Political Concepts and Political Theories

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POLITICALCONCEPTS AND POLITICAL THEORIES

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P o r r ~ l c ~CONCEPTS r AND POLITICAL THEORIES

Tulane University

Westview Press A Member of the Perseus Books Group

All rights wserved. Printed in the Uttited States of America. No part of this publiation may or mechanical, inbe reproduced or tmirsmitted in any form or by any irzeans, electri~~tic cfrxciiirg photocopy, recnding, or any inh>rmatiortstorage and retrieval system, without permissiim in writii~gfrom the p~~blishel: Copyrigl~tO 201N3 by Weswiew Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group Pubiisired in 211110 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Arrenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the U ~ ~ i t eKizrgdom d by Westview Press, 12 Hid's Copse Rc~aodd,Cumnor Hill, Oxfisrd OX2 9fJ Find us on t l ~ eWorld Wide Web nt www.wes~iiewpress.c~~m Library cof Congress Cataloging-in-PublicatioirData Gaus, Gerald F. Political concepk and political theories / Geraid F' Gaus. p. cm. Il~ciudesinclex. lSBN 0-8133-3331-8 l. Pc3litical ~ i e ~ ~ cl. eTitle. .

The paper used i-tt this publiation meets t11e requiremen& of the Amet-ican Natioiral Standard for Pemartence of Paper for Prittted Library Materials Z39.48-1984,


Part One: Conceptual Analysis

1

What: Axe Political Cancepts?

1.1 Socral-t;sfsQuestion, 3 1.2 Wads, Defhitions, and Things, 7 1.3 Wittgenstein's Later hat)rsis, 12 1 Wittgenstein and Conceptual Investigations, 16 1.5 Summary, 22 Notes, 23

2

Canceptual Disputes 2.1 Essentially Contested Concepts, 26 3.3 Political Ideologies, 33 2-3 Political Philosophy m d Political meories, 36 2.4 Summary 43 Notes, 44

3

Pofiticaf Theories: Conceptual Structures and Enduring Types 3.1 Liberalism, Socialism, and Conservatism, 46 3.2 Ratio~~alism/Antirationalism, 52 3.3 neories of Hzrman Nature, 60 3.4 .tndividuaZism/Collectivism, 66 3.5 Summary, 70 Notes, 71

3

Part Twe Political Concepts 4

Negative and Positive Liberty 4.1 Negaljve L,iberty: Some Ordinary Langtrage Considerations, 7 '7 4.2 Positive Freedom, 82 4.3 Two Concepts of t,iberty, 86 4.4 auestioning the PositivdNegative Distinctionf 94 4.5 Summary, 97 Notes, 98

5

Liberty and Power 5.1 Positive Freedom as Power to Act, 101 5.12. Pawer and Freedom 105 5 3 Freedom, Power, and Property 110 5.4 Freedom, Power, and the Law, 116 5.5 Summary 3123 Notes, 124

6

Equality and the Grounds for Equal Treatment, 127 6.1 E ~ a l i t y 6 2 Why Equality? External Arguments for the Importance of Equaliv, 129 6.3 Why Equality? Arguments from Fundamental Human Equality, 136 6.4 Equality of m a t ? M5 6.5 Summary, 3154 Notes, 155

7

Equality and Liberty in Political Theories 7.1 Do t,iberty and Equnljty Connict? 158 7.2 Chssical Liberalism: tiherty and Basic Equality 159 7-3 Revisioz~isfLiberalisms, 164 7.4 A Socialist Reconciliation Proposal, 178 7.5 The Consernative Criticjtte of Equ.alitJi,174 7-6 Summary, 178 Notes, 179

77

127

8

Justice and Liberalism 8.1 The EIeme~ttsof Justice, 182 8.2 Classical 1,iberdism: Rutes for Equaliy Free Peoptc, 188 8.3 Monistic Revisionist Liberalism: Social Justice and Cortt~butionsto the Common Good, 194 8.4 Pluralistic Revisionist Liberalism: A Revised Social Contract Among Free and Equal People, 199 8.5 Summary, 206 Notes, 207

9

Justice, Society, and Community 9.1 Marx on Societies and Their Justice, 210 9.2 Socialism and the Democratic Co 9.3 Three Conservative Appmaches to Justice, 223 9.4 Summary 233 Notes, 234

10

Political Authority 10.1. Conservatism and Political Authority, 237 10.2 art Being "hAuthol-ity;" X1 10.3 Liberal l"o1itical Authority, 246 10.4 Democratic Atr"cEr0rit.ym d the Mmagement of Collective Affairs, 251 10.5 Summary, 257 Notes, 258

Concluding Remarks: From Political Carrcepls to Political Theories


Decreasixlg margirtal trtiliv Different utility functions: Healthy and hmdicapped Conditio~ansfor effectkc. choice and coaperati\ic.equality Hohiel.dfsanalysis of liberties and claims I-lohfeld" sanalysis of powers and immunitie?; The prisoner 'S ddemma Two possible distl.i:butims of income A, coordhatian

problem


Ihe first great vestion of political theory was posed by Socrates: "Mikat is justicelf7t has beer1 joimd by otkrs, suCh as, "What is liberty?'" "Vtrhat is equality?" and "What is political authority"" Anyone with political ideals sooner or later will face these sorts of ~ e s t i o n sThey . also provide perhaps t-he best er~trypoint for the study of politic& Ifiou@t; if you understmd these questions, and the answers that have been proposed, you understand the main debates and issues in the lnistory of political theov, Ihis book is h ~ t e ~ ~ d for e dboth sorts of readers: those who have already asked these conceptual questions and those who seek an jntroduction to political theory. I have tried to write a hook that is intermking to those who have a l ~ a d ythought about these mtters, as well as accessible for those with little background in political theory. Acadennics' writb~g(including, I confess, my own) too fretftlentSy falls the one hand, we write sophisticated ar~dcomplex into two classes. (31 works that c m only be grasped by graduate students (perhaps only advanced graduate students) and fellow academics and, m the other, we write tex-ttnooksfor b e g k ~ i n gstudents that are of little interest to anyone else ( m d perhaps not even to them). X r t the first sort of book, we present our arguments forljfied by all our defenses and qualifications in order to withstand the scmtil7y and criticim of our colleagues; h the second, we rehearse the familiar and achawledged posi"cons. Understandi.tbly, we arc reluctant to bridge these safe shores. To present our views witl-rout their full fortifications, to illterest our readers without overwhcrlming thern with defenses, to introduce while challenging our readers and invitislg thern to disagre+a%l of these are fl-aughtwith obvious dangers, Yet, I think, some of the most interests politic& theory occurs in this no-mm%-landbetkveen the rigorous scholarly book and the elementary texfbook. In this book, I seek to present my own view of the analysis of political concepts, one that I hope will be inkresting to the expert and useful to the novice. :Ihave presented much of this material to my students-both first-year and more adva~ced-at the University of Queer~slandin Brisbane, Australia,and the University of Minnesota, Dnluth. My thanks to all of them

X ~ V

PRE~CE

for letting me think things through in front of them, and for their reactions to my ideas. I wodd also like to express my appreciation to Westview Press; I Ifiank them not oniy for their m u - a p p e e d y interest and support, but for their patience in the face of delays brought &out by my too-f~quentmovements back a7.d forth across Ihe I'acif-ic, Richard Dagger m d Michael Freeden provided extremely helpful comments for which 1am most grateful, Last, and in this case most irnpartant, 1wodd like to express my profound debt to John W. chap mar^, my o w r ~teacher. From him 1 learned not just what political. theory is about, but what academic life is all about.

PART ONE

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND POLITICALTHEORIES


I . I Socrates's Question Political Theory and Political Concepts

Western political philosophy begins with Socrates and Plato, and especially the Republic.1 In this imaginary conversation among a group of Athenians, Socrates poses what may be the most fundamental of all questions in political philosophy: "What is justice?" Indeed, one of the great legal theorists of the twentieth century called this "the eternal question of mankind."* We all wish a govenunent that is just-but what is justice? To a large extent, the study of political theory is an exploration of different ways of understanding core political concepts such as justice, liberty, power, equality, and authority. From Plato onward, political theorists have asked-and have provided conflicting answers to--questions such as "What is justice?" "What is liberty?" "What is power?" and "What is equality?" In the first part of this book, I shall try to get a bit clearer about what sorts of questions these are. Are we asking for a definition, and if so what constitutes a good definition?Or do we seek something other than a definition when we inquire, "What is justice?" Unless we know what we are asking for, we shall not be able to distinguish good from bad answers. After this clarification of what sort of question we are asking, Part I1 of the book will explore some of the enduring answers that have been advanced in political theory. Three Definitions of Justice

Let us return to the beginning: Socrates's inquiry, "What is justice?" The first proposal in the Republic is made by Cephalus, who has had a long

and hmorable life in business. To Cqhalus, just-ife is a skaightforward matter of telling the tmtb and paying one's debts-a view, no dnubt, that has guided his owl1 life. But Socrates immediately casts doubt on whether this is all there is to justice. Suppose, says Socrates, that a friend from whom you hiwe loaned a weapon has gone mad and now &mm& the return of the cveapm. W u M i t be right to if? Cephalus ilfSrees that it would not he right to do so; and if it is not rigbt, it cmnot be what is required by justice. At this point, another Athenian, Polemarchus, speaks up; he believes that he clan provide an account of justice that rescues the cmx of Cephalus's definition while also showing why it would not be just to retun1 the weapm. He suggests an abstract defi11itiox-r of justice---giving each man his due, But, asks Socrates, is not the mad friend due his weapon? It is, after all., his weapon. Polemarchus invokes a view that was commor.1 among i h e Grwks, that justice demands doing goad to friends (since that is what is due to friends) and harmhg enemies (since that is what is due to enemies), Thus, since the madman is a friend, and it w u l d harm him to retun7 the weapon, it cannot he just to do so; it wodd not be appropriate to return the weapon becatrse it would not be giving him what is his due. Socrates also rcjects this view, though his argument against it is not as straightforward as his criticism of Cephalus's definition (that is, that justice is simply repaykg one" debts):

Socrates: Gal it really be a just man's business to harm any h u m a ~ being? Palemarchus: Certainly; it is right to harm bad men who are his e~~emies. Socrafes: But does not harmkg a horse or a dog mean making it a worse horse or dug, so that each will be a less perfect creature in its own way? Polenzarchus: Yes. Soemitis: Isn't that also true of human beings-that to h a m &em means; making &em worse men by lrhe stmdard of human excellence? Polemarchus: Yes, S x m t e s : And is not justice a peculiarfy human excdence? Polemarchus: Undoubtedly. Socrates: To h a m a mm, then, must mean makhg him less just, Ptllemarchzls: I suppos soso. Thus, Socrates concludes that "if the just man is good, the business of haming people, whether f r i e ~ ~ or d s enemies, must betong to his opposite, the tmnjust."3

It is important to see that Socrates is not appealing to a nlidely accepkd definition of justice; rather, he is rejecting a populilr Greek view (that a just person does good to his friends and harms his enemies) by appealing to (what he sees as) a necessary connection between being just one who does good and and doing good. If a just persol1 is inhere~~tly who never makes others less just, then this widely held Greek view of justice must be wrong. At this point, Thras>~macus breaks in on the conwn.sat.ion, Thrasymacus is a teacher of rhetoric-eKective public speaking-and questions whether all this philosoyhicai argument really makes sense. Thrasymacus acivar7cc.s an appare~~tly hardheaded and skeptical definition: ?ustice" i s whatever promotes tile interests of the stronger. As a man of the world, rather than a philosopher, n~rasymacusjnsists that he sees the hard truth that the stronger make the laws, these laws serve their interests, m d "'justicef?s simEtty fhe name we use fctr what these l w s require of us. Socrates immediiitely points to a problem. Suppo" the stronger make a mistake and pass a law that is not in their interest, If justice involves obeyil7g tfie law, Lhen justice would require action Chat is not in the irtterests of the stronger. TI-rrasymacusreplies by scvitchiw his notion of a "ruler"': if a ruler m a k s an error and proclaims a :law that does not promote his interest, then at that point he is not redly a ruler: Would you say a man desrves to be called a physician at the moment when he makes a mistake in treating his patient and just in respect of that mistake; or a mathematician, when he ~ C X aS sum wmng and just in so far as he gets the wrung result? Of course we do commonly speak of a physician or a mathematician or a scholar having made a mistake; but really none of these, 1 should say, is ever mistaken, in so far as he is worthy of the name we give him. So strictly speaking-and you [,Socrates,] are all for being precise-no one who practices a craft makes mistakes. A man is mistaken when his knowledge fails him; and at that moment he is no craftsman."

mrasymacus now depicts a ruler as someone not simply with superior force, but witb superior h o d e d g e . T%isleaves him having to explain what type of h o w k d g e is required for a (true) ruler. mrasymacus has compmd a ruier to a mathematician or a phy"cian, but Socrates quickly pojnts out that the howledge that they must possess is not howledge about how to advmce their own interests, but howledge of their craft; aIthougb they b m f i t from Lhe exrnise of their crilft because they al.e paid, when exercishg their skill they are s e e h g the good of others, as physicians seek the health of their patients not their own. If this is the case, bowever, the "mferf?is one who, h the appropriate way, seeks the good "f the szllrjects over whom he exercises arnthority*Socrates thus

turns mrasymacus% concception of justice upside down: rulers rule for the sake of justice, rather tha3.1 justice servir~gtbe interests of lfie rulers. 326s last move by Socrates leads to the suhject of the rest of the Repzdhlil; which is concerned with the nature of the ideal state and the tasks of rulers and citizens in such a state. What Socrates is Looking For

We shall retznrn to Socrates's own proposal in Section 9.3. Right nolv, I want to draw attention to the sorts of critkisms Socrates makes of others" answers to "What is justice?" This will help show us the sort of answer he is seekiizg. Cephaius, Lhe hor~estmerchant, illustrates what Socraks takes as our nor~xalcondition: he c m identify hstances or examples of justire but confuses this with an understanding of what justice (itselffis, As an hoz~orableperson, he has acted justly throughr,ut Etis life, hut when asked, "'What is justice?" he provides a definition (justice as repaying debts) that is based m his own experienre and is easily &own to be inaddeiinitio~~. Socrates, though, is not interested in parequate as a ge~~erill ticular examples-he is searchhg for that common element: that all instances or examples of justice share, and bp vjrtue of shasing it are cases of justice.5 Polemarchus does better at providing a general account. His first proyosal-giving each his due-is a vague formula, and Sacrates is unclear what it means; even wmse, it does not seem to explain why it is not just to return the weapon to the mad friend, To clarify it, Polemarchus relies on a commozrly accepted view (among the Greeks), that justke consists in doir~ggood to friends a r ~ dharm to enernies. Socrates shows here that traditional or widely accepted views c m be, hdeed trsually are, defective, One can imagine Polemarchus saying to Socrates that "doing good to friends and harm to e~~emies it; what we Greeks mean by "justice."Yoocrates points out, however, that relying on shared, common views is objectionable because they c m be inconsistent or incohermt. It is clear, Socrates says, that a just man does not make others less perfect, and true harm to mother makes the other a worse mm. Since this fir~xconviction about just-ice is inconsistent with the widely held view Socrates believes that we must reject the widely held view. Socrates, then, is seeking neither examples of justice nor popular defhitions about what "we IhinkU";:he is seekb~gthe c o r ~ c definition t that locates that common feapeople, a r ~ dconditions that renders them just. ture or pmperty of actio~~s, Last, Socrates shows the inconsistencies of those who analyze concepts such as justice by debunkirlg them-that is, those such as Thrasymacus If Thrasymawho insist they are sirnply masks for power or dominatio~~. cus was content to say that talk of justice is simply nonsense or b;tbble

(as, we shall see, some have indeed claimed; see Section 1.22, he could avoid Socrates" criticisms. Instead he tries to show that ""adva~cingthe interests of the stronger" is what ""jusMceM means-rather thm ignoring the question, ''What is justice?" ':he seeks to answer it in a hardheaded m y that rduces it to the pursuit of inkrests. As Socrates shows, however, as soon as one accepts that terns like ""justicc'dakesense, efforts to expbi.n that sense in terns of mere intefest or power lead to muddles and inconsistencies. m a t e v e r we mean by "justiceff%e surely do not mem that which promotes the hterest of the stranger. nrasymacus finalv :Learns this lesson and walks away from the conversation; unahle to explain what justice is, he ignores it. 7b sum up, tben, we can ide~~tify three basic cox~victionsof Socrates about concepts such as justice:

* Ralrher Lhan examples of justice, he seeks that c o m o n element that all just thhgs share; it is because it possesses that element that anythivlg c m rightfully be said to be just. * The correct accour~tis coherent- itr.1~3 explains ail gex~uineexamples; we camot arrive at it s k p l y by rehearskg what "'we sayff justice is, Ordinary conceptions can be confused and contradictory * "Justicerris a meaningful and important term. As soon as we take it seriously, we see that it is not plausible to d&unk it by showing that it reduces to something hardheaded or more obviously ""ral," such as jnterests.

1.2 Words, Definitions, and Things Plato's Conceptual Realism me three convictions listed at the end of the previous section led Plato and Socrates (it will be recalkd that Plato wrote the Socratk diaiogues) to a distinctive, if not especiatly plausible, view that I shall call ""conceptuirl. realism,"' Simply put, Plato believes that conceptunl terms such as "justice" refer to a special realm in which the concepts themsekes exist. As Plato put it, our conceptuirl.terms refer to the world of '"formsff-pm instmces of the concepts. To better see what Plato has in mind, let us focus on an example outside of politics. In another dialogue, the Mn.to, Socrates asks, ""What is shape?'' Now, the first ilnpnlse mi,ghl.he to point to exam,ples of shapesround, square, oblong, and so on. But as we saw in the case of Cephalus's defir~itionof justice, this will. not do; Socrates wants to discover that propeAy shared by round things, square things, oblong thhgs, and so

on, such that all can he said to be "&apes." There must, Socrates is convizlced, be some feahnre &at makes round things, square thhgs, and Oblong thhgs illlshapes. A dejrritio~of shape would icfentify this "shnpemaking"' fcature. Socrates ultirnatell; proposes this definition: "Shape is the o~llythinfjr that always accompanies cotour,"'e Plato is seeking a similirP definition of justj.ceFor Plato, then, a d e f ~ t i o nidentifies an essence-a shared feature of many otherwise diverse examples. Now, recalf also that Plato is convinced that notions such as justice make sense; he is out to explain them, not debunk them*Thus, on Plato" view if ""justice" i s a sensible term, it nzzrst refer to sonzetilirriy; and his theory of definitions leads him to co~~clude that it must refer to thnf essence! that cammoll thing s h a r d by all examples of justice. It would seem ta follow however, that the essence mtrst in some sense exist; if "justice" i s sensible it must refer to something that actually exists. The essence &at is s h r e d by all cases of justice must, somehow, somewhere, exist. AS Plato sees it, ""justice"-that is, the pure essence shared by all hstances of just-ic xists only in what he calls the realm of ""foms," a re& of pure c o ~ e p t sPlato . ~ seems to believe that at some point before we are barn, we had direct access to the world of concepts and mtain in our p ~ s e n world t a more or less hazy rrcollection. Thus, people like Cephalus c m generally recognize examples of justice, as he has some recolkction of th.e concept m d c m group cases together as sharing the essence. But because our recollection of the world of concepts is incomplt.te ar~dhazy, definitions of this essellce me often wrol~g.

Why Plofo's View Is Nof os Alien os If May Appear It might seem that Plato's conceptual realism is implatrsible and alienno one thinks that way today. Although it is true that there are not too many strict Platonists around today, three of the convictions that led Plato to his conceptual realism are still widely shared. In particular' many of us believe (1)W r d s such as "justice""make sense and are impartant. :Inaddition, we arcept (2) &at if a word m&es sense we shodcl be able to give a defkition of it. A defkihn, let us say, iljms at pmviding a set of conditions for use of a term that is both necessary and sufficient for (properly) ushg the w o d . "fb say that con&tion X is ~ecessaryfor properly usil-tg word W is to say that on4 gcondtion X applies to a case c m we properly descl-ibe it by Mi;: to say that condition X is szificie~zfis to say that if a case has X, then W is a r ~ appropriak description. Thus, for example, "is mortal" is not a definition of hurnan bejngs; for ahhough being rnortal is necessary to make a creature a h u m (one can he human only if one is mortal), it is not szgflrtent; it is 110t always the case that if one is mortal one is also human, as all other animals are marhl too. A defi-nition

of hunnanity aims at identieing that feature that is distinctive of humans---that d l h u m a ~ ~ and only humans have. M e n asked, have, s " m a t is justiceTbounost people seek to provide a definition of '*justicerr that provides the essentid feature (or features) that governs the proper use of the word. (3) Last, mmy US share the conviction that if a word makes sense m d is importmt, and is not about fiction or fmtasy it must at least purport to refer to somethit~greal. When we are most comfortable using the least so it seernewordls refer to *lin.gs. Rrasymacus would not seek to prnvide a debunking account of "house'kr "horse": they obviously refer to real things in the world. He seeks to dehunk "~ustice,'bshe douibts r/vhetrher ""justice'bealty refers to al7ythiq at all; his proposal that it refers to cvhat is in the i n k ~ soft the stmnger, a l h u g h in one way cynical, at least does seem to show that "justice" ~ f e rto s something that is real, Taken singly, none of these convictio~~s seems outrageous. But t a k n together, they lead us to a new appreciation of Plato" proposal, for his conceptual realjsm explahs all three of these convictions: it shows that the word "justicef"is semible because it refers to a real thing (the concept of justice), which identifies the essence, and so provides proper definition of " J U S ~ ~ C ~ . " Words and Things

Many people arc. i\ttracted to some version of claims (2) and (3) above; that is, mmy af us are convinced that to understand a term is to grasp its definition, and that sensi:ble terms refer to things, or parts of the world, Ihose who approach ihe study of political concepts based on these two convictions oficen dmw their inspiration from the early work of I;,udwrig as the Wttgerrstein (3889-1"351)8 and a group of phi1osopher"onown basic proposal in his Traclutzis Logicological positivists.WI"l"it.tg;enstein's PhiEosvlziczls cvas that our language provides pictures of the world. Xnterestingly' 'MiitQenstcin tells us that this basic picture theory of language was suggested to him by Lhe Paris traffic courts, in which a collision bet-vveen two cars would be examined by using toy cars and toy people to recreate the accident.1" For Wittge~~stein, the cmcriai thing was the way In we connect m o v a the toy cars and toy peoyie to the real accide~~t. some smse, the toys must stand fir things in the real cvorld. MOre thm that, their ~ l a t i v epositims and movernmts must also comespond to the positiox~sand movemmts of the real things they stand for. That is, the placement of the toys forms a pictorial representation of the real world: each toy stands for a certain thing in the world, and the arrnngements of the toys pictures t-he arrangement of real things. The recreated accident, then, provides a picture of the world.

In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that language does the same job: our language rrrirrors the world by givi~lgus pictures of it. Roughly---and I c m only give an approximate account of his complex theory her Wittgenstc.in mahtains that the world is composed of objects that are related (or arranged) in such a way as to fomfacfs; lar~guageis composed of rutords that name objects; when these words are arranged in sentences they mirror facts, Simple sentences mirror simple facts (that is, si.mple sente~~ces arrange n a m s is such a way as to mirror the arrmgemmt of objects that for~xfacts), whereas complex sentences are composed of a nurnber of simple sentences mirroring a complex fact in the world.," It is important to stress that on the picturc? theory, languqe is not just a catalog of names that refer to things; the names must be arranged in such a way as to mirror the way objects are related in the kvorld. As Wittgenstein says, "What corrsfitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one mother in a determii'late wayff12Cdf course, Wttgenstcin realizes that sentences do not % o Ll?i ~k the world-they are not pictures in that stsnse. His point is that they model the world hsofar as the relations between elem e ~ ~oft sa s e ~ ~ krepresent ~ ~ c e the arrangement of facts in the world. Now, to say that language presents pictures is not to say all these pictures actually comespond to facts, "A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or klcorrect, true or false."= "us, "in order to tell. whclther a picture is true or fillse we must compm it to reali,ty""""it is irnpossiblc to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false."ls Language, we might say, is m attempt to describe the world; if the picture is m accurate on if it corresponds to the arrangement of objects into facts-it is a true sentence; if it does not accurately picture the world it is a false ser.ltence. Roughly, W can say that sentences make sense when they seek to mi,rror the world, and are true when they actually do nlirmr it (false sentences are thus meaningful). This led the logical positiwists-----whoadopted a very similar theory of lirnguage-as well as Wittgenstein fiinself (at least for a tiune) to adopt a uerificationi,i;ttheory of meming.Ib Semible or meaningful sente~~ceri can he verified in the sense that we can imagh~ea test that would allow us to dekrmine whether or not the sentence presented a true or Mse picturc? of the world. We need not actually conduct the test; in fact, we may not at the present time have the eyuipmmt to carry out such a test. The importmt claim is that if the sewence is meaningfd, it presents a picture that, in priflciple, c o d be tested to see whether it is or is not accurate, The Picture Theory and Political Concepts

We have arrked at a crucial junchre. Many of the se~~tences in which we are interrzsted seem in princi_pleunatole to be tested in this way; Consider

(1) It is not just to return a weapon to a madmm. (2) Justice is that which is in the interest of the stronger. (3) Masic?income for all is necessary for social justice(4) Liberty is the suprc?mepolitkal value. (S) We ought to have more equality in our sociev (C;) All authority should be illbolished.

Sentences (1.) to (6) do not seem verifiable by any test, because they contain terms ("just,'" "Ijustice," ""social justicer")that do not name any objects we couln ever observe. To be sure, Plato eho~gSllthere were such objects, but not only are most of us skepticd that "justice" xfers to any such object, but even if it did, it is impossi:ble to imagine a test in which this object plays a part, Sentence (4) has an additional problem: not only does it refer to the abstract value ""libert~'9butit also asserts that this value is ""spreme." H w codd we verify the supremacy of libery? Last, (5) m d (6) da not picture the way the world is, but the way it ozkglzb:to be. Mrheretas descriptive statements seek to fit themselves to the wodd-they seek to conform to the way the world is-ethical claims such as (5) and (6) seek to fit the world to them-they advise us to chmge the world so that the world fits "the picture"' they draw. Wittg"n&eir"t drew a similar cox~clusion.fn the Trachfus, he held that because these sorts of ethical statements do not even seek to descrijbe the world, they are without sense. In this he was very close to the logical positivists, who Fnsiskd that moral and value statements were "nonsenseff because they could not, in pril-tciple, be verified, Wittgenstein's view was more subtle. AIthough he agreed that ethical statements do 11ot describe the world m d so are without sel"tse, he does not deny that ethics is important and he does not think it should be abandoned. Rather, he believes, ehic-Sis mystical: it cmnot be taked about because it cmnot be conveyed in language since it does not seek to mkror the world. ""There are inked," says Miittgenstein, "&@S that c m o t be put into words. They make themsel:ves manifest. They are mystical."l7 Recall the three common convictions about the meaning of political concepts that I noted above: (1) Words such as "justice" mmake serrse and are important. (2) If a word m k e s sense we should be able to give a definition of it, (3) If a word makes scnse and is important, and is not about fieiior~ or fmtasy; it must at least purport to refer to something real.

For all its problems, Plato%conceptud realism it; attractiw il7soiar as it makes sense of all three convictions. If, howeverpwe take a more madern

view m d refuse to accept that there is a realm in which value-laden concepts exist, our devoticm to (2) and (3) tends to undermk~econviction (I), m e logical positivists, accepting (2) and (3),thus denied that value conceptmake sense and that they are important; in the Tractlatzrs Wittgenstein accepts that t h y m important, but still denies that t h y make sense. h either case, it seems clear that if we combine a commitment to a close connection between sensible words and things to which they refer while rejecting I'fato~~ic conceptual realism, it will be hard to make sense of puliltjcal concepts such as justice or affir~xationsof the value of liberty Perhaps if we eliminate any reference to goodness or vdue, we might still be left with s m e "value-neutral" plitical concepts. Clr p a h a p m e should say, we might be left with the value-neutral remnmts of our concepts such as justice, libertlr;, and equality Some philosophers, inspired by Wttger~stein'sTractaf~ks,have argued that W can separate out the ""value"ccompment oE concepts such as li.berty from the "descsiptivc'" compment, allowing conceptual. analysis to focus on the latter,'" shall m t pursue this passibility fi,r two reasons. First, even if "value-~~eutral'~ understanding5 of concepts such as liberty and equality are possible, m d even if they have their uses in s o m technical or social scientific Iheories, these vitlrte-neutral explicatiom are silent regar$ing our main interest in studying political concepts: we wmt to know, for example, not only what liber@ is, but why it is or is not important, and whether it is something some concepts-the. best exampie of vvhich we should strive for. Seco~~d, is jlzstice-seem to h v e very little purely descriptive components. An analysis of justice that left out of the account why it was to be sought, or why it s b u l d guide our actions, would tell us very little about justice. what justice is so that we can b o w what Like Socrates, we wish to h ~ a w sort of political and social life to strive for.

1.3 Wiugtgenstein's Later Analysis Wittgensfein's Rejection of the Picture Theory

Miittgenstc.in begins his most impormt work, Philosophical Investigatiom, with a quote from Csnfessiotzs, in which Saint Augustine (35440) tells us how he learned to speak a language: When they (my elders) named some c~bject,and aca>rdingfymoved towards something, X saw this and 1 grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant tct point it ctut. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of aft peoples: the expressions CIF the face, the play CIF the eyes, the movements of other parts of

the body, and the tone ctf voice which expresses ctur state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what ctbjects they signified; and after 1 had trained my motrtl-r to form these signs, I used thern to express my own desire.1"

Miittgenstein comments that this gives a particular "picture" of the essence of language. "lt is this: the indi\iidual words in language Inam objects-entences are crombi.rtali.ons of such nanzcs."zVhe waning of words, then, is the olbject for which they stand in the world. This view of course, is not simply Saint Augustine's---it is ihe view of Wittge~~stein M"ittge11stc.h thus begins the hinlself in his "I'raef-utzts Lclgico-Plz%los~pIzie~_~s. Philrtsophicul I1.rvesfigalionsby showing why hjs earlier picture theory of lmguage is wrong. Tb better undersmd the shortcomings of the naming t . l t e q of fallguage, WiHgenstein explores a simple language in which it seems correct. Let us imagine a language for which the description gl"venby Augustine is right. The language is meant to wrve for communication beween builder A and an assistant B, A is building with buitding-stones: there are blocks, pilltars, slabs and beam. B has tc3 pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs thern. For this purpose they use a language a>nsistingof the words ""bcock," '""pillar,"dab," """barn." A calls out;--B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a calt,nct.pts:A Reconstrttciio~z(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 1'E'-l"i7. 9. This movement was important in the years between the First and Second World Wars and in the 1950s. The British philosopher A, J, Ayer (191&1"389) was one of the leading logical positivists. 10. See Ludwig Wttgenstein, Tracfladzishglsu-Pljilosuphkus, D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuimess, tram. (tondctn: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961). 11. For a very helpful account, see K. T. Fann, Witfgenstez'nb Ci>nct.ytionof Pllilusopfty (Berkeley: University of Califc3rnia Press, 19691, esp. p. 20, 12. Witfgenstein, Tractatus, sect. 2.24. 13. Ibid., sect. 221, 14. Xbid., sect. 2.23, 15. Ibid., sect. 2.224, 16. See Hans Slugs, ""udwig Wittgenstein: Life and Work," in Hans SIuga and David G. Stern, eds., The Cambridge (?ompanit~illnfo Wii"fgenstez'n(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199Sj, pp. 14-15. 117. Wittgenstein, Raciafus, sect. 6.622. See also Hannah Pitkin, Wiffgenstez'nand just ice (Berkeiey: University of California Press, 1"322),chap, 2, 18. See Oppenheirn, F701itical Colzcepfs,chaps. 8-9. For a criticism, see Wiltiarn E. Connolly, The E n n s of PolifimfDiscourse, 2nd ed. (Princetcm: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 22ff. 19, Saint Augustine, as quoted in Ludwig Wittgenstein, PIzifosoplzica1I~vestigatr'ouzs, 3rd ed., G.E.M. Anscornbe, trans, (New k r k : Macmillan, 1958), note to sect. I. 20, Xbid., sect. 1. 21. Xbid., sect. 2. 22. Ibid., sect. 32, 23. See Pitkin, Wiftgenstez'nafaB lustice, pp. 102-105. 24. Wittgenstein, P!zilmoylzicol Itzvestigalb~zs,sect. 7. 25, Xbid., sect. 11. 26, Ibid., sect. 23. 27, Ibid., sects, 19,23. 28. Fur useful discussions, see Fann, Wittgensteil-zS Concepfio~zqf Plzilosaplzy, chap. 8; Fitkin, Wftgezisteinnzid fzkstice, chap. 4 29. Wittgenstein, Iff-tiIosoplzicnEIn~?esfigatir>ns, p. 18n. 30, See Pitkn, Wilkge~ste-ilz and jzrstice, chap. 8. 31. Wittgenstein, PFzz'losoplzicnl Inz?esfigafions,sect. 66. 32. Ibid.

33, See, far example, Plato, The Ryublie, pp. 12tt-143 [IV, 433-441, pp. 298-315 [IX, 5'92-587'1.

34, Hannak Pitkin makes the same point with a different example-knowledge. See her Wittgenslei~zand justice, pp. 85ff. 35, "The creed which accepts as the foundatirtn of morals %utility1or the "greatest happiness principle3hoXds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happinessr' (John Stuart Mill, Utl'lifarinnism, in jczhn G r a ed., ~ Otr Libert-y a ~ Ollzcr d Essnys [New Ycxk Oxfc>rdUniversity Press, 19413, chap. 2, para. 2). See my Socinl PJzz'lusupizy (Armonk, NE": M. E. Sharpe, 1999),chap. 4. 36. See Mill, Utl'lifarinnit;m,chap, 5. 37, John Rawls, A 77~mryofJzistice (Cambridge, M A : Haward University Press, lW"i71, p, 3. 38. See S. I. Benn, "Public and Private Morality: Clean Living and Dirty Hands," h S.1. Benn and G. E Gaus, eds., Public afaB PrimEe ilrz Social Lfe (New Ycfrk: St. Martin" Press, 1983), chap. 7,

2.1 Essentially Contested Conrepts The Politics o f Political Concepfs

I argued in. the first chapter that not only do we need to tmderstmd our concepkral confusions, but we wed to try to clear them up. This process of "'clearil7g up" inevitatabiy il7volves decisio~~s about whicrh uses-parts of the co~~cept-weWjll stress and continue to affim, and which we will revise or reject. To retznrn to our example of justice m d the social good ot be the case that jusftice is both (1)entirely inde(Section U),if it c per~dentof considerations of socid welfare and (2) simply a way to promote the social good, then we must in, some way revise our understanding of justice. Thus, utilitarian phihsophers such as John Stumt Mitl (1806-1873) have tried to show how justice derives from consideralions of social welfare, m d is nof something independent of it, whereas others have sought to demmstrate how svcial justice is enl-irely &istinctfrom social welfare, ancf camot be derived from it. As ratior~alagents, we employ cortcepts to make sense of, and to change, our social life-kve cannot remain content with contradictov and confused ideas. Socrates understoocf this and was constantly seeking to get beyond the confusions of our normal wnys of thinking. Philosophical mflection, he believed, codd clcar up these conceptual confusions. And m n y contemporay philosophers agree: philosophical i~livestigatior~, they insist, can clarify and systematize our cmcepts.1 Yet, when we examine disputes abmt the best way to interpret a political concept, we typically do not find dispassionak philosophers engaged in a disinterested pursuit of the truth, but parti,sm and chmged conflicts, with, all, parti,cipmts often denying that their opponenb even make sense, Consider, for example, the notion of social (or distributive) justice that has been described as the '%bsession of our tine,"Vo many philosopher, especidly socialjsts and

defenders of the contemporary wdfare state, social or distributive just-ife is a fundamentai maral imperative: To have an understanding of the moral language-game, to have an understanding of what morality requires, we need to understand that we camot be indifferent to the suffering of others. Are we justified in holding onto even a mkzdscztltr bit of our property, say Ecmd which could be shared with a starving person, when sharing it could be done without any serious inconvenience to oursefves? . . . Sometimes we are morally compelled to redistribute. . . . It is not so much demands placed on individuals within an unjust system that are crucial but a commitment ctn the part of individuals tct alter the social system. . . . What needs to be altered is the social system. . . . Morally speaking, there has to be redistrib~tion.~

In contrast, E A. Hayek (1899-1992), a Noble prize-whning economist, defevlder of milrkets and opponenf: of wonomic planning, insists that "social justire" k an "abuse"'of the word "~ustice": It is perhaps nett surprising that men should have applied to the joint effects of the actions of many people, even where these were never foreseen or intended, the conception of justice which they had developed with respect tc3 the conduct of individuals towards each other. ""Social'" justice (or sometimes "economic" justice) came to be regarded as an attribute which the "%ctions" of society, or the ""treatment" of individuals and groups by society ought tc? possess. As primitive thinking usually does when first noticing some regular process, the results ctf the spontaneous orderkg of the market were interpreted as if some thinking being deliberately directed them, or as if the particular benefits or harm difkrent persons derived from the market were determined by particular acts of the will, and could therefore be guided by moral rules. This ccmception of ""sclcial" "justice is thus a direct a?nseqtrence of that anthropomorphism or personification by which naive thinking tries to account far the xjt-ctrdering process. It is a sign of the immaturity of our minds that we have not yet outgrc~wnthese primitive ccmcepts and still demand from an impersonal process . . . that it conform to the moral precepts men have errotved for the guidance of individual actions,"

Thus, whereas the socialist, Kai Nielsen, insists that given the moral languilge game, social justice ~quirc3sthat the social sptem distribute goods in the way required bp morality, Hiayek maintains that this is to personify society, treat.ing it as if it were an indhictual that codd act, and so could violate rules of morality, Since society is the realrn of impersonal forces, Hayek co~~cludes, it is an &use of language to talk &out whether it is just. Nielsen is aware of?but rejects, Hayek"s dismissal of social.justice.3

In many ways, this dispute seems intractable: Nielsen believes that Hayek's view is based on a misur~derstandil-rgof the moral language game, kvhereas Hayek insists that Nielserr" socialism mistmderstands the concept of justice. Ratlner than being an ivnpartial dispute about the best way to char up our confused thhking, lfie conflict is more akjn to a political disptrte, jn which each side steadfastly trpholds its jnterpretation. Why do our conceptud disputernabout justice-and liberty, equality and so on-ti-tke on this politicai character?

In m h p o r t m t essay titled "'Essentially Contest-edConcepts," W. El. Gallie tries to explain the intractable nature of disputes about political concepts.6 GaUie expiains bis idea of a11 'kssa~tiallycor~testedconcept'" thmugh t-he example of championship. As Gallic points out, we are aIl fitmiliar with the idea of a c h q i o n s h i p , or "the champicrns" in a sport. Typically there is m m u a l competition, and the permon or team selwted by the rules is desipated the "'champion" for that year, and ge~~erally remains the champion until the next season's competition is concluded. Gallie, however, considers a different sort of competition, wifh some UTIusual f e a t u ~ s : (1) Each team has a distinctive style of play; some teams specialize in speed, others in power or "trategy (2) T%echampionship is not akvarded according to some settled and agreed-upon body of rules, but rather in virtue of the style and level of play. Ewryone agrees, though, that the champio~~ is the tearn that "'pfays the bestatf (3) There is no one point at which a team becomes the champion, nor does it retain the title for a fixed period. Since there arc. continuous games, a team can be the champion today and dethroned tomorrow. (4) The competition has no officiaf judges. Each side has its devoted supporter" as well as less loyd "floalifig" fms, who endorse the team as " h e best.'r (S) Every team" supporters insist that it is the champion, ol. ihe ""true"or the ''E&'chantpion. Even if one team tends to win the most, the supporters of other t c m s will insist that their tearn is the true champion, because their team excels in Ihe styie of play that is most importmt.

Each team stresses some aspect of the gam peed, power, strakgyand is supported by its fms, who hsist that this is trhe truly crucial aspect

of the game. So each side sees its team as the best because it expresses that part of the g m e that, t-hey claim, is lrhe most important. Gallie's poht, of course, is that such a competition would be characterized by constant, intractable dispute about who i s the champion. Clearly, W would never expect the dispute to be settled: who was champion would always be contcrsfed.More importmt; though, it seems in prhciplle impossible to resolve the dispute, for it seems ian.possible to show what aspect of the game is truly the most important, a r ~ dso which team is truly the champion. In this sense, the championship is essentially contested, Based on this model of the champior~ship,Gallie lists the conditions a concept must fuliill to be essentialfy conksted: (X) The concept must be evaluative or "'appriaisive"': it must indicate or signify something that is valuable, good, right, worthy, and so on. Each team wants to clajrn the title of ""chmpior~."No party to the dispute would be willlng to let another team decide on how ""campion" is to be used. (11) The nature of the concept must be complex? so that d i f f e ~ nast pects of it can be stressed. (XI%) 'Just why the achievement or condition signified by the complex concept is good, right, worthy, a d so 01%is not manifest; its goodness, righh-ress, and so on can be expained in different ways, depending on which aspect of the complex concept a supporter focuses. (IV)The cor~ceptis open to new h~terprctations. (V) Parties to the dispute recognize that their olvn use is disputed, m d each party has some understanding and agpretliation of opposing uses and the aspects of the cor~cepton which they are based. Because of (V), at1 contestmts must maintain. their own use af the concept in the face of other uses; aU must defend heir claim h a t the aspect (or aspects) of the concept on which they focus is the most importa~tand try to argue agahst those who stress other aspects.

An Example: Social Justice Gallie provides several examples of essentii-rllycontest4 cmcepts, one of r/vhich is the concept of social justice, "or of the gewral p"i""p1e""hat should govem the distribut-ion of goods in a civilised and humane society."" There are, Gallie claims, two rival interpretations of social justice, one liberal or individualist, the other socialist or coUectivist. The liberal conception builds on the idea af fair dealhgs between hdividuals and s t ~ s s e thats just rewards should reflect merit or contribution (see Sections 8.2 8.3).The cmtral case for this view is fair market relatior~s:in fair Crzla~sactims people are rewarcfed differently m d this reflects the meri.es of the

individuals and the products they offer, "hfine," says GaHie, "from the liberal or inllividuatistic standpoint, social justice consists of those arrmgements whereby the meritorious individual shall1 receive back, for his pmducts or serviccts, his . . . due,"mis has somethes been called com~zz-rfaeatz'zjz~sfice-its ~r? model is a free and fair ifldividual conkact, in which both sides hanor their commitmf3nt.s m d provide a proportionate service to the other. Cephalus (Section 1.1) focused m commutativejustice. :Incontrast, Gallie tells us, the socialist or collectivist insists that justice is not so mu& &out fair dealings between free individuals (though, of course, that is one aspect of justice), but about the best way for society to distribute its goods to help humms live the best lives possi:ble (see Sections 8.3, 8.4, 9.7). "Sociai justice, from this standpoirzt, does not rest on any claims that hdividual or groups have ever made on one mother in respect of fair rewards and returns for work donc: rather it is an ideaone aspect of a r ~ided picture of human living.""Vocialjustice looks at the justj.ce clr fairness of the overall distri:hution of goods ir.1a society, not the fairness of individual transactions. Importantly, these two ideas of justice can conftict. Suppose that meritorious inditciduals make free and fais contracts in whjch they serve each other's ijntertlst; m d that they are honest and always keep their contracts, Commutative justice is achieved. :In such a condition, however, t-he skilled anrt industrkut; may accumulate great wealth while the unskilled or unindustsious may be left behind. Nielxn, of course, would insist that the resralting distribuicjm of income would be unjust. Thus, a society that focuses on commutative justice may not achieve distributive justice. Because the idea of justice is so complex, a d because both commutative of justice are inteiiil;ible uses of the term "justice,"' and distributive. nolio~~s it is hard ta accept Hayek's claim that the sociafist-couectivisl is misushg the km or &using the concept, just as it s e e m wrong to say that acceptutative justice is based o r ~ a (clear)misw~dersta~dhg of the utative m d d~tribzxtivejustice are, as Gallie But which is notes, "cmBicting facets of m y advanced social morality"~f" most importmt? To be sure, to most it w d d be desirabk to achiwe both, but if we carnot have both, does the "truly just society" (the "real &ion"') stress the commutative or the distributive aspect of the "justice g a m f f ?Just a w e mm& see how the different terns could ever resolve their dispute about who is the champion, Gallie holds that liberals m d socialists will not be able to resolve their diBerences over social jus~ce, Concepts and Conceptions

Gafiie considers fhe possibility that, perhaps, there is no real d i s a g ~ e ment about such concepts. Perhaps the contendhg parties are not really

h l k h g about the s m e thing at all. If we were more careful, we might say that one team's supporters mair~titinthat it is the '"peed champio~~,'hnother team" declare it is the ""polver champion,'' m d a third group supports its team as the "strategy champim." Oar, in the case of justire, we mig:ht say that inditciduafists are the acfvocates of co whereas collectivists are the advocates of distributive justice. But if that is so, there really is no disagreemat, The liberal m d swialist thought they about justice, hut it turned out that they were simpIy using were a r w h ~ g the same ward to describe different things. But that seems wrong. To claim that, in the end, the liberal and the socialist do not really disagree about justice becauscl they are usixzg lfie same word 0-u-s-t-i-cr-e)to mean diffemnt thillgs implies Lhat these central political dispMes are simply confusions based on ambiguous words; when once the confusions are expo=& we will see that the liberal and the socialist do not reaIly disagree about the demands of justice. Yet nothing seems clearer than the fundamental difference between liberals and socialists about the demands of justice. We want to understand this dispute-we wmt to understmd precisely what liberals and socialists are &sagreeh"tg about when they &Spute the true meaning of.justice. To show that liberals and socialists are really disagreeingpGallie provides two more conditio~~s for esse~~tial contestabihty. According to condition WI, the connicting parties agree on m "exemplarM-a sort of perfect case-that embodies all the importmt fcaturcs of the concept. In the chmpionshig exirmple, we might think of some past team that everyone agrees is the best team ever-the one that perftlctly exemplifies all the aspects of Ihe sport, Each team" supporters, then, clairn that their team is closest to the exemplar. Furthemore, according to Gaitic's seventh CVfl) condition, each team" supporters claim that their tearn is the true inheritor of the exemplar" achievement and is developing that achievement in the best way. Conditions V1 and V11 ensure that the disputants are really disagreeing: Accepting the s a m exemplar, all claim that their tearn is closest to it and develops it in the w y s truest to why everyone values the exemplar. l%us, the supporkrs of the speed team clairn that t.lnough speed, power, and strategy were all characteristics of the exemplar team, it was its speed that was crucial to its greabss, and that is why the speed team is the true inhcritor of the exemplar's aclrievements. The p w e c and strategy teams, of course, will stress that it was other elements of the exempiar that made for its greabess. In t-he case of social justice, both liberals and socialists typically accept that justice concerns the fair treatment of individuals, and that in a just society indkiduals would receive their fair share of tbe socid resources. The idea of a society in which each perso11 is alwap treated fairly is an ideal shared by a wide range of liberals and so-

cialists; their debate is about how that ideal is best actualized in our world. One way to trnderstand Gallie" point is to distinguish between a concept m d various crlnclptiofzs of it.lLme characteristi~~ of the exemplar constit.uk ihe c m of the concept: unless one cxplah~sthis core, and can show that in same way one" account is the best interpretation of this core, one camot be said. to have provided m account of that concept. "Contests . . . are after all, contests over something: esserrtially contested concepts must have some common core; otherwise holv could we justifiably claim that the contests were about the same concept?"Q A team that ignored the qua:iities of the exemplar, hut still insisted that it was Lhe for the competition is champion, would not be part of the competitio~~, about the best analysis of, m d development of, the exemplar. We c m call each of these i n t e ~ ~ t a t i o of n s the concept a conception of it, Gallie's analysis suggests, then,&at we undertitar~deach co~~ception -as provi"Jing an interpretation and development of the core-the concept. But Gallie's claim that all the disputants accept a commm exemplat and the related idea that all the competing c o n c q t i o ~ ~ errrhrace s a comm m core, falls into the s m e error as did Socrates: the assmption that there must be an essential comxnon core to all, the uses of a concept C,by virtue of which we see each of those uses as an instance of C. Recall Wittgenstein" directive from Section 1.4: "Dan't say: There must be something common . . . but look and see whether there is anythhg c m man tru all.""We need not posit a common core ehat is shared by afl: the uses of a concept such as justice (or libert-y or equality), which every conception must seek to explain and develop. Instead of understmding vafious cmceptiom as all developint; a coma11 core, it it;better to see ehem as providi,ng diferent accounts of a constelfaljon or cluster'%f the ideas, beliefs, and actions that make up the area of conceptual dispute. There may be no one eleme~~t of the constellatior~that all agree is a part of the concept, but insofa as each conception pr0vidt.s an interpretation of Lhe complex of vaIues, beliefs, and actions (related by family resem:blmce), it competes with other co~~ceptions. A conception, then, identifia some parts of the cluster (or language garne) as crucial to uderstanding the coazcept, while insisthg that other elemnts of ihe cluskr are of less importance, and some perhaps shoufd be elimbaled. We might say, then, that a conceplion nvgavzizs fhc cllister of bell+, z ~ ~ l unlzd m actiiirify,sl'zowi~zgwhich are most il?zportatzt, and how they am all rclaft~dtrt ilze another. ':To employ a metaphor, we c m Lhink of a conception as a sort of map of the terrajn. covered by the concept. A good map tells us how to move around the terrain, identifyjng the crucial landmarks and showing h w they all relate to each other.

2.2 Political Ideologies

ideologies as Systems of Conceptions Gallie beljeves that political concepts are essentially contested, A concept such as social justice, he claims, harr; muttiple facets, which allow us to formulnte d i f f e ~ n t essentially , contested, conceptions of it. Insofar as Gallie shows how disputes about political concepts can themselves behas much to come political disputes, his esserrtial corntestability pr")~)oml recommend iL. But: although Gallie does a lot to help explain horu corrceptud disputes arise, he is less clear why we fight so hard about political concepts and why we are so averse to adopting our oppoxnentfsconception. His min thou&ht seems to be that because a corncept such as justice is apprasive it is somehow a valuable weapon or trophy ir.1 our political battles and can he used aggressively agailrst our poiitiral opponents. Surely there is more behind our disputes than that. Gallie's hndiwidualist liberals m d collectivist socialists believe that it is vitally important to und e r s t d justjce in their p r e f e r ~ dways. Zn this regard, the champimship exmple seems to mislead us. A team's fms support a team as chmpion just because it. is tfrcir twm. It seems odd to t h k of peoy,le coming to =asoned conclusions about what team they will he a fan of. In an important sense, the choice of one%favorite k m is just a preference, like a taste for ice cream or pizza, Liberals m d socialists, however, do not typicauy see their disputes like this; they see themselves as engaged in a deeply important dispute, onc. in which gettii.lg the answer wrong leads to all sorts of pr"blcms. Why do they see their conceptual disputes in this way? Michael Freeden goes far toward explaining the nature of our disputes about "esse~ntiallycolntested concepts."' Our political conceptiolns, Freeden polnts out, are the basic buildkg blucks of our thhkixlg &out poitics." m a t is constructed from these buildkg blocks-conceptior-rs of liberty, power; eyuality justice, aulhoriiy, and so onnal.e what Freeden classes as "ideologies," comprehensive systems of ideas that provide the basis for explanation and criticism of political life, Thus, on his view, liberalism, socialism, and colnservatism are all ideologies built up from an interrelated series of interpretations of political concepts. t,iberalism, then, constitutes a system uf corzccptiof~s,centered on a certain conception of liberty, with an -allied undcrrstandilng of equality and justice, supporting a disthctively liberal understanding of authority an$ democracy.l"t is importmt to stress that on Freeden" view liberalism (and the same c m be said about other ideologies) is not sinlply a group of politicai conceptions: it is a system of interpretation of political concepts; the case for, say, its interpretation of liberty supports, and is supported by, its interpretatioln of eyuality, justice, and authority. For example, in examining the

lheory of John Stuart Mdl, the great rtineteenlh-century liberal, Fxeden u21covers a mutually sustaining crtre structure of political concepts that holds Mill's ideology together. Xt is a crtre structure in a dual sense: the removal of any one of the concepts would change the peculiar pattern created by their joint intermeshing, causing the a x e to a>llapse; and a further range of adjacent and peripheral concepts derives from, and is in a slightly looser sense dependent on, that core, If Mill is a typical liberal, liberal ideofc3gy places the protection of Individual capacities at the core cof its programmatic concerns and its arrangements are primarily geared to emuring that free individuals will be able to develop their rational and sociable attributes. A diffused, responsible, and limited use of political power is the chief institutional corollary of liberty; it complements Mill's specific crtnceptictn ctf liberty, of achieving non-constraint through space for individual expression. It also a>mplementsthe avoidance of sectional privileges and, with the adjacent concept ctf democracy that attaches itself to l i d t e d power, the accountable and educated exercise of political choices and decisions,'c

My concern at present is not the accuracy of I;reede2lfsspecific ana[ysis of the system of col~ceptior.~~ that constitutes liberalism, but kis idea that political ideologies m systems of inteqretatioms of concepts. If we understand political views in this way WC can see why, for example, disputes betwer.1liberals and socialists have two key feahnres. First, these disputes run deep. A socialist's devotion to her favorcrd account of social. justice is not at all like a devotion to a sports team; it follows from everything else she believes about eyudity, merty, and the point of poliiicaI life. To challenge her views on social justice is not simply to challenge this one political concept, hut her system of cmceptions-her entire ideology. Because, as E'reedel~arwes, the interprtltatiol~of one col~ceptaffects the interp~tationof others, if (to revert to Gallie's exanzple; Section 2.1) the liberal individualist could convhce her that the cornmutarcive notion was superior to distributive justice, this w o d d chailenge her notiol~s e entire socialist of eq~~ality, liberty, and political life, Tlnd so m d e m h ~ her ideology. In dispute~aboutsocial justice, it is not simply ant.%views about social justice that are beil'lg challe~~ged, hut uitimately one's overall understanding of political, and perhaps nonpolitical, lifefjc.cond,if our view about one political concept is greatZy influenced by our wiews on others, it should he no suqrise that t-hese de$ates seem so intractable, Ruming so deep, and involvhg so much of our overall view of politia and society, our arguments about justice lead us to furlher disagreeme~~ts about the nature of liberty, powcsr, equality, ar.1~3authority Just because the d&ates covm so much ground, we must expect that it

will be very hard to make headway*In the face of your good reasons for sview of justice, she replies with an argument that v e s t i o ~ ~ i anothczr" r~g relies on her theory of equality, which you do not share m d which. you then proceed to criticize. Hence the familiar feeling that our disagreem e ~ ~not t s only go i\l-ow~din circles, but are continually leading to 11ew disagreements rather thm producbg agreement. Reason and ideology

Freeden" nrtotion of an i&ology aa a "cornbhation of political concepts org"l7ized in a particutar way'"l7helps us to explain the ~ ~ a t u of r r .our disputes about political concepts. We need to be cteilrer, however, as to precisely what he mems by ways of organizjng the jnterpretations- Freeden emphasizes three m a h ways that political concepts are linked, (l)Freeden allows that reason, or what he often calls '"logic," organizes our beliefs. This, of course, is the heart: of Socrates" method, and indeed all of philosophy. As Socrates reminds Cephahs (Scctim 1.29,one's beliefs must be consiste~~t; if one accepts that (af it is always right to do justice and it is kvrong to keep one's pmmise to retur11 a weapon to a mactxnan, then one must reject (c) the claim that justice always requires keeging o11e's word, includii7g one's promise to retun1 what one has horrowed. A ration& p e r s d s beliefs must be consistent-more generally, we can say that a rational person's beliefs hang together in a coherent m y . As a whole, the beliefs of a ratior~alpersm make sense, and they support each other to form a sensi[ble and coherent view of the kvorld. (2) Freeden stresses, however, that ideafogirr; are not simpl_)i organized by reasorl. Because '5deo:logies have to deliver conceptual social maps and political decisions, and they have to do so in lmgmage accessible to the m s s e s as well as intellectuals, to m a t e u r as well, as professional thinkers,'"t:hey freely mix appeals to rmson a r ~ demotion.18 An ideolugy may be organized in a way that is rationally flawed, but emotionally appealing. An emotionally appealing ideology m y cntertaisl inconsistent beliefs. Fascism, for instance, seemed to shultm~eouslymaintain that all. individuals should be subservient to the collective group m d that same individuals were superior and should lead m d &ape the collcrctivity. C3tn the face of it, these are inconsistent belie&; but if they are emotionally appealing-say; to the masses who desire to be Zed by their superiors m d yet yearn for equality-they both may he important parts of m ideology. (3) More generauy, Freeden emphasizes that ideologies are &aped by culture m d history. M a t combhations of interpretations are accepted as '"going together" in such a way as to form an ideology is as much a matter of histmy and culture as it is of I.casolI. Icieolclgies, on his view, are attached to social gmoups Tlnd shaped by political and social connicts about

m)

power; and their character is dependent on thc requirements of these conflicts as w d as the relations betwee11 ideas. Because ideologies "perform a range of services, such ils legitirn,ation, orderhg, simplification, and action-orientation," the configurations of concepts they produce are ones that have arise11because they serve these purposes.lq The upstnot of Freeden's analysis is that It-re student of ideologies should not engage in a "quest for a good usage of a concept,"~Wec m try to ~llzderstaszdideologies-to u~lderstmdhow they organize politic& concept-i;onsin. a particular kvay-but it seems illegitimate to try to "dear up" the interpretatims. After all, reason is not the sole, perhaps not even the primry, organizing principle of an ideology. To revise an ideologfs inkrpretation of a concclpt by making it better conform to reasolI, or by abandonhg same parts of it that do not fit with the others, is to ignore that the glue holding m ideology together is an emotive-politicalcuftrural-rational mis. Glvcn this, it seems that "there are no c o r ~ c tway^ of d e f b k g conceptsaff21 Gallie arrived at if not the same then at least a broadly similar conclusion. Gallie believed that recog1"tizing"a given concept as essentially contested imp;ies recognition of r i d uses of it (such as oneself mpudiates) as not only- loe;icallJr possibk and humanly 'likely,-ut as of permanent critical value to one's own use m hterp~"~"tati~fl of the co~~cciipt in quest.ion.'QUs Gallie perceives it, the various contedws all have n l . u artjculate elelnents of the concept, albeit in differing ways. Thus, Gallic too seems suspicious of those who would dismiss rival uses as wrong and who claim that they alone have the correct interpretation. And he seems suspicious because he a p p a ~ n t i ydoubts that there is such a thin; as the C I I Y R C ~ inte~retationof m essentially cmtested col~cept.

2.3 Political Philosophy m d Political Theories

ideology Versus Political

Theory: The Example of Public and Private

Freedex1 is certai~lilycarrect that liberalim, sociatism, a r ~ dconservatism can be viewed as systems of conceptions organized on partly rational, but also emotive, cultural, and historical grounds. And thus it may well. be that an ideo:iogy will not be hlly consistent, but nevertheless (indeed, perhaps because of that inconsistency) it c m serve to legitimate and orgmize political. movements, For s t u d e ~ ~ofbpolitical thinking, it will be important a r ~ dinteresthg if, say, the political movemer~tk ~ o w as n ""iiberalissrr" shodd turn out to be in some w y rationally fiawecf. Consicacr, for example, Stanley Bern and my work on the liberal conception of the public a ~ private. d For the most part, we a r p e d , the liberal conception of the privak and the ptrblic presupposes an individualist theory of social life:

society can he reduced to individuals (see Section 3.4). On this view, "Pzkblic, as oppaw"dto puimfef is that h i c h has no immediate relation tru any specified person or persons, but may directly concern any member or members of the communi.ty;without distinction.""2 h contrast, what is priv&e is that w:hich can be assiped to a specific perso11 or group. So, we might say, h the basicdly liberal individualist world, the idea of the private focuses on specific, assipable individuals, whereas the public centers on gex~eralclasses and can refer to nlzyone or eucryone in that ciass. A library is puhlic because it is open to any member of th,e class of residents, whereas a private house is only open to the specific iTldividuals owning it or invited into it. Both these concqtions---of the pu:blic and ake perfect sense in a world composed simpty of individuals, however. But as Jemmy Bentham (174GIS32) recopized, this purely individualist way of looking at sociey makes less sexlse of other ideas, such as the public interest: The interest uf individuals, it is said, ought to yield to the public interest. But what does this mean? X s not one individual a s much a part of the public as another? This public interest, which you introduce as a person, is only an abstract t c m ; it represents nothing but the mass of individual interests. It is necessary to take them all into account, instead of considering sorne a s ail, and others as nctthing. . . . Jn a word, the interest of everybody is sacred, or the interest of nobody Individual interests are the only real interests.24

In Bentham" thoroughly individualistic world, the only sensible meaning of the "public interesl" cvould be the ""interest of everyone.'Tef: Bentham is quite right that political discourse often treats "tthe public" as a sort of giant perm"": the puhlic int-erest is not the int-erest of everyone, but the interest: of '"the community," considered as an eMity in its own right, and one that cmnot be reduced simply to a collectim of individuals. After all, very &\/v of our appeals to the public interest really are appeals to the interests of &solutely each and every person in the c o m m nit8 but neither do they reduce to appeals to the interests of tfie mere m"jority Riltber, ox~ewho speaks of ihe pubfic interest typically has in mind sorne notion of the hierest of the community as a whole, or the society as such, Allhough, as Rentham recognized, this idea does not fit into an individualist mderstaxliding of society, liberals often make appeals to the public interest or the public good, NOW, as outsiders trying to u n d e r s t d liberal ideology, we find this an ertliglteniq insight: we find that the p w r and persuasivex~ess of liberiliism, may result h m its ability to scvitck from its prr.$om,inant

individ.ualist theory to a nonindividualist view of community when malking certain sorts of political appeafs. Consider; however, what a lfieral-someone who accepted liberal ideas and conceptions as her guide in politics-would make of this, From the kside-from within liberatism-could one reasonably coz~thueto affirm i h i s doctrfne bowing that one was appealkg to hconsistent views of society? It seems not. The analysis of the lberal conception of the public and psivate implies that the liberd conception is ratio~~aily flawed: it camot be sow~d,because it supposes an impossibility-that society both is, m d is not, simply composed of indkiduals. The liberal conception of the public and private thus canr~othe justgied, and it certairdy cannot in any seme he correct. TO coz~tinueadherence to the liberal conception of the public and private would be an act of faith, as same Roman Catholics accept the mystery of the Trhity (but, utlnllike the Catholic, the liberal could not have faith that this mystery will he resohed in itr.2 afterlife).As rational agez~ts,however, we seek beliefs that make sense of the world, and inconsistent beliefs camot help us do that. :If liberalism is not sirnply an ideology-a social or poliiical phenomenon that merits study-but a polificnl theory that contends for our allegiance and that seeks to guide our actions, it must be plausi"ule; m d to be plausibk, it must be illternally consistent. Should a liberal confmt the sort of inconsistency reveilled in liberal concepljons of the public and private, the rational liberal must either albando1.r liberalism or reconstmct it And of course, the same c m he said of cozIsel=. so as to make it consiste~~t. vatism, socialism, m d so on. Consider again the metaphor of a map. Freeden and others have comto maps (Sections 2.1, 2.2): they pared systems of political col~ceptior~s help us nalrigate around the political world by highlighting same features and showhg how one feature is related to others. Now, one thing a ratio~~al agent wants is a consistent m p . Imagke that you are visiting Atrstralia, m d you wish to drive from Sydney to Melbourne. After nine hours, you stop to consult your map to see just where you are, U n h t u mtely, your map has two cliffere~~t, inconsistent parts; if you loak at the first sheet you are almost in Melhoume, but if you check the second, you have gone ttntirely in the wrong clirectim m d will soon be in Brisbane. Where me you, and in which direction shouid you go? Clear@ an inconsistent map is no help at all..Until the entire map makes sense and all its directims are corrsisknt with each other, it does not even begin to help you make sense of your fcmcephnal)world. Of course, even such inconsistent maps may have their uses: if Auskaiia was invaded by a foreign power, this would be the psefect map for Australims to give to their invaders! One thi~ligsuch a map will not do, however; is to help people make sense of the locations of Australian cities.

Jvsfificafory Political Theories

We c m thhk of a political theory (as opposed to an ideology) as seeking to jzistih a specific organization of different intevretations of political cox-rcepts. A political theory will provide linked argu""ntdor cox-rcept i ~ n of s Eberty, p w r , e ~ d i t yjustice, , auel-lority, dernocrxy, and so on. :It will justify each interpsetation of the chief political concepts by appeal to other interpmtations, as well as other fur~clamentalvalues and claims (for example, individualism or collecti\rism; see Section 3.4). Furthermore, the justifications offered by the political theory will place some politicai ideas at the core of its concerns, while putt* others in a secondary position, and pushing yet others to a nnarginal place or even entirely rejecting them. To say that a political theov justifies a particular conception involves four important claims. (1)A justification does not seek simply to convince or persuade: it provides reasons* A justjfication, then, cims not appea1 to mere emotions or prejudices. Because political theories seek to justify rather than merely persuade, they are bound by reason to respect consistency and logicality No matter holv persuasive, an appeal to cankadictory considerations camot count as a justification. R may be useful here to distinguish jzl-st$cntio~z from legifimatiotz,A political view is justified if it is supported by good reasons, is free from inkrnal inconsistency, is consistent with known facts, and so on. Justification is a matter of sound belief. Rational adherel-rts of a political t-heory mtxst suppose that the view is justified; if it is not supported by good reasons, then adherence to it is not rational. Although related, the idea of legitimation is distir-rct. A political ideology m y legitimize a conception of, say, justice, for its adherenls insofar as the icieology actvances considerations that lead its aetberents to approve or accept that coxzception. The consideratiox-rsadvanced by the kgitimizing ideology may be good reasons, but they also may be emotional appeals, ungmunded cultural prejudices, and inconistent docthnes: what mtters is that the package of consideratiox-rsadvitr1cec.l by the ideology actually induces people to accept or approve of its conception of justice, If the package of considerations actually produces widespread support for the conception or povides consideratiox-rs that lead people to conclude that it is the best concept-i;on,the ideology has legitkized the concept-i;on.People view it as legitimate, Viewed from the inside, then, the ideology seeks to legitimize certail7 concegtiom, social armgements, m d policies for its adherents: it seeks to induce them to afcegt or approve of the conceptions m$ arrangements. But insofar as the packzlge of considerations involves unreasox-red entotional appeals or relies on incox-rsistenl:claims or Mse or weakly gromded theories, the pachge fails to justify the arrangement.

Thus, if liberaljsm is an incmsistent or confused political doctrine it can still legitimize (and so m y be a perfectly good ideology) but it camat iT'rterestingly, justify (and so is inadepate as a politjcd theory). z5 MW, insofar as you and I are rational agents, we must suppose that the political doctrine that guides us is not merely a legitixl-tizing ideology but a justifieatosy poli'E;cal theory. A raliomal dherent of ljberalism (or socialism or conservatism) must see it as more than a way to legitimize certah socid arrm-rgements-as a way to induce people to approve of tltose social arrangements. The rational adherent must suppose that liberalism is a justified, political theov; &at is, it provides good reasons to adopt the liberaf view of politics. (2) To say that: political theories justify an interpretation of a political concept is different from saying that a themy "chooses," '""adopts,"" or "prefers" a specific conception. This is an important point, Conceptual analysis is not about "'choosing""how to "clear up" our incmsistcnt or confirsed concepts, nor is it a decision to ""stamdby"' one hterpretntion rather than another. bstjfying a specific conception is, in the end, not at all Ijke becoming lrhc fan of a sports team. A po:iitical theory identifies some considerations as important, and havhg done that, it is led to seeing s o m aspects of, for example, justice or liberty as more important than others. As a cox-rtcmporarypolitical phiiosopher observes, our arguments-our justifications-"are our connection with the considerations that ultimately matter to us," and it is those considerations that lead us to favor ox-reway of seeing justice or Ilherty rather than another.26 W cannot anskver Socrates's question-"What is justice?"-t~ntil we b o w the thhgs that really matter to us, and the way h which we understand society 'Thus, onty withir-r a political theory can we justifgr one conceptim of, say' justice, rather thm mother. (3) This explains t%ie intractable nature of politjcal disputes to which Gallif. has called our attention. If we c m only justify a conception Lvithin the framework of a pdiljcai theory, we will find Lhat our jwstifjeationshowever convinckg they are to us-will not move those who are ern@a@g a competir-rg political theory From lrhcir poil7t of view, our conception will not seem justified, for the considerations that matter to us will not necessarily be compelling in their competing politicd Iheory. Hmce we may well find Irhal:even our very best argumex-rtsdo m t move those with kvhom we disagree. h d becatrse our conceptions follow from the other things we see as iMpoctmt, we are not apt to m r n ~ " " i xor back down in these political disputes, for that would be to give up muCh of what we hold importmt. (4) In contrast to Freeden and Gallie" view (Section 2,2), however, it does not fo:llow f m this that none of the parties is correct and there it;no correct answer to conceptual disputes. It is certahly true that given the

:limits of time, and our ability to think things through, we cannot resolve betweer.1 the major politicai theories. We cannot k ~ o win the differe~~ces advmce, however, whether this is becatrse none of the theories is better than all the others or because we have not yet ciiirried on the argument far enough and thoroughly cnough to discrover which trheory is the best. In the end, both Freeden and Gallie claim that they h o w what the result would be if we carried out a rational dialogue to its completion-they know that in the end no theory can be show"lo be the best. But how can we know that? Ali W c m say right nnw is that given the impmfect m d :limited reasoners we are, we disagree about wtRtich conception of libertyt justice, or equality is best. The ve"ion, then, is, which should we assume: (a) that no theory can ever lay claim to being the best, or fb) that some theory could perhaps make out such a claim if we thought long enough and hard cmough? As he sees it, the Gallie seems to t h i d that (a) is fhe superior assumptio~~. assumption that there is no shgle correct answer induces a tolerance of the views of others: Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies recopition of the rival uses of it (such as oneslf repudiates) as not only logically possible and humanly ""likely," but as of permanent critical value tco one's sown use ur interpretation of the concept in question; whereas to regard any rival use as anathema, per.verse, bestial or lunatic means, in many cases, tct submit oneself tc3 the chronic human perit of underestimating, or completely ignoring, the value of one's opponentsr p c ~ s i t j ~ > n s ~ ~ ~

Recognition that there is no miquely correct answer, Gallie believes, will tend to undermi,ne an intolerant fmatical belief:that one's p&li,.cal opponents have nothing wort%lwhil.eto say, while emouraging m appreciation that one's opponer~tsalso see an aspect of trhe concept, and so have a valuable critical contribution to make to the debate. Becatrse your favored conception of an essent-ially contested concept cannot be shown to be the uniyuely correct one, Gailie believes that r e c o p i t i o ~of~the essentially contested nature of political concepts leads you to be more tolerant and appreciate of other conceptions. If, however, we h c , w in advance t-hat m pasition can be show11 to be superior to the others, what is the point of argument? We might hope to win converts, but to do that emtive appeals arcr likely to be more effective Lhan arguments about ""What is liberty?" or " m a t is justice?" If we h o w there could never be a correct answer, why kvaste the time arguing and debating? Rather than promoting a tolcsrallt debate, accepting that them can be no correct or best al1swer makes ratioml defense of one's p u sition m d critiqtre of the other" position polintless. Why argue when no

one can he right? Perhaps some point remains: even if there is no correct answer, there d g h t be some that are fiomughly wrongheadedperhaps debate is simply about showing that your position is not one of the wrong ones.28 But there is still no point arguhg with the good alterm t h e s to your view-and it would seem that it is precisely those that we most wmt to confront and question. Of course, fanaticism and intolermce arr; to be avoided. The spirit of tolera~tdebate, however, is not fostered by a co~~viction that there is no right anskver to be had (for that mdermhes the spirit of debate) but by a recopition of our ownfallibiliy-recognition that we all easily fall into error and we c m never he certain that we possess the truth and others am in the grip of error. Recognition of our failibility leads us to a p p ~ c i a t r the potential vdue in the c d j c t i n g opinioms of others and to constsuctively engage them mther than repress or ignore them. h d given the compllzxity of tbe issues, involving as they do entirt. systems of concepts, it would be a foolish person d e e d who djd not appreciate her own fdlibility. fn contrast, Gallie" position suggests a sk~pticisn?that there is any correct answer to be had. Alll-rough the fallibilist hekves that there is a best mswer but is always abvare that her own position may be wrong, the skeptk questions whether there is a best amwer. It is clear why Lhe fallibilist sees poter~tialvalue in the cornpcting positions of othcrs: perhaps t h y have the best mswer, and it is the best mswer the fallibilist seeks. Thus, the fallibilist will not wish to silence oppo"ii7g v j,ws. As Jobn Stuart Mill arped, we shoutd not seek to repress a view that competes with our own because it may possibly be true, Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means ctf judging. To refuse a hearing tc:, an opinicm, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as abscllute certainy. All silencing of discussion is an assumption ctf infallibility.29

:It is far less clear why skepticism would lead to toleration of compeling views. True, a skeptic cannot clajrn that competing views are false or m n g , but neither c m lrhe skeptic hope to learn the truth from his opponent (becatrse, says the skeptie, ""there are no correct ways of defining concepts"). If part of the skeptic's ideology is that those who disagree with him art-. a menace (not because they are wror.11;~just because they disagree) m d so should be silenced, his skeptical view of political concepts provides him with no reason to xfrain from silenrhg others. Why should he not star~dup for his intolemnt ideology? It is, after all, no less correct than other, mare tolerant, l4ews.

2.4 Summary This chapter has considered several explanations of the nature of conceptual disputes and the reasons why they run so deep and are so difficult to resolve. In Section 2.1, I examined Gallie's essential contestability thesis, according to which parties to a conceptual debate favor conceptions that place importance on different aspects of a complex concept. In some sense, Gallie seems to be arguing, the different conceptions each stress a different, but valuable and important, aspect of the concept, and there is no way to adjudicate which is the superior. In Section 2.2, I inquired into why the participants in these conceptual debates are so wedded to their positions. I argued that a person's favored conception of, say, liberty is not freestanding, but linked to her favored conceptions of equality, justice, and so on. Consequently, debates about one political concept lead to our interpretationsof others; to give way to our opponent on one concept may lead to undermining our entire political outlook. If, then, one wants to understand a particular political conception, one must place it in a political theory-a system of such conceptions. The chapter concluded with a contrast between two ways of understanding political theories: as ideologies and as justificatory. If we follow Freeden, we shall understand these systems of conceptions as held together not only by reasons, values, and claims about society, but by emotional and cultural appeals that may lead to inconsistent yet engaging political views. In contrast, for political theories to be understood as genuinely justificatory, they must make sense by providing a reasoned and coherent view of the world. We saw that although a student looking at a political view from the "outside" can see it as an ideology, those who accept it and use it to make sense of the world and organize their political action must see it as justificatory. Justificatory political theories, I argued, make claims that they are in some way correct. As we saw in Section 2.1, liberals and socialists disagree about the nature of justice: each not only favors her own view, she thinks it the best view. Both Gallie and Freeden suggest that this is a mistakethere really is no true or correct conception. "The language of ideologies," says Freeden, "is couched in terms of truth-assertions, but ideologies .. .do not attain truth-value status."30 I concluded the chapter by considering whether tolerant debate is best supported by the assumption that (1)none of our views can possibly be the correct or best view, or (2) although there may well be a best answer to our disputes, because they are so complex, and we are so apt to error, we should not suppose we are certainly right and our opponents wrong beyond a doubt. The second assumption, I argued, gives us reasons both to pursue debate and to conduct it in a tolerant way.

1. See Fefix Opgenheirn, Polllicnl Cuncepks: A Reconstrz4clion (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19811, chap. 9. 2. By the French political philosopher, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Suvereiglzt!j: An 112quz'ry infu the I>ulificalGood, j. E Huntingtun, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 14561, p, 317. (Totowa, 3, Kai NieZsen, EqflaliCy mid Liberty: A Defe~zse";1( hdicnl EglaEitfirit~~zism N J :Rowman and AllenheEd, 1985), p. ?Q. 4. F", A. f-iayek, Law,Legislation utzd Liberty, vol. 2, M i r ~ g eof Suci~ljzlstice (Lc~ndon:Routledge, 2982), p. 62. 5. Nielsen, Eqltatity n ~ t~i bde r f for ~ example, p. 197, 6. W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in his Ptzilosuplzy alzd the Historical Ulzderstattdirzg, 2nd ed. (New Ucxk: Shocken Books, 14681, pp. 157-191. For discussions of this idea, see Christine Swanton, Freedorn: A Collewnce Tlzeuqj (Indianapofis, IN: Hackett, 19921, chap. 1; John Gray, ""On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts," htftical Tlzeory" vol. 5 (August 1977), pp. 3313-48, 7". Callie, ""Essentially Contested Concepts," p. 1181, 8. ibid. 9, Ibid., p. 182. 10. %id. 11, For a very helpful analysis, see Swanton, Fwedonz: A Coherence Theory, chap. l . 12, Steven tukes, P o w e ~A Radical View (New York: Macmillan, 1"34), p, 187, 13, On the idea ctf a "cluster concept,'" see Wifliarn E, Conncttly; The Terms of Political Disconrse, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princetcm University Press, 19831, chap. 1, 14, Michael Freeden, XdeoEogz'es a d Political Tjlcory: A Conceptzinl Apymach (Oxfcjrd: Cfarendon Press, 2996), p. 2. 15, See ibid., chap. 4, 16. Ibid., pp. 253-154. 17. Ibid., p. 75, 18. Ibid., p. 30. 19. Ibid., p, 22. 20, Xbid., p. 53. 21. Ibid. 22. Gallie, '%ssentially Contested Concepts," p. 188. 23. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, quoted in Stanley 1. Benn and Gerald E Gaus, ""Te Liberal Conception ctf it-re Public and Pri\rateP5islrBenn and Gaus, edw, Public afaB Priz~~le irz Social k f e (New York: St. Martin's Press, 113831, p. 32. 24. Jeremy Bentham, The TJ'lzwy of legisfatioiclrz, 2nd ed. (London: Triitsner, 1871), p. 144. 25. I argue in my ""Lberalism at the End of the Centuryf" "urncal ofPolificnl Ideologies. vol. 5 f2000), pp. 45-65, that the incoherence of liberal ideology may well account ftx its wide appeal. 26. Jererny Waldron, Tfze Right: to Prz't?ateProperfy (Oxford: CIarendctn Press, 1988), p. 433.

