Political Leadership in Foreign Policy: Manipulating Support across Borders

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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY

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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY MANIPULATING SUPPORT ACROSS BORDERS

Andrea K. Grove


© Andrea K. Grove, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–6949–1 ISBN-10: 1–4039–6949–3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: May 2007 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

CONTENTS

List of Tables

vii

Acknowledgments

ix

1

1

Leadership in Foreign Policy

2 Forcing Peace: John Hume’s “Long Struggle” in Northern Ireland, 1982–1998

13

3 From the Outside In: George H.W. Bush and the Persian Gulf War, August 1990–January 1991

41

4 Resisting Change: Mugabe against the People’s Struggle in Zimbabwe, 1998–2005

69

5 The South African “Miracle”: Mandela’s Struggle in a Globalized Transition, 1985–1994

101

6 Pakistan’s Musharraf: The War on Terror and Fueling the Jihad, 2001–2005

137

7

177

Concluding Observations

Notes

185

Bibliography

209

Index

221


LIST OF TABLES

1.1 1.2 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 5.1 6.1

Four leadership strategies Case studies Summary of John Hume’s use of strategy Bush’s framing threat strategy Summary of George Bush’s use of strategy Summary of Robert Mugabe’s use of strategy Summary of Nelson Mandela’s use of strategy Summary of Pervez Musharraf ’s use of strategy

8 9 20 60 65 98 134 172


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

have been so fortunate to have much help, support, and inspiration while working on this project. First, David Pervin, my initial editor at Palgrave Macmillan deserves my gratitude because he took an initial proposal targeted at a different audience and helped me to structure a project more suited to my passion—that of trying to make research in the field of international relations more accessible to undergraduate students. His expertise and stylistic approach were invaluable. In addition, I would like to thank my students at Westminster College who have challenged me with their curiosity and their optimism that learning about the world around them is their first step in changing that world. You know who you are. Thank you for sharing that hope with me. Westminster College provided research funds that supplemented travel to South Africa, Northern Ireland, and additional research locations. For this I am grateful for the sustained support of Professor Sandra Webster in securing funding. Also, thank you to all the great colleagues I leave behind as I move on to new challenges in California. Likewise, a number of colleagues have been so generous with their time and moral support. Brian Ripley at Mercyhurst College has become one of my most valued friends and mentors. His many insights on various drafts of this work are deeply appreciated. I am constantly amazed at his ability to be an excellent educator and colleague, while still maintaining an exemplary research agenda. Kent Kille at the College of Wooster, a longtime friend, has also provided both steady moral support and indispensable expertise. Finally, Chris Scholl has suffered the most from my years of work on the project (especially by reading countless drafts) and has helped me maintain my sanity in the struggle to balance research and nearly overwhelming teaching responsibilities. He has helped me remember that I should do what makes me happy, and inspired me to pull it all together in a book about my research for my students, who give it all meaning. His example on the campus leaves a legacy that would inspire anyone to want to be a better educator.

I


CHAPTER 1 LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction The higher a man stands on the social ladder, the more people he is connected with and the more power he has over others, the more evident is the predestination and inevitability of his every action. . . . In historic events, the so-called great men are labels giving names to events, and like labels they have but the smallest connection with the event itself. Every act of theirs, which appears to them an act of their own will, is in an historical sense involuntary and is related to the whole course of history and predestined from eternity. Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace1

Leo Tolstoy was a magnificent author, and perhaps it could be argued that his aforementioned words portray accurately the world of his time. However, in the contemporary setting of international politics, Tolstoy could not be more wrong. The following pages explore the idea that leaders matter in international politics, and the cases in this book compare that significance in systematic ways. Exposure to events in world politics, whether through news media or observations of political pundits, gives the clear impression that leaders are active players in international relations and the making of foreign policy. However, many scholarly analyses give greater weight to aspects of the domestic and international environments that constrain leaders and push them in particular directions. Especially in a world of great uncertainty and ambiguity, as opposed to the rigid Cold War environment, individual leaders make a difference. This book offers readers a way of looking at how elites adjust to and change their environment and do not simply get pushed around by grand forces of history.2 Whether in a democracy or authoritarian system, or in a Western, Islamic, or African culture, leaders are constantly engaged in a game of marshaling support to pursue their political goals. All leaders face the challenge of trying to match their agenda to their environment and of getting their constituencies to buy into their perspective. Meeting such challenges is by no means a passive process and goes beyond making decisions in a world with little room to maneuver. This book is about the games these actors play, and will show that leadership strategies transcend different types of governments, different cultures, and different types of issues. Further, regardless of context, skillful leaders do not limit their use

2


of resources and alliances exclusively to the domestic or international arena; their strategies incorporate tools from both. Exploring leaders’ strategic moves in comparative case studies of Pakistan and the “war on terror,” the Persian Gulf War, the Northern Ireland conflict, the transition from apartheid in South Africa, and Zimbabwe’s current crisis demonstrates the shared dynamics of the policy process. The cases are written so that each works well as a stand-alone tool for understanding the facts of the case and the policy process at the nexus of international relations and domestic politics. To this end, the chapters tell the story of a single case and the role of leaders’ strategies within that story. As the cases in this book reveal, leaders not only interpret the situation in which they find themselves but often manipulate it, framing elements of the domestic and international environments to their audiences, drawing attention, involving new actors, instigating issue linkage. The remainder of this introductory chapter presents the general approach to understanding the role of leadership in the policymaking process. The framework is situated within the literature on international relations, foreign policy, and political leadership, highlighting the view of leaders as poised between the domestic and external environments proactively using various tools. The tools are called strategies, and how they are used is part of the leadership process in policymaking. Four strategies, broadening audience, buying off, tying hands, and framing threat, are described here, and then the case studies and method of analysis are introduced. Leaders in International Politics The lines between domestic and international politics are increasingly blurred in the contemporary world. “Intermestic,” a combination of the words “international” and “domestic,” communicates the idea that domestic and foreign issues are linked together. Often the term “intermestic” connotes issues “that occur in the international environment but are reacted to as if they are domestic policy issues.”3 Also significant are issues occurring in the domestic environment, reacted to as if they are international policy issues. As President in 1995, Bill Clinton said, “The more time I spend on foreign policy . . . the more I become convinced that there is no longer a clear distinction between what is foreign and domestic.”4 The words and actions of those in power are crucial to the way in which issues get defined. In all of the cases explored in this study, from the 1991 Persian Gulf War of George H.W. Bush’s administration to Robert Mugabe’s current efforts to stay in power in Zimbabwe, connections between the two arenas are emphasized by the behavior of the leaders. These individuals actually play a crucial role in creating and/or using these linkages, when it will help them achieve their policy goals. As the world becomes more and more interconnected, the dearth of knowledge about this area is increasingly detrimental. Traditional approaches to international relations minimize the role of the individual. Instead, these explanations emphasize a few factors about the international system such as the lack of international government (a situation referred to as the condition of anarchy), the balance of power, or the distribution of economic wealth.5 No matter who is in power in a state or what kind of government is in place, structural variables (aspects of the international system’s structure) are presumed

LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY

3

to create constraints that push behavior toward a particular outcome. States are seen as “billiard balls” bouncing off of each other, their trajectory determined by the forces that act upon them. Another metaphor often used is that of states as “black boxes,” a phrase communicating the idea that what goes on inside the “box” of the state is insignificant; instead, observers only need to focus on external forces to understand how they will move. The bipolar structure of the Cold War is an example: behavior of states in this system was often predictable based on the given balance of power. There simply is no need to add complexity by looking at individual leaders. Yet there are situations in which states do not follow the expected path predicted by the international system’s structure; further, the international setting in the post–Cold War era has created “more flexible and indeterminate” constraints on foreign policy.6 What’s more, looking inside the black box of the state at the processes of foreign policy making allows us to consider that different leaders or groups of decision makers may interpret an ambiguous environment differently.7 One of the leading proponents of structural theories, Kenneth Waltz, conceded this point: Structures shape and shove. They do not determine behaviors and outcomes, not only because unit-level and structural causes interact, but also because the shaping and shoving of structures may be successfully resisted. We attribute such success to Bismarck when we describe him as a diplomatic virtuoso. . . . With skill and determination structural constraints can sometimes be countered. Virtuosos transcend the limits of their instruments and break the constraints of systems that bind lesser performers.8

Scholars in the field of foreign policy argue that we can better understand outcomes (the action a state takes) if we understand the processes of group dynamics and decision making,9 bureaucratic politics,10 or domestic politics.11 For example, states may adopt an aggressive foreign policy when a government wants to divert attention from domestic problems, known as the “scapegoat hypothesis.”12 A large body of research in recent years has focused on the “democratic peace,” which holds that democratic states do not fight each other.13 In this line of thinking, type of government—whether democratic or authoritarian—can make a difference in how a state behaves internationally. Individuals are especially important in times of crisis and uncertainty.14 Political psychological perspectives start with the assumption that a state’s behavior in international politics can be explained by various individual characteristics, such as a leader’s personality and motivation;15 the way a leader perceives the situation he faces (“problem representation”);16 the advisory systems a leader creates;17or the way a leader reacts to domestic political pressures.18 “Different ways of dealing with political constraints, processing information, and assuming authority can promote different reactions to what is essentially the same decision making environment.”19 An entire field of foreign policy analysis and comparative foreign policy analysis (which looks beyond the policy process in a single state) now addresses phenomena

4


that cannot be explained by other perspectives.20 Perhaps we need not choose among competing perspectives, but instead view them as complementary. Most useful is conceptualizing decision makers as significant while at the same time paying attention to their international and domestic environments. Situating decision makers at the center of analysis has deep roots in previous frameworks. One study argued for considering the “psycho-milieu,” or international context, as perceived and interpreted by those making foreign policy decisions.21 Others built on this idea of exploring the relationship between context and the decision maker’s perceptions of this environment through studies of specific countries,22 and by looking at when and how individual leaders are more likely to perceive and react to constraints.23 Going one step further, consider the leader as not just a passive perceiver, reacting to constraints, but as a politician and agent, working to manipulate his or her environment. Circumstances in the international system can “create new possibilities for creative statecraft.”24 The intriguing notion of the “two-level game” views leaders as sitting at two tables or game boards, one the domestic and one the international. When a leader sits at each, he finds himself with constraints and opportunities from the other: “Domestic policies can be used to affect the outcomes of international bargaining, and . . . international moves may be solely aimed at achieving domestic goals.”25 Scholarly work on political leadership, especially within the political psychology tradition, also provides food for thought about the possible relationships between leaders and their environments. Margaret Hermann has described how this research tends to fall into one of four categories.26 In the “great man” approach (or “pied piper” model), particular characteristics of individuals make them good leaders and insight comes from studying factors like charisma, personality, background, and political experiences of leaders.27 In the second model, sometimes called the “firefighter” image, the particular context of the time produces the appropriate leader so that learning about the individual per se is not necessary.28 Leaders are merely firefighters responding to what occurs in the environment. This idea is a lot like traditional (structural) approaches to international politics mentioned earlier; leaders have no freedom of action and simply react to events like billiard balls bouncing off one another. The words of Leo Tolstoy, which opened this chapter, exemplify such a perspective. The third model, the “puppet,” shifts attention to followers, holding that if we want to understand the kind of leader that emerges we must study the characteristics of the followers.29 Finally, a fourth perspective examines the relationship between leaders and followers. Here the leader is a “salesman,” sensitive to what people want and trying to help them get it. Presidential research on “going public” reflects this orientation.30 Instead of limiting the investigation to either leaders, followers, or the political context, in this book we consider a creative synthesis matching the leader’s audience, the domestic and international political contexts, and the way in which the leader frames that context.31 Indeed, the determinism of structural approaches and the idiosyncratic nature of work that focuses on leader personality and beliefs come up short. We can focus instead on what leaders across situations have in common. Elites always face a leadership dilemma. Regardless of their political system, leaders constantly engage in a game of marshaling support to pursue their political goals.


5

They all face the challenge of shaping their environment to best fit their agenda32 and of getting their constituencies to buy into their perspective.33 For example, in his memoirs, former secretary of state, James Baker, describes how George H.W. Bush convinced allies abroad to join the anti-Iraq coalition to push back the invasion of Kuwait by arguing that their support was necessary to convince the American public to get on board. Then, once that support was forthcoming and the United Nations passed a resolution allowing military action, Bush used the UN support as a lever to marshal American public opinion and congressional action.34 Astutely recognizing that Bush’s “private resolve to order American forces into combat if necessary to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait was conspicuously lacking in support—in both Congress and with the public at large,” while assembling an international coalition was “no less formidable,”35 Bush and his team succeeded by using several leadership strategies. The strategies, discussed in the next section, are the analytical tools used to study the intermestic process. Given this overview, we can situate the framework used in this book between systems-level or structural IR theories and individual-level approaches in the tradition of political psychology. The strategies are independent variables that explain the ability of leaders to achieve successful outcomes despite nearly impossible odds (i.e., when structural variables would have predicted different outcomes). From the other angle, knowing more about individual leader characteristics such as personality and belief systems may be useful in understanding the conditions under which a leader will adopt certain strategies most frequently or what kinds of leaders tend to use particular strategies; such would be a different study treating strategies as the dependent variable. Instead, within the present framework it is choice of strategy and not force of personality that makes the “Great Man” so effective. The Games They Play: Leader Strategies How do leaders generate support? A clearly identifiable set of broad leadership strategies generalize across remarkably diverse cases: broadening audience, buying off, tying hands, and framing threat. When leaders face opposition or general lack of support for something they want to do, they often reach out to other constituencies to gain legitimacy for themselves or to help convince those not yet on board that they are part of the larger whole that is supportive of the leader. The “broadening audience” strategy refers to the way in which a leader can expand a coalition to create legitimacy for his policy goals at home or abroad, or support a message of shared identity (“we’re all in this together”). To use this strategy, leaders may draw on resources such as accepted norms in the international community (such as the idea that violence is an illegitimate political tool) or common experiences that various states may have.36 Another resource is organizations or other actors with a mission sympathetic to the leader’s goals. For example, we often see Hugo Chavez of Venezuela using the broadening audience strategy. President Chavez, elected in 1999 on a wave of populist socialism, has engaged in an elaborate campaign to build an anti-American political coalition among Latin American states and in 2005 began reaching out to other states such

6


as Iran. He has argued that, as victims and potential victims of American colonialism, these states must stand together to assert their independence. This strategy, showing he is an international leader of victims of injustice and “the little guy,” has been central to his efforts at home to resist opposition groups. The latter have questioned his ability to follow through on campaign promises to help the vast majority of Venezuela’s population change their plight of poverty and injustice.37 Indeed, he hopes to shore up his image at home by proving he can accomplish similar goals in the external world. Angela Merkel, who became chancellor of Germany in a coalition government in late 2005, also broadened audience to the international arena in order to boost her legitimacy at home. Because her party, the Christian Democratic Union, failed to win elections outright, the need to form a coalition with the other major party (that of Chancellor Gerhard Schroder’s Social Democrats) prevented her from undertaking a bold domestic agenda and put her legitimacy on shaky ground. In the first few months of her term, she avoided domestic issues and instead took on the role of a “super foreign minister,” the foreign minister being a traditionally popular role in German politics. She engaged in numerous trips to meet other heads of state around the world and, as the New York Times put it, “played a central role in breaking an acrimonious stalemate over the budget of the European Union.” The latter “enhanced her standing at home as a figure to be contended with on the European scene.”38 Having gained more credibility by burnishing her image in Europe and the broader world, she returned home to get to work on the tough issues within her country. The case studies in this book demonstrate how Bush, Hume, Mugabe, Musharraf, and Mandela all “broadened audience” to the international arena to achieve domestic political goals. A second strategy is “buying off,” defined as using material resources or promises of those resources to co-opt opposition abroad or at home. A leader may also use resources to change conditions abroad or at home to better fit the way in which he is depicting the situation. Leaders may use economic aid, military assistance, and investment opportunities from other states or non-state actors (international organizations, private investors or corporations, political organizations) to buy off. We see this strategy used across many contexts. For example, President Hu of China has engaged in an active strategy of buying off states in Latin America and the South Pacific in the ongoing effort to win support on the Taiwan issue in international forums. Intriguingly, Hugo Chavez has used domestic resources to assist him in the effort to broaden audience in the international arena as described earlier. Estimates are that he has spent between $16 and $25 billion of Venezuela’s oil proceeds to buy allies in his effort to establish “his leftist government as a political counterpoint to the conservative Bush administration.” Recipients of the aid range from Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Caribbean states in Chavez’s region, to four African states, Indonesia, and poor purchasers of heating oil in the United States.39 All of the cases in this book demonstrate the ways in which the selected leaders employed this strategy too. A third common strategy is “tying hands.” Leaders may try to get what they want with foreign actors by highlighting the ways in which their domestic situation allows no other course of action. Conversely, they may push actions at home by


7

insisting that the international environment forces their hand. The tying hands strategy here is limiting the range of options in one arena to convince an actor(s) in the other arena that a particular course is necessary. Elements that leaders draw on in the international arena are international law, including treaties to which the state is party, and foreign aid conditions (which may include aid from other states or from international organizations). George W. Bush used tying hands to turn around the lack of domestic support for unilateral U.S. action against Iraq in 2003 (there was more support for multilateral action through the United Nations). In late 2002, Bush argued that the resolution requiring Saddam Hussein to allow inspectors to return to their search of sites in Iraq for signs of weapons of mass destruction also permitted enforcement action (in this case, a military response). Key veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council disagreed with this interpretation and insisted that another resolution authorizing the use of force was required by international law. As the United States moved closer toward military strikes in spring 2003, Bush repeatedly argued to the American public that his government must act to protect U.S. national security despite the objections of the UN because his hands were tied. Two restrictions on his behavior emanated from the international context: the combination of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and that country’s ties to the terrorist attacks, and the refusal on the part of the United Nations to sign off on military action. The extent to which at least a portion of the American public bought into this definition of the situation is revealed by the fact that, despite numerous reports and George W. Bush’s statements to the contrary, some still think Saddam Hussein engineered the attacks of September 11, 2001 and possessed weapons of mass destruction. We will see how all of the leaders in this book used the tying hands strategy. Finally, leaders may employ a “framing threat” strategy, defined as depicting particular actors as dangerous to one’s constituency (at home or abroad) to rally support and promote unity. Generally, a leader using “framing threat” highlights conditions of repression or an actor’s military strength. While some may use the strategy more frequently than others (demagogues such as Adolf Hitler and Slobodan Milosevic jump to mind), every successful leader must take on the task of describing reality to his followers (or potential followers). Indeed, students of politics recognize that the ability to define the situation is one of the most powerful tools elites have in promoting their policy agendas. How leaders interpret the political context to their people can be crucial to whether constituents are mobilized toward peace or war, toward cooperation with the external world or isolation, toward nation building or separatism. In summary, pointing out what threats a country faces, the sources of those threats, and how to cope with them are basic to a leader’s effort to bring along followers. Iran’s leader Ahmadinejad presents a powerful example of the framing threat strategy in action. When he was elected in June 2005, the powerful conservative forces in Iran expected him to fall into line. Instead, he appointed people close to him to several important posts and has set out on a mission to increase Iran’s role as a regional power. While he still does not hold direct control over foreign or nuclear policy, the general instability in the region has increased his room to move. He has drawn international attention to Iran by stepping up its efforts to produce

8


Table 1.1 Four leadership strategies Strategy

Definition

Resource

Broadening audience

Expanding coalition to create legitimacy at home or abroad, or to support message of shared identity

International norms, organizations/actors with sympathetic mission

Buying off

Using material resources or promises of them to co-opt opposition abroad or at home or change conditions abroad or at home

Economic aid

Tying hands

Limiting range of options in one arena to convince an actor(s) in another arena that a particular course is necessary

International law, foreign aid conditions (from state or other actor)

Framing threat

Depicting particular actors as dangerous to constituency (at home or abroad) to rally support and promote unity

Repression, military behavior

nuclear fuel, which Iran argues is for peaceful purposes, and by making numerous inflammatory statements about Israel. He has framed threat as the West, led by the “world oppressor” (the United States), against the Islamic world’s effort to advance scientifically. One of his colleagues stated the argument clearly when he asserted that the West knows Iran does not want nuclear weapons. “What they are really concerned about is an advanced Islam. They are concerned the Islamic expansion will be a success, following the same concern they had for Communism.” Ahmadinejad argues that the only way to deal with this Western threat to annihilate Islam is to work together to defy American pressure at every turn. By doing so, Ahmadinejad has boosted his own position at home against other conservative forces and regionally. For example, the Western pressure to end the nuclear program has created a nationalist reaction in Iran and has his “harshest critics . . . treading lightly.”40 Table 1.1 summarizes the strategies. The framework put forth in the preceding pages will help readers understand and clarify the five cases and offers a way of thinking about international politics more generally that recognizes how leaders make a difference. Analyzing Leaders’ Roles in Comparative Perspective With a framework in place to investigate the ways leaders maneuver among constraints and create opportunities to mobilize their constituents, we can turn to a method for examining these processes across diverse cases. Adopting a comparative approach does not assume that all leaders behave in the same exact way but shows that, in fact, there are common mechanisms in the intermestic policymaking


9

process across countries. Scholars of comparative foreign policy often conduct case studies to investigate their hypotheses.41 A common type of case study is the structured, focused comparison.42 Instead of pointing out many examples that illustrate an assertion, this method involves structuring an analysis to focus on a few variables (here, leader strategies), basically asking the same set of questions about each case. In this study, doing so creates a systematic framework for comparing how leaders engage in the policymaking process.43 The primary questions are about the challenges the leader faced, the leader’s goals, and the use of the four strategies to achieve the goals given the challenges. For example, in each case there is a puzzle: How did the leader manage to get what he wanted when it did not appear that he could? After beginning with that general question, each case presents the challenges or obstacles facing each leader that created an “impossible situation.” Next, what were the goals of the leader? Finally, taking each strategy in turn, how did the leader employ the strategy to achieve particular goals, using the international context to further his domestic agenda and the domestic context to make progress on the international front? A key question in any comparison concerns which cases to include. Portrayals of the processes of political leadership are too often idiosyncratic. Rarely are an American president and an African dictator expected to draw on the same set of strategies. Nor would one anticipate similar approaches to mobilize support within the United States for war and to spark guerrilla opposition to British control of Northern Ireland. The diverse cases in this book were chosen because they are important episodes in international relations, and because they represent different types of governments, different cultures, different continents, and different situations. Seeing patterns in the midst of such diversity is an exciting way of deepening our understanding of world politics. Social scientists refer to the use of diverse cases as a “most different systems” design.44 Table 1.2 summarizes the most notable dimensions on which the cases vary, regime type (democratic, authoritarian, transitioning), and whether the situation is primarily an internal or external conflict. Variation on regime type is an important factor to consider because researchers often expect significant differences in governmental behavior between democratic Table 1.2 Case studies Case

Regime Type

Primary Situation Type

Hume in Northern Ireland conflict

Democratic

Internal conflict

GHW Bush and Persian Gulf War

Democratic

External conflict

Musharraf in post-September 11 Pakistan

Authoritarian

External conflict

Mugabe in Zimbabwean politics

Authoritarian

Internal conflict

Mandela in South African transition

Transitioning

Internal conflict

10


and authoritarian regimes, as discussed above. Leaders use similar strategies across these two types, and a third, the transitioning government of South Africa in the early 1990s. Further, leaders in the cases sometimes have different decisionmaking contexts. Some rule almost single-handedly, such as Robert Mugabe and, increasingly, Pervez Musharraf. Others, such as George H.W. Bush, have a small group of advisors that often help make and execute decisions. Still others, such as John Hume and Nelson Mandela, sit atop a cadre of party leaders. In all of these cases, the leader was the primary decision maker; the extent to which others pushed and pulled him is considered part of the context within which he worked. The second dimension on which the cases vary is the type of situation. First, cases in which some kind of conflict was the focus were selected because it is in these circumstances when the situation is more ambiguous and leaders tend to be involved, as noted earlier. More routine policy decisions by governments tend to follow standard operating procedures and involve bureaucratic players more than the leaders. Conflicts generally considered internal—the Northern Ireland conflict and the transition in South Africa, for example—are included along with those involving external conflicts like the Persian Gulf War to demonstrate the similarities of the mechanisms and to illustrate the intermestic nature of all of these cases. The chapters begin with a background and a discussion of the leaders’ goals and the challenges or dilemmas in making the chosen policy. As noted earlier, if each case were viewed from a more structural perspective, there is a puzzle to explain: How did the leader manage to get what he wanted when the constraints of the situation appeared to prevent that? For example, Hume overcame centuries of rhetoric, the powerful campaign of the Irish Republican Army, and economic conditions working against his message; George H.W. Bush overcame the Vietnam syndrome and initial widespread opposition to the Persian Gulf War; Musharraf balanced diametrically opposed domestic and international demands, and got beyond his international pariah status and radical domestic opposition; Mandela pursued peace amid predominant pressures to inflame tensions; and Mugabe continued to beat erupting opposition and ruin at home and condemnation abroad, despite relative success of a new opposition party and ever-tightening sanctions. Materials used to write the cases are historical accounts by scholars and primary sources (such as memoirs of leaders and advisers, and the leader’s own speeches). Evidence to answer the questions about each case was evaluated in a systematic manner. The definitions and categories in table 1.2 point toward the kind of information necessary to determine the use of each strategy. Specifically, speeches and behavior were used to investigate whether the leader was attempting to broaden his audience, behavior assessed by investigating historical accounts and memoirs indicated whether the leader attempted to buy off, speeches and communiqués to other actors revealed whether and how the leader tied his hands, and speeches and other public communications provided evidence of the leaders’ threat assessments. Finally, the concluding chapter suggests ways that the policy process is manipulable by active leadership.45 Whether the goal is to help bring peace to protracted conflicts such as those in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, or South Africa or—most urgently after September 11, 2001—to enlist states such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,


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or Indonesia in the war against terror, foreign policymakers in the United States and elsewhere rely on incentives and sanctions to persuade leaders. These efforts often fall short because there is minimal comprehension by both scholars and policymakers of the games leaders have to play as they react to and manipulate their domestic and international environments. As the cases reveal, continued research must explore two issues: (1) how to know when the foreign leader of interest is manipulable by the outside world; and (2) ways in which to provide the leader with external circumstances that become resources on his domestic front—to help secure the goals of the external partner. Questions to Consider for Case Analysis As you read the case chapters that follow, you are invited to learn about the role leaders have played in reacting to and changing their domestic and international environments as they engage in making intermestic policy. The following questions are intended as a guide to stimulate thinking and discussion about the significant issues. 1. How does the case show that the situation and/or policy is “intermestic”? Which dimensions of the situation or policy are domestic? Which aspects of the situation or policy are international? 2. What are the goals of the leader? 3. What are the challenges facing the leader in this case? In other words, what obstacles are there to the leader achieving his goals? 4. Taking each strategy in turn, how is it used in this case? 5. How does the leader use the international context to further his domestic agenda? 6. How does the leader employ aspects of the domestic context to move on the international front? 7. How do actors in the international arena (such as other states, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental organizations) respond or react? 8. How do the various domestic constituencies respond or react? 9. What is the outcome of the case? Looking back at the goals you listed for question 2, in what ways is the leader successful? In what ways does the leader fail to overcome some of the challenges? 10. Which goals do the specific strategies help the leader achieve? 11. What does this case tell us overall about the process of leadership in policymaking? 12. How does this leader and his efforts, including the reaction of domestic and international actors, compare to the other cases in this book? What is similar? What is different?


CHAPTER 2 FORCING PEACE: JOHN HUME’S “LONG STRUGGLE” IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1982–1998

Introduction For most of the twentieth century, the citizens of Northern Ireland were caught in a long, bloody struggle between violent and apparently irreconcilable opponents. Alongside the raging dispute between British government troops and paramilitary forces, a battle of ideas raged as well between moderates and radicals on both sides. Extremists embraced violence, viewing it as the only practical alternative and indeed the most heroic path for true patriots. Advocates of nonviolent negotiation found their methods scorned and their proposals rejected as futile. Action—especially violent action—and not talk was perceived to be the most expeditious means of achieving the desired outcome of addressing the second-class role of Catholic citizens in a Protestant-dominated state. In the midst of the overwhelming push to take up arms, John Hume—a Catholic school teacher moved to political action by the injustice he observed in his community—saw the situation differently and employed a range of leadership strategies to mobilize support and move beyond the conflicting parties toward a peace agreement. This chapter describes Hume’s own “long struggle” for peace that culminated in the Good Friday Accords of 1998.

Historical Background Northern Ireland is a divided society in many ways. The province of Britain was created out of six counties on the island of Ireland when the southern 26 counties won independence from Britain in 1921. The southern counties were known as the Irish Free State, and then the Republic of Ireland in 1948. Because the majority of the population in the north was Protestant and its capital, Belfast, was an important industrial center for Britain, London was determined to hold on to this part of the former Irish colony. The politicians in the south agreed to a compromise, with the belief that unification would be possible and even enshrining the ideal of the 32-county Ireland in their new constitution. In the meantime, the British allowed the establishment of the North dominated by Protestants and

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providing virtually no representation for Catholics. Following agreement with London in 1919, a civil war in the Irish Free State (1919–1921) pitted those who wanted to fight for Ireland until total independence was achieved against those who had compromised with London. This divide parallels the one between nationalists in Northern Ireland throughout the “Troubles,” which erupted in the late 1960s. Indeed, while most people think of the conflict between nationalists (predominantly Catholic) who wish to be part of the Republic of Ireland and unionists (predominantly Protestant) who wish to remain part of Britain, another divide was also very intense for many years—that is, the divide within these communities. Each of the sides developed two factions: one more moderate and one more radical and violent. Protestants may identify as unionists (more moderate) or loyalists (more radical and violent). For the nationalist side, the two factions are labeled constitutional nationalists (more moderate) and republicans (more radical and violent). This case focuses on the nationalist side’s leadership. The constitutional nationalists were represented by the Social Democratic and Labour Party, led by John Hume. In the mid-1980s, the republicans also formed a party, called Provisional Sinn Fein (which means “ourselves alone” in Gaelic), which sprung up as the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). They claim as their forebears the leaders of the Irish independence movements throughout the ages, including those who won independence for the southern 26 counties. The leader of this party is Gerry Adams, viewed as a terrorist by the British, American, and other governments until the 1990s. In contrast to Gerry Adams, the republican who argued that the British could only be removed from Northern Ireland by the use of force, John Hume argued from the late 1960s that a consensual settlement that restructures the government and constitution of Northern Ireland is the only lasting possibility. This settlement, only possible with the involvement of the British and Irish governments, had to recognize the traditions and identities of both communities. Thus Hume’s goals were clear: achieve without violence a lasting settlement in Northern Ireland that enables all the people in Northern Ireland to live in a just society. For most people, Gerry Adams is the leader who comes to mind when thinking about this conflict, especially in America where many have a romantic image of the republican cause and the Irish Republican Army. In fact, most accounts of the peace process that resulted in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement highlight the central role of John Hume; indeed the peace agreement largely reflects the proposals he had been making since the 1970s. While the participation of Adams (and of course, the unionists) was crucial, Hume was instrumental in changing conditions that made it possible for Adams to come to the table and bring along his republican followers. In this case we examine John Hume’s sustained efforts to move nationalists in Northern Ireland toward a peaceful resolution of conflict with unionists and the British. Hume’s efforts especially after the rise of Sinn Fein in the early 1980s show the complex relationship between what leaders try to do and the external and internal environment. Significant events described in this and the following section are summarized in a chronology at the end of the chapter.

JOHN HUME’S “LONG STRUGGLE”

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An Impossible Situation Hume’s central dilemma was daunting: How to bring about a peaceful resolution to a raging conflict? Because there were roadblocks in every direction, it is a puzzle that Hume was able to envision a peace treaty signed in 1998 that reflected his ideas. Violence and its glorification have a prominent place in Irish history. Any politician trying to argue that nonviolence and negotiation are the best ways to resolve favorably the conflict in Northern Ireland has a tough road ahead—especially in the years when the British were running sweeps through Catholic neighborhoods and randomly throwing young men in jail. Put yourself in the shoes of John Hume in the 1970s and 1980s. There were five major obstacles. First, one had to convince those who carry on the legacy of militant republicans from previous centuries to give up on the dream of unification on their terms. While there was a period when the IRA was relatively dormant, by the 1970s recruitment was up and their movement was reenergized (described later). Second, you had to convince the unionists—those who had been oppressing your people and whom the republicans had been killing—to consider sitting down with you. And then there were the British: How could you get them to see that they should not fight fire with fire, continuing to jail and kill in their reaction to the terrorism of the IRA, and that they should support a more democratic solution? Fourth, the Republic of Ireland had to be on board. With a constitution that still claimed the territory of the North, but a public opinion that was happy to remain uninvolved, you had a problem. The constitutional claims offended the unionists and the apathy of the Irish public incited republicans to perpetrate violent attacks there too. Fifth, and finally, states outside the region had adopted a “hands off ” policy, for yours was an “internal” matter. What is worse, people in countries such as the United States contribute financially to the republican paramilitary cause. This section elaborates on each of these challenges, weaving in more history of the situation. The first obstacle to negotiating a peaceful end to the civil war was the republicans. As noted earlier, the Provisional IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, had as their mission righting of the wrongs of 1921 and of more than a century of British oppression before that. The IRA fought for Irish independence from the British colonial power, but in the 1921 Anglo-Irish Agreement, nationalists in the northern part of the island were left in the hands of Britain, ruled over in a province run by the majority Protestants. These Protestants (or “unionists” because of the desire to maintain union with Britain), dominated in the Stormont parliament until the British abolished that body in 1972 (Stormont is the name of the castle in which the parliament met). Because London allowed considerable autonomy from the 1920s, Protestants easily maintained a regime that discriminated against Catholics in most aspects of life— access to housing, employment, and civil rights (especially voting, which was based on landownership). Having eventually lost public support in the decades after the partition of the island, militant republicanism faded away. By the 1960s, the IRA was unable to sustain much sympathy in the international arena or among Catholics in the North. In its 1962 cease-fire announcement, the IRA acknowledged its failure to mobilize the Catholic population around the idea that unification could only be achieved through a military defeat of the British colonial power.1

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In 1967, the civil rights movement dramatically challenged the IRA’s way of defining the problem. This movement was influenced by the civil rights campaign in the United States. As Hume said to a group of graduating college seniors in the United States, “The American civil rights movement gave birth to ours. The songs of your movement were also ours. Your successes were for us a cause of hope.”2 The new view ushered in by this campaign was that Catholics should demand representation and improved living standards within the society of Northern Ireland; emerging politicians appealed to Britain that these were Catholic rights under British law.3 Indeed, “The Catholic middle class, while not abandoning their nationalist sentiments, began to seek the reform of Northern Ireland as their first goal; and before long for many it became the overriding goal.”4 Initial concessions by the unionist government only served to fan the flames of protest among Catholics and set the stage for the new Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) to transform the sentiment of the civil rights movement into a new political platform. The SDLP, of which John Hume eventually became the leader, argued that violence was not the answer and unity with Ireland could only be achieved by consent from all communities.5 However, despite these new ideas, the challenge posed by republicans returned in part because of the behavior of the British government and its army. Between 1969 and 1971, the British government increased its involvement, trying to balance reform with repression in the Catholic areas. The advent of British troops in 1969 was initially welcomed by Catholics, but soon troops would be seen as anti-Catholic.6 Violence escalated. The “Bloody Sunday” massacre, immortalized in the words of U2’s Bono, occurred in January 1972 when the British military shot dead 13 unarmed protestors at a march in Derry. This watershed event moved many young people to take up arms. In an effort to establish order, Britain disbanded the Stormont parliament in 1972 and began a 27-year period of governing through the Northern Ireland Office, with occasional attempts to set up power-sharing assemblies. The elections for the fourth such attempt in the fall of 1982 were marked by the first time Sinn Fein (SF)7 would contest elections in Northern Ireland; their meteoric rise in popularity changed the landscape of the conflict. Consider the environment to understand the rebirth of the republican movement in this period. Repression against both the nationalist community and SF/IRA was very high in the 1970s and especially the early 1980s. Security legislation was being applied to fullest extent to the nationalist community, as a counterreaction to Bloody Sunday. For example, the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act, instituted in 1973, gave powers to the British army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the RUC, the police force in Northern Ireland) to stop and question anyone “suspicious” and to search houses without warrants. The Prevention of Terrorism Acts of 1974 and 1976 reinforced this Act. This kind of emergency legislation created an environment of repression.8 In addition, in this period the RUC, seen as a Protestant police force, took over the security regime from the British army; and there was more frequent use of plastic bullets resulting in numerous killings. The supergrass system was started in late 1981, and mass trials began in 1982. “Supergrass” was the name given to “converted terrorists” or informants, who gave names of those involved in terrorist activities. Allegedly, they were


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mistreated and forced into this role by the security forces. From November 1981 to November 1983, over 600 people were charged with terrorist activity. Also in 1982, after SF did so well in the Assembly elections, the RUC adopted what has been described as a “shoot to kill” policy.9 The republican movement received an especially large boost from the behavior of the British government that led to hunger strikes by republican prisoners accused of terrorism. In the 1980–1981 period, the British government had refused all concessions to political prisoners, and their reaction was to go on hunger strike to demand the acknowledgment that they were not criminals (but political prisoners). The British intransigence on the hunger strike issue resulted in rioting, and in response to this the security forces used plastic bullets to shoot people in the nationalist neighborhoods. As a result of the new vigor to enforce security legislation, repression was also high against the IRA/SF more specifically. Indeed, the SF/IRA movement was a special target for enforcement of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. Further, SF was subject to media censorship under laws to prevent terrorism. In the Republic, the law banned SF spokespersons, and in Britain there was a ban on certain SF leaders—such as Gerry Adams—on traveling to England, Scotland, or Wales. In this atmosphere, by April 1982, Britain proposed another power-sharing arrangement to try to bring order to the province. Unlike previous proposals, the 1982 Assembly had no formal linkage for cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (something that Hume had suggested). Further, there was no one in the unionist camp expressing any desire to seek compromise, a fact that made the Assembly all the more unpromising.10 As noted earlier, the Assembly elections, for a Northern Ireland Assembly incorporating both Catholic and Protestant parties, was the first time both SF and the SDLP competed against each other. Examining the different views expressed during the campaigns of 1982 and 1983 puts this first set of Hume’s challenges in stark relief. Even though both the SDLP and SF ran on platforms that rejected the Assembly idea, they saw the campaigns as an opportunity to draw support. Hume, leading the SDLP campaign, maintained his belief that any internal solution was impossible, and argued that cross-border cooperation could deal with social and economic issues as well as the constitutional problems. Hume offered an alternative proposal. His “Council for a New Ireland” would provide an Anglo-Irish Framework where members of the new Assembly would work together with members of the Republic of Ireland’s Parliament (the Dail).11During this campaign Hume began to highlight the threat posed by the republican movement, and argued that the violence discredited their claims to carry on a tradition of resistance: “You are not Irish Republicans; you are extremists who have dishonoured and are dishonouring the deepest ideals of the Irish people. Can we remind you, yet again, that those whose inheritance you so falsely claim laid down their arms in 1916 lest they cause any undue suffering to the Irish people.”12 He framed the vote in terms of violent versus nonviolent approaches to conflict resolution, and on the eve of the vote attacked SF for its role in causing many of the problems in the Northern Ireland community.13

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For its part, SF (while also denouncing the Assembly) presented itself as the new leadership of the nationalist population, claiming the link to the SF that had been established in the South so long ago. John Hume and his cronies were “collaborators” with the British imperialists and the Irish sellouts in Dublin because they promoted talks with Britain and Ireland in a forum. To counter the propaganda of the other parties, SF’s manifesto argued that a vote for its candidates was not a vote for violence but for a “principled stand against the British, a vote for peace with justice. It is a vote against the British presence in Ireland, and a victory for Sinn Fein will inflict, like Bobby Sands’ election victory,14 a psychological defeat on Thatcher and her military chiefs.”15 Criticism of the Forum idea, especially the fact that it did not involve SF or any unionists, was at the core of the SF campaign. In an An Phoblacht/Republican News16 editorial, and in its election manifesto, SF characterized the SDLP’s pro-negotiation approach as “dangerous” to nationalists because it ignored that the British occupation was the real source of the problem, and instead focused more on unionist fears that the Protestant people would receive unjust treatment in a united Ireland. The poorest and youngest Catholics were mobilized by the republican appeals in the elections of 1982 and 1983.17 In these elections, Adams and his party made major gains against Hume and the SDLP. During this period the British treatment of the hunger strikers was fresh in peoples’ minds, and this event had shown nationalists that the British were willing to ignore basic human rights to protect the unionist community. People around the world were sympathetic to the republican cause, having seen the hunger strikes play out on their televisions. Hume’s calls for nonviolence were drowned out by the more vivid connections made by republicans with the liberation movements such as the ANC (African National Congress) and PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization). As evidenced by parts of the aforementioned account, Hume’s challenges went beyond the republicans in his own community. The second and third obstacles were the unionists and the British, dealt with together here because of the degree of collusion between them. Hume’s idea for a negotiated solution required not only that the republican paramilitaries put down their weapons but also that the British stop killing and jailing innocent young men and that the other community actually be willing to sit down at the negotiating table. In the 1970s and 1980s, all three seemed impossible. As noted earlier, unionists were not at all open to considering the views of Hume or anyone else, and the British had turned the North into a virtual police state for Catholics. What was even worse was the collusion between the British and unionists, as in past decades, which was visible with Thatcher’s now-famous statement that Northern Ireland was as British as Finchley, a constituency in England. The unionists also received support from Britain when the latter gave in to the demand to eliminate the power-sharing guarantee and the Irish dimension from any plans for an assembly. Indeed, in the 1970s, the SDLP had been offered power sharing as a right of the nationalist community, as well as the recognition that an Irish dimension was necessary. As noted earlier, in the 1982 proposal for the new Assembly, the Irish dimension was rejected, and unionists were effectively given a veto over power sharing.18 Anyone could see that the newest Assembly was no better than the Stormont regime that gave Catholics no voice.


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We can add even one more obstacle that Hume faced, which was related to unionists: all of the unionist parties were strongly against any measure of cooperation, so there was truly a united front standing in the way. In March 1982, Hume reached out to the unionist community in a speech, but no cooperation was forthcoming.19 Then the unionist parties convened the Assembly (after the October 1982 elections) without any nationalist parties and proposed only closer integration into Britain or majority voting rules as “reform” measures.20 Further, when invited to the Forum for a New Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party (then called the Official Unionist Party), the Democratic Unionist Party, and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (the major Unionist parties) all rejected invitations to join in negotiations with the SDLP and the parties from the Republic of Ireland. The fourth obstacle Hume faced was the challenge posed by the Republic of Ireland. Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution of the Republic claimed the North as sovereign territory, enhancing the perception of threat among unionists. Ireland had to be part of the solution. However, in the years after 1921, the Republic was consumed by the need to focus on economic development. Unification slipped further and further from the agenda. In the 1970s and 1980s, public opinion in the Republic was hostile to ideas about unification and the socialist goals put forth by Adams and SF, but they were not supportive of Hume either. From the government, mild antiterrorism legislation banned SF politicians, and there were the beginnings of dialogue with Britain about the North. But for the most part, instead of wanting to dedicate time and resources to the conflict, the people did not support active engagement. For Hume’s agenda, this was an enormous challenge that had to be addressed for his vision to succeed. The fifth and final obstacle in this post–hunger strike period came from the international arena. General international opinion was against Britain’s repression of the minority. For example, in 1982 the European Commission on Human Rights condemned the British reaction to the hunger strikes and the British army’s use of plastic bullets.21 Despite this diffuse support for some nationalist views, this general opinion did not translate into action. The international norms of conflict resolution and intervention were such that the European Community (EC) and United States were still reluctant to get involved; also the United States was committed to its “special relationship” with Britain. The United Nations would not get involved because of a British veto. In fact, Ireland had called for a UN peacekeeping force to be sent in 1969, but Britain exercised its veto in the Security Council, arguing that intervention would have violated the UN Charter since Northern Ireland was a domestic issue.22 In the preceding few pages, the background of this conflict was summarized by way of presenting the challenges encountered by John Hume. In essence, this case presents a puzzle: Given that so many aspects of the domestic and even international arenas ran counter to Hume’s goal of resolving the conflict peacefully, how did he help lead the way to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998? Basically, to achieve his goal of seeing the Northern Ireland conflict reach a nonviolent end, he would have to persuade the republicans that a united Ireland could not be achieved through violence nor without the active involvement of the British and Irish; persuade the unionists that they would be better off giving up their position of majority

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control; persuade Britain to talk to those they have been jailing and to push the unionists they have been protecting; and persuade Ireland that what happens in the North is a central issue unsolvable without the Republic’s help. He had to counter claims that the economic and security situations of Catholics were the fault of Britain and the unionists, in a place where objective reality indicated the opposite. These are daunting obstacles indeed, and it really is a puzzle to sort out how changes did in fact take place. The next sections unravel the story of the long road to the peace process, with Hume and his strategies at center stage. Table 2.1 at the end of the chapter summarizes each strategy, Hume’s use of it, and the outcome in terms of which obstacles the strategy addressed (the rise of republicanism, unionist intransigence, British obstructionism, and international isolation—including Ireland, the United States, United Nations, and European Union). Turning Things Around: Intermestic Policy Making Central to Hume’s vision for a peace process was to convince the parties and the public within Northern Ireland and key external actors that this situation was not only an internal conflict. At the same time, he had to convince SF and its followers that this was by no means only an external conflict. Finally, he saw a path to success if he could convince Britain, the Republic, the European Union, and the United States that “international” involvement meant more than having Britain and/or Ireland on board. How he did all of this is apparent in the way he defined the situation and the solutions that followed from this representation; all of this comes across through the strategies of broadening audience, buying off, tying hands, and framing threat. By using aspects of the international arena to change things at home, and vice versa, his practice of intermestic politics paid off. The next section begins with the framing threat strategy, since Hume’s action on this dimension actually drives his use of the other three. Framing Threat The rejuvenation of republicanism in 1982, and subsequent gains in 1983, was met by stiffened attitudes of unionists, together producing a deadlock.23 Perhaps feeling desperate at the republican electoral threat and at the thought of so many people advocating violence as a principle, Hume worked to redefine the situation in terms of what the threats were to the community; he used the “framing threat” strategy actively. Recall that when a leader uses this strategy, he is depicting particular actors as dangerous to one’s constituency (at home or abroad) to rally support and promote unity. Almost every leader frames threat in some way, but since political issues are usually ambiguous and may be attributed to many causes, we need to know how, specifically, this is done. This section shows how Hume framed threat to posit that any groups using violence were the central threat and to argue that external actors were crucial to addressing this danger. Once he got these actors involved in ways that changed the situation, he framed threat in a different way to highlight that first, those who opposed the peace process and, second, the general notion of moving back to the past were the major threats.


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Whereas earlier speeches had emphasized the threat of the British or the unionists, Hume began to give increasing emphasis to the republican “men of violence.” An especially passionate description of the problem appeared in his 1984 annual speech, quoted at length to allow full effect: Within the nationalist section of the community the cancer of violence has deepened and has hardened its grip. Violence is itself an incalculable evil. Murder is murder. What is more, violence makes the problem worse. . . . In this generation the Provisional IRA have destroyed not alone lives but the hopes and the happiness of thousands of families; they have deepened the divisions in this community which got to the heart of the problem. . . . They [Sinn Fein] insult the people by assuming that an intelligent people . . . will not see the irreconcilable contradiction between the bomb and the ballot paper. . . . They [the people] know, from their own terrible experience, the cost of violence. They know that the Provisional IRA and their supporters are responsible for a large part of all the murder and destruction. . . . They know the IRA have bombed thousands of jobs out of existence. . . . They [Sinn Fein] are morally and factually wrong. We will prove that. We must do so, not for the sake of mere victory, but to save this community and this country from self-destruction. . . . The most basic roots that hold people together in civilization and that withstand barbaric chaos are being weakened and hacked away by the violence of the Provos and by the lies of Sinn Fein.24

Over the next several years, in every speech Hume gave he repeated the damage done by violence, especially that of the republican movement, in terms of death, destruction, and lost opportunities for economic development. Further, the violence of the IRA was causing Britain to increase its repressive behavior, and yet republicans mobilized people with the argument that Britain alone was responsible for the violence. Hume argued that the republicans could remove a “. . . very great source of misery and suffering merely by stopping their campaign of violence and removing the justification for the repressive legislation that afflicts our people.”25 Throughout the 1980s and until the cease-fire in August 1994, Hume spoke about the victims of violence. While not ignoring the killings of the loyalist paramilitaries or the British forces, he highlighted that the nationalists were hit hardest by the republican paramilitaries. For example, in November 1988, 2,705 people had been killed in the Troubles, and 1,194 of them were from the Catholic community. Thirty-seven percent of Catholics killed were killed by republicans: “In the last twenty years republicans have killed more than twice as many Catholics as the security forces and in the last ten years have killed more than the Loyalists! Some defenders.” In the same speech, Hume went on to say that the major grievances, such as troops in the streets and harassment of nationalist young people, are direct consequences of the IRA campaign.26 The preceding information and words similar to the following quotation were not only the major themes of Hume’s speeches in this era, but were the basis of articles and editorials, as his arguments were widely reported in newspapers in Northern Ireland, the Republic, and abroad:27 Leaders of Sinn Fein have been saying recently that the Nationalist nightmare in Northern Ireland has not ended. They are dead right because they are a major part of that nightmare. There is not a single injustice in Northern Ireland today that justifies the taking of a single human life. What is more the vast majority of the major injustices suffered not only by the nationalist community but by the whole community are the

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direct consequences of the IRA campaign. If I were to lead a civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland today the major target of that campaign would be the IRA. It is they who carry out the greatest infringements of human and civil rights. . . . 28

As he publicized his message, Hume brought attention to this aspect of the situation; he also took action to involve external actors in solving the problem. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) shows in part Hume’s success in getting a response to his framing of the republican threat. The accord was signed by the Republic of Ireland and Britain, with the help of U.S. pressure, and committed the two governments to collaborate on a joint solution (also see “broadening audience” later). It was intended to stabilize and increase support for the SDLP at the expense of SF, and to encourage divisions among unionists that would make power sharing a more acceptable outcome. Indeed, several elections after the AIA do show its success for all of these goals. One analysis of the impact of the AIA on SF–SDLP competition reflects a consensus among students of the conflict: It [The AIA, negotiated at Hillsborough castle] has halted the growth of the Sinn Fein vote, and shows some signs of reversing it: the SF vote fell in each of the three [1986, 1987, 1989] post-Hillsborough elections. . . . And the SDLP’s position, while not hegemonic, has been restored: it has stemmed and reversed the SF tide, albeit within a growing Nationalist bloc.29

The January 1986 Westminster by-elections demonstrate Hume’s success as well. The by-elections were forced as a “mini-referendum” by unionists who resigned their seats when the government rejected their calls for an actual referendum, and the June 1987 Westminster elections. From the peak of SF’s support in 1983, the 1986 elections, where 15 seats were contested, showed a swing from SF to the SDLP of 10.8 percent. One analyst notes that an even better test of the Anglo-Irish Agreement’s effect is a comparison between May 1985 local government elections and the by-elections. “In this case there was a swing of 6.5% from S.F. to S.D.L.P. in eight months compared to 4.3% from 1983 to 1985.”30 Even though neither Adams’ West Belfast seat nor Hume’s Foyle seat was contested in 1986, observers took this election as a measure with which to gauge the contest between the two parties.31 Similarly to the January 1986 elections, the 1987 Westminster elections were widely seen as a vote on the AIA and, by extension, Hume’s way of looking at the conflict.32 In this election the SDLP increased its total vote to 154,000—which is higher than it had been since 1974 when they had no nationalist competition—and its number of Westminster seats to 3 of the 17 allotted for Northern Ireland. In comparison to SF’s 11.4 percent of the total vote, the SDLP captured 21.1 percent. Despite the fact that Adams retained his West Belfast seat, observers argued that this election demonstrated that the SDLP’s constitutional nationalism was gaining appeal over the earlier gains of republicanism.33 For Hume to be effective in framing the republican threat as the most urgent, it makes sense that his audience would have to experience this particular threat. It is clear that they did, and a few details exemplify why Hume’s framing was well received. In fact, the IRA stepped up its violence in Northern Ireland and elsewhere after the AIA of 1985. Many Catholics died in these operations.34 The IRA


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also attacked more targets in mainland Britain. Even if repression by the IRA (and loyalist paramilitaries’ responses) was seen by nationalists as more of a threat than anything else, appeals for negotiation and nonviolent approaches would seem inappropriate as long as repression of the nationalist community by the British army and the RUC continued and intensified. For Hume’s ideas to resonate, this aspect of the internal setting would have to change. In fact, things did begin to change on this front after the early 1980s; some of the changes were a result of Hume’s actions and others were not. As noted earlier, the republican hunger strikers received a great deal of publicity, and international and EC pressure on Britain to reform brought changes in the mid-1980s to the degree of repression imposed on the nationalist community. Also, pressure from Dublin within the structure of the AIA of 1985 meant that the general situation improved somewhat for most Catholics/nationalists.35 As promised by the SDLP, the AIA focused on improving the justice system for ordinary people in the nationalist community. In 1986 and 1987, the agreement was credited with addressing crucial problems such as unemployment, housing, and the justice system.36 Indeed, because of the AIA, the conduct of security forces was under greater scrutiny from international and British investigators; RUC officers were prosecuted by the British for interfering with investigations; and in 1989 the RUC was reformed by a new chief to be more responsive to both communities.37 Further, the British stopped using supergrasses, Britain and the Republic cooperated more on extradition, and Dublin finally signed the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Act in 1987. The European antiterrorism agreement relates to another important dimension of the situation: while the RUC and British army were scaling back their repression of the broader nationalist community, with the cooperation and consent of the European Community, the repression of the British and Irish states focused, relentlessly, on the IRA (and by association, on SF).38 Along with harassment of people in known IRA areas, both countries imposed broadcasting bans and signed the aforementioned European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. SF accused the RUC and British army of widespread harassment of SF campaigners. In this period repressive measures in the Republic and in the United Kingdom in response to the IRA bombing campaign were taking their toll on the IRA.39 This factor eventually was one of the reasons the militant republicans began to consider a cease-fire. Hume’s use of the other three strategies show how Hume contributed to or took advantage of changes in the internal and external environments in ways that made involving SF in talks seem necessary and feasible. After SF became engaged in the talks, Hume shifted his framing of threat. After an initial move back to seeing “men of violence” as the focus, he depicted the most crucial threats as the general notion of moving back to the past and those groups and individuals opposed to the peace process. After the cease-fires of 1994, the security forces scaled back their activities in Northern Ireland. Significantly for the sensitivities of nationalists, the British army ended their patrols of the streets of Derry and Belfast.40 The cease-fires also resulted in a scaling back of security force raids on IRA strongholds. After the cease-fires,

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Britain announced that the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) and the Irish Rangers would merge, forming the Royal Irish Regiment. This was significant because nationalists perceived the UDR as a Protestant regiment consisting of sectarian forces who could not get into the British army or the police/Royal Ulster Constabulary. Since the Irish Rangers were about 30 percent Catholic, the British hoped the nationalists would recognize the effort to be fair.41 Finally, as noted earlier, the Republic, and then Britain, lifted their censorship policies against SF. Apparently, a more open atmosphere existed than in previous periods; both governments treated republicans more like political activists and less like criminals. We see a renewal of the “men of violence” as the focus of the framing threat strategy in the speeches of Hume leading up to the Westminster elections in 1997. In this period, as discussed later, the IRA had broken its August 1994 cease-fire with a devastating February 1996 bombing at London’s Canary Wharf. The organization did not announce a renewal because of a political standoff. On one side, unionists and the British government demanded a cease-fire before SF could enter all-party talks. On the other, nationalists and international actors argued that talks and disarmament should take place in parallel. In speeches in early 1997, Hume explained that there could be no working with SF in election agreements to secure nationalist seats because without a cease-fire republicans were a danger to everything that had been achieved.42 Once the Good Friday Accord was negotiated in April 1998, Hume’s threat framing shifted as both the Republic and Northern Ireland geared up for referenda to approve the Agreement. His main focus was those who opposed agreement, especially the Democratic Unionist Party of Ian Paisley and hard-liners within the Ulster Unionist party. Primarily, the threat moved from the actors to the general idea of going back to the past.43 Overall, Hume’s use of the framing threat strategy in terms of the republican men of violence helped him draw attention to what was happening in Northern Ireland and thus undermine the rise of republicanism, reduce British intransigence, and end the province’s international isolation. He then used another strategy, that of broadening audience, to try to change things to put his agenda into action. Broadening Audience Hume reframed the threat to draw attention to what he saw as the true causes of desperation in Northern Ireland; next he took action. Hume broadened his audience in four directions: by including the Republic, Britain, the unionists, and the broader international community (especially the EC and the U.S. government). As with the other cases in this book, this strategy is employed when a leader is faced with a particular obstacle. First, Hume broadened audience to get around the growing popularity of the militant republicans, then to involve SF in talks, and a third time to get past a stalemate in the talks over disarmament. Recall that the definition of this strategy is expanding one’s coalition to create legitimacy at home or abroad, or to support one’s message of shared identity/shared fate with the group now being included in the expanded constituency. When a leader broadens audience, he persuades new actors that they have a stake in what


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he is trying to do; he appeals to them that his agenda offers them something they need or want. The more actors a leader can get to see the situation his way and to help reinforce his definition of the situation, the better able he is to accomplish his goals. Facing the popularity of SF and sensing the limits to what internal support he could gather, Hume broadened audience to include several actors and increased his legitimacy both domestically and internationally. He worked harder to cultivate a new constituency in the South. He had long seen external help as important, saying in 1980 that the SDLP must “. . . persuade those with power or influence, whether they be in Northern Ireland, in London, in Dublin, in Europe or in the United States, to consider the problem of Northern Ireland in a serious way and to use their influence to help solve it.”44 He took this opportunity to make this happen after SF’s gains. Emphasizing that the people of the Republic are part of the community on the island, he campaigned to get the constitutional nationalist parties to work together with counterparts in the North on an agreed negotiating strategy with the British. Hume argued that, if successful, the unionist veto could be undermined and SF stalled. The political parties of the Republic also worried about growing support for SF and agreed to establish the New Ireland Forum to deliberate with the SDLP in 1983 and 1984. Also at the urging of the SDLP, Anglo-Irish talks had been going on for a few years, but there was not much movement on an agreed approach. The proposals that came out of this forum, though first rejected by Margaret Thatcher, eventually became the basis for new talks and the eventual signing of the AIA in 1985.45 Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) FitzGerald helped Hume publicize the benefits of the AIA, as it would provide new opportunities, giving Catholics a greater voice in political institutions and providing protection from political and economic discrimination.46 Second, Hume was a significant player in expanding the pro-negotiation coalition by drawing in the British government as well (with help from the United States; see later). As with the Republic of Ireland, the setting was conducive to getting London to see things his way. Prior to SF’s gains, the British-Irish relationship was strained, and keeping things on track was not easy. For example, when Britain invaded the Falkland Islands in 1983, the Republic was very vocal in its opposition. This episode raised fears that the Anglo-Irish collaboration would break down. Also, after the New Ireland Forum’s three suggested options—a confederal Ireland, a united Ireland, or joint sovereignty—were presented to Thatcher at a November 1984 summit with FitzGerald, Thatcher proclaimed that all three options were “out” (this became known as the “Out, out, out speech”). Further, Thatcher had narrowly escaped death at the hands of the IRA in the Brighton bombing in October 1984, leaving her pretty reluctant to think about concessions to nationalists.47 Eventually London shifted this view, though. Hume’s idea that the militant republicans could be stopped by working with constitutional nationalists gained credibility. Other aspects of the situation working in Hume’s favor were that public opinion in Britain was increasingly hostile to Britain’s involvement, and the opposition Labour Party had committed itself to promoting unification of Ireland by consent.48 Since 1983, the Liberal Party in Britain had also been promoting the idea that

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British troops should be withdrawn from Ireland.49 Hume’s appeals came at the right moment, but at the same time it would be difficult to assert that British cooperation would have been forthcoming without Hume’s actions. The change in the official stance on Northern Ireland was exemplified by Britain’s decision to negotiate the AIA with Hume and the political parties in the Republic. Hume used the agreement to appeal to SF that in Article 1 of the treaty, the British declared that its government had no interest in staying in Ireland. Subsequently, the role of Hume would be to convince the republicans of this point (thereby undermining one of their key arguments) and to persuade the British to make this declaration more clearly. For years after, Hume argued that Britain did not have an objection to Irish unity if a majority in Northern Ireland approved, and that the job of nationalists was to persuade unionists. SF had always denounced this idea, but it began to show signs of change after 1990 when Northern Ireland Secretary of State Brooke announced that “the British government has no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland; our role is to help, enable, encourage.” Refusing to give up on the idea that the republican movement could be convinced of the sincerity of this statement and thus brought into the process, Hume wrote A Strategy for Peace and Justice in Ireland in October 1991 which was a draft of what would become known as the December 1993 Downing Street Declaration signed by British Prime Minister John Major and Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.50 In this Declaration, the British accepted that the people of Ireland alone by agreement between the two parts should be allowed to exercise the right to self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South. The Downing Street Declaration eventually produced the Framework Documents in February 1995. Resembling Hume’s ideas dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, this framework contained three dimensions of negotiation: internal North, EastWest, and North-South. Hume used Britain as an important part of his audience again when the peace process stalled in 1996; this also involved the United States (see later). Beyond Ireland and Britain, a third group to which Hume reached out with his broadening audience strategy in order to halt the republican progress was the unionists. As noted previously, the SDLP leader had given a speech during the 1982 election campaign appealing to unionists to work together with nationalists. More than words were needed. While not involving unionists directly, the AIA was a tool used to bring them into the dialogue that Hume envisioned—though it initially alienated them. The agreement re-represented the situation in Northern Ireland in a fundamental way. Moving past the view that the unification of Ireland was a basic right of the majority of Irish people on the whole island, the AIA embodied the view that Irish unification should and could only be achieved with the consent of the majority within Northern Ireland.51 Irish unity was a matter of those who want it trying to persuade those who did not.52 For the first time, a nationalist leader appealed to unionists on the basis that they are all part of Northern Ireland. Another way in which the AIA helped include unionists in the pro-negotiation constituency was to encourage divisions among unionists so that power sharing


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would be a more acceptable outcome. As noted, in the early 1980s the situation was practically deadlocked, a circumstance made worse by British unwillingness to push unionists. The AIA embodied the fact that Britain was no longer as willing to rescue the unionist people. Gone were the days of 1974 when the security forces stood by and watched unionist intransigence destroy any chances for negotiations;53 Britain still catered to unionist demands in many ways but the AIA was an important symbol of the changing times. Hume was right about the potential for the agreement to push unionists. In 1987, the representatives of one political group (the Ulster Political Research Group, the political arm of the paramilitary Ulster Defense Association) published Common Sense. In it, they recognized that the disgruntled, significant political minority had to be dealt with and, while not including the Irish dimension, rejected pure majority rule. The largest unionist parties, the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party, would not go this far, but by 1988 had recognized the need for dialogue.54 A fourth group that Hume included in his effort to broaden audience as a way to pursue his vision was the international community (that is, international actors beyond the Republic of Ireland and Britain). Much like George Bush during the Persian Gulf War, Hume recognized that domestic obstacles were too great to overcome and saw an opportunity to draw on the external environment. Most concede that international support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict was a crucial factor leading to the 1998 Good Friday Accords, yet it was not until Hume moved to pull in external states and organizations that these actors got deeply involved. Of course, Gerry Adams of SF and David Trimble of the United Unionist Party (and many others) deserve a great deal of credit for their roles, but Hume was a key player here, either drawing in the actors himself or drawing on aspects of the external and internal contexts to make things happen. Hume, working with the Americans, Irish, and British, was instrumental in getting SF accepted at the negotiating table, as is illustrated later. On the European front, Hume consistently worked to make the EC part of the solution. Serving as a minister of the European Parliament since 1979, Hume’s speeches and actions show how he (1) wanted the people of Northern Ireland to see themselves as part of Europe and (2) wanted the member countries of the EC to see that the Northern Ireland conflict was a European problem with which they had the responsibility to help. Themes in his speeches throughout the nearly thirty years of the conflict show that if Northern Irish people could see themselves as more than just nationalist or unionist, the sense of multiple identities would allow them to see what they have in common. Further, they might be more open to accepting new institutions within Northern Ireland, between the Republic and Northern Ireland, and among Northern Ireland, the Republic, and Britain that are modeled on the EC. Hume’s broadening audience strategy aimed at isolating the republicans was helped along by initiatives within the EU. The Haagerup Report, which placed Northern Ireland on the EC’s agenda for the first time, was issued in March 1984. This report presented the results of a study of Northern Ireland’s conflict and rejected the previous EC stance that Northern Ireland was an internal problem. Knowing about Hume’s work because of his role as a minister of the European Parliament, the Report supported Hume’s Forum initiative, arguing

