Operational Research in War and Peace : The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970

M a u r i c e

W

K i r b y

O P E R A T I O N A L R E S E A R C H IN WAR A N D PEACE THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE 1930s TO 1970 Imperial College Press

O P ERAT I O N AL R ESEARC H I N WAR A N D P E A C E THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE 1930s TO 1970

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Maurice W Kirby Lancaster University, UK

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Imperial College Press

Published by Imperial College Press 57 Shelton Street Covent Garden London WC2H 9HE and The Operational Research Society Seymour House 12 Edward Street Birmingham, Bl 2RX Distributed by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: Suite 202, 1060 Main Street, River Edge, NJ 07661 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH IN WAR AND PEACE The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970 Copyright © 2003 by Imperial College Press and the Operational Research Society All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

ISBN ISBN

1-86094-297-0 1-86094-366-7 (pbk)

Printed in Singapore.

Contents

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

ix

List of Illustrations

xi

Acknowledgements

xiii

1. Introduction

1

2. The Origins of Operational Research: Military and Other Antecedents to 1937

30

3. The Beginnings of Operational Research: British Air Strategy, 1920-1940

58

4. The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research, 1940-1945

86

5. Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945

132

6. The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research, 1945-1951

185

7. Operational Research in Iron and Steel

209

8. Operational Research in Coalmining

253

9. The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960: The Corporate Sector

293

10. Operational Research in the Public Sector

334

11. The Institutional Development of Operational Research

365

Bibliography

413

Index

437 v

Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett (Baron Blackett of Chelsea), the 'Father' of Operational Research in 1964

List of Figures

1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.3 10.1

Science Schema Appleyard's Diagrams Flash Spotting Layout of a Sound-Ranging Section Tizard ('Tizzy') Angle The Structure of Coastal Command Headquarters Frequency Plotted Against Time Interval: Data up to May 1941 The First Sixteen Attacks to be Analysed Mean Centre Points for Attacks Shipping Losses as a Result of U-boat Action, 1941-3 Accuracy of Night Bombing of German Cities Monthly Totals of Tons Dropped Per Sorties Despatched by Bomber Command The Growth of BISRA The Organisation of BISRA Total Importing Cost Repair Queueing Model Typical Availability Chart (12-furnace shop) Growth of Operational Research Staff in FIG, 1947-65 Organisation of the Operational Research Branch Results of Monte Carlo Computations of Warning Time O.R. Groups in Civil Departments of British Civil Service

Vll

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List of Tables

3.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 7.1 8.1 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4

Summary of Pre-War Expansion Schemes — 1934-1939 U-boat Effectiveness During the Second World War Progress of Lethality of Attacks Percentage of Attacking Sorties Within Three Miles of Aiming Point Density at the Aiming Point — German Cities Bomber Command Targets in the European Theatre, October-December 1944 Bomber Command Targets in the European Theatre, January-April 1945 German War Production, 1942-1944 Actual and Potential Armaments Production, 1943-4 Absence Episodes per 1000 Working Shifts Information Used in Selection Procedure Attendance at the First IFORS Conference The National Societies in IFORS, with their Year of Joining Area of Employment in Operational Research Respondents' First Degree Subject

IX

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List of Illustrations

Frontispiece: Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, the 'Father' of Operational Research in 1964. Patrick Blackett, the young physicist. Sir Henry Tizard. Sir Robert Watson-Watt. F. A. Lindemann. Sir Arthur T. Harris. Dr B. G. Dickens. Solly Zuckerman. Sir Charles Goodeve. Stafford Beer Roger Eddison. B. H. P. ('Pat') Rivett. Philip M. Morse. Sir Owen Wansbrough-Jones. Sir William K. Slater. The Earl of Halsbury.

XI

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Acknowledgements

I have incurred many debts in writing this book, the first of two projected volumes on the history of operational research in Britain. I am grateful to Robert Fildes for stimulating my early interest in the subject and to Rebecca Capey for research assistance. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to the Operational Research Society for funding the costs of the project. I must also acknowledge the invaluable support that I have received from members of the Society's Archives Committee — John Friend, J. D. Griffiths, Brian Haley, Norman Lawrie, Bob Miles, George Mitchell, Maurice Shutler, Richard Storey, Rolfe Tomlinson and Christine Woodland. All of them have given liberally of their advice and without their assistance this first stage of the project could not have been brought to fruition. Special thanks are due to Norman Lawrie in his capacity as a stern but sympathetic critic: his unerring eye for inconsistencies and infelicities in exposition has resulted in a much improved manuscript. Beyond the Archives Committee, I wish to acknowledge the help received from the following individuals: Jim Bamberg, Ray Beatty, Stafford Beer, Ken Bowen, Christopher Chapman, Peter Checkland, Roger Collcutt, David Comins, Sebastian Cox, Nigel Cummings, Peter Davies, Ian Disley, R. T Eddison, Samuel Eilon, Caroline Elliott, Ernest Field, Alec Glaskin, Carl Harris, J. Harrington, E. K. James, H. G. Jones, Ernest Koenigsberg, John Lawrence, Fred Lloyd, Robert Locke, John Macfarlane, Mike Makower, Alan Mercer, Hugh Miser, Jim Morrison, John Mowat, David Owen, Janet Parker, Peter Pengilly, R. W. Pipe, Graham Rand, John Ranyard, Pat Rivett, Shirley Rodden, Jonathan Rosenhead, Ronnie Shephard, Brian Shorrock, David Steer, John Stringer, Ian Taylor, Derek Trigg, Stephen Watson, Doug White and Brian Whitworth. Needless to say, they bear no responsibility for the opinions expressed or for any errors of fact or interpretation. Maurice W. Kirby xiii

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Patrick Blackett, the young physicist

Sir Henry Tizard, Chairman of the CSSAD

Sir Robert Watson-Watt, Superintendent of the Radio Department, National Physical Laboratory

F. A. Lindemann, Lord Cherwell, one time member of the CSS AD and Paymaster-General in the wartime Coalition Government

Sir Arthur T. Harris, Bomber Command's outstanding Commander-in-Chief, 1942-5

Dr. B. G. Dickens, Officer-in-Charge, Bomber Command's Operational Research Section

Professor Solly (later Lord) Zuckerman in 1945

Sir Charles Goodeve, Director of BISRA

Stafford Beer, pioneer of Operational Research and Cybernetics in the iron and steel industry

Roger Eddison, Founding Editor of the Operational Research Quarterly

Professor B. H. P. ('Pat') Rivett, pioneer of Operational Research in the coalmining industry and first Professor of Operational Research in a British university

Professor P. M. Morse, Operational Research practitioner and the outstanding advocate of Operational Research in American universities

Sir Owen Wansbrough-Jones, President of the Operational Research Society, 1954-5

Sir William Slater, President of the Operational Research Society, 1956-7

The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Halsbury, President of the Operational Research Society, 1960-1

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1

Introduction

This book provides an account of the history of operational research in Britain, the country of its inception, from the late 1930s to 1970. Originating in the prewar plans for the air defence of Great Britain against the Luftwaffe, by the end of the 1960s operational research had achieved substantial, if uneven diffusion throughout the civilian sector, both public and private. In the decade after the war operational research became well-established at the industry-specific level with a significant presence in the nationalised coal industry, the British Iron and Steel Research Association (BISRA), and the larger iron and steel companies. During the 1960s, coincident with the diffusion of corporate forms of enterprise into the manufacturing sector, the discipline was incorporated in the managerial structures of a wide variety of firms, from petroleum products and man-made fibres to confectionery and printing and publishing. By that time too, operational research had made its presence felt in the transport sector, including civil aviation, British Railways and London Transport, as well as in such public utilities as electricity generation, gas and atomic energy. Diffusion in the 1960s was also reflected in the emergence of operational research as a subject worthy of advanced study in universities. Initially confined to postgraduate courses, by the mid1970s several i n s t i t u t i o n s of h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n w e r e offering undergraduate degree programmes in operational research, either singly or jointly with other 'management' oriented subjects. Finally, from the mid-1960s onwards, operational research found increasing acceptance in civil g o v e r n m e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , both central a n d local. This development, precipitated in part by the modernising ethos of the then Labour Government, continued after 1970, by which time operational research had come to be a valued activity in Whitehall, not least in the Treasury and the Civil Service Department.

1

2 Operational Research in War and Peace A combination of acknowledged utilitarian value and formal academic recognition within thirty years of its foundation is consistent with an impressive trajectory of achievement for any human endeavour and it gives rise to a number of explanatory hypotheses. At one extreme, it might be argued that in the light of its wartime contribution to military effectiveness, the postwar diffusion of operational research was virtually guaranteed by a wave of enthusiasm propelled, wholly or in part, by wartime practitioners who, in returning to their civilian occupations, proved to be able and effective advocates of the application of 'science' to the process of management, broadly defined. Alternatively, it is possible that operational research, even at its inception, was sufficiently grounded in pre-existing developments, such as 'scientific management' and the 'rationalisation' of industry, that there could be no significant obstacles to its adoption thereby giving rise to a smooth and linear diffusion process. Thus, to the extent that the advocates of operational research were able to capitalise on some well-established trends in managerial organisation, they could lay little claim to originality. Before these and other hypotheses can be evaluated it is necessary to define the methodology and subject matter of operational research, always bearing in mind that formal definitions did not begin to appear until the later 1940s. That was the period when several of the leading wartime practitioners of the discipline described, as far as the Official Secrets Act would allow, its military origins and uses, as well as its potential civilian applications. At a conference held in Dundee under the auspices of the British Association in 1947, the innovator of radar, Sir Robert Watson-Watt, stated that although he had been directly involved in the inauguration of operational research in the period to 1940, he had no recollection of any generally accepted definition emerging then or subsequently. The exception was his own 'negative thesis,' maintained with 'damned iteration,' that 'Operational Research is not doing arithmetic for Air Staff.'1 For the Dundee audience, therefore, Watson-Watt presented his own definition of operational research — 'for industry as well as in war': To examine quantitatively whether the user organisation is getting from the operation of its equipment the best attainable contribution to its overall objective, what are the predominant factors governing the results at a minimal cost in effort and time, and the degree to which variations in the tactical objectives are likely to contribute to a more economical and timely attainment of the overall strategic objective.2

Introduction 3 Despite the claim that he had encompassed the non-military applications of operational research, the overall consensus was that Watson-Watt's definition was unduly limited: it may have described accurately the modus operandi of the scientists and engineers engaged in the radar-based system of aircraft interception in advance of the Battle of Britain, but it failed to convey the wider relevance of the discipline. This point was addressed explicitly in 1948 by Sir Charles Goodeve, the former Deputy Controller of Research and Development at the Admiralty. After stating his own 'shorthand' definition of operational research as 'quantitative common sense,' G o o d e v e t h e n cited w i t h a p p r o v a l (and w i t h m i n i m a l embellishment) Charles Kittel's 1947 definition of operational research as 'a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control.' 3 It was this sparse formulation which provided the basis for most of the subsequent definitions of operational research, at least until the 1970s. Its full flowering was reflected in the definition adopted by the UK Operational Research Society and prominently displayed on the first page of its house journal, the Operational Research Quarterly, from 1967 onwards: Operational Research is the application of the methods of science to complex problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of men, machines, materials, and money in industry, business and defence. The distinctive approach is to develop a scientific model of the system, incorporating measurements of factors such as chance and risk, with which to predict and compare the outcome of alternative decisions, strategies or controls. The purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically. The immediately striking aspect of this definition is its assertion that operational research was rooted in the methodology of 'science.' 4 In this respect, it is clear that one of the immediate concerns of the postwar pioneers of the discipline was to establish their credentials by reference not only to the mathematical basis of operational research, but also by rooting it in the established traditions of scientific enquiry with a particular emphasis on the objective appraisal of evidence. For the eminent scientist and philosopher, Karl Popper, 'every statement must be testable' in the sense that A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems of statements and tests them step by step.

4 Operational Research in War and Peace In the field of empirical sciences, more particularly, he constructs hypotheses or systems of theories and tests them against experience of observation and measurement.5 In the context of operational research, Popper's definition of the scientific method had already been anticipated by another scientist of distinction who had himself fulfilled a decisive role in the diffusion of operational research after 1940. Indeed, no account of the history of operational research would be complete without generous acknowledgement of the pioneering endeavours of Professor Patrick Blackett (later Lord Blackett). As a young physicist of outstanding ability, responsible for important advances in knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g of cosmic rays, rock magnetism and atomic physics, Blackett had been a key member of the official committee convened by Sir Henry Tizard in 1934 to advise the government on the effective air defence of Great Britain. After 1940, Blackett was primarily responsible for the diffusion of operational research from RAF Fighter Command throughout the greater part of the military command structure. He played the leading role in the creation of operational research sections in Ack-Ack and Coastal Commands before his appointment as Director of Naval Operational Research at the Admiralty in January 1942, a position which he held until the end of the war.6 Combining the role of scientist with the practice of operational research, Blackett has long been regarded as the 'father' of the discipline and as a Nobel Prize winner (1948) he was certainly well qualified to comment on the nature of operational research in its scientific context. His thoughts are conveniently summarised in the first issue of the Operational Research Quarterly, published in March 1950. Quoting with approval Kittel's definition, Blackett was mainly concerned to define the remit of operational research in relation to 'the application of the scientific method.' This could be defined as a systematic method of learning by experience. In more detail, scientific method may be defined as that combination of observations, experiment and reasoning (both deductive and inductive) which scientists are in the habit of using in their scientific investigations.8 Whilst conceding that this was a very general formulation, Blackett concluded that it conveyed accurately the two essential elements of any scientific investigation, namely

Introduction 5 (a) Observation which may in itself be something quite simple or a very complicated survey and may or may not be supported by special experiment, but which must be so carried out that it provides reliable information on the material observed; and (b) Reasoning which may often take one of the forms of numerical deduction and induction covered by the term statistical analysis. It may be noted that it is the use of appropriate and precise methods of observation and reasoning that make an investigation scientific. The fact that the initial material is scanty, as sometimes may be the case in operational research, does not of itself render an investigation unscientific, although no amount of scientific method can get more out of data than there is in them and one of the initial approaches to any problem must be to examine the material, consider what conclusions can be drawn from it and decide what further information is required and how it can be obtained.9 Defined in this way, Blackett was prepared to admit that the scientific method had often been applied to 'the analysis of human life and organisation,' a judgement validated by reference to the literature of applied economics and the statistical analyses carried out by a variety of research bodies such as Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.), the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and individual industry research associations. Thus, to the extent that operational research is 'merely the scientific method applied to the complex data of human society, however useful it might be, it certainly is not new.' It is in this context, therefore, that a full account of the history of operational research must place it in its correct historical setting. Whilst the following chapter establishes the origins of operational research by reference to its specific antecedents in the period to 1937, it is appropriate to examine the wider societal background to its pre-history in this introductory chapter in the general context of the scientific method as defined by Blackett. In this respect, it is possible to draw on the insights provided by Robert Locke in his study of management and higher education in advanced industrial countries after 1940.10 The explanatory tool deployed by Locke to analyse 'the application of science to the solution of managerial problems' in the modern era is the emergence of the ' n e w p a r a d i g m ' in business studies. This can be illustrated diagrammatically as follows:

6 Operational Research in War and Peace ^.Science ^

Philosophy, logic, mathematics, neo­ classical economics

natural sciences (physics, chemistry, etc.)

engineering sciences

social sciences including management studies

Figure 1.1 Science Schema Source: Robert Locke, Management and Higher Education since 1940: The Influence of America and ]apan on West Germany, Britain and France (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1989), Fig. 1.1, p. 3.

The figure distinguishes between the formal and empirical sciences and divides the latter into theoretical (pure) and practical (applied) branches. The practical sciences are themselves divided into technical and human relations sub-groups. The direction of the arrows, from left to right, is indicative of the evolution of the sub-groups and is thus illustrative of the emergence of the 'new paradigm.' In moving from left to right, the main precipitating factor in relation to the formal sciences was mathematics — 'the most significant and pervasive scientific tool of modern times.' 11 During the nineteenth century mathematics was transformed from a subject concerned mainly with numbers and shapes into a discipline with a wide variety of applications, both theoretical and practical. Critical in this respect were the insights provided by George Boole who applied arithmetic and a 'new' algebra to Aristotelian logic, thereby demonstrating that the existing laws of reasoning could be expressed in symbolic form: logical processes could thus be clarified by the precision of mathematical reasoning. Boolean algebra was entirely consistent with the emergent view among mathematicians that algebraic formulae and manipulations could be used to denote entities other than

Introduction 7 numbers, and that the methods of algebra could be applied to classes or collections of phenomena beyond ordinary arithmetic. As such, Boole's approach appealed both to pure and applied mathematicians, in the latter case primarily because of the insights it provided into the laws of probability. 12 A further significant development germane to the emergence of the 'soft' sciences was the growth of knowledge and understanding in the area of mathematical statistics. Since it was only the 'hard' sciences which could engage in laboratory experiment (in the sense that all variables could be held constant except two that could be varied in order to produce precise results), statistical inference rooted in the mathematics of probabilities could replicate for the 'soft' sciences some of the rigour of the scientific method insofar as it was a credible substitute for laboratory experiment. This view that the methodology of operational research was rooted in prevailing techniques of statistical analysis was also shared by Charles Goodeve, himself a university-trained scientist, and the outstanding postwar advocate of the new discipline. As he commented in 1948, In most problems there are a number of variables to be considered. Our first objective is to find the correlation between these variables, our second to test the stability of this correlation by finding the causal link lying behind it, and our final objective is to estimate the likely consequences of any particular change that may be imposed upon the system. We thus provide ourselves with a quantitative basis for any decision to be made regarding the change.13 It was this basic methodology which had been applied to the solution of a wide range of tactical problems during the Second World War. Nowhere was this more evident than in the anti-U-boat campaign and the justification for a convoy system in the North Atlantic. Chapter 4 deals with this issue in detail but some aspects of the approach adopted by operational researchers can be legitimately raised in this introductory chapter since they provide critical insights into their emergent methodology. Convoying of merchant vessels across the Atlantic was a vital factor in sustaining Britain's military capability in the First World War and so it proved again in the later conflict. In revalidating the convoy system after 1940, the key issues for analysis in relation to the optimal speed of a convoy were as follows:

8

Operational Research in War and Peace How does the number of ships in the convoy depend u p o n the speed of the convoy? Is the speed the direct cause or the effect? How many ships are likely to be saved if the speed is increased? What will be the cost resulting from the elimination of re-routing of slow ships etc.?14

Clearly, the s p e e d of t h e c o n v o y w a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e in conformity w i t h G o o d e v e ' s methodological generalisation, b u t It may be that the correlated rate of sinkings really depends on some other variable itself accidentally inversely correlated to the speed. For example, the ships may make smoke when steaming at lower speeds and thus be detected by a U-boat at a longer range. However, a study of the performance of the enemy's submarines and of his tactics showed clearly a direct causal link. It was possible to go and predict approximately the relation between sinkings and speed, and the relation was found to agree satisfactorily with the operational data. It could, therefore, be predicted that if it was decided to make a certain increase in speed of convoys a certain increased safety was to be expected. The loss due to various dislocations of convoy routine was separately calculated and set against the gain, and the net result formed the basis for decisions to increase speed in many important convoys. 15 A f u r t h e r e x a m p l e of m e t h o d o l o g i e s i n f o r m e d b y e l e m e n t a r y s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s is p r o v i d e d b y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of p r o b a b i l i t y calculations to tactical p r o b l e m s . A g a i n this w a s illustrated b y G o o d e v e , given his considerable appreciation of m a n y of the w a r t i m e applications of operational research. In the case of G e r m a n E-boats o p e r a t i n g in the English Channel, for e x a m p l e , it w a s found that t w o s e p a r a t e counter­ a t t a c k i n g flotillas h a d w i d e l y differing p e r c e n t a g e s of s i g h t i n g s . O n investigation it w a s discovered that there w a s n o statistical difference b e t w e e n the flotillas w i t h r e g a r d to the time taken to identify the e n e m y position. H o w e v e r , The average taken was a linear average, whereas the probability of interception is a function of the inverse third or fourth power of the time. Therefore, the average taken should have been of the times raised to the third or fourth power rather than to the first. When this was done, there was a marked difference found in the averages of the two flotillas, quite sufficient to account for the difference in success. 16

Introduction 9 It was evident, therefore, that there were considerable fluctuations in transmission times, with the successful intercepting flotilla in receipt of far more short transmission times, notwithstanding the fact that the overall average was the same for the other flotilla. For Goodeve, therefore, the application of the scientific method in this way was entirely consistent with 'quantitative common sense.' In 1950, Blackett advanced the claim for the 'newness' of operational research not by reference to its use of the scientific method but to 'the level at which the work is done, in the comparative freedom of the investigators to seek out their own problems and in the direct relation of the work to the possibilities of executive action.' 17 Whilst this was an accurate indication of a great deal of the operational research carried out in wartime, the postwar history of the discipline shows clearly that Blackett failed to anticipate the difficulties encountered by operational researchers in securing an equivalent remit in civil affairs. Although operational research was readily adopted by the coal, iron and steel, civil aviation and petroleum industries in the period to 1960, its penetration into the manufacturing sector was initially slow. Moreover, when the pace of diffusion accelerated after 1960 the coverage was notably uneven so that as late as 1970 operational researchers could not take their status for granted in corporate managerial hierarchies. In Whitehall too, significant diffusion beyond military affairs was delayed until the later 1960s after a brief flirtation of interest in the immediate postwar years. At one level, the peacetime trajectory of operational research is readily explicable by the very fact of the termination of the national emergency which had given birth to it and guaranteed its rapid diffusion throughout the military command structure. The fact remains that during the war operational research had a clearly defined purpose and a limited time scale: its achievements were intermittently dramatic in increasing military effectiveness and the credibility of the discipline was enhanced all the more for having been sponsored by civilian scientists of considerable talent and distinction. The postwar diffusion of operational research is analysed in detail in chapters 6-11, but in the present context it is necessary to highlight one aspect of the history of the discipline which is of direct relevance to its evolving status and standing. Whilst distinguished practitioners of operational research of the calibre of Patrick Blackett and Charles Goodeve could invoke wartime experience and the scientific method as positive justifications of the discipline's relevance to civil affairs, it is significant that the postwar pioneers of operational research continued

10 Operational Research in War and Peace to debate its 'scientific' status and possession of a unique and dedicated repertoire of analytical techniques at least until the early 1960s. In the former context, W. N. Jessop, an early practitioner of operational research in the manufacturing sector, commented in 1956 that Operational Research is still young and self-conscious. It is therefore very much concerned about what it is, how it came to be what it is, and what its standing is in comparison with other sciences — indeed whether it is a science at all. This latter question has probably been settled, at last, to the, satisfaction of most of its adherents. It is agreed that it is a science.18

Only two years later, however, the then President of the Operational Research Society, Professor M. G. Kendall, rejected the notion that operational research could be 'defined by definitions' in a scientific setting. In his view, Operational Research may be regarded as a branch of philosophy; as an attitude of mind towards the relationship between man and environment; as a body of methods for the solution of problems that arise in that relationship.19 Others, such as A. W. Swan, head of the operational research group within Courtaulds Ltd, expressed similar sentiments in the sense that operational research was no more, and no less than a 'point of view.' 20 These views were expressed in the form of brief articles in the Operational Research Quarterly, the recently established house-journal of the nascent operational research community. Their vagueness and contradictory nature might be forgiven in the light of the immaturity of the discipline, but they could only have mystified the readers of the Quarterly, the vast majority of whom were practitioners of operational research seeking to establish its relevance and credibility in a variety of industrial settings. In any event, they clearly represented a considerable dilution of the views of Blackett and Goodeve and it remained to Stafford Beer to provide a more thoughtful contribution to the debate. As a distinguished pioneer of cybernetics and head of the operational research group in one of the larger iron and steel companies, Beer was well qualified to participate in the discussion. In his opinion, operational research 'is not a science, for it is not about anything; it is science.' This was not to suggest that the discipline was devoid of specific subject matter. As Beer continued, I contend that operational research emerges as a [subset] of scientific methods appropriate to the analysis of activity....And

Introduction 11 these sets of methods do not form a science - nor does operational research. And so I am saying let us do away with the idea of 'the science of operational research'; and let us do away with the idea 'but we do not know what it is'. There is a wonderful ambiguity about these two statements, is there not? Beer then proffered his own definition of the content of operational research: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

Operational research is the attack of modern science on problems of likelihood (accepting mischance) which arise in the management and control of men and machines, materials and money in their natural environment Its special technique is to invent a strategy of control by measuring, comparing and predicting probable behaviour through a scientific model of the situation. 21

In reflecting on these definitional issues, the eminent American operational researcher, Russell Ackoff, concluded that although Beer's definition was broadly acceptable, it failed to answer the key question as to whether operational research was 'a unique and unitary discipline.' In addressing the 'uniqueness' of operational research, Ackoff chose to adopt a literal approach by focussing on 'the special class of phenomena we study,' namely, 'operations.' Thus, an operation may be defined as A set of acts required for the accomplishment of some desired outcome; that is, it is not a single act but a complex of interrelated acts, performed simultaneously or in sequence, which lead to the accomplishment of some desired outcome (i.e., set of objectives). It seems clear to me that in OR we have been studying just such sets of interrelated acts. This concept of an operation, of course, is equally attributable to industrial, military, governmental, and other types of organisations.22 In this setting, operational research could never be concerned with the 'operations' of individuals, but only with certain kinds of purposeful system in which 'choices are made and objectives pursued.' For Beer, such systems were coincidental with organisations composed of 'men and equipment' where responsibility for choices (decision-making) 'is divided among two or more individuals and/or groups of individuals' who are aware of each others' choices 'either through communication or observations.' 24 Looked at in this way, therefore, the specific remit of

12 Operational Research in War and Peace operational research was to study 'the operations of organisations.' As for the unitary nature of the discipline, in the sense of its possession of a dedicated methodology, the implication of Beer's conclusion that operational research was not a science was that it could never possess a unique body of knowledge as in the case of, say, physics or chemistry. This point had been anticipated by Jessop in his assertion that operational research in practice is concerned with particular cases or situations, or in other words, its job is to solve problems that are specific or local. It is, therefore, a natural consequence that what constitutes operational research is not knowledge but know-how. Problem solving technique is the bond that links operational research workers in diverse fields. Operational research considered as a subject rather than an activity is knowledge of particular situations and classes of situations and their associated methods. In natural science the unifying and synthesising process takes the form of recognising analogous situations and developing techniques to meet them.25 In agreeing with these sentiments, Ackoff concluded that operational research appeared 'to consist essentially of the ability both to construct suitable mathematical models of operational problems and to derive 'solutions' from them. 26 By the beginning of the 1960s, debate on the 'philosophy' of operational research h a d all hut ceased, not least because the methodological repertoire was expanding rapidly. For British operational researchers a defining moment in the postwar history of the discipline was the first international conference on operational research held at Oxford in 1957. Whilst British participants chose to address specific case studies, their North American counterparts demonstrated a high degree of technical and methodological virtuosity in papers ranging across linear programming, queuing theory, inventory control and search theory — aspects of operational research either unknown or hardly recognised in Britain.27 Thereafter, the methodological gap was closed rapidly as the American-derived techniques were disseminated both formally and informally. The techniques themselves were grouped as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Allocation Inventory Replacement Queuing

5. 6. 7. 8.

Sequencing and Coordination Routing Competition Search 28

Introduction 13 Inventories concern the holding or storing of resources, in particular the rate and timing of their acquisition. With multi-item inventories there may be delays in the allocation process if there are inadequate production facilities, the result, perhaps, of mechanical breakdown or power failure. To resolve this problem queuing theory could be deployed, entailing the application of a mathematically-based model to determine the optimal sequencing and coordination of the production process. If workers and equipment are to be prepared adequately for their tasks, consideration of time and set-up costs need to be taken into account. This may give rise to a routing problem, ie, the identification of a minimum-cost path through a network in order to contain set-up costs. If such a problem is considered over an extended period, the application of stochastic processes may be necessary in order to determine the appropriate rate of replacement of equipment that is either wearing out or is worn out. If account is also taken of factors external to the system being analysed, for example, the buying in of materials and pricing of final products, competitive problems entailing considerations of choice may arise. In this setting, zero and non-zero sum mathematical games may serve as a guide to cost-minimising or profit-maximising choices. Finally, effective responses to the above problems may be dependent on the acquisition of information. This is problematic in the sense that the search for information can give rise to costs — the cost of obtaining information and the losses arising from its use. In this respect, statistical decision theory could be used to minimise such risks. To the current generation of operational researchers these techniques will appear dated and in some cases distinctly unhelpful, insofar as there is an unrelenting focus on production-related issues. The key point to note, however, is that by the end of the 1960s, they had aspired to the status of a methodological orthodoxy, especially in the academic context of operational research. Underlying the developing methodology of operational research was the concept of the model as a means of analysing system-based problems by an experimental process in which physical manipulation of variables is not possible. In formal mathematical terms, models in operational research can be defined simply, but quite abstractly, in the form

w h e r e U denotes the utility of value of the modelled system's performance, x, denotes the variables that can be controlled, y, denotes the variables (and constants) that are not controlled but do affect U, and / i s the relationship between U, x,- and yy.

14 Operational Research in War and Peace In conformity with the scientific method, solutions could be derived from models either by experimentation in the form of simulation (manipulation of a model to produce a motion picture of reality) or by mathematical analysis. In the latter case variables could be derived by abstraction or symbol, or via known values (ie, concretely or numerically). The function, /, can be defined as a set of rules in the form of an algorithm that facilitates the calculation of utility (U). An algorithm, simply defined, is a logical or s e q u e n t i a l p r o c e d u r e w h i c h can solve a problem mathematically. In the post-war period, a critical development in opening up new possibilities in mathematical modelling was the innovation of linear programming. Emanating from the logistic needs of the United States Airforce at the time of the Berlin airlift in 1947, linear programming represented a significant advance in the analysis of problems involving an array of interacting variables subject to a variety of restraining conditions. To the extent that these restraints could be defined in such terms as 'not more than,' 'not less than,' 'at least/ and 'at most/ linear programming in the form of the original simplex method developed by George B. Dantzig provided a superior methodology to existing problemsolving techniques based upon systems of equations. The use of linear programming to produce optimal solutions to problems could be justified where all the functions in the relevant model were linear functions. Thus, in relation to the Berlin airlift, where the objective was to carry as much freight as possible within a specified time period, the constraints included the supply of suitable aircraft, efficient flying and maintenance schedules, the availability of aircrew, prevailing weather conditions and likely Soviet reactions. Linear programming as a means of finding optimal solutions to complex problems was clearly of direct relevance to the practice of operational research. In this respect, there was an interface with the discipline of economics where it was viewed as a powerful supplement to marginal analysis in calculating least-cost combinations of productive factors. The importance of Dantzig's simplex method was enhanced when J. von Neumann, the father of game theory, developed the concept of duality in the later 1940s. This facilitated a considerable extension to the applicability of linear programming to problem solving. Indeed, the 1950s witnessed a flood of new algorithms and theoretical developments in the subject which paved the way for the introduction of new algorithms for other mathematical programming problems, including integer, stochastic and nonlinear programming. 29

Introduction 15 In the non-military sphere, the first linear programming exercises relevant to executive decision-making were pioneered in the United States by the Gulf Oil and Standard Oil Corporations where they were applied to the optimisation of refinery processes. In the period to 1952, most of the relevant computations were carried out on punched card calculators, but by the end of the decade the first generation digital computers were being deployed to the benefit of data input and the resulting quantitative analysis. In Britain, comparable developments followed both in military and civil applications. In the former, the lead was taken by the Admiralty Research Laboratory, whilst in the civilian sector the main focus of interest was to be found in the coal, iron and steel and petroleum industries where linear programming had a valuable role to play in the selection of minimum-cost transport routes both for raw materials and finished products. Complementing linear programming was the technique of simulation as an aid to rational decision making. For modelling complex systems, simulation entailed the creation of a physical or mathematically-based analogue. The analogue could be a scale model, fully reflective of reality, for example, a model aircraft or railway, or in a different physical system as represented by the flow of coloured water in tubes. 30 In addition, an abstract approach could be adopted utilising mathematical equations and logical relationships. However, such calculations were time consuming and repetitive and were thus ideally suited to digital computerisation, a procedure which became increasingly common in the coal and steel industries during the 1960s. Computerisation itself fulfilled an invaluable role in the diffusion of operational research and in extending its practical scope. After 1960, the quantum leap in computer power through the innovation of the transistor and the associated 'hype and mystique' attached to computers, helped to ensure their commercial proliferation. Although this was a doubleedged development, in the sense that the specialised needs of operational researchers were rendered increasingly subordinate to overall company computing needs, the fact remains that by the end of the 1960s computers were an essential tool in operational research, encouraging more powerful linear programming codes and new high-level simulation languages. 31 At the end of the 1960s — a decade when 'management had become the focus of science and science the focus of management as they had never been before' 32 — operational researchers could congratulate themselves on their achievements. Diffusion of the discipline had accelerated markedly after 1960 and the decade was ending on a high note with its increasing penetration into Whitehall departments and

16

Operational Research in War and Peace

university-level curricula. The growing confidence of the operational research community was well reflected in the expanding membership of the Operational Research Society from less than 600 in 1960 to 2,565 in 1970 — equivalent to an annual growth rate of 15 per cent. In this light it is inevitable that the following account of the development of operational research should be generally positive in tone, notwithstanding the unevenness of the diffusion process. Yet such a history would be incomplete without reference to the doubts and uncertainties which began to afflict the operational research community after 1970. Writing in the context of the 'new paradigm' in management studies, Locke has observed that 'there were critics right from the beginning,' notably from those who were concerned to challenge the relevance of mathematics. 33 During the 1970s, moreover, challenges began to emerge from within the new paradigm itself. Whilst 'It is easy to find maverick critics cavorting inside the citadel of a new discipline while the victory bells are still ringing inside,' it is evident that the decade as a whole was marked by a growing reaction against the established paradigm. Nowhere was this more true than in the case of operational research, at least as reflected in the pronouncements of leading academic members of the discipline. The most extreme view was expressed by Russell Ackoff of the Case Institute of Technology, one time operational research pioneer turned critic, when he roundly condemned operational researchers for engaging in 'mathematic masturbation without substantive knowledge of organisations, institutions or their management.' 34 Coincidentally, M. G. Simpson, the then President of the Operational Research Society, similarly commented that in the world of operational research practice (as opposed to academia) 'Standard mathematical techniques are rarely applicable' although 'they can often be used in the initial stages of a study to give valuable "back of envelope" estimates of system change.' 35 Whilst Simpson possessed greater sympathy for mathematics than Ackoff, his reference to 'back of envelope' calculations may be viewed as revealing, in terms of the relationship between theory and practice. This theme was given full rein in Dando and Eden's report on the 1976 Euro II Conference on operational research when they concluded that the operational research community in general paid only lip service to 'the elegant models and mathematics' expounded in professional journals and academic conferences. Practitioners of the discipline, moreover, habitually referred to 'the normal inadequacy of data, the irrelevance of sophisticated mathematics and the transcendent importance of style and communication.' 36 It remained to Dando and Sharp to offer insights into

Introduction 17 the 'Kuhnian Crisis' afflicting operational research which were to achieve near-consensual status, at least among their fellow academics. 37 There were three distinctive themes in their analysis, all of them rooted firmly in the historical development of operational research. In the first instance, the 1950s and 1960s, up to and beyond the general election of 1964, were 'golden years for the concept of rational scientific progress,' a period when 'Belief in the power of physical science (as popularly conceived) was at its height and the world's problems were thought to be disappearing.' 3 8 It was entirely natural, therefore, that operational researchers, anxious to establish and confirm their credibility in peacetime, should have sought to present themselves as 'hard physicalmathematical scientists' in order to capitalise on popular feeling. The 'hard science' ideal was consolidated in the 1960s as operational research was taken up in higher education institutions. In that context the search for 'respectable' teaching material resulted in the proliferation of courses based on sophisticated models and complex mathematics. Evidence of the academic 'takeover' of operational research was well reflected in the contents of the discipline's house journal. In the five-year period from 1971 to 1975, 69 per cent of all papers published in the Operational Research Quarterly were bound up with mathematical theory and technical notes. Case studies of operational research in practice accounted for 22 per cent of the total, but even here, genuine 'management-oriented' papers were in a minority. Needless to say, these trends were also reflected in the tone and content of conference papers. 40 In retrospect, it is evident that the operational research community was undergoing a new phase of its evolution after 1970. In the early postwar years Patrick Blackett and Charles Goodeve had proclaimed the relevance of operational research as a general problem-solving approach utilising the 'scientific method.' Twenty years later, it aspired to the status of a distinctive 'hard science' which purported to analyse 'hard objective phenomena' on the basis of 'complex mathematical models.' 41 By the early 1970s, however, the point had been reached when the discipline's ability to generate precise mathematical answers to managerial problems was subject to mounting scepticism. The mood in this third phase was captured effectively by Pat Rivett, one of the pioneers of operational research at the National Coal Board and the first professor of operational research in a British university. In a 1974 paper, replete with references to his own experience, Rivett referred to the 'rather easy and exciting life' that he and his colleagues had enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the ongoing process of economic growth. 42 It was hardly

18 Operational Research in War and Peace surprising, therefore, that early industrial operational research should have concentrated on the production process. As Rivett pointed out, Of all the tasks of industry, production is the most well defined. One knows the capacities of the machinery, one knows and can state the input to the machinery, one knows and can state the output, one is dealing with quantitative measures about which there need be little discussion, one has objective functions which tend to be well defined, such as cost minimisation, maximisation of contribution to profit and so on.43 Thus, in conditions of sustained economic growth and in a relatively uncomplicated business environment, the pay-off from first acts of measurement and analysis was potentially large, a fact amply confirmed by wartime experience. After 1970, however, the 'golden age' of western economic growth was swiftly terminated by a combination of cyclical recession and macroeconomic shocks. 44 The business environment became increasingly 'messy' at the same time as the realisation dawned on operational researchers that their activities were constrained by a complex of social and political factors operative both within and without the organisations in which they worked. Thus, in a world where there were 'no clear objectives, little opportunity for quantification, and many stakeholders with different perspectives,' the hard mathematical paradigm was subject to mounting challenge. 45 Rivett himself had become an ardent advocate of linear programming techniques after working with Russell Ackoff at the Case Institute of Technology in the mid-1950s. By 1974, however, he had become disillusioned to the extent that he agreed with Patrick Blackett's judgement that the 'hard science' paradigm had reduced operational research to 'little more than a scientific closed shop.' 47 The post-1970 watershed in the history of operational research raises a set of historical concerns and issues of interpretation which merit a further book-length study of the evolving relationship between operational research and management science in general. In addition to the mounting disillusion with extreme mathematisation, for example, it is significant that in the UK corporate sector the economic recession of the early 1970s provoked an unprecedented bout of managerial 'downsizing' which in some cases resulted either in the closure of operational research groups or the dispersal of their functions elsewhere in the managerial hierarchy. 48 In examining the period to 1970, therefore, the following account is concerned with the 'golden age' of operational research as reflected in its diffusion beyond the military sector and

Introduction 19 ongoing methodological advances. Whilst it will be of primary relevance to those concerned with the history of management science, it is the author's hope that the book will be of interest to other historical specialists as well as to a lay-audience. The overriding aim has been to produce a history of operational research which sets the subject within the broad context of Britain's political, social and economic development in the twentieth century. It will be evident, for example, that no account of Britain's military effort, from the later 1930s to 1945, can be complete without reference to operational research. In their capacity as 'boffins' civilian operational research scientists were an integral part of the 'Secret War' so graphically portrayed by Professor R. V. Jones. 49 Their incorporation into high-level military c o m m a n d structures was unprecedented and was certainly indicative of a degree of flexibility in the British military hierarchy which was notably absent in its Axis counterparts. In describing the early antecedents of operational research, including the application of quantitative analysis to naval and military affairs during the First World War, the following chapter serves as a prelude to the formal inception of operational research. This is identified clearly in chapter 3 as an integral part of the emergent air defence of Great Britain in the later 1930s, culminating in the successful outcome of the Battle of Britain. The acknowledged enhancement of RAF Fighter Command's defensive capabilities in 1940 as a result of the application of operational research to the innovation and deployment of radar fulfilled a critical role in encouraging the adoption of the discipline by other commands. 50 In view of its origins in relation to air defence needs, the trajectory of diffusion after 1940 was predictable. After gaining a significant foothold in Ack-Ack Command (an army responsibility), operational research was then taken up in Coastal Command and the Royal Navy. The common denominator in the latter context was the urgent need to defend the Anglo-American convoy system in the North Atlantic against the depredations of the U-boat. 51 Chapter 4 confirms that, as in the case of the Battle of Britain, the favourable outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic was facilitated considerably by operational research. The chapter also highlights the diffusion of operational research in the army where the discipline was applied to the analysis of weapons lethality and manpower requirements in a variety of theatres. Chapter 5 is concerned exclusively with RAF Bomber Command with a particular focus on the campaign of area attack launched against Germany from the spring of 1942 onwards. At this distance in time the area bombing of

