Religious Factor in Russia's Foreign Policy

The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy

This book examines how religion interacts with Russian foreign policy, arguing that religion is an important but often overlooked factor in shaping Russia’s outlook towards international relations. It surveys the importance of religion in Russian social life – both historically and in the present – and considers a wide range of Russian attitudes which are affected by religion – such as Russian nationalism, notions of Slavic solidarity, the divine mission of Russian Orthodox civilization, Russian imperialism, and Russia’s special attitude to Islam. The book discusses how religious organizations, especially the Russian Orthodox Church, operate in international relations, pursuing, through “religious diplomacy”, their own interests and those of the Russian state. It also explores how religious ideas and culture linked to religion impinge on Russian attitudes and identity, and thereby affect policy, and it demonstrates how policy influenced by religion impacts on Russian foreign policy in practice in a wide range of examples, including Russia’s relations with other orthodox countries, non-orthodox Western countries, Muslim countries, Israel and the Vatican. Alicja Curanovic´ is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland.

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The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy

Alicja Curanović

This English language edition published 2012 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 The Work is a revised edition of the book originally published in Polish under the title: Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, Warsaw 2010, © Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2010. Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2012 Alicja Curanović The right of the author to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or used in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN 13: 978-0-415-68831-4 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-13327-9 (ebk) Typeset in Baskerville by Sunrise Setting Ltd, Torquay, UK

For religion, after all, is the serious business of the human race Arnold J. Toynbee (Civilization on Trial, 1949)

Contents

Introduction

1

PART I

The religious factor in Russian politics: past and present

11

1 Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state

13

2 Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation

60

3 Religion in Russian views on foreign policy

106

PART II

Religious diplomacy of the Russian Federation

139

4 Characteristics of Russian “religious diplomacy”

141

5 Russia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Belarus and Serbia

151

6 The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships with Ukraine, Estonia and Georgia

162

7 Occasional community: Russian Policy on Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro

181

8 The long shadow of Byzantium: Russian–Greek relations in the face of rivalry between two churches

187

9 Between fear and the necessity of cooperation: Russian policy on Muslim countries

195

10 Among us, the chosen nations: Tendencies in Russian– Israeli relations

214

11 Neighbourhood of giants: The place of the Russian Federation in Asian cultural space between India and the People’s Republic of China

221

x

Contents

12 There can be only one Rome: Russia’s traumatic relationship with the Vatican

227

13 The Antichrist lives in the West: The ideological burden of Russia’s policy on the United States of America

235

Conclusion

239

Notes

250

Bibliography

324

Index

342

Introduction

Matters which cannot be unambiguously described and expressed in words often prove to be the most important for humanity. Such is the case with religion, which eludes research and precise definitions. At the beginning of the last century, it was acknowledged to be a “relic” gradually disappearing from the life of society under the pressure of modernization. This approach began to change by the end of the 1970s. The “return” of religion to politics first drew attention in the Middle East, where after the so-called Six-Day War (1967), members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization more and more frequently stressed the religious dimension of their fight against Israel and began to call the suicide bombers religious martyrs (shahids). Another important signal was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as a result of which Shahanshah Reza Pahlavi was overthrown and Shiite clergy took power, transforming Iran into a theocratic state. Religion also figured in the war in Afghanistan (1979–89), where the conflict with the Soviet Union took on the tone of an international jihad and the final withdrawal of the USSR’s armed forces was perceived by the Islamic world as a symbolic victory of the faith-fighters (mujahedin) over what was at the time a superpower. Gilles Kepel called this clear manifestation of the religious factor in international relations “the revenge of God”, who returned to politics in defiance of proclamations of the inevitable end of religious influences. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, fewer and fewer political scientists, sociologists and specialists in religious studies question the growing importance of the religious factor in politics – both as a premise of decisions undertaken by states, as well as an instrument used by them. The choice of topic for this book was dictated by the desire to analyse and present contemporary foreign policy of Russia in a new light. In accordance with the thesis discussed in this book, at the beginning of the twenty-first century the significance of the religious factor in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is growing. The Kremlin ever more successfully conducts “religious diplomacy”, which is an element in building Russia’s “soft power”. Manifestation of the religious factor in Moscow’s policy is connected with the political elite’s search for a new identity. The religious factor thus has influence on the determination of the Russian Federation’s place in the international arena.

2

Introduction

The religious factor has two aspects: institutional (activity of religious institutions) and ideological (religious ideas relating to policy). The analysis of contemporary policy has been assisted by research on Russian culture and history, revealing certain similarities in the use of the religious factor in Russian policy in the past and present. It is important to notice, that the study of the religious factor does not relate only to Orthodoxy (although, due to the role it plays, most attention is naturally devoted to it), but also to Islam, Buddhism, Judaism (the so-called “traditional religions”) and other Christian faiths (Catholicism and Protestantism). This work is divided in two main parts, reflecting the research method. Part I presents an overview of determinants, past and present, of modern Russian “religious diplomacy”. It consists of Chapters 1–3. Chapter 1 presents the evolution of the role of the religious factor in Russian history, including the process of forming confessional relations characteristic of Russian tradition, on which the current relation between the political elite and representatives of “traditional religions” is partly modelled. The next two chapters are devoted to the two aspects of the religious factor – the institutional and the ideological. Chapter 2 deals with the characteristics of the status of religious institutions: the religious law in force in Russia, the demographic potential, possessions and infrastructure of the most important religious institutions, their relation to the authorities and their relations among each other – in other words, everything that determines their activity at home and abroad. Chapter 2 also covers the relationship between Russians’ religiosity and political preferences, indicating how Russians view the Orthodox Church and what they expect of it in the public sphere. Moreover, analysis of documents published by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the muftiates reveals the goals of Russia’s most influential religious institutions within and without Russia’s borders. Chapter 3 is devoted to the influence of religion on Russian views of foreign policy. The function of religion was researched in the context of the following intellectual trends: Imperialism, Neo-Eurasianism, Islamism, Nationalism and Slavic solidarity. An analysis of particular views relates mostly to four problems: Russian identity, the vision of the global order, Russia’s place in it and its mission. Also considered is the notion “Orthodox civilization”, which reflects concurrence of the views of the Russian state and the Moscow patriarchate. Part II, dedicated to the analysis of the religious factor in Russian foreign policy, consists of Chapters 4–13. Chapter 4 deals with the characteristics of Kremlin’s “religious diplomacy”. The other nine chapters present detailed analysis of the manifestation of religion in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards particular states, the main point of reference being the function, which the religious factor fulfils in a given context. Among these countries, three groups can be distinguished: states of faith “close” to Russia’s (Orthodox and Muslim), religiously indifferent ones (China and India) and those of a “foreign faith” (the USA and the Vatican). There are also two particular cases: Estonia (combined with Georgia and Ukraine) and Israel. In order to illustrate the religious specificity of Russia’s relations with other countries, the chapter titles use metaphors such as: “Orthodox brotherhood”, “Betrayal syndrome”, “There can only be one Rome” or “the Antichrist lives in the West”. Analysis of these cases occurs as follows: definition of

Introduction 3 Russia’s interests in relation to a given state, indication of the trend of political thought (among those mentioned in Chapter 4) related to a particular situation and presentation of the activity of religious institutions and a description of the function that the religious factor (both in the ideological and institutional aspects) fulfils. I would like to thank Philip Walters for his kindness and support. I owe a debt of gratitude to the always inspiring Professor Andrzej Kojder. Thanks are also due to Professors Alicja Stępień-Kuczyńska and Wojciech Jakubowski for their insightful advices and to Professor Edward Haliżak for organizational support. I am sincerely grateful for the help I have received from my colleagues from the Institute of International Relations of the University of Warsaw. Lastly, I would like to extend my thanks and appreciation to Professor Stanisław Bieleń for his perceptive mentorship, patience and understanding – this book would not have been possible without him. *** Attempts to define religion face the challenge of expressing, through a limited stock of concepts, a notion which defies research, for it refers (in expressions of various thinkers) to something supra-natural, supra-empirical or transcendent.1 This paradox is not eliminated by the two most widespread research approaches: the substantive approach – endeavouring to describe the substance of what religion is – and the functional approach – characterizing “what religion does”. Émile Durkheim understood religion as a “system of beliefs and practices … which unite into a single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”.2 In this definition, three elements can be discerned: faith, beliefs and values referring to the supra-empirical sphere (sacrum); cult (practice) and community (the church).3 In later definitions the relation to the transcendental remains an essential criterion of distinction between religious faith and convictions of another nature. Religion was most often described as a system of symbols, beliefs, values and activities, while the main object of interest was its function. Clifford Geertz described religion as a “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”.4 Peter L. Berger perceives religion as a world of meanings and symbols created by humanity and which humanity then transforms into a sui generis reality (“the sacred cosmos”). Humanity creates this world so that it can assimilate the events of everyday life and protect itself from chaos.5 For John Milton Yinger, religion is a “system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with the ultimate problems of human life”.6 Robert N. Bellah takes a similar position, defining religion as a “set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence”.7 Władysław Piwowarski proposed an understanding of religion as a “system of beliefs, values and activities connected with them, that are shared and followed by a group

4

Introduction

of people and which result from the distinction between empirical and supraempirical reality and subordination of the significance of the former to that of the latter”.8 The difficulties with the precise definition of the essence of religion have directed researchers’ attention to its nature and effects, differentiated in accordance with their meaning for the individual (personal function) and society (social function). É. Durkheim claimed that the idea of religion is inseparable from the idea of the Church [community], from which he drew his conclusion regarding the nature of religion as an “eminently collective thing”.9 The French scientist perceived beliefs and rituals related to the sacrum as the main organizing force of society – as an integrating and community-building institution. Talcott Parsons and Yuri Levada emphasized its regulatory and normative functions. Geertz stressed the motivational effect of religion in the life of an individual, while Berger, Bellah and Yinger stressed its influence in building a feeling of security and usefulness in interpretation of existential questions. Thomas Luckmann recognized religiosity as an intrinsic trait of humanity. In the opinion of this sociologist in religion humanity transcends its biological nature and only in this way becomes human.10 Niklas Luhmann questioned most of these functions of religion, including the integrative function11 and suggested that religion should be understood principally as a system of communication. Beyer formulated this as follows: “religion is a type of communication based on the immanent–transcendent polarity, which functions to lend meaning to the root indeterminability of all meaningful human communication, and which offers ways of overcoming or at least managing this indeterminability and its consequences.”12 It seems, however, that even this formulation of the function of religion does not negate its integrative potential, because a defined model of communication necessarily also establishes the boundaries of a given community. Professing the same values and beliefs and participating in the same rituals generates a sense of closeness and solidarity. As Danièle Hervieu-Léger states, religion is an ideological, practical and symbolic determinant that encourages the creation, development and control of one’s awareness of belonging to a particular line of belief13 – to a certain community. The presence of religion evokes contrasting effects – on one hand, it can act as a catalyst in society while on the other it determines a line of division between those who belong to the community and those that do not. This sense of separateness, along with the sense of continuity is an essential aspect of identity – “the collection of notions, judgments and convictions, which a given social subject constructs when facing the task of defining itself.”14 Without attempting to resolve the question as to whether “the ability to transcend” is the essence of mankind it should be stated that the relation of the individual to the supra-empirical, the interpretation of events of everyday life and the approach to the challenge of existence have an influence on the process of its self-identification. And because relation to the transcendental is one of the essential components of an individual’s identity, religion can take on the function of identification, not only in the case of an individual subject, but also in the collective, the best examples of which are religious organizations (institutions).15

Introduction 5 The activity of institutionalized communities plays an important role in the acculturation of a specific belief system and the imagination of the transcendence of a certain collective, which can often be much larger than, for example, a nation. Religion, to which Durkheim attributed the significance of the root cause of social behaviour (everything that is social originates from the relation to the sacrum),16 is an inseparable element of culture, having an influence on the understanding of moral, aesthetic, legal and political categories and the functioning of public institutions and, in connection with this, also on national and state identity. In each case, however, regardless of the selection and hierarchization of key factors for the process of self-identification of nations, the significance of religion is beyond question. Religion is a factor that influences the process of self-identification, not only of individuals, religious organizations and nations, but also of the enormous geocultural community that is civilization.17 Arnold J. Toynbee saw religious systems as axes, around which great systems arise. This British historical philosopher compared religion to a vehicle that enables the preservation and later the grafting of that which is most valuable in a dying civilization onto the stalk of a new civilization that is only beginning to form.18 If we take this assumption as a premise, religion could be seen as one of the main determinants of the global order.19 Referring to the theory of Niklas Luhmann in such context, it could be described as a system of communication of a given civilization – or, as suggested by Thomas O’Dea, a source of ideology in societies, states or civilizations in transition.20 As mentioned at the beginning, until the 1970s, the connection between modernization and secularization was not actually questioned in humanistic science. It was assumed that technological progress and revolutions in means of communication – and the socio-economic transformation these brought about – would lead to the secularization of society. However, with the historical developments mentioned above, this assumption has become increasingly challenged. The premise of the new, so-called transformative, approach was the assumption that religion, in the face of modernization and globalization does not disappear, but takes on new forms. Luckmann claimed that two opposing processes occur simultaneously in the world: the contraction of transcendence and the widening of religion. In post-industrial societies, the sacrum has not vanished, but has only shifted from the public sphere (a space with a neutral worldview) to the private sphere, often elusive for sociological research. The tendency to replace forms of institutionalized religions with deinstitutionalized (“invisible”) forms is what Luckman defined as “privatization of religion”. Niklas Luhmann pointed out the role of globalization as a factor that forces change in the context of communication (religion), which leads to marginalization of traditional value systems. As one of the manifestations of such transformation of the role of religion, Jean Séguy recognized the phenomenon of using religious concepts in a metaphorical way (“metaphorization of religion”), while Danièle Hervieu-Léger argues that this process can just as well be a symptom of structuralization of the modern element of religion, which in the face of modernity does not disappear, but is subject to dislocation.21

6

Introduction

Globalization, modernization, religious pluralism – all of these pose a challenge for the identity of both the individual and entire communities. The universally felt pressure makes ground for a “global rebellion” of religion. Berger abandoned the “secularization paradigm”, claiming that what had after the Second World War been considered a sign of the inevitable process of secularization of society, in reality refers to only a very small elite in the scale of the world – the heirs of Enlightenment ideals. In his view, secular Europe is an anomaly in what is still a very religious world.22 Berger distinguished three forms of “religious response” towards the processes of modernization: deductive (defence of tradition), reductive (reinterpretation of tradition in modernistic secular language) and inductive (a return to mysticism as the source of religious convictions). Meanwhile, Beyer created a dichotomous division of religions into those that undertake an attempt at modernistic adaptation (the liberal/pro-system option), and those that negate the changes occurring (the conservative/anti-system option).23 José Casanova draws attention to the phenomenon of “deprivatization” of the public sphere.24 According to him, religion is returning to public debate most of all in order to defend freedom and liberty (as a counterbalance to authoritarian power), to contest the autonomy of secular spheres or to safeguard traditional moral values.25 Patrick Michel connected the phenomenon diagnosed by Casanova with a “political deficit”,26 while Georges Corm connected it with the institutional weakness of the nation-state and the church.27 Analysing the return of religion to politics, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd proposes an interesting thesis: that secularization is not a historical process but rather a constructed paradigm that was accepted in the age of Enlightenment. She distinguishes, moreover, two trends of secularization – laicism and Judeo-Christian secularism. The first recognizes the presence of religion in the public sphere as a threat, which should be unconditionally eliminated. The second accepts the separation of church and state, but considers religion the source of values that lay at the foundations of the existing system. It is in this trend where one finds politicians who maintain that the separation of church and state is a phenomenon tightly connected to Judeo-Christian culture and thus impossible to repeat in other civilizations. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd stresses that the observed strengthening of religion in international relations should not be interpreted exclusively as a manifestation of socio-economic problems or as a desperate fight for the survival of anachronistic religious institutions, but also as an attempt to force a new definition of relations between what is “political” and what is “religious”.28 We can conclude that modernization affected religion and religious life on various levels: the effects of this process have been, inter alia, secularization, privatization and politicization of religion. The move towards “privatization” was forced by religious pluralism, which gained the status of one of the foundations of a democratic system. In other cultures, where there is no such categorical separation of “religious” and “secular”, the tendency towards neutralization of the worldview of public space causes many tensions. The resistance of religion and the forming of “privatization ghettos” found its echo also in Europe: Amsterdam (the murder of Dutch director Theo van Gogh in 2004), London (terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005), the French sub-

Introduction 7 urbs (the riots in the autumn of 2005 also had a religious dimension). The “revenge of God”29 has very serious consequences for the international political system. An analysis of the influence of religion on international relations requires the establishment of concrete parameters of a phenomenon which is probably indefinable by its very nature. In this context, the object of study has to be a measurable aspect of religious influence. This can be either institutional activity of religious communities (actors) or – unfortunately less-easily measured – influence of religious ideas related to policy (ideas). Presentation of the actual state of things should serve as the point of departure for reflections on the function that organizations and ideas perform in contemporary politics.30 The activity of religious institutions (organizations) and the influence of religion on the conceptualization of the policy of a given state – this is how the concept of the religious factor should be understood.31 Religious organizations are not only churches (as “compulsorily, coercive, monopolistic sacramental grace institutions”32) but also institutionalized expressions of a religious community, accepted by the majority of members of this community as its representatives, possessing a structure in which an important role is played by the clergy (e.g. the Council of Muftis of Russia, the traditional Buddhist Sangha or the Federation of Jewish Organizations of Russia). In A Theory of Religion, Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge wrote: “religious organizations are social enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain, and exchange supernaturally-based general compensators”.33 A church or religious organization is a “specific type of organized human community, possessing a defined internal system, capable of creating organs of power, fulfilling internal and representative functions and defining the obligations and rights of its believers”.34 In this book, concepts such as “religious institution/religious organization”, “church institution” and “church” are used synonymously. A church, as well as the institutions associated with it and the clergy, all have the possibility of influencing policy of states. The activity of religious institutions is conditioned by many factors. Depending on the regulations of religious law, which defines the status of the organizations and their relations to secular authority, the state may be bound by a unified religious–political authority, a system of subordination of one institution to another or a division of these two structures, which may take on different forms – from radical separationism to various systems of cooperation.35 Apart from the legal regulation of the system, the actual power relations among particular religious organizations and the power apparatus are also a factor. The position of a given church is furthermore determined by, among other things, the number of its faithful, its organization, the property it owns, its ability to effectively mobilize members of the community, the role of the church in the history of a given country and the traditions of forming relations between the church institution and the state. In the times of crisis, transformation or situations when politics loses credibility, the influence of religious organizations grows and “competition” from other religious organizations intensifies. A church is a particular community of ideas, which are mostly universal and aspire to regulate all spheres of life. From its point of view, the church – an organi-

8

Introduction

zation which considers itself as the depository of faith – bears responsibility also for the public sphere. It can transform this responsibility into action above all through its adherents – by influencing their worldview, mobilizing them to action against or in support of the interests of the rulers, persuading them to actively participate in politics in general, to vote at elections or create parties. Moreover, the church influences the public sphere as an institution around which citizens (the potential electorate) gather, an institution which acts as an independent, detached unit, often having status of a legal subject and as a specific, more or less influential, interest group, possessing its own administration and a disciplined, devoted staff (the clergy). In the context of foreign policy, a challenge for the state may be the international activity of the church – a transnational subject, in other words, a nonsovereign, non-territorial, non-governmental unit that undertakes relatively free trans-border activity influencing relations within and among states.36 Some church institutions of global religions fulfil the three criteria of trans-border agency indicated by Brian Hocking and Michael Smith:37 they represent a defined social group, possess freedom of action and are in a state to exercise – in a limited scope and on a particular level – a certain influence on the international environment. Depending on the relationship between secular power and church authority, the church’s trans-border activity can reinforce or weaken the state’s foreign policy. Apart from the institutional aspect outlined above, the second aspect of religious influence in politics is manifest through religious ideas which relate to politics and influence the public sphere. Among these, we can distinguish concepts directly related to the doctrine of a concrete religion (theocratic ideas) and concepts drawn primarily from tradition, from the common, “folk” notions of religious teachings, which can often differ from or even contradict more canonical thinking. This dichotomy is connected with the differentiation between using politics for religious purposes, such as creating the kingdom of God on earth (theologization of politics)38 or using religious motifs for realizing political projects, for example, characterizing a conflict as a battle between good and evil (politicization of religion). In the second case, religious myths and symbols are subject to reinterpretation and adaptation for political aims and, as a result of the process of politicization, they become the foundation of an ideological hybrid,39 which can take on various forms, such as the so-called civil religion,40 a common ideological orientation of a religious nature of all members of a given political collective, expressed in symbols, myths and rituals, which fulfil above all the functions of integration, identity-formation, legitimization, mobilization and upbringing. This is connected with the problem of creating a typology of religious influence; sociologists recognize its role, inter alia, in worldview formation, integration, communication, regulation, legitimization and creation of culture. From the perspective of a state-participant in international relations, the function of identity formation is especially relevant. Both aspects of the state’s international identity41 are specifically influenced by the religious factor. In the case of co-creation of “internal identity”, religion fulfils an integrative function; at the same time, it is also one

Introduction 9 of the factors creating the state’s image – it defines its place in the religiously differentiated international space (“external identity”). If religion is a component of the identity of a nation or state, it may serve as a source of legitimization of the foreign policy or as a mobilizing factor. Moreover, one must not forget about the numerous operative functions (services) of religious institutions, which can act as mediator, arbiter, organizer and so on. The unexpected collapse of the USSR marked the end not only of an empire, but also of the multi-ethnic “Soviet nation”. When particular republics abandoned the federation, emphasizing the need to protect and develop their separateness, Russians – as the most strongly attached to the Soviet Union – faced the challenge of defining their own identity and that of a new, multi-national, multi-confessional state – the Russian Federation. The time of transformation was marked by the search for a sverkhidea – a universal formula to integrate society, which could become the basis of the system of communication (as understood by Luhmann) corresponding to the new Russia. What is important is that religion – and most of all, Orthodoxy – has been, since the beginning, one of the identity-forming options considered. The clericization of the public sphere, observed in contemporary Russia, is inspired by the authorities themselves. The Kremlin maintains good relations with the representatives of all “traditional religions” (Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism) and uses religious symbols and motifs in the public sphere, which is seen by many anti-clerics as an element of the formation of a “civil religion” of the Russian Federation. Sergey Filatov, contemplating the nature of the process (politicization of religion or spiritualization of politics) taking place in Russia, draws attention to the religious component of Russian identity as a source of the current tendencies. Anastasia Mitrofanova, who is inclined towards the thesis of “politicization of religion”,42 emphasizes the exceptional nature of the Russian case – religious myths and symbols effectively used by politicians in a society which, as Dmitriy Furman aptly notes, is reminiscent of the Middle East as far as the extent of identification with the church is concerned, yet is similar to Europe when one considers the percent of people who declare their faith in God within a concrete religious system.43 In the opinion of Danièle Hervieu-Léger, it is characteristic of religion that it draws legitimacy from the authority of tradition, understood as a collection of notions, images, theoretical and practical knowledge, behaviours and attitudes which society accepts for the sake of the necessary continuity between the past and present.44 Every religion implicates its own sort of mobilization of collective memory and structuralizes the symbolic religious universe.45 Thanks to this, religion can serve in the reconstruction of collective memory in modern times and enables a nation to identify itself with a given tradition (historical origins). Religion is thus a useful instrument for creating and regenerating national identity.46 The years after the October Revolution abounded in violent social, political and economic changes which seriously violated the continuity of the Russian tradition, which is why at the end of the twentieth century, there was a huge need in Russia to compensate for the loss of collective identity brought about by the

10

Introduction

collapse of the USSR and the reconstruction of the common memory of Russians on the basis of historical religious tradition. It is in this context that one should read the changes occurring in the Russian Federation – the top-down policy of “controlled resacralization” of the public sphere or – according to Shakman Hurd – the formation by the authorities of a religious system according to the paradigm of JudeoChristian secularism. These changes are occurring in accordance with historical models; it is therefore in history that we should seek explanation as to why religion can be an attractive identity option for a modern state, in which atheism had been, until recently, the dominant religion.

Part I

The religious factor in Russian politics Past and present

1

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state

The statement that “history is written by the victors” conveys the difference between an actual event in the past and the historical record concerning it, which undergoes subjectivization, and often ideologization, mythicization and mystification. The lack of agreement among historians regarding the evaluation of breakthrough events is nothing unusual, but the extreme divergence of judgments, particularly among Russian researchers, sometimes gives the impression that one or another stance towards their native history is almost a consequence of their chosen worldview. Tendencies to idealize (or demonize) also concern the role of religion in Russian history and the evaluation of events such as the Christianization of Russia, the role of the Mongols in the formation of samoderzhavie (autocracy), the raskol (schism) brought about by Patriarch Nikon or the reforms of Peter I. Myths and notions about the past often seem to have greater significance than facts – in this case for reconstructing the influence of the religious factor. *** If one accepts that political community is a determining factor in the formation of a “community cult”,1 then it is no exaggeration to claim that the system of power in Byzantium had an enormous influence on the Orthodox Church – its structure, doctrine, liturgy and functioning. Christianity in the eastern empire lasted almost a millennium longer than in the West, which caused the formation of a particular system of relations between secular and church authority.2 The principle of symphony had fundamental significance for the forming of state–church relations.3 In accordance with this model, God entrusted the emperor and patriarch – joined in perfect harmony – with certain functions: the emperor’s power is a reflection of God’s power over the world, and for this reason he is to be treated with divine honour. The emperor is the patron of the church on earth, its leader and helmsman, although he is not a theologian and does not hold power over the church, he fulfils a religious function in the liturgy and – together with the church hierarchy – is responsible for the fate of the church and the people.4 The emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople jointly represented Christians of the entire oikumene and cared for the church in the material and spiritual domains.5

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Byzantium was managed in the political sphere by the emperor and in the religious sphere by the patriarch.6 The principle of symphony left its mark on the Eastern church’s understanding of the essence of state and law. It was accepted that a Christian state is the second element – after the church – necessary for humanity’s salvation. The empire was considered the earthly image of the heavenly kingdom,7 in which the order corresponding to the cosmic hierarchy was binding: God, emperor in cooperation with the patriarch, and then believers. As John Meyendorff aptly observed, this charismatic understanding of the state obviously lacked political realism and efficiency; provincial usurpation was a common phenomenon, while political stability was the exception. In political categories, the Byzantine imperial system really was a utopia and, understood as the universal equivalent of the universal church, the empire never gained a universal nature.8 The clergy in Byzantium were often de facto imperial civil servants, who would also carry out missionary activities in the interest of the earthly Christian empire.9 Evangelization was equivalent to the expansion of Constantinople, which during the Middle Ages was in a rivalry with Rome for supremacy in Christianizing people living to the east of the Elbe. Widening the influence of the empire was seen in Byzantium in terms of the realization of “God’s plan”, tightly connected with humanity’s salvation. The growth of the empire thus had an eschatological dimension – Pax Romana was the same as Pax Christiana. Dimitri Obolensky draws attention to the particular nature of the Byzantine commonwealth – a community of ideas, concentrated around the two institutions – the church and the emperor.10 Recognition by the princes of Rus of the superiority of the autocrat’s power was, in Obolensky’s opinion, one of the most important factors in the development of Russian statehood. Besides questions connected with religious dogma, church organization, liturgy or religious art, Kiev also borrowed from Byzantium the eschatological nature of the state, governed by a ruler by God’s grace. The thought expressed near the end of the fourteenth century by Patriarch Anthony on the indissolubility of the institutions of church and empire was taken up and creatively developed in the following centuries in Russia.

Identity-building role of Orthodoxy in the history of Rus Few periods in the history of Russia became an object of such idealization as the history of Rus. Existing around four hundred years (from the ninth to thirteenth century), the political structure of eastern Slavs with its centre in Kiev11 plays – particularly in the tradition of Russian Orthodoxy – the role of a legendary “Golden Age”,12 represented by four myths. The first of these concerns the Christianization of Rus, the residents of which supposedly en masse, voluntarily and spontaneously13 converted to the new faith after the example of Prince Vladimir, who, following the footsteps of his grandmother Olga,14 was probably christened in the year 988.15 This idyllic notion

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 15 about the conversion of Rus is supplemented by a legend that emphasizes the sovereignty of the decision of Kiev’s ruler, who, looking for a new religion for his state, invited representatives of various confessions and from among the “offers” presented to him ( Judaism, Islam, and Western and Eastern Christianity) chose Christianity of the Greek rite.16 Another motif, particularly exhibited by the ROC, is the presentation of Kievan Rus as the only state in which the ideal of symphony of secular and church authority was fully realized. The Social Concept approved in 2000 by the tenth general sobor of the ROC, mentions that Kiev, in regard to symphony, surpassed Constantinople because, among other reasons, the pagan tradition of pontifex maximus17 was unknown to the Slavic rulers. Moreover, apologists of Kievan Rus emphasize the high moral standards and humanism of the rulers, appealing to the fact that the death penalty was abolished for being contradictory to the teachings of Christianity.18 The idea of Rus also contains the thesis of the unusual tolerance that reigned in the Slavic state.19 While it is true on one hand that in the lands of Rus mixed marriages between Slavs and Khazars or Volga Bulgarians were not rare and Christian Slavs were not averse to making alliances with neighbouring peoples of a different faith, it is also true, however, that in thirteenth century Kiev, “nonOrthodox” people were considered “foreign”. Anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic sentiments could be felt: the pogrom and exile of Jews in 1113 and the expulsion in 1233 of Dominicans from Kiev20 and the order by Vladimir IV Rurikovich for the demolition of all existing Catholic churches and monasteries.21 Religious tolerance is often mentioned not only as a phenomenon of Old Rus, but also as a distinguishing feature of Russian civilization. But attention must be drawn to a certain detail: tolerance concerns, above all, relations between the dominant religions of Russia – Orthodoxy and Islam, Buddhism or local cults and to a decidedly lesser degree relations with other branches of Christianity and Judaism. The answer to the question as to why Russian history has more Jewish pogroms and crackdowns on “Latinists” than, for example, anti-Tatar campaigns, can be found in the difference in social and financial status or the rate of assimilation of particular minorities, but the significance of the religious factor should also not be neglected. The image of Rus living the “Word of God”, where under the harmonious rule of the prince and metropolitan tolerance reigned and high moral standards were binding, was created and then spread mainly due to the efforts of the Russian church, which from the beginning influenced the process of identity-formation of the eastern Slavic state. Religion was, next to language, the most important determinant of identity for Kievan Rus. Some researchers even claim that Rus was mainly a religious community,22 a Christian civilization administered by the clericalized power apparatus.23 Identifying with Orthodoxy was, for the elite of Kiev, the source of their sense of separateness from neighbouring pagan peoples, a determinant of their belonging to the Byzantine commonwealth (the universal Christian empire), and also the factor forming their unfavourable attitude towards Western Christianity.24

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The religious factor in Russian politics

Acceptance of baptism was a modernizing impulse, giving rise to a new type of social and political organization. It was in the interest of the fledgling institution of the Russian church, which was still new in the beginning of the tenth century, to raise the prestige of the prince and to increase the centralization of the state – its most importantally in the efforts to ensure effective and enduring Christianization. The authority of secular power grew thanks to the new source of legitimization provided by monotheistic religion. The Kievan princes who, in accordance with Christian teachings, held office by the will of God, significantly strengthened their position against the council. The prestige of their power was intensified by the splendour of Byzantine rituals, and also suggested the kinship with the Christian basileus.25 The highest manifestation of sacralization of power was the canonization of members of the royal family (Olga and Vladimir the Great, Gleb and Boris). The latter two, according to the common telling of the story, voluntarily gave themselves up to their executioners, sent by their brother Sviatopolk I, preferring death to the shedding of a brother’s blood. The history of the martyrdom of the first saints of Rus,26 which, among others, led to the establishment of the ethos of self-sacrifice in Rus culture, was largely prepared by the young church, which used the princes’ death as an instrument in the fight for political influence.27 With the help of canonization, the church institution effectively bound the dynasty and Kievan state with Christianity. The Orthodox Church itself played an essential role in the centralization of the state, creating a parallel, uniform structure, of which particular units that were not strictly religious fulfilled other functions as well – among other things, they established schools, supported the development of written language28 and were the most important centres of art. The church was the main institution ensuring connection between Rus and Constantinople – the bishopric in Kiev29 since around the year 103730 had been administratively subordinated to Constantinople. As a result, the Kiev metropolitans – a decided majority of whom were Greek – were picked by the patriarch of Constantinople.31 Strengthened by the “Greek factor”, the direct dependency on Byzantium (the Kiev metropolitan was first and foremost a vassal of the emperor) was a premise for a certain independence of the Kievan church from the prince’s authority. At the same time, the strong position of Greeks influenced the significance of the Orthodox Church as the main centre disseminating Byzantine culture. The church also fulfilled a political function – the metropolitan of Kiev often assumed the role of arbitrator between the prince and his vassals, or between particular claimants to the throne.32 In these circumstances, the church’s favour was worth its weight in gold and was won by, among other things, granting the clergy specific privileges and the strengthening of the position of church institutions. A source of special prerogatives for the clergy in the economic–jurisdictional sphere was the statute on tithes, courts and the clergy issued by Vladimir the Great and the Sudebnik of Yaroslav the Wise, concerning church courts. In accordance with the decisions included in the document, the clergy were freed from customs fees,33 the Orthodox Church was granted the right to one tenth of the prince’s income (from cultivation of the prince’s lands, trade and court fees),34 and entire

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 17 villages – together with their residents and financial burdens – could be sold to monasteries.35 Moreover, episcopal courts had exclusive jurisdiction in examining not only disputes involving clergy, but also matters of secular individuals in the sphere of family and morals. From the time Vladimir accepted baptism until the Mongol invasion of 1240, the ROC managed to create a structure including 16 bishoprics and more than 60 monasteries (including the most important – the Kiev–Pechersk Lavra), and had at its disposal a clergy several tens of thousands strong.36 The Christian religion and the institution connected with it fulfilled in the state of eastern Slavs the role of identity building, legitimization and the creation of culture in the widest sense. Combined with the myth of Boris and Gleb’s martyrdom, state and church became two central political symbols, constructing the identity first of Rus and later of Russia.37 The idealized image of the Kievan period became, for Russian historical memory, equally important as facts. The myth of Orthodox Rus served in the fifteenth century as a point of reference for the rulers of the new Russian state, as they appealed to the tradition of the “Golden Age”, interrupted by the Mongol invasion.

The Orthodox Church under the “Mongol yoke” The role of the Mongols in Russian history inspires many controversies. There are ongoing disputes over how long their rule actually lasted and what exactly was its nature: a brutal occupation or a tolerable dependency in which the khan replaced the Byzantine emperor.38 Whether the pejorative description of the period between 1240 and 148039 as the “Mongol yoke” is justified, or if, as some historians suggest (e.g. Lev Gumilyov40), the arrival of the Mongols was in reality the next “civilizing impulse” after Christianity for the eastern Slavs. Equally ambiguous was the attitude of the Orthodox Church which, no longer operating under a central government, was the strongest, most influential non-Mongol institution on a national scale in Russia. During more than 250 years, the Orthodox Church, first under the supremacy of a pagan, and then an Islamic sovereign,41 enjoyed its greatest independence from the state in its history. Regardless of the evaluation of Mongol influences on the development of the lands of Rus, the strengthening of the church’s position in this period is beyond doubt. Hardly a decade after42 the destruction of Kiev, the Orthodox Church gained many economic and jurisdictional privileges. The metropolitan received from the khan, on equal footing with the princes, a iarlik; the clergy, monasteries and also secular individuals connected with church institutions were freed from paying taxes and tributes;43 exclusive jurisdiction of church courts in matters concerning the clergy was maintained. A guarantee of the inviolability of property enabled the Orthodox Church to gain, with time, the status of the largest landholder in the state.44 Towards the end of the thirteenth century, the number of eparchies (bishoprics) grew to 19; among them was also the prestigious diocese Sarai, established in 126145 in the capital of the Golden Horde on the initiative of the khan.46 Mongol rulers did not interfere in the religious activity of the Orthodox

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The religious factor in Russian politics

Church, which enjoyed full freedom of cult. Berke Khan allowed evangelization of the Tatars, and Uzbeg Khan in 1313 forbid – under threat of the death penalty – insulting religion.47 Numerous privileges were also the Orthodox Church’s reward and encouragement for legitimizing the supremacy of the horde. Church hierarchs played the role of mediators between the khan and the princes, using their authority usually with the aim of mitigating conflicts and forestalling the threat of an anti-Mongol rebellion.48 Acting against the authority of the khan was treated by the Orthodox clergy as a transgression against the order of God, because God himself gave Rus to the reign of the “Tatar tsar”, for whose health and prosperity one should pray.49 The Mongol yoke, free of the stigma of paganism, was seen as a necessary suffering for redemption and took on an eschatological nature, which gave religious sanction to the obligation of obedience towards the ruler.50 Accepting such a point of view enabled the Russian church to identify to a certain extent with the Tatar tsar and to represent his interests towards Byzantium.51 Robert Landa draws attention to the significance of the anti-Western resentment which brought the Orthodox Church closer to the horde.52 The resolution of the dilemma of “the turban or the tiara” in favour of the former was made in Rus not without the influence of Balkan monks who, having left their homeland after the defeat at Kosovo Field,53 reinforced the strong dislike of Rome and Catholicism in the Slavic east.54 Being wealthy, taking advantage of its significant freedom of action and remaining in direct contact with the rulers (the significance of the diocese in Sarai), the Orthodox Church became an important political institution whose support had consequences for the balance of power among particular princes. One of the essential premises of the growth of Moscow’s position was the transfer of the metropolitan’s headquarters to this city (from Vladimir on the Klyazma) between 1326 and 1328. The presence of the highest rank of the spiritual hierarchy, with the title Metropolitan of Rus (not only of Moscow), raised the prestige of the entire duchy. Subsequent metropolitans more and more often took active part in politics, usually as arbitrators and truce-makers among particular princes or between rulers and their subjects: Metropolitan Cyril I, at the request of Prince Yaroslav, prevented a rebellion in Novgorod by threatening the rebels with excommunication, and Metropolitan Pyotr supported the Muscovian princes in their rivalry with Tver.55 The political role of the Orthodox Church (and Moscow) grew significantly during the times of Metropolitan Alexy,56 who was in large part responsible for the success of Ivan Kalita, distinguished in 1328 by the khan with the title of Prince of All Rus and a yarlik allowing him to collect tribute ( yasak) from the remaining princes.57 After the death of Kalita in 1340, Metropolitan Alexy assumed for 10 years the role of regent – guardian of his descendants – of his son Ivan II the Fair and grandson Dmitry Donskoy. The clergyman, in the interest of Moscow, did not hesitate to expel from the church his political rivals – Prince Mikhail of Tver and Prince Sviatoslav of Smolensk.58 In the middle of the fourteenth century, the church’s new approach to the supremacy of the horde became apparent. Together with the strengthening of

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 19 Moscow, distant Sarai lost its attractiveness in the eyes of the Orthodox hierarchs.59 The change in attitude of the highest dignitaries occurred to some degree under pressure from the monasteries, which during this time had begun to win the position of substantial political centres. Revival of monastic life in the fourteenth century was the consequence of the activities of monasteries such as that founded by Sergey Radonezhsky in 1337 (or 1339),60 the Trinity Lavra of St Sergey (Sergiyev Posad), the Moscow Chudov monastery (1366), the St Cyril–Belozhersk monastery (1397), the Solovetsky monastery (1436),61 the Simonov monastery in Moscow, or the monastery of Boris and Gleb (Borisoglebsky, near Rostov, 1363).62 The dynamically developing community63 undermined the metropolitan’s monopoly in the sphere of legitimizing the ruling power or resolving disputes between princes. In 1380 there came to a significant clash of authorities, when the monk Sergey Radonezhsky blessed Dmitry Donskoy before the Battle of Kulikovo, despite the burden of anathema declared on him by Metropolitan Cyprian. The victory of the Muscovite prince – cursed by the metropolitan, blessed by the monk – is accepted as a symbolic moment in the change of the church’s attitude, as it began more and more to clearly support Moscow in its efforts to unite the lands of Rus and cast off the Mongol yoke.64 While in the thirteenth century the church endeavoured to mitigate the hostile climate with regard to the khans, in the fourteenth century the Orthodox Church gradually assumed the role of an institution mobilizing Orthodox believers in defence of the lands of Rus. Evaluation of the significance of the church’s action to unite Rus divides historians. Some, such as James Billington,65 emphasize the importance of the metropolitan’s support of Moscow’s efforts and its delegitimization of the khans’ authority. Others, such as Larisa Andreeva, claim that the Orthodox Church, fearing the loss of its numerous privileges, did not play any significant role in the “gathering of lands”, and the image of the church as the main force of opposition in face of the horde is a creation of later political mythologization.66 It is must be remembered that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, changes occurred in the way the Mongol reign was perceived – paradoxically the Orthodox Church had a large part in the devaluation of the image of the horde’s rule. One of the instruments of creating the myth of the Mongol yoke was the canonization of the martyrs of faith from the times of the horde. Among those brought to the altar were Prince Roman of Ryazan (d. 1270), Prince Mikhail of Tver (d. 1318), Prince Basil (Vasilko) of Rostov (Vasilko Konstantinovich, d. 1238), Prince Mikhail Chernikhovsky and boyar Fyodor (d. in 1246).67 At the same time, the church emphasized its own merits, canonizing metropolitans Pyotr, Alexy and Cyprian – in this way it maintained a balance between the two institutions that were political symbols: secular authority and the church. During the Mongol reign, Orthodoxy began to notice more acutely the presence of a second monotheistic religion.68 From 1312 Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school was the official religion of the Golden Horde, which did not influence, however, the change in the khans’ policy of religious tolerance. Of far greater significance for the formation of tradition of relations between Orthodox princes and Muslim rulers was the existence of the Qasim khanate. In 1446 the khan’s

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The religious factor in Russian politics

son, Ulug Muhammad, joined the side of Muscovite ruler, Vasily II the Blind, from whom he received title to land on the shore of Oka, which in 1446 was called Kasimov. Rulers of the buffer kingdom, which existed for more than 200 years (until 1681) between north-eastern Rus and the khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan, supported Moscow in its struggles against the horde (among other things, they held up the troops of Said Ahmed Muhammad and took part in the Battle of the Ugra in 1480). In a later period they made up the core of the Russian army, conquering Astrakhan, Kazan and Siberia, and were active in diplomatic service.69 Some historians claim that thanks to their close contacts with the Muslim Kasimov khanate, “Russia became an empire, not a state programmed to assimilate nations and unify faith”.70 In the opinion of many scholars (e.g. Robert Landa, Larisa Andrieyeva, Nicholas Riasanovsky), it was during the reign of the Golden Horde, in fact, that there arose a model of religious policy, encouraging the assimilation of ethnicities. The Mongol rulers observed the principle of religious freedom and non-interference in the activity of religious institutions – besides Orthodox eparchies, there were also the Armenian and Latin bishoprics, while on the other hand it should be noted that tolerance and numerous privileges extended to church institutions by the Mongols did not concern the Jewish religious community.71 Moreover, in the horde, a specific system of confessional relations was formed, with secular authority in the dominant position, fulfilling the role of initiator, creator, administrator and arbitrator among particular religious institutions. Tolerance, enabling the coexistence of different religious confessions, did not mean, however, that the role of religion in identity building was reduced. The proximity of two monotheistic systems led to the association of Orthodoxy with Slavs and Islam with Tatars.72 The victorious princes in the struggles with the horde made Eastern Christianity and Byzantine tradition the main source of legitimization for their power and one of the key components of identity for the Grand Duchy of Moscow.

Byzantinization of Russian culture as a factor forming samoderzhaviye The debate as to which of the two traditions – “Genghiskhanization” or “Byzantinization” – had the deciding influence in shaping of the power system of Moscow Rus (fifteenth to seventeenth centuries),73 opens the next “great dispute” of Russian history. Researchers who attribute the key role to the Mongols demonstrate the adoption by Moscow of models characteristic of the horde, which was a centralized, hierarchized power apparatus, dominated by the khan – “heaven’s chosen one”, distinguished by the particular charisma that marks the members of the ruling dynasty.74 After the liberation of Rus from the Mongol yoke, the khan’s place was assumed by the “white tsar” – the Muscovite prince, who, in strengthening his position made use of the “blessings” of the horde’s sacralization of power. The princes’ use of the title White Tsar is invoked as an argument supporting the idea that Muscovite rulers considered themselves the heirs of the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 21 khans’ state – the White Horde from which they took over not only its solutions in the military, administrative and fiscal spheres, but also customs of the court, such as the prince’s selection of a co-ruler/advisor of lower social rank.75 One of the most important effects of Genghiskhanization was the undermining of the supremacy of the basileus of the universal Christian empire,76 which in the twelfth century had to yield his position in Rus to the khan. Over two hundred years of the Mongol yoke certainly had an influence on the form and functioning of the Moscow state, whose rulers had managed to unite the lands of Rus and ultimately gained independence from the horde near the end of the fifteenth century. Perhaps the final political product in the form of Russian samoderzhavie was in reality closer to the tradition personified by Genghis Khan than Constantine. However, the Muscovite rulers, creating the foundations of their power, consciously referred, above all, to the legacy of Byzantium – its customs, rituals, symbols or religious relations. Modelling itself on the eastern Roman Empire was the source of the Byzantinization of the Muscovite state observed in the fifteenth century. At the same time, a Russification of Byzantine tradition was also occurring, for as Boris Uspensky aptly noted, those holding power – both in the state and in the church – did not so much fathom the essence of Byzantine culture as they imitated forms and rituals which they often knew from secondary sources and which in the process of acculturation were often reinterpreted and endowed with new meaning. The Muscovite princes, who were glad to gain full sovereignty at a time when Constantinople fell under Turkish pressure, began to see themselves as the successors to the emperors and continuers of the tradition of the Christian empire. The Muscovite state, even if it derived, in its political essence, from the horde, had an identity that was Orthodox and Byzantine. The crown of the princes – and later of the tsars – the characteristic hat lined with fur and inlaid with gems, could be seen as an illustration of the Byzantinization of the Mongol elements present in the Russian tradition. According to historians, Ivan Kalita received this hat from Uzbeg Khan;77 however, according to common belief, it had been a gift from Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos for the Kievan prince, Vladimir II, son of the Byzantine Princess Anastasia and Prince Vsevolod. In this way the khan’s reward to his faithful vassal was included as the “hat of Monomachos” in the Russification of Byzantine tradition legitimizing the right of the Muscovite princes – heirs of Byzantine and Kievan Rus – to hold power over all of Rus (Russia) and to use the title Tsar.78 There are other examples of the Muscovite rulers’ conscious appeal to the legacy of the Christian empire: Ivan III, who ultimately defeated the Mongols in the standoff on the Ugra in 1480 had, eight years earlier, taken for his wife Zoe Palaiologina – the niece of the last basileus, Constantine XI, which justified the placing of the Byzantine two-headed eagle on the family coat-of-arms. The ruler also used the title Tsar, appealing to his kinship with Vladimir the Great, who had married Princess Anna Porphyrogeneta.79 The falsified genealogy strengthened the prestige of the Muscovite princess – descendents of Rurik, who according to fabricated texts from the sixteenth century was a relative of the fourteenth generation governing the lands from the Vistula of the mythological Prussia – the brother

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of the Emperor Augustus himself.80 The higher esteem for kinship with Roman emperors than for family ties to the khans speaks in favour of the thesis of the Byzantinization that strengthened the significance of Orthodoxy for Muscovite Rus (its identity, political system, culture), which had specific consequences for both secular authority and for the church itself. Adopting from Byzantine tradition the principle of parallelism of the power of God and the emperor, which became the premise for the sacralization of power in Russia, had important consequences for the Russian state. The coronation ceremony, during which the metropolitan used cross and chrism to bless the ruler, played a particular role. This act was quasi-sacramental and emphasized the grace of God with which the ruler was favoured. The monarch thus became “God’s regent” on earth, and his will was the source of law and justice, which he guarded in the name of Christ.81 This religious character distinguished the coronation of Ivan III,82 but of truly exceptional significance was the ceremony marking Ivan IV’s rise to power in 1547, when he was crowned Tsar of All Russia by Metropolitan Makary, which was later officially sanctioned by Constantinople. In 1562 Patriarch Joasaphus II confirmed the right of Ivan the Terrible to use the title Tsar.83 Under the influence of the teachings of Metropolitan Makary on the divine origins of the monarch’s power, Ivan IV believed that he had received directly from God the “sword of justice”, with the help of which he must establish order – also in the church, which received “only” the “sword of the spirit”.84 Granting secular authority in Russia the status of sacrum,85 gave obedience to the monarch a religious nature and possible rebellion against the autocrat the sanction of sin. This was reflected in, inter alia, legislation: in the sixteenth century subjects, before being administered the death penalty, were obligated to report any criticism made against the tsar.86 The process of sacralization of secular authority influenced the reduction of the church’s role as an institution legitimizing the monarchy – the metropolitan’s anointing only confirmed the special charisma of the ruler, of which dynastic succession eventually became a premise as well.87 Meanwhile, the secular “regents of Christ” all the more often and decisively interfered in matters of the church – also in questions of doctrine, which was against the principle of symphony. The precedent was set by Vasily II, who in 1441 ordered the imprisonment of Metropolitan Isidore of Kiev for ecclesiastical reasons: betraying the Orthodox faith by accepting the Florence Union in the name of the Orthodox Church. The ruler’s opposition, supported by some of the clergy in the face of Constantinople’s decision to renew its union with Rome, was a step on the way to independence for the Orthodox Church in Russia. There were also exceptionally brutal instances of the Russian rulers’ interference in church matters, such as the murder in 1568 of Metropolitan Philip on the orders of Ivan IV,88 but very sophisticated instances as well, as for example the legislative activity of Tsar Alexy, who ordered his subjects to observe religious fasts (1646), forbid monks from the Solovetsky monastery to possess alcohol (1647), and ordered the rooting out of all pagan amusements and superstitions (1648).89 The tsar gave vent to his ambitions of equalling the Byzantine emperor–codifiers in his Code of Law of 1649 (Sobornoye Ulozhenie/Соборное уложение), which included entries penalizing blasphemy and recognizing the tsar

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 23 as the main defender of Orthodox faith.90 During the reign of Alexy, the Byzantinization of Russian culture clearly gained in strength91 – among other things, the custom of the ruler’s endorsement of the choice of church hierarchs was consolidated,92 although one must admit that even earlier in the ceremony of ordaining the metropolitan (introduced in 1495), the role of the monarch was increased: he presented the newly selected highest member of the church hierarchy with a crosier, after which he led him to the metropolitan’s headquarters, where he officially introduced him to the remaining bishops.93 Gradually, secular power came to dominate over the church, and relations between these two structures evolved in the direction of caesaropapism.94 This process was not reversed even by the events during the so-called “Times of Troubles” (Smutnoye Vremya, 1584–1613).95 The “throne” and the “altar” were brought even closer at the end of Mongol rule on the initiative of the Muscovite princes who needed the support of the church to strengthen their position against the rulers of the remaining lands of Rus. The Orthodox Church, particularly the monasteries which had earlier, thanks to the goodwill of the khans, become very wealthy and influential institutions, assisted Moscow in extending its power over the entire state and became an important centre shaping the ideology of the Muscovite state in the sixteenth century.96 Religion and church institutions played a key role in the process of selfidentification of united Rus. At the same time as the endeavours to unify secular power were taking place, the church standardized the cult of saints. The period of regional fragmentation encouraged canonization on a local scale, as a result of which representatives of princely families of the other lands of Rus were usually raised to the altar. Regional pantheons of saints strengthened the tendency of decentralization, which is why they were initially questioned by Moscow. Only after consolidation of Moscow’s domination, the hierarchs began to create an all-Russian pantheon of saints, which symbolized the unity of the new state.97 While the princes of Rus gradually reduced their dependence on the khans, the church was still formally subordinate to the patriarch of Constantinople. Analogous to the deeds of the monarchs, who in their desire to strengthen their position appealed to ancient genealogy, the Orthodox church also began an attempt to raise its prestige, attributing to Saint Andrew (the so called “Rus Apostle”) the foundation of the first Christian communities on the northern shore of the Black Sea and even the foundation of Kiev – the “mother of all Russian towns”.98 The Orthodox Church’s emancipation was accelerated by events in western Europe. The one-page de facto announcement of autocephaly in 1448, the selection of Jonah by the bishops as metropolitan of All Rus without the sanction of Constantinople, came as a consequence of the rejection of the 1439 Florence Union by both the Russian clergy as well as secular authority. The act signed by Pope Eugene IV and Emperor John VIII, with the aim of ending the schism between the two Christian churches, was seen by Moscow as apostasy. In the conviction of its believers, the validity of the Orthodox Church’s position was confirmed by Providence itself – as a reward for remaining faithful to the true faith, Rus cast off the Mongol yoke, while heretical Constantinople fell to Muslims.

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The fall of the first-ranked Orthodox church made it easier for the Russian church to gain the status of a patriarchate. When it turned out that Rome was in no condition to organize an effective rescue of the former capital of the eastern empire, the hierarchs of the Eastern church began to put their hopes in the liberation of Constantinople through the policy of the Slavic tsars. They, in turn, mobilized by the strengthening of their western neighbours, which was reflected in the conclusion of the Union of Lublin in 1569, needed additional trump cards to raise their state’s position. The rulers perceived the establishment of a patriarchate in Russia as being in the interest of the power apparatus and were therefore active in achieving this goal. A success of the diplomatic “offensive” of Boris Godunov was the visit of Patriarch of Antioch Joachim to Moscow in 1586, who promised to support the matter of a Russian patriarchate, and the arrival of Patriarch Jeremias I of Constantinople in 1588. In January 1589 a ceremonial establishment of the patriarchate and the selection of Metropolitan Job as the patriarch of Moscow and All Russia took place. The act was confirmed two years later by a decision of the sobor of the remaining hierarchs of the universal Orthodox Church. The positive decision of the clergy did not completely satisfy Moscow, which was disappointed that the church was placed fifth instead of third in the hierarchy of patriarchates.99 However, regardless of the rank of the new patriarchate, its appearance evoked a reaction from Rome and neighbouring Catholic countries, the best example of which was the establishment of the Union of Brest on the lands of the Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1596, resulting in the foundation of the Greek Catholic Church. A result of the ecclesiastical advance of the Russian church was the appearance in the state (besides the autocratic tsar) of one more dignitary endowed with special charisma – the patriarch.100 The role of the highest hierarch grew during the Times of Troubles and then during the reign of Mikhail Romanov, who particularly at the beginning had been obedient towards his father – Patriarch Philaret Romanov. The clergyman, thanks to the endeavours of his crowned son, returned in 1619 from Polish captivity and was soon appointed to the highest clerical position and over the next 14 years (until 1633) held de facto power in Russia, using the title “great gosudar”.101 Philaret strove to maintain the tightest possible connection of secular and church authority, emphasizing at the same time the concurrence of the mission of the ROC as the unquestioned leader of the universal church, and of the Russian state as the universal Christian empire. In this way, the patriarch caused the strengthening of samoderzhavie,102 and thus the fortification of the “throne” at the cost of the “altar”. The establishment of the patriarchate did not safeguard the Russian church against interference from the monarchs. Constantinople’s marginalization in reality facilitated the rulers’ influence on the church, which lost its backing in the external centre of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.103 Moreover, the church was all the more weakened by internal disputes, especially those between the “white” and “black” clergy,104 but also the rivalry between particular monasteries. The question of the monasteries’ property ownership divided the clergy at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries into those who stressed the appropriateness of

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 25 accumulating goods – the so-called possessors (styazhateli) – and those who condemned the church’s growing riches – the “non-possessors” (nestyazhateli). Superimposed on these two opposing positions in the matter of property ownership were also two different visions of monasticism, represented by Nil Sorsky (whose supporters were called Nilists) and Joseph Volotsky (whose supporters were called Josephites). For the former, the ideal was the life of a hermit and severe ascetism as the only source of the mystic experience of divine energy (clear influences of hesychasm). The latter did not reject the monastic vow of poverty, but considered possession of material goods to be a condition sine qua non for fulfilling the church’s earthly mission – care of the sick and the impoverished, teaching and raising the faithful. The sobor’s resolution of this dispute in 1503 in favour of the “possessors” increased the church’s dependence on secular power.105 The increasing tendency towards caesaropapism was not unconnected to the different views of the Nilists and Josephites towards heresy. While older individuals concentrated around Nil did not demand active fighting against apostasy, the monks from Volokolamsky monastery considered heresy a great danger, which could be effectively fought only with the engagement of the state. Joseph, seeking to bring secular power closer, became an important propagator of political absolutism and the sacral nature of the monarchy – from the perspective of the monk, the tsar was the most important ally of the church and of Orthodox faith.106 This view found expression in the so-called Hundred Chapters Synod (Stoglavy Sobor) of 1551 which, among other things, emphasized the necessity of maintaining a tight bond between church and state (institutions exercising two God-given authorities) and imposed on the monarchs the duty of fighting paganism.107 The greatest blow for the Russian church was the raskol, provoked in the middle of the seventeenth century by the reforms of Patriarch Nikon. Guided by the desire to strengthen and increase the independence of the church, which was to be the unquestioned leader of the Eastern Christian oikumene, Nikon undertook its reorganization and standardization, in accordance with the Greek canon of liturgy of Old Rus that was in force. Among the most important changes were the introduction of crossing oneself with three fingers (instead of two), turning around the direction of processions (opposite to the sun’s apparent direction of movement), abolishment of the custom of bowing during the Easter mass of Saint Ephrem the Syrian, reduction of the number of prosphoras108 (from seven to five), the correction of the invocation to God in the Lord’s prayer and the written form of the name Jesus (from Isus to Iisus).109 The reform, which concerned above all forms and rituals, provoked deep resistance in society. The specific nature of the Russian raskol of 1655, in which part of the clergy and faithful, headed by archpriest Avvakum, rejected Nikon’s programme, is expressed in the conservative, anti-modernistic character of the schism. In contrast to the rebellion of Luther, Avvakum’s schismatics declared themselves not “in favour of” but “against” any change whatsoever. The modification of rituals which was to abolish the differences between the Old Rus and Greek liturgies (which resulted in part from isolation and the destruction of many books during the time of Mongol invasion) was seen as an assault on the truth of faith, protected in the forms and rites that were

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established by God and thus unchangeable. The support given to Nikon’s efforts by the remaining eastern patriarchs110 did not save the hierarch himself 111 and his reforms only halfway. The sobor deliberating in 1666 and 1667 (the so-called Great Council of Moscow) accepted most of the changes proposed by Nikon and declared anathema on all opponents of the reforms. Despite the threat of excommunication, some of the clergy rejected these decisions and, remaining true to the Hundred Chapters Synod and the old rites (from which the name Old Believers derives). As James Billington noted, the predominant part of Nikon’s corrections in the rite of the church were formally confirmed by the synod of 1667, however the essence of his programme – the attempt to establish a theocratic state, governed by a powerful and disciplined clergy – was definitively rejected.112 Instead of strengthening the church, the sobor of 1666–67 sealed its dependence on secular power, which in the following years took active part in executing the anathema in its persecution of the Old Believers. A specific mechanism was set into motion: the hierarchs in face of external threat or crisis in the church itself, anticipated help in the resolution of the dispute – in short, the intervention of secular authority. Support from the state apparatus of repression was an essential premise for the pacification of numerous groups of schismatics and sects.113 The church could still compensate for its reduced influence on policy with its strong financial position. Near the end of the seventeenth century, the Orthodox Church owned 16 per cent of all arable land (of which 61 per cent was situated in the centre of the state), inhabited by 1.4 million people (16 per cent of the population of Russia at the time).114 However, the disproportion between the economic and political potential of the church gradually dissolved also due to the leaders, who were interested in confiscating church property and limiting the privileges of the clergy. In 1530 Vasily III prohibited the sale of land to monasteries, and although at the Hundred Chapters Synod a certain compromise had been worked out regarding this question (the leaders could no longer undermine the financial inviolability of the church, but they were also not to grant new privileges or preferential treatment); in the Sobornoye Ulozhenie, a ban on church acquisition of feudal lands appeared again.115 Moreover, a state organ was called up – Monastirsky Prikaz,116 which oversaw the estates of the church and the people who worked and lived on them. The establishment of this secular office, which also had court jurisdiction with regards to the clergy, meant the significant thinning of the jurisdictional immunity of the clergy.117 The patriarchate became an institution strongly connected with the power apparatus, due to which it perceived reality all the more often through the prism of the Russian state, rather than the universal Orthodox Church. The religious factor manifested itself in the foreign policy of Muscovite Rus in times of war and encouraged territorial expansion. There is no doubt it affected Moscow’s contacts with the West, and with Rome in particular, which in turn influenced the process of self-identification of the Russia. In the case of international conflicts between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries in which, for various reasons, Russian rulers were involved, religion was used to dehumanize the enemy and mobilize people against him. In the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 27 fourteenth century Metropolitan Alexy convinced the faithful that struggling with Lithuania would fulfil their sacred duty to fight paganism.118 In the sixteenth century some of the clergy contributed to inspiring Ivan the Terrible’s conquest of the khans of Kazan (1550–51) and Astrakhan (1556).119 Making the expedition to the lands of the Tatars a quasi-crusade, the church facilitated the tsar’s achievement of a strategic goal – the liquidation of the “Genghiskhan” dynasties.120 The church carried out a missionary campaign on the conquered terrain. The clergyman Sylvester, supported by Metropolitan Makary, was the main ideologue of the Christianization of Muslim “trouble-makers”,121 which was accompanied from the beginning by the destruction of mosques, forced conversion to Orthodoxy, confiscation of property and – in many cases – by deportation of the local aristocracy. In this way, while the church perhaps did not gain crowds of loyal followers,122 but it did facilitate the secular authorities’ exchange of the khanate elite, from which it profited, receiving part of the confiscated land.123 In the following years, the church’s activity led to consolidation of the Russian state’s influence in the Volga region. These terrains were embraced by the church administration – in 1555 the eparchy in Kazan was established;124 moreover, this region was annexed to the Orthodox cultural space, promoting the cult of the icon of the Mother of God of Kazan.125 It is worth noting that the ROC’s attitude towards the Tatars contradicted the official image created by the ROC at that time as a Christian church that had lived for centuries in harmony with Islam. After annexing the Muslim khanates, the Orthodox hierarchs, similarly to the Catholic priests in South America, considered the Christianization of local peoples – also brutally – as the church’s duty. Orthodox clergy at the same time guarded the clean conscience of their own believers, supporting state punishment for conversion to Islam (by the decision of the Sobornoye Ulozhenie).126 It should, of course, be emphasized that the scale of forced conversions in Russia was decidedly smaller than in the New World, but this was the result of a lack of enthusiasm on the part of secular authorities, rather than a shortage of fervour on the side of the clergy. The state was often an agent that restrained the church’s “evangelizational” efforts, and after the initial phase of “destruction of mosques”, despite certain later episodes,127 there were no more serious conflicts based on religious confession in the Volga River region. The third “crusade” was carried out in 1612 by Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, who drove the Poles from the Kremlin, putting an end to the disgraceful Times of Troubles, when Russia was plundered by “Latinists, Jesuits and other agents of the Vatican”.128 The Polish–Russian war, including two years of the Polish army’s occupation of Moscow, strengthened the anti-West resentment and negative stereotypes already present of “Latinist heretics” and “hypocritical Jesuits” who wanted to bring about the doom of Orthodox Russia. Identifying the activity of the Catholic Church with the military expansion of the Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth effectively displaced from collective memory the earlier, better moments between the two churches, when in the second half of the fifteenth century Moscow established diplomatic relations with Rome, and when the pope, in a letter to Prince Ivan III, allowed its envoys to “stay in Rome until the end of the world.”129 The anti-Catholic sentiment that was very much alive at

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the beginning of the seventeenth century was sensed by Metropolitan Filaret, who in 1619 ordered all Catholics to be re-christened. In turn, in the 1630s the secular authorities ceased recruiting Catholic mercenaries.130 In 1672 reading and selling of “Latin books” was banned,131 and the Monastirsky Prikaz recognized proselytizing as a crime of state, punishable by death.132 The opening of the first Catholic church in Moscow, in 1698,133 did not improve relations between the patriarchate and Rome. The participation of the Orthodox Church in the expansion of the Russian state had mainly two aspects – integration of territories inhabited by Orthodox believers and missions in the lands of non-Orthodox peoples. In the latter case, church institutions participated in building infrastructure, established schools, spread Russian culture, taught the language, and so on. Extending the church administration onto the conquered territories was seen as a strengthening of the influence of the Russian state, for which reason missionaries were regular participants in expeditions to the Far East.134 This mechanism was also visible in Russian–Lithuanian relations, the axis of which had been for 200 years the rivalry over south-western Rus and also disputes in the sphere of jurisdiction of particular churches. In 1317, after the headquarters of the metropolitans of Rus were moved from Kiev to Vladimir on the Klyazma, Teofil, residing in Navahrudak, was appointed Metropolitan of Lithuania.135 Despite the efforts of the Moscow hierarchs, the metropolis of Rus had by the end of the fourteenth century already disintegrated into the Galician,136 Kievan–Lithuanian and Vladimir–Muscovite metropoles. Religious closeness was one of the factors that facilitated the shift of the Russian sphere of influence towards the west. Despite the establishment in 1458137 in Kiev of a separate metropolis subordinated to Constantinople, the Russian church endeavoured to extend its jurisdiction onto this territory, which played into Moscow’s aspiration to subordinate to itself the south-western lands of Rus. Nikon’s reforms, in unifying the liturgy and some customs, laid the groundwork for taking over the structures of the Kievan church. In 1658, four years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, on the authority of which the tsars annexed Zaporozhia, Patriarch Parthenius of Constantinople, prompted by the persuasion and reward paid by the Russian hierarchs, ordained the Muscovite metropolitan of Kiev. The sobor convened in 1685 by Ukrainian clergy sympathetic to Russia decided to abandon Constantinople and come under the auspices of the patriarchate of All Russia, which ultimately took over the Kievan metropolis in 1686,138 although Constantinople did not officially acknowledge this act.139 One of the arguments that convinced the Ukrainian clergy, and also a significant fraction of the people, to renounce obedience to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and become subjects of the Russian tsar was the Orthodox faith that Kiev and Moscow had in common.140 The fact of religious closeness also convinced the elite of other Orthodox states (particularly in the face of the Turkish threat) to seek closer relations with Russia: Metropolitan Gideon turned to the tsar in 1656 with a request that care be extended to Moldavia and in 1658 the Georgian prince Teymuraz I was interested in concluding an alliance of Orthodox rulers.141

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 29 Religion was one of the most important factors shaping the identity of the Russian state following its liberation from the horde. The growing Muscovite Rus absorbed Muslim khanates to the east, contended with the expansion of its Catholic neighbours to the west, and after the Ferrara–Florence Union, its contacts with Constantinople weakened. In these circumstances, Russia became antiGreek, anti-West and increasingly imperialistic. Belonging to Christianity of the Greek rite began to play a determinant role in “Russianness”. “Orthodoxy” was more and more often equated with the “Russian state”, a manifestation of which was the introduction of the requirement that candidates to the throne of Moscow must be of the Orthodox faith142 and capital punishment for individuals accused of proselytism, which was considered to be action harmful to the “Holy Rus”. After the Muslim population of the annexed khanates numbering two-and-ahalf million143 came under the rule of the tsars, there was a stronger the tendency to define nationality in terms of religious divisions: “Orthodox–Russian” and “Muslim–Tatar”. The Orthodox clergy helped spread this dichotomy to a large degree: the first metropolitan of Kazan, Hermogen, ordered a census in 1593, dividing the population into three groups: Orthodox, Muslims and pagans. The census decided the question of identity according to religious criteria and by the command of the metropolitan, christened Tatars were resettled in separate villages.144 Even deeper lines of division were apparent with relations to Russia Christian neighbours. After the Times of Troubles, when in the feelings of the Orthodox people and clergy, the presence of a Catholic army shamed Moscow, in the Kremlin cathedrals sacrilegious masses were conducted in the Latin rite and “Latinists” became the personification of evil in Russia. This negative image worsened still more after the conclusion of the Union of Brest. The ROC and secular authorities took upon themselves the task of protecting their believers (subjects) from the sin of contact with heretics. Contacts with “Latinists” were considered inadvisable. It was stressed that an Orthodox believer could not be a servant of a non-Orthodox person and even such attributes of Western culture as the Latin language and philosophy were condemned.145 Besides anti-Western sentiments, from the middle of the fifteenth century, an anti-Greek resentment appeared among Russian clergy, mainly due to the Ferrara–Florence Union. From the perspective of the Russian church, Greeks who made an agreement with Rome had committed treason, were guilty of the sin of heresy and by that token had lost their legitimacy as the leaders of the universal church, the fate of which was henceforth entrusted to the Slavs. It was seen as no coincidence that Orthodox Slavic rulers ultimately defeated the Muslim khans, while Greek Constantinople fell under the Turkish onslaught. Russia – ruled by the tsars, appealing to kinship with Emperor Augustus, and supported from the end of the sixteenth century by the authority of the patriarchs – was predestined to continue the idea of a Christian empire guided by an emperor (tsar) and patriarch, who were joined in harmony. The idea of Russian rulers’ special mission entrusted to them by Providence was first proclaimed in the fifteenth century by a

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Serbian monk from Mount Athos, Pakhomy Logofet, who foresaw the rule of the Russian dynasty in the Byzantine capital and who called Moscow the “new city of Constantinople”.146 More than half a century later Maximos the Greek zealously encouraged Vasily III to rescue Constantinople from the hands of the Turks and ascend to the throne of the Byzantine basileus.147 While the actual defeat of the Turks seemed at the time unfeasible, the indication of a successor, a continuer of the Christian empire, did not entail any problems. At the end of the sixteenth century, Russia was the largest and strongest state ruled by Orthodox monarchs and in which there existed a patriarchate. The concept of translatio imperii (transfer of rule), derived from Byzantine tradition, in which it had earlier served Constantinople when it took over the capital splendour of Rome, created an ideological basis for legitimizing subsequent “embodiments” of the empire. In Russia, the concept of translatio imperii found its reflection in Poviest’ o Belom Klobuke (Legend of the White Cowl) according to which the titular white klobuk – the head covering of Pope Sylvester I – was transferred by Providence to Constantinople (the “New Rome”) and from there to the land of Russia. The appearance in the east of the white klobuk – the symbol of a bishop’s authority,148 which since the times of Metropolitan Makary had adorned the head of each representative of the highest office of the hierarchy of All Russia – confirmed the status of the Russian church as the repository of Christian truth. The clergy’s conviction as to the Russian church’s assumption of the mission and glory of Rome by the will of God was manifested, for example, upon the establishment of the patriarchate of Moscow and All Russia, when the hierarchs demanded third position in the Christian pentarchy, after Byzantium and Alexandria, and before Antioch and Jerusalem, although the latter two were historically older than the Russian church. Here the clergy appealed precisely to the “inheritance” of the rank of “bishopric of Peter”.149 Metropolitan Zosima the Bearded wrote of the “New Rome” in Moscow in 1492 in Izlozhenie Paskhalii, but it was the letters of the monk Philotheus to Prince Vasily III and his son Ivan (the Terrible) that achieved greatest publicity; in them the hegumen presented a vision of the Russian state – the third and final Rome in the history of salvation, which after the downfall of the two first embodiments of the empire, Rome and Constantinople, must assume the burden of keeping the Christian faith. Many books and dissertations have been dedicated to the interpretation of this idea – some researchers claim that the “Third Rome”150 was a reaction to the Ferrara–Florence Union, and that Philoteus was concerned mainly with the succession of churches, not of states.151 Others draw attention to the context of events in sixteenth-century Rus: perhaps the author saw in a universal Christian empire a strength capable of attaining the lasting unification of the lands of Rus under Moscow’s authority;152 maybe in showing the close connection between the mission of the church and the secular power, Philotheus wanted to win over the monarchs in the fight against heretics and to impede plans of confiscating monastery landholdings.153 However, regardless of his intentions, his idea became a source of religious–national idealism which influenced the identity of the Russian state. This eschatological, theocratic concept had a distinctly anti-Greek character which

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 31 influenced the weakening of the Russian church’s contacts with the Hellenic Orthodox community and the exhibition of native Orthodox tradition, unfortunately at the cost of awareness of belonging to a universal church.154 In the geopolitical sphere, recognizing Russia as the Third Rome obliged the rulers to realize the ideal of a universal Christian empire, expanding its influence for the glory of God. The “chosen people” living in “Holy Rus” were destined for great things – great suffering, deification and salvation of humanity. Boris Uspensky defined the idea of the Third Rome as a theocratic eschatology in which “Moscow is the last Orthodox empire, and the tasks of the Russian tsar take on a messianistic nature”. Russia, as the last bastion of Orthodoxy, is contrasted with the rest of the world and this determines its negative attitude to external cultural influences.155 The concept of the Third Rome thus contains all the key components of the identity of sixteenth-century Russia: Orthodox, anti-West, anti-Greek and imperial (Byzantine) elements. The idea of the monk Philoteus reflected the ambitions of both the tsars and the patriarchs of the Russian state in the sixteenth century, in which religion fulfilled functions of identity, legitimization, mobilization and integration.

Instrumentalization of religious issues by secular authority in the Russian empire In the eighteenth century, the growing predominance of secular authority over the Orthodox Church was increasingly used by rulers. Peter I subjected the state and his subjects to modernization inspired by Western models. Reforms did not bypass the church either, which according to the plan of the ambitious ruler, was supposed to become – like Protestant churches – a modern church institution in service of the country. After the death of patriarch Adrian in 1700, Peter took advantage of his rights and delayed the calling of the sobor, which would choose a new head of the church. A year later, the monarch restored the Monastirsky Prikaz156 with Metropolitan Stefan Yavorsky at the head. However, as a result of conflict, Yavorksy was replaced in the role of the tsar’s advisor for church affairs by the rector of the Kiev–Mohyla Academy – bishop Feofan (Theophan) Prokopovich – the initiator of later transformations of the church. In 1711 the senate was established and the church was subordinated to it. This new organ had influence on the nomination of archimandrites and hegumens, and had certain court jurisdiction with regard to the clergy.157 The greatest changes were introduced by the Spiritual Regulation (Dukhovny Reglament)158 published in the beginning of 1721: in place of the patriarchate, the Spiritual Collegium, later transformed into the Holy Synod (the Most Holy Synod), was called into being; a condition set for clergymen who aspired to membership in the synod was the taking an oath of loyalty to the monarch. In 1722 the office of the oberprocurator was established, intended for secular individuals, mainly higher officers, who were obliged to inform the ruler about the course of sessions of the synod, which had assumed supervision of church properties after the liquidation of the Monastirsky Prikaz. The acceptance of these steps from the church’s viewpoint was determined by the patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremias III, who in 1723 recognized the replacement

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of the patriarchate with the Holy Synod as being canonically correct.159 Peter I, in turn, described by some historians as a deeply believing anti-cleric,160 sealed the work of subordinating the “altar” to the “throne” by giving himself, in the autumn of 1721, the title Emperor. The record of this act was clear – while the tsar became emperor, the patriarchate was replaced by the collegiate synod – the church’s degradation was accompanied by the elevation of the prestige of secular authority. Peter I’s reforms were deep: the first large-scale nationalization of church properties was carried out and from then on all income generated by monasteries went to the State Treasury;161 a regiment commanded by the head of the Monastirsky Prikaz was called up to control the finances of monasteries; monks were forbidden to change monasteries; moreover, the monarch himself decided on the ritual head-shaving of monks; monasteries were obligated to run hospitals and shelters; the Spiritual Regulation freed priests from the seal of confession in the case of “sins of bad thoughts” directed against the ruler.162 The course of limiting church privileges was maintained by the successors of Peter the Great: Catherine I, in 1726, reorganized the synod and reduced the role of the clergy in it,163 Elizabeth, in 1757, transferred management of church properties to officers,164 and Catherine the Great dotted the “i” in the matter of the subordination of Orthodoxy. In 1764 the empress confiscated church properties,165 gave the clergy yearly salaries and granted the secular courts jurisdiction over deacons.166 Her grandson, Alexander I, limited the rights of the synod, the members of which since 1802 could contact the government offices only through the agency of the oberprocurator,167 who was subordinated (from 1803) directly to the tsar.168 Secular authority not only changed the structure of the church and took over its properties, but also created a de facto state system of clergy education. In the years 1817–24 this role was performed by the Ministry of Religion and Education, directed by the former oberprocurator Alexander Golitsin. Monarchs, through the agency of the ministry, founded schools, established the number of seminarians,169 and through the synod, dominated by secular individuals, named the rectors of religious seminaries (since 1884).170 The cadre of priests educated at the expense of the state was presented with concrete tasks: the church was expected to legitimize the regime, raise the subjects in the spirit of unlimited obedience towards the ruler, maintain the ethos of service and form patriotic attitudes, bring about the unification (Russification) of the expanding empire through missionary work, mobilize the people to defend the homeland, ease conflicts and mediate between believers and the ruler in the case of rebellions,171 and finally to fulfil various social functions such as running hospitals, shelters and parish schools. A mechanism for effective subordination and control of religious institutions was created: the state monitored the system of educating clergy, and members of the clergy – maintained by and for the service of the state – became de facto imperial civil servants – this concerned not only Orthodoxy, but also all other major religions. The changes in the religious map of Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were influenced by its expansion and the new religious policy of the monarchs.172 In 1702 Peter I issued a toleration ukaz173 (similar ukazes were issued by Catherine II) encouraging foreigners from the west to settle in Russia (1762)

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 33 and guaranteeing newcomers religious freedom (1787). The promise of free choice of religious rites was not unconditional, however, non-Orthodox clergy had to take an oath of loyalty to the empress.174 Church institutions could thus fulfil – without any greater obstacles – their functions as a repository of faith, as long as they were loyal and useful. The opening of Russia to the world – particularly Europe – begun by Peter the Great, the war with Sweden, the conquest of Courland and the Duchy of Livonia, then the partition of Poland and annexation of Finland influenced the growth in number of Protestants, Catholics and Jews, while the expansion into the heart of Asia in turn increased the Buddhist and Muslim populations of the empire. After years of marginalization of Muslims – treated as second-class subjects, who were every so often the subject of attacks by the Orthodox Church175 – Catherine II decided to “restore” them to society and make them useful for the state. First, Muslim merchants were allowed to trade over the entire territory of the empire (1763), and then with the tolerance ukaz of 1773, the Orthodox Church was forbidden to interfere in matters of Islamic communities,176 to which part of the earlier confiscated properties were returned. Also, permission was given for communities of at least 300 (male) Muslims to build mosques177 and schools, and mullahs began to receive regular salaries from the State Treasury.178 In pulling the Tatars out of their “religious margin” of sorts, Catherine II was guided by pragmatism. In order to take advantage of the Muslim factor, at least to assimilate the conquered territories inhabited mainly by Muslim believers, she needed institutions capable of realizing the monarch’s intentions. The muftiates acted as a means of control over the scattered Muslim communities. The first was created in 1788 in Ufa, from where it was moved to Orenburg (for Siberia); the second in Bakhchisaray in 1831 (for Crimea); the third in Baku in 1872 (for Muslims of the Caucasus region). Members of the muftiates were named by the Minister of Internal Affairs and these institutions were also subordinate to him. The muftiates, as in the case of the Orthodox bishoprics and monasteries, were maintained by the state, which put certain obligations on them, such as running schools and hospitals.179 Moreover, the muftiates were opinion-making institutions, which upheld the loyalty of Muslims towards the emperor and undertook mediation between local communities and representatives of the authorities. As with Orthodoxy, in the case of Islam the state became the main creator of the education system, also in the sphere of religion. Already in 1716, at the order of Peter the Great, the Koran was translated into Russian,180 and at the end of the eighteenth century Tatar schools began to appear in Kazan. In 1870 mandatory lessons in the Russian language were introduced; four years later supervision of education in the Volga–Ural region was taken over from the Orenburg muftiate by the Ministry of Education.181 Cooperation with loyal muftiates turned out to be so fruitful that the secular authority decided to recognize the jurisdiction of sharia courts182 in select matters, and importantly – in 1886 Muslims were made equal under the law with the rest of the population,183 and a year later the freedom of cult granted earlier was confirmed again for Muslims. When mentioning the subsequent decisions of Russian rulers aimed at reducing the political “handicap” of Muslims, one should remember the serious limitations

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still existing in those times. The main beneficiaries of change were the Tatars, Bashkirs and Azeris. It was they, who from 1864 had their own representatives in zemstvos (local governments) and were equalized before the law in 1886. In the northern Caucasus, where since 1825 a gazavat (holy war) had been going on against the Slavic invaders, Muslims were perceived as disloyal, intractable and rebellious, in connection with which until 1887 they did not have the right to serve in the Russian army.184 Thus the only chance Muslims of the Caucasus had for social advancement remained inaccessible. Central Asia, in turn, was treated as a strategic buffer separating Russia from the British Empire. Turkistan was directly subordinated to the Governor General, and the nature of development of this region was largely determined by the army and its needs. The military did not consider the introduction of local government or creation of a muftiate for Muslims of this region a requirement for ensuring the security of the Russian state.185 Realization of the main assumptions of the religious policy of Russian emperors – the nationalization of religious institutions – in the case of Buddhism required creating a centralized structure and weakening the influence of Buddhist centres outside Russia’s borders – mainly in Tibet, Mongolia and China – among the Buryats and Kalmyks.186 In 1728 instructions were issued, requiring the authorities of Irkutsk to hold back the influx of lamas from neighbouring countries; moreover, steps were undertaken to form a sangha that would be loyal and dependent on the state apparatus. In 1741 Empress Elizabeth gave a legal and institutional framework to the religious faith of the Buryats – state positions were created for 150 lamas.187 In 1853 the Senate sanctioned the founding of an office for lamaic clergy of eastern Siberia, established a limit on the number of clergy (285) and monasteries – datsans (34).188 The head of the hierarchy – Pandido-Hambo Lama – was confirmed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, and control over the activity of monasteries, in turn, was overseen by the head of the Office of Foreign (non-Orthodox) Religions, and approval of the Governor General was required for building new temples.189 The state played an active role in the creation of the sangha. The secular authorities purposely strengthened local lamas who, like Orthodox clergy and mullahs during the time of Catherine II, began to receive financial support from Petersburg and became less and less connected with the monasteries of Mongolia and Tibet. A similar process of institutionalization of Buddhist communities took place in Kalmykia. In the nineteenth century under the influence of the policy of the Russian state, a sangha was formed there, which since 1847 was led by a lama appointed by the senate. Clergymen, of whom there could be no more than 1530, received salaries and could only attend to matters of cult. The relations between Petersburg and other Christian faiths were far more complicated, mostly because Catholicism and Protestantism were in direct competition with the main ideological institution of the state, the Orthodox Church in the period of the synod. Besides this, the clergy of both religions were strongly associated with centres abroad. Russian emperors were inclined to tolerate the activities of the Catholic Church, under the condition of complete political loyalty. Nine years after the opening of

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 35 the church of Peter and Paul, the Poselsky Prikaz announced the monarch’s approval of the Catholic faith.190 Rulers consistently endeavoured to subordinate the structures of the Catholic Church on Russian territory – for example, Catherine II established a bishopric, Mogilev, in 1773 without consulting Rome, and then later named its leader, Stanislav Bogush-Sestrentsevich, the head of all Catholics living in her empire.191 “Latin” clergy was required to take an oath of loyalty to the Russian sovereign, was subject to observation by state organs, had limited freedom to travel in the country, and their sermons were censored. The formation of relations between the Catholic Church and the Russian state, particularly the appearance of the stereotype of “treacherous Latinists” was influenced by the activity of Jesuits, who were expelled several times by the Orthodox autocrats – in 1700 the monks opened their first school on Russian land, but 19 years later, Peter I ordered them to leave Russia. Alexander I allowed the Jesuits to open centres in Siberia (1809), Crimea (1811)192 and Polotsk (1812), but in 1815 the monks were once again forced to leave. Despite different sorts of tensions, Petersburg and Rome signed a concordat in 1847, which was broken in 1865 by Russia and renewed in 1894.193 The pope decided to normalize relations with rulers of the Eurasian empire despite the noncanonical (from Rome’s point of view) liquidation of the Uniate Church. Two years after it was subordinated to the oberprocurator, the Greek Catholic Church was then integrated, by an ukaz of Nicholas I, into the Moscow patriarchate, which thus gained one and a half million new believers. The situation of the Uniate believers improved somewhat only after 1905, when they were permitted to celebrate the Catholic mass in the Greek rite, and four years later a Uniate church was opened in Petersburg.194 Although the Protestant communities have been present on Russian lands since the mid-sixteenth century,195 from the perspective of the development of this branch of Christianity in Russia, the policy of Peter I was of key significance. The ruler ordered the Russian translation of the catechisms of Lutherans and Calvinists (and also Catholics) and took steps with the aim of facilitating marriage between Orthodox believers and Protestants – for example, he allowed mixed marriage without requiring the Protestants to convert to Orthodoxy, and he successfully intervened so that the patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremiah II, would abolish the condition of re-christening Protestants who wanted to convert to Orthodoxy.196 In 1711 Peter the Great personally appointed Pastor Bertold Vegetsya197 to the office of superintendent of Lutherans in Russia. Less than 100 years later, in 1810, the office of superintendent was established as the central organ for matters of all nonOrthodox Christian faiths, and in 1819 Alexander I gave the highest of the Evangelical–Lutheran Church hierarchs the title Bishop. The legal basis of this institution’s functioning was the charter issued by Nicholas I in 1832, which established the creation of consistorial districts which were led by consistories subordinate to the General Commissariat. Secular individuals and clergymen who were members of the highest organ – the General Consistory, convened twice a year for proceedings in Petersburg.198 The Protestant Church, just as other religious institutions, was under the control of the Russian state.