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that the British and Irish governments should set up a framework to resolve conflict. The other audience Hume sought to involve in the international arena was the United States. The SDLP leader certainly was not the first to think of calling on friends overseas. Americans—especially Irish Americans—were involved in the Northern Ireland conflict for decades before Hume succeeded in getting the kind of help he wanted from the United States. In 1969, NORAID (Northern Irish Aid) was set up in the United States to support the families of IRA volunteers who were in jail or on the run.55 A priest from Northern Ireland established the Irish National Caucus in the 1970s, and enlisted actors such as the Ancient Order of Hibernians and Mario Biaggi, a congressman from New York. The latter recruited colleagues to an ad hoc committee of congressmen and senators; this group engaged in lobbying, mostly to pressure Britain. They succeeded in stopping the sale of American weapons to the RUC in 1979 because of its abuse of human rights.56 Hume wanted to change two aspects of America’s involvement: first, get people to see beyond the republican view of the situation that British policy was the main cause of the conflict; second, to get prominent Irish-American politicians (rather than IrishAmerican organizations) involved in promoting a broadly conceived peace process that included unionists, Britain, Ireland, and the U.S. government.57 Accounts of Hume’s behavior and the actions of U.S. policy makers clearly show that his lobbying in the U.S. Congress really was an important reason for the initial activity of the U.S. government and the attention given by the EC.58 His activity began in 1977 when, working with the Irish embassy in Washington, he gathered together Tip O’Neill (Speaker of the House), Senators Edward Kennedy and Patrick Moynihan, and New York Governor Hugh Carey. Called “The Big Four,” these powerful figures were instrumental in the issuing of the Carter initiative in 1977. This presidential statement moved away from the policy of noninvolvement in Northern Ireland,59 taken to preserve the tight Anglo-American bond. These actors would continue to pressure for U.S. involvement. In 1981, during the hunger strikes, Senator Kennedy condemned the British, as did President Reagan, who expressed that he was “deeply concerned about the tragic situation.” The U.S. leadership was short on action, though, as Reagan declared in the same statement that the United States would not take an interventionist stance.60 In May 1984, Congress backed Hume’s Forum strategy in the first resolution on Ireland since 1918.61 Further, the United States (and Irish-American pressure) was a crucial actor in bringing about the AIA, pushing Thatcher to work with the New Ireland Forum group, in combination with other factors noted earlier. Once Britain seemed to be moving toward renouncing its interests in Northern Ireland, the Irish were committed to working on solutions, and SF was still garnering votes (though at a slow rate after the AIA), Hume began to change his mind about talking to Adams. His stance against violence meant he abhorred talking to SF, but its level of support meant that the republicans had to be part of an inclusive solution. Initial talks took place in 1985, failing quickly, then had more success during a second attempt in 1988.62 In 1992, SF published an analysis, Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland, which showed significant shifts in its depictions of Britain,


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the Republic of Ireland, the SDLP, and the unionist people. Hume’s role in effecting change is captured in the following quotation: Crucially, it [Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland] appeared to shift the Republican Movement’s strategy towards that of the SDLP. It called on the British Government to “join the persuaders,” and to use its influence to convince unionists that their future did not lay within the Union. It also called on the Dublin Government to persuade the British that partition had failed; to persuade unionists of the benefits of reunification; and to persuade the international community that it should support a “peace process” in Ireland. The unseen influence of John Hume was revealed in this document.63

By 1993, Hume and Adams had met again and issued a joint statement calling for a peace process. Given the roots of SF, this was a monumental event. Hume received a great deal of criticism from his own party and anger from Dublin; loyalists mounted attacks in fear of the “pan-nationalist front”; British Prime Minister John Major rejected working with anyone not renouncing violence.64 It was at this point that Hume reached another roadblock: How to get the other parties to see SF as a partner for peace? Hume broadened audience again, drawing on the international environment to bring about changes in perceptions at home. At this juncture, in the early 1990s, Hume’s goals were helped along by changes in external circumstances. The EC, in part at Hume’s urging, continued to express the change begun with the endorsement of the Forum idea in 1984—that of viewing the conflict as an international concern and not only an internal one. Evidence is that by the 1990s, the Single European Market (SEM) and the regional programs of the Community (now the EU) created a logic that has made North-South integration in Ireland a necessity. It has also made the treatment of Northern Ireland as part of Britain “illogical.” This force has even led unionists in Northern Ireland to agree that an “all-Ireland” framework in the SEM is necessary, although disagreement exists on the structures for it.65 Increased European integration also made possible an EU governmental action that reinforced the American and UN view that the situation in Northern Ireland was an international matter: in September 1995, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the killing of three IRA personnel by SAS forces at Gibraltar (1988) was illegal.66 The British had argued that the killings were legitimate responses to terrorism. In his effort to get people at home to buy into his view of a broadened audience, Hume presented European integration and the governance processes related to it as an opportunity for the community of Northern Ireland, Britain, and Ireland to overcome their differences: We are all aware of the discussion [in the European Community] regarding the degree to which the evolving Community will require the pooling of sovereignty by the member States so as to meet the common tasks. Clearly these developments have the most profound implications for our relationships on this island. . . . The lesson of the European example is obvious.67

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He often used the example of France and Germany: after centuries of fighting, the two countries were now the mainstay of peace and stability in Europe. For example, We ought to be encouraged by the example of the European Community. . . . In this century alone, the peoples of Europe have been locked in the savagery of two world wars with the bitterness and slaughter that goes far beyond anything we have experienced on this island. Yet 34 years after the Second World War, as a result of an agreed process, they have been able to create one parliament to represent them, one community—and the Germans are still Germans, the French are still French. They have a unity in diversity. Is it too much to ask that we on this small island do precisely the same thing?68

At the international level beyond the EU, ideas about sovereignty and international intervention to deal with internal conflicts changed substantially after the Cold War, as the United Nations under Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (then Kofi Annan) and the United States formulated “peacemaking” as an important part of the agenda of the international community. Whereas sovereignty has been held up as a “negative,” to limit the interference of external actors,69 in recent years it has acquired a second dimension of “responsibility.”70 A sovereign state has not only rights, but also the responsibility to protect people within its borders, and states in the rest of the international community should intervene if there are violations of this responsibility. Also, the change in norms of conflict resolution meant that the United States was now more involved in offering mediation and guarantees.71 Clinton’s presidency especially took this stance; a major goal of his foreign policy was regional conflict resolution. Hume took advantage of this climate to push the Americans to accept the legitimacy of SF through granting Gerry Adams a visa for entry into the United States. Adams had been banned for years because of his associations with the IRA, labeled as a terrorist organization by the United States. A powerful embodiment of the changed context was Clinton’s agreement to approve the visa in February 1994. The American connection here was essential: Senator Edward Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador to Ireland Jean Kennedy Smith (Kennedy’s sister), Americans who had formed a group to lobby for Northern Ireland during the 1992 presidential campaign (ANIA: Americans for a New Irish Agenda), and Hume lobbied to get Adams’s visa. This move would boost his legitimacy within his organization, as he sought an IRA cease-fire announcement that would help SF participate in a peace process; the cease-fire did come at the end of August (1994). Equally important, Hume and the Americans hoped that the symbolism of the U.S. move would pressure Dublin and London to engage with SF (and, in reciprocating fashion, help further Adams’s effort for a cease-fire announcement).72 Especially as the peace talks proceeded, Hume reminded people in Northern Ireland of their shared identity with the Irish diaspora worldwide, and noted that “we can harness their good will and sympathy to help us with the real development of our country.” His party was engaged in several projects to that end (see later).73 Hume broadened audience again during the years of talks preceding the 1998 Good Friday Accord. In late 1995 and January 1996, broadening audience to


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include the United States and thus making it possible to pursue Hume’s proposals was crucial as republicans and unionists reached a stalemate over disarmament. As with many conflicts, a tough issue is how to disarm paramilitaries. In this case, SF argued that it could not convince the IRA to give up its weapons stockpiles until an agreement was reached. This agreement would involve a significant reduction in the British military presence; the IRA did not surrender but taking the first move toward disarmament without the agreement may have looked like surrender to its members. Unionists argued that they would not negotiate a final agreement until the IRA began to give up its weapons. The United States, informed by Hume’s talks with Gerry Adams as well as communication with Adams directly, stepped in to argue that decommissioning and negotiations should take place in parallel. On the eve of an historic trip by Clinton to Northern Ireland, American diplomats working with Irish and British governments were able to announce in late November 1995 that negotiations and decommissioning could proceed in parallel and that an International Commission chaired by former Senator George Mitchell would be set up to figure out the plan’s implementation.74 In January 1996, Mitchell issued a study reporting that the paramilitaries would probably never surrender their weapons first, and that to start negotiations all parties should commit to six principles of democracy and nonviolence (“the Mitchell Principles”). SF (and the IRA) committed to the democratic process for the first time and was allowed to proceed with decommissioning during the peace process (as opposed to before or after).75 Mitchell’s proposals were hamstrung when the British government under John Major basically stopped the talks, as it bent to unionist pressure and announced that elections to a negotiating forum must be held. Seventy U.S. senators and representatives, under the banner of the Ad Hoc Committee on Ireland, wrote to Clinton denouncing Major’s move. Condemnation was bipartisan, adding to its credibility. U.S. media was predominantly hostile to Britain as well. Next, on February 1, 1996, Adams, U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and President Clinton met and issued a statement supporting Mitchell’s approach to all-party peace talks and—between the lines—condemning Major’s move.76 Still, this condemnation did not succeed. Frustrated by what they called the British government’s “stalling tactics,” the IRA broke the cease-fire with the London Canary Wharf bombing on February 9, 1996. In response, the Irish and British governments broke contact with SF negotiators until the IRA reinstated the cessation. Elections were set for May 1996 and talks without SF would follow that summer. In Hume’s campaign for the forum, his efforts to broaden audience to isolate SF are apparent. One target was the unionists again. After the IRA ended its ceasefire, Hume went to a prison to talk with loyalist prisoners. His purpose was to explain to them that a renewed republican cease-fire was still possible if John Major would help clear the way for SF’s entry into talks. Ultimately, Hume’s goal was to persuade the loyalists to keep their cease-fire intact and to stay with him in the effort to get to an agreement.77 He appealed to the idea that they all shared a common fate and identity as peacemakers. In appealing to nationalist voters, he tried to get them to conceive of their own audience broadly. Worried that they

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would boycott the forum elections in solidarity with SF (or simply with anger toward Britain), Hume made clear the SDLP position that the forum would not replace or be an obstacle to all-party negotiations. People had to vote SDLP because “ ‘the eyes of the world’ would be focussed [sic] on the election, and it was important that people demonstrated their desire for peace by speaking with their ballot papers.”78 He continued to work with the Americans to bring pressure to bear on both SF (for a renewed IRA cease-fire), on one hand, and on the British and unionists, on the other. This section began with the assertion that a primary strategy used by John Hume to further his definition of the situation in Northern Ireland, and ultimately his goal of bringing an end to the conflict, was that of broadening the audience. The idea behind this strategy is that a leader can gain support for his agenda by increasing the scope of his audience. The more actors he can include in his agenda, the more weight carried by his ideas for a solution. In this case, Hume’s broadening audience drew in actors and changed conditions in Northern Ireland at particular junctures where he was stymied in his efforts to move toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Several examples of this strategy illustrate how the issue became one of intermestic politics, in which the leader sees opportunities to use circumstances in domestic politics to affect the situation in the international arena, and vice versa. The world changed from the 1970s to the 1990s, and Hume was certainly not responsible for all of those changes. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, dramatic changes within republicanism and in the relationship between republicanism and constitutional nationalism were started by and are the result of many factors including difficulties for SF (including losing public support for militant nationalism as casualties mounted). Additional examples are that the period between the late 1980s and the first IRA cease-fire of 1994 was marked by (1) changes in the social and political profile of nationalists in Northern Ireland toward a larger middle class with a greater interest in a capitalist economy; (2) the growing economy of the Republic of Ireland; (3) deepening integration in the EU and the effect of the EU’s single market and regional programs on the need for North-South integration in Ireland; (4) the end of the Cold War; (5) changes in British leadership to John Major (in 1997, the impending election of Labour leader Tony Blair became even more influential); (6) shifts within the unionist bloc promoted by Britain’s denial of their “Britishness” in statements such as the Downing Street Declaration, and by “pan-nationalism,” or increased cooperation among Hume, Adams, and the Dublin parties; and finally, (7) enough IRA-British attacks and counterattacks to leave the region in a political and military stalemate. Still, we have seen how Hume played an important role in taking advantage of and bringing about some aspects of the new state of affairs, because Ireland, Britain, the European Community/Union, and the United States responded to Hume’s efforts to pull them in. The following quotation, reflecting on the 1998 agreement, illustrates Hume’s broad conception of his audience, as he defines his constituency as any actors working for peace: Our party needs to make no apology for our aspiration to the unity of our people. But let us consider our definition of unity. . . . What greater unity is possible than the


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unity of the joint endeavours of those elected to serve in the Assembly and its Executive? What greater unity is possible than the unity of our shared endeavours in the North-South Ministerial Council? At this point in our history, we have achieved a truly valuable unity. The unity of purpose across all previous boundaries of party and tradition that suffuses, informs, and directs the institutions and principles of the Good Friday Agreement. The unity of purpose that directs the new politics on behalf of the people in this society. The unity of purpose undertaken on behalf of all the people of these islands, North and South, East and West. . . .79

Hume used issues in domestic politics—such as the violence of the IRA, the deprivation of the nationalist community, and the occasional intransigence of the British government or the unionist parties—to draw in external actors. This often had the effect of changing conditions within Northern Ireland to better fit his definition of the situation (e.g., “the British can be worked with”). He used issues in the international arena such as concern for severe repression or economic development in the EC to make foreign actors part of his audience. In addition, through consistent behavior and rhetoric, Hume connected his international audience and its issues with the domestic audience, aiming to convince people in Northern Ireland that, to give two examples, solutions were possible on the European model and a peaceful approach will help bring economic development. In summary, Hume was able to use broadening audience to help undermine the rise of republicanism, ease the sense of threat among some unionists, reduce British intransigence, and end international isolation. In the next section, the “buying off ” strategy is investigated as another significant way Hume sought to change Northern Ireland. Buying Off The “buying off” strategy is defined as using material resources or promises of them to co-opt opposition abroad or at home or change conditions abroad or at home. Hume’s activity to bring aid and investment into Northern Ireland was unsurpassed by any other actor. Republican politicians were very skilled at raising money, through sources such as NORAID, but most of the money they brought was for prisoners, for SF’s political campaigns, and for helping families in working-class areas. Hume was engaged in finding or creating projects to bring money for development of the province as a whole. In his speeches Hume constantly drew attention to economic problems in the whole community and especially in deprived areas, as well as focused on what the SDLP had done or planned to do. His initiatives grew from his definition of the situation, and from the perceived need to do something about support (and recruitment) for the paramilitaries. For example, in an address as a minister of Parliament to the British House of Commons in 1984, which was also printed in a Northern Ireland newspaper, he said, . . . in Northern Ireland today we have a generation of eighteen-year-olds who have lived through the past fifteen years who know nothing except violence and soldiers on the streets, and who, having built up resentment to that type of society, have nothing but unemployment staring them in the face in our desperate economic situation, making them easy meat for recruitment by paramilitary organizations. That in turn makes a bad situation even worse.80

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He did not claim that the conflict was caused by economic problems alone. However, he believed that it was made worse by the relative deprivation of nationalists in the North and fears of unionists, in a province where the entire economy was in decline, that if they gave up power they would lose even more jobs. He also was very clear that the violence of paramilitaries on both sides was causing even more economic destruction, as investment was chased away and existing assets were continually bombed. A cycle was created that was intensifying the resentment between the communities and creating in young people the mindset that political violence is an option. He made these arguments throughout his career. Several examples demonstrate how his efforts came to fruition. As with use of the broadening audience strategy, Hume’s intermestic diplomacy is related in timing to particular roadblocks he came across: stopping the gains of the republicans, appealing to unionists, and trying to get negotiations underway. From the early 1980s, the EC responded to Hume and the SDLP’s initiatives and addressed the economic aspects of the conflict with infrastructure projects and other aid. These actions addressed the first two obstacles noted earlier (isolating republicans and appealing to unionists). Hume’s position as a minister of the European Parliament since 1979 was his primary avenue. The first successes were in 1981, when the European Parliament, at Hume’s urging, requested special assistance to Northern Ireland from the European Commission. The initial allotment was 16 million pounds for housing in Belfast. Working with Britain, the SDLP succeeded in creating the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, which took housing decisions out of control of the unionists.81 Because discrimination in housing was one of the major complaints of the civil rights movement, this achievement was very important to nationalists. Second, the SDLP brought 80 million pounds to help farmers with the European Economic Community Small Farm Plan. As Hume noted at the time, the party used its influence on behalf of all the people of Northern Ireland and not just Catholics.82 Northern Ireland became a major recipient of EC funds in future years.83 Reception of aid from the EC brought sustained attention to the conflict, also drawing increased visibility to the problem of IRA terrorism in Europe and against EC projects in Northern Ireland.84 Other evidence of buying off in action is seen around the time when Hume was working to get negotiations underway. Following the announcement by President Clinton about increased U.S. economic efforts in Northern Ireland (see later), the SDLP worked with the EU for a new package of economic measures at its 1995 Essen meetings. In this regard, the Commission set up a task force in 1994 to create a plan for EU assistance to Northern Ireland and the border regions. In a 1994 speech, Hume stated his high hopes for this package, and he gave emphasis to a “Social Inclusion Programme” that would bring economic and social development to the communities in the North hardest hit and most alienated by the conflict in both communities.85 Within the nationalist community, these are also the areas most likely to support the republican cause; he mentions statistics of West Belfast, a republican stronghold. The final result was the 350 million pound European Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. Connections with the United States were fundamental to Hume’s buying off strategy as he sought to slow down the shift toward republicanism among nationalists.


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After the 1985 AIA was signed, President Ronald Reagan pledged U.S. economic aid;86 this aid came in March 1987—just a few months before the Westminster vote where the SDLP had to worry about SF votes—and was in the amount of $50 million for the International Fund for Ireland.87 Hume was one of those who came up with the idea for the fund, working with Tip O’Neill and others in Congress. In early 1987, under Hume’s leadership, the SDLP forged a program of investment partnerships between American, Northern Irish, and Irish cities. The first was a Boston-Derry-Galway partnership, working with academic institutions such as the University of Massachusetts to rejuvenate the economies in the northwest of the island of Ireland.88 Hume was also the inspiration for a broad economic initiative during the Clinton administration. In late 1994, following the cease-fires, Clinton assembled a team to assess economic initiatives that would be feasible in Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic. The team included officials from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the Treasury, State, and Commerce Departments; and the Office of Management and Budget. Based on their report, Clinton appointed Senator George Mitchell as an economic envoy (later to become the peace envoy), with the title Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for economic initiatives in Ireland. In Clinton’s words: “There must be a peace dividend in Ireland for the peace to succeed. Peace and prosperity depend on one another.” He increased the allocation to the International Fund for Ireland from $20 million to $30 million over the next two years. Finally, the largest part of the package was an investment conference on Ireland “of unparalleled scope and prestige,” held in 1995 under the auspices of the White House. This economic package was “an initiative long recommended in Washington by John Hume.”89 In summary, Hume successfully used the buying off strategy over the years to address two goals. First, he wanted to bring jobs and development to areas of Northern Ireland where poverty—and recruitment to paramilitary organizations— was most rampant. The more this could be achieved, the less the appeals of more radical leaders would resonate. He could stem the move toward republicanism and try also to reduce fears of unionists by helping Protestant communities too. Second, by working on projects to benefit the province as a whole, and by consistently framing the projects this way as he publicized them, Hume wanted to further the sense of a shared identity. The community consisted not only of nationalists, but was all of Northern Ireland. This sense of a shared identity and fate was crucial to build to get negotiations underway. Tying Hands The final strategy Hume employed is “tying hands,” defined as limiting the range of options in the domestic arena to convince an actor(s) in the international arena that a particular course is necessary (or limiting options in international diplomacy to convince domestic actors that a particular course is necessary). In order to know whether a leader is using this strategy he has to make reference to the situation into which he is being “forced.” Hume tied his hands in combination with other strategies.

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He involved external actors (broadening audience), and then argued that, without help from the United States, Britain, and the Republic, he could not deal with the rise of militant republicanism and deadlock on the unionist front alone. This was especially true when he reached out after the 1982–1983 elections, when arguing for recognition of Adams and inclusion of SF prior to the 1994 cease-fire, and again during the summer of 1996 as Hume fought to get the talks back on track. Also, in trying to keep domestic parties on board in negotiations, he emphasized that any settlement would absolutely fail without external support, and that support would dissipate if they strayed from the agenda he was pursuing. Thus, the tying hands strategy helped Hume address several obstacles: the rise of republicanism, unionist intransigence, British obstructionism, and international isolation. In the first instance, Hume argued in the early years of the conflict that Britain must stand up to unionists. He emphasized that London was the only actor who could change the situation in a way that would bring the unionists to the table. “Unionist selfishness in this generation is the result less of malevolence than of a privilege which they did not themselves institute. They will not, and probably cannot, make the leap of the imagination alone. They must be helped to do so. The British Government, and only them, can do it.”90 The italics are added here to emphasize what Hume was getting at: he and the other nationalists could only go so far—their hands were tied—without British help. Later, in the mid-1990s, Hume tied his hands in discussions with Americans about needing help pressuring the British to allow Adams into the dialogue (“talks about talks,” as they were often labeled). Sharing his insight from talks with Adams in 1988 and 1993, Hume argued that the situation was deadlocked in Northern Ireland, but by giving Adams a visa the United States could send a strong signal about his legitimacy. He and other visa supporters in U.S. policy circles argued that with this move, Adams’s standing within the republican organization would be buoyed and, in turn, would help him bring about a cease-fire. Again, Hume insisted that until things changed on this front, his hands were tied. Final examples of Hume tying hands occurred in 1996, when, once again, the talks were stalled. As noted earlier, the IRA broke the cease-fire in February 1996 with the Canary Wharf bombing. In doing so, the organization reacted to Britain’s choice to conduct talks through an elected assembly (thus siding with unionists); nationalists saw the assembly as a stalling tactic. At this time, Hume argued that the only way to move forward was with Irish and British help in setting a date for allparty talks and making a joint declaration. The declaration undermined the IRA’s violent approach. It would state (1) that the two governments have chosen to leave the past aside and acknowledge that the animosities among the people are consequences of history; and (2) the two governments had committed to build institutions in the north and south of Ireland that respect difference but allow working together where common ground is shared.91 Also, Hume met with loyalist prisoners and emphasized that a renewed cease-fire from the IRA might be possible if the British government would respond positively to Hume’s proposals to get SF back to the table.92 During this time, he also emphasized to SF how support from international actors would disappear if parties could not stand by a nonviolent approach. There


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was only so much movement nationalists could get in favor of republicans; the Mitchell principles tied their hands. In sum, Hume resorted to tying hands, as with the other strategies, when he reached a point where the situation constrained progress—on isolating republicans, dealing with unionists, and during a few episodes when getting talks underway. Without the vision and ability to use elements of the international sphere to affect domestic politics and vice versa, the outcome may have been very different. Table 2.1 Summary of John Hume’s use of strategy Leadership Strategy

Hume’s Use of Strategy

Outcome (Obstacles Addressed)

Framing threat

Denounced “men of violence” as primary threat to peace; later, those opposed to peace process and moving back to past as primary threats

Undermined rise of republicanism; reduced British intransigence; ended international isolation (drew in Ireland, EU, the United States)

Broadening audience

Drew in republicans, British, unionists, international community

Undermined rise of republicanism; eased sense of threat for some unionists reduced British intransigence; ended international isolation

Buying off

Brought in aid and investment from international sources for broad cross-section of NI

Undermined appeal of republicanism; gains appealed to unionists; ended international isolation

Tying hands

Once international community and Britain got involved, he argued that he could not deal with unionists and republicans on his own; once agreement was reached, he argued that he could not hold any settlement together without support for his approach

Created pressure on republicans and unionists; convinced international actors and Britain to stay involved and supportive of the Good Friday Accord framework

Conclusion We began this chapter by painting the picture of John Hume’s predicament. A leader who came on the scene during Northern Ireland’s civil rights movement, he based his career on the principles of nonviolence and peaceful resolution of conflict, never missing a chance to quote Martin Luther King, Jr. Anyone in this position in the Northern Ireland of the 1970s and 1980s had a tough challenge: not only was the SF/IRA movement growing in popularity, but its appeals to nationalists were reinforced by the behavior of the British and unionists. Especially after the elections of the early 1980s, John Hume redoubled his efforts to transform the environment in which he found himself. By framing threat, broadening audience,

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buying off, and tying hands, he used issues within Northern Ireland to further his international efforts, on one hand, and used circumstances in the international arena to manipulate other domestic players and domestic conditions, on the other. Again, the world changed in many ways from the beginning of the Troubles until the negotiation of the 1998 Good Friday Accord. However, when one examines Hume’s behavior and also the format of the accord, he obviously played a significant role in making the situation in Northern Ireland one in which the signing of the Accord was possible (his work and that of Unionist Party leader David Trimble was recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998). Indeed, the Accord itself was reflective of the proposals that Hume had put forward for many years, and resembled the EC (now Union) model. For example, it established a power-sharing Assembly for governing within Northern Ireland. Representatives would be elected on the basis of proportional representation, and a system of voting was created to insure that most decisions have the support of the majority of both communities. A second part of the governance structure set up was the North-South Ministerial Council. Representatives from the Northern Ireland Assembly would work with counterparts from the Dail (Parliament of the Republic of Ireland) on issues for which it makes especially good sense to treat the island as a unit (such as tourism and agriculture). The third structure is the East-West Council in which members of government from Northern Ireland, the Republic, and Britain, plus Wales, Scotland, and the Isle of Man would meet to work as a unit on particular issues. An international commission would serve as a verifier of the disarmament agreed to by the IRA, which would proceed in phases. Progress in governing on this model has been made in fits and starts, as the decommissioning issue has served as a main obstacle. Briefly, unionist political parties in the Assembly have not been satisfied that the IRA is disarming quickly enough. Deadlock growing from this disagreement led the British to dissolve the Northern Ireland Assembly and now the parties, including the Irish and British governments, are endeavoring to restart the system. Because of age and ill health, John Hume’s role at the forefront of his party has ended (he still serves in the European Parliament). In recent elections in 2004 the more extreme parties on both sides—SF and the Democratic Unionist Party—won the most seats. In the interest of conflict resolution, it appears that this is a time when the people of Northern Ireland desperately need another leader willing to challenge constraints and engage in intermestic diplomacy. Significant Events in the Northern Ireland Case 1919 Irish war of independence from Great Britain. 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty creates Irish Free State in the southern 26 counties (which became the Republic of Ireland in 1948) and Northern Ireland as a province of the United Kingdom in the northern 6 counties; Stormont parliament created; Irish Free State constitution (Articles 2 and 3) state the goal of eventual unification. 1960s Civil Rights Movement begins to demand that Catholics or nationalists be treaty as equal citizens.


1969 1971

1972 1973 1974 1979 1981 1982

1983

1985 1986 1988 1992 1993

1993 1994 1995

1996 1998

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British army deployed to Northern Ireland to quell civil unrest; initially welcomed by nationalists. In response to the rise of republican paramilitary attacks, British authorize internment (detention without trial), sweeping republican areas in cities, and imprisoning many young male nationalists. Bloody Sunday occurs (British army kills 13 unarmed nationalists in Derry); British abolish Stormont parliament and assume direct rule. Sunningdale Agreement (which set up a power-sharing arrangement). Massive anti-power sharing worker’s strike staged by unionists. SDLP established. Republican paramilitaries launch hunger strikes in prisons. Power-sharing Assembly proposed; PSF contests elections in Northern Ireland for the first time and makes major gains in nationalist community (gains are increased in 1983 elections). Hume begins New Ireland Forum Initiative to work with nonviolent political parties in the Republic of Ireland; sets up Anglo-Irish consultation process. Anglo-Irish Agreement signed by British and Irish governments. SDLP begins to gain back support from republicans in elections (and in 1987). Hume-Adams talks fail. Sinn Fein publishes Toward a Lasting Peace in Ireland, showing changed views of British and unionists. Downing Street Declaration signed by British and Irish governments: the people of Ireland alone by agreement between the two parts should be allowed to exercise the right to self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South. Hume–Adams talks result in a joint statement arguing for a peace process. U.S. grants visa to Gerry Adams; IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries announce cease-fires. Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell proposes principles for peace process to begin without disarmament as a first step; unionists and Major government obstruct (early 1996) with Major’s announcement of an election to choose delegates. IRA breaks cease-fire with massive bombing of London’s Canary Wharf; Forum elections occur; new cease-fire. After many ups and downs, an accord is reached in April 1998 ( known as the Good Friday Accord or the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1998); establishes three “strands” of governance and addresses disarmament, issues of human rights and justice, a new police force, and so on; elections to ratify held in North and South in May.


CHAPTER 3 FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: GEORGE H.W. BUSH AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, AUGUST 1990–JANUARY 1991

Introduction In early August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and offered up a challenge to President George H.W. Bush’s hopes for a new world order in the wake of the unraveling Soviet bloc. Instead of handling this crisis with its former ally in the Gulf alone, the Bush administration chose to enlist a broad segment of the international community to expel Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait and prevent an attack on Saudi Arabia. In fact, domestic opposition was one of the largest obstacles as Bush sought to move ahead with military force; dealing with that resistance posed a puzzle for the president and his advisors. One observer noted after the 1991 Persian Gulf War that “military schools will long be studying Schwarzkopf ’s march through the Gulf. Government schools will be studying Bush’s march through Washington.”1 In this case study, we explore not only how President George Herbert Walker Bush marshaled improbable support from within the United States for military mobilization in the Persian Gulf region, but also from the international community. By using the four strategies, he managed both through intermestic policy making. A brief history of events is provided in the next section, which highlights the obstacles George Bush faced in 1990. The chronology at the end of the chapter summarizes many of these events. An Impossible Situation For numerous reasons it was a far-fetched goal to get Americans and an international coalition to threaten, and then employ, force against Saddam Hussein in response to Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. This section presents the obstacles that constitute the puzzle in this case, and the bulk of the chapter illustrates Bush’s use of the strategies for taking advantage of, changing, or reinterpreting the domestic and global contexts to fit with the goals of forcing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia from invasion.

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Let us begin with a contradiction to the aforementioned assertion that Bush’s plan faced impossible obstacles. Several changes in global politics indicate that Bush could have been far less constrained in his foreign policy choices: a monumental shift away from the rigid bipolarity of the Cold War in 1989 and 1990 provided an opening for the Bush administration. Up to this point, cooperation between the superpowers on the UN Security Council was hard to imagine; calls for action on one side were often met with vetoes on the other. However, in 1989, the USSR had scaled back its involvement in Third World conflicts and in developing countries more generally. Cooperation on long-standing regional conflicts in Latin America and southern Africa was increasing. The change within the superpower relationship in turn opened up the possibility that many Third World states would be willing to get on board with American policy. Indeed, the Non-Aligned Movement, established among large numbers of developing countries in the 1960s, had been good at manipulating the superpowers, playing them off against each other in ways to benefit the developing states. Once the Soviet Union was “out of the game,” many of these countries shifted allegiance to the United States. Former Soviet bloc states, such as Poland, did this as well.2 In addition to improving relations with the USSR, Bush also felt that the United States had good relations with China.3 President Bush saw an opportunity for an “international community” to work together in establishing a “new world order.” Still, someone else may have interpreted things differently, and getting the rest of the world and the audience at home to shift their view of the world was a great challenge. Given these structural shifts, what was it about the context of August 1990 that made the execution of Bush’s emerging plans so improbable? The following obstacles had to be dealt with: the shadow of the past U.S. relationship with Iraq; the past policies of other states whose help was needed; the special case of the Soviet Union; the positions of states in the region including the Arab countries, Turkey, and Israel; the American public and Congress; and once the use of force was on the table, the antiwar (and sometimes pro-Iraq) publics at home and around the world. The shadow of the past was perhaps one of the most important barriers that had to be overcome. The United States, France, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union all had maintained significant relationships with Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Reagan and Bush administrations pursued a policy of cultivating Saddam, despite congressional attempts in the late 1980s to push the executive branch to condemn the human rights abuses of the Iraqi leader. The courting of Saddam went beyond a limited relationship to balance the Islamic revolutionary leadership in Iran after 1979. Two analysts note that the Reagan and Bush administrations “did not just tilt, they lunged. . . . Iraq was taken off the list of terrorist nations, even though it still supported terrorism.” Further, any protests to Iraq’s objectionable behavior were subtle, not tough and assertive. Not in August 1988 (after the war with Iran was over; emphasis in original) when Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurds. Not in February 1990 when, at an Arab summit, Saddam warned against new U.S. efforts to dominate the region and called on all “good” Arabs to undermine U.S. influence. Not in April

GEORGE H.W. BUSH AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

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1990 when Saddam threatened to “burn half of Israel.” Not when Saddam massed his troops on the Kuwaiti border.4

Meanwhile, by 1987, Iraq was one of the largest buyers of American agricultural and food products. Saddam was promised a credit of $1 billion, which was the largest loan of its kind to any single state in the world. By 1990 the agricultural credit scheme had gone over the $1 billion mark, and yearly trade between the two countries had grown to over $3.5 billion (from near $500 million in the early 1980s). When investigations by the Treasury and Agriculture Departments in November 1989 uncovered that loans had been diverted to buy military hardware, Bush’s Secretary of State James Baker made sure that the loan programs continued.5 Further, export controls were relaxed to the extent that hundreds of millions of dollars of dual-use technology were imported by Saddam. The executive branch opposed congressional attempts to sanction Iraq after the chemical weapons incident in August 1988 and again in July 1990.6 Bush’s first policy responses to the invasion of Kuwait were the pursuit of UN Security Council resolutions for an arms embargo and for economic sanctions. European and other states presented obstacles to Bush’s efforts. Consider the situation in the years leading up to the invasion. France, for example, had long been one of the regime’s largest suppliers of military equipment. Also, by 1990 Britain had become Iraq’s third-largest trading partner, having been more cautious about relations with Saddam prior to the end of the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war.7 From 1984 to 1989, Saddam used $14.2 billion in hard currency to buy high-technology imports from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, demonstrating that he was an important customer of these states’ industries.8 Especially once the UN Security Council moved to adopt full economic sanctions (including on oil supplies), Japan was concerned. The Asian economic powerhouse had been sending $490 million a year to Iraq, for which it was owed about $2.56 billion in loan repayments. Japan was receiving part of these in oil, since 12 percent of Japan’s oil came from Iraq.9 Others with significant trade relationships with Iraq, such as Brazil, were also an initial obstacle. Turning to the Soviet Union, as President Bush put it, “What we would be trying to accomplish ran counter to Moscow’s traditional interests and policy in the region.”10 The USSR had played a delicate balancing act, attempting to maintain influence with both Iran and Iraq. Though during the Iran-Iraq War, for example, the USSR tried to court Iran. Yet, the longer-term Soviet-Iraqi relationship meant that there were people in the foreign ministry who would try to obstruct a hard line against Iraq after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. These “Arabists” had to be fended off, since the Americans wanted to get tough with and eventually go to war against a country with which the Soviet Union still had significant ties. The text of UN Security Council Resolution 660 condemned the invasion and called for an arms embargo; the fact that the Soviet Union was Iraq’s leading arms supplier posed another challenge. Many decision makers, some close to Gorbachev, still looked through Cold War lenses. “In their view, giving the United States a blank cheque [sic] to lead the international coalition against Saddam would not only amount to an open admission of the USSR’s decline from superpower status, but

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would also risk years of carefully nurtured relations with the Arab world.” What’s more, this view was shared by the military, which did not like the idea of Western military deployment in the region. Because the Soviets had 8,000 personnel in Iraq, they worried about them becoming hostages.11 Another challenge came from Arab states in the region, whose governments at the beginning of the crisis repeatedly asked the United States to stay out of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. This attitude surfaced before the Iraqi invasion. When Saddam moved thousands of troops to the border of Kuwait in July, the United States stepped up diplomatic meetings and communications with the Iraqi leader. The United States, at the request of the United Arab Emirates whose offshore oil rigs had been attacked by Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war, sent two tankers and a transport in late July (arriving July 24).12 At this time, Egypt’s leader Mubarak and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah asked the United States to keep a low profile while the Arabs solved the problem among themselves at a summit meeting.13 Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan made similar pleas after the invasion, imploring Bush to refrain from action. Undoubtedly, these leaders were concerned about how their cooperation with the Americans would look to publics who were more anti-American. During the entire crisis, Saddam would attempt to play off regional suspicions of Western colonialism in the Middle East and to exploit the divisions between governments and the Arab “street.”14 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft expressed understanding of this dynamic: It was important that we listen closely to, and take seriously, their advice and not act unilaterally in the face of it. We needed Arab backing for whatever moves we might have to make. We almost certainly would forfeit improved U.S.-Arab relations, and U.S. credibility in the Middle East, if we acted against an Arab state without regional support.15

A lingering danger was that the Arab states would give in to a compromise solution, a constant temptation because their populations were so anti-American.16 Others might have given in to Saddam’s offers of riches from Kuwait’s oil in return for support; Egypt’s Mubarak reported that he received such an offer and believed that Jordan’s King Hussein and Yemen’s Saleh accepted.17 Saudi Arabia’s leaders had an especially strong incentive to compromise with Saddam in order to stop him from invading their country.18 The United States also had to get Saudi Arabia to agree to American troops on its soil, something the kingdom was very reluctant to do.19 In one of the August meetings between Prince Bandar, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States, and Brent Scowcroft, Bandar explained why the Saudi kingdom was unsure it wanted to be defended by the United States. The Americans had a reputation in the region for being unreliable because of the retreat from Lebanon in 1984 and an incident in 1979 when U.S. support for the kingdom turned out lukewarm.20 Another regional issue emerged with the U.S.-led effort to impose economic sanctions through a UN Security Council resolution. Sanctions, especially on oil, would make a difference only if they could be enforced. Pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia had to be closed. Both states were concerned about the financial


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and security issues involved. A major obstacle was getting Turkey on board, because the sanctions meant a substantial loss of about $7 billion and because the military and a few others in the government favored neutrality in regional disputes.21 Iraq supplied about one-third of its oil and owed Turkey about $1 billion as well. In addition, just before the Gulf crisis the American-Turkish relationship was at a low point because Congress and the White House had condemned Turkey for the Armenian massacres perpetrated as the Ottoman Empire collapsed.22 In terms of security issues, Iraq could also incite the Kurds who live in the border region of the two states. Saudi Arabia was more concerned with the security issues than with the economic impact of the sanctions.23 A final regional dimension raising questions was Israel’s interest in the conflict. Could Saddam be opposed by the coalition without Israel becoming a target? And, relatedly, how could Israel be kept from engaging in a preemptive strike issued out of fear that Saddam would act first?24 These fears were fueled by Saddam’s fanning of Arab-Israeli tensions such as an August 10 speech in which he declared a “holy war” on Israel and the United States.25 Separate from the challenge of “turning on a dime” American foreign policy toward Iraq and the pressures of the weapons and agricultural lobbies noted earlier, Bush faced an American public and Congress that would be difficult to mobilize. With regard to the former, Secretary of State James Baker noted that “. . . practically overnight, we went from trying to work with Saddam to likening him to Hitler. The apparent contradiction made it more difficult to raise the consciousness of the American people to Saddam’s threat.”26 Bush was facing political challenges because the country was in a recession, and he was in an allout partisan battle with Congress over the budget. There was also concern, verbalized frequently in Congress, that the United States was footing the bill for all of its allies and risking lives out of all proportion to the benefits from opposing Iraq’s invasion.27 Perhaps the greatest obstacle of all within the United States was the Vietnam syndrome, the label given to the “lingering fear of a drawn-out foreign military involvement,” as described by Scowcroft.28 Indeed, in Baker’s words, “The President’s private resolve to order American forces into combat if necessary to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait was conspicuously lacking in support—both in Congress and with the public at large.”29 Bush especially faced a strong challenge when he doubled the troop deployment soon after the November elections, and the consensus that had supported his previous moves seemed to be dwindling.30 Polls showed that Americans began to think U.S. involvement was about oil and not allies and reflected a fall in confidence.31 Finally, within the United States the move away from sanctions and toward the use of force in October and November was met with resistance by those who felt that war should only be a last resort; the sanctions should be allowed more time to work. The public opinion polls showed a strong sense of wanting to wait out sanctions. Hearings in Congress, timed to coincide with debate on a use of force resolution in the UN Security Council at the end of November, showed the prevalence of this theme. In October, significant figures such as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, Head General of the U.S. forces in the Gulf Norman Schwarzkopf, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell,

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and Secretary of State Baker all questioned the move toward war.32 In the November congressional testimony, the most recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral William Crowe and Air Force General David C. Jones stressed the costs of war and argued that Bush was moving too fast toward this option.33 On December 2 at the hearings, five former secretaries of defense (Harold Brown, Frank Carlucci, Robert McNamara, Casper Weinberger, and James Schlesinger) argued against the use of force and that sanctions and diplomacy be given more time.34 Former President Jimmy Carter also wrote a letter to members of the Security Council asking them to withhold support of the resolution.35 Once the military option became the focus, governments around the world faced antiwar and in some cases pro-Iraqi publics. Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Brazil, Tunisia, and Morocco were especially volatile.36 In fact, there were only a small number of states where there was wholehearted support for the war effort, and in industrialized countries the “governments were lukewarm— anxious to do enough to show they supported UN resolutions but unable to go further because of a deeply reluctant public opinion.”37 The strongest support was from Britain and the other Anglo-Saxon countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Indeed, in their accounts of the crisis, President Bush and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft refer to Margaret Thatcher’s firm stance after the invasion and her appeals to them to not go “wobbly” (she was replaced as Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister by John Major part way through the crisis).38 France, with the economic interests noted earlier, was preoccupied with asserting leadership to find a solution to the crisis and in this way was an additional obstacle to the Bush administration’s effort to act as a single international community, and to not reward Iraq in any way for its illegal behavior.39 The French government also had to worry about its large Arab, pro-Saddam and anti-American population.40 Germany was distracted by its reunification process until actual war became a possibility, at which time the largest antiwar demonstrations in Europe took place. In late December, Turkey tied its willingness to allow the coalition to use its bases to NATO support, and Germany was resistant to vote for NATO approval.41 Americans and countries around the world also had economic concerns, specifically that the price of oil would skyrocket as supplies were interrupted. Many of the publics in the Third World states listed earlier had concerns about neo-imperialism and the “bullying” image of the United States. In the end, one of the most remarkable characteristics of the campaign against the Iraqi invasion was the “sheer size and diversity of the thirty-one-member coalition that closed ranks behind U.S. leadership during the fall of 1990.”42 At this point, surveying the obstacles, we can see that Bush had his work cut out for him. He had to deal with the shadow of the past in terms of relationships the U.S. government and the weapons and agricultural lobbies had with Iraq; the past policies of other states such as France, Britain, Germany, and Japan; the special case of the Soviet Union and the staunch opponents within the regime to taking a tough line against Iraq; the positions of states in the region including the Arab countries, Turkey, and Israel; the American public and Congress; and once the use of force was on the table, the antiwar (and sometimes pro-Iraq) publics at home and around the world. Having given the background on the international and domestic scenes, in the next


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four sections this chapter works through how President Bush used the strategies to get from here to there. Turning Things Around: Intermestic Policy Making As with the other cases in this book, Bush is a leader who needed to gain support in order to achieve his goals, both domestically and internationally. While another leader in the same situation may have treated the situation in the Persian Gulf as an international policy issue or as a situation specific to the United States, Bush used strategies in ways that enabled him to blur the lines between domestic and international politics. Recall the four strategies and how they lend themselves to intermestic policy making. When he “broadens audience,” a leader expands his audience from only the domestic to include the international, in order to gain legitimacy at home, for example. “Tying hands” involves using an event at the international level to “force” action at home, or using events at the domestic level to force moves on the international front. “Buying off ” means using domestic resources to secure foreign help, or using resources from overseas to co-opt constituencies at home. Finally, use of the “framing threat” strategy is the process of using a threat to the domestic scene to justify behavior overseas or using a threat to the international audience to justify behavior at home. As will be apparent in the sections that follow, Bush used a complex array of moves in this case. We begin with broadening audience since it was one of Bush’s initial maneuvers, setting the stage for use of the other strategies. Broadening Audience The need for Bush to assemble a coalition in response to the Iraq invasion might seem obvious in retrospect. However, other leaders, notably George W. Bush in 2003, put much less emphasis on multilateralism in foreign policy in the region. Further, what makes this case so intriguing as well as a good illustration of the strategies in action is the way George H.W. Bush used the coalition idea to overcome a wide array of challenges at home and on the international front. This section presents Bush’s use of the broadening audience strategy to address the obstacles generally, and also looks at how Bush used it at specific decision points to overcome opposition. Indeed, the primary obstacles addressed by this strategy were the resistance of Congress and American public opinion, the difficulty of moving from sanctions to the use of force, and the need to convince observers that the use of force would be a last resort. As with many other leaders, Bush and his advisors did not draw sharp lines between domestic and international audiences, instead understanding the need to make intermestic policy. The goal in this case became acquiring international support to be used to get Americans on board. A former advisor, David Gergen, notes, “At every step, he first lined up international support for his initiatives and left Congress no choice but to come along for the ride.”43 And, “as he did with Congress, Bush was cleverly able to influence [public] opinion at home by first mobilizing support overseas.”44 By using this strategy, Bush altered the situation in a way that made the use of additional strategies more necessary. Indeed, as journalist Bob Woodward noted, one of Bush’s challenges was finding “a successful

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formula for speaking to the various publics out there”—American and coalition troops, publics, Congress, the United Nations, Arab states, Israel, and so on.45 Subsequent sections illustrate how he dealt with this challenge. Indeed, when the news came that Iraq had invaded Kuwait, President Bush’s first move was toward multilateralism. From his years as a diplomat and Director of Central Intelligence, Bush was aware of the complexities of this situation that posed some of the obstacles outlined above, such as the significance of having Moscow on board. In his own words, “While I was prepared to deal with this crisis unilaterally if necessary, I wanted the United Nations to be involved as part of our first response, starting with a strong condemnation of Iraq’s attack on a fellow member. Decisive UN action would be important in rallying international opposition to the invasion and reversing it.”46 Throughout the crisis Bush broadened audience through words and actions. To whom he appealed in his speeches is one indicator of his audience. In his speeches, discussed in more depth in the “framing threat” section later, in comparison to reasons of national interests and national security for acting against Saddam, Bush gave much greater emphasis to the universal nature of the crisis, the transgression of Saddam against international law, the threat to international security, and the reasons why the international community must act as one. For example, in August, the vast majority of statements in Bush’s speeches referred to the international audience and not the national constituency (specifically, of 487 paragraphs from Bush’s speeches, 229 referred to the international audience and 47 to the national audience). Bush’s strategy of first garnering international support precipitated the need to couch the Iraq situation in terms of how it affected the international arena. Bush’s actions also exemplified the effort to broaden audience beyond the American public to whom he was accountable. The same day of the invasion, August 2, 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660 calling for Iraq’s withdrawal, settlement of the dispute with Kuwait through negotiations, and an arms embargo on Iraq (with a 14–0 vote, Yemen abstaining). Bush continued to make policy in the international arena with the proposal for economic and financial sanctions, passed as Resolution 661 on August 6.47 The initial decision to go to the United Nations for the economic sanctions resolution was followed by consideration of a resolution approving a blockade. Bush wanted to be sure that the sanctions policy had teeth, and though the navy had stopped Iraqi vessels, none had been boarded. A decision point was reached: should the United States assert authority to act unilaterally (to board ships) or wait for the UN resolution? Secretary of Defense Cheney, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Powell, and Secretary of State Baker relayed to the president their views that using the United Nations was a better option. On August 25, the Security Council voted to give the U.S. navy and the navies of other states the right to use force to stop any trade with the outlaw regime. “It was the first time in the UN’s 45-year history that individual countries outside an umbrella UN command were authorized to enforce an international blockade, an extraordinary diplomatic victory for the administration.”48 Indeed, the administration had already made the argument that the situation was one in which they needed to get or keep much of the international community on board. Taking the United Nations as the audience on the sanctions enforcement issue was a key part of that effort.


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Bush did not involve the domestic audience at all during the first part of the crisis. In fact, he did not address the nation until August 8, after the first two resolutions and much international diplomacy had already been conducted. It was at this point that American troops were sent to the region with the beginning of Operation Desert Shield. In fact, one of the reasons Bush did not want to tell the American public earlier about the upcoming troop deployment was that, in order to get the Saudi rulers to agree to having U.S. troops on their soil, the administration had to promise silence on the issue for awhile.49 As far as Congress goes, Bush did invite leaders to Maine at the end of August and on a trip to visit troops in the Gulf region in November. Also, during the first week in September, when things were going well in terms of public support for the multilateral sanctions regime, Bush hoped to use the successes on the international front to push through a domestic budget deal with Congress. Referring to the budget negotiations, he wrote in his diary on September 7, “Maybe this Helsinki trip with Gorbachev and the Iraq crisis will be the fulcrum that we need to lever a deal through Congress.”50 Without prompting from the president, the House passed a nonbinding resolution on October 1 (with a vote of 380–29) supporting Bush’s objectives in the Gulf and urging continued effort at a diplomatic resolution. The Senate passed a similar measure, also falling short of backing military action.51 For the most part Bush focused his efforts on the international audience, actually keeping the domestic audience separate until after the vote for UN Resolution 678 at the end of November. Indeed, one of the significant signposts of this case is UN Security Council Resolution 678, passed on November 29, to authorize the use of force against Iraq to remove Saddam’s army from Kuwait. The activities showing the broadening audience strategy in action were remarkable. For example, Bush had dispatched Secretary of State Baker to travel over 100,000 miles over 10 weeks, holding over 200 meetings with heads of state and foreign ministers.52 Bush engaged in a stepped-up effort to emphasize the international dimensions of the crisis. The UN resolution was the culmination of these efforts. Then, as Baker put it, “Now we not only had the diplomatic authority for waging war, but also the potential leverage to, in effect, shame the recalcitrants in Congress into doing the right thing.”53 As noted in the previous section, members of Congress and others opposed the move away from sanctions and wanted to wait longer before authorizing the threat of force. In a meeting with congressional leaders on November 30, Bush argued about how congressional opinion was crucial to the diplomacy (directed at Saddam) undertaken by Bush with a vast array of international allies. By pointing out that Congress and the international actors in the coalition were one, Bush argued that the Congress must act to send a strong signal to Saddam by going along with the use of force policy at the United Nations.54 It was only through supporting the international actions that the sanctions could work. Senator Nunn resisted the link between the UN audience and America, arguing that it would not be the soldiers of the foreign countries who would die. Still, Bush responded to this criticism by stressing that world unity was achieved.55 He also emphasized that the international support demonstrated to the American public that Iraq would not be another Vietnam, addressing head-on the Vietnam syndrome.

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After focusing primarily on the international community as his audience and then tying this broader constituency to the domestic audience as he worked with Congress, Bush made a move that made little sense if we consider the international coalition as the main audience. Indeed, at a crucial moment in the battle for American support to forgo sanctions and move to a war stance, Bush broadened audience from the international to include a domestic audience and took action to address the concerns of this domestic constituency. November 30, the day after the UN Security Council voted to approve the Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force against Iraq, President Bush announced an initiative that shocked the international community. He stated that the United States would go “the extra mile for peace” by having James Baker meet with Tariq Aziz (Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations).56 Members of the coalition feared Saddam would see this move as a sign of weakness. However, since he had secured the international support in the United Nations, Bush was more free to turn to the concerns of the domestic audience. As Scowcroft put it, this was “a needed step to prove to Congress and the American public that the President was willing to exhaust all diplomatic alternatives before war.”57 Baker brought home the point of the way the administration was using the international to further domestic goals and vice versa: “With the United Nations solidly behind us, no congressman could credibly oppose the war if these high-level meetings could not get Iraq to withdraw. Paradoxically, only by offering these meetings could we ever hope to obtain the domestic consensus necessary to wage war.”58 This section has illustrated how Bush used broadening audience in his intermestic diplomacy. In summary, to overcome congressional resistance and the Vietnam syndrome in the American public, Bush emphasized the universal nature of the crisis and took action through the United Nations first (pursuing resolutions on condemning the invasion, placing sanctions, and enforcing sanctions). He actively excluded an American audience. When he wanted to move away from sanctions and toward the use of force, Bush mobilized the United Nations, through a very active global diplomatic campaign, to authorize the use of force. Once that was accomplished, he turned to Congress and argued that congressional cooperation was a crucial part of the threat of use of force against Saddam. Failure of the United States to cooperate would undermine the effort at coercive diplomacy. Finally, once he had involved the domestic arena, the demand from within America that force would only be used as a last resort led Bush to suggest the “extra mile” policy. Some congressional opposition was about the cost of the military option; Bush would need to address this concern directly. The next section discusses the skillful way in which the president engaged in buying off. Buying Off As with the other cases in this book, leaders often use the four strategies in tandem. For the Bush administration during the Iraqi crisis of 1990, “buying off ” was a significant tool in Bush’s success at “broadening audience.” In other words, Bush’s move to use the United Nations to get international support did not overcome many of the obstacles outlined at the beginning of this chapter. In some cases,


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resources were mobilized to co-opt those who were reluctant to join the coalition, for example. The challenges Bush addressed with buying off were the fear of some states about the impact of increases in the price of oil, garnering support of states whose votes were needed on the Security Council, easing the worries of regional states concerned about physical and economic damage from the war, dealing with Israel’s role, and the impression within the United States that other countries, especially the rich states of Japan and Germany, were not contributing as much as the United States to the coalition effort. As the last item in the given list indicates, this section shows how this strategy was not limited to one arena; domestic resources were used to secure foreign help and international resources were used to get domestic audience support. The American public and congressional opposition were bought off with funding from other states, and the economic and other concerns of states were bought off with American resources. Many states, including some Eastern European countries, initially had reservations about economic sanctions and then the use of force because of their need for oil from Kuwait and Iraq; they feared that war would bring shortages and a steep rise in price. Working with the International Energy Agency, the United States agreed to provide half of the 2.5 million barrels of oil that would be released per day if war began. By acting to guarantee a certain level of oil to the nervous states, the United States was able to get them in the coalition. In the end, prices only went up a little, then fell once the air war was going well.59 In some cases, the United States worked with states to help them get multilateral aid to offset the problem. For example, when Bush visited Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, a state foundering from the loss of oil from its Soviet supplier, he offered to help the newly free country to get aid from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.60 When the United States was working on securing the vote for the use of force resolution (UNSCR 678), Bush dispatched Baker to many of the countries on the Security Council. He recounts that the Ivory Coast told him how their concerns were not with the Gulf but with the issue of development, and that debt forgiveness would be extremely helpful. Baker agreed to look into including Ivory Coast in a debt forgiveness plan previously formulated by the G-7, the seven major industrialized countries.61 Ethiopia, Colombia, and Zaire were offered new aid packages as well as access to World Bank credits or rearrangements of International Monetary Fund loans. Ethiopia, which had long been denied access to arms, and Colombia were offered military assistance.62 The Chinese wanted to exchange capital visits between the president and their premier, but the most Bush would offer was a brief “pull aside” during a White House visit of the Security Council’s five members.63 In this case, the Chinese might have been bought off (though with diplomatic and not financial resources) but the United States was unwilling to pay the price. The Chinese abstained in the vote for UN Resolution 678; getting them not to vote “no” cost a brief meeting with the president. In addition, one week later the World Bank announced that China would receive access to $114 million in economic aid, though it is unclear whether the Bush administration helped with this package.64 Finally, because Bush wanted to make a symbolic gesture thanking the United Nations for its help on the Gulf crisis, on the day of the vote Baker took Secretary

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General Perez de Cuellar checks for $186 million in partial payment of the back dues the United States owed the United Nations.65 The buying off of the Soviet Union was more convoluted. In this case, the Bush administration explained to Prince Saud and Prince Bandar that Gorbachev was under a lot of pressure from the old guard (the “Arabists”) described earlier, making his cooperation against Iraq a tough sell. The Saudis were told that Gorbachev needed something “to sustain him in the face of that pressure.” The Saudis extended a $4 billion line of credit to the Gorbachev government. Baker stated that, “I believe that our role in arranging the line of credit was instrumental in solidifying Soviet support for the use-of-force resolution and keeping them firmly in the coalition throughout the crisis.”66 In the region, Turkey and the other states so close to Iraq were given a great deal of economic assistance to ease their concerns about the U.S. policy, including physical and economic damage that might befall them due to their proximity to the conflict. Trying to wean Jordan’s King Hussein away from Iraq and offset damage to others became a major policy initiative, as Scowcroft put it. This strategy never worked with Jordan, whose leader was more convinced by Saddam’s effort to buy him off.67 As noted earlier, Turkey suffered about $7 billion in economic losses due to the economic sanctions.68 Working with President Turgut Ozal, Baker promised that the United States would help with aid to offset some of the losses from sanctions and the pipeline. Ozal asked Baker to help convince the World Bank to increase its loans to Turkey from $400 million to about $1 billion; the request was granted.69 Also at Ozal’s request, NATO sent alliance aircraft and air defense batteries in case of Iraqi retaliation to American strikes from this NATO member’s bases.70 Egypt was given a very large debt forgiveness package, and Bush invoked special authority under the Foreign Assistance Act to sell Saudi Arabia an arms package (certain special munitions could not be sold to non-NATO states without a waiver). Under the law the president had to notify Congress, where there was some objection but not enough to stop the sales.71 Recall that Israel’s position raised significant issues during the entire crisis. To the Bush administration, a priority was to keep Israel out of the conflict and out of the coalition. Because of the Arab-Israeli conflict, combined with the perceived need to have the Arab states in the coalition, Israel could not be a part of the effort.72 Further, Saddam gave speeches during the conflict to try to inflame ArabIsraeli tensions and also to link his withdrawal from Kuwait to Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it captured from its Arab neighbors in the 1967 war. The fear was that Israel would be tempted to launch a preemptive strike on Iraq that would escalate into an allout battle in the region. A key strategy Bush used to “manage” Israel was buying off. As the president noted in describing the crisis, “for the most part it [Israel] cooperated, but from early in the crisis it made many demands of us for aid and information sharing.”73 A brief background is necessary to understand one way in which this strategy was applied to Israel. In late 1989, the United States was engaged in diplomacy over the conflict with Palestinians; at that time, Israeli Prime Minister Shamir’s ultimate intransigence ended that round of talks. In frustration, the Bush administration refused to allow $400 million in housing loan guarantees that Congress had


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approved for Israel in early 1990. On another dimension, Congress was rethinking the overall structure of American aid in reaction to changes in Eastern Europe. No exceptions were discussed for Israel in proposals to reduce aid by 5 percent to the top five recipients of U.S. assistance. As violence against Palestinians continued, reducing aid to Israel specifically was on the table. These recent changes were reversed during the Persian Gulf crisis. More aid was given for settlements, and new economic and military aid was provided. When the Gulf War ended, the $400 million in housing loan guarantees, requested to help with the immigration of Soviet Jews, was released, presumably a reversal based on “good behavior” during the war. Bush requested from Congress an additional $10 billion for 1991–1995. Second, in response to the Bush package of debt forgiveness to Egypt, Congress authorized Israel to redirect from economic to defense purposes $200 million of its total $3 billion aid for 1990. Congress also approved another $700 million of additional military aid in the form of advanced weapons systems.74 Six days after the bombing of Baghdad began, Israel gave the United States an assessment of its costs for exercising restraint during the war, for which the Congress approved payments beginning in March. Of a total of $13 billion, $400 million was for keeping its military at highest alert, $1 billion was for economic losses when the country shut down for four days at the start of the air campaign, $1 billion was for losses to the tourist industry, and $10 billion was for additional housing loan guarantees needed to settle Soviet Jewish immigrants.75 Also, prior to the launch of the war, Bush sent diplomats Paul Wolfowitz and Lawrence Eagleburger to Israel to offer to improve Israel’s defenses. The Patriot missile deployment, already in progress, would be expanded. Israel accepted the offer, which eventually included American operation and maintenance crews. The Israelis also took Bush up on the offer of a top-secret voice communications link between the Pentagon center of operations and the headquarters of the Israeli Defense Forces.76 In addition to addressing concerns of states fearful of increases in oil prices, getting on board states whose votes were needed on the Security Council, easing the worries of regional states concerned about physical and economic damage from the war, and dealing with Israel’s role, a major challenge on the home front was confronted by buying off. The issue was the impression among Congressmen and the broader American public that other states, especially the rich states of Japan and Germany, were not contributing as much as the United States—an especially salient topic because the United States was in the middle of a budget crisis. By involving a wide range of states in the coalition, Bush sought to counter the image of the United States carrying the burden alone. Baker made the connections in the following statement: “At a time of economic uncertainty at home, it would be politically impossible to sustain domestic support for the operation unless we demonstrated that Uncle Sam wasn’t footing the bill while others with pockets as deep as ours sat on the sidelines.”77 In November, Les Aspin, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, assessed the efforts of other countries, giving only Egypt and Turkey grades of “A” while Germany and Japan received a grade of “C.”78 From the beginning Bush was concerned about costs, with Desert Shield averaging about $28.9 million per day by the end of August.79 With states who would not or could

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not contribute troops ( Japan and Germany both had constitutions that confined the use of military forces to self-defense), the administration sought to buy off the domestic criticism by pushing them hard to contribute financially. In September, Baker went on what was dubbed the “tin cup tour.” Prior to his arrival in Germany on September 16, congressional members criticized the way the German government came up with $8 billion to support Soviet troops in East Germany until they could be repatriated. On this trip, Baker managed to get a package worth several billion dollars, much in the form of economic aid to states in the “economic front line.”80 Japan’s contribution was an important resource that Bush was able to use in his effort to buy off domestic concerns. The initial behavior of Japan at the outset of the crisis drew fire from Congress, as noted earlier. The first aid package finally announced by Japan provided for $1 billion to be spent on sending food, water, medical supplies (such as tents and water carriers), and medical specialists. There were many constraints on how the supplies would get to Iraq. In anger, members of the House of Representatives passed legislation that threatened to withdraw American troops from Japan. The American “tin cup” team visited Prime Minister Kaifu right before his visit to the United States and the Middle East. A new package was announced on September 14, adding $3 billion to the $1 billion package. Half of the $4 billion was to help with mobilization of the military and half was economic assistance to Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt. Assessing this turn of events, one historian of the conflict notes that the assistance “tended to confirm the impression that Japanese contributions were geared to keeping the United States quiet as much as an assessment of need.”81 Once the war began Bush initiated another tin-cup trip in an effort to head off congressional concerns. In addition to Japan, a small group of other states played a predominant role. The plan of the Bush administration was to have Japan provide 20 percent of the costs, the United States and its allies another 20 percent, and the Gulf States the remainder. The end result was close: in addition to what each had committed earlier, Japan said it would pay another $9 billion (total of about $10 billion), Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would pay $13.5 billion each (total of about $16.8 billion and $16 billion, respectively), and Germany would pay $5.5 billion (total of about $6.5 billion). The United Arab Emirates paid a total of $4 billion. The final costs of the war were $54 billion, with the allies pledging $48.2 billion of that total.82 The conduct of intermestic diplomacy by the Bush administration is very clear in the use of the buying off strategy. In summary, Bush faced states that were uncertain about the impact of war on their ability to pay for oil, countries on the Security Council that were not yet signed on to the American-sponsored resolutions, regional states with multifaceted fears of the war’s impact, Israel’s need for security and the American need to keep Israel out of the war, and the American feeling that the United States would have to carry too much of the war burden. He was able to meet these challenges through paying for additional oil supplies to the world market, increasing bilateral aid and helping states get access to multilateral aid programs, creating packages of debt forgiveness and military supplies, and pushing rich allies to provide money for the U.S.-led war effort. The third strategy, tying