20 Operational Research in War and Peace Germany by the RAF in conjunction with the US Eighth Air Force is still the subject of controversy both in terms of its questionable morality and alleged ineffectiveness.52 Whilst the chapter lends further support to the critics of area bombing as a presumed war-winning strategy, it confirms the vital importance of operational research in informing Bomber Command tactics, not least in relation to target routing and bombing accuracy. The chapter also comments on the role of operational research in support of the allied invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy and N o r t h e r n France w h e r e , in all of the relevant theatres, aerial bombardment of precision targets was viewed as an essential precondition for successful seaborne invasions. In the case of the civilian diffusion of operational research after 1945, it is a notable fact that some, at least, of the early pioneers were to the left of centre politically and viewed operational research as a means of advancing the cause of socialism. Of the founders of operational research, Professors Blackett and J. D. Bernal, as well as Sir Robert Watson-Watt, were active members of the Association of Scientific Workers — the leftleaning union for scientists and laboratory technicians. There was a strong communist presence in the 1940s and it is significant that all three were to serve terms as president. In the radical science movement of the later 1930s, embracing such organisations as the Cambridge Scientists Against War Group and the Division for the Social and Industrial Relations of Science of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, were to be found scientists of the calibre of Professors Solly Zuckerman (later Lord Zuckerman) and C. H. Waddington. Both of them were prominent in operational research during the war and determined to capitalise on the discipline's wartime achievements. 53 With the election of the first majority Labour Government in 1945, with a commitment to effective economic and social planning, the latter part of the decade appeared to offer an ideal environment for the application of operational research to the rational distribution of resources in an impoverished economy with substantial infrastructure needs. Yet it is instructive to note that beyond the nationalised coal industry and BISRA, operational research made little headway in either central or local government in these years. In analysing the reasons for this, chapter 6 focuses on the postwar Board of Trade and the Committee on Industrial Productivity chaired by Sir Henry Tizard. Whilst it will be evident that the latter body devoted considerable attention to the relevance of operational research to enhanced productive efficiency in the manufacturing industry, the chapter highlights some of the early difficulties encountered by the advocates of operational research

Introduction 21 in the new peacetime setting. Hostile reactions encompassed outright scepticism to their claims in the utilitarian sense and also the incompatibility of operational research with established civil service structures insofar as they were relevant to the needs of the manufacturing sector.54 Chapters 7, 8 and 9 are concerned with the application of operational research in the coal and iron and steel industries, and also in the corporate sector, the latter embracing manufacturing and services. Whilst operational research was viewed with considerable disdain within the Board of Trade, it is a notable fact that the discipline achieved an early presence in coal and steel after 1946. In focusing on these key industrial sectors, chapters 7 and 8 assess the specific factors conducive to the diffusion of operational research and also the principal operational research programmes instituted within each industry after 1950. The chapters demonstrate that in these sectors the adoption of operational research was wholly dependent on personal advocacy on the part of individuals with direct knowledge and appreciation of the wartime achievements of operational research. Thus, in relation to the coal industry, the foundation of an operational research facility in 1947 was due to the intervention of Sir Charles Ellis, the designated 'scientific member' of the newly-created National Coal Board and former Scientific Adviser to the Army. Similarly, the incorporation of operational research within BISRA was the product of the personal drive and enthusiasm of Charles Goodeve. Goodeve, more than Ellis, had direct experience of operational research during the war, having worked with Patrick Blackett at the Admiralty. Indeed, Goodeve was to play the leading role in disseminating operational research into the corporate sector. He achieved a modicum of success in the 1950s as a result of personal advocacy, but the fruits of his endeavours were not realised in any significant way until the 1960s. That decade was notable for an upsurge in merger activity in the manufacturing sector which entailed considerable changes in managerial styles and structures. 55 Hitherto, the managerial organisation of UK industry had reflected a continuing commitment to 'personal' or family influence and control. This fact in itself had served to limit the extent of professionalism in British management, especially in an AngloAmerican context.56 The merger movement of the 1960s, however, in giving birth to a US-style 'corporate economy' precipitated the recruitment of professional managerial hierarchies based on the US model, often on the advice of North American management consultants. In these circumstances, the Anglo-American corporate gap was closed,

22 Operational Research in War and Peace but in such a way as to encourage the adoption of operational research as a management tool.57 The diffusion of operational research into the corporate sector is analysed in chapter 9 where the main focus is on the relevance of the discipline to the management of increasingly complex organisations. In identifying the role of operational researchers as early 'gatekeepers' to new computer-based technologies, the chapter concludes that the corporate managers of the 1960s could envisage a growth in firm size with a degree of confidence denied to their pre-1950 counterparts Chapter 9 also highlights the role of Patrick Blackett in his capacity as an industrial 'moderniser.' Marginalised politically after 1945 on account of his principled opposition to the use and spread of nuclear weapons, Blackett was readmitted to public life in the context of the post-1964 Labour Government's commitment to economic and industrial rejuvenation.58 He shared fully Harold Wilson's belief in the virtues of the 'white heat of the technological revolution' and concurred in the new Prime Minister's view that the competitive advantage of UK manufacturing industry, at least since 1950, had been adversely affected by a rising tide of defence expenditure. This had led to a damaging transfer of scarce resources, including scientific expertise, from civil to military-oriented R and D. Since the relevant outlays on nuclear weaponry and aerospace had brought few countervailing advantages to Britain, either politically or economically, the time had come to reconstruct the country's scientific and technological effort away from defence procurement in favour of civilian manufacturing industry.59 It is in this context that the creation of new ministries by the Wilson government in 1964 can be readily understood. Blackett himself was appointed Chief Scientific Adviser to the newly-created Ministry of Technology (Mintech) and was also instrumental in establishing the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation in 1966 as an official 'merger broker' to encourage the formation of large scale firms in civilian manufacturing in the belief that the exploitation of scale economies provided a direct route to enhanced competitiveness. In all these respects, Blackett advanced the cause of operational research in the context both of 'big government' and a belief in the virtues of large scale business. In doing so he received powerful support from his wartime colleague, Solly Zuckerman, who had been Chief Scientific Adviser to the outgoing Conservative Government before his reappointment by Harold Wilson in 1964.60

Introduction 23 History and practice have not proved kind to Blackett's views: even before the end of the 1960s the reduction in defence R and D initiated after 1964 had been reversed whilst 'big government' was manifestly in retreat. In the 1970s and 1980s, moreover, there was increasing disillusion with the performance of large scale corporate enterprise on the part of economists and politicians alike.61 But if the attempt to boost industrial competitiveness by means of interventionist industrial policy proved to be largely ineffectual, chapter 10 shows that the Labour Government succeeded admirably in one aspect of 'modernisation' which was to cast a long shadow forward to the benefit of operational research. This concerns its efforts to reform the Civil Service in the light of the recommendations of the Fulton Committee, published in 1968.62 This committee was the first major enquiry into the Home Civil Service since the Harcourt-Trevelyan reforms of the early 1850s, and its terms of reference, embracing structure and recruitment, elicited a robust intervention by the Operational Research Society to the effect that its members had a significant contribution to make to the resolution of 'major policy problems.' As chapter 10 reveals, the representations of the Society fell on fertile ground, not least in the Treasury where the Permanent Secretary, Sir William Armstrong, took the lead in establishing a separate Civil Service Department with a strong operational research section. Chapter 10 also comments on the adoption of operational research in local government in the 1960s, as well as on its diffusion into the Home Office and the nationalised railway and electricity sectors. The chapter concludes by highlighting the continuation into peacetime of defencerelated operational research by reference to its role in informing naval tactics and strategy in the era of the Cold War. Chapter 11 examines the institutional development of operational research with particular reference to the foundation of the Operational Research Society and the diffusion of the discipline across international frontiers. Contrasts and comparisons are drawn with the experience in the United States, not least in relation to the differing trajectories of the discipline's penetration into higher education. The chapter points out that in the same way that the Anglo-American corporate lag was closed in the 1960s in terms of the adoption of advanced forms of corporate enterprise, so too was the academic deficit in operational research. Higher education expanded considerably in Britain following the publication of the Robbins Report in 1963, and although the first dedicated chair in operational research was established in 1964 in the new University of

24 Operational Research in War and Peace Lancaster, the representative experience was for the discipline to be introduced into established institutions. This was in conformity with pioneering efforts in educational provision for operational research at the University of Birmingham in the 1950s. The chapter concludes with a commentary on the increasing introspection of the operational research community in the 1970s as the future of the discipline was debated in reaction to the limited practical relevance of complex mathematical modelling and the growing divide between the practitioner and academic communities. Again, contrasts and comparisons are drawn with North American experience in the context of Andrew Abbott's concept of the 'Division of Expert Labour' whereby professional status is related directly to the application of 'pure' knowledge in the form of mathematical dexterity. 63 In acknowledging the increasing mathematisation of operational research after 1960, the following account is consistent with the view that the 'hard paradigm' was a by-product of the discipline's aspirations to high academic status. For operational researchers in general, and especially for those intent upon inserting the discipline into universitylevel curricula, their professional standing was the subject of acute concern. To those members of the operational research community who were anxious to achieve a distinctive professional status, the increasingly mathematical orientation of the discipline was a positive development. This fact in itself was to play a key role in precipitating the debates and controversies of the 1970s and 1980s. But whilst it is possible to agree with Dando and Sharp that the academically-driven hard paradigm created a 'myth' — in the sense that the elegant mathematical models enshrined in 'classical' operational research would be wholly incapable of dealing with a post-1970 world afflicted by mounting economic, social and behavioural problems — this should not be allowed to detract from the achievements of the postwar community of operational research practitioners. At the most general level, the application of the 'scientific method,' in the sense defined by Patrick Blackett, injected a degree of objectivity into decision-making processes which had hitherto been lacking. In this respect, operational research contributed as much in peacetime as it had in war. It may well be argued that an overwhelming proportion of the discipline's peacetime endeavours was bound up with the tactical rather than strategic application of operational research (thereby providing invidious contrasts with its presumed wartime role), but that would be to downgrade the cumulative contribution to economic and social well-being of a myriad of efficiency-enhancing and cost-saving

Introduction 25 projects in a wide variety of industrial and commercial settings. In any event, it is a valid argument that the vital contribution of operational research lay in improving confidence in the decision-making process. As a notable practitioner of operational research once observed, A decision reached by OR methods is not necessarily different from the decision that would be reached by other methods; a right decision is a right decision, irrespective of whether it is obtained by sticking a pin into a list of all the alternatives, or by a piece of OR work. The basic difference is in the degree of confidence that can be placed in the correctness of the result.64 Operational research, as with other branches of management science, necessarily deals with systems which may be simple or complex, but in general they all contain human beings. The latter, in conjunction with the limitations of quantitative data, have necessarily compromised the discipline's predictive abilities. But even allowing for these deficiencies, the diffusion of operational research from the later 1930s onwards, in encouraging a trend towards precise measurement, was consistent with greater self-confidence, and hence professionalism, on the part of executive decision makers. In the context of the definitional issues alluded to earlier in this chapter, the following account is most in sympathy with the view that operational research, although not a science in the 'hard' sense, utilised the scientific method as the unifying factor in the application of 'know-how' or 'problem-solving technique.' In its methodology it was quantitatively driven, but the relevant techniques need not entail the application of sophisticated mathematics. Operational researchers may have tried to express problems in quantitative terms, as well as applying empirical checks to provisional conclusions, but their decisive contribution to decision-making processes was to inject a degree of objectivity into the appraisal of alternative courses of action which would otherwise have been lacking. Both in war and peace, therefore, the effect of operational research was to reduce the scope for 'gusts of emotion' in determining tactics and strategy.

NOTES 1. Maurice Goldsmith and Roy Innes, 'Operational Research,' Pilot Papers (1947). 2. 'Operational Research in War and Peace,' Nature, 15 November, 1947, p. 660. 3. Sir Charles Goodeve, 'Operational Research,' Nature, 13 March, 1948, p. 377.

26 Operational Research in War and Peace 4. Samuel Eilon, 'How Scientific is OR?,' Omega, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1995), p. 1. 5. K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Hutchinson, London, 1959), p. 27. 6. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett: Baron Blackett of Chelsea,' Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), pp. 1-115; M. W. Kirby, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett (1897-1974),' in Malcolm Warner (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Business and Management (Thomson, London, 1996), pp. 386-9. 7. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1950), pp. 3-6. 8. Ibid., p. 3. 9. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 10. Robert Locke, Management and Higher Education since 1940 The Influence of America and Japan on West Germany, Britain and France (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989). 11. Ibid., p. 5. 12. Keith Devlin, Mathematics: The Science of Patterns: The Search for Order in Life, Mind and the Universe (Scientific American Library, New York, 1994), pp. 43-9; Carl B. Boyer, A History of Mathematics (John Wiley, New York, 1968), pp. 632-8; Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971), pp. 89-91; Donald Gilkes, 'The Fregean Revolution in Logic,' in Idem, Revolutions in Mathematics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 265-305. 13. Goodeve (1948), p. 379. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., p. 381. 17. Blackett (1950), p. 4. 18. W. N. Jessop, 'Operational Research Methods: What Are They?/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1958), p. 49. Emphasis added. 19. M. G. Kendall, 'The Teaching of Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1958), p. 267. 20. A. W. Swan, 'The Name and Nature of Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1957), pp. 1-5. 21. Stafford Beer, 'What has Cybernetics to do with Operational Research?,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 10 (1959), p. 12. 22. Russell L. Ackoff, 'The Meaning Scope and Methods of Operational Research,' in R. L. Ackoff (ed.), Progress in Operational Research, Vol. 1 (John Wiley, New York, 1961), p. 6. 23. Ibid., p. 8. 24. Ibid., p. 11, citing Beer. 25. Jessop (1956), p. 50. 26. Ackoff (1961), p. 20.

Introduction

27

27. M. Davies, R. T. Eddison and T. Page (eds.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Operational Research (Oxford, 1957), (ORSA, Baltimore, 1957). 28. R. L. Ackoff and M. W. Sasieni, Fundamentals of Operational Research (John Wiley, New York, 1968), pp. 13-16. 29. On the development of linear programming see George B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1963); Robert Dorfman, Paul A. Samuelson and Robert M. Solow, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis (McGraw Hill, New York, 1958); George B. Dantzig, 'Reminiscences About the Origins of Linear Programming,' Operations Research Letters, Vol. 1 (1982), pp. 43-8. 30. G. H. Mitchell, Operational Research: Techniques and Examples (English Universities Press, NCB, 1972), pp. 202-71. 31. J. C. Ranyard, 'A History of OR and Computing,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1988), pp. 1073-86. 32. Locke (1989), p. 26. 33. Ibid., p. 30. 34. R. L. Ackoff, 'The Future of Operational Research is Past,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 30 (1979), p. 97. See also Idem, 'President's Symposium: OR, A Post Mortem,' Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987, pp. 471-4. 35. M. G. Simpson, 'Those Who Can't,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 24 (1978), p. 518. 36. M. R. Dando and C. Eden, 'Reflections on Operational Research: A Report from the Euro II Congress,' Omega, Vol. 5 (1977), pp. 255-70. 37. M. R. Dando and R. G. Sharp, 'A Kuhnian Crisis in Management Science,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 32 (1981), pp. 91-103. 38. M. R. Dando and R. G. Sharp, 'Operational Research in the UK in 1977: The Causes and Consequences of a Myth?,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 29 (1978), pp. 939-49. 39. Ibid., p. 943. 40. Ibid., p. 942. 41. Ibid., p. 943. 42. Patrick Rivett, 'Perspective for Operational Research,' Omega, Vol. 2 (1974), p. 225. 43. Ibid., p. 228. 44. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 1-37. 45. John C. Ranyard, 'Supporting Real Decisions: A Review of OR Practice in the UK,' European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 87 (1995), p. 475. See also R. L. Ackoff, 'Resurrecting the Future of Operational Research,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 30 (1979), pp. 189-99 and J. V. Rosenhead, 'Old and New Paradigms of Analysis,' in J. V. Rosenhead (ed.),

28 Operational Research in War and Peace Rational Analysis for a Problematic World (John Wiley, New York, 1989), pp. 65-89. 46. Rivett (1974), p. 229. 47. 'Editorial: Appreciation Lord Blackett,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 25, (1974), pp. i-viii. 48. R. Fildes and J. C. Ranyard, 'Success and Survival of Operational Research Groups — A Review/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 336-60. 49. R. V. Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1978). 50. M. W. Kirby and R Capey, 'The Air Defence of Great Britain, 1920-1940: An Operational Research Perspective,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 555-68. 51. C. H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U-Boat (Elek Science, London, 1973). 52. M. W. Kirby and R. Capey, 'The Area Bombing of Germany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 661-77; Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939-45: Reaping the Whirlwind (Harper and Collins, London, 1997); M. W. Kirby, 'Operations Research and the Defeat of Nazi Germany,' Military Operations Research, Vol. 5 (2000), pp. 57-70; Mark Connelly, Reaching for tlie Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II (I. B. Tauris, London, 2001); Robin Neillands, The Bomber War (Murray, London, 2001). 53. Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of the 1930s (Allen Lane, London, 1978). 54. M. W.Kirby and R. Capey, 'The Origins and Diffusion of Operational Research in the UK,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 49 (1998), pp. 307-26. 55. Derek F. Channon, The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise (Macmillan, London, 1973). 56. Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990), pp. 235-392. 57. Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (Methuen, London, second edition, 1983). 58. Lord Zuckerman, Six Men Out of the Ordinary (Peter Owen, London, 1992), pp. 13-38. 59. M. W. Kirby, 'Britain's "Manifest Industrial Destiny": The Culture of High Technology and Industrial Performance in the Twentieth Century,' Business and Economic History, Vol. 26 (1997), pp. 1-19. 60. M. W. Kirby, 'Blackett in the "White Heat" of the Scientific Revolution: Industrial Modernisation under the Labour Governments, 1964-1970/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 50 (1999), pp. 985-93.

Introduction 29 61. M.W. Kirby, 'The Corporate Economy in Britain: Its Rise and Achievements since 1900/ in M. W. Kirby and M. B. Rose (eds.), Business Enterprise in Modern Britain: from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century (Routledge, London, 1994), pp. 139-71. 62. Fulton Committee, The Civil Service, Cmnd. 3638 (1968). 63. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1988), pp. 237-8. 64. R. W. Shephard, 'Some Aspects of Measurement in Operational Research' (Stephen Cook Papers, MSS 335/GKN/71, 1961, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick — hereafter, MRC).

2

The Origins of Operational Research: Military and Other Antecedents to 1937 Whilst the discipline and practice of operational research originated in the later 1930s and came to fruition during the Second World War, the history of warfare is punctuated by attempts to apply some element of quantitative analysis to understanding the causes of victory and defeat. If it is reasonable to presume that even in pre-historic times questions arose as to whether 'an enemy would be discomfited by a rapid barrage of small stones or by a less speedy process of throwing big ones.' 1 The first overt attempts to apply 'algebra and numbers' to the battlefield occurred in the later sixteenth century. 2 During the Middle Ages, the outcome of battles had been determined by 'the collision of aristocrats on horseback/ From 1500 onwards, however, changes in military technology in favour of 'stand-off weapons such as harquebuses, muskets and artillery, went hand in hand with the evolution of new battle tactics whereby hundreds and even thousands of troops were arranged in precise squares and triangles. According to one interpretation, the development of new weapons and military formations can only be understood in the context of the perceptual revolution in thinking in terms of quantified time and space evident in the Renaissance West after 1400.3 The development of mathematical techniques facilitated precise measurement in cartography and astronomy leading ultimately to quantum leaps in navigational skills, whilst the innovation of doubleentry bookkeeping enabled the new merchant class to manage effectively ever-expanding trading links. In a long term perspective the movement from qualitative to quantitative perception was consistent with the triumph of a civilisation which was to achieve unprecedented control over its environment. Certainly, contemporary advances in science and technology after 1500 were to provide the 'edged weapons' of European imperial expansion during the succeeding four centuries. In the specifically military sphere the decisive moment towards the systematic 30

The Origins of Operational Research 31 control of force was undertaken by Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange and Captain-General of Holland and Zeeland in the period 1585-1625. Equipped with a university training in mathematics and classics, Maurice sought to confront the Spanish armies in the Low Countries by capitalising on precedents established in the legionary forces of the Roman Empire. In addition to siege-related earthworks, he introduced critically important innovations in the areas of drill and marching. In the former, he systematised the loading and firing of matchlock guns into forty-two sequential moves, from powder loading to discharge. Every move was named so that on command every soldier could act in unison thereby imparting a considerable 'shock' effect to opposing forces. Systematic drill enabled soldiers to load and fire their weapons more rapidly and accurately, resulting in a dramatic leap forward in the efficiency of hand-guns defined in terms of 'the amount of lead projected against an enemy per minute of battle.' So too in relation to marching, Maurice moved far beyond Roman practice by introducing the concept of the counter march. This provided for successive bursts of fire as ranks of arquebusiers or musketeers, after discharging their weapons, marched to the rear to reload, having been replaced in the front line by the next rank. Timed to perfection a n d operated with d u e discipline, countermarching was tantamount to 'a well-choreographed military ballet' which could produce spectacular results on the battlefield, as demonstrated in innumerable armed conflicts up to and beyond the Napoleonic era.4 Insofar as Maurice's innovations were based upon observation and measurement in relation to the development of advanced weaponry, it is legitimate to view him as an unconscious practitioner of operational research. His status in this respect is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that 300 years were to elapse before a comparable programme of military innovation was to take place. During that time technological change in land-based armaments remained modest, mainly because the weight of field weapons was limited to the extent that they could be pulled by horses. From the 1880s onwards, however, the world's navies were subject to a profound scientific and technological revolution. A multiplicity of causal factors were at work, ranging from national and imperial rivalries, to the evolution of domestic politics and the rise of private sector armaments contractors endowed with substantial research and development capabilities. As the world's greatest naval and imperial power it was entirely appropriate that the revolution should have been inaugurated in Britain. Whilst the whole of the period from the 1880s to

32 Operational Research in War and Peace the outbreak of the First World War witnessed a sequence of spectacular innovations conducive to enhanced speed, firepower and armour, there were equally important changes to the process of naval procurement. The latter were consistent with the concept of 'command technology' whereby Admiralty technicians provided naval constructors with precise specifications for a range of performance characteristics whether for guns, engines or ships. Up to 1880 the pace of technological advance had been slow, mainly because development costs had to be borne by the contracting entrepreneur. In reducing the risks of innovation 'command technology' encouraged deliberate invention, all the more so since the Admiralty proved willing to contribute towards the costs of the relevant research and technical programs. Whilst 'command technology' was not entirely new in the 1880s in the sense that the Admiralty had been in the habit of issuing performance specifications since at least the 1860s, it was the sheer range, breadth and rapidity of technological change which demarcated the three decades before 1914 as inaugurating a new era in weapons procurement which was to establish precedents reaching far into the twentieth century. Drawing on contributions from 'metallurgists, ballisticians, chemists and engineers' paying 'sophisticated attention to accurate steel analysis, precise heat control and very small dimensional tolerances,' Britain's armaments firms were the leading innovators in the use of alloy steels and nickel alloys. Their research and development commitments were correspondingly large. In the early 1900s, Vickers, the predominant British armaments manufacturer, employed a design staff of 300-400 individuals. By that time the leading gun makers were habitually allocating 6-12 per cent of net annual profits to their scientific departments, whilst 'research appropriations of £80-100,000 per annum were not unheard of in the busiest years of the 1900s.'5 The new 'command technology' resembled operational research in one sense only, namely the close cooperation in developing new weapons systems between technically proficient naval officers and civilian scientists and engineers. The remit of the latter was still confined to the material of war with little or no input into tactical or strategic analysis. In these respects, the First World War may be viewed as a staging post in the application of scientific techniques to problems of warfare insofar as it inaugurated a trend towards official military and governmental recruitment of scientists. This was in recognition of the unprecedented logistical needs of a country fighting for survival in the first mechanised war. Whilst collective memories of the conflict are rooted in the tragic extent of infantry casualties on the Western Front in consequence of

The Origins of Operational Research 33 trench warfare, the First World War was to cast a long shadow forwards in that it heralded a new era of warfare as a result of the innovation of the military aeroplane and the submarine. In both respects, the period after 1914 was one of rapid technological development in armaments with considerably greater implications for the formulation of military tactics and strategy than the revolution in surface ship design manifest after 1880. In the light of these developments, governments and military commanders alike acquired a new awareness of the potential contribution of scientists to the strategy and tactics of warfare, an awareness, moreover, which was to remain alive throughout the interwar years in view of the evolution of international political relations following the German capitulation in 1918. A portent of things to come was provided by the insights of F. W. Lanchester into the deployment of air power. Better known publicly for his pioneering work on automobile engineering, Lanchester also made seminal contributions to the science of aeronautics and aerodynamics. 6 As early as 1894 he had formed an accurate, if undeveloped view of the theory of flight, concentrating on calculations of lift force as a vital precursor to the design of an aircraft worthy of the name. Although Lanchester's ideas were published in Aerial Flight,7 a two-volume work appearing in 1907-8, the long delay between conception and publication meant that the lion's share of the credit for defining and establishing the principles of wing design went to others, in particular the German scientist, Ludwig Prandtl. More germane to the history of operational research was Lanchester's original work on military aeronautics. In the latter part of 1914 (by which time he was a member of the official Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) he published a sequence of articles in the periodical Engineering which, with appropriate embellishment, appeared in book form in 1916. Although it remains unclear whether the ideas set out in Aircraft in Warfare informed either contemporary aircraft design or aerial tactics and strategy it is, perhaps, significant that a fulsome preface to the work was contributed by Major General Sir David Henderson, Director General of Military Aeronautics. 8 The core of Lanchester's analysis was a sequence of equations consistent with the 'N 2 law' which quantified the relationship between victory and defeat by reference to the 'concentration of effort,' the relative strengths of opposing forces, the nature of weapons and their impact both on casualties and the outcome of the battle. The techniques deployed by Lanchester were eventually incorporated into the repertoire of operational research techniques in that he formulated clear assumptions, derived

34 Operational Research in War and Peace their mathematical consequences and identified the manner in which variation in the assumptions affected the results. A validation of Lanchester's equations in the context of modern warfare was published in 1954 utilising data derived from the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945 with particular reference to combat casualties. 9 Whilst the modern field of 'combat simulation' can be regarded as a direct descendant of Lanchester's pioneering work, it is interesting to note that an early antecedent of his approach was provided in 1902 by Rear Admiral J. V. Chase of the United States Navy who applied calculus to illustrate the square law effect of the concentration of effort.10 This work was acknowledged subsequently by Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske who published an equivalent battle model in the form of an essay which won the Navy Institute Prize for 1905.11 Coincidentally, the Russian military theoretician, M. Osipov, produced equations similar to those of Lanchester, but his work remained unknown to the western world until it too was published in 1915.12 These rival studies, however, do not detract from Lanchester's wholly independent achievement, a fact recognised by the Operations Research Society of America which, from 1955, has awarded the annual Lanchester Prize 'to the author or authors of the best paper on operations research or reporting on an operations research study, identified as such.' 13 In methodological terms, the relevant chapters in Aircraft in Warfare (v, vi and viii) provide a unique and outstanding example of operational research at the tactical level. Indeed, writing forty years after the formulation of the 'N 2 law,' Joseph F. McCloskey commented that if there had been journals in the discipline of operational research at the time when Lanchester was writing, his work would have merited prize-winning status, a judgement which McCloskey also applied to Lanchester's calculated dismissal of the dirigible in favour of the aeroplane. In this latter case, 'a few more graphs and a few more equations' would have produced 'the best article of the year reporting an operations-research study on weapons systems.' 14 If Lanchester's work lay principally in the realm of mathematical theory, it was the German Zeppelin raids of 1916-17 — in effect the first strategic air offensive — which encouraged the Experimental Section of the army's Munitions Invention Department to investigate the problem of anti-aircraft gunnery. Led by a young physiologist, Captain A. V. Hill, a small group of applied mathematicians embarked on a statistical study of tactics and procedures which produced greater accuracy of fire. At the same time, the group — referred to colloquially as 'Hill's Brigands' — formed the prototype of what came to be known in the

The Origins of Operational Research 35 Second World War as the Operational Research Section attached to the principal military commands. 15 In 1917, when Britain was planning its own aerial bombardment of Germany, Viscount Tiverton (later the Earl of Halsbury), at that time serving with the British Aviation Commission in Paris, submitted a report to the Air Board setting out the factors which in his view would determine the outcome of a bombing campaign. 16 The report was based on a study of aerial bombardment begun by Tiverton in 1915 which had sought to discover the knowledge and skills necessary for success and to determine the requirements of a bomber force in terms of aircraft characteristics, organisation and maintenance and the training of aircrew. Tiverton's work was remarkable for its application of scientific research methods to the analysis of factory types and the bomb loads required for their destruction. Tiverton also assessed the merits of day and night operations (favouring the former in the light of available aircraft types), highlighted the need for reliable meteorological services and urged the development of improved aids to navigation. Tiverton, like Lanchester, favoured the concentration of effort so that all available aircraft would attack a single target in any one raid, thereby anticipating the RAF's 1,000 bomber raids in the Second World War.17 Quantitative analysis of military operations was also applied to naval affairs after 1914 with favourable consequences for Britain's war effort. The immediate context was provided by the decision of the German Naval Staff to embark upon unrestricted submarine warfare from 1 February 1917. As a war-winning strategy, sinking without warning by U-boats was designed to force a British capitulation in response to the disruption of vital supply lines from the United States. Judged by its results in the summer of 1917, the German plan held out every prospect of success in view of the U-boats' record in sinking an average of 10 per cent of Britain's Atlantic shipping per month. The initial response of the Admiralty was to seek technological solutions in the form of depth charges, hydroplanes, deep mines and air patrols. But although U-boats began to be sunk in consequence, the average loss of three per month was amply offset by replacements at the same time as the rate of British and neutral shipping losses continued to rise. The ultimate solution was found in a more effective deployment of existing naval forces in accordance with a precedent first established during the Napoleonic Wars. This was the convoy system whereby merchant ships were required to sail in large groups escorted by warships. The credibility of convoying, however, could be called into question by reference to several objections

36 Operational Research in War and Peace which appeared to be soundly based. In the first instance, it could be argued that the process of assembling large numbers of merchant ships would reduce the total tonnage transported per month, whilst inadequate port facilities would lead to severe bottlenecks in loading and unloading. More obviously, convoys could travel only at the speed of the slowest vessel, thus placing a further constraint on the tonnage transported, a problem compounded by the fact that faster ships would be prevented from extricating themselves from the area of torpedo attack. Further reservations were expressed in relation to the difficulties in maintaining coherent formations of merchant and naval vessels and the fact that massed shipping would provide an easier target for U-boats. Even if convoys could be proved to be practicable, where were the requisite n u m b e r s of naval escorts to come from, bearing in mind that contemporary customs returns indicated that more than 5,000 ships were entering and leaving British ports each week? On the other side of the account, the proponents of convoys could point to a number of countervailing factors based upon contemporary operational experience. At the end of 1916, for example, in the face of severe disruptions to the cross-channel supply of British coal to French industry as a result of U-boat activity, a convoy system was introduced resulting in an immediate reduction in sinkings. More impressive confirmation of the benefits of convoys over a longer sea passage was provided by the reorganisation of the North Sea trade in iron ore imports from Narvik. In the first month of convoy operations the loss rate fell more than one hundredfold to 0.24 per cent, and in the light of experience the initial sailings of six ore carriers was boosted to a 5-day cycle of convoys consisting of 20-30 ships with no increase in escort strength or sinkings. These events provided the advocates of convoys with some effective arguments, but they still had to confront the Admiralty's proclaimed inability to organise sufficient escorts in relation to the 5,000 weekly arrivals and departures at British ports. In the event, the conundrum was resolved by two Royal Navy Commanders — R. G. H. Henderson and Rollo Appleyard. The former was responsible for organising the cross-channel coal convoys and in that capacity had access to Ministry of Shipping figures on arrivals and departures of all ocean-going merchant vessels. Henderson calculated that the figure of 5,000 referred to the average number of ships of all nationalities of over 100 tons entering or leaving British ports each week. Thus, 'If a dredger sailed from Yarmouth to Felixstowe, it was counted once. If it then went to Harwich it was counted a third time. If it made the return journey inside

The Origins of Operational Research 37 the same week, it would be counted six times.' 18 The implications of these observations were profound: they revealed in stark terms that if arrivals and departures were restricted to ocean-going vessels of 1,000 tons and above, the figure of 5,000 was reduced to 300 — in effect little more than 20 arrivals and departures per day in British ports. Convoying across the Atlantic with effective escort provision was thus practicable. Given that Henderson's calculations were prompted in part by his knowledge of a rapidly developing shipping crisis, he took the unorthodox step of contacting the Prime Minister, Lloyd George directly, recommending the adoption of convoys as soon as possible. His intervention was immediately effective, although it remains to be said that the Admiralty's face was saved to some extent by the formal entry of the United States into the war, an event which heralded the arrival of more merchant and escort vessels. Convoying was introduced officially in May 1917 and in November the Admiralty, citing statistics for September, announced that 90 per cent of all ships crossing the Atlantic had been in convoy with a loss rate '0.5 per cent or 1 in 200.' Taking the period from February 1917 to the end of the war, there were 83,958 sailings in convoy in Atlantic and home waters resulting in 260 sinkings. This compared highly favourably with the 1,497 ships sunk out of 48,861 individual sailings in the year from November 1917. Why did convoying work? The reasons ranged from organisational factors (convoying to schedule alleviated port congestion) to tactical considerations. In particular, convoys did not offer rich pickings for U-boats on account of their size and mass. Convoys in the Atlantic were almost as difficult to find as isolated ships ('If a single ship is visible to a submarine at 10 kilometres and a convoy at 12 kilometres, the chance of a submarine finding the convoy is only 20 per cent higher than that of finding the single ship' 19 ), and the presence of escorting destroyers placed the U-boat itself in danger whilst reducing the possibility of torpedo hits. During the course of 1917, Commander Appleyard produced a mathematically-based justification for the convoy system making use of 'ships' logs, eye witness accounts, diagrams of U-boat attacks, diagrams of convoy formation, columns, and escort dispositions and with an accurate knowledge of the capabilities of merchant ships, escorts, U-boats and their torpedoes.' 20 Replete with algebraic equations and diagrammatic representations, Appleyard's calculations were 'as good a piece of "operational research" as anything in the Second World War.' 21 His analysis of convoy attack and defence was based on two assumptions — that U-boats had innumerable options

38 Operational Research in War and Peace for attack and these were paralleled by the infinite variations in convoy formation. Nevertheless, it was possible to apply quantitative methods to the mode of U-boat attack in relation to the course steered, the angle of attack measured against the target, and the areas of sea to be navigated. The resulting calculations could then be used to determine the optimal response of the convoy in terms of formation and speed. Equipped with 'cardinal' angles and areas, calculations could then be made of the ideal positions of escort vessels. Appleyard also investigated the 'danger angle' for U-boat attack in order to determine the shape of the convoy and paid particular attention to the merits of zigzagging as a defensive tactic (see Fig. 2.1 below). The resulting report on 'Elements of Convoy Defence' formed part of a highly classified Technical History series which were 'kept locked up in a safe when not actually in use.' 22 Incredibly, these so-called 'Confidential Books' were declared obsolete in 1939 and subsequently destroyed so that the lessons of the First World War had to be relearned at considerable cost in lives and material. Two further examples of studies in the First World War, which would later have been designated as operational research can be cited, one complementary to the work of Henderson and Appleyard in relation to the U-boat weapon, and the other concerning the counter-battery intelligence exercise carried out for the Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge in 1917. In the former case, Thomas Edison, head of the US Naval Consulting Board, utilised statistical methods to devise a 'Tactical Game Board' as an aid to the evasion and destruction of U-boats. Like Appleyard, he also analysed zigzagging as an evasion tactic for merchant ships in the light of his discovery that most ships were following known prewar routes and it was here that the majority of sinkings were taking place. 23 The importance of the Canadian Corps' experience at Vimy Ridge lies in the fact that it provides real insights into the methodology of operational research as a means of enhancing military effectiveness. The strategically important high ground of Vimy Ridge had been captured by the Germans at an early stage in the war and in three attempts to retake it between 1914 and 1916, the French Army had lost 200,000 men. The problem for those attacking a strong defensive position was defined by the nature of trench warfare: on leaving their trenches attacking infantry had three obstacles to overcome — barbed wire, machine gun fire and artillery shelling. By 1917, a combination of technology and tactics had limited the effects of the first two — barbed wire by the innovation of a new fuse causing shells to explode on impact, and machine guns in

The Origins of Operational Research 39

Scale of Sea Miles 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I—I- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

A Convoy at A is proceeding in the direction of the arrow. Visibility 5% sea miles. A Submarine, approaching from about astern, tries to take up a position somewhere near the beam at Torpedo-range of 1 Mile. The Submarine cannot proceed for more than 1 Hour. The Diagram shows the Danger Angles and the Widths of Screen corresponding to various speeds of Convoy. Figure 2.1 Appleyard's Diagrams Source: Rollo Appleyard, 'Elements of Convoy Defence/ reproduced in John Winton, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade, 1890-1970 (Michael Joseph, London, 1983), p. 117.