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Judaism benefited the least from the greater openness and new religious policy of the Russian rulers. The tolerance ukaz of Peter I did not concern Jews. Catherine I ordered them to be removed from Russia, setting the requirement of conversion to Orthodoxy as a condition for remaining. A similar ukaz was issued by Empress Elizabeth.199 It was only the rule of Catherine II that brought improvement to the situation of the Jewish population. She allowed them to create their own local governments (kahals), granted limited religious freedom and the right to register as townsmen.200 In accordance with the decision of 1791, Jews could enjoy these freedoms only in the so-called Pale of Settlement, present-day Belarus and parts of present-day Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine.201 In the process of assimilation of Jewish believers, the proverbial “carrot” in the form of privileges and favourable norms (e.g. the 1817 ban on accusing Jews of ritual murder202), was soon replaced with a “stick” – in 1827 Nicholas I decreed the conscription of Jewish recruits,203 in 1844 Jews were taxed for wearing traditional clothing, and in that same year the kahals were abolished. In 1882 Jews were banned from settling in villages and their access to institutions of higher education was limited, while eight years later the Jewish minority was denied the right to vote or run in elections to the city council (Duma) – this decision was accompanied by a wave of pogroms which occurred across Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century.204 From the time of Peter the Great secular authority dominated religious relations. Rulers founded religious institutions, financed the clergy, decided on the filling of church positions, organized the system of religious education, and so on. As a result, in the nineteenth century the majority of religious institutions in the Russian Empire were dependent on the state. Territorial expansion brought with it a growth in the number of non-Orthodox subjects and the transformation of the relatively uniform, in terms of religion, Orthodox Rus into multiethnic and multiconfessional Russia. Subsequent rulers thus faced the challenge of the appropriate formation of religious relations, which would allow them to maintain the unity of the Russian Empire and avoid religious conflicts. Orthodox, Muslims, Buddhists, Catholics Protestants and Jews were forced to coexist peacefully in the face of the might of the Russian state. The strength and unquestioned superiority of secular authority over all religious institutions was to be a guarantee of stabilization. The state demanded from representatives of all religions loyalty and involvement on behalf of the state. Communities that did not cooperate with the authorities were liquidated or pushed to the margins. Churches with the status of state institutions, and clergy as a class of quasi-civil servants led to the formation of religious identity as a certain sub-category in the framework of an overriding state identity, which emphasized the belonging to a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, Russian-speaking empire of Orthodox samoderzhavets (autocrats). In this religious system, the vassalized Orthodox Church was a key state institution, raising subjects in the spirit of obedience and patriotism, legitimizing the authority of the tsars and providing the empire with an integrating idea. Rulers took care to ensure the superiority of the Orthodox Church under their control over all other churches – for example, all religious communities, even after the issuing of edicts guaranteeing religious freedom, still needed the approval of the local Orthodox clergyman to establish a

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 37 new temple and the ban on building churches, mosques and synagogues near an Orthodox church was still in force.205 The state was engaged in the missionary work of the Orthodox Church, suggesting privileges and freedoms for believers of other faiths who decided to convert to Orthodoxy. With the decision of Peter I (from 1720), a convert was entitled to a tax reduction and exemption from military service for three years from the moment of christening.206 Empress Elizabeth ordered that the newly christened be given a one-time award and that any obligations – whether tax or related to military service – weighing on them were to be transferred to the remaining members of the non-Orthodox religious community to which the newly christened person had belonged. Catherine II, in turn, promised an award of three roubles and something significantly more valuable – freedom – for Turks and Tatars who decided on conversion. A symbol of the close cooperation between the state and church was the activity of the Commission for the Newly Christened created in 1731 in Sviazhesk in the Kazan guberniya, which (with the great support of the tsars) carried out a Christianization campaign in the Volga region.207 Besides this, Orthodox clergy actively participated in the Russification of other ethnicities by establishing schools and propagating the Russian language everywhere where Orthodox churches were built – on the Caspian Sea, in Siberia or Kamchatka. It may seem strange that the authority, treating the missionary activity of the church as an element of its own policy, decided (in 1773) to forbid the synod to interfere in matters of Tatar Muslim communities. However this was due to the fact that loyal Tatars turned out to be exceptionally useful in assimilating Muslims from Central Asia. Catherine II had (in 1786) allowed the construction of a network of mosques and caravanserais along the trade routes on the Bashkir and Kazakh steppes, so that Tatars could exert Russian influence on the population of these territories.208 After years of repression, Russian rulers in the eighteenth century tried to draw schismatics and sectarians out of the “religious grey area”. Peter I took an important step when, in 1716, he permitted Old Believers to settle in cities under the condition that they pay double taxes. Despite this, publically professing their faith was still an illegal act and holding mass was punishable by exile to forced labour camps. Old Believers could not perform any public functions or serve as witnesses in trials of Orthodox believers.209 The position of “religious dissenters” improved during the reign of Catherine II, who issued a toleration ukaz with regard to raskolniks (1764), allowed them to act as witnesses (1769), agreed to the establishment of a cemetery for Old Believers in Moscow (1771), abolished the double taxation introduced by Peter I (1782) and admitted schismatics to serve in certain public offices (1785).210 From 1883 raskolniks enjoyed freedom to travel and the right to trade and own land, but the ban on publically conducting their rites was still in force. Only with the ukaz of 1906 were Old Believers made equal to foreigners – non-Orthodox people – before the law.211 The process, in which secular authority had taken control of religious institutions and managed to harness religion for the realization of its own policy, led to a paradoxical situation: churches and clergy (particularly Orthodox) gradually lost

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regard in the eyes of society, even though the rulers did not resign from religious legitimization of their power. In Russia there occurred a specific “declericalization” of the public space,212 perhaps even a sort of “desacralization” of the church itself, which nevertheless did not entail a desacralization of power. In the opinion of Boris Uspensky, Peter I’s liquidation of the patriarchate made the monarch the head of the Orthodox Church in the eyes of subjects, and the phenomenon of sacralization of power gained in strength during the eighteenth century. Uspensky quotes more than a dozen examples confirming the specific status of the Russian monarchs after 1721: Catherine II called herself the “head of the church” “only” in private correspondence with European monarchs,213 while Tsar Paul, during his coronation, took this title officially and administered the holy communion to himself,214 and Nicholas II, in turn, presented the synod with his candidacy for the position of patriarch in case of the restoration of the patriarchate. Treatment of the ruler as the principal of the church is confirmed by many customs: the monarch appointed bishops,215 as a sign of respect clergymen would kiss the tsar’s hand, in the church there were so-called festive days celebrated in connection with birthdays, anniversaries, and so on of members of the ruling dynasty,216 and from the time of Peter the Great, clergymen were obliged to take an oath of loyalty to the emperor in the name of God.217 Together with the progression of nationalization of religious institutions, their alienation from society deepened, which was particularly evident in the case of the Orthodox Church. A distance similar to that between the rulers and their subjects arose between the faithful and the church that legitimized the tsars’ power. The authority of the church weakened, but religious ferment was still present in society.218 A reflection of this state of affairs was a dualism, characteristic of religious life in Russia during the modern era: on one side were the official church institutions – supported by the state and keeping watch on behalf of samoderzhavie, and on the other side, non-institutionalized communities negating the existing order, such as sects, discussion groups, Masonic lodges and hermitages. The dichotomy of religious life influenced the differentiation of religiously inspired ideas, which either legitimized the absolute power of the tsars, or quite the opposite – called for change. Postulates of spiritual renewal, seeking mystic experience or a return to the sources of Christianity appeared in the works of Vladimir Solovyov, Lev Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky and many other thinkers. Religious philosophy played a significant and an unusual role in shaping the worldview of Russian society in the nineteenth century. However, taking into consideration the tsars’ policy, there were three significant trends referring to religious motifs: strengthening of samoderzhavie, the debate on the identity of the Russian state and presentation of a vision of a new world order. The first trend is represented by two triads: “God, state, samoderzhavets”219 of Teofan Prokopovich and “Pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost”220 (“Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality”) of Sergey Uvarov, which emphasize the sacral nature of the tsars’ power and the indivisible, sacred union between the state and the church, Russianness and Eastern Christianity. Religion was used to legitimize an increasingly anachronous Russian absolutism, and was the source of ideology for

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 39 a multi-national and multi-confessional empire. In the state of the Russian tsars, Orthodoxy was to fulfil the sort of role that Christianity did in the Byzantine Empire. This relationship towards the church was not foreign to opponents of samoderzhavie either – in the plans of one of the leaders of the Decembrists, Pavel Pestel, the Orthodox Church was to become an organ of government administration, integrating the state.221 Slavophiles, contending with Occidentalism over the history and future of Russia, recognized Orthodoxy as a determining factor of Russian identity. Accepting Christianity in the Greek rite weakened the influence of the highly rationalized Roman legal tradition in Russia, thanks to which the Orthodox Church – as it perceived itself – managed to guard the truth of faith and keep the people of Rus in a state of moral purity. To this notion of the role of the church, Eurasians eagerly added the thesis of what basically amounts to the positive influence of the Mongol invasion, which protected Rus from Roman expansion. Slavophiles and Eurasians agreed that Orthodoxy is a living religion, which the Russian people keep in their hearts,222 and as such is predestined to great things – to finding a different path of development than that proposed by the demoralized West. In their view, Russia was a separate civilization which was entrusted with a historic mission of creating an earthly empire – a Slavic one, according to the Slavophiles, and a Slavic–Turanian one, according to the Eurasians. In this way, Russian imperialism acquired in the nineteenth century two messianic ideas – the pan-Slavism of Nikolai Danilevsky and the Byzantinism (Eurasianism) of Konstantin Leontiev. Leontiev believed that annexing other Orthodox states to Russia would be a valuable impulse strengthening “Russian Byzantinism” and advocated the idea of a Slavic–Asiatic civilization, founded on two pillars: Orthodoxy and samoderzhavie.223 Danilevsky considered the most important goal to be the creation of a powerful state capable of expansion, that in the future would be crowned with the capture of Constantinople – the capital of a new, Slavic empire.224 Danilevsky explained the presence of non-Slavic people in the future Slavic empire, in the case of Romanians and Greeks, by their professing the Orthodox faith and, in the case of Hungarians and Finns, simply by their location on a territory of natural Slavic expansion. Danilevsky very strongly associated Slavicness with Orthodoxy, writing that “the Russian nation and the majority of other Slavic peoples have been given such a fate by history, that they should, along with Greeks, become the main guardians of living religious truth – Orthodoxy – and in this way continue the great work which earlier had been the lot of Israel and Byzantium: being the chosen people”.225 For this reason, he excluded Poles from the Slavic community, or at most referred to them as the “vile Slavs”, remarking that “the highly degenerative influence of Latinism on the Polish national character proves that religious doctrine is not something superficial”.226 In the face of the concepts attributing an exclusively Orthodox identity to the Russian Empire, Russia’s Muslim elite in the process of self-identification could choose mainly between pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism or Jadidism. The first idea227 was propagated by the Ottoman sultans, who were counting on the re-creation of

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the ummah and gaining the Muslims who lived under the rule of the “infidels”.228 The second concept assumed the existence of a Turkish nation – a community of language and faith, which should be joined under one state – Great Turkistan.229 However, the Jadidists and Kadmists, who recognized the authority of the tsars, demanded recognition of Muslim tradition as part of the national heritage of an Orthodox–Islamic empire and creation of conditions within its framework for the development of the Turkish community, which brought them closer to the Eurasians. In Petersburg’s foreign policy, the religious factor was used mainly for legitimizing the state’s activities abroad, for widening its sphere of influence and mobilizing society against external threats. During Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812, the church played an important role in convincing subjects, who suffered oppression at the hands of their rulers, to defend the homeland and the tsar. The clergy effectively used the pulpit to present the conflict to the faithful as a “holy war” against the Antichrist, and the fight for “Holy Rus” as the religious obligation of every Orthodox person. Borodino became a symbol of victory of Good over Evil, of Christ’s regent, Alexander I over the Antichrist, Napoleon, on whom the Orthodox Church had already declared anathema in 1806.230 The establishment in 1815 of the Holy Alliance – a coalition of the rulers of the ancien régime with the goal of maintaining the status quo in Europe and suppressing social unrest – was, in the opinion of James Billington, an alternative concept of social order, represented by the conservative Christian elite in face of the changes postulated by the French Revolution.231 Among the monarchs, Alexander I was the greatest enthusiast of the Holy Alliance. The emperor was convinced that Russia, which had freed Europe from the rule of the Antichrist, had a special role in the salvation of humanity and had the duty of forming international relations in accordance with the will of God.232 Many historians stress that the Holy Alliance was treated most seriously in Russia, which in the nineteenth century used religious motifs to present its participation in wars as the fulfilment of its obligation to protect Christians suffering from the repression and persecution by people of other faiths. Russian rulers, as the protectors of the Christians of the Caucasus,233 had been waging war with Persia since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the direct cause of which was the Manifest of Paul I from 1801, confirming the annexation of Georgia, which the Georgian tsar, George XIII, had himself requested, as his predecessor, Heraclius II, had earlier in 1783.234 The necessity of protecting Christians was also stated as one of the main reasons for the war against Turkey in 1853. The conflict, which lasted three years and went down in history as the “Crimean War”, ended with a defeat of the Russian army. It was to have brought the Russian samoderzhavets closer to fulfilling their mission of winning back Constantinople from Turkey’s hands, and helping to realize the goals determined by pan-Slavism – creation of a Slavic empire or at least the formation of a camp of allied Orthodox states in the Balkans. It is worth noting that Russia’s use of the religious factor in the Crimean War was paid back in kind by Turkey. The Sublime Porte partly neutralized the subversive activity of the Armenians who sympathized with

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 41 Petersburg by granting them certain cultural autonomy, guaranteeing their clergy certain state rights and giving the Armenian Greek patriarch of Constantinople the title Head of the Armenian Nation, which evoked protests on the Russian side.235 It should also be noted that the Russian rulers were not irreconcilable enemies of the sultans,236 and twice – in 1833 and 1839 – supported Turkey against the Egyptian Mamluks.237 After their subordination of the church, the tsars treated the missionary activity of the Orthodox clergy as an instrument for widening the sphere of influence of the Russian state. Two institutions were created in 1860 which were to coordinate all the missions of the Russian Church – the Orthodox Missionary Society238 (with headquarters in Petersburg) and the Society for the Restoration of Orthodox Christian Renewal in the Caucasus.239 The missionary activity of the Orthodox Church in the territories annexed by Russia was different than that carried out abroad. In the first case, Orthodox clergy mainly had the task of assimilating people of different faiths, often understood as Christianization and Russification. In schools run by missionaries, obedience and loyalty to the Russian state, Russian language and customs were emphasized.240 In the Volga region, Siberia and Kamchatka241 or in Kalmykia Orthodox churches were built, in which masses were held in the local languages,242 and Orthodox brotherhoods were established, which in accordance with the plan of secular authorities were bastions of Russianness in territories dominated by non-Orthodox people. A particular example of the usefulness of the Russian church for the realization of the state’s political goals within the empire was the absorption of the separate Kievan metropolis by its structures and the liquidation of the Uniate Church. Both events led to the consolidation of Russian influence in the territories of today’s Ukraine and Belarus. A similar manoeuvre was applied to Orthodox Georgia. Several years after its annexation in 1801, the autocephalous local church – historically predating the Russian church – was liquidated.243 The foundation for these changes was prepared in good time. In 1783 the Georgian princes received Russian titles of prince and nobleman,244 and the Georgian katolikos became a member of the Holy Synod. Against the Orthodox clergy of the Caucasus, the synod used the strategy of Peter I – after the retirement of Katolikos Anthony in 1811, the Georgian bishops were incorporated into the structure of the Russian church. From then on, the highest of the hierarchs of Georgian clergy was the exarch,245 who led the institution called up by the synod – the Georgian–Imeretian Office of the Synod.246 Although the removal of the Georgian church’s independence was contrary to canonical law, this state of affairs was maintained until 1917.247 This had specific consequences for both churches – among other things, the Russian church, which appointed missions to Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1814, adjoined these two regions to its own jurisdiction, thus weakening the influence of the Georgian administration there. Beyond the borders of the Russian Empire, the church carried out missionary activities mainly in Palestine, East Asia and North America. The first Russian mission was opened in Jerusalem in 1847. After an interruption caused by the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1857, the mission renewed its activity, which

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involved not only evangelization and care for Russian pilgrims, but also academic work, translation of old books and conducting excavations. This centre in the Middle East was supported from the mid-nineteenth century by the Palestine Committee founded in Petersburg, which collected means to assist pilgrims travelling to the Holy Land. Funds sent from the homeland were well used by the head of the mission, Bishop Kirill, who managed to convert the majority of Arabic Uniates, tightened contacts with the Jerusalem patriarchate and brought the Russian church closer to the Copts and the Ethiopian church. Moreover, the hierarchy gained important real estate for the mission, among which was the land around Hebron containing the Oak of Mamre, which was considered sacred.248 The Archimandrite Antonin, who directed the Middle East mission during the years 1865–94, founded a women’s convent (1871) and created hostels in Jericho and Tiberias.249 The mission of the Russian church in the Holy Land was supported in its activities from 1882 by the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, funded by Tsar Alexander III.250 The evangelization campaign initiated in East Asia by the synod began unsuccessfully with the Chinese emperor’s order forbidding entrance to the country to Orthodox missionary Innocent, who after several years on the border of the Middle Kingdom returned in resignation to Irkutsk. It was only in 1858 that the Russian clergy gained freedom to act in Chinese territory.251 Two years later, the monk Nikolai arrived in Japan, where he founded the first Orthodox community in Hakodate, which in 1912 numbered 33,000 believers.252 In 1897 Russian missionaries began activities in Korea.253 Much earlier – near the end of the eighteenth century – Orthodox monks reached the Aleutian Islands, where in 1799 a vicariate was established. The building up of the Orthodox Church’s infrastructure in North America – above all on the Aleutian Islands and Alaska – occurred with the support of the Russian– American Company, which was obligated by Alexander I in 1821 to erect a certain number of churches and monasteries on the territory under its control. The mission sent by the synod to Alaska three years later resulted in two bishoprics – of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska.254 In the period of the synod, the church had to fulfil a civilizing mission to further the unification of the empire. It became an instrument for maintaining the system’s status quo (samoderzhavie and serfdom), it legitimized, indoctrinated, mobilized, raised, educated and in part even evangelized in the interest of the Russian state. The effectiveness of the religious policy carried out by the emperors, involving greater dependency of religious institutions on the power apparatus, was confirmed after 1905. In a society where the revolutionary intelligentsia ever more boldly demanded changes and was increasingly decisive in its questioning of the tsars’ mandates, official religious institutions turned out to be loyal to the absolute monarchy right up to the end. In face of the conservative, royalist attitudes displayed by the top hierarchs, divisions arose within the clergy itself.255 In the Orthodox Church, dignitaries from the monasteries, who in a changing context permitted only a return to the idyllic harmony of secular and church authority from the times of Kievan Rus, were opposed by the impoverished

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 43 “white” clergy, who benefitted from the state apanage the least. Some of the priests from Petersburg, later called Group 32, formed the Alliance of Church Renewal, which criticized the synod’s administration, nationalization of the Orthodox Church and the excessively strong position of the bishops, in connection with which it postulated democratization of church structures. “Traditionalists” and “renovationists” came into conflict at the assembly in 1906, which had been called together with the aim of preparing the All Russian sobor, which ultimately began proceedings in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in August 1917. Successes of the supporters of the church’s democratization, such as the holding of elections among the clergy and delegates of secular centres for dignitaries of particular bishoprics, did not increase their influence in the hierarchy. The All Russian assembly of Orthodox clergy and laity in June 1917, accepted the resolution which defined the church’s position towards secular authority: the possibility of separation of church and state was ruled out. Orthodoxy was recognized as the most important religion of the empire, and the government should guarantee the church a privileged position; heads of state and ministers of religious affairs were required to belong to the ROC; moreover, it was expected that the freedom of other religious institutions would be limited.256 The anti-modernization postulates contained in the declaration show how detached the Orthodox clergymen were from the faithful at the beginning of the twentieth century, and how erroneously the hierarchs read the signs of the times. The Orthodox Church – the most powerful of all churches in Russia – approached the new authority and the unlimited religious freedom introduced in 1905 with great mistrust. It recognized the overthrow of tsardom as a curse and democracy as a satanic invention. The restoration of the patriarchate near the end of 1917 was, in the expectations of the hierarchy, to be the beginning of the rebuilding of the church’s position as the most important partner of secular authority and to lead to a renewal of the “Orthodox imperative”257 in politics. The October Revolution, however, brought dramatic changes for all religious institutions.

Religion in the Soviet state: between constraint and opposition In October 1917 the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, staged a coup in Petersburg with the conviction that their uprising would precede a world revolution of the proletariat. In Russia, the first classless society in history was to be formed, fascinated by technological progress and the virtually limitless potential of humankind. In their eyes, the establishment of Communism in the world, crowning the history of humanity’s development, required the destruction of all remnants of the old order – laws, customs, institutions and the people connected with them. Lenin and his comrades viewed the clergy and religious institutions as one of the founding blocs of the ancien régime, by their very nature inimical to the cause of revolution in Russia and averse to progress. Moreover, these institutions were depositories of a truth that competed with the vision of the world presented by the “builders of Communism”. For this reason, the Bolsheviks took steps to weaken the influence

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of the clergy and church structures immediately after taking power by, among other things, adopting legislative changes, state propaganda representing religion as superstition and a sign of backwardness, physical demolition of churches and religious schools, persecution of the clergy and – what was arguably most dangerous for religious communities – providing support and sometimes inspiration for schisms within church institutions. In the new legislative framework, a decree was issued on 8 November 1917, by force of which church properties were nationalized; on 23 January 1918, the principle of secularization of the state was introduced, establishing a separation of the state and educational system from the church, thereby officially guaranteeing freedom of professing any religion or atheism. In February 1918 religious institutions were banned from legally acquiring new properties, and four years later, in face of the spreading famine, confiscation of church property was announced in order to meet the needs of the starving population. Finally in 1923 two decrees were issued, legalizing the seizure of liturgical articles remaining in possession of the clergy for the needs of the state.258 The impressive catalogue of guarantees and religious freedoms contained in the Constitution of 1936 in no way influenced the improvement of the situation of religious institutions. The goal of state anti-church propaganda was to strike at the authority of religious institutions, most of all of the Orthodox Church. Serving this end were, for example, the public autopsy of the remains of Orthodox saints carried out on the recommendation of the competent Narkomat259 – the most important exhumations were those of Sergey Radonezhsky (April 1919) and Seraphim Sarovsky (December 1920),260 which were to prove to believers the false holiness of people whose remains in reality were subject to the same decomposition as those of sinners. Such actions of the Bolsheviks, aimed at discrediting the rival “truth”, are reminiscent of the Peter I’s initiative to organize in Petersburg a sacrilegious “false-patriarch” and the “All-Joking, All-Drunken Synod of Fools and Jesters”. However, the Bolsheviks undoubtedly went much farther in fighting religious institutions than the first Russian emperor did. The activity of the “Society of the Godless”, established in 1925, became emblematic and in 1932 it adopted an ambitious, five-year plan to completely remove religion from the lives of Russians: in the first year most religious schools were to be closed and the clergy was to be denied food rations; in the second year – mass closing of places of cult was to take place; in the third – forced emigration of all clergy; in the fourth – completion of the liquidation of churches; and in the fifth – consolidation of the successes already achieved.261 It is estimated that in the years 1929–36, 50,000 Orthodox believers were arrested, of whom 5,000 were killed, while the years 1937 and 1938 marked the peak of persecution of the church – 200,000 believers were held captive and 100,000 lost their lives.262 The greatest danger for religious institutions in the new Russia, however, was the schisms which most of the major religions experienced in the 1920s and 1930s – Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism. The splits came about against the backdrop of the clergy’s relations with the new authorities and the changes they introduced. Among religious leaders, a collision of attitudes occurred: the “liberal” one, which before 1917 had minimally profited from privileges, and the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 45 “pro-monarchical” one, which had functioned before the October Revolution within the framework of nationalized religious institutions. Among Muslims, the kadmists, who during the reign of the tsars had dominated in the muftiates, in large part remained distrusting of the Bolsheviks; however, reformers from the dzhydidites either joined the White Guard, emigrated or allied themselves with nationalists, but there also appeared clergymen who declared their loyalty to the new authorities. These so-called “red mullahs” who included, among others, Babakhan (Turkestan), Rasulov (Tatarstan), Takko-Kakhadzhiy (Dagestan), Kachanov (Kabardia), Ali Mitayev (Chechnya), even created a group called For the Soviet Rule, For the Sharia.263 Among Buddhist monks there were also “red lamas” who, supported by the Bolsheviks, dominated Buddhist assemblies (Buryat 1922, 1925; Kalmykia 1923), where they decided on structural reforms that supported infiltration of the religious community by communists. Buryat Buddhists called up a spiritual sobor, to be led by the hambo lama, established councils of datsans which were to make decisions based on majority rule and increased the influence of believers from beyond the sangha.264 “Red lamas”, who convinced the remaining monks to renounce the goods they possessed, resigned once and for all from private property, transferred valuable objects in possession of the sangha to the new authorities and facilitated the Bolsheviks’ nationalization of the datsans, which took place in the years 1923–24.265 The revolutionaries liquidated Jewish settlement zones and withheld all permissions for building synagogues in Moscow. Some Jews adopted Lenin’s ideas and formed a movement called the Living Synagogue, which professed loyalty to the Bolsheviks.266 The most dramatic divisions in the 1920s were experienced by the Orthodox Church. In contrast to the hierarchs coming from the “black” clergy and connected with the Holy Synod before 1917, the impoverished “white” clergy accepted the new authorities with hope. The milieu concentrated around Group 32 called into being – still during the provisional government – the All Russian Democratic Union of Clergy and Believers, which was active in many cities (among others, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Novgorod and Kharkov) until 1919 and gave the impetus for new groups that brought together renovationists (obnovlentsy) of the church, for example Religion in Face of Life of Joan Yegorov and Friends of Church Reformation of Alexander Boyarsky.267 Of key significance was the announcement by the obnovlentsy in May 1922 of the founding of the Living Church, at the head of which stood protorey Vladimir Krasnitsky. Recognized in the so-called Memorandum of Three268 as the only canonical Orthodox Church in Russia – the Living Church – broke down into subsequent communities: the Church of Revival with Bishop Antonin, the Union of Communities of the Ancient Apostolic Church with Alexander Vvedensky269 and Alexander Boyarsky. In the interim, protorey Belkov founded the Union of Religious Work Communes. The Puritan Revolutionary Party of Clergy and Believers was established in Saratov and in Penza the Free Church of Work.270 At the sobor of obnovlentsy,271 which took place in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in May 1923, the closing of monasteries was confirmed, priests of the “white” clergy were ordained as bishops

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against the canon, and it was agreed that clergymen should be allowed to enter a second marriage. Importantly, Tikhon, who at the time was under house arrest,272 was deprived of the position of patriarch. In 1925 Archbishop Grigoriy stood at the head of a new structure – the Provisional Higher Church Council. The activities of the Grigorianists, who in contrast to obnovlentsy emphasized their faithfulness to Patriarch Tikhon, were legalized by the Bolsheviks, who could easily control the dispersed Orthodox communities that were at variance with each other.273 In mentioning the division affecting the ROC in the first half of the twentieth century, it is worth drawing attention to particular schisms resulting from the strengthening of nationalism of neighbouring nations, which in striving for liberation from Russian dominance, supported the independence of local Orthodox Churches from the superiority of the Moscow patriarchate. The first example of such a split occurred in Georgia, where in March 1917 the selfdesignated sobor of bishops, representatives of the clergy and believers deliberating in Mtskheta, against the will of the Exarch Platon, announced the restoration of autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church, and then in September of the same year, Katolikos Kirion was elected.274 It was not until the Second World War, in November 1943, that the community was renewed.275 However, the Georgian Church managed to officially keep its autocephaly in the Soviet Union, which the Ukrainian clergy in turn was not able to do. The question of granting the Ukrainian Orthodox structures wider autonomy in the framework of the patriarchate was taken up by the sobor, which gathered in January 1918 in Kiev; however, the proceedings were interrupted by the Red Army’s arrival in the city. Supporters of Symon Petliura, who managed to recapture Kiev for a short time, arrested Metropolitan Antonin in December 1918 and announced the establishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church276 with the highest power held by the Holy Synod, led by Archbishop Agapit. After the Red Army’s ultimate victory in Ukraine, the synod ceased to function, and Archbishop Agapit recanted before Patriarch Tikhon. Another announcement of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church by part of the clergy and the faithful occurred in 1920, to which Tikhon reacted decisively by abolishing the autocephaly and restoring the status of exarchate to the local structures.277 In the autumn of 1921 the Bolsheviks got involved in the church conflict in Ukraine, giving their support to the schismatics, who elected Metropolitan Vasil (Lipkivsky) at a sobor in October of the same year; he – together with another hierarch – rukopolozhil (ordained)278 the new bishops279 of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church. In 1941 a new structure was created – the Autonomous Ukrainian Church with Archbishop Alexy (chosen subsequently as the exarch of Ukraine). However, in contrast to the “autocephalists”, the “autonomists” did not officially break all canonical ties with the patriarchate, although the latter never recognized the declaration of autonomy.280 The Russian church, after normalizing relations with the Soviet authorities, managed to gain control over the Ukrainian structures – this took place in 1930, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was forced to dissolve itself and return under the administration of the patriarchate. Moreover, the ROC again subordinated the Uniate Church to

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 47 itself – in March 1946 in Lviv, the sobor of Greek Catholics announced its breaking of the Union of Brest and recognition of the superiority of the Russian patriarch.281 After gaining independence in 1918, the authorities of the Polish state were interested in making the local Orthodox Church independent of Russian influence. Within the borders of the Second Republic there were 4½ million citizens of the Orthodox faith,282 making it the second largest religious community and as such was treated by the state authorities as a potential “Russian fifth column”. In order to prevent manipulation of the Polish Orthodox Church, the government actively supported the efforts of the hierarchs to gain autocephaly. These efforts ended successfully in 1924 upon gaining independence from Constantinople. However it was only in June 1948 that the Moscow patriarchate, which was the mother church, granted the Polish church canonical autocephaly, which determined the establishment of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church (PAOC).283 During the Second World War, the superiority of the Russian church was undermined in territory occupied by Germans, with whom local nationalists – the greatest enthusiasts of the independence of local churches – cooperated. Besides Ukraine, announcements of autocephaly appeared also in Belarus and Estonia. In 1942 a group of Belarusian clergy announced the establishment of the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church; however, most of the “autocephalists” emigrated after Germany’s withdrawal.284 In Estonia, which had achieved independence following the overthrow of tsardom, Bishop Alexander of Tallinn turned to the ecumenical patriarch with a request for the local Orthodox Church to come under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, to which Meletios IV agreed in July 1923, granting the Estonian church autonomy. After the annexation of Estonia by the USSR in 1940, the autonomy was repealed and the local structures were included in the Russian church. The official unification of the churches was accomplished in March 1945,285 and in 1978 the patriarch of Constantinople, upon the official application of the ROC, denied the legality of the 1923 decision of Meletios IV.286 After the end of the war, the Moscow patriarchate managed to subordinate to itself the rebellious clergy in the territory of the USSR. It is worth emphasizing that this “canonical reconquest” was achieved with the support of the communists who, after the pacification of the Russian church and the testing of its loyalty during the Great Patriotic War, began to use the Orthodox Church as one of its policy instruments. From the point of view of those in power, the unification of the canonical territory of the ROC helped the centralization of the Soviet Union. Characteristically, the problem of schisms which appeared in the first half of the twentieth century reappeared after the collapse of the USSR. The religious policy of the Bolsheviks between 1917 and 1942 underwent clear change. At the very beginning, they attempted to differentiate their approach to particular communities – the Orthodox Church was attacked most strongly, while somewhat milder treatment was directed towards Catholics,287 Protestants and especially Muslims, possibly due to the idea promoted by Tatar Communists regarding a correlation between Islam and socialism.288 At the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, an aggressive anti-religious campaign was carried out on a nation-wide

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scale, as a result of which, among other things, official structures of the Catholic Church ceased to exist in the USSR and a registered sangha289 and the Jewish population were subject to forced assimilation. In the face of the actual threat of extermination, religious institutions stood before a dramatic choice: put up a resistance until the end, despite their predictable defeat, or recognize the Soviet authority and undertake cooperation with it on its own terms. After the Bolshevik victory the hierarchs of the ROC counted on the idea that neutrality would ensure their safety and the possibility of carrying out their priestly services: for example, during the civil war Patriarch Tikhon refused to give an official blessing to the White Army.290 However, with the increasing repression of clergy, they increasingly emphasized their loyalty to the new government. In the autumn of 1919 Patriarch Tikhon appealed to the archbishops not to take any position with regard to current political events. In 1923 the patriarch categorically cut himself off from the counterrevolutionaries, and in the beginning of 1924 a patriarchal ukaz was issued on praying for the state authority.291 A propaganda success for the Bolsheviks was the letter of Solovetsky monks to the government of the USSR in June 1926 (Pamyatnaya zapiska Solovetskikh episkopov, obrashchyonnaya k Pravitelstvu SSSR/Памятная записка Соловецких епископов, обращенная к Правительству СССР), in which they emphasized the non-involvement of the church in political matters, declared their loyalty towards the authorities and recognized the lawfulness of the decree on the separation of church and state.292 At the same time, the document takes a critical stance towards the government for not observing the principle of a neutral worldview in its religious policy.293 In that same year Metropolitan Sergey, acting as head of the church during the patriarch’s absence, turned to the NKVD with an official request for the legalization of the church administration. The hierarch renewed the appeal in May 1927, after which, together with other bishops, he called a provisional patriarchal Holy Synod. After the so-called Declaration of 1927, in which the hierarchs assured the church’s apolitical nature and its loyalty towards the Soviet authorities, the Narkomat registered the synod in August of that same year.294 This recognition of the church’s legality divided the clergy and believers in the country and abroad – those Orthodox believers living in the USSR who rejected the “Sergianism,” created the so-called “Catacomb Church”,295 and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, that was called into life in 1921 by emigrant bishops gathered at a sobor in the Serbian town of Sremski Karlovci, announced in September 1927 the breaking off of canonical ties with the ROC.296 The Bolsheviks, in forming their religious policy, returned to methods used by the Russian emperors – instead of fighting religion and persecuting its believers, thanks to which the churches won themselves new martyrs, the Soviet government decided to legalize loyal religious institutions and created effective mechanisms of control over these institutions, which in result became instruments in the hands of the communist party. An event which inclined Soviet decision makers towards a change in the previous religious policy was the Great Patriotic War. In the face of the quick movement of the German army into Russia’s interior, Joseph Stalin needed additional instruments for mobilizing the people to fight

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 49 against the enemy, and took the example of Alexander I, who defeated Napoleon partly by presenting him to the Orthodox people as the Antichrist desecrating “Mother Russia”. Stalin’s historic meeting with three of the hierarchs – metropolitans Sergey, Alexy and Nikolai – came about in the presence of Vyacheslav Molotov and Colonel Georgiy Karpov in the Kremlin on 4 September 1942. Stalin not only agreed to the calling of the sobor, the election of a new patriarch with the title “Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia”,297 but also offered logistical assistance, including use of aeroplanes, to organize the sobor. Moreover, he agreed to the reopening of religious seminaries and the release of priests from prisons and prison camps. Only four days after this meeting the sobor met at the Kremlin and summoned the people to fight against the invader and to support the Soviet authority, categorically condemned collaborators, established the synod and elected Metropolitan Sergey the first patriarch after the death of Tikhon in 1925.298 Making this compromise with Stalin strengthened the position of the patriarchate with regard to other Orthodox structures, which inclined many of them to seek an agreement with the “official church” – in the years 1943–45, the majority of obnovlentsy and grigorentsy returned to the structures of the ROC.299 At the beginning of 1945, the sobor met again and in February a new patriarch, Alexy I,300 who led the church until 1970, was elected. Moderation of religious policy after the September meeting at the Kremlin in 1942 meant that the Soviet decision makers gave the church, in exchange for its loyalty, some freedom of action. In October 1943 at the Council of the People’s Commissars of the USSR, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was created, in which the government’s side was represented by a colonel of the state security service – Georgiy Karpov.301 Stalin charged Karpov with supervision of the Orthodox Church within the framework of the new religious policy, the so-called concordat policy.302 Although no agreement between the government of the USSR and the church was ever signed, the church had to strictly observe the principle of loyalty in order not to provoke the next wave of anti-church propaganda. The council created in 1943 was, in a way, the Holy Synod called up by Peter the Great, but for the Soviet Empire, with Georgiy Karpov fulfilling the function of oberprocurator. This “concordat” set the framework for the ROC’s service for Soviet diplomacy.303 The method of “pacification–legalization–control” was also used on Muslim structures. To ensure the support of the Islamic clergy in the face of German aggression, Stalin agreed in 1943 to legalize the institutions – besides the muftiate in Ufa for Central Russia and Siberia (Dukhovnoye upravlenie musulman Evropeyskoy chasti SSSR i Sibiri, DUMES/Духовное управление мусульман Европейской части СССР и Сибири, ДУМЕС) three more muftiates were established: Buynak (Dagestan) for the Caucasian Sunnis, Baku for the Caucasian Shiites, and Tashkent (Dukhovnoye upravlenie musulman Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana, SADUM/Духовное управление мусульман Средней Азии и Казахстана, САДУМ). The latter enjoyed the greatest support of the Soviet authorities and with time the three remaining structures were subordinated to it.304 As in the case of the Orthodox Church, so too in the case of the muftiates, on one hand, the government made concessions – in 1945 it allowed its Muslim

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citizens to take part in the hajj – the pilgrimage to Mecca – and financially supported the Islamic administration; on the other hand, the authorities improved the mechanisms of control and infiltration of religious communities, establishing in 1944 the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. In 1965, two institutions were joined together – the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Council for Affairs of Religious Cults, creating a new organ – the Council for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The first chairman of the council was Vladimir Kuroyedov, who was replaced in 1970 by Vasily Furov.305 This state of affairs was maintained until the mid-1980s – the Soviet authorities tolerated the functioning of religious institutions that had been subordinated to them, from time to time deciding to intensify anti-church propaganda for the needs of domestic policy. An example of this is the anti-religion campaign begun by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 or the secret instructions issued in 1961, recommending an increase of control over the church by using clergymen recruited by the security service.306 In these harsh times, the church was forced to keep much of her activity under-cover; this was the reason, for example, for the phenomenon of sacrament and prayers celebrated by mail.307 Remarkably, the first permission to build new churches in the USRR was issued only in 1978.308 Despite the anticlerical and antireligious campaign of the Soviet state, Russian Orthodoxy provided a certain ground for social action and opposition movement. Dmitry Pospielovsky describes the “battle for Pochaiv”, when between 1960 and 1966 Orthodox believers stood up, despite the harassment by the militsiya, in order to save the holy sanctuary.309 Jane Ellis presents the characteristics and evolution of the dissident movement in connection to the Orthodox environment.310 Two main camps formed: the nationalistic (the so-called Christian patriots, e.g. Vladimir Osipov, Dmitry Dudkov) and democratic movement and human rights activists (e.g. Anatolij Levitin, Andrei Sakharov). The common cause which had brought all the groups together was rebellion against lies and hypocrisy in the Soviet public sphere. Confronted with the grass-roots activity of the intelligentsia the ROC faced a dilemma. On one hand, the church (at least part of the hierarchy) sympathized with the dissidents, especially with their appeals for respect of freedom of religion. On the other hand, the ROC was forced by the Soviet authorities to deny all accusations that the dissidents made in the international area. By denying that religious prosecutions were taking place in the USSR, the Moscow patriarchate weakened the credibility and legitimacy of oppositionists, including those who were members of the church. A well-known example is the reaction of Metropolitan Juvenaly who condemned the open letter by Gleb Yakunin and Lev Regelson addressed to the participants of the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Nairobi in 1975.311 The significance of institutional backing is obvious in the case of the Jews in the USSR. After 1948 the Soviets took a negative approach to Jewish emigration to Israel. As a result, some Jews (called otkaznicy)312 were denied jobs, faced political persecution and were prohibited to leave the USSR. This repressed group turned

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 51 to the international community, the UN and UNESCO calling upon them to pay attention to their difficult situation. Unfortunately for the Soviet authorities, they did not have at their disposal a loyal and credible Jewish organization which could efficiently discredit the accusations made by the otkaznicy. Because of this, organizations such as the World Jewish Congress had legitimate ground to press the authorities of the USSR to improve the status of its Jewish citizens.313 One of the best-know results of the anti-Soviet pressure created by the Jewish community is the Jackson–Vanik amendment to US federal law from 1974, which inter alia denied most-favoured nation status to the Soviet Union. The role of the ROC as an institution adding credibility to the USSR’s image brings us back to foreign policy. Despite the fact, that the Soviet decision makers did not hide their dislike of religion in public life, the religious factor continued to play a role in the policy of the USSR. The Second World War reminded the elites of the large potential of faith for mobilizing society; however, after 1945 the Communist Party used religious institutions mainly in its foreign policy. Contacts of the clergy served the Soviet state as an additional diplomatic channel. Their missionary activity and involvement in the ecumenical movement helped to create a positive image of the Soviet Union – a peacefully inclined empire of the proletariat, bringing help to peoples exploited by the vile capitalists of the West. The criterion of usefulness for policy determined the extent to which the authorities tolerated a given religious institution. The possibility of using a church’s or muftiate’s contacts abroad inclined Soviet political figures to support the activities of these institutions beyond the borders of the USSR; however, following this criterion there was no real basis for improving the status of Buddhists, Catholics or Jews.314 Referring to the latter, William C. Fletcher remarked: “The Jewish community in the USSR has not been permitted the facilities of a central organisation, and has had very few opportunities indeed for joint action with the State in foreign affairs”.315 Professionalization of the international activity of the Moscow patriarchate required the creation of an appropriate organ, which occurred in 1946 when the Department of External Contacts was created, which was first led by Metropolitan Nikolai.316 William C. Fletcher argued “these antireligious policies, effectively executed, ... have led to the present incongruous partnership of Church and State in foreign affairs”.317 The religious factor in the foreign policy of the USSR was used to strengthen the unity of the Eastern Bloc, keep up good relations with Greece and ensure the presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, in contact with Muslim states and in relations with the Vatican. Stalin wanted to forge the defeat of the Third Reich’s army into the founding myth of the Eastern Bloc, singing the praises of the historic victory of the heroic and righteous Slavs over aggressive Germans. To this end, he used motifs of Russian slavophilia – this nineteenth century idea was invoked by Stalin in order to strengthen his newly founded society, with the difference that, as Adam B. Ulam aptly notes, pan-Slavism in the nineteenth century was to be a method of getting Russia out of isolation and including it in the European Slavic world, while after 1945 the Slavic idea guaranteed the hermetic closure of the system – it welded

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the socialist community together and safeguarded it against the “capitalistic drain”.318 In order to symbolically cut itself off from the “reactionary” nature of the pan-Slavic idea, the term “Slavic solidarity” was used, and the expression of this “solidarity” was, among other things, the conclusion of treaties “on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid”. The culmination of pan-Slavic sentiments was the All-Slavic Congress organized in Belgrade in December 1946 by Josip Broz Tito319 and the creation in 1947 of the Cominform – a structure established for coordinating the foreign policy of the Eastern Bloc.320 In the framework of integration proceeding under Slavic slogans, the Moscow patriarchate had the task of bolstering the sense of solidarity among Orthodox nations in democratic nations. With Moscow’s agreement, a renewal of the ROC’s contacts with “brotherly Churches” – Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian – was accomplished. In 1945 a delegation of the ROC met with the hierarchs in Bulgaria. Bulgarian Exarch Stefan went to Moscow the same year and his visit was returned by patriarch Alexy I in 1946.321 During the visit to Belgrade in 1945, the representatives of the ROC tackled the issue of reconciliation between some of the Russian bishops living in emigration and the Moscow patriarchate. In 1945 representatives of the ROC came to Romania to renew cooperation with the local clergy and to help ease tensions resulting from Bucharest’s siding with the Nazis during the war. Paradoxically, Orthodoxy was to be a factor convincing the Romanian people that their place was in the Slavic socialist camp.322 Patriarch Alexy I visited Bucharest in 1947 and on this occasion the staff of the Soviet Embassy took part in liturgy in the Rumanian patriarchal cathedral.323 In the autumn of 1945 there was an occasion for the Moscow patriarchate to extend its administration onto the territory of Czechoslovakia. As a result of an agreement between the Serbian and Russian churches, the Orthodox communities of Czechoslovakia came under the jurisdiction of the ROC, which effected a change in the position of local Uniates, who less than a year later – in April 1946 – “returned” to the Moscow patriarchate. In the name of building trust between particular nations of the Eastern Bloc, the Russian church also agreed to grant several local Orthodox churches autocephaly. The Moscow patriarchate ultimately accepted the canonical separation of the Orthodox Church in Poland (June 1948), the Church in Czechoslovakia (1951) and the Orthodox Church in Finland (1957). Foreign contacts of the Moscow patriarchate turned out to be valuable for forming relationships between the USSR and Greece – a European Orthodox state which was outside the Eastern Bloc and in 1952 joined the NATO. In Greece, Orthodoxy was the state religion and the clergy formed an influential centre with an unfavourable attitude towards the West. Although the “unsubtle attempts [of the ROC] to intervene on behalf of the Communist partisans in the civil war were not especially welcome in Greece”,324 later Greek priests, many of whom received scholarships to study at the Leningrad Religious Academy,326 often showed goodwill towards the USSR. In the context of Inter-Orthodox relations, one of the most interesting aspects of the ROC’s diplomacy in the 1940s were the efforts to gain the status of the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 53 leader of the entire Orthodox community. In 1947 the ROC proposed to hold the Eighth Ecumenical Council, the first since the Council of Nicaea (787). Because of the reluctance of the other churches, the Moscow patriarchate put forward another initiative, namely the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the ROC. According to the plan, after the official part, the heads of the churches would participate in an ecumenical conference. The intentions of the ROC failed to materialize. The meeting was held but did not receive the needed support from the ancient patriarchates,326 despite various efforts by the ROC, such as significant donations to the Antioch patriarchate.327 Generally, the space to manoeuvre for the ROC’s diplomacy in the West was limited. However, a certain potential existed: after the Second World War in France, which had a sizeable community of Russian émigrés, there was a relatively favourable ground for exploiting two factors: temporary enthusiasm among emigrants for the USSR – the vanquisher of fascism – and the popularity of the Communist Party. Pospielovsky speculates that had Communists succeeded in taking over in France, the ROC would have “served as a most welcome adjunct to future Soviet relations with the country”.328 The ROC also turned out to be useful in the manifestation of the Soviet Union’s presence in the Middle East. From the beginning, Bolsheviks were interested in winning the Arab population for the cause of the proletarian revolution. In December 1917 they addressed a proclamation to “Muslims of the East, Persians and Turks, Arabs and Hindus”, arguing for the need to link the Islamic uprising with the proletariat’s fight against the capitalist West. In an attempt to undermine the system of mandates forced on the region by France and Great Britain, the USSR concluded a “treaty of friendship and brotherhood” with Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran, and was the first non-Muslim state to establish diplomatic relations with Hejaz (from 1932: Saudi Arabia).329 In allowing the ROC to renew its missionary activity in the Middle East, the Soviet government was guided by state interest – in this way, it gained an additional diplomatic channel and an institution forming a positive image of the Soviet Union among Arabs. In 1945 Moscow allowed Patriarch Alexy I to go on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, during which he held various meetings in Palestine. From there he travelled to Cyprus and then to Egypt and Lebanon, then further to Syria, Iraq and Iran.330 On that occasion Alexy met with the remaining patriarchs of the Eastern Church – Christopher II of Alexandria and Alexander III of Antioch. The patriarch headed for the Holy Land a second time in 1960, while his successor went on a pilgrimage in 1972.331 The activities of the ROC in the Middle East were written into Soviet policy towards Islamic countries, for which revolutionary slogans were attractive. In order to win the favour of Muslim leaders, the USSR presented itself as an unusually tolerant state, which respects religious freedom and “takes care of its own Muslims”. As proof of the undisturbed cooperation between Soviet Muslims and the Communist Party, representatives of the former were added to official delegations sent to Islamic countries, in order to convince Muslims in other states of the community of interests linking the USSR and Arab nations. Usually, it was

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members of the muftiates that took part in diplomatic missions. Zia al-Din Babakhanov was one of the most prominent Muslim clerics in Soviet diplomacy.332 The Islamic factor was used by Moscow also with regard to governments that persecuted Islamic believers. For example, Soviet decision makers criticized communist China for its persecution of Muslim Uygurs and Kazakhs.333 The USSR tried to use its “Islamic asset” also in policy towards non-Arabic countries, such as Indonesia. For instance, in 1956 president Sukarno met in Tashkent with the chief mufti of central Asia and Kazakhstan. Later Soviet delegates took part in Muslin gatherings in Indonesia.334 This Soviet policy broke down after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which had negative consequences for the image of the Soviet state in the Arab world and its relations with Arabs. The conflict also antagonized Soviet Muslims, particularly those living in the Caucasus. Even the muftis who were loyal to the Soviet authorities found it difficult to justify an aggression against another Islamic nation, let alone a nine-year invasion. After the Second World War the ROC was involved in campaigns for peace.335 After the conference in Wrocław, Poland, the World Peace Council (WPC) was established in 1949 and henceforth became an important platform for the ROC’s international activity. In connection with the WPC the Moscow patriarchate convened conferences of religious leaders who supported Soviet initiatives for peace and condemned the aggressive policy of the West. The ROC’s involvement was particularly noticeable during the Korean War, when hierarchs were publicly accusing “American fascists” of “cannibalistic extermination of the inferior Korean race”.336 One of the most significant initiatives was the All-Christian Peace Assembly and the Prague Christian Peace Conference held in 1961, 1964 and 1968, which contributed to the revitalisation of the peace campaign and the strengthening Soviet propaganda of “peaceful coexistence”.337 It is worth stressing also that Muslim clerics supported the peace campaign and took part in international conferences on disarmament.338 In contacts with the Vatican which – despite the fact “that it had no armed divisions” – caused trouble for the Soviet Union, the Russian church was involved for obvious reasons.339 Its representatives participated as observers in sessions of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), which enabled the USSR to gain insight into the work of the Catholic clergy. During the course of the council, Pope Paul VI had an audience with a metropolitan of the ROC – Nikodim – in 1963. This meeting began a conversation on, among other things, the topic of a possible visit of the pope to the USSR.340 The Soviet authorities fulfilled the request of Pope John Paul I and allowed the previously persecuted Uniate Archbishop Josyf of Lviv to leave the USSR. A symbol of the new openness in relations between the Vatican and the USSR was the meeting of Pope John Paul II with the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, in December 1989; however, even then tensions between the two churches were becoming increasingly obvious, mainly in connection with the controversy over the status of the Uniate community in Ukraine and accusations against Catholic missionaries of proselytism in the canonical territory of the Russian church.

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 55 Establishment of contacts with the Vatican at the beginning of the 1960s was connected with a change in the approach of the Moscow patriarchate towards the ecumenical movement. In the beginning the ROC distanced itself from the dialogue between different Christian churches, in which the patriarchate of Constantinople, for example, had been taking part since the 1920s. As late as 1948 the ROC stated in a resolution that modern ecumenism was not a means of achieving Christian unity. In 1959, on the initiative of the Moscow patriarchate, the Confederation of European Churches341 was organized as an alternative to other ecumenical institutions. The ROC decided to join the World Council of Churches (WCC) in New Delhi in 1961,342 and in 1975 a hierarch of the Russian church, Metropolitan Nikodim, was elected leader of the WCC.343 By engaging in the ecumenical movement, the ROC built its position among the remaining churches, and the influence of the Russian clergy grew, particularly within the universal Orthodox Church. The church’s diplomacy was increasing and had the task of presenting the USSR as a democratic state that respected the freedom of its citizens – an image which the Communist Party valued and effectively used to its advantage. It is worth emphasizing that the activity of the Moscow patriarchate abroad during the time of the Soviet Union was not limited only to Europe and Arabic countries. In the 1970s the church took part in the gradual normalization of the USSR’s relations with Japan, and was active in North America: for example, in 1970 Patriarch Alexy I granted the American Orthodox Church autocephaly.344 Moreover, the ROC tried to develop relations with African countries: for example, the Moscow patriarchate exchanged visits with religious leaders of Ethiopia, Uganda, Madagascar and Kenya. The ROC also joined other churches in condemning apartheid.345 In the 1970s the diplomatic activity of the ROC gained new dynamics with the Patriarch Pimen. In 1972 he visited the Holy Land where he held a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Office of Israel. The same year he travelled to Greece and was granted a meeting with the Prime Minister Georgios Papadopoulos. Three years later he returned to Greece and visited Rumania and Yugoslavia. In 1977 Pimen met with the patriarch of Constantinople.346 It is impossible not to notice that the Soviet authority used religious institutions mainly in foreign policy, while – besides the mobilization during the years of the Great Patriotic War or the use of the church’s structures to infiltrate social groups – the religious factor played a small role in domestic affairs. In comparison with the Russian Empire, in the USSR, religion was not a source for legitimization of power or a founding block of the identity of its citizens. Religion was deprived of operational social functions, as the well-being of the working people was looked after by the state, which had a monopoly in every domain – education, law, social care, health care, production, and so on. The place of the sverkhideya, regulating all aspects of life, was taken over by Communist ideology. Many researchers point out that the authority and system of the USSR had a gnostic nature – the teachings of Marx were transformed in Russia under the influence of its own tradition of secular messianism. Uvarov’s triad of Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost was replaced with a new one: “Atheism, Communism and Sovietness”. According to

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James Billington, the changes which took place in Russia after 1917 actually had the character of a change in decoration – icons were replaced with portraits of Lenin, the place of Orthodox saints was taken over by geroy truda (heroes of labour) – stakhanovites347 – and the Third International corresponded to the idea of the Third Rome.348 Jarosław Bratkiewicz seems to share Billington’s opinion when he claims that the Bolsheviks, despite slogans proclaiming modernization, created a traditional empire, anti-modern in its nature, in which power was not separated from property.349 The genesis of Soviet Union’s system remains a subject of discussion among researchers – was the USSR the effect of applying Marx’s theories, or did a “Russification/Byzantinization” of Marxism take place? Supporters of the latter view emphasize the noticeable influence of the samoderzhavie tradition in the Soviet system, manifested in, among other things, the centralization of power, the cult of the leader, hypertrophy of state structures, domination of the military factor in formation of foreign policy, the system of invigilation and repression,350 collectivism and anti-Occidentalism. From the onset, the vision of “newness” presented by the Bolsheviks was contradictory. They completely rejected the old order and sought the creation of a system which was the direct opposite of the tsarist empire. Moreover, this vision had an utopist, gnostic nature – as a conflict between the embodiment of evil (the ancien régime) and the ideal good (Communism). However, after the victory of the revolution, Communist ideology took the place of the sverkhideya, which earlier had been occupied by samoderzhavie. The ideology, which determined all spheres of social life in the Bolshevik state, took on a mystical and eschatological character as the Communist system, in the convictions of Russian revolutionaries, was the ultimate stage of humanity’s development. Taking into consideration the dominant role of ideology, the USSR should be recognized as an example of an ideocracy. The Soviet Union, in a certain sense, was the continuator of the Russian Empire – just as Rus, Muscovy and tsarist Russia, it was a civilizational formation imbued with a mystical element. Although Orthodoxy was replaced by Communist ideology, the authority of those holding power still derived from their particular charisma. Residents of the USSR were, to a large extent, believers of – rather than citizens of – the Soviet state: they had no real influence on the exercise of power, and could thus only believe in it. Subsequent secretaries of the Communist Party took the place of the “Orthodox autocrat– tsar” in society’s consciousness. The new, secular religion had its prophets (Kropotkin), priests (Lenin, Stalin), saints (stakhanovites), martyrs (those who fell fighting the White Guard) and inquisitors (the NKVD). Professional, elite cadres of revolutionaries had to, in Lenin’s convictions, stand in for the masses in the realization of Communism on earth. Revolutionaries had to devote themselves completely to the cause and renounce their personal “I”. The party was to be reminiscent of a holy order – an exclusive community of egalitarian “monks-revolutionaries”,351 who, thanks to their involvement and self-sacrifice would save humanity (messianism) and attain the grace of building a Communist heaven on earth. In the case of the cult of Lenin and Stalin, whose remains were mummified and displayed as relics for public viewing in a mausoleum on Red Square, the

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 57 association with religion and sacralization of power speaks for itself. In the Soviet Union, ideology fulfilled the functions that had earlier been attributed to Orthodoxy – it became a source of legitimization of power and sacralization of the new order and the main determinant of identity for more than 290 million citizens of the USSR. However, it is worth stressing that, all in all, the forced policy of atheisation did not turn out to be very successful considering the efforts invested into supporting it. According to the official data, 18 per cent of the population were declared atheists in the USSR in 1970.352 Paul Froese, who has analysed the dynamics and consequences of atheisation in the USSR, argues that the Soviet campaign failed because the Communist Party did not fully understand and therefore neglected the nonempirical aspect of religion which could not be replaced with scientific atheism.353 It can be argued, that the break-up of the Soviet Union was, among others things, caused by exhaustion of the ideological legitimization, thus sharing the fate of the idea of samoderzhavie in 1917. The loss of faith in the sverkhideya hastened the revival of nationalism and separatist tendencies in particular republics. Mikhail Gorbachev – the last secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – in the face of the “ideological bankruptcy” of Communism instinctively sought an understanding with the Orthodox Church, which represented a definite ethos. The festive celebration of the millennial anniversary of the baptism of Rus in June 1988 was supposed to unite Russians. Two months before the beginning of the millennial celebrations, a meeting took place between Patriarch Pimen and members of the Holy Synod with Gorbachev, who acknowledged the earlier antichurch policy as a mistake and promised to enact a new law on religion.354 In the same year a sobor was called which took steps aimed at reorganizing the church, and when in the beginning of the final decade of the twentieth century the changes taking place in the USSR picked up speed, the ROC was directed by the successor of the deceased (May 1990) Patriarch Pimen – Alexy II. The Soviet Union’s new law on religion, enacted on 1 October 1990, was well received by the ROC. Religious institutions were granted status as legal entities, the Council on Religious Affairs’ direct influence on churches was reduced, and the possibility of religious education for children was created. In the bill accepted a month later by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the council was replaced by a Commission on Matters of Religious Freedom, the rigorous separation of church and state was mitigated, and optional religious lessons were allowed.355 Moreover, the Soviet authorities began to return previously confiscated churches, including those within the Kremlin, to the church, and in 1991 – at the request of the patriarch – Christmas was declared a public holiday. This was the last year of the USSR’s existence, and its unexpected break-up became a challenge for both the Russian state and the church. *** Analysis of the significance of the religious factor in Russian history highlights the prominent role of the Orthodox Church. Throughout centuries, the church

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was the second most important political symbol of Russia, after the state, and the evolution of their mutual relations marks the stages of Russian history. The models of relations between sacerdotium and imperium were drawn from Byzantium, where the church, developing under the auspices of the emperor – the regent of Christ – served the state in the realization of “God’s plan”. The Byzantine legacy, encompassing the sacralization of secular power and its predominance over the church, the ideal of a universal Christian empire and the sense of having a mission were assumed by the Russian state. Initially, in Kievan Rus, the church was an independent institution, whose favour, support or mediation was sought by rulers struggling among themselves. In the period of subjugation to the Golden Horde, the Orthodox Church received many land grants and privileges, which significantly strengthened its position with regard to the princes of Rus. Historians emphasize that the “Mongol yoke” was a time when the church knew greater freedom in relation to native authority, while at the same time the khans, who at the beginning of the fourteenth century converted to Islam, introduced the principle of freedom of cult in exchange for the unconditional loyalty of religious institutions. When the Muscovite princes, not without the help of the church itself, united Rus and broke free from dependency on Sarai, the initiative in the relations between the church and secular authority was on the side of the monarch. Even the Smuta at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not reverse this tendency. Nikon – the last church leader who strove to subordinate the monarch to the patriarch – lost in the sobor of 1666. As a result of the expansion into the heart of the Asian interior, beginning with the victories of Ivan the Terrible over the Volga khanates, the tsars ruled over an increasingly large, multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empire. A condition for maintaining the integrity of the state was a strong central authority, capable of controlling religious conflicts, administrating religions, and deciding on the legalization or marginalization of a given religious institution. In the eighteenth century, the emperors became the main creators of religious structures. Churches, which from the perspective of state interests, fulfilled the criteria of loyalty and usefulness (or the minimum requirement – harmlessness), were de facto absorbed by the apparatus of the tsarist administration. The most important religions became “nationalized”, which enabled the rulers to use the churches both in domestic and foreign policy, a good example of which is the Orthodox missionary activity, treated as part of the tsarist diplomacy. Instrumentalization of religion caused the growth of anti-clerical sentiments. The church lost its status as the repository of truth, while sacralization of the state gained in strength. An important source of sanctification of secular authority in the history of Russia were its military victories: the triumph of Alexander Nevsky over the army of the Livonian Brothers of the Sword, the defeat of the Mongols when Byzantium was about to fall, the victory of Peter I over the Swedes and the two “Patriotic Wars” – were events that confirmed the conviction of the rulers and the ruled as to the special mission entrusted to Russia by Providence. In the history of the Russian state, the religious factor fulfilled roles of identity-formation, legitimization, integration, creation of culture, social functions and in foreign

Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 59 policy – diplomatic and civilizing functions. From the point of view of those holding power in the Russian Federation such potential of religious institutions had to be used. The first years following the collapse of the USSR – defined by Russians themselves as a new Smuta, a time when the power of state is weak and cannot neutralize decentralizing tendencies, avert economic collapse and changes in society – forced religious institutions to define their position in the new order that was forming. In thinking about the form of religious relations in the Russian Federation, both the majority of politicians as well as clergy looked towards proven models from the past.

2

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation

The religiosity of Russian society and its influence on the political preferences of citizens Religiosity is an element of social consciousness, a conglomerate of various ideas, worldviews and attitudes characterizing a certain group of people. This consciousness resembles a multi-dimensional structure in which particular elements are interconnected in every possible way, some of them interpenetrating each other, others being in largely independent of one another, while yet others are activated only during confrontation (under the influence of an event, a strong experience). In contrast to religion, which can be seen as an objectified phenomenon, religiosity is understood as a collection of ideas, values, convictions and attitudes towards non-empirical reality, as well as opinions about humanity’s relationships with this reality and the consequences of this worldview for a person’s functioning in empirical reality. It has a subjective character and is strongly grounded in the socio-cultural context and connected with religious institutions. When first approaching this concept, researchers usually used frequency of religious practice and the role of an individual within the framework of religious institutions as a measure of religiosity.1 They began to devise scales of religiosity, taking into consideration different parameters (dimensions). A significant contribution to the field was made by Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark: using their work we can distinguish seven dimensions: overall relation to faith (combining an individual’s self-declaration of faith with the individual’s own assessment of the degree of intensity of his or her religiosity), religious feelings (concerning the intensity of the experience of religious emotions: for example, the sense of God’s presence, the experience of “heavenly intervention”), religious practice (e.g. the frequency of participation in Mass, receiving the Eucharist, reading the Gospels), agreement of the individual’s beliefs with those postulated by his or her professed faith (e.g. his or her notion of God, acceptance of the dogma of the Holy Trinity, the immaculate conception, resurrection, life after death), familiarity with the principles of faith (e.g. knowledge of the main figures of the Gospels, the Four Evangelists), membership in a community or religious organization (e.g. involvement in parish affairs) and the effects of the individual’s religious worldview on his behaviour in “secular” reality. Based on this, seven parameters of religiosity have

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 61 been formulated: self-identification (overall relation to faith), intellectual (religious knowledge), ideological (religious ideology), experiential (religious feelings), ritual (religious practice), community (religious community) and consequential/ethical (religious morality) parameters. One of the effects of the fall of the USSR and the “ideological fiasco” of the scientific atheism forced on society was the religious revival noticeable over the entire post-Soviet area in the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century – concerning both traditional religions and new religious movements. The thesis of a “religious renaissance” found, to some extent, reflection in sociological studies, which at the same time revealed the specificity of religiosity of Russian society.2 On the level of self-identification, the phenomenon of religious revival is the least problematical. The first studies conducted by Sergey Filatov, Ludmila Vorontsova and Dmitriy Furman, show that in the years 1990 to 1993 the fraction of the “believing” population grew from 29 to 40 per cent, while the group defining themselves as atheists halved – from 16 to 8 per cent.3 A real “religious boom” concerned mostly Orthodoxy: according to information published by the Levada Centre from 1989 to 1994, the number of believers increased by 26 per cent and, although a weakening of this tendency was later noted, in the course of the decade 1997–2007 the fraction of individuals identifying with Orthodoxy rose from 45 to 66 per cent (70 per cent in 2008). During this same period, other religions barely managed to maintain their numbers; however, the group of declared non-believers noticeably decreased from 45 to 23 per cent. According to the latest studies conducted by the Levada Centre in February 2008, among 1600 respondents representing 130 localities, 71 per cent were Orthodox, 5 per cent Muslim, 1 per cent each Catholics and Protestants, less than 1 per cent Buddhists and Jews, and 5 per cent atheists.4 On the basis of this information, Russian society should be classified as very religious, but studies show that in 2008, 5 per cent of respondents considered themselves “very religious”, 37 per cent “religious to some extent”, 33 per cent “rather non-religious” and 20 per cent “not religious at all”.5 Taking into consideration the ritual parameter makes the specificity of the Russian “religious renaissance” stand out. The clear growth in the number of people declaring themselves as believers only insignificantly influenced an increase in “church attendance”. According to surveys, only 6–8 per cent of Orthodox believers and 4 per cent of Muslims participate in a religious service at least once a month. Importantly, this result has been maintained without major changes since 1991.6 The number of believers who do not go to church at all has decreased, although they still make up the largest group – 38 per cent (compared to 65 per cent in 1991). Moreover, 78 per cent of Russian Orthodox believers never take communion (in 2007); 34 per cent never pray (2008). In the case of Muslims, the frequency of participation in religious ceremonies appears slightly worse: 12 per cent declare their participation to be once a month, 14 per cent several times a year or less, and 50 per cent do not participate in ceremonies at all.7 The large disproportion between the self-identification and ritual parameters is the most characteristic feature of the religiosity of Russian society, mainly of Orthodox believers. Nikolai Mitrokhin distinguishes two groups among them: the

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minority, not exceeding 10 per cent, of votserkovlennie (воцерковленные) – those who regularly practice – and the decided majority of zakhozhani (захожани), coming to church sporadically, usually for the purpose of “praying” for the fulfilment of a specific request (Mitrokhin defines them as “those who come to light a candle”).8 The low indicators for the ritual parameter have been questioned by scholars from the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Vyacheslav Lokosov and Yulia Sinelina, who in May 2008 estimated the fraction of practising Orthodox believers at 34 per cent. This result – high for Russia – was achieved thanks to the use of a wide definition of “practising” individuals, among whom are counted: votserkovlennie (воцерковленные: 10 per cent) and (semi-) poluvotserkovlennie (полувоцерковленные: 24 per cent), and also a separate group (14 per cent) of Orthodox believers who are “on their way to the church”.9 The Moscow patriarchate reacted enthusiastically to the information above, but most sociologists discredited it, questioning the rationale for creating the category of “semi-practising”.10 If this criticism is accepted, the number of “practising” drops to a level nearly consistent with the earlier established average: 6–8 per cent. The discrepancy between the aspects of self-identification and practice is considered a manifestation of religion’s functioning in Russian society primarily as a determinant of membership in a given community, with only secondary significance as a determinant of personal worldview. The “attribution” of a religious confession to specific nations, deriving from the times of the tsars, has led to the consolidation in society’s consciousness of stereotypes of “traditional” Catholics (Poles and Lithuanians), Protestants (Germans, Finns, Estonians and Latvians), Buddhists (Kalmyks, Buryats, Tuvinians) and Muslims (Tatars, Bashkirs, peoples of the Caucasus, Azeris and nations of central Asia).11 It is worth recalling that in tsarist Russia only the Orthodox Church had the right to conduct missionary activities outside its “traditional ethnic milieu”. Proselytism of other religions, perceived as subversive and anti-state activity, was banned. In the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Russian Empire, the functioning of the Orthodox Church as a state church, and Orthodoxy as a legitimizing source for power and the basis of identity for the dominant nation (eastern Slavs) led to the formation of so-called Russian Orthodoxy,12 which through its tight connection – de facto, identification – with the essence of Russianness, in many respects resembles Jewish or Armenian religion. This phenomenon is still universal in Russian society. For many people in twenty-first century Russia, baptism is an act of identification, and Orthodoxy is an essential component of national identity. Respondents, when asked whether they are “Orthodox”, give their answer for the most part thinking, “Yes, I am Russian”. Mikhail Mchedlov emphasizes the ethnic homogeneity of the two most important religious communities – 88.8 per cent of Orthodox believers are Russians and 1 per cent are ethnicities that have “traditionally” been Islamic. In turn, among Muslims, believers of “traditional” ethnicity make up more than 90 per cent, Russians 2 per cent, and other “non-Islamic” ethnicities 4 per cent.13 Attributing religion to specific ethnicities is well reflected in the statement of the mufti of Tatarstan – Gusman Iskhakov – who asserted that he did not support the

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 63 conversion of ethnic Russians to Islam because of the irrevocable incompatibility between the Russian mentality and the truth of Islam. Moreover, in the opinion of Iskhakov, Russian converts are usually aggressive.14 The primary significance of religion as a factor of identity is confirmed by other aspects of Russian religiosity. Particularly interesting is the ideological parameter in the context of the phenomenon of “Orthodox atheism”. The justifiability of this seemingly absurd phrase, which Alexander Lukashenka used in his first presidential campaign,15 is confirmed by studies, according to which among Russian believers indicating their belonging to a specific religion, there exists a group of “non-believers in God”. In the year 2000 these individuals represented 17 per cent, in 2001 21 per cent,16 and in 2008 16 per cent.17 Looking at this data, it is worth referring to the especially apt diagnosis of Dmitriy Furman concerning the paradox of Russian religiosity – with regard to the number of individuals identifying with a specific religion, Russian society resembles those in the Middle East, with regard to declaration of belief in God, citizens of the Russian Federation are situated lower than the average level of a secular Western European state.18 The functioning of religion mainly as a symbol of mass identification and moral and political unity, as well as an idea welding together the secular community is most visible in the case of Orthodoxy. Nikolai Mitrokhin proposed differentiation between declared Orthodox “believers” and those “belonging to Orthodox culture”, which could include, for example, atheists who celebrate religious holidays.19 The formula “Russian Orthodoxy” encompasses not only Orthodox monarchists or nationalists, but also Communists who consider outstanding service to the Russian state as the most important (and maybe only) criterion of “holiness”. In their convictions, Ivan the Terrible was the first tsar, and thus the first anointed one who revived Rus; Rasputin fulfilled the role of John the Baptist, who prepared Nicholas II – the regent of Christ – to redeem Russia with his own blood; Stalin, in turn, was the “father of nations who gathered up the lands of Rus, drove out foreigners and created a social minimum”.20 Perception of Orthodoxy exclusively in categories of native tradition makes it difficult for many “belonging to the Orthodox culture” to understand why a Christian church cannot grant sainthood to Kosmodemyanskaya,21 an atheist who gave up her life for Communism, or to Morozov,22 a boy who denounced his own father. Attempts to force the canonization of these figures signal the low intellectual parameter of religiosity of Russian believers. In the case of nearly every world religion, it is possible to distinguish the official trend, formed by religious institutions and the clergy, and the so-called popular trend, which is related to notions of faith and rituals widespread among the faithful, but not always in agreement with the dogma in force. In Russian society, the popular trend is very strong, and religious institutions usually place the blame for this state of affairs – not without a reason – on the brutal, Soviet anti-religious policies, which for seven decades interrupted the natural process of “inheritance” of religiosity by subsequent generations, destroyed the system of religious education and eliminated clergy from the life of society. In religious communities which survived the USSR, functions

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previously reserved for priests had been assumed by the faithful – conducting Mass, issuing the sacraments, and so on. The popular trend in Russia has a conservative and syncretic character. The influences of pagan traditions are apparent in it, and great significance is attached to the proper way of conducting ceremonies – what counts is the faithful re-creation of the “old” or “true” rituals. Due to shallow acquaintance with the ritual and its relative abstruseness the prayers which are not completely understood take on the character of spells, and religious symbols become talismans. Applying Durkheim’s perspective brings us to the conclusion that in the Russian Federation in the twenty-first century, religion has in many cases been degraded to the role of “utilitarian magic” which has no ambition to soothe existential dilemmas or tackle transcendental issues, but to multiply happiness, ensure good health and luck, or protect against evil charms.23 The magical nature of Russian religiosity is confirmed by data concerning Russians’ relationship to astrology and the occult. Studies reveal that belief in horoscopes, witches, charms, talismans and spells by citizens of the Russian Federation are matched only by inhabitants of Latin America. What is curious is that the fraction of those interested in astrology among individuals with a higher education and skilled workers is higher in the case of Russian respondents than believers in Latin America. Moreover, in Russia the fascination with the occult is manifested decidedly more often among believers than atheists.24 With the exception of self-identification, the remaining parameters of the religiosity of Russian society are not impressive. The low intellectual, ideological and ritual aspects also influence the low level of activity of the faithful on behalf of their religious community: in 1998 93 per cent of interviewed were not involved in any way in the life of their church during the last 12 months (the community parameter).25 The impression that the religiosity of Russian society is superficial, reflected in the low parameter of consistency, cannot be avoided. For the majority, religion is mainly a question of national identity and does not determine their system of values. In 2007 religion did not have any significance or played only a small role in the lives of 65 per cent of respondents, and only 12 per cent would want to inculcate in their children a belief in God.26 Russians, asked in 2008 about the place of religious institutions in the public sphere, for the most part indicated their educational function (formation of social morality, 46 per cent), social work (helping the poor, 30 per cent), protecting the national culture (29 per cent), functions strictly connected with cult (29 per cent), integration (building a national community, 22 per cent), while in the opinion of 15 per cent, religious institutions should not be active at all in the public sphere.27 The relatively high social acceptance of a role as “educators” for religious institutions does not mean, however, agreement to religious education – in the question of religious lessons, Russians are divided,28 and one fifth consider that in “school there is no place for religion”. Even in the formation of moral attitudes, respondents assess the influence of religious institutions much lower than family (72 per cent) or school (15 per cent).29 Russians do not believe in the effectiveness of the most influential religious institution – the

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 65 Moscow patriarchate. The solutions to difficult problems proposed by the ROC appear to be less convincing than state intervention: for example, 18 per cent believe that introducing the institution of military chaplains will help to eliminate the phenomenon of dedovshchina (hazing) in the Russian army, while more than half of respondents put their stakes in the military police and one fifth in psychologists.30 The majority of Russian citizens dislike the political activity of religious institutions, including the ROC. Sixty-one per cent do not agree that the church should influence decisions made by state organs; 58 per cent consider that decision makers should not be guided by their own religious worldview; 70 per cent are against privileging Orthodox believers; 68 per cent do not want to pay a tax in support of their church,31 and more than 75 per cent would not vote for an “Orthodox party”.32 From the data quoted above, it follows that Russian society is laicized, against clericalization of the public sphere and the dismantling of the secular state. In sum, the religious factor does not have great influence on political preferences of citizens; however, the high indicator of trust that Russians – including nonbelievers – have for the Orthodox Church allows one to make the assumption that the ROC can influence the political scene. Since the collapse of the USSR, in the face of the chaotic Russian transformation, the Moscow patriarchate has remained the leader in the ranking of institutions enjoying the greatest trust of society and was “dethroned” only by Vladimir Putin in 2007, 86 per cent of those questioned declared they trusted the president, while the church came second with 64 per cent.33 In the yearly ranking of the hundred most influential Russian politicians, Patriarch Alexy II was found in the top 15. Patriarch Kirll’s public position is even stronger – in the ranking of most trusted polititians (sic!) of 2011 he held 6th place, ahead of Sergey Lavrov, Sergey Ivanov, Sergey Sobyanin, Yevgeny Primakov or Viktor Zubkov.34 Moreover, in 2007, in the ranking of the most influential political activists, in every subject of the federation, bishops of the ROC took fourth place, right after representatives of the executive and legislative powers and the mayor of the capital city, and before the director of the FSB subdepartment and the Inspector General – such a high position means a huge advance for the Orthodox hierarchs, who occupied eighteenth place in the first studies done in 2003.35 The expectations of a large group of citizens that the head of state must reckon with could testify as to the specific position of the Moscow patriarchate in the public sphere. More than half of the respondents require the president to show particular respect for the ROC in consideration of its exceptional significance for the Russian people, and 45 per cent consider that even if the president is not a religious person, he should foster close relations with the ROC and celebrate church holidays, including Christmas and Easter.36 In other words, the religiosity of the head of state is not significant as long as the president emphasizes his adherane to the Russian national community – that he is “Russian” or “ours”. Thus, the influence of the religious factor on politics is not connected with religiosity, but is a consequence of the role that the religious component plays in the formation of Russian identity. The quality of the relationship between the rulers and religious

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institutions (mainly the ROC) and the nature of the religious policy they carry out influences the political preferences of citizens,37 and one could therefore argue that while a tight alliance with the church does not bring a growth in popularity in politics, it also true that it is not advisable to have a declared adversary in the Moscow patriarchate. After all, the Kremlin, which attempts to use the church and Orthodox tradition to rebuild Russian collective memory (Danièle HervieuLéger’s concept of religion), is not set on antagonizing the church. Russians rely on the might of the state to solve their problems:38 reform of the army, alleviation of social tensions and tackling the problem of low birth rate. They expect religious institutions to tend to the spiritual needs of believers; however, they attribute a special position to the Orthodox Church, which for most citizens is a national symbol. Russian law on relations between church and state is formed under the influence of two postulates, reflecting the scheme above: a secular state that guarantees freedom of conscience and safeguards the national tradition of Russian Orthodoxy.

Interfaith relations in the Russian Federation in light of the legal regulations in force Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic established a new law on religion in October 1990: the Law on Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations was accepted, corresponding to the standards of a democratic state: guaranteeing the neutrality of the state’s worldview, equality of all religious associations39 and freedom of religious activity. Liberal regulations led to a growth in activity of foreign missionaries and the dynamic development of new religious movements, which soon roused the misgivings of “native” religious institutions (above all, the ROC and the muftiates), which began to lobby for a more stringent law and strengthening of their position with respect to “foreign” religions. The struggle to change the law on religion went on for four years in the state Duma. The first initiative appeared in February 1993. Patriarch Alexy II himself tried to persuade the deputies to support it, but the bill was vetoed by the president. Boris Yeltsin did not hesitate to reject the revised document again in August 1993 and promised to do so a third time, when in July 1997 a new initiative in this matter was announced in the Duma. Ultimately, the president did not risk a spectacular defeat in parliament and on 26 July 1997 signed the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.40 The present act, together with constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience, is the foundation of the Russian law on religion. In accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, “the Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one. Religious associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law”.41 The constitutional neutrality of worldview of the Russian state was confirmed by Art. 4 of the 1997 law.42 Moreover, the state guarantees equality of rights and freedoms of person and citizen independently of his or her religious beliefs, and forbids any form of limitation of the rights of citizens due to religious affiliation

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 67 (Art. 19 of the Constitution).43 Freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess any or no religion and the right to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious views, and also the right to receive religious instruction are confirmed in the Constitution (Art. 28) and in the 1997 law (Art. 3 and 5). For religious associations44 the legislature establishes two forms: religious groups and religious organizations. In contrast to organizations, groups are not required to register and are not legal entities, which limits their activity.45 Organizations, in turn, are divided into local46 and centralized47 and are required to undergo state registration.48 The Law on Freedom of Conscience also introduces the idea of foreign religious organizations – those organizations that were founded outside Russia’s borders in accordance with the laws of another state. Such an organization can open a representative body on the territory of the Russian Federation without the right to conduct religious activity, and is subject to special registration.49 These norms do not differ from the standards of religious pluralism in a state governed by rule of law: separation of church and state, constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, equality of all religious associations and a registration system. However, some points in the 1997 law have evoked protests – not without reason – both in Russia and abroad. In the preamble to the law, there is a point distinguishing those religions which, according to lawmakers, “are an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia”. Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism50 and Judaism are mentioned directly,51 while Orthodoxy is attributed a special historical role and contribution to the spiritual and cultural development of Russia. This formulation gave rise to the idea of “traditional religions” in Russian law on religion. The next weakening of the principle of equality of all religious associations was the reservation of the right to use the word “Russia” or “Russian” in an association’s official title only for those centralized religious organizations that have had legal structures on the territory of the Russian Federation for at least 50 years.52 Only a few of the religious communities can meet this condition. The establishment of registration norms exclusively for those local religious organizations that could present proof of the existence of their own structures on a given territory for at least 15 years had even more serious consequences.53 The final deadline for registration was 31 December 1999; after that, associations which to that point had not been able to legalize their status were to be eliminated by force of law.54 In the face of dramatic reactions from the majority of religious associations, which in December of 1999 were still unable to meet the legal requirements of registration, and under pressure from protests and the insistence of the “international community”,55 Vladimir Putin extended this deadline to the end of 2000.56 The de facto differentiation of religious associations was intended. The main purpose of the 1997 law was to restrain the influx of foreign missionaries to Russia and to limit the activities of religious associations that maintain intensive contacts with foreign religious communities. Together with the new regulations, there appeared a problem with the interpretation of the concept of “traditional religions”, left undefined by the legislature, which in turn motivated some politicians to take steps with the aim of giving the term “traditional religions” the status of a

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legal category. Some of the hierarchs of the Moscow patriarchate began to appeal to the special role of Orthodoxy, indicated in the law, as an argument for introducing a mandatory school subject – “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” (Osnovy pravoslavnoy kultury / Основы православной культуры, ОПК).57 Although many experts stress that the distinction or the de facto privileging of select religious organizations by the secular state is against the Constitution,58 in 2001 the Russian Ministry of Justice prepared two bills, the adoption of which would sanction the special relationship between the state and the ROC. Neither proposal (“The Basis of State–Church Relations in the Russian Federation” and “The Concept of State Policy Regarding Relations with Religious Associations in the Russian Federation”)59 was accepted, however, by the president’s administration. The introduction of a tax for the support to religious institutions also failed.60 A year later, three initiatives were announced concerning the regulation of relations between the state and the “historic religions of Russia”: two were presented by deputy Alexander Chuyev, “On Traditional Religions of the Russian Federation” (February 5) and “On the Social Partnership of the State and Traditional Religious Organizations in the Russian Federation” (March 21), while the third, “On the Social Partnership of the State with Traditional Religions for the Protection of National Spiritual Tradition and the Maintenance of Social Welfare for the Russian Population” (May 14), was promoted in the Duma by Sergey Glazev.61 These bills foresaw the introduction of legal criteria for defining “traditional religions”,62 the establishment of a central organ to coordinate religious policy and the formation of a “social partnership” between the state and the favoured religious institutions that assumes cooperation in the sphere of education and the media, strengthening of national security, law and foreign policy. There were also proposals for granting special status to the Orthodox Church as the church of the majority of citizens, and for signing of a “concordat” (agreement on bilateral cooperation) between the state and the “traditional religions”.63 Even before his election as patriarch of the ROC, Kirill Gundyayev argued that the status of the four “traditional religions” should be modelled after the religious legislation in Greece or Georgia, guaranteeing each of these denominations special status either in the Constitution or else in a separate agreement.64 The second issue after traditional religions which is central to the debate on Russian law on religion is the problem of the state’s “spiritual security”65 (dukhovnaya bezopasnost / духовная безопасность), connected with the fight against religious extremism. On 27 July 2002 a Law on Counteracting Extremist Activity was passed increasing the rights of the authorities with respect to religious institutions, such as introducing the possibility of the prosecutor suspending an organization’s activities until a court decision is reached.66 A year earlier, in the Law on Political Parties (11 July 2001), it was forbidden to establish a party based on a certain profession, race, ethnicity or religious affiliation. Also significant are regulations in force on the territories of particular federal subjects – often going further than the federal law, for example, in Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino–Balkaria, where “wahhabist activity” was explicitly outlawed.67 In 2004, in turn, the authorities of

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 69 the Republic of Adygea tried to introduce a ban on propagating religious content through literature and audio-video materials in pre-schools and schools and on visiting homes in connection with religious activity.68 Within the context of counteracting extremism, attempts were undertaken to legally limit the activity of religious sects and proselytism by foreigners. In 2006 the Ministry of Justice produced an initiative, “The Struggle with Unlawful Missionary Activity”, proposing, among other things, the criminalization of acts which were earlier only a basis for eliminating religious organizations, widening the definition of missionary activity and introducing special visas for missionaries.69 A similar idea was announced by Dmitry Medvedev, suggesting that a special mode of naturalizing foreign missionaries would be worked out, so that most of them would have Russian citizenship and be subject to Russian law.70 In 2008 the Duma discussed the two further bills, foreseeing more severe penalties for extremist activity and striking directly at religious institutions, such as giving local authorities the powers to eliminate organizations without a court order after issuing a second official warning.71 The bill proposals foresaw more severe penalties for organizing extremist groups – up to three years imprisonment – and the obligation of state registration for groups numbering more that ten people.72 Another noteworthy initiative in 2008 was the bill proposed by Alexander Chuyev, a Duma member, which would give an act of violence committed against a clergyman the status of an attack on a civil servant; however, despite the support of Communists and nationalists, the parliamentary majority rejected this initiative, as well as the one proposed by a member of the Federation Council, Issa Kostoeva73 concerning the restoration of the Julian calendar (used by the ROC) in Russia. On the day of voting (11 April 2008) the only the person who voted in favour of the bill was the individual who sponsored it, while 446 deputies refrained.74 Russian law on religion evolved from granting religious associations equal status and full freedom of action to the gradual introduction of restrictions and differentiation of the state’s relations with particular religious institutions. The formation in Russia of a “model of cooperation”75 between the state and religious associations is encouraged by the role of state organs in forming relations with confessional organizations. Among the most important of these are the Council on Cooperation with Religious Associations with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation (established in 1995), led by the chair of the presidential administration;76 the State Duma Committee on Social Organizations and Religious Associations; the Commission on Religious Associations of the Government of the Russian Federation; the Federation Council Commission on National Policy and Relations between the State and Religious Associations; the Department on Rights of Freedom of Conscience with the Office of Ombudsman of the Russian Federation; and the less well-known Social Council77 of the Federal Registration Service.78 Analysis of law on religion shows the de facto privileging of “traditional religions”. Despite the constitutional guarantees of equality of all religious communities, their positions in the Russian religious system significantly differ.