27, Gaflie, "Tssentiaify Contested Concepts," pp. 187-188. 28, See here Swanton, Freedonz: A Collerence Tftmry, chap. 1. 29, John St-uart Mill, Qtz Liber+, in John Gray ed., Ozz Liberty nzzd Other Essap (New York: Oxfc~rdUniversity Press, 1981), chap. 2, para. 3, 30, Freeden, Xdenlogies a d Political Tl~eory,p. 94.

THEOR COIVCEPTUAL STRUCTURES AND ENDURING TYPES TlCAL

3,! Liberalism, Socialism, and Conssrva~isrn Enduring Types

In the last chapter, I argued that political theories hvolve systems of interpretations of political concepts, .A political theory will, for example, advance a catain col~ceptionof liberty, which helps justify a view of equality, whi& in turn supports (and is supporkd by) a conception of justice and aut-Xlonty-And as Freeden rightly contends (Section 2.3, the political theory will order these concepts-same will be given pride of place, whereas others will be accorded supporting mles or a periphaal status in the overall,scheme. The construction of such a system of concepts will often involve cmativity, producing novel combinations of interpretations. Political theorizjng is an ongoing enterprise, m d one ilspect of that entet-prise is drawing new conceyhail maps, which logically relate political concepts in hitherto unthought-of ways. There is no formuia for the creation of a political theory m a t said, the history of political theory reveals endurhg types: systems of interpretations that traditions of thinkers have embraced and, withi11 limits, have sought to improve and modify. These enduring types unite concept-i;onsof liberty, power, eqt~ality,justice, m d political authority, appealing to values and visions of society that produce a cofnmnt and compelling view of these fundamer~talpolitical concepts. n e s e endtrr.ing political theories are by no means the only rczasonable ways to arrange political conceptions, but their appeal over h u d r e d s of years to sizable groups of thjnkers and citizens m k e s t-hern of special importmce in. our debates about political concepts.

When describing political theories as systems of political conceptions, must always remember Wittgenstein's insight that language is not merely about words, but about actions and practices (Section 1.3).To understand liberty, power, equality justice, rights, and authoriy in certain w y s is not just to think ar~dtalk in certak ways, but to dr, certail7 things: to work for certain sorts of just arrangemms, opposing solne sorts of govemental actions while supporting others, and so on. Like language itself, potiticai theories arc. complexes of words and actiom. The focus of this book i-vill be on liberalism, socialism, and conservatism-three enduring political theories and arguably the tlhree most important of the past two hundrt"d years. We shaii see that these are by no mearls mor~alithicviews: within each there are varieties, which arrmge political concepts in different i-vays.Also, as we pmceed we will have occasion to corrtrast these three enduring theories to other political theones. W

"By defhition," i t has been said, "'a liberal is a man who believes in liberty."UAll fiberai theories, regardless of Iheir disagrecmer~f;?;, place h & viduitl liberty (or freedom) at the heart of politics 2; indeed, so irrnportant is Ijberty to Eberals that, to a large degree, debaks h u t the nature of liberty are debates within the liberal tradition. We shall see that fibera1 devotion to freedom leads to a view of justice that gives pride of place to expansive liberty rights while m a h g equality a more limited, secondary; notion. Justice focuses on eyual liberty rights. Because liberals typirally as a limitatior~of freedom, they are ususee the auLhority of goverr~mer~t ally suspicious of it. The liberal tradition and its debates about the nature of liberty approxconimates one aspect of Gallie's description of an essentiaIIy co~~tested cept. It will be recalled from %ction 2.1 that, accordiing to Gallie's conditjon Vf, the conflirting parljes agree on an "exemplaru-a sort of perfect case-that perkctly ernbodics the concept. In his championship example, it was perhaps same past team that everyone agrees is the best team ever-the one that perfectly exemplifies all aspects of the sport. Now, in the liberal tradition fohn Stuart Mill's On fibrrty (1859) approximates the stiltus of an exem,plar. Allt-tough a few li,berals are highly crioical of On tibcrtyPto an amazing extent it is seen as the pintessential liberal text. In what is perhaps the. most famous paragrayh in the li:beral tradition, Mill explains the aim ol On Liber&: The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, a s entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of sociew with the individual in the way of

compulsion and control, whether it-re means used be physical farce in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion ctf public rtpinion. That principle is, that the sale end for which mankind are warranted, individually or a>llectivelyin interfering with the liberty of action of any of their numberr is xjt-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized cc3mmmity against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either phpicaf or mural, is not a suffjcient warrant, He carnot rightfully be compelled to dct or forbear because it will be better for him tc:, do so, because it will make him happier, becaus, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with hirn, or reasoning with him, or persuading hirn, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting hirn with any evil, in case he do otfiewise. Tr3 justify that, the a>nductProm which it is desired to defer him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else, The only part of the condud of any one, for which kre is amenable tt3 society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.?

As Mill says in another work, the plmper rok of c o e r c i o ~ ~ employing ~of threats to get people to do what you want them to cJo (see Sectior~4.1)---"is to enforce upon everyone the conduct necessary to give all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists in not doing them harm, a ~ mt d impedjng them in ar7ytl-thgwhich withoul harmin$ others does good to themselcres-" And Mill adds, ""Demanding no mare than this, society, in m y tolerable circumstances, obtahs much more: for the naturd activity of hurnan naturt-., shut out from ail ~~ortious directions, will exparrd itself in useful ones."" lhese pass%@.;express fu~rdamentalliberal thcmes. First, Mill defends ' s fife---tl~efreedom to lead ox?re"sown life one's sovmignty m r o ~ ~ eown in a way that one sees fit" Yet, though liberals insist on the prhacy af freedom, they recognize the necessity of limits m freedom. My freedom may be lhited if f use it in a way that harms others. Mill is explicit that ot be limited to protect me from my own choices: what 1 do with my life is up to me exccpt insofar as it harms others. Because M11 piaces so much vdue 01%the individual" ssovereignv over her own life, hie places severe limits an the atrthority of others, hcluding government, over the individuals, h d although Mill was a proponent of democratic g o v e m n t , he was dways worrid that democratic mjorities may tyrannize over the individual, wrongfulily limiting her liberty- (Compare Freeden" descriptio of the Milliian conceptual m p inSection 2.2.) %ward the cnd of the ninekmth century, liberal theory split into iwo camps. M a t m o&en cdled "'cassicalrYiberals ftzllowed Mili in insist-

ing cm the central role of freedom, and the necessiw in the interests of frtiedom, to drasticdly limit coercio~~ or force, including the force of govemnnenl. For classical libernls, both freedom and justice are closely bound to the protection of the market order and private property rights. Hmce ctassical liberais have been advocates of limited govemme~~t and free markets. Elelng wary of all government; they are cautious advacates of kmocracy, Insofar as democracy pmtecb liberty, they suppart it, but, ag"in foilowing Mll, they oppose democracjes that overly restrict Lhe freedom of some of their citizens. 1". A. Hayek, one of the preernhent classical liberals of the twentieth century, writes of democracy that it "is an ideal worth fil;hting for to lfie utmost, because it is our only protection . . . against tyranny. mough democracy itself is not freedom . . . it is one of the m s t ixnportant safeguards of frcedom."Vn all this, Mayek sees himself developing Mill's liberalism, A%thoughcritical of sume of Mill's speciiic views, F-layek concludes one of his mast irnportmt works with the s m e quote with whi& M111 htroduced Qn Libert,~:"The grmd, the :leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these p"ges directly cowerges, is the absolutely a d essentid importance of humm development in its richest diversity*"B Co~~trasting to the classical liberals are '%revisionistuor ""new liberalsfff who sc,u$ht to move liberalism closer to sc,cidism. L. ':l: Hohhouse f 186419291, a leading new liberal, \vent so far as to advocate a ""Zberal SocialMill's doctrine: "The ism."7 Hobhouse also SW himsdf as developi~~g teaching of Mill brings us close to the heart of Liberdim."" Hobhouse and his kllow revisionist liberals reinterpret liberty; distancing it from private property and moving it closer to a full embrace of the democratic welfnre state. "fhough incfividual liberty remains at the coref their fmored conception of liberty harmonizes with an extensive democratic bvelfare state pursuing social justice and regulating market relations. Because liberals have developed Mi:tl%exemplar in such profoundly different bvays, 1 will disthguish throughout betkveen classical and revisionist liberalism. WC shall see that classical and revisionist liberals defend markedly differe~~t conceptio~~s of liber% ewaiit;\l, and justice, yet their common stress on liberty m d their Millian heritage firmly identiq lhem both as parts of the liberal tradition. Socialism

As Freeden notes, "AB socialisms as5el.t ihe equality of human beings,'"" placing strong ideals of eyualiv at the core of their political outlooks, which in turn provides the basis for strongly egalitarian conceptions of social justice and cJemocracy. It has often been said that one of the great debdes in political. theory is between propomnls of m e r e and of equal-

ity. Now since liberals place liherty in a s u p ~ m positim, e relegating equaiity to secondary status, it m y seem that as standard bearer.; of equality, socialists kvould simply reverse this priority upholding equality over liberty. Altln.ough this m y well have been a characteristic of early socialist tl-leories, it is not a feature of recent socidism. fndeed, according to one contemporary scxiillist, '*Liberty deserves almost fanatic support horn democratic socialists,0l"' Fundamental to most recent socialisms is the ciaim that given lfie proper interpretatio~~s, liberty and ewaiity are mtxtuaUy supportkg. Z,&erty, says an importmt contemporary socialist philosopher, 'kequires equalil-yI""l in particular, an quality of power, In a simi:iar vein, another contemporary socialist insists that "'freedom and equality, far h m be* oppoed ideais, actualty coincide."12 In arguing far a cojncidence of iiherty m d equalxty, socjaists pave the way far claims that strongly egalitarian democratic governments en:hance frcedom. fn contrast, they insist, priv"te property-hased markets-perhaps all, markets-are the enemy of freedom, produckg irtegalitarian concen&ations of properly and power. Again, although some simpIification is helpfui in understanding complex poljtical theories, we must be careful not b be too siMII)tistic, Socialists, Eke liberals, disagree on impartant issues. One such disagreementl which we will consider in Sectior.3 10.4, occurred between democratic socialists and the followers of Vladimir I3ich Lenin (1870-1924) as to whether a nondemocratic state, controlled by a socialist elite, could be a justified means to socialist egalitarian values;. Could the values; of social and economic equaliv justify m authoritarim state that was devoted to those socialist aims? And what feature of the socialist conceptual map coutd lead an othwwise egaiitarian politicai t.lteory to endorse a higw inegalitarian view of po1iticd authority? Conservatism

Orze mcent political theorist has charwterized conservatism as "a philosophy of imperfectim, committed to the idea of h i t s , and directed towards the defense of a lirmited style of politics.'"3 At the core of conservatism is a conception of politics as a limited and difficult activity that is vpicaily misun&rstood. Co~~servatism arose as a reactior.2 to the g d poiitical projeek of first liberals and then socialists to bring about revolutionary changes in support of their key political values: liberty and equality. The Fre~~ch Revdutior~of 1789 was the spur for tl-le greatest of all conservat.ive wnrks, Edmund Burke's (1729--1797) RepTections on the Rm~ll~ifirrn ilz Fra~~ce (1790). Because of the complexity of society and the limits of our reasor.2, lrhc conservative stresses that politics cannot k i n g about great, beneficial, revolutionary changes. Attempts at such revoltx-

tioalary chmge almost a h a y s bring about disasters-witrzess, says the cox~servativc.,the great fiberaf and socialist rwolutims, France in 37139 and Russia in 1937. As Bwke saw it., "A man full of warm speculative benevolence may wish his society otherwise constituted than he finds it; but a good patriot, and a true politician, always considers how he shall make the most of the existing milferial of his counky. A cfisposj,tion to preserve, and an ahiljty to improve, would be my standard of a As we shall see, the conservative typically stresses that polities is a practical and complex activiw. Indeed, says the coalserviltiv+alld Plato has been the inspiraticm of many conservatives on this point-it is lfie art of govemillg people a r ~ dr u ~ u ~ i na gstate. The main justification for some rather than others possessing this authmily is that some, and not others, have practicral howledge of the art of politics, filing, like medicine or cavenh-y, is an art. It requires a prc)F)erknowledge of the techniques of the art, its tools and its ajms. And like any art, it should be performed by lhose who are best equkped to parljcipate. If one wodd not trust one's body to a doctor who has 210 practical knovviedge of medicirne, but o d y has read a book, why would one trust one's ssociety to a group that has no practical knowledge of politics? Because the conservative insists that most do not understand the lintited possibifities of the art of politics, conservatives offer a view of political authority that stresses the irnportmce of expertise, and so is criticd of egalitarian (dcmocralic) values, The attitude toward liberty is more complex---it is not so much a rejection of the idea as an attempt to control and limit its revolutionary potential, stressing not a gepleral, expansive notion of liberty, but a defhed enumeration of important traditional potitical liberties. And it is clear that the corlservative rejects the socialist's attempt to reconcile liberty and equality: "There is no prhciple more basic in the conservative philosophy than that of the inherent al?d absolute incompatibiuy between liherty and equalityff Again, within the co~~servative tradition &ere is variety and suhtley* S o m cmservatives stress the limits of politics, whereas others grant great political authority to political experts, and yet others give governm n t the role of cmfnrcing traditional virtue and morality. One of our system of ideas aims will be to discover what parts of the co~~servative justify these different understamdings of justice and aul17orily. Three Enduring Political lssues

ALt-hough political theorics are systems of mutually supporting inttzrpretations of politic& c o ~ ~ c q tour s , enduring political theories have oeber elements as well. As we have just seen in. our sketch of conservative political

*inking, one of its roots is a skepticism about the powers of human reason to unGjerstar~dand control sockty. Liberalism, for exampk, can be understood as havhg positions on the nature of howledge, humm society m d psychology, reasm, m d ideals of lj.fe.1" lIlhcral%position on these nnattws helps justify her il7terpretatiom of politic& concepts and the policy proposals that follow from them. An entire political theory; then, is a highly complex structure, involving claims about moralivf the nature of society a r ~ dpersons, reason, libery, eyuality, justice, a r ~ dso on. TO fully gm"" the justificatiort for a liberaf, conservative, or socialist analysis of a political comepc we wodd have to take account of the relevmce of the politic& Ifieorist" ppositions on d l these other matters. That, thougl~,wodd be a daw~tirrgundertaking, and one outside the scope of the book. Although we c at consider all these other elements, we c m identify three crucial issues on which liberals, swialists, and conservatives have long disagwed and that art.crucial to understanding their dis(2) a g ~ e m e n t sh u t pol.iticd concepts: (l)rationalism~a~~tirationalism~ theorjes of human nature, and (3) individualism/collecti~ism~ Again, these three issues are by no means the only relevmt ol3c.s; but they are fundamentill, m d they explain a gseat deal of the differences in. the socialist, liberal, and conservative outlooks. Throuighout this book, we shall see that differences 017 these three basic issues often resuit in very different hte~retationsof our main political concepts.

Rationalism

An endurbg issue in.political theory is the role of reason in humm affairs. A rationalist is one who stresses the power of human reason to understand society to enlighten us about what is good and right, and wide society almg the best path. The rationiJlist is g n c r d y suspicious of custom m d &adition, for people follow them without knowing why they do so or d are the best options whether the actions dictated by custom a ~ tradition open ta US. M e n confronted with a customay practice, the rationalist malyzes and questions it: does E a s m point toward a better way of doing: things? A rationalist is thus apt to look to scie~~cc? rather &an tradition for guidmce, for science is the syst-ematiceffort to apply reason to ~mderstmd naturt-.and stciety: For shilar reasons, rationalists are apt to be suspicious of rdi@or~ insofar -as it asks us to accept beliefs on faith rather than rctaso1.1.

Fundamental to most conservative political theory is a criticism of rationalism in politics. Michael Oakeshott (1901-19YO), the foremost recent

conservative polifical philosopher; tells us that a rationalist in politics is characterized by the foflowing traits:lT A rationalist believes that thought should be free from any obligation to itny authority and should follow the dictates of reasor1 alone. A rationalist is the encmy of tradition, authority, custom, and prejudice. A rationalist feels herself free to question any ophian, belief, or habit. A ralionalist trusts the power of reason tru deternine truth ancf value. A rationalist believes that the pokver of reason is common to all humms, A ratior~alistfinds it hard to believe that others who think about a problem in a clear and honest bvay will arrive at an answer that differs horn her own, A ratior~alistdoes not pay cnough attentiar~to experience; he idways wmt S to rely on his own, reason m d begin, afresh the solution to every prdlem. When a rationalist does learn from experience, he wants to transform its lesson into a rational formula that can be conveyed to all. A rationalist does not-grasp ihe mysteries of Iife. (9) (10) A rationalist uses theones to understand events; hence she only recopizes the large outline of experience.

As Gdakeshatt sees it, this sort of thinking has characterized much of modern life, and especially political theory since the Middle Ages. Liberalism and socidism, with their strong declaratior~sof politicai values aramd which politics should be orgmized, are, in. Oalkeshotl" eyes, mmifestations of the rationalism that has characterized modern European politics.M These rationalislic theories ignore experience m d seek to r e p late the life of complex societies by abstract concepts invented by political thhkers, Oakeshott does not claim that such theodes are useless, Butr he insists, they capture only a part of the truth. The ratior~alist,Ifiough, does not see this; she mistakes part of the tmth for the whole truth. Oakeshott builds his case around two types of knowledge: what he calls "technical k%ovvledgeff a r ~ d"'practicd hIovvledge.""The firstkchnieal knowle$ge-invotves knowledge of techrrjquc: In every art and science, and in every practical activity, a technique is involved. In many activities this technical knc>wlledgeis formulated into rules which are, or may be, deliberately learned, remrsmbered, and, a s we say put

into practice; but whether or not it is, or has been, precisely formulated, its chief characteristic is that it is susceptible of precise formulatirtn, althaugh special skill and insight may be required to give it that formulaticm, The technique (or part of it) of driving a motor car on English roads is to be found in the Highway Code, the technique ctf cookery is contained in the cookery book, and the technique of diwavery in natural science-or in l-ristcxy is in their rules of research, ctbservation and verification,l9

Cbakeshatt contrasts this sort of knowledge to practical bowledge, which cannot be formulated into rules, :It is knowledge one gains through actual experience, as a cook h a w s m a y things that are not witten in cookbooks, but can only be learned by being a cock. As Cbakeshott puts it, techica) kno'~vledgewilt. te13 a person what to do, but practical knowledge will tell him how to do it.2" Techical. bawledge c m be written down. It can be codified ar put in, the forln of rules. Practical knowledge, C)&eshott believes, c m o t be. TThis does not mem that practkal knowledge camot be taught; a master craftsman teaches his appre~~tice his skills. Rut all that he teaches cannot be reduced to rules and put down in same book- The typical expression of such practicd bowledge, Oakeshott writes, is in a customary ctr traditional way of doing things, or, simply, in practice. And this gives it the appearance ctf imprecision and consequently of uncertainty, c~ofbeing a matter c~fopinion, of prt~babilityrather than truth. It is, indeed, a knowledge that is expressed in taste or connoisseurship, lacking rigidity and ready for the impress of the mind of the learner.21

Now, says Oakeshott, ""Rationalism is the assertion that what 1 have called prackical knowledge is not knowledge at all, the assertion that, poperly speaking, there is no h o d e d g e that is not techl7ical knowledge-"" That isI Oakeshott thinks that ratimalim equates knowledge with what can be systematized, cast in the form of a gerreral tl-reor~and witten down in books. "The sovereipty of keaso11,9for the Rationaljst, mems the sovereignty of techiqueeff23 :It would appear that both liberal a d socidist lfiinkinfjr are rationaljst insofar as they are attempts to rethink the nature of poijticd life f m the begbb~g and aim to codify all this h t o neat, logical.systems of &ought. :In place of the practical knowledge that one needs to engage in politicshoLvledge that c m 011ly he gained through experience-the liberal and the socialist give US the equivalent of political. ""coakbooksm-""f-tw to" Thus, books that simplify palitics by reducing it to technical k~~owledge. to Oakeshott, tt7e great works oi the liberal and socialist traditions---for exmple, Mitl's CZtz Lihevfy and the writings oC Kart. Marx (1818-1883) and

Friedrich Engels (382E)--1895)-manifcst the rationalist urge to equate all political knoMJledge with technical lu~owledgethat car1 be writtell down liberalism and socialism, he suggests, arose as far all to read." "Koth guides for a politically inexperienced class that was comk~gto power. These 1lew classes-first flte middle class ard later the workcjrs-gained power, but were without the necessary practical political bowledge. So they sought political "cribs": they needed a book to tell them what to do. As he sees them, liberal and socialist political theories might be aptly subtitled "political rule made easy" or "'a layunm" guide to politics." If all political knowledge is reduced to technical knowliedge, it can be taug:ht to t-he hexperienced. B u r k e u t t a c k on Rationalism

Burke" attack on the French Revolution shares mtxch with Oakeshott's criticism of rationnlism. Throughout t-he Reflections, Burke calls attation to the way in which the French Revolutim was be@ guided by ""metaphysicsf%d "phil~sophy,'"~~ """They[the Frencf-t Assel-nblyj commit the whole to the m c ~ of y untried speculations; they abandon the dearest in&rests of the public to those loose theories, to which none of them would chuse [sic] to tmst the slightest of his private co~~cer~~s.'"%atso appalls Burke-and every other conservative who has followed hh-is the way in which. the rrvolutionaries in Frilnce sought to create a whole new social and politiml order based on Lhe ahstract theory of the rights of mm. In place of the political &aditions of France-traditions that had grown and developed over many generations-the :Leadersof the French Revolution sought to remold h n c h society and politics on the basis of a philosophic theory of natural rights (see Sections 8.1,8.2). As Burke sees it, this view of politics places far too much faiZlh in the powers of hurnm reaso1.l to undc.rsta"~d society. Writing to a supporter of the Fre~~ch Revolution, Burke kvrites, in defense of the English, You see, Sic that in this enlightened age T am bold enough to confess, that we [in England] are generally men uf untaught feelings; that instead of casting away ail our old prejudices, we cherish thern to a very considerable degree, and, ta take mtlre shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prcrjudices; and the longer they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid tct put men tct five and trade each upon his own private stock of reason; becaus we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of natiom, and ctf ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of explrsding general prejudices, employ their sagacity tc:, discover the latent wisdom which prevails in thern.27

Thus, whereas the ratimaljst grounds her theory in the power of reason in each individual, the. conserwative places his faith in fie accumulated practical howledge embedded in custom m d tradition. T%us, to Elurke, the rationalist "scirnce" that would attempt to datroy all traditim and start afresh is no morc? than a "presumph;rous ig11orance.~'28 Socialism and Rationalism

The conservative characterization of rationalism seeks to show it in a negative light-in Gurke" words, as a '"presumptuous ignorance." We should mf expect that a n y liberal or socialist wouid concur with that characterization of their doctrfne. Neverthekss, it seems ge~~erally correct that lfieralism sometimes, and socialism trsually; tends toward something akin to Oakesholt" notion of rationalism. Especially since the writings of Marx and E~~gels, socialism has tended to stress the powes of h m m reason, the ilccomplishmentsof sciences ir.r understanding burnms and societ~and the ability of rational people to control their societies. Fclr Xl'riedrich Engels, Marx's collaborator, the great triwmpfi of Marxism cvas to t-ransfotm socidi,sm into a science.29 According to a contemporary socialist, rathalism is one of the basic tendcmies of socialism: The human race, rationalism maintains, has now grown up and at last has freed itself from the age-old yokes of iporance and superstition. We have in our possession ""science," the rational, ordered kmcjwledge of the laws of nature: we can progressively dctmesticate, mould nature as to make it serve our own ends, and we can apply this knowledge tc:,human society, Since it is primarily material wealth (objects gained through the process of subjugating nature) that conduces to our happiness, we shctufd ctrganize our lives, our relatic2nships as to secure the maximum technical, economic and administrative efficiency in a13 our social activities. The rationalistic critique of capitalism, it-rerefc~re,decries most of the CJZOC)S and zufistt" involved in capitalist production, and its cmtinued enthronement of ignorance and superstition, . . . Socialism, the rational organisation of society, it holds to be the selfevident crowning of the values and aspiraticlns of the Enlightenment: it needs only common sense and the right kind of education tt3 make people accept it and work towards its realization.%

Liberalism's Complex Rejotion to Rationalism

Liberal Xafz'a~zalisjt~z.Like socialism, liberalism has its roots in the h~tellectual period known ils the Enlightenment. This era-the heart of whjch

was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France, England, Scotland, and America-insisted on the power of individual reason. Reason, insisted the philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Voltaire (1694 1778) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784), was the key to progress and scientific discovery, whereas custom codified superstition and error.31 From this followed the supreme importance of individual freedom, especially freedom of thought. John Stuart Mill was to make this a key theme of On Liberty. Mill repeatedly criticized "the despotism of custom. . . the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or irnprovement."32 As Mill saw it, improvement in human affairs depended on the free exercise of human reason, which is always questioning tradition and custom; to insist that we follow custom is to stifle liberty, reason, and progress. Liberalism thus asserts the primacy of reason in conducting human affairs. As the great classical liberal Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) argued, "All that man is and all that raises him above animals he owes to his reason. Why should he forgo the use of his reason .. . in the sphere of social policy and trust to vague and obscure feelings and impulses?"33

Liberal Antirationalism: Value Pluralism. As one contemporary liberal has pointed out, not only are liberals identified with rationalism, but its critics often associate them with "hyperrationalism": Rationalists are said to believe that human reason is powerful enough to construct a workable blueprint for the best possible social order and that people can be led by rational argument to accept this blueprint. The critics of such hyperrationalism argue that reason is too feeble for such a task, given the complexity of social life.34

Liberals seldom embrace hyperrationalism. Although drawing on the Enlightenment's faith in reason, liberalism also displays skepticism about--or at least a cautious attitude toward-the powers of human reason." Von Mises asserts not only the importance of being guided by reason, but its limits: "Our powers of comprehension are limited. We cannot hope ever to discover the ultimate and most profound secrets of the universe."36 Indeed, one of the most famous liberal works of the twentieth century, Karl Popper's (1902-1994) The Open Society and Its Enemies, was, first and foremost, a criticism of the highly rationalistic philosophies of, among others, Plato and M m . The most famous liberal criticism of rationalism was advanced by Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997). According to Berlin,

One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals ctn the alters of the great historical ideas-justice or progress ctr the happiness of future generations, or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedctm of society. This is the [ratirtnalistic] belief that somewhere, in the past or the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinkex; in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted gclod man, there is a final solution.57

For Berlh, the ratimalists of the Enlightenment believed that, ultimately, the use of human reason would reveal the best way to live; it would show us what values we all should follow, and how those values should be ordered in our lives. T%ey were convinced that. application of humm reason would, in the end, tell us how to live and what to strive for. As Berlin sees it, the ermr of rationalism is its failure to grasp that there is no fjnar answer to the questions, '*What is best in Ijfd" or "'Whieh is the most worthy end for our society to pursue??"'The ratimalist seeks to answer a question that cannot be answered; and her effort to mold society to conform to her mswer is no more than sanneone trying to live out m illusion, albeit at great:costs to others, Bedin, drawing 0x1 the tradition of antiratiox~alistthh~kers,advocaks "value pluralismft-the doctrine that there are many values or goad lhings in life, and there is no rational basis for concluding that one is best, is best. Says Berlin, or that some combinatio~~ The world that we encowter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitabXy involve the sacrifice of others. . . . If, as X believe, the ends of men are many, and nctt all ctf them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflictand of tragedy-can never wholly be eliminated from human Xife, either persrtnaf or social. The necessity ctf choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic nf the human cc3nditic?n.38

Berlin thus contrasts his notion of pluralism (according to which there is no rational answer about how to resolve basic: conflicts of values) to murzism, a rationalistic doctrine that jnsists that a rationally correct answer to d u e disputes can be discove~d,and there is, in principle, a rationally best way for us all to live. Cln Berli1Ifsview, true liberalism rests on pluralism: because there is na sbgXe correct answer as to holv each should live, it is essential to ensure each has liberty to arrive at: her own answer: co~~trast, Berlin insists, socialism, a ~ much d of revisio~~ist liberalism, are hfarlxed by a monistic tmderstmdhg of life: the application

of buman reason, these theorists believe, can show us how all, our important and cherished ideals c m he h d simultaneously, eliminating the need to sacrifice some good amd important things so as to achieve others.

Liberal A;r-rtl'ratz'olzalIsm: A~z-ttz'eonsCruc~iiir~sm. Liberals have defended two opposing views of the liberal order-one s t ~ s s i n gthe spo~~taneous, unplmned order of a marke"lsociet.y; the ather stresshg btentional design. The former has been of fundamentd importance to classkal liberahsm. As Lord Robbins observed, The essence of Classical Liberalism was the belief that, within a suitable system of general rules and instituticms, there will arise spontaneous retationships also deserving the name ""order" but which are self-sustaining and, within the limits prerjcribed by the rules, need nct detailed and specific regula tion.3"

l'l-rc most sophisticated artfedation of this conception of liberal society and institULims is to be found in the work of Hayek, who cor~traststwo "rvays of tookhg at the pattern of humm activities which lead to very different conclusions concernhg both its explanalion and the possibilities of deliberately alkring it." The first [that is, constructivist] view holds that human institutions will serve human purposes only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes, often also that the Pact that an institution exists is evidence of its having been created for a purpose, and always that we should so redesign society and its imtitutions that all our acticlns will be wholly guided by known purposes. . . . The other view, which has slowly and gradually advanced since antiquity but for a time was almost entirely overwhelmed by the rntlre glamorous constructi\~istview was that the orderliness of society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual action was not due solely to instituticms and practices which has been invented or designed f ~ that r purpclse but was largely due to a process described as ""growth" m d later as "evoXutirtn.""""

On the first view of sock@-implicit inthe whtinga of revisionist liberals such as f o b Dewey (M59-1952)-humm reason can grasp the purposes of society ar~dplan society so arr; to fulfil1 this purpose; indeed, on this view, consciaus plaming is the only way social order cm be achieved. This constructivist theory of sociG@is thus highly rationalistic: the applicalion of the powers of humilr~reason is what altows for ordered social life. Cln the alternative, anticonstructivist l4ew characteristic of much

classical liberal thought, the social order is so complex that husnan reason cannot grasp it-it cannot understmd and coxrtrol society.

Rutkaalism and Political Thmvies. Socialism, then, is c o m i t t e d to s t m g forms of rationalism. Socialists, we will see, closely ljnk freedom with reason -and insist that, properIy undastood, freedom and equality al.e consistent. Conser~~atives typically strongly disagree, hsisting that reason camot show US how to avoid conflicts between commitmen& to liberty a d the promotion of equillity. Nor do ihey beliwe that politics is properly understood as the attempt to rationally reconstmct society. Liberals, we have seen, am profoundly divided on rationalkm in politks. Although all libel-als believe that we shouid seek to apply our reason to better understand society and reform it, they fmdamentally disagree as to the limits of this rationalistic tndcavor, Although many revisionist liberals have believed that reasoxr can reveal the true good for h u m a r h d and the best sort of society (see SecLicm 4.3) that zznites freedom with equality, those such as Berlfn insist that reason c m never tell us the one best way to live or harmxrize liberty and equality. And dthough revisionist liberals such as John Dewey have endorsed the power of reason to understand and pZm societ-y;classical liberals such as Hayek insist that m such comprehensive planning is possible. As we shail see Irhrougbut this book, because liberais & s a v e on the basic issue of the place of reason in politics, liberalism fractures into divergent political doctrjnes and inlcrpretatims of political concepts.

Human Nature and Polifical Theory

The notion of ""humar~nature" h s been used in narrower and wider senses. h its narrower sense, humm nature is about: human "hstkctsPf or "drives," h the wider sense, ""human nature" i s much the same as "psychologym-explaxrati~xrs of humar~hehavior and characteristics. When the term is trsed in the narrower sense, many disptrte kvhether there is really such a thhg as human nature, since many doubt whether we have natural instincts or drives. hrdeed, as we will see, the clairn that humms are moved by powerful. jnstincts can be trnderstood as one view of human nature-a view rejected by many h the wider sense, however, it seems that any poIitical theory must include some picture of human nature. hsofar as a theory of hmmm natznre tries to tell us what humms are really like," this will be of obvious relevance to questions such as, "Why do we value tiherty?'" "Are we suited to al.1 egalitarimr society?ff and "Wow much can juastjce demmd of pe~ple?'"~et us briefly consider

four theories of human nature that have played impartant roles in liberal, socialist or co~~servative theories.

According to one familiar view of human nature, people are basically self-interested-if not in all. aspects of their lives, certainly in politics, David Hume (1711-1776) famusly argued that it is "a just politic& maxim, that every man must be supposed a have,"% that is, that peaple will always act to promole lheir own self-interest. Jererny Bentharn went a good &a1 further, a r p i n g that in -all amas of life each person purmxes her m 1pieasurea a ~ -avoids d her own pains: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is f t x them alone to point out what we ought tc? do, as well as to determine what we shall do. . . . They govern us in all we do, in a13 we say in all we tit-rink: every effort w e can make to throw off our subjectirtn, will serve but ta demtlnstrate and confirm it.4?

lhis co~~ception of human nature has had great influence in ccronodcs. ma~-can be t-he n o t i o ~of~Wonzo ecunun4ic~as co~~omic traced back to Bentharn; economic m m acts to pursue his own hterests and plans m d is not dirnctly cmcerned with advancing the goals and int e ~ s t of s others. Because of the close tie betweell classical liberalism and economics, this seE-interested theory of human action has had great influence in classical liberal thought. James Buchanan, another Nable Prize-wil711ing classical liberai economistr, has repeatedly argmcl that X-lomo econumz'cus explains political as well as economic behavior.4 This lheory also has been a favoritc target of criticism by revisionist liberals, conservatfves, and socialists who hawe strel~uouslyargued that the flaw in classical liberal capitalism is its view of humms as seff-inte~stcdconsurners with infinite appetites,= :In many ways,

l h e divide betwee11 clwsicai and revisionist lfberals is nowhere sharper than concerning their views of human nature. h the place of the basically (if not entirdy) self-interested cmception of persons that dominated classical liberal ecommic t h h ~ h gliberals in tt7e late nineteenth and twenti, eth centuries embraced a view of humans as self-developers, focused not on promoting their i n t e ~ s t hut s on developing their capacities, talents, and abilities. Again, Mill it; the critical figure?. In On I,ibert!/, Mill argues that freedam is necessary for individual sel6deveXopment and growth;

only if a person is allowed great scope for choosing a life of her own will she find a life that suits her talents, abilities, and interests. Later liberals such as 'E H. Green (1836-1882), L. T. Mobhouse, Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), and John D e w q developed this idea. In his analysis of the "Heart of Liberalism," Hohhouse insisted, "The f o w ~ d a t i oof~Iiberty ~ is the idea of growth.""" Although this view of humms is by no mems absent from dassical liberal theory," it dominates revisionist liberalism. Individuals, says the revisionist liherai, are not moved simply to advmce their i n t e ~ s t sm d consume or satis@ their appetites, but to develop and refine their capacities and talents. Moreover, according to revisionj.st Ifherals, seli-development is a cooperat& activity: only by participating in a communiw of self-developers can one best develop o11e~s talents. The development of others stimulates m d completes one's own: one cannot be a developed,, realized, individual in a world of undevely , have a r ~interest in each otherfs oped, stunted people. C o ~ ~ s e q e twe devdopment. T%is idea was crucinl to T, M. Grt?err'snotjon of the common good; according to Grem, "Man cannot cmtemplak himself as in a better state, or on the way to the best, witl-toutcontemplating others, not merely as a means to fiat better state, but as slnaritlg it with him."" K u s , revisionist liberalism comes to advocate a cooperative and sociable view of t-rumm beil'lgs as parbIers in each other's self-developmmt. T%eideal of self-devetapment, central to rcrvir;ionist liberdsm, has also been influential in socialist thought. C, B. Macpherson (1911-1987)-a Marxist philosopher ard a harsh critic of ihe wlf--1Rterestc.d conception of human n a m e that looms large irt clnssicaf liberalism-was much more sympathetjc to the revisionist liberal view of the human being "as exerter and en~oyerof his own powers."49 T%eproblem for ~visiol2istIjberalism, Macpherson repeatedly insisted, bvas that liberal capitalism did not allow people to direct and develop their powers and capacities, revising instead that workers m s t sell their lahor to t-he capitalist so that hc. couid use their pokvers and abilities for his own purposes..'This criticism c m be found in the early works of Karl Marx, in which he developed his theory of alienation, maintaining that under capitalism workers were -alienakd from their work-they sabv their work as controllkg them rather than as lheir own cxalion. A worker" labor is not a way for her to express her humanity; it is the way for the capitalist to make the worker reflect his aims. Work, as Marx saw it, becomes under capitalism s k p l y a means to meet one"s most basic needs. ITather than the expsession of the distinctively humar~capacities, work is reduced to being a mere mems for animal surbsistence. The worker bvorks k order to eat: "It is . . . not the satisfaction of a need [fiat is, the human need to express oneself by c-ing to it,"so Morethe world], it is merely a rncrans to satisfy needs exter~~al over, far from, de~relopingthe disti,lzctive:ly h u m capacities of the

worker, labor under capitalism destroys those capacities. Capitalists do m t emphy machhery to lighttln t-he load of workers, hut to get more out of them. Consequently; Marx argued, work trnder capitalism is dehumanizh~gin the sense that it starves higher huznm capacities and molds humans Fn the image of machines.

Social Envir;onmenfa/ism Although the self-developmental ideal looms large in both revisionist liberal and socialist theories, in socialist theories it is very nearly always complcme~~kd by a concreptio~~ of M a n n a t m that lays great stress on the ways in r/vhich our envimnmex~tshapes our pammfiities. A social mzilinjnmenfulist conception of human nat-ure stwsses that pcofle's characters are largely pmdttced by the c u l t m in which they live.51 a l e ' s culture provides the raies, categories, and symbols by which one defines oneself and generates what we think of as "'personality." On this view, peoplc are formed by their history and culture-the characteristics of people in one country or epoch will differ fudammtally from those of others. IThe personaljty of an nlnerican liv.ing at the beginninfi~of the h/verrty-first century will be radicallJr different from that of a Greek in the third century sec, Now, although socialists have emphasized the individual's capacity for self-development, they have also put great stress on the makability of h a a n nature?. Sociaiists have long maintained that the selfishnc.ss of of capitajist society: a changed humans in capitatist society is the c ~ a t i o n society will produce radically different types of people with radically different concerns and nnotivatims. Thus, for exampk, Marx believed that in a communist society that does abvay with private property and the market, individuals will no longer see work as drudgery that they only perform if rewarded. In a higher phase of communist society, after the emlaving subordinaticm of the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis beWeen mental and physical labor; has vanished; after labor has become not only a meam of life but life's prime wmt; after the productive farces have also increased with the all-rt~unddevelopment of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth FIow abtxndantty-only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banner: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.52

Marx" point was that this transformation in our tmderstandkg of justice, m d the sort of people who would embrace this rrew conception of:

justice, would only arise &r the corrupting influences of ca~pitalistculture had been elisninated. 'Thus, lrhe antisocialist claim that people are too sell-interested to mbrace commmist society fails to a p p ~ c i a t ethat selfishess is not a trait of humans as such, but of humans under capitalism. Because sociitlism insists that many of the traits of "'capitalist mn" will not be traits 01 "socialist mm:' it emphasizes the ways in kvhich our society shapes our personality. :Interestingly, on this point cor-rservatkestend to agme with socidists. Conservatiries too see humans as essentially beings of a parti,cular time and place, and so '"heir naturt." is to a large extent a product of swiety and its tradition. m a t a person is deper-rdsvery much 0x1 her history, the traditions in which she has been broul;ht up, her affections, and her attachments. Simply put, humms are essentially historical creatznres: to be a person is to he an Englishman of a certain locality at a cerlaisl time or an hericar-r at the turn of the twer-rty-firstcenlury, but: it is not Sjmp1y to be "a human." Far the conservative, our traditions constitute our nature: what we are is to a large extent determined by our customs, traditional ways of doing things, traditior-ral religious beliefs, traditior-ral political arrmgements, and so on. To take these away-to embark on the rationalist project of startislg out from scratch-is to attack the "oasis of our persmiities. Oakeshott makes this point in an essity entitled 'Qn Being Conservativerf: Change is a threat to identity; and every change is an emblem of extinction. But a man" identity (or that of a community.) is nothing more than an Wbroken rehearsal of contingencies, each at the mercy ctf circumtances and each sipificant in prt~portionto its familiarity, It is not a fortress into which we may retire, and the only means of defending it (that is, ourselves) against hostile forces of change is in it-re open field of our experience; by throwing our weight upon the foot which f t x the time being is most firmly placed, by cleaving to whatever familiarities are not immediately t h ~ a t e n e dand thus assihlating what is new without becoming unrecognizable to ctursejves. The Masai, when they were moved frtlrn their old country to the present Masai reserve in Kenya, took with them the names of their hills and plains and rivers and gave them to the I-kIls and plains and rivers of the new crtuntry. And it is by such subterhge of conservatism that every man or people a>mpelledto suffer a notable change avoids the shame of extinction.53

T%us,the conservative view of humans as essentially constituted by their history and tradition leads to the conservative" deep concern about change: change undermines our very identity. MI are creafrures embedded i17 a particdr time and a particula place, and that is why the conservative so stresses tradition m d locality

We are cmfrmkd with a puzzle, It would seem that the socialist is attracted to a social ernivirox~mentalistview of h u r n a ~nature because she supports and bvelcomes great chmges. Because she c m look forward to new sorts of people in the new society, the motives and shortcomings of people llr~derliberal capitdim need not carry over into socialist society. But the conservative fears change just because our personalities are shaped by our historical and cultural heritage. How can the same theory of hunit1.1nahre be employed to welcome and discourage change? We mtxst recall that whereas conservatives are antirationalist, socialists are rationalist. Socialists have faith in our ability to control changes and through reasoned plax~ingproduce the sort of soGiety that will creak desirahle human beings. In gmeral, for the socialistf that our characrter is shaped by our society is an opportunity to bring &out the right sort of character in the right sort of society. We have seen, however, that conservatives such as Oakeshott and Burke deny that we c m have such k ~ o w l edge illbout, and control of, our s0ciet.y and how it c m be altered. For the conservative, gwat chmge is a leap into the dark, where we will becme, in ways W c a ~ n oeven t wess, differat sorts of people.

We saw that Mamim sacialism ( m d it is not at all unique in this regard) contibjnes a se)f-developmentalwith a social mvim entalist view of human nature, Conservatives such as Burke combine social e~~viro~~mentalism with what c m be called m insl"inefiuistt l n e a ~of humm nature. Accoding to one of the most farnous instinetiriist psychologists, 'The humm mind has certain innate or Fnherited tendencies which are the essential sgrhgmr motive powers of all thought m d action." And these h a t e tendencies are the basis of the ""caharacter md -will of individuals and of nations"'; thus the cbracteristics of peclf?lefrom one era to the next are largely mchmg;ing, since thew hstistcts have a "stable mQmchmghg character."%I n s ~ ~ c tthe^^, s , are kmate propensities far humans to behave in certain way.;, propmsitics that are relitthew constant in all times and culhrres. Although, as I have said, conservatism stresses the way in which hmmans are the product of their history and culture, it also has an instinctivist strain. Conservatives such as Burke and Oakeshott insist that we are hherently passionate creatures. Accordhg to Burke, S~cietyrequires . . . that the passions of individuals should be subjected . . . the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their wilt controlled, their passions brought into subjection. This can ctnly be done by a pozuer out ofthemselves; and not, in the exercise of its fwcticm, subject tc:, that will and to those pas"ims which it is its offjce to bridie and subdue.5'

And to Oakeshott, a m m of conservative "disposition understands it to be the bushess of gwernment not to inflame passion and give it new objects to feed upon, but to inject into the ilctivities of all-cady too passionate rnen an ingredient of moderation; to reskaisl, to deflate, to pacify and to recox~cile;not to stoke t-he fires of desim, hut to d m p them down."56 The tie betkveen consernative and Clhristim thlinking is evident in. their shared conception of humans as passimate, flawed creatures, who canm t obtain p e r k d i m on this earth." Thus, in contrast to Lhe socii\list, who envisages grand projects to reconstruct humans and society to achieve a community in which all cooperate and thrive, for the conservative the possibilities of politics are much more limited. Arthough it w u l d , no douht, be going too far to say that conservatives adopt Saint A~tgustine'scharacterization of th.e political r d e as one of jailer to shful cxatures, the inherently passionattz and flawed nature of human beings puts severe constrai~litson what politics can achieve. These constraints were emphasized by the psychologist Sigmtxnd Freud (18561939).Although Fxud is not typically associated with conservatism, his book C k ilization and its Disccrrtfenfs---writtell late in his Me (1930)-paix~ts a deeply pessilnistic picture of what c m be achieved by civilization, .I\s F ~ u understood d it, our death instinct-our destmctive and a g g ~ s s i v e nature-is always threatening to undermir~ecivilizatior~,Thus, rather than being devot.ed to the perfection of hurnms, poi,itics is properly focused on controllisrg their destructive urges,

:In Sectiox~2.1, we exan7inc.d one of Galiie's exmples of an essentially conteskd concept: social justice. It will be called that Gallie arglted that liberals and socidists advanced competim.tg conceptions because they have different ideas about the relation of individuals to society: liberals, Galtie argued, favur an "'individualist" view, wherclas socialists uaderstand society in a "col1eccti:vistic" way. Now, althougl"l,of course, this is far too simple, and although political theorists have often meant very different thhgs by "individualism" and "'collectivism," Gdlie nevertheless is right that debates about the proper interpretation of concepts such as liberty, ewality, and justice inevitably involve &bates about persorls and society, hdeed, according to Bemard Basanquet-m important revisionist: liberal-'The relation of the individual to society is the root of every social proklem."M A number of differat senses of individualism and collectivism c m be W e hawe already c o n s i d a d one in our examination of disthguished.~~ human nature: it;human personality largely the result of culkral and social influences (as the social environmentalist maintaiurs) ar the conse-

quence of factors arising out of individuals (as, for example, in the selfinterest or instinctivist views)? Two additional individualism/collect-ivism disputes shodd be ibricfly merttiomed: (I) the metfurldologid dispute about the hest way to understand hurnans-in-society, a d (2) the mortal dispute &out the relative moral claims of tfne illdividual and commt~nity.

A metlnodological inctividualist believes that people" actions, social cusam ultimtely best explahed in terms of the chartoms, and institutio~~s acteristics of individuals-their beliefs, desires, actions, and effects on each other. In contrast, a methadological collectivist believes that not only the workings of society and its institutions, but the beliefs, actions, are to be explained by the social and other characteristics of i~~dividuals, system in which people fhd themselves.@Often, this comes down to a simpk question: what is more basic-the individual or sockty? Jeremy Bentham (Section 2.3) had no doubts: "The commurGlry is a fict-itious body, c o q a s e d of t-he hdividual persolls who are consi,derecf as constituting as it were its menzbeus."" For m i~~dividualist such as B~IItham, Lhe ""community"'is simply a name we use to describe the actio~~s, traits, and hteractions of indivici.uals,who are real, Any useful accomt of social life has to start off from what is real-hdividuals, h ~ n the g ninet e e ~ ~cemry, th however, a wide variety of political thirkers----including many conservatives, socialists, and revisionist liberals-began to questjon this individdist understanding of society. Although a "first lookf' may seem to m e a l independat indi\iiduals living next tru each other in society' a deeper understandkg kvould show the extent to which hdividu& are expressions of their swiety and their place in it.Q Followhg the French political philosopher Jeit1.1-JacyllesRousseau (1712-1778), m a ~ of y these pditical phjlosophers insisted that individuals in s0ciet.y share a common life, culture, and will. hdividuals are a refiection of this comman life ard culturc: ""Every mind is a mirror or hpression of tlte whole cmmunityf'@Individuals arc thus held to be reflections or exyressions of the essence of their social order, They do not just live next to each other-society is not simply an agg~gatioxtor "'heap of individuals.""" Rather, says the collectivist, a ""sitciety," "'"nation," or ""people" i s much m r e than a grouy, of individuals: it has a culture and custom that shape the inhiduals born into it. W h e ~ a as s ""at;gregationf9ssimpiy a cdection of parti,cdars, a society is a system of organized life. The coUectivist believes that it is generally far more fruj.tfui to explaiyr facts about individuals by appeal to more basic facts about their society. If one wants to explain the hope$ fears, amd dreams ori. the average American citizen, one

must first understand the nature of America and its life, customs, and traditions.

TOa moml arlk?cli.r-blst.,moraljty "consists in the social puvose working by its own force on the individual wi1l."bWince individuals arc exyressims of eheir societies, morality is the. expres"i"" of social pupox* inindidual lives. Bernard Bosanquet, a revisionist liberal collectivist, explicitly contrasted this "socialistic'konceptim of morality whi& fimly focuses morality or7 social purposes and the sociai good, with ar.1 individualfst comeptio~rof morafity that stresses oniy what is good for individuals. Thus, as a moral collectivist, Bosmquet maintains that the indikridual's e may have Me expresses the c o m o n will of society and in e x t ~ m cases to be sacrificed for the good of her socicty In cor~trast,moral individualists such as S o h Rawls put at the very center of their political theory the principle that "each person possesses an inviolhility founkd, on justice that even, the welfare of the whole society c m ~ ooverridemff66 t Of course, we are not cmfronttzd with simply the stark alternatives of radical individualism (of either the methodological or moral sort) or radical co11ecti\rism (of either sort). Politicai lfieorists hawe sou@t to articulate jntermediate positions, giving weight to both individual and social factors, Rather than two stark alternatives, it is more enlightening to think of a continuum of positions, from radical individuaiism at one end to radical collectivism at the other. Nevertheless, disputes between jndividualists and collectivists-whether individuals are or are not more basic than sociev, or r/vheeher individual person40 or do not have mord priority over social purposes and the good of societ?,r-halre been at the core of political theorizi~agfor the past two hundred years. As we shall see in the io11owing chapters, sociaiists, and in general cor~servativestoo, have been attmcted to positions toward the collectivist end of our continuurn (though, as always, there arc exceptions-some socialists have embraced forms of hdividualjsm).~Typica'iy, conserva.eives as well as socialists have been critical. of what has been described as '*liberal.f'' ""caf)italisticI"or "boourgeojs" kindidualism. As Marx wrote, The further back we ga into history, the more the individual, and, therefc~re, the producing individual, seems to depend on and constitute a part of a larger sociat whole, . . . It is but in the eighteenth century, in ""bourgeois sacietyr3hat the different fcjrms of sociat union confront the Individual as mere means tct his private ends, as an oulward necessity. . . . Man is in the mast Xiteral sense of the word a zoon yolitikon [political animal] not only a social animal, but an animal that can only develop into a n individual in socliew. Pro-

duction by isolated.individuals outside ctf society . . . is as great an absurdity as the idea of development of a language wilhrtut indirriduals living together and talking ta one another.(&

hteresthgly, a l t h o s h liberalism has often been equakd with individualism, ljherds tkmselves have been &@plydivided about the merit.s of various forms of individualism and collectivism. Revisionist liberals expiicitrly sought to bring collectivism-bo& methodological and moral--into liberalism. As we saw above, liberals such as Basmquet insisted that the dassical :liberals had an overly indkidualistic view of humans and society, in both the metrhodologicat and moral senses. Silnce the ninetee1"tthcentury----andright up w"tCil todapthere have beer1 persiste~~t attempts to move liberaljsm w a y from, stronger forms of individualirsm to the middle of the individualist-collcctivist continuum, or even toward the colrcctivist ernd.h9As Galtje incticaes, this has had significant impact on the ways concepts such as jusMce are understood by, on the one hand, classical liberals and, on the otherf more collectivist views such as socialism and much revisio~~ist liberalism,

The past two decades have witnessed a renewed hterest in collectivist analyses of sociev-though the km "collectivist'?~ abjured in favor of "cc,rnmur"titarian," Witing in 1985, Amy Gutmann observed, "We are witnessing a revival of communitaian criticisms of liheral, political theory. Like the critics of the 1960s, those of the 1980s fault liberalism for being mistaker~lyand ir~parahlyirTdi\ridualisticIff7Q A number of critics have insisted that liberalism is too individualistic; it puts too much weight on individual choice, individual self-interest, and individud m o d rights and pays too little attation to the ways in which inclividuals are members of a community and how group, cultural, and ethnic identities shape individuals. d political doctrine-or rather, a loose p o u p of diverse ipoliticd views----knowx"tas 'kcummunitaria~~isnn'" has thus arisen as a challenge to what is seen as the overly hdividualist-ic nature of li:beral political theory, Some observers maintajn that communitarianism it; a distinct a"td important wiew, taking its place next to liberalism, conservatism, and socialism as m endurkg political theory. Should we add it as a fourth endurjng political theory? I think not. Debaks about the relatio1"tsof individuals to their societies are jndeed fmdamerrtal to political theory Mether irrdividual personalities are in some basic way shaped by society, whether individual facts can be best expkhed in terms of social facts, and whether the moral ciaims of the community are jn some way superior to those of the hdivicfual are,

without doubt, enduring political questions. Alone, however, answers to these questiclns do not col~stitutea politic& theory----they are simply one type of issue with whieh a comprehensive political theory must deal. Communitarian cmvictims in themselves have no clear political implications; only when ernbedded in a ystem of interlocking theories and inkrpretations of poljsjcal concepts docls communitarianism yield a political doctrine. Communitarianism as part of a socialistic rationalism, d i c h stresses hummshability to plan and control their society and the importmce of equality for a healthy community is vastly different from conservative communitariarrisun, which. stresses tbe iYnportance of tradid way this e~~dorses an tions and habits in the life of a commur-tity,a ~ the inegalitarian socid order (see Sections 9.2, 9.3, 10.1, 10.4). Cornmunitxianism illorre is no more of a po,jticd theory than is rali,onnlism alone or a theory of human nature alone, WC shall see, however, that it is a crucial eleme~~t of socialism m d co~~servatism (as well as much revisionist liberalism); it will thus loom large irt the analysis of this book.

In this chapter, 1have conside~dthree enduring political theories, liberalism fin both its classical and revisio~~ist versions), socialism, and conservatism. Of course, all three enduring political theories are complex familics of doctrines; :l: have tried to draw attention to important differences within each. Nevertheless, these fmilies do have their h~temalresemblances trhat disthguish thern from the others. In %ction 2.1, we saw that each has a disthctke conceptud structure; liberalism puts individual liherty in the pride of place, limi2;ing the importance of equality and tyhg justice closely to the protection of liberty. Socialists, in, contrast, almost always insist that libesty and eyuality are consistent and mutually reinforcinl;; justice is tied very closely to equality, and democracy is close to the heart of most socialjsms. Conservatives are dcepiy skegticd of eyuality, insisting that it is at odds with individual liberties; conservative justice, we S h d see, tends to stress the ineyua1it)l of rights and &ties ~ IaI well-ordered society. Political. authority is a core idea of mast conservah e accomts of politics. although our three cnduring politic& theories have different conceptual structures, their justifcations of these different structures depend significantly on their positions in three enduring debates in political theory: tl-te role of reasall in politics, human nature, and Lhe rntatio~~ of individuals to society. h sctions 3.2 to 3.4, we examked these three debates a d the positions on each that liberals, socidists, and coalserviltives tend to take. Again, it it; important to he awm &at w i t h each tradition there are disputes m d diversity. Because there is no essential core to lib-

eralism, socialism, or conservatism, we shall encounter versions of conservatism that ernbrace a type of rationalism, sociatisms that aclvocate inequality m d liberalisms that are collectivist. Nevertheless, in the course of our analysis the family resemblance ( S c t i m 1.4)within each type of theory should reveal itself.

This chapter draws on the work of John W. Chapman, "Political Theory: Logical Structure and Enduring Types" in L"d4e de pfzilosuphie politiqzre: Antzales de philosnplli"(X,aris: Presses Universitaires de France, 3965), pp. 57-96. 1. Maurice Cranston, "%iberalism," in Pmuf Edwards, ed,, The Encyclopedl'a of PFzifosoplzy (New York: MacmilXan and the Free Press, 1967). 2. See Michael)Freeden, Ideologies n~zdPolitical Tlieory (Oxfc~rd:Clarendctn Press, 1996), chaps. 4 and 5. 3. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Gray, ed., On Libertjj mzd Otlzer E'says (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 1, para. 9. 4, John Stuart Mill, Augusfe Conzde and Positivisnz, in J, M. Robson, ed., The CofEected Works of Johtz Stuart Mill (Toronto: University ctf Torontct Press, 1963), vut. 10, p. 334. 5. E A. Hayek, Lam, Legislatio~xn ~ Liberty, ~ d vol. 3: The Political Order ofa Free People (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979),p. S. 6. Wilhelm van Hurnboldt, quoted in E A. Hayek, The Couzstifzrtion of Liberty (Lc~ndon:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 196Q),p. 394. 7. L. T. Hobhouse, Liber~fisnz(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p, 87, 8. Ibid., p. 62.. 4, Freeden, ideologies and Political Tfzeoy,p, 430. 10, Bernard Crick, Socialism (MiXton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1987), p. 84, 11. Kai Nielsen, Eqliafity mzd Liberty: A Befelzse of Radical Egalitfiritz~lism( Totctwa, MJ: Rclwman and AIlenheId, 1985), p. 201. 12, Richard Norman, Free n~zdEqual: A Phr'losqhicaf Examiittaiiiouz ofhlitiml V d ues ((Oxf a d : Oxford Universit_rsPress, 19817), p. 133. 13. Nog1 OTSuivan, Co?zservatism(Ltmdon: Dent, 19"i76),p. 12. 14. Edmund Burke, RePeetions on ffie Rez~olufioni~zFm~zce(Harmondtjworth, UM: hnguin, 19681, p. 267. 15. Robert Nisbet, Corzservatism (Milton Meynes, UK: Open University Press, 1(386),p, 47. Compare Freeden, Idco,.alogicsatzd PoliiFic~ZTIzeo~y,p. 397. 16. See, for example, my essay on ""tiberafism," in EEdward N. Zafta, ed,, Tfze of PIzilosoplay [online at http:/ /plato.stanft>rd.edul. S t ~ ~ ~ E~tcyclopedia ord 17. This fist is given by Kirk F. Koerner in Liberalisurr n~zdits GP"itics(London: Croom Helm, 2985), p. 272. 18. Michacl Oakeshott, htic~t~nlisrn in Politics, expanded ed. (Irrdianapalis, IN: LJ1"bertyPress, 1992), pp. 5-42!. 19. Ibid., p, 12.

20, Xbid., p. 13, 21. Ibid., p, 15. 22. Xbid., p. 16. 23, Ibid. 24, Xbid., pp. 29-30, 25. See, for example, pp. 153,171,185,2317,244of Burke" Repections un the Revolutk~ziz Fra~zce, 26. Xbid., p. 277. 27. Ibid., p, 183. 28. Ibid., p. 2%. 29, Frederick Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Robert C. Tucker, ed ., Tfze Mnrx-E~zgelsReader, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 700. 30, R, N. Berki, Socialism (Londrm: Dent, 1475), pp. 27-28. 31. For more on the influence ctf the Enlightenment on liberal thinking, see John Gray, Libeual&m (Mjlton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1984), chap. 3. 32, Mill, U E Liberty, chap, 3, para. 17, 33. Ludwig von Mises, Libemlism in the Classical Tradit-iol.2(San Francisco: Cobden Press, 1485), p. 7. 34. Stephen Holmes, The Atantomy of" Atztilibernlis~~i(Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 247. 35. This aspect ctf the fiberai tradition is stressed by D, J. Manning, Liberalism (Londr3n: Dent, 19?4), pp,43-50. 36. Van Mises, Liberalkm in the Classical Tradifl'clrz,p. 7, 37. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in inhis Four Essays un Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 167, 38. Xbid. pp. 168--169. Far a good account of the antirationalist roots of Berlin's pluralism see John Gray, lsclinfl Berlin (Princetan: Prince-tan University Press, 1996), chap. 5. 39. Lord Robbins, Polificuf Econonzy: Past ~ n Present d (London: Macmillan, 197"7),p. 9. 40*Ei A. Hayek, Law, Legislatic~t~ and Liberty: A New State??zentq t f i e Liberal Priuciples of Justice a d hlitical Economy, vol. 3: Xctztles n~zdOrder (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 29731, pp. 8-9. 41. Alan Ryan, "The Nature of Human Nature in Hobbes and Rousseau,'?n N~tzii.e( N e w k r k : E. P. Dtxtton, 19;74), Jonathan Benthat], ed., TfteLinzifs t.fFTt~ma-~z p, 4. $2. David Hume, "Of the Independency of Parliament," h his Essays, Muml, Political and Literary (Oxkjrd: Oxford University Press, 1%A), pp, 42-43. 43. Jeremy Rentham, lntrodzlction to tlte Priitzcip1es of Momls a d tegisl'atiarz, in Alan Ryan, ed., Ulilitarknism and Other Essays (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 19871, p. 65. $4. See Tames Buchanan, 7'hc Limits of Likrdy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). 45. C. B. Maepherson, The I>oliticnl Tfzeory qf Possessive Ittdividualism (Qxfcjrd: Clarendon Press, 14621, $6. Hobhouse, Libemlism, p. 66;. 1 have explored this theor~lrin my iVEoden2 Lib(New Vc>rk:St. Martin" Press, 1983). eral T l ~ e o ojrvla~z ~y

47. See, for example, Tibor Machan, Xndiztidzrals and their Rigtlts (La Safle, XL: Open Court, 1983). 48.4". H. Green, Pmlrgomena to Ethics, A. C. Bradfey, ed, (Oxfrjrd: Clarendon Press, 1890), p, 210, 49, C, B, Macpherstsn, Democm tic Theory: Essays i1.t Refriez~al(Oxford: Clarendctn Press, 4973), p. 33. See also his life and Tinzes ufkibeml Democraq (Oxfcjrd: Oxford Universiq Press, 1977). SO. Karl Marx, Econornz'c n ~ Philosophic d Ma-lzuscwts of 1844, Martin Mllligan, trans. (New York: International Publishers, 19641, p, 111. For an analysis of Mam's theory of alienation, see BertiT OIZman, Alienniiitjn: Mnrxb Gonceptiotz of Mn-lz in Cayitalisi" Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197'1). 51. Tf-ris term derives from Maurice Mandelbaum, History, iGlarz n~xdReasouz (Baltimore: Johns Pllopkins University Press, 19"i71),pp. 142ff. 52. Karl Marx, ""Critique of the Gotha Program," in the Mnm-Engels Refider, p. 534. 53, Michaei Oakeshott, "On Being a Conservative,'>n his &tl;o-lznlism itz h l i tics, p. 4-10, 54. Williarn McDougalf, An Jlrtmdt~ctic?tzdo Social Psychofon (Lr3ndon: Methuen, 1934), pp. 1-7-18. 55. Burke, Reflectio?zson !lie Revolzitic~tzin Franw, p. 151, 56, Oakeshutt, ""On Being a Conser.vative," p. 4332. 57. On Christianity % doubts about perfection, see John Passmore, The Perfectibility $Man (Lctndon: Duckworth, 13470),chap. 4. 58..Bernard Bc->sanquet,The Plzilosophical Tlfeory f:)f the State, in Gerald E Gaus and Will iam Sweet, eds., Ttte Philosopllictzl Ttteory I;1(the Sta te a~zdRerfated Essays (Indianapofis, IN: St-.Augustine Press, 200Q),p. 79. 59, For very useful overviews, see: j, Roland Pemctck, Dcnzocmlic lJllliticnl Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19792, chap. 3; St-evenLukes, I~diztidldalism (Oxford: Basil Bfackwelt, 1973). 66,For a useful introduction, see Son EXster, A11 Xntrod~cfiouzto EC12rl Mnrx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, IldfJk), chap, 2, 61. Jeremy Bentham, Introdzacfiouz to tlte Principles ofhX~ralsmzd Legz'slatz'nuz,chap. 1, sect. 4. 62, Bosanquet, The Philosopl~icalTheory of the State, p. 166, 63. Ibid., p. 51. M. See D, G. Ritchie, The Prilzcif?lesof S k t e I~teqerezce(tondrm: Gearge Allen, 1912), p. 13. 65. Bosanquet, "The Antithesis of Individ-ttafism and Socialism, Phifosophi1;1( the State a~zdRellnted Essays, p. 329. caify Considered,'3in Tfze 1~hikosophicaITFl:t@ory 66, John Rawlt;, A 7"hcufy of justim (Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 197"1),p. 3.See Sectirtn 1.4 above, 67. Ion Etster, for example, is a methodological individualist and a Marxist. But his is a fairly n e y and somewhat unorthodox, socialist approach. Stie his IrztroGbucfl;Ol"lCO F(iZrI Marx. 68. Kart Marx, Inkrt~"Cldctic~tz to the Critique of Politicat Eeotlotny, quoted in D.EB. Tucker, Marxisria and I ~ d i v i i (Oxford: t Blackwelt, 1980), p. 2.

653. See Altan Qan, ""The Liberal Community," in Jahn W Chapman and Tan Shapiro, eds., NOMOS X X X X V : D~enzocrakicConztnrrlzity ((New York: New York Universiq Press, 19533),pp. 91-114. 70. Amy Gutmann, 'Tommunltarian Critics of Liberalism," Phitosopfly 6.Pzibfic Afla;az';.s,vol. 34 (1985), p. 308.

PART TWO

POLITICAL CONCEPTS --

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NEGATIVE AND

4.1 Negative Liberty: Some Ordinary Language Considerations Freedom as the Absence of Qbshcles

Let us begjn by focusing on a simple case: fJllse 9: Btf is a political dissidex~tand has been jaifed by trhe govcmment m d locked in a cell. He shakes the bars but cmnot get out. :If we ask why AII is unfree, tt7e simplest answer is that he is locked in a cell and cannot leave i t For mamas Mobbes (1588-1679), '%l,jberty is the absence of . . . impediments to action," AS Hobbes w~derstoodit, something that is not p ~ v e n t e dfrom m o v i ~ ~ byg an exten~aiobstacle is free: if something stops il:from moviclg it is ttnfree. .hball moves h e l y down a hill until something stops it; AJf moves freely across his cell until the locked cell door stops him. We immediately come to a crucial question: do all exter~~al impediments to action or obstacles invalve a loss of freedom"?ansider the f o t b w h g cases:

Cnsc 2: Alf is hiking across the Rocky Moluntains and encounters an avalanche that bbcks his way. The avdmche occurred mturally. Cnsc 3: Alf is hiking across the Rocky Moluntains and encounters an avalanche that blocks his my, Betty wanted to get across first so she used dynamite to cause the avalmche.

78

NEGAT~VE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY

:In each case, Alf meets an Ohstacltl that prevents him from gojng further, and so wouid seem unfree in Hcibbes's sense. Yet, many have been reluctant to depict Case 2 as a limit.ilCion of Alf's liberty. According to :Isaiah Berlb, one of the most famous of modern philosophers of freedom, "You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prwezlited from attaining a goal by other humm beings."Vh-tns, even though gravity is an obstacle to your jumping higher than ten feet in the air, says Berlin, that does not make you ul-tfree, since no human created the obstacle. We may dispute this; after ali, it is not senseless to say that people are not free to jump mofe than ten feet in the air. But insofar as our i n t e ~ sis t political and morai discours those moral and political language that focus on peoplefwomplaints and challe~ligesto orlie person creating obstacles in the path of others-it does indeed seem that what Berlin calls ""plitical liherty" 'involves humanly created (or, perhaps, maintained) obstacles. Thus, even modern followers of Hobbes are more Xikely to adapt the view that "'bmilcfly s p e a h g , . . . a person is u n h e to do an actjon if, and only if, his doing that action is redered impossible by the acticrrz of another per so^^."^ Case 3 is clear: not only does Alf confront an obstacle, but it is one that was created by another person, Eletty- What, howeveq about Case 4: Alf is h&kg across the Racky Mamtains m d encounters m avalmche that blocks his way. The avalmche was accidentally caused g kli the higher reaches of the mountain. by Betty who was s Berlh, at least sometimes, indicates that Case 4 would not involve a

lack of f ~ e d o mTo . collistitute a iirnitatio~liof freedoq Berlin suggests in his famous essay, '*TwoConcepts of Liberty,'' the obstacle must not only be created by humans, but it must be a ddeberate or intentional obstacle to a person's activity. Liberty talk, on Berlin's view, is not simply about one person accidentally getting in. the way of another, but deliberate inlerventions in an other"^ life, If someone gels in my w q I may point out to her that she is blocking mef but I am not likely to complain that she is limithg my freedom until 1see her as deliberately or h o w h g l y blockng me. If someone accidentally parks her car in front of your driveway, it is true that you are not free to drive away, but it woutd be smewhat odd to appeal to the value of freedom in your complaint against your neighbor; the most likely and appropriate cmplaint would be that she is inconsiderate or thoughtless.Wn the other hand, if she deliberately blocked yom path, then a complaint about lirniting y o u freedom kvould be pmfectly sensible m d not at all odd. In anotrher essay, however, Berlin suggests a diff'ereM derstarlidirlig of what sorts of obstacles are relevant to freedom. Here Berlin seems to

arguc that if ( 3 ) Alf is blocked by an obstatrle that (2) could be removed by someozle (3) who fails to do so, then (4) Alf 'S freedom is limited.6 0 x 1 this view, it kvould seem that All%freedom is limited in,

Cnsc 5: Alf is hiking across the Rocky Moluntains and encounters an avalanche that blocks his way. The avalanche was natural and was no one's fault. Bet$ however, sees hj,m stuck in the snow, but passes by without helping.

On Berlin's alternative conception, Bet9 limits Alf 'S freedam in Case 5, If we adopt this notion of kedorn, it seems that we are never really free, after all, if enough money was spent, the obstacles that stop me f m going to the moon could be overcome (by supplying me with a spaceship). So if my freedom is limited every time 1 confront an obstacle that cazatd be remved by hurnans, my frecdom is ITOW dril~tiCitI1ylin7ited..If we take a more moderate \4ew, and say that one" freedom is limited i-vherever one conlronts m obstacle that could feasibly be removed by others, things become more mamgeable, but now we confroz~tdeep problems with explainhg what we mean by "'feasible."7 If other people did not want BMWS and beach houses, the obstacle to me living the life of ease easily be ovcrrome: they could pay ack ot:money-odd for my pleasures. Does this mean that X am trnfree? Coercion and the Ineligibility

of Options

Thus far we have been exyloP-ing Hobbes's idea that one is free unless an obstacle p ~ v e n t one s from acting. Consider, though,

Cnsc 6: Alf is hiking through the Rwky Mountains m d comes upon Betty, a thief who wants his new hiking boots. She says, 'Give me your boots or 171 break your arm! But I" not a murderer; so that's all 1% 10.You choose." AAlf likes the boots, but not that much, so he hands them over* Bet9 did not prevent Alf h n n walking by with his boots; he could tlaz~e chosen to do that, though the cost would have been a broken arm. Since she did not p ~ v e nAll t from conlhuing, accordhg to Mobbes AIS is stifl. free. After all, he can choose whethier to keep his boots or have a broken arm, a ~ ifd he c m choose what to do, it would seem that he is free. As Hobbes sees it, one is free trnless m obstacle renders the action impossible. And since it is not impossible for Alf to keep his boots, be is free to do so (though the cost wiff be a broken arm). Of course, it is z~owimpossihIe for A1.f to perform, the complex action of continuing-waIkig-with-his-boots-

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a.rzd-not-having-a-broken-am.8 Before B e y arrived, Alf had a possible complcx a c t i o ~ ~ ~prekrrcd his artion f keeping hit; boots and keeping his arm in one piece- Betty has provided an obstacle that has rendered that action impossible, Still, it seems that: although Alf is not compLetely u ~ ~ f r etoe choose tru keep his boots (md have a brokm arm)-it is, after all, possible to choose that option-neither is he perfectb free to choose to keep his hoots, Most of us would say that his freedom has been limited by Betty's threat. Most philosophers have thus rejected Elabbes" claim that you are free to do what no ohstacle prevents you from doing; ralher, most have argued that ctwucion----threats to do you hwm----limit your freedom..As F. A. Hay& says, '"Coertrion implies that 1 still choose but that n7y f i n d is made someone" else's tool, becatrse the alternatives before me have been so manipulated that the conduct: the cmcer wants me to choose becomes for me the least p"inful one. Aithougb coerced, it is stiil 1 who decide which is the least evil,under the circumstmces."~ We might .;ay that although coerciox~does not entirely black off an option (for example, '"Ali keeps his boots"), it makcs the option "less eligible" for choice-it renders an option not a real option by attaching a severe penaIty (for example, Alfs arm is bmkatrm) to choosing it.10 According to &is izcligibillfy uiez~?of freedom, All's freedom is infrk~gcdif either (If another person has intentionally httxkcd off an opeim or (2) mother person has ernployed coercion against Alf to render an option ineligible." Althougf-1this seems to accord much better with, ordinary usage than does Hobbes's simple impossibi,lity view, it raises mul-nber of additional prctblems. Most important, a threat that renders an optim ineligible to Alf may not have the same effect on Charlie. Considel; for hstance,

Casc 7: Betty is a mild-mamered bank robber. She passes Alf, the teller, a note, "Give me all the money or 1 will caii. you a nasty name!" Gilf hates to be called names, so concludes that Betty" threat has rendered the option "don't turn over the mmey" ineligible for choice---the costs we just too high. So he hand.; over the money. W e n he explains what happened to Charlie the police officer, Charlie arrests Alf, insisting that the threat was not sufficiently great as to r e ~ ~ dthe e r optior.~inetigihle. ALf may be telling the truth, in which case it does seem that perhaps his frtiedom was limited. But ii we accept that co~~clusiun, we will not be able to say when a person's freedom is limited without howing a great deal about that person, such as what sorts of thillgs he realty fears. Advocates of the ineligibility view h a w been reluctant to take this path a ~ generd aUy have argued that judgmeMs &out freedom should be graided by how a normal or typical person would view the threat, and whether such a

normal or typiral person would see the thrc3at as sufficimtly severe as to It: is important to ohserve il.1 Case 7 that r e d e r the o p t i o ~ineligible. ~ everyone would agree that Betty" threat made the option ""dn't hand over the money" "ss aftmctivc or k s eli'yiblc, hut s i q l y making an option somwhat less attracthe is not enough to rerlider you (as Hayck says) "'someone else" tool" and so unfree. There has been considerable debatc among philosophers whether oflcus as well as flzreafs cali be coercive, and so limit freedom. Co~~sider ali example horn J. G. Murphey: Cusc 8: Suppose I own the only water well within a two-hundredmife radius of desert. A man, nearly dead from thirst, drags hhself to my well m d begs for cvater. Realizhg (a) that the well is lawfully owned by me and that I: m entitled to all its watel; and (b) that the

thirsty man's predicamenl: is no h d t of mine . . . I say " h i l l sell you a glass of water d y if you s i p over to me illlyour worldly goods."a

326s is an offer. Unlike a threat-in which someone says that he is gohg to jnflict pain on you, or take away somethiXlg that is yours, or somehow make you worse off than you now ar-an offer gives you the opportunity to get something you need or want. But many have believed that an offer c m be coercive if (1)it allo~vsyou to get somethhg at a terribly high cost, but because of your circumstance (2) you cannot afford to turn the offer down. In such a case, many hawe believed that the option of reject ing the offer is ineligible: "You have no chaice." On the other hand, it seems hard to see how the offer resfricts your options: it seems that all offers exyaszd your options. Even though it is not a desirable offer, it gives you an additiond option. n o s e cvho believe that offers can be coercive typically argue that they should be cownpa~dto the ""starrdard" options In Case 8, a stanthat a person would normally expect in this situatio~~. dard option might be that a person in desperate need can expect help from others at no or rninirnal costs. If we accept t h i s as a standard. option-part of the. normal hackgromd----wemight say that Lhe person makhg the coercive offer not only is making an offer, hut at the same h e i s blocking that standard option (""low-cost help"') offering instad mly high-cost help, thus dec~asingour options.lTo apply this noticm of freedom., howwer, we need an accoumt of what: are one's "standard optj,ns," something that would seem to difkr by locality econornic prosperity cdtum, tastes, and so on. Negative Freedom os on Opportvnity Concept

n u s far we have been considerhg ALIf mfree when he confronts an obstack to what he w n t s to do or when someone rmders ineligible an

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option of his. mis, then, is a negatiz~t.cofzccpfionof liberty: liberty consists in the absex-tceof obstacles to, or h-tkrlerex-tcewith, actio1-t.But co~~sider,

Case 9: All is in jail. He is tied to the wall m d has duct tape over his mouth so that he cannot talk. Alf, however, is a strmge klXow, He thinks, "'What luck, this is what I've aiways wa~-tted!~' Berlin, the preeminent theorist of negative liberty, would insist that Alf is not free; freedom, he tells us, is "the absmce of obstacles to possible choices m d activities-absence of obstructions on roads which a m m can decide to walk."M Mf is not free to take mmy roads-there is not rwch he mn do, though in fact he it; doini; everythil7g he wnlzts to do. He is contented, but free. In this scnse, slaves, even happy, conlented, slaves who cherish their chahs, are not free: there are mmy obstwles placed in the path of possi:hie choices. We may say, then, that negative liberty is m oppovtzanify concept: one's freedom depends on what me has an opporkrnit)l to do, not what one actually does.1" ppcsson w l o does little, but who has few paths rendered ineligible by others, is free, even ilshe does little. Think about fJllse 10: k t t y is not in jail. In fact, Betty really has no significant mstraints on her. Well, there is one. Betty is a thrill seeker: she likes driving witl?out a seat belt, Unfortunately, she lives in a state with oxdy ox-te law: mndatory seat belts. Vou car1 do anything you wmt, as long as you wear your seat belt. Alas, this prohibits the thing Betty most wmts to do, fn fact, she dislikes this promition more than any other one she c m hagine.