40 Operational Research in War and Peace the form of a 'rolling barrage' to confine enemy machine gunners to the bottom of their trenches whilst the attacking forces advanced 200 yards behind the barrage of shellfire. The problem remained, however, of how to neutralise the enemy's own artillery. By the spring of 1917, the Canadian Corps were in position in front of Vimy Ridge, determined to dislodge the Germans where the French Army had manifestly failed. Whilst the Corps devoted meticulous attention to the mode of attack (even to the extent of constructing full scale replicas of the terrain for training purposes), considerable thought was also given to the problem of the German artillery. In this respect, a classic operational research study was undertaken by the Corps' counter-battery organisation led by Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. L. McNaughton who in civilian life had been an electrical engineer at McGill University with an interest in the oscillograph. 24 Building on pioneering work carried out in the British A r m y ' s V Corps, M c N a u g h t o n recruited the services of three distinguished scientists — Lawrence Bragg, a physicist and Nobel Prize winner in 1915, Charles Darwin, another physicist, and Lucien Bell, who shared MacNaughton's interest in the oscillograph. Collectively, they perfected two techniques which severely reduced the effectiveness of the German artillery. The first was flash spotting, entailing close cooperation between observation posts in order to determine the location of field guns literally by the flash of the shell on exit from the barrel. Figure 2.2 is illustrative of the technique. Three points are identified as typical of a World War One front — point G for a German gun and points 01 and 02 for observation posts: an arbitrary direction is indicated by 'd 0 .' If the German gun is fired then the observers at 01 and 02 will be able to use the reference direction, 'do,' to measure angles giving straight lines to the flash, as indicated in Panel B of the figure. Inevitably, however, such a procedure would encounter problems if more than one gun was being fired from the same direction: coordination would be impossible and any calculations would produce incorrect target locations. McNaughton's solution to the problem, which could be applied to enemy guns at a distance of 10,000 yards, was as follows: Survey sections have two or more 'posts' situated on commanding ground, equipped with the finest type of surveying instruments and interconnected by telephone with a station. When one post locates a hostile battery firing, the bearing is reported to central station and the other posts put on approximately. Then telephone communication is cut off, and each post as it sees the flash corrects

The Origins of Operational Research

41

German Line

01

"o f

01

Figure 2.2 Flash Spotting Source: J. S. Finan and W. J. Hurley, 'McNaughton and Canadian Operational Research at Vimy/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), p. 12.

its bearing and presses a key which lights a corresponding light at central station. When all lamps there light u p together the operator may be fairly certain that all posts are on the same flash. Bearings are phoned in and plotted and the position determined with great precision (under favourable conditions to within

5 yards).25 The second technique devised by McNaughton and his colleagues was sound-ranging. As with flash spotting, it can be illustrated diagrammatically: Figure 2.3 presents a number of landmarks, with G denoting the position of a German gun. There are three microphone posts (Ml, M2 and M3), a forward listening post (L) and a headquarters (H). On hearing the gun firing, the operator at the listening post would press a key to activate a recording apparatus at headquarters, and with each microphone post hard-wired to the recorder, the latter would record the arrival time of the sound from each microphone. Combining the known location of the microphone post with the calculated speed of sound, an estimate of the enemy gun position could be made. A further refinement,

42 Operational Research in War and Peace •

G

German Line Allied Line L

M3

Figure 2.3 Layout of a Sound-Ranging Section Source: Finan and Hurley (1997), p. 12.

based upon the reports of exploding shells, was that the resulting calculations of flight time and range would enable headquarters to determine the type of gun and its calibre. Sound ranging was of no use during an enemy artillery barrage, but when combined with flashspotting it could provide a vital scientific contribution to counter-battery intelligence, complementing conventional techniques based upon visual observation from the ground and air, wireless intercepts, captured documents and prisoners' statements. In judging the effectiveness of McNaughton's work the Canadian Corps was, of course, successful at Vimy Ridge, not least because counter-battery intelligence facilitated the destruction of 83 per cent of the German artillery. Following the First World War much of the work carried out by pioneers of the calibre of Tiverton and McNaughton was forgotten. Whilst their studies may be viewed in retrospect as employing analytical skills akin to operational research, they did not result in the sustained and conscious use of scientific techniques in the planning and execution of military operations. There were ongoing developments in the technology

The Origins of Operational Research 43 of warfare, especially in relation to aircraft, submarines and tanks, as well as in radio and telephone communication, yet until the mid-1930s, 'The designers led, the tactics lagged, and effective countermeasures were virtually nonexistent.' 26 It is significant, for example, that the officiallysponsored history of operational research in the RAF makes no reference to the studies of Lanchester or Tiverton.27 One obvious reason for the failure to sustain such work after 1918 was the policy of military disarmament enshrined in the 'Ten Year Rule' of 1919 which resulted in severe financial stringencies in the allocation of defence funding for the greater part of the interwar period. Under the rule, the armed services were required to prepare their annual estimates 'on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war in the next ten years.' This was subsequently refined by the Treasury to require service chiefs to justify expenditures on a daily shifting basis. In the relatively placid international environment of the 1920s it is hardly surprising that defence expenditure fell dramatically from £766 million in 1919-20 to £189 million in 1921-2 and to £102 million in 1932. But a powerful adjunct to objective financial constraints was the lingering cultural division between military personnel and scientists. A notable attempt to bridge the divide was provided by the government's decision in 1915 to establish the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) with a view to organising civilian research in the national interest, both in war and peace. Four research boards, embracing physics, chemistry, engineering and radio research were created under the leadership of the distinguished chemist, Henry Tizard, with a remit to coordinate civilian efforts with the corresponding service establishments. The project was, however, unsuccessful due to the inability of the civilian boards to understand military requirements, together with a chronic lack of research funding in the aftermath of the war. 28 In a long term perspective, the rise of scientific influence in military affairs in the formal sense began with the establishment of the post of Director of Scientific Research at the Admiralty in 1920, a precedent followed four years later by the creation of the Air Ministry's Directorate of Scientific Research.29 Whilst these offices gave every appearance of forward-looking developments, their effectiveness was limited by the fact that their remit was confined to weapons development. In the case of the Air Ministry's Directorate, there can be no doubting the technical abilities of its head, H. E. Wimperis, inventor of the Wimperis accelerometer and of the course-setting bombsight developed for the Royal Flying Corps in 1917 which remained in service until 1939. But in

44 Operational Research in War and Peace addition to funding limits, Wimperis's efforts were frustrated by an ongoing reluctance on the part of the Air Staff to relinquish significant control over weapons research. In fact, his role consisted mainly of directing routine tasks which had been instituted before the establishment of the Directorate and would have continued in its absence. In commenting on the resulting frustrations, A. P. Rowe, principal assistant to Wimperis, noted the difficulty in attracting scientists into armaments research in the 1920s and early 1930s. Quite apart from the lack of perception of a national emergency at this time, such work as was available was controlled by RAF officers who were invariably interested only in the improvement of weapons familiar to them, thereby leaving little scope for civilian scientists. In Rowe's view, however, the most significant constraint was the 'curse of secrecy' which stifled legitimate scientific discourse to the point at which it stunted the progress of research. As Rowe observed, Although security in defence science is often essential and although no man of goodwill would break a pledge of secrecy, it must be admitted that the more secret a project the less efficient it is likely to be. The science of aeronautics, for instance, progressed rapidly under a system of healthy competition between the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough and the National Physical Laboratory at Teddington, whereas knowledge of armament work was known only to the few engaged upon it and workers in this field rarely, if ever, had to encounter the criticism of greater or even other minds.30 Until the mid-1930s, therefore, little attempt was made to encourage civilian scientists to engage in military research. In the case of the Air Ministry, it was ironic, to say the least, that whilst it was accepted that flight was based on scientific principles, the belief was pervasive that science had little relevance to the conduct of war. Revealing insights into contemporary RAF thinking in this respect are provided by the following quotation from a contemporary issue of The Hawk, the official journal of the RAF Staff College, purporting to explain the reluctance of the military profession to take advantage of the scientist's knowledge: The first reason is the natural resentment felt by any highly developed guild towards intruders from another equally powerful guild. It is permissible to make use of traders, yes; but permitting them to have a voice in policy making is another matter. It has also happened in the past that science has been pressed into war

The Origins of Operational Research 45 by radicals within the military group or by outside pressure of civilian governments. This tended to cause a hardening of feeling against scientists among the military hierarchy. Secondly, the basic education and aims of the two professions differ widely in purpose. The scientist deals primarily with inanimate objects and natural laws; the soldier with men, their handling and discipline. The scientist reaches his decision by laborious experiment, by exploring every avenue, deliberately seeking the unusual and unexpected. Time is seldom of great importance to him. The soldier must make his decision quickly, since the lives of his men and his whole force may be in jeopardy. His decisions thus tend to the orthodox, time worn decisions he has been taught to make; there is little room for experiment with so much at stake. The scientist is brought up in an atmosphere where complete independence of thought and action is a cardinal tenet. He regards with suspicion any organisation which demands rigid obedience to authority. Finally, although war has spurred science and technology on to greater efforts, and has even served to spread their benefits more widely, the scientist is aware that war, in the end, drains away the resources of mankind, and that future wars may wipe out civilisation itself. Even when recognising that another war would only be in defence of his way of life, the scientist is reluctant to give his talents to the arts of destruction. He is above all a builder, not a destroyer.31 It remains to be said that the prejudicial judgements on the leisurely time horizon of scientists and their reluctance to engage in 'destructive' research were to prove to be wholly wrong. Nevertheless, the statement remains significant for its scepticism on the worth of scientific endeavour from within the one branch of the armed services which might be expected to have been in the vanguard of the scientific evaluation of military tactics and strategy. In reflecting on the origins of operational research, Patrick Blackett paid tribute to the work of Lanchester in an article published in the journal, Advancement of Science, in 1948.32 In this light, it is reasonable to assume that he would also have acknowledged McNaughton, Tiverton and Appleyard as practitioners of operational research in the classical sense. Each of these pioneers of operational research was concerned exclusively with the military application of the scientific method. It would therefore be instructive to conclude the chapter by considering the extent

46 Operational Research in War and Peace to which attitudes, or modes of thought akin to operational research were foreshadowed in the non-military sphere. In this respect, the historical lineage is confined to the onset of the modern industrial era, coinciding with the movement from the workshop to the mechanised factory in the period from the late eighteenth century onwards. Evidence of sophisticated thinking grounded, albeit implicitly, in quantification can be traced back to the first great work of classical economics, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in 1776.33 As a tract for the times, this book laid the foundations of all subsequent justifications for a liberal socio-economic order by reference to the 'invisible hand' whereby the pursuit of individual self-interest within a framework of law and custom maximises social welfare. In the present context, the critical point to note is that Smith was determined not only to justify individual freedom on the basis of a fundamental mutuality of individual interests, he was also concerned, more prosaically, to identify the sources of economic growth. In his view, the 'wealth of the nation,' literally, was dependent upon the specialisation or division of labour, which in practical terms was the principal cause of enhanced productivity. Smith's well known example of a pin manufactory provided an eloquent illustration of the point. In the absence of functional specialisation, an individual worker, even 'with his utmost ability,' could scarcely make 'one pin in a day, but certainly could not make twenty.' On the basis of his own observation, however, Smith described the division of labour applied to pin-making in the following terms: One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinctive operations; to put it on is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is a new trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same can well sometimes perform two or three of them.34 Citing the case of a 'manufactory' employing ten workers, Smith then calculated that, collectively, they could p r o d u c e u p w a r d s of 12 pounds of pins per day, approximately 48,000 in total. Thus, the average daily production of each worker was 4,800 pins. The quantum increase in productivity was dependent upon three specific attributes of the division of labour, first the increased dexterity of each worker,

The Origins of Operational Research 47 secondly the saving in time of not having to switch from one task to another, and finally the encouragement to the use of machinery, facilitating the automatic repetition of identical movements. Smith's references to the opportunities for mechanisation are insightful to the extent that they foreshadowed the 'machinery question' which was at the forefront of debate among political economists during the first half of the nineteenth century.35 At one end of the spectrum, the diffusion of machine processes in the context of the factory system was consistent with the appearance, over time, of a reserve army of the unemployed in response to deskilling arising from the substitution of capital for labour. According to Karl Marx, mounting technological unemployment would be one critical factor in undermining the structure of competitive capitalism. The overwhelming majority of political economists, however, adopted a more optimistic view of technological change as holding out the prospect of ongoing economic advance in the face of population growth and the inherent tendency towards diminishing returns. This is encapsulated in the work of David Ricardo, the doyen of early nineteenth century classical economists. 36 But whilst Ricardo appeared to take Smith's conception of the division of labour for granted, others placed it at the forefront of their analysis. Nowhere was this more true than in the case of Charles Babbage, the inventor of the first calculating, or 'difference' engine incorporating many of the facets of automation and anticipating the development of computer-based technology. In c o m m e n t i n g on The Economy of Machinery and Manufactures^ Babbage was concerned to establish 'the domestic economy of the factory' with a view to production and sales at the lowest possible point via the achievement of scale economies. In this connection he reiterated the elements of Smith's division of labour, but proceeded further than Smith in attempting a more accurate calculation of the skills and force necessary at each stage of production. In facilitating precise measurement, mechanisation would enable manufacturers to more accurately determine their costs of production and, more specifically, the economic life of individual machines. Insofar as his views on the division of labour were validated by reference to his own empirical observations, the value of Babbage's work was acknowledged by his fellow political economists, from J. S. Mill to Marx. Its impact on contemporary industrial practice, however, is far less certain, if only because examples of his philosophy of industrial management can be cited on the part of entrepreneurs unfamiliar with his work. For example, in establishing the Soho Factory at Birmingham in 1795, Boulton and

48 Operational Research in War and Peace Watt adopted as rigorous approach to the division of labour as that advocated by Babbage. The delivery of steam power was analysed to a degree and individual job specifications were identified for each class of worker employed in the factory.38 Similar approaches were adopted in the period before 1830 by Benjamin Gott in his Leeds woollen mill and by William Brown, flax spinner of Dundee, the latter notable for offering a consultancy service to other mill owners on the efficiency of work processes. 39 It is only in retrospect, therefore, that the claim can be made that Babbage's commitment to the 'empirical methods of science' ranks him as a 'proto' operational researcher. Indeed, it is arguable that Babbage was less interested in producing practically useful insights into managerial problems than in addressing his fellow political economists struggling to understand the manifold repercussions of industrialisation for the wider society. In any event, his work failed to lay the foundations for a nascent management science rooted in the achievement of scale economies, not least because of its limited relevance to the needs of British industry both in its contemporary setting and for decades to come. Even as late as the Second World War the single unit family-owned firm or partnership was the norm in British manufacturing industry. Where large scale firms existed they invariably took the form either of integrated 'entrepreneurial' companies (i.e., manager manned but owner controlled) or holding companies encompassing decentralised federations of family or entrepreneurial firms.40 In the very few instances where professional managers were employed their small numbers and restricted functions 'helped to perpetuate a commitment to personal ways of management' which effectively precluded access both to significant scale economies and the adoption of a scientific approach to the resolution of managerial problems. 41 The pre-1914 dominance of 'personal' or 'family' capitalism in Britain's industrial structure has been explained by reference to a number of interrelated factors which derive their validity from explicit contrasts with the United States. In that country, the foundations of a modern corporate economy were laid in the period after 1890 as the business structure came to be dominated by firms possessing professional hierarchies in which managerial tasks were differentiated by function. By this means American enterprise was able to respond to buoyant demand conditions by the exploitation of managerial economies of scale. In Britain, however, domestic markets were relatively slow growing and disintegrated: real incomes were lower and income distribution more highly skewed. For many firms, moreover, export markets both in

The Origins of Operational Research 49 composition and geographical extent, were extremely fragmented, thus compounding the limitations of the home market as a source of scale economies. The incentives, therefore, to create integrated firms with managerial hierarchies were far less compelling than in the continental United States, all the more so because of the existence in Britain of a sophisticated and entrenched system of marketing middlemen, operating both nationally and internationally, which placed a substantial institutional brake on integration. 42 It is therefore unsurprising that the first practical attempts to enhance managerial processes on the basis of rational observation and measurement, consistent with the application of scientific principles, were made in the United States following the publication of Frederick Winslow Taylor's Principles of Scientific Management.® Scientific management, or 'Taylorism/ was grounded in Taylor's experience first as a labourer and then as chief engineer for the Midvale Steel Company. He subsequently worked for the Bethlehem Steel Company, but from 1901 onwards devoted himself to writing and industrial consultancy. Even before the publication of his seminal work in 1911, he had been invited to serve as a visiting lecturer at the recentlyformed Harvard Business School where his ideas were debated in an atmosphere of controversy. Taylor's first paper was delivered to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in 1895 in which he argued that the allocation of labour on the shopfloor should be determined 'scientifically' through detailed job analysis and time and motion studies. In this way 'standard time and output' could be identified which would determine differential piece rates according to the individual worker's productivity. 44 The achievement of 'standard time' was dependent on the establishment of a planning department to administer the factory as a whole, supported by a number of highly specialised 'functional foremen.' Thus, instead of reporting to one general foreman, workers would report to eight. These included '1) route clerks, 2) instruction card clerks, 3) cost and time clerks, who plan and give directions from the planning room, and 4) gang bosses' for coordination and control. Others ('the speed boss, the repair boss, and the inspector') assessed work performance and quality, whilst the 'shop disciplinarian' reviewed workers' 'virtues and defects' in order to enhance their productivity. 45 Although every factory would possess an administrative hierarchy, the planning department occupied the pivotal position, insofar as it presided over job evaluations and time and motion studies, as well as establishing daily work plans for units and individual workers. In this way, Taylor

50 Operational Research in War and Peace hoped to move away from the prevailing intuitive approach to managerial control to one based on scientific principles. Taylor's advocacy of extreme specialisation was in a direct line of descent from Adam Smith and Charles Babbage. Like the latter, he took the view that the division of labour was conducive to the welfare of the workforce as a whole as a result of enhanced monetary rewards. It is well known, however, that the introduction of scientific management into American industry provoked labour unrest to the extent that it was perceived as a threat to the strength of trade unionism in consequence of its focus on individual rather than collective incentives.46 But although it is true that a majority of American employers rejected the full application of Taylor's ideas, a number of principles associated with scientific management were incorporated into managerial practice, albeit with adjustments to meet local circumstances. After 1900, more overt line and staff organisations appeared and the essential functions of Taylor's planning department were taken on by a plant manager's specialist staff.47 As for the linkages between scientific management and operational research, it is clear that Taylor's work was to have long-term influence insofar as he was the founding father of managerial consultancy in the United States, an activity which was to come to fruition in the interwar years and which played a notable role in the diffusion of operational research into the American corporate sector after 1950. Taylor's approach to managerial organisation can be regarded as a direct precursor of operational research because it was concerned to optimise the use of existing resources by reference to procedures akin to the 'scientific method,' based upon observation and measurement. On this level, scientific management had practical impact, although it is important to note that its techniques of analysis were far removed from the relative technical rigour of operational research as it was to develop after 1950. The fact remains that scientific management originated in practical experience on the shopfloor where 'intuitive feel' had an important role to play in achieving greater operational efficiency. This was, of course, far removed from the modus operandi of the academically trained scientists who were to lay the real foundations of operational research after 1937.48 In the period to 1914 there was no movement in Britain corresponding to scientific management. In the interwar years, however, a number of factors encouraged prominent sections of the business community to accept that 'a more rational control....of economic life through the application of scientific method is possible and desirable.'49

The Origins of Operational Research 51 The war itself was one causal element, insofar as its unprecedented logistic needs had encouraged product standardisation, mass production and company mergers, as well as the growth of capital intensive industries such as advanced chemicals and electrical engineering hitherto underrepresented in Britain's business structure compared with Germany and the United States. In the decade after the war the fulcrum of debate was provided by the 'rationalisation' movement which offered a congenial home for the British advocates of scientific management. Whilst The Economist claimed that rationalisation was no more than 'a cloak for confused ideas, and....a badge of respectability for processes of doubtful value,' 50 it is clear in retrospect that it was consistent with the movement towards a larger scale of business organisation as a result of company mergers. In the depressed commercial climate of the 1920s this was viewed as desirable on several counts. Surplus productive capacity, for example, entailed a loss of competitive efficiency. In that context, horizontal integration (mergers of firms at the same stage of production) was viewed as a direct means of overcoming the slowness of market forces in eliminating loss-making firms, whilst vertical integration (the merger of firms at different stages of production) was advocated as a means of achieving economies of scale in industries such as iron and steel and cotton textiles. Rationalisation owed its popularity in part, therefore, to increasing dissatisfaction with market mechanisms. As Harold Macmillan, MP was to state in 1934, There is abundant evidence to prove that some form of conscious social direction will have to supplement the old system under which the regulation of our economy was entrusted to the method of trial and error in response to the price indicator.51 As a progressive Conservative and advocate of planning, Macmillan, like the business community in general, was concerned to revalidate the capitalist system in the face of depression and mass unemployment, and at a time w h e n the Labour P a r t y w a s a d v o c a t i n g wholesale nationalisation as one solution to the extreme forces of competition. In these respects, it is significant that in the later 1920s government and the leading supporters of rationalisation regarded it as a structuralist solution to the problem of unemployment. Whilst it was conceded that mergers would have the immediate effect of raising unemployment, in the longer term, as industrial efficiency improved in response to scale economies, lost export markets would be regained and rationalised industries would be able to recruit more workers. 52

52 Operational Research in War and Peace The belief that rationalisation would lead to industrial rejuvenation was also grounded in contemporary conceptions of the virtues of German, and more especially American business organisation. This is confirmed by the flood of literature pointing to foreign competitive strengths based upon large scale organisation. Official publications were no exception to this trend, as evidenced by the reports of the Balfour Committee on Industry and Trade and the Samuel and Lewis reports on the coal industry, all of which proclaimed the virtues of 'scientific' marketing and management as the paramount sources of commercial success in German and American business. 53 The issue of foreign emulation as a force for rationalisation can be taken further by reference to the direct intrusion into the British business scene of industrialists or firms with American and German origins. 54 Excellent examples are provided by Sir Hugo Hirst of the General Electrical Company (GEC), the Renolds of the Renold and Coventry Chain Company and, for his role in founding ICI in 1926, Sir Alfred Mond (later Lord Melchett). Mond claimed to have inaugurated the rationalisation movement in Britain, and it is significant that his enthusiasm for a large scale merger in the British chemical industry was prompted by his desire to emulate the competitive power of the recently-founded German chemical combine, I. G. Farben. At the level of the firm it was American companies which spurred on the rationalisation movement by acquiring and then merging British firms in sectors such as electrical products and vehicles. GEC, for example, was responsible for the merger of four electrical manufacturers to form Associated Electrical Industries, whilst General Motors, in taking over Vauxhall Motors, complemented Ford's presence as a large scale producer in the British domestic market. 55 Taking all of the above factors into account, the business historian, Leslie Hannah, has argued that the interwar period in general, and the 1920s in particular, marked the rise of a corporate economy in Britain whereby the structure of business and the practice of management began to move towards prevailing standards in the United States. 56 During the 1920s, an average of 188 firms disappeared each year as a result of mergers. This was three times the average for the forty years to 1920, and its effects were fully reflected in the g r o w t h of industrial concentration. In 1910, the share of the largest 100 firms in manufacturing net output stood at 16 per cent: by 1920 it had risen to 18 per cent before advancing to 26 per cent in 1930. The growth in firm size, moreover, was facilitated by managerial innovations on an unprecedented scale. The diffusion of the telephone, for example, greatly facilitated

The Origins of Operational Research 53 managerial control and coordination, as did the introduction of office machinery such as the Hollerith 'which could process accounting data with great speed, and which were recognised to have caused important developments in the collection and diffusion of information, notably in large companies.' 57 Equally significant as a response to the growth in firm size was the rise of the functional managerial specialist with a particular focus on new methods of accounting. In this respect, the spread of cost accounting was complemented by innovations in internal audit and forecasting procedures. Yet although the 1920s witnessed a move away from the small scale 'family capitalism' of the nineteenth century in favour of the corporate business form and professional salaried managers, great care should be taken not to exaggerate their impact in terms of the introduction of 'scientific methods of management' on the American model. The consensus among business historians is that as late as 1939 Britain's' business structure could still be described as being based upon family, or personal capitalism. As Chandler has emphasised, As late as the 1930s the great majority of the leading firms making packaged branded goods continued to be run by one or two families. The Cadburys, Frys, Rowntrees, Colmans, Recketts, Ranks, Lyles, Barratts, Beechams, Sangers, Courtaulds, Albright and Wilsons, and the families who owned Cross and Blackwell, Peek Frean, Huntly and Palmers, Gilbeys Gin, Cerebos, Liebig, Bovril, Carreras, Yardley, Pinchin Johnson and Goodlass, Wall and Borax Consolidated continued to manage their firms into the third and even fourth generations.58 The mergers of the 1920s, moreover, were also consistent with the perpetuation of family influence and control. Although the contemporary merger wave gave birth to such corporate giants as ICI and Unilever, the practice of constructing federations of autonomous family enterprises in the form of holding companies was the norm. In this context, it is significant that Hannah has conceded that, Companies like AEI, Hawker Siddeley, Liebigs, Cadbury-Fry, Stewarts and Lloyds, Tube Investments and Reckitt and Coleman appear to have been little more than loose confederations of subsidiaries, and it may reasonably be doubted whether such a structure can have achieved many of the potential economies of large scale. Suspicion is inevitably aroused that they were a form of cartel — albeit a strong and permanent cartel — which could achieve many of the private benefits of monopoly power whilst

54 Operational Research in War and Peace foregoing the social benefits which strategic and organisational innovation were likely to bring.59 When it is borne in mind that the rate of merger activity tailed off dramatically in the 1930s to be replaced by overt cartelisation as the dominant trend in business organisation, it can be readily appreciated that the movement towards managerial innovation was blunted further. The rise of the functional managerial specialist should also be placed in its correct historical context in that the emphasis on the recruitment of accountants is indicative of a notable weakness in educational provision for management. In the United States, the modern business school had made its debut in the decade after 1899 culminating in the foundation of the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard in 1908. At the same time, organisations for professional managers and specialist journals proliferated, as did m a n a g e m e n t consultancy. 6 0 Such developments were notable for their absence in Britain where the 'cult of the amateur' prevailed until well after 1945. In the context of a business structure where family ownership and management continued to be writ large, this was hardly surprising. In these circumstances, large swathes of British industry were unaffected either by scientific management or the rhetoric of the rationalisation movement. There were British variants of 'Taylorism' in the interwar period, notably the Bedaux system of work simplification and standardisation introduced by 225 firms by 1937, but which encountered substantial worker and trade union resistance for simply trying to 'speed u p work.' 6 1 Much closer to the spirit of operational research was the work carried out at the Shirley Institute for the cotton textile industry from the 1920s onwards. This focussed on time and motion studies of loom operations entailing the assembly of large quantities of statistical data. 62 Such activities, however, were the exceptions to the general rule of a widespread and fundamental indifference to the 'scientific' organisation of business.

NOTES 1. A. P. Rowe, One Story of Radar (Cambridge University Press, London, 1948), p. 51. 2. Thomas Digges, An Arithmetical Militaires Treatise Named Stratioticos (London, 1571: Da Capo Press, Amsterdam, 1968). 3. Alfred W. Crosby, The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society 1250-1600 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997).

The Origins of Operational Research 55 4. William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since AD 1000 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982), pp. 126-30. 5. Ibid., pp. 262-306; M. W. Kirby, 'British Culture and the Development of High Technology Sectors,' in Andrew Godley and O. M. Westall (eds.), Business History and Business Culture (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996), pp. 190-221. 6. H. R. Ricardo, 'F.W. Lanchester/ Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 5 (1948), pp. 757-65. 7. F. W. Lanchester, Aerial Flight, Vol. 1 Aerodynamics, Vol. 2 Aerodonetics (Constable, London, 1907, 1908). 8. F. W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare (Constable, London, 1916). 9. J. H. Engels, 'A Verification of Lanchester's Law,' Journal of the Operations Research Society of America , Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 163-71. 10. Lt. J. V. Chase, 'Force on Force Effectiveness: Model for Battle Lines' (1902). Reprinted and discussed in B. A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (Navy Institute Press, Annapolis, MD.). 11. B. A. Fiske, 'American Naval Policy,' US Naval Institute, vol. 130 (1905), pp. See also, K. Weiss, 'The Fiske Model of Warfare,' Operations Research, Vol. 10 (1962), pp. 569-71. 12. M. Osipov, 'The Influence of Numerical Strength of Engaged forces on their Casualties'. English translation in Robert L. Helmbold and Alan S. Rehn, Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 46 (1995), pp. 435-90. See also, R. L. Helmbold, 'Osipov: the "Russian Lanchester",' European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 65 (1993), pp. 278-88. 13. J. Reed Lowell to President Rinehart, in Operations Research, Vol. 2 (1954), p. 363. 14. Joseph F. McCloskey, 'The Beginning of Operations Research: 1934-1941/ Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), p. 146. 15. B. D. Powers, Strategy without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914-1939 (Croom Helm, London, 1976), p. 18. 16. N. Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing (William Kimber, London, 1973), p. 142. 17. Tiverton Papers, RAF Museum, Colindale, Boxes 1-4. 18. V. Van der Vat, Tire Atlantic Campaign (Hodder and Stoughton, London 1988). 19. T. W. Korner, The Pleasures of Counting (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 28. 20. J. Winton, Convoy (Michael Joseph, London, 1983), p. 115. 21. Korner (1996), pp. 32-3. 22. Winton (1983), p. 122. 23. Lloyd N. Scott, Naval Consulting Board of the United States (US Printing Office, 1926). I am grateful to Ernest Koenigsberg for this reference. 24. J. Finan and W. J. Hurley, 'McNaughton and Canadian Operational Research at Vimy,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 10-14.

56 Operational Research in War and Peace 25. A. G. L. McNaughton, 'The Development of Artillery in the Great War,' Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1929), pp. 160-71. Cited in Finan and Hurley (1997), p. 12. 26. McCloskey (1987), p. 144. 27. Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force (HMSO, London, 1963). 28. Sir Harry Melville, The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (Macmillan, London, 1962). 29. R. W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (Phoenix House, London ,1962), pp. 10-11. 30. Rowe (1948), p. 2. 31. Cited in Clark (1962), pp. 16-17. 32. P.M.S. Blackett, 'Operational Research,' Advancement of Science, Vol. 45 (1948), p. 30 and appendix 1, p. 38. Reprinted in Idem, Studies of War (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1962), Part 2, ch. 1, pp. 169-98. 33. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, 9 th edition (London, 1799). 34. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 35. Maxine Berg, The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy 1815-1848 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980). 36. Ibid., pp. 43-74. 37. Charles Babbage, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (London, first, second and third editions, 1832, fourth edition, 1835). 38. Eric Roll, An Early Experiment in Industrial Organisation (Longmans, London, 1930). 39. Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management: A Study of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968), pp. 115-6; Dennis Chapman, 'William Brown of Dundee, 1791-1864: Management in a Scottish Flax Mill,' Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Vol. 4 (1952), p. 124. 40. Alfred D. Chandler, 'The Development of Modern Management Structure in the US and UK,' in L. Hannah (ed.), Management Strategy and Business Development: An Historical and Comparative Study (Macmillan, London, 1976), p. 40. 41. Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990), p. 242. 42. Alfred D. Chandler, 'The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis,' Economic History Review, Vol. 33 (1980), p. 402. 43. Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (W. W. Norton, New York, 1911. 44. Frederick Winslow Taylor, 'A Piece-Rate System Being a Step towards Partial Solution of the Labour Problem,' Transactions of the American Society of

The Origins of Operational Research

57

Mechanical Engineers, Vol. 16 (1895), pp. 856-83. See also Daniel Wilson, 'Scientific Management, Systematic Management and Labour, 1880-1915/ Business History Review, Vol. 49 (1974), pp. 479-500. 45. Taylor (1911), p. 104. 46. D. Nelson, Frederick Taylor and the Rise of Scientific Management (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WL 1980). 47. Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 276-7. 48. Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (Methuen, London, second edition, 1983), pp. 31-3. 49. Lyndall F. Urwick, The Meaning of Rationalisation (Macmillan, London, 1930), p. 27. 50. The Economist, 7 December, 1929, p. 1073. 51. Cited in Hannah (1983), p. 31. 52. M. W. Kirby, 'Industrial Policy/ in Sean Glyrm and Alan Booth (eds.), The Road to Full Employment (Allen and Unwin, London, 1987), pp. 131-5. 53. Final Report of the Committee on Industry and Trade (Balfour Committee), Cmd. 3282 (1929); Report of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (Samuel Commission, 1925), Cmd. 2600 (1926); Report of the Departmental Committee on Cooperative Selling (Lewis Committee), Cmd. 2770 (1926). 54. Hannah (1983), p. 38. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., pp. 90-122. 57. Leslie Hannah, 'Managerial Innovation and the Rise of the Large Scale Company in Interwar Britain,' Economic History Review, Vol. 27 (1974), p. 257. 58. Alfred D. Chandler, 'The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the United Kingdom,' Economic History Review, Vol. 33 (1980), p. 402. 59. Leslie Hannah, 'Strategy and Structure in the Manufacturing Sector/ in Idem, Management Strategy and Business Development: An Historical and Comparative Study (Macmillan, London, 1976), p. 199. 60. Chandler (1977), pp. 464-8. 61. C. Littler, The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies: A Comparative Study Heinemann, London, 1982), pp. 99-116. 62. John Singleton, Lancashire on the Scrapheap: The Cotton Industry, 1945-1970 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991), p. 69; Board of Trade, Working Party Reports: Cotton (HMSO, London, 1946), pp. 129-31.

3

The Beginnings of Operational Research: British Air Strategy, 1920-1940 Political and diplomatic historians are agreed that the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 was followed by a peace settlement which sowed the seeds of future conflict. The economist, J. M. Keynes may have lamented the imposition of a 'Carthaginian' peace settlement on Germany, 1 but the Treaty of Versailles left the sinews of German military power intact. 2 Reparations were dominated by financial transfers, whilst the Allied military occupation of the Rhineland was subject to a time limit at the same time as it preserved the greater part of the prewar German state. In these circumstances, there were no effective restraints on German revanchism, a fact confirmed by the covert military rearmament undertaken by the Weimar government in the 1920s, together with the rapid revival of German industry following the hyper-inflation of 1922-3. Default on reparations payments, moreover, did not lead to effective sanctions, especially in the light of the willingness of the United States to guarantee Germany's financial security in the form of short term loans after 1924. Even these were repudiated after 1930 when, in the midst of renewed financial crisis and mass unemployment, the stage was set for the takeover of the German state by the National Socialist Party committed to the reassertion of German political and military power in Europe and hence the overthrow of the Treaty of Versailles. Following the inauguration of Adolf Hitler's Chancellorship in 1933, Germany's territorial ambitions were rekindled in such a way as to offer a renewed threat to that long standing British foreign policy objective of maintaining a balance of power in Europe. But in exactly the same way that the construction by Imperial Germany of a naval battle fleet in home waters had undermined the military integrity of the British Isles after 1900, Hitler's elevation to power was followed by an overt drive for rearmament which was to incorporate a substantial aircraft building programme. In this context, interwar observers of military and diplomatic 58

The Beginnings of Operational Research 59 affairs adopted a view of future warfare reminiscent of the 'mutually assured destruction' of the nuclear age: quite apart from its implications for naval and land forces, aerial bombardment held out the prospect of mass slaughter of civilians concentrated in urban areas. 'Terror bombing,' therefore, was viewed as a potent new weapon in the military arsenal, a fact which received some confirmation from the Japanese bombing campaign in Manchuria in the early 1930s and the deployment of air power during the Spanish Civil War after 1936.3 As indicated already, British defence policy after the First World War was based upon the 'Ten Year Rule' which placed severe constraints on military expenditure (see above, p. 43). From the early 1930s onwards, however, the changing international situation forced a fundamental reappraisal of military strategy. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in defiance of the League of Nations in 1931 coincided with the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the progressive breakdown of the Disarmament Conference convened at Geneva in 1932. Faced with the prospect of having to deal with 'two great states at opposite ends of the world, with unfulfilled ambitions and bitter memories,' the Cabinet was obliged to consider the defence requirements of 'the largest conglomeration of political and economic interests and commitments in the world.' 4 The Ten Year Rule was therefore partially abrogated in 1932 and laid aside completely following Hitler's accession to power. Thereafter, the Treasury began to relax the reins on military expenditure, marginally at first, but culminating in the Defence White Paper of 1936.5 In recognition of the prevailing public hostility to the expansion of the army for a military campaign on the Continent, the White Paper envisaged a 'two power naval standard' whereby the Royal Navy would maintain an effective presence both in Far Eastern and Home waters. Equally significant was its endorsement of the Air Ministry's 'Scheme F' which allowed for the construction by 1939 of a force of 1,736 first-line aircraft, including nearly 1,000 bombers with adequate reserves. In relation to the foundation of operational research it was the strategic role allotted to the RAF which was to prove to be of decisive importance, albeit in circumstances which had little, or nothing to do with the initial bias of the relevant rearmament programme in favour of a bomber force. In order to explain why this was so it is necessary to trace the evolution of British air strategy after the First World War. During the 1920s the Air Staff became committed to the view that the ongoing development of military technology ensured that any future conflict on land or sea would result in a lengthy battle of attrition.

60 Operational Research in War and Peace Evidence from the First World War was cited to demonstrate that nations did not surrender because their armed forces had been defeated in the field but because their internal economic and socio-political cohesion had been undermined. 6 In this latter context, it was argued that aircraft could be used to accelerate the process of internal collapse by means of aerial bombardment of an enemy's war-making capacity. This would entail attacks on centres of industry and urban areas w i t h a view to undermining civilian morale. Aircraft, moreover, had the potential to fulfil a major strategic role in warfare insofar as it was widely assumed that no effective defence against air attack could be organised. The first strategic air offensive in history was launched by Germany against Britain in the form of the Zeppelin raids of 1915 and 1916 (see above, p. 34). These were directed against military targets, although in reality bombs were dropped largely at random. Whilst they caused few casualties and little material damage, the raids had a significant public impact in Britain, not least because the Zeppelins were able to strike deep into the English mainland, carrying out attacks with apparent impunity, against towns and cities as far to the north west of England as Cheshire and Lancashire. In June, 1917, German Gotha bombers caused considerably more damage, both moral and material, when they attacked central London in broad daylight, killing 162 people and injuring 432. All but 11 of the casualties were civilians and numbering amongst them were 46 school children. 7 The Zeppelin and Gotha raids did much to determine the future of air force organisation and strategy in Britain. Two reports prepared for the Imperial War Cabinet by the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, and General Smuts, pointed to future needs in the form of anti-aircraft gunnery and other defensive measures, but also favoured an offensive capability.8 The latter was highlighted in the second report which adopted the doctrine already established in the Royal Flying Corps by its Commander-in-Chief, Major General Hugh Trenchard, that counter-attack was the best form of defence: a strategic air offensive, in crippling the enemy air force over its own territory would reduce the potential scale of attack, deny air superiority, and in destroying the enemy's war-winning potential would reduce morale. To the extent that 'The day may not be far off when aerial operations...on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war to which the older forms of military and naval operations become secondary and subordinate', Smuts recommended that the air arm should be separated from the existing controls exercised over it by the army and the navy. 9

The Beginnings of Operational Research 61 In fulfilment of Smuts' recommendation, the RAF came into existence on 1 April, 1918 with its separate identity linked clearly to the concept of a strategic bombing offensive. It was the latter which provided the justification for the continued existence of an independent air arm in the face of opposition from the established services and cost-conscious politicians after the war. In this respect, the role of Trenchard as Chief of Staff (1919-29) was decisive so that by the end of his period of office the accepted RAF doctrine was that the bomber was a weapon of warwinning capability via its impact on enemy morale. As Trenchard argued before the Cabinet Standing Sub-Committee on Defence in May 1921, 'it is only by way of the air that one country can reach the heart of another in the earliest days of war and drive home the fear of personal injury and loss to every individual.' 10 In the early years of the interwar period the RAF was not alone in its acceptance of the Trenchard doctrine. In the United States, General Billy Mitchell expounded the strategic role of the bomber, whilst Guilio Douhet, an Italian general, formulated it at length in a treatise published in 1921. In The Command of the Air, Douhet argued that in the event of war the devastation threatened by aerial bombardment was so great that a nation's only hope of survival was to destroy the enemy air force before it had a chance to strike. Douhet suggested, therefore, that the bulk of military resources should be devoted to producing fleets of heavy bombers designed to deliver, without warning, a 'knock-out blow' resulting in immediate capitulation. 11 Fear of the so-called 'knock-out blow' dominated Air Staff thinking for the greater part of the interwar period. In March 1922, a report in The Times disclosed that the French L'Armee de L'Air had a considerable force of 300 bombers and fighters to match. 12 Published at a time of increasingly frigid diplomatic relations between France and Britain, the public stir created by this pronouncement was fully reflected in official deliberations on military strategy. Only one month after The Times article was published, a sub-committee of the Committee on Imperial Defence (CID), in extrapolating from the German Gotha Attacks on London, concluded that a French bomber force would be able to drop 75 tons per day on civilian centres in England after an initial attack amounting to 150 tons. In these circumstances, 'Railway traffic would be disorganised, food supplies would be interrupted, and it is probable that that after being subject for several weeks to the strain of such an attack the population would be so demoralised that they would insist upon an armistice.' 13 In retrospect, the possibility of an Anglo-French military conflict in the early 1920s w a s virtually

62 Operational Research in War and Peace unthinkable, but the strategic aspects of air power continued to be debated for the remainder of the 1920s. In 1923, for example, a further sub-committee of the CID with a remit to consider 'National and Imperial Defence,' r e c o m m e n d e d the establishment of a H o m e Defence ('Metropolitan') Air Force of 52 squadrons dominated by bombers in a ratio of two to one over other aircraft types. In this respect, Trenchard's views had been decisive on two counts. First, 'Air power holds within itself the possibility of bringing about an early termination of a European war' thereby eliminating the prospect of infantry casualties on the scale of the First World War. Secondly, to the extent that there could be no effective defence against aerial bombardment of the English mainland, the only credible response to an enemy bombing campaign was deterrence: the RAF should therefore be equipped with a bomber force large enough to provide a credible threat against a potential aggressor by virtue of its ability to deliver its own variant of the 'knock-out blow.' 14 Although the RAF's expansion plans of the early 1920s were stunted by the financial constraints imposed by the Ten-Year Rule, Trenchard's focus on the strategic bombing offensive and the knock-out blow continued. In 1925, for example, the official Air Raid Precautions Committee reconfirmed the probable effects of an attack on Great Britain by the L'Armee de L'Air as resulting in 'a loss of more than twice the whole First World War total of [civilian] casualties in only three days.'15 The Air Staff, moreover, reconfirmed its belief that the effect on morale of a bombing offensive would be far greater than the material damage, since no defence was possible against such an attack. By the early 1930s fear of aerial bombardment was being articulated in public. This was well illustrated by Stanley Baldwin's doom-laden statement to the House of Commons that 'the bomber will always get through,' made in the aftermath of the 'terror' bombing of Shanghai by the Japanese airforce in 1931.16 Following Hitler's accession to power both political and military minds were concentrated by the fact that in relation to Germany, Britain was at a serious disadvantage in the conduct of aerial warfare. Although Germany possessed no official air force in the early 1930s, evidence soon began to accumulate that preparations were underway for the formation of the Luftwaffe.17 Confronted by this development, British military planners were conscious of the fact that no part of the British Isles lay further than seventy miles from the coast, a meagre seventeen minutes' flying time for enemy aircraft in the event of a German occupation of Belgium and the French north-east coast. British targets, moreover, were relatively concentrated, whereas their German equivalents were spread

The Beginnings of Operational Research 63 over a wide geographical area, the implication being that 'The same weight of bombs, ferried over the same distance, would do far more effective damage to the British economy than it would to the German.' 18 Already, in 1934 the Air Staff had concluded that with a first-line strength of 1,230 aircraft, Germany could drop 75 tons of bombs per day on England, a figure that would be doubled if the Luftwaffe had access to airfields in the Low Countries. Casualties were estimated at 50 per ton. 19 As estimates of Luftwaffe strength were raised after 1935 (when Hitler claimed, falsely, to have achieved parity with the RAF), so too were the calculations of the possible Luftwaffe bomb load. In 1936 the Air Staff estimate stood at 600 tons per day with 150,000 casualties during the first week of war. By 1939 it had been raised to 700 tons, a figure that was viewed as consistent with an attempted 'knock-out blow' of 3,500 tons delivered within the first 24 hours. 20 As the international situation deteriorated from the mid-1930s onwards, Britain's defence requirements were subject to continuing review. For the RAF this entailed the formulation of successive construction programmes as set out in Table 3.1. The later schemes after 1937 were consistent with the perceived need to construct a strike force of at least equal strength to the Luftwaffe. In that context there were three primary considerations, first the need to sustain a bomber force of sufficient capability to deter aggression, second to possess sufficient strength in depth to defeat a knock-out blow, and third to develop a strike force with the ability to engage, if necessary, in a counteroffensive against the German homeland. These objectives were enshrined in Scheme J and reached maturity in Scheme M, the latter being devised in the aftermath of the German takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The evolving schemes up to and including 'K' were biased in favour of the bomber strike force and were thus in conformity with the Trenchard doctrine. The 'L' and 'M' schemes of 1938, however, provided for an increasing proportion of interceptor fighters which at first sight was indicative of an increasing concern with the air defence of Great Britain itself. This was, however, more apparent than real insofar as the final prewar expansion Scheme M fully reflected the Air Ministry's decision, taken in 1936, to re-equip the RAF with four-engined heavy bombers with a flight range of 2,000 miles and therefore capable of reaching targets in eastern Germany. Thus, although the strike force in Scheme M was numerically smaller than in Scheme H twenty months earlier, the estimated bomb lift was 5,000 tons compared with less than the 1,000 tons carried by the twin-engined 'light' bombers envisaged in the

Table 3.1. Summary of pre-war expansion schemes — 1934 to 1939.

s

GERMAN AIR FORCE

R.A.F

(estimated) Scheme

A

Date Submitted

July

Total Striking Force

Total Fighter Command

Total R.A.F Incl. Overseas

Due for Completion

500

336

1252

March 1939

1934

Striking Force

Total G.A.F

Due for Completion

Remark

I

The first pre-war expansion.