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Status of the most important religious institutions in the Russian Federation The status of religious institutions in Russia is determined mainly by the number of members, their infrastructure, property and relations with the authorities and other religious confessions. In January 2007 there were nearly 23,00079 registered religious organizations of 59 confessions and denominations in the Russian Federation, more than half of which are parishes of the ROC.80 According to information from 2007,81 around 100 million citizens of the Russian Federation consider themselves Orthodox, and the number of Muslims fluctuates between 14 and 23 million; taking into account present demographic trends, this proportion will change in favour of Islamic believers, who by 2015 should be the largest group in the Russian army and by 2020 make up one fifth of the entire population.82 Currently there are more than 2 million Protestants living in Russia, almost 2 million Buddhists, around 600,000 Jews and the same number of Catholics. The most developed infrastructure belongs to the ROC, which has 196 archbishoprics, 156 bishoprics, 29,141 parishes, 769 monasteries and 30,544 chapels83 (chasovni) in the territory of the Russian state. The structures of the remaining Orthodox churches are almost negligible, representing around 1 per cent of the institutions of the ROC: more than 200 parishes belong to the Old Believers, including 146 of the Russian Orthodox Old-Rite Church (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Staroobryadcheskaya Tserkov / Русская Православная Старообрядческая Церковь),84 74 of the Old Orthodox Church (Drevlepravoslavnaya Tserkov / Древлеправославная Церковь) and 42 of the Pomorian Orthodox Church (Pomorskaya Tserkov / Поморская Церковь).85 Moreover, 41 parishes are subject to the ROC Outside Russia, 36 to the Russian Autonomous Orthodox Church (Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Avtonomnaya Tserkov / Русская Православная Автономная Церковь), 19 to the True Orthodox Church (Istinno-Pravoslavnaya Tserkov / Истинно-Православная Церковь), 14 to the Free Russian Orthodox Church (Rossiyskaya Pravoslavnaya Svobodnaya Tserkov / Российская Православная Свободная Церковь), 8 to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Ukrainskaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov / Украинская Православная Церковь) and 26 to the Orthodox Church of the Holy Mother Derzhavnaya (Pravoslavnaya Tserkov Bozhiey Materi Derzhavnaya / Православная Церковь Божией Матери Державная).86 In terms of the development of infrastructure, neither the Catholic Church (with 235 registered parishes87), nor the Greek Catholic Church (5), nor the Armenian (57) can match the ROC. However, Protestant Churches occupy second place after the ROC in terms of registered organizations (4,708), thus surpassing Islamic institutions. Among the Protestant communities in Russia, one can distinguish autochthonous trends (e.g. the Molokans, Dukhobors, or the Etika Povedenia Movement that arose in the early 1990s (important, not 1980s!) led by Sergey Ustyuzhanin”88), early Protestantism (e.g. Lutherans, Anglicans and Calvinists) as well as neo-Protestantism/late Protestantism (e.g. Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Adventists, Baptists, Methodists, Mormons, the Salvation Army, Jehovah’s Witnesses). The number of believers, particularly in

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 71 neo-Protestant churches, is growing in Russia each year – these communities are developing so dynamically that in Siberia or the Far East they are beginning to equal “traditional religions” in number.89 Considering their lack of a uniform, centralized structure, it is difficult to determine precisely the number of Protestant institutions, especially since more and more of them stop trying to register for fear of the trouble that local governments might give them. There exists, however, the Consultation Council of Representatives of Protestant Churches in Russia, created by the four strongest organizations – the Union of Evangelical ChristiansBaptists of Russia (over 100,000 members, 922 communities), the Russian Union of Christians of the Evangelical Pentecostal Faith (over 300,000 members, 1,398 communities), the Russian Union of Christians of the Evangelical Faith (1200 communities)90 and the Church of Seventh Day Adventists (620 communities). It is estimated that the churches united in the Consultation Council bring together 85 per cent of all Russian Protestants. In discussing Protestant communities in Russia, it is worth drawing attention to the Lutheran Church – it has had the longest presence on Russian land and had been perceived until the 1990s as the church of an ethnic minority, mainly of Germans and Finns. In 1992 its headquarters were moved from Riga to St Petersburg, and two years later its name was changed from the German Evangelical Lutheran Church to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Most of the clergy are Germans, who see as their primary aim not so much the spread of faith among all citizens of the Russian Federation, as religious revival among Russian Germans. Over the years, pastors have received financial support from the German government, but despite this their efforts have not brought the expected results. The problems with the idea of rebuilding the Lutheran Church in Russia as the church of the German minority became apparent after four fifths of believers emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany after simplification of the visa procedures.91 In 2007, in the Russian Federation, there were 202 registered Lutheran communities; apart from the German Lutheran Evangelical Church, there are three other significant institutions of Lutheran denomination: the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia, founded in 2006 and led by Vladimir Pudov (a schismatic from the Evangelical Church in Germany);92 the Church of Ingria, owing its revival to the involvement of Pastor Arvo Survo;93 and the Biblical Lutheran Church founded in Novosibirsk by Russian Vsevolod Lytkin.94 Observing the Lutheran institutions in the Russian Federation, one may notice a rivalry between the German and American clergy (the Lutheran Church of Missouri). This rivalry intensified a previous division resulting from the presence of two traditions – the German and the Scandinavian (Church of Ingria). Lutheran Churches are gradually losing the character of national institutions of German and Finnish minorities. The generations born in the USSR for the most part do not know the language of their parents, which has necessitated replacing German with Russian in the liturgy, and this in turn helped draw Russians into the church. The Lutheran community is being Russified and taking on its own characteristics; a Russian Lutheran Church is being formed, conservative, opposed to female clergy and liberal treatment of homosexuality,95

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and claiming inspiration from Orthodox liturgy and strong connections with Russian tradition. In second place with regard to the number of believers, Islam is in third place with regard to the number of legalized organizations – the total of 3,600 Muslim communities make up 17 per cent of all registered communities. As in the case of Protestantism, Russian Islam does not have a centralized structure. The Spiritual Board of Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia (Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Evropeyskoy Chasti Rossii i Sibiri/Духовное управление мусульман Европейской части России и Сибири, ДУМЕС), having maintained a monopoly in the USSR, was undermined by the muftiates that arose in the beginning of the 1990s in particular republics (Bashkortostan, Tatarstan) and large cities (Moscow, Saratov, Omsk and Penza, among others). In 1998 independent muftiates ceased their destructive rivalry and established a division of their spheres of influence, reflected in the formation of two larger structures – the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Inner Russia (Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Evropeyskoy Chasti Rossii/Духовное управление мусульман Европейской части России, ДУМЕР, with mufti Rawil Gaynetdin as chairman) and the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Asiatic Russia (Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Aziatskoy Chasti Rossii/Духовное управление мусульман Азиатской части России, ДУМЧАР, with mufti Nafigulla Ashirov as chairman, and headquarters in Tobolsk).96 Several institutions presently claim the title of representative of all Russian Muslims, but their influence is limited on a nationwide scale by regional institutions that function on the territories of nearly every federal subject. Fifty-nine significant structures are distinguished,97 among which the most important are the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia (Tsentralnoye Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Rossii/Центральное духовное управление мусульман России, ЦДУМР, 900 communities, with Sheik-ul Islam Talgat Tadzhuddin as chairman, and headquarters in Ufa),98 the Council of Muftis of Russia (Soviet Muftiyev Rossii/ Совет муфтиев России, СМР, 700–800 communities, with mufti Rawil Gaynetdin as chairman, and headquarters in Moscow, founded in 1996),99 the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Asiatic Russia (ДУМЧАР), the Coordination Centre of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus (Koordinatsionniy Tsentr Musulman Severnogo Kavkaza/Координационный центр мусульман Северного Кавказа, numbering more than 1000 communities, with mufti Ismail Hadzhi Berdiyev as chairman, and headquarters in Moscow,100 founded in 2001) and the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan (Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Musulman Respubliki Tatarstan/Духовное управление мусульман Республики Татарстан – ДУМРТ, 1000 communities, with mufti Ildus Faizov as chairman and headquarters in Kazan, founded in 1998). According to information from the Ministry of Justice, there are 180 registered Buddhist communities in Russia, concentrated in ten organizations. The visit of the fourteenth Dalai Lama to Elista, the capital of Kalmykia, in 1991 was an event that dynamicized the rebuilding of the sangha. The centres arising in Russia initially attempted to establish relations with monasteries in Tibet and India, and later sought possibilities for closer contact with monks from Japan and South Korea.101

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 73 The Traditional Buddhist Sangha of Russia (Traditsionnaya Budiyskaya Sangkha Rossii / Традиционная Будыйская сангха России – ТБСР), representing the Gelug school, was registered relatively late, in 1999, due to internal rivalry and divisions. This organization, led by the Pandito Hambo Lama, Damba Ayusheyev, represents mainly the Buddhists of Buryatia. Ayusheyev is also the vice-chairman of the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (Азиатская буддийская конференция за мир). The conference is held every four years and serves as a platform for Asian Buddhists with participants from Vietnam, Cambodia, China and Mongolia.102 In Tuva, Buddhists are concentrated around the Kamba Lama, Lopsan Tupten (the headquarters of the office restored in 1997 are located in Kyzyl), while the Union of Buddhists of Kalmykia (Obyednenie Buddistov Kalmykii / Объеднение буддистов Калмыкии, ОБК, registered in 1991, with headquarters in Elista) is led by the Shadzhin Lama, Telo Tulku Rinpoche.103 Moreover, in 1998 in Ulan-Ude, the Spiritual Board of Buddhists, currently the Central Spiritual Board of Buddhists of Russia (Tsentralnoye Dukhovnoye Upravlenie Buddistov Rossii / Центральное духовное управление буддистов России) was registered with Nimazhap Ilyukhimov as the leader, and in 2001 on the initiative of Damba Ayusheyev the All Russian Coordinating Council of Buddhist Organizations (Vserossiyskiy Koordinatsionniy Soviet Buddiyskikh Organizatsiy/Всероссийский координационный совет буддийских организаций) was founded.104 Ayusheyev and Ilyukhimov present two streams of Buddhism in Buryatia. The former is a conservative, member of the old nomenclatura, loyal to the Kremlin, who favours Buddhism as the basis for local nationality; the latter stresses the religious aspect of Buddhistic revival. As Yevgenya Ostrovskaya has noticed, it is “national Buryiat” versus “poli-ethnic Buddhism”.105 Disputes between these two leaders casued a split in the Buryiat community. Important spiritual Buddhistic centres of Buryatia are Ivolginsky and Aginsky Datsans. In the 1990s institutions representing the Kagyu school appeared, such as the Buddhist Centre of the Diamond Way106 founded in 1994, and the “new Buddhism” (e.g. the “Green Tara” community registered in Ulan Ude in 1999)107 or the Aum Shinrikyo “Aleph” (which began its activities in Russia in 1992). Buddhism is counted among the “traditional religions”, but in reality this distinction applies only to the Gelug school. The state supports the Traditional Buddhist Sangha, which counteracts the spread of other schools (Kagyu and Dzogchen) in Russia. Importantly, as in the case of Lutheranism, Buddhism is slowly losing its character as the exclusive religion of three ethnicities (Buryats, Kalmyks and Tuvans), and since the end of the 1990s, ethnic Russians have dominated its adherents. Interestingly, another characteristic feature of the revival was a considerable political activity of lamas after 1989. Among those, who tried their luck in regional elections, were Erdem Tsybikdjapov, Dordjodjap Markhaev or Nimadjar Ilumkhimov.108 Two-hundred and fifty-six Jewish communities109 are subordinated to two central institutions – the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (Federatsia Evreyskikh Obshchin Rossii / Федерация еврейских общин России, ФЕОР, with Rabbi Berel Lazar as chairman) and the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Communities of Russia (Kongress Evreyskikh Religioznikh Organizatsiy i Obshchin Rossii / Конгресс еврейских религиозных организаций и общин

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России, КЕРООР, with Rabbi Adolph Shayevich as chairman).110 Both organisations struggle with each other for the title of representative of all Russian Jews, however in face of the activeness of the Orthodox Church and Islamic communities, initiatives to merge into one central organization have appeared.111 Against such a background, the ROC stands out among religious organizations as the unquestioned leader, followed by the remaining “traditional religions” and the minority religions, among which we can distinguish historical churches (e.g. the Armenian, Catholic, Lutheran and Anglican Churches) and the new religious movements (such as the Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Zen Buddhists and Hare Krishna). A similar division is noticeable when taking into consideration the financial situation of religious institutions. Despite guarantees in the Constitution of the Russian Federation as to the neutrality of the state’s worldview and equality of all religious organizations, the “traditional religions” are in a far better material situation than other communities, largely thanks to the favourable treatment by the authorities, which decided on the return of nationalized properties (including land), grant financial support and tax relief, as well as radio and television concessions.112 For all “traditional religions”, not excluding the ROC, regaining properties confiscated by the Bolsheviks is a priority. President Putin understood this perfectly when he described the seizure of church goods as a “deeply immoral” act113 and assured that the “state will make every effort to return the properties of the ROC and other traditional religions as quickly as possible”.114 The greatest controversy is stirred up by the return of landholdings, because full restitution would mean that the ROC would inevitably become the largest land owner in the Russian Federation. The solution supported by the Moscow patriarchate (creation of a special legal category of “church land”) is far from realization, however the “Land Code” enacted in 2001 enables religious organizations to lease land on favourable terms. Moreover, in October 2007, under the influence of the “church lobby”, a change was made to the code, which extended the period of favourable regulations until 1 October 2010.115 In February 2009 a new “Land Code” bill appeared in the Duma, foreseeing, among other things, the transfer to the ROC of property leased by it to date (in the years 2004–2009, the federal authorities transferred 76 sites to the ROC).116 In fact, the government only takes into consideration the claims of “traditional religions” to confiscated property, and only these denominations can count on financial support from the authorities (on the central and local levels), which assist the churches in their programmes for rebuilding and protecting the national heritage. The biggest beneficiary of subsidies is the Russian Orthodox Church: in 2004 the state earmarked 200 million roubles for the renovation of 50 Orthodox churches, three years later for the same purpose 1½ billion roubles were spent from the national budget (364 sites were restored), and President Medvedev announced that in the years 2008 to 2010 the state would hand over 2 billion roubles a year for the protection of the Orthodox national heritage.117 Local authorities also allot means for religious organizations from their budgets. For example, they co-finance the celebration of religious festivities, and they help renovate old and cooperate in building new places of worship.118 The mayor of Moscow Sergey Sobyanin

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 75 decided to hand over to the ROC 60 lots for new churches in the capital. This decision obviously contrasted with the refusal of a new mosque.119 The ROC is supported also by state enterprises. In the 1990s, with the consent of political decision makers, the ROC became a shareholder in certain companies. Nikolai Mitrokhin indicated that in this period, the ROC controlled 20–40 per cent of stocks of the oil company RAO MES (РАО МЭС),120 which meant that the church received 8 per cent of the company’s profits from the sale of oil. The ROC also generated income from the import of raw materials from Iraq and the harvesting of rare species of fish in the Far East.121 One of the state enterprises supporting the ROC is the Russian railways, the president of which is Vladimir Yakunin – the leader of the Centre for National Glory and the St Andrew Foundation. In 2003 the railway spent US$70,000 on the introduction of “chapel wagons”, used by the ROC in its evangelization activities. Two years later the railway and the Moscow patriarchate signed an agreement on the creation of railway station chasovni (chapels). On this occasion, both institutions issued a statement regarding the forming of an alliance against sects that “recruit Russian citizens travelling by train”.122 In 2006 the railway was involved in a project for rebuilding the Marfo-Mariinsky Shelter of Mercy, established by Princess Elisabeth Romanova in Moscow. Moreover, it became customary for the Russian railways to organize a special fleet each year before Easter to transport the “blessed flame” from Moscow to Jerusalem, accompanied by a representative of the government, usually the Minister of Culture.123 The activity of the Association of Orthodox Patrons, composed of Russian state companies, is noteworthy. In the context of the social responsibility of business, promoted by the Kremlin, the association finances the construction of schools, pre-schools, repair of public buildings and so on. In 2007 a project (supported by the patriarchate) was announced to build as many as 300 churches each year in various cities of Russia.124 In the 1990s the Moscow patriarchate, thanks to the goodwill of those holding power, took advantage of tax relief. It was revealed, for example, that the church imported – for trade purposes – poultry, which the authorities gave the status of humanitarian aid in order to free the merchandise from the customs duty required by law. In 1994 the government Commission on Humanitarian Aid gave the ROC permission for duty-free trade of tobacco as part of the church’s aid to the needy (the so-called “tobacco scandal”). It is estimated that the patriarchate imported around 10,000 tonnes of tobacco without paying tax, which cost the Russian government around US$40 million.125 The new draft of the tax law in 2002 did little to limit the special status of religious organizations: cult objects remain untaxed, and activities connected with cult, considering the very wide and imprecise definition of this notion, allow religious institutions a lot of discretion in their interpretation of the regulations.126 There were also proposals to create special tax relief or even complete exemption from taxation for “traditional religions” and for the introduction of a church tax.127 Of all the “traditional religions”, the ROC is most dynamically developing its own economic activity.128 One of the manifestations of this are the attempts to

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create an “Orthodox Brand” (pravoslavniy brend / православный бренд), such as the socalled pravoslavniye konfeti (Orthodox candies)129 and a group of food products marked with the logo “Orthodox Rus” – 10 per cent of the proceeds from the sale of these products go to the ROC.130 In 2005 the Russian media reported on an agreement reached between the Moscow patriarchate, the church firm Sofrino131 and the Old Bank on the opening of ten small shops on land belonging to the ROC, near churches, where among others “Orthodox” goods would be sold.132 The Russian Orthodox Church is gradually building its media backing. In 2002 the Moscow patriarchate revealed plans to create its own media holding, concentrating on television stations, radio broadcasting and the press. In applying for concessions, the ROC argued that 70 per cent of citizens in the country are Orthodox, and so the church should get 70 per cent of air time.133 In 2005 the Orthodox television channel Soyuz began broadcasting. It was created by the bishopric of Yetakerinburg with support by the local government.134 In the same year, another private television station, Spas (directed by Alexander Batanov), was created. It cannot be ruled out that in the near future a federal Orthodox channel will be created. This was also announced by the new Patriarch Kirill, who enjoys support in this matter from the Federation Council and some deputies of the Duma.135 The ROC publishes several magazines, the most important of which are Zhurnal Moskovskoy Patriarkhii (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), Moskovsky Tserkovny Vestnik (The Moscow Church Messenger), Tserkov i Vremya (The Church and the Times), Pravoslavny Palomnik (The Orthodox Pilgrim), Pravoslavnaya Beseda (The Orthodox Word), Prikhod (The Parish), Rus Derzhavnaya (Imperial Rus) and Radonezh.136 The clear predominance of the ROC over other “traditional religions”, and in turn their predominance over the remaining religions is connected with state policy. The extent to which the authorities favour and support a given institution determines its status. There can be little doubt that, in accordance with the legal formula, those who govern Russia take special notice of the ROC and other “traditional religions”. These institutions are privileged in the public sphere, with the support assuming various forms, depending on the rank of the state structure – the office of the president, particular ministries – with a distinct role for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Duma, local authorities, the security service (Federal Security Service and the public prosecutor), and also other state institutions (e.g. institutions of higher education). The Russian head of state sets the tone for religious policy, so his goodwill towards the “traditional religions” is the most valuable. Boris Yeltsin, who as the first president of the Russian Federation had influence on how this office functions, restored the custom of church inauguration after the swearing in of the head of state: a solemn Mass, during which the patriarch of the ROC blesses the newly elected leader.137 Moreover, during the Yeltsin administration, the patriarch of the church was granted sixth place in the list of state dignitaries, and the church hierarchs began to participate in public celebrations (e.g. the dedication of newly opened buildings, solemn Masses, the blessing of politicians).138 Struggling with economic collapse, social crisis and opposition in parliament, the first president of the Russian Federation, in moments of weakness, appealed to the church: for

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 77 example, during the political crisis in 1993, he agreed to mediation by the patriarch,139 and during the election campaign in 1996, he effectively solicited the support of Alexy II, which he later had to “pay back” with concessions concerning reform of the law on religion (1997). Vladimir Putin – the only politician who Russians trust more than they do the ROC – was in a decidedly more comfortable situation than this predecessor and did not need ostentatious support from outside institutions.140 The public statements of the president concerning religious questions were usually well thoughtout and politically correct – when he emphasized the special role of the Russian church, he also added that Russia is a “multi-ethnic and multi-confessional” state. It is worth pointing out how skilfully Putin forged his image. Raised by non-believing parents, he was an atheist during his many years of KGB service, but – as he indicated – he was christened by his grandmother without his parents’ knowledge. After a visit to Jerusalem, Putin began to wear a cross from the Holy Land. It is also no secret that the Russian president has his own “spiritual guide” in the person of Archmandrite Tikhon Shevkunov from the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow.141 Twice after inauguration to the office of president, Putin took part in a solemn Mass, but, as commentators have noted, in contrast to Yeltsin, he did not publicly accept the patriarch’s blessing, although the “Union of Orthodox Citizens” demanded the presence of Alexy II during the inauguration as “a perennial element of Russian tradition”.142 During the eight years of his tenure as president, Putin carried out a balanced and effective religious policy which allowed him to use the ROC as a special institution of public trust, while at the same time he managed not to antagonize the remaining “traditional religions”. At one of his conferences in September 2003, Putin admitted that “in Russia there are four traditional religions, but the ROC is the most numerous and I should take this into account”.143 In September 2005, during “telemost”,144 the president described the Russian church as the only opposition during the Soviet times. In a speech on 19 May 2007, on the occasion of the restoration of canonical unity of the ROC and the ROC Outside Russia, Putin indicated that the ROC in the USSR had protected the “national culture, language and soul of Russia”.145 He spoke in a similar spirit in January 2008, asserting that the state has a debt of gratitude to the ROC, which for centuries had protected Russian culture and promised to lead to Russia’s moral rebirth. During the festive celebration of the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Russia on 29 June 2008, the Russian prime minister emphasized that Orthodoxy “played a historical role in the formation of the Russian state, culture and identity” and in the tradition of the dialogue between civilizations.146 Putin thanked the ROC for its “enormous contribution to the unification of the russkiy mir147 and for its efforts on behalf of religious peace in Russia”, for it is precisely “the historical tolerance of the ROC towards other religions that allowed Russia to become a multiconfessional superpower”, in which Orthodoxy “indissolubly bound the fates of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian nations”.148 Putin several times presented a “catalogue” of roles the Moscow patriarchate should play in the interest of the Russian state: a social function, an educational

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function, carrying out constructive dialogue with the other “traditional religions” and upholding the ties of the Russian diaspora with the homeland.149 During his two terms in office, Putin met many times with Patriarch Alexy II and other hierarchs and spoke at ceremonial meetings of the Orthodox clergy. The president’s administration gave the church regular financial aid: during the 2004 meeting with members of the Council of Archbishops, he answered complaints of the clergy over the lack of funds for building new parishes abroad: “I am not going to comment on anything now, I’ll only say this: we’ve helped you before, and we’ll help you now”.150 Putin won himself the gratitude and loyalty of the church for his involvement in discussions of the ROC with the Vatican and the process of restoring the canonical unity of the ROC and the ROC Outside Russia. In the years 2002–2003, during official visits to Washington, the president met with hierarchs of the non-canonical structure and invited them to Russia in the name of Alexy II.151 The result of Putin’s diplomatic efforts was the arrival in Moscow, in May 2004, of Metropolitan Lavr, the first dignitary in the history of the ROC Outside Russia to visit the Russian Federation. After this, Putin met with clergymen of the ROC Outside Russia in September 2005.152 When on 17 May 2007 the unity of both churches was restored, the president stated that “renewal of the Church’s unity is the basis for the unity of the entire russkiy mir”.153 One should remember that thanks to the economic boom and his enormous popularity, Putin never became a political hostage to the church’s support. Testimony to this independence of the head of state includes the decision in 2008 to abolish the clergy’s exemption from mandatory military service. This was illreceived by the Moscow patriarchate, which considered it an “offense against the Church”.154 With Dmitry Medvedev’s assumption of the office of the president of the Russian Federation the ROC has kept its privileged position. Both Dmitry Medvedev and his wife, Svetlana,155 emphasize their memberships of the church. After the president’s swearing in on 7 May 2008, Dmitry Medvedev took part in a solemn Mass and received blessing from the patriarch.156 During the inauguration, the new president announced: “the special relationship of trust that binds the state and church will be maintained and deepened for the good of the homeland and the people who live in it”, which was a bit disconcerting for the representatives of the other “traditional religions”.157 This was taken as a promise to strengthen the already privileged position of the ROC, increasing the distance between it and the other three “traditional confessions”.158 The first decisions of Dmitry Medvedev confirmed his goodwill towards the Orthodox Church: for example, the president granted generous subsidies for the reconstruction of the New Jerusalem Monastery,159 supported the idea of granting the graduates of religious seminaries the right to pursue a degree at state institutions of higher education (the state will recognize the seminary diploma)160 and opted for the “Land Code” bill, which foresees the transfer to the ROC of all its property held by the state.161 Considering their lack of a centralized structure, and the rivalry taking place between particular institutions of the same religion, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 79 must face the Kremlin’s “divide and rule” policy on them. Regardless of who is head of the Russian Federation, the mechanism remains the same – the authorities favour the most loyal structure that acts in the interests of the country. An institution that enjoys the goodwill of the power elites must constantly confirm its willingness to cooperate, otherwise it loses the support of the authorities, which then bestow their sympathy upon another organization. The former favourite falls into disfavour, which means a drastic reduction of its influence, the fall of its prestige, cuts in state subsidies, its absence at important festivities and marginalization in the public sphere. Who will be the de facto representative of all Russian Muslims, Buddhists or Jews is decided by the Kremlin, which is why particular structures compete with each other for its favour, trying to prove their own loyalty and undermine the credibility of their competitors. Such a situation only makes it easier for the Kremlin to play on internal animosities, to subordinate and control the organizations of the traditional religions and to create, in the end, a system in which each of them will be represented by one structure that is completely devoted to and dependent on the state. This specificity of the religious policy of the presidential centre is noticeable in the example of Islam. Boris Yeltsin favoured Rawil Gaynetdin and the Council of Muftis of Russia. In face of the rivalry between Gaynetdin and Tadzhuddin, Vladimir Putin put his stakes from the beginning in the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and weakened Rawil Gaynetdin, supported by the mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov.162 After controversial statements of Tadzhuddin in 2003, the president did another about-face, this time strengthening the muftis of the northern Caucasus, led by Ismail Berdiyev. A big success of Vladimir Putin’s religious policy should be recognized in the fact that, despite the privileging of the ROC (the time of his presidency is often described as the “Orthodoxization” of the state) and despite the brutal pacification of Chechnya, he is perceived as a politician who supports inter-confessional dialogue in Russia, and enjoys the respect and recognition of most Russian Muslims. When making an appearance in 2005 in Kazan on the occasion of the city’s 1,000th anniversary, Vladimir Putin received a standing ovation for making part of his speech in the Tatar language. The president acknowledged Kazan as one of the key centres of Eurasian civilization, and emphasized the exceptional role played by the Tatars in creating the Russian ethnos and making Russia a “bridge” between Europe and Asia – a civilization built on a foundation of interconfessional tolerance and harmonious cooperation of the Muslim and Orthodox clergy.163 Opening the proceedings of the Chechen parliament in 2005, Vladimir Putin called Russia “the most dependable defender of Islam”,164 and during a meeting in November 2007 at the Kremlin with Muslim community leaders, the president noted that “Russian Muslims have always made a big contribution to the state’s development into a great power … today they play a very positive role, taking part in the moral education of citizens”.165 Muslims remembered that during Putin’s administration, the Islamic holiday of Kurban-Bayram was celebrated at the Kremlin,166 the Foundation for the Support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education was created (2007),167 and that through the mediation of the government’s Council on Hajj Affairs, Russian Muslims were supported on pilgrimages

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to Mecca.168 Mufti Ismail Berdiyev ensured that Putin enjoyed the highest authority among the Russian Islamic believers, and in the name of the Muslims of the northern Caucasus, he proposed a referendum which would enable Putin to hold the office of president for a third term.169 Although Dmitry Medvedev’s popularity among Russian Muslim does not match his predecessor’s, he, nevertheless, has succeeded in constructing a plausible image of himself in the eyes of the Russian Muslim community. He was the first president in history to visit the Sobornaya mosque in Moscow.170 A positive point was also the reception of Caucasus muftis in his dacha in Sochi where he discussed, among other things, the issues of terrorism, religion in school and the institution of army chaplains.171 Ummah has given a very positive response to his appearance on the conference “Russia and the world of Islam: a partnership in the name of stability”. Another nod to the Russian Muslims was a proposition to found a Muslim TV station and the instruction to the Russian media forbidding the use of the term “Islamic extremism”.172 The current president also gained the sympathy of the Russian Buddhists, when he visited Buryatia – he was the first president of the Russian Federation to have done so. An important and controversial event was also his meeting with the representatives of the sangha in August 2009. The monks wanted to declare the president the reincarnation of the White Tara and perform a ritual bow to the “white tsar” invoking an old tradition dating from the times of Russian Empire.173 On the insistence of the Kremlin the ceremony was ultimately not performed, but this did not, however, prevent critics from circles around the Orthodox Church.174 Among Jewish organizations, Vladimir Putin also favoured one structure. In the conflict between two leaders in 2000, the president supported Rabbi Berel Lazar, who since then has been, in fact, the only representative of Russian Jewish communities and has consistently been invited to the Kremlin and participated in important events. In turn, the position of his competitor, Adolph Shayevich, closely connected with a media oligarch critical of Putin, Vladimir Gusinky,175 has decidedly weakened. Rabbi Berel Lazar actively supported the policy of the presidential administration, for example, he lobbied – through the mediation of Jewish American organizations – for the US Congress to repeal the so-called Jackson– Vanik amendment (1974);176 in 2002 Vladimir Putin officially thanked the leader of the Federation of Jewish Communities of the Commonwealth of Independent States for his intervention.177 The Kremlin’s favour is reflected also in numerous state awards granted to the rabbi (among others, the Order of Friendship and Minin and Pozharsky Order).178 Berel Lazar has also become the Presidential Council for Interaction with Religious Organizations and Unions and has repeatedly declared his support for Putin and his successor – after the 2008 elections, the rabbi affirmed that he believes in Dmitry Medvedev’s administration, which will, “with time, fulfil hopes”.179 The presidents of the Russian Federation, particularly Vladimir Putin, clearly favoured the ROC, but at the same time tried to compensate the other “traditional religions” – at least in the sphere of image and prestige – thus creating a convenient arrangement for both sides: Islamic, Buddhist and Jewish clergy tolerate to

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 81 some extent the special status of the ROC, but the president has to create a credible pretence of treating religions equally: by meeting at the Kremlin with leading clergymen, sponsoring various initiatives, participating in religious festivities and emphasizing the “multi-confessional and multi-ethnic nature of Russia” in his official appearances. Political correctness, which successive presidents try to observe, is decidedly less apparent in the activities of the government. The asymmetry in the privileging of Orthodoxy and the other “traditional religions” is clear on the level of relations of particular ministries with religious organizations. In cooperation with the ministries, the Moscow patriarchate has achieved a high level of institutionalization, made contacts on many levels, established diverse mechanisms (e.g. joint forums, mixed expert commissions, regular meetings of the patriarch with ministers) and joint initiatives (e.g. conferences, publications). Agreements between the church and particular ministries became standard practice – the ROC has signed agreements with, among others, the Ministries of Health, Justice, Education, Defence and Internal Affairs. For example, following an agreement with the Ministry of Justice, the ROC can conduct activities in penitentiaries, open chapels in them, organize “Sunday schools” and teach prisoners “Orthodox culture and religion”.180 An important forum of cooperation between the ROC and the Ministry of Education is the joint Coordination Council,181 which is mainly occupied with the controversial question of introducing the subject “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” into the school curriculum, which, in the opinion of many experts, would be a violation of the principle of a secular state and equality of religious associations. The problem of restoring religious lessons was touched upon by Patriarch Alexy II in January 2002, and the Minister of Education at that time, Vladimir Filippov, was favourably disposed towards the initiative. Towards the end of that same year, the ministry announced that while “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” would not be included in the curriculum on the federal level, the authorities of particular regions could introduce it to their schools as an optional subject.182 Andrei Fursenko, the new Minister of Education (from March 2004), has demonstrated greater restraint than his predecessor regarding the initiatives of the Moscow patriarchate; however he has proposed, as a compromise, the introduction of regular classes dedicated to all world religions.183 The ROC did not depart from its postulates, and in March 2007 accepted a resolution in which it argued that since the preamble of the 1997 law on religion acknowledges the “special role of Orthodoxy”, this should also be reflected in the school curriculum.184 In January 2008 Alexy II announced that “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” would become part of the program of “Spiritual and Moral Education” and would appear in schools as of 1 September 2009.185 In this communication, the patriarch mobilized the elite to action. In February 2008 supporters of “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” turned to the president with a request for that he support the ROC against accusations of clericalizing the state, which in reality “is a vulgar myth, used by belligerent atheists and enemies of Russia”.186 Several months later, in

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June, Putin received an open letter from intellectuals against the manifest violation of the principle of a secular state.187 The authorities of republics in which non-Orthodox religions dominate tried to introduce their own equivalent of religious lessons. Expert commissions in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, among others, worked on the curriculum and textbooks for “Foundations of Muslim Culture”.188 The federal authorities have also taken certain steps: for example, in August of 2008, in accordance with a decree of the Federal Agency on Educational Affairs, institutions of higher education guaranteed Muslim students places in departments of Arabic and Islamic studies, paid for by the state budget.189 Trying to match the competition from Arabic institutions of higher education the government financially supports domestic Muslim colleges (in 2007, 400 million roubles were allotted for this purpose).190 Similar initiatives do not change the fact, however, that for the Ministry of Education, the most important partner among the religious institutions is the ROC.191 After years of discussion it seems that an agreement on religious classes at school has been reached in Russia. In 2009 president Medvedev accepted the inclusion of classes on history and culture of “traditional religions” in the teaching programme of schools. Supposedly, three modules of classes, “Foundations of Religious Culture”, “Foundations of History and Culture of World Religions” and “Foundations of Secular Ethics”, will be introduced to all schools in Russia in 2012.192 The Moscow patriarchate is also an ally of the Ministry of Defence in the formation of patriotic attitudes. Love of homeland, associated with faithfulness to tradition, leads to the conviction that Russian patriotism is inseparable from Orthodoxy.193 In the case of the army this means the restoration of patron saints, an “Orthodox” soldier’s oath, the custom of solemnly blessing new recruits and the introduction of the institution of military chaplains. The ROC and the ministry created an institutional basis for cooperation. In 1995 a Department on Cooperation with the Army of the Russian Federation was founded within the ROC. This led to the signing of an agreement on bilateral cooperation with the ministry (1997), the Council of Atamans of the Cossack Forces, and also with the ministry of Belarus (2006). Tightening of the ROC’s contacts with the Ministry of Defence and the army is furthered by regular meetings and joint conferences (e.g. “Homeland, Army, Church”). The most measurable proof of the special position of the Moscow patriarchate in Russian armed forces is the expression of the army’s attachment to the state through the manifestation of its attachment to Orthodoxy. In army barracks, icons of St Vladimir the Baptist (the patron of security forces) and St Andrew (the patron of the navy) are displayed, bishops bless units and military equipment,194 and recruits can take an oath on the cross and the Gospels.195 A further example of this cooperation was the 2003 celebration of the centennial of Serafim Sarovsky’s canonization; the Ministry of Defence and the army were involved in organizing the event and a church–state committee was created for this purpose. During the main ceremony, at the altar with relics of the saint, the president of the Russian Federation prayed together with the defence minister and the commander-in-chief of the army, and in that same year, navy

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 83 units were visited by emissaries of the ROC with relics of St Andrew.196 Reproaches about the Orthodoxization of the army were refuted by the ministry, which explained that a partnership with the Moscow patriarchate was an essential premise for raising the army’s morale and fighting signs of pathology – particularly dedovshchina. According to official information quoted by the Ministry of Defence, of soldiers in the Russian army, 46 per cent are Orthodox, while those belonging to other confessions make up a mere 5 per cent. One out of three soldiers is a believer, and of these, 76 per cent are Orthodox, 9 per cent are Muslim, 3 per cent are Buddhists, and 12 per cent belong to other religions.197 Such a large disproportion in favour of the ROC justifies, in the ministry’s opinion, the issuing of the joint bulletin of the army and patriarchate, Pobeda, Pobedivshaya Mir (Победа, победившая мир), published since 2002, currently with a circulation of 5,000 (as a supplement to the main newspaper of the armed forces of the Russian Federation – Krasnaya Zvezda).198 The next important project of the church and ministry was the creation of an institution of military chaplains.199 When the ROC proposed the restoration of chaplains in the army in 2005,200 other religions – including Muslims, Jews and Protestants – also expressed their interest in this initiative. However, it soon became clear that the military intended to cooperate in this matter mainly with the Orthodox clergy. In order to mitigate the disappointment of the “traditional religions”, their representatives were invited in 2006 to take part for the first time in military manoeuvres.201 In the same year, the Council of Muftis supported the introduction of army chaplains, but protested against the draft for a bill “on military clergymen”, which strengthened the position of the ROC.202 In 2007 the military permitted a rabbi with the rank of colonel, Aaron Gurvich, to create a military rabbinate, within the framework of which the clergyman could freely visit units and meet with Jewish believers.203 Although the law on military chaplains was not enacted, the ROC actually dominates in the army thanks to the goodwill of the ministry, which tolerates the fait accompli of the church. In 2008 around 2,000 volunteer Orthodox clergymen served in the military, of whom 950 were given staff positions. Representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the army assert that they cooperate in same way with Muslim and Jewish clergy. The army has concluded agreements on cooperation with all “traditional religions”,204 but in reality Muslim soldiers have a chance of contact with their clergymen only in republics dominated by Islamic believers,205 while the Orthodox Church functions as the de facto “church of the Russian armed forces”. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also gives special status to relations with the Moscow patriarchate. The sides have established, for example, the Council on Cooperation of the ROC and Federal Protective Service (FPS). Thanks to this, Orthodox chapels have been built in the headquarters of FPS organs (in 2007 alone, eight were erected), and in the FPS Academy in Orel, a Department of Orthodox Theology was created.206 The Federal Security Service (FSB), conducts characteristic religious policy, intervening directly in the activity of particular religious communities: for example, before the election of the new leader of the Old Believers Church (winter of 2004), functionaries of the FSB met with influential

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members of the sobor, asking which candidate they preferred and suggesting which would best meet the expectations of the state authorities.207 Pressure from the FSB among traditional religions is felt the strongest by the Muslim community, which is heavily infiltrated because of the threat of Islamic extremism.208 It is worth noting that the security service does not treat the muftis equally, for example Talgat Tadzhuddin and Rawil Gaynetdin have good relations with the FSB, in contrast to Nafigulla Ashirov, who suggested that the FSB could have inspired the attempted uprising in Dagestan in 1998.209 The state prosecutor also demonstrated special treatment of “traditional religions”. In 2006 the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Ustinov, announced that he would cooperate only with “traditional religions”,210 among which exceptional status is reserved for the ROC. It often happens that the prosecutor does not react to cases of violation of the law by Orthodox clergy,211 and charges against the church are often dismissed. Among all the ministries, the Foreign Affairs Ministry is most dynamically developing its cooperation with the Moscow patriarchate, although the sides have not yet signed a standard framework agreement. A break-through moment was the official visit of Patriarch Alexy II to the ministry in 2003. After this meeting, an expert working group of the ROC and Foreign Affairs Ministry was established, which holds regular sessions. The group is the initiator of joint ventures, organizes conferences, issues publications and so on. The close cooperation between the Moscow patriarch and the Foreign Affairs Ministry is favoured by the head of the ministry. Sergey Lavrov is a declared supporter of renewing the historical ties between the ROC and diplomacy and participation of the church in Russian foreign policy.212 In his official appearances, the minister emphasizes the necessity of close cooperation of his ministry with the church.213 At a meeting with the patriarch in 2007, the minister stated that the Foreign Affairs Ministry and ROC were allies with common goals. He also assured that the ministry supported the missionary activity of the ROC and all of its efforts on behalf of world peace.214 The Foreign Affairs Ministry threw its support behind the ROC in conflicts with the Vatican and the patriarchate of Constantinople. The Foreign Affairs Ministry often uses the visa regulations as a means of pressure, denying foreign clergy who displease the Moscow patriarchate entry into Russian territory.215 Not only Catholics and Protestants complain of such impediments,216 but also Buddhists from outsider the official sangha (e.g. those from Green Tara).217 Great controversy among Russian Buddhists was caused by the decision of the federal authorities in 2004 to deny a visa to the fourteenth Dalai Lama, who was to be an honorary guest of the Religious Forum in Elista, Kalmykia.218 Representatives of the elite from the three Buddhist republics tried to intervene through Putin. Buddhist senators sent an open letter to the head of state, after which a campaign of protest letters to the president was carried out in the three republics219. It should be noted, however, that in this case, the reason for denying the visa was the desire to maintain good relations with China, not other motives of religious policy. An offshoot of relations between the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the ROC is the patriarchate’s cooperation with the forge of future diplomatic cadres – the MGIMO. Informal cooperation with the university began already in 1989, and

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 85 on 30 March 2005 the sides signed an agreement which created the framework for multi-level cooperation. Among other things, on the basis of this agreement, students and doctoral candidates of MGIMO can take part in internships in the ROC’s Department of External Contacts, and church diplomats are accepted to MGIMO for training. Moreover, regular meetings are held by representatives of both institutions, and debates, round-table sessions and joint conferences are organized. In 1997 MGIMO established a research centre the Church and International Relations, which is also gaining significance.220 The Moscow patriarchate tries to use the experience it has gained from its cooperation with MGIMO in contacts with other universities and academic centres: since 2000, under the patronage of the church, experts in religious matters have been working on a multi-volume Orthodox Encyclopaedia.221 The ROC is also introducing a project of constructing chapels dedicated to St Tatiana – the patron saint of students – on campuses of Russian universities.222 A differentiated attitude towards religious organizations is noticeable also in the activities of the State Duma. Most deputies are prepared to support legislative bills that guarantee the privileged status of “traditional religions”. In spring 2003, on the initiative of parliament member Gennady Raikov (Narodnaya Partia), an interparty, socio-political group for the “support of traditional spiritual-moral values”, composed of 45 deputies and leaders of traditional religions formed in the Russian parliament.223 The group is only one of the manifestations of the informal “church lobby”224 functioning in the Duma, which is supported by various political options. The “faces” of political Orthodoxy225 are Sergey Glazev, Alexander Chuyev, Valery Galchenko, Dmitry Rogozin, Nikolai Leonov, Konstantin Zatulin, Alexander Dugin, some of the party comrades of Gennady Zyuganov226 and the nationalist group of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. It is due to the activity of the “church lobby” that the Duma discusses bills such as the restoration of the Julian calendar, return of land assets to the ROC, establishment of new state Orthodox holidays and the suspension of visa-granting to foreign clergymen. The application of double standards to religious organizations is most visible in the activity of local authorities, who decide whether or not to grant a given community a place for their worship needs, whether to extend or revoke lease agreements, introduce religious lessons to local schools, finance religious holidays and so on. None of the federal subjects questions the special status of the ROC on its territory. Local government authorities treat the ROC as a sort of representation of the central authorities. Orthodox clergy belongs to the local elite, and their opinion is taken into consideration when important decisions are made because strained relations with the patriarchate are looked upon unfavourably by the Kremlin. The fact is, all religions besides the ROC complain of impediments to carrying out religious service. Most often, the problem is lack of approval from local authorities for building non-Orthodox churches. Old Believers, Muslims and Buddhists – not to mention Catholics and Protestants – have repeatedly reported that the voice of the local Orthodox priest was the deciding factor for the authorities. Local government officials, in refusing permission, have often used the

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argument that a non-Orthodox church would disrupt the “harmony of the traditional architecture of Russian cities” or simply that it cannot be located near an Orthodox church. It is worth noting that both examples are reminiscent of administrative practices from the time of the Russian Empire. The ROC has a privileged position on the territory of the entire federation, even where Orthodox believers are a minority. The church takes advantage to the fullest extent of financial support from local governments (the most well-known example is the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, supervised personally by the mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov),227 it can count on political support (e.g. in March 2008 the legislative body of St Petersburg appealed to Putin to restore the postponement of military service for clergymen)228 and is an institution influencing the local elite (e.g. in the Sverdlovsk Oblast, in the town of Irbit, doctors agree to perform a legal abortion only after the woman’s mandatory consultation with an Orthodox clergyman, even though this practice is not in accordance with the law).229 In a survey by Levada Centre from 2011, respondents estimated the influence of the ROC in public sphere stronger than the one of the State Duma, intellectuals, political parties, unions or the police.230 Two other traditional religions – Islam and Buddhism – use the goodwill of local government authorities only to a limited extent and only in those federal subjects where these populations – Muslim and Buddhist, respectively – dominate. This is largely because, in the conviction of the local elite, support of their “own” religions is equivalent to building identity, developing native culture and strengthening the sense of community. An example of this could be the policy of the former president of Tatarstan – Mintimer Shaimiev – who recognized the creation of a local muftiate, independent of other religious institutions, as one of the priorities for the republic’s development strategy. The authorities of the republic inspired the establishment in 1998 of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan, led by Gusman Iskhakov, who proved his loyalty to the local elite. The local leaders than protected the institution’s dominant position and helped eliminate its potential competitors. For example, Farid Salman tried to register in Tatarstan a branch of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, but was denied. Salman appealed against the decision before the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, which recognized the unconstitutionality of the decision. However, even after the court’s verdict, the authorities of Tatarstan were not forced to register the competing organization, and the officials even punished Farid Salman for his intractability, depriving his community of its mosque.231 In face of the intentions to introduce “Foundations of Orthodox Culture”, Tatarstan authorities announced the teaching of “Foundations of Muslim Culture” in local schools.232 In March 2006, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan, started preparing the necessary textbook.233 However, in May 2008 President Mintimer Shaimiev announced that the republic’s authorities would not introduce lessons on “spiritual–moral education” to federal schools.234 The Buddhist equivalent of Mintimer Shaimiev was the first president of Kalmykia (1993–2010), Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, who likes to call himself “the first Buddhist president of Kalmykia”. He supported the development of the Buddhist

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 87 community (e.g. financing the construction of the Suyakiusan-Suime Temple235), closely cooperated with the Traditional Buddhist Sangha and kept cordial contacts with the Dalai Lama.236 The distinct stratification of the privileging of religions results from the relationship of state organs to concrete religious institutions – the dependency is simple: the lower the level of the authorities, the less decision makers are concerned with political correctness, the more visible the privileging of the ROC becomes, and along with this the line of division in the alleged monolith of “traditional religions” becomes more visible. The four religions favoured by the Russian legislature create their own sort of elite club that under certain circumstances changes into a platform of cooperation against schismatics (those who do not recognize the superiority of the central institutions), proselytism of “foreign faiths”237 and extremism. A key institution for the cooperation of the four religions is the Interreligious Council of Russia, established in 1998 on the initiative of the ROC, and in which representatives of the largest Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist organizations participate.238 Importantly, in many oblasts, local interreligious councils have been established, serving as a forum of cooperation for the clergy of the “traditional religions” with which local governments and elites must reckon.239 Thanks to the Kremlin’s goodwill, the Interreligious Council of Russia soon became the most important forum of cooperation between the four religious communities and state authorities, particularly if one takes into consideration the fact that the presidential state organ of the Russian Federation which represents other religions as well convenes very rarely.240 On 12 March 2009, in Tula, a sitting of the presidium of the state council with the Presidential Council on Cooperation with Religious Associations was held. The proceedings were led by Dmitry Medvedev personally, which the Russian media drew attention to because it was the first time that such a composition of the council had met. During the eight years of Vladimir Putin’s term of office, there was only one such meeting (2004), which was conducted by a representative of the presidential administration. In Tula, Dmitry Medvedev talked only with representatives of “traditional religions”: Mufti Rawil Gaynetdin, Hambo Lama Damba Ayushev, Rabbi Berel Lazar and a delegation of the ROC – Patriarch Kirill, supported by metropolitans Yuvenly and Kliment, Archbishop Alexander Kostromsky, Archbishop Yevgeny and Bishop Teofilakt. Experts agreed that the raising of the council’s status by the president’s attendance was a success of the new patriarch striving for closer cooperation with the Kremlin.241 On 1 March 2011 the Commission of the Presidential Council for Cooperation with Religious Institutions was established.242 The existence of the Interreligious Council does not eliminate the tensions between the particular institutions. The main line of division runs between the ROC and the three other “traditional religions”, which feel threatened by the consolidation of the ROC’s position and the growing – in their opinion – phenomenon of “Orthodoxization” of the public space. Taking into consideration the latest interpretation of “multi-confessional balance” by the ROC, other traditional religions could have reasons for concern. In the lecture given on 28 September 2010,

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hegumen Filip Riabykh argued that the citizens of Russia had the right to be protected from proselytism of “foreign missionaries”. He stated that the ROC acknowledged the fact that Russia was a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country, however, in the ROC’s opinion, “Russian model of interfaith dialogue comes from the principal of ‘good proportions’, which means that the presence in the public sphere of particular ‘traditional religions’ should be proportional to the number of its adherents”.243 This could indicate a new, more decisive approach of the ROC towards other “traditional religions”. Muslims, Buddhists and Jews mainly oppose the introduction of “Foundations of Orthodox Culture”: protests were raised by the Council of Muftis244 and the Traditional Sangha,245as well as “non-traditional” Protestant organizations.246 In Moscow, in October 2008, demonstrations of the Islamic group Vatan were held,247 and a year earlier Muslim communities organized under the slogan “clericalization is a threat to national security”.248 All of the religions also reacted critically to the legislation bill On Military Clergymen, supported by the ROC.249 Muslims, Buddhists and Jews are more and more offended by the identification of state symbols with Orthodoxy in a country that lays claim to the title of the unique multi-confessional and multinational civilization of Eurasia. Increasingly, not only clergy of other religions, but also the citizens themselves demand the removal of crosses from public places and the abandonment of the Orthodox tone of state celebrations. The boldest in criticizing “Orthodoxization” are the Muslims whose ambition is to be an equal-ranking partner of the ROC – all the more so, considering that the demographic factor works in their favour. Good relations between Orthodoxy and Islam are essential for the domestic security and stability of Russia, which is why the state sponsors “interreligious dialogue” and promotes religious organizations that are “the most inclined to compromise”. This obviously weakens the position of Muslim institutions, which must prove their loyalty: for example, by maintaining good relations with the ROC.250 Rivalry between particular muftiates impedes their cooperation – no Muslim institution can be sure that if it speaks out against the ROC, its competition will not take advantage of this to gain the Kremlin’s favour. Muslim institutions of the Russian Federation try to keep up with the activity of the ROC: for example, in 2006 an organization analogous to the church Commission on the Dialogue of Islam with Christianity was established at the Council of Muftis in Moscow.251 On the occasion of creating this commission, representatives of the Council of Muftis announced the undertaking of talks with their “Jewish brothers”, for although in Russia there is no tradition of Jewish– Muslim conflict, echoes of the conflict in the Middle East could be heard at times. For example, in March 2008 the Federation of Jewish Organizations of Russia announced a temporary suspension of relations with the Council of Muftis of Russia due to the anti-Semitic statements of Mufti Nifigulla Ashirov, who compared Zionism to Hitlerism. The Orthodox Church got involved in the conflict, offering its services as a mediator and persuading them to instigate a three-way dialogue.252 It is worth drawing attention to the many roles of the ROC – mediator, initiator

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 89 of social projects, and promoter of interreligious dialogue. The ROC is an institution that the other “traditional religions” are wary of and yet often appeal to its authority in disputes or when they seek support for their own initiatives.253 The ROC has dominated the religious reality of contemporary Russia. Its predominance over other religious institutions follows not only from its having the greatest number of believers and registered institutions, a developed infrastructure and property, but also from the support given to it by the state, which sees in it an important partner in its efforts of renewing Russian society. This, in turn, is connected with the tendency of part of the Russian elite towards “fetishization” of Orthodoxy, manifested in opinions that a return to the “national religion of Russians” is the proverbial cure for all evil: resocialization of prisoners, reducing violence in the army, fighting drug addiction and alcoholism, raising the morale of youth, and so on. Considering the premises of the special status of “traditional religions” in the Russian Federation, it is worth taking a look at the activity of institutions representing the two most numerous religions of Russia – Orthodoxy and Islam.

Activity of the Orthodox church and Islamic institutions in the Russian Federation The break-up of the Soviet Union meant a radical change from the conditions in which religious institutions had functioned in the last decades of the twentieth century. The unexpectedly gained religious freedom was both a chance and a challenge, and forced religious institutions – which had up to that point existed in hiding or on the margins of social life – to define anew the priorities of their activity. In trying to characterize the activity of the ROC and muftiates, one should consider the variation of worldviews of the clergy, present the postulates concerning relations with the world of politics found in documents, and also define the goals of the activity of these institutions in the country and abroad. Within the Russian Orthodox clergy, three “camps” can be distinguished: liberals, conservatives and fundamentalists. Liberals, being in the decided minority, try to modernize the church and want to fight folk Orthodoxy. They attribute priority to the evangelization of Russia, the improvement of Orthodox believers’ understanding of the essence of their professed faith, and the reduction of the role of ritualism and folk practices – in short, the growth of self-awareness of Orthodox believers. According to these liberal voices this could, inter alia, be achieved also by the introduction of the Russian language to the liturgy.254 Moreover, liberals think that the church should be open to ecumenism, particularly in the dialogue with other Christian faiths. Figures that could be seen (in a lesser or greater extent) as the representatives of this “camp” are, among others, Alexander Mien, Georgy Kochetkov and – among the hierarchs – Archbishop Mikhail Mudyugin of Vologda and the present metropolitan of Minsk, Filaret Vakhromeyev. On the other end of the spectrum are the fundamentalists, who perceive globalization as a sign of the Apocalypse. They are ill-disposed towards ecumenism and are against maintaining contacts with the Vatican; they see Russia’s salvation

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in its isolation from the demoralized West and even in the restoration of the monarchy. Within the ranks of the fundamentalists are those who are more moderate (connected with siloviks) and closer to the hierarchs of the Moscow patriarchate, and the irreconcilable ultras, criticizing the current policy of the church. Most of the clergy of the ROC Outside Russia belong to the first circle. Ultra-fundamentalist views are proclaimed by Bishop Diomid (the metropolitan of Chukotka and Anadyr), while the postulates of Metropolitan Ioann Snychev, the metropolitan of St Petersburg and Ladoga, can be classified as somewhere in the middle. Between those two extremes is the numerically stronger centre, occupied by traditionalist–pragmatists who currently hold power in the ROC and include Alexy II and the current patriarch, Kirill. Nikolai Mitrokhin pointed out the division within the episcopate.255 The Russian sociologist singled out mainly the so-called Nikodimians – bishops who climbed to successive levels of the church hierarchy thanks to the goodwill of the metropolitan (at that time) of Leningrad, Nikodim Rotov (1929–78). Among the metropolitan’s trusted circle were Alexy Ridiger,257 Filaret Denysenko,258 Vladimir Kotlyarov,259 Nikolai Kutepov,260 Nikodim Rusnak,261 Augustine Nikitin,262 Filaret Vakhromeyev,263 Jevenaly Poyarkow264 and Kirill.265 Among the “Nikodimians” we can distinguish two branches. The right wing consists of enthusiasts of the closest possible cooperation with the state apparatus. According to them, the ROC should function like a “para-ministry on morality and education”. The bishops from the left branch are closer to the liberals. Nikolai Mitrokhin defines them as “more open and European”, focused on evangelization. Moreover, a further division among the bishops is connected with their cooperation with one of two centres – Moscow (Trinity–St Sergius Lavra) or St Petersburg.266 Alexy Ridiger’s election in 1990 as the fifteenth patriarch of Moscow and All Russia meant the ascendancy of the pragmatists in the Moscow patriarchate. The conservatives concentrated around the new patriarch very soon faced pressure from the fundamentalists. In the first half of the 1990s the position of the radicals clearly strengthened thanks to, among other things, the popularity of Metropolitan Ioann, but after the metropolitan’s death in 1995 and the disclosure of the so-called tobacco scandal, the influence of this group began to decline.267 Moderate fundamentalists regained their influence in the episcopate thanks to the clergy of the ROC Outside Russia, which in May 2007 renewed its canonical union with the ROC. This unusually important event for the Moscow patriarchate (the undoubted success of church diplomacy, winning the ROC the respect of other Orthodox churches) significantly influenced the balance of power at the highest levels of the hierarchy. The price of overcoming the schism of 1917 was compromise and “adjusting” the opinion of the Moscow patriarchate to the more conservative views of the clergy from the other structure. On the episcopate forum, the “Nikodimians” have to reckon, more than they did before, with the moderate fundamentalists – an important sign of this is the anti-ecumenical trend clearly gaining in strength from year to year (many of the clergymen of the ROC Outside Russia consider ecumenism to be heresy), the ever-returning problem of the status of the tsar’s family and the proposal of restoring the Julian calendar.

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 91 In June 2008 Bishop Hilarion suggested that the ROC might resign from the WCC or reduce its activity to the status of observer. In that same year the ROC announced that Orthodox clergy could not pray together with representatives of other religions. An end was put to the discussion on the topic of introducing Russian language to the liturgy.268 In November 2008 the ROC suspended its membership in the Conference of European Churches after the acceptance of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church to the organization, and the rejection of the Estonian Orthodox Church.269 The ROC’s recognition in August 2000 of the status of martyrs for all family members270 of the last tsar, Nicholas II Romanov, was the second condition besides condemnation of “Sergianism”271 for beginning negotiations with the ROC Outside Russia.272 After restoring canonical union, the Moscow patriarchate, under the influence of “foreign” clergy, redoubled its efforts to get the state to complete a moral evaluation of the murder of the Romanovs.273 Ceremonies recalling the Bolsheviks’ crime against the tsar’s family were held in 2008 by the church with unprecedented energy: for example, a pilgrimage was organized – a via dolorosa – from the beachhead at Stanichka (Novorossiysk), through Mamayev Kurgan (Volgograd) to Yekaterinburg,274 recalling places of tragedy for the Russian nation, such as the heroic stand of Soviet forces at Malaya Zemlya, the siege of Stalingrad and the place of execution of the Romanovs. In April of the same year, after a two-year break,275 Duma deputies once again voted (again, only one deputy voted in favour) on the restoration of the Julian calendar in Russia.276 In the summer of 2008 the pragmatists of the Moscow patriarchate and the ultra-fundamentalists found themselves in open conflict, when Bishop Diomid of Chukotka and Anadyr – who ardently opposes globalization and ecumenism – criticized the patriarchate and appealed for cutting off contacts with other religions. After the breakdown of negotiations, the synod dismissed Diomid from the office of bishop. The latter first appealed the above decision in a church court, after which he declared anathema on Alexy II, explaining that the patriarchate in many spheres had had departed from “pure, true Orthodoxy”.277 The Diomid affair not only divided the Orthodox clergy, but also moved the believers. In June demonstrations took place on the street of Moscow, by turns, of supporters and opponents of the former bishop of Chukotka.278 A small group of Diomidists demonstrated before Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour also during the proceedings of the Sobor of Bishops, which chose the head of the ROC on 25 January 2009.279 Metropolitan Kirill (of Smolensk and Kaliningrad)280 became the sixteenth patriarch of the Russian Church. He directed the Department of External Relations since 1989 and from 6 December 2008 performed the function of “guardian of the patriarchal throne” (Alexy II died on 5 December). Before Metropolitan Kirill was elected as the new patriarch, the Sobor of Bishops singled out281 three candidates among the hierarchs who met the criteria:282 besides the metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, there was also the metropolitan of Kaluga and Borovsk–Kliment283 (who had been directing the patriarchal administration since 2004) and the hierarch of Minsk and Slutsk–Filaret.284 The sobor thus chose between Kliment, considered a representative of the conservative-fundamentalist

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fraction, and two “Nikodimians”: Filaret – a modernizer, and Kirill – a traditionalist–pragmatist who supported the church’s close cooperation with the Kremlin in the country and on the international arena. On 27 January 2009 Kirill received 508 of 677 submitted, valid votes, which gave him a particulary strong mandate.285 Treated from the beginning as the likely successor of Alexy II, Kirill made it clear that the role of the church would not be restricted to theological matters, but that it should be the main partner of the state in solving social problems.286 This follows the conception of policy of Alexy II and the maintenance of the strong position of “Nikodimians” in the patriarchate. The domination of pragmatics in the Moscow patriarchate was confirmed by decisions of the new patriarch, announced on 31 March 2009 at the first assembly of the Holy Synod. Kirill began by strengthening his own position and weakening the potential competition and entrusting the most important posts in the synod to his trusted and loyal clergymen. The most serious competitor – Metropolitan Kliment – received a much less significant post as chairman of the Publishing Council: his previous duties as manager of the Moscow metropolis were entrusted to Varsonofy, the Archbishop of Mordovia and Saransk. Moreover, the very influential Department of External Relations was divided, giving rise to the Department of Church–Society Relations, which was taken over by Vsevolod Chaplin. Hilarion (Alfeyev), the Bishop of Vienna and Austria, became the new chairman of church diplomacy, and his deputies –Mitrate Nikolai Balashov (previously the Secretary of the Patriarchate on relations with other Orthodox Churches) and hegumen Filip Riabykh (previously involved with media relations). Newly created bodies included the Department of Information, directed by a secular individual, a professor of MGIMO, Vladimir Legoida, and the Department of Finance/ Economics, entrusted to Archimandrite Tikhon (Zaitsev). Also, a new Commission to prepare the All-Russian Sobor was created (Hieromonk Savva Tutunov became its secretary). After the announcement of changes, the Russian Press reported that Patriarch Kirill was creating his own “vertical of power” (vertical vlasti) within the church, bringing in his loyal clergymen to Moscow, such as Bishop Ignatius Vyazhma, Bishop Sergey Ussuria or the previous manager of the mission in Jerusalem, Archimandrite Tikhon, whose (strategically important) post was filled by another trusted hierarch, Bishop Merkury Ivanov (performing at the same time the function of chairman of the synodal Department of Education and Catechism).287 It was also under Patriarch Kirill that the Higher Church Council, a collective organ of church executives was established (the first meeting was held on 14 April 2011). It includes leaders of 15 organizations from 21 synod offices, Administrative Secretariat, Department for Offices Abroad and Cultural Council. It was described as Kirill’s attempt to shape vertical vlasti, which would strengthen the bureaucracy of the ROC.288 The changes testify to the intentions of the new patriarch, who endeavours to strengthen the position of the ROC within the Russian state, increase its activity, carry out new methods of catechism (e.g. by creating Orthodox computer games), raise the effectiveness of church diplomacy and create his own information policy,

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 93 including the creation of new Orthodox television stations and widening their reach.289 Conservative–pragmatists, from among whom Patriarch Kirill comes, support the rebuilding of the ROC’s position in strict cooperation with the state, and it is they who worked out the documents regulating the functioning of the church, defining the goals of its activities and its relationship to contemporary problems. Among the most important are the Regulations of the Russian Orthodox Church (Ustav Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi/Устав Русской Православной Церкви, 13-16.08.2000),290 The Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (Osnovy sotsialnoy kontseptsii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi/Основы социальной концепции Русской Правосльавной Церкви, 13-16.08.2000),291 The Foundations of the Principles of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Relations with other Religions (Osnovniye Printsipi otnoshenia k inoslaviyu Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi/Основные принципы отношения к инославию Русской Правосльавной Церкви, 13-16.08.2000),292 The Concept of the Missionary Activity of the Russian Orthodox Church (Kontseptsia Missionerskoy Deyatelnosti Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi/Концепция миссионерской деятельности Русской Православной Церкви, 27.03.2007)293 and The Foundations of the Teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights (Osnovy Uchenia Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi o dostoinstve, Svobode i Pravakh Chloveka/Основы учения Русской Православной Церкви о достоинстве, свободе и правах чловека, 26.06.2008).294 Among these documents, The Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church has key significance for defining the church’s place in the public–political sphere.295 In it, the Moscow patriarchate addresses the problem of the relations church–nation, church–state, church–politics, and issues of Christian ethics and the legal order. The Moscow patriarchate recognized the principle of symphony in its traditional form as a historical idea, while at the same time acknowledging the state’s neutral worldview. The patriarchate believes that the church is obliged to subordinate itself to secular authority; this authority, however, cannot assume absolute power nor cross the boundaries indicated by God.296 The ROC maintains that the state and church are institutions belonging to different orders (sacrum–profanum), thus the best solution, according to the council, is mutual respect of each other’s autonomy and non-interference.297 The secular nature of the state should not mean, however, pushing the church to the margins of public life; on the contrary, both institutions should cooperate on various levels for the good of society.298 According to the church, secular law – an essential regulator of any society – should protect the basic values that all citizens share. The goal of legal norms is not to make the state God’s kingdom on earth, but to keep watch over it, so that the state does not become hell.299 However, a law decreed in contradiction to God’s law is void.300 Law should serve people, to realize in them the image of God and in this way help them properly fulfil their duty before God and the church, other people, their families, the state, the nation and other communities.301 The church, in turn, bears the responsibility of protecting the norms of its autonomous canonical law. The Moscow patriarchate confirmed that the Orthodox Church can function within the frame of various legal systems, to which it shall always

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relate with great respect. All Orthodox believers are also called upon to respect the law and observe its regulations.302 In The Social Concept the ROC expressed its position with regard to the value of human labour, private property, the challenges of times of war and peace. It touched on questions connected with administration of criminal justice, public health-care and the education system. It took a stand on the development of science, the dilemmas of bioethics, the threats associated with the degradation of the natural environment, the role of mass communications media, and the challenges of secularization and globalization. This catalogue already proves that The Social Concept is a document of special significance not only for the Russian Church, but also for the entire Universal Orthodox Church, which up to now, despite promises, has not managed to call a sobor of all the canonical churches and their authorities to formulate opinions binding the world Orthodoxy.303 The ROC is against the absolutization of freedom and human rights, a view it expressed in The Foundations of the Teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights. In this document, the sobor recognized, among other things, the need to protect human rights to such a degree that the individual is brought closer to goodness, emphasized the necessity of linking human rights with morality and concrete obligations, and their correlation with the common good of the family, local society, the nation and humanity. Moreover, the declaration indicated values that stand “no lower” than human rights, namely faith, morality, holiness and homeland.304 Some members of the Russian clergy even speak of the need to create an Orthodox democracy, the essence of which – in accordance with the principle of symphony – would depend on the skilful harmonization of the interests of different social groups.305 A specific “religious variation” of the democratic system, suggested by some of the hierarchs, fits well with the Kremlin’s idea of “sovereign democracy”.306 The noticeable similarity of the concepts of the political system advocated by the ROC and the centre of power is a further incidation of the importance of the position religion and the church hold in contemporary Russian politics. Analysis of The Social Concept and other documents confirms that the ROC perceives itself as an institution active in the public sphere, and does not agree that the secularity of the state should mean the marginalization of the church. Alexy II presented the gist of this broad document thus: “In Russia, the Church is separate from the state, but not from the nation”. 307 The patriarch and other hierarchs often stressed that the church did not aspire to the status of a state church and did not want to be a separate player in the political game.308 On 3 April 1990 the synod of the ROC recognized that the church could not support any party or get involved on behalf of any political option.309 Four years later, the Moscow patriarchate forbade Orthodox priests, under threat of expulsion, from participating in political rivalry or running for office in elections.310 In 2011 the ROC still supports the ban on clerics becoming deputies. However, under special circumstances, such as a threat from schismatic or alien religious group which could use its powers against the ROC, priests are allowed to take part in elections. This view was

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 95 presented by Vsevolod Chaplin who claimed that “so far, this kind of case has happened only once – in Ukraine”.311 According to the ROC, it does not want power, but to cooperate with those holding power, who should see in it an institution that is an “inseparable part of its nation”,312 responsible for the moral and spiritual development of Russians. According to the expectations of the Moscow patriarchate, in Russia, which was defined by Kirill as “an Orthodox state with ethnic and religious minorities”,313 the government should establish a “social partnership” with the church. In a message of the Archbishops’ Sobor to Putin, on 6 October 2004,314 the clergy indicated that a “social partnership” presumes close cooperation of the state with the church in such areas as peace initiatives, upbringing in society, revival of national culture, patriotic education of youth, care for orphans and retirees, fight against alcoholism, drug abuse and crime, which is a direct reference to some points of cooperation marked out in The Social Concept.315 On this occasion, members of the sobor also expressed hope that the state would gradually remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to the free activity of the church, and especially that it would hasten the restitution of the ROC’s property. In The Church, State and Society: The Present State and Current Challenges In Relations Between the Church and State and Between Church and Society (26 June 2008),316 the deputy chairman of the Department of External Relations of the ROC, Vsevolod Chaplin, noted significant progress in the process of forming a “social partnership”. He emphasized that the church actively cooperated with state organs at all levels and that in most cases this cooperation was regulated by a bilateral agreement. The state also spares no expense in financial support of the church and acts on behalf of recovery of the ROC’s property, especially beyond Russia’s borders. Vsevolod Chaplin recognized the relationship between the ROC and the authorities of Belarus as a model for a “social partnership”, and took the situation in Ukraine as an anti-model. The clergyman drew attention to the expectations of the Moscow patriarchate connected with President Dmitry Medvedev, who had announced the continuation of the process of harmonization of relations between the Russian state and the church.317 Referring to Peter Beyer, who asserts that in face of the challenges of modernization, churches either undertake an attempt to adapt or negate the changes, it seems – in light of the documents of the ROC – that the Moscow patriarchate is leaning towards the conservative option, postulating changes, but keeping them in the spirit of Russian tradition. Such an approach plays into the Kremlin’s policy of forming national identity by referring to traditions symbolized to a large extent by Orthodoxy. In the public sphere, where the state dominates, it is hard to see how a “partnership” with the state would not be viewed, eventually, as support for the political force that holds power. The church’s activity is thus undergoing gradual politicization and is stepping beyond lobbying on behalf of Orthodox believers. Vladimir Putin’s presidency was of great significance for bringing the ROC closer to the centre of power. The church presented the former president to the faithful as a man of providence, who pulled Russia out of the collapse following perestroika.

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Together with the Kremlin media, the patriarchate skilfully created a particular aura around the president: for example, by holding mass on behalf of the head of state.318 Before each election after the year 2000, the church, although formally neutral, clearly signalled its political preferences, the best example of which was the unconditional and immediate support it showed for the successor indicated by Putin – Dmitry Medvedev. Patriarch Alexy II grasped this succinctly: “if this is a suggestion for president, then it’s surely a balanced and well thought out one, so we support it”.319 Metropolitan Vsevolod Chaplin went even further, recognizing the transfer of power by Putin to Medvedev “as a new, better stage of politics in Russian history and a great accomplishment of Russia”.320 Seeing the positive aspects of cooperation between the state and church; for example, the Orthodox church’s involvement in government campaigns such as reform of retirement scheme or the programme on fighting corruption,321 one cannot help but notice that the price of a “social partnership” is the obligation of the patriarchate to publicly share the views of the Kremlin. The consequences of dissent are evident in the case of a clergyman, Father Sergey, who had called Mikhail Khodorovsky a political prisoner – as a result he received an official reprimand from his superiors and was sent to a provincial parish.322 Observing the sobor’s ban on political activity, the clergy did not inspire the foundation of political parties and did not openly undertake cooperation with any group modelled after Western Christian democratic parties (“Russian Christian Democratic Party”, “Russian Christian Democratic Movement”),323 or with any formation referring not so much to Christian ideals as to samoderzhavie (autocratic), Orthodox tradition (e.g. For Holy Russia of Sergey Popov or Narodnaya Partia of Gennady Raikov). Only the pro-Kremlin Rodina party won the unofficial status of the “party of the patriarchate”;324 that is, the ROC sees it as a group that guards the interests of “traditional religions”, which is guaranteed mainly by the strong position of Deputy Sergey Glazev. Close cooperation with the state is seen by the Moscow patriarchate as a means of realizing the church’s concrete goals. The domestic priority of the ROC is to rebuild its own position, most notably by advocating the idea of “social partnership”. Widening the church’s influence assumes the quickest possible recovery of property, gaining predominance over competing religious institutions and impeding proselytizing activity. Acting jointly with the state, the church has set itself the task of “the spiritual revival of Russia”. In a resolution accepted by the synod on 11 December 2006, conditions of the “revival” were defined:325 it can happen only on the basis of Orthodox culture; a system of protecting the Russian ethnos must be created for this purpose; religious institutions should be founded, which will be responsible for raising youth in the spirit of patriotism and traditional values; the family should be guarded with special care; moreover, the “renewal” demands that the church take up missionary activity over the entire territory of the Russian Federation, and that local languages be used in the evangelization of ethnic minorities. The primary aim is the protection of Russian national identity mainly through the native culture and language – two elements which, in the conviction of the ROC, are strictly connected with Orthodoxy.

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 97 Another domestic priority of the Moscow patriarchate is the overcoming of schisms. The dialogue with the ROC Outside Russia ended in success, sealed with the signing of the Act on Restoration of Canonical Union between the two churches.326 The Moscow patriarchate also undertakes efforts to come closer to the Old Believers.327 On 19 July 1999 a Commission on Coordination of Relations Between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church of Old Believers was established, which tries to initiate joint projects, conferences, publications, and is also involved in giving material aid to needy members of Old Believers’ parishes (the commission met for the first time in December 2008).328 Beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, the Moscow patriarchate concentrates its activity mainly in the area of the former Soviet Union which, with the exception of Armenia and Georgia, is the canonical territory of the Russian church. Moreover, there are six autonomous churches subordinated to the ROC – the Ukrainian, Moldovan, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Japanese and the exarchate of Belarus.329 In the face of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the ROC assumed a position that has not changed to this day: the break-up of the political structure cannot violate the unity of the church, in accordance with the formula “many states, one church”. The most important aim of the ROC is thus the maintenance of the integrity of its own canonical territory, which is threatened particularly by the schismatic Orthodox churches in Estonia, Ukraine and Moldavia. Moreover, the patriarchate wants to rebuild its administration and regain its property located beyond the post-Soviet area (especially in the Middle East and in Western Europe), and also establish new communities (e.g. in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the Republic of South Africa, North Korea, Japan and even in the Arctic). A long-term aim is to achieve the position of leader of the universal church, which is indirectly connected with an increase in activity of church diplomacy (e.g. mediation in conflicts, organization of humanitarian aid), and the cooperation of the patriarchate with international organizations (e.g. with the Council of Europe).330 The patriarchate emphasizes that a condition of achieving the indicated goals is a partnership with the Russian state, but the well-developed structure of the ROC allows it to act effectively on its own as well. Its activity in the country is decided from day to day by the Moscow patriarchate,331 and within it by the Holy Synod – a collective organ, in which six rotating and eight permanent members sit; the permanent members are the patriarch and the seven “key” metropolitans of St Petersburg, Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Kolomensk (Krutitsa and Kolomensk), Kaluga (Kaluga and Borovsk), Moldavia, Ukraine, Belarus and the chairman of the Department of External Relations. Seven departments are subordinate to the Holy Synod: External Relations, the Publishing Council, the Science Committee, Department on Religious Services and Social Activity, Cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Religious Education and Catechism, the Missionary Department, and Youth, as well as two newly created ones – Information and the Department of Finance/Economics. Administration over current matters of the church rests in the hands of a quartet of bishops, called the “Little Synod” – the patriarch and three permanent members of the synod residing in Moscow.332 The activity of particular departments has significance for

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the effectiveness of the ROC in the country, but so does the skilful use of the forum of the Interreligious Council of Russia and such institutions as the Union of Orthodox Citizens (founded in 1995, with Valentin Lebedev as chairman), the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods (1995), the International Fund for Unity of Orthodox Nations (1995) or the World Russian National Sobor. The latter was reactivated by the decision of the Bishops’ Sobor in 1995. From the beginning, the ROC tried to get politicians to participate in these meetings – the National Sobor gradually became an important forum of debate for the church,333 as well as an instrument for influencing policy and an opinion-forming body in which politicians wanted to participate. The ROC’s activity abroad is overseen by the patriarch, performing the function of representative of the church, and the Department of External Relations (the so-called Church Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The ROC is a special institution: it is not only a supra-state church organization, but also a structure which to certain degree represents the Russian state. The ROC is a trans-national subject, with its own network of diplomatic contacts. The church uses instruments that allow it to act effectively on the international arena in its own interest and in that of the Russian state. The ROC has a strong position, the will to act, support of the government and is also seen by the rest of the participants in international relations as an institution that is not only religious, but also political.334 The characterization of the activity of Russian Muslim institutions is made difficult by their number and the internal rivalry which in turn makes it impossible for them to carry out one, coherent line of action. Most Islamic communities can be classified into one of three trends: traditional, liberal (Euro-Islam) and the so-called new Islam. Among the “new Muslims”, Alexander Malashenko distinguishes the “Protestant” attitude (they, among other things, question the division between believers who are “more and less initiated”, criticize the muftiates that are loyal to the state, but rule out violence as a means of realizing their own ideals).335 Both the fundamentalists and the liberals are a minority among Russian Muslims, who treat religion as an element of national identity. In Russia, the “traditional” trend dominates, represented by the muftiates, whom the government considers the only acceptable representation of Muslims in public debate concerning the status of Islam. The muftiates are united by their attempts to win the Kremlin’s support, for the clergy agree that only the goodwill of the authorities can safeguard the Muslims against being pushed into the status of second-class citizens – a “minority religion in an Orthodox country”. Importantly, no great divergence can be noticed in the views of particular muftis. In the 1990s a rivalry played out between the institution continuing the tradition of the Soviet muftiate and the newly founded organizations. These two camps had their own leaders.336 The “old power” was represented by Talgat Tadzhuddin, and the “schismatics” by Rawil Gaynetdin, joined shortly by Nafigulla Ashirov. During a sort of “test of loyalty”, which was the second Chechen war, Tadzhuddin turned out to be more reliable, while Gaynetdin clearly lost his way: at times he supported the decisions of the Russian government and at times he called on the Muslims of Dagestan to fight. The chairman of the Council of Muftis again

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 99 displeased the Kremlin in 2001, when he supported the Tatar group Vatan (which drew the attention of the authorities by protesting against the celebration of the victory on Kulikovo Field as an “offense to the Tatar nation” and by organizing in Moscow in 2002 a manifestation under the slogan “I vote for Shamil Basayev!”) Certain of his position, Talgat Tadzhuddin, following the USA’s attack on Iraq in 2003, called Muslims to a jihad against the USA. Such an attitude and some other awkward statements resulted in the loss of the authorities’ favour. Without a doubt, the balance of power in traditional Islam depends on the support of the Kremlin. Moreover, there is a tendency to make temporary, informal coalitions. Two “camps” can be distinguished: Tadzhuddin is trying to save his position by seeking closer ties to the current favourite of the Kremlin – the leader of the muftis of the northern Caucasus – Ismail Berdiyev. This coalition is concerned about “political correctness”, is engaged in the fight against extremism and strives for good relations with the ROC. The second coalition is created by the Gaynetdin – Ashirov tandem within the framework of the Council of Muftis. They demonstrate a certain degree of tolerance for wahhabism: that is, they allow the existence of wahhabism unconnected with terrorism. Open conflict broke out in 2003 between the Council of Muftis and the Coordination Centre for Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, with the core of the argument being the reproach that Gaynetdin spoke too mildly on the topic of wahhabism. The Council of Muftis demands the protection of Muslims in Russia, by which it understands, for example, the rejection of Orthodox elements in state symbols, and the introduction of elements of sharia to federal law. The anti-Semitic rhetoric of Ashirov is a source of tensions in relations with Jewish organizations. The Council of Muftis also provokes the ROC, declaring, for example, its willingness to convert ethnic Russians to Islam. Within traditional Islam, we can thus distinguish two main coalitions, and three institutions connected with them (the Spiritual Board for Muslims of Russia, the Coordination Centre for Muslims of the Northern Caucasus and the Council of Muftis of Russia) and one outsider (the muftiate of Tatarstan). The great multiplicity of structures, which facilitate manipulation by the Kremlin, became a burden when, in the face of successive terrorist attacks, the government increasingly felt the lack of a central institution able to fulfil the role of an intermediary between the authorities and Muslim citizens. Already in 2001 rumours were rife that Putin would create a higher Islamic organization to be led by the trusted Caucasian Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov. This, however, did not happen, but on 20 May 2004, Berdiyev, Tadzhuddin and Gaynetdin created the Joint Council of Spiritual Boards for Muslims of Russia for counteracting extremism and terrorism. Moreover, in May 2008 one of the muftis from the northern Caucasus – Shafig Pshikhachev – proposed the creation of a council representing all the Muslims of Russia.337 In November 2009 another initiative for forming a central, unified muftiate was rather unexpectedly suggested by Talgat Tadzhuddin, who – as a sign of good will – proposed the function of the future mufti of All Russia to his rival Gaynetdin. Tadzhuddin accompanied his proposal with a letter to president Medvedev, asking him to support the initiative.338 This initiative brought, however, no results.

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To the surprise of many, a new organization was registered in December 2010 with headquarters in Perm. The Russian Association of Islamic Concord (Российская ассоциация исламского согласия, РАИС), led by Mufti Mohamoud Hadji Rahimov, was initiated by muftiates of Perm, Mordovia and Razan. New institution has challenged the status quo of power in Russian ummah. According to Roman Sliantiev, the establishing of the Russian Association of Islamic Concord has just accelerated a crisis in the already considerably weak Council of Muftis of Russia.339 Trying to overcome the crisis of authority, Talgat Tadzhuddin agreed in March 2011 on reviving, under the guidance of the Central Spiritual Board for Muslims of Russia, the muftiate of Moscow and the Central Region led by Mufti Albir Krganov.340 At the same time, his main rival, Rawil Gaynutind, made a bold attempt to get rid of “old Tatarstan guard”; that is, he tried to replace mufti Iskhakov with Ildus Faizova, which eventually happened in January 2011.341 In an attempt to save his prestige, Gaynedtin initiated an all-Islamic meeting “Russia – Our Common Home” on 24 March 2011. The most influential Muslim institutions – the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, the Spiritual Board for Moscow and Central Region, the Russian Association of Islamic Concord, the Coordination Centre of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, muftiates of Tatarstan and Dagestan – all rejected this initiative, thereby questioning Gaynetdin’s mandate. The Moscow meeting, conceived as an alternative to Tadzhuddin’s annual meetings in Bolĝar (Povolzhe) and promoted as “the biggest Russian Islamic event since 1917”, ended in spectacular failure.342 The absence of a central structure for all Russian Muslims has resulted in the lack of documents presenting the joint position of the Russian ummah. Under the influence of the ROC, the Council of Muftis of Russia worked out in 2001 a document modelled on The Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, entitled Basic Guidelines of the Social Program of Russian Muslims (Osnovniye polozhenia sotsialnoy programmy rossiyskikh musulman / Основные положения социальной программы российских мусульман).343 This document included references to the rights of the individual (Islam assumes equality of all people, who by Allah’s will are free and possess rights) and the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights. The requirement of observing “freedom of conscious and religion” and the ban on discrimination on the basis of religion were unequivocally supported. It was emphasized that in Russia – a multi-national country – separation of religion from the state (schools, army, and so on) is a value that should be protected; besides this, in a state arising as a result of a social agreement, observance of the law is a religious obligation that must be fulfilled regardless of the existing system. The document also included a declaration of the loyalty of Islamic believers to the Russian state and Russian law. The obligation to defend the homeland was given the dimension of religious duty and only in this case was declaration of a jihad recognized as justified (according to the document’s authors, in the history of Russia jihads took place twice: in 1812 and 1941–945). “Pseudo-Muslim extremism” and the misuse of religious emblems was decisively condemned (however, the document also stressed that wahhabism is not equivalent to terrorism). In sum, the document states that Russian Islamic

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 101 institutions are obliged to observe the law, be loyal to the authorities, observe the principle of non-involvement in politics, protect morality, strengthen patriotism, mitigate social conflicts, carry out dialogues with other “traditional religions”, cooperate closely with the state in the social sphere, protect family values and introduce a complete ban on stimulants.344 In the document, the Council of Muftis defined the goals of its activity in the country and abroad. For all Islamic structures, domestic matters have priority over foreign ones – each wants to become the leader of the Russian ummah, and then consolidate the position of Muslim citizens in the Russian Federation. The preliminary condition is the development of institutionalized cooperation with the state, modelled on the practices of the church – that is, signing bilateral agreements with state organs. The goal is to establish a “social partnership” with the state, within the framework of which muftiates will be involved with social matters, education, patriotic upbringing of Muslims and limiting the influx of “foreign mullahs” (mullahs coming to Russia from Arab countries, questioning “Russian Islamic tradition”). A “social partnership” is seen not only as a safeguard against discrimination against Islamic believers, but also as an instrument which ensures Muslims equality with Orthodox believers. In recent years, Islamic elites have increasingly often and decisively demanded changes that testify to the fact that they are not merely a minority in Russia. Some of the muftis raise the problem of symbols (the emblem and anthem), which should show the interreligious nature of the Russian state.345 There even appeared an initiative for creating an office of the vice president of the Russian Federation reserved for a representative of the Muslims. Many demand making Muslim holidays into state holidays on the level of the entire federation, mostly with regard to Uraz–Bayram and Kurban–Bayram (for now, this is the case in Dagestan and Ingushetia).346 An example of the challenges that the Russian authorities face could also be the matter of head shawls – in February 2003, representatives of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European part of Russia met in Moscow with the Council of Europe’s commissary on human rights – Álvaro Gil Robles – and asked him for support in the demands of Russian Muslims and respect for their right to have photos with head shawls in their identity documents.347 A month later, a federal court dismissed the Muslims’ complaint, and only in May did the court of cassation overturn the earlier verdict.348 Muslim institutions all the more often realize that their future status in the Russian Federation depends on whether they will be able to impede the “Orthodoxization of the state” and keep pace with the ROC in the public sphere. Presenting themselves as supporters of a secular state and opponents of clericalization, the muftiates gain support in new circles, for example among some of the siloviks349 or in academic centres.350 In domestic activity, Muslim institutions must also face, on one side the phenomenon of Islamophobia, and on the other the growing dissatisfaction of Muslims harassed by the police and the FSB. Trying to influence the policy of the state, which operates with a notion of “Islamic extremism”, representatives of Muslim communities addressed an open letter to Putin on 5 March 2007, in which they protested against the arrest of Imam Aton

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Stepanenko, who had been held for more than a year without a verdict, and was recognized as a “prisoner of conscience, guilty only of receiving ‘non-ethnic Muslims’ in the mosque”.351 On 3 August the muftis also wrote a letter of protest about the numerous impediments from local governments in the construction of mosques.352 Islamic organizations pay decidedly less attention to international activity than the Moscow patriarchate does. One of the reasons for such a state of affairs is the lack of institutions equivalent to the synodal Department of External Relations. But this is gradually changing: for example, within the framework of the Council of Muftis of Russia, a Department of Foreign Relations was established, the work of which is directed by Mufti Rushan–Hazrat–Abbyasov. Muftiates have almost no property and no administrator beyond Russia’s borders, and their activity thus amounts not to recovering a lost position, but rather to building it from its foundations. The Russian muftiates, trying to find their place in the world of Islam, present themselves as representatives of “peaceful Islam”, close to the “Turkish model”. The authors of The Social Program of Russian Muslims recognize contacts with other institutions as the most important goal – notably with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the League of Arab States and with Muslim states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Iran and Egypt. In this way, the muftiates want to become a part of a process of building “strategic partnership” of Russia with these countries. The Russian government assesses similar postulates positively. Similarly to the Moscow patriarchate, Islamic institutions see the key to realizing their goals in close cooperation with the state, although the Muslims are in a much more difficult situation, as their ability to act on the international arena is limited. Their potential as trans-national subjects is limited – in contrast to the ROC, they are rarely treated as an institution representing the power centre. They do not have a specialized diplomacy and no means to carry out such policy. As such, they are not a subject, but an instrument of Russian diplomacy, which has a practice of sending representatives of the muftiates to Muslim countries as part of official delegations. To be able to act, institutions need the support of the authorities, which give this in exchange for loyalty, which is why mullahs legitimize the Kremlin’s policy, even in circumstances that are inconvenient for them: for example, in October 2002, after the controversial action of anti-terrorist groups in the theatre in Dubrovka, all the muftis unanimously supported Putin.353 The activities of the ROC and the most important Muslim institution are determined by traditionalist–pragmatists, oriented towards close cooperation with the state in the framework of a “social partnership”. Such readiness to cooperate puts the authorities in a privileged position and allows them to engage religious institutions in action on behalf of the state’s interests and realization of its goals.

The situation of minority religions in Russia Just as the status of minorities is an indicator of the state of health of democracy in a given state, the situation of religious minorities serves as a test of the actual

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 103 respect for “freedom of conscience” in a given state. In the case of Russia, the privileged status of “traditional religions” goes hand in hand with intentional marginalization of “foreign” denominations, the numbers of which grew dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union.354 The category “foreign” is the key to the subtle differentiation of minority religions into “traditional-Russian” and “non-Russian”. Considered as “foreign” are native Russian sects, for example the Rerikhovsky Movement or the Fyodorovsky Movement, the Neo-Protestants – Mormons, Pentecostals, Methodists – Scientologists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Etika Povedenia Movement (Ethics of Behaviour) and other new religious movements – among others, the Unity Church (of the Holy Spirit), the Ringing Cedars of Russia (Anastaziytsi /Anastasians), the Church of the Last Gospel (Visarionovtsy), the White Ecologists Movement, Hare Krishna, Tropa Troyanova, Radasteya.355 The expression “Russian paganism” concerns the rebirth of shamanism and paganism in the form of cults, spell-casting, restoration of the institution of fortune tellers in rural communities, and so on. “Traditional” pagans are tolerated, and even supported by the authorities in some republics: for example, in Buryatia or Mari El, which see local customs as part of the national heritage. “Traditional” paganism is developing mainly in the south of the Volga region, in the republics of Mordovia, Udmurtia, Chuvashia, Mari El, Tuva, Khakassia, the Sakha Republic and Altai. It is estimated that in Mari El, 5–7 per cent of society practises paganism, and 60 per cent profess both paganism and Orthodoxy at the same time.356 According to Michael Bordeaux, such a significant presence of paganism in Mari El has political consequences for the entire Volga region, as pagans from neighbouring republics are beginning to consider Mari El as a model of a pagan political union that is possible for the whole region of the lower Volga.357 The ROC is aware of the problem and the patriarch’s visit to the capital of Mari El (Yoshkar–Ola) on 24 July 1993 testifies to this. In his speech, Alexy II referred to paganism, but he did so in a particular way: “Religions and communities traditional to our state must live together in peace and not fight with each other. Some of the Mari people are Christians, other are pagans. The Russian population of Mari El is Orthodox, but Orthodox believers shall not instigate war and hatred between our traditional religions.”358 After analyzing this statement, it is hard not to agree with Michael Bordeaux that “the patriarch seems to concentrate more on opposing the missionary activities of other churches than dissuading Russians from paganism”.359 Neither the ROC, nor the state sees “traditional” paganism as a threat, treating it as local folklore. However, neo-pagan communities and groups such as the Great White Brotherhood, the Boguroditsa Centre, the Church of the Last Testament (Vissarionists)360 or the mystical combination of Buddhism and Hinduism created by the Russian Nikolai Rerikh at the beginning of the twentieth century361 are perceived as undesirable. Neo-pagans, together with Neo-Protestants and sects, generally falling under the umbrella term “new religious movements”, are considered a threat to the “spiritual security” of the Russian Federation, and limiting their influence is one of the most important tasks of the cooperation of “traditional religions” within the framework of the Interreligious Council.