Proponenls of negative liberty such as Ber:lin maintaisl that Betty is much freer than is AIf in Case 9, even Irhough in Case 9 Alf is doing what he wmts to do, kvhereas in. Case IQBetty camot do what she really wmts to do, As we are about to see, proponents of what has been called ""positive f ~ e d o m "seek " a much more intimate tie between Betty being free and doixlg what she wants to do.

T. H. Green and Liber?. as Autonomy In a famous lecture, "01-the t Different %rises of 'Freedom' as Applied to the Wll and the Moral Progress of :Man,"x the English libtral 'K H, Green developed a conception of liberty that closely lillks beh-tg free to doing what one truly desires..Green begins his famous lecture by achowltedg-

ing that, in a sense, the negative conception of political liberv is basic to our understanding of freedom. As he says, "It must be of course admit ted that every usage of the term [that isl frcledomj to express anythhg but a social and palitical relation of onc man to another involves a metapbor. . . . It always implies . . . some exemption from compuitiion by a~other.'"T But Green wants to explore an extension of this usage, one that centers on the idea of afret?"persarz. We all agree that: an unfree person is one Mi'ho is in some sel-rse in bondage: he is a slave m d c at do as he kvishes. Now, Green achowledges &at this is certainly if others are p~ventinghim from acting, and advocates of negatke liherty are right about Ehat. But Gree1-r wants to explore another case: where one is unfree because one is subject to an impdse or craving. A person who is str"nject to some irnptrlse or craving Ihat he camot control, Green said, is "hthe condition of a bondsmm who is carrying out the wifl of another; not his om."" Green is suggesting here that th.e basic m d e l of negative liberty-the relation betwwn an actor and someone trying to make h i ~ nor her a "toolM+an be applied witE\in the individual psycho:iogy of a pertion. A s s m e t-hatwe idel-rtifya person's basic personaiity-Lhe sort of things a person ljkes to do, f i a t she cares for, her lmg-tern plans and goals, m d so on.NOW,further assume that a person has an addictiol-r,say, to namotics, which ilnpeis her to satisfy her craving regardless of the harm it does to alZ the other things she cares for. s not free: she is a slave to her addiction. The real, exgrc?ssitself: the foreign impulse takes over. reen's proposal, suppose that a person c m sometjrncs be considered as being split into two parts, C)ne part is someljmes called her "real seliU'---thosevalues, interests, and ptans that: really make up this person. T%e second part can be an htrusive impulse or addiction that sets itself up in opposition to the real self. Now if we view the self h this way, we can cox-rsider the 'keal self'" as being e~wlavedby the imptrtse. The person in such a condition is not really free: she is a slave ot her impulse, A h e person, then, is one rolza does liotzaf.she really rl~antsta do---what ber real self wmts-and so the free person does not wish to give in to the impuSse. On this view, then, a free person is whal is d e n called. m mtonrtnzot~sperson: someone who can decide for herself what to do anrt is mt the slave of impulses, ignormce, error, past col-rditioning, or addictiom. She is, Ijterdy, self (uzifct) d e d (nornos).l" htrunomy can be Iimited both by internal and exfertzaf restraints or obstacles. Atlvwtes of negative liberty are sensitive to the importan" of external restrajwlts: yau c ot be your own master if others are interkring with your actions and restrainhg you. But &SO,you cannot be your own master if there we internal restrair-rts:these too prever~tyou from being a free person-frm leading a self-directed or autonomous life. We


84

see here, then, that in conkast to negative liherty, which makes liberty an opportwity concqt, the positive conceptiol~sees liberty as m exerciite concept: one is free when one exercises one's capacities for self-control and self-direction m d so does what one really wan& to do. Under the inthe idea of hcedom moves awity from a Awnce of this way of thir~kir~g, focus on jntergersanal relations-who is b l o c h g or contralhg whom?to a characw ideal. A free person is a self-controlled, self-di~ctedperson r/vhu is not under the sway of external or internal compulsions. Ofher Senses

of Autonomy

Green provided a classic case for freedom as a self-ruled life. But in developing this general idea, philosophers have come to distinguish a number of different senses h which one can be self-mled; hdeed, even in Green" writings we can discern OR than one notion of being scif-&d.

Auto~zomyas Dajelopnzent of Orze's Cnpcities. Green, we have seen, described the life of freedom as one in which one%real self ruled over irnpulses and passions. h addition, he believed that, given human natznre, lhis involved a life in which one developed one's capacities (Section 3.3). I h e o1111ysatisfying life for humans is a life in Mi.hiclh one's distinctiy human capabiljtjes are develuped, m d so that is the only life a free persnn will h e . .A person pursuing a life that cannot satisfy his capacities, wrote Green, is not free, because the objects tc3 which his actions are directed are objects in which, according ta the law of his own being, satisfaction of himelf is not to be found. His will to arrive at self-satisfaction not being adjusted to the law which determines where this self-satisfactic~nis to be found, he may be considered in the ccmditicm of a bondsman who is carrying out the will of another, not his own. From this bondage he emerges .into real freedom, not by overcoming the Xaw ctf his being . . . but by making its fulfillment the ctbject of his will; by seeking the satisfacticm of himself in objects in which he believes it sltould be found, and seeking it .in them because he believes i t shoutcl be found in tlfiem.20

Arkto~~orny as a Self-Chosrurz I,#. Some abocrates of autonomy reject of one's capacities Grtten's claim that only a life devoted to the ~ a l i z a t i m is truly free. Accordimg to Joseph Raz, r/vhereas ""self-~alizationconsists in the development to their fullest extent of all, or all. the valuable capacities a person possesses . . . the aut~)nomous person is one who makes his own life and he may chooscl the path of self-realizatior7 or reject it.91 The basic thought is that according to the ideal of autonomy, it is not crucial

that a person develvs her capacities, but that she decides rul~etherto develop her capacities and, more generaliy, how to live her life. 'The fully autonomous person is one who leads a life of her olvn chaoshg-who makes decisions about her life on the basis of the thirtgs to which she is committed. T%eworry about this notion of atrtonomy, however, is whether anyone really ever chooses his life, Our personalities and choices are deeply influenced by our naturai taie~litsm d propensities, our culture and our upbringixlg. By the time a person reaches adulthood, many of his desires, goals,cnnfs, and aims have been learned from parermb, fl-iends, and teachers. G i ~ e n this, in what sellse can one say Ihat one creates oneself? Even if one decides to reject s m of ~ n e ' scultrural and intellectud heritse, one will make that decision because of other things onc. believes imd valuesbut those too h o s t surely have been learned from someone, If one is raised a Cathok and rejects that life because of one's so mmistic philosophy, kvhere did one get that humanistic commitment? No matter where one turns, it seems one" deliberations and decisions draw on aspects of onesell: that one did m t create.

A U ~ O FasI flze O ~l,@ r?f Reason. Perihaps an autonomous person is not s life, values, and co itme~lits,but who necessarily oxlie Mrho c ~ a t e her subjects all aspects of her life to critical scrutiny; m d always acts according to her understanding of what she has the best reasons to do.22 Thus, even if a person does not create her commitments, if she has &ought through ali of them,, and deliberated about whjch seem, well, grounkd and which ought to be rejected, and acts on those delfierrztions, her life is ru:ied by rmson; she is not the slave of iglorance or past conditioning. Ark f o~~orny ns a Second-Order Desire. Contemporary philosophers are skptical &out Gree11"s ctailn that a person car1 be divirled into a "real sell""-which concerns the person" true kvmts, goals, and so forth-md a nonrctal, lower, or "actual">& that is ruled. by impulses, passions, and ignorance (see Section 4.3). Although Green" idea is out of favor today, many proponents of atrtonomy have adopted a surgrisbgly similar division of the person, into "first-0rdfi.r" and "secod-order" &sires. A firstorder desire is a desire the object of which is m action or evmt: a person desires to be rich or s k h y , to eat; or to win the Nobe1 Prize. All these are first-order desires. A second-order desire is a desire the object of which is a first-order desire. A desire not to have the desire to be skhxly is a second-order desire, Nwv, sonzc advocarcjs of autonomy have ilrgued that an autonomous person is m e who exercises her capacity to rehct on her first-order desires in terms of her second-order desires, and rejects or amends first-order desires in the light of her second-order desires"23


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Thus, for example, a persm m y have a first-order d e s k to be skinny, but aiso think that this desim is silly a ~ isdinkrkring wieh her Me. She is a healthy weight and enjoys eating; although she kvimts to lose more weight and become skinny, when shc reflects on this, she sees that the best thing for her life would he to rid herself of the desire to be s k h ~ yIn , Green" terms, she is s e e h g satisfaction where she does not think it c m be found, and so is not free. Thus, on this view, an autonomous person seeks to make her first-order desires c o ~ ~ f otomher second-order desires.

Even this brief survey of differe~~t senses of autonomy demo~~strates the relation between positive liberty and rationalism (Section 3.2): we can only achieve true freedom if we am rational. When we are acthg on good. ~ ~ , are reasoIIs and arc. mflective, are m t ruled by custom or t r a d i t i ~ and not the subject of craving5 or impulses or arbitrary hterference; when we refiect on our firstorder desires; when we use our reason to choose our lives for ourselves, then we are trdy free. The life of h e d o m is the life of reason.

4.3 Two Concepts of Liberty Berlin3 Attack on Positive Liberty

In his famous essay, "Two Concepts of Liberty," baiah Berlin attacks positive liberty and argues that it is fundamentally opposed to negative liberty Three cfainzs made by Berlin stmd out.

lli

pursllif of positive liberty can lead to infri~~gir-lg rzegative liberty.

:If we accept Green" view, it would seem that lfie ideal of positive liberty as autonomy is simply m elaboration, or at most m extension, of the case for negative liberty Berlin, however, wants to show that far from being an cxtensiotz o f the case for r~egativeii$erty, the ideal of positive liberty clashes with the ideal of negative liberty, This cllash comes out most clearlq. on the issue of pater??alisnz, Legal paternalism involves the use of legal sanctiox~sto make someone do what is good fir hiru or prevent him from doing what is bacf fir him. Paternalism is, roughly, t~at-ingadults :like children: it is forcing them to do things for their own good. That is just the sort of intcrventio~~ that J o h Stuart MiKs H a m Princifle prohibited: "The only purpose for kvhich power c m be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized c o r n u n i t y agahst his will, is to prevmt harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficie~litwarrant" (see Section 3,1).NOW,it woulca seem, that Green's view of positive

:liberty supports paternalism as a way to achieve fzlllcr freedom, If I act in w y s that make me less autonomous---if I act in ways that will make me ignorant or give into impulses-then if sameone renders these autonomy-haming options ineligible for me (that is, he interferes with my negative liberty), this kterferexlce can promote my positive liberty 'f. H. Green himself was deeply concerned with alcoholism among members of the working class in late-nineteenth-century Britain. As he saw it, t h i s addictio~~ was impeding their freedom; t h y were slaves to alcohol. Green would allow laws designed to limit or prohibit the consumption of alcohol, because doing so would promote positive h-eedom. li-, Berlin, such paticr~~alism is a great despotism: the state is interferirlg with your freedom to make you a better persol%.Other people are h p o s ing same bvay af Xiivhg on you; the liberal tradition from J o h Stuart Mill onward has opposed paternalism because liberalism rejects the legitimacy of one person or a group "f pea* imposing their way of lking on others. Moreover, Berlin argtres, not only does Green's notion of positive freedom. allow paternalism that limits freedom, it adds insdt to injury by callkg this interferexlice '"freedom"? Berlin depicts the argumex~tfor positive IibertJi,in the following way: The dominant self is . . . identified with reason, with my "higher nature," with the self which calcutates and aims at what wiXI satis@ in the long run, with my ""ray,""or "ideal," ar ""autonomous'helf, ctr with my self "'at its bestU";hich is then contrasted with irrational impulse, uncantralled desires, my ''l~ower'' nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures. My "empirical" ctr ""hteronctmous" self, swept by every gust of desire and passion, needlsf . . . ta be rigidly disciplined if it is ever ta rise to the full height of its ""real nature. . . . Once F take this view, 1 am in the position to ignore the actual wishes ctf men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on the behalf, of their "real'>sefves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happinem' performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilllment)must be identical with his freedom-the free choice of his ""true," albeit oAen submerged and inarticulate, seff.24

For one person to take charge of the life of alotkr, arguing that t%le other is co~ltrolledby her own ""false'kor "low&>self hstead of her "hjg:herfF self, attacks precisely the freedom that Berlin cherishes. And ta make lhings worse, all this is done in the name of freedom!

12)Pt>siti.ilcliberty splits not nn(y itzdividzcnls blsl also sclciclJc?sitzfo the higher and lazueE Berlin advances another criticism of positive liberty: its split betweal the "'hil.;hermand the ""lower" self is often transferred to a division in society between those who are enlightened m d those who are not:

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The reason within me, if it is to triumph, must elidnate and suppress my ""lower" instjncts, my passions and desires, which render me a slave; sirnilarly (the fatal transition from individual tc:, social concepts is alrntxt irnperceptible) the higher elements in socliew-the better educated, the mare rational, those who " p ~ s s e s s the highest insight ctf their time and peoplerr-may exercise compulkon to rationalize the irrational section of socliew. For . . . by obeying the rational man we obey ourselves: not indeed as we are, sunk in our ignorance and our passiom, weak creatures afRicted by diseases that need a healer, wards who require a guardian, but as we a>uldbe i f we were rational; as we could be nowt if we wotrXcl listen to the rational element which is, ex tlypofltesi [by hypothesis] within every human being who deserves the name.25

Ihus, being subjected to tlte aut.horityof another-the very essellce of being restrained-is, Berlin argues, conwerted into a sort of freedom (see Sections 5.4, 10.5, 20.4). Because the '*otherf'-the King, the Great Dictator, or the People-mpresents what is higlzer and rational, whereas what you wmt mmifests lfie lower m d irratio~~al, to obey the higher and control the lower is freedarn.

(3) The yclsitiw ctlnceptintz is lznt an a f e ~ ~ s i ooft zthe negatiw ctmccplirtr.r, hut rrndermilzes it. Points (1)and (2) support Berlin's third, and in some ways most basic, claim: those who depict positive liberty as simply m extensiczr~of negative Il:herty are wml~g.As (1) and (2) demo~~strate, Lhe propoxlcnt of positive &be* entertains a cortception of liberty according to which the most basic kature of negative :liberty---to be free from restraint in order to live your life as you see lit-is not ody ignord, but is i g n o ~ din the n m e of liberty itself. Thus, Kerlil-t condudes, "'nese are not two different intevretati.ons of a single concept, but two profoundly $iwergmt and irrecolwilable attitudes to the emis of life.'"b Consicier again Case 1 in %ction 4.2. C)n the negative mderstmding of freedarn, being locked in jail is a core and Ohvious case of unfreedom; some of our other cases may pose puzzles for nc.gati\re liberty, but not Case 1. But on the positive conception, it may turn out that hCase 1All is being forced to be h-perhaps he is in jail to stop him from getting drunk. Because positive freedom takes a bask case of (negative) w~freedoma"td t ~ itm ~ into a possible (positivl.) freedom-enhancing condition, it s e e m that these are two fundamentally opposed ways of looking at freedom. Monism and Pluralism

Ib u ~ ~ d e r s t a why ~ l d Berlin insists on the func[amer.ltaloppositior.~bet-vveennegative m d positive freedom, we have to go back to the contrast

between monism and plzrralism (Section 3.2). b l u e pluralism, it will he recalled, stresses the diversity of the ends of life. As a form of a~tirationalism, it insists that our reason cannot provide a single, agreed-trpon, answer to the questim, "What is the best way to live?" There are imumerabie ways of living that appeal to each of us, but they c d i c t m d we often camot decide among them. As Berlin says, "That we cmnot have everything is a necessary, m t a contingat, truth."27 Monism, in conkast, is a form of r&ionaiism: our =ason can be employed to reveal the one type of life, or the set of good lives, that best suits everyone-perhaps the one sort of life that combhes, in just the right measure, all good. things. Berlin col1vincir7gly argues that a notion of positive liberty such as 'I: H. Green's is based on a rationalistic, monistic view of life: a developed, autononnous person is the true goal for everyone, Anyone who forsakes this goal ar~dwho lives a life that does not develop her capacity for choice is not seeEng the one, true humm end. h contrast, says Bedin, pluralism leads to mderstanding liberty as a n e g a t h concept. Guaranteeing each a measure of negative liberty is, Berlin aques, the most humane ideal, as it recognizes that ""hmm goals are mmy," and no one c m make a choice that is right for all people.28 If you arc to avoid behg a despot (that is, smeone who forces others to live their lives as you see fit), you must grmt others freedom to make their own decisions. According to the value pluralist, just because masm cannot reveal. what is the best r/vay of living-just because there are so many h u m n gods, so m a ~ ~ y things that are worth pursuing-it is necessary to ensure that no one needlessly raises Obstacles to the possible choices of others. Nthough I trhink RerliIl is correct in arguing that a rationalistic monisnt informs the ideal of autonomy and, so, positive liberty, it is importmt not to push the point too far, The ideal of autonomy is certainly less monistic and ratiol~aiisticthan, for exmple, some religious understandings of the good life- Basic to the ideal of autonomy is that one should choose the life that fits one's capacities and talents; and because our capacities and talents differ, trhe ideal of a r ~auto~~omous life justihs each person living a d i f f e ~ nsort t of life, stressing different vallles m d interests. This is much more accommodating to pluralism than,say, a ~ l i g i o u ideal s accordiislg to whiCh everyolxe, regardless of his or her capa"tiies, m s t lead a specific sort of lifec,stressing simplicity, otSler~lorldti,nesq and ilbso1ut.eobedience to God." will. Such a conception of the good life is much less opm-ended than the ideal of a u t m m y . There are certainly degrees of ratiol~alism and monism. Nevertheless, the ideal of autonomy pohts toward an ideal of a good. life that can identify a "red selff' that seeks the cultivation of its capacities and is "w~free"when the lower self pursues a lffe incoz~sistent with that ideal.

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Berlin, then, believes that a commiment to mmism supports positive liberty: those who e x e ~ i s etheir will in such a way as to lead the truly human life are free. On the other hand, a pluraljst, beiieving that there is no uniquely or truly human manner of livhg, will stress the way in which liberty provicjes opportclrTities for choice, and so be attracted to the negative concept. Many political theorists note Berlixl" distinction bet-vveen negative and positive liberv, but faif to grasp his broader point: that these two t;heories reflect opposi"$ politic& theories ar~dvkws of =ason and values. One misses Berlin" message if one mderstmds him as simply arguing for a certain. negative conception of liberty. ITathcr, he is arguing for a certain sort of po:iitical Irheory, one devoted to plwalism: if we adopt this politic& theory Berlin believes, we will afso be comitted to acceptkg the negative, and rejecting the positive, notion of liberty* Liber?. and Human Nature: Mill as an Exemplar

Not only does it seem that positive liberty draws on what Berlin calls ma~~ism, but it also is supporkd by what E deslrribed (Sectim 3.3) as fhe '*self-.developmental"theory of human nature, As X noted earlier (Sectjons 3.1,3,3), John Stuart Mill" case for individual liberty was based on our capa"ty for grow& a l ~ dhvelopment. If each is guaranteed liberty to make his or her own choices, Mill believed, each person would exercise that freedom to find ways of life that suited his or ber unique ciiiyacities h On Liberty, Mitl and e11couragt.d his or her grow& and developme~~t. indicates that this supports negative freedom: he wished to show that we should not place needess obstacles in the paths of others, as this may limit their development. I also pointed out that classical liberals such as E A. Mayek look back to Mill, as m exelnplar of Ihe case for negative liberty (Section 3.1). But-consistent with the idea that Mill's On Liberty is sornelhing &in to GaIliefs notion of an exemplar, accepted by proponents of compethg conceptions of liberty (Section 3.1)-proponents of positive liberty have also looked to Mill, as an inspiration. Mill" case for liberty cJepel7dec.lon the desirability of autonomous people who &ought for themselves and developed their natures and so were not ruled by custom or prejudice. If the development of such people is indeed a good thing, and if that is why negatiwe liberty is a good thir~g,then, some pMosophers have concluded, posieive liberty must be a good lhixlg too. Although Mill, may not have realjzed it, say sorne advocates of po"itive liberv, not only was he prewnti~ligthe case for negative liber% but he was lnyislg the foundatkns for devebpment of the positive concept. If only M y developed people are free people, the positive conceptic)n of freedom can explain why this is so and, on that gm&, seems superior.

Thusl according to one contemporary pfopment of positive :Liberty if we why Mill vaiuecl ffeedom-why he thought it was someehing to be prized and cherished-we will be led to embrace positive freedom-freedom understood, as the ability to make choices that dev e l ol~e's ~ naturt3." To many advocate?;of positive hedom, Mlll's stress on self-devt.lopmcnt and self-perfection supplies what is missing from theorjes of negative liberty: an mswer to the questions, "Why do we vaiue liberty?'" m d ""What sort of liberty is most importmt to us?'""" T%us,it has been argued, (l) If we want to understmd what freedom isr we have to understilnd why it is imyortar~t. (2) And Mill" answer to the q~~estion is, ""1E"eedomis important because it promotes choice m d self-development." (3) But once we see that choice is at the heart of the value of freedarn, then we will also see that negative freedom is not enough. And some negative frecdoms, that is, those that interfere with dmlopment or are not 17~?cessary for development, may not even be very valuable.

So the answer Mill gives to the westior~,"Vtrhy is freedom important?" it has been argued, leads his theory beyond negative freedom to a fuler, positive ideal of freedom. Liberty and Liberalisms

Liberty, I have said, is at the heart of ail li$eralisms (Section 3.1).We can now see, though, that different conceptions of liberty can lead to divergent understandings of liberalism. Classical liberalism is "oat on a negative conception of freedom." A person, on the negalive conception, is free when others are not erecting obstacles in his path or rtraderhg some of his options ineligible. J o h Loclke" Second Treatise of Goverpznzcrzt (l689) in many ways remains Lf-reclearest statemmt of the classical liberd's $Cvotion to each individual" liberty (and property-see %ction 5.3). According t~ Locke, the orighal cmdition of humm beings is a "'Sfatc @perfect Fwedonz to order their Actiol~s,ar~ddispose of their Possessinns, and Persons as they think fit, within the bomds of the Law of Natznre, without asking leave, or depending upon the Wll of any other Man.""?" This mtio1.1 of a persol13 naturai freedom or lihertp is fundamer~taito lfie &Ssical liberal tradition. The natural condition of humans-in Lacke's case, the condition in which God created humms-was one in which each has a claim to act as he chooses without interference from others, so lol~g"as he respects the freedom and property of others. An implim"tion of this

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view is that social life, and life under government, is somehow artificial. The orighal, natural state of humans, the state that does not stand in need of m y justification, is a state in kvbich each is perfectly free to do as he wishes as long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others, h d if Che natural state is one of perkct freedorn, any departure from this natural state, any loss of freedom, requires special justifjcation. The upshot of this is the d o c t h e that government is only legitimate if it is consented to by ail citizens (Section 10.3). G o v e m e n t imposes obstueles and restrktians in the forms of laws, the collllection of taxes, and so on. Thus, it limits freedom (notice, then, that the classical liberal. sees freedom as the absence of restraints). But according to the classical liberal, no one has the right to interfere with t-he natural freedom of allyone else, and that ixlcludes government. Consequently, only if people consent to the creation of governmen&that is, only if they agxe to its creation, can that s o u e t to impose its will g o v e m n t he legitimate. A gover~~mer~t on people without the consent of the people woz-tjd,be tyrannical. It wodd invade the natural liberv of the people. But if goven~mentis a limitation on naturai freedom, why would myone ever consent to it? Why voluntarily limi,t your own negative freedom? Locke" answer, and this has been the general classical liberal answer; is that wc. accept the limits on freedom that government requires for the sake of better protecting our freedom itself. In the absence of government, we are always in dmger of havit~gour freedom Zhited by others. Even if others try to respect our freedom, disputes wifl arisef and unless same authority exists (see %clion 10.31, there will be no easy way to resolve them. And of course, some people may not even try to respect the frtiedom of others, arid so lrhey pose a real threat to everyone else. 'Thus, the chief task of govemerrt, the job for wl.licb it was primarity designed, is the prokctim of indkidual liber@ (and properv), To use the phrase of Rohert Nozick, a conkmporary follower of Locke, the state is essaltially a ""prateclion agency.''3 :In the late nineteex~t%r century, t-he "'new liberalism,'" or ""revisionj.st liberafism,'" arose to challe~~ge this mhimalist theory of gover~~ment, and one of its pillars was T. H. Grc3en's positive conception of liberty T. H. G m n was indeed himself active in the Liberal Party in the tinjted Kingdom, and that was the party (at the time) ure;ing reform. Now, it c m be argued that those who m in e x t ~ m waM-those e ttnable to gai.n the basic necessities of food, and shelter-are unfrce in the positive sense of freedom. Under the burdexl of Lheir circumstance, lrhey are unahle to develop into self-directing, atrtonomous individuals, being instead constantly concerned with o b t a h i ~ ~the g daily necessities of life. For similar reasolls, Greexl was an educatiollaf reformer. If to he free people must be autonomous, they mtxst be educated: education provides the basic tools

necessary for people to act rationally and develop and understand their long-t"'m plans and goals. Liberal educatio~~, then, aims to develop autonomous hdividuals-those capable of &inking for themselves and not tied to custom or prejudice. If the lihcral stat the state devoted to libto erq-was tru do its job, it had tru provide citizens with the coz~ditior~s achieve autonomy, includhg at least a primary education. So those liberals who came to embrace Gree11" positive conception of freedom begm to see t-he task of protecting freedom -as requiring wide-ranging positive state action. These revisionist liberals agree that the liberal state is devoted to the p'ote"ian of liberty and that the great classical liberals such as John b c k e and John Stuart Mill were quite right about that. But given their more complicated notion of freedom, these revisionists insist that the protection of liberty is a more complicattzd foh than the great early liberals t h o s h t . Yes, the liberal state must ensure na~~h~terfere~~ce, but it also must provide for the conditions necessary for the development of autonomous people. T. H, Green and his fabwers thus could argue that they wre true to the traditional liberal doctrine of the functions of the state; the maixr job of government was to protect freedom. So in contrast to socialists and Marxists, these revisionist liberals we= not advocating a mdiberal a n s w r to lrhe question, "What is lrhe function of the state?'?nstead, they agreed with the classical.liberals that the main job of the state was to protect freedom, but now that freedom is undastood in this positive, rather than a negative, way, the job of protecting freedom is a much more demandkg one. C)-nceagain, we need to be camful. I do not wish to imply that everyme who embraces r~egativeliherty must be a classical liberal or all those who embrace positive lfierty must embrace revisionist liberalism and some notion of a welfare state. We can find some Marxists who adopt negathe liberty and some classical liberitis who advocate a sort of positive liberty,3"s I remarked earlier, constructing political theories is a complex and creative matter for wkch there are no formulas (Sectioz~3.1). Never&elcss, (3) the endorsement of a self-development d view of human nature, (2) a mux7it;Lic view of values, (3) posithe liberty, and (4) a supportive welfare state has been a coherent enduring political theory, and this has been the crux of the mo~~istic revisionist liberal theories that arose in the United Kingdom and the United States at the end of the nketeestth cent-ury In contrast, classical liberalism can be uz~derstoodas an ellduring theory based on (1)a Lockean moral individualism, (2) a pluralist theory illbout the values people pursue, m d (3) a negative conception of libervf all,helping to justjfy (4) a state the most essential functiox~of which is to protect individuals from il7terfere~lceby others.

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4.4 Quertioning the Positive/Negutive Distinction The Triadic Analysis

Thus far, 1have followed Berlh, accepting that negative m&positive liberty are two opposed w~derstmcJingsof freedom..Gerafd C. MacCallum Jr., however, has q~~e"i~nl.d the dislinction, insistkg that all, uses of liberty conform to the same schema. According to r\AacCallum, Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to dcting, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something. Such freedom is thus always ofsomething (an agent or agents),fiotn something, fu do, not do, become, or not become something. Taking the frjrmat "X is (is not) free From y to dct (not do, become, not becorn) z " ranges ~ over agents, y ranges over such "preventing conditictm" as ccmstraints, restricticms, interferences, and barriers, and s ranges cwer actions or conditions of character OF circumstance.35

To simplify, MacCallum" bask point is that dl ascriptions of freedom dways refer to three different elements: (1) an actor (X), (2) some restraislt (y), and (3) somc. action (zi. So, we can say, "Pason X is freehot free from restrajrtt y to &/not do z."326s has been called a triadic malysis of freedom: any intelligible use of "ffreedoxn"' in political discourse always refers, expli"tlly or implicitly, to these three elements. For instance, Alf is free horn Betty" hhadcuffs to run away Betty is free from the constraint of too little money to attend a university. Charlie is free from his addiction to develop his capacities.

As Maccallurn sees it, the debate between proponents of negative m d positive liberty rests on a confusion. For example, 8crl.k tells us that negative liberty is 'Vreedom from"' restraints," a d this is to be cmrasted with positive freedom that emphasizes "freedom to" do things or act in a certajn rational way MacCaLIum says this is a mistake. All ascriptions of freedom collcem a claim. that someolle isfree bnth fionz s m e t h h g m d to do something. Not only is it wrong, MacCallum argues, to say that "fseedom fronn"' and "freedom to"' are distinct "col~cepts of liberty,'" but he holds fiat looking at liberv through the negativelpositive distinction leads us to ignore the really importu7t political issues. The fw~damentalquestions that separate differe~ltpolitical theories are how the three variitbles are iden~fied. m a t sorts of entities are ascribed liberty (X)? M a t sorts of restraints are identified as po1i~call.ymost objectionable @,l? What sorts of actions does

a political theory indicate that we should be free to do (z)? Looking at these differences, says MacC:a:ilurrr,witr reveal the real basic diiferences in vlilrious defenses of liberty offered by polircical theories. He adds, The distincticm between positive and negative freedom ha$ however, stood in the way of this approach, It has encouraged US tt3 see differences in aca>untsof freedom as resuiting from differences in a>nceptsof freedom. This in turn has encouraged the wrong sorts of quesliom. We have been t-empted ta ask such questions as ' ' w d who is right? Whose concept of freedom is the correct one?" or ""Which kind of freedom do we really want after all?" Such questiom will not help reveat the fundamental issues separating major writers on freedrrrm from each other, no matter hour the various writers are arranged into ""camps." It w d d be far better to insist that the same concept of freedom is ctperating throughout, and that the differemes, rather than being about what freedonz is, are for example about what persons are, and about what can count as an obstacle to or interference with the freedcjm of persons so conceived.37

So MacCalIunr wants us to abiandoxz talk about ""negative" and "positive" freedom and instead focus debate on the ways vasious theories identify (X) yf z). of the triadic relatio~~ the eleme~~ts Berlin replies to MacCallum, insistkg that someone i-vhois chained simply wants to he free from her chajns: ''A m m struggljng agaimt his need not consciousfy aim at any chains or a people against e~~slavement definite further state. A m m need not h o w haw he will use his freedom; he just m t s to remove the yoke.""" As E understmd Berlin, though, his main concen.1is not to provide an analysis of ordinary language and analyze the structure of freedom sentences. Berlin's crucial claim is that certain theories of liiCaerty which he identifies aa "positive" cconeptims, facus 0x1 the ~estior.1,""Who governs me? A ratior~alwill of an il-riltimai passion?" k r l i n kvimts to impress on us that these are very different questions from those that move proponents of negatke liiberty: "How way to much am I governed? What do others stop me from doing?"" understand Bel.lii,n is that a theory of humm m e r e that begjrns with tke first question will, lead to policies and political program that will he rejected---or, at least, seen as liberty infringing-by a theory that stal-ts with the second question. Although many have thought that the positive conception is simply an extension of the negative conception, Berlisr tells us that it is a very diffemnt approach to the analysis of liberty. Bridging Negotiv~and Positiv~Liberty? We have seen that those advocating positive liberty tie freedom very close to reason; a free person must be a person who acts according to

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reason rather than through impulse, superstition, or custom or out of igmrance. In contrast, what harr; been catled pure negative liberty seems to understand freedom without any ~ f e r e n c to e what it i s r a h n a l for a person to do: it does not concern itself at all with why a person acts, only whether this act is obstructed." "Indeed, Ilobbes" sown account applies to the movement of natural objects as well as peaple: whatever moves unobstructed is free. Yet, even those attracted. to negative freedom have thought that freedo~ninvokes something more than mere mavement. In Cln Liberty, John Stuart Mili writes, 11 either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting tc:, cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be msafe, and there was no time to warn him of his danger, they may seize hirn and turn hirn back, without any reat infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river.4~~

Accordbng to Mill, the man chose trhe action " c r m the bridge." He cannot, however, perform that action: he is lacking crucial idormation that would show the impossibility of that act. The action open to him is "try to cross the bridge and,end up falling into the water," m d that is not an action he has Chosen to perform. Shce you are not stopping him from ""crossing the bridge," you are not stopphg him from doing anything that he has chosen to do. I(ou are only stqping him from "tryiulg to cross the bridge and inskad i a l h g into the river," msometbir7g that he has not chosen. Because stopping him from walking on the bridge does not stop him from doing what he really wants to do, stopping him does not override any decision t-hat he has made. A free act mtxst in some sense be chosen. To act freely, one must be capable of choice, or be a chooser, and one must exercise that capacity. Thus, if a person is sleepwalking, we do not consider it an interfere~nce with her liberty to stop her from crosshg a busy street, because she has not chosen to cross the street. Free action, even in the ncgatke sense of freedom, thus does, after all, presuppose the wrcise ofa capacity: the capacity far voluntary choice. To choose voluntarily ((I) the p e m n must not be so subject to cravistgs that she is literally compelled to act; (2) she must b o w what sbe is doing, bn the sense that sbe intends to perform slcepwalkhg); (3) she must not so mjsmnthe act (for exilmplc, she is derstand the context of her action that she does not h o w what she is really doing (as in Mill" bad bridge case); (4) she must not be so greatly influenced by drugs or psychological distmtions that she does not h o w what she is doing or is unable to control hersclf; and (5) she must not have been co~nditionedby others to the extexnt that what she thinks of as

her choices actually have been progmmmed into her (that is, she must not be "brainwashedff). T%ese are all complex conditions and I have dealt with them in. more length elsewhere.42 The crucial point, though, is that insofar as negative ew competent chooser, ~liegativeliberty beliberty p ~ " ~ " m p p ominh"lly gins to move in the direction of positive liberty. T%us, observes an advacate of positive :Liberty, Mitl's claim. that one does not infringe the libertlJ of a person crossing lfie bridge bmause t-he persolli does not wish to fall into the river is '*hgerm thc doctrine of the 'real witl."'" As soon as m advocate of negative liberty acknowledges that a free person must he a chooser, the pmponent of posithe frctcdom can insist that a better chc-toser is freer than a worse chooser. Advocates of negativr. Iiberty of course, do not accept this, T%ey deny that a free person is ~ e r e n t l ya good choose%or one who follows her real, fully rational, will. A free person is a cboser whose opportunities for actim are not made ineligible by others. Nevertheless, insofar ils defenders of negative lirberty are concerned about obstacles to choice, freedum cannot be understood purely in terns about eder~lialrestraints. A person must have, if not a real will, a mliu\imalIy effective will, allowing us to accurately describe what he does as his own choice. As one contcmporar)r philosopher has put it, although negative freedom is by rlio means to be equated Lyith autonomy it does presuppose the exercise oC a more modest capacity, crtctavchy, the capacity to choose.44

T%is chapter has focused on the distkction between negative m d positive li:berty*In Section 4.1, I considered, a series of examples and tried. to develop a conception of freedom on the basis of ordinary w u a g e , Begirlining with the simple idea of freedom as movement that is m t blocked, we saw that one's freecfom c m be limited when a possible course of action has been made ineligible by thfeats, even if it is stil possible to perfom t-he actio~li.Not just force, but threats of force, limit freedam. I also considered whether offers c m be coercive and limit freedam. Sction 4.2 t u m d to positive freedum, which 7: H, Green believed was a development of the ~liotionof negative freedom. A free person, 01%this view, is one guided by her real will-her settled aims, goals, m d desires.. For Green, such a perwn was necesmlily concerned with the dwelopmerlit oi her capacities. Only a persm i;uided by rr,.at;m,on this view, can be free. Thus, RIIhctugh extersrd obstades c m prevent one from being guided by reason, so too can internal obstacles. This idea is central to Be various notiorlis of mli autorliomous life that we examined.

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%cti,;on4.3 then examined Isaiah Berlh" salysis of the difference un$er:iying positive and negative Ilherq Positive libaty, Berlin -argues, is grounded on monism-the belief that all values ultimately are harmanious s d that a s i ~ ~ ganswer le can be uncovered to the question, 'What m a k s life worth living?" In ccontrast, Berlin believes that negative Iiberty is supported by pluralism, a conviction that the ends in life are many m d conflicting. Because there are many good things in life and we cannot have them all, we must choose, but if does not Seem that any one choice is demankd by reason. Mence the importance of negative lirberty. X extended Berlin" ppoint, showhg how positive liberty reacts rationalism and ailegiance to a self-development& view of human nahnre. This combination of rati.ol7alism and self-development views of h u n m 11ature characterized much of the ""new liberalism" that arose at the beg;inning of the Wentieth century thus helping to explah why new liberal theorists tended to adopt positive conceptions of liberv- :In contrast, Che classical liberal tradition has been far less prone to accept either rationalism or self-developmental views of human nature, and has tended to stress m o d indivitluafim and @ralism. In %ction 4.4'1 examked two challenges to the stark contrast betkveerr negative and positive liberty. Gerald MacCaliurn tries tcr show that all ave a t%lree-partstrucfrtiedom chims-~~egativeas well arr; podtiv ture; k hSjsts there is but 0111;' comept of liherty. Last, E argued that we should be careful not to overstate the differences between negative and po"tive liberty, since even adwocates of negative liberty must corlcen fiemsclves with the internd conditions for genuine choice. Only choosers c m be denied political liberty Nevertheless, although the distinrtion is not quite so stark as some have thought, it seems that- Berlin has made out a powerful. case that the different interprcltntions of libere am grounded. on different, indeed competing, understmdil-tgs of value, reasall, a ~ human d nahnre,

1. In this book, I foltc3w normal philosophical practice in treating "liberty" and "freedom'hs synonyms, though they have slightly difkreltt uses in English, A person, f t x instance, might be said to "take liberties" with the English language; he would not be said to "take freedoms'hwith it. 2. Thornas Hobbes, "Of L1"bertyand Necessity," hSir WlIiarn Molesworth, ed., E~zglkhWo&s [of Thorms Hobbesl, vol. 4 (Londctn, 1840), p. 273, 3. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in his For.tr Essnys un Libert'y (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p, 122. 4. WiXlel Steinel; An Essay un R~~I'IGs (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 2994), p. C-;. Emphasis added.

5. For different analyses ctf cases such as these, which link interfering with freedom to moral responsibility for obstacles, see David Miller, ""Constraints on Freedom," "Ethics, vol. 94 (19831, pp. 66-86; Mristj6n Mristjiinsson, Social Fretadorn: The Responsibility New (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), chap. 2. 6. Isaiah Berlin, ""lltroductictn," in his Four Essays orz Liberty, pp. xxxix-xi. 7. See Krisl-jjdnsson,Social Freredorn, pp. 68-69; Williarn E. Connolly The Temgs of hlitiml Disconrse, 2nd ed, (Princetctn: Princeton University Press, 19831, pp. 365ff. 8. See J. I). Day, "Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Liberty," America?$ Philosophical Quurtcrty, vol. 14 (1977), p, 263. 9. F. A. Hayek, The GonsGitzltlon qfLiberf,y ((London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1%A), p, 133, 10, On the option view of freedom, see Joel Feinberg, Rights, Jzlstice and the Bofrnds 0.f Liberty (Princeton: Princetan University Press, 1%0), p. 36. 11. See S. I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein, ""Bing Free to Act, and Being a Free Man," Mil.zd, vol. 80 (1971), pp. 202-203; See KristjBnsson, Social Freedom, pp. 41 ff. 12, Quoted in Joef Feinberg, Ham to Self (New York: Oxftord University Press, 1986), p. 250. 13. Far a good discussion, see KristjBnsson, Sucinl Fredonz, pp. 51ff. For drrrubts about the idea of coercive offers, see my Soclrnl Plzilosoplzy (Armonk, N Y M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp, 204-210. 14. Berlin, ""Xtroduction,""p, xxxix. Emphasis added, 15. See Charles Taylor, "What" Wrong with Negative Liberty," in inlan Qan, ed., Tfze Idea of Freedom (Oxford: Ciarendon Press, 197!9), pp. 375-194, 16. This lecture has been reprinted in several places. For some useful selections, see John R. Rodman, ed ., 7: H,Green: PoliCimE Tfwoty (New Ycjrk: AppletonCentuly-Crofts, 1964). For the Pull lecture, see Paul Harris and John Morrow eds., Green's Leclzdres on the Principles of Political Obligakiorz (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiv Press, 1986).My references are to the latter. 17. Green, ""On the Different %rises of Freedom," p 222. 18, Ibid., p. 228, 19. For different views on the relation of positive freedom and autonomy, see Robert Ycfung, X3ers,i.onafAufiorzomy: Beyorjd Negntive nrjd hsitive Liberty (Lctndon: Croom Helm, 1986); Woracio Spector' Aufonorny and Riglzfs: The Moral Foundations oftiberalism (Oxford: Claredon Press, 19921, pp. 942. 20. Green, ""On the Different S n s e s of Freedom," p. 228. 21. Joseph Raz, T/w Morality ofFreedom (Oxfc3rd: Clarendon Press, 39861, p. 375, 22. See S. 1. Benn, A Theory qf Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1"38&),chap. 4; Thamas E. Hill Jr., Autolzonzy atzd Seq-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3391), pp. 35ff. Susan Wolf distinguishes freedom as following the real self from freedom as living acccrrrding to reasctn in her Freedom FZritlzin Reasorz (Oxford: Oxford University f3ress, 3990). 23. See, for example, Gerald Dworkin, The TIfeury and Practice qf Azifonsmy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 39881, chap. 1. 24. Berlin, "Two Concepts," pp, 3 32-233. 25. Ibid., p, 150, 26..Tbid ., p. 2 66. 27. Ibid., p, 170.

100


28, Xbid., p. 171, 29, Richard Norman, Free arzd Equal: A Pltilosophicnl Examination of Political Vafut2s(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3987), pp. 36-37, 30. See Taytor, "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty." Libertarian Idea (Pl~iladelphia:Temple Uniriersity 31. See Jan Nrzrveson, Press, 2 9238). 32. John toske, Secouzd Treatke of Cozjemmelzt, in Peter taslett, ed., Two Eeatkes of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 9601, sect. 4. 33, See Robert Nozick, Anarc/ty, State a~zdU t o p i ~(New York: Basic Books, 197'4), Part 1, especially chap. 5. 34. See KristjBnsson, Social Freedom, p. 314; Spector, Autollotny and Rig121.s. 35, Gerald C, MacCatlum Jr., ""Negative and Positive Freedom," in Peter Ladett, W, G, Runciman, and Quentin Skinner, eds., Pfzilosoph?~,Politics alzd Society, 4th series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19721, p. 376. 36. Berlin, "Two Concepts," p. 127. 37, MacCallurn, ""Negative and Positive Freedom," p. 181. 38. Berlin, Four Essays 072 Libe~tj/~ p. xfiii, note. 39. See Richard E, Flathman, The Plzilosoplsy alzd Pofitics of Freedonz (Chicago: Universiv of Chicagc:,Press, 1987), p. 32. 40. John Stuart Mill, Orx Liberty, in JohnGray; ed., O n Liberty land Ollzer Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 5, para. 5. 41. I am following Joel Feinberg, I-farnz fu SeV (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 315; Benn, A T11eory ofFreedam, chap. 8. 42. See my Social Philosopfzy, pp. 202-205. 43, Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosoplliml Tjleo~y1;1( f?te Slate, in Cerald E Gaus and Wi11iam Sweet, eds., The Pfjilosop?ziml Theory offhe Slate and Related Essays (Indianapofis, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2000), p. 47. $4. Benn, A TI-~oqj f:$ Freehrn, chap. 8.

5. I , Positive Freedom as Power to Act Freedom as Being Able to Do What One Desires

The prc.vious chapter focused on the distincrtim between negative and positive Illbere, the latter behg trnderstood as autonomous, rational, or self-conkolled action. We now must consider a different cmception of positive liberty---one that is often co~~fused with freedom as autol~omywhich I call liberty us paw tn act. AIthough distinct, freedom as power to act is conceptually tied to liberty as autonomy. 'f. H. Green (Section 4.2) was concerned with one's piiwcr or ability to acf; someone under the infiuence of alcohol did not have the power to act accodiing to her true preferences. At one poj,27f;G ~ e actually n d e h e s mm's freedom as "the power of acting according to his true will or prefcrence,"l Now, in Crc;.enfsmind this idea is allvitys lirlked to the concept of freedom arr; autonomous action, but later theorists develop a different conceplion of positive freedom, According to this second conception of positive freedom, someone is free to perform act if sbe has the efictctiwe power to Q. By "effective power,'' h e a n skills, resources, or whatever one needs to perform @. This sort of positive fomulation of freedom locates freedom in not simply the absence of impedime~~ts to action, but the ability to perform the actions a person's dc.sil-c.s.In short, a free person can do what she desires to do. Or as the British swialist R. H. Tawrrey (1880-1962) put it, iiberty implies "the ability to act.'"? To see how freedom as power differs from negative liberty consider the case of segregated, universities and colleges in the United States. mrough the 195Os, and well into the 19hOs, universities and colleges in many southern staes in the United States we= legrrlly segrt?grrt.ed:blacks were legally barred, from atteding all-white universities. Such. segregation wits declared illegai by federal authorities and no longer is practiced today. Many blacks are still trnable to attend these formerly all-white

1 02

LIBERTY AND POWER

universities, however, Family incomes are lower among blacks, so they are less able to send their children to any university; a r ~ dbecause black elernentar?, and secondary schools are often pomly funded cornpmd to the scbols whites attend, blacrks are often less well. prepared for college. Now OUT vestion is not- whether this is jusethat is a wider query that is relevant to Chapters 8 and 9-b& w h e t k blacks art. asfree as whites to attend universities. A liberal defcnder of negative fx-eedom. would agree that prior to the desegregation of southern colleges and universities, blacks wert. not free to attend schools like the Universjly of Mississippi (Oxford). The option of attending was made ineligible; efforts by bhck studex-ttsto attel-td would be, a r ~ dweR, blocked by *rests and force. The (1'~e&liC"11 cor-tcernsLhe present: are blacks BOW free to attend t-hese ul-tiversities? Advocates of negative li,berty maintajn that as long as blaclc students are not threatened for attending, or excluded by racist admissions poliries, black students are free to attend these univerdics. To be sure, poorer black st-udents-like poorer white students re nol"able fo use Illis liberty, but that does not mean they do not have it. In conkast, a proponent of freedom as power will insist &iallperson who is not able to go to a tmiversity simply is not free to do so. A poor person, on this view, is not free to go to a university, take the Concorde to Europe, or buy a Mercedes. m a t one is not able to do, one is not- free to do. Freedom and Material Well-Being

me debate between advocates of liberal, negative liberty and liberty as p w e r ihhihlighted in the debate whether it makes sense to distinguish a pawn%liberty from lfie worth or value of that liberty. Libaais -almost always insist tha"r"overty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally" are not constraints that limit one's freedom, but affect ''the worth of liberty."W~'ottoo surprising, socialist wrilers tend to reject this distimction.Voor the socialist, human emancipation is inherently linked to material well-bring: In contemporary society . . . the rnctst obvious example ctf the liberating character of mat-erial conditit.ionsis monetary wealth. If X inherit a fortune ctr win the pools or, less spectacularly, get a new job which will provide me with a larger income, new opportunities become available tt>me which were previously inaccessible: I can travel to different places, engage in difkrent activities or pastimes-new worlds, geographically new or culturally new, are opened up for me. The connection with freedom lies not in the greater material comforts or enjoyments, but in the increase ctf possibilities-the greater scope f ~ choice.' r

To be free to do soxnethingpone needs both to be free from restraint and to have the rwources to do the thing. Obviously; this c o n c q t i o ~of~liberty tremendously hcreases the scope of state action req~riredto ensure freedom, The task of ensuring freedurn becomes the job of providing a multitude of resources: income, health care, educatio~~, housing, and so on. rfi> make citizens free, the state must provide them with the resources necessary for action. So understood, the responsibilities of the freedomenhanci~~g state go far beyond even that of T. H. Greeds autonomyenhancing regime. For according to freedom as atrtonomy, a state devoted, to freedom must provide thc conditions for autonomy; and althou& this may include some provision of basic educatio~~al, cultural, and welfare goods, it does not ixnply Ehat all resources increase freedom. According to freedarn as power to act, however, every *crease in material resources that increases your ability to pursue your desires necessarily increases your freedom. Thus, t-he aixn oi equalizing freedom is inherently linked to equalizing material resources (see Section 724). And because capitalism leads to inequality of resources, on this view, it necessarily involves w q u d freedom. Liberal advocates of capitalism thus reject this conception of freedarn. Writes F. A. Hayek, This confusion of liberty as power with liberty in its original meaning inevitably leads to the identificatic~nof liberty with wealth; and this makes it passible ta exploit all the appeal which the word "liberty" carries in the support of the demand Ear the =distribution of wealth. Yet, though freedom and wealth are both good things which most of us desire and though we often need both to obtain what we wish, they still rernah different, Whether 1 am my own master and can follow my own choice and whether the possibilities from which X must choose are many or few are two entirety different questiom, The cclurtier living in the tap of luxury but at the beck and call of his prince may be much less free than a poor peasant or artisan, less able to five his ctwn life, and to chctose his own ctpportunities for usefulness. . . . Liberty drrres not mean all good things or the absnce of all evils, It is true that to be Free may mean freedom to starve, to make costiy mistakes, or to run mortal risks. In the sense in which we use the term, the penniless vagabond who lives precariously by constant improvisation is indeed freer than the conscripted sotdier with a13 his security and relative cornfc3rt. But i f liberty may not therefore be preferable to other goods, it is a distinctive good that needs a distinctive name.(>

Nofrice that just as Isaiah Berlin appealed to plwalism (Seclrion 3.2) in his $efense of negative liherty against ljberty as a u t o ~ ~ o m(Section y 4.2),

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LIBERTY AND POWER

Hayck too appeals to pluralism. Freedown is just one of the good things in life; material wealth aid security art.others, and they too are important if we are to achieve our aims and purposes. But Hayek, like Berlk, jnsists that it is a mistake to include all these good things in the concept of l&erty; the pursuit of freedom and other good things can col~flict,and one may have to choose, say, freedom over security, or freedam over material well-being. Including all of these good things in the concept of liberty belies a mollistic beiief that they all are part of the same ideal and we can avoid the necessity of choosixlg ilrnollg &em.

Athough freedom as power is in m m y ways a m c h more straightfoward notion of positive libery than that p ~ s e n t e dby "f: H. Green, it has a serious prcrblem t-hat Green's lrheory does not. Grceds theory helps us make sense of the ideal of a free person. Green c m argue that a libert-yenhmcing swial policy ought to aim at encou~agingthe dcrvelopment of free, auto~lomous,people. According to freedom as effective power, however, the general idea of a free person becomes lost. What is a free person? The proponent of ncgative liberty has an answer: someone who is m t being restrained by others. Green has an awwer: someone who can act atrtonomously, and so is not a slave to passions or prejudices. But the proyonent of freedom as effective power does not have a clear answer: a persol1 can be h e to do this or free to do fiat, but the ideal of a fret. perso?? appears to evaporate. Sbce freedom requires resources, m d since no one will ever have all the resources to do everything she wants, people will always be free to do some things and not others. The or~lyway to reconcile freedom as power with the idea of a free penon is to rely on a social environmentalist theory of human nature (Section 3.3); according to which people's wants are formed by their society. As m m y socialists have argued, although peaple" svmts in, capitalist societies are endlessno matter what we have we always want some2rlnhg more-it does not follow that people living h a socialist socjety would be ""limitless consumers." If, under socialism, people only wmted what they needed, or in, some way their wmts were limited and modest, then everyone might have the power to do everythil7g they war~tedto do, and then everyone could be called a free person. In the absence of such a radical change in the nature of people's w n t s , however, lfie collception of frcredom as effective power switches the focus of Ereedom discourse f r m th.e general value of freedom, to the value of being able to do this thing (go to university) or do that thing (take a vacation). That is, if we take this second coxlceptioxl of positiwe freedam as basic, we will no longer be committed to the idea of a free

person, but must focus on particular sorts of freedom, Should you be free to travel to the moon? Are we to w o r 7 if people are unfree in this sense? Clearly same unfreedoms (that is, lack of powers) are not to be regretted, and some frcedoms (that is, powers) arc not to be pursued. But if that is so, then we need criteria to disthguish valuable freedoms from silly freedams- Why are some powers essential and other pokvers unimportant? Somewhat surprising, developing such criteria is apt to lcad us back to freedom arr; autonomy, or freedom as seli-realizatim (Sections 4.2,4.3). We can distinguish important from trivial liberties if, accepting an ideal of self-realization or self-developmentlwe can distinguish those liberties (powers) that are critical for achieving self-realization from those t-hat do little to advar~ceit-indeed, perhaps even are impediments to it. Suppose, for example, that great wealth is act-ually an obstacle to self-development; it has been said that it distracts us and tempts us to pmwe "If-indulgent, but ultimatczly not self-satisfying, lives. Equipped with a theory about. which freedoms me innportmt, the advcxate of freedom as power could now say what types of freedom (abilities) are necessary for a satisfying, free life. But: note that at this point k e d as~ pokver has collapsed into freedom as self-realization: the free life is a self-realized or autonomous life, not simply a life rich with effective powers.

5.2 Pewer and Freedam "F)Ower to" and "Pawer averN

I h e noti011 of positive freedom as power to act has k d us into one of the enduring disputes in flitical theory-the relation of freedom and power, We cannot really understand freedown until we grasp its relation to power. UrTforb~~ately like other important political cox~cepts,power itself seems essentially contested (see Section 2.11.7 The discussion in Section 5.1 relied on what might be called the Hobbesian conception of power. kcording to Thomas Hobbes, "The power of a man . . . is his present means, to obtain some f'trture or apparent good."%~ounderstood, power b e h g s to a person if he has the means to achieve his goals, desires, and so on. &e's power is ox?re"sa$iijty to do what one wishes. Such poruer fo depends on one's natural capacities, information, m d resources.. All these could be employed by Rohinson Cmsoe alme on a desert isl a ~ dm . a t he couid not have w~tilanother person a p p e w d was powr over. mother: Xf n person pos~(3sses""powerover" others, he can somehow affect their interests and lives; he can typically make them do things they w u l d not o&erwise have d m e or believe thir~gsthey would not have otherwise b e l i e ~ e d . ~

1 06

LIBERTY AND POWER

It would seem that '"ower to" is the more general idea. A person can have the power to do things for many differerzt reasons, olze of which is that he has ""polver aver" others. Having power aver athers is one way, but o d y one way, of being able to secure what one desires. Let us say, then, that '"power overf"is a subset of '"power to." A persm who has '*power aver" anather necessarily has "'poolver to" affect that person in, certain ways, but one c m have the power to, say, buifd one" own house w i t b u t having power over anyolze. Cont.rof krsos Effect Theories of ""Power over"

Political theorists have long debated precisely what is involved in one person having pawer over another. Skplifqri,g a cmplex debak, we can distinguish two broad farnilies of theories. according to cuntml theories of power over, to possess power over others evinces an ability to colztrol fihern.l"lf is thus said to have power over Betty when Alf can control some aspect of Betty" life, Alf has power over BetSy's dream if he can in some m y corztrol her drems; he has powcsr over her desires if he can control kvhich anes she adopts; he has power over her actions if he c m control what she does. "Control" is to be distinguished from influencing another through reasoning with her or exchange with her. W e n I try to convhce you to join the American Civil 1,iberties Union, 1 do not control you, even if you decide to join up; when I offer the car dealer $20,001),I do m t control her, even if she takes up t-he offer. fn ~ z e i t k case r do I have power aver the other in the sense of control. But if I hfluence your decisions by brainwashing you or by coercing you, then I do ext.rcise corrtsol, and so have power over you. Some, however, have denied this. It has been rxraintahed by Felix Oppeheim that control was exercised by President Eisenhower when he persuaded voters to ekct him by promising an end to the Korean war." Although, to be sure, if &ere redly is such a thhg as "'hidden persuasion" in the form af subliminal advertishg, that wodd indeed be a type of contrd; but simply persuading vokrs that you will do what they wazt you to do har$ly seems a way to control Ihem. If, an the other hand, the president withheld crucial. information so as to maniyulate the people, thm we may well see him as exercising control. If we adopt the c o n t d view, it does not seem that Alf has power over Betty just because he can affect her, even greatly affect her, in ways that he cannot control. A bull in a china shop greatfy ahcrts the owners of the shop, indeed in ways that go against their interests, but tt7e bull does not exercise p w e r aver the owners. This is important, for we see that a person may possess a great amomt of "power to"' do th-s that trcmendousiy affect people, yet still not have ""power over"' t-hem in the selzse of controll.

Cmtrol theories explajn the notion of power over in terns of one person being subject to the will of another. They thus piace gm& stress on the way in which power is tied to intentional or conscjous pttrposes. It has been said that "power may be defined as the production of intended. efiects."lTContrt,l of another =erns to imply that one wishes person A to cfr, and because one has control one is able ta make it the case that person A. perfoms action @. To be sure, one who has control, c m accidentally use it-my daughter may accidental:iyhit the cox~trolbutton on her video game and make it turn oK when she does not wmt it to. In that case, her control of the game led to a resdt she did not intend or wish, l y lfie other do w:hat you wish, you do But unless you can g e ~ ~ e r dmake not control her. And ur~lessyou haue control (can guide things to do what you wmt them to do), you cannot lose i h n d cause an unhtended outcame, Ma21y have disputed that for person A to hawe power over 13 with regard to @, A must intend that N @. According to effect theories of poulcrv over, the heart of power is the ahility to adversely affect the interttsts of others, usually in a way t-hatbenefits the power holder*" Thus, according to Steven L,trkes%famous account, "'A exercises power over B when A affecb B in a manner contrary to B's interests."lVonsider, for example, the following story p s e n t e d by William Connelly: Suppose . . . as a white emplrsyer in control of important and xarce job opportunities, I fail through inattenticm and habit tc3 consider candidates for employment other than lower-class white mates. 1 could do cltherwise .if X were to attend carefully to the consequences ctf my actions, but X don?, contributing thereby tt3 the high unemplrsymcnt of minorities.1" li-, ihe advocate of Ihe control t h e q , this looks morc like a bull in a china

shop that an exercrise of control over people. The employer has great power to do things, m d his exercise of this "'pawer to" has effects on others, brat it is hard to see how in any way it exhibib a conk01 of them. h one way, of course, lrhe owller is clearly d i f f e ~ nfrom t the hutl in the & h a shop: he is respmsible for his actiOns, m d could have done olherwise. For sorne, this is cmcial: if person A. is responsible for m Obstacle confronting B, some insist that he is exemising power over her." To many, what is also salient in. this case is that because the white employer holds a ""srrategic poktion with regad to empioyment chances," he can reasonably be said to "'exercise power over them.'"l7 The core idea is that the mployer's actions have a systematic, adverse e&ct on the interests of the blilcks, m d that is why he holds power over them, On this effect view of power over, permn A has power over person B if person A (systematically) acts in ways Chat ildverseiy a:fect the interest of B while advancing his own.

1 08

~ ~ B E R TAND V

POWER

What is not irnportartt to effect Ulieories is that the power holder controls peofle in the sellse of making them do what he wants them to do. Which conception of "'power over" a theorist thinks best will, as is the case with my essentirslly contested concept, turn on the rest of his political theory. Wi& respect to theories of power, an especially important consideration will be the jvldividualist ar collectivist commitments of the theory. AS we saw in Sction 3.4, a methodological, collectivist believes that s individuals are to be explained by the the beliefs, actions, ar~di n t e ~ s t of social system jvl which they find them,selves. In expla;ming a person's life and its conditions, then, the colkctivist insists on the prirnary importance of one%piace i17 the swiill system, not lfie aims, desires, ar~dintent.io~lsof individuai agents. Such collectivism, then, inclines strongly to effect thee ries of "'power over." To use Connolly" term, it is the ""srategic positionrr in the overall social m d economic system t h t gives one persm power over another. We locate power not in one agent's abiljty to make ar~other da what he wishes, but in, the way the social system systematically disadvimtagesome interests aver others, allowjng some people to thrive m d others to be dominated. Political theories that: combine a collectivist melhod imd a view of sockty t h t stresses codicts of jvlterest thus tend to place effect theories of "power over" dose to their core. Not surprising, then, socidist analyses of capitalist society are apt to m& t-he most of this collception of power*For example, accordhg to Marold. Laski, one of the twentieth century" foremost socialist political theorists, socialism is not a movement the summary ctf which is simple. There go tct its making ideas derived from the most disparate sources. But it is not, X think, inaccurate tc:, say that the essence of its attack [on liberalism] derived from the realization that the liberal idea secured to the middle-dass its Full share of privilege, while it left the proletariat in chains,l"

The core of socialjtjm's criticism of liberal capitalist societfi is that its basic arrangements leave some welI off vvhile others are impoverished; in this seme the workers are in "chains,"' ar~dtt7e owning classes have power over them. Of course, Laski daes not mean either that: the workers are literally in chahs or even that they are consciously controlled by capitalists: he is pointing to their place in the ecorlomic system ar~dhow it disadvantages them. In contrast, classical liberaiis adopt s o m version of methodological individuaiism. They mderstand society in terms of the beliefs, artions, and desires of individuals and the relations between them. Consequently; when malyzing what is involved in one person having power over others, liberal indivicfualistsidentify relatio~~s in LVhiCh one person is able to, or actually does, control the belliefs, desires, and actions of anather jndi-

vidual. Although classical liberals arc? likely to achowledge that rules and institutions are usually employed in this p o w r r&tior-r, the core case of *'power overrfis one person intentionally controlling mother.'" Liber?: Power, and Competition

Mic began the chapter by examin-ting the conception of positive liberty accordir-rg to vhJhich freedom is eyuakd with "power to.'Te are now in a position to appreciate one of the kvorries raised by such conceptions: because one f o m of "power b" do something is to have "power over" others, if to have freedom is to possess power; one's freedom may be enh n c e d by havir~gpower over others. Exercising power over anotherd however, inherttntly limits that person's liberty;" If, saqi, 1 cmtrol you, then your artions respond to my wishes; should you want to do otherwise, you could not, or could only do so at co11sider;llale costs. It would not, 1 think, make much sense to say that 1 controlled you, but you were perfectly h e to act against my wishes-h what sense do 1 then control you? Kecail that for Haycsk (Section $.I), cwrcrior-r lirnits your liherty because it makes you "sameone% else" tool." That too is the right metaphor for being controlled by mother: if you exercise power over me I am to some extel-rtyour tool, and so not free. NOW,if one way to have polver is to have polver over others, and if ALFs having power over B e y implies that Bey's liberty is limited, then according to freedom arr; power to act, or-reperson's liberty irherel-rtlylimits mother person's. If Alf h s power over Bet@ he is free, but her freedom is limited. If Alf does not have power over Betty, her hedown shows that his power idimited; but if freedom is power, then Butty's freedom necessarily limits Mf's freedonn. Insofar as fmcdom invotves having power over others, freedom thus becomes an inhex~ztlycunzptifz'uegc~od. We c m distinguish three vpewf ggods. Let us call a good a cnmmcllz good if ollc person's shart? of it cmnot detract from other people's share-it is ""not diminished by sharirrg."21 Listel-rhg to a concert together is such a good; my liste~lingdoes not diminish the amour-rtof concert open to you to hear. And if I get mare of the good-the performer does an encore, say-you also get more of the good. A partinlly eompetitivc good is one that, in some cases, both Aif and Betty car1 gain m m of at the same time, whereas in other cases Alf gains more by diminishing Eletty" share. Weal& is such a good, In productive m t e ~ r i s e sthe , coopesating partks both increase their weal&; pluderers, however, gain through taking the wealth of others. Last, an hherently competitive good is one in. which the only way for you to increase your amount is to decrtlase the m o u n t of someone else. The good of '(being bestf"on a team is such a g o d ; tfie only way you cm get it is to take it away from someone else-

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Insofar as freedom is sought through power over others, it is inherently competitive. The only way E can achieve such freedom is by limiting your liberty (that is, power) to da as you please. If, then, we understand freedom as "power over"' others, we camot even contemplate the ideal of a society of free peopk. We can no more imgine a society in which everyone is free (in the sense of havbg power) than we c m imagine a society in which everyant. is the best basdaX1 playtlr. Freedom thus mderstood can be r e d i s t r i t e m o v e d from person to person-but its at be *creased." It is certahly trol.ibling for a concept it seems to undernine the very ideal of a free sock@ Ef, however, we restrict freedom as power to the notio~?~ of "power to," where this does not imply "power overfUt k pursuit of freedom is m t inherently competitive. It is then a good like wealth (indeed, freedom becomes very closely lhked to wealth). We can all simultaneously increase our wealth (or freedom), but I also c m increase my wealth (or freedom) by takixlg some of your wealth (freedom qua power to). Is it possibZt. to understand freedom as a common good-one that is not dimhished by sharing? Negative liberty seems to render fmedom noncompet.itive insofar as my share of freedom does not in itself diminish yours, Alf is negatively free insofar as no one acts in such a way as tr, render o p t i m h e i b l e for him; Belly it; free hsofar as no one r e ~ ~ d eoprs tions ineligible for h a (Section 4.1). The absence of obstacles t~ n l f in no way necessitates obstacles for Betty; his ""sare" of nonintemention does not initself decrease her share. The problern, -as classical liberals have long recognized, is that although there is no ~ e r mcodict t beween Alf m d Betty's negative freedom, as sow as they ernplop their freedom to do fhil~gs,they may end up limiting earh other's freedom. Should Bet-ty use her freedom to capttxre Alf, or to block his path when walking down the street, she lirnits his freedom. As soon as we begin to use our negative freedom, it is very hard not to, as it w r e , bump into each other hways that limit each other" negative freedom. Thus, liberals have argued, a condltiomz in which each was free to use her freedom in m y way she wished-a "sta;te of 17abre"-would he characterized by cro~~flict and illsecurity (Sections 43,8.2), Classical liiberals have clfen insisted that to ensure a generally free sociely, we must give up the liberty to "b p into each other" in crertab~ways-say by attacking each other, ?'his suggests that as a practical matter, even negative freedom is a partially competitive good.

5.3 Freedom, Power, and Property Liber?. and Pn'vofe Proper?.: Classical Liberal Views

Irzstrzrmcnluli,sf Defenses of Freedom. Since ill least the seventeenth century liberals have not only upheld liberty as their core value, they have

insisted that private property is necessary for liberty. Liberals, however, have p~sentecltwo marhdly difkrexlt accounts of this relation. According to what we mi,ght call liberty-prot-ecfitzgcasesfor pmperfy, private property is justified because it supplies individmls with the power they need the power of goven~ment.Mthou$h, as we have just seen, to cou~~teract liberais recognize that government. is necessary to protest us horn each other, they also insist that the power of governmcnt is the chief threat to liberty. "fb exercise. power is to limit someaxle else's freedom; since government is the mast pokverful shgle actor in society, it poses the greatest lhreat to freedom. Consequentlyr liberals have insisted that only an ecommic system based on private property disperses power and ~sourccs, ensuring that private people have the ~ s o w c eto s oppose the state. Property provides individuals with the power to resist government. As Hayek argues, "There can "o no freedom of press if the instmrnenb of printing control, 110 freedOm of assennhly if the needed are ur~dergover~~ment rooms are so controlled, no freedom of movement if the means of trimsport are a government monopoly.'"2 Another; skitar cJefense of properv insists ody tfiose with property have lfie i n d e p e ~ ~ d enecessary ~~ce for a free socievt because they do not depend an the state ar others for their :livelihood., they can afford to speak their mind and oppose those who w u l d use thejr power to dominate society+2"jibc.rty-pr~te~ting dekmses of property, then, see property as irtvolving " p o m to": if I have property E have the power to act orz my desires, including desires that the goven~mexltopposes. None of this constitutes a dt.nial that Alf's property limjts Betty's freedom, ff P is AXf% property, he has a "bundle of rights" ~rcgardingit, most important of which are (1) Right Of Use: Alf has a right to use that is, (a) It is not wrozlg for Mf to use 1D, a d (b) It is wrong for others to interfere with Al,ffs ushg P. (2) Right L?~EXGILCSZ(IIZ: Others (including B e y ) map use P i f and only if Aff e~x~sex~ts, that is, (a) If Alf consents, it is, other things being equal, not wrong for others (irtrludir~gBetty) to use P; (h) If Alf does not consex~t,it is, other trhings being equal, wrong for athers to use P. (3) Right C?f:Tratzsfer: Alf may permanently t-t.anskrthe rights in rules (1)ar~d(2) to specific persms by conse1lt.2" Ihe right of exlusion---(2)-clearly limits Rcrlty'ui Iiberty: Mf's property right to P limits Betty's liberty to use it. Liberal defrtnses of private property do not deny that All" property limits Bet.ty% freedam to use P. After all, all 0fAlf"s rights limit the f ~ e d o m of others: Alf's Sight not to he

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mugged limits the freedom of others to mug him (see Section 8.1).26 But, says the classical liberal, that Alf has property does not imply that he exercises "power over" Betty, even if Alf has a great deal of property and Betty has little. Everything depends on precisely how Alf employs his property. If Alf uses his property to hire thugs to intimidate his neighbors and get them to do what he wants, then his property clearly is the basis of his power over them. He uses his property to control them by making some options ineligible. Consider a different case: Al£is a rich entrepreneur who offers Betty a low-wage job. Classical liberals would insist that he is not exercising power over her, because he is not controlling her. He is not limiting her options: indeed, as we have seen, since offers expand one's options, many liberals insist that they can never render options ineligible (Section 4.1). This being so, although Betty agrees to obey Alf's instructions, he does not exercise power over her: he has increased her choices. Since she is free to not obey him and to quit her job, she is not controlled by Alf. After all, when you order a hamburger at McDonaldfs, you do not exercise power over the person behind the counter, even though he does what you want him to do-he gives you a Big Mac. Because it is a free exchange, the classical liberal insists that neither party controls the other-exercises power over the other-and so neither limits the other's freedom. For classical liberals, then, a private property market order is absolutely necessary for a free society. More than that, in the eyes of classical liberals, the market has the unique virtue of producing (1)an orderly system of social cooperation (2) among people with diverse ends while (3) respecting their freedom. It is easy to see how two of these can be combined; the trick is accommodating all three. It is relatively easy, for example, to produce a system of cooperation that respects freedom if we all happen to value the same thing, for then we will voluntarily cooperate to attain the thing we all desire. And it is relatively easy to respect freedom while allowing for a diversity of ends if we do not care about social cooperation and are content to live in a condition of anarchy (see Section 8.2). And of course, we can produce order even with a diversity of ends if we do not care about freedom: an authoritarian can take charge and command us to cooperate (see Section 10.4). The market order, insists the classical liberal, allows for all three. It requires a diversity of ends or goals; it is only because we want different things that exchange is possible. If everyone wanted the same things-if we all valued everything in the same way-exchange could not occur. People enter market transactions, they trade, in order to obtain those goods and services that will better allow them to pursue their aims. And because our aims differ, we pursue different things. The market thus allows free, that is, noncoerced, cooperative behavior without any agreement on ultimate ends.

The market thus coheres with classical liberalism" pluralism (SecCion 3.2) and its self-interested view of humm nahnre (Section 3.3). When you go to McDonatdk and ask for a Big Mac, a possibility of exchange occurs because you and McDonald" have different values: they would prekr h a m g your money to keeping their burger, a d you would p ~ f e havr ing the burger to keeping your money. As Hayek sees it, the great accomplishment of the market is that it allows peogle pursuing a tremendous diversity of aims to cooperate in such a way &at they assist each other in their pursuits dovithout havbg any intention of doing so. T%us, as Adam Smith (1723-1790) put it, each person '"intrmzds only his own gairz, and he is hthis, as in many other cases, led by an invisible har"td to promote an end which was no part of h3s inte1"ttion.~~27 According to the liberty-prokcting defcnses of property then, (I)your proyerty rights do necessarily limit the freedom of others insofilr as they exclude others from using your property. (2) Property, uniike freedom, gives one "'power to" do dovhat one wants, Property is necessary for a free society because it is essential that private citizens have the p w e r to do things wi&out a s h g the approval of government. (3) The use of property does not inberclnlly iwoJve the exercrise of "power over" others. As a resource giving one power to do what m e wmts, it can be used to acquire power over others, but such power is not the norm in free exchmge. fndeed, for the classical liberat the markct order is the only way for people to freely coordinate their actions,

Property as Freedom. 1,iberals have not only insisted that property is a rnems to pseserving liberty, they have often conceived of it as an embodime2"tt of liberty, or as a type of liberty, or indeed as identical to libertp, This view is popular among many contemporary classical liberals. Jan Narvesm, for instmce, bluntly aaserts, "Liberty is Property."" There are, once again, a nunber of variatims on this clain.'Vhe main idea, though, is that one's freedom is a "zone" or "space" hwhich one c m act without interference fmm others. Property defines this zone: a person who has property can do what she war~tswith it, and others cannot interfere. So, the zone defined by one% property is simply a manifestation of one" ffrcedom. 7i,be free is just to be free to use what is yours-your property+30 Although advocates of this view typically see thennsehes as advocating negalive libcrm their argumcnt seems to confuse negative liberty and liberty as power (Sectiom 4.1, 5.1). A person With properv is a permn with the resourc-es to t r d a t e her d e s i ~ jclto s ~alirty.If that is a sort of freedom, it is just the sort of positive freedom that classkd liberaiis such as Haycsk stmngly and explicitly reject; -as I arped, it seems much more at home in soci&st political, theories.

~ ~ B E R TAND V

POWER

Privafe Propery and Power: Sociolisf Views

P~imteP Y O ~ Cand Y ~ fhe ~ 'Ilmngfer of ''Poruer lit.'3oci&sts have long insisted that capitalist private property inevitably and crucially involves s the owners a r ~ dworkers. Foll0win.g Karl l:Marx, power ~ l a t i m hetwem socialists have often trnderstood private propere as a mechanism that aX:lows capitalists to extract the productive powers of the worlcers and use them for the benefit of t-he capiCalist class. Under capitatism, it is argued, those with private prapert-y systematically employ the pmductive pawers of the workers to enrich themselves; consequently, m tbis view, the r/vh& point of privak p r ~ e r t p it; to tra~sfer""power to" from the producers (workers) to owners. according to C. B. Macphersol~, Mtsst simply, what is transferred, from the non-owner tc:, the owner of the means of labour (i.e., of the land and capital), is the non-owner's ability tc3 labour, .i.e., his ability.to use his own capacities productively; during the time contracted for. The ctwner purchases that ability for a certain time and puts it ta work, The ability, the labour-yozuer, is transferred. The actual work is perfornged by the non-owner. But in a very real sense the actual work is owlzed by the owner of the capital. He, having purchased the other's abiliq tt.o labour, has the rights of ownership in the labour that is actually performed. . . . He also owns the product, including the value added to the materials of the work. . . . What is transferred, then, is both the ability tt3 work and the ownership of work itself.?"

n u s , whereas the liberal sees private pmperty rights as providing every property owner with the power to do as she wishes, Marxists such as fvXacpherson insist that because capitalism is based on the sale of liabor power by the workers to t-he owners, capitalism is a systematic redistribu tion of '*"p'~verto" fr,m workers to capilalists.

