PRAGMATISM An Annotated Bibliography 1898-1940 John R. Shook with Contributions by
E. Paul Colella Lesley Friedman Frank X. Ryan Ignas K. Skrupskelis
VIBS Volume 66
Robert Ginsberg Executive Editor
Associate Editors G. John M. Abbarno Mary-Rosc B a d Virginia Black H. G. Callaway Rem B. Edwards Rob Fisher Dane R. Gordon J. Everet Green Heta H3yry Matti H3yly Richard T. Hull
Joseph C. Kunkel Ruth M. Lucier Alan Milchman George David Miller Michael H. Mitias Samuel M. Natale Peter A. Redpath Alan Rosenberg Arleen Salles Alan Soble Daniel Statman Amsterdam - Atlanta, G A 1998
Contents
Foreword by Peter H. Hare Acknowledgments
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Introduction
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Research Methods Abbreviations
Zover design by Chris Kok based on a photograph, 01984 by Robert Oinsberg, of statuary by Gustav Vigeland in the Frogner Park, Oslo, Vonvay.
@ The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of "IS0 3706:1994, Information and documentation Requirements for permanence".
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Paper for documents
ISBN: 90-420-0269-7 OEditions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA 1998 Printed in The Netherlands
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Bibliography
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Author Index
53 1
Subject Index
557
About the Author and Contributors
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Foreword
As we near the millennium, Western philosophy is fragmented to an unprecedented degree. Analytic philosophy no longer dominates the anglophone world. Western Europe is no longer dominated by phenomenology or hermeneutics. The philosophical profession has become so splintered that no philosophical movement enjoys a dominant position. However, if any "ism" can be said to be moving toward dominance, it is pragmatism. The reasons for this are many, too many to explain here. Surely one reason is that economically, politically, militarily, and culturally, the U.S. today is the most influential nation in the world, and approximately half of the academic philosophers on the planet teach in American colleges and universities. It should surprise no one that the American philosophical tradition is treated with increasing respect. But there are other reasons intrinsic to the special intellectual problems of philosophy and related to immediately preceding philosophical tendencies. Some of these reasons were explored in Richard Rorty's landmark book of 1979, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. In 1979, however, no one anticipated how many different sorts of philosophers would embrace pragmatismnot to mention those philosophers unwilling to embrace pragmatism but compelled to publish lengthy critiques of it. Moreover, the participants in this debate have not been limited to members of the philosophical profession. There is no discipline in the humanities and social sciences that has not recently contributed numerous proponents and critics of pragmatism. 1 hazard a conservative guess that, if a bibliography of pragmatism since. 1979 were prepared, it would contain thousands of books and tens of thousands of articles. This massive and still growing interest in pragmatism is one of the reasons that an annotated bibliography (1898-1940) is needed. In his Introduction below, John R. Shook mentions other compelling reasons. Let me add to his litany. Scholars working today in pragmatism often, indeed usually, are seriously confused about how what they are doing is related to the work of "classical pragmatists." I t is commonplace, for example, for philosophers and non-philosophers alike to suppose erroneously that Rorty's pragmatism is fundamentally the same as the pragmatism of Dewey. Use of this bibliography should discourage that misconception; it should also discourage the equally serious niisconception that every clever argument concerning pragmatism presented today is original and not to be found in the early literature. Most important, this volume will be a powerful aid in the development of the pragmatist tradition. Philosophers with a clear understanding of how they stand i n relation to classical pragmatism will be in a strong position to build on and contribute to that tradition.
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111 corrcludi~~g llrese renlarks I rnust acknowledge the stupendous labor, as tedious as it was intellectually demanding, of Shook, E. Paul Colella, Lesley Friedman, Frank X. Ryan, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Academic philosophers are notoriously unwilling to undertake major bibliographical projects; they condescendingly suppose that such work should be done by historians and librarians. Philosophy, for this reason, is in a sony bibliographical state compared to other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Even where philosophical bibliographies exist, they are rarely as painstakingly and helpfilly annotated as this one. Everyone with a serious interest in philosophy and its history should be grateful to these five academic philosophers for their willingness to do an importantjob in the face of professional disdain.
Peter H. Hare State University of New York at Buffalo
Acknowledgments
The enormous magnitude of this project naturally required a correspondingly large amount of dedicated assistance fiom many people. First and foremost, my appreciation goes to Richard T. Hull, until recently Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo, and presently Executive Director of the Texas Council for the Humanities in Austin, Texas. It was his initial suggestion to me, and his convincing endorsement of my book proposal to Robert Ginsberg, the Executive Editor of the Value Inquiry Book Series (VIBS), that launched this project. Along the way, Dick's encouragement, and his advice in his capacity as VIBS Stylistic and Format Editor, supplied needed course corrections. Robert Ginsberg deserves my gratitude for his recognition of the value of such a bibliography and his abiding confidence in its success. His commitment of VIBS and Editions Rodopi to the publication of bibliographies, and specifically, one concerning pragmatism, must be applauded. The author of the Foreword, Peter H. Hare, is the most fitting and capable person to situate this bibliography in the wider context of American philosophy, for several reasons. His prominent stature and long experience in the field, reflected by the 1996 Herbert Schneider Award honoring him for service to American philosophy by the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, provides him an excellent vantage point to survey its significant features and trends. He also has an evident familiarity with bibliographical research and its value, that was inculcated by an influential teacher, Joseph L. Blau, whose bibliographies in Herbert Schneider's A History ofAmerican Philosophy elevated this form of scholarship for American philosophy to an unprecedented height. Peter's role as my mentor, having chaired my dissertation committee and helped with subsequent publications, links my work with this proud tradition of service. Also, he made several important recommendations improving the breadth of this bibliography. I extend my warmest thanks to Peter for all his assistance. The contributors were obviously essential to this bibliography's existence and value. Lesley Friedman's early agreement to join such a daunting effort, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis's willingness to write his invaluable annotations for James's works, were the signs of support confirming for me that this project was indeed important and could be completed. E. Paul Collela and Frank X. Ryan added their expertise to considerably enhance the bibliography's scope and quality. My congratulations and admiration goes to the contributors for their very hard work. The research aspect to this bibliography is indebted to many people The Lynchburg College Faculty Research and Development Committee awarded a grant to assist Lesley Friedman's research. Jeffrey O'Connell, Scott Hotaling.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
and Free Spirit provided me with energetic research assistance. Meg Nyberg, the Interlibrary Loan Officer of Coming Community College, was extremely hardworking and most generous with her time. Pat Riesenman, Reference Librarian at Indiana University, tracked down articles by Italian pragmatists. The staff of the libraries of Comell University, State University of New York at Buffalo, and State University College at Fredonia were also quite helpful. The annotations for works about James by Ignas K. Skrupskelis are reprinted, with some changes, with permission of G. K. Hall and Co., an imprint of Simon and Schuster Macmillan, from William James: A Reference Guide by Ignas K . Skrupskelis. Copyright 8 1977 by Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Extracts from The Collected Works of John Dewey are quoted with the permission of The Center for Dewey Studies, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Unless otherwise noted, the source of other quotations is the original publication, or, if reprinted or translated, from the most recent publication. I prepared the camera-ready copy on a Gateway 2000 P4D-66 computer using Microsoft Word 6.0c, and printed it on a Hewlett Packard LaserJet 4P on loan from Richard T. Hull. Two colleagues, Paul McNaney and Glenn Harris, generously supplied their proofreading time. The completion of this bibliography was accompanied by a curious mixture of emotions; relief, to be sure, and pride, but also humility for its shortcomings. Hundreds of partial references must remain in notebooks for now; the potential for further research seems limitless. No one could be more aware than I that this bibliography is really only able to provide a launching pad for the reader's own investigations into the diverse modes of thought gestured at by the label "pragmatism." My thanks in advance hence goes to readers for their suggestions for expansions or their corrections of errors. Finally, my wife's support and patience made, as with all else, this work possible. To Karen and our new daughter, Adrienne, whose arrival created delays but much joy, this book is dedicated.
I
This bibliography contains 2,794 main entries, and more than 2,200 additional references, for publications by pragmatists and commentators on pragmatism, written from 1898 to 1940. 2,10 1 of these works are annotated. The more significant works by the twelve major figures of pragmatism are included, along with those of dozens of minor pragmatic writers. This bibliography's international scope focuses on writings in English, French, German, and Italian; a small number of works in other languages are also referenced. Almost every significant philosopher of the period had something to say about pragmatism; their comments are referenced here. This bibliography encompasses writings not only about pragmatism as an alliance of philosophical theories of meaning, inquiry, belief, knowledge, logic, truth, ontology, value, and morality, but also as an intellectual and cultural movement through art, literature, education, the social and natural sciences, religion, and politics. 1. Why a Bibliography for Pragmatism?
Aside from the historical fact that the last truly international and comprehensive bibliography on pragmatism was published in France in 1922, the need today for an annotated bibliography on pragmatism has arisen due to four main factors. (1) While bibliographies for many of the pragmatists have been published, these typically do not include the many books and articles which do not specifically address them by name. This results in the exclusion.of hundreds of writings which instead discuss pragmatism as a philosophical trend or theory without narrowing attention to individual pragmatists. (2) These bibliographies (with one exception) do not have an international scope. Pragmatism was not a philosophy limited to the United States. Original contributions to, and critical reactions against, pragmatism were heard from countries in every continent of the world. (3) Annotation has far greater value in this "information age," since the vast (and rapidly growing) amount of available data tends to obscure the significance of any single piece of information. (4) Interest in pragmatism has been rising in America and Europe for two decades, and this trend shows no signs of abating. A bibliography covering the first four decades of pragmatic thought will assist the studies of those who are already interested, and, hopefully, it will generate new interest. 2. The Contributors' Responsibilities E. Paul Collela [EPC] supplied publication information for the Italian piasmatists and wrote 60 annotations for their works and works about them. I lc also wrote the Italian pragmatism portion of the historical survey in sectim
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five. Lesley Friedman [LF] researched French works about pragmatism and wrote 101 annotations for them and for Peirce's writings. Frank X. Ryan [FXR] wrote 125 annotations for most of John Dewey's post-1920 works and many works about Dewey. Ignas K. Skrupskelis [IKS] wrote 62 annotations for James's works, to accompany 419 annotations for works about James first published in his William James: A Reference Guide (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1977). The contributors also found additional references and advised me on the selection of works for inclusion. However, I [JRS] am solely responsible for fmal selection decisions, errors or incomplete information, and the editing of all material.
Third, the "significance" of the work is evaluated. A work must relate in some way to the major figures of pragmatism, listed below.
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3. Selection Criteria Bibliographers occasionally claim that they did not have to make any difficult selection choices, since they included anything of even questionable value or glancing reference. Pragmatism, like any significant school of philosophical thought, permeated deeply into intellectual life and was debated widely. At the height of its prominence, professional journals in America, England, France, Germany, and Italy found a more than ample supply of authors eager to defend, refute, borrow from, or dismiss pragmatism. In the areas of metaphysics, theology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics, a new book would be quite unusual if it had nothing to say about pragmatism. Serials for a more popular audience also contributed to the proliferation of writings on pragmatism and its application to all aspects of culture, from education and economics to affairs of church and state. Since any attempt at comprehensiveness would therefore be daunting, this bibliography uses three selection criteria. First, the period covered is from 1898 to 1940, inclusive. The 1898 date is the traditional year of the beginning of the "movement" or "school" of pragmatism. While Peirce, James, and Dewey themselves were espousing pragmatist doctrines prior to that date, their work and the critical responses to them in the pre- 1898 period are already fully covered by the existing bibliographies for each philosopher. The 1940 date permits the publication of this bibliography as a single volume. Furthermore, the Philosopher's Index starts with 1940, providing the researcher with an excellent resource. Second, this bibliography does not attempt to include all the publications of the pragmatists themselves. The foremost pragmatists already have their own primary bibliographies. The numerous book reviews by Peirce, Dewey, Mead, and Schiller, James's extra-philosophical writings, Mead's essays on education, and Dewey's commentaries on educational, social, and political topics of his day, are the basic areas that received pruning. However, the most significant works in these areas are included. For C. I. Lewis, A. W. Moore, and John E. Boodin, this bibliography is the most complete guide to their publications. This bibliography is also the most extensive English-language guide to the works of the Italian pragmatists as a group.
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Charles Sanders Peirce William James John Dewey George Herbert Mead Giovanni Vailati Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller Addison Webster Moore John ~ l o ~f o o d i n Mario Calderoni Giovanni Papini Guiseppe Prezzolini Clarence Irving Lewis Many more thinkers professed pragmatic themes during a part or the whole of their career, including Jane Addams, Antonio Aliotta, Giovanni Amendola, H. Heath Bawden, Boyd H. Bode, Harry T. Costello, Irwin Edman, Charlotte P. Gilman, Sidney Hook, Horace M. Kallen, Howard V. Knox, Charles W. Morris, Max C. Otto, Donald A. Piatt, Joseph Ratner, John E. Russell, Hu Shi, Alfred Sidgwick, Henry W. Wright, and William K. Wright. Only their work bearing directly upon pragmatism is referenced here. Books, journal articles, essays in a collection or anthology, book reviews, and encyclopedia articles are included if they give an extended treatment of any of the above members, or of pragmatism in general. An extended treatment is a significantly critical, comparative, or supportive exposition of at least one paragraph in length. Book reviews offering significant comments on a book's treatment of pragmatism receive annotation. The large number of reviews of the pragmatists' books preclude annotation for all, so a representative sample is selected for annotation. Dissertations and very significant master's or honors theses are treated as books. Considerable effort has been made to find and annotate significant works on pragmatism published in French, German, and Italian. Works in other languages have been included if found, and annotated where possible. While this bibliography aims to record as entries only works published from 1898 to 1940, two exceptions are made: collections of letters, if written during this period, and lectures or public addresses delivered during this period, but published after 1940. 4. Annotation Style The "art" of writing annotation has no single genre and displays no fixed style. Those who have tried their hand at it quickly discover its limitations. For
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example, have you ever wondered who writes those one-sentence blurbs on a television show for the newspaper listings? I especially pity the person who tackles movies. For "The Wizard of Of the TV listings once read, "A girl's adventures with a scarecrow, a lion, and a tin man." There is no way to catch all of the essence, the magic, with brevity. Besides, if a movie could be so captured, no one should want to see it anyway. Matters are made worse where a bibliography is concerned, since many articles or books discuss pragmatism only in the course of pursuing other issues and other conclusions. The annotation, by distilling out the comments on pragmatism, will necessarily distort or often completely obscure the author's original intentions. Those Munchkins are lovable, aren't they? The blurb might instead read, "A peaceful village of short people witness the extraordinary visit of a nice stranger." The moral of this story is that the readers should view the annotation as an invitation to read the work for themselves, and not as a substitute. Assessments, comparisons, or other types of commentary to help the reader are placed in a concluding "Notes" section at the end of an entry. This section may also direct the reader to a related item in the bibliography, or to relevant post- 1940 literature. 5. Historical Studies of Pragmatism
Inquiry into pragmatism's history should begin with H. S. Thayer's panoramic treatise, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism, 2nd ed. (India,napolis: Hackett, 1981). Max Fisch, "American Pragmatism Before and After 1898," reprinted in Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 283-304, should also be consulted. Herbert W. Schneider, A History ofAmerican Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), and Elizabeth Flower and Murray Murphey, A History ofphilosophy in America (New York: G . P. Pumam's Sons, 1977) situate pragmatism in American thought and give helpful references. Other important surveys include S. Morris Eames, Pragmatic Naturalism (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977); Charles Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York: George Braziller, 1970); Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Pragmatism and Feminism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Philip Wiener, Evolution and the Founders ofPragmatism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949). More specialized studies of the history of pragmatism are given below, selected for their comprehensiveness, diversity of viewpoint, and ability to guide the reader to other studies. A. Cambridge The quasi-official story of pragmatism's inception as a philosophical movement is well-told by Max Fisch. It finds Harvard professor William James in
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Berkeley in August 1898, where he addressed the Philosophical Union of the University of California. His paper, titled "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," announced his chosen direction "to start upon the trail of truth": the principle of "pragmatism," as enunciated by Charles S. Peirce. James described how Peirce used the term in philosophical conversation in Cambridge, Massachusetts back in the early l87Os, and he mentioned Peirce's 1878 publication of an essay, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear." In that essay is found, not the term "pragmatism," but Peirce's method to maximize a concept's clarity: "Consider what effects, which might - conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object" [CP5.4021. James's philosophical efforts were hardly founded on only and exactly this principle. His psychological and metaphysical inquiries (resulting in "radical empiricism") and religious and moral interests (represented by the "will-tobelieve" doctrine) complemented his unique version of pragmatism. By the time of his death in 1910, James had aroused a public interest in philosophy in general, and pragmatism in particular. He had also influenced a generation of philosophers, who repaid their debt to James by developing selected aspects of his philosophy into principles for their own independent thought. The exploration of other aspects of Peirce's multi-faceted philosophy, sparked by James's enthusiasm, accelerated through the 1910s and 1920s. His place alongside James in the pantheon of American philosophers was firmly established after his Collected Papers were edited in the 1930s. Among the many philosophers indebted to Peirce and James, several can arguably be called "pragmatic." Josiah Royce profited from the' study of both Peirce and James. He incorporated several pragmatic tenets into his system of absolute idealism, which has often been termed "pragmatic idealism" or "absolute pragmatism." John E. Boodin studied under James and Royce. His treatises on epistemology and metaphysics develop a realistic pragmatism in the context of an evolutionary theism. Harvard also nurtured Horace M. Kallen, who advocated pragmatism for decades, and C. I. Lewis, whose "conceptual pragmatism" synthesized many pragmatic strands. And while George Santayana may not have enjoyed the label, many scholars comprehend his thought in a pragmatic context. Authors focusing on the Cambridge pragmatists are A. J. Ayer, The Orrgins of Pragmatism (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper, and Co., 1968); Bruce Kuklick, The Rise ofAmerican Philosophy-Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). Books concerning Peirce include Douglas Anderson, Creativity and tlw Philosophy C. S. Peirce (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); Joseph Brent. Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993); Vincent Colapietro, Peirce's Approach to the S ~ i j (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); James Feibleman, , l r ~
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Introduction to the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969); Carl Hausman, Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Christopher Hookway, Peirce (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Murray Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961); Sandra Rosenthal, Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Peter Skagestad, The Road of Inquiry: Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). For James, these studies can be consulted. Gay W. Allen, WilliamJames: A Biography (London: Rupert Hart-Davies, 1967); Graham Bird, William James (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986); Gerald Myers, William James: His Life and Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Ruth Anna Putnam, ed., The Cambridge Companion to William James (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Charlene Haddock Seigfried, William James 's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Ellen Kappy Suckiel, Heaven's Champion: William James's Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996; John Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James (Garden City, N.Y .: Doubleday and Co., 1969). Other Cambridge philosophers are discussed by John Clendenning, The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Bruce Kuklick, Josiah Royce: An Intellectual Biography (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972); Milton R. Konvitz, ed., The Legacy of Horace M Kallen (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1987); Henry Levinson, Santayana, Pragmatism, and the Spiritual Life (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); John McCormick, George Santayana: A Biography (New York: Knopf, 1986); Mary Mahowald, An Idealistic Pragmatism: The Development of the Pragmatic Element in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972); Charles H. Nelson, John ElofBoodin: PhilosopherPoet @JewYork: Philosophical Library, 1987); Sandra Rosenthal, The Pragmatic A Priori: A Study in the Epistemology of C. I. Lewis (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1976); Paul A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court, 1968); T. L. S. Sprigge, Santayana: An Examination of His Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).
research and theorizing of Dewey and four of his philosophy colleagues, G. H. Mead, James Tufts, James Angell, and A. W. Moore. Challenging the dominant "structuralist" psychologies, they formulated the doctrines of "functionalism," in which mental entities are interpreted in terms of phases of purposive organic action in an environment. Dewey and Mead explored the philosophical consequences of this viewpoint: Chicago functionalism evolved into Dewey's naturalistic instrumentalism and Mead's social behaviorism. Moore's polemical defenses earned him the nickname, the "bulldog of pragmatism." Other members of the Chicago branch of pragmatism include Jane Addams in education and social theory, E. S. Ames in religion, H. Heath Bawden in psychology, Boyd H. Bode in education, and William Wright and Sidney Hook in philosophy. The 1930s saw Charles Morris's announcement of his "neo-pragmatism," which promised a collaboration of pragmatism with logical empiricism. General works describing philosophy at the University of Chicago are Andrew Feffer, The Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Darnell Rucker, The Chicago Pragmatists (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969). Studies of Dewey include Raymond D. Boisvert, Dewey S Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988); James Campbell, Understanding John Dewey: Nature and Cooperative Intelligence (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court, 1995); George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, ed. Jo AM Boydston (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973); Ulrich Engler, Kritik der Erfahring: Die Bedeutung der asthetischen Erfahrung in der Philosophie John Deweys (Wurzburg: Konigshausen und Neuman, 1992); Christopher B. Kulp, The End of Epistemology: Dewey and His Current Allies on the Spectator Theory of Knowledge (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992); Steven Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1995); R. W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); J. E. Tiles, Dewey (New York: Routledge, 1988); Jennifer Welchman, Dewey's Ethical Thought (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). Concerning other Chicago pragmatists and their influence, see Edward Scribner Ames, Beyond Theology: The Autobiography of Edward Scribner Ames, ed. Van Meter Ames (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Gary Cook, George Herbert Meud: 7he Muking ofcr Social Pragmatist (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Emily Cooper Johnson, ed., Jane Addams, A Centenuiol Reader (New York: Macmillan, 1960); J. David Lewis and Richard Stnitli, American S o c i o l o ~and ~ Pragmatism: Mead, Chicago Sociology, and Sytnbolrc Interactionism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1980).
B. Chicago The development of John Dewey's "instrumentalist" or "experimentalist" version of pragmatism occurred largely during his ten years at the University of Chicago (1894-1904). Dewey was stimulated by James's novel approach to psychological inquiry and later dedicated his first major work in pragmatism in 1903 to James. This development was also nourished by the psychological
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C. Great Britain F. C. S. Schiller recognized a kindred spirit in James, linking his similar rebellion against rationalism with the "will-to-believe" principle. Preferring the tenn "humanism" to pragmatism, Schiller centered his philosophy on the fundamental reality of the personal self. Throughout the fwst two decades of this century, European philosophers perceived Schiller and James as the leaders of the pragmatic movement. At his post as Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, Schiller assigned himself the task of dogging the British idealists' every published word, probing for evidence of their failures and of pragmatism's superiority. Ready assistance was found in Alfred Sidgwick, Howard Knox, and Henry Sturt; together they provided "Bradley and Co." with a more than ample barrage of polemical attacks. Schiller's constructive efforts awaited his later years, focused on the effort to systematically elaborate the principles of voluntaristic logic. In the 1920s the brief career of F. P. Ramsey was marked by his occasional expression of agreement with several pragmatic themes. Further research into Schiller and Ramsey can profitably start with Reuben Abel, The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller (New York: King's Crown Press, 1955); Nils-Eric Sahlin, The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kenneth Winetrout, "F. C. S. Schiller (1 864- 1937): Some centennial ~houghts,"Personalist 45.3 ( J U I 1964): ~ 301-315.
When William James traveled to Rome in the spring of 1905, he spent an afternoon with a small band of enthusiastic pragmatists who made quite an impression on their famous American mentor. For his part, James memorialized that afternoon and lionized its leader, Giovanni Papini, in a publication of his own on returning to the United States, "G.Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy." The key figures in the Italian movement besides Papini are Giuseppe Prezzolini, Papini's close friend and intellectual collaborator, and the two "Peircean" members of the circle, Giovanni Vailati and his student and colleague, Mario Calderoni. The movement was quite short-lived, however. Papini and Prezzolini had shed their pragmatism by 1907, moving on to the next stage of their complex intellectual itineraries. Vailati and Calderoni produced only a modest literary output, and both were dead by the outbreak of the Great War. Giovanni Amendola, who would later suffer tragically and fatally at the hands of the fascists, is an interesting minor figure in the movement. A significant later thinker who identified himself with pragmatism is Antonio Aliotta.
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Crucial to the study of Italian pragmatism is the review Leonardo, launched, co-edited, and sometimes entirely written by Papini and Prezzolini from 1903 to 1907. Many of the seminal essays by these thinkers, as well as important contributions by Amendola, Calderoni, and Vailati, first appeared in its pages. Schiller and James both published in it, and James spared little praise for the review in his correspondence. The more political essays of these thinkers are to be found elsewhere, most notably in the review I1 Regno. Both Papini and Prezzolini wrote autobiographical statements which, together with their correspondence and diaries, provide an excellent picture of these two extraordinary cultural figures, who for a brief time called themselves pragmatists. Some studies of Italian pragmatism are Giovanni Gullace, "The Pragmatist Movement in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962): 91-105; H. S. Thayer, Meaning andAction: A Critical History of Pragmatism, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 324-346; Antonio Santucci, II pragmatism0 in Italia (Bologna: Societh editrice il Molino, 1963); C. P. Zanoni, "Development of Logical Pragmatism in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 40.4 (Oct-Dec 1979): 603-6 19.
E. France Three interrelated schools of thought already making waves in French philosophy warmly greeted James's writings: the "school of action" inspired by Maurice Blondel, the scientific constructionism of Henri Poincad and Pierre Duhem, and the neocritical school inspired by mile Boutroux and Henri Bergson. The first, an important component of Catholic Modernism, came to a quick end with the condemnation of Modernism in 1907 by Pope Pius X. The second argued that scientific theories must be judged only with regard to their ability to account for experimental evidence and to solve practical difficulties. The third was exemplified by ~douardLe Roy, who termed his philosophy "pragmatisme." These schools never completely abandoned the notion of an absolute truth and reality, and they never fully agreed with James's or Schiller's tenet that truth should be identified with the practical. French interest in pragmatism quickly faded after James's death. One exception is Georges Sorel, who gave qualified approval to James's pragmatism and used pragmatic tenets to support his political syndicalism. The relations of pragmatism with French thought is described by Walter Horton, The Philosophy ofthe AbbP Bautain (New York: New York University I'ress, 1926); Richard flumphrey, "f'ragmatism and a Pluralist World," chap. 5 of Georges Sorel: Prophet wifhout Ifonor (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard LJniversity Press, 195 I), pp. 1 17-142; H. S. Thayer, Aleaning and Action. A C r i ~ i c u l History ofPragmatism, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 3 14-323.
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INTRODUCTION
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F. Germany Unlike France or Great Britain, Germany had no ongoing native movement struggling against rationalism, and accordingly it treated pragmatism with minimal respect at best. The reaction against absolutism had erupted four decades before and was already spent: neo-Kantianism presently reigned. Content to dismiss pragmatism as an undigested remnant of Fichte or Nietzsche, or as a crass utilitarian spin-off, most mainstream academics trumpeted the obvious inferiority of American thought. Wilhelm Jerusalem and GUnther Jacoby prior to the First World War, and Arnold Gehlen and Eduard Baurngarten prior to the Second World War, figure as the significant sympathetic interpreters of pragmatism. The best study of the German reaction to pragmatism is Hans Joas, "American Pragmatism and German Thought: A History of Misunderstandings," translated by Jeremy Gaines, in Pragmatism and Social Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 94- 121.
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Research Methods
6. Reference format
The reference style for serial articles and reviews is as follows: [Journal Title] [volume].[number] ([day] [month] [year]): [pages] example:
J Phil 13.6 (3 March 1916): 214-221
Research for this bibliography took four primary forms: the searching of bibliographies, indexes, and electronic database catalogs, and the direct examination of journals and books. The works listed in the historical section of the introduction were consulted. Especially helpfid were the Textual Commentary of the volumes of Dewey's Collected Works, and the explanations of the text appended to each volume of The Works of William James. Nearly all of the publication information in the bibliography was verified by the direct inspection of each item.
1. Philosophy Works Consulted Blau, Joseph L. Men and Movements of American Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Campbell, James. Selected Writings of James Hayden T U B . Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992. Compton, Charles H. William James, Philosopher and Man: Quotations and References in 652 Books. New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1957. Dewey, John. "The Pragmatic Movement of Contemporary Thought: A Syllabus." John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924, vol. 4 (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 25 1-263.
The "number" of a volume's issue is calculated by assigning "1" to the first issue of that volume, "2" to the second, and so forth. Most British and American journals and magazines have long used this convention. Some serials instead number their issues from the very first issue, for example, vol. 4, no. 16, even though each volume only has four issues. Such issues are re-numbered according to the above formula. Other serials do not offer numbers; in these cases a number is assigned to an issue, using this formula. The present-day convention that assigns each volume number to one full year's worth of issues did not generally prevail decades ago. Where a serial assigns a volume number a different way (usually by having two or three volumes a year), the serial's convention is followed. Sometimes a serial only assigns issue numbers; in those cases the volume number represents the decision of the particular research library used which bound that journal for its shelves. Accordingly, volume numbers might vary at other libraries.
Edwards, Paul, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Evans, Valmai Bunvood. "The Pragmatism of Giovanni Vailati." Internalional Journal of Ethics 40.3 (April 1930):41 6-424.
Metz, Rudolf. "Pragmatism." In A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, ed. J. H . Muirhead (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1938),pp. 446-529. Morgenbesser, Sidney. Dewey and His Critics: Essays From the Journal of Philosophy. New York: The Journal of Philosophy Inc., 1977. Passmore, John. "Pragmatism and Its European Analogues." In his A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1966). pp. 95-121 Perry, Ralph Barton. The Thought and Characrer of William James. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935. Riley, I. Woodbridge. "Continental Critics of Pragmatism." Journal of Philosophy 8 (1 9 1 1): 225-232, 289-294.
xxiii
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RESEARCH METHODS
Spirito, Ugo. I1 pragmatismo nella filosoja contemporanea: Saggio critic0 con appendice bibliografica. Florence: Vallecchi, 1921.
Corrado, Michael. "A Bibliography of Italian Logical Pragmatism. I. Giovanni Vailati." Philosophy Research Archives 8 (1980): 76-80.
Wolstein, Benjamin. "Addison Webster Moore: Defender of Instrumentalism." Journal of the History ofldeas 10 (1949): 539-566.
Crowley, John Dennis. "Bibliography of Sidney Hook." In Sidney Hook and the Contemporaty World: Essays on the Pragmatic Intelligence, ed. Paul Kurtz (New York: John Day, l968), pp. 42947 1.
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Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Nature and Mind: Selected fisays of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, with a Bibliography of his writings. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. Reprinted, New Yo&: Russell and Russell, 1965.
Geldsetzer, Lutz. Bibliography of the International Congresses of Philosophy: Proceedings, 1900-1978. New York, London, Paris: K. G. Saw, 1981. Gueny, Herbert. A Bibliography of Philosophical Bibliographies. Westport, Corn.: Greenwood Press, 1977.
2. Bibliographies Consulted Abel, Reuben. "Selected Bibliography." In The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller (New York: King's Crown Press, 1955), pp. 179-203. Adams, E. M. "The Writings of C. I. Lewis." In The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1968), pp. 677-689.
Gunter, P. A. Y. Henri Bergson: A Bibliography. 2nd rev. ed. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1986. I
Baumgardf David. Philosophy Periodicals: An Annotated World List. Washington: Library of Congress, 1952. Bechtle, Thomas C., and Mary F. Riley. Dissertations in Philosophy Accepted at American Universities, 1861-1975. New York: Garland Press. 1981.
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Harris, Leonard. "Bibliography." In The Philosophy of Alain Locke, ed. Leonard Harris. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989. Hibbert Journal. "Bibliography of Religion and Philosophy." Included in each issue of the Hibbert Journal from October 1902 to July 191 1. Until 1910, the bibliography offered considerable annotation. The bibliography was succeeded by the regular "Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature."
Besterman, Theodore. A World Bibliography of Bibliographies, 3rd ed. Geneva: Societas Bibliographica, 1955-1956.
Hoffmans, Jean. La Philosophie et lesphilosophes: Ouvrages ge'nkrau. Brussels: Librarie Nationale d'Art et d'Histoire, 1920.
Bibliografa Filosofca Italiana, dal1900 da 1950. A cum dell' Istituto di Studi Filosofici e del Centro Nazionale di Informazioni Bibliografiche. Rome: Edizioni Delfino, 1953.
Hogrebe, Wolfram, Rudolf Kamp, Gert Konig. Periodica Philosophicd: Eine internationale Bibliographie philosophischer Zeitschrijien von Anfangen bis zur Gegenwart. Dusseldorf: Philosophia Verlag, 1972.
Blau, Joseph L. "Guide to the Literature for Chapter 8: Radical Empiricism." In Herbert W. Schneider, A History of American Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), pp. 572-587.
Jasenas, Michael. A History of the Bibliography of Philosophy. New York: Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim, 1973.
Boydston, Jo Ann, and Kathlcen Poulos. CheckIist of WritingsAbout John Dewey, 18871977.2nd ed., enlarged. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978.
Kallen, Horace M. "Pragmatism." Article with a bibliography in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. I2 (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 307-3 11.
Broyer, John Albin. "Bibliography of the Writings of George Herbert Mead." In The Philosophy of George lferbert Mead, ed. Walter Corti (Winterthur, Switzerland: Amriswiler Bucherei, 1973), pp. 243-260.
Ketner, Kenneth, ed. A Comprehensive Bibliography of the Published Works of Char1e.r S~ndersPeirce with a Bibliography ofsecondaty Studies, 2nd rev. ed. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1986.
Campa, Odoardo, ed. "Bibliografia completa della opere di Mario Calderoni." In Scritti di Mario Calderoni (Florence: Societh anon. editrice "La Voce," 1924), vol. 2, pp. 359-365.
Kloesel, Christian J. W. "Bibliography of Charles Peirce, 1976 through 1981." In 7'he Relevance of Charles Peirce, ed. Eugene Freeman. La Salk, Ill.: The Hegeler Institute. 1983.
Cook, Gary. "13ibliography." In George Herbert Mead: The Making of a Social Pragmatist (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993), pp. 215-225.
Le Breton, Maurice. "Bibliography." In La Personnalite' de William James. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1929.
RESEARCH METHODS
RESEARCH METHODS
Leroux, Emmanuel. Bibliographic methodique du pragmatisme, americain, anglais, et italien. Paris. 1922. Reprinted. New York: Burt Franklin, 1968.
1935." Journal of Philosophy 33.17-18 (13,27 Aug 1936): 449-504; "A Bibliography of Philosophy For 1936." Journal of Philosophy 34.16-17 (5, 19 Aug 1937): 421-476.
Levine, Barbara. WorksAbout John Dewey, 1886-1995. Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996.
Searles, Herbert L., and Allan Shields. A Bibliography of the W& San Diego: San Diego State College Press, 1969.
Lowy, Richard. "George Herbert Mead: A Bibliography of the Secondary Literature with Relevant Symbolic Interactionist References." Studies in Symbolic Interactionism 7B (1986): 459-52 1.
Shook, John. "John Dewey's Early Philosophy: A Research Bibliography." In John Dewey f Early Philosophy: The F o u ~ i o n of s fnstrumentalism, pp. 219-293. Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1994.
Malclb, Louise-Noelle. Manuel de bibliographie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963.
Skrupskelis, Ignas. "Annotated Bibliography of the Published Works of Josiah Royce." In The Basic Writings of Josiah Rayce, edited with an introduction by John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). pp. 1165-1226.
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Mayeroe Milton, et al. "Contributi bibliografica 111. Studi Italiani su Dewey. IV. Studi Shanieri su Dewey." Rivista critica di storia dellafilosoja 6 (195 1): 446-453. McConnell, Francis John. Borden Parker Bowne: His Lge and His Philosophy (New York: Abingdon Press, 1929). Contains a "Bibliography" of Bowne's books, p. 282, and "Articles by Borden P. Bowne," prepared by Carroll D. W. Hildebrand, pp. 282-286. McCoy, Ralph E. Open Court: A Centennial Bibliography, 1887-1987. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987. McDermott, John J. "Annotated Bibliography of the Writings of William James." In The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition, ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 81 1-858. Nicoletti, Giuseppi. "Bibliografia." In Giovanni Papini Opere: Dal "Leonardo" a1 Futurismo, ed. Luigi Baldacci (Milan: Amoldo Mondadori, 1977), pp. 799-804. Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio. "Materiale per lo studio di Vailati." Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia 12.4 (Oct-Dec 1957): 468-485; 13.1 (Jan-March 1958): 82-108. Runes, Dagobert D., ed. Who's Who in Philosophy. Vol. I. Anglo-American Philosophers. New York: Philosophical Library, 1942. Schillcr, I.'. C. S. "l'ragmatis~n." Articlc with bibliography in the Encyclopaetiia o/Religion anti Ethics, ed. James l lastings (New York: Charles Scribncr's Sons, 1924-1927). V O ~10, . pp. 147-150. Schilpp, Paul A. and Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds. "Writings of John Dewey," "Addenda to the Writings of John Dewey," and "1989 Addenda." In The Philosophy of John Dewey, 3rd ed. (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), pp. 61 1-715. Schneider, Carol S. "A Bibliography of Philosophy For 1933." Journal of Philosophy 3 1.17-18 (1 6, 30 hug 1934): 45 1-503; "A Bibliography of Philosophy For 1934." Journal of Philosophy 32.17- 18 ( 15, 29 Aug 1935): 450-504; "A Bibliography of Philosophy For
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of F. C. S. Schiller.
Skrupskelis, Ignas K. WilliamJames: A Reference Guide. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1977. Taylor, Donald S. R G. Collingwood:A Bibliography. New York: Garland, 1988. Toomey, Noxon. "A Bibliography of Pragmatism." Catholic Universify Bulletin 18 (1912): 443-459. Ueding, Wolfgang. "A German Supplement to the Peirce Bibliographies, 1877-1981." American Journal of Semiotics 2 (1983): 209-224. Varet, Gilbert. Manuel de bibliographie philosophique, If. Les Sciences philosophiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956. Walbridge, Earle F. "Horace Meyer Kallen: A Bibliography." In Freedom and Experience: Essays Presented to Horace M Kallen, ed. Sidney Hook and Milton R. Konvitz (Ithica, N.Y.: Comell University Press, 1947), pp. 334-345. Woodbridge, Barry A,, ed. Aped North Whitehead: A Primaty-Secondary Bibliography. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1977.
3. Indexes Consulted Dcll, Marion V., and Jcan C. Ilacon. Poole's Index. Dak and Volume Key. Chicago: Association of Collcge and Kefcrcnce Libraries, 1957. Blackbum, Simon, ed. Mind: Volumes I-C, 1892-1991 Index. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Blau, Peter M., ed. Cumulative Index to The American Journal of Sociology. Volumes I 70, 1895-1965. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. The Catholic Periodicallndex. 1930 - 1933. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1939.
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The Catholic Periodical Index, 1934 - 1938, ed. Richard B. O'Keefe. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Library Association, 1960.
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I
The Saturday Review of Literature Index, 1924-1944. London and New York: R R. Bowker, 1971. Scott, J. W. A Synoptic lndex to the Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Sociefy, 1900-1949. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954.
Cumulative Book Index: A World List ofBooks in the English Language. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1899-1941. I
Cushing, Helen Grant, and Adah V. Morris. Nineteenth Century Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. 1890-1899, With Supplementary Indexng, 1900-1922. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1944. Dallenbach, Karl M., ed. The American Journal of Psychology Index to Volumes 1-XYX. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1926.
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1900-June 1941. Sader, Marion, ed. Comprehensive lndex to English-Language Little Magazines, 18901970. Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1976.
The Catholic Periodical Index, January 1939 - June 1943, ed. Lawrence Leavey. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1939. The Complete Index ofthe Monist, Volumes I-WII, 1890-1907. Chicago: Open Court, 1908.
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Sears, Minnie Earl, and Marion Shaw, eds. Essay and General Literature Index, 119001933. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1934. Shaw, Marion, ed. Essay and General Literature Index, 1934-1940. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1941.
4. Catalog Databases Consulted
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Farber, Evan Ira, executive ed. Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals, 1886-1974. Arlington, Virginia and Inverness, Scotland: Carrollton Press, 1980. Fletcher, William and Mary Poole, ed. Poole 's Index to Periodical Literature, 4th Supplement, 1897-1902, and 5th Supplement, 1903-1907. New York: Houghton Mifllin, 1903, 1908. Goode, Stephen H. Index to Little Magazines, 1900-1919. Troy, N.Y.: Whitston, 1974.
Index to the American Sociological Review, Volumes 1-20, 1936-1955. New York: American Sociological Society, 1956. International lndex to Periodicals. Volumes 1-9, 1907 - March 1943. New York: H. W. Wilson. 1916-1943. Journal of Philosophy Fijiy-Year Index, 1904-1953. New York: The Journal of Philosophy Inc., 1962. McLean, George F. and Valerie Voorhies, ed. Index of The New Scholasticism, Volumes IXL, 1927-1966. Washington, D.C.: The American Catholic Philosophical Association, The Catholic University of America, 1968. Pancake, Cherri M., and Sarah S. East. The Southern Review Index to the Original Series, l blrtn~esI- 1'11. 1935-19.12. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University, 1973.
Philosophical Review lndex, Volumes I-XAXV. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927.
OCLC (Online Computer Library Center) Online Union Catalog, accessed using WorldCatTM.A union catalog of over 36 million items held in member institution libraries. RLG (The Research Libraries Group) Bibliographic Database, accessed using Eureka. A union catalog of over 68 million items held in member institution libraries.
5. Journals Examined Mind Open Court International Journal of Ethics The Monist Philosophical Review Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series Hibbert Journal Journal of Philosophy University of California Publications in Philosophy Thought Analysis Journal of the 1 listory of Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research American Journal of Psychology Psychological Review British Journal of Psychology Psychological Bulletin Journal of General Psychology Journal of Modem History
1. Abbreviations for Serials Amer J Psych Arch Gesch Phil Arch Syst Phil Int J Ethics J Phil Phil Rev Proc Arist Soc Psych Bull Psych Rev Rev Meta Rev Phil Rev de Phil Riv Filo
Z Phil Ph Krit Zeit fllr Psych
American Journal of Psychology Archiv f i r Geschichte de Philosophie Archiv f i r systematische Philosophie International Journal of Ethics Journal of Philosophy, Psychology. and Scientific Methodr ( 1904-1 920) Journal of Philosophy (192% ) Philosophical Review Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series. Psychological Bulletin Psychological Review Revue de mitaphysique et de morale Revue philosophique Revue de philosophie Rivistafilosofica (1 899-1908, v. 1-1 l), Rivista di filosofia (1909- ,v. 1- ) Zeitschrift fur Philosophie undphilosophische Kritik Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und Physiologie der Sennesorgan. I. Abteilung. Zeitschriftfir Psychologie
2. Abbrevations for Collected Works and Critical Editions The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1.6, ed. Charles CP Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 193 1 - 1939, and vols. 7-8, ed. Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958). References provide volume and paragraph numbers. Collected Papers Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis, ed. John Goheen and John Mothershead, Jr. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. Dewey and His Critics Dewey and His Critics: Essays from the Journal of Pl~ilosophy, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser. New York: The Journal of Philosophy, 1977. EW The Early Works ofJohn Dewey, 1882-1898, 5 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1972. MCV The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1923, 15 vols., ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976-1983. LW The Later Works ofJohn I)e\vey, 1925-1953, 17 vols.. cd. Jo Ann I3oydston Carbondale and I~dwardsvillc,Ill.: Southern Illinois University I'rcss, 198 1- 1990.
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Bibliography
A BBRE VIATIONS
Writings of WJ The Writings of William James, ed. John J. McDermott. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1977.
1 Angell, James R Habit and Attention. Psych Rev 5.2 (March 1898): 179183. Habit involves the anticipation of proper stimulus. Attention arises from a need to acquire such stimulus. This functional theory is based on the study of reaction-times. JRS Notes Angell's psychological functionalism was first published in his and A. W. Moore's article, "Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and Habit," Psych Rev 3.3 (May 1896): 245258. There they credit John Dewey and G. H. Mead for its interpretative standpoint. See Dewey, "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology," Psych Rev 3.4 (July 1896): 357-370 [EWZ:96-1091, in which Dewey in turn refers the reader to Angell and Moore's paper for "an excellent statement and illustration" of Dewey's theory of the sensori-motor circuit.
The Nation Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to The Nation, 4 vols., compiled and annotated by Kenneth Laine Ketner and James Edward Cook. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press,1975-87. Philosophy of JD I The Philosophy of John Dewey, vol. 1: The Structure of Experience, edited with an Introduction and Commentary by John J. McDermott. New York: G. P. Putnarn's Sons, 1973. Philosophy of JD 11 The Philosophy of John Dewey, vol. 2: The Lived Experience, edited with an Introduction and Commenkuy by John J. McDermott. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973.
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Pure Experience Pure Experience: The Response to William James, edited and introduced by Eugene I. Taylor and Robert H. Wozniak. Bristol: Thoemmes, 1996.
Theory is hardly less reliable because it is not instinctive or of mental origin. A belief, which is generally a guide to action, a unification of the means to achieve an end, can only be tested by experience. "The end is simply the summing up and completed expression of all the details which constitute the means and make them organic elements in the whole." The practical and the theoretical are inseparable, and truth cannot be isolated or pursued for itself. Philosophy seeks "to realize concretely and state abstractly and in essence the entire experience possible to man." JRS
Selected Writings Selected Writings: G. H. Mead, ed. Andrew Reck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964. Writings I William James: Writings 1878-1899. Text selections and Notes by Gerald E. Myers. New York: The Library of America, 1992. Writings 2 William James: Writings 1902-1910. Text selections and Notes by Bruce Kuklick. New York: The Library of America, 1987. Works The Works of William James. Frederick Burkhardt, General Editor. Fredson Bowers, Textual Editor, lgnas K. Skrupskelis, Associate Editor. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975-1984. Works ECR Works EPh Works EPR Works El's Works ERE Works ERM Works MT Works Prag
Essays. Comments. and Reviews, 1987 Essays in Philosophy, 1978 Essays in Psychical Research, 1986 Essays in I'sychology, 1983 Essays in Radical Enrpiricism, 1976 Essays it1 Religion and Morality, 1982 The i24eaning of Truth, 1975 Pragmatism, 1975
Baillie, James B. Theory and Practice. Int J Ethics 8.3 (April 1898): 291-
3 16.
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Baldwin, James M a r k On Selective Thinking. Psych Rev 5.1 (Jan 1898): 1-24. Reprinted as "Selective Thinking" in Development and Evolution (New York: Macmillan, 1902), pp. 238-268. Truths are habits which have been selected by "the test of fact." The necessities of the environment are manifested socially. James rightly rejected Spencer's cumulative "raceexperience" explanation of knowledge; the "organic selection" upon individual variations proceeds alongside cultural tradition. JRS Reviews Stella E. Sharp, Phil Rev 7.2 (March 1898): 200-201. Notes James referred to this essay as "an unusually well written pragmatic manifesto," in 7'he Meaning of Truth {672), p. 12111[Works MT, p. 70n], but Baldwin took a critical stand against pragmatism. See his "The Limits of Pragmatism" ( 153). 4 Brunschvicg, Leon. De quelques prkjugks contra la philosophie. Rev MCta 6.4 (July 1898): 401-42 1. Summaries Vida F. Moore, Phil Rev 8.1 (Jan 1899): 73.
5 Caldwell, William. Philosophy and the Activity Experience. Int J Ethics 8.4 (July 1898): 460-480. Extracts were reprinted in Pragmatism and Idealism (1 l59), pp. 109-1 15.
Recent philosophy has taken a "practical turn," trying to "grasp the significance of the world from the standpoint of the moral and social activity of man." A survey of philosophers (including James) concludes with the assertions that "the real object of knowledge is to store up reality or experience in conceptions that may, in the form of motives, influence or determine conduct," and that "the mind itself is a dynamic thing." JRS Summaries James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 7.5 (Sept 1898): 538439. Notes See John Watson's response, "The New 'Ethical' Philosophyn (44).
6 Dewey, John. Evolution and Ethics. Monist 8.3 (April 1898): 321-341. Reprinted in EW 5: 34-53. T. H. Hwley surprisingly distinguishes evolutionary progress (survival of the fittest) from ethical progress (survival of as many as possible), but this clashes with his accurate placing of the ethical struggle within the larger evolutionary struggle. Mankind uses one part of nature to control another part. A society may benefit more from the protection of the weak in the fostering of group economy and loyalty. Instincts should be controlled and directed, not rejected as some evil "self-assertion." Morality is a conscious struggle to reconstruct behavior in a changing environment. JRS Summaries Jacob G. Schurman, Phil Rev 7.4 (July 1898): 423-424.
8 Dewey, John. The Primary-Education Fetich. Forum 25 (May 1898): 3 15328. Reprinted in Education Today (27461, pp. 18-35. E W 5: 254-269.
9 Dewey, John. Review of James Mark Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretatiom in Mental Development: A Study in Social Psychology. Phil Rev 7.4 (July 1898): 398-409. Reprinted in EW 5: 385-399. Baldwin shifts from a search for social elements in individual consciousness to an examination of individual psychical processes in terms of their social origin and function. This shift results in a circular definition of personality, and a contradictory theory of moral and social progress. JRS Notes Social and Ethical Interpretations (New York: Macmillan, 1897). See Baldwin's reply, "Social Interpretations: A Reply," Phil Rev 7.6 (Nov 1898): 621-628 [EW 5: Ixxxvi-xciv], and Dewey's rejoinder, Phil Rev 7.6 (Nov 1898): 629-630 [EW 5: 399-4011. See also Dewey's second review of this work, New World 7 (Sept 1898): 504-522 [EW 5: 4024221. William Caldwell discusses these articles in "Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development," American Journal of Sociology 5.2 (Sept 1899): 182-192.
10 Dewey, John. Review of William Torrey Harris, Psychologic Foundarions of Education. Educational Review 16.1 (June 1898): 1-14. Reprinted in EW 5: 372-385.
Dewey, John. Lectures on Psychological and Political Ethics, 1898. Donald F . Koch, ed. New York: Hafner Press, 1976. A transcript of lectures delivered by Dewey at the University of Chicago during the Winter and Spring quarters of 1898, with a prefatory note and introduction by Donald Koch, pp. xix-I. Psychological ethics originates with the true individual, who can modify social custom in response to new demands. To avoid the psychologist's fallacy, aims and habits must be functionally analyzed. The organic circuit and the intellectual process are described. Moral deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal of imagination, in which the self is projected into a possible resolution of competing interests. Conduct is stressed by utilitarianism and charactcr is stressed by intuitionalism, but they are reciprocal notions, distinguished as self-dcvelopn~entbccotnes understood. The rolc of emotions in volition is central. The determinism debate and the egoism/altruism debate both rely on a false division between the self and its actions, since, following James, the self is "defined in terms of what it can do." The basic virtues are conscientiousness, courage, temperance, and justice-love. Political ethics has historically denied that individuals are part of a common social process and rooted in biological, economic, and ethical contexts. Biologically, organisms possess functional identity through change, by an evolving habitual accommodation to the environment. Consciousness is "mediation of action in the reconstruction of function." Society is an organism and consciousness has a social structure. The social organism can make progress when the individual is free to act for the common good. Economically, the role of sciencc and exchange value invalidates socialism. The modem division of labor makes social institutions probletnatic. Ethically, sovereignty is "the working orgiani7ation of the social consciousness." based on a consensus on rights and obligations, which in tum arises out of social rc-adjustment. JHS
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Notes Psychologic Foundations of Education (New York: D. Appleton, 1898). James, William. Human Immortali~:Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine. Boston: Houghton MiMin, 1898. New edition, with replies to criticisms, 1899. Reprinted in William James on Psychical Research, ed. Gardner Murphy and Robert 0.Ballou (New York: Viking, 1960), pp. 279-308. WJ Writings I, pp. 1098-1 127. Works ERM, pp. 75-1 0 1. While not himself interested in immortality, James defends thc possibility of belief in personal immortality against recent materialistic objections. Thought, on the first objection, is entirely dependent on the brain and ceases with its death. Granting that physiology comes closer and closer to showing how thought is a function of the brain, the function need not be a productive one but could be a transmissive or permissive one. The brain need not bring thought into existence, but only allow portions of the "preexisting larger consciousness" to appear. This possibility allows for either individualistic or pantheistic conceptions of immortality. The second objection arises from the continuity between human beings and other living things made prominent by evolution. If there is continuity, not only humans would enjoy immortality, resulting in a very populated heaven. James replies that this objection expresses only a personal distaste and that he is willing to share immortality with as many creatures as the divine wants. IKS Reviews J. C., Revuc NCo-Scolastique 8.4 (Nov 1901): 430-431. James's willingness to Ict every leaf that has ever existed become immortal is too paradoxical to be advanccd without proof. IKS
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Thomas Davidson, Int J Ethics 9.2 (Jan 1899): 256-259. James's position is unclear. Almost two pages of questions are listed, raised by James's notion of the "transmissive hction." IKS C. W. Hodge, Psych Rev 6.4 (July 1899): 424-426. For James thought is a function of the brain, but the function is transmissive and not productive. However, if the brain only transmits a pre-existing consciousness, the term "function" loses its meaning. IKS Albert Lefevre, Phil Rev 9.1 (Jan 1900): 109-110. The "transmissive function" seems inconsistent with James's pluralism. JRS "p", Open Court 14.1 1 (Nov 1900): 702-703. His expositions have the irresistible charm of "emotional mysticism." Immortality erases individuality. JRS F. C. S. Schiller, Nation 67.22 (1 Dec 1898): 416-4 17. James answers the materialistic objection to immortality by accepting all the facts while insisting that the conclusion does not follow. IKS F. C. S. Schiller, Mind n.s. 8.2 (April 1899): 261-263. James's application of modem psychological methods to this topic gives sorely needed "ventilation" to "one of the darkest and dustiest" provinces of philosophy. JRS 12 James, William. introduction. T o Boris Sidis, Introduction to the Psychology of Suggestion (New York: D. Appleton, 1898). Reprinted in Works EPs, pp. 325-327. Personality has generally been studied by metaphysical methods, but Sidis instead uses empirical material compiled since the hypnotic state was recognized as genuine. He discusses suggestibility, double personality, and the psychology of crowds in an original way. IKS
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James, William. Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results. University of California Chronicle 1 (Sept 1898): 287-3 10. James made extensive revisions and deleted the critical remarks about Kant for reprinting as "The Pragmatic Method" { 178). Collected Essays and Reviews { 15791, pp. 406-437. Writings of WJ, pp. 345-362. Writings 1, pp. 1077-1097. Works Prag, pp. 257The words of both philosophers and poets mark the beginning of the trail and point out a direction, but cannot give the fullness of the forest of truth. For James, the starting point is the principle formulated in the 1870s by Charles Sanders Peirce called practicalism or pragmatism: since beliefs are rules of action, to know the meaning of a belief we must know what conduct it is fitted to produce. This rule-which he prefers to restate in terms of experiences to be expected-reveals the idleness of philosophical disputes or their point at issue. In the dispute between materialism and theism, it shows that materialism cannot offer a permanent warrant for our ideal interests. It also defines the differences between monism and pluralism. Traditional English philosophy has always tended towards pragmatism and has produced important results. On the other hand. Kant and present day English idealism have produced nothing of permanent value in philosophy. Philosophic progress is not "through Kant as round him." 1KS 14 Mead, G . H. The Child and His Environment. Transactions of the Illinois Society for Child Study 3 (1898): 1- 1 1.
s d l'essai sur la 15 Milhaud, Gaston S. Le Rationnel: ~ u d e complimentaires certitude. Paris: F d i x Alcan, 1898. Notes James recommends this work, among others, to readers who "wish to read farther" on the general subject of pragmatism, in his "Preface" to Pragmatism t438).
16 Miller, Dickinson S. Review of William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Int J Ethics 8.2 (Jan 1898): 254-255. A "most striking and powerful product" with numerous temptations for the critic. IKS Other reviews of 7he Will to Believe Anon, Dial 23.6 (16 September 1897): 149-150. That faith is often needed before its object can exist, while undeniable as a "general proposition," is a dangerous guide for "untrained seekers." James himself in his comments on psychical research carries too far his principle of believing what one wants to believe, but it is a well-written book, the product of a "rich and acute mind." IKS A. C. Armstrong, Psych Rev 4.5 (Sept 1897): 527-529. For the psychologist, the chief interest of the book lies in the emphasis placed on "emotional and volitional elements in consciousness," the recognition of the "interplay of the several phases of consciousness." In spite of its originality, it can be compared with many contemporary works. One looks forward to the promised treatise on epistemology. IKS John Jay Chapman, "On Prof. James's Will to Believe," The Political Nursery (July 1899): 2-3. Any plumber knows more psychology than James. James gives no picture of life because he has not studied people who have faith. IKS Benjamin Lewis Hobson, Presbyterian and Reformed Review 9 (1898): 726-730. If we cannot know when we have truth, why should we bother having faith that it exists? James omits a sufficient definition of God and does not clarify psychological determinism. James's utilitarianism is regrettable. JRS Alfred Hodder, Nation 65.2 (8 July 1897): 33-35. James's views, in spite of appearances, must be distinguished from the sophistry of subordinating "intelligence to desire" in the name of God and morality. If James invokes the will as a last resort, it is within narrow limits and only within the practical sphere. James's thought is a celebration of the "strenuous mood." IKS Thomas J. McCormack, Monist 8.4 (July 1898): 616-621. James has "an air of blankest despair," offering only subjectivism. Desires surely produce beliefs, but we want justified beliefs. James has an obligation to offer a theory of explanation. JRS F. C. S. Schiller, Mind ns. 6.4 (Oct 1897): 547-554. While a collection of essays, this work reveals a remarkable degree of unity. It is held together by a "strong and picturesque personality." The essays are popular for they appeal to the many without ceasing to stimulate the few. James's work is a protest against "reckless rationalism." It is thus far only a raid upon philosophy, but one which promises "solid conquests." IKS Jacob G. Schurman, Phil Rev 7.1 (Jan 1898): 86-88. James opens our eyes to the "ultimate mysteriousness of the universe." Religious faith is no more irrational that science's confidence in the unifonnity of nature; for both, verification cannot be theoretical but "by its fruits." A suspension of belief is incompatible with sound philosophy. JI<S James Seth, American Journal of Theology 2.2 (April 1898): 393-396. James expands the notion of empiricism to include the moral and the aesthetic. He reaches a "moral and aesthetic idealism." IKS
Giovanni Vailati, Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria 25.3-4 (1899) [Scritfi {1018), pp. 267-2721. Vailati gives an essay by essay summary of James's book, commenting most favorably on James's obvious skill at presenting philosophical ideas with a vitality not usually found in the discipline. EPC Giovanni Vailati, Rivista Italiana Sociologica 3.6 (Nov-Dec 1899) [Scritti {1018), pp. 273-2771. Vailati concentrates on the sociological importance of James's essays, restricting his comments to "The Importance of Individuals" and "Great Men and Their Environment." EPC Giovanni Vailati, Riv Filo 2 (Jan-Feb 1900) [Scritti {1018), pp. 282-2861. Vailati's third distinct review is again more explicatory than critical. It examines the title essay as well as "On Some Hegelisms," with much praise for James. EPC Reviews of the German translation by Th.Lorenz, Der Wille rum Glauben (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1899) Erich Adickes, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 21 (4 Aug 1900): 2074-2077. James is more prudent than others who hold similar views. He holds that decisions are based on inner need. IKS H. Bromse, Zeit Phil Ph Krit 118 (1901): 247-254. Bromse summarizes the contents, with special emphasis on James's preface. While James is eager to defend the having of faith, he gives no details as to its contents. IKS Julius Kaftan, Theologische Literaturzeitung 25 (9 June 1900): 375-377. It deserves serious attention and is appropriate for the modem spiritual situation. However, there are many doubts and questions which could be raised. IKS Notes William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897). It was reprinted as The Works of William James: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). See Friedrich Paulsen's introduction to the German translation, Der Wille zum Glauben (40). 17 Moore, A. W. The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge in Locke's Essay. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1898. The ~ n i v e r s i bof Chicago Contributions to Philosophy, vol. 3 , no. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902). Locke represents the tension between the older scholastic view of knowledge as the statement of a completed system of reality, and the newer scientific view of knowledge functioning in relation to practice. He tries to separate the origin of ideas from their function. However, simple ideas are stimuli to action, and complex ideas stand for problems to be solved. Locke's other classifications of ideas (distinctkonfused, adequatelinadequate, etc.) suffer from difliculties arising from a failure to recognize their functional significance. "Passive empiricism," either of the empirical or rationalistic type, ignores the role of the future in an analysis of experience, and thus makes verification "either needless or impossible." Moore concludes his discussion with a functional account of knowledge. JRS Reviews I.'. C. S . Schillcr, Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 114. A "refreshing advance" which makes "a valunhle and important contribution" to pragmatism. JRS
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Notes Moore notes that this dissertation is "the outcome of work done in Professor Dewey's seminar in advanced logic." An earlier dissertation which was presumably also done under the direction of John Dewey is Waldemar Read's John Dewey's Conception of Intelligent Social Action (University of Chicago, 1897). 18 Peirce, C. S. Reasoning and the Logic of Things. Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner, with an Introduction by Kenneth Laine Ketner and Hilary Putnam. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992. Lectures given at the Cambridge Conferences, February 10 March 7, 1898, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Their titles are "Philosophy and the Conduct of Life," "Types of Reasoning," "The Logic of Relatives," "First Rule of Logic," "Training in Reasoning," "Causation and Force," "Habit," and "The Logic of Continuity." JRS Notes Includes Putnam's "Comments on the Lectures," pp. 55-102. "Training in Reasoning" was first published as (2056). Other portions of the manuscripts of these lectures were first published in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 6: Scientgc Metaphysics (2442). See the "Bibliography of the Works of Charles Sanders Peirce," CP 8, p. 288.