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hands, was also a key part of Bush’s effort to conduct diplomacy using intermestic policy making. Tying Hands Facing obstacles at home and abroad to the policy in the Persian Gulf crisis, Bush used the broadening audience strategy to justify focusing on an international (multilateral) approach. He further was able to succeed in this approach by buying off the domestic audience and many of those in the international constituency that he created or invoked. In this section we will see how “tying hands” was also used in conjunction with the other strategies. During several points in the crisis, Bush acted internationally to “create new facts”83 and then used those facts to argue at home that his response to the new situation was the only viable one. He also used elements of the domestic policy debate to tie his hands on the international front. Indeed, the use of this strategy is clearly linked to the rise of particular obstacles. First, in an uncertain world, Bush had to set the agenda in terms of what tools would be on the table. Second, many parties abroad and actors within the United States were not willing to consider the use of force even though Bush wanted to use this threat and knew he had a time limit for when attacks could occur (because of weather and Islamic holidays). Finally, once Bush decided to use force, he still faced resistance from Congress to authorizing the use of force. The words of one observer sums up the fact that Bush tied hands: “Bush managed to rally a reluctant nation to a successful war not with inspiring words or soaring visions, but with a series of shrewd and forcing actions” (emphasis added).84 Though in a subtle way, Bush acted to tie his hands at the outset of the crisis, shaping the outlines of the entire policy debate and thus the course of the reaction. In a speech at the White House on August 5, at which time the administration had been working through the United Nations to condemn the invasion and impose sanctions (for which the resolution was passed on August 6), Bush stated, “This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.”85 His statement was in response to a question concerning whether or not he planned to move militarily. Bush’s advisors, including General Powell, were shocked. “ ‘Uh-oh!’ Powell said to himself. The President had now clearly, categorically, set a new goal, not only to deter attack on Saudi Arabia and defend Saudi Arabia but to reverse the invasion of Kuwait.”86 Recall that as autumn came in 1990, one of the primary debates in American politics was about Bush’s move to threaten the use of force versus giving economic sanctions more time to work. His approval ratings were high, for example, when sanctions were the main focus of action: a New York Times-CBS poll on August 22 showed 76 percent.87 In August these numbers stayed in the 70–85 percent range, but dipped to the 50–70 percent range in October and November as people grew uneasy about the possibility of war. The polls showed these numbers begin to rise in December and January.88 The administration’s desire to threaten and prepare for the use of force emerged from several factors. First, if force was to be used, military planners explained that it had to happen in a window from December (when the adequate troops would be in place) to mid-February because of bad weather in late

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February and the subsequent month of Ramadan. Ramadan is followed by the annual pilgrimage to holy sites in Saudi Arabia. Second, Margaret Thatcher and some Bush advisors argued that the longer they waited, the more the coalition would unravel. Thatcher said too that the Arab states would begin to question the resolve of the coalition.89 The fear with this issue was that they may be willing to compromise with Saddam. Third, as one month and then two months passed, Bush decided that Saddam would not back down without the use of force. In the Congress and in the broader public context in October and November, many argued against an increasingly pro-force Bush policy and for waiting out the sanctions approach. Appealing to the lingering Vietnam syndrome in public opinion, this sentiment was a serious obstacle for the president, though, intriguingly, part of the 36 percent of public opinion that disapproved of the handling of the crisis in mid-November actually wanted the president to move faster toward the war. Still, vocal congressional leaders emphasized the need to wait. He employed the tying hands strategy to get around it by approving on October 30 a force augmentation of 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, subject to Saudi approval but without consulting with Congress. This move doubled the troops there and supplied the heavy armor capability for a ground war. Importantly, the augmentation gave the defensive deployment offensive capability.90 Now that an offensive force was ready in the region, backing down from Saddam Hussein no longer seemed like an option. Bush could rely on the oft-proved maxim that the public would rally around the flag, supporting the president’s stance. Bush chose to wait until after the November elections to notify the American people of the buildup; Sam Nunn (chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee) was very angry when he was told of the buildup two days after the election. During the week the decision was made, Defense Secretary Cheney testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee and did not mention the potential for increasing troops. Also, the morning of the day Bush signed the approval for the buildup, he met with leaders in Congress—making no mention of the plan. Doubling the troops was a fait accompli, and Nunn was concerned that this move would force the United States to fight (he would go on to hold the hearings in November that are discussed elsewhere in this chapter). This move on the international scene gave leverage at home, even though some of Bush’s advisors thought not consulting Congress was a mistake.91 Public opinion began to shift more toward Bush, as people began to rally around the flag and the troops in the Gulf. One scholar of public opinion noted that the polls later in the year reflected “the public’s growing sense of fatalism— a feeling that the United States simply couldn’t back down from the expensive and heightened troop commitment that had been unilaterally instituted by the president two months earlier.”92 Going to the United Nations for authorization on the use of force was an example of broadening audience, as described earlier. Once Resolution 678 was passed, Bush’s appeals to Congress reflected use of the tying hands strategy as well. As Bush noted, the resolution “changed the debate with Congress, creating a context for the use of force which helped bring it aboard. The Security Council had voted to go to war.”93 President Bush held a bipartisan meeting of the congressional leadership on November 30. At that time, as Scowcroft notes, the Democrats who had been


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against war may have realized that they were in an awkward position of opposing a president with such broad international support. The way in which Bush used the UN policy to tie the hands of the Congress was clear: the president implied that Congress would send a signal of weakness to Saddam if it did not endorse the UN resolution.94 Some people in Congress recognized what was happening and some felt that they had been set up by the White House. Many of those who voted with Bush (for example, Senator Al Gore) felt the decision had been lifted from their hands: if they voted against Bush, the international coalition might fall apart, Saddam Hussein would emerge victorious, the United States would suffer a devastating defeat. And who would bear the blame?95

It was discussed earlier how Bush provided Saddam’s government with one last chance to withdraw. The administration thought that getting congressional support would be more likely if they could provide additional chances for a peaceful resolution—even though the international allies were unhappy about the “extra mile.” Bush was able also to use this effort as part of the tying hands strategy to manipulate support from Congress for the use of force. On January 9, the Baker-Aziz talks were held in Geneva, and at this point the Bush team tied its hands again in order to make it easier to get the outcome they desired. At the meeting in Geneva, Baker handed Aziz a letter to Saddam from President Bush. It stated very clearly that if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait, the coalition would use force to remove it. Aziz refused to take the letter to Saddam and continued to argue that the situation be linked to Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories, an argument the Iraqi leadership had been making since the invasion.96 Given this public display of the threat to Iraq (with the Geneva letter), Congress had little choice but to back Bush’s agenda. The administration went back and forth on the issue of asking for official congressional support for the use of force in January, as the UN deadline for withdrawal approached ( January 15, 1991, at midnight). For example, Bush would not allow anyone from the administration to testify at the November hearings in the Senate, chaired by Sam Nunn, while the UN resolution was still being debated. At that point there was less confidence in Congress than in the United Nations, and the strategy to use the latter to convince Congress to get on board was applied.97 Once the administration decided to seek congressional support in January, the January 15 deadline loomed large, and Bush used the urgency of the impending date for UN action to further tie his hands with Congress. Bush wrote a letter to the legislature essentially arguing that the United States, as a significant part of the United Nations, had to endorse and carry out its policies.98 The sense of urgency is made palpable by Bush’s framing threat in this letter and others (see later). The primary argument was one of the U.S. obligations to the United Nations, with the idea of U.S. national security and national interests secondary. The following excerpt illustrates how Bush tied hands in his appeal to Congress: It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve

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separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it would also help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq’s leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq’s continued aggression against Kuwait.99

Baker summarized how Bush and his advisors saw the linkages between domestic and international politics: “[T]here was a synergistic relationship between the international coalition and domestic support. The stronger the coalition, the easier it was to generate consensus at home. Likewise, the more domestic support we had, the more the President was put in a commanding position vis a vis other governments.”100 It was Bush’s strategic use of the elements of the context that enabled him to play the domestic and international audiences off each other in a way that kept support on both fronts. In summary, the major obstacles addressed by the tying hands strategy were setting the contours of the response (and thereby addressing the apparent inconsistency between confrontation now and the former engagement with Iraq ), getting around American and international resistance to move from sanctions to the threat of force (including the Vietnam syndrome at home), and garnering congressional approval for the use of force. With his “this will not stand” comment in response to a question about military mobilization, Bush was able to get the idea that one response to the crisis could involve the use of force. In terms of the second challenge, the decision to double troops in the region had the effect of a fait accompli; once U.S. troops were deployed as an offensive capability the rally effect reduced much resistance. Finally, the UN resolution on the use of force and the “extra mile” effort helped force the Congress to support Bush’s stance. An analysis of the final strategy, framing threat, indicates how President Bush sought to motivate both audiences in his speeches. Framing Threat Bush’s speeches reflect his efforts to encourage constituents to see the situation the same way he did, so that they would agree that his policies were the “right” way to respond. For some in the administration, such as Baker and Scowcroft, and for scholars writing about this case in subsequent years, finding an ideal way to frame the conflict was a significant problem. For example, after one of the initial meetings of the National Security Council, Scowcroft was bothered by the tone of discussion that “implied that the crisis was halfway around the world and doing anything serious about it would just be too difficult.” He asked the president whether he could open the next meeting and state that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was an intolerable threat to U.S. interests and the stability of the post–Cold War world.101 It took some time for these advisors to agree on how the situation should be put to the American public. Scholars writing later about this case noted that the justifications for the U.S. presence in the Gulf kept changing in “priority and emphasis giving rise to initial speculation that the president had either not clearly articulated the real reasons for entering into war or, like a fox, had cleverly disguised his military objectives.”102 It is undoubtedly the case that some of the inconsistency grew out


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of dealing with a difficult situation and needing to adjust according to events. But further understanding is gained when we examine the justifications that the president used in his framing threat strategy, which was a tool to further his goals at different points in the crisis. Indeed, the way in which President Bush framed the threat in this crisis reflects the complexity of his approach. Because he was trying to broaden his audience to include domestic and international actors, he had to appeal to a range of interests. Also, both in the effort to achieve support that proved elusive at times and in the effort to make his appeals fit with the changing context created in part by his policy moves, his message was often modified. This section illustrates that the message was modified when new challenges arose: the initial invasion, a sense of congressional resistance to Bush’s initial moves to go beyond economic sanctions and the danger of the coalition unraveling in October, increased congressional resistance to the move toward the use of force in November and December, and the need to move from UN support of the use of force to congressional support in January. When Iraq invaded Kuwait and Bush made the decision to go to the United Nations, Bush spoke to reporters. In accord with the recognized necessity of having an international, unified front against Saddam, Bush framed the situation in terms of the threat that Saddam’s “naked aggression” posed to the international community.103 He emphasized the illegal nature of the invasion in that Saddam had circumvented the norm of international law, and that the international community could take collective action and use the opportunity to create a “new world order.” From the beginning, he hit hard on the fact that he was in near constant contact and working with other countries. He also emphasized that Iraq’s control over significant oil supplies because of its annexation of Kuwait was a matter of concern to the entire world, not just the United States. Finally, in this first phase he noted that he would do what was necessary to defend long-standing U.S. vital interests in the Gulf. This greater concentration on the international dimensions of the conflict than on the national interests would continue throughout the crisis. Beginning on August 22, in reaction to Saddam’s efforts to turn the Arab world against the United States, Bush stated explicitly that the conflict was between Iraq and the world, not Iraq and the United States. He would repeat this in many speeches and press conferences throughout the crisis. The press conferences and speeches can be analyzed by comparing the number of times Bush uses framing that focuses on the universal nature of the threat or makes reference to international solutions to the number of times he emphasizes the threat to American interests or unilateral action. This kind of analysis is relevant to this case and not the others in this book because of the point being made here: Bush’s intermestic policy making was based around first defining the issue as international and only then using the international response to get domestic support. Everything else in his leadership during the case emerged from this initial maneuver. These numbers are striking. For example, in August, out of 487 paragraphs, 229 used international or universal threat frames while only 47 were focused on the United States. Table 3.1 summarizes the results. In accordance with the broadening audience and tying hands strategies, Bush’s framing of the threat turned more than previously to the national dimension in November, December, and January, once

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Table 3.1 Bush’s framing threat strategy

August September October November December January (through January 15)

Total Coded Paragraphs

References to International Dimension/Universal Nature of Threat/International Coalition

References to National Interests Threatened/U.S. Action Called for

References to National as a Percentage of International References (%)

487 332 240 487 152 201

229 131 38 232 64 135

47 18 9 60 20 62

20.5 13.7 23.7 25.9 31.3 45.9

he had international support. As described earlier, he began to use this support to get Congress and the American public on board. Another way to investigate Bush’s framing threat strategy is by looking at the change in content over time, which is the general focus of other cases in this book. What we see is that he kept adding reasons why something had to be done about Saddam Hussein. As noted earlier, the idea that Iraq’s leadership violated international law by invading its neighbor was set out initially. This theme continued. On August 8, in his first address to the American public, he began to compare Saddam to Hitler and the mission of America and the world to that of World War II. Though staff in the American embassy in Kuwait and other Americans there had been taken hostage, Bush gave greater emphasis to the broader, universal threat Saddam posed. In late September and early October, the battle over the budget was raging, support from Congress on the Gulf policy began to dwindle, and a dispute with Israel104 led observers to speculate that the coalition against Saddam was unraveling. On October 1, the Senate and House passed resolutions that supported the deployment of troops, but did not support military action. On October 9 (and then on October 28 with more signatures), Democratic members of Congress sent a letter to Bush that explicitly denounced an offensive military posture and the use of force, urging the continued use of sanctions.105 In his public utterances, from October 9, Bush added another threat to his frames, that of human rights abuses. From late September, according to his memoirs, Bush began to hear more and more reports on the treatment by Iraq’s military of Kuwaitis and of hostages from around the world within occupied Kuwait. A visit to Bush by the emir of Kuwait on September 28 in which he told of atrocities against his citizens/subjects had a profound effect. As Bush noted, during this time he moved beyond seeing Saddam as a strategic threat and his move as an injustice to the point where pushing Iraq back became a “moral crusade.”106 In many speeches from then on, he spoke passionately about what he had heard from the emir and what he was reading in reports from Amnesty International. On October 23, for example, he argued that the United States and the world were up against “Hitler revisited, a totalitarianism and brutality that is naked and unprecedented in modern times. And that must not stand. We cannot talk about compromise when you have


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that kind of behavior going on this very minute. Embassies being starved, people being shot, women being raped—it is brutal.”107 The themes of rape and torture were repeated in many speeches around this time. At another campaign stop on October 23, he argued that Saddam’s abuses had to be stopped: I saw some signs coming in: “No War for Oil.” I can understand the sentiment by some of those young people. But I would simply say that rape and the systematic dismantling of Kuwait defies description. The holding of hostages, innocent men and women whose only mistake was to be in Kuwait or be in Iraq when the invader took over Kuwait—holding them goes against the conscience of the entire world. The starving of embassies—good God, this is 1990. And you see this man starving out small embassies in Kuwait. These are crimes against humanity. There can never be compromise—any compromise—with this kind of aggression.108

On October 29, Baker gave a speech highlighting the use of more than 100 American human shields and said that force would not be ruled out. The next day, Bush met with 15 leaders of Congress, including from both houses and both parties. He told them about the barbarous mistreatment of hostages that the United States could not let stand; Bush mentioned he was reading a book about World War II, and he would not let the appeasement of a dictator happen again.109 Later, in mid-December, Bush was interviewed for public television by David Frost for a show to be aired on January 2. Prior to the taping, he read a 79-page report by Amnesty International about human rights abuses perpetrated since August by Iraq in Kuwait. He talked to Frost about what he had read, giving some examples of the atrocities that made such an impact on him, including rape, beatings, and torture. He said that the coalition had to stand up to Saddam because this was a case of “good versus evil.”110 This change in the content of his framing threat strategy coincided with increasing opposition in Congress, and thus it makes sense that Bush needed to work harder to convince the home audience to get behind the effort. Implicit in this kind of threat framing was that action was even more urgent, and the demonization and dehumanization of the enemy had the effect of making options other than military force unthinkable. Apparently public opinion focus groups had ascertained that Americans were more sympathetic to taking action when the framing was about Saddam as a dangerous enemy than when the focus was on helping Kuwait, though there is no evidence to connect these polls with Bush’s decisions about what he would say.111 The focus on human rights violations was controversial, and Amnesty International expressed frustration with the way in which the administration used its report on Iraq. The organization had been reporting on Iraq’s rights abuses for years without any leaders wanting to act; the Bush administration was also in coalition with governments that had engaged in similar abuses as Bush reported for Saddam.112 Also, one witness, who was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, testified in front of the House of Representatives Human Rights Subcommittee about newborn Kuwaiti babies being taken from incubators so the equipment could be looted. According to witnesses interviewed by Middle East Watch, a human rights organization, this incident never occurred; investigative journalists in the United States reported that the woman testifying at the House

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had been trained by a Kuwaiti government-hired public relations firm. Similar questions were raised about a woman who testified at the UN Security Council.113 Still, even though these accounts of human rights atrocities were later called into question, and Amnesty International corrected its earlier report that babies had been thrown out of incubators,114 the images they evoked were etched in the minds of Americans and had the effect of boosting the use of force argument. As described earlier, the president made the decision in late October to double the number of U.S. troops, which was announced two days after the November 6 elections. This move was met with an outcry in Congress. To some Bush was clearly moving toward war without congressional approval, to others it defeated the purpose of the sanctions effort and undermined any hopes for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Vietnam syndrome also lingered. Scowcroft observed that another issue was the “increasing difficulty [of ] making our point understood about what was at stake.” Even supporters argued that the reasoning “seemed abstract.”115 At this juncture, having kept the international coalition on board, President Bush faced the challenge of convincing Americans of the need to issue a deadline for withdrawal by Saddam, under the threat of use of force. He did so by making a connection between the international situation and the domestic one. As shown in table 3.1, the references to factors at the national level began to increase in November, up through the start of the war in January. Baker spoke to reporters about the issue being one of American jobs: The economic lifeline of the industrial world runs from the Gulf, and we cannot permit a dictator such as this to sit astride that economic lifeline. . . . And to bring it down to the level of the average American citizen, let me say that means jobs. If you want to sum it up in one word, it’s jobs. Because an economic recession worldwide, caused by the control of one nation, one dictator if you will, of the West’s economic lifeline will result in the loss of jobs on the part of American citizens.116

Bush saw Baker’s comment as consistent with his statements about the economic impact of Saddam’s control of oil, statements that had been on the increase since November.117 A new element also came into the threat frames in November, especially after public opinion polls showed that the American people saw protecting the source of oil as a less compelling reason to take a tough stance than either restoring the government of Kuwait and defending Saudi Arabia or stopping Saddam Hussein from developing nuclear weapons. The latter was easily translated into a threat to the safety of Americans. In a CBS News poll on November 19, 54 percent said “to stop Saddam developing nuclear weapons” was a good enough reason to attack Iraq (39 percent said it was not a good enough reason), compared to 35 percent for restoring Kuwait’s government and defending Saudi Arabia (56 percent said “not good enough”) and compared to 31 percent “to protect the source of much of the world’s oil” (62 percent said “not good enough”).118 On November 22, Saddam’s effort to develop weapons of mass destruction began to appear in the president’s threat frames and remained a central part of his speeches up through the start of the war. For example, in a visit to the troops in the Gulf region, Bush stated that “every day that passes brings Saddam Hussein one step


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closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that’s another reason, frankly, why more and more, our mission is marked by a real sense of urgency.”119 That same day he gave a more elaborate explanation, in the effort to connect the weapons threat directly to Americans: As in World War II—the threat to American lives from a seemingly distant enemy must be measured against the nature of aggression itself: a dictator who has gassed his own people—innocent women and children—unleashing chemical weapons of mass destruction, weapons that were considered unthinkable in the civilized world for over 70 years. And let me say this: Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam’s atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation and the gravity of the threat. . . . 120

Recall that the next phase of this case comes after the United Nations passed Resolution 678, giving a deadline for withdrawal of January 15, after which force would be used to remove Saddam’s military from Kuwait. Bush shifted how he framed threat again during this time, especially between the end of November and January 9, when the Congress endorsed the use of force (note that the themes discussed previously remained in Bush’s frames). For example, on January 9, Bush wrote in a letter to college students: Each day that passes means another day for Iraq’s forces to dig deeper into their stolen land. Another day Saddam can work toward building his nuclear arsenal and perfecting his chemical and biological weapons capability. Another day of atrocities for Amnesty International to document. Another day of international outlaws, instead of international law. I ask you to think about the economic devastation that Saddam Hussein would continue to wreak on the world’s emerging democracies if he were in control of one-fifth of the world’s oil reserves—and to reflect on the terrible threat that a Saddam Hussein armed with weapons of mass destruction already poses to human life and to the future of all nations.121

The threat now, along with the possibility of weapons of mass destruction, human rights abuses, violation of international law, and economic recession, was in not standing together and in the United States failing to live up to its commitment to the United Nations. The lines that follow the preceding quotation get at this point: “Together, as an America united against these horrors, we can, with our coalition partners, assure that this aggression is stopped. . . .”122 Indeed, one of the obstacles to peace was that Saddam “had not gotten the message” that the world was standing together against him. The “best hope for peace” was implementation of the Security Council resolutions.123 Bush argued that Congress especially had to keep in mind the danger of the United States not acting with the United Nations because if Congress did not endorse the resolutions, Saddam would get the wrong signal and think he had room to maneuver. Bush often repeated that there could be no message sent that there was room to compromise: “No compromise on anything. That’s the problem. Everybody wants you to compromise. There is not going to be a compromise with this man. That would be the worst signal to send to the people around the world that are together.”124 The day before Baker met with Aziz in Geneva, Bush spoke of the threat Saddam

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posed to the coalition: “Saddam may seek to split the coalition, to exploit our sincere desire for peace, to secure for himself the spoils of war. . . . And that is why we simply cannot accept anything less than full compliance with the United Nations dictates: Iraq’s complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.”125 This same day, January 8, 1991, Bush sent a letter to congressional leaders. This letter again contained the urgent claims that the invasion of Kuwait threatened vital national interests and international peace. As indicated here, a sequential reading of Bush’s public statements during the course of this case shows how his strategy of framing threat shifted to address new challenges as they arose. The sense of congressional resistance to Bush’s initial moves to go beyond economic sanctions and the danger of the coalition unraveling in October was met by a focus not only on the universal threat of Saddam to the sanctity of international law, but also on the human rights abuses committed by the Hitlerian leader. With increased congressional resistance to the move toward the use of force in November and December, Bush continued earlier themes but stepped up the demonization of the enemy by talking more frequently about specific abuses and victims. He also began to talk about weapons of mass destruction as a severe threat to Americans, and Baker spoke about how Iraq’s actions threatened the American economy. Finally, when Bush needed to move from UN support of the use of force to congressional support in January, he highlighted that an additional threat was U.S. weakness. This weakness was embodied in failure of the United States to carry out the mandate of the United Nations; he then emphasized the threat that such weakness would provoke by emboldening Saddam Hussein. Thus, overall, framing threat enabled Bush to address all of the obstacles he faced: dealing with the inconsistency of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Iraq, overcoming opposition of moving from diplomatic and economic to military responses, handling concerns of states whose opposition threatened the cohesion of the coalition, getting past the Vietnam syndrome at home, and shutting down congressional opposition. Conclusion In August 1990, George Bush faced an uphill battle in the effort to rally both his home audience and the international community to confront Saddam Hussein. Taking a tough stance against Saddam ran counter to the relationships that various agencies in the U.S. government had developed since the Reagan administration, evoked fears of another Vietnam in the American public, interfered with the economic relationships Saddam had with American and European interests, went up against significant interests in the Soviet Union, and threatened regional states (and others taking the U.S. side) with potential instability and hardship. This leader indeed found himself in an impossible situation. However, by engaging in skillful intermestic policy making President Bush turned the situation around to fit his own agenda. Bush’s actions exhibited the use of the four strategies, each of which took his policy making across the lines of international and domestic politics (see Table 3.2). By broadening audience to posit the international community as a key constituency, he then turned back on Congress the need for the United States to go along with the actions of the United Nations. As opposition in the international arena arose,


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he used resources to buy off the wavering states. Likewise, when congressional leaders objected to an inequitable burden of the coalition effort, the administration convinced Japan, Germany, and other countries to cooperate so he could buy off domestic opposition. Tying hands was also an integral part of the effort to achieve and maintain support in both arenas. For example, certain actions such as the Baker-Aziz Table 3.2 Summary of George Bush’s use of strategy Leadership Strategy

Bush’s Use of Strategy


Broadening audience

Response to invasion primarily an issue for the international community; international response required U.S. support

Resistance of American public (especially “Vietnam syndrome”); opposition in Congress; antiwar sentiment once use of force decision was made

Buying off

Used American and multilateral organizations’ resources to address concerns of key foreign governments; secured resources from international actors to address domestic concerns

Concerns of states about impact of war on oil, security, and other costs of military option; concerns of Israel and those concerned about role of Israel; bought support from those resistant to join coalition; concerns of Congress about burden sharing and budget crisis

Tying hands

Took early def iant stance against Saddam’s actions; deployed offensive force to Gulf region, withholding from public and Congress until after elections in November; used U.N. resolution 678 to argue U.S. obligated to support U.N. commitment to use of force; made public threat in “extra mile” effort

Inconsistency of current stance with past alliance upon initial invasion; opposition of move from economic and diplomatic response to use of force, including Vietnam syndrome at home; Congressional opposition to use of force

Framing threat

Iraqi invasion primarily as global threat/violation of international law; then more focus on threat to the United States; also first denounced Saddam as Hitler and his human rights abuses as crimes against humanity, then focused on threat to the U.S. economy and Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction; posed failure of world to stand together as threat

Inconsistency of current stance upon initial invasion with past alliance; opposition of move from economic and diplomatic response to use of force, including Vietnam syndrome at home; congressional opposition to use of force; concerns of states that threatened coalition cohesion

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meeting were justified to the coalition as the only way to get American support, while the Congress was forced into going along with Bush’s policy to threaten the use of force because of UN Resolution 678. Finally, the use of the framing threat strategy was especially intriguing in this case. By analyzing Bush’s speeches and press conferences from August through January, we observe how he adjusted the nature of threat presented by the situation. These adjustments reflected the challenges present at each particular time in the crisis. At the beginning of the crisis, when the decision was made to garner international support before domestic support, Bush framed the threat in universal terms and argued that this violation of international law was a problem for the global community. During the middle phase of the crisis, when public support began to drop, he highlighted the human rights abuses, the images of which the American public often finds compelling. This threat framing was followed by the weapons of mass destruction threat, which Americans and others could most easily connect to their personal security. Finally, when he had the coalition together and needed congressional support, he posited as a threat (along with those noted earlier) the failure of the United States to go along with the UN threat of use of force. Anything short of this would embolden Saddam Hussein. Chapter 4 turns to a leader in an authoritarian regime, Robert Mugabe, and illustrates that even though the type of system and the issues were different from the first two cases, many similar mechanisms and processes are observable. Significant Events in the Persian Gulf War Case126 July 10 July 15 July 17 July 25 August 2

August 6

August 8 August 9 August 16 August 25 September 11

OPEC oil ministers meet in Saudi Arabia; Kuwait agrees to adhere to production quotas but does not satisfy Iraq’s demands. Iraqi Republican Guard begins moving troops from central Iraq to Kuwaiti border. Saddam Hussein demands that Kuwait meet his demands or suffer military attack. Saddam meets U.S. ambassador April Glaspie, who warns Hussein against using force. Iraqi troops invade Kuwait; Bush says that no options will be ruled out; UN Security Council votes 14–0 (Yemen abstaining) for Resolution 660, calling for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. UN Security Council Resolution 661 passes, placing an embargo on financial and economic resources to Iraq. Saudi King Fahd asks the United States for troops. Iraq annexes Kuwait; Bush addresses U.S. public; Operation Desert Shield begins. UN Resolution 662 declares annexation of Kuwait illegal. U.S.-led naval blockade of Iraq begins. UN Security Council votes to allow coalition ships to use force to defend embargo. Before a joint session of Congress, Bush threatens to use force if necessary.


September 25 October 17 November 8 November 11 November 27 November 29 November 30

December 4

January 8, 1991 January 12 January 15 January 17 February 22 February 24 February 26 April 2

April 6

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UN Security Council passes Resolution 670, imposing an air embargo on Iraq. Senate Foreign Relations Committee demands that the president get approval from Congress prior to any military action. Bush announces plan to nearly double U.S. troops to enable offensive action. Powerful members of Congress call for congressional action approving war. Senate Armed Services Committee opens hearings on Iraq situation. UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes the use of force. Bush makes effort to begin talks between Secretary of State Baker and Iraq’s Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz (they meet again January 9). Democrats in the House issue a nonbinding policy statement warning that Bush must seek congressional approval before taking any military action. Bush requests that Congress pass a resolution supporting the use of force against Iraq; divisive debate begins. Senate votes to give Bush war authority (52–47); House also approves (250–183). UN Security Council deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait passes. Coalition launches Operation Desert Storm. Coalition gives Iraq a deadline of 8 p.m., February 23, to withdraw from Kuwait or face ground war. Coalition launches ground war. Iraq announces withdrawal from Kuwait. UN Security Council Resolution 687 ends Gulf War and provides for the end of most sanctions if Iraq agrees to many punitive economic and military conditions. Saddam accepts UN cease-fire.


CHAPTER 4 RESISTING CHANGE: MUGABE AGAINST THE PEOPLE’S STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE, 1998–2005

Introduction Robert Mugabe, trained as a school teacher much like John Hume, carries the distinction of being Zimbabwe’s greatest savior and its darkest nightmare. In 1980, 20 years of grinding civil war in Zimbabwe came to an end and freedom fighter Robert Mugabe led his nation to liberation from white colonial rule. The entire world watched with the highest hopes as this resource-rich nation embarked on creating a nonracial democracy and an economic example for the rest of the continent. As the twenty-first century dawned, a tragic turn of events finds Zimbabwe—still led by Mugabe—in political, economic, and social free-fall. The hopes that this independence leader could carry the southern African nation of 12 million into a peaceful adolescence have been crashed on the rocks of poverty and selfish rule. In 1998, massive protests rocked the nation and galvanized support for the opposition trade union movement. The following year, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerged to push for a multiparty democracy. Despite international and domestic support for the MDC, and against all trends in the region, Mugabe managed to strengthen his grip. In fact, while his unpopularity at home peaked in the first few years of the millennium, by 2004 Mugabe’s skillful intermestic policy making reversed some of his most significant losses. While nominally the head of a parliamentary democracy, in reality Mugabe is an authoritarian leader. Although one may think that the processes of leadership are vastly different in a non-Western, nondemocratic country, an investigation of contemporary Zimbabwe shows a leader using several common strategies. By turning the domestic situation in Zimbabwe into an “intermestic” issue, Robert Mugabe worked with and changed domestic and international circumstances to fit his agenda of staying in power in the midst of ruin and opposition. The case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe shows that when the international community misunderstands the mechanisms of leadership, efforts to isolate a repressive regime can have devastating results. Indeed, in February 2000, the Zimbabwe opposition

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movement, southern African leaders, members of the Commonwealth, the European Union (EU), and the United States all thought the writing was on the wall. Robert Mugabe, head of state of Zimbabwe since the first post-independence elections in 1980, had finally been defeated symbolically in a referendum on his proposed constitutional changes. A few months later, in June 2000, the MDC won 57 of 120 seats in a parliamentary election. To observers at home and around the world it was only a matter of time before Mugabe agreed to end his one-party rule. While foreign actors exerted what influence they thought they could to undercut his influence, in 2005 Mugabe still called the shots and in March of that year won another presidential election. This chapter tells the tale of how Mugabe managed to tie together and manipulate international and domestic contexts to his favor. After a discussion of the historical background, the subsequent section describes the obstacles faced by Mugabe, addressing domestic and external factors that posed challenges to his agenda of staying in power. A later section describes his intermestic policy making by examining how Mugabe employed the four leadership strategies. Historical Background In the 1970s, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) made a loose alliance with Joshua Nkomo’s smaller Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) to lead the “People’s Struggle” in Rhodesia—the long fight against British white settlers to rule what became Zimbabwe. A settlement brokered by Britain in 1979, known as the Lancaster House agreement (named after the location in Britain of the negotiations) provided for elections in 1980 and a plan for coexistence between the majority blacks (about 96 percent of the population) and tiny white minority (about 4 percent). The new government was bound to maintain many of the agreed structures for seven years and could not change the constitution for ten years. Robert Mugabe was elected as prime minister in a parliamentary system, where his ZANU-PF took most of the seats. Nkomo’s ZAPU was the other major party (though much smaller), and the whites were guaranteed 20 of the Parliament’s 100 seats for seven years. Another aspect of the Lancaster House agreement had great significance for the current situation: former colonial power Britain and also the United States agreed to give aid to enable the new government to purchase land for redistribution from whites to blacks. This aspect was crucial because the struggle for land was the basis of the liberation war. The agreement also established that land must only be redistributed on a “willing buyer, willing seller” basis. After surprising the world by promising in his inaugural address to promote reconciliation in Zimbabwe, Mugabe set out to consolidate his power. From 1982 to 1987, he waged war in the southwest part of the country that was Nkomo’s stronghold. Mugabe kept much of the powers created by the white government during the war, such as emergency legislation that would later be employed and even strengthened to limit dissent. The fighting, estimated to have killed 20,000 of Mugabe’s enemies, ended with the Unity Accord of 1987 in which Nkomo was co-opted into the government as one of two co-vice presidents. Part of this

RESISTING CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE

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restructuring also involved changes to the constitution—now freed from constraints of Lancaster House—making Zimbabwe a presidential system in which parliamentary powers were reduced to an advisory role. After 1987, ZANU-PF and the state became more or less synonymous. For several years Mugabe’s increasingly authoritarian rule went unchallenged. Then, in 1990, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement formed around opposition to the one-party state. This opposition came mostly from within the party. Led by a colorful former ZANU-PF member, Edgar Tekere, the party won 17 percent of the vote in the 1990 presidential election. While this number looks minimal on paper, considering ZANU-PF’s intimidation of voters and manipulation of the voting rolls, observers at the time considered this a significant challenge.1 Still, after the elections, organized opposition died down for awhile. The opposition that grew much stronger in the late 1990s arose from the trade unions, partially in response to economic decisions of the government. Zimbabwe’s political situation is tied closely to its economic circumstances, which are in turn linked to the international arena. The next section describes the unpromising situation that faced Mugabe in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Significant events in this and subsequent sections are summarized in the chronology at the end of the chapter. An Impossible Situation When one considers how and to what extent Mugabe consolidated power around his personal rule, it may appear contradictory to say he faced challenges to his agenda at the turn of the century. He had managed to rid himself of anyone or any structures that might interfere with his plans: he had wiped out Nkomo’s resistance, intimidated any nascent opposition parties, changed the constitution to make himself nearly all-powerful, and implemented legislation that allowed him to squash dissent almost before it began. In addition, he ran the economy as he wished while enriching himself and his political allies. Even with so much in his favor, Mugabe still faced challenges coming from both the domestic and international contexts. It will be clear as the story unfolds that his reactions to some of the obstacles created new problems with which he was forced to struggle. Any one of the following obstacles has been known to precipitate collapse of governments around the world. Mugabe had the unique challenge of confronting all five at once and yet still managed to stay in power. Zimbabwe was in the midst of a dramatic economic collapse and dislocation. Economic problems were amplified amongst the population as a result of failed land reforms. Inadequate government responses to these issues gave rise to the opposition party, the MDC, posing a third challenge. A fourth challenge for Mugabe was his loss of prestige among African leaders with the emergence of powerful post-apartheid democratic South Africa. And finally, Mugabe was trying to maintain one-party rule amidst the global failure of such systems in Eastern Europe, Indonesia, and southern Africa. We can explore each of these constraints further, thus setting the stage for investigating how Mugabe used multiple strategies to stay in power. In its 25 years of independence, Zimbabwe’s economic plight served as the backdrop for the political situation. For example, at independence the government’s

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inclusive attitude toward the white community signified recognition of whites’ dominant role in the economy, with white-owned farms and white-run firms producing most of the economic wealth. In the 1980s, drought, falling commodity prices, and global recession wrought havoc. Compounding these problems were corruption and political decisions that hurt the economy. By 1990, the economy was failing; external lending agencies and the impending catastrophe at home pressured the government to make changes in macroeconomic policy.2 In 1991, the Mugabe government implemented the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP). Mugabe, using ESAP as a political tool, blamed the international community for hardships experienced in both the urban and rural sectors. Most relevant here, the conditions of ESAP set the stage for political unrest. The program required cuts in government spending on subsidies for food and on public sector employment and/or wages. For Zimbabweans this meant that food was increasingly unaffordable and jobs were lost or salaries cut (while inflation—the prices on most goods—continued to climb). Mugabe’s traditional constituency was in rural areas, also where many veterans of the war lived. ESAP upset farm workers most because the structural adjustment policies sought to remove landownership “still further from the ancestors and deliver it into the hands of the global state system.”3 Along with food shortages and loss of subsidies due to the IMF, drought wiped out about 150,000 head of cattle, which to peasants was a loss of life savings or “traditional bankruptcy.”4 Two analysts describe the sweeping effects of the structural adjustment program: “However necessary economic reform must have been, the implementations of ESAP led to the impoverishment of the majority of Zimbabweans, while a minority of (white) business people and (black) members of the ruling class benefited from the liberalization and the flow of expensive imported goods [structural adjustment loosened the exchange of foreign currency].”5 Many companies folded because of competition or the shortage of goods; tens of thousands of workers were fired in the first four years of ESAP. Further, about 20,000 civil servants lost their jobs. In 1995, unemployment was estimated at 50 percent and still rising. At the same time, the cost of living rose; the index for food prices increased more than 100 percent from 1993 to 1996.6 Failure to reduce government spending led to a suspension of IMF payments, as well as freezes on World Bank loans and many bilateral aid programs in 1995. While opposition to Mugabe remained relatively muted, ESAP’s effects put into stark relief that land and other resources were going to a small group of political elites. Onto this scene came the angered veterans of the liberation war, a traditional Mugabe constituency, demanding faster land reform. In 1992, Mugabe began to talk about taking land from whites and giving it to the peasants. In 1994 a scandal broke that one acquired farm was given to a politician and not to poor peasants. This revelation gave rise to a perception of greed and corruption that would only grow more intense. The scandal also drew international condemnation; Britain canceled its aid program that was supposed to be used to redistribute land. In the face of growing hardship for much of the population, the corrupt land redistribution episode fueled Mugabe’s unpopularity.7 Bringing even more attention to the land reform issue was Mugabe’s long-term neglect of issues facing veterans of the liberation war. At a funeral in 1996, an officer


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serving in the army gave a speech in which he condemned corruption in the country and the gap between the rich and poor. Ironically, only a few months later, payments from the War Victims Compensation Fund ended because the fund had been looted by government officials. The War Veterans Association demanded their payments; by July 1997 they were holding marches and other protests. Mugabe continued to refuse meetings with them. How could he overcome this challenge from such a significant, vocal constituency? We will see that Mugabe used several strategies to address the land reform challenge. As he did so, he intensified the broader economic challenge Zimbabwe faced. On “Black Friday,” November 14, 1997, the Zimbabwean dollar lost 75 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar.8 The Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions held a day of protest and general strikes; in January 1998, people took to the streets to protest rising food prices. Protests continued throughout the year. Controversially, in August 1998, Mugabe sent troops to help the Congolese government fight rebels in a long-lasting conflict, costing Zimbabwe millions of dollars and arousing even more opposition to the president. Further, the economic conditions revealed growing misery by the time of the 2000 referendum when voters were willing to hold Mugabe’s policies responsible: 120 percent inflation, 70 percent unemployment, 80 percent poverty rate.9 By the 2002 presidential election, the IMF and World Bank had suspended official development assistance and balance of payments support. Poverty deepened and Mugabe imposed price controls; in response the international financial institutions cut off more aid.10 According to the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, 75 percent of Zimbabweans were living in poverty that year, and the country confronted “the worst crisis in its history.”11 As reported in 2003 by the International Crisis Group, Mugabe’s government “engineered an economic decline of increasingly drastic proportions in a record four years which is underpinned by a breakdown in the rule of law and an attack on property rights.”12 These events and conditions sowed the seeds for the emergence of the MDC. The strength of political opposition was exemplified in February 2000, when Mugabe’s proposed constitutional changes were rejected in a referendum. He actually only held the referendum in an effort to shut down the growing trade union movement. Since 1998, trade unions and other civil society groups had joined together to seek a new constitution; this alliance was the precursor to the MDC. They tried to draw attention to the Mugabe government’s poor economic decisions, government corruption, and, especially, ZANU-PF’s repressive hold over civic life. For example, protests against the regime were illegal, and opponents of the government were often jailed. In April 1999, Mugabe created a Constitutional Commission, and when the referendum on its proposals was held in February 2000, 55 percent of those voting voted against it. This result was seen at home and abroad as a serious blow; one observer called it a “stunning defeat for Mugabe.” The MDC received a boost for its June 2000 parliamentary elections campaign. Indeed, in this campaign the MDC won 57 of the 120 seats, another historic victory and blow to the liberation leader.13 As with the growing economic crisis and the land reform dilemma, observers wondered how Mugabe could possibly survive this challenge. All three obstacles discussed thus far—economic collapse, failure of land reform,

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and rise of the political opposition—have been mainly domestic in nature. The fourth and fifth contributing factors to Mugabe’s impossible situation emanate from his role in the international arena and the fact that he tied his domestic leadership so much to the international context. Mugabe had always been a significant leader on the African scene and within organizations of developing states. The Zimbabwean president spent a great deal of time—more than most leaders—traveling around the world. He was especially prominent in the struggle against the white South African government’s apartheid regime. Once Nelson Mandela was freed from prison in 1990 and a black majority-ruled government (led by Mandela) was elected in 1994, Mugabe’s international standing was vastly diminished. Further, the perception of Mugabe as one of the great freedom fighters of Africa had always contributed to Mugabe’s domestic legitimacy. As the 1990s wore on, it became clear that Mandela and then Thabo Mbeki were Africa’s leading lights. Mbeki in particular, who was elected South Africa’s president in 1999, saw himself as the statesman for Africa within wider international forums such as the United Nations. When events inside Zimbabwe in the early 2000s began to raise eyebrows, leaders in the region encouraged Mugabe to reconsider his approach toward the opposition.14 Mugabe’s behavior also clashed with efforts in the region toward greater political and economic development. Two examples are illustrative. First, consider postapartheid South Africa’s policies. Mandela came into office announcing that South Africa’s foreign policy would be driven by human rights. Mbeki’s presidency was marked by the call for an “African Renaissance” and end to the authoritarian systems that have done so much damage to the African people. South Africa pursued these goals within the Southern African Development Community and within the broader African Union (AU). The latter aims to create an integrated Africa on the model of the EU, leaving behind the reputation of African governments as corrupt and repressive. Second, South Africa’s President Mbeki, along with the leaders of Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal, and others have recently created NEPAD, the New Partnership for African Development, to integrate African states more with the global economy. As a part of the broader vision for the AU, NEPAD’s legitimacy was threatened by Mugabe’s actions, especially because the organization “commits African leaders to self-police their continent to maintain good governance and responsible economic policies. . . .”15 Given these various elements of the context working against Mugabe, how would he deal with these potential challenges to his legitimacy in the region, which was in turn connected to his image at home? Related to the shifts within the region was Mugabe’s final obstacle: How could he pursue his agenda of power consolidation and tighten his repressive practices in the face of greater democratization in the region and all over the world? He had moved further toward a one-party state just when the concept was being discredited everywhere—from the USSR to neighboring Zambia, from Romania to South Africa, from Mexico to Indonesia. Indeed, in May 1998 amidst protests in the streets of Zimbabwe, people there watched on television the fall of Indonesia’s Suharto in the face of massive street protests and likened Mugabe’s fate to his.16 Regionally, by 2002, Mandela had handed over power in a second South African democratic election (1999); Zambia’s President Chiluba, in office for ten years,


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allowed elections to proceed without him as a candidate (2001); and the long-ruling leaders of Namibia, Malawi, and Mozambique all stated that they would respect their respective constitutions and not run for reelection.17 Further, throughout the 1990s, international aid donors increasingly required “good governance” of recipient states before funding would be approved. Once the international community saw Mugabe’s solution to the land reform program and his reaction to MDC gains, sanctions were imposed, lending programs and aid were cut off, and rhetoric escalated. For example, in June 2001, at the southern Africa regional session of the World Economic Forum in Durban, South Africa, the director of the IMF said that Zimbabwe would get no new loans until the government ended the occupation of the commercial farms by the war veterans and met other new conditions. Since the occupations were part of the 2002 presidential election campaign, nothing was resolved in terms of financial help.18 In late 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act, which imposed “smart” (targeted) sanctions that promoted the seizure of assets and made travel to the United States illegal for Mugabe and other significant government leaders.19 Most observers thought that Mugabe’s days were numbered, especially as the March 2002 presidential elections approached. After the 2002 elections, in the wake of complaints and allegations that the vote was far from free and fair, the spring of 2002 brought international involvement and pressure on Mugabe. Following the preelection action of the United States, the EU imposed a travel ban and froze the assets of Zimbabwe’s top officials. In addition, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe. These actors also promoted talks between the MDC and Mugabe’s regime, which began on April 4. Talks broke down in mid-April when the MDC filed legal charges about the election. On July 23, Mugabe opened the Parliament and the MDC delegation walked out.20 During this time, Mugabe managed, using several strategies, to keep regional leaders from criticizing him. Instead of losing power to the MDC and giving in to broader international pressures, he stayed in power and tightened his grip even further, having the MDC leader arrested and engaging in other repressive practices that brought even more international condemnation. In 2004, Mugabe may have even shown “something of a comeback.”21 Indeed, most other authoritarian leaders facing internal and international opposition in the post–Cold War era have been unable to maintain power. What happened in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2004 is no small puzzle. As one observer put it: For all the sound and fury of international condemnation and domestic opposition, octogenarian President Robert Mugabe maintains the upper hand in Zimbabwe. He has bludgeoned opposition parties and neutralized mass action strategies, minimized African criticism, maintained South Africa’s friendship, and withstood sporadic pressure from the wider international community. It has been a masterful performance. It is also one that has done massive damage to Zimbabwe’s economy.22

While there are indeed many costs to what Mugabe did, including hundreds of victims of political violence, it is a fact that he managed to achieve his central goal

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of staying in power. The remainder of the chapter elaborates on the strategies he employed to do so. Turning Things Around: Intermestic Policy Making The four strategies (buying off, broadening audience, framing threat, and tying hands) provide useful analytical tools for understanding how this leader managed to defy all expectations. As with the other cases, they help us see ways in which the leader used international circumstances to make gains in the domestic arena and also employed domestic conditions to manipulate the international context. Some of Mugabe’s moves make no sense if examined from the perspective of only foreign policy or only domestic policy. For example, why did Mugabe spend so much time condemning Britain, when it seems that he needed its cooperation to achieve land reform and thus satisfy the demands of those at home? This puzzle and the general conundrum of how he has stayed in power against all odds are explored in the following pages. Buying Off Recall that the buying off strategy is defined as a leader using domestic resources to secure foreign help, or using resources from overseas to co-opt constituencies at home. When used in this way the leader is practicing intermestic policy making. Buying off can also occur when domestic resources are used to co-opt domestic opposition. Mugabe used both variations extensively. In fact, this strategy is one of the core tools used by an authoritarian leader because he is more able than a democratic leader to allocate resources without scrutiny. Implicit here is an important point: while authoritarian rulers may not be as accountable to their public as democratic leaders, they still have to maintain a level of legitimacy, especially with particular groups such as the military (to avoid a coup, for example).23 For Mugabe, other groups that were important were other ZANU-PF officials, the rural peasants (his traditional constituency), and the war veterans (also a traditional constituency, whose membership overlapped with the rural peasants). Mugabe’s buying off strategy took four primary forms: land redistribution, economic policy, direct cash payments, and, most recently, access to food. Using this strategy addressed three of his challenges, including the effects of economic problems, the failed land reforms, and the rise of the opposition. The discussion about the buying off strategy that follows includes more of an account of the events in the case-study time period and is thus longer than the subsequent strategy sections. A scholar of African states and markets, Robert Bates, wrote extensively about how African governments use resources to buy political support from important constituencies.24 In this sense it is not at all surprising that buying off was one of Mugabe’s most frequent moves. However, this case study shows that he also created other problems as a result of using this strategy and thus had to employ other tools as well. The Zimbabwean leader used the buying off strategy to address the obstacles generally, and also used it at specific decision points to overcome opposition.


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From the early years of his rule, Mugabe used the state’s resources to buy off important allies. For example, he allowed army commanders to build their own “fiefdoms,”25 keeping them dependent on and thus loyal to him. To stem the flow of white farmers and businessmen after independence, he adopted favorable policies for them and shied away from acting upon the socialist rhetoric he had adopted during the war.26 He even manipulated international aid programs for development. For example, he would not allow any projects that would help people in the rural areas to gain autonomy, reserving for his government the role of patron.27 When the economy was doing so poorly in the early 1990s, Mugabe turned the tables on the white farmers who had received such good treatment from the government. He began to use the demand for land, which had fueled the independence war, to deflect attention from the devastating consequences of structural adjustment. He was especially concerned about the negative impact of economic restructuring on the rural poor, one of his traditional constituencies. By drawing attention to the injustice of so few whites still owning much of the land, Mugabe gambled that the rural peasants would continue to see him as their champion. Finally freed from the restrictions of the Lancaster House agreement, in December 1990, the Mugabe government changed the Bill of Rights to allow “government to confiscate land and pay ‘fair’ compensation over which landowners would have no right of appeal.”28 In 1992 the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle from the constitution was thrown out and replaced by the Land Acquisition Act allowing the government to take agricultural land on its terms.29 In practice, landowners were prevented from getting adequate compensation for confiscated land and from appealing in the courts.30 While the rhetoric seemed to dampen dissent in the countryside, in reality acquired land was going to politicians and not peasants. In his effort to buy off elites whose allegiance he needed, Mugabe fueled the growing opposition among war veterans he had largely neglected and to whom he had not distributed the land for which they had fought. He then used the buying off strategy again to deal with the demands this group made. The war veteran protests in 1997 created a crisis for Mugabe not only because so many were in the streets, but also because the veterans were a constituency he depended on for his legitimacy. After protests on August 21, 1997 disrupted his annual speech in honor of war heroes, Mugabe met with the war veterans and heard their demands for money and land. In addition, with a colorful individual known as “Hitler” Hunzvi31 leading the way, they threatened to invade farms and take the land from the white owners. Amid continuing reports in the media that many ZANU-PF party leaders continued to receive land and huge government payments, Mugabe gave in to the demands.32 He agreed that more than 50,000 liberation war veterans would receive a lump payment of 50,000 Zimbabwean dollars in addition to Z$2,000 monthly pensions, all of which was tax-free. He also agreed to free education for their dependents, free health care, free land, and interest free loans up to Z$20,000. In October 1997, Mugabe renewed his verbal attacks on white farmers, stating that any farm owners losing their land would only be compensated for buildings on the land. Intriguingly, Mugabe was pushed in this case to buy off the veterans, but later using other strategies he once again avoided distributing the land widely.

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Buying off the war veterans intensified Mugabe’s existing problems, as the multilateral lending agencies and Western states, especially Britain and the United States, loudly condemned the scheme to confiscate land. Making matters worse, Mugabe announced that a new sales tax, and initially a new income tax and gas tax increase, would be imposed to pay for the war veterans’ benefits.33 The latter was the impetus for the massive strikes and protests that swept the urban areas, organized by the ZCTU. In January 1998, the protests about the rising price of food were so large that Mugabe turned to the army to restore order. The result was the worst urban violence since the country’s independence.34 Finally, in the middle of 1998 he did attempt to buy off this opposition by imposing price controls on basic goods, which did quiet the protests for several months.35 In total, three outbreaks of protests took place in the capital Harare in 1998: in January against food prices; in May and June when students overtook Parliament, inspired by similar moves against Suharto in Indonesia; and in November over the rising prices of fuel and its scarcity.36 In December, Mugabe actually imposed a six-month ban on strikes.37 Amid the protests through 1998, Mugabe used the buying off strategy again; this time the target was the military, some of the business community, and party loyalists. Without consulting the Parliament or his cabinet, he made the decision to send troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1998 to help Laurent Kabila stay in power. The latter was fighting a war against rebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda. Mugabe also convinced Angola and Namibia to join him. In the end Zimbabwe sent 11,000 troops38 at a cost of around US$500 million.39 This decision was very unpopular at home, and Mugabe was criticized by Western governments who questioned Zimbabwe’s pleas for aid for land reform when it was spending so much on unnecessary military action. It is widely believed that Mugabe’s decision to get involved in a war that the country could not afford had to do in part with loot: “For a select group of defense officials and businessmen . . . the Congo offered rich pickings.”40 What Kabila had to offer were mining and timber concessions, preferential trade in diamonds, and cobalt. A UN Security Council report on the 1998–2002 war in the Congo reveals the unbelievable riches that a few Zimbabwean beneficiaries received: The elite network of Congolese and Zimbabwean political, military, and commercial interests seeks to maintain its grip [established during the war] on the main mineral resources—diamonds, cobalt, copper, germanium—of the government-controlled area. This network has transferred ownership of at least U.S.$5 billion of assets from the state mining sector to private companies under its control in the past three years, with no compensation or benefit for the state treasury.41

Facing the reduction of international assistance after the deal with the war veterans, Mugabe got involved in the Congo at least in part because of the opportunity for enriching himself and thus his patronage system.42 Not only were the top military leaders, defense officials, and those in the relevant businesses being bought; Mugabe also sought to curry favor with soldiers by giving them extra pay for their service.43


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Meanwhile, among those who were not yet co-opted, street protests continued. The reaction of the government was much like it always had been: more rulings that the work strikes were illegal and the jailing of critical journalists. In a case publicized in the West, journalists were arrested and tortured, but later the Supreme Court upheld their rights. In reaction, Mugabe stated that the Supreme Court had no right to tell the president what to do and that the judges should leave the bench.44 A few years later, the judges not in Mugabe’s pocket would be chased out of the court. These repressive tactics only encouraged the opposition to seek a new constitution limiting Mugabe’s powers. Mugabe’s reaction to the political opposition, proposing a new constitution of his own, shows the use of several strategies, including buying off. Among other measures, Mugabe included an amendment targeted at securing the rural vote: the new constitution would allow land expropriation without consultation; he placed all responsibility for payment of seized land on Britain, and if that country defaulted, there would be no payment.45 In addition, his campaign to pass the referendum involved much buying off. In late 1999, he announced pay increases, going back to July 1999, for his cabinet and ministers of Parliament. He also doubled allowances for traditional chiefs to deliver their tribal constituents’ votes. He made promises of higher salaries to teachers, doctors, and nurses. Finally, in January 2000, he gave 100 percent wage hikes to 30,000 members of the army.46 Despite all of his efforts, Mugabe suffered his first electoral defeat ever when the new constitution was rejected. Soon after the failed referendum Mugabe met with the ZANU-PF leadership and all agreed that the June 2000 parliamentary elections called for “a far more aggressive election campaign.”47 At this point, we see the ultimate buying off move of the Mugabe regime: on February 26, 2000, in a carefully coordinated operation, gangs of war veterans invaded white farms. They were transported by government and army trucks and led by Hitler Hunzvi, who was chosen by Mugabe to head up the invasions. By March 8, nearly 400 farms had been invaded.48 The reaction was swift: although it was ignored, the High Court declared the invasions illegal and told the police to evict those who had seized the land; Britain condemned the seizures and offered to accept fleeing white Zimbabweans (a move that enraged Mugabe). In response, Mugabe ordered the Parliament to pass a constitutional amendment making seizures legal, as his defeated constitution had tried to do.49 Just before the vote, a list of 800 farms was published and Mugabe told party candidates that all land would be taken back in the revolution.50 Simultaneously, he engaged in buying off of a wider range of people to help him win: war veterans and young people joining the party were given jobs in the police, and the government issued an amnesty for any crimes committed between January and June 2000. The latter encouraged widespread preelection violence by ZANU-PF members against anyone suspected of supporting the opposition.51 Further, as the land invasions continued, it was clear that some of the “war veterans” were poor urban people to whom the party gave veteran credentials in the effort to gain allies in its weaker districts.52 Though the ruling party kept its hold on the Parliament, the defeat of the constitutional changes increasing his powers was an historical loss for Mugabe.

