Religion and the Social Order was initiated by the Association for the Sociology of Religion in 1991, under the General Editorship of David G. Bromley. In 2004 an agreement between Brill and the ASR renewed the series. 11. State, Market, and Religions in Chinese Societies. 2005. Edited by Fenggang Yang and Joseph B. Tamney ISBN 978 90 04 14597 9 12. On the Road to Being There: Studies in Pilgrimage and Tourism in Late Modernity. 2006. Edited by William H. Swatos, Jr. ISBN 978 90 04 15183 3 13. American Sociology of Religion: Histories. 2007. Edited by Anthony J. Blasi ISBN 978 90 04 16115 3 14. Vocation and Social Context. 2007. Edited by Giuseppe Giordan ISBN 978 90 04 16194 8 15. North American Buddhists in Social Context. 2008. Edited by Paul David Numrich ISBN 978 90 04 16826 8 16. Religion and Diversity in Canada. 2008. Edited by Lori G. Beaman and Peter Beyer 978 90 04 17015 5