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Without developed structures and without considerable means of their own, deprived of the state’s protection, “foreign” minority religions are fighting an unequal battle for survival with the authorities of particular republics. Most often, believers complain of unwarranted termination of leases, difficulty in buying land or finding any kind of room where believers could hold meetings. Unannounced inspections by the security service, confiscation of publications, refusal of visas and unwarranted arrest of members of the community are widespread.362 A notable example is the scandal involving the Hare Krishna community and the mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov. In December 2005 the Hare Krishnas filed a petition in a court of arbitration in connection with the impeding the purchase of a building lot for a temple. In January 2004 Luzhkov signed his approval, but then later tried to withdraw it, suggesting at first that they be granted a place in a building instead of a lot. He then broke the agreement, appealing to the public prosecutor’s office, which was to proceed starting a case regarding the violation of federal law by the Hare Krishnas.363 What is interesting is that similar problems are reported also by communities belonging to the “traditional religions”, but acting outside the “official structures”: for example, the Russian Autonomous Orthodox Church complained in February 2008 about pressure from civil servants, who often refused to register their parishes.364 The ultimate weapon that minority religions possess against discrimination by the authorities is to file complaints with the European Court of Human Rights. So far, such action has been taken by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Salvation Army and the Church of Scientology, among others. The first of these appealed against the verdict of a Russian court, which after a six-year trial initiated on the petition of the Moscow prosecutor’s office, decided in 2004 on the delegalization of the community. The court ruled in favour of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the matter, as it did in the next case concerning a Chelabinsk community, for which the authorities terminated a property lease without justification. According to the ruling of the court, the Russian state had to pay the Jehovah’s Witnesses from Chelabinsk damages and compensation.365 The verdict did not bring about a change in attitude of the public prosecutor’s office in Ufa, which in March 2008 issued a ban on leasing rooms to Jehovah’s Witnesses.366 The Russian state organs explained the decision to cancel the registration of the Salvation Army in 2001 by the “openly paramilitary” character of the organization. In 2006 the Strasburg Court ruled in favour of the religious institution and obliged the Russian government to pay the plaintiff for damages.367 The unfavourable rulings of the European Court of Human Rights have not significantly changed the policy of the authorities, which fulfil the obligations imposed on them by the court with reluctance. *** Thoughts on the religious situation in contemporary Russia are worth finishing with reflection on the religious policy of the state as a subject that determines the functioning of religious organizations. Despite the constitutional principle of the

Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 105 state’s neutral worldview, obliging those who govern not to interfere in religious matters, the Russian state does not so much register all institutions fulfilling the formal requirements, as it licenses their activities according to the criterion of loyalty. A priority of the government’s policy on religion is to prevent religious conflicts, which is why it is also so essential to support and encourage representatives of various confessions to hold dialogues. The Kremlin realizes that special responsibility for success in this sphere rests on the institution that shows the greatest ambition and the greatest activity in the public sphere: the ROC. A specific system was created: the Kremlin favours the ROC as its key partner in the moral rebirth of Russia (Putin often emphasized that the ROC is the cornerstone of religious peace in the country),368 but also says that the church, as the most “mature”, internationally present and influential Russian religious institution, must limit its ambitions, support dialogue, and behave as the oldest child in the family does towards its less mature siblings. The Kremlin has similar expectations with regards to Islam: for example, Putin appealed to the muftis to widen “traditional Islam” and be a positive influence on the mood in Chechnya.369 The Kremlin forms its own domestic religious policy keeping in mind the “spiritual security”370 of the Russian Federation. This concept is a part of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, the Information Security Concept of the Russian Federation and the Criminal Code (concerning crime against the public order: offences against public morality). From the points of the two documents, it follows that the main danger to the “spiritual security”, being an essential component of “national security”, are the destruction of the system protecting and transmitting cultural values and traditions, destruction of traditional values, demoralization of society, degradation of the national heritage, religious fundamentalism and proselytism of sects of a totalitarian character. In the government’s opinion, the “spiritual security” of the Russian Federation requires an improvement of people’s living conditions, strengthening social control over formation of the value system, “cultural renewal” and establishment of legal-political mechanisms which help to minimize the negative effects of foreign (meaning: “non-traditional”) missionaries and religious associations. The dialogue between particular religions in “multinational and multiconfessional” Russia is initiated by the state, which dictates the conditions of cooperation for the four “traditional religions”. The Kremlin is inclined to accept (albeit to a limited extent) the activity of these organizations in the social, educational and cultural spheres. Although the Kremlin’s decisive influence in Russian religious policy is beyond doubt, it is worth reflecting on the thesis of Sergey Buryanov. In the opinion of this analyst, in church–state relations in Russia we can observe a sort of “systemic corruption”, in that religious institutions support the authorities in exchange for favourable decisions, while these in turn create the basis for the clericalization of state organs, particularly in the structures of the armed forces and educational centres – as a result, the significance of the religious factor in the policy of the Russian Federation is growing.371

3

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy

The break-up of the USSR was without a doubt a geo-political “earthquake” which changed the balance of power in the world. Not only did the Soviet Union cease to exist, but so did the so-called Eastern Bloc, the United States triumphed and NATO found itself in a dominant position. This was not, however, a sign of the “end of history”, but the beginning of a new world order, in the face of which the Russian Federation stood before a double challenge: defining its identity and formulating its own vision of the new order. Both questions are closely connected, because the choice of the model for identity building significantly influences Russia’s vision of an international system of the twenty-first century. For this reason, religion, as an essential component of Russian national identity, is present in Russian views on foreign policy. Over many centuries, Orthodoxy was the defining criterion of Russiannesss. Atheisation and secularization, to which Soviet citizens had been subjected, later only reinforced the phenomenon of “Russian Orthodoxy”, in which religion is actually reduced to an element of tradition and serves as a determinant of Russia’s exclusiveness in relation to Europe as well as Asia. The superficial knowledge of the canons of faith that characterizes concept of “belonging to Orthodox culture” (Mitrokhin) creates fertile ground for the politicization of religion – the use of selected ideas, symbols and motifs for political purposes. Politicization results in the appearance of political–religious ideological hybrids in contemporary Russian thought – completely new ones, as well as those referring to earlier ideas. Hybridization, manifested mainly in eclectic attitudes and very free interpretation of “useful” elements of a given religion, hinders distinguishing particular trends of “politicized religion”, In Russia, this topic was taken up among others by Anastasia Mitrofanova, who distinguished five types of “political Orthodoxy”: fundamentalism, neo-Eurasianism, communism, nationalism and pan-Slavism.1 In response to her work, Alexander Verkhovsky pointed out the neo-Eurasian, ethno-nationalistic and church elements in “political Orthodoxy”.2 Verkhovsky’s classification is interesting because of his use of a dual criterion. Besides these three trends, he also considered the relationship of selected milieus towards religion. He distinguished three categories: religion as the central idea, religion often used in the group’s ideology and religion used only sporadically.

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 107 The systematization of “political Orthodoxy” by Mitrofanova and Verkhovsky was an essential inspiration for formulating the distinction made below. Considering the problems with a typology of Russian political–religious thought that result from inter alia the vagueness of key concepts (such as nation, empire, civilization), eclectic worldviews and language difficulties (different connotations of concepts), it is not easy to isolate clearly defined “ideal types”. In order to consider in Russian foreign policy not only Orthodoxy, but also other religions (particularly Islam) and at the same time to not lose the clarity of the argument, the standard typology (usually comprised of imperialism, neo-Eurasianism, nationalism and neo-pan-Slavism) is used here. At the same time, this division has been modified with an additional criterion, expressed in the question: “To what end does the religious component serve in a given intellectual trend?” Naturally, the use of these criteria does not solve the problem of the interpenetration of individual ideas, but the distinction helps to emphasize the religious aspects in particular trends. In the discussion of them, the religious factor, Russia’s vision of the world and its place (identity) in it, its vision of the desired global order and mission are considered. Religious ideas do not appear directly in official Russian state doctrine. Nevertheless, their impact can be traced in certain ideas, for instance “spiritual security”. Opinions of political authorities and these ideas are discussed respectively – in the last point of this chapter and Chapter 4.

The religious dimension of Russian imperialism One of the sources of revival of the idea of Russia-as-empire has its roots in the imperialistic connotation of Russian Orthodoxy and Russia’s broader religious tradition. Emphasis is put on rebuilding the might of a state as an empire and a separate civilization. The recurrence of the concept of empire is connected to the perception that the state should be strong, sovereign (free of foreign influence in every domain) and autocratic. Giving tradition (including religion) a key role in reforming society and state emphasizes the conservative nature of imperialism. Among early, contemporary Russian conservatives, researchers distinguish “preservationists” (those who are against sudden changes) and “revolutionaries” (those demanding a revolution in morals and customs).3 Propagators of the rebirth of the empire can be divided into three groups: conservative–revolutionaries, fundamentalists and Communists. For the conservatives and Communists, tradition is of key significance – while religion is an important element, it is secondary to the empire. For the fundamentalists, religion is the point of departure, the central idea that determines the vision of the empire, which is only a means for realizing “God’s plan”. In the conviction of the decided majority of Russian intellectuals, the empire cannot exist without a sverkhidea, an idea, an ideology, to integrate a multi-national and multi-confessional society. From the moment of the break-up of the USSR, there has been discussion in Russia on how to fill the ideological void left by Communism and how to formulate a new “Russian idea”. President Boris Yeltsin even commissioned sociological research in 1995 with the goal of establishing

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what the citizens of the Russian Federation thought: the initiative did not, however, bring any measurable results. A new impulse for seekers of a sverkhidea was provided by publications that appeared at the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s second term. An example of this are projects Russkaya Doktrina (Sergieyevsky Proyekt),4 the trilogy Proyekt Rossiya5 and (from the same series) Kriepost Rossiya,6 Pravoslavnaya Monarkhiya …7 and works of more scientific nature, such as Natsionalnaya Ideya Dla Rossii … .8 In all these books, a similar diagnosis of the situation was put forth: Russia is in a deep crisis, an important aspect of which is the moral degeneration of society and particularly of the elite, who are incapable of thinking in terms of the good of the state and the nation. The transformation now occurring in the global order gives Russia a chance to regain its strong position and obtain a favourable balance of power in the international arena. It is in Russia’s interest to have a multi-polar world in which Russia itself occupies the position of one of the key powers; only in this way can it hold back the expansion of the West (mainly the USA), whose expansion would ultimately lead to destruction of Orthodox civilization. The authors questioned the usefulness of democracy as a system that is foreign to Russian culture, rejected the three-way separation of power, criticized the idea of terms of office, particularly for the head of state, and also the universalism of the concept of human rights and the secular state. In the opinion of conservatives, Russia must create a system corresponding to its political tradition: a strong, centralized state, ideally managed by one person. A monarchy is thus the most highly valued, although contemporary conservatives allow for mixed options: for example, indirect elections (through the agency of highly qualified electors) of the head of state, for a minimum term of 10 years. All the authors favour the “civilizational paradigm” according to which international relations are the domain not so much of states as of civilizations. At the same time, they stress the separateness of Russia, Russian/Orthodox/Eurasian civilization (in the case of imperialism, all three descriptions are used interchangeably), which has been bestowed with a special mission. A condition of the rebirth of Russia-as-empire is a deep moral renewal, possible thanks to the return of Russians to the “religion of their forefathers”. Here it is worth drawing attention to the differentiated notion of religion: some conservatives refer only to Orthodoxy as the “national faith of Russians”, which brings them close to the nationalistic trend. Moreover, the definition of the notion of “Orthodoxy” is very wide: it can include those “practising”, the “christened non-practising” and those who “identify with Orthodox tradition”. Interestingly, it is actually this last group that conservatives are counting on to rebuild the empire.9 Russia’s moral renewal can be accomplished also in a broader formula – the union of traditional religions or Christian universalism. The proposal of Vladislav Bachinin, among others, is connected with panChristianity, entailing the use of evangelical tradition; that is, drawing on the legacy of Strigolniks, Judaizers, Dukhobors and Molokans in the formation of the new Russian identity. He does not mean, however, strictly religious proselytism, but the formation of an evangelical attitude. In Bachinin’s opinion, the Protestant ethic is closely connected with the Russian tradition and will lead to the development

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 109 of society and improvements in the functioning of the state.10 It is worth emphasizing that religion is perceived not only as a factor of rebirth, but also as the most important and – in the case of empire – a necessary source of legitimacy of authority and the system of norms, values and symbols harmonizing the multi-national and multi-confessional society. Conservatives disagree on the nature and extent of the future Russian Empire. Most of them stress its Christian identity and a paternalistic system in which society is one family, and different ethnicities form brotherly relations under the fatherly supervision of the central authority. Some mark out the limits of the new empire in accordance with the borders of the former Soviet Union minus the three Baltic countries. Others assert that the empire must embrace all of the regions in which the Russian diaspora lives, or where the variously defined Russian cultural space extends (e.g. wherever the Russian language dominates). At the same time, most consider it necessary to restore the community of eastern Slavs. In the case of foreign policy, conservatives perceive multi-polarism as the only sensible and to date the only realistic vision of a new global order. It is no coincidence that the rising powers which, together with Russia, would oppose US hegemony are those that form the core of a union of conservative civilizations. There are also those among conservatives who consider isolationism and political neutrality to be in Russia’s interest.11 All of them emphasize the special mission of the exceptional Eurasian civilization which involves, for example, showing the world a “third way”, creating an alternative to American domination, protecting societies of the “South” from imperialism and preserving the “Christian Truth”. These conservative publications were the result of a grass-roots initiative and officially created independently of the state administration. In the case of Proyekt Rossiya, the matter is exceptionally secretive because the team of authors, despite having published three books, remains anonymous.12 The texts, geared towards the “average citizen”, are written in accessible language, although with much pomposity and patriotic elation. They enjoy a fair amount of interest and have given rise to discussion among the Russian elite. One of the publications, Russkaya Doktrina (Sergieyevsky Proyekt ), is worth devoting more attention to for several reasons. Written by people brought together by the Foundation of Orthodox Entrepreneurs, including Andrei Kobyakov, Vladimir Kucherenko (Maxim Kalashnikov), Valery Averyanov, Alexander Anisimov, Ilia Brazhnikov, Yaroslav Butakov and Pyotr Kalitin,13 and published in 2005, it was recognized as a harbinger of “Russian neo-conservatism” and became a reference point for subsequent projects. Considering its detailed nature, Russkaya Doktrina is reminiscent of a political programme and refers to many spheres of life (e.g. religious policy, foreign policy, the question of security, social welfare, education and public health systems, ecology, the demographic crisis), in relation to each of which the authors present concrete solutions. Moreover – particularly relevant in the context of this book – Russkaya Doktrina has gained the support of some of the hierarchs of the ROC – the “pro-state pragmatists”, including the then-chairman of the Department of External Relations, and presently the patriarch – Kirill.

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Alexander Verkhovsky described the authors of Russkaya Doktrina as “Orthodox patriots”, and they in turn call themselves representatives of “dynamic conservatism” and call for the necessary modernization of Russia in the spirit of native tradition, the foundation of which is Orthodoxy. In the opinion of these “conservative–revolutionaries”, the Russian Federation is the next – after Rus, the empire of the Romanovs and the USSR – historical embodiment of Russia – a separate civilization. The Russian Federation is thus not identical to “historic Russia”, and the borders of the modern Russian state do not coincide with the Russian cultural space. Existential interest requires the elite to cast policy in terms of the russkiy mir, encompassing all the territories where Russians predominate. The russkiy mir is, besides the Russian Federation, also Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Latvia. Moreover, Russia in the twenty-first century should be prepared to “accept” new territories, particularly South Ossetia, Abkhazia and all of Moldova. Irredentism in the post-Soviet area is treated by neo-conservatives as an element of national rebirth. The authors of Russkaya Doktrina consider the Russian Federation to be a homogenous state both in terms of religion (an Orthodox state inhabited by other religious minorities) and ethnicity (a country of Great Russians, i.e. ethnic Russians and “non-Russian” minorities). Additionally, Russkaya Doktrina contains the concept of the “Russian nation”, which refers to the community of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. From among the four ethnic categories mentioned in Russkaya Doktrina – “Slavs”, “Russian nation”, “non-Russian minority” and “Great Russians” – the last of these played the main role in the history of Russia. The explicit elevation of the Russian ethnos brings the position of the neo-conservatives closer to the nationalists, but what distinguishes the authors of Russkaya Doktrina is the perception of the nation, which according to them is in an indissoluble relation with the state. It is the state which is the formula for existence of the Russian nation – the nation cannot exist outside the framework of the state and is only a category subordinate to the state. The conservative– revolutionaries, who set themselves the goal of creating an empire, try to mitigate the privileging of ethnic Russians by stressing that realization of the interests of the Russian nation cannot occur at the cost of other ethnicities. How the multinational and multi-confessional empire, defining its identity in mono-ethnic and mono-confessional categories (i.e. “Russian” and “Orthodox” Russia), will be able to protect minorities from discrimination was not explained in Russkaya Doktrina. Propagators of “dynamic conservatism” have no doubt that the way to empire leads through modernization, however with the caveat that modernization is not reduced to copying foreign models (“Westernization”), but involves the adaptation of tested solutions in the spirit of native tradition and cultural specificity. In the case of Russia this means, above all, the rejection of democracy as the sverkhidea and the necessity of forming a new system taking into consideration samoderzhavie and sobornost’ (spiritual unity). Samoderzhavie is understood as “independence from other powers or concentration of power in one hand”, while at the same time, power must have a sacral character, for only such legitimization ensures the stability of

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 111 the empire. Sobornost’ expresses “cooperative aspiration to the common good with the help of state authority”. Furthermore, among the four pillars of Russian tradition, Orthodoxy, monarchy, empire and messianism, religion is the key component of national identity. Conservatives maintain that Orthodoxy is even something more than religion – a formula for social existence. They distinguish its two aspects: external (Orthodox tradition, the main component of national identity) and internal (mystical, religious stricto sensu). The symphony of these two is the foundation of Orthodox (Eurasian, Russian) civilization, and the church (a community in the Holy Spirit without formalized membership) is the prototype of the empire. Conservative–revolutionaries are convinced that Orthodoxy has an enormous modernizing potential – it can, for example, stimulate the development of a modern economy no worse than Protestantism did in the case of Western European capitalism. In accordance with Orthodox ethics, social justice and welfare stand above profit, while service to others, asceticism and cooperation are fundamental values. The canon thus formulated allows Russia to build a better, “supra-industrial capitalism”, but this must be preceded by the spiritual education of new generations of Russians and the rebirth of the “idea of sanctity” in society. The state must place responsibility for this task on religious institutions, which should be perceived as “corporations of the public good” and should fulfil social and educational functions, be involved in the protection of the family and cultural heritage, as well as supervision over morality and lifestyle (e.g. regarding television programmes), work in schools, the army, prisons, hospitals, shelters and so on. Examining the question of religion, the authors of Russkaya Doktrina did not rule out the establishment of a religious state in which the ROC would be accorded special status, as would – to a lesser extent – Islam and Buddhism. It is worth emphasizing that in this way, neo-conservatives have reduced the number of “traditional religions” to three and omitted Judaism. According to the “revolutionaries”, Orthodoxy should be given the status of the official state ideology, and the requirement of belonging to the church should be introduced for individuals holding the highest power in the empire; offences against Orthodoxy should be penalized, and leaving the faith should be treated as a hostile act towards the Russian state. Integration of society would be assisted by the introduction of religious holidays (all Orthodox ones, and several Muslim and Buddhist ones) and the restoration of the Julian calendar. Neo-conservatives have also drawn attention to the “spiritual security” of Russia, which requires the strengthening of the institutions of “traditional religions”, impeding proselytism of foreign sects and limiting the freedom of cult. Russkaya Doktrina emphasizes that Russia must return to its traditions and the sources of its own civilizational separateness if it wants to take advantage of the chance which the transformation in the global order offers and join the elite group of powers that will decide on the balance of power in the world in the twenty-first century. The People’s Republic of China is all the more boldly undermining the Pax Americana and creating a competing power centre in the Pacific. It is in Russia’s interest to prevent the formation of a new dual-polar order, this time on the axis

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Washington–Beijing. It should therefore concentrate its activity on supporting its potential allies: India, Iran, Japan (which must be encouraged to regain its full sovereignty and set itself free from the United States) and Arab countries. These states, together with Russia and China can create a front effectively opposing the imperialism of the USA, which is the greatest threat not only to Russian civilization, but also to global security and peace. Neo-conservatives stress that Russia can join the twenty-first century “concert of powers” provided that it can manage to strengthen its position in Asia. It must occupy a place appropriate to its rank among Asian civilizations – India, China and Japan. Russia can achieve this goal by rebuilding its Orthodox identity. According to the authors of Russkaya Doktrina, Russia’s civilizational superiority in Asia results from the universalism of Orthodoxy, which (in the authors’ opinion) Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism lack. Russia should make great efforts to raise the prestige of Orthodoxy in the world: for example, by efforts such as the foundation of the Organization of the Orthodox Conference, in which the leading role would be played by the Moscow patriarchate.14 Supporting dialogue between Orthodoxy and Islam and activity in the forum of Muslim organizations, particularly the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will facilitate Russia’s closer relations with Muslim countries. Moreover, Moscow should promote interreligious dialogue as the domain of Russian civilization and at the same time end the ecumenical movement, which is washing away its civilizational identity and is in fact only an instrument of American expansionism. From the neo-conservative viewpoint, the religious factor is extremely useful in foreign policy and Russia should take advantage of the diplomatic activity of native Orthodox and Muslim institutions. Besides this, as an Orthodox civilization, it can act in the role of representative of all those belonging to the Eastern Christian tradition and mobilize Orthodox believers to cooperate on the international arena. The Russian Federation should manifest its imperial ambitions, regain its postSoviet assets and demand recognition for particular interests in its historical space (russkiy mir), especially the right to intervene for the protection of the Russian diaspora (e.g. by sanctions). Russkaya Doktrina discusses the formulation of three circles around Russian civilization – the “circle of satellites” in the area of the former USSR, the “circle of strategic allies” (among others, India, the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Mongolia, Iran and Syria), and the circle encompassing the remaining states. It is in Russia’s interest to maintain in Asia an institution closed to the EU states and the USA, such as, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the same time, Russia should resign from membership in those international organizations which lower its prestige and in which it is deprived of real influence in decision making. On the “black list” of such institutions the neo-conservatives included, among others, the United Nations, OSCE, Council of Europe and all the international tribunals. Among the most important tasks of Russian diplomacy is the formation of a multi-polar order, prevention of world conflicts, restoration of the authority of

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 113 the sovereign state and interfaith dialogue. These postulates in their concrete dimension reduce down to the necessity of regaining influence in the Balkans and central Asia, taking control over the Black Sea waterways and weakening Turkey. These goals are, in turn, connected with the question of the mission of Russian civilization, which in the conservatives’ vision of the world is the “demiurge of harmony”, in contrast to the “demiurge of destruction”, the West. According to the authors of Russkaya Doktrina, Russia – heir to and successor of Rome, liberator of all Orthodox nations – is responsible to Providence for maintaining equilibrium in the world, saving humanity and preserving the Christian faith. The “salvation project” in the twenty-first century involves, above all, the creation of an alternative to “Westernization” that will allow for the rejection of liberal democracy which unavoidably leads to the atheisation of society.15 The further course of history depends on whether Russian civilization can manage to give the world a new idea of a “brotherhood of nations”, Russian neo-conservatives are convinced that Russia’s defeat in this field is equivalent to the extermination of mankind. The Orthodox empire must return in the role of a “moral hegemony”, protecting the states of the “South” from the aggression of the “North”. Only a union of conservative civilizations under Russia’s leadership is capable of matching the pressure of the enemies – the USA, NATO, Turkey, and the states that belonged to the so-called Eastern Bloc. The points and opinions presented above form the core of Russkaya Doktrina, which shortly after its publication was recognized as a manifesto of “Russian neoconservatism” and was favourably commented upon by Metropolitan Kirill. The unofficial patronage of the hierarch was one of the reasons that the publication became a topic of debate among members of the World Russian National Sobor in the beginning of 2005. Earlier, at the request of Alexy II, Moscow’s Spiritual Academy prepared for the patriarchate a review of Russkaya Doktrina, in which, for example, it was stated that despite the radicalism of some postulates, they do not contradict Orthodoxy in spirit, and in fact have a lot in common with the social programme of the ROC. Although the church did not take an official position in the matter of Russkaya Doktrina, explaining that it is required to maintain an apolitical stance, the lack of contraindications by the academy and Kirill’s involvement16 were received in many milieus as an expression of the ROC’s positive attitude towards this initiative. In July 2007 Russkaya Doktrina again became the subject of discussion of the World Russian National Sobor, which had appealed for the beginning of a national debate on the subject. Moreover, members of the assembly invited the authors to take part in the Youth Sobor in February 2008.17 Following the sobor’s example, the leader of the party Velikaya Rossiya, Andrei Savyolov, included theses of Russkaya Doktrina in the political programme of his group.18 Intellectuals were decidedly less enthusiastic towards Russkaya Doktrina: Viktor Aksyuchits described “dynamic conservatism” as exceptionally boring eclecticism. The manifesto was also critically evaluated by Gleb Yakunin (who recognized it as a return to the anachronous idea of a Third Rome). The highly controversial Alexander Dugin considered Russkaya Doktrina as essential reading for every Russian.

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To sum up the thoughts regarding conservative–revolutionaries, it is worth emphasizing that four years after the appearance of the publications of members of the “Foundation of Orthodox Entrepreneurs”, two concrete examples can be cited that drew their inspiration from the postulates of Russkaya Doktrina: extension of the president’s term from four years to six and the point of the so-called Medvedev doctrine,19 stating that Russia can exercise the special right to protect the Russian diaspora. Another step in the right direction, according to conservatives, is acknowledgment of the state sovereignties of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The principle difference between the conservatives and the fundamentalists is in the latter’s treatment of Orthodoxy not as an element of national tradition, but as a truth revealed by God. Such an approach does not mean, however, absolute subordination to church institutions. Fundamentalists are at times rather critical of the patriarchate, often presenting a xenophobic, nationalistic attitude and speaking out against attempts to change rituals and liturgy in the church. They oppose ecumenism. They reject democracy as an evil system that makes sinful people believe they are competent – against the will of God – to independently establish authority. Moreover, they believe that only an Orthodox monarch is in accordance with God’s design. The best known representative of the fundamentalist milieu in the ROC was Metropolitan Ioann Snychev, whose publications, especially Samoderzhavie Dukha and Russkaya Simfonia20 are described by most of the conservative–revolutionaries as an important source of inspiration. In his perception of the world at the turn of the millennium, the metropolitan disclosed the Manichaean character of such fundamentalist views. The domination of the West – a civilization of false progress and atheism – was the triumph of the Antichrist, the creator of the American falseempire. The only force capable of defeating it is Russia, which must be reborn as an Orthodox empire in order to fulfil this mission. Only within the framework of this “unique, multi-ethnic organism”, which is the empire, can the Russian nation oppose apostasy.21 Anastasia Mitrofanova rightly pointed out that, in the case of the fundamentalists, the emphasis on religion results in a greater indifference towards questions of foreign policy in comparison to other trends of “political Orthodoxy” (although, Metropolitan Ioann often makes references to the global order). Referring to the “civilizational paradigm”, the hierarch distinguished two types of civilization: modernistic and traditional. In their opinion, Russia belongs to the second of these: its mission is to create and lead a union of civilizations similar to it, in order to stand against the alliance of new powers in a multi-polar world. The metropolitan emphasized at the same time that the Russian Empire fulfilled two functions – an internal one, involving the maintenance of peace between nations of the empire and an external one, keeping humanity from falling into chaos. Like the conservatives, Metropolitan Ioann and other fundamentalists believed that Russia would get out of the present collapse thanks to an “Orthodox revolution”. Thanks to this, it would again become an empire. Among the “ideological heirs” of the metropolitan, Roman Bäcker mentions Juvenaly Tarasov, Benjamin Pushkar (the archbishop of Vladivostok), Ambrose Schurov (the archbishop of Ivanovo–Voznesensk)

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and also protorey Dmitry Smirnov. This list could be completed with the milieu associated with the magazines Rodonezh and Rus Derzhavnaya and the activists of such organizations as Orthodoxy or Death, Slavic World, Alexander Nevsky and the Union of Orthodox Citizens (UOC).23 Members of the latter put a lot of hope in Patriarch Kirill, who, they feel, is distinguished by the necessary personality traits, abilities and experience to bring together all the Orthodox churches around himself. The chairman of the Moscow branch of UOC, Kirill Frolov, following the election of the head of the ROC, argued that the new patriarch should make it a priority of the church’s activity to consolidate the universal church and gain in it a status comparable to the one Vatican has among Catholics. With this goal, the Moscow patriarchate must significantly increase the number of its faithful (ideally to one billion), for which the post-Soviet area will not suffice. Missionary activity should thus be spread across Europe – the potential believers of the ROC are, among others, conservative Europeans.24 Russian Communists in the beginning of the twenty-first century are interested not so much in building Communism, as in restoring the empire and regaining Russia’s status as a great power. Priority treatment of the empire enabled the former believers in scientific atheism to come closer to the milieu of “political Orthodoxy”. From the first half of the 1990s, some Russian Communists have been trying to prove that the contradiction between religion and Lenin’s materialism does not exist. In reality, Communism and Orthodoxy share many values: both ideologies are oriented towards social justice, put the interests of the community above the interests of the individual and promote cooperation, while the triad sobornost, narodnost, dukhovnost contains the premises of socialism,25 and the central symbol is Jesus Christ: the “first socialist”. Alexander Molotkov, for instance, argues that only a synthesis of Christianity and socialism can secure for Russia a status of global power in twenty-first century.26 Both ideologies share the ethos of “brotherly service” strongly rooted in Russian tradition. Neither capitalism nor liberalism will accelerate Russia’s development. On the contrary, in Molotkov’s opinion, the spread of anti-Christian capitalism is the main source of modern Russia’s moral downfall.27 Despite its present weakness the Russian Federation should create an alternative model of modern development on the basis of socialism combined with sobornost’.28 Despite his attachment to socialism Molotkov has no praise for the Soviet system, whereas some intellectuals have undertaken attempts to mitigate the image of the USSR as a state hostile towards religion. Alexander Prokhanov states that the Bolsheviks were not so bad for the church: they allowed the election of a patriarch, Stalin permitted the opening of churches, and besides that the ROC, thanks to persecution, gained many new martyrs and managed to protect Russians’ spirituality from Western secularism.29 The idea of “Orthodox Stalin” is popular among Russian Communists, who claim that, as the creator of the empire, he should be included in the pantheon of Russian saints, along with other “model Bolsheviks” such as Pavlik Morozov and Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya. For understandable reasons, most of the hierarchs of the ROC decidedly reject the possibility of canonizing Stalin. Nevertheless, support for the canonization of Stalin has its

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supporters even among the clergy. Among the so-called “red priests” are, for example, Viktor Pichuzhkin and Estafy Zhakov – the parish priest of the church of St Olga in Strelna (near St Petersburg), which even has an icon of Joseph Vissarionovich.30 It is no secret that until the 2000, Communists in the State Duma defended the interests of the ROC: they submitted initiatives that were favourable to the church and voted against bills which the patriarchate criticized.31 Communists dreaming of the re-creation of an empire within the borders of the Soviet Union see a natural ally in the church that is reserved towards capitalism and democracy and advocates a strong state and that in addition has a canonical territory corresponding approximately to the territory of the former USSR.32 Change in their mutual relations came about after Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Gradually, the presidential office took on the role of church patron, while in the Duma this function was taken over by the “Orthodox lobby” from the Rodina party. The church’s distancing itself from the Communists influenced, among other things, the change in attitude of Gennady Zyuganov who, although continuing to talk about the necessity of restraining the “spiritual aggression of hostile sects” in Russia, all the more often spoke not so much of Orthodoxy, as of cooperation with the “traditional religions”, emphasizing at the same time the role of Islam and Buddhism. He also increasingly often referred critically to the – in his opinion – too liberal policy of the patriarchate during the time of Alexy II.33 The vision, however, did not undergo change: the Russian Empire is called upon to oppose the hegemony of the “golden billion”,34 to assume care of all the exploited nations and to show them a new way of development that will realize the ideal of social justice. Besides Gennady Zyuganov, other figures associated with “Orthodox communism” are Sergey Kara-Murza,35 Konstantin Dushenov (editor of Rus Pravoslavnaya) and Alexy Podberezkin.

Religious aspects of neo-Eurasianism Eurasianism contains many concepts typical of other trends: for example antiOccidentalism or nationalism. Eurasianism is situated near imperialism, however the difference in the handling of the religious factor argues for the separate treatment of these two ideas. In both cases, religion serves a similar function: it promotes values and attitudes necessary for moral rebirth, it is foundation of tradition, an essential component of civilizational identity and the ideological glue that holds the empire together. However, in the case of Eurasianism, religion is not the sverkhidea, which is Eurasianism itself understood as a civilizational concept, an ideological base of a new revolution in Russian identity and of antiglobalism or a variant of multi-polarism.36 Moreover, the religious factor is defined more broadly, as a synthesis of Orthodoxy, Islam and Russian Cosmism37 with elements of Buddhism, and even Hinduism or Confucianism. Eurasia is more than an empire, it is a geopolitical project that is the essence of the whole trend. Religion is an important component, though only one of the many necessary for its realization.

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 117 The best-known (and the most controversial) representative of Russian neoEurasianism, Alexander Dugin, looks at religions through the prism of usefulness for the realization of the geo-political project, for not every religion is suited for this, not even every trend of Orthodoxy or Islam.38 He distinguishes “traditional” Orthodoxy, represented by the Moscow patriarchate, and the “godless” one, which is connected with the patriarchate of Constantinople. According to the controversial ideologue, Russian Orthodoxy is superior to other religions thanks to its incorporation of pagan elements, the fusion of Russian Cosmism and Christianity that occurred in Russia gives the Eurasian empire its necessary sacral aura.39 In Islam, in turn, Dugin distinguished Wahhabism (Saudi Arabia) and “enlightened Islam” (Pakistan and Turkey), which do not play into the Eurasian vision, in contrast to the mystical Shiitism (Iran), “Islamic socialism” (Iraq during the rule of Saddam Hussein, Libya) and “continental Islam” (Tatarstan).40 Writing of Russia’s place in the modern world, Alexander Dugin treats it as a separate Eurasian civilization which cannot be satisfied with the narrow borders of the Russian Federation established in 1991.41 Its destiny is empire which would be home to different ethnicities42 but under the rule of the Great Russians.43 The imperial identity should be composed of two elements: anti-Americanism and a strong sense of civilizational separateness, connected with the renewal and strengthening of Orthodox tradition.44 According to Dugin, the changes observed at the beginning of the twenty-first century in the balance of power in the world – above all, the weakening of the USA and Europe, which he understands as a harbinger of the soon-to-come twilight of the West – are a chance for Russia to form a new, multi-polar global order.45 The strength and security of Russia depend on the success of the project of creating a united front against the USA. Alexander Dugin admits that Russia does not have any devoted friends, but there is no lack of potential allies in holding American expansionism in check – “Old Europe” (Germany and French), “Greater China” (China and the states of Southeast Asia) and the “Islamic world”. Each of the three areas mentioned represents a different civilizational project, but none of them has a place for Russia, which is why it must present its own vision and occupy on the world stage a position equal to the other powers. Dugin argues that the role of ideological foundation of the new “Russian project” – an alternative to Americanism – should be played by a Eurasianism that draws on the universalism of Orthodox civilization. The Russian Federation should concentrate all its strength on the creation of a Eurasian union in the post-Soviet area – a voluntary confederation of states having different political systems, territorially corresponding to the Soviet Union, but without the three Baltic republics and with the addition of Mongolia. Calling up a Eurasian union assumes the full integration of Russia with Ukraine and Belarus, because only in this way will these two states be able to protect their separateness from Americanization.46 Among Russia’s most important tasks is the creation of “axes of friendship”: Moscow– Berlin–Paris; Moscow–Tehran–Beijing; Moscow–Tehran–Delhi, which in a multi-polar world will combine the particular poles of power into an anti-American union.47

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In the twenty-first century, which according to Alexander Dugin will bring new crusades, colonization expeditions and pirate raids, Russia must become the spiritual leader of humanity, the creator of an anti-American global project and the main initiator of Eurasia, the counter-empire48 to the Western civilization led by the United States. Dugin’s conviction that the moment of conflict between the West and the East is approaching is shared by professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexander Panarin, author of Orthodox Civilization in a Globalized World (Pravoslavnaya Tsivilizatsia v Global’nom Mire/Православная цивилизация в глобальном мире).49 In his opinion, the totalitarian, civilizational and cultural racism of the West – manifested, for example, in its demeaning of other civilizations, in the forceful imposition of democracy, liberalism, the concept of human rights, free-market institutions and so on – must be opposed by Russian, Orthodox (Eurasian) civilization. At the same time, Panarin emphasizes that he understands civilization differently than, for example, Samuel Huntington. For the Russian scholar, it is not a separate existence, but a historical, eschatological project connected with the restraint of “parasitic” civilizations and the creation of a just world for those excluded.50 Like Dugin, Panarin considers that Orthodox civilization’s exceptional nature results from the successful historical synthesis of two elements – pagan and Christian. From the pagans comes the sensitivity to nature present in Russian culture, in which it is seen as a living Cosmos, with which man lives in union (Cosmism), and from Christianity comes faith in the triumph of spirit over matter. Orthodox civilization is characterized by mysticism, irrationality (recognition of truth not by reason, but by the heart), asceticism, the ethos of service, and also the relatively late appearance of processes such as rationalization and mechanization. The realization of the civilizational project can succeed only within the framework of an empire. The Russian nation, as an imperial ethnos, is capable of great things only when they concern ultimate, universal questions.51 Thus, Russia must once again become an empire to fulfil the mission it has been entrusted with – uniting humanity around a new eschatology, a new model of world development, an alternative to Americanism. According to Panarin, just after the Second World War the Soviet Union created a Slavic empire extending from the Oder river to the Pacific Ocean and in this way saved the civilizational identity of the so-called Eastern Bloc from “Westernization”. So too at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia must undertake the universal mission of the USSR and take into its care the countries of the poor “South” and oppose the Western “democracy of freedom” with the Eastern “democracy of equality”.52 The defeat of the United States requires Russian influence in the “near abroad” and closer relations between Moscow and Beijing and Delhi. Alexander Panarin was convinced that only Orthodox civilization, thanks to its universal message, has the potential allowing it to meet pressure from the West. For Panarin, Orthodoxy was something more than a religion or tradition, it was a universal project of humanity, closely connected with the mission which, in his opinion, is the essence of Russianness.53 A consequence of such pan-Christianism was a fairly critical relationship towards the ROC, which is satisfied with the work

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 119 of saving Russians instead of saving humanity. The ROC, following the model of “liberation theology”, should be involved in solving social problems and become the church of the weak, the needy and the excluded. Recognition of the important role of Islam in forming Orthodox civilization has inclined some Russian Muslims to sympathize with Eurasianism, seeing it as a political concept ensuring Muslims an equal status with Orthodox believers. Among the muftis, one of the greatest enthusiasts is Talgat Tadzhuddin, who in August 2008 announced a joint Islamic–Orthodox jihad against American imperialism.54 Another prominent Muslim figure mentioned in association with Eurasianism is Khozh-Ahmed Nukhayev.55

The face of Islamism in Russia Although there are different opinions on a suitable definition of Islamism, it can generally be described as politically engaged Islam, expressing both a search for systemic solutions in religion, as well as politics.56 Singling out this trend in this book serves to emphasize the efforts of part of the Muslim elite to work out their own, independent political concepts that take into account the specificity of Islam. In these concepts, the Islamic faith is not presented in close connection with Orthodoxy, as in the case of Eurasianism; the Orthodox factor is omitted, or even contrasted to Islam. Moreover, as with the traditionalists, Islamists refer to Islam, the religion, and Islam, the foundation of tradition. In such a broad definition of Islamism, the religious component determines the political. The typical division into a modernist option (neo-Jadidism) and fundamentalist one (Wahhabism) applies in the case of Islamism as well. Considering the relationship to the Russian state, however, one can distinguish concepts promoting close cooperation with the government, and those urging independence. In the first dichotomy, the accent falls on the question of faith, and in the second it regards domestic matters – and so foreign policy is on the margins of Islam. It is, however, worth presenting the most important trends, because they are the ideological support for other political ideas that refer to the Islamic factor. European Islam (or Euro-Islam) is one of the most interesting results of the intellectual quests of the Muslim elite in Russia. Its relatively few supporters are considered the intellectual heirs of the nineteenth-century Jadidism, an Enlightenment trend, popular mostly among the Tatar intelligentsia, postulating the modernization of Islamic institutions through the creation of modern, universal education in the Tatar language. Modern religious education was to be a way of reconciling tradition with modernization. The Russian Jadidists (notable representatives are Gataulla Bayazitov and Musa Bigiyev) maintained that within the Russian Empire an exceptional, Russian Islamic civilization, had formed, which is not foreign, let alone hostile to Europe. In the Tatar tradition they saw the vanguard of European Islam, reconciling modernization with tradition in different spheres – education, art and the political system. Jadidists considered free choice and tolerance towards other convictions to be indispensable elements of a modern society, and they declared themselves to be against violence and condemned the

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jihad. They wanted Tatars to act on behalf of closer relations between the East and the West, stop the growth of Islamophobia and spread among the ummah a “European model of Islam from Tatarstan”.57 Neo-Jadidism (Euro-Islam) is to be an expression of the harmonization of Islamic values, democracy and liberalism,58 a testimony to the absence of contradiction between Islam and a democratic system. In the face of the growing tension between the Islamic world and the West, Euro-Islam could play the role of mediator between civilizations.59 The main ideologist of Russian neo-Jadidism is Rafael Khakimov,60 at one time an advisor to the president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaymiyev. Publicist Gamer Bautdinov is also considered a sympathizer of the trend. In 2003 a document titled Where is our Mecca? (which came to be known also as the “Manifest of Euro-Islam”) was published by Rafael Khakimov. In it he called for the modernization of Islam; that is, an interpretation of the Koran in spirit of modernity. He pointed out the necessity of improving education within Russian Muslim communities that could be modelled on existing West European examples. He also stressed the respect the Tatars historically displayed for the secular state and which, according to Khakimov, was always closer to the European conceptions than those from the Middle East. But Khakimov’s views have not gained popularity. Considered as the right hand of Shaymiyev, he was relieved of the function of advisor in March 2009, after 18 years in the service of the president of Tatarstan. In presenting religion as a worldview that should give an answer to contemporary challenges and go beyond the framework of the traditional Hanafi principles, propagators of Euro-Islam displease the muftis, especially Gusman Iskhakov, Waliulla Jagkup and also the nationalists from the Ittifak party. Attempts are thus undertaken to work out a position somewhere between the neo-Jadidists and traditionalists: for example, Mahmud Sultanayev states that ideas can and should be drawn from the European democratic tradition, but without rejecting the traditional Hanafi trend.61 In contrast to the position of the official muftiates, Geydar Dzhemal, the chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia, advocates opinions which are a specific synthesis of Islam, Marxism and Russian messianism.62 The most famous ideologist of “Russian political Islam” (or “Islamic Marxism”) criticizes liberalism, capitalism and consumptionism, all of which were, in his opinion, bravely challenged by the USRR.63 Although Stalin distorted the noble idea of social justice, the Soviet legacy should, he claims, be continued by the Russian Federation, while Muslims, misused and humiliated by the West, are the proletariat of twenty-first century. Dzhemal distinguishes between elites in Muslim countries which “have betrayed Islam” and “Muslim streets”. He considers, for example, Turkey an antiIslamic state.64 In order to stand up against American imperialism strengthened by what he sees as NATO’s aggression, Moscow must unite the Eurasian ummah and turn it into Islamintern.65 In Dzhemal’s opinion, Muslim countries are the most trusted allies that Russians have. Seeking rapprochement with China and India is just a dangerous illusion because those countries, in longer perspective, have conflicting interests with Russia.66 Supported on one side by Muslims and on the

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 121 other side by post-Soviet “friends”, Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation is obliged to fulfil its historical mission, to shape a new, just world order.67 Attempts to reconcile democracy with Islam are acknowledged by fundamentalists with the ironic statement that “an Islamic democrat sounds about as plausible as a Muslim alcoholic”.68 Islamic fundamentalism began to gain supporters during the time of perestroika and soon took the place of opposition towards the muftiates that were loyal to the authorities. Fundamentalists claim that in contrast to the traditional clergy, which reduced their spiritual duties to performing the service of ritual, they perceive Islam as a way of life, to which all else should be subordinated.69 Alexander Malashenko distinguishes two orientations in fundamentalism: the “Protestant” and the extremist. Representatives of the first are called “new Muslims” – they are prepared to cooperate with the authorities, as long as their faith is shown respect. They support the fighting of extremism, do not resort to violence and have a lot of reservations about the “foreign mullahs” who come to the Caucasus from Arab countries. An example of this trend is the Islamic Centre which was established in 1993 in Kabardino–Balkaria, and in which Ruslan Nakhushev, Musa Mukozhev and Anzor Astemirov, among others, have been active. Representatives of the other orientation are the extremists, commonly called in Russia wahhabis (a, mostly unconscious, reference to the branch of Islam founded by Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab and dominant in Saudi Arabia). They demand independence for the northern Caucasus and the creation of an Islamic state. Wahhabis, calling their fellow believers to a gazawat (“holy war”), look for the support of Islamic governments, particularly Saudi Arabia. Among the wahhabi ideologists one might mention Akhmad-kadi Akhtayev, Bagautdin Muhammad and the controversial “icon” figure, Chechen militant leader Shamil Basayev, who in 1998 declared an anti-Russian jihad. The activity of the wahhabis worries the Russian government and influences the form of the security doctrine, foreign policy and also Russia’s relations with Arab states. Moreover, the last decade has taught that the Russian authorities’ lack of a proper, balanced policy in the Caucasus, involving the inclusion of the “young Muslims” in the work of local governments, can have tragic consequences. “Hunting” wahhabis (including the delegalization of dissemination of such views; for example in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria), introducing censorship, closing magazines and mosques and carrying out preventive arrests lead to antagonization and radicalization of the “young Muslims”, some of whom, with time, go over to the side of wahhabis. Ruthless fighting of extremism, connected with violations of freedom of conscience, prompts the objection of Muslim communities, which can lead to violent social protests, like those that occurred in Nalchik in 2005.70 Scholars studying Islam in Russia emphasize that the real support of society for the realization of the wahhabis’ postulates is not significant. Most Russian Muslims accept a secular state, and only in the case of serious political, economic and social destabilization (e.g. perestroika or the war in Chechnya) does the influence of extremists begin to grow.

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Discussion around the concept of “Russian Islam” (russkiy Islam) was evoked by the speech of Sergey Grandirovsky in 2003 in Kazan during a “round-table” devoted to the issue “What is Islam for Russia?”71 Invited as an expert on religious matters, Grandirovsky explained that under the influence of Muslims migration, Islam itself in Russia is subject to changes: for example, the Russian language, understood by both Tatars and emigrants from central Asia, is becoming the language of prayer, religious services and publications. This phenomenon strengthens the Russian cultural space. An unfavourable phenomenon, in the Kremlin’s view is the reinforcement of the Muslim community – which already has a higher birth rate than the Slavic population – by immigrants, which generates demographic pressures on the Slavs of the Volga region, leading to the religious homogenization of these territories and creates the danger of secession in the future. For this reason, the state must consider ways to harmonize Orthodoxy (in the sense of Russian culture) with Islam, making the Russian language the foundation of their common identity. It is in the state’s interest to define a nationwide theological standard of “Russian Islam”, which in practice would mean creating – on the initiative of and under the supervision of the state – a Muslim national theological school, which would become the central authority for Russian Muslims, more important than the visiting Arab muftis.72 The Kazan round-table also stressed the need for mechanisms for stimulating the Muslim press (in 2003, the Union of Muslim Journalists was founded)73 as well as a framework for constructive dialogue between Islam and Orthodoxy. In the context of foreign policy, “Russian Islam” could prove to be helpful in establishing close cooperation with Muslim countries and building solidarity between the wealthy North and the poor South. The message of this conception was clear: the state should stimulate education and worldview preferences in the sphere of policy, because this is required for maintaining Russia’s territorial and cultural integrity. The project, in which, besides Grandirovsky, two members of the Federal Research Centre of the Volga Region were involved – Sergey Kiryenko and Pyotr Shchedrovitsky – caused a stir among the Tatar intelligentsia. The theses presented were interpreted as a call for a state to form a corpus of loyal imams identifying with the Russian state and Russian tradition, who would guarantee the religious education of Muslim citizens in the spirit of patriotism. The elaboration by a federal scientific centre of a plan to create “Russian Islam” was explained by the Kremlin’s increasing lack of trust in the so-called young imams, educated in Arab countries, and also towards the “old” muftis, especially after the unexpected behaviour (e.g. the announcement of a jihad against the USA) of the most trusted among them – Talgat Tadzhuddhin. The most ardent critics of the conception were found among the clergy: for example, in May of 2003 mufti Farid Salman turned to the FSB and requested that the secret service investigates “Russian Islam” as a form of subversive activity.74 An accusation of a similar sort was brought to court as well, by Orthodox monk Anatoly Berestev.75 The respected Islamic publicist Maxim Shevchenko distanced himself from the project, describing it as provocation.76 After such events, the interest in forming “Russian Islam” clearly decreased and voices appear only sporadically to encourage consideration of the proposal anew.

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 123 The embodiment of the concerns of the authors of the pro-state “Russian Islam” and the ideological opposition of Euro-Islam is the programme of the Ittifaq al-Muslimin party, which can in short be described as a representative of Islamic nationalism or, more appropriately, as the synthesis of Tatar nationalism and Islam. The views of this group, established in 1992, were expressed in the document accepted in 1996, Tatar Kanuny (Constitution of the Tatar Nation).77 The vision of the world presented there is simple: Western civilization and all that is associated with it – democracy, secularism and human rights – are a threat to the Tatar nation. It is thus necessary to establish an Islamic state in Tatarstan, which will protect Tatar Islamic believers. Ittifak is situated on the margin of political life in the Republic of Tatarstan; however, the party’s long-time leader, Fauzi Bayramova, makes efforts to change the situation. For example, in September 2008 there appeared in the press, on Ittifak’s initiative, a call to declare Tatarstan’s independence. The party referred to the fact of Russia’s recognition of the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.78 Several weeks earlier, members of Ittifak had appealed to the USA, the European Union and the Turkish-language states of Central Asia to boycott the Olympic Games in Beijing as an act of protest against the persecution of the Uyghurs by the authorities of the People’s Republic of China.79 The five ideas presented above can be divided into three groups based on the geographical criterion: wahhabism is associated with the northern Caucasus, “Islamic Marxism” with cosmopolitan Moscow, and the other three with the Volga region. The Tatars have traditionally tried to play the role of the “intellectual vanguard” of Russian Muslims. The need for Muslims to present their own vision of their role in the federation, their wider (state) identity and foreign policy is an increasingly burning question in the face of the activities of nationalists who try to create political capital on the growing Islamophobia in Russian society.

The religious component of Russian nationalism A lot has been written about the problems connected with research into Russian nationalism. The main difficulty is the close connection between the categories of nation and state (empire). As Yaroslav Bratkevich notes, this results from the secondary nature of Russian nationalism with regard to the state.80 Russian nationalism is imperial, autocratic and messianic and has the character of a civilizational–cultural alternative.81 Attempts at resolving the problem of the conceptual knitting together of “nation” and “empire” have been made by introducing different divisions. Specialists on Russian cultural and national issues often cite two archetypal divisions, by which the problems was addressed in Russian political thought.82 One paradigm consisted in choosing between the concepts of “guardian of the empire” (the priority is to save to the empire, in which Russians are the central ethnos, absorbing other ethnicities) and that of the “builder of the nation” (the priority is to save the nation by strengthening national sovereignty, and all eastern Slavs belong to the Russian ethnos).83 The second approach was to follow either the reasoning connected to the concept of “All Russians” (the Russian

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nation is a poly-ethnic oikumene in which the important role of “elder brother”, the state-building ethnos, falls to Russians) and that of the “Great Russians” (the Russian nation is ethnically homogenous and destined to take the hegemonic role over other ethnicities of the empire). In this book, nationalism is not presented through the prism of these distinctions, but through the prism of religion as a factor creating a national bond: religion, treated as the source of the nation’s rebirth, as a criterion for belonging to the nation – in its radical version as a criterion of “ethnic purity” – and as a factor uniting the eastern Slavic Russian nation. Besides these three components, two other, phobic attitudes that mark out the framework of Russian nationalism have also been taken into consideration: anti-Occidentalism and Islamophobia. The influence of nationalistic attitudes on foreign policy are recognizable in references to the identity of the nation and state, the problem of the diaspora and the “adequacy” of Russia’s borders, the question of ethnic separateness of Ukrainians and Belarusians and relationships with the Islamic states neighbouring Russia. The nationalists’ conviction that religion is the foundation of moral renewal brings to mind the postulates of the conservatives. The difference is that the nationalists’ most important goal is the rebuilding of the nation, while for the conservatives it is the rebuilding of the empire. The views of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who often emphasized the role of religion in the rebirth of Russian society, can serve as an example.84 In a publication from 1991, Rebuilding Russia, the former dissident announced that Russia’s future depends on spiritual, moral and cultural renewal. A return to traditional, Orthodox values was to be a way of alleviating many problems: for example, raising the birth rate, reducing the number of abortions, fighting alcoholism, improving work efficiency, limiting crime.85 At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that Solzhenitsyn’s relations with the ROC were not the easiest. The writer often stigmatized the conformism of the patriarchate, and in emigration sympathized with the ROC Outside Russia, valued the spirituality of the Old Believers and “folk Orthodoxy”.86 Some nationalists treat religion, specifically Orthodoxy, as a criterion for belonging to the Russian nation. Members of the national community are Orthodox: not so much believers, but those belonging to “Orthodox tradition”, preserving what is best in Christianity and Slavic beliefs. Ethnic and religious identities are often equated with each other: every true Russian (in the ethnic sense) is by nature Orthodox. Moreover, the nation, which strongly binds its history with Christ, is called to do great things, above all to subordinate to itself the other ethnicities of Eurasia. Nationalists recognize Russia as an Orthodox state, whose well-being depends on the condition of the central ethnos, and the correct “ethno-cultural development” of Russians can only be ensured by “Orthodox therapy”. Written in this spirit was the resolution (11 December 2006) of the Orthodox Missionary Forum (Pravoslavniy Missionersky Forum/Православный миссио нерский форум) containing a plan for “saving Russia” which depends on the creation of a defence system for the “ethno-cultural health of the nation” by the combined efforts of the state, church and society within the framework of a “social partnership”. In the document, it is recognized as a priority to “save the ethnic

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 125 identity of Russians as the state-building nation”. It was proposed to establish institutes of “traditional religions” and centres of “ethno-cultural education and upbringing” and also to introduce throughout the entire federation a mandatory subject – “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” – and intensify Orthodox missionary activity among the native ethnicities of the Volga region.87 The problem of the ethno-cultural protection of Russians is touched on also by the leading ideologist of Eurasianism. Alexander Dugin often writes of Orthodoxy as a criterion of Russianness and of the need to maintain the high number and ethnic purity of the Russian ethnos. In this context, he uses the concept of “norms of ethno-cultural hygiene”.88 The oprichnina brotherhood, a form of Christian–Arian nationalism – which according to Alexander Verkhovsky represents a sort of nationalist-fundamentalist trend, and according to Roman Bäcker89 Orthodox fascism90 – goes decidedly further in its concern for the “hygiene” of the nation. The first communities of oprichniks were founded in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century within the Catacomb Church, and then appeared again on a wave of neo-Catacomb movements after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The views of the oprichniks are described in Russia as “Orthodox wahhabism”. Members of the communities, which function as knightly orders led by a tsar–hegumen, put religious identity above ethnic identity, claiming that the nation is defined by faith. They allow the use of violence towards “traitors and enemies”, popularize the forced conversion of all other ethnicities except for Jews, who they claim “cannot be converted”. In the process of salvation, an inseparable element of which is punishment, the oprichniks received the role of “God’s warriors” who are administers of justice, the fire that purifies the sinful earth and the force that leads to the rebirth of a Christian empire.91 Oprichina brotherhoods exist outside the structures of the ROC, towards which the communities even have a hostile relationship. For example, they consider the previous patriarch, Alexy II, to be the Antichrist (and the former president, Vladimir Putin, as well). The best-known is Andrei Shchedrin’s Oprichnina Brotherhood of Josif Volotsky established alongside Alexander Barkashov’s party (Russian National Unity). The community’s “headquarters” are in the Yaroslavl Region, in the village of Kashcheyevo, and the brotherhood publishes a magazine, Tsarsky Oprichnik,92 The oprichniks consider their ideologists to be historian Andrei Khvalin and Metropolitan Ioann. Among the figures acting outside the brotherhood, though with the same ideological trend, one might mention Yegor Kholmogorov, Archimandrite Tikhon Shevkunov, Protorey Vladislav Sveshnikov and Kirill Frolov from the Union of Orthodox Citizens. One of the most famous actions carried out until now by the oprichniks is the 1999 attack on a police station by “brothers” Alexander Sysoyev and Yevgeny Kharlamov, who shot four officials on Easter eve.93 The theses of nationalists that present religion as one of the three foundations of the eastern Slavic Russian nation (besides language and “common origin” from a mythical ancestor) are related to the conceptualization of Russian foreign policy in the “near abroad”. In this way, the ethnic and cultural separateness of Belarusians and Ukrainians is questioned – their nation-states are artificial creations, and their languages are Russian dialects.

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The church no doubt had its share in the construction and consolidation of the myth of one Orthodox nation of Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians, and of itself as – in its own convictions – one of the symbols of this unity. Orthodox tradition exhibits the idealized image of “Holy Rus”, the special status of Kiev – the mother of all Russian cities and the holy ground of the three-member community: one nation of one faith in one Orthodox Church, speaking one language, with one history and a common future.94 The special bond between Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians is emphasized not only by nationalists, but also by contemporary pan-Slavists. There is, however, a difference (albeit a subtle one) between the two positions. Nationalists emphasize the artificial nature of the separateness of their western neighbours, who – sooner or later – must “return” (or – in the radical version of this vision – will be forced to do so) to their one true, Russian identity. The pan-Slavists, on the other hand, accentuate above all the closeness of the three Slavic nations, which should face the cultural expansion of the West together. Both views are present in Russian imperialism. The vision of the unification of eastern Slavdom under the patronage of Russia is supported by both the defenders of the “All-Russian” and the “Great Russian” concepts. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, among others, argued for the restoration of the Orthodox, eastern Slavic community. In his book Russia under Avalanche in the chapter on “The Slavic Tragedy”, he writes that he is a decided opponent of panSlavism, which, has always been for Russia a conception beyond its strength. He further states that he has never approved of Russian concerns for the fate of the western Slavs (he considers the annexation of Polish and Czech lands a terrible mistake of Alexander I, as they “are far from us”) or the southern ones, where the care and sacrifice of Russians were repaid either with ingratitude (Bulgaria), or entanglement in a destructive war (Serbia). However, he expresses the deepest bitterness about what he considers the artificial split of eastern Slavdom.95 The writer repeatedly emphasized that only Moscow is and will remain the true “friend” of Kiev, for “no … insult can turn our hearts away from holy Kiev” and reasserts that there is one, tri-Slavic nation which joins in brotherhood Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians.96 Also Alexy Senin, on the pages of Russkiy Vestnik, defined the russkiy nation as the tri-Slavic nation. According to the politician of the strongly nationalistic Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the independence of Ukraine and Belarus are an anomaly, the elimination of which is a premise of re-creating the Russian Empire in Eurasia. Many nationalists, including Alexander Rutskoy and Alexander Prokhanov, emphasize that Ukraine and Belarus are an inseparable part of the Russian ethnos, which created Orthodox civilization, and that by separating themselves from Russia, they are rejecting their own true identity, without which they are condemned to “cultural extinction” in the twenty-first century. In the opinion of Natalia Narochnitskaya, Ukrainians and Belarusians are linked to Russia by an “allOrthodox destiny” – they are the bearers of Russian (Orthodox) civilization. It is worth emphasizing that the thesis on the unnatural character of the separateness

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 127 of Russia’s western neighbours can also be found in scholarly works: for example, Mikhail Mchedlov uses the concept of the Great Russian nation, in which the Russians, representing the highest degree of development, are called to take care of their “younger brothers” – Little Russians and Belarusians.97 In the media, in turn, every so often a more or less radical plan appears for uniting of Ukraine with Russia, which in combination with the Russian–Belarusian integration would help to restore the integrity of the eastern Slavic Orthodox nation. For example, after the “Orange” Revolution, Dmitry Yefremenko presented a “conceptual alternative to Ukrainian Galician nationalism”, involving the creation of a common state – a union of the presidential parliamentary system, where the president and vice president would represent the two nations, Russian– Ukrainian parties would exist and the most important state institutions would be located in different regions – the capital in Kiev, the National Bank and enterprises of the energy industry in Moscow, the Constitutional Court in St Petersburg and so on. As Yefremenko has emphasized, his plan – tentatively called “Kievan Rus II” (in reference to the roots of the common civilization) – would be directed not only towards the Russian political elite, but also towards Ukrainian parties, particularly the Party of Regions of Viktor Yanukovych and Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko.98 The conceptions concerning the restoration of unity of the “threemember Russian nation” are linked with two other slogans – safeguarding the Russian diaspora and (a wider notion) Russian cultural space (russkiy mir). All nationalists are concerned about the fate of the “Russians orphaned by the Soviet Union” – many of them, for example, Viktor Aksiuchits, speak of the “inadequacy” of the borders of the Russian state, which should extend over the territories dominated by Russians: Alexander Solzhenitsyn, among others, argued for the inclusion of northern Kazakhstan in a common state of Orthodox Slavs.99 The presence of the Russian minority thus marks out the borders of the federation, but there also appears the criterion of the presence of the Russian language as the natural limits of Russian territory. Although the Russian cultural space (russkiy mir) is represented by the ROC and by the involvement of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in the project as an initiative with the aim of building friendly relations between states of the former USSR, the radicals try to interpret russkiy mir in the spirit of Lebensraum, which is why Ukrainians and Latvians treat such initiatives with great scepticism. In the strongly differentiated Russian nationalism anti-Occidentalism and Islamophobia should be singled out. Both attitudes have a phobic nature resulting from a sense of threat connected with suspicion, dislike and even hostility towards another civilizations. Anti-Occidentalism is present in nearly every trend of Russian political thought, however in the case of nationalism it has particular significance as a factor by which national identity is constructed. In the process of the self-identification of the Russian state, the West plays a negative role, and Orthodox tradition has a large part in this. The eleventh-century schism between Rome and the four other Christian patriarchates lies at the base of the image of the West, which in the (still strong) view of Orthodox believers is perceived as a land ruled by the Antichrist.

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Throughout the centuries, the church, supported by the authorities, stood watch over the conscience of its faithful and tried to minimize the influence of the morally fallen West: for example, it was forbidden to bring in books in the Latin language, Latin scholarship was condemned, the significance of rationalism was devalued along with the secular science connected with it. A series of wars waged with the West were perceived by Russia in categories of two orders: sin and virtue, heretics and defenders of the revealed truth. The belief that the Vatican plans to destroy the Third Rome and extend its influence onto Russia’s territory was spread among Orthodox common folk. The church warned the faithful against the godless pope, the inquisition and the Jesuits who were the proverbial embodiment of hypocrisy. The nineteenth-century European industrial revolution was seen by many Russian Orthodox intellectuals mainly as a ruinous mechanism of society and nascent capitalism as a system forcing people to sell their souls to Mammon. In the opinion of many Russians, modern secularism, hedonism, nihilism and omnipresent egoism, strengthened by promotion of the individual’s rights instead of the community, bode of the quick downfall of Western civilization. At the beginning of the twenty-first century Russian nationalists view the Vatican as an unofficial member of the (hostile) NATO and remain steadfast in their conviction that the priority of the West, led by the USA, is the annihilation of Russia, the successor of Rome, responsible for the salvation of mankind. Russian civilization must reject the murderous “dictate of progress” promoted by the West and listen to “Russianness”. For even with a weak economy, lower GDP and outdated military, Orthodox Russia morally towers over the godless West. Such views are presented by, among others, Sergey Baburin, Gennady Raikov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky and clergymen such as Dmitry Dudko. In contrast to anti-Occidentalism, Islamophobia, as an increasingly strong social resentment, is a relatively new feature of Russian nationalism. Since the conquest and pacification of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century southern Muslims were presented in Russian literature as ruthless, cruel and wild highlanders who abduct for ransom or treacherously kill noble Russian officers whose mission is to bestow the benefits of civilization upon weakly developed peoples.100 However, from the times of the Mongols, Islam did not essentially threaten the Russian Empire. From Moscow’s viewpoint it stood lower on the civilizational ladder, while enemy number one remained the West. In the nineteenth century fears appeared with regard to Asians, mainly Japanese and Chinese, but it was only in the last decade of the twentieth century that people began to speak of the threat of a caliphate being established near Russia’s southern borders. The turbulent transformation, the sudden geopolitical and socio-economic change favoured the appearance in Russian society of xenophobic attitudes, which with time began to take on the character of dislike of Muslims. The source of this change was the pressure felt by the layers of society most affected by the changes brought about by immigrants from the former Soviet republics, prepared to work for lower pay than citizens of the Federation. The newcomers spoke Russian, but they kept together and acted with ethnic solidarity. With time, they began to dominate in certain industries, above all markets. Gradually, Islamophobia

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 129 increasingly became a visible feature of the immigration phobia. Comparison of the two Russian aversions – towards Americans and towards Muslims – reveals that the former is based partly on envy while the latter on fear. Negative feelings towards Islamic believers in Russia have a predominantly economic basis, because of the fear of losing work to an immigrant, and a “threatening newcomer” is increasingly often equated with a Muslim. Under the influence of such events as the conflict in Chechnya or the bloody terrorist attacks on the theatre in Dubrovka, in the Moscow underground or on the school in Beslan – chorniye (dark or black people)101 – are becoming an increasingly obvious object of hate. For this reason, in works on Islamophobia the concept of “Caucasus phobia” appears often.102 The social discontent in relation to the Caucasian minority has reached a level in which ethnically motivated riots easily break out, as for example in April 2006 in Kondopoga (Karelia), where, as commentators described it, a “pogrom of chorniye” took place. For two days, Russian residents demonstrated against the presence of Caucasian immigrants, while at night there occurred destruction of property, burning of stalls, shops and market stands belonging to “outsiders” while the police remained passive and the city council remained silent.103 Sociological studies concerned with social moods try to provide answers to the question of the causes of such occurrences. They suggest that, among other things, the slogan “Russia for Russians” is supported by an increasing number of citizens. In 2007 half of Russians accepted it (in 2006 only 34.5 per cent). Half of those surveyed consider the outburst of ethnically motivated riots in Russia as very likely – in Moscow and St Petersburg as many as 89 per cent of those questioned shared this opinion. Thirty per cent of those interviewed believe that Russians are discriminated against in Russia, which is manifested in their marginalization in the markets. Moreover, immigrants are ungrateful, behave provocatively and fail to show their “Russian hosts” the respect they deserve. Thirty-two per cent of respondents claimed that to some extent non-Russians are responsible for Russia’s misfortunes, and 78 per cent are convinced that the immigrants themselves carry the blame for Russians’ growing dislike of them.104 An essential change concerns the image of Islam: more than half of those surveyed recognize it as an aggressive religion and more hostile towards Orthodoxy than towards Catholicism. Asked in 2005 as to the source of potential threats, 27.3 per cent of respondents indicated Islamic influences, 17.6 per cent the growing popularity of national chauvinists, 17 per cent the expansion of the West, 9.3 per cent China’s activity and 8.5 per cent Zionists.105 A testimony to the growing tension between Muslims and Orthodox Christians is another act of violence with a religious background: the murder of the Orthodox missionary Danila Sysoev, the enfant terrible of the Russian Orthodox Church, known for his missionary activity in traditionally Muslim communities (he boasted of having converted 80 people) and his critical remarks on Islam. He was shot on 19 November 2009 in front of the church of St Thomas in Moscow. His murder was condemned by all the muftiates but this did not prevent him being called the “Russian Salman Rushdie”.106

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Populist nationalists quickly attuned themselves to the social moods and began to create political capital using slogans about holding back the Islamization of Russia, drastically limiting immigration from Muslim countries, fighting panTurkism in Central Asia and keeping Russia prepared for the real threat of an anti-Orthodox jihad. It should be noted, however, that nationalists do not present a united front on the “Islamic question”. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, although characteristically chaotic in his statements, speaks of the “threat of an Islamic onslaught”,107 but Eduard Limonov or Alexander Prokhanov, for example, do not rule out a union of Orthodoxy and Islam against the West.108 In their view, antiOccidentalism takes precedence over Islamophobia. Taking into consideration views on Russian foreign policy, it seems that nationalism is a greater threat to the separateness of neighbouring Slavic states than it is to the stability of Russia’s borders with Muslim countries.

The Orthodox component of Slavic solidarity In the Slavic trend of Russian political thought, religion is an essential premise of the ethnic (Slavic) community. Orthodoxy is considered as the true religion of Slavs – the heirs of the mission of Cyril and Methodius. Those Slavic nations that did not accept baptism in the Greek rite lost their true identity under the influence of Latinization, which is why the Slavic community does not include Poles, Czechs, Croatians or Slovenians, while Bulgaria and Romania are included in it. The idea of Slav solidarity is a general, collective concept that contains in itself Russian Slavophilia, Austroslavism, Illyrism, pan-Slavism, Yugoslavism, neoSlavism, the idea of a central European federation of Slavs and so on. Its most important element is the assumption that the Slavic peoples (among which nations that are ethnically not Slavic are often counted) constitute a community due to their common origins (often the subject of mythologization, a prominent example of which is the legend of Lech, Czech and Rus), similarity of culture and customs (mostly language), and also their similar historical development (constant struggle to protect their territory and native languages against the efforts of Germanic and Turkish ethnic groups). This conviction lies at the base of many joint Slavic initiatives and action and even projects to create a common state. For these reasons, it exerted an influence on the foreign policy of Slavic states, especially Russia. Neo-pan-Slavists single out Orthodox–Slavic civilization – the solid core of which is a three-member union in the eastern variant (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) or a “union of the most loyal” (Russia, Belarus, Serbia). In each case, Russia alone, as the empire which in the past had given freedom to all Orthodox nations, is capable of playing the role of the leader mobilizing Slavdom to close cooperation and creation of a common front against the West. Compared to nationalists, contemporary propagators of Slavic solidarity treat the separateness of Ukrainians and Belarusians with more restraint and emphasize their natural, cultural and religious, closeness. Often, however, it is difficult to separate the two trends – for example, on 6 July 2008 the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods addressed a proclamation to Orthodox citizens of “Rus–Ukraine”,

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 131 of which the addressees were “brothers and sisters of Slavic-Russian lands”. The authors warned that the West had found the next object of its aggression after Kosovo, namely the “place where Russia’s heart beats”: Orthodox Ukraine. Inciting unrest in Ukraine, the West is striking at the unity of the ROC, using the Uniates, Protestants and numerous sects to achieve its aim of federalizing Ukraine. The proclamation ends with an appeal for all Orthodox believers to stand in defence of the “Russian holy land”.109 Of all the trends presented above, neo-pan-Slavism is the least popular. Among the most important groups, there is a lack of those who would put “Slavic brotherhood” on their list of priorities. It is not easy to point to any ideologists of “pure” neo-pan-Slavism, with the exception of the views of Yevgeny Troitsky. He suggests making “Slavic brotherhood” the foundation of the “Russian idea”, with the further perspective of giving the community a state framework, because it is only in this way that the actions of the West – which supports “Slavic separatism” – be held in check. In such a state of Slavs, Russia would play the role of patron, guardian and defender of its “brothers”.110 Particular Slavic motifs can be found in the views of imperialists, Eurasianists and nationalists. For example, Alexander Panarin lamented over the disintegration of the so-called Eastern Bloc – the “Slavic empire”. In this opinion, “it is indisputable that in the Central European geopolitical system, Ukraine awaits the status of a marginal state … . Ukraine and Belarus obviously gain more in a geopolitical union with Russia than compared to a situation in which they are pulled into the Romano-Germanic system that is more foreign to them.”111 According to A. Panarin, this same fate was already experienced by Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the republics of the former Yugoslavia. “In the framework of the socialist camp, Poles and Czechs played the role of the reference groups, while Warsaw and Prague were perceived by the Eurasian nations living behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ as our own Paris. Leaving for the West, these nations were transformed from cultural leaders into a Slavic margin of the Romano-Germanic system.”112 Although Panarin laments this escape from the “civilizational home of Slavs” (the “Eastern Bloc”), he argues that the Slavic nations lying to the west of the Bug river have, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a historic mission to accomplish. They must at all costs must transform central Europe into an “autonomous Slavic world” and not allow themselves to “dissolve in epigonic Atlantism”. This mission could end successfully only in cooperation with Russia: to save their identity from the “destructive German element”, western Slavs need a strong Russia. Slavic slogans also appear among nationalists. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, during the NATO bombing of Belgrade in 1999, demanded support for the “Serbian brothers in the name of pan-Orthodox and pan-Slavic solidarity”.113 Earlier in the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Russian volunteers had taken part, having been recruited by, among others, a member of the “National Republican Party of Russia”, Yuri Belayev.114 In September 2006 in Moscow, on the initiative of Sergey Baburin, an international assembly of parties of Orthodox nations was held, in which nationalists

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from Russia (Narodnaya Vola, National Conservative Party of Russia), Bulgaria, Transnistria, Ukraine (Party of Regions), Romania and Serbia participated. The leaders present called upon the governments of their states to cooperate, show solidarity and develop historical ties between Orthodox Slavs. They argued for the rebirth of Orthodox civilization with their combined forces, which under the leadership of Russia would – in a multi-polar world – promote constructive dialogue with other civilizations, especially Islam and Western Christianity.115 Among propagators of the strengthening of the “Slavic community”, Anastasia Mitrofanova mentions Boris Itskhakov, Natalia Narochnitskaya, Ilia Chislav, Mikhail Kuznetsov and also Alexander Lukashenka. Institutions connected with the ROC play a critical role in fortifying the spirit of unity and brotherhood of Orthodox Slavs. One of these is the Russian Slavic Fund, founded in 1990 (directed by Galina Bogolyubova), over which the ROC holds patronage. The most important aim of this organization is to “fortify friendly relations with brotherly Slavic nations”. It is responsible for, among other things, the annual organization of Days of Slavic Written Language and Culture, during which the Cyril and Methodius Prize is awarded (it was awarded to, among others, to Alexander Lukashenka, Vladimir Putin and Yury Luzhkov). Moreover, the fund prepares symposia, conferences and publications devoted to Slavic topics.116 The World Russian National Sobor also tries to promote the solidarity of Slavs: for example, during the assembly in March 2007, a section called Orthodoxy – The Core of the Community of Nations of Russia and Eastern Slavs was created, in which ways of fortifying Orthodox (Slavic) civilization were debated.117 For four years, camps have been organized – under the initiative called “Slavic Friendship” for students from Slavic countries. At one of these meetings, in June 2008 in Sochi, a forum was organized under the title “The 1020th Anniversary of the Baptism of Rus: The Foundation of Slavic Nations’ Unity”.118 The activity of the International Fund of Unity of Orthodox Nations (Mezhdunarodniy Fond Yedinstva Pravoslavnikh Narodov/Международный Фонд Единства Православных Народов), which has been in existence since 1995, enjoys great respect – it is composed of clergymen representing particular Orthodox churches and respected figures from the world of science, culture and politics. Each year, the fund grants the prestigious Patriarch Alexy II Award (the new name was accepted after the death of the patriarch on 10 December 2008) as a recognition for “activity on behalf of strengthening the unity of Orthodox nations”. Among the circle of awardees there are clergymen, politicians, social institutions and enterprises.119 The views of Valery Alekseyev – who has uninterruptedly been serving as chairman since 1995 – fit in with the Slavic trend: he emphasizes the role of Orthodoxy as the binder of Slavdom and claims that the process of widening the borders of the European Union marginalizes Orthodox nations in Europe, forcing them to accept the status of second-class nations.120 The initiatives mentioned above indicate that after the break-up of the USSR, it was mainly the ROC that took upon itself the role of propagator of the idea of Slavic solidarity.

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The mission of Russian Orthodox civilization Seeing Russia as a separate Orthodox (Eurasian, Russian) civilization is characteristic of Imperialism, neo-Eurasianism, Nationalism and neo-pan-Slavism. All these ideas contain the view that due to its unique multi-national and multiconfessional model, connected with the synthesis of Orthodoxy and Islam, this civilization has a particular mission to fulfil. It should create an alternative to the West, prevent the “clash of civilizations”, support the poorest, to put it short save humanity. Orthodox civilization does not present a separate ideological trend. But the idea stands out due to the fact that in recent years it serves as a common slogan of the Kremlin and the ROC. “Orthodox civilization” expresses the convergence of the vision of the state and the church in relation to such problems as identity, the global order and mission. Orthodox civilization is one of the identification options of the Russian Federation.121 Using somewhat different concepts, referring to different arguments, the two sides share similar ideas concerning spheres of influence, the vision of the world order and the civilizational specificity and mission of Russia. The convergence of the attitudes of the church and the Kremlin were most quickly revealed when each defined its own interests in the post-Soviet space. Near the end of 1992 the then-foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, and presidential advisor, Andranik Migranian, began to use the term “near abroad” in reference to the former Soviet republics, which assumed recognition of the territory of the former USSR as a zone of particular influence and vital interests for Russia, where the activity of other international agents aimed at undermining Russia’s position was not to be tolerated. The politicians argued that Moscow must do all that is in its power to maintain its domination in the region and restrain the activity of the West, especially NATO’s eastward expansion. The “near abroad” encompasses all the former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic states, and corresponds approximately to the canonical territory of the ROC, which extends over the Pribaltyka, but not Georgia or Armenia. In this context the ROC was appealing to the canons accepted during the times of the universal church, which demanded that individual Christian churches respect its canonical zone of exclusive influence, the territory subject to the patriarchate’s administration.122 In the face of the impending fragmentation of the Soviet state, two months before its official dissolution and one year before Migranian formulated the concept of “near abroad”, the Holy Synod of the ROC on 22 October 1991 accepted the formula “several states; one patriarchate” (neskolko gosudarstv – odin patriarchat/несколько государств – один патриархат),123 explaining that the break-up of the secular federation is not sufficient reason to violate the holy unity of the church. The ROC recognized as its priority the protection of the integrity of its canonical territory, and as its greatest threat the activity of nationalist and pro-Western groups in the former Soviet republics, the policy of the Vatican and the proselytism of Protestant churches. The priority of maintaining the unity of the church, including the unity of “Holy Rus”, was supported by the resolution On

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the Unity of the Church, published by the Archbishops’ Sobor in June 2008. The “near abroad” and the canonical territory assume the maintenance of the post-Soviet area within the orbit of Russian influence and opposition to the West’s open undermining of Moscow’s and the patriarchate’s dominance in the territory of the former USSR. As regards the vision of global order, the government presented its position first, which was later supported by the church. Soon after assuming the office of Foreign Affairs Minister in 1996, Yevgeny Primakov proposed an alternative to the Pax Americana in the form of a new multi-polar order in which the hegemony of the USA is balanced by the close cooperation of Moscow, Beijing and Delhi. Near the end of the 1990s the idea of multi-polarism began to appear in the statements of hierarchs and church publications as well, with the difference that the church replaced great powers (centres of power) with civilizations. It promoted a union of traditional civilizations against “Westernization” and defended the right to preserve civilizational separateness. The chairman of the Department of External Relations, Metropolitan Kirill, often emphasized that the concept of multi-polarism promoted by Russian diplomats should be widened to include civilizational pluralism.124 In his appearance at MGIMO in 2002, the chairman of the church Foreign Affairs Ministry remarked: Orthodoxy is a whole world, a civilization no less significant than Islamic or Western European. The stability of the future global order depends on how the world will treat this civilization. Will Orthodox civilization be appropriately represented in the new world order that is forming as a result of European integration and globalization? We pose the question: Can a monopolar world exist with regards to culture? … . An order built on the foundations of one civilizational model does not favour stabilization.125 During a meeting in 2003 with diplomats at the headquarters of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Alexy II spoke of the necessity of creating a multi-polar world, and at the same time emphasized that Russia should keep its own model of civilizational development. In order to achieve this, Russian cultural space on the Eurasian continent should be fortified. The patriarch said: Today it is especially important to define the place and role of Russia in a dynamically changing world … . Russia should become one of the world poles, one of the key decision-making centres of the world. At the same time, Russia must remain itself and protect the values of its separate, thousandyear-old civilization. The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian diplomacy together act on behalf of a multi-polar, multi-cultural, just and free world.126 Russia’s civilizational identity is the third element of the united front of the church and the Kremlin. During the time of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the authorities were subjected to increasing criticism by Western states and international organizations for the clear weakening of democratic processes, unfair

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 135 treatment of the opposition, the return of censorship and so on. In answer to these accusations, people in the government more and more often appealed to Russia’s civilizational specificity, which requires an adaptation of a democratic system; that is, the creation of a Russian version of this system, for example, in the form of a “controlled democracy”. The church kept its distance from the “system of rule by the will of the people” and stood on the government’s side in this matter, promoting the concept of “Orthodox democracy” based on the values of Eastern Christianity. A break-through moment for the Kremlin and the ROC were the so-called coloured revolutions, especially the triumph of the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine at the end of 2004 and beginning of 2005. This event unified the stance of the government and the church. Both subjects wanted to keep their influence in Ukraine, had a lot to lose in the case of victory of Victor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine,127 and also perceived the “Orange Revolution” as an example of the “clash of civilizations” – Western and Slavic-Orthodox, in the light of which Russia had to fortify its position as soon as possible.128 A new conception – “sovereign democracy” – arose in circles connected with the Kremlin. While deprived of the “Slavic” tone, it does express a specific Russian concept. Its outline was first presented by Vladislav Surkov on 7 February 2006 during a meeting with representatives of the youth organization of the party Yedinaya Rossiya. Surkov spoke of, among other things, three priorities – rebuilding social solidarity, forming a responsible and involved new elite and using culture (tradition) as a building material for national identity, appealing here to the sobornost’ of the Russian nation. In this new concept commentators saw an attempt to give the Kremlin’s activities the form of a doctrine, an attempt to propose a new legitimation of power and a new social contract, and also a subtle reference to the triad of “Orthodoxy, samoderzhavie, narodnost”,129 Roman Bäcker draws attention to the geopolitical concept of sovereignty: “sovereign democracy involves a struggle with external democratization, which is in reality a mechanism of de-sovereignization”; that is, the concept of “sovereign democracy” has a defensive character.130 From the perspective of the ROC, “sovereign democracy” corresponded to “Orthodox democracy”. In both cases, the goal was to take into consideration the tradition and spirituality of Russian civilization when forming the political system. On 6 April 2006 the sobor accepted the Orthodox Declaration of Human Rights and Dignity,131 which the authorities received with respect. Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the document conveys the heart of Russian foreign policy, for just as the church’s document does not negate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we, too “confirm our European choice, which does not mean resigning from the sovereignty of Russia abroad”.132 The central idea reflecting the common position of the state and the church is civilization – the government prefers the description “Eurasian” or “Russian”, while the church (understandably) prefers “Orthodox”. What is interesting is that the spread of the expression “Russian civilization” among the hierarchs is attributed to the present patriarch, Kirill.133

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The Kremlin and the church are also brought together by the notion of Russia’s mission. Two aspects can be singled out: the positive, such as the patronage of the dialogue of civilizations, and the negative (less noticeable with the Kremlin, but emphasized by some of the hierarchs), such as the union of traditional civilizations against “Westernization” or domination by the West. Connected with the negative aspect of the mission is the Kremlin’s aversion to the liberalism promoted by Americans – the “American version of globalization” (in one interview, Metropolitan Kirill stressed that he is against globalization, if it means the domination of one civilizational model, that of the West)134 – and the ROC’s hostility to ecumenism and “global secularism”. Besides the common vision of identity and the global order, another thing that binds the church and the Kremlin is anti-Occidentalism or, to be precise, the view of the West as a serious threat and the conviction that Russia must regain its position as a great power on the international scene. Moreover, the two sides agree that one of the conditions of Russia’s rebirth is its moral renewal in the spirit of traditional Russian (Orthodox) values. President Putin, stated during the formal signing of the act restoring the canonical union of the ROC with the ROC Outside Russia that “national rebirth and the development of Russia are impossible without appealing to its historical and spiritual heritage … we appreciate the power of influence of the pastoral word that unites the Russian nation and this is why the restoration of the unity of the Church serves our common goals”.135 A concept that is appearing increasingly often in deliberations on Orthodox civilization is russkiy mir, referring to the variously understood Russian spiritual space, Russian cultural space or the space of the Russian language. While the three descriptions are mainly used in documents of state organs,136 the term russkiy mir was spread in Orthodox circles. Russkiy mir has a subtle mythological aura, it assumes the existence of a separate world of Russian spirituality, the integrity of which was violated by political events, but which will be re-created, and the first step in this direction is overcoming the internal schism of the Russian church. At the above mentioned occasion of the restoration of the canonical union Vladimir Putin also stressed that this act would lay the groundwork for building the unity of the entire russkiy mir, the core of which is the Orthodox faith.137 Characteristically, the term began to appear in the statements of not only the clergy, but also of politicians when Western states’ criticism of Russia began to intensify. Russkiy mir is more and more often presented as a Russian civilizational project. The convergence of the church’s vision with that of the state is evident in the statements of both clergy and politicians. The late Patriarch Alexy II and the present – Kirill – very often emphasized the benefits of a multi-polar order, and spoke of an “Orthodox democracy” and the threat of “Westernization”. Many hierarchs directly linked the safeguarding of Orthodox identity with Russia’s status as a great power: for example, Vsevolod Chaplin argued that the Russian state should develop its military potential in order to be able to repel any invasion and defend its civilizational separateness, especially from the USA and NATO.138 Putin usually spoke of Russia as a Eurasian civilization, a “civilization–bridge”, marked

Religion in Russian views on foreign policy 137 by its multi-confessional, multi-ethnic character, tolerance and interreligious dialogue.139 This is why Russia should become an intercessor of interreligious dialogue in the twenty-first century.140 In turn, the ministers of the Russian Federation speaking on international forums frequently describe Russia as an Orthodox civilization. The term was used, for example, by ministers Igor Ivanov,141 Sergey Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov,142 who repeatedly assured representatives of other states that the ROC can play an important role in holding back the “clash of civilizations”.143 These themes also appeared in President Dmitry Medvedev’s speech on the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Rus. The president emphasized that Russia was a separate, Orthodox civilization, distinguished by its unusual synthesis of elements of West and East (Christianity and Islam). Connected with Russian civilization is the russkiy mir, combined by a common religion and language (the president mentioned Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). Considering its unique religious tolerance, Russia should play an important role in the dialogue of religions (civilizations) in the world.144 It is worth emphasizing that the slogan “Orthodox civilization” falls on “fertile” social ground. In studies conducted by the Levada Centre in 2008, 58 per cent of respondents stated that Russia should follow its own path of development, which means mainly creating a system in which the state takes care of the people (34 per cent), defends its own values and traditions that differ from Western ones (22 per cent) and realizes its own mission (5 per cent). A decided majority (82 per cent) agreed with Fyodor Tyutchev, that Russia cannot be understood, it can only be believed in, which suggests the mythologization of the state and the conviction of its “exceptional destiny”. As one of the most important sources of Russia’s distinctness, 80 per cent of those questioned indicated its spirituality. According to 82 per cent of respondents, Russia has always been a state of a “great spiritual culture” and that due to this spiritual/moral barrier, the West cannot understand Russia. Russians differ from “people of the West” mainly because of their “spiritual structure” (82 per cent), and because, among other things, only Russians are inclined to self-sacrifice (71 per cent), put spiritual matters over material goods (28 per cent), the interests of the community over those of the individual (19 per cent), and because they are a religious nation, which kept its pure Christian faith (50 per cent). Fiftynine per cent do not consider themselves Europeans (compared to 32 per cent who think otherwise), 48 per cent view the West as a separate civilization, and 77 per cent state that “Western democracy” cannot be realized in Russia, which must create its own system, corresponding to its cultural specificity.145 The union wrought by the ROC and the Kremlin under the influence of the “Orange” trauma was sealed by the patriarchate’s “blessing” of Dmitry Medvedev’s “anointment” as Vladimir Putin’s “official” candidate in the presidential elections of 2008. It should be emphasized that the formula “Orthodox civilization” does not close the road to the muftiates’ cooperation with the Kremlin. The Moscow patriarchate and Muslim institutions cooperate on the domestic scene with state organs within the framework of the still unregulated

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“social partnership”, and on the international scene they appear under the banner of Russian civilization. The converging visions of identity (a separate civilization), the global order (multi-polarism) and mission (a leader in the new balance of power between the West and other civilizations, the patron of interreligious dialogue) are a solid foundation for the cooperation of religious institutions with the Russian state in the world. Table 3.1 Correlation of goals and ideas of the Kremlin and the ROC Issue

Kremlin

Russian Orthodox Church

Post-soviet area

“Near abroad” (the sphere of essential interests of Russia)

Identity Political system

Eurasian/Russian civilization “Sovereign democracy” (social partnership)

Canonical territory (the sphere of essential interests of Russia) Orthodox civilization “Orthodox democracy” (social partnership)

Global order

Geo-political multi-polarism

Mulit-polarism of civilizations

Allies

Strategic partnership (China, India)

Mission

Shaping new, better-balanced global order, overcoming the dominance of the USA, bridging the gap between West and East

Alliance of conservative civilizations (China, India, Iran) Shaping a more just global order, halting the process of Westernization, promoting interfaith dialogue

Part II

Religious diplomacy of the Russian Federation

4

Characteristics of Russian “religious diplomacy”

Religious diplomacy can be described as state activity consisting of the use of the religious factor in foreign policy; that is, the whole set of mechanisms of the state’s cooperation with religious associations in the pragmatically defined national interest, use of the international activity of religious institutions, ideas and religious symbols (appropriately interpreted for realization of current political aims) and so on. By stressing pragmatism I wish to emphasize that the use of the religious factor does not necessarily imply that the actor (i.e. the decision maker, in most cases, politicians or state organs) implementing it, personally professes any belief. Although the actor usually has at least a sentimental relationship to the given belief, this does not necessarily have to be the case – the religious factor can be used in foreign policy regardless of the decision-maker’s attitude to transcendence. Pragmatical considerations are evident in the way the Kremlin and the ROC influence each other. The relationship between the two is a mutual (albeit far from equal) influence and co-dependency. At present, the political elites of the Russian Federation are trying to rebuild the country’s distinct geo-political and historical identity and thereby enhance Russia’s position in the globalized world. In this situation Russian Orthodox tradition appears as a particular asset which can be important for purposes of forming identity, legitimization, international image and so on. The particularity of this asset arises from the fact that it is, at the same time, a component of cultural legacy. In this context it necessarily determines the behaviour of policy-makers. The religious factor’s role in foreign policy is thus situated somewhere between “reasons for action” and “assets” which can be instrumentalized for specific purposes. An important aspect to keep in mind in this context is that the state has a dominant position in relation to the church (or wider religious institutions). The dominant position of the state is reflected, among others, by the fact that in case of divergence of opinions or interests it is the religious institution which adapts to the Kremlin and not vice versa. The Kremlin views Russian Orthodoxy as important component for constructing Russia’s new identity and favours interfaith dialogue as one of key elements of Russia’s mission. The authorities view the ROC and muftiates as loyal institutions eager to work for the good of the state. Therefore the