Prr,pr.rfy and "Power OWT." A core t-heme of socialist writings has been that private propere constitutes the capitalists"+"power over" the working class. Some socialists such as R. H. Tawney employed the narrower mtio11 of *'power over" as 'kcontml" to make this point: For the characteristic of modern industry, and of ithe financial arrangements associated with it, is not only that it increases, by its technological triumphs, man" power over nature, but that, in the absence of deliberate restraints imposed by society, it heightem that ctf some men over ctthers, by ctrganizing and concentrating it. It concentrates it because it normally involves the ccmcentration of ownership, and therefow of the rights which ownership con-

fers; because its method is mass-productictn, and mass-production involves the control of large armies ctf workers, who execute, by small groups, who direct and plan; because it makes all, or nearly all, types of eccmomic activity interdependent, so that those who control a key service can impose their t e r m on it-re rernainder.5"

Capitalists have power over workers because they c m direct the workers according to their plans. Ihus, hthe eyes of Tawne)i arr; well as rwisionist liberals such as fa,T. Hobhouse, protecting the ljberty of the cvorkers r c q u i ~ dconstrainhg the power of employers. "mere is no intrinsic and inevitable conflict betwcsen liberty and compulsion,""since coercive restraints in the form of gove ent regulation~orcerning,say, workh~g hours, factory conditions, m d wages-are necessary to protect the workers from the power of capitalism*s3 T%e contemporary socialist philosopher Kai Nielsen employs m effect account of powes in his critjcism of capitalism, In commenting on the power of the farnous capitalist John I),Rockekller (2839-1937), Nielsen, in col~trastto Tawi~ey,does not m a k much of the way in which Rockefeller's "'eapitaljst property rights" alllowetit him to intent.ionally conkol, his workers or consumers, Instead, Nielsen stresses how Rockcfeller's decisio~lsp d u c e d "unintended" pbIic cor7seyuc.r.rcc.t;for the entire SOciet).:" Capitalism, a socialist mitght say constitutes a p w e r stmture insofar as the holders of property rights systematically act in ways that advance their i n t e ~ s t swhile adversely affecting Lhe interests of workers and other non-property-owning classes, This second criticism of the power inherent in capitalist pmperty relations goes much deeper than Tawney". The power of a capitalist such as Rackdeller is not locakd in his abitity to control m d manipulate his workers or goverrnrnent officds, but his ability to act on his interests in a way that, whether intended or ~ ~ " t i r ~ t e ~has ~ dfar-rearhing ed, effects throughout the econorny that work to the disadvantage of the working class. And because the capitalist's p w e r runs so much deeper, controlling it reyuises much more radical action. hsofnr as t-he capi.t.alistfs" p w e r over'kthers col~sistsin his power to consciously control his workers, legislation that protects workers c m check the power of cont.01. But if &e power of capitalism resides in the ly tremendous effect of owners' decisions on the entire economy, o ~ ~the elimination of the capitalist system will free the workers by eliminathg this power over them. I h e reader mi\y have noticed that not only do the liberal defensc. of private property m d the socialist criticism clash on the nature of power, they also deeply disagree m how markets are to be understood. To the classical liberal, markets are r e a h s of freedom and mubal benefit; to the socialist they are arenas of intense competition and conflict. Sacialists, for

1 Tb

LIBERTY AND POWER

instance, almost always see profits as deriving from exploitation of the wrkers: that the capitalist gains mans that others lose. And that is why socialists jvlsist that the capitalist system must rest on power, since it takes from some to give to others. In contrast, defenders of liberal capitalism insist that profits are the result of muhnally beneficial activity Because both owners m d workers gab from their market relations, there is no need to assume that the cm~l.eedifice rests on pawer rather Ulim free choice.35

5.4 Freeclon?, P ~ w r and , fhe Law Negative Liber?. and the Low: A Basic View

Recall from Section 5.3 that according to a lypical classical liberal arguwas free to use her negative fiberty in any way whatsoever, m e ~ ~ift each , people would, as I put it, ""btrmp" into each other in ways that would limit each other's freedom. h short, we would often use our freedom to construct obstacles that limit thc freedom of others, To prevent us from linliting each other% frtiedom in this w q , we re+rc_. a system of laws that protect the freedom imd property of each (see Section R.Z),Of comse, in creating a system of laws, we construct a power over us: the governus with coercim unless we obey. ment can control: us by thl-eater~i~~g T%us, to check the power of other people, we create the power of government. But of course, governxnent chrcks not o q the libesv of others, it checrks your a r ~ dmy liberty too. Because government uses its power to constmct obstacles to our action, most classical liberals have held that each lawf at least insofar as it threatens us with coercrion (see Sectim 4.l)-lhat is, pufiishme~~t-is itself a limitation of our liberty Thus, we accept some coercion by the state, and the limits m liberty it implies, in order to protect ourselves against the coercion of private individuals." Law is thus t-kvo-edged:it pratccts us ft-om coercion by coercion, it protects our liberty by taking some of it away. Law provides scczlrif!/ for m s t of our freedom bp linniting some of it. Peopie wish their freedom to be secure from attaCk; to provide that securiy we institute a power that c m block those who would limit our liberty*But the pluralism of classkal liberals (Section 3.2) indines them to insist that although security is a good, it is not the same good -as fnzwdom. h d -as the flufalist tells us is usually the case, to gain the good of secrnrily we must give up some of another good-in this case, some of our freedom.37 Freedom, Low, and Morality: Kmt's Liberal Rotiono/ist View

hma11ue:i Kant (1724-1804) agreed &at rat-ional, moral people w u l d abandon the "wild, lawless" heedom of the state of nature-in kvhieh

one person can use her freedom to harm others-and agree to live under laws of justice (Sction 8.2). Kmlit, though refuscld to see this as b o l v i n g any loss of freedom, however: Any oppogition that cowters the hindrance- of an effect promotes that effect and is ccmsistent with it. Now, everything that is mjust is a hindrance- to freedom according to universal laws. Coercion, however, is a hindrance or opposition tct freedom. Consequently, if a certain use of freedctm i s itself a hindrance to freedom according tt3 mivcrsal laws (that is, it is unjust), then to a)unteract it, inasmucb a s it is the prevention of a hinthe use of coerci~~n drance to freedom, i s consistent with freedom according to universal laws; in other words, this use of coercion is just.38

Kitllitfsargument seems to be that (1) If a person employs his freedom in a way that coerces others (2) h d which cannot be justified by universal laws of justice, then (3) 'That perwrlifmseof his; f ~ e d o m is itself unjust. (4) T%eprevention af such a hindrance to freedom is consistent with heedam according to rdes of justice, that is, just freedom. (S) merefom, acts uphotding universal justice are not opposed to (JLIS~) freedom.

Although law does indeed restrict ""wild"freedom, it is essential for ""just" fscledom, Thus, argtEes Kant, when we enter society we give up our wild lawless freedom. and accept a rational frcedm, under the rules of just laws. Note the ratiorlialist claim (Sectiorlis 3.2,4.3): true freedom must confom to the dictates oC reason, wt-rich teits us to live according to just :laws that protect the h e d m of everyone. Properk unkrstood., them is no corliflict betwee11law, freedom, alid reasolli. Freedom as An tipower

Alf 'S exercise af power over Betty hherently limits her freedom. But what of Alf's mme ppasscssiorl of power over her? A person can possess power w i t b u t actuai:ly using it; to have power is to have the ahilifcy to control or affect others, but not everyone who has m ability actually uses that abifity f: have the ability to count to 1,000, but have never done so; someone who has thousands of loyal followers may have great power; Si17ce "ozdd she tell her followers to do somethhg, they would. But she may not tell them-that is, she may not exercise that power. &coding to most liberal advocates of negative liberty, a person is free i f she is not. being interfered cvith by others. Consequently that others

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possess great power does not in itself limit yom freedown*Recently, Philip Pettit has criticized t-his understar~dingof freedom. As Pettit sees it, Betty is not free if, althoue;h as a milller of fact she is left alone, at any moment Alf could constrain her choices if he wished to. Perhaps she merely is lucky that so far ALf has not mticed her; or p e r h a p ~ h eingratiates hersell with Alf to protect krself from his pokver. But none of this, says Settit, makes her free, for she lives under the constant possibility that Alf may decide to tirnit her liberty. Thus, for Pettit, "the employer who can fire his employees as kvhim inclines him" "possesses power that limits the hberty of his employees, even if he should never choose to use that p~wer."" Pet-tit argues for m alternative view: freedom as "antipower," If All has power over Betty inone kvay but she had power over A:l in anothel; their mutual power might nullify the power of either to interkre. Each can resist the power of the other; each the11 it; trdy free, for not o17Iy is each not interfered with, but both are secure from having power exercised over them by the other. Unlike classical liberals, Pettit does not believe that the law takes away some of our k e d o m to better protect other part" rather, like Kant, Pettit jnsists that the rule of law jn no way detracts from our freedom.because it provides citizens with mtiipower, The law says Pettit, neulralizes the power possessed by some citizens that, if left w~checkd, would limit th.e freednm, of their fellows. Specit"ical,1Cy,Pettit: q u e s that the law promotes antipower in three ways: (1) T%e crimjnal law deters hdividuals with power from jnterfering with others, (2) The iaw regulates the way in which ihe powerful may employ their resources. Thus, for example, regulation of economic decisiom by corporations protects the liberty of employees and shareholders. (3) Government provision of transportation, education, and other opportunities empowers ordinary citizens, making them less vuherable to t-he mare powerfui members of sociev.

Petrcit insists that his view is distinct from liberal, socialist, and conservative conceptio~~s of freedom. Accordimg to thit; "republican'"tt7eory of government; nonarbitrary legislation does not limit the freedom of citizens." Because being subject to arbitraly interfere~~ce is t-he m r k of an unfree life, systems of nonarbitrary law making-systems based on widespread participation by citizens in the creation of general laws that apply to all-do not constitute limih on freedom. Thus, in the republican tradition, freedom is closely bound with popular participation in legislation and the prevention of the arbitrary use of power, h this respect, the

republican h-adition embraces Kantfs ralionalism: arbih-ar)r interference is hostile to freedom because it is not based on rules of justice and reason. This idea was central to the French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau, like Mmt and the republican tradition, emphasizes between beil'lg sukject to lfie will of specific people a r ~ dbethe differe~~tre ing subject to ilnpersonill laws. His great work, The Social Confmct, stresses the way in which a system of law secures each citizen agajnst perwnd dependence on tt7e wills of others. The theme of paw11"l dependence runs very deep in fCousseatt's writings. m e crucial sort of unfreedom for Rousscau is when you are foxed to &ey the will of mother individual: when ar~otherhas control over you. For Rousseau, and the republican and to some extent the socialist traditio~~s, such personal dependency is avoided by makhg each person subject only to the laws he had a part in making. This, saps Rousseau, is the only sort of freedom that can be had by humal~s-ir.l-society(as opposed t-he wild and lawless frctedom af people in a ""sate of natureM")freedarn trnder the rule of Xiabv. Without the rule of general laws, there would only be persmal dependency and so siavery (see Section 10.4). f i e General

Wll:

taw and Positive Freehrn

Perhaps the most radical pmposal for reconciling labv and freedom has been proposed by those upholding the ideal of the "general wilf.." Although Rousseau is lfie most important theorist of the general will, the idea was mast completely developed by later political philosophers such as Bernard, Bosmquet. .Abstracting from the specifics of their particdar treatme~~ts, the basic q u m e n t can be broken into four claims: (If Sey-imposed restrailrts do not limit f r ~ d o m .According to Rosanquet and others, restraints that you irnpose on yourself do not b i t your freedom. This idea of freedom is a version of freedom -as autonomy (Section 4.2). A person is free w h n she c m do what she really wants to do: if she imposes a restraint on herself-if she kcides that she does not want to $O s~mc"f:hi~-----Ihe restraint does not interfere with her freedom. Selfimposed restrajwlts, then, are not a limitation af one's autonomy, as ane desires to act on them*So those who really will a law who wish to have the law, do not have their freedom limited by it: they remain free. f r ~a democracy; Rousseatr believed, all citizens deliberate and vote on the laws, and the laws apply to all. In a democracy, then, laws seem to be a f o m of seti-imposed restraints. (2) Tlze milzorify arr.fiee if Cflqj loo can som&ow "wifl'9fhelart? The problem is the dissenthg minority, that is, those who vote against the law. C3tn the face of it, the law seems to genuinely rest.rict lrheir frcredom, since it is not a self-imposed restraht: they voted agakst it. And if so, i"could

1 20

LIBERTY AND POWER

seem that the law limits their autonomy But if there was some way in which the minority could emhmce the majority's verdict as t-heir own-if they could come to will the result-then they too would be free. (3) hros that express the genernl will am ~uilledby ewyone. The minority codd will the laws (that they voted against) if the laws were really in the interests of all cilizem. m a t is, we might distir-rgwishtwo types of law: (a) Some laws favor the m 4 o ~ t y at the expense of the minority, and so could never be embraced by the minority. fh) Other laws, however, apply to all citizens equally and serve the common interests of all citizens. Even if the minority voted agaimt such laws, as members of the community dcsising the cornmall good they achally do will ehe h s insofar as they promote the generd good. Recall again T. H. Grt;er.lfsdisthction betweell a persods **realum d "actual" will (%ction 4.2); a person's red will consists of the things he rc;aliy cares about-his long-term aims, interests, and goals---whereas a person's "aceslal'kwill is distorted by irnpulses and errors. Now to the extent. that the minority will the common good, if: the law promotes the common good, then that is what the minority =ally will, even if they do not know it. (4) Since the nlinorify will fhc ~ W Sf ,h q arefrcf men zut~enf h q a r e f i l ~ e dto o b q them, If being free is to do what you mally want to do, and if the minority really want to act on the general will, t-hen t-he minority act freely when they act on the general will. True, they voted against the law because they believed that the law did not express the ge~~eral will; but if the majority are c o r ~ cthat t the law articulates the gemral will, the minmity should accept the majority's judgment. When a law is proposed in the people" assembly what is asked of them is not precisely whether they approve of the proposition or reject it, but whether it is in confc~rmityto the general will which is theirs; each by giving his vote gives his opinion on this question, and the counting of votes yields a declaration of the general wiX1. When, therefore, the opinion contrary to mine prevails, this proves ctnIy that 1 have made a mistake, and what X believed tc3 be the general will was not so. 11 my particular opinion had prevailed against the general will, X should have done something other than what X had willed, and then 1 shauld not have been iFree.41

Once the general w i l has been revealed by the majority those who continue to oppose it are captives of their particular wills. Recall here Green" analysis of freedom: those who act on their '"actual will" rather than their "real will" are unfree. Rousseau agrees. According to Rousseau, compelling someme to submit to the gerraal will "means nothhg other thm that he shall be forced to be free; for this is the necessary condition which . . . secures him agahst all personal dependenceef'd2

Bosmquet apparently approves of "busseau% observation (Social Crmfmct, Book Itr: chap, ii, n.) that the convicts in &c galleys at Genoa had "iberty-tamped on their chairts- The fetters of the bad self are the symbol of freedom.'f4"gagain, we confront Ber1in"s worry about positive liberty: forcirzg a person to act on his "real will" c m itself he a way of making him free. The doctrine of the general will reconciles law and positive freedom by presupposing a collectivist theory of society (Section 3.4). Rousseau himself expljcitly embraces such a corrception. In The Social Contract, he insists that society is more than an '%aggregationu-it is an "ass~ciation" with a real unity a d shares a genuine "commo~~ good.""" ":lf indi\riduirls are memhers of m association in w:hich the good of each it; bound to the common good, m d in. kvhich each thus wills the cornman good as a crucial constituent of her own good, it is possit;lle to claim that each mally wills t-he generai will, and so is aulonomous when acting on it. Hence Rousseau" ksistence that a society is a ""people" "rather than a collltection of individuals. For if all we have is a collection of individuals, it seems dubious indeed &at all share a gex~eralwill, ar~dare free when they follow it. Conservatism and Legal Liberties

In concluding our analysis of :liberty and the law we should note a m r e modest proposal, characteristic of much conscrwtiwe thought. As I stressed in. Section 3.2, conservative antirationalism leads to valzlb~gtraditions, as embodying the accumulated practical knowledge of a political culhrre. Rather & a seeking ~ to develop ar.2 i\bsh.act iheary of freedom--as da liberals and socialists-conservati\~es are wont to stress that our understanding of what ljberties art. h d a m e n h l to political life is determined by our political traditiolls, fn his Reflectiarzs orz fhe Xez)ofzlCinlzi l z Frunce, Burke criticized the liberal doctrine of trniversal mural rights to :[email protected], Burke argued that the ljherties of the English were an '"ir7herita1ce derived to us from our forefathers, a ~ to d be transmitted to our posterity-as an estate specially belonging to the peaple of this kingdom, wilf-tout any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right.-s Mo~over,Burkc., hawing on a typical comepvaf-i~(~1 themy of human nature, stressed the dangers of human passions for politicd society (Section 3.3). Burke maintained, Society requires nctt ctnly that the passictns of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be done by a poiucr ouf

1 22

LIBERTY AND POWER

of tfter~tsel~s, and not, in the exercise ctf its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office tct bridle and subdue, In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights. But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances and admit to infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upctn any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as tc:, discuss them upon that principte.4"

Thus, for Burke, the law-"'a polver out of themselcres"-is needed to identify specific liberties of, and put restrictions on, too-passionate people. No ger~erallaw or prhcipie can be laid out in advance, specifying precisely what t-hese will be; they arc. a r ~ inheritance oi a people's political and legal traditionsBurke's account is resolutely antiralionaljst, in m y ways far more so than even Berlin" dcfefense of negative liberty (Section4.3). No philosophical theory of liherty in general is sound. Specific li:berties, such as freedam of the press and freedom of association are the oukomes of a c m piex legal traditio1.1; wbat liberties are importar~t,and what such liberties imply, is not a matter for a phjlosopt7icd theory of liberty but a historical and legal study of a complex political community. For Burke and conservatives who f d o w him, although there are no "human rights""or ""rights of man," "ere are rights more precious and important: "the rights of Englishmen . . . as a patrimony derived from their forefathers."" Indeed, in the conservative is sure to criticize the liberal e ~ ~ d o r s e mof e ~freedom ~t gemral as destrt~ctiveof social traditi.ons, Tlnd ult-imately to heedom itself. Altt-tough some freedoms are central to our traditions, others are not; and liberalism" constant attack 01.1 limits to freedom-its ""lberationist"" proposals-destroys social custams and paves the way for authoritarim leaders, Where the liberal sees a probable increase in freedom and creativeness the result of these liberations, it-re conservative is more likely to see, or at least fear, insecurity and alienation. The chief accusation made against liberalism by conxrvatives is . . . that liberalism is a kind of Judas goat for totalitarianism. By its incessant Xiberaticmist work on the traditional authorities and rotes in society, liberalism, it is argued, weakens the social structure, encourages the mtrltipjfication of "mass-types" of human beings and thus beckons in its way to waiting totalitarian masters. "By destrclying the social habits of the people," wrote Elliot, "by dissolving their natural collective consciousness into individual constituents. . . . Liberalism can prepare the way for that which is its sown negation."dB

LIBERTY AND POWER

123

It is interesting to observe here the reply of liberal theorists. "Liberty," says Hayek, "is one. Liberties appear only when liberty is lacking; they are special privileges and exemptions that groups and individuals may acquire while the rest are more or less unfree."49 Conservatism displays a cleavage about the relative importance of economic freedoms. Burke himself harshly criticized the Fmch revolutionaries for praising moneymaking--success in the marketplace---rather than landed property. Landed property, as he saw it, represented society's traditions, whereas the marketplace undermined them. John Gray, a contemporary conservative, continues this tradition; he has been increasingly critical of "market capitalism" and the way that it undermines cultural and natural values.50 Although these latterday Burkeans are not opponents of private property and the market, they stress the way that it can undermine traditional institutions, and so are willing to limit economic liberties to protect cultural traditions. In contrast, what are sometimes called "new right" conservatives-most notably, Margaret Thatcher, the former prime minister of the United Kingdom-put great stress on the importance of economic liberty, as necessary to promote the traditional virtues of self-reliance, prudence, hard work, and care for one's family (see Section 9.3). This difference, then, stems from competing interpretations of the relation of economic liberty to traditional liberties and values-does it undermine them, protect them, or form a part of them?

5.5 Summary This chapter considered the relation of freedom to power. I began in Section 5.1 by examining a conception of positive liberty that identifies freedom with the power to act on one's desires. Manifestly, this view of freedom greatly expands the task of a "freedom-valuing state": to protect and promote the freedom of citizens requires supplying them with the resources necessary to achieve their aims. Section 5.2 examined in more detail the notion of power and its relation to freedom; we distinguished ''power over" and "power to." Whereas power to can be seen as enhancing freedom, it seems that one person's power over another inherently limits the freedom of the person over whom he exercises that power. Like freedom, power, especially "power over," is a contested concept; we examined the debate between a liberal-individualist analysis emphasizing control and a socialist conception stressing systematic adverse effects on the interests of some while benefiting others. The debate between liberals and socialists carried over into Section 5.3, which examined differing views of the relation of property and freedom. Drawing together liberal analyses of power and freedom, we saw how liberals argue that property

1 24

~ ~ B E R TAND V

POWER

is necessary to protect freedom while insisting it does not necessarily involve power mer others, w:hereas socialists insist &at it inbermtly involves liberty-limiting power. In Section 5.4, the relation of liberty and law was examined. Stasthg with the basic classical liberal claim that all law, qua cocrcjve restraint, h i t s iiberty, we went or1 to examine several proposals that seek to show how, properly mderstaod, general justified :legal restraints do not :linnit civil freedom. Finally, we briefly examined Burke" co~~scrvative, antirationalist view, w:hich abjures a generai a ~ a l y sis of freedom, localifig the important lherties of a people in their hjstorical-legall tradition.

1. T. H. Green, ""On the Different S n s e s CIF Freedom' As Applied to the Will and the Moral Progress of Man," in Paul Harris and Jtlh Marrow eds,, Crt3~?riS Lecizims on flze I"rz'nc@i~s ufl""olz'ticnlOLtligalz't~n(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1486), p, 235, 2. R. H. T a m e y Equality ((New York: Harcc~urt,Brace, 19311, p. 221. 3. J o h Rawts, A Tlteory of jzrstice (Cambridge, MA: Elarvard University Press, 1971), p. 204, 4, See, ftx example, Kai Nietsen, Eqzinlify and Liberty: A Defcnse of Rndimt Egalitnria~iism(Totowa, MJ:Rctwman and Ailanheid, 19851, p. M, 5. Richard Norman, Fret?n~tdEqual: A Pltilosoplzical ExnmhaCion ufhlz'timl Values (Oxford: Oxfc~rdUniversity Press, 1987), p. 44. 6. F. A. Hayek, The GottsEil.zifionofLiberty (London: Routledge, 1960), pp. 17-18. 7. %3e Skven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (tondcm: Macmillan, 1974). 8. Thornas Hubbes, Leviadha~z,Michael Oakeshott, ed., (Oxford: Blackwell, 1(348),p, 56 (Book 1, chap. 10). 9, See S. X. Bern, ""Power," in Paul Edwards, ed ., The E~tcyclopt~dia of Philosoplly (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1965). 16, See here Felix Oppenheirn, Bimensio;ansof Fre~dorn(New Yctrk: St. Martin's, Press, 196'11, 11. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 12. Bertrand RusseEil, bwer (Lc~ndon:Unwin Books, 1960), p. 25. 13. See Christian Bay, The Structzire of Frecdanz (New York: Atheneurn, 1"355), p. 257; Williarn E. Connolly, The Terms f:)fI"olidr'cnlDiscozirse, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princetan University Press, 19831, chap, 3, 14. Lu kes, Power: A &dial Viezu, p. 34. 15. Comolly, The Rnns ofPolr'tical LZisco~krs&p. 106, 16, See Mristjhn KristjBnsson, Social ic1.er.drsm: The Resyorzsibility View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 150ff. 17, Connolly, The Terms of Political Bisconrse, p. 106. ~ of E~uropealzLiberi~lknr(London: George AI3en and 18. Harold J. Laski, 7 % Rise Unwin, 1936), p. 239. 19. Again, we need to stress that political theories are aImplex, and can exernplify different sorts of comectiom, See Kristjbnsson, Socinl Freedonz, chap. 6.

20, See ibid. 21. See Bernard Bosanquet, The Plzilnsoplziclal irhleory of lfte State, in Gctrald F. Caus and William Sweet, eds., The Philosophical "l"heoryof ifhe Stndc a d Related Essays (Indianapolis, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2000), p, 46. 22. This claim is disputed by C, B. Macpherson, Democmtic Tfzmry: Essays in Retrieval (Oxfcjrd: Clarendon Press, 19732, pp. 40ff. 23. E A. Hayek, "%LiberaXism," in his New Stz-ldks itz Philosophy, Politics, Ecouzorni c and ~ the Hisimy f:)fldc.las(London: Routledge and Kegan Paut, 1978), p. 149. 24. See AZan Qan, Property (Mifton Keynet;, UK: Open University Press, 3987). 25. I am following here Frank Snare, "The Concept of Property," Anrlrricnlz PIziIosophical Qlrarterly, vol. 9 (April 1972), pp, 208--206.1 have sipificantfy altered some ctf these conditions. See also Lawrence C, Becker, Prqerty Rights (Lcmdon: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 18-14, 26. This claim i s argued for in Cerald F. Gaus and Loren E, Lomasky; ""re Property Rights Problematic"' The Munisd, vol. 173 (October, 1990), pp. 483-503. 27, Adam Smith, APZ. Itzquiq into the Natzire mid Caztses ";lf the Wealth ";1(Nations. R. W. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, eds. (Indianapolis, IN: LiberCy Fund, 19811, p. 456. 28, Jan Narveson, Tlze Libertarl'att fdea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), p. 66. 29, f have considered these in detail in "Property, Rights and Freedom," "cial Pfzr'losoyhy 6 hlicy, vol. 11 (Summer 1994), pp. 209-240. 30, Narveson, The Libcrt~riaslfdetz, p. 64, 31. Macpherson, Denlocrafic Tlzeory, pp. 64-65. For Marx's views on the sate of labor power, see Capital, in Robert C. Tuckex; ed., The ~ C / I R ~ X -Reader, E M ~ ~2nd ~ Sed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 19782, pp. 351ff. See Section 9.1 below. 32. T a m e y Equality#p. 214. 33, L. T. Hobhause, Libemlisnz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964 [1911l), p. 78. 34. Nielsen, Equality and Liberty, pp, 234-235. 35. For an examination ctf proA"Es an essentially contested concept, see James W. Child, "Profit: The Concept and Its Moral Features,;,"3ocintPhilosclylly & h l i q , vol. 35 (Summer 1998), pp. 243-2132, 36. See Hayek, The Consiiitztdio-rzufLibertcyfp. 21. 37, S63e Bertrand de Jouvenel, 0 1 2 Z-sozoer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), chap.17, 38. Irnmanuel Kant, The Mefapltysical Elernenfs ojJzisticc~,John Il,add, trans. (Tndianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 39651, p. 36. 39. Philip Pettit, "Freedom As Antipowe~""Ethics, vol. 106 (April 1996), p. 581. 40, See Pet tit's R e y blicnt~isnz: ~ A Theory of Freedom alzd Guverntncn t (Oxford: CXarendvn Press, 2 997). 41. Jean-Jacques R o u ~ e a u Tlzc , Socinl Go~ltract,Maurice Cranston, trans. (tondon: Penguin Books, 1968 [17622), Bctok 4, chap. 2. $2. Ibid., Book 1, chap. 17. 43, Bosanquet, The PJtilosopl~icaitTheory of the Stnte, p. 150. $4. Rousseau, The Social Conlmcd, Book 1, chap. 5. 45. Edmund Burke, Xefiectiorzs on the Xezwlzativrz in Fralzce (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1968), p. 119. 46- Ibid., p, 1%.

47, Xbid., p. 138, 48. Robert Nisbet, Gorlsert~ntisism(Mitton Keynes, LJK: Open University Press, 1986), p. 50. 44. Hayek, The G ~ ? ~ s t i f ~ ~ofLibertyr t i o t z p. 19. 50. See, for example, John Gray, Beyond the New Right: firkt*ts, Got?emmerztn~zd Ct>mjuionEnvironment (London: Routledge, 1993).

6.1 Equality and the Grounds for Equal Treatment In contrast to libere, equality seems a simple idea. We all h o w , for example, what is meant by saying, "Alf and Betty are of equal height" or ""Charlie" and Doxisk weights are equal." h these contexts, there is a scale of m e a s u ~ m e ~and ~ t ,both people have the same score on the scale. Let us call this the tied scclru cctncqfiol-r ofeqrialify. mings are equal when they are tied: they have the same score. Other standard uses of equalitr, however, are less precise. If X say, for example, that I like chocolate and coffee ice cream equally well, I am probably not saykg anything so precise as "on my scoring system for ice cream, chocolate and coffee h v o r s have the same score." 7b he sure, if one did have a scoring system for ice cream, then indeed the tied score conception would be appropriate- We typicdly do not have scoring systems, yet we often ernploy the idea of equality. fn the ice cream case, I am probably saying that I do not prefer chocolate to coffee and X do not prefer coffee to chocolirte,"n this sense, "A and B are eyual" means "neither is to "o prefclrred to the other." Let us call this the nonpreferrnfinf concepFinlz of qualify.This is a broader co~cepti~n thm the tied score noti,on: one reason far not plr~lferrhgA to N or N to A is that they have a tied score, but we mi&t have less numerical, reasons as well. As a political ideal, equality has most aften expressed something akin to the nonpreferential conception. Throughout the history of political of political ar~decothought, advoc&es of equality have been oppane~~ts nomic systems in. which one person or group af peoplfe is given preference over others, Thus, as the English socialist R. H. Tawney observed, the egalitarian program of the eighteenth century opposed legal privileges that gave a select group of citizens legal rights wjthheld from otht.rs.2 In legal matters, insisted these early egalitarians, one class of ci.tizens (for exmplc, aristocrats) is not to be preferred to another (for example, commoners). Later egalitarians extended their apposition to

inequality, attacking the econoInic privileges that accompallied property ownerskip as well as the infomai social privileges (for example, those st-cmming from having attended priv&c schools, bejng a member of Ule ""rght" eethl~icgroup, having a high-status wcupation, and so on). As a political itled, then, ewaiity hirs usudly impiied a criticism of prekren1preferring one person or class to another. C)f course, as we shall see, other understandings of equality, such as the tied score conceptio~~, have also been advanced; we would do well to begin, &ough, by focuskg on the nonpreferential conception. Mie can immediately appreciate the core prOhlem of equality: equality does not dwitys seem a good thing, a d iwyuality is not &ways to be 3voidc.d. In many contexts, it is totally unokjectionable to prefer one person to another. Many people, for instance, believe that it is right and proper-hdeed, detnanded by justice-to give pseference (in the distributio21 of mmey) to the hardwc,rE~gover the lazy, (in the distribution of hel2J) to our mighbors over distmt &rangers, (hthe distribu-lion of punishment) to the guilty over the imocent, (in the distribution of love) to our family over skangers, ad (in the distributiox~of assistance) to the needy over tfte wd-off (see %ct.ion 3.3). Aristotle farnously &served that justice demands treatkg those who are equals k~m equal way alld trr;atjng those who arc? w~equal-say in writ-in an uncrquirl way.%s Aristotle noted, it "is the origist of quarrels m d complahts-when either equals have mQare awardied uneyual sharrs, or unequals equal shares."4 7b be surcl, some uitraradical egalitarians have wished to &dish all ways in which or~eperson is to be preferred to mother, Accordhg to the followers of the radicd egalitarian Fransois-NoEl Babeuf (1760--17971, " m y price" should be ppaid to achieve ""te equality"'; so deeply dicl Babeui hate m y privilege or preference between people that in the hterests of nrraisltaislb~gequality; he was willfing tr, restrrain those who wodd work extra hard to prtzvent them from having a claim to additional rewarcls.5 For BabeuC and his bllowers, e q d ity was essentially sammxess: the more we are alike, the mare equal we are. :Few#however, arc. wil1iixg to go so far down the egalilarian road, Devotion to the political ideal of equality is almost -always an hsistence that in so~~ze irmportarrt ways people shodd be treated as e ~ a 1 e i l -some i irnportalnt matters one person should not be preferred tr, mother although, of course, in other ways prefere~~ce and diseil~ctio~~ are mtkely accqtabk. A case fos eqalir"iy,then, must (1.) specify the ways in which people are to be ttreakd cqually, and (2) provide the grounds, or justjfying reasons, t that way Ir-r what ways should we be treated for equal t ~ a t m e n in equallyfmQwhy should we be treated equally? tiV1-.ry is it so importmt to treat people equally-that is, not to prefer s o m to others? The main task of EInis chapter is to get clearer about the grounds for equality and the types of eqz~srltreatment that political theorists have thought importmt.

:In Sections 6.2 and 6.3,I consider different g r o u d s for cqual treatment; in Sectior~6.4, I examine propasills &out the ways in which it is important not to treat some people better than others.

6.2 Why Equality? External Arguments for the importance of Equcrliv Utilitarian Egalitarian ism

Our first cmcem is why many politic& theorists have insisted that people fbr quality must be treated equally m a t I shall call extcrrznl argzlnze~rfs main&* that equal trcatmex~tis desirabie because it advances some other good thing or important goal. T%e best-hown example of an external argument for equality is utilitarian. As we saw earlier (Sctim 1.4), the utilitarim traditio~~ in social and pouical philosophy has insisted that the one, supreme, proper goal of political institut.ions is to promote the greatest hayphess of the greatest number. Accordiing to Jcremy Benthm, the "father" of modem utilitarianism, a c t i o ~is~""confomahle to the principle of utility, or for shartness>ake, to utility (meaning wifi respect to the community at large) When the krrdency it has to augment the happiness of the community is w a t e r than it has to diminish it.% The ttt.ilitarian seeks to maxirnize the overall net Izaypillcss for society as a whole. Suppose that m e is a Berltharnite utilitarian, seeking to maximize pleasure and minhize pain. TOdo this, one must he able to compare the pleasures and pains of different people. 'That is, suppose that the Ben&amite ut-ilitarim is trying to decide whefier policy X ur 2/ is required by morality in a three-persm~smiety composed of Alf, Betty, and Charlie; his question is, roughly, whether X or V will lead to the greater surplus of pleasure over pak, So for each policy he needs to calculate the billowing: ( M ' s pleasure) + (Betty's pleasure) + (Cll?ariiefspleasure) - (AIfrspain) - (Bettfs pain) - (Chartie's pain) = overall net pleasure or happiness. The Benthamite's aixn is to maximize net pleasure or happiness. Now many utiiita~anshave a r p e d that if a society is distributhg a good such as money, food, or houshg it will usually maximize net happiness to distribute the good eqtmlly. This argument rests on the assumpexample of which is iltion of marginal decrtrusiytg ufilifyof these goods, a r ~ lustrated in Figwe 6-1. In this case, Betty presently has $100 m d Alf presently has $ 6 0 . Onc hundred additimal dollars are to be distributed. If our ox~lygod is to gex~erakthe most possible "utiiity'" for happiness), how should we divide up the money? As Figure 6.1, shows, if we give the additional $100 to Alf, it will move his overall utility level from Alf, to Alf,; if we give it to Betty it will move her utility from Betty, to Betty,. We can see that giving Betty the $100 yields a much greater gain in utility

Alf, Alf, Betty, Betty,

FIGURE 6 ,l

Decreasing Marginal Utility

than givhg it to Alf. This is because of the slope of the zrtilifyfinnrtictr2;the m r e one already has, the less extra happjness an additional unit of the good gives you. More formally, we c m say that lrhe rr+l unit of any good always yields less utility than ctid the nth unit, It is important to stress that more of the good always yields some additional utility: in Figure 6.1 Alf does gain some utility by moving from Alf, to Alf,, but, on this assumption, utility increases at a dinzirzishirtg rate. Now, argues the egalitarian utilitarian, given the d e c ~ a s i n gmarginal utility of goods such as mowy, because it a f w a y s yields more utility to distrihute a good to those lower on the ueility fmctim than to those further up m it (119 o w case, to Betty rather than Alf), the distributions of goads that will maxirnize utility will &ays be that w h i c l p m m t e s equality: we should keep on giving to those who have less (sisrce, as it were, they get more utility per dollar than do those who are richer), until. evayoxle is at exact[y trhe s m e point 0x1 trhe utifity function. a c e everyone is at the same pojint, we will distribute money equally, because, once again, that would maximize overall utility. Note that this argument does not depend 017 the intril7sic desirability c>f the value of equality. The value being promoted is not itsejf egalirtrtrim: it is the moral collectivist aim of maximization of utility in society (see Section 3.4). It just so happens that given the assumgtion of decreashlg marginal utility, Lhe best way to promote utility is to promote equality*

AMOUNT OF MONEY FIGURE 6.2

Different Utility Functions: Healthy and Handicapped

Just because the utilitarim case far equality daes not depend an the ht-rinsic desjl.ilbility of equality, if we vary the asslamptions a bit, or add additional considerations, the utilitasian c m become a strong defender of inequality. Crucial to the uLilitariar1 egditarian argument is that everyone's utility function-t:hc rate at whjch they get utility from a good-is the same. But consider Figure 6.2, which depicts the utility functions of a healtfny and a handicapped person.7 Notice that at m y level of income, the hmdieapped person receives less utiliq thm does the healthy person. Given her hmdicap, it takes much more money to rake her to the same level of utility; in fact, it is often impossible for her to reach t-he same level of: utility as the healthy person. Add to this that it often takes a lot of money to raise the handicapped persods utility even a little hit: she needs expensive help to even get small increases of utility. 7his is depicted by the flatness of the handicapped person's utility functisn. Even at the move from m o u n t $X to $X+?, the healthy person gets more mar@al utility than does the handicapped person. Thus, if Fipre 6.2 accurately describes the ueifjty (happiness m d so on) that d i f f e ~ npeoy,le t receive from different amounts of money the utilitarian -will advocate m w~equaldistribution,givifgg nzolzq to the healthy pesm rutller f h a flte ~ handl icapped persorz. The utilitarian case for equallq is thus highly sensitive to

the assumptions made about the rate at whi& people turn money and goods into happinc?ss (or utility).

Some political theorists have held that we should endorse equalit-y because it expresses a truly impartial or objmtive view of our ~ l a t i m with s others. EaCtn of us is tempted to lrhjnk that his or her own life is special. After all, yom Xjfe is special lu ytl: you directly experience your ocvn life, and the trials and triumphs of your own life are, to you, of immense importar~ce,But, argues the "impartialkt egditaria-r,"'that your own life is in some way more important to you does not show that it is, or shouid be, especially important to others. More than that, from the ""objective point of view"' we can see that each persods life is, in itself, no more or less important than anyol-reelse's. From the objective point of view, Alffs life i s na more important &an Betty", m d Betty's i s na more important than Alf's. As was proclaimed in the famous debate at h k y in 16471649, ""'Thepoorest he that is in England has a life to live as the grc;atest.'"g From the impartial viewpoint, the life of neither the poorest nor the greatest is to be pseferred. But, argues Thornas Nagel, if everyone matters just as much as everyone else, it i s appalling that the most effective social systems we have been able to devise permit so many people tc3 be born into conditions of harsh deprivation which crush their pro~ectdcc)rleading a decent life, while many others are well provided for from birth, come tct control substantial resources, and are free tct enjcly advantages vastly beyond the conditions of mere decency."

As Nagel sees it, if we take an impartiaf perspective and so corn to value equ"lity, we cannot condone the vastly unequal disrribution of goods and life chances that results from our economic hstitut.ians. Thtrs, continues Nagel, "impartiality generates a greater interest in benefiting the w r s e off than in benefiting tl?e better off-a kind of priority to the. furmer over the latter,"lQFor Nagel, then, a commitrncnt to impartiality m d equality leads us to favor those with less over those with mox. 011reflectiol-r, it is doubthl that a c t m e ~to ~ tthe abstract ideal of impartiality so qt~icklyleads to social p es that favar less well off over better-off For dthough m objective attitude may well incticate or classes should not be partial toward some citize~~s that goye (for example, government policies should not favor the rich just because they are rich), it is manifest that governments should be partid in some w y s : in many cox~textsthey should favor the innocent over the guilty and perkaps the hardworking over the lazy. To be ohjeclionatzbly parfial-

partial in a way that mmifests a lack of Objectivity-is to favor some over others without good rr.asc,w. It appears that rather than leading directly to egalitarian social policies, a devotion to impartiality justifies a prhciple of '"formal equality," which asserts "the presumption in favor of equality.'"

Frrr~nalEqunEify: Any discriminatory act-any action that provides differential advantages or bur&ns-stands in need of justification; discriminatory act is wrorlg. any u~~justiiied Fomal equality asserts a "omket moral premmption in favor of equality. If, say somc.or?rew i s k s to he partial to Alf over Charfie, she must show that she has good reasons for this partiality. If she has good reasons, then slne is still acting from the objective point of view, She is not favoring A:lf just becauscl he is Alf (that would be ohjectiollably pmtiai), but for good reasons. Formal eqrrality "'requirc3s that if two people are being treated, or are treattzd, differently there should he some relevant difference betrwern them.'"" As S t d e y Rcnn and R. S. Peters put it, ""None shall.be held to have a claim to better treatment than another, hadvmce of good grounds being produced."= They cor-tth~ue, Understood in this way, the principle of equality does not prescribe pc&tively that all humans be treated alike; it is a presumption against treating them differently, in any respect, until grounds for distinction have been shewn [sic]. It does not assume, therefare, a c(tra1it-y which all men have to the same degree, which is the ground of the presumption, for to say that there is a presumption means that no grounds need be shewn. The onus of justifica tion rests on whoever would rna ke distinctions. . . . Presume equality until there is a reason to presume olherwise.1"

As Benn claimed in a latter essay, "Discrimination in treatment between persons r c q u i ~ moral s justification: it is not cnough sirnply to psefer one to anot-fnersince that involves regarding a ~ ~ o t hperson er from the poh~tof view of one's own satisfaction; respect far a person involves a right to be considered from his own standpoint."l4 In itself, for~xalequality does not justify egalitarian social policies of the sort Nagel has in mir'rd (that favor the poor over the better off in the distribution of resources, advantages, and opyorhnities). Formal equality simpiy requires that any differential treatmer-ttbe jlastified. But it takes on a much more strongly egalitarian character when it is combined with a second principle, asserting the moral arbitrariness of natural endowmer~ts,such as a person's innate skills and abilities. It has been arguedby revisionist liberals and socialists-that inequalities that stem from the

"natural lottery" of birth, in which people get nahral and social advantage?;that they do not deserve, are unjust: "A11 Iwequalities of birth constitute undeserved discrirninations.""'Vecause these hequalities c be justified, argue some egalitarians, an impartial government must "redress'" them by giving additional resources to those who have lost out in the lottery of birth: 'Without such special justification all persons, whether equal or unequal, ought to have equal shms."" The crucial claim here is that these advantages am u~~deserved, and so w~~ustified. Taken together, then, (l)the principle of formd equafity m d (2) the claim that advantages and liabiliSiczs based on natural gifts and socid advantage?;cmnot be justified lead to (3)the sort of egalitarian-redistrihtio~~ist policks t-hat Nagel adwocates. Mether this argtrment is persuasive largely turns on whether we believe that advantages flowing from one's natural gifts and social position are morally arbitrary and so carnot be justified. Some, such as the leading revisionist liberal, John &&, are admant that one does not deserve one's talents-they are the result of a natural lottery, in h i c h sorne peopie are wimers (they have extensive talents that arc? in &mmd) and others lose (they have few special talents, or k w tdents in high demand), Thus, frm Rawls" pperspective, whether one is talented or not is inelevar~tto an impartial evaluation of principle of justice. According to Rabvls, the best principles of justice would represent " m agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those Mrho have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune o q on terms that improve the situalion of those who have lost out.""' Indeed, it would seem that for Rawls even the extent to which one makes m effort m d tries to succeed is largely a matter of luck, being dependcz~~t on on& being born into a "happy family and social circrumsta~ces."MThis is a matter of deep dispute. Although, to be sure, one daes not deserve one's talents, it does not follow that one daes not deserve the fruits of those talents, Indeed, a widely shared belief about distributi\re justice is t-hat a producer of a good has a special claim over what she has produced-t:hc fmits of her labot: Axld it is widely believed that those who work hard deserve greater rewards thm those who do not. WC shall turn to this dispute &out justice a d desert in Sectior~s8.2 and 8.3, Incommensurobili~and

Equality

Mic have thus far considered two types of arguments supparting the hportance of equality, and in particular equal distributio~~s of the good things in life: the utilitarim argument that such distributions maximize

overall happiness, and the argumcnt f r m impartiality, Many have been perwuaded by a differe~~t case for ewality, csihich maintains that people should be treated eqtlalty just because each person is a m@e individual and camot be cmpared to, or r a n k d above or below, others. :If I calz say whether A is better than B or vice versa, the11 they m commensurable; 1can compare and rank them. And in most cases we cm, at least roughly, make such comparisons. When I go to the malt shop, I rank a chocolate malt above a strawberry malt and so I choose lrhe chocolate over th.e strawberry Indeed, wh.enc.ver one makes a reasoned chice-for example, every time you buy sosnething at the store, or decide to turn down one date a ~ accept d another-you are making m impiicit rankil7g, and so are comparhg two differexnt optioxns or valuable things, We make such comparisons with more or less effort, but we make them constantl.y. Sometimes, though, we cannot compare two things. 7il say that two is to say that they cannot be r a ~ k e d things, A and B, we i~~n,mmrr.tszrrnbIe in terms of "'better than" and "worse than." h the novel Sophie3 CFzoice, the Nazis offer a Polish mother a choice: she can choose which of her chitdren will live and which will dir.lVophie is unable to make the choice; she cmnot compare thc importance of the lives of her children-lfiey are literally incommensurable, Some think that all individuals are incommensurable: each h~dividtlal is unique and c a ~ n o be t rmked as, overall, above or belokv others. Of course, proponents of the view readily admit, we can rank people for specilic purposes: teachers rmk students in terms of academic merit, students rank teachers in terns of their teaching perhmance or poputizrily, CSJ,vmpicofficials rank athletcrs according to their performances, and so on. But although "it is of the esselrce of merit . . . to be a grading concqt . . . there is no bvay of gradkg individuals as such. We c m grade them with respect to lheir qualities, hence only bp abstracthg from. their individudity."'" We c m rank peoplc in terms of their possession of certair? features (for example, academic talents, teaching ability; pop~xlarity, speed), but any such ranking abstracb from their full indkiduality and miguer~ess,focusing 011 some specific attributes. m a t we canr~otdo, on as ssti:h, for each indivicfual is a zznique comthis view, is rantc i~di~jidrruls bkation of traits, abilities, and so on. This is often what is meant by the clairn that each individual is of "i~nfh~ite" worth: we ca~xnotrank individuals on some overall scale, because each individual is tmique. And as we saw in Section 6.1, according to the nonprefcrential. conception of equality this is precisely what is memt by equality: A is not preferred to B, and B is not preferred to A. Although the argurnent from incommensurability shows why claims to rank hdividuais can he rc.jected, it is not e~~tirely clear how it shows that peope slsorrld be trrrated eqz~ally.After all, il A and K cannot be compmd,

then we cannot say that they are equal. The claim to equality is itself a compaison. In mathematics, if A is not greater than RI and if B is not greater than A, it follows that A m d B are equal. But according to the incomensurabi1i"ry argument, we cmnot say '"A is not gmatcr than R"' or "B is not greater ihm A," because we cannot make any sensible comparison of A arrd B. If so, then we also cannot say that A imd 13 are equal. If: the value of Sophie" chi1dren was incommensurable, her problem was m t that she valued them equally, hut that she wits totally unable to make any comparisons at all. She was unable to choose because there was no way to compare their value. This points to a basic worry about the very idea of nonpreferential cox-rception of equaiity: to claim that neiCher person should be p r e k r ~ dto the oehcr does not necessarily show t-hat tl-tey are equals. It may sholv simply we are tmable to make my comparisons at:all. The nonprrlfel-ential notion is d y egaiitarian on ihe supposition that if we are not to prefer one permn to amCher, we should treat them equally: if A > B, and B k A, then A = R. It is here that an egalitarian may well resort to the psurnption in fmor of equaritry ihat we examined above. If a presumption in favor of "Ieating people as equals is our "default" or "baseline" assumption, then if A is not better than B, and if B is not better than A, we will have a good reason to treat A and B equally If, then, we accept the presumption in favor of equality the argument from incommnsurability does generate a case for treating people equally.

6.3 Why Equality? Arguments from Fundamental Human Equality External Grounds Versus Argomenh from Fundamental Human Equality

Thus far, we have been examhhg arguments that endorse equal treatment because such treatment is called for by some other value or consideration. Thus, for the utifitarian egaiitaria-r, to maximize overall zli-Zlity we oughC to distriibute goodr; equally; for the imparLiaijst, to treat people impartially and Objectively we must treat them equally. The propment of incomme~-rsurahility maintai~listhat given our inability to compare Lhe vdue of individuals, the ralional thjng to do is to prefer no one, and so treat people equally, "External" (or mixed) arguments for equality are thus of the fom: ginerr mlue or principle X , wlzere X is not itseyubouf.the importance crfeqricizlify,we shotlld trelzi:people cqulzlly. Let us contrast such external cases for equal treatment to what I shall call argumex-rts from f ~ t z d a m e ~ t uhumal? f equality, which have the form: people shaalu' be IreafcIZ ilqrktzlly becurrse they art. ill some important orfgnda-

nlerztal rcrspect equal. Equals, Aristotk said, shouln be treated equally If in s m e important respect people really are equitl, the11 Aristotle" s i c k m indicates that we should treat them equal2y in some relevant cvay A number of argullnents in favor of equal treatment thus have been defenses of the ways in which h u a w are basically eyuai. Of cowse, to show that people should be treated equally, it is not enough to show that in some way WC are e v a l : that a l m s t everyone has an equal number of fingers does not help much in showing that everyone should be treakd equally.. An argument from fundamental human equality must establish three claims: (1.) that in some respect, R, humans am equal: (2) that R is important; and (3)that X is relevant to lrhc case for equd treatment. Shored Humon Nature: The Theological Foundations

Perhaps the most important egalitarian argument has called attention to our shart.d humm nature, or our shared nature as h m m kings: all, of us are humans, and equally so, As f. R. Lucas has pointed out, however, this seems to rely on fallacious reasoning.2" All humans are human; : , All humans are equally human; ... A13 humans are equal.

But, Z,ucas points out, this camot be a valid argument; an argument of exactly the same form is A13 numbers are numbers; ... A13 numbers are equally numbers; :. All numbers are equal,

Never'thekss, it seems wrong to sirnply dismiss arg ents for equal tmatment grounded on the idea that humans are basically equal. The Americ a L>crcliarnfian ~ $bzdependence declares it to be self-evident that ""all men are cseakd equal." This famous claim :rctm the Declnvutictn pokts to an irnportant tie between egalitarianism and Christian doctri.ne. If we are all God's child re^^, and if hc loves aif his childre11 eqmaliy, then we are equal in our most important trait-being loved by Gad. Any inequalities beWeen people almost vanish when compared to this crucial ecjuality of human heirrgs. Since God loves the poorcst as much as the richest of his children, the welfare of each is eqt~allyimportant; shce the poor are in. greater need, the Christian-egalitadan response is to devote special attention to their wellarc a11d problems. 111 the words of the Vivcyilzia Declarafinn Rights, it: is '*the mutunl duty of all to practise [sic] Christian fotbewance,

love, and charity toward each orcher."Z "alitarian thought has been mu& more deeply influer~cedby Christian ideals than hns thinking about liberty. This hauence cont-inuesright up to the present day: the liberation theology of the Catholic Church and "social justice" movements t on the %rot%rert-rood'"of in Protestant denominations place g ~ a stress all humms, m d so their basic claim to be treated as equals. Indeed, the socialism of :R. H, Tawney-who was a guiding intellectual force in the Labour Party of the United Kingdowwas pre"iw"dx~ ⁢ Christian ideal of equality.23 Fundamental Equolify and Ordinary Language

An argument from f"tmdamenta1equality, then, mahtains that because we really are equal, we should he treated. as equals. As we have just seen, one way to defend filndamex~talhuman equality is to reiy 017 theologicai claims about God's equal. love for each of us; m s t egalitarians, though, insist on a purely secular defense of fundamental evality, The problem with such defenses, arr; Benlard WiUims, a contemporary philosopher, has observed, is that ""P say that all men are equal b all those characteristics in respect of which it makes sense to say that all m m are equal or w q u d , it; a patent faisehood; and even if some more restricted selection is made of these characteristics, the statement does not look much better,"% Cox-rhoxltedwith the obvious ways in whiCh we are unequal, many egatitarimls resort: to what might be called the we& argument for fundamental equality ""On this bterpretatian," says Williams, "we should not seek some special characteristics in respect of which all men are e q u d but merely remind ourselves that we are all me~~."ZWilliams believes that this remkder is morcj powerful than one might think: That all men are human is, if a tautology a useful one, serving as a reminder that those who belong anattlmicalliy to the species honrs sapiens and can speak a language, use tools, Xitie in societies, can interbreed despite racial differences, etc. are also alike in certain respects more likely tt3 be fc)rgatten, These respects are notably the capacity to feel pain, both frcjrn immediate physical causes and from. various situations represnted in perception and thought; and the capacity to feel affection for others.26

:Is this acknowledgment of our similarity really importa~~t? Suppose some cruel dictator achowledges this fact of human similarity, but insists that this tells her nothing &out what she shouI,C1d ~MOW , can a mere fact about the ways in which people are similar tell us how we o q h t to treat them? How c m facts about human beings lead me to wEue equality? Williams, follawirrg Wittgenstein (Section 1.31, mahtains that facts and

values are not two disthct realm, but are intermixed in our language and the form of life in which our language is embodied. ':lb be a speaker of a language is to be committed to certain forms of discourse; jn particular, to use a language, Williams, believes, is to accept severe constraints on what c m cow~tas a reason for dohg somethir-rg.Cox-rsider,for example, someone who denies racial equality; insisting that black people's welfare siwnply does not mtter, Few can be fcjund who explain their practice [of discrimination] merely by saying "But they're black; and it is my principle to treat black men differently than ctthers.'yf any reasons are given at all, they will be reasons that seek to conflate the fact of blackness with certain other characteristics which are at least candidates for relevance to the question of how a man should be treated: such as insensitivity, brute stupidity, ineducable irresponsibility! etc.27

Williams, of course, realizes that such c h a ~ e are s false rationalizaf;io~~s; his point is that a defender of myud tmatmerrt sees lfie need to give some relevmt reasons for discrimhation, and our lmguage does not al:low the m r e fact of skin color as a relevant reason for, say, denying medical c m or educatio~~ to a person. A deknder of discrimii7atior-r must try to advance some relevmt reason for his actions. And, Williams argues, what constitutes a relevant reason for doing something is drastjcally constrained by our la-rt_yuage. Williams believes that this insight shows that the recognition of our common humanity giv"ws strong reasons to treat people equally Consider, for instance, Lf-re distributim of medical care in the light of our common humanity. What constitutes a relevmt reason for distrilbuthg medical care? To Williams, the answer is clear: medical care should go to those who are in ill health. 'Xeavh~gaside prevel-rtativemedicine," he argues, "the proper g m m d of dllstribllition of medical c m is ill-health: this is a necessary tmth.""" His poi~liti s that our mderstanding of medicai care and health, embedded in our form of life, greatly constrains what reasons c m be relevant in, distributkg medical care. Given that we are all husnan, and so display basic human needs, we have rc.asom.l to msure that those who need medical care receive it. Of course, this arwmer-rtdoes not directly show that medical needs shoulcf be e ~ d satisfied, y but it does sugge" that those who are equally needy have m evally strong claim to medical care. Cln this view, our basic human equalit-y derives from our basic sirnilarity: we have a common nature, which gives rise to cornmost needs, Basic human ewality is, at bottom, lrhe basic samel-ressof people: we share the same nature, kvhictrr gives rise to common needs. rlis treat people equally

is to recognize that in their essential charactehstic they are the same and so there is no reason to prefer one to the other. Note here tfne way in whjch e ~ d i t as y sajncness is said to give rise to equality as ncl~prflercnlid treatment: because we are basically the same, no one should "o ppreferred to others (see Section ci.l), It is important to stress Irhal:although the basic ground for our equnljty is our similarity, the treatment that is argued for is not that everyone be treated exactly the s m e , but that needs be met in a nonprefe~xlitialway, That we share a commoxli hrtmarli nature that givcs rise to common needs does not imply that at every moment each person has the same needs: at m y given time some may r c q u i ~medical care, others education, and so on. What is crucial is that these comma11 needs be eyually satisfied. AS Tawny pointed out, '"quality of provision is not idenli,ty clf provision. It: is to be acbieved, not by treating different needs in the same w q but by devctthg equd c m to ensuring b t they are met in the differexlit w y s most appropriak to thern."'Z" Miilliams, then, believes that our language provides a secular basis for showing that our shared hummity gives us reason to help the needy. The diffiicuity with Williamsfsargt;ume~~t is revealed if we recall the analysis of conceptual disputes in Chapter 2. Our lmgmage is remarkably open-textuxd m d allows people to smsil>ly employ terns in opposing ways. It was Gililie" hsight that Lhe smsible use of language is consistent with great differences &out the best interpretahn of our pol,tical concepts. The same lesson applies to notions like ""medical care," It is simply wro~ligto say that an advocate of the free m r k e t who claims that "Alf should get good medical care because he c m pay for it" i s misusing 1mguage. One d g h t disagree with him and try to provide an argument that, when distributing medical care, needs are more important than ability to pay. R e issue, though, cmnot be settled by proclaimhg that since "it is a matter of Xo@c that particular sorts of weds constitute a rcason for receiving pmtimlar sorts of goods,""" the advoc&c of the free market is simply misushg languageTwo Eews

of Human Essence: Mcrrx and Kanf

I h e strength of Williams3 pproosal is that he does not make m y controversial claims &out the way in which we are equal (for example, that we are all equally loved by God). M m y secular proponents of fundamental equality, howevex; have been preyaf-cld to identify soxne core, shared hum m characteristic that defhlies the ""hmm essexlice," Karl Marx, far example, argued for the basic equality of humans insofar as all humans sham a common humm nat-ure (Sction 3.3) or essence, which generates similar needs. According to Marx, h u m s need to ""l,bjectifyMthemselves.32 To objectify oneself is to turn one" thoughts and plans into

something objective by chmging the world, In short, it is tl.ansfoming the world in such a way arr; to rcflect ox?re"saims and htentiox~s.That, -as Marx sees it, is what makes the works of htxmans so special; they are ways in which hurnans have changed the world to conform with their aims. We11 humar~sact on the world, their actio11 is conscious: they are seeking to shape the world in, accordance with their conscious purposes.. :In more familiar language, we might say &at we are planners m d doers; our lalhar is the way in which our pimaare e x p ~ s s e din doing. A~Gmals are doers, but not, Marx thbks, conscious plamers. Thtrs, our essenc our distinctively human feature-shows that we have basically the same needs: to create and produce, Because, Marx il7sisted, capitafist sockty stifles this creative ilnyulse for alnlost everyone, it dehuma~izesus (see Section 9.l). anuel Mant, in contrast, mahtain that our fmdamental humm characteristic is our ability to act morally. b r Kant, it will be recalled, freedom, never conflicts with jusli,ce (Section 5-4): to act freely is to act in accordance with rules of jusljce. To Mant, OUT dignity and wmtih stem from our ability to ~ s t r a j nour impulses and act autonomously (Section 4.2) on prkci_plesof justice. This ability to restrajn. our impulses and inslead do the right thing is our moml personality: it is the feature that enables us to h e morally and to respect the moral rights oi others. If we did not possess such a moral personillity, there wodd be no poirtt in having rights or rules or justice, for no one would pay attention to them h e n they clashed with her passiox~sor impulses. ally because we have the ability to put aside our impulses m d act according to reason, Kmt argues, does morality make any difference to us. Thus, for Kant, our funnamental human equality is our shared ratiox~alnature (Section 3.2). tXlr equal rationality, hparticular our equal capacity for moral personality is our fundamatal. humm equaliv.32 h d it is this equaLity of moral personality that gives us an entitlement to eyual justicc.33 The problem is that we do not seem to have an equal moral personality if this means an equal capacity to restrak our irnpulses an$ desires and to instead act 0x1 rules oi lustice. Some people seem to have precious little capacity to do so-they have an extremely h a d time resisting temptation-whereas other people are able to resist almost any temptation. s hardly ever Some people are always getting into tr-ouhlc, w h e ~ a others break moral rules or act mjustly In what sense, then, c m it be claimed that we are equalIy rational or have an equal.cayaciw for moral personaiity? This is actualty a general problem for most clairns &out fur~damental equality. No matter what characteristic cve identify as a c o r n o n , fundamental human characteristic, it will almost surely be open to some variation m o n g humms. People possess d i f f e ~ ndegmes t of ratiomlity difkrent capacities and desires to "ohjectify" th.emselves, differenl needs,

and so on. WC do not all have "tied scores" orz rationality, moral personality or capabity for objectilcication. If wt. are never all really equal, can arguments from ftmcdamental equaiity ever succeed? h interesting response to this problem is to chazrge continuous concepts into threshoM conceptsMFor example, cox~sidera continuous concept such as "'ageM-we have a continuous scale (years old), and score each person on the scale, 'Mie find, of course, that many peoptc beat out others----they have higher ages. To tfne extrnt equality requires a tied score (Section 6.l), mast people are unequal on this continuous concept. mreshold concepts hold out the possibility for a huge nurnber of ties, however. Cor~sider,for ertample, the concept "'ofd enough to drive." Someone who is fourtee11 years old is ranked below (that is, "too yow~g'") someone who is twenty (who is ""od enough"") But those who are Iwenly, thirty, forty, fifty, and sixty are equal: they get the same scor"old enough.'" Thus, even though trtvtznty-, thirv-, forty-, fifty- and sixtyyear-old peaple are mequal in ages, they are equal in satisfying the criterion of bejng old enough to drive. The thirty-year-old person does not better satisfy the criterion than does the twlmty-year-old. We can apply this snme idea to a fundannmtal equality claim. Mthough we do not illl possess equal moral personality (inthe sense of an equal ability to control our impulses ar~dact on rewox~),we may all be equally capable of mkirnal moral personality: we are able to usually follow the basic rules of morality, Perhaps a few dD not even meet this minimum criterion, but such people really mighL be special cases wbo are not-on par with the rest of us (for exmple, small children and psychopaths). The great majority of function@ adults am indeed equal insofar as they meet the minimurn conditions for moral pmonillity and thus have a "tied score" 0x1 that threshold trait.

Equal Freedom The V"igi~ziaDeclaration of Rights of l V 6 w h l c h in many ways was the model for the Deckvukiv~zof Ilzdlyerzdet?ce-proclaims Fn its first article, "That all men are by nature equally free and independent."" 5 The Second Treatise on Civil Gtlvermulzt, one of the most important works in liberal political theory, John Lock (1632-1704), makes a very similar claim about the condition ""all men are naturally h."It is a condition not only of liherty (Section 4.3) but also of equaliq, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing mare evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, prsmiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal

one amangst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master ctf them all should, by any manifest declaration ctf his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undc~ubtedright to dominion and sovereignty36

For ZJocke-and the entire liberal tradition in political theory-the h d a mental human cqualjv is the absence of any natural rmkistg of iL7dividuals into those Who command and those who obey. We are not born under any natural authority (except, Locke would add, God"). Thus, given the nonp~ferentidconception of equality/ since no one is to be rmked above or bebw any one else in terns of autfnority, we am natclrally equal. 'Thus, by nature, peogsrie have equal freedom..This fundamental equality, argues Locke, shows that ~ustifiedpoliitical authority cmnot be derived from, the natural stabs of some as rulers over others, but must: be based on the consat of all citizens. We will hrPn to the relation of equality and authort c h a t i s crucial i s t h t , in liberal ity in Chapter 10; for p ~ s e n purposes political. theory, She fundaxnenhl equality is an qzlnlify c~ffieed~~m. Two Worries about Arguments from Fundamental E q u a l i ~

Thus far, I have been assuming that arguments from h d a m e ~ ~ tequalal ity are the key egalitarian arguments. But Joseph Raz, a contemporary political phifctsophes, gives us reason to wonder whether arguxnmts from fudamenlal equality are redly egalitarian a r g m n t s at all!" Followirrg Raz, let us consider a version of what X have called the argument from fundamental equality (HE): FE: Afl whct are equally F are equally entitled to G,

T%us, as mmy egalitarians have argued, those who are equally needy are equally entitled to have their needs met, Now, it seems that we can rephrase HE along the lines of FE": If Gs are being distributed solely ctn the basis of feature F, then thase whct are equaly F are equally entitled to Gs.

Thus, again, if we are distributing health care simply on the basis of need, then those who have equd needs have equal claim to healtl? care. On reflection, h0wevc.r; FE* is not an egaiitarian principle at all-it is a principle of nonarbitrary distribution. Xf we are really distributing Gs simply on the criterion of possession of F; and if two people are equally F, to say that one person has a stronger claim to C m s t imply one of two things.

(1)It may show that possession of F was not really the sole grounds for distributing G. For example, suppose a teacher says that a 90 on t-he final exam, is the complett. gromds for itwading an .A in the course, and that two students receive 90 on the final, but only m e gets an A, If the two s t u d e ~ ~receive ts dilferent find grades for the course, it may be that, after all, the teacher is ushg two criteria rather than one- Perhaps, in, addition to performmce on the h a l exam, the teacber is taking into account class pmticipation, c d it factm E. In t-hat case, all those who arc? equally F and equally E should receive equal grades. (2) Alternatively the teacher may assign, the grades arbitrarily: he randomly assigns grades regardless of one's xore on the find exam. 11%this case, we would not expect those with equal Fs to ~ c t t j v eyud e Gs. But if the teacher is not being arbitrary, and if: the teacher has specified all, the criteria, for giving grades, then those vvho score the same on the criteria have equal claims to an A, and will both recri\ie an A. 'This will not be because the teacher is an egalitarim: it is because the teacher is distributing the good on the basis of the stated, criterion, This seems to meal that the fundmental egaiital-ian argument does not really depcnd on any commitment to the value of equalityf but simply to nonarbitrary rational distribution of the goods at stake, of the It may well be a r p e d , however, t-hat FE is not tt7e best statcme~~t argument f s m fmdamental equality More in the spirit of egali,tarianism, seems to be TrueFE: All thctse whct are equally F are to receive equal shares of G,

RuePE is distinct from, FE. Whereas as FE generates q z l a l claims lo G, True FE endorses clnirns to eqztal amoztnts of G. We can rclilnterp~etTmeFE as TrueFE*: If Gs are being distributed safety ctn the basis ctf feature F, then thase who are equally F are entitled to equal amounts of G,

In most cases, the same general paint holds for TmeFE as for FE, In our case of the teacher, TrueFE tells the ttzacher to give equal grades to those who have equal F-scores. As Aristotle put it, Lhe teacrher is treating e q u d y (giving equal Gs to) those who are equals (have eqz~alsFs), m$ &eating unequally (giving different Gs to) those who are u n q u a l (have differe~~t Fs). 'IiueFE is, thnugh, a true egaiitarian principle-it is m m than a mere statement of nonarbitrary distrihtlCion of G. Consider, for instance, a case in which we have nixle indivisible units of G and five people to distribute them to, all of whom are equally F'. :lf W -are to give those who are equally F equal Gs, and we carnot give fra~tionsof Gs,

then TrueHE reyuires us to give each person m e G. This leaves four Gs wsted, but there is no w q to equally distribute them, so TrueFE requires that they must be left mdistributed, This is important: although one way to promote evality is to give more to those with less, mother m y is simpiy to take away from those with m m until everyoxle has the snme amount. fndeed, often it is impossible to raise everyone to the highest standard, and the only way to satisfy TrueHE is to lower s o m people, For exarrrple, if all who hawe equal health care needs are to have equal health care, m d if we c ot a h r d some very expensive treatment for everyone (say, dialysis machines), then it satisfies TrueFE if no one Rceives the health care. Raz, then, concludes t-hat pkciples such as FE arc? reasonable principles, but are not really egalitarian. On the other hand, TrueFE, which seems most truly egalitarian, may he very waskhl and that appears unreaso~~able.

6.4 Equaliv of What? T%us far, our maixr focus has been on arguments in, favor of equality In Section 6.2, we examined attempts to ground the case for eyual trcattnent on utitity impartialiq, and incommensurability; Sectior~6.3 focused on argumentHchat we should be t-reated equnlly because we are, in some fundamental respect, really equal. Throughout, we have considered various ways people can be t ~ a t e dequally-goods can be distributed equally, needs c m be fulfilled equally, people c m have equal liberty Not only do political theorists offer very different reasons why we should treat people eqmlly, they cJeeply disagree 0x1 the. ways in whjch people should he treated eqz~ally~ T%e aim of this section is to brieny =view the different ways in which it has been said people should, or should not, he treated eyaifEi. Equal Welfare

It is platrsible to suppose that if we want to tmly treat everyone as equals, we should seek to make everyone" life go cqually weif.." AAfr all, is not the real paint of giwi"g people goods, such as money or educatior~,to make their lives go betterKonsider an "equal" "distribution of a good such as music compact disks (CDs): everyme in society gets a certain number of CDs every year. S o w of these peopie, Irhough, arc. tone deaf, or entirely deaf, and have no use for CDs. It hardly seems that we are treating equals equally if we give C B to everyone, including the deaf. I f W wish to treat the deaf eqmlly, it seems that we shouid give them something that they want just as mtrch as a music lover kvimts a CD.

More generalw, if some people have psessing needs-say, they are h d i capped and require additional assistance to lead a n o m d life-it may seem that givhg them the same income as a healthy person is not really to treat &em equally, If they are to lead a life that is equal.@ satisfying, they will require additional funds (sec F i g m 6.2 above). Folilobving a standard view in economics m d political theory; let us define a person" wwelfare as the satisfaction of her wmts or "preferences." Suppow each person ranks her p~ferences-hel- desires or wmts-from those things that she wants most to what she wmts the least. We can then say that a person's welfare (or ratility) level is a function of the number of her prefmex~cesthat arc? satisfied and how higbly these preferexlees are someonc who gets her top p~ferencesat.isfied has a hjgher ral7ked.B SoSo, level of cvelfare than someone cvho gets only her forty-fifth prefe~nce satisfied. If we adopt the view that to treat people equally is to ensure that they have an equdity of welfare, we will equally satisfy cveryo12efs preferences. Equality of welfare, however, is open to at least two dbjc~tions,"~ (l)Although most peoplgs preferences concerxl how their own liwes go---preferences for nicer housesf cars, good heal&, and so on-all of us s o m of the time, and some of us most of the time, have pseferences about how other people% lives go. Indeed, we often encourage this: we teach our children not to thhk only of themselkres, but to wmt to help others. We can say then, that people entertain "extct-nal'"references-preferences about other people getting thcir prefc.rex~cessatisfied. Alf, for instance, might have a preference that Betty gets what she wants-this cvould be an external prekrence, External preferences raise problems for the egalitarian. For mthing, lrhcy may he nasty: if one of my prefere~~ces is to see you fail to get wh& you want, the pursuit of equal sati,sfactionof welfare must admit that the very thing that satisks your preference stiRes my prekrex~ce,You getting "hat you want makes my life worse. So, pahaps you ought not to get ir. But even "nice" external preferences cawe problems for the egalitarian. If ALf has a prekrermce that Betty gets what she walits, Betty's preferenws will in a selrse be "'double-counted"":giving it to her will satisfy her preference and Alf's too, thus mnbcing two people's :lives better off. Perhaps this is not a decisive problem, since ALf is gettjng smething he wants: the satisfaction of Betty's prefe~nce.It will, however, be likely to have the consequence that selfish peopt" will receive m r e goods in an egalitarian system, A11 the selfish persods preferences will be about her receiving goods; but the unselfish (altruistic) people will have split: preferences-ome of their prefclrences w i l be &out their receiving goads, and some will be about otZner people, includislg presumably selfish people, receiving goods. If so, Irhcx~Lhe equal satisfaction of preferences will lead to adcttitiond g o o h for selfi,skpeople, some to sat-

isfy the preferences of the selfish people and some to satisfy the external prefererlees of the altruistic peogslIe. A more serious objection to equaliq of welfare is that we choose many of our preferences, and some people choose very expenshe ones, Some people want a life of luxury filled with e x t ~ m e l yexpensive things; others arc! more modest. Now, the equal satisfaction of pscrlerences would l e d to giving more goods to those who have expensive tastes, since it takes so much more to satisfy tt7e preferences of such people. We thus are faced with the possibility of m "egalitarim state" that supportsome in a life of luxury. The case of the persm with expensive tasks, it should be noted, is very simitar to the handicapped person we considered above (see Figure 6.2). The handicapped person needs more goods to give ber the same level of preference satisfaction as that obtahed by the healthy person; the person with expensive tastes is in a similar position. If we think there is an important difference between the cases, it is because we think that the person with luxurious tastes is responsible for having expensive tastes whereas the handicapped person did not choose her exper~sivepreferer~wsIt seems, then, that a plausible cJefense of equal welfare must develop an ilccount of "freely chosen expensive tastes" and "nnovohntary expenske preferences." Altbough in some cases this distinrtior~will seem clear, it will raise intractable problems in a host of 0the r s Compare, for example, someow who, for as long as she can Emember, has had an overwheiming desire to be a political leader, and a persm who has suffered paraiysis in a car accidex~t.Can we say that lfie first person somehow is respmsible for h a costly p~ferenceswhertras th.e second person did not voiuntarily choose his now-expensive preferences? But the paralyzed persorl chose to drive in cars, ar~dso run tt7e risk of injury whereas our would-be leader cmnat recall ever making any choice to desperately want to lead others, m a t does equality of welfare instruct us to do? Equal Safisfaction of Needs

One way to avoid these problems is to adopt a needs-based conception of welfare. Instead of understanding a person" wwelfare in terms of what she walks ar~dwhetkr she gets it, we may characterize a person's welfare in terms of the satisfaction of her basic rreeds. The noli,on of a "'need'" points to standard conditions or goods that are required by everyone," Thus, for example, one political philosopher had advanced the following list of ""curse-of-life needs": (1) The need to have life-supporting re1af;ior.lto the environmcnt (2) T%e need for food and \vater

The need to excrete The need for exercise T%eneed for periodic rest, ixlcludhg sleep The need (beyond what is covered by the preceding needs) for r/vhatewer is indispensable for preserving the body intact in irnportmt respects (7) The need for companionship (8) The need for educatio~~ (9) T%eneed for social.stcceptmce and recognition (10)The need for sexual activity (11)The need ta be free from harassme~~t, h~cludhgnot beirrg ~011thually frightened (12) T%eneed for recogni"con42 (3) (4) (5) (6)

Such needs do not depend on preferences: on a needs-based account: of well'arcr, these are the things that people need, regardless of what they W&, Equal treatment, then, wouln entail the equal satisfaction of these basic needs.43 T%us, said Mam, the ultimate achievement of a communist society kvould be to distribute "".L each accordhg to his needs" (see Sections 3,3,9,1), ?b the extent necds-based accounts inc[icate that a person's overall welfare does not depend on her own view of what she kvmts, they are controversial. Suppose, for example, that a person has no inkrest in cornfor a period) as a hermit. panio~~ship, wishing to live (as did Wittge~~stein It s e e m content.ious indeed to say that we arc? furthering her weifare by providw her wi2.h cmpanionshiy (need 7 above), something for which she has 110 desire. Needs-based accour~tsof welfare am typicaliy lir~kedto theories of human nature, such as Marx's, that depict humans as having an essence that we must fulfil1 if we are to lead satisfied lives (Sections 3.3, 6.3). Such a theory @ e m basis for deemhg some lhillgs (such as cornpanjonshipf a true need, but othtlrs (such as doing philosoplhy) a mere desire, Gtne of the attractions-as well, ultimately, as one of the drar/v$acks---of the p~ference-basedaccow~tof welfare is that it makes each individual atrthoritative in deciding kvhat her welfare is; needsbased accounts make authoritative a h o r y of hurnm nature, or a rationalist insight into the true proper life for humans (Sectims 3.2,3.3). Equal Resources

T%eproblems with equal welfare ixlterpreetions of equal treatment have led mmy egalitaians to defend an equal resource view44 "fu treat people equaily is to give them equal resomes. Having rrtceived their equal share of the resources, it is up to each person whlfnes he or she wilt use

lhem wisely to help construct a satisfy* life or waste them in the parsuit of empty pleasures. 'Thus, a person wbo cdtivates expensive tastes will have to use her e ~ a s lh m of the resources to satisfy them; given how expensive they are, she will pfobabb not be able to satisfy many of them, and so her welfare level will be lower than someolle with mare modest tastes.. Equal resource theories must identify what is a resource. It seems clear that money is a resourcre, but what about eyes? If a resource is someehing that is jnstrumental to achieving your purposes, then having eyes is a crucial resource. There would thus seem a case for an equal distribution of eyes, perhaps justifying t a h g a1eye from some to transplmt into the blind. Some resource theorists have been arnbivalmt r/vheeher body parts and personal traits are to be viewed as resources..Although J o h Rawls, for example, is explicit that body parts are not to be distributed, he also believes that a just society treats everyone's natural tde~ltsas a ""cokct-ive asset" that should work to the advantage of the poolr." Although Rawls seems somewhat attracted to such an expansive view of resources, he ultimately advoc&es a list of ""primarygoods," which am -all-purpose resources that everyane must have to pursue their ajms in lile. Thus, says Rawls, we require liberty, income, opportunities, and the social basis of self-respect, *atever our plan of life is; t-he distributior.~of Rsources, for Rawis, is the distributjon of these goods. We may well query however, whether an equal share of such goods constituks an adequate interpretation of equal treament. Some people may not: be Ale to use their goods or may require a great deal of additjonal goods for an akquate life. Amartya Sen draws our attention to the har~dicappedpersorl, who would not receive any additional.goods under a simple equal resource view: shc. would get her share, m d only hclr share, even though she can do comparatively little with it. Sen suggests that such a view suffers from a "pods; fetish""36-its only concern is goods, but goods are only a means, not an end. T%e end or goal is that people" lives go well. In response to problems raised by the handicapped and the ill, equal resowce views have developed c0rnplt.x insurance schemes, which try to accommodate extra assistmce for some in. m equal resource distribution.47 Basic Capability Equoliv and Needs

Sen's own pmposal is to focus on equal capabilities, rather than either welfare or resources: It is arguable that what is missing in all this . . . is some notion of ""basic capabilities"": person being able to d o certain basic things. The ability to

move about is relevant here, but one can consider ctthers, e.g. the ability tto meet one" nutritional requirements, the wherewithal tct be clothed and shettered, the pawer to participate in social life of the community. . . . [bwls's idea of] primary goods suffers from the fetish handicap in being concerned with gmods . . . rather than what these gclod things do to human beings. Ulility [i.e., preference- satisfaction welfarismj, on the other hand, is concerned with what these things do to human beings, but uses a metric that foctrsses not ctn the person" capabilities but on his mental reaction. There i s still samething missing in the cclmbined list of primary goods and utilities.48

Or~ceagain citing the case of the handicapped person, 5er.l concludes that what is reyuired by the egalitarian it; an '"interptation oi r~eecjsin the form of capabilities."@ Note here that Sen himself sees his account as a versim of needs theory. Rather than conceiving of needs aa more-or-less pwkive resource requiremmts, Sen understands them as active powers or aibilities-apabilities or "'functionings" that one must posess to lead an adequate life. Although we carnulot go into th.details of Sen's account here, it should be manifest that insofar as his accow~tis needs based, it has the general rationalist trait of such accounts of presupposing a nation of an adequately or properk functioning person.