C

March 1935

840

420

1804

March 1937

800/950

1512

March 1937

The result of Sir John Simon's and Mr. Eden's visit to Hitler in Berlin

F

November 1935

1022

420

2204

March 1939

840/972

1572

March 1937

Further German expansion and the Abyssinian war.

H

January 1937

1631

476

2770

March 1939

1700

2500

March 1939

Withdrawn after consideration by cabinet.

J

October 1937

1442

532

3031

June 1941

1458

3240

December 1939

The first scheme based on estimated of minimum overall strategic requirements.

K

January 1938

1360

532

2795

March 1941

1350

2700

Summer 1938

The 'emasculated J'

L

April 1938

1352

608

2863

March 1940

1950

4400

April 1940

After Austria

M

October 1938

1360

800

3185

March 1942

After Munich. The first 'all-heavy' programme.

n

The Beginnings of Operational Research 65 earlier scheme. 21 The decision to bolster fighter production was based upon two interrelated factors which were bound up with the quality of the available bomber strike force and contemporary developments in fighter design and construction. In relation to the former, it is important to note that the later RAF expansion schemes were to be completed in 1940 or beyond. Under the final Scheme M, for example, the proposed heavy bomber strike force would not materialise until March 1942. The implication of this was that at the point of the scheme's inception in October 1938, and for a considerable period thereafter, Bomber Command would be reliant on obsolete or interim aircraft types which were wholly incapable of launching either a knock-out blow against Germany or undermining German civilian morale in conformity with the Trenchard doctrine. Thus, in November 1938, only one month after the inception of Scheme M, Bomber Command's Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edgar LudlowHewitt, informed the Air Staff that to dispatch the existing strike force deep into Germany could well result in a major catastrophe. 22 It was this scenario which would ensure that when war broke out in September 1939, 'conservation' of the bomber strike force was the primary concern in Bomber Command (see below, p. 135). In the light of the RAF's limited deterrent and offensive capability it was inevitable, perhaps, that in the circumstances of the later 1930s the Air Staff should focus increasing attention on the possibilities of defending Britain against the Luftwaffe with a view to negating a bombing strike, whether in the form of an attempted knock-out blow or a concerted campaign to undermine civilian morale. Defence, as opposed to offence in the deployment of air power was a radical challenge to the received wisdom of the Trenchard doctrine. It was, moreover, an increasingly realistic possibility in the later 1930s as a result of contemporary improvements in fighter design and techniques of interception. In the former case, the initial development was the transformation of the RAF's fighter population from the wooden biplanes of the mid-1930s to a force of cantilever monoplanes by 1939 with vastly superior armament and performance. Epitomised in the form of the Hurricane and Spitfire, the revolution in fighter design after 1935 was a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for the successful interception of enemy aircraft. As indicated already, the geographical configuration of Great Britain meant that the country was highly vulnerable to aerial attack. There was no way of intercepting bombers by night and the only means of interception by day was to maintain

66 Operational Research in War and Peace

standing patrols, a system which could not be sustained indefinitely — unless the RAF possessed a mass fighter force capable of defending the greater part of the English eastern and southern coastline. Since logistic and financial considerations ruled out the construction of such a force, the effective air defence of Great Britain was entirely dependent upon a radical improvement in techniques of interception. In the late 1920s the CID had established an anti-aircraft research sub-committee to investigate 'the present position in regard to research for anti-aircraft purposes.' Its report, submitted in 1928, concluded that the 'only system which can be applied at present with any hope of success' was the detection of aircraft by acoustic methods. By 1934, a prototype acoustic device was in place, situated on Romney Marsh. Measuring 25 feet high and 200 feet long, it was directed towards the French capital. Sensitive to ground noises and with a circumscribed range of only eight miles, it could provide no information on the altitude or bearing of incoming aircraft. In these respects, it was already obsolete, not least because of increasing air speeds and the changed international situation whereby France was replaced by Germany as the most likely source of aerial attack. 23 The practical limitations of the acoustic system were highlighted dramatically during the RAF's summer exercise of 1934 consisting mainly of night attacks on London, but with Coventry singled out as the main provincial target. In the first raid the Air Ministry was effectively 'destroyed' without interception by defending fighters, and in subsequent raids the Houses of Parliament were picked out without difficulty. The lessons of the exercise were not lost within the Air Ministry where A. P. Rowe, principal assistant to the Director of Scientific Research, H. E. Wimperis, undertook an informal investigation into Britain's air defence capabilities. 24 After studying the fifty three files on 'air defence' in the Ministry's archives, Rowe reported that unless 'science' could develop some new method of enhancing Britain's defences against aerial bombardment, any war beginning in the next ten years would be lost. 25 It was this bleak conclusion which prompted Wimperis to recommend to the Air Ministry that a Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence (CSSAD) should be established under the chairmanship of Henry Tizard, assisted by himself and Rowe, and also Professors A. V. Hill and P. M. S. Blackett. The remit would be 'to consider how far recent advances in scientific and technical knowledge can be used to strengthen the present methods of defence against hostile aircraft'. The Tizard Committee, as it came to be called, was well suited to its task.

The Beginnings of Operational Research 67 Tizard himself, after gaming a doctorate in chemistry, had moved into administrative work at the DSIR and in 1934 was Rector of the Imperial College of Science and Technology as well as chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee. He had already collaborated with Wimperis by permitting the Air Ministry to establish a research laboratory at Imperial College. By the early 1930s, seven scientific officers were employed to undertake experiments on engine fuels and navigation instruments. 26 Of even greater relevance to the work of the CSSAD, Tizard possessed directly relevant military experience having served in the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War. In this capacity he had undertaken experimental flying at Martlesham Heath, and on one occasion, whilst testing a new Sopwith Camel fighter, had obtained vital information on the performance of Gotha bombers by joining a formation on their return from a raid on London. 27 The other members of the CSSAD also possessed experience of scientific and military affairs. Hill, holding a chair in physiology at University College, London, was a Nobel Laureate in Physiology and Medicine and offered a long record of pure research. Reference has already been made to his work as Director of the Anti-Aircraft Experimental Section during the First World War (see above, pp. 34-5). Blackett also possessed military experience having served as a junior naval officer before and during the war. He had been present at the Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914 and had served as a gunnery officer on HMS Barham, flagship of the Fifth Battle Squadron, at Jutland in 1917. During the course of the 1920s, after embarking upon an academic career under Sir Ernest Rutherford at the Cavendish Laboratory, he had proved himself as one of the most brilliant scientists of the day. Elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1933, he was to earn a Nobel Prize in 1948 for his work on theoretical and applied physics. 28 With these backgrounds, the distinguished members of the Tizard Committee were well qualified to ponder the scientific principles which might be utilised for the effective air defence of Great Britain. In advance of the first meeting of the CSSAD in January 1935, and at A. V. Hill's suggestion, Wimperis approached Robert Watson-Watt, Superintendent of the Radio Department at the National Physical Laboratory, to examine the feasibility of a 'death-ray' which 'would either claw an aircraft out of the sky or burn up the occupants at the turn of the switch.' 29 Deeply sceptical at the possibility of 'radio destruction,' Watson-Watt nevertheless asked his assistant, A. F. Wilkins, to calculate the radio power necessary to raise the temperature of a man standing at 600 metres away from the transmitter by two degrees centigrade within

68 Operational Research in War and Peace ten minutes. Whilst Wilkins confirmed the practical impossibility of the death-ray concept (the power requirement would amount to many thousands of kilowatts), he concluded that it might be possible to locate aircraft by using reflected electromagnetic or radio waves. Watson-Watt agreed, and with the encouragement of Wimperis prepared a paper for the CSSAD offering to undertake 'numerical calculations on the method of detection by reflected radio waves.' It was this offer which inaugurated a research programme which would give birth both to radar and operational research. One month after the first meeting of the CSSAD and with the encouragement of Air Marshall Hugh Dowding, the Air Council's member for Research and Development, Watson-Watt presided over an experiment which confirmed the practicality of radio direction finding. Using a BBC transmitter near Daventry for the beam and an RAF Heyford bomber as the enemy aircraft, the crude receiving apparatus produced an identifiable response on a cathode ray tube. Within weeks of this first experiment the Air Ministry, at Dowding's instigation, had awarded research funds amounting to £10,000 and by the end of 1935 the Treasury had approved the remarkably generous budget of £10 million to provide for the construction of an air defence system based upon radio direction finding. The early experiments were carried out at an 'Ionospheric' Research Station at Orfordness by a team of civilian scientists recruited under the auspices of the CSSAD. By September 1935, the problem of altitude identification had been solved when an aircraft was located fifteen miles away, flying at 7,000 feet. An accurate method of determining compass bearing, however, had to wait until January 1936. By that time a new experimental site was under construction at Bawdsey Manor on the Suffolk coast, ten miles south of Orfordness. The Bawdsey Research Station was to become the nerve centre for research and experimental work, and also the administrative headquarters for planning a chain of twenty radar stations to be built around the English coast, from Southampton to the Tyne. Bawdsey became operational early in 1936 and in March a newly-constructed 240 feet steel mast enabled the bearing and altitude of an aircraft to be calculated at a record range of seventy-five miles. During the period of experiment at Bawdsey, members of the CSSAD began to consult RAF officers concerned with the operational needs of early aircraft warning. Collectively, they considered the difficulties of dealing with individual aircraft and also of anti-aircraft gunners confronted with the problem of targeting aircraft flying at high speeds.

The Beginnings of Operational Research 69 From these deliberations there emerged two problems requiring solution. The first was the need to intercept raiders in time, bearing in mind that a more accurate positioning was required by night than would suffice by day. Secondly, once located enemy aircraft had to be destroyed. Again, this required very different solutions by day and night. The sheer rapidity at which decisions were made and actions carried out in this early phase of radar research reflected the outstanding ability of Tizard and his colleagues and the high esteem in which they were held by those charged with the formulation of air defence policy both within and without the Air Ministry and the Cabinet itself. The decision to back radar within a fortnight of the first meeting of the CSSAD, and for the necessary approvals to pass smoothly through official administrative channels 'was almost miraculous.' In this setting, C. P. Snow observed, appositely, that If the Establishment had not trusted Tizard as one of their own, there might have been a waste of months or years. In fact, everything went through with the smoothness, lack of friction, and the effortless speed which can only happen in England when the Establishment is behind one. Within a very short time the Tizard Committee were asking for millions of pounds and getting it without blinking an eye.30 Within the CSSAD, Wimperis and Rowe formed the main commu­ nications link to Air Ministry officials. Blackett and Hill added scientific weight combined with a knowledge of service procedures. As Chairman, Tizard contributed critical insights gained from his own military experience. In retrospect, he always remembered how Things that seemed easy for other people to do or use in the air, when one is sitting safely on the ground, assumed quite a different aspect when one was in the cramped and cold cockpit of an aeroplane, cumbered with heavy clothing — quite apart from the fact that other misguided people might be trying to shoot one down.31 It was his instinctive ability to understand the problems of military flying that contributed significantly to Tizard's personal standing and the credibility of the CSSAD with serving officers. So too, in relation to the work carried out at Bawdsey, Tizard presided over a highly informal research establishment, notably devoid of red tape. The academic scientists recruited by Watson-Watt arid others were in the habit of working into the early hours, often as not in collaboration with visitors

70 Operational Research in War and Peace from the Cavendish Laboratory. Informal discussions grew into what Bawdsey staff called 'soviets,' involving not only visiting scientists, but also civil servants, high-ranking RAF officers and, ultimately, operational aircrew. At a very early stage in its deliberations, the CSSAD recognised the need for research into the operational aspects of radar in view of the fact that its innovation rendered obsolete existing techniques of fighter interception. But in laying down the practice of standing patrols, it was essential to prove that fighters were capable of meeting approaching raiders in suitable conditions of height, position and readiness. Thus, in the summer of 1936, a team of RAF officers, accompanied by Dr B. G. Dickens, an engineer from the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, was established at Biggin Hill to investigate techniques of controlled interception in advance of the construction of the first radar station. The CSSAD authorised this investigation in order to determine the percentage of occasions on which effective fighter interception could be undertaken under normal daylight conditions, on the assumption that enemy aircraft could be identified at specified intervals as they approached the coast. In particular, the Biggin Hill experiments attempted to analyse how close to a bomber it was possible to direct a fighter by radio instruction from the ground. In this respect, a major issue was to determine the range required for a radar set for installation in fighter aircraft for use at night or in poor visibility.32 The initial procedure adopted under the 'Biggin Hill experiments' was to provide pilots with a fifteen minute warning of the approach of an attacking force emitting constant radio signals. The latter were, in turn, picked up by a directionfinding station which telephoned the results through to Biggin Hill in order to facilitate radio direction of the fighters. The early interception results were an outstanding success, but only as long as the attackers flew in a straight line. When they altered course or altitude the success rate trailed off markedly, mainly because the vastly increased length of time necessary to plot interception courses led to inaccurate fighter responses. Tizard himself was responsible for solving this problem with the aid of simple geometry. Noting that fighters flew at higher speeds than bombers, assuming that the course of a bomber was on the line AD, and the fighter was at position B, ground control should direct the latter to C as the interception point. In simple mathematical terms, an isosceles triangle, ABC, was drawn with the two marked angles equal. As the interception experiments continued, an observant ground controller noted that the so-called Tizard ('Tizzy') angle could be

The Beginnings of Operational Research 71 Bomber — ►

7

D

Fighter

B Figure 3.1 The 'Tizzy' Angle estimated visually thereby giving rise to the well known jargon of interception — 'scramble, angels and vectors' — familiar to postwar cinema audiences viewing films of the Battle of Britain.33 From its inception in 1936 to the outbreak of war the Bawdsey Research Station participated in the annual air exercises held by RAF Fighter Command with its headquarters at Bentley Priory, Stanmore. The completion of five radar stations in the south-east of England by July 1938 facilitated exercises based upon controlled interception. In September, these 'Chain Home Stations' engaged in continuous operation, coincidental with the Munich crisis.34 Radar research was developing so rapidly at this time that significant organisational changes had to be implemented. With Watson-Watt absent from Bawdsey for prolonged periods, A. P. Rowe was transferred from his post as Coordinator of Air Defence at the Air Ministry to become Deputy Superintendent at Bawdsey. Shortly afterwards, in June 1938, he was elevated to the position of Superintendent following Watson-Watt's appointment as Director of Communications Development responsible for all radio equipment research and with overall responsibility for the activities at Bawdsey. In identifying the origins of the term 'operational research,' it is evident that it originated at Bawdsey in the summer of 1938 following the arrival of Rowe and his instruction to E. C. Williams and G. A. Roberts to undertake 'operational researches.' Williams, a university scientist, took responsibility for control room procedures, whilst the telephone engineer, Roberts, examined the communications system. This work was commissioned by Rowe in the light of experience gained in the 1938 air exercise. Whilst this had reconfirmed the technical feasibility

72 Operational Research in War and Peace of radar, it had also pointed to the need for the coordination and correlation of the often conflicting information received from the five Chain Home radar stations which were operational at that time. 35 In describing the operational research undertaken by Williams and Roberts, the account contained in the official RAF history is exceptionally clear. In the case of Williams, his team had to judge the skill of the observers operating the radar equipment and, to take an example, they discovered that the R.A.F. personnel who had been observing for some two or three hours daily for a period of six months were more competent operators than scientists who, by comparison, lacked experience on the observer side of radar operations.36 Williams' investigations were to lead to the 'Filter Room' system of fighter interception which was to play a critical role in determining Fighter Command's tactics and strategy during the Battle of Britain (see below, pp. 80-1). No less important, however, was the work carried out by Roberts, who studied the procedures, relationships and working of the various stages of the reporting and aircraft control systems of Fighter Command as carried out in the chain of operations rooms, in the course of which he moved away from the boundaries of communications, engineering, equipment, electrical circuits, and all the physical paraphernalia, and ....entered into the wider field of the executive officer responsible for the control of the system as a whole,37 D u r i n g the a u t u m n of 1938, scientists from the Cavendish Laboratory, led by Professor John Cockroft, were sent to Bawdsey to be instructed in radar procedures, whilst in the first half of 1939, scientists were recruited from the universities of Oxford, Manchester, Birmingham and London so that by the end of August some 80 scientists had been familiarised with the principles and practice of controlled interception. On 1 September 1939, two days before Britain declared war on Germany, groups of up to ten scientists were sent to radar stations around the coast, by that time more than twenty in number. In this context, Rowe took a further decisive step in the inauguration of operational research by arranging with Squadron Leader R. G. Hunt — the RAF officer responsible for the administration and operation of all radar stations — that some of the Bawdsey scientists should be sent directly to Fighter Command headquarters at Stanmore on the outbreak of war. In

The Beginnings of Operational Research 73 September 1939, Williams and Roberts were already there, having played key roles in the 1939 air defence exercise. Deploying 1,300 aircraft and 33,000 men, this final exercise before the outbreak of war demonstrated that by the standards of the time Fighter Command possessed a highly sophisticated air defence and warning system. It had also highlighted the importance of close liaison and cooperation between civilian scientists and RAF operational personnel. In this respect, Rowe was under no illusions that his agreement with Hart represented a milestone in the early history of operational research. As he commented in retrospect, By this agreement I hoped to give and get. I hoped to give Fighter Command the services of men who had an intimate knowledge of the performance of the radar chain and who had, as scientists been trained to use their analytical faculties; and I hoped to get....from my detailed members of staff the true facts concerning the operations against the enemy, and so enable the Bawdsey staff to be permeated with an intimate knowledge of the needs of Fighter Command.38 After the declaration of war, Harold Larnder was sent to Stanmore to head the group of civilian scientists, including Williams and Roberts. They acted as the 'Stanmore Research Section' until June 1941 when, under the continuing leadership of Larnder, its designation was changed to the Operational Research Section, Fighter Command. 39 In the autumn and winter of 1939-40 Larnder and his colleagues concentrated their efforts on the development of 'filter room techniques.' This entailed the plotting and dissemination of information emanating from the cathode ray screens at the Chain Home Stations. They also analysed the relative performance of station personnel and after highlighting significant differences in the skill of radar operators, recommended improvements in training procedures. 40 In practical terms, therefore, the early wartime work of operational research scientists was devoted to the progressive refinement of the aircraft reporting system whereby observations from the Chain Home Stations were plotted on a single diagram in a filter room. This process was known as 'Plan Position Filtering,' and the derived locations were then passed on to the relevant operations rooms at command, group and sector levels where appropriate responses by interceptor fighters, ack-ack units and civil defence were planned. Information on aircraft sightings was also reported from Observer Corps posts and used to confirm radar-based locations and the plotting of previously unreported aircraft. Operational researchers were involved

74 Operational Research in War and Peace in the continuous observation of the Stanmore filter room, where improvements in Plan Position Filtering were made by analysing virtually every failure to intercept daylight raids by German aircraft.41 In view of the historic relationship between scientists and military personnel, it was a remarkable step for civilians to be attached to the operational headquarters of a command. But, as Rowe indicated, there were important reasons for the decision. First, detailed knowledge of radar was confined largely to the Bawdsey scientists. Secondly, it was realised that the scientific analysis of military operations under the new guise of operational research was best conducted by civilians with formal scientific training, if only because RAF technical officers were more interested in the equipment per se than in the wider implications of its employment. Above all, however, it was the product of an established equality of collaboration between scientists and serving officers. The inception of radar marked the first occasion on which problems were presented from a military perspective and scientists were asked for solutions. In this way, staff officers became accustomed to bringing difficult problems to scientists, thereby breaking down institutional barriers to fruitful working relationships and creating a climate conducive to the development of operational research. Before appraising the contribution of operational research to the outcome of the Battle of Britain, there are two issues relating to the work of the Tizard Committee which require elaboration, first the political background to its deliberations, and secondly, the precise role of WatsonWatt in the inauguration of operational research. That the air defence of Great Britain was a matter of acute public concern was heralded even before the establishment of the CSSAD by Winston Churchill's much publicised campaign, launched in 1934, for enhanced measures of air defence. Ably assisted by his friend and advisor, F. A. Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell), Professor of Experimental Philosophy at the University of Oxford, Churchill succeeded in persuading the Cabinet to establish not only an air defence sub-committee of the CID, but also in securing Lindemann's membership of the CSSAD. Lindemann, however, proved to be a reluctant recruit, viewing the CSSAD as an ineffectual body, susceptible to interference by Air Ministry officials with a 'defeatist mentaility' in the face of 'terror bombing.' He was, moreover, doubtful about the merits of radio direction finding and proved highly critical of the amount of effort and resources devoted to it. For this reason alone, quite apart from any personal antipathies, the meetings of the CSSAD became heated. The situation was exacerbated by Lindemann's forceful

The Beginnings of Operational Research 75 advocacy of his own research agenda focusing on alternative methods of aircraft interception. In particular, he argued for the development of aerial mines supported by parachutes that could be dropped in front of enemy aircraft, and infra-red detection as a substitute for airborne radar equipment. A further source of tension lay in Lindemann's wholly unfounded criticisms of the tempo of the committee's work and its failure, in his view, to initiate effective research programmes, not least in relation to his own concerns. 4 2 The committee, in turn, came to resent Lindemann's open association with politicians and there was general unease that whatever took place in the CSSAD was retold in private to Churchill. The internal battles came to a head in the summer of 1936 when Lindemann announced his intention to stand for Parliament in a by-election at Oxford, the focus of his campaign being the lamentable state of the country's air defences. This provoked the resignations of Hill and Blackett from the CSSAD, followed by its dissolution in July 1936 by Lord Swinton, the Secretary of State for Air. When it was reconstituted in October, Hill and Blackett were reappointed but without Lindemann. In a postwar account of the Work of the CSSAD, C. P. Snow questioned whether radar would have been in place by September 1939 if Lindemann had remained as a member. 43 More sympathetic writers, however, have argued that Lindemann did not attempt to retard the development of radar in favour of his own projects, a fact confirmed by Watson-Watt himself who subsequently proved unable to recall 'even the merest shadow of evidence that the Prof [Lindemann] ever did anything to obstruct the development of radar.' 44 There remained, however, the continual arguments at meetings that could only have hampered the work of the committee. In retrospect, it seems clear that had Lindemann succeeded in gaining greater influence in the CSSAD the purely technical development of radar would have continued, with Watson-Watt's assistance. However, something would have been lacking. As Tizard's biographer commented, he was concerned from the outset to bring about a unity of purpose between scientists and service personnel, based upon mutual respect. 45 In this he succeeded admirably. Whilst it is true that the concept of radio direction finding was essentially handed to Tizard on a plate, it was largely due to his efforts that the developing radar system was integrated into the operational procedures of Fighter Command. Lindemann, prompted by Churchill, may have fretted at bureaucratic and administrative delays, but the fact remains that by September 1939 Britain possessed a technically efficient and fully

76 Operational Research in War and Peace operational early warning system of aircraft interception all along the greater part of its vulnerable south and east coast. As for Watson-Watt, there can be no doubting his critical role in the development of radar. His scientific abilities were of a very high order as was his capacity to make sound guesses as to the most fruitful lines of research. Acting with a sense of urgency and prompted by the motto, 'second best tomorrow,' he set time limits to individual research programmes, after which equipment went into production irrespective of its state of development. But although his status as the leading innovator in the inception of radar is incontrovertible — notwithstanding a notable tendency on his part to downgrade the contribution of colleagues — this does not apply to his role in the inauguration of operational research. In his memoirs, Watson-Watt included the statement that 'If I was not the first and true inventor of Operational Research....I was at the very least a first and true inventor with one or two of my early staff at Bawdsey.' 46 He also claimed to have coined the specific name 'operational research' in 1940.47 Whilst it is true that Watson-Watt had overall responsibility for the 'operational researches' carried out by E. C. Williams and G. A. Roberts at Bawdsey, a survey of other personal memoirs, autobiographies and biographies reveals little, if any support for his claims. 48 Williams, for example, identified A. P. Rowe as the first to use the term 'operational research' as a description of the work carried out with Roberts in the period 1937-9, 49 whilst E. G. Bowen, scientific officer at Bawdsey, concluded that 'the real origins are hard to pinpoint given the general commitment to the application of a quantitative and scientific approach to Britain's air defences evident both within and without the Tizard Committee.' 50 At this distance in time it is reasonable to assume that Rowe was the original instigator of operational research, although Bowen's point is well taken that the quantitative evaluation of radar in the context of the Bawdsey experiments was an integrated team effort. As radar became more sophisticated technically and operationally the Stanmore Research Section began to examine the efficiency of 'Identification: Friend or Foe' (IFF) and night interception through the use of 'Air Intercept' (AI) sets installed in aircraft.51 The CSSAD had recognised as early as 1936 that once radar had solved the problem of daylight interception, the enemy would turn to night raids. Inevitably, this would render the task of air interception extremely difficult, insofar as it would be necessary to guide fighters in the black of night to within a few hundred yards of hostile bombers. By the end of 1940 RAF night

The Beginnings of Operational Research 77 fighters were being equipped with airborne radar which enabled them to engage in combat once they had been brought to within AI range by ground control. Operational researchers played a key role in improving AI techniques, presenting Fighter Command staff with detailed evaluations of different techniques of night interception, including the coordination of fighters with searchlights, proportions of interceptions resulting in combats, and combats resulting in kills. Operational researchers also considered the problems of routing friendly aircraft in ways that would ease night interception, as well as the effectiveness of weapons systems and the optimal distribution of personnel to ensure the most rapid repairs. 52 A final refinement to the early warning radar system based upon the Chain Home Stations was the innovation of the 1.5 metre wavelength. The Chain Home Stations operated on a much higher 10 metre wavelength, but from 1938 onwards they were complemented by a second radar system — Chain Home Low — operating on the shorter wavelength geared to altitudes up to 500 feet and thus able to locate low-flying aircraft. Operational researchers were again instrumental in devising procedures for the incorporation of the Chain Home Low Stations within the reporting network. In terms of the development of operational research, the events of May-September, 1940, encompassing the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain are conventionally viewed as marking a turning point, leading ultimately to the diffusion of operational research throughout the greater part of the military command structure. In relation to the German military offensive in north-west Europe, the role of Fighter C o m m a n d ' s operational researchers has been highlighted in the context of the aircover needs of the British Expeditionary Force as measured against the minimum requirements for the air defence of the British home islands. It is well known that in the early phases of the offensive, French requests for additional RAF fighters were viewed by Fighter Command and its Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Dowding, as damaging to its defensive capability. In this setting, considerable attention has been focussed on a meeting of the War Cabinet on 15 May 1940, attended by Dowding and called to consider a range of possible options, including the Prime Minister's evident desire to send additional fighter squadrons to northern France. 53 In preparation for the meeting Dowding, at short notice, had requested that his operational research staff should study the record of aircraft losses on a daily basis in order to calculate the desired replacement rate. In this respect, the objective was to 'show how rapidly the Command's strength was being sapped and how much more rapid

78 Operational Research in War and Peace this would become if its losses were to be doubled while the replacement rates remained constant.' 54 For the purpose of the meeting, Harold Lardner, as section head, had converted the numerical findings of E. C. Williams into a graph. This indicated, in stark terms, that in relation to the minimum home defence requirement of 52 squadrons, Fighter Command had already been reduced to 36, and at the existing rate of attrition in France, the entire force of Hurricane fighters would be dissipated within two weeks. According to some accounts, Dowding used the graph to great effect during the War Cabinet meeting. Finding that he was making little headway in persuading the Prime Minister of the vital necessity to preserve the home defence force, he rose from his chair in order to place Williams' analysis in front of Churchill. In Dowding's recollection 'That did the trick' in persuading the Prime Minister of the futility of his preferred course of action.55 In reality, however, it would appear that Dowding did not address the full War Cabinet. According to A. J. P. Taylor, he made use of the graph in a restricted meeting in advance of the assembly of the full Cabinet.56 Attending the former were the Prime Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair (Secretary of State for Air), Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Aircraft Production), and Sir Cyril Newall (Chief of the Air Staff). Although he was permitted to remain for the subsequent Cabinet meeting, Dowding did not speak and his views went by default such that orders were given for four more fighter squadrons to be sent to France. On the following day, the Prime Minister flew to Paris and after listening to French pleas for even more RAF fighters, he telephoned London to ask the Cabinet to agree to send six further squadrons. At an evening meeting to consider Churchill's request, the Secretary of State for Air drew attention for the first time to Dowding's quantitative exposition to the restricted meeting on the previous day. The Chief of the Air Staff, moreover, described in graphic detail the complex logistics of sustaining an RAF presence in an increasingly chaotic battle zone. In the Prime Minister's absence, the Cabinet reached a consensus: six further Hurricane squadrons would be deployed in France, but on condition that they returned to English airfields at night. This decision was arrived at in spite of a letter written by Dowding to the Air Ministry as soon as he had been informed of the previous day's Cabinet decision to send four Hurricane squadrons to France. Dowding's view was unequivocal: if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.57

The Beginnings of Operational Research 79 In this light the Cabinet compromise is readily understandable: Churchill may have been absent from the meeting on 16 May, but the Cabinet was hardly in a position to deny his request for the six squadrons given that he was in Paris and in direct liaison with senior members of the French government and armed forces. On the other hand, Dowding's bleak warning could not be ignored. In the event, the drain on Fighter Command ended on 19 May, by which time the War Cabinet had come to accept the inevitability of French defeat and hence the pointlessness of offering further air support. 58 In recounting the story of Fighter Command's role in May 1940, the official narrative confirms that the conditional agreement of 17 May was based not on Dowding's 'quantitative' analysis submitted two days earlier, but on his letter directed at the Air Ministry on 16 May. 59 This raises the intriguing question as to the precise role of operational research in informing the deployment of Fighter Command squadrons in the third week of May. It is the gestation and utilisation of Williams' graph which have excited the attention of those who have sought to emphasis the role of operational research in the relevant deliberations. The fact that its impact was less decisive than originally thought can be ascribed to the pressure of immediate events and the manner in which they resonated within the War Cabinet in the absence of a forceful Prime Minister. Whilst the graphical analysis presented by Dowding underlined Fighter Command's primary duty as the air defence of Great Britain, the War Cabinet members would have been less than human if they had failed to be moved by the urgent pleas for help from Paris and the desperate plight of the allied armies in the field. Above all, there was the fact of Churchill's ascendancy as leader of the War Cabinet: he may have been absent at a critical juncture but his political command was firm and sure. In this setting, ministerial subordinates were bound to respond to the Prime Minister's wish to bolster the French war effort. If the precise contribution of operational research to the War Cabinet deliberations of May 1940 is less clear cut than has been supposed, the events recounted above were of great significance for its subsequent development. As the official history of operational research in the RAF concluded in relation to the calculations of Larnder and Williams, Though the mathematics were of the simplest nature and the figures in loss and replacement very crude, this use of the [Operational Research Section] by the Air Officer Commandingin-Chief when considering a point of high-level staff policy forms

80 Operational Research in War and Peace a notable milestone in the progress of the idea of operational research.60 Although the work of Larnder and Williams was vastly less sophisticated than the quantitative analysis applied by Rollo Appleyard to justify the convoy system in the First World War (see above, pp. 36-8), it was the first real hint, in the later conflict, of the wider scope of operational research in informing high-level military tactics and strategy on the part of civilian scientists attached to a military command. It remains to be said that the outcome of the Battle of Britain provided the first practical demonstration of the relevance of operational research to military effectiveness. Before assessing the contribution of operational research to the events of August-September, 1940 it would be instructive to provide a brief description of the radar-based air defence system in operation. Essentially, it was a reporting organisation triggered off by visual representations of attacking formations on cathode-ray tubes located at the Chain Home Stations. At this point, the estimated strength of a formation and its altitude and position were telephoned through to Fighter Command's filter room at Stanmore headquarters. Within the filter room WAAF personnel utilised a 'plotting table' with markers to indicate the changing trajectory of the formation. The key requirement, entailing much skill, was to identify the incoming aircraft as 'friendly,' 'hostile,' or 'doubtful.' This was the nub of the filtering process, whereby the 'filtered' information was passed, simultaneously, to the Command operations room and its Group and Sector counterparts. All operations rooms possessed identical plotting tables and the hoped for result of filtering was the elimination of doubtful locations. The functions of the Duty Group Controller in charge of the group operation room were to identify, with the aid of the plotting table, the Fighter Command sector responsible for interception and to coordinate anti-aircraft fire so that friendly aircraft would not be hit. The final task was to ensure that actual fighter interception took place. Len Deighton's authoritative study of the Battle of Britain provides a succinct description of the relevant procedures: The Sector Controller ordered the squadrons under his command to various states of readiness or 'scrambled' them into the air. As with all the Operations rooms, girl plotters received the plots over their headsets and used croupiers' rakes to move coloured counters on the plotting table. The Controller — or his deputies, often NCOs — spoke with the leader of each of the fighter

The Beginnings of Operational Research 81 formations while they were flying and directed them towards the enemy. They exchanged simple code words intended for brevity and clarity rather than security — 'Angels' meant height, so that 'angels ten' meant ten thousand feet, 'Vector' meant steer, so 'Vector 180' meant head due south. 'Pancake' meant come home and land. A 'bogey' was an unidentified aircraft and a 'bandit' an enemy one. From the fighter pilots, 'Tally-Ho' meant enemy sighted, 'liner' was cruising speed, and a 'buster' meant full throttle.61 It was this system, aided and abetted substantially by Observer Corps posts, which was the ultimate product of the work of the CSSAD. Its crucial importance rested on two factors: first it rendered obsolete the pre-radar interception system based on standing patrols, and even more importantly, it negated the Luftwaffe's superiority in numbers. The official narrative of Fighter Command's operations pointed out that on the basis of the required size of the prewar fighter force, the deteriorating military situation in the summer of 1940 necessitated a minimum defensive force of 120 squadrons. 62 At that time, Dowding possessed half that number, representing a force far smaller than a reasonable security demanded, even allowing for contemporary overestimates of Luftwaffe strength. In this light, the contribution of operational research in designing, testing and refining the radar-based system of air interception cannot be overestimated. The techniques applied throughout the Battle of Britain had been conceived as early as 1936 in the initial Biggin Hill experiments and improved upon in the intervening years by civilian scientists, first at the Bawdsey Research Station and then in the Stanmore Research Section, Fighter Command. The result was that by the opening stages of the Battle of Britain in July 1940, Fighter Command's defensive capabilities were enhanced by 'the most efficient scheme of air defence in the world at the time.' 63 This is not to suggest that the technical quality of the relevant equipment was unduly sophisticated. In the case of Germany, its 'Freya' early warning radar was considerably more advanced than anything in Britain, whilst the 'Wurzburg' was an excellent fire control radar. On the eve of the war, however, the German air defence system was notable for its weak integration, leading to low operational efficiency. Even then, the 'system' was confined largely to the Berlin area where the few available 'Freya' radar sets were concentrated. 64 As Winston Churchill commented retrospectively, in the Anglo-German context the decisive contribution of the Chain Home Stations to the outcome of the Battle of Britain rested on 'the extent to which we had

82 Operational Research in War and Peace turned our discoveries to practical effect, and, woven all into our general air defence system....it was the operational efficiency rather than the novelty of the equipment that was the British achievement.'65 It was left to Sir Charles Goodeve to offer a quantitative assessment of the contribution of radar and operational research to the events of 1940. According to his postwar estimate, radar had been responsible for increasing the probability of fighter interception by a factor of ten: the work of operational researchers had increased the probability by a factor of two. The combined effect, therefore, had been to render Fighter Command twenty times more powerful. In this light Goodeve's conclusion that the contribution of operational research to the air defence of Great Britain 'was out of all proportion to the amount of effort spent on research' seems entirely appropriate. 66

NOTES 1. J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (Harcourt Brace, New York 1920). 2. J. R. P. McKenzie, Weimar Germany, 1918-1933 (Blandford Press, London, 1971), pp. 95-6; Gaines Post, Jr., The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1973), pp. 159-202. 3. B. Collier, A History of Air Power (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1974). See also H. Schliephke, The Birth of the Luftwaffe (Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1971). 4. Paul Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980 (Fontana, London, 1981), p. 279. 5. H. M. Government, Statement on Defence, Cmnd. 5107 (1936). 6. Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), pp. 13-43. 7. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945, Volume 1: Preparation (HMSO, London, 1961), p. 35. 8. Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914-1939 (Croom Helm, London, 1976), p. 69. 9. Cited in Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974), p. 81. 10. Cited in Ibid., p. 81. 11. Guilio Douhet, Command of the Air, Translated from the Italian by Dino Ferrari (Faber and Faber, London, 1943); Martin Edmonds and Robert C. Gray (Eds.), Landmarks in Defence Literature (CDISS, Lancaster, 2001), pp. 62-9. 12. R. E. Groves, 'Our Future in the Air: the New Warfare: No First Line Defence,' The Times, 22 March, 1922, pp. 13-14.

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13. Cited in Howard (1974), p. 82. 14. Cited in Ibid., pp. 84-5. 15. John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Air Force in the European War, 193445 (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985), p. 11. 16. Cited in A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965), p. 364. 17. R. Suchenwirth, The Development of the German Air Force 1919-1939 (Arno Press, New York, 1986). See also, R. J. Overy, 'The German Pre-War Aircraft Production Plans/ English Historical Review, Vol. 30 (1975), pp. 778-97. 18. Howard (1974), pp. 112. 19. PRO, CAB 53/24, 'The Potential Air Menace to this Country from Germany: Memorandum for Chiefs of Staff by the Air Staff,' 12 June 1934. 20. Webster and Frankland (1961), pp. 89-91. 21. Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (Cassell, London, 1956), pp. 145-85. See also, Sebastian Ritchie, Industry and Air Power: The Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935-41 (Frank Cass, London, 1997), pp. 41-74. 22. Howard (1974), p. 114. 23. Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force (HMSO, London, 1963), p. 3; R. W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (Phoenix House, London, 1962), pp. 26-7. 24. W. Peyton Cunningham, Denys Freeman and J. F. McCloskey, 'Of Radar and Operational Research: An Appreciation of A. P. Rowe (1898-1976),' Operations Research, Vol. 32 (1984), pp. 958-67. 25. A. P. Rowe, One Story of Radar (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1948), pp. 4-5. 26. Air Ministry (1963), p. 2. 27. P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War (Oliver and Boyd, London, 1962), pp. 116-17. 28. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea, 18 November 1897-13 July 1974/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1974), pp. 1-117. 29. E. G. Bowen, Radar Days (Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1987), p. 4. 30. C. P. Snow, Science and Government (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961), p. 28. For a review of alternative air defence proposals considered by the Tizard Committee see David Zimmerman, 'Preparations for War', in Peter Hore (ed.). Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist and Socialist (Frank Cass, London, 2003), pp. 112-25. 31. R. W. Clark, Tizard (Methuen, London, 1965), p. 116. 32. PRO AIR 16/45, 'Note of Conclusions Reached at an Informal Meeting held at the Air Ministry to Discuss Certain Experiments Suggested by Mr Tizard, Chairman for the Scientific Study of Air Defence/ 13 July, 1936.

84 Operational Research in War and Peace 33. T. W. Korner, The Pleasures of Counting (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 47-9; David Zimmerman, Britain's Shield: Radar and the Defeat of the Luftwaffe (Sutton, Stroud, 2001), pp. 110-17. 34. Air Ministry (1963), p. 6. 35. Harold Lardner, 'The Origins of Operational Research/ in K. B. Haley (ed.), OR '78 (North Holland Publishing Co., 1979), p. 8; Air Ministry (1963), pp. 6-7. 36. Air Ministry (1963), p. 7. 37. J. G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (HMSO, London, 1947), p. 92. 38. Rowe (1948), p. 52. 39. Air Ministry (1963), pp. 7-8. 40. H. M. Barkla, Historical Monograph for the Director of Scientific Research, Ministry of Supply: The War Lessons of the Operational Research Section, Fighter Command (IIH/240/14/7, Air Historical Branch, December, 1947). 41. F. L. Sawyer, A. Charlesby, T. E. Easterfield and F. E. Treadwell, 'Reminiscences of Operational Research in World War II by Some of its Practitioners/ journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 40 (1989), p. 117. 42. Earl of Birkenhead, The Prof in Two Worlds (Collier, London, 1968), pp. 84-7. 43. Snow (1961), p. 28. 44. Birkenhead (1968), p. 200. 45. Clark (1965), pp. 129-30. 46. Sir Robert Watson-Watt, Three Steps to Victory (Odhams, London, 1957), p. 200. 47. Ibid., p.203. 48. Joseph F. McCloskey, ' The Beginnings of Operations Research: 1934-1941/ Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), p. 150. 49. E. C. Williams, 'Reflections on Operational Research/ Operations Research, Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 441. 50. Cited in McCloskey (1987), p 150. 51. Air Ministry (1963), p. 10; Zimmerman (2001), pp. 169-70, 180-1, 186-7. 52. PRO AIR 14/1763, 'Summary of the Present Programmes of Operational Research Sections at Bomber, Coastal and Fighter Commands (1941): Note on Current Investigations of Operational Research Section, Fighter Command (1942)'. 53. Taylor (1965), p. 405; R. Wright, Denuding and the Battle of Britain (MacDonald, London, 1969), p. 103; Len Deighton, Tighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain (Triad, Grafton Books, London, 1979), pp. 61-5. 54. Harold Lardner, 'The Origins of Operational Research/ Operations Research, Vol. 32 (1984), pp. 45-75.