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After these elections, the ruling party was so worried about the 2002 presidential elections that they put into place even more repressive practices. These included additional draconian laws such as the Public Order and Security Act of 2000, a deep reduction in the number of polling places in urban areas (where the MDC did especially well), and the use of violence and other forms of intimidation against MDC supporters.53 January 2002 brought even more repressive laws that aimed to limit what the media and foreign journalists could report, and also to repress the labor movement by eliminating the right to assembly and the right to strike.54 The 2002 presidential campaign gave Mugabe another opportunity to use the buying off strategy to win. The biggest piece of this was continued land invasions throughout 2001. In fact the campaign had the theme, “Third Chimurenga,” with the goal of setting Zimbabwe totally free of its colonial heritage.55 In November 2001, Mugabe ordered the expropriation of all farms without compensation.56 While earlier the Supreme Court had ruled these policies illegal, the new chief justice—an ally of Mugabe—allowed the fast-track land acquisition to go forward. This strategy showed some successes to the veterans and other rural people, while allowing the government to give the best farms to top government officials, including ministers, the police commissioner, leaders of the veterans, senior civil servants, and party officials.57 Using the land to buy off also served another purpose: the white farmers were predominantly MDC supporters who were now being destroyed.58 The land invasions intensified the economic crisis on many levels, not only severely damaging the food supply and practically ending some of Zimbabwe’s money-making exports, but also putting out of work about 400,000 black farm laborers.59 In the leader’s simple depiction of the world, only rich whites were hurt by the invasions, and the farm workers were depicted as “foreigners” from other countries.60 Not surprisingly, the land invasions, which resulted in the deaths of five white farmers in 2000 alone, increasingly raised alarm around the world. Mugabe dealt with the obstacle of international opposition by using additional strategies. Further, as the effort to insure victory in the 2002 presidential elections continued, the land invasions transformed into business invasions in urban areas; the idea was to reward pro-government individuals with loot and also to try to scare opposition supporters in these areas.61 More promises were made for land and for the distribution of money for development projects for supporters of Mugabe, and “freedom trains” were even created to address problems of transportation for urban commuters. In an egregious scheme, the government went on a “vote-buying spree” and handed out money to the elderly, orphans, and the disabled in rural areas.62 A report from the International Crisis Group in 2002 stated that despite Mugabe’s attacks on whites and white farmers, “evidence is increasingly emerging that his principal local facilitators, financiers, money launderers and arms suppliers are primarily white Zimbabweans. They provide a front for ZANU-PF to conduct business internationally and in return make millions of U.S. dollars.”63 All of this shows how Mugabe provided elites with a vested interest in helping him stay in power. Mugabe granted a 100 percent raise for security personnel and civil service wage increases of 55–80 percent in early 2002, and stepped up recruitment for the


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youth brigade.64 The latter meant employment and food for young people struggling with an increasingly devastated economy. In fact, in 2002 food was used as a way to pay off supporters in this election as never before. Besides problems with serious drought, government policies intensified an existing food crisis. The land seizures brought down the commercial food sector, while small farmers were getting no government support. The International Crisis Group reported that the output of maize, already at depressed levels in 2001, fell by two-thirds in 2002 while wheat production fell by more than half. The problems were compounded by unemployment and inflation, which devastated peoples’ ability to buy what was available. The government’s control of imports and foreign exchange made things worse still. Finally, it is that control which also enabled Mugabe to use food as a political tool. Interviews with members of the nongovernmental organizations such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Save the Children––United Kingdom revealed that ZANU-PF officials actively shut down food distribution in areas of MDC support. Beyond monopolizing imports, additional methods were used in 2002 to politicize the distribution of food.65 The words of one official reveal the chilling logic behind these actions: “You cannot vote for the MDC and expect ZANU-PF to help you.”66 In the end, Mugabe won the election and six more years as president, with a government count of 1,685,212 to 1,258,401 for the MDC candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai. Analysis of the voter turnout and outcome in the districts of the country suggests that if more MDC voters had turned out, Tsvangirai would have won.67 Strong support for Mugabe in the rural areas tipped the balance, showing that the resources were well spent, given his overriding goal of staying in power.68 The buying off strategy not only bought him votes but helped him to enlist more thugs to intimidate, and in some cases eliminate, those who would never vote for Mugabe. The same kind of co-optation (and intimidation) continued during district elections in September 2002. Mugabe may have bought off enough people to keep himself in office at home, but his actions increased the pressure in the international arena. He used buying off to deal with the domestic ramifications of the international condemnation. Indeed, though Mugabe had won the election at home, most agree that he only won illegally. The sanctions and the eventual Commonwealth suspension gave the opposition enough moral support to continue the political fight. Mugabe seemed to realize that he had to keep up the pressure on the MDC. Despite the continued suffering in the country, by 2004 Mugabe had turned things around politically. The buying off of rural and veteran constituencies continued in August 2003 when Mugabe issued an order directing thousands of white farmers to leave their farms.69 In 2004, looking ahead to the March 2005 parliamentary elections, Mugabe also continued using economic policies, the land issue, and food to buy off potential opposition. For example, in early 2004, the central bank introduced new monetary policies to lower inflation ( bringing down the annual inflation rate from 624 percent in January to 250 percent in August 2004). The average peasants in rural areas have actually benefited a great deal from the fast-track land reform process (which was not true in earlier episodes). Observers note that this fact has built very strong support for ZANU-PF in rural areas. Mugabe also used land to buy off several opposition

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leaders, inducing some to defect from the MDC. The military and the police were also beneficiaries in 2004.70 Food was again a significant currency: as in 2002, the government manipulated food distribution so that MDC enclaves did not receive the food they needed while ZANU loyals got more than their share. International organizations such as the World Food Program and the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization suspected that the country was experiencing huge food deficits while Mugabe rejected imports with claims that they had a bumper harvest. Some observers thought the government was importing food through covert channels, making it easier to distribute it to communities that the government wanted to co-opt.71 Finally, the government focused since August 2004 on trying “to win the hearts and minds of young people” as part of its electoral strategy. For example, Mugabe announced a massive increase in the funds allotted to youth services and youth centers; the allocation went from about $79 million in 2002 to $380 million in 2003 (from 418 million to 2 billion in Zimbabwean dollars).72 Especially in tough economic times, such a gigantic amount reflected Mugabe’s priority in buying off this sector of Zimbabwean society. With all of these groups, Mugabe seemed to do well in the elections. The International Crisis Group reported in November 2004 that Mugabe’s support in polls increased from 20 percent in 2000 to 46 percent in 2004, and his job approval ratings moved from 21 to 58 percent. Mugabe used the buying off strategy immensely in addressing four of the five dimensions of his impossible situation: the economic crisis, the land reform issue, the rise of the political opposition, and international reactions to his policies ranging from the land invasions to the treatment of the political opposition. Whenever he was faced with obstacles to his retention of power, he tended to resort to the buying off strategy—a strategy more easily available to an autocrat perhaps. He often did so in conjunction with other strategies, as will be obvious in the discussion that follows. What else emerges from this study of buying off is the fact that his use of this strategy often gave rise to additional challenges that he had to overcome. One of the most significant was the reaction to the land invasion policy. Broadening audience was a crucial way Mugabe met this obstacle and others. Broadening Audience Recall that the definition of this strategy is expanding one’s coalition to create legitimacy at home or abroad, or to support one’s message of shared identity/shared fate with the group now being included in the expanded constituency. When a leader broadens audience, he appeals to new actors (through words and actions, not resources) that they have a stake in what he is trying to do; he appeals to them that his agenda offers them something they need or want. The more actors a leader can get to see the situation his way and to help reinforce his definition of the situation, the better able he is to accomplish his goals. Mugabe used this strategy to overcome three significant obstacles: the rise of opposition and subsequent demands for change at home, his faltering regional leadership role and regional efforts to advance political and economic development, and international condemnation of his domestic and foreign policies. He broadened audience to the


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opposition’s constituency, to African states, to war veterans, and to Third World states generally. At its core, his behavior in using this strategy was intermestic in nature. For example, his regional leadership role and his manipulation of international condemnation were central to justifying and pushing his domestic agenda. Mugabe used broadening audience to deal with demands for change, especially with reference to the constitutional initiative and the demand for land reform. Mugabe’s reaction to demands by the MDC for a new constitution was an attempt to broaden his audience to the MDC’s audience on this issue: he proposed the commission that drafted the new constitution. Indeed, this mode of broadening audience is similar to what Dick Morris has called “triangulation”: overcoming the opposition by addressing problems that motivate the other side’s voters73 (or in this case, pretending to address the problems). Unfortunately for Mugabe, his effort to win over the audience in this case was limited. He was more successful when he used this strategy to address demands for land reform. Here we will see that the land issue was used to overcome economic and political difficulties at home, the fading of Mugabe as a regional leader, and international objections to his political agenda. He broadened audience to the African states on the land issue, trying to get them on board to support Zimbabwe, a fellow black former colony, against the white rich states. Achieving success in appealing to these fellow Africans was unlikely. Mugabe’s behavior at home defied the trends in the region toward democratization and greater respect for human rights. Further, the broader international response to him threatened the credibility of NEPAD, the pet project of many of Africa’s other leaders. The many ways in which he managed to get key Africans on his side is the subject of the next few pages. Though the fruits of the Congo war were crucial to his buying off strategy, Mugabe’s involvement in the Congo exemplifies broadening audience too. Indeed, sending troops to help Kabila stay in power against the Rwanda-Uganda onslaught in the central African country helped Mugabe argue that he was a leader of the continent as a whole—and especially, a leader who stood up for sovereignty. Indeed, an observer argued that Mugabe got involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to boost his ego and his regional image; the “shift of limelight from him to Mandela-Mbeki led him to look north to the Congo to prove that he remained a player on the wider African scene.”74 He originally tried to get a regional force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to help the Congo, a member of the regional organization. In the end, most members refused while Angola supplied airpower and Namibia sent several thousand troops. By spearheading this force Mugabe could show regional leadership when South Africa was unwilling to step forward.75 Another way that this move embodied the effort to broaden audience is that it helped him gain allies against any regional criticism of his domestic policies within the SADC because Angola and Namibia benefited from working with Zimbabwe in the Congo.76 Even though the war was unpopular at home and was very expensive for a devastated economy, Mugabe kept troops there because it helped him accomplish his goal of appearing “as defender of African sovereignty and territorial integrity.”77

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Broadening audience was employed as a way to circumvent the demands of the war veterans for land reform. Instead of fighting off the demands, he broadened audience to include them and eventually tried to buy them off. Upon failing to redistribute land as promised, he broadened audience again by making an overture to the international community in 1998. He was so desperate to win back the favor of international lenders that he promised not to take farms and to proceed only with the lawful purchase of land. In September 1998, he worked with a broadbased international and grassroots effort for a solution on the land issue. The group came up with a plan, but Mugabe did not follow through, in November 1998 announcing the seizure of over 800 farms.78 Still, this effort to placate the international audience got him past a tough episode and won him continued international lending when he initially made the deal. A similar event took place in September 2001. Amid fears of damage to the entire region from Zimbabwe’s food production problems (related to the land invasions), regional leaders within the Commonwealth organization proposed an initiative to get Mugabe to restore law and order in exchange for international funds to help in the land reform program. Mugabe signed the Abuja Agreement (named for where it was negotiated in Nigeria), which was also applauded and endorsed by the SADC, but Mugabe failed again to follow through on his promises. What he did gain was enough favor “to survive a forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting.”79 Finally, in 2001, Mugabe also worked with regional leaders within the SADC to pledge that his government would abide by the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region. In practice, though, his behavior was far from acceptable.80 Mugabe’s appearing to be a “regional team player” on the surface, if not in execution, exemplified his broadening audience strategy. Participating in the Abuja talks and agreeing to the SADC’s standards were necessary for him to stay a part of the Commonwealth group. For the most part, he broadened audience in the effort to further his goals of blaming others for his failure to engage in true land reform and to gain legitimacy as a leader at home by looking like a leader of Africa in the world. He internationalized the land issue as soon as he brought it back into the political arena in the 1990s, and in 1997 and 2000 argued that it was Britain’s duty to provide money to white farmers. While Mugabe lost the referendum for the constitution, which included the demand that Britain pay, he later made sure this provision was passed into law. Britain’s actions fed into Mugabe’s broadening audience strategy (broadening to make this a situation of black Africa against colonial whites). For example, in 2000, Britain condemned the land invasions and offered to accept 20,000 white Zimbabweans. Mugabe argued that Britain’s actions showed that, indeed, this was a struggle by his country to “gain its rightful heritage against a former colonial power acting on behalf of the white community to protect their interests.”81 During and after the parliamentary elections of 2000, Mugabe broadened audience to include other former colonies again. He used the land invasions to get support at home (buying off ), and then also connected the land seizures with the larger issue of colonialism. When other countries in the region grew concerned about


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unrest in Zimbabwe, he was credited with skillful diplomacy because he “play[ed] down their fears of instability, convince[d] them he really was the only game in town, and construct[ed] a myth of white colonial interference that touched raw nerves . . . in the very recently freed South Africa.”82 At an August 2000 meeting of SADC leaders, Mugabe received support from southern African presidents, some of whom said the violent land invasions were the fault of foreign donors for not financing the plans to resettle the land.83 Mozambique’s President Chissano made a statement that showed he shared Mugabe’s concerns; he said some “big powers” had put a “blanket” over their history by “portraying heroes of the freedom struggle as anti-democratic and even dictators. . . . We cannot in SADC condone these views. We are the democrats. . . .”84 The SADC leaders also publicly asked that Britain follow through on Mugabe’s demands that it (Britain) fund the land acquisition program. South Africa’s and Malawi’s presidents were even sent to pressure Britain’s prime minister.85 While other African leaders did not approve of Mugabe’s tactics on land reform, the West’s failure to carry out their promises of assistance kept them from condemning the farm invasions.86 In December 2001 after Mugabe had not made progress toward the Abuja agreement or democratic norms, the SADC team that visited the country “meekly accepted government claims and attempts to cast blame on external forces.”87 In this case the “external forces” were the just-passed sanctions bill in the United States. Mugabe’s actions around the 2002 presidential election also showed his successful efforts at broadening audience. An initial example is the treatment of EU election observers. Before the observers arrived, Mugabe declared that individuals from a list of “hostile” governments could not be part of the EU teams. The EU objected and sent a team that included a Swedish delegate; Sweden was considered hostile and the observer was expelled. In response, all of the EU observers left and the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe government response to the withdrawal, issued in the state-run newspaper, the Herald, reflected Mugabe’s definition of his audience as well as the opposition: the withdrawal “represents an important epoch in the evolution of the African continent into a region that can now stand on its own and define its own political processes without the endorsement of former colonizers.”88 One week before the 2002 presidential election, the Commonwealth voted to suspend Zimbabwe because of Mugabe’s policies. States from the Caribbean, Asia, and the Pacific voted on both sides of the issue. However, the African states all voted together to reject Zimbabwe’s suspension unless Commonwealth election observers found the presidential election to be unfair. This episode showed Mugabe’s great skill, since these states were more hurt by his policies than any others. For example, political and economic refugees were flooding South Africa, the farm invasions were causing regional food planning problems, and the farm invasions were raising the fear in South Africa of a similar chaos.89 Along with sending observers to the elections, the Commonwealth appointed a team of well-respected heads of state who would review the observer report and recommend on the suspension question: South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, and Australia’s John Howard.90

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After the election, African observer teams were not as quick to condemn the election as others. The South African team said the election was “legitimate,” stating (at least) that they avoided the words “free and fair” on purpose. A team from the Southern African regional economic body was critical of state-sponsored violence, but the Nigerian team said, “We recorded no incidence that was sufficient to threaten the integrity and outcome of the election, in areas monitored by the team.” The Organization of African Unity (OAU), along with a group from Namibia, claimed that the vote reflected the wishes of Zimbabwe’s people.91 The Tanzanian president summed up “the general African reservation about the election: not that it was unfree and unfair, but that external dictates had been, by definition, unfair to an independent country and militated against its freedom.”92 On the other hand, the final report of the Commonwealth observer group concluded that “the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for a free expression of will by the electors.” Despite dissention among the three-person group, it did vote for a year-long suspension of Zimbabwe from Commonwealth council meetings.93 Still, Britain and other Commonwealth states failed to persuade Mbeki and most African leaders to impose harsher measures against Mugabe.94 In September 2002, South Africa and Nigeria prevented the extension of the Commonwealth suspension to a broader range of activities.95 Despite the mixed result among observer groups, significantly, “the core of the African power bloc—Mbeki and Obasanjo—chose to back Mugabe, downplaying the significance of the electoral theft.”96 That the South African leader identified with Mugabe and Zimbabweans was obvious in his statement to the South African parliament several months after the March elections: We are not going to act on the Zimbabwe question with a view to punishment. . . . Other people think our task is to punish, to defeat, to crush Robert Mugabe and Zanu. [Those are based upon] the fear that things happening to white people might happen here. That is the center of the concern, and the result is that major challenges happening on our continent, those people in our country do not want to address. It doesn’t matter how many Ivoirians die. “Let’s talk about Zimbabwe.” Doesn’t matter how many millions of Sudanese die. “Let’s talk about Zimbabwe.”97

In an interview with the International Crisis Group in 2002, another high-ranking South African official asserted that the opposition leader Tsvangirai is an “agent of Western colonialism.”98 These expressed views were significant in validating Mugabe’s effort to broaden audience beyond the landless in Zimbabwe to the larger Africa still trying to recover from the trauma of colonialism. Again, the reaction of the Western governments in fact aided Mugabe in his efforts to broaden audience to all of Africa. With the support of African leaders, that he was condemned by actors in the broader international arena had less of an impact. A South African official stated that the tactics of the Americans and Europeans “may have even influenced Zimbabwean voters to rally round Mugabe. When the British started screaming, all doors were closed.”99 In this light his actions could “make more sense.” The comments of several observers emphasize the point here. “The displacement of the Zimbabwe crisis to an international level


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was an essential part of Mugabe’s attempt to project himself as the champion of African and third world rights. . . .”100 Another stated that, Mugabe picked the perfect words, the perfect causes: land, which is a historic injustice. Second, colonialism and neocolonialism. It’s an ongoing legacy that needs to be dealt with. Third, economic exploitation which is a serious problem in Zimbabwe and on the rest of the continent. And fourth is race, which remains an unaddressed issue in Zimbabwe.101

The MDC refused to accept the results of the election and called for a new one; that party received endorsement by the United States, the EU, and others who refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Mugabe regime. South Africa and Nigeria, with eyes to averting a mounting crisis that would have regional implications and to showing the rest of the world that Africans could solve their own problems, made efforts to start negotiations between Mugabe and the MDC. The idea of a transitional Government of National Unity, on the South African model, was suggested. Mugabe at first agreed to talks and a first round was held in April 2002; he then reneged much as he had on the Abuja agreement. As noted earlier, the government ended the talks when the MDC chose to go forward with a court challenge of the election results. Many think his initial agreement (without ever having the intent of sharing power) was an effort to play to other African states in a way that would allow him to say he made a good-faith effort. Again, this behavior fit the pattern he followed with the land issue.102 Despite this outward effort to reach a solution, most African governments in international forums stayed with a public position of solidarity with Zimbabwe’s leader. There are several aspects of the context of this situation that made Mugabe’s broadening audience strategy work so well. The first was implied earlier: resentment of British and American pressure. Anger at being told what to do by former colonial powers is palpable in the statements from South African officials. Indeed, being told how to respect democracy, human rights, and the rule of law by one country that put so many black people into submission (Britain) and another country that called the ANC and Nelson Mandela terrorists during apartheid (the United States) only generated anger. Many governments condemned Britain for failing to live up to the promises that were made at Lancaster House. Further, resistance to U.S. unilateralism was strong in the post–Iraq war climate. Because of extensive developing state opposition to the American insistence on acting unilaterally in Iraq, South Africa and others did not want to appear to be a part of the U.S. agenda. One ANC official said, “If we are perceived to be allying with the U.S., we will then be perceived by the region and the continent to be advancing the U.S. agenda.”103 A second dimension has to do with the fact that Mugabe was so strongly identified with the anticolonial struggle of the whole continent. As the head of one of Africa’s most successful liberation movements, Mugabe could tap into the resentment of all Africans toward economic neocolonialism and their understanding of the urgency of land reform. Third, Mugabe for years gave the ANC of South Africa sanctuary and aid in their antiapartheid struggle. The sense of debt to

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Mugabe ran deep. Fourth was the resistance of African states to interference from external actors. During the era of independence, the OAU had enshrined that the principle of sovereignty meant no foreign involvement with domestic affairs. Mugabe brought attention to this tradition, raising the specter that interference with his policies could mean a domino effect of interference across the region; all of Africa was in the same boat. Fifth, South Africa feared that support for the opposition from external actors could make the situation in Zimbabwe even more unstable. Already suffering from economic refugees flowing into South Africa, that state feared even greater backlash in the future. Though South Africa began to push Mugabe privately in late 2002, the Mbeki government was constrained by the need to maintain regional solidarity.104 Finally, even though some South African officials have expressed the desire to do something more about Mugabe, it could not appear to be a bully in the region for historical reasons. With its history as a regional bully under the apartheid regime, South Africa had to act within the SADC. Still, the SADC was divided, with Angola and Namibia more supportive of Mugabe.105 As Mugabe continued to appeal to his African audience, by 2003 divisions between Africa and the West over how to respond to Zimbabwe had widened.106 South Africa and Nigeria split with Australia within the Commonwealth group appointed to rule on Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth after the March 2002 elections. The foreign ministers from South Africa and Nigeria traveled to Zimbabwe in January 2003, and Mbeki and Obasanjo met there in February 2003, to observe conditions; their reports would inform their leaders’ decisions on the ruling whether or not to lift the suspension in March 2003. They met almost exclusively with government representatives, spending very little time with the opposition. While there, they clearly referred to Zimbabwe’s problem as a land issue and not one of governance. Arguing that the land grabs had ended and other problems had been addressed (none of which was the case), the two African leaders informed their Australian counterpart that they would lobby the Commonwealth to end the suspension and that no meeting was necessary. The result was a standoff between the African leaders who argued that the suspension’s term would be over at the end of March, and Australia and others who held that the suspension had to remain until a different joint decision was made.107 The preceding episode exemplifies how these African leaders indeed saw themselves as part of Mugabe’s broadened audience. Nigeria’s foreign minister, on a visit to Zimbabwe, was quoted in the state-controlled Herald warning Australia, Britain, and others not to use African states to squeeze Mugabe: “If they put their kith and kin ahead, we will put our kith and kin ahead, too.”108 Meanwhile, MDC officials continued to express great frustration with Mugabe’s efforts to paint the ongoing crisis as a colonial and black–white issue: “The dispute is between Mugabe and the people of Zimbabwe, not Mugabe and Britain.”109 In the time after the 2002 elections, we see more evidence that Mugabe kept his audience and that he again reached out when pressure did come from the African audience. In July 2003, President George W. Bush visited South Africa as a way to pressure Mbeki to take more of a leadership role in the Zimbabwe crisis. Mbeki’s actions afterward, though, showed the same behavior as before: in travels


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prior to the Commonwealth summit he lobbied against extending Zimbabwe’s suspension. After the December 2003 Commonwealth summit at which members voted to keep the suspension, Mbeki organized the other SADC members to oppose the decision. Further, he defended ZANU-PF, its liberation struggle, and its current “spirit of reconciliation” in the December 2003 ANC newsletter.110 South Africa did respond subtly to some international pressure. In early 2004, the South African government again got ZANU-PF and MDC officials to engage in short-lived “talks about talks.” Also, observers noted in 2004 that South Africa’s nongovernmental sector may emerge as a force for change in Zimbabwe as churches, businesses, and others pressured Mbeki to do more about the growing crisis next door. In 2003, some dissenting behavior by African states surfaced. Following many visits from MDC officials and other representatives from an array of Zimbabwe civic groups, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Botswana started talking more about the need to press Mugabe to share power. Several states in the SADC disassociated themselves from Mbeki’s dissent at the Commonwealth meeting in December 2003. Part of the reason for the shift in their position was the devastating economic crisis in Zimbabwe, which continued to intensify and affect the entire region negatively.111 In a significant shift, Nigeria’s President Obasanjo, host of a 2003 Commonwealth summit, split with Mbeki and did not invite Mugabe to this meeting. Observers point out he was motivated by the desire to gain back credibility for the NEPAD.112 Obasanjo also used his chairmanship of the AU to pressure Mugabe and offered to provide new homes for some of Zimbabwe’s fleeing white farmers.113 In response to the Commonwealth decision, Mugabe angrily withdrew Zimbabwe from the organization, arguing that if his country had to choose between membership and defending Zimbabwe’s sovereignty he would sacrifice membership.114 In July 2004, the AU also broke ranks with Mugabe by criticizing the human rights situation after an observation visit to Zimbabwe in 2002.115 The dynamics of the Commonwealth and also the AU have been transformed because they are constituted by a larger number of stable democracies and new governments who have assumed power through opposition movements. In some sense the identity of these bodies is changing, undermining Mugabe’s broadening audience strategy that they are all part of the same group of anticolonial (African) nationalists. Intriguingly, by 2004, Mugabe appears to have picked up on these changes and taken actions to keep his African audience from walking away. As noted earlier and shown in the framing threat section, this would be a severe blow to his domestic support because that support depends on his image as a great African leader continuing his historic role of protecting Africans from colonialists. In August 2004, inspired by similar measures in the AU, SADC heads of state adopted 12 core principles that SADC member governments must abide by during elections. Examples are insuring all citizens can fully take part in the electoral process, guaranteeing all candidates have access to state media, guaranteeing results can be challenged, and providing for an independent judiciary. The protocol also provides detailed guidelines for African observer missions. The development of these principles, paired with

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the AU criticism of the human rights situation, pushed Mugabe to recalculate.116 However, his actions were similar in nature to those of the past: in an effort to capture some of the message of the MDC, he broadened audience by telling the opening of Parliament in July 2004 that he would introduce specific electoral reforms in line with the regional organizations’ recommendations. In August 2004, he took part in the adoption of the protocol at the SADC summit in Mauritius. By September 2004, Mugabe’s government created legislation to establish an independent Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). Observers noted that Mugabe’s reforms showed that “he considers the AU a serious forum whose criticism he cannot ignore in the same manner as he has Western criticism.”117 This kind of move was similar to his behavior during the Abuja Agreement on land reform: when there was danger of being excluded from the African club of leaders, he took action to keep those leaders in his audience. Without them, the rhetoric he used at home to maintain power and justify his actions would be empty. Indeed, as noted in the previous section, Mugabe’s moves have increased his popularity at home recently. In summary, broadening audience was an essential strategy for Robert Mugabe, employed to overcome four of the five obstacles: the rise of the opposition, his faltering regional leadership role, condemnation by the international community, and failed land reform. Next we look at Mugabe’s use of the tying hands strategy. Tying Hands “Tying hands” involves using an aspect of the domestic context to justify limiting the range of options in the domestic arena to convince an actor(s) in the international arena that a particular course is necessary or limiting options in international diplomacy to convince domestic actors that a particular course is necessary. Mugabe used this strategy to address the economic crisis, demands for land reform, and international pressure (primarily related to the farm invasions). Tying hands took three main forms: he argued that the IMF limited his ability to fix the economic plight of Zimbabweans; he highlighted the role of the Lancaster House agreement and then the duplicity of Britain in preventing land reform; and he told the international community that its failure to help him limited his ability to control the land invasions. As economic problems worsened in the 1990s and the early 2000s, Mugabe used tying hands to deflect blame for this situation by emphasizing the role of the IMF (and later, whites) in limiting his room to maneuver. The structural adjustment programs that began in 1991 and then subsequent funding packages were often mentioned in Mugabe’s speeches and in the government-controlled media. Later he took a more proactive role by encouraging the land invasions, but Mugabe continued to emphasize the “fact” that the IMF severely constrained Zimbabwe’s economic choices and tied his hands (keeping him from making everything better). To deal with the challenge that arose from failed land reform, for many years Mugabe’s government emphasized its helplessness that the productive land was nearly all in the hands of a tiny white minority. Indeed, until the 1990s, he often spoke about the Lancaster House constitution and the way in which it limited his


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room to maneuver on the land issue. Once he was unconstrained by that agreement, he still failed to redistribute land equitably, instead using it to buy political allies and to enrich his family. In the effort to stem unrest about the slow process and alleged corruption, he argued that the British tied his hands again. Instead of Lancaster House, the issue was now money to purchase the farms. He argued that his effort to give the Zimbabwean people what they fought for was hampered because the British did not fulfill promises to fund land reform. Finally, once the land invasions began (as part of his buying off strategy), international condemnation was rife. Though he eventually gave up on trying to dampen this criticism and employed the framing threat strategy to turn it to his favor, in 1998 and 2001 he attempted the use of tying hands to deflect his critics. Indeed, while negotiating the 1998 Abuja agreement and a 2001 deal (described earlier), he was under threat of sanctions and diplomatic isolation. In 2001, the Commonwealth isolated Mugabe by banning him from an upcoming conference. He appealed to Britain, Nigeria, South Africa, and others that he could not stop the land invasions without money and time. He argued that his hands were tied by the anger of the people and the shortage of funds. He ended up with money, time, and attendance at the Commonwealth conference (until being banned finally after the 2002 elections). In summary, Mugabe often extricated himself from or deflected tough situations by using the tying hands strategy. In some cases international factors were used to tie his hands on domestic progress, and in others domestic factors were posited as restricting what he could give his negotiating partners in the international arena. Note that this strategy was less central for Mugabe than for other leaders in this book. Perhaps the difference stems from Mugabe’s tendency to depict himself as the supreme leader of Zimbabwe. For the most part, in his mind there is not much he cannot do; no one could actually tie his hands effectively. Still, when convenient for addressing specific obstacles, he did use this strategy. The next section turns to Mugabe’s use of the framing threat strategy; it will be apparent how closely linked his depiction of threats is to his use of the other strategies, especially buying off and broadening audience. Framing Threat Recall that when a leader uses this strategy, he depicts particular actors as dangerous to one’s constituency (at home or abroad) in order to rally support and promote unity. All leaders frame threat in some way, but since political issues are usually ambiguous and may be attributed to many causes, we need to know how, specifically, this is done. Mugabe’s framing threat was used in tandem with the three other strategies. One element of his use of this strategy that is especially striking is the extent to which he connected nearly every facet of Zimbabwe’s domestic politics to the international context. This section employs Mugabe’s speeches to show how he used aspects of the international arena (such as neocolonialism and interventionism) to posit threat to his domestic audience; he did so to maintain domestic support for his regime by trying to divert attention from other issues and invoke that he was the leader who had previously defeated threats of this nature. In addition, he used

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conditions within his country (economic crisis, the land issue, and the rise of the opposition) to frame threats regionally, helping him broaden audience to include the regional front. This in turn helped him to achieve his goal of staying in power against many odds. Indeed, framing threat in tandem with the other strategies helped him to overcome all five of the challenges to his rule: economic crisis, turbulence over land reform, the rise of the opposition, loss of regional leadership, and broader international condemnation. Beginning in 1990, Mugabe began to frame the threat of neocolonialism to the land of Zimbabweans (which, in a sense, was a return to the way threats were framed during the liberation war). At this time the white colonial threat began to appear frequently in his speeches. Significantly, he began to shift from his conciliatory view of Zimbabwe’s white community that had marked his early years in office. He stated, “It makes absolute nonsense of our history as an African country that most of our arable land and ranching land is still in the hands of our erstwhile colonizers, while the majority of our peasant community still live like squatters in their God-given land.” He vowed to institute a “revolutionary” policy of redistribution. By the end of 1990, Parliament had passed the constitutional amendment allowing government to take land at its chosen price, with no appeal allowed.118 In the 1996 presidential election, Mugabe focused on the role of Zimbabwean whites in the country’s economic ills, including and beyond the land issue. Though increasing unemployment in the country was mostly due to his policies, he made whites the target: “It is sad to note that a majority of our [predominantly white] industrialists are crooks. Some are using retrenchment [eliminating jobs] as a cost reduction measure thereby increasing their profit margins at the expense of Zimbabweans.”119 It is clear in this framing that whites are not Zimbabweans. He also emphasized the threat from the IMF, which as the sponsor of economic reforms was trying to dictate how he should run his country: “Experience has shown that it’s not all gold from IMF, there is a lot of poison from it too.”120 Just days after the ZANU-PF government announced an agreement with the IMF on an economic reform program, Mugabe demonized the organization: “It [the IMF] should not be in a position to be a dictator, sometimes a blind dictator, who does not look at the effects of the policies emanating from it. The harshness of the policies is what we criticize.”121 After announcing the concessions to the war veterans in the fall of 1997, Mugabe stepped up his attacks on the white farmers, depicted them as agents of the British colonizer, and connected their defeat with the final winning of the liberation war: “We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay a cent to any soul. . . . The colonial exercise of robbery will be corrected once and for all. . . . If Britain wants to compensate its children, it must give us the money, or it does the compensation itself.” Indeed, the whites were “Britain’s children,” with no legitimate claim to Zimbabwean land. In another speech that fall, Mugabe continued to connect his actions to the liberation war: “We fought for the land and now we are going to take it.”122 Later, in February 1999, reacting to critical media reports, growing political unrest, and the rise of the MDC, Mugabe made a special live broadcast to the nation. The speech painted a picture of the severe threat posed by whites toward


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whom his government and the people of Zimbabwe had been so magnanimous after the liberation war. He spoke of the crimes of the Rhodesian regime and the fact that “we have striven to create an environment in which white and black can live peacefully side by side without fear of the past visiting them.” However, after a media report that there was an attempted coup in the army, Mugabe was angry that anyone would suggest the presence of opposition in his army. He said that the country’s peaceful atmosphere “was clearly being undermined by the acts of some white persons of British extraction who have been planted in our midst to undertake acts of sabotage. . . .”123 In an interview on television a few weeks later, he blamed the economic crisis on a white plot and warned that Western embassies were attempting to “subvert” his government. Whites were “trying to relive their Rhodesian past. . . . This is the fight. It’s black and white, pure and simple.”124 As economic conditions worsened, he continued to blame the international lenders for hurting the country’s economy. He also began more frequently to connect Zimbabwe’s exploitation with that of all Third World countries. In an interview with the BBC (British Broadcasting Company) on March 19, 1999, Mugabe was asked whether he could survive without the IMF. He replied, “They can go to hell. Tell them that. They are an iniquitous institution right now, because they are politicized. . . .”125 When the IMF suspended its loan program because of Zimbabwe’s questionable budgeting during an economic crisis (specifically, the increased military spending in the Congo, forced land redistribution, and other aspects of Zimbabwe’s economic policy), Mugabe said the IMF was “bent on stifling development in the Third World.” In May 1999, returning from a trip abroad, he said, “I do not like the IMF. It is a tool being used by the western imperialists to subject us to their will. The IMF is being political and we will be political in our attitude towards it. It is a monster we do not deserve. We are better off without it. . . .”126 In the same speech, he brought in the racial dimension to discredit Western accusations about his government’s repressive behavior: Despite what they say about human rights, Europeans are the most racist people to the core. For all they appear to be democratic, you just have to go to the United States to see where the blacks live. . . . No European country gave us weapons [in the fight against white minority rule]. . . . We were called terrorists because we were fighting the white men. To this day we are still being called terrorists.127

In this statement he used the former Rhodesian racial classification of “European” for all whites ( by including Americans), contributing to his view of the world as “us” (blacks) against “them” (whites). He also connected the present-day struggle with the liberation war in his comment about the terrorist label. After the February 2000 constitutional referendum defeat, Mugabe described his losses by framing the political threat posed by the white farmers and positing the land invasions as a necessary way to confront this threat. In comments to his party, he noted that his “revolution” was being attacked by whites, the British, and the West. The whites were to blame for Zimbabwe’s economic and political situation: “They are trying to sabotage the economy in their fight against the government.” It was Zimbabweans’ duty in support of the government “to strike fear in the

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hearts of the white man, our real enemy.”128 As was chronicled in previous sections, this framing inspired a violent response by party loyalists toward whites during the campaign for the June 2000 parliamentary elections. On April 18, 2000, Mugabe addressed the nation on television to commemorate Zimbabwe’s twentieth anniversary (which coincided with the campaign season for the June elections). He attacked the “entrenched colonial attitudes” of the white farmers. “What we reject is the persistence of vestigial attitudes from the Rhodesian yesteryears—attitudes of master race, master color, master owner and master employer.” He continued, “The sacrifices we have made for our country and Independence simply mean that as Zimbabweans, we cannot settle for nominal sovereignty. It is not sufficient to have a national flag, and national anthem, and a black President. . . .” He accounted what has been achieved in the country, and, significantly, ended with the land issue. Redistributing land was framed as the final aspect of achieving independence: The whites we forgave and allowed to live with us on the understanding that we will get our land back are now refusing to cooperate. They are now working to topple the government and this is what has infuriated the people. . . . Our present state of mind is that you [white farmers] are now our enemies because you really have behaved as enemies of Zimbabwe. . . . Our entire community is angry and this is why you have the war veterans now . . . seizing land.129

In a speech introducing the ZANU-PF election manifesto on May 3, 2000, Mugabe tied together as a monolithic enemy all who opposed him. The whites were “sell-outs,” the MDC members were their “puppets,” and the central enemy was the British government. “Down with British imperialism. . . . Without land, we don’t have wealth, we don’t have dignity. . . . This country can never be Zimbabwe if we have a part of us being ruled by colonial settlers.”130 He also framed the British threat to justify his defiance of international demands for “democratization” and a change in Zimbabwe’s treatment of its citizens. He said, “We fought them [the British] in a war of liberation to give our people the power to rule themselves, to have democracy—our democracy. In this country there was no democracy, the British never brought the rule of law. Now they think they can teach Mugabe the rule of law.”131 In addition to liberation war nostalgia, painting of the foreign enemy, and depicting the situation in racial terms, the manifesto and campaign speeches included land as the issue that tied together all the rest: land was the unfinished agenda of the liberation struggle.132 Indeed, a month after launching the manifesto, on June 7, 2000, Mugabe spoke of the current actions as a continuation of the liberation war: “. . . Perhaps we made a mistake by not finishing the war in the trenches. We were modest and rushed to Lancaster. If the settlers had been defeated through the barrel of a gun, perhaps we would not be having the same problems. . . . Our revolution has not ended. We want it to end and the starting point is land.”133 After the MDC did so well in the June 2000 elections, Mugabe realized that a new strategy was necessary to confront the opposition as the 2002 presidential


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election approached. He stepped up his demonization of the MDC and made seamless the connection between this party and a vast white conspiracy to overthrow his government and end Zimbabwe’s independence. In a speech to ZANU-PF’s central committee, Mugabe spoke of how the MDC embodied the “resurgence of white power” and was supported by Britain, the United States, and the network of Rhodesians around the world: The MDC should never be judged or characterized by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density [urban] elements. It is much deeper, whiter and wider than these human superfices; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. . . . It is a counter-revolutionary Trojan Horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday.134

The white commercial farmers were simply the same whites with whom the black liberation movements had fought for control of Zimbabwe in the independence war. They were part of the conspiracy to retake control of the country: “While at independence this power base of the Rhodesian Front melted and disguised itself as farming unions . . . [t]his is the constituency which has created and controlled the MDC.”135 By December 2000, the tone against whites was even more hateful. As he lashed out at Supreme Court rulings against his policies on land he called the white landowners “white devils” and broadened Zimbabwe’s situation to a larger global struggle: The courts can do whatever they want, but no judicial decision will stand in our way. . . . My own position is that we should not even be defending our position in the courts. This country is our country and this land is our land. . . . They think because they are white they have a divine right to our resources. Not here. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans, Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans.136

He used framing threat to help him broaden audience to the regional level. Increasingly, leading into the 2002 presidential election, his statements and speeches connected Zimbabwe’s situation with the regional context. He gave great emphasis to the threat of neocolonialism and its economic effects and the (related) threat against state sovereignty. Observers note that Mugabe “tapped into perceptions of an increasingly marginalized South, and painted his internal struggle as part of a larger clash against neocolonial Northern policies and intrusive human rights demands.”137 With regard to sovereignty, he posed his defiance of the whites, the MDC, and international condemnation as defense of sovereignty. He played on the strong African sentiment, enshrined in the founding principles of the OAU, of noninterference. Sovereignty was under attack by advocates of human rights, democracy, and the free market in the North.138 Others in the region bought into the definition of the situation as Mugabe presented it. For example, an ANC official said in the aftermath of the 2002 presidential election, “If we had pushed ZANU-PF as the Europeans did, they would have lost all say in their own affairs,

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and would have been taken over by NGOs from Europe.”139 To encourage more of this thinking, he warned that if British and American efforts to change his behavior succeeded, the entire region and even the entire Global South would fall victim in a domino effect.140 During his inauguration after the March 2002 presidential election, he warned, “When they aim at Zimbabwe it is not Zimbabwe alone. They have other countries in mind.”141 By 2002, any others within Zimbabwe who opposed Mugabe were included in the conspiracy—judges, the BBC, and other media. Even when Nigeria’s president finally began to break ranks and pressure Mugabe in 2004, that country was framed as a front for Britain, which was interfering in Zimbabwean politics by funneling money to the MDC.142 Speaking to his Parliament in July 2002, he returned to blaming the IMF (as part of the global white conspiracy) for his country’s problems and also magnified the threat by linking it to the effects of globalization on the poor states: “Equally, Mr. Speaker, we reject any attempts to use the present drought relief effort to smuggle in failed and inappropriate IMF policies which we know to have exacerbated our vulnerability to the vagaries of nature and neocolonial manipulation disguised as globalization.” He warned that no one should be allowed to take “advantage of our stomachs to get to the soul of our sovereignty.”143 Indeed, this was the first time the term “globalization” entered into his threat framing. Globalization as the newer embodiment of colonialism became a significant theme from 2002, as did the idea of a changed world that was now more threatening to Third World states. The global environment has drastically changed and, for an independent Third World nation like ours, there are new challenges on the horizon. Our sovereignty is constantly under attack from the bullying states and nations of the world which seek to use their political and economic prowess to achieve global hegemony. We are caught up in an era of undiminished unipolarity, with some Western countries unashamedly ganging together and unjustly riding roughshod over small but still sovereign nations.144

He used this framing of threat to justify his actions at home against the agents of these powers, to justify his defiance of international pressure to change, to depict himself as the historic African leader who had proven his mettle in the struggle against colonialism, and to emphasize his role as regional leader arguing for the increased cooperation of African states in the AU. The theme of Third World solidarity in the face of changing global circumstances came up again in a September 2002 speech to the Earth Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. Globalization, pushed by the imperial powers, aimed at exploiting the dependency of poor states and forcing them to give up sovereignty to survive. Mugabe defended the farm occupations as part of the path to sovereignty and African unity: We love Africa, we love Zimbabwe, we love our independence. We are working together in our region to improve the lot of our people. Let no one interfere with our processes. . . . We belong to this continent. We do not mind having and bearing


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sanctions banning us from Europe. We are not Europeans. We have not asked for any inch of Europe, any square of that territory. So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe.145

By 2003, the U.S. invasion of Iraq contributed to Mugabe’s effort to frame threat in a way that boosted his domestic and regional standing. Mugabe more frequently used the advances toward a more integrated region within the AU as part of his framing. The increasingly dangerous “unipolar” world necessitated that Zimbabwe work to build solidarity in Africa and other “Third World peoples”: The recent developments in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere have clearly demonstrated that the new, unipolar global order which some countries seek to impose as the international order is as dangerous as it is unjust. Needless to say, the dialectical opposite and fitting response to such an ambition is our collective unity and self-assertion in Africa and in the rest of the progressive humanitarian world.146

The pressures on Mugabe’s regime were not coming from valid criticisms but instead from part of an increasingly threatening “unilateralism-cum-hegemonism, supported by an interventionist military doctrine that bids the more powerful to impose their will on those who, like many of us, are weak.” Standing up to external pressures was not only Mugabe’s duty in defense of his country but also a display of international leadership against a new form of colonialism that “seeks to garner all of us of the Third World as we get globally villagized under false economic pretenses.”147 Indeed, in Mugabe’s eyes Zimbabwe’s economy ( by the IMF), sovereignty (because of the land issue), and politics (by colonial whites linked together in a global network) were all threatened, and he was the only one who could save the nation. As illustrated in this section, President Mugabe’s framing threat strategy had two overarching themes: (1) all of Zimbabwe’s problems have external roots; and (2) Zimbabwe’s problems are actually the same problems faced by all of Africa, and even the entire developing world. Economic problems were caused by greedy whites and their neocolonialism. In turn, neocolonialism was embodied in the actions of the IMF and the agents of Britain operating within Zimbabwe. In addition, much of the economic ills of Zimbabwe centered on the need for land reform that was prevented by the policies of Britain and their agents who had infiltrated the country’s farms. The domestic opposition, the MDC, was also an agent of the British and the arm of the colonialists within the country. Finally, international condemnation was an attack on sovereignty, represented neocolonialism and, after the invasion of Iraq, was an extension of dangerous Anglo-American interventionism. The only logical solutions emanated from Mugabe (and only Mugabe) standing firm, leading Africa and the Third World in defiance. Conclusion The preceding pages have detailed the ways in which an authoritarian leader in Africa used the four strategies to achieve his central goal of staying in power in

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a context that made continuation of his rule seem quite unlikely (see table 4.1 for a summary). Though much was different about Zimbabwe as compared to the other cases in this book, we see many of the same mechanisms that individuals use to manipulate domestic and international conditions in which they find themselves. As may be expected, the buying off strategy was used very frequently. In this case, as Mugabe bought off constituents he often created more obstacles—and thus the need for additional strategies to overcome them. For example, the buying off of restive veterans intensified the economic crisis. Mugabe sought then to deflect domestic attention and buy off more unrest through the use of farm invasions. This in turn brought international condemnation. In order to address this external pressure, Mugabe used the broadening audience strategy to co-opt regional opposition and tying hands to delay reform. And, as detailed earlier, he used framing threat in tandem with the three other strategies to justify his policies and tie together his intermestic diplomacy. Chapter 5 also examines the intermestic policy making of an African leader, but Nelson Mandela was vastly different from the autocrat in Zimbabwe. Instead of

Table 4.1 Summary of Robert Mugabe’s use of strategy Leadership Strategy

Mugabe’s Use of Strategy


Buying off

Directed resources at needed allies or constituencies including rural peasants, war veterans, party elite, military

Economic crisis, failed land reform, rise of the opposition, international condemnation

Broadening audience

Appealed to opposition’s constituency, war veterans, African states

Rise of the opposition, faltering regional leadership role, international condemnation, failed land reform

Tying hands

Insisted external actors limited his ability to address economic woes and land reform; argued to external actors that their failure to help limited his ability to control invasions

Economic crisis, failed land reform, international condemnation

Framing threat

Aspects of international context (i.e., neocolonialism, interventionism) major threat to Zimbabwe, Africans, and the Global South generally; domestic problems symptomatic of threats to entire region

Economic crisis, failed land reform, rise of opposition, faltering regional leadership, international condemnation


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moving from hopeful democracy to political, economic, and social free-fall, the South African case was the opposite: a system transitioning from racial autocracy to multiracial democracy full of hope. Significant Events in the Zimbabwe Case December 1979 March 1980 1982–1987 1987

1990

September 1997

Late 1997

August 1998 September 1999 February 2000 June 2000 September 2001 February 2002 March 2002

May 2002 September 2002

July 2003

August 2003

Lancaster House Agreement. Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF wins elections by wide margin. Mugabe wages war in southwest to eliminate ZAPU as a political opposition. ZANU and ZAPU reach Unity Accord; Mugabe forms Government of National Unity, appointing Joshua Nkomo as one of two Co-Vice Presidents. Opposition to the move toward a one-party state grows; Edgar Tekere and the Zimbabwe Unity Movement win 17 percent of vote in presidential election. Liberation war veterans demand payments from government; Mugabe makes generous deal and announces that government will acquire 1,500 white-owned farms without full compensation; The IMF withdraws backing for loans to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions mounts effective strikes to oppose tax increase made necessary by payments to veterans; National Constitutional Assembly formed to demand new constitution. Mugabe sends troops to aid the Kabila government in the DRC. Opposition party Movement for Democratic Change formed. Government loses constitutional referendum; farm invasions begin soon after; foreign aid cut off. Parliamentary elections held, MDC wins 57 of 120 seats. Abuja Agreement on land reform negotiated with Britain. The United States imposes sanctions, targeted at ZANU-PF leadership. Presidential election; land invasions continue; EU imposes sanctions; Mugabe increases repression; Commonwealth suspends Zimbabwe’s participation in Commonwealth councils for one year. Interparty talks promoted by South Africa and Nigeria (as agents of the Commonwealth) collapse. MDC defies new laws and holds meetings prior to the September 28–29 local elections; Tsvangirai arrested for high treason; new land invasions launched. U.S. President George W. Bush meets South African President Thabo Mbeki in South Africa to push for more regional pressure on Mugabe. Mugabe orders more white farmers to leave.

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December 2003

Commonwealth renews suspension of Zimbabwe; Mugabe quits the Organization. July 2004 African Union condemns human rights situation in Zimbabwe; SADC leaders (including Mugabe) adopt protocol on democratic governance. September 2004 Mugabe introduces “electoral reforms” in Parliament. March 2005 Parliamentary elections.

CHAPTER 5 THE SOUTH AFRICAN “MIRACLE”: MANDELA’S STRUGGLE IN A GLOBALIZED TRANSITION, 1985–1994

Introduction Twenty-seven years in South African prisons. That is how long Nelson Mandela had to think. “When I try to sleep at night / I can only dream in red / The outside world is black and white / with only one color dead. . . . And the eyes of the world are watching now.”1 Perhaps Peter Gabriel’s words commemorating the death of another South African hero, Steven Biko, capture thoughts passing through Mandela’s head on some of those nearly ten thousand cold nights. Mandela could be forgiven for emerging from prison bitter and ready to lead his people to revolution against the white regime—a regime that had oppressed them for generations. Instead, his actions reflected an appreciation not only that the eyes of the world were watching, but also that the international community could help him achieve a different kind of revolution. His revolution foresaw the rainbow nation, where South Africans of all colors would prosper. Indeed, from the perspective of South Africa’s large black2 majority (more than 85 percent of the country’s 43 million people), their situation has always been an international issue. To the African National Congress (ANC) and most of Africa, South Africa was the last holdout of white European colonialism. However, for the white population the situation in South Africa was not about colonialism at all. Especially to Afrikaners, they built South Africa with centuries of hard work to conquer the frontier. Their claim that they maintained a right to a disproportionate voice in the nation’s politics complicated the transition to majority rule. The 1994 democratic transition is often called a “miracle” because the potential was so great for it to end in bloody civil war—perhaps along the lines of Zimbabwe in the 1970s. Observers often point out the puzzle of South Africa’s transition: Why did whites accept “an outcome that they had always been expected to resist to the point of civil war?”3 Though changes in the domestic, regional, and international contexts played significant roles in setting the stage, this chapter illustrates that Mandela’s manipulation of these contexts was pivotal in understanding the path of

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South Africa around the many obstacles to the election of an inclusive democratic government. As with many cases, this leader did not stand alone; still, Mandela’s vision directed the actions of other top decision makers. The narrative is clear about when that is not the case and notes how Mandela was either constrained or worked to change others’ minds at those times. After centuries of colonial domination and nearly forty years of white apartheid rule in South Africa, the National Party (NP) and the ANC began talks secretly in 1985 to bring the black majority of South Africans into its political system. With the examination of this South African case, we turn from the authoritarian regime type of Robert Mugabe to a regime in transition under the leadership of Mandela and De Klerk, the ANC and NP leaders; this chapter focuses on Mandela. Despite the difference of regime type and the fact that the policy type in this case is primarily domestic, the analysis shows processes similar to democratic and authoritarian systems. As with the other cases, the leader’s behavior is best described as intermestic policy making observable in his use of the four strategies. As noted by U.S. Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Throughout the history of the struggle over apartheid, both the government and its opponents had seen international opinion as important if not decisive. . . . The start of formal negotiations in South Africa did not end those efforts. . . . [E]ach actor looked for international support to buttress its position and increase its leverage.4

The following section reviews the historical background, with a focus on shifts at the global level that influenced the domestic context and thus created an opening for change in the regime. Although there were several factors that were conducive to the end of apartheid, the third section chronicles the obstacles to a peaceful transfer of power in 1994. Though many people in the West think that Mandela was freed from prison in 1990 and freedom for South Africa quickly followed, the intervening four years were brimming with challenges including violence, intransigence of negotiating parties, and near-devastating spoiler behavior (actions by groups who want to “spoil” or derail the process). Organized around five major obstacles to Mandela’s vision of a successful, peaceful transition, the third section sets the stage for the analysis of strategies in the fourth part: how Mandela broadened audience, tied his hands, bought off, and framed threat to move beyond the obstacles. This case was truly a transition occurring in a globalized context, and was so primarily because the leadership constantly worked to keep it that way. Historical Background In 1994, South Africa was the last country on the African continent to gain independence from its white colonial settlers. Descendants of Dutch and British settlers, who had arrived as early as 1652, established a minority regime. In 1948, a political party came to power that represented the Afrikaans-speaking (Afrikaner) whites, or descendants of the Dutch. This NP instituted a superstructure of laws from 1948 that created new barriers among an already segregated population. This system was called apartheid, which means “separation” in Afrikaans. Apartheid

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divided people into racial categories (African, Colored, Indian, and White), kept them apart, and helped maintain the political and economic dominance of whites. The ANC—the party of Nelson Mandela—was established in 1912 with demands that the vast majority have a political voice (in fact its goal was a nonracial society).5 The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) broke away from the ANC in 1959, promoting the idea that South Africa belonged to its blacks.6 Initially, the PAC gained more attention around Africa.7 In this brief sketch we can already see two major constraints on Mandela in the path to a democratic system: the NP pushing for white inclusion and the PAC pushing for their exclusion. The fate of South Africa has been tied to events in the international arena throughout its history. Most relevant for a background to the transition are the connections since the 1960s. Despite support for the ANC and PAC in newly independent African countries, most of the international community paid little attention to the situation in South Africa until 1960. In that year, the PAC sponsored peaceful demonstrations against the pass laws. These laws, requiring that Africans carry passes allowing them to move around, enabled the government to restrict their movement and keep them in particular economic roles (e.g., as miners).8 The PAC asked Africans to gather without passes at police stations so that the government would be overwhelmed and unable to arrest them all. At Sharpeville, near Johannesburg, the police fired on the demonstrators and killed 69 (wounding 186). As protests erupted across the country, the regime declared a state of emergency, arresting thousands and banning the ANC and the PAC. The banning pushed many leaders into exile over the years including Oliver Tambo, who became ANC president in 1967. Historians call Sharpeville a watershed event not only because the rest of the world took notice, but also because at this time the ANC ended its commitment to nonviolence by founding Umkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation), known as MK. Nelson Mandela, a lawyer by profession, and other ANC leaders were jailed for life because of their association with MK. (Mandela was charged and convicted of sabotage in 1964 and sent to Robben Island, as was Walter Sisulu).9 Indeed, after Sharpeville, the African opposition movements went underground and set up camp in newly independent African neighboring states, which were called the Front Line States. In particular, Angola and Mozambique provided bases for MK to launch attacks against South Africa. Denied the opportunity to participate in legal processes within South Africa and in rivalry with the PAC, the ANC reached beyond Africa. Both organizations were recognized in 1969 by the UN General Assembly as “authentic representatives of South Africa’s population.”10 As the next section shows, the ANC leadership engaged in skillful maneuvering to finally legitimize their organization as the main liberation movement in the 1980s and maintain that legitimacy as the negotiation process proceeded. In an early effort to gain legitimacy, ANC leaders worked with the South African Communist Party to make alliances with the Eastern bloc,11 including the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, these ANC links drew in the United States on the side of the South African government. While most Americans now regard Nelson Mandela as a heroic freedom fighter, he was vilified in earlier decades as a communist and terrorist. The decolonization of South Africa’s neighbors

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drew the United States into supporting military conflicts against the ANC. After socialist governments took power in Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s, they allowed MK to set up bases. To abbreviate a complex set of relationships, the United States supported the South African military against a “communist onslaught” in southern Africa. Global shifts in the 1980s precipitated profound change in the region. When Mikhail Gorbachev took the leadership reins in the USSR in 1985, he ushered in “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy in the developing world in which his primary goal was to cut spending on proxy wars with the United States. In December 1988, the superpowers mediated a complex accord that ended the multiple conflicts in southern Africa; it required South Africa to pull its troops from its neighbors and for Angola to shut down MK bases.12 This deal, and the collapse of the Berlin Wall less than a year later, had immense impact both on the ANC and on the NP’s apartheid ideology that had painted the ANC as dangerous communists. Briefly, the ANC lost its patrons in the Eastern bloc and some of its key bases in the Front Line States, lessening the threat to the white government. For De Klerk, the fall of the Berlin Wall created the greatest opportunity. In his own words: “The risk that the ANC was being used as a Trojan horse by a superpower had drastically diminished.”13 Part of apartheid ideology had crumbled along with that wall. There were a few other reasons apartheid stopped making sense. Apartheid was justified by moral and economic arguments and not only as an ideological battle against a communist foe. In 1958, the policy of “separate development” created separate tribal homelands to which blacks were moved so that whites could occupy most of the land; the blacks were allowed separate governments because rule by the minority was immoral. As De Klerk said, apartheid was “a plan to make all the people of South Africa free.”14 This thinking also justified the new constitution in 1983, which set up a tricameral parliament to address nonwhite demands for representation. The moral defense of separate development began to crumble by the mid-1980s after the Soweto massacre on June 16, 1976 drew world attention to the human rights abuses in South Africa (including a UN arms embargo imposed in 1977) and set alight the antiapartheid movement. The policy did not look moral at all to the rest of the world, and the policy was hurting whites too. No one abroad seemed to agree that the Africans were free, and even the average white South African could see that blacks were not thriving.15 Further, the incident in Soweto was especially egregious to observers abroad because police opened fire on thousands of students protesting Afrikaans (the language of Afrikaners) as the required medium for education in schools. A 13-year-old boy, Hector Pieterson, was killed that day, and by February of 1977, at least 575 people had been killed, including 494 Africans.16 Further, separate development was not so good for whites either. The structure of South Africa’s economy had changed over time. Simply put, whereas the color bar (reserving certain jobs for whites) and influx control (pass laws) were useful for an economy dominated by labor-intensive work such as farming and mining, apartheid was an obstacle to growth as more skill-intensive manufacturing came to dominate the economy.17 In addition, the moral outrage of the international community became more than white South Africans could bear as sanctions took


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effect. While feeling strongly African by their own definitions, the whites were also tied in a cultural sense to the West. The ban on participation in world sporting events was a major blow to their sense of identity. In addition, financial sanctions (which denied South African access to long-term loans after 1978, and after 1985 ended the ability to roll over short-term capital loans) took a serious toll on the economy. Indeed, separate development seemed finally to be failing them too. Compounding these elements was the founding of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 to fight the tricameral constitution. This broad front, including the labor movement, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), engaged the nonwhite population in an “ungovernability campaign” in the mid-1980s, which involved work stay-aways, boycotts, and the refusal to pay rents.18 From the white perspective, black labor was increasingly powerful and the townships were exploding. The failure of separate development and the vocal recognition of that failure from the international community and the black population put apartheid’s moral ideology in crisis. Increasing international diplomatic and economic pressure pushed the white government to change its stance toward the ANC. As early as 1958, the ANC called for boycotts on South African products.19 In the 1960s, African nations formed a caucusing group within the United Nations, by 1962 creating a Special Committee against Apartheid. In 1966, the Centre against Apartheid, connected to the UN Secretariat, was formed. By 1973, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) formally recognized both the ANC and PAC as the legitimate representatives of the South African people. In 1974, the ANC was granted observer status in the General Assembly and the Special Committee. Also in 1974, the apartheid government was denied the right to participate in the UNGA.20 The first move toward sanctions occurred in 1963 when the UN Security Council (UNSC) called on states to stop selling and shipping arms to South Africa. Compliance was not mandatory, however, and in 1977 the UNSC passed a resolution imposing an arms embargo with the justification that South Africa’s arming posed a threat to international peace and security.21 The ANC stepped up the effort to achieve international cooperation on sanctions in the 1980s. As Oliver Tambo said, sanctions are our “trump card with which we can mobilize international opinion and pull governments over to our side.”22 They were aided in this effort by the Commonwealth. In 1985, this organization of Britain and former British colonies agreed to send an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to South Africa to explore the potential for dialogue between the parties in South Africa before more stringent actions were taken. The Commonwealth Accord asked the apartheid regime to take five steps: (1) declare that apartheid would be dismantled and specific action taken to do so, (2) end the state of emergency, (3) immediately release Nelson Mandela and others in prison for their opposition to apartheid, (4) establish political freedom and lift the ban on the ANC and other parties, and (5) begin a process of dialogue, in the context of a suspension of violence by all, with a goal of establishing a nonracial and representative government.23 Even with so many demands from the EPG, the government agreed to cooperate. Indeed, the NP saw an opportunity to start winning the international community

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over to the idea of gradual reform.24 After a first trip in March 1986 during which the EPG met with Mandela, the group ended early its second visit in May because the government launched air strikes against alleged ANC targets in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. In reaction, the EPG called for “stricter sanctions coupled to financial aid for the ‘victims of apartheid,’ and it was this strategy which . . . became the key mode of foreign response to apartheid.”25 All Commonwealth states except Britain imposed sanctions. While British opposition prevented the European Community (EC) from enacting sanctions, EC member states sent assistance to antiapartheid groups. The visits and declaration of the EPG gave momentum to the policy of isolation, and the ground under apartheid began to shift. Soon after the EPG suggestion, the pressure of many nongovernmental organizations in the United States pushed U.S. corporations to curtail their economic relationships with the regime and the American Congress to pass the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 over Ronald Reagan’s veto. Britain and the EC also joined the sanctions regime. The U.S. legislation created six conditions for the ending of sanctions, similar to the Commonwealth demands and modeled on the ANC’s position.26 Indeed, the imposition of sanctions gave legitimacy to the ANC’s leadership claim and boosted the role of Mandela: “The ANC’s international role in spearheading the sanctions campaign also helped to reinforce its domestic standing.”27 As the antiapartheid, pro-sanctions movement gathered steam in the 1980s, Nelson Mandela had emerged as the international symbol of the South African liberation movement. His stature and the use of his image by supportive groups around the world further raised the profile of the ANC at home and abroad. By August 1989, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), through its Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa, had recognized the ANC as the official liberation movement and endorsed an ANC position paper about the conditions that had to be met by the government before negotiations could start. This became known as the Harare Declaration; the United Nations endorsed it in December 1989 and Mandela referred to it repeatedly during the transition process.28 In summary, after many years of keeping races separate “for their own good,” the regime recognized that some kind of transition was necessary to insure their own survival and to maintain the integrity of their own moral ideology. Shifts at the global level de-emphasized the threat the ANC posed to South Africa and, as international isolation intensified, compounded the economic and moral imperatives already on the horizon. At the same time, the ANC moderated its stance because of the demise of its patrons within the Eastern bloc, the loss of its MK bases, and the fear that the NP might achieve international legitimacy for a modified form of apartheid. The subsequent transition process might appear simple. In 1985, then-NP leader P.W. Botha reached out to Mandela, who carried out talks while in prison. Other figures in the ANC such as Thabo Mbeki met with government representatives in London and other foreign locations. Having released Sisulu and several other key ANC leaders in late 1989, by February 1990, De Klerk had released Mandela and legalized the banned parties. A period of “talks about talks” was


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followed by painstaking negotiations in various phases, until an interim constitution was agreed in November 1993. That constitution created (1) an Independent Electoral Commission to oversee the April 1994 elections, and (2) a Transitional Executive Council ([TEC] a multiparty interim government), which began to function in late 1993. The TEC was replaced by the elected Government of National Unity (GNU) in May 1994, with Nelson Mandela as president, Thabo Mbeki as first deputy president, and F.W. De Klerk as second deputy president. The GNU oversaw the writing of the permanent constitution, adopted in 1996. With substantial internal, regional, and global elements pushing the ANC and the NP toward a negotiated settlement and with an outcome that was so successful, highlighting how immense obstacles made a positive outcome for Mandela seem impossible may seem strange. Indeed, with a massive, worldwide alliance standing behind him, Mandela’s walk out of prison into the arms of the celebrating masses looked like the end of the story. The next section explains why, in fact, analysts of this transition consider it miraculous and why Mandela himself considers it one of the toughest legs of the very long walk to freedom. The chronology at the end of the chapter notes the significant events highlighted in the following pages. An Impossible Situation To observers on the ground in South Africa in the early 1990s, it was quite shocking that the parties finally agreed on the architecture for transition and the form for the new government. The many deadlocks in negotiations and the background violence were in stark contrast to the hope present on February 26, 1990, when a freed Nelson Mandela spoke to his first mass rally outside of Cape Town’s City Hall. Consider the view through his eyes as he struggled with the last phase of the freedom fight. He confronted five major obstacles: (1) convincing other key actors to talk at all—both the white minority and the leadership and grassroots of the ANC; (2) deflecting other claims to leadership of the nonwhite population; (3) getting what the ANC wanted during the negotiations; (4) once a settlement was agreed, dealing with spoilers who did not participate in talks; and, finally, (5) achieving victory—but not too much so—in a peaceful election. Each challenge is explained next, and the subsequent sections are structured around how the strategies were used to overcome them. The ANC had a single mission: to end the apartheid regime in South Africa. Supporting ideological tenets consisted of installing majority rule, establishing a nonracial society, and achieving economic justice. The latter was to be accomplished by redistributing the means of production through nationalization of major industry (socialism). The NP had a single mission too: to maintain political and economic power in the hands of the white minority. Therefore, the first very tough challenge for Mandela and his colleagues was getting both whites and blacks to understand why they should even consider a negotiated settlement.29 Second, Mandela and the other top ANC leaders faced competing claims to leadership of the liberation movement. Since the PAC also had credibility around Africa, the ANC was vulnerable to accusations of “selling out” to the whites and abandoning the cause of South Africa’s true liberation. Chief Mangosuthu

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Buthelezi, head of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and based in the homeland of KwaZulu, claimed to represent the Zulu nation. Since Zulus are 20 percent of South Africa’s population, the ANC had to take this claim seriously even though many Zulus are members of the ANC. Buthelezi also posed a significant challenge as a spoiler. Further, several homeland leaders competed for influence. These individuals had a great deal to lose in a free South Africa, because they had entered into a bargain with the apartheid regime in pursuit of its separate development policy. The following territories became “independent” countries and their citizens lost South African citizenship: Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981 (in KwaZulu, Buthelezi refused independence).30 Perhaps the most direct challenge to the ANC’s leadership was the nature of its own organization. By 1990, the ANC was “a diverse and scattered movement” whose ideological base was in confusion with the collapse of the Soviet bloc.31 The ANC consisted of three autonomous parts: the released prisoners (many old), returned exiles, and younger activists (many radicalized in the uprisings of the 1980s as members of the UDF). Those in the UDF posed a great challenge to Mandela’s consolidation of power as the older leaders moved toward a negotiated settlement because the UDF activists did not want to see the leadership make any compromises. When more radical members of the ANC and UDF first heard about Mandela reaching out to Botha in the mid-1980s, they wanted to shun him. In fact, the debate between those who wanted to take power and those who argued for a negotiated transition continued for the first few years of the process. In the early 1990s, the latter were “dangerously few.”32 This point leads to another challenge for Mandela. The third obstacle for this leader was getting what the ANC followers wanted from negotiations. At the start, whites aimed to keep power and blacks thought only of taking it. Mandela and the chief ANC negotiators, notably Cyril Ramaphosa who was a leader in the labor movement, quickly found out that the NP did not agree that the black majority should rule. Once they finally realized they could not maintain absolute control, the apartheid government held firmly that whites should maintain a degree of power greater than their proportion of the population. This was anathema to the ANC.33 Disputed issues both within the ANC and between the ANC and the NP were ending violence and specific elements of the final agreement (this included the electoral rules, who would oversee the transition, and how the economy would be restructured). In the next few pages, the situations with the violence and the negotiations are elaborated, as some details of the case are filled in. On the issue of violence, the extent of the political violence in South Africa nearly shut down the transition. Mandela claimed that the government was actively fueling violence between members of the ANC and IFP around the country. Documented in 1991, collusion between security forces of the government and Buthelezi’s followers was instigated to create a sense of chaos to disrupt the transition and leave people wishing for the stability of apartheid. During the campaign for the 1994 elections, some whites claimed that the interethnic strife exemplified that Africans could not live peacefully.34 The numbers show the extent of Mandela’s impossible situation. In 1989, 1,403 were killed in political violence; in


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1990, 3,699; in 1991, 2,706; in 1992, 3,347; in 1993, 3,775; in 1994, 2,476; in 1995, 1,044; and in 1996, 683 were killed.35 While violence against blacks was on the rise, Mandela agreed to a “unilateral suspension of the armed struggle” when he signed the Pretoria Minute in August 1990. Ninety percent of the ANC grassroots were opposed to this concession at a time when the enemy remained defiant.36 At a party conference in December 1990, ANC members criticized the leadership for failing to protect township members from violence and for compromising with the government.37 As will be discussed later, Mandela focused more attention on Third Force violence after this conference. Debates about specific elements of a final agreement made things tough on Mandela and the head negotiators, especially in December 1991 during the first negotiating forum (known as the first Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I). The NP wanted to oversee the transitional period, the writing of a new constitution, and elections. The ANC argued that it would be deeply unfair for the NP to serve as a referee. During this forum, the white government would not move from its positions, making for an uphill battle by the ANC team. De Klerk wanted a multiparty coalition government, the institutionalization of minority power, and federal devolution as the state’s organizing principle.38 This intransigence seemed especially egregious in light of the emerging reports that the government colluded with Inkatha to attack ANC members. The parties took only two steps forward during the first Convention. First, De Klerk agreed to let elected representatives (as opposed to the current negotiating parties) write the new constitution. Representatives from the forum would write an interim constitution providing the ground rules for the first elections. These elections would choose a constituent assembly and interim government to rule for ten years (in the final deal, the term was five years) and write a final constitution conforming to principles agreed at the forum. The second achievement for the ANC was that international observers would be present at all plenary sessions.39 Despite these limited gains, Mandela still faced grassroots questioning of some of his decisions. For example, in March 1992, in response to a challenge from the right-wing Conservative Party, De Klerk held a referendum seeking endorsement of negotiations with the ANC. Mandela aided De Klerk in the campaign, which was a success for De Klerk (turnout was 86 percent, with 68.7 percent voting for changing the apartheid system).40 However, instead of working more with the ANC, De Klerk’s negotiators remained intransigent in the second round of the negotiating forum, CODESA II (spring 1992). Unable to agree on the percentage of votes needed to pass a new constitution, both parties walked out of the talks. A reasonable person could be surprised that Mandela maintained any legitimacy with his followers at this point, when almost nothing had been won and many lives lost. As if things were not going poorly enough, two massacres in June and September 1992 marked a turning point. On June 17, 1992, 45 ANC members were killed by Inkatha at Boipatong. Mandela, directing his anger at the government for playing a role in the violence, pulled the ANC out of negotiations. Then, on September 7, 1992, 28 ANC marchers were killed by the Ciskei homeland government when their protests in Bisho, its capital, evoked a forcible response.41