Bt:L of the modes of equal treatment thus far examined have employed an extremely wide conception of "'trealmeat." Having one's tife go well, having resources, having needs satisfied, or possessing capabilities are all see11 as ways that people can he tmated. To u d e r s t a d '%reatmmtMh this way presupposes that almost all of one's life constitutes a "treatment" of you by your society or government, Thus, if your life has not go11e a w d as other people%, some seem kmpted to say that you thus have not been treat& as 4; if you have Icss rclsources than others, you thus have been treated uwqualiy. Wnderstandhg treat~nemltin this way would seem more at home in collectivist accounts of individuals-insociety (Sctian 3.4), which trnderstand mast attributes of the jndividual in terms of collective or social facts. It thus shouln come as no surprise that the political lrheorists discusscld thus far in Section 6.4 embrace either socialism or revisionist liberalism. A more modest understanding of "treatunentH-md one that is more cor~siste~~t with classid liberalism's individuatist analysis of individuals-h-society (Sctians Z.f,,3.4)-focuses on cases in whjeh s m e individuals (officials of the state) are explicitly meting out treatments such as pul7ishments, rewards, and positior~sto others (citizens). According to the notion of civic eqaljt_y,when treatkg people in these ways puhlic of-

ficials are not to sixnply prefer some group of citizens to others, but must employ general, public criteria for any difference in treament. If alf have equal status as citizens, no group of citizens, just becatrse of their group membership, will be preferred to others, nor will any group be ranked lower than others. Hence they witl he treated ewaily in the sense of the nonpreferential conception. One aspect of this equality of civil status is ~"quditybefore fhc law, In meting out kgal pu~~ishment, gover~~ment officials arc to be concerned only with a person" legal rights, not extralegal considerations such as class, race, sex, or ethnic background. Of course, dikrent people have different legal rights-the law creates differenl: classes of pevle, such -as lm~dlordsand t e ~ ~ a ~doctors t s , a d patients, public officiais and private persons. The ideal of equality before the law is that when being treated by the law, one" treatment is determilled solely by one" legal stabs (as social stadetermined by one%rights and duties), not by one's no~~legal tus. In itself, equality before the lnw is consistenf: with gi,ving some groups legal privikges; &us aristocrats may have legal ri@s denkd to commoIlers. A stronger conceptior7 of civic equality and one that has been at the heart of Ule li:beral tradition, is qzld basic riglzfs of all citizens, and a general opposition to legal distixzctims based on class, sex, or race. An ideal of equal citizenship is expressed by the Fourteenth a d Fifteenth. Amendments to the U.S. Constitution: AMENDMENT XIV. . . . No state shall make or enfcjrce any law which shall abridge the privileges or irnmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, withaut due process of taw; nor deny to any person within its juridiction the equal protection of the laws. AMENDMENT XV: . . . The right of citizens of the United States tt3 vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of semituude,

The Fifteenth Amendment outl-ight prohibits legal distinctions based on race in matters of voting. The Fourteenth Amendment holns that no citizen is to be $enied "equal protection of the law,""In interpreting this clause, the Supreme Court has developed a doctrke of ""suspicious classifications," which include race and national origin, and at times has been illterpreted to incllade status as m dien and as poor, and might plausibly be extended to include homosexuals and women. X n evaluathg whether the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated, the Supreune Court looks especially hard at any laws that: emplny any of trhe "suspiciaus classifications." E a law invokes such a classification, it mtrst be

shown that (I)the law serves a legitimate public goal of considerable impartarlee, and (2) using the ciassificatio~~ fits the public goal perkctly-it is precisely the classia'ieation Chat is required if the g o d is to he achieved51 Thus, for example, race might be used as a classificatim in a desegregation law, since it wodd be necessary to achieve the goal of the law, but in most cases th.e court would prohibit use of the &ssifieali.on as a k n i a l of equal citizenship. Some, however, have opy osed any laws that allot different treatmmt to citize17.s01%the basis of such ' * s ~ ~ p j C i catews gories," arguhg that all such laws tmdermine equal citizenship. Polificol and Social Equality

Advocates of democracy-and the Fifkenth Amendment-have argued politicat equality, according to which each that equal citizenship e~~dnrses citizen has an equal say in elections. The ideal of one perso1.1, one vote, is an expression of political equntjty: each citizen is the political equal of any other insofar as the vote of each counts equally, O&er interpretations have been much more expmgve; to one socialist, political equality "'is the demmd to be equally involved in the auehorizati~nof a total way of Me, and it is the fundamental demmd of democracy.'"2 Chapter 9, in our exmk~ationof social justice, we will retun1 to the socialist notioz~of political equality. Some egalitarians have insisted that the ultirnate expression of the value of equality is social equality, in whiCh all citizens; have lrhc same social statzns and perhaps the same power. Social. equality is usually taken to r e q u i ~both economic e v a l i t y (say, in the form of cqudity of resources) and palilical equatity, but it goes beyond those. It has sometims been called ""socialdemocracy"-a way of life chacrc!ria,ed by the ilbsence of social and occupational hierarclhies. Thus, to advocates of social equality, it is necessary to refom the "division of labor itself. . . the way that people sort themselcres out (or are sorted out) to accomplish their goals of production and distribution,"" F~coplemust not be sorted out according to occupationill status hierarchies or into groups of owwrs and workers, bosses Tlnd bossed, Citrried to i t s extpcme, the pursuit nf social equality can lead to ~gujatiosrsconcerning dress and consumption, for both of these are ways in which some people display their higher status over others. Thus, in Maoist China uniform st-yles of dress were mandated; on a smaller scale, social egalitarians often favor school unifoms. Social equality thus seems to lead to equality as sameness (Section 6.1). On =fleckion, o w e v e t it seems impossible ts really eliminate social hierarchies: although in Maoist China leaders and the led dressed alike, no one was in dt>ukt about who the leaders were, or t-heir praogatives. Indeed, it seems impossible to educate without creating a hierarchy of educa-

tit,nal att;airzments, impossible to entgage in sport?;wi&out creating a&letic hiermhic.5 fsta~dit~gs), hpossible to have art wi&out producing artistic inequalities. A h o s t evesy field of erndeavor creates r m h g of Phose who are better or worse, more or less praiwwozfi~and so m. In response to this inevitabiliQ of social r m h g s , Michael Walzer; a co~~temporav egditanm, has advocated "'complex equali@."%By this, Walzer mews that isl a socially egalitarian societFT,the rmkings from one field of endeavor will not trmslate into an overall social hierarchy. Being better at sports will give one high statzns in sports, but will not trmsliate into better medical care, higher wealth, m d overall high status; being a scholar will give one high academic stahls, but, again, not more political status or better medical care. elhinating social hierarchies, e p a l treatme17.t reFor Walzer, rather t h a ~ quires that they be contajned. As he is a socialist, his deepest worry is about economir cqualitks; alt%lou@he allows that they are necessary for production, he wishes to contain their h~flwnce,so that high economic stat-us does not automatically brhg high political status, the best education, and the best medical care, Like Williams fsction 6,3),W h e r believes that we share socidly agreed upon understa~cfingsof what the distributive criteria should be for digerent parts of social life-academic fame should go to great scholars, m d mdical care shoulid go to the sirk. Walzer" proposal thus raises a very simitar problem to that we c o n s i d e ~ din relation to Williiams" salysis of humm eqt~ality:the diversiv of our lmguage and culkre leads to sensible disagreements about the nature of the practjces of medicine or educatioz~,and so disagreements about just what are the correct criteria far dist-ributing their goods.

An important aspect of civic equiality concerns competition for public positions: in competing for public offices, citizens are not to be discrriminated against on the grounds of race, national origh, or sex. Understood in this way, cq~itrlif_zlof opportznnify rcquircs nonpreferential tseatment in competition for goven~mentpositions. The development of modem civil services is an expression of this ideal, in which appointments are made on the basis of criteria relevant to the performance of the posit.jon, The of ideal has been expanded in more recent times to include the treatme~~t citizens by nongovernmental orgmizations such as busixless corporations and private unkersities. One g r o d for this extension is an expanded. view of what comtitutes a puhlic organizatio~~. Rather than restricting the ideal of equal citizenship to public qua governmental organizations, there has been a movement in kgislatiorl to include '"private" organkations that we open to t-he public or serw lfie public. :Elence, according to the Unjted Kingdom Race Relations Act of 1968, it is "'unl,awful,for any

person concerned with the provision to the public . . . of any goods, facilities or services to discrimhate'kon the grounds of color, race, ethnic or national origka55 The ideal of equaliv of oyportunity as open competition, barring pmfe ~ n l i a treatment t except on grow~dsrelevant to the performance of fhe task in question, is distkct from a more encompasshg ideal af equality of opportunity, sometimes called "eequaljty of fair opportunity."" The d care of this latter idea is that social factors such as class, race, a ~ sex should not affect one% chances to obtain desired pasitions in society. Those equally endowed should have equal chances of success, It is importar~tto note that not even equaiity of fair opportunity seeks to guaranis to hawe some obstacles to tee equal success: to have a r ~opportu~~ity success-such as being a women or being poor-elimhatedl, not to be guaranteed success, if only because the positions "okg competed for are scarce.S7 Mereas the arighal ideal sabv each competition for each position as a differenl compeljtion chat should bc conducted f;zirly, equality of fair opportunity extends this idea of a fair cmpetition to life prospects as a whole. Is it fair, ask the pmponents of ewality of fair opportu~liity, that the competent poor child stands less af a chance af eventually getling favored positions in our society than does the cqually competent rich chilcl? Is fiat treating ewals eyudly? Note that if we embrace this concept-i;onof equality of fair opportunity, we are again taking m encompasskg m d abstract view of '~reatnrtent"-socz'et.y is tmt.in,u people unequally because some are born in positions that do not allow them to effectively compete with others who are no more competent thm they..

:In this chapter, :I have explored two groups of questions, (1)Why is equaiity to be valued or pursued? (2) In what witys me people to be t-reated equally? In answerkg the first question, 1distkgwished "external arguments" for equality, which endorse equality because it prmotes or expresses some other value, a r d arguments from h d a m e n t a l eytnality which hold that we aught to treat people equally because in some deep sense we really are equal. Section 6.2 considered three external argum e ~ ~for t s equality: that based on p r ~ m o t h goverall utility that based on impartiality, m d that based an incommensurability. %clion 6.3 examined arguments maintajnkg that we are fundamenhl1.y equal because we are all human, because we share a co on human essex-tce, and because we are equally naturally free- Section 6.3 closed by considerkg some concerns about arguments from fundamental equahty, most importantly r/vheeher they really are egalitarian at ail. Section 6.4 t u r ~ ~ etodmodes of equal treament. People c m be treated equally in an almost limitless vari-

ety of ways; only a saxnple of the main proposds were discussed. Examined were a r p m e ~ ~in t sfavor of (f) equal w e l f n ~ (2) , equal satisfaction af needs, (3) equal resources, (4) equal capabilities, (5) equal civic statzns, (6) politicat and social equal*, and (7) eguality of ~ p o r t u n i w .

1. See here J. R. L,ucas, The Principl~sof hlitics (Oxford: Cfarendcjn Press, 196&), pp, 243K 2. R, H. T a m e y Equality ((New York: Harcc~urt,Brace, 1931), pp. 110--.111. 3. Aristotle, The IJlllifics, in Richard. McKetm, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), Book 3 [1280~1281a). 4, Arititcltfe, Micotnerehe~tzEklzics, W. D. Ross, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Book 5,s [1131.16-1132a2]. 5. Franlois-Noel Babeuf and Slpain Marechal, "The Manifesto of Equality," in Lcctuis I? Pcl)man and Rubert Westmarland, eds., Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 987),pp, 49-52. 6. Jererny Bentl~arn,I~ztrudzlcfionto the Princif?les of Murals alzd Legislation, in AZan Ryan, ed., U l r ' l i t a r i i alzd Other Essays (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1987") chap. 1. 7". This is an alteration of a case given by Amartya Sen, " T ~ q a l i cct qf What"??n d Law (Cambridge: Cambridge UniSterling McMurrin, ed., Liberty, Equalif!{ ~ n the versity Press, 1987), pp. 145ff. See Section 6.4. 8. Quoted in Bernard Crick, Soczlnlistn (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1987), p. 8. 9. Thornas Nagel, Equality and Partllality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1WI), p, 64. 10. Ibid., p. 66. 11, J. R. tucas, "Against Equality," h Hwao A, Bedau, ed., lustice and Etliialiky (Engtewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p, 139. 12, S. 1. Benn and R. S, Peters, Social Priuciples a d the Denzocratic State (London: Ceorge AltIen and Unwin, 19591, p. 110. 13. Ibid., p. 111. 14. Stanley X. Benn, "Human Rights-for Whcctrn and for Wlrrat?'"n Eugene Karnenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds,, Flxxrnn~tRiglzls (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978>,p. 67, 15. Herbert Spiegelberg, "A Aefense of Human Equalit&" E~ifosoplzicalRer?iew, vaf. 53 (March 19441, p, 114, 16. %id. 17. See Rawls, A Tfjeoy of jrastice (Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 101, 18. Ibid., p. 174. 19. William Styrun, Soplliek Choice (New York: Vintage Books, 1992). 20. See Cregory Vtastos, "Justice and Equality;" in R, B. Brandt, ed., Social Jt'lrsfice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Halt, 1962). 21. Lucas, The Principltrs.ufpolifics, p. 251.

22. Online at http://www.constituticlnnorg/bcp/\~irgRdur.htm. 23, See Tawney, Equality. See Also Sanford A. takclff, ""Christianity and Equality'% J, Roland Pemosk and J o h W. Chapman, eds., NOMOS IX: Eqziality (New York: Atherton, 19671, pp. 115-133. For an argument that the idea of equal human worth is essentially reli@ous, see Louis P. hjman, "On Equal Human Wtrth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism," h Pllojrnan and Westmurland, eds., Eqliafity, pp. 282-299. 24. Bernard Wlliams, 'The Idea of Equality;" in his Problems f:f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 230. 25. Ibid. 26, Ibid., p, 232. 27, Ibid., p. 233, 28, Ibid. p. xx. See also Uavid Braybrooke, iCleeting Needs (J3rince29, kwney; Eyualif?~~ ton: Princeton University Press, 198T), pp. 14-4145. 30. Braybrooke, nifeeting 1Vlseds, pp. 241-242. 31. See here John Plamenatz, K ~ v MarxS l Ptzilosophy of Mazz (Bxfcjrd: Oxford University Press, 1"35), p, 115. See also jcln Elster, An Infroduction do Karb m m (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),pp. 44% 32. See Amy Gutmann, Liber~lEqzialify (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19801, pp. 27-41. 33. Rawls, A Thmy t$jzrstice, p. 505. 34. See here Alan Gewirth, Reason n ~ Momlity ~ d (Chicago: Universiq of Chiicagct Press, 2 9781, pp. 121-1 22. 35. Online at http:/ /www.constituticlnnorg/bcp/\~irgRdur.htm. 36. john Locke, Second EeaCisc f:$ Covenzmenf, in Peter Z,aslett, ed., Two Reatises of Goztlrmnzen (Cadridge: Cambridge University Press, 1(360),sect. 4. 37. The fclllowing discussion Is drawn from Joseph Raz, The niloralifyf:$Freedorn (Oxford: Ctarendttn Press, 1486), chap. 4, 38, 'fhis view is endorsed by Mai Nielsen, Equality n~xdLiberty (Totuwa, NJ: Rowman and Alleheld, 1485), for example, p. 7. 39, This is a very basic view, which requires modifkatirtn. I consider the idea of preference satisfaction in mure depth in my Social Pizilusopirzy (Armontc, W M-.E. Sharpe, 19991, pp. 5@58. $C)-. Much of what J say here is drawn Prom Ronald Dworkin, "What 1s Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," PPhilusoplzy & Public Agaz'rs, vol. 10 (Summer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 185-246; and Eric Rakowski, Equal J~lsfl'k'e 1(391),pp, 23ff. 1 leave aside here serious objections ti:, the very idea of comparing the degree to which different people have had their preferernes satisfied; 1 discuss these problems in Social Pkilosupfry, chap. 4. 41. Fur a somewhat different view, see James Griffin" notion of well-being as based on certain ""prudential values" that are held to be rialuable by everyone. Well-being: Ifs ~neaz~ittg~ Measuvemerz Mnmf Iunyurta~ce(Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2 986). 42. Braybrc~oke,Meetit18N e d s , p. 36. 43.For ct-tmpl-ications,see ibid., pp. 238ff.

44, See Ronald Dworkin, ""What Xs Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resc~urces," PIziIosoph~jt 3 Pz-i.blicAflaim, vol. 10 (Fall 1981), pp. 283-345; Eric Rakowski, Equal jzkstil7e. 45. Rawls, A T h m y t$jzrstice, p, 101. 46. Sen, ""Equality of What?"". 160. 47. See Dworkin, 'What Is EqtraliQ'? Part 2: Equaliv of Resc~urces." 48. Sen, "Quality of What?" p. 160. 49. Ibid. See also Amartya %n, ItteqrfaliCy Reexamined (Cambridge: Warvard University Pressf 11992). SO. See Benn and Peters, Social Pn?zciplfssalzd flze Detnocrgtic State, pp. 122-123. 51. For an excellent analysis, see John Hart Ely, Denzocracy alzd Distrust (Cambridge: f-farvard University Press, 19801, pp. l45ff. 52, Philip Green, Xetrieving Denrocmcy: ln Smmh of Civic Equnliky (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 5. 53. Ibid., p. 9. 54. Michael Miafzer, Splreres oflusticr;. (New York: Basic Books, 1983). 55. For a discussion uC this act, see S. I. Benn and G. E Gaw, "The Il,iberal Conception of the Public and Private," in in. 1, Bern and G, E Gaus, eds., Public mzd Prkpate in Social L f i (New York: St. Martin", 19831, pp. 3638. 51;. See Rawls, A Tfzeolyjof justice, pp. 65ff. 57, See Peter Westin, "'The Concept ctf Equal Opportunity;" "Ells, vol. 95 (July 1(385),pp, 837-8511,

7.1 Do Liberty and Equulify Conflicf? :In The Sociul Cont~act,Jean-Jacques Rousseau tells us, If we enquire wherein lies precisely the greatest gcmd ctf all, which ought to be the guai of every system ctf law, we shall find that it c o r n s to two main objects, freeclem and equality: freedom, because any individual dependence means that much strength taken from the body of the state, and equality; because freedctm carnot exist without it.1

For Rousseau, not only are liberty and equality the two chief components of the common good, but eyuality supports liberty-there is no clash between the purstrit of ljherty and ewality. In co~~trast, J. Roland Pennock, a leadlin.g theorist of democracy, insisted that lherty and eqz~alityare, at best, in "tension" with each other; we need to somehow accommodate both, even though they tend to p d l us in opposite directions.2 More radically, many have believed that "'liberty Tm$ equality are in essence contradictozy; From the malyses of Chapters 4 to 6, one reason for these radically differcnt. views about the ~latiorrof ljberty a d equality slnodd be obvious. Both. "liberty" and "equality" can mean m y different things; depending 01%what view is taken of liberty what grounds for equal treament are endorsed, and what type of equal treatment is advocated, a mtxltitude of different relations between liberty and equality c m result. A lheorist who adopts a negative c o n c q t i o ~of~liberty and see?;eyuality arr; "'social equ"lity" will have a differclnt view of the relation of liberty and equality from a political lheorist who adopts a positive conception of :liberty and mderstands equi-tiityin Lcrrns of "'czylldity before the law." This, though, is only part of the story, This long-standing debate in. political theory can-

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not be reduced to a bunch of confused peoyle thinking that they are having an argument about whether freedom and eyuality confict, whe~nacwally they are not having m y argument at all, since they are trshg the words "freedom" and "epality" h very different ways, Recall agairt Gallic." notiorn of essentially contctsted concept (Section 2.1); each side is not si~xplyemployhg particular understmdhgs of freedom and equality but maintaining that their inkrl~retationsof the concepts are the hest interpretations; and so their view of the relatioln between freedom and equality is the mast enlightenhg. To understand the debate between liberals, socialists, and conservatives about the relation between freedom and ewality, we rneed to grasp not only the different conceptions of freedom and ewality they errrploy but why t-hey empioy these conceptior.ns and why they claim that these are the preferred conceptions-

7.2 Classical Liberalism: Liberty and Basic Equoliv Social Confract Theory: An Example of Classical Liberal Egalitarianism

Although, as; we shall see, classical liherals me apt to insist on the many ways in which liberty and equality clash, itis clearly wrong to understand classical liberalism as devoted simply to libert-y with no concern whatsoever for m y sort of equalityWmt important, libcrals have typically asserted the furndamental equality of each person hsofar as; each person has natural liberty As J o h Locke said, humms are naturally in a ''State of perfect Freedom to order their actions . . . as they think fit . . . w i t b u t asking leave, or depe~ndirngon lfie Will of any other Man"q1Section 4.3). T%us, Locke argued, because each person is by nature equally free, and not u n k r the authoriv of any person, politicd authority can only be justified by the consent of each free and eyual persorn (see Sections 6.3,10.3). Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out OF this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The ctnly way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and mite into a a>mmtmityfar their ec-tmfurtable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst anctther, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it.6

Now given that legitimate politic& authority must be based 0x1 the consent of all equally free persons, it follows that only if the authority it; impartial (Section 6.2) will everyone agree to it. Any political system that

favorcd some citizens over others would be rejected by those who are disfavored: only an impartial political authority upholding a system of equd rights, could possibly be accept& by all equally free people. T%us, fundamental to social contract theory is that our status as equally free justifies a politic& order that is egalitarim insofar as it trcats all citize~~s impartially: no citisn is to be privileged in relation to any ather. :In classical liberal theory, this fundmental equality requires a regime that warantees the equd citizenst-rip (Section 6.4) of each person. Classical liberal,equal citizenship has three core elements: (1)It requires that all citizens possess e"9"al rights to negative liberty and equal rights to acquire properv m d have their property protected. We have already seen hOw their individualjst and plurdist commitments lead classical liberals to favor negative liberty (Section 4.1); importantly; we have also seen how fmdamental to classical liberalism is the claim that liber@ is only secure when accompanied by privak property (Section 5.3). Classical liberals thus posit a word of cssentialiy seg-interested indhiduals, whose main concern is leading their own lives, while disagreeing fundarnentally on what is good or what makes life worth living (Sections 3.3,4.3). Thus, all are concer~~ed to protect their own ""eves, 1,iberties and Estates.'" ((2) 7b eniorce these rights, hdivitluals quire a syskm of settled law, specify.ing the e x t e ~ of ~ t their rights, and ilnpartial judges, to fairly decide disputes, with the power to enforce their verdicts (see Sections 5.4, 10-3).Equal citizenship thus requires equality before the law: the iunpartial resolution of disputes is the defini~ligfeaturn of the ctassical liberal state, and this can only be achieved if government officials treat individuals strictly according to their legal rights, treating equally those With equal legal rights. 'This idea of equatity befme the law applies not only to criminal mat-t.ers,but to all the admkistrative ftznctions of the state, m a t has been called the Recl-zfsstmt is the "Xegal statef'' in wh.ch administrative as well as criminal functions express equality under the law."(3) Last, the hdl application of the rule of law to the state requires that its offices be filled on terms that are imparljal and do not h-eat some p u p s of citizens as; privileged over others. Thus, eytnaliv of opportunity, applied to public positiom, is a development of the ideal of the rule of law.

Mill, Individuality, Utilitarianism, and Classical Liberalism As 1 have stressed throughout this hook, political theories arc complex and diverse. There is more t h a one ~ form of elas~icalliberalism and mare than one classical liberal argument for civic equality*T%e mast important a1ternati-t.eto the social contract argument is advmced by the classical liberal utilitariar~s.Although mitI.7.ycor~temporaryutititarians adopt some form of revisionist liberalism, the early utilitarians (and many econo-

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mists today) employ utilitarian reasorring to endorse classical liberal equal citizenship. J o h Stuart Mill pmvided a utilitarian case for equal libert-y rights (Section 4.3). It will be recaliied that accoriiing to Mill, each person seeks to develop h a owr~capa"ties each thus =wires freedom to make her own choices about what sort of life best suits her. T%us, says Millr the proper role of coercive legal rules "is to enforce upon everyone the conduct necessary to give all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists in not d o h g them harm, and not impeding them in anything which wiihout haming others does good to tlremselves."Us we saw earlier (Section 3.1), Mill argues that a society that er~forcresonly these minimum requireme~~ts will spur the developmer~tof human nature (Sections 3.3, 4.3): once human nature is prevented from growing in "noxious" directions by respecting the basic ljberty rights of others, it will "'expand itself in useful ones.'""""us, given humm nature, g m t i n g people libere rights produces overati happiness and developmenl. Assuming that this establishes a case for liberty, does it Lead to eqtml liberty? Why not give more liberty to those more capable of development and less liberty to those who, in, m y case, are not really capable of much? Mill certahly does not belicve that everyone is capable of equal development: s m e peoyie excel at many tfiil7gs a r ~ ds m e find it very dil'iicult to do mtxch of mything. kVhy should libert-y be distributed equally? Mill relies here on another developmental argumnt based m his theory of human natur,. In chirpter 3 of On Libertyf he explicitly considers what to do about those whose development mi&t seem held back by in,sistin,g on m equal liberty for all, Mitl mswcss, As much compression as is necessary tct prevent the stronger specimens of human nature frr3m encroaching ctn the rights of ather%cannctt be dispensed with; but far this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury ctf others, are chiefly at the expense of the development of other people. And even tc3 himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their clbject.1"

Mill thus advances two arguments for restraking the "'stronger specimens of humm nature." First, controlling them, aids the development of the '"eaker specimens" whose lives they would encroach on. But second, a r ~ dI think mctrt-. interestingly, Mill thinks that Lhe "stro~~ger specimens" so restraiwd receive a "full eq2tivaleMr":whatever opportunities

for individual development am closed oM to them, the dcvelopmcnt of their social 11ature is enhanced by a system that secure?;equal rights for everyone. The argument based m t%ie devehpment of human natum is, 1 think, , of J o h Stuart Mill's whole politic& the core of On Libeey, a ~ dseed, philosophy .And Mill mmikstly thirtks it is a utilitarian argument: those who develop their capacities lead rich, fulfilled, and satisfying lives, h e r e a s Lhose who fail to clevelop their r ~ a t u ~are ? ; lethargic and unhappy- But about midway th.rt>rrghclapter 3, Mill pauses and reflects, Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cuf tivation of individuality which prc~duces,;,or can prc~duce, well-developed human beings, T might here close the argument: for what more ctr better can be said of any crtnditictn of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer tc:, the best they can be? Or what worse can be said of any clbstruction to good, than that it prevents thjs?iz

Nevertheless, Mill thinks that the argument based on human nature might not be enough. Those who most need convincing, Mill says, are not those who cherish the ideal of development, but hose who do not much care about the ideal. So, after giving all these inspirfng arguments about the development of human naturc? and making each pcsson the best beillg she can be, Mll t-umto a more mmdane issue: what good arc3 developed people to hose who are uncox~cernedwith development? Mill's m s w r focuses on the idea of progress. Smgress irt societies, he maintains, depends on allowing freedom so that p e ~ l of e genius can grow. :Mill paints a pickre of the e x c e p t i ~ ~hdi\ridual ~al versus the collec, to Mill, is a "'collective medioctive mass. "Ihe mass of s o c i e ~ accordirrg rity": it is composed of people who tend to eonfomz and arcr not intcrestcd ~IInew ideas. Mill hsists, however, that even this collective mass ber~efits frrctm allokvhg people of gmius to develop in an atmosphere of freedom. The few who do thhk and, inzvent are "the salt of the earth: wi&out them, human lifu would beome a stagna~tpool."" As Mill sees it, "The jnitiat-ion of all wise or nohle things, comes and must come from irtdividtlals, generally at first from some one ind.ividual."lWILlf writing in 1859, pointed to China as -an example of a civiiizatio~~ that had managed to root out irrdividuality h d hChka, he thought, pmgress had halted. The kmdermining of individuality bad thus resulted in, the development of a stagnirnt sociel)r, The u p s b t of Mili's account Ihen, is that for a society to advmce-to increase material abmdance m d the comforts of life, as well as intdlectual improvemen&-at the very least the elite needs freedom. The questim, however, is whether Mill's argumer~testablishes the need for specialized freedom applyirtg only to the elite or freedom for the

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society as a whole, According to Mill, it is the latter, He says, "Genius c m only b ~ a t h efreely in a r ~ufmosphrrc-:of frcredom.'"rs Q ~ l ya general heedarn-a society in rvhich there is a kvide-ranging freedom for citizens to act as they choos-will genius prosper, So, although this case for liber@ stresses the role of lrhe exceptional indhidual in spurring progress, Mill advocates equal liberty for ait. Only such a general kecdonz, he thinks, will lead to progrc2ss; and even those who are not inte~steztin liberty or dewelopmex~twill benefit from materiai progress. Liberty Versos Equality: The Dangers of Social Equaliy

Implicit in. Mill" argument for equal liberty is a concern that social equality is a danger to individuality Mill was greatb influenced by Alexis de i a America. TwqueviXie (1805-1859) was conTocyueville" Dmmocraey u vinced that cour~triessuch as France were developing toward grc'akr p u litical and socjal, equality; he saw the United States as the country that had g m e furthest down this egalitarian road. He kavcled to America in 1831 to study this new regime of social equality His findings we= anzbivalent; he rep0rtc.d' "I am full of apprehmsions and of hopes. I perceive mighty dangers which it is possible to ward off, mlghty evils which may be avoided or alleviated.'"b Toci-fuevillebdieved that the progress of political m d social equality led to a society of "'a countless mtxltitude of beings, shaped in each other" likeness, amid whom nothing rises and mthjng falls.'"" He &served an America with tremendous pressures to coxlform-for each to be like his or her neigt?bor. The spirit of social equality favored sameness (Section 6A); no one wished to stand out as exceptional, defying fhe democratic mass: As the conditions of men bect3me equal among a people, individuals seem of less and society of greater importance; or rather every citizen, being assimilated in the rest, is lost in a cn?wd, and nothing stands conspicuous but the great and imposing image ctf the people at large, This naturally gives the man of democratic periods a lofty opinion of the privileges of society and a very humble notion of the rights of individuals; they are ready to admit that the interests of the former are everything and those ctf the latter nothing.1"

This becomes a fundamental theme in classical liberal thou&t: social equality is understood as allied to a moral collectivism, which counts the g o d of the collecthe as "'everything"" and that of the indiwidual as "nothing."lWqquality thus understood is in conaict with Millian individuiality and his case for negative liberty, lhis is not to say, howwer, that: eitber Tocq?levilleor Mill opposed the movement toward greater equality As Tocquevillie put i& '% state of

equality is perhaps less elevated, but it is more just, . . . [However) No mar1 0x1 the earth car7 as yet affirm, i\bsolukly m d general:(y that the 11ew state of the world is better than its [hegalitarian] forlner one."2V~rMill, the spirit of equality and democracy cm, under some cmdjtions, protect frtiedom, w:hereas under others it can destroy it: "Quality may be equal freedom ar equal, servitude."X If eq~~ality is understood as equal libert-y for each to :live his own life as he pleases, m d equal citizenship, classical liberais see no danger in it. But following ':lbcqueville"s andysis, if the spirit af equality leads to elevation of "the people" aver the jndividual, and to conformity over indkiduality, then liberty and cqualiv are in inherent cox~flicrt.7i,cquwil:le cox~cludedDe71ztrcrac.y in Anzrrica by observing, "The natiox~sof our time cannot prevent the conditiox~sof men fmm becoming equal, but it depends upon themselves whether the prkci_ple of equality is to lead them to servituk or freedom, to :knowledge or harbarism, to prosperiiy or w ~ t c h e d n e s s . ' ~ ~ ~ Liber?. Versus Economic Equalip

I',qu"ljty is in confiict with liberty and indivictuality insofar ils it takes the form of social equaliSi, which is both mora1l.y collectkist (Section 3.4) and conformist. Classicai liberds also insist that the pursuit of economic equality is at adds with indi~ridualliberty Or as it is sometimes put, people's liberty upsets the pattern of income and wealth that economic equality strives after. Ihis position has been upheld by a contemporar)i classical liberal, Robett Nozick. To make his point, N'ozick tells the followhg story about Wilt Chmberlain, a star basketball player who is in gre& demand. Living is a Mly egaijtarian society Wilt decides on a way to improve hjs salary: Me will d y ilgrcc to play if a box is put outside the arena with ""For Wilt, 25g" "written on it and each spectator pays the extra twenty-fie cents. If oxw milliox~people go to hame games, Wilt ends up with $250,6300 more than he was allotted jn the egalitarian distribution. Now, it would appear that to sustaill the equd dish.ibution the govermmt mu" ti"terffc-?re with free transactiom between Wilt and his fans: the governmcnt must stop the fans from givir-rg hixn the additional quarter of a million dollars. So, Nozick argues, any attempt to cmsure ecommic equdity will require interfering with the liberty of citizens to do as they wish, and this makes the pursuit of economic egalitarianism objectionable.25 Some object that that an egalitarim taxation system does not hterfere with people's liberty, it simply taxes them-it alters the relation betkveen their gross and net incmes. But, say these critics, that hardly cmstitutes a limitation of freedom. No one is forcing you to act against your will. Nozick has a strong (and controversial) reply :he mahtains that such tax-

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ation is essentially the same thing as forced labor-that is, slavery. He reasons that since a person must w r k extra to pay the egalitarian tax, some proportion of her kvorkkg day is devoted to payhg the tax, that is, working so that others will benefit, But to be forced to work to benefit others is p e c i ~ l ywhat is meant by foxed 1a:hor. One concern &out Nozick"s argument is that it appears to prove too mtxch: it kvould seem to show that all taxation is forced labor. But all classical liberals endorse s m e g o v e r ~ ~ m e ~activities, ~tal so all endorse same form of taxatio~~; but if taxation is forced labar, all classical liberals endorse forced labar, hardly an inviting cmclusion. Nozick" s a h point, however, can be less cmtroversially put. Insafar as ecmomic egalitarianism requirtzs coercive transfers of fur~ds.from some to others, egalitarimism il7trinsicaily limits liberty To be sure, this ctws not show that it is t~njustified,for all laws linlit :liberty. It does, though, indicate that the pursuit of ecmornic equalily inevitahly clashes with negative Iiherty w:hich is the crucid point of Nozick's tale about Wilt Chamberlain. Moreover, because classical liberals have insisted that property rights have a fundmental role in protecthg indiwidual liberty (Section 5.4), coercive impo"tions that redistribute property are especially hostile to a system of negative liberty This classical liberal argument against any sort of economic equdity depend" on two claims: (1)Economic equality requires a certairr patter11 of property holdings; and (2) The natural ~ s doft ~~egative liberty is to upset such a pattern. C l a h (2) is crucial,.As E A. Hayek, argues, "From the fact that peaple am very different it follows that if we treat them e ~ a 1 l . yEthat is, prima^ ily by ensurir~gthat all have equal liberty], the. result rmst be inequality in their actual positim."24 Ludwig von Mises, mother great classical liberal of the twentieth century is even mare adamant: Nothing . . . is as ill-founded as the assertion of the alleged equality of all members of the human race. Men are altogether unequal, Even between brothers there exists the most marked differences in physical and mental attributes. Mature never repeats itself in its creations: it produces nothing by the dozen, nor are its products standardized. Each man who leaves her workshop bears the imprint of the individual, the unique never-to-recur. Men are not e q ~ a I . 2 ~

Thus, if we seek to ensure equal results-an equal distribution of resources or welfare, for example-we c m only da so by ixlterferhg with equal l i k r v : some people must be restrained, or granted additional favors dellied to others, if we are to llbtain equal results. So, the natural differences in human nature, coupled with equal liberty according to the

classical liherd, translate into inequalities in property holdi*rgs; to equdize propertp holdings requircs that some people's libertp he rwtricted. C)f course, as socialists have noted, this prc!supposes a liberill tkory oC htxman nature (Section 3.3): it supposes that in the light of the human differences, people will wish to pursue their own aims and a c t u a l a t e resources rather than seek to aid each other and maintail? an egalitarian distribution.'"f people were thoroughly cooperative, the pursuit of equality need not co~~flict with individuaf fiberty.

Liberal Egalitarianism: Liberty Reduced to Equality

We have seen that: classical liberalim has a sigrific.ant egalitarian element. Only a system of labvs that is impartial, and thus enshrhes equal :liberty and equal civic status, would he agreed to by cqually free persons. A nurnber of contemporary liberal philosophers have sought to make equaiity and impartiality f i e very heart of liberalism. According to Ronald Dworkin, for example, "'a certain, concept-i;onof equality,'' which he calls "the liberal conception of equality . . . is the nerve of liberalism.'"z7Dworkin q u e s that at the k a r t of Iiheralism is a comilmenl. to treat all individuals equally-cvith equd concern and respect. For Dworkin, this equality derives from pluralism (Section 3.2) and the fun$irmc.ntai requiremer~tof being impartial between competir~gconceptions of the good life (Sctiion.6.2): Eqtraliv supposes that political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or whatever gives value to life. Since the citizens differ in their conceptions, the guvernmrsnt does not treat them as equals if it prefers one ccmception tc:, another, either because the clffjcials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is held by the more numerous ctr powerful gruup.W

Thus far, most classical liberals would concuz But- for Dworkiur and his followers, this generates a case not simply for equal civic status, but for equality of resources and opportunities. As Uvvorkin sees it, for trhe political system to distribute resources on any other basis would be to "'assume either that the fate of some people should be of greater concern than that of others, or that the ambitions and talents of some are more worthy, m d so should be supported mare generously on that ac~ount."2~ VVhat is of particulal- interest in Zaworkin" pprposal, howwer, is not simply that he bases a r ~arpmernt for equal resources and opportunities on impartiali"iy,but that he &n grouncds inditridud liberty rights on irn-

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partiality Uworkin is critical of a hybrid view of liberalism, which conceives of liberdim as devoted to both libery and equillity as independent values. On the hybrid view, ljherds cizrc-.deeply for liberty, but give eyuality an importmt, though limited, role, h o r k i n suggests that those who adopt this hybrid cox-rceptionare apt to contrast liberalism to conservatism and socialism, arguing that conservatism gives greater kveight to liberty and less to eyuality than does liberalism, whereas socialism gives equality a m m dominant role than does liberalism. b o r t i i n , however, understands liberalism in a monistic way: its core value is equality, not :liberty. Indeed, he believes that the very idea of a general right to liber@ is cox-rfused.There is, he insists, no general ""commodity'" liberty that we always value, On the traditional classical liberal view (Sections 4.3, 5,4), liberty is itself always a good thing; of course, we may give trp some of it to secure other goods such as security from altack, but, in itself, it is aiw y s better to hawe liberty than lose it. Uworkin disapes. The liherty to drive on the left side of the street is of no value at all in, the United States, he maintains, and m sane person thinkti she loses something by giving it up. fn place of the general cox-rcept of liherty then, Dworkir-r f u k w s the traditional conservative route of identifyhg a list of basic liberties (Section 5.4). M a t is important is nut lihert.y, hut certain civil liberties."" m a t makes Dworkin" version of liberalism so radical is that he not only dismisses the general concept of liberty but mahtahs that the important civil liberties are grouded in evality. According to his egalitarian liberatism, Ilberties such as freedom of speech -and association al.e ways to achjeve equal concern and respect. The equal distributjon of libertics is m instance of the general case fur m equd diskibution of resources and opportmities. The special stabs attributed to these basic liberties in herd thought does not dcrive h m , the ttnique importmce of freedom, "out from our commitment to evaX concern and respect and the need to protect people from the external prefe~ncesof others (Section 6.4). External preferences, it will be recalled, are a person's preferences that other people act in the way he wants; if you are a Catholic, you might have an cxten-ralpr&rex-rce that everyox-rebe Catholic. To m& m confom to your external preferences, presurnahly, wotrld not be to treat me with cqual concern and respect; freedom of religion ensures me protection from your external prefere~~ces. Egalitarian liberalism, then, avoids conflicts betkveen liberty and equality by putting equality on center stage and entirely baIlishing liberty in gemral. :It must be wodered wheeher liberalism is rex-rdered more piausibk by, first, almost entirely removbg its traditional core and, second, deyicthg it as expressing simply one valu+and a value that has traditionally t-rad a complex and difficult place in liberal theory." fn m y event, it seems clear that egalitarian Ijberaljsm is a narrow understandjng of

:liberalism: liberalism is depicted. as a theory about how a distributor of good things should distribute them. It takes the perspective of a distributor of treatments for a society as a whole-hr e x q l e , the distcributjon of resources, rights, or oppartunities-and provaes an impartial criterion for all these distributions: distribute them in a way that accords with equal concern and respect. The theory, then, assumes that liberalism is essentially a theory to guide m organization that distributes benefits. Interestingly, the theory does not adequately q l a i n why an hdividual demands that the distributor-government respect her choices about how she is to live her life, To the egalitarian liberal, the individual's demand for respect stems from her right to be treated as equal to others: her objection to r~onrespectfutstate interference is that it fails to treat her equally with others, But it is at best dubious that the hdividual's real complaint here is that she is not being keated as an equal; much more plausible, f think, is lfie s h p l e r idea that she just wisfrles to live her life as she sees fit-she seeks to be free to pursue a vision of the good life without undue interferctnce by others. Liberdism cerhislly psesupposes that individuitls are free and equal; it is much more doubtful that it claim we are equal, m d so mtxst in some ways be treated as free. HobhouseHevisionist Liberalism: Self-Determination, the Common Good, and Equal;@

l h u s far, we have seen that classicaf Iiherals endorse a basic requirement of equal treatment-equal civic status-while stressing the ways in which social and economic equality confljct with liberty and individuality Dworkin" segditariar.2 liberalism seeks to overcom t-he clash betwen libert-y and eq~~allity by groundkg liberalism, hcluding its basic liberty rights, purely on equaljty. The "new liberal'' theory of L. 7:Hobhouse offers a different way to reconcile liberty and equality within the liberal tradition. Lmlike D w o r b , Hobhouse never denies that libert-y is the heart of liberalism, Following T, H. Green (Section 4.21, though, Hobhouse advocates a positive accour~tof freedom: a free person is "selfdetermin,edM-we might say autonomou+in. that her self constitutes a ""harmonious whole.""" Hobhouse believes, however, that such internal "moral" freedom needs to be supplemnkd by social freedom-the freedam of "man in, society." Now, social freedom, as liberals generally recopize, requires constraints; if people are to be self-determined in sociely, there must he limits on what others may do to them and what they may da to others. h a state of natznre or anarchy, people c m constantly interfere with my sell-determhalion by coercing and restraining me (Sections 4.3,8.2). Thus, argues Hobhouse, social freedom presupposes a system of

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social restraints, Unlike classical liberals, who see law as a system of restraints that takes awity some of our liberly so as to better protect the rest, Hobhause sees na clash bet-vveen law and freedom (Section 5-4): 11 Liberq involves restraint, it may be asked whether its pursuit is not itlusory. What is gained from the point of view of tiberq by substituting one system of restraints [that is, law] for another [that isf restraint by other individuafs]"r'an we find a system of restraints which is consistent with liberty; while others are inconsistent?s"

Hobhouse3 answer is that the "the liberly of earh . . .must, on the principie of the common good, be limited by the rights of all.'"" Basic to I-lobhouse's argument is a strongly monistic view (sctian 3.2) that the good of the kdividual and the c o r n o n good of society necessarily are harmu17i0us. bllowh~gGrecr~,Hohhouse believes that the good for individuais is to develop their personalities, but that such development is only possible in a society of developed individuals (see Section 3.3). For both H&house m d Gree* there is no ultimte cor~flictbetwen one perso11's &velopment and the development of others: all persons cm only realize what is best in themsel:ves by parljcipating in a swial life with other developed pezsmalities. A free person follows his ratioml will, and a rational person kvills the common good. A free persort "'eomes to reafizo that his true good not in s m e course dictated by self-will but in a modification of that course r/vhich open"o him a life compatible with and contribratkg to the life of societyerr33 Ihe common good, Hobhouse maintah~s,requirtrs equal rigltts for all, so that everyorle may develop his or her persol~alityEqud rights, then, in no way detmct horn the hdividual's good or his true (positive) I.iberty; indeed, equal rights are required by true liberty. O n Hobhouse" view, equal rights to coxltribute to the cornmm good, i~~cluding not or~lytLte traditional liberal liberties but "equal satisfaction of equal needs"% ((Section 6.4)"are implied by liberty. It is fi4i.riy obvious how the plausibility of this reconciljation of liberty and equdiy cjepends on accepting a rationalistic m d monistic view of liberty m d a collectivist view of society; Libere is rationalistk (Section 4.3) insofar as true freedom requires a self-determined will that pursuctti its true good; the theory is mor~istic(Swtion 3.2) insofar as the true good for one person necessarily involves and supports the true good for other people. In contrast to Ber:lin%ppluralism (Sections 3.7, 4.3), there it; no tragic co~~fl.ict of corrrpeting conceptions of the good life in Mobhouse's theory Last, as Hnhhouse ki,mself was apt to point out, the theory is co:llectiviatic (Section 3.4): it supposes that the good for one perm11 is intimately bound up with the commof.1good oi his socicty,

Pluralism, Liberty, and Equoliv

There is a much simpler route from classical liberalism to a revisionist liberalism that seeks to advance economic equality. A pluralist liberal might insist that although negative liberty is a crucial social value in a world in which people must choose what values to pursue (Section 4.3)' a pluralist political theory need not always choose liberty aver equali.ty. Indeed, Isaiah Berlin, the most prominent expo~~ent of pluraijsm and negative lihertJii is very clear &out this: 1do not wish to say that individual freedrrrm is, even in the most liberal sacieties, the sole, or even the drrrminant, criterion of social action. We compel children to be educated, and we forbid public executions. These are certainly curbs to freedctm, We justify thern on the ground that ignorance, or a barbarian upbringing, or cruel pleasures and excitements are worse for us than the amount of restraint needed to repress thern.. . . The extent of a man's, ctr a pectpfe", liberty to choose to five as they desire must be weighed against the cbirns of many other values, of which equality, or justice, or happiness, or security or public order are perhaps the must obvictus examples.37

That liberty and eguality clash-that we camot have all of both, and so we must weigh them and choose between IhemAoes not itself imply that we must -always choose liberv Because classic& liherals arc. devoted to hdividuals and their ends, m d see most for~xsof equality as a threat to individuality, they typically oppose equality. But pluralism itself does m t lead to this t;tror.lgranking of liberty over equalit_y,Some revisiox~ist liberals view the madern welfare state as a balancing of the demands of :liberty and cqualjty: civil liberties such as f ~ e d o m of speech, association, the press, and religi01.1 take p~cedenceover equality but once those liberties have been secured, the pursuit of economic equality is justified.38 Thus, at the heart of much revisio~~ist liberal thix~ki~~g is the claim that economic fiberties to buy, to sell, and to advertise are less important than civil liberties and more easily overridden for the sake ol economic and sociai equality

7.4 A Socialist Reconciliation Proposal As I pointed out in Section 3.1, almost all socialist theories agree in claiming that, pmperly understoocf, liberty and equali,ty do nut connict (in this respect, Hobhouse" revisionist liberalism concurs). A very nice example by of a socialist case for the harmony of liberty and equality is prese~~ted

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Rchard Norman in his "o& Free nlzd Eqzml, in which he explicitly CMlenges the claim that liberty and eyuality are at odds. Norman on Effecfive Choice and Liber?.

Let us begin by briefly considering Norman" views on liberty, which combi~~e a view of litsert;y as a self-chosen life (Sction 4.2) with freedom are free in so far -as as p o w r (Section 5.1). Accortling to Norman, "h you are in a position to make choicesrr: In maintaining that freedom consists in being able tt3 make choices, we must add that the degree of freedom is determined not by the sheer number of choices available, but by the range of meaningful choice. And here the phrase ""range of meaninghf choice" must refer both to the areas ctf people's lives in which they can make choices and the options from which they can choose.

Norman argues that in addition to noninterkrence, effective choice requires (1)political, (2) material, and (3) cult-ural conditions- m e puEitbE colrdifiotzs concern one" ability to participate in collective decisionmaki~~g. "It seems p:lausihle,'" he wites, "to suppose that institutio~~al arrmgements whi& give me some degree of political power will, to that extemzt, increase my capady to make choices about the affairs of the society in vhJhicfi I h e , m d tltereforc. &out my own life. In other words, an increase in democracy would seem to be m hcrease in freedom.""" As we have already seen (Section 5.1), it is clear how mnterinl conditio~rsir;tcrease one" effective choice, 11 I inherit a fortme or win the pools or, less spectacularIy, get a new job which will provide me with a larger income, new opportunities became available to me which were previously inaccessible: J can travel to different places, engage in different activities ctr pastime-new worlds, geographically new or culturally new, are opened up far me. The comecticm with freedom lies not in the greater material cornfc3rts or enjoyments, but in the increase of possibilities-the greater scope for choice.41

N o m m 3 third condition for freedom concerns education and other cultttral opprfznzitics. As we saw in Sectim 4.3, for the advocate of positive frtiedom educatio~nis fiberating: it adds to freedom by expandilng the options available, Education also adds to freedom becatrse it seeks to make people into better choosers, prmoting the critical capacities necessary for an autonomous life.

EQUAL~TYAND LIBERTY IN POLITICAL THEORIES

Cooperation and Equoliv Fundamental to almost all socialist theories is a cooperative view of uncormpted husnan nature and &e ideal society. Competitive individudism, socialists typically argue, is a pathhgical psyrrhologicai state produced by capitalist productive relations, which give some polver over others (Sect-ion 5.3). Humans are, by nature, social creatures, more inclined to cooperalion than conflict. '9'0 enter into co-operathe relatiorrs with otl-rers," writes Norman, is "'to commjt onesela' to the point of view of a shared project, it is to replace the question, 'What will benefit me?' with the questio~~ 'Whd will benefit us?'""32If people adopt this collectivist view of our nalure and our projects, two things follow: First, this will affect the way they make decisiom, It will be a joint decision, not one imposed by some of thern on others. Everyone wit1 be able tc:, have their say. If possible, they will try to agree on a decision acceptable to thern all. If they cannot reach an agreement, they will at any rate make sure that everyone" view is taken into account. . . . [The seam4 thing that fc3llows from a commitment to a>-operationis that the] set of arrangements which is adopted by the group must be one which can be justified to each of its members, If a co-operative group is one in which each person has an equal say, then each o f thern can make an equal claim on it-re group; those claims, therefore, can properly be satisfied only by a state of affairs in which all benefit equally 0veralt.4"

I h e coopcratiwe socky, thfhen, will =quire, first, political equality. Norman is dear that potitical equaiity requirt.5 more thar~just equal voting rights: '*It rc?q~iresa shift of the balarlce of power between electors and elected. It requires that political representatives should be more answerable to , that gex~uinepower lies with the latter.""" those whom they r e p ~ s e n tso Nomm also thinks equd power r e q u k s economic democracy (Sction 9.21, according to which the grlinciples of majority rule should be applied to the mar~agementof the firm, such that the workers, through representatives, manage the firm for t-fiemselkres. N o r ~ x mthus believes that this cooperative social life is incompatible with capitalism, in which the owners manage the firm and instmct the workers what to do. Et requirtrs a social ownership of industry that allows the kvorkers to democratically manage their own firms. Normal also cndorses resource eyzlttlitly in the cooperative socic..t>i.He does not mem by this that everyone is to have precisely the same goods, or that those with special needs are not to be arcordied more. Rather, he argwdthat "'everyone &odd benefit equally overall from their participation in a co-operative communityW43There should be ""free communal.

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The Cu-lgdilk?zsforCuopemtlve Eqzrrality 3. Equal PoTiticaZ Power 2, Equal Material Benefits from Cooperation 3. Equal Cultural &sources

FIGURE 7.1 Conditions for Effective Choice and Coaperative Equality

provision of goods to satisfy basic needs, and, beyond that, the distribution of wealth in such a way that everyone "nenefits equal:iy overall that, if they arc. able to, from Lhe work of the commu~lityon the co~~dition they participate in such work.""" N o m a n thus appears to allow that those who have special burdens or who work at hard jobs require extra compensation, He sees this as Aecting a more basic equality. They receive extra rewards to cancel out the extra work they did: in the end everyone should receive something like equal, overall benef ts, Last, Norman maintains that lfie cooperative socialist society will pmvide eqzral czllfzdrul opporZzdzifies. Educational equality, he says, is especially important in producing m egalitarian society. What is particularly important is the equal opportwity ctl each child to develoy, his or her capacities. Norman, of course, does not accept the libetd idcd of equal opportunity as the equal opportunity to compete for the best jobs and so climb to the top of society (he c a b this the "ladder"" notio~lof equillity of opportun.ity). hsteacf, he argues that each person, regardless of his or her capacities, should have the opportunity to develop *ern. The Convergence of he Demands for Liber?. and E q u a l i ~

:It now should be clear why Norman thi~likshis notion of positive liberty is rrot ir.1 conflict with the demnnds of equality. As F i g m 7.1 shows, the conditions for cooperative eyuali.ty are simply the equalization of the col~ditio~~s for freedom as effective choice! It is worth emphasizing again in what way Norlxan" theory is monistic. Like T. H . Green-whom kexplicitly f ollows-Norman believes that them is a true goal for each of us: to devel')p into good choosers with developed capacities. He thus adopts a positive notion of freedom: to be a free person is to he such a developed chooser, riiomm" ccooperative society gives everyone the ihings he or she needs to become such a chooser: because we aII have the s m e general goal, cve illIneed these =sources if we are to do what we desire. Moreover, Norman" effort to show that no conflict exists betweell freedom and equality is itself monistic: it manifests a conviction that, properly understood, the valt~esworth having

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E a u ~ ~AND i ~ vLIBERTY IN POLITICAL THEORIES

must go together. Vu'e cannot be faced with choice between two desirable values, havirtg to sacrifice some of one to achieve more of the other.

7.5 The Conservative Crih'que of Equality

There is no principle more basic in the conservative philosophy than that of the inherent and absolute incompatibility beween liberty and equality Such incompatibility springs from the contrary objectives ctf it-re two values. The abiding purpose of liberty is its protection of individual and family property-a word used in its widest. sense to include the immaterial as well as the material in life, The iherent ctbjective of equality, on the ctther hand, is that of some kind of redistribution or leveling of the unequatty shared material and immaterial values of a communiv. Moreover, individual strengths of mind and body being different from birth, all efforts to compensate through law and government for this diversity of strength can only cripple the liberties of those intiolved; especially the liberties of tlne strongest and the most brilliant, This is, in brief, the view which conservative philosophers have unfailingly taken, from Burke on, on the relation between liberty and equali v.47

We can trace the conservative hostility to eqt~allityto its theory of humm nature, its antirationalism, m d its theory of society. Human Nature and inequolip

"Men are by nahnrc unequaf. It is vain, therefore, to treat them as if they were equaI."4"K~orethan even the classical libcsal, the conservative is struck by the basic and *eradicable h~eq~~alities between people, It is not sod.ety, but nat-ure, that makes peopl" uneyual, and it makes them unof iife. ?'hey are unequalty moral; equai in cvery possible dimensio~~ m q u a l i y patriotic; unequal in physically abilities; mequnlly fit for leadership; unequally intellectually talented; unequally good at being fathers, or mothers, or teachers; and so on. Hobhouse fSectio116.3) once insiskd that despite the many bvays in which people were different; their common human nature "lies far deeper than all the differences between them."49 NO so for a conservative. What is c o r n o n is 1ase;ely overshdowed by our differences. :In light of this, calls for equiality are apt to be seen not only as vain but as motivated by pride and envy. Those who are too proud to &it that others are their betters are cmstanlfy insisting on the equality of every-

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one. "All men are equal," the consermlive suspects, is motivated by a boastful convictio~~ that ""no one is better than me'"itl"~d it is a h o s t certainly false. AlterrtaCively, eequaiit-y may be motivakd by mvy and spite; seeing others more successful, seeing their high status and their wealth, those without it w a ~it; t a ~ ifdthey camat have it, they will h~sistthat no one has it. &call that equali,ty can be sat.isfed by denykg goo& to s m e , as well as providiIlg them to everyone (Section 6.3).Thus, Nisbet worrics that calls for eyualiv are attarks on the briliimt and talented, for it is often they who have what others want. In this regard, the conservative might point m t that in Australia, a distinctly egalitarian country when a public figure or bushess person is disgraced or suffers a social or ecommic fall, people often conte~~tedly remark 01%the &sirability of cutth~g "tall poppiesf'-those who have stood out and grown too high require cutthg down to size,"" Antirationalism and Social Complexity

Because people we so different and unegual, and because societies develop over long periods of time m d are thus not plamed, all human societies are characterized by numerous institutions and associations that $isplease egalitarim. The economy is divided into those who have wedth and those who do not. Ttne instjllation of the family produces economic incqualivf because the children of good parents as a rule are more successful t h a ~the childre11 of pwental failures; within the family, parents have i7tr"cErorit.yover children, and to the exasperation of egalitarians, the farnily continues to di:vid.e tasks on sexual lines. The Catholic Church is offirially sexist, universities we intellectually elitist, atbletic clubs disfmor the physically hancdicapped, and so on. As a conservative sees it, these institutiorms, some of which are vooluntar)r and some not, have functions hsociety, althoul;h no one can give a complete accounl: of m y complex instituiiion and its functions. Given the complexity of humm society, no singlet person or group of people can fulIy understand its workings. take What we call a '%ocieVfYisthe complex sytitm of these institutio~~s: away business corporations, the family universities, schaols, churches, and the rest,and there would be nothing left of American society I h e co~~servative Chargedhat because each of these institutic.ms is in some way a s o m e of inequalit5 egaljtarian socialists drmm of reformi.ng each and every one of them acceding to m egalitafian plan. But, says the conservathe, this ratio~~alist project is doomed to faiture, since societies are far too complex to be guided by any rational plan or t.l?eory. Furthermore, to produce social and economic equality reyuires a pim backed by power (see hrther Section 10.4). Of a political authoriy with treme~~dous such colectivism, Michael Oakeshatt observes,

The opposition of collectik~ismto freedctm appears first in it-re collective rejection ctf the whole notion of the diffusion of power and of a society organized by a means of a multitude of genuinely vtlluntary associations . . . The organization to be imposed upon sociev springs from the minds of those who compcjse the government. It is a comprehensive ctrganization. . . . And great power is required f ~ the r over-all control of this organizaticm, . . . Having discouraged all other means of social and industrial regulation, a collectivist government must enforce its imposed order or allow society to relapse into chaos. . . . All this is, clearly, an impediment tc3 freedom; but there is mure to f~jI10w.In addition to the rule of law, and often in place of it, collectivism depends far its working upon a lavish use ctf discretionary authority. The organizaticm it imposes on society is without any inner momenu~, interventions-conturn: it must keep going by p r r ) m i ~ e ~ oday-to-day trots of prices, licenses to buy and sell, the perpetual readjustment ctf rations, and the distribution of privileges and exemption-by the exercise, in short, of the kind of power most subject to misuse and a>rruption. Collectivism i s indifferent to all elements of our freedom and the enemy of s ~ ? m e * ~ l

:It is importar~tto remember that that the first great conservative work, Burke" Reflections on the RenoEzkficltz in France, was a criticism of the first great egalitarian revolution, the French Revolution of 1789. T%e revolutjonaries were willing to sweep away those parts of French political culture that did 110t correspond to their abstract ideas in order to bring about thoroughgoing civic m d social equality Burke kvarned that such a rationalist project could only end in clisastec Egalifcrrion Co!/ectivism, Conservative Organicism, and Liberal Individualism

Conservatives, then, join liberals such as Mill (Section 7.2) in heeding Tocqwvitle's warning that social egalimianism is apt to lead to a moral p e r ~ w t i w ethat counts the good of the collective as "'everythingf' ar~d that of the individual as "'nothing." Milliain lj_kseralsand conservatives have diffemnt objections to such a collectivism, bowevex: Millian liberals, as we SW, see it as a threat to individuality and free choice. Of course, it is not the only such threat: Mill was equally critical. of custom, whi& led to the servitude of women and ofien discouraged individuakty. Conservatives, in contrast, arc? defenders oi custom: it reflects pradkal r/visdom that has been slowly accurntxlated over generations m d provides a much better guide to action than a rationalist defense of liberty such as that offered by Mill. Many conservatives object to egalitarian collectivism, not because it favors sociev over the hdividtral, but becatrse it is based an a

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confused understanding of society. Egalitarian colrecti:vism, charges a certaill sort of conservative, sees society as a machine that: c m be designed to work just the way we want it to, m d jndeed a very simple machine, composed of almost identical, equal parts. Indeed, the conservative is apt to suggest that there is an odd sort of individualism at the core of socialist egaljtarianism., sjnce it sees the cdlective as composed of a mass of thoroughIy equal individual units. Important to the conservative tradition has been the idea that society is better ur-tderstood as an organism or a c o q l e x aninnd. horganism, such as a m m m d is composed of: a variety of different parts with different and unequal functions. Most are mcessary, but some are not. B n d some have controlling fur-tctions, r/vhereas others, ai*ough importmt, must obey if they are to fulfiil their functions (Section 20.1). Moreover, na one really. c m explain exactly how such an o ~ a n i s mworks; we certainly c ot: alter it to conform to our piar-ts &out what ideal ar1ima1s shouid look me. If society is to be understood ir-r this sort of "orgatlic" way, a true cdlectivism will remgnize the importance of custom, the insli-tutions of a sock@, and will be wary of anyme's claim to be able to plar-t and drasticaily reform t-he nahre of the organism. Conservatism and Liberal Egolifaricmism

In s m , the typical conservative case against social and economic e q d ity is Lhat (l) people are naturally uwyual in a variety of ways, (2) societies develop institutions and priactices that rclffc.ct this deep inequizlity, and so these practices lhemsclves are inegalitarian, (3) the project of establishh-tg social and ecor~orrricequality must t-herefore invoive a radicai restructuring of society m d so (4) must give great power to g o v e m n t . But (5)because equality can only he achieved by rooting out swi.al practices a-td negating natural te~~dex-tcies, this power constantty will be used to int.crfere with, tracfiti.onnl liberties; (6) because nn such plan call possibly cope with the full cmplexity of society, it will inevitably fail, lhough the eiforts to save it may lead to long periocf" of repssion. Classical liherals such as t-layek m d van Mises would agree with essentially all of this. Classical liberals and conservatives, then, join in rejecting egalitarim projects. M a t do cmservatives ta-td to say about liberal egalitarianism? Consematives, like liberals and socialists, have differhg views about the p q e r extent of equality. As a =asonable gmerali.zatim, however, we c m say that cmservathes favor a more limited h t e ~ r e t a t i oof~civic ~ equaiiCy than liberals ilnd are mart? skeptical of equality of opportmity and political equality Conservatives in the Arrglo-Americm tradition have overwhehin& el-tdorsed eyuality before lrhe law, w:hirh has been fundi-tme~~tal to British law fttr cmtu:u,sic.s." Oakeshon, in particulal; has been insistent that

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only a society fomded on the mle of law can secwe freedom m d avoid collectivim. 'That said, fiough, co~~servafives have been mu& more reluct a t to embrace the idea of civic equality understood as istcluding not s h ply equality before the law, "out ewality of :legal rigbts between classes, sexes, a ~ so d OIT.John Stuart Mill, for example, was a s t r o ~ ~ proponent g of equal legal rights for women, and he was quite prepared to tmdermine c u s t o m a ~notions of the family and mamiage to xhieve such civic equality. Writing in 1869, Mill proclaimed &at "'the pkciple Mihich re~1atc.sthe existing social relat;ions between sexes-tlne legal subordkation of one sex to mother-is wrong k~itself, and is rtow one of the chief impedhenb to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principie of perfed ew&fit, admittll~gno p o w r or privikge on the one side, nor disabi1if.y on the 0ther~~5-3 Conservatives, not surprishgly have h g upheld the importmce of diffe~ntiatedroles, including diffe~ntir-ltedsexual roles, and conceive of liberal efforts to equalke rights as deskuctive to smiai staibility So too have conserv&ivcs been critical of equal opportnnity; alIhough, advocathg faimess m d effjciencyin selection processes, the idea that opportunitiescanbe equalkcd arrro~~g ci-tizensof diverse backgmunds is dismissed as mother rationalist dellusion.34 More generdly, conservatit;es have expressed resemations about the egaiitarian and r&ionalist tendmcies of alt legislation. As Elie I-faI4vy (1878--4937)noted, all laws are egalitarian and hdividualist because they tend to treat each person as a distinct, abstract, legal individual on par with ail the rest. In his discussion of Rentham's liberalism, Halkvy points out that gcneral legislation is also inhert?ntl,yrationalist. As will be recalled from Section. 32, The rationalist is inclined to neglect the particular in ctrder to confine himself tto the consideration of the general. The existence of ""general facts'bprovides him with a ccmvenient meam of distinguishing, in a rowdabout way, the necessary from the accidental. Granted the existence of individuals, he finds it convenient to admit, first ctf all, that individuals can be considered . . . ecquat.'"

Ihis is not to say that co~~servatives are opposed to lcgislaliorr, but it does indicate a cautious attitude &out wickly resorting to legislation to respond to the diSIiculties of social life, for it cmnot take ac-corn of the partjcularity m d context that often are crucial to an adequate response (see Section 5,4).,

7.6 Summary My unah aim in this book is to show holv m d why the maixr enduring political theories have interpsekd poliSical concepts differentSy. Follow-

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ing on the consideration of the concept of equality in Chapter 6, this chapter examined, first, why classical iiberals, revisionist liberals, sxialists, m d conservatives endorse different types of equal treatment; and, second, :how their differing intevretations of the concepts of liberty and equally lead them to competing positions on one of the central questio~~s of poljtical theory: do liberty and equalirty c d j c t ? Sction 7.2 argued that classical liberals, starting from their assumption of equal freedom and the need for impartial political authority, endorse equdity before t%le law and civic equality. They are firm critics of social and economic equality, however, which they see as threats to the core concept of negative tihery*In general, ctassical tiberals insist that ihe protection of negative liberty is incompatible with the pursuit of most f o m s of ewnljty. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 considescld attem,pts to reconcile lihcrty and equiality Section 7.3 analyzed revision.ist liberal proposais. I first exarnined Uworkin"s argume~~t that liberalism is based 01%equaiity and basic liberties are derived from m ideal of equal .treatment, a view of liberalism about which Z expressed s o m skepticism. Chser to the mvisimist liberalism of T. H. Green is Hobhouse's claim that true, positive liberty requires a self-determined will directed to the common goad, and because the common good requires an equaliw of rights, true tiberty is necessarily consistent with, in fact requires, an equality of rights, hcluding rights to have needs satisfied. In Section 7.4, 1 considered a positive liberty argument more typical of socialism than revisjonist liberalismNoman's sanalysis &at equates freedom with the conditio~~s for effective choice. 15 to be free is to have material, political, and cultural =sources s necessary for efft-.ctit.echoice, and if a cooperative society ~ q u i r c equality of mterial, political, and culturai resources, equal lihertp simply is an egditarian distribtttioln of resowrces. Finally Section 7.5 examhed conservative c r i t i ~ e of s both socialist and liberal notions of equality.

1.Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Tfze S~~cial C o ~ t m c fMaurice , Cranston, trans, (London: Penguin Books, 2968 [lT62[f),Book 2, chap. 21. Emphasis in clriginal. 2. J. Roland Pemcttk, Democmtic 130litical 71jze"ory((Princeton:T7rinceton University Press, 2979), p. 16. 3, Erik von Kuehnelt-Ledbib, Liberty or E'qz-lalidy:TIze Chalfenge of Our Ti~nc (Lclndon: Ffotlis and Carter; 2952). 4, See Wilt Kymticka, Gol~te~npomry Political Philosoyhy: At1 I~trodnctioll(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 5, 5. John Lock@,Secolzd peat is^ ufC"overnnzet~1~ in Peter Laslett, ed., Ttuo Ecratises of Gozjenzmezit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), sect. 4. 6. Ibid., sect. 95. 7". bid., sect. 324.

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8. For a survey of developments in understanding the Rechfsstaaf in relation to classical liberal ideals, see F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), chap. 13. 9. John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comfeand Positivism, in J. M . Robson, ed., The Collected Wwks of John Sfuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), vol. 10, p. 339. 10. Ibid. 11. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Gray, ed., On Liberty and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 3, para. 9. 12. Ibid., chap. 3, para. 10. 13. Ibid., chap. 3, para. 11. 14. Ibid., chap. 3, para. 13. 15. Ibid., chap. 3, para. 11. Emphasis in original. 16. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Henry Reeve, trans. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), vol. 2, p. 334. 17. Ibid., p. 332 18. Ibid., p. 290. 19. See, for example, Pemock, Democratic Political Theoy, chaps. 2 and 3. 20. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, p. 333. 21. John Stuart Mill, "Democracy in America," in his Dissertations and Discussions (New York: Haskell House, 1973), vol. 2, p. 8. 22. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, p. 334. 23. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 161. For a sustained socialist criticism, see G. A. Cohen, Self-Owr~ership,Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 1. 24. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p. 87. 25. Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism in the Classical Tradition (San Francisco: Cobden Press, 1985), p. 26. 26. See Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, p. 29. 27. Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 115. 28. Ibid., p. 127. 29. Ibid., p. 129. 30. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Haward University Press, 1978), chap. 12. 31. See further, Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Polifical Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 241. 32. L. T. Hobhouse, The Elements of Social Justice (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1922), pp. 55-57. 33. Ibid., p. 59. 34. Ibid., p. 62. 35. Ibid., p. 70. 36. Ibid., p. 111. 37. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 169-170. 38. See, for example, John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 106. James P. Sterba characterizes "welfare liberalism"

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as a ""lend of liberty and equality'3in his jzkstil7e: Altenznfive Politic~fPerspectiztes, 2nd ed. (Belmcmt, CA: Wadsworth, 1492), p, 4, 39, IGchard Norman, Free nrzd Eqltal: A P1)lrilosqhicafExamiitzafZ'Onof hlitiml VnIE ~ C (Qxford: S Oxford Universiy Press, 1987), pp. 34,38, 40. Ibid., p. 41. $I. Ibid., p. 44. 42. Ibid ., p. 78. $3. Ibid., p. 170. 44. Ibid., p, 108, $5. Ibid., p. 113. 46, Ibid., p, 114, 47. Robert Nisbet, Corzservatism (Millon Meynes, UK: Open University Press, 1(386),p. 47'. 48. farnes Anthany Froude (181&-1894), "Tarty Politics," in ins Slzort Strtdies ouz Crmf Szlbjects , 4 vols., (London: Longmans, Green, 11305-3906). 49. Hobhouse, 736 El'ements of Social J U S icef ~ p. 95. SO. "Tnl ppupp: very important perscin; influential person; person with statusoften held in contempt by others, who try ta bring about this person" downfall or ruin." k n i e Johansen, The Iliizklrm Dz'ctiona~>/(Rinpood, Victoria: Ctaremont Books, 1997), p, 414, 51, Michaef Oakeshott, Ratiorzalism iitz 13oliCies nrjd Other Essays, expanded ed. (Indianapofis, IN: Liberty Press, 1941), p, 401. 52, On the French and German traditions, see No61 O'SzxlXivan, Currserzr?atism (Lc~ndon:J. M . Dent, 197&),chaps. 3 and 4. 53, 'John Stuart Mill, The Sltfbjectio~.~ of Wofnerz,in Alice S. Rossie, ed., Essays ouz Sex Eqlaalz'ty (Chicago:University. of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 125. 54, Sec, for example, Lincoln Allison, Xiglzt Priuciples: A Coizsc~rzantivcPhilosclylty of hlitics (Qxfc3rrrdt: BlackweIl, 1984), pp. 80-84. 55. Etie P-Ialkvy, TIzc Gru'zuZI~of Philosophical Xadicnlisnz, Mary Morris, trans. (London: Farfaer and Farber, 2.9281, p. 52. %e atso Nisbet, Corzserztntl;sm,p. 53.

C€ AND L

Mill's Five Aspects of Justice In this chapter, we return to the question with which we began the book"'at is justice?" U~dikePlato, however, we know that we should not be asswing there is a defkition or a core featurc. that is shared by ail notions of justice a d that only characterizes jusljce (see 9cti.m 1.I).This is an hportant lesson, for the search for the "coxnmon attribute" has dornhated. investigation of justice. 11%11561----overtwo thousand years after Plato wrote-Job Stuart Mii,l was still searchjng for ""thedistlinguishing charack r of justice." As was typical with Mill, however, he was more cautious &:hatit wits a questiol~to be investigakd, rat-her than most, ach%owlt.dgk%g than a certairt assumption, whether ""all modes of conduct" "designated as just or unjust share the same quality. To answer this question, Mill begins in a sensible way: he tries to get a rough feel for the conceptual terrain of our uses of justice-our main uses of ""-just" m d "'unjust." Only once we understmd thc main features of the concept of justice, can we try to arrange &em on a concephal map f%ctio112.3). Mill icaentifies five ""mdes of action and arran8enzcnl.s of humm affairs, which art. classed, by universal or widely spsead opinion, as just or as u11just."?(1) "hthe first place,'' says Mill, "'it is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one of his personal. liberty, his property, or m y other thhg which belongs to him by law. Here, therefore, is one instance of the applicatiol~of tfne terms just and unjust in a perfectly defhite sense, namely, that it is just to respect, tmjust to violate, the legal rights of any one," The cmcept of justice, then, has especia11y close ties to the law, and in partimlar the l a w of tt7e country one is in. It would, for example, be unjust to punish m A m a i c a n for not voting in a U.S. p~sictentidelection, because she has a right to abstaiiz; but it w o d d not seem unjust to pu"itih an Austraiiar~for failing to vote in an Australian parliamer~tary election, since he does have a duty to vote. The same c m be said for a

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variety of laws; if there is a law giving one a right, then, as a rule, it w u l d "n u ~ ~ j uto s tdeny one that right. Mill, h o w e l ~ r immediately , recognizes that (2) "the legal rights of which he is dep-rivedi, may be rights nlhich ought not to have &longed to him; in other words, Lhe law which confers on him these rights, m y be a bad law. W e n it is so, or when (which is the same thing for our purpose) it is suppoxed to be so, opinions will differ as to the justice or injustjce of infrint;ing it." Accodhg to tl-te Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, slaweskowners had a right to have their fugitive slaves returned ta them. Private slave catchers we= employed to assist them in securing their legal rightt;. In one case, slave catchers seized a black man who had worked for nineteen years as a taitor in Pougbkeepsie, New k r k , a r ~ drekrr~edhim to his owner in South Cardina. h 1850, residents of Boston set trp a "'vigilimce committee" to idcntify m d harass these "man-stealers." They put one hul71-ed black couple, t-he Crafts, on a ship to Eqland. Preside~~t Fillmart_. threatened to send in federal troops to trphold the law (and property ittee act unjrastly? Mmy insist that a law rights).Wid lrhc vigilance co that assigns an immoral claim cannot yield a genuine right, a d so violating such a rule is no ir-rjustice at all. hdeed, the *justice was suffered by the Crafts, who were hunted down in violation of their moral rights. As Mill observed, when a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always tt3 be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody's right; which, a s it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is called a mtlrai right. We may say, therefore, that a second case of injustice camists in taking or withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right.