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19 Phillips, D. E. Some Remarks on Number and Its Application. Pedagogical Seminary 5.4 (April 1898): 590-598. Phillips replies to Dewey's "Some Remarks on the Psychology of Number," Pedagogical Seminary 5.3 (Jan 1898): 426-434 [EW 5: 177-1911. Dewey's remarks were directed at Phillips' "Number and Its Application Psychologically Considered," Pedagogical Seminary 5.2 (Oct 1897): 221-281 [EW 5: xxviii-lxxxv], which criticized Dewey and James A. McLellan, The Psychology ofNumber (New York: Appleton, 1895). JRS Notes See M. V. O'Shea, "The Psychology of Number-A Genetic View," Psych Rev 8.4 (July 1901): 371-383.
Ritchie, D. G. The One and the Many. Mind n.s 7.4 (Oct 1898): 449-476. Ritchie defends idealism and the doctrine of rlccessity from the criticisms of James's The Will to Believe (1897). JRS Summaries Ira MacKay, Phil Rev 8.1 (Jan 1899): 70-7 1.
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21 Rogers, Arthur K. Epistemology and Experience. Phil Rev 7.5 (Sept 1898): 467-484. Dewey's functional theory ofjudgment and knowledge is def'endcd and used to retain the common sense distinction between the judgment process and independent reality. When we experience immediate and unproblematic activity. this "concrete" experience is wither subjective nor objcctivc. This distinction arises only in the thought process. aroused by problems. The Hegclian finds one inclusive experience, as does the subjective idealist, but real experience, and hence reality itself. must be pluralistically individualized. In this sense there is an independent reality of experiences beyond my own unified \\hole of immediate experience. while my thought is an inadequate representation of reality. JRS
Royce, Josiah. Studies in Good and Evil: A Series of Essays upon the Problems of Philosophy and of Life.New York: D. Appleton, 1898. Reprinted,
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Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964. In chap. 8, "Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and Nature," Royce uses the concept of "habit" He describes and rejects Peirce's hypothesis of "tychism" (p. 237), instead supporting the position'that "our conscious life is the inner aspect of a physical process of what is called our adjustment to our environment." JRS
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Russell, John E. Epistemology and Mental States. Phil Rev 7.4 (July 1898): 394-396. Russell comments on James H. Tufts's "Can Epistemology Be Based on Mental States," Phil Rev 6.6 (Nov 1897): 577-592. Tufts rejects any theory of knowledge that relies on a trans-mental reality, preferring one that interprets experience within consciousness. This confuses "the criterion of truth with truth itself, the reason or grounds of cognitive certainty with the objective validity of cognition," and approaches subjective idealism. JRS Notes See Tufts's reply, Phil Rev 7.4 (July 1898): 396-397.
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24 Blanchard, D. H. Some Deterministic Implications of the Psychology of Attention. Phil Rev 8.1 (Jan 1899): 23-39. James uses voluntary self-determination and the notion of chance to defend free-will, but neither can rebut determinism. The self cannot be influenced by the nothingness of chance, and "the faculty of the will is left without a function." JRS 25 Brown, George P. The University Elementary School. School and Home Education 18 (1 899): 98-99. The title refers to the University of Chicago, where Dewey chaired the departments of Philosophy and Pedagogy. The latter opened its experimental elementary school in the fall of 1895. JRS 26 Caldwell, William. The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt. lnt J Ethics 9.3 (April 1899): 373-378. Caldwell comments on D. S. Miller's "'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt" (39). James's apparent irrationalism, if properly understood, is a protest against the limitation of cxporicnce to the level of the understanding. with its "antitheses and its enumerations of abstract possibilities." James's position can bc compared with llegcl's and that of many religions. IKS Notes See Brown's "Dr. John Dewey's Educational Experiment," Public-School Journal 16 (1897): 533-537.
27 Dewey, John. John Dewey's "Lectures in the Theory of Logic. '* Edited with an introduction by Stephen Alan Nofsinger. Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1989. These lectures were delivered at the University of Chicago, during the Fall 1899 and Winter 1900 quarters. The seven chapters are titled "A Preliminary Account of Thinking," "Psychology and Logic," "Experience and its Controls," "Discussion of the Nature of Judgment," "The Subject of the Judgment,* "The Predicate of the Judgment," and "Discussion of the Copula" Nofsinger's detailed introduction describes the development of Dewey's thought in these lectures towards his Studies in Logical Themy { 118). JRS Notes See Dewey, Lectures in the Philosophy of Education, 1899, ed. Reginald D. Archambault (New York: Random House, 1966).
28 .Dewey, John. Principles of Mental Development as Illustrated in Early Infancy. Transactions o f the Illinois Society for Child-Study 4 (1899): 65-83. Reprinted in MW 1: 175- 191. 29 Dewey, John. Psychology and Philosophic Method. University of California Chronicle 2 (Aug 1899): 159- 179. Reprinted with "slight verbal changes" as '"Consciousness' and Experience" in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (7931, pp. 242-270. MW 1: 1 13-130. Psychological inquiry does not find states of consciousness "given" as data, and hence it cannot be scientifically isolated from philosophical issues. However, such issues are not independent of larger social and political concerns. The present stress on individual consciousness is a manifestation of democracy. JRS
30 Dewey, John. The School and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1899. London: P. S. King and Sons, 1900.2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1915. Reprinted in MW 1: 1- 109. The school must adapt to the modem industrial needs of society. Education develops the child's natural curiosities into socially useful skills. Theoretical knowledge should be learned in its functional relation to practical human activities, not by rote memorization. Dewey relates the organization and teaching of the University of Laboratory School. JRS Reviews B. A. Hinsdale and A. S. Whitney, Dial 29.4 (16 Aug 1900): 97-99. This work "has virtue" regardless of the future of the school. JRS Thomas J. McCormack, Open Court 14.9 (Sept 1900): 564-569. A detailed and approving exposition. While "institutions for the stupefaction of the public" will always be with us. Dewey's plans are "in the intcrests of advancing civilization." JRS Anon, Transactions of the Illinois Society for Child-Study 4 ( 1 899): 100-10 1 ; Anon, University of Chicago Rccord 5 (1900): 159-160; A. W. Moore, Revicw of Education 7 (1901): 31; Laura Louisa Runyon, Chautauquan 30 (1900): 589-592; William S. Sutton, Educational Review 20 (1900): 303-306. Reviews of 2nd edition Anon, Education 36 (1915-16): 123; Anon, Elementary School Journal 16 (1915): 67-69: Anon, Journal of Education 82 (1915): 357.
31 James, William. Preface, To E. D. Starbuck's Psychology of Religion (London: W . Scott; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.4th ed., 1914)' pp. v-x. Reprinted in WorksERM, pp. 102- 104. When Starbuck first proposed a statistical study of religion, James was sceptical because the "question-circular method" had become a nuisance. He expected Starbuck to receive descriptions of peculiar experiences reflecting the "Protestant Volkgeist," but did not expect the statistical treatment to be important. However, there are interesting statistical results. For example, experiences of conversion are not limited to rare cases, but correspond to common events of moral and religious development. Where some scientists find only hysterics and evangelical extremists find supernatural events, Starbuck discovers "normal psychologic crises." The book adds much to the current psychological and sociological stock-taking. IKS
32 James, William. Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Lge's Ideals. New York: Henry Holt; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1899. Translated by L. S. Pidoux as Causeries p'dagogiques (Paris: Felix Alcan; Lausanne and Paris: Payot, 1900), with a preface by Jules Payot (54). Translated by G. C. Ferrari as Gli ideali della vita: discorsi ai giovani e discorsi ai maestri sulla psicologia (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1902. 2nd ed., 1906). Translated by F. Kiesow as Psychologie und Erriehung (Leipsig: Englemann, 1900; 2nd ed., 1908). New edition, with an Introduction by John Dewey and William H. Kilpatrick [LW 14: 337-3401 (New York: Henry Holt, 1939). Reprinted in WJ Writings I, pp. 705-887. The Works of William James: Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some ofLife's ldeals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). This treatise is a popular restatement of the psychology elaborated in his Principles ofPsychology (1890). Its purpose is to depict mental lives in a manner most useful to teachers. In their desire for professional training teachers are turning to the new psychology in search of basic principles, but there is no new psychology, only the old one with some physiology added to it. Furthermore, no principles of teaching can be deduced from psychology, since teaching is an art. Psychology helps to prevent mistakes by showing which methods will not work, but it does not guarantee good teaching, since that requires ingenuity and tact. Fundamental is the biological view of mind as an organ of adaptation, selecting appropriate responses to impressions received from the environment so as to best avoid harm. The mind is conditioned by the brain, "runs parallel therewith," while currents enter from organs of sense into the brain and leave into muscles and glands. It is best to treat brain and mind as having the same structure and purpose. All thinking, even the most abstract, influences practice. The aim of education is to develop "powers of conduct," fitting a human being into his physical and social world. The task of the teacher is to supervise and direct the acquisition of reactions. Hence, the great mmim of teaching is that there should be no "reception without reaction." Human beings have many native reactions, and every acquired reaction is either a "complication graRed on a native reaction" or a substitution for it. The art of the teacher is to bring about the appropriate complications or substitutions. Pupils begin with native reactions of fear, love, curiosity, imitation, ambition, pugnacity, pride. ownership,
collecting, constructiveness, and many others. Teachers must remember the transitoriness of instincts: impulses ripen at a certain time and fade away if no objects are provided. Teachers must try to recognize the "proper pedagogic moment" when impulses are at their strongest and begin attaching appropriate habits, lest the opportunity be lost. Because habit is second nature and the nervous system must be trained into an ally, useful actions must be made automatic and habitual. To this end, teachers should not so much preach as lie in wait for practical opportunities. Daily routines free the higher powers of the mind for their own proper work. Instincts make certain objects automatically interesting, while other interests have to be acquired. Children are originally interested in novel sensations, in what moves and suggests danger. New interests can be acquired only by association with such native interests. Teachers should strive to recognize native interests, offer objects immediately connected with them, and then gradually introduce the more remote ideas they wish to instill. Attention is either passive or voluntary; the latter cannot be continuously sustained. Teachers have to develop various techniques for gaining and keeping voluntary attention, but once attention is gained, teachers should strive to make the subject itself excite attention. Change and novelty here are very important. People differ in their capacity for concentration as well as the capacities of memory, reasoning, inventiveness, observation. Mental life is dependent upon all of them, and a weakness in an elementary faculty should not be considered decisive. Thus, scatter-brained children can achieve as much as others, provided the objects are interesting enough to attract attention time and time again. Memory training can only be the acquisition of specific additional associations. Most people forget rapidly, but even things once known and forgotten influence our conduct. Association also lies at the bottom of apperception. It is governed by the law of economy: new experiences are received so as to least disturb the old "apperceiving mass." The tendency to economize grows with age and leads to "old fogyism": the incapacity to learn anything new. The education of the will-the formation of charactermust also be treated. All ideas lead to movement. Willful action properly so-called follows deliberation, which occurs when one idea inhibits another in preventing the natural motor consequences of another. Teachers must instill many ideas, making sure not to inhibit the capacity for vigorous action in their pupils. Moral effort is voluntary attention, the effort to keep in focus an idea which otherwise would be driven out by other tendencies. Thus, character formation involves the acquisition of good ideas, the development of moral effort, and habits. The picture of mind thus drawn is mechanistic, but James himself claims to not be a materialist since while the brain is condit~on of consciousness, it is not the producer of consciousness. Freedom remains possible because the anmmt of voluntary attention is indeterm~nate Free will consists of our ability to make more or less of an cn'ort to keep certain ideas i n focus Talks lo Teachers includes three talks to university students: "rhe Gospcl ot Relaxation." "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings." and "What Mabes a Life Significant?" James especially wants to draw attention to the second talk sincc it is closely connected with James's philosophy of pluralism and individualism. For it. there is no universal point of view and "private and uncommunicable" perceptions alnays remain. This philosophy leads to a "democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality," to the outward tolerance of different behaviors IKS
Reviews Charles DeGarmo, Science n.s. 9 (30 June 1899): 909-910. It is well that books on education are being written by "real leaders of thought." This is an important contribution to education, but why did James copy a chapter from his earlier book? Nobody wants to buy the same book twice. James holds that from a science one cannot directly derive an art. A "mediator" is required, a "mind full of tact and invention." IKS Edward H. Griffin, Psych Rev 6.5 (Sept 1899): 536-539. It is dangerous in psychology to have partial points of view obtained by abstracting from the whole. James views humans biologically, as organisms which adapt to their environment, and this obscures "the free activity of mind." Still, it is the work of a "master," never dull, and full of "whole-some and timely" instruction. IKS B. A. Hinsdale, Dial 27.8 (16 October 1899): 275-279. One of the best new works on the subject, full of good sense. It takes away the "terrors" of psychology for teachers. IKS Alfred Hodder, Nation 68.25 (22 June 1899): 481-482. James explains the value of psychology for teachers in a "popular" work marked by "sincerity and conviction." IKS Thomas J. McCormack, Open Court 14.2 (Feb 1900): 125-126. The addresses "abound in practical insight and unconventional wisdom." JRS Cornelia Ahvood Pratt, "Teachers, Students, and Professor James," The Critic 36 (Fall 1900): 119-121. James correctly recognizes that teaching is an art, the practice of which depends upon the personalities of the students and teachers, and which is thus not derivable from the science of psychology. James also correctly holds up character as the goal of education. IKS Reviews of the Italian translation Giovanni Vailati, "Sull'arte d'interrogare," Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1.2 (March-April 1905) [Scritti { 10181, pp. 572-5761. Reviews of the German translation M. OiTncr. Zcit fur Psych 52 (1909): 319-320. James warns against the overemphasizing of psychology in education. For him, man is an active being and the mind is an instrument of adaptation. IKS Notes Ten chapters also appeared in Atlantic Monthly. Chapters 1-3. Atlantic Monthly 83 (Feb 1899): 155-162; chapters 4-7, Atlantic Monthly 83 (March 1899): 320-329; chapters 10 and I I, Atlantic Monthly 83 (April 1899): 5 10-5 17; chap. 15, Atlantic Monthly 83 (May 1899):617-626. "The Gospel of Relaxation" was also published in Scribner's Magazine 25 (April 1899): 499-507. "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings" is reprinted in The Moral Phdosophy of William James, ed. John K. Roth (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), pp. 2 14-232.
33 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vienna and Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1899. 2nd ed., 1903. 3rd ed., 1906. 4th ed., 1909. 5th and 6th eds., 1913. 7th and 8th eds., 1919. 9th and loth eds., 1923. The authorized translation of the 4th ed. was by Charles F. Sanders as Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1910). The loth ed. was also translated by Charles F. Sanders (New York: Macmillan, 1932). I n the fourth edition "my distinctive views have...been brought together and stated cohcrcntly." An empirical. genetic, and biological and social interpretation of mind "has brought me rather close to pragmatism in epistemology." (p. vi) The section "Pragma-
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tism" (pp. 98-102) is a summary, mentioning the principal pragmatists. "Genetic and Biological Epistemology" (pp. 102-134) offers a psychology of knowledge starting from apperception. "The truthfulness of a judgment is nothing more nor less than its practical value for the determination of the means necessary to human welfare." (p. 117) Further sections treat aesthetics and ethics. JRS Reviews Ellen Bliss Talbot, Phil Rev 10.2 (March 1901): 218-219. Reviews of 3rd edition Frank Thilly, Phil Rev 16.2 (March 1907): 2 12. Reviews of 5th edition F. C. S. Schiller. Mind 23.1 (Jan 1914): 146-147. Reviews of 1909 translation Jay William Hudson, Phil Rev 2 1.1 (Jan 1912): 107-109; D. L. Murray, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 436-437; Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 8.8 (13 April 1911): 220-221; Wilmon H. Sheldon, Amer J Psych 22.4 (Oct 1911): 588-589. Reviews of 1932 translation Edward L. Schaub, Monist 43.2 (July 1933): 3 13.
34 Lee, Vernon (pseud. for Violet Paget). The Need to Believe: An Agnostic's Notes on Professor Wm. James. Fortnightly Review n.s. 72.1 1 (1 Nov 1899): 827-842. Reprinted with alterations as "Professor James and the 'Will to Believe'," in Gospels ofAnarchy (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1908), pp. 193-23 1. The author's own need to not believe can refute James's philosophy. The will to believe cannot direct us to any one religion, but anywhere our aesthetic faculties can take us. Theism is too self-contradictory to be desirable, and James's God is really "a man of war," providing us with the bcst of all possible worlds. More preferable is the satisfaction of peaceful harmony with a loving Creator. JRS 35 Le Roy, ~ d o u a r d .Science et philosophie. Rev MCta 7.4 (July 1899): 375-425; 7.5 (Sept 1899): 503-562; 7.6 (Nov 1899): 708-73 1; 8.1 (Jan 1900): 37-72. Le Roy gives an expost on the way in which those inclined toward the positive sciences can understand the unity of knowledge and the mutual rapports of the various orders of knowledge. (p. 375) A contributor to the Theory of Knowledge must first be concerned with its foundation: an initial position to function as a solid base of operations. Using Bergson as a model, Le Roy dedicates the first part of this work, "The Given of Common Sense," to this topic. Included is a discussion of the ideas of space and time. He concludes that everyday knowledge (connaissance commune) is the sole field for knowledge, and that the words "reality," "truth," and "certitude" are defined by the use common thought gives to them. It is thcrcfore a mistake to raise questions about other, more subtle, meanings. The foundation of everyday knowledge is solid and indubitable, but the form, toufepratique. is not to be trusted. 111 the sccond part, L,c Roy takes up an ar~alysisof scicncc (and a critique of common sense). lie concludes that: ( I ) science itself is nothing but a form-it is common sense that gives it its organization, (2) science begins by collecting materials i n i t \ "positive stage," then moves to an experimental stage, and finally comes to a rationd
stage in which it attempts to construct a model of the world, and (3) the rationalistic method of completed science is limited to symbolic representation and the laws of its origin and genesis restrict the rational truth of science to contingency and relativity. In the final two parts, Le Roy turns his attention to philosophy, and considers its definition and the question of whether it consummates and perfects knowledge. The Bergsonian critique makes an important point that the difficulty of responding to questions generally attends those which are ill-posed. Philosophical truth is what can be lived and put into practice; philosophical knowledge is thus a living and true knowledge. (p. 70) From a social point of view, the function of philosophy is to begin the education of common sense anew. Ultimately there exist three representative doctrines of given reality: common sense, science, and philosophy. There are thus three points of view: that of bodily action and social relations, that of a reductive analysis and rigorous discourse, and that of sympathetic intuition and of internal life. The course of these methods are connected by three successive orientations of mind, and all rest on the liberty of the mind. (p. 71) There is a response in the final portion of this work by Couturat on pp. 223-233. LF Summary of the first two sections E. A., Phil Rev 9.2 (March 1900): 2 11-212. Notes James recommends this work to those who "wish to read farther" on pragmatism, in his "Preface" to Pragmatism (438). See also Le Roy, "Un Positivisme nouveau" (66) and "Sur quelques objections adresskes h la nouvelle philosophie" (67).
36 Marshall, Henry Rutgers. Belief and Will. Int J Ethics 9.3 (April 1899): 359-373. Marshall sides with James in the controversy raised by D. S. Miller's "'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt" {39). IKS 37
Mead, G. H. The Working Hypothesis in Social Reform. American Journal of Sociology 5 (1 899): 367-37 1. Pp. 369-37 1 are reprinted in Selected Writings, pp. 3-5. 38 Miller, Dickinson S. Professor James on Philosophical Method. Phil Rev 8.2 (March 1899): 166- 170. James associates pragmatism with empiricism, but empiricism is only interested in the origin of a concept, not its destiny. Is James prepared to accept the consequence that the truth of a concept lies in its utility? JRS
39
Miller, Dickinson S. "The Will to Believe" and the Duty to Doubt. Int J Ethics 9.1 (Jan 1899): 169-195. Kant, Fichte. and Arthur Balfour appeal to the will to overcome religious skepticism. James gocs further by refusing to sanction faith by reason. The will to believe is the "will to deceive." James's method is to take as certain what is not, to "hypnotize" the mind. IKS Summaries Boyd fl. Bode. Phil Rcv 8.2 (March 1899): 195-196.
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Notes See Caldwell's comments, "The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt" (261, and Henry R. Marshall, "Belief and Will" (36). 40 Paulsen, Friedrich. Introduction. To Der Willezum Glauben (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1899). This work is the German translation by Theodor Lorenz o f William James's The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longrnans, Green, and Co., 1897). 41 Rogers, A r t h u r Kenyon. A Brieflntroduction to Mociern Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1899. The final chapter, "Scepticism and the Criterion of Truth," argues that any truth is at best a probable hypothesis and serves active experience. JRS Reviews James B. Baillie, Int J Ethics 10.4 (July 1900): 525-530. Too many contradictions infect Rogers' offered experimental criterion of truth. JRS 42 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Hugo MUnsterberg, Psychology and Life.Mind n.s. 8.4 (Oct 1899): 540-543. Notes See J. Mark Baldwin's response, "Prof. Miinsterberg's Psychology and Life," Mind n.s. 9.2 (Jan 1900): 143, and Schiller's reply, ibid., pp. 143-144. 43 Vailati, Giovanni. Alcune osservazioni sulle quesfioni di parole nella storia della scienza e della cultura (Prolusione ad un corso libero di Storia di Meccanica, 1898-99.) Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1899. Reprinted in Scritti { 10 181, pp. 203-228. An examination of the clarity of meaning in scientific and cultural discourse, this essay draws most heavily on Aristotle. While there is no mention of the American pragmatists, Vailati does refer to Lady Welby's "Sense, Meaning, and Interpretation," Mind n.s. 5.2 (April 1896): 186. EPC 44 Watson, John. The New "Ethical" Philosophy. Int J Ethics 9.4 (July 1899): 413-434. Watson responds to William Caldwell's "Philosophy and the Activity-Experience" ( 5 ) . Intellectual idealism's identification of knowledge and being is defended against "ethical" idealism, which, in proclaiming the relativity of knowledge, is inherently skeptical and contradictory. James's view that reality is only partly intelligible, and hence requires the supplement of faith, is only partly correct. Experience is wider than knowledge, but "no theory of reality can be true which is based upon a particular aspect of reality." Thus there can be no unintelligible aspect of experience. This doctrine actually supports free-will: resting free-will on mere feeling is hardly philosophical. JRS Notes See James Lindsay's response, "Ethical versus lntellectual Idealism," Int J Ethics 10.2 (Jan 1900): 235-240. Caldwell's "Pragmatism" (46) answers both Watson and Lindsay.
45 Boodin, J. E. The Reality of Religious Ideals. In Unit (Iowa College), vol. 5 (1900), pp. 97-109. Reprinted in Harvard Theological Review 2.1 (Jan 1909): 58-72. Truth and Reality (9161, pp. 307-326.
46 Caldwell, William. Pragmatism. Mind n.s. 9.4 (Oct 1900): 433-456. Portions were reprinted in Pragmatism and Idealism { 1 1591, pp. 109- 115. James's "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" (13) gives us Pragmatism, a fortunate "blankly utilitarian and flatly commonplace" term, which can be applied to recent "ethical" tendencies in philosophy. A generally supportive exposition is followed by a statement of seven necessary but missing assumptions, chief being a criterion for judging consequences and a statement of our present experience of the world. German metaphysicians have long agreed that reality is what stands in a verifiable relation to us; why should James cast them aside? Pragmatism is an expression of current science and psychology, but it requires a criticism of categories and a theory of ideas. Then it would be a worthy "attempt at an ontology through the door of a teleology." JRS Reviews Warner Fite, Psych Rev 8.2 (March 1901): 197-198. Has not James simply "overlooked the limiting conditions of activity?" How could John Dewey be omitted from the list of pragmatists? JRS Summaries N. E. Truman, Phil Rev 10.2 (March 1901): 204-205. 47 Dewey, John. Lectures on Ethics, 1900-1901. Donald F . Koch, ed. Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991. A transcript of lectures delivered by Dewey at the University of Chicago in 1900 and 1901. .Three sets of lectures are included, from his "The Logic of Ethics," "The Psychology of Ethics," and "Political Ethics" courses. It contains a preface and introduction by Donald Koch, pp. vii-lvii. JRS Reviews James Campbell, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 29.1 (Winter 1993): 107114; K. J. Dykeman. Choice 29 (Nov 1991): 462; Abraham Edel, Ethics 102.3 (July 1992): 85 1-853. 48 Dewey, John. Mental Development. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1900. Reprinted in MW 1: 192-22 1. From age two to twenty-four, the mind progresses from play activity through intellectual interest to independent inquiry. JRS 49 Dewey, John. Psychology and Social Practice. Psych Rev 7.2 (March 1900): 105- 124. Also published in Science n.s. 1 1 (2 March 1900): 32 1-333, and as University of Chicago Contribzrtions to Education, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Cl~icagoPress, 1901). In Philosophy, Psychologr~,and Social Praclice, ed. Joseph Katner (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 295-3 15. MW 1: 13 1 150. I'caching today assumcs that the child's psychology is fundamentally different from adults. and that schooli~lgshould impart to the child those specialized skills of adulthood.
Instead, psychology should use the school to test developmental theories of social personality. Psychology can thus contribute to an ethical understanding of that institution. Similarly, psychology should study all social institutions in their relations of value to all members of society, lest we fall victim to the alternative of aristocratic hierarchy. JRS Reviews L.M. Aldrich, Phil Rev 9.3 (May 1900): 340-341.
50 Dewey, John. Review of Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, First Series: The Four Historical Conceptions of Being. Phil Rev 9.3 (May 1900): 3 1 1-324. Reprinted in MW 1: 241-256. Royce prefers the Absolute to contradictory and meaningless experience, but he ignores Kant's critical rationalism, in which possible experience tests the validity of ideas. "What we need is a reconsideration of the facts of struggle, disappointment, change, consciousness of limitation, which will show them, as they actually are experienced by us (not by something called Absolute) to be significant, worthy, and helpful." JRS Notes The World and the Individual, First Series (New York: Macmillan, 1900). See Dewey's review of the second part of this work (89). 51 Dewey, John. Some Stages of Logical Thought. Phil Rev 9.5 (Sept 1900): 465-489. Reprinted with revisions in Essays in Experimental Logic (13591, pp. 183-219. MW 1: 151-176. Thought is a doubt-inquiry function, that aims at settled assurance. Thought proceeds through four stages: fixed social attitudes, reflective reconstruction, the Aristotelian quest for first premises, and finally inductive and empirical research. Aristotelianism, empiricism, and transcendentalism all confine inquiry's material and extent, and hence fail to capture modem science's instrumental aims. A new practicality theory of thought would reinterpret the terms of thought as "divisions of labor within the doubt-inquiry process." JRS
Mead, G. H. Suggestions Toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines. Phil Rev 9.1 (Jan 1900): 1-17. Reprinted in Selected Writings,pp. 6-24. Dewey's theory of the reflex arc holds that sensations result from the fixing of attention on a problematic experience. When this theory is philosophically applied, metaphysics is the statement of a problem, deductive logic idealizes the past meaning of the object, psychology takes up the subjective immediate experience, and inductive logic forms new meanings of objects. Ethics is the application of these methods to conduct, and aesthetics treats the representations of the object. "Finally, the general theory of the intelligent act as a whole would fall within that of logic as treated in works such as that of Hegel." JRS Notes See Dewey, "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology," Psych Rev 3.4 (July 1896): 357370 [EW 5: 96-1093.
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Moore, A. W. Review of James Ward, Natzrralism and Agnosricisn~ American Journal of Sociology 5.4 (Jan 1900): 553-556.
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Ward does not consistently apply a teleological interpretation to the subject-object relation within experience. JRS Notes Naturalism and Agnosticism (London and New York: Macmillan, 1899). 54 Payot, Jules. Preface. To Causeries pkdagogiques (Paris: Felix Alcan; Lausanne and Paris: Payot, 1900). This work is the French translation by L. S. Pidoux of William James's Talks to Teachers on Psychology (32). The preface consists primarily of quotations illustrating the great merits of James's work. For James, psychology is a science, while teaching is an art. IKS Peirce, C. S. Review of Josiah Royce, l%e World and the Individual, First Series: The Four Historical Conceptions ofBeing. Nation 70.14 (5 April 1900): 267. Reprinted in The Nation, Part Two, pp. 239-24 1. The purpose of Royce's "important book" is "to say what it is that we aim at when we make any inquiry or investigation." (p. 239) Peirce focuses here on the doctrine of possible experience, the only view Royce takes to be "essentially different" than his own. Peirce describes this view, explains Royce's four objections to it, and voices his opinion that these positions are more consonant than Royce admits. LF Notes The World and the Individual, First Series (New York: Macmillan, 1900). See Peirce's review of the second part of this work (72).
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56 Robertson, J o h n M. The Ethics of Opinion-Making. Int J Ethics 10.2 (Jan 1900): 173-193. Robertson describes James's "will to believe" thesis as "risk one error rather than risk another error." Even Pascal avoided "the false proposition that a man can of conscious choice set up the habit while believing or fearing that the given belief is baseless, and may so reach hallucination." JRS 57 Rogers, Arthur K. The Hegelian Conception of Thought. Phil Rev 9.2 (March 1900): 152- 166; 9.3 (May 1900): 293-3 10. The psychology of the struggling organism displays a distinction between the object prior to thought and the object known. Purposive activity binds experience; no timeless Absolute is needed. Reality is distinct from our knowledge, though it can be known. JRS Notes Rogers further critiques Hegelianism in "The Neo-Hegelian 'Self and Subjective Idealism," Phil Rev 10.2 (March 1901): 139-161.
58 Schiller, F. C. S. On Some Philosophical Assumptions in the Investigation of the Problem of a Future Life. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 15.1 (Feb 1900): 53-64. Reprinted in expanded form as "Philosophy and the Scientific Investigation of a Future Life" in Humanism (139) pp. 266-289. There could be empirical evidence of continuity between this life and the next. JRS Notes See his "Do Men Desire Immortality" (73).
59 Schiller, F. C. S. On the Conception of 'ENE'PTEIA 'AKINHCI'AZ. Mind n.s. 9.4 (Oct 1900): 457-468. Reprinted as "Sur la conception of I'dvdpye~a cixtvqaiaC in BibliotMque du congrb international de philosophie. IV. Histoire de philosophie (Paris: Armand Colin, 1902). pp. 189-209, In "revised and considerably expanded" form as "Activity and Substance" in Hwnanivm (139) pp. 204-227. A discussion and defense of Aristotle's elevation of energylactivitylprocess to the highest conception of reality. Life tends toward a perfectly harmonious adjustment of activities, providing e k m d happiness. Philosophers cannot fail to "appreciate the great practical value of putting before men a metaphysical ideal of being which stimulates us to be active and to develop all our powers to the utmost." JRS Summaries Warner Fite, Psych Rev 8.2 (March 1901): 201-203; W. A. Heidel, Phil Rev 12.4 (July 1903): 474-477; N. E. Truman, Phil Rev 10.1 (Jan 1901): 88.
60 Balfour, A r t h u r J. The Foundations ofBelief: 8th ed., revised, with a new introduction and summary (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901). Both naturalism and transcendental idealism are condemned by their incompatibility with the existence of ethical ideals and moral practice. Science and religion can be reconciled, so long as the notion that "all beliefs ultimately trace their descent to nonrational causes" is firmly rejected. Theism provides the soundest basis for this reconciliation. JRS Reviews Jacob G. Schurman, Phil Rev 1 1.2 (March 1902): 213-214. Balfour's restatement of his position in this edition, that the harmony between the knower and reality arises by common design, better distinguishes it from James's "will to believe" position. JRS 61 Bonatelli, F. 11 movimento prammatistico. Riv Filo 3.2 (Spring 1901): 145151. 62 Calderoni, Mario. I postulati della scienza positiva ed il diritto penale. Florence: Stab. tipo-litografico pei minori corrigendi, 1901. Florence: Ramella, 1901. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni (17491, vol. I , pp. 33-168. Calderoni's thesis for the laureate degree in law shows an interesting predisposition towards examining the meanings of words pragmatically. The question of free will is located at the center of the current debate between the positivist and classical schools of jurisprudence. Calderoni maintains that the dispute between these two schools has much to do with confusion over the meaning of the term. Imprecision df language renders the dispute so complicated so as to be nearly unresolvable. Without invoking I'eirce specifically, Calderoni urges the careful examination of the meanings of concepts and ideas in order to resolve problems and conflicts in jurisprudence. EPC
Reviews G. C. Ferrari, Rivista Sperimentale di Freniatria 39.2 (1902): 405-406; E. Juvalta, Riv Filo 4.2 (1901): 256-263; G. Lombroso, Archivo di Psichiatria, Scienze Penali ed Antropologia Criminate 23 (1902): 656; Giovanni Vailati, Rivista Italiana di Sociologia 4 (March-June 1902): 2-3 [Scritti { 10181, pp. 42 1-4281.
63 Howison, George H. The Limits ofEvolution and Other Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theoty of Personal Iakalkrn. London and New York: Macmillan, 1901.2nd ed., 1905. In chap. 6, "Human Immortality: Its Positive Argument," pp. 279-312, Howison declares that James's Human Immortality {I 1) barely leaves room for faith. Howison attempts to raise this "ideal hypothesis" to the level of demonstrated fact. Only once does James approach the "idealistic doctrine of an eternal pluralism." On the whole, for James, our personalities are only fragments, transmitted by our brain, of the vast "mind-ocean" beyond our consciousness. And once the transmitter dies, our personalities will die with it and "vanish into nameless nothing." IKS In chap. 7, "The Harmony of Determinism and Freedom," pp. 313-380, Howison rejects James's dilemma of pessimistic determinism vs. optimistic subjectivism. Personal self-determination aiming at God's atonement reconciles necessity and choice. JRS Reviews Norman Kemp Smith, Hibbert Journal 4.2 (Jan 1906): 451-455.
64 James, William. Frederic Myers's Service to Psychology. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 17 (May 1901): 13-23. Reprinted in Popular Science Monthly 5 9 (Aug 1901): 380-389. Memories and Studies {957), pp. 145- 170. William James on Psychical Research, ed. Gardner Murphy and Robert 0. Ballou (New York: viking: 1960), pp. 213-225. Works E P R , - ~ ~ . 192-202. While searching for evidence of human immortality, Myers contributed to the psychological study of mind. Cultivated by academics, past psychology studied mind as an abstraction and only described normal adult consciousness. Myers was among the romantics types, who in recent years have uncovered a mass of phenomena lurking at the fringes of normal mind. For them, the normal mind is only an extract from a larger whole. Myers's central notion was that of the subliminal self, and his problem was to establish the precise constitution of the subliminal. His hypothesis is very important, but James has not studied the matter sufficiently to express a definite opinion. IKS 65
James, William, James M a r k Baldwin, et al. Experience. Article in Dictionav of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 1, ed. James M. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1901. Rpt., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), pp. 360362. James's contribution @p. 360-361) is in Works EPh, p. 95. Experience is the totality of present data, taken in its immediacy before reflective analysis. Other mcnnings invite question-begging, making discussion impossible. IKS
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Le Roy, ~ d o u a r d Un . Positivisme nouveau. Rev Mtta 9.2 (March 1901): 138-153.
On the threshold of the 20th century we are witnessing the birth and growth of a new Critique, which attempts to substitute the ancient conceptions with an altogether different theory of science's nature, meaning, scope, value, and methods. In light of several objections, not the least of which is that its advocates are accused of not believing in truth, Le Roy argues that this new critique is a reaction against the old positivism, which was too simplistic, too utilitarian, and too encumbered with a priori principles. As well, he holds that the new view is the point of departure of a new positivism which is more realistic, and more confident in the powers of the mind. LF Notes James recommends this work to those who "wish to read farther*' on pragmatism, in his "Preface" to Pragmatism (438).
67 L e Roy, ~ d o u a r d .Sur quelques objections adresstes i la nouvelle philosophie. Rev Mtta 9.3 (May 1901): 292-327; Rev M6ta 9.4 (July 1901): 292-327. In the first part Le Roy is concerned to provide an explanation of the "new philosophy" so that there will no longer be any uncertainty about its leanings. and to make it evident that it constitutes real progress without sacrificing anything that was acquired in the past. The new philosophy is understood as both an attitude and a discipline. Le Roy's conclusions include the following: (1) understanding is not a purely intellectual act, since a truth is only fully understood if it is lived, (2) living a truth consists in making it an object of an inner life in which one believes, lives on, and fully embraces, and (3) far from having skeptical leanings, this doctrine founds the only effective means of reconciling the critical mind with the positive spirit. In the second part, Le Roy discusses the production of knowledge itself, its results, and its signification. Serious objections have been leveled against his position on the contingency of what we call the Laws of Nature. The objections center on a central question: Why does science succeed? From what is the obvious fact of its success derived? In response, Le Roy develops several views on the nature of matter. LF Notes James recommends this work to those who "wish to read farther" on pragmatism, in his "Preface" to Pragmatism (438). 68 Leuba, James H. The Contents o f Religious Consciousness. Monist 11.4 (July 1901): 536-573. Whether we have the right or duty "to act as if we believed what seems best," as James claims, everyone surely behaves this way. Religious consciousness operates on "working hypotheses." JRS 69 Leuba, James H. Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion. Monist 11.2 (Jan 1901): 195-225. Religious experience is the foundation for "corporate religion," embodied in "beliefs and ceremonies." Definitions of religions have all suffered from ovei-intellectualizing. The existence and charactcr of the divine is less important than our relation to it. Psycllology has revealed the inseparability of feeling, thought, and will. A religious psychology will study all three aspects. JRS
70 Marshall, Henry R Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Self. Mind n.s. 10.1 (Jan 1901): 98-1 13. Marshall offers a theory of self as one limited psychical system operating among others. He defends James's view that "belief is essentially an act of volition." JRS 71 Mead, C. H. A New Criticism of Hegelianism: Is It Valid? American Journal of Theology 5.1 (Jan 1901): 87-96. A review of Charles D'Arcy, Idealism and Theology (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1899). Hegel deserves credit for his thesis that "entities are but formulations of thought at different phases of experience." "Reality lies in immediate experience" and "thought can only make us conscious of how we act." Hegelianism can be misused to postulate a supreme conscious entity, as the author argues, but is the only alternative a vision of independent personalities, divided by an ontological and epistemological chasm? A social conception of the self, in the true spirit of Hegel, forbids all modem idealisms. Philosophy is "a statement of the method by which the self in its full cognitive and social content meets and solves its difficulties." JRS
"Human Sentiment with Regard to a Future Life," Int J Ethics 12.1 (Oct 1901): 115-1 17. See also his "Note on a Questionnaireon Human Sentiment with Regard to a Future Life," Mind n.s. 10.3 (July 1901): 433; his "The Desire for Future Life," Independent 57 (15 Sept 1904): 601604; and his "The Answers to the American Branch's Questionnaire Regarding Human Sentiment as to a Future Life," Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 18.4 (Oct 1904): 416-453.
74 A Troglodyte [pseud. for F. C. S. Schiller], editor, with the cooperation of THE ABSOLUTE and others. Mind! A Unique Review of Ancient and Modern Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate, 1901. The best philosophical humor of that era, Schiller's "Special Illustrated Christmas Number" substituted for the Mind October number of vol. 10. The cover is a "Portrait of Its Immanence The Absolute," offering a uniform disk of "the very pink of perfection." The articles satirize typical contributors and topics, especially the narrow historian and the Hegelian idealist JRS Seth, James. The Utilitarian Estimate of Knowledge. Phil Rev 10.4 (July 1901): 341-358. James has rightly shown the practical value of knowledge, so that "the value of knowledge depends...upon the character of the will that uses it." This is common business sense, but was denied by the Greek philosophers, who, with Kant, said that "all practical virtue is an expression of intellectual virtue." To reverse this, we should say that ideas which have no expression in action are valueless. However, if this implies that practice determines truth, then all beliefs are mere opinions. This agnostic tendency is incompatible with the disinterested curiosity of strictly intellectual life. "The destiny of the intellect is independent" from worldly practical needs and wishes, but is instead devoted to the higher ethical goal of the common truth and love for God. JRS Reviews John Grier Ilibben, Psych Rev 9.1 (Jan 1902): 99-100. The true scholar follows the "categorical imperative" of science: the pursuit of scientilic truth should be for its own sake. JRS
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Peirce, C. S. Review of Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, Second Series: Nature, Man, and the Moral Order. Nation 75.5 (3 1 July 190 1): 94-96. Reprinted in The Nation, Part Three, pp. 8 1-86. The aim of this second and more persuasive volume, is to introduce into the Hegelian philosophy of religion the new "scientific conceptions" (logical, psychological, and mathematical) recently worked out. The new mathematical ideas about infinity, and particularly our conceptions of it, are of the most interest to Peirce. "As a first serious attempt to apply to philosophical subjects the exactitude of thought that reigns in the mathematical sciences," Royce's book "will stand a prominent milestone upon the highway of philosophy." (p. 82) Peirce provides a rough sketch of Royce's views, including an account of the distinction between internal and external meaning, Royce's map analogy to explain how an idea can be of the nature of an "entire life." the connection of selves, and God. I le also discusses possibility in llegel and Royce, rcpresentation. and Royce's refutation of rcalism. On the last issue, I'eirce argues that Royce has been led astray by tlegelian logic, that he has a wrong definition of realism, and that he has conflated "to be" with "to be represented." LF Notes 7%e World atzdthe Ind~v~dual, SecondSeries (New York: Macmillan, 1901).
73 Schiller, F. C. S. Do Men Desire Immortality? Fortnightly Review 76.3 (Sept 1901): 430-444. Reprinted as "The Desire for Immortality" in Humanism { 1391, pp. 228-249. A study of people's thoughts on death would likely reveal that few are preoccupied by it. requirir~gthc dcvaluatiou of in~mortalityand any religion using it. A questionnaire about lili: alicr clcath is acco~~tpanicd by Schillcr's cspli~l~ittiot~ that the results will assist a "cll;~l~gc oftxtics" hy the Anlcricau~Society Ibr I'sychical liescarch. J I G Notes I'l~cq~tcstio~~r~oirc. uith Schillcr's stntcment tkat the rcsults will rticasure the emotional bias in her of surviviug dcath. and test the doctrine of a "will to believe." comprises his
76 Stratton, George M. A Psychological Test of Virtue. Int J Ethics 1 1.2 (Jan 190 1): 200-2 13. Stratton discusses John Dewey's analysis of good and evil conduct in Tile Study of Ethics: A Syllab~is(1894) [EW 4: 219-3631. It seems "profoundly true" that good acts arc in accord with one's whole nature, but the strict psychologist sees the true self in every act. foolish or deliberate. Dewey instead identifies the true self with an ideal self, leaving bad acts without a real origin or explanation. Dewey fails even to offer a definite criterion PI goodness, so his "whole nature" test is passed even by the consistent sinner, who, on Dewey's theory, could claim that he did not do the evil We judge people, not by thcir progress toward their ideals, but by their ideals. Where is Ikwcy's theory of higher ntrd lower ideals? JKS Summaries Warner I:ite, Psych Rev 9.2 (March 1902): 203-204; N. i:. I ruman, Phil Re\ 10 3 (hltt> 1901): 317.
77 Bawden, H. Heath. The Functional View o f the Relation between the Psychical and the Physical. Phil Rev 11.5 (Sept 1902): 474-484. The history of philosophy displays a progressive hypostatization of mental functions, leaving parallelism as the modem insoluble problem. Functionalism instead holds that "all our reflective distinctions arise within the life of action." The physical is the habitually controlled means, and the mental is unrealized ideals. Their separation occurs when direct experience is broken up by a problem and the process of its resolution. "Reality and experience are one organic whole" and "is capable of growth or transformation." JRS Notes This essay is a companion to a prior article, "The Functional Significance of the Terms 'Sensory' and 'Motor'," Psych Rev 7.4 (July 1900): 390-400. Bawden continues such themes with reference to Emst Mach and James Mark Baldwin in "The Functional Theory of Parallelism," Phil Rev 12.3 (May 1903): 299-3 19. 7 8 Bergson, H e n r i L'effort intellectual. Rev Phil 53.1 (Jan 1902): 1-27. Reprinted with significant alterations in his L'Energie spirituelle: Essais et confkrences (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1919). Translated by H. Wildon Carr as MindEnergy (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), pp. 186-230. This revised essay was also reprinted in Oeuvres, ed. Andrk Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), pp. 930-959; and in Mdanges, ed. Andre Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 5 19-550. Bergson argues that intellectual work takes an idea "through different planes of consciousness...from the abstract to the concrete." He applies Dewey's thesis, presented in "The Psychology of Effort," Phil Rev 7.1 (Jan 1897): 43-56 [EW 5: 151-1 631, that effort results from the use of acquired habits in learning new habits. JRS Reviews of L 'Energiespirituelle F. C. S . Schiller, Mind 29.3 (July 1920): 350-354. 79 Berle, A. A. Professor James on Religious Experience. Congregationalist and Christian World 87.5 1 (20 Dec 1902): 933. James's Varieties oJ Religious Ekperience {90) contains "supposed concessions to Christian experience," but cannot distinguish the "pseudo-experiences" of Christian "cults" from "genuine spiritual enlightenment." James's "scientific credulity" values all evidence equally, but the churches use contemporary witnesses to judge religious veracity. Scientific research into immortality and spiritualism cannot replace the New Testament. JRS
80 Boyce Gibson, W. R. The Problem of Freedom in Its Relation to Psychology. In Personal Idealism, ed. Henry Sturt (London and New York: Macmillan, 1902), pp. 134-192. The "soft" determinism of James, throwing us into the "shapeless arms of indeterminism," results from an unnecessary psychological admission that "only matter in motion can he a dctcrnminant of tnaterial change." Instead, an indirect proof that mind can affect matter will best defend kee will. 'l'he pursuit of such a proof comprises the bulk of the cssay. Jnmcs's psychology. which holds that an individual's cxperience should be esplai~~ed by sorncthing beyond his personality, has simply made the necessary postulate
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leading to the determinist4ndeterminist dilemma An alternative psychology, aiming to defend the unity of the self s immediate experience, will not make volitional activity a mere delusion. James's indeterminism fails to relate choices to a person's personality. JRS Reviews William James, Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 93-97 [Collected Essays and Reviews (15791, pp. 442-444; Works ECR, pp. 540-5451. Gibson distinguishes two kinds of psychology: the inductive and the direct. The former describes things from the outside, while the latter places itself in the position of the subject. Direct psychology describes an "active inwardness" and this is what Gibson means by freedom. For this conception, indeterminism is not essential. IKS Charles S. Peirce, Nation 76.23 (4 June 1903): 462-463 [The Nation, Part Three, pp. 125-1271; Arthur K. Rogers, Phil Rev 12.5 (Sept 1903): 577-580.
81 Bradley, F. H. On Active Attention. Mind n.s. 11.1 (Jan 1902): 1-30. Reprinted in Collected Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939, vol. 2, pp. 408443. James's theory of attention is criticized in several footnotes. In another footnote, Bradley explains his rejection of the idea that all thought is ultimately practical. JRS 82 Bradley, F. H. On Mental Conflict and Imputation. Mind n.s. 11.3 (July 1902): 289-3 15. Reprinted in Collected Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 3 3 , vol. 2, pp. 444-475. James's defense of free will is criticized in a long footnote. James wrongly creates a false alternative between determinism and pure chance, and does not see that pure chance is just as incompatible with our moral experience of responsibility. JRS
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Carus, Paul. Theology as a Science. Monist 12.4 (July 1902): 544-567. James's "will to believe" represents the pre-scientific psychological elevation of the will into a metaphysical entity. Intellectual progress harnesses the will and formulates new religious doctrines to fit science. JRS Notes Part two of this article is Monist 13.1 (Oct 1902): 24-37. 84 Crozier, John Beattie. The Problem of Religious Conversion. Fortnightly Review n.s. 78.12 (1 Dec 1902): 1004-1018. James's contention that conversions are due to the presence of God is contradicted by the fact that adherents of different religions in their mystical states experience only \\hat they expect and that similar states can be induced by other means. Conversions are hettcr explained by the fact that some centers of the brain become detached from others and cease to be subject to their control. IKS 85 Dewey, John. The Child and the Curriculum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902. Reprinted in MW 2: 271-292. Against both the "traditional" and "child-centered" pedagogies. Dewey argues that tlw child's active cxperience contains the elements of mature practices. The child's intcrcst.; have value only where they can be directed by education toward social occupations. J I U
86 Dewey, John. The Evolutionary Method Applied to Morality. Phil Rev 1 1.2 (March 1902): 107-124; 11.4 (July 1902): 353-371. Reprinted in MW 2: 338. Dewey makes a rebuttal of the separation of historical fact and spiritual value, proceeding from the principle that historical logic permits the study of "the conditions under which moral practices and ideals have originated." Scientific experimental logic similarly studies the origins of particular things under specified conditions. The idealists rightly complain that materialism sets up the initial conditions as ultimate fact and misplaces the %awe'' superior to the "effect"; however, idealism just as wrongly reverses priorities. Evolution places these factors in their proper unity and continuous reality. Morality as a fixed ideal is useless; as a part of a "larger historic continuum* its understanding makes possible the future practical control to resolve actual conflicts. Intuitionism gives moral belief ultimate value. Empiricism analyses belief into valueless states, and resorts to intuitionism. The genetic method aims to control moral judgment, and indirectly, moral conduct. JRS Notes See Theodore De Laguna's discussion, "Evolutionary Method In Ethical Research" (163). See also A. Seth Pringle-Pattison's review of Henry Sidgwick's Philosophy, Its Scope and Relations, Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 83-93, where he proclaims the "really transforming and vitalising effect of the historical method" on ethics, and comments that in this article by Dewey, "this function of history is convincingly vindicated." (p. 93)
87 Dewey, John. Interpretation of Savage Mind. Psych Rev 9.3 (May 1902): 217-230. Reprinted with alterations as "Interpretation o f the Savage Mind" in Philosophy and Civilization (2 1701, pp. 173-1 87. Philosophy, Psychofogy, and Social Practice, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: G. P. Putnarn's Sons, 1963), pp. 28 1-294. MW2: 39-52. With civilization as the standard, primitive traits are only incapacities. Viewed genetically, they are developments relative to cultural occupations. The hunting and agricultural modes of life are contrasted, explaining their different mental abilities and resulting religions. The transition to civilization requires the strengthening of social interests, especially the objective and idealized pursuits of "truth, beauty, virtue, wealth, social wellbeing, and even of heaven and of God." IRS Summaries M. S. MacDonald, Phil Rev 11.5 (Sept 1902): 529-530.
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8 8 Dewey, John. Philosophy. Article in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 2, ed. James M. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1902. Rpt., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), pp. 290-296. Reprinted in MW 2: 190202. Philosophy is the theory of "the unity, Experience-to the universe or whatever is taken as a systematic whole." A historical survey, as Dewey provides, is the best pedagogy for learning philosophical classifications. Modem difficulties involve the uncertain placement of psychology aid the logic of history. The widespread distinction made between genetic and analytic questions (how things come to be vs. what they are) is a remnant of an older non-historical age. Genesis is a "controlled, orderly, and complete analysis." JRS
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Notes Dewey also wrote entries on 118 other terms for this dictionary, from "Natural" to "World." Significant entries include "Nature," MW 2: 142-148, "Organic," MW 2: 177178, "Pluralism," MW 2: 203-204, "Possibility, Impossibility, and Possible," MW 2: 210212, "Realism," MW 2: 218-223, "Relation," MW 2: 224-230, "Subject," M W 2: 248-252, "Tychism," MW2: 259, and ''Understanding and Reason," M W 2: 259-261.
89 Dewey, John. Review of Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual Second Series: Nature, Man,and the Moral Order. a i l Rev 11.4 (July 1902): 392-407. Reprinted in MW2: 120-137. Royce requires individual experiences to give meaning to the Absolute, but the Absolute denies all meaning to individual fragments. There is no criterion to distinguish a "self" from its own states. Royce's Absolute erases the difference between goodness and evil, but the individual is trapped in dissatisfaction and evil. The German transcendentalists at least used the Absolute to give our experiences greater meaning and worth. JRS Notes The Worldand the Individual, Second Series (New York: Macmillan, 1901). See Dewey's review of the first part of this work (50). 90 James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New York and London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902. Translated into Italian by G. C. Ferrari and Mario Calderoni, with Robert Ardigo's preface { 151), as La varieforme della coscienza religioso (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1904). Translated into French by Frank Abauzit as L'fipirience religieuse: Essai de psychologie descriptive (Paris: FClix Alcan, 1906.2nd ed., 1908). Translated into German by Georg Wobbennin with an introduction (500) as Die Religiose Erfahrung (Leipzig: J . C. Heinrichs, 1907. 2nd ed., 1914). Reprinted in WJ Writings 2, pp. 1-477. The Works of William James: The Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). Medical materialism has tried to discredit religion by tracing its roots to pathological neurological states. Nevertheless, all thought is neurologically dependent; pathological states connected with religion, for all we know in advance, might be just the ones best suited for rcvcaling higher truth. 'The origin of a truth is not important; religious beliefs must be tested by the same empirical tests: "immediate luminousness," reasonableness, and moral helpfulness. Institutional religion, ecclesiastical organizations, and theologies will not be discussed; instead, these lectures will discuss personal religion: the experiences in solitude of individuals face to face with what they consider the divine. As distinguished from moralism, religion is a strong feeling, an enthusiasm, a solemn happiness, the feeling of power and freedom, with the "keynote of the universe sounding in our ears, and everlasting possession spread before our eyes." Religion involves experiences of presence which carry conviction. These experiences are more like sensations than intellectual operations. Rationalists reject the testimony of feelings, but those who have them are not generally moved by arguments. Religious feelings in different degrees combine feelings of expansion and joy of complete self-surrender with feelings of contraction and fear. Where the former predominate, we have the religion of hcalthy-mindcdness, of the once-born. Whcrc Ihc
90 (cont.) latter predominate, we have the religion of the sick soul, of the twice-born. Healthymindedness is an optimistic view for which evil is not an ultimate part of reality. The sick soul, with its conviction that the meaning of the world is best revealed by taking evil seriously, leads to the difficult problem of evil. Popular theism tends towards polytheism, making God just the highest, and not the sole, principle. Philosophical theism tends towards pantheism, making a good God responsible for evil. The resulting paradox that evil must have a function in the final good can be eliminated only by giving up monism. In its profounder form, evil is seen as a radical wrongness in one's essential nature for which only supernatural remedies suffice. One source of pessimism is the sense of insecurity and failure which accompanies even the greatest successes. Another is the contemplation of approaching death; because of this, every naturalistic view of life is sad, lacking a permanent meaning to a human life. The deepest source of pessimism is pathological melancholy. It is sometimes an incapacity for joyous feeling; in its worse form, an "active anguish"; and in its worst form, a "panic fear" of the universe. The latter was experienced by a French correspondent [in fact, William James himself] and Henry James, Sr. When compared with healthy-mindedness, the sick soul yields the more inclusive view. Healthy-mindedness is good as long as it works, but it breaks down in the face of melancholy. it is also inadequate philosophically because the evil which it dismisses is a genuine portion of reality. Pessimism yields more complete religions for which man must die to an unreal life in order to be born into real life. The process whereby a consciously unhappy self through the espousal of religious realities becomes unified and happy is called conversion, in which religious ideas become the "habitual" center of "personal energy." Central to all kinds of conversion is self-surrender, the throwing of oneself upon the mercy of higher powers. The discovery in 1886 of mental processes lying beyond the margin of consciousness is the most important step in psychology in recent decades. The subliminal, to use a term proposed by F. W. H. Myers, can break into our conscious lives. This discovery casts light upon many phenomena of religious biography. In cases of sudden conversion, we may be dealing with psychologically peculiar individuals with large subliminals. For persons with small subliminals, conversion will come gradually, if it comes at all. Most important are the "fruits for life" of conversion: if they are good they should be venerated evert if produced naturally, and if evil, rejected although coming from a supernatural source. Conversion involves feelings of peace, the sense of perceiving unknotcn truths, and the finding of a "clean and beautiful newness" in reality. But what are the fruits for life of conversion? To answer this question we must describe the fruits of religious lifc, collectively called "saintliness," and judge their value. In all religions the saintly character is made up of a belief in the existence of an ideal power, a scnsc of sclf-surrender to it. a scnse of elation and frcedom, and a shift of the emotional center tmcard loving and harmonious feelings. The practical consequences of these conditions are asceticism, strength of soul, purity, and charity. These fruits now have to be evaluated, and the test proposed is that of fitting human needs, which yields no final judgtncnts and concludes that different people necd different religious beliefs. The vices generally charged against religion are the vices of churches, not of inner religious life. \+hiell 4 ields steadFastncss, charity, sympathy, dutifulness, purity, happiness. patience. and self-severity. Saints, often admired for abiding by their principles, are not imitated because most people want more balance in their lives.