The Beginnings of Operational Research

85

55. Cited in Ibid., p. 51. 56. Cited in Deighton (1979), p. 62. 57. PRO AIR 41/14, Letter from Sir Hugh Dowding to Under-Secretary of State, 16 May 1940. 58. Terraine (1985), p. 158. 59. PRO AIR 41/14, Tlie Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume 1: The Growth of Fighter Command, July 1936-June 1940 (1944), pp. 143-4. 60. Air Ministry (1963), p. 24. 61. Deighton, (1979), p. 125. See also R. W. Burns (ed.), Radar Development to 1945 (Macmillan, London, 1988); G. Hartley, The Challenge of War: Scientific and Engineering Contributions to World War Two (David and Charles, Newton Abbot, 1970); O. Blumstritt, H. Petzold and W. Aspray (eds.), Tracking the History of Radar (Piscataway, New Jersey, 1994; and Guy Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the Second World War (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 18-38. 62. PRO AIR 41/15, The Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume 1, The Battle of Britain (1944), pp. 564-5. 63. Ibid., p. 569. 64. Walter Kaiser, 'A Case Study in the Relationship of History and Technology and of General History: British Radar Technology and Neville Chamberlain's Appeasement Policy,' Journal of the International Committee for the History of Technology, Vol. 2 (1996), p. 38. 65. Cited in A. Beyerchen, 'On Strategic Goals as Perceptual Filters: Internal Responses to the Potential of Radar in Germany, the UK and the US,' in Blumstrittt et al (1994), p. 271. Emphasis added. 66. Sir Charles Goodeve, 'Operational Research/ Nature, 164 (1948), pp. 377-84. See also Zimmerman (2001), pp. 226-8.

4

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research, 1940-1945

The role of civilian scientists in informing military tactics and strategy is exemplified in the work of the Tizard Committee on air defence. It was, perhaps, the very secrecy of the Committee's deliberations, together with an increased appreciation of the mounting technological complexity of warfare, which helps to explain why the British scientific community in the later 1930s began to assert the need for the direct involvement of scientists and professional engineers in military defence planning in general. One of the earliest promptings came from Captain Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, military correspondent of The Times and an ardent advocate of mechanised warfare. In 1937 he approached the Secretary of State for War in order to press the case for the creation of 'a [military] staff organisation devoted to research' in which 'the best intellects in the army' would be supplemented by 'first-rate university men who have been trained in the process of scientific enquiry.' 1 There is no evidence to suggest that Liddell-Hart's proposal was taken forward, but a further initiative launched by a young and ambitious university chemist at University College London (UCL) fell on more fertile ground. The contribution of Charles F. Goodeve to the diffusion and practice of operational research after 1945 is highlighted in chapters 6-8. In 1938, Goodeve was 34 years old, Reader in Chemistry at UCL, and within two years of his election as a Fellow of the Royal Society. An expert on the physical chemistry of vision, he was especially interested in the industrial applications of his research. 2 Equally significant was Goodeve's experience as a volunteer reserve naval officer: as a Canadian national he had attended the University of Manitoba and in his final year had joined the Royal Canadian NVR. After his arrival in London in 1927 to join UCL's chemistry department, Goodeve had entered the RNVR and thereafter 'went to sea in submarines and minesweepers, and served in

86

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 87 four battleships and three destroyers.' 3 By 1938, he held the rank of Lieutenant Commander, RNVR, and was already combining his academic and service roles in the form of research projects funded by the Admiralty. Although he failed to convince the Admiralty of the need to enlist specialist scientists and engineers in the RNVR, Goodeve did achieve a modicum of success in encouraging the Royal Society to take up the issue of official recruitment of scientists for any putative war effort. In 1938 he wrote jointly with an academic colleague, G. T. R. Hill, to Professors A. V. Hill and A. C. Egerton, Biological and Physical Secretaries of the Royal Society respectively, suggesting the creation of a 'Peacetime Organisation for Voluntary Training of Scientific Workers in the Event of a National Emergency.' The immediate result of this initiative was the establishment, with government backing, of a Central Registry of civilians with administrative, scientific and engineering qualifications. After coping with 'a surge of amiable muddlers who believed themselves equipped to deal with great enterprises,' the compilers of the register soon focussed their attention on the universities. 4 By October 1939 the register contained 7,000 names, including up to 90 per cent of all qualified scientists and engineers, the majority of whom were already employed on radar, or radar-related projects.5 Thus, in July 1940, in view of an emergent shortage of personnel in the general area of telecommunications, all qualified engineers, physicists, chemists and quantity surveyors were required to put their names on the register.6 It was the apparent success of this exercise which helps to explain why the efforts of the Royal Society to ensure the provision of scientific advice on military affairs at the highest levels of government were initially frustrated. In July 1939 the then President of the Royal Society, Sir William Bragg, proposed to Lord Chatfield, Minister for the Coordination of Defence, that senior members of the Society should be empowered to advise the CID on 'any opinion, suggestion or scientific result which might appear to be important to the purpose of the Committee.' This approach was followed in September 1939 by Bragg's suggestion that the two secretaries of the Society (Professors Hill and Egerton) should be attached to the War Cabinet to advise on 'the best distribution of national scientific effort.'7 Bragg's efforts eventually bore fruit in September 1940, albeit in emasculated form, when the government agreed that a member of the War Cabinet should preside over a committee representative of the leading scientific societies. This was approved by the Prime Minister on the understanding that the committee would not be informed of the existence, let alone the

88 Operational Research in War and Peace progress of highly sensitive scientific research projects. In the meantime, the scientific advice available to the government was delivered on an adhoc basis with minimal coordination and assessment. Even in the case of the Central Register, it would appear that 'cut-throat competition' for the available personnel was the order of the day in Whitehall. 8 An early and public outburst against the government's apparent inability to ensure the effective deployment of civilian scientists and engineers took the form of a 'Penguin Special' entitled Science in War, published in the summer of 1940 after the fall of France, but in advance of the Battle of Britain.9 The significance of this book in the present context is that among its 25 anonymous authors were individuals such as Professors Solly Zuckerman, J. D. Bernal, C. H. Waddington and Patrick Blackett who were to fulfil critical roles in the development of operational research in wartime. Emanating from the deliberations of the 'Tots and Quots' (quot homines, tot sententiae — literally, 'as many opinions as people'), a small dining club formed by Zuckerman as early as 1930 to discuss the 'social responsibility' of science, Science in War was written and delivered to the publisher, Allen Lane, within eleven days. 10 The book's mission statement proclaimed that 'A large proportion of the scientific brains in this country are not being used at all and, due to defects of organisation, most of those that are being used are not working at anything like their possible efficiency.' Thereafter, the authors lamented the domination of British public life by graduates with academic backgrounds confined to the classics and humanities, and pleaded for the rapid diffusion of 'scientific management' in industry. More to the point, Science in War stated that the effective mobilisation of scientists entailed far more than the consultancy role currently assigned to them: the scientific method shpuld be applied to the analysis of military tactics and strategy as well as to the administration of the war economy. More specifically, The use of weapons and the organisation of men who handle them are at least as much scientific problems as is their production. The waging of warfare represents a series of human operations carried out for more or less definite ends. Seeing whether these operations naturally yield the results expected from them should be a matter of direct scientific analysis. The ultimate answer is provided by victory or defeat, but failure to understand the factors contributing to that victory or defeat and the degree to which each contributes, removes any secure ground for organising further success.11

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 89 What this meant in practice, therefore, was that scientists should participate directly in the formulation and implementation of policy.12 Science in War sold 20,000 copies before the end of 1940, but there is an excellent case for claiming that it was 'pushing at a door which was already half open' in relation to the central direction of the war effort.13 The fact remains that the Tizard Committee had already provided a striking demonstration of the direct contribution of civilian scientists to military effectiveness. In the guise of operational research, the application of the 'scientific method' to the innovation and development of radar had reached a high degree of sophistication in this particular sphere, and even as Science in War was receiving favourable notices in the national press, its recommendations were being validated by the conduct and outcome of the Battle of Britain. It was entirely appropriate, therefore, that the concerns expressed in Science in War should be addressed most explicitly by the early advocates of operational research. In this respect, the contribution of Patrick Blackett was uniquely outstanding in that it is legitimate to view him as the catalyst for the diffusion of operational research beyond Fighter Command to embrace virtually all of the major military commands by 1945. A further indication of the desire to bring a scientific perspective to bear on the conduct of the war was reflected in Winston Churchill's appointment of his friend, F. A. Lindemann, as his personal scientific and statistical adviser when he joined the government as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1939. After assuming the premiership in 1940, it was natural that Churchill should bring Lindemann with him, although the influence exerted by the latter, for good or ill, was and remains the subject of controversy, especially in the light of ongoing rivalries and antagonisms emanating from Lindemann's temporary involvement in the work of the Tizard Committee (see above, pp. 74-6). In 1941, Lindemann was raised to the peerage as Lord Cherwell and in the following year he entered the War Cabinet as Paymaster-General thereby enabling him to enjoy 'power greater than that exercised by any scientist in history.' 14 Even before embarking on his ministerial career, Lindemann's close relationship with Churchill had resulted in the marginalisation of Tizard and A. V. Hill, the very individuals who, in the light of their role in the development of radar, might have been expected to wield considerable influence in the delivery of high-level scientific advice. Tizard was undoubtedly the chief sufferer: shortly before the outbreak of war his air defence committee was amalgamated with the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Offence which had been formed under his

90 Operational Research in War and Peace chairmanship in 1936. However, the new Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Warfare (CSSAW) did not survive beyond the summer of 1940. Although Blackett subsequently claimed that it 'died a natural death, since an advisory committee of part-time members was not useful under fully mobilised war conditions,' 15 other commentators have argued that the hand of Lindemann could be detected in the winding down of the CSSAW's business. 16 But given the scientific eminence of Tizard and Hill, they could hardly be declared totally redundant in the context of wartime scientific policy. Thus, in May 1940, Hill was despatched to the British Embassy in Washington as scientific adviser to the Air Attache, whilst Tizard was appointed head of a scientific delegation to the USA in September 1940. The resulting 'Tizard Mission' was Tizard's own brainchild, the product of his desire to bring American scientists into the war 'before their government.' Facilitated by Hill and the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, the purpose of the mission was to engage in an interchange of highly sensitive scientific information, some of which in the British case was the product of operational research. Thus, the mission's famous 'Black Box' contained design blueprints and reports on asdic (sonar), atomic energy, the variable time fuse, the sonabuoy and anti-aircraft gunlaying. The most important item by far was the 9.1 cm resonant cavity magnetron which vastly improved the power and range of radar. The product of a research programme at the University of Birmingham, the magnetron precipitated the formation of the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology which, in turn, produced outstanding innovations in centimetric radar. According to Vannevar Bush, Director of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development, the contents of the Black Box' represented 'the most valuable cargo ever brought to our shores' rendering it 'the single most important element in reverse lease lend.' 17 It has also been suggested that the composition of the mission — the combination of civilian scientists with serving military officers — was noted by the hosts and was one factor in persuading the US armed forces to form operational research sections within weeks of the bombing of Pearl Harbour. 18 On his return to England, Tizard worked for the Ministry of Aircraft Production and subsequently joined the Air Council in the middle of 1941. His role at this time became increasingly ambiguous in view of Lindemann's ascendancy in Whitehall. In a retrospective comment on this period Patrick Blackett highlighted Tizard's frustrations: In spite of his [Tizard's] wide knowledge of the government machine, he seems to have been genuinely disappointed that the

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 91 Air Council rarely discussed strategy or tactics, but often minor administrative matters: he related that at one meeting of the Air Council the main business was the inspection of an exhibition of different designs of WAAF underwear! A deeper difficulty underlay the frustrations of this period. For it was not at all easy for a Service Ministry to incorporate a man as senior as Tizard in its taut, war-time machine. On one hand he was too senior to do his own devilling among the files at the lower levels of the machine, where much of the real work of a department is done — to be sure he was too important to have been very good at this — and on the other hand, he had too much self respect to acquire influence by becoming a courtier. Tizard evidently felt that he was not wanted in Whitehall and so he accepted the presidency of Magdalen College, Oxford, where he remained, apart from some Government advisory work and several important visits abroad, until after the end of the war.19 To his sympathetic biographer, Tizard's treatment as Britain's 'most competent defence scientist' was 'shabby' and was accepted as such by his protagonists in the House of Commons. 20 Moreover, it is to Blackett's credit that in his postwar recollections he made no reference to Lindemann's machinations against Tizard. Before his return to academia in the summer of 1943, Tizard was to have one last confrontation with Lindemann on the strategic merits of area bombing (see below, pp. 139-40). In the meantime, the career of Patrick Blackett was in the ascendant, the result, in part, of his original membership of the Tizard Committee and a demonstrated ability to apply the scientific method to a wide range of military problems. Like Tizard, Blackett was also destined to clash with Lindemann on bombing policy, but not before he had established a formidable reputation as the foremost practitioner of operational research in the British military command structure. In 1939 Blackett was appointed Principal Scientific Officer at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) with a remit to investigate the activities of all departments. On his own initiative he embarked upon a study of bomb-sights, motivated, perhaps, by his early experiences as a gunnery officer a '.d engagement with RAF personnel in the development of radar. 21 It is generally agreed that Blackett was the catalyst for the Mk-14 bomb-sight which remained in service with the RAF until 1965. He also designed the low-level Mk II bomb-sight around existing components and worked with E. C. Williams on the magnetic field detection of submarines. The defining moment in Blackett's wartime career, however, took place on 9 August 1940 when A. V. Hill introduced

92 Operational Research in War and Peace him to General Sir Frederick Pile, Commander-in-Chief of Ack-Ack Command. As noted already, Hill had investigated anti-aircraft gunnery problems during the First World War (see above, pp. 34-5), and given Pile's sensitivity to his Command's limitations in terms of military effectiveness, it was natural for the latter to take note of Hill's warm endorsement of Blackett's capabilities, all the more so since Ack-Ack Command was under the operational control of Fighter Command. Recognising that Blackett possessed 'the quick intuition of a freshman.' 22 Pile appointed him as his Scientific Adviser at Ack-Ack Command Headquarters, Stanmore. Blackett remained with Pile for only seven months, until March 1941. During that time, however, he made an enduring impression on the Command as a result of his expertise in operational research and an outstanding ability to achieve practical results. At the time of the Battle of Britain, Ack-Ack Command was equipped with G. L. Mk I gun-laying radar sets. These were capable of determining the bearing and slant range of attacking aircraft but could not give their elevation. The latter was provided by sound-locating apparatus with the result that the aiming of guns was cumbersome and ineffectual to the extent that ack-ack crews could engage in Tittle more than a gesture of fist-shaking.' 23 Even when the Ground Controlled Interception apparatus was modified to provide the elevation of aircraft, the results were less than satisfactory in terms of accuracy of fire: the equipment was complicated to use and the radar gun-layers in particular were proving highly sensitive to their local environment. As Blackett commented, Immense scientific and technical brilliance had gone into the rapid design and manufacture of the [gun-laying radar] sets; likewise at a more leisurely pace into the construction of the guns and predictors. Understandably, but unfortunately, partly through shortage of scientific and technical personnel but also through a certain lack of imaginative insight into operational realities, hardly any detailed attention had been paid to how actually to use the [radar] data to direct the guns until the Battle of Britain was in progress. Thus the first months of the AA battle against the night bomber were fought with highly developed radar sets and guns, but with the crudest and most improvised links between them.24 A further cause for concern was that ack-ack gunners were encountering insurmountable difficulties in predicting the trajectory of enemy aircraft given that shells had to explode at a point determined by the estimated speed of the aircraft at the time of their exit from the gun

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 93 barrel. However, the mechanical predictors in use had been designed to use accurate visual observations rather than the imperfect data generated by the crude early metric wavelength radar sets. The problem was eventually overcome in 1944 by combining the more sophisticated 10 cm radar with an electronic predictor. In the pressing circumstances of 1940, however, Blackett could only devote his efforts to improving the operation of the existing equipment. His first step was borrowed directly from his experience on the Tizard Committee in that he assembled a team of scientists with specialist radar knowledge to study the performance of the gun-laying equipment in the field. It was an eclectic group composed of physiologists, mathematical, astro and general physicists, two pure mathematicians, a surveyor, and an army officer. Collectively known as 'Blackett's Circus' they began by working out the best method of plotting the [radar] data and of predicting the future enemy position for the use of the guns on the basis only of pencil and paper, range and fuse tables. The second task was to assist in the design of simple forms of plotting machines which would be manufactured in a few weeks. The third stage was to find means of bringing the existing predictors into use in connection with radar sets. This was found to be possible if, by intensive training of predictor crews, the inaccurate radar data could be smoothed manually. A special school was set up by AA Command to work out the methods of doing this and to give the necessary training. The fourth stage was to attempt to modify the predictors to make them handle the rough [radar] data more effectively. This proved possible with the Sperry predictor leading to what was known as the amputated Sperry which played a useful though limited role as an alternative to the use of plotting methods.25 Whilst the efficient deployment of batteries equipped with radar presented significant problems in defending London against the night bomber, the operational effectiveness of Ack-Ack Command was further compromised by the remaining 50 per cent of batteries devoid of radar assistance. In this respect the 'Circus' considered whether the 120 guns in question would be better organised in conformity with existing practice in 30 four-gun batteries or in 5 eight-gun batteries, bearing in mind that the latter would facilitate radar cover for all metropolitan ack-ack units. The resulting calculations demonstrated clearly the advantages of radar assistance, leading to the formation of more eight-gun batteries. In the

94 Operational Research in War and Peace event, however, the increasing availability of radar sets pre-empted the need for full redeployment. 26 The critical indicator of Blackett's effectiveness at Ack-Ack Command was the declining number of shells required to destroy enemy aircraft as the efforts of the 'Circus' gradually bore fruit. At the outset of the London Blitz the 'rounds per bird' amounted to 20,000 shells expended for each aircraft shot down. By the summer of 1941 the number had fallen progressively to 4,000 as a result of the operational researches of the 'Circus' in improving the accuracy of radar-based gun-laying. Coincidentally, the ' C i r c u s ' succeeded in resolving a p u z z l i n g phenomenon revealed by statistical investigation. This concerned the considerable disparity in the rounds per bird achieved by coastal and inland ack-ack batteries, with the former appearing to be twice as accurate as the latter. In Blackett's own words, All sorts of....hypotheses were considered as explanations of this strange result. Were the coastal batteries better sited, or did radar work better over the sea? Perhaps the enemy aircraft flew lower and straighter than over the land. Then suddenly the true explanation flashed to mind. Over the land a battery, say, in the Birmingham area, which claimed an enemy aircraft destroyed, would have this claim checked by the search for and identification of the crashed machine. If no machine was found, the claim was disallowed. But, in general, no such check could be made of the claims of the coastal batteries, since an aircraft coming down at sea would not be traceable. The explanation of the apparent better shooting of the coastal batteries turned out to be due, therefore, to an overestimate of the coastal batteries (as by almost all other batteries!) of their claims of enemy aircraft destroyed by a factor of two.27 On Blackett's departure from Ack-Ack Command in March 1941 to join Coastal Command, Pile complained to A. V. Hill that 'They have stolen my magician,' a comment indicative of Pile's heartfelt admiration for Blackett's achievements. 28 The 'Circus,' led by C. E. Bayliss, remained intact for a short period before being absorbed into an Air Defence Research Group under the direction of J. A. Ratcliffe, an expert in the training of radar technicians. On his transfer to the Telecommunications Research Establishment, Ratcliffe was replaced by the South African physicist, Colonel (later Brigadier) B. F. J. Schonland, who was principally responsible for expanding the organisation into an operational research facility for the army in general. The work of the Army Operational

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 95 Research Group is analysed in the latter part of this chapter (see below, pp. 117-24). The occasion for Blackett's transfer to Coastal Command as Scientific Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, and as head of the Command's operational research group, was the mounting threat to Britain's merchant shipping supply lines across the North Atlantic as a result of enemy U-boat action. As Table 4.1 reveals, until the dramatic change in their fortunes during 1943, the growing U-boat fleet experienced substantial success in terms of ship sinking rates and the loss rate for the U-boats themselves. All of this was reminiscent of experience during the First World War: as in the earlier conflict, the U-boat menace held out the prospect of a British capitulation as a result of the disruption of vitally important military and civilian supply lines. The problem was compounded by wholly inadequate anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defences on the part of the Royal Navy and RAF Coastal Command, and also by the boost to the U-boat's fortunes from January 1942 as a result of minimal protection for merchant vessels on the eastern seaboard of the USA. For the first few months of 1942 American inshore merchant ships continued to sail independently against the backdrop of a brightly-lit shoreline and at a time when the US Army Air Force possessed only nine short-range bombers for ASW work. 29 In these circumstances, the ship sinking rate soared whilst the U-boat loss rate reached an all-time low. Taking the whole of the North Atlantic theatre into account, A. P. Rowe commented of this period we did not know what was happening in the battle against the submarines largely because there was nothing at Coastal Command corresponding to the operational research section at Fighter Command. We wanted to know the hours flown per submarine sighting by day and by night, the average range of radar locations and the results of attacks on submarines. I therefore went to Air Marshall Sir William Freeman, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, who was ever ready to listen, and argued that P. M. S. Blackett should be asked to form an Operational Research Section at Coastal Command. This was arranged within a few days.30 The group of scientists assembled by Blackett was as eclectic as his ack-ack 'Circus.' Among the initial recruits were three physicists, three c o m m u n i c a t i o n s experts, four m a t h e m a t i c i a n s , t w o C a n a d i a n astronomers, and several physiologists and biologists. 31 Until the end of the war the maximum size of the group was no more than 25 with an average membership of 16. These were modest numbers for the task in

96

Operational Research in War and Peace T a b l e 4.1.

Sep-Dec 1939 Jan-Dec 1940 Jan-Jun 1941 Jul-Dec 1941 Jan-Jun 1942 Jul-Dec 1942 Jan-Jun 1943 Jul-Dec 1943 Jan-Jun 1944 Jul-Dec 1944 Jan-Apr 1945

U-boat effectiveness during the S e c o n d W o r l d War. Ship Sinking Rate (grt* per U-Boat day at sea)

U-Boat Loss Rate (% of U-Boats at sea per month)

Approximate Exchange Rate (ships per U-Boat)

276 550 484 119 284 170 78 39 27 34 41

16 13 11 8 4 9 15 25 24 19 33

10 23 24 8 40 11 3 0.9 0.6 1 0.7

Source: P. M. Sutcliffe, 'The End of the Battle of the Atlantic (German U-Operations, 1943-1944)/ Journal of Naval Studies, Vol. 18 (1996), p. 118. *gross tonnage

h a n d , b u t shortage of staff w a s m o r e t h a n c o m p e n s a t e d for b y the high calibre of the scientists in question. T a k i n g the w h o l e of the w a r t i m e p e r i o d from its inception, Coastal C o m m a n d ' s O p e r a t i o n a l Research Section (ORS) included t w o N o b e l Prize w i n n e r s , five Fellows of the Royal Society a n d a Fellow of the N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y of Sciences of Australia. O t h e r s w e r e to achieve professorial rank in British universities a n d their average age w a s well u n d e r 40. By this time, Blackett himself h a d ' a fairly clear idea' as to h o w a n ORS s h o u l d be organised. His major requirement, fully reflecting his experiences at Ack-Ack C o m m a n d , was that The operational research group must be an integral part of the Commander-in-Chief's staff and all the reports or recom­ mendations must be to the Commander-in-Chief and not to the Air Ministry direct. The importance of this lies in the fact that a considerable part of the work of an operational research group at a command must inevitably involve criticisms of the work of the Command coupled with suggestions for improvement. For any part of the Command's work in which no improvement seems possible, it is not likely to be the subject of a report by the group.

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING IN CHIEF

Scientific Adviser to C-in-C

Air Staff

Administrative Staff

Senior Air Staff Officer S.A.S.O.

Air Officer Administration A.O.A.

D.S.A.S.O.

D.A.O.A »-*

Intelligence

Operations Anti-U-Boat

Operational General

Training

Operational Requirements

Organisation

1

I

Personnel

a 5' 3 o

-O.R.S.—1

O •a Specialist Branches -l

Signals and Radar

Navigation

1—

Armament

Photo

-1

etc.

Engineering

Equipment

s» 5' a SL. CO

Figure 4.1

The Structure of Coastal Command Headquarters showing the Administrative Position of the Operational Research

Section Source: C. H. Waddington, O. R. in World War 2 (Elek Science, London, 1973), Table 1.1, p. 13.

n> ^ n =r \o

98 Operational Research in War and Peace When, however, the group find, say, that some tactics in use are faulty and could be improved, their report would necessarily have a critical character. If these reports were sent (as at one time was the suggestion) direct to the Air Ministry, then the Staffs at C o m m a n d w o u l d rightly feel aggrieved and the intimate collaboration between operational service staffs and operational research workers, would become impossible. If, however, the report went to the Commander-in-Chief, and if the recom mendations were adopted successfully, the Air Ministry would hear of it as a successful achievement of the Command itself.32 M u t u a l t r u s t a n d confidence b e t w e e n civilian scientists a n d service personnel h a d b e e n the hallmark of the operational researches c o n d u c t e d o n behalf of F i g h t e r C o m m a n d after 1936. I n c o n t r a s t to F i g h t e r C o m m a n d ' s reactive a n d defensive role, h o w e v e r , the offensive r e m i t of Coastal C o m m a n d offered far g r e a t e r s c o p e for t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of o p e r a t i o n a l research. 3 3 The anti-U-boat w a r , c o n v o y p r o t e c t i o n , a n d attacks o n e n e m y s h i p p i n g lasted for t h e w h o l e w a r w i t h v a r y i n g levels of intensity. Coastal C o m m a n d ' s activities, moreover, w e r e vastly m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n those of Fighter C o m m a n d . A s M c C l o s k e y h a s pointed out, Each [Coastal C o m m a n d ] operation involved problems in navigation, search, identification, bombing accuracy, verification of results and, not least, given Britain's weather, return to base. Whether flights were search patterns over the Bay of Biscay, or convoy missions over the North Atlantic, Coastal Command planes had to know position in a way not applicable to Fighter Command; for the task they were fitted with airborne radar aids as soon as these could be made available — and the Operational Research Section, Coastal Command, was charged with making these aids fully operational. The fulcrum of Coastal C o m m a n d ' s efforts — a n d hence that of the ORS — w a s , of course, the anti-U-boat w a r in the N o r t h Atlantic. T h e ' f u n d a m e n t a l scientific b a c k g r o u n d to the w h o l e c a m p a i g n ' w a s b a s e d o n the U-boats' r e q u i r e m e n t to surface, bearing in m i n d that [the standard] 550 ton U-boat had an overall endurance on the surface ranging from 14,000 miles at 6 knots to 2,800 miles at 17 knots; but the underwater endurance on one charge of the batteries was only about 14 miles at 8 knots, 28 miles at 6 knots, 65 miles at 4 knots. It was, therefore, essential for the batteries to be charged

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 99 at frequent intervals and until 1944 [when the Schnorkel tube was introduced] this implied repeated surfacing at short intervals.35 In practical terms, therefore, surface recharging rendered the U-boats vulnerable to aerial detection and attack. The construction of U-boat pens on the French Atlantic coast opened up new possibilities for Coastal Command insofar as U-boats traversing the Bay of Biscay en route for the open Atlantic were obliged to spend part of their voyage on the surface. In attacking merchant shipping, moreover, even the lowest convoy speed of 7 knots was sufficiently fast to oblige U-boats intent on shadowing a convoy to spend a considerable portion of time on the surface. Thus, Coastal Command had two critical opportunities to engage with the U-boats, in the first instance via their traffic routes, and secondly, in and around the convoys themselves. In appraising the effectiveness of Coastal Command's ORS, the historian is confronted by proliferating research programmes as the antiU-boat war ebbed and flowed in terms of tactical responses on both sides. In overall terms, however, there were a number of common themes which can be grouped under the following headings: (a) enhanced search capability of individual aircraft and/or reduced U-boat visual observation. (b) enhanced bombing accuracy (including optimal depth charge settings). (c) improved aircraft range and availability. As far as search capability is concerned, Blackett recalled a night in April 1941 spent in the operations room of the Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches, in Liverpool. A large wall map was displayed indicating the predicted positions of U-boats in the Atlantic: From the recorded number of hours flown by Coastal Command aircraft over the relevant area, I calculated in a few lines of arithmetic on the back of an envelope the number of U-boats which should have been sighted by the aircraft. The number came to about four times the actual sightings. This discrepancy could be explained either by assuming the U-boats cruised submerged or by assuming that they cruised on the surface and in about four cases out of five saw the aircraft and dived before being seen by the aircraft.36 A further insight into the problem was gained from an analysis of the reported sightings of U-boats up to May 1941. This indicated that in

100 Operational Research in War and Peace nearly 40 per cent of sightings the U-boat was diving at the time of sighting, whilst in a further 20 per cent the U-boat was submerged at periscope depth. 37 The clear implication was that 60 per cent of all U-boats sighted had spotted the aircraft in advance of its attack. What about unsighted U-boats? The analysis of this problem is illustrated in Fig. 4.2 which shows frequencies for various states of submergence plotted as a histogram on the right and continued (for lack of observations) as a smooth normal (or bell shaped) curve to the left. This really assumes that the aircraft is as likely to see the U-boat a few minutes before the U-boat sees the aircraft as the other way round. The times along the horizontal axis are gaps between the moment when the aircraft sights the U-boat and the moment when the U-boat sights the aircraft. The limits are set at six minutes, for this is the time corresponding to the maximum distance at which U-boats can be spotted from aircraft. On the extreme right of the figure, the aircraft sees the U-boat well before the U-boat sees the aircraft and an attack takes place with the U-boat on the surface. Near the centre of the figure the two protagonists see each other at much the same time and the attack takes place with the U-boat submerged for some minutes. On the left and the extreme left of the figure, the U-boat sees the aircraft first, begins to submerge and wholly escapes detection. The hatched area represents the fraction of U-boats in

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1

2

3

*

5

6

minutes

ALL VISIBILITIES. DATA UP TO MAY 1941. PER CENT U-BOATS LOST BY DIVING 67%

Figure 4.2 Frequency Plotted against Time Interval: Data up to May 1941. Source: C. H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U-Boat (Elek Science, London, 1973), Fig. 6.1, p. 152.

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 101 the observation path of the aircraft but not observed and demonstrates that u p to two-thirds of all U-boats escaped detection. The key problem for resolution, therefore, was how to raise the number of U-boat sightings. As Blackett recalled, All the obvious courses of action were considered and recommended where necessary [by the ORS] — better lookout drill for the aircrews, better binoculars etc. Then the best direction of aircraft course in relation to the sun was considered. If the aircraft flew down the sun, the U-boat crew might have more difficulty in seeing it. Discussing these questions one day in Coastal Command, a Wing Commander said casually: 'What colour are Coastal Command aircraft?' Of course I knew that they were mainly black as they were mainly night bombers such as Whitleys. But before the question was asked me, I had missed the significance of the fact. Night bombers are painted black so as to reflect as little light as possible from enemy searchlights. When there is no artificial illumination by searchlights an aircraft of any colour flying at moderate or low height, both by day and by night, is normally seen at a great distance as a dark object against a lighter sky and only seldom as a light object against a darker sky.38 In the generally overcast weather conditions of the North Atlantic, therefore, the ideal colour for Coastal Command aircraft was white, a fact confirmed by model and full-scale tests. These demonstrated that white aircraft were, on average, sighted at 20 per cent less distance than black aircraft indicating that the former were likely to engage with surfaced U-boats on 30 per cent more occasions than the latter, thereby facilitating 30 per cent more U-boat sinkings for the same number of sightings. 39 Following the repainting of all Coastal Command aircraft white the sinking rate began to climb significantly. It was not possible, however, to calculate statistically the direct contribution of the new marking since other work being conducted by the ORS was simultaneously producing improvements in the rate of sightings. These included the analysis of optimal flying heights and the most effective use of binoculars. In overall terms, by the middle of 1943 The number of escaping U-boats had fallen from some 66% to a figure that rose from 10% at low visibilities to 35% at high visibilities. This very satisfactory result was probably due to

102 Operational Research in War and Peace improvements in aircraft look-outs and to the effectiveness of [repainting], though a deterioration in the standard of U-boat watch may also have played a part.40 As sighting efficiency improved, so too did the lethality of attacks. In this respect, the ORS could lay claim to significant achievements, some of which rested on investigations which have been widely acknowledged as classic operational research studies. Nowhere was this more true than in the study of depth charge settings carried out by Professor E. J. Williams, FRS, a scientist well known for his work on the quantum theory of atomic collisions. In the spring of 1941 Williams had been attached to the Instrument Department of the Royal Aircraft Establishment in order to investigate the possibility of equipping depth charges with proximity fuses so that explosions would take place adjacent to a U-boat at any depth. This was presumed to hold out the prospect of a higher kill rate than could be obtained from the conventional depth charge calculated to explode at a pre-determined depth. Later in 1941, whilst still pondering the merits of the proximity fuse, Williams joined Coastal Command's ORS and immediately began to analyse all aspects of air attacks on U-boats with a view to estimating their depth at the moment of attack. The existing practice in Coastal Command was to assume that a U-boat would spot an incoming aircraft at approximately two minutes before the attack commenced and that within this time it would dive to 100 feet. Thus, depth charges were set to explode accordingly. Blackett provides an excellent summary of Williams' reaction, based on his air attack analysis: [He] spotted a fallacy in the argument leading to the 100-foot depth setting. It might be true that on the average a U-boat might sight the aircraft a long way off and so manage to get to the 100 feet before the attack. However, just in those cases the U-boat had disappeared out of sight of the aircraft for so long that the air crew could not know when to drop the depth charges, so that the effective accuracy in plan of the attack was low. Williams drew attention to the few cases when the U-boat failed to see the aircraft in time and so was on the surface when attacked. In these cases the bombing accuracy in plan was high, as the U-boat was visible at the time of attack. However, Williams pointed out that in just those cases the explosion of the depth charges at 100 feet would fail to damage seriously the U-boat as the radius of lethal damage was only about 20 feet. Thus the existing method of attack failed to sink deep U-boats owing to low bombing accuracy and failed to sink shallow boats due to the depth setting.41

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 103

The official history of the application of operational research to the anti-U-boat war records that the transition to a shallower depth setting took place in stages so that the 25 feet setting was not in general service until the summer of 1942. In the meantime, as Table 4.2 reveals, the lethality of attack mounted steadily. Whilst the rise in lethality can be attributed in part to the introduction of torpex as a more effective explosive material, and an increase in bomb loads as heavier aircraft became available, it is evident that the shallower depth setting made a substantial contribution to the observed improvements. In the words of the official history, Thus far in the period July 1941 to December 1942 there were 209 attacks against visible and partly visible U-boats which scored 11% sunk and 15% damaged, while the 309 attacks against definitely submerged U-boats scored only 2% sunk and about 9% damaged. Again, when the attacks were classified as 'shallow setting' (about 30 feet) and 'not shallow setting' (about 60-100 feet), the former scored 7% sunk and 11% damaged, the latter less than 1% sunk and about 14% damaged.42 As Blackett observed, 'There can be few cases where such a great operational gain had been obtained by such a small and simple change of tactics.' 43 Certainly, captured U-boat crews assumed that Coastal Command had begun to make use of depth charges containing a vastly more effective explosive.

Table 4.2.

Progress of lethality of attacks.

Period

Total No. of attacks on U-boats

Sunk (%)

Seriously damaged (%)

Sept. 1939-June 1941 July 1941-Dec. 1941 Jan. 1942-June 1942 July 1942-Dec. 1942

215 127 79 346

1 2 4 7

4 13 19 9

Source: Waddington (1973), Table 7.2, p. 177.

104 Operational Research in War and Peace The essential complement to the heightened lethality of depth charges was the drive to increase bombing accuracy. Paradoxically, in trial conditions accuracy was achieved far more often than in operational conditions. In taking the investigation further, Coastal Command's operational researchers embarked on a study of aerial photography of bombing runs informed by aircraft type and trajectories of attack. The results of the first sixteen attacks to be analysed are indicated in Fig. 4.3. The arrows give the direction of attack with the centre points indicating the concentration of depth charges dropped. Since the outer ring has a radius of 300 feet, the diagram confirms the general problem of inaccuracy. However, when the ORS calculated that the distribution of the mid-points of the depth charge sticks was 60 yards ahead of the Uboat's conning tower, the realisation dawned that there was a 'systematic error' in aiming. As the official history records: At that time [early in 1942] the tactical instructions and the training in low level bombing, both laid considerable stress on the need to aim off ahead so as to allow for the forward trend of the U-boat

300°

SCALE: 1 inch 100 feet ® MEAN POINT OF EXPLOSION

Figure 4.3 The First Sixteen attacks to be Analysed. Source: Waddington (1973), Fig. 4.4, p. 184.

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 105 during the time of the fall of the depth charges. It was clear that this aim-off was being overdone. It is notoriously difficult to establish distances at sea by eye when travelling at the speed of an aircraft (a difficulty which also accounts for the optimistic assessments by pilots of their bombing accuracy). It could be shown that in this case the cure was worse than the disease: a greater percentage of hits would be obtained if pilots forgot all about the forward travel of the U-boat and aimed boldly at the conning tower.44 Once the 'systematic error' had been removed it seems likely that the n u m b e r of kills increased by 50 per cent, a result indicated by Fig. 4.4. The focal point of Coastal Command's operational research effort was the 'Bay of Biscay Campaign' waged against the U-boats over an eighteen-month period in 1941-3. At the outset of the campaign, Coastal Command aircrews were dependent upon visual sightings only. In the

VISIBLE U-BOATS

Figure 4.4 Mean Centre Points for Attacks (after aim-off countermanded). Source: Waddington (1973), Fig. 4.5, p. 185.

106 Operational Research in War and Peace latter half of 1941, however, aircraft began to be fitted with ASV radar. This led to a vast improvement in sighting efficiency with the result that U-boats were obliged to cross the Bay at night. ASV radar was obviously capable of operating in darkness but its low operational efficiency on the IV2 metre wavelength, meant that it could not guide aircraft sufficiently close to the target to engage in an effective night attack. Indeed, in the final stage of approaches, aircrews were dependent upon eye contact with minimal assistance from flares.45 The problem was partially resolved by equipping aircraft with powerful searchlights (Leigh Lights) located in a retractable turret under the fuselage. After several highly effective attacks by modified aircraft, the U-boats began to submerge at night. They were then forced to cross the Bay in daylight, but this, in turn, rendered them even more vulnerable to surface attack. In this war of response and counter-response the next move was initiated by the Germans in the form of 'Metox' radio receivers which could give warning of the approach of aircraft equipped with radar. During the course of 1942, however, Coastal Command was supplied with new radar sets operating on the 10 centimetre wavelength. Facilitated by the innovation of the cavity magnetron (see above, p. 90), and already applied to Bomber Command aircraft as a navigation and bombing aid, centimetric radar had greatly enhanced range and proved extremely difficult to counter. In fact, its diffusion throughout Coastal Command led to the successful conclusion of the Bay campaign in the summer of 1943, a result confirmed by Fig. 4.5 which charts the ebb and flow of the battle from its inception in 1941. Throughout the campaign, the ORS

1941

1942

1943

Figure 4.5 Shipping Losses as a Result of U-boat Action, 1941-1945. Source: Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Blackett in War and Peace/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1988), Fig.l, p. 226.