Features (1)and (2) point to one of the most perplexhg aspects of our t h i n h g about justice- Although in some ways our notions of what is just and laPlfust arc closely tied to our legal and judicial s y s t e ~ f e itn is called ""the justice systemfJ----hother w a p jwtice cliearjy tranxends ihat system and can be used as a way to criticize our current laws and the ways they are applied, lt is Qmpting to simply say that these are just two ofs justice-what might be called legal justice and idmI differex~tn o t i o ~ ~ justice- mat, however, would fail to appreciate the intimate relations beWeen the two; as we saw in the case of the Fugitive Slave Law, if legal justice departs in a radical way from ideal justice, it seems to lose clairn to being justice at all. Our t h k h g about justice seems torn bet-vveen the actual and the ideal.3 (3) "mirdly," observes Mill, "it is universally considered just that each person should obtnin that (whc.ther good or evil) whi& he deserves; and

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unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil, r/vhich he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest ar~dmost emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind." One can deserve both good m d evil; criminal.justice is somethes mderstood as giving criminals their "just deserts,'-that isf punishment. Of course, people can also deserve rewards. hdeed, to one prominent political theorist, '"~esert . . . says 'mank you."'4 Claims about what a P deserves some treatperm"" deserves are usually of the form: "Persa~~ ment T nolv because of some act @ that she performed in the past." "at is, in most cases of desert one deserves some sort of treatment now because of something that one has already done. A sturfent might he said to deserve a good grade because she worked so hard; or a worker might be said to deserve morcj pay becatrse he has produced so much. T%ese two examples point to the two most common grounds for desert claims: effort and production.5 In th.e case of the studenl, the ground of the desert claim (what act she has performed that makes her deservhg) was that she put in so much effort; in the case of the worker, the desert claim was gmunded on how rwch he pmhced. (4) ""Fo~rthly,'~ as Mill says, "it is confessedly unjust to break faith with any one: to violate m engagement, either express or implied, or disappoir~texpectations raised by our conduct, at least if we have raised those expectations bowingly and voluntarilyffheaking promises and contracts is quintessentially unfust behavior, Of course, as Mill says, few think that it is always u ~ ~ j uto s t lie or to break a contract: there can be overriding considerations, For example, suppox that a professional killer is looking for his victim and calls you on the phone to ask you wheeher you h ~ o wwhere the victim is. You do, hut you tell him that you do not. It then occurs to him that you migf-tt have caller IF), and so h o w who he is; he asks you to promise him not to call the police and give them his n a m a ~ number. d You reasox1 that he will be more likely to flee if you tell h h that you wilt call the pojice, so you promise him that you will. not, As soon as he hangs up, you call the police and give them his mme and 11urnht.r. Few think that you have acted unjustly in breakh~g your promise, Immanuel. Kant, though, disagreed. h a similar case (tE.\oughnot involving caller El)), Kant insisted that you were r,bliti;ated to tell the truth to the killer. "R be truthful fhor~est) in all your deliberations . . . is a sacred duty m d hsolutely commmdhg decree of reason, limited by no expediency.""& (5) "Fifthly," Mill maintains, "it is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to be par(i;al,; to show favour or p~ferenceto one person over another, in matters to vvhich favom and preference do not properly apfly," Recall that according to Aristotle, justice is t ~ a t i n ge ~ equally & and ullcquals uneqrrally (Sction a).. This czften-cited definition captures


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a great deal of what we mean by justice. To act justly is certajnly to act impartially; it is to treat relevantly similar cases equally and to distinguish between those who have tmequal merits or claims (Section 6.2). Thus, a judge who sentaces black defendmts to dea& but gives whites for the same crime is unjust, as is a teacher who gives a lighter se~a-t-rtence higher grades to attractive st-udents just because they are attractive*But although the ideal of impartial treatment captures m c h of justice, it leaves much u~~accounted for. AS Mill recog~~iZed, and as I stressed in Section 6.1, we do not always have to be impartial: Favour and preference are not always censurable, and indeed the cases in which they are condemed are rather the excepticm than the rule. A person would be more likely to be blamed than applauded for gjving his family or friends no superioriq in gclod ctffices over strangers, when he could do so without violating any other duty; and no one thinks it unjust to seek one perwn in preference to another a s a friend, connection, or companion. 1mpartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory, but this is involved in the more general obligation of giving tt3 every one his right. A tribunal, for example, must be impartial, because it is bound to award, without regard tct any other cornideration, a disputed ctbject to the one of two parties who has the right ta it.

50, although one should certainly give each person what she has a right to-and so should treat eyually those with equal rights-in much of life you shortM be partkl to your friends m d family. As Aristotle" famous dirtuvn suggests, and as MX i X achowledges, "allied to the idea of impmtiality is that of equaiity; w:hich often er~tersas a component part bath into the conception of justice and h t o the practice of it, and, in the eyes of many persons, constiLutes its essence," "Mil . himself seems skeptical; as he saw it, people think that equality is fundamental to justice except when they thirrk inequality is called for! Nevertheless, it is clear that to some exSent, the cowepts of justice and equality overlap. Whot is o Right? Hohfeld's Classic Analysis Justice concerns aur rights and aur duties. T%ere is, however, almost as much diversity in theories of rights as there is about justice in general. The m s t famous amlysis of leg& rights was acfvanced by Wesley Hohfeld (1879-4918). To Hohfeld, the concept of "a right" hvo1olves several different ideas, each of which is related to the others, Figure 8.1 sketches part of tlohkld" sa-t-ralysis:sin* lines with an arrow at each end represent what Hah1el.d cdled ""opposites" or c o n t r a d c t r i e (Iegal


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[l]Alf has a liberty with ~ s p e cto t Betty to ct,

F31AIE has a duty tc3 Betty not to tl,

FlGURE 8.1

4

L21 Berry has no claim against Alf that AIE not

[4] Betty has a cfairn against Alf that All not cf,

Wohfeld's Analysis of liberties and Claims

statuses that are jnconsistent), whereas lines with sizlgle arrows represent ""correlatives" "tatznses that imply or entail each other).? For Hohfeld, then, Alf has ([l1 in Figure 8.1) a l i h ~ v f yto engage in act (D if and o~lilyif ( 2 ) Bctty has no daim agaimt Aif that A:if not nfessto the bank job, we won? have enough evidence to prosecute. Then we'll proceed with the shctpfifting charge, and you% each get ctne year,'"

Their choices can be schematically displayed as in Figure 8.3. Alf reasons: if Betty conftrsses, and J keep quiet, I get ten years; if B e y confesses and I confess too, I get seven years. So I know one thhgr if Betty confesses, I had better confess too. M a t if Betty keeps quiet? All reasons: If Betty keeps quiet and I: keep quiet too, I get a year; if Betty I go free. So if Retty keeps quiet, I do best by keeps qujet ar~d:I co~~fess, confessing. But now ,Aff has shown that confessing is the dumi~antsirateCW:no matter what Betty does, he does best if he confesses. And BettlJ will reason in a parallel way; she will conclude t-hat no matter what Alf does, she does best by confessing. S s they will bath confess, and get seven years, In some sense, they seem to have ouLsrnarted themselves: by each dob~g what is ixldividually the best, they both end up with their third option: seven Fars injail, There i s a clear sense in which it would have been hetter for both of them to keep quiet, receiving ody one year in jd. Yet, they

Keep Qsr iet

FIGURE 8.3

%he

Prisoner" Diiernma

Ct~nfess

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will not do that, for being ralional individuals they will see that if the other keeps quiet, they wifl do best by confessing. They will thus ""dekct"' or "cheat" on the cooperative policy of keeping quiet. Both. Alf m d Betty would benefit iff somehow the option of confessing were not eligibl it could he excluded b m the set of actions they were at liberty to perform, If they could bath be convinced that confesshg was not a real option for them, they would end up cooperating and b o a "onefit. The lessor.~it; clear: like the parties in Hohbes" state of nakre, each would gain from a system of reskaint that mimdaed certain actions (fur example, "'T>o not conksd"). Tnstituting such a systern is therefore mutuaZly beneficial. Contemporay foltowers of Hobhes m a i x ~ t a ithat ~ ~ the prisoner's dilemma models a wide raxge of social intcractio~~s of under conditio~~s unconstrained liberty: those who are equaUy free are often urrable to achieve the fmits of social cooperation. FIence, to better advance their interests ratior~alagents woutd give up some of their liberty and embrace rules of justice, wtltnout rules of justice, we are caught in prisoner's dilemmas, in which each person3 attempt to ac)"rievehis or her ends lead.; to a ur~productiveconflict. Thus, cmtemporary classical Ilberals such as David Gauthier and James Bznchanan'haintain that rational agents wodd agree to rules of justice that protect liberty and property rights. These liberals, then, reject Hohbes" claim that free and rational people kvould create a government with the unlimited right to legislate and deternine the content of justice, To live logether inpeace and to gain the benefits of cooperative social life, insist these recent foilowers of Hobbes, we require negative claim rights pmtecting our liberty (dairns against others that they do not interfere with our actions) and claim rights to acquire and enJoyproperty. The classical liberal analyses of hzrmm nature as self-kterested (Seclion 3.3) negalive liberty (Section 4.11, the relation of liberty and properly (Sectiox~5.4), and the fundamental importmce of our stabs as equally free (Sections 6.3,7.2) thus set the stage for the Hohbesian-inspired classical liberal theory of justice. To live together in peacel respecting each other's stratus as equafly free people, we require negative claim rights protecting our liberty (claims against others that they d a not interfere with our actiom) and claim rights to have our property protected. We must add to these two basic aspects of justice a third---clairns over our bodies m d protection from hnrm, for unless we m proteded fi-on,beiag harmed by others, we cannot bet securr; in either our liberty or use of our properv (Sectio~~ 5.4)*14

In contrast to Habbesim theories of justice, which seek to derive justice from a rational bargaixl m m g essentidly equal, free, and self-interested


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agerrts, Lockean-inspired theories insist that legitimate contracb specify: are constrained ing systems of rrrubal ac-fvitntqe and just goverl~me~~ts by the prior moral rights of hdividuals. As John L,ocke says, we have natural rights to "Lives, Librtrty and Estates."l5 These rights are what Mill called '"mord rights" ((point 121, Section 8.1) and so their jusliiicatiorr does not depend-as they do in Hobbes's theory-on being a part: of the estnln:lished legal system, Indeed, for Lockeans, to be just, a legal or political system must respect these basic moral rights to life, liberv, m d property. Even in the state of nature, ZJocke argued, peaple would recognize that each had a claim. right to his or her life, liberty and property. Locke thus disagrees with Hobbes; the state of nature was a "%Cafe qf Liherfy," but '"nota Stntc r?fLice~zt;c,"'because each would recopize that he was not free to attack the "Life, the CJiberty, Health, Limb or Goods of ilnother."I6 These naturd rights are basic elcmcnts of ideal justice: wntd politrical arral~gemerrtsmust respect them. Equal claim rights to noninkrfereme Tlnd prolecticrn of one's body m d proyerty are the core of Lockean-inspired classical liberal justjce. Classical liberal justice also lays great strcss on the role of pmmising and contracts injustice (Mill's point [ill, Sction 8.1).The concepeion of justice inherent in the classical :Liberat market swiety is, essentially, the justice of keepir~gone's agreements witfnin the bour~dsof basic mgatiwe clailn rights to liberty and the rights involved in private property. The classic liberal, then, tends to thhk that Cephalus was basically right in saying that justice is a matter of telling the tmtrh and paying your d&ts (Section l.%), as long as we remember that this takes place against equal basic rights to liberty and property This explains the central place of commutative justice in classical liberalism (Section 2.1). Once again, we can see that the classical liberal justice is shaped by the pivotal role of negative :liberty and individualism. Justice is by and large a characteristic of relations between ewaily free individuals; it is not about whett-rer t-he social whole concducts its affairs in a just or appropriate mmner. Classical libera/ism"smmbafence b w r d Desert Claims

Classical liberals are mbivalent about the idea of desert (hilays point p], Sectio~~ 8.1). III some ways, desert is centml to their theory of justice. &erall, and in, general, cbssical liberals have believed that one of the virtues of private property a d the market syskrn is that they tend to reward the ~ Mill said, "'Private property, in every deknse industrious. As J o h Stuart of it, is supposed to mean tbe guarantee to inctividuals of the frujts of their own labour m d ab~thence.~'fl 7 e deserves the fruits of one's OWII labor, and it is generally seen as a real virtue oi private property m a r k t systems that producers me rekvardeci for their produclive efforts. Nevertheless, classical liberals have been wary about transfoming t h i s Observation

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about the generaii kndencks of markets based on private property into a strict criterion of justice-in-holdings.lVor tt7e mast part, classical liberals have not maktahed that a person" property holdings are just if and only if she deserves those holdhgs, Any such crjl.erion of justice, they have insisted, is incompatible wittl a strong cJefense of negative 1i:berty If a person is to be free to dispose of her property as she sees fit, she wiit be free to give it to undeserving others, such as her children, If no one is to have ur~deservedproperty, the freedom of people to dispose of their property as they see fit must be greatly limited. Moreover, cfassical tiberals wodd almost always insist that theories endeavoring to reward, people accor$ing to their overall d e s e r v h p e s are overly rationaiist. In a well-defir~edco~~text, such as a matrhcmatict;competitio~~, we may be able to say cvhn deserves the prize, but it is innpossjble to determke a person" overall deservhgness, or even overall economic dessrvimgness, 1s a doctor more or less deserving than a computer programmer? Is a great artist more or less deserving than a second-rate air traffic controller? Because, says the classical liberal, there is no way to make such determination~,the attempt to apply desert to an indivicaual's overall ecmrrric standing leads to incessanf: meddling cvith the market with no ckar idea of what should result, Success in the market is determined by a comhiniltim of skill and luck, and "while, as in a g m e , we are right in insisting that it be fair and that nobody cheat [see Mill's point (S)], it would be nonsensical to demand that the results for the different players be justeff19

8.3 Manistic Revisionist Liberalism: Social Justice and Carrfributians to the Common Good Desert, Social Gontribufions, and Distribufive Jusfice Claims about desert have played a much larger role in the revisionist libn L. 'I:Hobhouse, the so-called 'kew erafim inspired by "f: H. G ~ e and liheral.ismfl of the first part of the mentie* centwy. kVith its much stronger rationalist m d e ~ b i x l g sthis , version of revisionist liberalism has been at the forefront of theories of distributive justice that seek to relibward peoyie according to their deserts or merits. 7b many revisio~~ist erals, a cornpetititre m a r k t society c m be just only if its competition Ewards the &serving-those who produce or at least make the effort to produce.2Utthough marry contemporary advocates of the welfare state associate it with an egalitarian needs-based distribution (Sections 6.4,7.3, 9.1), its early proponents tried to show how the equal provision of needs was cor~siste~~t with people getting w:bat they deserve. Htbhouse, for example, argues,


1 $9

The principle ctf distribution by needs would be generally recognized as broadly a principle of equality. We have now to consider it-re ground ctf differentiation. Differences arise in a system in which all have a part, and a claim to equal consideration, frorn the necessities frorn the system itself. For example, captain and sailors have an equal interest in the safety of the ship, but for the sake of that safety differences must be recognized as wilt ensure that the captain" orders will be carried out. In general terms, the common good is maintained by the xrvices of its members, . . . Every one ctf whom a function is required may claim on his side the ccmditions necessary to its performance, e.g. if he has a certain political responsibility he must be Eurnished with adequate powers, if he has to do hard and muscular work, he must have ft3t3d and rest in proporticm. If he is a brain-worker he needs air and exercise to keep him fit. . . . We may then define Distributive Justice as equal satisfaction of equal needs, subject to the adequate maintenance of ur;cEul functions,zl

We see here I-lobhouse's moral collecti\iism m d his tende~~cy tru tie justice OIT good (Sections 1.4,3.4). m a t one needs depends on one's social function, and so the equal satisfaction of needs must be adjzrsted to what one must have to effectively contribute to society. Thus far, the argun7ent is cast entirely il.1 terms of what one needs in order to contrib~rteto s0ciet.y; not what one deserves..Hobhouse, however, wishes to recmcile social justice as needs provisim with social justice as desert. In advocating a "civic minimumm----annirtimw level of resources-Hobhouse was jnsistent that this was not charity but the workhg class" just re'iuards fC?r ~ontrthz~fi~zg to the filmmm g130d; consequently, he teXl us that the ciwic minixnurn paid to a contributing m m b e r of the c o r n u n i t y must be his "true and full property with unlimited right of disposal." Hobhouse explicitly contrasts such conthbutors to "&pndentsm-"the helpless, thc. defective, the idler'" cor.~tributorshave a claim based on desert for a decent existence f i e r e a s dependcnts "'art? a charge upon trhe humanity of the community" and are pmvided with an allowance "for the speciiic purpose of meelting their needs."""' In thc history of the development of the welfare state, this was a critical. argument. The first elemen& of the modem welfare state, old-age pensions (such as the Social Secwity system) and w~employmerntinsurmce, were often advocated on the grounds that they were the just rewards of those who had previously contributed to thCS common good. Old-age pensions and unemployment insurance were 11ot charity: they were the just deserts of workers who had made socid contributions. That the provi,sions of the welfare? state were deserved rewards was especially important in its expansion in the United I(ingdom and the United States after the Scco~tdWorld War; educational. and housing assistance were viewed as deserved

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compensations for those who had contributed, to the c o m m good by fighthg fascism. Underlyixng the new liberal" desert-based conception of social justice is not only a rationalist suppo&tion that the government can reliably detemine lrhe deservhgness of ir~dividuals,but a monistic notion of what is valuable and a collectivist conviction that there is a common gaod and those who contribute to it are especialfy daerving. To =ward a person for doing s o m e t h g presupposes that what he does is a good or valuable thhg. For desert to be the guiding principle of social justice, then, we must have a socially recognjzed notion of what is valuable. To s o m , w h a t is valuable is simply productio~~. But of course, not -all productior~is valued by everyone: many insist that the productior.~of p~n~ography, large cars, \vater jets, or moder11 art is not valuable at all, Hayek dismisses the very idea of social justire as rewardhg desert for just this reason, emphasizil-rg the classical liberal plwalist position that there is no such thing as "'value to society.'' '*%rvices call only have value to parti,cuh r people (or an organization), and any particularr service will have different value to differen.t: members of the same society.""" For a society to adopt a notion of social jusMce as the systematic rewarding of people accordjng to their deserts, there must be a socially sanctioned idea of what is valuable. Typicailyf those who employ desert-based ideas of socid justice appeal to what is of value to society or what promotes the social or common good. New liberals were usually very clear that in contrast to the inditridualim of classical liberaiism, their poli"es were based on the good of the "sncial orgTmism as a whole" or the inCcrc3sts of "'crrganized society as a wholle.'"24 Development, Liber?: and Welfare

'Thus far, I have stressed the collectivism of the new liberal accow~tof social justice: justice mandates that one should receive what one needs to contribute to the common good and be rewarded according to one" ccontributio~~ to the cornmon good. This gives tt7e impressior~that the irtdividuall's rights and duties are totally subservient to the gaod of society* But Hohhouse's collecthisrn is moderated by his conception of the common good asthe harmonious developwnt of human I7atul.e. The good of the inc2ividual (her self-developmat) is thus in harmony with the good of sociely (the self-development of e v e ~ o n e )indeed, ; we have seen (%ction 7.3) that for Hohhouse one can ox~lydevelop one" sown nahnre in a society whclrc other people arc? d s o developing their personalities. the monistic harmony between individuai and socid good, and ideas of self-development and positive liberty, are at the core of his new liberal t.S7eory of social justice (see Section 4.3). Mobhouse argued that if we are


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to assist each other in dweloping our capacitks, we need to provide the conciitions necessary for development for everyone. Social justice, as Hllbhouse sees it, concem the equal pmvision of the conditiom for the growth of all citizens. 7he f i s t condition for growth is claim rights to basic liberties. Rut, Hobhause emphasized, liberty is not the sole condition for development. Because, Hobhouse argued, we should understand sociev as a cooperative elldewor, we &odd cooperate to assist each other in devdaping our personalities, This, then, =inforces the necessily of the "civic minimumu-a rninirnal level of income necessary i f a persopl is to develop, A society devoted to the. development of all its citize~~t; would also guarantee all citiztms have adequate health c m : those who are sick are unable to develop their potential, Education also becomes a major concern of the state (Section 4.3). :Notice that in this theory of liberal justice, negative claim r i e t s to nonillterfercnce do not have the c m positio~~ that they occupy iz7t classical lilberal theory The very aim of nourishing development and true freedom requises a complex of negalivc claim rights to noninkrference a r ~ dpositive claim rights to income, education, and so on. Although the new liberals do not reject classical liberalism" devotion to negative freedom, they stress that much more is required to promote developmmt t h a sirnply ~ e~~suring each citizen her negative liberty. Civil Justice and Facilitofory Social Justice

Justice as giving people what they deserve is related to justice as awarding positions on the basis of merit, They are not the same idea, however. Ib clairn you deserve somthir"tg is typicatly to focus on some past n c c m piilisl~menfof yours: a person who has given a lot of effort in a good cause desemes some recompense, At least in the most clear-cut cases, desert says "thank you" for sorne past action. But to select on the basis of merit is typicallyfirzl~urdIrtctkirzg: the selection aims to pick the person who will, in the future, do the best job, G'tf course, if someone has worked very hard to prepare herself, say, by diligently practicing to make the hascball team, we rnjght say she deserves a dance; but if w e m selecting on the basis of merit we will consider only her competency to play baseball-how well she will do as a member of the team. For J o h Passmore, selection according to competency is the heart of "civil justice," acccording to which "except by way of pmishcnent or a result of kapacity, no perso11 ought to be excluded from participaeicrr~in any form of desirabe activi9 tmless there is, of mcessity, com,petition for en& m e to it, when thf.m r e competent ought always to be prefemed to the less campetent." E This i s a strongly mcritocrufic conception of: justice; it conceives of socic.9 as a vast mass of competitions, each of which should

]"It8


be run such that the most connpetent win. Although such meritocratic ideals are often associated wieh classical liberalism, this seems a mist&, To be sure, classical liberals have supported selection accordhg to merit in relation to campetition for government or public positions, as required by the equality of opportunity (Sectio~~ 6.4). But ai&ough selection according to merit has its place in public irrstitutions with specifi,cd e h e d puqoses m d goals, classical liberals have insisti?d that it cmazot be qplied to swiety as a h o l e , for socieq as a whole does not share commorl notions of deskirable activities or what constitutes excellence in perfoming them. h d again, say the classical liheralsf aIly attempt to apply a me~tocraticnogon of justice t-hrou$uut socie'ry is bow~dto require large-scale interkre~~ces with the liberty a ~ property d of citizens. Consider, for example, the status of religions scl?ools. Xs it unjust for Ca(Jldic sehoots to hire a malh .teacher just becmse she is Catholic, even though a Baptist candidate mitght be a better math kacher? According to the idea of civil justice, it seems that the Cat.holic hiring authorities mtrst show that, in some way, the CalXnolic math leacher is really more competent. But if the schools are the property of the Catholic Chur& ant[ it funds its o m schools, LVhy shC)ULLf not the Catholic Church be free to spend its money as it sees fit? Passmrds ideal of civil justire is allied to rationalism insofar as it unthat posd e r s t d s all of sociey in terns of bureaucratic orl;.anizatio~~s sess goals they seek to achieve, and so possess standat-ds of coqekrrcy measured by ability to meet those goals. C)sr the face of it, civil justire appears to be hostile to egalitarian social justice (see Sections 6.4, 8.4, 9.1): civil justice stwsses the distinction bet.ween the more m d less competent and allows that, justly, there will he losers in fair competitions. Propotypically seek to assist the nents of egditarian social justice, i17 co~~trast, '*losc;.rs"or worst-off mentbers ol society. On closer inspectiom, however, we can see that civil justice easily endorses a mokrately egalitarian notion of social justice. Passmore observes, In its most moderate form-let us call it facititatc~rysocial justice-the advocates of social justice do not reject outright the leading assumptions of civil justice. They dc:, not deny either that some forms of activity are particularly desirable or that when a process of selection is inevitable, competence is it-re proper criterion. But they go beyond civil justice by demanding that a saciety should take positive steps tofacl'fifate the wider participation of its members in desirable activities and the selection of the potentially most competent persons in any competitive situation. Such facilitaticm takes the ft>rmof so modifying the socio-economiccircumstances which disadvantage particular individuals that those circumstances no longer act as a shackle.zfi

To see how civil justice can give rise to facilitatory social justice, think about the common metaphor of life as a race. If life is a race, or a series of


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races, then civil justice demands that the winnes be the best entrantsthose who are best at r u m h g . But if some peopk are unable to train for the race becatrse they are too poor to take time off of work or camot afford good running shoes, then we might question vvhether the best are really being selectd. Perhaps the person best suited to the job IIever received adequate trajwling. If we limit ourselves to those who have had the opportunity to train, c m we say that we have selected the best? Should m t a fair competilior~eyuirlly prepare the eyuaily talented? This gives rise to a notion of socriaI.jwstice that em,phasizes a thoroughgoil-rgequality of fair opportunity (Sections 6.4, 8.4). Government provision of equal educatknal opportuxGties, child care, and head start programs all become part of the expanded ideal of rewading people accordhi; to their merit. Although Passmre accepts that the ideal of civil justice can be extended to include facilitatary social justice and its attendant ideal of equality of fair opportmity, he argtres that civil justice is opposed to the use of quotas in awardhg scarce positions. The propment of civil just-ife can "protest agab~stany attempt to rule out blacks, or women, as b~competent en, masse to enter any particular occupation." But he will reject the idea that justice requires that social groups must be ""rtlp~sentedin proportim to their numbers in any form of desirable activity.'"2 For, Passmore hsists, we s k p l y da not b o w whether, say, mathematical abilities are equally disthbuted be?t-w.eenmen and women or between Asims and Europeans. There is, Pasmore says, no reason why ail talents must be equally distributed among all social groups-whether they are or are not is a matter to be investigated. Giwn this, we camot infer that just because the praportio~~s of, say, men and wornell in a certain occupation am not the same as their proportion in the general population, there must be an unjust competition. h l y if one h e w that the competencies for all occupations were equafly distributed amor~gall social gmups coutcl one infer that an instance of ""under-" or representation is, ipso facto, a case of civil injustire. Passmore is not enough of a ratior~aiistto claim that he can make such a strong claim to kl~owledge,hence he rejects quotas as a violation of civil. justice.

8.4 Pluralisfie Revisionisf Iliberalhnn; A Revised Secial Confract Among Free and Equal People Pluralistic Disfinguished from Monisfic Revisionist Liberalism

mroughout this book, I have contrasted classical and revisionist liberal-. ism. The type of revisimist liberalism on which I m i n l y have been focusing might be calied mclnisfic rez?isioni~Iliberalism. At the h e a t ol this type of mvisimist liberalism is a monistic doctrine that the good. of each

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person is to fully develop her capacities, be guided bp her real will, or realize her true self. This versiol~of monism allows that each permnfs true good may be somewhat different, and crucially depend on her choices-my developed personality will not be the same as yours, and it will reflect my choices. Nwertheless, this type of rwisionkt liberdim presupposes that there is a good life for humans, which only a liberal society can achieve. It is this monistic ideal that is the foundation of posi4.31, as well as lfie claim that, properly ur~derstood, tive freedom (Sectio~~ equaliv (qua equal rights) is harmonious with freedom (Section 7.3). Monistic revisionist Iiberalism also tends to be far more collectivist in its than classicai liberalism. Thus, for mderstanding of moraiity a ~ society d instance, ;:l: H:. Grt3e11, perhaps lfie greakst revisionist liberal of this sort, advocated a collectivist theory of justice accordhg to which "a right is a p w e r claimed and rrtcowized as contributory to a common g o d . " b r Green, a right is a recognized power that we need in order to contribut-e to the social. good, not an hdividual claim that c m block social projects that seek to promote the common good. Thus for Green 'k aright against society as such, is impossihlct.'""~The h a r t of the liberalism of Green, Hobhause, Bosmquet, and others was this ideal of the common good. As we have just seen, this type of ~viaionistliberalism understands justice in terns of what one needs to contribute to the cornmon good, and what contributors deserve and merit. Another type of revisionist liberalism has dminated palitical theory reui~iottisf.liberalism-most fain the past thirty years. This pf~kralisfi~ mously advanced by John Rawts in A Theory ofl~istice(7.971,)-has closer ties to the class-ical doctlxine. Rawls" revisionist liberalism is both more individualistic and more pluralistic than the versiol~advanced by Green and Hobhouse. Like the classical liberals (Section 8-22),Rawls starts from the supposition that we are f i e and eqztal. We are eqzlal in that we are owed "eyual col~siderationand respect."29 We are free in the sense that each person is capable of chooshg her goals in life and formivrg plans to achieve them. RawLs accepts a versim of pluralism (Section 3.2), holding d competing, notiol~s that reasodlct people have various, a ~ sometimes about what is goad-what is kvorth pursuing in life. Different people, that is, have different goals in life, different plans t h y wish to pursue. Rawis typically illsists that there is r ~ single o goal-such as the. pursuit of pleasure, nobility or kvhatever-that every reasonable person must pursue. Rawls also endorses a strong version of moml individrtlalism (Sction 3.4). :Not only must we recognize that each us pursues his or her own vision of what makes life worth living, but we also must recognize that "each. person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfnrt-.of society as a whole cannot override.""""'For Racvls, prhcQles of justice defke the rights of hdividuals, rights that are so importmt m d


20 1

strong that even corlsideratiom based on pmmoting the overall sociail welfare or common good are unable to override them. Again, we confront the complexity of political theory*The "'new liberal" followers of Green and Hobhouse sought to construct a welfare state 0x1 foundations that were strikingly differex~tfrom the classical liberals m d which borrowed much from socialism. Hobhouse in. England, and J&xr Dewey in Ammica, explicitly sought to move liberalism closer to socialism-x~ot simply in its support of goverx~mer~t policies to help the poor, but in its mderstanding of individuals, society, and morality." 2x1 contrast, Rawlsian, pluralistic revisionism stays much closer to the classical li;bed's c o m i m e x ~ t to s moral indi\iidualism and pluralism: its aim is to show that, p r ~ e r l yunderstood, these commitments lead to a comprehensive wel.fare state along the lines acjvocated by Hobhouse and Dewey The contrast should, not he pushed too far: the writing of Rawls and his f ollowers displays mitI.7.yof the self -devetopmex~talcommitne~~ts that were at the heart of monistic revisionism: the idea that the state should, actively assist in the development of our distinche human capacities is a dominant t-heme in R a d s as well as Gree11.X N~evertheless, whereas Green m d Hobhouse believed that a wholesale reconstmction of liberal theor~swas requlscd to show this, Rawls begins from prennises that have much more in common with classical liberals such as Berlin and Hayek,

Rawls, then, supposes that (l)we have different goals, and (2) we are not part of a collective er~tity"'society,'?o whose interests we can he sacrificed. M a t , then, is the nature of social life? Rawls's s s w e r is that social relations are partly cooperative and partly cmpetitive. They arc?cooperative because we all benefit from social ir~teraction.Goods are prclduced and services obtained that would never exist without social cooperation. To a large extent; then, Hobbes was right (Section 8.2): society is an endewor for mutual adwantage and we all can gain thl.ough living together in peace. But as Hobbes also stressed, social relations are also competitive: each of us would Itke the resources-the goods and services-that are produced so that we c m achicve our most Cherished goals. Betty wmts resources so that she c m write the Great Americm Novel, kvhereas ALf wants to explore Australia, j"Jot everyone can have all he or she walits. So, we have competing claim for t-he resources that are prduced by social cooperation. Because of all this, Rawls says, we ~equircwhat he calls a "public conceptio~ of~justiceff-some standard by which we c m resolve our competing claims. Ulthately, we have a choice: we c m resolve our competing

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claims through force or by a public conception of justice that we all can accept. f r a~ h o s t all-perhaps all-societies that have ever existed, force has been used. Those with the necessary force-the rulers-hrtve c m pelled others to live according to the l w s set down by the rulers. In such over the distributio~~ of resources societies, the cor~flictbetwee11 citize~~s has been resolved by force. The alternative is a society that c m agree on a moral code to adjudicate cornpetjng claims. In such a society, no one is likely to receive all she wm~ts,but she can see that the rules that determ k e wh.& she gets are fair in the sense that they arc? innpartial (see Mill's point [S], Section 8.1) and so could be accepted by everyone, Probably the most striking feature of Rawls" col~tracteheory is that the parties to the social contract decicfe on a set of moral pri'7ciple" the "crl:igjn,alposition" behjnd a "veil of ignorance."' Tlis means that they do not h o w certain facts about themselves, such as their (l)place in socieq; (2) naturaf talents (for example, intefigence); (3) "conception of the goodM";and (4) societ.ytscircumstances, such as its level of economic development, They do, however, know general facts, such as the laws of economics and psyclhology. The aim of the exclusions is to rule out speciSic in,formation. If we are meeting to determine cvbat arc! the best pritlciples of justire, Rawls tells us, some things are irrelevmtl that is, informaEavor her. tion that would allow a person to propose p'incip1e"Ihrt Justice is impartial; it does not favor some sorts of peopk over others-the veil of ignorance is meant to express this. An agxement under the veil of specific facts ignorance would thus be fair. Because people do not k ~ o w about themselves, they are not in, a position to hold out for m agreement that provaes them with extra benefits-how could they, since they do m t h o w INho they are? Rawls realizes, of course, that no one ever met of really forget who we are; he is tryunder these conditions, m d we c ing to impress on us that if we are really interested injustice and fairness, then we must ehil7k about what sort of morality everyone could accept, and so we must think about: what cve wodd accept behind the veil of ignorance, where bias in one's own favor is impossible. One featurrt of the veil of ig~orancethat merits special emphasis is Rawls's exclusion of bawledge about natural talents. Our natural tallents, Rawls says, are morally arbibary; no one deserves greater intelligeme or nakral skills. Justice, then, should not achowledge that those with greater natural talents deserve greater resources. Thus, the veil of ignorance restricts our howledge of our own talents: as h w l s sees them, they we arbitrary Erom a moral point of view (Retrai:i here from Section 6.2 the egalilnrian argument that inequalities that stern from the "nnatu.ra1 lottery" of birth, in which people receive mtural and social advitntages that they do not deserve, are unjust, and cait for redress.) This leads Rawls away from a desert-based theory of social justice. For most


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of the claims a person might make to he specially deserving-her contributim ws m r c important, she provided a ill7ique service, she was a high producer-stem from her natural talents or her lucky social, position. Shce Rawls wishes to exclude claims based on such talentr;, cayacities, and circumsta~ces,he excludes col~sideratiox~s of deservinpess and merit from his theory of justice. Thus, whereas our first version of revisionist liberalism (Section 8.3) is characterized by monism m d collectivism and stresses desert and selectiox~according to merit, Rawls" libem1 theory of social justice is pluralist and indivicfualist and excludcs desert al~nostentire+ Rawls tells us that when evduating each proposed set of prhciples, a rational contractor will cor~sidereach possible position that she may occupy in a society. She witl. ask, "Ef this set of principies is chosen, haw well will X fare if I am the worst-off person in the sociely?" So, Rawls suggests &at indeliberating &out principles of justice, one witr be most concerned with the westion, "'How does the bottom of sociev fare under each gmposal?" R w l s calls this strategy "maximin"qou muxlmize the vlirzimum you might receiw. Eor ar~ysocial arrangemer~t,the minilnum you might receive is what you will get if you end up at the bottom of that society; you maximjze the minimurn if you select the society in which the bottom or worst-off class gets m m than does the bottom or worst-off class in m y alternative society. Rawls argues that you will thus select the principles of justice that result in a society with. the "highest bottomf'that in which the least well off do as well -as possible. Thus, as a first approximation, IZawis holcts that the parti,es to the original position would accept his "General Conception of JusticeH":%ll social values-liberty and opportunity, income m d weal&, and the basis of sdf-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any; or all, of these values is to everyone" advantageeP'33

:Rawis%lfieory of justice is a variation on the a r g m n t for eyuality from impartiality that we examined in %ction 6.2, combined with an argument that equal treatment requires a type of resource equality (Section 6-41. If we are to treat people equaily in trhe sense of impartially (see Mill's poi,nt 151 abovef-if our trrratment of them is not to depend on afcidents of birth m d other inelcrvant cmsideralions-justiee d c m d s an approximation to equality of resources. We observe here a common phenomenon: roughly the same political arrangement c m be advocated trnder the concept of justice or under equali@,3"~awls% veil of ignormce undermines all possible argumex~tsfor diffe~ntialtreatmernt based on spwiat talents, competencies, or past accomplishments..Consequently, by ab-

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skacting away all our individual characteristics, all that remahs is our basic equality; under these collditions to be impartial must lead to equal treatment. It is this strong egalitarim element in. Rawls" revisionist liberalism that led Dworkin to depict Rawls" liberalism-mdi, apparently by exte~~sion, arl true tiberdism-as based on equality rather than liberty (Section 7.3). In two respects, however, Rawls" theory departs from resource egalitarianism, f l) b w l s ailows inegualities of resourcres if those ineyuditks work to the advmtage to the least well off. If we are distributing a fixed amomt of resources-for example, dividing a cak then m ecj~taldistrithe bution will always be selected by the muinnin. h an equal cJivisio~~, "smallest'" piece is as large as the '%"biggestwpiece, since all pieces are the same size. Eeanamies are, holvever, dynamic. People in the orighal posilion are deliberating not only how to divide a fixed stock of resources, but in what way, and to what degree, the stock of resourcres will grow. It seems quite certain that the stock of reclsources will not significantly grow under a strict egalitarian distribution. 'To induce the more talented to work hard, to undertake long trainingJ to perform unpieasant tasks, and so on, it will be necessary to pay them more, Thus, it would seem that al:low% some inequality of wealth and income is necessaq to promote the overall illcrease in wealth, which is bex-teficial to the least well off, Consequenlly, RawIs allows inequality of holdings if the inequality works to the long-tern advantage of the least well off. When an increase in inequaiity no longer results in gabs to those at t-he bottom of sociew Rawls deems it to be unjust. The above argument supposes an individualist view of burnan nabre (Section 3.9:the better off will not work hard-or hard enough-for the sake of the commzlmity or because thcy are committed to justice. Only if: the more talented will benefit from the use of their talents will they develop &em and work. Some sociatist egalitarians have criticized Rawis on just this ground; if: we suppose that people reaXiy are devoted to jwstice these additional incentive payrrrents to work will not he necessav.35 CrttciaUy,then, Rawls's liberal, individualist conception of human nat-ure draws hirn back from endorsing a thoroughly egali,Carim distribution of resources, Nevertheless, Rawls" theory is sufficiently egaljtarian to justify wasting resources to achieve equality (see Section 6.3). Suppose parties in the origkal position are faced with two possible distributions of resources, as in Figure 8.4. Rawis% "'Cmeral Conception of Justice" selects Distrihutiol~(1) over Distribution (2), sirnce the greater bequalities in (2) do not result b additjonal advantages to the worst ofE.36 This implies, however, that alt%lough society could have the addifioml resources in (2), Rawlsfsegalitarianism would prefer the overall p o m r society cor~spondingto DjstribtlCion (I).


FIGURE 8.4 Two Passible Distribulions of income

(2) The Iiberaj, as opposed to the resource egalital-iar~, aspect of Rawlsfs of Justheory comes to t%re fore in what he calls the "Special Conceptio~~ tice." According to the General Conception, all primary goods-ix\c2uding liberty and opporbnity-are to be distril>u&de y ~ a i f yunless an unequal distributio~~ maximally adva~tagesthe least well off. But Rawls adds, If the parties assume that their basic liberties can be effectively exercised, they will not exchange a lesser liberq for an improvement in economic wel lbeing. It .is only when social conditions do not allow the effective establishment of these rights that one can concede their limitation; and these restricticms can be granted only t~:,the extent that they are necessary to prepare the way for a free society The denial of liberty can be defended onXy if it is necessary to raise the level of civilization so that in due course these freedoms can be enjoycd.37

Rawls insists that Beyond some point it becomes and then remains irrational from the standpoint uf the original position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for the sake of greater material means and amenities of office. Let US note why this should be so. First of all, as the general level of well-being rises (as indicated by the index ctf primary goods the least fitvored can expect) only the less urgent wants remain tc3 be met by further advances. . . . At the same time the obstacles to the exercise of the equal liberties decline and a growing insistence upon the right tct pursue our spiritual and cultural interests asserts itself. Xncreasngly it becomes more important to secure the free internal life of the various communities of interests in which persons and groupweek to achieve, in modes ctf social unictn consistent with equal liberty, the ends and excellences to which they are drawn.3"

Rawis a r p e s that except if one finds onesdf han impoverished society (in which case s o m sacrike of fiherty for ccronodc advitr~cementmay be justified), one will insist on equal liberties and appartuni"ces. This

206


leads to the Specid Cmceptjon of Justice, which specifies his farnous two principles of justice: First Prkciple: "'Each person is to have m equal right to the mast exknsive s y s t m of cqual h s i c liberties compatihie with a siJnilar system of Liberty for all. %cond Prjnciple: "%cial and economic hequalities are to be arranged so that they are both t of the least advmtaged . . . (a) tro the g ~ a t e sbex~efit (h) attached to offices amd positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of o p p o r t m ~ . " ~ ~ Rawls holds that the first, liberty, principXe is "lexical@ prior" to the second, egalitarian, principle: the first must be met before the second comes into play. But Rawls's notion of freedom does not include economic liberty or private property; these core elements of classical liberalism are unprotected in his liberal theory of justire. Indeed, Rawls does m t endorse freedom hgewral, advocating instead the traditional list of specss liberal freedom (Sections 5,4, 7.3). Within the egalifarian second principle, the principle of fair equality of opportunity (Section 6.4) is similarly prbr to clause (a), the egalitarian distribution of resomes. Rawls's theory of jctsti.cc3, then, combines (in order of priority) equal lirberty, equal fair opporhnity, and (qualified)equal resources.

8.5 Summary :Ibegan in Section 8.7 by skctchhg t-he terrain of justic portmt elements of our practiee of ~usticethat a theory otjzrstice must organize and explain. I focused on, two well-known sketches of the elements of justice: Mill's five aspects of justice (legalitypmoral r%hts, desert, het. agreement, and imparti,ality)and Mohfeld's analysis of the relatims between liberties, claims, duties, powers, liabilities, irnmunities, and disabilities. Sectio11 8.2 analyzecl classical liberaf theories of justice, which place equal negative claim rights to liberty, claim rights to property and contracts at the heart of justice, giving desert a somewhat ambiguous mle. Underlying this theory of justice is the classical liberal's core value of negative liberty and its supposition of equal freedom, as w e l as its cmmitment to individualism, pluralism, and skepticism about our -nbi:lity to know what people really deserve. Section 8.3 analyzed a monistic revjsionist liberal conception of justiee, which puts much greater stress on collectivism and rationalism. Crucial to this understar~dingof social justice is that those who contrihutre to the common good deserve rewards and that people should be given what they need to


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be effective contribubrs. The allied ideas of civil justice and facilitatory social justice werc? also examhed. I s t ~ s s e dthat although a lheory of justice emphasizbg merit is often associated with classical liberalism, and although selection of civil service positions by merit has been edorsed by cfassical iiberals, the ge~~eralizr-ttion of selection by merit to all social positions presupposes a view of society that is much closer to Hobhouse" revisionist liberalism than to Hayek" classical liberalism. Contrasted to Hobhouse" ccoilectivist desert theory is Raw:is% pplralist egalitarian revisionist lilberal conception of justice (Section 8.4). For Rawls-md here he follows the classical liberal.t-radition-justice is comp""w"doi the rulus that free and equal people woulcl accept. But in :Rawls"s versior~of the social contract, the equality rather than t-he freedom of the parties is salient; h a w i n g nothing about their specific natures, values, or way of life, they select p~nciplesthat stress their equality, especially in the distributior~of wealth, incorne, a r ~ dopporhnnities. We now turn, to exambing some leads rronliberal theories of justice.

1. John Stuart Milt, Utififariajtisnr,in John Gray, ed., OIILiberty @and'Other Essays (New York: Oxfcjrd University Press, 29(a1)lchap. S, para. 4. All the quotes frorn Mill in %ction 8.1 are frorn Utilitnritzr-zlzr'snz,chap. 5, paras. 5-10. 2. See Jarnes M-.McPherrion, The iF3atClc. Cry 9f Frcedonr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988),pp. 8&82, 3,See Hamah Pitkin, Wittgerzsteirz mid Justice (krkefey: University of Caiifornia Press, 19721, chap. 8. 4. J. R. Lucas, On fastice (Oxford: CXarendon Press, 19801, p. 209. S. See Michael Slote, "Desert, Consent and Justite,'T/zilos~pilzyand Pzlblr'c Af~~irs, vol. 2 (Summer 3973), pp. 323-,%7, David Miller considers a third principle, "'cornpenmation,'bccording to which a "man" reward should depend on the costs which he incurs in his work activity." "cinl fztstice (Qxford: Clarendon Press, 197&),p. 103. Compare Norman's view of ""equal benefitsr' in %etion 7.3.For a very good analysis of theories of distributive justice that pays attention to principles ctf desert, see julian Lamont, "Distrjibutive Justice,'" Edward N. Zaita, ed., Starqord Etzcycloi?edzi;zof PI2ifusuyIzy [nnliineat http: / /plato.stanford,eduj. 6. Zmmanuel Kant quoted in lames Racheis, The Elelnezits of Moral Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999),p. 127. 7". For Hohfeld's classic analysis, see his "5ome Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning," Yale Law Reviere vol. 23 (39131, pp. 16-59, I am drawing here on L, W. Sumer, TIzc Moral Fozdndatic~tzsofXi2y;lhl.s(Oxford: Oxfcjrd University Press, 1987), p. 27'. For helpful explications of Hc>hfe1dJs analysis, see R, E. Robimon, S, C. Coval, and 5, C. Smith, 'T11e Logic of Rights," U~zE't?rrsify of 7l0rofztoLaw Reaiew, vol. 33 (19831, pp. 267-278; M-ichaef Freeden, Rights (Mimeapolis: Universiv of Minnesota Press, 19911, chap. 1. 8. 1 am again fc~llowingSumer, The Marat Fozindatiovzs ctf" Rights, p. 30.

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9, Thomas f-iobbes, Le.iliatl~ar.r, Michael Oakeslhcttt, ed., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948 fl65lj), chap. 13, Emphasis added. 16, Ibid., chap. 33, para. 9, 11, Ibid., chap. 13, para. 13. 12, Xbid., chap. 38, 13. David Gauthier, Mt~mlsby Agreenrenf (Oxfcjrd: Clarendon Press, 1986); see James Suchanan, The Limits cl( Liberfy (Chicago: Unirrersity ctf Chicagct Press, 19755).X consider Neo-Hobbesian a>ntractualismin more depth in my Soci~lPhilosophy (Armonk, NY M . E. Sharpe, 39991, chap. 5, 14. On the idea of harm, see my Social Philosoplz,yl cchp. C-;. 15. John Loclse, Second Em tkc of Covenltnenf, in Peter Laslett, ed., Tzoo Pen tises ofGot?enztlzc~zf(Cambridge: Cambridge tinik~ersityPress, 1960 [1689]),sect, 123. 16. Ibid., sect. 6. 17. John Stuart Mill, Principles ";tf Polifical Ecorromy, Sir Williarn Ashtey, ed., (Fairfield, MJ:Augustus M. Kelley, 1976 [1C-;71]),p. 209 (Book 2, chap, 1, sect. 3). 18, Compare here Caliie's comments on commutative justice in Section 2.1, 19. E A. Hayek, Law, Legisindion and Liberttyt vol. 2: The M i r n ~uf Soci~lJtrstz'ce (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1474), p, "17% 20, See David NjlXer" snow-classic study of social justice, where he maintains that desert-based theories of justice are especially approprhte to market societies:

Social Jusf ice. 21. Hobhouset The Eltvnlcn ts of Social jzrstice (London: George Allen and Zlnwin, 1922), pp. 110--111. 22. Ibid., pp. 1-38-139. 23, F-fayek, Law, Legislntl;o~znrjd Libertyf vol. 2: TfzeMirage ";1(Socktaf Justicr;: p. 75. 24. The first quote Is Prom J. A. Hobson, TIze Science f:f WmElh, 4th ed., revised ed. R. E Harrcjd (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp, 168-169, The second is from John Maynard Keynes, " m e End of L,aissez-Fajre," in his Essays irz Persuers-iotz (London: Macmillan, 19721, p, 2'75. For a fuller treatment, see: Gerald E Caus, "Public and Private Interests in Liberal Political Economy, Old and New." in S. I. Benn and G. E Gaus, eds. Pzrbfic ~ n Private d ilz Socint (New Uc2rk: St. Martin" Press, 1983),pp. 1 95ff. 25. See J. A. Passmore, ""Civil Justice and Its Rivals, " in inugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon k y , eds., Jzlrstl're (Londctn: Edward Amold, 1979), p. 26. 26..Xbid., p. 36. 27. Ibid., p, 46. 28. See T. H. Green, Lecfztres un the Pritzcz'ples f:$ hlifical Obligation n~zdOf1zer Writittgs, Paul Harris and John Morrow, e d ~(Cambridge: . Cambridge University Press, l986), pp. 79,110. 29. See Joim Rawls, ""A Kantian Concepticm of EqualiQ," hinobert M. Stewart, ed., Readilzgs iz Socitzl' a ~d Pat itickzf Philasopfly (Oxford: Uxford University Press, 1986), p. 1-88.See Section 7.2. 30, Rawfs, A T;l;zeoryof fzlsfice (Cambridge, MA: f-iarrrard University Press, 1971), p. 3. 33. See my ""Lberatism at the End of the Centuryf'' "~zirz~al of Pctlitiml Idmtc~gies, vol. 5 (2800),pp. 45-65.


209

32. X comider the similarities of Rawis to these earlier theorists in The Modenz Ll'ber~lT!$eojyjof Malz (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). 33, Rawls, A Tf~eary of Jusiiice, p. 303, 34. As Elnbhouse observed, "Justice is a name ta which every knee will bow, Equality is a word which many fear and detest, Yet the just was rightly declared by Aristotle is be a farm of the equal." The Elvrnenfs 0fSoczit.l Jusriice,p. 94. 35. See C. A. Cohen, ""Te Pareto Argument for Inequality" h EEtlen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller Jr., and jeMrey Paul, eds., Gotttecrmporay I>uliliml nnd Suc;itrl Pljilusophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1495) pp. 160-185; and ""Incentives, Xnequaliq and Community," Tanner LecCzircs on Hrrllgalz VoIues (Salt Lake City: Univergty of Utah Press, 1992). 36, The issue is more complex than indicated here. For complicaticlns, see RawEs, A Theoy oflustice, pp, 65ff. 37, Xbid., pp. 542-543. 38. Ibid. 39, Xbid ., pp. 302-303.

9,11 Marx on Societies and Their Justice Socialism and Justice

Socialist justice is often equated with egalitarianism, especially the equal distribution of resources, welfare, or the satisf~tionof needs, based on a claim &at hurnans are fw-rdamntaly equal.1 Our discussions of equality in Chapter h ar-rd Section 7.3 have covered most of the. ground of '"socialist justice." h its conceptual structure, equality, not justice, is the core idea. Insofar as socialists endorse theories of justice, these are typically dwelapments or extensions of revisiox-rist .liberal theorks. Particularly striking is the way in which many socialists have come to embrace :RawIspst k o r y of social justice, although perhaps putting more emphasis on the egalitarian f e a t u ~ and s criticizing the ways &at Rawls illlows inequality." discussims of social justjce, the line between egaktarim revisionist liberal and moderate socialist views is often murky indeed, alrnost nor~exis tent. One of the m a h aims of this chapter is to explain why socialism accords a less prominent place to justice in its conceptual shucture. Now, one obvious a-rd plausible explan"tior7 is the tremendous il7Ruence exercised by Karl Marx in socialist thinkhg. nlthowgh Marx was, of course, a vehement critic of capitalism, it is ul-tckar whelher he was prepared to employ the cox-rcept of justice ir-r criticizing capitalism or whether he advanced a socialist conception of justj.ce. '*DoesMarx have a theory of justice?"' Let us exanthe three competing mswers. The Scientific Socialism Answer: The Study of Power Relations

The first a~swer-which is short and sweet-takes very sel-lously Marxfs daim that i s theory of socialism is "scientific'%d not moralistic. Ac-

cording to this (fairb standard) view, Marx was a social scientist investigating b w capitalism malaged to tr;msic.r productive power from the working class to the capitalists. It will be recalled from %ction 5.3 that, in, the language of C. B, Macpherson, capitahst private property rights tl-ansfw the "labour power'kf the workers to the owners. In capitalist systems of procfuction, the owrrer purchases the worker's labor p o w r for a certain period of time-thc owner of private property pays the wrkers a wage, and in return for the wage, everything that the worker produces becomes the property of the capitalist. The olvner ptrrchases &at abiZity for a certain time and p u b it to work, "The ability, the labourpororl; is tralsfemd. The actual work is ye$om-rcd by the n011-owner, But in a very real sense t-he actual work is i w ~ e dby the owner of capital.'"" Marx c a k d this process ""expl"'itatim.wThe key to understandlrrg capitalism, Marx argued, was that the worker" labor power creates more value than the worker receives .from the capitalist in wages. The wage contract gives the capitalist all the value that the worker produces in a day, but the worker only gets a part of that back in wages; the difference betweal what the worker produces and what he gets paid is the surjullads zilalae. Capilalism "'expbits" the workers because the surplus value goes to the capitalist, not the worker. "The time during which the labourer r/vorks,'Wrote Marx, "is the time durhg d i c h the capitiilist consums the labour polver he has purchased of It--rim."4 (_ln this '%scientif"icsocialism" reading, Marx's theory is an analysis of the power reiations i n h e ~ ri~ n capi.tatism and their economic, social, and t political effects. The concept of power, not that of justice, is crucial*According to this interpfetatim, Marx is not concerned with the "morals'" of capitalism: he is concerned, very simply, with a scientific alalysis of it. ':To be sure, he believes that it will be overthrown by the kvorkers, m d Marx no doubt is happy about this, but what Marx likes or clislikes is not part of his theory. Suppod fm this view desives from Marx's owll ctaim that his theory was scientific as well as his criticism of earlier socialists. h the Cornmzi~zz'st Mnlzfestn, Marx and Engels criticized what they called ""utopianf\socilists, who "'want to improve the condition of every member of snckty, even the most favored.. Hence, they habitually appeal to suciety at large, withoul distinctiorl of dass; nay, by preference, to the ruling dass. For how can people, when they once understand their system, fait to see in it the best possi:ble plm for the best possible state of sociely?"Vhis idea--that -all mord people will favor socialist pr~posaisonce they understand their jnherent j ustic is not treated khdly by Marx and Engels. Revoltrtion and socialism, they repeatedly insist, wilf be created by the objective conditinns of thc working class, not by moralistic socialist preaching. In an essay of his own, Engels explicitly contrasts "'utopim socialism" to the

"sciet.ltific socialism" that he and Marx devised. Consider what Engels says of three non-Marxist socialists-C1aude Ele~~ri $c Rouvroy Comte de Saint-Simon (1768-2825), Charles Fourier (2772-1837), and Robert Owen (1771-1858): One thing is common to a13 three. Not one of them appearwas a representative of the interests of that proletariat which historical development had, in the meantime, produced. . . . They do not claim to emancipate a particular class to begin with, but aft humanity at once. . . . They wish tc3 bring in the kingdom of reason and eternal justice. . . . For' to our three social refc?rmers, the bourgeois world, based upon the principles ctf these philosophers, is quite irrational and unjust. . . . If pure reason and justice have not hitherto ruled the world, this has been the case only because men have not rightly understood thern.6

Engels is echoing Marx" s a n d his argument in the Marzfcsto (but, as is Wical, p u t t i ~ ~itgin a somewbt cruder way), criticizing the very idea of a soGialism based on claims of "'injustice.'%~s Eng& sees it, with Marxfs work "sacialism became a science"7(Section 3.2.). And in a science, w o ~ e about s justice have no place; scjence is about facts, not values (see Sectio~~ 1.2). This interpretation of Marx, although by no means the last word, draws on three fundamental commitments of Marxism: (1) its rationalism (Section 3.21,( 2 ) its ""social envirox~me~~talist" view of h u m a ~ nature (Section 3,3),and (3)its colfectivist analysis of pcrsons-in-society (%clion 3.4). If a persods nature is essentially shaped by her society, and we are to explain individual facts in terns of social facts, the sGientific explanation af human behavior should focus on a person's place in. the overall social systern. How a person acts will not be detclmined by her abstract views of justice-whih, as Marx said, arc? suppawd to appeal to the oppressor as we(t as the oppressed. If the oppressor-the capitalist-was actuially iTlfluenced by such, appeals, his behavior would not be determined by his role in the social system, but by his h~dividualco~~science or will. Marx is so critical af ""utopian," socialists just because they assume that appeals to what is right or just actually can make a political difference. "Utopian socialism" employs a iiberal-lfke appeal to an individual's sense of right m d wrong; as we have seen throughout this book, liberalism puts great stress on individual choice and autonomy. Far the liberal, what moves a perso11 to act largely depends 0x1 her own choices. Hence for the liberal, to convince others that sonzcthing is ttnjllst can be politically effective. For scientific sodalists following Mam, this is entirely wr011g: it is too individualistic, a r ~ dsupposes &at people's actio~ls are to be explahed by their individual choices m d values, not by their

overall role m the social system. Thus, m enduring strand in sod.alist thought is suspicious of all appeals to individual conscie~~ce, and so of appeals to justice. The Reiafivity of Justice

AccordiIlg to the first interpretation, then, Marx has no concern (or, it w u l d seem, patknee) with the idea of justice. In "The Critique of the Gatha Program," "ough, Marx appears to advocate a different positjon-that "right cm never be higher than the economic structure of society and its culturaf developmnt conditioned thereby."'" This idea has been developed by Aller1 Wood, who argues that Mam hetd a c o ~ ~ c e p t i o ~ ~ of justice according to wfiich each mode of production has a notion of justice appropriate to it. h Capital, for instance, Marx says, The justice of transactions which go ctn behiveen agents ctf production rests on the fact that these transactions arise out of the producticln relations as their natural consequence. The juristic ft3rms in which these eccmomic transactions appear as rioluntary actions of the participants, as expressions of their common will or as contracts that may be enfc~rcedby it-re state against a single party, cannot, being mere Er~rms,determine this ccmtent. They only express it. This content is just whenever it corresponds to the rnude of production, is adequate tct it, Xi- is unjust whenever it ccontradicts it."

Marx" point seems to he that a trazssaction is just when it is appropriate to the prevailing "mode of productionH-the cument syskm of power relations, pmperty rights, and pocfuctive technotogy. A ""just""action or policy "harmonizes with and perfor~xsa function relative to it. An m u s t action, by cmtrast, is one whieh 'conkadicts' the prevailirrg mode, which clashes with it or is dysfctnctional dative to it.'"lW/?ilthoughWood hinself resists cdling this a relativist conception of justice, it: is indeed d a tive in the sense that what is just in a particulirlr society is relative to the mode of production of that socieq. If this is Marx" sddersbnding of jrrst-ice, what would he say about:the exploitation of the workers under capitalism? Codd that be just? Surprisingly enough, at m e place Marx suggests pre&i"elythat: "What is a "just distributir,n'? Do not the boure;eois assert that thc present distribution is just? h d isn't it in fact the only &Skibution based on the present mode of production?"'I"o, it would seem of justice a p p r ~ r i a t to e capitalism---a capitalist conthat the conceptio~~ ception of justice-kvould hold that exploitation is just. And within the capitalist mode uf psoduction, it zuould he jlrst. Despite initial appearmliees, this interpretatio~~ of Marx is not a radical depature from, the first. Both stress Che importance of the collectivist

supposition that before one can understand an elernent of a system, one must understand the hmctioning of the ovaall sociaf and economic system. Uncrterstandi.ng t-he w o r h g s of the whole is prior to mderstamding the individual unit. Thus, if we are to understand qpeals to justice, we must see how a certain co~lceptionof justice f m c t i o ~ ~ ar.1 ecowithin s nomic system. We will then see haw the capitalist conception of justice fits into the capitaljst system and plays a role init. Note how this analysis of justice ties justice very ciosclly to legality (see Mill's first point Section 8.7),or wj-tat might be cailed "offidaf,state justice." The legal system witl expfess the n o t h of justice that is appropriate to the mode of productim. On the other hand, this interpretation cJismisses "idea:i justice"' (Mill's second point, Sc.ctio118.l) in its "concept-ual mapff3ecausesuch idealizhg suggests the liberal hdividualist ~4ewthat a person's actions can be determhed by notions about what is right or wrong that do not reflect his actual social positio~~ or sociely"s co~~ception of justice.12 Marx's Theory

of Justice?

In response to Woad" hterpre"ltion, it has been argued that Marx was satirizjng capitalism in the above passage, and so it is not to be taken at face va1ue.n A number of other contemporary politicill and moral philosophers have argued that Marx did hdeed present an "ideal" theory of justice, Marxfstheory of trxploitation, and much of the rest of his work, is filled with a moral fervor and outrage. As one Marxist philosopher, Jon Elster, points ouk Quite generally almost any page of Capital, opened at random, crtnveys the strong impression that Marx is arguing the case in moral terms. More specifically, he frequently refers tt3 capitalist extraction of surplus value as theft, embezzlement, robbery, and stealing. These are terms that immediately imply that an injustice is being committed. Moreover, the sense in which it is an injustice camot be the relativistic one, Marx insists that, with respect tc3 capitalist conceptions of justice, exploitation, unlike cheating and fraud, is fair: "The sense in which extraction ctf surplus value is unfair must refer tct a nonrelativistic, transhistc3rical ccmcepticm, This argument is one important piece of evidence that Marx thought capitalism to be unjust. . . . Capitalism is an unjust system because some get more and others less than they have contributed.14

As Elster sees it, Marxfscoz~ceptof exploitation it-;a moral notio~~, Capitdism is unjust because it extracts from t;he worker what the worker has produced, And it is hdeed difficult to read Cupifal wjthout sensillg Mam's

moral outrage at such m llnjust economic order. Chl this readin; the injut;tice of capitalism is its transfcl. of powers (Sectim 5.31, resulting in the t-ransfer of the fruits of ehe worker's lilbor to the capitnljst. Note that this is essen~all).a desert-based crificism of cqitalism: workers do not receive the fruits of their productive activities. The lirborer produces the product (whi& has value), but the capitalist receives the product; consequently#the worker does not receive the fuld product (or value) that he has produced.15 50, it seems that Marx has a theory of i~justiceinsofar as he advances a variety of criticisms agajnst capitalism, all of whjch have the poht that under capitalism the w o r k r does not get what is properly his; and so capitalism is Must. To a large exte~~t, Marx's "theory of justice'3s a theory about Ihe i~zjrasticcof capitalism..Some po:iitical theorists have maintained that we miss a great deal by lookkg only at the positive ideal of justice. h fact, we might have a much better feel for injustic-for identifying victims a r ~ dunfairnes~~eha3.1 for develqint; a posilivc idea of just.ice.I%nd this seems the case with Marx, in particulal; and socialism, in germeral: its strength is its account of perceived in_ju.stjcesof capitalism, As Marx" theory of exploitation makes clear, the most basic sociaiist criticism of the ca@talj,st m a r k t order is that it is fmdmentalty unfair. Capitalism, runs tlne criticism, is a system in which h s e Lvho actually produce and labor receive extremly meager rewards, whereas tfne g ~ a t benefits accrue to those-the owners-who do not actually pmvide any useful labor. The capitalist, thcn, makes his living by extracting labor from the wokers: the w o r k r recttjves a wage, but the capitalist keeps the bulk of what has been produced. As we have obser~red,this indicates that capitalism is unjust because workers do not get what t h y deserve. Marx-ar~d again he is joined by contemporary socialists-arwes that, under capitalism, the basic human needs of workers go unfulfilled whereas capitalists have incredible wealth to satisfy their slightest whims. Thus, on both the cI..ikerio~~ of desert a r ~ dthat of need, Marx and socialists in gewral insist that capitalism is unjust. We s h o d d s o recall that the socialist insistrs that it fails dismally in terms of freedom. At the heart of capitaiism lie m y u d power relatiom, and so by its nature it cannot secure. freedom as power (Section 5.1); m d becmse under capitalism workers am under the power of capitalists, neither can capitalism offer t-he workers positive freedom arr; autonorny or self-rute. If capitalism is tmnjust, what is just? The mswer would appear obvious: justice is givjng the worker the fruits of his lahor. Marx, though, apparently sees this as an imperfect sort of justice, suited to the trmsirion from capitalist society to a true commmist society: What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not a s it has developed on its own fcjundations, but, on the contrary, just a s it erBerges from

capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly the individual producer receives back Prom society . . . exactly what he gives. . . . The same amount CIF liabor which he has given to society in one form he receives back in anctther.1'

This princQle of distribution can he summed up as "to each accordinf: to his contributio~~s." If this principie it; followed, expioitatio~~ is eliminated and wnrkrs will get what they deserve. Yet, Marx was not satisfied with this csiterion:

In a higher phase CIF commtmist sociee, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division CIF liabor; and therewith alst:, the antithesis bemeen mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a meam of Life but life3 prime want; after the productive ft3rces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperatib7c.e wealth flow abundantly-only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entire5 and society inscribe on its banner: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.18

When the higher phase of communism has arhved,"tto each according to his contributions"kcan be ~ y l a c e dwith "from each according to his ability, to each accoding to his needs."' Bnd as others have argued, that looks iike a theory of how a just socialist society would distribute resousces.lS 326s higher phase of justice, Mam suggests, c m come about only when htxmans are no longer "'alienated." Recall from Sections 3.3 and 6.3 Mam" notion that the human essence is to 'bolbjectify" its ideas into objects. We are planners and doers: we take ideas; in our heads a d create real -elningsout of them. Thus, working, in the sense of creating, expresses the human essence. Now, M m insisted that under capitalism this human essence is repressed and its e x p x s i o n distorted: people do not labor in order to express Cheir humnnity, but for the m s t brutish of reasons-to stay alive, Beciiiuse capitalism robs the worker of his product, in work. Thus, under capitdim we only work he can find no satisfactio~~ inorder to get '*external"%benefits such as pay. Mumms still infec&d wit.h this capitaiist mentality, Marx suggests, would not he ready to live accordir~gto the dictum "to each according to his needs, b m each according to his ability," since people corrupted by capitalism will only work if rewarded. Thus, the first stage of communist justice is to give people what they deserw; arr; alienation is overcorn, and people learn to love

rather than hate :labor, the higher phase of socialist justice can be achieved. Does Marx, then, offer us a theory of justice? m e problems in, answering this question stem from a tension in Marx's own writing between two views of huma-t nature (Section 3.3). If we focus on Marx" social envirorrlnerrtillie and collectivist views, the concept of justice fades; the interpretations of Marx skessirsg either the scientific nabre of his socialism or the relativity c>f justice seem persuasive. But Marx idso ac-fvocatesa strong view of hmmm essence that is not determbed by one's ssaiety and one's place in it. 'This vkw-more aypaxnt in Marx" earlier w~tings-points to notions of ideal justice, in lNhich peapi" receiw lrhe fruits of tl~eirLahor and col-tditionsexist for t-he flourisha of hurnan nahnrc?. Steven lIJtxkes, hokvever, has argued that all these different facets of Marx's views on justice form a single, coherenl, multilayered account. Accordhg to Lukes, there is no simple and straightforward answer to our query' ""'Did Marx think capitalism unjust, or didn" he?"20 Lukes identifies four layers of Mam" amount of justice.2vl) The first layer is the analysis of capitalist norms as they fux-tction in cagitalist society, which is stressed by the sckntifc and relativist interp~tatiunsof Marx. "In the first place, he did offer a functional account of the norms by which capitalist exploitation is judged just. . . . These norms . . . p"evai1 because they sanction and stabjlize capi.ealist exploitat.iom and thus the capitalist system." (2) Second, however, Mnrx offers a criticism of capitalist norms from flWithi~-t.ff Capitalism, Marx says, cannot live up to its own image of its&. It: fails to be just even on its own understmdSng of justice. It is not the realm of free and fair exchange that it daims to be, but a system that enslaves workers and is unfair to them. (3) "But thirdly," "says L,ukes, "Marx also offered an 'external' critique of capitalist exploitation and of the norms and perspective from which it appears just. That c r i t i ~ is e in turn made from the perspecthe of comunism's lowes phase: capitalist exploitation is from this slancdpoint uxljust because it violates the principle 'To each according to his labour and contribution,""' (4) Last, says Lukes, Marx adopts a per~efitivethat is critical of the very idea of justice. "From that slmdpoht, the very attribution of justice and injustice is a m r k of class society, a sign that society is still in its prehistorical phase." As Lukes understmds Marx, the pmpectivc of the t7igfic.r phase of cmmunism-"from each according to his ability; ta each according to his needsw-leaves behind not only capitalid justice, but ihe entirc concept of justice, and seeks to re.place it with an emancipatory; communitarian (Section 3.4), moral vision. Insofar as the notion of justice presupposes individuals in conflict who milke clains on each other, Marx's collectivist ar-td cooperative

conception of society (Section 7.4) seeks to leave behind the very cmcept of justice.

9.2 Socialism crnd the Democratic Community Beyond the Welfare Sfate: Equalip of Freedom and Power

:It is terrrpting, but :Ithi~likuttimately nnistaken, to u n d e r s t d Marx as offerillg a theory of distriibutive justice along th,c lines of ~visionistliberals such as Rawls (Section 8.3). Rawls, m d some moderate socialists, are inst terested in providing principie"hat identify just and u ~ ~ j udistributions d on. These criteria of distrribuof resources, weliare, opporhmities, a ~ so tive justice are typically assnciated with the modern cvel'are state, for which revisionist liberals have been the rnajin advocates. But the welfare state cannot secure equal liberty as power to act (Section 5.1)because, says the more radical socialist, it cannot secure equality of power. According to effect theories of power (Section 5.21, inequaZity of power relaa d endemic to, capitalist market societies (Sections are constitrutive of, tion 5.3). Thus, so long as capitalism endures, freedom and eqt~allitywill be urrachievable however much the welfare state undertakes to redistribute resources, opportunities, or whatever. The aim of iryualiziq power calls for radical democratic control of social life- At least as understood by the socialist tradition, the core of d e m r a c y is political equality (Section G.$), where this meals not simply equd votes, hut real, substantive equality of political polver. It is clear cvhy socialists are dracvn. to such a conception of democracy For the socialist, it is the ineyuality of power d of capitatist disthat is the root causcl oi ail the inequdities a ~ h~justices tribution; only by eliminating the hequality of power can these evils be rooted out. This, then, points socialist justice toward a radical conceptim of the democratic community in which all are free because ai) equal:iy possess poJ.iticd power (itself an hgrcrdient of freedom, Sectioln 7.3) and all power is controlled by democratic process= in which everyone has an equal role. Tme democracy---w:hich alone expresses the equality and real freedom of all citi,zenewould thus =quire the abolition of capidism. As Macpherson observes, a fully democratic society requires democratic political control over the uses to which the amassed capital and the remaining resources of the society are put. It probably does not much matter whether this takes the ft3rm of social omershig of all capital, or a social control of it so thorough as to be riirtually the same thing as ownerhip. But more welfare-stale redistribution ctf naticmal income is not enough: no matter how much it might reduce class ineqtralities of income it would not ttmch class inequalities of power.Z

Rather than looking for the socialist justire in revisionist-liberal-like principles of distributive justice, it is better to focus on lfie ideal of a fully dewcratic community. Not only does thjs ideal include the equality of: power that is the heart of socialism, but it is consistent with "socialism as a doctrine that takes human socid or communal existe~~ce more sel-lously than the excessive indhirfualism that they [that is, socialists] associate with liberalism,"B Given our nature as communal beings, a just societ-y will not simply be one in whiCh each gets her fair share, for that e~~tirt. conceptim of justice has an incfividlzalist slant. hther, a just societ-J,will be a political community in which the basic equality of its citizens results in a democratic life in which all eyuirlly participate in colliective decisiozts. Proclaimed the hglish socialist G.D.H. Cole (1889-1959): the hdivictual. is "most free kvhere he co-operates with his equals in making latt~s,~~24 Given this picture of the just s0ciet.y as the fully democratic society, we should not expect radical democratic socialist political theorists to advance specific principles of justice, To endorse any set of principks as t f ~ correct principles of justice is to preernpt the voice of the democratic commtxnity Far example, if the socialist embraces Rawls" prhciples of distributive justjce (Section X,3), then these principles deternine what justice requires; a just democratic community must co~lformto these psinci_ples. That, though, is to set limits on what the democratic commtxnity can decide; the political theorist is overridjng the voice of the people. Seen ~ Ithis I light, Marxfsreluctance to acfvance a theory oi justice is well grounded; the only worry is that even his fragmentary remarks on justice (to each accorcting to his needs, from each according to his abilities) say too much, for they instruct the dernocratic commul7ity of the future how it is to decide (see Section 20.4). The ideal of the just society as one with eguality of power explains the cornmox~sociaiist enfrhusiasm for exknding democratic decisio11makil7g throughout all social life- Democracy is not simply a political ideal, says the socialist: it should inform large organizatrions, including business corporations. Foflowing Cofe, a number of socialists have emhraced the idea of hdustrid democracy.2"ere arc numerous variations of the industrial democratic ideal: some involve trade unions, others propose worker management along the lines once p'a"iced widely in hgoslavia. On this latter model, h m s west. owned sociillly or by the state, but run democratically. The workers set up fjrms by borrowing from state banks; typically all the worker-members &cted a workerskouncil to make the main policy decisions regarding the firm. The workers" council did not undertake day-to-day management but hired mangers (who earned sig1"tificantly more t h a ~did ~ the workers who were, officiaLIy, their employers). For our purposes, however, the detai:ls of the Vu-

goslav model are not crucial: the important point is the extension of the dmocratic ideal throughout social life.2" Not only large orgmizations such as corporations, but, on this ideal, the family itself should mmikst m equality of power (between adult members, at ar~yrate). We c m see hercl. the social& roots of much contemporary feminist thought for one of the main themcs of feminism is the jnjuslice of unequal power relations in the family which. reinforces unequal. power between the sexes throughout the social order. E'clminists have often criticized socialism for not paying sufficient attenlion to the hequalj2.y of "patriarchyH-male rule---but the two politicd theories have a cornmon core: justice understood as equality of power. &cause of &is, much feminist thought i s antiliberal, Altl-tough liberal feminists aldorse equirl civic status bet~veenmen and women, m d equality of opportunity (%ctjon 6.4), they do not endorse e ~ a l i t yof power. Moreover, liberal principies of justice provide only the basic ru1es Eor social life between equdly free peoy,le (Sction 8.1,8.3). Given this framework of rules, says the liberal, people must be free to make their own consensual arrangements in their prhate "ff';3irs, based on &eir differe~~t values and ideals. Reconciling Socialism and Democracy

We have seen that the aim of equalizing power, m d so pmmatbg equal effective freedom, provides a case for extensive democratic decisionmaking. Power is something to be used to achicwe ends, and so to equalize power is to equalize the ability to achieve ends; i"coes not tell trs what &ose axis should be. Ch radicd democratic views, if the people, under conditions of equal paw'; c h o o ~ a a l e or policy, then it is just. T%e democratic tendencies of socialism thus =Sleet what might be called a voltiuterist conception of justice: it is the people's voluntarily choosing something-mab~g a democratic decision-that rer~dersit just. Now this volunterist stance seems at odds with socialism's commitment to rationalism and its commitment to social equality, quality of resources, and ewdity of wlfare. m a t if the people choose to go agailnst reasollw h d if they choose i n e ~ a l i t ycompetition, and p"iv"te property? The volunterist, democratic comitments of socialist justice wodd tend to side with t-he people's choice (alLhougb socialists hope that the people would not make such choices), whereas the rationalis"commitments of socialism and its critique of capitalism as ihumane would lead it to reject the decision of the peopie. This polint c m also be trnderstood as a possible tension bet-vveen procrdaml anct szrbsturztlve justice, According to procedural justice, whatever is the outcome of a just procedure is itself just. Thus, if a participatory democracy, based on real equality of political. power, follows a just proce-

dure, then whatever the democratic procedure chooses is necessarily just. 01% the other hand, substa~tivejustice idenl-ifies certah-r cI..iteria for just distriibutions or outcomes, such as "'to each accordjng to his needs, from each according to his abilities,'Wf~o~ a thoroughgoing procedural conc e p t i a ~of~justice cannot be comhined with a purely substanthe conception of social justice. l%e pure procedural conception maintaixrs that m outcorn is just if m d only if it has been arrived at by the correct proced u e ; the sukstantive conception hsists that regardless of the procedure that generated the outcome, that outcome is just i f and only if it ilccords with the principles of social justice. Although, of course, in some cases the just procedure may lead to the suhstantively just outcome, this canm t he guaranteed; when the two conflict, consideratiol~sof justice witl yield hconsistent judgments. And as we have seen (Section 2.3), consiskncy is necessary fm an adequate political theory Joshua Gohen a ~ Joel d Rogers seek to resolve this teIvi011 in demucmticsocialist theory by expanding the conditions for genuine democracy so as to include socialist economic organization. "To choose democracy," they write, "is to choose a f o m of social association whicfi manifestly respects . . . capacitks uor reasoned social choice] \.vithin m order of equal freedom.""'" But because "the taking of prdits under capitalism subordinates one class of h~dividualsto another and thus . . . subverts the conditio~~s of equd flleedosn,"" "capitalism subverts demmracy. Democracy r e ~ i r e s reasoned deliberation under conditions of equal freedom and power, and it is precisely this, Gohen and b g e r s argue, that capitalism makes impossible. Consequently, true democratic decisions presuppose certain conditions, ir;tcluding "civil :Liberties, distributimal measures of equality, M1 empbyment, . . . a humanc. foreign poliq, . . . public control of investment workplace demncracy, and . . . equaljty of opgotltmity"2%ll these conditions are said to be part of a genlcirze democratic procedure: there a ~ suhstand can he no conflict between justice as democratic decisio~~s tive egalitarian-socialist justice, becatrse truly democratic decisions can only occur in an egalitasian socialist society. Democratic socialis&, then, seek to resotve ihe apparmt t e n s i o ~be~ t-vveen their faith in. democratic praceduralism and substantive egalitarianism by expading the idea of dcmcracy to include not o q political equality w~dertitoodas one person, one vote, but a ge11uine equality of politic& power (at least m o n g groups), social equality, k e d o m as power, and freedom as autonomy. True democracy presupposes the socialist core vaiues, thus eliminating any conflict. We Witness once again the monistic inclinalions of socialist &ought: just as Ijbaty WBS i n t e r p ~ t e dto include equality (Sectim 7.41, democracy is interpreted in a way that includes the sociaiist col~ceptsof freedom, equality, a r ~ d justice-

The Contrast to Liberal Democracy

m e especially htimate tie in socialist thought bet-vveen democracy and the just comrnuIlity is brought out by contrasti~~g the socialist-egditarian to liberal understandings of democracy. Jiirgen Habermas, a leadi17g conkmpmary exponent of cdcmocratic egalitarimism., explahs the contrast thus:

tmiv

The dispute has to do with how to reconcile equality with libere, with diversiv, or the right CIF the majority with the right of the minority Liberals begin with the Xegal instituticinalization. af equal liberties, conceiving these as rights held by individualized subjects. In their view, human rights enjoy normative priority over democracy and the constitutional separation of powers has priority over the will of the democratic legislature, Advocates of egalitarianism, on the other hand, conceive the collective practice of free and equal personma" wvereign will-Pormatic?n.They understand human rights as an expression ctf the savereign will of the pectpfe, and the constitutional separation of powers enzcrges from the enlightened will of the demtlcratic legisiature.""""