Personal religious experience has its roots in mystical states, which are ineffable, transient, passive, and have a noetic quality. To mystics, these states appear to yield insights not available under ordinary circumstances. Mystical states have much in common with states produced by alcohol and drugs. While James himself has no mystical leanings, some years ago under the influence of nitrous oxide he had experiences which convinced him that ordinary consciousness is only one form of consciousness. Mystical consciousness is generally pantheistic, optimistic, anti-naturalistic, and best harmonizes with twice-bornness. Does it yield evidence in support of the truth of such conceptions? Mystical states are absolutely decisive for the mystics themselves but have no authority for those lacking in mystical experiences. Furthermore, they show that ordinary consciousness is only one kind of consciousness and indicate the possibility of different oiders of truth. Mysticism is too private to make religion a public truth. It is philosophy which seeks to turn the private and mysterious into "truth objectively valid for all thinking men." What is the role of philosophy? The intellectualization of religion is valuable and important as long as it is content to be interpretation and elaboration of religious feeling, but religious philosophy should be discredited where it constructs religious objects using logic and objectively valid facts. Current philosophy, both scholastic and idealistic, fails to produce general agreement, fails to prove both God's existence and His attributes, and leads to the formation of schools and sects (in this, it is just like religious feeling). It must be remembered that human thinking is always connected with conduct; C. S. Peirce calls this principle "pragmatism," which holds that beliefs are rules for action and that the meaning of a thought is determined by what conduct it is fitted to produce. By the pragmatic test. God's metaphysical attributes, even if we were logically coerced into believing in them, would lack all significance. The intellect is helpless and represents a "relatively superficial" and unreal path to the divine. Philosophical reflection can help purify religious belief from local and accidental accretions and eliminate doctrines absurd from science's viewpoint. The outcome will be a collection of testable hypothetical doctrines. Prayer is the central religious act, distinguishing religion from moral and aesthetic sentiment. To the believer prayer appears a mutual re!ation in the course of which something is transacted. Another religious fact is that of inspiration. From the fact that inspiration is so widespread, religion must have close ties with the subliminal part of consciousness. We must now ask whether religion is true. The god of science can only be a god of universal laws that cannot acconimodate the convenience of individuals. This point of view, however, is shallow; when dealing with the general we are dealing only with symbols of reality. We deal with realities in the fullest sense of the term only when dealing with the private and personal. And religion, because it keeps in contact with the only absolute realities we know of, is destined to be a permanent part of human history. The faith state has proved itself of great subjective utility in respect to our actions and endurance. As for religion's intellectual content, is there a common nucleus to all the diffcse::t creeds? All creeds teach that we can be saved from our natural wrongness o n 1 h ~ . establishing a proper connection with "higher" powers. The notion of the sublimi~~al a hypothesis that the "higher" is the subconscious continuation of conscious lifc. I t appears to be “literally and objectively true" that the conscious self is continuous ~vitha wider self through which saving experiences come. To go any further than this requircs ic;
90 (cont.) over-beliefs, but to some extent, the unseen world is real and can be called God. In all religions, God is a guarantee of an ideal order which shall be permanently preserved even when the present world is destroyed. The hypothesis of a God who figures only in someone's experience of union is not a real one, because it has no properties other than those it is invoked to explain. A God placed in "wider cosmic relations" represents a real hypothesis. Religion in this sense is not only an explanation of facts given elsewhere, but requires the postulation of new facts; if religion is true, different events can be expected. James's own over-belief, a "crasser" kind of supernaturalism, is that our consciousness is only one of many worlds of consciousness and that at times higher energies enter our own from the other worlds. His view agrees with popular religion in rejecting monism, and leans towards a polytheism in which the universe contains a plurality of godlike selves. As for personal immortality, it is essentially a question of facts; psychical research has achieved impressive results but nothing final. IKS Extended reviews A. A. Berle (79) and (106); J. B. Crozier (84); Henri Delacroix (1 10); James Leuba (182); Eric Waterhouse (387); C. C. J. Webb (101). Reviews Anon, Congregationalistand Christian World 87.28 (12 July 1902): 65. This book is a "natural history of religious experience." James's conclusions nowhere contradict "the great central teachings of Christianity." JRS Anon, Independent 54.12 (18 Sept 1902): 2251-2253. James presents an extraordinary "collection of intimate spiritual confessions" and an essay on the "truth of religion," containing the grounds of James's "own belief in the fundamental tenets of religion." There is much to dissent from, but more valuable than specific doctrines is the author's spirit. IKS Anon, Outlook 72 (27 Dec 1902): 991-995. James subjects religion to scientific scrutiny, something which is almost never done. James is devoted to people "in their highest life" and writes dramatically. He can put himself in the place of his subjects. The effects James describes can only be explained by spirit and they necessitate belief in a "personal God," although James himself does not draw this conclusion. IKS D. Baines-Griffiths, "Professor James and the Prophets," Congregationalist and Christian World 88.9 (28 Feb 1903): 303-304. Baines-Griffiths mounts a defense of James's religious views against Berle's essay (79). Christians should respect others' religious experiences. JRS William Samuel Bishop, "Religion Within the Bounds of Strict Psychology," Sewanee Review 10.4 (Oct 1902): 493-497. A "mass of testimony" to the power of religious belief, but as a psychological study, it cannot contribute to the "objective content" of religion. In Lecture 18, James makes "short work of positive doctrines concerning God. IKS T. D. A. Cockerell, Dial 33.10 (16 Nov 1902): 322-323. "One of the great books of our time" which finds the origin of religion in "feelings and impulses of individuals." The fact that a religious experience may originate in a psychopathological condition does not rule out the "influx of some external spiritual force." IKS Gorge Albert Coe, Phil Rev 12.1 (Jan 1903): 62-67. James takes us for a walk through a great forest. We enjoy the variety and detail and the sense of not always knowing where we are going. It is hoped that the promised second volume will consider the "criterion" of the truth of religious consciousness. IKS
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Thtodore Flournoy, Rev Phil 54.5 (Nov 1902): 516527 [reprinted in La Philosophie de William James (9471, pp. 217-2441. James's philosophy of religion is empirical and practical. He wishes to embrace all the detail of the world and considers vain all mere speculation. This last view is called pragmatism. Flournoy emphasizes James's refkition of "medical materialism" and his efforts to justify religion. IKS P. Gardner, Hibbert Journal 1.1 (Oct 1902): 182-187. James works on a higher level than others who have dealt with the psychology of religion. Of special interest is his attempt to justify religious beliefs. IKS John Grier Hibben, Psych Rev 10.2 (March 1903): 180-186. James makes a permanent contribution to our understanding of "religious experience and of human nature." Emphasis on the exceptional pushes aside "common experiences" expressed in "institutional religion," which, however, are the final court of appeal. James's view that the divine operates through the subconscious is suspect, since the subconscious may be the "region of chimeras." James's suggestion that everyone may have their own God does away with the unity of religion. IKS "p," Monist 13.1 (Oct 1902): 147-151. James makes the commonly ignored distinction between the "existential facts" of a revelation's origins and the "spiritual values" in our judgments upon a revelation. JRS John Henry Muirhead, "Professor William James's Philosophy of Religion," lnt J Ethics 13.2 (Jan 1903): 236-246. A major contribution to psychology, but it is defective philosophically. James totally misrepresents idealists, for no serious writer attempts to construct religious objects by means of logic. James himself appeals to the "full fact," but this leads to idealism, like Royce's. James's proposed substitute for idealistic philosophy is the science of religion. This can give us the "subliminal," but never the "sublime." IKS Wilhelm Ostwald, Annalen der Naturphilosophie 2 (1903): 142-143. An unusually interesting work, filled with a wealth of observations. IKS Guiseppc Prezzolini (signed as Giuliano il Sofista), "Le varie forme della coscienza religiose," Lconardo 2.2 (June 1904): 29. Prezzolini calls James "the greatest and most original living philosopher" in the world. James's book is praised for having restored the philosophical value to the question of the supernatural. EPC IIastings Rashdall, Mind n.s. 12.2 (April 1903): 245-250. James undertakes a worthwhile task and does it well. He makes prominent kinds of human experience undreamed of by philosophers and theologians, but he overemphasizes exceptional cases and does not realize that their social uselessness may be due to their abnormality. By exaggerating the mystical side, he misses the true significance of some religious figures. In his philosophical conclusions, James revives "Pyrrhonism," abandons the search for truth, and hands religion and morality over to the "sway of willful caprice." IKS Gcorg Runzc, Zeit fir I'sych 37 (1904): 129-143. James's work is interesting, but disappointi!ig to the exact thinker. Runzc discusses the treatment of James in Uaunlann's Deutsche w t d ausserdeutsche I'hilosophie der letzen Jahrzel~nle{ 104). IKS 1'. C. S. Schillcr, Nation 75.8 (Aug 21 1902): 155. Scientific mcthods are introduced into a lield which hitherto contained nothing but "dogmatizing." We only get glimpscs ol. the IICW philosophy; hopeI'uIIy Jillnes can trritc the promiscd work on pragmatism. IKS F. C. S. Schillcr, I'roceedings of thc Society for I'sychical Rescarch 17.4 (Fcb 19031: 403-41 1. Mystical statcs should be judged by rational tests. Most such statcs "produce nothing of valuc for practical lilk." Neither the "transmarginal self' nor the con~munication with spiritual powers has an explanatory role beyond psychical rcscarch JKS
Frank Sewall, "Professor James on Religious Experience," New Church Review 10 (April 1903): 243-264. James seems to view religion as a disease, overemphasizing the morbid. In a book full of surprises, a major surprise is the absence of references to Swedenborg. James's style is "engaging," marked by a "catholicity of spirit." IKS Edwin D. Starbuck, Biblical World n.s. 24 (1904): 100-111. James turns the psychology of religion into a science. He finds the sources of religion in feeling, but this is unexpected considering his theory of emotion. The feelings themselves are manifestations of "life-movements" in the organism, which are the sources of religion. IKS George B. Stevens, American Journal of Theology 7.1 (Jan 1903): 114-117. James proposes utility as a test of religion and offers a "rather succinct volume of dogma" yielded by empirical psychology. IKS Reviews of the French translation Edgar Janssens, Revue Nbo-Scolastique 14.1 (Feb 1907): 136-140. James's method of valuing religion by its moral results contains much truth, but is not as harmless as it appears. It leads James into certain contradictions and to concentrate on the affective side of religion, excluding the intellectual and voluntary. IKS E. Michaud, Revue Internationale de Thtologie 14 (1906): 351-354. It is not reasonable to emphasize abnormal cases and ignore metaphysics and theology. It is a valuable book, especially in its refutation of medical materialism. IKS Frangois Pillon, L'Annke Philosophique 16 (1905): 214-219. Pillon praises the translation and primarily gives extended quotations. IKS H. Norero, Revue de L'Histoire des Religions 53.2 (March-April 1906): 65-78. Reviews of the German translation K. Oesterreich, Kant-Studien 13.4 (28 Dec 1908): 474-478. Kant would have found it interesting, but would have insisted on a critique of religious experience. IKS [?I Schott, Zeitschrift fur Religionspsychologie 2 (1908): 220-229. A chapter by chapter summary of the contents. IKS Reviews of 2nd edition of German translation Heinrich Scholz, Preussische Jahrbucher 167 (1917): 478-483. James overemphasizes pathological details which are of secondary interest in the study of religion. Germans, influenced by different traditions, will be dissatisfied with the treatment of truth. IKS Notes The French translation contains Abauzit's preface, citing a letter from James authorizing his translation, and an introduction by mile Boutroux, that was later published separately as L 'fipkrience religieuse selon WilliamJames (409). 91 Jastrow, Joseph. Belief and Credulity. Educational Review 23.1 (Jan 1902): 22-49. On pp. 23-28, Jastrow explains Peirce's "The Fixation of Belief' (1877), which gives a "most attractive" account of belief as the settlement of opinion. Various types of credulity contrast sharply with "strenuous rationality," while "a divorce of theory and practice is disastrous." JRS 92 Logan, J. D. The Optimistic Implications of Idealism. Int J Ethics 12.4 (July 1902): 494-50 1. James. like other idealists, is an example of how religious optimism is always based on a hope for afterlife personal happiness. JRS
93 Peirce, Charles S., William James, James M. Baldwin. Pragmatic (I) and (2) Pragmatism. Article in D i c t i o n a ~of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 2, ed. James M. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1902. Rpt., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), p. 321-323. Peirce's two sections, on p. 321 and p. 322, are reprinte d in C P 5.1-4. James's paragraph, coming between Peirce's on p. 321, is reprinted in Works EPh, p. 94. Peirce endorses his 1878 formulation of pragmatism: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." He remarks on some misunderstandings of it (the end of man is action) and on the reality of general objects, and mentions his synechism. LF James states that pragmatism is the doctrine that the whole meaning of a conception lies in its practical consequences, either in the form of recommended conduct or expected experiences. IKS Notes Peirce made numerous contributions to the Dictionary; see especially "Sign," vol. 2, pp. 527-528. The list of his contributions is in Kenneth Ketner, A Comprehensive Bibliography of the Published Works of C. S. Peirce with a Bibliography of Secondav Studies, 2nd rev. ed. (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1986), pp. 116-1 18, 120-135.
94 Peirce, Charles S., G. E. Moore, James M. Baldwin. Truth and Falsity (1) and (2) Error. Article in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 2, ed. James M. Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1902. Rpt., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), p. 7 16-720. Peirce's section, pp. 7 18-720, is reprinted in C P 5.565573. Peirce's entry is on logical truth. It includes remarks on the distinction between truth and reality; positive scientific truth; truth in the normative sciences, in pure mathematics and in practical life; and some general remarks on this category called "complex truth or truth of propositions." He concludes by remarking on some historical uses (for example, by Plato and the Scholastics)of the word "truth." LF 9 5 Sage, M. Mme Piper et la sociiti anglo-amkricaine pour les recherches psychique. Paris: Leymarie, 1902. Translated in abridged form as Mrs. Piper and the Society for Psychical Research, by Noralie Robertson (New York: ScottThaw, 1904). Contains many references to James's work with Mrs. L. Piper, a medium. IKS 96 Schiller, F. C. S. Axioms as Postulates. In Personal Idealism, ed. Henry Sturt (London and New York: Macmillan, 1902), pp. 47-133. Translated by Rudolf Eisler as "Axiome als Postulate," chap. 1 of Humanismus: Beitrage zu einer pragmafischen Philosophie (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 19 1 I), pp. 32- 103. All expcrience is individual and reveals a world in cvolution, growing through experiments by nature, God, and us. We cannot assume the existence of any rigid limits or fixed truths. The growth of experience overthrows any "facts." James has traced out the
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need to believe that the world is amenable to human desires, but the doctrine of "apriorism" blocks the path. While presuppositions do organize experience, this hardly demonstrates their existence prior to any mental content or their unchangeable nature. They are instead temporary postulates, that are useful as hypotheses enabling us to control experience for our purposes. Kant presupposed empiricist psychological atomism; his resulting system is admittedly complete, though aesthetically arbitrary. The plain facts of experience are hardly explained by a principle prior to all experience. Kant's Practical Reason should absorb theoretical reason. Apriorism ignores the activity and wholeness of the organism. James's "will to believe" is misunderstood if the risks and tests of belief are ignored. Postulates are ranked in value; the oldest and most widely held deserve respect as successful survivors, but none are immutable, if even more successful ones arrive. The postulates of personal consciousness, the external world, and the uniformity of nature are especially valuable. Euclidean geometry has been competent to date, but other geometries may be real too, when new experiences may require them. "Objective*' time, while necessary for "intersubjective intercourse," is still relative to "the synchronism of motions and the assumptions of physical constants," while Newtonian absolute time is of limited practicality. The postulate of an intelligent agent designing nature is hardly defeated by a successful mechanistic biology, since the latter theory is but a device of our own, and its success shows how nature does somewhat conform to our purposes. To stop short of requiring nature to be completely teleological is not warranted, in light of our achievements and moral needs. The objector who questions the logical validity of postulation, while accepting its psychological manifestation, offers the nothingness of truths which are never conceived. The "method of origins" should not reduce the reality of the result to a more ultimate reality than the starting-point.This is why knowledge, though starting from postulation, has a value connected to its goal of practical success. Our will is only to blame for our theoretical mysteries; we must vow that there are no unsolvable problems. JRS Reviews William James. Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 93-97 [Collected Essays and Reviews { 1579), pp. 442-444: Work7 ECR, pp. 540-5451, These essays promise a middle ground between naturalism and absolutism. Schiller's essay is radical. The world for him is a gradual construction. There is a resisting factor, but even that "is only what is made of it." Mental categories also evolve. They were at first postulated for the sake of practice and later became "truths" through successful use. Human nature is the key to nature and intellectualism fails because it ignores human goals. IKS Charles S. Peirce, Nation 76.23 (4 June 1903): 462-463 [The Nation, Part Three, pp. 125-1271. Schiller's method has influenced all the writers of this collection, and his cssay is the "liveliest" and the "most brilliant." lie believes that philosophy is a matter of "personal fancy," and docs not think that there are any facts independent of what we think ahout them; "they change with every phase of experience." With Schiller's claim that axioms are explanatory hypotheses, Peirce does not quarrel. though he is not altogetller satislied with the application of this notion. LF Ar-tlw I.;. Ihgcrs. I'llil I k v 12.5 (Sept 1903): 577-580. Schillcr avoids thc "hclicvc \ \ h t \vc pleatic" ~ I I ~ c ~ I > I - but c ( ; Iby ~ ~stressing ~I~, the world's readiness to satisfy us, he ignores another source of knowledge in nalure's occasional rcfusal to be allccted. JRS J . Illlis Md'aggnrt. 1111 J Lthics 13.2 (Jan 1903): 246-251; Charles 13. Upton, Hibbert I 403-407. Journal 1.2 ( J ~ I 1003):
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97 Schiller, F. C. S. 'Useless' Knowledge: A Discourse Concerning Pragmatism. Mind n.s. 11.2 (April 1902): 196-215. Reprinted with "some additions" in Humanism (1 391, pp. 18-43. In an ideal-worldy interview with Plato, Schiller confesses that, like the liberated cavedweller, few will later believe his story of what he has seen. His only method of persuasion must be to display the usefulness of his learning. Schiller contrasts four positions on truth: Plato's view that "Goodness was born of Truth," Aristotle's separation of truth from usefulness, Kant's duty to "believe and practically act on what we do not know to be true," and Pragmatism's view that speculativewisdom arises from practical wisdom. In the ensuing debate with Aristotle, objectivity is identified with socially useful postulates. Mere self-evidence is an accident of mind. "Useless truths" are only useless for some purposes, some truths exist for purposes not yet discovered, and no real truth can be useless for all purposes. Many useless beliefs parade as knowledge, such as the "Unknowable." JRS
98 Spiller, Custav. The Mind of Man: A Text-Book of Psychologv. London: Swan Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1902. Experimental introspection shows that mental processes are organically interrelated, continuous, teleological, and dynamic. These processes function to satisfy of natural needs, requiring prolonged organic readjustments to the environment. The psychologist cannot admit any dualistic metaphysics, since the "data of existence" are only artificially placed in "mind" or "matter" categories. This Machian monism solves the problems of free-will, causality, energy, etc., by viewing them as only "short formulre" for observable and definable changes. James is extensively referenced with general approval. JRS Reviews 1. Madison Bentley, Amer J Psych 16.2 (April 1905): 243-246. 99 Tufts, James H. On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories. Decennial Publications ofthe University of Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), First Series, vol. 3, pp. 5-14. Reprinted in Phil Rev 12.1 (Jan 1903): 1-1 5. Selected Writings ofJames Hayden Tujs, edited with an introduction by James Campbell (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 47-59. The aesthetic consciousness arises not from nature, but from social relations, which in turn originate in the social "struggle for existence." It has qualitative universality, a free detachment of contemplation, and "an appreciation for the broadly significant." JRS
100 Vailati, Giovanni. Scienza e filosofia. Rivista Populare di Politica 8 (1 5 April 1902). Reprinted in Scritti { 10 I8 J , pp. 4 17-420. Vailati gives a brief overview of the philosophical climate in Italy, especially in regard to problems of science. A proposal to revive philosophical culture in Italy is discussed. It is interesting to contrast this with Papini's proposal for a philosophical revival in Leonardo one year latcr, in which pragmatism has a central role. EI'C 101 Webb, Clement C. J. Psychology and Religion. Journal of Theological Studies 4.1 (Oct 1902): 46-68. An approving explication of James's Varieties ofReligious Experience (90). JRS
102 Young, Ella Flagg. Some Types of Modern Education Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902. Dewey was influenced by Young, a pedagogy department colleague and the supervisor of the Chicago Laboratory School until 1904. Chap. 5 of this work is "The Philosophy of Education, 1895-1902. John Dewey," pp. 53-67. JRS Notes See also Young's dissertation at Chicago, Isolation in the School (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1901); "Scientific Method in Education," in Decennial Publications ofthe University of Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), First Series, vol. 3; and Ethics in the School (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1906).
108 Bradley, F. H. The Definition of Will. 11. Mind n.s. 12.2 (April 1903): 145176. Reprinted in Collected Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), vol. 2, pp. 515-551. James's theory of consent is rejected. In a footnote, Bradley recognizes a British "primacy of will" movement, denouncing %hiller's ''Axioms as Postulates" {%). IRS
109 Creighton, James E. The Standpoint of Experience. Phil Rev 12.6 (Nov 1903): 593-610. Reprinted in Studies in Speculative Philosophy, ed. Harold R. Smart (New Yo*. Macmillan, 1925), pp. 71-92. Descriptions of experience must pass the intellectual tests of completeness and consistency. Any "pure" experience, prior to thought, is thus ruled out Purposes are limited and corrected by the stubbornness of reality. JRS
103 Angell, James R The Relations of Psychology to Philosophy. In Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), First Series, vol. 3, pp. 55-73. Reprinted as "The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," Phil Rev 12.3 (May 1903): 243-271. Structural psychology's analytic search for stable contents of consciousness commits the "psychologist's fallacy." A functional description must involve structural elements, and vice versa, due to psychology's teleological basis. Further structural doctrines must then fall. Logic and epistemology cannot be isolated from psychology, and knowledge, truth, morality, and beauty are psychological values relevant to practical success. JRS 104 Bau mann, Julius. Deutsche und ausserdeutsche Philosophie der letzten Jahrzehnte dargestellt und beurteilt. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1903. James's thought is surveyed in two sections, pp. 474-489 and pp. 510-528. JRS 105 Benedict, W. R. Religion as an Idea. Int J Ethics 14.1 (Oct 1903): 66-80. Understanding and emotion certify the highest conception of God as "Supreme SelfConscious Intelligence," but James has no positive conception of God. Pragmatism locates a concept's meaning in the specific inquiry, but this fails if a meaning for all existence is sought. Faith is insufficient, since the "logical intellect" cannot be coerced. JRS 106 Berle, A. A. The Psychology of Christian Experience. Bibliotheca Sacra 60.1 (Jan 1903): 1-27. The Varieties of Religious Experience (90) must be judged by whether it deepens and strengthens one's religious life. James fails, in blunders obvious to anyone practiced in the "cure of souls." Yet, it is good to see a professor taking such experiences seriously. IKS 107 Bosanquet, Bernard. Imitation and Selective Thinking. Psych Rev 10.4 (July 1903): 404-4 12. Baldwin's genetic psychology pragmatically makes practice a test of truth. JRS Notes See J . Mark Ihldwin's reply that he, like Peirce, rejected pragmatism for its inability to explain the universal aspects of reality, Psych Rev 10.4 (July 1903): 412-41 6.
110 Delacroix, Henri Les Varidtds de l'expdrience religieuse par William James. Rev Mdta 11.5 (Sept 1903): 642-669. An extended account of the contents is given. James and others have placed the study of religion within the study of human nature. James exaggerates the importance of individual experience and ignores the social aspects of religion. IKS 111 Dewey, John. Democracy in Education. Elementary School Teacher 4 (Dec 1903): 193-204. Reprinted in MW3: 229-239. The servility of teachers to the mechanical education system is inconsistent with the purpose of public education in democracy: the freeing of mental activity for its proper purpose. JRS 112 Dewey, John. Emerson-The Philosopher of Democracy. Int J Ethics 13.4 (July 1903): 405-4 13. Reprinted as "Ralph Waldo Emerson" in Characters and Events (20241, vol. 1, pp. 69-77. MW 3: 184-192. Emerson belongs to that class of philosophical and poetical intellects. His respect for the creativity of intelligence joins with a concern that "every individual is at once the focus and channel of mankind's long and wide endeavor, that all nature exists for the education of the human soul." JRS Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 12.5 (Sept 1903):574. 113 Dewey, John. Introduction. To Irving King's The Psychology of Cldd Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. xi-xx. Reprinted in MW 3: 299-304. 114 Dewey, John. Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality. In
Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), First Series, vol. 3, pp. 115-139. Reprinted irr Prohlerns (ij' Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 21 1-249. MW3: 3-39. Science can find regular controls on the formation of moral judgments, provided that we assert a continuity within moral experience (denying moral "intuitions"), and a reference by science to individual acts of value judgment (denying disinterested pur.:
"universality"). A moral judgment is concerned with the character of the judger, and in the context of such concern, moral terms (such as "good," "duty") must receive standard functional definitions. These in turn permit objective generic statements of conditions, with testable consequences. These conditions will be specifically social, but can also include biological and environmental factors. JRS Notes See Albert Schinz, "Professor Dewey's Pragmatism" (602).
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115 Dewey, John. The Psychological and the Logical in Teaching Geometry. Educational Review 25.4 (April 1903): 387-399. Reprinted in MW3:216-228. 116 Dewey, John. The Psychological Method in Ethics. Psych Rev 10.2 (March 1903): 158-160. Reprinted in MW 3: 59-61. Genetic psychology can study the conditions and consequences of the moral value component to the stream of consciousness. Such understanding would permit a functional test of any claimed moral ideal. JRS Summaries Phil Rev 12.2 (March 1903): 173-174.
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117 Dewey, John. Religious Education as Conditioned by Modem Psychology and Pedagogy. Proceedings of the Religious Education Association, vol. 1 (Chicago: Executive Office of the Association, 1903), pp. 60-66. Reprinted in MW 3: 210-215.
118 Dewey, John, et a/. Studies in Logical Theory. Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, Second Series, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903). Dewey's contributions, chapters 1-4, are revised as chapters 2-5 of Essays in Experimental Logic (13591, pp. 75- 182. These four chapters, with Dewey's preface, are in MW 2: 293-375. "Thought and its Subject Matter: The General Problem of Logical Theory," pp. 1-22, was revised as chap. 2, "The Relationship of Thought and Its Subject-Matter," Essays, pp. 75-102. "Thought and its Subject Matter: The Antecedents of Thought," pp. 23-48, was revised as chap. 3, "The Antecedents and Stimuli of Thinking," Essays, pp. 103-135. "Thought and its Subject Matter: The Datum o f Thinking," pp. 49-64, was revised as chap. 4, "Data and Meanings," Essays, pp. 136-156. "Thought and its Subject Matter: The Content and Object of Thought," pp. 65-85, was revised as chap. 5, "The Objects of Thought," Essays, pp. 157-182. The preface states the contributors' agreement that judgment is the purpose of knowledge, and knowledge is linked with practice, implying that psychological functionalism is the proper standpoint for logic. The only standard of truth is one designed with reference to "readjusting and expanding the means and ends of life." The writers owe a "pre-eminent obligation" to William James. Chap. 1 explains that just as thought itself arises from specific practical needs, logical theory (the "generic account of our thinking behavior") arises in a historical period where reflective processes fail to meet practical needs. Since thought always deals with a concrete problem at hand, so too must logical theory remain tied to
specific conditions. The opposite view, that logic is the science of universal forms of thought, dealing with the relation of thought to a separate reality, is "epistemology." The standpoint of "nave experience," from everyday life to scientific inquiry, has no place for such universal thought, and stays within a continuous realm of experience. Evolutionary biology and psychology sees life's structures as instruments of dynamic adaptation to a specific changing environment. Thought is a life structure, and as the study of this changing and relative structure, logic cannot "guarantee any particular reality or value." Chap. 2 describes how thought's subject-matter goes through three stages. First, a "whole dynamic experience" has both a "pervasive identity of value," yet also has an inner tension of conhion and uncertainty. This emphasis on the continuity of thought with the antecedent problematic experience is developed as a remedy to the contradictions inherent to the epistemologist's account of thought (represented by the German philosopher H. Rudolf Lotze). With Lotze's conviction that thought (universal forms providing value and meaning), has nothing in common with experience (particular existents lacking value and meaning), comes two problems. First, how can thought interact with something unthinkable? Second, even if experience does have some initial coherence, as Lotze occasionally intimates, why is a distinct process of thought required to re-work it? Chap. 3 explains that the problematic experience in its second stage contains assured, secure elements (the given datum), and doubtful, precarious elements (the ideas). The goal is to re-attain the unification of practical experience; the two types of elements have a functional existence, each with a proper destiny of transformation for re-integration. From the perspective of the final stage, where experience is re-unified, both properly appear to be merely mental, as sensations and ideas, while the re-unified experience is the "reality." The epistemologist however is trapped by a fixation on the second stage. making them independent mental realities of their own. He cannot help but give to the datum the responsibility of providing a link to physical reality, and to the ideas the responsibility of providing all value and meaning. That this factlvalue dichotomy is repugnqt is felt even by Lotze, for whom the activity of thought is a progressive realization of systematic meaning inherent in experience. Since epistemology lacks a genetic and historical understanding, thought is set loose from its concrete stimulating conditions. Chap. 4 finds the epistemologist in deeper contradictions, as the givens of experience require a preliminary elevation by thought from the purely subjective and transitory to the objective and permanent. Thus the impression of "blueness" becomes "that blue thing," ready to participate in thought's further categorizing. But when the epistemologist says that thought requires experience to give it content, and declares that prior to thought, experience is without any relations or form, then the method by which thought "picks out" that bit of experience for investiture with the category of "blue" must be completely mysterious. The functionalist solution is to see both elements as functionally related in one content or object of thought. The epistemologist might try to guarantee the objectivity of thought by a correspondence to experience, but there can be no correspondence between bare particulars of experience and abstract forms of thought. It follows that thought cannot be tested by experience, much less by a reality beyond experience. The functionalist instead treats ideas as provisional transformations of given but partial meanings, designed to give "standpoints and methods of a reconstruction which will maintain the integrity of experience." In so far as ideas succeed in this office, they are verified. The modes of judgment and inference are "processes of reflection by which mutual connection in an individualized whole is given to the fragmentary meanings or ideas with which thought as
its sets out is supplied." They too must be judged instrumentally, and their present value arrives from their survival in the historical evolution of life's effort to maintain the integrity of experience. A. W. Moore's essay, "Some Logical Aspects of Purpose," pp. 341-382, critiques Josiah Royce. Royce blithely agrees with pragmatism on the purposiveness of ideas, without requiring that purposes must always be tied to specific situations. For Royce, limited purposes only result in limited truths, and ultimately, ideas represent the Absolute. Also of interest are the other essays in this work: Helen Bradford Thompson, "Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment," pp. 86-126; Simon Fraser MacLeman, "Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment," pp. 127-141; Myron Lucius Ashley, "The Nature of Hypothesis," pp. 142-182; Willard Clark Gore, "Image and Idea in Logic," pp. 183-202; William Arthur Heidel, "The Logic of Pre-Socratic Philosophy," pp. 203-226; Henry Waldgrave Stuart, "Valuation as a Logical Process" pp. 227-340. JRS Extended reviews William James ( 173); J. A. Leighton ( 181); Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (196); Arthur K. Rogers { 199). Reviews Edwin Norton, Educational Review 28.3 (Oct 1904): 310-313. Norton gives an appreciative outline of the main tendencies: evolution, empiricism, pragmatism, and the value of logic and psychology to education. JRS Charles S. Peirce, Nation 79.1 1 (15 Sept 1904): 2 19-220 [CP 8.188- 190 and The Nation, Part Three, pp. 183-1861. Dewey is opposed to the German school (Sigwart, Wundt, Schuppe, Erdmann, and Husserl), and seems to regard what he names "logic" as a "natural history of thought." Though he considers it to be a project which will potentially form valuable knowledge, Peirce cautions the Chicago School not to overlook the lesson of the great American thinker Dr. James Rush, and the already well established natural histories of chemistry, botany, and zoology: to abandon the "trivial language of practical life" in favor of an entirely new vocabulary. LF F. C. S. Schillcr, Mind n.s. 13.1 (Jan 1904): 100-106. These essays are "an independent attainment of the pragmatist point of view." hndarnental agreement forbids a criticism of details. JKS W. H. Sheldon, J Phil 1.4 (18 Feb 1904): 100-105. One aspect of experience (purpose) and one of the sciences' methods (biology's genetic method) have here been applied to all reality and knowledge. Theoretical need is met only by beliefs representing an external and unchanging reality. Pragmatism must admit an independent standard to judge which needs can or ought to be met, lest every satisfier of any whim be real. Success (and truth) is due to external conditions, but the pragmatist has no respect for causation. In actual experience, we deal with more than our own advantage, and use other a priori categories than "purpose." JRS Anon, hlonist 14.2 (Jan 1904): 3 12; Thtodule Ribot, Rev Phil 58.6 (Dec 1904): 655661; Arthur K. Rogers, Dial 36.10 (16 May 1904): 328-329. Reviews of 2nd edition Bernard Bosanquet, Mind 20.3 (July 1911): 435. Notes Sce Pcirce's lcttcrs to Dcuey about this work, in CP 8.239-244. See also C. E. Ayres, "Dewey: Master of the Commonplace" (2655).
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119 Fite, Warner. An Introductory Study of Ethics. New York and London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1903. Reviews Norman Wilde, Int J Ethics 16.3 (April 1906): 377-379. 120 Fite, Warner. The Place of Pleasure and Pain in the Functional Psychology. Psych Rev 10.6 (Nov 1903): 633-644. James does not develop a functional role for pleasure and pain. They arise from conflict, and are transient states of succeeding, or failing, to resolve a conflict, respectively. Harmony lacks any definite feeling; pleasure then cannot be a goal. JRS Summaries Annie D. Montgomery, Phil Rev 13.2 (March 1904): 241-242. Notes Contra? Fite's conclusion with Schiller's portrait of the happiness of ultimate harmony in Humanism { 139). 121 James, William. Address of William James. In The Centenary of the Birth of Ralph Waldo Emerson as Observed in Concord Mqy 25 1903 under the Direction of the Social Circle in Concord (Concord, N.H.:Riverside Press for the Social Circle, June 1903), pp. 67-77. Reprinted as "Address at the Emerson Centenary in Concord" in Memories and Studies (9571, pp. 19-34. As "Emerson" in Works ERM, pp. 109- 1 15. In death, a man's whole personality gradually shrinks into a "mere phrase suggestive of his singularity." Emerson's life is that of loyalty to "his own personal type and mission." He was a scholar whose mission was to report each perception, but he was also an artist in words. In the name of his mission, he avoided involvement in public affairs, including the controversy over slavery. For Emerson, Universal Reason is expressed in each individual. llence, everyone strives to perceive realty in a fresh and personal way, unencumbered by institutions and human history. Such individualism, his belief that even the commonest act. only if genuine and sincere, can be an "epitome of reality," is at the heart of Emerson's electrifying message. IKS
122 James, William. The Ph. D. Octopus. Harvard Monthly 36 (March 1903): 1-9. Reprinted in Memories and Studies (9571, pp. 329-347. Work ECR, pp. 67-74. Because as yet few have doctorates, smaller institutions have come to emphasize degrees as a means of adding prestige to their generally young and obscure faculty. Graduate institutions, in their turn, make doctoral examinations increasingly more difficult. Harvard takes pride in the number of failed candidates. Graduate degrees help to stimulate learning. but the system also hides possibilities of corruption. There can be good teachers without degrees and many with degrees will fail as teachers. The system also creates a class of victims: those with slight abilities ~vhoaspire to degrees but cannot pass examinations. The remedy is to lower standards so that more can obtait~ degrees and encourage men of talent not to work for degrees. IKS
123 James, William. The True Harvard. Harvard Graduates' Magazine 12 (September 1903): 5-8. Reprinted in Memories and Studies {957), pp. 348355. Works ECR, pp. 74-77. Because not a graduate of Harvard College, he has always felt himself something of an outsider. The College fosters social bonds, but the true Harvard is the one which fosters "independent and lonely thinkers." Harvard leads in producing them and should be proudest of its "undisciplinables." IKS 124 Jones, Henry. The Present Attitude of Reflective Thought Towards Religion. Hibbert Journal 1.2 (Jan 1903): 228-252; 2.1 (Oct 1903): 20-43. James's The Will to Believe (1897) is Jones's primary example of current philosophical skepticism, which is incongruous with science's confident progress and religion's firm hold. Radical empiricism's inconsistent world abandons philosophy and theology, and supports religion by rashly limiting reason. Separating practical faith from reason only injures religion. Jones offers their integration: intelligence is a process aiming at an ideal system, involving the presumption of an objective order. The monist vs. pluralist debate is, as James says, the deepest philosophical question. Human will and intelligence cannot be separated and experience is a unified whole; the pragmatist's "intellectualist" is a "phantom of their own creation." JRS Notes See Schiller's response to the first part ( 141). 125 King, Irving. Pragmatism as a Philosophical Method. Phil Rev 12.5 (Sept 1903): 5 1 1-524. James and Peirce emphasize the practical. The test of concrete experience is attractive to those impatient with the "vagaries" of metaphysics, but pragmatism has not analyzed adequately the relations between thought and action. The ambiguities of pragmatism would disappear if pragmatists realized that thought arises out of definite crises in activity. IKS Notes See J. A. Leighton, "Pragmatism" ( 181 ). 126 Koekebakker, Willem. Willen en Kunner gelooven: Opmerkingen naar Aanleiding van "The Will lo Believe and Other Essqs in Popular Philosophy by Williatv James." Amsterdam: J. H . de Bussy, 1903.
127 Koons, Willian George. The Psychology of Conversion. Church Quarterly Review (April 1903). 128 MacLennan, Simon F. Existence and Content. Mind n.s. 12.1 (Jan 1903): 78-82. Ijra(ky sets up knowledge as abstractly relational, and then resolves such knowledge's contradictions in a trans-human Absolute of pure experience. If knowledge serves hurnan corltlul. and idcas are but expectations of new concrete experiences, then the "question of the ultimatc content of Reality" is "useless." JRS
129 Mead, C. H. The Definition of the Psychical. In Decennial Publications of the Universi~of Chicago, First Series, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago: 1903), pp. 77-1 12. Pp. 77-78 and 92-1 12 are reprinted in Selected Writings, pp. 25-59. 130 Moore, A. W. Existence, Meaning and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology. The Universig of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903). A condensation of The Functional versus the Representational Theories ofKnowledge in Locke f Essay (17). Locke separates mental value from physical existence and then attempts to re-join them to account for truth, but at the cost of failing to explain doubt and error. Moore reconstructs Locke's doctrines using the Chicago functional psychology. The past must be as contingent as the future, and reality is growing experience. JRS Review Henry Sturt, Mind n.s. 13.1 (Jan 1904): 130. While on the right path, functionalists shouldn't forget that objective reality limits human activity. JRS 131 Papini, Giovanni (signed as Gian Falco). Morte e ressurezione della filosofia. Leonardo 1.1 1-12 (20 Dec 1903): 1-7. Reprinted in Sul pragmatisrno { 1202). Papini allied himself with Pragmatism at the same time as he launched Leonardo, and his pragmatism must be understood in the light of the review's design: to provoke action from literate young Italians which would result in the creation of a new Italian culture. This project remained constant in Papini's imagination throughout his pragmatist phase. It can be seen in his I1 Crepuscolo ( 3 5 1 ) and "Campagna per il forato risveglio." (349). It is at work in his Futurist phase five years later, and it is most destructively present in his agitation in favor of Italy's involvement in the Great War. Philosophy in the traditional sense is dead; its desire for universality, for complete rationality, and for the total grasp of the real is futile. A resurrected philosophy-here Papini has a voluntaristic brand of pragmatism in mind-redirects itself towards the practical remaking of the world. EPC Notes See Carlo Golino, "Giovanni Papini and American Pragmatism," Italica 32.1 (1955): 33-48.
132 Prezzolini, Giuscppe (signed as Giuliano i l Sofista). La ntiscria dci logici. Leonardo 1.4 (8 Feb 1903): 5-7; 1.6 (8 March 1903): 7-8. Reprinted irr La culrare ibdiana del '900 alfraverso le revisit., ed. Delia Frigessi (Turm: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 132- 134. Prezzolini attacks the conception of mind as purely a logical and rational instrument, and rejects the view that there is one, single logical model for the human rni~~d Prezzolini examines the role of sentiment in the process of action. There is passing reference to James's Principles of Psycltolop ( 1890). EI'C 133 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Guiliano il Sofista). Scetticismo r. sofistica. Leonardo 1.1 1- 12 (20 Dec 1903): 9- 15.
A detailed examination of the creative mind, as opposed to the logical, categorizing mind. This article is essential to understanding Prezzolini's intellectual development, which takes him from Bergson to pragmatism in late 1903 and early 1904. Modem positivism is bankrupt and can only lead us into skepticism. The modern sophist, on the other hand, subordinates reason to the practical and sentimental ends of humanity. The sophist is free of the skeptic's pessimism. Recognizing the creative and sentimental powers of the mind, the sophist is an optimist, aiming at the enlargement of human creative powers over the external world. EPC
134 Prezzolini, G i u s e p p e (signed as Guiliano il Sofista). L'uomo dio. Leonardo 1.3 (27 January 1903): 3-4. Reprinted in La culture italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 115-1 19. While James praises Papini for his articulation of this new model for the creative human being, Prezzolini actually precedes Papini in the exploration of the new superman, the Uomo-dio. Armed with an omnipotently creative will while remaking the world as it desires, the Man-god represents the future of humanity. Jamesian pragmatism, writes Prezzolini, is an expression of this same creative impulse. EPC Notes See James, "G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy" (328).
135 Prezzolini, Ciuseppe. La vita intima. Florence: Pei tipi d i Giovanni Spinelli, E. C., 1903. At the urging of Papini, Prezzolini traveled to Paris to attend the lectures of Iienri Bergson. The discovery of Bergson, as Prezzolini records in L 'haliano inutile, marked something of a revolution in his thinking. In Bergson Prezzolini believed that he had found the key to the universe: the notion of the hidden, innermost self. Prezzolini's captivation with this notion remains a constant in his thinking well into his pragmatist phase. La vita intima is a brief statement of Prezzolini's Bergsonian outlook just as he was founding Leonardo with Papini. While not itself concerned with pragmatism, this book is vital for the proper understanding of Prezzolini's intellectual attitude as he discovered William James and F. C. S. Schiller. One can say that Bergson's metaphysics of the self was at the root of Prezzolini's attraction to the Will-to-Believe; his rhetorical excesses concerning pragmatic voluntarism can only be understood if this Bergsonian orientation is kept in view. Prezzolini remained a Bergsonian until his Crocean conversion in 1908. EPC 136 Prezzolini, C i u s c p p e (signed as Guiliano i l Sofista). Vita trionfante. Leonardo I . l (4 January 1903): 4-5. Reprinted in La culture italiana del 'YO0 atrraverso /e revisre, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 96- 100. I'herc is no ~nentionat all of pragmatism in this contribution by Prezzolini to the inaugural issue of Leonarcio. It is a discussion of the French "Philosophy of Continge~icy"drawn from lleuri Bergson. Nevertheless, Prezzolini signals things to come \ ~ I C I IIre describes this philosophy as an effective instrument of liberation, a theme to which he will soon harness pragmatism. EPC
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Notes The Leonardo was published from 4 January 1903 to August 1907, totaling 25 issues.
137 Sadler, Michael Ernest. The Ferment in Education on the Continent and in America. Proceedings of the British A c d m y , vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1903), pp. 81-94. Dewey's "most disturbing criticisms" fail to identifjl the social order toward which schools should aim. Artistic ability is "patheticdly unnecesary" to industry. JRS
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138 Schiller, F. C. S. The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics. Int J Ethics 13.4 (July 1903): 43 1-444. Reprinted with "a few additions" in Humanism { 1391, pp. 1- 17. Pragmatism refutes the charge of irrationalism by rejecting "pure" reason, favoring a purposive reason which offers practical, testable hypotheses. Neither Peirce, James, nor Baldwin has a comparably defined pragmatism. Facts are based on values; values are both limited to human purpose and diversified across human purposes. This explains the variety of scientific and religious theories. Pragmatism offers a universe compatible with our efforts and progress, but attaches moral responsibility to every judgment we make. JRS Summaries A. D. Montgomery, Phil Rev 12.6 m o v 1903): 674. 139 Schiller, F. C. S. Humanism: Philosophical Essays. London and New York: Macmillan, 1903.2nd ed., with four new chapters, 1912. Four essays, with some from Studies in Humanism (4901, were translated by Rudolf Eisler for inclusion in Humanismus: BeijFage zu einer pragmajkchen Philosophie (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 191 1). Seven chapters reprint articles published before 1898. One, "The Ethical Significance of Immortality," was translated for Humanismus, pp. 385-400. Six chapters are articles published after 1898: "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics," pp. 1 - 17 { 138) [Humanismus. pp. 122- 1371; "'Useless' Knowledge," pp. 18-43 (97); "On Preserving Appearances," pp. 183-203 (140); "Activity and Substance," pp. 204-227 (59) [Humanismus, pp. 341-3631; "The Desire for Immortality," pp. 228-249 (2nd ed., pp. 3 13-334) (73); "Philosophy and the Investigation of a Future Life," pp. 266-289 (2nd ed., pp. 35 1-374) (58). The "Preface," pp. vii-xxv [pp. xv-xxi in Humanismus, pp. 180-1961. "Truth," pp. 4461 [lfumanismus, pp. 180- 1961, and "Concerning Mephistopheles." pp. 166- 182. were written for llurnanism. The preface orients the reader to the Pragmatic movement. Schiller has been a pragmatist since 1892, but prefers the wider name of "humanism." "Truth" rcjccts corrcspondcncc (this makes knowledge of the cor~espondcnccirnpossihle) and systematic coherence (which cannot rule out the possibility of multiple systems). 1,ogic cannot be independent of psychology, and truth is the recognition of a practical value. The apparent chaos of values is gradually harmonized, as the useless drops away. Pragmatism announces social objectivity, in which "the useful" is the consistently practical for all. I'hc 2nd edition adds four articles: "Humism and Ilumanism." pp. 228-248 (484); "Solipsism," pp. 249-267 (716); "Infallibility and Toleration," pp. 268-282 (596); "Freedom and Responsibility," pp. 283-3 12, Oxford and Cambridge Review (Nov 1907). JKS Extended reviews J. A. Leighton (181).
Reviews A. R. Ainsworth, Int J Ethics 14.4 (July 1904): 520-522. Evolution might settle what is useful, but then could evolution be just a useful postulate? Usefulness presupposes the law of causality. JRS John Dewey, Psych Bull 1.9 (15 Sept 1904): 335-340 [MW 3: 312-3181. Dewey proclaims his "almost total dissent" from the positions in "Activity and Substance" and "Philosophy and the Investigation of a Future Life." Still, Humanism is "not only sane and sensible, but inevitable." while no scientist or philosopher can transcend their o h experience, the "universal and objective factors" of humanity repulse solipsism. Humanism adopts the methods and results of science without reducing philosophy to naturalism. Values are facts and all experiences are real, preserving the "continuity of experience." Dewey's preferred "genetic" method, of which Schiller seems ignorant, lies between a "broader Humanism" and a "narrower Pragmatism." Schiller does affirm that knowledge, like any action, actually alters reality, instead of simply revealing a preexistent reality. This central view is an experimental, ethical, and metaphysically evolutionary idealism. It applies purpose as a category without denying others, broadens "practice"-into a wider notion of conduct, and rejects the critics' deceptive attempts to portray knowledge as the special practice of representing reality. JRS A. W. Moore, "Humanism," Monist 14.5 (Oct 1904): 747-752. Moore provides a supportive survey of this latest contribution to the pragmatic movement. JRS William James, Nation 78.9 (3 March 1904): 175-176 [Collected Essays and Reviews {1579), pp. 448-452. Works ECR, pp. 550-5541. In imitation of logic and mathematics, it has been generally assumed that truth consists of a system of eternally true propositions depicting things as they are. However, some philosophers have shown that our thoughts, even when incongruent with things, nonetheless often handle them successfully. Furthermore, the doctrine of evolution has weaned us from "fixities and inflexibilities," while the sciences of recent years have shown that approximations are the best we can achieve. These developments have called forth the pragmatic movement, of which Schiller's humanism is a part. At its core is the claim that all our categories have "evolved because of their fruitfulness for life." In this collection, Schiller proposes an empiricist notion of the ultimate as a "changeless consciousness." He hints at the central problem facing humanism: accounting for the stubbornness of things which limits the range of humanistic explanations. The "rltar of things" should be conceived "non-humanistically," but we have no such categories. IKS F. B. Jevons, Hibbert Journal 2.3 (April 1904): 621-623; H. Lkard, Rev de Phil 6.4 (1 April 1905): 463-468; J. Legond, Rev Phil 57.6 (June 1904): 640-644: Arthur K. Rogers, Dial 36.10 (16 May 1904): 328-329; Alfred Sidgwick, Mind n.s. 13.2 (April 1904): 262268. Review of 2nd edition Willard C. Gore. J Phil I 1.5 (26 Feb 1914): 137-139.
140 Schiller, F. C. S. On Preserving Appearances. Mind n.s. 12.3 (July 1903): 34 1-354. Reprinted with additions in Humanism { 1391, pp. 183-203. Ihdlcy's commit~ncnlto thc principle of non-contradiction, a special case of the natural rlcsirc for rncr~talharmony, hardly warrants his metaphysical conclusion that our espe!icncc 1nus1he an illusion. Experience is broad and continuous enough to contain both unsatisfi~ctoryand satislactory portions, and there is no ultimate barrier to a complete
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and perfect satisfaction. "Higher" realities could not be asserted to exist if appearances had no reality at all; similarly, theories have value only in their ability to transform immediate experience. The first postulate of cognition is "Ultimate reality must be absolutely satisfactory," unifying appearance and reality. JRS Summaries Grace Mead Andrus, Phil Rev 12.6 (Nov 1903): 674-675.
141 Schiller, F. C. S. Professor Henry Jones on "Reflective Thought and Religion." Hibbert Journal 1.3 (April 1903): 576-578. Schiller responds to the first part of Henry Jones's "The Present Attitude of Thought Towards Religion" {124}.. The so-called "sceptics" are revolting against idealism's "approved and tested sterility." Pragmatists offer a new understanding of truth based on psychology. Indeed, Jones's own defense of science by appealing to how well it works makes his condemnation of pragmatism most curious. Pragmatism is equally friendly towards religion and science. JRS t
142 Stettheimer, Ettie. Die urteilsfi.eiheit als grundlage der rechtefirtigung des Religiosen Glauben, mit besonderer berucksichtigung der lehre von James. Wittenberg: Herrose und Ziemsen, 1903. Translated by Ettie Stettheimer as The Will to Believe as a Basisfor the Defense of Religious Faith: A Critical Study, no. 2 of the Archives of Philosophy (New York: Science Press, 1907). An extensive criticism of James's The Will to Believe (1897), based primarily on the grounds that this doctrine results in subjectivism. IKS Reviews of the translation Bernard C. Ewer, Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 564-566. Stettheimer's Neo-Fichtean standpoint is the real cause of the alleged inconsistencies in James's position. IRS ' Edward E. Richardson, Psych Bull 6.6 (15 June 1909): 200-202. Notes This work was Stettheimer's inaugural dissertation at Frieburg University in 1903.
143 Sturt, Henry. The Logic of Pragmatism. Proc Arist Soc 3 (1903): 96-122. The intellectualist takes mathematical deduction as the ideal system of knowledge, while the pragmatist adopts the "system of human purpose." While truth might be a correspondence with reality, reality is an immense flux, and our slender knowledge is relative to our weak efforts to grasp hold of it. Statements possess meaning insofar as they are generated for a purpose, and their truth is tested by their ability to function accordingly. The intellectualist's eternal completed system of true judgments is irrelevant and lacks meaning. Science, requiring standardized concepts, creates them in line with a specific purpose. Judgments are not necessary, universal, or a reference to reality. Sturt aligns other logical distinctions with pragmatism, and finds the essence of knowledge in "if-then" judgments. JRS
144 Taylor, Alfred E. Elements ofMefaphysics.London: Methuen; New York: Macmillan, 1903. Reviews J. A. Leighton, J Phil 2.8 (13 April 1905): 213-218.
Notes See Schiller's comments in "Empiricism and the Absolute" (282).
145 Vailati, Giovanni. Sull'applicabilith dei concetti di cause e di effetto nella scienza storiche. Rivista Italiana di Sociologia 7.3 (May-June 1903). Reprinted in Scritti { 10181, pp. 459-464. This essay treats a number of different theories of causality as articulated in the history of science. While not specifically about pragmatism, this essay reveals Vailati's turn of mind which brings him into sympathy with C. S. Peirce. EPC Notes See C. P. Zanoni, "Development of Logical Pragmatism in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 40.4 (Oct-Dec 1979): 603-619, and G. Villa, "Sul pragmatismo logico di Vailati e Calderoni: la questione della varieta del pragmatismo," Memorie dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Bologna S.V. 10 (1962): 187-213. 146 Vailati, Giovanni. L a teoria aristotelica della definizione. Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini 5 (Nov-Dec 1903). Reprinted in Scritti {1018), pp. 485-496. Vailati was a student of Peano, interested in the logical and linguistic dimensions of philosophical problems. The work of C. S. Peirce was hence especially attractive to him. This essay shows Vailati at work in the texts of Aristotle, foreshadowing his later attitude towards Peirce as the true, and James as the derivative, pragmatist. EPC
147 Alexander, Hartley B. The Concept of Consciousness. J Phil 1.5 (3 March 1904): 1 18-124. James's "stream of consciousness" is discussed in a survey of philosophies. This stream of fleeting qualities is on poor metaphysical foundations. JRS 148 Andrus, Grace Mead. Professor Bawden's Interpretation of the Physical and the Psychical. Phil Rev 13.4 (July 1904): 429-444. Bawden has four mutually incompatible views: experience contains functions, the organism has functions, the psychical is the meaning of reality while reality is the physical, and both the psychical and physical are just energy. A limited biological standpoint is being raised to an all-inclusive philosophy, culminating in metaphysical speculation. JRS Notes See Bawden's reply, "The Physical and the Psychical" (156). 149 Angell, James R. Psychology. New York: Henry Holt, 1904. 2nd ed., London: Constable and Co., 1905.4th ed., New York: Henry Holt, 1908. This principal tcxt of Chicago functionalism treats at length the various aspects of thinking as a purposive activity in problematic situations. Of special interest are the chapters "The Cnnsciousncss of Mcaning and the Formation of Concepts," "Judgment and the I3elncnts of'lkasoning." "'ftlc Forms and Functions of Reasoning," "Relation of Voli-
tion to Interest, Effort, and Desire," and "Character and the Will." A concept is defined as "a working hypothesis, a tentative manner of thinking about things, and is subject at need to revision." (p. 221) Reasoning is defmed as "purposive thinking, that is to say, thinking carried on in the interests of some plan which we wish to execute, some problem which we wish to solve, some difficulty which we wish to surmount." @. 223) Mind is "an engine for accomplishingthe most remarkable adjustments of the organism to its life conditions." (p. 379) JRS Reviews I. Madison Bentley, Amer J Psych 17.3 (July 1906): 415-418; H. C. Stevens, Psych Bull 4.1 (IS Jan 1906): 14-16; Frank Thilly, Phil Rev 14.4 (July 1905): 481-487. Reviews of 2nd ed. William McDougall, Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 277. Notes Angell's relationship with Dewey and the Chicago School is described in his contribution to A History of Pgehology in Autobiography, vol. 3 { 1936). 150 Anon. The Human Sympathy of William James. The Critic 44 (March 1904): 244. A poem written after reading James's "The Diversities [sic]of Religious Belief." IKS
151 Ardigo, Roberto. Preface. T o La varie forme della coscienza religioso, translated by G . C. Ferrari and Mario Calderoni (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1904). 152 Bakewell, Charles M. Latter-Day Flowing Philosophy. University ofCalifornia Publications in Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1904. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 92-1 14. Absolute idealism agrees that thought is tied to practice, but voluntarism invites skepticism or anarchy. Dependable reality is exposed by the transformation of experience by universalizing thought. James's fallacy infers, from the undoubted association of feeling with thought, that mere feeling grounds all thought. JRS Reviews H. Heath Bawden, J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 238-245; A. W. Moore, Psych Bull 3.1 (1 5 Jan 1906): 18-25. 153 Baldwin, James Mark. The Limits of Pragmatism. Psych Rev I I . I (Jan 1904): 30-60. Like Baldwin's own views, pragmatism makes thought, truth, and reality relative to evolution and ends, and denies dualism. But what of things missed or poorly apprehended by cognition, or types of thought overlooked by pragmatism? Pragmatism avoids idealism by asserting restrictions on thought, coming from external conditions. The "environment" plays this role, but the pragmatist should supply an independent account of the relationship between cognition and the environment. This objectively pragmatic standpoint (which Baldwin adopts) explains the selfhot-self contrast, but must also provide for an cxpcricnceltrans-cxpcrience distinction (to account for error and undiscovcrcd realities). Pragmatism might try to meet this demand, but will fail, since it only subsunics thc environment under the "reality" term when consciousness is divided bctwecn thought and
reality. This "genetic fallacy" reveals how pragmatism is a monism when thought needs an environment, but in explaining error, falls back on a dualism. Another failure lies in pragmatism's contradictory assertions that time is just a cognitive construction, and is also a real feature of dynamic reality. Psychology can deny dualism, but metaphysics and logic cannot. Pragmatism demotes general judgments as non-testable, and so sides with nominalism. JRS Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 13.2 (March 1904): 236. Notes See A. W. Moore, "Professor Baldwin on the Pragmatic Universal" (188). Baldwin's relationship to pragmatism is described in his autobiographical contribution to A History ofPsychology in Autobiography, vol. 1, ed. Carl Murchinson (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University, 1936. Rpt., New York: Russell and Russell, t961), pp. 1-30.
154 Bawden, H. Heath. The Meaning of the Psychical from the Point of View o f the Functional Psychology. Phil Rev 13.3 (May 1904): 298-3 19. Experience is action in process, and consciousness is a tension in activity that creates reflective contents. These static contents can be objectively studied by psychology, but they are not experience. Consciousness is social, and growing more so. Morton Prince, Charles Strong, and Josiah Royce are discussed. Consciousness is the "complete organic circuit" which involves the nervous system and its external world context. JRS Reviews Mary Whiton Calkins, Psych Bull 2.5 (15 May 1905): 174-175. Notes See Grace Andrus, "Professor Baldwin's Interpretation of the Physical and the Psychical" (1481, and Morton Prince, "The Identification of Mind and Matter," Phil Rev 13.4 (July 1904): 444-45 1. 155 Bawden, H. Heath. The Necessity From the Standpoint of Scientific Method of a Reconstruction of the Ideas of the Psychical and the Physical. J Phil 1.3 (4 Feb 1904): 62-68. Science has replaced matter with energy, and evolution sees the universe as a dynamic whole, possessing progressive degrees of organization. Mind must shape matter, just as matter shapes mind. Consciousness is not some entity among others, but just meaning for an organism. The paradox, "if the world cannot exist except for consciousness, how can biology assert that evolution only lately produced consciousness" is dissolved when we view consciousness not as an entity or force, but as functional significance for an organism. Only by taking methodological distinctions as fixed and distinct realities (establishing parallelism) can the paradox be generated. JRS Notes Bawden outlines Mead's "The Definition of the Psychical" (129) in his next article, "lieccnt 'Tendencies in the Theory of the Psychical and the Physical," Psych Bull 1.4 (15 March 1904): 102-117. 156 Bawden, H. Heath. The Physical and the Psychical. Phil Rev 13.5 (Sept 1904): 54 1-546.
Bawden replies to Grace Mead Andrus, "Professor Bawden's Interpretation of the Physical and the Psychical" (148). Andrus has taken these two functional terms for the aspects of reality, but experience is wider than the meanings of those terms. "Reality is only as it is experienced' and transcends the contents of reflective thought. JRS Notes See Andrus's reply, "Professor Bawden's Functional Theory: A Rejoinder," Phil Rev 13.6 (NOV1904): 660-665.
157 Bawden, H. Heath. What Is Pragmatism? J Phil 1.16 (4 Aug 1904): 421427. An overview of pragmatism at an early stage, distinguishing the doctrines of Schiller's "Humanism," James's "Pragmatism," and Dewey's "Instrumentalism." Dewey's is the best formulation, since it places needs within the functional cycle of experience. James instead subordinates thought to needs. Critics have rightly focused attacks on James's version: but Dewey avoids that error. JRS 158 Boodin, J. E. Time and Reality. Psychological Review Monograph Supplements, vol. 6, no. 3. New York: Macrnillan, October 1904. A "clearer and completer" statement of Boodin's 1899 Harvard dissertation. Time is "absolute and dynamic non-being," requiring contradictory judgments on the same quality in space. Time is not serial, nor mere duration. Peirce's notion of continuity is "a double begging of the question," as an attempt to define it in static terms. (pp. 43-45) Time is absolute novelty, essential to "habit-forming reality," and accounts for real change. Idealists and realists use only static concepts, but truth must be "relative to process...and truth can never exhaust reality." Knowledge is instrumental to anticipating the environment. JRS Reviews Boyd H. Bode. Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 730-731; Percy Hughes, J Phil 2.8 (13 April 1905): 2 18-220. Notes Boodin continues this anti-idealist thesis with "The Concept of Time," J Phil 2.14 (6 July 1905): 365-372. 159 Bradley, F. H. On Truth and Practice. Mind n s . 13.3 (July 1904): 309-335. "The greater part" is reprinted in Essays on Truth and Real@ (12441, pp. 75106. The practical does not determine reality, since ideas need a separate reality to work wi:h. Truth lies in "this forced agreement of my ideas with a nature other than my volition." If practice is just a change in my existence, the quality of my life becomes irrelevant. Our goal should instead be "the fullest and most harnlonious development of our being" which will, only incidentally, be manifested in our activity. Truth will satisfy wants, but it is not thereby created by such satisfaction. "You rnight as well demonstrate to mc that plainly 1 can love nothing beyond me, because my love alter all must be a piece of myself." (p. 323) IIow might truth be subordinated to practice? Pure theory may bc dcclared ineligible for truth, but this very doctrine is purely tllcorctical. If thcory is just the means to practical ends, there can be no real error or argument. Reality itself might be will,
but will implies an "other." A plurality of wills faces the problem of how one bare will could be a firm reality for another will. Reality might be just the individual will, as James and Schiller imply, but then "reality and truth are what I want and are that which at any time I choose to make them." Such solipsism hardly explains why the pragmatists try so hard to persuade others. Pragmatism has failed, for all Schiller's brash talk, to produce a coherent thesis. JRS Reviews Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 1.25 (8 Dec 1904): 693-695; Alban D. Sorensen, Psych Bull 2.3 (15 March 1905): 105-108. Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.1 (Jan 1905): 84-85. Notes See Schiller's response, "In Defense of Humanism" (202).