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Kremlin finds it reasonable to support its “players” and thereby develop its “assets”. It is not a matter of belief but rather political calculation that motivates the decision makers to strengthen the potential of the ROC and muftiates as trans-national subjects. The conviction of the authorities that the ROC or muftiates act in Russia’s advantage is the point of departure for “religious diplomacy”. If it were not for this assumption, the Kremlin would not lend its support to religious institutions on the international arena. The state reinforces and protects them because it is convinced that this brings political benefit. It might often seem that it is the Russian state which backs the church and not vice versa, but in fact the state never loses sight of raisons d’état. Cooperation comes naturally since both sides have defined common ground and perceive rapprochement in their mutual interest (see Chapter 6). The state and the church are almost always in consensus regarding the actions of the latter in the international area. The personal aspect of religious factor (i.e. identification of decision makers with e.g. Orthodox Christianity) can play a role in Russia’s “religious diplomacy”; however, considering Russian foreign policy in general, this is necessarily only one of the reasons determining the use of religion in international activity of the state. In Russia’s foreign policy, use of the religious factor has a long tradition (see Chapter 1). The Contemporary “religious diplomacy” of the Russian Federation is motivated by the necessity of ensuring “spiritual security”,1 which should be understood as protection of Russia’s identity, tradition and culture. “Spiritual security”, treated as a component of national security, is closely connected with cultural (civilizational) sovereignty – not so much complete independence from outside influences (impossible to achieve in the face of globalization), but rather the ability to resist civilizational pressure. The adequacy of the term “sovereignty” in the context of “spiritual security” is confirmed by the idea of “spiritual aggression” that appears, for example, in the agreement on cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ROC.2 The goal of such aggression is the “reduction of the spiritual/moral potential of society” and a blow to the “state’s spirituality”, which is the foundation of its identity. The cultural expression of spirituality is one of the factors indicating the extent of a given state’s (civilization’s) influence, thus in the “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” accepted during Vladimir Putin’s administration, the restraint of the “cultural– religious expansion of particular states” in the historically Russian spiritual space is considered of crucial importance. The Federal Security Service recognizes as threatening not only totalitarian sects, but also the Catholic Church and Protestant communities (which it considers even more dangerous than Islamic extremists). In the FSB’s assessment, the activity of these institutions undermines the status of “traditional religions”, especially the Orthodox Church – the central institution of the religious system created and supervised by the Russian state. Foreign or “non-traditional” religions disturb the religious equilibrium of the country – which is crucial for the internal dimension of “spiritual security.” In the external dimension, “spiritual security” requires

Characteristics of Russian “religious diplomacy” 143 the building of a civilizational sphere of influence – of the Russian cultural (spiritual) space, the russkiy mir. References to religion can also be found in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation from 12 May 2009. Religious extremism connected with the activity of certain religious organizations was recognized as a threat to the Russian state. The document emphasizes that traditional Russian values, spirituality and respect for historical memory are being reborn in society and, at that, in circumstances in which the value system and model of development have become the object of global rivalry among the great powers. For this reason, protection of the cultural and spiritual heritage is a priority, and the development of spiritual values encourages the strengthening of national security. The strategy points out the role of culture (including religion) in supporting the unity of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Russian population (in this sphere, the state wants to cooperate with other institutions, which corresponds to a “social partnership” of the church and government), and also in the creation of an appropriate international image of Russia. Such a clear emphasis on the spiritual dimension testifies as to Russia’s selfidentification in terms of civilization (Russian/Orthodox/Eurasian) and to the Russian elite’s view of the global order in terms of civilizational multi-polarism. It is in Russia’s interest to carry out a cultural (civilizational) policy that is an alternative to “Westernism”, and in which “religious diplomacy” is actually a crucial element. Supervision is managed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which in close cooperation with the presidential office marks out the goals for activities of religious institutions beyond Russia’s borders.3 Among the priorities of the Moscow patriarchate are the integration of the Russian diaspora and the strengthening of Russian influence in the “near abroad”,4 especially through the cultivation of cultural ties of Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine, which is an important element of maintaining the Russian cultural space in Eurasia5 (it is no coincidence that Patriarch Kirill announced his plans to visit Belarus and Ukraine during his first months in office). The nearly 20-million strong diaspora6 on post-Soviet territory is distinguished by above-average religiosity (and with a decidedly greater attendance at religious practices than in Russia) and great attachment to the ROC, which is treated as a substitute institution for the homeland. In these states, where other Orthodox churches exist outside the structures of the Moscow patriarchate, belonging to the ROC is also a manifestation of patriotism. The church’s activity, which involves supporting ties of sootechestvenniks with the homeland, influences interstate relations. For example, it fits into the so-called Medvedev doctrine, recognizing Russia’s right to protect its citizens who live beyond its borders in the post-Soviet area. The special role of the church in the “near abroad” is shown by the presence of clergymen in the work of state organs concerning activity in the post-Soviet space – for instance, Bishop Mark of Yegoryevsk took part in deliberations in the Duma on the topic of integration in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) territory.7 Care for Russians living beyond the territory of the former USSR has less of a political character, but is nevertheless very important for integrating the Russian minority and turning it into an active Russian lobby. Such operations of the ROC

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take place in Western Europe, where parishes bring together emigrants and organize cultural life. Another example is the activity of the patriarchate in Latin America. The ROC is the strongest and in fact the only institution on the South American continent bringing Russians together. One of the known initiatives is the “Russian Days” – propagating mainly questions of faith, Russian spirituality and culture – organized with the participation of Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry in several Latin American states.8 A relatively new challenge for the ROC is the integration of the increasingly numerous Russian diaspora in Israel. Clergyman Andrei Kurayev emphasized that the Moscow patriarchate should increase its activity among the Russianspeaking Jews – inter alia in order to pave the way for strengthening Russia’s influence in the Middle East.9 To this problem Chapter 10 is dedicated. Supporting the diaspora’s ties with Russia, with its native culture and, above all, its language and faith serves to maintain the Russian cultural space. An interesting aspect of marking out the symbolic borders of the russkiy mir is placing religious signs – churches, chasovni (chapels) and crosses – in sensitive places. For example, in 2003 on Kolguyev Island, the northern most chapel was erected, demonstrating Russian activity in the Arctic.10 In February 2004 the first Orthodox church at the Faddey (Fabrian) Bellingshausen polar station in Antarctica was established – visible from 30 kilometres away, the Church of the Holy Trinity is the first noticeable object from the sea after rounding Tierra del Fuego and a symbol of the Russian presence on the coldest continent.11 In 2004 Sakhalin Cossacks put up crosses on disputed islands of southern Kuril, signifying in this manner “Orthodox, Russian land”,12 and four years later Crimean Cossacks put up crosses on the edges of their village of Zuya Belogorskaya, which was taken by the Tatar population as Russian provocation and was complained about in court.13 In accordance with the expectations of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the activity of the muftiates should encourage closer ties between Russia and Muslim countries, contribute to building a positive image of the Russian Federation and also help limit the influence of Islamic extremists in Russia and help win the acceptance of the Muslim elite for the Kremlin’s actions in Chechnya. It is worth emphasizing that the Kremlin uses not only the muftiates, but also secular Muslim politicians (mostly from Tatarstan), presenting them in the international arena as symbols of the emancipation and independence of Allah’s faithful in Russia. The common task of the church and the muftiates is the creation, within the framework of their international activity, of a positive image of Russia as a “civilizational bridge” and a patron of interreligious dialogue. Religious institutions maintain their own network of contacts which are a valuable, additional diplomatic channel at the Kremlin’s disposal. During meetings with representatives of other states, Orthodox and Muslim clergymen are treated as representatives of not only their religious communities, but also Russia. Very often, governments offer a gesture of their goodwill towards the ROC, wanting to send a positive signal to the Kremlin. A good example of the functioning of this mechanism is Russian–Latvian relations, where the Moscow patriarchate represents the interests of the Russian minority. In March 2004 Alexy II announced that he would

Characteristics of Russian “religious diplomacy” 145 not go to Latvia until the status of the Russian language in schools was positively settled, which was taken to be a symptom of a clear cooling of relations between Riga and Moscow.14 However, after the patriarch’s visit in May 2006, Prime Minister Aigar Kavitis declared that he accepted the visit of the head of the ROC as a sign of a warming in relations with Russia and a signal from the Kremlin of a new openness in bilateral relations.15 The hope that a meeting with a representative of Russian religious institutions foretold a growth in Russia’s activity with regards to Iraq was expressed also by Saddam Hussein, for example, when he met with Mufti Rawil Gaynetdin in Baghdad in 2001. A delegation of Japan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry indicated similar expectations during a conversation with Metropolitan Kirill in July 2005, as did a Cuban delegation in September 2008. For creating a favourable image of Russia, emphasizing its civilizational uniqueness and its vision of the global order, the activity of Russia’s “traditional religions” – led by the ROC – in the forums of international organizations is very valuable. The church belongs to the most important organizations of religious institutions – among others, the World Council of Churches, the Conference of European Churches (although on 11 October 2008, the ROC suspended its membership),16 the European Congress of Religious Leaders (ESRL), the World Conference of Religions for Peace and to less significant groups such as the Council on Cooperation of Christian Churches in the Barents region17 and the Forum of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions.18 The ROC also cooperates with secular organizations. For example, after a meeting of Metropolitan Kirill in Brussels in 1999 with representatives of parliament and EU Commission, the Moscow patriarchate decided to form a permanent representation with the European Union institutions. Since 2002 the role of representative has been performed by the bishop of Vienna and Austria, Hilarion (since March 2009, the archbishop and chairman of the Department of External Relations and a member of the Holy Synod).19 Establishment of a regular mechanism of consultation allowed the ROC to intensify contacts with the EU and react in a timely manner to the work of the institutions. The patriarchate has devoted a lot of attention to the plan of the Constitutional Treaty: for example, in 2001 the ROC worked out its own official position on the White Paper on the systemic solutions in the EU published by the European Commission. The church’s involvement was noticed by Romano Prodi, who in an official letter invited the hierarchs of the Russian church to participate in the work on regulations concerning religious institutions, and in March 2002 the ROC took part in sessions of the Convention on the Future of Europe. In June 2002 Metropolitan Kirill, at a meeting with representatives of the European Commission, suggested holding a dialogue between the ROC and the EU on the topic of a multi-polar civilizational order.20 Over the next year, the ROC took part in a debate on values in the Constitutional Treaty, and Metropolitan Kirill even sent a letter with the church’s propositions in this matter to the chairman of the convention, Valery Giscard d’Estaing. The Moscow patriarchate also cooperates with the Council of Europe: for example, it participates in the forum of representatives of religious institutions, which functions within the CE, and also in the European Consultation Ecumenical

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Council on Church and Society. An important event in the ROC’s contacts with the Council of Europe was Alexy II’s appearance before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 2 October 2007, when the patriarch spoke of the necessity of a dialogue between civilizations and the need to strengthen the Christian identity of Europe, which is incomplete without consideration of the Orthodox tradition. The European Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Orthodox Believers – bringing together parliamentary representatives from Orthodox countries – is also involved in promoting the Orthodox point of view.21 This organization, established in 1994 on the initiative of Greece, gathers once a year in different member states. Its secretariat is located in Athens, and the secretary is usually Greek, while the chairman is Russian.22 The Moscow patriarchate also acts on the forum of the UN, UNESCO and the OSCE. Muftiates, on the other hand, support Russia’s cooperation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States. Rarely do representatives of the other “traditional religions” show similar activity, although the presence of Rabbi Berel Lazar at the Forum in Davos in 2008 might indicate an exception.23 An important part of the diplomacy of Russian religious institutions is dedicated to peace-building processes. The greatest achievements in this field to date have been achieved by the ROC, which played the role of mediator between the Armenians and Azeri in the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict. In November 1993 Alexy II succeeded in convincing Katolikos Vazgen I and Sheik-ul Islam Allahshukur Pashazadeh to meet in Moscow at the St Danila monastery.24 In May 2001 Alexy II and Pashazadeh signed a joint declaration in which they call upon politicians of Transcaucasia to resolve the conflict in Karabakh by peaceful means and announced new talks between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Caucasus Muslim Council.25 It is worth emphasizing that the ROC’s action brought benefits to Russian diplomacy as well: Katolikos Karegin II asked President Vladimir Putin to increase Russia’s activity in the resolution of the conflict in Karabakh, which ensured that the Kremlin would not be subject to possible accusations of interfering in Armenian–Azeri relations. The second trilateral meeting took place in Baku on 26 April 2010.26 Alexy II also tried to mediate in the conflict between Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo in 1999. During the patriarch’s April visit, he met with President Slobodan Milošević and the leader of the Kosovars, Ibrahim Rugova. However, the Russian hierarch did not succeed in bringing about direct talks between the politicians. Moreover, Alexy II was involved in the peace process in Cyprus and Moldova, and also in church disputes that had been burdening relations between states of the former Yugoslavia: Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. The convergence of the vision and interests of the Russian state with those of religious institutions, expressed in the concept of “Orthodox civilization”, motivates both sides to cooperate beyond Russia’s borders. Russian religious institutions take on para-state functions, while the state, in turn, supports them in the international arena and builds the potential of its “own” religious institutions as transnational subjects of political relations. At meetings with representatives of

Characteristics of Russian “religious diplomacy” 147 other countries, Russian diplomats bring up problems concerning religious organizations. Vladimir Putin would also very often intervene on behalf of the ROC abroad. For instance, before his arrival in China in October 2004, he promised the Archbishops’ Sobor that he would discuss with the Chinese authorities the situation of Orthodox believers in the PRC.27 As promised, Putin talked in Beijing about the conditions of the ROC’s activities on China’s territory within the framework of an agreement signed by the two states on neighbourly relations, friendship and cooperation.28 In turn, during a visit to the Republic of South Africa, the president conveyed to the head of the RSA the hierarchs’ request for the return of the icon of the Mother of God (blessed by Sergey Rodonezhsky) that had been given at one time to the Boers.29 Moreover, in accordance with the tradition of Russian diplomacy, clergymen often join official delegations sent to other states. Delegations composed entirely of clergymen frequently bring up state matters in talks with their partners. Church diplomats also organize professional briefings on the situation in a given country for employees of Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry.30 An important element for strengthening religious institutions in the international arena is state support for the development of their infrastructure abroad, which consists mostly of political lobbying for the recovery of properties lost after 1917 and co-financing the construction of new sites. During Vladimir Putin’s presidency, thanks to the efforts of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Moscow patriarchate regained churches and monasteries in, among other places: New York, Zurich, Biarritz, Jerusalem (Sergieyevskiye Podvorya) and in Italian Bari. In this last case, Vladimir Putin played a large role, having talked about the status of the church during his audience with Benedict XVI in 2007. As a result, in November 2008 an act was signed on the church’s transfer to Russia, and on 2 March 2009 there was a ceremonial handing-over of the keys of the church from Italian president Giorgio Neapolitano to Dmitry Medvedev.31 The Kremlin financially supports the construction of new sites for the ROC, which President Putin distinctly emphasized at a meeting with participants of the Archbishops’ Sobor (2004).32 Means for construction come not only directly from the state budget, but also from enterprises such as Gazprom and Lukoil, which funded the repair of St Nicholas’ Cathedral in Vienna,33 while Stroitransgaz financed the building of a church in the Republic of South Africa. The Russian state does it because it considers helping the ROC developing, in a way, its own national infrastructure. Establishing new Orthodox sites beyond Russia’s borders also has a political dimension. Such undertakings require the permission of a given state’s authorities which, in granting their approval, are counting on intensification of their cooperation with Russia. Building an Orthodox church is a positive signal to the Kremlin, and the ceremonial inauguration is an occasion for meetings at a high level. For example, when the cornerstone of he ROC’s cathedral in Johannesburg was set in place in 2001, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, was present, while in March 2009 Dmitry Medvedev attend the ceremonial transfer of a building lot for the construction of an Russian Orthodox church in Madrid.34 The king of Jordan was guided by the desire to win Russia’s goodwill when he gave the

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Russian church – through Vladimir Putin’s mediation – land on the bank of the River Jordan. The construction of the Holy Trinity Church in Pyongyang and the exchange of students from theological seminaries (on this occasion Metropolitan Kliment visited the Korean peninsula in 2004) were also to be a new impulse in the relations between North Korea and Russia.35 A good example of the diplomatic game taking place around sacred sites is the construction of Russian Orthodox church in Havana. When Metropolitan Kirill visited the Cuban capital in July 1998, the local authorities did not show any interest in his requests. The hierarch’s visit in 2002 also turned out to be a fiasco due to a cooling of relations between Havana and Moscow after the Russians decided a year earlier to decommission a radar station in Lourdes outside Havana, much to the dismay of Cubans (the reason was the excessively high rent). It was only when Vladimir Putin visited Cuba in 2004 that a meeting between Kirill and Fidel Castro was made possible. Castro invited Patriarch Alexy II to Cuba and promised that Cubans would build a Russian church at their own cost as an expression of gratitude “for the help given to them by the Soviet Union.”36 In October 2008 there was a solemn inaugural Mass attended by Kirill, Raul Castro and the highest ranking Cuban officials. Raul did not forget to meet with Kirill, then already serving as patriarch, during his official visit to Russia on 3 February 2009.37 In the cases of Pyongyang and Havana, the gesture towards the ROC (specifically construction of a church) was calculated to draw the Kremlin’s attention and motivate it to greater activity. There are also situations in which the establishment of a new church is the confirmation of dynamically developing relations, as in the case of Iceland, cooperating ever more closely with Russia. A symbol of closer relations between the two countries was the honouring of the president of Iceland, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, with a medal from the ROC at the end of May 2005, after the church had earlier been given a building site in Reykjavik.38 Viewing ROC sites as (to a certain extent) state centres should come as no surprise, considering that in cases where there are no churches, Orthodox Masses are held on the territory of embassies and consulates (such is the case, for example, in China, in Shanghai, and in India, in Delhi). The highest-ranking Russian state officials often visit churches during their trips abroad, which raises the significance of the ROC’s sites. For example, during his stay in Bulgaria in January 2008, Vladimir Putin accompanied President Georgiy Pirvanov to the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, where both presidents lit candles, prayed and admired icons.39 An important element of building the prestige of Russian religious institutions is the Kremlin’s support for the international initiatives they proclaim, the leading motif of which is the “dialogue of civilizations”. When, after the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, the theme of the irreconcilable contradiction between the West and the Islamic world became increasingly common in the media, on 4 March 2004 the ROC and the muftiates created the Interreligious Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Mezhreligiozny Soviet SNG/Межрелигиозный Совет СНГ),40 which was to symbolize the success of the dialogue between religious confessions in the post-Soviet area. Russian diplomacy became involved in promoting the image of Russia as a civilization

Characteristics of Russian “religious diplomacy” 149 reconciling Christianity with Islam (a leader of inter-civilizational understanding). When Russia assumed leadership of the Council of Europe in 2006, it organized two forums devoted to religious dialogue (in Kazan and Novgorod). The Foreign Affairs Ministry also positively evaluated Alexy II’s speech before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasburg (2 October 2007) on the need to intensify interfaith dialogue.41 The most ambitious project concerning dialogue between religions, promoted on the forum of the United Nations Organization by Sergey Lavrov42 in cooperation with hierarchs of the Moscow patriarchate was the creation, under the auspices of the UNESCO, of a new institution. This initiative has eventually resulted in establishing a consultative UNESCO group Peace and Dialogue of Cultures in 2009. The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry is also involved in the work of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, UNAOC, established in 2005 on the initiative of two prime ministers: José Zapatero (Spain) and Recep Erdoğan (Turkey).43 It is difficult to imagine the “interreligious dialogue” without the participation of religious organizations. Russia promotes the ROC and the muftiates in the international arena as institutions that, due to Russia’s tradition of tolerance, are well-suited to be the initiators and moderators of intercivilizational contacts. In the bodies being formed within important organizations, bringing together representatives of religious confessions, having a strong church to represent Orthodox civilization is Russia’s asset. In Moscow’s opinion, the ROC, as the “most conciliatory Christian church”, should be the mediator between Christianity and Islam, while muftiates are the vanguard of “European moderated Islam”. An event which confirmed the Moscow patriarchate’s ambitions to be the main animator of the interfaith dialogue was the summit of religious representatives 2–5 July 2006, preceding the meeting of the states of the G8 Group in St Petersburg. The gathering was carefully prepared by the Interreligious Council of the CIS with strong support of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Alexy II and Allahshukur Pashazadeh jointly served as host, symbolizing the successful cooperation of Orthodoxy with Islam. President Vladimir Putin inaugurated the talks,44 while the General Secretary of the UN sent a letter of support for such meetings and for the development of the dialogue between religious confessions on the forum of the UN. On the same occasion, the patriarch of the ROC turned to the representatives of the eight richest nations in the world with a request for their involvement on behalf of understanding between civilizations.45 This initiative gave rise to regular meetings of religious leaders before G8 summits in Cologne (2007), Sapporo (2008), Rome (2009) and Baku (2010). The Moscow patriarchate uses this forum to promote its initiatives. At the meeting in Sapporo, in which 300 individuals from 23 countries participated, the ROC was represented by Protorey Vsevolod Chaplin, who appealed for the creation of a consultative body within the UN.46 Four months later, the next gathering of clergymen from different religions took place in Moscow, devoted to Russia’s proposal to establish a consultative religious body and make the UN an important centre of interreligious debate. Among those present were Allahshukur Pashazadeh, Vatican representative Antonio Menini, the Rabbi of Israel, Jona Metzger, a representative of the American foundation

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Order of Conscience, Budmir Loncar and a representative of the World Islamic League, Mohammad Hajat.47 Considering all the effort, the creation of the consultative committee on religion within the UNESCO — the Peace and Dialogue of Cultures group – can be considered a success of the Moscow patriarchate. The first meeting of this body took place in Moscow on 22 June 2009 and was chaired by patriarch Kirill. The Russian state defines the goals of religious institutions and supports their international activity. These institutions have a part in forming the new image of Orthodox civilization, integrating the russkiy mir and – thanks to their extensive contacts – widening the network of connections of Russian diplomacy. When the need arises, representatives of religious institutions supplement the functioning of professional diplomats, or even substitute for the Foreign Affairs Ministry in “politically awkward” situations. In Russian foreign policy, the religious factor performs mostly functions of identity-formation (civilizational identity and the vision of the global order: that is, civilizational multi-polarism), community-building (depending on the context, a union of conservative civilizations, a union against American imperialism, a union of those excluded, of Orthodox believers and so on), legitimization (due to its religious tolerance in the role of mediator between civilizations, deeply rooted in its tradition, Russia has special interests in its spiritual space, and a mandate to care for Orthodox believers and so on), and is an instrument of cultural expansion (russkiy mir) and diplomacy. The religious factor is, above all, an instrument of Russian diplomacy, which uses native religious institutions for realization of defined tasks. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, the religious factor can also become a reason for steps taken by Russia in the international arena. The sense of community that politicians invoke for reasons of “political expediency” – justified by religious closeness – can with time take on real forms in social consciousness and become a factor mobilizing people to action. This mechanism is visible in Russians’ relations with Serbs and Belarusians.

5

Russia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Belarus and Serbia

From the perspective of Russian foreign policy, Belarus and Serbia are the two European states most strongly oriented towards cooperation with Moscow, and the most dependent on its support in the international arena. Despite these similarities, the significance of both countries for Russian interests – if only for their geographical positions – is different. Belarus, situated between Russia and NATO members, is a crucial element in the collective security system formed under the supervision of the Russian Federation in post-Soviet areas (in the framework of the Organization of the Tashkent Treaty). The territory of Belarus is an extension of Russian military space and an important corridor between the European Union and Russia (including the transport of strategic raw materials, such as oil and gas). Besides this, Minsk is traditionally a loyal supporter of Moscow’s initiatives in the “near abroad” and in the international forum. Serbia, however, lies beyond Russia’s strict sphere of influence, in the Balkans, which are increasingly falling under the influence of the NATO and the European Union. Serbia’s potential destabilization does not directly threaten Russia, and trade with it has little significance for the development of the Russian state, but Serbia is useful for Russia as an stronghold in the “soft underbelly” of Europe. The disproportion of Russia’s interests in these two states is mitigated by the ideological factor. According to well-established sentiments, the three nations are bound by the ties of a “mystical brotherhood”.1 They are the vanguard of Orthodox Slavdom: they were the least subjected to “Westernization” and saved their own tradition, Slavic identity and sense of belonging to Orthodox civilization. In the case of Russian–Belarusian relations, the sense of closeness is strengthened by the idea of “Holy Rus” and the three-member nation of eastern Slavs. A possible reorientation of Minsk’s foreign policy would affect not only the security or economy, but also Russia’s national identity. This is the fundamental difference between the sense of community uniting Russians with Belarusians or even Ukrainians, and that uniting them with Serbs. The interest in the fate of Serbs in Russian society generally grows in moments of crisis, while the eastern Slavic identity is a crucial element of the identity of a contemporary Russian, an element of self-definition, present regardless of political events. The Slavic identity,

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understood more widely than the eastern Slavic community and involving a sense of solidarity with other Slavic nations, is especially obvious in relation to Orthodox Slavs and manifests itself in moments of threat: in the face of a stereotypical confrontation between the West and Slavdom. This is why Serbia, when subjected to “civilizational aggression”, can count on Russia’s support. The Slavic brotherhood promoted by Russian neo-pan-Slavists, nationalists and imperialists is reflected in the convictions of society. In the sociological studies of the Levada Centre, the decided majority of those interviewed declared having a positive relationship towards Belarus and Serbia, and saw both countries as Russia’s most loyal allies on the international arena. The special relationship towards Belarus is visible in the conviction of 60 per cent of respondents who do not consider it a foreign state (but rather an integral part of the Russian cultural space), and also in the high support (64 per cent) for the plan of a common Russian–Belarusian state. At the same time, one should note the idyllic and also illusory nature of Slavic brotherhood. The fragile basis of the declared solidarity is visible when concrete interests are in play: for example, in the price of Russian gas. In the case of economic interests, a growing number of Russians are pragmatic: they support integration, love their Belarusian brothers, but see no reason why they should pay less for gas than Ukrainians (31 per cent expressed this opinion; 15 per cent think that Belarusians should pay less than Ukrainians, but more than Russians, while 18 per cent agree on the same price for both Russians and Belarusians). On the whole, 51 per cent of those surveyed think that the Kremlin was right in its decision in January 2007 regarding a two-fold increase in the fee for gas supplied to Minsk.2 The ROC is the institution most actively promoting the brotherhood of Orthodox Slavs in the country, which is why its activity is significant in Russia’s relations with Belarus and Serbia. In January 1990, by a decision of the sobor of the ROC, an exarchate was created in Belarus. The local church gained a certain degree of independence in internal matters (its own synod), but only within the limits indicated by the Moscow patriarchate (the Holy Synod of the ROC decides, for example, on administrative division, construction of new monasteries and theological schools, names directors of schools and also approves reports from the sessions of the local synod).3 Since the beginning, the head of the exarchate has been Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Slutsk, who is recognized as a reformer. In the face of the sudden fragmentation of the USSR, the secessionist tendencies among the clergy in particular former republics and the growing activity of nationalists negatively disposed towards Russian supremacy, moderate Belarus seemed to the Moscow patriarchate as an “oasis of peace”. The significance of the exarchate grew even more after Alexander Lukashenka assumed power in 1994, calling for the tightening of cooperation of the former republics, reintegration of the post-Soviet space, including the joining of Belarus and Russia into one political organism. While in other states, especially Ukraine, the elites were declaring their sympathies for Western ideals and aspiring to emancipate themselves from Russian influence, the leader of Belarus was speaking of Slavic brotherhood and Orthodox unity more ardently than Russian decision-makers. The ROC

Russia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Belarus and Serbia 153 perceived in Lukashenka’s policy a guarantee for maintaining the integrity of its own canonical territory. The “Slavic spirit” and enthusiasm for integration declared by the Belarusian “Orthodox atheist” president convinced the ROC to lend him its support. The church put a lot of hope in the Union of Russia and Belarus. On 2 April 1996 Alexy II personally blessed the act signed by the presidents announcing the union of the two states.4 Even after the slowing of the integration, the hierarchs often and eagerly met with Lukashenka. The crowning moment of bilateral relations was the signing by the ROC and authorities of Belarus of an agreement on 12 June 2003. This concordat of sorts, regulating the status of the ROC and conditions of cooperation with the Belarusian authorities is put forth by the patriarchate as a model for all states of the CIS.5 The harmony of the relations between the Moscow patriarchate and Belarus is emphasized on different occasions: for example, in 2004 Alexy II was honoured by Alexander Lukashenka with the Medal of Friendship of Nations “for enriching the national culture and spiritual and intellectual development of the brotherhood of the Russian and Belarusian nations”.6 In May 2005, in turn, the president of Belarus received a reward “for his contribution to the strengthening of the brotherhood of nations”, on the occasion of which the hierarchs of the ROC reassured Alexander Lukashenka of their support for the integration of the “two states of common Slavic roots and one Orthodox Church”.7 The motif of eastern Slavic integration was manifested in the statements of the Russian church’s clergymen, particularly at meetings with politicians. For example, in 2001 Alexy II, in a message to members of a gathering of Slavic nations – Belarus, Ukraine and Russia – appealed to “spiritual community”.8 The patriarch thanked President Lukashenka for strengthening the unity of Slavs and stressed that the ROC presents the same position as the head of the Belarusian state in the matter of uniting Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.9 Also, president Putin often speaks of the community of eastern Slavdom: in June 2008 he stated that Orthodoxy is indissolubly connected with the fate of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian nations.10 The idea of Orthodox brotherhood or Slavic solidarity is used by the three parties –Belarus, Russia and the ROC – as a factor forming a new identity, integrating the two nations and legitimizing the plan for a unified state. It is no coincidence that the ROC was mentioned as a separate subject, and not merely as an instrument of Russian diplomacy, because in the case of Belarus, the Moscow patriarchate presents its position slightly differently than the Kremlin. Besides that, thanks to the strong position guaranteed by the “concordat” and the goodwill of the Belarusian authorities, the ROC is not so dependent on support from the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry. In contrast to the Kremlin, where enthusiasm for the quickest possible integration with its western neighbour decreased after Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the church did not give up the plan for creating an eastern Slavic political community, which would strengthen the integrity of its canonical territory. The Slavic slogans of Alexander Lukashenka were still attractive for many of the hierarchs, although they know that Moscow is playing hardball with Minsk and that the Kremlin no longer holds the Belarusian president in the same high esteem as before. Despite the unfavourable climate for talks

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on a brotherly unified state after the dramatic rise in gas fees, the ROC continues to support a sense of closeness with Belarusians and interest in integration in Russian society. The ROC’s activity is not the only aspect of the religious factor in Russian– Belarusian relations. Alexander Lukashenka also uses it in foreign policy. The president does not disregard the influence of the ROC, and cares about good contacts with the hierarchs, through which he can count on their discrete lobbying among the Russian elite. At a meeting with representatives of the Belarusian exarchate, Lukashenka expressed hope for very close cooperation with patriarch Kirill.11 Earlier, the president had supported the hierarchs’ initiative of creating a Social Council on Morality and introducing regulations concerning the Internet which enable holding someone criminally accountable for the spread of “inappropriate content”. Lukashenka’s announcement met with the support of Metropolitan Filaret, who, interestingly, emphasized the advantages of solutions used in this sphere in the People’s Republic of China.12 The proverbial “carrot” in Lukashenka’s policy is complemented by a “stick” as well – exerting pressure on the Russian church with “threats” of inviting the pope to Belarus. Lukashenka first used “Catholic blackmail” in 2002, when he mentioned the possibility of the pontiff’s visit to Minsk. The exarchate reacted to this immediately, refusing to give official approval for the visit of the bishop of Rome. The situation was repeated in June 2008, when during a visit of the Vatican’s delegate – Tarcisio Bertone – to Belarus Lukashenka gave the dignitary an official invitation for Benedict XVI.13 A month later Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, the pastor of Belarusian Catholics, announced the pope’s acceptance of the president’s invitation. On 28 April 2009 Alexander Lukashenka was granted an audience with Benedict XVI, who spoke with the Belarusian president privately for over 20 minutes. At this meeting, Alexander Lukashenka again invited the pope to Belarus and asserted: “We’ll see each other in Belarus, God-willing”.14 Lukashenka’s initiative aims to show Minsk’s independence from Moscow and emphasize the openness of the Belarusian authorities to dialogue with the EU. The president used religious institutions to this end, thinking that closer relations with the Vatican would improve the image of Belarus in Europe and facilitate further contacts with the West. Lukashenka would like to play the role of mediator in the dialogue between the two churches, but the hierarchs of the ROC dispelled his delusions in this matter, declaring that the Russian church does not need the help of the Belarusian president in its contacts with the Vatican.15 It is worth adding that Lukashenka also uses the religious factor in domestic policy: for example, the authorities tried to discredit the opposition leader, Alexander Milinkevich by presenting him as a Catholic, a foreign figurehead put in by the Poles.16 After 1991 Belarus did not lose its significance for Russia, which was forced by the geo-political changes in Eurasia to concentrate its activities in the post-Soviet space at the cost of its presence in other regions of the world. If it had not been for the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia in 1992, Belgrade would have remained on the margins of the Kremlin’s foreign policy, and Russian–Serbian

Russia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Belarus and Serbia 155 “Orthodox brotherhood” would not have seen a “renaissance” in the public debate. The noticeable analogy of the fates of Russians and Serbs at the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century brought the two nations closer to each other: the “death of Communism”; the break-up of the federation in which each of them had played the main role and with which each had strongly identified; perceiving the disintegration of the state union as an effect of the West’s intrigues; a sentiment of historical degradation; a sense of being betrayed by those who had until recently been their fellow countrymen and of being hurt by the stigma as a nation of offenders. Importantly, both Orthodox churches also found themselves in similar situations. The disintegration of the federation threatened the integrity of their canonical territory, for in the independent neighbouring states, the new elites together with part of the clergy aspired to create autocephalous churches. In face of these problems, the patriarchates adopted the same position: “several states, one church”.17 The beginning of the conflict in Yugoslavia brought an instant growth in anti-Western sentiments in Russia, which in turn weakened the position of President Boris Yeltsin and the conciliatory government of Yegor Gaidar. Deputies of the nationalistic faction in the Duma, with their Slavic slogans fitting society’s moods, began to gain ever greater influence. In 1992 their appeal to the authorities to give Serbs their unconditional support and withdraw from the sanctions still passed by without so much as an echo. However, the events that took place after the seventh Congress of the People’s Deputies – Victor Chernomyrdin’s rise to the position of Prime Minister, Yegor Gaidar’s resignation from government work, the October crisis of 1993 and the December parliamentary elections – radically changed the political situation in Russia. Vladimir Abarinov wrote in a 1994 article: As far as foreign policy is concerned, seemingly not much has changed, because parliament, just as before, does not have a greater influence on the decisions of the cabinet of ministers. Only now, its opinion cannot be disregarded, as was the case with the Supreme Soviet … . Representatives of the executive branch interpreted the results of the Russian parliamentary elections unambiguously. In the changed political situation, incessant reminders that Russia is a great power seemed to be the order of the moment.18 So as not to lose the electorate to the nationalists, those in government had to assume some of their slogans, and in this way, the anti-West Duma began to exert increasingly greater influence on the Kremlin’s rhetoric and on Russia’s foreign policy. At the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 Moscow’s official position in the matter of Yugoslavia was still relatively close to the position of Western states, trying in the first phase to avoid the disintegration of the Yugoslavian federation. Russia took part, together with Germany, Great Britain, France and the USA in the work of the international contact group on matters of the former Yugoslavia, supported the Vance–Owen Plan, and from May 1992 Russians joined the contingent of UN peace-keeping forces in the former Yugoslavia. It was only the political reshuffling in the Kremlin that compelled a change in Moscow’s attitude, which gradually went from being a neutral mediator to an advocate of Belgrade.19

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The joint action of the nationalists and the church influenced the sharpening of the course of Russian diplomacy: in Orthodox churches, services were held on behalf of Serbs, people prayed in public places to St Sava – the patron saint of Serbia20 – and nationalistic groups even recruited volunteers ready to fight “for a Slavic matter”. For instance, the National Republican Party of Russia, led by Nikolai Lysenko and Yuri Belayev, created the Russian National Legion in 1991, a “Slavic combat group” acting outside the law, which took part in the armed conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.21 The Russian Federation’s incessant efforts to ease the sanctions placed on Serbia after the war and its objection to labelling the Serbs a “nation of perpetrators” evoked a certain consternation among Western intellectuals. Wolf Oschlies asked: “Why are the Balkans so important to Russia? In reality, they are just as unimportant to Russia as they are to other countries … . The idea of Slavic, Orthodox integration, which had long been considered merely a historical joke, has suddenly become an instrument of policy”.22 The bombing of Serbia, begun on 24 March 1999, evoked violent reactions in Russia. The Kremlin and all political groups violently protested against NATO’s actions. In studies by Russian Public Opinion Research Centre carried out in the first days of the air-raids, 90 per cent of those questioned thought that the West had no right to attack Yugoslavia, and only 2 per cent were of the other opinion.23 Alexander Rutskoy demanded in the Duma that Russia send anti-aircraft equipment to Yugoslavia, and Natalia Narochnitskaya commented in the press: Serbs and Serbia, as the forefront of the Orthodox world, the borders of which run along the Drina River, are the object … of brutal military actions. Their goal is not to be overlooked: to divide Orthodox Slavs, destroy their will to create a common, Slavic state, reduce their role in the international arena and take the post-Byzantine space into the possession of the Atlantic civilization … . The joining of Hungarians, Poles and Czechs to NATO not only disturbed the strategic military symmetry and made the North Atlantic Treaty even more anti-Russian, but also exerted a clear, negative influence on Orthodox Slavdom.24 Vladimir Zhirinovsky assured Belgrade of Moscow’s support, explaining that “for many Russians, Yugoslavia is the second homeland” and for this reason they cannot look on calmly as “thousands of bombs fall on our Orthodox Slavic brothers”.25 Wolf Oschlies summed it up: “Russian politicians drowned in their love for their Orthodox brothers and condemned the USA, the president [of Russia] mumbled about taking adequate steps, in the Duma, General Roman Popkovich called for preventive use of atomic weapons, the press was talking about the NATO aggressor and summing up – Give military aid to our Serbian brothers!”26 The Moscow patriarchate immediately and very decisively condemned the NATO operations, which Alexy II recognized as “a sin and a crime against international law”,27 while Metropolitan Kirill called it the next crusade against Orthodox believers and compared NATO expansion to the coming of the Antichrist.28 The ROC’s position was supported by representatives of other

Russia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Belarus and Serbia 157 Christian denominations in Russia, such as the Catholic Bishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz and the Evangelical Pastor Pyotr Konovalchik29 and also by all members of the Interfaith Council of Russia.30 Two days before the bombing began Alexy II addressed an official letter to General Secretary of the UN Kofi Annan and US President Bill Clinton, in which he called upon them to bring an immediate stop to NATO’s action.31 As during the war in 1992–1995, the church mobilized Russian public opinion to get people involved on behalf of their Serbian brothers. Clergymen initiated marches of solidarity, masses were held on behalf of Serbs and the ROC was one of the first institutions that began to organize humanitarian aid. All of these initiatives activating Russian citizens forced the Kremlin to take decisive steps and replay its historical role as patron of Orthodox believers in the Balkans. Ultimately, the authorities bent under pressure from society, showing evidence of Slavic solidarity. In the beginning of April 1999 the Speaker of the Duma, Gennady Seleznev, announced that Boris Yeltsin agreed to fulfil the request of Milošević and accept the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Union State of Russia and Belarus. The concept, announced in the autumn of 1998 by the leader of a Serbian nationalistic group – Vojislav Šešelj – and supported by Zhirinovsky’s party, gained political attractiveness in face of the NATO attacks. On 12 April 1999, in the Serbian parliament, the announcement of accession to the Union State of Russia and Belarus was confirmed by vote, and four days later deputies of the Moscow Duma (with 293 votes to 54) accepted Serbia into the Russian– Belarusian, Slavic union.32 After this event, nationalists proclaimed the quick end of the war, a final halt to NATO’s eastward expansion and a bright future for the Slavic empire extending “from the Adriatic to Kamchatka”. Although in reality, the Kremlin could not accomplish much, the ROC’s diplomacy was still active. On 20 April Alexy II came to Belgrade and assured the Serbian nation of Russians’ support. Together with Pavle I (the head of the Serbian church), Alexy II held a solemn Mass, which was an important socio-political event and a symbol of Russian–Serbian brotherhood. During his stay in Belgrade, the patriarch of the ROC attempted to mediate between the two sides, met with Slobodan Milošević and Ibrahim Rugova, but ultimately failed to bring about a three-way meeting.33 The church, represented by Metropolitan Kirill, was also involved in the work of the informal international Christian mediation group that was established on 18 May 1999 in Vienna on behalf of peace in Yugoslavia, but this initiative also failed to bring measurable effects.34 At the same time the Kremlin tried to highlight its own, separate position towards NATO, an expression of which was, for example, the occupation of the Pristina airport by Russian soldiers without consulting UN forces. This did not, however, erase the impression that the ROC’s diplomacy was more involved in Belgrade’s problems, more effectively appealed to “Orthodox brotherhood”, and that it was the one to first take care of Serbs’ needs – it organized humanitarian aid and stood in defence of the Belgrade government on the international forum: for example, by bringing up in the UN the problem of the destruction of Orthodox churches in Kosovo.35

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A new test for Russian diplomacy was the “October Revolution”, as a result of which in October 2000, Slobodan Milošević was removed from power by the opposition. In the dispute over accusations of falsification of the election results by those in government, Russia at first maintained its support for Milošević, accepting the results given by the State Election Commission on 26 September 2000. The violent protests of the opposition and Western countries forced Russia to change its position. Counting on silencing the matter, Vladimir Putin invited Vojislav Koštunica and Slobodan Milošević to Moscow and offered to serve as a mediator between the two feuding parties. After Koštunica’s victory had already been announced, the Russian president, offering his congratulations to the opposition leader, emphasized the many years’ friendship between Russia and Yugoslavia and the actions that Moscow had taken in its defence on the international forum:36 In Russian–Yugoslavian relations, there has been a significant change. The new Yugoslavia has ceased to be the enemy of the West and has begun to receive Western aid. The West, which decisively supports the unity of Kosovo, is trying to counteract Albanian separatism. Sanctions have been lifted, and Yugoslavia has returned to international organizations as an equal partner.37 Despite these positive declarations and assurances of its readiness to cooperate with any democratically elected president of Serbia, the Kremlin did not know what to expect from the new government in Belgrade. Vladimir Putin treated Koštunica’s team with a certain distance and did not hesitate to grant asylum to Milošević’s closest family.38 The ROC was pragmatic throughout this difficult period. During the first visit of Vojislav Koštunica to Moscow (27–28 October 2000), there was a meeting of the Serbian leader with Alexy II in the presence of Patriarch Pavle, Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov and Metropolitan Kirill, who a month later went to Belgrade for talks on cooperation between the two states.39 After a clear reduction in the Russian elites’ interest in Serbia after 2000, the Orthodox churches actually took the initiative in bilateral contacts. In 2002 Serbian Patriarch Pavle I visited Moscow, where he was honoured with the award of the Fund for the Unity of Orthodox Nations, and then in the winter of 2003, Metropolitan Kirill discussed with the Serbian patriarch the church’s position on the possibility of a US attack on Iraq. In the following year on 12 May a meeting took place in Moscow, in the presence of ministers of foreign affairs, between the chairman of church diplomacy and the candidate of the “Serbian Democratic Party” for the July presidential elections – Boris Tadić. Tadić was hoping for a meeting with the Russian patriarch in the course of his campaign in order to raise his prestige and emphasize his good relations with the church and Russia. At the meeting in Moscow, the Serbian politician thanked the head of the ROC for supporting his country and stressed that relations between the churches are a very crucial element of relations between the states.40 After winning the election, President Tadić participated in the solemn meeting of the two patriarchs on 15 November.41 Belgrade’s strong appreciation of the role that the ROC plays in maintaining good relations between Russia and Serbia can be seen in the statement of the Serbian Foreign Affairs Minister, Vuk Jeremić, who at a meeting with representatives of the ROC in June

Russia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Belarus and Serbia 159 2007 in Moscow asserted that a visit to Russia is not complete without talks with the ROC.42 The activity of the Russian church is important for Serbia mainly in the context of the status of Kosovo. In the face of the increasingly obvious fiasco of talks between Pristina and Belgrade and the announcements of Albanian politicians of Kosovo’s independence, the decisive opposition of the patriarchs and their activity in connection with this has reinforced the efforts of Serbian diplomacy. Representatives of the two churches have tried to influence the Kremlin: near the end of March 2007, Metropolitan Amfilohije assured that the Serbian church prays daily for Vladimir Putin to “say a firm no” when the UN Security Council voted on acceptance of Kosovo into the organization.43 In October, during a meeting in Moscow with Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, Alexy II publically expressed his gratitude to the Russian president for his “firm stance in the matter of Kosovo” and for understanding that “an attack on Kosovo is an attack on Slavic identity”,44 and in January 2008 Minister Sergey Lavrov was honoured by the chapter of the Fund for the Unity of Orthodox Nations for his diplomatic support for Belgrade. After the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence by the government of Hashim Tachi, on 17 February 2008, Russia showed complete solidarity with Serbia. On 25 February 2008 Dmitry Medvedev travelled to Belgrade. The future president visited, together with Boris Tadić, St Sava’s Cathedral and was assured that in this difficult situation, Moscow would show financial, political and moral support for Belgrade.45 Most Russians showed solidarity with the Serbs: in February Cossacks organized a protest campaign and in April a “meeting of solidarity” between Russians and Serbs took place in Moscow with the participation of representatives of the ROC, who spoke of the necessity of the rebirth of the community spirit of Slavic brothers, putting an end to US hegemony and rebuilding “Great Russia” (also by “regaining” the “Russian Kosovo”: Ukraine).46 On the tenth anniversary of the NATO bombing of Serbia, the new head of the ROC, Kirill, in a message to Patriarch Pavle, stated that the sorrows of the Serbian nation “are the pain of the entire Orthodox Church” and assured that “the Russian church will continue to use every possibility to strengthen the voice in defence of God’s truth, in defence of our Orthodox brothers and sisters living in Kosovo – part of Serbia – and in defence of all the victims of violence and demands for justice”.47 Support for Serbs has been given by all the Orthodox churches, even in states where the governments recognized Pristina’s proclamation: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland.48 Most Muslim institutions, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference, declared themselves in favour of Kosovo’s side, but in Russia among the known muftis, only Nafigulla Ashirov allowed himself to express the opinion that “Kosovo has the right to exist as a separate state”, from which the other Islamic institutions immediately distanced themselves, including the Council of Muftis of Russia.49 The leader of Serbian Muslims, Hamdije Jusufspahić, also condemned the decision of Kosovars, recognizing the proclamation of independence as an “act of political violence”.50 The Vatican, in turn, trying to maintain a certain neutrality, called for respect of the rights of Orthodox Serbs in Kosovo.

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In relations with Serbia, the Kremlin uses the religious factor mostly to legitimize Russia’s interests by emphasizing its traditionally close ties with Serbia and its special role in the Balkans. From Moscow’s perspective, the ROC’s activity is unusually valuable, as it often appears as a representative of Russia, brings up the matter of Serbia in the forum of various organizations, maintains intensive diplomatic contacts with Serbian institutions (not only the church), gives a mystical character to the relations between the two states, (a brotherhood of faith, two “chosen nations”, a mission) and conducts wide-ranging humanitarian activities, which means that the Moscow patriarchate enjoys the great respect and gratitude of the Serbian population, and this in turn influences the positive image of the Russian Federation. It is worth emphasizing that Serbia also appeals to “Orthodox brotherhood”, in order to give its bilateral contacts with Russia a “brotherly” connotation. Belgrade is trying to use the good cooperation between the two patriarchates to come closer to the Kremlin – such a tactic was used, for example, by President Vojislav Koštunica when he headed for Moscow immediately after assuming the office in October 2000. The main purpose of his visit was to ask the Kremlin to renew the supply of gas to Serbia, which several months earlier had been stopped in connection with an unpaid debt of US$400 million, but Koštunica tried to give his stay mainly the character of a “brotherly meeting” by emphasizing the Slavic community of faith that has linked Russians and Serbs for centuries. The idea of Slavic solidarity, used ideologically by Belgrade, meets with a positive response from Moscow. Appealing to the solidarity of Slavs, the Kremlin can play the role of Serbia’s patron in international relations and advocate of its interests. Close relations with Belgrade allow Moscow to maintain its influence in the Balkans, and on the other hand to present itself in the eyes of Russians and the “international community” as a state to be reckoned with. Moscow’s greatest asset in its relations with Belgrade is its credibility. From the beginning, the Kremlin has consistently refused to recognize Kosovo’s independence, appealing to the necessity of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia, and promises to veto Kosovo’s application for membership of the UN. Russia tries to convince Serbia that it is in a position to offer it an alternative model of development to that of the EU, guarantee assistance for the necessary investments and include it in strategic undertakings, an example of which was to be the agreement signed by the governments of both states in January 2009, creating a basis for cooperation in the energy industry within the framework of the “Southern Stream” gas pipeline project”.51 The rather widespread sense of closeness, solidarity and conviction of the traditional friendship of Orthodox Slavs among both societies is not without significance for Serbian–Russian relations. Belgrade’s aspirations to EU membership are not contradictory to Russian interests because the appearance of EU structures in Serbia will strengthen the informal pro-Russian “lobby” which is currently formed by Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Slovakia. As long as Russia has an argument in the form of a veto blocking acceptance of Kosovo to the UN, Belgrade

Russia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Belarus and Serbia 161 will take into consideration Moscow’s interests in the Balkans, and the idea of “Orthodox brotherhood and solidarity” will be useful to both sides. Presidents of the three Orthodox Slavic states – Russia, Belarus and Serbia – often appeal, in trilateral relations, to a “special bond”, “brotherhood”, “solidarity” and the resulting community of interests and need for close cooperation. The instrumental use of the Orthodox-Slavic idea for the realization of current political aims is possible and relatively simple in times of peace. However, the example of Russia’s reaction to events in Serbia in the 1990s shows that in particular (politically unstable) situations, an ideological creation that is the result of cold political calculation can take the upper hand over Realpolitik. Russian politicians speaking of Russia’s moral obligation to defend Orthodox Serbs did not have to believe in Slavic brotherhood, but in this way activated myths and notions, under the influence of which society began to protest against Russia’s impotence and passivity with regards to the war in the former Yugoslavia. Alexander Lukashenka is most probably indifferent towards the Slavic slogans, but his rhetoric confirms Belarusians in their conviction that a mystical, spiritual bond exists between them and Russians, which is an essential premise of the integration of the two nations and states. In this way, in specific circumstances religion can be transformed from an instrument into a political premise, or serve both functions simultaneously.

6

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships with Ukraine, Estonia and Georgia

Maintaining Russian influence in the territory of the former USSR is, from Moscow’s point of view, crucial for national security and Russia’s position as a great power. It is in the Kremlin’s interest to support parties in Kiev and Tbilisi oriented towards cooperation with Moscow, reinforce economic and infrastructural ties of both former Soviet republics to Russia, hold back NATO’s eastward expansion (acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia into the organization) and not allow closer ties with its strongest competitor – the USA. In the case of Estonia, which along with Lithuania and Latvia is not viewed as part of the “near abroad”, and is a member of NATO and the European Union, Moscow’s most important goal is the favourable settlement of the status of the large, Russian-speaking minority, which Russia can use as an important policy instrument in the Baltic region. Although Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia differ in many regards, they are linked in the consciousness of the majority of Russians as “traitors”. The states indicated are the “black sheep” of the former Soviet republics and arouse in Russian citizens many negative emotions. The “betrayal syndrome” that burdens Moscow’s relations with Kiev, Tbilisi and Tallinn in large part result from the specific nature of the three nationalisms which, for historical, cultural and political reasons formed in opposition to the Russian element and have to a large extent an “anti-Russian” character (sovereignty means mainly emancipation from Russian influence and exhibiting “non-Russian” elements of their traditions). The perception of these states as members of a sort of anti-Russian camp is corroborated by an initiative of the group Nashi, which announced the organization of an event in Moscow in connection with April Fool’s Day, in which passers-by would be able to throw a shoe at the portraits of four politicians on display. It is no coincidence that in this group, besides the ever unpopular George W. Bush, were the president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, the Ukrainian leader Viktor Yushchenko, and the prime minister of Estonia, Andrus Ansip. According to the explanations of Nashi’s commissar, Mariya Drokova, the boots were intended for “Bush’s regents who made political capital out of mud-slinging against Russia, stirring up anti-Russian sentiments and thoughtless provocations directed against our state”.1 The most painful is Ukraine’s “betrayal”, because from Moscow’s perspective, the Ukrainians, in choosing independence and rejecting integration with Russia in

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 163 order to establish closer cooperation with the West, are denying their true identity, falsifying history, and showing disloyalty towards the heritage of “Holy Rus”, Orthodox brotherhood and Slavic solidarity. Most Russians feel a special closeness to Ukrainians. In studies carried out by the Levada Centre in 2008, nearly half of the respondents believe that Russians and Ukrainians form one nation (46 per cent were inclined to agree with the thesis of the existence of two nations), and 62 per cent do not consider Ukraine a foreign country (35 per cent hold the opposite view). It is worth pointing out, however, that with the passage of time since the break-up of the USSR, there is increasing acceptance among Russians of a sovereign Ukrainian state, which should nevertheless be friendly towards Russia, and not have border control or visa requirements (such an answer was chosen in February 2009 by 68 per cent of those surveyed; a possible union between the Ukraine and Russia was supported by 23 per cent). The decided majority of those asked (63 per cent) negatively assessed the current relations between the two states and the pro-Western policy of Kiev, especially its aspiration to NATO membership, which according to 68 per cent of those asked threatens Russia. Superimposed on the existing disputes between the two states concerning, for example, borders, the status of Crimea, the naval base in Sevastopol, transport of raw materials across Ukrainian territory and debt repayment, is the conflict between the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, which highlights the identity aspect of political problems. While it is true that Estonians did not betray Slavdom or the “Orthodox brotherhood”, with their declaration of sovereignty on 16 November 1988 they initiated – together with Lithuanians and Latvians – the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. Moreover, after gaining independence, Tallinn began to question the Red Army’s role as “liberator” of Estonia, thus undermining one of the most important components of identity of the generations brought up in the USSR after the Second World War. Most Russians see Tallinn’s policy as anti-Russian, usually claiming that Estonia discriminates against the Russian minority and does not show proper respect for the graves of Russian soldiers (the transfer of the monument to soldiers of the Red Army from the centre of Tallinn to a military cemetery on 26 April 2007, for example, was recognized as such an act, and because of it violent protests by the Russian minority erupted, which ultimately resulted in the worsening of relations with Russia). The tensions between Moscow and Tallinn are augmented by the conflict between the churches and the lack of a social “shock absorber” in the form of cultural closeness, as is the case with Ukraine. This has contributed to the fact that Estonia, together with the other Baltic countries, has for several years been leading in the ranking of states recognized as the most unfriendly towards Russia. In 2008 Estonia was recognized as such by 60 per cent of respondents, Georgia by 46 per cent, Latvia 36 per cent, the USA 35 per cent, Lithuania 32 per cent, Ukraine 23 per cent and Poland 20 per cent. In the studies of the Levada Centre, Georgia is in the second place. AntiGeorgian resentment in Russia places it between Ukraine and Estonia. Due to the increasingly clear language barrier, the closeness between Georgians and Russians

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is not as strong as that between Ukrainians and Russians. More than half of Russian respondents (55 per cent) do not question the separateness of Georgia as state and nation (38 per cent are of the opposite opinion). However, in contrast to Estonians, Georgians are linked with Russians by the Orthodox faith,2 while still belonging to separate churches. The “betrayal” of Russians by Georgians involves their distancing themselves from the USSR. Georgians increasingly portray the USSR as the next embodiment of the Russian Empire, constraining the free development of Georgia. Vladimir Putin expressed the Russian irritation with Tbilisi’s “history policy” when, during a meeting with Mikheil Saakashvili in June 2006 in St Petersburg, he strongly criticized Tbilisi’s museum of “Soviet occupation”.3 Putin pointed out that Georgians – including Joseph Stalin and Lavrentiy Beria – were also the creators of the USSR’s power, so it was difficult to agree with the image of Georgia as victim. In this context, it is worth noting the initiative of the Georgian non-governmental institution, Historical Legacy, which brings together people of science and culture. Its members addressed an open letter to Dmitry Medvedev with a request for support in their efforts to defalsifiy the history of the two brotherly nations, which has been taking place for many years “with the involvement of third-party states”. The Russian president reacted kindly to the letter’s authors, and promised to help in the struggle with those who try to set Russians and Georgians against each other.4 The pro-Western policy of Mikheil Saakashvili reinforced among Russians the conviction of the treacherous intentions of Georgians, who have brought Americans into the Caucasus, directly into Russia’s neighbourhood (63 per cent of those asked think that Georgia’s membership in NATO threatens Russia). After the escalation of the conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi in August 2008, in connection with the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 47 per cent of Russian respondents assessed their bilateral relations negatively (44 per cent as hostile); 74 per cent stated that Georgia has become a hostage of US policy, in the face of which Russia should recognize the independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia, and accept them into the federation (40 per cent). In contrast to Moscow’s relations with Kiev and Tallinn, the tensions along between Moscow and Tbilisi are the most serious, although they are not burdened by a dispute between churches. Quite the contrary – in the situation of open conflict, both patriarchates maintain one of the most important diplomatic channels between Russia and Georgia, carry out dialogue and try to mediate between the feuding sides. Examination of the religious factor in Moscow’s policy towards Kiev, Tallinn and Tbilisi requires analysis of the Russian Orthodox Church’s activities in these three countries as well as its significance for interstate relations. In trying to keep its advantage over other religious institutions in Ukraine, the Moscow patriarchate takes into consideration not only the protection of the integrity of its canonical territory, but also the maintenance of its status as the church with the largest number of believers in the universal Orthodox Church. In the case of the establishment of a strong Ukrainian national church, the ROC will lose its position as leader to Constantinople, and the new Orthodox Church in Russian spiritual space would be able to exert claims to the role of trustee of the tradition

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 165 of “Holy Rus”. Moreover, the ROC would lose a valuable ideological argument in the form of the myth of Orthodox brotherhood of eastern Slavdom. From the church’s perspective, among the most important problems in Russian–Ukrainian relations are the status of ROC structures, the rivalry with Constantinople and the Vatican and the important problem of Russian and Ukrainian identity, symbolized by the disputes over the legacy of “Holy Rus”. In January 1990, by a decision of the ROC sobor, an exarchate was created in Ukraine, however several months later the local hierarchs demanded an increase in their decision-making autonomy, to which the sobor reacted by granting the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church” “independence and self-governance” on 27 October 1990.5 In consequence the Ukrainian church gained wide autonomy – among other things, it had the right to name its own bishops without interference from the ROC.6 Despite these concessions, some of the Ukrainian clergy connected with Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko of Kiev increasingly loudly demanded autocephaly, especially after Ukraine declared its independence on 24 August 1991. In accordance with the accepted formula of “several states – one patriarchate”, the ROC categorically refused to change the Ukrainian autonomy into autocephaly in April 1992. In that same year, Filaret was deprived of the office of metropolitan of Kiev and excluded from the priesthood.7 During the absence of Patriarch Mstislav, who was in the USA at the time, Filaret became active within the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC).8 In November 1992, Patriarch Mstislav broke off contact with Filaret, which led to a split in the UAOC. Secessionists created the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev patriarchate, and on 22 October 1995 Filaret was chosen as patriarch of the new schismatic Ukrainian church, to which the Moscow patriarchate reacted by excommunicating its former hierarch. In Ukraine there are currently three significant Orthodox jurisdictions9 and two main camps – the Kiev patriarchate, aspiring to the creation of a united, autocephalous Ukrainian church, and the Moscow patriarchate, counteracting recognition of the non-canonical Ukrainian church through the universal church. According to estimates, around 10 million believers belong to the structures of the Moscow patriarchate in the Ukraine, and half as many belong to the Filaretists, while 38 per cent of all Orthodox believers declare their commitment to maintaining the unity of the Ukrainian church with the ROC.10 Two challenges stand before the ROC in Ukraine – it cannot allow canonical recognition of the Kiev patriarchate and the establishment of a united national church, and at the same time, it must struggle with the status of its own structures. It is no secret that some of the clergymen belonging to the UOC of the Moscow patriarchate expect recognition of their full independence. The ROC thus has a dilemma: to disregard the separatist sentiments and promote those who oppose autocephaly or to voluntarily recognize the autonomy of the Ukrainian structures. In the first case, the ROC risks rebellion, as a result of which one Ukrainian church could arise and be set against the Moscow patriarchate, while in the second, the ROC would lose a very important part of its canonical territory, but would assure itself the goodwill and gratitude of the church hierarchs in Ukraine.

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Testifying to the limited trust of the Moscow patriarchate in the Ukrainian clergy is the controversy connected with the editing of the new regulations of the UOC of the Moscow patriarchate, accepted on 21 December 2007. The ROC synod was concerned by the divergence between the new document and the regulations of the ROC, including the lack of mention of the regulations’ coming into force only after their ratification by the ROC. The point concerning the condition that only the archbishops of canonical structures can serve as head of the Ukrainian church disappeared, and the function of the Archbishops’ Sobor of the ROC as the highest court authority was omitted.11 The ferment among the Ukrainian clergy, which is threatening to the Moscow patriarchate, was confirmed also by the so-called Anniversary Declaration of 17 January 2009, in which a suggestion appeared that the possible “self-assumed” independence of the Ukrainian church does not mean its exclusion from the universal church.12 Characteristically, Orthodox brotherhoods reacted most violently to the slogans of autocephaly – for example, the Union of Orthodox Citizens stated that the new regulations would deepen the civilizational divide in eastern Slavdom,13 while the chairman of the Orthodox Way Community, Yury Boldyrev, argued that the Vatican was behind everything, with its intention being to create a single church in the Ukraine.14 The Orthodox brotherhoods enjoy the support of the decided majority of opponents of autocephaly among the Ukrainian clergy – one of the most prominent displays of such support was given by Dmitry Medvedev in June 2008 when he honoured the Shamordino monk Zosima Sokura and Bishop Agafangel of Odessa and Ismail with the Medal of Honour for “strengthening the Russian– Ukrainian friendship”.15 Supporters of church unity argue that granting autocephaly will lead to the “Ukrainianization” of the church (e.g. by introducing Ukrainian into the liturgy) and warn that the church will become an object of manipulation of the nationalists and the Vatican, and that Ukraine will ultimately lose its true identity. Many members of the brotherhoods are convinced that the real aim of the current authorities is the destruction of Orthodoxy at the West’s bidding.16 Some of the hierarchs of the UOC, even those against autocephaly, distance themselves from the radical slogans of the brotherhoods. Metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan criticized the Union of Orthodox Citizens for “practising political Orthodoxy”.17 Here it is worth drawing attention to a controversy that appeared following the death of Alexy II around the person of the Metropolitan of Kiev. In the corridors of the sobor rumours were circulating that Metropolitan Volodymyr, acting at the instigation of Constantinople, intended to present his candidacy for the office of patriarch, thus lessening the chances of Metropolitan Kirill’s success. The status of the ROC’s structures in Ukraine is in reality is not unimportant for the activity of the Kiev patriarchate and for two outside actors – Constantinople and the Vatican. From the ROC’s point of view, the establishment of one Orthodox Ukrainian church would be potentially most threatening, as it would mean the integration of the present structures of the Kiev patriarchate, the UAOC and other schismatic Orthodox communities. Recognition of such a church as

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 167 canonical by the patriarch of Constantinople and other local churches would be its chance for “legalization” in canon law, which is why the ROC reacts violently to every manifestation of the ecumenical patriarch’s activity in Ukraine. The Russian church must also face the Vatican, to which the Roman and Greek Catholic structures are subordinate, and which are developing strongly, especially in the western part of the country. The hierarchs of the ROC are worried about rumours regarding intentions to combine the Uniate structures with the Kiev patriarchate (with the consent of the Holy See and the goodwill of Constantinople).18 In the face of the growing activity of the Filaretists, supported by many influential Ukrainian politicians – among others, President Viktor Yushchenko and his brother, Pyotr, a member of the parliamentary committee on culture and spirituality – the Moscow patriarchate can count on the Kremlin’s intercession. At a meeting with President Yushchenko on 7 June 7, Dmitry Medvedev and Minister Sergey Lavrov pointed out to the Ukrainian authorities the necessity of respecting the ROC’s canonical territory.19 The Kremlin and the Moscow patriarchate also stand together against Kiev’s “historical policy”. Considering itself to be the spiritual heir of Kievan Rus, the ROC is involved in the public debate and “textbook wars” (concerning the content of school history textbooks),20 defending the common identity of Russians and Ukrainians, their common traditions, symbols and faith. One of the examples of the deep divergence of views between the ROC and a significant part of the Ukrainian elites is the assessment of Ivan Mazepa’s actions. For nationalists, the president and the party Nasha Ukraina, the Cossack hetman who lived at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a Ukrainian patriot, while in Russian tradition Mazepa was a vile traitor, a “Cossack Judas”. In February 2008, at a meeting with Alexy II, Viktor Yushchenko asked for the removal of the anathema declared on Ivan Mazepa by the ROC in 1708.21 The patriarch refused, explaining that the hetman had committed grave sins in joining the side of the heretics and in betraying the Orthodox state and the tsar.22 Orthodox brotherhoods also protested against the presentation of Mazepa as a national hero.23 The dispute returned in May 2009 with the approach of the 300th anniversary of Mazepa’s death. The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement in this matter, in which it had affirmed that the desire to rehabilitate Mazepa is another attempt to “draw the Ukrainian nation into an artificial conflict with Russia”.24 Also Vladimir Putin got involved in the matter of the Russian–Ukrainian past. In December 2007, in an official message to the Ukrainian head of state, the Russian president stated that for a strategic partnership of the two nations, interpersonal cooperation was very important, and that this was impeded by the “war over history” that was going on between the two states. A war “which Moscow did not start”, involving excessively free interpretation of events from the common history of the two nations, a war against memorials, a war allowing the idealization of war criminals, the profanation of Red Army graves, discrimination against the Russian language and support for the activity of non-canonical churches. Putin ended his message by expressing hope that the authorities in Kiev would show due respect for and protection of Russian culture in Ukraine.25

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The convergence of interests of the Kremlin and the ROC in Kiev was particularly visible in 2004 during the presidential campaign in Ukraine, which led to the Orange Revolution.26 In the election for head of state, the candidates with the greatest chance of victory were Viktor Yushchenko from Nasha Ukraina, supporting integration with the West, and the then-prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych of the Party of Regions, who favoured a strategic partnership with Russia. Yanukovych was supported by the Kremlin and the Moscow patriarchate and advised by the most important Kremlin experts, including Gleb Pavlovsky, Marat Gelman, Igor Shuvalov and Dmitry Medvedev.27 Also involved in the campaign on the side of Ukraine’s then-prime minister was Putin, who twice visited Ukraine – on 26 October, when he met with Leonid Kuchma in Kiev, and on 12 November, when he met with Kuchma and Yanukovych in Kerch in Crimea. In this way, the Russian president sent a clear signal to the Ukrainian electorate – the victory of the leader of the Party of Regions would be a guarantee of Kiev’s good relations with Moscow, including favourable decisions for the Ukraine, such as a zero tax rate on the oil and gas exported through the Ukraine,28 abolishing the registration required for Ukrainians during a stay in Russia (not exceeding 90 days) and the possession of dual Russian and Ukrainian citizenship. All these propositions were presented by Putin during meetings with Yanukovych in the summer and autumn of 2004, which was seen by most commentators as the Kremlin’s “pre-election present” to the candidate it supported. At the same time, the hierarchs of the UOC of the Moscow patriarchate were conducting their own campaign on behalf of the leader of the Party of Regions.29 Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev accompanied Yanukovych during his visit to Mt Athos (11 August) and on his journey to the Holy Land (28–29 August). Three weeks before the first round of elections, on 9–10 October, the then-prime minister of Ukraine was received by Alexy II in the patriarchal residence in Moscow. Already after the first round, Metropolitan Vladimir emphasized in a television interview that only one candidate has received the blessing of the canonical church in the election – Viktor Yanukovych. After the questioning of the results of the second round (21 November) and the first protests of the opposition, Alexy II wrote a letter to Leonid Kuchma, in which he expressed his hope for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. In contrast to Putin, however, the patriarch did not decide to send official congratulations to Yanukovych. In face of the sharpening conflict between the “orange” and the “blue” camps, the ROC did not take an official position: for example, representatives of the UOC of the Moscow patriarchate did not sign the appeal (29 November) that the Christian churches addressed to the president of Ukraine requesting an investigation into the falsification of election results. Gradually, the political conflict took on the character not only of an international conflict (Ukraine–Russia–the West), but also a clash of two cultures, symbolized by the different attitudes of the Orthodox churches. Each of the patriarchates supported its “own” candidate – the Kiev patriarchate declared itself in favour of Viktor Yushchenko, and the Moscow patriarchate was for Viktor Yanukovych. Both churches campaigned for a concrete political option. It even happened that a group of believers of the canonical Ukrainian church protested

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 169 against prayers for the victory of the leader of the Party of Regions during services, and cases in which believers who had voted for Yushchenko were denied absolution of sin.30 It was not infrequent that self-styled Cossack patrols “took under their care” sites of the canonical church, including the Pechersk Lavra, in case of an attack by the “Orange” supporters.31 The victory of the leader of Nasha Ukraina in the second round came at the cost of a deep division in Ukrainian society. Belonging to one of the patriarchates became not only a religious choice, but also a political, civilizational and identity option. The polarization of Ukrainian Orthodox believers intensified. Each of the two patriarchates gained a political patron – the Moscow church became the patriarchate of the “blue” supporters, and the Kiev church the patriarchate of the “orange” supporters, who recognized the existence of a national church as a condition sine qua non of Ukraine’s recovery of full sovereignty. In a document directed to the Supreme Council in 2005, Viktor Yushchenko recognized as one of the priorities of state policy the creation of a common UOC, and ordered the administration to undertake action facilitating dialogue between the conflicting jurisdictions while maintaining the secular authorities’ respect for their independence.32 On his first visit abroad, the newly elected Ukrainian president headed to Russia in January 2005, where he met with Vladimir Putin and Alexy II. During a second conversation with the patriarch of Moscow and All Russia on 21 February 2008, Yushchenko assured that he wanted a dialogue of all the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, in which Alexy II would play the main role.33 Similar declarations did not, however, increase the ROC’s trust in the Ukrainian president, who not only kept up good contacts with the Filaretists (he took part in masses with their participation,34 and granted them state honours35) and supported the activities of his brother, Pyotr – the chairman of the One Ukrainian Orthodox Church Movement36 – but also became the main creator of foreign policy aiming to form a coalition among canonical Orthodox churches in support of the existence of an independent Ukrainian church. In order to realize the plans of the presidential administration, gaining the goodwill of the patriarch of Constantinople was of key significance. While Bartholomew I had not declared himself in favour of either side in the Orange Revolution, after the ultimate victory of the leader of Nasha Ukraina, he congratulated him on his win and offered his assistance in resolving the problem of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.37 In March 2006 Borys Tarasyuk, the foreign affairs minister, came to Fanar (the headquarters of the patriarch in Istanbul), where, according to reports by the Russian media, he was to receive from the hands of Bartholomew I “authority to act as proxy” in the coordination of relations between churches in Ukraine.38 Three months later, on 26 June 2007, there was a meeting of the patriarch with Yushchenko, who was once again received by Bartholomew I on 20 May 2009.39 The president tried to win over other Orthodox churches as well in the matter of a Ukrainian national church: for example, in November during his stay in Israel, he spoke with Patriarch Teofil of Jerusalem40 and, in September while visiting Greece, he went to Mt Athos.41 Viktor Yushchenko’s diplomatic activity met with a positive response from the Romanian Orthodox Church, which has, since

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1998, been in conflict with the Moscow patriarchate in connection with the establishment of the Bessarabia Metropolis in Moldova. The questioning of the inviolability of the ROC’s canonical territory has brought Kiev closer to the Romanian church. On 31 October 2007 in Bucharest, Yushchenko thanked the Romanian church for canonizing the distinguished Ukrainian Metropolitan Petro Mohyla of Kiev and expressed hope that cooperation between the Orthodox churches would bring the two nations closer.42 Yushchenko was also concrened about contacts with the Vatican, an expression of which was the audience of the Ukrainian head of state with Benedict XVI on 1 June 2009.43 Observing the dynamics of the relations between Nasha Ukraina and the Party of Regions, a certain relationship can be noticed: the more decisively Viktor Yushchenko played the role of mediator between churches and champion of the unification of a national church, the more strongly Viktor Yanukovych emphasized his loyalty to the canonical church. Assuming the position of prime minister for the second time in his career, Yanukovych confirmed that unlike his political rival, he would not meddle in the internal affairs of churches.44 In October 2007, at a meeting with the patriarch of Alexandria, the leader of the “Blue” camp stressed the necessity of strengthening the canonical church. From the ROC’s point of view, the administration of the Party of Regions is the best guarantee of keeping Ukraine as part of its canonical territory and preventing thecreation of one, independent church, which the patriarchate refers to simply as the “Yushchenko Plan”. Viktor Yanukovych enjoys the trust of the ROC, which even forgave him for participating in a solemn mass in November 2007 dedicated to the memory of the victims of the great famine, celebrated in a raskolnik church. During the memorial service, Yanukovych kissed a cross from the hands of Metropolitan Filaret, which some representatives of the ROC recognized as sufficient grounds for excommunicating the leader of the “Blue” camp. Ultimately, the Moscow patriarchate recognized Yanukovych as a “victim” of the Filaretists’ provocation.45 The leader of the Party of Regions drew his own conclusions from this event and confirmed that he would stand guard over canonical Orthodoxy in Ukraine.46 The “religious diplomacy” carried out by Viktor Yushchenko aroused not only domestic opposition, but also the Kremlin. On 6 June 2008 the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry criticized Kiev’s religious policy, stigmatizing especially the president’s aspirations to create one church. This same position was conveyed to Viktor Yushchenko by Dmitry Medvedev and Sergey Lavrov when they called on the Ukrainian head of state to not interfere in internal affairs of churches. The joint appearance of the Russian president and foreign affairs minister was intended to discipline Kiev before the second event in Russian–Ukrainian relations following the Orange Revolution in which religion and politics were entangled with one another – the celebration of the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Rus in 25–27 July 2008. Alexy II received an official invitation to take part in the celebration in April, but delayed making a decision. He spoke publically about his doubts, emphasizing that he had not been to Ukraine since 1997 and feared playing the role of a puppet, legitimizing the Ukrainian political elites who supported the raskolniks. It was

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 171 only Vladimir Putin who convinced the patriarch to accept Kiev’s invitation, promising support and explaining that if there was not be a warming up in the contacts between the churches, then there would not be any in general in Russian–Ukrainian relations.47 Besides the head of the ROC, the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria and Jerusalem were also invited to Kiev, while representatives of the non-canonical Orthodox communities of Ukraine were excluded.48 The arrival of the patriarch of Moscow and All Russia to the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy after a more than 10 years was, for Kiev, a chance to manifest its own independent religious policy. Alexy II was greeted at the airport by opponents of autocephaly for the Ukrainian church, holding banners with such slogans as “Russia, Ukraine, Belarus – this is Holy Rus” or “Autocephaly – the road to hell”. Yushchenko was not among the greeters, however, although he did not fail to personally greet Bartholomew I and ask him on the spot for support in creating one church.49 In this way, the president made it clear which of the patriarchs was the most important guest. In the face of the unambiguous attitude of the head of state, Viktor Yanukovych supported Alexy II during the celebrations. Meanwhile, prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko purposely – so as not to incur the displeasure of Moscow – distanced herself from the celebrations (she did, however, make a gesture towards Alexy II by sending him, through intermediaries, an enormous bouquet of roses).50 With each subsequent day of the celebrations, the controversy mounted. The Moscow patriarchate complained, for example, of the predominance on the streets of Kiev of posters with the likeness of President Yushchenko and Bartholomew I (posters with the image of Alexy II were fewer and of smaller dimensions) and the biased planning of television transmissions showing only the appearances that included the patriarch of Constantinople. Still during the course of the celebrations, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry officially protested against the lack of respect shown for the head of the Russian church, while after the celebration’s closing, the Foreign Affairs Ministry asked the Ukrainian ambassador in Moscow for an explanation on this matter.51 The outcome of the trip to Kiev was unfavourable for Patriarch Alexy II. Patriarch Kirill first official visit to Kiev (27 July – 5 August 2008) was more successful than his predecessor’s.52 Kirill emphasized the importance of unity of the church, but tried to stay far from politics. He stressed that the UOC of the Moscow patriarchate was home for all Orthodox believers regardless of their nationality, political sympathies or view on history.53 He reminded the Russian and Ukrainian nations that they shared a common history and spoke of a community of peoples that identified themselves with an Orthodox civilization that was born In Rus, grew its roots in Russia and persists as an actor in international relations.54 He referred to Kiev as the “Jerusalem of Russian Orthodoxy”.55 An important moment was the patriarch’s visit to the monument of the victims of Holodomor where he laid flowers. In the presence of President Yushchenko the patriarch presented a short speech in which he talked about his personal experience of poverty and the threat of death of starvation.56 He also stressed that there was no need to create a new church in Ukraine as the UOC of the Moscow

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patriarchate was open to everyone and that it was this church that truly had the potential to unite all Ukrainians. Kirill added that this conviction was not an expression of Russian imperialism but of ecclesiology and asserted that the patriarch was “father to all believers regardless of the colour of the passports in their pockets or the country in which they happen to live”.57 As well as Kiev, the patriarch visited Crimea, Donieck and cities in the west of the country – Rivne and Pochaiv – and met with the most important Ukrainian politicians, President Yushchenko,58 Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko59 and Viktor Yanukovich. The patriarch made his second visit to Kiev in February 2010 to attend the inauguration of Viktor Yanukovich as president. Before taking the oath of office by laying the hand on the constitution and the Peresopnytsia Gospels, Yanukovich was blessed by Patriarch Kirill during a mass in the Pechersk Lavra. The leader of the ROC also presented the future prime minister with the signet ring that according to the tradition was worn by Vsevolod of Kiev, son of the Yaroslav the Wise.60 The blessing was seen by many members of the opposition as a slap indented for other Orthodox communities in Ukraine.61 The growing tension in Russian–Ukrainian relations during the celebration of the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Rus draws attention to the ambiguous position of the ROC in Ukraine. The UOC of the Moscow patriarchate is a domestic institution subject to Ukrainian law, while at the same time it is a part of the ROC, which is a trans-national subject, connected to the Russian state to such an extent that it could rightly be called the Russian church. If not for the Kremlin’s support, the ROC would be one of many religious institutions registered in Ukraine. This sort of patronage of the Russian authorities, which the Moscow patriarchate so eagerly takes advantage of, puts it in the position of a foreign subject which, from Kiev’s point of view, threatens Ukrainian sovereignty. The image of the ROC as an outside actor was strengthened after the Orange Revolution. Moreover, in face of the strong polarization of the Ukrainian political scene, the Moscow patriarchate declared itself in favour of one of the sides in the struggle for power. As a result of the clear politicization of Orthodoxy in Ukraine, all the churches in fact participate to varying degrees in the political rivalry, which had not been so common before 2004. The increase in the ROC’s political involvement in Ukraine has specific consequences for Russian–Ukrainian relations. Each misunderstanding on the Kiev patriarchate entails a reaction by the Kremlin. Regarding this problematic image of the ROC as a Russian institution it is important to stress a new tendency in the Moscow patriarchate’s pubic image; that is, its routine emphasis that it represents all eastern Slavic Orthodoxy. For instance, during his meetings with foreign politicians from the Near East the head of the ROC declared support for the development of relations between the country of his guest (Lebanon) and not only Russia but also Ukraine and Belarus.62 This is how the ROC underlines the supranational character of the Moscow patriarchate’s service. The ROC is trying to discredit accusations of her being an exclusively Russian institution. Examining the manifestation of the religious factor in Russia’s relations with Ukraine, three levels of disputes can be distinguished: church–church (the Moscow

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 173 patriarchate, the Kiev patriarchate, the Constantinople patriarchate, the Vatican), church–state (the Moscow patriarchate, the Ukrainian presidential administration and government) and state–state (Russia and Ukraine). The third of these levels of dispute concerns not only actions undertaken by the Kremlin in defence of the ROC, but also a sort of “religious diplomacy” duel between Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yushchenko.63 The most important element of Russia’s “religious diplomacy” in Estonia is its decisive support for the Moscow patriarchate, which functions in the Baltic republic as an institution protecting Russian culture, faith and language. For this reason, the state helps the church. The problems with registering the ROC’s structures in Tallinn were presented by the Kremlin within the country and on the international arena as a sign of discrimination against the Russian minority. Russia could use this case as an instrument to worsen image and weaken credibility of Baltic republics. In a way, the problems of the ROC turned out to be politically useful for the Kremlin. Similarly as in the case of Ukraine, by granting autonomy in 1993 to the structures in Estonia the Moscow patriarchate could not prevent a local split.64 The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC) that was established as a result of this schism65 was registered by the Estonian Internal Affairs Ministry in August 1993, and then on 20 February 1996 it was accepted under the jurisdiction of the patriarchate of Constantinople, which gave the EAOC a chance to achieve canonical status. The decision of Bartholomew I evoked a very serious crisis in relations between the two patriarchates and the ROC even considered breaking off canonical relations. The remaining Orthodox churches and even the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry were involved in mitigating the conflict. The compromise reached by the Holy Synod of Constantinople and Moscow on 16 May 1996 after numerous consultations was unsatisfactory (among other things, it did not settle the question of disputed properties). The Russian church thus began to seek support in international institutions. In 1999 it turned to the chairperson-in-office of the OSCE – Berndt Braun – with an official request to investigate the Estonian government’s observance of freedom of conscience. Moreover, the archbishop of Tallinn, subordinate to the ROC, postulated making Estonia’s accession to the EU conditional on the settlement of the problem of church property division in a way that is satisfactory to the Moscow patriarchate. In a speech on 21 March 2001, the ROC’s permanent representative to the European institutions presented the matter as a problem of violation of human rights in Estonia.66 On 16 May a meeting was held between the Russian ambassador and the Estonian minister of internal affairs on the matter of registering the ROC structures, and on 7 June Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov urged the Estonian government to legalize the status of the ROC.67 The pressure exerted by the Russian diplomacy and the ROC inclined the Estonian government to compromise. Near the end of 2001 the EAOC and the ROC signed a protocol, on the authority of which the Estonian church would withdraw claims to 18 churches managed by the ROC. The government guaranteed the Russian church the right to exclusive use of the sacral sites for 50 years and pledged itself to pay compensation.68 The Estonian

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structures of the ROC were finally registered on 17 April 2002,69 which was recognized in Russia as the first step towards normalization of bilateral relations, reinforced later by the visit of Dmitry Rogozin – a representative of the Russian Duma – in Tallinn. The Estonian government was “rewarded” by the Kremlin for the positive settlement of the ROC’s status with the conclusion of several bilateral agreements.70 Moreover, the authorities of the Russian Federation did not rule out the final settlement of border questions by 2003, emphasizing that the new, positive impulse in bilateral relations was the result of the Estonian government’s change in attitude towards the Moscow patriarchate. Alexy II’s visit in Tallinn, 25–30 September 2003, brought a clear improvement in the mutual relations of the ROC with the EAOC and Estonian authorities. In a gesture of reconciliation, the Estonian president, Arnold Rüütel distinguished the patriarch on this occasion with the “Cross of Maarjamaa”. Alexy II, in turn, reciprocated by inviting the Estonian head of state to Moscow, and granting him an award (during his visit on 20 January 2005) for “outstanding work on behalf of strengthening the unity of Orthodox nations”.71 Although the conflict was mitigated, this did not mean the elimination of all misunderstandings. The ROC is perceived by Tallinn as an outside subject acting in Russia’s interest, thus weakening Estonia’s sovereignty. Acceptance of the EAOC under the jurisdiction of Constantinople puts the church and the Estonian authorities in a better situation than that in which Kiev currently finds itself. The truth is, however, that it was easier for the Moscow patriarchate to reconcile itself to defeat in the small Baltic republic, than to the possible loss of the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy – Ukraine. The problem of seeing the ROC’s activities as a threat to the sovereignty of the state is not the most important in relations between the ROC and Tbilisi, because Georgia is not under the jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate, but is the canonical territory of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). In the beginning of the 1990s both churches – Russian and Georgian – had to first deal with history and the consequences of the Moscow patriarchate’s takeover of the structures of the Georgian Church in 1811. It was only in 1943 that the Moscow patriarchate formally granted the GOC autocephaly. However, the GOC was still compelled to subordinate itself to the Moscow patriarchate in matters of ecumenical and international policy. The question was ultimately settled on 4 March 1990, when the Ecumenical Patriarchate granted the Georgian church the status of autocephaly and confirmed its patriarchal rank.72 There exist at least several platforms of cooperation between the Georgian and Russian churches: they share a dislike for the activity of new religious associations in post-Soviet territory, suspicion towards the activities of the Vatican,73 distance towards ecumenism (on 20 May 1997 the synod of the GOC voted to leave the WCC and the European Council of Churches, in which the GOC had been a member since 1962) and last but not least, attachment to the idea of respect for the integrity of canonical territory and a lack of acceptance for schisms.74 In official appearances, representatives of both churches assure of the neighbourly relationship between the churches and the nations. Alexy II and Ilia II

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 175 unanimously emphasized that even tensions in relations between the states could not destroy the “brotherly bond”. As an example of such solidarity was the crisis evoked by the holding in Georgia in September 2006 of Russian officers suspected of espionage. The churches took upon themselves the task of easing the conflict; the Moscow patriarchate issued a communication in which it assured that the “two Orthodox nations will protect their friendship”.75 On 11 October 2006 Ilia II together with Alexy II held a solemn Mass on behalf of the friendship between Russians and Georgians, and then a Mass in this same intention took place on 4 March 2007 in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow.76 The issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia put friendly relations between the churches to a serious test. Formally, they are a part of the canonical territory of the GOC, but many of the residents of the Orthodox faith in these regions have Russian citizenship and consider themselves to be members of the ROC. The rightful head of the Sukhumi–Abkhazia diocese and a bishop of the Georgian church, Danila Datuashvili, is in fact not allowed to enter the territory of the separatist republic. The Bishops’ Council of Abkhazia, which is currently under the self-assumed leadership of Vissarion Aplin, maintains contacts with Russian dioceses (Maykovsk and Krasnodar) and openly supports joining the ROC.77 In South Ossetia, Orthodox believers who do not recognize the supremacy of the GOC are concentrated around Georgy Pukhayev. The rebellious community turned to the Moscow patriarchate several times – unsuccessfully – with requests to be integrated into its structures. After the ROC’s refusal, a group of around 6,000 individuals, led by Georgy Pukhayev (who took the name Father Alexander) was admitted to the jurisdiction of the ROC Outside Russia, which it then abandoned to create the South Ossetia–Alania diocese within the framework of the structures of the Greek Old Calendrists.78 Although the Moscow patriarchate had for years distanced itself from schismatics – Alexy II, during a visit to Georgia in June of 2003, officially confirmed respect for the integrity of the GOC’s canonical territory79 – complaints of foul play in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were brought against the ROC. The Georgian church accused the ROC of training Abkhazian clergymen in the Moscow theological seminary80 and of activity contrary to canon law on the part of clergymen of the Moscow patriarchate in separatist regions. For instance, in February 2007, Russian clergymen distributed in Abkhazia thousands of copies of the Gospels in Abkhazian, blessed by Alexy II.81 Katolikos Ilia II protested when, on 20 September 2005 in Tskhinvali – the capital of South Ossetia – ROC dignitaries were spotted in a military parade.82 Even greater controversy was evoked by the presence of hierarch Teofan (the bishop of Stavropol and Vladikavkaz) at the ceremony during which the – unacknowledged by Tbilisi – president of Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, took the oath of office. After this, in March 2007 Ilia II once more expressed hope that the authority of Alexy II would support the territorial integrity of Georgia.83 It is worth mentioning that the Moscow patriarchate was not the only Russian religious institution active on the territory of the two separatist regions. For example, in 2007 mufti Rawil Gaynetdin visited Abkhazia, where he met in Sukhumi with two presidents not acknowledged

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by Tbilisi: the Abkhazian president, Sergey Bagapsh, and the Ossetian, Eduard Kokoity, who came to Sukhumi especially for this meeting with the chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia.84 Such actions of Russian religious institutions served to create ties between these two regions and Russia and complemented the Kremlin’s policy involving unofficial support for the separatists, strengthening their loyalty to Moscow and thus weakening the authority of Tbilisi and the territorial integrity of Georgia. The fighting between Russian and Georgian soldiers in August 2008 in South Ossetia, President Dmitry Medvedev’s recognition of the independence of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali and the deployment of Russian armed forces to the two self-declared republics mean the chances of Georgia restoring real control over the two rebellious regions look grim. As a result, relations between Moscow and Tbilisi are the worst have been in years. In such a situation, it is also much more difficult for the ROC to avoid taking a clear position without jeopardizing its relationship with the Georgian patriarchate. The military action in South Ossetia, which lasted eight days (7–15 August), aroused religious institutions, beginning with the call for an immediate ceasefire issued jointly by Alexy II and Ilia II to the authorities of both countries on 12 August. The patriarchs’ appeal was supported by all the Russian religious institutions, although at this stage there were already noticeable divergences in the attitude of the GOC and other organizations. Ilia II defended Tbilisi’s right to “restore constitutional order”, while representatives of Russian Orthodox believers, Muslims and Buddhists decisively condemned the “Georgian aggression” and praised Moscow’s intervention in defence of the civilian population: for example, on 14 August, at the request of the mufti of North Ossetia, Ali-Haji Yevteyev, a delegation of the Council of Muftis and the Islamic Cultural Centre arrived in South Ossetia to “comfort the Ossetian nation in the face of the Georgian aggression”.85 Despite the increasingly apparent differences in their views, the churches jointly organized humanitarian aid, all the important in the light of the fact that for a long time they were the only institutions that the Russian army allowed to carry out such activities.86 The commanders allowed the Georgian church to pick up the goods that were brought and distribute them in Russian-occupied Gori.87 The Moscow patriarchate acted as intermediary in contacts between military personnel and the Georgian church. The ROC later conveyed to the president and the prime minister of the Russian Federation an official letter from Ilia II,88 in which the patriarch lamented the killing of Orthodox believers by others of the same faith, and appealed to the Russian leaders not to recognize the independence of the two regions which by law were part of Georgian territory.89 Ilia II’s letter did not, however, effect a change in the Kremlin’s plans: in a television appearance on 26 August, the president informed citizens that the appropriate decrees were issued concerning Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After this decision was made public, the mistrust between the sister churches grew, which the Muslims tried to use to strengthen their role in foreign policy.