As Habermas explains it, liberals give priority to substmtive justice: dmocralic procedures are designcd so as to promote and protect substantive rights. In contrast, he indicaks, egamarians emphasize procedural justice, and conceive of substantive justice as arising out of just procedures. We must be careful here, howe\*r: as we have just seen, egalitarians such as Cahen and Rogers interprrt true dmocracy in a rich m y , such that it presqposes the essence of socialist justice. For socialists, then, "'demncracy" d ' oes not describe simply a set of formal kcision procedures "out a type of egalitarim community. In contrast, classkal tiberals understmd democracy sirnply as a set of political instit-ut.ions characterized by equal voting rights, frequent elections, competitjon by political parties, the right to form palitical parties, and so m. hprtar~tly,il.1 contrast to socialism, democracy is not itsell a sort of freednm,, but a useful instrument for protecthg negative lirberty from opp ~ s s i v egovernments. Recall that according to Hayek, democracy "is an ideal worth fighting for to lfie utmost, because it is our only protection . . . agahst tyrmny; mough democracy itself is not freedom . . . it is one of the most important safegumds of freedom,""" Hayek, however, reminds us, '"iberalism is concerrted with trhe functiox~sof government and particularly with the limitation of all its power. Democracy is concerned with the question of who is to direct government. Liberalism requires that -all power, and therefore also that of the majority, be limited."" It thus follows on the classical liberal view that liberalism is

"incompatible with unlimited democracy, just as it is incompatible with all other unlimited govenlime1lit.~~33 For the classical liberal, democracy is not a way to reveal the voice of the people. Given the i~~dividualism and pluralism lyivlg at the core of classicill liberalism, it denies &at "the people""speak with a single voice or have a common interest-individuals speak with a dizzying variety of voices m d often have clasfting irrrterests-and even if it made sense to t a k of "'the peopleff having a voice or a generai will, classical liberals have spent great effort showjng that democrairjc hstitutims are especially msuited to reveal what that might be.% Moreover, classical, liberals can be deeply critical of the witys in which democracy functions; it can lead to waste and iavor 2;:hort-run gains over lo11g-term be~~efits, and it oftt.11 puts political power irr the hmds of the incompetent. P e r h a p h e classical liberal view is best s med up in the famous remark of Whstm Churchjll: democracy is the worst form of govenliment, except for all lrhe others. Revisionist liberalism gives a much mare promkent place to demacracy; for Ihc revisionist ljberals, the right to equal civic status (understood at least as one person, one vote) in politic& decisions is itself a h n damental requirement of ~ustiee(see Section 6.4). Democracy is not simply an effective way to prokct basic sdstantlvo rights, the right to pmticipate in democratic decisiollis is itself a basic requirement of ~ustice. Democratic participation eAances self-developmerrt.and induces people to *ink about the common good rather than their nanow self-inte~sts. I h e right tru political voice is a complex of liberties, claims, and powers; the last (powers) is worth not-ing, as a right to participate in poli'E;caldecisims is necessarily a right to participate in chmghg the rights and duties of other pcopie tfirougb legislatim, anrt so valifies not simply as a liberty or claim, but what Hohfeld caitls a "pwer" (Section 8.1.). Although revisionist: liberals are much more enthusiastic democrats than arc. classicd liberais, they join their classical counter)l7arts in insisting that Che basic liberty rights of individuals limit Icgitimille democratic choice. Revisionist liberals also hold dear the basic liberties identified by the Bill of Rights: even a democracy giving each person an equal voice cannot justly violate these basic rights. Suhstnntivc justice thus clearly sets limits on procedural justice in liberal theory, keeping democracy away from the very core of the liberd co~~ceptclal map,

9.3 Three Conservative Approaches to Justice Tradition, Convention,

and Justice: Antirationalist Gonservatism

h R e Szabjecfic~l.~ cif Women (1869), foh~liSrcuart Mill argued for a "perfcct equality'' between the sexes. Although his focus was on legal rights (md

so equal civic status, see Sectim 6.4), he sought to push his egalitarian case further; he argued that family relations &odd be a "school in equality-" Mill, of course, ~aiizerfthat this view directly opposed tracfition m d custom, which attributed differential and hierarchical positiozls within the family. But for Mill, that inequality was uphelcl, bp custom and tradition was no real jwstificati,on for it. If custom and tradition opposed reason, then custom and tradition must give way. As Mill saw it, for the most part custom a d kaditicm sirnply were trhe rehctior~sof past injustices; that men had su'lbjugated women in the past provides no good reason why women should accept an inkrior status today. As 1have previously indicated, this is a quintesscmtid ratim~alistdaim ( S ~ t i o n3.7). Custom and traditior~are understood as the embodiment5 of superstition, unfairness, m d caprice; only the rigorous application of impartial standards of justice verified by reason can tell us *ether these past practices are to be cond Conservative crit of rationalism is in large part a criticism of this rejection of &adition, Reason, the conservative believes, is not up to the society hthe light of itbstract principies of justice. task of ~col~structint; Indeed, reason itself depends on tradition. Although to some extent reason" deliverances can be conveyed in, the preferred rationalist m abstract principies a ~ rdes d (Sction 3.2)-there are often ""overtol~es,elements of 'tacit h o \ v l e d g e , h d *sight where the principles and rules are imppropriate, wllich are not teachable by articulated assertions but r/vhich arc. rcvired by intimate association and empathy with the acts of exemflfication in the persons who perform them."'""n Michael Oakeshott's t e r m (Section 3.2), reasm involves practical knowledge, which can ol~lybe gained through the actual practices, for e m p k , of scientific, polit-ical, or legal hquiry, and association with those who excel at it. More radically, s m e conservatives hiwe argued that the very idea of reasor.1 depends on traditiol~a ~ culture. d m a t is rational or reasonable in, say, thirteenth-century England is not the same as in twentyfirst-century England, much less twenly-first-century Japan, C m we say, for exampie, that the belief in angels is equaily rational in -all three cultures"!ccording to Alasdalr MacIntyre, a contemporary conservativecommunitarim (%skion 3,4), It is ctf the first importance to remember that the project of fc~mdinga social order in which individuals could emancipate themselves from the contingency and particularity of tradition by appealing tc:, genuinely universal, tradition-independent norms was, and is not only a project of philosc~phers.Itwas and is the project of liberal, individualist society; and the most cogent reasons we have f t x believing that the hope of a tradition-independent rational universality is an iXIusion derives from the history of that prc)ject, For in the course of history, liberalism, which began as an appeal to the alleged

principles of shared ratictnality against what was felt to be it-re tyranny of traditictn, has itself been transformd into a tradition.36 C)-n this antj,ationalist view, then, the place to look for justice is inone's own traditio~~s and practkes 'T'ktisis not to imply, however, &at Lhe conservative c m say nothhg in general about justice- David Hume, agreeing with Hobbes (Section 8-21, tells us that all sociehes require rules of justice, a settled way of disthguishing "mhe" and "trl~ine."" Hume, Lhough, rejects the claim that these rights are established through a social contract. 3'ht.y arise, Hume argues, by ci;rfz~~entions. A convention, says I-fume, expresses our common interest in settled ruies and albws us to coordir~ate our actions. f i o w i r ~ g&at you accept the conventio~~al mles of properq allows me to act in a predictable and consistent way, which in turn allolvs you to do so,

After this conventictn, concerning abstinence from the possessions ctf other% is entered into, and everyone has acquired a stability in his possessions, there immediately arises the ideas of Justice and injustice; as also those of prt~pert'y~right and ublig~fion.The latter are altogether unintelligible, without first understanding the former. Our property is nothing but those goods, whose comtant possession is established by tile laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice.37

It is importmt to stress that Hume believes that such conventions arise slowly, on the model of a Zmguage, rather than a once-and-far-all social contract (Section 8.2). Cmventions and traditions evnfue; they are not the of a sociresult of one person" rationality but the ongoing developme~~t ety % wisdom. Note that the Hurnean conception of justice ties justice to legality rather than to ided justice (see Mill's points [l]itr.1~3 [2j, Section 8.1). In the last sentence of the above quotation, Hume actually ideulges the :lacvs of justice with the laws of one's society: it is the actual laws of one's ssociety that pmvide ihe cox~ventisonsthat make possibk a settled disth~ction between mine and thine. Although Hume believes that rules of justice serve social utility (Sections 1.4, 6.2, 7.1, 8.1) insofar as they allow for a settled sociai life, he opposes ar7yo11e who wouid employ consideratio~~s of ideal justice based an furthering social utility to overturn current conventions. Moreover, although Hurne can see how abstract reason points to the ideal of distributing material goods according to deserts, he believes that experience shows such a rationalist criterion is unworkable, as people disagree on merit and deservhgness*~~ n i s Humean orientation of much conservative thought helps explain the conservative p~ferencefor the common law over Iegislafion. tn the Anglo-American tradition, law has two different souxes. Legislation, with

which we are all familiar, is the result of deliberate efforts of the legislature to enact general laws, oftm with the stated aim of furt-hering lrhe social good. +The very idea d general legislation has a rationalist bias: legislators apply their reasoning to bring about certain results, withjn the constraint of general laws (see Sectim 5.4). The other source of law is fhe common law. It has developed over centuries in response to specific problems bought before the courts. In making a kcision, the courts-at least according the ideal of lrhe c o r n o n law----donot seek to ellgage in social engheering or bring about illbstract social goods. They respond to specific problem with intevreting specific laws, or specific problems raised by the apflication of the l a w . Each of thc. decisions, arrived at to solve a specific problem, forms the precedent for further juciicial reasoning-later courts seek to make their decisions consistent with earlier decisions, The result is a slow evolution of the laws of justice. Rather than c h a ~ g eto conform to abstract ideals or theories, the laws of justice change in response to real cases hspecific contexts. Virtue and Conservcrfism: Antip/urcrlist Conservatism

Libemlism and the Death of Virtzre, Consider an interpretation of the libe r d pmject t-hat has been acivar~cedby cor~serwative-cornmu~~itaria~~s such as MacInvre. The liberal, aim, the story runs, is to develcsp a social morality that does not require that we a p e on what is g o d , what ends are most worth pursning, or what sort of life is a good life. In tke ancient world, and in traditional societies, it has been said, there was indeed agxement on these matters. The Greeks, for exaunple, upheld, an ideal of what a good person was, m d this ideal united their community. Disa g ~ e m e n t wilhh s their comunity-moral, confiicts-codd be resolved by calling on this shared understanding of what constitutes a t~irfztous perm"". As Aristotle saw it, humans possessed a natural end-a lefos. TO achieve this end, to be a person of a certain, sort, was the good for humans. Virtues, then, were those character traits that were conducive to this end or a part of it. Nobility, couragcl, temperance, and fortitude w r e such virtues, whereas the vices-injustice, ktemperance, deceithhesswere traits of humans that prevented them from achieving that perfection natural to humar~s. NOW,conthues the narrative, a sociev that understands humm life in this way constitutes a community. It is not a mere collection of selfseeking hdividuals, hut an associatio~~ that shares a common moral life based an a shared conception of what it is to be a human and what ways of living suit humans, But liberalism, it has been argued, deskoys such a its lrhem to insist% that there is no community Liberals' plurafism co rationally obvious or right answer to the question, " m a t is the best way

to ljve?" The pluralism that the liberal so cherishes destroys the basis for a true moral community. For since we can no longer say that some ways of livitlg are more h w a n or better than others, we cannot say that those kaits that promole this way of living are virtues and those that psevent it are vices. fndeed, the liberal has no cor~ceptionof wirtue and vice, or excellence, in human ile. In place ol a community bmded together by a vision of what it is to be human, the liberal puts form& a theov of moral chaos, in h i c h hatewer a person wants is acceptable. Thus, : M a c I n p and other conser~rativeshave charged that the liberal conception of justice, seeking to r e m i n neutral a m n g ways of living, results in nihilism-110 beliefs are good or bad, right or W ~ Q X I ~ . ~ ~ Ttle Cnfommcnt of Momls, This inte~ret.illion of conservatism continues the strttss on tractition, hut insists that tradition is inhermtly anti;FXusalist: traditions are defined by shared notior~sof excellence, and so a society's conceptioln of justice must reflect this. A famous exmple of the dvergeme of liberal and virtue-conservative views of justice was the debate betwee11 liberals and co~~servatives over the regu:iation of homosexuality and prasti.tutian in the United Ki,ngdom in the 1,96Os, focused on tf7c Report of the Committee on FIomosexual Offences and Prostitutim. This report-knc,wr~ as the Wolfer~denReport-proposed a r d o m oi the law in Britain relating to certain "victimless crimes." "e report adopted an essentially liheral, Millan approach based m the harm principle (Sections 3.1,4,3): in ge~~eral it advocated that sirlee these acts did not harm others, these so-called immoral acts should be decriminalized. T%ere ensued a famous &bate between the liberal legal philosopher H.L.A, Hart and the cor~serval-ive Lord Devlh, T%e Millian approach, defended by the report and Hart, maintained that acts that do not: harm others, but are considered disgusting or degrading by m s t members oi society should not be pw~ishcdby the law. Although Hart does not ascribe to Mill" har~xprhciple in every respect, he holds that "on the narrower issue relevant to the enforcement of moralify Miil seems to me right.'"" T%at is, Mart izssisted that so-cdled immoral sexual behavior is not the proper subject of legal regulation. :In their private lives, people should be free to do as they wish, as long as doing so does not harm others. As the report said, "There must remain a realm of private moraliey and immorality which is, in brief and crude terns, not the law" business."'"T'Thebusiness of law is to provide a framework for l i v a togett7er' not to make geopie better or more moral* Almost as soon as Mill defended the harm principle, conservatives attacked it. Sir f m e s Fitzjames Stephe11 (1829-1894), an eminenl: English conservative thkker, complained of Mill's prhciple that it would be

subtiersive of all that people commonly regard as morality. The ctnly moral system which would comply with the principle stated by Mr. Mill would be one capable of being summed up as ft3llotvs: "Let every man please himself without hurting his neighbor;" m d every moral system which aimed at more than this, either to obtain benefits far society at large other than prot-ecticm against injury or do good to the persons affected, would be wrong in principle. This would condemn every existing system of morals. Positive morality is nothing but a body of prhciples and rules more or less vaguely expressed, and more or less left to be mderstood, by which certain lines of a>nduct:are Pohidden under the penalty of geneml disapprobation, and that quite irrespectively of self-protection.4"

Morality, Stephen is arguing, goes h q o n d merely preventing h a m to others, and m y political doctrine that would prohibit samtions except to preve~~t harm would undernine morality itself. Put simply; liberalism is said to destroy the moral bands of society. Dcvlin, in his criticism of the Mrolfenden Report, presents a similar criticism of MiHiar7 liberafism. It is not possible, D w l k argued, to set theoretical limits to the power of ithe State to legislate against i ity. It is not pclssible tt3 settle in advance clxceptions to the general rule or to dePine innexibty areas of morality into which the law is in no circumstances to enter. Society is ent;itfed by means ctf its laws to protect itself from dangers, whether from within or without. . . . Societies disintegrate from witKn more frequently than they are brciken up by external pressures. There is a disintegratirtn when no common morality is ctbsenred and history shctws that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration' sc) that saciety is justified in taking the same steps tc:,preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government and ctther essential imtikrtions. The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive activities.43

Devlin, fhcn, is arguing that a society is pwtiafly constituted by a code of morillity, which includes public acrknowledgment of conceptio~~s of virtue m d vice. T h i s bejrtg so, it is the proper office of a government to protect this morality by iegally punishing &we who engage in vicious acts, such as homosexuality pmstitutiol~,a d the selling (and p e r h p s the readkg) af pornography. &v2in thus criticizes Mill and the aulhors of the Miolfenden Report for failing to see that a society is founded on not-ions oi what constitutes good and bad people. 326s ""shared morality" i s part of "Ie historical traditions of a society A rationalist such as Mill, who would reject this in the m m e of abstract pril7ciples, simply does not understand what a society is. A society without a &zed moraljty would dishtegrate-it would find

that the cement that hound it together was gone, and all that remains is a collectiol~of rootless and cox~fusedindividuals. And of course, that is precisely what the conservatives charge that Millian morality has praduced. Qur societp, the conservative maintajns, is cornposed of individuals wilo have no sense of the traditiol~sof the community; no sense of the shared values that constitute that community; m d , ultimately, hdividuals with very few values at all, So, for Dcvlin, it is not wrong to enforce a shared morality of a society, and this includes matters concerrTing sexual relat-ions, taking drugs, harming oneself, and so on. In his liberal =ply, Hart distinguished what he cdls the "moderate" and the "ertreme"' forms of Devh's argume~~t: According to the moderate thesis, a shared morality is. it-re cement of society; withhout it there would be aggregates of individuals but no society. ""A recognized morality" is, in Lord Devlin" swords, "as necessary to society1s existence as a recognized government" and although a particular act of immorality may not. harm or endanger ctr corrupt others nor, when done in private, either shock or give offence to others, this does not conclude the matter. For we must not view the cc,nduct in isolation from its effect on the moral code; if we remember this, we can see that ctne who is "no menace to others" nmetheless may by his immoral conduct "fireaten one of the great moral principles upon which society is based." h this sense the breach of the moral principle is an offense ""agaimt society as a whole," and society may use the law to preserve its morality as it u s s it to safeguard anytKng else essential to its existence.""

T%is, says Hart, is the most madera& kteqretation of the conservative argument that a s h a ~ mordify is necessary to the existence of a swiety. The d argument is, irz short, that to weaken the & a ~ moraliv d of a society does, in fact, kad to weakex-rir~g thtr society itsell, Rut Hart simpIy disputes this supposed fact. No reputable historim, he says, has ever held that departures irz sexual morality, even when these deviant practices are mgaged in within the privacy of one's home, breaten sockty's very existcr~ce.Altowjrtg dlrrergence in. one area of morality-*at concerning sexual practicesneed not lead to a b ~ a k d o w nof consensus on other parts of moraliw more central to public life. As Ha& s y s , morality is not a "sh~glesemless webrff such that a break in one area will leave the rest ist tatlers. Faced by the lack of evidence in support of the moderate thesis, Hart argue"Ihrt ccolwervatives sometimes resort to what Hart calls the "extreme thesis": The extreme thesis does not look upon a shared morality as of merely instrumentaI value anatclgous to ordered government, and it does not justiv the

punishment of immorality as a step taken like punishment of treascln, to preserve a society from dissolution ctr collapse. Instead the enfc~rcementof morality is regarded as a thing of value, even if immoral acts harm no one directly or indirectly by weakening the morai cement of soclieVdli.fi

Whereas the above quotation from Devlin seems to endorse the moderate thesis, Hart inciicates that Stctphen supports the extreme thesis. As indicated h the above votation from Stephel-r, the pu~~ishmex~t of immorality is seen as simply the right and pmper thing to do; no claim is made that such behavior has bad consequences by weakenkg society (as the moderate thesis hoids); it is simply held that i oral behavior, hcluding immoral sexual beha\lior, ought rightly to be puni"hed. This, of course, is a st-rongly anti-Millim, m d , indeed, an antiliberal position. It asserts that the proper office of coercion in a society is to cndorse a certain way of living and discourage those who would act differently. Conservatism and Collectivism: "My Station and its Duties"

Our analysis of political concepts began with Plato" inquiry into the nature of justice (%cti.m 1.1);we have yet to consider Plato's favored conceptio~~ of justice. Plato thinks that justice involves the corrc-lctofdering or harmonious arrangement of the bvhale; a just man" soul is organized so that each element performs its p r v e r task; correspondingly a just state is leading to the organized so that each part properly fulfiUs its fw-retio~~, heallhy working of the whole, The focus oC justice is not, then, individual rights in the sense of clairns that are owed to indi:viduals, but those duties, powers, and claims that lrhe individual must passess ii ske is to perfarm her proper social function. And because societies are complex wholes and not simply aggrcgations of individuals (Section 3,4), these functions will be differentiated. Not everyone has the same f u ~ ~ c t i m . Plato thus divides his ideally just state in classes-the guardians who rule; the rnilitary class that is to cnforce the decisions of the guardians; and the economic class of ifarmers, those in trades, mexhants, and so on. Each class in a just state, then, will have the rights and duties that are necessary for it to perform its function, "W have hid down as a universaI pri~~ciple,'" says Socrates, ""that everyone ought to perform the one function in the community for which his natznre best suited him. Well, 1 believe that that prind.pie . . . i s justice.".lh Justice demands that one perf o m the duties of one's stal-io1-ror functior~in the co This, broadly speaking, Platonic theor?, of justice has exercjsed g ~ a t influence h conservative political thinking, Samuel Coleridge (17721834) explicitly ur-rderstood the state as a "moral unit, an orgal7ic whoie."" C~onsequently, Coleridge mintaified that m individual's rights

and dut-ies are detennked by his or her piace in the whole. A similar view, stressing the embedded nature of h u n m (Sectio~~ 3.3) and our place in the social organism, was offered by F: H. Bradley (1,846f924):

. . you must not take him in isolation. He is one of a people, he was born into a familqi; he lives in a certain society; in a certain state. What he has to dc:, depends on what his place is, what his function is, and all that comes from his station in the organism. . . . We must content ourselves by pointing out that there are such facts as the family, then in the middle positicsn a man" s:,wn profession and society and, over all, the larger community ctf the state. . . . We must say that a man" life with its moral duties is in the main filled up by his station in that system of whales which the state is, and that this, partly by its laws and institutions, and stiXI more by its spirit, gives him the life which he lives and ought to live. . . . In short, man is a social being9

'To know what a man is.

:It is a perso113 place in his famity, professim, community, and state that determines what justice demands of hinl and what is owed to him. Giwen this view of society and justice, we c m tmderstmd the conservative" stipathy to eyuality (Sclction 7.5). SInce the community is a complex system in which difkrent people perform various functions, and since justice requires that one have the rights and duties necessary to perform one" ffunctioxl, it will not result in a system of equal rights and duties, much less rights to equaliry of resowes or welfare. It might be said that we equally have claims to those rights we need to perform our social functions, but these rights will, be different and unequal." Not only is this collectivist interpretatio~~ of justice hegalitariar~,it also seems prone to limiting liberty Plato" theory is infamous in this regard-his ideal, just state abolished the family in favor of mandatory c o m u n a l marislg of child re^^. We need not, however, go all the m y hack to Plato; ':lhomas Carlyle (1795-1881) voiced deep worries about classical liberal concegtj,ns of a free society, Carlyle harshly criticized the individualism behind. classkal Iiberal liberty and the market order, "which hits to purchase itself by socid isolat-i.cln,imd each man stmding separate from the other, having 'no bushess with him' but a cash account,'bll of which mounts to little more than the '"liberty to die from star~ation.~~So Liberty? The true liberty of a man, you wtlutd say, consisted in his finding out, or being forced ta find out the right path, and to walk thereon. To learn, or to be taught, what work he was actually able for; and then by permission, persuasion, and even compulsion, to set about doing the same! That is his true blessedness, honour, ""liberty" and the maximum of wellbeing: if liberty be not that, T for one have small care about liberty5t

Corrservatives such as C a r v e have been attracted to medkva2 society. rather thar-r liheral capitdim. In an ort;anic, hierarchical order, each fulfills a function, and society seeks to ensure that a person has bvhat he needs to do his job well, unlike liberal miarkt society, which leaves a person to sink or swim according to his talents and luck. T%e moral and methodological collectivist tendencies of much conservative thought seem in tension with cmservativeskaluinlf of liberty. W saw that or-re reason &at cox-rservativesreject equality it; their perception that it is hostile to lilfoerty (Section 7.5), but liberty itself is not firmly mchored. in this sort of collectivist conservatism. To be sure, given English society and its traditiox~s,some civil and politial liberties are central to that tracfitiox~(Section 5.4); but a cox-rservativeanalysis of nonliberal traditions (say, eighteenth-century France or twentieth-centz~ryRussia) would not provide a gmeral case for individud freedont. h d even in the An+-America7 tradition, it is not ckar that t-he cox~servativecase is for liberty for everyone; as Carlyle suggests, it implies libert-y for the wise with deference from their inferiors. A morally colleclrivist picture of C-hejust society is not unirfuely conselvative. Especially in the nketeenth an$ the first half of the twentieth, centuries, there was a widespsead reaction to the individualism of classical liberalism: conservatives, monistic revisionist liberals (Section &.3), and socialists all proposed conceptions of a just sociey that mderst-oad societies themselves as (to use Rousseau" swords) a '"public person" This collectivism led to conceptions of justice that &parted from classical liberalism in three main ways. First, citizens not only have duties to other citizens and to the government, but they have deities fu s ~ c k t yas a ~uhule. I h e cdectivity becomes itself a rights holder against citizens, and citizens have duties of justice to their society; such as to perform their station or to contribute t-o this common good, Second, this collectivist:orientation to justice leads to a moritl:iy crucial difference betweer1 those who al.e members and those who are not members of society- Foreigners and aliens are not part of the community; they do not owe the s m e duties to it, nor do t-hey h m the same claims against it. :If justice deper-rds011 o r ~ e ~ s role in the community, those outside the communiQ are, from the perspective of justice, at the periphery of the practice of justice, perhaps even entirety excluded.. Moreower; subgmups that do not fit into the larger commnity or refuse prifnary altegiance to the common good-for example, cmmunists, Jews, Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses, atheists-may also be relegated to a secor-rd-class status. Third, as the commur-rity becomes a moral. or public person, it may come to hold rights and duties against other comuplities, Z'hus, collectivist liberals seeking to defend culbral diversity-and so who wish to el-rsure that some ethnic or cultural, groups are not accorded second-class statzns because they do not fit

into the wider community-hold that these various communities have rights against each other, For exampIe, it has been argued that the French-speahg eummunir"yin Canada hat; rights to m a h t a h its cultural identity, rights that the English-veakirng commztnifymust respect.32

9.4 Summary Ihis chaptel. has exp1orc.d a vafiet_vof socialist and conservalive accow~ts of justice. The common theme running through these theories is a conceptual connectim bewecn justice and the orgmizatim of society, and the nature of the community. We began in Scctio~~ 9.1 by examiHing Karl Marx" views on justice, n/farx seemed suspicious of claims re:lying on ideal justice; they appear to presuppose a liberal moral individualism insofar aa people's motivations are not determined ky their place in the economic sytitem but by their individual sense of justice. I also argued that because Marx ties justice closely to legality and the nature of society, he tends to see justice as relative to economic systems-capitalist justice is thus fundamentally d i i k r e ~from ~ t socialist justice. Marx does, though, give us some CILI~S about ideal socialist justice: he seems to hoSd that it wodd first give workers what they deseme (thus overrroming capitalist exploitation), a r ~ donce the corruption of capitalism had been left beltind, and so alienation was overcome, resources would be distributed according to need. :I noted in the discussion of Marx his reluctmce to prt>vide detai:ied prkci_ples of justice to grnide socialist sociev. Except for its insistence on the abolition of capitalism, socialism has in general been less ready than liberalism to advance principks of justice. 012e reasall for this, explored in %ction 9.3, is socialjsm's deep devot.ion to e ~ a l i t yof power Tlnd its resulting commitment to radical democracy If power is to be equaljzed, so must politic& power; this leads to a democratic ideal of the just society*T%is, however, implies that the principles of a just society must be a matter of the popular will of the e@itasian cooperative community, % c t i o ~9.3 ~ co~~sinrfnzr~zi;Ey ("NewYLXK: St. Martin" Press, l989), p, 77. 24. Quoted in CacoXe Pateman, Participation in Denrocrntic Ttz~c~ry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1470), p. 36. 25. For an analysis of Cole's views, see A. WI Might, C.D.H. Cole mid Socialist Denzocracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 26, For a general discussion, see Robert A. Uahl, A Pr@ce to Emvzornic Bemocr ~ c (krkeley: y University of California Press, 1"385). 27. Joshua Cohen and Joef Rogers, Or-2 De~~tocracy: 7i3.rual-d a Tra12sfirsnatim of Axnerz'cnn Suclcrty (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 2983), p. 147. 28, Ibid., p, 148. 29. Ibid., p. 247. 30, Jiirgen Habermas, 'Topular Sovereignty as Procedure," in Jarnes Bohman and Willam Rehg, eds., Beliberatitle Democmcy: Essnys ouz Reasouz nzzd Politics (Cadridge, MA: MfT Press, 1997), p. 44, ~d vol. 3: Tfze hlitiml Order of a Free 31, E A. Hayek, Law, Legislrlfk~za ~ Libertyr People (London: Routtedge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 5. 32. Hayek, ""tiberalism,'5n his New Studies iitz PIliEosqhy, Politia, Ecovzornics n~zd the Flisfory of Idcms (London: Routtedge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 243. 33. Ibid. 34. See, for example, W'Zliam Riker;:Libel-nlism Against Pqulism (San Francisco: W. W, freemen, 1982). 35. Edward Shils, Eizditiuuz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 22, 36, Alasdair MacIntyre, WIzuse ]lastice? Wlzose Rationality ? (Notre Dame, IN: Universiq cctf Notre Dame Press, 19881, p. 335. See also John Gray, EnligfztenmentS Wake (London: Routledge, 1995), chaps. 1,1Q. 37, Uavid t-lume, A 7i.cafl;scof Human Natzire, L. A. Selby-Bigge and I? H. Nidditch, eds. (Oxfcjrd: CXarendon Press, 1978), Book 3, Part 2, sect. 2. Emphasis in original. 38. See David Miller, Soci~llustice (Oxfcjrd: Ctarendon Press, 197S), pp. 166ff. 39, Alasdair MacIntyre, Afiev Virlzle (Notre Darne, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 3381). Et is important to stress that some conservati\res dissent from this view. For a cc7tnservative who embraces a version of pluralism, see John r (Ethaca, NY Cornell University Press, 1998). It is at Kekes, A C ~ s e f o Couzservatz'sm best contentious whether this historical account is accurate. For a critical examination, see Derek L. Phillips! Lookkg Backzunrd: A Critiml Appmisaf @Commzi~zitarinn Tf~owglird(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 40, E1.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberlji aand Morality (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 6. 41. Quoted in ibid., pp, 14-15,

42. James Fitzjames Stephen, Libertyf EqzraEityf Fratenzity, quoted in Lctuis BlomCooper and Gavin Drewey, eds,, Law a t ~ dMornlif.y (London: Duckworth, 1976), p. 34. 43. Patrick Devlin, Tlze E'n$?rcenzctzt ojMoreirls (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 12-14. 44. Hart, Law, Liberfayaalzd Morality, pp. 48-49. The quoted passages are from Devlin, Tfze Etforcemerit of2llumtsPpp. 13,8. $5. Hart, Lnw, Liberty and Momlify, pp. 51-52.. 46, PIatcl, Tljc Xepriblic, Francis MacDsnatd Cornford, ed., trana (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 127 [IV 4-32]. 47, Samuel Coferidge, Qtz llze Constitution of flie Cfzfarchand State, John Barrelt, ed. (Lctndon: Dent, 1972), p. 137". 48. Ei H, Bradley, Elhicnf Studies, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 142"j7, pp, 173-174. $9. See Crane Brinton, E~~glislz I>olr'lic~lTlfazfglzt.in the Nineteentfi Ceiziiury (New Yctrk: Harper and ROW, 39621, p. 82, SO. Thornas Carlyle, Past and Pvsent (Lc~ndon:Dent, 2960), pp. 211,204. 51. Ibid., p, 204. 52. Fczr a good selection of essays on this topic, see Will Kymlieka, ed., The Rights of Mirzority Czdlttkr~~~ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

10.1 Conservatism and Political Authority

O n Being "An Authority" The crux of accepting another person as m authority seems to be that you '"urrmder your judg1ne17tff to the aulfiority. In Caazbluszca, :Ingrid B e r g ~ ~tells m Hurnphrey Bogart that he will have to "'dothe thhkk3g for both of us." She sumenders her judgment to him: she will allow her ncfions to be detemhed by what he decides* 11 we value liber@ and autonomy (Sections4.1,4.2), we will be suspicious of authority: when a person is guided by another in this way, she is ather-mled rather than self-ruled. :It is for just this reasm that many marchists reject the very idea of political mthority. Ef our core value is auto~~omy or liberty, it might seem that we should never surrender our judgment to others: we should always have the right and responsibilitJi of acting on our own judgment.' It seems, though, terribly difficult to avoid ever surrendering your judgment. Consider a trip to the doctor, when the doctc7r tells you that you have an ailment and prescribes a treatment, Most of us do not have the expertise to evaluate the doctor%diag~osisand prescription; even if she seeks to cxplajn it to zzs in detajl, few of zzs have Phe backgrozlnd inbiology and physiology or the clinical experience, to really make a judgm e ~ ~about t . what should be done. To a very large exte~~t, we M o w fhe doctor's judgment. Of course, we may get a secmd opinion, but then we arc fullowirsg another" doctor" oopjnicrn. To be sure, WC do not totally surwnder our judpex~t:if the doctor tells us that we need to stilnd on our k a c f h r a w e k to cure our headache, few will take that judgment seriously But withh a wide range, we rely on the doctor" judgment, because we believe it is superior to our own. As Ricbard B. Friedman, a leading t-heorist of auel-lorgy, h a v e s , The basic purpox o f this sort CIF authority is to substitute the knowledge CIF one person for the ignorance or lesser knowledge o f another person, al-

thaugh what the person who defers thereby comes to possess as a surrogate for his ignorance is nctt knowledge, but "'true belief"" in the sense ctf belief that is indeed justified, though the believer knows not why2

We should distinguish relying 01.1 such authority from m e ~ l yash"ig for &vice- One speciakt may ask the advice of another jn a complicated case. The spe"iaist may want to make sure that she has not overlooked so she may col~sultanother. But she does anythi~ligin her deliher&io~~s, not surrender her judgment to the other; she retains the final decision about what should be done, a decision that she will make on the basis of her own extttnsive k~owiedge,suppkmnted by the advice of otkrs. When 1 go to the doctor; however, I am not merely ask1"igfor advice to supplement my own deliberations; the doctor's deliberations suppla-lzt what I originally thought and X take over her beliefs as if they were my own, I col7fide~"ttly tell my family and friends that I have "iritis,"" though I am not really sure just what it is or how the doctor h ~ o w Xshave it. Yet, as Friedman points out, because X do not rcaUy have the knowledge that w u l d justify those belief!;----Icannot achnally replicak? lrhc doctor's reasoning-1 take them on largely trust. I have "true beliefs" about what course 1should take, but X do not have the howledge on which those beliefs am based. As Friedman st-resses, "One person defers to another on same matter because he lacks the howledge or insight that he assumes the other possesses.'" At the heart of this type of authority relation is m ineqrkmlity of bztltsttledge. The authority relati,on does not create this hequaljty, it: =cognizes a prior inequality. "It is because of the superior insight of some perm"" that he should be ack~owtedgedarr; "11 authority" by others: the deference relation is supposed to reflect the antecedent c o n c ~ t e/personal9di"fferencesbetween the partjes." 4 Being %n Aothoriv" and the Art of Politics: Platonic Collectivism

I h e idea of being "an authority" has, as Friedman points out, been employed in political philosophy. Toccjuevilile, the great: French political theorist of the nineteenth cenhzry (Section 7.1),held that socjety could, not exist without common beliefs. And Friedman tells us, Tacqueville ""makesquite clear in an extended discusson ol this matter that he means beliefs held on the 'principle of authority,' that is, 'on trust and without discrussio~~.""" ""anazrthurity" wwitl be particulaly importmt to m a c c o m of political authoriey if it: is h d d that the art of poljtics is a special art and those who :know it best should rule. As far back as Plab, political theorists-especidy those who arc? conservatively illclined-have justified political authority because some are "'an arzt-Xlontyon polities." Plato

insisted that politics is m art, and like any art, such as medicine or carpentry it shouid be practiced by those who have the necessary h o w l edge and skill. Those drawing on this conception of pl-iticd ault*lority have, like Plato himself, often compared the state to a ship at sea; a ship needs a crew with diverse skills, but it aiso needs a capt"in who has the necessary skill amd howledge to safely nwigate the mm): perils confrontkg the ship. The sailors submit to the aullnority of the capta.in because ihe captain has the skill and knowledge to preserve the ship;in the same bvay citizens ought to surrender their judgment to those who h o w the art of politics. Thus, says Thomas Carlyle, the wise deserve to be the maskrs of others." Notice that this is an application of Plato%ccollectivist theory of justice (Section 93). If justice demands "cat each person perfotm his or her rightful function, and have the rights m d powers necessary to do so, then justice demands that those who hawe the skiil to rule and maxage t-he state have the rights and powers-the atrthoriq-to do so. Cerhinly, says the corzservative, the skill needed to run a government is greater than the skifl needed to build a house; ar~dno one thinks that everyone is equally skilled h house buildhg. hdeed, when building a house we take great care to ensure that we find the most skillful builde~If we take all this trouhle with a house, we should not be any less careful with Lhe &airs of government. n o s e who are sklltlzrl should run the government, and athers should ackrrouilc?clg.etheir authority in these matters. Hence the politically skilled should rde, axd others should accept their aulhority and obey Oakeshoft on Political Avthorip: Antimticrnalist and Anficol/ectivist Cctnservatism

I h e version of conservatism we have thus far considered supposes that there i s a goal or end of political Efe, and s m e sfiodd have authority over others because they are more cmpetent at achieving this goal. Many reject this view of political lift.. Politics, we may say, is not an art like medicine, for mediche has an aim, a goal-health. And it is just because medicine has a goal that exyert knowledge is useful, for the expert k~fozosthe &';f wny to achie~~e the goal. But it is often said, politics has no goal; peaplle in. society have a wide krariety of different goals and values.. Because there is no political god corresponding to '"ealth," we cannot treat the politician as an expert Lvho howl; the best route to a goal. Just because there is no single political goal, politics cannot be the art of achievhg that goal. One of the interesting features of C)akeshotifsco~xservatismis that he agrees that politics does not have a goal such as health, or making us all

better people, or whatever. But Oakeshott says, it is those who do not und e r s t d politics-the politicaily naive voters of today%democracies, for exmple-who fail to see this. Those who fait to grasp the real naturcl of politics, nlho think there is some common god to be achieved, are always seeking some politic& utopia. He writes, To some people, ""government'happears as a vast resr.vuir of power which inspires &ern to dream ctf what might be made of it. They have favorite projects, of various d i m s i o n s , which they sincerely believe are for the benefit of mankind, and to capture this source CIF power, if necessary tcj increase it, and to use it for imposing their favourite projects upon their fellows is what they understand as the adventure of gclveming men. They are, thus, disposed to recognise government as an instrument CIF passion; the art of politics is to inname and direct desire. . . . Now, the disposition tc3 be conservative in respect of politics reflects a quite different view of the activity. of governing. The man uf this disposition understands it to be the business of government nctt to inflame passion and give it new objects to feed upon, but to inject intc3 the activities of already tt3o passionate men an ingredient of muderatiljn; to restrain, to deflate, to pacify and to reconcile; not to stoke the fires of desire, but tct damp them down.7

The politically inexperienced, Oakeshott argues, are those Who are :likely to conceive of politics as aiming at some great goal, he it social justice, equality, or peace on earth. :hfot understand* the limited possibilities of politics, the poljtically inexperienced sec polities as the way to solve all, of our problems (md, of course, they become disappointed and cpical when they digover that this is impossibte). TO a conservative, in contrast, "Governhg is mderstood to be a secondary activity."~Politics is not itself directly concerned with promoting goals, but is the art of arranging social life so that various goals can he pursued by different people with c o d i c t h g aimsayYet, alt-3nough it is in this sense a secondorder activity-m activity devoted to regulating other activities without an end of its owl%-it still is a specific art, and so one that requires practical h~owledge. "Pditics," says Oakeshott, is "the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a set of peoyie whom chance or choice have brought together."" This "attending to'9heir affairs requires howledge of their poljtical traditiom; it requires amending, p r e s e h g , and exterrding those traditions in the ongoing effort to attenrt to the prOhlems of life among diverse people. Consequexrtl_y,those who do not grasp the political tradition are unable to effectively exercise political authority. Although C)akcshottfsantiratio~~alist case for political expertise diffclrs from Plab's nnonistic cdectivism, both identijCy pditics as m art that cannot

be successfully practiced by the inexperienced. Thus, wither Plab nor Oakeshott-21or any conservative-is enamoed of democracy; for it gives political power to those who are bvit%loutpolitical. howledge, with the result that they Iet loose their passims in the politkal realm (see Section 3.3). The art of political rule involves the art of restraining passior~s and enthusiasms, which continudly threat.cn to engulf pditics. And in most conservative writings, there is a clear I'ndiration that the mass, or the majority, are prone to such passio~~s.

10.2 On Being "In Aufhority" The Confrast with "An Avfhorifym

Friedman tells us, A person can be said to ""have authctrity'2n Iwu distinct senses. For one, he may be said to be "haauthctrity," meaning that he cttcupies some office, positicm, or status which entitles him to make decisions about how other people should behave. But, sea>ndlilr,a person may be said to be "an authority" on something, meaning that his views or utteernces are to be entitled to be believed (includingI ta carnplicate matters, beliefs about the right and wrong ways of doing things).'l T%e nation of "'an authorityM-which we have been exmhkg-concerrtrates an belief m d howledge, whereas the idea of someone who is "in

authority" points to her entitlement to replate action. If you accept someone as "m autl?rorityU"your beliefs are guided by her judpent; if you accept y o u doctor as an authority on medjcine, you believe her when sfie tells you that you have a certah disease and what you should do about it, But to accept smeone -as ""in authori'cy"?~to obey herr dimctives, not necessarily to believe that what she says is correct. As Friedmm puts it, when one ackplowlcdges mother as being "in authority" "stead of acthg on one's "private juclgment" one acts on the wit1 of another. "iou follow the will of mother even if it codicts with your own private jdgmmt: on this matter you say the person ""in aufiority" wwiII decide what is to be done, Her will replaces your decisio-.~. Particularly important in this regard is that your obedience to the directives of the autharity is nat dependent on your agreeing with her wisdorn. Indeed, the vvhole point of recogvlizing is that the validity of her dhctivtts is not another as being "'in autho~ty'" dependent on your agreekg to their somdness. As Fsiedmm says, The idea being a>ntieyedby such notions as the surrender of private judgment or individual judgment is that in ctbeying, say a command simply be-

cause it comes from someone accorded the right to rule, the subject does not make his obedience conditional on his own personal examination of the thing he is being asked tc3 do, Rather, he a c c e p t ~as sufficient reason ftx ft3.clowing a prescription the fact that it is prescribed by someone acknawledged by him as entitled to rule. The man who accepts authority is thus said to surrender his private or individual judgment because he does not insist that reasons be given that he can grasp and that satisfy him, as a condition of his obedience.12

In many y s , followhg the directi\res of someone who is "in authoriw" is much more puzzling thar~doing what you are totd by "m1 authority" If smeone is " m autfnority,""she h o w s more than you do, and things witl hilrn out better if: pm follow the directivm of a m e howledgeable person. But why woutd we ever fdlow the directives of someone who is "in authorip,"' given that such authority makes no claim to be ar7y wiser or any mare howledgeable than are \ve"ZAfter all, if the person with atrIhority does not have special knowledge of political matters, why arc we obeying him? Why should we accept directio~~ of our actions by s m o n e who does not h o w my mare than we do?

Equality and Coordination Problems To grasp why we might follow someone who is simply "in authority,"

col~sider a situation in which a ccrrllection of individuals wish tc:, engage in some common activity requiring a certah degree of cclordinated action but they are tmable to agree on what the substance of their coordinated action should be. And because they camctt agree, it fc~llowsthat if each insists ctn following his own views, the common activity will be made impossibfe. Since the ccrrst of insisting on faltc3wing one's own judgment is chaos, it may then appear reasonable for each man to sacrifice his own judgment as it-re basis ctf (some part) of his behaviclr and also tt3 forego pressing his own views on all others, W ~ as fully justified and theirs as m%even though he regards his ~ I views taken; and instead accept someone to make binding decisions for all, ctr to establish some procedure, such as election lottery or hereditary lineage, designed to define who is to have the right to make binding decisions upon a~1.13

In this case, we all want to engage in some cooperative actit.iW but we each have diffemt ideas about how to go about it. Our situation is not simpiy a onetirne conflict that might be suhject to negotiation; we will find ourselves in constant disagreement as we go about the activity. If

FIGURE l 0.1 A Coordination Problem

each insists on the right to decide for herself, we wifl not gain the benefits of cooperation; hstead of cooperation we confront endless disputes or chaos, in which each does his own thing, m d sc-, aciitriv remains uncoordinated. We i-vill, in. short, fkd ourselkres jxt Hobbes" state of nature (Section 8.2). ?"he case for a coordirnator is clal-ffied irn Figure 10.1. Alf a d k t t y are confronted with four possibilities: they each drive on the right, they each drive on the left, Alf drives on the rigbt/Retty on the left, M f drives on the le&/Betty drives on the right. The nunnbers in t-he cells irndicate how each ranks that optiom. 11-tthis case, A l i is a right-hamded person who has a slight preference for a traffic code according to which he drives on the right side of the road, since he finds it slightly easier to sbft gears with his right hand. Thus, AWs first choice is for everyone to drive on the right. Betty m the other hand, is left-handed and, for parallel reasons, w u l d prefer a traffic code that instructs people to drive on t-he left. Her first choice is for evqorre to drive on the left. We can see, however, that neither wishes to go it alme and drive on the side he or she most prefers regardless of what others do: that wouid lead to A:if drivint; on lrhe right and Betty on the left-a disaster, since they will eventually crash! What is most important is that they drive on the same side of the mad, even if it is m t the side that is most fitvored. Eitkr coordinatior.1point (rightjright; left/left) is vastly preferred by both, of them, to options in which they fail to coordinate. Both, then, would benefit from a coordinator who proclaims h i c h side of the road to drive on. Even if, say, the coordirnator selects the right-hand side, which is Betty's second choice, Betty has every reason to obey' since she benefits from achieving coordination. In this sort of case, then, it is not relevarnt whether the coordinator chooses wisely (there probably is no correct mswer to this problem); what is important is that the coordinator instructs everyone on what to do. We requirt, this type of coorcfinator, then, when we disagree about wh& is best or what we most prefer. W e n we all agRe on what is to be

done, the problem is not severe: our individual judgments conver2i;e. But that is rare in complex activities involving many people; typically we each have Merent ~udgmentsabotrt what should be done, In, this common case, we can only continue our cooperative activity if sorne peopIe act in ways that codict with t-heir perw11""i judgmex~tsabout what is best to do or what they would most prefer. That is, it:is necessary that they act on the fudgmcnts of the authoritalive coordinator rather than their own judgment about what is best. This case for authority then, directly follows from Hobbes's analysis of the state of nature in which each person follows his own private judgments, leading to war (Section 8.2). There. c m be no justice or order in such a co~liditim.To create a just and peaceful society Ilobbes argues, we m~rstcreate someone who has authority-someom "in authority"-to resolve our disputes and direct us in what we should do. 'This does not rman, hwevcr, that we must accept the authoritative coordinator" opinions about what is best. For cooperation to continue, it must he the case that people can say, (1) "Well, cl, isn't the option that I think is best, but that's what the coordix~atorsays we should do, so I'll do it.."'And that is very different from (2) "Well, if the atrthoritative coordinator says that is the best waEi, it must be. I guess I was wrorzg to thirtk not-V)."fiiedmitr~'~ point is that "h authority"' c m e r n s (1); it does not require (2), which is a case where one thinks that the coordinator is "an authority" about cl,-ing. Again, the w r i t s or demerits of the particular decisior~are i r ~ k v a nto t the decision to obey in case (1); you do not obey becatrse the authority has the right answer, but because he gives an answer that allows for a coordi.nated solution, Friedman wl-ites, From this standpoint, then, the basis of the claim to obedience made by a person "in authority" is isof a very special kind. The claim drrres not derive Prom any special personal characteristics of the person inve&t"dwith authority, such as superior power ctf judgment or special knowledge (as in the case of being "an authority"") His claim to be obeyed is simply that he has been put "in authority" acasrding to established procedure, ratl?er than that his decisirtns are, on independent grounds, meritorious, or superior decisir1ns.14

F ~ e d m a ntakes the argument one step further, Not only does the concept of being ''in authoriv" not presuppose that he who is jn authoP-ivis also "m aulhoritpf3ut the two ideas of autfnority involve different PRsuppositions- The argument that we have just examined for havhg an authoritative coordinator of actions starts from the premise that we are equally h e (Section 6.3) and are not LVilliftg to defer to fihe judgments ot:

others. It is because each person has his t>wn opinions, and does not think that others are especialty wiser than is he, that the basic pr""biem develops- Each person thjnks that he h ~ o w the s best way to act, and because others disagree they fail to coordinate their actions. No one thinks that any of the others is especially wiser, so each keeps to his owl7 opinkm. Still, some one thing must be done if thejr activity is to be coordjnated. So they develop some pmcedum whereby they selc3c.t someone to coordinate their actions even though they continue to disagree &out what is best. Sa, follltowing once agah Habbes" analysis of the state of nature (Section 8.2), Friedmm argues that it is pfecisely because each of e do not recop~izethe natural us considers ourself to be ewally frc superiority of anyolxe to rule over us---that we argue and disagree, m a n d so need someone ta be "'in. atrthority." h contrast, he argues that the idea of "an authority" involves a basic inequality; someone knows better than the others, and so they should not only accept her directions about how to act, they should accept her ophions too. Obedience When You Think the A u f h o r i v Is Wrong

Friedmm" aanalysis of political authority is enlightening. He explains what is perhaps the most important feature of potitical au&ority: Irhal:we have Emon to obey even when we think that it is wrong. X , as cortservatives are apt to thisrk, political authoriv is based on being " m a u t h o ~ v r " accepting the autfnority of the state seems servile. For you must not or~ly accept its directions, but you must alter your judgments to conform to its dictates. You must say to yourself, "If the government says that suchand-such is the best policy, then I guess it must be the best. The government knows i t s business." Most of us, however, are not prepared to say that: we are not prepar(3d to handon our political jdgments. WC continue to evaluate government policies as good or bad. Yet, this might seem to mem that we only obey laws when we agree with them. "I'm not goil~gto abandon my judgment," yyo might say, "so only if I. think a law or a poticy is good wilt I follow it.'" But that wodd seem to u d e m h e political authority entirely L,aws are then little morcj than suggestions put fomard by the government for the evaluation of each citizen, fiietlmm points to a way out of this difficdy: we are not faced with the choice of either (I) abandonhg our independent judgment and becoming servile subjects, or (2) adopting anarchism, that is, denying that ent could ever have authority over us. A third aiten~ativeis to follow the directions of the government so as to achieve coordination, without abandoning one's judgment: m e puts smeone "in authority"' l~ but denies that he or she is "'an a u t h o ~ p ' k politics.

1 0.3 Liberal Political Authority The Pure Coordination Theory o f Justice and Authority

As 1have stressed, Friedman"~analysis of the notion of being "in aulhori ~ ' 9 i t sw l l with Ilobbes"s theory Recall Hob$esfs account of the state of nature and justice (Section 8.2). Hobbes demonstrates how tmlimited liberties in the state of nature would lead to conflict and istsecurity Thus, he argu"& rational individuals wodd conse~rtto a sovereig~rwho would institute rules of justice- It is importmt for Hobbes that m y rules of justice am better than no rules of justice, thus ever)rone can see it would be better to live wrder alzy sysf-em qf jzlsfice thaa to co~rtirruelife in Lhe state of nature. But to gain the benefits of a syskm of justice----a system of rigbts that distinguishes "mine" and "thineM-we need to coordinate on the same system. Thus, Ei0bbc.s maintains that we must appoint someone, or s m e body of people, to be in authorip and thus have the power to lay down common rules af justiceThe coordhation theory of political authorit). also miakes sense of the idea that a crucial task of poli.tical authority is to pmvide for plablic p o d s such as clean air, defense, police, m d so on. It has long been recognized that a private property--ha~"darket will not supply these ""public Conside3; for example, the case of c l e m goods""in sufficient ~al7tities.l~ air*Suppose that in the state of natznre, three-quarters af the population managed to agree to cut emissions, and this resulted in. much cleaner air. Of cowse, there will be costs that these three-quarters oi the popuiittion will have to bear: they will have to buy emission controll devices, ar drive less, or in some other way alter their activities irz ways that:cost. SLIppose, however, they do so. We c m immediately see that the one-quarter who did not. cut. their emissions gab the full benefits of the restrizint by the other th~e-quarkrs:the one-quarter of noncooperators get @Elthe beneiits of clean air, wi.thout bearing any c>f the cost! One feature of public goods is that nonpayers c ot be exclded from elljoying the good; f ul-z!pnegels the c ~ ~ezferyarze ~ d f else cnn gct if fir free, Seeing that the noncooperating mev a r t e r of the populatio~rget the clean air without p a w g "ny of thc cost, some of our cooperators are likely to decide to stop payhg their share af the costs. Why should they have to pay when others get it for free? Why not get it for free themselves? Reasoning thus, we might expect a r increas~ ing nul-nber of cooperators to switch to the nnncooperator camp, with the result that eventually so fcw cooperate that air quality goes down. Yet, it may well be the case that evayoxre prcfers clem air to dirty air, but all purely volwtmy schemes fail because too many people seek a '"free rides'-they seek to get the kenfits without payhg the cost, with the result that the benefits are not achiewd at all. 'Thus, one important liberal argument for political mthorif?/is that cve wodd illlbemfit from a coordi-

natior-someone in authoriw-who could direct everJv.oneto do his or her part in a c o ~ e r a t i v escheme that everyorle wmts, but which cannot be achieved as long as contributions remain purely voluntary If we accept the Hohbesian pure coordination theory of justice and political aulhority political authority is unlimited in t-he sense t-hat all citizens have goad reason to follow any rule laid down by the political atrthority. :In this case, the sovereign" rrulcs of justice or policy always "preemptf"our own views about what is just: you follow the sovereigr"tfs reasonkg to the extent that you exclude your own viekvs about justice when considering what to do,lVhe reason for this should be clear: since our overriding aim is to coordinate our actions according to c o m o n rules, it is better to follow even a bad directive of the authority t h a ~ ruin cooperation m d risk a return to the state of nature by followkg different rules than those laid down by the political authoriv. Moreover, since justice is tied to legdity (Sectior~s8.7,8.2), no one c m reasonably daim that the rules laid down by political authorify are unjust. It is important, however, to stress that the sovereign makes no claim to be comect or have the d the Hobbesim account your obedience best views about justice, a ~ on in no way supposes that the sovereign is "m atrthority" about mything. The important thing is to dr! what the sovereip says, not at all to believe what he says. Locke, Kclnf, and Umpires

Although the pure coordination theory is extremely helpful in explahing the puzzle of why equally free people would sunender their judgment to others, ar~dso is heif3ful h constructing a liberal theory of political authority, it seems to put too much kveight on coordination. As we saw in, Section 8.2, Hobbes's theory tics justice foa closely to legality. Most liberals have ii7sisted that there are s m moral rights that constitute the basis of ideal justice, to which legal justice must conform. :If we reject the Hobbesin position that political authority defi~esjrtsflee, what is the relation between pinciples of justice and political au&ority? Suppose that we illlaccept certain substantive prhcQles of juslice, such as the classical liberall rights to life, liberQf and progerty Locke held that even if everyone achlowlebged these natural rights, disputes will still arise as to what justice dernmds. People kvou2d interpret these rights differently; in disputes each individual wodd be likely to inclhe toward interpretations that favor his interests over those of others. To avoid this "inconvenience," L,ocke argued, it is necessary to appolint m "uumpire"' to resolve disputes about the requirements of justice, Peaceful social life requires an authoritative ii7te~reterof justice. Immar~ueljKant agrees:

Although experience [and, we ~ g hadd, t Hobbes] teaches us that men live in violence and are prone tct fight one another before the advent of external cornpulsive legislation, it is not experience that makes public lawhf coercion neces-17. The necessity of public lawful coercic.iondoes not rest on a fact, but on an a priori Idea ctf reason, for, even if we imagine men tct be ever so good natured and righteous before a public lawful state of society is established, individual men, nations and states can never be certain they are secure against violence from one another because each will have the right to du what seems just arzd good to Ilim, entirely independently of the opinicm of others,l7

K a ~goes t on to il7sist that justice is &sent in the state of nahre because each relies on his own judgment about w h a t is just, and thus %hen there is a controvmsy concerning rights (jus contrc~mrsrkm),no cowet(?"l j d g e can be found to mnder a decision having the force of law.'.'"lWecauseconflict a ~ h~justice d arise if each persol1 aiways relies on his own interpretation of what is just, Kmt jnsists that if one "'does not wish to renomce all concepb of justice," one must "quit the state of nahxre, in which everyone follows his w n judgmer~ts"" and subject oneself to a ""j@."Jif Tke liberal theories af Locke and Kant, then, are first m d foremast justificalions of an "uunpire" (Lock@)or '"judge" ((Kant)whose task is to provicIe pdlic, defirtitive resdutions of conflictini; jlldgments &out justice. To escape the state af nature, in. kvhich each relies on his own moral judgmen&, we require rule by an "Umpire, by settled, standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Partie~.~ZO Umpires: "In Avfhoriv" or "An AuthorivffB

Must the liberal umpire be " m authority" about:justice ar is it enough to be si~nply""in authority" to make decisions about what we should do? To better grasp what sort of authority is needed, let us focus on a particuiar case: suppose two people, All: and Betty, are in the state of nature, m$ they disagree about the nature of liberal justire. For example, Alf may insist that although li$aal justice makes some provision h r private property rights, property is subject ta taxation in order to redistribute resources to the least well off along the lines suggested. by John Rawls (Section 8.4). 1x1contrast, ZSetty may mak~tainthat the liberal cor~tract gives no significant scope for redistribution. m a t are they to do? Of course, we hope that they will discuss heir differences m d pmsent their arguments; hut give11 the comple>tityof political debate, especiaily concerning interp~tationsol contest-ed notions such as property and distributive justice, we &odd expect continued disagreement. One possibility is that they will go to a sage: someme who is '%D authority" about justice.21 The sage, priest, dder, or moral philosopher is,

on this view taken to have superios insight into justice. Now, although sometimes we do seek the advice of those whom we co~~sider more wise, the Eberal supposition of the basic freedoln and equality of illlmakes it krribly unlikely that everyone will defer to the s m e sage about justice. I h e entire liberal prc,ject in political theory---and in this way it radiraily difkrs from most conservati,ve views-rests on the supposition that there are no natural. moral authol-ities to whom everyone should or would defer. 'fhe liheral recopizes ""no high priests of moral~.~~22 In terms of Friedxnm" salysis, Alf and Betty may well. conclude that they do not need "an authority" on morals; they require only that someone be "in authority'" to end the practical dispute. But on reflection, it does not seem that Alf and Retty simply seek a coordinator who tells them what to do, with no claim that the caordinatar's views are correct or right. In our case, because Alf and Bet@%practical conh-oversy about what to do is based on a marai dispute about wZlai. is just, it seems doubtful they kvould be satisfied with an umpire who makes no attempt whatsoever to track the underlying issue about justice, After all, they conceive of themselves as disagreeing &out what to do because they disagree about what is right; to resolve the former without reference to the latter treats their m r a l dispute as if it were no mr~fthan a conflict of preferences, iike our drking a m p l e in :Fit;- 10.1. It would seem, then, that All and Betty mtxst reject the pure coordinator notion of authority-Hriedman"s notion being simply "in authorivf"because it makes no attempt to relate t-he resolution of the practical controversy to the proper solution of the disagreement about justice. But also, they reject the sage account of political authority-trying to find smeone who is "an authority"habout justic ecause as free and equal people they will surely disagree about who the proper atrthorities are. Locke's notion of an "unnpire" provides a third alternative. Consider more carefully ihe idea of an umpire in a game. Players require ar.2 umpire because they have practical disputes based on their different views on how the rules of the garne apply to particular sitzlations. Often, the $ispute is simp:iy -about fairly straightforward matters of fact such as whether or not Betty hit the ball in foul territory. But: this is not always the case, Cmsider the concept of a "strike zone'hnd what constjtutes a '"called strike," The boundaries of the strike zone are contested-we might even say essentially contested: same players and trmpires insist that the zone is wide, others advocate a nanower conception. Neither in law nor in sporting matches do rules apply Lhmselves: they need to be interpreted, and the application req~rirespractical judgment. The umpire, then, makes her practical dettiminations m the basis of her judgments cox~cerx~ing the rules of the game. This makes the umpire appear to be somethjng of a sage. But players typical%yd o not, and nothing &out

accepting an umpire rcquixs that they must, see the umpire as a sage. Players certair~lymay, but usually do not, take the urnpirt.'~decisions -as reasons to believe: they usually do not see her as "an atrthority" in the sense that they defer to her judgmnts about what to believe, Players usually believe just what Lhey did before the umpire detrided----that is why they so d e n argue with umpires-hut they accept her judgment as a resolution of the practical dispute insofar as they do what she says. Ihey may a r p e , but in the end they do w h a t the mpirtr says. Yet, they expect the trmpire to deliberate about what to do on the basis of the rules and the facb. Although the problem is essent-ially a practicd one, the mpiw%resolution is to he based on her determhations col~cemjngthe. facts and the rules oi the games. Umpireship, then, constitutes a mix of expertise (ibeing ""an authority") and practical disectives (bekg "in authority"'). The umpire3 aim is to podurn pmticai decjsions that best track what the ruies r e w r e . Yet, players need only conceive of her as a practical au.l%tonty(they see her as being "in authority," not " m authority"). Indeed, the players must accclpt the urnpirt.'~practicd auLhority even when they are cmfidmt her decision is wrong. Unless they were prepared to do so, they could not proceed with the game. Situations a l w y s arise when plaq'ers reasonably disagree about what is Lhe appopriate thing to do, and that is precisely when an umpire is needed. Unless they are prepared to follow the umpi=" ddecisioazs in these cases, the umpire coulci not do her job. Ti> be sure, there are lirnits. At same point, we say thhgs We, "' ese just are not even reasonable calls. 'This ump is either blind or has been paid offff Even When we disagree with an umpire, we can usually grasp how smeone seekhg to apply lrhe ruies of the g m e would make that decision. But if an trmpire consistently acts in ways that, ils far as we c m tell, have nothing to do with the rules of the game, we will sooner or later or cormpt. We can say then, that conclude that she is either incompete~~t the players only accept the practical authority of the umpire for decisions withh~some r a q e of reasonable decisions. I h e differe~~ce between Lockers umpire account and Friedman's coordination theory is fmdarnental: Lockets srmpire view trltimately leaves each citizen the ri@t to judge when m aoufiority loses its claim to be an interpreter of justice a17d hence m longer need be obeyed. One of Lhe most controversial ieatznres of Z,ocke%Seeu~a"Treatise is his claim that each citizn reBins a ri&t to =volt against a political authoriv that has lost its claim to be a judge of justice. Allhough we need an urrtpirtr to resolve dfsputes about the nature of justice, each ot us must stitj examjrte the merits of the umpire" decisions to see if they are beyond the bounds of =ason. Ib accept the auihority of an urnpircl. is not to accept a tyralit; if the case for governmental authority is based on our need to resolve conflictkg in-

tergretations of justice, a government that no longer is concerned with justice loses its authority fn trhe history of political p:hilosophy this hat; been a controversial position. To s m e , such as Hobbes, it undoes everylhing that the argument for authority was meant to accomplish. If authority was me& to end the arpments about what is to be done, many political theorists have concluded that citizens should not decide, on the merits of each decision, vvhcther to obey. But T have argued that the Locke m positioz~does indeed fdlow from the u m p i ~ s h i pmodel; our understarrding of umpirer;hjp implies &at the umpire must remain within the bounds of reasonable &cisions, (A baseball umpire who declares, "Strike two, youh out!'" loses his authority to call the game.) h d if that is true, then the ""inco11venier7ctt" of each persorl relying on his own opinio~lis not completely removed; for one must stilt rely on one's own oplnion as to whether the political authority is acting within the hounds of reasonable interp~tatio~ls of the princifia of justice,

10.4 Democratic Authority and the Mcmugemenf of Collective Affairs Socialism and Anarchism

Atrthoriv conflicts with equality- If someone has authority over others, that persm is in the position to d k c t or commmd others-that person's judgmcnt "'prcemptsf"he judgment of ihose over vhJhom she exercises aut_hont.y.This is manifestly inegalitarim. Conservatives, of course, are not troubled by this, since .they are critical of equality (Section 7.5). It is much more of a pr~b1emfor liberals; in marly w q s the chief project of liberal political theory has been to show that equally free peaple would consent to rules of justice that constraiut their freedom, as -well as submit to a pditical autrhoriCy to i n t e r ~ >arid ~ t er~forclejustice, :Now, as I have previously remarked, much socialist thought is very close to revisionist liberalism (Section 8.1) and embraces a view of the state as the authoritative interpreter of jwtice; insofa as it does so, such socialist thought adopts an essentially iiberal theory of politied authority. We dso have seen, however, that radical socialist thought-for exaunple, that jnspired. by PJIarx-has refused to build its case on principles of justice (Section 9.1). Indeed, socialjsm's valuling of equalj,Q of p o w a (and so of f ~ e d o m as power) leads generally to a privileged place for democracy in socialist thinking about justice (Section 9.2). Nut il: equaiity of power is a core value, it. seems ahxost impossible to justify political authority. The core commitment to eyuality has kd some socialists to marchism. As we saw above (Section 10.2), some liberal-hlclhed thhkers so value libert-y m d autonomy that they insist on the iltlegithacy of any political

authority In a sirnilar way, some socialists so value equality of power that they too rexlounce all authority Mikhail Bakunin (181&1&";76)-who fought Marx for leadership of the inter~~ational socialist movement-was adamant that the inequality i n h e ~ nh t ali political authority corrupted it was the mture of h a m s al?d destroyed social cooperation.2"us, not simply the destruction of capitalism, but political authority and the state, at which Bakurrin aimed. h his cont-roversy with Bakunb, Marx hinlself s e e m d to accept that, ultimately, communist society would abolish political atrthori-ty in the sense of atrtharity of one person over an0 t h ; although there still would he a ceelkal administrative authority in a ful:ly commwist state, the ""admistration of things" would replace the "domixlation of people."" Just as in many ways conservatism is a csitiqzre of the ideal of eqwali,ty rather than an interpretat.i.on of it, socialjsm often takes the form of a rcjectim, rather than an interpretation, of political authority. Democracy and Socialist Authority

Anarchists such as Bakunin reject political atrthonty as corrupting; because Mam places so much weight on economic forces as the true determinarts of a socictL; he tends to d o w n p l ~ the role of political authorip* What became b a w n as ""dmocratic socialism" was a rejection of Marxfs beliefs that socialism was the inevitable result of economic forces, Instead, argued socialists such as Eduard Bcrnstein (1850-1932) in Germany and G.D.H. Cole in Britain, socialjsm was an egrrlitarim ethic& ideal and r e q u i ~ dpolitical action to implement it. Thus, to democratic socialists, parliamex~tarydemocracy and it?;attendant political autl-rority are necessary to bring socialism about. As sooal as socialim arcepts political authority as legitimate and necessary, howwer, its tex~sionwikh eyuality immediately xises. H w can anything that is intrinsically hegalitarian, such as political atr"cEroritybe a necessary part of a thoroughly egaiitariul, ideal such as suciahsm, which seeks equdity of p o w r and social equality? 32-10key once again, is democracy, understood in such a way as to reconrile auCf*Lmi-tywith both freedom and eyuality &call that in their analysis of socialist dlemocracy (Section 9.29, Cohcm and Rogers insisted that a genuine democratic community presupposes equal freedom and some sort of equalization of p w e r and resower; among classes. Under such conditions, they argue, the members of the comul7ity car1 detiberate m d debate about "the direction of social life" and "conditions of their olvn associationff: That members of the order together determine the institutions, rules and a>nditionsof their own association means that they themselves are sover-

eign. This sovereignky isfiely exercised in the seme participants in it-reorder have, and are recognized a s having, the capacity to form reasclned judgments about the ends of social life. . . . Sovereignty is eqzia11y exercised in the wnse that the views of each member of the democratic order are accorded equal weight in public deliberationez Followhg Rousseau, Cohen and Rogers understand the democratic communiiy as exrcishg political mthority over itself, ancf so political authority actually expresses both freedom and equality. Each member of the cornmuniq, argued Rousseau, is not only a citizen stlbject to the laws but also a member of Lhe '"~oeerign,"' tt7e supreme political authority Supreme poli6cal auihorityf then, rtrsides in the co of which everyone is a membec L,aws-acts of th acts of the entire cornmuniv (considered in their active role as citizens) legisbting for the entim cornunity (in their passive role as subjects). T%us, afl genttine acts of authority comefrom all and apply Io 1111. h actof sovereignty is not, then, the act of a superior talki-ng to an inferiol; it "is the will of the body of lfie people,'"lrhe group deciding what is best for the group.2"~ such, it does not involve an inequality between those with political authority and those subject to it: everpne exercises political authority, and everyo17.eis subject to it. Criticai to Rousseau"~anafysis is that the verdict of the majority is not simply the will. of the maj0rit.y imposed on the minority-for that would be yet another f o m of slavery and dependence-but t%le expressior~of the general will a r ~ dthe common interest. Recall Wousseau's analysir; of tkc reation of freedom and the germeral will (Section 5,4). If (1.) a free person acts true will, (2) each w~ity;(3) because desires the general will or common good of lfie the democratic process reveals this common good (4) each person wills the democratic verdict and so (5) each person is free when sine subrnits to the verclict. Furt-her, si~lice(6) the democratic verdict is based on equality of civil and social status because each has the same political.rights m d (7) the law is general and applies equally to all citizens, (8)equdity is mconciled with autrhority Rouseau is so faslrinaling just because he seeks to show that the political concepts we have examined-liberty, equality, justice, democracy, and aut-hority-can be achieved, without conflicts or trac-fe-offs, giver1 Lhe proper political arrangemer~ts.I\lousseaufsIhwry is perhaps the clearest example of a thoroughly monistic view ol political concepts. Rousseau depicts the authority of the democratic sovereign arr; "an auth0rit.y" about the general will. To be sure, the democratic sovereign is not nlruays comect about the general will: ''The people is never corrqted, but it is often misled, and only then does it seem to will what is bad." As Rousseau puts it, the democratic majority sometimes expresses only "the

will of all" rathcr than the general will. "The general will studies only the commm interest while the will of all studies private h~terest~ and is indeed no more than the sum of individual desires- But if we take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, the balance which remains is the gel7era:i will.'T'fhus, argues Rousseau, ""From the deliberations of a people properly infor~xed,and provided its members do not have any communications among themselves, the great rider of small differences will always produce a general will m d the decision will always be good."Z7 Rousseau, then, holds that insofar as the democratic majority has genuine authority, it speaks will, and democracy is justified because under Lhe proper for the ge~~eral conditions it is a reliable, ihough by no means perfect, way to arrive at the general will. Thus, if democracy is properly functioning, codronted by the verdict of the majoriv the minority should change what it believes to be right. Accodhg to Rousseau, each person in the minority shodd conclude, ""l my particular opinion had prevailed against the general will, I should have done something other than what I: had willed, and then I should not have been free.'"me people, in the form of a properly constituted democracy; is thtrs ""an authority" on the general will, although, like most authorities (such as doctors) it can sometimes be mistaken. The tension between procedural m d substantive justice in. democratic socialist thought (Section 9.2) leads to a similar lension in its analysis of political au&ority. In the. passages I have been examhhg, Rousseau depicts democracy as a reliable way to discwer the common good: the democratic:mjority is " m authority" about the general will, and thus we should ""srrender our judgme~~t'" to it. This, &~II,assumes that we possess a substantive tmderstmdhg of a just outcome, and democratic decisionmaking is an '"expert" method to achieve this outcome. Cohen agrees: follaWing Ro~ssew,he insists that people should reason together about the common good of the commmity. Zs, But we have seen that: democratic socialism tends to depict democratic outcomt-.s as proceduralZy just: a law or policy is just s h p l y bcjcause it has hem anived at by democratic methods. On this view, the democratic majority is not ""an authoriy'babout justice, its will dcfi~zesjustice. Insofar as Rousseau and democratic socialists define justice in terms of the democratic will of the people, the authority of the people goes far beyond mere expert authority: it is more like the authority of God., whose will d e t m i n e s justice, As it has sometimes been put: pctyzlli, uox dei, "The voice of the people is the vojce of Gocf." In the face of the pronoumements of such aulhority, the individual citizen has no grounds for objection or complaint, If: it is the true voice of the peopk, its will is necessarily just and rwst always be obeyed. In itself, the people as a wt-tolc cannot conceivably be wrong

about justice, Hence the cmservative jibe that in Rousseau" ssociety "each morning the citizen would look into the mirror while hawing and see the face of one ten-millionth a tyrmt and one whole slave*"3@ Rofionolism and Experf Authoriv

:Ihave been stressing the egalitarian commitmen& of socialism, and how this Lea& to a thoroughly democratic account of 1eli;itirnak authority. But socialism displays a strong rationalist strain that leads in precisely the opposite direction, toward rule by m elite wl-ro have the necessary understar~dingof society a"td skills to r m it. Recall Lhat according to E~"tgds, one of Marx's great achievements was to base socidism 0x1 a scientilic uncderstandhg of society ralhcr than elhjcd claims (Sections 3.2, 9,1). Now, science is the realm of expert knowledge, The scjentist has special techniques and has studied a specialized area of knowledge, with which the average person is not acquahted. m e scientist is thus "an authoritypf on her area of expertise (Section 10.1). Scientists, of course, may be m n g , and they disagree with each other, hut the h y person is seldom in the position to participate in these debates among aufionties. :If socialism is a scjence that reveals the laws of capitalist production, the l a w of economic, social, and political change, we s b u l d not expect lay people to really grasp these laws or their implimtions. 'To be sure, Marx hirnself apparently believed that explicil. understanding of the laws of economics was not necessay: those very laws wouid cause the inmasing impoverishment of workers, which would lead them to develop a revolutionary consciousness, workhg for a socialist revolution without themselves understandhg Marxist theory But -as the ni17eteex"tth cex"tkry progressed and turned into the twentieth, it becme increasingly clear that this rewlutiOClary c~nsciowne~s was not develophg. fsrstead, workers we= joini~ligtrade unions and democratic socialist parties, seeking simply to reform capitalism and hstitute something like a welfare state. Lenin, the leader of the Russian revolution of 1917, saw this refoming socialism as dellying "the a n t i ~ e s i in s principle betwen liberalism and socialism."3"min did not "oefieve that the workers would spontaneously develop a revolutionary consciousness; according to Lenin, insofar as the workers develop any "'sgontaneous" wx~sciousness,it woutd be the capitalistic ideology that their problems can be solved through trade unionism and some sort of reformist liberalism. Lenin thus makes the proclmation that t u n s socialim away .from cJemocratic egalitarianism to rationalism and hierarchy: "Without revolutionary theory there can be no mvolutionary movement."~"f h~owlecfgeof socialist rwolut i o ~ ~ a rtheory y is necessary for effective political action, then political leadership rests in the hands of those who h o w the theory. Lenin &us

advocates ieadership by a '"varlguarct" party, controlled by the elite who m d e r s t d sociatist theory and thus are in the position to advance the workrs' cause. Note that few workers will themselves be part of this elite, for they are unlikely to be conversant with the socialist theory. Lenin" extreme rationalism thus leads to a socialkm that rests political authority in those who are m authority on socialist theory and practice; it is their task to lead the workers toward an egalitarian social state. Lenin thus proposes to combine a high degree of political inewality in a hierarc-hied political structure with a commitmm to social and economic eyuality ( S c r t i m 6.4). This became the official version of socialism in the former co unist states of eastern Europe ard Asia, ard still remains in8wntia:l in the political cultwes of China, North Korea, and Cuba. From its v e v incept-i;on-md this view easily c m be traced to Marx himself-its critics have doIlbted whether this starkly ir;tegal^itarimconception of political authoriv couId be johed to socialist equality. The result, they predicted, kvould be a socially m d economically inegalitarim society favoring the politicd elite over the masses, in whose interests they were sqposed to rule. And these predicliolrs were largely home out. Aithough the commtxnist societies were probably more economically egalitarian than rnost (but they were by no means remarkably egalitarian), they demo~~stmted marked social inequal* resting orr p a t political ineqt~ality:Lenin" dream that rule by the vanguard party would fade away as the workers developed socialist consciousness was never achieved: the inequality of authority remained a &finjng kature of these societies.

m e tendency of socialism to embrace hierarchical political authority, despite its deep commitment to equaliity, has deeper roots than Lenin's conviction that left to themselves, the workers would embrace reformist rather than revolut.ionary politics- Mast versions of socialism have been critical of not simply private property but the very idea of rnarkt sock@. A long-standing criticism ot: capitalim is that the market is chaotic and wastef d.Accorcf ing to a stmdard Marxist view, Under capitalism the production and distribution of goods is quite unorganized. What does this mean? It means that all the capitalist entrepreneurs (or capitalist companies) produce cummodities independently of one another, Instead of society undertaking to reckon up what it needs and how much of each article, the Pactar~lrowners simply produce upon the calculatirtns of what will bring them rnost profit and will best enable them to defeat their rivals in the market. . . . The first =ason, therefore, for the disharmony of capitalist society is the anarchy of production, which leads to crises . . . competition and wars.33

The Marxist soIutim, and this was often put explicitly, was to organize all of society a l o ~ ~ the g lines of an "hmense cooperative workshop.ffTo quot.e again from a book cailed, The ABC crf Comm~r~isrn, We must know in advance how rnuch labour to assign to the various branches of industry; what products are required and how much of each it is necessary to produce; how and where machines must be provided. These and sidliiir details must be thought out befclrehand, with approximate accuracy at least; and the work must be guided in accordance with calculations, . . . Without a general plan, without a general directive system, and without careful calculation and book-keeping, there can be nct organization. Btr t in the communist social organization, there is such a plan.34

with market coordinatio~~, and repfaci~~g it with a conUOiTlg sciously p b e d economy, exprc?sses socialist rationalim a r ~ dits faith in the power of human reason to trnderstand and control society, 1x1 compxison to conscious plannhg, market coordination seems haphazard; it subjects us all to the whim of uncor~tralledforces. Ta Marx, this violaks not mly =ason, hut freedom, which can "'only consist in socialjzed man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under the common control.""" "Clearl5 however, this rationalist demmd to control and plan requires giving experts the authority to organize and pian the economy Although some soci.alists have , hoped to combine radical democracy with ecol~ornicp l m ~ i q this hardly seems plausible; economic plmning presupposes specialized economic and orgmizatimal knowledge. Thus, it seems inevitable that efforts to eliminate or even reduce the role of the market inevitably lead to increased political-economic atrthori-ty of experts. M m y contemporary socialists accept this, and so bave endeavored to kvelop forms of socialism that rely on m r k e t coordination (compare here lrhe classical liberal view in Section 5.3).

f 0.5 Summary This chapter has examined the concept of political aufhority m d its ties to the. cor~ceptsof iiherw equality, democracy, and justice. Richard Friedman" analysis of the distinction between " m aut-Xlorityf'm d "in authorityf"rovided our focus. Section 10.1 argued that politicd authority understood as the right of those to ruie who are ""a1 authority'" 0x1 po:iitics is fundamental to most conservative theories. Understood thus, political authority is inegalitarian; it is based on the inequality of h o w k d g e betwee21 those who rule and those Mrho are ruled. Friedma~(Section 40.2) contrasts this to political. atrthority mderstood as someone "in atrthort ity": such a person is empowered to give directives that p ~ e m p our

own decisions about what we should do. This is the aulhority of the coor-tor. Rather than being based 01%-an inequality, this conception of authority arises out of our freedom, a d equality, and so our disagreemats over how to conduct cooperative arrangements, Precisely because we conceive of ourselwes as equally free, we require a coordinator to direct our actions to mutually beneficial outcomes. Sction 10.3 examirzed two accounts of authority associated wi& the liberal tradition: Friedman's coordinator, who directs our actions but provides no reasons to accept her pronouncements as c o r ~ c tm , d the Lockean umpirt., who seeks to umpire? dispuks about justice and moral rights. Although both modcl?; have played important roles in liberal political theire model better accow~tsfor the relation of libory, I arwed that the eral justice and liberal authority. Given the liberal position that equal liberty (and, typical@ propert).) rights are fundmental tu a legithate state, these provide h i t s on what a justified authority may commmd. Moreover, because these deal moral rights are abst.ract and vague, they need to be inte~retcdand expressed in legal justice (see Mill's points [l]m d [2], Section 8.l).That, accord* to the Lockean urnpirr;. model, is ihe main task of political autf-tority.As 1 argued, such a concepti,on of au&ority combines aspects of being "in aauthorirt)."with being "m authority" on justice. 5cticm 10.4 turned to the problematic place of politrical wthority in socialist thought. On the one hand, socialism" strong egalitarian cornmitm n t s lcad it to be skeptical of the very idea of political aulhority It seems that o d y when such authority is democratic, and so arises out of the e ~ d i t of y & citizens, can sociahsm embrace it. Moreover, given the close rclatim of demwracy to swialist theories of libertyt equality, and justice, we observed that: the ideal democratic state appear" to hold out: the possibility for a harmonious realization of all key socialist values. Yet, the rationalism of socialism also draws it to conceptians of authority that share m c h with the conservative views with which we began. Those who are experts on the social good, economic plamixlg, or socialist theory seem to have claims to direct the activities of their less well-informed fellow citizens. Thus, we have lfie paradox of socialism: the pojitical theory that in some ways seems most averse to authority was employed to justify some of the most authoritarian states in history

1. %3e Robert Paul Wolff, In Defcnse of AnnrcIlism (New Ucxk: Harper and Roriv; 1970). 2. Richard B. Friedman, ""On the Concept of Authority in Political Philc~st~phy," in Richard E. Flathman, ed., Concepts irz Social n~zdF701ifiml Philose~plty(New York: Macmillan, 19731, pp. 142-143,

3, Ibid., p. 143, 4, Ibid., pp. 143-1124. 5. bid., p. 123. 6. Thornas Carlyle, Past and Preserzt (London: Dent, 1960), p, 212. 7, Michael Oakeshott, "On Being a Conservativer'9in his Ratiorznlism iitz hlifics, expanded ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1"31), pp. 431-432. 8. kid., p. 433. 9. This is very dose to the liberal ideal, especially as articulated by the value pluralist. See %ctions 3,2,4,3,8.2. 10. Michael Oakeshott, ""17oliticat Education," h his Rationnlknr irz iDulitics, p. 44. 11, Friedman, ''On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosnyhy," pp. 122-123, 12. Ibid., p, 129, 13, Xbid., p. 140. 14. Xbid., p. 241. 15, X consider the reasuns for this more fully in my Social Pizikmophy (Ammonk, MY:M-.E. Shave, 3999), pp. 187ff. 16. On the idea of exctusitlnary reason% see Lcslie Green, The AuChorif2j of the Stale (Oxfad: Clarendon Press, 1988), chap. 2. 17. Immanuel Kant, Metnyhysicial Elenzents qf ju"iice John Ladd, trans, (Indianapolis, IN: Roibbs-.Merrilf, 1965),p. 76. Emphasis in original. 18. Ibid. 19. Xbid. 20. John Locke, Second Rentise Covenzmenf, in Peter Laslett, ed., Two Reatises ofGot?enzmerzt(Cambridge: Cambridge Unkersity Press, 196O), sect, 87. 21. See E. D. Watt, Azatliouz'ty (London: Croorn-HeXm, 19821, chap. 6. 22. Jan Narveson, The Libertarialt Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), p. 225. 23, For a selection of his writings, see Sarn Dolgaff, ed., trans., Bakunilz on Atlarcfiy (Lrtndon: Allen and Unwin, 2971). For Bakunin" disputes with Marx, see Paul Thornas, Krrl Marx and Clill. A~zarchists(London: Routledge and Kegan Paut, 1980), chap. 5, 24. KarZ Marx, "AAfr the Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The nilarx-Engdls Rrmder! 2nd ed. (New k r k : W. W, Norton, 1978), p. 545, 25. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogcrs, On Dmnocmcy: Toward a Transfornzation qf Axnerz'c~~z Society (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 19831, pp. 149-150. Emphasis in original. 26. Jean-Jacyues Rousseau, The Social Co~ztmcf,Maurice Cranstun, trans. (Londrm: Penguin Books, 19681, Book 2, chap. 2, 27, Xbid., Book 2, chap. 3. 28. %id., Book 4, chap. 2. 29, Jctshua Coken, "Deliberaticln and Democratic Legitimacy," in James Bohrnan and VVilliam Rehg, eds., Delz'bsraiiive Deriilocmcy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 19981, p, 69. 36. See Robert Nisbet, Gotzserzlaiiism (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1986), p, 48.