Pragmatism is part of a general tendency to use personal need as the key to reality. While knowledge and action are connected, knowledge requires a detachment from personal interest, and can become an end in itself. Ideas may be only functions of experience from a limited biological viewpoint, but philosophically, thought gives experience its significance; hence, no practical purpose could be the final end for a rational being. Pragmatism accuses other metaphysical systems of abandoning experience, but the real issue between them is the nature of experience. While we should reject reason as an independent abstraction, pragmatism flies to the opposite extreme by reducing it to a plurality of experiences. Truth is an ideal of reason, and its universality and necessity pennits the practical evaluation of ideas. Pragmatism cannot talk of social purposes without presupposing metaphysical constructions, and thus the objective nature of experience is lost. Dualism is retained, since experience can exist without thought, and has the novelty of thought thrust upon i t JRS
160 Brown, Francis Theodore. William James and the Philosophy of Emerson. Methodist Review 76 (Sept 1904): 747-756. James has avoided the half-truths of Emersonian monism by his emphasis on activity and human personality. James overlooks Christianity's uniqueness, though his The Will to Believe (1897) belongs in an "admirable modem library of Methodist apologetics." IKS
163 De Laguna, Theodore. Evolutionary Method in Ethical Research. Phil Rev 13.3 (May 1904): 328-337. De Laguna critiques Dewey's "The Evolutionary Method Applied to Morality" (86). Experiments do not essentially involve genetic methods, introspection into value cannot be so easily dismissed, and the validity of an intuition holds independently of its origin. Empiricism can survive Dewey's criticisms. JRS
161 Calderoni, Mario. Le varieta del pragmatismo. Leonardo 2.3 (Nov 1904): 3-7. Reprinted in Scrittidi Mario Calderoni (17491, vol. 1, pp. 209-222. Preuolini came to pragmatism after a brief yet intense study of Henri Bergson. He, together with Papini, articulated a militantly voluntaristic version of pragmatism which fused the Bergsonian notion of inner self with James's "will to believe." The ideal type of the Uomo-dio, or Man-god, began to appear in the writings of both men, denoting a kind of pragmatic superman whose will stood as an omnipotent shaper of the external world. Calderoni uses this essay to delineate the various branches of pragmatism, urging his reader to understand the movement in terms of its Peircean variety, and especially in terms of the wording of the pragmatic maxim. According to this essay, I'rezzolini's Will-to-Believe variety of pragmatism is derived from Peirce's "original" pragmatism. built upon the pragmatic maxim. Calderoni asserts that Peirce's pragmatism was meant to discourage the excesses found in the derived form. lie accuses the Will-to-Believists of behaving like the worst kind of theological metaphysician; that is, they create worlds in which contradictories can exist side by side! Calderoni's essay sparked a response frorn Prezzolini, and for a while a lively ongoing debate continued in the pages of Leonardo. EPC Notes See Prezzolini's reply {195). See also E. Paul Colella, "Two Faces of Italian Pragmatism: The Prezzolini-Calderoni Debate, 1904-1905," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Socicty 30.4 (Fall 1994): 861-896, and Vincent Colapietro, "'Tell your Friend Giuliano...' : Jarnesian Enthusiasms and Peircean Reservations," ibid. pp. 897-926.
165 Dewey, John. Notes Upon Logical Topics. 11. The Meanings of the Tenn "Idea." J Phil 1.7 (31 March 1904): 175-178. Reprinted in MW3: 68-72. The history of philosophy reveals that ideas, originally objective, have become subjective objects. For James, they are devices for controlling knowledge. JRS
162 Creigl~ton,James E. Purpose as Logical Category. Phil Rev 13.3 (May 1904): 284-297. Reprinted in Studies in Speculative Phifosophy, ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, l925), pp. 93- 109.
167 Dewey, John. The Psychology of Judgment. Psych Bull 1.2 (I 0 Feb 1904): 44-45. Reprinted in MW 3: 35 1. James's notion of consciousncss as a stream, having a focus and fringc. is used to interpret the logical judgment's subject and object. JRS
164 Dewey, John. Notes Upon Logical Topics. I. A Classification of Contemporary Tendencies. J Phil 1.3 (4 Feb 1904): 57-62. Reprinted in Dewey and His Critics, pp. 484-489. MW3: 62-68. Formal, empirical, transcendental, mathematical (here Peirce is mentioned), grarnmatical, and scientific method logics are distinguished. A seventh type examinqs the "working logic of practical life, and of scientific investigation and verification," and is exemplified by Alfred Sidgwick. JRS
166 Dewey, John. The Philosophical Work of Herbert Spencer. Phil Rev 13.2 (March 1904): 159- 175. Reprinted as "Herbert Spencer" in Characters a t ~ d Events (1 929), vol. 1, pp. 45-62. MW 3: 193-209. Spencer's single-minded system of evolution mirrored his social and intellectual isolation. It is a return to 18th-century French progressivism and German organicism, against the British empiricist tradition. Spencer is a transitional figure, pointing away frorn fixed values toward "self-organizing reality." JRS
collaborators have produced an original and important new system of philosophy. Dewey is an evolutionist and an empiricist. For him there are no unknowables and absolutes, and biology and psychology are continuous. Thought results from a situation in experience of conflict between the old and the new. For the sake of action, such a situation must be reconstructed. Judgment and knowing occur in reconstruction and are only incidents in the wider activity of adjusting. For Dewey, fact and theory differ only in their functions: when we hesitate we use "theory," and when we are steady, "fact." Thus, truth is in process of formation; it is not an agreement with some eternally standing system, but the maximum of stability in belief. This view is saved from caprice by the "object-factors" in situations which are common to many knowers. This system has two gaps: it lacks a cosmology and an account of our sharing a common world. IKS
Notes Abstract of a paper read at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association at St. Louis, Missouri, in December 1903.
168 Dewey, John. The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education. In the Third Yearbook of the National Society for the Scientific Study of Education, Part One (1904), pp. 9-30. Reprinted in MW3: 249-272. Teaching should imitate other professions, where training develops the intellectual methods to acquire mastery without trying to bestow all the skills of a profession. Theory and practice would be reunited, and teachers could focus on the child's own interests while still maintaining order and progress. Dewey outlines how educational and moral psychology should be taught in the context of a "practice school." JRS
169 Galloway, George. Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1904. .James forgets that feeling and will are useless without thought. JRS Reviews F. C. French, Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 193-199. 170 Gentile, Giovanni. Religione e prammatismo nel James. La Critica 2.6 (20 Nov 1904): 47 1-482. Reprinted in his N modernismo e i rapporti@a religione e filosoja (Bari: Latena e Figli, 1909), pp. 159- 183. 171 Herrick, C. L. The Logical and Psychological Distinction Between the True and the Real. Psych Rev 1 1.3 (May 1904): 204-2 10. Functionalism, as espoused by Dewey, Baldwin, Bawden, and Herrick, reforms philosophical terms. Reality, a "primary feeling-cognition" extends beyond thought (and its true/false judgments). Truth is the organic system of judgments, but reality is direct experience; a blind person lacks the visual experience which even all truth cannot replace. Psychological tcrms (concept, pcrccpt etc.), if taken as mental contents, create the old debate over universals. Functionalism instead takes them as parts of processes and dissolves that debate. JRS
172 Hobhouse, L. T. Faith and the Will to Believe. Proc Arist Soc 4 (1904): 87-1 10. The two replacements for "vital" religious belief are n~etaphysicsand scientific skepticism. The rejection of the authority of reason in preference for the "will to believe" in faith "would be voluntarily to embrace a self-contradiction." The "flowery paths of imagination" have a role as the "forerunner of thought," but thought should not be surrendered to feeling. JKS 173 James, William. 'The Chicago School. Psych Bull 1.1 (15 Jan 1904): 1-5. Reprinted in Collecled Essays and Reviews (15791, pp. 445-447. WJ Writings 2, p p . 1 136-1 140. Workr EJ'h, pp. 102-106. A review of Dcwcy et a/.,Studies in Logical Theory (1 18). Some universities have much thought. others. much school, while Chicago has both. John Dewey and ten
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174 James, William. Does "Consciousness" Exist? J Phil 1.18 (1 Sept 1904): 477-491. Reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism (10781, pp. 1-38. McDermott, pp. 169-183. WJ Writings 2, pp. 1141-1 158. Pure Experience, pp. 1-17. Works ERE, pp. 3- 19. The soul, once conceived as a substance and person, has become mere consciousness, a ghostly substance about which nothing definite can be said. Consciousness is a vestige of the older mind-body dualism, which can be eliminated entirely by showing that consciousness simply does not exist. There remains, however, the function of knowing, which must be accounted for without using the concept of consciousness. Immediate experience has no dualistic structure; it is pure experience, a collection of mere thats. These bits can be treated as either mental or physical, becoming one or the other depending upon the system of relations into which they are placed. A perceived table is physical when placed in a chain leading from a tree to the finished product, and mental, when viewed as a part of a given biographical stream. Knowle'dge does not take place in a non-experienceable consciousness, but is a relation which certain experiences have with each other. IKS Summaries George N.Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 383-384; L. A. Weigle, Psych Rev 2.2 (15 March 1905): 99- 102.
175 James, William. Herbert Spencer. Atlantic Monthly 94.1 (July 1904): 99108. Reprinted as "Herbert Spencer's Autobiography" in Memories and Studies (191 11, pp. 107-142. Works EPh, pp. 107-122. For some, Spencer was the greatest of philosophers, for others, someone who combined generally known facts into an incoherent system, full of contradictions hidden behind an imposing terminology. His autobiography reveals a man of great erudition and civic courage and also a petty man, "lukewarm in all his tastes and passions," writing with tones of "pedantic rectitude." To him belongs the credit of discovering that evolution is universal, but his works are a "museum of blundering reasoning." Janlcs was at first much impressed by Spencer, but his opinion reversed after listening to criticisms ptoposed by C. S. Peirce and using Spencer's works in classes. IKS Notes James's other discussion of Spencer is "Herbert Spencer Dead," New York Evening Poc! (8 Dec 1903) [WorksEPh, pp. 96-1 0 I].
176 James, William. Humanism and Truth. Mind n.s. 13.4 (Oct 1904): 457475. Reprinted with additions taken from "Humanism and Truth One More" (2451, in lrhe Meaning @Truth (6721, pp. 5 1-10 1. WorksMT,pp. 37-60. James restricts "pragmatism" to the method of C. S. Peirce, that of testing an abstract concept by considering the "concrete difference to someone which its being true will make." In England "pragmatism" is used in a wider sense as a theory that the truth of a statement consists of its consequences, and for this, F. C. S. Schiller's proposed "humanism" is a good name. Instead of defending Schiller and John Dewey against critics such as F. H. Bradley, James will develop his own understanding of humanism while "playing sympathetically" with the subject. Experience is not received in a pure form, but the chaotic "first" is enveloped by a "second" in the form of categorieetime, space, thing-devised by common sense. Reality is an accumulation of human intellectual inventions, and the problem of truth is the problem of inserting new experiences among the old, while changing the latter as little as possible. Opponents of humanism are too "lazy" to make their abstractions concrete, something which in any case could be done only in humanistic terms. Thus, reality is experienced as an inability to control aspects of experience. Whether behind experienced reality there lurks some absolute, humanism does not say. In any case, the absolute could serve as a standard for thought only as the experience of resistance to concrete errors. Contrary to what its critics charge, humanism shows why we should be devoted to truth, for truth stands for whatever is valuable in our lives. To replace truth conceived abstractly as copying, humanism offers the concrete idea of beneficial interaction between the conceptual and the sensational parts of experience, with copying included among the interactions and theoretical satisfaction among the benefits. IKS Reviews Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 1.25 (8 Dec 1904): 693-695. Recognition is lacking that reality also shapes thought and that religious knowledge mirrors the real being. JRS Giovanni Vailati, Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1.2 (March-April 1905): 1 1 1-1 13. Summaries Grace Mead Andrus, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 385. Notes See H. W. B. Joseph's comments (253).
177 James, William. Introduction. T o G. T. Fechner, The Little Book ofLfe after Death, trans. Mary C.Wadsworth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1904), pp. viixix. Reprinted in Works ERM, pp. 1 16-1 19. Fechner's is a rare mind, combining "patient observation and daring imagination." His central thought is panpsychisn~:the claim that matter is not dead but alive and conscious. For him, God is the total consciousness of the universe and has a genuine history. The scheme is based on the idea of the span of consciousness. IKS
178 James, William. The Pragmatic Method. J Phil 1.25 (8 Dec 1904): 673687. Partly reprinted in Pragmatism (4381, pp. 97-108. Works EPh, pp. 123-139. Notes This essay is a lightly revised version of "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" ( 13).
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179 James, William. Remarks at the Peace Banquet. In Oficial Report of the Thirteenth Universal Peace Congress (Boston: Peace Congress Committee, 1904), up. - - 266-269. Reprinted with revisions in Atlantic Monthly 94.12 (December 1904): 845-847. Memories and Studies (9571, pp. 299-306. Works ERM, pp. 120- 123. While philosophers emphasize reason, it plays only a small role in the settlement of disputes. Human beings are by nature belligerent, the most formidable of all beasts of prey. Historians and clergymen idealize war. Civilization was built in the shadow of wars. Men live for "thrills and excitements." In the face of the human desire for war, we should emphasize prevention rather than radical cure: leave open the general possibility of war, but strive to prevent each occurrence. IKS ?.
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180 James, William. A World of Pure Experience. J Phil 1.20 (29 Sept 1904): 533-543; 1.21 (13 Oct 1904): 561-570. An extract was reprinted under the title "The Relation Between Knower and- Known," in The Meaning of Tnclh (6721, pp. 102- 120 [Works MT,pp. 61-69]. Essays in Radical Empiricism (10781, pp. 39-9 1. McDermott, pp. 194-2 14. WJ Writings 2, pp. 1 159- 1 182. Pure Experience, pp. 18-40. Works ERE, pp. 2 1-44. Philosophy is being rearranged, creating an opportune time to sketch a view which has grown up in James to such an extent that he cannot "see things" in any other way. Radical empiricism admits into its constructions everything that is directly experienced and only that. Differing from ordinary empiricism, it asserts that relations are matters of experience. Among conjunctive relations, mere "withness" is the most external and involves no further consequences. The relations of transition between mental states in a person's history, co-conscious transitions, are of strategic importance through which all the corruptions of rationalism can pour in, if they are not taken at "face-ualue." As for the cognitive relation, it is either a matter of acquaintance in which knower and known are identical, or of description, where experienceable paths of conjunctive relations connect knower and known. The logical function of substitution is very important: some experiences better fulfill the purposes of others by leading to further experiences, and can be functional substitutes. Objective reference is experienced as continuity, the transition from experiences themselves felt as insufficient to others. These transitions are a part of the fringe of consciousness. Radical empiricism does not have affinities with Berkeley or John Stuart Mill but rather with natural realism, as it allows different minds to meet in common objects. IKS Reviews Giovanni Vailati, Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 1.2 (March-April 1905): 111-1 13. Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 384-385; L. A. Weigle, Psych Rev 2.2 (15 March 1905): 99-102. 181 Leighton, Joseph Alexander. Pragmatism. J Phil 1.6 (17 March 1904): 148-156. Schiller confuses the psychological conditions of truth with the criterion of attained truth. Leighton says, "1 regard the number-system of algebra as true, but it ha=no practical value for me and, not being a mathematician, I have not discovered that it produces in me
any emotional thrills." (p. 151) There are a pluralism of personal harmonies, but all must face reality's determinate nature. Dewey's genetic account of thought does not explain the universal and objective marks of truth. Logic should distinguish intellectual harmony from all aesthetic harmonies. Truth must be timeless and all striving must be toward a fmal value, but pragmatism's evolving reality abolishes both. JRS
182 Leuba, James H. Professor James' Interpretation of Religious Experience. Int J Ethics 14.3 (April 1904): 322-339. What James concludes about the universal element in religion is already well-known. James's Varieties ofReligious Experience (90) is a preparation for a startling pluralism, akin to polytheism. The way to the other world is through the subliminal consciousness; hence James emphasizes mystical states. But why substitute spirits who "crawl in through the subliminal door" for an omnipotent God? IKS
183 MacLennan, Simon F. Two Illustrations of the Methodological Value of Psychology in Metaphysic. J Phil 1.15 (2 1 July 1904): 403-4 1 1. F. H. Bradley is criticized for his failure to appreciate a fimctional analysis of ideas. Royce assumes that psychic experience is an entity, and then accuses the pragmatist of limiting knowledge to "the magic limits of psychical insuficiency." The whole process of experience contains "self-conscious factors," so that similar aims requires similar means. This provides for objectivity without presupposing eternally futed conditions. JRS 184 Marron, William R. A. Pragmatism in American Philosophy. Catholic University Bulletin 10.2 (April 1904): 2 1 1-224. Pragmatism finds a proposition's truth in its "service-capacity," and sees the essence of anything real in the end it serves. Its inspiration lies in Peirce, Lotze's teleological idealism, and Ritschl's ethical theology. Royce relies on these conceptions to support absolutism, while James instead defends empiricism. Pragmatism has no future prospects since it destroys speculation, though it is inspiring a new generation of religious believers. JRS
185 Mead, G. H. Image or Sensation. J Phil 1.22 (27 Oct 1904): 604-607. Mead comments on Willard Gore, "Image or Sensation" J Phil 1.16 (4 Aug 1904): 434-441. Gore has a functional theory of sensation, in close agreement with Dewey, but wrongly locates images in our responses. JRS Notes See Gore's response, "Image or Sensation," J Phil 2.4 (16 Feb 1905): 97-101.
186 Mead, G. H. The Relations of Psychology and Philology. Psych Bull 1.1 1 (15 Oct 1904): 375-391. Wundt's voluntarism and theory of the community-life properly finds in the gesture the origin of language. Mead describes several problems with Wundt's specific philological tenets. JRS
187 Moore, G. E. Jahresbericht Uber "Philosophy in the United Kingdom for 1902." Arch Syst Phil 10.3 (July 1904): 242-264.
188 Moore, A. W. Professor Baldwii on the Pragmatic Universal. Psych Bull 1.12 (15 Nov 1904): 415-423. Reprinted with revisions as "The Pragmatic Universal," in Pragmatism a n d Its Critics (8601, pp. 174- 194. Moore responds to Baldwin, "The Limits of Pragmatism" (153). Pragmatism rejects Baldwin's transcendent abstract universals. Universals are mediating, experienced, and hypothetical, providing continuity to the process of experience. Logic cannot describe all reality, only thought's role in it. A pragmatist "confesses that the only reality he can find in which thought is playing a discoverable part is just the world of instinctive, emotional, volitional, social, 'real life,' ...without prejudice to the conviction that this world of 'real life' may have in it things not dreamed of in our philosophies." JRS Reviews Mary Winifred Sprague, Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 102. Notes See Baldwin, "A Word of Rejoinder to Professor Moore," Psych Bull 1.12 (Nov 1904): 424-429.
189 Moore, A. W. Review of Armand Sabatier, Philosophie & l'effort. Phil Rev 13.5 (Sept 1904): 569-572. Despite its title this work is not pragmatic, as it argues for an eternal ideal that teleologically orders universal evolution. How can this ideal be applied to concrete life, and how does its existence make the universe any less "mechanical" than materialism? JRS 190 Noble, J o h n H. Psychology on the "New Thought" Movement. Monist 14.3 (April 1904): 409-426. James's Varieties of Religious Experience (90) praises the practical focus on spirit, the emphasis on the subconscious identity with the Divine, and the use o'f mystical experiences, made by "mind-cure" practitioners. JRS Notes The Christian Scientists emerged as a major element of the New Thought movement.
191 Peirce, C. S. Review of Josiah Royce, Outlines of Psychology. Nation 79.13 (29 Sept 1904): 264-265. Reprinted in The Nation, Part Three, pp. 186189. This "short text-book"-bound to "seduce a young person into close observation and close reasoningyis about the "essential unity of conduct and...cognition." Peirce describes how this above unification "cuts deep into the theories of psychology," discusses Royce as an automatist, and remarks on the division of mentality into feeling, volition, and cognition. LF Notes Ou~linesof Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1903). 192 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Guiliano il Sofista). Un compagno di scavi (F. C. S. Schiller). Leonardo 2.3 (June 1904): 4-7. While philosophical systems are likened to prisons, Schiller is praised for a philosophy which leads to freedom. He sees philosophy as something as personal as the fit
of one's clothes, and he recognizes the fluidity of the world and the experimental character of human responses to it. Humanity is made into a god. There is much mention of Schiller's "Axioms as Postulates" (96). Schiller is the philosophical miner, burrowing under experience to unearth its secret core: the supremely creative self. EPC
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193 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Giuliano il Sofista). Dalla sorgente alle foci dello spirito. Leonardo 2.3 (June 1904): 18-24. Prezzolini offers a detailed analysis of the psychology of habit. Drawing heavily from the work of Bergson and James, he develops a view of habit as originating in creative inspiration and sharpening in conscious and determined effort. Social life requires stability and order; through habit this is assured. EPC 194 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Giuliano il Sofista). I1 David della filosofia inglese (F. C. S. Schiller). Leonardo 2.1 (March 1904): 1-3. James wrote about the Italian pragmatists' debt to Schiller and himself in a letter of 30 April 1905 [The Letters of William James {1580f, p. 2271. This article is Prezzoh i ' s first lengthy treatment of a specific pragmatic thinker, and he chose Schiller rather than James as his subject. Schiller plays the David to the Goliath of British Hegelianism, slaying the logical and intellectualist giant with his humanism. An article concerning his more positive contributions is promised; see his "Un compagno di scavi (F. C. S. Schiller)" { 192). EPC 195 Prezzolini, Giuseppe. Le varietA del pragmatismo (Riposte a Calderoni). Leonardo 2.3 (Nov 1904): 7-9. Prezzolini replies to Mario Calderoni's "Le varieta del pragmatismo" {161). Prezzolini launches his attack against Calderoni over the nature of pragmatism by maintaining that the foundation of pragmatism is the realization that the will acts on belief. Pragmatism is connected to Prezzolini's earlier attachment to Bergson's philosophy. Beliefs are not adopted solely on rational evidence. Rather, they are adopted because they respond to desires in the human will. Responding to a specific point raised by Calderoni, Prezzolini argues that there is much in the pragmatisms of James and Schiller which is not to be found in Peirce, and hence it is wrong to think of Peirce as the founder of the family, and James and Schiller as degenerate descendants. James and Schiller actually represent an enlargement of Peirce. What emerges here is Prezzolini's understanding of pragmatism in terms of the Man-god. It is a philosophy of radical voluntarism, unwelcome to limitations upon the efficacy of the will. EPC Notes I'circe made a bricf remark on this debate and Prezzolini's voluntarism, in CP 5.4975.501, particularly 5.497 note I.
196 Pringle-Pattison, Andrew Seth. Review of John Dewey, Studies in Logical Tl~eory.Phil Rev 13.6 (Nov 1904): 666-677. Reprinted in T/le Philosophical Radicals a t d Other Essays (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1907), pp. 178- 194. A review of { 118). Idealism too rejects representational epistemology and stresses the continuity oT experience, so why is Bosanquet misunderstood in Thompson's essay?
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Dewey fixes the limited practical role for thought by definition. No experience, however aesthetic, leaves intelligence's sphere. Dewey's criticism of Lotze's logic is incisive. JRS Reviews of The Philosophical Radicals S. H . Mellone, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 97-104; W. R Sorley, Hibbert Journal 6.1 (Oct 1907): 212-215. 197 Rieber, Charles H. Pragmatism and the A Priori. Universiw ofCalfornia Publications in Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1904. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 72-91. Knowledge requires necessity; without certain facts, the pragmatist cannot arrive at truth. Idealism protests the.pragmatic view of minds as "mere phenomena among phenomena" Thought and action must be related in time, from a standpoint beyond immediate experience. Pragmatists accuse metaphysicians of erecting an impassabie barrier between thought and reality, but the pragmatic account of judgment requires a similar leap from the present into the past and future. Pragmatism offers a materialism, has no method to tell good from bad effects, and cannot find reasonable wants. Pragmatism's psychology is epiphenomenal, since thoughts exist for acts. Their protest against idealism, that there is no complete system of truth, ignores the fact that nothing can be known as partial unless the outline of the complete reality is also known. JRS Reviews H. Heath Bawden, J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 238-245; A. W. Moore, Psych Bull 3.1 (15 Jan 1906): 18-25. 198 Rogers, A r t h u r K. Rationality and Belief. Phil Rev 13.1 (Jan 1904): 30-50. The "real" is what satisfies needs, and our recognition of real things arises from a check to activity, a lack of the proper stimulus to a habit. In the resulting search for the stimulus, self and world are distinguished. Both social and physical realms'are due to "a postulate of the will," since no demonstration is possible. Emotion is more than mere physiological stimulus; it flourishes as spiritual needs are met, and as the "sentiment of rationality," it demands harmonized experience and practical consistency. In the face of this demand, mere present appeal to a feeling cannot justify a truth, but the opposite view that feeling is irrelevant to reason cannot stand either. The common-sense separation of the useful from the true is just the difference between limited success and "a satisfactory outcome in the case of every activity, actual or possible, that enters into experience in its widest sense." JRS Notes See also his "Scepticism," Phil Rev 13.6 (Nov 1904): 627-64 1.
199 Rogers, Arthur K. The Standpoint of Instrumental Logic. J Phil 1.8 (14 April 1904): 207-2 12. Rogers reviews Dewey's Sudres in Logteal 'Iheoty { 1 18). Functional psjcholog\ transforms every concept applied by its critic, thereby avoiding serious debate and ignoring "natural instincts of belief." Why should we abandoll external reality, anti its ability to account for novel intemptions in experience, religious attitudes, and other persons, for a theory which holds that "the earth \+asreally flat...so long as mcn hund it satisfactory to believe it so." Pragmatism escapes solipsisnl only by making thought impossible. JRS
200 Royce, Josiah. The Eternal and the Practical. Phil Rev 13.2 (March 1904): 113-142. Reprinted in The Development of American Philosophy (27861, pp. 246-26 1. All judgments are expressions of activity in response to our needs, as pragmatism asserts, but "pure" pragmatism declares that they completely determine truth and reality. Pure pragmatism cannot appeal to evolution, since all science would be the product, not the prior conditions, of judgment. When one makes a judgment, one is telling others they ought to believe too; but pure pragmatism reduces judgments to expressions of personal attitude, and stripsjudgments of their ability to contradict. A completed pragmatism would preserve the striving for objectivity using the Absolute perspective. JRS Reviews H. Heath Bawden, Psych Bull 1.9 (15 Aug 1904): 320-324. Notes See Simon MacLennan's comments in "Two lllustrations of the Methodological Value of Psychology in Metaphysic" { 183).
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Stratton discusses recent theories of consciousness, including James's "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" { 174). JRS Notes See his "The Character of Consciousness," Psych Bull 3.4 (15 April 1906): 117-124 [Pure Experience, pp. 113-1411. 205 Strong, Charles A. A Naturalistic Theory of the Reference of Thought to Reality. J Phil 1.10 (12 May 1904): 253-260. The James-Miller theory of cognition, formulated by James in "On the Function of Cognition" (1885) and Dickinson S. Miller in "The Meaning of Truth and Error" (1893) has been too long ignored. With pragmatism's rise it is time for this theory to be revived. IKS 206 Stuart, Henry W. The Logic o f Self-Realization. University ofCalfornia Publications in Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 9 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1904. Rpt., New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1969), pp. 175-205.
201 Schiller, F. C. S. Dreams and Idealism. Hibbert Journal 3.1 (Oct 1904): 83102. Reprinted with revisions in Studies in Humanism (4901, pp. 452-486. Absolute idealism rests on fallacies. The pragmatic test shows that reality cannot be either a single knowing spirit or be independent of experience. Dreams are not as real as waking experience, because dreams have less internal harmony. Higher-level experiences will gain in harmony; ultimate harmony permits a synthesis of idealism and realism. JRS Summaries Mary Winifred Sprague, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 389-390.
207 Tawney, Guy A. Utilitarian Knowledge. J Phil 1.13 (23 June 1904): 337344. Pragmatism makes truth subjective and inferior to its objects. Yet, "the heart craves the permanent and the universal," and a reflective mind will view ideas as limitations on a wider reality. When pragmatism appeals to evolution, either a pragmatic metaphysics supplements pragmatism, or pragmatism offers a circular proof in describing how evolutionary theory arises in relation to an individual's needs. Facts, meanings, and needs all arise from concrete experience. JRS
202 Schiller, F. C. S. In Defence of Humanism. Mind n.s. 13.4 (Oct 1904): 525-542. Reprinted in "considerably altered" form as "Truth and Mr. Bradley" in Studies in Humunisni 14901, pp. 114-140. Schiller replies to Bradley's "On Truth and Practice" { 159). Bradley substituted misrepresentations and absurdities for Schiller's position, while Bradley's own position has been destroyed by the impracticality and irrelevancy of the correspondence theory of truth. Pragmatism does not separate theory from practice and "enslave" one to the other. Kant did express pragmatism in the Critique of Practical Reason. Bradley deceptively cloaks himself in religious terms for rhetorical gain. JRS
208 Taylor, Alfred E. Some Side Lights on Pragmatism. McGill University Magazine 3 (April 1904): 44-66. James infers the truth of a belief from its existence, but this is illegitimate. even though the belief enjoys universal consent. James ignores the fact that we can possess evidence without complete proof, and forgets that to adopt something as a working hypothesis is far from holding it to be true. James admits that some truths can be proved. and this is a fatal admission. The existence of a truth independent of my will shows that to be true mearis something different from being willed. lKS
203 Spiller, Gustav. Voluntarism and Intellectualism: A Reconciliation. Phil Rev 13.4 (July 1904): 420-428. I'ragmatism ends in sheer fancy and moral chaos, and intellectualism is refuted by sciencc. A properly "organic conception of human nature" instead makes truth social. I'ragmatism should rightly deny science's claim to legislate all reality without making all beliefs equally justifiable. JRS Rcviews J. A. Leighton. J Phil 1.18 ( 1 Sept 1904): 500-50 1.
209 Tyrrell, George. Lex Orundi, Or Prayer und Creed. London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904. The conclusion olfers universal fruitfulness as the test of religious truth. Religious lire determines religious creed. JRS Notes Tyrrell distances his view from pragnlatistn in I.cr Cretkendi (1,ondoll: I,ongt~larlr.GI-ccn. and Co.. 1906) and Through Scylla and ~ / z f ~ y b d Or, i s : The Old 7'izeolo~vand llre (New York: Longmans. Green and Co.. 1907).
204 Stratton, Ceorge M. The Difference Between the Mental and the Physical. Psych Bull 3.1 (1 5 Jan 1906): 1-9. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 123- 132.
210 Vailati, Ciovanni. La piu recente definizione della tnatematica. Leonardo 2.2 (June 1904): 7- 10. Reprinted in Scrirli { 10 181, pp. 578-533.
Vailati debates with Bertrand Russell concerning the nature of fundamental mathematical definitions. Vailati uses the example of non-Euclidean geometries to show the creative side of intellectual work in mathematics. EPC
211 Van Becelaere, L. La Philosophie en Amkrique: depuis les origines jusqu'd nosjours, 1607-1900. New York: The Eclectic Publishing Co., 1904. It contains Josiah Royce's "Introduction," pp. ix-xvii, a section on John Dewey in the chapter "~coleswntemporaines: Idkalistes," p. 117, and a section on William James in the chapter "La Psychologie," pp. 150- 153. JRS
212 Wells, H. G. Scepticism of the Instrument. Mind n.s. 13.3 (July 1904): 379393. Concepts cannot grasp unique individuality, thought wrongly attempts to use negative concepts to characterize reality, and reason cannot accommodate different levels of reality. From this view, the resulting skepticism towards any universal validity is in line with pragmatism. JRS Reviews F. D.'Mitchell, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 391. 213 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. The Field of Logic. Science n.s. 20.18 (4 Nov 1904): 587-600. Reprinted in Nature and Mind {2598), pp. 56-78. Pragmatism is part of the tendency to force logic and knowledge to yield to treatment by evolutionary biology. It cannot support relativism or rid itself of metaphysics. Knowledge must be practically valid, but remains independent of its discovery. Reality does not change through becoming known. JRS
214 Anon. What They Think of Our Dewey. School Journal 71 (30 Sept 1905): 322. This article consists of quotations from two foreign articles, each lauding Dewey's educational methods. JRS 215 Bakewell, Charles M. The Issue Between Idealism and lmmediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.25 (7 Dec 1905): 687-691. Bakewell replies to Dewey's "Immediate Empiricism" t233). Dewey confusingly equates an object conceived in all of its relations with an object immediate experienced. Such an object is perfectly compatible with idealism. JRS Notes See Ileuey's rcply, "The Knowledge Experience Again" (234). See also Schiller's conlnlents on this exchange, "Thought and Immediacy" (374).
216 Itlakewell, Charles M. An Open Letter to Professor Dewey Concerning lrwrlediate Experience. J Phil 2.19 (14 Sept 1905): 520-522. Reprinted in MW 3: 390-392.
An immediate experience cannot refer beyond itself, so how can one "wrrect" another? JRS Notes See Dewey's reply, ''Immediate Empiricism" (233).
217 Bellonci, Goffredo. Le Pragmatisme et la morale. In Congr&s International de Philosophie, Ilme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 670-673. A series of conclusions given in six paragraphs. They claim that (1) living signifies acting in diverse ways, and that from the point of view of knowledge no theory expresses anything, and hence there are neither true nor false theories, (2) there is frequently a confusion between the cause of a thing and the condition of a thing, (3) logic has no necessity, but rather is, like law, an intermediate between two liberties, (4) morality... is nothing other than the condition which permits that passage of cause to effect, of ideality to fact, (5) the moral man is not living: one must continuously create new "idtalitith," and (6) life and art force us, at every moment, to be something and someone, under pain of not being anything at all. LF Notes Subsequent discussion by Prosper Meyer de Stadelhofen, Allesandro Levi, and Odoardo Campa is reported on pp. 673-674. 218 Bergson, Henri. Lettre au Directeur de la Revue Philosophique sur sa relation 5 James Ward et ii William James. Rev Phil 60.8 (Aug 1905): 229-230. Reprinted in Ecrits et paroles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), vol. 2, pp. 239-240. Melanges, ed. Andrd Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 656-658. In his report, "Le Congrts international de psychologie," Rev Phil 60.7 (July 1905): 67-87, Gaston Rageot remarked that ( I ) it was a result of the influence of James Ward and William James that Bergson developed his doctrine of real duration (what Rageot calls his "tcoulement inttrieur,") and (2) "it is impossible to see anything other than the Bergsonian doctrine of the primacy of action in ...James." (p. 229) In this letter, Bergson takes exception to both these claims. LF Rageot is mistaken in attributing similarities between James and Bergson to accidental influences. They are due to general and profound causes. James's "stream of thought" and Bergson's "durke rkelle" have different meanings. IKS Notes See Rageot's reply, Rev Phil 60.8 (Aug 1905): 230-23 1. 219 Bode, Boyd H. Cognitive Experience and Its Object. J Phil 2.24 (23 Nov 1905): 658-663. Reprinted in MW 3: 398-404. James's radical empiricism is but one mode, a functional role for feelings of relation, of the common appeal to experience made by all philosophies. This mode is individua1i.;tic, and James's resulting logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are consequently confusctl with psychology. JRS Notes See Dewey's response, "The Knowledge Expcricrlcc Again" (234).
220 Bode, Boyd H. The Concept of Pure Experience. Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 684-695. How can Dewey's functionalism explain the difference between ideas and perceptions, and the inability of some people to call up images? This theory supposes both that distinct sensations arise from conflict in experience, and that conflict can only originate in the experience of discriminated sensations. James's account of attention similarly suffers. The admitted continuity in experience from silence to thunder cannot be functionally explained. It must be instead attributed to basic relations in consciousness, which refutes "pure experience." JRS
221 Bode, Boyd H. 'Pure Experience' and the External World. J Phil 2.5 (2 March 1905): 128-133. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 55-60. "Thoroughgoing" empiricists find unacceptable the theory that thought refers to a reality beyond itself. James's is the latest attempt to do away with "objective reference" and to reduce everything to pure experience. Such efforts are futile since they lead to solipsism. IKS Notes See James's response, "Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?" (247). 222 Bush, Wendell T. An Empirical Definition of Consciousness. J Phil 2.21 (12 Oct 1905): 561-568. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 98-106. James's functional concept of consciousness is the first step towards dissolving any credibility to idealism. JRS 223 Brunschvicg, Leon. L 'Idc!alismecontemporain. Paris: FClix Alcan, 1905. Of interest is Brunschvicg's remarks about ~ e k owhose ~ , position the former takes to be a kind of pragmatism. In developing his own view the author opposes his spiritualism to the "new philosophy" of Le Roy et al., arguing that although science has its origin in the demands of practice, it develops by discarding these origins and turning toward the unity and continuity of reason. (p. 131) See especially "La Philosophie nouvelle et I'intellectualisme," pp. 98ff. LF Reviews Adam Ixroy J o ~ ~ cPhil s , Rcv 15.4 (July 1906):426-430. 224 Calderoni, Mario. De I'utilitk "marginale" dans les questions Cthiques. In Congr2s In/ernu/ional dtr Pl~ilosophie, llme Session, Rapporfs el Comptes Ret7dtrs (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, l968), pp. 6 19-620. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni { 17491, vol. 2, pp. 207-208. Notes Subscqucnt discussion by (ioffi-edo Bellonci is reported on pp. 620.
225 Calderoni, Mario. Du role de I'evidence en morale. In Congrh Inter11clfiot7r11 Pl~ilosopl~ie, llme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt.. Ncndeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 616-6 17. lielx-htcd in Scri~licfi Aiwio ('uldc~roni{ 17491, vol. 2, pp. 205-206.
Notes Subsequent discussion by Petavel-Oliff, D. Metzger, Prosper Meyer de Stadelhofen, and E. Peillaube is reported on pp. 617-618. See also E. Peillaube, "Le vE congnh international de psychologie* Rev de Phil 6.6 (1 June 1905): 698-704.
226 Calderoni, Mario. I1 senso dei non sensi. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 102-104. Calderoni provides a detailed discussion of what he believes is the essential core of pragmatism, Peirce's pragmatic maxim, in reaction against Prezzolini's negligent interpretation. Calderoni builds the continuum between the experience of the scientist and the experiences of ordinary human beings, thereby establishing the relevance of Peirce's maxim to all facets of human experience. He also offers some discussion of the peril into which philosophy must fall by ignoring precision of conceptual meaning. EPC
227 Calderoni, Mario. Intorno alla distinzione fka atti volontari e d involuntari. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 125-127. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni (1 7491, vol. 1, pp. 267-274. This article seems to have been written in response to the militantly voluntaristic pragmatism of Giuseppe Prezzolini and Giovanni Papini. Having just concluded a skirmish with Prezzolini over the essence of pragmatism in the pages of Leonardo (see his "La varieti del pragmatismo" { 161 )), Calderoni steps back to examine the general problem of the relationship between will and action. Prezzolini endows the human being with virtually infinite power of action stemming from an omnipotent will. Calderoni once again employs the pragmatic method in his more Peircean understanding of it to attempt definitive solution to the problem. Philosophers fall into the trap of taking the will as a given and then proceeding to define other more complex states. Calderoni maintains that this is not a legitimate approach. The meaning of will needs to be clarified with some greater care. Calderoni concludes, quite pragmatically, that the belief that an act is voluntary or involuntary will manifest itself in different practical consequences. In addition, Calderoni severs Preuolini's Will-to-Believe pragmatism from the Peircean variety entirely, maintaining that the tradition of James and Schiller is distinct from that of Peirce! The latter is seen to be articulating a kind of positivism, in that they both root out useless and futile questions. EPC 228 Calderoni, Mario. Variazioni sul pragmatismo. Leonardo 3.1 (Feb 1905): 15-2 1. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni {I 7491, vol. I, pp. 239-258. Calderoni expands his polemic with Prezzolini in this essay, describing the relative positions of C. S. Peirce and William James. The most telling lines are reserved for the closing paragraphs, where Calderoni maintains that Peircean pragmatism based on the pragmatic maxim, and the Will to Believe variety which had been argued by Prezzolini, are "truly opposites and antagonists" to each other. EPC Notes For an interesting overview of the two camps, with a decided preference towards the "Peirceans," see Giovanni Gullace, "The Pragmatist Movement in Italy," Journal of the History of Ideas 23.1 (Jan-March 1962): 91 -1 06.
229 C a b , Giovanni. Intorno a1 progress0 d e m o del prammatismo e ad una nuova forma di esso. Riv Filo 8.2 (March-April 1905): 182-209. Reviews Wendell T. Bush, J Phil 2.19 (14 Sept 1905): 528-530.
230 Chadwick, Cabell Wright. The Theology of Jcunes. Dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1905. 231 Christie, R Humanism as a Religion. Contemporary Review 88.5 (Nov 1905): 683-702.
232 Dessoulavy, C. Le hgmatisme. Rev de Phil 7.1 (1 July 1905): 89-94. A brief but dense sketch of pragmatism: "a vigorous system destined for a more than just a momentary existence," (p. 89) The dispute between its defenders-including part of the English religious community-and its critics still continues. "Pragmatism should be envisaged as the culminating point of modern philosophy and the different tendencies that were made manifest during the nineteenth century: Kantianism, Evolutionism, [and] Utilitarian philosophy." (p. 90) "In agreement with the Kantian, the pragmatist strongly (re)doubts pure metaphysics; with the evolutionist, he admits the provisional...character of our faculties of knowledge, and in agreement with the English moralists, he distinguishes two kinds of goods, but he further identifies them with the true." This discussion is followed by several examples of pragmatism and pragmatic truth, and the suggestion the pragmatism is just Leibnizism in disguise. There is a discussion of the categorical imperative, and of the difference between pragmatism and empiricism. Dessoulavy concludes that the advantages of the pragmatic system are numerous, and that notes that the Scholastic assumption that the good is the useful is the very affirmation in which pragmatism consists. LF 233 Dewey, John. Immediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.22 (26 Oct 1905): 597-599. Reprinted in MW 3: 168- 170. A reply to Charles Bakewell's "An Open Letter to Professor Dewey Concerning lmmediate Empiricism" (216). Bakewell takes immediate experience to be unchanging and unrelated to other experiences. We must be able to directly experience something as mediating between othcr expcricnccs. Transcendentalism fails to account for the experience of reality's continuity and growth. JRS 234 Dewey, John. The Knowledge Experience Again. J Phil 2.26 (21 Dec 1905): 707-7 1 1. Reprinted in Dewey and His Critics, pp. 183-1 87. MW 3: 178183. A reply to Bakewell's "The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism" (215) and Bode's "Cognitive Experience and Its Object" (219). The recognition of the full meaning of an experience cannot itself be beyond experience; it is another type of experience intermediating towards a "new aesthetic-moral attitude." Knowledge does involve mediation, but when Bakewell mistakenly assumes that all experience must be knowing experience, he wrongly concludes that no experience can be immediate. JRS
235 Dewey, John. The Knowledge Experience and Its Relationships. J Phil 2.24 (23 Nov 1905): 652-657. Reprinted in Dewey and His Critics, pp. 177- 182. MW3: 171-177. Dewey responds to F. J. E. Woodbridge's "Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience?" (297). Knowledge is not needed to experience the various qualities of things, but begins as things are experienced as able to influence other things, and ends in an experience of an object's "knowness" when it resolves a doubtful situation into a "stable, dependable state of aff&irs." In this sense, a knowledge experience transcends the doubtful experience. JRS
236 Dewey, John. Philosophy and American National Life. In Centennial Anniversary of the Graduation of the First Class, July Third to Seventh, 1904 (Burlington, Vermont: University of Vermont, 1905), pp. 106- 113. Reprinted in MW3: 73-78. Philosophy serves the democratic concern with working solutions for citizens. JRS
237 Dewey, John. The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism. J Phil 2.15 (20 July 1905): 393-399. Reprinted with a concluding note answering critics, in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (7931, pp. 226-24 1. Dewey and His Critics, pp. 167- 173. Pure Experience, pp. 107-1 14. MW 3: 158-167. Things are what they are experienced as. Since knowing is not the only way of experiencing, then there is nothing subjective or unreal about experienced unknown things. Known things are not "more" real, but instead more valuable. The "cognitive" encompasses the experiences involved the process of inquiry, culminating in a known object. Illusions can be detected only if they are as real as their causes. JRS Summaries Mattie Alexander Martin, Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 350. Notes See Woodbridge's response, "Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience?" (297). 238 Dewey, John. The Realism of Pragmatism. J Phil 2.12 (8 June 1905): 324327. Reprinted in MW3: 153-157. Dewey responds to Stephen S. Colvin's remark that pragmatism results from a solipsistic psychology in "1s Subjective Idealism a Necessary Point of View for Psychology?" J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 225-231 [MW 3: 382-3891, Dewey states that pragmatism is doubly realistic: experience is "naTvely realistic" when thought is not needed, and ideas arc "rcalistically conceived" in physiological terms. Empiricism eliminates the threat of metaphysical dualism. JRS 239 Dickenson, G. Lowes. The Newest Philosophy. Independent Review (Aug 1905). 240 Herrick, C. Judson. A Functional View of Nature As Seen by a Biologist. J Phil 2.16 (3 Aug 1905): 428-438. An activity process, a "total situation," can be objectively viewed either temporally (functionally) or spatially (structurally). One type of process, the organism, is the "sum
total of the reaction of protoplasm and environment," and its experience ought to be studied in the same objective modes like any other process. It is easy to fall into the fallacy of deriving structure from function, or vice-versa, arriving at idealism or materialism. JRS
241 Hoernld, R F. Alfred. Pragmatism V. Absolutism. Mind n.s. 14.3 (July 1905): 297-334; 14.4 (Oct 1905): 44 1-478. This conflict is the Anglo-American phase of the wider post-Hegelian debate between voluntarism and intellectualism. Pragmatism differs from its German metaphysical or ethical counterparts (Schopenhauer, Sigwart) by focusing on epistemology: its doctrine is that consciousness is purposive, and the intellect serves wider natural demands for ethical, religious, and aesthetic harmony. HoemlC pursues several major criticisms of Bradley; on the nature of error, he praises pragmatism's concern with our ability to detect error, and faults Bradley's Absolute for making all human pursuits pointless and impossible. When pragmatism's critic declares that a theory's success is due to its truth, and not the reverse, pragmatism must respond by raising this dilemma: is the acceptance of a theory as "true" independent of reasons for its acceptance, or not? The first horn portrays the label "truth" as a purely "formal endorsement," and permits one to declare a theory true without any supporting reasons or any recognition of its truth. The better alternative is the second horn: to reject "crude realism" and see that "when we discover the answer to a problem, the solution and the acceptance of the solution are for us one and the same," and that the intellectual process which culminates in such acceptance cannot be artificially isolated and cast off as incidental: "to make the working of a theory responsible for its truth, or the truth for the working, is to deal in tautologies." (p. 449n) We can only claim that someone else's judgment is false, and distinguish "the truth" from their reasons, when we believe that we have better reasons to judge differently. Experience has objective and subjective aspects, relative to our ability to control them. The realist forgets that interaction is reciprocal, and that just as we must change to gain knowledge, reality must change to become known. All "laws of thought" are limited to some definite range of experience, and susceptible to revision. James's doctrines of "will to believe" and "indeterminism" illustrate how faith is practically justified through successful living. Pragmatism cannot arbitrate among various successful theories spawned by conflicting values, yet envisions an ultimate objective harmony. Psychology will no longer assist the pragmatist, since it treats only subjective facts of psychical existence, facts irrelevant to the search for validity. Our common interests, made possible by our sharing in a wider, objective experience (absolute idealism), allow the search for universal truths. JRS Summaries Grace Bruce, Psych Bull 3.4 (15 April 1906): 135-138; F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 15.4 (July 1906):450-453. Notes Scliiller praises this essay as "the best general account of the Pragmatic movement which is extant'' in "The Relations of Logic and Psychology," Studies in Humanism (4901, p. 7111.
242 Jamcs, William. The Essence of Humanism. J Phil 2.5 (2 March 1905): ~ of Truth {672), pp. 121-135. Essqys in 113-1 18. Reprinted in T / J Meaning Radical Empiricism { 10781, pp. 190-205. Works MT, pp. 70-77. Works ERE, pp. 97-104.
Humanism is neither a hypothesis nor based on discovery of new facts, but is rather a change in perspective, leading to change in the sizes and values of things. Its formulations are provisional as yet and its definitions are incomplete. Its leading advocates, F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey, have only published fragmentary programs. Its central assertion is that experience is self-contained and depends upon nothing. The formula can be read atheistically but his own reading is theistic, with God being an experience of "widest actual conscious span." Humanism eliminates the typical monistic problems of evil and freedom, and the sterile absolute of idealism. It analyzes knowledge as a relation between portions of experience, agreeing with common sense as to the identity of knower and known in perception, and in case of representative knowledge, asserting an experienceable "leading" from knower to known. For common sense, the perceptions in which chains of leadings terminate are the real objects. Philosophers view these perceptions as not quite reaching reality. For humanism, the reality beyond, whether conceived as viscera and cells, or atoms, or mind-stuff, is just further possible experience. Since the subject of truth is discussed elsewhere, here it is enough to emphasize that truth lies wholly within experience and is always a matter of apperception: if new experiences are too incongruous with old experiences they are always treated as false. IKS Reviews Giovanni Vailati, Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 73 [Scritti { 10181, p. 5961. Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 383.
243 James, William. The Experience of Activity. Psych Rev 12.1 (19 Jan 1905): 1-7. Reprinted in E s s q s in Radical Empiricism (10781, pp. 155-189. McDermott, pp. 277-29 1 . Works ERE, pp. 79-95. The problem of activity involves a psychological question, wheth'er we perceive activity, and a metaphysical question, whether there is activity. For radical empiricism, either the word "activity" has no meaning, or it must be possible to point out concrete experiences which serve as "type and model" of its meaning. In the case of activity, we find experiences which contain desire, goal, and resistance, but many writers have insisted that behind phenomenal activity there must be real agents. Three kinds of theories have been proposed concerning such agents and they have to be examined i n terms of the pragmatic method. If one holds real agents to be consciousnesses of wider span than ours, their purposes become ours. If they are understood in religious terms, they do not "de-realize" activity but corroborate it. The real agents are by othel-s thought of as of lesser span, either as "ideas" or nerve-cells. In both cases, the real agents would have to be thought of as indifferent to the larger outcome. Thus, pragrnatically, our interest is in outcomes. The metaphysical question centers around causalit). for real activities are those which create things which otherwise would not be. Causalit!. must be accepted as an ultimate category and what we feel it to be. IKS Rcvicws (iiovanni Vailati, Kivista di I'sicologia Applicnla 1.2 (March-April 1905): 1 I 1- I 13 Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Kev 14.3 (May 1905):381-382. Notes An abstract is in Psych Bull 2.2 (15 Feb 1905): 39-40 [ W o r k ERE. pp. 257-2581.
244 James, William. How Two Minds Can Know One Thing. J Phil 2.7 (30 March 1905): 176-1 8 1. Reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism {1078), pp. 123- 136. McDermott, pp. 227-232. WJ Writings 2, pp. 1186- 1192. Works ERE, pp. 6 1-67. Radical empiricism's claim that a bit of pure experience becomes mental or physical, by entering into relations with other portions of experience, can be extended to explain how the same thing can be known by different knowers: a pure experience can also enter many streams of thought. But how is this possible? Since a thought is as it is felt, it seems possible for it to exist only once; if so, we return to ordinary dualism for which insulated minds "representatively know a third thing." The analysis of personal identity in Principles of Psychology (1 890) instead shows that an experience becomes mine by appropriation, by having a feeling of warmth added to it. Many such feelings can be attached to the same object. IKS Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 739.
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245 James, William. Humanism and T ~ t Once h More. Mind n.s. 14.2 (April 1905): 190-198. Reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism (10781, pp. 244265. Works ERE, pp. 127-136. James replies to H. W. B. Joseph, "Professor James on 'Humanism and Truth"' (253). Humanism is not a thesis which &I be refuted, but a shift in opinion which can survive the errors of its advocates. To understand it one must abandon ideals of rigor and finality and be content with "on the whole." Critics such as Joseph are like scholastics trying to refute Darwinism on the grounds that the higher cannot come from the lower. Their "truth" is conformity to a non-human archetype, a sterile formula for which humanism substitutes concrete motives. Humanism is not complete subjectivism and does not deny trans-perceptual reality. Some truths are subjective and made in the assertion. At other times, it is more satisfactory to assert the past existence of the object. A11 truths are subject to future revision. The history of belief is the substitution of more for less satisfactory opinions, but on the side of the object, humanism is not alone in facing various difficulties. Some humanists are dualists, but James himself affirms a pure experience to resolve the difficulties. Concerning knowledge, Joseph claims that the most important satisfaction is to believe what is true, making truth prior to satisfaction. However, an analysis of intellectual satisfaction shows that it is a felt consistency among our beliefs; such satisfaction in consistency can be explained in beings who develop mental habits. Theoretical interests have arisen from our practical ones. IKS
246 James, William. Introduction. To Edward L. Thorndike, The Elements of Psychology (New York: A. G. Seiler, 1905. 2nd ed., 1907), pp. v-vii. Reprinted in Works EPs, pp. 328-330. Textbooks of psychology f'ollow an established pattern, and many of them are so fillcd ~ v i t hexposilory machincry as to frustratc the "natural movenicnt of the mind whcn rending." 'l'horndikc's book is fiesh, concrete, and gives a "first-hand" acquaintance with the workings of the human mind. IKS
247 James, William. Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic? J Phil 2.9 (27 April 1905): 235-238. Reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism {1078), pp. 234 240. WJ Writings 2, pp. 1203-1205. Works ERE, pp. 119-122. James replies to B. H. Bode's '"Pure Experience' and the External World" (221). Bode argues that without self-transcendence there can be no objective reference, and without that, it is impossible for a subjective stream to lead to an objective order. Radical empiricists deny self-transcendence, but a complete analysis shows that their concept of pointing means the same as that of self-transcendence, because in the case of pointing, the future term, while not experienced, must nevertheless be present noetically. Bode concludes that this is exactly self-transcendence. James replies that pointing is as an aspect of "experience's living flow." Bode rationalisically substitutes for that flow a static object. Bode's analysis is retrospective, while radical empiricists insist on "understanding forwards." Whether called self-transcendence or pointing, objective refereqce is something which occurs within experience and that a definite description can be given of it. Rationalists deny this, insisting either that objective reference occurs without an experienceable medium, or that the mediation takes place in some superempirical realm. IKS 248 James, William. La Notion d e conscience. In Archives de Psychologie 5.17 (June 1905): 1 12. Also published in Atri del V Congresso lnternazionale di Psicologia (Rome: Forzani e C. Tipografi del Senato, Editori, 1905), pp. 146-154. Essays in Radical Empiricism (1 0781, pp. 206-233. Works ERE, pp. 105- 118. A translation is provided in Works ERE, pp. 26 1-27 1. All philosophical schools accept the dualism of ideas and things. Scientific psychology has achieved important results by beginning with this dualism. However, while we can allow dualism for practical purposes, we cannot admit that ultimately ideas and things are made of different kinds of stuff. Whatever may be true in respect of their private lives, in the public lives of things, in perception, we find identity and not dualism. We also find identity in those qualities of things which we appreciate such as beauty, and, as Santayana has shown, in rcspect for them we prefer not to draw a distinction between subject and object. The same holds for secondary qualities and emotions. However, dualism lingers because experience not only is, but is reported. The notion of "pure experiences" allows for non-dualistic description because it makes the reporting simply another part of experience. On this view, consciousness as an entity does not exist. IKS Reviews Giovanni Vailati, "La 'concezione della coscienza' di William James," Rivista di Psicologia Applicata I (June-Aug 1905) [Scritti ( 10l8), pp. 643-6451. Notes The Atti del I' Congresso publication was followed by a report of discussion by Bulliot, Lipps, Beaunis, Itelson, and Claparkde, pp. 154-156 [Works ERE, pp. 259-2601,
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249 James, William. The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience. J Phil 2.1 1 (25 May 1905): 28 1-287. Reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism { 10781, pp. 137-154. McDermott, pp. 27 1-277. W J Writings 2, pp. 1206- 12 14. Works ERE, pp. 69-77.
Common sense is dualistic, taking the opposition of thoughts and things as ultimate since the two are made of different kinds of stuff. Radical empiricism treats the opposition as only an affair of function. Fear, love, valuations, and other Sectional facts seem merely mental, lacking physical function. James argues that Sectional facts as concretely experienced are ambiguous. They often remain "pure" and unclassified when there is no need to decide whether they are mental or physical. The existence of such ambiguity supports radical empiricism over dualism. IKS Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 99.
250 James, William. The Thing and Its Relations. 3 Phil 2.2 (19 Jan 1905): 2941. Reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism (10781, pp. 92-122. McDermott, pp. 214-226. Works ERE, pp. 45-59. Experience as lived gives rise to disappointments but no paradoxes, which arise only in reflection. Rationalists claim that the flux of pure experience is conceptualized for theoretical reasons. Naturalists emphasize practice: conceptualization is needed for prediction and control of experience. Hence, rationalists such as F. H. Bradley want concepts to leave experience behind, while naturalists use them to return to concrete experience. Rationalists use dialectical arguments to attack the common sense belief that several minds can know one thing and introduce the Absolute to restore unity. Such arguments are purely verbal; a thing can stand in several relations while remaining the same. Some conjunctive relations are more intimate, some more external; radical empiricism accepts "concatenated union," the partial "hanging-together" of things. Because external relations seem so numerous, it tends towards pluralism. Bradley, on the other hand, finding external relations irrational, asserts that there must be a deeper unity, an internally related whole. IKS Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 382. 251 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Gedanken und Denker: Gesammelte AAufa~ze.Leipzig and Vienna: W. Braunmuller, 1905. Reviews F. C. S. Schiller, Int J Ethics 16.3 (April 1906): 391-393. An "interesting and vigorously written" collection of popular reviews and essays, from 1888-1905. JRS Grace Neal Dolson, Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 92-93; J. L. Mclntyre, Mind n.s. 15.1 (Jan 1906): 118-119.
252 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Der Kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik. Leipzig and Vienna: W. Braunmuller, 1905. Reviews F. C. S. Schiller, Int J Ethics 16.3 (April 1906): 391-393. Jerusalem's psychological treatment of logic "arrives at very nearly the same conclusions as the pragmatists" but he risks affirming a metaphysical realism. JRS C. Cantoni, "Sull' idcalisrno critico: Saggio di una difesa del sapere volgare," Riv Filo 9 (Jan-Feb 1906): 3-23: Grace Neal Dolson, Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 92-93; J. L. Mclntyrc, Mind n s . 15.1 (Jan 1906): 118-119.
253 Joseph, H. W. B. Professor James on 'Humanism and Truth'. Mind n.s. 14.1 (Jan 1905): 28-41. Joseph comments on James's "Humanism and Truth" { 176). Truths may have practical consequences, but we want to settle questions of truth or falsity apart from them. Do pragmatists identi@ truth with the consequences of an assertion's truth, or the consequences of believing it true, or with a beneficial reaction to an idea? If our categories evolve, how can the conception of man as adapting to his environment be taken as true "anteriorly" to them? IKS Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 740-741. Notes See James's reply, "Humanism and Truth Once More" (245). 254 Judd, Charles H. Radical Empiricism and Wundt's Philosophy. J Phil 2.7 (30 March 1905): 169- 176. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 6 1-69. Wundt agrees with James that mind and body are logical constructs from the one reality of immediate experience. However, Wundt's explanation of experience's stable patterns and processes of thought is not "ndive" or "radical" but instead "critical." Wundt offers better theories of the future, objective space, and other minds. JRS Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 739-740. 255 King, Irving. The Pragmatic Interpretation of the Christian Dogma. Monist 15.2 (April 1905): 248-26 1. Pragmatism's functional account of belief reveals how religious dogmas are only symbols of faith. Real religious faith originates in, and only serves, immediate practical crises. JRS Notes See also King, The D~flerentiationof the Religious Consciousness (Dissertation. Univcrsity of Chicago, 1904. Rpt., Psychological Rcvicw Monograph Supplcmcnt vol. 6, no. 4. Ncw York: Macn~illan.January 1905). 256 Lindsay, A. D. Moral Causation and Artistic Production. Int J Ethics 15.4 (July 1905): 399-41 7. There is no need to follow James's indeterminism in order to defend morality, since, like the skill of an artist, moral judgment requires the creative transformation of tradition in the pursuit of character perfection. JRS 257 Lloyd, Alfred H. The Personal and the Factional in the Life of Society. J Phil 2.13 (22 June 1905): 337-345. Pragmatism violates the a priori foundations of any specialized field, whethcr 01' science, business, morality, religion, etc., which all dcrnand of its respective participants ;I conformity to some necessary rules for expericnce. Pragmatism instcad respects the free:dom of the individual. and the personal demands made on institutions. Conformit! ;IWI freedom are relative aspects of social unity; pragmatism provides a needed balancc tv absolutism. JRS
258 Marchesini, Giovanni. Le Finzioni dell ' anima. Bari: L a m e Figli, 1905. Reviews E. Ritchie, Phil Rev 14.6 (Nov 1905): 734. 259 McTaggart, J o h n M. E. The Inadequacy of Certain Common Grounds of Belief Hibbert Journal 4.1 (Oct 1905): 116-140. Portions reprinted in his Some Dogmas of Religion (London: Edward Arnold, 1906). McTaggart rejects, among many others (and without openly mentioning pragmatism), these arguments for religious belief: any dogma without which we could not act must be true, and that the practical desire for a conclusion is suff~cientto make it true. JRS
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260 Mead, G. H. Reviews of D. Draghiscesco, Du R6e & I'individu dam le &terminisme social, and Le Probl2me du de'terminisme social. Psych Bull 2.12 (15 Dec 1905): 399-405. Draghiscesco assumes that sociology and psychology treat the same individual. He reduces psychology to the teleological laws of sociology, and concludes that sociology cannot be one of the mechanistic natural sciences. However, reftective consciousness treats all areas of knowledge teleologically. JRS 261 Mellone, S. H. Is Humanism a Philosophical Advance? Mind n.s. 14.4 (Oct 1905): 507-529. If postulates are the start to knowledge, where is the origin of postulates? It cannot be in feeling, will, or pure experience, as Schiller and James suggest, but in some "embryonic" intellectual function. Only reason can apprehend and judge purposes, and if humanism cannot supply one highest purpose, it "sinks to the level of the crudest naturalism." While reality is not static, it cannot be "constructed" out of our efforts either, and humanism must admit some objective order. JRS Summaries F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 563-564. 262 Montague, William P. The Relational Theory of Consciousness and Its Realistic Implications. J Phil 2.12 (8 June 1905): 309-316. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 70-78.