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 177 On 21 September 2008 a representative of the Islamic Cultural Centre, AbdulWakhed Niyazev, offered to mediate between the feuding Orthodox nations, trying in this way to assume the role which up to then, in the Caucasus, had been reserved for the Moscow patriarchate.90 However, the Muslims did not get a chance to prove their skill as mediators, because both patriarchates tried to save their good relations and maintain cooperation on behalf of the conflict’s mitigation. The Georgian church realized that after the Kremlin’s decision, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were lost for Tbilisi, but there was still a chance to save the integrity of its canonical territory, provided that the ROC would not decide to extend its own jurisdiction over the two republics. The desire to assure itself of the goodwill and solidarity of the ROC inclined the Georgian patriarchate to appeal to the Russian church on 9 September for continuing their joint efforts on behalf of peace. Emphasizing brotherhood instead of their divergent views, the GOC did not want to give the ROC a pretext for “assuming care over” the Abkhazian and Ossetian Orthodox believers, especially considering that the temptation for the ROC was very large. Not long after the military action stopped, the statements of representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia left no doubt that the decided majority of society declared they belonged to the Moscow patriarchate.91 In this situation, the GOC could only demand that the ROC act in accordance with its own principle of “several states, one church”. The already difficult relations between the two churches are further complicated by the game being played with them independently by Moscow and Tbilisi. Mikheil Saakashvili wants to keep the support of the Georgian patriarchate, which enjoys enormous trust in society. The president especially wants the GOC to maintain its negative assessment of the Russian action in Abkhazia and Ossetia. The Kremlin also has its own plans in connection with the Georgian church. Increasingly often in the Russian media there appear voices arguing that the good relations between the two churches should be used to win the goodwill of Ilia II, who in Georgian society enjoys greater esteem than the president (in 2009, he was chosen the Man of the Year in Georgia92). The Georgian patriarch is in a delicate situation. In some church circles the idea of publicly supporting the opposition to Saakashvili’s authority93 (less pro-American, oriented towards cooperation with Moscow) at the price of saving the integrity of the GOC’s canonical territory is gaining popularity.94 In the face of political clash in Georgia, Patriarch Ilia tries to keep neutral position and calls for peace.95 Most often he plays the role of a social mediator, for example after the May 2009 demonstrations were brutally suppressed by the police in Tbilisi he condemned violence and successfully negotiated with the government the release of arrested demonstrators for Easter.96 Interestingly, Georgian opposition is also trying to win the patriarch’s support, while actively they seek support of the ROC. On 23 December 2010 Nino Burdjanadze met with Patriarch Kirill in Moscow and asked for help in securing renovation of a church in Abkhazia. With this request, Burdjanadze, in a way, acknowledged the actual influence of the ROC in this province.97 The situation that came about in the Caucasus is a great challenge for the ROC. Until this time, the ROC had not taken a position regarding the requests of

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the clergy in Abkhazia and Ossetia about the acceptance of their communities to its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the director of the Orthodox television channel Spas, Alexander Batanov, said in an interview on 18 August 2008, that he did not have the slightest doubt that the Moscow patriarchate must do this, for otherwise thousands of believers would be left without a church’s care. Batanov was supported by Orthodox publicist Mikhail Tyurenkov, who tried to persuade the ROC hierarchs to begin talks with the South Ossetian bishop, Georgy Pukhayev.98 The decisive statement of Metropolitan Kirill, who called on the church to show restraint in this matter and not to meddle in politics, put an end to similar speculations. The then-chairman of the Department of External Relations pointed out that the relations between the patriarchates remain the only active channel of contacts between the two Orthodox nations, for which reason the church is all the more obliged to uphold brotherly relations.99 The ROC, without a doubt, has a dilemma. On one side is the pressure of the expectations of Russian society, Orthodox Abkhazians and Ossetians and the expectations of the government; on the other side is the threat of creating a precedence that would be dangerous for the integrity of its own canonical territory, especially since the Georgian church has thus far loyally supported the Moscow patriarchate in the face of splits in Estonia, Moldova and Ukraine.100 Moreover, several months before the August conflict in South Ossetia, the Georgian church had, in solidity with the ROC and the Serbian patriarchate, protested against the independence of Kosovo.101 In considering the acceptance of the two rebellious republics, the ROC must also reckon with the disapproval of the Serbian church102 and the possible intervention of the patriarchate of Constantinople, to which Georgia could turn with a request for support. So far, the churches have managed to withstand pressure from the governments, still declare their desire for cooperation, and the GOC has not lost its hope of maintaining the territorial integrity of its canonical space. In February 2009 the Georgian patriarchate declared itself in favour of widening its cooperation with the ROC in the interests of the churches and the nations.103 Settlement of the canonical membership of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a test of Orthodox solidarity, which could lose out to national interests as defined by the states. The position of the ROC is slowly evolving: from the view that the jurisdiction of the Georgian church in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is unquestionable104 to a more and more vague stand and declarations that the faith of the believers should be discussed in a dialogue between the two churches. Bishop Hilarion opts for this dialogue, arguing that Orthodox communities are under a possible threat of proselytism from a “third party” in that area (this cryptic notion can be interpreted either as the patriarchate of Constantinople or Islamic extremists).105 Interestingly, the ROC clearly distinguishes between communities from Abkhazia and South Ossetia: the former keeps canonical ties with Orthodox Church, while the latter are called “schismatic”.106 Analysing the ROC’s recent activity in both quasi-states brings to a conclusion that it is trying to strengthen its presence in the disputed area. The Moscow patriarchate keeps contacts with political leaders: for example, Patriarch Kirill sent

The Betrayal Syndrome in Russia’s relationships 179 good wishes to Sergey Bagapsh after his election to the post of the president of Abkhazia and met with him in Moscow on 18 February 2010.107 To Eduard Kokoyity Kirill sent a congratulation letter on the occasion of the anniversary of declaration of Independence on 20 September 2010.108 The ROC delivers humanitarian aid, sends teachers, instructors, organises courses and so on.109 The Moscow patriarchate’s decision to redraw the eparchial boundaries in the northern Caucasus on 22 March 2011 was also seen as an attempt to expand the ROC’s canonical territory.110 As a result, there are the Vladikavkaz and Makhachkala eparchy (for Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya and North Ossetia, with the seat of the archbishop in the latter) and the Karachaevo–Cherkessia and Kabardino– Balkaria eparchy (with the seat of the archbishop in Pyatigorsk). The eparchies of Stavropol and Nevinomyssk were put under direct jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Moscow. Thus, the ROC has decided to increase the importance of North Ossetia – the northern Caucasus region with the biggest Orthodox Christian population – possibly with the aim of influencing the Ossetian quasi-state.111 Nevertheless, in contacts with Georgia, the ROC remains the most important Russian institution. In January 2010 both churches exchanged official representatives which are stationed – respectively – in Moscow (Vahtang Liparteliani) and Tbilisi (Roman Lukin).112 In 2010 Bishop Hilarion visited Georgia twice, in October and December.113 Patriarch Ilia consistently restrains from antagonising the Moscow patriarchate. Comparison of the role of the religious factor in Russia’s relations with Ukraine, Estonia and Georgia allow certain nuances to be observed. In the first case (Ukraine), it is an essential element in the dispute over the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation and state. Orthodoxy, as a potential foundation of the community, became a factor antagonizing not only the two nations, but also Ukrainian society. In its relations with the authorities in Kiev the ROC acts as an outside subject backed by a foreign state and not as a native church. In Russia’s policy towards Ukraine, the religious factor mainly performs the roles of identity-formation (one faith, one church, one nation), legitimization (the right to be involved in political processes and in religious disputes), mobilization (e.g. against the supporters of autocephaly for the UOC) and a tool for maintaining political influence. The Kremlin uses the ROC’s complaints of its ill-treatment by Kiev as a pretext for interfering in Ukrainian politics and highlighting its own particular interests in the “near abroad”. The dispute over the status of the ROC’s structures in Estonia was a manifestation of a deeper conflict between the two states and a good opportunity for the Russian government to discredit Tallinn in its aspiration to join European Union. Moreover, the Kremlin made it clear that the church acts in post-Soviet territory not only as a religious organization, but also as a guardian of the diaspora and an institution representing Russian interests. The religious factor reinforced the image of Estonia as an anti-Russian state, which the Kremlin in turn could use in domestic policy, showing its citizens a potential object for unloading their frustrations and grievances.

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In the case of Georgia, unlike Ukraine or Estonia, the religious factor plays a constructive role in relations with Russia. An awareness of Orthodox closeness is still maintained in the two nations. The churches try to mitigate tensions, mediate, and maintain an additional diplomatic channel. This does not mean that religion is not treated instrumentally by the authorities, which is visible in the Kremlin’s use of the ROC’s activities in Abkhazia and Ossetia. Moscow’s religious diplomacy towards Tbilisi based on “good cop – bad cop” tactics (the ROC and the Kremlin, respectively) is characteristic. In Russia’s policy towards Tallinn and Tbilisi, religion is an instrument, but in the case of Kiev, it is also sometimes a premise for decisions made by the Kremlin, because Russian identity comes into play. Religion highlights the resentment in Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Estonia, but in relations with Georgia it is the strongest premise of community, a possible foundation for closer ties. In each of these three cases, albeit in different contexts, the religious factor is connected with the “betrayal syndrome” that burdens relations between the states involved.

7

Occasional community Russian policy on Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro

Among the five states mentioned here are two of the former Yugoslavia, two from the former Eastern Bloc and one former Soviet republic – all of them linked by Eastern Christianity. Southeastern Europe, where Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro are found, lies beyond Russia’s privileged sphere of influence. Only Moldova – a former republic of the USSR – is perceived as part of the “near abroad”, which does not change the fact that Russian diplomacy must acknowledge the strong position of two important partners of this region – the European Union and NATO. Moscow is still too weak, economically and technologically, to effectively compete with Brussels, but it does have an often underappreciated asset in its relations with the countries indicated – the sense of closeness that has its roots in the community of faith. In the tradition of Orthodox nations of southeastern Europe, the image of Russia as the defender of the church and liberator of the Slavs is very strong. Older generations still remember such slogans of “Slavic solidarity” and “Orthodox brotherhood”.1 The slogans alone, unsupported by ecumenical arguments, are not enough to re-orient the policy of Sofia, Bucharest and Podgorica from their Western course to Moscow, but they help to maintain trust in relations between the states. It is difficult for people in Bulgaria, Romania or Macedonia to understand warnings against the Kremlin’s policy, because these states do not feel particularly threatened by Russia. Moscow uses its positive image and animates the spirit of “Orthodox community” in order to accomplish concrete tasks: for example, in diplomatic efforts to prevent the establishment of NATO bases on the Black Sea and stop the construction of an EU gas pipeline that would compete with the Russian gas transporting network. The Kremlin’s long-term goal is to strengthen the European Union’s pro-Russian lobby, formed mainly by Orthodox states – Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Cyprus.2 One of Russian diplomacy’s most important allies in supporting the sense of closeness is the Moscow patriarchate, propagating the solidarity of Orthodox nations. One should remember that two questions determine the ROC’s activity in southeastern Europe: first, with the exception of Moldova, the ROC is acting outside its own canonical territory, and must therefore consider the viewpoint of the local churches; second, the ROC’s most important partner in the region

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remains the Serbian patriarchate, which is why relations with the other Orthodox churches are often secondary to Russian–Serbian relations, especially in the ROC’s contacts with the non-canonical churches of Macedonia and Montenegro. The Bulgarian patriarchate and the Russian church are linked mainly by their common experience of struggle with internal schisms, while the dialogue with the Romanian Orthodox Church is impeded by the dispute regarding canonical jurisdiction over Moldova. This confrontation encourages activation of the religious factor – the Moscow patriarchate concentrates its efforts on maintaining exclusive jurisdiction in the former Soviet republic. In consequence of the Romanian Orthodox Church’s decision to restore the metropolis of Bessarabia,3 structures of both churches – Romanian and Russian – have coexisted in Moldova since December 1992.4 In contrast to the similar situation in Ukraine and Estonia, this time the ROC has had an ally in the Moldovan authorities at least until the elections won by the opposition in 2009. Supporting the canonical Russian church, for nearly 10 years Kishinev has refused to register the structures of the Romanian patriarchate. In 1998 representatives of the metropolis of Bessarabia filed a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights, following the decision of the Moldovan Supreme Court in December 1997, according to which legalization of the structures of the Romanian patriarchate depends entirely on the decision of the state-recognized church – the ROC. In 1999 a meeting took place in Kishinev between representatives of the two patriarchates, during which Metropolitan Kirill demanded the subordination of the Bessarabian structures to the ROC, which turned the talks into a fiasco.5 On 27 September 2001 the Moldovan government decided to unilaterally end the dispute by announcing the ROC to be the only legal Orthodox church. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg, in its verdict of 31 December 2001, recognized this act as a violation by Moldova of the obligations accepted in the European Convention on Human Rights concerning freedom of conscience. The court then rejected Kishinev’s appeal, and ordered the authorities to register the metropolis of Bessarabia (which occurred on 30 July 2002) and to pay compensation. The court stated that believers of the metropolis of Bessarabia were entitled to freely practise their religion within the structures of the Moscow patriarchate. It is worth mentioning that the Council of Europe pressured Moldova for the quick settlement of the church dispute – in 2002, for example, it accepted a document related to this matter, Religion and Changes in Central and Eastern Europe.6 Against the background of the dispute between the patriarchates remains the unsettled status of Transnistria. The ROC is in fact the only institution connecting the divided Moldovan state. This can explain the former president Vladimir Voronin’s attachment to the ROC – he saw the patriarchate as an ally in the process of uniting Moldova. The expectations of the Moldovan president with regards to the Russian church were not unfounded. In November 2005, during his first official visit to Kishinev in 15 years, Patriarch Alexy II expressed his support for the president’s action “having the aim of reconciling the people of Moldova and Transnistria” and emphasized that in resolving this conflict, it was necessary to take into consideration the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Moldovan

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state. The ROC appreciated Kishinev’s involvement in the dispute with the Romanian patriarchate and pointed to Vladimir Voronin (along with Alexander Lukashenka) as a model (e.g. both presidents were distinguished by Vsevolod Chaplin in his summing up of the first six months of church diplomacy in 2008).8 The continued rule of the current president of Moldova would have guaranteed the ROC the support of the government. Voronin was useful to the church, and the church was useful to the former president as a lobbying institution among the Russian elite on behalf of Moldova’s integrity. Russia’s voice is important in the matter of Transnistria’s future, but Moscow would not encourage Tiraspol to have talks with Kishinev without being sure that, after warding off conflict, supporters of closer cooperation with Bucharest would not come out ahead. Vladimir Voronin, who tried to distance himself from his western neighbour, was aware of similar concerns of Moscow. For example, in an interview for the Russian media in January 2009, the president, referring to Romania’s policy, firmly stated that Moldova needed neither an “advocate”, nor a “big brother”.9 Vladimir Voronin’s restraint towards the Romanian government was appreciated in Moscow, where on 18 March 2009 a meeting of the Moldovan head of state with Dmitry Medvedev took place. Both leaders had specific hopes vested in the bilateral talks. Voronin wanted to improve his image, convince Moldovan voters that he enjoys the Kremlin’s support, and at the same time was counting on getting a loan on favourable terms. Medvedev, in turn, wanted to return to the 2003 Russian peace plan for Transnistria, the so-called Kozak memorandum, which would allow Russia to assume the initiative which had belonged to the European Union since 200510 and also extend the mandate of Russian “peace-keeping forces”. Moscow would gain recognition in Europe and prestige by playing the role of the mediator who effectively reconciled the two sides. Moreover, working out a compromise between Kishinev and Tiraspol under the patronage of the Kremlin would keep Moldova within the Russian sphere of influence.11 After the meeting with Medvedev, Vladimir Voronin paid a visit to Kirill. The president introduced to the patriarch the conclusions reached at the earlier talks in the Kremlin.12 The victory of the opposition strengthened by the “Twitter Revolution” (April 2009) broke the continuity of Communist power in Moldova. The government of Vlad Filat has declared its strong commitment to EU accession and is actively adapting its legal, political and economic system to EU standards. Filat emphasizes, however, that the goal of Moldovan diplomacy is to have a balanced policy which succeeds in tightening cooperation with Brussels without worsening relations with Moscow.13 Among countries targeted by EU Eastern policy, Moldova has suddenly advanced from being a “latecomer” to a leader praised by the EU Commission and member states.14 The most enthusiastic lobbyist of reorientation of Kishinev’s foreign policy is, naturally, Bucharest. Current rapprochement of Moldova and Romania could, eventually, result in strengthening Bessarabian church structures. From Moscow’s perspective, the ROC’s activity in Moldavia complements the activity of the state diplomacy. The Russian church maintains its structures over the entire territory of the former Soviet republic. It has good relations with the

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authorities in Kishinev and can help in the peace process initiated by the Kremlin. It is in the ROC’s interest to hinder a “Romanization” of Moldova’s cultural sphere. The Moscow patriarchate represents the russkiy mir in the Dniester region, supporting Russian culture and language. This is of great value especially after Romania’s political and cultural appeal had increased with the accession to the EU. In Moldova, where 65 per cent of people surveyed expressed support for entry into the EU, 77 per cent consider Vladimir Putin the most admired authority, 50 per cent expect Russia to remain a strategic partner and 44 per cent wish that the USSR still existed,15 attachment to the ROC could have an impact on Russia’s role in the region. The dispute between the two patriarchates is thus a rivalry over cultural space, the friction between two elements – Slavic and Romance. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Romanian church has been trying to restore the sense of community between citizens of Moldova and their historical homeland. The Romanian hierarchs recognized the creation of the metropolis of Bessarabia as an “act of restoring justice”, while the Moscow patriarchate saw it as a political manipulation supported by – among others – Vlad Kubyarkov (the current vice-chairman of the Moldovan Christian Democratic opposition party). After its accession to the European Union, Romania’s attractiveness grew in the eyes of Moldovans, and in Bucharest people began to mention the possibility of recovering the lands lost in 1940: for example, President Traian Băsescu had a plan for the future unification of Moldova and Romania within the EU.16 What Romanian diplomacy could not allow with regard to a neighbouring country, the church accomplished by establishing in October 2007 three bishoprics within the metropolis of Bessarabia – one in Moldova (southern Bessarabia) and two in Ukraine.17 Russian political scientist Gennady Konenko recognized the Romanian church’s decision as aimed at strengthening the pro-Romanian opposition in Moldova which, if the liberals win in Romania’s parliamentary elections, would bring Moldova closer to the EU.18 In November the ROC called upon all Orthodox churches not to recognize the Romanian parishes in Moldova and Ukraine.19 The Bulgarian church tried to mediate in this matter between the two patriarchates, but the three-way talks on 22 November did not bring any results. In this difficult situation, the ROC was not disappointed by President Voronin, who recognized the decision of the Romanian patriarchate as an “act of aggression”.20 Moreover, in January 2008 Kishinev announced the deportation of four Romanian clergymen,21 about which the metropolis of Bessarabia complained to the Council of Europe.22 Tensions between the two patriarchates rose further, when the Romanian church announced in July 2008 its intention to open parishes in Japan and South Korea, which are recognized as the historical terra misionis of the Russian church.23 It is worth emphasizing that it is not only the ROC that has problems with the non-canonical structures of the Romanian patriarchate, so too does the Serbian church, which does not recognize the Romanian parishes existing on its canonical territory. In the face of the joint Russian–Serbian front, the Romanian church has indicated interest in cooperation with the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, which

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President Viktor Yushchenko encourages. In this way, the religious factor is interwoven with Moscow’s policy towards Kiev, Kishinev, Bucharest and Belgrade, while at the same time one should admit that the disputes of the two churches over canonical territory do not preclude the presentation of a common viewpoint of churches and states on the international arena, an example of which was the non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Moscow, Bucharest and both patriarchates. Solidarity with Serbia was abandoned however by the government of “brotherly Bulgaria”, which despite the protests of its own church, recognized the right of Kosovars to self-determination. In the Kremlin’s policy towards Sofia, the ROC’s activity serves mainly to emphasize the closeness of Russians and Bulgarians, which should encourage Sofia to appear in the forum of the EU as a state friendly to Russia.25 The significance of the ROC for Russian–Bulgarian relations involves, however, something more than just creating a good atmosphere. It is in the Bulgarian government’s interest to maintain friendly relations with the Moscow patriarchate, not only because of the Kremlin, but also taking into consideration the problems of its own church, which since the early 1990s has been fighting internal divisions and noncanonical communities.26 In the dispute with raskolniks, the Bulgarian Church, represented by Patriarch Maxim, has been supported by the ROC from the very beginning.27 For this reason, representatives of the highest authorities of Bulgaria seek an audience with the Russian patriarch when they visit Moscow: Alexy II met Prime Minister Simeon Sakskoburggotski (2002) and President Georgi Parvanov (2003).28 Bulgaria needs the ROC’s support, especially after 22 January 2009, when the European Court on Human Rights issued a verdict in favour of the raskolniks, stating that Bulgaria violated freedom of conscience by allowing police to forcefully remove schismatics from 250 monasteries and churches on 21 July 2004.29 The court gave Sofia three months to resolve the dispute through arbitration, and ordered it to pay compensation.30 It is no coincidence that a meeting took place in Moscow on 6 February 2009 between Georgi Parvanov and Kirill. Appealing to “brotherly bonds of one faith”, the Bulgarian president asked the patriarch to take a critical stand towards the ruling of the Strasburg court and to declare itself in favour of protecting “spiritual sovereignty” (dukhovnaya samobitnost / духовная самобытность) of Orthodox states. Parvanov emphasized that he had always perceived the essential role of the Orthodox Church in developing relations between Bulgaria and Russia.31 The patriarch of Moscow and All Russia recognized the verdict as a dangerous precedence threatening the independence of Orthodox states32 and expressed his desire that the president take part in the Bulgarian patriarchate’s talks with the raskolniks, which took place on 11–12 March in Sofia.33 Getting involved in similar events helps the ROC build its position in the universal church and thanks to successful mediation it raises the prestige of its own diplomacy. The Moscow patriarchate is also active in Serbia’s relations with Macedonia and Montenegro. The ROC recognizes the independence of the two post-Yugoslavian republics,34 but in accordance with the principle, “several states, one church”, it tries to persuade the two non-canonical structures (the Serbian

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patriarchate does not recognize the independent Macedonian church, established with the permission of the Socialist authorities in 1967, or Montenegrin church from 1993)35 to return to the jurisdiction of the Serbian church. The Moscow patriarchate offers mediation for the feuding churches. At a meeting in Moscow in April 2007, Alexy II tried to convince the delegation from Macedonia to begin talks with Serbia,36 and in February 2009 Patriarch Kirill encouraged the president of Montenegro, Filip Vujanović, to do the same. The ROC’s activity does not have greater significance for Russia’s policy towards Macedonia and Montenegro, but these states are situated on the “margins” of Moscow’s foreign policy. The ROC is treated as a representative of the Russian state. The authorities in Skopje and Podgorica follow the premise that good relations with the ROC facilitate dialogue with the Kremlin. In its activity in southeastern Europe, the Moscow patriarchate appeals to a community of faith and the cultural heritage of Orthodox nations. The Russian government also willingly uses these slogans to achieve concrete goals. The Kremlin does not, however, try to make “Orthodox brotherhood” the main instrument of its policy towards Kishinev, Bucharest and Sofia. “Orthodox solidarity” appears on the international level occasionally, when it is beneficial to Russia. The “occasional” character of the community follows from political reality. Moscow accepted the course of integration with the EU and NATO that Podgorica, Skopje, Sofia and Bucharest followed, clearly reducing its ambitions and activity in Southeast Europe. At the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, nothing happened in this region that could have activated the myth of “Slavic solidarity” in Russia’s relations with Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia or Montenegro to the extent seen in Russian–Serbian relations. If an event similar to the NATO bombing of Belgrade in 1999 took place in Bulgaria, then the spirit of brotherhood would probably be renewed and consolidated in Russian–Bulgarian relations, but as it is, the “Orthodox community” is treated today by the Kremlin itself and the central European political elites with as a factor that creates a certain closeness in contacts between states. With regards to the smaller churches of Romania and Bulgaria, and also the non-canonical churches of Macedonia and Montenegro, the Moscow patriarchate tries to play the role of an “Orthodox patron” and in this way builds its position in the international arena, which has great significance for realizing the Russian vision of cooperation of civilizations represented by particular religious institutions. However, the matter of leadership in the universal Orthodox Church is an issue that still has to be resolved.

8

The long shadow of Byzantium Russian–Greek relations in the face of rivalry between two churches

The religious factor plays a specific role in Russian–Greek relations. In the forefront are the relations between the two churches, which are supported by the state – Greece helps the patriarchate of Constantinople, and Russia helps the Moscow patriarchate. The main goal of Kremlin diplomacy with regards to Athens is the maintenance of good relations, allowing them to present a common position in the international forum (regarding the problems in the Balkans or the Cyprus conflict, in the UN, OSCE, the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and so on).1 The religious factor, used to support the “traditional closeness”,2 would place Greece in the trend of “occasional community”, were it not for the rivalry between the two patriarchates, which gives Russian–Greek contacts a particular dimension. The ROC’s primacy in the universal Orthodox Church has a crucial significance for the credibility of Russia as an Orthodox civilization. Acting as patron of the dialogue between Christianity and Islam requires that the ROC be treated in the international arena as the unquestioned leader of world Orthodoxy, with a mandate to speak in the name of all the churches. Only Constantinople can challenge Moscow in this sphere. Frictions between the two patriarchates has a historical basis.3 Each of the churches represents a different tradition of Orthodoxy: Constantinople – Greek, Moscow – Slavic. Comparison of their demographic potentials gives the Russian church a clear advantage (80 million believers compared to the 3½ million subordinated to Constantinople), however, according to the Greek doctrine, the canons speak in favour of Constantinople. The Council of Constantinople (381) announced the bishop of Constantinople to be the “first dignitary after the bishop of Rome”, and the Council of Chalcedon (451) granted the patriarch supremacy over the bishops of territories located outside the Byzantine Empire.4 The Third Council of Constantinople (680–681), which actually began the existence of the patriarchate of Constantinople, established the order of the existing local churches. After the so-called great schism of 1054, Constantinople came out first among the patriarchates and Moscow took fifth place – the interpretation of this classification divides the universal Orthodox Church even today. The Greek tradition emphasizes the right of Constantinople to a special supremacy over the other churches

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and grants it, for example, the status of court of appeals in relation to the metropolitan courts of other patriarchates and jurisdiction over the diaspora – all Orthodox believers outside the area of existing Orthodox jurisdictions.5 From the viewpoint of the Russian church, representing the Slavic branch: [The] ecumenical patriarch does not have the authority over other local churches. Only in certain cases … when one of the churches is deprived of the possibility of independent action … the patriarch has the right, and even the obligation, to help the other churches, if it has been so requested; it can also act on its own initiative in defence of existing law, but it shall not be allowed to violate anyone’s laws”.6 Some theologians also undermine the patriarch’s right to use the title “ecumenical”, which was justified only in the times when the oikumene existed: that is the Byzantine Empire.7 The Moscow patriarchate criticizes Constantinople for the “Hellenization” of the universal church, the most important symptom of which is the domination of Greek clergy in the patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. In all four ancient jurisdictions, Greeks predominate among the hierarchs, while the majority of believers are Arabs,8 and this disproportion is often brought up by the ROC. The stereotypical opinion that Constantinople does not appreciate Slavic Orthodox tradition and considers it a “vulgarized” version of the Greek tradition sharpens the division in the church between the Slavic and Greek camps. The ROC also accuses Constantinople of the heresy of “Eastern papism”.9 This problem set the two patriarchs against each other: for example, during a meeting of Orthodox and Catholic believers in Belgrade in October 2006, the Russian church protested against the treatment of Constantinople by the Catholic delegation as the “Orthodox Vatican”. The representative of the ROC in European international organizations, Bishop Hilarion, emphasized the exclusively honorary nature of the supremacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the universal church.10 A month earlier, the ROC had questioned the points found in a document prepared by the Catholic–Orthodox Commission, suggesting Constantinople was superior to the other Orthodox churches.11 Disputes between the delegations of the Ecumenical and Moscow patriarchates became almost a rule in international forums – in July 2008, clergymen of the ROC left the deliberations in Rhodes when representatives of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church were invited. This was seen in Russia as a cunning provocation by Constantinople with the aim of eliminating the ROC from similar initiatives.12 Many Russian hierarchs are of the opinion that the “papal” tendencies of Constantinople prove its ambition to widen its own jurisdiction and subordinating to itself as many local churches as possible. The geo-political changes that took place in Europe after 1989 heightened territorial disputes between particular churches because the states which gained independence at the beginning of the 1990s considered the possession of their “own” independent church an important element of state sovereignty. For the former Soviet and Yugoslavian republics,

The long shadow of Byzantium 189 changing over to the jurisdiction of Constantinople was a chance for legalizing the status of the “national” Orthodox Church. Raskols in the canonical territory of the ROC are the source of the most serious tensions in relations between the two patriarchates. After the Holy Synod of Constantinople acknowledged the independence of the Estonian church, the Moscow patriarchate broke off relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate for a short time, and removed the name Bartholomew I from the diptych of the liturgy.13 The compromise reached in April 1996 did not change the view of the ROC, which claims that Constantinople violated canonical law by accepting the EAOC under its jurisdiction. Having learned the “Estonian lesson”, the ROC mistrusts the close relationship of Bartholomew I and Viktor Yushchenko, who is trying to get Constantinople’s support for a national Ukrainian church. The ROC’s fear is justified, because the Ecumenical Patriarchate had already once, in 1995, accepted under its jurisdiction Ukrainian structures – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Diaspora,14 and in 2007 the metropolis council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA asked Constantinople to get involved in the canonical dispute in Ukraine.15 An additional field of controversies between the Moscow and Ecumenical patriarchates is church properties and competencies in western Europe. The disputes concerned the Exarchate for Orthodox Parishes of Russian Tradition in Western Europe.16 Characteristically, the majority of these disputes were resolved in court, and the ROC was actually supported by Russian diplomacy each time. During the course of the legal action over the right to the Uspensky sobor (Cathedral of the Assumption) in Budapest, the foreign affairs minister, Igor Ivanov, visited the capital of Hungary to give support to the Russian clergymen.17 As soon as Constantinople registered its structures in Austria, Vladimir Putin brought up the question of the ROC’s status in Vienna during a meeting with his Austrian counterpart Heinz Fischer in the summer of 2007.18 Earlier, in December 2004, a problem occurred in Biarritz (France), when some of the parishioners of a community of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, under the leadership of Protorey Georgiy changed over to the ROC’s jurisdiction. This evoked the protest of Constantinople, which had held authority over the Biarritz church since 1931. The Holy Synod removed the clergyman responsible for the schism from priestly office and directed the matter to the French court. The legally valid verdict from 2006 compelled the ROC to return the church, however some of the community’s parishioners, who had changed over to the Moscow patriarchate, did not reconcile themselves to the court’s decision and as a sign of protest, conduct services in a rented hall in a building next to the church.19 A lot of controversy was also inspired by the matter of the Surozh Bishop, Vasily Osborn (Great Britain), who on 8 June 2006 left the ROC and changed to the jurisdiction of Constantinople with the approval of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The synod of the Russian church expressed its “deep concern in connection with the non-canonical activity” and called upon Constantinople to resolve the problem within the framework of bilateral talks “in the name of the unity of the

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universal church”.20 In July the ROC recognized the decision of the Constantinople synod as invalid and contradictory to the canons. Rivalry between the patriarchates over jurisdictions has lately been taking place also outsider Europe. When in 1996 Constantinople created a bishopric in Hong Kong,21 the ROC did not attach much significance to the event, but when the Ecumenical Patriarchate announced on 9 January 2008 that the territory of mainland China is subordinate to the bishopric of Hong Kong, the Russian church protested against the decision “violating the rights of the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church”.22 The “race” between the patriarchates did not pass over even communist Cuba.23 In 2004 Bartholomew I visited Havana, having gained Fidel Castro’s permission to establish the island’s first Orthodox church. This event mobilized the Russian minority, which began efforts to build a Russian prayer centre. In trying to weaken the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the universal church, the ROC uses the growing distrust of conservative hierarchs towards the excessive ecumenical enthusiasm demonstrated by Bartholomew I. Even in the Greek Orthodox Church, closely connected with Constantinople, voices have been heard suggesting that the current patriarch is going too far in dialogue with the Vatican. There was a lot of controversy surrounding the joint prayer of Bartholomew I and Benedict XVI in February 2009,24 but voices of discontent had been heard even earlier. For example, at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, monks from the Esphigmenou monastery on Mt Athos stopped remembering Bartholomew I in their prayers, protesting against his ecumenical activities. An additional element of the “conspiracy” theory of history circulating around Fanar is the conviction – characterizing especially Orthodox fundamentalists – that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is financially and politically supported by Washington. Thus, it did not pass unnoticed that on 7 April 2009, the American president, Barack Obama, met with Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul. The president is said to have mentioned the issue of the Orthodox Halki seminary during the conversation with his Turkish counterpart.25 A popular conviction is also that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is in alliance with the Vatican. Such opinions became so popular among clergy that the patriarch of Constantinople had to make demonstrative statements to avert them from getting too strong: he officially denied rumours of the possibility of recognizing the Greek Catholic Church as canonical and supporting its integration with the non-canonical Orthodox churches in the Ukraine.26 The disputes between the two most influential patriarchates concerning interpretation of the canons of the Slavic and Greek traditions, schisms and the right to properties should not hide the very clear differences in each church’s relationship to the modern world. While Moscow consistently refuses permission for the pope to enter its canonical territory and treats ecumenism as a type of Catholic proselytism, Constantinople emphasizes the need for cooperation between Christians of both churches on behalf of renewed evangelization of laicized Europe. The friendly reception that Benedict XVI was met with in Fanar during his November visit to Turkey (2006) won a lot of goodwill for Constantinople from

The long shadow of Byzantium 191 the “international community”. The hierarchs’ joint prayer and declaration of cooperation on behalf of Christian Europe was recognized by many commentators as an important step towards bringing the two churches closer together. The Moscow patriarchate’s lack of participation in this initiative weakens its position in Europe. The ROC treats globalization and liberalism with great suspicion, while Bartholomew I does not miss important political and economical events – for example, in January 2006 he took part in deliberations at the Davos Forum.27 In July 2008 he expressed Constantinople’s openness by recognizing dialogue with Catholics and ecology as priorities of the Orthodox Church in the twenty-first century.28 Rivalry between the patriarchates thus reflects the conflict of two trends in world Orthodoxy – a progressive one, involved in the ecumenical movement, represented by Constantinople, and a rather conservative one, suspicious of the West and ecumenism, and led by Moscow. One must not fail to appreciate the significance of the rivalry in the sphere of concepts, in which, for now, the ROC clearly dominates. The Moscow patriarchate, as the first in the universal church has attempted to define the position of Orthodoxy with respect to modernity’s most important challenges in documents: The Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (2000), The Foundations of the Principles of Contacts of the Russian Orthodox Church With Other Religions (2000), The Concept of the Missionary Activities of the Russian Orthodox Church (2007) and The Foundations of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Teachings on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights (2008). The growth of the Russian church’s prestige is influenced also by its involvement in theological and academic projects, such as the work being carried out since 2000 on the multi-volume Orthodox Encyclopaedia, which is a long awaited Old Church Slavonic equivalent to the already existing series in the Greek language.29 Patriarch Kirill did not fail to emphasize the ROC’s superiority in the conceptual field. On 10 March 2009 in Moscow, in a speech to guests of the Greek ambassador on the occasion of the Orthodox Society Days, Kirill remarked that “Orthodox civilization should work out and present its own model for resolving socio-economic problems”, which the ROC did, for example, by publishing The Foundations on the Social Concept and The Collection of Moral Principles and Rules in Management (Svod nravstvennikh printsipov i pravil v khozaystvanii/Свод нравственных принципов и правил в хозайствовании 2004).30 On 4–6 July 2009 Patriarch Kirill paid an official visit to Turkey. Bishop Hilarion said that “the visit has opened a new chapter in relation between Constantinople and Moscow, on the field of All-Orthodox cooperation as well as bilateral contacts. This visit symbolises shift from confrontation to cooperation”.31 According to Hilarion, the meeting was held in “cordial atmosphere of brotherhood”.32 Next, on 22–31 May 2010 Patriarch Bartholomew arrived in Moscow for an official visit. The talks focused inter alia on the possibility of an All-Orthodox sobor and inter-Christian dialogue.33 Intesity of contacts was maintained in the following year. On 19 February 2011 Patriarch Bartholomew received a Russian delegation of the ROC and the Duma.34 In the same month Patriarch Kirill announced that inter-Orthodox relations were a priority and an All-Orthodox sobor the highest goal.35

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It is in the context of these goals that the ROC’s dialogue with Constantinople and Kirill’s travels to the Near East and ancient patriarchates of Alexandria and Antioch in 2010 should be viewed. The ROC’s intention to summon an AllOrthodox sobor is not possible without the cooperation of Constantinople. “A new chapter” in the bilateral relations of these two leading Orthodox churches sets favourable ground for the sobor. In trying to achieve the position of leader in the universal church, the ROC attempts to gain favour with particular churches. Among the ROC’s allies, one can distinguish three “circles”: anti-ecumenical, anti-Greek and anti-schismatic. The first consists of the Serbian, Georgian and Greek churches, in which conservative hierarchs have significant influence. In the second, built upon dislike of Greek domination, there is a Slavic sub-group – the Serbian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Polish, Czech and Slovakian churches, and also the Arab Christians from the ancient patriarchates (if a general sobor was to be called, the Moscow patriarchate could count mainly on the support of these churches). The third circle encompasses the ones struggling with raskols – again the Serbian, Bulgarian and Georgian churches. The camp of the patriarchate of Constantinople includes churches that are in conflict with the ROC – the Romanian, Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church and the non-canonical Kiev patriarchate. Depending on the circumstances, the group of ROC’s allies mentioned above could also be different. For the Montenegrin and Macedonian churches, the spectre of Hellenization is less of a problem than the status of their own structures, which is why they would support Constantinople if the latter recognized their canonical status. The recent Russian–Georgian conflict in South Ossetia, in turn, undermined the trust of the Georgian patriarchate in the Russian church. In the face of the threat of losing its canonical supremacy over Abkhazia and Ossetia, the GOC could use the help of Bartholomew I, who Mikheil Saakashvili, for example, is counting on36 as he carries out “religious diplomacy” modelled on that of Viktor Yushchenko, with the aim of balancing the ROC’s influence with the activity of a competing patriarchate. In the rivalry over primacy in the universal Orthodox Church, the Russian church has the support of the Kremlin, which is involved on the ROC’s side, ensuring financial support and diplomatic assistance, lobbying in the international forum on behalf of initiatives favourable to the ROC and exerting pressure on the governments of particular states. A good example of actions of this last type is Moscow’s policy towards the Estonian crisis: when, with the Estonian government’s support, the patriarchate of Constantinople established its own jurisdiction over the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry sharpened its policy towards Tallinn,37 and the Duma demanded that President Yeltsin apply economic sanctions to the Baltic republic.38 Russian diplomacy also had its part in preventing a crisis between the two patriarchates and urged the hierarchs to re-establish canonical relations. After the election of Kirill as patriarch, commentaries appeared in the Russian media concerning the ROC’s chances of becoming, under Kirill’s leadership, an “Orthodox Vatican”. A representative of the Union of Orthodox Citizens, Kirill

The long shadow of Byzantium 193 Frolov, argued that the new head of the Russian church fulfils all the conditions to play the role of an “Orthodox pope”, gather the other churches around the Moscow patriarchate and increase Eastern Christianity’s competitiveness with regards to Protestantism and Catholicism.39 Russia’s efforts to ensure the primacy of the ROC in the universal church collide with the plans of Greece, which sees the Constantinople patriarchate in the role of Orthodox leader. In accordance with agreements worked out in Lozanne in 1922–1923, the seat of the ancient patriarchate is located in Istanbul, in the old Greek district – Fanar. The patriarch is a Turkish citizen and subject to Turkish law, but in the international arena, the state holding political patronage over Constantinople is Greece. Athens regularly reminds Ankara to observe the rights of the Greek minority living in Turkey and to treat the ecumenical patriarch not as the leader of a minority church, but as the leader of world Orthodoxy. Religious questions are often a source of tension in the relations between the two states: for example, relations cooled after a group of Turkish nationalists demanded in November 2006 the introduction of a ban on the patriarchate’s activity in Turkey and the transfer of its seat to Greece.40 The relations between Russia and Greece in the context of rivalry between patriarchates are complicated by the activity of a third church – the Greek church with its seat in Athens.41 At the beginning of the third millennium, the consolidation of the position of the patriarchate of Constantinople has brought the ROC and the Greek church closer together; the latter understands the Moscow patriarchate’s accusations of expansionism directed at Fanar, because it has itself argued with Constantinople over the right to name bishops in the northern part of Greece (this matter even led to a temporary severance of canonical relations between the two churches, from 30 April to 28 May 2003).42 Paradoxically, the Greek church unofficially favoured Moscow in the rivalry between the two patriarchates and the Greek’s government’s foreign policy of promoting the Ecumenical Patriarchate. According to reports in the press, in March 2006 the Greek government recommended that the Foreign Affairs Ministry strengthen the role of Constantinople in the international arena and support Bartholomew I as the representative of world Orthodoxy.43 Athens’ diplomacy backed the Ecumenical Patriarchate in order to inter alia reduce the influence of the conservative Greek church, which has a distinct anti-Western attitude. The animosity between the two churches resulted in a strange balance of power in the conflict between patriarchates. Constantinople was supported by the Greek government, while Moscow – besides the intercession of the Kremlin – could also often count on the goodwill of the Greek Orthodox Church. For instance, the archbishop of Athens and All Greece, Christodoulos, participated in a meeting at the Kremlin with President Vladimir Putin and Alexy II on 8 May 2001, during which they discussed conduct towards the activity of Constantinople in Estonia. Later, the Greek archbishop also met with representatives of the Duma, who called for the “consolidation of Orthodox churches and nations”.44 The authorities in Greece were also involved in the mitigation of the dispute, for which the patriarch of Moscow and All Russia personally thanked the minister of culture,

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Evangelos Venizelos on 18 May 2001.45 In December of that same year, Vladimir Putin came to Athens on an official visit, part of which was prepared by the Greek Orthodox Church, which was responsible for, among other things, the Russian president’s stay at Mt Athos. The Orthodox holy mountain became the reason for the next misunderstanding between patriarchates, which evoked problems between Russia and Greece. In 2003 Bartholomew I suggested in a letter to Alexy II limiting the number of Russian monks living on Mt Athos in the St Panteleimon monastery, to which the Moscow patriarchate, supported by the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, reacted rather harshly. The matter was eased by the arrival of the Greek prime minister, Konstaninos Karamanlis, in Moscow in October 2004, when he met with Alexy II and assured him of the solid foundation of Greek–Russian cooperation.46 The tension between the two churches clearly lessened with the election in 2008 of a new, more liberal archbishop of Athens and All Greece, Ieronymos II. Soon after his inauguration, he met in Istanbul with Bartholomew I and confirmed that the Greek church is an inseparable part of Constantinople, which opened the way for creating an exarchate of Constantinople on the territory of Greece.47 It is worth emphasizing that Ieronymos II’s efforts to come closer to Bartholomew I did not occur at the cost of relations with the Russian church. At a meeting with the Russian ambassador in March 2009, the archbishop of Athens and All Greece stressed that he is counting on maintaining the traditionally close relations with the ROC and fruitful cooperation with its new patriarch.48 The Orthodox faith is one of the most important premises of Russia’s close relations with Greece. The rivalry between the two patriarchates has a destabilizing influence on relations between the two states, but from the viewpoint of the governments, “the game is worth the risk”. Without recognition of the ROC as the leader of the universal church, it is more difficult to give credibility to Russia’s identity as an Orthodox civilization and to realize its civilizational mission. The religious factor thus fulfils an identity function. The primacy of the Moscow patriarchate among the other Orthodox churches strengthens its position relative to other world religions, especially western Christianity and Islam. The ROC becomes an increasingly effective player, and thus a increasingly useful instrument of Russian foreign policy.

9

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation Russian policy on Muslim countries

In relation to Muslim countries, Russia fears two things above all. Firstly, the destabilization of the global order through the terrorism of Islamic fundamentalists. Conflicts between Muslims and believers of other religions could, in an extreme case, lead to a religious conflict in Russia. Secondly, it is concerned with the shift of Muslim countries towards cooperation with the USA, as in case of Saudi Arabia or Turkey, which would be a serious obstacle to the multi-polar order envisioned by Russia. According to survey of the Levada Centre, the decided majority of Russian respondents (67 per cent) declare themselves in favour of strengthening ties with Islamic countries, while 39 per cent support the Kremlin’s policy of close cooperation with Teheran.1 However, sociological surveys also show a noticeable ambiguity in Russian attitude towards Muslims. In his research, Vladimir Kolosov argues that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of average Russians and that of Russian political elites, which manifests itself Russia’s attitude to Muslim states.2 While the Kremlin emphasizes its close cooperation with Iran and strategic rapprochement with the Arab world, more and more Russians express concern about credibility of Muslim partners. According to Kolosov, in the beginning of twenty-first century for the average Russian the “axis of evil” includes Iran, Iraq and the USA.3 The inability of the Russian authorities to deal with repeated terrorist attacks and in solving the tensions in the northern Caucasus strengthens Russians’ fear of Islam. The convergence of interests between Russia and the world of Islam, resulting from the respect for tradition, manifests itself in various streams of Russian political thought: for example, Eurasianism, “Russian Islam” and in the concept of Orthodox civilization (propagated by the ROC and the Kremlin), one of the premises of which is the peaceful coexistence of Christianity and Islam. In this context, Geydar Dzhemal’s views on Russia’s necessary alliance with the Muslim proletariat is an obvious call for strategic and civilizational rapprochement with the world of Islam. Russia perceives Muslim countries as potential allies in the formation of a new, multi-polar global order. Moscow assumes that the other pillars of this order share its fear of the domination of the USA, view the “benefits” of globalization with

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reservations and question the universalism of democracy.4 Islamic states view Russia as an influential player, wielding the right of veto in the UN Security Council, and as an alternative supplier of technology and essential raw materials. In turn, Russia, after the experience of degradation in the international arena in the last decade of the twentieth century, values the respect paid by these countries. By tightening its ties with Muslim states, Russia wants to manifest its presence in the Near and Middle East, increase its influence on decisions connected with the export of strategic natural resources, create a mechanism of cooperation for fighting Islamic terrorist groups and also minimize support for the Chechen separatists among Muslim politicians. In defining its interests in relationships with Islamic countries, Russia is pragmatic, which allows it to use the religious factor as an instrument of foreign policy. In the realities of the world order, seen by many political decision makers in terms of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”, the image of a state as “fighting” or “favouring” Islam has gained in significance in relations with the Muslim world. Russia learned this lesson rather early, when its own image deteriorated after the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, the unambiguous support Moscow given to the Serbs during the war in former Yugoslavia and the military action in Chechnya. Following a clear weakening of contacts with the Islamic world in the 1990s, the administration of Vladimir Putin added dynamism to Russian policy on Muslim states. Russia gradually began to renew relations with the former allies of the USSR (among others, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen), intensified its diplomatic activity in connection with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and started developing bilateral cooperation with states traditionally connected with the USA (e.g. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Turkey).5 The Council of Muftis of Russia attributes such a dynamic development of relations to the diplomacy of Vladimir Putin, who, in the opinion of mufti Gaynetdin, with his “historic visits” to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar has opened a new chapter in Russia’s relations with Islam.6 The Kremlin’s attitude to events in the Palestinian National Authority has resulted in the improvement of the Russian Federation’s image among Muslim states. The Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, was received twice in Moscow (August 2000, May 2001). Moreover, the Russian state decisively condemned the murder of the Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, by Israeli forces in 2004. The Kremlin also gained considerable respect in the eyes of Muslims by inviting to Moscow representatives of Hamas after the elections it won in the Palestinian National Authority.7 The Kremlin gained the respect and sympathy of Muslim elites also thanks to its policy towards Iran, despite pressure from the USA and the EU. Since the unilateral withdrawal from the so-called Gore–Chernomyrdin Memorandum (1995) in 2000, Moscow remains Iran’s most important partner – it maintains a favourable tone regarding its right to develop nuclear technology, supplies the country with weapons and essential technology and opposes sanctions or military action.8 The Russian Federation has increased its credibility as an “ally of the Muslim world” by unequivocally condemning the American invasion of Iraq in

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 197 March 2003 and by consistently declaring itself in favour of the Islamic side in situations such as the scandal connected with the publishing of caricatures of the prophet Muhammad in Danish newspapers or the controversial speech of Pope Benedict XVI at Regensburg University.9 Russian religious institutions – most notably ROC and muftiates (above all the Council of Muftis of Russia) and structures connected with them (such as, respectively, the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society10 and the Fund for Support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education) – contribute to the formation of Russia’s positive image, the rebuilding of its relations with Muslim countries and assist in developing Russia’s diplomatic network. They also legitimize the Kremlin’s activity, emphasizing the special bond that connects Russia with Islam and Russia’s dedication to the interfaith dialogue. Diplomacy (combined with image and prestige) and interfaith dialogue are the key issues in assessing the religious factor in the Kremlin’s policy towards Muslim states. When analysing the map of diplomatic activity of Russian religious institutions in the world of Islam, two main areas can be distinguished: Arab countries (especially those in the Near East) and non-Arab Muslim states. The latter include the “well-known neighbours” (post-Soviet Muslim republics), “strategic partners” (Iran and Turkey), “favourites” (Malaysia and Indonesia) and “trouble makers” (Pakistan and Afghanistan). From the perspective of Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan cause nothing but problems, at least over the last two decades. For many years both countries have been a source of regional instability and served as safe havens for Muslim extremists. After the USA entered Afghanistan, Russia got involved in humanitarian aid, training the Afghan army and renovating military equipment. Nevertheless, even the visit of Hamid Karzai to Moscow in 2005 did not turn out to be a breakthrough.11 In the case of Pakistan, Russia has precise interests: cooperation on the field of energy, transit and arms trade, to name just few. Vladimir Putin’s attempts to act as mediator between Delhi and Islamabad failed in 2002. The rapprochement of the USA and India limit Russia’s room to manoeuvre. Plans to include Pakistan in combat against extremists in the northern Caucasus seem, at least for now, unrealistic.12 Considering the unstable circumstances in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, there is no ground for efficient Russian “religious diplomacy”. In 2002 the ROC delivered humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and held talks with representatives of Islamic communities.13 At present, Russian religious institutions comment on Afghanistan mostly in the context of the drug trade. In October 2009 Dmitry Smirnov, delegated by the ROC as a contact with the army, argued that American – and if not then Russian – fighters should bomb poppy fields in Afghanistan, as this was the only efficient way to protect Russian citizens.14 The metropolitan of Tashkent and Central Asia, Vladimir Ikim, blamed American occupation for the rise of heroin traffic through post-Soviet territory.15 A positive sign was the Easter service held for the first time in history in Kabul on 6 April 2010.16 In general, Russia tends to play a supporting role, but the Organization of the Islamic Conference wants to encourage Moscow to get more involved in Afghanistan.17

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The community of Orthodox Christians in Pakistan has 400 believers. The first priest was ordained in 2008 in Lahore and the first Russian parish was opened in Islamabad in 2010. Russian muftiates are rather sceptical about prospects for cooperation with Pakistan in the near future. For Russian elites, including Muslims, Afghanistan and Pakistan are a source of problems. Russian newspapers report stories of Russian Muslims visiting the two countries, receiving training from extremists and joining their ranks (notable examples of such groups are Bulgar Djamaat, the Islamic Party of Turkestan and Djamaat Tablig18). Malaysia and Indonesia present the opposite pole of Asian Islam. On 12 September 2004, on the occasion of the international forum dedicated to interfaith dialogue, the president of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the prime minister of Malaysia Naijb Razak declared that their countries would join their efforts for promoting “moderate Islam” in Asia.19 The ROC is present in both countries. There are three Orthodox parishes in Indonesia: Jakarta, Surabaya and Bali Island. Most of believers are autochthons. A small community of 2000 was registered in 1991. Archimandrite Danila Bambang Dvi Byantoro, who takes care of believers, is under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Sydney and Australia–New Zealand of the ROC Outside Russia. Since 2000 the ROC has supported the Indonesian community: for example, deacons learn in Russian seminars. In December 2003 Metropolitan Kirill visited Indonesia. Then, in 2007, a common delegation of the ROC and the ROC Outside Russia came to Indonesia. A year later, a delegation of the ROC with Bishop Mark Jegorovsky visited Jakarta.20 The most important visit to Indonesia, however, was that of Vladimir Putin in September 2007. Among the priorities of bilateral cooperation the president mentioned interfaith dialogue, underlying that Russia and Indonesia – “independent ancient civilizations” – could profit from one another’s experience in managing of multi-ethnic society.21 In an article, “Russia–Indonesia: Towards New Horizons of Cooperation”, for the Indonesian press, Putin wrote: “The dialogue with Indonesia, one of the leaders of Islamic world, the country with the biggest Muslim population in the world, is of special interest to Russia. We are ready seeking together a way to multi-confessional mutual understanding, inter alia within the framework of the OIC, where Russia has gained the status of observer thanks to the support of Indonesia”.22 In June 2009 a conference, “Peaceful Coexistence in a Multi-confessional Society: Lessons from Russian and Indonesia” with participants from those two countries, took place in Moscow. Apart from academics and clerics politicians also participated, including Minister Sergey Lavrov. Academics drew parallels between Russian and Indonesia: both countries have undergone a tough political transformation, both are multi-ethnic and multi-confessional, but have one dominant religion.23 On the occasion of the conference, Bishop Hilarion received the delegation of religious communities of Indonesia. The metropolitan commented that due to the significant and successful experience of interfaith dialogue the ROC could collaborate not only with religious institutions but also political circles of Indonesia.24

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 199 Russian muftiates do not want to stay behind the ROC. In April 2011 the delegation of the Council of Muftis of Russia paid a 10-day visit to Indonesia in order to sign an agreement on cooperation with Islamic institutions. The main purpose was to establish closer cooperation with Islamic universities in Jakarta, Malang and Yogyakarta.25 An important event was the visit of Putin to Malaysia on 4–5 August 2003, which gave an impulse for further cooperation in the field of education. In 2006 the Global University of Islamic Finance discussed a project to establish in Kazan financial offices which would work in accordance with the rules of Islam.26 The Centre for Islamic Economy and Finance was organised within the Russian Islamic University in Kazan with help of the Islamic Bank of Development27 and the School of Business in Kuala Lumpur.28 In 2007 a meeting of representatives of Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant and Anglican churches of Asia took place in Kuala Lumpur: proof that Malaysia is active in interfaith dialogue, at least for the purpose of foreign policy.29 In 2009 for the first time Orthodox Christians celebrated Easter in Malaysia, although there is no Russian parish there. However, it is obvious that the scope for activity by the ROC is marginal in this country. The activity of Russian Muslims has just started. What is the most appreciated by the Russian ummah is the cooperation with Islamic universities of Malaysia and Indonesia. From the perspective of Moscow’s interests, supervision of the religious education of Russian Muslims abroad is crucial, which is why muftiates organize exchange programmes with those universities which guarantee education in the spirit of “moderate” Islam.30 The muftiates’ efforts are aided by the state-formed Fund for the Support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education, which establishes contacts with similar institutions in Muslim states,31 and also by one of the most important religious universities of the Russian Federation: the Russian Islamic University in Kazan, which cooperates with the International Scientific Research Centre of Muslim History, Culture and Art with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).32 In 2007, thanks to the funds provided by the Council of Muftis of Russia, 40 Russian Muslims students were able to study abroad – 19 in Egypt and Syria and 21 in Malaysia. Maghreb countries, Indonesia and Malaysia are crucial partners for educating Russian Muslim within frames of “moderate Islam”. Saudi Arabia, which carries a stigma of “wahhabism” in the eyes of the Russian public, is trying to improve its position in Russia and present itself as an important and reliable funder. Saudi activity on the field of education was strengthened in November 2007 after the Islamic Development Bank and the Council of Muftis of Russia agreed to fund a system of scholarships for Russian Muslims who plan to study in Russia as well as abroad. The initiative is aimed at supporting secular faculties like medicine or engineering.33 In 2009 Saudi Arabia announced the investment of US$320,000 in Islamic education in Tatarstan with the cooperation of the Fund for Support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education. Saudi Arabia initiated, among others, the project supported by the Islamic Development Bank to create in Tatarstan a financial centre which would function in accordance to

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the principles of sharia.34 The rise of Saudi activity has motivated Iran to start its own projects with the Russian Fund.35 The Iranian–Saudi rivalry for “the minds and souls” of Russian Muslims is for the latter, naturally, beneficial. Riyadh also has ambitions to enter Russian mass media. In 2007 mufti Gaynetdin held talks with the representative of Saudi TV channel Mecca who offered to start a sister-channel in Russian. Eventually, negotiations ended with no result because the Saudi side would not include Russian journalists in the project.36 However, cooperation with foreign Islamic universities does not always proceed smoothly. On 29 May 2009 35 citizens of Russia and other former Soviet republics studying at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo were arrested on charges of having invalid documents.37 The event was condemned by the Russian authorities and the Council of Muftis of Russia, which declared it would have to revise its strategies of educating Russian Muslim students abroad.38 The impact of the “Arab Spring” on this field will also be considerable for Russian Muslims. The extent to which the revolutions of 2011 have upset the ummah is evident from the words of mufti Muhammadgali Khuzin who said that “the Al-Azhar University has lost its credibility after its graduates went out of the streets in protests against Mubarak” and concluded that in countries, involved in the turmoil of the Arab Spring, “traditional moderate Islam” is under pressure of radicals and that as a result, schooling opportunities in Egypt or Tunisia for Russian Islamic cadres has been lost.39 Talking about the Arab Spring it is worth noticing that Russia is concerned about the political situation in the Maghreb and the Near East. Politicians, clergyman40 and academics are pessimistic about future stability. The notable political analyst Alexey Malashenko even pointed at Turkey as a country of growing Islamization where a radicalized part of society would be encouraged by events in neighbouring countries to go out on the streets.41 This is probably the reason why Russia decided not to veto the no-fly zone over Libya in the UN Security Council. The biggest critic of this decision was Vladimir Zhirinovsky who called upon all Muslim states – Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others – to lend support to Gaddafi in face of the NATO aggression.42 Interestingly, the representative of the Russian ummah took the opposite stand. It is hardly a coincidence that it was mufti Gaynetdin who supported the operation against Gaddafi saying that “the UN resolution is in the interest of Muslim countries”. However, he was concerned that the operation would not be prolonged over the time that was necessary to accomplish the goal set out in the resolution.43 Gaynetdin’s weak position forces him to look for occasions to express and prove his loyalty; in this regard, his actions contrasted with reactions of the Caucasian mufti Allahshukhur Pashazadeh who said that abolishing Hosni Mubarak was not surprising and compared it to the removal from power of Mikhail Gorbatschov.44 Most Russians were reluctant about any kind of intervention in Libya’s domestic affairs. According to surveys conducted by Levada Centre in April 2011, 47 per cent were against economic blockade aimed at abolishing an undemocratic regime, 79 per cent against bombardments, 73 per cent against deploying military troops. Consequently, 53 per cent favoured Putin’s criticism of the UN resolution

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 201 and NATO actions and condemned Medvedev’s support for the UN. Sixty-five per cent supported neither of the two sides in Libya. Forty-seven per cent declared that the situation in North Africa states raised their concern, and 27 per cent agreed with the opinion that the Arab Spring had been triggered by the West which planed to install its own regimes in this region.45 Making contacts in the field of education is just one dimension of diplomacy of Russian Islamic institutions. The Russian muftiates ever more boldly undertake action beyond the “near abroad”, building a network of connections with centres in Muslim states, and meetings of clergy often precede visits by Russian politicians. Rawil Gaynetdin, the chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, aspires to play the role of representative of Russian Islam in the international arena. His accomplishment is the initiation of cooperation with the Turkish clergy, which was motivated by three factors: the attractiveness of the model of an “Islamic secular state”, the actual absence of the ROC (most of Turkey’s territory is under the jurisdiction of the patriarchate of Constantinople) and closer relations with Istanbul, which are in the interest of Moscow. So far, the actions of the Council of Muftis in this area can be considered successful. In 2006 Rawil Gaynetdin was officially invited to a meeting with the Turkish prime minister and representatives of government, during which Turkish authorities gave approval for the building of a Russian mosque in Istanbul. Moreover, a mechanism was also established for regular meetings of representatives of the Council of Muftis with the Office for Religious Affairs of Turkey.46 An important step in developing bilateral contacts was made by signing an agreement on cooperation between Islamic institutions in 2008.47 Gaynetdin also won of Turkish and Moroccan financial and technical support for restoration of the Moscow Congregational Mosque, for which the mufti had a chance to express his gratefulness to President Abdullah Gül during the official meeting of the presidents of Russia and Turkey.48 Gaynetdin’s international ambitions are evident from his attempts to establish closer contacts with Islamic institutions from the Balkans. In September and October 2008 representatives of the Council of Muftis of Russia visited Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia–Herzegovina for the first time.49 At present much of Ganynedtin’s attention is drawn by the Near East conflict. On 8 April 2009 he met with Mahmoud Abbas in Moscow and reassured him that Russian Muslims were praying for peace in the Near East; he invited Abbas to Kazan and received his invitation to visit Jerusalem.50 On 24 September 2009 Gaynedtin lent official support to a sovereign Palestinian state as the only way to bring peace to the Near East. He also voiced his support for an international conference on the Near East peace process in Moscow.51 On many other occasions, the chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia expressed solidarity with Palestinians and offered diplomatic help to the conflicting sides.52 Talking about his diplomatic experience mufti Gaynetdin underlines his role in Iranian–Russian talks in 1993, participation in Russian state delegations to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Israel in 1995 and his activity at the OSCE.53 However, in comparison to Patriarch Kirill, mufti Gaynetdin has still a long way to go in the field of diplomacy. The ROC’s patriarch first official visit outside the “near abroad”

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was to Turkey (4–6 July 2009), which was applauded by Russian Muslims.54 In Ankara the patriarch was received by Prime Minister Recep Erdogan. During this meeting Kirill expressed interest in developing close cooperation with Turkish Islamic institutions, offered his support for Ankara’s initiative of the Alliance of Civilizations and invited Turkey to participate in the UNESCO consultative group Peace and Dialogue of Cultures.55 One of the ROC’s diplomatic priorities under Kirill is rapprochement with the “traditional religions” of Turkey. The goal is to establish forums and create mechanisms of cooperation similar to those present in Russian–Iranian relations. The ROC contributes to the work of the Russian–Turkish Social Forum established in 2010 on the initiative of two presidents. Participants of the Forum – Bishop Hilarion and hegumen Filip Riabykh – are involved in developing interfaith dialogue between Russian Orthodox Christianity and Turkish Islamic institutions.56 Diplomatic involvement of the ROC in relations with Turkey is also evident from numerous visits to Istanbul by her dignitaries – on 27 April 2010, hegumen Filip took part in the summit of the European Council of Religious Leaders (ECRL)57 and met with the chairman of the Office for Religious Affairs of Turkey, Ali Bardakoĝlu,58 while on 14 March 2011, he represented the Moscow patriarchate during the international “Leaders of Change” summit.59 Simplifying, one could argue that Russian Muslim institutions specialize in cooperation with states of moderate Islam, mostly Turkey and countries of south-eastern Asia. Although the muftis also visit Arab states, it is the activity of the ROC in this region that seems to have more significance for the Kremlin’s policy. This specific geographical differentiation of the activities of Orthodox and Islamic diplomacy follows from nearly 200 years of the ROC in the Holy Land. The image of the ROC formed in the nineteenth century among the Arab elite as an institution representing the interests of the Russian state gives the activity of the patriarchate today a particular dimension – when Arab governments make a gesture of goodwill towards the church they wish to send a positive signal to the Kremlin. The tasks of the ROC in the region include: regaining properties, rebuilding infrastructure (this is usually connected with cooperation between Russia and the respective state), carrying out diplomatic activity and forming a positive image of the Russian Federation, for example through humanitarian aid, joint projects and academic exchanges. The question of the return of church properties appears above all in relations with the Palestinian National Authority (and perforce with Israel). Successive Palestinian leaders have clearly treated the restitution of property as one of the ways of winning the Kremlin’s favour. Yasser Arafat was involved in one of the most controversial property matters, the so-called Scandal of the Oak of Mamre. In 1997 the Palestinian leader together with Patriarch Alexy II visited the monastery in Jericho that belonged at the time to the ROC Outside Russia. Yasser Arafat, wanting to gain the Kremlin’s goodwill, stated that the site should be returned to the Moscow patriarchate, after which the local monks were removed by force.60 An international scandal broke out three years later when, on 15 January 2000, two American nuns – Maria Stefanopulos and Ksenia Sesiena – refused to

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 203 leave the monastery and were taken away against their will. American diplomats became involved in the affair, trying to convince Patriarch Diodoros of Jerusalem and Yasser Arafat to leave the monastery under the auspices of the ROC Outside Russia.61 Washington’s action mobilized the Moscow patriarchate. At the end of January and beginning of February 2000, Metropolitan Kirill came to the Holy Land, where he met with, among others, the Palestinian Authority’s chief of security service, Jibril Rajoub. On 9 February 2000 Alexy II, enjoying the support of the Kremlin and the Palestinian National Authority, addressed a message to President Bill Clinton about respecting the rights of the ROC to their property in Jericho. With time, the matter subsided and the ROC kept the monastery. In Moscow in 2008 in the presence of government representatives at a meeting with Alexy II, President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority promised to give permission for the construction of a new hotel complex in Bethlehem for Russian pilgrims. Israel very quickly reacted to Abbas’ declaration by unexpectedly finishing the talks that had been dragging on for months and returning to Russia the Sergieyevskiye Podvorye62 in Jerusalem, which was a friendly gesture towards President Putin, who during a visit to Israel in 2005 ordered the Russian foreign affairs minister to undertake talks with Israeli authorities about returning the historical site.63 An important institution supporting the ROC’s activity in the Holy Land is the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS). The activity of this institution, founded in 1882 (and liquidated in 1917) by decree of Emperor Alexander III (with the purpose of supporting Orthodoxy in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon) was revived in 1992 on the initiative of state authorities. Among the most important tasks of the IOPS, directed by Sergey Stepashin, is the recovery of property and land. Moreover, the IOPS is involved in the implementation of educational programmes, the first sign of which is the project of building a school of Russian in Bethlehem (“Russian Palestine”). The IOPS is also planning to build centres for Russian pilgrims, a cultural centre on Mt Eleon and a Russian centre in Ramallah. The most prestigious project, which is also supported by the government of the Russian Federation, is the establishment of the Russian Historical Institute in the Middle East.64 Moreover, the society announced the widening of its activities on the territory of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.65 All these projects were considered a great success by Patriarch Kirill who attended the first conference of the IOPS in Moscow on 11 June 2010. The patriarch delivered a speech of praise with a conclusion that “it is absolutely necessary to coordinate actions between the state, church and organizations in the Holy Land”. 66 Interestingly, among diplomatic cables from the American embassy in Moscow revealed by WikiLeaks there is one commenting on the IOPS: Although the GOR [Russian government] referred to the IOPS, founded in 1872, as “one of the oldest” Russian NGOs, the organization is not independent of the government. The head of Russia’s Audit Chamber, Sergey Stepashin, is Chairman of the IOPS and MFA Middle East Department Deputy Director Oleg Ozerov heads its international section. The MFA and

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The ROC’s new investments in the Middle East are usually connected with the dynamics of relations between states: for example, in 2007 the Moscow patriarchate received – through Vladimir Putin – from Abdullah II, the Jordan monarch, a one hectare lot on the bank of the Jordan River.68 In 2010 the ROC informed that another “unique architectural complex at the banks of the Jordan river” would be handed over to Russian pilgrims.69 Also, in a sign of new openness in relations between the United Arab Emirates and Russia, permission was issued by the local authorities for the construction of the first Russian church on the Arabian peninsula. Work on the realization of the project began in 2000, but the visit of Vladimir Putin (autumn 2007), who was accompanied by a representative of the ROC – Metropolitan Kirill – accelerated the construction of the church of St Filip in Sharjah.70 In 2008 the ROC announced initiative to build a Russian Orthodox church in Manama, the capital of Bahrain.71 Undertaking actions in the interest of the Russian state is most visible in the diplomatic activity of the ROC. The ROC’s initiatives are most valuable in situations where the Russian government, due to pressure from other states – usually the USA, the EU or Israel – would rather not take an official, “hard” stance. Often, the involvement of the ROC complements the actions of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, creating an additional channel of communication. For example, the Moscow patriarchate, like the Russian government, appealed for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. In 1998 Alexy II received in Moscow a delegation of Saddam Hussein’s government, and in 2001, together with mufti Rawil Gaynetdin, went on an official visit to Baghdad, where he assured Iraqis of support in this matter (the lifting of sanctions).72 Two years later, the patriarch met in Moscow with the deputy prime minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, and in March of that same year, Metropolitan Kirill went to Baghdad, where at a meeting with ambassadors he maintained Russia’s support for removing the sanctions on Iraq.73 In March 2006, following the example of President Putin, the patriarch received members of Hamas. A year earlier and two years later, Alexy II also met with President Mahmoud Abbas. Moreover, the patriarch received the president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, who later – in July of 2006, through the medium of mufti Ahmad Badr El-din Hassoun – invited the patriarch to come to Syria on an official

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 205 visit (it is no coincidence that 2006 was a break-through year in bilateral relations between the two states). In that same year, Alexy II also met the king of Jordan, who he presented with the prestigious award of St Andrew in recognition for his contribution to the “dialogue of civilizations” and with the prime minister of Lebanon, Fouad Siniora (December 2006), to whom he offered support in regard to the conflict with Israel. The ROC also sent humanitarian aid to Beirut during the Lebanon–Israeli war in 2009. The ROC leads initiatives that allow it to develop contacts with particular Muslim states in many domains. Such an example is Syria, which in recent times has become a key Russian partner in the Mediterranean region, a recipient of weapons and technology, and a state which is prepared to give Russian naval ships access to the port in Tartus. In Syria, the ROC serves as a mediator in unofficial Russian–Syrian contacts and a patron of the Russian minority: thanks to the church’s efforts, in 2001 in Aleppo a Russian Orthodox community began to function, and in 2005 the ROC was involved in the celebrations of “Russian Culture Days”. The church is also the co-founder of the Russian–Syrian fund “Spiritual Heritage of the Holy Apostle of Paul”, the aim of which is to renew historical ties between the two countries.74 The ROC has focused its diplomatic efforts on the Near East. In 2010 the patriarch paid visits to Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.75 In Egypt, the Russian patriarch spent three busy days, meeting with the patriarch of Alexandria and All Africa, the head of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria and the representative of the National Assembly.76 In February 2010 Kirill met President Michel Suleiman of Lebanon in Moscow;77 then in November 2010 he hosted the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri with whom he discussed the Near East peace process and the role of interfaith dialogue.78 In examining the ROC’s activity in the Middle East and its significance for the Kremlin’s policy, one crucial detail should be considered: the Palestinian National Authority, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon are canonical territories of two ancient patriarchates: Antioch and Jerusalem. The hierarchs of the latter, especially after the scandal that broke around the Patriarch Irenaios of Jerusalem,79 arouse the dislike of many believers. The tension growing between the “rank and file parishioners” and the clergy has, among other things, an ethnic basis. Among the hierarchs, Greeks predominate, while most of the believers are Arabs. The ROC skilfully uses this animosity to its own advantage, presenting itself as a non-Greek church supporting discriminated against Orthodox Arabs, which has a beneficial influence on both the image of the church and of the Russian state among the people of the Middle East. The growing activity of the ROC in the Near East has raised the concern of the patriarchate of Antioch. In an interview for Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Bishop Nifon Saykali, representative of the patriarch Ignatius IV, diplomatically explained that the Christian Orthodox Church in Lebanon appreciated the ROC’s spiritual support but that there was no need for the ROC “to subsidise” local hierarchs. As the bishop said: “We have really good, cordial relations with the ROC but we don’t need to be protected anymore. … The laws of Lebanon and Syria guarantee our rights and freedom of conscience.”80

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From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, the Moscow patriarchate’s cooperation with Iran is of key significance. The regular contacts manifest the skill of the church’s Department of External Relations, which, as Sergey Lavrov puts it, often acts more effectively than the secular diplomats. Alexy II met in Moscow three times with the most influential politicians of the Iranian state: on 12 March 2001 with President Mohammad Khatami, in November 2005 with a delegation of the Mejilis and a month later with representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran.81 The most important effect of cooperation is the activity of the Islam–Orthodoxy Commission, created in 1997. The first session took place in that same year in Teheran, and subsequent ones were organized alternately in the capitals of Russia and Iran (1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Each time, the meetings of the clergy were preceded or complemented by talks between politicians. For example, in 1999 the Iranian delegation met also with the foreign affairs minister, Igor Ivanov, and in 2004 Sergey Lavrov flew to Teheran (on the occasion of his official visit, the minister also visited the Orthodox Cathedral of St Nicholas). Two years later, the commission’s deliberations were preceded by talks in Moscow on establishing a joint enterprise for atomic energy, and in December 2007 the ROC’s Department of External Relations convinced a delegation of the Iranian Organization of Culture and Islamic Relations to support Sergey Lavrov’s initiative on the creation of a consultative body under the auspices of the UN in the form of a religious council.82 It is very probable that in many situations the commission helped to develop a common position for Iran and Russia in the international arena.83 Both states proclaim the need to balance the USA’s domination with the cooperation of new power centres: Moscow, Teheran, Beijing and Delhi. Each of these governments attaches great importance to the “dialogue of civilizations” – an initiative of President Khatami. Moscow and Teheran are also involved in the work of the UN group, the Alliance of Civilizations (Iran is represented by Mohammed Khatami, and Russia, together with all of eastern Europe, by Professor Vitaly Naumkin).84 The ROC is the only Christian church in the world that maintains such close contacts with the Ayatollahs. The experiences gained in the Islam–Orthodoxy Commission have predestined the ROC (at least in its own conviction) to the role of leader in the debate of civilizations – debates that are (from Russia’s viewpoint) crucial for world security and peace. With the help of its religious institutions, the Kremlin creates an image of Russia as a state in which Islam and Christianity have coexisted peacefully for centuries in the spirit of cooperation and tolerance. The harmonious cooperation of the ROC and muftiates in the international arena authenticates the image of the Russian Federation as a Christian country friendly to Muslims, and more importantly, as a country capable of countering the antiIslamic connotations of the policies of the USA and the European Union. The rebuilding of trust between the Kremlin and Muslim states is one of two fundamental results of the use of the religious factor in foreign policy. The second is closely connected with the promotion of the Russian Federation’s new identity – as a unique civilization that conciliates Islam and Christianity, a civilization with which Orthodox nations and Muslim countries trying to reconcile Islam with the

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 207 standards of a secular state can identify. The creation and promotion of a new, attractive and ideologically capacious identity formula for Russia is one of the Kremlin’s most important tasks in the twenty-first century. An essential component of the new identity of the Russian state is the promotion of international dialogue, with particular emphasis on bringing together Christianity and Islam. In the Russian Federation, the central institution of religious cooperation is the Interreligious Council of Russia, and in the “near abroad” – the Interreligious Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States. An important factor of interfaith cooperation is the activity of the ROC in Islamic post-Soviet republics. Despite the emigration of Russians from central Asia after the fall of the USSR, Orthodox Christianity has maintained the position of second most-practised faith in the region. Sébastien Peyrouse argues that the ROC has decided on the following strategy: it presents itself in central Asia as an “autochthonous” institution, which ensures Christian Orthodoxy a status of a “traditional religion” almost equal to Islam; in fact, the ROC would like Orthodoxy to be perceived as “the second faith” in central Asia.85 As a result, the ROC enjoys considerable freedom of activity in central Asian post-Soviet republics. The Moscow patriarchate acts according to similar rules as in the Russian Federation: it keeps cordial relations with political authorities, respects the privileged role of muftiates, concentrates on ethnic Russian communities and does not proselyte among “traditional” believers of Islam. Both Muslim institutions and the ROC cooperate together in order to limit activity of “non-traditional” religious denominations. This Christian–Islamic alliance is used by regional leaders as proof that, contrary to the negative reports of human-rights activists, the interfaith dialogue is fruitful and freedom of conscience is commonly respected in central Asia. In fact, regulations on religious law are getting stricter – a system of censorship of religious literature has been established, registration is subject to tough conditions, in some countries (e.g. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) bans on wearing the hijab in public places are in force and so on. Communities considered disloyal are refused registration, categorized as “wahhabis” (i.e. extremist) and banned. This mechanism of mutual support between “traditional religions” and the state follows tendencies in the Russian Federation. In fact, a specific “post-Soviet model” is being shaped with three main features: the legal principals of a secular state, the privileged status of “traditional religion” and the dominant position of the state which awards “licences to preach” in return for loyalty of religious institutions. Loyalty plays a key role in this model. Therefore, the ROC made it clear in the 1990s that it would not support Russian irredentism or aggressive nationalism in central Asia.86 This choice has paid off. The ROC’s status is respected in the region, Orthodox hierarchs take part in public events, are represented in interreligious commissions, organize interfaith conferences with muftiates and so on. As mentioned, the ROC is useful for political leaders because it legitimizes the official policy which claims interfaith dialogue a priority. Central Asian authorities make attempts to conduct their own “religious diplomacy”. Kazakhstan has turned out to be the most efficient so far on this field. Nursultan Nazarbayev is

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well known for his sympathy to Eurasian ideas.87 He is convinced that it is not Russia but Kazakhstan which is the embodiment of Eurasian civilization. Astana claims to have developed the most successful policy model for managing a multi-ethnic and interfaith society – Kazakhstan’s model of multi-culturalism.88 Therefore, in his view, the largest post-Soviet central Asian republics should play the role of “cultural bridge between East and West in the twenty-first century”.89 Hence, Kazakhstan has visionary ambitions similar to those of Russia. In order to promote “Kazakhstan’s model” every three years since 2003 meetings of leaders of religious institutions take place in Astana. The president holds the official patronage on this initiative which with each summit gains more and more popularity. In 2009 in Astana 77 delegations from 35 countries, including the Arab League, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the UN gathered.90 On Kazakhstan’s initiative the UN announced 2010 the International Year of Rapprochement of Cultures.91 Furthermore, after taking over chairmanship in the OSCE in 2010, Kazakhstan proclaimed interfaith dialogue its priority. Obviously, “interfaith dialogue” is important for Kazakhstan’s “religious diplomacy”. To no surprise, the ROC praises the religious policy of Nursultan Nazarbayev. These good relations were sealed in 2008 with the official visit of Patriarch Alexy II who received from the president the keys to the sobor in Almaty.92 On 16 January 2010 Patriarch Kirill visited Astana. He also met with President Nursultan Nazarbaeyv and honoured him with the Glory and Honour Order. The most celebrated event was the opening ceremony of the Uspensk Cathedral – the largest Orthodox church in central Asia, built with the support of the Kazakhstan authorities. The Russian patriarch praised Kazakhstan for its chairmanship of the OSCE and its devotion to interfaith dialogue.93 In 2009 Danila Sysoev promoted a vision of Kyrgystan as a Russian Orthodox foothold in central Asia whence the ROC could spread the faith not only in post-Soviet republics, but also in China, Afghanistan and Tibet.94 However, Kazakhstan remains crucial for the ROC’s position in the region. Paradoxically, it is the ROC which has potential to act in central Asia, while Russian Islamic institutions are in fact excluded from a region monopolized by local muftiates. The fall of the USSR caused a split within the central institution representing all Muslims: the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia with headquarters in Tashkent. The Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kazakhstan was established in 1990, the kazijat of Turkmenistan in 1992 and the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan in 1993. On post-Soviet territory the only Muslim institution which has maintained supranational character is the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus (Upravlenie Musulman Kavkaza / Управление Мусульман Кавказа, УМК, with headquarters in Baku) led by Sheik-ul Islam mufti Allahshukur Pashazadeh. The mufti is highly respected in society and his support has political value. Pashazadeh’s position is strong also because of his diplomatic activity in the post-Soviet area. On 9 November 2009, on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, an international conference “Interfaith Dialogue: From Mutual Understanding to Cooperation” took place in Baku. Representatives of 40 countries participated in this event, including Patriarch Kirill, Patriarch Ilia of Georgia95 and the patriarch of Constantinople.

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 209 The invitation of the latter could be interpreted as a manifestation of Azerbaijan’s independency. Azeri welcomed Bartholomew I despite the reluctance of the ROC. The whole conference was an attempt to promote the image of Azerbaijan as a “European Orient” – a country of “secular Islam”.96 The success of this event encouraged Azeri authorities to organize in 2010 three religious summits: “The Interfaith Council of the CIS” (25 April),97 “The International Summit of Religious Leaders” (26 April)98 and the UNESCO consultative group Peace and Dialogue of Cultures (27 April).99 In my opinion, however, the highlight of this “interfaith marathon” in Baku was the second (since 1993) trilateral meeting of religious leaders (Patriarch Kirill, Karekin II and Pashazadeh) on the peace process in Nagorno Karabakh (26 April).100 Allahshukur Pashazadeh owes his position inter alia to close cooperation with the Moscow patriarchate. For the ROC, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus is the most convenient partner in terms of interfaith cooperation because it helps to marginalize Russian Islamic institutions in the post-Soviet area. The dynamically developing cooperation brought measurable effects in the form of a joint declaration (15 September 2005) between Grand Mufti Allahshukur Pashazadeh and Alexy II on upholding good relations between the two religions and opposing extremism.101 Also, the Interreligious Council of the CIS became the most important forum for cooperation, of which Alexy II and Pashazadeh were chosen to be co-chairmen. The two dignitaries also served as the hosts of the prestigious summit of religious leaders that took place in Moscow on 3–5 July 2006.102 With a little help from the Moscow patriarchate, Allahshukur Pashazadeh tends to act as a representative of the post-Soviet ummah. However, muftis of the Russian Federation are trying to break the ROC’s monopoly on interfaith dialogue in the “near abroad”. On 17 June 2009 the first ever summit of leaders of Islamic religious institutions of the CIS took place in Moscow. It was dedicated to the strengthening of cooperation between the states and integration of the ummah of the former Soviet Union.103 Another sign of Russian Muslims’ diplomatic “emancipation” was the international conference “Russia and the Muslim World” held on 24 September 2009 in Moscow. It was chaired by mufti Rawil Gaynetdin and strongly supported by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sergey Lavrov.104 However, this does not change the fact that it is not Russian Islamic institutions but the ROC which is involved in Russian “religious diplomacy” in post-Soviet areas. All in all, from the perspective of the Kremlin, the main role of the ROC is to integrate the Russian diaspora and to develop a dialogue with central Asian and southern Caucasian Islamic institutions for the sake of Russia’s image and prestige. Interestingly, it is the ROC which dominates diplomatically in terms of dynamics of contacts with Muslim countries. Politically, it is more beneficial to be on good terms with the ROC, because it is commonly associated with the Kremlin. Muslim institutions have yet to reach this status. Additionally, the ROC tries to secure its future position by promoting the idea that efficient dialogue with Muslim countries is impossible without her participation.105 In the Near East and in contacts with Iran the ROC has strong position, stronger then Russian muftiates.