31. Vladirnil: llyich Lenin, W7tat 1s to Bc Butzc? in James E, Connor, ed., Leziin auz Politics alzd Rez?ulrkZion (Indianapofis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 19681, p, 32. 32, %id., p. 35. 33, N. I, Bukharin and Pret3bra~hensIk.y~ The ABC of C~onrnzzanisnz,quoted in Michaef Ellman, Socialist- Plnzi~ri~g (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 8-9. 34. Ibid. p. 9. 35. Mam, Cgpz'tnl, in The Marx-E12geIs Reader, p. $41.

Throughout Part Il of this book, I have tried to show how liberal, conservative, and socialist interpretations of political concepts are shaped by, first, the analysis of other political concepts, as well as by, second, commitments to rationalism or pluralism, collectivism or individualism, and views of human nature. We have seen, for example, how a classical liberal analysis of negative liberty supports classical liberal suspicions about most forms of equality, how the notion of equally free people is the basis of its theory of justice, and how this leads to a certain view of political authority. We have also seen the way in which much socialist thought endorses interlocking conceptions of liberty, equality, justice, authority, and democracy, which stress how all these political ideals, if properly understood, can be harmoniously achieved, without the conflicts and tradeoffs that are so central to classical liberal thought. I have also stressed how a great deal of conservative thought focuses on the themes of inegalitarianism, antirationalism, and the historical and customary dimensions of human life. We have, then, developed some rough conceptual maps of our enduring political theories, which have related the analysis of one concept to that of others, as well as to their differing views on some of the fundamental issues in political theory. Think back to our starting point: Plato's query, "What is justice?" This looked at first as if it was a request for a definition or an essence. By now, we can appreciate that Plato was proposing a rationalistic and collectivist political theory. For Plato, justice involved the proper ordering of the collectivity, with one's rights and duties related to one's place in that collectivity; naturally enough, political authority ought to be invested in those who have the expert political knowledge. Equality, of course, has little

importance in such a political theory, except insofar as we are equally merrthers of the community; and democracy is cntirely wro~~gheaded. Insofar as freedom hvolves doing what is rational to do, the members of such a state are h e , On all these issues, Plato may be right or wrong. But our inquiry into whelher he is right or wrmg will not take the f o m of an isolatcd analysis of the tarn '*j~~tj.ce." It wifl involve wide-ranging e x m inations of his views about reason, human nature, and the nature of society, as wefl as the value of tiberty and equality; questions about how liberty m d equality relate to each other, and holv they relate to justice m d politic& authority; and whether all of Plato" positions on these matters cohere or whether they conflict. Having started out with the a r ~ q s i s of a potitical concept, we will hitwe ended with an analysis of a political theory. Although I have so~lghtto show how the liberal socialist, and corner vativc tra&tions form enduring, ccohe~ntviews of politics and society, I have also tried to point to the internal diversity within each enduring theory. As 1have stressed throughout, political theorizing is not done according to a formufa; interpretations of p"liti-l concepts c m be combined in. different ways, as can positions on rationalism, collectivism, m d human nature. For example, although in many ways Plato" account of justice is clearly con~rvative,s t ~ s s i n ga version of "'my station and its duties," it illso is highly rationaljst: Plato's "'philosopher h g s " have knowledge of the workings of society and what is best for it, Thus, we have a sort of rationalist conservatism, a view that is very different from Burke" sand Oakeshatt" conservatisms. The liberal and socialist traditims, we have seen, are no less complex: classical liberals stress individualism, whereas Hobhouse described himself as a collectivist; some socialists are radical egalitarians and anarchists, whereas the followers of Lenin developed an elitist and authoritarian &ory of political autho~1-y. ancf trhe e n d u m traditio~~s overlap: at times it can be difficuit to distinguish between a revisionist liberal and a moderate socialist, or a resolutely antirationalist classical ll.beral such as Hayek and a conservative such as Oitkeshott. Like politicd concepts, our enduring theories am not characterized by a common essence, but by crisscrosskg family resemblmces (Section 1.4). Nevertheless, it should be clear by now that, by and large, classical liberals e ~ ~ d mconstellations se of political conceptions that fundarnentdy differ from the sort of conceptuaj cluskrs that have dominated socialist and conservative polizical theories. Hence it should not be surprising that cmlceptclal disputes seem so intractabk. What is at stake is not the memhg of a word, but a view of the world.

NDEX

Allison, Lincoln, 181 Anarchism, 237,245,251,252,262 Anscornbe, G.E.M., 24 Aristotle, 155 on human felos, 226 on treating equals equally, 144,185 on treating unequals unequally, 128 AshXey, Wiitliarn, 208 Augustine, Saint, 24 accomt of language, 12-14 characterization of politics, 66; Aulhctrity, Chap. 10 ""ar'authorivf 237-242,245 and justice, 246251 and anarchism, 237,251,252 and cc~operaticm,242ff and coordination problems, 242-245 and disputes about justice, 247 and expertise in socialism, 51 and Hobbes's state ctf nature, 244 and poitive liberty; 88 and preernptive reasons, 247,257; 258 and rationalism, 53 anti-rationalist consemalive view of, 239-241 as anti-egalitarian, 251 as expertise, 23Zf as inegalitarian, 251,252

as surrender of judgment, 237, 241-245 as way of providing social order, 112 based on consent in liberalism, 92, 143,159,160 being '"in' authoriv, 241-252 ccmservative conception as case of justice, 233 ccmservative view of, 51 coordinator conception of, 244,246, 247,249,258 democratic, 252, 253, 255 distinguished from advice, 238 epistemological elements in umpire account, 249-254 Elobbesian and Lockean views contrasted, 251 Lenin" view of, 256 liberal conception nut based on expertise, 248, 249 limit of on umpire view, 249-251 not natural in Lockers theory, 159 obedience when y cm disagree with, 245 of experts based on inequality, 238 of experts in socialism, 256,257 of law, 245 of the people in Rousseau, 255 of umpires mix of '"in" and "an" authority, 249

reconciled with equality in socialism/ 253 Socrates on, 5 umpire theory of, 247-251'258 Autonomy and authority 237 and freedom as power, 105 and po"tive freedom, 82ff and power tt3 act, 101 and reason, 85 and second-order desires, 8586 and self-rule, 83 as acting on principles of justice, 141 as development of capacities, C-24 as exercise concept, 84 as w;c3lf-chosen life, 8445 distinguished from autarchy, 97' Green" \view of, 82ff thwarted by internal and eternal obstacles, 83 Aye& A. J., 24 Babeuf, Franqois-Niiel, 328,155 Bakunin, MikhaiX, 252,259 Barrell, j o h , 236 Bay Christian, 124 Becker, Lawrmce C., 125 Bedeau, Hugo A., 255 Benn, S. I., 25,44,99,100,124,155, 357,208 on presumption in favtlr of equality, 133 on public and private, 36ff Benthafl, jonathan, 72 Bentham, Jeremy 44,72,73,155 as a rationalist, l78 as methodological individualist, 67 as psychological egoist, 61 pure individualist conception of public interest, 37 Bergman, Ingrid, 237 Berki, R. N., 72 Berlin, Xsaiah, 72,94,99, 300,104,180 as anti-patemalist, 87 as critic of rationalism/ 57 as pluralist dassical liberal, 201

critic of monistic rationalism, S8 critic of positive liberty, 86ff critic of real self, 87 on ccmflict of negative and positive liberty, 88ff on libere as non-interference, 78ff on negative liberty as pluralistic, 98 on positive liberq as monistic, 48 on \values competing with liberty l 70 rejection of triadic analysis, 95 Bernstein, Eduarb, 252 Berry, Christopher J., 235 Blom-Cooper, Louis, 236 Bogart, Humphrey, 237 Bohman, James, 235,259 Bosanquet, Bernard, 73,10Q,125 as monistic revisionist liberal, 200 as moral cc3llectivir;t, 6&69 as proponent of self-detrelopment, 62 on fctrcing tct be free, 121 on relation of individuals to society, 66 Bradley E A., 231,236 Bradley, A. C., 73 Brandt, Richard B., 255 Braybrookc, David, 156 Brinton, Crane, 236 Buchanan, lames, 72,192,208 as proponent of llolno ~couzornictas, 62 Bukharin, N. X., 260 Burke, Edmund, 71-73,125,262 anti-ra tional nature of conservative account of freedom, 124 as central figure in conservatism, 50 as instinctivist, 65 critic c~fratirtnalism, 176 critic OF money making, 123 his attack on rationalism, 55ff his ideal statesman, 52 on relation between liberq and equality 274 on human passions, 65,121

on law, 122 on limits of knowledge about society, 65 on limits of reason, 55-56 on rationalist science, 56 Campbell, R, W., 125 Capitalism. See also Markets ambivalence of conservatives towards, 123 and individualist nature of, 68 and power, 218 and Marxist theory of exploitation, 211 as just according to Marx, 213 injustice of in Marxism, 214,215 Marx on human nature in, 63 Marxfs criticism of prc~pertyunder, 314 Marxist criticism of as socially unecqual, 152 Marxist criticisms of, 62-63 socialist criticism as based on power, 108 Carlyle, Thornas, 236,259 criticism ctf liberal crtnception of liberty 231,232 on hierarchical society, 232 on the wise as masters, 239 Cephalus, 3,4, 6,7; 17, 38,20,30,193 Chamberlain, Wilt, 164,165 Chapman, Jolm W., 71, 74,156 Child, James W, 325 Choice. Set. nlsu Autonomy; Positive liberty and coercion, 79,79ff and freedom, 171 and ina,mmensurabi1i@, 235 and markts, 112 and negative liberty, 96,97 and socialist ccmception of liberq, 373 a,nditions far; 9 6 9 7 of preferences, 147" Christianity; 66, 137, 13% 175, 2923 Churchill, Winston, 223 Classical liberalism

ambivalence about desert as grc~undsof justice, 193-195 and Lockean justice, 192,193 and cc3mmutative justice, 143 and egalitarianism, 177 and equatiq of citizenship, 160 and Hayek's view of social justice, 27-28 and human inequality, 165 and justice as mutual advantage, 190-192 and negative rights, 192 and natural freedclm, 41 and protection of property, 192 and self-interest#61,160,192 and social equality, 164 and state of naturet 91-92 and utilitarianism, 16&243 as anti-constructivist, 59 as based on negative freedom, 91 as favoring control theories of power, 108,109 as pluralistic, 58 conception of democrac-3rr,222,223 elements of, 49 conceptions of justice in, 288--394 Macpherson" criticism of, 62 Mill as exemplar' 48-49,90 not all advclcates endorse negative liberty, 93 and pluralism, l70 on freedom and possession ctf power, 117 on government as liberty limiting, 92 on limited role of government in, 92 on importance of consent, 92 on liberty as both a common and competitive good, 110 on markets a s free, 112-113,315, 116 on private property, 110-114 on property and powec 112-113 overlapping with anti-raticmalist a,nservatism, 262 property as core value of, 11Off

rejection of ratirtnafism, 98 relaticm of liberty and equality in, 359ff, t 64-1 65 summary of conceptual structure of, 93,221 theory of justice based on negative libertyf 206 Coercion and liberq, 102 and notion of a typical person, 80, 81 and offers, 81 and pawer of capitalists, 115 and standard ctptions, 82 and the law 126 as making options ineligible, 73-81 Cohen, G. A., 180,209,234 Cohen, Jorshua, 235,254 on democracy and atrthoriq, 253 on socialism as equal freedom and power, 252 on socialist ccmception of democracy, 221,222 Cohen, Marshal], 234 Cole, G.B.H., 235 as democratic socialist, 252 on freedom as lawmaking, 219 Coleridge, Samuel, 231,231,236 Collectivism, 52 and communitarianism, 69-70 and ccmservative justice, 230-233 and equality, 375,176 and Hobhouse" seeoncilia t i w of liberty and equalityt 169 and mincjrity rights, 232 t~ and organic theory C$ s ~ c i e177, 230,231 and Plato, 261 and political authority, 238, 239 and Rousseau, 232 and st>cjaIequaUty, 364 and social,justice, 30 and socialist authority; 253ff and socialist view of social justice, 66 and sociely as an organization, 2 77 and the general will, 121

and utilitarianism, 236 as favoring effect theories of power, 308 as foundation of revisitmist iiiberalism, 200 importance in 19th and 20th century thought, 232 in tension with c~>nservative commitment to liberty, 232 methodological, 67-68 moral, 68-69 Oakeshctttf"scriticism ctf, 175, 176 senses of, 6SEf understanding rtf a person's treatment by others, 250 Common good. See also Cornmunitarianim, Social good and authority, 239 and conservative a,llectivism, 232 and desert, 195,196 and justice in rerrisionist liberalism, 195 and liberty and equality, 158 and revisionist liberalism, 16%170, 200 and Rousseau" nnot.ion of democracy, 254 and the general will, 321 ccmtrasted with competitivc goods, 163-110 Hobhouse's cconceptictn of, 169 liberty as a, 309-310 and individual good in the new liberalism, 146 Commtmism. See also Mam; Marxism; Sr>cialism and justice, 63 equallw udder, 256 inegalitarian conceptirtn ctf authority in, 256 Marx on justice under, 216 Commtmitarianism. See also Collectivism; Community; %?ciety and democracy, 218ff and group rights, 233 and virtue, 226---B0

as form of collectivism, 69-7"0 conservative versicms of, 224ff criticism ctf liberalism, 69 not an enduring political thet>ry, 69-70 Community See also Commmitarianism; CoIlectivism; SocieQ and justice, 232 and pluralism, 227 and socialist democratic authority, 252,253,255 Bentham" iindividuafistic view of, 67 justice as serving, 230 Rausseau" ccollectivist view ctf, 67" Commutative justice. SW also Justice; Markets and classical liberalism, 293 and markets, 30 as keeping faith, 185 Polemarchus on, 4 Complex structured concepts. See also Concepts; Essentially contested concepts; Political concepts and essential contestability thesis, 43 and language games, 19 and the concept/ctmception distinctirtn, 32 need not have a cclmmon care, 32 Concepts, Sec also Complex structured a>ncepts;PoIiticaZ concepts and forms uf life, 26 and what is important to us, 14 as identifying things, 2 3 % and ccmfusion about, 19 public nature of, 17 threshold, 142 Conceptual disputes, Chap, 2 about views of the world, 262 and conceptual coherence, 20ff and toferance, 41ff as about world views, 34-35,262 as clash of political theories, 40,262 depth of, 3535,262

fallibilistic versus skeptical account of, 42 Freeden and GaXfie ctn no correct resoluticm of, 36 Ccllfie ctn basis for tolerance about, 41 importance of, 33 not simply semantic, 31 political nature of, 26ff presuppox that there is a correct answer, 41-42 two key features of, 34-35 Conceptuaf maps and conceptions, 32 must be consistent, 38 summary of conceptual structure, 261 Conceptuafism realism as explaining basic convictions about concepts, 8,11-12 Plato on, 7-43 Comolly, Witliam E., 24,44,99,124 on power, 307,108 Conservatism ambivaleme about economic f ~ e d o m123 , and Christianity, 66 and collectivist justice, 230--.233 and democracy, 51,241 and equality before the law, 177 and fear of clhange, 64 and human passions, G5 and instinctivist view of human nature, G5 and mural experts, 249 and pluralism, 232 and sexual inequalitr; 178 and social enviromcntalism, 64, G5 and socialism, 50 and it-re new right, 123 and the organic theory of saclie@ 177' and tradition, 176,224 Ang1c.l-American, l 77 anti-rationalist view of authorit5 239-241

as anti-pluralist, 226ff as critical of equality, 51 as philosophy ctf imperfection, 50 attitude tcl liberq, 51 close connection bemeen law and justice in, 225 collectivism in conflict with liberty, 232, conception of politics in, 240 a>nceptionsof authority in, 237-241 criticism ctf equality, 174-1 78, 224 criticism of liberal egalitarianism, 177 criticism of liberalism, 50, 122, 123 criticism ctf liberty in general, 121, 122,232. criticism of rationalism/ 55, 60, 224ff elements of, 50 Humean, 225,226 on humans as historical creatures, 64 on importance of virtue, 228 on inequality and human nature, 174,175 overlapping with classical liberalism, 262 rationalist and anti-raticmalist versions ctf, 262 skepticism about legislation in, 178 summary of conceptual structure of, 70 tendemy tct collectivism, 68 three approaches to justice, 233 view of law and liberties, 121-123 Coordination problems, 222t-f Cornford, Francis MacDonald, 23,236 Coval, S. C., 207 Cranston, Maurice, 71,179 Crick, Bernard, 71,155 Custom. See Tradition DahX, Robert A., 235 Day, j. P., 99 de Jouvenef, Bertrand, 44,125 Declaration of Independence, 137,242

Definitions and essnces, 7,8,18-19 and family resemblances, 18, 19 and pictures of the world, 9 and poiitical concepts, 3 as necessary for sense, 7 1 1 as set af necessary and sufficient a>nditions,8-9 Plato" error in searching ftx, 182, 260 relation of wtrrrds and tKngs, 7ff Socrates on, 6-23 Democraey and authority; 252,253,255 and community, 252,253,255 and conservatism, 51,241 and deliberation, 252,253, 255 and equaiiity, 152 and freedom, 171 and freedrrrm as power, 221 and freedctm in socialism, 172 and majority tyramy, 48 and social equafiq, 163,164,221 and socialist cooperative sociefy, 172 and socialist justice, 218-223 and the general wifli, 119-121,253 and the new liberalism, 48 as equalization of power, 218ff classical liberal view of, 49 liberal conception of, 222 rejected by teninist socialism, 255 rise of and rationalism, 55 social, 152 socialist conception of, 221-223 uttlpian errsrs of, 240 voting as the exercise of powers, 223 Desert ambivalence of classical liberals toward, 193-195 and conservatism, 225 and Marxist justice, 214 and Rawls, 134,202-204 and rewards, 185 and the a>mmongood, 195 and the new liberalism, 195

as central to monistic revisionist liberalism, 194-196 as element of justice, 183,184 as rationalist, 225 distinguished from merit, 197 Hume's skepticism about, 225 Desires and autonomous action, 241 and freedom, 101f' and property 113 as blocking positive freedom, 83, 87" as politically dangerous, 240,241 choosing, l47 equal satisfaction of, 246 external, 146,167 Developmentalism See also Human nature and autonomy 84 and demcjcracy; 223 and harm principle, 161 and human capacities, 62 and positive liberty 84,97,98 and revisionist liberalism, 93, 368-1 70,201 and social justice, 296 as a theory of human nature, 61-63 as rationalist and monist, 89ff Green" view of as cc30perativef 62 Hobhouse" sonistic account of, I 96 influence ctf Mill"s version on liberalism, 90-91 DevXin, Lord Patrick, 236 and enforcement of morality 233 criticism of liberal morality, 227, 228 on point of law, 228 on relatio~nof law and morality, 227-230 Dewey; John and semi-socialist liberalism, 201 as comtructivist, 58, 60 as proponent of =If-developmentp 62 Diderot, Denis, 57 Discriminaticm, 101-102

and equal basic rights, 151 and equality of opportunityr 153, 154 and language, 134 and presumption in favur of qtraliv, 133 and property, 198 Distributive justice. See Justice; %?cial justice; Equality Dolgaff, Sarn, 259 Dominant strateiiry, 191 Urewey, Gavin, 236 Duty. Sec anlso Rights; My station and its duties and conservatism, 234 and rights, 186 to socieQ 232, Dworkin, Gerald, 49 Workin, Ronald, 156, 157,1180 criticism of hybrid view of liberalism, 167" criticism of liberty in general, 167 on liberalism as based on equality, 166-1 68,179 on Rawls" liberalism, 204 Edtrca lion. See also Autonomy and freedom, 171 and equality of opportunity, 199 and social justice in the new liberalism, 197 Edwards, Paul, 71,124 Eisenhower, Dwight, 106 EiXman, Michaet, 260 EXster, Jon, 73, 156,224,215,234 Ely John Hart, 257 Engefs, Friedrich, 72, 234 as a rationalist, 55,56 on socialism as a science, 212 Edigl-rtenment, 5&58 Equalityf Chaps. 6, 7 absence of political, in Commmist states, 255-257 absence ctf social, in Communist states, 256 and authority, 238,251 and Christianity, 237,138

and civil justice, 198 and ccloperative socialist society; 372 and coordination problems, 242-246 and coordinator a>nceptionof authority, 244,245 and freedom, 142,143 and human nature, 137-142 and ina>mmensurabiIi~, 2 34-3 36 and cclmmon needs, 339,140 and law, 351,177,378 and liberalism, 143,166-168,177 and liberty in Hobhause" theory, 168-1 70 and liberty, Chap. 7 and lottery of birtki, 202 and marginal decreasing utility, 129-1 32 and organic theory of society, l77 and Rawfs, 203-206 and revisionist liberalism, 168-1 70 and social justice in new fiberalism, 197 and threshctld concepts, 342 and tmiqtreness of individuals, 135 of resources and equal ctmcern, 166 as a>ltapsinginto rationality, 143-145 as core of socialism, 49 as core of socialist democracy 221-223 as sameness, 140,263,164,177' as the basis of legislation, 178 as wasteful, 145,175,204,205 civic, in liberalism and conservatism, 177 complex, 153 conflicts with liberty in conservatism, 51 connectictn tct rationalism in conservatism, 275 consernative criticisms of, 174-178 ea>nomic,and liberty 164-166 economic, in Cc~mmuniststates, 255 external grounds of, 129ff

formal, 132-134 fundamental human, 136-1 45 of liberty in Hobbes's state of nature, 189 of opportuniq in socialism, 173 nonpreferentid conception, 127, 140 not always a good, 128 of basic liberties in Rawts, 205, 206 of citizenship in classical liberalism, 160 of civil status, 150-152 of concern and respect, 164-1 S8 of cultural opportunities in socialism, 273 of equal concern and respect in RawXs, 200,201 of fair opportunity, 154 of freedom and power in socialism, 218ff of liberty, 361-163,170-174 of needs satisfaction, 147, 3148 of opportuniq, 353,f S4 of opportuniq in RawXs, 206 of opportuniq, and merit, 197-199 of power in socialism, 50,218, 251-255 of power and feminism, 220 of resources in Rawls, 203-206 of resources, 148,349,172 of servitude, I& of slatus, 128 of welf-are, 245-247 of basic rights, 151 of outcomes, 299 overlaps with justice, 185 political, 152 political, and socialism, 172 political, in democratic socialism, 252,253,255 precarious place in Leninism, 255 presumption in favur of, 133, 336 problems with non-preferential conception, l36 reconcited with libere in socialism, 17&174, 222

relation to liberty in classical liberalism, 159ff salient in Rawls's social contract; 20%" xcondary role in liberalism, 47 summary of types of, 154,155 social, 152,176 social, and conflict with liberq, 163,164 tied score a>nceptionof, 127, 142, 144 utilitarian arguments for, 129-132 Essentially ccmtested concepts, Chap. 2 and conflict of liberty and equaliv, 359ff example of "champion," B-31,33 example of social justice, 26ff, 29ff features of, 29, 31 Gallie on, 28 idea of an exemplar of features of, 31-32 power as, 105 Exemplars and essentially contested concepts, 31-32 compared to Socratic essences, 32 Mill as in liberalism, 47-48, 90 Experts and authctrity, 238 and ccmservatism, 249 authority of in socialism, 256, 257 liberalism's denial of morai, 248 Fallibilism, 42 Faithman, Richard E., 258 Family, l"i",220,231 Family resemblances and political theory, 71 basic idea of, 18-19 Farm, K. T., 24 Fascism, 35 Feinberg, Joel, 99, 100 Feminism and liberalism, 178,220,223,224 and socialism, 220 Fisk, Milton, 234

Flathman, Richard E., 100 Forms of Life and arguments far equality, 13%140, 153 on the organizatirtn ctf ideologies, 35-36; Wittgenstein on, 16 Fotrrier, Charles, 212 Freeden, Michael, 4445, 71, 180, 207 argument against quest far a good usage of concept' 36,43 on sucialism, 49 on ccmcepts as building blocks of ideologies, 33R on conceptual structure of Mill's theory, 34 on structure of political theories, 46 Freedom. See Liberty French Revolution, 5O,55,176 Freud, Sigmund, 66 Friedman, Rishard B,, 249,257,259 on being ""an" authority, 237,238 on contrast between "in" and ""an'" authority; 241ff on coordinator crtnception of authority; 244,245 on inequality as the basis of expert authcltrity 238 First Amendment, 187 Froude, Anthany, l81 Fugitive Slave t a w of 1850,183 Gallie, W. B,, 30,44, 45 analysis of disputes about social justice, 29ff against a best interpretation of political ccmcept, 36,43 as a skeptic, 42 championship example, 28ff contrasts to justificatory political theories, 43 notion of an exemplar, 32 on essentialty a>ntestedconcepts, ZSff, 43 on exemplars, 47,90 on importance of individualisma>llectivismdisagreement, 69

on liberal and socialist notiom of justice, 66 on possibility of conceptual disagreement, 140 on the intractable nature of political disputes, 40 on whether conceptual disputes are real, 3Qff problem explaining why conceptual disputes are important, 33 Caus, 6 . E, 25,44,73,100,125,157, 208 Cauthier, David, 192,208 General will and democracy, 253,255 and reconciliation of law and freedom, 119-1 21 as reconciling authority liber& and equality, 253,255 Gewirth, AXan, 156 Government. See anbsv Authority; Law; Politics and equality of opportuniv, 353 and umpire conception of authority; 249-251 as coordinator, 241ff as experts, 238B as liberty limiting in classical liberalism, 92 as protection agency; 42 consernative account of, 240 equal treatment by 2 SQ Hobbes's argumrsnt for, 390 tasks under positive liberty; 403 utopian view of, 240 G r a John, ~ 44,45,171,172, 100,123, 126,180,207,235 Green, ksfie, 259 Green, Philip, 157 Green, T. H., 73,99, 124, 194,208 and free persons, 104 and paternal ism, 8 6 8 7 and semi-socialist liberalism, 207 and welfare state, 92-93, 103 as a>llectivistrevisionist liberal, 200

as educa tiunal refc~rmer~ 92 on equaliv and liberty, 174 as monistic revisionist liberal, 200 as prapc2nent of self-development, 62 as rationalist and monist, 89Ef cooperative theory ctf human develrtpment, 62 Hobhouse follows on positive liberty 168,169 influence on socialist conception of freedom, 373 on freedom as autcmomy 82ff on freedom as development of capacities, 84 on freedom as power to act, 101 on positive freedom as a development of negative, 97 on the real self, 120 Griffin, James, 156 Guthrie, W.K.C., 24 Gutmam, Amy, 69,74,156 Habermas, J-iirgen, 222,235 Hal&vy,Elie, 178,181 Hampshire, Stuart, 380 Handicapped, 131,132, 149, 150, 175 Harm principle and the Law, 161 and paternalism, 86 and classical liberal justice, 142 and liberal view ctf the law, 227-230 and Mill" liberalism, 48 Harris, Paul, 99, 124, 208 Hart, H.L.A., 227-230,235,236 Ha yek, E A., 44,171,172,99,125, 22Gr 180,207,208,235 as anti-rationalist, 262 as pluralist classicat liberal, 201 criticism of social justice, 30 defense of liberty in general, 223 on co~ercic~n, 80, 109 on confusion of freedom and power, 103-104 on dernucrac~49,2222

on distinction beween constructivism and anticonstructivism, 59 on egalitarianism, 177 on human inequality, 165 on impossibility of planning, 60 on markets and diversity, 113 on Milt as an exemplar, 90 on Mill's liberalism, 49 on necessj ty. of private property 111 on rejection of d e x r t as grumds for justice, 196 on social justice as confused, 27-28 similarity. to Oakeshott, 262 Hill, Thornas E., Jr., 99 Hobbes, Thtlmas, 98,208 accowt of social contract, 190 and Hume, 225 and justice, 188--192,246,247 and ordinary language, 77-82 and prisoner's dilemma, 192. conceptian of liberty, 77ff on freedom as possibiliQ, 80 on limits ctf justified authorily; 252 on pawer, 105 on relation of justice and law 190, 247 on society as mutual advantage, 201 on state ctf nature, 190, 243-245 pure non-impediment account of liberty, 96 Hobhouse, L. T., 71,72, 125,180, 181, 207-209 as a collectivist, 262 as a monist, 169,200 as advocate of liberal socialism, 49, 201 as advocate of positive liberty, 168, 169 as proponent of self-develupment, 62,1136 on basic similarity of people, l74 on desert and social justice, 194-196

on harmony of equal rights and liberty, 148-2";70 on liberty and equality, 168, 169, 170,179 on liberty as it-re core of liberalism, 168 on prot-ecting workers from capitalist's powec 1l 5 on sc3ciety as a cooperative endeavur, 197 on the common good, 169 Hobson, J, A., 208 Pllohfeld, Weslcy, 206,207,223 analysis of rights, 185-188 identifies elements of justice, 188 Holmes, Stephen, 72 Homo econunziczis, 61 Human nature. See also Developmentalism; Tnstinctivism; Self-interest; Social envircmmentalism conservative view as unequal, 175 and equatiw, 137-142 and liberty, 90-91 and Marxist justice, 216 and Mill" case for equal rights, 161 and needs, 148 and society, 231 individualist view of, 204 theories of, 60ff wide and narrow senses ctf, 60 Hume, David, 72,235 on justice as conventirtn, 225 on political man as a knave, 61 Plluntington, J. F., 44 Husami, Ziyad, 234 Impartiality and justice, 184,185 and Rawls's theory of justice, 202-206 and rule of taw, 160 as basis of egalitarian liberalism, 166 Inct3mmcnsurabilitr, 1,34-136 Individualism, 52

and restricted view of a person's treatment by others, 150,151 and classical liberalism, 93, 193 and liberal justice, 24-30,66 and Mill's case for liberty, 90-91 and Raw! S% lliberalism, 200,201 and socialist egalitarianism, 177 as Pavoring a,ntrol theories uP power, 108 xnetl~odological,67-68 moral, 6&69 Individuality. See also Devef opmentaIism; Jndiv-idualism; Milf; Revisionist liberalism and progress, 162 and liberty, 162,263 and the social good in the new liberalism, 3 96 conflict with social equality, 163, 164 uniqueness of, 135 Instinctivism. Sec also Human nature and conservative theory of law 122 and conservative thectry of politics, 239ff as theory of human nature, 65-66 Invisible hand, 113 Is/ought, 11,12 Johansen, Lenie, 181 Justice, Chaps, 8,4. See also Equality; Social justice account of depends on entire political theory, 262 and autonomous action, 241 and ccmservative virtue, 226ff and dernucrac?s,21S 2 2 3 and desert, 183,184,193ff and equality, 185,210 and freedom in Kant, 117 and harm to others, 4-5 and Hobbes's state of nature 189 and impartialiq ty inawfs, 202 and law, 182,183,190,225 and taw in Pllobbes, 140, 247

and Marxist transformation of human nature, 63 and merit, 397-1539 and moral arbitrariness of talents, 134 and mural rights, 183 and need for authority, 244, 246;--248,250,251 and public goods, 246,247 and quotas, 199 and rights, 183,185-188 and it-re common gclod, 26,194-199 and mequal treatment, 185 and utclpian socialism, 211,212 as contientional, 225, 226 as giving each his due, 4,6 as interest of the stronge~17 as mutual benefit, 1%-192 as my station and its duties, 230-233 as property rights, 190 as the interest of the stronger, 5 as to each according to his needs, 148 as way tct escape prisoner's dilemma, 192 civil, 197-199, 207 classical liberal a,nceptions, 18S194 collective conception of, 232 cc~nservativeapproaches, 2223-225, 227-233 conservative views of and tradition, 224 coordinator a,nception of, 246,247 disputes about and liberal authority 247-251 distributitre, in the new liberalism, 1943 elements of, 182t'f Hobbesian account of, 246 idea of a the017 of, 188 ideal, 383 in competitions, 2 54 inconsistency in our ctlncept of, 20 liberal and socialist views of, 26-28,222

Lockean, 192, 393 Marx on, 210-218 Marx's reluctance about, 251 need for ccmsistent conception of, 21-22 not essentially descriptive, 12 Plato's view of, 8,262 procedural d istingtrished from substantive, 220-223 relativity of in Marxism, 213, 214 social, 26ff socialist notions ctf, 210-223 socialist reluctance ta advance principles ctf justice, 233 %?crateson, 3 Socrates9denitirtn ctf, 6ff, 19, 262 special conception of in RawXsfs theory, 2205,206 three definitions of, 3-6 under communism, 63,216 uses of, 22 utilitarian versus Rawls, 20 voluntaristic conception ctf, 220 Justification, 39ff Kamenka, Eugene, 355,208 Kant, Tmmanuel, 125,207,259 on equal capacity for moral personality 141 on political authority, 247, 248 on problems of private judgment, 240;1;248 on slate ctf nature, 247, 248 on truthfulness, 185 view of law and freedctm, 116, 317 Kekes, John, 235 Kelsen, Wans, 23 Keynes, John Maynard, 208 howledge and authority, 238,241-246 practical, and tradition, 224 technical and practical distinguished, 53ff Kcterner, Kirk E, 71 Kristjgnsson, KrisPjBn, 99, 100, 224 Kuehnelt-Leddih, Erik von, 179 Kymlicka, Will, 1179, 236

Labour Party 138 Lakoff, SanEord A., 156 Lamunt, julian, 207 Language and arguments far equality, 138-1 40 and fctrms of life, 16 and language games, 15 and reasons, 139,140 and social justice, 27 as involving wtlrds and acticjnst 47 as naming, 4,10, 12fft 23 no single function of, 15 open-ended nature of, 140 picture theory of, 9ff public nature of, 1&,17 St. Augustine" aaccowt of, 12ff Language games and distributive justice, 27 and games, 18 and justice, 17 as crtnsteXlations, 19 diversiy of, 23 inconsistency in, 20 not just about naming, 15 Laski, Elarold, 124 on power of capitalists, 108 Laslett, Peter, 100,208 Law and antipower, 118 and authority; 245 and convention%225 and enforcement of mtlraliq, 227-238 and equal treatment, 151 and freedom, 126ff and harm principle, 161 and impartiality, 184, 385 and justice, 182,183,190,225, 247 and justice in Marxism, 214 and nonpreferential conception of equalitr; 127,128 and rationalism, l78 and security, 116 and sexual equality, 178

and the general will, 119-121,253, 255 and tradition, 122 and freedom in socialism, 219 as coercive, 315, 116 as heart of Mobbesian justice, 190 as protecting rights, 160 a>mmonlaw distinguished from legislation, 225,226 a>nservativeview of, 3 21, 2 23 equality before, 160,177 Hobhause" claim that it does not limit freedom, 169 impersonality of and freedom, 119 Kant's view of, 116,127" relation to justice, 182, 183 republican cc>nceptionof, 118,119 Legitimation, 39-40 Lenin, Vladirnir Tlich, 260 an vmguard party, 255,256 as elitist, 50, 262 as e t r e m e rationalist, 256 rationalist conception ctf socialist authority; 255,256 Lewis, Sir Gectrge Comewall, 44 LJ1"beralParty, 92 Liberalism. See also Classical liberalism; New liberalism; Revisionist liberalism anarchist textdencies of, 245 and commutative justice, 30 and different interpretations of liberty 93ff and egalitarianism, 177; 204 and equal basic rights, 251 and feminism, 223,224 and individualism, 2(3--30,&6,&8 and justice, Chap, 8 and limits of justifkd authority, 250 and harm principle, 48, 192 and rationalism, 54,SG-60,194200 and the death of virtue, 226,227 and umpire conception of political authority 246-251 as antipaternalistic, 48, 86 as based on equality, 166-l%, 204

as blend of equality and liberty, 167; 180,181 as critical rtf custom, 57 as ideology and political theory, 40 Berlin" view of as pluralistic, 58 charge that it is nihilistic, 227 crtmmunitarian criticism ctf, 69 conceptual strudure of, 34,52,70 ccmservative criticism of, 122 divided over individualism and colfectivism, 49 h o r k i n ' s egalitarian characterizatic2n of, 204 foundational role of equal liberty in, 143 individualist commitments ctf, 29-30,623 its conception of democracy a>ntrasted to socialist, 222, 223 its incamistent ccmception of public and private, 3Gff liberq at the heart of, 47 Maclntyrek criticism of, 224 Mill as an exemplar' 47"-49,90 no moral experts in, 248 not hyperratisnal, 57 on distinction between freedom and wealth, 202 on importance of reason, 57 on limits of reason, 57 opposition to the enft3rcement of morality, 227-230 relation beween types of, 201 secondary place of equality in, 47 split between classical and new fiberala48-44 tendencies to towards anarchism, 237 understood as purely distributive theory, 168 Liberty, Chaps, 4,5,7, 8 and authority, 237' and choice, 96-97" and constraints in Mobhc~use's liberalism, 168, 169 and doing what one desires, 101ff

and eyualiv? 342,143,368,169, Chap. 7 and f o r m ctf power, 165ff and free persons, 104ff, 369 and human nature, 90-91 and liberalisms, 91-92 and markets, 115,136 and pluralism, SS and pawer, Chap. 5 and property 11Off and Rawls? liberalism, 200,205, 206 and reason, 85 and resources, 102,371 and second-order desiresr 85 and the general will, 119-121 and the law 1Zliff. anti-rational nature of conservative account of, 122 as the absnce- of obstacles, 77-82 as antipctwer, 117-119 as common good, 109-110 as core of liberalism, 47 as effective power, 171ff as lawmaking under socialism, 219 as natural in classical liberalism, 91ff as power coXXapsing into autcmorny 105 as set ctf libertieti, 205, 206,232 as synonym for freedom, 98 as the absence of arbitrary intervention, 11CF--222 based on growth far Hubhouse, 62 Carlyte on true meaning of, 232 classical liberal view that law limits, 116 conflict with conservative collecti\~ism,232 conflict with social equality, 163, 164 a>nservativeclaim that it clashes with equality, 51, 174, 375 a>nservativestress cm specific liberties, 121-1 23 civil distinguished from natural, 117-114

economic, 123 ectmornic, and equality, 166166 endorsed by socialists, 50 equality of Rawts" theory of justice, 205,206 government as protector cif in classical liberalism, 92 harmonized with equaliv in socialism, 60,1;7C1,1';72-174 limited by ""power cwer," "9-116 Mill's case for equality of, 361 not valued in general by Dworkin, 167 priority of in Rawis's theory, 205, 206 questioning the negativeipositive distinction, 94ff reduced tc3 equality by Dworkin, 166-1 68 relation to equality in classical liberalism, 159ff and properq in classical liberalism, 160 triadic analysis of, 94-95 two concepts of, 86ff Locke, John, 92,100,156,1179,208, 259 account of authority; 250,251 account of justice, 192,393 on natural frcredom, 91 as classical liberal, 93 on equalivf 342,143 on freedcjm and equality; 159 on political authority, 247, 248 on probtems of private judgment, 247; 248 on state uf naturet 991-92,247, 248 Logical positivists and picture theory "I) and Sctcrates" three convictions, 12,23 and verificatic~nism,16 on ethics as nonsense, 11 Lornasky; Loren E., 125 Lotte~ of birth, 202, Lucas, J. R,, 155,156,207

on fallacy of egalitarian reasoning, 137 Lukes, Stex~en,4473,124,235 on layers of Marx" theory of justice, 217, 218 on power, 107 MacCallum, Gerald C,, 94-95,160 Machan, Tibor; 73 Maclntyre, Alasdair, 235 as c o n s e ~ ~ a t i cc.tmmunitarian, ve 226,227 on liberalism and traditions, 224, 225 Macphersrtn, C. B,, 72,73,225,234, 235 as proponent of self-development, 62 on capitalism and trawfer c>E powers, 211 on exploitation, 114 Mandelbaum, Maurice, 73 Maming, D. f ., 72 Maoist China, 152,153 Marechal, Slyain, 155 Marginal decreasing utility, 129, 330, 132 Markets and desert, 194 and distribution of medical care, 239 and freedom, 112 and public goods, 246,247 and social justice, 29-30 consernative criticism ctf, 232 a,ntrasting views of liberals and socialists of, 115, 116 not necessarily ""power over" in classical liberalism, 112 socialist criticisms ctf, 50 socialist views of as anarchic, 56, 256 Marx, Karl. See also Marxism; Socialism, 73,125, 234,259,260 and justice as interest of tlcie stronger, 17 and scxial environmentalism, 63

as a rationalist, 55-56 attempt ta do away with markets, 257 ccmnict with Bakwin, 252 critit.idsm of liberal individualism, 68 criticism of moralism, 221, 212 his theory of justice, 214218 not a thetlrist of distributive justice, 218 on development of revolutionary consciousness, 255 on explc.litatinn, 114,211,214-218 on justice under communism, 216 on justice, 210--218, 233 on cjbjectification, 140,141 on relativity of justice, 213,214 on socialism as scientific, 210-213, 2217,218 reluctance tc3 advance principles of justice, 229,251 theory of alienation, 62-63,141 theory of human essence and equality; 140,141 to each according to his needs, 348 Marxism. See also Marx; Sociaiisrn and desert, 214 and developmentalism, 62 and morality, 211 and negative liberty, 93 as politically elitist, 256 law and justice in, 214 view market as anarchic, 256 Masai, 64 McDougall, William, '73 McGuinness, B. F., 24 McKeon, Riclhard, 155 McMurrin, Sterling, 155 McPherson, lames M., 207 Merit. See Dewrt Mill, John Stuart, 45, 71,72, 100, 380, 181,206-208 and heart ctf liberalism, 49 and harm principle, 48,86, 161,227 as a fa'atllibilist, 42 as a rationalist, 55 as anti-paternalistic, 87

as classical liberal, 93 as in exemplar in liberalism, 47-44? 90 as prc3ponent of self-development, 61 a>nceptualstructure OS his theory, 34 criticism of custom, 57, 276 definiticln of utilitarianism, 25 identifies elements of justice, 288 on danger of social equality, 176 on h e d a m and vo1untar.y choice, "l>-47 on individuality and equaliq, 160-1 63 on justice and desert, 183, 3% on justice and moral rights, 1483 on justice and the law, 182,183 t>njustice as keeping faith, 185 on limits of impartiality 185 on progress, 362 on sexual equality, 3723,223,224 on social equaliq, 163, "L4 trtili tarian account of justice, 26 Miller, David, 99,207,208,235 on justice as impartialit-y;185 Miller, Fred, 209 Mltligan, Martin, 173 Mtslesworth, William, 98 Monism and Plato's coflception of authority 240 and po"tive freedom, 87-88,98 and socialismp373,221-223,253 as form csf rationalism, SS as foundation of revisic~nist liberalism, 93,194-199 rectmcifiation of individual and social good in the new liberalism, 196 Rousseau as good example of, 253 Moralilry and ju&ice, 183 and authority, 246-251 and Marxism, 211

Morris, Mary, 181 Morrow John, 99,124,208 Murphey; J, G., 81 My staticm and its duties, 230-234, 262 Nagel, Thornas, 155 argument for equality, 332-334 Na~veson,Jan, 100, 3 25, 259 Needs and coercion, 81 and freedom, 169 and case far equality, 339, 140 and socialist justice, 216 and it-re common gc~od,195 based on theor~lrof human nature, 148 eqtraliv of satisfaction, 147, 248 Sen3 skew off 149,150 Negative liberty. See also Liberty and autarchy, gL%9';7 and classical liberalism, 193 and cc3ercion, "7ff and exercise of capacity for choice, 96 and ineligibility ctf ctptirtns, 79ff and intentional interference, 178 and ordinary language, 77-82 and paternalism, 86 and removal of obstacfes, 79 and vutmtary choice, 95--97" as basic tt3 classical liberalism, 43, 188-194 as ctlmmon good, l10 as opportunity concept, 81-82 as partially competitive good, 110 as pluralistic, 88ff as upsetting patterns, 165 characterized, 77-82 claim that it is not distinct concept, 4.2'45 contrasted to doing what one desj res, 82 Green" view of as basic, 83 limited by law, 114 Mill's theory of, 40 not core of new liberalism, 297

not limited by others' possession cjf power, 117 nut simply about external obstacles, 91; nut the only value in classical liberalism, 170 undermined by positive liberty, 88 Nelt, Edward, 235 New liberalism. Sec-.also Liberalism; Revisionist liberalism and democracy, 49 and desert-bawd social justice, 395, 196 and Mill, 49 and positive liberty; 98 and relation of constraining laws and tiberty, 168,169 and social justice, 44 a>nceptionof justice not based on negative liberty 197 contrast tct classical liberalism, 49 elements of, 49 Nidditch, I), H., 235 Nietsen, Kai, 28, $4,71,124,125, 156, 234 as colleetivjst, 30 criticism of Pliayek on social justice, 27-28 on pawcr of capitalists, 115 Nihilism, 227 Nisbet, Robert, 73, 126,181,2159 on basic conflict of liberty and equality; l74 on equality as attacks on the great, 175 Norman, Richarb, "17,10CIf124,181, 267 atternpt to reconcile liberty and equality, 171-1 74 on cooperative society, 172 on equality and liberty; 179 Nozick, Robert, 3 00, 180 on conflict of liberty and econctmic equality 165, 166 on states as protection agency, 92

O5uuHivan, Nczi+l, 71, 181 OakcshotI; Michael, 71,73,124,181, 259 anti-rationalist view of authority, 239-241 as anti-rationalist, 262 conception of politics, 246 doubts about democracy 241 on change as threat tt3 identity, 64 on dangers of collectivism, 175, l76 on human passions, 65,66 on limits sof knowledge about society, 65 on practical knctwiedge, 54,224 on rationalism, S2ff s i d l a r i q to Hayek, 262 Oilman, Bertii, 73 Oppenheim, Felix, 24,44,124 on powec 106 Owen, Robert; 212 X3assmure, John, 73,208 on civil justice, 1197-149 X3ateman, Caroie, 235 Paternalism, 48,86 X3aul, EIlen Frankel, 209 Fad, Jeffrey, 209 Pennock, J. Rofand, "173,156,179,180 on tension b e h e e n liberty and equality, 158 Peters, R. S,, 155, 157 on presumption in favor of equality, 133 Pettit; Phitip, 118 X3hillips, Derek L., 235 Philosophy and reason, 35 as cleaning up a>nceptual cont-usion, 26 as providing consistency, 19ff Pitkin, Hannah, 24,215,207 X31arnenatz, John, 156 Plato. See also Socrates, 3,24, 25,236 account of justice, 182,230,261,262 and conceptual realism, 7fft 31,3 2, 22,23 as a conservative, 262

as rationalist and collecti\rist, 261 author of Socratic dialr.lgues, 7,223 change in views about fr~rms,24 doubts about democracy, 241 on authctrity, 23S211.0 on interference with liberty far the sake of it-re whctte, 231 Pluralism and attempts to reconcile liberty and equality; 270 and classical liberalism, 93, I16 and conservative collectivism, 232 and Dworkin" egalitarian liberalism, 366 and market wlations, 112,123 and negative liberty, 88ff, 538 as anti-rationaiist, 57-59 as basis of ctmservatism, 239-241 as destructive of ec>mmunity, 227 as foundation for revisionist liberalism, 370,199-206 Berlin" characterization of, 58 Hayek on, 103-104 Pojman, Louis P., 155, 156 Potemarchuq 4, 6, 37, 18,20,186 Political Concepts. See also Complex structured concepts; Concepts; Definitions; Essentially contested concepts; Language and crtnceptiom, 3@32 and exemplars, 32 and picture themy? 10ff and political theories, ix, 3 and political theoriesy40ff and Wittgenstein"s picture theory 9ff

as building blocks uf ideologies, 33 best interpretation of, 36, 40ff, 43 debunking accounts of, 6,9 disputes abc~utintractable, 20ff embedded in system ctf conceptions, 43 need to make coherent, 21-22,26 not simply descriptive, 11,12 private interpretatictm of, 37' realistic aca>untul", 7 shared understanding of, 37

Socrates" three basic convictions about, 7,11 value-neutral anafysis of, 32 Political ideologies and culture, 35-36 and ernution, 3 5 3 6 and reason, 3S36 as systems of conceptions, 33-35 ccmtrasted to political theory, 36ff contrasts to justificatory political theories, 43 Freeden" analysis of, 33E function of, 36 haw incomistertcy of can be enlightening, 37 may legitimize but nut justify, 39-40 understanding, 36ff PoIi ticai tf-reory and clearing up conceptual confusion, 40 and enduring political debates, 770 and rationalism, 54-55 as a view of the world, 262 as framework for the justificatirtns for political a>nceptions,40 as system of interpretatiims of political concepts, 46 ccmtrasted to ideolom, 36ff creative element in, 46 diversity of structures, 262 enduring types, 46-52 justificatory; 39ff#43 must be consistent, 38 p r ~ t i c a nature l of, 47 Politics and equality, 152 as an art, 51,238-241 authoriq in, Chap. 10 ccmservative conception of, 5&51, 66,240 Marx" view as essential to humans, 68-69 Oakeshott" view of, 239-240 rationalist view of, 53,240, 255ff Popper, Karl, 57

Positive liberty: See also Autctnomy; Liberty and authctrity, 88 and basic capabilities, 148, 150 and ed ucatirtn, 92-93 and effective choice, 1171 and equality, 173, 174 and equality in Hcjbhcouse's liberalism, 168,169 and expansion of the state, 103 and forcing to be free, 88-816,121 and paternalism, 86 and pawer tt3 act, 101-105 and property, 113 and real self, 83 and reason, 95,96 and the general will, 219-121 and the welfare state, 92-93'123 as autonomy 82ff as competitive good, 109-110 as development of capacities, 84 as clxercise concept, 84 as monistic, 88ff as =If-chosen life, 8 4 4 5 as undermining negative freedctm, 88 Berlin" criticisms of, 86ff claim that it extends negative liberty, 83,86ff claim that it is not distinct concept, 94,95 influence ctf Mill"s Developmentalism on, 91 not limited by self-imposed restraints, 119 socialist view of, 171 Poverty 102,132-13,195 Power, Chap. 5 "power to" as more general idea, 106 ""power to'3distinguished from ""over," 4 05Ef ""power to'3does not imply ""power cwer," 10106 and antipower, 117-119 and feminism, 220 and freedom, 105,123

and hidden persuasion, 206 and justice, 5, 6, 50,211, 218ff, 251, 252 and markets, 115,116 and property; 110ff, 114 as central concept of Marxism, 212 as competitive gctod, 109-110 as essentialty contested concept, 105,123 capitalism and transfer of, 211 ccmtrol theories of, 106ff effect theories ctf, 107ff equality of, 50,152,218ff, 251,252 political, equality of, 152, 218ff, 252ff Preferences. See Desires Preobrazhensky E., 260 Prisc3ner 3 dilemma, 190-l 92 Private judgment and authority, 241 problems of overcome by authority 247-251 Property; private and basis of justice, 190 and desert, l94 and equality of holdings, 265 and freedrrrm, 110-1 16 and justice, 28, 190 and tockean justice, 193 and positive liberty, 113 and slavery, 183 and freedctm, 113 as ""power to," "212 as bundle of rights, 111 as contientional rules, 225 basis of, 111 conflict with merit' 198 classical liberal views of, 110-114 government as protector of in classical liberalism, 32 necessary for liberty in classical liberalism, 160 not basic to Rawls"fiberalism, 206 not necessarily ""power over" in classical liberalism, 112 socialist claims that it is based on pawer over, 114-1 16

socialist claims that it is exploitative, 114,211 Public goods, 246,247 Public/private distincticm, 36-38, 153 Rachefs, James, 207 Rakowski, Eric, 156,157 Rationalism. Sec @]soRationality; Reason and civil justice, l 98 and desert, 196 and enduring political theories, 60 and equality, 175,176 and expert authority in socialism, 2SL%257 and Kant's theory of freedom, 23 6, 317 and legislation, 226 and liberalism, 54, 56ff and Marxism, 212 and Plato, 261 and positive liberty, 89ff and the republican theory of freedom, 119 and rise of middle class, 54 and science, 52, 56 and S n ' s view of capabilities, 149 and social environmentalism, 65 and social justice, 299 and socialism, 54,56,212,25&258 and the Enlightenment, 56ff and tradition, 52 as assertion that all knowledge is technical, 53-54 as basis of consenlati\7e authctrity, 238ff as comtructivist, 54 as ignoring practical knowledge, 54 consernative criticism ctf, 53, 55, 37'5,176, 2211fft 228 distinguished from byperrationalism, 57 general characterization of, 52ff of my stiltictn and its duties, 262Rationality. Sec also Ra tionalism; Reason

and cleaning u p conceptual confusions, 20ff and crtherence, 35 and freedrrrm in Hobhouse" theory 163 and equality, 143-245 and justificatictn, 39 and pl-titosophy, 35 and political .theory, 36-38 and positive liber& 95-96 and structure of ideologies, 35 as basis for equality, 141 Rawls, John, 25,73,124,155-157,180, 207-203,248 and ega1.itariazlism, 203-206 and equal concern and respect, 200 and invidability ctf persons, 20 and moderate socialism, 218 and socialist conceptions of justice, 210 as crtntractualist, 201-203 as individualist, 68, 200,204 as pluralist, 200,201 developmental aspects of, 201 h o r k i n ' s egalitarian characterization of, 204 general conception of justice, 203-205 liberal aspect of, 205 on desert, 202-204 on maximin, 203 on moral arbitrariness of talents, 134 on primary goods, 349 on priority of liberty, 205,206 on special conception of justice, 205,206 on talents as ccrrllective asset, 144 on veil of ignorance, 202 Raz, Joseph, 99,156 analysis of egalitarian arguments, 143-145 conception of autonomy, 8 4 8 5 Real self and Mill" bad bridge case, 47 and monism, 89 and positive liberty, 83,47,121

and the general will, 120 applied tc7t society, 87-88 Berlin" criticism of, 87ff Reason. Sec also Rationalism; Rationality and authority, 242 and custom, 57 and freedom, 85 and language, 139,143 and rationalism, 54 and truth about values, 558 Burke on limits ctf, 55-56 importance of in liberalism, 57 liberal skegticism about, 57 Rec/tfssEanl,160 Redress, principle of, l34 Reeve, Henry, 280 Rehg, William, 235,259 Republicanism, 218,119 Revisiclnist liberalism. Sec anlso Liberalism; New liberalism and cc~lfectivism,200 and desert, 194,196,206 and developmentalism, 61-63 and moral arbitrariness of talents, 133,134 and positive liberq, 82-93 as rationalistic, S s 6 0 Berlin" view that it is monistic, 58 conception of democracy, 223 Dworkin's conception of as egalitarian, 16G168 influence of Mill's devel opmentalism ctn, 91 Macpherson" criticism of, 62 monistic versicms, 194-200 not all advocates endorse positive liberty, 93 overlapping with moderate socialism, 262 pluralistic versions, 199-206 relation of liberty and equality in, 166-1 70 summary of conceptual structure of, 93 Rights and authority, 247

and democracy 222,223 and duties, 186 and groups, 232,233 and justice, 21-22,111,183, 184, 246 and liabilities, 187 and Lockean justice, 193 and social good, 21-22 as claims, 186, 187 as immunities, 287 as liberties, 186,187 as personal free space, 113 as powers, 187,223 as positive and negative, 186,187 coXXectivist account cif, 200 equal basic, 151 human, a>nservativecri ticism of, 55,121,122 different senEs of, 188 Hobhouse on equality of, 169 in f-tobbes" state of nature, 189, 190 inequality of under consenratism, 231 Mill's case for equality of, 161 moral distinguished from legal, 183 natural, 193 of Englishmen in Burke, 121,123 of gcttiernmrsnt and authority, 239 of Hobbesian sovereign, 190 of minorities, 3 99 of women, 178,223,224 that comprise property 111-312 types of, 185-188 Riker, William, 235 Ritchie, D. G,, 73 Robbins, Lord, 59,72 Robinson, R, E., 207 Robwn, J. M., 71,lEIO Rockefejler, John D., 215 Rodman, John R., 99 Rogers, JoeX, 235, 259 on demcrrcracy and authority, 253 on socialism as equal freedom and power, 252

on socialist conception of democracy 221,222 Ross, W D., 155 Rossie, Alice S., 181 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 125,179,259 as a,llectivist, 67,232 as monist, 253 on democracy, 253-255 on distinction between civil and moral freedom, 119 on freedom as absnce of perstmal dependence, 120 on harmony of liberty and equality, 358 on relation csf law and freedom, 119 tendency tct gloriQ the pectple, 254, 255 Runcirnan, W. G., 100 Russell, Bertrand, 124 R u ~ i a nIievoluticm, 51 Ryan, Alan, 72,74,125, 155 Scanlon, Thomas, 234 Saint-Sirnon, Curnte de, 212 Science and rationalism, 52,56 and socialism, 56,255-257 Selby-Bigge, L. A., 235 %If-interest and lzanlo eco~lotnicus,61 and markets, l13 as theory of human nature, 61 and Rawls' thectry of justice, 392, 204 in ciassical liberalism, 160 %n, Amartya, 155,157 basic capability view, 14%2,150 on goods fetish, 143 on handicapped, 149,150 Shapiro, !an, 74 Shils, Edward, 235 Shklar, Judith, 234 Skepticism, 42, 52, 57 Skinner, Quentin, 160 Skinner, A. S., 125 SIote, Michael, 207 Sluga, E-Tans, 24

Smith, Adam, 125 on invisible 'hand, 113 Smith, j. C., 207 Snare, Francis, 125 Social environmentalism. See nlso E-Tt~mannature and collectivism, 66 and conservatism, 64: and Marxist socialism, 212 and reconciliation of freedom as pawer with ideal of free persons, 104 as theory of human nature, 6 3 4 5 Social good. See also Collectivism; Common good; Utilitarianism and justice, 20-22,26,160-163 and mural collectivism, 68 and public interest, 37 constrained by justice in Rawls's liberalism, 201 Social justice. See nlso Justice; Revisionist liberalism and under representation of minorities, 199 and civil justice, 298, 199 and Nagel" argument far equality, 132 and new liberalism, 49, 194f.E as essentially contested concept, 26f&29ff as fmdarnental moral imperative, 27 collectivist understanding of, 30 convergence ctf revisionist liberals and socialists on, 210 disputes about, 34-35 fatilitatory, 298, 199 Hayek" criticism of, 27, 30, 196 Hobhouse%cconcepticm of, 195 Rawfs9heory of, 201-206 relation tr3 individualism and collectivism, 66 two key features, 34 Socialism, Sec also Marx; Marxism ambivalence about principles of substantive justice, 219

ambivalence towards authoriq in, 258 anarchist textdencies of, 251,252 and collectivismf29-30,66,68 and democracy, 172,218-223 and desert, 214 and develupmentalism, 62 and feminism, 220 and equality of pawer, 50,218-223 and freedom as resources, 102ff and justice as desert, 216 and justice as equality, 216 and justice as needs fulfiilment, 216 and justice, 2&ff,22-30, 2163--.223 and moral arbitrariness of talents, 133,134 and rationalist planning, 256258 and Rawis" theory of justice, 21Q and reconciliation of liberty and equality, 50,176-174 and social environmentalism, 63, 65,304,212 and social equality, 152 and tramformation of capitalist man, 64: as critical of liberal individualism, 219 as favoring effect theories of power, 108 as overlapping revisicmist liberal justice, 210, 262 as rationalistic, 54, 56, 60, 212, 255-257 as scientific, 56, 21Qff atternpt to do away with markets, 257 authoritarian tendencies of, 258 authority in democratic versions, 252,253,255 Berlin" view that it is monistic, 5&59 criticism ctf Rawls" account of motivation, 204 defense of hierarcl~yin, 256 eqtraliv as core, 4-49 faith in ability tt3 control society, 65

its voltmtaristic conception of justice, 220 Lenin's view ctf, 255,256 limits of wants under, 104 on inadequacy ctf the welfare state, 218 on liberty and economic equality, 166 on markets as cclmpetitive and a>nflictual,115, 136 on power c~fcapitalists, 114, 115, 218 on property and Ereedrrrm/ 114 place of expert autharity in, 257 reludance to advance principles of justice, 233 summary of a>nceptualstructure of, 70,261 supporters who endorse negative liberty, 93 tendency to glorify the people in, 255 tension belween substantive and procedural justice, 254,255 utctpian, 211, 23 2 Society SW also Cojlectivism; Community; Individualism and desert, 296 and equality of opportunity, 154 and justice, 27, 30, Chap. 9 and positive liberty, 87-88 artificial in ciassical liberalism, 92 as mass of competitiuns, 197-199 as an organic whole, 230,231 as realm of impersonal forces, 27' as system of mutual advantage, 201 cclftectivist analysis of, 67' 2232 complexity and inequality ctf, 175 ccmRict and ccrroperaticm in, 201 conservative hierarcKcal a>nception,232 evolutionary account of, 59 individualist analysis of, 67' justice as organization of, in socialism, 27, 30 justice as the proper c~rdering,230ff

organic theory of, 177 rationalist attempts to remold, 55 relation of to individuals, 66ff undermined by vice, 228,229 Socrates. See nlsu Pbto, viii, 16,40 account of justice, 6,230,260-261 abstractness of his definition of justice, 3 9 and cclherence in concepts, 19 and justice as action guidingf 112 and need for consistent concepts, 22 and Plato, 23 and task of philosophy, 39ff and the idea of an exemplar, 32 and westem political philosophy, 3 basic a>ntiictionsand Wittgenstein, 17ff criticism of traditional Creek noticm of justice, 51% definitirjn of shape, 7-43 definiticln of virtue, 24 methad ctf, 35 on adequate definitions, 17, 18 on aims ctf a ruler, 5 on authority, 5 on clearing up conceptual confusion, 26 on definitionst 8'22 on justice as giving each his due and paying debts, 4 on justice as the interest ctf the strc>nger,S on need for cr>nsistentconceptic~n of justice, 21 three, basic convicticms about political a>ncepts,7, 22 two errors of, 17ff Spector, Horacio, 99,100 Spiegelberg, Herbert 155 Stalin, Josef, 21 State of nature and coordination yrobfen~, 243-245 and prisoner" dilemma, 1912 classical liberal view of, 91-92 equality in, 142, l43

Hobbesian account of, 188-192 Kant on, 116,117',24'7,248 lack of freedom in, 168 Lockean accowt of, 41-92,193, 247,248 problems of private judgment in, 247,248 Steiner, Willel, 98 Stephen, lames Fitzjames, 236 as tlclnservative critic of liberalism, 227; 229 Sterba, James l?, 380,234,235 Stern, David G,, 24 Stewart, Robert M., 208 Styron, WitTiam, 155 Sumer, L. W., 207,208 Swanton, Christine, 44,445 Sweet, William, 73,100,325 TaXen ts as resources, l48 moral arbitrarhess of, 133,334 "Tall poppies,;,"'117, 181 Ewney; R. H,, 124,125,355,156 and Christian foundations of egalitarianism, 338 and nonpreferen tial conception of equality, 127 on Freedtjm as power tt3 act, 201 on meeting different needs, l40 on pctwer c-tf capitalists over workers, 114 E y , Alice Erh-Soon, 355,208 Taylor; Charles, 99,1Q0 Thatcher, Margaret, 123 Thrasymacus, 5,6,9, 27,28,20 R)cqueville, Alexis de, 180 and political authority 238 on social equality, 163, 164,176 Traditim hfillian criticism of, 17'6 and conservative account of law, 2 22 and conservative account of poli tics, 2240 and ctmservative justice, 224 and conservative liberties, 2 21

and justice, 233 and practical knowledge, 54 as obstacle to positive liberty, 86 central to cornervatism, 55-56 consernative delense of, 176 ignored by French revc3f utionaries, 55 rationalist suspicic3n of, 52 Tucker, D.F.B., 73 Tucker, Robert C., 72,125,234,259 Ukrainian prisoners of war, 21-22 Umpire theory of authctrity, 258ff Utilitarianism and classical liberal equality, 160-1 63 and equality, 329-132 and justice, 20-26,160-4 63 and marginal decreasing utitilit?i, 129-1 32 as morally ct3llectivistic, 21fft 1JO Bentham" characterization of, 329 Value statements, 12 as nonsense, 13 Verlificationist theory of meaning, 20 Virginia BecXaration of Rights, 137, 142 Virtues and justice, 233 conservative, 226-230 disagreement within comematism about, 123 VXastos, Cregory, 155 Voltaire, 57' von Humboldt, Wilhelm, 71 von Mises, Ludwig, 1717, 2 8 0 on egalitarianism, 177 on human inequali~;165 on importance of reason, 57 on limits ctf reason, 57 Waldron, Jeremlii,44 Mialzer, Michael, 153,157 Wattt E. D., 259 Weinstein, W. L., 99

Welfare as preference-satisfaction, 146, 147 equali'ty of, 14&%147 Welfare state. See nfsn Revisionist liberalism; %?cialjustice and equality of opportunity, 3399 and human development, 196 and positive liberty, 92-93, 103 and social justice, 27 e x p m i o n of after Second World W r , 195 Westin, Peter, 157 IIVestmorland, Rnbert, 155, 1156 Willjams, Bernard, 156 case for equality, 13S140 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 24, 248 and conceptual inct3nsistency, 19-2 1 and social nature of concepts, 17 and Socrates%basic convictir~ns,12, 17% 23 and Williaxns" case for equality, 13&140 approach to conceptual confusion, 198f on ethics as mystical, 11 on fcjrms of life, 16 on lack of conceptual essences, 18-29,32 on language games, 15ff on language picturhg the world, Qff, 12ff on practical nature of language, 47 on St. Augustine's view of language, 12ff WoIP, Susan, 99 Willfenden Repart 227,228 Wolff, Robert Paul, 258 Wilod, Allen, 213,234 might, A. W., 235 Yc)ung, Robert' 99 Yugoslavia, 219 Zalta, Edward N., 171,207'

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Key Concepts in Political Communication (SAGE Key Concepts series)

Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought: New Theories of the Political (Routledge Innovations in Political Theory)

Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought New Theories of the Political (Routledge Innovations in Political Theory)

Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development

Multiculturalism and Political Theory

Islam and Political Legitimacy

Multiculturalism and political theory

Constitutionalism and Political Reconstruction

Levinas and the Political

Foucault and the Political

Political Concepts and Political Theories