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 107 engaged in a sequence of statistical studies of detection rates of U-boats by radar and visual means. Operational hours flown by Coastal Command aircraft were carefully recorded and predictions were made of the number of U-boats at sea and the likelihood of sightings. As a result 'All the tactical resorts to which the enemy were driven could be followed and the best tactics could be devised to meet them.' 47 Indeed, as Blackett confirmed, operational research reports on hours flown, U-boat densities, search rates, and other statistical indicators were tabled regularly at the fortnightly meetings of the Anti-U-Boat Committee chaired by the Prime Minister.48 One remaining Coastal Command operational research study which deserves to be highlighted concerns the problem of aircraft availability. This was a critical issue for the Command in terms of the number of sorties that could be flown by existing squadrons, especially those equipped with long-range aircraft. The desirability of such aircraft for the anti-U-boat war was defined by the ORS in terms of 'ships not sunk.' At first sight, it is reasonable to assume that ship sinkings would be proportional to the product of U-boat and convoy density. In practice, this was not the case. On the basis of sinkings in 1941 the ORS calculated that Inside 300 miles from shore, where there was regular air cover, the density product (of U-boats x convoys) was 6.4 and the number of ships sunk for that product was seventeen. For 300-500 miles from shore, where there was occasional air cover, the density product fell to 3.2, but the number of ships sunk rose to forty six. Finally, outside 500 miles, where air cover was very scarce, density product was 3.3 and the number of ships sunk was fifty-five.49 With a density product for U-boats and convoys almost twice as high for inside 300 miles from shore compared to 500, it might be expected that the number of ships sunk would increase in the same ratio with 106 ships sunk within 300 miles of the coast compared to the actual figure of 17. The much lower figure was the result of air cover, thereby u n d e r l i n i n g Coastal C o m m a n d ' s need for l o n g - r a n g e aircraft. Unfortunately, the necessity for such aircraft with a heavy bomb load placed the Command in direct competition with Bomber Command's requirements for the area bombing of Germany. In the spring of 1942, therefore, stimulated by an urgent instruction from the Prime Minister to increase patrols over the Biscay ports within existing resource limits, the ORS decided to investigate the possibility of increasing the

108 Operational Research in War and Peace 'effectiveness rating' of individual squadrons defined in terms of the proportion of serviceable aircraft. The task was entrusted to Dr Cecil Gordon and it led to one of the classic operational research studies of the Second World War. Gordon was a biologist 'who combined a brilliant mind' with 'an abrasive personality.' As one of his wartime colleagues recalled, His mind was temporarily one-track; and whatever obsessed him obsessed him to the exclusion of all else for the time being. If it was his problems at work, at times it could get monotonous; and if it was his grievances it became a bore. Indeed, I suspect that he was only acceptable to Coastal Command because, like a lot of other odd types employed there, it was acknowledged that they might be mad, but they got results.50 Gordon's work bore fruit in the concept of 'Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance' whereby aircraft maintenance schedules were related directly to the number of sorties to be flown. According to Crowther and Whiddington, Gordon approached the problem from a biological 'life cycle' perspective. 51 Thus, he began by defining the 'availability' of aircraft in terms of the cycle of activities between one service inspection and the next. The activities themselves included flying days, days spent on the ground awaiting maintenance, and days when the aircraft is available for sorties but does not fly. The key variables in determining the time spent in each of these states were the number of permitted flying hours before the need for a major inspection and the length of individual sorties on a daily basis. After three weeks of study, Gordon identified the supply of skilled maintenance labour as the critical determinant of aircraft availability. According to existing RAF practice, the ideal availability or 'serviceability' percentage was in the range 70-75 per cent. But Gordon's analysis of the interaction between flying and maintenance demonstrated clearly 'the illogicality of this requirement for the more an aircraft is flown, the sooner it will need repair or maintenance.' 52 Since he calculated that if every serviceable aircraft flew daily whenever weather conditions permitted, the serviceability percentage would fall to approximately 1 in 3, it appeared that the 70-75 per cent range could only be achieved by reducing flying hours. No. 502 squadron of Coastal Command was the first to be subject to 'Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance' with the requirement to ignore the serviceability percentage so that all available aircraft were flown, weather permitting. The ORS recorded the results which revealed that

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 109 The availability percentage shrank as predicted, the maintenance system continued to function satisfactorily, and the flying output was approximately doubled. There were, of course, consequential adjustments to be made, especially in the organisation of maintenance — for example, to the balance between different trades within the maintenance workshops, and in the design of maintenance returns so that performance and manning levels could be monitored on a daily basis. Other work was carried out on the grouping of tests into minor or major inspections.53 'Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance' was subsequently adopted by all Coastal Command squadrons under the guidance of Gordon and his colleagues. As a result, flying hours per month were virtually doubled thereby enabling Coastal Command to sustain the Bay of Biscay campaign at a higher level of intensity. After completing the work, Gordon then joined the Scientific Directorate of the Air Ministry in order to secure the adoption of 'Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance' throughout the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm. 54 His labours were recognised officially in 1946 with the award of an OBE in the New Year's honours list. The ultimate tribute to Coastal Command and its ORS is provided by the increasing proportion of U-boats sunk by land-based aircraft after 1941. Up to the end of that year, land-based aircraft had sunk only 4 U-boats compared with 46 sunk by naval vessels. In 1942, however, virtual parity was achieved with 36 and 35 sinkings respectively. In 1943, Coastal Command achieved a decisive lead, destroying 84 U-boats compared with 64 sunk by naval action. From the beginning of 1944 to the end of the war more U-boats were sunk by naval vessels (124 compared with 91 by air attack), 55 but there can be no doubting the fact that during the course of 1943, the role of Coastal Command aircraft was transformed from 'submarine scarecrow to submarine killer.' 56 When Patrick Blackett moved from Coastal Command to the Admiralty in January 1942 (see below), he was succeeded as head of the ORS by his colleague, Professor E. J. Williams. The latter also joined the Admiralty in January 1943, ultimately to be appointed Blackett's deputy as Assistant Director of Operational Research. 57 As Blackett generously acknowledged, it was his partnership with Williams which drove forward 'the technical battle of wits' which resulted in the successful conclusion of the 'Bay Offensive' during the course of 1943. In his obituary notice of Williams, Blackett stated that the successes achieved by Coastal Command's ORS put operational research 'on the map' to the extent that the anti-U-boat campaign of 1943 'was waged

110 Operational Research in War and Peace under closer scientific control than any other campaign in the history of the British Armed Forces/ save for the final stages of the Anglo-US bombing offensive against the German communications system in 1944. As for Williams himself, it is revealing that following his retirement from the Admiralty due to ill health, he confessed that he found 'the subtle intricacies of the U-boat war of comparable intellectual interest' to his academic research as Professor of Physics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. Blackett's transfer to the Admiralty was orchestrated in large measure by Sir Charles Wright, the Admiralty's Director of Scientific Research. Having been informed of 'the new techniques Blackett had used for the Air Forces,' Wright and his advisory committee agreed that Blackett should be invited to meet them with a view to persuading the Admiralty to establish an operational research facility. In preparation for the meeting, Blackett circulated a paper — 'Scientists at the Operational Level' — containing the fruits of his experiences in operational research from the Tizard Committee onwards. 5 9 One memorable phrase stands out as proclaiming Blackett's philosophy at this time, namely that the application of numerical analysis could 'help to avoid running the war by gusts of emotion.' Thus, Operational staffs provide the scientists with the operational outlook and data. The scientists apply scientific methods of analysis to these data, and are thus able to give useful advice. The main field of this activity is clearly the analysis of actual operations, using as data the material to be found in an operations room, e.g. all signals, track charts, combat reports, meteorological information, etc. It will be noted that these data are not, and on secrecy grounds cannot, in general, be made available to the technical establishments. Thus such scientific analysis, if done at all, must be done in or near operations rooms.60 If operational researchers were of the highest standing in science 'with direct experience of Service Technical Establishments,' then there was no reason why they should not 'grasp the service problems of operational research as surely did the service officers themselves.' Indeed, an operational research section should operate in conformity with 'a firstclass pure scientific research institution,' but with the proviso that its members should work in close cooperation with service personnel. More

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 111 specifically, Blackett expressed concern about the 'natural inclination' of the Services 'to acquire new weapons instead of expending effort upon using existing ones properly.' 61 This was quantified in terms of three factors: the first N(f) is the number [of weapons] in use; the second P is the scheduled performance of the weapon; and the third S(t) is the average state of service ability and training, i.e. the actual performance expressed as a function of the schedule. The probable form of N(t) could be obtained from the production statistics of existing weapons. Relatively little is known of the form S(t), but probably a good first approximation would be to take S(t) = a(l - e~'/r) where T is of the order of the order of 2 months to 1 year according to the type of gadget. Some operational research might usefully be directed towards elucidating this function. One could then attempt a numerical estimate of the gain or loss involved in the changeover from one device to another, and so attempt to avoid the unduly heavy overhead costs of too rapid change-over.62 According to Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Scientists at the Operational Level' w a s a hurriedly and s o m e w h a t flippantly written document.' 6 3 Nevertheless, it impressed Wright's committee, all the more so in the light of Blackett's personal exposition in which he set out his ideas on the relationship between operational research scientists and the Royal Navy's command structure. In January 1942, therefore, after spending only nine months at Coastal Command, Blackett was appointed Chief Adviser on Operational Research in charge of an ORS reporting directly to the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff. In 1944, Blackett's title was changed to Director of Naval Operational Research, a post which he held until the end of the war. In his biographical memoir of Blackett, Lovell cited the view of the then Chief Scientist (Royal Navy) that operational research was given the widest remit by the Admiralty following Blackett's arrival. His searching mind ranged over the relevance of battleships or carriers as 'core of the fleet,' priorities in postwar budgeting between production and operating costs, and proposals to establish a Joint Warfare Committee to consider the theory and practice of Combined Warfare. He also pontificated on the nature of military operations in more general terms, suggesting that in any one weapons epoch 'there are relatively few things which a commander of major operations must know and remember if he is consistently to be more successful than chance.' 64 Inevitably,

112 Operational Research in War and Peace however, the initial thrust of Blackett's work was directed to the antiU-boat war. In this respect, there can be no doubt that he would have continued to work closely with his former colleagues in Coastal Command even if the latter had not come under the operational control of the Admiralty. In the. period 1942-3, Blackett and his colleagues presented 89 operational research reports, of which over 60 per cent concerned anti-U-boat tactics. In 1944, however, following the successful outcome of the 'Bay of Biscay Campaign,' of 105 reports published, only 35 per cent were concerned with U-boats, a figure which fell to 15 per cent in 1945. It was during his period of office at the Admiralty that Blackett became involved in a vociferous and personally bruising dispute with Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, and other high-level advocates of the area bombing of German towns and cities. The issue in contention — Harris's overriding need for long-range heavy bombers as against that of Coastal Command, is considered more appropriately in the next chapter which deals with the role of operational research in informing the theory and practice of strategic bombing. In the present context, the value of Blackett's work for the Admiralty can be illustrated to no better effect than in his analysis of the organisation of convoys in terms of desirable escort provision in relation to the number of merchant ships and optimal convoy speeds. Blackett's work on these issues constituted outstanding examples of wartime operational research. In examining the number of escort vessels deployed in 1941-2, he calculated that convoys with nine escorts had experienced 25 per cent less sinkings than those with six. This led him to the conclusion that for each extra escort vessel, between two and three merchant ships could be saved annually. In reality, however, the resulting conclusion in favour of building proportionately more escorts could not be realised, at least in the short term as a result of the practical difficulty of changing the shipyards rapidly over from the building of merchant vessels to the building of escort vessels. As so often happens with the predictions of economic theorising the theoretically optimum production programmes cannot be realised quickly in practice.65 For Blackett, however, the matter did not end there since statistical analysis of convoy losses for 1941-2 revealed that 'smaller convoys with an average size of 32 ships had suffered a loss of 2.5 per cent, whereas the large convoys with an average size of 54 ships, had suffered a loss

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 113 of 1.1 per cent. Large convoys appeared to be in fact more than twice as safe as small convoys.' 66 Existing Admiralty rules, derived from collective memories of the First World War, were based on the assumption that small convoys numbering no more than 40 vessels were relatively safe. Convoys in excess of 60 ships were therefore prohibited. Yet although the operational research results in favour of the latter were 'quite reliable/ Blackett and his colleagues were determined to provide the Admiralty with a 'rational' justification for larger convoys. As Blackett recalled: an intensive study of all available facts about the U-boat campaign against the convoys was undertaken. Of great use were the accounts of prisoners of war from sunken U-boats of the detailed tactics pursued by the U-boats in their 'wolf-pack' attacks on the convoys. After several weeks of intensive research analysis and discussion, the following facts emerged. The chance that a given merchant ship would be sunk in any voyage depended on three factors: a) the chance that the convoy in which it sailed would be sighted; b) the chance that having sighted the convoy the U-boat would penetrate the screen of escort vessels round it; and c) the chance that when a U-boat had penetrated the screen the merchant ship would be sunk. It was found a) that the chance of a convoy being sighted was nearly the same for large and small convoys; b) that the chance that a U-boat would penetrate the screen depended only on the linear density of the escorts, that is, on the number of escort vessels for each mile of perimeter to be defended; and c) that when a U-boat did penetrate the screen the number of merchant ships sunk was the same for both large and small convoys — simply because there were always more than enough targets.67 Blackett's reasoning replicated, in large measure, Rollo Appleyard's work during the First World War, namely that the percentage of U-boats sunk was inversely proportional to convoy size. Admiralty policy should therefore be directed to reducing the number of convoys in order to limit the possibility of U-boat sightings with the proviso that the size of convoys should be increased to maintain the total number of ships sailing. After weeks of 'earnest argument' Blackett's recommendations were accepted so that from the spring of 1943 onwards average convoy size was gradually increased. Although the first 'large' convoy suffered severe losses, the ultimate accolade for the results of operational research was provided by the Admiralty in the summer of 1944 when it proclaimed the successful crossing of the Atlantic by a record 187 ships in convoy.68

114 Operational Research in War and Peace Blackett was the first to admit that the pay-off to his work could not be tested directly since the move to larger convoys (more than 150 ships) took place after the Battle of the Atlantic had been won. He did, however, regret deeply that the relevant statistical analysis had not been undertaken earlier by 'a strong operational research group with access to the relevant facts.' 69 If large convoys had been introduced earlier than 1943 the bottleneck in the supply of escort vessels would have been alleviated, and u p to 200 merchant vessels and countless lives saved. As it was, the n e w rules were introduced in sufficient time to permit the transfer of naval vessels from the Atlantic to support the Normandy landings in 1944, thereby diminishing the threat of U-boat attacks against the invasion forces whilst in cross-Channel transit. Further valuable work undertaken by Blackett and his colleagues was directed at improving the lethality of attacks by naval vessels on U-boats. This was an essential complement to the air attack analyses of Coastal Command's ORS. As in the latter context, naval operational researchers calculated that a substantial proportion of depth charges — u p to 40 per cent — were set too deep, although very few were set too shallow. The problem was more difficult to resolve than in Coastal Command due to the absence of an accurate method for determining the depth of the target. Some improvement followed from the suggestion that 'ahead-thrown weapons with contact fuses' should be deployed, but work in this area remained a matter of concern until the end of the war. In 1945, following the introduction of 'Hedgehog' and 'Squid' as new anti-submarine weapons, Admiralty operational researchers investigated their effectiveness relative to depth charges. The resulting study demonstrated that the probability of destroying a U-boat was 27 per cent, 53 per cent and 8 per cent respectively, a result in conformity with theoretical predictions. The study also revealed that the lethality of escort attacks had mounted significantly after 1943 in response to improved tactics, training and experience. In the case of 'Hedgehog' attacks (forward-throwing bombs), for example, their effectiveness had increased by a factor of three between late 1943 and the early months of 1945. For the same period, moreover, the study confirmed that independent attacks on U-boats were considerably less effective than when two or three escort vessels coordinated their manoeuvres, if only because of the greater number of attacks being carried out.70 In founding and leading the operational research groups at AckAck and Coastal Commands and the Admiralty, Blackett was assisted by civilian scientists of outstanding ability. At first sight it appears

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 115 paradoxical, therefore, that whilst some complex investigations were conducted, the application of advanced mathematical theory was generally absent. In a document released to operational research sections in May 1943, Blackett set out his thoughts on the relevant applications and methodology of operational research. 71 On the former he stated that The main fields of operational research can be classified under the following headings, the study of weapons, the study of tactics, and the study of strategy. The first consists mainly in analysing how and why existing weapons perform as they do, with the object of finding out how they can be improved. The second consists in analysing the various tactical methods in use, with the same object of finding methods of improving them. The third consists in studying the results achieved by various types of operation and the cost in the resources of war in achieving them. The actual form of the method of variational analysis lends itself immediately to the calculation of 'marginal' profits and costs — which is in general what is required.72 'Variational' analysis was presented as 'a commonsense procedure' to establish 'both by experiment and analytical methods how a real operation [of war] would be altered if certain of the variables, e.g. the tactics employed or properties of the weapons used, were varied.' 73 If an operation of war results in the yields Yy Y2 etc. on the basis of a number of operational variables, xy X2,...,x„, then the form of the resulting function y =/(*!,...,x„) cannot be deduced from first principles due to the complexity of the problem and the non-quantitative basis of many of the variables. But for predicted small changes in the variables 'a fairly accurate answer' might be achieved by determining the partial differential coefficients dY/dXn. In this case, the operational effect of changes in weapons, tactics or training can be estimated quantitatively giving the predicted yield dY dY Y' = Y+ — d X a + — d X 2 + efc dXl dX2 In an appendix, Blackett illustrated the application of what was no more than elementary regression analysis to the air war against the U-boats, the analysis of convoys, and the area bombing offensive then

116 Operational Research in War and Peace underway against Germany. Two questions arise in this context: first, to the extent that Blackett and his colleagues had the wherewithal to engage in sophisticated mathematical analysis, why did they not do so, and secondly, if the results of operational research were derived from relatively simple procedures, why was it necessary to employ highlyqualified academic scientists? On the first issue, it is important to remember that in the rapidly changing circumstances of war, operational researchers were invariably confronted with imperfect data which rendered 'delicate mathematical techniques' redundant. 74 In the context of the unfolding U-boat war, when relatively large data sets were simply unavailable, Watson-Watt's philosophy as applied to the development of radar (second best today is better than tomorrow's optimal solution) was the most appropriate basis for the evaluation of tactics. It is a point well taken, therefore, that In operational research, as in much human endeavour, the first 10% of the effort produces 90% of the result. In practice, under stable conditions it may be very much worthwhile or even essential to use sophisticated tools to produce the full 100% but not in war.75 On the second question, concerning the employment of 'high-powered' scientists, one useful insight is the need to differentiate between 'knowledge' and 'competence.' Thus, To an 8 year old, multiplication may appear a difficult operation. To a 16 year old, algebraic manipulation may seem hard but multiplication is trivial. At 18 calculus is hard but algebraic manipulation presents few problems. After a year or so of university mathematics, multi-dimensional calculus is hard but the one dimensional calculus of school is reassuringly familiar; and so on. We lack the confidence and competence to make use of our highest levels of knowledge but the possession of the highest levels gives us the confidence required to make use of the lower levels.76 To labour the point, When we can speak a language well, we can concentrate our thoughts and not worry about the language in which we express them.77 In relating this to the operational research sections formed by Blackett after 1940, the scientists involved spoke a common and well known language of mathematics so that they were free to concentrate on

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 117 operational problems. A further, and even more obvious factor, well appreciated by Blackett, was that operational research 'has, or should have, a strictly practical character' in that 'Its object is to assist the finding of means to improve the efficiency of war operations in progress or planned for the future.' 78 This was exemplified in Williams' work on depth charge settings. In this case, past operations [were] studied to determine the facts: theories were calculated to explain the facts; and finally the facts and theories [were] used to make predictions about future operations.79 The credibility of these procedures in terms of their influence on military operations rested in part upon the confidence placed by serving officers in academic scientists. It is, of course, possible that Blackett's standing as a scientist of distinction was of lesser importance than his status as a former officer in the Royal Navy, albeit of junior rank. But this is to devalue the point that from 1940 onwards, operational research scientists could lay claim to demonstrable achievements in enhancing military effectiveness. Their credibility therefore rested on dual foundations: respect for them in their capacity as 'boffins/ but a respect bolstered by impressive results. In his historical review of British operational research during the Second World War, McCloskey estimated that upwards of 1,000 men and women made their contribution to the war effort in this particular setting. Of the total, approximately 200 were associated with operational research for the British Army both at home and abroad. 80 It has already been noted that Blackett's Circus was the starting point for army operational research in advance of B. F. J. Schonland's appointment as superintendent of the newly-designated Air Defence Research and Development Establishment (ADRDE) Operational Research Group. The group was initially under the joint direction of the Ministry of Supply and the War Office, but in February 1943 it severed its connection with the ADRDE to become the Army Operational Research Group (AORG) under the sole control of the Ministry of Supply. Coincidentally, a policy was inaugurated of establishing operational research sub-groups so that by the end of 1943 AORG had under its wing eight sections with a further two being formed before the end of the war. The breakdown of responsibilities was as follows: AORS 1(a) AORS 1(b) AORS 2(a)

Ack-Ack and Field Army Radar Ack-Ack Operations and Searchlights Coast Defence and Coast Artillery Radar

118 Operational Research in War and Peace AORS 2(b) AORS 3 AORS 4(a) AORS 4(b) AORS 5 AORS 6 AORS 7(a) AORS 7(b) AORS 8(a) AORS 8(b) AORS 8(c) AORS 9 AORS 10

Analysis of Coast Artillery Shoots and Trials Signals Armour and Mobility of Tanks, and Tank Gunnery Anti-Tank and Field Gunnery Airborne Forces Operations and Equipment Infantry Weapons and Tactics General Mathematical Problems, Fragmentation Fuzes Accuracy and Lethality of Artillery Fire, Field Trials Mines and Obstacles Special Optical Aids and Visual Problems Flame Throwers and Smoke Time and Motion Studies of Drill and Uses of Equipment Analysis of Battle Records.81

AORS 1(a) and (b) were the linear descendants of Blackett's Circus and, as such, had pride of place in AORG. Whilst sub-section 1(a) continued to refine the radar basis of ack-ack fire with a particular focus on centimetric fire control, 1(b) developed special expertise in analysing the performance of VI flying bombs and V2 long range rockets. By the spring of 1945, procedures had been devised for predicting the point of fall of flying bombs and of engaging them with ack-ack batteries. Happily, the allied advance into Germany, in ending the V2 attacks, rendered this aspect of the section's work redundant. AORS 2 was formed in June 1941 in order to enhance the effectiveness of the newly-introduced chain of 'coast-watching radar stations': it also determined the siting of the first centimetric stations. In its early incarnation, the section's main function was to provide advance warning of any seaborne invasion, but after 1942 it concentrated on the defence of coastal convoys and on the improvement of coastal artillery fire-control sets as well as accuracy of fire. AORS 3 was formed in the autumn of 1942 at a time when 'many units... knew little of communication by sky waves over distances of 100 miles or less.'82 The work of the section therefore concentrated on improving long distance communications as well as investigating the possibility of VHF transmissions to forward troops. AORS 4, 5, 6 and T33 were established in sequence in 1942-3 with wide-ranging remits to investigate the effectiveness of equipment, from tanks and field artillery to the destructive power of projectiles. The work of AORS 4 was especially effective under the direction of the distinguished Canadian physiologist, Omand Solandt. Before joining the section in July 1942, Solandt had been the director of the Physiological Research Laboratory

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 119 attached to the Gunnery Wing of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Training School at Lulworth in Dorset. The main thrust of his research was to improve the physical capabilities of tank crews in the context of 'fume hazards, environmental problems, vision, tank driving and gun laying.* 4 Before joining AORS 4 Solandt had become convinced that tank crews, 'although a very important component in determining the tank's overall effectiveness, should, in operational terms, be regarded as only a sub­ system of the whole. Work needed to be done in other sub-systems too, if a complete approach was to be taken to tank and [armoured fighting vehicle] performance.' 85 AORS 4 provided Solandt with the opportunity to address these issues. Initially frustrated by a lack of engineering facilities to conduct trials, Solandt was instrumental in the creation of the Tank Armament Research Establishment (TAR) in October 1943 at Porton. Equipped appropriately, TAR worked in close cooperation with AORS 4 until the end of the war when it was redesignated as the Research Wing of the Fighting Vehicle Design Department at Chobham. In a postwar review of the AORS 4's work, Solandt highlighted the following projects as worthy of note: Tank Gunnery (a) The value of zeroing, and devising zeroing drills when shooting is not possible, which led to a study of the variation in jump of tank guns. (b) An investigation of the errors of visual estimation of opening range — leading to work on the value of range-finders in tank gunnery. (c) The accuracy of central laying with different types of aiming at moving targets. (d) Methods of correcting fire — In A.P. Shooting the Tine of sight' method of correction and direct correction. In H. E. Shooting, the general theory of bracketing has been developed, tested and applied to the production of bracketing drills. (e) The experimental work on the drills to be employed with ricochet airburst fire. Tank Armour Theoretical studies have been made of the best armour distribution on tank hulls and turrets, together with work on the vulnerability of tanks, both allied and enemy, to A. P. fire.

120 Operational Research in War and Peace Tank Mobility (a) The production of Tank Going Maps in conjunction with the Met. Office, reliable data on the performance of tanks under given soil conditions have been obtained in various trials. Instruments and methods of measuring the conditions existing in tank mobility trial have been developed. (b) Methods of reconnoitering (sic) ground to estimate the going condition for tanks. (c) The general theory of the relation between the factors which influence the going, including the design of suspension and tracks, is being developed.86 Across the spectrum of AORG activities, much of the work could not be dignified with the term operational research. Solandt himself was fond of recounting the results of studies of manpower deployment which could be more appropriately be regarded as 'work study.' For example, one investigation revealed that anti-tank gun drills could be carried out as effectively by three men as by the six originally assigned to this duty. However, the resulting report was not implemented after 'Those responsible for this "waste" of manpower pointed out...that it had taken 20 years to get enough men assigned to their units to do the cooking, bring up ammunition, and handle other chores.'87 In a similar vein, it was discovered that during artillery drills one member of the crew remained motionless in his capacity as the horse holder, bearing in mind, of course, that the unit in question had dispensed with horses twenty years previously. Studies of this kind were clearly useful and it was eventually decided that their specialist nature required the formation of a dedicated operational research section.88 Thus, in 1944, AORS 9 (Time and Motion Studies) was formed in order to investigate 'fatigue problems' and 'work simplification.'89 One of the most effective studies concerned the efficiency of the 25-pounder field gun. The key issue, on which opinion was divided, was whether the gun's function was primarily antimateriel or anti personnel. If it was the latter, a further consideration was whether it should have a lethal or morale effect. In recommending that the function should be anti-personnel, covering both effects, AORS 9 presented tabulated results of the measurement of effectiveness embracing the operation of the gun, the quality of the ammunition and irregularities in terrain. In defining effectiveness in terms of functions, the implementation of the relevant findings led to a substantial improvement in the gun's effectiveness.90

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 121 AORS 10 was the final operational research section to be formed under AORG auspices in the summer of 1944. In formal terms, its remit was to analyse battle records but in such a way as to provide future military commanders with a compendium of knowledge rooted in practical experience. The early work of the section concentrated on the effects of artillery shelling and bombing in advance of the Allied invasion of Italy. These were timely studies in the lead up to the D-Day landings in Normandy when the section investigated the comparative effects of fire support on the British and American invasion beaches. Solandt's immediate postwar commentary is instructive: The British beaches in Normandy all [presented] similar problems to the attackers. It is first shown that the casualties on those beaches which were defended by machine guns and not by mortars were closely proportional to the number of machine guns in the defences. It is then shown that if the machine guns on the other British beaches were as effective as those on the British beaches where there were no mortars, then each mortar caused about three times as many casualties to the assault troops as each machine gun. The third stage introduces the American areas and shows that the very heavy casualties on Omaha area (which revealed much the same density of bombardment as the British areas) were not much more proportional to the weight of the defences, while the light casualties on Utah area may be related to the heavy bombardment to which it was subjected. The final stage is an attempt to express this reduction of casualties by weight of bombardment in numerical terms, and to relate these numerical expressions to the corresponding expressions for land operations and for American assaults on Pacific atolls held by the Japanese.91 ORS 10 was unique in AORG in engaging directly with the needs of the Army in overseas theatres. As such, it fulfilled a valuable linking role between the Ministry of Supply and the War Office. It has already been noted that from February 1943, AORG operated under the aegis of the Ministry of Supply in order to provide an operational research facility for army commands located in the UK. For the War Office, the relinquishing of interest in AORG was part of an overall strategy for operational research whereby its Scientific Adviser would be responsible for the formation of operational research sections attached to overseas commands in the Middle East, Italy, India, South East Asia and Australia. Up to March 1943, the post of Scientific Adviser was held by Sir Charles Darwin, but on his transfer to the National Physical Laboratory, he was

122 Operational Research in War and Peace replaced by his deputy, Professor Charles Ellis. The latter was to prove to be an able advocate for the civilian diffusion of operational research after 1945, principally in the nationalised coal industry (see below, pp. 255-6). It was Ellis who was primarily responsible for the formation of overseas operational research sections from the spring of 1943 onwards. However, in marked contrast to the acceptance of operational research within the UK-based command structure, there is good evidence to suggest that the diffusion of the discipline'in overseas theatres was patchy and unsatisfactory. In a frank and revealing postwar report to the Army Council the then Scientific Adviser, Sir Owen Wansbrough-Jones, referred to numerous problems encountered by overseas operational researchers, even though the scientists involved possessed military rank. In the Middle East, for example, the operational research section (S.O.6) produced 'many valuable reports' on radar research in collaboration with RAF researchers, but had to contend with indifference from GHQ resulting in 'a very hand to mouth existence' where they sought their own work 'as and when they could.' 92 Ellis's efforts to place the section on a sounder footing in July 1943, met with little enthusiasm with the result that S.O.6 'gradually disintegrated and its members were absorbed into other appointments within the scientific framework.' 93 Similarly, the operational research section in Italy (No. 1 ORS), despite being able to learn from the experiences of S.O.6, was also confronted with a lack of commitment on the part of headquarters staff. As the postwar report commented, There was by no means complete understanding between the Staff of [HQ] and the O. R. S.; as so often happens, a new type of unit has great difficulty in making good headway unless it is lucky enough to have a powerful sponsor. In No. 1 ORS's case there was no such sponsor and work was undertaken in a somewhat haphazard fashion instead of being undertaken under the definite direction of a Staff branch which was fully alive to the potentialities of such a unit.9* The situation was little better in India and the Far East. In India, O.R.S.10 failed to surmount the problem of 'top heaviness' in its organisation at the same time as it w a s subject to 'considerable dilution w i t h comparatively inexperienced personnel.' 95 Operational researchers in the Far Eastern (Pacific) theatre, experienced similar problems which were compounded substantially by the sheer vastness of the operational area. In this respect, the postwar report was direct and to the point:

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 123 Battles were few and far between, thus providing little opportunity for detailed battle studies. Distances were great and travel by Jeep track was slow, and it could conceivably mean a two weeks absence from the unit for a member of the section to visit a battle area for only one day's observation. The impossibility that they were constantly up against was in carrying out orders that they received. On many occasions the sections were ordered to observe a specific type of warfare or action and to report on detailed aspects thereof: but unless that type of warfare or action was in existence to be observed the work obviously could not be carried out. A truism which was all too frequently overlooked by those who demanded the information.96 The exception to this general picture of indifference was provided by O.R.S.2, formed in August 1943 to provide an operational research facility for the 21 st Army Group, then in the process of formation as the British Army Command responsible for the planning and execution of the invasion of north west Europe as part of the allied war effort. O.R.S.2 had the inestimable advantage of being formed within the UK under the leadership of B. F. J. Schonland. Schonland's work for the AORG has already been noted and he brought to O.R.S.2 a degree of credibility denied to the overseas sections. In his postwar report, Wansbrough-Jones highlighted several further advantages enjoyed by the section: No. 2 O.R.S. was a fortunate section in one important respect: they had no need to indulge in any advertising campaign for their wares. The reasons for this were that by the time they were formed, operational research already had an established reputation in the Army: an O.R.S. had already been accepted by the C. in C. before the Army Group was formed: there was plenty of time to 'show the flag' before the start of full scale operations: and useful work was undertaken during the planning period; many of the appointments in the section were made by the staff of 21 Army Group which, perhaps, occasioned slightly more parental affection than might otherwise have been the case. One other important factor in their favour was the presence of the Scientific Advisor on the Staff of the Army Group, who was in a position to ensure that operational research was never overlooked.97 With a remit to engage in investigations on its own initiative, O.R.S.2 provided its members with unparalleled opportunities to engage in operational research studies in battlefield conditions from June 1944 to the German surrender in May 1945. The work of the section was viewed

124 Operational Research in War and Peace as of sufficient importance to future military operations that WansbroughJones authorised the compilation of a detailed account of its activities.98 This was divided into four main sections covering air support, artillery, tanks and infantry operations. The investigation which established the ground rules for the section's work was an appraisal of the impact of heavy bombing on Caen undertaken by the RAF in the second week of July 1944. Although the resulting report was 'little better than a study of the plain physical effects of the bombing/ its very limitations served to identify the essential ingredients of an operational research analysis of an active war zone, namely the advantages of studying the operational orders in advance of the attack, and observation of the actual course of the battle. The latter were exemplified in the section's report on the impact of bombing on the Ardennes offensive, launched by the Wehrmacht in December 1944. The report, prepared in consultation with operational researchers attached to the 2 nd Tactical Air Force, concentrated on the effects of allied bombing of enemy tanks. The RAF's anti-tank operations were limited in scale compared to American fighter-bombers, so that the report concentrated on the latter. The overall conclusion was that American aircraft were 'indifferent' at tank destruction: For every hundred claims, we could find only one tank indubitably destroyed by air. Though a few cases turned up where perhaps tanks had been abandoned because of air attack, they were doubtful and went only a little way to making good the discrepancy. Almost the only claim we did substantiate was that of a Royal Tiger well and truly demolished by a hit from a 500 lb bomb." Although the report was not widely circulated, insofar as it was concerned with American operations, it was undoubtedly a classic operational research study: By analysing a large number of small tank/anti-tank actions from the Ardennes salient, in terms of the number of anti-tank guns defending, the number of tanks attacking, and the losses on both sides, it was possible to establish a clear numerical superiority for self-propelled over towed guns and for anti-tank layouts with infantry over those without. The report is a good example of a how commonsense numerical approach to warfare can sometimes settle points that have always been regarded as the preserve of experience and intuition.100

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 125 O.R.S.2 may have been far more effective than any other overseas operational research section, but it was entirely dependent for its credibility within the command structure on the patronage of a senior field commander. Its wide-ranging remit notwithstanding, the section found that its influence was limited to the extent that it had such support. Its frustrations in this respect show through in the postwar report: Time and again we came up against the inescapable fact that the introduction of new ideas rested solely with a commander, or at least with his immediate deputy. We thus found ourselves trafficking in ideas far above our rank, with report-writing as the only ready means at our disposal of conveying them, and it must be stated once and for all that report-writing is a very poor substitute for a senior officer who can discuss the idea with his equals in Armies, Corps and Divisions. Many of the ideas that emerged from our reports were never adopted, often never even considered because they were only ideas buried in reports that were never read. The conclusion that must follow from this is that the investigating body, the O.R.S., can be lowly ranked, but that it needs a highly-ranked officer, a Scientific Adviser to see that its ideas are tried out.101 The above paragraph provides excellent confirmation of the fact that even a well-founded operational research section, if deployed in an active military theatre was dependent for its ability to influence events upon high-level sponsorship. Schonland's departure at a critical moment, early in 1945, was felt keenly by the section, although by that time the mould had been cast. The fact remains that taking the period of the war as a whole, operational researchers were most influential in the context of home-based military commands and when investigating immediate operational problems. In this respect, Patrick Blackett's record was unique. Operational researchers overseas, however, could never replicate Blackett's role: obliged to accept honorary military rank due to service exigencies, they were bound to be constrained by their position in the military hierarchy, quite apart from their subservience to immediate events in active military theatres. Even in Blackett's case, his scientific reputation and formidable record in tactical operational research could not prevent his marginalisation in relation to the higher strategic conduct of the war. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of Bomber Command's campaign of area attack against Germany. Before examining the role of operational research in informing the tactics and strategy of

126 Operational Research in War and Peace aerial bombardment, it is appropriate to conclude this chapter with a brief account of the work of operational researchers in the area of home defence, bearing in mind that their overriding concern was to evaluate the impact of German bombing on British towns and cities. On the outbreak of war the Ministry of Home Security was established as a new Whitehall department with general responsibility for civil defence. It was the immediate product of the generally accepted view that the primary military assault on Britain would be undertaken by the Luftwaffe in the form of attacks on towns and cities. In that setting, the Ministry undertook a series of investigations focussing on the nature and scale of anticipated air attacks, the likely number of civilian casualties in the first three months of the war, and the extent to which casualties could be reduced by the construction of air-raid shelters. The work was carried out by the Ministry's Research and Experiments Division at Princes Risborough under the leadership of Sir Reginald Stradling, the prewar Director of the Building Research Station. The engineering section, led by Professor John Baker, concentrated on air-raid shelter design whilst the 'operational' side was headed by Professor J. D. Bernal. Baker's work was to result in the innovative Anderson and Morrison shelters which saved innumerable lives during the Blitz and the VI attacks of 1944.102 No less important were Bernal's studies of the effects of bombing. In these he was assisted by Professor Solly Zuckerman, the distinguished South African anatomist and authority on primates. Indeed, it was Zuckerman who succeeded in devising standardised casualty rates for differing weights of bombs dropped. Preliminary investigations, based upon the personal experiences of 10,000 people who had been involved in 380 bomb explosions, together with experiments on animals, produced the surprising result that humans had a 50-50 chance of surviving blast pressures up to 500 pounds per square inch — vastly in excess of the 5 pounds per square inch dictated by conventional wisdom. This result was confirmed by a full-scale air-raid casualty survey undertaken by Zuckerman in 1940-1. The survey also revealed that smaller bombs were more destructive in terms of casualties. In the range 50 kg-1000 kg, the smaller weapon was the greatest producer of casualties and was 'every bit as dangerous as the V2 rocket bomb.' 103 The key factor was the larger number of strikes for the same weight of aircraft bomb load. The concept of a standardised casualty rate also made it possible to compare the relative risk of different sized bombs in different situations; for example, being out of doors or

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 127 on the ground floor, as opposed to being in the cellar of a terrace house or in a small outside shelter. We were also able to find out whether there were differences in the spectrum of injuries associated with characteristic conditions of exposure in, say, daytime as opposed to night raids, or high-level as opposed to low-level attacks. Very soon, too, I had all the evidence which was necessary to reinforce the extrapolations that I had made from any experimental studies about the levels of blast pressure that would prove directly fatal to men.104 Lethal blast pressures above 500 lbs per square inch were only likely to be experienced in the immediate vicinity of an explosion, and even then most air raid casualties were caused not by the primary effects of the explosion but by the secondary and tertiary consequences of 'violent displacement/ the product of 'flying and falling debris and other secondary missiles/ given that most air-raid casualties were to be found in their homes where the severity of their injuries was 'proportional to the amount of structural damage that their dwellings suffered.'105 Zuckerman's work revolutionised understanding of the effects of bombing and it led to significant improvements in hospital facilities for air-raid casualties as well as air raid protection and fire services.106 Before transferring to the staff of Combined Operations under Lord Louis Mountbatten, Zuckerman and Bernal were attached to a sub-section of the Research and Experiments Division, R.E. 8, responsible for providing the Air Ministry with assessments of the effectiveness of Bomber Command's operations against Germany. Using aerial photographs of enemy targets, estimates were made of optimal bomb loads in relation to damage, as well as likely production losses. These activities were fully reflective of a new stage in the war as the Western allies turned to the offensive. Indeed, by the time R. E. 8 was transferred to Air Ministry control early in 1944, it was effectually an Anglo-US organisation incorporating such distinguished American scientists as Charles Hitch, L. M. Denbitz, I. N. Pincus, LeRoy A. Brothers and Jacob Bronowski.107 It was in their capacity as members of R. E. 8 that Zuckerman and Bernal also became embroiled in the bitter and heated debate on the merits of area bombing which once again placed Patrick Blackett and Henry Tizard in contention with F. A. Lindemann (Lord Cherwell). The subject of ongoing controversy, more than fifty years after the event, the role of operational research as a critical aspect of the debate is the subject of the following chapter.

128 Operational Research in War and Peace NOTES 1. Basil Liddell-Hart, The Defence of Britain (Random House, New York, 1939), pp. 346-7. 2. 'Obituary: Sir Charles Frederick Goodeve, OBE, FRS,' journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 31 (1980), p. 961. 3. R D. Richardson, 'Charles Frederick Goodeve, 21 February 1904-7 April 1980/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 27 (1981), p. 312. 4. Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939-1945 (Panther, London, 1971), p. 253. 5. Ronald Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (Phoenix House, London, 1962), p. 156. 6. Ibid., pp. 56-8; H. M. D. Parker, Manpower (HMSO, London, 1957), pp. 319-22, 331-3. 7. Clark (1962), p. 156. 8. Ibid., p. 157. 9. Anon, Science in War (Penguin Special S74, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1940). 10. Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords, 1904-46: An Autobiography (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978), pp. 110-12, 398-9; Idem, Scientists and War (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1966), pp. 148-9. 11. Ibid., p. 38. 12. Ibid., pp. 8, 35, 44-5, 138. 13. Calder (1971), p. 534. 14. Earl of Birkenhead, The Prof in Two Worlds (Collier, London, 1968), p. 73. 15. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Tizard and the Science of War/ Nature, Vol. 185 (1960), p. 647. Reprinted in Idem, Studies of War (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962), Part 1 , Chapter 8, p. 101. 16. Clark (1962), pp. 157-8; C.P Snow, Science and Government (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961); R. V. Jones, 'Scientists at War/ The Times, 6, 7, 8 April 1961. 17. James Phinney Baxter, Scientists Against Time (Little Brown, Boston, Mass., 1946). 18. Joseph F. McCloskey, 'U.S. Operations Research in World War 11/ Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), pp. 910-25; Erik P. Rau, 'The Adoption of Operations Research in the United States During World War 11/ in Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes (eds.), Systems, Experts and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000), pp. 57-92. 19. Blackett (1962), p. 109. 20. R. W. Clark, Tizard (Methuen, London, 1965). 21. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea, 18 November, 1897-13 July 1974/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), p. 54.