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Turkey, until recently a main partner of Russian Muslims, with Kirill as patriarch, has become one of ROC’s priorities. The case of the religious factor in Russian–Iraqi relations after 2003 is interesting, as it displays a somewhat marginal but nevertheless important aspect of religious diplomacy in a wider sense. Representatives of Syriac Christians living in Russia (an estimated 14 000, mainly around Moscow and Krasnodar) appealed to the Russian authorities to protect the Christian minority in Iraq. Delegates of the Russian community took part in a manifestation of support for Iraqi Christians held in Washington on 4 December 2006.106 Later, in 2007, the Front for Saving Syriac Christians was established by communities from Northern Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. The same year the representative of the Front, Josif Zaya, asked Russia to initiate debate on a protection programme of Iraqi Christians at the UN. On 24 August 2007 the international meeting of the Front took place in Moscow. In his role as vice-chairman of the Regional National Cultural Autonomy of Syriac Christians of Moscow Josif Zaya stated that “Syriac Christians all over the world are hoping for Russia’s new activity in the Near East. Russia, better than other countries, understands the problems of Syriac people”.107 On 12 February 2008 he proposed giving Syriac Christians in Iraq an autonomic territory in order to protect them from harassment. The petition for this initiative was handed over to the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hoshyar Zebari, during his visit to Moscow.108 The analysis of the religious factor in Russia’s policy on Muslim states will be completed with an important achievement of mutual diplomatic efforts of the ROC and muftiates – Russia’s status of the observer at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Tightening cooperation with the OIC in accordance with the Kremlin’s expectations, has become a factor not only in animating Russia’s relations with Muslim states, but also opening new possibilities for the realization of the tasks of the project of “Orthodox civilization”. It must be emphasized that Russia consciously uses the “Muslim” component of its identity to participate in the work of organizations that are closed to the USA and the EU, and in this way gains an advantage over the West in relations with the Islamic world. The General Secretary of the OIC visited Russia in 1994 and 1997, when Yevgeny Primakov – supported by the Union of Muslims of Russia – mentioned the possibility of joining the organization. A serious declaration was issued in 2003 by Vladimir Putin, who argued that 20 million Russian citizens expect to come closer to the OIC. The foreign affairs minister, Sergey Lavrov, argued that the combined efforts of Moscow and the organization can prevent the “clash of civilizations”. Ultimately, Russia was accepted by the OIC in the capacity of an observer in the spring of 2005 with the support of Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This event was recognized by the Russian muftis as the success of all Muslim citizens of the Russian Federation. Also, significantly, the initiative met with the understanding and support of the patriarchate, which was appreciated by the Secretary General of the OIC – Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. In 2006 he met in Moscow not only with the representatives of the authorities and the Council of Muftis of Russia, but also with Alexy II.109 On 27 March 2009 President Medvedev assured Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu that Russia was interested in broadening its

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 211 cooperation with the OIC. Medvedev said: “Russia and the OIC are linked by a special bond. Russia is an observer in the organization, but desires to form relations with the OIC in different spheres and at different levels.”110 The Russian president declared his readiness to coordinate the peace process in the Middle East with the OIC, and his intention to organize an international conference on this matter. The most important result of Russia’s cooperation with the OIC is the functioning of the international Strategic Vision Group: Russia and the Islamic World. Already during its first meeting, which on Russia’s initiative took place in Moscow in March 2006, a proposal was formulated for creating a Civilizational Council under the auspices of the UN as a forum for meetings of different religions. Spain undertook this initiative, organizing one year later in Madrid an international congress of interreligious dialogue, which was chaired jointly by the King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and the Spanish monarch, Juan Carlos.111 The second meeting of the group Russia and the Islamic World took place in August 2006 in Kazan. However, it was only the third meeting, in February 2007 in Istanbul, which can be regarded as a certain break-through. Representatives of 22 Muslim states, the Secretary General of the OIC, and representatives of the Russian side – including a representative of the president of the Russian Federation, Alexander Konovalov, chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Rawil Gaynetdin, Mufti Gusman Iskhakov and Metropolitan Vsevolod Chaplin (Department of External Relations of the ROC) – took part in the talks. In Istanbul, it was decided to give the meeting an institutional framework, create a fund and an award for contributions to the development of dialogue between Christianity and Islam. Apart from that, three projects of special importance were singled out: issuing a collective publication concerning religious tolerance, creating a website and a journal112 on Russia’s relations with the Islamic world and creating a commission on dialogue.113 The fourth assembly took place in October 2008 in Saudi Jeddah. Besides “traditional” participants, the president of Tatarstan, Rawil Gaynetdin and Vsevolod Chaplin,114 Russian politicians such as Yevgeny Primakov and the deputy chairman of the Federation Council, Alexander Torshin, participated, which can testify to Russia’s growing expectations of the group. In 2009 Russia announced an opening of a permanent mission to the OIC in Jeddah.115 One of the results of this forum is the noticeable change in the perception of Russia by Muslim states. Representatives of Islamic countries increasingly emphasize the significance of Russia as an important agent in the international arena, capable of easing the “clash of civilizations” in the Caucasus, in central Asia and in the Balkans. Vladimir Putin especially is considered to be a friend of Islam and enjoys great popularity among the Muslim elites. It is worth drawing attention to the finesse of Russian “religious diplomacy”. A forum was created of Russia’s exclusive contacts with the Muslim world, using the premise of religious closeness, which was enabled by Russia’s presence in the OIC. Moreover, the Kremlin’s main representative in the Strategic Vision Group: Russia and the Islamic World is the former president of Tatarstan, a secular politician who Russian diplomacy very often includes in delegations sent to Muslim

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states. Mintimer Shaimiev’s activity in the international arena legitimizes the Kremlin and presents Russia as a country of equal opportunities for all citizens, regardless of their religion. Shaimiev was the first citizen of the Russian Federation to be granted the prestigious King Faisal International Prize (2007).116 He has held talks with the highest ranking politicians that visit Russia: for example, he met Hilary Clinton on her first official visit to Russia in October 2009.117 It seems that Tatarstan is slowly making its way into the ranks of the world Muslim elite: for example, the chairman of the OIC Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, attended the inauguration of the new president of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnichanov in 2010.118 Another success of the Kremlin’s policy on the Muslim states was the establishment of the Russian–Arab forum in December 2009.119 This was a triumph for President Medvedev, whose speech presented during his first visit to the headquarters of the Arab League was received enthusiastically and hailed by some commentators as the “Russian answer” to President Obama’s Cairo speech. The Russian president asserted that “Islam is an inseparable element of Russian history and culture, [that his] country is organically connected to Islam [and that] reinforcing mutual respect between believers of different faiths is a priority of [Russian] policy”.120 Analysing the activities of Russian religious institutions in the service of the state and the efforts of the Foreign Affairs Ministry connected with the dialogue of civilizations, the following conclusion can be drawn: in stimulating these activities, the Kremlin seeks not only to strengthen its ties with Islamic countries, but also manifest its ambition to create a new formula for Christian–Islamic relations. Many examples can be cited of Moscow’s activities abroad, directed towards the development of interreligious dialogue. For example, at the ASEAN summit in Indonesia in October 2006, the question of interreligious cooperation was brought up on Russia’s initiative. At this same meeting, the Secretary General called on Muslim states to model themselves on Russia and the mechanisms it has created, such as the Strategic Vision Group: Russia and the Islamic World, which can be considered an undoubted success of Russian diplomacy. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia skilfully used the religious factor in its policy as an instrument for shaping a new, positive image in its relations with the Muslim world. Russian rapprochement to Islamic countries is an advantage for Moscow in the realization of its ambition of becoming the main patron of dialogue between Christianity and Islam (the West and the East). Associating these developments with the context of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” it can be argued that Russia has discovered for itself a new mission at the beginning of the third millennium. The religious factor in the Kremlin’s foreign policy regarding Muslim states fulfils external (the needs of other subjects in international relations) and internal functions (the needs of Russia itself). In the first case, the religious factor influences how Russia is perceived in the international arena: religious institutions legitimize Kremlin’s decisions, support diplomatic activity and so on. The second case

Between fear and the necessity of cooperation 213 refers to the implications of the situation in Russia itself. Including Islamic institutions in diplomatic activities helps Muslim citizens to identify with the authorities in Moscow, limits the influence of fundamentalists (wahhabis) and supports religious peace in the country. Introducing Russia into the international arena as a unique civilization is an attempt to answer the question of Russia’s place in the new global order. On 28 August 2009, during the meeting with the leaders of the northern Caucasus, Dmitry Medvedev expressed his gratefulness to Russian Islamic institutions for their efficient international activity. Explicitly, the president praised the Coordination Centre of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus which “is developing relations between our country and the world of Islam. This was undoubtedly beneficial and I have experienced it personally during my visits to Muslim countries. … Leaders of Russian Muslim community have won Russia support for its uncompromising fight against terrorism from all Muslim countries”.121 On 1 April 2010 a letter of support condemning terroristic attacks in Moscow and Kizylar (Dagestan) was issued by the muftis of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia–Herzegovina, India, the USA and the Council of Muftis of Russia.122 All this proves that on this particular field Russian “religious diplomacy” can be very efficient.

10 Among us, the chosen nations Tendencies in Russian–Israeli relations

In 2011 20 years have passed since the reestablishment of diplomatic contacts between Russia and Israel. Relations between the two countries have a troubled history, but what brings them close in the twenty-first century is the common threat of terrorism by Chechen and Palestinian militia groups. Both Moscow and Tel Aviv present the common view that their opponents should not be considered partisans or freedom fighters but terrorists. Similar concerns have served as grounds for Russian–Israeli cooperation in security. Since 1999 secret-service agencies have been working together and since 2004 common training of anti-terrorism brigades have been taking place. Furthermore, Moscow and Tel Aviv have developed close relations in the field of space technology (since 1994) and energy: there are plans to extend the Blue Stream pipeline1 and join it with the Eilat–Ashkelon pipeline in order to strengthen Israeli energy security and to ship gas to Asian markets. Trade is also growing fast especially after the introduction of visa-free travel in 2009. However, bilateral relations are much more ambiguous than one might judge at first sight. This is particularity noticeable in the arms trade: if Russia sells weapons to Syria, Israel will not hesitate to supply Georgia with military equipment. Naturally, in the case of these transactions both countries perceive the another’s policy as opposed to their national interests. Relations with Israel are inevitably connected with the Palestinians and Near East security issues, which means that considerable geo-political gains and losses are at stake in terms of status of power, prestige and the image of Russia. Moscow’s policy towards Tel Aviv is shaped by its relationships with Muslim countries as well as the USA or the EU. Being involved diplomatically in managing this conflict (e.g. as a member of the Middle East Quartet) Russia tries to balance Israel and the Palestinians and avoid taking sides. Nevertheless, the logic of the conflict results in “action–reaction” sequences: Tel Aviv always views Moscow’s contacts with Palestinians in the context of Israel’s national security and vice versa. Therefore, Russia pays attention to keeping a “symmetry” of diplomatic contacts which can be seen, for instance, in the sequence of visits in 2010–11. On 26 January 2010 the president of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas met with Dmitry Medvedev in Sochi. A week later Hamas political leader Khamal Meshal held talks with Sergey

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Lavrov in Moscow. This “Near-East sequence” was closed by Benjamin Netanyahu who paid a visit on 15–17 February. At the beginning of the “Arab Spring” in January 2011 Medvedev made a tour of the Near East which included the Palestine National Authority and Jordan. Later, Mahmoud Abbas’s visit to Moscow (22–24 March)3 was followed by the arrival of Netanyahu.4 On this occasion, during a meeting with the Russian president the Israeli prime minister underlined the common threat of Islamic extremism which could spread in the region as a result of the Arab Spring. Netanyahu’s concerns were echoed by Medvedev, who at the meeting of the National Anti-Terroristm Committee in Vladikavkaz (22 February 2011), referred to the Arab Spring as a possible threat to Russia’s security connecting it to a rise of Islamism in the northern Caucasus. The president reassured his citizens that: “although the ‘Arab scenario’ may be also planned for Russia and [the extremists] will try to carry it out, it definitely won’t succeed in the Russian Federation”.5 Abolishment of old regimes in Tunisia, Egypt or Yemen, civil war in Libya and the unstable situation in Syria and Bahrain will have a significant impact on regional system of power and security. The Arab Spring is one more reason for Moscow as well as Tel Aviv to seek rapprochement. Among the political views presented in Chapter 3, the phenomenon of growing Islamophobia and mistrust of Muslims among Russian society, theoretically, could cause a shift in traditional Russian sympathies and push them from the Palestinians towards Israel. However, what seems more probable is that the common front against terrorists and Israel’s status as a constant target of terrorist attacks will improve its image in Russian eyes. This tendency has already been observed by American diplomats who reported on it in a cable from the American embassy in Moscow revealed by WikiLeaks: “During Israel’s 2006 war with Lebanon, Russian television showed Russian-speaking Israeli soldiers, which helped heighten Russian sympathy for Israel’s situation … public opinion polls … showed Russians were more inclined to have a favourable opinion of Israel than the US”.6 According to a survey by Levada Centre from 2011,7 67 per cent of respondents declared a positive attitude to Israel, which supports the observed positive tendency in Russia’s perception. Fifty-four per cent describe bilateral inter-governmental relations as “normal and peaceful”. Israel is attractive because of its successful, in Russians’ opinion, system of social and health care as well as fight against terrorism. Twenty-seven to twenty-nine per cent of those surveyed had friends among emigrants to Israel who, for the respondents, are very often the main and the most credible source of information on modern Israel. Significantly, the number of Russians who declare a neutral attitude to the Near East conflict is growing and in 2011 it reached 71 per cent. Consequently, 44 per cent expect the Kremlin to participate in the peace process as a neutral mediator and 39 per cent want the Russian government to stay out of the conflict. The growing sympathy of Russians towards Israel, based on certain feelings of empathy, is especially interesting to observe, when it is compared with a phenomenon in Russia’s domestic affairs. A report of the Jewish People Policy Institute

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estimates the number of Russian Jews at 228,000 and suggests that by 2020 there will be some 130,000 Jews left in Russia. Thus, it is a small and rather secular community with around 15 per cent attending religious ceremonies.8 Research conducted in 2005 by Vyacheslav Karpov and Elena Liskovskaya revealed strong religious intolerance (defined as “unwillingness to grant them basic religious freedoms”) towards Jews among Muslims as well as Orthodox Christians in Russia. According to the authors, this intolerance is rooted in illiberal and ethnocentric beliefs and it is not limited to anti-Semitism; it is rather “a non-religious phenomenon”.9 Consequently, Jews are the least tolerated among “traditional religions”, which has already been symptomatic for the views of some representatives of Russian imperialism (e.g. the authors of Russkaya Doktrina). According to surveys, 47 per cent of respondents would allow synagogues to be built in their hometowns; 38 per cent would not mind building religious schools for Jews; 27 per cent would support public preaching of Judaism and 13 per cent teaching Judaism at school. Interestingly, the most commonly accepted role for Jewish communities is involvement in charity (56 per cent).10 Karpov and Lisovskaya argue that this should be interpreted in the context of the weakness of democracy in Russia. Antipathy towards Jews is motivated by the “otherness” attributed to Jewish community.11 However, there are positive tendencies, especially in reference to Russia’s image in the international arena. In a cable from American embassy in Moscow, revealed by WikiLeaks, American diplomats discuss the chief rabbis of Russia – Pinchas Goldschmidt and Adolph Shaevich – who are “cautiously optimistic about prospects for the Jewish community in Russia”.12 In their opinion, the Russian Federation is successfully getting rid of the stigma of anti-Semitism. What is interesting, part of the credit for this is given to the personal efforts of Vladimir Putin who has improved Russia’s image among international Jewish institutions. In shaping “religious diplomacy” towards Israel the Kremlin can take advantage of the Russian Orthodox Church’s activity in the Near East as well as Jewish organisations: the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia and the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Communities of Russia, the Russian Jewish Congress, the Conference of Chairmen of Jewish Organizations of Russia and the Association of Jewish Social Organizations. In the twenty-first century the Russian Federation and its dominant religious institutions face new opportunities in Israel due to a relatively recent factor, the diaspora of Russian Jews. After the Second World War there have been three major waves of immigration from the USSR/Russia to Israel:13 1955–67 (around 12,000); 1967–89 (around 18,000); 1989–2000 (the big aliyah, 1,100,000). During the last wave an estimated 1500 Jewish emigrants left Russia for Israel every year.14 At present, Russian Jews make up 21 per cent of the citizens of Israel.15 Among the Russian-speaking diaspora two groups are distinguished. The first are Russian Jews with relatively weak religious identity. The second includes Jewish communities from Georgia, Bukhara and the so-called Mountain Jews (emigrants from Russian Dagestan, Kabardino–Balkaria and Azerbaijan). Characteristically, in this group religious tradition and ritual play an important role in shaping identity.

Among us, the chosen nations 217 Because of the relatively small numbers of migrants during two first waves, the influx of Soviet Jews was absorbed by Israeli society without serious tensions. Only with the big aliyah was a critical mass reached. Between 1989 and 1992 400,000 immigrants from the former Soviet republics arrived in Israel.16 In the beginning of the 1990s the Russian diaspora had problems with its negative image in Israel. “Russian” was often associated with “mafia” and “prostitutes”. Even now opinions persist that emigrants from the former Soviet Union generally lower standards of education in Israel.17 It was also not easy to fight this perception because Russian Jews were largely kept out of political influence.18 However, this disproportion has significantly changed in the last decade. Among Israeli political groups which represent Russian diaspora one should mention Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel is Our Home) led by Avigdor Lieberman, the Democratic Choice (Demvybor) with Roman Bronfman and people around Natan Sharansky, the founder of Yisrael BaAliyah.19 Yisrael Beiteinu achieved considerable political power and in 2009 formed a coalition government with the winner of the election to the Knesset, the Likud Party. As a result, the party leader, Avigdor Lieberman, became the deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister. Natan Sharansky and YuliYoel Edelstein were appointed ministers. The latter was entrusted with the post of the minister of information and diaspora by Prime Minister Netanyahu in 2009. What is more, the political scene in Israel shows that since the end of the 1990s, if not earlier, votes in elections to the Knesset by Russian Jews have had an impact on the division of mandates in the parliament.20 Former Soviet citizens and prominent Israeli politicians bring a cordial atmosphere to Moscow–Tel Aviv contacts. For example, after the visit of the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman to Moscow in June 2009, American diplomats reported that, born in Soviet Kishinev in 1958, “Russian-speaking Lieberman is one of their [the Russians’] own”: Fuchs explained that Lieberman conducted his meetings in Russian, shared stories about Moscow, and smoked, creating a comfortable atmosphere with his Russian interlocutors. The Israeli foreign minister “behaved like an old friend” commented Fuchs, who thought that the Russians acted as if they already knew him, although it was too early to say whether this personal diplomacy would have a measurable effect on already strong Russia–Israel relations.21 All in all, American diplomats predict rather “sunny days” in Russian–Israeli relations in the future due to the strong position of ex-Soviet personal contacts, business, cultural ties and visa-free travel. These prognoses seem to be confirmed by a recent tendency for Russian migrants to return to Russia. More and more Russian Jews from Israel are keeping regular contacts with the former homeland, buying property and starting businesses.22 Russian Jewish communities outside Israel act in favour of Russia’s interest. Therefore, it is good news for Moscow that the emigrants from the USSR are gradually taking over leadership in the Jewish community in Germany,23 the

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European Jewish Congress is chaired by Russian billionaire Vyacheslav Moshe Kantor24 and Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt is one of the leaders of the Conference of European Rabbis. In the opinion of American diplomats, Russia is using religious institutions to build her soft power capacity in the Near East: MFA Counselor for Israel and Palestine Viktor Simakov told us that the return of historically Russian property in the Holy Land was a symbol of Russia’s postSoviet cultural and religious renaissance. The properties, which had either been abandoned by the USSR or sold to Israel, would be used for facilities for religious pilgrims and tourists, as well as Russian language schools and clinics that would benefit local residents, including the large number of Russian-speaking Israelis. The MFA was also considering establishing a consulate at the compound in Jerusalem. Simakov said that at present Russia had only its Embassy in Tel Aviv and a small Mission in Ramallah to handle relations with the PA. A presence in Jerusalem would help provide assistance to the many Russian citizens living in Israel as well as Russian tourists, whose numbers, presently estimated at 200,000 per year, were expected to grow significantly after the Russian-Israeli agreement to end visa requirements became operative in September. 4. (C) Simakov explained that countries in the region recognized that providing land to Russia was a means to improve bilateral relations and attract Russian tourists. In addition to Israel and the PA, Jordan had already given Russia land on the banks of the Jordan River historically associated with Jesus’ baptism (ref A). Lebanon also had property that once belonged to Russia, although discussion of its return had not begun. 5. (C) Palestinian DCM Faed Moustafa posited that GOR interest in the Holy Land property was part of the Russian desire to “return” to the Middle East in various ways: politically by resurrecting ties with Arab states that had been allowed to atrophy during the 1990s, diplomatically by enhancing its role in the Middle East Peace Process, and culturally by re-establishing a physical presence for the Russian State and Church. For Russians, it was only fitting that the Orthodox Church should have a presence in Jerusalem along with the other ancient Christian dominations already present: the Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox. Moustafa said that the PA hoped that giving Russia land for cultural and religious facilities would attract Russian tourists to the West Bank.”25 One of the most interesting aspects of the Russian diaspora’s activity in Israel is the idea of common Russian–Israeli mission – the mission of the “chosen nations”. Although it is certainly not a part of the mainstream of political views, it is nevertheless worth a comment. Keeping a deep connection with Russian culture on the one hand and acknowledging the advantages of Israel’s democracy, some intellectuals, such as Yuri Stern and Dmitry Radyshevsky, call for a synthesis of Russian and Jewish potential. In order to fulfil the expectations and ambitions of the former citizens of a global power (the USSR), Israel should strive for a powerful status regardless its size. To achieve this, it needs to be more than a country stuck

Among us, the chosen nations 219 in the Near East conflict. According to proponents of these views, if Israel adopts the Russian vision for its aspirations and foreign policy, it has all instruments to take part in the shaping of the new global order.26 According to Dmitry Radyshevsky, Israel is capable of facing great challenges and improving the life of societies all over the world. The goal should be the “spiritual transformation of the world”, in other words: “universal Zionism”.27 Israel’s mission is the “collective prophecy”;28 that is, the role of visionary leader for all other countries. Israel should aspire to be the global centre of culture and ideas. Russian Jews – diasporaborn of two “chosen nations” – have a crucial role to play in achieving these goals because they are able to make synthesis of the West and the East and to combine “elements of reality and spirituality”.29 Russian Jews, who are not satisfied “unless Israel has a world champion in chess”, are to give the new impetus for an “ethic revolution” and for new global projects. Radyshevksy’s views indeed present a synthesis of Russian imperialism and Jewish messianism – a particular aspect of the religious factor in Russian–Israeli relations. Considering the growing influence of Russian Jews in Israel, Russia considers it her strategic prerogative to build up her soft power. Culture is the key to maintaining the diaspora’s integrity. The identity of the Russian-speaking community in Israel is sustained by three “pillars”: nostalgia for the Russian homeland, language and culture, and mentality. Sociological research has revealed that 90 per cent of Russian-speaking Israelis are secular; 95 per cent consider Russian their mother language; 20 per cent visit their former homeland every year.30 Asked about their identity Russian immigrants in Israel say “Jewish”, but when asked about culture, they answer “Russian”.31 Another factor, which is not to be neglected, is the considerable number of mixed marriages in the Russian diaspora: during the big aliyah every twentieth incomer was not originally Jewish.32 Orthodoxy is not perceived strictly as a religion but rather as a national tradition. The culture factor plays a crucial role in preserving the Russian diaspora’s integrity. From their perspective, Russian culture has a global (and not just local) dimension and goes beyond national particularity. Russian Jews in Israel regularly watch Russian TV and read Russian newspapers. According to surveys, 67 per cent of the Russian diaspora in Israel prefer their mass-media in Russian, while 15 per cent watch Yiddish language media.33 However, it is worth stressing that Russian Jews find news from Israeli media much more credible then from the Russian ones. The most popular is Russian-speaking channel Israel+. Interestingly, the presence of religion in the Israeli public sphere makes it harder for Russian emigrants to assimilate since most of them are secular.34 Paradoxically, 80 per cent of Soviet/Russian immigrants to Israel declare satisfaction with their assimilation,35 while at the same time 80 per cent confess to have experienced discrimination.36 Under these circumstances, the ROC can act as a symbolic link to their homeland. The ROC is eager to fulfil this role. Additionally, the ROC also has diplomatic ambitions. It offers its mediation to the sides in the Near East conflict37 and “back channel” diplomacy. Interestingly, Israel has tried to use the diplomacy of the Moscow patriarchate. In January 2001 President Moshe Katsav met with Alexy II, asking the patriarch for help in negotiations with Hezbollah over the

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release of three Israeli soldiers. Five months later, the foreign affairs minister, Shimon Peres, also talked with the head of the Russian church.38 Anticipating the ROC’s approval, Israel was counting not only on the ROC’s good relations with Arabs, but also on Russia’s involvement in the conflict, if only through the participation of the church, which would exert additional pressure on Hezbollah who did not want to antagonize the Kremlin. Nothing, however, became of Israel’s plans, because the ROC opted for a diplomatic exit and refused to help, explaining that Lebanon is under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Antioch and that he should be the one to negotiate with Hezbollah. Considering the growing influence of the Russian diaspora in Israel, Moscow wants to expand its diplomatic instruments in order to maintain and enhance the bond between the “nostalgic” homeland and emigrants. Apart from the ROC, the Kremlin can also use Russian Jewish institutions in its “religious diplomacy”. Both the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia and the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Communities are active in the international Jewish community, their representatives take part in the Assembly of the World Jewish Congress and the European Congress of Jews.39 In the autumn of 2009 the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Communities signed a partnership with the Jewish Agency for Israel Sochnut with the aim of developing the Jewish education system in Russia and create a system of scholarships.40 It is probably not a coincidence that the agreement was reached the same year, when Natan Sharansky became the chairman of Sochnut.41 As a reward, at the end of 2009, Sharansky was chosen “Man of the Year” by the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia.42 To complete the picture of Russian–Israeli relations one should mention a problem which is officially ascribed to contacts between Moscow and Washington, namely the Jackson–Vanik amendment. Rabbis of the Russian Federation have taken steps to convince the American authorities to rescind this law, and the Russian diaspora in Israel appeals to have it removed: Natan Sharansky called it “a huge mistake”.43 During a meeting with the American–Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on 5 April 2001 in Moscow, the Metropolitan Hilarion asked for this “artificial barrier” in Russian–American relations to be abolished44 and expressed gratefulness to the AIPAC for supporting Russia in the matter.45 Obviously, the ROC and Russian Jewish institutions are involved in helping Russian diplomacy. From the Russian perspective, the Jackson–Vanik amendment is an anachronism from the Cold-War era. The present dynamic in Russian–Israeli relations can serve as proof of Russia’s successful struggle to remove not only the negative Soviet stigma but also that of anti-Semitism. Moscow is interested in both keeping constructive dialogue with Tel Aviv and returning to the big geo-political game which is played in the Near East. Russian “religious diplomacy” in this region is based on the activity of the ROC, muftiates and Russian–Jewish organizations. The Russian diaspora can give a new dimension to contacts between Moscow and Tel Aviv. Russian emigrants who live in the Holy Land are still emotionally attached to their homeland, which gives Russia unprecedented opportunity to build her position in this region, her image and her soft power.

11 Neighbourhood of giants The place of the Russian Federation in Asian cultural space between India and the People’s Republic of China

According to most predictions, Asia will become the main arena of international rivalry in the twenty-first century – a place where key decisions will be made concerning the development of the whole world. Russia, wanting to give credibility to its status as a great power, must strengthen its own position in this region through the intensification of economic and military cooperation and participation in integrative initiatives (APEC, ASEAN, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). From the perspective of building a new global balance of power, an important thing for Russia is to form a “strategic partnership” with India and China, while maintaining the regional balance of power among India, China and Japan in Asia.1 The purpose of the multi-polar order promoted by the Kremlin, with its core located on the Asian continent, is weakening the Pax Americana. In the assessment of Moscow, Beijing and Delhi, a uni-polar world does not encourage peace. Security requires strengthening the UN and respect for international law, including in particular the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Building a new multi-polar order does not have only political, economic and military dimensions, but also a cultural–civilizational aspect. Undermining unipolarism also means questioning a single vision of the world order, one “universal” value system, one “proper” political or economic system and so on. The policy of the USA, which in Russia’s eyes, forces its own “model” on other countries is opposed by the civilizational multi-polarism of Russia, China, India and Iran, representing global order as a system of separate civilizations with their own developmental specificity, with their own systemic solutions, which cannot be the compared and evaluated. The Moscow patriarchate is one of Russia’s advocates of civilizational multipolarism. In the ROC’s opinion, the pressure of “Westernization” can be matched by an alliance of conservative civilizations, promoting dialogue between cultures, religions and traditions. Russia – integrating elements of Christianity and Islam – should play a special role in the West’s communication with the East, although this intermediary role requires consent of other allies. The Moscow patriarchate counts China, India and Iran among the conservative civilizations. Against the background of these three ancient civilizational giants, the slightly over 1,000 year

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(from the baptism of Kievan Rus) history of Russia appears rather modest. Russian enthusiasts of the alliance try to present this disproportion as an advantage of a “young” civilization – full of energy, vital, capable of leading ancient civilizations towards a new global order. Moreover, neo-Eurasianists and “dynamic conservatives” emphasize that the Russian civilization, thanks to Orthodoxy, has a universal nature and is therefore the only one which can create an alternative model of development that could be acceptable to the other civilizations. Defining the global mission is an element in the process of Russia’s civilizational self-identification. For over 1,000 years, the West was the most important point of reference for Moscow’s development. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the situation is more complicated. It is true that the USA serves rather as a negative point of reference for the formation of the Russian vision of global order. Moscow does not have the power to balance the configuration of power by itself. This is one of the reasons why it chooses cooperation with the “rising” powers of Asia, which means that it must take a position not only towards the West, but also define its place beside China and India.2 Both states have a greater demographic and economic potential and Russia must find a way to balance the growth of their power in its neighbourhood. Creation of an alliance with potential competitors is nothing new in international relations, but success in this initiative depends on whether Beijing and Delhi are willing to treat Moscow as a partner, as a power equal to them, capable of competing with them not only in the spheres of technology and trade, but also as a civilization. Naturally, an ambitious state must care about its cultural attractiveness, which is an element of its power; not only about its prosperity, but also the richness of its culture that can attract other nations and encourage foreign elites to orient themselves with their policies. According to Joseph S. Nye Jr., soft power derives from three sources: culture, political values and foreign policy if it is perceived by other countries as fair and legitimate.3 Considering the weaknesses of current Russian soft power, it is its culture which probably carries the greatest potential to attract other nations. Defining civilizational identity is connected with the determination of the state’s place in the international area, building a position, gaining prestige, emphasizing its own cultural sovereignty. With regards to both the West and the East, Russia tries to circumscribe the area of its civilizational influence, mark out Eurasia as the symbolic border of the Russian cultural space, for which not only “Westernization”, but also “Sinoisation” presents a certain challenge. Supported by the ROC, Russian diplomacy has set itself the goal of protecting and widening, as much as possible, the Russian cultural space, which still has not been clearly defined. The question is whether its limits are set by the area of Russian language, the community of faith and language or both. Guided by the directives of the russkiy mir project (promoting Russian language and culture), it can be argued that the Russian cultural space corresponds to the areas of the former Soviet Union, in which three zones can be distinguished: the “Orthodox core” of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; the “zone of rivalry” in the Caucasus and central Asia (keeping these regions within Russia’s civilizational orbit, especially by supporting knowledge

Neighbourhood of giants 223 of the Russian language, is a key to its position in Asia); and there the “Baltic periphery”, where Russia has no ambitions of tempting Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia with its own civilizational counter-offer, but would like to guarantee its sootechestvenniks (compatriots) access to education in Russian in order to support their ties with the homeland. The significance of the civilizational space is connected mainly with promotion of the Russian language and culture, at the very least within the framework of such undertakings as “Year of the Russian Language in the World” (2007), the celebration in China of the “Year of Russia” (2006) and the “Year of Russian Language” (2009) and the “Year of Russia” (2008) in India.4 While in post-Soviet areas – in its own canonical territory – the Moscow patriarchate is one of the most important institutions promoting Russian culture, in southeastern Asia, its significance is marginal.5 Although the ROC carries out missionary activity in Mongolia, South Korea and Japan, on the territory of multi-confessional India and communist China there are neither many believers nor a developed infrastructure.6 Nevertheless, in recent years the Moscow patriarchate’s interest in renewing its activities on Chinese territory is growing. The first Orthodox communities in the Middle Kingdom were established by Russian missionaries in the seventeenth century and in 1957 the ROC decided to grant autonomy to its Chinese structures. More than 40 years later, the Russian church has returned to missionary work among the Chinese, at first evangelizing migrants in Mongolia, where a new parish was founded for this purpose in 1996.7 The return of Mongolia into the ROC’s sphere of interest was confirmed in 2009, when Bishop Mark Yegorovsky visited Mongolia to consecrate a new church in Ulan Bator.8 At the same time, the situation of around 3,000 Orthodox believers in China itself has become increasingly difficult. The last hierarch, ordained before the revolution, died in 1997, in 2000 Grigoriy Uzhu – the last clergyman capable of conducting Mass9 – died and in 2003 the last protorey, Alexander De, passed away. The efforts of the Group on Chinese Affairs, functioning since 1998 within the ROC, geared towards settling the status of Orthodox communities, did not bring many results. 2004 turned out to be a break-through year, when at various times Patriarch Kirill (July), Bishop Mark Yegoriyevsky (August) and Vladimir Putin (October) visited China. During the Russian president’s stay in Beijing, a Convention on Neighbourly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation was agreed upon, concerning, among other things, interreligious dialogue.10 The ROC and Beijing made a compromise – Beijing kept the ban on the activity of clergymen who are not PRC citizens, but agreed to send 18 Chinese students to Russia for theological studies.11 The resolution of this problem, satisfactorily for both sides, gave a new impulse to cooperation in the international arena. The chairman of the Office for Religion of the People’s Republic of China took part in the Moscow summit of religious representatives in June 2006.12 The ROC, in turn, supported the Chinese authorities’ policy in Tibet during the Olympic year – the critical reports in the press on the brutality of Chinese police were seen by the Moscow patriarchate as manipulation similar to that regarding “alleged” ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999. The ROC criticized the anti-Chinese propaganda supported by the West, emphasizing that the problems of Tibet should be resolved by peaceful means.13

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In Russian–Chinese relations, the religious factor plays mainly a civilizational role, but Moscow also uses it sometimes to manifest its independence, such as visits of the Dalai Lama. China’s hostile and critical stance towards the activity of the spiritual leader of Tibetans is universally known. Countries that invite the Dalai Lama are either powerful enough or insignificant enough to disregard the possible negative reaction by Beijing. Russia, where Buddhism is considered a “traditional religion”, has been visited by the fourteenth Dalai Lama four times – he has been to Moscow (1994) and twice to Kalmykia (1992, 2004), although he has never had official meetings with representatives of the authorities.14 At the beginning of January 2009 Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that the Russian government did not see any reason against visits by the Dalai Lama to Russia, which was well-received not only by the Buddhist community.15 It is worth stressing that the authority of the Dalai Lama is a factor in regional elections in Buddhist regions of Russia, as, for example, in 1998 some candidates promoted themselves with posters depicting the religious leader of Tibetan Buddhists.16 However, the traditional Sangha is cautious about the “Dalai Lama factor” and tries not to limit its ability to cooperate with Chinese Buddhist communities. In comparison to Buryiats, Kalmykian institutions are more rebellious regarding the problem of Tibet. In 2004 a scandal broke after Telo Tulku Rinpoche (Erdne Ombadykow) refused to remove the portrait of the fourteenth Dalai Lama when an outraged delegation of Chinese Buddhists demanded it.17 Russian Muslims also seek contacts with China. In November 2008 a delegation of the Council of Muftis of Russia and the Centre for Islamic Culture of Russia (Исламский культурный центр России) visited China: Beijing, Shanghai and Xian. As Islamic websites boasted, it was the first historical official visit of Russian Muslims to the country.18 Delegates held talks with, among others, the vice premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, the chairman of the Office for Religious Affairs and the head of the Muslim Association of China. With the latter the Council of Muftis of Russia consulted an agreement on friendship and partnership. This document was officially signed during the visit of Chinese Muslims to Russia who, apart from Moscow, went to Kazan, Makhachkala and Derbent.19 An important consideration in the context of ROC’s relations with Beijing is the so-called Chinese problem, the threat of Sinoisation of the Russian Far East, which has raised Russian concern since at least the nineteenth century. At that time religion was indicated as one of the factors facilitating assimilation of the Chinese population, and enabling their inclusion in the Russian cultural space. This idea was picked up again in Russia at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 2004 the Moscow patriarchate announced a renewal of evangelization among Chinese immigrants living in Russia. Interestingly, the hierarchs claim that they were inspired by President Vladimir Putin, who at a meeting with members of the sobor in October 2004 responded to the clergy’s complaints about the Sinoisation of the Far East, by suggesting that the hierarchs should consider converting the Chinese to Orthodoxy.20 Moreover, mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin suggested encouraging Tatars and Bashkirs (nations with higher than average

Neighbourhood of giants 225 population growth rates) to settle in strategic regions of the Far East and to marry Chinese and Korean women who would eventually convert to Islam.21 Similar to other border regions of Russia with ethnic tensions, in the Far East religious symbols serve as indicators of Russian cultural sphere. Russian Orthodox places of worship play a role of symbolic border posts. One of them is the chapel of St Victor the Warrior situated on Bolshoi Ussuriski Island, which according to the intergovernmental agreement, was to be divided between Russia and China. Unfortunately, the chapel is on the Chinese part, which has caused disputes.22 Beijing and Moscow have managed to reach a compromise, deciding to leave the chapel. The place has become a destination of a ritual via dolorosa for residents of Khabarovsk.23 The ROC’s activity on the Indian subcontinent has even less significance than in China; the latter is a state where religion could yet blossom and it thus viewed as a potential terra misionis,24 while multi-confessional India is a space already “administered” with regards to religion. Religious factor is rarely a source of controversy between Moscow and Delhi. One noticeable exception was when India protested against the decision of local Russian authorities to refuse the Hare Krishna community permission to establish a centre in Moscow. The response of some hierarchs of the ROC (some referred to the centre as the “temple of the devil”) and the mayor of the capital, Yury Luzhkov, made a bad impression on India’s elites. Influential Indian businessmen, together with representatives of the Indian Orthodox community addressed a letter of protest in this matter to Putin and the matter was soon mitigated.25 Here it is worth emphasizing that while China, because of its Communist ideology, does not have a religious instrument at its disposal in its foreign policy, India tries to use it in its diplomacy, appealing, for example, to a sense of religious community with Mongolia. Pan-Buddhism is perceived by some as a way to strengthen India’s position in relations with Ulan Bator with regards to its most serious competitors: China, Russia and the USA.26 Interestingly, in research on the Russian Buddhist revival Evgenya Ostrovskaya argues that pan-Mongolism as a religious project of pan-Mongolian cultural unity is gaining popularity.27 The uniting force behind a potential move to bring together Buddhists from Buryatia, Kalmykia and Tuva could be played by the Kalmykian elite led by Kirsan Ilyumzhinov (with eventual support from the current Dalai Lama). The Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace could also play an important role.28 Orthodoxy, as the foundation of Russian culture, is the second factor after language that symbolically marks the borders of influence of the Russian civilization. A multi-polar order will be advantageous for Moscow, provided that it can manage to keep its status as a partner in relations with Beijing and Delhi. Russia is aware that in the near future its economic competitiveness is not likely to match that of rising Asian powers and is trying to compensate for this by creating a unique role for itself within the “alliance of conservative civilizations”. In this context China is perceived as the “factory” and India as the “IT laboratory”, while Russia wants to present itself as the “university of ideas” – the creator of new visions (which will be able to compete with the civilizational offer of the West),29 a

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visionary and conductor in the twenty-first century concert of great powers, with the Asian powers on its side. Since the seventeenth century, the expanding Russian Empire had gradually gained status as a “zone of prestige” for Eurasia.30 It managed to create its own cultural sphere of influence which was later transformed and reinforced by the USSR. The Russian Federation has lost its monopoly on “civilizational projects” in the post-Soviet area. At the beginning of twenty-first century former Soviet republics can orient themselves towards other centres. Orthodox countries, with the exception of Belarus, are increasingly attracted by the European Union. Muslim republics can model themselves on Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia or even the USA or China. The growth of the cultural appeal of China as well as India is successfully expending beyond the region of East and South Asia. The attractiveness of the Indian or Chinese path to modernization comes from the rapid economical growth. Both emerging powers provide an example, which can be extremely inspirational for other developing countries, including post-Soviet republics – the promise of explosive economic growth is more evocative then the Kremlin’s vision of a new just global system if it does not come with a successful pattern for modernization and economic prosperity. Delhi and Beijing are becoming increasingly aware of the potential of soft power and do not shy away from using their cultural appeal or the religious factor in their foreign policy.31 Russian soft power depends strongly on Moscow’s ability to maintain post-Soviet space as russkiy mir. In attempts to achieve this, “religious diplomacy” could prove to be very useful.

12 There can be only one Rome Russia’s traumatic relationship with the Vatican

The relations between Russia and the Vatican are founded on the history of the relationship between two churches, which is burdened by the dispute over the legacy of St Peter. The genesis of the animosity between the churches has already been extensively examined and described in scientific literature and will therefore not be discussed here. The schism of 1054, the Crusades, the plundering of Constantinople, the Union of Florence, the expansion of states bordering Russia to the West – mainly the Catholic Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Lutheran (since the sixteenth century) Sweden – the Union of Brest and the creation of the Greek Catholic Church are the most important reasons not only for the conflict between the Vatican and the ROC, but also for the anti-Occidentalism in Russian tradition. For centuries, Russia presented itself as a stronghold of Christianity, constantly under siege by Latin heretics and – after the French Revolution – by Western atheists and nihilists. Successive victories of the Russian military over aggressors were recognized in Moscow as proof of the favour of Providence, which entrusted Russia with the mission of keeping the “true faith” and opposing evil – the expansion of the West. Attributing to itself the role of defender of Christianity, Russia referred to the universal mission of Imperium Christianum, and perceived itself as the rightful and only heir to Rome. The problem, however, was in the fact that while in Moscow the ultimate downfall of the first patriarchate had been proven, in the former capital of the Imperium Romanum, there still resided the head of the Catholic Church, proclaiming the apostasy of the Orthodox Church from the truth of the faith.1 It is widely accepted that in accordance with the canons of Christianity there is only one apostolic church – there can thus be only one “Rome”, while others must necessarily be false. The core of this dispute, symbolized by the Eternal City, is the resolution of the question as to which of the Christian traditions – Latin or Greek – is true and in accordance with the teachings of Christ. The dispute touches on the foundations of identity not only of the two churches, but also of the Russian state, which manifests itself in the presence of anti-Occidentalism in many trends of Russian political thought, especially in imperialism and nationalism. The Cold War was a conflict of ideologies, which shifted the religious dispute into the background. After the break-up of the USSR, in the newly founded,

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democratic Russian state, with constitutionally guaranteed religious pluralism and official religious neutrality of the state, the traditional problems in the relationship between the ROC and the Catholic Church returned, above all with regards to canonical territory, proselytism and the status of Greek Catholics. Functioning for more than 70 years in a state that favoured atheism seriously weakened the position of the Orthodox church which, even with the support and goodwill of the authorities of the Russian Federation, will need a lot of time to rebuild its influence. At the same time, religious pluralism brought an explosion of activity of both traditional churches as well as new religious movements that compete with the ROC in the post-Soviet territory. The Moscow patriarchate recognizes the area of the former USSR (with the exception of Georgia and Armenia) as its traditional terra missionis, which in accordance with the ROC’s expectations should be respected by the other Christian churches. Missionary activity by Catholic priests on the canonical territory of the ROC is seen by the latter as proselytism. The Moscow patriarchate is not convinced by the arguments of the Vatican (and also Protestant churches) that religious pluralism allows the activity of many Christian communities at the same time and that citizens must be able to choose the church to which they want to belong. The Christian churches seeking to spread their faith in Russia also argue that a state in which nearly 40 per cent of declared believers do not manifest their faith in any way cannot be viewed as ambiguously Orthodox. The ROC consistently refutes such arguments, claiming that Russians were and will be an Orthodox nation. While it is true that the USSR weakened their religious identity, the Russian churches will once again be full with believers, if only other Christian churches would stop impeding the ROC’s evangelization of “ethnic” (traditional) believers. In the official document Pro Russia (1992), the Vatican asserted that it does not intend to conduct missionary activity, much less proselytize in the area of the former USSR. However, the ROC considers that the Catholic Church “is carrying out extremely unfavourable policy towards Orthodoxy in Russia and other postSoviet countries”.2 The Moscow patriarchate considered the visits of John Paul II to former Soviet republics (which took place despite the decisive protests of the ROC about the lack of respect for its canonical territory) as irrefutable proof of the proselytic enthusiasm of the Vatican. Karol Wojtyła, during his pontificate, visited Ukraine (23–27 June 2001), Kazakhstan (22–25 September 2001) and Azerbaijan (22–23 May 2002), and also visited two former Soviet republics that are not under the ROC’s jurisdiction: Georgia (8–9 November 1999) and Armenia (25–27 September 2001). From the point of view of the Orthodox community3 the most controversial was the pope’s four-day visit to Ukraine, which he visited at the invitation of President Leonid Kuchma.4 The Moscow patriarchate saw the arrival of John Paul II as an act revealing the proselytic intentions of the Vatican. In the ROC’s opinion, the pope did not respect the principle of “canonical territory” and had sought to strengthen the position of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The ROC’s assessment of the papal visit was unambiguous: “Proclaiming the equality of sister Churches, it is not possible for representatives of one of them to enter the

There can be only one Rome 229 residence of another Church without the owner’s permission, especially with aims that are contradictory to the interests of the master of the house”.5 The second event which increased tensions was the raising of the rank of administratures. The Catholic Church reestablished its structures even before the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. At that time, four informal apostolic administratures were established: two European ones (Moscow, Saratov), and two Eastern ones (Novosibirsk, Irkutsk).6 Then in February 2002 the four administratures were raised to the rank of dioceses, which the ROC recognized as a hostile act, dispelling the perspective of an improvement in the mutual relations of the churches.7 Metropolitan Kirill, in an open letter to the chairman of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, Walter Kasper, declared that the Vatican’s actions stand in contradiction to the declared respect for the sister Orthodox Church. The Orthodox hierarch emphasized that decisions to create the dioceses were kept secret by the Vatican, the Orthodox side had not been consulted, and their establishment had the goal of enabling the Catholic Church to gain new converts in Russia.8 One of the most serious problems in the relations between the Vatican and the ROC is the settlement of the status of the Greek Catholic Church. In 1946 the Uniate structures were liquidated and taken over by the Moscow patriarchate. Only the end of the Soviet era allowed the gradual rebuilding of the community. Although the Vatican, in a declaration signed in Balamand (1993) condemned Uniatism as a method of bringing about unity among Christians, the problem of the already existing Greek Catholic Church remained, especially in Ukraine. Since the dissolution of the USSR, Ukrainian Uniates and Orthodox believers argue mostly about the return of properties requisitioned by the Communists,9 the form of administration and missionary activity. The activity of the head of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, Cardinal Lubomyr Husar, arouses the particular dislike of Orthodox believers. They attribute to him, among other things, the initiative of transferring the church’s headquarters from Lviv to the capital Kiev and the change of his official title from Archbishop of Greater Lviv to Archbishop of Greater Kiev and Halich (2005), which was taken by the ROC to be a sign of the Uniates’ aspirations to widen their influence beyond Galicia into “Russian” – that is, Zaporozhye – Ukraine.10 Cardinal Husar was also the author of a controversial letter on the occasion of the transfer of headquarters to the capital, entitled “One Nation of God on the Hills of Kiev”,11 in which he proposed that the Ukrainian Greek Catholics remain in canonical sacramental unity with Rome and Constantinople at the same time, and supported the creation of one Kiev church (the vladyka argued that as long as there was no united national church, the religious factor would be an instrument of political games of foreign states in Ukraine), which immediately gained support from the Filaretists. The archbishop of Kiev and Halich also incurred the displeasure of the Moscow patriarchate for trying to persuade the Roman curia to grant the Greek Catholic Church the status of a patriarchate and by striving for the canonization of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky (the head of the church from 1904 to 1944), who is perceived in Russia as a Ukrainian nationalist who collaborated with German Nazis.12

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Analysing the relations between the ROC and the Vatican, one cannot neglect the influence of the Polish factor during the pontificate of John Paul II. The large percent of Poles among the Catholic priests working in the area of the former Soviet Union, including at a very high level (such as Bishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz and Bishop Jerzy Mazur), fit into the stereotypes functioning in Russian tradition: taking advantage of the difficult situation in which Russia found itself after the break-up of the Soviet Union, hosts of Lachy13 headed east to Latinize and Polonize Russians. Particularly the activity of Polish priests in Ukraine and Belarus was perceived in Moscow as imperial nostalgia for the lost Kresy and an attempt to rebuild the influence of the pre-war Polish state. It was in this spirit that the arrival of John Paul II in Ukraine was commented on, when thousands of Polish pilgrims came to Lviv. During the pontificate of Karol Wojtyła, the Vatican’s activity in the east was seen in the context of Polish foreign policy. At the same time, the lack of the ROC’s agreement to a papal visit to Russia and Vladimir Putin’s absence at the funeral of John Paul II were seen in Warsaw as an affront not so much towards the Vatican, as towards the Poles. Although for the last two decades Moscow has mostly avoided implementing “religious diplomacy” in its relations to Warsaw, it would nevertheless be opportune to reflect briefly on this issue. Currently, the religious factor in Polish–Russian relations is manifested mainly in the sphere of stereotypes and historical prejudices. Russian sentiments towards Poles could be described as a “betrayal syndrome”, which puts Poland in the same “camp” as Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia. Warsaw reproaches Russia’s many historical offences against Poland, but Russians also feel cheated by Poles and state events such as the Dymytriads, anti-tsarist uprisings, support for Napoleon, the fate of Soviet soldiers in 1920, and what they perceive as Polish ingratitude for liberation from Nazi occupation in 1945. From the Russian perspective, questioning the achievements of the Red Army undermines the single most important component of identity and collective memory of Russian generations after the Second World War. The underlying tension has its roots in a long history of clashes between two Slavic empires in eastern Europe, both legitimated by Christianity, though of different traditions. Polish and Russian national identities are strongly connected with religion, which is manifested in the notions “Polish Catholic” and “Russian Orthodox”. Messianic ideas are a very strong element of the political cultures of both nations. Wars between Poland and Russia often took on a civilizational dimension, being fought in the name of the God and the only true – Catholic or Orthodox – church. In Russian eyes, the Polish army was sometimes jokingly referred to as the armed forces of the Vatican, while the basis of Polish policy was seen to be converting Russians to Catholicism. The greatest symbol of Polish missionary ambitions was the Uniate Church created in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, supported by the Polish King Sigismund III.14 In Russian phraseology the term “Polish Jesuit” is to this day synonymous with a hypocrite and swindler. At present, when Poland and Russia are secular states the religious factor does not appear in the foreground of bilateral contacts; however, it can still to be

There can be only one Rome 231 noticed in mutual perception and it remains a source of mistrust.15 In such situation, good relations between the ROC and Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church (PAOC) could be used to soothe the strained relationship between the countries. Now, as the ROC within Russia rises in prominence and importance, church institutions could get involved to help improve the atmosphere of bilateral relations. The head of the PAOC, Metropolitan Sava Hrycuniak regularly meets with representatives of the Moscow patriarchate. His first visit in Moscow took place a few months after his coronation (26 August 1998) as the metropolitan of Warsaw and All Poland. He met with Alexy II who decorated him with the Order of Prince Vladimir I and granted him the award of the Fund for the Unity of Slavs in recognition of his activity in this field. On the other hand, in 2003 the PAOC honoured Hilarion, the bishop of Vienna and Austria (currently the head of ROC diplomacy) with the Medal of Prince Konstanty Ostrogski. Good relations between the two Orthodox churches could serve as an additional, unofficial diplomatic channel between Warsaw and Moscow. However, stereotypes are an exceptionally stubborn and deep-rooted element of national identity. A departure from a centuries old tradition of symbolic and factual confrontations between the nations requires dialogue, change of language in the discourse on the common past and, finally, reconciliation. At a conference on religion in international relations, in St Petersburg in November 2008, I presented a paper on the religious factor in Polish–Russian relations after 1991, which dealt, inter alia, with the creation and strengthening of stereotypes. I drew attention to the fact that the “church” channels between the two Orthodox churches, let alone the virtually “dead” contacts between the ROC and Polish Catholic Church, have yet to be used in efforts to overcome mutual prejudices and improve relations. The moderator of the panel was Father Gieorgij Riabykh (after ordination, hegumen Filip), who was, at the time, the press secretary of the Department for External Relations of the ROC. A lively discussion ensued and questions were raised whether Polish bishops would in the near future be able to address a letter to the Russian nation in the manner of the Letter of Reconciliation of 1965 addressed to German bishops, in which Polish clergy declared “we forgive and ask for forgiveness”. I held at the time that any initiative of such kind would be welcomed and very useful, but that little seemed to indicate that any such move would be possible in the foreseeable future. It is a rare sensation to feel such genuine satisfaction with a missed prognosis. In the autumn of 2009 hope for an improvement in Polish–Russian relations was kindled by talks between the representatives of the ROC and the Polish episcopate. The initiative came from the Russian monks of the monastery of St Nilus of Stolobensk (diocese of Tver), who turned to the Paulin fathers of Jasna Góra to enquire about the possibility of creating a copy of the famous Black Madonna in order to place it in the chapel consecrated to the memory of the victims of totalitarianisms of twentieth century. A delegation of six Orthodox priests arrived at Czestochowa on 25 September 2009, where it received the painting from the hands of the General Superior of the monastery, Father Izydor Matuszewski, and prayed for Russian–Polish reconciliation.16

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The events that followed indicate that one of the goals of this visit was also to probe the possibilities for dialogue and improve the atmosphere. First talks between the high representatives of the churches took place in Warsaw on 28 February 2010. Bishop Hilarion, head of diplomacy of the ROC, despite earlier announcements, did not come to Poland. The Russian delegation was presided over by the current deputy head of the Department for External Relations, hegumen Filip, while the Polish party was lead by the Secretary General of the episcopate – Bishop Stanisław Budzik.17 After the meeting the parties issued a joint statement calling for a rapprochement between the nations. A commission for dialogue was created and entrusted with a mission of drafting a Letter of Reconciliation.18 A second meeting also took place in Warsaw on 1 March 2010.19 The visit of monks of St Nilus and talks between the clergy of both nations may very well be a result of an autonomous decision of the ROC, but this does not mean that the Moscow patriarchate did not discuss its plans with the government. It is too early to see these events as an example of “religious diplomacy”; that is, the use of the religious factor by the Kremlin for its own political goals. One can, however, argue that the revitalization of relations between the churches favourably affects relations between governments. The inclusion of confessional institutions in the process of reconciliation is a new and valuable element in the Polish– Russian relations. The event, which led to the intensification of relations between the churches was the seventieth anniversary of the execution of the Polish officers in Katyn. On 2 April 2010 Polish and Russian clergy prayed together to commemorate the soldiers assassinated in the Katyn forest.20 The efforts made by both churches created a favourable atmosphere for political talks and facilitated important symbolic gestures. One of such gestures was the meeting of both prime ministers, Vladimir Putin and Donald Tusk, who paid homage to the victims on 7 April 2010. With both politicians present, the representatives of the Moscow patriarchate and Polish episcopate blessed the installation of the corner stone of the Church of Resurrection of the Lord, the first construction of a future complex, which is to include a museum, conference hall and a parish. On 10 April 2010 a ceremony was to be held in the Katyn forest. Representatives of the Polish government, army, the church and President Lech Kaczyński were supposed to be in attendance. The Polish president along with high-ranking officials and all other persons on board perished in the airplane catastrophe near Smolensk. This tragic event changed the balance of Polish–Russian relations. Both sides expressed readiness for closer cooperation, forgiveness and reconciliation. It is, however, too early to assess how permanent and extensive this shift will prove to be. The Polish stigma disappeared in 2005 along with the election of the new pontiff – the German Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger. Benedict XVI began with a symbolic gesture towards Eastern Christianity, resigning the controversial title “Patriarch of the West”. He explained his decision by the fact that the title Patriarch might arouse negative feelings in the Russian church.21 In 2005 Vatican diplomacy increased. First, in June Cardinal Walter Kasper visited Moscow, then in October Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo went to Russia,

There can be only one Rome 233 where he met with Metropolitan Kirill. After this visit, the archbishop acknowledged that the “ecumenical ice age” between Orthodoxy and Catholicism had ended, and announced that the Vatican wanted to establish full diplomatic relations with the Moscow patriarchate because “the level of present contacts does not correspond to the rank of both Churches in the world”.22 A result of diplomatic measures was the meeting between Metropolitan Kirill and Benedict XVI at the Vatican in May 2006, which brought about the decision to build an Orthodox church (St Catherine) in Rome – the first since the great schism. The German pope decided to reduce the role of Polish hierarchs in Russia in October 2007, the previous representative of Catholics in Russia, Bishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz,23 was replaced by Italian Paolo Pezzi.24 The attempts made by Benedict XVI to improve relations with the ROC brought certain results. Not quite a year after his election, at the beginning of May 2006, there took place a joint conference “A Soul For Europe”, at which representatives of Catholics and Orthodox believers spoke of the need to oppose secularism and to cooperate in the re-Christianization of Europe. Russian clergy began increasingly to speak in a similar tone: for example, Metropolitan Hilarion called on all Christians to form a “strategic partnership” in the face of progressing secularization of Europe.25 A joint commission was established for clearing up problems between the ROC and the Catholic Church (this solution was employed also for disputes on the lowest level; for example, resolving the question of teaching Orthodoxy in educational facilities run by Catholics).26 When in November 2007, after another dispute with the patriarchate of Constantinople, a representative of the ROC left the work of the mixed commission on matters of theology, the Vatican stood on the side of the Russian church, explaining that the work of the commission without the participation of the largest Orthodox Church loses its sense.27 In December 2008 the first European Orthodox–Catholic forum concerning the question of protecting the family (the ROC was represented by Metropolitan Hilarion) began to function.28 The election of a new patriarch of Moscow and All Russia did not bring any serious changes to the ROC’s relations with the Catholic Church. Already as an official candidate, Kirill stipulated that there was no reason why the ROC should fundamentally change its attitude to the Vatican and, for example, invite the pope to Russia, because the Moscow patriarchate still regarded the activity of Catholic priests in post-Soviet territory as inappropriate. After his election, on 2 February 2009, Kirill received an official delegation from the Vatican, led by Cardinal Walter Kasper and Archbishop Mennini.29 Despite the increasingly frequent declarations of readiness for cooperation, one should remember that an “alliance against secularism”30 is a rather general slogan, and – for now – it is difficult to imagine its factual realization, all the more so considering that Protorey Vsevolod Chaplin, in February 2009, ruled out the possibility of organizing a joint Catholic–Orthodox evangelization mission.31 The ROC still undertakes action with the aim of limiting the activity of Catholics in its own canonical territory – it influences the authorities, so that they issue fewer visas to Catholic priests who do not have Russian citizenship, impede

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the construction of churches or the work of Catholic presses and so on. Perhaps the most important element in efforts to weaken the position of the Catholic Church in Russia is ROC’s blocking its admission to the Interreligious Council of Russia. The ROC supports its stance on this matter by claiming that Catholics as a group are too small and could only join the council after the Old Believers, Armenians and Protestants. In the face of disputes between the Moscow patriarchate and Vatican, Russian authorities declare themselves to be decisively on the side of the ROC hierarchs. The actions of the state organs could be characterized as “good cop, bad cop”. While the president tries to present himself as an intermediary, encouraging the churches to engage in dialogue, the Foreign Affairs Ministry does not hesitate to use harsh words on the Vatican’s policies in Russia. Vladimir Putin met with John Paul II twice (2002, 2003). During the second visit, the president unambiguously supported dialogue between the churches and announced that the Russian authorities would do everything in their power to bring the Vatican and the ROC closer.32 At the same time, when questioned about the possibility of inviting the pope to Moscow, Putin answered that such an event could not take place without the clear approval of the patriarchate. In an official communication, Orthodox hierarchs expressed their gratitude to the president for his understanding and support for the church’s position regarding the Vatican. Vladimir Putin also did not attend the funeral ceremonies for John Paul II or the inauguration of Benedict XVI, which was mainly a signal to the ROC that the Kremlin would not raise the level of its relations with the Vatican. Nevertheless, on 13 March 2007 the Russian president met with the new pope, with whom he talked – among other things – of the transfer to the ROC of an Orthodox church in Italian Bari. It is worth emphasizing that Vladimir Putin declined to use an interpreter and spoke with Benedict XVI in his native language. Patriarch Alexy II officially thanked the president for his personal involvement in the efforts to improve relations between Orthodox believers and Catholics.33 The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry usually reacts more decisively than the president. In the face of tensions between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church, on 12 February 2002, an official note was addressed to the Vatican, in which the Holy See was asked to delay the decision to raise the status of the administratures until this question could be resolved with the Orthodox Church. The Foreign Affairs Ministry’s position was supported by the Duma, which on 15 February, on a motion made by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, ordered the ministry to deny visas to representatives of the Vatican. As a consequence, in 2002 five Catholic clergymen were refused entry to Russia’s territory.34 Moscow stands guard over the ROC’s interests – in supporting the Moscow patriarchate in its relations with the Vatican, the Kremlin strengthens the position of “its own” church in the international arena. Moreover, the relations of the two churches influence Russia’s image in the West as well as Russians’ perception of the West, which is tied in with complicated questions of Russian identity.

13 The Antichrist lives in the West The ideological burden of Russia’s policy on the United States of America

The makers of Russia’s foreign policy mention, as one of their most important goals, the dismantlement of the current uni-polar order and its replacement with a system of cooperation between powers that will balance the USA’s domination that – from the Russia perspective – has a destabilizing influence on international relations. The Cold-War rivalry between the USSR and the USA left a clear mark on the Russia Federation’s relations with the USA – it formed their perception and created a deep rooted mistrust and distance.1 The fall of the USSR was seen by a considerable part of the American elite as a triumph of their state and system, proving the correctness of its worldview and the beginning of a long-lasting supremacy in the world – in the spheres of politics (liberal democracy), economy (economic liberalism) and culture (the so-called “American way”). However, for Russia the end of the USSR meant degradation in the international arena – its reputation suffered as it fell from being a superpower to a state in deep crisis, fearing further territorial disintegration. Not quite two years after the signing of the Belavezha Accords, not much remained in Russia of the initial enthusiasm and faith in the quick realization of the vision of a common space “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. The United State’s triumphalism contrasted with the collapse that the Russian Federation experienced in the 1990s. The society greeted “Western exports” – democracy and the free market – with disappointment and together with it a dislike of the West began to grow, which once more began to be seen as “unfriendly” and “foreign”. After the Second World War the United States replaced Germany, France and Great Britain as the main representative of the West in the consciousness of most Russians. Russian policy towards the USA, especially in the way they perceived America, rather quickly became marked by anti-Occidental resentment. The kingdom of the Antichrist, which from the times of the “great schism” had been located in Europe was now across the ocean. In Russia’s relationship with the West, Stanisław Filipowicz points out, there is an unusual mix of fear and fascination that inclines Russia, on one hand, to imitate Western solutions and, on the other, to emphasize its own separateness.2 Studies conducted in recent years on Russian public opinion indicate that both fear and fascination still characterize the USA in the eyes of Russians, who envy

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American prosperity, admire their power, and at the same time fear them. The decided majority of respondents (76 per cent) consider the United States aggressive and aspiring to rule the entire world; 47 per cent claim that the USA threatens Russia; 80 per cent are convinced of the American government’s incessant interference in Russian politics. Regarding the activity of the USA, Russians consider the most dangerous to be its aspiration to global economic dominance (56 per cent), the forcing American values and democracy on others (43 per cent) and the expansion of NATO (40 per cent). 17 per cent fear an attack by the United States on Russia; more than half of the respondents agreed that the United States threatens Russia economically (51 per cent) and as a civilization (44 per cent) – by destroying its sense of separateness, its traditional value system, native culture and so on.3 The data regarding Russian fears that the USA threatens their identity, cultural space and “spiritual security” is particularly interesting. Although the Kremlin’s policy towards the USA is burdened with anti-Western resentment closely connected with the Orthodox tradition,4 the influence of Russian religious institutions on Moscow’s relations with Washington is negligible. This follows from several premises. Above all, the communities connected with the ROC that are functioning in the USA represent only one of many denominations that, while enjoying freedom of conscience, are at the same time separate from the state organs by the Jeffersonian “wall of separation”.5 In the past, the ROC was the first Orthodox Church carrying out missionary activity among American Eskimos (to this day, the Moscow patriarchate emphasizes the innovative evangelizing methods of nineteenth-century Russian priests, compared with the supposed roughness of Protestant proselytists). In 1903 the residence of the head of Orthodox communities of the ROC in the USA was transferred from San Francisco to New York. After the Revolution of 1917 relations between the American Orthodox communities and the Russian church worsened. Negotiations on the regulation of the status of American structures failed inter alia due to the refusal of the representatives of the American Orthodox Church to pledge loyalty to the Soviet government.6 Then in 1970 the Moscow patriarchate granted the American structures autocephaly. As a result, the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) was established, the canonical status of which has still not been recognized by some Orthodox churches, including the patriarchate of Constantinople.7 In December 2008 Metropolitan Jonah James Paffhausen became the new head of the community of around ½ million believers of the OCA. He has been called the “Barack Obama of the Orthodox Church” because of his announcement of reforms to the church administration, an increase in missionary activity and aspirations to create one Orthodox church on US territory.8 While Protestant communities have a certain influence on power in the USA, Russia’s diplomatic “arsenal” does not include a loyal, well-organized, native Protestant institution. Protestantism is not considered a “traditional religion” in the Russian Federation, but a foreign one: earlier defined as the “faith of the Germans” and now of Americans. Assuming that the Kremlin was interested in strengthening the Russian Protestant communities currently undergoing revival

The Antichrist lives in the West 237 (the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Russia, the Church of Ingria and the Biblical Lutheran Church) with the aim of using them in contacts with the USA, it would first have to overcome the objection of the ROC, for which the dynamically developing Protestant churches represent a considerable challenge. Thus Moscow does not have any instruments that would allow it to effectively use the religious factor in its policy towards the USA. At the same time, the Kremlin accuses Washington of using religion to weaken Russia. The specificity of the American religious system involves, on the one hand, the separation of church and state, which leaves the matter of faith in the private sphere of each citizen, and, on the other, making the symbols, values and ethics of Christianity an inseparable part of the American “civil religion”. Also, although American law prohibits any form of state religion, sociologists of religion and political scientists point out the constantly growing influence of the radical Protestant milieu on American political elites. Thanks to good organization, large networks of contacts and sometimes significant fortunes, fundamentalists are becoming one of the most important electoral groups, able to decide the fate of elections, which makes the religious factor significant in American politics.9 In the Kremlin’s assessment, the aim of the USA’s “religious diplomacy” is to undermine the existence of separate civilizations, including Russia’s, through the weakening of their traditions and value systems. The neo-Protestant communities active on Russia’s territory are seen as subjects acting in the interests of the USA, realizing the plan of Americanization of particular cultures.10 For this reason, their activity has been recognized by the FSB as the most serious threat to the “spiritual security” of Russia. The formulations in The Security Concept of the Russian Federation concerning the “cultural-religious expansion of particular states” and the “spiritual aggression” that threatens Russia refer above all to the USA violating Russian cultural space through its support of Protestant proselytism. The Kremlin and the ROC were confirmed in such convictions each time Washington criticized Moscow for not observing freedom of conscience: for example, when the Clinton administration protested against the religious law of 1997 that restricted the activity of neo-Protestants. Also the world ecumenical movement, in which the Protestants are very involved, is considered in Russia to be an instrument of the USA, and the WCC an institution under strong American influence. In the opinion of Russian conservatives, the real goal of ecumenism is the washing away differences between particular religions and the creation of an illusion of unanimity of all religious worldviews. Moreover, in Russia there is a widespread conviction of the close cooperation of Washington with the Vatican (symbolized by the good relations of John Paul II with Ronald Reagan) and the USA’s tacit support for the patriarchate of Constantinople in its rivalry with the ROC for supremacy in the universal Orthodox Church. Such interpretation of the activity of the USA and Protestant communities by the Russian state and the ROC is influenced, among others, by prejudices and negative stereotypes conditioned by anti-Occidentalism. On the level of perception, for Moscow, the United States is the next embodiment of the West, serving for centuries as Russia’s point of reference in its search

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for identity and its own way of development. In the popular conception, threats, temptations, sin and demoralizing ideas have for centuries been coming to Eurasia from the west. As Europe once, the USA is now often – at the very least in the Russian conservative milieu – portrayed as the “land of the Antichrist”, which with its mantle of prosperity, absolute freedom and liberalization of lifestyle propagates nihilism and secularism in the world and pushes faith and humanistic values to the margins of public life. Similar to the nineteenth-century Slavophiles, contemporary Russian critics of the USA claim that American culture has a selfdestructive nature, pays tribute to consumptionism and chases after riches, leads to the disintegration of the institution of the family and the deep demoralization of society, which means that the end of the USA’s power is near. This image of the USA can be traced among others in Russian neo--imperialism, dynamic conservatism, nationalism, Marxist Islam. In the Russian perception the American Antichrist (as a sort of the Grand Inquisitor),11 that tempts with the illusion of equality, freedom and prosperity, propagating democracy and the free market, can only be opposed by Russia, which is capable of gathering around itself other civilizations: China, India and Iran. The answer to Pax Americana should be multi-polarism, in the creation of which Moscow is prepared to closely cooperate even with potential competitors directly neighbouring it, if only to weaken the USA’s position. Tensions between Moscow and Washington are still the clash of two imperialisms, two visions of the world and two senses of mission. The religious factor is one of the sources of mistrust, suspicion and distance in relations between Russia and the USA. Religion deforms their perceptions of each other, which leads to an increase of mistrust. At the same time, with the help of religion, using the negative archetype of the West, Russia can justify its actions in the international arena, underline the characterization of its adversaries and legitimize its priorities – in short, define its identity. Although the religious factor plays a small role in Russian–American relations, it can be both an instrument and a reason for certain decisions and policies, thus making pragmatic behaviour more difficult and creating fertile ground for misperceptions and mutual animosity between Moscow and Washington. As long as the Antichrist lives in the West, the bilateral relations will bend under the weight of ideology.

Conclusion

Mahatma Gandhi once observed that only people who did not really understand what religion was could claim that it had nothing to do with politics. It is one of the most important factors forming the identity of an individual, nation, state or civilization. It influences society above all through culture, the roots of which in large measure grow out of religious values, beliefs and traditions. This influence – regardless of whether it is direct or indirect – is difficult to conceptualize or measure. A visable and direct manifestation of it is the activity of religious institutions, which propagate and strengthen a certain religious worldview within a society. In this way, religion also shapes the political system – the conception of law and power (including the source of its legitimization), the functioning of the state and its identity, and thus also the way the state determines its own interests, how it views the international system and its place in it. In the case of Russia, Orthodoxy (and to a lesser extent, Islam) is one of the most important components of identity and culture, and therefore a factor in politics. Many features of Russian political tradition have their source in Eastern Christianity; for example, antinomianism, holism (searching for the sverkhidea), scepticism towards established law, sacralization of power, anti-Occidentalism and the sense of mission connected with it, as well as the conviction of Russia’s special destiny in the history of humanity. The strong connection of Orthodoxy with identity is what enables the religious factor to play its role in Russian politics also in the present day, when the Russian Federation must define its place in the international arena. The identity crisis is only one of many challenges which Russia must face after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It has experienced violent geo-political changes in nearby states, conflicts, economic collapse and the growing frustration of society. The initial enthusiasm gave way to embitterment. Among elites a conviction spread that the state cannot simply copy foreign systemic solutions, but must work out its own model of development compatible with Russian culture. Such a position was exhibited also by “traditional” religious institutions – the ROC, muftiates and the Buddhist Sangha – which, like the government, had to deal with new circumstances after 1991: the low religious consciousness of believers, the increased activity of “foreign” religions, the weakness of the central authorities, brutal

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capitalism and other symptoms of destabilization of the life of society resulting from transformation. In the opinion of the sociologist Peter Beyer, with the changes happening in the world – generally characterized as modernization – religious institutions are faced with the following choice: they can open themselves to modernization and redefine their functions in society, especially in the public sphere (the liberal option), or they can question the changes and defend tradition and the old order (the conservative option). Analysis of documents accepted in recent years by Russian religious institutions (The Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, The Basic Principles of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Contacts With Other Religions, The Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Missionary Activity, The Foundations of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Teachings on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights, The Basic Guidelines of the Social Program of Russian Muslims, Foundations of the Social Concept of Russian Judaism) indicate that they favour the conservative option. The ROC and, following it, other “traditional religions” consider the reestablishment of close relations with the state as the way out of the crisis and to increase the role of religion in society. For the decided majority of Orthodox (and also Islamic, Buddhist and Jewish) clergy, including the pragmatists currently dominating the Holy Synod, modernization, associated with the West, is seen as a threat to Russian sovereignty, identity and culture. After 70 years of functioning in the Soviet system of “rationed” freedom of conscience, the ROC praises the separation of church and state, but at the same time strives for close cooperation with the authorities in selected areas. In the relations taking shape between the Russian authorities and religious institutions, we may notice many similarities to the church–state relations that had formed over centuries in Russia. The reasons for the complicated relations of the ROC and other religious institutions with the Kremlin should be partly sought in the past. Kieven Rus’ acceptance of Christianity was an important civilizational impulse, and the development of church administration strengthened the state structures. Unlike western Europe, in Rus and later in Russia, there has never been a persistent rivalry between the church and the ruler. The model based on the Byzantine principle of symphony led to a gradual subordination of the “altar” to the “throne”. What was important for relations between these two subjects was the subordination of the lands of Rus to Moscow and the gradual weakening of the Golden Horde. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Russian state and church became independent of other centres of influence – Moscow cast off its dependence on the khans, and the Russian church gained autocephaly from the patriarchate of Constantinople (1448) and later the status of patriarchate itself (1580). This was a transitional period, in which the Russian monarchs sought a new formula for the state in dynamically changing geo-political conditions. To the east, the Mongols were clearly weakening, to the south, Byzantium was ever less effective in warding off attacks by the Turks, and to the west the threat of its neighbours’ expansion was still present. For the first time since Vladimir the Great’s acceptance of baptism, Russian rulers were deciding on the state’s identity in a clear way. They were choosing between two traditions, representing different

Conclusion 241 identity options: Byzantium or the horde. Despite the fact that the administrative system was largely based on that of the horde, the Muscovite state had an identity that was decidedly Orthodox–Byzantine. Successive rulers in Russia legitimized their power and shaped their governance on the model of the eastern Empire. As a civilizational model, Constantinople turned out to be more attractive than Sarai. After 1453 the Russian rulers considered themselves the heirs and successors of the mission of the Christian Imperium Romanum. At the same time, the Byzantine tradition, serving the monarchs and the clergy as the main point of reference, underwent Russification. The result of this process was samoderzhavie, drawing legitimacy from Orthodoxy and the idea of a universal empire which God entrusted with the salvation of humanity. The next turning point in relations between the “throne” and the “altar” was the rule of Peter I, whose vision of the role of religious institutions in the state was realized by his successors. In the Russian Empire, in fact, all important religious communities took on the character of state institutions, and the clergy gained the status of quasi-public functionaries, whose education and regular income was assured by the authorities. The price of monarchical patronage was the unofficial obligation of religious associations to act in the interest of the state, both in domestic policy and in the international arena. The state, in the person of the emperor, decided on the extent of religious freedom and freedom of conscience, and thus supported only those religious institutions that were loyal and useful from the perspective of the state’s interests. Guided by the principle “one religion – one institution representing it”, the state favoured loyal communities and limited the activity of their competitors. Institutions that enjoyed the goodwill of the authorities had to perform the tasks imposed on them by the state (e.g. carrying out social work, assimilating the nonRussian population, diplomatic tasks) and constantly manifest their devotion. Falling into the ruler’s disfavour (e.g. by questioning his legitimacy, undermining his authority or propagating views that threaten the state with destabilization) resulted in being pushed to the margins of social life (such was the fate, e.g. of the Old Believers and native Protestant sects). The mechanism for granting freedom of conscience “by concession” (based on the principle “freedom in exchange for loyalty and acting in the state’s interests”) was maintained also in the atheist Soviet Union. Stalin retreated from the complete destruction of the church when he perceived its usefulness (its ability to integrate and mobilize society) in the face of the military aggression of the Third Reich. Communist authorities agreed in 1943 to the election of a new patriarch, and after the war used the ROC’s activity abroad as an additional diplomatic channel and institution helping to create a positive image of the USSR on the international arena: for example, in contacts with Arabs or with Orthodox Greece. In sum, in the history of the Russian state the religious factor played an important role in the formation of the state’s identity, served as a source of legitimization and as a catalyst for integration processes, acted as one of the pillars of its culture and an important element in social, diplomatic and civilizational developements.

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After 1991 the decided majority of Orthodox, Islamic and Buddhist clergy declared themselves in favour of at least a partial re-creation of the “traditional model”, expecting support from the state (mainly financial aid, return of properties nationalized by the Bolsheviks and the introduction of favourable legal regulations) and the decisive restriction of the activity of “foreign” religious associations and sects. Such an attitude meets the expectations of the Kremlin, which has its own plans regarding “traditional religions”. Following these historical solutions, the authorities in Russia do not so much put up a “wall” (as is the case with the American “wall of separation”) between themselves and religious associations, as – against the principle of neutrality of the state’s worldview – they grant freedom of conscience “by concession”, according to an institution’s “degree of loyalty”, and intervene in relations between particular organizations. A specific post-Soviet model of state–church relations is thus being formed and its distinctive features are the dominant position of the state, the existence of “traditional religions” and a system of “licences to preach”. In accordance with expectations of the Kremlin, the ROC and muftiates should return to their traditional roles in contemporary Russia – legitimizing the authorities, forming patriotic attitudes and an ethos of service for the homeland. The elites see Orthodoxy and Islam as a system of traditional principles, values and symbols that are useful in the Russian Federation’s process of self-definition. The emphasis the Kremlin puts on the religious factor in the formation of Russia’s identity can be justified not only by historical considerations, but also by sociological studies showing that Orthodoxy is, for most Russians, mainly an element of identification, a determinant of their belonging to a certain tradition and to a lesser extent a strictly religious worldview (a similar attitude is found also among Russian Muslims and Buddhists). The association of particular ethnic groups with a given religion was consolidated in the Russian Empire, where religious institutions cared for their “traditional believers”. Specific “ethnic spheres of influence” functioned (only the Orthodox Church was not bound by this restriction), which allowed serious religious conflicts to be avoided. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, all eastern Slavs living in Russia are considered by the ROC to be “traditional Orthodox believers”, although it is worth emphasizing that the practice of “assigning people to a religion” is gradually being overcome, particularly in Protestant and Buddhist communities, whose adherents are increasingly also ethnic Russians. The specificity of the religiosity of citizens of the Russian Federation is conveyed by the categories used by sociologists, who among Russian Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Buddhists distinguish those who are “believers” and those who “belong to the Orthodox/Islamic/ Buddhist culture”. For studying the religious factor in politics, the idea of “Russian Orthodoxy” has particular significance – it is related not so much to religion, but functions rather as a symbol of mass identification and moral and political unity and an idea integrating the secular community. The support of the church does not significantly increase the popularity of politicians in the Russian Federation, but it is also not worth having it as an opponent. The ROC, from the beginning of the 1990s, has enjoyed the trust of most citizens,

Conclusion 243 who perceive it as a national symbol. This trust does not mean, however, that society wants greater church activity in the public sphere. Russians react critically to the potential political activity of the ROC, and also to parties that proclaim religious slogans. They are ill-disposed towards mandatory religious lessons and paying taxes on behalf of religious institutions. They also do not require the president to be a believer, but at the same time, they expect him to show the church the respect it deserves, to participate in solemn Masses and celebrate church holidays (especially Christmas and Easter). From the citizens’ point of view, the president emphasizes his ties to tradition and the Russian nation also through good relations with the church. The influence of the religious factor on policy does not follow from the religiosity of Russians, but from their identification of Orthodoxy with patriotism, with attachment to culture heritage and “Russianness”. A close alliance with the ROC is not necessary to win elections in Russia, but an open conflict with the church can put off voters. From the end of the twentieth century, the growing popularity of civilizational concepts that represent the global order not only as a network of connections between particular states, but above all as balanced power between civilizations (especially the West, China, India, the Islamic world and Russia) can be observed in Russia (not without the influence of the popular and oft-quoted in Russian publications theses of Samuel Huntington). During the eight-year presidency of Vladimir Putin, in the statements of the most important state functionaries (including the head of state) references to “Eurasian civilization” (also Orthodox or Russian) began to appear in connection with Russia. The proponents of this concept claim that Eurasian civilization is distinguished by its unusual religious tolerance and the peaceful coexistence of Christianity and Islam extending back over several centuries, a fact which is proved, they argue, by the lack of religious wars in Russian history. This is true, although the reasons for such historical development also lay elsewhere: for example in the weakness of the church, which was incapable of mobilizing the state apparatus to military support for its missionary ambitions. In Russia, religious institutions were in the service of the ruler, and carried out evangelization in the interest of the empire. The idealization of harmony between religions, especially between Orthodoxy and Islam, is an element of Moscow’s Geschichtspolitik. One of the priorities of the multi-national and multi-confessional Russian civilization is the assurance of its “spiritual security”. This idea, which is referred to in The Security Concept of the Russian Federation, is connected with the protection of Russia’s identity, tradition and culture. Two important aspects of “spiritual security” can be distinguished: internal, related to maintaining peace between Russian citizens (believers of different faiths) and external, concerning protection of civilizational sovereignty: that is, Russia’s ability to resist pressure from other civilizations and preserve Russian cultural space (russkiy mir). Realization of these two intentions is not a trivial matter. On one hand, the Kremlin promotes interreligious dialogue in the country, making its support for “traditional religions” conditional on their compliant cooperation. On the other hand, in emphasizing Russia’s civilizational separateness, those in government refer above all to the

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symbols of Orthodoxy. What we can observe in Russia is a “top-down” Orthodoxization of the public sphere, which begun even during the administration of Boris Yeltsin. This, in the opinion of Sergey Burianov, entails the threat of deepening the specific “systemic corruption”, which involves the religious institutions’ support for the authorities in exchange for favourable decisions, which in turn encourages the clericalization of state organs, especially in the structures of armed forces, the police and educational centres. As a result, the significance of the religious factor is growing in the policy of the Russian Federation. For the internal “spiritual security” of Russia, relations between religious institutions are of key significance. In the group of “traditional religions” favoured in legislation, the division between the church and other religions – Islam, Judaism and Buddhism – is becoming more and more apparent. The clergy of the three other confessions are concerned about the strength of the ROC. Despite certain misunderstandings, especially between the Jewish communities and the muftiates, representatives of the three religions increasingly often act jointly against initiatives of the ROC, such as was the case with the introduction to schools of the “Foundations of Orthodox Culture”, or the conscription of (mainly Orthodox) military chaplains. The conflict of interests between the ROC and other “traditional religions”, especially Islam, is visible on the level of domestic goals for the activity of religious institutions, formulated in official documents. The ROC wants to fulfil the role of a church–symbol of all Russia and aspires to be the most important partner of the Kremlin. It is moving in the direction of institutionalizing its cooperation with the government and gaining as many guarantees as possible – at the very least “soft” guarantees – of its special status. Moreover, the ROC wants to overcome internal schisms and limit proselytism of “nontraditional” religions in Russia. Only the last two aims do not raise fears among the Muslims, who are also interested in reducing the influence of “foreign mullahs”. From the point of view of muftiates, the most important objective is leadership in the Russian ummah and the strengthening of the position of Muslims in Russia. In accordance with their assumptions, this goal is to be achieved through the development of institutionalized cooperation with the state, which in turn should assure Russian Muslims a status equal to that of Orthodox believers. Against this background, problems familiar from other states are increasingly common: for example, the dispute over Islamic believers wearing headscarves in photos for official documents, or introducing elements of sharia law into federal law. For Muslim citizens, it is not enough that the government presents Russia as Eurasian civilization, based on the traditions of both Orthodoxy and Islam. More and more representatives of the ummah demand concrete decisions that confirm Russia’s status as a Christian– Islamic state: for example, a change of the national anthem and state symbols, making Islamic holidays days free of work in the whole federation and establishing the office of vice president reserved for a representative of Muslim citizens. In drawing attention to the source of potential tensions between the church and the muftiates, it is important to emphasize the lack of serious conflicting interests of these religious institutions outside Russia’s borders, which facilitates the Kremlin’s use of the religious factor in foreign policy. Among the international

Conclusion 245 goals of the ROC are the maintenance of the integrity of its canonical territory, regaining property lost after 1917 and also gaining the position of leader in the universal Orthodox Church. The muftiates, which only started to create their own diplomatic structures, concentrate on establishing cooperation with particular Islamic states and organizations (e.g. with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States). The formula for the cooperation of federal authorities with “traditional religions” (in reality mainly with the Moscow patriarchate) in the public sphere is “social partnership” – an initiative announced by the ROC and enjoying the unofficial support of the Kremlin. The church accepts the secularism of the state, but at the same time emphasizes that the separation of church and state does not mean the separation of the church from the nation. From this, the ROC draws the conclusion that bilateral cooperation is essential in spheres crucial for Russia’s development – education, upbringing, protection of the cultural heritage, different forms of social welfare and everything connected with restoring the historical memory and traditional value system of the Russian society. Without this, the Russian Federation will not become a true great power. Importantly, the Kremlin in principle agrees with the church’s diagnosis, but wants to achieve the “moral sanitation” of citizens with the help of religious organizations on its own terms. It could be argued that the fact that the way for national rebirth is sought in the return to tradition implies that the state (and much less so the church) is incapable of giving Russia the necessary impulse for modernization. The Kremlin’s treatment of religion as a possible source of new identity, legitimacy of power and patriotism is anachronous. Some researchers interpret Moscow’s intentions in this context as an attempt, inspired by the American model, to create a Russian civil religion. However, it is far from certain whether conservative Orthodoxy can match the potential that Protestantism has in this context. The Kremlin and religious institutions, above all the ROC and muftiates, present similar views as to the identity of Russia, its mission and place in the international arena. None of the “traditional religions” questions the perception of the Russian Federation as the next “embodiment” of the “Russian civilization” (understandably, the Moscow patriarchate prefers the description “Orthodox civilization” while representatives of the other religions – “Eurasian”). This separateness and civilizational specificity is often used by the Kremlin to defend itself against criticism by the USA and EU, as it explains that Russia is working on its own “model” of democracy in accordance with its tradition and culture. The slogan of “sovereign democracy” presented by presidential experts has been supported by the church, pointing out the inappropriateness of Western solutions for Russian tradition, and proposing the creation of an “Orthodox democracy” which would take into consideration the values of eastern Christianity. An important impulse for discussion on creating an “Orthodox democracy” in Russia were the documents published by the ROC – The Declaration on the Rights and Dignity of Man and The Foundations of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Teachings on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights, in which an “Orthodox” catalogue of human rights was presented.

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The convergence of the Kremlin’s and the ROC’s visions concerning global order is a key component of the religious factor in Russian foreign policy. Both subjects perceive post-Soviet territory as Russia’s sphere of influence, in which the activity of other subjects should be limited to the minimum. In reference to the area of the former USSR, Russian diplomacy uses the notion of the “near abroad”, while the Moscow patriarchate talks about “canonical territory”. A third term, “Russian cultural space” (russkiy mir), is also employed, which can – depending on the chosen criterion (linguistic, linguistic–religious or the presence of the Russian diaspora) – refer to the territory of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, with the possibility of including the areas of Latvia and Estonia inhabited by Russians or the entire post-Soviet space including the Mongolian borderlands. Maintaining the cultural space is an element of rebuilding Russia’s position on the international arena – without a strong Russia in Eurasia, there is no Russian power. From the times of Yevgeny Primakov, Russian diplomacy has declared itself in favour of creating a global power system, in which the domination of the USA will be balanced by the cooperation of new centres – Russia, China and India. The Moscow patriarchate fully supports the geo-political multi-polarism promoted by the Kremlin and at the same time accentuates the civilizational dimension of cooperation between the three mentioned states (civilizational multi-polarism). The ROC calls for the establishment of an alliance of conservative civilizations, which corresponds to Moscow’s aspirations of forming a strategic partnership with Beijing, Delhi and Teheran. At the same time, the Kremlin and the Orthodox Church are guided by a common purpose, to challenge the Pax Americana and the USA’s cultural domination (the ROC sees ecumenism, Protestant proselytism and liberalism as symptoms of American civilizational imperialism). Orthodox hierarchs and representatives of the highest Russian authorities increasingly often speak of “Russia’s mission”. Thanks to its exceptional civilization, it is called upon not only to create a new, multi-polar order, but also to work out a more just model of world development. According to these ideas, only Orthodox Russia can prevent a Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations”, effectively mitigate tensions between different civilizations and fulfil the role of initiator and patron of interreligious dialogue. These motifs are present in different trends of Russian political thought (as classified in this book): imperialism, neo-Eurasianism, nationalism and Slavic solidarity. Religion, and especially religious tradition, fulfils different functions in particular trends. In the conviction of imperialists, the rebirth of the Orthodox tradition within society is a way to get Russia out of its present collapse. Religion is seen as a tool for rebuilding the empire. Nationalists, in turn, see in it a system of values that creates the framework for the identity of the Russian nation. In Eurasianism, religions (Orthodoxy, Islam, to a lesser extent Buddhism) are treated as the ideological glue for the geo-political project – Eurasia. Propagators of the idea of Slavic solidarity see Orthodoxy as the most important foundation of the closeness and special bond between Slavic nations, which should closely cooperate with each other and aspire to create joint institutions on the international arena,

Conclusion 247 such as the proposed “Eastern Slavic Union” (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) or the “Union of the Most Faithful” (Russia, Belarus, Serbia). The slogan “Orthodox civilization” expresses the closeness of the views of the Kremlin and the ROC. It represents a good basis for the cooperation of the state and religious institutions in the international arena. For obvious reasons, this is not the cooperation of equal partners, as the creator of foreign policy is the president and the Foreign Affairs Ministry subordinated to him. These two centres mark out goals for loyal religious institutions and coordinate with them their actions beyond Russia’s borders. Analysis of Moscow’s foreign policy reveals the mechanisms that enable the Kremlin to use the religious factor in its international activity. Among these are the joint state–church institutions dealing with political issues, expert forums and regular meetings of the clergy with decision makers. An essential premise of “religious diplomacy” is also the implicit acceptance by the Russian religious institutions of an “obligation” to act in the interest of the state. Russia at the beginning of the twenty-first century is carrying out well-thought-out “religious diplomacy”. The effective use of soft power requires the Kremlin to strengthen native religious institutions in their role as transnational subjects. A good example of such action is the successful initiative of the Moscow patriarchate (supported by the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry) which resulted in establishing UNESCO group Peace and Dialogue of Cultures – a consultation body in which the ROC seeks to play the role of intermediary between Christianity and Islam. At the same time, Russian diplomacy undertakes efforts to strengthen the ROC’s position in the universal Orthodox Church, especially by engaging in the rivalry of the Moscow patriarchate with Constantinople for primacy in the oikumene. Also in this context the convergence of the aspirations of the church and the Russian state (the ROC has ambitions to be one of the leaders of the universal church, and the Kremlin seeks to play a key role in the global balance of power taking shape) is natural. The religious factor is, above all, an instrument used in Russian diplomacy for creating a positive image of Russia, raising the prestige of the state, legitimizing the Kremlin’s activity abroad and mobilizing Russian society. Moreover, religious institutions often serve as an additional diplomatic channel (e.g. the ROC’s contacts with Hamas), support government initiatives within international organizations (e.g. supporting efforts to gain observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference), engage in peace processes and mediate in conflicts (e.g. the role of the ROC in the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict). The ROC’s international activity is especially important in terms of integrating the Russian diaspora in post-Soviet areas as well as elsewhere: for instance, in Israel. Russia uses the argument of religious closeness in contacts with Orthodox and Muslim states, which allows it to create a better atmosphere for talks and inspires the trust of the other side. The argument of “Orthodox solidarity” is useful to Moscow, for example, in relations with Athens and Sofia. By emphasizing, in turn, the significance of Islam in Russian culture, the Kremlin skilfully forms an image of a state friendly to Muslims, understanding and respecting Islam.