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In reaction to the massacres, Mandela adopted several strategies that began to turn the tide. Up to this point, though, Mandela saw his situation go from tough to impossible. Only his skillful intermestic policy making shifted the balance of power. In September, De Klerk agreed to the Record of Understanding, committing the NP and ANC to negotiations. The Record of Understanding met many of the ANC’s demands for returning to talks and isolated the IFP, who were responsible for a lot of violence. Even then, once Mandela’s actions turned the tide in the ANC’s favor, the road was rough-going. Mandela had a hard time getting the NP to commit to an election date, significant because until that happened, the settlement remained theoretical. By spring 1993, the violence continued, and in April of that year Chris Hani was murdered. Hani, young and charismatic, was an important figure especially among younger ANC members who were part of the UDF. Massive demonstrations of angry ANC followers threatened to crash the talks. How could Mandela maintain the momentum of the negotiations in this environment? The previous paragraphs filled in some of the background and chronology of the case in a discussion of the third challenge to Mandela—getting what his followers wanted out of negotiations. Mandela faced a fourth obstacle after a settlement was in view in 1992: spoilers. Indeed, on both sides, those who refused or were not invited to take part in talks tried to wreck the settlement. As one observer noted, on November 18, 1993 when the parties passed the interim constitution there was peace, but soon after that South Africa came as close as ever to civil war.42 Both the IFP and the white Conservative Party had exited negotiations in summer 1993, when the election date was set.43 The PAC and three homeland leaders, who were not included in the talks, were among the African spoilers: Mangope of Bophuthatswana, Holomisa of Ciskei, and Matanzima of Transkei (who was Mandela’s nephew). The PAC had split with the ANC alliance early in negotiations when it refused to give up the armed struggle. It was in a position to act as a spoiler since it maintained the historic support of several African nations.44 In addition, Buthelezi’s IFP was a severe threat, especially once he aligned with the white right. In fact, all of the spoilers joined together in the Freedom Alliance: the Afrikaner Volksfront (a white Right umbrella group headed by General Constand Viljoen), the Conservative Party, the IFP, and the governments of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. Another group, the paramilitary Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), was on the right fringe of the white Right and engaged in violent attacks against blacks in the sabotage effort. The ANC was especially terrified that the white Right would sabotage the transition, with its strongholds in the army and police. Mandela “had to be the one” to shut down this threat, because De Klerk, seen as a traitor to the nation, was even more hated.45 Yet given their all-or-nothing demands that the majority could not accept—the white Right wanted control over their own white state (volkstaat)—what could Mandela really do? Perhaps the transition was doomed after all. The fifth challenge relates to the election itself. Obviously, Mandela wanted his party to win, but the ANC had never run an election campaign. Organization, voter education and training, and reaching potential followers not yet associated


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with the ANC posed problems. Compared to the population, the actual number of ANC members was quite small. Further, the ANC’s resources were no match for the money the NP could spend on the campaign so the NP’s claims that a vote for the NP was a vote for stability might actually appeal to some nonwhite voters. In addition, violence continued throughout the campaign and many feared that the Third Force would be active in scaring the majority away from the polls.46 Another election issue for Mandela was the distribution of votes. Mandela and the ANC negotiating team painstakingly achieved a settlement that would reassure whites and guarantee they would have a role to play. To pass legislation, the ruling party or coalition required a two-thirds majority. If the ANC won two-thirds or more of the seats, whites might have felt swamped by the majority. Thus, the ANC feared both not winning enough votes at the elections and winning too many. The way this all unfolded and the role of Mandela is an intriguing tale of leadership. An underlying theme of the five major obstacles stands out: Mandela’s core leadership challenge was that his party had to get whites and blacks to see themselves as pursuing the common goal of a peaceful transition to democracy. This meant moving all groups from where their feet were firmly planted during decades of struggle or domination. The next section explores Mandela’s skillful intermestic policy making, for which he cultivated domestic and international resources using the four strategies. The narrative is structured around two dimensions: the particular points in the process, arranged chronologically, at which Mandela faced challenges; and how he used the four strategies to maneuver around them. Turning Things Around: Intermestic Policy Making The ANC strategy was based on four pillars—mass action, armed struggle, diplomatic isolation, and economic isolation—and all four had a significant international dimension.47 The organization’s ideology also had international aspects. Briefly stated it was centered on African nationalism, freedom from colonialism, socialism, the pursuit of democracy, and fighting apartheid. African nationalism obviously tied South Africa’s plight with its neighbors; the socialist vision connected it with the global socialist movement; and by the 1980s, more connections were made with a worldwide democratization and antiapartheid movement. Mandela’s linkage of domestic and international politics was crucial to overcoming the five obstacles. His use of broadening audience set the stage for how he would use the other strategies. Broadening Audience When a leader employs the broadening audience strategy, he expands his coalition to create legitimacy at home or abroad, or to support a message of shared identity or shared fate with the group now being included in the expanded constituency. In broadening audience, the leader appeals to new or different actors that they have a stake in what he is trying to do, that his agenda offers them something they need or want. The more actors a leader can get to see the situation his way and to help reinforce his definition of the situation, the better able he is to accomplish his goals. Mandela broadened audience at specific points to surpass all five obstacles—convincing

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the parties to start talking at all, other claims to leadership of the nonwhite majority, getting what the ANC wanted out of negotiations, dealing with spoilers, and winning the election. This section describes specific examples of broadening audience that fit into two overarching categories. First, Mandela broadened audience domestically, as he sought (1) to convince whites that they shared a common fate with nonwhite South Africans; and (2) to appeal to the mass nonwhite public when he needed them to play a supporting role in negotiations. Second, he broadened audience to include international actors that helped (1) push the NP closer to the ANC agenda, and (2) gain legitimacy with blacks for his actions. Recall one of the fundamental puzzles facing Mandela and his colleagues: for decades they mobilized their followers to fight the apartheid regime. Likewise, the ideology of the enemy was structured around the idea that living and working with the nonwhites was suicide. To pursue a negotiated settlement, the ANC leader had to get whites on board and convince blacks that working with the enemy was acceptable. This challenge was his first concern. Taking advantage of shifts in global and regional contexts, Mandela and his ANC colleagues in prison and in exile broadened audience to particular white leaders. They sought to soothe white fears about being overrun by a hostile majority and about losing their economic well-being in a socialist system. Mandela faced potential pitfalls, especially that of losing his core audience (ANC followers and others engaged in the struggle) while reaching out to the enemy. He walked a tightrope between the traditional constituency and the new. Several examples show broadening audience to the whites. In opening lines of communication to the white community in the mid-1980s, Mandela took advantage of shifts with roots in the early 1980s. For example, in 1983, one of the bastions of apartheid society, a secret organization called the Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood) reflected some new thinking. The new leader of the society, Pieter de Lange, circulated a discussion document with the title, “Basic Political Conditions for the Survival of the Afrikaner.” It stated that continuation of the system of legal discrimination would threaten the survival of the Afrikaner. Turning the ideology on its head, de Lange argued that exclusion of black participation in politics was dangerous for whites. The following years would show similar shifts in the national intelligence service and among other key actors in Afrikaner society.48 The township uprisings of 1984–1986 helped reinforce this view. Still, there were setbacks as in August 1985 when Prime Minister Botha lashed out against international isolation. In the years that followed, outward government policy was as violent and repressive as ever—including the 1986 airstrikes on MK bases in neighboring states and the imposition of a state of emergency. The South African mining giant Anglo-American (a symbol of international capitalism) was the first to break the taboo against talking with the ANC when its chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, met ANC President Oliver Tambo in September 1985. The meeting was sponsored by Zambia’s President Kaunda, a respected African nationalist whose presence helped legitimate the participation of the ANC. The ANC leadership hoped that “once it persuaded Anglo-American its money could be safe in the new South Africa, Anglo execs would return home as powerful ambassadors for change.”49


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Secretly, Kobie Coetsee, a member of the intelligence services, started meeting with Mandela in prison in November 1985. Another set of talks, which proved especially important, between Mandela and head of the intelligence community Niel Barnard lasted from May 1988 until Mandela’s release. Initially, other ANC leaders were skeptical. But from 1986, Mandela and several other top leaders reached out “to get to know the enemy better” as a matter of new strategy. In Mandela’s quest to soften the ideology of Afrikaners, he often appealed to the common humanity and common basis of African and Afrikaner nationalism. He aimed to show Afrikaners that apartheid was damaging to whites and blacks. Instead of trying to defeat Afrikaner nationalism his effort was to “enlist it for his own purposes”50—that of creating a multiracial South African nationalism. One author summed up the impact of broadening audience to whites: “Peace was made because Mandela was able to persuade such Afrikaners that he had the best interests of the nation—their nation, his nation, the South African nation—at heart.”51 Indeed, by the time F.W. De Klerk became NP leader in 1989, the central pillars of the Afrikaner establishment had ended their support for apartheid: the church, the press, universities, the business community, and the Broederbond.52 The ANC magazine Mayibuye began in 1989 to highlight the evolving attitudes of some whites and called for ANC members to reach out to other whites. Emphasizing that “Botha and his generals are the enemy of all our people,” Mayibuye published a story in late 1988 about 143 (whites) recruits who denounced the role of the South African Defense Force (SADF) in oppression.53 Getting whites to engage in talks was also achieved by appealing to international guarantees; several examples are described later. The second audience to which Mandela reached out was the mass public. One of the toughest challenges for any leader of armed struggle is bringing followers to the table. Mandela maneuvered to maintain legitimacy by alternating between keeping his constituents in the dark and reaching out to them. For example, the ANC leaders did not make the meetings with whites public because they feared that helping the NP make a soft landing on their way out of power would inspire a revolt within the party ranks.54 Much of the talks about talks after Mandela’s release were conducted out of the public eye, much like the Israeli-Palestinian talks that produced the 1993 Oslo Accords. As one observer said of the secrecy, the meetings were part of “a deadly serious process by which the leaders on both sides had to distance themselves from their own constituents, in order to approach the middle ground. In those early days of contact, the rank and file of the opposing sides were radically polarized; only the elites were beginning to edge along the tightrope toward a meeting in the middle.”55 From 1988, the NP government allowed Mandela more contact with exiled ANC leaders and the broader movement. He chose to make public letters he wrote to Botha and De Klerk prior to significant meetings with them. For example, in a document presented to Botha when they met on July 5, 1989 (known as the Mandela Document), he emphasized to blacks that he only wanted to make the government aware of the movement’s positions. Mandela acted out of fear that the government sought to legitimize itself in the eyes of the international community, continuing to use violence against the movement while demanding that the ANC

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end the armed struggle as a precondition for talks. The government also long demanded that the ANC renounce its quest for majority rule. Mandela’s document took a hard line, condemning the government for demonizing blacks. He pointed out that the ANC demands were backed by the international community in the Harare Declaration of 1989.56 Specifically, the Harare Declaration contained principles on establishing the interim government and the elected constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.57 An ANC document from the Department of Political Education highlighted that the terms for negotiations were set: “This has been officially recognized by the international community in the Organization of African Unity’s Declaration—also known as the Harare Declaration—and in the United Nations General Assembly Declaration.”58 As he did with whites, Mandela drew on resources in the international arena to appeal to black audiences. He argued that in any talks, whites would be limited by the demands of the international community for majority rule. A final example of broadening to different audiences illustrates how skillfully Mandela balanced various constituencies. More radical members of the liberation movement had written the speech Mandela gave at his release; according to Mandela, had he written it, he would have been more conciliatory. The speech itself was very appealing to the masses of ANC followers. In interviews with reporters afterward, Mandela emphasized, in contrast to the speech, that the ANC was concerned to address the fears of whites: “Whites are our fellow South Africans. We want them to feel safe.” He also praised the integrity of De Klerk.59 Mandela also used the broadening audience strategy to gain legitimacy as the voice of the oppressed and thus addressed the second obstacle. One important example was especially illustrative of intermestic policy making: reaching out to the international community. In the late 1980s, the U.S. government began to respond to the ANC’s claim that it was nonaligned. With the Cold War having limited the contact between the United States and the ANC, the shifting environment had an impact on the U.S. position. In the early and mid-1980s, conservatives in the United States, who exerted some influence in the Reagan administration, urged support for non-Marxist Buthelezi and the IFP.60 However, by 1987, Oliver Tambo had been invited to visit Washington, and later that year the ANC was recognized as the legitimate voice of South Africans.61 In the 1989 Mandela Document, Mandela used the ANC’s international relations to bolster his position at home. He emphasized the nonalignment of the ANC as counterargument to the regime’s claims of its communist sympathies.62 Continuing the ANC tradition, Mandela reached out to international actors once he was released. Mandela toured the globe and was greeted as a celebrity everywhere. Between 1990 and mid-1992, he made 16 trips abroad, visiting 49 countries. Twenty of the countries he visited were in Africa, and he lobbied for OAU support at summits in Uganda (1990) and Nigeria (1991), in part trying to neutralize De Klerk’s appeals to these states to lift sanctions prior to a settlement.63 Speaking to the British House of Commons, Mandela requested support for continued sanctions, asking that they “walk the last mile with us.”64 U.S. President Bush signaled support with an invitation to Mandela, who visited Washington in June 1990.65


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Mayibuye provided broad coverage of Mandela’s travels, as did the rest of the South African press. He was not only seeking a boost against other black parties such as the PAC and IFP, but also sought to temper the attention being granted to F.W. De Klerk who was touring the world as well. Mandela fought hard to broaden audience to the international community and to convince them that they were all united in the struggle for majority rule. Further, the prestige that came with the association between the sanctions campaign and the ANC helped reinforce the ANC’s domestic standing.66 The sanctions campaign and Mandela’s global lobbying to keep sanctions intact until real change was implemented were crucial to keeping support of doubtful members of the liberation movement at home. The conditions for the lifting of sanctions (which were based on the ANC’s demands) “engender[ed] and then reinforce[d] a dominant ‘culture of negotiation.’ ”67 Throughout the talks, Mandela also appealed to Zulus and people in the homelands to shore up his party’s support against the IFP and the homeland governments. For example, the ANC organized a rally in KwaZulu where Mandela spoke; the event commemorated Shaka Zulu, the historic Zulu king, and symbolized that the ANC was the party of all the people.68 The rally was in November 1993, as the ANC campaign was moving into full swing. Indeed, from July 1990, the ANC had been reaching out to Buthelezi supporters and tried to undermine the IFP leader. The third challenge to Mandela was getting what the ANC wanted out of negotiations. In a general sense, Mandela often spoke of the ANC, the rest of the nonwhite majority, and the international community as one united actor. The ANC needed key international actors to see themselves as part of the ANC’s audience, which in turn would get more people at home on board with the movement’s negotiating position. Mandela reiterated that no deal would be made that sold out the ANC’s goals, pointing out continued sanctions and international solidarity as guarantees to his black audience. A comment on this relationship from one of Mandela’s colleagues, Essop Pahad, is descriptive: “The ANC understood better than most liberation movements how important international solidarity was . . . if you intensified your struggle at home the possibilities of creating a broader base and a stronger movement outside was better and vice versa, if you had a powerful solidarity movement outside it would in turn impact upon developments in South Africa. . . .”69 To reassure ANC followers that negotiations did not mean selling out, Mandela continually referred to the Harare Declaration and the similar resolution adopted by the United Nations. Mandela also broadened audience to the international community in the effort to keep white support for negotiations. In a comment to U.S. President Bill Clinton, Mandela highlighted the importance of American support in the effort to appeal to whites that negotiations with the black majority were a safe bet: “If the United States could say we were not a terrorist organization, who would any longer say we were?”70 Both Mandela and De Klerk posited to whites that the best way to end South Africa’s international isolation was through substantial, bold reforms. It was as part of this strategy that Mandela supported De Klerk in the March 1992 referendum. During De Klerk’s referendum campaign, Mandela reinforced the NP platform when he appealed to whites that a “yes” vote for the government was a vote to rejoin the international community. Involvement of the United States

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was crucial in helping overcome white fears about the future too. The American government made reassurances to whites that the ANC would be held to its promises to respect human rights and democratic principles.71 At pivotal points during negotiations, Mandela faced threats to realizing ANC goals; he used broadening audience to move things forward. Recall that one of the biggest problems during the process was violence. All the strategies were used to deal with violence, and broadening audience to include the international dimension proved critical in mid-1992. In August 1990 De Klerk was under pressure from the white Right about the refusal of the ANC to abandon the armed struggle. Thinking that De Klerk would commit to ending violence against ANC followers, Mandela helped De Klerk, broadening audience by agreeing to a “suspension” of the armed struggle in the Pretoria Minute: “The white president had a problem with his constituents to the right; so the ANC decided to solve it for him, on the grounds that they could not gain by weakening the reformist president.”72 Broadening audience to include and, in a sense, co-opt whites created another problem for Mandela though. Some elements of the liberation movement objected to what they saw as the leadership selling out the cause. To get around this roadblock the leadership took actions to appeal to a wider group of nonwhites, broadening audience to more of the masses. As soon as the Pretoria Minute was agreed, Mandela began to emphasize that the struggle continued. In the September 1990 Mayibuye, Mandela even appeared in uniform visiting MK camps.73 At the conference, the year 1991 was declared the “Year of Mass Action” in which the people would accomplish the transition to majority rule and MK would “play a leading role in defending the people.”74 Instead of ignoring the objections and skepticism of the masses, Mandela and his colleagues broadened audience, renewing attention on the value of MK and on the people’s participation. This was part of the ongoing balancing act between keeping the details of negotiations away from the people and, at key times, drawing them in to further the leader’s ends. The problem of violence did not dissipate as Mandela hoped when he agreed to the Pretoria Minute. Instead, the government continued to work with the IFP against the ANC until the large-scale massacres at Boipatong and Bisho, after which Mandela tried to broaden audience again. He also employed several additional strategies (tying hands and framing threat; see later) to finally overcome this challenge. Mandela telephoned U.S. President George Bush in June 1992 after the Boipatong massacre, when the main negotiations had broken down and Third Force violence racked the country. Mandela sought Bush’s support in the United Nations to condemn the violence, emphasizing that the government was primarily to blame, and to urge the United Nations to send observers. Bush offered to send Secretary of State James Baker to oversee a direct U.S. diplomatic intervention; Mandela turned him down, preferring the international community to act as a whole. Still, Mandela’s comment that “The United States and the ANC are moving closer together. We are seeing problems from the same perspective,” is indicative of his sense that his strategy was working.75 By the summer of 1992, Mandela told his followers of his concern that there was so little international objection in the face of government-sponsored attacks. He then looked overseas for support. He


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reached out to the OAU, attending a heads-of-state summit to appeal for a resolution condemning the NP government. At the United Nations, on July 15 and 16, he spoke to the Security Council. Originally opposed to the idea of increased international involvement, the government gave in after the killings at Boipatong. Indeed, one effect of the broadening audience strategy was that NP leaders began to change their “prime constituency— foreign diplomats assumed primacy over local NP supporters. This clearly strengthened the government’s commitment to negotiation. . . .”76 Mandela was successful in his efforts to draw in the outside world during this episode: the Security Council appointed former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to chair an observation commission. Fifty UN observers arrived in South Africa in September 1992, and soon after the OAU sent a team as well.77 The presence of the observers did not prevent the killing at Bisho on September 7, 1992, but these killings did have the effect of increasing UN, OAU, and Commonwealth involvement.78 At the same time, continuing the balancing act between isolating versus involving the masses, Mandela turned back to them after the collapse of the second round of the negotiating forum and the intensifying violence in the summer of 1992. Indeed, he and the rest of the ANC leadership mobilized supporters into mass action campaigns. Rallies, marches, and protests filled the streets.79 We return to this rolling mass action campaign in the discussion of the tying hands strategy, which Mandela used in combination with broadening audience during this episode. The use of the broadening audience strategy in summer 1992 drew global attention to the government-sponsored violence and convinced the international community that it had a role to play in pressuring the government to be more cooperative with the ANC. Domestic pressure and pressure from international observer teams produced the Record of Understanding in September 1992. It was also a result of behind-the-scenes negotiations between the chief negotiators Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer, who kept the road to peace open by talking out of the public eye during the tumultuous summer.80 The Record of Understanding went a long way toward neutralizing violence, and Third Force actions decreased dramatically. Broadening audience to the international community also impacted several specific aspects of the settlement such as the form of government and the direction of the economy. One scholar notes that “the power of key South African actors, and the parameters of their debates and agreements, were set in part by global pressures for racial equality and a non-violent democratic process.”81 Though the reform process did not include direct participation of external actors, pressures from outside South Africa helped create conditions for talks and also influenced the outcome of the talks.82 Before the Record of Understanding, the NP did not want to meet the ANC preconditions for returning to talks, especially because the preconditions were all anathema to Buthelezi (the NP’s negotiating partner, recruited to balance the power of the ANC). Agreement on the constitutional assembly, the government of national unity, and restrictions on traditional weapons83 (meant to limit the behavior of Zulus) seemed to be insurmountable obstacles. Mandela constantly worked to create pressures for change, and eventually succeeded. The NP government could not get support for an agreement that

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would give whites a veto, with De Klerk realizing his goals had to change after statements from a prominent U.S. diplomat in 1992 that a minority veto was unacceptable.84 Agreement on the constitutional assembly and the GNU in the Record of Understanding was in part the result of pressure from the UN mission led by Vance and the Goldstone Commission (created to monitor violence).85 Mandela and the ANC also used the international dimension to build support domestically for aspects of the settlement that were compromises and thus may have created suspicion among blacks. For example, on the interim government, the ANC agreed that the NP government would remain and the TEC would oversee elections. For a long time the ANC wanted the NP government completely replaced. The leadership reassured the majority that any agreement would be “reinforced with the necessary international backing at the level of the United Nations and other international bodies.”86 By emphasizing that the international community was watching, blacks could be rest assured that the compromises were still in the spirit of the democratic transition they demanded. At times Mandela’s decisions to broaden audience created problems with his core audience. The outcry about the Pretoria Minute was described earlier and helps explain why Mandela took a hard line against the government involvement with violence. His broadening audience to whites and to the international community also pulled him away from some long-held goals of the ANC, especially when it came to the issue of the economy. Once both were part of his constituency, he was under pressure to respond to the “deal breaker” issue of state ownership of major industries. To maintain international support more generally and to keep whites in talks, Mandela reached out to whites on the economic issue. In 1992, a National Economic Forum was held to discuss the economic structure in the new South Africa. It brought together business, labor, government, and the ANC to try to achieve consensus on issues that severely divided the two sides.87 Parallel to constitutional talks, the ANC was crafting an economic plan known as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). One author notes that the first draft of the RDP “read like a blueprint for a socialist society, but with each revision it moved away from that model, so that Mandela, with an eye on the prevailing international climate, could underline that the final version made no mention of nationalization or contained a single Marxist slogan.”88 Mandela welcomed U.S. support in appealing to whites on the economic issue, benefiting from a series of speeches by the U.S. ambassador, in which the United States recognized the ANC’s move away from socialism.89 Mandela now had to convince his core ANC constituency to stay on board. We will see how he used tying hands and buying off to do so. Mandela also broadened audience to the international community to cope with the fourth obstacle, disruption of the process by spoilers. First, involving the United States as a stakeholder was useful in dealing with the PAC, which had walked out of the alliance of antiapartheid groups during negotiations. In late 1993, the United States appealed to Tanzania and Zimbabwe that support for ANC was crucial for a nonviolent end to the apartheid regime (the PAC had refused to renounce violence); the Americans succeeded in getting these African states to isolate the PAC. In addition, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali


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appealed to the PAC to give up armed struggle and participate in the elections. The last gasp of PAC resistance to elections was occasioned by use of the buying off strategy.90 As agreement on the interim constitution approached, opposition was mostly coming from the new alliance between the IFP and the white Right (to which many in the army and security forces belonged). Mandela turned his attention to these new audiences whose support was crucial. Starting in 1992 and continuing into 1993, Mandela’s team reached out to top army leaders and involved even the most conservative officers in talks to try to assure them of their positions and their safety. We see his intermestic policy making in terms of broadening audience at work in his words to former generals as he spoke of the consequences of their resorting to civil war: “You must remember two things. You cannot win because of our numbers: you cannot kill us all. And you cannot win because of the international community. They will rally to our support and they will stand with us.”91 After the November 1993 interim constitution deal, Mandela reached out to Constand Viljoen, the retired general who was head of the white Right umbrella group. Its primary demand was a white homeland; while the broadening audience strategy opened the door to dealing with this spoiler, in the end Mandela had to buy it off. When it came to Buthelezi and the IFP, Mandela had long resisted the Inkatha leader’s calls for international mediation because of the legitimacy it would confer on IFP claims. However, the IFP was the last major spoiler after the PAC and Viljoen group agreed to participate. Finally, after fruitless one-on-one meetings with Buthelezi and unsuccessful constitutional concessions to buy him off, Mandela agreed to an international mediation team headed by Henry Kissinger and Britain’s Lord Carrington. The various parties could not even agree on basic terms, though, so this effort at broadening audience to pressure Buthelezi fell short.92 It would take an especially intriguing use of the buying off strategy to finally get Inkatha in the elections. The final obstacle for Mandela was the election in 1994. Once the election was on the horizon and the last of the spoilers was sidelined, Mandela and his party were concerned about the difficult transition from liberation organization to political party. It would be tough to match the slick NP campaigning. We see the effort to broaden audience in meeting the challenge. The party reached out to potential followers in the format of town meetings (called People’s Forums), during which Mandela and other top leaders traveled around the country and engaged in conversations about the ANC’s principles and what the people wanted from government.93 Mandela also reached out to white and mixed-race communities, something that the press covered widely—including a visit to the Orange Free State (a bastion of Afrikaner nationalism). The March 1994 Mayibuye published articles emphasizing that the ANC was committed to consultation and consensus; no one should fear its dominance.94 A public information campaign to make whites aware of the ANC position is another good example of broadening audience. Even Mandela’s position in final negotiations over election results reflect his effort to reach out to the broadest audience. Recall that the challenge was not only insuring enough support but also not getting too much of the vote. If the ANC

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were to win enough votes to have a two-thirds majority required to make decisions (67 percent), white fears could have threatened cooperation. Immediately after the voting, the parties disputed the vote count; also, many irregularities were reported. In the end, the parties agreed to ignore the disputes and agreed on the distribution: The ANC received 62.6 percent, the NP received 20.4 percent, and the IFP received 10.5 percent. Each of the big three parties surpassed the 10 percent threshold for participation in the government. Mandela said he was relieved with the result: “We have to be very careful not to create the fear that the majority is going to be used for the purpose of coercing the minorities.”95 More explicitly, “If we wanted stability, cooperation, and the smooth functioning of the government of national unity, we should not get that two-thirds majority.”96 In summary, Mandela’s drawing in of international actors as part of the ANC’s audience convinced them that they had a role to play in the internal political problems of South Africa. The work of the EPG, OAU, United Nations, Commonwealth, and several states all helped force the NP to be more committed to negotiation and to changes moving the process forward.97 Likewise, creating as his own and drawing in various domestic constituencies at crucial times helped Mandela move talks forward and skirt challenges. As with the other leaders in this book, a single strategy was not sufficient for Mandela to overcome all the obstacles. Further, sometimes broadening audience created additional problems with his core constituents. The next section turns to Mandela’s use of the tying hands strategy. Tying Hands Most leaders generally want to appear as if they are in control, both demonstrating to negotiating partners that they can bring along their followers and showing their constituency that they have power to elicit concessions. Yet a leader may benefit at times by looking helpless. The tying hands strategy is observable when a leader draws on aspects of the domestic setting to limit the range of options he has with external actors, or when he uses elements of the international setting to convince domestic actors that a particular course is necessary. In this case, Mandela did both; he also drew on aspects of the domestic setting to tie his hands with other domestic actors. This section explores how Nelson Mandela tied hands to address three of the five obstacles: the challenge of convincing blacks to negotiate at all, the challenge of achieving ANC goals in the negotiations, and the challenge of winning the election with the right balance for governing. We see that how Mandela tied hands falls into two overarching categories. First, he used this kind of intermestic policy making to keep followers on board when he had to broaden audience to the white community. Second, he tied hands to force concessions by De Klerk when he (Mandela) reached limits beyond which he thought he could not compromise. As noted, some ANC factions accused Mandela of selling out when he broadened audience to whites. The Pretoria Minute was especially contentious. How Mandela broadened audience to the masses to address their unease was recounted earlier. He also used the tying hands strategy. Two examples are illustrative. First, in the months after the Pretoria Minute, Mandela and the ANC literature stressed that this suspension of the armed struggle was the only way to get important


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concessions from the government. Though Mandela and other top ANC leaders had been released and the political organizations of the liberation movement had been legalized, the NP still refused the remaining ANC preconditions for negotiations: the release of more prisoners, the return of MK members exiled in neighboring countries, and the end of government violence against blacks. Mandela essentially argued that his hands were tied in gaining more from the government until the ANC took a step toward compromise. Indeed, the Pretoria agreement opened up talks on setting dates for releasing political prisoners, removed obstacles to greater political freedom, and started exploratory talks on a new constitution.98 In the short term, the government did not meet the target dates nor stop violence against blacks. Later, we see that Mandela tied hands again to confront this intransigence. With regard to easing the objections of his core audience, a second example shows how Mandela used the international context to justify negotiations. The requirements of the sanctions regime and the Harare Declaration reinforced that a negotiated settlement was the only “internationally accepted path away from apartheid.” In addition to broadening audience Mandela used tying hands to argue to his own followers that Harare gave him only one choice if the movement wanted to keep international support.99 One of the toughest issues for the ANC was the move away from socialism. There were many aspects of the situation pushing the movement away from this long-held goal. While international sanctions boosted Mandela’s position for a negotiated settlement, the sanctions did not legitimize the ANC’s socialist goals. In fact, the sanctions packages placed no emphasis on socioeconomic change within South Africa.100 Along with socialism’s symbolic failure embodied in the collapse of the Soviet Union, the realities of South Africa’s economic situation confronted ANC leaders as they moved closer to governing. South Africa seemed rich because its wealth was concentrated in the hands of 5 million people; spreading that wealth to over 40 million people would not do much to improve the lot of the average South African. Still, in June 1990, an ANC pamphlet stated that the movement had to fight “by all means” any efforts “to rob the masses of the fruits of victory, by privatizing state industry.”101 Also, the influence of the labor union on the liberation front made it tough for Mandela to make the shift.102 A few examples illustrate the skillful use of tying hands to bring along core constituents as the socialist dream was extinguished. In December 1992, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Mandela was persuaded by world business leaders that foreign investment would not materialize for a country attached to socialism. Mandela said that these meetings changed his mind completely and explained his tied hands in making his case: “We either keep nationalization and get no investment, or we modify our own attitude and get investment.”103 Along with the Pretoria Minute and the shift on the economy, Mandela’s support for De Klerk during the February 1992 referendum puzzled people still victimized by Third Force violence. With little to show for the ANC by spring 1992, Mandela was pushed too far by government intransigence—especially after the referendum, when De Klerk dug in after the vote of confidence from whites. The path followed next—arguing that De Klerk had to move because Mandela’s hands were tied—was presaged in an article in Mayibuye: “If deadlocks in the negotiations

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process are to be resolved only by discussion and compromise with the regime, rather than by struggle linked to negotiations, then the masses will be excluded from the process and unnecessary compromise will be the result.”104 Mandela’s team would have to use the people to further the ANC’s goals. When the “rolling mass action” campaign started in the summer of 1992, Mandela used it to force change on De Klerk. This move was an intriguing use of tying hands, and it surmounted two tough issues: ending violence and agreeing on the form of the transitional government. Encouraged by the ANC leadership, strikes and protests plagued South Africa from June through September 1992. The action included a nationwide general strike on August 3 and 4 that was the largest political strike in the country’s history.105 Mandela did not control the mass action but he and the entire organization encouraged it. Mass action also sent a crucial signal to this leader about the limits to his ability to bring followers along. In Mandela’s words, “With negotiations stalled, the ANC and its allies agreed on a policy of ‘rolling mass action,’ which would display to the government the extent of our support around the country and show that the people of South Africa were not prepared to wait forever for their freedom.”106 Indeed, Mandela argued that if the Third Force violence did not end, people would lose faith in the process. He chose to manipulate the violence in his favor. After the Boipatong massacre on June 17, Mandela pulled out of negotiations, blamed De Klerk for the massacre, and demanded that the government stop helping the IFP murder ANC followers. Without change in the government’s actions, Mandela argued, his hands were tied: “I can no longer explain to our people why we continue to talk to a regime that is murdering our people and conducting war against us.”107 In his autobiography, Mandela described how he used majority sentiment to argue that he could settle for no less than majority rule. In the end, De Klerk gave in and signed the Record of Understanding.108 A final example of Mandela’s tying hands strategy is with regard to the fifth challenge: the election. Specifically, he used the tying hands strategy to deal with white fear (and thus the danger that they would resort to violence) that the ANC majority would be too large. The negotiated election results reveal that Mandela tried to demonstrate to the whites that his hands were tied from harming their interests. He was thus able to accomplish the goal of keeping them in the system: “Ironic as this may sound, I think the fact that we did not get a two-thirds majority will help to allay the fears of those who believe that we want to write the constitution on our own and to run the country alone as the ANC Not that this was our intention. Far from it. But many people believed this, and at least their fears can be laid to rest.”109 In summary, tying hands was a significant strategy for Mandela in coping with three major obstacles during the transition, especially as used in tandem with broadening audience. Next we see that buying off was also an integral part of his success. Buying Off The buying off strategy is defined as using material resources or promises of them either to co-opt opposition abroad or at home or to change conditions abroad or


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at home. Mandela and the ANC employed this strategy to deal with each of the five obstacles. As we will see, in several crucial episodes buying off was combined with other strategies. All of the examples in this section fall into one of two categories. Mandela (1) used resources from international actors to manipulate domestic opposition or to promise change in domestic conditions, or (2) employed ANC resources at home to overcome domestic opposition. Because of the role played by sanctions, buying off was useful with the first obstacle, the initial resistance of whites and blacks to begin talks at all. For example, Mandela often appealed to whites that negotiating with the black majority was the only way to end sanctions. Also, in a speech to South African business executives in May 1990, Mandela promised that the world would invest in South Africa once the white minority veto was gone: “For us to be able to persuade the world that it must invest in South Africa, that it must extend aid to us, that it should agree on a Marshall Aid plan, we must be able to report to the nations that white minority domination is no more.”110 With his core constituency, Mandela used his moneygathering trips overseas to convince ANC members to stay with him. His efforts were not only boosted by the international community’s endorsement of the negotiations strategy (broadening audience) but also by the fact that external actors would provide the ANC with funding if it stuck with Mandela’s agenda. He made this relationship clear to his followers.111 The second obstacle was the fact that the ANC initially had to compete for legitimacy and top billing with other groups such as the PAC and IFP. Mandela employed buying off successfully, in tandem with other strategies. With the international aid garnered by Mandela, the ANC ensured that activists inside the country were willing to join the liberation front with the ANC at the helm of talks. Indeed, the ANC’s “identification with the United Democratic Front meant that domestic activists received financial support from external allies in the anti-apartheid movement. The internal wings of the democratic movement were strengthened both materially and morally by their association with the ANC.”112 They, therefore, had much incentive to stay with the ANC. Buying off was also crucial to overcoming the third obstacle—fulfilling goals in negotiations. Specifically, Mandela used buying off to force De Klerk to set an election date, to get whites on board with a final settlement, and to get the ANC’s core constituencies to go along with the move from socialism. Final success in setting an election date was not achieved until Mandela bought off De Klerk with the promise of external reward. As described earlier, Mandela refused to receive the Liberty Medal in Philadelphia with De Klerk until the NP agreed on a date for the vote. As both leaders traveled to and arrived in the United States for the awards ceremony on July 4, 1993, their teams continued to negotiate. In meetings with Bill Clinton, the president stated that “a major package of proposals to bolster the South African economy would be announced as soon as negotiators agreed on an election date and the creation of the TEC.” The date was agreed for April 27–29, 1994, and the establishment of the TEC was given greater urgency.113 In this case, Mandela manipulated external sources to his ends. After the Record of Understanding, ANC thinkers focused on how they would sell the settlement to whites. Specifically, Mandela and his colleagues worried

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about white fears of black majority rule and the potential for dangerous behavior that such fear could encourage. They chose to address white fears in part by buying them off. In November of that year the ANC adopted a policy called the “sunset clauses.” These were guarantees to whites that they would keep some of their privileges, especially the jobs and benefits for civil servants (a major source of jobs for whites). Again a few weeks before the election, the TEC issued formal statements reminding people how the new constitution guaranteed continued employment and pensions for government workers. Also, security forces, liberation fighters, and others who had committed political crimes would receive amnesty (with details to be worked out later upon establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission). Of course, the sunset clauses flew in the face of ANC principles. But to Mandela, the white audience was at times as crucial as the ANC audience. Speaking in 1995, he said of these measures, “You must understand that there was great opposition even in [the government] to the talks. The sunset clauses won us the support of many people who would otherwise not have been involved in this transformation.”114 Along with the sunset clauses, the ANC agreed in the Bill of Rights to measures preventing the expropriation of land or property. This buying off strategy was successful, helping De Klerk in “preventing immediate economic trauma for whites.”115 The second negotiations issue for which buying off was helpful was the opposition from Mandela’s core constituency to the concessions on the economy. In meetings with the NP, the ANC leadership agreed to capitalist principles, committing “to reducing the deficit, to high interest rates, and to an open economy, in return for access to an IMF loan of $850 million if required. The settlement with international capitalism was almost as important as the settlement with De Klerk.”116 Because Mandela had broadened audience to international actors as a central part of his efforts to achieve a settlement, he was exposed to the facts of South Africa’s economy and saw this path as the only option. Convincing his followers why they should go along with changing this core principle was made possible in part by this outside funding from the IMF. The rhetoric in ANC publications such as Mayibuye emphasized earlier in the process that South Africa’s path was not one of either nationalization or free enterprise, but instead should be about how to meet the people’s needs.117 Mandela was able to use the help of this international organization to give weight to the argument that meeting needs is what he was doing, and thus he was able in part to buy off his core constituency. In fact, the IMF loan got substantial attention, since the TEC’s first significant decision in December 1993 was to endorse South Africa’s application for the $850 million package.118 Other help to buy off black opposition came from the United States. U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown visited South Africa in December 1993 as an effort to insure the country’s place in the international club of capitalist economies. He led an American business mission who signed an investment agreement and created a joint committee on commerce and trade between the two countries. Stating that the deal would create confidence in future investors, he also announced that, since 1991, 30 American companies had returned to or invested in South Africa for the first time.119 The South African media promoted the idea that the capitalist path was


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best, with headlines such as: “Billions for South Africa,” “Opening Up to the World,” “Huge U.S. Support,” and “U.S. Firms Streaking Back into the Country.”120 Buying off was critical to dealing with spoilers, the fourth obstacle. Mandela used both domestic and international resources to co-opt these actors. Though Mandela and his ANC team had broadened audience as a strategy to neutralize the spoiler behavior of the PAC, IFP, white Right, and homeland leaders, they had to also use buying off to succeed completely. The PAC had been the target of much diplomatic pressure, as noted earlier. Finally, as elections approached, the U.S. position reinforced Mandela’s message: the PAC could not participate until it declared an end to the armed struggle. At that time, and when it decided to participate in the elections, the PAC would receive U.S. aid. This happened in January 1994.121 Second, the ANC leadership sought to neutralize the spoiler potential of the homeland leader Mangope of Bophuthatswana. This was the largest homeland with lucrative mining properties; along with a substantial base, its leader had some claims to legitimacy. Further, being allowed to campaign in all the homelands was important to the ANC, so gaining access to the largest was a priority. First, Mandela tried to lure Mangope to participate in the settlement with constitutional concessions guaranteeing regional powers. Though Mandela had U.S. support in meetings with Mangope, the latter would not give in. Finally, in March 1994 the ANC leadership promoted rumors that employees of homelands would not get pensions if the homelands did not incorporate with South Africa. This was a stark contrast with the widely publicized sunset clauses rewarding white civil servants elsewhere. These rumors inspired labor strikes by civil servants in Bophuthatswana. A desperate Mangope turned to his white partners in the Freedom Alliance to restore order. The resulting chaos collapsed Mangope’s regime on March 11; the homeland government of Ciskei fell soon after (on March 22) in a similar way.122 In essence, the ANC bought off the civil servants in the homelands by telling them they would be nicely rewarded if they were South African citizens and punished substantially if not. A third example of using the buying off strategy to deal with spoilers involves the IFP. Having failed to get Inkatha on board by broadening audience to the international community, De Klerk and Mandela made an effort to buy off the Zulu king to undermine Buthelezi’s resistance. Initially maintaining his long-held intransigence, Buthelezi was finally swayed by a Kenyan mediator (Washington Okumu) who was part of the international group brought in to attempt a deal. Not coincidentally, the Mandela–De Klerk team had made an offer that was secret. Three million acres in KwaZulu was transferred to King Goodwill Zwelethini, insuring that he would not be under the financial control of the new national government.123 This addressed the concerns behind the IFP’s demands for a federal system with strong regions. Mandela’s broadening audience had set the stage by narrowing the IFP’s options, making the KwaZulu leadership amenable to a good offer. The buying off of IFP resistance eliminated one of the most dangerous spoilers. Buthelezi registered his party for the elections on April 19, with only one week to spare.

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Finally, the ANC bought off some of the “white Right” spoilers—Viljoen’s Freedom Front (FF), which had broken away from the Freedom Alliance (FA) after the AWB’s debacle in Bophuthatswana. Mandela told Viljoen when he was still part of the FA that the ANC was willing to sign a deal on the volkstaat. This separate state for whites was the prize the former general had been asking for since Mandela had reached out to him in August 1993. Mandela may have viewed this as a way of buying off the white Right, apparently thinking the ANC would never really let a white state come into existence yet providing Viljoen with “the political ammunition he needed to keep his supporters away from the warpath. . . .” Previously, the volkstaat deal had fallen victim to deadlock in negotiations with the FA.124 But by March 1994, the homeland situation had apparently convinced Constand Viljoen that there was no future in armed resistance. Indeed, with Mangope, the SADF had complied with Mandela’s request to help overthrow the homeland government when the chaos ensued. Without support of the SADF, Viljoen’s threat of violence was toothless. He registered a list of candidates minutes before the March 11 midnight deadline. Finally, just three days before the election, the ANC and Viljoen sealed his participation with the signing of the Volkstaat Accord.125 With the IFP, the homelands, and the FF successfully bought off, only the ultra right wing was out—the Conservative Party and the AWB. Having dealt with the challenges of starting talks, legitimacy, negotiations, and spoilers, Mandela also used buying off in coping with concerns arising in the election, the fifth obstacle. Indeed, Mandela and the ANC leadership sought to buy off voters—though not in the direct way pursued by Mugabe. Two examples are illustrative. From the initial trips after his release, Mandela began to ask for money to support the ANC as it built its internal organization and developed into a political party. In 1990, for example, 90 percent of the ANC’s budget ($27 million) came from abroad. In the years leading up to the election, he requested “buckets full of money” to help the ANC rebuild internally and match the NP’s resources. He succeeded almost everywhere he went, and by April 1994, the ANC reportedly had more money for the elections than the NP.126 A February 1993 interview with Mandela in Mayibuye exemplifies his thoughts on how, indirectly, money from outside would help buy off voters. He stated that the ANC expected the international community to help with resources so that “democratic forces” could fight and win an election.127 Once the parties reached a settlement, in November 1993, U.S. President Clinton signed the Transition to Democracy Act, lifting all remaining sanctions and authorizing an aid program for South Africa. Indeed, the U.S. Agency for International Development funded many programs to prepare the nonwhite population for governing.128 A second example is the campaign itself. Most liberation movements that engage in elections structure their campaigns—especially their first one—around their role in achieving freedom. The ANC took a different path, instead focusing attention on basic needs and how the ANC would dedicate itself to job creation and housing.129 The organization used the campaign opportunity to buy off any voters who were still uncertain. As a centerpiece of its campaign, the ANC published the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) that outlined ways “to improve the quality of life for the African masses by creating jobs, redistributing


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land, providing low-cost housing, extending the supply of electricity and clean water, and improving education.”130 Thus, from getting parties to the table to the vote in April 1994, this section provided several examples of the many ways in which Mandela used resources from within and outside of the country to maneuver around all five of the biggest challenges. The final section turns to how Mandela framed threat, again drawing on both international and domestic contexts. Framing Threat Nelson Mandela’s optimism is legendary. One wonders at his ability, after being imprisoned for decades, to tell South Africans to put the past behind them. Indeed, at his inauguration speech, Mandela spoke to all of South Africa—the “rainbow nation” for its diversity—about the need to unite so that they could enter the future as one. Mandela’s famous optimism during the transition is especially surprising given the circumstances of those four years—intensifying violence, deepening poverty, and rampant crime. While Mandela’s goals were to get parties on all sides to the table and keep them there until apartheid was history, these tasks were increasingly challenged by the revelations that the government was perpetrating much of the violence. In fact leaders whose people are under attack generally mobilize them to fight back. Mandela’s use of the framing threat strategy is intriguing because of the way he used this situation to promote faster progress to a negotiated settlement. The violent context may have been out of the control of any leader in Mandela’s position, as it was with John Hume in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. Nonetheless, how leaders interpret this context to their people can be crucial to whether those followers mobilize toward peace or war. Mandela’s framing threat strategy demonstrated well his intermestic policy making. He used it to address the four challenges of getting the parties to negotiate in the first place, maximizing the ANC agenda in negotiations, dealing with spoilers, and achieving a positive outcome in elections. As this section illustrates, he depicted domestic threats to an international audience in order to mobilize external support. In turn, he drew on this international support to convince followers at home to stick with a nonviolent approach, even when everything in their surroundings was pushing them in a different direction. At the beginning of the negotiations process, Mandela framed threat as posed by the NP’s effort to gain legitimacy. He argued that the ANC had to force the NP into talks and use the leverage the antiapartheid movement had gained with the international community to push for real reforms. With the shifts in the global context, the NP had started to build better relationships with its African neighbors. By promising reforms in the apartheid system, more doors were opening to the NP around the world but majority rule was not on offer. As stated in ANC resource material distributed to grassroots members, the ANC’s failure to negotiate would enable Pretoria and “the imperialists” to win; it would divide the democratic forces, take the pressure of sanctions off the government, and give the regime the initiative on the international front.131 The solution was simple: the ANC must talk. Mandela framed threat in various ways as he coped with specific problems in negotiations such as keeping followers on board in the face of increasing violence

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perpetrated by the negotiating partner, forcing the NP to give up the demand for a minority veto, and getting final agreement on the transitional government and election date. In his many speeches, Mandela framed threat in a way that posited the only solution was his: democracy must be agreed to and instituted as soon as possible. Again, the linkage between the international and domestic contexts was a central part of his framing threat strategy. Several examples illustrate these points. Once the parties agreed to talks, Mandela focused on the threat to the outside world from events in South Africa. External involvement then was essential to addressing threats to his domestic audience. Speaking to the European Parliament in June 1990, Mandela reminded them that apartheid was still in place, threatening the goals and security of the entire world. EU, UN, Commonwealth, and OAU objectives asserted over the years were still flouted. The threats and solutions are clear in the following excerpts: We continue to be ruled by a White minority government. . . . All the other pillars of the apartheid system have not yet been removed. . . . Our people continue to die. . . . Indeed, it is also of vital importance that we do not forget that there are many among our White minority [who disagree that] domination must come to an end . . . What all this means is that the struggle against apartheid must continue. . . . The international community shares the same obligation. That is why we continue to call on the peoples of the world to maintain sanctions. . . . The situation should not be created where our people would point an accusing finger at the governments and peoples of Western Europe that at the moment when movement forward seemed possible, these peoples and governments acted in a manner which denied us that possibility. . . . 132

Indeed, he argued that the threats in South Africa were universal in nature. The external audience had an obligation to maintain sanctions to keep the pressure on the whites to talk. Another necessary solution to the threats in South Africa was material: “We must also bring it to your attention that our movement and people also need enormous material resources to enable them to accomplish various objectives. The accomplishment of this task is not only important in the interests of the ANC as such. It is vital for the success of the process of negotiations itself.”133 In a speech to American businesses in June 1990, Mandela appealed directly to their interests as he advocated international involvement in South Africa’s transition. He noted that investors and the ANC had the common interest of security, the former because of their investments. Thus, the investors had obligations to South Africa: You should continue to isolate apartheid South Africa. . . . You should help us with the material resources which will enable us to repatriate and resettle our compatriots whom the apartheid system forced into exile. You should help us with the resources which will enable us to carry out the educational work among all our people which will encourage and enable them to participate in the process of negotiations. . . . 134


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Mandela articulated similar arguments in all of his speeches to international audiences. Using threat to draw in the international community kept pressure on the white government, but for the first two years the NP was not budging much in talks and was escalating violence through its contacts with extremist groups. Mandela could not ignore the dire situation. His speeches, as well as ANC publications such as Mayibuye, frame this threat in fascinating ways. In essence, the threat posed by violence was used to advocate more negotiations instead of ending them or responding with violence. First, we see the recognition of the severity of the violence, then he frames the threat as if to say “we’ve got them on the run” with talks and have to stay on this path: “Black people have been dying for generations as a result of the policies of successive white minority Governments. . . . Now the purpose is more sinister: our sons and daughters, our mothers, fathers and grand parents are being deliberately killed, brutally hacked to reduce our capacity to fight and remove all aspects of racialism and apartheid from our country forever.”135 To the July 1991 ANC National Conference, Mandela stated again that the NP was using violence to derail the peace process; reactionary forces—the “Third Force”—were fearful because the ANC was succeeding. All of us present in this hall know that there are people within our country, and within state structures, who remain opposed to the transformation of our country into a non-racial democracy. . . . That is precisely why there has been the escalation of public violence. . . . The lesson from all this must surely be that as long as we make progress towards the achievement of our goals, so must we expect that those who fundamentally disagree with these goals will resort to violence and terror to deny us the possibility to move forward.136

Mandela posited that the solutions to these threats were building self-defense in the communities and, centrally, getting to agreement, setting up the transitional government, and holding elections. By mid-1992, Mandela thought he needed to draw in more active involvement of the international community. This move itself was described as broadening audience, but the framing threat strategy was integral to making his case: The only way to end the violence is to install an interim government of national unity in the shortest time possible, and hold elections. . . . The ANC is asking for international support to end, or at least bring under control, the violence . . . . [W]e are convinced that international monitoring, and a role in securing a peace-keeping force, will bring under the spotlight all those in our country who are determined to plunge us into the abyss.137

The previous excerpt is from a speech to the OAU in April 1992. He later appealed similarly to the UNSC and the OAU again, after the Boipatong massacre pushed the ANC to end talks. Indeed, after arguing for years that the threats of government intransigence and violence pointed to the need for more negotiations and thus greater engagement with the NP, by June 1992 he argued that isolation of

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the NP was the only solution. Mandela’s words at the funeral of Boipatong victims emphasized that the threat from government-inspired violence had grown too severe for his previously advocated solution to succeed on its own; Boipatong was the last straw: “I can no longer explain to our people why we continue to talk to a regime that is murdering our people and conducting war against us.”138 Further, as in the aforementioned examples, he told international audiences that it was their obligation to help address the threat of violence. The Record of Understanding was the successful outcome of Mandela’s efforts to end De Klerk’s intransigence and Third Force violence. After this point, September 26, 1992, his threat framing gave even greater emphasis to the elections in addressing the intensifying problems of crime and poverty: “Our economy has been badly damaged. Starvation, lack of jobs, the education crisis, poor services and crime infect our society like the plague. . . . [T]he longer the transition to democracy takes, the more are solutions to these problems postponed.”139 Indeed, even earlier Mandela had not only framed threat in terms of the violence and continuation of apartheid but also had begun to give more emphasis to deepening poverty and raging crime. Crucially, he argued that these threats could not be addressed until a new government was set up, and addressing these problems was then necessary to the stability of that new democracy. This was also a central theme in international speeches, for example, in addresses in the United States in 1991 and at the international economic conference in Davos, Switzerland, in early 1992. At these times he argued that the international community was the only hope for coping with the economic threat. As the elections approached, poverty and underdevelopment of the economy were framed as the main threats, and the calls for external engagement continued. Setting the election date was a big challenge once the pressure on the government about violence and the transitional government took effect. Mandela employed the framing threat strategy (with broadening audience and buying off, as described previously) to push for compliance. He drew on a situation unrelated to an election date to rally domestic pressure on De Klerk—activist Chris Hani’s murder. After a white right-wing immigrant killed Hani in April 1993, Mandela went on television appealing for calm across the country. “Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for—the freedom of all of us.”140 In several press statements, the funeral address, and the televised appeal, Mandela framed the murder as a crime against the entire country, and those who killed him were “men who worship war, and who lust after blood.” He framed the threat as one against all South Africans and to democracy in general, arguing that the solution was to get to those elections: “This is a watershed moment for all of us. Our decisions and actions will determine whether we use our pain, our grief and our outrage to move forward to what is the only lasting solution for our country—an elected government of the people, by the people and for the people.”141 This reaction generated more pressure at home, especially because it gave the impression that only the ANC could control the suppressed violence of the masses.142 Subsequently, the added pressure from Clinton when Mandela broadened audience, and the monetary aid promised by Clinton, finally produced the April 27, 1994 date.


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The challenge from spoilers, which intensified after September 1992, was another obstacle Mandela addressed with the framing threat strategy. As with the earlier violence, Mandela could not ignore that significant actors rejected talks. How he chose to frame the threat from these spoilers was crucial in convincing followers that he had an effective policy for dealing with the challengers. Many speeches, to domestic and international audiences, highlighted the ominous threat of civil war from the white Right. Mandela provided three related solutions: establishing the democracy, isolating the spoilers, and enlisting external help. At the September 1993 MK conference, he framed threat in terms of the “forces of reaction” that sought to derail the peace process, especially the white Right with elements in the security forces. The solution to this threat was consolidating the democratic process, which would provide for multiparty control of all armed groups.143 Second, Mandela approached isolating the spoilers as a balancing act. Though he recognized that they were ripping South Africa apart, Mandela held on to the goal of a united, nonracial democracy. Thus, he framed threat in a way that left the door open for a peaceful end to the spoiler problem—allowing the possibility of a future with these groups. A clear example is in a speech to party activists in November 1993. He started with the premise that those on the white and black extremes sought to destabilize the country and the election because they knew they could not face the test of the vote. But he continued, “We are able to deal with this threat. In the first place, we must find the correct political answers which will leave them as an isolated tiny minority. We must be willing to accommodate without abandoning our principles.”144 In January 1994, he reached out to the FA, which had finally entered into talks with the ANC the month before. Mandela stressed that the right wing is not the real enemy—racism and oppression were.145 In other speeches, Mandela posited that the killers were terrorists who gained strength from fear; this threat could also be addressed by the ANC continuing to demonstrate commitment to a nonracial society. Doing so would isolate the violent factions from their supporters by discrediting the arguments they made about the danger of the ANC. Similarly, in March 1994, as continued attempts to get Inkatha into the elections failed, Mandela focused on the fear aspect of the threat and promised to keep trying to address Zulu apprehension.146 A final example shows a third solution to the spoiler problem that Mandela offered repeatedly: that the international community was integral to changing the calculations of these actors. At the United Nations in September 1993, he framed threat in terms of those small minorities who opposed genuine change, many through violence, and stated, “We believe that it is critically important that these forces too should understand that the international community has the will and determination to act in concert with the majority of the people of our country, to ensure that the democratic change which is long overdue is not delayed.”147 The ANC leader used the framing threat strategy to maneuver around the fifth obstacle, the challenges of the election: the continued threat of violence (even civil war) and the need for the ANC leadership to convince people that the ANC would bring solutions to the economic and social chaos taking the country

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hostage. Once the parties agreed on the TEC and it took office, their election campaigns gathered steam. Mandela and the ANC framed the main threat as the economic underdevelopment of South Africa and the poverty of the masses. To domestic audiences, he argued that the new system was the first step on the road to recovery, for two reasons: apartheid was responsible for the problems, and once the country was a democracy the international community would bring help: “Greater opportunity will enhance the climate for economic growth, economic growth will create greater stability, and stability is the indispensable condition for the thriving of democracy.”148 To international audiences, the economic threat was also a threat to the rest of the world. The solution was their help (buying off ). The intermestic nature of this strategy is clear. The following is an example of the latter, from a speech to the United Nations soon after the TEC was agreed: The apartheid system has left a swathe of disaster in its trail. We have an economy that is tottering on the brink of an even deeper depression than the one we are experiencing now. . . . The very fabric of society is threatened by a process of disintegration. . . . In addition, the absence of a legitimate state authority, enjoying the support of the majority of the people, immensely exacerbates this general crisis, emphasizing the critical importance of speedy movement forward to democratic change. In sum, acting together, we must, at all costs, resist and rebuff any tendency of a slide towards another Somalia or a Bosnia, a development which would have disastrous repercussions extending far beyond the borders of South Africa.149

In speaking to the World Economic Development Congress in September 1993 and the Confederation of British Industry Conference in October, Mandela framed the economic threats as applying domestically and internationally. He again argued that international aid, from private industry and governments, was a large part of the solution. In terms of the violence and the election challenge, Mandela used framing threat in a classic way: to rally people to unite with the ANC against a common enemy. He also posed the battle in universal terms: the inalienable right of people to decide who will govern them versus the continued struggle against racism and oppression. For example, The ANC has worked fervently to bring peace, justice and a better life for all. In these times do not be despondent. Do not lose hope. . . . In these times we need to stand together, we need to work together. . . . I have spent 27 years in jail. Others like Chris Hani . . . have paid the supreme price, so that all of us can have a better life. . . . Our country will be the symbol of hope for the rest of Africa and the world. In these times we need to be firm and steady as we take our country through the stormy waters.150

A final example of this strategy was Mandela’s inaugural address, on May 10, 1994. At this time he mentioned both the threats of violence and poverty, and offers unity as the solution. Near the middle of the speech, he cited the “bloodthirsty


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forces which still refuse to see the light.” He continued: The time for the healing of the wounds has come. . . . We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender and other discrimination. . . . We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity—a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world.

At the end of the speech, he indicated the challenges and asserted the solution: “We understand it still that there is no easy road to freedom. We know it well that none of us acting alone can achieve success. We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation building, for the birth of a new world.”151 In summary, Mandela used the framing threat strategy to get the liberation movement to talk, interrupting the NP’s campaign to achieve legitimacy without the commitment to end apartheid. Then, framing threat was an especially significant strategy for maintaining negotiations when the NP was involved in promoting violence, and when it was so obstinate about the minority veto, the transitional government, and the election date. Finally, Mandela used framing threat as part of the effort to turn people toward the elections while the violence continued and the spoilers stayed out. The intermestic nature of Mandela’s framing threat strategy furthered his goals by pulling in the international community, then using its support (1) to assure his domestic audience that the threats could be addressed, and (2) to pressure the white government.

Conclusion South Africa’s transition represents the kind of case we are more likely to see in contemporary international politics—internal conflicts and regime change with a weighty international dimension. In these cases, how the leaders in each case conduct intermestic policy making may be crucial to understanding the process of transition and the likelihood for an inclusive, long-lasting, peaceful outcome. This chapter told the story of how Nelson Mandela and his colleagues made conscious decisions to involve the international community in the country’s internal affairs in order to pursue their agenda with their various domestic audiences. In turn, he appealed to the international community to get involved by emphasizing elements of the domestic situation. Table 5.1 sums up the strategies and which goals they addressed. Perhaps the successful outcome in this case is due to the fact that the ANC and particular international actors had a long relationship and it was clear exactly what Mandela’s agenda was: liberation for black and white South Africans from the racist apartheid ideology. In the case of General Musharraf in Pakistan, the subject of Chapter 6, the motivation of the leader has not been as clear, with tragic implications for the external actors to which he has broadened audience.

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Table 5.1 Summary of Nelson Mandela’s use of strategy Leadership Strategy

Mandela’s Use of Strategy


Broadening audience

Reached out to white establishment; with nonwhite masses, alternately kept in dark and reached out to them; abroad, cultivated international actors to push agenda and gain legitimacy at home

Convincing blacks and whites to talk; asserting leadership of ANC; pursuing ANC agenda in talks; dealing with spoilers; winning election with right balance for governing

Tying hands

International policies gave the ANC the option to negotiate only and pushed toward some concessions; when reached limits to concessions, mass action showed De Klerk that ANC could not give in; negotiated vote count to keep whites in government

Convincing blacks to talk; pursuing ANC agenda in talks; winning election with right balance for governing

Buying off

To both whites and blacks, he noted that he must talk to others for external help; other parties needed ANC approval for funding; external resources and sunset clauses to address negotiation obstacles; promises of internal and external funds to spoilers for cooperation; external funds for campaign

Convincing blacks and whites to talk; asserting leadership of ANC; pursuing ANC agenda in talks; dealing with spoilers; winning election

Framing threat

Whites may convince states to lift sanctions if the ANC does not agree to negotiate; threat to international community so it had to help; threat from white violence meant he had to talk to them; threat from poverty so had to have elections and external help; spoilers outside of system had to be brought in or civil war was possible

Convincing blacks to talk; pursuing ANC agenda in talks; dealing with spoilers; winning election


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Significant Events in the South Africa Case152 1948 1960 1964 1976 1983 1984–1986 1985 1986 1987 1988 July 1989 September 1989 October 1989 December 1989 February 1990 August 1990 July 1991 September 1991

December 1991 March 1992 May 1992 June 1992 July 1992 September 1992 November 1992 April 1993 July 1993 August 1993 October 1993 November 1993 December 1993 January 1994 March 1994

National Party comes to power; legal institution of apartheid begins. Sharpeville Massacre; ANC banned. Mandela sentenced to life in prison. Soweto revolt. UDF formed to fight tricameral parliament created this year, denying power to blacks. Township uprising; States of Emergency declared in 1985, 1986. Mandela and Kobie Coetsee begin secret talks. U.S. Congress passes comprehensive sanctions legislation over Reagan’s veto. Talks in England begin. South Africa, Cuba, and Angola sign accord ending regional conflicts; government team begins meeting Mandela in prison. Botha and Mandela meet. De Klerk replaces Botha as president. Sisulu and several other ANC leaders released from prison. De Klerk and Mandela meet; OAU issues Harare Declaration. Mandela released; ANC and SACP unbanned. ANC suspends armed struggle; government agrees to lift repressive measures (Pretoria Minute). Mandela elected party president at key policy conference. National Peace Accord signed, bringing together government, nongovernmental groups, and international actors to confront escalating violence. CODESA I starts. De Klerk holds whites-only referendum on negotiations. CODESA II begins. Boipatong massacre; rolling mass action begins; CODESA II collapses. Mandela calls on OAU and the United Nations for intervention; the United Nations agrees to send observers. Bisho massacre; observers arrive; Record of Understanding signed. “Sunset clauses” adopted. Chris Hani murdered. Election date agreed; IFP and Conservative Party leave talks. Mandela secretly meets Afrikaner Volksfront leader. Freedom Alliance forms. Interim constitution agreed; the United States lifts sanctions. TEC (multiparty interim government) starts to function. PAC renounces armed struggle, joins election race. Bophuthatswana and Ciskei governments overthrown; Viljoen forms Freedom Front, breaking from Freedom Alliance.