263 Moore, A. W. Pragmatism and Its Critics. Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 322343. Reprinted with revisions in Pragmatism andlts Critics (8601, pp. 128-173. Moore surveys idealistic criticisms of pragmatism made from 1903 to 1904, in light of pragn~atism'saccusation that idealism's definition of truth is disconnected from, and irrelevant to. standards used to test particular judgments. Moore shows how several idealists appeal to pragmatic-sounding criteria only to unreasonably add that the absolute system must be the fixed and final standard of truth. Moore then defends pragmatism from their criticisms that it is subjective, unable to find permancnce in the flux of experience, too dependent on teleology, abuses evolution, and leads to skepticism. JRS Summaries Gcrtrudc I,. I3cssc, I'sych I h l l 3.1 (15 Jan 1906): 15-18.
264 Papini, Giovanni. Agire senza sentire e sentire senza agire. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 2.2 (May-June 1905). Reprinted in Sul pragmatismo ( 1202). Tutte le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 92- 104. This essay is another exploration into the complex problem of human activity. Drawing upon a dizzying array of sources which include Kant, Aristotle, Ignatius Loyola, Campanella, Pascal and La Rochefoucauld, Papini offers a sketch of the various ways in which action and sentiment are related. EPC 265 Papini, Giovanni (signed as Gian Falco). Atena e Faust. Leonardo 3.1 (Feb 1905): 8- 14. Reprinted as "Unico e Diverso" in Sul pragmatismo (1202). Tutte le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 26-44. Papini found much he liked in William James, not the least of which was James's aversion to philosophies that cast reality into total, unified systems. This is the theme of Papini's present essay. Philosophy is defined at the outset as "one of the instruments created by man for the appropriation of the world." He lays out two opposing systems of thought: the Classical, summarized in qualities such as universality, being, and passivity on the one hand, and the Romantic, embracing such attributes as particularity, evolution, and activity on the other. The post-Romantic problem takes philosophy out of the realm of the speculative and into the realm of the active augmentation of power. The power of the "subliminal self' must now be expanded so as to remake the world. This must be the project of the new philosophical culture. EPC 266 Papini, Giovanni. Les ExtrSmes de I'activitt thtorique. In CongrGs International de Philosophie, IIme Session, Rapports et Comptes Rendus (Geneva: Kundig, 1905. Rpt., Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1968), pp. 473-480. To understand truly, it is necessary, as James well know, to exaggerate. The discovery of truth happens in extreme circumstances; and for this reason Papini proposes a study of the extremes of I hctivitk theorique, that is to say, the form of an activity that consists in "knowing objects" and not in "experiencing pleasure or pain from doing so, or in wanting to change those objects." (p. 473) "The extremes are: intuition-gnostic fact, elementary, immediate-and concept, an idea general and universal, the abstract that is expressed in symbols, simple and definite." (ibid.) Until now, the concept triumphed over intuition in philosophy, and philosophy has been rationalistic. Papirli sketches this idea from f leraclitus to the present. Recently, he argues, there has been an anti-rationalistic turn, which is a move away from symbols to things (ci~oses).This movement affirms the humanity of the philosopher and critiques intellectualisln and its ins!rurnents (language and logic). The advocates of this vicw thcn wish to "rct11r11to 1 1 1 ~ particular. to plurality, to thc individual. to action." (1,. 479) "...l'r;~grn;~tisr~~ sul!jug;~lc.; theoretic truth to practical nccds (I'circe, James, 13runetiPre. Sigwart. Simnicl, Schillcr. Eucken, Prezzolini, and Singer). Because it is not a matter of knowing but rather a matter of making (Kemacle). It is not a question of knowing the world, but of possessing and creating it." (ibid.) LF Notes The subsequent discussion by Fr6dCric Rauh and Giovanni Papini is reported on pp. 48048 1.
of determination of existent singulars...[and]...the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues, and especially real possibilities"-and its relation to his pragmatism. (p. 492) Peirce also mentions his original formulation of pragmatism, and reconsiders the case of the untested diamond. Pp. 492-497 are concerned with real necessity and possibility. LF
267 Papini, Giovanni. I1 pragmatismo e i partiti politici. L'Idea liberale (28 May 1905). Reprinted in Sul pragmatismo { 1202). Tutte le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 114- 118. Of all of the essays selected for inclusion in Sulpragmatismo, this one stands apart. It is not a theoretical inquiry into an abstract set of problems, but rather an attempt to introduce clarity into the confusing world of Italian politics by classifling political parties using the pragmatic method. The advantage that the pragmatic approach has is that it classifies on the basis of "real differences of action," rather than on the misleading basis of slogans and phrases. EPC 268 Papini, Giovanni. Influenza della volonth sulla conoscenza. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 127-128. Reprinted as "Volonth e conoscenza" in Sul Pragm a t i s m ~( 1202). Tutte le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 88-9 1. In this essay Papini discusses some recent theories of the will, including those of Schopenhauer, Herbart, and Mach. He urges that we abandon discussion of the will, and focus instead upon voluntary actions. In the little that follows, he is eager to establish the reciprocal influence of will and intellect. Paraphrasing Bacon, he asserts that not only is knowledge power, but power is knowledge as well. EPC
269 Papini, Giovanni (signed as The Florence Pragmatist Club). Pragmatismo messo in ordine. Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 45-48. Reprinted in Sul pragmatismo (1202). Tufte le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 67-72. This essay is Papini's intervention into the published dispute between Prezzolini and Calderoni concerning the true nature of pragmatism. Papini opens by saying that while it is impossible to define pragmatism in a univocal and precise manner. it is possible to articulate its essential characteristics. Ever the pluralist (and one might add, ever the consummate editor as well), Papini urges the view that pragmatism embraces both the pursuit of clarity of meaning as Calderoni would have it, as well as the expanded power of the will to create, as Prezzolini had argued. This is the essay in which Papini first offers the corridor metaphor. Like a corridor in a grand hotel, pragmatism opens into many different rooms. The occupants of these rooms all use the same corridor, and it is likely that they will converse and even argue with one another on their way to their own rooms. EPC 270 Peirce, C. S. Issues of Pragmaticism. Monist 15.4 (Oct 1905): 481-499. Reprinted in CP 5.438-463. Peirce opens this second of three Monist articles with a restatement of his pragmaticism. 111 the first eleven pages he discusses six points concerning his Critical Common-sensism: ( I ) the claini that there are indubitable propositions and inferences, which leads I'circe to a discussion of the Cogito, (2) his affinity to Thomas Reid's philosophy, (3) several remarks on instinctive beliefs, (4) his insistence "that the acritically indubitable is invariably vague" (p. 486) which brings him to a discussion of the determinate and thc indcterniinate, (5) the value that he attaches to genuine doubt, and (6) his n~odilicd Kantianis~n.I'circe explains his version of scholastic realism-the opinion that "there are real objects that are general, among the number being the modcs
Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 565-566.
271 Peirce, C. S. Notes. Nation 81.5 (3 Aug 1905): 97. Reprinted in The Nation, Part Three, pp. 233-234. Peirce remarks on the interest in pragmatism in Italy, and on the value of James's "La Notion de conscience" (248), in which he "maintains that the distinction between thing and thought is exclusively functional." LF I
272 Peirce, C. S. What Pragmatism Is. Monist 15.2 (April 1905): 161-1 8 1. Reprinted in CP 5.4 1 1-5.437. Peirce begins with a discussion of his own views as an experimentalist, his interest in methods of thinking, and a statement of his pragmatism. This leads him to discuss his ethics of terminology and to the reasons for changing the name of his position to "pragmaticism." He holds that his version is superior to others since it "more readily connects itself with a critical proof of its truth." (p. 166) Of the several preliminary positions "without which pragmatism would be a nullity," Peirce focuses on the stricture to "dismiss make-believes." He provides definitions of "doubt," "belief," and "truth," remarking on the fundamental characteristicsof a rational person. On p. 170 he takes up pragmatism explicitly, via a dialogue between a questioner and a pragmatist. These interlocutors reveal that Peirce's method is intended to show that "almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish...or...downright absurd..." (p. 171); that pragmatism is a species of prope-positivism; that it accepts instinctive beliefs; and that it insists on the truth of scholastic realism. Their discussion then turns to the nature of experiments, experimental phenomena, the meaning of propositions, and phenomenalism. The pragmatist in the discussion provides a list of points with which he will agree, and gives accounts of the distinction of objective and subjective generality, the reality of generals, and predication, respectively. On the final pages, Peirce remarks on Hegel and on the reality of continuity and Thirdness. LF Reviews Henry Ruger, J Phil 2.25 (7 Dec 1905): 694-695; Giovanni Vailati, Leonardo 3.3 (JuncAug 1905): 139-140 [Scritti ( 1018), pp. 639-6401, Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.5 (Sept 1905): 628-629. Notes See Harold I lenderson, Catalystfor Controverv: Paul Carus of Open Court (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), pp. 125-141, for a discussion of Peirce's relationship with The Monist and its editor, Paul Carus.
273 Peirce, C. S. Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology. Nation 81.3 (20 July 1905): 56-57. Reprinted in The Nation, Part Three, pp. 229-233.
A review of Wilhelm Wundt's
Principles of Physiological Psychology, vol. 1,
translated from the fifth German edition (1902) by Edward B. Titchener (New York: Macmillan, 1904). Peirce begins with a discussion of the "malady of psychology": the slow pace at which this science is progressing compared to every other, experimental or otherwise. He then turns to the common experience of all people which Bentham called cenoscopy, and the Philosophy of Common Sense, "of which analytical mechanics and analytical economics are branches." @. 23 1) Pragmatism is only an attempt to give "the philosophy of common sense a more exact development, especially by emphasizing the point that there is no intellectual value in mere feeling per se, but that the whole function of thinking consists in the regulation of conduct." (ibid.) Wundt was not gifted as a philosopher; he views common sense as "an imperfect kind of science," and overlooks "the value of the pragmatist analysis in binding together nerve-physiology and psychology." LF
274 Perry, Ralph B. The Approach to Philosophy. London: Longrnans, Green and Co., 1905. Pragmatism is discussed in connection with Kant and Fichte on pp. 151-152 and 404408. JRS Reviews Walter T. Marvin, J Phil 2.18 (30 Aug 1905): 497-499; F. H. Melville, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 119-120.
275 Prezzolini, Guiseppe (signed Giuliano il Sofista). I1 mio prammatisto. Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 48. Reprinted in La cultura italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 230-23 1. In' the next stage of his dispute with Mario Calderoni, Prezzolini accuses his antagonist of being more Peircean than Peirce himself! Calderoni, writes Prezzolini, imagines the world to be populated by logical marionettes rather than flesh and blood human beings. The intellectualist interpretation of pragmatism which Calderoni proposes is suited only to the well-appointed studies of the universities, having little relevance for the particular human individual. EPC Notes For an account of Peirce's reaction to Prezzolini's position, see Max H. Fisch and Christian J. W. Kloesel, "Peirce and the Florentine Pragmatists: His Letter to Calderoni and a New Edition of his Writings," Topoi 1-2 (Dec 1982): 70-73.
276 Read, Carveth. Tl~eMetaphysics of Nature. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1905.2nd ed., 1908. llurne rejected Pyrrhonist skepticism by appealing to the pragmatic grounds of action. llowever. pragmatism is still a form of skepticism, since its foundation is nothing but feeling and will, which "puts the conviction of Reason solely upon any ground other than cognition." (p. 93) Why can't "disinterested curiosity" pursue knowledge? JRS Reviews Charles M. 13akcwell. Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 324-333; David Morrison, Mind n.s. 15.4 (Oct 1906): 554-559; David Phillips, Int J Ethics 16.3 (April 1906): 393-397; Thoma Whittaker, I libbert Journal 4.1 (Oct 1905): 205-209.
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Reviews of 2nd edition Charles M. Bakewell, Phil Rev 20.2 (March 1911): 206-21 1; David Morrison, Mind 18.2 (April 1909): 287-288; H. A. Overstreef J Phil 6.25 (9 Dec 1909): 689692. Notes William James refers to Read as a new member of "the pragmatistic church," in The Meaning of Truth (6721, p. xli(n) [WorksMT,p. 9(n)].
277 Russell, Francis C. Substitution in Logic. Monist 15.2 (April 1905): 294-
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278 Sabine, George H. Radical Empiricism as a Logical Method. Phil Rev 14.6
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(Nov 1905): 696-705. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 79-89. Radical empiricism is an empirical method for solving metaphysical problems with emphasis on "introspection" and observation of individual experiences. This can only yield psychological facts and not principles of unity and explanation. The method is inappropriate for metaphysics. IKS
279 Santayana, George. The Life ofReason, or the Phases omurnan Progress. 5 volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905-1906. Reprinted as vols. 1-
5 in the Triton edition, The Works of George Santayana, 14 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936- 1937). Reviews of vols. 1-2 John Dewey, Science n.s. 23 (9 Feb 1906): 223-225 [MW 3: 319-3221, Santayana's "naturalistic idealism" overemphasizes natural impulses and makes facts indifferent to ideas. JRS F. C. S. Schiller, Hibbert Journal 4.2 (Jan 1906): 462-464. This work will "probably rank as one of the most systematic applications of the pragmatic method to philosophy," despite its pronounced naturalism. JRS Ernest Albee, Phil Rev 14.5 (Sept 1905): 602-607; Arthur K. Rogers, Dial 38.10 (May 1905): 349-35 1. Reviews of vols. 1-4 A. W. Moore, J Phil 3.8 (12 April 1906): 21 1-221. A confusion between consciousness and reflective thought leads Santayana to first affirm, then deny, the instrumentality of reason. Is reason both the expression and controller of impulse? JRS Reviews of vols. 3-4 Arthur K. Rogers, Dial 40.3 (1 Feb 1906): 87-89. This work is the first attempt to "give systematic expression to that new group of tendencies which, under the name of Pragmatism, or Humanism, is causing a ferment in the philosophical world." JRS Reviews of vols. 3-5 F. C. S. Schiller, Hibbcrt Journal 4.4 (July 1906): 936-940. The "only flaw" in Santnyana's pragmatic theory of knowledge is the overly irrational status given to the data. The pragmatic value of science should not be used to defend a naturalistic metaphysics. JRS Reviews of vol. 5 A. W. Moore, J Phil 3.17 (16 Aug 1906): 469-471. The "discordant note" uf I'latonic fixity taints an otherwise forceful statement of the "vltal character of reason." JRS
Reviews of vols. 1-5 John Dewey, Educational Review 34.2 (Sept 1907): 116-129 [MW4: 229-2411. Santayana displays a "direct sense" for experience's realities, but then he rejects them as subjective. He commits the "initial fallacy of vicious metaphysics" by forgetting that philosophy is a human effort in a historical context. As a survey of intelligence's attempt to learn from struggle to direct M e r achievements, his philosophy "will permanently count." JRS G. E. Moore, Int J Ethics 17.2 (Jan 1907): 248-253. So much " c o n W thinking" may be suggestive, but not useful. JRS Notes Vol. 1: Introduction and Reason in Common Sense (1905), vol 2: Reason in Society (1905), vol. 3: Reason in Religion (1906), vol. 4: Reuson in Art (1906), vol. 5: Reason in Science (1906). See Santayana's reply to Moore's first review, "The Efficacy of Thought," J Phil 3.15 (19 July 1906): 410-412; and Moore's reply to Santayana, "The Function of Thought," J Phil 3.19 (13 Sept 1906): 519-522.
280 Schiller, F. C. S. The Defmition o f 'Pragmatism' and 'Humanism'. Mind n.s. 14.2 (April 1905): 235-240. Portions reprinted in "The Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism" in Studies in Humanism (4901, pp. 1-2 1. The narrow pragmatism of Peirce can be expanded into a wider "general view of the mind" by the realization that only practical consequences are needed to "account" for current truths. The wider pragmatism is an epistemological method which, however, does not force the acceptance of the general philosophical principle called humanism. Thus, Schiller would like to dissent in part from the limits proposed by James in "Humanism and Truth" ( 176). IKS Notes See A. E. Taylor's response, "Truth and Consequences" {381 ).
281 Schiller, F. C. S. The Definitions of Pragmatism. Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 44-45. Portions were reprinted in "The Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism," Studies in Humanism {490), pp. 1-21. Reprinted in full in Opere: Dal "Leonardo" a1 Futurismo, ed. Luigi Baldacci (Milan: Amoldo Mondadori, 1977), pp. 755-757. 282 Schiller, F. C. S. Empiricism and the Absolute. Mind n.s. 14.3 (July 1905): 348-370. Reprinted with "modifications, additions, and omissions" in Studies in Humanism (4901, pp. 224-257. Schiller responds to criticisms made by A. E. Taylor's EIements of Metaphysics (144). Taylor represents a bridge from narrow intellectualism to humanism. He uses teleological language, speaks of intellectual demands, agrees that science uses unproven postulates, and recognizes the instrumentality of thought and the reality of only experience. Still, his dominant intellectualist assumption-the "system" of unchanging realityovenvhelms these improvemcnts. without any practical benefit in return. JRS Summaries William I,. Iiaub. J Phil 3.3 (1 Feb 1906): 80-81; George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 564-565.
283 Schiller, F. C. S. The Progress of Psychical Research. Fortnightly Review n.s. 77 (2 Jan 1905): 60-73. Reprinted with additions in Studies in Humanism (490)' pp. 370-390.
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284 Schiller, F. C. S. Review of Edgar Janssens, Le Ne'o-Critickme & Charles Renouvier. Mind n.s. 14.1 (Jan 1905): 125-126. Janssens's fundamentally unsympathetic and Catholic-oriented exposition overlooks Renouvier's pioneering voluntaristic psychology. This psychological standpoint led to James's humanism. JRS
285 Shenk, William Washington. Pragmatism in Its Philosophical and Thee ogical Relations. Dissertation, Boston University, 1905. 286 Sidgwick, Alfred. Applied Axioms. Mind n.s. 14.1 (Jan 1905): 42-57. Sidgwick defends Schiller's position that McTaggart misuses the Law of Contradiction, and thoroughly describes the pragmatic view of "laws of thought." JRS Notes Schiller's critique of Taylor is in "The Metaphysics of the Time-Process," reprinted in Humanism { 139) pp. 95- 109. 287 Taylor, Alfred E. Truth and Practice. Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 265-289. In the discussion of truth, three separate issues arise: what is the meaning of "true" and "false"; to which propositions are they to ascribed; and how in a given case we consider a proposition true. "True" cannot mean the same thing as "useful" and it is false that utility is always a sign of truth. IKS
288 Tower, Carl V. A Neglected 'Context' in 'Radical Empiricism'. J Phil 2.15 (20 July 1905): 400-408. In James's "Does 'Consciousness' Exist" (174), he correctly discards consciousness as an entity and keeps it as a function. We can accept its definition of consciousness as a "context of experience." However, radical empiricism ignores one context, the "total context," which includes an indefinite fringe of objects. IKS Summaries Mattie Alexander Martin, Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 563. Notes See his "The Total Context of Transcendentalism," J Phil 2.16 (3 Aug 1905): 42 1-428. 289 Tyrrell, George. Notre attitude en face du "Pragmatisme." Annales de Philosophie ChrCtienne 4th series 1.3 (Dec I 905): 225-232. A discussion of apologetic theology and pragmatism in which lyrrell argues that pragmatism is-"especially in the hands of W. James and F. Schi1ler"-"clear, seductive and one that can be managed with particular ease by the apologist." (p. 225) I.yrrel1 further holds that truth is an agreement of attribute with subject. and that one cannot think of ob.jects outside of mind. I t is as easy to confuse thought that contains tlli~lgs with the things themselves. as it is to confuse a sentiment uith things sensed. Our likes are such that we can act on external objccts. alter our experience, and thus govern pain
and pleasure. "In a word, feeling transforms into action..." (p. 227) There is a discussion of Reason and truth on pp. 228-231, and Tyrrell concludes that where pragmatism has been severely criticized by the intellectualists and the Hegelian school, it is partly the fault of the pragmatists, and also partly due to the association of "pragmatism" with the similar sounding "Moralism." If at all a sympathetic view, pragmatism is to be understood as a first sketch, to be revised and corrected. @. 23 1) LF 290 Vailati, Giovanni. La caccia alle antitesi. Leonardo 3.2 (April 1905): 5357. Reprinted in Scritti {1018), pp. 582-589. Translated as "The Attack on Distinctions," J Phil 4.26 (19 Dec 1907): 701-709.
h conoscere e volere. Leonardo 3.3 (June-Aug 1905): 128-129. Reprinted in Scritti (10 181, pp. 626-629. Translated with some additions as "Distinction entre connaissance et volonte," Rev de Phil 6.6 (1 June 1905): 642-648. Reviews of the translation Wilmon H. Sheldon, J Phil 2.23 (9 Nov 1905): 641-642.
Woodbridge comments on Dewey's "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism" (2371, defending the transcendence of knowledge by arguing that the alternative, the alteration of things by knowledge, leads to absolute idealism. JRS 298 Wright, Henry W. Evolution and Ethical Method. Int J Ethics 16.1 (Oct
1905): 59-68. Evolution is a process of differentiation and integration. Evolutionary morality finds purposive conduct to be both individually impulsive and socially organized, thus reconciling hedonism and intuitionism. JRS
291 Vailati, Giovanni. La distinzione
292 Vailati, Ciovanni. L'Influenza della matematica sulla teoria della cono-
scenza nella filosofia moderna. Riv Filo 7 (May-June 1905). Reprinted in Scritti {1018), pp. 603-618. 293 Vailati, Giovanni. I tropi della logica. Leonardo 3.1 (Feb 1905): 3-7.
Reprinted in Scritti {1018), pp. 564-571. Translated as "On Material Representations of Deductive Processes," J Phil 5.12 (4 June 1908): 309-3 16. 294 Vailati, Giovanni. La ricerca dell'impossibile. Leonardo 3.4 (Oct-Dec 1905): 146-150. Reprinted in Scritti { 10181, pp. 659-666. 295 Ward, James. Mechanism and Morals: The World of Science and the
World of History. Hibbert Journal 4.1 (Oct 1905): 79-99. Ward mentions Peirce's objective idealism. JRS 296 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. The Nature of Consciousness. J Phil 2.5 (2 March 1905): 119-125. Reprinted in Nature and Mind (25981, pp. 307-315. Pure Experience, pp. 90-97. James is right to find consciousness in relations, but how can functionalism assert that only one field of experience encompasses consciousness? JRS Summaries George [I. Sabine, Phil Rev 14.3 (May 1905): 390-391. 297 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Of What Sort Is Cognitive Experience? J
Phil 2.21 (12 Oct 1905): 573-576. Reprinted in Nature and Mind {2598), pp. 320. D e w y and His Critics, pp. 174-177.
299 Adams, Elizabeth Kemper. The Aesthetic Experience: Its Meaning in a Functional Psychology. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1906. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1907. The value of re-organized experience is the aesthetic culmination of logical or ethical judgment, just as the doubt of interrupted activity marks its origin. It should not be generalized into an absolute goal (Schiller) or standard (some idealists). JRS Reviews W. D. Funy, Psych Bull 5.11 (15 Nov 1908): 363-366.
300 Baillie, James B. An Outline ofthe Idealistic Construction ofExperience. London and New York: Macmillan, 1906. Reprinted, New York: Garland, 1984. In chap. 1, conscious purposiveness is used to unify conception and existence, and provides the "sentiment" of rationality which, when directed toward the nieds which all people share, forms objectively valid knowledge. (p. 10-1 1 ) Pragmatism's individualistic psychology cannot explain such knowledge, which requires universal experience (though humanism does talk of "social" consciousness). JRS Reviews Ernest Albee. Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 538-543; 1-1. N. Gardiner, Amer J Psych 18.3 (July 1907): 371-373; John S. Mackenzie, In1 J Ethics 18.2 (Jan 1908): 256-260; Edward Elliott Richardson, J Phil 5.12 (4 June 1908): 331-334; J. W. Scott, Hibbert Journal 5.4 (July 1907):933-937. 301 Bald win, James Mark. Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic. Vol. I . Functional Logic, or Genetic Theory of Knowledge. New York: Macmillan; London: Swann Sonnenschein, 1906. The problem of knowledge must be interpreted by the evolutionary view of life as continuous adjustment to environments, without going to the extreme of "cruder" pragmatism. On p. 50, Baldwin argues that objects resist our active processes, and do not, as Dewey holds, emerge from them. Knowledge at the instrumental stage is only hypothetical, not universal. but pragmatism (including Peirce himself-see p. 22211)mistakes this stage for the end of knowledge. JRS
Reviews James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 17.1 (Jan 1908): 68-75. By opposing pragmatism with a dualistic account of judgment, Baldwin seems to assert a "most primitive realism." JRS A. W. Moore, Psych Bull 4.3 (15 March 1907): 81-88. Can Baldwin avoid static absolutism? Even new objects must fit into the "active system of habits and attention." His hypotheticaVuniversaI distinction is confusing. JRS F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 247-251. Baldwin commits the "psychologist's fallacy," and offers only one of many possible "genetic" logics. JRS Notes See Baldwin's reply to Moore's review, "Thought and Things" (393). See also Baldwin, Thought and Things,vol. 2 {509), and Thought and Things, vol. 3 (905).
307 Bode, Boyd H. Realism and Pragmatism. J Phil 3.15 (19 July 1906): 39340 1. Reprinted in Dewey and His Critics, pp. 77-85.
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Realists assert that the consciousness "is not a constituent element of extramental objects," but they have traditionally had difficulty separating the "acquaintance with" and "knowledge-about" types of knowledge. Pragmatists can easily do so, but must attempt to show how the latter can originate out of the former. This attempt will always fail. JRS Summaries Mattie Alexander Martii Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 108.
i
308 Boodin, J. E. Mind as Instinct. Psych Rev 13.2 (March 1906): 121-138. Reprinted in Truth and Reality (9 161, pp. 15-42.
1
302 Bawden, H. Heath. Evolution and the Absolute. Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 145-156. Our conception of a thing is our understanding of that thing's gradual origins and successive operations, demarcated from the rest of reality's processes only by our particular interest in it. An absolute understanding of anything, much less the whole of reality, is impossible. JRS
303 Bawden, H. Heath. Methodological Implications of the Mind-Matter Controversy. Psych Bull 3.10 (1 5 Oct 1906): 32 1-349. A detailed survey of psychology, portraying the growing dissatisfaction with parallelism. Bawden describes the positions of numerous thinkers, including Dewey and James, who argue that reality and experience are identical and provide a functional account of consciousness. Charles Strong's idealism receives lengthy scrutiny. JRS 304 Bentley, I. Madison. The Psychology of Organic Movements. Amer J Psych 17.3 (July 1906): 293-305. An overview of the current psychological emphasis on motor activities. The functional psychology of John Dewey, J. R. Angell, A. W. Moore, and J. M. Baldwin is described in historical and present-day contexts. JRS 305 Blondel, Maurice. Le Point depart de la recherche philosophique. Annales de Philosophie ChrCtienne 4th series 1 (1906): 337-360; 2 (1906): 225-249. Notcs Ja~licsrccolnnlcntls this work, ;u~torlgothers, to readers who "wish to read Ihrther" on the g ~ c m suhjcct l of pragniatisnt, in his "l'reface" to I'rc~gmafrsm(438). See 13londel. L 'Actlot1 11 (2539).
306 Blondel, Maurice (signed as Bernard de Sailly). La T k h e de la philosophie d'aprks la philosophie de I'action. Annales de Philosophie ChrCtienne 4th series 3 (1906): 47-59. Notes James rccotnntcnds this work. among others, to readers who "wish to read farther" on the genml subject ofpragtnatism, in his "Preface" to Pragnmtism (438).
309 Boodin, J. E. Space and Reality. J Phil 3.20 (27 Sept 1906): 533-539; 3.22 (25 Oct 1906): 589-599. 1
310 Calkins, M a r y W. A Reconciliation Between Structural and Functional Psychology. Psych Rev 13.2 (March 1906): 6 1-8 1. Self-consciousness requires both types of psychological explanations. Dewey, Mead, Angell,-and Bawden are referenced as functionalists. JRS Reviews I. Madison Bentley, J Phil 3.1 1 (24 May 1906): 303-305. Summaries Elsie Murray, Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 35 1. Notes Calkins continues her criticisms of functionalism in "Psychology: What Is It About?" Phil 4.25 (5 Dec 1907): 673-683.
311 Cab, Giovanni. II problema della Iiberta nel pemiero contemporaneo. Milan: Remo Sandron, 1906.
312 Colvin, Stephen S. Certain Characteristics of Experience. Psych Rev 13.6 (NOV1906): 396-403. Pragmatism agrees with idealism that experience is the "ultimate essence of the universe," but pragmatism hopelessly searches for an experience beyond consciousness. Colvin explains his non-absolutist idealism. JRS 313 Colvin, Stephen S. Pragmatism, Old and New. Monist 16.4 (Oct 1906): 547-56 1. Pragmatists should only assert, what all philosophers but pessimists would admit, that satisfaction in the long run will coincide with tntth. If pragmatists identify the two, the critics' charges of subjectivism and solipsism are likely justified, and pragmatism is only a renewed empirical nominalism and utilitarianism. The pragmatist cannot arbitrarily halt the transcendence of thought to human experience in the rational search for complete knowledge, but must assert, with the idealist, the existence of the Absolute to permit intellectual satisfaction. JRS
314 Creighton, James E. Experience and Thought. Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 482-493. Reprinted in Studies in Speculative Philosophy, ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, l925), pp. 110- 123. Idealism maintains that all experience is had by a rational, conscious subject. Pragmatism's stress on "pure experience" and the specificity of judgment are only abstractions produced by functional psychology. Experience must "be a unity, and not just a continuity," and the distinction between experience and judgment is one made within thought.
JRS 315 Dewey, John. Beliefs and Realities. Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 113- 1 19. Reprinted with "verbal revisions" as "Beliefs and Existences" in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (7931, pp. 169-197. MW 3: 83-100. Philosophers have disabled belief by going against the common view of belief as referring to both the world's value and the person's evaluation. Epistemologists have a "ready-made reality," to determine and produce belief. Every school, fiom idealist to materialist, "are at one in their devotion to an identification of reality with something that connects monopolistically with passionless knowledge, belief purged of all personal reference, origin, and outlook." The rejected features (need, uncertainty, choice, novelty, and strife) were hence set apart, in personal faith's realm of subjectivity. Scientific inquiry now contradicts such subjectivism, despite philosophy's claim that psychology, sociology, etc., are irrelevant to issues regarding truth and knowledge. Pragmatism does not arbitrarily restrict knowledge to let some privileged belief (in immortality, freedom, God, etc.) claim validity; any belief is subject to testing and possible elimination. When beliefs are as natural as anything else, no fear that science will eradicate "spiritual values" could take hold, and no professionalized fortifications are needed. JRS 316 Dewey, John. Experience and Objective Idealism. Phil Rev 15.5 (Sept 1906): 465-481. Reprinted with "slight verbal changes" in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (7931, pp. 198-225. MW 3: 128-144. Objective idealism has inherited an unstable attitude toward experience. With the Greeks and Kant, idealism portrays thought as providing universal objectivity and value to experience. Granted, experience must already have some degree of organization so that reflection can produce more order, but all order in experience, from the smallest habit to the greatest social institution, is "teleological and experimental, not fixedly ontological." Could the objective idealist show how "his immanent 'reason' makes any difference as respects the detection and elimination of error, or gives even the slightest assistance in discovering and validating the truly worthful?" In reflective thought, observation and description are functionally distinguished. Idealism survives only by perpetuating the false identification of ordinary perception with the "sharply analyzed" elements of scientific observation. Experience always displays transitions of meaning and value, which permit intelligent control. JRS Reviews Grace Bruce. Psych Bull 4.7 (15 July 1907): 230-232. Notes See John 1.: Russell's response, "Objective Idealism and Revised Empiricism" (364). See also McGlvary's cornnicnts in "Pure Experience and Reality" (450).
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317 Dewey, John. The Experimental Theory of Knowledge. Mid n.s. 15.3 (July 1906): 293-307. Reprinted with "considerable change" in The Injuence of Darwin on Philosophy (7931, pp. 77-11 1. MW 3: 107-127. A feeling is an experience distinct fiom being knowingly conscious of something. We can fbrther distinguish (1) the cognitive experience of feeling-movement-gratification, and (2) the cognitional experience (knowledge as acquaintance) in which a recurrent cognitive experience is supplemented by the feeling anticipating the gratification. Such anticipation, an experience of "present-as-absent," is the meaning. A "knowledge as assurance" experience is marked by the possession of two elements, the first meaning the second, and the second hlfilling the intent of the first. A cognitional experience could, alternatively, end in disappointment, infecting the first element with doubt instead. Truth and falsity are properties only of specific knowledge attempts, but modem epistemology searches for the conditions of knowledge by reference to a subjective mind separated from extra-empirical reality. The subjectivity arose early in philosophy from a need to locate error, and the extra-empirical reality then became the place for the purity of truth. Pragmatism "explains the dominating importance of science; it does not depreciate it or explain it away." JRS Summaries Mary W. Sprague, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 107-108. 318 Dewey, John. Reality as Experience. J Phil 3.10 (10 May 1906): 253-257. Reprinted in MW 3: 101-106. Hopeless metaphysical puzzles can be avoided if experience is viewed asjust a state of reality. This state is the culmination of a continuous transition from earlier stages of reality. The earlier stages are known only through the conditions in present experience. In this way, knowledge does have a transcendent aspect, which permits both verification and error correction. JRS 319 Dewey, John. The Terms "Conscious" and "Consciousness." J Phil 3.2 (18 Jan 1906): 39-4 1. Reprinted in MW 3: 79-82. Six meanings are enumerated. Structural psychology takes consciousness "in itself," while functionalism avoids metaphysics altogether, by using the term for "a personal being or agent, as distinct from a stone or a plant." JRS 320 Farley, J. H. Unity and the World Ground. J Phil 3.24 (22 Nov 1906): 651656. Farley comments on Schiller's "Idealism and the Dissociation of Personality" (370). The controversy between pluralism and absolutism cannot be "total disjunction versus non-diferentiation," but instead concerns the nature of the required relations between minds. JRS 321 Fite, Warner. The Experience-Philosophy. Phil Rev 15.1 (Jan 1906): 1-16. Pragmatism is a subjective idealism, since it denies the conceptually independent object in space and time. Present experience is not immediately given, and past experience is not more immediately given than the world of things, since all experience is in a world of bodies. Knowledge needs no "given" or absolute "data," but is instead a cohcrent system. The two opposed standpoints of metaphysics, the agent's subjective view arid the
Papini's book N crepuscolo dei filosofi (351) marks him as very radical pragmatist, clearing as he does accumulated philosophical rubbish. For him, the pragmatic attitude is nominalistic, utilitarian, positivistic, voluntaristic, and tideistic. It a f f i n s with Kant the primacy of the practical reason. Papini conceives of pragmatism as only a method and is neutral among doctrines, being like a corridor leading to many rooms. For Papini, the whole of human life is a search for instruments of action, "the quest of power," to bring the world closer to the ideal. Man becomes a kind of god. Philosophy should be made fully pragmatic and become a general theory of human action. IKS
external obse~er'sobjective view, are mutually dependent and one cannot eliminate the other. JR!3 Summaries Helen Gardner Hood, Psych Bull 4.1 (15 Jan 1907): 29-30; Robert Morris Ogden, J Phil 3.10 (10 May 1906): 275-277.
322 Fullerton, George S. Pragmatism. Section 64 of An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1906. Rpt., New York: Macmillan, 1924), pp. 2 19-222. Reviews H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 217-219; Carveth Read, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 116-118. 323 Gerrard, T. J. The Spiritual Value of Christianity. Catholic World (Aug 1906). f
324 Gore, Willard C. The Mad Absolute of a P l u r a l i i J Phil 3.21 (1 1 Oct 1906): 575-577. Gore responds to Schiller's "Idealism and the Dissociation of Personality" (370).The absolute is the underlying harmony and unity to the pluralistic phenomena Does it not appear that it is Schiller's pluralism which offers only madness? JRS Notes See William James's comments, "The Mad Absolute" (329). 325 Hocking, William E. The Transcendence of Knowledge. J Phil 3.1 (4 Jan 1906): 5-12. Dewey's request that cognition be defined and empirically studied is answered by Hocking's own theory of "systematic continuity." JRS 326 Hoffding, Harald. Preface. To Religiose Erfringer, translated by E. Lehmann and C. Monster (Copenhagen: T. Branner, 1906).
327 Hollands, Edmund H. The Relation of Science to Concrete Experience. Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 6 14-626. Pragmatists, among others, deny that science describes actual reality. If thought has only internal goals, pragmatism is just an idealism, but if thought's goals are externally given, then pragmatism will either get trapped in a will-thought identity, or take refuge in an uncritical naturalism. JRS 328 James, William. G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy. J Phil 3.13 (21 June 1906): 337-341. Reprinted in Collected Essq~sa n d Reviews { 1579), pp. 459-466. work^ EPh, pp. 144-148. Italy is undcrgoitig at1 i~itellcctualrcbirth. An illustration of this is tho vigorous dufcnsc of pragniatisin i n Giovanni Papini's journal Leonardo. Contrasted with American academic pedantry, the journal has youthful "frolicsomeness and impertinence."
329 James, William. The Mad Absolute. J Phil 3.24 (22 Nov 1906): 656-657. Reprinted in Collected Essays andReviews (1 5791, pp. 467-469. Works EPh, pp. 149-150. James comments on W. C. Gore's "The Mad Absolute of a Pluralist" (324). Gore argues against F. C. S. Schiller that the absolute remains one and sane and that it is we, the finite forms, who are mad. Gore needs to explain how our madness came about and by what kind of return to the absolute it is to be cured. The dispute is welcome because it makes the hypothesis of an absolute a matter of concrete discussion. IKS 330 James, William. Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of 'Radical Empiricism'. J Phil 3.26 (20 Dec 1906): 7 12. Reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism { lO78), pp. 24 1-243. Pure Experience, pp. 122. Works ERE, pp. 123. James replies to W. B. Pitkin's "A Problem of Evidence in Radical Empiricism" (356). The refusal by radical empiricism to admit into its theories anything not experienced is only a methodological postulate and does not involve the claim that noumenal objects are impossible. Noumenal objects may exist and may be admitted into philosophy should their pragmatic value be shown. IKS Notes See Pitkin's reply, "In Reply to Professor James" (475). 331 James, William. Preface. To Harald Hoffding, The Problems of Phifosophy, translated by G. M. Fisher (New York: Macmillan, 1906), pp. v-xiv. Reprinted in Works EPh, pp. 140-143. The book is Harald Hoffding's philosophic testament. For rationalism, parts are explained through the whole and reality forms a unit, with every part linked with others in intimate and not external ways. Empiricism proceeds from parts to wholes and claims that some parts ire merely added to others, linked by "and" and nothing more. Hoffding is an empiricist, but has the manners of a rationalist. His critical monism is really a pluralism, because the unity is still in process of completion. His idea of truth is dynamic and can be understood in terms of what "works" taken in its widest sense. In religion, he interprets belief as conservation of what has value, a formula which covers much of the concrete history of human religion. IKS 332 James, William. Stanford's Ideal Destiny. In Founder's Day Addresser (Leland Stanford Junior Publications, Trustees' Series No. 14, 1906). pp. 5-8. Reprinted in Science n.s. 23 (25 May 1906): 801-804. Memories and Studies (9571, pp. 356-367. Works ECR, pp. 102- 106.
Wealthy American businessman have become benefactors of universities, usually with only a vague understanding of what a university is. Leland Stanford and his wife saw the opportunity for an "absolutely unique creation." The campus reminds one of the classic scenery of Greece. As a private university Stanford has the opportunity to nurture personalities of genius, especially by breaking the American tradition of low pay for faculty. It should strive to train scholars. IKS
333 Joachim, Harold H. The Nature of Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906. Pragmatism will not be considered, since it emphasizes some "elementary theses" which idealism also holds, and does not offer a theory of truth but only "a denial of truth altogether," @. 4) JRS Reviews John S. Mackenzie, Int I Ethics 17.2 (Jan 1907): 264-265. The reasons given for the omission of pragmatism are inadequate. JRS F. C. S. Schiller, J Phil 3.20 (27 Sept 1906): 549-557 [reprinted in "somewhat expanded" form as "The Nature of Truth" in Studies in Humankm {490), pp. 163-1781. This work is the "final breakdown" of the contradictory attempt to explain absolute truth while deprecating human knowledge. Pragmatists will "rejoice that Mr. Joachim has unequivocally said a multitude of things they had long suspected their opponents of believing, and desired to see stated in cold print." JRS P. E. Winter, Amer J Psych 18.4 (Oct 1907): 524.
334 Jones, Henry. The Working Faith of the Social Reformer. 111. The Metaphysical Basis-Mine and Thine. Hibbert Journal 4.3 (April 1906): 550-569. Reprinted in The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, and Other Essays (London and New York: Macmillan, 19 10). Our purposes do define the meaning of things, as pragmatism holds, but this subjectivism must be enfolded within an encompassing social consciousness. JRS Reviews of The Working Faith James B. Baillie, Hibbert Journal 10.2 (Jan 1912): 495-501.
335 Lalande, Andrf. Philosophy in France (1905). Phil Rev 15.3 (May 1906): 24 1-266. A summary of philosophy in France for the 1905 year, including several pages on the word "pragmatism" and its independent origin in France, the entry for the word "action" in the C'ocabulaire philosophique, and Blondel's L'Action (1893). Also of interest is pp. 244ff on the "intimate connection" between French pragmatism and religious ideas. LF
336 Lalande, Andrf. Pragmatisme et pragmaticisme. Rev Phil 61.2 (Feb 1906): 121-146. The pragmatism of l'eirce and James is a revolt against philosophical dilettantism, a reclaiming of a strict homogeneity between scientific truth and philosophic truth, and an absolute experientialisn~(empiricism). It is, accordingly, a rejection of Kantian pure Reason. Pragmatism is a realism-generals are to be found in nature-though particulars are countenanced as well. James's radical empiricism involves the ciaim that reiations
are objects of experience. (p. 127) There is a comparison of Peirce, James and Schiller, and references to Le Roy and Dessoulavy. Lalande then gives a personal expod on pragmatism as a reaction to intellectualism, and the subordination of individual to collective thought. LF Summaries George H. Sabine, Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 673-674. Notes See Pierre Mesnard's Notice sur la vie et les travaux de And& Lalande (18674963) (Paris: impr. Firmin-Didot et Cie., 1966).
337 Lang, Sidney Edward. A Primer of General Method: Being an Introduction to Educational Theory and Practice on the Bask oflogic. Toronto: The Copp, Clark Co., 1906. Logic "deals with the mind as performing certain acts with a purpose in view-the good of the organism." Knowledge is a systematic explanation of facts that serves as a guide for action, and is pursued for practical and aesthetic interests. Ideas are plans of actions. which undergo organic growth. Judgments are instruments to gain goods and when used as hypotheses they are testable by the inferences drawn from them. Education is a process of reconstructing knowledge toward an ideal system, and should be guided by social needs. JRS Reviews John Grier Hibben, J Phil 4.21 (10 Oct 1907): 577-580. Lang's position is "unqualified pragmatism," which ignores logical necessity, distorts the role of hypotheses, and confuses practical interest with interest in a subject-matter. JRS Notes See Lang's reply, "Logic and Educational Theory," J Phil 4.26 (19 Dec 1907): 709-713.
338 Leighton, Joseph A. Cognitive Thought and 'Immediate' Experience. J Phil 3.7 (29 March 1906): 174-180. James's doctrine of pure experience confuses logical and psychological treatments of thought. What holds only of "possible" experience is asscrted of "actual" and "personal" experience, and vice versa. IKS Dewey's version of immediate empiricism denies possible experience and ignores thought's mediating and transcending activities. JRS
339 Lyman, Eugene William. The Influence of Pragmatism upon the Status of Theology. In Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, by the former students of Charles Edward Garman, ed. James H. Tufts et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press; New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1906), pp. 219-236. Pragmatism offers a new type of empiricism by recognizing ethical life a? integral to reality, which provides an alternative to theological dogn~ntism.It meshes with rcccr:t historical mcthods applicd to religion, resulting in a "religious search for an ethical universe." Religion's claim to absolutism is proper within its sphcre, since the pcrson:~l conviction of the solution of a vital problem must he verified by the conimunity, and in the process of history all humanity will have the opportuni!y tn converge toiixds niie religion. JRS
On p. 43-44 Nunn rejects James's relational theory of space. On pp. 136-138 he asserts that scientific theories are distinct from factual certainties, against James's and Dewey's emphasis on their continuity. JRS Reviews James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 17.4 (July 1908): 446; T. Loveday, Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 274275.
Reviews John Dewey, Phil Rev 16.3 (May 1907): 3 12-32] [MW4: 217-2281. Lyman's essay is "free from both the sentimentalism and arbitrary 'fideism' which sometimes accompany a professedly pragmatic view of religion." JRS A. W. Moore, J Phil 3.23 (8 Nov 1906): 63 1637. This application of pragmatism to theology does credit to both fields. JRS R. F. Alfred Hoeml6, Mind n.s. 16.1 (Jan 1907): 140-141; Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Psych Bull 4.1 (15 Jan 1907): 18-24.
340 Mallet,
F. Le Philosophie de I'action. Rev de Phil 9.3 (1 Sept 1906): 227-252.
341 Mead, G. H. The Imagination in Wundt's Treatment of Myth and Religion. Psych Bull 3.12 (15 Dec 1906): 393-399. 342 Mead, G. H. The Teaching of Science in College. Science n.s. 24 (1906): 390-397. Reprinted in Selected Writings,pp. 60-72. 343 Moore, A. W. Experience and Subjectivism. Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 182-186. Portions reprinted in "Pragmatism and Solipsism" in Pragmatism and Its Crifics (8601, pp. 220-244. Moore replies to Warner Fite's "The Experience-Philosophy" {321). Fite wrongly imputes to the pragmatist the position that all experience is experience given to a subject. Pragmatism agrees with Realism that reality extends beyond cognitive experience. JRS 344 Miinsterberg, Hugo. Science and Idealism. Boston and New York: Houghton, MiMin, and Co., 1906. Pragmatism, while rightly devaluing mechanistic science, has abandoned all absolute values, and somehow misunderstood idealism. Reality is independent of our wishes, and science aims to conceive the world as a permanent system. JRS Reviews James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 95-96. 345 Nichols, Herbert. Professor James's 'Hole'. J Phil 3.3 (1 Feb 1906): 64-70. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 142- 149. Having rejected the soul and association, James uses the notion of continuous transition to preserve the unity of the sclf. Past states no longer exist when new ones have replaced them. IIowcver, when James talks of two minds knowing one thing, he returns to the reality of past states. Nichols tries to explain what leads to this error. IKS
346 Norero, H. L'expCrience religieuse d'aprks William James. Revue de I'Histoire des Religions (July-Aug 1906). 347 Nunn, T. Percy. The Aim and Achievements of Scienlific Mefhod:An Episfemological Essay. Proc Arisf Soc 6 (1 906): 14 1- 182. London: Macmillan, 1907.
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348 Ormond, Alexander Thomas. Concepts ofPhilosophy. London and New York: Macmillan, 1906. Philosophy aims to unify truth. Only beliefs are judged by the practical good (p. 704), while knowledge is a theoretic certitude. James's "will to believe" cannot produce certitude, but only personal "make-believe." Where theoretical reason can supplement a social interest in practical belief (for example, God is both rationally supportable and a universal object of interest), the combination provides "the highest credence." JRS Reviews Arthur K. Rogers, Phil Rev 16.4JJuy 1907): 425-433. 349 Papini, Giovanni. Campagna per il forzato risveglio. Leonardo 4.3 (Aug 1906): 193- 199. Reprinted in La cultura italiana del '900 attraverso le reviste, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Editore, 1960), pp. 3 12- 3 16. This essay is perhaps Papini's most famous from the Leonardo period. It is a clarion call to reawakening, summoning "a few hundred young Italians" from their slumbers to rise up and re-make the world. Pragmatism appears as an instrument of this remaking, wielded by a generational elite who will transform their will into concrete reality. Among the qualities that this new elite must possess is the distrust of "the exaggerated love of useless words." The traditional rhetorical excesses\must be cast aside. In this, pragmatism becomes useful, since it is the enemy of "all vacuous discourses and illusory problems." A close reading reveals that pragmatism is an "ally" to Papini in this endeavor, suggesting perhaps that he himself is outside of the movement, even though willing lo enlist its aid. EPC 350 Papini, Giovanni. Dall'uomo a dio. Leonardo 4.1 (Feb 1906): 6-15. Reprinted in Sul pragmatismo (1202). Tutfe le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 45-54. This essay centers on another one of Papini's core conceptions, the Uomo-dio. which so attracted the attention of William James that he specifically wrote about it in his "G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy" (328). l'rezzolini cmploycd this idea first in 1903, using it to capture the essence of the new Pragmatic Supermarl whose will stood as the omnipotent re-maker of the world. For Papini. the idea of the Uornodio becomes at once the philosophical ideal and an autobiographical self-revelation. James's "will to believe" is transformed into Papini's program for the Man-god's remaking of thc world, in order that objective reality may confurm to his will. 'l'lie essa!.. like "Compagna per i l forzato risveglio" (349) is directed to the elite few: those nlio \vatit to prepare for "a new plcrsli~age of thc world." l'akcn i n isolation. tI1c essa! seems to suffer from excessive rhetoric. Understood politically. the links to Fa!uri!i! and Fascism are not hard to find. EI'C
Notes The entire February issue of Leonardo deserves special mention because of a remark made by James in a letter to F. C. S. Schiller on 7 April 1906. James states that "What I really want to write about is Papini...and the February number of the 'Leonardo'." [The Letters of William James ( 1580) vol. 2, pp. 245-2461. This issue is replete with articles on pragmatism, offering the broad spectrum of viewpoints from those of Papini and Prezzolini on the one hand, to those of Giovanni Vailati on the other. Papini offers a brief survey of recent events concerning the development of Pragmatism ("Cronaca Pragmatists"), including a report of discussions on pragmatism held at the American Philosophical Association meeting at Cambridge during December of 1905.
351 Papini, Ciovanni. I1 crepuscolo deijilosoji. Milan: SocietB editrice Lombarda. 2nd ed., Edizioni di "Laceha", 1914. 4th ed., Florence: Vallecchi, 1921. 7th ed., Florence: Vallecchi, 1953. 7th ed. reprinted, Florence: Vallecchi, 1976. Selections reprinted in Opere: Dal "Leonardo" a1 Futurismo, ed. Luigi Baldacci (Milan: Amoldo Mondadori, 1977), pp. 503-555. Written as his pragmatist phase was coming to an end, this book contains one of Papini's favorite methods for expressing his ideas. He devotes a chapter each to significant modern philosophers, including Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Comte, remaking them into something akin to Vico's imaginative universal, as concrete embodiments of ideas and intellectual tendencies which he finds compelling. Most important, however, is the final chapter which James identified to Schiller as having completely captured his interest. It is a manifesto of the Man-god in which the entire movement of modern philosophy issues forth in the creation of the new superman. Pragmatics is identified as the supreme theory of action into which all other branches of theoretical philosophy must lead. A careful reading finds a subtle and somewhat sobering foreshadowing of fascism amid all of the references to the human becoming divine. Papini writes that the book contains a program which is both a criticism of the past and "a terrible program for the future" in which the will is omnipotent in remaking reality. EPC Reviews Jean Bourdeau, Pragmatisnie et modernisme (6291, pp. 49-65.
I
Peirce comments on James B. Peterson's proposal to start a "discussion of philosophical terminology" in "Some Philosophical Terms," Monist 15.4 (Oct 1905): 629-633. Peirce gives an account of the term "experience," and the history of its use from Polus the Acragentine and Aristotle to Locke. LF Notes Erratum, Monist 16.2 (April 1906): 320.
354 Peirce, C. S. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism. Monist 16.4 (Oct 1906): 492-546. Reprinted with supplementary material in footnotes, CP 4.530-572. In this last of three articles written for the Monist, Peirce takes up the construction of "diagrams to illustrate the general course of thought." (p. 492) In his introduction he asserts that the object of investigation is the "form of a relationy' @. 494), and that "by experimentation upon some diagram an experimental proof can be obtained of every necessary conclusion from any given Copulate of Premises..." (ibid.) To prove this claim he begins with an analysis of the essence of a sign, though the division that he provides is only one of ten that he has devised. On p. 503, Peirce states his intention to defend pragmatism by way of his System of Existential Graphs. He then defines "sign," "objecf" "interpretant," the type-token distinction, "pheme," and "argument." This is followed by one of several discussions on the objects of perception, and percepts. "No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise..." Pp. 517ff distinguishes categories from universes, and describes the nature of real possibility. Proper analysis, Peirce contends, must be thorough by separating "the compound into components each entirely homogeneous in itself..." (p. 518) On p. 524 Peirce explains the five "Conventions": the determinations of "the forms and interpretations of the existential graphs." He concludes with several examples of existential graphs to "illustrate the method of interpretation, and also the Permissions of Illative Transformation of them.:' LF Summaries G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 564-565. Notes Errata at Monist 17.1 (Jan 1907): 160. 355 Piazza, G. La mistificazione "pragmatista." Avanti della domenica 4 (1906): 24.
352 Papini, Giovanni. La volonta di credere. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 2.2 (March-April 1906): 77-84. Reprinted in Sul pragmatismo { 1202). Tutte le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 105- 1 13. Papini stays very close to James in the early part of this essay. Much of the controversy surrounding the "will to believe" is, according to Papini. the result of there being no Italian language translation of James's The WINlo B~lieve(1897). 1le gives a careful explication o f James's position, together with the limiting conditions that James had placcd upon the will to believe. What follows is a protracted discussion of the various lines of influence that connect will. belief, reality and action. Papini concludes by praising Janies for liaving contributed one of the most fecund constructions to contemporary philosophical theory. EPC
356 Pitkin, Walter B. A Problem of Evidence in Radical Empiricism. J Phil 3.24 (22 Nov 1906): 645-650. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 1 1 5- 121. Experisnce is autonomous for the radical empiricist. Both the physical and the psychical is said to fall within experience. but experience itself must rest on nothing. Arguments in support of radical empiricism fail since in them description is confused with evidence. IKS Notes See James's reply, "Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of 'Radical Empiricism"' (330)
353 Pcirce, Cl~arlcsS. Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion. Monist 16.1 (Jan 1906): 147-1 5 1. Reprinted in CP 5.610-614;
357 Pitkin, Walter B. The Relation Between the Act and the Object of Belief. J Phil 3. i9 (13 Sept i906j: 505-5 I 1 .
As Dewey holds in "Beliefs and Realities" (3151, beliefs are real, but the metaphysician cannot accept that beliefs are just a matter of comparative convenience. Beliefs must be convictions about objects in independent reality, and, as pragmatism contends, "every distinction in value must be a distinction in the nature and behavior of those objects." JRS
Reviews Boyd H. Bode, J Phil 4.7 (28 March 1907): 192-194. Rogers is "clear and forcible," but does not handle well James's thesis that knowledge can be reduced to a resemblance leading to a "beneficial reaction towards an object." IKS
358 Pitkin, Walter B. ?he Self-Transcendency of Knowledge. Phil Rev 15.1
(Jan 1906): 39-58.
362 Rotta, Paolo. D'una psicologia pragmatica della credenza. Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affmi 15.1-3 (July-Sept 1906): 542-554.
James says that both he and transcendentalists find continuous transitions in experience, but the latter have a quite different psychological view. Pitkin distinguishes six meanings for "self-transcendent knowledge." JRS
363 Rusk, Robert R Der Pragmatische und humanistische Strdmung in der modernen englischen Philosophie. Leipzig: Frommann, 1906.
359 Prezzolini, Giuseppe (signed as Giuliano il Sofista). Pragmatism0 e occultismo. Leonardo 4.4 (Oct-Dec 1906): 354-356. Reprinted in La cultura italiana del '900attraverso le reviste, ed. Delia Frigessi (Turin: Guilio Einaudi Edi-tore, 1960), pp. 329-33 1. Prezzolini gives a very brief treatment of the true meaning of pragmatism, this time in the last issue of Leonardo, and in proximity to his abandonment of pragmatism as his official creed. Prezzolini is careful to establish that pragmatism can mean many things. It is a method for clarifying meanings, certainly, but it is more. Its voluntaristic side (drawn from James's "will to believe") means that to be a pragmatist is to be open to a higher plane of reality and to acknowledge the creative power of the will. An occultism which rises above mere verbalism refers to such creative power. EPC 360 Raub, William Longstreth. Pragmatism and Kantianism. In Studies in PhiIosophy and Psychology by the former students of Charles Edward Garman (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1906), pp. 203-217. .. I he important doctrines of pragmatism were "completely expressed" by Kant: thc chaos of given experience, the substitution of orderly thought using fundamental categories. the plasticity of reality, and the practical criterion of truth. Like Kantianism, pragmatism still must explain how individuals all belong to the same universe. JRS Reviews John Dewey, Phil Rev 16.3 (May 1907): 3 12-321 [MW4: 2 17-2281. Kant's difticult a priori categories are dealt with simply by noting that some pragmatists accept the Spencerian theory of racial acquisition. JRS A. W. Moore, J Phil 3.23 (8 Nov 1906): 63 1-637. Kant's second "Kritik" must "contain a very rich vein of pragmatism." Intellectual harmony cannot be isolated from the wider "development and dissolution of tensions." Pragmatism has no difticulty accounting for the interaction among individuals. JRS R. F. Alfred 1loernlC. Mind n.s. 16.1 (Jan 1907): 140-141; Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Psych 4. I (15 jan 1907): 18-24. 36 1 Rogers, Arthur K. Professor James's Theory of Knowledge. Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 577-596. 1)iscussions of pragmatism leave many questions unanswered. While pragmatism as a method i s acceptable. its nictaphysics is questionable. How are we to interpret the view that "realiiy is actually in evcry sense created" in the process of knowledge? IKS
364 Russell, J o h n E. Objective Idealism and Revised Empiricism. Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 627-633. Russell comments on Dewey's "Experience and Objective Idealism" (316). Kant committed no contradiction; he asserted that the a priori categories are not beyond experience, but only underived from sensation. As for error, "a priori thought is not bound to be infallible, nor to do work that needs no correction or revision" (p. 630-63 I), and "a priori thought supplies those elements in the constitution of our experience that need not and suffer not correction or revision." (p. 63 1) Value resides both in the Eternal and in us. Dewey's empiricism offers only a fragmentary reality, momentary thought, no truth, no final meaning, and no ultimate standard of value. JRS
365 Russell, J o h n E. The Pragmatist's Meaning of Truth. J Phil 3.22 (25 Oct 1906): 599-60 1. Only on the supposition that it is the objective truth which causes satisfaction, can the existence of satisfaction be properly explained. JRS
366 Russell, J o h n E. Solipsism: The Logical Issue of Radical Empiricism. Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 606-6 13. For radical empiricism, experience alone is real and reality is known only by experience. It forgets that experience must be mine; it cannot provide for the experience of others. IKS Summaries Boyd H. Bode, J Phil 4.6 (14 March 1907): 164-165. 367 Russell, John E. Some Dificulties with the Epistemology of Pragmatism a d Radical Empiricism. Phil Rev 15.4 (July 1906): 406-413. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 164- 17 1. Pragmatism confuses logic with psychology, knowledge with the situation in which knowledge arises, and truth with the consequences of truth. It eliminates all relations, excepting "nextness." Its interpretation of truth leads to a dilemma. An idea is not true unless it has been verified, but once verilied, it no longer exists, since the transition from the idea to the terminus has taken place. Finally, radical empiricism involves solipsism. IKS
368 Schiller, F. C. S. The Ambiguity of Truth. Mind n.s. 15.2 (April 1906): 161- 176. Revised and expanded in Studies in Humanism (4901, pp. 14 1 - 162.
The intellectualists stress a logical requirement that truths must be nontontradictory, while ignoring the problem of how a truth is verified. Truth is a valuation made in reference to a purpose. Can pragmatism's opponents give one example of how a doubtfid assertion could come to be a truth, though any non-pragmatic process? JRS Summaries F. D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 15.6 (Nov 1906): 674-675; Helen G ~ d n e Hood, r Psych Bull 4.3 (15 March 1907): 88-89.