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22. A. V. Hill, cited in Lovell (1975), p. 56. 23. J. G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (HMSO, London, 1949), p. 95. 24. Blackett (1962), p. 208. 25. Ibid. 26. Lovell (1975), p. 57. 27. Blackett (1962), p. 211. 28. Cited in Lovell (1975), p. 58. 29. P. M. Sutcliffe, 'The End of the Battle of the Atlantic (German U-Boat Operations, 1943-1944),' Journal of Naval Studies Vol. 18 (1996), p. 119. 30. A. P. Rowe, One Story of Radar (Cambridge University Press, London, 1948), p. 105. 31. Derman Christopherson, and E. C. Baughan, 'Reminiscences of Operational Research in World War II by Some of its Practitioners,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 43 (1992), p. 574. 32. Blackett (1962), pp. 213-14. 33. Joseph F. McCloskey, 'British Operational Research in World War II,' Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), p. 455. 34. Ibid. 35. C. H. Waddington, O. R. in World War II: Operational Research against the U-boat (Elek Science, London, 1973), pp. 31-2. 36. Blackett (1962), p. 216. 37. Waddington (1973), p. 151. 38. Blackett, (1962), pp. 216-17. 39. Waddington (1973), pp. 151-67. 40. Ibid., p. 151. 41. Blackett (1962), p. 215. 42. Waddington, (1973), p. 177. 43. Blackett (1962), p. 215. 44. Waddington (1973), p. 186. 45. Christopherson and Baughan (1992), p. 576. 46. Waddington (1973), pp. 246-7; Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force (HMSO, London, 1963), pp. 41-6. 47. Blackett (1962), p. 223. 48. Ibid. 49. John Winton, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade (Michael Joseph, London, 1983), p. 224. 50. F. L. Sawyer, A. Charlesby, T. E. Easterfield and F. E. Treadwell, 'Reminiscences of Operational Research in World War II by Some of its Practitioners,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 40 (1989), p. 127. 51. Crowther and Whiddington (1949), p. 98. 52. Jonathan Rosenhead, 'Operational Research at the Crossroads: Cecil Gordon and the Development of Post-War Operational Research,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 40 (1989), p. 127.

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53. Ibid. 54. Waddington (1973), pp. 40-8; Air Ministry (1963), pp. 102-3. 55. German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties during the War: Particulars of Destruction, Cmd. 6843 (HMSO, London, 1946). 56. T. W. Korner, The Pleasures of Counting (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 68. 57. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Evan James Williams, 1903-1945/ Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 45 (March 1947). 58. Blackett (1962), p. 238. 59. 'Scientists at the Operational Level/ reprinted in Blackett (1962, Part II, Chapter 1, pp. 171-6. 60. Ibid., p. 171. 61. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Blackett in War and Peace/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1988), p. 224. 62. Blackett (1962), p. 176. 63. Lovell (1975), p. 60. 64. Ibid., p. 68. 65. Blackett (1962), p. 229. See also M. Llewellyn-Jones, 'A Clash of Cultures: The Case for Large Convoys, in Peter Hore (ed.), Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist and Socialist (Frank Cass, London, 2003), pp. 142-3. 66. Ibid., pp. 230-2. 67. Ibid., p. 232. See also M. Llewellyn-Jones (2003), pp. 148-9. 68. Noel Falconer, 'On the Size of Convoys: An Example of the Methodology of Wartime OR Scientists/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 23 (1976), p p . 315-27. 69. Blackett (1962), p. 233. 70. Paul M. Sutcliffe, 'Operational Research and the Battle of the Atlantic/ in Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds,), The Battle of the Atlantic 19391945: The 50th Anniversary International Naval Conference (Naval Institute Press, Annaplois, MD. 1994). p. 422. 71. ' A Note on Certain Aspects of the Methodology of Operational Research/ reprinted in Blackett (1962), Part II, Chapter 1, pp. 176-98. 72. Ibid., pp. 177-8. 73. Ibid., p. 180. 74. Korner (1996), pp. 92-3. 75. Ibid., p. 93. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. Blackett (1962), p. 177. 79. Ibid. 80. McCloskey (1987), pp. 462-5. 81. 'Reconstruction of Operational Research Group Ministry of Supply' (War Office and Ministry of Supply Joint Paper 287/GEN/752). Reprinted in R. W. Shephard (ed.), Readings on Early Military Operational Research (with

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 131 Particular Reference to Army OR (Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, March 1984), Reading J, p. 97. 82. Ibid. 83. Brief histories of AORS 5, 6 and 8 are contained in Shephard (1984), pp. 195-228. 84. Ronald W. Shephard, 'The Influence of Solandt on the Development of Early Operational Research in Britain,' in C. E. Law, G. R. Lindsay and D. M. Grenville (eds.), Perspectives in Science and Technology: The Legacy of Omand Solandt (Queen's Quarterly, Kingston, Ontario, 1994), p. 32. 85. Ibid., pp. 37-9. 86. Omand Solandt (ed.), Army Operational Research Group: Conversazione (26-27 July 1945), p. 9. 87. McCloskey (1987), p. 463. 88. Omand Solandt, 'Observations, Experiment and Measurement in Operations Research/ in Joseph F. McCloskey and John M. Coppinger (eds.), Operations Research for Management (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1956), pp. 267-84. 89. Solandt (1945), pp. 13-14. 90. McCloskey (1987), p. 464. 91. Solandt (1945), p. 464. 92. Department of the Scientific Advisor to the Army Council, Operational Research in the British Army 1939-45 (October 1947). Reprinted in Shephard (1984), pp. 229-76. 93. Ibid., p. 243. 94. Ibid., p. 244. 95. Ibid., p. 248. 96. Ibid., p. 251. 97. Ibid., p. 246. 98. Operational Research in NW Europe: The War of No 2 Operational Research Section, With 21 Army Group, June 1944-July 1945 (Defence Operational Analysis Centre: Library Accession No. 35965). Reprinted in Shephard (1984), pp. 277-310. 99. Ibid., p xiii. 100. Ibid., p. xiv. 101. Ibid., p. xv. 102. Christopherson and Baughan (1992), pp. 570-3. 103. Zuckerman (1978), p. 137. 104. Ibid., pp. 137-8. 105. Ibid. 106. Crowther and Whiddington (1949), pp. 98-9. 107. Air Ministry (1963), p. 42.

5

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945

From its inception in 1940 the strategy and tactics of Bomber Command's campaign against Germany were the subject of continuing debate both within and without the Air Staff. Issues such as the relative merits of precision versus area bombing, the relationship between offensive and defensive tactics, and the Command's capabilities as a war-winning weapon in its own right were the meat of wartime deliberations at the highest level. In these respects, the historiography of Bomber Command is extensive, ranging from popular accounts, television documentaries and personal memoirs to informed analyses based upon full access to official records. 1 In general terms, the literature has described the trials and tribulations of the Command from three interrelated perspectives. In the first instance, the so-called campaign of area attack, launched in 1942 and culminating in the 'terror bombing' of Dresden in February 1945, has been viewed by some as morally reprehensible, sufficient by itself to justify the absence of a campaign medal for Bomber Command operational personnel and the establishment's failure to elevate its outstanding Commander-in-Chief, Sir Arthur Harris, to the peerage. Secondly, of all British service branches, Bomber Command suffered by far the greatest rate of attrition, all the more poignant in view of the youthfulness of the casualties. To the extent that the personnel in question were endowed with exceptional leadership qualities and courage to match, the high casualty rate has been viewed as reminiscent of the decimation of the British officer corps during the First World War. Thirdly, the entire strategic contribution of the Command to the defeat of Germany has been brought into question. The focus here has been on Sir Arthur Harris's unwavering commitment to the area bombing of the German civilian population in the country's principal industrial towns and cities. This was sustained even after his Command had the wherewithal to engage in the allegedly more profitable strategic option

132

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 133 of attacking precise targets of direct military importance. The account offered in this chapter offers a new interpretation of the area bombing campaign from an operational research perspective. It does not seek to refute existing interpretations, all of which contain an element of validity. The aim, rather, is to enhance understanding of the most controversial element in the British war effort against Germany in the knowledge that the strategy and tactics of area attack were informed by the use and abuse of operational research. Chapters 3 and 4 have highlighted the vital role of operational research in enhancing the military effectiveness of Fighter and Coastal Commands, as well as the Army and the Royal Navy. In the case of Bomber Command, however, the role of operational research is deeply contentious both in its contemporary setting and in historical retrospect. The enduring source of controversy is provided by the validation of area bombing by reference to its presumed impact on the morale of the German civilian population — a strategy endorsed, in part, on operational research grounds which signally failed to convince either Henry Tizard or Patrick Blackett that 'morale' bombing by itself could induce a German capitulation. A separate but related source of disquiet was Sir Arthur Harris's deep opposition to his Command's involvement in Operation Overlord on the grounds of its strategic irrelevance to the outcome of a war which could be ended by bombing German towns and cities if only sufficient resources were made available for the task. That Harris's commitment to uninterrupted area bombing was overruled in favour of attacks on precise targets relevant to the military invasion of the Continent can be ascribed in large measure to the quantitative analysis of bombing in the Mediterranean theatre undertaken by Solly Zuckerman in 1943. As an advocate of aerial attack on precise targets, Zuckerman was intrinsically o p p o s e d to ' m o r a l e ' bombing. This view was propounded vigorously in his memoirs, in which he also condemned Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (ORS) for its failure to challenge Harris's wholly mistaken strategic vision. 2 In order to illuminate these controversies the chapter begins with an assessment of the RAF's experience of bombing in the period to 1942 in order to explain the transition from precision to area bombing. It then analyses the work of Bomber Command's ORS in enhancing the effectiveness of the striking force before examining the wartime debate on the relationship between Bomber Command and Operation Overlord. It concludes with an assessment of the impact of area bombing, particularly in relation to Harris's view that an effective campaign of

134 A History of Operational Research area attack, supplemented by the efforts of the US Eighth Air Force, obviated the necessity of a seaborne invasion of north-west Europe. Up to the mid-1930s, the Air Staff remained committed to the view that the primary responsibility of the RAF in any future war would be to attack an enemy's war-making industrial capacity and to undermine civilian morale in accordance with the Trenchard doctrine. In 1937, however, the Air Ministry clarified the RAF's role in the context of German rearmament and the need to identify suitable targets. The resulting 'Western Air Plans' were prepared in October 1937 in which the most important objectives were grouped as follows: (a) Plans for attack on the German Air Striking Force, and its maintenance organisation. (b) Plans for reconnaissance in co-operation with the Navy in Home Waters and the Eastern Atlantic. (c) Plans for close co-operation with the Navy in convoy protection in Home Waters and the Eastern Atlantic. (d) Plans for attacking the concentration areas of the German Army and the interruption of its communications in an advance into Belgium, Holland and France. (e)PIans for attacking the enemy's manufacturing resources in the Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar.3 The first, fourth and fifth objectives were directly relevant to the newly-established Bomber Command, with the attack on German industry in closest conformity with the Trenchard doctrine. In December 1937, therefore, the Command formalised a list of industrial targets in collaboration with the Air Targets Sub-Committee of the Industrial Intelligence Centre. With the focus on the Ruhr, the identified priorities covered electricity supply, canal and rail transport, and the Ruhr dams. In responding to these recommendations, the Air Staff were primarily concerned to avoid any semblance of an attack on civilians in order to reduce the risk of provoking Germany into launching a 'knock-out blow' against British towns and cities. Thus, when war broke out in September 1939, Bomber Command was ordered to confine its activities to the support of the allied armies in the field and to attacks on German naval units in the North Sea. Penetration into German air space was permitted only for the dropping of propaganda leaflets. During the first two years of the war Bomber Command was to learn some painful lessons. Offensive activities were minuscule in comparison with the succeeding period but they were on a sufficient

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 135 scale to underline the limited capabilities of the Command. Daylight raids against German naval ports produced catastrophic losses, whilst night­ time propaganda raids revealed gross deficiencies in navigation skills and wholly inadequate flying conditions for operational personnel in relation to aircraft icing and frostbite. These deficiencies were highlighted in acute form following the German attack on France and the Low Countries. In the aftermath of the Luftwaffe 'blitzkrieg' in Poland, the Air Staff had modified its stance on civilian attacks to the extent that 'expediency' should henceforth be the 'sole consideration' in determining bombing targets. 4 Following the bombing of Rotterdam in May 1940, however, the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in authorising Bomber Command attacks east of the Rhine, effectively laid aside the Air Staff's ruling against attacks on civilians. The resulting attacks on the Ruhr, however, were little more than pinpricks in the German war effort. Indeed, this initial phase of operations was entirely consistent with 'the conservation of the bomber force' on the grounds of its ineffectiveness in penetrating 'into enemy territory by day or to find its target areas, by night.' 5 By the summer of 1941, the offensive limitations of Bomber Command were painfully evident from photographic intelligence. In August of that year the Prime Minister's confidant and personal scientific adviser, F. A. Lindemann, initiated a statistical investigation of Bomber Command operations prompted by the accumulating photographic record of bombing sorties and air crew debriefings. The resulting report, prepared by Lindemann's personal secretary, David Benusson-Butt, was based upon 100 separate raids on Germany encompassing 28 different targets. In stark terms the 'Butt' report revealed that, on average, less than one third of the striking force was navigating to within five miles of the designated target, a fraction reduced to one tenth in raids on the heavily defended towns and cities of the Ruhr. What was even more depressing, however, was the fact that the figure of one-third related to the average number of aircraft which had contrived to reach the actual target, and not to the total dispatched. Thus, as Benusson-Butt concluded, In the raids considered in the analysis, 6103 aircraft were dispatched but 4065 attacked (66%). Thus of the total dispatched not one-third but one-fifth reached the target area.6 This observation was complemented by the calculation that of the bombs dropped on Germany by night, only five per cent had hit genuine objectives. For Bomber Command these were sobering conclusions which

136 A History of Operational Research were fully reflective of prewar bombing trials. In the tactical sense they pointed in two directions: first and foremost the need to develop reliable navigation aids, and second the abandonment of attacks on predesignated targets in favour of an 'area' approach. On the basis of existing navigation techniques it was practically impossible for Bomber Command to achieve the accuracy in timing and routing necessary for the concentration of large numbers of aircraft in time and space. Insofar as the striking force had operated as 'a collection of individual aircraft/ it had been unduly vulnerable to the enemy defence system, all the more so because it was dominated by increasingly obsolescent aircraft with limited bomb loads and performance characteristics. Concentration, however, held out the prospect of saturating enemy air raid and anti­ aircraft units as well as enhancing defensive capabilities against fighter interception on a collective basis. As for area bombing, it could be justified as a short-term measure until such time as the striking force was equipped with the means to resume precision attacks. 7 It might be thought that the truly rational response to Bomber Command's predicament in 1941 would have been to suspend offensive operations over Germany, at least until navigational improvements had been effected. Alternatively, in the quest for accuracy, daylight bombing could have been resumed but with severe cost in terms of aircraft losses and the supply of experienced aircrew. At this stage in the war, however, the Command was in desperate need of operational experience and it was this fact, in combination with wider political and military exigencies, which dictated the continuation of night bombing. In political terms, there were two paramount considerations. The first was to lend support to a hard-pressed Soviet Union following the German invasion in June 1941. At that time Bomber Command was the only British force capable of offering even a modicum of assistance. Secondly, in relation to Britain's own war effort, fortunes were at a low ebb in 1941 with the Royal Navy fully strained by the Battle of the Atlantic and the Army in retreat in North Africa. From this perspective alone the constellation of forces in favour of a continuing bombing offensive was unrelenting. It was thus a combination of operational and political considerations, in conjunction with the limited capabilities of the Army and Royal Navy, that provided the immediate background to the devising and launching of 'an ever increasing air bombardment of Germany.' 8 The wartime origins of Bomber Command's strategic air offensive can be traced back ultimately to Churchill's stated view to Lord Beaverbrook, following the defeat of France, that there was 'only one

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 137 sure path' to winning the war 'and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack of heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm by this means, without which I do not see a way through.' 9 Although the subsequent poor results achieved by Bomber Command, confirmed by the Butt report, caused the Prime Minister to doubt 'whether bombing by itself would be a decisive factor/ rather than 'a seriously increasing annoyance,' 10 it was in July 1941 that the Chiefs of Staff committed themselves to an area bombing offensive to be launched as soon as practicably possible. In the history of aerial warfare this was a momentous decision, insofar as the primary target for attack was to be the morale of the German civilian population. 11 In subsequent discussion within the Chiefs of Staff and Air Staff organisations, it is apparent that there was 'a certain looseness' in the interpretation of the term morale: On the one hand it denoted the attack on a wide and heavy scale on the civilian population of Germany regardless of, or at least, with secondary consideration to, the intrinsic economic value of objectives; on the other hand the more limited but economically effective attack on the heavily built-up areas of major industrial towns with the aim of dislocating the lives of the industrial workers and thereby reducing their output to a level which would seriously affect and ultimately bring about the collapse of the German war economy as a whole.12 Divorced from economic objectives of a more or less precise nature, the area bombing of 'heavily built-up areas' conjures up certain unpleasant images. These have been conveyed well enough by John Terraine as being consistent with 'putting the fear of death into individuals. On a collective basis it means threatening a massacre.' 13 In 1941 it is fair to say that, notwithstanding the London blitz, such thoughts were confined to a small minority of military planners. For example, as an advocate of the destruction of German towns and cities, Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff and former Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, was of the opinion that the object of area bombing was 'to demolish factories, communications, the homes of the workers, the apparatus and amenities of major urban life.' Civilian deaths would undoubtedly occur but they would be minimised because industrial workers and their families 'would retreat from the urban areas to the countryside with consequent loss of production, or, if they remained, suffer loss of morale from hours spent in shelters and from the reduced amenities of life.'14

138 A History of Operational Research In reviewing the evolution of British bombing strategy against Germany in 1941-2 it is apparent that the official record of deliberations conveys considerable ambiguity. As noted already, the Chiefs of Staff took the view that as soon as the necessary four-engined aircraft were available, Bomber Command should embark upon an area offensive: more specifically, this would take the form of 'a planned attack on civilian morale' on such a scale as to bring about a complete collapse of the German war economy. 15 The Air Staff, however, envisaged a war on two fronts, with attacks on morale and the economy of equal importance. These objectives, moreover, were interdependent to the extent that 'economic distress would produce lowered morale while loss of spirit would increase economic strain.' 16 Semantics apart, it would appear that the latter view was capable of reconciliation with the former insofar as considerations of civilian morale were focussed clearly on the industrial workforce where it was assumed that nervous strain and fatigue would have an adverse effect on productive performance. The real ambiguity in bombing policy relates to the interpretation of its origins in the account of RAF operations prepared by the Air Historical Branch (AHB) of the Air Ministry in the later 1940s. In this it is stated clearly that 'as originally envisaged, the bombing offensive was to be directed against the most heavily built-up area of a town rather than the docks or factories unless the two points coincided.' In other words, 'the domestic lives' of the workers themselves should be the primary focus of attack.17 In this form the offensive was 'conceived by the Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Prime Minister.' More significantly, however, it was never intended to be more than 'a temporary measure, born of bitter experience' until such time as navigational techniques had improved to the point where Bomber Command could 'return to the precision attack of specific industrial objectives.' Stated in these terms, area bombing was 'a policy of despair,' driven forward by the ineffectiveness of early bombing operations and the political and military exigencies already noted. 18 The bombing offensive, launched in the spring of 1942, continued until the end of the war. Despite considerable improvement in Bomber Command's precision capabilities, its overall thrust remained as an area offensive directed principally at civilian targets. Whilst it is true that in the final eighteen months of the war the Command began to adopt a more flexible approach in relation to particular target systems (see below, pp. 165-6), Sir Arthur Harris remained committed to the view that the deployment of the heavy bomber force in favour of attacks on 'fleeting' or 'panacea' targets was an unwarranted diversion from the strategic

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 139 task allotted to his Command, namely to force a German capitulation in the wake of the mass destruction of towns and cities. Whilst Harris himself regarded civilian demoralisation as a useful by-product of the area attack strategy, 19 an early and possibly decisive endorsement of morale bombing emanated from F. A. Lindemann (now Lord Cherwell) in the form of a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister at the end of 1942. Assessing what could be achieved in an eighteen-month period with a given weight of effort against the built-up areas of 58 German towns and cities with populations in excess of 100,000, Cherwell wrote: Investigation seems to show that having one's house demolished is most dangerous to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relations killed. At Hull signs of strain were evident even though only one-tenth of the homes were demolished. On the above figures we could do as much harm to each of the 58 principal German towns. There seems little doubt this would break the spirit of the people.20 Apart from the unconscious irony, it is significant that the Cherwell memorandum focussed entirely on civilian morale, making no reference to the effects of bombing on industrial output. Passed by the Prime Minister to the Secretary of State for Air (Sir Archibald Sinclair) and the Chief of the Air Staff for comment, it received their approval, prompted in part by the fact that Cherwell's calculations relating to the German bombing of Hull and Birmingham conformed broadly to the findings of a more detailed analysis of Luftwaffe attacks on Coventry carried out on behalf of the Air Staff in October 1941 by the Director of Bombing Operations. 21 In the historiography of the Second World War the Cherwell memorandum has become a cause celebre on account of its apparently decisive endorsement of area bombing on the part of a close friend and confidant of the Prime Minister, recently ennobled and appointed to Cabinet office as Paymaster-General. Public controversy erupted in 1961 with the delivery of C. P. Snow's Godkin lectures in which he portrayed Cherwell as an area bombing fanatic to the detriment of other legitimate calls on the striking force.22 Further critical comment stemmed from the pen of Patrick Blackett who in his Studies of War, published in 1962, claimed that he could 'vouch for the fundamental truth of Snow's account.' 23 In Blackett's case added credence was given to his remarks by virtue of the fact that he had been involved directly in the wartime debate on bombing policy in his capacity as Director of Naval Operational

140 A History of Operational Research Research and, together with Henry lizard, had sought to challenge the quantitative assumptions underlying the Cherwell memorandum. As he stated in retrospect: My [view] was that [Cherwell's] method of calculation was correct in principle, but that the actual numerical answer, that of the number of houses which could be destroyed within 18 months, was six times too high. The main mistake in the calculation was the assumption that all bombers which would be delivered from the factories in the next 18 months would in the same period have dropped all their bombs on Germany....24 Tizard, using the same basis of calculation as Blackett, independently assessed Cherwell's estimate as five times too high. According to Tizard's biographer, Cherwell responded to these criticisms by pointing out 'that all his calculations were intended to show was that a great deal of damage could be done by bombing in built-up areas,' a view with which Tizard, at least, did not disagree. 25 The fundamental division of opinion, however, related to the use of Bomber Command as a cohesive striking force at a particular stage in the war. For Tizard and Blackett in particular, the overwhelming strategic issue confronting Britain in 1942 was the anti-U-boat war in the Atlantic. An effective campaign required the deployment of long-range, heavy aircraft by Coastal Command in direct competition with the needs of Bomber Command. To the extent that an area bombing offensive against the German homeland could not produce decisive results in 1942 or 1943, neglect of the defence of convoys entailed the unacceptable risk of British defeat as a result of the rupture of the all-important Anglo-American supply line. The critical issue raised by the Cherwell memorandum was whether offence or defence should be the predominant factor in air strategy. In 1942 the argument went in favour of Cherwell by virtue of the Prime Minister's commitment to a bombing offensive in support of a Soviet Union in desperate straits in advance of the defeat of the German army at Stalingrad. In this respect, area bombing was Britain's response to Stalin's repeated calls for immediate assistance in advance of any military invasion of north-west Europe by the western allies. It was, in effect, a 'Second Front' in its own right which confirmed Britain's commitment to an offensive war. 27 A final insight into the Cherwell controversy was provided by Solly Zuckerman in his memoirs published in 1978.28 Described by Sir Maurice Dean as 'one of the best minds in operational research,' 29 Zuckerman had secured a reputation in 1940-1 as Britain's leading expert on the

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 141 human effects of blast damage. His work in this respect has been noted in the last chapter with particular reference to the analysis of air raid casualties (see above, pp. 125-6). An important aspect of Zuckerman's work was a survey of the effects of German bombing on Hull and Birmingham in 1940-1 on behalf of the Ministry of Home Security in collaboration with J. D. Bernal. The relevant survey had been carried out with Cherwell's knowledge and it was a most impressive and comprehensive piece of operational analysis, not least because the researchers had a tally of virtually all bombs dropped. After an exhaustive investigation, entailing extensive quantitative evaluation, the ZuckermanBernal report concluded that In neither town was there any evidence of panic resulting either from a series of raids or a single raid. The situation in Hull has been somewhat obscured from this point of view by the occurrence of trekking [people leaving the town at night], which was made possible by the availability of road transport and which was much publicised as a sign of breaking morale, but which in fact can be fairly regarded as a considered response to the situation. In both towns, actual raids were, of course, associated with a degree of alarm and anxiety which cannot in the circumstances be regarded as abnormal, and in which in no instance was sufficient to provoke mass anti-social behaviour. There was no massive effect on the health of either town.30 As Zuckerman revealed, Cherwell used the report as the empirical basis for his own calculations to justify an area bombing offensive on the grounds of its impact on civilian morale. But as the above quotation indicates, the Zuckerman-Bernal report stated 'the very reverse' of what Cherwell claimed. 31 In short, the Cherwell memorandum was seriously misleading and certainly provided no objective justification for an area bombing offensive. Commenting in retrospect on these wartime iterations, Blackett confessed to 'a haunting sense of personal failure/ feeling sure that Tizard had been of the same opinion. 32 Both men, Blackett in particular, may have had an emotional antipathy to the 'terror bombing' of civilians, but that was not the issue in 1942. They simply did not believe that area bombing could produce decisive results in an eighteen-month period in view of likely trends in aircraft production, the availability of trained aircrew and other valid demands on the supply of long-range bombers. To that extent, Zuckerman was correct in his assertion that the difference of opinion between Cherwell, Tizard and Blackett was 'a technical one.'

142 A History of Operational Research Blackett's controversial claim that the issue could have been resolved effectively if only Bomber Command had possessed 'a strong and trusted operational research section' which had subjected Cherwell's calculations to rigorous analysis is considered later in the chapter. In summarising the evidence thus far, it is apparent that the evolution of wartime bombing policy was subject to a complex of influences. At the most subjective level there was the understandable desire to deliver retaliatory blows against Germany in the wake of military reverses in North Africa and the Atlantic, and when a seaborne invasion of the Continent seemed an uncertain prospect. There was also the perceived need to lend support to the Soviet Union: at the very least, a bombing offensive, in drawing Luftwaffe fighter strength from the eastern front and in necessitating the formation of ack-ack divisions and extensive air-raid precautions within Germany itself, would reduce the pressures on Soviet forces. On less certain ground was the argument advanced by the Inter-Services Research Bureau in April 1942 that the German civilian population was, at that stage in the war, peculiarly susceptible to 'morale bombing.' In the light of adverse developments on the eastern front, the experience of a massive bombing offensive would bring home to German civilians 'the intense horrors of war' and also 'the horrors which would follow defeat and accompanying vengeance.' 33 If this smacked of wishful thinking, the Cherwell m e m o r a n d u m purported to stand on firmer ground. Although it took its stand on considerations of civilian morale, it was supported by an appeal to quantitative evidence. The 'evidence,' however, was used in a highly selective way to support a preconceived conclusion. Whilst Webster and Frankland's official history of the RAF in the Second World War concluded that Cherwell's intervention was 'not decisive,' 34 it is possible to agree with Zuckerman that without it the impetus to sustained area bombing would have been less urgent and certainly less compelling. During the winter of 1941-2 Bomber Command's operations against Germany had been limited by the previous commitment to conservation of aircraft and by the need to direct a considerable proportion of the available effort to attack two German battleships in harbour at Brest. By February 1942, however, circumstances were moving strongly in favour of the launching of the area offensive. The military situation in Russia was at crisis point, whilst morale in Britain was at a low ebb following the surrender of Singapore to the Japanese. More specifically in the context of Bomber Command, new airfields were becoming available at the same time as the supply of trained aircrew and the production

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 143 of heavy bombers were increasing markedly. Above all, the tactical abilities of the striking force were about to be revolutionised by the inception of new techniques of routing and concentration, together with improved navigational facilities. In these respects, Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (ORS), formed in September 1941, was to fulfil a vital role in enhancing the capabilities and effectiveness of the striking force. Prior to the formation of the ORS, scientific analysis of bombing operations had been carried out by A. E. Woodward-Nutt and Dr B. G. Dickens of the Department of the Director of Scientific Research at the Ministry of Aircraft Production. Their researches concentrated on the causes of aircraft losses, the efficiency of aircraft armament and a variety of signal problems. The formation of a dedicated ORS was prompted by the precedents already set in other military commands and also by the acute awareness, generated by the Butt report, of the need to increase the efficiency of operations in terms of 'bombs on the target per aircraft lost.' 35 In view of his long-standing involvement in operational research on behalf of the RAF, Dr Dickens was appointed Officer-in-Chief of the section. The first distribution of staff duties was issued in September 1941 and covered the following areas: Dr B. G. Dickens Dr R. J. Smeed Miss K. M. M. Goggin Mr G. W. H. Stevens Mr E. A. Lovell Mr L. A. Roberts Mr J. A. Jukes

Officer-in-Charge Study of bomber losses Study of bomber losses Study of success of bombing operations Study of vulnerability of bombers Study of radar and radio problems Study of radar and radio problems

From these modest beginnings the number of staff grew steadily as the area offensive increased in intensity. By the autumn of 1942 the establishment had reached 41. A further expansion to 51 officers was approved in April 1943 and the maximum wartime establishment of 55 was reached in August of that year.36 Shortly after the formation of the ORS, day operations were identified as a further area of study. Coincidentally, it was realised that 'the study of radar problems was too closely linked to both the study of the success of bomber operations and that of bomber losses for it to be pursued in a separate section.' 37 Thus, the ORS began to be reorganised from early 1942 onwards on the basis of specialist sub-sections. At the end of the war the organisation was as follows:

144

A History of Operational Research

Officer-in Charge ORS Administrative Officer ORS 1 Research into Success of Operations

ORS 1(a) General tactical success of operations ORS 1(b) Bombing accuracy and weapon effectiveness ORS 1(c) Bombing training

ORS 2 Research into Bomber Losses

ORS ORS ORS ORS

2(a) 2(b) 2(c) 2(d)

Bomber tactics Radio counter-measures Aircraft vulnerability Causes of bomber losses

ORS 4 General Problems

ORS ORS ORS ORS

4(a) 4(b) 4(c) 4(d)

Use of night photography Airfield control Bomber Command Review Night and day raid reports

ORS 5 Research into Radar Aids

ORS 5(a) Use and accuracy of blind bombing aids ORS 5(b) Use and accuracy of navigational aids

ORS 3 Statistical Section

ORS 6 Research into Manpower and Economy Detachments

(a) Group Representatives Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 100 and Pathfinder Force (b) Bombing Development Unit Representatives (c) Bomber C o m m a n d Bombing Research Unit (Investigations) (d) Group Damage Inspectors Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 Group

ORS 3 was initially responsible for the analysis of day operations, but when daylight bombing was suspended early in 1943 it was reconstituted as the Statistical Section responsible for the collation of data emanating from each Bomber Command sortie. As for the position of the ORS in the Command organisation, it differed to experience elsewhere in that it was placed under the Senior Air Staff Officer rather

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 145 than the Commander-in-Chief. The ORS was therefore a branch of the Air Staff, although Dickens, as officer-in-charge, had open access to the Commander-in-Chief.38 At the inception of the ORS the then Commander-in-Chief, Sir Richard Peirse, formulated a broad programme of research with the precise content left to Dickens in consultation with senior members of his staff. The overall objective at this early stage 'was to study the success of operations, in terms of the percentage of aircraft dispatched which bombed the target, and make recommendations whereby the percentage could be improved.' 39 Central to this task was the need to engage in 'raid analysis': Considered as an entity the individual raid has a more or less complex structure, and if consideration is restricted to its active phase in the target area, a relatively short life. The ultimate units of which the raid is composed are individual aircraft moving through space at considerable speeds, but along various contorted tracks. At a critical point in each track the bomb-load is dropped. The raid as a whole is then the aggregate of these tracks considered in their mutual inter-relationships; it is a warp, the strands of which are the individual aircraft tracks. If the actual raid-as-awhole can be reconstructed and studied it will be found to differ more or less from the raid as planned; such differences either may be of the order expected (from past experience) by the planners, or they may be critically large so as to be significantly discrepant from the planners' intentions. The problem is to reconstruct the raid, compare it with the plan, and (if possible) to account for major discrepancies between them.40 Raid analyses were based upon three sources of information. In the first instance, a detailed report was prepared in the aftermath of every operational sortie in order to collate information on bombs carried and dropped, method of bomb release, and general conditions in the target area. Supplementary information was obtained from operational photographs and daylight photographic reconnaissance. The former were a vital adjunct to sortie raid reports because they enabled the position of the aircraft when bombing to be fixed in space and time with considerable accuracy. In the latter case, the aftermath of most major raids was surveyed by aircraft of the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit. The resulting images were then analysed with a view to identifying the number of bomb craters and their distribution. The most elaborate analyses were undertaken on behalf of the ORS by the Research and Experiments Department (RE8) of the Ministry of Home Security.

146 A History of Operational Research The analytical methods deployed by the ORS in evaluating the effects of individual raids were both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative analysis was based upon individual sortie raid reports and photographic intelligence. Together, they facilitated the construction of a 'time histogram' of bombing and its unique distribution in each raid. In this context, operational research scientists acted in a manner akin to 'the detective' of fiction insofar as 'a great number of strands of evidence [were] mentally assessed for reliability (mainly for their coherence and mutual consistency) and then woven together to form what is, in effect, a reconstruction of the raid' in the form of its 'life history.' 41 Thus, In the case of a raid which has fallen below expectation (and these are the raids mainly selected for study), the time when and reasons why it failed will usually emerge as analysis proceeds. For example, it might be that a small group of aircraft claim to have bombed a cluster of red target indicators at a time when it is known that more were burning; one of these aircraft may have been plotted away from the main concentration and their descriptions of the target area may make it probable that the others were part of the same division. The evidence points to the use of decoy target indicators by the enemy. Moreover, this might be an isolated incident limited in time to about ten minutes, or it might have the effect of attracting most of the rest of the raid.42 As for methods of quantitative analysis, the main requirement was to characterise any given raid by some numerical measure of success, or by a set of such measurements, so that a whole series of raids carried out by one bombing technique can be compared with other series carried out by other techniques; also, so that seasonable and longer-term changes in accuracy and the varying effects of weather can be assessed.43 The relevant 'measure of success' was defined in terms of the 'bombfall distribution' as indicated by the results of photographic intelligence. The sources of data and methods of analysis employed by the ORS proved to be critical ingredients in enhancing the effectiveness of the striking force. The object of qualitative analysis was to provide a rapid estimation of tactical success and the reasons for relative failure of operations. Distributed to Bomber Command headquarters and the Air Officers commanding Groups participating in the operation concerned, qualitative analyses 'were of obvious practical importance, and made concrete suggestions for improving future operations.' 44 In contrast, the

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 147 results of quantitative analysis appeared to be 'somewhat academic and unpractical,' at least in the short term. However, raid parameters which are the end-product of the process of quantitative analysis, became in turn the new data for further researches. By collecting the parameters for whole groups of comparable raids, it became possible to characterise the groups as a whole in a reasonably exact way, and thence to compare one group with another. Thus, the way was open to assessing and comparing different bombing techniques, to furnish precise information on the accuracy of Bomber Command attacks under given conditions, and to estimate the weight of attack required in future operations.45 The ORS engaged in quantitative analysis throughout the campaign of area attack. The parameters had to be re-calculated continually as the striking force improved in effectiveness in terms of aircraft bombing the aiming point of the operation. The derived data was used in the estimation of force requirements when the bombing effort was turned on to the attack of multiple targets preceding the Normandy landings and thereafter in the campaign against communication centres and in attacks in support of the ground battle. Up to August 1941, in advance of the introduction of radar aids to navigation and highly developed marking techniques, the only available means of navigation and bomb aiming were 'compass, loop and sextant, combined with such visual identification of ground detail' that could be made 'by starlight, moonlight, or in the light of an occasional unshaded flare.'46 In these circumstances, difficulties in navigating to the target area were compounded by the need to obtain a visual fix of the target itself or of a clearly identifiable landmark in order to make a dead reckoning run. Since the process of searching for the target could occupy the better part of an hour in the face of intense anti-aircraft fire, the reasons for the lack of success of Bomber Command's early night raids can be well appreciated. ORS studies of these raids, based upon photographic analysis, demonstrated the need for crews, whenever possible, to use more than one feature to identify the target. Indeed, of crews claiming to have identified a single ground feature, the ORS calculated that only 33 per cent located the target successfully compared with 47 per cent for those who used two features, and 82 per cent for those who used more than two. In addition, the ORS identified significant differences in the reliability of various ground features for visual fixing.

148 A History of Operational Research The most popular features — lakes and rivers — proved the least reliable, whilst coastal features, docks in particular, were the most trustworthy. All of these observations were passed on to Bomber Command stations together with exhortations for a general improvement in standards of map-reading to be obtained from training flights at operational heights in British airspace. One critical recommendation for an improvement in target identification was that consideration should be given 'to the formation of specialist squadrons to initiate raids and to raise fires.' The same report, submitted to Bomber Command headquarters in December 1941, also stressed the need for 'the use of reconnaissance flares by a number of aircraft in co-operation.' 47 Together, these recommendations led to the formation of the much-famed Pathfinder Squadrons which commenced operations in August 1942 with a view to improving the accuracy and visual impact of target marking. At the end of 1941, the ORS concluded that in the absence of clear moonlight conditions, the ability of the striking force to inflict substantial physical damage on Germany's urban centres was dependent upon the introduction of radio aids which would make successful night attacks less dependent on the visual identification of ground features. The first radio aid, known as Gee (Ground Electronics Engineering), was developed by the Telecommunication Research Establishment, and was first used operationally in a raid on Essen in March 1942. The Gee system was based on the measurement in the aircraft of the phase difference between signals transmitted from three ground stations. As such, it was designed to enable large numbers of aircraft to navigate 'with certainty' to specific targets in Germany, with a particular focus on the Ruhr industrial towns. Before Gee was brought into use, the ORS, conscious that the device was susceptible to enemy jamming, engaged in a research programme designed to derive maximum short term benefit from its deployment. The overall conclusion from the analysis of early Gee raids, was that its beneficial effects were confined to raids undertaken in specific weather conditions and on certain classes of target. Given Gee's limited range, its positive impact on navigation and routing was most marked against short-range targets in the northern Ruhr area, and under meteorological conditions which were unfavourable for visual identification. In conditions of light moonlight and good visibility, Gee's contribution to routing accuracy was negligible, but in cloudy, hazy or moonless conditions it produced measurable results to the extent that from April 1942 onwards the striking force was deployed principally in moonless conditions.

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 149 German jamming of Gee was confirmed early in August 1942 and it was this factor that persuaded Bomber Command's Commander-in-Chief, Sir Arthur Harris, to authorise the formation of the Pathfinder Force despite his concern that the 'creaming off of squadrons' in terms of 'elite' aircrew would have an adverse effect on morale. Jamming of Gee reduced its range from 400 miles to 250-300 miles from Daventry thereby eliminating all worthwhile German targets. But although Gee could no longer be used as an aid to target identification, it was still of value as a navigational aid over the greater part of the route to the Ruhr. 49 From the inception of the Pathfinder Force, Bomber Command's ORS was committed to enhancing its organisation and effectiveness. In the former category, ORS reports led to improved methods of crew selection and training, optimal numbers of Pathfinder aircraft in the main striking force, and the compilation of a manual describing the role and functions of Pathfinder crews on behalf of the Main Force. 50 In March 1943, the ORS compiled a major report on the accuracy of bombing operations based upon 316 raids and 38,000 sorties. The main parameter — the percentage of sorties bombing within three miles of the aiming point — was applied to three distinct sub-periods, and produced the following results:

Table 5.1.

Percentage of attacking sorties within three miles of aiming point.

Pre-Gee Period to March 1942 Coastal Towns 33% Ruhr Towns 14% Other Inland Towns 23% Gee Period: March 1942 to August 1942 Coastal Towns 44% Ruhr Towns 11% Other Inland Towns 29% Early Pathfinder Force Period: August 1942 to February 1943 Coastal Towns 27% Ruhr Towns 34% Other Inland Towns 18% Source: Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Operational Research in Bomber Command (1949), pp. 106-7.