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April 1994

May 1994 May 1996 June 1996


Mandela agrees to Buthelezi demand for international talks about fate of KwaZulu; offers land to Zulu king; IFP enters elections; elections take place April 26–28. Inauguration of Mandela as president; Government of National Unity (GNU) formed to function until 1999 elections. New constitution adopted, to take force in 1999. National Party withdraws from GNU.

CHAPTER 6 PAKISTAN’S MUSHARRAF: THE WAR ON TERROR AND FUELING THE JIHAD, 2001–2005

Introduction Pakistan hangs in a precarious balance. As a nuclear power having fought three wars over Kashmir with nuclear India, as the home of radical jihad groups nurtured there since the 1970s, and as a hideout for al Qaeda and Taliban fighters since the U.S.-led war on neighboring Afghanistan in late 2001, Pakistan’s actions in international politics influence both regional and international stability. In turn, Pakistan’s foreign policy is intimately entwined with its domestic political context. Repeating a history of failure of democratically elected governments, General Pervez Musharraf took power in a military coup in 1999. Both international isolation and seemingly insurmountable domestic challenges confronted the new leader immediately. Despite this grim situation, Musharraf managed to manipulate domestic and international factors to his advantage. While the cases of Iraq, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Zimbabwe were also significant to regional security and U.S. interests, Pakistan in the Musharraf era is viewed by many as absolutely critical in the American policy to fight global terrorism. Policy makers have not sufficiently viewed Musharraf as engaging in intermestic politics and thus have seriously misjudged Pakistan’s role in this “war on terror.” On one hand, the general’s usurpation of power raised the ire of international donors and policy makers in democracy-promoting states such as the United States, anger that was reflected in wide-ranging sanctions. Domestically, Musharraf faced abysmal economic conditions, perceived security threats from India, and a growing Islamic fundamentalist movement pressuring for an even tougher stance against India in the disputed Kashmir region. This chapter tells the story of Musharraf ’s leadership strategies, as he successfully manipulated changes in the post–September 11 world to insulate his authoritarian regime from external criticism and usurp even more power. The next section provides a background of Pakistan’s political history, centered on several key themes and ending with how Musharraf came to power. Subsequently, the impossible situation facing Musharraf highlights challenges to his

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rule, Pakistan’s internal stability, and external security. Indeed, as with the other cases in this book, this leader faced a puzzle: How could Musharraf balance diametrically opposed domestic and international demands, managing to put aside his international pariah status and yet still cope with powerful domestic opposition that was only strengthened by improved relations with the international community? Finally, four sections provide an account of how Musharraf ’s leadership strategies enabled him to engage in successful intermestic policy making, using elements of the domestic environment to further international goals and manipulating the external environment to address challenges on the home front. Looking at the Pakistan situation through the lenses of leader strategies reveals that American foreign policy toward post–September 11 Pakistan is deeply misguided: the United States sees Pakistan’s Musharraf as a key to fighting terrorism, but Pakistan in fact has become one of its central staging grounds. Historical Background A few basic facts about Pakistan help set the stage. This country is located in South Asia, with India sharing the southwest border and Afghanistan to the north. Pakistan gained independence when British India was partitioned in 1947, but consisted of two wings separated by 1,000 miles of India (East and West Pakistan). War with India over the fate of Kashmir (for which each claimed sovereignty) occurred in 1948, and another clash between the two states occurred in 1971 when India supported the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Since 1958, when Field Marshal Ayub Khan orchestrated the first coup, the military has been a major player in the formation of governments. After that, civilians have been in control only in 1973–1977 (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) and 1988–1999 (alternating between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the leaders of two major secular parties).1 The civilian governments were plagued by “corruption, incompetence, oppression, and infighting,”2 which is why takeover by the military has often been popular with the general public. Pakistan’s population is 138 million (compared with over 1 billion in its rival, India), with about one-third of the population below the poverty line and another 21 percent just above it. At independence, the literacy rate was 16 percent; in 2004 it was still only 35 percent (compared to 18 percent and 65 percent in India, respectively). Its gross domestic product (GDP) is about $75 billion in absolute terms. Pakistan spends less than 2 percent of its GDP on education and about 5 percent of its GDP on defense. Unemployment is high and the state of public health care and other social services is in decline.3 The devastating earthquake of 2005 plunged Pakistan to even deeper desperation. Still, this country has devoted massive resources to the military and to the development of nuclear weapons. This imbalance is due to the evolution of Pakistan’s national identity and foreign policy priorities, all inextricably bound to its political instability and diverse population. Several core, interrelated themes run throughout Pakistan’s history and remain predominant in the contemporary era: the perception of a grave security threat from neighboring India (with whom it fought several wars); the dominant role of the military and intelligence services in building the state’s national, Islamic identity;

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the shifting back and forth of political control from civilians to the military; the relationship of patronage with the United States, marked by ups and downs of close alliance and perceived American betrayal; and internal political violence due to sectarian (among various Sunni and Shi’a groups) and ethnic tensions, the latter that affects relations with neighboring Afghanistan. This section provides an overview of Pakistan’s history with emphasis on these themes. As one Pakistani scholar put it, “The military, which has dominated the Pakistani state since the mid-1950s, has embraced a tripartite policy that emphasizes Islam as a national unifier, [dominating in] rivalry with India as the principal objective of the state’s foreign policy, and an alliance with the United States as a means to defray the costs of Pakistan’s massive military expenditures.”4 Pakistan was born into conflict with India. Conflict and relative power have influenced Pakistan to seek external allies. The United States has always been the “patron of choice” for Pakistan, supplying both weapons and aid: “In one of its first overtly political initiatives, Pakistan’s intelligence community fabricated evidence of a communist threat to Pakistan to get U.S. attention. . . .”5 In actual fact, American and Pakistani interests have often clashed. Some examples include the following: in the 1960s the dismantling of the initial U.S.-Pakistan alliance against communism; President Carter imposing sanctions after a military coup; and fracturing again after the Cold War, over Pakistan’s nuclear program and failure to democratize.6 The specific concerns that affected these relations are included in the following pages. During the late 1940s, the creation of a largely Hindu state in India and a largely Muslim state in Pakistan was marked by massive and bloody shifting of people around the region, yet still left significant divisions among Pakistanis (and Indians). As a result, Pakistan is predominantly Sunni Muslim, but also has a number of ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian groups. For example, while a majority of Pakistanis are Punjabis (63 percent), several minorities have had separatist tendencies. The Pashtuns, about 10 percent of the population, see fellow Pashtuns across the border in Afghanistan as brethren, making it imperative to Pakistan’s central government that the regime in Afghanistan is friendly. A long-term separatist movement exists in another border area called Baluchistan, where a Baluch rebellion in the 1970s was defeated by the Pakistani military. As noted, Bengalis already seceded to form their own state of Bangladesh. Since the 1980s, Shi’a and Sunni groups have engaged in low-intensity conflict in several areas, notably the urban center of Karachi. Still, contrary to the image much of this chapter evokes, the majority of Pakistan’s Islamic population is moderate and not extremist or militant. Because of these divides, the state focused on building consensus around a national identity in Pakistan. Since the death of its founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, whose vision was a democratic, tolerant, secular country, Pakistan adopted an Islamic identity and sought to rally the nation against India as part of protecting this identity. At the same time, there was a recognized need to “manage” militant Islam to prevent internal instability and disruption of relations with Western allies.7 Given the embedded connection between India and Pakistan’s national identity, the military and intelligence services have been central to the cultivation of an Islamic identity.

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Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a civilian in power from 1971 to 1977, looked to Islam to rebuild national identity after the devastating loss of East Pakistan. He oversaw writing of a new constitution giving religious parties a chance to play a key role for the first time, declaring Islam the state religion, and promoting the Islamization of society in other ways. Significantly in terms of future impact, Bhutto excepted Islamic boarding schools from state control.8 The overthrow of Bhutto in 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq in alliance with Islamist groups began the most intense strengthening of the mosque–military alliance, the legacy of which shapes Pakistani politics today. Indeed, Zia “undoubtedly went furthest in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state, and he nurtured the jihadist ideology that now threatens to destabilize the Islamic world.”9 As with Musharraf two decades later, Zia promised that his coup would be followed by elections. However, much like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks for Musharraf, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed everything because of American interests in countering Soviet actions and U.S. perceptions that Zia’s support was crucial in this effort. Decades before the invasion, promoting an Islamic identity in the nation-building project was part of Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan to acquire a friendly neighbor for the struggle against India and to dampen Pashtun separatism in the Pakistan-Afghan border regions. Military leaders argued that Afghanistan’s hope for fostering ethnic nationalism and creating Pashtunistan was tied to India’s efforts to pull Pakistan apart.10 The only way to make Afghanistan a necessary strategic ally would be to help those take power who wanted to revive “Islam’s glory.” Thus, by the 1960s, the intelligence services in Pakistan were pushing Pakistani Islamist groups to build alliances with ideological compatriots in Afghanistan. In 1973, Jamaat-e-Islam Afghanistan came to Pakistan and was provided financial support and military training for its struggle against those in power in Afghanistan. The need of the United States for guerrilla fighters to oppose the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 fit well with the Pakistani military’s agenda, first begun with support for a low-intensity conflict across the border in 1973.11 Given this context of shared interests with Pakistan, the Western international community turned a blind eye as Zia changed the constitution to increase his power and bring Islam into politics.12 General Zia adopted several specific policies that expanded the influence of Islamic groups and led to the creation of new ones; a few examples illustrate the point. He made the collection of zakat (a 2.5 percent tax of assets and savings Muslims are obligated to give to charity) a government function and created a network of Islamic groups to distribute the money.13 Much of these funds went to the building of madaris; ever since, these radical schools have flourished while public school funding has been cut.14 One of the groups strengthened by Zia was Jamaat-e-Islami. Formed in 1941, Jamaat or JI is one of the oldest influential Islamic political organizations, drawing support from the urban middle classes and advocating Islamic revolution. Zia gave Jamaat control over several ministries.15 In addition, Zia increased the power of the military intelligence services, placing the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) in charge of covert operations to undercut support for opposition political parties and to increase the influence of their Islamist counterparts.16


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Zia’s efforts also tied Pakistan to regional dynamics and relations in the Islamic world that continue to affect the context for Pervez Musharraf in the contemporary era. Soon after taking power, Zia put the ISI in charge of recruiting, training, and operations of the mujahideen, which would take part in the anti-Soviet fight in Afghanistan and eventually the Kashmir insurgency. Further, Zia received a great deal of American support as the latter funded the mujahideen, and Saudi Arabia was the most generous provider of funds to Pakistan (as well as the mujahideen). In fact, the two major fundamentalist parties in Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islaami (JI) and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islami ( JUI) are backed by the conservative Wahhabi sect in Saudi Arabia to which the Saudi royal family belongs.17 Iran attempted to gain influence over Shi’a groups in Pakistan to balance Saudi influence; the two states still engage in funding rival sectarian organizations and militias.18 Many of the groups funded and trained by the ISI to fight India in Kashmir had an increasingly destabilizing effect within Pakistan itself. For example, Sipah-e-Sahaba launched a relentless campaign against the Shi’a minority, killing over 3,600 people since the 1990s.19 Thus, sectarian terrorism in Pakistan since the 1980s is not merely a domestic issue but is directly connected to regional power struggles and global struggles within the Islamic world. A shift away from Zia’s approach began in 1984 when he called for a referendum on his Islamization program to silence its critics. The official turnout was 60 percent, with 99.7 percent voting “yes.” However, since the “no” vote was prevented from campaigning and the results were suspicious, many saw the referendum as a sham. By the time of parliamentary elections in February 1985, which Zia declared would be “non-party” based, opposition parties were boycotting the vote. Zia’s cabinet ministers were defeated, several former Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) members won seats (the party of Bhutto, whom Zia had overthrown and killed), and there was no significant increase in the Islamist parties’ seats. This National Assembly moved away from the Islamization project. In defiance, Zia dissolved the National Assembly in May 1988 and commanded that all judicial decisions were to be based on Sharia (Islamic law). He died in a mysterious plane crash a few months later (August 1988).20 Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir, replaced him. She and Nawaz Sharif, of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), would alternate in the position of prime minister until Musharraf ’s coup in 1999.21 Though to a lesser extent, these leaders also viewed the Islamic identity as a political opportunity. For example, Benazir Bhutto drew members of JUI into her government as a coalition partner and helped put the Taliban in power in Afghanistan.22 Most importantly, the effects of Islamization under Zia continued to impact Pakistani politics and also created constraints in the conduct of domestic and foreign policy. Again, Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan demonstrate these relationships. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the United States ended its relationship with the Pakistan military; Pakistan was forced to find new security relationships to counter India. Relations worsened still when the United States was unable to assert that Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons, and in accordance with U.S. law, imposed sanctions cutting off military funding.23 Until then, Pakistan received about $6 billion in U.S. aid per year.24 In the early 1990s, the Northern Alliance, consisting of jihadi groups that Pakistan had supported since the early 1970s, was

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ruling Afghanistan, but not very well. Revulsion among Afghanis to their disastrous situation gave rise to the Taliban, a group of religious scholars that emerged from the Pakistani madaris who were guided by extremist Islam but also by Pashtun supremacy. In the early 1990s, Bhutto, assisted by her Director-General of Military Operations Pervez Musharraf, shifted support from allies in the mujahideen to the Taliban. Pakistanis thought that they were buying a loyal ally, providing “strategic depth” in the struggle against India.25 Osama bin Laden and his monetary support arrived on the scene as the Taliban was taking control of Kabul in May 1996. Support for the Taliban was a major part of Pakistan’s foreign policy, but was also integral to its domestic policy. Beyond strategic depth, the relationship gave the ISI the opportunity to use the Taliban and al Qaeda to provide facilities and expertise to the jihadis fighting for Kashmir. Domestically, the friendship with the Taliban helped address two trends since the 1970s and 1980s. Civilian governments had a way to provide patronage to the growing number of Islamists and to build a support structure among them. Also, Pakistan’s leaders could address Pashtun alienation within Pakistan, while steering the Taliban clear of efforts to encourage Pashtun separatism.26 Indeed, the U.S. pressure on Pakistan’s leadership to turn against the Taliban in October 2001 was a difficult decision because of the role strategic depth played in Pakistan’s historic struggle against India, the Kashmir cause, and the relationship between these goals and the military’s efforts to cultivate Pakistan’s Islamic identity. As with Afghanistan policy, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy was part of building an Islamic identity. India claims that Jammu and Kashmir is a state of India, legitimized by the choice of the maharajah who was granted permission to choose independence, accession to India, or accession to Pakistan. However, the region is majority Muslim in terms of population (about 75 percent at the time of independence), which prompted Pakistan to argue that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan. The two states fought right after achieving independence, ending with a cease-fire in January 1949; India controlled about two-thirds of Kashmir and Pakistan one-third (the Northern Areas and Azad [or Free] Kashmir). Meanwhile, India had referred the situation to the United Nations in 1948, but the two sides were deadlocked over various solutions proposed by the United Nations. One of the most promising was a plebiscite, in which the people of Kashmir could choose by whom they would be governed. Still, there was disagreement on the details of such a proposal and India, consolidating its power, eventually argued that there was no need for a referendum. The Cold War deadlock on the UN Security Council dictated a lack of resolute action from this body, as Pakistan allied with the United States and India with the Soviet Union.27 In 1965, the two states went to war again. Pakistan launched an operation into Kashmir, hoping to inspire a revolt against Indian rule; the operation failed, perhaps because Pakistan failed to notify Kashmiri leaders. India responded by opening a front into Pakistan. With the pressure and help of UN negotiators, the two parties reestablished the 1949 cease-fire line. The miscalculations of Pakistan’s leader, Ayub Khan, eventually forced him from power. The subsequent event most significant to today’s situation occurred in talks ending the war over Bangladesh. At that time (1972), India and Pakistan signed the Simla Accord. It became most


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notable for its effect on the Kashmir situation: Bhutto agreed to the term “line of control” in place of “cease-fire line.” Critics argued he thus signaled the willingness in the future to concede the international border at this line. In addition, both states agreed to settle differences peacefully through bilateral talks or other peaceful methods to which they both consented. Ever since, India has used this agreement to reject one of Pakistan’s main goals: to internationalize the dispute by demanding that India comply with UN resolutions on holding the plebiscite and/or by involving the United States in negotiations.28 The contemporary phase of the conflict began in 1988 when the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), supplied by the ISI, bombed Srinagar (the Kashmiri capital). This Pakistan-supported insurgency and India’s effort to end it has claimed 60,000 lives (by Pakistan accounts) or 20,000 lives (by Indian accounts).29 With the end of the war in Afghanistan and the escalation of Indian repression, the ISI focused its work on Kashmir. In addition, the civilian politician Nawaz Sharif used the liberation of Kashmir as a cause to mobilize popular support in the 1990 election campaign, rallying Pakistanis around the effort to unite with its Muslim brothers. “By the end of 1991, the ISI was helping Pakistani and international volunteers, including veterans of the Afghan jihad, to cross over into Indiancontrolled Kashmir and mount guerrilla attacks against Indian forces. Thus Kashmir’s indigenous struggle for self-determination became linked with the global jihad of the Islamists.”30 Pakistan recruited more foreigners in the struggle both to gain greater control over the insurgency and to gain sympathy from other Islamic states for the cause in Kashmir. The latter was a tactic to further the strategy of internationalization of the dispute. Jamaat-i-Islami’s armed branch Hizb ulMujahideen was the most influential in the 1990s, eventually facing competition from Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. All of these groups have been backed by the Pakistan state.31 By 1992, the United States threatened Pakistan with the “state sponsor of terrorism” label. Along with this certification would come a much harsher sanctions regime than that imposed for Pakistan’s nuclear program in 1989; the threatened sanctions would have cut off World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) aid. Sharif avoided sanctions by promising to end support for Kashmiri militants and to purge the ISI of its most radical elements, but he also asked for an active American role in resolving the conflict. Like Musharraf later, Sharif used the argument that too much American pressure on the government would lead to the takeover by the mullahs.32 Despite American expectations to the contrary, during the subsequent term of Benazir Bhutto (1993–1996) the Pakistani position on Kashmir hardened as Bhutto responded to pressure from the ISI to stop apologizing for the Kashmir policy. Islamic groups were free to raise money and campaign among the public for the Kashmir cause. The ISI demanded that Pakistan Television broadcast shows depicting Indian atrocities in Kashmir. Bhutto did appeal to the United States for help in standing up to the radicals, but domestically this backfired as the Islamists condemned her focus on cultivating Western favor.33 During Sharif ’s second term (1997–1999), he made little effort to stop the growth of the militants’ role in Kashmir until he invited Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Lahore for talks in

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February 1999. The two leaders agreed privately to achieve a solution to the Kashmir problem by the end of 1999, and at Lahore they set up a series of backchannel meetings.34 At the same time, during this meeting, the Islamic radicals organized a massive protest that escalated into a riot in Pakistan. Indeed, even this brief overview demonstrates that the civilian leaders of Pakistan were unable to formulate their own policies regarding India and Kashmir.35 While the Lahore process was ongoing, the military was up to something completely different at Kargil—actions that reached a new level of danger now that both states possessed small nuclear arsenals. The conflict over Kashmir reached a new peak during the Kargil operation in winter 1998–1999, and again demonstrated the limits of civilian control when it comes to this issue. This event was also the beginning of the end of Pakistan’s last civilian government. At this time Musharraf was Sharif’s Chief of Army Staff. In a risky operation, Musharraf gave the Pakistani military the order to occupy an area on the Indian side of the line of control. To this day, Pakistan claims that only Islamic militants crossed the border, a myth foreign governments have not challenged publicly because it allowed Pakistan to back down more easily.36 The operation was a tactical success but created a political disaster. When India discovered the incursion in May 1999, it mobilized its air force and army for battle throughout the summer. Sharif was the object of intense pressure from the international community, led by the United States. Having defied the rest of the world by carrying out nuclear tests in response to India’s tests in May 1998, Sharif was viewed at home as a nationalist hero. Capitulating to international pressure and withdrawing from Kargil left Sharif as the symbol of Pakistan’s humiliation, especially among the army command and its more Islamicized ranks.37 The perception by the army command that Sharif squandered its advances precipitated the coup in October 1999. Ironically, when Musharraf took the reins of power, he faced negative world opinion because of Kargil. Since the 1980s, Pakistan emphasized to the international community that India was an outlaw because of its human rights abuses in Kashmir and its failure to respect UN solutions. With Kargil, Pakistan “had instead managed to enhance its image as an aggressive and unpredictable state.”38 As a result, the Kargil operation worsened even further the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. Just the year before Sharif had defied U.S. pleas to cancel the nuclear tests. Also in 1998, the United States launched missiles through Pakistan’s airspace at an Afghanistan-based al Qaeda camp in retaliation for bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Two of the four camps that were hit were ISI facilities and several militants under ISI tutelage were killed; the intelligence services were furious at the Americans.39 In the end, the domestic fallout from foreign policy decisions concerning Kashmir and Afghanistan ended civilian rule in Pakistan. The coup in Pakistan followed continued divisions between the civilian Sharif government and the military over both U.S. demands to end support for the Taliban and over U.S. pressure to withdraw from Kargil.40 While the military leader was on a flight on October 12, 1999, Prime Minister Sharif ordered that Musharraf ’s plane be diverted from Pakistan. After a series of events, Musharraf ’s men took control, arresting Sharif and insuring that the general’s plane landed safely. From the beginning, Musharraf


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emphasized that he did not take power but instead was thrust into the role of saving the nation from the disaster that the civilian leadership had wrought. To reflect this role he took the title, “Chief Executive.” He emphasized that his seven main priorities would include rebuilding national morale, restoring democracy, strengthening the federal government to restore national cohesion, reviving the economy and bringing back investor confidence, establishing law and order, depoliticizing state institutions, devolving power to the grassroots, and ensuring accountability.41 As the next section illustrates, the obstacles to accomplishing these goals were immense. This overview of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign relations shows how history has shaped Pakistan’s contemporary situation (main events in this and the following sections are summarized in the chronology at the end of this chapter). First, the connections are undeniable between domestic issues (e.g., national identity and state cohesion) and foreign policy issues (such as policy toward India, Afghanistan, and the United States). Second, past and previous leaders’ manipulations of this history gave certain issues priority for any Pakistani leader: the need to resolve favorably the Kashmir dispute, the prominent role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s state ideology, the imperative of avoiding abandonment by the United States again, and the urgency of having good relations with the neighboring Afghanistan regime. As with the other leaders in this book, to achieve his goals, Musharraf had to establish domestic and international legitimacy. The challenge in doing so is that many of these goals are at cross-purposes. The impossible situation the general faced after taking power made this fact very clear. An Impossible Situation How leaders interpret the world around them and succeed in manipulating their internal and external contexts to their advantage often poses a puzzle. Despite the tendency of hindsight to judge that a situation was “just right” for a leader to get what he wanted, careful scrutiny often shows that success was in fact unlikely. In the cases examined thus far, using the analytical tool of leadership strategies we have seen how leaders manipulated aspects of domestic context to further their foreign policy agenda and aspects of the international context to further their domestic goals. Indeed, when we consider the process of intermestic policy making we shed light on these puzzles. In this Pakistan case, Pervez Musharraf faced five major obstacles. His efforts to cope with them were complicated by the fact that addressing one obstacle often intensified another. This section elaborates on the challenges, and the subsequent sections apply each strategy to further understanding of how he managed such a complex situation. The five challenges were as follows: (1) addressing Pakistan’s dire economic conditions; (2) coping with international pariah status because of the military takeover, as well as other recent “outlaw” behavior; (3) insuring security from India and resolving the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s favor; (4) limiting the increasing power of militant Islamists; and (5) countering Pakistan’s lack of national cohesion and the breakdown of law and order.

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By 1999 when Musharraf took power, Pakistan was in a “prolonged deep social and economic crisis,” with its state institutions “so weak that no leader has ever been able to get his or her ideas enacted.”42 Poverty was rampant, with debt growing from $15 billion in 1986 to $34 billion in 1999.43 In 2003, though the defense budget had been reduced to comply with international lending restrictions, defense expenditures still amounted to 54.5 percent of the budget. This astounding number compares to 35.5 percent spent on development, again both after forced reforms—these numbers were “better” than when Musharraf took power.44 Besides having spending priorities unmatched with the country’s urgent needs, the state takes in little money for its budget from the people: fewer than 1 percent pay taxes.45 In his first address to the nation after taking control of government, Musharraf used words such as “despondency” and “hopelessness” to describe Pakistan’s situation and stated that one of the main reasons for the coup was the economic situation. Still, a few additional statistics show that the economy continued its decline, which began in the 1980s, during the first few years of his rule. Especially notable were the unemployment and poverty rates. The former was 5.37 percent in 1996 and 7.82 percent by 2002. The poverty rate was 17.32 percent in 1987–1988 and 32 percent by 2002.46 Long-term declining investment in education pushed many poor people to send children to madaris; not only are there no fees but also the children receive free food and clothing. The economic impact of this circumstance is that Pakistan has a growing pool of young people who are uneducated and unskilled because the madaris educate students only about conservative Islam. The brief snapshot indicates that Musharraf was correct in his assessment: the dire economic situation was one of his biggest challenges. It also impacted his ability to deal with other challenges. For example, insuring Pakistan’s security by continuing the struggle in Kashmir and maintaining the nuclear program were expensive. As he said, “Only with a viable economy will the security of Pakistan be guaranteed.”47 In addition, the economy made overcoming a second challenge absolutely crucial. Pakistan had become an international pariah, subjected to damaging sanctions, but could only improve its economic health with external aid, trade, and investment. Coping with international pariah status was so important not only because Musharraf realized integration with the external world was the only way to address the economy, but also because the U.S. relationship was crucial to acquiring weapons and for pushing India to talk about Kashmir.48 When Musharraf took power, the United States imposed even more sanctions and, dreadfully for Pakistan, continued to move closer to India. Since the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program was intensified in the 1980s, the country was under sanctions from the United States. Even more damaging and wide-ranging sanctions were applied by the Americans and international lending agencies after the nuclear tests in 1998. By U.S. law, when Musharraf launched the coup in October 1999, foreign assistance to Pakistan was prohibited; Pakistan became ineligible for all U.S. aid except humanitarian or food assistance. This blow was intensified when, two weeks after the coup, President Clinton waived the nuclear-related sanctions on India (also imposed after that country’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998). A final blow was struck when sanctions were


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imposed in November 2000 (and renewed by George W. Bush in early September 2001) because Pakistan was importing missile technology and materiel from China.49 In addition to American and European concerns about the role of the military in Pakistan’s democracy and the weapons issues (including its refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), foreign actors increasingly viewed Pakistan as a rogue state because of the Kargil invasion and its support for the Taliban. Indeed, Pakistan was only one of three states that recognized the Taliban. Intensifying its isolation was the fact that much of the outside world was warming to India. The Clinton administration perceived India as a better partner in South Asia. Guided in its foreign policy generally by policies of “geoeconomics,” “engagement” (with market democracies), and “enlargement” (of the “club” of these market democracies), Clinton’s team deepened relations with India to take advantage of its move to open markets. The Americans also treated India more as a legitimate nuclear weapons state (though still pressuring it to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) while Pakistan was painted as a dangerous proliferation challenge.50 India’s reaction to the coup was essential to further isolation for Pakistan regionally and globally. At that time, India launched a massive propaganda campaign painting the military coup as a threat to peace and stability in the region. India also engineered the cancellation of a November 1999 summit in Nepal of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) because India refused to interact with Pakistan’s military leaders; earlier this had been a fruitful avenue for India-Pakistan interaction. Finally, India’s denouncing of Pakistan at the Commonwealth summit in November 1999 led to the Commonwealth’s suspension of Pakistan’s membership, a symbol of international condemnation.51 Symbolizing the shift toward India was Clinton’s visit to South Asia in March 2000. The American president spent five days in India, working on substantive issues and demonstrating a sense of goodwill. The trip to Pakistan was cut to only about five hours, during which time the Americans demanded the streets be shut down to insure security. Musharraf and Clinton did not exude a sense of mutual goodwill but instead demonstrated clashing opinions on most issues. Clinton pressured Musharraf on Afghanistan, pushing Pakistan to cut relations with the Taliban (which Musharraf refused). Clinton’s statement on Kashmir was especially bad news: he essentially agreed with the Indian view that the 1972 Simla Agreement committed the states to resolve the dispute bilaterally.52 Prior to September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration took the same approach to Pakistan (though it had resolved to lift the 1998 sanctions), with even more vigor focused on India’s rapidly expanding economy, fast-growing information technology capabilities, and relatively stable democracy. The line on Kashmir remained the same as Clinton’s—that the two parties must engage in bilateral talks. Even China, long a Pakistani strategic ally, moved closer to India in this period. Seeking stability on its borders, China made it a priority to achieve more normal relations with India while adopting a more distant stance toward Pakistan. Indeed, China saw Pakistan as somewhat reckless after Kargil and the nuclear tests. While still a source of military and economic aid to Pakistan, China shifted toward the Indian “bilateral talks” line on Kashmir and away from a commitment to help Pakistan. 53

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In all the ways described earlier, Musharraf inherited and significantly deepened Pakistan’s pariah status. In the first year of his rule, he only intensified this status by continuing to consolidate power. On one hand, he appeared to be committed to democratic rule in the near future. When he took over and named himself chief executive, the general said he would hold elections soon. He repeated this commitment in January 2000 when he told a television interviewer, “I will not perpetuate myself.”54 In May 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that the coup was legally acceptable under the “doctrine of state necessity” but that elections had to be held three years after the coup. Musharraf agreed to respect this decision.55 On the other hand, in January 2000 when the PML filed the court challenges, Musharraf had demanded that every senior judge in the country swear allegiance to the provisional constitutional order his coup established or resign. The chief justice of the Supreme Court and five others resigned but 89 of 102 other Pakistani judges complied. In the spring of 2000, he also banned all political rallies and public protests; the military began dispersing public gatherings of opposition politicians. In September 2000, the offices of a critical media outlet (Dawn, an English-language newspaper) were raided by soldiers under false pretenses.56 In November 2000, Musharraf took steps toward warmer relations with the outside world. Following an Indian cease-fire, Pakistan withdrew its soldiers from the line of control; Musharraf met with the Indian high commissioner in Islamabad and also reached out for U.S. or UN help in resolving the dispute.57 The two prime ministers agreed to a meeting in India in July 2001. However, in a giant step backward, Musharraf declared himself president before the trip, claiming this title would ensure better treatment and respect from India. Protests from politicians in Pakistan and from the West (especially the United States) erupted, deeply disturbed by the fact that this move stripped away “Pakistan’s last façade of constitutional rule.”58 Already under U.S., European, and Commonwealth pressure to reestablish democracy, curtail its nuclear program, and distance itself from the Taliban, Musharraf was under increasing pressure on Kashmir after September 11, 2001, when the United States was no longer willing to accept that there was no link between militants in Kashmir and Pakistan.59 In other words, though he was isolated internationally when he took power in 1999, things only got worse for the general during the first two years of his rule. How would Musharraf address the second obstacle of ending Pakistan’s isolation without compromising other priorities? The context was even more challenging considering the state of the Kashmir situation when he took power. Indeed, the third obstacle Musharraf faced was insuring security from India and resolving the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s favor in a climate that was moving in the opposite direction. Given Musharraf ’s role in Kargil, it is unsurprising that after the coup tensions with India escalated. In addition, the U.S. position had shifted toward India. Pressure continued to build on Pakistan to end the incursions of militants across the line of control. This situation is a good example of how these multiple challenges made Musharraf ’s situation so impossible. In order to end international isolation, he had to rein in the ISI-trained militants. However, the Kashmir rallying cry pulled together many Pakistanis as a nation; keeping up the


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struggle there was a key part of keeping militants in Pakistan happy and in building national cohesion. The fourth challenge for Musharraf was to limit the increasing power of militant Islamists, some of which allegedly launched several attempts on his life in 200260 (others, alleged to be al Qaeda operatives, tried to kill him in December 2003). The general depended at least initially on the support of some of these groups. Musharraf was brought to power by an army that was “increasingly antiAmerican and fundamentalist” and connected to these groups; the moves of the American government especially since 1998 had fueled the anti-American, Islamist movement in the military.61 When Musharraf instigated the coup, he was generally welcomed by the jihadis. Further, they helped him in some aspects of Kashmir policy by doing the dirty work there (yet he also wanted to get U.S. help on Kashmir, a goal increasingly at cross-purposes to the militancy). As in the past, the relatively small but powerful presence of Islamists—and the Saudi Arabian help in supporting them—also allowed the government to cultivate the Islamic national identity. The latter effort was meant to counter the cohesion problem and enlist help from the Islamic world on Kashmir. When he took power, Musharraf did speak of ending Islamic extremism in Pakistan, but he clearly distinguished between domestic Islamists (especially those engaging in sectarian attacks plaguing the country) and Kashmiri freedom fighters. In 2000, there were eighteen groups focused on the liberation of Kashmir, and Musharraf ’s government took no action toward curbing their activities in the first two years.62 Even in terms of the domestic groups, he made several moves early in his tenure but nearly always backed down on enforcing his decisions.63 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan accused Musharraf of being a “silent spectator” in the ascent of the radical clergy promoting a militant Islam.64 As noted earlier, the mullah–military strategic alliance dates back to the Zia era. However, by the time Musharraf took power in 1999 the number and viciousness of the armed Islamic groups in Pakistan had grown tremendously. The presence of these groups, which have supplied fighters to Afghanistan, Kashmir, and to sectarian battles within Pakistan, has created domestic instability and intensified international isolation. For example, pressure on Musharraf to do something about the negative effects of the Islamists’ power increased soon after he took office. The situation only turned more unstable. In October 2001, militants launched attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld traveled to the region to encourage de-escalation. However, a more egregious attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 ensued and the tensions with India escalated through spring 2002.65 Was the militants’ behavior part of Musharraf ’s strategy to balance domestic and external demands after siding with the United States? How would he deal with the tensions between needing the extremists and ending international isolation? The fifth and final obstacle Musharraf faced was countering Pakistan’s lack of national cohesion and the breakdown of law and order. A number of factors contributed to these problems, several of which were noted earlier. For one, violent traditions in society were strengthened by the wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Due to the instability in Afghanistan, now decades long, about 3 million refugees

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settled in Pakistan. Over the last 20 years, several trends intensified: automatic weapons are numerous, readily available, and flow freely; the heroin smuggling trade has boomed; and the armed radical Islamist groups have grown dramatically.66 For example, in terms of weapons, the number of illegal arms is estimated at about 18 million compared to 2 million legal weapons. The failure of a government ban on the sale and purchase of non-licensed weapons is symbolic of the breakdown of law and order.67 As noted in the discussion of the rise of Islamists, some groups made Pakistan itself their battleground. Devastating violence has rocked Pakistan, especially in the Punjab and particular urban areas such as Karachi, as rival Sunni and Shi’a sects murder each other regularly. One of the most violent Shi’a groups is Sipah-eMohammed Pakistan (SMP); Sunni militants formed Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in 1985, with an even more militant group breaking away and forming Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in 1995. Though the nature of sectarian violence has varied over time, when Musharraf took power it was clear that the security forces were unable to control the violence. Further, one way in which they tried to do so was through extrajudicial killings, contributing even more to the breakdown of law and order.68 The increase in this sectarian terrorism is related to the increase in religious schools69 and dwindling resources for the public education system, a good example of how the collapse of moderating social institutions is related to the economy and to foreign policy. The domination of the education system by zakat- and foreignfunded religious schools presented Musharraf with a dilemma. The madaris have brought support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states and provided Kashmiri insurgents, but also pose a serious threat to stability and have created a huge class of unemployable youth. Besides the training in conservative Islam, 10–15 percent of the schools preach a “particularly virulent kind of hatred or provide military training.” The growth in numbers of schools and people attending them is astounding. There were about 250 madaris at independence, growing to around 3,000 in 1987, and in 2004 estimates ranged from 10,000 to 45,000.70 Another example of the decay of law and order that faced Musharraf when he took power was rampant corruption. In fact, for decades the civilian governments were associated with this problem, and the military has been perceived as the only institution capable of saving the country from the politicians. Musharraf ’s coup was so welcomed by much of the public because he vowed to crack down on corruption, and the people saw him as more able to do that than any politician. Still, this general lack of trust in government undermines any leader’s effort to cultivate legitimacy. Related to law and order and corruption was the issue of the “feudals.” The general had to face the fact that much of the land in Pakistan is owned by a small class of very powerful landowners. The need for land reform was driven by the desire to address the problems of a huge number of poor, landless peasants and low agricultural productivity, but also by the need to limit the autonomy of the feudals. The latter generally have independent justice systems and private prisons.71 These circumstances pose an obvious threat to state institutions and the need to build a cohesive nation.


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Not least of the threats to Pakistan’s cohesion is the lack of agreement on Pakistan’s identity. The country is divided between the civilian and military elite, between Islamists and secularists, and among ethnic and provincial groups.72 In 1999, Musharraf had to cope with the nationalism of regional groups that were a threat to the center.73 Demands for change come from nationalists in Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).74 For example, Baluchistan’s 1970s rebellion was crushed, but resentment strengthened again by the time Musharraf took power and since then (Baluchi separatism was growing more intense at the time of this writing, in mid-2006). Because the province shares a long border with Afghanistan, it has received large numbers of Pashtun refugees since the 1970s. The presence of the Pashtun is viewed as a threat because the Baluchs fear becoming a minority in their own homeland.75 At the core of this issue is the same challenge that faced earlier leaders of Pakistan: What kind of national identity will best pull together the various regions and diverse groups? Previous governments depended to varying degrees on the Islamic identity, which proved to be a double-edged sword. How would Musharraf deal with this challenge, as well as the need to rebuild state institutions (addressing the problems of law and order)? To what extent would addressing these elements of the fifth obstacle work against addressing the other priorities of his regime? The next section investigates Musharraf ’s strategies so that we may understand better the puzzles noted earlier: How did Musharraf get around the very serious challenges he faced when he took power, especially when he was pulled in opposite directions? Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk once said that Pakistan’s “fear, distrust, and hatred of India” meant that the United States “cannot rely on Pakistan to act rationally and in what we think would be in its own interest.”76 When we focus on Musharraf and his domestic and international challenges, Pakistan’s behavior seems very rational indeed. Turning Things Around: Intermestic Policy Making We have seen that numerous connections between Pakistan’s foreign policy and its domestic priorities have always existed. Though observers such as Rusk have posited that we can assess Pakistan’s foreign policy interests in terms of traditional international relations concepts such as security and balance of power, understanding is furthered by looking at Pakistan through different lenses. More explanatory power is gained when we focus on a leader like Musharraf and consider him as making intermestic policy. Indeed, leadership dilemmas in which Pervez Musharraf found himself in 2006 can be understood by using the strategy approach. Especially after September 11, 2001, the international environment changed dramatically and with these changes Musharraf saw the opportunity to pursue his goals, addressing the obstacles previously described.77 The central opportunity Musharraf perceived as the United States launched its “war on terror” was that Pakistan, because of its location and thus strategic value, could end its international isolation and become an ally in this war. The chance to address the other challenges followed from ending its pariah status. As noted previously and observed in the

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other case studies, addressing one problem with a particular strategy often affected the context in a way that created the need to use another strategy. Within each strategy section, the narrative proceeds by describing Musharraf ’s use of the strategy (“how we know it when we see it”) and which challenges the strategy addressed. We begin with broadening audience because it was the cornerstone of Musharraf ’s intermestic policy making. Broadening Audience With the broadening audience strategy, a leader reaches out to create new constituencies in order to build his legitimacy and gain leverage with political constituents. With broadening audience, the leader appeals to new or different actors that they have a stake in what he is trying to do, that his agenda offers them something they need or want. The more actors a leader can get to see the situation his way and to help reinforce his definition of the situation, the better able he is to accomplish his goals. Aided by global events, Musharraf employed this strategy very skillfully to overcome obstacles in the international and domestic arenas. This narrative describes how he broadened audience to the United States and the West, to Islamists in Pakistan, to Islamic and regional states, and perhaps to the opposition party coalition. Before September 11, 2001, Musharraf had made overtures to an international audience. For example, in the effort to cope with the dire economic situation he inherited, he appointed a Pakistan executive at Citibank in New York (Shaukat Aziz) as finance minister to give reassurance to international lenders and investors. He also appointed teams to work on fiscal reform, privatization of state utilities, and lower tariffs in the early days of his regime. The result was “cautious praise” from international financial institutions; indeed, a one-year loan agreement from the IMF showed him that his effort to satisfy the international financial world could be rewarded.78 Once the terrorist attacks of September 2001 changed the landscape of U.S. interests in the region, Musharraf more actively broadened audience. By cooperating in the Afghanistan war (and later deploying the Pakistan military in border regions to catch al Qaeda terrorists), making some (in the end, half-hearted) efforts to limit extremists, and committing to bring madaris under control, he succeeded in ending his pariah status that he earned with his 1999 coup. His decision to side with the United States in the war on terror is the epitome of a successful use of the broadening audience strategy: as he cooperated he also vigorously focused on his domestic issues and how to use the newly cultivated constituency to get what he wanted. When the terrorists struck on September 11, 2001, Musharraf was isolated internationally and was failing in his many domestic initiatives. On September 12, 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage called the Pakistan ambassador to the United States and ISI head Lt. Gen. Mahmood to a meeting in Washington, DC. The United States made it clear to Pakistan that its government was either 100 percent with the Americans or it was with the Taliban.79 Apparently seeing opportunity, in response, in September and October 2001, Pakistan gave the United States airspace rights, access to military bases, and intelligence.80 In a speech to the nation, Musharraf told his people of the


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ultimatum and abandoned sponsorship of the Taliban. He also retired or moved three powerful generals who had helped him with the October 1999 coup but were hard-liners in terms of supporting the Taliban; this maneuver allowed him to consolidate power as well, since they were potential rivals.81 While the framing threat strategy was also crucial at this juncture, the speech to the nation on September 19, 2001 emphasized the international audience: he noted that the U.S. initiative was backed by a UN resolution against terrorism, and that Islamic countries and nearly all others were behind the United States.82 At the United Nations in November 2001, he decried the terrorist attacks and pointed out, “This was an attack on humanity itself, and we all must therefore unite to fight this scourge.”83 By January 2002, as American pressure to address extremism increased following the December 2001 attacks on the Indian parliament by pro-Kashmiri groups, Musharraf reached out to cultivate the international constituency in a significant speech on January 12, 2002. He condemned extremists, banned certain groups, arrested prominent figures, and pledged to start madrassah reform.84 Further broadening audience moves occurred in spring 2002 when tensions with India were high. American and European figures pushed Musharraf to crack down on crossborder raids from Kashmir to India. By May 27, Musharraf met this demand especially because the Americans made it clear that cooperation was a precondition for any more U.S. aid. After this point, the threat of war with India receded and India promised to open a new dialogue.85 Musharraf then argued to his domestic audience that his actions had pushed India to talk, a central goal of Pakistan’s approach to Kashmir. A few other events over the last few years exemplified his use of this strategy. On the eve of a visit to the United States in June 2003, Musharraf denounced the extremist policies being implemented in two of the provinces by the parliamentary alliance of the Islamic parties (the MMA) for the first time. He stressed that he could not allow the “talibanization” of Pakistan; it was on this visit that he secured more trade and aid deals (see buying off ).86 In June 2004, he appointed Shaukat Aziz (the former Citibank executive) as prime minister. Also in 2004 he supported initiatives to improve relations with India and Afghanistan and stepped up the effort to arrest al Qaeda operatives.87 Which obstacles did Musharraf ’s broadening audience to the West address? First and foremost, by becoming an ally in the “War on Terror,” he changed the pariah status bestowed upon him after his coup. While he was first and foremost “military dictator,” now the “western world had a stake in his survival.”88 He gained a stronger sense of international legitimacy, which he needed to address the other obstacles. Indeed, even “token criticism” about the coup faded as democratic leaders from the United States and Europe came to Pakistan to praise him for joining the alliance.89 During his state visit to the United States in February 2002, he received generous praise. “This reception helped him demonstrate to his home audience that his decision to side with the United States had paid off.” Indeed, the United States was very careful about embarrassing him with his domestic audience and thus did not say much at all about the return to democracy in Pakistan.90

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Even by 2005, when it seemed more apparent that Musharraf ’s broadening audience was helping him more than the United States (see later), on a March visit, Secretary of State Condolezza Rice heaped high praise on Musharraf, stating that Pakistan, “has come an enormously long way. . . . This is not the Pakistan of September 11. It is not even the Pakistan of 2002.” She ignored, for example, the rise of the Islamists (see later) and the issue of A.Q. Khan (it had been discovered that the Pakistani nuclear scientist had played a key role in the proliferation of nuclear technology to several states including North Korea, Iran, and Libya).91 In fact, one of the aspects of Pakistan’s pariah status was its nuclear program. Reaching out to the international audience deflected attention from the nuclear program and assisted Musharraf in ending the sanctions imposed after the 1998 tests. His broadening audience to the West also addressed the first obstacle, the economic situation, which flowed from ending his pariah status. The details of progress are elaborated in the discussion of the buying off strategy, because Musharraf actively used the aid from the United States and others that came with cooperation to convince his domestic constituencies why what he was doing was “worth it.” But relevant here is the fact that the move to reach out to the West and posit that Pakistan was an indispensable partner in the war on terror did bring aid that furthered Musharraf ’s economic goals. The challenge of dealing with the India threat and pursuing the Kashmir cause was also addressed by broadening audience. As noted, the diplomatic pressure in spring 2002 resulted in the quid quo pro that Pakistan would pull back in the confrontation and India would agree to new talks. Musharraf argued that the alliance with the West helped push India. Siding with the United States against the Taliban, Musharraf hoped to shift the United States away from its increasingly prevalent view of India as the regional favorite. In addition, “Musharraf and the Pakistani leadership hoped that Pakistan’s support for U.S. policy in Afghanistan would lead the United States to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s support for militancy in Kashmir and to provide some diplomatic support for a Kashmir settlement with which Pakistan would be comfortable.”92 He was actually less successful here than he needed to be, which is why he also broadened audience to Islamists and other states as well as to the West (see later). Broadening audience to include Pakistan as part of the international, antiterrorist alliance gave Musharraf strength from the outside, which emboldened and enabled him to consolidate power. He did so as part of the effort to counter the breakdown of law and order (the fifth obstacle). He engaged in marginalizing the civilian party politicians, acting against principles of democracy traditionally promoted by the West, and addressing sectarian terrorism and ethnic resistance. For example, while his January 2002 reforms were announced as part of the crackdown on terrorism, the measures he called electoral reforms were actually mechanisms the military could use to manage the new Parliament to be elected in October 2002. In creating these reforms, Musharaff effectively banned Bhutto and Sharif from participating in elections; a total of 85 seats would be appointed by his government, and some constituencies were redrawn. Also, by 2002 the National Accountability Board established by Musharraf upon seizing power to root out corruption was being


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used politically by the military as leverage to control politicians; more politicians were beholden to the power of the military regime because the alternative was investigation and conviction.93 The referendum Musharraf held in the spring of 2002 was an additional step to insure he would maintain control if all these measures failed.94 Indeed, as U.S. Special Forces were arriving in spring 2002, he announced the referendum to legitimize his position. He campaigned to stay in power for five more years “to permit economic recovery, the restoration of democracy, the end to extremism, and the ‘achievement of the vision’ ” of Pakistan’s founder Jinnah.95 One day after the referendum, his government admitted that a small number of U.S. troops were allowed to operate in Pakistan. Allowing U.S. troops the right of “hot pursuit” (if they were in pursuit of terrorists in Afghanistan that crossed into Pakistan, they were allowed to enter Pakistan) and allowing the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to operate in Pakistan is more evidence of his effort to broaden audience— and these moves fit with Musharraf ’s desires to address sectarian violence and recapture authority over militants.96 He continued to consolidate power two months after the referendum, when he announced a plan to change the constitution by giving the military institutionalized power. Again all of these moves were now possible because he had insured that the cultivated international audience would not cut off support. A few more steps in Musharraf ’s consolidation of power were apparent after the Parliament was elected. In December 2003 he made a deal with parliamentary groups that extended his presidency until 2007 if he gave up his seat as head of the military. Then, in late 2004, he broke this deal and declared he would maintain both positions—head of state and military. The West did not condemn this move, and the Commonwealth even stated clearly it did not oppose the president holding both positions. The latter was true despite that when readmitting Pakistan in May 2004 the Commonwealth demanded that Musharraf honor pledges to quit his military post. As if the United States never took a stance of promoting democracy abroad, U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker stated that it was up to Pakistan to decide whether the president holds both civilian and military leadership positions: “Our aim is to see democracy developed in a broader sense of the term.”97 As one observer noted, “Musharraf, like Zia before him, can pursue his program in the knowledge that billions of dollars of aid are flowing into the country. And, like Zia, he can be confident that the U.S. will not be pressing for the restoration of democracy.”98 Broadening audience to the West helped Musharraf, but at the same time it created some constraints. Primary among these was the growing anger of Islamic militants, fueled by Musharraf ’s coziness with the West and the crackdown on Islamists that this relationship required. Also, many in the military were angered by the general’s willingness to work with the United States. To them, America had proven its fickle nature after cutting off ties with Pakistan in the 1990s. The way in which Musharraf chose to deal with the Islamist backlash, while publicly stating he would crack down on these groups, was to broaden audience to include them. Indeed, his doing so helped with four obstacles: deflecting foreign criticism and thus helping him stay in power (in essence, coping with pariah status), actually limiting the

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power of the Islamists, which had grown because of government policies in the past (the fourth obstacle), dealing somewhat with the lack of cohesion and breakdown of law and order, and maintaining support for the Kashmir cause (the third challenge). Initially, it seems counterintuitive to say that Musharraf began to treat Islamists more as a core constituency and doing so helped overcome his pariah status internationally. Simply put, Musharraf found that he had to appease the radicals somewhat to maintain his Kashmir effort and to increase his power. And as he did so, the extremist groups boosted their activities. In turn, then, he used this increased bad behavior to argue to the West that he is better than the alternative—rule by the mullahs (this was the tying hands strategy, described more in the next section). Therefore, the West gave him even more support and he was able to end the pariah status and create increasingly authoritarian institutions with impunity. Looking at Musharraf ’s specific behavior sheds more light on these maneuvers. Musharraf ’s reaching out to the West forced him to pledge to address the chaos and disorder in Pakistani society connected to the growth of Islamic extremist organizations. For example, he committed (at different points in time) to document madaris and bring them under state control, to liberalize blasphemy laws from the Zia era, and to consider signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under pressure from the United States and Europe about the nuclear program. However, time and again, Musharraf gave in to the demands of the religious right and retreated from his pledges. In addition, though he had banned political parties and political activities when he took power, the religious Right convinced the government that they were not political groups. Their ability to organize public meetings for the 2002 parliamentary elections gave them a great advantage over the parties of Bhutto and Sharif.99 Expanding on this gap between Musharraf ’s promises to the West and what he actually did, a report from the International Crisis Group in January 2004 stated that the Pakistani leader had not invoked antiterrorism laws to arrest radical leaders as promised; groups that are banned can keep changing names and re-forming; new legislation in January 2004 to crackdown on extremism was not being enforced. While Musharraf said madrassah reforms were underway, the MMA kept up the pressure to prevent government regulation of curriculum or finances.100 Again in June 2004, the same observer group stated, “Most madrassahs remain unregistered, their finances unregulated, and the government has yet to remove the jihadist and sectarian content in their curricula.”101 By May of 2002 when U.S. operations in Pakistan began, popular anger against the United States was turning to rage because of the large number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and U.S. support of Israel during escalating tensions in the Middle East; in the army rage was also growing because a number of military sanctions were still in place. To cope with this domestic unrest, Musharraf backed off the tough rhetoric of the January 12, 2002 speech pledging the crackdown on militants.102 Perhaps the crowning example of Musharraf ’s broadening audience strategy in reference to the Islamists was his regime’s behavior during and after the October 2002 parliamentary elections. In the elections, the MMA (an alliance of six parties called Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal or the United Council for Action in English) won


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a surprising percentage of the vote, which translated to even more seats. This level of support for religious parties was unprecedented in Pakistan’s history. The alliance, which included the JUI and the JI, took 11.3 percent of vote and 44 seats (17 percent).103 The PPP actually won most of the votes (25.8 percent, 63 seats) but the government/military-supported party PML-Q (25.7 percent, 77 seats) worked with the MMA to form a coalition.104 Also, the MMA won control of the regional government in the North West Frontier Province and established a partnership in a governing coalition in Baluchistan.105 Changes in the electoral rules marginalized most parties, especially the politicians from Bhutto’s PPP and Sharif ’s PML-N. Bolstering accusations of the PPP, outside observers argued that Musharraf ’s regime deliberately reached out to the Islamists and helped to boost their political role. An EU observer mission cited the misuse of official resources to assist certain parties, especially the PML-Q and MMA, while other parties were severely constrained from campaigning. A rule that one had to have masters-level education to run hurt other parties but not the MMA because madrassah degrees were accepted; a study showed that the MMA received dramatically more coverage on state-run television; the Islamist alliance was allowed to get away with violations of the election code while others faced severe restrictions and penalties.106 Beyond broadening audience with the actual election, Musharraf made a deal with the MMA (referred to previously) by which he would give up his military role by December 2004 but would stay in office until 2007. In return, the MMA consolidated its role in the governing coalition107 in which the Islamists form the largest party, now holding 62 of 342 seats.108 Also, Musharraf agreed he would not dismiss the prime minister without consultation. Prior to this deal, the Parliament elected in October 2002 was deadlocked because the MMA and others did not want to recognize the constitutional amendments (to increase his power and term length) Musharraf had put through earlier with no parliamentary consent.109 Stepping back, the election of 2002 and the subsequent deal with the Islamist alliance show Musharraf ’s broadening audience strategy with regard to this troublesome constituency. The effects have been profound. In the NWFP and Baluchistan, the MMA has been able to reverse bans on certain extremist groups, which Musharraf imposed in January 2002. Further, while in January 2002, he had denounced the religious parties as a threat to Pakistan, by December 2003 Musharraf stated that the MMA was more reasonable than other forces—the secular parties were the real threat.110 We can see from this account that Musharraf ’s reaching out to Islamists helped him consolidate power against politicians while maintaining foreign support (see later). Further, he sought to address the fourth obstacle of controlling Islamists’ power by drawing them into a relationship in which they gained power if they tolerated his continued rule. Also, by backing off the proclaimed efforts to crack down on the Islamist groups, Musharraf sought to maintain among these groups the sense that rule by civilians was much worse for the MMA than his rule. Addressing the problem of Pakistan’s lack of cohesion, Musharraf saw his support for the MMA in Baluchistan as a way to balance the resurgent Baluch nationalist forces.111 Finally, by making the Islamist parties a part of his constituency he sought

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to gain legitimacy for the Kashmir cause. He continued the ISI training programs of some militant fighters and distinguished in speeches between the “foreign terrorists” who were guilty of disrupting Pakistani society and “freedom fighters.” By broadening audience to the West, which was against the armed struggle in Kashmir, and also to Islamists, whose raison d’etre was this cause, Musharraf created a dilemma. For a long time the Pakistani military had cultivated the extremists to help in the struggle and thus aid the long-held goal of state building around an Islamic identity. Now, though reaching out to both audiences helped him achieve specific goals, he found himself limited in what he could do about Kashmir. To deal with this problem and also to help with a few other obstacles, Musharraf broadened audience to a third category of actors: Islamic states, regional states, and other developing states. As he noted in his first address to the nation, “The strengthening of brotherly ties with the Islamic countries will be a central pillar of our foreign policy.”112 We see evidence of this in his effort, especially after 2002, to take a lead role in international organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and regional conferences such as the SAARC among others. In addition, as will be noted in more detail in the framing threat section, he gave high-profile speeches at the opening of the United Nations every year in October. In these speeches he made it clear that he focused on the Islamic states as his audience. Further, fundamentalists from many countries continue to be allowed into Pakistan for education; the madrassah “industry” remained under Musharraf an important tie to Islamic allies in the Middle East. Broadening audience to emphasize the “Muslim nation” ingroup has served several purposes for Musharraf. This move on the international stage was an effort to highlight at home his credentials as a leader in the Islamic world; it worked toward the goal of a strong sense of Islamic identity at home, which could help contain Islamist opposition (the fourth obstacle) and also could serve to address the cohesion challenge. Economic aid coming to Pakistan from Gulf states continued because of his active effort to cultivate these ties (including money going into madaris); this funding assisted in his effort to confront Pakistan’s economic problems. While cultivating ties for economic reasons and for the purpose of building national identity were important, Musharraf ’s main focus of the broadening audience strategy with regard to the Islamic world was the situation in Kashmir. In his efforts at the United Nations and the OIC, he argued that Kashmir is an international issue and as much a part of the struggle for Muslims—and for all deprived peoples—as is the Palestinian struggle. In a speech to the United Nations in September 2000, he stated, “This august body has resolved many major disputes and conflicts. In recent years UN intervention arrested massive human tragedies in Bosnia and Kosovo. . . . Whereas the international community and this world body are seriously engaged in finding a solution to the Palestine issue, Kashmir cries for justice even after 52 years.”113 By creating a constituency among states with significant Muslim populations, Musharraf could justify to the West his stance on the conflict while also gaining legitimacy at home (showing that he is still fighting the good fight). Throwing in his lot with Muslim states in this way could have worked against entente with the West since broadening audience to the West had brought with it


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the constraint of cutting back on extremist influence in Kashmir. When this continued support for freedom fighters—and then more actively cultivating international support for the fight—began to draw fire from his Western audience, Musharraf eventually began to speak of “Enlightened Moderation.” This philosophy, put forth first in addresses to Islamic states114 and then the broader international community at the United Nations, posited that he had a vision to bring both “audiences” together. To state the ideas briefly, he explained to the Islamic states that “we” have to show the world that “we aren’t terrorists.” To do this these states had to commit to internal reform and renewal by working on social and economic development. In turn, he told the rest of the global community that the problem of extremism would not be solved until the challenges of Kashmir, Palestine, and continued economic deprivation were a major focus of international diplomacy. The international community also had to reject the effort to equate terrorism with Islam. Again, a commitment to poverty alleviation and socioeconomic development by the rest of the world was crucial.115 This approach addressed many obstacles at once: the economic problems of Pakistan, ending international isolation, addressing the Kashmir cause, and limiting the power of, or here perhaps co-opting, the Islamist groups in Pakistan. Musharraf also expanded his audience to regional states for similar reasons. He argued that all the states in the region would continue to suffer economic problems unless they worked together to resolve the conflict over Kashmir; the “code words” for this were that bilateral disputes must be resolved at a regional level and poverty in each regional state can only be addressed by the region as a whole. He repeatedly made the point that peace between India and Pakistan (arrived at in a way that satisfies Pakistan) was a prerequisite for progress to occur in the region. For example, he stated: Pakistan is located in the world’s most volatile region where one-fifth of humanity lives in a state of economic deprivation. While the global trend is for economic progress through regional cooperation, South Asia is embroiled in conflict. Why this tragedy? Only because the people of Kashmir remain deprived of justice. The consequence of this injustice has been four wars.116

By broadening audience in this way, he hoped to boost his position among regional states vis-à-vis India and also show the domestic audience that he was truly leading an international effort to win Kashmir for Pakistan. The final example of Musharraf broadening audience to a constituency that posed a challenge to him is less clear than the previous three. The audience is the alliance of politicians including the PPP and PML-N, called the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD). The vague nature of this situation grows out of the fact that Musharraf ’s leadership saga is ongoing and it is unclear as of this writing in which direction Pakistan’s politics will shift. Recall that Musharraf saw little choice and much opportunity in changing direction by broadening audience to the West after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Doing so, however, created a backlash among Islamist groups that had previously been allied with the Pakistani military. To get around that challenge, Musharraf reached out to them, cultivating

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them as a constituency at the same time as seeking to maintain the ties to the West. The outcome of broadening his audience in this way appeared to work at first, as Musharraf used the Islamist agitating to serve his purposes. However, the contradictions in walking the tightrope between the two audiences materialized over time, especially as the international context shifted with the Iraq war. Indeed, the Islamists eventually capitalized on renewed anti-American sentiment related to the war in Iraq (begun in spring 2003) to protest the Pakistan-U.S. alliance. That Musharraf ’s balancing act may spin out of control became apparent when some of the Islamist groups were responsible for attempts on Musharraf ’s life in December 2003.117 By November 2004, Musharraf decided to go against the deal he made in late December 2003 with the MMA that he would put aside his uniform, while at the same time reaching out to politicians. For example, also in November 2004, Musharraf released PPP leader Bhutto’s husband from prison.118 This apparent warming of relations between the military leadership and the main civilian parties actually had the effect of keeping the MMA from protesting Musharraf ’s breaking of their deal as much as they might have. As one commentator noted, there was a realization that the mullahs would be “left out in the cold.”119 This potential détente with the civilian parties may also be an effort to deflect the potential of any international attention to Musharraf ’s continued authoritarianism. While it is too early to tell which way he will move, this episode may show that when Musharraf ’s earlier maneuvers were beginning to lead away from certain goals (ending pariah status, controlling Islamist groups, and establishing law and order), he broadened audience to cultivate yet another audience to balance the others. Musharraf—like other leaders in this book—often used different strategies in tandem to manipulate his domestic and international situations. The next section looks at how he used the tying hands strategy. Tying Hands The tying hands strategy is useful to leaders who make policy choices that are potentially unpopular with one of their constituencies. By arguing to a domestic constituency that international constraints force his hand or can only be overcome by adopting that (unpopular) policy, a leader seeks to surmount domestic opposition. Likewise, by arguing to an international constituency that domestic constraints force his hand, a leader may gain sympathy or cooperation that frees him from international pressure. Because Musharraf used the broadening audience strategy so readily, he got himself into several situations in which domestic and international audiences pulled in different directions. Tying hands was employed effectively at these junctures, and he used this strategy to address each of the five obstacles. From the very beginning of his rule Musharraf faced pressures from domestic and foreign audiences because of the way he took power. Because Pakistan is nominally a democracy, Musharraf was compelled to justify the coup. He also had to try to put a legitimate face on the coup to deflect criticism from the international community. He argued that both the domestic and international settings tied his hands so he was forced to take control from corrupt politicians; domestic (corruption) and international (the threat from India) circumstances made the coup necessary.


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Indeed, in his speech to the nation after the coup, he used the tying hands strategy to argue how four of the five main obstacles to Pakistan’s future (economic crisis, pariah status, the threat from India over Kashmir, and the challenges of law and order and cohesion) forced him to get rid of Sharif and attempt a better government. We know that before September 11, 2001, Musharraf faced challenges to law and order in Pakistan growing out of increasing Islamist influence. The former refers to the sectarian terrorist attacks occurring within the country since the 1980s. He used the tying hands strategy with the broader domestic audience (and especially Islamic scholars and clerics) to argue for a crackdown on (some) domestic extremists. He argued that Pakistan had to unite against this sectarian violence because it led the world to see all Pakistanis as terrorists. If the country could not work together to change, he was helpless in addressing Pakistan’s other problems because help for them must come from the international community.120 Once the decision was made to side with the United States in the war on terror, Musharraf sought to head off domestic opposition to the complete turn away from its former client, the Taliban. He did so with tying hands (as well as buying off, described in the next section). Indeed, he tied his hands by stating that if his government did not side with the United States, Pakistan would be forced to give up Pakistan’s nuclear program. This was a clever move because Musharraf knew that the program was a source of immense national pride.121 Further, in the campaign to mute domestic criticism of cooperation with the United States he maintained that this decision in the international arena was based on the best way to maximize four major Pakistani interests: its “security, its economic revival, the need to safeguard its ‘strategic nuclear and military assets,’ and the Kashmir cause.”122 Therefore, with the decision and the use of tying hands to deflect domestic objections, Musharraf addressed Pakistan’s pariah status. The sectarian groups Musharraf sought to ban in August 2001, Lashkar-eJhangvi and Sipah e Mohammed Pakistan, had a different focus from those that were cultivated by the ISI for years to fight the Kashmiri struggle. Indeed, he often distinguished between the “terrorists” who posed a challenge to him and the “freedom fighters.” However, because broadening audience to the West after September 2001 created pressure to end support for the militant Kashmir struggle and broadening audience to Islamists pulled in the opposite direction, Musharraf needed a strategy to get away with keeping both audiences at bay. He did so largely with tying hands. With the Islamist militants, he tied hands to scale back pressure for more aggressive action on Kashmir while stepping up his rhetoric on Kashmir. For example, after the December 2001 militant attack on the India Parliament, the U.S. pressure to stop the raids into India and Kashmir was highly publicized. Musharraf ’s response was the January 2002 crackdown on these groups and the argument that he had no choice but to address the external criticism. In the meantime, as noted earlier, he managed to apply the crackdown very selectively (next we look at how he used tying hands to the West, and [later] framing threat, to get away with the half-hearted enforcement of the crackdown). Thus, tying hands to the Islamists was how he managed to maintain the commitment to Kashmir while keeping extremists in check and not losing international support.