369 Schiller, F. C. S. Faith, Reason, and Religion. Hibbert Journal 4.2 (Jan 1906): 329-345. Reprinted with revisions in Studies in Humanism (4901, pp. 349-369. James revives the traditional religious appeal to emotional faith with a novel psychological emphasis on the dependence of reason on values. Faith is not "belief without knowledge," but is best defined as "the mental attitude which, for purposes of action, is willing to take upon trust valuable and desirable beliefs, in the hope that this attitude may render possible their verification." Religious faiths, like scientific theories, have survived this severe test; however, one ultimate truth is highly unlikely to emerge. The psychological evidence of personal religious consciousness should not be ignored. JRS Reviews William Hallock Johnson, J Phil 3.7 (29 March 1906): 189-190.
370 Schiller, F. C. S. ldealism and the Dissociation of Personality. J Phil 3.18 (30 Aug 1906): 477-482. Reprinted as "Absolutism and the Dissociation of Personality" in Studies in Humanism (4901, pp. 266-273. The chaos of conflicting personalities in the world cannot be explained by idealistic monism, unless it portrays the absolute as suffering from a universal mental illness. JRS Notes See 1. H. Farley, "Unity and the World Ground" (320) and Willard C. Gore, "The Mad Absolute of a Pluralist" (324).
371 Schiller, F. C. S. Is Absolute Idealism Solipsistic? J Phil 3.4 (15 Feb 1906): 85-89. Reprinted as "Is 'Absolute ldealism' Solipsistic?'in Studies in Humanism (4901, pp. 258-265. A carefully defined solipsism asserts only that some one experiencer is the complete reality. Absolute idealism fits this definition, revealing its contradictory nature. JRS Notes Walter B. Pitkin criticizes Schiller's treatment of solipsism in "Why Solipsism is Rejected," J Phil 3.13 (21 June 1906): 344-350. 372 Schiller, F. C. S. Plato and His Predecessors. Quarterly Review 204.1 (Jan 1906): 62-88. Reprinted with additions as "From Plato to Protagorus" in Studies in Humanism (4901, pp. 22-70. A critical review of five works on Plato and ancient philosophy, followed by an investigation into the Greek's curious progression from religion, to scientific reasoning, and culmination in intellectualist theology. Plato's theory of Ideas receives special condemnation. JKS
373 Schiller, F. C. S. Pragmatism and Pseudo-Pragmatism. Mind n.s. 15.3 (July 1906): 375-391. Schiller responds to A. E. Taylor's "Truth and Consequences" (381). JRS Summaries Mary W. Sprague, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 107.
374 Schiller, F. C. S. Thought and Immediacy. J Phil 3.9 (26 April 1906): 234-.*-. L> I . Schiller responds to Bakewell's "The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism" (2 15). Dewey's position would be better appreciated if the psychological facts were admitted by all. Most perceptual experiences are not permeated by thought's mediating categories, and hence do not require the idealist's rationalist account. Where thought does enter into perception, it is gradually absorbed in a continuous process, culminating in the immediate "rapid insight" type of perception. "Instead of saying that perception is made by thought, why not say that thought is perception in the making?" JRS
375 Schiller, F. C. S., Bernard Bosanquet, Hastings RashdalL Can Logic Abstract from the Psychological Conditions of Thinking? Proc Arist Soc 6 (1906): 224-270. Schiller's contribution is material for "The Relations of Logic and Psychology," Studies in Humanism {49O), pp. 7 1- 1 13. A symposium; parts 1, 4, and 6 are by Schiller (pp. 224-237, 255-262, 265-270). Schiller's negative answer is founded on the contention that without the psychological feeling of certainty, logical "necessity" would lack meaning. Bosanquet's affirmative answer in part two accuses Schiller of confusing logic and ethics. Rashdall's aftirmative answer in part three asks logic to examine the truth of judgments without reference to any individual mind, which pragmatism makes impossible. No one denies*that thought is accompanied by willing and feeling. Schiller's response in part four points out that Bosanquet took a stance from established logic, without appreciating the concern for its psychological origins. Bosanquct's part five makes no reply to Schiller, but explains that a science can "only be judged by itself at a further stage." In part six, Schiller comments on Rashdall. Even Bradley has come to deny that "no psychological idea has validity and no logical idea has existence." The logician's task is to evaluate those claims to truth, a described by psychology. Rashdall's accusation that both James and Schiller are [Iumian sensationalists is refuted, and his warning that pragmatism threatens morality and knowledge is merely an unfair attempt to prejudice the discussion-revealing how Rashdall can resort to a pragmatic argument from consequences! JRS
376 Sheldon, W. H. The Quarrel About Transcendency. J Phil 3.7 (29 Marc11 1906): 180-185. The realist can assert a reality beyond any empirical knowledge, without having to deny the pragmatist claim that our beliefs must be formulated in experiential terms. JRS 377 Spaulding, Edward G. Pure Science and Pragmatism. J Phil 3.3 (1 Feb 1906): 75-76. Pragmatism is inconsistent with the practice af physic?.! science. ;;hick place?; ihc "ground of the validity of knowledge" external to the self-transcending cognition. JKS
382 Vailati, Giovanni. Per un'analisi pragmatistica della nomenclatura tilosofica. Leonardo 4.2 (April 1906): 103-1 15. Reprinted in Scritti {lo181, pp.
Notes An abstract of a paper. A substantially different abstract of this paper is in Phil Rev 15.2 (March 1906): 16%170.
378 Spaulding, Edward G. Review of Pierre Duhem, La TEorie physique. J Phil 3.22 (25 Oct 1906): 606-610. Pragmatists will be pleased by this physicist's similar views, but Duhem does not draw their ontological conclusions. JRS 379 Stuart, Henry W., Boyd H. Bode, Stephen S. Colvin. Discussion: Recent Arguments for Realism, with especial reference to the Relations of Realism and Pragmatism. J Phil 3.12 (7 June 1906): 319-321. Stuart praises pragmatism's non-representational view of knowledge, which defines truth without making it impossible to identifL truths. Bode views pragmatism's distinction between pure experience and consciousness as a failure. Colvin argues that pragmatism is essentially idealistic. JRS Notes An abstract of a discussion during the 1906 meeting of the Western Philosophical Association. Bode's contribution was published as "Realism and Pragmatism" (307). 380 Sturt, Henry. Idola Theatri: A Criticism of Oxfrd Thought and Thinkers fiom the Standpoint of Personal Idealism. London and New York: Macmillan, 1906. Sturt declares that the future lies with voluntarism (experience is dynamic) and personalism (individuals are fully real), allying himself with F. C. S. Schiller's "humanism" and James's "pragmatism." Chapters 4-7 attack "Intellectualism," "Absolutism," "Subjectivism," and "German Idealism." Chapters 8-10 critique T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet. JRS Reviews Alfred E. Taylor, Mind n.s. 16.3 (July 1907): 424-430. Many idealists believe that "there is something seriously amiss with the foundations" of idealism, but Sturt's criticisms are less than thorough. JRS John Watson, Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 78-83. Sturt lacks the requisite knowledge of Megel to attack idealism. Examples abound of "inept criticism." JRS A. Mackie, Int J Ethics 17.3 (April 1907): 403-404; J. W. Scott, Hibbert Journal 5.1 (Oct 1906):2 12-216. 381 Taylor, Alfred E. Truth and Consequences. Mind n.s. 15.1 (Jan 1906): 8193. Taylor responds to F. C. S. Schiller's "Empiricism and the Absolute" (282) and "The Definition of 'Pragmatism' and 'I-lumanism"' (373). Two mathematical examples are offered to support the view that some truths are independent of all practical consequences. If Schiller would still object, he ought to better define what is meant by "practical" and "consequences." The allegations of borrowing from humanism are without basis. JRS Notes seey.:p.-'-a ....-I.. t q n y , "Piagii~Ji~m Pseudo-Praginaiis~n''i373j. Lttt tLt
I
701-708. Vailati, like his student Mario Calderoni, identified Peirce's pragmatic maxim as the genuine core (and horizon) of pragmatism. Given the perceived excesses of Papini and Prezzolini in the name of this philosophical doctrine, it comes as no surprise that Vailati would attempt to restore order of meaning to the realm of philosophy. Once again, the presence of this article in Leonardo shows that not only were its editors open-minded with regard to their philosophical adversaries, but also that the review was the place to look for philosophical debate on the latest developments from outside of Italy. EPC
i
383 Vailati, Giovanni Pragmatismo e logica matematica. Leonardo 4.1 (Feb 1906): 16-25. Translated by Herbert D. Austin as "Pragmatism and Mathematical Logic," Monist 16.4 (Oct 1906): 48 1-491. Reprinted in Scritti { 10181, pp. 689694.
1
i I
384 Vailati, Giovanni. Uno zoologo pragmatista: Andrea Giardini, Le discipline zoologiche e la scienza generale delle forme organizzate. Leonardo 4.4 (Oct-Dec 1906): 329-338. Translated by Herbert D. Austin as "A Pragmatic Zoologist,'' Monist 18.1 (Jan 1908): 142-151. Reprinted in Seritti {1018), pp. 728-735. Notes Le discipline zoologiche (Pavia, 1906). 385 Veblen, Thorstein. The Place of Science in Modem Civilization. American Journal of Sociology 11.5 (March 1906): 585-609. Technology is the pragmatic aspect to our culture. but modem science is purely theoretical, marking our civilization's progress away from the "pragmatic-barbarian" way of life. JRS 386 Vitali, Guilio. Note pragmatische. Ressegna nazionale (16 Dec 1906): 646662. 387 Waterhouse, Eric S. The Religious Philosophy of William James. London Quarterly Review 106.1 (July 1906): 82-94. Waterhouse reviews James's The Will to Believe (1897) and The VarJeties ojRelJgiozrv Experience (90). James has "an impartial desire to give due attention to every shade in the prism of experience" which collides with scientific "dogmatism." JRS Notes Extensive quotations from this essay are given in Anon, "The Religious Philosophy of William James," Literary Digest 33.10 (8 Sept 1906): 3 19. 388 Wolf, Abraham. Le "Dieu" des pngnstistes. Revue Augustinienne 8.6 (June 1906): 727.
389 Angell, James R The Province of Functional Psychology. Psych Rev 14.2 (March 1907): 6 1-91. Reprinted in Readings in the History of Psychology, ed. W. Dennis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1948), pp. 439-456. Functional psychology and pragmatism "spring from similar logical motivation." JRS Summaries Felix Arnold, J Phil 4.10 (9 May 1907): 276277; Margaret K. Strong, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 568-569.
390 Anon. The Philosophy of a Renunciation. Harper's Weekly 51 (21 Sept 1907): 1370. James's "The Energies of Men" (437) is used to recommend that Theodore Roosevelt renounce his ambition for a third term. IKS
396 Besse, Cldment. Letm de France. Pour l'intellectualisme. Revue NdoScolastique 14.3 (Aug 1907): 281-303. 397 Billia, Lorenzo-Michelangelo. L'Iddalisme n'est-il pas chrdtien? Rev de Phil 11.2 (1 Aug 1907): 155-181. 398 Bjorkman, Edwin. Interview with William James. New York Times (3 Nov 1907): 8. James's books are "selling by the thousands," "business men are caught disputing over their lunches," while "matrons and maids display equal eagerness." IKS 399 Blanche, F. A. Un Essai de synthbe pragmatiste: L'Humanisme. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques 1.3 (1907): 433-448.
391 Amiaz, Marc. Pragmatism0 y humanismo. Cultura espailola 7 (Aug 1907). 392 Baldwin, J. Mark. On Truth. Psych Rev 14.4 (July 1907): 264-287. Most of this essay is reprinted as chap. 13, "Truth and Falsity," of Thought and Things, vol. 2 (509). Eight paragraphs on pp. 27 1-274 are reprinted in chap. 14, "Control Through Knowledge" of Thought and Things, vol. 2, pp. 379-382. Baldwin stresses his distinction between "knowledge through control" and "control through knowledge." Pragmatism perceives only the former. but actually the self controls knowledge for the good. Baldwin objects to Dewey's characterization of knowledge offered in "The Control of Ideas by Facts" (42 1 ) and to Moore's review of Thought and Things, vol. 1 (30 1 ). JRS Summaries James E. Creighton, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907):665-666.
393 Baldwin, James M. Thought and Things. Psych Bull 4.4 (15 April 1907): 123-126. Reprinted in revised form as appendix 2, "Certain Explanations," in Thought and Things, vol. 2 {509), pp. 42 1-425. Baldwin replies to Moore's review of Baldwin's Thought and Things, vol. 1 (301). ''Is a discrete unintelligible dynamic any better than a contentless formal static?" The absolute aesthetic experience reconciles logical dualisms. JRS Notes See Moore's reply, "Experience, Habit and Attention" (459).
394 Barbour, G . F. Progress and Reality. Hibbert Journal 6.1 (Oct 1907): 4762. Pragmatism, like I legelianism, affirms the dependency of God on mankind's spiritual development, despite its conflict with the perfect God of common sense. JRS
400 Blanche, F. A. Pragmatisme et humanisme. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Thdologiques 1.1 (Jan 1907): 105-129. 401 Boodin, J. E. The New Realism. J Phil 4.20 (26 Sept 1907): 533-542. Both realism and idealism falsely assume that "only like can act upon like," and that "what is not stuff cannot be real." The real must be what is intelligibly known through our purposes, and is never perceptions or constructions of them. JRS
402 Boodin, J. E. The Ought and Reality. Int J Ethics 17.4 (July 1907): 454474. Reprinted with revisions as "Form and the Ought" in A Realistic Universe (13521, pp. 326-359. Ideals have meaning only in oriented, teleologically changing univkrse. Neither personal satisfaction, self-realization, nor reason can provide ideals, but only the "absolute direction" of the time process. Pragmatism requires its affirmation. This "Ought" provides immortality, the categorical imperative, and rational thought. We are led by its current incarnation in human history. JRS
403 Boodin, J. E. The Ultimate Attributes of Reality. J Phil 4.1 1 (23 May 1907): 28 1-289. Pragmatism is too subjective. The attributes are "stuff, time, space and direction." JRS
404 Borrell, Philippe. La Notion de pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 11.6 (1 Dec 1907): 587-590. Borrell replies to Mentre, "Note sur la valuer pragmatique du pragmatisme" (457). LA: Notes See Mentre's reply, ''Compliment a la note sur la valeur pragmatique du pragmatisme," Rev de Phil 11.6 (1 Dec 1907): 591-594.
395 Beals, Charles Elmer. Pragmatism and Determinism. Department of
Philosophy Story Prize, Dartrnouth College, 1907. I'ragmatism. with absolutism, guards human teleology from scientific determinism. Pragmatism also defends human Srcedom by denying the Absolute. JRS
405 Bourdeau, Jean. Agnosticisme et pragmatisme. Revue Hebdomadaire & I Journal des Debats 14 (30 Aug 1907): 40 1-403; 14 (27 Sept 1907): 592-594. Keprinted in Pragmatisme et modernisme {629), pp. 49-65.
This article is an exposition of Spencer's agnosticism, including his background, a brief comparison of Kant and Spencer, and a discussion of science and religion. "The originality of Spencer's agnosticism is that it does not conclude with pure skepticism. The relativity of knowledge supposes the existence of something positive..." (p. 52) Science is relegated to the domain of the knowable, and religion to the domain of the unknowable. Bourdeau writes that the "agnostic and anti-rationalistic character of Spencer's philosophy opened the way to the American pragmatism of William James and the philosophy of Bergson." In part two the author focuses on the sense in which Spencer and pragmatism are connected, and the sense in which they are opposed. "Pragmatism is a philosophy of action, a philosophy that consists in proving our ideas by living them..." (p. 62) LF 406 Bourdeau, Jean. L'Illusion pragrnatiste. Revue Hebdomadake du Journal des Ddbats 15 (28 Feb 1907): 400-402. Reprinted in Prugmutisme et modernisme (6291, pp. 76-83. "Pragmatism," Bourdeau writes, "is at once an orientation and a theory of truth." (p. 76) It is in accord with rationalism on the point that truth is born out of the agreement of our ideas with reality. We can get to that reality only by a relative knowledge. Protagoras's aphorism "man is the measure of all things" serves as an epigraphy of pragmatism. There is discussion of meliorism, monism and pluralism. "By dint of our efforts and failures, we can ultimately succeed in saving the world, that is to say in changing it for the better. Is this not the illusion and the hypothesis which we need for daily life? Between the two extremes of...naturalism and absolute transcendentalism, pragmatism makes room for emotions as much as it does for ideas." (p. 81) LF 407 Bourdeau, Jean. Le Pragmatisme contre le rationalisme. Revue Hebdomadaire du Journal des Dtbats 15 (24 Jan 1907): 161- 163. Reprinted in Pragmatisme et modernisme {629), pp. 66-75. Bourdeau gives a short history of the rationalism and French intellectualism that dominated the 18th century, and the schools that have opposed it. "Pragmatism is a mediatory system that, like rationalism, purports to satisfy the religious intellect, and like empiricism, retains a most cordial intimacy with the facts..." (p. 73) "Pragmatism has nothing in common with eclecticism. It is not a system, but a method for resolving philosophical questions..." (ibid.) LF
408 Bourdeau, Jean. Une Sophistique du pragmatisme. Revue Hebdomadaire du Journal des DCbats 14 (8 Nov 1907): 880-882; 14 (22 Nov 1907): 975-977. Reprinted in Pragmatisme et modernisme (6291, pp. 84-1 0 1. Bourdeau discusses the work of Prezzolini, whose work "combats the intellectualist prejudice so widespread in France." (p. 101) Pragmatism is understood as a "philosophy without words, a philosophy of gestures and acts..." (p. 85) LF 409 Boutroux, mile. L 'Expkrience religieuse selon William James. Nimes: La Laborieuse, 1907. Of interest are his remarks on habits and James's pragmatic empiricism; "action that we perform is the only reality that we immediately apprehend." (p. xii, xivf)
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Thought is only a method for producing habits of action. According to Boutroux, James grapples with several of the great religious philosophical questions in an original and profound way. LF Notes First published as the introduction to L'fip'rience religielrre, the French translation of James's The Varieties of Religious Experience (90). 410 Bradley, F. H. On Truth and Copying. Mind n.s. 16.2 (April 1907): 165180. Reprinted in Essuys on T m h and Reality { l244), pp. 107- 126. Pragmatism separates truth from knowledge (pp. 167-168). James has abandoned placing the essence of truth in its practical results (p. 177). While truth must have practical effects, reality is not just its consequences, and satisfaction is never an indication of ultimate truth. James agrees that reality is comprised of finite mind, but should explain the "practical" side of mind, and the relationships between minds. JRS Summaries G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 665. Notes See Schiller's response, "Mr. Bradley's Theory of Truth" {486). 411 Brown, William Adams. The Pragmatic Value of the Absolute. J Phil 4.17 (15 Aug 1907): 459-464. James has admitted that the notion of the absolute satisfies some people by eliminating evil, but its greater force lies in stimulating action (similar to Puritanism). Why can't absolutism pass the pragmatic test? JRS Notes See James, "The Absolute and the Strenuous Life" (435). 412 Burckhardt, R. Biologie und Humanismus. Jena: Diedrichs, 1907. 413 Calderoni, Mario. La previsione nella teoria della conoscenza. I1 Rinnovamento (Milan) 1.2 (Feb 1907): 190-207. Reprinted in Scritfi di Mario Calderoni (17491, vol. 2, pp. 1-24. Translated as "La PrCvision dans la thCorie de la connaissance," Rev MCta 15.5 (Sept 1907): 559-576. 414 Calb, Giovanni. L'umanismo. La cultura filosofia 1 (1907): 38-44. 415 Castro, Matilde. The Respective Standpoinls of Psychology and Logic. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1907. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1913.
416 Cattell, James McKeen. Review of Leo Koenigsberger, Hermann von Helmholtz. J Phil 4.26 (19 Dec 1907): 715-717. In the concluding note, Cattell offers to the readers of The Journal ofPhilo~oplg:"a journal devoted largely to the exploitation and suppression of pragmatism," a quotation from I-Ielrnholtz on causation: "We must anticipate the consequences; then the consequences will be its confirmation." JRS
417 Cesca, Giovanni. Lajilosofia ciell' mione. Milan, Palermo, Naples: Biblioteca "Sandron" di Scienze e Lettere, 1907. Reviews A. W. Bern, Mind 18.1 (Jan 1909): 151-152; E. Ritchie, Int J Ethics 18.3 (April 1908):
423 Dewey, John. Reality and the Criterion for the Truth of Ideas. M ind n.s. 16.3 (July 1907): 3 17-342. Reprinted with "many changes" as "The Intellectualist Criterion for Truth" in The Inzuence of D m i n on Philosophy (7931, pp. 112-153. MW4: 50-75.
406. 418 Colvin, Stephen
Present-day idealism, exemplified by F. H. Bradley, defends an absolute reality of
S. The Ultimate Value of Experience. Psych Rev 14.4
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(July 1907): 254-263. Pragmatism, like hedonism, must offer an independent standard to judge satisfactions. Lacking this, experience cannot be systematized, and no objective truths exist. Since experience exhausts reality, this standard is within experience. JRS 419 Crespi, Angelo. 11 problema religiose nella luce del pragmatismo. Coenobium (July 1907). 420 Davies, Arthur. Ernest Imagination and Thought in Human Knowledge. J Phil 4.24 (2 1 Nov 1907): 645-655. The cognitive role of imagination has historically been ignored, save for Hume and the pragmatists (especially Dewey). JRS 421 Dewey, John. The Control of Ideas by Facts. J Phil 4.8 (I 1 April 1907): 197-203; 4.10 (9 May 1907): 253-259; 4.12 (6 June 1907): 309-3 19. Reprinted with revisions in Essays in Experimental Logic (13591, pp. 230-249. Dewey and His Critics, pp. 188-2 12. MW 4: 78-90. A poor theory of facts has led to epistemological dualism, common to both realism and idealism. This dualism makes knowledge impossible, but monism is not the remedy. The truth of ideas lies in their agreement with reality, but functionalism construes ideas as extended meanings given to present facts, and facts as present experiences selected to fit into ideas. An idea is a plan of action to a goal, and if the goal is so achieved, then the idea is verified. This process requires facts and ideas to be mutually adaptable, and relative to the specific problems that called for their development. JRS Summaries Robert Morris Ogden, Psych Bull 5.10 (15 Oct 1908): 336-337; C. H. Williams, Phil Rev 17.1 (Jan 1908): 104-105. 422 Dewey, John. Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer. Phil Rev 16.4 (July 1907): 41 9-422. Reprinted in MW4: 120-124. Dewey replies to McGilvary's "Pure Experience and Reality" (450). Things do exist when they are not being experienced, and they condition present experience. The denial that objects of thought exist prior to thought is designed to correct both empiricism (thought is only an organization of sensations) and idealism (thought is reality itself). Thought docs control objective situations, to the limited extent of reorganizing specific situations for successful action. This theory takes a "naturalistic. biological, and moral altitude." JKS Notes See McGilvary's reply, "l'ure Experience and Reality: A Reassertion" (45 1 j.
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fused "intellectual, affectional and volitional features" by curiously appealing only to the purely intellectual aspects of human experience. Bradley's theory of relational judgment confines all knowledge to appearance; a transcendent reality is then logically inferred! His devotion to formal logic has another source, driving an ontological argument for the absolute. Instead, let thought's standard be harmony, but find it in experience, growing as thought does its practical work. On truth itself, the intellectualists "describe so little in analytical detail" and c o n k three separate conceptions of truth. Why is "making truth" such a "blasphemy"? The "verification" is the process of idea development and testing, which is called "truth" when viewed as an accomplished product. The intellectualist only begs the question against pragmatism by declaring truths to exist before verification, since pragmatism instead treats all ideas as hypotheticals. Most truths cease to exist after they have solved minor difficulties and are forgotten. Others successfully operate in so many inquiries (for example, scientific hypotheses) that they get an "eternal" status as "proved ideas, but this special pragmatic status can only "indicate prospective modes of application which are indefinitely anticipated." The conclusion summarizes the pragmatic theory of intellect and truth. JRS Summaries Mary S. Case, Psych Bull 5.5 (15 May 1908): 166-167; G. Watts Cunningham, Phil Rev 17.1 (Jan 1908): 103-104. 424 Douthat, Robert William. Pragmatism: The Newest Philosophy. Morgantown, West Virginia: Robert W. Douthat, 1907. A thoroughly metaphysical and religious vision, offering a categorical explanation of "both the Physical and lntellectual Universe." That "working force, which we call Pragmatism, is now at work and has been since the dawn of creation in the production of Harmonious Relations in every part of the Universe of God." (p. 14) JRS 425 Duprat,
mile. L'attitude
pragmatiste. Coenobium 2.1 (Nov 1907): 13- 17.
426 Eisler, Rudolf. Einfiihrung in die Erkenntnistheorie: DarsteNung zind Kritik der erkenntnistheoretischen Richtungen. Leipzig: Johann Arnbrosius Barth, 1907. Reviews E. C. Wilm, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 657-659. There is only a limited recognition of pragmatism. JRS 427 Eucken, Rudolf. Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauug. Leip~ig: Veit, 1907. Translation by Alban G. Widgery as Life's Basis and Life's Idr.rrl (London: Adam and Charles Black, 19 1 1). Reviews of the translation Winifred tfyde, Phil Rev 22.1 (Jan 1913):74-80.
428 Farges, Albert. La Crise de la certitude: ~ t u d edes bases de la connaissance et de la croyance avec la critique du Nko-Kantisme, du Pragmatisme, du Newmanisme, etc. Paris: Berche et Tralin, 1907.2nd ed., 1908. Farges attempts to do for certainty what Aristotle did for physiology and anatomy (created a theory of movement and bequeathed it to the science of sciences: philosophy). "After having observed, thought, reasoned, and more than once attained certainty, it remains only to reflect on our observations, our thoughts, our reasonings; to show not only that certainty is attainable, but also why and how it is[:] in a word, to construct a critical theory of knowledge and belief" (p. 18) Part of this project involves a critique of pragmatism (pp. 57-69 esp.), including the voluntarism of Renouvier and psychological pragmatism. According to Farges, the pragmatist's effort to achieve a pure subjectivism leads to its defeat, for "the only logical conclusion one can draw from the fact of action...is to admit and recognize the power of the mind to apprehend real objects, since it is the mind that shows them to the will, and the will that controls their reality." (p. 62) The two powers of the mind, intelligence and the will, are equally effective and objective in the pragmatist's "lame system." Discussion of "moral dogmatism" follows, along with a section about the role of the will and instinct, and the attempt to collapse the distinction between the true and the useful. LF 429 Foster, George Burman. Pragmatism and Knowledge. American Journal of Theology 11.4 (Oct 1907): 591-596. Religion's symbols have lost cognitive function and any claim to truth, but pragmatism has similarly altered science's facts and laws. Pragmatism is doctrinally nominalistic but faithfully realistic. The cognitive function cannot be discarded, since either science cannot make predictions (which is obviously not the case), or science does gain knowledge. Besides, action is not science's exclusive goal, and scientists do not freely create scientific facts. JRS Notes Foster authored The Finality of the Christian Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906). 430 Fullerton, George Stuart. The Right to Believe at One's Own Risk. Phil Rev 16.4 (July 1907): 408-4 18. Fullerton reflects on the freedom to act, stimulated by James's "right to believe." JRS 431 Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. Le Dieu fini du pragmatisme. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et ThCologiques 1.2 (April 1907). 432 Hodges, George. William James: Leader in Philosophical Thought. Outlook 85 (23 Feb 1907): 448-45 1. Ilodges surveys James's thought, emphasizing his empiricism and open-mindedness. James is one of the most religious of philosophers. IKS 433 Inge, Willian~R. Personal Idealism and Mysticism. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907.
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434 Jacks, Lawrence P. The Universe as Philosopher. Hibbert Journal 6.1 (Oct 1907): 18-36. Reprinted in hi The Alchemy of ?%ought(New York: Henry Holt, 191l), pp. 79-105. Philosophers, including pragmatists, forget their position in the world when they try to survey the whole. Such speculations "appear to 'work' only so long as they and their authors are...in two absolutely separate and unrelated worlds." JRS Summaries Edmund H. Hollands, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 568-569. Reviews of llhe Alchemy of Thought "K," Monist 24.1 (Jan 1914): 158-160, S. H. Mellone, Hibbert Journal 9.2 (Jan 1911): 42743 1. 435 James, William. The Absolute and the Strenuous Life. J Phi1 4.20 (26 Sept 1907): 546-548. Reprinted in The Meaning of Truth {672), pp. 226-229. Works MT,pp. 123-125. James replies to W. A. Brown's "The Pragmatic Value of the Absolute" (41 1). In response to James's claim that the hypothesis of the absolute allows for moral holidays, Brown shows that it also permits a life of effort and striving. This must be admitted, because the absolute can be used to justify any form of life. Pragmatism or pluralism, on the other hand, because for it the world is unfinished, demands ultimate hardihood, a willingness to live without assurances. Absolutism offers consolation to sick souls, something which pluralism cannot do. IKS 436 James, William. A Defense of Pragmatism. Popular Science Monthly 70.3 (March 1907): 193-206; 70.4 (April 1907): 351-365. Part one, "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy," was also published as Lecture 1 of Pragmatism (4381, pp. 3-40 and reprinted in Works Prag pp. 9-26. Part two, "What Pragmatism Means," was also published as Lecture 2 of Pragmatism (4381, pp. 43-81, and reprinted in Works Prag pp. 27-44. Notes For annotation see Pragmatism. 437 James, William. The Energies of Men. Phil Rev 16.1 (Jan 1907): 1-20. Also published in Science n.s. 25 (1 March 1907): 321-332. Memories arld Studies (9571, pp. 229-264. Writings 2, pp. 1223-1241. Works ERM, pp. 129146. This essay was also published with omissions and additions as "The Powers of Men," American Magazine 65 (Nov 1907): 57-65 [Works ERM, pp. 147-1611. The difference between structural and functional psychology can be understood as the difference between the analytical and the clinical points of view. The two are not contradictory. However, the clinical picture, such as that of Pierre Janet, is more COPCrete and of greater practical importance. One of its concepts is that of the "amount" of available energy. We have much more of it than appears on the surface, because of the inhibiting effects of some ideas upon others. We have reservoirs of energy that can be tapped, for wars and other excitements. Through ascetic practice such as Yoga trainin?. we can deveiop abiiities to tap into these reservoirs at will. IKS
Reviews William I. Thomas, J Phil 4.10 (9 May 1907): 268-271. James suggests that we can remain in equilibrium while living at a much faster pace. He discloses the technique of Yoga and "its patent bearing on educational theory." IKS
438 James, William. Pragmatism: A New Namefor Some Old Ways of minking. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907. Translated into German by Wilhelm Jerusalem as Pragmatkmus (Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt, 1908). Translated into French by E. Le Brun as Le Pragmatisme (Paris: Flamrnarion, 191l), with Bergson's introduction (907). Translated into Italian as Saggi pragmatkti, with an introduction by Giovanni Papini (Lanciano: R Carabba, 1911). Reprinted in WJ Writings 2, pp. 479-624. The Works of William James: Pragmatism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). Philosophical differences reflect differences in temperament between the toughminded (empiricist) and the tender-minded (rationalist and religious). Pragmatism is religious while remaining intimate with facts. It was proposed in the 1870s by C. S. Peirce as a method of settling intellectual disputes: to attain perfect clearness in our thought of an object we must consider what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we are to prepare. The conception of the effects is our sole conception of the object. The principle remained unnoticed until 1898 when James stated it in his "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" (131, but the method is not new and was used by Aristotle and many British philosophers. It is an anti-intellectualist attitude, a turning away from origins, abstractions, and fixed systems towards consequences, concreteness, and action. Pragmatism has also become a theory of truth. Theories are instruments, and scientific laws are no longer viewed as representing the eternal workings of the universe but as useful approximations, a conceptual shorthand. Reflecting this revision of scientific logic, F. C. S. Schiller declared that truth is what works, while John Dewey developed instrumentalism. Noting that new ideas are assimilated so as to least disturb old beliefs, they argue that true ideas are those which help us get into satisfactory relations with other parts of experience. English philosophers have used the pragmatic method to demolish scholastic conceptions of matter and spiritual substance. They reduced "soul" to the experienceable fact that all experiences belong to personal histories. Pragmatism shows that the conflict between materialism and theicm is in part a conflict of aesthetic preferences. Theists regard matter as gross, but science has shown it to be active and subtle. It makes no difference whether we think of the world as run by the lower (matter) or by the higher (spirit): it is for ever what it is. According to materialism, all human artifacts will disappear, while the designer offered by theism holds out the promise of a permanently preserved moral order. The pragmatic meaning of free will lies in the possibility of novelty and the promise of something better. In respect of the ancient problem of the one and the many, that most pregnant of philosophical differences between monism and pluralism, the method shows the world to be one in the sense of namable by one name and in the sense of being in one time and space. When we consider causal lines of influence we find niany unifying chains and also many separations. For monists all things have unity of origin, while pluralists find many units with no common origin. In \iew of the existence of evil, it is dogmatism to assert that the universe enjoys a single unity of purpose. With respect to aesthetic union, the pluralistic view that reality
contains many stories which do not form a single meaningful whole is more natural. While the absolute knower of idealism is a useful belief allowing us to take moral holidays, logical proofs in its favor fail and it must be treated as a hypothesis, along with the pluralistic hypothesis that there is no single point of view from which the universe can be understood. Perhaps some parts of reality are connected by nothing stronger than the copula "and." Pragmatism favors neither absolute monism nor absolute pluralism, but asserts there to be neither more nor less unity than we can make out in the concrete. It also recognizes that human energy is making the world more unified. The pragmatic view that our theories are only instruments is supported by the existence of unadjudicable conflicts between various levels of thinking. The categories of common sense discovered by ancient geniuses and turned into a system by scholasticism still stand for many purposes. However, science has developed the corpuscular view, which has led to astonishing inventions, and the critical or idealistic philosophy has produced systems yielding great intellectual satisfactions. The pragmatic view of truth is attacked as absurd, but when compared with the intellectualist view, it is the more reflective and analytic philosophy. Both begin with the dictionary notion of truth as agreement, as a kind of copying, but what is agreement and what is to be done with ideas which in no definite sense are copies of reality? Pragmatists insist that truth is not a stagnant property of ideas but is something made by events, by processes of assimilation, validation, and verification. True ideas are valuable instruments of action in dealing with often harmful realities. Pragmatism generalizes and thinks of truth as "a leading that is worth while" from one experience to another. Such leadings are not always carried out because truth lives on a system of credit where verifiability is enough. Absolute truth obtains only among relations between purely mental ideas. Schiller has proposed "humanism" as the name of the view that all formulas have a human twist. He conceives reality as something plastic and still in the making. His humanism sharpens the alternative between humanism and rationalism by questioning the structure of the universe. Humanism thinks of it pluralistically, as unfinished and growing. Rationalists think of it monistically, as having many editions, only one of which is real. In this luxury edition all finite imperfections are overcome. This optimistic view appeals to the tender-minded and suits the idea of religion as self-surrender. For optimistic monists, the universe needs even my "sick soul and heart." The pragmatist cannot rule out this view because questions are decided by faith and not logic; still, James himself prefers a more dangerous and dramatic world, uncertain of salvation, with the outcome depending in part on human action. Such meliorism bests fits the pragmatic attitude, standing as it does between crude naturalism and religious idealism. His view is not atheistic; he believes that human experience is not the highest thing in the universe. IKS Extended reviews G. E. Moore (575); Bertrand Russell (592). Reviews Henry M. Alden, "Editor's Study," Harper's Monthly Magazine 115.4 (Sept 1907): 645-648. Philosophy has been more tolerant of generalities than science, but now science has forced its hand. James brings philosophy from "her aerial heights to the ground." IKS James R. Angell, Int J Ethics 18.2 (Jan 1908): 226-235. Pragmatism has aroused much controversy. With age, it promises to become one of the "real progressive factors" in the history of thought. James does not pay enough attention to the stubbornness of realit). lo
438 (cont.) which our truths must conform. James also tends to slur over the social aspects of establishing truths. IKS Anon, "Comments on Pragmatism," Expository Times 19 (Oct 1907): 1-3. Afbhis classification of temperaments, we expect a treatise on philosophical predestination. Instead, James insists that in philosophy we are free to come and go as we please. IKS Anon, "The Fascinations of the Pragmatic Method," Current Literature 43.2 (Aug 1907): 182-186. Pragmatism is "in the air" and can be found in many writers who themselves may be unaware of it. James is perhaps its ablest exponent. IKS Anon, "A New Philosophy," Harper's Weekly 51 (3 1 Aug 1907): 1264. James is the "high priest" of a new philosophy and provides "racy reading for the common man." IKS Anon, "A Practical Philosopher," Literary Digest 34.15 (13 April 1907): 584. The reviewer gives two quotations illustrating the pragmatic method. JRS Anon, "Oficial Pragmatism," Nation 85.3 (18 July 1907): 57-58. This philosophy of the "average man" must turn to intellectualism to solve the problem of how expediency can determine truth. Its error "lies in a kind of intellectual laziness or shiftlessness, a desire to shuffle off the responsibility of the mind." JRS Anon, "Pragmatism," Independent 63.1 1 (12 Sept 1907): 630-631. Pragmatism is a unifLing point for different fields. Many find that they have been pragmatists all along. James left his Harvard chair to appeal to wider audiences, showing his "faith in pragmatism as a philosophy for the people." IKS Anon, "Pragmatism," Spectator 99.1 (6 July 1907): 9- 1 1. With a reputation as a psychologist and defender of religious belief, James "in what many think was an evil day" turned his attention to metaphysics. Pragmatism contains a bold creed. James's style, often brilliant, is at times obscure. James insists on the practical value of truth. But how many theories lead to no direct application and yet help us to understand experience? IKS Anon, "Pragmatism, the Newest Philosophy," Current Literature 42.6 (June 1907): 652-653. James is "prophet-in-chief' of pragmatism in America and gave up his professorship to devote himself to its propaganda The body of the article consists of quotations from Slosson's review (below). IKS Anon, "The Pragmatist Microbe," Current Literature 43.4 (Oct 1907): 4 18-420. Surveys remarks on Pragmatism with many quotations and an emphasis on criticism. IKS Anon, "Professor James's 'Pragmatism'," Harvard Illustrated Magazine 16 (Sept 1907): 20-25. Everyone should read this book; it is bound to arouse much controversy. At present, philosophers say it is not philosophy, psychologists say it is not psychology, and theologians say it is not theology. IKS Charles M. Bakewell, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 624-634. James's depiction of the "intellectualists" is a caricature of their views. Philosophical problems are ignored and not solved. James gives unobjectionable advice to be cautious and patient, but does not give a method. Like positivists, James seeks to turn philosophy into a science, but one with more scope than the other sciences. IKS Giinther Jacoby, Kant-Studien 13.4 (28 Dec 1908): 478-480. This long awaited work is a disappointment because it does not make clear the basis of James's thought. James's conclusions are not based upon scientific investigation, but upon his preferences. IKS Charles fl. Judd, Psych Bull 5.5 (15 May 1908): 157-162. A psychologist can review this book since pragmatists approach their problems from a psychological point of view. The distinction between the tough-minded and the tender-minded is psychological and
shows that philosophical disputes are a clash of temperaments. Pragmatism risks subjectivism. In spite of James's claims, it is hard to distinguish pragmatism from his other philosophy. IKS John M. E. McTagga Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 104-109. Pragmatism is said to look away from "principles" and "necessities" and turn towards "consequences." But all philosophers consider consequences, while James uses principles and asserts necessities. James's exposition of a theory of truth, while "picturesque," is not "lucid." IKS Max Meyer, Zeit fllr Psych 48 (1908): 279-280. The term pragmatism is not known in Germany, but the idea is. It can be found in Avenarius, Mach, and G. Heymans. IKS Wilhelm Ostwald. Annalen der Naturphilosophie 7 (1908): 510-512. James's lectures are popular and filled with humor. Ernst Mach has recently presented similar views. IKS I. Woodbridge Riley, Bookman 26.1 (Oct 1907): 215-2 17. Pragmatism "rids one of Puritanism" and sets us "if not on the road to perfectibility, at least into the fiesh fields of independent action." James's meliorism is a reversion to religious mysticism. JRS F. C. S. Schiller, Mind n.s. 16.4 (Oct 1907): 598-604. Novel are James's recognition that correspondence within experienck is acceptable to pragmatism and his discussion of potential truth. We also receive new hints about James's metaphysics. James's description of pragmatism as anarchic is misleading. That each man ought to interpret his own experience is only a long overdue recognition of "human freedom and responsibility." IKS Carolyn Shipman, North American Review 185.8 (16 Aug 1907): 884-888. Pragmatism is "infinitely superior to either rationalism or materialism." JRS Paul Shorey, "The Equivocations of Pragmatism," Dial 43.9 (1 Nov 1907): 273-275. James does not satisfy his own insistence on clear definition and consistency. Pragmatism stands condemned by deriding the "precious gitt" of the "dry light of the intellect." JRS Edwin Emery Slosson, "Pragmatism," Independent 62.8 (21 Feb 1907): 422-425. Pragmatism is not yet a school but a focus of converging lines of thought. This new humanism does not originate in the humanities but is the "gift of rnodern.science." The fact that both James and Schiller engage in psychical research is giving rise to the fear that pragmatism will bring with it "Mrs. Piper" and "the whole host of devils." IKS ''Student," "Pragmatism." Century Path 10 (14 July 1907): 4. Pragmatism is a "new darkness." It begins by ruling out the soul and ends with "eat, drink, and be merry; for tomorrow we die." A pragmatist sets aside controversies over materialism and idealism. But two men, alike except one is a spiritualist and the other a materialist, would in a few years differ greatly: one will be "fine" and the other "gross." IKS "Student," "Pragmatism and Chaos," Century Path 10 (3 November 1907): 4. Materialism has receded, leaving a "lot of seaweed" with the "well-sounding name of Pragmatism." For it, there is no universe with its laws, "except what I think there is." IKS Giovanni Vailati, Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 3 (July-Aug 1907): 284-286 [Scrim {1018), pp. 791-7931. This brief review is replete with quotations from James. Vailati concludes the review with a brief criticism of James's willingness to speak of the will to believe as a "right" to believe. EPC Robert M. Wenley, Scicnce n.s. 26 (1 1 Oct 1907): 464-468. Pragmatism is only thc raw material for a philosophy and one hopes that James and his allies will actually state one. It represents a "Protestant attitude" towards orthodox university philosophy. but the work "fails to rise to the level of its author's reputation" and contains "cheap stuff." IKS P. E. Winter, Amer J Psych 18.4 (Oct 1907): 524. The "confusion of truth with the knowledge of truth" is not cleared up. JRS
Reviews of the German translation Hennann Lange, Zeitschrifi ftir Philosophie und Padagogik 16 (1909): 155-158. It is desirable that James's work have an influence in Germany like it has had elsewhere. His method needs elaboration. IKS Otto Neurath, Der Kunstwart 23 (Oct 1909): 138-141. The basis of pragmatism is the view that theories test themselves in practice. Jerusalem is the major representative of this view in Germany. IKS Reviews of the French translation Francois Pillon, L'Ann6e Philosophique 22 (191 1): 213-214. The traditional conception considers truth after it has been established, while pragmatism deals with it before verification. It is difficult to see how James deals adequately with all kinds of truths. IKS Maurice Serol, Rev de Phil 20.1 (1 Jan 1912): 94-97. A sense for the concrete may suffice for experimental psychology, but it does not go far in philosophy. James's radical empiricism is sterile. IKS Notes See "The Alleged 'Decay of Responsibility' in America" (503). 439 James, William. Pragmatism's Conception of Truth. J Phil 4.6 (14 March 1907): 141- 155. Also published as Lecture 6 of Pragmatism (4381, pp. 197-236. Writings of WJ, pp. 429-443. Works Prag, pp. 95- 114. Notes For annotation see Pragmatism. 440 James, William. Professor Pratt on Truth. J Phil 4.17 (15 Aug 1907): 464467. Reprinted in The Meaning of Truth (6721, pp. 162- 179. Works MT,pp. 9098. James replies to J. B. Pratt's "Truth and Its Verification" (477). The views which Pratt attributes to pragmatists are asinine. In fact, for pragmatists an idea is true or false only when it refers to an object. Otherwise, it is simply non-cognitive or irrelevant. Truth is a relation constituted by a Tundamenturn ofcircumstance" which can be traversed at length or short-circuited as needed. Where this fundamentum exists. the idea both is true and has been true of its object. For Pratt, the fundamentum is likely only a test of truth, while truth is defined as copying. However, few of our abstract ideas resemble objects. Pratt thinks of James as a modified pragmatist, and of Schiller and Dewey as radical. But in fact, all three agree. IKS 441 James, William. A Reply to Mr. Pitkin. J Phil 4.4 (14 Feb 1907): 105-106. Appended to "Mr. Pitkin's Refutation of 'Radical Empiricism"' (3301, for reprinting under that title in Essays in Radical Empiricism {1078), pp. 241-243. Works ERE, pp. 125. James replies to W. B. Pitkin's "In Reply to Professor James" (475). Pitkin's reply is perplexing because of his obscurity of style, a characteristic of many of the younger philosophers. James agrees that many things are experienced as "that which they are not." While experience cannot preclude the possibility of something not experienced or of action of cxpcrience upon noumena, in philosophy it is wisest to remain with the experienceab!e. IKS
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442 James, William. A Word More About Truth. J Phil 4.15 (18 July 1907): 396-406. Reprinted in The Meaning of Truth (6721, pp. 136-161. Works MT,pp. 78-89. James will try once again to give an exposition of pragmatism, a view he first stated in 1885 in "The Function of Cognition." Knowledge is an ambulatory relation and is "made" by the ambulation from an idea to the vicinity of its object, both of which meanwhile are parts of reality. It is a saltatory relation only when taken abstractly. Such abstractions can be useful as long as in their name concrete reality is not denied. Pragmatists are erroneously accused of confusing logic with psychology, but they only claim that truth conceived logically is a "saltatory abstraction" in need of "ambulatory concreteness." Critics dwell on the supposed subjectiveness of "satisfactoriness" and of "the will to believe." However, should such critics state exactly what they mean by objective truth, such truth would still fall within the field of pragmatic analysis. IKS 443 James, William a n d J o h n E. Russell. Controversy About Truth. J Phil 4.11 (23 May 1907): 289-296. Reprinted in Collected Essays and Reviews (15791, pp. 470-483. Works ERE, pp. 145-153. Letters between James and John Russell on truth reveal that at the heart of the controversy lies Russell's claim that verification does not make an idea true but only proves that it was true. James agrees that before verification a true idea was true in the sense of being verifiable but demands that Russell define "was true." James claims that no definition is possible without terms such as leading, guiding, "getting there." Russell responds that truth is "agreement," which cannot be further defined. IKS 444 HoernlC, R. F. Alfred. Image, Idea, and Meaning. Mind n.s. 16.1 (Jan 1907): 70- 100. 445 Kaltenborn, Hans von. William James at Harvard. Harvard Illustrated Magazine 8 (Feb 1907): 93-95. Contains anecdotes about James's last class and his examination for the degree of M.D., written to mark James's retirement. IKS 446 Labeyrie. R61e de la volontk dans la connaissance-Pragmatisme et humanisme. Revue des Sciences EcclCsiastiques (April-May 1907). 447 Lalande, Andre. La Mouvement logique. Rev Phil 63.3 (March 1907): 256-288. Notes Sce also Louis Couturat, "La Logique et la philosophie contemporaine," Rev
[email protected] (May 1 906): 3 19-341.
448 Levi, Allesandro. I1 prammatistno religiose. La cultura filosofia 1 (1907): 305-3 10. 449 L!nyd, Alfred H. Some !inportmi Situations and their Attitudes. Psych Rev 14.1 (Jan 1907): 37-53.
Lloyd discusses the moral, artistic, practical, and natural types of situations. Each is dependent on the next, with the spiritual attitude taken in natural situations of fundamental importance. The pragmatiddogmaticdistinction arises relative to situations. JRS
454 Mackenzie, John Stuart. Lectures on Humanism with Special Refrence to Its Bearings on Sociology. London: Swan, Sonnenschein and Co.; New York: Macmillan, 1907.Reprinted, New York: Burt Franklin, 1971.
450 McGilvary, Evander B. Pure Experience and Reality. Phil Rev 16.3 (May 1907): 266-284.Reprinted in MW4: 295-313.
An exposition of humanism, in a wider sense than pragmatism offers. If pragmatism ignores the universal principles guiding individual choice, or the objective conditions that determine life, then it lands us in "absolute scepticism." @. 194) JRS
James accepts the existence of reality beyond experience, but Dewey holds that "the pre-experiential something is not to be considered completely real." His position that known objects have reality only through present experience mistakenly identifies "making real" with "recognizing as real," and makes knowledge of the past impossible. The object is independent of the reflective process, unless the pragmatist holds that the "mighty thought" of Copernicus really altered the earth's position. Some of our knowledge is representative, some mental images refer to things never experienced, and truth is correspondence with reality. Jm Summaries Helen G. Hood,Psych Bull 5.7 (15 July 1908): 239-240. Notes See Dewey's reply, "Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer" (422).
451 McCilvary, Evander B. Pure Experience and Reality: A Reassertion. Phil Rev 16.4(July 1907): 422-424. McGilvary replies to Dewey's "Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer" {422), stating that his article contains no misconceptions. It described his experience of Dewey's logical philosophy, and (since reality is what it is experienced as) hence must be the truth. Dewey's past realities "have a way of now undergoing past changes every time they are differently experienced." JRS
452 McCilvary, Evander B. Realism and the Physical World. J Phil 4.25 (5 Dec 1907): 683-692. Non-realists have argued that since objects change in our experience they cannot be objectively real. Realists counter by distinguishing objects' real and subjective qualities. This distinction is not in immediate experience. The conviction that objects persist before and after experience is supported by others' testimony, the test of coherence, and further pragmatic criteria. A pragmatically realistic theory of knowledge is thus possible. JRS Summaries C. H. Williams, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 567-568.
453 McCilvary, Evander B. The Stream of Consciousness. J Phil 4.9(25 April 1907):225-235.Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 152-163. Consciousness is a continual stream, not a succession of pulses of thought or little egos. James errs in Principles oJPsychologv (1890) because he attributes to the ego the discreteness found in the objects of thought. "Feelings of transition" and the "quality of warmth and intimacy" try to restore unity, but they work as badly as Hume's association. IKS Summaries Roheri hlorris Ogden. I'sych I3ull 5.10 (, 15 Oct 1908): 333-334.
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455 Mead, G. H. Concerning Animal Perception. Psych Rev 3 (1907): 383390.Reprinted in Selected Writings,pp. 73-81. 456 Mead, G. H. Review of Henri Bergson, L '~volution crkatrice. Psych Bull 4.12 (15Dec 1907): 379-384. Why has Bergson not recognized the "creative power of consciousness?" JRS I
Notes L 'kvolutioncriatrice (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907).
457 Mentrk, Franqoise. Note sur la valeur pragmatique du pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 1 1.1 (1 July 1907): 5-22. Reviews
F.D. Mitchell, Phil Rev 16.6 (Nov 1907): 666-667. Notes See Borrell's response, "La Notion de pragmatisme" (404).
458 Mitchell, William. Structure and Growth of the Mind. London, Macmillan, 1907. Reviews R. F. Alfred Hoemlt, Mind 18.2 (April 1909): 255-264. With regard to truth Mitchell is a pragmatist, but he does not discuss this position's controversial aspects. JRS
459 Moore, A. W. Experience, Habit and Attention. Psych Rev 14.5 (Sept 1907): 292-297.Reprinted as "The Social Character of Habit and Attention" in Pragmatism and Its Critics 18601,pp. 245-256. Moore replies to Baldwin's "Thought and Things" (393). JRS Notes See Baldwin, "Comment on Professor Moore's Paper," Psych Rev 14.5 (Sept 1907): 297298.
460 Moore, A. W. Professor Perry on Pragmatism. J Phil 4.21 (10 Oct 1907): 567-577.Reprinted with revisions in Pragmatism and Its Critics (8601,pp. 195219. Moore responds to R. B. Perry's "A Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization" (472) and "A Review of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge" (473). Perry separates cognitive interest from ideas, and the subject from objects. f3e is not free from correspondence assumptions, and his criticisms rely on obscurities. Pragmatism only asserts that knowiedge re-makes the world. JRS
461 Mlinsterberg, Hugo. Professor James as a Psychologist. Harvard Illustrated Magazine 7 (8 Feb 1907): 97-98. Reprinted in William James Remembered, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 106-1 10. Written to mark James's retirement. James's basic method is "selfsbservation." He is more of a descriptive than explanatory psychologist. IKS 462 Neilson, William Allan. William James as Lecturer and Writer. Harvard Illustrated Magazine 8 (Feb 1907): 98-99. Occasioned by James's retirement. James is concerned with thought, not form. Harvard English professors were envious of the writing ability of the philosophers. IKS
463 Nichols, Herbert. Pragmatism Versus Science. J Phil 4.5 (28 Feb 1907): 122-131. James is willing to infer other minds, but he reduces physical objects to experiences. Science distinguishes objects from perceptions of them. James has no reason to reject the hypothesis that reality is one complex mind; science only has good reason to accept it. JRS 464 NoEI, Leon. Bulletin d'6pistCrnologie: Le Pragrnatisme. Revue NCo-Scolastique 14.2 (May 1907): 220-243. French publications have shown a growing interest in the new philosophical views of England and America. Of the "Anglo-French" philosophy, and the hearty understanding of recent years, Noel writes: "it is at least permissible to declare that ...if the Anglo-Saxons prove themselves sympathetic, it is France who frets and fumes." (p. 221) After a discussion of the pragmatisms of Peirce, James, Schiller, and Dewey, the author covers the work of the chef of Italian pragmatism, Papini, and of the French pragmatists Le Roy and Blondel. LF 465 O'Donnell, M. J. Faith and Will. Irish Theological Review (Jan 1907). 466 Paetz, W. Die erkennmis-theoretischen Grundlagen von William James "The Varieties of Religious Experience. " Eilenburg: Ewald Lesske, 1907. Paetz quotes fiom Varieiies (901, focusing on the problem of knowledge. He examines James's claim that the scicncc of religion can be givcn an exact basis. 1KS 467 Papini, Ciovanni. I1 tragic0 quotidiano. Florence: Libreria della Voce, 1907.2nd ed., 1913.4th ed., Florence: Vallecchi, 1920.5th ed., 1927. Reviews I. Woodbridge Riley, Nation 85.23 (5 Dec 1907): 521. 468 Papini, Ciovanni. lntroduzione al pragrnatisrno. Leonardo 5.1 (Feb 1907): 26-37. Reprinted in Sul pragmatismo (1202). Tulte le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 55-66. "Whoever would state in few words a definition of pragmatism would be doing something more anti-pragmatic than it is possible to imagine." With these words,
Papini begins the essay whose title promises so much. Pragmatism is far too rich a philosophical movement to be captured so easily in a single sentence. Part of the difficulty also lies in the fact that pragmatism is not a philosophy in the sense of a mechanism for building a metaphysical system. Rather, it is a means for relying less upon philosophy in this system-building sense, considering that such metaphysical activity is bound to collapse into confusion. Papini goes on to discuss the relationship between pragmatism and positivism. From the beginning of honardo, both Papini and Prezzolini had declared war on Italian positivism precisely because it accepted the world as it is, while they wanted to remake the world after the pattern supplied by the will residing in the deeper-lying self. Pragmatism shares positivism's distaste for empty, metaphysical phrases, but pragmatism proves to be a much more effective lever to action since it has less loyalty to the world as it is. EPC Reviews Wendell T. Bush, J Phil 4.23 (7 Nov 1907): 639-641. How does a pragmatist distinguish genuine from real problems? JRS 469 Papini, Giovanni. Non bisogna esser rnonisti. In Ricerche dipsichiatria
e neurologia, antropologia e jilosofa dedicata a1 prof: Enrico Morselli nel25 anno del suo insegnamento universitario (Milan: Dottor F. Vallardi, 1907), pp. 685-696. Reprinted in Sul Pragmatismo (1202). Tutte le opere (Florence: Vallecchi, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 73-87. A cautionary essay against the tendency to reduce all reality to some fundamental metaphysical unity. Papini attacks what he calls "monistic" philosophy, then propounded with vigor in Italy by Enrico Morselli. During his pragmatic period, Papini was a committed pluralist, and this essay is perhaps the most sustained discussion he provides for this position. EPC 470 Papini, Giovanni. What Pragmatism is Like. Translated by Katharine Royce. Popular Science Monthly 71.10 (Oct 1907): 35 1-358. 471 Perry, Ralph B. Professor James as a Philosopher. Harvard Illustrated Magazine 7 (Feb 1907): 96-97. Reprinted in William James Remembered, ed. Linda Simon (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. I 19-203. Occasioned by Jancs's rctiremcnt. J;unes dislikes sharp distinchxi and linds "hod" for both psychology and philosophy in an event. lie is in the tradition of British empiricism. Even his "nearest disciples" would not claim that his right hand always knows what his left is doing. IKS 472 Perry, Ralph B. A Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization. J Phil 4.16 (1 Aug 1907): 42 1-428. Though truth has practical corollaries, they must remain distinct. Clearness is not gained by restricting the meaning of concepts to their practical implications. Satisfaction lies in accommodating ourselves to reality, not the reverse. Knowledge cannot have an> affect on reality. If pragmatism would be a truly empirical philosophy, it can only lead to subjective skepticism. If pragmatism would be a relativism, it can only lead to t r a n ~ r n dental idealism. JRS
473 Perry, Ralph B. A Review of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge. J Phil 4.14 (4 July 1907): 365-374. Reprinted in Dewey and His Critics, pp. 213222. The locus of pragmatism is the "experience of arriving at belief." True knowledge somehow lies at its conclusion, when the "cognitive structure" collapses back into immediate experience. How can knowledge be relative to intention unless the content intended is already known? While true knowledge is sought and found in one "selfsufficient process," any theory of it must include the known object; because "it is truth it must envisage reality." In these criticisms, there has been no resort made to "a general and vague insistence that true knowledge must 'correspond' to its object." JRS
479 Prezzolini, Giuseppe. N sarto spirituale. Florence: Biblioteca del Leon a r d ~ F. , Lumachi Libraio Editore, 1907.
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474 Pillsbury, Walter B. An Attempt to Harmonize the Current Psychological Theories of Judgment. Psych Bull 4.8 (15 Aug 1907): 237-242. Dewey's theory of judgment generally agrees with four other recent theories. JRS 475 Pitkin, Walter B. In Reply to Professor James. J Phil 4.2 (17 Jan 1907): 44-45. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 150-15 1. Pitkin replies to James's "Mr. Pitkin's Refitation of 'Radical Empiricism"' (330). The "common-sense realism" of some passages in the radical empiricism essays cannot be reconciled with the idealism of other passages. IKS Notes See James's reply, "A Reply to Professor Pitkin" (441 ). 476 Porret, J. Alfred. Au sujet de la conversion: remarques sur la the'orie e'misepar M. William James, dans son livre "L'Expe'riencereligieuse." Geneva: H . Robet, 1907. Porret discusses conversion as described in the Varieties (90). James thinks it only possible that conversion involves divine intervention, but certain facts cannot be explained without God and intervention is necessary. 1KS 477 Pratt, J a m e s B. Truth and Its Verification. J Phil 4.12 (6 June 1907): 320324. Reprinted in William James's Pragmatism in Focus, ed. Doris Olin (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 156-160. It is "non-pragmatic" to define truth in terms of verifiability since verifiability is not something found in an individual's experience, but is a "general condition" which "transcends every single finite experience." IKS Notes See James's response, "Professor Pratt on Truth" (440).
478 Prezzolini, Giuseppi. L'arre di persuadere. Florence: Biblioteca del Leonardo, volume settimo, Francesco Lumachi Editore, 1907.2nd ed., Naples: Liguori, 199 1. Extended reviews Giovanni Vailati (497) Reviews Anon, Rev de Phii 7 ( 1 907): 296.
480 Rogers, A r t h u r K. The Religious Conception of the World. New York: Macmillan, 1907. On pp. 19-27 Rogers argues that pragmatism's reduction of knowledge to human experience escapes solipsism only if it takes experience to be inherently social. Rationality requires feeling and will, since it is "the impulse to harmonize our experience." @. 71) Freedom lies in the individual's acts, as determined by character. James's indeterminism is unnecessary, since the truth of determinism is compatible with the practical human ignorance of outcomes. @. 225) JRS Reviews George Galloway, Hibbert Journal 6.2 (Jan 1908): 442-446; H. W. Wright, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 555-557.
481 Russell, J o h n E. Pragmatism as the Salvation fiom Philosophic Doubt. J Phil 4.3 (31 Jan 1907): 57-64. For pragmatism to persuade non-pragmatists, some non-pragmatic justification is necessary. Pragmatism cannot account for others' experiences, and must consider truth as agreement with reality. JRS Summaries Mattie Alexander Martin, Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 567-568. Notes See F. C. S. Schiller's response, "The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt" (488).