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An interesting example of this are Russian–Iranian relations, where regular meetings of Orthodox and Shiite clergy within the framework of the Islam–Orthodoxy Commission are an important platform of bilateral contacts. A visible effect of this forum’s work in the international arena is the joint promotion by Moscow and Teheran of a “dialogue of civilizations” and the support for creating a Religious Council in the UN. The ROC’s dialogue with the Ayatollahs is presented by the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry as a success and strengthens Russia’s mandate to act in the role of intermediary between civilizations. In foreign policy the religious factor also serves to demarcate the zones of civilizational influences. Russia attaches increasing importance to its own cultural space (some documents use the term “spiritual space” – dukhovnoye prostranstvo / духовное пространство), which is directly connected with its position in Eurasia between the “rising” powers – China and India. Moscow’s technological edge (especially in the military field) over Beijing and Delhi is gradually decreasing, which – given the demographic and economic potential of both Asian states – is forcing Russia to seek a new role for itself. Emphasizing the universal character of Christianity, in contrast with Confucianism and Hinduism, the Kremlin uses the conciliatory potential of its cultural and religious heritage to build up its role in this triangle of powers of the new multi-polar order – if, in the eyes of Russia’s ideologues, China, due to is economic and industrial prowess, is to be the “factory” of the world and India a sort of “IT laboratory”, Russia must take the role of the “university of ideas”. Russia’s ability to secure efficiently its culture space determines its position in post-Soviet areas. In order to maintain the already deteriorated status of Eurasian zone of prestige Moscow has to improve its cultural appeal. “Religious diplomacy” is just one of the methods to achieve this. In most cases, the Kremlin’s “religious diplomacy” fits into the logic of Realpolitik. Analysis of the Russian Federation’s activity abroad, however, indicates that in some situations the religious factor can be not only an instrument, but also a reason for decisions made by Moscow. Such is the case in situations important for Russia’s identity, usually connected with either the “Western complex” or with “Orthodox brotherhood”. This can be observed, for example, in Russian policy during the war in the former Yugoslavia when the Kremlin, partly against its national interests, risked good relations with the West by taking the side of the Serbs. The government was under pressure from society, which demonstrated in defence of its “Orthodox brothers” and called upon its leaders to fulfil Russia’s “historical mission” of protecting Orthodox Slavs. On this same principle, the religious factor could become a premise for Moscow’s actions towards Kiev or Minsk. Another example is the “burden” of anti-Occidentalism in Russia’s relations with the United States. A large part of the Russian power elite at least partly agrees with the view that the intention of the USA is to destroy Russian civilization. This is why, to overthrow the Pax Americana, Russia does not hesitate to reinforce its potential rivals in its close neighbourhood – China and India. In these cases, it seems that the religious factor has potential to cloud Moscow’s perception and can thus be detrimental to its intentions to conduct Realpolitik.

Conclusion 249 In Russian domestic matters, the gradual selective Orthodoxization of the public sphere is noticeable. The church’s cooperation with state organs is extending over an increasingly wide array of matters, which creates fertile ground for cooperation of the government and church on the international arena. Russia carries out “religious diplomacy”, which is nothing new in Russian tradition. The activation of the religious factor observed in Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first century is connected with processes of self-identification. More and more often Russia tries to define its place in the global order in categories of civilization. With the help of the religious factor, it draws a picture of the international system and based on such assessments attributes roles to itself and to other participants of the system. However, such ideological differentiation carries a certain risk – the religious (ideological) factor can, even if used strictly pragmatically, nevertheless deform the perception of reality. During the eight-year administration of Vladimir Putin, the subordination of the church to the Kremlin was rarely seen as controversial. The ROC supported the authorities without setting any conditions, humbly counting on the goodwill of individuals in power. During the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, the Moscow Patriarchate strengthened its position in the public sphere. In this context, many commentators emphasize the charisma and political instinct of Kirill whose public persona is gaining an increasingly political dimension. The patriarch promotes Russia’s path to modernisation in accordance with Orthodox tradition. He is a visionary presenting the ROC as supranational institution of all eastern Slavs. And last but not least, he has set for the ROC an ambitious goal, organizing an all-Orthodox sobor. The religious factor does not determine the general course of Russian policy. It does not influence its behaviour and the global balance of power to the same degree as its military potential or access to strategic resources. However, it is of crucial significance for the identity of the state. Religion appears in politics in a dual role – as an instrument and as a premise of the state’s activity. As a component of culture, it forms citizens’ attitudes and perceptions, and its influence is often noticeable only in the perspective of many generations. Religion is manifested, inter alia, in how the power elites define the national interest, security, prestige and priorities. Taking the influence of the religious factor into consideration reveals less known aspects of Russian policy. Diplomats and foreign policy planners cannot afford to ignore it in relations with Moscow, as it allows to better understand contemporary Russia, its choices, dilemmas and plans.

Notes

Introduction 1 P. Beyer, Religion and Globalization (London: Sage, 1994), p. 5. 2 É. Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), p. 47. 3 Durkheim considered beliefs and rites to be the basic types of religious phenomena. He defined the former as states of opinion, consisting of ideas, the latter – established courses of action. He called church “a moral community, formed by all the believers in a single faith, laymen as well as priests” (ibid., pp. 31, 40). 4 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System”, in S. D. Kunin and J. Miles-Watson, Theories of Religion: A Reader (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2006), p. 208. 5 W. Piwowarski, Socjologia Religii (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1996), p. 37. 6 J.M. Yinger, Religion, Society and the Individual: An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 9. 7 R.N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution”, American Sociological Review 29 (1964), pp. 385–374. 8 Piwowarski, Socjologia Religii, p. 43. 9 Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p. 47. 10 T. Luckmann, Niewidzialna Religia (Kraków: Nomos, 2006), p. 13. 11 N. Luhmann, Funkcja Religii (Kraków: Nomos, 1998), p. 13. 12 Beyer, Religion and Globalization, pp. 31–2. 13 D. Hervieu-Léger, Religion as a Chain of Memory (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2000), p. 81. 14 S. Bieleń, Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej (Warsaw: ASPRA-JR, 2006), p. 24. 15 Three main ideal types of religious organizations can be identified – sect, denomination and church. The term sect refers to a small exclusive group, most often with a confrontational attitude towards society and other religious formations; denomination can be defined as a homogenous group with decentralized structure, governed in a democratic way, characterized by conservatism, lack of openness, but also some stability and performing non-religious functions as well; church is the most institutionalized, hierarchized and aspiring to universalism (Piwowarski, Socjologia Religii, pp. 70–71). 16 Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p. 400. 17 According to the definition put forward by Wadim Cymburski, civilization is a geocultural community, which as a result of the historical process of self-identification perceives itself as the leading force of mankind (Основное Человечество) and shapes the geopolitical space in order to popularize this notion (В. Цымбурский, “Сколько цивилаций? (С Ламанским, Шпенглером и Тойнби над глобусом XXI века)” Pro et Contra 5/3 (2000), p. 174. 18 A. J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (London: Oxford University Press, 1949).

Notes 251 19 In his analyses Toynbee singled out five civilizations – Western (Catholic/Protestant), Orthodox, Islamic, Hindu and Chinese (ibid., pp. 154–6); Samuel Huntington included three more – Japanese, Latin-American and African (Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1997)). 20 A. T. Embree, Utopias in Conflict. Religion and Nationalism in Modern India (Berkeley: University of California Press,1990, p. 11). 21 Hervieu-Léger, Religion as a Chain of Memory, pp. 100–101. 22 P.L. Berger, “The Desecularisation of the World: A Global Overview”, in P.L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularisation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center & Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005). 23 Beyer, Religion and Globalization, pp. 152–64. Beyer cites the “theology of liberation” as an example of a pro-system religious tradition and the ayatollahs’ revolution in Iran as an anti-system one. See also P. Norris, and R. Inglehart, Sacrum and profanum. Religion and Politics Worldwide, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 24 The term “deprivatization” is understood by Casanova as a “dual, interrelated process of repoliticization of the private religious and moral spheres and renormativization of the public economic and political spheres” ( J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 5–6). 25 Ibid., pp. 111–12. 26 P. Michel, Polityka i religia. Wielka przemiana, Nomos, Kraków 2000, pp. 39. 27 G. Corm, Religia i polityka w XXI wieku, Dialog, Warszawa 2007, pp. 134. 28 E. Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 29 From G. Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 30 Sergey Filatov adopts a similar distinction: the Russian Orthodox Church influences Russian politics, bolstering the interests of its own corporation (activity of institutions) and propagating certain ideals, values (concepts) (С. Филатов, “Традиционные религии, ‘русская цивилизация’ и суверенная демокрация”, in А. Малашенко and С. Филатов (eds), Религия и конфликт (Москва: Московский Центр Карнеги, 2007), pp. 17–18). 31 “The religious factor is a definition of the functioning of religion and its institutions in the system of social, economic and political relations” (А.А. Нуруллаев, А.Ал. Нуруллаев, Религия и политика (Москва: КМК, 2006, p. 95). See also T. Dębowski (ed.), Problemy międzynarodowe w doktrynach społecznych religii Oficyna Wydawnicza Arboretum, Wrocław 2004. B. Grott (ed.), Religia chrześcijańska a idee polityczne Nomos, Kraków 1998.Hadden, Jeffrey K., Shupe, Anson ed., Prophetic Religions and Politics. Religion and the Political Order, New York (Paragon House) 1986. M. Kempy and G. Woroniecka (eds), Religia i kultura w globalizującym się świecie Nomos, Kraków 1999. Религия и политика на рубеже двух тысячелетий (Москва: Экслибрис-пресс, 2000. 32 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, p. 47. 33 R. Stark and W. S. Bainbridge, A Theory of Religion (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), p. 42. 34 W. Wysoczański and M. Pietrzak, Prawo kościołów i związków wyznaniowych nierzymskokatolickich w Polsce (Warsaw: ChAT, 1997), pp. 1–2. 35 А. В. Логинов, “Государственная политика и этноконфассиональные отношения (цивилизационный аспект)”, in М. Мчедлов (ed.), Вера. Этнос. Нация. Религиозный компонент этнического сознания (Москва: Культурная революция, 2007). pp. 142–3. See also: Е. Н. Салыгин, Теократическое государство Московский общественный научный фонд, Москва, 1999. 36 M. Pietraś and K. Piórko, “Podmioty transnarodowe”, in Marek Pietraś (ed.), Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Skłodowskiej-Curie, 2006), p. 140. See also: M. Pietrzak, Historia kształtowania się rozdziału kościoła i państwa, “Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne” 1976, nr 1. M. Pietrzak, Prawo wyznaniowe, PWN, Warszawa 1988. I. Borowik ed., Church – State Relations in

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41 42 43 44 45 46

Notes Central and Eastern Europe, Nomos, Kraków 1999. J. Krukowski, Kościół i państwo. Podstawy relacji prawnych, Wydanictwo Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 1993. G. Robbers ed., Państwo i Kościół w krajach Unii Europejskiej, Kolonia, Wrocław 2007. R. Sobański, Remigiusz, Kościół jako podmiot prawa: elementy eklezjologii prawnej, ATK, Warszawa 1983. R. Sobański, Teoria prawa kościelnego, ATK, Warszawa 1992. B. Hocking and M. Smith, Word Politics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p. 71. It is worth recalling the term “political theology”, introduced by Carl Schmitt (C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996). See also: H. Meier, Czym jest teologia polityczna? Wstępne uwagi na temat kontrowersyjnego pojęcia, “Teologia Polityczna” 2003–2004, nr 1). Anastasia Mitrofanova distinguishes “politicized religions” from “political religions” – secular ideologies which legitimize political decisions by invoking the supernatural. The term “political religion” was introduced by Eric Voegelin to describe the phenomenon of totalitarian ideologies, seeking to preserve national unity by giving politics a quasireligious dimension (A. V. Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy: Actors and Ideas (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2005), pp. 21–3; E. Voegelin, Lud Boży (Kraków: Znak, 1994); E. Voegelin, Nowa nauka polityki (Warsaw: Aletheia, 1992)). A term used by Jean Jacques Rousseau in his writings about the necessity of creating a religion of “public good” in order to strengthen the legitimization of the secular power. The term was then used by Bellah to describe the phenomenon of the religious character of the American public sphere R.N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America”, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 96 (1967), pp. 1–21. Bieleń, Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej, p. 25. Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy. Д. Е. Фурман and К. Каариайнен (eds), Религиозность в России в 90–е годы XX начале XXI века (Москва: Доклады Института Европы РАН, 2006), p. 47. Hervieu-Léger, Religion as a Chain of Memory, p. 93. Ibid., p. 134. See also I. Borowik, Odbudowanie pamięci: przemiany religijne w Środkowo-Wschodniej Europie po upadku komunizmu Nomos, Kraków 2000. V. E. Bonnell (ed.), Identities in Transition: Eastern Europe and Russia after the Collapse of Communism University of California, Los Angeles 1996. L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity Harvard University Press, London-Cambridge 1995. R. Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York 1959. I. Szlachcicowa (ed.), Religia – przenikanie – tożsamość. Szkice socjologiczne Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1998. R. Szporluk (ed.), National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia M.E. Sharpe, New York-London 1994. E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishing 2006.

1 Evolution of the role of religion in the history of the Russian state 1 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, pp. 94–5. 2 Larisa Andreyevna claims that the Byzantine model was forming under the influence of the Eastern despotisms, the Ptolemaic Egypt above all (Л. Андреева, Религия и власть в России (Москва: Ладомир, 2001), pp. 32–8). 3 According to the Sixth Novel of Justinian, the spiritual power of the Church (sacerdotium) and the secular power (imperium) are two blessings offered by the same God’s will, complementing each other in the single holy diarchy, meant for mutual accordance (symphony) (P. Evdokimov, Prawosławie (Warsaw: PAX, 2003), p. 34. 4 L. Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History (New York: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 14. 5 J. Keller, Prawosławie (Warsaw: Iskry, 1982), p. 13.

Notes 253 6 A. Znosko, Prawosławne prawo kościelne (Warsaw: ChAT, 1973–75), vol. 1, p. 50. 7 Mary B. Cunningham, “The Orthodox Church in Byzantium”, in A. Hastings (ed.), A World History of Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 67. 8 John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (New York, Fordham University Press, 1987), p. 54. 9 See M.B. Leszka, Rola duchowieństwa na dworze cesarzy wczesnobizantyjskich, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2000. See also T.E. Gregory, Historia Bizancjum, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2008. 10 Dimitri Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500–1453 (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), pp. 265–74. 11 It is important to distinguish between the traditions of the southern and northern (or north-eastern) Rus. The dynamically developing Novgorod in the north saw the formation of a different Orthodox culture, distinguished, among others, by a denial of the autocratic power of the prince, conferment of a sacral character on the institution of the rally and election of the bishop by the rally (the elected bishop performed the role of an arbiter at the rally gathering) (Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 84–5). 12 N.V. Riasanovsky, Russian Identities: A Historical Survey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 25–30. 13 Such opinions can be found in М. П. Мчедлов (ed.), Вера. Этнос. Нация. Религиозный компонент этнического сознания (Москва: Культурная революция, 2007), p. 125. 14 Princess Olga was baptized between 946 and 960 (954 or 957 are often given), but this event did not begin the Christianization of Rus. 15 For the resistance posed by the residents of Rus against forced Christianization, see A. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, 2 vols (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 2004–2005), vol. 1, pp. 68–70; Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 27–8; Андреева, Религия и власть в России, pp. 91–3. 16 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 63–4; Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, p. 192–3. 17 М. П. Мчедлов, О социальной концепции русского православия (Москва: Республика, 2002), p. 267. The Kievan princes also had no qualms about violating the canons, if the interest of the “throne” required it. Rus developed a custom of the prince electing the bishop (after consulting the sobor). From the twelfth century the rulers in Kiev gradually increased their control over the local ecclesiastical structures (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 86–7). 18 In reality “the high-minded decision abolishing the death penalty was not observed in practice. It was meted out for theft, robbery, arson, religious crimes” (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 94). 19 Мчедлов, Вера. Этнос. Нация, p. 122. 20 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 90. 21 О. Ю. Василева and Н. А. Трофимчук, История Религий в России (Москва: РАГС, 2004), p. 333. 22 J.H. Billington, Ikona i topór. Historia kultury rosyjskiej (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2008), p. 13. 23 N.V. Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 26. 24 For example, monk Theodosius, who contributed to the flourishing of the Kiev– Pechersk Lavra, considered the Catholic Church to be a hotbed of lies and called for a boycott of latinists (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 89). 25 Vladimir the Great married the Byzantine princess Anna Porphyrogenita (“born in the purple”), daughter of Emperor Romanus II. A second politically important marriage was the one between Yaroslav the Wise (Vsevolod I) and Anna, daughter of Constantin IX Monomachus, the future parents of the Kievan ruler Vladimir Monomachus. 26 Boris and Gleb were declared saints in 1072.

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27 The political character of the canonization of Boris and Gleb is evidenced, for example, by omission of the third brother, Svatoslav, also murdered by Sviatopolk in the fight for succession (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 74–5). 28 A hugely important factor for the development of the Slavic writings was Glagolitsa – an alphabet whose creation is attributed to St Cyril. It was subsequently modified, most likely by the students of St Methodius, and evolved into Cyrillic alphabet. The activity of both the missionaries from Thessaloniki contributed to the creation of Old Church Slavonic, which became the lingua franca of central and eastern Europe in the Middle Ages (Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, p. 139–41). 29 At the end of the tenth century, the Rossias (Россиас) Metropolis was established in Kiev (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 93). 30 The administrative suzerainty of Constantinople over the Kievan Metropolis before 1037 raises many controversies. Some historians, e.g. Andrzej Andrusiewicz, support the argument of Kiev’s dependence from the Bulgarian Metropolis in Ohrid; others, like Dimitri Obolensky, reject the “Ohrid option”, claiming that the Rus were subordinated to Constantinople from Vladimir’s baptism onwards (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 64; Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, p. 198). 31 “In 988–1240, out of 23 Kievan Metropolitans 19 were Greeks. They were frowned upon. They didn’t know the local language and their main activity was collecting levies and supplying income to the Patriarchate in Constantinople” (Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, p. 85). Lee Trepanier, writing about the same time period, mentions 2 Russian and 22 Greek patriarchs (L. Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History: Church, State, and the Quest for Order and Justice (New York: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 25). A credible example of the assumption of the position of metropolitan of Kiev by a Russian priest, Hilarion, took place in 1051 as a result of a choice made by local bishops at the urging of Yaroslav the Wise. Historians argue about whether the choice of Hilarion was ultimately approved by Constantinople, but a lack of such approval is certain in the case of the choice of Russian Metropolitan Kliment (from 1147) by Prince Izyaslav and the bishops. It was a conscious act of disobedience, aimed at the emancipation of the Kievan Church from the control of the Patriarch of Constantinople (Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, p. 227–8). 32 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 24. 33 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 79. 34 It is noteworthy that such a form of supporting the church was alien to the Byzantine tradition, but quite commonplace in the western Slavic states (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 95–9. 35 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 94. 36 According to various sources, there could have been 66 (E. E. Golubinskiy), 68 (A. W. Kartashev) or even 154 ( J. E. Vodarskiy) monasteries in the Russian lands in the XIII century (М.Ю. Смирнов, Российское общество между мифом и религией (Петербург: Издательство Петербургского Университета, 2006), pp. 62–3). 37 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 25. 38 Р. Г. Ланда, Ислам в истории России (Москва: Восточная Литература, 1995), pp. 49. 39 The commonly recognized period of Mongol rule in Russia. 40 L. Gumilow, Od Rusi do Rosji, PIW, Warszawa 2004. 41 In 1312 Uzbek khan adopted Islam in its Sunni version (hanafi school) and made it the official religion of the Golden Horde. Earlier, in the first half of the thirteenth century, Berke khan recognized the sovereignty of the Baghdad caliphate. 42 Historians point to 1250–67. 43 Galina M. Yemelianova, Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 20. 44 According to estimates, at the beginning of the fifteenth century one fifth of all the inhabited Russian lands belonged to the church (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 113).

Notes 255 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

Larisa Andriejewa dates it at 1263 (Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 100). Смирнов, Российское общество между мифом и религией, p. 64. Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 20. In the thirteenth century the church did not support anti-Mongol rebellions. Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 79. Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 30. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 139–40. Ланда, Ислам в истории России, p. 54. After the victory over the Serbs on Kosovo Field in 1389, Turkey extended its influence into a significant part of the Balkan Peninsula. Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 52. Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, pp. 31. Metropolitan Alexy won favours from Jenibek Khan after he miraculously brought back the eyesight of his wife Taidula (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 139). Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 109. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 140. Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, pp. 33. Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 20. Billington, Ikona i topór, pp. 46–8. Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 111. According to some estimates, in the Russian lands there were 140 monasteries in the fourteenth century, 205 in the fifteenth century, and as many as 409 a hundred years later (ibid., p. 110). Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 100. Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 47. Андреева, Религия и власть в России, pp. 98–104. According to Orthodox tradition, princes Roman of Ryazan and Vasilko of Rostov died because they refused to convert to Islam. Mikhail Chernikhovsky and his boyar Fyodor refused to bow to the khan. In reality, in most cases the khans, sentencing the Slavic princes to a “martyr’s death” were motivated first and foremost by political considerations (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 141–2). Experience in dealing with Islam was already gained by the rulers of the Kievan Rus, who maintained contacts with Khazars, Arabs and Crimean Bulgarians. Ланда, Ислам в истории России, pp. 63–4. Ibid., p. 72. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 135. It happened that marriages were contracted between members of the two confessions, but it was always connected with conversion of one of the spouses, e.g. in 1317 Prince Yury of Moscow took as his wife the khan’s sister, who converted to Christianity before the marriage. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 16. А.В. Логинов, “Государственная политика и этноконфассиональные отношения (цивилизационный аспект)”, in Мчедлов (ed.), Вера, этнос, нация, pp. 125–8. Ланда, Ислам в истории России, pp. 68–9. Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 53. Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 29. According to tradition, a ruler crowned by the emperor was entitled to the title Tsar (N.V. Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 66). Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, pp. 39. Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 66. B. Uspienski, Car i patriarcha. Charyzmat władzy w Rosji (Katowice: Śląsk,1999), pp. 15–17. Following the example of the Kievan ruler Vladimir Monomachus, during the coronation Ivan received a “life-giving” cross and crown (Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 51).

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83 Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 89. 84 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 342. 85 Borys Uspienski notes that in Rus, as in Byzantium, the object of sacralization was power understood in an abstract way, not a person exercising it, and that is why, for example, the process of sacralization did not eliminate assassination attempts on rulers. 86 The so-called “tsar’s words” (Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 59). 87 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 60. 88 Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 93. In the fifteenth century, 5 out of 11 metropolitans ceased to perform the function as a result of the monarchs’ policy. Out of 9 hierarchs elected to the position of the metropolitan during the rule of Ivan the Terrible, only 3 ended the service with natural death (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 119). 89 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 77. 90 Ibid., p. 78; L. Bazylow, Historia Rosji (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1985), pp. 152–3. 91 B. Uspienski, Car i bóg (Warsaw: PIW, 1992), pp. 29–33. 92 Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 115. 93 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 119. 94 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 61. 95 According to Andrzej Andrusiewicz, Ivan the Terrible “introduced the dogma of unlimited autocracy. This basic assumption explained why the tsar was responsible for sins committed not only by himself, but also by his subjects, which was connected with the belief that God punishes the whole country for the monarch’s sins. … Ivan IV believed that the first power redeems the soul, the other cares about the temporal good; humility should be an attribute of the first one, punishment and suppression – of the other” (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 342). 96 Billington, Ikona i topór, pp. 58. 97 In 1547–49 30 locally worshipped saints were inducted into the all-Russian pantheon (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 122–3. 98 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 38. 99 The Russian elites, convinced that the new patriarchate replaced the heretic Rome in the pentarchy system, pushed for a higher standing than it would have on the basis of chronology. “Under pressure from tsar Fyodor Ivanovich and after bribing Jeremias, the Patriarch of Moscow was recognized as the third in the hierarchy, after the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Alexandria, but before the Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem” (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 285). 100 Uspienski, Car i patriarcha, p. 15. 101 Billington, Ikona i topór, pp. 117–19. 102 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, pp. 75–6. 103 For the first time in the eastern Christian church, the “ecumenical” title was officially assumed by the patriarch of Constantinople, John the Faster, encouraged by Emperor Maurice. This decision of the patriarch’s was perceived as an insult by Pope Gregory VII, who insisted that only the bishop of Rome can use this title in the light of the canons. Up to the present day, the patriarch of Constantinople is called the Ecumenical Patriarch (S. Runciman, Teokracja bizantyjska [Katowice: Książnica, 2008], pp. 67–8). 104 The term “black” clergy refers to unmarried monks. Some of them had a positive attitude towards the reforms of the church contrary to most of the “white” clergy from the countryside, which expressed a fundamentalist position that was “a true reflection of conservatism and superstition” (Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 125). 105 At first, guided by the support from the “unacquisitive”, Ivan III confiscated some of the church lands, but he retracted his decision under pressure from the rest of the clergy. 106 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, pp. 41–4. 107 The sobor also granted the church courts exclusive judicial authority over the clergy, allowed bishops to participate in trials of laymen, established the position of protopope responsible for overseeing the “white” clergy and deacons, recommended setting up of

Notes 257

108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

118 119 120 121 122

123 124 125

126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134

schools for priests’ children at archdioceses and prohibited the faithful from contacting foreigners without the Church’s knowledge (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 150–51). A small leavened bun used for the Holy Communion in the Orthodox Church. T. Nasierowski, Świat rosyjskiej duchowości. Kościoły i ruchy dysydenckie a Cerkiew panująca (Warszawa: Neriton, 2005), pp. 31–5. At the beginning of 1656 Patriarch Macarius of Antioch, Serbian Archbishop Gavrilo and Nicene Metropolitan Gregory excommunicated the supporters of the two-finger sign of the cross (Nasierowski, Świat rosyjskiej duchowości, p. 34). In 1658 Nikon resigned as patriarch and went to the new Jerusalem monastery. Nine years later he was officially stripped of his priestly orders by the Great Moscow Sobor. In 1682, on the initiative of Tsar Fyodor, Nikon was posthumously rehabilitated. Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 125. The most important sects that appeared in Russia included strigolniki, Judaizers, Doukhobors, Molokans, Skoptsy and Khlysts. Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 111. Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 147–9. Monastyrski Prikaz was officially abolished in 1677 and then re-established by Peter I in 1701. The judicial immunity of the clergy was limited as early as the end of the fifteenth century. In Sudebnik issued during the reign of Ivan III in 1497, trials of priests before mixed courts were allowed if the other party was a layman and the catalogue of cases which church courts could consider was limited (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 124–5). Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 187–8. Ibid., p. 347. Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, pp. 36–7. A term for a Muslim. Kazan and Astrakhan Tatars who converted to Orthodoxy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were called starokreshchency (старокрещенцы, lit. those baptized before) as opposed to novokreshchency (новокрещенцы, lit. newly baptized ones) converts “recruited” in the eighteenth-century Christianization campaign in the Volga Region. A characteristic trait of the converted Tatar communities was syncretism, adherence to the Koran’s commands alongside the Bible’s directions and a phenomenon called otpadanijem, i.e. returning to Islam. Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 37. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 348–9. According to legend, after a huge fire in 1579 in Kazan the Virgin Mary appeared to a young girl and showed her the location of the icon, hidden by the khanate rulers. Guided by the revelation, the icon was found in the ruins of a burned down building, which was deemed a miracle. St Sergey attributed to Our Lady of Kazan the power of unification and salvation of the Russian nation. For example, it was believed that thanks to the intercession of Our Lady of Kazan the Poles could be driven out of the Kremlin in 1612. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 430. For example, in the eighteenth century 418 of 536 Kazan mosques existing at the time were destroyed as a result of another attempt at Christianization of the Volga Region (Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 39). Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 139. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 213. Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 103. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 453. Ibid., p. 371. Ibid., p. 450. The Siberian khanate fell in 1598 and the Orthodox metropolis was established in 1620 (ibid., p. 358).

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135 The hierarch of Lithuania used the title Metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia, which aroused protests of the bishops residing in Moscow) А. Карташев, История Русской Церкви (Москва: Эксмо, 2005), pp. 224–31). 136 From the twelfth century southern Rus became an object of rivalry between the two Christian churches. In the case of Halicz, Catholics gained a certain advantage over the Orthodox when Prince Daniel recognized the ecclesiastical suzerainty of pope Innocent IV. In 1320 John XXII appointed a bishop for the Russian Catholics, and in 1377 the Catholic Halicz Metropolis was established in Lvov (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 166–7). 137 R. G. Roberson, Chrześcijańskie Kościoły wschodnie (Kraków: Homini, 2005), p. 145. 138 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 440–41. 139 Roberson, Chrześcijańskie Kościoły wschodnie, p. 145. 140 From the conclusion of the Union of Brest to 1633 the Orthodox Church officially ceased to exist in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1619, at a secret meeting in Kiev–Lavra, a part of the Orthodox clergy illegally restored the hierarchy in the western Russian lands (Карташев, История Русской Церкви, p. 669). 141 Ibid., p. 442. 142 For example, the condition of converting to Orthodoxy was imposed on Vladislav IV. Princess Sophia Frederica Augusta, who ruled Russia as Catherine II, was baptized again according to the Greek rite. 143 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 348. 144 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 138. 145 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 76. 146 Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 64–5. 147 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 310. 148 According to legend, this characteristic headgear was instituted by St Peter and St Paul and Emperor Constantine the Great. 149 Uspienski, Car i patriarcha, pp. 62–6. 150 See N. Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome (London: MacMillan, 1937). 151 Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 71–2. 152 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 279–81. 153 Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, pp. 56–7. 154 Uspienski, Car i bóg, p. 28. 155 Ibid., p. 28. 156 It was definitely abolished in 1720. 157 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p. 51. 158 Андреева, Религия и власть в России, pp. 130. 159 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 167–9. 160 Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 81. 161 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p. 130. 162 Ibid., pp. 48–51. 163 The synod was divided into two departments: six archbishops sat on the first one, five laymen on the other. 164 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 171–2; Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 102. 165 An economic college established earlier by Peter III took over the lands together with almost 100,000 serfs living there. 225 monasteries, included in the official inventory, were divided into three classes. Depending on which class was granted, a monastery received appropriate financing. Monasteries omitted from the inventory were closed down (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 175). 166 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, pp. 129–30; Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 107. 167 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 178. 168 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 268.

Notes 259 169 For example, in 1769, after an excess of “vacant” clergymen was found, the senate sent uneducated children of Orthodox priests to serve in the military. In 1784 1540 deacons were sent from the central dioceses to the remote provinces and sons of priests were told to choose a place in the trade or craft (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 176). 170 Ibid., pp. 185–92. 171 In 1826, faced with the revolt of the Decembrists, the tsar sent metropolitans Seraphim (from Petersburg) and Eugene (from Kiev) to try to convince the rebels that by declaring disobedience to the ruler they were coming out against God (Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 177). 172 According to data, in the second half of the nineteenth century there were about 74 million people in the Russian Empire, including 70.8 per cent Orthodox, 8.9 per cent Catholics, 8.7 per cent Muslims (about 18 million), 5.2 per cent Protestants, 3.2 per cent Jews (about 5 million), 1.4 per cent schismatics, 0.7 per cent pagans, 0.3 per cent Greek Catholics, 0.3 per cent Armenian-rite Catholics and more than 160 thousand Buddhists (data for Transbaikal). Ethnically, Russians (together with Belarussians and Ukrainians) comprised 72.5 per cent of the population of the empire, Finns 6.6 per cent, Poles 6.3 per cent, Lithuanians 3.95 per cent, Jews 3.4 per cent, Tatars 1.9 per cent, Bashkirs 1.5 per cent, Germans 1.3 per cent, Moldovans 1.2 per cent, Kalmyks 1.1 per cent (M. Heller, Historia imperium rosyjskiego (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 2000), p. 611). 173 В. Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви. Синодальный и новейший периоды 1700–2005 (Москва: Издательство Сретенского Монастыря, 2006), pp. 28–9. 174 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p. 146. 175 In the first half of the thirteenth century, the Department of Conversion was established, responsible for carrying out, together with the church, another Christianization campaign in the Volga region, involving, among others, destruction of mosques (Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 39). 176 Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 98. 177 Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, pp. 43–4. 178 Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 98–9. 179 Ibid., pp. 55–71. 180 Ланда, Ислам в истории России, p. 134. 181 Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, pp. 72–5. 182 The sharia courts were supported by the Russian state mainly in central Asia, while in the Caucasus it was preferred to strengthen the adat courts in order to weaken the sharia institutions backing “holy war”. In 1868 the adat norms were codified, adapted to the Russian law, and the courts were allowed to consider some civil and criminal cases (ibid., p. 70). 183 Ланда, Ислам в истории России, p. 139. 184 Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 50. 185 Ibid., p. 64. 186 Buddhist monks from Tuva recognized the suzerainty of lamas from Tibet until 1944. 187 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 462–6. 188 The remaining “excess” monks were forced by the state to choose a secular profession. 189 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 467–8. 190 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p. 42. 191 The pope approved the Catherine II’s decision in 1784 (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 336–9). 192 Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 254. 193 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 338. 194 The shrine was closed in 1922 (ibid., pp. 334–5).

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195 In 1559 the first Lutheran pastor Timan Brakel (1535–1602) arrived in Russia (Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 377). 196 Ibid., pp. 384–5. 197 Ibid., p. 385. 198 Ibid., p. 387. 199 Ibid., p. 500. 200 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p.145. 201 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 503. 202 Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p. 146. 203 A Jewish recruit took an oath of allegiance to the emperor in a synagogue in the presence of a Christian. 204 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 507–10. 205 Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 70. 206 An event of extraordinary importance, which Peter I himself attended, was the solemn baptism of Taishin – the grandson of Kalmuk Khan Ayuka (Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 97). 207 In 1740 the commission was renamed the Office of the Newly Baptized (ibid., p. 99). 208 Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 44. 209 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 268. 210 Ibid., p. 269. 211 Ibid., p. 270. 212 A mocking campaign aimed at the Orthodox clergy was initiated by Peter I who in 1717 appointed a “liar-patriarch” (шутовской патриарх) in Petersburg, convened a “drunk sobor” and sponsored an iconoclastic carnival. 213 Uspienski, Car i bóg, p. 68. 214 Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 241. 215 A custom developed that the monarch appointed to the position of bishop one of three candidates presented by the synod (Uspienski, Car i bóg, p. 67). 216 Ibid., pp. 71–90. 217 Ibid., p. 113. 218 The crisis, which marred the relations between the official Orthodox Church and the faithful, manifested itself mainly in the increasingly common phenomenon of odpadanija from the faith of the ancestors. 219 Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 131; Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p. 43. 220 A. Walicki, Zarys myśli rosyjskiej. Od oświecenia do renesansu religijno-filozoficznego (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2005), p. 183; Billington, Ikona i topór, pp. 262–4; Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, pp. 133–9. 221 Walicki, Zarys myśli rosyjskiej, p. 115; Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 247. 222 In the view of S. Choruży, there is another profound difference between Slavophilism and Eurasianism. For older Slavophiles, Orthodoxy was a creative act of striving for God. Eurasians, however, expressed Orthodoxy mainly in material (geographical) and cultural terms, thus giving it the character of a local or tribal cult (R. Paradowski, Eurazjatyckie imperium Rosji. Studium idei (Warsaw: Elipsa, 2003), pp. 51–2. See also: V. Clementis, Panslavism. Past and Present, Williams Lea, London 1943. A. Walicki, W kręgu konserwatywnej utopii. Struktura i przemiany rosyjskiego słowianofilstwa, PWN, Warszawa 2002. 223 Walicki, Zarys myśli rosyjskiej, pp. 344–5. 224 This empire would encompass – besides the territory of Russia (from 1869) – Austrian Galicia, northern Bukovina, the Ukrainian part of the Carpathians which then belonged to Hungary, the Czech Kingdom, Moravia, Slovakia, present-day Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, northern Albania, Vojvodina, Hungarian Banat, Istria, Trieste, Gradishche, Carniola, one fifth of Austrian Styria

Notes 261

225

226 227 228 229 230

231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240

241

242 243 244 245 246 247 248

249 250

and two thirds of Carinthia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania with Austrian Bukovina, half of Hungarian Transylvania, Greek Tesalia and Epirus, Crete, Rhodes, Cyprus and the shore of Anatolia all the way to the Aegean Sea (H. Kohn, Pan-slavism: Its History and Ideology (New York: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960), pp. 200–201)). M. Danilewski, “Rossija i Jewropa. Wzglad na kulturnyje i politiczeskije otnoszenija slawianskiego mira k giermano-romanskomu”, in L. Kiejzik (ed.), Niemarksistowska filozofia rosyjska. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych XIX i pierwszej połowy XX wieku, vol. 1 (Łódź: Ibidem Verlag, 2002), p. 144. Ibid. The main ideologue of pan-Islamism in the nineteenth century was Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani. Ланда, Ислам в истории России, pp. 120–21. Ibid., p.149. The anathema imposed by the church did not stop Alexander I from awarding Napoleon the order of St Andrew in Tilsit in 1807 (Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, pp. 266). In exchange for the protection of Providence, in 1817 the Russian rulers commissioned the construction of the Temple of Christ the Savior in Moscow as an act of thanksgiving. Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 263. Heller, Historia imperium rosyjskiego, pp. 520–21. Ланда, Ислам в истории России, p. 104. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p. 241. Ibid., p. 327. Nicholas I is said to have tried to convince the Turkish sultan that the Russo-Turkish conflicts would stop as soon as the sultan adopted Orthodoxy (Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 136). Ланда, Ислам в истории России, p. 101. Православное миссионерское общество (Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 185). Общество восстановления православного христианства на Кавказе (ibid., p. 179). It needs to be admitted, however, that the translation activity of friars sent to heretics, who translated catechisms, the Gospels and liturgical texts into languages of ethnic minorities was also an impulse for the development of identities of particular ethnicities. Missionaries were often the first authors of texts written in local languages; for example, such was the case with the inhabitants of Kamchatka, Kalmykia and Altai. The first Orthodox mission was sent to Kamchatka in the beginning of the eighteenth century, in 1705. Twenty years later, the task of evangelization of Kalmyks was entrusted by the synod to monk Nicodem. In 1830 a mission was established in the Altai region (Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 33, 100, 189). In Kazan, masses in the Tatar language were held since 1869 (ibid., p. 186). The rulers of the Kingdom of Iberia, situated in eastern Georgia, in 337 declared Christianity the official religion of their country. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 2, p. 125. The first exarch was a Russified Georgian, Arlaam. Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 177–8. In March 1917 the Georgian clergy and laity, against the Russian hierarchs, announced the restoration of autocephaly, and a year later they chose a katolikos (Roberson, Chrześcijańskie Kościoły wschodnie, p. 86). In the book of Genesis, God in the form of three angels appeared to Abraham and Sarah exactly by the Oak of Mamre. The scene is depicted in the Andrey Rublev’s icon “The Holy Trinity”. According to legend, when the old Oak of Mamre sprouts, the Christian world will unify. Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 291–3. Andrusiewicz, Cywilizacja rosyjska, vol. 1, p. 426.

262 251 252 253 254 255

256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264

265 266 267 268 269 270 271

272 273 274 275 276 277 278

Notes Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 103. Ibid., p. 312. Ibid., pp. 314–15. Ibid., pp. 190–94. A similar division also arose in the Muslim community, where two camps formed: Jadidists supporting modernization and conservative Qadimists, dominating the structures of the muftiates. The division into Jadidists (linked to Ismail Gasprinski) and Qadimists emerged during a dispute over a reform of Tatar language education. Gasprinski proposed phonetization of reading rather than learning pasuses by heart in Arabic. It is worth emphasizing that none of the communities challenged Russia’s suzerainty over the Tatars (Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, pp. 75–7). Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 201–11. Андреева, Религия и власть в России, p. 230. Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 141; Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 362–80. Народный комиссариат, people’s commissar. Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 375–6. Ibid., p. 441. Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 229; see also M. Bourdeaux, Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church Today (London: MacMillan, 1969). Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 103. A similar move, involving the infiltration of communities of believers by forcing the clergy to increase the participation of laymen in community decision making, was later made by the Soviet authorities towards the Orthodox Church. In July 1964 Patriarch Alexy I confirmed the subordination of the communities to local authorities, agreeing to allow parishes to be administered by believers, not priests (Trepanier, Political Symbols in Russian History, p. 147). Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 481–2. Ibid., p. 513. Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 378. The memorandum was issued to the faithful by three hierarchs – Sergey, metropolitan of Vladimir, Eudoxius, archbishop of Nizhny Novgorod and Seraphim, archbishop of Kostroma (ibid., p. 391). See M. Maszkiewicz, Mistyka i rewolucja. Aleksander Wwiedeński i jego koncepcja roli Cerkwi w państwie komunistycznym (Kraków: Nomos, 1995). Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 392–3. Also among the participants of the “sobor of obnovlentsy” were tikhonovtsy, or representatives of Orthodox circles which were not enthusiastic towards the reformist demands of obnovlentsy, but cooperated with them for various reasons (see C. Lane, Christian Religion in the Soviet Union (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978)). Tikhon was freed in the summer of 1923 (Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 394–5). Ibid., p. 413; see also Pospielovsky, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 2 vols (Crestwood, New York: St. Valdimir’s Seminary Press, 1984), vol. 1. Ibid., p. 363. Ibid., p. 473. Ibid., pp. 365–7. Ibid., p. 379. Vasil Lipkivski and the other clergymen were ordained as bishops by the then priests and laymen who placed hands on them. The non-canonical character of this ordination is one of the main arguments against the legality of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Roberson, Chrześcijańskie Kościoły wschodnie, p, 146).

Notes 263 279 280 281 282

283 284

285

286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295

296 297 298

299 300 301 302 303

Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 379. Ibid., pp. 456–9. Ibid., p. 496. After the loss of Kiev to Russia in 1686, the commonwealth was left without an Orthodox metropolis. According to the 1686 Grzymultowski Treaty, the Orthodox Church in Poland was subordinated to the metropolitan of Kiev, who a year earlier recognized suzerainty of Moscow (M. Bendza, “Autokefalia Kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce”, Elpis 7–8 (2003), pp. 115–43). Ibid., p. 117. Many of them later joined the ROC Outside Russia. Currently the Belarussian Autocephalous Church exists only in the diaspora and has not been recognized by any of the canonical Orthodox churches (Roberson, Chrześcijańskie Kościoły wschodnie, p. 149). Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 494. See also R. Dzwonkowski, Kościół katolicki w ZSRR 1917–1939. Zarys historii, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 1997. A. Grajewski, Kompleks Judasza. Kościół zraniony: chrześcijanie w Europie ŚrodkowoWschodniej między oporem a kolaboracją, W drodze, Poznań 1999. M. Mróz, Z dziejów rosyjskiego katolicyzmu. Kościół grekokatolicki w Rosji w latach 1907–2007, Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2008. Roberson, Chrześcijańskie Kościoły wschodnie, pp. 123–4. The Bolsheviks did not want a deterioration in the relations with the Vatican, which could prove useful in overcoming the diplomatic isolation of the USSR in the international arena. Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 104. Such a state of affairs continued until the 1980s. Pospielovsky, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, vol. 1, p. 39. Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 397–8. See Я. Н. Щапов, ed., Русская Православная Церковь и коммунистическое государство 1917–1941. Документы и фотоматериалы, Библейскобогословский институт святого апостола Андрея, Москва 1996. Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 416–17. Ibid., p. 423. The Catacomb Church was made up of small, scattered communities, which often met in the priest’s absence at illegal masses held in private apartments. The catacomb communities emerged mainly in the deportation areas – Siberia, the Caucasus or the Far East. Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, pp. 222–8. Stalin stated that the use of the word Rus rather than Russia reflected the unity of eastern Slavs – the Rus people (Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 462–5). Metropolitan Sergey, who acted as head of the Russian church from 1926, died eight months after the official enthronement to the position of the patriarch in May 1944. The newly elected patriarch addressed the faithful in December 1942 and called for a fund raising effort to rearm the Dmitry Donskoi tank brigade. In response to Sergey’s call, 8 million roubles were raised. Cannons purchased from this fund are currently on display in the Moscow monastery of St Dmitry (ibid., pp. 451–2). Ibid., pp. 476–77. Alexy was one of three hierarchs who took part in the meeting at the Kremlin on 4 September 1942. As patriarch, Alexy again talked with Stalin in April 1945 (ibid., p. 490). Georgiy Karpov performed his function until 1960. Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 743. Pospielovsky, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, vol. 1, p. 302.

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304 Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 121. 305 Василева and Трофимчук, История Религий в России, p. 235. 306 In the recommendation included in the secret instruction, one can see an analogy with the policy of Peter the Great who reformed the church “with the hands of the clergy itself” (ibid., p. 237). 307 Pospielovsky, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, vol. 2, p. 357. 308 Interestingly, of seven new churches, four were built in Siberia and the Far East, which Pospielovsky explains as due to Soviets’ growing concern about China’s potential threat. The ROC was to help to support nationalistic sentiments among the population of the Far East frontier (ibid., p. 405). 309 Ibid., pp. 355–7. 310 J. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church. Conformity and Dissident (London: Overseas Publications Interchange, 1990). 311 Ibid., p. 447. 312 Those who were denied the right to emigrate to Israel. 313 М. Кенигштейн (ed.), “Русское” лицо Израиля: Черты социального портрета (Москва: Гешарит – Мосты культуры, 2007), p. 473. 314 For the limited role of communities of Buddhists and Protestants in the foreign Policy of the USRR, see W.C. Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy 1945–1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 81–101. 315 Ibid., pp. 8. 316 Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 503. 317 Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 5. 318 A. B. Ulam, Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective. Nationalism, Panslavism, Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 56. 319 Between 8 and 15 December the capital of Yugoslavia celebrated the victory of the Slavs over the Germans, with the highest glory attributed to “the bravest Slavic nations”, the Russians and the Serbs. The meeting was for the first time attended by Slavs from outside Europe: the USA, Canada, South America, Australia and New Zealand. The delegates to the congress created the Slavic Committee composed of representatives of five countries – Yugoslavia, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Belgrade was chosen to be the seat of the committee (Kohn, Pan-slavism, pp. 305–6). 320 The use of the idea of “Slavic solidarity” in the policy of the USSR came to an end with the conflict between Stalin and Tito and the resulting crisis in Soviet–Yugoslav relations. In March 1948 the Tito’s policy was condemned by Moscow, with the other socialist capitals following suit. It was typical to call Yugoslavia a “Judas of the Slavic world”, which thus took over the role of Poland in the time of the tsarist empire. As early as 1950 hardly anyone invoked the Slavic bonds. 321 Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 17. 322 Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 491–2. 323 Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 18. 324 Ibid., p. 27. 325 О.Л. Цеприцкая, Взаимодействие Русской Православной Церкви и российского государства в мировом сообществе (Петербург: Издательство Петербургсого Университета, 2006), p. 69. 326 Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 26–7. 327 Pospielovsky, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, vol. 2, p. 311. 328 Ibid., p. 21. 329 Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 112. 330 Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 20–21. 331 Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, pp. 520–39. 332 Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 71.

Notes 265 333 Yemelianova, Russia and Islam, p. 127. The press of the USSR would criticize the Chinese Communists for persecuting religion in Tibet (Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 63). 334 Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 75–6. 335 Ibid., pp. 30–32. 336 Ibid., p. 32. 337 Ibid., pp. 39–56. 338 Ibid., p. 80. 339 Ibid., pp. 106–16. 340 Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 520. 341 At first a loose association of churches, in 1964 the CEC was transformed into an organization of ecumenical cooperation. 342 Keller, Prawosławie, p. 253. 343 Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 519. 344 Ibid., p. 525. 345 Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 58–9. 346 Pospielovsky, The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, vol. 2, pp. 445–7. See also R. Imos, Wiara człowieka radzieckiego, Nomos, Kraków 2006. 347 Alexey Stakhanov (1906–77) became famous for exceeding his quota by 1475 per cent during one shift in 1935: he mined 102m3 of coal. 348 Billington, Ikona i topór, p. 505. 349 J. Bratkiewicz, Zapętlenia modernizacji, p. 77. 350 According to Riasanovsky, the totalitarian system of invigilation and repression emerged in Russia long before the October Revolution, during the rule of Emperor Nicolas I (Riasanovsky, Russian Identities, p. 153). 351 The proximity in Serb Orthodoxy of the ethos of the monk and the warrior, who should lead an ascetic and virtuous life despite being forced to kill, is described by Ivan Čolović (Polityka symboli. Eseje o antropologii politycznej (Kraków: Universitas, 2001), pp. 61–70. 352 P. Froese, The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularisation (Berkeley: University of Californian Press, 2008), p. 126. 353 Ibid., p. 138. 354 Цыпин, История Русской Православной Церкви, p. 574. 355 Ibid., p. 654. 2 Religion in the social and political life of the Russian Federation 1 The typology of religious attitudes developed by G. Le Bras was indeed a result of observation of religious practices (I. Borowik, “Religijność jako jeden z wymiarów życia religijnego”, in I. Borowik (ed.), Religia a życie codzienne (Kraków: Nomos, 1991), p. 51). 2 On religiosity in post-socialistic societies, see also: I. Borowik, M. LibiszowskaŻółtkowska, J. Doktór, ed., Oblicza religii i religijności, Nomos, Kraków 2008. I. Borowik, Irena, G. Babiński ed., New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, Nomos, Kraków 1997. I. Borowik, Irena, T. Doktór ed., Pluralizm religijny i moralny w Polsce. Raport z badań, Nomos Kraków 2001. I. Borowik, Irena, A. Szyjewski, Andrzej ed., Religie i Kościoły w społeczeństwach postkomunistycznych, Nomos, Kraków 1993. 3 Religion enjoyed the most interest among young people. “Believers” constituted 45 per cent of the 16–17 age group in 1992 (K. Behrens, Die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche: Segen für die neuen Zaren? Religion und Politik im postsowjetischen Russland (1991–2000) (Munich: Schöningh, 2000), p. 113. See also B.V. Dubin, Religion, the Church, and Public Opinion, “Russian Social Science Review” 1998, vol. 39, nr 6. A. Need, E. Geoffrey, Analysing patterns of religious participation in postcommunist Eastern Europe, “British Journal of Sociology” 2001, vol. 52, nr 2.

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4 Левада-Центр провел исследования религиозности россиян, , 9 Oct. 2008. 5 Levada Center Report (2008). 6 Levada Center Report (2007). 7 For the religiosity of Russian Muslims, see М. Тарусин, Исследование “Религия и общество” (Москва: Институт общественного проектирования, отдел социологии, 2005), , 18 Sept. 2008. 8 Н. Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь: современное состояние и актуальные проблемы (Москва: Новое литературное обозрение, 2004), p. 39. 9 Five practices were studied: attending church/confession, taking the Eucharist, reading the Gospels, prayer, observing fasts (Согласно социологическим исследованиям доля воцерковленных россиян составляет 34 per cent , 24 Sept. 2008). 10 For comment on the results of the research, see С. Минин, Полувоцерковленные как  немного беременные, “Независимая газета” , 2 June 2008. 11 The most populous ethnic groups professing Islam in Russia include Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, Avars, Azeris, Kabardins, Kumyks, Ingush and Lezgins (A.D. Krindatch, “Religion, Public Life and the State in Putin’s Russia”, Religion in Eastern Europe 26 (2006), pp. 37–8. 12 M. Smirnov describes Russian Orthodoxy as a “religious and mythological phenomenon” (М.Ю. Смирнов, Российское общество между мифом и религией, p. 113). 13 M. Mchedlov, “The Religious Component of Ethnic Awarness”, Russian Politics and Law 43 (2005), pp. 83–88. 14 Муфтий Татарстана против перехода русских в ислам , 24 Sept. 2008. 15 Asked about his religious philosophy, Alexander Lukashenka replied that he was an Orthodox atheist. 16 M. Mchedlov, The Religious Component of Ethnic Awarness, “Russian Politics and Law” 2005, vol. 43, No. 2, p. 83. 17 According to the research, 21 per cent of respondents believe in God, although doubting at times, and 32 per cent “believe and do not doubt” (Левада-Центр провел исследования религиозности россиян). 18 Д. Фурман and К. Каариайнен, Религиозность в России в 90-е годы XX начале XXI века (Москва: Доклады Института Европы РАН, 2006), no. 173. 19 Almost half of atheists celebrate Christmas and Easter (Mchedlov, “The Religious Component of Ethnic Awarness”, p. 84). 20 М. Поздняев, “Святая диверсантка. Зое Космодемьянской опять ставят памятники и даже предлагают ее канонизировать”, Новые Известия (17 Sept. 2008) , 7 Oct. 2008. 21 According to Russian propaganda, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya (1923–41) joined a partisan unit in the first days of the Third Reich’s invasion on the USSR. In November 1941 she was captured by the Nazis who hanged her in a public execution after a brutal interrogation (the Nazis allegedly carved a star-shape into her breasts). In 1942 Zoya was posthumously honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 22 Pavlik Morozov (1918–32) made his way into the history books after he reported to the authorities a planned peasant plot with that involved his father. According to the official version, Pavlik was then murdered in revenge by his own grandfather. 23 Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, pp. 39–41. 24 Б. Дубин, “ ‘Легкое Бремя’. Массовое православие в России 1900-2000-х годов”, in К. Руссел and А. Агаджанян (ed.), Религиозные практики в современной России (Москва: Новое, 2006), pp. 70–72. 25 Ibid., p. 78.

Notes 267 26 Religion played a very important part in the lives of 6 per cent of the respondents (, 22 Sept. 2008.) 27 Ibid. 28 According to data for 2007, 45 per cent backed teaching the basics of religion in schools, and 41 per cent were against (ibid.). 29 In a 2006 survey, the church, with a result of 4 per cent, overtook the media and the workplace (47 per cent россиян выступают за усиление влияния Церкви , 9 Oct. 2008). 30 Дедовщина – “болезнь” армейской системы , 5 June 2011). 31 Data for 2007: 7 per cent of respondents strongly suport the ROC’s influence on state decisions, 6 per cent believe that decision makers should be guided by their own religious convictions, 8 per cent agree to granting the Orthodox a special status in the Russian Federation, 14 per cent declare willingness to pay tax (47 per cent россиян выступают за усиление влияния Церкви). 32 Levada Centre, Религия и церковь , 6 June 2011. 33 С. Минин, “Вторые после президента”, Независимая газета , 18 Apr. 2007. 34 The first five places, starting with the leader, were taken by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, Sergey Shoygu, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Gennady Zyuganov (Февральские рейтинги одобрения и доверия , 7 June 2011). 35 Епархиальные архиереи занимают четвертое место в рейтинге политического влияния , 24 Sept. 2008). 36 Мнение россиян о принципах отношений между государством и РПЦ (по данным опроса ВЦОМа) , 24 Sept. 2008. 37 С. Бурьянов, Фактор отношений государства с религиозными объединениями накануне и в ходе выборов и депутатов Госдумы РФ 2003 года , 22 Sept. 2008. 38 Data for 2005: 41 per cent of the people attending a mass at least once a month believe that Russia will be saved by strong state power, 23 per cent claim that God will do it (Тарусин, Исследование “Религия и общество”). 39 A distinction between a church and a “religious association” in Polish religious law is not found in the Russian law. Article 14 of the Russian Constitution uses the term “religious association” to describe every possible religious institution. In order to avoid repetitions, the following terms will be used interchangeably: “religious association”, “religious institution”, “confessional institution”, “religious organization”, “confessional organization”. 40 D. H. Davis, “Russia’s New Law on Religion: Progress or Regress?”, Journal of Church and State 39 (1997), pp. 645–655. See also A. Verkhovsky, O. Sibireva, Restrictions and Challenges in 2007 on Freedom of Conscience in Russia , 24 Oct. 2008. А. Малашенко, С. Филатов, ed., Дватцать лет религиозной свободы в России, Московский Центр Карнеги РОССПЭН, Mосква 2009. 41 Andrzej Kubik, Konstytucja Federacji Rosyjskiej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2000), p. 43. 42 The text of the law is available at , 4 Jan. 2007. 43 Kubik, Konstytucja Federacji Rosyjskiej, p. 44. 44 The statutory definition of a religious association is “a voluntary association of citizens of the Russian Federation or other subjects permanently and legally residing on the RF territory, established for the purpose of common profession and spread of faith, posessing

268

45 46 47 48

49 50 51

52 53 54 55

56

57 58 59

60 61

Notes features corresponding to these goals: religion, holding of worship services, other rites and religious ceremonies, teaching of religion and religious education of its faithful” (Law on Freedom of Worship and Religious Associations, 26 Sept. 1997, Art. 6.1). Ibid., Art. 7.1. Membership of at least ten citizens is required to set up a local religious organization (ibid., Art. 9.1). A centralized religious organization can be set up for a minimum of three local organizations (ibid., Art. 9.2). Local and centralized organizations, which exist in the territory of only one subject of the federation, are registered by the judicial organs of the subject. In turn, centralized organizations which operate on the territories of two or more subjects are registered by the judicial organs of the federation (ibid., Art. 11.2. i 3). Ibid., Art. 13. In the case of Buddhism, only the Gelug school is recognized as a traditional Russian religion. In the preamble, the lawmakers added Christianity and “other religions” when specifying the four religions. But due to the lack of a list of confessions and given the fact that Orthodoxy is a Christian religion, it is difficult to find a convincing interpretation of this expression (M. Bourdeaux, “Religion Revives in All Its Variety: Russia’s Regions Today”, Religion, State and Society 28 (2000), p. 11). According to the ROC, “Christianity” in the preamble refers to the Armenian–Gregorian Church (Мчедлов, О социальной концепций русского православия, p. 110). Law on Freedom of Worship and Religious Associations, 26 Sept. 1997, Art. 8.5. Ibid., Art. 9.1. , 8 Jan. 2007). The protest included the Baptist Union, the Union of Pentecostals, the Union of Adventists of the Seventh Day, the Union of Council for Soviet Jews, the Catholic Church, the Free Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, Old Believers as well as American Congressmen and EU representatives (Davis, “Russia’s New Law on Religion”, p. 647). The requirement of a 15-year period of existence of legal structures affects even the confessions that have been present in Russia for several hundred years, due to the simple reason that in the USSR most religious associations were banned or severely restricted, such as Methodists, Lutherans, Baptists, Greek Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and even the Catholic Church which had only two churches in the USSR. The defenders of the controversial regulation argue that the associations which do not meet the requirements of registration can still use the formula for a religious group (not subject to registration). However, only a religious organization can maintain international relations and bring in foreigners to carry out religious activities (Law on Freedom of Worship and Religious Associations, 26 Sept. 1997, Art. 20), which is of huge importance for the confessions whose clergymen are mostly foreigners. Резолюция ВРНС “О преподавании Основ православной культуры в школе” (7 marca 2007 r.) , 25 Sept. 2008). Among those who spoke out against singling out “traditional religions” were Mikhail Mchedlov, director of the Institute of Religion and Law Anatoly Pchelintsev, expert on religious affairs, Sergey Ivanenko. The draft was compiled by experts from the Ministry of Justice, represented by Vladimir Zhbankov and workers from the Institute for State-Confessional Relations led by Igor Ponkin (Александр Верховский, Беспокойное соседство: русская Православная Церковь и путинское государство (2003) , 17 Nov. 2006). Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, p. 279. Both deputies in 2001 represented the “Party of Russian Regions” (С. Бурьянов, Свобода совести. Отношения государства с религиозными объединениями

Notes 269

62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74

75 76

, 17 Nov. 2006; С. Петров, Религиозные организации и законотворческий процесс в России , 17 Nov. 2006. The proponents do not agree on the list of “traditional religions”: some propose omitting Judaism, voices are also raised in favour of marking out Orthodoxy as a “traditional religion” in the whole territory of the federation. On the other hand, the two remaining religions – Islam and Buddhism – would be entitled to this status only in regions dominated by their believers (Glazev) or according to a criterion of “age and strength”, that is a requirement of the existence of a given confessional organization in the territory of the Russian state for at least 50 years and a million faithful (Chuyev) (Верховский, Беспокойное соседство). А. Верховский, Границы секуларности государства в России: правовые нормы и споры об их интерпретации , 24 Sept. 2008. А. Петров, Кому нужен этот договор? , 1 Feb. 2007. The term is used in Russian science to refer to the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (10 Jan. 2000). The law triggered a lively debate due to a wide definition of “extremist activity”. Krindatch, “Religion, Public Life and the State in Putin’s Russia”, p. 40. С. Медведко, Религиозная ситуация и законодательство в сфере государственноконфессиональных отношений в России , 18 Nov. 2006. А. Верховский, Минюст предлагает резко ограничит возможности миссионерства , 22 Sept. 2008. In mid-October of 2008, the Ministry of Justice made public a list of 56 confessional organizations whose state registration was to be revoked due to a failure to submit the required documents. The list of the organizations is available at , 23 Sept. 2008. Д. Медведев считает необходимым создать особый механизм предоставления российского гражданства религиозными деятелями , 24 Sept. 2008. Курские законодатели внесли в Госдуму законопроект, упрощающий ликвидацию организаций, обвиненных в экстремизме , 24 Sept. 2008. Курганские парламентарии предлагают ужесточить противосектанское законодательство , 24 Sept. 2008. Госдума отклонила законопроект об ужесточение ответственности за преступления против священников , 9 Oct. 2008. The initiative to restore the Julian calendar was put forward two years earlier by Sergey Baburin (the Rodina party) (Госдума отклонила законопроект о переходе на юлианский календарь , 24 Sept. 2008; С. Бабурин предложил перейти на юлианский календарь , 24 Sept. 2008). Mikhail Mchedlov proposes creating a Russian “confessional model” as a “priority partnership between the state and the traditional religions” (Мчедлов, Вера. Этнос. Нация, p. 143). The council is a consultative body. Since August 2008, its chairman has been Sergey Naryshkin who replaced Sergey Sobyanin (2005–2008) – the successor to Dmitri Medvedev (2003–2005). Besides the chairman, the council is made up of representatives of academic circles, Orthodoxy (the ROC and Old Believers), Islam, Buddhism,

270

77

78 79 80 81 82 83 84

85 86

87 88 89 90 91 92 93

94 95

Notes Judaism, the Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church, as well as the Protestant communities (Pentecostals, Evangelists, Baptists and Adventists) (, 26 Sept. 2008). The members of the council included representatives of the Traditional Buddhist Sangha, Council of Muftis and the ROC (Религиозные деятели вошли в состав Общественного совета при ФРС , 24 Sept. 2008). More about the particular bodies at , 28 Sept. 2008. Exactly 22,965 confessional organizations. Медведко, Религиозная ситуация и законодательство в сфере государственноконфессиональных отношений в России. The list of the registered organizations can be found at , 15 Oct. 2008. Russia: International Religious Freedom Report 2007 , 15 Oct. 2008. По данным британских ученых, за последние 20 лет число мусульман в России выросло на 40 процентов , 24 Sept. 2008. Статистические данные о состоянии РПЦ , 24 Sept. 2008. The Russian Old Orthodox Church has a total of 260 parishes on the former Soviet territory, comprising of 1–1.5 million faithful (Отношения РПЦ со старообрядцами должны улучшатся – митрополит Кирилл , 7 Oct. 2008). Ibid. Data for 2004 (О составе и количестве религиозных организаций и пред ставительств иностранных религиозных организаций, содержащихся в реестре Министерства юстиции Российской Федерации , 27 Oct. 2008). D. L. Schlafly, Roman Catholicism in Today’s Russia: The Troubled Heritage, “Journal of Church and State” 1997, vol. 39. No. 10. S. Filatov, “Protestantism in Postsoviet Russia: An Unacknowledged Triumph”, Religion, State and Society 28 (2000), pp. 93–104. F. Corley, Unsuccessful Orthodoxy in Russian Heartlands, “Religion, State and Society” 2000, vol. 28, No. 1. Ibid., p. 96. G. Stricker, “Lutherans in Russia since 1990”, Religion, State and Society 29 (2001), pp. 106–10. В России учреждена новая лютеранская юрисдикция , 24 Sept. 2008. At the beginning of the 1990s, Arvo Survo succeeded in reviving the Church of Ingria under the supremacy of the Estonian church. The new community became increasingly independent of Riga, establishing close cooperation with the Lutheran Church of Missouri. The Church of Ingria carries out missionary activity not only in Karelia, but also among the Finno-Ugric peoples of the Volga Region – Mordvins, Udmurts, Mari, Komi (S. Filatov and A. Stepina, “Lutheranism in Russia: Amidst Protestantism, Orthodoxy and Catholicism”, Religion, State and Society 31 (2003), p. 373; Filatov, “Protestantism in Postsoviet Russia”, p. 99). The Biblical Lutheran Church is active mainly in Siberia, it is canonically connected with the Estonian Lutheran Church, but also enjoys financial suport from the Lutheran Church of Missouri (Filatov and Stepina, “Lutheranism in Russia”, p. 380). Among the Lutheran communities in Russia, only the Russian United Methodist Church (legalized in 1992) takes a liberal position toward homosexuals.

Notes 271 96 The role of an institution integrating the independent muftiates created in the Volga Region and Siberia was played by the Higher Coordinating Centre of Muslims of Russia (Высший координационный центр мусульман России, ВКЦ), established in 1992, whose chairmanship went in 1995 to Mufti Nafigulla Ashirov (М. Бурдо and С. Филатов (eds), Современная религиозная жизнь в России, 4 vols (Москва: Логос, 2003–2006), vol. 2, p. 93. 97 Р. Силантьев опубликовал данные о количестве зарегистрированных мусульманских общин в России , 24 Sept. 2008. 98 ЦДУМР is another incarnation of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the European part of Russia and Siberia (ДУМЕС), whose name was changed, first in 1994 to the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and the European Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Центральное духовное управление мусульман России и Европейских стран СНГ), and then in 2000 to the current name, the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia (Бурдо and Филатов (eds), Современная религиозная жизнь Росси, vol. 3, p. 84). 99 The Council of Muftis of Russia was established in 1996 as a counterbalance to the Higher Coordinating Centre of Muslims of Russia (Высший координационный центр мусульман России, ВКЦ), operating since 1992. The establishment of cooperation by the chairmen of both structures – Gaynutdin and Ashirov – led to the creation of zones of influence – the European units of ВКЦ were taken over by the Council of Muftis of Russia. The same year, ВКЦ virtually ceased to exist, although the formal dissolution came in 2002 (ibid., p. 95). 100 In 2008 the intention to move the headquarters from Moscow to Mineralnye Vody in the Caucasus was announced (Религиозное просвещение поможет в противостоянии экстремизму в ЮФО , 29 Jan. 2009). 101 Bourdeaux, “Religion Revives in All Its Variety”, p. 16. 102 С.Б. Намсараева, “Политический аспект религиозной жизни соврменной Бурятии”, in Н.Л. Жуковская (ed.), Религия в истории и культуре монголоязычных народов России (Москва: Восточная литература РАН, 2008), p. 69. 103 G. Fagan, “Buddhism in Postsoviet Russia: Revival or Degeneration?”, Religion, State and Society 29 (2001), pp. 9–21. 104 Бурдо and Филатов (eds), Современная религиозная жизнь Росси, vol. 3, pp. 234–5. 105 Е.А. Островская, “Российский буддизм в оправе гражданского общества”, in С. Филатов and А. Малашенко (eds), Религия и глобализация на просторах Евразии (Москва: Московский Центр Карнеги, 2005), p. 143. 106 It is estimated that currently there are about 60 Buddhist communities belonging to the Kagyu school in Russia. 107 Fagan, “Buddhism in Postsoviet Russia”, p. 10. 108 Намсараева, “Политический аспект религиозной жизни соврменной Бурятии”, pp. 22–3. 109 О составе и количестве религиозных организаций и представительств иностранных религиозных организаций, содержащихся в реестре Министерства юстиции Российской Федерации , 27 Oct. 2008. 110 In Russia, there are also secular Jewish organizations which influence the activities of confessional communities. They include, first of all, the Russian Jewish Congress (its chairmen included Vladimir Gusinsky, deputy chairman of Yukos Leonid Nevzlin and Evgeniy Satanovsky), the Conference of Chairmen of Jewish Organizations of Russia, the Association of Jewish Social Organizations (Бурдо and Филатов (eds), Современная религиозная жизнь Росси, vol. 3, pp. 21–2).

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111 In March 2006 a similar proposal was put forward by KEPOOP (КЕРООР и ФЕОР объединяются? , 24 Sept. 2008). 112 See also Z. Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 78–90. 113 Президент России В. В. Путин принял участников Архиерейского Собора во главе со Святейшим Патриархом Алексием , 6 Oct. 2008. 114 12 Jan. 2008 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 115 According to the regulations, confessional organizations leasing land indefinitely should purchase it or lease it through local authorities; in these circumstances close cooperation of an organization with local decision makers is of crucial importance, which puts the ROC in a privileged position (Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, p. 166–7; A. Verkhovsky and O. Sibireva, Restrictions and Challenges in 2007 on Freedom of Conscience in Russia , 24 Oct. 2008. 116 Церковь не станет вторым “Газпромом” , 11 Mar. 2009). 117 РПЦ не возвращены еще около десяти тысяч храмов , 7 Oct. 2008. 118 Verkhovsky and Sibireva, Restrictions and Challenges. The best known example concerns the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, with the involvement of Mayor Yury Luzhkov (he donated icons worth US$11.8 million) and representatives of elites and government. The inauguration mass in October 2000 was a symbolic event, attended by representatives of the supreme state authorities, including two presidents, the former and the incumbent – Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. 119 Сергей Собянин обращает Москву в православие. Столичные власти выделят землю под 60 храмов , 8 June 2011. 120 The joint stock company Международное экономическое сотрудничество was founded in 1990 by the finance and economic department of the Moscow parchiarchate. The patriarchate makes it clear, however, that it does not participate in the company’s operations. The company has been exporting oil since 1993 (С Божьей помощью фирма перешагнула пятилетний рубеж , 28 Nov. 2008). 121 Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, p. 167. 122 К поездам прикрепят православных священников , 9 Oct. 2008. 123 Святейший Патриарх Алексий встретился с министром культуры и массовых коммуникаций России А.С. Соколовым , 6 Oct. 2008. Another well-known venture that was financially suported by state companies was the renovation of the Iver monastery. The federal authorities constructed a road to the building at their own expense, ЕЭС Россия provided electrical installation, Gazprom gas, the key sponsors also included Sbierbank Rossji (the institution donated several million dollars, as president Putin announced on 12 Jan. 2008) (, 8 Oct. 2008). 124 T. Bielecki, Rosyjskie koncerny chcą zbudować 300 cerkwi , 20 Jan. 2007. 125 There was also a similar agreement on import of wine (Z. Knox, “The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate’s Post-Soviet Leadership”, Europe–Asia Studies 55 (2003), pp. 575–596. 126 Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, pp. 164–5.

Notes 273 127 Similar proposals are put forward, for example, by Aleksandr Dugin (Александр Дугин о государственно-конфессиональных отношениях , 24 Sept. 2008). 128 Л. Тимофеев (ed.), Экономическая деятельность Русской православной Церкви и ее теневая составляющая (Москва: Русский государственный гуманитарный университет, 2000). 129 Новосибирская кондитерская фабрика начала выпуск “православных” конфет , 24 Sept. 2008. 130 Десятая часть прибыли от использования торговой марки “Русь православная” пойдет на нужды церкви , 24 Sept. 2008. 131 The Sofrino company, established in 1980, was involved in the tobacco affair (Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, p. 164). 132 РПЦ примет участие в строительстве торговых центров рядом с храмами , 24 Sept. 2008. 133 Верховский, Беспокойное соседство. 134 Православный телеканал “Союз” расширяет зону вещания , 25 Sept. 2008. 135 Вице-спикер Совета Федерации поддержал идею создания федерального религиозного канала , 11 Mar. 2009. 136 Бурдо and Филатов (eds), Современная религиозная жизнь Росси, vol. 1, pp. 30–31. 137 The first solemn inauguration took place on 10 July 1991. 138 Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, p. 235. 139 The talks between the president and the representatives of the Supreme Soviet took place in the Danilovsky monastery in Moscow. С. Филатов, “Традиционные религии, ‘русская цивилизация’ и суверенная демократия”, in С. Филатов and А. Малашенко (eds), Религия и конфликт, pp. 17–18; Бурдо and Филатов (eds), Современная религиозная жизнь Росси, vol. 1, pp. 25–6. 140 See J. Garrard, C. Garard, Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent. Faith and Power in the New Russia, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford 2008. G. Codevilla, Relations between Church and State in Russia Today, “Religion, State & Society” 2008, vol. 36, No. 2. J. W. Warhola, Religion and Politics under Putin Administration: Accommodation and Confrontation within ‘Managed Pluralism’, “Journal of Church & State” 2007, vol. 49, No. 1. For comparison see: I. Bria, The Orthodox Church in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, “The Ecumenical Review” 1998, vol. 50, nr 2. 141 W. Sparks, The Faith of a President: Exploring the Religious Profile of Vladimir Putin , 24 May 2006. 142 Союз православных граждан резко критикует попытки понизить статус участия Патриарха Алексия II в церемонии инаугурации В.В. Путина , 2 Oct. 2008. 143 А. Верховский, Власть и религия в современной России , 22 Sept. 2008. 144 A programme broadcast live on public television, during which the president answers citizens’ questions asked by telephone or sent by e-mail. Putin took part in “telemosts” seven times as president, and in September 2008 he appeared as prime minister for the first time. President Dmitri Medvedev backed out of this form of contact with citizens, explaining that his official blog, available on the website of the Kremlin, was sufficient enough. 145 19 May 2007 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 146 29 June 2008 (, 8 Oct. 2008).

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147 A term for Russian cultural space. 148 Премьер Владимир Путин: “Православие изначально было исключительно терпимым к представителям других конфессий, и именно такая позиция РПЦ способствовала созданию российского государства не только как многонацио нального, но и многоконфессионального” (, 26 Sept. 2008). 149 3 Sept. 2006 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 150 Президент России В. В. Путин принял участников Архиерейского Собора во главе со Святейшим Патриархом Алексием , 6 Oct. 2008. 151 Доклад митрополита Смоленского и Калининградского Кирилла, председателя Отдела внешних церковных связей Московского Патриархата по вопросам взаимоотношений с Русской Зарубежной Церковью и старообрядчеством , 6 Oct. 2008. 152 15 Sept. 2005 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 153 17 May 2007 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 154 Президент отменил отсрочки от призыва на военную службу для священнослужителей , 24 Sept. 2008). 155 The First Lady of Russia suports the programme Spiritual and Moral Culture of the Younger Generation, and is also involved in the popularization of the new Russian Day of Love, Family and Faithfulness, celebrated on July 8 as the Orthodox equivalent of St Valentine’s Day (Жена третьего президента РФ Светлана Медведева предлагает сделать ромашку символом праздника любви, семьи и верности , 1 Oct. 2008). 156 Церковь и власть: молебен в честь Медведева , 22 Sept. 2008. 157 7 May 2008 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 158 Despite this, representatives of Tatar Muslims presented the president with a tughra (in Islamic culture, a monogram symbol of the reigning ruler) in token of sympathy and desire for cooperation (Новому президенту России – мусульманскую тугру! , 1 Oct. 2008). 159 Президент Димитрий Медведев подписал указ о предоставлении сусыдий на восстановление Ново-Иерусалимского монастыря , 11 Mar. 2009. 160 Выпускники духовных вузов получат государственные дипломы и смогут защищать кандидатские и докторскике диссертации по светским специальностям , 11 Mar. 2009. 161 Церковь не станет вторым “Газпромом” , 11 Mar. 2009. 162 Верховский, Беспокойное соседство. 163 26 Aug. 2005 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 164 Открытое письмо мусульманской общественности президенту В. В. Путину , 9 Oct. 2008. 165 8 Nov. 2007 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 166 10 Jan. 2006 (, 8 Oct. 2008).

Notes 275 167 The state allocated 60 million roubles for the purpose. 168 8 Nov. 2007 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 169 Мусулмане Северного Кавказа предлагают изменить Констицию и дать Путину возможность остаться президентом на третий срок , 11 Mar. 2009; Глава Координационного центра мусулман Северного Кавказа исмаил Бердиев заявил о высоком авторитете президента РФ среди мусулман , 11 Mar. 2009. 170 Один в поле воин? Пределы исламской политики в России , 12 Jan. 2010. 171 Медведев встретился в Сочи с муфтиями и руководителями регионов Северного Кавказа , 12 Jan. 2010. 172 Вертикаль. Будет ли в России единый муфтий? , 18 Dec. 2009. 173 The ceremony became widespread during the era of Catherine II (Царский трон для Дмитрия Медведева. Буддисты Бурятии готовы объявить президента воплощением божества на Земле , 8 Mar. 2010. 174 От светскости к патернализму. Религиозная политика Дмитрия Медведева , 8 Mar. 2010. 175 Верховский, Беспокойное соседство. 176 19 Mar. 2002 (, 8 Oct. 2008). 177 President’s speech (19 Mar. 2002) (, 2 Feb. 2008). 178 . 179 Главный раввин России (ФЕОР) Берл Лазар верит, что период президентства Медведева станет “временем сбывшихся надежд” , 1 Oct. 2008. 180 Доклад в рабочей группе: Доклад председателя Отдела по взаимодействию с Вооруженными силами и правоохранительными учреждениями протоиерея Димитрия Смирнова , 6 Oct. 2008. 181 Верховский, Беспокойное соседство. 182 Министерство образования разъясняет свою позицию по вопросу преподавания основ православной культуры в светских школах , 6 Oct. 2008. See also P. L. Glanzer, K. Petrenko, Religion and Education in Post-Communist Russia: Russia’s Evolving Church-State Relations, “Journal of Church and State” 2007, vol. 4, nr. 1. 183 Minister Fursenko’s idea was backed, among others, by then chairman of the Russian Academy of National Education, Nikolai Nikandro (Krindatch, “Religion, Public Life and the State in Putin’s Russia”, p. 52). 184 Резолюция ВРНС “О преподавании Основ православной культуры в школе”. 185 Заявление движения “Российское исламское наследие” в связи с высказываниями Алексия II о преподавании ОПК в школе , 24 Sept. 2008. 186 Обращение представителей научной общественности к президенту России в поддержку изучения религиозной культуры в школах и признания ученых степеней по теологии , 25 Sept. 2008. 187 Открытое письмо протеста родителей против клерикализации российского образования , 9 Oct. 2008. 188 Неожиданные союзники. РПЦ поддержана Хизб ут-тахрир , 24 Sept. 2008.

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189 Несколько российских вузов выделили бюджетные места для мусульман , 24 Sept. 2008. 190 Verkhovsky and Sibireva, Restrictions and Challenges. 191 Pro-Kremlin organizations increasingly suport the ROC’s educational programme: for example, an “Orthodox corps” was created within the “Nashi” movement in 2007, and its members promised to hold free classes in schools on “Basics of Orthodox Culture”. The corps numbers about 500 activists, and its leader is Boris Yakemenko (Активисты движения “Наши” собираются преподавать ОПК , 24 Sept. 2008; Первая акция Православного корпуса движения “Наши” , 7 Oct. 2008). 192 V. Malukihn, Russia Looks to its Religious Culture , 7 June 2011. 193 А. Б. Григорьев, Вера и верность. Очерки из отношений Русской Православной Церкви и российской армии Кучково Поле, Москва 2005. 194 Епископ Вениамин благословил вновь назначенного командующего Тихоокеанским флотом , 6 Oct. 2008. 195 Пограничники Камчатки приняли воинскую присягу по православной традиции <www.mospat.ru/archive/nr308087.htm>, 6 Oct. 2008; see also S. Mozgovoj, “Siloviki im Dienste der Orthdoxie. Staat, Kirche und Nation in Russland”, Osteuropa 54 (2004). 196 Доклад в рабочей группе: Доклад председателя Отдела по взаимодействию с Вооруженными си лами и правоохранительными учреждениями протоиерея Димитрия Смирнова , 6 Oct. 2008. 197 Доклад в рабочей группе: Доклад председателя Отдела по взаимодействию с Вооруженными силами и правоохранительными учреждениями протоиерея Димитрия Смирнова , 6 Oct. 2008. 198 The bulletin is also available in some government offices and ROC parishes. 199 Главный военный прокурор представил официальную статистику правона рушений в армии, а также высказался о взаимодействии вооруженных сил и РПЦ , 9 Oct. 2008. 200 Interestingly, on the issue of regulating the status of chaplains in the army, the ROC suggests that the ministry of defense adopt solutions aplied in the Polish armed forces (Доклад в рабочей группе: Доклад председателя Отдела по взаимодействию с Вооруженными силами и правоохранительными учреждениями протоиерея Димитрия Смирнова , 6 Oct. 2008. 201 Присутствие духовенства в военных частях позволяет сократить до минимума конфликты в них, заявляют в российской армии , 24 Sept. 2008. 202 Совет муфтиев России сделал заявление по поводу введения института военных священников , 9 Oct. 2008. 203 Russian Army Gets 1st Chief Rabbi since 1917 , 9 Oct. 2008. 204 Данные о количестве православных священников в российской армии , 24 Sept. 2008. 205 Verkhovsky and Sibireva, Restrictions and Challenges. 206 Theology graduates receive two diplomas: theological and military (В России при органах Федеральной службы охраны действует 8 православных храмов , 24 Sept. 2008). 207 Kridatch, “Religion, Public Life and the State in Putin’s Russia”, pp. 50–51. 208 The most violent reactions to brutal actions of security forces took place in October 2005 in the Karachayevo–Cherkessia Republic, when armed civilians attacked local

Notes 277

209 210 211

212

213 214 215 216

217 218 219 220

221 222 223 224 225 226

police stations in Nalchik, in protest against an earlier wave of arbitrary preventive arrests, which mainly affected people regularly praying in mosques. М. Тульский, Взаимоотношения мусульманских организаций России с федеральными и региональными властями , 17 Nov. 2006. Между властью и православием. Кто культивирует нетерпимость в российском обществе , 9 Oct. 2008. One well-known case concerned a complaint filed in June 2008 by mufti Nafigulla Ashirov about the inactivity of prosecutors, who did not open an investigation into defamation of islam by priest Daniil Sysoyev, the author of the controversial book Marriage to a Muslim (Суд рассмотрит бездействие прокуратуры Москвы в отношении священника РПЦ МП Даниила Сысоева, оскорбившего религиозные чувства мусульман , 1 Oct. 2008). Symbolic of the historical intimacy between diplomacy and the church were the 2004 ceremonies marking the 70th anniversary of the Russian Diplomatic Academy, held in ROC premises next to the Moscow Cathedral of Christ the Saviour (В  Храме Христа Спасителя состоялись торжества по случаю 70-летия Дипломатической академии МИД РФ , 6 Oct. 2008). Святейший Патриарх Алексий вручил министру иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврову высокую церковную награду , 7 Oct. 2008. Святейший Патриарх Алексий принял участие в юбилейном заседании Рабочей группы по взаимодействию МИД России и Русской Православной Церкви , 25 Sept. 2008. Kridatch, “Religion, Public Life and the State in Putin’s Russia”, p. 49. Independent research institutes note that after 2006 there have been fewer cases of refusals to grant visas to foreign clergy (Положение с выдачей виз иностранным миссионерам улучшилось? , 24 Sept. 2008). Fagan, “Buddhism in Postsoviet Russia”, p. 10. Rosja odmówiła wizy Dalaj Lamie , 28 Sept. 2008. Российские буддисты просят В. Путина выдать российскую визу Далай-ламе <www.demos-center.ru/news/12422.html>, 9 Oct. 2008. Состоялась встреча Святейшего Патриарха Алексия с ректором МГИМО(У) А.В.Торкуновым , 6 Oct. 2008. Митрополит Кирилл и ректор МГИМО подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве , 7 Oct. 2008. В. Вигилянский, Русская Православная Церковь: итоги 20-летия религиозной свободы , 17 Aug. 2008. Молельные комнаты в честь святой Татьяны открылись во всех вузах Кемерова , 7 Oct. 2008. Петров, Религиозные организации и законотворческий процесс в России; see also, I. Papkova, The Russian Orthodox Church and Political Party Platforms, “Journal of Church & State” 2007, vol. 49, No. 1. Бурьянов, Фактор отношений государства с религиозными объединениями накануне и в ходе выборов и депутатов Госдумы РФ 2003 года. Ibid. The leader of the Russian Communists presented his attitude towards the church in a book with the telling title Faith and Faithfulness. Russian Orthodoxy and the Problems of Russia’s Revival.

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227 Knox, “The Symphonic Ideal”, pp. 586–7. 228 Законодательное собрание Петербурга просит В. Путина вернуть отсрочки от армии для священнослужителей , 24 Sept. 2008. 229 В Ирбите каждая женщина, решившаяся на аборт, должна встретиться с православным священником , 9 Oct. 2008. 230 Кто влиятельнее в России? , 7 June 2011. 231 Тульский, Взаимоотношения мусульманских организаций России с федеральными и региональными властями. 232 Глава ДУМ Татарстана и представители мусульманского духовенства предлагают ввести во всех школах республики уроки нравственности на основе мусульманской культуры , 24 Sept. 2008. 233 В Казани готовится к изданию учебник по курсу “Основы мусульманской культуры” , 25 Sept. 2008. 234 Мусульмане продолжают выступать против уроков православия в школах , 9 Oct. 2008. 235 Bourdeaux, “Religion Revives in All Its Variety”, p. 16. 236 Островская, “Российский буддизм в оправе гражданского общества”, p. 146. 237 T. Bielecki, “Sojusz prawosławno-żydowski”, Gazeta Wyborcza (2004) , 20 Dec. 2004. 238 The Interreligious Council of Russia refused the Catholic Church’s requests to join (В  Межрелигиозном совете России не видят оснований для включения в эту организацию представителя российских католиков , 19 Nov. 2006. 239 Ставропольская епархия и Духовное управление мусульман Кабардино-Балкарии подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве , 12 Dec. 2008; Летний лагерь православной и мусульманской молодежи открылся в Ставропольском крае , 12 Dec. 2008; Межконфессиональный Совет Воронежской области выступил против осквернения Успенского собора , 11 Dec. 2008. 240 Верховский, Власть и религия в современной России. 241 Д. Медведев решил повысить статус Совета по взаимодействию с религиозными объединениями при Президенте , 16 Apr. 2009; Дмитрий Медведев встанет во главе церковных дел. Статус совета по религиозным объединениям повышен до  президентского , 16 Apr. 2009. 242 Заявление Совета по взаимодействию с религиозными объединениями при Президенте Российской Федерации , 5 June 2011. 243 “Диалог в христианско-еврейских отношениях в современной России и в мире”. Доклад заместителя председателя ОВЦС игумена Филиппа (Рябых) , 10 June 2011. 244 В Совете муфтиев России выступают против концепции “Духовнонравственной культуры” в школах, предложенной Церковью , 7 Oct. 2008. 245 Неправославные верующие Республики Коми выступили против навязывания ОПК , 19 Nov. 2006.

Notes 279 246 Лидеры крупнейших протестантских организаций Воронежской области в открытом письме к властям выразили негативное отношение к введению в школах ОПК , 16 Oct. 2008. 247 В Москве движение “Ватан” провело пикет против введения уроков православия в школе , 13 Oct. 2008. 248 Российские мусульмане резко отреагировали на возможное усиление влияния Церкви на жизнь страны , 9 Oct. 2008. 249 Совет муфтиев России сделал заявление по поводу введения института военных священников , 9 Oct. 2008). 250 А. Малашенко, Ислам для России (Mосква: Московский Центр Карнеги РОССПЭН, 2007), pp. 125–31. 251 При Совете муфтиев России создана комиссия по исламо-христианскому диалогу , 25 Sept. 2008. 252 РПЦ призывает Совет муфтиев и Федерацию еврейских общин к диалогу , 7 Oct. 2008. 253 For example, the Federation of Jewish Organizations of Russia acts like this, seeing close cooperation with the ROC as a way to become closer to the authorities and consequently fight anti-Semitism more effectively (Диалог РПЦ и иудейской общины нужно развивать – ФЕОР , 7 Oct. 2008). 254 Между фундаментализмом и миссионерством. РПЦ готова к диалогу с современностью, но опасается “нового обновленчества” , 22 Sept. 2008. 255 Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, pp. 176–9. 257 Born 1929, ROC Patriarch in 1990–2008. 258 Born 1929, former hierarch of the ROC, since 1995 the head of the non-canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev patriarchate. 259 Born 1929, since 1995 metropolitan of St Petersburg and Ladoga. 260 Born 1924, died 2001. 261 Born 1921, metropolitan of Kharkov and Bogodukhovsky. 262 Born 1946, lecturer at the Petersburg Spritual Academy. 263 Born 1935, metropolitan of Minsk and Sluck, since 1989 Exarch of Belarus. 264 Born 1935, until 1977 metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna. 265 Born 1946, in 1989–2008 chairman of the Department for External Relations of the ROC. On 27 January 2009 he was chosen the sixteenth patriarch of Moscow and All Russia by the local sobor. 266 Nikolai Mitrokhin also mentions two “clans” operating outside the logic of the “camps” described earlier, i.e. a “clan” of Ukranian priests and the so-called “sky-blue mafia” or a minority of homosexual priests (Митрохин, Русская Православная Церковь, p. 217). On the other hand, following Della Cava, Zoe Knox suggests dividing Russian clergy into ultranationalists, ecumenists, institutionalists and pastoralists (D. Cava, “Revivng Orthodoxy in Russia: An Overview of the Fractions in the Russian Orthodox Church, in the Spring of the 1996”, Cahiers du Monde russe 38 (1997), pp. 387–414; Z. Knox, “Postsoviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991– 2001”, Religion, State and Society 32 (2004), pp. 87–113. 267 During the election of the XVI Patriarch of the ROC, suporters of Metropolitan Kirill emphasized his contribution to ending the so-called tobacco scandal. The hierarch then took the whole responsibility on himself and thus saved the Church’s authority. Приняв весь удар на себя в “табачно-алкогольной истории”, митрополит

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Notes Кирилл спас Церковь от грязи