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On the other hand, Musharraf also used tying hands with the international community (arguing that the domestic context prevented him from fully meeting international demands) to help consolidate power, establish law and order, and stay in power (the fifth challenge) and to avoid a total crackdown on militants (thus maintaining some of the Islamist support he needed). He also tied hands to skirt international criticism of his domestic policies, trying to avoid renewing his pariah status by showing the West that alternatives to his rule were much worse.123 The words of U.S. General Anthony Zinni, from an interview in spring 2001, reinforce the extent to which the United States bought into Musharraf ’s strategy: Musharraf may be the last hope for Pakistan. The pressures he faces are extreme: the economic conditions in Pakistan, the tensions with India, the country’s relationship with the United States. If he fails in carrying out his reforms and putting Pakistan back on track, I can foresee three worst-case scenarios: the true military hard-liners will take over; the religious hard-liners will take over, and we’ll see a theocracy like Iran; or Pakistan will be faced with complete chaos and fall apart. Then we’ll have another failed state in the region, like Afghanistan. And any of these scenarios will be extremely dangerous for the United States.124

Another observer describes Musharraf ’s approach. The following quotation captures several points that have been made here thus far: Musharraf broadened audience both to the West and to the Islamists, and while seemingly at cross-purposes, he used tying hands to maximize his goals with both constituencies: Musharraf is walking a tightrope between the urgent needs of the U.S.-led alliance and the radical opposition he faces at home. . . . Whatever else it might mean, Islamist rage gives Musharraf an opportunity to tighten his grip on power. . . . Musharraf seems to be playing the “mad mullah” card to impress upon Washington and its allies his indispensability to a stable nuclear-armed Pakistan and therefore his need for unconditional support.125

Musharraf also employed the tying hands strategy with the United States in the attempt to address the India/Kashmir issue. On one hand, he was under pressure from the United States to stop supporting the insurgency in Kashmir while working with the United States in the effort to root out al Qaeda in South Asia. On the other hand, he had goals of meeting domestic demands to keep up the struggle for the Muslim brethren in Kashmir (thus keeping up the pressure on India) and, separately, ameliorating Pakistan’s economic problems. He made it clear to the American government that the Pakistani leadership remained powerless to aid in the war on terror without U.S. help on Kashmir. Musharraf also used tying hands again later in the war on terrorism to address Kashmir and economic issues. As the campaign to root out al Qaeda continued, Musharraf faced rising opposition at home. This discontent was largely due to antiAmericanism coalescing around the expansion of the war on terror into Iraq; perhaps it was also related to the way in which Musharraf had empowered the Islamists in the pursuit of other goals. In addition, after the first few years of the war on terrorism, Musharraf grew impatient with what he felt was insufficient help to ease poverty


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more rapidly and internationalize the Kashmir dispute. Further, since he broadened audience to include Muslim and developing states in the United Nations, he credibly placed himself in the position of speaking for the Islamic and developing worlds. Thus, as the United States kept up its demands for cooperation from Pakistan’s government and military, Musharraf in turn insisted that the United States and the West in general work on Palestine and Kashmir and address poverty. Until such efforts were visible, his hands were tied to do much more. Indeed, he argued that Pakistan and others could not fight terrorism without addressing its root causes; the Kashmiri and Palestinian people are struggling for self-determination (a root cause) and are not terrorists. The actors involved in both situations must have international help to resolve the disputes. While Pakistan was working hard to track down terrorists, the U.S. failure to resolve key disputes in the Muslim world undermined Pakistan’s efforts. The Iraq invasion was a step in the wrong direction and made things harder for Musharraf domestically. For example, in spring 2004 poll, only 16 percent of Pakistanis supported the war on terrorism, with over 50 percent saying that effort is motivated by the American desire to rule the world, to take over Middle East oil, and to eliminate Muslim governments.126 In addition, Musharraf argued that his government could not fight al Qaeda without help for the 3 million Afghani refugees located in Pakistan or without the United States doing a better job of stabilizing Afghanistan. Finally, the success of Musharraf in fighting terrorism and achieving stability at home required continued economic help from the United States. Musharraf argued that all of these issues were fundamental to the stability of the region as a whole. Pakistan’s minister and deputy chief of mission at the country’s Washington, DC embassy, in an article elaborating this view, summed up, “The success of Pakistani-U.S. cooperation, and especially the extent of the U.S. role, will also determine the prospects for peace and security in South Asia. . . .”127 Finally, after a devastating terrorist attack in London in the summer of 2005, British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued widely publicized remarks that the terrorists had spent time in Pakistan. Soon after, in July 2005, Musharraf gave a national address in which he emphasized his commitment to the war on terror and used words that exemplify the tying hands strategy as part of his intermestic policy making. Indeed, what was most important about the speech “was the subtext that strongly suggests that there is little Pakistan can do to tackle its problem of extremism without active assistance and support from the outside world.”128 In conclusion, there are many ways that Musharraf tied his hands to both domestic and international audiences in the effort to cope with opposition to his agenda. This section has described the way he did so to address all five obstacles. Next we turn to the buying off strategy. Buying Off Buying off is perhaps the simplest strategy to understand and is a very common concept in political science: elites use resources to co-opt various constituents whose support they deem necessary. In the present framework, the underinvestigated

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intermestic nature of buying off is highlighted. Therefore, this section discusses how Musharraf used resources from the international community to gain domestic support and how he drew on domestic resources to meet international demands. This strategy helped him address all five challenges. Perhaps the most significant example of Musharraf ’s effort to buy off was winning and distributing U.S. economic aid at home to counter the negative side effects of broadening audience to the West and to tackle Pakistan’s economic challenges. While the American government may have seen its economic incentives as buying off Musharraf, the most impact came from the room to maneuver that the aid gave the Pakistani leader with his domestic audiences. From the time of his first announcement that Pakistan would join the U.S. alliance, he argued that Pakistan’s cooperation was paying off and all the Western aid was “worth it.” The specific resources Musharraf negotiated included a U.S. aid package of $1 billion and “massive humanitarian aid.” The United States removed sanctions imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests and the “democracy” sanctions imposed after the 1999 coup.129 Further, economic help from the United States had a global effect: “The United States has also used its influence to convince the international agencies and other donors and lenders to lend to Pakistan, and it has used its significant powers of persuasion to convince countries not only to give Pakistan some debt relief but also to contribute to the development of Pakistan through aid.” This influence elicited billions of dollars in IMF loans.130 Early on, in late 2001, President Bush promised trade quota restriction waivers for Pakistan’s textile industry (its largest source of exports, limited by protectionist barriers in the United States and EU). The EU came through in meeting its pledges on this issue. The American package was less complete than Musharraf wanted, but was combined with other concessions in a large commitment Musharraf received on his February 2002 state visit to the United States. Musharraf was welcomed by President Bush at the White House in February 2002 as a “leader of great courage and vision.” At this time, Bush announced that Pakistan would receive more economic and military aid in exchange for continued help in the war on terror.131 According to the White House Fact Sheet issued for the meeting, Pakistan would receive $1 billion in debt relief in 2002–2003; $2 million in technical support for the October 2002 elections; and improved market access for $142 million of Pakistani apparel exports. A Joint Economic Forum was created to discuss economic issues, and the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation would provide loans up to $150 million to private enterprises for oil and gas projects. In social areas, the United States committed $34 million for an educational support program, the beginning of a $100 million multiyear program; $5 million in grants to fight child labor and promote vocational training for youth in Punjab province; and $800,000 to go with private money assisting school districts in using technology to promote educational exchanges with schools in the United States. Finally, the United States pledged cooperation on law enforcement, science and technology, space cooperation, and a few other areas.132 Musharraf scored again in June 2003, when the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement was signed with the United States. Among other items, annual talks were set up to address the textile trade, and Bush promised to seek


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from Congress $3 billion more in aid for Pakistan. The talks on textiles were welcome as a long-term way to improve Pakistan’s position because the February 2002 three-year package of trade bonuses would expire as the World Trade Organization agreed on future changes to disallow quotas.133 While this generous economic and social aid gave Musharraf something to sell to his civilian audiences at home, the February 2002 package also included carrots for the military that was still leery of cooperation with the United States because of the rocky past. The commitment included expanded military cooperation: the Defense Consultative Group would be reestablished in September 2002 (having been cut off after the 1998 nuclear tests) to discuss military-to-military relations; $1 million was included for International Military Education and Training in 2003; and the United States promised to resume dialogue on nuclear security issues.134 There were other aspects of the buying off of the military. Beyond the initial suspicion of working closely with the United States again, some in the military grew disgruntled because of the commitment to dialogue with India after the tensions of mid-2002 and because of U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on Afghanistan. The latter was problematic to some because Pakistan turned away from the alliance with the Taliban and now had to help the United States support a leadership in Afghanistan that they feared would ultimately prove less friendly to Pakistan. Indeed, one observer noted that the Karzai government in Afghanistan, while the choice of the United States, was a “strategic disaster” for Pakistan.135 Along with the items noted earlier, the military was bought off with new weapons packages and a commitment to ongoing cooperation on these matters. The two governments issued a joint statement that Pakistan’s priorities were, “acquisition of U.S. defense stores for improving conventional weapons capabilities” and “measures and conditions for a long-term, sustainable defense relationship between the two countries.” Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith gave Musharraf the material he needed to argue the relationship was paying dividends when Feith stated that Washington has “an interest in enhancing Pakistan’s conventional defense capabilities as sought by Islamabad.”136 Overall, half of the American aid was used for military hardware.137 All of the evidence presented thus far exemplifies the leader using resources from the international arena to buy off domestic constituencies. Another way Musharraf dealt with the need to bring the military on board with the U.S. agenda is an example of him using domestic resources to further his goals in the international arena. Though the group he is seeking to buy off, the army, is a domestic actor, in part its utility for Musharraf was its role in the Kashmir conflict. Musharraf used his power prior to the elections of a Parliament to propose an institutional change to give the military a constitutional role in the policy process (which would thus outlive the role taken for it by the military coup in 1999). The National Security Council (NSC), on which the service chiefs were represented, was reconstituted in July 2001 and became—especially in the absence of an elected Parliament—“in effect the highest deliberative body in Pakistan.”138 The controversial Legal Framework Order (LFO) issued in August 2002 by General Musharraf restored the authority of the president to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet (Nawaz Sharif had overseen the passing

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of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1997, which removed this power). Most relevant here, the LFO provided for the legal role of the NSC in the policymaking process.139 Of course, this controversial move also increased Musharraf ’s power vis-à-vis the Parliament elected in October. Musharraf also used money from international sources to buy off potential local opposition to the changes he made once he took power. This move helped him address Pakistan’s lack of cohesion, as he created a new local government system giving him greater control and incentivizing cooperation with the central government. Aid from the IMF and World Bank (both before and after September 2001) came with strings attached that required reforms in local government. Musharraf used this reform, and the money that followed it, as a way to co-opt local politicians. He created a local district system (called the nazim) where no parties were represented and the local elected assemblies received funds directly from the government. There were three major effects of this system. First, since money bypassed the bureaucracy, it weakened the power of the bureaucracy that the military distrusts. Second, it created a class of locals who owed their positions to the army. This resulted because the officials were unconstrained with how the money was spent as long as the spending fit with the concerns of the local military commander. Finally, since block grants were made at the local level, the system weakened the provincial government too. The latter was especially a concern for Musharraf because he did face separatist challenges from some of the provincial areas (noted elsewhere).140 A final constituency that was bought off by Musharraf was the religious Right (the Islamists), whose opposition grew as he was pressured by external constituencies to engage in madrassah reform and limit jihadi activity. His buying off strategy is another example of using domestic resources to meet international demands (though the groups he tried to co-opt are primarily domestic groups). Musharraf ’s federal Ministry of Education has played a primary role in the effort to control the spread of sectarian extremism in the madaris (thus addressing the challenges of the Islamists and the breakdown of law and order), a demand increasingly made by the United States. By the end of 2004, the ministry distributed the equivalent of $8.37 million to provincial educational departments in order to “cajole the religious right to abandon the jihad and accept internal reform voluntarily.” The aid was part of a total package of $100 million that did not even include the funds from zakat. The International Crisis Group observers noted that this policy is failing and a better solution would be to fund the nonreligious educational sector more generously; yet Musharraf ’s pursuit of this path makes sense when we consider why he initially broadened audience to the Islamists and his continued efforts to curry favor with and control them at the same time.141 Musharraf tried to buy off jihadi fighters directly. Initially, the Pakistani government accepted and used tribal militaries (many of which are run by religious extremists) to pursue its goals. As the pressure from the United States to crack down on jihadis continued, Musharraf adopted the buying off strategy to deal with local pro-Taliban militants. While it is true that Musharraf ’s regime arrested several high-profile leaders, including one working with al Qaeda and allegedly responsible for the attempts on Musharraf ’s life,142 the government also gave large amounts of money to those fighters who committed to ending support for foreign militias and


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accepted the Pakistan government’s authority. The government stated that the money was for settling debts with al Qaeda; also, the government put forth a plan to buy back heavy weapons.143 Finally, by 2004, the ISI had paid large amounts of money to influential jihadi leaders such as Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of Lashkar-eTaiba, Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khahlil of Harkatul Mujahideen “in return for their agreement to remain dormant for an unspecified duration.”144 Perhaps it is too early to tell how well these initiatives are working, though we do know that the Pakistan government and U.S. forces continue to battle al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in South Asia. This section has detailed how Pervez Musharraf attempted to buy off several actors who objected to or stood in the way of the policies he wished to pursue. Most dramatic is the way in which U.S. aid enabled him to argue credibly to his domestic constituencies that the turn toward the West was truly “worth it.” As the war on terror continued, Musharraf ’s alliance with the Islamists and the U.S. war in Iraq contributed to the growth in influence of the religious Right. Instead of taking a hard line toward these groups as external actors have advised, he sought to buy them off instead. Counterintuitive from one angle, this tack makes sense given what we know from investigating Musharraf ’s leadership strategies as a whole. We now turn to the framing threat strategy, a strategy all leaders use in some way as they seek to pursue their goals. Framing Threat Apparent from the other cases in this book, all leaders use the framing threat strategy. While some may use the strategy more frequently than others, every successful leader must take on the task of describing reality to his followers. Indeed, students of politics recognize that the ability to define the situation is one of the most powerful tools elites have in promoting their policy agendas. In summary, we need to understand the leader’s role in pointing out what threats a country faces, the sources of those threats, and how to cope with them. As with John Hume, George H.W. Bush, Robert Mugabe, and Nelson Mandela, Pervez Musharraf ’s framing threat strategy exhibits the extent to which he was engaged in intermestic policy making. This section shows how he framed domestic threats to an international audience in order to mobilize external support. He also depicted threats emanating from the external environment to mobilize domestic audiences to stay with him during his rule. Common as well to the four other leaders is that framing threat is often used with other strategies. Indeed, Musharraf too combines framing threat with broadening audience and tying hands most frequently.145 This section proceeds by looking at how Musharraf used framing threat at critical junctures as part of a plan to surmount all five obstacles. It is organized around a few critical junctures: when he took power in 1999, when he chose to side with the United States against the Taliban, when he had to address Pakistan’s role in terrorism and was pushed to institute reforms against extremists, as he continued to seek support for the Kashmir policy, and as he continued to consolidate his authoritarian grip on power.

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From the beginning of his rule in October 1999, General Musharraf justified his military takeover by positing that the most severe threat to Pakistan was continued rule by civilian politicians. This threat was used in tandem with tying hands, as described earlier: He was “forced” to get rid of civilian rule because his love of country made it impossible to abide by the damage from Sharif and his colleagues. In fact, in interviews he corrected the idea that he had taken over with the phrase, “when governance was thrust on us”146 or, “First of all I didn’t take power, power was thrust on me.”147 Civilians threatened Pakistan’s economy, its role in the world, the fate of Kashmir, sectarian divisions that grow with the strength of exclusiveminded Islamists, and law and order: “Today, we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled, our credibility is lost, state institutions lie demolished; provincial disharmony has caused cracks in the federation, and people who were once brothers are now at each other’s throat.”148 He argued to the West that a return to rule by politicians posed a threat to the integrity of Pakistan and the stability of the region. These arguments, made in his first speech and in many subsequent speeches and interviews, reflected his attempt to address all five obstacles with framing threat. Though significant later too, appeals to religious leaders that sectarianism threatens law and order and relations with the rest of the world predate Musharraf ’s post–September 11, 2001 shift. A speech he gave to a conference of religious leaders in June 2001 exemplified his framing of this threat. After noting that the only hope for saving Pakistan is through economic advancement, he stated that law and order was a key factor, and the lack of it in Pakistan inhibited investment. For Pakistan, law and order was equivalent to sectarian harmony. And, “For our internal strife, the outside world is asked to declare us terrorists. Some say we are primitive. Others say we are a failed state. . . . Religious and sectarian harmony is therefore an inescapable necessity in Pakistan. It will unite us and bring stability. . . . If we become a tolerant society, where people with different outlooks can live peacefully, investors will come.” He appealed to the community of Islamic clerics to address the threat of internal violence and help Pakistan achieve unity so that all energy could go toward economic development.149 The framing threat strategy was crucial to how Musharraf sought to bring along his allies in the military and the nation as a whole when he decided to ally with the United States in the war against Afghanistan and the broader war on terror. Indeed, in his speeches he posited that making the wrong choice (not siding with the United States) posed an existential threat to Pakistan. On September 14, 2001, he met with the corps commanders to consult about shifting Pakistan’s loyalties to the United States and abandoning the Taliban. In this meeting, he argued that any delay in cooperating with the United States would present India with the opportunity to build its alliance with the United States.150 This threat of India manipulating this situation to its advantage against Pakistan was also used in the speech to the nation on September 19, 2001. He noted about the “designs” of India, “They want to enter into any alliance with the United States and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. They want to harm our strategic assets and the Kashmir cause. In my view, it would not be surprising that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in Afghanistan changes, it


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shall be an anti-Pakistan government.”151 Indeed, he indicated threats to four of Pakistan’s “critical concerns and priorities”: the security of the country from external threat, the economy and its revival, the strategic nuclear and missile assets, and the Kashmir cause. While initially he stated that the U.S. effort had overwhelming international support from the United Nations, including Muslim nations, in the main body of the speech to the nation he clearly avoided too much focus on helping the United States and concentrated instead on the fact that siding with the United States was essential for protecting Pakistan, “a fortress of Islam.”152 Those opposing his decision, who couched their arguments in appeals to Islamic solidarity, were depicted as a small minority who threatened the “sane majority.” In subsequent months, as Islamist groups mounted public protests, Musharraf continued to make this point—that those opposed to cooperation in the war against terrorism were a threat to the greater concerns of Pakistan.153 Framing threat in terms of the threat to the Islamic religion from extremists was a theme common in speeches at international conferences. At the United Nations in November 2001 he pointed out that the Islamic religion and Muslims worldwide were being blamed for the horrors of terrorism, but that such a view was misplaced. Instead, extremists were responsible. He raised another threat in this speech, which became more and more prominent in his rhetoric as the years passed: the idea that the extremists were wrong but motivated by legitimate concerns—by injustice and poverty that was real. We need to ask ourselves what really causes these extreme acts around the world. To my mind it is the unresolved political disputes the world over, disputes in Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine, Kashmir, and other places. Unfortunately, all these disputes involve Muslims, and more sadly the Muslims happen to be the victims. . . . The lack of progress in resolution of these disputes has created in them [the extremists] a sense of deprivation, hopelessness, and powerlessness. . . . All forms of terror must be condemned, prevented, and fought against, but in so doing the world must not trample upon the genuine rights, aspirations, and urges of the people who are fighting for their liberation and are subjected to state terrorism.

In order to deprive the terrorist of his motivation, the world must find solutions to the Palestinian and Kashmiri conflicts and eliminate economic deprivation.154 Musharraf also noted during this speech and earlier addresses to the United States that the failure to reconstruct Afghanistan quickly also posed a threat to Pakistan and global security.155 These arguments exemplify how Musharraf sought to address the economic problems of Pakistan and to achieve a balance between the second and fourth challenges—staying in line with the antiterrorism alliance while controlling Islamists and bringing attention to their demands at the same time. Framing threat was an integral part of Musharraf ’s strategy to gain acceptance at home for the January 12, 2002 announcement that he would heighten measures to control the Islamist militants (which addressed international pressures). He argued that extremists threaten the human rights of all Pakistanis.156 He reached out to moderates and painted an “us” versus “them” picture: “Sectarian terrorism has

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been going on for years. . . . Our peace-loving people are keen to get rid of the Kalashnikov and weapon culture. . . . The day of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to become a theocratic state? . . . The verdict of the masses is in favor of a progressive Islamic state.” He also tied his desire to cultivate moderation with the visions of Pakistan’s founding fathers. Before he listed the measures of the crackdown, he justified it by describing how extremists misuse mosques to propagate hate speech. He noted that while most madaris are good for Pakistan because they provide education to the poor, there are a few that have become breeding grounds for hatred.157 Finally, he emphasized that terrorism threatened the stability of Pakistan and relations with rest of world (addressing the fourth and fifth obstacles). As noted earlier, this strategy was combined with tying hands because he was under pressure to make arrests and push madrassah reform. In the January 2002 speech and others over the next few years, Musharraf framed threat to the outside world and the threat to Islam in Kashmir posed by India. Musharraf was careful to distinguish between the terrorism of al Qaeda and the sectarian extremists in Pakistan and the groups linked with Kashmir: “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. . . . The Kashmir problem needs to be resolved by dialogue and peaceful means.”158 Indeed, he used the strategy this way to deal with the challenge of Pakistan’s pariah status. To do so, he emphasized the victimization of Pakistan, especially that Pakistan should not be treated as a pariah because India was the violator of international norms with its human rights abuses and acts of state terrorism. Also by playing up the danger from India, he sought to address the lack of cohesion in Pakistan, using an external threat to rally Pakistanis around the flag. He also tied in the sectarian and separatist terrorism within Pakistan with the threat from India over Kashmir. In an interview with the Washington Post about India in May 2002, he accused India of working secretly with the sectarian organizations to support bombings inside Pakistan: There are so many bomb attacks here. These attacks on our mosques. Well, I wouldn’t say that all of them could be inspired from abroad. I am pretty sure that our sectarian divide is such an issue that it can be easily exploitable. So this is the area where they [Indians] exploit. . . . We know there have been training camps across on their borders when there were certain ethnic differences within our society. They have been involved with that. . . . 159

The final juncture at which Musharraf relied significantly on the framing threat strategy was when he needed to justify consolidating power further, both to the domestic and international audiences. He did so to address every obstacle with the exception of the Kashmir issue. He seemed to believe he could only help Pakistan out of its economic quagmire if he had a great deal of power (especially over the corrupt civilians and radical elements) at his disposal and if he had Western support. Two examples of him using threat to achieve these goals are in 2002 and in late 2004. In 2002, he made changes increasing his power (e.g., naming himself president, increasing his power to dismiss the prime minister and Parliament, and creating the NSC) and limiting political party activity prior to the parliamentary elections.


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In late 2004, he broke the deal with the MMA and chose to maintain his roles as both president and Chief of Army Staff. To the domestic audience, Musharraf emphasized the following: (1) the threats to Pakistan that his changes have overcome since the 1999 coup, and (2) the threats from continued militancy and economic instability that required him to consolidate power more. For example, in August 2001 he said, “Our threat emanates from within. Our economic malaise coupled with intolerant extremist attitudes in certain quarters are termites eating us from within.”160 He was still using this argument in 2004, when he said in the English-language newspaper Dawn, “If there is a threat to Pakistan it is from (the) internal security environment.”161 He spoke on these themes throughout 2002, especially around times when he increased his power. In 2002, the external threat from India was also salient since tensions between the neighbors were high. In the second example, in 2004, he dwelled more on internal security issues. For example, during the time when he was aligning with the MMA and sidelining the traditional parties, he posed (in December 2003) that Pakistan’s biggest threat was from the secular parties.162 In the televised address he gave when he broke the deal with the MMA, he stated, “I have decided to keep both offices as the change in internal and external policies will be dangerous for Pakistan.” Keeping the dual office was the “only way to ensure continuity in the policies being followed to crush terrorism and eliminate extremism besides moving forward the composite dialogue process with India to resolve the Kashmir issue, safeguard vital national interests [the nuclear weapons program], and create harmony among political, bureaucracy, and military institutions.”163 To his Western audience, he used framing threat with the tying hands strategy as previously described. He emphasized to the United States and the broader international community that the threat from more radical elements was severe and that he was essential to the war against terrorism.164 He also used the threat of the Kashmir conflict continuing or worsening if he were to leave office. As noted previously, observers have bought into this definition of the situation. For example, in November 2004 one noted that only the military in his person can bring peace with India over the Kashmir issue.165 There is no doubt, from numerous statements, speeches, and policies of the Bush administration, that it also sees Musharraf ’s role as indispensable. Framing threat is essential to any leader’s strategies to cope with domestic and international challenges. The central question for analysis is how and when the leader employs this strategy. This section has examined how Musharraf used framing threat in combination with other strategies at several critical junctures in his tenure. Conclusion This chapter has investigated the intriguing, skillful manipulation by Pervez Musharraf of his domestic and international contexts (see table 6.1). By examining his efforts to get around five major obstacles, we have seen that he has managed his constraints well. However, while he has stayed in power since 1999 it is not clear that he can continue to balance international and domestic demands indefinitely. When we consider what he does as intermestic policy making, we can gain a better

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Table 6.1 Summary of Pervez Musharraf ’s use of strategy Leadership Strategy

Musharraf ’s Use of Strategy


Broadening audience

Sided with the United States in international, antiterrorist alliance; reached out to Islamists to counter effects of U.S. alliance; depicted Pakistan as part of larger Islamic, regional, and developing state groups to get support on Kashmir

Coping with pariah status, addressing economic conditions, insuring security from India/dealing with Kashmir, limiting Islamist power, countering lack of cohesion/law and order problems

Tying hands

Argued to extremists that he had to scale back on Kashmir to get international help with other problems; to domestic audience, he noted he had to side with West or give up other national interests; argued to external world that he had to consolidate power or face rule by mullahs; to external world that he could not help fight terrorism unless world works on poverty, Kashmir, Palestine

Addressing economic conditions, coping with pariah status, insuring security from India/dealing with Kashmir, limiting Islamist power, countering lack of cohesion/law and order problems

Buying off

Used U.S. aid to co-opt domestic opposition to alliance with West and to consolidate power; used domestic resources to meet international demands such as dealing with extremists and jihadi fighters


Framing threat

Pakistan’s interests, existence threatened by civilians, not going along with the United States, not addressing extremism; threat from extremists must be addressed with international action on Kashmir, poverty and domestically by consolidation of power



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understanding of how the domestic and foreign policy moves interrelate. Most significantly for the Western world, he oriented himself toward the West in order to address Pakistan’s severe economic problems and (he hoped) to get help on Kashmir, while enabling him to consolidate power at the same time. In turn, we see that he has empowered militant Islamists (not unlike earlier military leaders in Pakistan) in part to counteract opposition to his pro-Western policies and, in a clever maneuver, so that he could justify to the West increasing his own power at the expense of democratic reform. As a result of global events beyond his control such as the continuing U.S. presence in Iraq, the slow progress on the rebuilding of Afghanistan, the devastating earthquake of 2005, and the controversy over anti-Islamic cartoons, which ignited riots around the Muslim world in 2006, Musharraf ’s pro-Western stance may become untenable and his empowerment of the MMA may in the end be his downfall. At this writing, it is too soon to tell. Perhaps, as noted earlier, his government will pursue the relationship with the civilian politicians again and somehow offset the growing power of the Islamic appeal. And, to his credit, Musharraf has used his military to arrest substantial numbers of foreign terrorists. Still, the appeal of the untamed regions of Pakistan near the Afghanistan border makes this an endless fight. Overall, we see through the lenses of leader strategies that American foreign policy toward Pakistan after September 11, 2001 has been misguided: the United States sees Pakistan’s Musharraf as a key to fighting terrorism, but in fact Pakistan, under his rule, has become one of its central staging grounds. Significant Events in the Pakistan Case 1947 1965 1971 1979

Pakistan becomes a state; war with India over Kashmir follows. War with India over Kashmir. Civil war with East Pakistan; India intervenes; Bangladesh forms. Soviet Union invades Afghanistan; U.S. funding for mujahideen and Pakistan. 1988 Insurgency begins in Kashmir; throughout 1990s militants trained in Pakistan join struggle. 1990 U.S. cuts military aid to Pakistan because of nuclear weapons program. May 1998 India and Pakistan test nuclear weapons; international sanctions on both. Spring 1999 Pakistan invades India at Kargil; India and Pakistan battle through summer; international condemnation force Pakistan’s withdrawal. October 12, 1999 General Musharraf takes power in a military coup; soon after, the United States imposes sanctions; Commonwealth suspends Pakistan. March 16, 2000 Musharraf bans political rallies and public protests. March 25, 2000 U.S. President Clinton angers Pakistan with short visit full of criticism about support for Taliban, extremism, Kashmir, and nuclear proliferation.

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May 2000


Supreme Court upholds coup as legitimate, says elections in three years. September 2000 Musharraf in New York for UN summit, solicits support on Kashmir and offers talks with India and to make South Asia nuclear-free. November 2000 Indian cease-fire in skirmishes in Kashmir; Pakistan partially withdraws from the line of control; high commissioners meet; U.S. sanctions imposed for buying missile equipment from China. December 2000 Opposition parties form Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy. June 2001 Musharraf declares himself president; politicians and West protest. July 2001 Summit with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee; India demands end to infiltration. August 2001 Musharraf bans two groups, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-iMohammed. September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks United States. September 12, 2001 U.S. officials tell Pakistani officials in Washington to choose sides; soon after, Musharraf tells Pakistani public that Pakistan will side with the United States; the United States lifts sanctions, etc. October 2001 Musharraf extends term as Army Chief of Staff; the United States attacks Afghanistan; militants attack Kashmir legislative assembly. December 2001 Pro-Pakistani militants attack Indian parliament; extremist attacks escalate in Pakistan with many Western targets. January 2002 Musharraf announces electoral changes increasing power of military, limiting civilian politicians; condemns extremists, bans more Kashmiri militant groups, says will regulate madrassah curriculum and funding. February 2002 Musharraf praised on official state visit to the United States. Spring 2002 Tensions with India increasing; U.S. special forces arrive; Musharraf announces April 30 referendum to legitimate position. May 27, 2002 Pakistan agrees to end cross-border raids under U.S. pressure; India makes some concessions, sends new high commissioner to discuss Kashmir. August 2002 Musharraf rewrites constitution, expanding powers. October 12, 2002 Islamic alliance (MMA) makes gains in parliamentary elections. November 2003 Under U.S. pressure, Musharraf bans some extremist groups again; makes new pledges to reform madaris. December 2003 Musharraf and the MMA form government; seventeenth amendment institutionalizes military control; Musharraf agrees to give up military post by December 2004; secular opposition PPP and PML (N) form Democratic Alliance.


January 2004 June 2004

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Vote of confidence extends Musharraf ’s term until 2007. Musharraf meets with Vajpayee; speaks of Enlightened Moderation. November 30, 2004 Going against the deal with the MMA, Musharraf gets bill passed allowing him to remain military leader and president; releases Bhutto’s husband from prison. July 2005 Terrorist attacks in London perpetrated by individuals trained in Pakistan; Musharraf criticizes verbal attacks on Pakistan but launches new measures against extremism and reforming the education system.


CHAPTER 7 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The Argument Summarized An Irish school teacher turned politician in the midst of ethnopolitical chaos, a former CIA director challenged to shape a “new world order,” an old African liberation fighter beset by a new revolution, a caged hero determined to free his people without bloodshed from a brutal racist prison, and an international pariah desperate to engage with the world in order to save his country: We have now met these leaders and explored their impossible situations during the cases chosen for this study. Indeed, whether they were embedded in democratic, authoritarian, or transitioning systems, in a Western, Islamic, or African culture, all of the leaders defied the constraints of their situations. In the study of international relations, it is customary to give primacy to structural explanations and to downplay the role of the individual. On the other hand, it is tempting to move too far in the other direction by focusing on a leader’s personality and downplaying global and domestic political constraints. When thinking about cause and effect, students of politics have to sort out the role of general versus idiosyncratic factors. The framework developed and applied to the cases in this book starts from the premises that both are important and can be treated as complementary. The choice of placing the leader at the center and asking particular questions about how he interprets and responds to global and domestic political contexts allows a more integrative analysis. Further, the focus on intermestic policy making provides a broader perspective of how leaders operate and cope with the complicated contexts in which decisions must be made and policies adopted. Looking at “what leaders do” in terms of four core leadership strategies enables observers to explore the argument expressed in the introductory chapter: Leaders are not just pushed and pulled by structural and situational factors. Further, while they may interpret similar situations differently, they are not just passive receivers. These individuals, some working alone and others as top decision makers among a group, often manipulate their context, framing elements of the domestic and international environments to their audiences, drawing attention to their way of seeing things, involving new actors, instigating issue linkage.

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In the five cases, the strategies were treated as independent variables. The assertion is that to varying extents and for diverse reasons, leaders broaden their audience, attempt to buy off opposition, tie their hands, and frame threats. Choice of strategy makes a leader effective. These cases were chosen because they are significant episodes in international politics that illustrate this point, and thus the cases are all puzzles: How did the leader manage to get what he wanted when many aspects of his domestic and foreign policy settings pushed toward a different outcome? Further, a key aspect of the strategy concept is that looking at the strategies a leader brings to bear sheds light on how he uses aspects of his domestic context to pursue international ends and how he uses elements of the international context to pursue domestic goals. In other words, the nexus between foreign and domestic policy—and leaders’ roles in creating that nexus—is clarified when we ask the right questions, namely, how is the leader broadening audience, buying off, tying hands, and framing threat? In the rest of this brief chapter, two topics are covered. First, an overview of the findings shows the ways in which, despite the very different kinds of cases, the study of leaders reveals similar processes and mechanisms at work. Second, the significance of this approach for policy making is elaborated. In a world where the headlines seem to give leaders all the power, what insights about policy might we gain from the framework developed in this study? Can we learn anything about how leaders can be helped in achieving or stopped from enacting their agendas? The Cases Reviewed Each of the five leaders employed the strategies to overcome challenges. Perhaps the strategy that was most essential to each was broadening audience. The cornerstone of intermestic policy making for Hume, Bush, Mugabe, Mandela, and Musharraf was reaching out to the international audience when it was apparent to them that they could not make things work at home. For example, Hume and Bush turned their main focus to convincing others that the problems they were trying to resolve were in fact concerns for the international community and not only domestic political challenges. Several leaders also drew in previously untapped segments of society as domestic constituents when they encountered roadblocks in executing their agendas. For example, Musharraf took advantage of the Islamists to partially maintain his Kashmir policy when the international audience pushed in another direction, and Mugabe reignited his leadership of the war veterans and peasantry when the urban classes turned against him. Whether Musharraf tries and succeeds in broadening audience to civilian political leaders as he now faces a backlash from Islamists could mean the difference between his continued rule or his downfall. Often, framing threat went hand in hand with broadening audience. It has been established through the empirical studies that all leaders frame threat in some way, even if some individuals do so more frequently or as a more central part of their leadership approach than others. Investigating which challenges a leader perceives and what he posits as solutions to these threats furthers understanding about whether followers will be moved toward peace or violence, conflict or compromise. For example, Mandela’s framing threat strategy was especially intriguing. Whereas

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

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he pointed out the mortal danger posed by the white government as part of the Third Force, his solution was that the black majority, therefore, had to work harder to resolve the transition peacefully—not take up arms themselves. This fit with the way in which he broadened audience: the world was watching, the black majority could not accomplish its goals without this external support, and a violent response would only push this support away. President Bush’s framing threat and broadening audience strategies were configured quite differently. Having started his effort to confront Saddam Hussein by broadening audience to the international community, his framing focused on the threats to universal values (such as human rights) and to global security. Instead of arguing that Hussein’s violence required a nonviolent response that would leave all safer in the end, Bush argued that the only solution to the Iraq threat was military confrontation. Tying hands was another strategy that generally followed broadening audience. Once each leader had succeeded in convincing domestic followers that their fates were tied to an international dimension or in drawing in an international audience as part of pursuing a domestic agenda, he often used one arena to “tie his hands” in the other. Musharraf used this approach in an especially crafty way. He realized that to achieve most of the goals he established in his initial speech to the nation after the coup, he had to get the United States to end its isolation of Pakistan, but he was bound by the constraint that siding with the West in the war on terror would ignite the ire of many Pakistanis. He did side with the United States against popular opinion, but then “tied hands” with the domestic audience: He asserted that joining with the Americans was the only way to promote Pakistan’s security, begin its economic revival, uphold the Kashmiri cause, and protect its nuclear weapons program. On the other hand, when the international community pushed him to do more to control Islamist influence and to institute democratic reforms, Musharraf tied hands again. With the West he used the increased “bad behavior” of the Islamists to argue that continued external support to keep him in power (and not pressure or criticism) was better than the alternative (rule by the “mad mullahs”). He also tried to pursue the Kashmir cause with tying hands to the U.S. and UN audience, contending that he was powerless to engage in the war on terror unless the external world were to help internationalize the Kashmir issue. Finally, an overview of the cases demonstrates that buying off, while used by all leaders, was perhaps most prominent in the authoritarian cases—merely because Mugabe and Musharraf had more direct control to co-opt with government resources and to distribute nearly single-handedly any resources they gained from external actors. Mugabe engaged in a tremendous program of buying off opposition, even when the country has been mired in economic squalor. Of course, some of that squalor is due to his overzealous use of this strategy. Hume’s use of buying off was especially intriguing because of the way he turned external resources into tools for changing the conditions on the ground in Northern Ireland—thereby undermining the appeals to arms of his rivals. Indeed, he first convinced the United States and others that they had a role to play in addressing the poor conditions, then once this aid was being used he could effectively argue that peace brings dividends and continued fighting would end these dividends.

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Policy Significance: The “So What” Question Using the four strategies as a tool to understand how leaders make intermestic policy equips observers to ask particular questions. It could be argued that the answers to those questions—knowing how a leader is bringing together foreign and domestic elements—gives the observer a useful advantage to affect policy making. Indeed, in these cases this approach might have helped policy makers or others see what was going on more clearly and thus have more of a chance to affect the outcome of the case. Depending on one’s perspective, the observer might want to empower the leader (i.e., help him achieve his agenda) or constrain him. A few examples from the five cases illustrate this point, shedding light on the question we should ask of any analytical framework: Now that we know about these processes and mechanisms, why do they matter for what is going on in the world today? In other words, so what? One way to illustrate the utility is to consider what hindsight through the lenses of the leader strategy framework tells us about these five cases. If observers had looked at these situations the way this study has, how might they have made better policy? In the cases of John Hume in Northern Ireland and Nelson Mandela in South Africa, we see much success on behalf of policy makers. The analyses illustrate the great significance of intermestic policy in getting parties to the negotiating table and keeping them there. They show how the international dimension, when cultivated by domestic leaders, can also be crucial to enacting a peace agreement. Hume and Mandela both recognized that their own followers had to see a change in the context before they would be susceptible to the appeals of moderation. The response of external actors in terms of internationalizing the situations to some extent and providing aid to change the facts on the ground worked hand in glove with the ways in which these leaders sought to frame the context. Essentially, external actors pulled in by these leaders responded in the “right way” to help things turn out the way the leaders envisioned. Light is thus shed on how external actors can have the greatest chance of affecting what leaders can and cannot do. The cases indicate how these actors can enable a leader who thinks of his constituency more broadly or even push leaders toward thinking of their constituencies in that way. In addition, with various forms of aid and support, international actors can lessen the pressures on the leaders’ followers so that the latter are more open to moderate appeals and less vulnerable to calls for violence. Additional support for these claims is apparent when we look at Northern Ireland today. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement remains only partly enacted as the less moderate parties in both communities (nationalist/Catholic and unionist/Protestant) are at a standstill over the issue of whether or not republican disarmament has proceeded enough to allow Sinn Fein participation in the Northern Ireland Assembly. In this tense environment, the parties on the extremes have won the most votes over the last few years (Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party), a sign of polarization that observers hoped had been relegated to the past. Unlike in the years leading up to the agreement, international attention— especially from the United States—has ebbed. Likewise, the leader who had worked so hard to cultivate that attention and to draw in external help has stepped


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away from the political scene due mostly to health issues. Judging from what has worked in the past and what is not working now, until the leaders in Northern Ireland return to a more intermestic approach, there is little hope for moving beyond the current impasse. Both the domestic leaders and international observers would benefit from studying the earlier success. With the case study of President Bush and the Persian Gulf War, examples abound of the policy relevance of the strategy approach. Here this question is explored from two angles. First, what can other leaders learn from Bush’s success in turning things around to his administration’s favor, against all odds? Second, what lessons are offered by this case to actors who may have wanted to interfere with Bush’s agenda? As was clear in the Chapter 3, President Bush used intermestic policy making to turn a skeptical and unsupportive public around 180 degrees in support of a tough stance (and eventually military confrontation) against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We have seen how he broadened audience first to the international community, getting UN and key allies’ approval for military action. Only then did he argue that America had to live up to its commitment to support that international community. He also overcame domestic opposition by using external resources to buy off and by framing threat to both universal values and American national interests. Earlier on, when he did have some international resistance, he bought off some of this opposition, and dealt with others by tying hands and framing threat (arguing that domestic opposition made the international commitment to help even more essential, and the fact that international security was at stake meant inaction was not an option). Any leader who faces stiff domestic opposition to his foreign policy would do well to follow this model. For example, George W. Bush took a very different road in 2003, when he also faced both domestic and international opposition to his policy of preemptive war against Iraq. This policy was much more unilateral in nature, and his administration only reached out to try to get international support from the United Nations after opposition was solidified. From another angle, the leader strategy framework can be useful for observers who want to stop a leader from accomplishing his agenda. Consider the perspective of an American group against the war with Iraq in 1991. As makes sense from a conventional perspective, most antiwar groups focused attention on the national scene, holding protests in Washington, DC, and in localities around the country. Because the case revealed that broadening audience was a cornerstone of Bush’s success, however, antiwar activists might have more effectively focused on the international audience as a target of protests, including countries on the UN Security Council and the governments of allies who were eventually bought off. Insight into how a leader can be stopped from accomplishing his agenda seems especially necessary when dealing with situations like those in contemporary Zimbabwe and Pakistan. One of the fundamental lessons of the Mugabe case in this book is that external policy makers (and even internal political opposition) must realize the precarious balance between international intervention that can empower moderate leaders and that which instead provokes a rallying of support around a nationalist leader urging behavior against international norms. With

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Mugabe and now Chavez in Venezuela and Ahmadinejad in Iran, external actors always appear to learn this lesson too late in the game. In Zimbabwe, the leader used an intermestic approach to deflect attention from his failing domestic policies. As opposition arose in the form of the MDC, Mugabe blamed Britain and the United States for economic problems and the slow progress on land distribution. Over time, he tied any domestic opponents to a vast conspiracy of colonial powers and agents trying to retake Zimbabwe for the white man. Failure of the international community to live up to commitments on land reform played into Mugabe’s hands, making his appeals seem more truthful. Further, lingering anti-imperialist sentiment and fears of neocolonialism across Africa enabled his broadening audience and framing threat on a black–white basis resonate with continental states whose interests do not align with Mugabe’s much at all. External actors might have had more success in “interrupting” Mugabe’s intermestic policy making by providing more resources to redistribute the land and reaching out to the other African states before Mugabe did. In the chapter on Pakistan, a bold claim was asserted, that is, American foreign policy toward Pakistan after September 11, 2001, has been misguided. While the United States has treated Pakistan’s Musharraf as a key to fighting terrorism, in fact Pakistan has become one of its central staging grounds. This case illustrates well that if policy makers continually assessed the situation in Pakistan with more of a focus on intermestic policy and leader strategies, they would have picked up on the ways in which Musharraf was manipulating internal and external conditions to pursue a central goal: staying in power. Further, the sort of manipulation he undertook has created outcomes against U.S. interests, especially the empowerment of jihadists. To avoid such an outcome, perhaps the United States could have come up with a more balanced approach that empowered the civilian politicians and limited the appeal of Musharraf’s tying hands strategy that it was either him or the mullahs. If it is the case that Musharraf is now trying to broaden audience to the civilian politicians, American policy makers should find subtle ways to help this happen. From the standpoint of policy relevance, stepping back from the individual cases it is possible to conclude that paying more attention to intermestic policy making by using the strategy framework can enrich knowledge about how external actors can have the greatest chance of affecting what leaders can and cannot do. The findings indicate how these actors can (1) enable leaders to depict their constituencies more broadly and thus get domestic opposition on board, or how they can push leaders toward thinking of their constituencies more broadly (or interfere with these processes if the leader has not won external actors’ support); (2) how they can lessen the pressures on the leaders’ followers that make them vulnerable to less moderate leaders (e.g., by providing resources for a leader’s buying off strategy), or how they can avoid being used by leaders as part of a buying off strategy if the leader’s agenda is not in the observer’s interests; and (3) pay attention to the way in which the leaders are depicting the context in order to stay on top of how they may see particular opportunities and constraints and to guard against the international community being used to promote ends against an observer’s interests (whether circumstances against international norms such as authoritarian government, human rights abuses, weapons proliferation, or an external actor’s individual national interests).


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From a theoretical perspective, this study illustrates with empirical case studies an important role of leadership that has rarely been the focus of international relations or foreign policy research: leaders often manipulate the external world to channel the roles of the international and domestic contexts in the process of policy making and mobilizing support for that policy. Many avenues of investigation pose intriguing additional questions for further research. Exploring the strategy concept with a different research design opens up several possibilities. For example, we could treat the strategies as dependent variables and ask why certain leaders choose particular strategies in given situations. More broadly, we could choose cases of failed versus successful leadership and ask whether there is a difference between ways in which successful versus unsuccessful leaders utilize the strategies. Readers are encouraged to consider these and other aspects of the games leaders play as they try to marshal support for their agendas. Simply thinking that leaders are pushed around by forces of history or that they have all the power to control events as “Great Men” leaves too much rich complexity unexplored.


NOTES

Chapter 1

Leadership in Foreign Policy

1. Leo Tolstoy, “Rulers and Generals Are ‘History’s Slaves’ ” (from War and Peace) in The Leader’s Companion: Insights on Leadership Throughout the Ages, edited by J. Thomas Wren (New York: The Free Press, 1995): 55–59. 2. Daniel I. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25 (2001): 107–146. 3. Ralph Carter, Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002): 3. 4. Quoted in Carter: 4. 5. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). 6. Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, “International Decision Making: Leadership Matters,” Foreign Policy 100 (Spring 1998): 124–137. 7. Classic pieces in this area include Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series No. 3. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); and Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1971). 8. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, edited by Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): 343–344. 9. Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Paul t’Hart, Groupthink in Government, (Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger, 1990); Charles Hermann, Janice Gross Stein, Bengt Sundelius, and Stephen G. Walker, “Resolve, Accept, or Avoid: Effects of Group Conflict on Foreign Policy Decisions,” International Studies Review 3, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 133–168. 10. Allison, 1971; Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974). 11. Joe D. Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Juliet Kaarbo, “Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 501–530; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Joe D. Hagan, Philip P. Everts, Haruhiro Fukui, and John D. Stempel, “Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise, and Anarchy,” International Studies Review 3, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 169–216.

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12. Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence,” in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 1, edited by Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul S. Stern, and Charles Tilly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 13. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology,” International Studies Quarterly 39 (1995): 511–533. 14. Fred L. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Margaret G. Hermann, “When Leader Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions,” in In Search of Global Patterns, edited by James Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1976): 326–333. 15. Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Margaret G. Hermann, ed., A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders (New York: The Free Press, 1977). John D. Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979); Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy Shaw, “Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals,” International Studies Review 3, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 83–132; David G. Winter, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview,” in Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, edited by Eric Singer and Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). 16. Donald A. Sylvan and Stuart J. Thorson, “Ontologies, Problem Representation, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1992): 709–732; Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds., Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 17. Thomas Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Policy Making, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 18. Levy, 1989; Joe D. Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993). 19. Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw, 2001: 84. 20. An excellent review is Valerie M. Hudson, with Christopher S. Vore, “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” Mershon International Studies Review 39, no. 2 (October 1995): 209–238. 21. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). 22. Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). 23. For a review, see Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw, 2001. 24. Andrew Moravcsik, “Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining,” in Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, edited by Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993): 16. Also, see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (1988): 427–460; and George Tsbelis, Nested Games (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 25. Moravcsik, 1993: 17. 26. Margaret G. Hermann, “Ingredients of Leadership,” in Political Psychology, edited by Margaret G. Hermann (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986): 167–192. 27. See n. 12. Also, Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons, (New York: Free Press, 1947); Thomas Carlyle,

NOTES

28.

29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42.

43. 44. 45.

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“The Hero As King,” in The Leader’s Companion: Insights on Leadership Throughout the Ages, edited by J. Thomas Wren (New York: The Free Press, 1995): 53–54; Alexander L. George, “Woodrow Wilson’s Political Personality,” in Political Leadership in Divided Societies, edited by Anthony Mughan and Samuel Patterson (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1991): 29–71. Martin Burch and Michael Moran, “The Changing British Political Elite,” in Mughan and Patterson, 1991: 123–135; Donald D. Searing, “The Socialization of British Political Leaders,” in Mughan and Patterson, 1991: 171–192. Robert E. Kelley, “In Praise of Followers,” in The Leader’s Companion: Insights on Leadership Throughout the Ages, in Wren, 1995: 193–204. James McGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); James McGregor Burns, Transforming Leadership (Berkeley: University of California, 2003); Bruce E. Cain, “British MPs and Their Constituencies,” in Mughan and Patterson, 1991: 377–397; Clive Bean and Anthony Mughan, “Voters and Leaders in Australian and British Elections,” Mughan and Patterson, 1991: 423–436. Andrea Grove, “The Intra-National Struggle to Define ‘Us’: External Involvement as a Two-Way Street,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (2001): 357–388; Andrea Grove, “Theory, Perception, and Leadership Agency: A Multiple Processing Model of Nationalist Mobilization,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 2 (2001): 1–32. Robert Tucker, “Politics as Leadership,” in Mughan and Patterson, 1991: 29–48. Hermann, 1986. James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995). Baker, 1995: 331. For example, work by Finnemore and others argues that international norms can be an important variable. See Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,” International Organization 50 (1996): 325–348. Juan Forero, “Chavez, Seeking Foreign Allies, Spends Billions,” New York Times (April 4, 2006): A1, A6. Richard Bernstein, “German Leader Nears the End of Her Political Honeymoon,” New York Times (March 23, 2006): A3. Forero, 2006: A1, A6. Michael Slackman, “A New Face in Iran Resurrects and Old Defiance,” New York Times ( January 30, 2006): A1. For more discussion of this approach and another example, see Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Michael T. Snarr, eds., Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002). Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches to History, Theory, and Policy, edited by Paul Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1969): 43–68. See James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khruschev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). A. Przeworski and H. Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley, 1970); Tsbelis, 1990. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).

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Chapter 2 Forcing Peace: John Hume’s “Long Struggle” in Northern Ireland, 1982–1998 1. Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1993): 161. 2. John Hume, “Commencement Address at the University of Massachusetts,” Congressional Record, 131, no. 67 (May 21, 1985): 3. 3. Bob Purdie, Politics in the Streets: The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1990). 4. O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 160, 168. 5. O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 170. 6. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland (New York: Longman, 1997). 7. The name of the party at this point was Provisional Sinn Fein, having branched off in the North from the Sinn Fein party long based in the Republic. Later the “Provisional” was dropped. For the sake of consistency, SF is used here. 8. Kennedy-Pipe, 1997: 65. 9. Cynthia Irvin, Paramilitary Politics in Parliamentary Democracies: Militant Nationalism in Ireland and Spain (Dissertation, Duke University, 1993): 322; see also KennedyPipe, 1997. 10. O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 212. 11. Sydney Elliott and Richard A. Wilford, The 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly Election, Studies in Public Policy (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde [Center for the Study of Public Policy], 1983): 31. 12. John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1981 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 6. 13. Elliott and Wilford, 1983: 32. 14. Bobby Sands was the political prisoner who was the first to die in the 1981 hunger strikes; he was elected in a by-election to replace a deceased member of Parliament, and then died a prisoner shortly after. 15. Quoted in Elliott and Wofford, 1983: 33. 16. To get around censorship issues, this newspaper was established by the republican movement and sold in Catholic neighborhoods. 17. Cynthia Irvin and Eddie Moxon-Browne, “Not Many Floating Voters Here,” Fortnight (May 1989): 7–9. 18. Barry White, John Hume, Statesman of the Troubles (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1984): 237. 19. White, 1984: 238. 20. O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 213. 21. O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 214. 22. Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966–1995 and the Search for Peace (Boulder, CO: Roberts Reinhart Publishers, 1996): 90. 23. In the 1982 Assembly elections and 1983 Westminster elections, the Hume/SDLP percentages of the votes were 18.8 percent and 17.9 percent, respectively, compared to 10.1 percent and 13.4 percent for Adams/PSF. Looking at percentage of the nationalist vote, 65.1 percent and 57.2 percent voted for Hume/SDLP and 34.9 percent and 42.8 percent for Adams/PSF. These were monumental gains for SF. In contrast, by the 1986 Westminster by-elections and the 1987 Westminster elections show that Hume/SDLP turned things back around, receiving 12.1 percent and 21.1 percent, respectively, compared to Adams/PSF’s 6.6 percent and 11.4 percent. The share of nationalist vote was 64.6 percent and 64.9 percent for Hume/SDLP and 35.4 percent and 35.1 percent for Adams/PSF (Grove, 2001a).

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24. John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1984 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 3–4. 25. John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1985 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 2. 26. John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1988 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 5–6. 27. Extensive press clippings from Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland, in author’s possession. 28. John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Conference, 1988 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 4–5. 29. Brendan O’Leary, “Beyond the Blocs,” Fortnight (March 1990): 16. 30. Sidney Elliott, “A Post-Mortem on an Unprecedented Poll,” Fortnight (February 10, 1986): 6–7. 31. Sidney Elliott, “And Then There Were Thirteen,” Fortnight ( July/August 1987): 11–13. 32. Elliott, 1987. 33. Rupert Taylor, “Running on Empty,”Fortnight (February 1990): 10–11. 34. Kennedy-Pipe, 1997. 35. See Kennedy-Pipe, 1997. 36. Bill Rolston, “Alienation or Political Awareness? The Battle for the Hearts and Minds of Northern Nationalists,” in Beyond the Rhetoric: Politics, The Economy, and Social Policy in Northern Ireland, edited by Paul Teague (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987): 78; and William Graham, “Accord Advances Real Says Hume,” Irish News (November 11, 1986). 37. Kennedy-Pipe, 1997. 38. Kennedy-Pipe, 1997. 39. Rolston, 1987. 40. Kennedy-Pipe, 1997: 161. 41. Kennedy-Pipe, 1997: 162. 42. John Hume, “Why Voters Must Turn Away From Sinn Fein,” Irish News (February 20, 1997). 43. Jonathan Turner, “Hume ‘Confident’ of Yes Vote for Deal,” Irish News (April 14, 1998); William Graham, “Learn from the Past, SDLP Chief Tells North,” Irish News (April 24, 1998). 44. John Hume, Address to the SDLP Annual Party Conference, 8 November 1980 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 3. 45. O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 213–215. 46. Karen DeYoung, “Key Accord Signed on Northern Ireland: Pact with London Gives Dublin a Role in Troubled Ulster,” Washington Post (November 16, 1985). 47. Coogan, 1996: 183. 48. O’Leary and McGarry, 1993. 49. Kennedy-Pipe, 1997: 106. 50. Thomas Hennessy, The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles? (New York: Palgrave, 2001): 75. 51. O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 228. 52. Hennessy, 2001: 47. 53. In 1974 a “forced” strike engineered by the Ulster Worker’s Council to protest against a power-sharing arrangement with the Catholic minority resulted in some of the worst violence of the Troubles before the British government finally declared a state of emergency. Even then, the British soldiers and the RUC dragged their feet to dismantle barricades manned by the UDA (Ulster Defense Association) (Coogan, 1996: 170–171).

190 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

NOTES

Hennessy, 2001: 52. Coogan, 1996: 344. Coogan, 1996: 345. Coogan, 1996: 345. Coogan, 1996. Coogan, 1996: 347. Coogan, 1996: 194. White, 1984: 232. The 1988 talks foundered because the focus was on differences in policies, strategies, and goals between SF and the SDLP; perhaps the largest obstacle was Adams’s refusal to agree with Hume that Britain was “neutral” and would support unity by consent. In 1993, the talks were more productive because interparty differences were set aside to focus on the issue of an IRA cease-fire and how to get SF into inclusive negotiations. Hume’s talks with Adams caused a major rift within the SDLP because SF was at low ebb; dissenters argued that Hume’s actions brought SF back from their neardefeat. One SDLP councilor stated, “We helped Sinn Fein and now they are standing on our fingers” (SDLP councilor (anonymous), interview with author, Belfast, September 1997). The joint statements issued by Hume and Adams during this period were especially objectionable to some SDLP members, especially because these statements were faxed to newspapers on SF paper. Further, the fact that Adams and Hume decided not to publish the details of the agreement reached in 1993 created great debate in all circles (Marie-Therese Fay, The Battle for Control of the Nationalist Agenda: S.D.L.P. and S.F. Competition, 1982–1996 [Dissertation, Queen’s University, 1996]). Hennessy, 2001: 72. Coogan, 1996: 364–365. James Goodman, Nationalism and Transnationalism: The National Conflict in Ireland and European Union Integration (Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1996): 114. Kennedy-Pipe, 1997: 168. John Hume, “SDLP Analysis of Nature of Problem,” submission to Brooke talks ( June 17, 1991, Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 10. John Hume, Address to the SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1985 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland). For example, see Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). O’Leary and McGarry, 1993: 332. Coogan, 1996: 364–373. John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1996 ⬍http://www.sdlp.ie⬎ (1996): 19. Coogan, 1996: 407. Coogan, 1996: 409. Coogan, 1996: 411–412. William Graham, “IRA Ceasefire Still Possible Hume Tells the Loyalists,” Irish News (December 20, 1996). Jim Fitzpatrick, “SDLP Clarifies Forum Position,” Irish News (May 21, 1996). John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1998 ⬍http://www.sdlp.ie⬎ (1998).

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80. John Hume, “Time for Rethink All Around,” Irish News ( July 11, 1984). 81. John Hume, Address to SDLP Fifteenth Anniversary Party Conference, 1985 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 2. 82. John Hume, Address to the SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1981 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 1–2. 83. Reports of Hume/SDLP success at the European level were covered in the newspapers. For example, “Hume’s Rural Fight Victory,” Irish News (September 10, 1986). 84. Goodman, 1996. 85. John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1994 ⬍http://www.sdlp.ie⬎ (1994): 5–7. 86. DeYoung, 1985. 87. Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles, 1968–1993 (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1993): 204. 88. Terry McLaughlin, “Hume Secures New U.S. Jobs Initiative,” Irish News (March 27, 1987). 89. Coogan, 1996: 384. For additional examples of Clinton’s “commercial diplomacy,” see Conor O’Clery, The Greening of the White House: The Inside Story of How America Tried to Bring Peace to Ireland (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1996). 90. John Hume, Address to SDLP Annual Party Conference, 1980 (Linen Hall Library Political Collection, Belfast, Northern Ireland): 8. 91. “Hume’s Appeal to the I.R.A.,” Irish News ( June 3, 1996). 92. William Graham, “I.R.A. Ceasefire Still Possible Hume Tells the Loyalists,” Irish News (December 20, 1996).

Chapter 3 From the Outside In: George H.W. Bush and the Persian Gulf War, August 1990–January 1991 1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith, After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War (Lanham, M.D.: Madison Books, 1992): 181. 2. Strobe Talbott, “Status Quo Ante: The United States and Its Allies,” in After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War, edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith: 22. 3. George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998): 303. 4. Larry Berman and Bruce Jentleson, “Bush and the Post-Cold-War World: New Challenges for American Leadership,” in The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals, edited by Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1991): 120. 5. Lawrence Freedman and Ephraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993): 25–26. 6. Berman and Jentleson in Campbell and Rockman, 1991: 121. 7. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 23–24. 8. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 37. 9. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 81. 10. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 304. 11. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 79. 12. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 309. 13. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 57–58. 14. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 69.

192 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

NOTES

Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 313. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 319, 323. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 331, 339, 340. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 324–325. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 323. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 325. After the Iranian revolution, the United States offered to send F-15s to Saudi Arabia to warn the radicals in Iran and show support for the kingdom. Washington announced that the planes were unarmed once they were already on their way. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 353. Talbott in Nye and Smith, 1992: 9. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 82. Jeanne Butterfield, “U.S. Aid to Israel: Funding Occupation in the Aftermath of the Gulf War,” in Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader, edited by Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991): 103–104. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 346. James A. Baker, III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995): 331. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 359. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 398. Baker, 1995: 331. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991): 36. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 224. Steve A. Yetiv, The Persian Gulf Crisis (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997): 65. Yetiv, 1997: 19, and Woodward, 1991: 337. Joao Resende-Santos. “The Persian Gulf Crisis: A Chronology of Events,” in After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War, edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith: 328. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 413–414. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 345–346. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 346. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 349–352. Talbott in Nye and Smith, 1992: 10. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 354–355. Talbott in Nye and Smith, 1992: 4. David R. Gergen. “The Unfettered Presidency,” in After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War, edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith: 177. Gergen in Nye and Smith, 1992: 180. Woodward, 1991: 323. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 303. Yetiv, 1997: xix. Woodward, 1991: 285. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 336. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 363. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 379. Woodward, 1991: 333. Baker, 1995: 331. Woodward, 1991: 338.

NOTES

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

193

Woodward, 1991: 338–339. Yetiv, 1997: 25–26. Woodward, 1991: 336. Baker, 1995: 360. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 343. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 405. Baker, 1995: 316. Phyllis Bennis, “False Consensus: George Bush’s United Nations,” Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader, edited by Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991): 119. Baker, 1995: 323. Bennis in Bennis and Moushabeck, 1991: 120. Baker, 1995: 324–325. Baker, 1995: 295. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 348. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 352. Baker, 1995: 284–285. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 352. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 373. Butterfield in Bennis and Moushabeck, 1991: 104. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 347. Butterfield in Bennis and Moushabeck, 1991: 105 (based on articles in the Washington Post, October 3 and 16, 1990). Butterfield in Bennis and Moushabeck, 1991: 106 (based on an article in the New York Times, January 21, 1991). Woodward, 1991: 363. Baker, 1995: 288. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 216. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 216. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 120. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 123. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 358. Gergen in Nye and Smith, 1992: 181. Gergen (quoting Krauthammer) in Nye and Smith, 1992: 181. Woodward, 1991: 260. Woodward, 1991: 260. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 358. Gergen in Nye and Smith, 1992: 178–179. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 385. Baker, 1995: 303. Gergen in Nye and Smith, 1992: 174. John Mueller, “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War,” in The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict, edited by Stanley Renshon (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993): 206. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 415. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 421. Gergen in Nye and Smith, 1992: 177. See Chapter 18 in Freedman and Karsh, 1993. Woodward, 1991: 341. Woodward, 1991: 356.