482 Russell, J o h n E. A Reply to Dr. Schiller. J Phil 4.9 (25 April 1907): 238243. Russell replies to Schiller's "A Pragmatic Babe in the Wood" (487) and "The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt" (488). On Schiller's definition of "lost," an injured traveler who had a map would be lost. The truth of a doctrine is one thing, and what produces certainty in that doctrine another. Schiller's prescription is like the command to experience being cured, and if a satisfying experience follows, that experience is called the medicine that cures. Pragmatism does not deal with reason or logic, anymore than mysticism. JRS Notes See Schiller's reply, "Pragmatism versus Skepticism," J Phil 4.18 (29 Aug 1907): 482487; Russell's "A Last Word to Dr. Schiller," ibid. pp. 487-490; and Schiller's reply. "Ultima Ratio?'ibid. pp. 490-494. 483 Sabine, George H. The Concreteness of Thought. Phil Rev 16.2 (March 1907): 154-169. Reality consists of partially organized experience, and thought implies the Absolute. Functionalists and instrumentalistsrely on "givens" of pure experience which cannot possibly exist, hence forbidding any pre-reflective/reflective distinction. JRS Reviews F. S. Wrinch, Psych Bull 5.4 (15 April 1908): 123-125. Sabine avoids the "mmhistic tendencies of pragmatism" while satisfying science. JRS
Notes These themes are continued in Sabine, "The Material of Thought," Phil Rev 16.3 (May 1907): 285-297.
484 Schiller, F. C. S. Humism and Humanism. Proc Arist Soc 7 (1907): 9311 1. Reprinted in Humanism, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 222-248 Humanism replaces Hume's atomistic and passive empiricism with voluntarism. Hume's attack on voluntary causes and powers should be rejected on the grounds of immediate experience. Kantian idealism, not humanism, uses mental powers to defend the objectivity of physical causation. JRS Summaries Edwin B. Holt, J Phil 5.16 (30 July 1908): 439; H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 17.3 (May 1908): 342-343. 485 Schiller, F. C. S. The Madness of the Absolute. J Phil 4.1 (3 Jan 1907): 18-
21. Schiller replies to W. C. Gore's "The Mad Absolute of a Pluralist" (324). A pluralist must admit the existence of some madness, but not that madness infects everything, which is instead implied by monism. JRS 486 Schiller, F. C. S. Mr. Bradley's Theory of Truth. Mind n.s. 16.3 (July 1907): 40 1-409. Schiller comments on Bradley's "On Truth and Copying" {410). Bradley has clarified his views on the correspondence of truth to reality, absolute mind, error, and pure thought. Pragmatism does not deny correspondence, but finds it within human experience. Bradley has wrongly portrayed pragmatism, by separating theory from practice, making will, thought, and feeling independent faculties of the mind, and assuming that pragmatism is a metaphysical method. Bradley's absolute truth is only an idea in many minds. JRS 487 Schiller, F. C. S. A Pragmatic Babe in the Wood. J Phil 4.2 (17 Jan 1907): 42-44. Schiller responds to John E. Russell's "The Pragmatist's Meaning of Truth (365). The "right" solution depends on the purpose of the seeker, which is not determined by any "objective conditions." JRS Notes See Kussell's reply (482).
488 Schiller, F. C. S. The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt. J Phil 4.9 (25 April 1907): 235-238. Schiller responds to John E. Russell's "Pragmatism as the Salvation from Philosophic Doubt" (481 ). Russell's inability to try pragmatism is created by unreal theoretic doubt; a case of "paralysis of the will proceeding (probably) from chronic intellectualilis." Postulates are riot presuppositions, and pragmatism is not inconsistent with Russell's notions of correspondence and reality. JRS Notes See Russell's reply (482).
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489 Schiller, F. C. S. Psychology and Knowledge. Mind n.s. 16.2 (April 1907): 244-248. Schiller comments on H. A. Prichard's "A Criticism of the Psychologist's Treatment of Knowledge," Mind n.s. 16.1 (Jan 1907): 27-53. Schiller objects to Prichard's assumptions: what is known is independent of knowledge, tmth is correspondence, and objects can be abstracted from the cognitive process. Prichard cannot account for illusion and error. JRS
490 Schiller, F. C. S. Studies in Humanism. London and New York: Macmillan, 1907. 2nd ed., 1912. Translated into French by S. Jankeldvitch as &rude sur Z'humanisme (Parisi Felix Alcan, 1909). Nine essays were translated by Rudolf Eisler for inclusion in Humanismus: Beifage zu einer pragmafuchen Philosophie (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 1911). "The Defmition of Pragmatism and Humanism," pp. 1-21 [Humanismus, pp. 10412I], is "based in part" on (280) and {281). "From Plato to Protagown pp. 22-70, is an expansion of (372). "The Relations of Logic and Psychology," pp. 71-1 13 [Humanismus, pp. 138-1791, is partially based on (375). "Truth and Mr. Bradley," pp. 114-140, is an expansion of (202). "The Ambiguity of Truth," pp. 141-162 [Humanismus, pp. 197-2171, is an expansion of (368). "The Nature of Truth," pp. 163-178 [Humanismus, pp. 2182331, is an expansion of Schiller's review of (333). "The Making of Truth," pp. 179-203 [Ifumanismus, pp. 234-2581, and "Absolute Truth and Absolute Reality," pp. 204-223 [Humanismus, pp. 259-2791, were written for this book. "Empiricism and the Absolute," pp. 224-257, is a revision of (282). "Is 'Absolute Idealism' Solipsistic?" pp. 258-265, is a reprint of (371). "Absolutism and the Dissociation of Personality," pp. 266-273, is a reprint of (370). "Absolutism and Religion," pp. 274-297, "The Papyri of Philonous," pp. 298-301, "Protagorus the Humanist," pp. 302-325, and "A Dialogue Concerning Gods and Priests," pp. 326-348, were written for this book. "Faith, Reason, and Religion," pp. 349369 [Humanismus, pp. 364-3841, is a revision of (369). "The Progress of Psychical Research," pp. 370-390, is a revision of (283). "Freedom," pp. 391-420 [Ilumanisn~us. pp. 280-3091, and "The Making of Reality," pp. 421-45! [Humanismus, pp. 310-3401, were written for this book. "Dreams and Idealism," pp. 452-486, is a revision of (201 ). JRS Reviews Anon, "The Pragmatic Philosophy," Independent 62.10 (4 April 1907): 797-798. '1 hr "most comprehensive" exposition of humanism yet; the possibilities suggested arc marc fascinating than its theories. JRS Anon, Nation 84.19 (9 May 1907): 436-437. The more Schiller explains pmgmatisrn. the more "elusive and unsatisfactory must this doctrine appear to his critics." JRS Henry Barker, Phil Rev 17.3 (May 1908): 323-332. Schiller's polemics attack a ncmexistent "intellectualism," and encourage a "revolutionary attitude" toward logic. Schiller confuses reality with our knowledge of it, but rightly argues for psychology's relevance I!) logic. JRS Carveth Read, Int J Ethics 18.3 (April 1908): 387-394. Humanism is just empiriciw~ with some accidental and dubious additions. JRS Arthur K. Rogers, J Phil 4.12 (6 June 1907): 328-334. Basing the account of kr1w. ledge on the psychoiogy of truth cannot be objected to. Is Schiller also ofrering a n l w 8
physics? A metaphysics is necessary to judge pragmatism, and to provide independent objects to which knowledge refers. Schiller's panpsychism seems impractical, and his attack on absolutism only defends irrationalism. JRS Herbert L. Stewart, Hibbert Journal 5.4 (July 1907): 938-942. Perhaps the uniformity of nature is no mystery, and even if it were, pragmatism has no solution, since the origin of a belief is not its justification. JRS G. F. Stout, Mind n.s. 16.4 (Oct 1907): 579-588. Schiller's doctrine is highly coherent, but it has a mistaken conception of experience as "primary reality," and it reduces the reality of others to their value to me. JRS M. R, Rev de Phil 10.6 (1 June 1907): 607-6 10. Reviews of the French translation F r a n ~ iPillon, s L'Ann& Philosophique 20 (1909): 208-209. Notes Schiller wrote a new introduction for Humanismus, pp. 1-15.
491 Sellars, Roy Wood. Professor Dewey's View of Agreement. J Phil 4.16 (1 Aug 1907): 432-435. Reprinted in Dewcy a n d His Critics, pp. 223-225. Sellars comments on Dewey's "The Control of Ideas by Facts7' (421). People have purposes, not ideas, and not all ideas are plans of action. The "practical realist" will find a gap in his knowledge filled by the true idea, solving the problem. Common sense corrects pragmatism's emphasis on the personal. JRS 492 Sidgwick, Alfred. Humanism. Albany Review 1 (Aug 1907): 575-587. As a revolt against absolutism, now a "stale and lifeless orthodoxy," humanism insists that any statement capable of being true must have a meaning that "consists in its intended application." Absolutists have not revealed whether their claims have meaning, but instead attack'humanism using the assumption that the term "theoretical" can be opposed to the "merely" practical. The humanist logic states that "all propositions stand in a context and therefore are in need of an interpretation which fixes their actual meaning." The independence of truth is sometimes a valuable assumption and hence not meaningless, but metaphysical issues lacking any relevance to "the actual distinguishing of truth from error, or good from evil" are a waste of time. JRS 493 Talbot, Ellen Bliss. The Philosophy of Fichte in Its Relation to Pragmatism. Phil Rev 16.5 (Sept 1907): 488-505. Notes See Talbot, The Fundamental Principle of Fichte 's Philosophy (1906). 494 Troiano, P. R Le base dell' umanismo. Turin, Rome, Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1907. Reviews F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 17.1 (Jan 1908): 133-134. His pragmatic arguments, and his anti-intellectualist positions, place Troiano closest to the British personal idealists. His rejection of pragmatism results from his separation of theory and practice. JRS 495 Vailati, Giovanni. Dal monismo al pragmatismo. Rivista di Psicologia Appiicata 3.4 (Juiy-Aug 1907j. Reprinted in Scritti { 10181, pp. 787-790.
Vailati comments on Giovanni Papini's "Non bisogno esser monisti" (469). According to Vailati, this essay, together with Papini's I1 crepuscolo deifilosofi (3511, represents an all-out attack against systematic philosophy. The nominalistic bent of Papini's position comes in for much criticism, as one would expect from a thinker with such a Peircean turn of mind as Vailati. EPC
496 Vailati, Giovanni De quelques caract6res du mouvement philosophique contemporain en Italie. La Revue du Mois 3 (Feb 1907): 162-185. Reprinted in Scritti { l o 181, pp. 753-769. 497 Vailati, Giovanni. Un manuale per i bugiardi: a proposito dellYArtedi persuadere di G. Prezzolini. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 3.2 (March-April 1907). Reprinted in Scritti { 10181, pp. 770-776. A review of Prezzolini's L jlrte dipersuadere (4781, contrasting his more scientifically minded pragmatism with Prezzolini's enthusiastic voluntarism. This interchange makes an interesting complement to the debate between Prezzolini and Mario Calderoni over the nature of pragmatism, fought earlier in the pages of Leonardo. EPC 498 Valle, Guido della. Le premesse dell' umanismo. Riv Filo 10.2 (MarchApril 1907): 184-200. 499 Watson, John. The Philosophical Basis of Religion. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1907. Pp. 138-164 discuss James. James returns to the Kantian claims that the intellect cannot grasp true reality, and the world can still be understood through its response to "the claims of our fundamental needs." James rejects our taking as true what "suits us personally to believe." A close summary of The Will to Believe (1897) is'followed by the criticism that James, in following Kant, overlooks the actual teleological basis of nature. James's theory of the subliminal origins of religion arbitrarily rejects many ordinary intellectual forms of experience. "No one is more emphatic than he in affirming that a theory of religion must be based upon 'experience', and no one, as a matter of fact, has made so little use of it." Such a method is hardly respectful to all experiences, or to the responsibility to unify them, and only "tries to find in the aberrations of unbalanced emotion the secret of life." James has no justification for the elevation of "this invertebrate state of mind" to the status of religious evidence. Religious experience is a cultural and historical teleological process, not an isolated individual event. Novel religious cxpcriences must be philosophically interpreted in the light of the long-term consequences for the whole of human life. Such intellectual reflection only empowers emotional inspiration. We can agree with James's Pragmatism (438) that ideas become true when found to be in agreement with the facts, but verification can only take place because realily is a sellconsistent and rational system. Therefore, this system settles truth independently of. anti only incidentally causes, our satisfactory experiences. Our provisional "categories," if s!) contingent as pragmatism claims, would throw us into an irrational universe, where neither common-sense. science, nor philosophy could claim priority. JRS Reviews Henry Jones, Hibbcr! !ouma! 6.3 (Apri! 1908): 676-652; John S. blackenzie. iviinci l 7 i (Oct 1908): 554-559; Arthur K. Rogers, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 529-532.
500 Wobbermin, Georg. Introduction. To the German translation by Georg Wobbermin of James's The Varieties of Religious Experience (90) as Die Religiiise Erfhmng (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1907.2nd ed., 1914.) Wobbermin explains the views of F. D. E. Schleiermacher, arguing that James is much like Schleiermacher. The second edition has an additional introduction by Wobbermin, who replies to criticisms, especially from Wundt's Problem der Volkerpsyrhhologie { 1020). Wundt criticized the whole of James's work in terms of pragmatism, but that is only a part of James's thought. It is necessary to combine Schleiermacher's critique with James's psychological approach to attain an adequate standpoint. IKS
501 Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Pragmatism and Education. Educational Review 34.3 (Oct 1907): 227-240. The pragmatic method remains obscure, due to the term "practical." Pragmatism abolishes the separation between ideas and facts and claims that experience knows no distinct "orders of existence." This is unobjectionable if kept within proper limits, but it is sometimes extended to mean that ideas produce the whole realm of facts. In education, pragmatism urges us to make ideas clear by showing where they lead and emphasizes the principle of continuity. IKS
502 Amendola, Giovanni. La Philosophie italienne contemporaine. Rev MCta 16.5 (Sept 1908): 635-665. 503 Anon. The Alleged "Decay of Responsibility" in America. Current Literature 45.4 (Oct 1908): 424-426. Contains quotations from James G. Huneker's disapproving "recent essay on pragmatism" in the New York Sun, and from an unidentified reviewer in The Mirror, who castigates James's Pragmatism (438) as "damnable," "abominably vulgar," and "the most insidiously immoral book." JRS 504 Armstrong, A. C. The Evolution of Pragmatism. J Phil 5.24 (19 Nov 1908): 645-650. Reprinted in Berichte iiber den 111 Internationalen Kongress fur Philosophie zu Heidelberg {656}, pp. 720-726. Controversies over pragmatism have begun to clear up. Pragmatists agree that it is primarily a method, although it may not be distinct from a theory of truth. Pragmatism is not subjectivism, and less open to metaphysics than Schiller's humanism. IKS 505 Armstrong, A. C. Issues of Pragmatism. Methodist Review 68 (March 1908): 258-268. 506 Bakewell, Charles M. On the Meaning of Truth. Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 579-59 1. Truth. like all philosophical concepts, is vaguely used but not satisfactorily defined. Pragmatism's loosely worded doctrines are quite acceptable: "we can all join the choir of
the pragmatists, and with them sing the praises of huth and its practical value." But the real issue is whether ideas are true or false before they are tested, or only afier, as pragmatism claims. Thought seeks the unified and permanent, not an "anarchy of opinions." A true judgment of a thing is "conceiving it in its total context" in hmansc&dent experience. JRS Notes This essay is summarized in "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth,"Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 182-183.
507 Baldini, P. La re1igosit.A second0 il pragmatisrno. I1 Rimovamento 3.1 (1908): 43-66. 508 Baldwin, James Mark. Knowledge and Imagination. Psych Rev 15.3 (May 1908): 181- 196. Portions reprinted in Thought and Things, vol. 3 (9051, pp. 3-14. 509 Baldwin, J a m e s M a r k Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic. Vol. 2. Experimental Logic, or Genetic Theory of Thought. New York: Macmillan; London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1908. The "pragmatic" interest is in the motives involved in cognition and action, considered from an objectively psychological view (p. lo), and pragmatism emphasizes only this partial aspect of knowledge. (p. 165) Baldwin critiques Dewey's theory of knowledge in chapters 13 and 14; see Baldwin's "On Truth" (392). "The 'problem' is a problem, a proposal, to a self; the adjustment is of a self to a situation." (p. 385) JRS Reviews Guy A. Tawney, J Phil 8.7 (30 March 191 1): 187-194. Baldwin identifies pragmatism with his theory of "inner control" and "treats it as though the pragmatists held that it is the only control-an altogether disappointing procedure." JRS F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 423-424; W. H. Sheldon, Psych Bull 6.4 (15 April 1909): 133-139. 510 Balthasar, N. Le Problkme de dieu, d'aprks la philosophie nouvelle. Revue NCo-Scolastique 14.1 (Feb 1908): 449-489. Summaries M. Molloy, Phil Rev 17.4 (July 1908): 454-456. 511 Bawden, H. Heath. The New Philosophy Called Pragmatism. Popular Science Monthly 73.5 (July 1908): 61-72. Material used in The Principles of Pragmatism (752). Pragmatism mccts thc needs of thc "man of allairs...the religious nlystical man. and ...the man of science." It is empiricist: it docs not depart from experience. it does no! distinguish mind as a separate entity, and does not take all experience or reality as givcn I t is idealistic: it finds the "key to the nature of reality in ideas" and emphasizes thinking in human progress. Pragmatism finds conseiousnrss to be "essentially social in its contcnl.' and sees philosophy's purpose in "the control of cultured living." JRS
512 Berthelot, R e d . Sur le pragmatisme de Nietzsche. Rev. Meta 16.4 (July 1908): 403-447; 17.3 (May 1909): 386-412; 17.5 (Sept 1909): 654-702. Ree le mouvement pragmatiste. Le printed as Un Romantisme utilitaire: ~ t u d sur Pragmatisme chez Nietzsche et chez PoincarP (909). 513 Bjorkman, Edwin. William James, The Man and the Thinker. American Review of Reviews 37.1 (Jan 1908): 45-48. James, the leading exponent of pragmatism, has retired fkom Harvard to devote himself to writing. James became well-known through his The Principles of Psychology (1890) which states the James-Lange theory of emotion. He first announced his pragmatism in The Will to Believe (1897). IKS 514 Bode, Boyd H. Some Recent Defmitions of Consciousness. Psych Rev 15.4 (July 1908): 255-264. Reprinted in Pure Experience, pp. 189-200. James's theory of consciousness is ambiguous where subjectivity is concerned. Dewey's theory, in avoiding solipsism, collapses into common sense realism. The issue is too dependent on other fundamental problems to allow an adequate definition. JRS 515 Boodin, J. E. Consciousness and Reality. J Phil 5.7 (26 March 1908): 169179; 5.9 (23 April 1908): 225-234. Consciousness, like time, space, and direction, "must be stated as a non-stuff dimension of reality." It cannot be reduced to relations, energies, or interactions. There can be no "subconscious mental activity." Consciousness only adds awareness to reality and permits meaningful activity. It cannot really be divided, subjective, or created. JRS 516 Boodin, J. E. Energy and Reality. J Phil 5.14 (2 July 1908): 365-375; 5.15 (16 July 1908): 393-406. 517 Boodin, J. E. Philosophic Tolerance. A Winter's Revery. Monist 18.2 (April 1908): 298-306. Reprinted in Truth and Reality (91 61, pp. 3- 14. Philosophy could ncver satisfy in one system the soul's moods and needs. James's unfinished structure at least provides for creative and active work. JRS Notes Paul Carus's "Editorial Comment" following this article on p. 306 notes that it "is a typical instance" of pragmatism, "the philosophic temperament that is at present in its ascendancy."
518 Boodin, J. E. Truth and Meaning. Psych Rev 15.3 (May 1908): 172-180. Reprinted with revisions as "Meaning and Validity" in Truth and Reality (9161, pp. 200-2 13. The "true" cannot be classified as the "useful" or "satisfactory." Often the truth arrives as defcat. Certainty is no justification of belief. The "social satisfaction of our meanings" is temporary. due to evolutionary changes. JRS 519 Boutroux, ~ ~ n i l Science e. et religion dans la philosophie contetnporaine. Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1908. Reprinted, Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1947.
Translated by Jonathan Nield as Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1909; New York: Macmillan, 1911). Translated by Emilie Weber as Wissenschaj? und Religion in der Philosophie unserer Zeit, with an introduction by H. HoltPnan (Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1910). The Introduction surveys the history of religion and science. Part One describes the "Naturalistic Tendency." Chap. 1 discusses Comte and the religion of humanity; chap. 2, Herbert Spencer and the unknowable; chap. 3, Haeckel and monism; and chap. 4, psychology and sociology. In Part Two, "The SpiritualisticTendency," chap. I is about Ritschl and radical dualism, and chap. 2 is on "Religion and the Limits of Science." Chap. 3, entitled "The Philosophy of Action," includes a short section on pragmatism, pp. 278-281, and a discussion of the idea of a philosophy of human action on pp. 281298. Here, science is understood as the "creation of man's activity," and religion is the "realization of the human soul's deepest want." Chap. 4, "William James and Religious Experience," pp. 298-339, also has three sections. First, James on religion: his point of view of religion as personal and inward, his radical empiricism as method, mysticism, the value of religious experience, the pragmatistic point of view, and the subliminal self. Second, James on the relation between religion and science, including their difference as "concrete" vs. "abstract." Third, Boutroux comments on the objective value of religious experience. The last chapter discusses the conflict between the scientific and religious spirit. LF Extended reviews Fran~oisPillon (588). Reviews of the English translation Archibald A. Bowman, Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 550-559; Irving King, Phil Rev 20.1 (Jan 191I): 93-94; John H. Muirhead, Int J Ethics 21.1 (Oct 1910): 92-97. Reviews of the German translation Nima Hirshensohn, J Phil 8.5 (2 March 1911): 134-138. 520 Boutroux, mile. William James et I'expdrience religieuse. Rev MCta 16.1 (Jan 1908): 1-27. Reprinted in Science et religion dans la philosophie contemporaine (5 191, pp. 298-339. For James, consciousness is a field containing multiplicity, fluid and continuous. IIe deals with the truth of religion pragmatically by considering its fruits. For understanding the religious object, James uses F. W. H. Myers's theory of subliminal consciousness. Boutroux asks whether this treatment of religion is scientific and how it compares with other sciences. James's emphasis on the inner life gives us the soul of religion, but we also need the body of religion, the system of beliefs and institutions. IKS Reviews Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 569-570. 521 Bradley, F. H. On the Ambiguity of Pragmatism. Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 226-237. Reprinted in Essqs on Truth and Reality { 12441, pp. 127- 142. It is difficult to say whether Bradley himself has always been a pragmatist, becaux James and Dewey are so unclear as to what pragmatism is. "Practice" and "practical" can be given narrow or broad interpretations. If understood in the latter way, pragmatism would hardly exclude anyone. IKS
Notes See Schiller, "Is Mr. Bradley Becoming a Pragmatist?" (597) and Alfred Sidgwick, "The Ambiguity of Pragmatism" (605). A curious use of the term "pragmatism" by Bradley occurs in his The Presuppositions of Critical History (Oxford: J. Parker and Co., 1874), reprinted in his Collected Essuys (Oxford: Clarendon. 1935), p. 49. There Bradley labels some historian's attempts to complete historical records with "the creation of causes and motives" as "overstrained Pragmatism."
522 Burke, J o h n Butler. Fashionable Philosophy at Oxford and Harvard. Living Age 257 (30 May 1908): 559-561. Pragmatism offers nescience in the form of a revived Schopenhauerianidealism. JRS 523 Butler, Nicholas Murray. Philosophy. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1908. A "just appreciation" of pragmatism requires "considerable philosophical knowledge." (p. 43) JRS Reviews Anon, Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 156-157. 524 Caldwell, Morley Albert. Does Pragmatism Involve Indeterminism? Dissertation, Harvard University, 1908. 525 Cantecor, Ceorges. Le Pragmatisme. In L 2nnbe Psychologique 14 (1908): 355-379. Notes See Cantecor, Le Positivism (Paris: P. Delaplane, 1906). 526 Carus, Paul. Pragmatism. Monist 18.3 (July 1908): 321-362. Reprinted in Truth on Trial (9251, pp. 4-45. A survey of the pragmatism of Peirce and James, emphasizing its relativism and skepticism. James's love of idiosyncrasies is "desirable in a poet, but not in a philosopher." JRS Notes for Controversy:Paul Carus of Open Court (Carbondale See Harold Henderson, Catal~vst and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), pp. 148-152, for a discussion of Carus's writings on William James. 527 Chandler, Albert Richard. Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge. Dartmouth College, Department of Philosophy Story Prize, 1908. The intellect's "cool and dispassionate attitude" controls will and emotions. An idea's success is due to its correspondence to reality. Pragmatism lapses into solipsism. JRS 528 Chide, Alphonse. Pragmatisme et intellectualisme. Rev Phil 65.4 (April 1908): 367-388. The clear thought exalted by Cartesians is undergoing a crisis: Descartes simply substituted ancient mistakes for modern ones. Rationalism is as dogmatic as theology,
and results in contradictions. Pragmatism, born out of a reaction against intellectualism, goes too far itself in accepting "obscure thought." A version of moderate pragmatism, consonant with rationalism, is then described by Chide. LF Summaries A. H. Jones, Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 680.
529 Coe, George Albert. The Sources of the Mystical Revelation. Hibbert Journal 6.2 (Jan 1908): 359-372. James argues for a spiritual reality by appealing to common features of mystical experience. This argument fails because James only examines a small number of unusual people, anything can be a "direct perception of f a " and the common features are best explained as the result of "self-hypnosis." The special intuition that James defends arbitrarily excludes more specific religious dogmas, of which people can feel equally certain. A closer investigation of the will's role in religion is needed. JRS 530 Creighton, James E. The Nature and Criterion of Truth. Phil Rev 17.6 (NOV1908): 592-605. Pragmatism fails to give any systematic account of experience, which is necessary for an adequate understanding of truth. While pragmatism's definition of truth in practical terms has been refuted, it rightly protests any formally logical criterion of consistent truth. "It is only in so far as our desires and purposes are capable of being universalized that they can participate in the nature of truth and goodness." JRS Notes This essay is summarized in "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth," Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 181-182. 531 Cristiani, Leon. Le ProblZme de dieu et la pragmatisme. Paris: Bloud et Cie., 1908. Almost as a historical law, Cristiani tells us, the Church absorbs, and thereby destroys, its heretics. The goal of this book is to determine what the Church adopts and what it rejects in the Modem Pragmatist thesis on the subject of God. The first chapter is a sketch of pragmatism, including the English branch (James and Schiller) and the French branch (Bergson and Le Roy). Chap. 2 discusses the classic proofs of the existence of God (proof by contingency, by final causes, and moral proofs). Chap. 3, "The Positive Thesis of Pragmatism," describes Le Roy's claims about how God is perceived. The author concludes in chap. 4 that pragmatism receives condemnation "because it denies the value of the traditional proofs...in favor of personal experience..." (p. 57) LF 532 De Roberty, Eugene. Sociologie de I 'action. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1908. Of special interest is a discussion of pragmatism on pp. 249-256. After a brief survey of its history, De Roberty argues that pragmatism has developed in three main directions during our time: esthetic, philosophic (as a work of feeling or imagination, an abstract poetry), and scientific. It is the first of these "aspects" that is taken up in the discussion. The author is an anti-pragmatist, arguing that the position involves a confusion of "teieoiogical" with "causal." LF
Reviews
Be-d Russell, Hibbert Joumal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 203-207. Dewey defends a Kantian unknowable. He accuses epistemologists of affrrrning a static universe, but even if the universe changes, truths about specific changes would not change. JRS A. C. Armstrong, Psych Bull 6.5 (15 May 1909): 171-174; H. A. Overstreef Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 204-215. Notes See E. B. McGilvary's response, "Professor Dewey's 'Action of Consciousness"' (973).
A. W. Moore, Phil Rev 18.6 (Nov 1909): 669-672. The author of this work-the last
in a series on "ethics as elementary sociology"-is considered as W e celebrated founder of the new school of neo-positivism." De Roberty holds that "the goal of science, philosophy and art appears to be in practical social thought @ e d e pratique) which probably is 'pragmatic' enough for most cis-Atlantic pragmatists." LF
533 De TonquCbec, J. La Notion de la &rite' dans la philosophie nouvelle. Paris: Beauchesne et Cie., 1908. Reviews Bernard Bosanquet, Mind 18.1 (Jan 1909): 143-144.
t I
, t
534 Dewey, John. The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education. Progressive Journal of Education 1.2 (Dec 1908): 1-3; 1.3 (Jan 1909): 5-8; 1.4 (Feb 1909): 67. Reprinted in MW4: 178-191.
I
Education has been dominated either by a rationalistic emphasis on theoretical knowledge for its own sake (for the leisure class), or an empiricist emphasis on obedient and uniform acceptance of facts (for the masses). Intelligencefor pragmatism is the instrument of social coordination, and education accordingly must be based on social activity, observation, and experimentation, in a context of practical occupations. JRS
I
535 Dewey, John. Does Reality Possess Practical Character? In Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James, by his Colleagues at Columbia University (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908), pp. 53-80. Reprinted as "The Practical Character of Reality" in Philosophy and Civilization (21701, pp. 36-55. Philosophy ofJD I, pp. 207-222. MW4: 125-142. Dewey finds that "in current philosophy, everything of a practical nature is regarded as 'merely' personal." The objection to pragmatism from realists and idealists that knowledge cannot alter reality rests on their commitment to a static universe. They fallaciously take pragmatism to mean that knowledge "makes a difference in the object to be known, thus defeating its own purpose." If reality is changing, only a "kodak fixation" would distort reality. The assimilation of scientific and moral judgments hardly violates common sense. Awareness involves "a relation between organism and environment," but this relation supports neither the idealistic nor the agnostic "relativity of knowledge" philosophies, and cannot by itself offer knowledge. Knowledge's object is "a prior existence changed in a certain way" by an adapting organism to "expand adequate functioning." Psychologically, awareness is attcntion; attcntion is the conflict of habits in a problematic situation, and exists as part of the "successive stales of things." The "intellectual lock-jaw called epistemology" is bypassed when we see that things assume "new relations in the process of inquiry." The desire to contemplate the eternal only results in a philosophy forgotten in time. Philosophy should be active "in the living struggles and issues of its own age." JRS Reviews IIorace M. Kallen, Mind 19.1 (Jan 1910): 97-105. How can knowledge be distinguished from its object? Prior existences are transcendent unknowables. Dewey implies that all knowledge relations are internal, but a more consistent pragmatism holds that such relations are external. JRS
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536 Dewey, John. Ethics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1908. Reprinted with revisions as "Intelligence and Morals" in The Znzuence ofDarwin on Philosophy (7931, pp. 46-76. MW4: 31-49. Greek philosophy stressed personal character and intelligence in its conducive role for a free, stable society; its limitations lay in the uncritical acceptance of the Greek division between the wise (contemplating fixed, eternal reality) and the ignorant (working with mutable, impermanent material). Moral philosophy has only recently freed itself, just as science has; this "revolution ...of the applied and experimental habit of mind" deals only with the present possibilities of social life. True democracy will rely on this moral psychology. Utilitarianism and German idealism have taken steps toward placing moral reason "within the struggles of life." "If the business of morals is not to speculate upon man's final end, and upon an ultimate standard of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology and psychology to discover all that can be discovered of man...to converge all the instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education, economics, and political science upon the construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot." (p. 45) JRS 537 Dewey, John. The Logical Character of Ideas. J Phil 5.14 (2 July 1908): 375-381. Reprinted with revisions in Essays in Experimental Logic (13591, pp. 220-229. MW 4: 9 1-97. Logic must be freed from "metaphysical psychology-the assumption of consciousness as an existent stuff or existent process" which portrays knowledge as a relation between things and states or functions of consciousness. A behavioral psychology examines ideas as hypotheses created in the process of inquiry. Deductive logic relies on fixed symbolic meanings, rendering it useless for inquiry. Modem inquiry requires "personal (i.e. intraorganic) events to have, transitively and temporarily, a worth of their own" which will terminate in objective experimental conditions. JRS 538 Dewey, John. Religion and Our Schools. Hibbert Journal 6.4 (July 1908): 796-809. Reprinted in Characfersand Events (20241, vol. 2, pp. 504-5 16. MIf' 4: 165-177.
539 Dewey, John. What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical? J Phil 5.4 (13 Feb 1908): 85-99. Revised and without the last paragraph as "What Pragmatism Means by Practical" in Essays in ExperimenfalLogic (13591, pp. 303-329. Mlt7 4: 98-1 15. This essay offers a discrimination of meanings of "practical," stimulated by James'.; confusing usage in Pragmafisnt f438). Practical "meaning" has three senses: the delinition of an object, the existential reference of an idea, and the actual value of a truth
Pragmatism must enforce these distinctions. James rightly emphasizes the "personal" nature of huth, though humanism takes the individual to be metaphysically real, while according to the "Chicago School" the personal "is to be analyzed and defined biologically on its genetic side, ethically on its prospective and hctioning side." @. 113) When the tremendous role of the personal is recognized, "a new era in philosophy will begin." The different aspects of pragmatism have been "uniquely" united by James, and firther progress lies in "more analytic clearing up and development of these independent e l e ments." "Possibly 'pragmatism' as a holding company for allied, yet separate interests and problems, might be dissolved and revert to its original constituents." (I Phil, p. 99) JRS Notes Dewey's understanding of the pragmatic movement is also preserved in two syllabi from this time. A privately printed syllabus for his classes in 1909 at Columbia University, 'The Pragmatic Movement of Contemporary Thought," is reprinted in MW 4: 251-263. Dewey later gave a course of lectures in January and February, 1910, on "Aspects of the Pragmatic Movement of Modem Philosophy," reprinted in MW6: 175-176.
I
'
541 &says Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James. By I
540 Dewey, J o h n a n d James Hayden Tufts. Ethics. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1908. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1909. Reprinted as MW5. Part 1, "The Beginnings and Growth of Morality," was authored by Tufts. Part 2, "Theory of the Moral Life," was authored by Dewey. To determine which situations are distinctly "moral," we must look beyond acts engrossed in immediate ends or indifferent to the effects on others. Instead, distinctly moral conduct involves the deliberate arbitration of conflicting values. The product of such deliberation is commonly called "good," but philosophy has long been divided as to whether such "good" truly resides in a proper moral attitude or in the procurement of beneficial consequences. Good is the product of the union of attitude and consequences, for a proper moral attitude channels behavior toward beneficial consequences. A moral attitude or disposition, in turn, is a mark of a properly developed character-a pattern of growth from a "narrow self' absorbed in self-interest, to a "larger self' that acknowledges a duty to the "tacit contract we have with others." A virtuous individual possesses habits of character that sustain the common good. Although the virtues are innumerable, their cardinal traits are in fact developments of the original Greek ideals: (I) temperance, as the control and direction of excitement; (2) courage, as the vigorous pursuit of long-range goods; (3) justice, as equity, fairness, impartiality and honesty, and 4) wisdom, as conscientiousness. Part 3, "The World of Action," was jointly authored. FXR Reviews William Caldwell, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 221-229. "The fault alike of our Western (or American) civilization and the general Pragmatist outlook on life and morals is their eternal belief in 'experimentation' and 'setting free', instead of in the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of certain kinds of 'experiments' that are unfortunately continually made with human life and with conduct and with morality." This book does not account for the moral person's attempt to lead a life without endless "re-formations." JRS Evander B. McGilvary, Psych Bull 6.1 (15 Jan 1909): 14-22. McGilvary gives a detailed approving analysis. JRS Norman Wilde, J Phil 5.23 (5 Nov 1908): 636-639. The naturalistic idealism is J. S. Mill's philosophy "freed from the illogical hedonism." Where is a discussion of judging conduct, freedom, or mysticism? JRS
Anon, Amer J Psych 20.1 (Jan 1909): 151; Anon, Monist 20.3 (July 1910): 478; Anon, Sewanee Review 17.1 (Jan 1909): 118- 120; Charles Abram Ellwood, Economic Bulletin 1 (1908): 335-336; Arthur 0.Lovejoy, American Journal of Theology 13.1 (Jan 1909): 140-143; Frank A. Manny, Survey 22 (1909): 2 17-218; Walter T. Marvin, Educational Review 37.4 (April 1909): 413-416; Irving E. Miller, School Review 17 (1909): 204206, Guy Allen Tawney, American Journal of Sociology 14.5 (March 1909): 687690, Frank Thilly, Science n.s. 30 (1909): 89-92. Notes See the revised edition (2227). See also a collection of Dewey's writings on morality drawn from other major works, The Moral Writings of John Dewey, edited with an introduction and notes by James Gouinlock (New York: Hafner Press, 1976). Tuft's contributions are summarized by James Campbell in Selected Writings of James Hayden Tufls (Carbondale and Edwardmille: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 371-373.
H i s Colleagues at Columbia University. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1908. Essays of interest are: John Dewey, "Does Reality Possess Practical Character," (535); Dickinson S. Miller, "Naive Realism; What Is It?" pp. 233-261 [Pure fiperience, pp. 172-1881; Kate Gordon, "Pragmatism in Aesthetics," pp. 46 1-482; James McKeen Cattell, "Reactions and Perceptions," pp. 571-584; and Edward L. Thorndike, "A Pragmatic Substitute for Free Will," pp. 587-610. JRS Reviews Anon, "Some American Philosophers," Spectator 101.8 (22 Aug 1908): 267-268; A. C. Armstrong, Psych Bull 6.5 (15 May 1909): 171-174; Horace M. Kallen, Mind 19.1 (Jan 1910): 97- 105; H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 204-2 15; Bertrand Russell, Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 203-207; P. E. Winter, Amer J Psych 19.3 (July 1908): 400-405.
542 Eucken, Rudolf. Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker: Eine Entwickelungsgeschichte des Lebensproblems der Menschkeit von Plato bis zur Gegenwart. 7th ed., Leipzig: Veit, 1908. Translated by Williston S. Hough and W. R. Boyce Gibson as The Problem ofHuman Life: As Viewed by the Great Thinkersj?om Plato to the Present Time (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1909). Reviews of the translation Frank Granger, Hibbert Journal 8.4 (July 1910): 900-904. 543 Fouilibe, Alfred. Morale des ideks-forces. Paris: FClix Alcan, 1908. Fouillte defends an ethical theory based on his philosophy of the ideks-forces. In his review, Everett notes that part and parcel of the theory is that "the intensity of a mental state at once constitutes and determines its force in action"; thus it is a theory related to pragmatism. Fouillte briefly explains this relationship (pp.xxii-xxiii), although it is an explanation to which Everett takes exception. LF Reviews Walter G. Everett, Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 656-66 1. 544 Galdi, M. Ilpragmatismo en il diritto civile. Naples: 1908.
545 Gardiner, H. N. The Problem of Truth. Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 113137. If we confine discussion to propositional truth, all truths are particular and "must be judged with reference to its own unique meaning and intent." Truth does not have degrees and cannot be affected by related truths. That an object has some character should not be identified with the object's character, and truth is not the same as recognized truth. Truth is intellectually reflected fact and must be a purely logical relation. Pragmatism rightly tests truth by use, requires that truth at least be potentially experienced, and holds that all truths are particular, but ignores the distinction between cognition and the object of cognition. Truth must be structural, not instrumental, for there must be a relationship between a verified idea and the facts. Pragmatism cannot account for the universality of truth. JRS
546 Gifford, A. R The Pragmatic "TAHof Mr. Schiller. J Phil 5.4 (13 Feb 1908): 99-104. Schiller combats idealism and realism with a reduction of all reality not constructed by conscious agents to an indeterminate potentiality. This concept conflicts with humanism's identification of reality with experience, and since such an indeterminate could not be real, reality must be either material or psychical. JRS Notes See H. M. Kallen, "The Pragmatic Notion of &q" (562). 547 Cutberlet, Const. Der Pragmatismus. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 21.4 (1908): 437-458. Pragmatism is a new fashion from the land of the dollar. It is a religion, but one built on sand. IKS
548 Hawtrey, Ralph. Pragmatism. New Quarterly 1 (March 1908): 197-210. James can define words as he pleases; the word "true" means what James says it does. If so, we will use "correctness" to mean what we ordinarily mean by truth. "Correctness" would not mean what pragmatists mean by "truth." IKS Notes James's reply, "Two English Critics," is in The Meaning of Truth (672), pp. 272-286 [Works MT,pp. 146-1531. 549 Hgbert, Marcel. Le Pragmatisme: ~ l u d e sd e ses diverses formes, AngloAm&ricaines, Fran~aises.Ifaliennes, et de s a valeur religieuse. Paris: mile Nouny, 1908.2nd ed., 1910. This account of pragmatism includes discussions of the philosophies of Peirce and Papini (chap. I), William James (chap. 2), and Schiller, Le Roy, and PoincarB (chap. 3). Chap. 4 surveys precursors to pragmatism-from Socrates to Nietzsche-along with the work of Blonde1 and Bergson. Chap. 5 is a survey of the various forms of religious pragniatism (the moralism of Secrttan and Mtnard, the fideism of Pascal et a!., the symbolism of Loisy, Le Roy, Laberthonniere, and Tyrrell, and the religious positions of James and Schiller), and a discussion of pragmatism's failings. HCbert holds that "Anglo-Anlcrican pragmatism did not demonstrate that the true was exclusively limited to the useful. any more than that action be singly limited to a given tendency." (p. 123)
t
Ultimately pragmatism is subjectivism-it falls short of affording one knowledge. There are six appendices: on pragmatism and esthetic, pragmatism and morals, Rousseau and Chateaubriand, Le Roy, Berthelot, and Durkheim. LF Reviews William James, J Phil 5.25 (3 Dec 1908): 689494 [The Meaning of Truth {672), pp. 230-245. Works MT, pp. 126-1331. According to Hebert, pragmatism holds that beliefs can have utility without having cognitive value; actually, utility follows upon cognitive value. Htbert's subjectivist interpretation arises because James, while treating truth on its subjective side, identified truth and expediency and did not mention objective reference. James did not believe that critics could attribute to him a view as silly as the denial of "realities outside." For he and other pragmatists, truth is a relation between realities which is concretely experienceable and definable. Some hold that Schiller denies external realities even if James does not, but their views are identical. Schiller offers more of a psychological description while James gives a logical definition. IKS H. C. Corrance, Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 218-220; F r a n ~ i Pillon, s L'Ann6e Philosophique 19 (1908): 202. Notes The 2nd edition contains James's review with slight revisions, pp. 139-153, and Hebert's reply, pp. 155-163. See Paul Carus, "A Postscript on Pragmatism. In Comment on Professor James' Review of Marcel HCbert's Book" (639).
550 Hibben, John Crier. The Test o f Pragmatism. Phil Rev 17.3 (Julv 1908): Pragmatism fails its own test: it is insufficient as a working hypothesis, it is subordinated to other considerations, and its alleged creative function is limited. JRS Notes This essay is summarized in "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion o f ~ ~ t hPhil , " Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 183-184. 551 Hoeck, Louis G. Pragmatism in Its Relation to Religious Thought. NewChurch Review 15 (Oct 1908): 548-555. Pragmatism has encouraged religion to reconnect faith and works and to expose false doctrines for their harmful errors. Swedenborg's truly Christian revelations would benefit humanity more than any other religion, and thus have full pragmatic justification. JRS
552 Horne, Herman H. The Problem of Sin. Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 179180. The modern social problem of sin "can be solved on absolutistic principles and at the same time in accord with legitimate pragmatic demands." JRS Notes Abstract of a paper read in 1907.
553 James, William. Hegel and His Method. Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 63-75. Also published as Lecture 3 ofA Pluralistic Universe {675),pp. 85-1 09. Notes For annotation see A PluralisficUniverse.
554 James, William. The Meaning of the Word Truth. Privately printed, 1908. Also published as "The Meaning of the Word 'Truth'," Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 455-456. The Meaning of Truth (6721, pp. 217-220. Works MT,pp. 117-1 19. Pragmatism's account of truth is realistic and follows common sense dualism: at its basis lies the notion of an independent reality taken from ordinary social experience. To be true, statements must agree with such realities; and by "agreeing" pragmatists mean "working." One cannot define what is meant by calling certain statements "true" without reference to their "workings," to their "functional possibilities." IKS Notes This essay is summarized as "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth," Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 180-181 [Works MT, pp. 291-2921. The explanation of this summary's relationship to the entire essay is given in Work MT,pp. 2 10-213. 555 James, William. Pluralism and Religion. Hibbert Journal 6.4 (July 1908): 721-728. Also published as the "Conclusion" to A Pluralistic Universe (6751, pp. 303-3 16. Notes For annotation see A Pluralistic Universe. See Paul Carus's comments, Monist 19.2 (April 1909): 317-318. 556 James, William. The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders. Phil Rev 17.1 (Jan 1908): 1-17. Reprinted in The Meaning of Tnrth (6721, pp. 180-2 16. Works MT, pp. 99-1 16. Pragmatism is neither positivism nor skepticism. Pragmatism seeks to define truth, while skepticism accepts the dogmatic idea of truth and concludes that at best we have merely phenomenal truth, good enough for practical purposes. The name "pragmatism" has been unfortunate; it has played into the hands of those who want to dismiss pragmatism as not philosophy but a crude world-view for men of action. Meanwhile, the pragmatists concern themselves with theoretic questions. Pragmatists can believe in ejective realities, they can be epistemological realists, they offer an account of truth itself, and they do not ignore theoretic interests. The term "practical" can and does cover intellectual perplexities. Pragmatists are not solipsists. IKS 557 James, William. The Social Value of the College-Bred. McClure's Magazine 30 (February 1908): 419-422. Reprinted in Memories and Studies (9571, pp. 309-325. Works ECR, pp. 106-1 12. Any subject can be given humanistic value by teaching it historically as the achievement of human geniuscs. Humanistic study, as distinguished from technical training, teaches us to "know a good man when we see him." In a democracy, humanists should be able better than others to identify the more worthy leaders. IKS
558 James, William. "Truth" Versus "Truthfulness." J Phil 5.7 (26 March 1908): 179- 18 1. Reprinted, the last two paragraphs omitted, as "The Existence of Julius Czsar" in The Meaning of Trufh (6721, pp. 22 1-225. Works MT, pp. 120122.
The claim that truth cannot be defined without reference to its workings is purely logical. In cases such as "Caesar really existed," for truth to occur, the specific person must be singled out. Transcendentalists invoke the absolute, while James insists on a concrete medium as certifying the reference. IKS 559 Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Der Pragmatismus: Eine neue Philosophische Methode. Deutsche Literaturzeitung 29.4 (25 Jan 1908): 198-206. 560 Johnson, W. Hallock. Pragmatism, Humanism and Religion. Princeton Theological Review 6 (Oct 1908): 544-564. Pragmatism is friendly to religion and has helped it by revitalizing philosophy. Pragmatism emphasizes personality and the right to believe, but it appeals only to the strong and offers nothing to sick souls. It fails to see that man is dependent on God. IKS 561 Kallen, Horace University, 1908.
M. Notes on the Nature of Truth. Dissertation,
Harvard
562 Kallen, Horace M. The Pragmatist Notion of 6kq. J Phil 5.1 1 (21 May 1908): 293-297. A defence of pragmatism against Gifford's "The Pragmatic ?AH of Mr. Schiller" (546). JRS 563 Lalande, Andre. Pragmatisme, humanisme, et vdrite. Rev Phil 65.1 (Jan 1908): 1-26. In the first two parts of this article Lalande discusses James's Prag~nafism(438) and Schiller's Studies in Humanism (490). In the third part Lalande adds his own remarks, though he refrains from calling them objections because he believes that "the essential thesis of pragmatism is useful and just." (p. 13) Belief in the final unity as a pragmatic act of faith is to be emphasized: "we cannot pass from our needs to our truths, but from the truths unanimously conceived to the needs they satisfy." (West, p. 567) In the concluding pages a distinction is drawn between two social relations: interdependence and community. LF Summaries C. West, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 567. 564 Latta, R. Purpose. Proc Arisf Soc 8 (1908): 17-32. What is the meaning of this oft-used term? A thing has purpose to the degree that it has systematic unity, and self-conscious purposes presuppose an ability to rationally selcct within a larger system of order. Schiller's insistence that purposes can only be had by an agent who is aware of them is not well-founded. JKS Kcviews W. If. Sheldon, J Phil 6.12 (10 June 1909): 328-333. 565 Lloyd, Alfred H. Radical Empiricism and Agnosticisn. Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 175- 192.
Most types of agnosticism are logically fallacious, as they manage to conceive the unknowable in some fashion. Pragmatism is a Kantian agnosticism which finds the unknowable in "the direct and immediate reality of positive experience." Kant's use of the a priori to find the nournenon made him a pragmatist. Pragmatism is not a solipsism. The "knowable and the unknowable correspond respectively to structure and function." The pragmatic psychologist understands experience to be "the vital intimacy of structure and hction," which permits the recognition of subject and object. JRS Summaries Elijah Jordan. Phil Rev 18.1 (Jan 1909): 97-98. Notes Lloyd's philosophy at this time is expressed at length in The Will to Doubt (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1907).
those of natural science and the moraVreligious life. 13. All objects of thought contain a reference to some subjective purpose or plan. JRS Summaries F. A. Peek, Phil Rev 17.6 (Nov 1908): 680-681. Notes See Max Meyer, "The Exact Number of Pragmatisms" (5731, and Lton N&l, "Bulletin d'tpistkmologie: Aurour du pragmatisme" (699).
569 McGilvary, Evander B. British Exponents of Pragmatism. Hibbert Journal 6.3 (April 1908): 632-653. I
566 Lorenz-Ightham, Theodor. Der Pragmatismus. Internationale Wochenschrift fur Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 2 (1908): 943-990. I
567 Lovejoy, A r t h u r 0. Pragmatism and Theology. American Journal of Theology 12.1 (Jan 1908): 1 16- 143. Reprinted in The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 40-78. James proposes as a criterion of meaning that propositions refer to concrete future experiences. However, some propositions are meaningful without any such reference; pragmatism must be restated as a test of verifiability. When this fails, we realize that James is proposing a test for the importance of a belief. Connected with pragmatism is the belief in a genuine future, which is pragmatism's contribution to theology. IKS
568 Lovejoy, A r t h u r 0. The Thirteen Pragmatisms. J Phil 5.1 (2 Jan 1908): 512; 5.2 (16 Jan 1908): 29-39. Reprinted in The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 1-39. Pragmatists have made thirteen logically independent contentions, due to their originality and failure to carefully make distinctions. 1. A proposition's meaning is the anticipated future conscquences in experience. Pragmatists often confusingly apply this thesis also as a criterion of truth and knowledge. 2. A proposition's meaning is the anticipated future consequences of believing it. This second thesis in incongruous with the first, but James 0 t h vacillates between them. 3. A proposition becomes true only when its anticipated future consequencesare realized. This "sterile" doctrine deprives gained knowledge of my meaning. 4. True propositions are those generalizations which have been found to "work" in the past. This "evolutionary empiricist" criterion of truth contrasts with the next similar thesis. 5. True propositions are those which contribute to increase the energies or chances of survival of the believers. Many beliefs do this, yet they cannot be empirically verified. 6. The future is indeterminate and contingent, permitting real creativity in choice and action. 7. Belief arises in the satisfaction of the resolution of doubt. 8. The criterion of truth is the satisfaction of the resolution of doubt. 9. Beliefs arising from intellectual or theoretic satislhction should have priority. This thesis is not distinguishable Srom intcllcctu;~lism.10. Axioms arc postulates expressing practical needs and providing w r k i ~ ~presuppositions. g I I. 'l'hcrc arc some indubitable and o priori truths (James h a admitted this class) wliicl! 111upt bc supplemented by postulatcs. 12. I'ostulntcs include
British pragmatism blindly strikes out at other positions, instead of imitating American pragmatism by allying itself with potential friends. F. C. S. Schiller, Henry Sturt, H. V. Knox, and Alfred Sidgwick actually would find many other sympathetic philosophers. Almost all philosophers agree (including Bradley, Ward, and Stout) that "the meaning of a rule lies in its application" and that actual knowing is purposive. However, no one could hold that all meaning and mental life must be purposive. Schiller does not consistently apply the doctrine that truth is decided by its consequences. A wide variety of philosophers (though not Dewey) agree with Schiller that knowledge makes reality. British logicians since Darwin have held that axioms are postulates. Pragmatism has no reason to support indeterminism, and Schiller's metaphysics is at least as odious as that of absolutism. JRS Notes See F. C. S. Schiller's response, "British Exponents of Pragmatism" 1595). 570 McGilvary, Evander B. The Chicago "Idea" and Idealism. J Phil 5.22 (22 Oct 1908): 589-597. Reprinted in MW4: 3 17-327. Dewey redefines "fact" and "idea" to fit his theory of judgment and knowledge. This theory appears to regard "all reality as embraced within experiences or within Experience" and is thus idealistic. If Dewey's understanding of "experience" does permit the existence of things not in experience, how is his view different from objective realism? Thought cannot create or ignore given scientific facts. JRS Summaries Edith H. Morrill, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 246. Notes See Dewey's reply, "Objects, Data, and Existences: A Reply to Professor McGilvary" (653). 571 Mead, G. H. The Philosophical Basis of Ethics. Int J Ethics 18.3 (April 1908): 31 1-323. Reprinted in Selected Writings,pp. 82-93. Moral consciousness is the most concrete and inclusive experience. The pragmatic grounding of metaphysics on ethics is one corollary, but two other implications are explored: the moral motive is the recognition of purpose in consciousness, and "the moral interpretation of our experience must be found within the experience,itself." Moral conduct cannot be dependent on external ideals. JRS Summarics C. 11. Williams, f'hil Kcv 17.6 (Nov 1908):690-691.
578 Nelson, Leonard. Uber dclr sogennante Erkenntnisproblem. G6ttingen: Vanderhoek und Ruprecht, 1908.2nd ed., G6ttingen: Offentliches Leben, 1930. Reviews A. D. Lindsay, Mind 18.3 (July 1909): 464-466. Nelson convincingly argues that all intellectualist and pragmatist theories of knowledge must fail, since they try to "explain away the independence and uniqueness of the objectivity of knowledge and to reduce it to something other than knowledge." IRS
572 Mead, G. H. Review of William McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology. Psych Bull 5 (1 908): 385-391. 573 Meyer, Max. The Exact Number of Pragrnatisms. J Phil 5.12 (4 June 1908): 32 1-326. Meyer responds to Lovejoy's "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" (568). A pragmatist could distinguish many more types. A truth cannot be separated from its meaning. Lovejoy has found insignificant differences. JRS 574 Moore, A. W. Truth Value. J Phil 5.16 (30 July 1908): 429-436. Reprinted with revisions in Pragmatism and Its Critics (8601, pp. 110-127. Truth and error "are values belonging to the experience of judging." Metaphysical disagreements turn on the diverse psychological and logical accounts of this type of experience. The intellectualist is content with apetitio definition: true judging is the satisfaction of the cognitive need. Cognition must go beyond mere logical formalisms. Pragmatists assert (with Bradley and Royce) a "continuity between the process and content of thought," deny that thought can produce its own content, and instead find that the content can "produce its own thought" as judgments are formed in the readjustment of values for conflict resolution. Some statements have the form of judgments (for example, perceptual statements) but are judgments no longer. Pragmatism does not subordinate the intellect to other values. JRS 575 Moore, G. E. Professor James' "Pragmatism." Proc Arist Soc 8 (1908): 3377. Reprinted in Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), pp. 97-146. William James' Pragmatism in Focus, ed. Doris Olin (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 16 1- 195. James finds a connection between truth and verification and usefulness, but not all true ideas can be verified, not all true ideas are useful, and not all useful ideas are true. For James, truth is mutable and truths are man-made. However, it is reality that is mutable. When James talks about man-made truths, he seems to be talking about the process of coming to believe. IKS Reviews W. l I. Sheldon, J Phil 6.12 (I0 June 1909): 328-333. Moore is unfair to James concerning verification and usefulness, since James clearly says that utility is relative to some environment. Moore is right to reject the mutability or the man-made notions of truth. JRS Notes Vivian McGill defends James in "Some lnquiries Concerning Moore's Method," in The Pl~ilosophyo/G. E. Moore, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1942), pp. 483-5 14. D. C. Phillips asks "Was William James Telling the Truth After All?" Monist 68 (1984): 4 19-434, reprinted in WilliamJames ' Pragmatism in Focus, pp. 229-247. 576 Morris, Bertram Jasper. Pragmatism and Its Limitations. Dissertation, Boston University, 1908. 577 Miiller-Freienfels, Richard. William James und der Pragmatismus. Philosophische Wochenschrifl und Literaturzeitung 9.1 (Jan 1908): 14-27.
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579 Parodi, Dominique. Le Pragmatisme d'aprhs MM. W. James et Schiller. Rev MBta 16.1 (Jan 1908): 93-1 12. Reprinted as chap. 2 of Parodi's Du Positivisme b l'id&alisme:Philosophies d'hier et d bujourd'hui (2 130). 580 Parodi, Dorninique, et al. La Signification du pragmatisme. Bulletin de la SocietB Franqaise d e Philosophie 8 (July 1908): 249-296. Parodi's portion is reprinted as chap. 3 of his Du Positivisme ci I'Ide'alisrne: Philosophies d'hier et d'aujourd'hui ( 2 130). Parodi's remarks on problems with Anglo-Saxon pragmatism (pp. 249-265) are followed by a report of the subsequent discussion by Parodi, Rent Berthelot, Bouglt, Leon Brunschvicg, Hadamard. Elie Haltvy, Lucien Laberthonnitire, Andrt Lalande, ~douardLe Roy, Georges Sorel, and Jules Tannery. A letter from Max Leclerc is appended. LF 581 Peillaube, E. Programme d'etudes sur le problbme de la connaissance. Rev de Phil 12.5 (1 May 1908): 449-462. The editor announces a series of articles on epistemology on the basis of Aristotle and St. Thomas. "Pragmatism, which is essentially anti-rational, dissolves the notion of truth, confounding it with its practical consequences, that is to say, with utility, and; in spite of the noblest efforts, replunges us into scepticism." JRS
582 Peirce, C. S. A Letter from Mr. Peirce. Open Court 22.5 (May 1908): 3 19. I'eirce endorses an article on modern theology in the previous issue of Open Court. I'circc finds most agrccablc the idca that Christianity is not just a "Jesus Icgend," hut rather an evolution of the Christ-idea based on the development of Ifuman Reason. 1.1; 583 Peirce, C. S. A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God. Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 90-1 12. Reprinted in CP 6.452-485. Peirce begins with an account of the terms "real," "experience." "argument," and of the three Universes of Experience. "If God really be, and be benign." there should be an argument, obvious to all minds, whose conclusion is presented "not as a proposition of metaphysical theology. but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of life. and full of nutrition for man's highest growth." These criteria, Pcirce suggests. arc best fulfilled by the Neglected Argument. "...in the Pure Play of Musement the idea of God's Reality will be sure sooner or later to be found an attractive fancy." and in it. the Muser will desire it for its "thoroughly satisfactory explanation of his whole threefold environment." This hypothesis of God is vague. and will grow. and one will he led to think of the features of each universe as purposed. Onc will also hc Icd to believe: to "shape one's conduct into conformity" with this hypothesis. 'l'hc rest 01' ~ h c
paper divides into three unequal parts: (1) an outline of the different steps of every "well-conducted and complete inquiry," (2) an account of the logical validity of deduction, induction, and retroduction, and (3) a discussion of the "place of the Neglected Argument in a complete inquiry into the Reality of God." LF
584 Peirce, Charles. Some Amazing Mazes. Monist 18.2 (April 1908): 227241; 18.3 (July 1908): 416-464. Reprinted in C P 4.585-593,4.594-642. Notes See Peirce, "Some Amazing Mazes, A Second Curiosity," Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 36-45 [CP4.643-6461. See also Francis C. Russell, "Hints for the Elucidation of Mr. Peirce's Logical Work" (593).