194

NOTES

99. Bush, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Crisis,” January 8, 1991, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 1. 100. Baker, 1995: 333. 101. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 318. 102. Berman and Jentleson in Campbell and Rockman, 1991: 116. 103. George H.W. Bush’s speeches and statements are all available and freely accessible on the Internet, at the website for the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum (⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎). The references made in this section are repeated in almost all the speeches. 104. On October 8, there were demonstrations at the Temple Mount in Jerusalem that led to violence; Israeli soldiers fired into the crowd, killing 21 Palestinians and wounding over 150. In an effort to head off a more harsh reaction in the United Nations, the United States cosponsored a resolution condemning Israel (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 378–379). 105. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 389. 106. Bush and Scowcroft. 1998: 374. 107. Bush, “Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Manchester, New Hampshire,” October 23, 1990, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 4. 108. Bush, “Remarks at a Republican Fundraising Breakfast in Burlington, Vermont,” October 23, 1990, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/ papers⬎: 4. 109. Woodward, 1991: 316–317. 110. Woodward, 1991: 343. 111. Jarol B. Mannheim, “The War of Images: Strategic Communication in the Gulf Conflict,” in The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict, edited by Stanley Renshon: 169. 112. Naseer Aruri, “Human Rights and the Gulf Crisis: The Verbal Strategy of George Bush,” in Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader, edited by Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck: 305–324. 113. Mannheim in Renshon, 1993: 168–169, Yetiv, 1997: 19. 114. Aruri in Bennis and Moushabeck, 1991: 317. 115. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 398. 116. Baker, 1995: 336. 117. Bush and Scowcroft, 1998: 399. 118. Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 227. 119. Bush, “Remarks to the Military Airlift Command in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,” November 22, 1990, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 2. 120. Bush, “Remarks to Allied Armed Forces Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,” November 22, 1990, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 3. 121. Bush, “Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf Crisis,” January 9, 1991, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 2. 122. Bush, “Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf Crisis,” January 9, 1991, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 2. 123. Bush, “Question and Answer Session with Reporters in Montevideo, Uruguay,” December 4, 1990, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 2–3. 124. Bush, “Exchange with Reporters,” December 27, 1990, ⬍http://bushlibrary. tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 3. 125. Bush, “Message to Allied Nations on the Persian Gulf Crisis,” January 8, 1991, ⬍http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers⬎: 2. 126. Yetiv, 1997: xviii–xxi, and Resende-Santos in Nye and Smith, 1992: 297–355.

NOTES

195

Chapter 4 Resisting Change: Mugabe against the People’s Struggle in Zimbabwe, 1998–2005 1. Jonathan N. Moyo, Voting for Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1992). 2. Pierre Du Toit, State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995): 146. 3. Du Toit, 1995: 148. 4. Stephen Chan, Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003): 95. 5. John Makumbe and Daniel Campignon, Behind the Smokescreen: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s 1995 General Elections (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 2000): 7. 6. Makumbe and Campignon, 2000: 7–8. 7. Martin Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York: Public Affairs, 2002): 126–127. 8. Alfred Nhema, Democracy in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Liberalization (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Press, 2002): 144. 9. John Makumbe, “Zimbabwe’s Hijacked Election,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002), ⬍http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_dem./v013/13.4makumbe.html⬎ (November 19, 2004): 88. 10. Makumbe, 2002: 90. 11. Quoted in International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: The Politics of National Liberation and International Division, Africa Report No. 52, October 17, 2002 ⬍http:// www.crisisgroup.org⬎: 5. 12. International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: Danger and Opportunity, Africa Report No. 60, March 10, 2003, ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎: 3–4. 13. Meredith, 2002: 162–165. 14. Meredith, 2002: 222. 15. International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe’s Election: The Stakes for Southern Africa, Africa Briefing, January 11, 2002 ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎: 1–2. 16. Chan, 2003: 113. 17. International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, 2002: 2. 18. Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism, and the Search for Social Justice (Scottsville, South Africa: University of Natal Press, 2003): 47. 19. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 47. 20. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 270. 21. International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, Africa Report No. 86, November 20, 2004 ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎: i. 22. International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: In Search of a New Strategy, Africa Report No. 78, April 19, 2004 ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎: i. 23. Hagan, 1993. 24. Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). 25. Meredith, 2002: 81–82. 26. Meredith, 2002: 111. 27. Meredith, 2002: 84. 28. Peter Stiff, Cry Zimbabwe: Independence—Twenty Years On ( Johannesburg, South Africa: Galago, 2000): 291.

196

NOTES

29. Du Toit, 1995: 126. 30. Stiff, 2000: 292. 31. In all sources consulted for this study, Hunzvi is portrayed as having a questionable background including the fact that he did not even fight in the liberation war. 32. Meredith, 2002: 135–138. 33. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 39. 34. Meredith, 2002: 141. 35. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 73. 36. Chan, 2003: 138. 37. Stiff, 2000: 318. 38. Meredith, 2002: 148. 39. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 22, 2000: 7. 40. Meredith, 2002: 138. 41. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 283–284. 42. International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a Way Forward, Africa Report No. 32, July 13, 2001 ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎: 10. 43. Meredith, 2002: 139. 44. Meredith, 2002: 152–153, 156. 45. Meredith, 2002: 163–164. 46. Stiff, 2000: 305. 47. Meredith, 2002: 166. 48. Meredith, 2002: 167–169. 49. Meredith, 2002: 170. 50. Meredith, 2002: 184. 51. Meredith, 2002: 194. 52. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 80. 53. Makumbe, 2002: 88. 54. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 182. 55. This label carries much emotional impact because the first and second chimurengas were the uprisings in the name of land against new white settlers in 1896 and the war for independence in the 1970s. 56. Meredith, 2002: 223. 57. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 81. The extent of the corruption involved in the land distribution is described in International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002. For example, the provincial lands minister allocated himself six farms and many other farms have gone to Mugabe’s friends and family members. 58. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002: 2. 59. Robert Rotbeg, “Africa’s Mess, Mugabe’s Mayhem,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 5 (2000) ⬍http://wilsontxt.hwwilson.com/pdfhtml/03188/WAU9G/USJ.htm⬎ (November 19, 2004): 5. 60. International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: Three Months After Elections, Africa Briefing, September 25, 2000 ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎: 6. 61. Meredith, 2002: 211. 62. Makumbe, 2002: 96. 63. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002: 6. 64. Chan, 2003: 174, and International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 47, 2002: 5. 65. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002: 3–5. 66. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002: 5. 67. Where the MDC candidate did well, 50 percent of the voters turned out, but where Mugabe did well, over 60 percent of the voters turned out (Chan, 2003: 207–208).

NOTES

197

68. Chan, 2003: 204. 69. “Key dates in Zimbabwe’s recent history,” The Guardian Unlimited, December 3, 2004, ⬍http://www.guardian.co.uk/zimbabwe/article/0,2763,1328379,00.html⬎ (December 3, 2004). 70. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 86, 2004: 5. 71. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 86, 2004: 6. 72. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 86, 2004: 3–4. 73. Dick Morris, Power Plays: Win or Lose-How History’s Great Political Leaders Play the Game (New York: ReganBooks, 2003): 90. 74. International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, 2000: 6. 75. International Crisis Group, Africa Report, No. 32, 2001: 10. 76. International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, 2002: 11. 77. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 32, 2001: 10. 78. Meredith, 2002: 141–142. 79. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 79. 80. International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, 2002: 4–7 (these pages list the specific provisions of this agreement that the ZANU-PF government has violated). 81. Meredith, 2002: 172. 82. Chan, 2003: 159–160. 83. Stiff, 2000: 419. 84. Ian Taylor, “ ‘We are the democrats’: The crisis in Zimbabwe and the death of the NEPAD,” Foreign Policy in Focus, March 18, 2002 ⬍http://www.fpif.org⬎ (November 10, 2004): 3. 85. Chan, 2003: 170. 86. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 47, 2002: 21. 87. International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, 2002: 11. 88. Quoted in Chan, 2003: 195. 89. Chan, 2003: 192. 90. Chan, 2003: 193. 91. Makumbe, 2002: 88. 92. Chan, 2003: 206. 93. Chan, 2003: 209. 94. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 279. 95. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002: 13. 96. Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 261–262. 97. Quoted in Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 267. 98. Quoted in International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 47, 2002: 10. 99. Quoted in International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 47, 2002: 19. 100. Statement from Brian Raftopoulos, quoted in Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 273. 101. Prendergast, quoted in Bond and Manyanya, 2003: 274. 102. Makumbe, 2002: 99, and International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 47, 2002: 12. 103. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002: 14. 104. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002: 13–15. 105. International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, 2002: 11. 106. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 60, 2003: 2. 107. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 60, 2003: 10–11. 108. Quoted in International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 60, 2003: 10. 109. Quoted in International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 60, 2003: 12. 110. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 78, 2004: 11, 15. 111. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 78, 2004: 12, 15.

198 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129.

130.

131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145.

146.

NOTES

International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 78, 2004: 16. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 86, 2004: 16. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 78, 2004: 16. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 86, 2004: 15. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 86, 2004: 13. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 86, 2004: 9–10, 16. Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 121–122. Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 128. “Mugabe Points to Economic Sabotage Ahead of Polls,” Agence France Presse, March 10, 1996 ⬍Lexis-Nexis⬎ (November 19, 2004). “Mugabe Denounces IMF as ‘Dictator’ Days after Bank Backs Reforms,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 20, 1996 ⬍Lexis Nexis⬎ (November 19, 2004). Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 138–139. Robert Mugabe, “Live Broadcast to the Nation,” Zimbabwe Government Online, February 6, 1999 ⬍http://www.gta.gov.zw⬎ (April 19, 2000). “Zimbabwe: Mugabe Attacks Critics, Western Governments,” B.B.C. Monitoring Africa-Political, February 21, 1999 ⬍Lexis Nexis⬎ (November 19, 2004). “The President on B.B.C.’s Newsnight,” Zimbabwe Government Online, March 19, 1999, ⬍http://www.gta.gov.zw⬎ (April 19, 2000). Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 156. “Mugabe Scorns IMF, European ‘Racists,’ No Sign of Resigning,” Deutsche PresseAgentur, May 12, 1999, ⬍Lexis Nexis⬎ (November 19, 2004). Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 17. Robert Mugabe, “Televised Address by His Excellency the President on the Occasion of Zimbabwe’s Twentieth Anniversary, Pocket’s Hill, Harare,” Zimbabwe Government Online, April 8, 2000 ⬍http://www.gta.gov.zw⬎ (April 19, 2000). Lewis Machipisa, “Politics-Zimbabwe: Ruling Party Launches Election Manifesto,” Inter-Press Service/Global Information Network, May 2, 2000 ⬍Lexis Nexis⬎ ( January 28, 2005). Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 180. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 22, 2000: 2. Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 185. Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 192. Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 193. Quoted in Meredith, 2002: 203. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 41, 2002: 10. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 41, 2002: 10. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 41, 2002: 10. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 52, 2002: 14. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 41, 2002: 10. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 86, 2004: 16. Mugabe, July 23, 2002. Mugabe, July 23, 2002. Robert Mugabe, “Full Text of the Speech delivered by President Mugabe at the Earth Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa,” Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2002 ⬍http://www.zimfa.gov.zw.speeches/president/ pres002.htm⬎ (December 10, 2004). Robert Mugabe, “Address by His Excellency the President Comrade R.G. Mugabe on the Occasion of the Opening of the Fourth session of the Fifth Parliament of Zimbabwe,” Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2003

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199

⬍http://www.zimfa.gov.zw.speeches/president/pres005.htm⬎ (December 10, 2004). 147. Robert Mugabe, “Statement by H.E. Comrade R.G. Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe at the NAM Summit, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,” Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 25, 2003 ⬍http://www.zimfa.gov.zw. speeches/president/pres004.htm⬎ (December 10, 2004).

Chapter 5 The South African “Miracle”: Mandela’s Struggle in a Globalized Transition, 1985–1994 1. From Peter Gabriel, “Biko,” Peter Gabriel, Geffen Records, 1980. 2. The term “blacks” was often used as a synonym for nonwhites. The category includes black Africans, Indians, and Coloreds (or those of mixed-race). 3. Adrian Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005): 168. 4. Princeton N. Lyman, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002): 51. 5. The British, who controlled the Cape Colony and Natal, defeated the Afrikaner republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State in the 1899–1902 Anglo-Boer War. Britain established parliamentary government to all these areas by 1906–1907, only enfranchising whites (Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, Third Edition [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000]: xxi). 6. Thompson, 2000: 210. 7. Roger Pfister, “Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960–1994,” Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 1 (2003): 51–73. 8. Thompson, 2000: 166. 9. Thompson, 2000: 210–211. 10. Pfister, 2003: 57. 11. Pfister, 2003: 58. 12. Thompson, 2000: 239. 13. Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and The Birth of the New South Africa (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997): 136. 14. Waldmeir, 1997: 12. 15. Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz (eds.), How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999): 203. 16. Thompson, 2000: 213. 17. Waldmeir, 1997: 25–26. 18. Waldmeir, 1997: 48. 19. Guelke, 2005: 195. 20. Pfister, 2003: 62–63. 21. This action led to the development of an indigenous arms industry in South Africa, and so in 1984 the Security Council passed a resolution asking states not to import any military equipment from South Africa. Guelke, 2005: 194–195. 22. Crawford and Klotz, 1999: 15. 23. Guelke, 2005: 201–202. 24. Waldmeir, 1997: 95. 25. Chris Landsberg, “Directing from the Stalls? The International Community and the South African Negotiating Forum,” in The Small Miracle: South Africa’s

200

26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

NOTES

Negotiated Settlement, edited by Steven Friedman and Doreen Atkinson ( Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994): 277. The conditions were as follows: (1) repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of equal justice under the law for citizens of all races; (2) release Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, black trade union leaders, and all political prisoners; (3) permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the political process; (4) establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws; (5) negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa the future political system in South Africa; and (6) end military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring states (Guelke, 2005: 150). David Black, “The Long and Winding Road: International and Domestic Political Change in South Africa,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 99. Pfister, 2003: 64. Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC Since 1960 (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996): 215. Thompson, 2000: 191. James Barber, Mandela’s World: The International Dimension of South Africa’s Political Revolution 1990–99 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2004): 47. Waldmeir, 1997: 163–164. Barber, 2004: 47. Mayibuye 5, 2 (March 1993): 13. Guelke, 2005: 178. Waldmeir, 1997: 165–166. Barber, 2004: 1999. A federal system was a desire the NP shared with the IFP; the NP envisioned a state with a white majority and the IFP would hold power in KwaZulu. Waldmeir, 1997: 193–194. Note that this was not truly a vote for changing much: the NP slogan was “vote yes if you are scared of majority rule” (Waldmeir, 1997: 198). Waldmeir, 1997: 206–207. Waldmeir, 1997: 233. Waldmeir, 1997: 225. Lyman, 2002: 148–152. Waldmeir, 1997: 237. Lyman, 2002: 182. African National Congress Department of Political Education, The Road to Peace: Resource Material on Negotiations (Marshalltown, South Africa: June 1990): 14. Waldmeir, 1997: 52–53. Waldmeir, 1997: 72–73. Waldmeir, 1997: 100, 66, and 89. Waldmeir, 1997: 102. Waldmeir, 1997: 132. Mayibuye 8 (1988): 1. Waldmeir, 1997: 94. Waldmeir, 1997: 159. Nelson Mandela, “Mandela Document: Document Presented by Nelson Mandela to P.W. Botha Before Their Meeting on 5 July 1989” ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ ancdocs/history/mandela/doc890705.html⬎.

NOTES

201

57. Johannes Mutshutshu Rantete, Facing the Challenges of Transition: A Critical Analysis of the African National Congress in the 1990s ( Johannesburg: University of Witswatersrand, 1994): 136. 58. African National Congress Department of Political Education, Guidelines to the Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress ( Johannesburg: African National Congress, 1991): 9. 59. Waldmeir, 1997: 157. 60. Lyman, 2002: 47. 61. Lyman, 2002: 46. 62. Mandela, 1990. 63. Pfister, 2003: 65–66. 64. Anthony Sampson, Mandela: The Authorized Biography (New York: Knopf, 1999): 412. 65. Lyman, 2002: 50. 66. Black, 1999: 99. 67. Black, 1999: 100. 68. Mayibuye 4, 10 (November 1993): 13. 69. Quoted from an interview in Lyman, 2002: 53. 70. Lyman, 2002: 53. 71. Lyman, 2002: 93. 72. Waldmeir, 1997: 166. 73. Mayibuye 1, 2 (September 1990). 74. Barber, 2004: 49. 75. Lyman, 2002: 3–4, 72. 76. Landsberg, 1994: 283–284. 77. Sampson, 1999: 455; Pfister, 2003: 67–68. 78. Landsberg, 1994: 286. 79. Sampson, 1999: 456. 80. Waldmeir, 1997: 208. 81. Black, 1999: 97. 82. Guelke, 2005: 188. 83. Sampson, 1999: 459–460. 84. Black, 1999: 102. 85. Sampson, 1999: 459. 86. Mayibuye 2, 10 (November 1991): 8. 87. Waldmeir, 1997: 257. 88. Barber, 2004: 76. 89. Lyman, 2002: 103. 90. Lyman, 2002: 148–152. 91. Quoted in Lyman, 2002: 167. 92. Lyman, 2002: 202–206. 93. Mayibuye 4, 11 (December 1993): 23. 94. Mayibuye 5, 2 (March 1994): 10. 95. Lyman, 2002: 220. 96. Waldmeir, 1997: 261. 97. Landsberg, 1994: 284. 98. Mayibuye 1, 2 (September 1990): 6–8. 99. Black, 1999: 101. 100. Black, 1999: 103. 101. ANC Department of Political Education, 1990: 83. 102. Lyman, 2002: 96. 103. Lyman, 2002: 96.

202

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104. Mayibuye 3, 3: 34. 105. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995): 605. 106. Mandela, 1995: 603. 107. Waldmeir, 1997: 206. 108. Mandela, 1995: 606. 109. Interview in Mayibuye 5, 4 (May/June 1994): 8. 110. Nelson Mandela, “Nelson Mandela’s Address to SA Business Executives, Johannesburg,” May 23, 1990 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/ 1990/sp900523.html⬎. 111. Sampson, 1999: 413. 112. Black, 1999: 99. 113. Landsberg, 1994: 290–291. 114. Waldmeir, 1997: 214–215. 115. Waldmeir, 1997: 258. 116. Sampson, 1999: 466. 117. Mayibuye 1, 1: 31. 118. Rantete, 1994: 174–175. 119. Barber, 2004: 56. 120. Lyman, 2002: 124. 121. Lyman, 2002: 157, 166. 122. Lyman, 2002: 169. Dates from Waldmeir, 1997: 246–247. 123. Thompson, 2000: 262. 124. Waldmeir, 1997: 240. 125. Waldmeir, 1997: 247, 250. 126. Barber, 2004: 60. 127. Mayibuye 4, 1: 8. 128. Lyman, 2002: 114–115. 129. Rantete, 1994: 192. 130. Thompson, 2000: 263. 131. ANC Department of Political Education, 1990: 16. 132. Nelson Mandela, “Address of the Deputy President of the African National Congress Nelson Mandela, at the European Parliament, Strasbourg,” June 13, 1990 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1990/sp900613.html⬎. 133. Nelson Mandela, “Address of the Deputy President of the African National Congress Nelson Mandela, at the European Parliament, Strasbourg,” June 13, 1990. 134. Nelson Mandela, “Mandela Message to Big Business USA,” June 19, 1990 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1990/sp900619.html⬎. 135. Nelson Mandela, “Speech by the Deputy President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, to May Day Rally,” May 1, 1991 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/ mandela/1991/sp910501.html⬎. 136. Nelson Mandela, “Nelson Mandela’s Opening Address to the 48th National Conference of the African National Congress, Durban,” July 2, 1991 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1991/sp910700-02.html⬎. 137. Nelson Mandela, “Address to OAU Ad Hoc Committee for Southern Africa by ANC President, Nelson Mandela, Arusha,” April 28, 1992 ⬍http://www.anc. org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1992/sp920428.html⬎. 138. Waldmeir, 1997: 206. 139. Nelson Mandela, “Statement by Nelson Mandela, President of the African National Congress, at the Opening of the ANC/NP Government Summit,”

NOTES

140. 141.

142. 143.

144.

145.

146.

147.

148.

149. 150. 151.

152.

203

September 26, 1992 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1992/ sp920926.html⬎. Waldmeir, 1997: 223. Nelson Mandela, “Televised Address to the Nation by ANC President, Nelson Mandela, on the Assassination of Chris Hani,” April 13, 1993 ⬍http://www.anc. org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1993/sp930413.html⬎. Guelke, 2005: 183–184. Nelson Mandela, “Keynote Address of the President of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, to the Umkhonto We Sizwe National Conference, Eastern Transvaal,” September 3–4, 1993 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/ history/mandela/1993/sp930903.html⬎. Nelson Mandela, “Nelson Mandela’s Address to the Summit of the Patriotic Front,” November 24, 1993 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/ 1993/sp931124.html⬎. Nelson Mandela, “Address by President Nelson Mandela to the ANC National Conference on Reconstruction and Strategy, Johannesburg,” January 21, 1994 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/sp940121.html⬎. Nelson Mandela, “Address by ANC President Nelson Mandela to ANC-Business Summit,” March 30, 1994 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/ 1994/sp940330.html⬎. Nelson Mandela, “Statement of the President of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, at the United Nations, New York,” September 24, 1993 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1993/sp930924.html⬎. Nelson Mandela, “Speech by Nelson Mandela at Zionist Christian Church Easter Conference, Moria,” April 3, 1994 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/ mandela/1994/sp940403.html⬎. Nelson Mandela, “Statement of the President of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, at the United Nations,” September 24, 1993. Nelson Mandela, “Speech at a Cultural Dinner in Midrand,” April 7, 1994 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/sp940407.html⬎. Nelson Mandela, “Statement of the President of the African National Congress Nelson Mandela at His Inauguration as President of the Democratic Republic of South Africa, Pretoria,” May 10, 1994 ⬍http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/ mandela/1994/inaugpta.html⬎. Adopted in part from Waldmeir, 1997: xv–xvi.

Chapter 6 Pakistan’s Musharraf: The War on Terror and Fueling the Jihad, 2001–2005 1. International Crisis Group, Conflict History: Pakistan, 2005 (18 August 2005). 2. Anatol Lieven, “The Pressures on Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 ( January/February 2002): 106–118. 3. Husain Haqqani, “The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future,” The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2004): 85–96. 4 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005): 93. 5. Haqqani, 2005: 32. 6. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001): 359–360.

204

NOTES

7. Haqqani, 2005: 2–3. 8. Alex Alexiev, “The Pakistani Time Bomb,” Commentary 115, no. 3 (March 2003): 46–52. 9. Haqqani, 2005: 131. 10. Haqqani, 2005: 159. 11. Haqqani, 2005: 167, 172–173. 12. Haqqani, 2005: 140, 142. 13. Haqqani, 2005: 140–141. 14. Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution: 2004): 183. 15. Haqqani, 2005: 138–139. 16. Haqqani, 2005: 142. 17. Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002): 27. 18. Haqqani, 2005: 144. 19. Lieven, 2002: 109–110. 20. Haqqani, 2005: 154–156. 21. Bhutto served 1988–1990 and 1993–1996; Sharif served 1990–1993, 1997–1999. 22. Alexiev, 2003: n.p. 23. In fact, a major source of contention throughout the 1990s and beyond was the refusal of the United States to deliver F-16s that had already been purchased. 24. Cohen, 2004: 251. 25. Weaver, 2002: 25–26. 26. Mohammed Ayoob, “Southwest Asia After the Taliban,” Survival 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 55–57. 27. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002): 70–73. 28. Jones, 2002: 77–80. 29. Jones, 2002: 82–83. 30. Haqqani, 2005: 287–288. 31. Haqqani, 2005: 289. 32. Haqqani, 2005: 294–297. 33. Haqqani, 2005: 298. 34. Jones, 2002: 95. 35. Jones, 2002: 283. 36. Jones, 2002: 90. 37. Jones, 2002: 34–35, 97; Lieven, 2002: 115. 38. Jones, 2002: 104. 39. Weaver, 2002: 32. 40. Sukakshan Mohan, Pakistan Under Musharraf (Delhi: Indian Publishers Distributors, 2000): 312. 41. Pervez Musharaff, “Address to the Nation,” October 17, 1999, ⬍http://infopak. gov.pk/CE_Addresses/Speeches-COAS.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 42. Jones, 2002: 285. 43. Cohen, 2004: 253. 44. Cohen, 2004: 249. 45. Jones, 2002: 285. 46. Bashir Ahmad Khan and Faisal Bari, “Pakistan: Economic Challenges for a New Millennium,” in Pakistan on the Brink, edited by Craig Baxter (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004): 132, 134.

NOTES

205

47. Weaver, 2002: 23. 48. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, “Pakistan’s Security: Problems of Linearity,” South Asia Journal 3 ( January-March 2004): 36. 49. Denis Hagerty, “The United States-Pakistan Entente: Third Time’s a Charm?” in Pakistan on the Brink, edited by Craig Baxter: 2, 6. 50. Hagerty, 2004: 4–5. 51. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan in 1999: Back to Square One,” Asian Survey 40, no. 1 ( January/February 2000): 218. 52. Hagerty, 2004: 5. 53. Hagerty, 2004: 5–6. 54. Jones, 2002: 270. 55. Aqil Shah, “Democracy on Hold in Pakistan,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 67. 56. Pamela Constable, “Pakistan’s Predicament,” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1 (2001): 22. 57. Weaver, 2002: 40. 58. Weaver, 2002: 41. 59. Jones, 2002: 27. 60. Weaver, 2002: 261–262. 61. Weaver, 2002: 31. 62. Haqqani, 2005: 300–301. 63. Jones, 2002: 36. 64. Weaver, 2002: 36. 65. Hagerty, 2004: 10. 66. Lieven, 2002: 113. 67. International Crisis Group, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report No. 95, April 18, 2005, ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎: 27. 68. Jones, 2002: 22–23. 69. International Crisis Group, Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism, Asia Report No. 73, January 16, 2004 ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎. 70. Cohen, 2004: 182. 71. Jones, 2002: 249. 72. Haqqani, 2004: 87. 73. Cohen, 2002: 115. 74. Jones, 2002: 33. 75. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 95, 2005: 20. 76. Quoted in Kux, 2001: 363. 77. Teresita C. Schaffer, “U.S. Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities?” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2002–2003): 173. 78. Constable, 2001: 22. 79. Jones, 2002: 2. 80. Hagerty, 2004: 7. 81. Weaver, 2002: 45. 82. Pervez Musharraf, “Text of the Speech of President General Pervez Musharraf,” September 19, 2001 ⬍http://infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/president-address19-09-01.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 83. Pervez Musharraf, “President Pervez Musharraf ’s Speech at the 56th U.N.G.A. Session,” November 10, 2001 ⬍http://www.infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/ president_speech_unga.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 84. Weaver, 2002: 222. As will be noted later, he found himself pressured to reach out to the Islamist domestic constituency as a result of broadening audience to the West. Thus, the end result of the promises to crack down is complicated. In the end he

206

NOTES

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98. 99. 100. 101.

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113.

114.

115.

backed off much of his reforms; the ISI went on supporting extremists; and the bans were limited (banned groups were Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba but no move was made against Hizb ul Mujahideen) ( Jones, 2002: 30). Weaver, 2002: 263–264. International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, Asia Report No. 49, 20 March 2003 ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎: 19. “Pakistan’s President: Still in Uniform, But Now in a Bind As Well,” The Economist, 29 December 29, 2004. Jones, 2002: 3. Constable, 2002: 68. Schaffer, 2002: 179. Haqqani, 2005: 309. Schaffer 2002: 175. Jones, 2002: 289. Jones, 2002: 274. Weaver, 2002: 48. Schaffer, 2002: 174. “Law Confirms Musharraf Army Role,” BBC News Online, November 30, 2004 ⬍http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4054067.stm⬎ (August 18, 2005). Jones, 2002: 33. Weaver, 2002: 36. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 73, 2004: 2, 8–9. Samina Ahmed and John Norris, “A ‘Moderation’ of Freedom, Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf Isn’t Practicing What He Preaches,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2004 ⬍http://www.crisisgroup.org⬎ (August 18, 2005). Weaver, 2002: 248. Cohen, 2004: 137. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 49, 2003: 16–18. Cohen, 2003: 9. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 49, 2003: 15–16. “New Law Extends Musharraf Powers,” CNN.com, December 30, 2003 ⬍http://edition.cnn.com/2003/World/asiapcf/south/12/29/pakistan.musharraf.ap/ index.html⬎ (August 18, 2005). International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 49, 2003: 1. “New Law Extends Musharraf Powers,” December 30, 2003. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 73, 2004: 17. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 95, 2005: 20. Musharaff, “Address to the Nation,” October 17, 1999. Pervez Musharraf, “Address by the Chief Executive of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations,” September 6, 2000 ⬍http://www.presofpak.gov.pk⬎ (August 18, 2005). For example, Musharraf elaborates on Enlightened Moderation to an audience of Islamic states in the following speech: Pervez Musharraf, “Address by General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan O.I.C. Summit 2003 Putrajaya, Malaysia,” October 2003 ⬍http://www.infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/OIC_2003.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). Pervez Musharraf, “Address at the 58th Session of the U.N.General Assembly,” September 24, 2003 ⬍http://www.infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/ address_ at_the_58th_session_of_U.N.G.A.⬎ (August 18, 2005).

NOTES

207

116. Musharraf, “Address . . . at the Millennium Summit,” September 6, 2000. 117. Amy Waldman, “General, a ‘Bridge’ From Islam to the West, Worries About His Foundations,” New York Times, February 10, 2004: 8. 118. “Pakistan’s President: Still in Uniform, But Now in a Bind As Well,” December 29, 2004. 119. “Law Confirms Musharraf Army Role,” November 30, 2004. 120. Pervez Musharraf, “English Rendering of Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf’s Address Delivered on 25th National Seerat Conference in Islamabad,” June 5, 2001 ⬍http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Addresses/CD_Seert_ Conf.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 121. Haqqani, 2005: 302. 122. Schaffer, 2002: 173. 123. Haqqani, 2004: 91; Haqqani, 2005: 320. 124. Weaver, 2002: 20. 125. Constable, 2001: 69–70. 126. David Rohde, “A Muslim Ally: Concern Rises in Pakistan of a War Without End,” New York Times, November 1, 2004, ⬍http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 11/01/international/asia/01pakistan.htm⬎. 127. Zamir Akhram, “Pakistani-U.S. Relations After 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Summer/Fall 2002): 120–123. 128. Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Musharraf Looks Two Ways in Extremist Fight,” BBC News Online, July 29, 2005 ⬍http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/ print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4⬎ (August 18, 2005). 129. Constable, 2001: 68. 130. Khan and Bari, 2004: 136. 131. David E. Sanger, “A Nation Challenged: Diplomacy; Bush Hails Musharraf, and Warns Iraq,” New York Times, February 14, 2002: 16. 132. White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact sheet: Official Working Visit of President Musharraf of Pakistan, Programs to Assist the People of Pakistan,” February 13, 2002 (Washington, DC: White House). 133. Daniel Altman, “Trade Pact with Pakistan Reflects Politics, Not Economics, Critics Say,” New York Times, July 2, 2003: 1. 134. White House, 2002. 135. Schaeffer, 2002: 174. 136. Quoted in Hagerty, 2004: 8. 137. Altman, 2003: 1. 138. Shah, 2002: 70. 139. Ian Talbot, “Pakistan in 2003: Political Deadlock and Continuing Uncertainties,” Asian Survey 44, no. 1 (2003): 36–42. 140. Cohen, 2004: 155–156. 141. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 95, 2005: 24, fn. 145. 142. Zaffar Abbas, “Pakistan’s Two-Pronged Terror Strategy,” BBC News Online, September 27, 2004 ⬍http:// news.bbc.co.uk/ go/ pr/ fr/-/ 2/ hi/ south_asia/ 3694458.stm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 143. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 95, 2005: 27. 144. Haqqani, 2005: 306. 145. For this section, speeches of and interviews with Musharraf from October 1999 through September 2005 were consulted. There were 76 items in total, focusing roughly equally on the domestic audience (38) and international audiences (34). Four speeches were made to both types of audience.

208

NOTES

146. Pervez Musharraf, “Chief Executive Interview with Asian Age,” April 9, 2000 ⬍http://www/infopak.gov.pk/President_addresses/ce_interview_9-4-2000.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 147. Pervez Musharraf, “Chief Executive’s Interview with British Daily The Guardian,” May 16, 2001 ⬍http://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Addresses/ce_Guardian.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 148. Musharraf, “Address to the Nation,” October 17, 1999. 149. Musharraf, June 5, 2001. 150. Jones, 2002: 3. 151. Musharraf, “Text of the Speech of President General Pervez Musharraf,” September 19, 2001. 152. Musharraf, “Text of the Speech of President General Pervez Musharraf,” September 19, 2001. 153. Jones, 2002: 7. 154. Musharraf, “President Pervez Musharraf ’s Speech at the 56th UNGA Session,” November 10, 2001. 155. “U.S. Secretary of State’s Visit to Pakistan Joint Press Conference,” October 16, 2001 ⬍http://www/infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/joint_PC.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 156. Jones, 2002: 30. 157. Pervez Musharraf, “English Rendering of President General Pervez Musharraf ’s Address to the Nation,” January 12, 2002 ⬍http://www.infopak.gov.pk/ President_Addresses/President_address.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 158. Musharraf, “English Rendering of President General Pervez Musharraf ’s Address to the Nation,” January 12, 2002. 159. “President’s Interview with the Washington Post,” May 25, 2002 ⬍http:// infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/president_interview.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 160. Pervez Musharraf, “President’s Address at Flag-Hoisting Ceremony to Mark 55th Independence Day of Pakistan—Highlights,” August 14, 2001 ⬍http:// www.infopak.gov.pk/President_Addresses/presidents_address_at_flag_hosting.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 161. “N.S.C. Vows to Crush Terrorism, Militancy: Musharraf Accuses M.M.A. of Breaching Accord,” Dawn, June 25, 2004 ⬍http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/ 25/topl.htm⬎ (August 18, 2005). 162. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 73, 2004: 17–18. 163. Pervez Musharraf, “President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf ’s Address to the Nation,” December 31, 2004 ⬍http://www. presidentofPakistan.gov.pk/speechAddressList.aspx⬎ (August 18, 2005). 164. Haqqani, 2005; International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 49, 2003. 165. “Law Confirms Musharraf Army Role,” November 30, 2004.

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INDEX

Abuja Agreement, 84–5, 87, 90–1, 99 Adams, Gerry, 14, 17–19, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30–2, 36, 39, 190 Afghanistan, 138–42, 144–5, 147, 149–56, 162–3, 165, 168–9, 173–4 African National Congress (ANC), 18, 87, 95, 101–35 African Union (AU), 74, 89–90, 96–7, 100 Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), 110, 126 Afrikaners, 101–2, 104, 110, 112–13, 119, 126, 135 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 7–8, 182 framing threat, 7–8 al-Qaeda, 137, 142, 144, 149, 152–3, 162–3, 166–7, 170, 174 Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), 159 Amnesty International, 60–3 Anglo-Irish Agreement (1921), 15, 38 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) (1985), 22–3, 26–7, 28, 35, 39 Anglo-Irish Agreement (1998), See Good Friday Accord Angola, 78, 83, 88, 103–4, 135 Annan, Kofi, 30 apartheid, 101–36 Armitage, Richard, 152 Australia, 46, 85, 88 authoritarian-style government, 1, 9–10 See Robert Mugabe; Pervez Musharraf Aziz, Shaukat, 152–3 Aziz, Tariq, 50, 57, 63, 65–7 Baker, James, 5, 43, 45–6, 48–53, 57–8, 61, 63–7, 116 “tin cup tour,” 54

Baker-Aziz meeting, 63, 65–7 Baluchistan, 139, 151, 157 Bangladesh, 138–40, 142, 173 Bhutto, Benazir, 138, 141–3, 154, 156–7, 160, 175 Bhutto, Zilfikar Ali, 138, 140–1, 143 Biko, Steven, 101 bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, Abdullah (Crown Prince/King Abdullah), 44 bin Laden, Osama, 142 bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Bandar (Prince Bandar), 44, 52 bin Talal, Hussein I (King Hussein), 44, 52 Bisho massacre, 116, 135 Blair, Tony, 33, 96–7, 163 Boipatong massacre, 109, 116–17, 122, 129–30, 135 Bophuthatswana, 125–6, 135 Botha, Pieter Willem, 106, 112–13, 135 Botswana, 106 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 30, 118 Brazil, 6, 43, 46 broadening audience, 2, 5–6, 8, 10, 20, 22, 24–33, 36, 47–50, 55, 64, 82–90, 111–20, 134, 152–60, 172, 178 definition of, 5, 8, 24, 32, 47, 82, 111, 152 See George H.W. Bush; Hugo Chavez; John Hume; Angela Merkel; Robert Mugabe; Nelson Mandela; Pervez Musharraf Bush, George H.W., 2, 5, 9–10, 27, 41–67, 114, 116, 178–9, 181 Director of Central Intelligence, 48 intermestic policy of, 47–67, 181; broadening audience, 5, 47–50, 56, 59, 64–5, 178–9, 181; buying off,

222

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Bush, George H.W.––continued 50–5, 65; framing threat, 48, 58–66, 179, 181, change in content over time, 58–66, focus on international support, 59–60, 66; tying hands, 55–9, 65–6, 181 Persian Gulf War, 41–67; defining the situation, 58–9; “extra mile” policy, 47, 50, 57–8, 65; garnering support for, 48–54, 60, 64–6, 181; multilateralism and, 47–9, 54; “new world order,” 42, 49, 59, 65; obstacles to, 41–7, 55–6, 65; and Saddam Hussein, 42, 45, 60–6, 179, is “like Hitler,” 45, 60, 64–5, human rights abuses, 42, 60–6, 179, weapons of mass destruction, 42–3, 62–6 See also Persian Gulf War; Saddam Hussein, and Israel; Vietnam syndrome Bush, George W., 6–7, 47, 88, 99, 147, 164, 181 tying hands, 6–7 unilateralism, 47 Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, 107–8, 110, 114–15, 117, 119, 125, 136 buying off, 2, 5–6, 8, 10, 20, 33–5, 47, 50–5, 65, 76–82, 122–7, 134, 163–7, 172 definition of, 6, 8, 33, 47, 76, 122–3, 163 See George H.W. Bush; Hugo Chavez; Jintao Hu; John Hume; Nelson Mandela; Robert Mugabe Carter, Jimmy, 29, 46, 139 Catholics, 13–18, 20, 22–3, 25, 34, 38, 180, 189 See nationalists Chavez, Hugo, 5–6, 182 broadening audience, 5–6 buying off, 6 Cheney, Richard Bruce (Dick), 48, 56 China, 42, 51, 147, 174 Chissano, Joaquim Alberto, 85 Clinton, William Jefferson, 2, 30–1, 34–5, 115, 123, 126, 130, 146–7, 173 and conflict resolution, 31 Transition to Democracy Act, 126

Coetsee, Kobie, 113, 135 Cold War, 1, 3, 30, 32, 42–3, 75, 114, 139 Columbia, 51 Commonwealth of Nations (CN), 70, 75, 81, 84–6, 88–9, 91, 99–100, 105–6, 120, 128, 147–8, 155, 173 communism, 103–4, 139 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 147, 156 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 105 constitutional nationalists, 14, 22, 25, 32 See John Hume; Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I & II), 109, 135 Czechoslovakia, 51 De Klerk, Frederik Willem, 102, 104, 106–7, 109–10, 113–16, 118, 120–5, 130, 134–5 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 73, 78, 83, 93, 99 rich in mineral resources, 78 democratic-style government, 1, 3, 9 “democratic peace,” 3 See George H.W. Bush; John Hume Downing Street Declaration (1993), 26, 32, 39 East Pakistan, See Bangladesh Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), 72 Egypt, 44, 52–4 Eminent Persons Group (EPG), 105–6, 120 Ethiopia, 51 European Community (EC), 19, 23, 25, 27–9, 33–4, 38, 93, 97, 106 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Act (1987), 23 European Union (EU), 6, 20–1, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 70, 74–5, 85–7, 128, 147–8, 153, 156, 164 and Africa, 74 Pakistan, 147–8, 153, 156, 164 South Africa, 128 Zimbabwe, 70, 74–5, 85–7 foreign policy, 1–4 and “black boxes,” 3

INDEX

changing world’s effect on, 3 and domestic politics, 2–4; “scapegoat hypothesis,” 3 framing threat, 2, 5, 7–8, 10, 20–4, 47, 58–66, 91–8, 127–34, 167–72, 178 definition of, 7–8, 20, 47, 91, 167 See Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; George H.W. Bush; John Hume; Nelson Mandela; Robert Mugabe; Pervez Musharraf France, 30, 42–3, 46 Freedom Alliance (FA), 125–6, 131, 135 Freedom Front (FF), 126, 135 Front Line States, 103–4 See Angola; Mozambique Germany, 6, 30, 43, 46, 51, 53–4, 65 Good Friday Accords (1998), 13–15, 19–20, 24, 27, 30, 33, 38–9, 180 Gorbechev, Mikhail, 43, 49, 52, 104 Great Britain, 13–39, 43, 46, 70, 72, 76, 78–9, 84–8, 90–7, 99, 102, 105–6, 114, 132, 135, 138, 163, 182 attacks on, 22–3, 163 and Northern Ireland: renouncement of interests in, 26, 28–9; repression of nationalists, 16–17, 22–3, 39; use of “supergrasses,” 16, 23 Pakistan, 138 Persian Gulf War, 43, 46 South Africa, 102, 105–6, 114, 132, 182; See Eminent Persons Group (EPG) Zimbabwe, 70, 72, 76, 78–9, 84–8, 90–7, 99; See Lancaster House agreement “Great Men,” 1, 4–5, 183 Harare Declaration, 106, 114–15, 121, 135 Havel, Vaclav, 51 Hu, Jintao, 6 buying off, 6 Hume, John, 9–10, 13–39, 69, 127, 178–80, 190–1 challenges to peace, 13–20 on civil rights movement, 16 defining the situation, 21, 25, 32 Forum for a New Ireland, 17–19, 28–9 and Gerry Adams, 29, 31, 33, 36, 39 intermestic policy making, 20–38; broadening audience, 20, 24–33,

223

36, 38, 178; buying off, 20, 33–5, 38, 179; framing threat, 20–4, 38; tying hands, 20, 35–7 as minister of European Parliament, 27, 33–4, 38 nonviolent negotiation, 13–24, 29, 36, 179 use of persuasion, 19–20, 25–6 See Northern Ireland conflict; Social; Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Hunzvi, Chenjerai “Hitler,” 77, 79 Hussein, Saddam, 5, 7, 41–6, 48–50, 52, 56–7, 59–67, 179 human rights abuses, 42, 60–6, 179 “like Hitler,” 45, 60, 64–5 and Israel, 42–3, 45, 52, 57 trade relationships with, 42–3 weapons of mass destruction, 42–3, 62–6 See invasion of Kuwait; Iraq war; Persian Gulf War India, 46, 137–49, 151, 153–4, 159, 161–2, 165, 168, 170–4 and Kashmir, See Kashmir nuclear power, 137, 146, 173; See Simla Accord Indonesia, 6, 11, 71, 74, 78 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 108–10, 114–16, 119–20, 122–3, 125–6, 131, 135–6 “intermestic” nature of political leadership, See political leadership, “intermestic” policy International Crisis Group, 73, 80–2, 86, 156, 166 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 51, 72–3, 75, 90, 92–3, 96–7, 99, 124, 143, 152, 164, 166 See Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) International Relations (IR) theory, 1–5, 9 Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), 140–4, 148, 152, 158, 161, 167 invasion of Kuwait, 5, 41, 43–5, 48, 55, 57–64, 66–7, 181 Iran, 5–8, 42–3, 141, 154, 162 Iran-Iraq War, 43 Iraq, 5–7, 41–67, 97, 160, 162–3, 167, 173, 181 international relationships, 42–5

224

INDEX

Iraq––continued oil, 43–5, 51, 59, 62, 64 See invasion of Kuwait; Iraq War; Persian Gulf War; Saddam Hussein Iraq war, 7, 97, 160, 162–3, 167, 173, 181 Ireland, See Republic of Ireland Irish Republican Army (IRA), 10, 14–17, 22–3, 25, 28, 30–3, 35, 37–9 Canary Wharf bombing, 24, 31, 39 disarmament of, 38–9 Islam, See Shi’a Islam; Sunni Islam Islamists, 137, 141; 155–63, 166–74, 178–9 armed groups, 149–50 extremists, 149–50, 152, 154–6, 158–9, 161, 163, 166–7, 169–74; how to solve problem of, 159 domestic Islamists vs. Kashmiri freedom fighters, 149 “Enlightened Moderation,” 159, 175 foreign terrorists vs. Kashmiri freedom fighters, 158–9, 161, 170, 173 militants, 139–145, 149–50, 153, 155–6, 161–2, 169, 173 and the “Muslim nation,” 157–9, 162–3, 169 See also al-Qaeda; jihadists; Taliban; Pervez Musharraf Israel, 8, 42–3, 45–6, 48, 51–4, 57, 60, 65 Italy, 43 Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), 140–1, 143, 157 Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islami (JUI), 141, 157 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKFL), 143 Japan, 43, 46, 51, 53–4, 65 jihadis, 137, 140–3, 149, 156, 166–7, 172, 182 Jordan, 44, 52, 54 Kargil conflict, 144, 147–8, 173 Kashmir, 137–8, 141–9, 153–4, 156, 158–9, 161–3, 165, 168–74, 178–9 See also Kargil conflict Kennedy, Edward, 28, 30 Kissinger, Henry, 119 Kurdish people, 42, 45 Kuwait, 5, 41, 43–5, 48, 51, 54–5, 57–64, 66–7 KwaZulu, 107–8, 115, 125, 131, 136

Lancaster House agreement, 70–1, 77, 87, 90–1, 94. 99 Latin America, 5–6, 42 leadership, See political leadership Legal Framework Order (LFO), 165–6 loyalists, 14, 22–3, 31, 36, 39 madaris, 140, 146, 150, 152, 156, 158, 166, 170, 175 Mahmoud, Ahmad, 152 Major, John, 26, 29, 31–2, 39, 46 Malawi, 75, 85, 89 Mandela, Nelson, 9–10, 74, 83, 87, 98–9, 101–2, 105–36, 179–80 constitution, 109–10, 114, 118–19, 121, 125, 136 economy, 117–18, 121, 123–5, 127–8, 130, 132, 134 elections, 109–11, 118–20, 122–33, 136 and Government of National Unity (GNU), 107, 118, 136 intermestic policy, 102, 110–36; broadening audience, 111–20, 123, 134, 178; buying off, 122–7, 134; framing threat, 127–34, 179; tying hands, 120–2, 134 and international community, 114–21, 123–30, 132–3 the Mandela Document, 113 and the masses, 113, 116–17, 119, 121–2, 126–7, 130, 134 obstacles to leadership, 107–11 optimism of, 127 release from prison, 101, 105–7, 135 and Robert Mugabe, 74 spoilers, 108, 110, 118–19, 125–6, 131, 133–4 a “terrorist,” 103 Transitional Executive Council (TEC); interim government, 107, 124, 132, 135 and violence, 108–14, 116–18, 120–2, 125–35; Chris Hani murder, 130, 132, 135; government, 112, 116–18, 121–2, 127, 129–30 and white Africans, 109–10, 112–16, 118–26, 128–9, 131, 134–5; “sunset clauses,” 124–5, 135; and volkstaat, 110, 126, 131, 135

INDEX

See also African National Congress (ANC); Afrikaners; Bisho massacre; Boipatong massacre; Harare Declaration; KwaZulu; Pretoria Minute; Record of Understanding; Third Force Mbeki, Thabo, 74, 83, 85–6, 88–9, 99, 106–7 McNamara, Robert, 46 Merkel, Angela, 6 Meyer, Roelf, 117 Mitchell, George, 31, 35, 39 “most different systems” design, 9 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 69–70, 73, 75, 80–3, 87–90, 92, 94–5, 97, 99, 182 Mozambique, 75, 85, 89, 103–4 Mubarak, Hosni, 44 Mugabe, Robert, 2, 9–10, 69–100, 102, 126, 178–9, 181–2 authoritarian leader, 69–71, 74–6, 81–2, 85, 91, 97, 102, 179 and the Commonwealth, 75, 81, 84–6, 88–9, 91, 99–100 and Congo; See Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) consolidation of power, 70–1, 74 constitutional changes, 71, 73, 79, 83, 92–3 economic problems, 71–3, 75–8, 80–1, 83–5, 87–90, 93–5, 97–9, 179, 182 elections, 70, 73, 75, 79–82, 85–7, 89, 90, 92, 94–5, 99–100, 126 and globalization, 96–8 and Great Britain, See Great Britain, and Zimbabwe history of rule, 69–71 and human rights, 83, 87, 89–90, 93, 95, 100 intermestic policy, 69–70, 74, 76–100, 182; broadening audience, 82–90, 98, 178; buying off, 76–82, 98, created other problems, 76–9, 98; framing threat, 91–8; tying hands, 90–1, 98 land invasions, 80–2, 84–5, 88, 90–1, 93, 98–9 land reform, 70–3, 75–88, 90–4, 97–9, 182

225

and MDC, See Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) obstacles to leadership, 71–6 one-party rule, 71, 74–5, 79–81, 83, 88, 91, 99 opposition to, 69, 71, 73–4, 76–9, 82–4, 88, 90–6, 98, 179, 181–2 regional leadership role, 71, 74–5, 82–9, 91–2, 96–7 and South Africa, 74–5, 85–9, 99 Third World solidarity, 93, 96–8 war veterans, 72–3, 76–81, 83–4, 92, 93–4, 98–9, 178 white colonialism, 69, 80, 82–9, 91–7, 182 and white farmers, 77, 79–81, 84–5, 89–90, 92, 94–5, 99 and ZANU-PF, See Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) See also Abuja Agreement; Chenjerai “Hitler” Hunzvi; Lancaster House agreement; South African Development Community (SADC) mujahideen, 141–3, 173 Musharraf, Pervez, 9–10, 133, 137, 140–1, 143–75, 178–9, 182 authoritarian leader, 137, 148, 156, 160, 173, 179 breakdown of law and order, 149–50, 156, 161–2, 166, 168 “Chief Executive,” 145, 148 consolidation of power, 148, 154–7, 162, 165–6, 171–3 constitution, 140, 155, 157, 165–6, 174 and democracy, 154–5, 160, 164, 173, 179 domestic sectarian conflict, 149–50, 155–7, 161, 166, 168–70 economy, 137, 145–6, 152–5, 159, 161–5, 167–9, 171–3 education, See madaris elections, 140–1, 148, 154–7, 165–6, 170, 174 and India, See India intermestic policy of, 137–8, 145, 151–73, 182; broadening audience, 152–60, 167, 178; buying off, 161, 163–7, 179; framing threat, 161,

226

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Musharraf, Pervez––continued 167–72; tying hands, 160–3, 167, 179, 182 international investment, 137, 164, 168 international pariah status, 138, 145–9, 151–6, 161–2, 170, 172 and Islamists, See Islamists and Kashmir, See Kashmir and MMA, See Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, (MMA) (United Council for Action) military takeover, 137, 140–1, 144–50, 152–5, 160–1, 168, 171, 173–4 national identity issue, See Pakistan, national identity nuclear program, See Pakistan, nuclear program obstacles to leadership, 145–51 “president,” 148, 155, 157, 160, 170–1, 174–5 regional dynamics, 141, 159, 163, 172 sanctions, See Pakistan, sanctions post-September 11, See Pakistan, postSeptember 11 and unemployable Pakistani youth, 146, 150 “war on terror,” See “war on terror” and William Jefferson Clinton, 147 See also Afghanistan; al-Qaeda; InterServices Intelligence agency (ISI); Iraq; war; jihadis; Kargil conflict;; mujahideen; Taliban; United States, and Pakistan Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, (MMA) (United Council for Action), 153, 156–7, 160, 170–1, 173–5 Namibia, 75, 78, 83, 86, 88 National Party (NP), 102, 105–13, 115, 117–21, 123–4, 126–30, 133, 135–6 nationalists, 14–27, 29, 32–3, 35–7, 39, 180 See constitutional nationalists; republicans New Ireland Forum Initiative, 17–19, 28–9 New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), 74, 83, 89 Nigeria, 85–9, 91, 96, 99, 114

Nkomo, Joshua, 70–1, 99 See Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) Non-Aligned Movement, 42 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 46, 52 North West Frontier Province (NWFP), 151, 157 Northern Alliance, 141–2 Northern Ireland conflict, 2, 9–10, 13–39, 180–1 Bloody Sunday massacre, 16, 39 Canary Wharf bombing, 24, 31, 37 challenges to peace, 13–20 and civil rights movement (1967), 16, 35, 37, 38 disarmament, 38–9 elections, 22–3, 35, 38–9, 188 history of, 13–14 hunger strikes (republican), 17–19, 23, 28 an identity issue, 27, 35 resolution to, See John Hume Stormont parliament, 15–16, 18, 38–9 and violence, 15–16 world changes aiding peace, 33, 38 See Anglo-Irish Agreements; Catholics; Great Britain; Irish Republican Army; John Hume; the “Mitchell Principles”; New Ireland Forum Initiative; Republic of Ireland; Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC); “the Troubles”; Protestants; Sinn Fein (SF) Nunn, Sam, 45–6, 49, 56–7 O’Neill, Tip, 28, 35 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 85–6, 88–9, 96 oil, 6, 43–6, 51, 54, 59, 62 See also Iraq, and oil Organization of African Unity (OAU), 86, 88, 95, 106, 114, 117, 120, 128–9, 135 Organization of Islamic Conference, 158 Oslo Accords, 113 Ozal, Turgut, 52 Paisley, Ian, 24 Pakistan, 2, 9–11, 46, 133, 137–75, 182 and Afghanistan, 138–41, 144–5, 151, 153, 155–6, 163, 168

INDEX

and Baluchistan, 139, 151, 157 and China, 147 demographics, 138–9 earthquake (2005), 138, 173 education, See madaris government style, 137–40 internal violence, 139, 141 military, 138–42 mullahs, 143, 149, 156, 160, 172, 179 national identity, 138–42, 149–50, 157–8, 166, 169–70; and India, 139, 149 nuclear program, 137–9, 141, 143–8, 154, 156, 161–2, 164, 169, 173–4, 179 and Persian Gulf War, 46 political history of, 137–45 post-September 11, 2, 9–11, 137, 140, 142, 148, 151–5, 159, 161–4, 168, 173–4, 182; See “war on terror” sanctions on, 137, 143, 146–7, 154, 156, 164, 173–4 and Saudi Arabia, 141 and terrorism, 161, 163, 168–71, 173, 175, 182 zakat policy, 140, 166 See al-Qaeda; Islamists; Jamaat-e-Islami (JI); Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islami (JUI); jihadis; Kashmir; madaris; mujahideen; Nawaz Sharif; Northern Alliance; Pervez Musharraf; Pashtuns; Punjabis; Shi’a Islam; Simla Accord; Sunni Islam; Soviet war in Afghanistan; Taliban; United States, and Pakistan Pakistan Muslim League (PML), 141, 157, 159, 174 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), 141, 157, 159–60, 174 Palestine, 18, 53, 113, 158–9, 163, 169, 172 Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), 103, 105, 107, 110, 115, 118–19, 123, 125, 135 Pashtuns, 139–40, 142, 151 Persian Gulf War (1991), 2, 9–10, 27, 41–67, 181 Poland, 42 political leadership, 1–11, 69, 177–83 approaches to, 2–5, 10

227

individual leaders: active players, 1–4, 10, 177; define reality for followers, 2–3, 7, 20–1, 24, 167; affected by external actors, 180–2; manipulate policy process, 10–11, 177, 183; problem representation of, 2–3, 7 “intermestic” policy and, 1–2, 4–7, 9–11, 177–83; importance of, 69, 180–3 in policymaking, 2–11 strategies, 1–2, 4–11, 178, 182–3; are shared by all forms of government, 1–2, 4–6, 9–11; See broadening audience; buying off; tying hands; framing threat Powell, Colin, 45–6, 48, 55, 149 Pretoria Minute, 109, 116, 118, 120–1, 135 Protestants, 13–18, 180 See loyalists; unionists Punjabis, 139, 150, 164 rally effect, 56, 58 Ramaphosa, Cyril, 108, 117 Reagan, Ronald, 28, 35, 42, 106, 114, 135 Record of Understanding, 110, 117–18, 122–3, 130, 135 Republic of Ireland, 13–15, 17, 19–22, 24–31, 32, 35–9 republicans, 14–18, 20–9, 31–7, 39 hunger strikes, 17–19, 23, 28 and other liberation movements, 18 See Irish Republican Army (IRA); Sinn Fein (SF) research methodology, 9–11 Rhodesia, 70 See Zimbabwe Rice, Condolezza, 154 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 16–17, 24, 28, 189 Rumsfeld, Donald, 149 Rwanda, 78, 83 Saleh, Ali Abdullah, 44 Saudi Arabia, 10, 41, 44–5, 49, 52, 54–6, 62, 66, 141, 149–50 Schwarzkopf, Jr., Norman, 41, 45–6 Scowcroft, Brent, 44–6, 50, 52, 56–8, 62 September 11, 2001, 7, 9–11, 137, 147, 152–4, 159, 174, 182

228

INDEX

Sharif, Nawaz, 138, 141, 143–4, 154, 156–7, 161, 165–6, 168 Shi’a Islam, 139, 141, 150 Simla Accord, 142–3, 147 Sinn Fein (SF), 14–26, 28–9, 30–7, 180, 190 Sisulu, Walter, 103, 106, 135 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), 14, 16–19, 22–3, 25, 26–8, 32, 34–5, 39, 126, 190 South Africa, 71, 74–5, 83–9, 91, 99, 101–36 history of, 102–7 and Robert Mugabe, 74–5, 85–9, 91, 99 transition to post-apartheid, 2, 9–10, 87–8, 101–36; citizen involvement, 105, 109; economic incentives to, 104–6; globalized context of, 102–3, 106, 112; human rights abuses, Bisho massacre, 116, 135, Boipatong massacre, 109, 116, 135, Sharpeville, 103, 135, Soweto riots, 104, 135; spoilers, 102 socialism, 107 Soviet Union, 103 white European colonialism, 101–3, 105; See African National Congress (ANC); Afrikaners; National Party (NP); Nelson Mandela; Thabo Mbeki South African Defense Force (SADF), 113 South African Development Community (SADC), 83–5, 88–90, 100 South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 147, 158 Soviet Union (USSR), 41–4, 46, 48, 51–2, 54, 64, 74, 103–4, 121, 140–2, 173 and Iraq, 43–4, 46, 52 oil, 51 Persian Gulf War, 42–3, 48 South Africa, 103 Soviet war in Afghanistan, 140–1, 173 strategies, See political leadership, strategies Sunni Islam, 139, 150 Taliban, 137, 141–2, 147–8, 152–4, 161, 165–8, 173 Tambo, Oliver, 103, 105, 112, 114 Tanzania, 86, 89, 118 Tekere, Edgar, 71, 99

terrorism, 7, 14–17, 19, 23, 29–30, 34, 42–3, 93, 103, 131, 141, 143, 153, 159, 161, 163, 168–71, 173, 175 Canary Wharf bombing, 24, 36 causes of, 163, 169 Indian parliament attack, 153 London subway bombing, 163, 175 See September 11, 2001 Thatcher, Margaret, 18, 26, 29, 46, 56 Third Force, 109, 116–17, 121–2, 129–30, 179 Third World states, 42, 46, 83, 96–8 See Non-Aligned Movement Tolstoy, Leo, 1, 4 transitioning government, 9–10 Trimble, David, 27, 38 the “Troubles,” 14, 22, 38, 189 Turkey, 42, 44–6, 52–4 tying hands, 2, 5–8, 10, 35–7, 47, 55–8, 65–6, 90–1, 120–2, 134, 160–3, 172, 179 definition of, 6–8, 35, 47, 90, 120, 160 See Geroge H.W. Bush; George W. Bush; John Hume; Nelson Mandela; Robert Mugabe; Pervez Musharraf Uganda, 78, 83, 114 Umkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation) (MK), 103–4, 106, 112, 116, 121, 131 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, See Soviet Union United Arab Emirates, 44, 54 United Democratic Front (UDF), 105, 108, 123, 135 United Kingdom, 23, 38, 42, 81 See Great Britain; Northern Ireland conflict United Nations, 5, 7, 19–20, 30, 42–5, 48–59, 62–7, 73–4, 78, 82, 103–6, 114–18, 120, 128–9, 131–2, 135, 142–4, 148, 153, 158–9, 163, 169, 174, 179, 181 United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, 73 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, 82 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 103, 105, 114

INDEX

United Nations Security Council (UNSG), 7, 19, 42–6, 48–59, 62–7, 78, 105, 117, 129, 142, 181 Persian Gulf War, 43–6, 48–51, 55–9, 63–7, 181; Resolution 660, 43, 48, 66; Resolution 661, 48, 66; Resolution 662, 66; Resolution 678, 49–51, 56–9, 63–7 United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, 105 unionists, 14–29, 31–4, 36–9, 180 United States (U.S.), 5–9, 11, 14–16, 19–22, 25–36, 39, 41–67, 70, 75, 78, 85–7, 93, 95–6, 99, 103–4, 106, 114–18, 123–6, 128, 130, 135, 137, 139–49, 151–6, 160–9, 171–5, 179, 182 colonialism, 6, 42, 44, 46, 87, 163 and Great Britain, 19, 29 Northern Ireland conflict, 14–15, 19, 22, 24–37, 39, 137, 179 India, 146–9, 161, 168 Israel, 52–4, 60, 65, 156 Pakistan, 137, 139–49, 151–6, 160–9, 171–5, 179, 182; anti-American sentiment, 149, 155–6, 160, 162–3; economic aid, 153–5, 162–5, 167, 172–3; military aid, 141, 146, 165, 167, 173; and Taliban, 142, 144, 152–3; See also “war on terror” public opinion, 5, 7, 42–51, 53–6, 60–2, 65–6; and oil, 45–6, 62; See Vietnam syndrome Saudi Arabia, 41, 44, 52 South Africa, 103–4, 106, 114–18, 123–6, 128, 130, 135, 137, 182 War in Afghanistan, 137 “world oppressor,” 8, 163 Zimbabwe, 70, 75, 78, 85–7, 93, 95–6, 99, 137 See George H.W. Bush; George W. Bush; Iraq war; Persian Gulf War; “war on terror” U.S. Congress, 5, 28, 35, 42–3, 45–67, 75, 106, 135 and the budget, 45, 49, 60, 65 resistance to Persian Gulf War, 42, 45–51, 53–67 and Saddam Hussein, 42–3, 63 Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act, 75

229

U.S. House of Representatives, 49, 54, 60 U.S. Senate, 32, 49, 56–7, 60, 67 USSR, See Soviet Union Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 143–4, 174–5 Vance, Cyrus, 117–18 Venezuela, 5–6 Vietnam syndrome, 10, 45, 49–50, 56, 58, 62, 64–5 Viljoen, Constand, 126, 135 “war on terror,” 2, 10–11, 137, 142, 151–4, 161–4, 168–9, 179 War in Afghanistan, 137 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 42–3, 62–6 World Bank Group, 51–2, 72–3, 143, 166 World Trade Organization, 165 Yemen, 44, 48, 66 Zaire, 51 Zambia, 74–5, 106, 112 Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad, 140–1, 149, 155–6 Zimbabwe, 106, 118 economic plight of, 71–2; and white ownership, 72 politics, 2, 9, 69–100; Unity Accord of 1987, 70 resource-rich ration, 69 suspension from the Commonwealth, 75, 81, 85–6, 88–9, 99–100 See Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); Robert Mugabe Zimbabwe African National UnionPatriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 70–1, 73, 76–7, 79–82, 89, 92, 94–5, 99 repressive regime, 73 Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 70, 99 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), 73, 78, 99 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), 90 Zimbabwe Unity Movement, 71, 99 Zinni, Anthony, 162

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