585 Perrier, Joseph Louis. The True God of Scholasticism. J Phil 5.26 (17 Dec 1908): 708-714. Thomistic theology corrects James's portrayal of "old fashioned theism." The scholastics understood God as involved in the world's affairs, not "remote and vacuous." JRS 586 Piat, Claude. Insuflsance a'es philosophies ak I'intuition. Paris: Plon, 1908. 587 Pikler, Julius. Zwei Vortrage iiber dynamische Psychologie. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1908. Reviews F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 19.4 (Oct 1910): 593-595. Pikler shares with Dewey the principle that "tensionis the normal condition of psychical existence, and that doubt and conflict are the stimuli to mental development." JRS A. P. Weiss, Psych Bull 7.9 (15 Sept 1910): 305-306. Notes The second part is also published in Berichte iiber den III. Internationalen Kongressfiir Philosophie zu Heidelberg (656). 588 Pillon, Frangois. Un Ouvrage rkcent sur les rapports de la science et de la religion. L'AnnCe Philosophique 19 (1908): 11 1-195. Pillon gives an extended exposition and criticism of Boutroux's Science et religion duns la philosophie confenporaine (519), and develops his own idealistic philosophy. JRS Reviews E. L. I-iinman, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 76-79. 589 Pratt, James B. Truth and Ideas. J Phil 5.5 (27 Feb 1908): 122-13 1. Pragmatists offer two incompatible interpretations of truth. Dewey holds that truth is an experienced relation of the working of a truth. James finds truth in the relation between ideas and reality, so long as there is an experiential matrix linking them, and says that truth can exist apart from utility. intellectualists construe ideas as judgments, not as plans of action, and admit the reality of things beyond private consciousness. Dewey's work has been written from the standpoint of solipsism. JRS
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590 Rey, Abel. La Philosophie moderne. Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1908. Reprinted, 1927. Rey offers a "statement of the form which the great problems of philosophy assume at the present time": the problems of math (chap. 2), matter (chap. 3), life (chap. 4), mind (chap. S), morality (chap. 6), and knowledge (chap. 7). Throughout the text, Rey opposes "scientism" to pragmatism. The former notes the progress made in science, does not claim to possess all truth, holds the scientific method sacred (as the means of attaining truth) and affirms that "science alone as that which permits of knowledge." (p. 4) As Elkus remarks in her review: "Either scientific method is the only path to the attainment of truth (positivism, rationalism, 'scientism') or there are other sources of true knowledge, such as 'religious feeling, moral ideas, sentimental intuitions'. According to this latter point of view, science is an artifice whose sole validity consists in its practical utility Ipragmatism]." (p. 51) Rey discusses PoincarC, Bergson, James, and, (primarily) French pragmatists. Anglo-American pragmatism has the distinction of putting mind back into Nature and establishing the theory of the continuity of consciousness. Rey's position, however, is anti-pragmatic: "science is not true because it succeeds, but succeeds because it is true." LF Reviews Savilla Alice Elkus, J Phil 6.2 (2 1 Jan 1909): 5 1-53. 591 Royce, Josiah. The Philosophy of Loyalty. New York: Macmillan, 1908. Edited and with an introduction by John J. McDermott (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995). Lecture 7, "Loyalty, Truth, and Reality," explores "the world of truth" for the loyal, which points to a higher spiritual unity. James's pragmatism (outlined on pp. 316-323) agrees with idealism that assertions are deeds and receive verification in one's experience of the practical results. But what constitutes success? "Are the loyal seeking only the mere collection of their private experiences of their personal thrills of fascination?" Idealism offers the highest ideals, which live beyond personal experience. Assertions are attempts to state truths, not mere conditions of expediency or states of mind. Many undeniable truths are unverifiable.The eternal unity satisfies the needs of the loyal. JRS Reviews David Saville Muzzey, Int J I3hics 19.4 (July 1909): 509-510; J. W. Scott, Mind 18.2 (April 1909): 270-276; Frank Chapman Sharp, J Phil 6.3 (4 Feb 1909): 77-80; Amy E. Tanner, Amer J Psych 19.3 (July 1908): 409-412; Frank Thilly, Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908):541-548; James H. Tufts, Psych Bull 5.12 (15 Dec 1908): 394-396. 592 Russell, Bertrand. Transatlantic "Truth." Albany Review 2.10 (Jan 1908): 393-410. Reprinted as "William James's Conception of Truth," in Philosophicd Essays (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 191O), pp. 127- 149. Reprinted in the revised edition (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 1 12- 129. I.Villiam Jatnes ' Pragtnafisrn in Focus, ed. Doris Olin (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 196-2 1 I. A review of James's Pragtnarism (438). Many of James's views are shared by all empiricists. James states them in an "insinuating, gradual, imperceptible" manner. They seep in like "hot water running in so slowly that you don't know when to scrcanl." If the
pragmatic definition of truth is to be useful, we must be able to know that a belief pays without knowing that it is true. It is often easier to know whether a belief agrees with the facts than to know its consequences. IKS Reviews of Philosophical Essays Evander B. McGilvary, Phil Rev 20.4 (July 1911): 422-426. Russell's type of realism has not faced the problem of meaning raised by pragmatism. JRS Notes The preface of Russell's Philosophical Essays includes a tribute to James written shortly after his death [reprinted in Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 6: Logical and Philosophical Papers, 1909-1913 (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 3871. Annotations to "Transatlantic 'Truth"' are published in appendix four of Works MT pp. 299-310. James's reply, "Two English Critics," is in The Meaning of Truth (672), pp. 272-286 [Works MT, pp. 146-1531. F. C. S. Schiller responded with "The Tribulations of Truth" (600). See also Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, "Russell and the Pragmatists" in Bertrand Russell's DiaIogue with His Contemporaries (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, l989), pp. 170-214.
593 Russell, Francis C. Hints for the Elucidation of Mr. Peirce's Logical Work. Monist 18.3 (July 1908): 406-4 15. Russell comments on C. S. Peirce's "Some Amazing Mazes" (584). JRS 594 Salter, William M. Pragmatism: A New Philosophy. Atlantic Monthly 101.5 (May 1908): 657-663. Pragmatism has created such controversy not seen since Darwinism thirty years ago. A survey of James's and Dewey's pragmatic doctrines is followed by the complaints that experience cannot be self-contained and faith cannot be sheer belief. JRS 595 Schiller, F. C. S. British Exponents of Pragmatism. Hibbert Journal 6.4 (July 1908): 903-905. Schiller replies to E. B. McGilvary's "British Exponents of Pragmatism" (569). McGilvary must have hoped that his "misapprehensions and misrepresentations...would escape confutation." JRS Notes See McGilvary's reply, "British Exponents of Pragmatism" (686).
596 Schiller, F. C. S. Infallibility and Toleration. Hibbert Journal 7.1 (Oct 1908): 76-89. Reprinted in Humanism, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 268-282. The rcccnt Papal condemnation of Catholic Modernism raises many questions about Papal infallibility, logic, and absolulc trulh. The spiritual craving for absolute truth leads some to the Pope and others to rationalistic absolutism, but such craving really only ends in skepticism. Let us be satisfied with humanized truth, as the Modernists ask, and let absolute truth be only an ideal. JRS Notes See Thomas S. Jerome's response, "Dr. Schiller on Infallibility and Toleration," Hibbert Journal 7.2 (Jan 1909): 437-438, and Schiller's reply, "lnfallibility and Toleration," ibid. 7.3 (April 1909): 670-67 1.
597 Schiller, F. C. S. Is Mr. Bradley Becoming a Pragmatist? Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 370-383. Schiller comments on Bradley's "On Memory and Judgment," Mind 17.2 (April 1908): 153-174, and "On the Ambiguity of Pragmatism" (52 1). Bradley has made several key concessions to pragmatism, but inconsistently remains a skeptic on knowledge and an absolutist in metaphysics. JRS 598 Schiller, F. C. S. Pluto or Protagom? Oxford: Blackwell; London: Simp kin, Marshall, and Co., 1908. The subtitle reads "Being a Critical Examination of the Protagorus Speech in the Theaetetus with some Remarks Upon Error." JRS Reviews John Burnet, Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 422-423. Notes See Schiller's reply to Burnet's review, "Plato or Protagorus?" Mind 17.4 (Oct 1908): 5 18-526,
599 Schiller, F. C. S. Science and Religion. Published for the Pan-Anglican Papers, Being Problems for consideration at the Pan-Anglican Congress. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1908. Reprinted in his Riddles of the Sphinx (8791, pp. 463-474. Reconciliation is possible when the recognition of their common goal-to transmute reality into useful forms-makes the scientific understanding of religion possible. A psychological view finds religion and science both using postulates of faith (the conservation of energy, the Divine Helper) to control experience, and each should be tested pragmatically. Pragmatism has been misunderstood as offering a mere "as-if' personal whim or making a Kantian divorce between theoretical and practical reason; it instead stands for a test of effectiveness in human experience. A purely rational religion has never proven to have much value to many people, and a God that sympathizes and aids us in our suffering (the ideal is the Christian God) is more emotionally appealing than the march of science. Religion cannot eliminate science, but should incorporate its knowledge into a vision of "the growing fulfillment of a divine purpose." JRS 600 Schiller, F. C. S. The Tribulations of Truth. Albany Review 2 (March 1908): 624-635. Reprinted in Must Philosophers Disagree? (23921, pp. 182- 193. Schiller responds to Bertrand Russell's "Transatlantic 'Truth"' (592). Russell has missed the "essential point" of pragmatism, which goes beyond the banality that any assertion claims to truth, but instead actually tries to discriminate real truth from error. Russell simply "treats truths as givens" but the notion of "fact" is histoy. Russell docs confess that experience alone cannot be trusted, requiring the selection of "evidence," but doesn't see that this fallible method dissolves his "absolute" truth. JRS 601 Schinz, Albert. Anti-Pragmatism. Rev Phil 66.3 (Sept 1908): 225-255; 66.4 (Oct 1908): 390-409. Materials used in Anti-Pragmatisnte {7 19). Summwies Helen M. Clarke, Phil Rev 18.3 (May 1909): 359-360; 18.4 (July 1909): 462-463.
602 Schinz, Albert. Professor Dewey's Pragmatism. J Phil 5.23 (5 Nov 1908): 617-628. Reprinted as "The Dewey Case" in Anti-Pragmatism (719) pp. 88- 109. Dewey argues in "The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" (1 14) that scientificjudgments have the same basic traits (including the personal involvement of character) as moral judgments. Pragmatism emphasizes the morally subjective (and hence irrational) element; but Dewey keeps morality logically independent from science, by arguing that personal character is relevant only to morality. This contradictory stand on the personal factor was avoided by James (in his rejection of logic) and by Peirce (in pragmaticism's rejection of any "extra-logical" order). JRS 603 Sellars, Roy Wood. Critical Realism and the Time Problem. J Phil 5.20 (24 Sept 1908): 542-548; 5.21 (22 Oct 1908): 597-602. Portions are reprinted in Principles of Emergent Realism, ed. W. Preston Warren (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1WO), pp. 68-75. Dewey's position that "things are what they are experienced as" is commendably objective, but fails as a metaphysics, since it is susceptible to pluralistic psychology. (p. 543) Dewey has "taken refuge in the impersonal objectivism of science." (p. 598n) JRS 604 Seth, James. The Alleged Fallacies in Mill's 'Utilitarianism'. Phil Rev 17.5 (Sept 1908): 469-488. Reprinted in Essays in Ethics and Religion, ed. Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1926), pp. 22-46. Many commentators, including Dewey, have misunderstood Mill's attempt to show that general happiness is desirable. JRS 605 Sidgwick, Alfred. The Ambiguity of Pragmatism. Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 368-369. Sidgwick comments 011 Bradley's "On the Ambiguity of I'ragrnatism" (521 ). JRS 606 Stein, Ludwig. Der Pragmatismus. Arch Syst Phil n s . 14.1 (27 Feb 1908): 1-9; 14.2 (25 May 1908): 143- 188. Material used in Philosophische Stromungen der Gegenwart (607). The first part, "Ein neuer name f i r alte Denkmethoden," surveys the pragmatism controversy and praises James for maintaining a high level. The second part. "Versuch einer Geschichte des Terminus Pragmatismus," traces the history of pragmatism. It is the outcome of certain English tendencies, nominalism, voluntarism. and utilitarianism. The controversy between pragmatists and idealists parallels the controversy between psychologists and logicians in Germany. IKS Notes This essay is summarized, with extensive translations, in Carus, "A German Critic of Prag~natisrn."Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 136-148 [Truth on Trial (9251, pp. 1 13-1261. 607 Stein, Ludwig. I'l~ilo.so/?hi.scheSfriinlunget1 der Gcgenn~urt. Stuttgart : Enke, 1908. Translated by Shishirkumar Maitra as Philosophical Czwrenfs offhe Present Day, 3 vols. (Calcutta: The University of Calcutta, 19 18- 1924).
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In chap. 2 of the first volume, "The Neo-Positivistic Movement (The 'pragmatism' of William James)," pp. 44-100, Stein examines this new American philosophy, which revives nominalism using "excellent wit and brilliant satire." He offers a history of the t e n "pragmatism," and shows why Kant would not support pragmatism and why Aristotle would. Stein describes how "positivism, radical empiricism, nominalism, voluntarism, ethical individualism and political liberalism are logically most connected with one another." James's genetic and biological basis for huth would have been strengthened if he had read Semon's Mneme. Pragmatic truth finds its terminus in the ideal future, while transcendentalistsplace truth in an ideal past. This "warm philosophy of feeling has again raised its head against the 'mathematical' intellectual philosophy of the rationalists, logicians, and idealists." Criticism of pragmatism begins with the fact that teleology is only a regulative, not constitutive, principle of nature, but pragmatism assumes teleology a priori. Pragmatism should "concentrate itself and discipline its troops of thought logically" in order to present a comprehensive "energistic-voluntaristic view of the world." JRS Reviews Walter T. Marvin, J Phil 6.24 (25 Nov 1909): 668-669; Henry W. Stuart, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 69-76. Reviews of vol. 1 of the translation F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 29.2 (April 1920): 244. 608 Strong, Anna L. Some Religious Aspects of Pragmatism. American Journal of Theology 12.2 (April 1908): 23 1-240. Pragmatism must give theology a special scientific status, and makes God either the whole process of reality, or a part of reality. Since pragmatism identifies reality with experience, and sets time as a form of all experience, then time and change will be real for God. This God can satisfy the needs of "ordinary religious consciousness." YRS 609 Strong, Charles A. Pragmatism and Its Definition of Truth. J Phil 5.10 (7 May 1908): 256-264. Pragmatism succeeds best as a theory of "why we think things true," not of "what truth means." JRS Notes A portion of this essay is summarized in "Discussion: The Meaning and Criterion of Truth," Phil Rev 17.2 (March 1908): 184-186. 610 Thilly, Frank. La Philosophie amkricaine contemporaine. Rev MCta 16.5 (Sept 1908): 607-634. 611 Vailati, Giovanni. II linguaggio come ostacolo alla eliminazioni di contrasti illusori. Rinnovamento 2.5-6 (May-June 1908). Reprinted in Scrifti (101 8 ) pp. 895-899. This essay makes no explicit mention of pragmatism, but its topic, the need f(?r clarification of meanings and the positive impact that this would have on intellectual inquiry, is of interest. The danger of assigning one's own personal meanings to important philosophical terms is addressed. EPC
612 Walker, Leslie J. Martineau and the Humanists. Mind 17.3 (July 1908): 305-320. Martineau's philosophy bears a close resemblence in several respects to Schiller's humanism. JRS Summaries Edith H. Morrill, Phil Rev 18.4 (July 1908): 464-465. Notes See Schiller's response, "Humanism and Intuitionism" (7 13). 613 Waterhouse, Erie S. Pragmatism; Or, The Method of Common Sense in Philosophy. London Quarterly Review 109.2 (April 1908): 241-253. Material used in Part One, chap. 8, of Modern Theories of Religion (8911, pp. 266-288. Waterhouse writes a heartily sympathetic exposition of several central pragmatic doctrines. JRS
614 Whately, Arnold Robert. The Inner Light: A Study ofthe Signijkance, Character, and Primary Content of the Religious Consciousness. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1908. 615 Witmer, Lightmer. Mental Healing and the Emmanuel Movement. Psychological Clinic 2 (15 Dec 1908): 212-223; 2 (15 Jan 1909): 239-250; 2 (15 Feb 1909): 282-300. Witmer critically reviews the mental healing movement associated with the work of Richard C. Cabot and Elwood Worcester. James is singled out in the third part. His support of psychical research and his opposition to medical licensing are tactics in his campaign against science. The Principles of Psychology (1890) is a work for beginners and its popularity is evidence for the low level of science. In the last edition of his Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie (5th ed., Leipzig: Englemann, 1902-19031, Wundt refers to James only three times, and not a fact or theory is introduced on James's authority. James is the "spoiled child" of American Psychology, "exempt from all serious criticism." IKS Notes Quotations are reprinted in "Is the Psychology Taught at Harvard a National Peril?" (620). In the anonymous "Miinsterberg Replies to Criticism," Psychological Clinic 3 (15 Jan 1910):248. the rumor is reported that Hugo Miinsterberg asked the American Psychological Association to expel Witmer for publishing this article, and threatened to not invite the Association to meet at Harvard. 616 Wright, Henry W. Evolution and the Self-Realization Theory. Int J Ethics 18.3 (April 1908): 355-363. The moral agent should be understood in an evolutionary way. The self is gradually realized, through "rigorous obedience to duty and continual self-sacrifice," into conformity with the true good. JRS Notes See Wright, "Religion and Morality," Int J Ethics 20.1 (Oct 1909):87-92.
617 Aars, Kristian B. R Pragmatismus und Empiricismus. Z Phil Ph Krit 135.1 (May 1909): 1-10. 618 Alexander, Samuel. Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place of Mind in the Universe. Hibbert Journal 8.1 (Oct 1909): 47-66. Absolutism and pragmatism defend an experienced-centered reality. Theism can only be supported by the opposed metaphysics of independent reality and passive mind. JRS Notes See Cryms H. Eshleman's response, Hibbert Journal 8.2 (Jan 1910): 428-429, and Alexander's reply, Hibbert Journal 8.3 (April 1909): 667-668. 619 Aliotta, Antonio. 11 pragrnatismo anglo-americano. La Cultura Filosofica 3.2 (March-April 1909): 104-134. 620 Anon. Is the Psychology Taught at Harvard a National Peril? Current Literature 46.4 (April 1909): 436-438. A summary of Witmer's article (615) and a long quotation from Raymond Perrin's article in The Bang. IKS 621 Anon. Philosophy in the Open. Bookman 29.6 (Aug 1909): 661-662. Critics would "rather thump a pragmatist than explain him," which makes it easier to follow for "we simple folk." "Time spent in understanding is time lost in battle," and "no good word-fighter will ever seek an enemy's meaning when there are verbal shifts by which that enemy can be proved insane." JRS 622 Anon. Pragmatism and Religion. Spectator 102.2 (9 Jan 1909): 45-46. Pragmatism is more favorable to religion than naturalism or absolutism. JRS 623 Baldwin, James Mark. The Influence of Darwin on Theory of Knowledge and Philosophy. Psych Rev 16.3 (May 1909): 207-218. Reprinted with additions in Darwin and the Humanities (Baltimore: Review Publishing Co., 1909. Rpt., New York: AMS Press, 1980). 2nd ed. (London: Swann Sonnenshein and Co., 1910). The Darwinian revolution results in instrumentalism or experimental logic, which "holds that aN truth is confirmed hypothesis, and that all reason is truth woven into mental structure." Pragmatism is a radical and self-defeating extension of this logic into metaphysics, which denies reality to anything unconfirmed or useless. JRS
624 Baron, E. La Theorie de la connaissance dans le pragmatisme. Rev de Phil 14.6 (1 June 1909): 617-634. 625 Baudin, E. La MCthode psychologique de W. James. The preface to Pr6ci.s de psychologie, translation of James's Principles of psycho log^ (1890) by E. Baudin and G. Bertier (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1909. 3rd ed., 1912). Also published in Rev de Phil 14.6 (1 June 1909): 635-658.
James's psychology studies the living individual. He accepts physiological research as preliminary, but for psychology itself he uses introspection. James attempts to find the immediately given, which for him is the stream of consciousness. IKS Reviews of PrPcis de psychologie Frangois Pillon, L'Annk Philosophique 20 (1909): 195-196. Pillon expresses reservations on several points. IKS
626 Blanche, F. A. La Notion d e vdritd dam le pragmatisme. Rev d e Phil 15.1
(1 July 1909): 5-25. Summaries Helen M. Clarke, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 99- 100
627 Boodin, J. E. Truth and Agreement. Psych Rev 16.1 (Jan 1909): 55-66. Reprinted with revisions in Truth and Reality {916), pp. 214-229. Pragmatism sets aside "the real questiowthe relevancy of knowledge to its object." There is a lower stage of purposive thought, but that does not mean that nature itself is purposive. The higher stage of "sharing" knowledge copies the real object. Instrumentalism gives meaning to a moment of life only in so far as this moment is an instrument to another moment, and hence it is unable to give meaning to life as a whole. JRS Summaries John B. Kent, Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 572. 628 Boodin, J. E. What Pragmatism Is and Is Not. J Phil 6.23 (1 1 Nov 1909): 627-635. Reprinted with revisions in Truth and Reality {9l6), pp. 186-199. Pragmatism would scientifically test any philosophical hypothesis, and tries to specify the nature of a truth's agreement with some portion of reality. A pragmatist's conclusions drawn from pragmatism should not be assimilated to pragmatism itself. Pragmatism does not make the true and the useful coincide, nor does it reduce reality to what is humanly known. Truth does not always originate in practical demands or any and all satisfactions. Pragmatism is realistic "in so far as it intends a world beyond our finite cognitive purposes" but will not make any untested assertions about the mental or material, unified or plural, nature of this world. Nor will pragmatism commit to any apriori theory of ideas or the mind. It is unpragmatic to declare that ultimate truth will, or won't, be realized, or that time and chance are real, or unreal. JRS 629 Bourdeau, Jean. Pragmatisme et modernisme. Paris: Ftlix Alcan, 1909. There are three parts: Agnosticism, Pragmatism, and Modernism. Bourdeau notes in the preface that this work is for specialists, not amateurs. He writes that "in the face of a radical powerlessness of pure reason, the American philosophers, Peirce and James, propose a new method: pragmatism..." (p. vi) In Part One, chap. 4 (pp. 30-38) is "Le Crkpuscule des philosophes," a reprint of a review of Papini's I1 crepuscolo dei Filosofi (351). In Part Two, chap. I (pp. 39-48), "Nouvelles modes en philosophie," is an exposition of the pragmatist as the "new style of philosopher," who is at once a kind of positivist and whose work is derived from English Utilitarianism. Authors mentioned include Peircc, James, and Bergson-whose original philosophy has affinities with the work of the former two-Blondel, Papini, Lalande, and Schiller. Pragmatism is
a philosophy of adventurous and daring young intellects. Chap. 2, "Agnosticisme et pragmatisme" (pp. 49-65) is a reprint of (405). Chap. 3. "Le Pragmatisme contre le rationalisme" (pp. 66-75) is a reprint of (407). Chap. 4, "L'illusion pragmatiste" (pp. 76-83) is a reprint of (406). Chap. 5, "Une Sophistique du pragmatisme: Le Manuel des menteurs" (pp. 84-101) is a reprint of (408). In Part Three, chap. 2, "La Logique des sentiments" (pp. 112-121) describes Ribot's logic of emotions. Chap. 7 is entitled "Le Modemisme et I'orthodoxie" (pp. 122-186), in which Modernism is understood as an "application of pragmatism to religious beliefs." (p. vii). Chap. 8, "Inquietude religieuse" (pp. 187-204) focuses on Boutroux's work. The first appendix is by Dr. Louis RCnon, "Le Pragmatisme en medicine," pp. 2 15-220. LF Reviews Grace N. Dolson, Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 563-564; Xavier Moisant, Rev de Phil 14.1 (Jan 1909): 101; F m @ s Pillon, L'Ann& Philosophique 19 (1908): 202.
630 Boyce Gibson, W. R God With Us: A Stu& in Religious Idealism. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1909. In chap. 7, "Fruition and Action," pp. 128-144, Peirce's theory that "the real stimulus to action is not belief, but doubt" is accepted save for religion, which requires faith. In chap. 9, "Pragmatism and Religious Idealism," pp. 174-206, James's positions on the "will to believe" and religious mysticism are considered. Pragmatism's "greatest service" to Religious Idealism is its stand on the psychological basis of personality, but it offers pluralistic mysticism instead of an "all-inclusive spiritual life." (p. 196-197) Schiller's metaphysics resembles Aristotle's. Chap. 10, "Universalism and the Problem of Evil," pp. 207-229, compares James's "meliorism" and "indeterminism" with Religious Idealism's "optimism." Possibilities are real, and human possibilities are spiritual (making evil possible). JRS Reviews George Galloway, Hibbert Journal 8.2 (Jan 1910): 460-462. 631 Bradley, F. H. Coherence and Contradiction. Mind 18.4 (Oct 1909): 489508. Reprinted in Essqys on Truth and Reality { 12441, pp. 2 19-244. Truth must satisfy the intellectual need for consistency. Judgment ascribes multiple, and hence contradictory, relations to objects, and hence must fail to attain complete truth. In a footnote on p. 505-506, Bradley comments on difficulties understanding James and his A Pluralistic Universe (675). JRS 632 Brown, Harold C. The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. J Phil 6.2 (2 1 Jan 1 909): 44-5 1. A report of papers and discussions. including several about pragmatism. at this meeting. JRS 633 Brumas, E. Humanisme et pragmatisme. Revue Thomiste 17 (May-June 1909): 34 1-342. 634 Buckham, John Wright. The Organization of Truth. Int J Ethics 20.1 (Oct 1909): 63-72.
The "world of values" offers a "center" for truth. Lotze's appreciation for the role of feelings in truth led to Ritschl's value-based theology, and was paralleled in philosophy by pragmatism. Their common appeal to the individual's experience rejects any universal standard of value. This standard must instead be sought in the ethics of "universal moral selthood." JRS
641 Cook, E. A. Christian Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Believing. 1909.
635 Calderoni, Mario. Una diflicoltA del metodo pragmatists. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 5.3 (May-June 1909): 234-238. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calderoni (17491, vol. 2, pp. 125-132. Calderoni treats difficulties with the verification of past or historical facts. EPC
642 Cox, Ignatius W. Pragmatism. American Catholic Quarterly Review 34.1 (Jan 1909): 139-165. Pragmatism is not merely a synthesis of old errors; "it advances a few new ones of its
636 Calderoni, Mario. Giovanni Vailati. Rivista di Psicologia Applicata 5.5 (Sept-Oct 1909): 420-433. Reprinted in Scritti di Mario Calieroni { 17491, V O ~ .2, pp. 161 180. Calderoni's memorial essay gives biographical information and shows the development of Vailati's thought. Vailati's role in the turbulent years of Leonardo and the debates over the meaning of pragmatism are mentioned. Calderoni maintains that Vailati's philosophy was a pragmatism taken in its "original" and most "serious" form, following the lead of C. S. Peirce. It is also interesting to see how Calderoni views Vailati's pragmatism as a reaction against Italian positivism. Positivism was also an object of revulsion to Papini and Prezzolini, whose voluntaristic version of pragmatism was based upon an aggressive re-interpretation of James's "will to believe." EPC
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637 Carr, H. Wildon. Bergson's Theory of Knowledge. Proc Arisr Soc 9 (1 909): 4 1-60. Bergson's Evolution Criatrice, while depicting reality as activity and intelligence as practical, does not agree with pragmatism that the truth is "what works," or that we make truth, or that truth is mutable. JRS
638 Carus, Paul. The Philosophy of Personal Equation. Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 78-84. Reprinted in Truth on Trial (9251, pp. 46-64. Individual irregularities cause fluctuations in scientific measurement. In like manner. pragmatism allows the vagaries of subjective interest to control cognition. JRS
639 Carus, Paul. A Postscript on Pragmatism. In Comment on Professor James's Review of Marcel Hdbert's Book. Monist 19.1 (Jan 1909): 85-94. James's review of (549) complains that his critics see subjectivism in pragmatism. but an examination of his I'ragn~atisn~ shows how he confuses the real issues. James is merely "fixing belief' to relieve doubt, as Peirce long ago outlined. Pragmatism usefully investigates the psychological origins of belief and the practical applications for truth, but as a theory of truth, it will "deny the value of theory, of consistency, systematization, etc." JRS
640 Chiappelli, Alessandro. Naturalisme, humanisme, et philosophie des valeurs. Rev Phil 67.3 (March 1909): 225-255. Summaries John B. Kent. Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 568-569.
Notes See also Cook, Christian Faith for Men of Today (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1913).
own." Truth is declared to be mutable, but what of the truth of pragmatism? James ambiguously says that tmth is."to agree in the widest sense with reality," which allows a distinction to be made between some absolute truths and the remaining provisional theories. To "copy reality" is just to know reality "as it is." Truth can grow in a relative sense, as knowledge of relations between objects expands. Pragmatism drives us to subjectivism and skepticism, and defines reality as sensations and our constructions from them. Logic and ontology become one, dropping pragmatism into a subjective idealism which cannot account for our experience of a common external world. An intellectualist realism and a representational cognitivism is far more practical. Hypotheses work because they are true. Pragmatists must admit that an external reality explains why sensations are mostly beyond our control. "It is pleasant for lovers of Catholic philosophy to contemplate in her doctrine on reality another victory" and "may we not say that she is true because the Divine Hand of Eternal Truth is guiding her." JRS
643 Creighton, James E. Darwin and Logic. Psych Rev 16.3 (May 1909): 170187. Reprinted in Studies in Speculative Philosophy, ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, l925), pp. 180-20 1. The impact of evolution on logic is evident in the work of the pragmatists and J. M. Baldwin. JRS Notes See J. M. Baldwin's response, "Darwinism and Logic: A Reply to Professor Creighton," Psych Rev 16.6 (Nov 1909): 43 1-436. 644 Creighton, James E. Knowledge and Practice. Int J Ethics 20.1 (Oct 1909): 29-48. Reprinted in Studies in Speculative Philosophy, ed. Harold R. Smart (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 24-44. The value of knowledge is connected with practice: "the practical lifc becomes thc means and instrument of reason" when the desire for truth overcomes selfish passions. 'I IK current popular demand that knowledge serve only the expedient material needs of society threatens all aspects of the university's real purpose: truth, free inquiry, moral character, devotion to scholarship, philosophical intellect, and liberal culture. JRS 645 Croce, Benedetto. Filosojia della practice, economia ed etica. Vol. 3 o f Filosoja come scienza dello spirito. Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1909. 3rd rev. ed., 1923. 8th ed., 1963. Translated by Douglas Ainslie as The Philosophy of the Practical (London: Macmillan, 1913. Rpt., Kew York: Biblo and Tannen, 1967).
"Psychological" philosophy may affirm practical activity, but only the complete abstraction of philosophy, achieving universal consciousness, can judge it properly. The theoretical cannot be reduced to volition, since practical activity presupposes theory, and vice versa (p. 33) Pragmatism, "the school of the greatest conhion that has ever appeared in philosophy," has at least seven forms. 1. The theoretical depends on the practical. 2. The true is the production of the will. 3. Only the sciences and mathematics offer any wellbeing for life. 4. Knowledge is limited to positivistic formulas. 5. The principle of human creative power should be elevated to universal spirit. 6. It is useful to make one's illusions and believe them to be true. 7. Superstition, the occult, and spiritism. Pragmatism falsely assumes that it possible to know the end and then will it, but the ends do not justify the means. The concepts of "the good" and "value" are not "original facts." Theory and practice are correlated. "Knowledge is not an end, but an instrument of life: knowledge that did not serve life would be superfluous and harmful" but it is also true that "activity, if it does not wish to become an irrational and sterile tumult, must lead to contemplation." @. 304, 305) The recognition of this bond between theory and practice results in a "new pragmatism," which can show that all thought, including philosophy, is historically conditioned. Philosophy itself must reflect its historical situation, not in its solutions, but its problems. JRS Reviews of the translation Bernard Muscio, Int J Ethics 24.4 (July 1914): 455-457, H. J. Paton, Mind 23.3 (July 1914): 428-432; James H. Tufts, Phil Rev 24.3 (May 1915): 321-325. 646 De Bussy. Gedachten over het Pragmatisme. 1909. 647 De Laguna, Grace Andrus. The Practical Character of Reality. Phil Rev 18.4 (July 1909): 396-4 15. Reprinted as appendix 2 of Dogmatism and Evolution {790j, pp. 235-255. Pragmatism cannot hold that universals are immediately experienced, and hence must deny that they are real. Doubt cannot be immediately experienced either, nor can illusions. The better theory explains these matters by holding that reality is only functionally ideal, which also accounts for the practical advantages of scientific hypotheses. JRS 648 Dewey, John. Darwin's Influence Upon Philosophy. Popular Science Monthly 75 (July 1909): 90-98. Revised as "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy" in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy {793), pp. 1-19. Philosophy ofJD I, pp. 3 1-40. MW4: 3-14. The significance of the debate generated by Darwinism does not involve its opposition to the typically conservative and unoriginal theology, but rather to the historically scientific understanding of nature as possessing fixed, purposive forms. Darwin extended the modem scientilic denial of such forms to biology, by applying a genetic logic to the conception of organisms. Evolution takes place within natural constraints; it is not mere chance, but successful variation, which undermines the appeal of the argument from design. Intelligence can similarly throw off the restrictions of formal logic and bondage to transcendent reality without falling back on experience as mere "flux." This defeat of absolutism is a matter of a "growing recognition of its futility." JRS
649 Dewey, John. The Dilemma of the Intellectualist Theory of Truth. J Phil 6.16 (5 Aug 1909): 433-434. Reprinted in Dewey and His Critics, pp. 226-227. MW4: 76-77. The intellectualist insists that ideas have the property of truth prior to their verification. This theory implies that truths come into existence when true ideas are first conceived. If the intellectualist responds that truth lies in the idea's agreement with things, then ideas are portrayed as "concretely lighted upon their intended objects so that their truth or falsitv was self-luminous." If the intellectualist instead describes truth as a property solely of objects or events, then a system of absolutistic rationalism is offered. JRS 650 Dewey, John. Discussion: Realism and Idealism. Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 182-183. Reprinted in MW 4: 1 16-1 17. Both positions result from an exaggeration of the role of observation and ideas, respectively. Their reconciliation lies in giving up "the attempt at wholesale characterizations of 'Reality' as such." JRS Notes Abstract of a paper. This discussion and subsequent debate is described in "The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" (632). 651 Dewey, John. Is Nature Good? A Conversation. Hibbert Journal 7.4 (July 1909): 827-843. Reprinted as "Nature and Its Good: A Conversation" in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy {793), pp. 20-45. MW 4: 15-30. A dialogue in which a pragmatist ("Eaton") rejects the notion that an absolute reality can support values. It is the absolutist who cannot distinguish good and evil, not the pragmatist. Values are experienced only by sentient organisms, which use intelligence to maintain and increase goods in a precarious world. JRS 652 Dewey, John. Moral Principles in Education. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909. Reprinted in MW4: 265-293. An "elaboration" of Dewey's earlier "Ethical Principles Underlying Education," in the Third Yearbook of the National Herbart Society (Chicago: The Society, 1897), pp. 7-33 [EW 5: 54-83]. JRS Reviews Anon, Proceedings of the Second International Moral Education Congress (1912). pp 184-187; Frank A. Manny. Elementary School Teacher 10 ( 1 909): 204; Carl E. Seashore. Journal of Educational Psychology 1 (19 10): 1 17-118.
653 Dewey, John. Objects, Data, and Existences: A Reply to Professor McGilvary. J Phil 6.1 (7 Jan 1909): 13-21. Reprinted in MW4: 146-155. Dewey replies to McGilvary's "The Chicago 'Idea' and Idealism" (570). 'lke existence of data prior to reflection is essential, but McGilvary confuses such data bill^ ideas within judgments created by retlection. Science must keep them distinct. hut intcl-lectualisrn conflatesthem and enfolds reality within ideas. Dewey points out that ifrcaliwl rejects such a move. then he is a realist. The real issue is the status of data and hldiilvary's own position forces him into a dilemma: an act of experiencing \rill hc eitllcr :! particular, fragmentary, meaningless sensation (requiring the idealistic conceptual lans 111
create the ordered world) or a full and complete cognitive knowing (leaving no purpose for scientific investigation). What does McGilvary mean by "experience"? Since philosophy should only deal with experienced things, in that sense it should be idealistic. "I know shamefully little about 'all reality', since my empiricism is precisely that the only realities I do know anything about or ever shall know anything about are just experienced realities." JRS Notes On this exchange between Dewey and McGilvary see John R. Shook, "John Dewey's Struggle with American Realism, 1904-19 10." Transactions 01the Charles S. Peirce Society 3 1.3 (Summer 1995): 542-566.
tion of American Pragmatism in Germany, 1899-1952," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 17.1 (Winter 1981): 25-35. The proceedings of the congress were reported by A. C. Armstrong, 'The Third International Congress of Philosophy," Phil Rev 18.1 (Jan 1909): 48-58; Henri Delacroix, "Le Troisieme c o n e s internationale de philosophie," Rev Phil 66.5 (Nov 1908): 528-545; G. Seliber, "Der Pragmatismus und seine Gegner auf dem 111. Internationalen KongreD ftlr Philosophie," Arch Syst Phil 15.3 (27 Aug 1909): 287-298; and Giovanni Vidari, '"Terncongresso filosofico internazionale," Riv Filo 11.5 (Sept-Oct 1908): 543-553. Vidari declared that "the Heidelberg proceedings illustrate the tendency to profit by what is helpful in Pragmatism without adopting the extreme wnclusions of its advocates."
654 Doan, F r a n k Carlton. An Outline of Cosmic Humanism. J Phil 6.3 (4 Feb 1909): 57-64. Reprinted as appendix 1 of Religion and the Modern Mind (655). Notes Abstracted in Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 173-174, and mentioned in "The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" (632).
657 Eshleman, Cyrus H. Professor James on Fechner's Philosophy. Hibbert Journal 7.3 (April 1909): 671-673. Eshleman comments on James's "The Doctrine of the Earth-Soul" (671 ) with the regret that James did not give a fuller account of the soul-life. IKS
655 Doan, F r a n k Carlton. Religion and the Modern Mind and Other Essays in Modernism. Boston: Sherman, French, and Co., 1909. Reviews F. C. French, J Phil 7.5 (3 March 1910): 133-135. This treatise is a "gospel of humanism, on the basis of the pragmatic philosophy." JRS ,
656 Elsenhans, Theodore, ed. Berichte iiber den III. Internationalen Kongress fir Philosophie zu Heidelberg. Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universittitsbuchhandlung, 1909. The papers discussing pragmatism are the following. Josiah Royce, "The Problem of Truth in Light of Recent Discussion," pp. 62-90 [see (70911, and the subsequent discussion by W. Jerusalem, Itelson, W. M. Kozlowski, G. Storring, F. C. S. Schiller, J. Waldapfel, and A. Daring, pp. 91-93. Kristian B. R. Aars, "Energie-lehre und Pragmatismus," pp. 494-501. Julius Piblcr, "Die Funktion des lnteresses bein Strewn und die PRAGMATISCI 1E Streitfrage," pp. 622-629, [also published in his Zwei Vortrage iiber dynamische Psychologie {587)] and the subsequent discussion by Josiah Royce, Waldapfel, Doring, and Pikler, pp. 629-630. F. C. S. Schiller, "Der rationalistiche Wahrheitsbegriff," pp. 71 1719 [the translation of "Rationalistic Conception of Truth" (71711. A. C. Amstrong, "The Evolution of Pragmatism," pp. 720-726 [also published as {504)], and the subsequent discussion of both Schiller's and Armstrong's papers by Diin; Arnold Ruge, E. Mally, Pikler. Wilhelm Jcrusalcm, Boris Jakowenko, Otto Karmin, W. M. Kozlowski, G. Storring, and F. C. S. Schillcr, pp. 726-729. Further discussions of pragmatism by Leonard Nelson, Rudolf Goldscheid, Theodore Elsenhans, E. Mally, Diirr, Oskar Ewald. Boris Jakowenko. W. M. Kozlowski, Paul Carus, Abel Rey, J. Waldapfel. M. Grelling, and F. C. S. Schiller are reported on pp. 729-740. Schiller remarks on Rudolf Goldscheid's "Die Willenskritische Mcthodc," p. 762. Wilhelm Jerusalem, "Apriorismus und Evolutionismus," pp. 806-814. and the subsequent discussion follows on pp. 814-8 15. JRS Notes This congrcss took place ill Ilcidelbcrg, 31 Aug-5 Sept 1908. Klaus Oehler refers to it as "the oflicial starting point of pragmatism's influence in Germany" in "Notes on the Reccp-
658 Eucken, Rudolf. Geistige Strdmungen der Gegenwart. 4th rev. ed., Liepzig: Veit, 1909. Translated by Meyrick Booth as Main Currents of Modern Thought (London: T . Fisher Unwin, 19 12). In a section entitled "Pragmatism" (pp. 75-79) Eucken is "compelled to regard it, when we consider it as a whole and in its ultimate bearings, as an error." If truth is viewed as a mere means, and not an end in itself, it loses "all the power of conviction" and brings only disharmony. Pragmatism assumes a great "optimistic enthusiasm" for human culture. In the succeeding section on "Our Own Position: Activism" Eucken contrasts pragmatism with his desire for the higher spiritual life. JRS Reviews A. C. Armstrong, Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 230-23 1. Reviews of the translation R. F. Alfred Hoernlt, Mind 24.1 (Jan 1915): 86-93. Notes The first edition was titled Grundbegr~feder Gegenwart (1878). The material on pragmatism was added in the fourth edition. On Eucken, see W. R. Boyce Gibson's Rudolf Eucken i Philosophy of LiJe (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1906). 659 Eucken, Rudolf. The Life of the Spirit: An Introduction to Philosophy. 2nd ed.. Translated by F. L. Pogson. London: Williams and Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909. Pragmatism's emphasis on solely human goals and experiences is inadequate to "the irresistible power of man's innate spirituality." (p. 323) Truth should be in a "closer connection with the whole of life," but this life is "cosmic." JRS Reviews Anon, Amer J Psych 20.3 (July 1909): 463. Notes The first edition was titled Einfuhrung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1908).
660 Ewald, Oscar. German Philosophy in 1908. Translated by William A. Harnmond. Phil Rev 18.5 (Sept 1909): 514-535. Ewald briefly describes the debates on pragmatism at the Third World Congress of Philosophy. Royce's position mirrored the Neo-Kantian and Neo-Fichtean opposition to pragmatism. JRS
Reviews G. W. T. Whitney, Phil Rev 19.2 (March 1910): 218-221. Whitney argues that Hermant and Waele's concluding position has "much in common with pragmatism and positivism," and that the authors' criticisms of pragmatism can be leveled against their own view (see esp. pp. 265ff). LF
661 Ewer, Bernard C. Paradoxes in Natural Realism. J Phil 6.22 (28 Oct
666 Huizinga, Arnold van C. P. The American Philosophy Pragmatism. Bibliotheca Sacra 66.1 (Jan 1909): 78-104. Materials used for 17te American Philosophy Pragmatism (954).
1909): 589-600. A footnote on p. 595 complains that Dewey's pragmatic definition of reality does not refute independently existing realities, and indeed, his disagreement with idealism must rely on processes lying beyond consciousness. JRS 662 Fawcett, Edward D. The Individual and Reality: An Essay Touching the First Principles ofMetaphysics. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909. In two sections on pp. 27-33, Fawcett describes pragmatism's "subordination of truth to practice" as a later phase of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of will, and points out that reality can be "disastrous." JRS Reviews H. A. Overstreet, Phil Rev 19.5 (Sept 1910): 541-548. 663 Foston, Hubert. The Mutual Symbolism of Intelligence and Activity. Proc
Arist Soc 9 (1 909): 100- 1 18. Pragmatism tends to evade its difficulties with the "activist fallacy of making process cover the whole of being." (p. 1 16) JRS 664 Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. Le Sens commun, laphilosophie de I'&e et les formules dogmatiques. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie., 1909. In Part 1. chap. 1 especially, the author presents and attacks ~douardLe Roy as a nominalist and sensist, and pragmatism as "worthless and heretical." The end of the chapter includes remarks on Bergson's and Boutroux's positions. Chap. 2 develops his own conceptualist-realist view of common sense, which is inexorably linked to Scholastic philosophy and eternal truth. See also pp. 242ff on Le Roy's critique of Thomistic proofs of the existence of God, and pp. 282ff on Le Roy's pantheism. LF Reviews Joseph I.ouis I'erricr. J Phil 7.22 (27 Oct 1910): 6 12-6 14. I'crrier argues that. pace Garrigoil-l,agrange, pragmatism is neutral with respect to realis~nlnominalismand conceptualismlsensism; and that there is "in pragmatism a profound meaning and a good deal of truth which [the author] has never suspected." LF 665 Hermant, P. a n d A. Van d e Waele. Les Principales the'ories de la logique conremporuine. Paris: FCIix Alcan, 1909. A critical survey of theories of knowledge by German, English, and French schools. The Ilnglish are divided into realists, idealists and pragmatists. Peirce, James, Dewey, and Schiller are discussed (pp. 207-230). American Pragmatism is regarded as a "local e\prcssion of a gcncral philosophical tendency," and as an "adversary of absolutist thcories " (pp 22Qff) Scc pp. 23 If for remarks on Renouvier and FouilleC. LF
667 Hume, J a m e s G. The Import of Pragmatism for the History of Philosophy. Phil Rev 18.2 (March 1909): 176- 177. Notes An abstract of a paper. This paper is also summarized in "The Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association" {632). 668 Inge, William R Faith and Its Psychology. London: Duckworth, 1909. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910. Reviews Douglas C. Macintosh, "Pragmatism and Mysticism," American Journal of Theology 15.1 (Jan 1911): 142-146. The criticism of pragmatism "is not based on a more intelligent appreciation," identifying it with the "pseudo-pragmatism of modernist Catholics." JRS Arnold R. Whately, Hibbert Journal 9.1 (Oct 1910): 212-215. 669 Jacoby, Giinther. Der Pragmatismus: Neue Bahnen in der Wissenschafteslehre des Auslands. Liepzig: Dun, 1909. Reviews A. W. Moore, Psych Bull 7.9 (15 Sept 1910): 301-303. Germany is starting to notice the pragmatic movement. JRS Wilhelm Jerusalem, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 3 1 (1910): 789-792. 670 James, William. The Confidences of a "Psychical Researcher." American Magazine 68 (Oct 1909): 580-589. Reprinted as "Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher," in Memories and Studies (9571, pp. 173-206. Wrihgs 2, pp. 1250-1265. William James on Psychical Research, ed. Gardner Murphy and Robert 0.Ballou (New York: Viking, 1960), pp. 309-325. Work EPR, pp. 36 1375. The English founders of the Society for Psychical Research expected immediate results, but after more than 25 years, everything is still uncertain. Yet the failure of orthodox science to persuade people that psychic phenomena are mere frauds suggests that there must be something genuine and baffling. The English researchers followed the rule that once a cheat, always a cheat. This is a wise rule, yet irrelevant as a test of truth, because most of us sometimes cheat for the sake of a higher truth. A better tcst is one's sense of the "dramatic probabilities." While swindling predominates, it is likcly to imitate genuine phenomena. The best theory is panpsychism. If there is an enveioping cosmic reservoir of consciousncss. then apparitions, presentiments, cxtraordin:~r\
knowledge exhibited by mediums, and other phenomena could be thought of as leaks. Mediums may be able to tap into the reservoir telepathically. The hypothesis of telepathy, first proposed by Frederic Myers, is a usefbl, unifying hypothesis. IKS
671 James, William. The Doctrine of the Earth-Soul and of Beings Intermediate between Man and God. An Account of the Philosophy of G. T. Fechner. Hibbert Journal 7.2 (Jan 1909): 278-294. Also published with slight changes as "Concerning Fechner," in A Pluralistic Universe (6751, pp. 145-176. Notes See Eshleman's reponse, "Professor James on Fechner's Philosophy" (657).
672 James, William. The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909. Reprinted as Works MT. Translated into French by L. Veil and Maxime David as L'Zdek de vbitk (Paris: Fdlix Alcan, 1913). A collection of polemical articles in the controversy over pragmatism. James's "Preface," pp. v-xx [Works MT,pp. 3-10], explains that in his Pragmatism he gave some grounds for misunderstandings concerning religious beliefs by saying that they consist in their "feeling good" to us. But he had only meant to say that among competing beliefs in all other respects equal, sane men will choose the one which satisfies a vital human need. The pragmatic conception of truth is important in establishing radical empiricism. Such empiricism consists of a postulate that philosophers should debate only in terms drawn from experience, a factual claim that relations are matters of direct experience, and a generalized conclusion that the universe because held together by relations which are themselves parts of experience needs no support outside itself. Rationalists use the truth-relation as an obvious case of something resting on something outside experience, while pragmatism shows it to have a content definable in experiential terms. Schiller, Dewey, and he agree in the existence of objects because such are as much needed to explain the falsehood of ideas as their truth. "The Function of Cognition," pp. 1-42 [Works MT, pp. 13-32], is included because much of the analysis of truth developed in Pragmatism is in this 1885 article. It places the truth function within experience and provides for an experienceable environment between idea and object. However, the essay places too much emphasis on resemblance and lacks a generalized notion of workability. "The Tigers in India," pp. 43-50 [Works htT, pp. 33-36], is an extract from "The Knowing of Things Together" (1895). It defines representative knowledge with reference to a context which leads to an object. In intuitive knowledge, there is simply the datum, the experience, which later is considered either thing or mind, depending upon the context in which it is placed. "Humanism and Truth," pp. 51-101, is a reprint, with additions, of (176). "The Relation Between Knower and Know," pp. 102-120, is an extract from (180). "The Essence of Humanism," pp. 121-135, is a reprint of (242). "A Word More About Truth," pp. 136- 161, is a reprint of (442). "Professor Pratt on Truth," pp. 162-179, is a reprint of (440). "The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders," pp. 180-216, is a reprint of (556). "The Meaning of the Word Truth," pp. 217-220, is a reprint of (554). "The Existence of Julius Czsar," pp. 221-225, is a reprint of (558). "The Absolute and the Strenuous Life," pp. 226-229, is a reprint of (435). "Professor
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Htbert on Pragmatism," pp. 230-245, is a reprint of a review of {549). "Abstractionism and 'Relativismus'," pp. 246-271, is a reprint of (673). In "Two English Critics," pp. 272-286 [Works MT,pp. 146-1533, James argues that the attacks upon pragmatism by Bertrand Russell and Ralph Hawtrey are examples of vicious intellectualism: the rigoristic assumption derived from mathe-matics that words can be exactly defined and their full context ignored. Russell repeats the slanders that for pragmatists any truth-claimer must know the consequences of the belief and that a belief can be true even when its object does not exist. But to say that a belief is true and define truth by workings is not to claim the belief to be one about workings, as Russell claims. Furthermore, pragmatists have repeatedly argued that for beliefs to be true their objects must exist. Hawtrey identifies truth with expediency and proposes to use "correctnessn to designate the fact that an object is as the belief declares it to be. This makes the term ambiguous, sometimes indicating a property of beliefs and at other times, that of facts. The word "proposition" proposed by G. E. Moore and others is also defective. In "A Dialogue," pp. 287-298 [Works MT,pp. IS4-159], James argues that a belief about a past events, which by hypothesis will never come to be known, is true now in this sense: any knower, were he to come to know the event, would find himself coming into satisfactory relations with it and devising substitutes for it, and in this be partially constrained by the nature of the event. An analysis of the intellectualist view reveals three entities: the reality, the knowing, and the truth. Pragmatists recognize only the first two, since "what truth is known as" cannot be distinguished from them. IKS Extended reviews Paul Carus (773). Reviews Anon, Amer J Psych 21.1 (Jan 1910): 172-173. The critics' difficulties in interpreting James is caused by his "off-hand, slap-dash, vivacious way of after-dinner table talk, instead of in the method of severely reasoned, logical thinking." JRS Anon, Athenaeum 4280 (6 Nov 1909): 549-550. Compromise is now in the air. James acts as if he had never left the fold. There are almost no traces of the pragmatic appeal to the individual conscience. James "abjures subjectivism." 1KS Anon, North American Review 193.2 (Feb 191 1): 298-300. With James, for the first time, ideas originating in the United States have influenced thinkers in Europe. IKS Anon, "Pragmatism Again," Nation 90.4 (27 Jan 1910): 88-90. James at last clarifies that pragmatism is only a doctrine of epistemology, not ontology. JRS E. Baron, Rev de Phil 16.4 ( 1 April 1910): 426-428. James is an ardent propagandist of the gospel and gives us a collection of essays on its most controversial point. I'ragmatism, it become clear, is not a matter of believing what one &ants to believe, but recognizes an object with which we come to agree through the working of our ideas Pragmatism should not be confounded with the metaphysics (Schiller's humanism, James's pluralism) which makes it possible. IKS Pierre Bovef Archives de Psychologie 9 (1910): 149-150. James's humanism seems to be nothing else than his radical empiricism. IKS John Grier Hibben, Educational Review 40.2 (Sept 1910): 201-207. Pragrnatisnl offers students the lure of expediency and would cause them to "fall into slovenly and lax methods of inquiry." It confuses the ground of truth with its verification, and forgcts that practical endeavors are conducted nith the prior assurances of constant truths. 7 he pragmatic test cannot deal with truths of logical or rnathernatical relations. JRS
George T. Ladd, Phil Rev 19.1 (Jan 1910): 63-69. James shifts from question to question and alters the meaning of terms. Pragmatists claim that truth is agreement with reality, thus making reality authoritative over our ideas. But in trying to explain how we recognize truth, James claims that truth is the agreement of portions of experience with other portions and thus approaches solipsism. IKS And& Lalande, Rev Phil 71 (Jan 1911). A summary of the major aspects. It is an ingenious book. However, James at times uses poor arguments. IKS James Lindsay, Arch Syst Phil 17 (191 1): 133-134. James is too polemical and the result is not very satisfying. Some rationalists are absurd, but this is no reason to "proscribe the legitimate place*' of the intellect. IKS Evander B. McGilvary, Int J Ethics 20.2 (Jan 1910): 244-250. To one who has suspected that James was capable only of "random excursions," this work proves that behind them stands a "thoroughly systematic plan." James shows that he is not a subjectivist. However, James's attribution of truth to ideas which never intended to be true or false confuses the issue. Schiller's account which begins with claims to truth is preferable even if unsatisfactory. IKS Richard MUller-Freienfels, Zeit ftir Psych 57 (I9 10): 195-196. James answers accusations that pragmatism leaves no room for an external world. He wants a radical empiricism. Pragmatism does not clariQ the difference between established truth and personal belief, even where this difference would be useful. IKS John E. Russell, J Phil 7.1 (6 Jan 1910): 22-24. In his anti-pragmatist days, Russell would have viewed the volume differently. Now he finds it a challenge to the rejectors of pragmatism. James opposes a concrete conception of truth to the empty abstraction of the anti-pragmatists. He answers critics' claims that radical empiricism leads to solipsism. IKS F. C . S. Schiller, Mind 19.2 (April 1910): 258-263. This treatise shows how the "pragmatic conceptions actually grew up in a first-class" mind. James upholds the solidarity of the leading pragmatists, although he seems to be somewhat hesitant about Dewey. This is due to a realistic strain in James: his views on "real objects." Here, James is not pragmatic enough, for he does not ask what is meant by real objects. Schiller cannot agree with James that his own contributions to humanism are primarily psychological. IKS A. Wolf, Hibbert Journal 8.4 (July 1910): 904-908. Pragmatists write as if their doctrine was the only alternative to Absolute idealism, but the pragmatic view of truth is "hardly more akin to empirical realism than to solipsism." Under the spell of modem science's skeptical tendencies, pragmatism has identified verity with verification. JRS Lionel Dauriac, Rev Phil 70.6 (Dec 1910): 643-649. Reviews of French translation Fraqois Pillon, L'Annte Philosophique 24 (1913): 202-203. A summary of the contents. James protests against the view that pragmatism ignores theoretical interests and is a philosophy of action. IKS
673 James, William. On a Very Prevalent Abuse of Abstraction. Popular Science Monthly 74.5 (May 1909): 485-493. Reprinted as "Abstractionism and 'Relativismus'," in The Meaning of Truth (6721, pp. 246-271. Works MT, pp. 134-145.
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Abstract concepts are useful because they allow us to anticipate experience, and philosophers have rightly prized them. Abstractionists abstract a feature of an object and then insist that the object is nothing but that. G. S. Fullerton engages in abstractionism in his attack on free-will, arguing that free-will involves disconnection while the admission of any point of disconnection invoIves the denial of dl connection. McTaggart treats the "will to believe" as an abstraction. In the concrete, the will is the right to choose between attractive alternatives in cases where complete evidence is lacking. McTaggart reduces the situation to the silly premise "all good desires must be fulfilled," thereby loosing sight of the complexity of the motives which in the concrete are at work. A similar fault is present in the attacks on "relativismus" by H. Rickert and Hugo Monsterberg. In attacks on pragmatism, the notion of truth is taken as selfevident. Pragmatists try to explain the concrete meaning of truth and treat beliefs not as abstractions but as "opinions in the flesh." IKS
674 James, William. The Philosophy of Bergson. Hibbert Journal 7.3 (April 1909): 562-577. Also published in revised form as "Bergson and His Critique of Intellectualism," in A Pluralistic Universe (6751, pp. 223-272. 675 James, William. A Pluralistic Universe.New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909. Translated into French as La Philosophie de I'apPrience by E . Baudin and G. Bertier (Paris: Flammarion, 1910). Translated into German with an introduction { 1254) by Julius Goldstein as Das pluralistische Universum (Leipzig: Alfred Kroner, 1914). The Works of William James: A Pluralistic t Mass.: Harvard University Press, Universe, ed. Frederick ~ u r k h a r d(Cambridge, 1977). Philosophy expresses a vision in argumentative form: philosophers fmd reasons for what they believe on instinct. The vision is the important thing, and philosophers should be careful that their thinking not become mere technique, as is the case in Germany. Philosophy is undergoing a revival, as empiricism arises and challenges the dominant rationalistic idealism. Rationalism proceeds from wholes to parts and tends towards monism, while empiricism, beginning with the parts, leans towards pluralism. Another opposition, perhaps the most interesting one, is that between materialism and spiritualism, resulting from a clash between cynical and sympathetic temperaments. From a pragmatic point of view, spiritualism is an attitude of trust in the universe, while materialism leaves us on guard and suspicious. Spiritualism has two forms: dualistic theism and pantheism. The former leaves man and God totally different, and often depicts God in legalistic and monarchic terms; truth is a passive acquiescence to the order established by Him. Scientific evolutionism has opened up for our time vast vistas, and the rise of social democratic ideals has made monarchism strange, pushing our thinking towards pantheism for which God is the indwelling divine. Pantheism is the more intimate type of spiritualism. Its vision of the union of man and God develops pluralistic and monistic forms. Pluralism or radical empiricism conceives the divine in the "each-form," denying that everything is collected into totality and taking the reals separately and distributively. Monism or absolutism thinks in the "all-form": the divine exists authentically only when reality is experienccd as a totality. Monism fails to establish real intimacy between man and the divine. I t declares time
675 (cont.) itself to be unreal. Its absolute remains strange to us because it has no history, cannot suffer, cannot strive, which exist only in time, for the relative and finite point of view. Absolutists such as Hermann Lotze, Josiah Royce, and F. H. Bradley try to establish absolutism dialectically, by arguing that only the extremes of absolute chaos or absolute unity are logically possible. Their arguments are merely verbal and tainted by vicious intellectualism: the habit of thinking that names exclude from the facts which they name anything not stated in their definitions. Absolutists begin with the healthy belief that the world is rational, but they cling to the faith that sensations are not rational and that therefore conceptions must be substituted for them. They lose the "innocent continuity" of sense-experience, and because they treat concepts intellectually, cannot find continuity on the conceptual level. They then have no recourse but to bring in the absolute in order to reestablish continuity. The issue can be reduced to the problem of external relations. Bradley denies their possibility, while to James they undoubtedly exist. Hegel is the source of much current absolutism. He cultivated obscurity and ambiguity, but like other philosophers, is simple to understand once one gets to the center of his vision. His mind was impressionistic and saw reason as all-inclusive and things as dialectical. His dialectic accurately portrays the fact that any equilibrium is but temporary and is rushing towards destruction within a larger system, and that things cannot be isolated but are always being invaded by their environment. Hegel unfortunately clung to rationalistic ideals and expressed his vision in what he called logic, thereby claiming coercive necessity for his system. Finding the logic of identity sterile, he began to move from the different to the different as if by the necessity of thought, found things to negate themselves, and made self-contradiction the "propulsive logical force that moves the world." He correctly observed that many paradoxes are reconciled in higher syntheses, but he was dogmatic and clung to the notion of the one truth. In concepts, the dialectic serves the need for an absolute and final truth because any afirmation implies its negations, thereby leaving no room for any alternatives outside itself. Hegel's dialectic, a case of vicious intellectualism, is rejected even by many of his followers. James also rejects it, leaving Hegel as "one of the great types of cosmic vision." Hegel wants to substitute concepts for the data of experience because he treats experience itself intellectualistically, making the data of sense "untrue" because they are not their own others. But the flow of experience, when taken in its own terms, reveals some realities being their own others. This is the view of Bergson. Leaving aside Hegel's method, it must be noted that the Absolute is not the God of popular religion, because the latter is always a member of a pluralistic system. Does the Absolute exist? It is alleged to make the world more rational, but rationality has at least four dimensions: intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and practical. The conception of the absolute is beautiful aesthetically and intellectually because by making the universe static, it yields the feeling of peace. Yet the absolute gives rise to the problem of evil and cannot make rational the existence of finite knowers making imperfect copies of reality. Rationality fails at this point because a perfect whole requires perfect parts and we cannot see Iiow irnpc~fcctparts can constitute a perfect \+hole. A better way of cor~ccivingrcalitj i l l spiritual terms is proposed by