150 A History of Operational Research Whilst the introduction of Gee was consistent with a positive effect on most raids, the results in the heavily-defended Ruhr were disappointing. With the introduction of the Pathfinder Force, however, target finding improved significantly over the Ruhr. This was where the striking force was concentrated, although even here, the improvement in the proportion of bombs hitting the target area was not accompanied by improvement in the accuracy of attack. The real breakthrough in the latter respect was achieved during the course of 1943 as a result of the innovation of considerably more sophisticated radio aids to navigation. The first, known as ' O b o e ' was developed by the Telecommunications Research Establishment as a 'blind' bombing device as aircraft were directed to the target along a fixed radio beam emanating from a tracking station. At the designated aiming point, two ground stations signalled the aircraft to release its bombs. The accuracy of Oboe was initially estimated at a remarkable twenty yards, although the chief limitation of the system was that the single pair of ground stations could only deal with one aircraft every ten to 15 minutes. 51 ORS studies of bombing operations had demonstrated clearly that if the aiming point could be identified visually, or on the basis of target marking flares, successful attacks could be achieved. The fundamental problem, however, was to identify the aiming point at the inception of the attack. Prior to the operational use of Oboe, the ORS conceived the idea that if Oboe aircraft could drop a distinctive mark on the aiming point at zero hour and replenish it, say, every three minutes, an accurate and easily seen aiming point would be provided for the whole bomber force. This would require, say, four pairs of ground stations and one squadron of high flying aircraft such as Wellington Vis or Mosquitoes [sic].52 The Air Staff at Bomber Command accepted this suggestion for attacks on the Ruhr which were to be supplemented by a new system of target indicators as recommended by the ORS. Thus, Aircraft flying at 28,000 to 30,000 feet marked the Oboe with red target indicators (T.I.) approximately one every five minutes (there were two Oboe channels — two pairs of stations working on different frequencies — each channel being able to deal with one aircraft every ten minutes). To provide continuity (as The T.I.s only burnt for a few minutes) and to guard against failure of Oboe aircraft, 'Backers-up' were provided. These Backers-up, which were normal heavy bombers, dropped green T.I. visually on the Red

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 151 T.I. (or on previous greens if no reds were visible). The main force bombed the red T.I. if visible, otherwise they bombed the Green T.I.53 Taken together, these developments were probably the greatest contribution to the increase in the effectiveness of bombing operations.' 54 The first Oboe attacks inaugurated the 'Battle of the Ruhr' and lasted for the greater part of 1943. They resulted in a quantum leap in Bomber Command's effectiveness. Indeed, the first significant Oboe ground marking operation, launched against Essen in March 1943 by a force of 400 aircraft, resulted in severe damage to a target which had been attacked on numerous occasions previously with little effect: the greater part of the residential area was burnt out and the Krupps armaments works were damaged severely for the first time. At the same time as Oboe was being developed, the Telecom­ munications Research Establishment was also investigating the possibility of airborne radar. The ultimate objective was to provide all aircraft in the striking force w i t h the capability to b o m b b u i l t - u p areas independently. The relevant equipment, known as H2S, was derived from A.S.V. radar. Operating on the more accurate centimetric band, it held out the prospect of releasing Bomber Command from the limitations imposed by range from ground stations as in the case of Gee and Oboe. Given the limited supply of H2S radar sets at the beginning of the Battle of the Ruhr, it was decided as an interim measure to deploy H2S as an aid to Pathfinding. By January 1943, two flights of the Pathfinder force had been equipped. At the end of September, the whole of the force had H2S, and by February 1944 its deployment in the main striking force was well underway. 55 During February and March 1943 the ORS examined the results of ten raids in which H2S had been used for target marking. In accounting for the limited degree of success, the ORS analysis pointed to a number of problems. In the first instance, the early H2S raids were characterised by the very small number of primary target indicators (i.e. those dropped blindly via H2S) which were burning at any one time. The practical effect was to limit the effectiveness of target marking on the part of back-up Pathfinder aircraft which were not equipped with H2S. Thus, many raids were poorly centred on the target. A further difficulty, beyond the control of aircrew, was the low serviceability of the early H2S equipment. Indeed, the ORS calculated that only 55 per cent of sorties arrived in the target area with serviceable radar sets. Moreover, fewer than half of the crews with working sets used it for blind marking, the rest releasing their target

152 A History of Operational Research markers visually. Blind marking itself was subject to large errors and the situation was further aggravated by the poor timing of arrival of the marker aircraft, especially in relation to longer range targets. After reviewing all of these problems the ORS secured the adoption of the following recommendations: (a) That Pathfinder crews whose H2S was working satisfactorily must use it for marking, and must not be tempted to release on visual identification. (b) That the blind markers, instead of being spread throughout the attack, should all be detailed to attack at the beginning of the raid (at zero minus one), or if considered necessary, in two waves, one at the beginning and one in the middle of the raid. (c) In view of the fact that raids on which visual marking in the light of flares laid by H2S aircraft had been used as the primary marking method had proved much more successful than those on which purely blind marking was employed, it was recommended that this technique be used whenever weather conditions would permit.56 The problems encountered in primary marking were compounded by the fact that even when the target was marked satisfactorily, the raid as a whole tended to move backwards along the line of attack. ORS time analyses revealed that the resulting shift in the centre of the attack was due primarily to back-up aircraft which displayed 'a strong tendency to undershoot the main concentration/ Since back-up aircraft dropped their target indicators at intervals during the attack, each aiming at target indicators already dropped, undershooting was invariably cumulative so that in an attack, say of 25 minutes, the drift from the centre could amount to several miles. In making suggestions to correct the shift in the centre of the attack, the ORS focussed on the need for frequent 'recentering' via H2S as the raid proceeded. Whilst this led to improved results, the problem was not resolved finally until 1944 when back-up aircraft were eliminated as a result of the employment of smaller forces which, in shortening the duration of the attack, required only primary marking. In the meantime, the Pathfinder Force was able to avail itself of the so-called 'Newhaven technique' of target marking which emanated from the ORS analyses of the early H2S raids. The Air Historical Branch account provides a succinct summary of its development: In the original form of the Newhaven method the attack was opened by a wave of H2S aircraft, all detailed to attack at the same time, who would blindmark the target with target indicators

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 and at the same time illuminate it with sticks of flares. These blindmarker illuminators, as they were called, were followed after an interval of about two minutes by a smaller number of visual markers, whose function was to identify the aiming point visually in the light of the flares and to mark it accurately with target indicators of a distinctive colour. If they were unable to do this on account of weather or any other reason, they would refrain from dropping their markers. Finally came the backers-up, attacking at the rate of one or two per minute throughout the duration of the attack, who would either back-up the visual marker's target indicators or, if these had not been dropped, would centre the attack on the... the blind marker's target indicators. The later backers-up, arriving after the primary markers had died out, would continue to back-up the target indicators of previous backers-up. On the early Newhaven attacks both the visual markers and the backers-up both used the same colour target indicators. This was a highly dangerous procedure since the backers-up had no means of telling whether they were in fact backing up the primary marking or were simply aiming at target indicators dropped by previous backers-up which might or might not be accurate. It was also unsatisfactory from the point of view of the main force who had no method of distinguishing the more accurate visual target indicators from the less accurate secondary target indicators. This plan of attack was partly responsible for the poor results of the attack on the Skoda Works at Pilsen on 13/14 May 1943 which led the ORS to put forward a suggestion for a modified form of Newhaven attack employing target indicators of three different colours. It was suggested that the blind markers should use yellow target indicators, the visual markers red, and the backers-up green. The three colour Newhaven was first tried out on the Pathfinder Force experimental raid on Munster on 11/12 June 1943, and remained in general use throughout 1943. The use of the yellow target indicators by the blind markers was eventually abandoned when, early in 1944, the hooded flare came into general use, since it was found that these flares when viewed through haze were liable to be mistaken for yellow target indicators. This was thought to have led to some confusion on the raid on Frankfurt on 20/21 December 1943 and on subsequent attacks the colour scheme was changed to green for blind marking, red or large salvoes of mixed red and green for visual marking, and green for backing-up. The first raid on which this modified colour scheme was tried (Stettin 5/6 January 1944) was not an outstanding success but on subsequent operations the scheme proved reasonably satisfactory.57

153

154 A History of Operational Research A major advantage of the Newhaven method was that when weather conditions pre-empted visual marking of the aiming point, 'the attack would automatically develop as a blind H2S groundmarking raid/ More than half of the Newhaven raids in 1943 developed in this manner, but during 1944 and 1945, as visual marking skills and the quality of illumination improved, a rising proportion of attacks developed as 'Visual Newhavens.' According to the Air Historical Branch account, 'This was one of the many factors contributing to the steady improvement in the efficiency of [the Pathfinder Force] and consequently the Command as the war progressed.' 58 From 1943 until the end of the war in Europe, Bomber Command's ORS monitored the bombing accuracy of the striking force against a range of German towns and cities in terms of aiming point densities. The results are presented in Table 5.2. The density is defined in two ways: the absolute density in tons per square mile at the aiming point is a measure of the scale of attack, whilst the relative density at the aiming point is the absolute density per 1000 tons dropped and is independent of the scale of attack and provides a measure of accuracy, including both centering and scatter. The table indicates an average absolute density of 57 tons per square mile at the aiming point in 1943, with a range of 3.2 to 216 tons per square mile. The equivalent figures for 1944-5 were an average absolute density of nearly four times as great as in 1943, with a range from 23.7 to 658 tons per square mile. The 1943 average for relative density was 33 tons per square mile per 1000 tons dropped, with a five­ fold increase to 174 in 1944-5. Even allowing for two daylight raids in the later period, there was an increase in the accuracy of night bombing to 122.4 tons per square mile per 1000 tons dropped — 3.7 times the accuracy achieved in 1943.59 A further indication of Bomber Command's mounting accuracy was that at the inception of the area campaign the ORS calculated the results of raids in terms of the percentage of aircraft bombing within five miles of the target. During 1943 the distance was reduced to three miles, falling to one mile during the course of 1945. These results, the fruits of new equipment and operational research, receive some confirmation from Fig. 5.1, prepared by the ORS at the end of the war. The figure is also consistent with the Air Historical Branch account which claimed that 1942 was essentially a year of experiment in which 'new ideas, new methods [and] new scientific devices' played critical roles in facilitating concentration of the striking force. This was exemplified in the thousand bomber raids of May and June 1942, exceptional efforts in themselves but marking a watershed in

Table 5.2.

Density at the aiming point — German towns and cities (calculated from raid parameters).

Target

Date

Absolute Density (tons/sq. mile)

Relative Density (per 1000 tons dropped)

Target

Duisburg Duisburg Bochum Dortmund Barmen Dusseldorf Drefeld Cologne Mannheim Hamburg Hamburg Nurnberg Manheim Hannover Kassel Hannover Kassel

26/27-4-43 12/13-5-43 13-14-5-43 23/24-5-43 29/30-5-43 11/12-6-43 21/22-6-43 3/4-7-43 16/17-4-43 24/25-7-43 27/28-7-43 27/28-8-43 23/24-9-43 27/28-9-43 3/4-10-43 8/9-10-43 22/23-10-43 Average

8.5 53.4 21.0 35.2 84.3 145.5 86.8 72.5 7.5 47.8 7.7 3.8 28.6 3.2 39.0 108.9 216.1 57.1

5.9 36.6 21.1 16.3 46.6 72.0 44.6 40.5 22.6 20.2 3.3 2.2 15.4 1.4 25.1 64.8 128.8

Stuttgart Hamburg Russelsheim Bremen Russelsheim Frankfurt Saarbrucken Dortmund Bochum Wilhelmshaven Bochum Freiburg Ludwigshaven Magdeburg Nurnberg Emden Munster

3M

Date

25/26-7-44 28/29-7-44 12/13-8-44 18/19-8-44 25/26-8-44 12/13-9-44 5/6-10-44 6/7-10-44 9/10-10-44 15/16-10-44 4/5-10-44 27/28-11-44 2/3-1-45 16/17-1-45 2/3-1-45 6/9-44 )* 12/9/44 )* Average Increase over 1943:

Absolute Density (tons/sq. mile)

Relative Density (per 1000 tons)

159.1 48.9 23.7 108.1 139.0 328.2 89.8 305.7 46.1 349.8 658.4 287.2 182.6 238.3 182.7 463.6 110.5 218.9 3.8 fold

110.2 42.4 24.5 95.6 89.4 212.0 54.0 184.3 31.7 163.8 198.3 169.3 149.5 223.5 87.7 797.5 315.7 173.5 5.2 fold

* = Day raids Source: Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Operational Research in Bomber Command (1949), Table 1, p. 110.

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the conception of the bomber force not, as in the past a collection of individual aircraft but as a single, cohesive and decisive weapon capable of being used with deadly effect against any target or on any task required by the strategic situation.60 But if 1942 was a watershed in Bomber Command's offensive capability, 1943 was to be the year when the strategy of area bombing would reach sufficient momentum to encourage Sir Arthur Harris in the belief that he had at his disposal the means to secure a German capitulation. Figure 5.2 lends support to this insofar as it depicts 1943 as the decisive year in relation to the increased tonnage of bombs dropped per sortie at a time when aiming point accuracy was improving significantly. Harris's confidence could only have been increased by the arrival in Britain of substantial numbers of American heavy bombers committed to daylight precision bombing as a complement to night-time area bombing on the part of his own command. In reviewing the progress of the area offensive in a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister on 3 November 1943, Harris assessed 19 German towns as 'virtually destroyed' and a further 19 as 'seriously damaged/ all of them centres of substantial importance to the enemy war effort.61 A more detailed progress report was submitted

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 157

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to the Air Ministry in December, in which Harris forecast that by 1 April 1944, 37,750 acres of built-up area would have been destroyed out of a total target area of 89,000 acres. Moreover, the population of the towns attacked would be over 75 per cent of the total population of towns in Germany with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Thus, by the end of 1943, Harris 'felt certain that Germany must collapse before his programme, which was more than half completed already, should have proceeded much further.' 62 In the context of the original objective laid down in 1942 at the inception of area bombing — the breaking of the morale of the German civilian population — the Chief of the Air Staff informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff in November 1943 that the effects of the air offensive on German morale were of 'tremendous importance' in view of the fact that up to six million people had been rendered homeless 'and were spreading alarm and despondency in the areas into which they had gone.' 6 3 This view was reinforced by a contemporary appreciation by Air Intelligence and the Political Warfare Executive of the effects of area bombing during 1943: (a) Fear of air attack has been the dominant preoccupation of a large part of the German civilian population, and has contributed to produce a situation in which fear of the consequences of continuing the war is becoming greater than fear of the consequences of defeat.

158 A History of Operational Research (b) Air attacks on Germany have resulted in social disruption on a scale which has greatly impaired the German ability to prosecute the war. (c) Though the forces of repression, the hopes of compromise with one or other of the belligerents, and the favourable climatic conditions of the past three months have so far prevented any general break in morale, it is not unreasonable to infer that... such [a] break in morale can occur.64 A further optimistic report on the progress of the area offensive was presented to the Air Ministry at the beginning of March 1944. This was based on an analysis carried out by Department RE 8 of the Ministry of Home Security. Staffed by operational researchers, the department calculated that Bomber Command's attacks during March-December 1943 had cost Germany one million man-years, or 36 per cent of the potential industrial effort of the 29 towns attacked in this period. Since the relevant towns contained a high proportion of war-related industries it was thus reasonable to assume that the figures of man-hours lost contained a high proportion of skilled workers' time. As the report concluded, This being so, a Lancaster [bomber] has only to go to a German city once to wipe off its own capital cost, and the result of all subsequent sorties will be clear profit.66 The message conveyed in these reports and assessments is clear: area bombing, via its effects on civilian morale, held out the prospect of a German capitulation without the need for a military invasion of the Continent. Indeed, as far as Bomber Command was concerned, an allied victory could have been achieved before the end of 1943 if only the striking force could have delivered the necessary weight of attack. This view was stated explicitly in the Command's Quarterly Review for December 1943: Had resources been available for the execution of the Combined Bomber Offensive on the scale as planned it would also have been the year of victory over Germany. As it is, although we have gone a long way and the end is now in sight, the decisive blows have yet to be delivered.67 The reference to the availability of resources is apposite, especially in relation to the delivery of so-called 'decisive blows.' In this context, Sir Arthur Harris took the view that in terms of the supply of warrelated resources, his Command should have first priority. Not only that, he felt entitled to resist vigorously any calls on the use of the striking

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 159 force which he regarded as serious diversions from the primary offensive against Germany. Unsurprisingly, in the light of changing military perspectives on the part of a War Cabinet increasingly obliged to collaborate in the formulation of 'Grand Strategy' in partnership with the Soviet Union and the USA, Harris was to find himself periodically engaged in bitter dispute concerning the diversion of his command to 'secondary fronts' and 'panacea targets.' This occurred, for example, at the very outset of the area offensive in 1942 when Harris succeeded in retrieving 60 bomber crews from Middle East Command after accusations that the latter had creamed off 'the best part of a thousand crews/ few of whom returned to Britain.68 Of even greater consequence for Bomber Command was the 'Pointblank' directive in June 1943 which launched a Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany in cooperation with the US Eighth Air Force. The first draft of the directive stated that the immediate and primary focus of attack for the combined striking forces should be 'enemy fighters in the air and on the ground.' This was the direct product of devastating losses on the American side during the first half of the year and concern that the effective bombing of Germany, whether on a precision or area basis, necessitated the destruction not only of the Luftwaffe but also its supplying industries. As the Official History notes, 'There was not a single mention of the general area attack on German morale.' Yet the final draft, whilst stating that the 'first priority' was the attack on the German air force, reinforced the 'primary object' as being 'the undermining of the morale of the German people,' as stated by the British Chiefs of Staff in October 1942. In effect, therefore, the object of defeating German fighter strength was 'specifically allotted to the [US]...Air Force and to the Eighth Air Force alone,' thereby enabling Bomber Command to continue with the campaign of area attack. 69 These episodes are illustrative of Sir Arthur Harris's overwhelming commitment to a particular military objective and his ability to carry the day against political doubters, sceptics within the Air Staff, and rival commands. In relation to the theme of this chapter, therefore, it is significant that his principal reverses were at the hands of civilian operational researchers. Two issues of crucial military importance stand out in this respect, first, the Bay offensive against the U-boats in 1943 (see above, pp. 104-6) and secondly, the allied preparations for the invasion of the Continent under the cover of 'Operation Overlord in 1944. In the former case, the immediate cause of dispute was the submission in March 1943 of an Admiralty paper to the Anti-U-boat

160 A History of Operational Research Committee chaired by the Prime Minister. The paper, prepared by Patrick Blackett in his capacity as Director of Naval Operational Research, noted the rapidly mounting shipping losses in the North Atlantic and ascribed them to the U-boats' successful countermeasures against radar detection. Blackett called, therefore, for the diversion of 90 heavy bombers from Bomber to Coastal Command, a reinforcement which in his view would effectively contain the renewed U-boat challenge. 70 As noted already, the Admiralty exercised operational control over Coastal Command and it seems perverse at first sight that Blackett's request should have elicited a vitriolic response from the Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshall Sir John Slessor. In denying the need for additional aircraft Slessor referred, in a well-quoted passage, to 'slide-rule strategy of the worst kind,' before concluding that the anti-U-boat offensive should be tackled from 'a less scientific, namely, less quantitative, but more practical angle.' 71 What Coastal Command required was not additional aircraft, but 'aircraft of the right type with the right sort of radar and with crews trained in the right sort of way'. In appraising this episode, Sir Bernard Lovell commented that there were strengths and weaknesses on both sides of the argument. 72 Blackett's numerical calculations, for example were more relevant for 1942 than 1943, and in Slessor's case there was an apparent complacency in the face of steeply rising shipping losses after the sustained fall observable in the last three months of 1942. What is really significant about the Blackett-Slessor exchange, however, is that it was more a reflection of the latter's commitment to the area offensive as the primary claimant on resources in contrast to his own needs. In Slessor's view, Coastal Command was essentially a defensive organisation which should draw 'as little as possible on limited resources.' More to the point, Bomber Command's area offensive under Harris's direction represented 'true air warfare' and Slessor shared fully Harris's belief that area bombing could win the war outright without the need for 'great land battles on the scale of the First World War.'73 In his memoirs, Slessor sought to explain Blackett's stance by reference to his intellectual and temperamental opposition to area bombing, a view which receives some credence from Blackett's public opposition to the use and spread of nuclear weapons. 74 Whatever the truth in this there can be little doubt that it was official perceptions of Blackett's scepticism on the merits ofarea bombing which encouraged his marginalisation in strategic debate to the point where he was excluded from any role in the preparation of Operation Overlord. Nevertheless, the impact of his intervention in 1943 can be gauged from the fact that during the course of the year Coastal

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 161 Command was reinforced by a further 72 heavy aircraft in the face of determined opposition from Bomber Command. For Sir Arthur Harris the activities of Coastal Command represented an unacceptable diversion of effort from the area offensive and hence 'an obstacle to victory.' 75 It remains to be said that the ultimate diversion was represented by Operation Overlord which called for an intensive programme of precision bombing both before and after the allied landings in Normandy. In short, the invasion of the Continent necessitated Bomber Command's deployment in tactical support of the allied armies to the detriment of the strategic air offensive. Harris's deeply hostile reaction to Overlord had been foreshadowed in a personal minute addressed to the Prime Minister immediately after the first 'Thousand Bomber Raid' on Cologne in May 1942: It is imperative, if we hope to win the war, to abandon the disastrous policy of military intervention in the land campaigns of Europe, and to concentrate our air power against the enemy's weakest spots. The success of the 1000 plan [has] proved beyond doubt in the minds of all but wilful men that we can even today dispose of a weight of air attack which no country on which it can be brought to bear could survive. We can bring it to bear on the vital part of Germany. It requires only the decision to concentrate it for its proper use.76 A land campaign, moreover, 'would play right into Germany's hand,' leading to mass slaughter 'in the mud of Flanders and France.' 77 This view that Bomber Command could deliver the British Army from a fate pre-ordained by experience in the First World War was widely held in the upper echelons of the RAF, even beyond the spring of 1944 when detailed planning for Overlord was in its final stages. Indeed, as late as December 1943, in the midst of sustained attacks by Bomber Command on Berlin, Harris claimed that the Lancaster force [by then in excess of 40 squadrons] alone should be sufficient to produce in Germany by April 1st 1944 a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable.78 It is not surprising, therefore, that the prospect of Bomber Command's subordination to the needs of Overlord in general and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) in particular, should have elicited from him a robust but dogmatic plea for the uninterrupted continuation of the area offensive. In a memorandum addressed to the Air Ministry in January 1944 entitled 'The Employment of the Night Bomber Force in

162 A History of Operational Research Connection with the Invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom' Harris reminded his superiors that the primary objective of his command was the destruction of 'the enemy's industrial centres.' 7 9 In that connection, specialised aircraft and operational tactics had been developed, chiefly for use at night. The striking force, moreover, was 'quite incapable of being brought into action against "fleeting targets".' It followed, therefore, that 'A planned schedule of heavy bomber operations to give assistance to ground forces would be extremely unreliable and almost wholly futile.' These judgements and presumptions did not go unchallenged since both the AEAF and the Air Ministry itself qualified virtually every statement in the Harris memorandum. The decisive factor, however, in securing Harris's subordination to the needs of Overlord was the decision of Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder, the designated Deputy Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, to request that Solly Zuckerman should leave Combined Operations to join the AEAF Bombing Committee in the role of Scientific Advisor on Planning. On completing his work on air raid casualties, (see above, pp. 125-6), Zuckerman had been appointed to the staff of Combined Operations, spending the greater part of 1943 in the Mediterranean theatre of war. During this time he worked in an advisory capacity to Tedder, the then overall Air Commander, in preparing highly detailed bombing plans and then analysing the results in support of land forces in North Africa, Sicily and Southern Italy. Zuckerman's quantitative assessments pointed to the fact that the swiftness of the allied advances in these areas had been heavily dependent on the precision bombing of communications networks in general and enemy-held railheads in particular. In the case of Sicily and Southern Italy the rail systems had been 'practically paralysed' by the end of July 1943 as a result of bombing attacks on only six rail centres — Naples, Foggia, San Giovanni, Reggio, Messina and Palermo. The enemy was thus forced to rely heavily on motor transport to the detriment of oil and petrol supplies to the field forces.80 Tedder's response was to relate these findings directly to the needs of Overlord, insofar as they supported the conclusion that concentrated, precise attacks upon railway targets scientifically selected could probably produce a degree of disruption and immobility which might make all the difference to the success or failure of the long-awaited invasion of France. The clear and detailed reports submitted by Professor Zuckerman convinced me that this was the right method of attack.81

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 163 Enjoying 'complete confidence in Zuckerman's knowledge and judgement/ Tedder pressed the case with extreme determination for the adoption of a 'Transportation Plan' with the object of destroying the rail network of northern France. His efforts are recounted in Zuckerman's memoirs which highlight the full extent of Bomber Command's rigid opposition to any departure from area bombing in direct support of Overlord. In particular, Sir Arthur Harris focussed on the issue of bombing accuracy and enlisted the support of his ORS to dispute Zuckerman's claim that the specified railway targets could be obliterated. In reflecting on a sharp exchange on this issue with Dr Dickens in his capacity as head of Bomber Command's ORS, Zuckerman commented revealingly, This was not the first, but unfortunately not the last time that it became apparent to me that not all scientists who during the war had been drawn into service posts were as questioning and independent in their judgements as they could have been. On occasion they were constrained by assumptions which increasingly fitted their masters' preconceived ideas. There was also a tendency to defer to the rank than the intellectual competence of the officers they served82 This judgement is undoubtedly unfair to Dickens. It can only be assumed that his position in relation to Harris was one of extreme delicacy, given his Commander-in-Chief's singular tendency to reject valid advice and criticism. As section head, moreover, he interpreted his brief correctly as being to enhance the tactical capabilities of the striking force, given the overall strategic objective of the area offensive. Dickens was no Blackett and even if he had sought to query Harris's intransigence it may safely be assumed that his advice would have been ignored. As it was, Dickens conceded that precision bombing was possible — he could hardly do otherwise given the success of his ORS in informing the tactics of the striking force. Harris himself was eventually forced to accept this fact and it is to his credit that even before the Transportation Plan was formally adopted, he had already authorised attacks on rail centres. They began on the night of 6/7 March at Trappes when twelve hundred tons of bombs were dropped on the marshalling yards. The devastating results were a testament to the high standards of bombing accuracy that Bomber Command was capable of achieving in night attacks at that stage in the war. The overriding objectives of the Transportation Plan were '(a) to strain to the utmost the enemy's capacity for carrying out railway

164

A History of Operational Research

m o v e m e n t , b y the destruction of p e r m a n e n t installations, rolling stock a n d repair facilities, a n d (b) to disorganise, a n d if possible stop military t h r o u g h traffic/ 8 3 Including the raid o n Trappes, 79 designated rail centres h a d b e e n attacked in n o r t h e r n France a n d the L o w Countries by D-Day on 6 J u n e , 1944. A s u b s e q u e n t r e p o r t by Z u c k e r m a n , c o m m e n t i n g o n the effects of Bomber C o m m a n d ' s precision attacks, concluded as follows: Due to attacks on rail centres the capacity of the railways of the northern half of France, which previously exceeded by far the enemy's military and economic needs, had by D-Day fallen below the level with which he had sustained his garrison troops in the preceding period. During the Normandy Battle he consequently had to try to maintain, and actively employ more numerous forces than he had previously kept in Northern France, on a traffic level lower in capacity than that which he had used for his holding troops. One immediate result was that he was increasingly forced to the roads — in spite of a very precarious [motor transport] and fuel situation, and in spite, after D-Day, of the large scale of our armed air reconnaissance of roads. Another was that the residue of rail traffic which continued, after D-Day, to trickle at a slow rate through the battered railway regions became, in general, easy prey for fighter-bombers which, in a short time before our landings occurred, started to operate in increasing strength against arriving rail traffic. Attacks on bridges and open lines added to the chaos that had resulted from the rail centre attacks, and before June had passed, organised rail movement in Northern France had, by all accounts, practically ceased.84 F r o m M a r c h until M a y 1944, Bomber C o m m a n d ' s ORS e n g a g e d in an intensive research p r o g r a m m e d e s i g n e d to e n h a n c e still further t h e precision capabilities of the striking force. This entailed careful evaluation of the merits of different bomb-sights, the further refinement of g r o u n d m a r k i n g techniques, and the design of i m p r o v e d training m e t h o d s a n d practice in b o m b aiming. According to the Air Historical Branch Account, It was the general drive on bombing accuracy which was without doubt the most fruitful of the various measures taken at this stage. More frequent practices, better maintenance [of equipment] and, above all, the engendering in the aircrews of enthusiasm to attain the maximum possible accuracy on operations, produced great and rapid improvement which was stimulated by a healthy amount of rivalry. Knowledge of the difference between what was being achieved and what might be was the basis of this propaganda

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 165 and since that knowledge was provided by the analysis carried out by the ORS they can claim a considerable share of the credit for the improvement which took place.85 The overall historical consensus is that the tactical support offered by Bomber Command to the invasion forces both before and after D-Day was an outstanding success in preventing German troop and logistic reinforcements until well after the Normandy beach-head had been consolidated. 86 Zuckerman's contemporary reaction is recorded in his wartime diary: The amazing thing is that Harris, who was even more resistant than the Americans to the idea of AEAF domination, has in fact thrown himself wholeheartedly into the battle, has improved his bombing performance enormously, and has contributed more to the dislocation of enemy communications, etc. than any of the rest.87 In one sense, the fact that Harris subordinated himself to Overlord should occasion no surprise. Committed to absolute and unquestioning confidence in his own judgement he may have been, but he was, above all, a military man. Having been given orders with no scope for interpretation, as in the Transportation Plan, he was bound to obey them. But when a directive conveyed a degree of ambiguity, as in the case of the Combined Offensive, he proved capable of exploiting this to the full. So too, in the aftermath of his formal release from AEAF control, Harris was concerned to return Bomber Command 'to its proper strategic role,' namely the area offensive in the belief that the war could still be won by this means. 88 In this respect, however, Harris came into prolonged conflict with Sir Charles Portal in view of the latter's insistence that Bomber Command should engage in precision attacks on the German oil industry and the country's internal transport system. Thus, in the final phases of the war, from the autumn of 1944 onwards, Harris was obliged to trim his overriding strategic objective to include a range of secondary targets. The target percentages, set out in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, provide prima facie evidence that in the face of Portal's strictures as Chief of the Air Staff, Harris proved remarkably successful in sustaining the area offensive as the single most important element in Bomber Command's operations. Although the bomb tonnage directed at urban areas fell below 30 per cent in the period January-April 1945, it is salutary to remember that in addition to Dresden, 29 other towns were subject to 'major area attack' in this period.

166 A History of Operational Research Table 5.3. Bomber Command targets in the European theatre, October-December, 1944. Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks

on on on on on

cities railways and canals oil targets enemy troops and fortifications naval and other objectives

53% 15% 14% 13% 5%

Source: John Terraine, The Right of the Line (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985), p. 675.

Table 5.4. Bomber Command targets in the European theatre, January-April 1945. Attacks on cities Attacks on troops and defences Attacks on transportation Attacks on naval targets Attacks on oil Attacks on the German Air Force Attacks on specific industries Miscellaneous

36.6% 14.4% 15.4% 6.1% 26.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2%

Source: Terraine (1985), p. 679.

Assessments of the effectiveness of area bombing and its contribution to the defeat of Germany began even before the war in Europe ended in May 1945. Both Britain and the United States had established bombing survey units by the autumn of 1944, and after defining criteria for analysis they began to make on-the-spot visits to the most heavily bombed towns and cities, complementing their visual inspections of damage with interviews with German military and civilian personnel. Like the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, the British Bombing Analysis Unit (subsequently the British Bombing Survey Unit), under Zuckerman's leadership as scientific director, adopted a mixture of qualitative and quantitative techniques in assessing the effects of bombing both on the German industrial economy and the impact of the area offensive on civilian morale. 89 In reviewing the British and American reports it is

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945

167

a p p a r e n t that there w a s a striking m e a s u r e of agreement: area attacks h a d a considerable effect on the G e r m a n w a r economy, b u t t h e effect w a s n e v e r critical. As the British r e p o r t concluded: The lack of decisive effect was due primarily to the fact that the direct loss imposed could be absorbed by non-essential German productive resources. The indirect effects fell on industries able to bear the burden. An area raid drove down production by as much as 55% in the month immediately following an attack, but recovery was rapid. 90 The resilience of the G e r m a n w a r e c o n o m y in the face of B o m b e r C o m m a n d ' s area offensive is indicated in Table 5.5, taking the i n d e x for 1940 a s 100:

Table 5.5.

German war production, 1942-44.

Monthly Average Production Year Group Panzer Motor vehicles Tractors Aircraft Warships Ammunition Weapons

1942

1943

1944

130 120 124 133 142 167 137

330 138 210 216 181 247 74

512 130 238 264 162 297 313

Source: PRO AIR 41/43, AHB, Chap. 18 (1949), p. 168.

The figures point to the fact that the b o m b i n g offensive forced G e r m a n y to call o n its e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s to create a m o r e fully m o b i l i s e d w a r e c o n o m y b e y o n d the n e e d s of the short term 'blitzkrieg' tactics of 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 . Indeed, the p r o p o r t i o n of a r m a m e n t s p r o d u c t i o n to civilian p r o d u c t i o n rose from 25 per cent in m i d - 1 9 4 2 to 42 p e r cent in mid1944. 9 1 F u r t h e r evidence of the a p p a r e n t l y limited industrial i m p a c t of the offensive is p r o v i d e d by Table 5.6 w h i c h c o m p a r e s the actual a n d p o t e n t i a l o u t p u t of a n u m b e r of g r o u p s of a r m a m e n t s . T h u s , according

ON

> 3" O Ml

O Table 5.6.

Actual and potential armaments production, 1943-4. o'

Tanks

Aircraft

Motor Vehicles

Naval Construction

3

TO

Year and Quarter

Actual

Potential

Actual

Potential

Actual

Potential

Actual

Potential

en

1943 3rd 4th 1944 1st 2nd

367 411 465 558

390 485 565 631

166 159 173 163

175 170 185 195

229 213 227 300

233 255 280 320

171 156 154 129

186 176 177 141

13-

Source: PRO AIR 41/43, Chap. 18 (1949), p. 168.

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 169 to the British Bombing Survey Unit, in 1943 air attacks only delayed the armaments programme in four categories of production — 'some 5% of potential.' 92 Direct evidence of the recuperative power of the German economy is provided by the aftermath of the much-celebrated 'Dambusters Raid' in May 1943. Although the 'vast disruption of the Ruhr water supply caused a serious loss of production in the first few days — within 8-14 days this had been overcome.' Repairs to the Moehne Dam, moreover, 'were rushed through in order to catch the autumn rains/ 9 3 Finally, there was the startling discovery by the American Strategic Bombing Survey that the height of the productive power of the German war economy coincided with the period of greatest bombing intensity. It was this fact which caused one outspoken member of the American team — the youthful economist J. K. Galbraith — to conclude that the combined bombing offensive had been a strategic failure. As he stated in memoirs notable also for their commentary on the ineffectiveness of American bombing in Korea and Vietnam: Our first indication that something was wrong came in London before the fighting stopped. It was a superb statistical find, the Statische Schnell bericht zur Kriegs produktion or the German statistical overview of war production. The factories producing the guns, tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns were not a primary target. But they drew on labour, coal, steel, ferrous-alloys, machine tools, transportation and all the lesser resources and fabrics of industrial life. In 1940, the first full year of the war, the average monthly production of Panzer vehicles was 136; in 1941 it was 316; in 1942, 516. In 1943, after the bombing began in earnest, average monthly production was 1004, and in 1944, it was 1538. Peak monthly production was not reached until December 1944...We were beginning to see that we were encountering one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest miscalculations of the war...94 As for the impact of the area offensive on civilian morale, the official British records, together with contemporary German assessments, also lend support to a common conclusion, namely that the adverse effects of bombing were surprisingly short term so that the indirect impact on industrial production was limited. Bomber Command's attack on the Baltic port of Rostock in 1942, for example, caused Goebbels to comment that

170 A History of Operational Research Community life there is practically at an end...The situation in the city is in some sections catastrophic...seven tenths of the city have been wiped out. More than 100,000 people had to be evacuated...There was, in fact, panic...95 Similarly, in the aftermath of the 'fire bombing' of Hamburg in JulyAugust 1943, resulting in the destruction of 61 per cent of the city's residential accommodation, Adolf Galland, then serving as Inspector of Fighters in the German Air Ministry, stated: A wave of terror radiated from the suffering city and spread through Germany. Appalling details of the great fire were recounted...A stream of haggard, terrified refugees flowed into the neighbouring provinces. In every large town people said: 'What happened to Hamburg yesterday can happen to us tomorrow'...After Hamburg in the wide circle of the political and military command could be heard the words: 'The war is lost.'96 This view was shared by Albert Speer, the Reich Minister for Armaments, who in his postwar interrogation admitted that 'Hamburg put the fear of God in me' to the extent that he informed Hitler that 'a series of attacks of this sort, extended to six more cities, would bring Germany's armaments production to a total halt.' 97 Yet for each of these apparently devastating attacks such judgements were subsequently viewed as premature. As the Official History records in the case of Rostock: The panic was soon over as the people hastened back to work, took energetic measures themselves to put the streets back in order, much helped by the Mecklenburg Gauleiter Hildebrandt. He could report on 29th April that the principal war factories were nearly back to hundred per cent production.98 Hamburg enjoyed the same experience with the speed of its industrial recovery causing Speer to revise his initially gloomy view of the survivability of the German war economy in the face of area attack. This was well reflected in his postwar recollections, as recorded in the Air Historical Branch account: The purpose of the night attacks directed exclusively at city centres had been incomprehensible to Speer: their effects on industry were very slight. He considers that area bombing alone would never have been a serious threat. He emphasises that civilian morale

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 171 was excellent throughout and resulted in rapid resumption of work after attacks." Further reservations concerning the effectiveness of area bombing relate to the outcome of 'Operation Pointblank' in view of the coincidence of its termination date, 1st April 1944, with Sir Arthur Harris's forecast that by that date Germany would be in 'a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable.' Although twenty towns and cities were attacked during the relevant period (November 1943-March 1944), the main target for Bomber Command was Berlin, accounting for 9,111 sorties out of a total of 11,117 and 492 of the 555 aircraft failing to return. 100 A frank verdict on the 'Battle of Berlin' is provided by the Official History: for all practical purposes it 'was more than a failure. It was a defeat' for Bomber Command. 101 The validity of this conclusion is underlined by the strongly rising trend of German armaments production throughout the period of the Pointblank Offensive, together with the insupportable losses sustained both by Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force, mainly at the hands of the German Fighter Force.102 The question remains as to why Bomber Command persisted with the campaign of area attack over an extended period in the face of appalling losses in terms of aircraft and aircrew, and with results both in relation to the check to physical production and the impact on civilian morale which were, at the very least, questionable. Whilst the effects of faulty intelligence should not be discounted, the following factors should be taken into account. In the first instance, intelligence did improve during the course of 1943 and the cumulative message was consistent: German morale was resilient in the face of aerial attack and the impact on armaments production was uncertain. The evidence, however, was poorly corroborated and this fact in itself, independent of Sir Arthur Harris's personal commitment to the area offensive, effectively insulated Bomber Command from the constraints of critical evidence. 103 It has been argued that it was the lack of such evidence which enabled Harris consistently to exaggerate the effects of the offensive and, more to the point, to resist the periodic pressure from within the Air Staff and Chiefs of Staff organisation for the resumption of precision bombing. Thus, Once adopted, and with elaborate target plans laid for area bombing, it became all the more difficult to change to alternative tactics and alternative targets. Even when Portal presented Harris with the means to adopt more economical precision bombing later in the war, the commitment of Bomber Command and its

172 A History of Operational Research commander to the original decision was almost impossible to reverse.104 On this interpretation, therefore, area bombing was the line of least resistance: minimal intelligence was required and for all practical purposes Harris 'simply needed a long list of German cities and the industries located in them.' 105 In its political and strategic context, moreover, area bombing was always vulnerable to criticism from the military and naval establishment. It is instructive to note that at the Casablanca conference in 1942, called to discuss future Anglo-American military objectives, area bombing was viewed as only one of five forms of offensive action, and the key emphasis was placed on the invasion of enemy-held territory by surface forces. Thus, confronted at an early stage by the realities of 'Grand Strategy' the subsequent survival of the area offensive depended on 'political protection and vigorous advocacy on the part of the air forces.'106 For the greater part of the period after 1942, it is evident that both were supplied in full measure. In fairness to Harris, however, his rejection of precision targets was not without foundation. For example, there is the telling comment by Noble Frankland in the context of Harris's reluctance to augment the US Eighth Air Force's attacks on Schweinfurt as a centre for ball bearing production, a target identified by the Ministry of Economic Warfare as vital to the German war effort: Previous experience of what he called the 'panacea mongers' had made the C-in-C cynical. The breaching of the Moehne and Eider dams [by the Dambusters], the destruction of the molybdenum mine at Knoben, the destruction of the marshalling yard at Modane, had all been urged upon him as measures likely to produce vital consequences. All these tasks had been achieved but no serious consequences had followed. It would be the same, the C-in-C thought, for Schweinfurt. There was always an alternative factory, marshalling yard or [metal] factory to keep things going.107 It was this perspective that Harris brought to bear on Sir Charles Portal's advocacy of an oil campaign following Bomber Command's release from AEAF control in the autumn of 1944. Although the justification for such a campaign was based on ULTRA decrypts of German Enigma signals, to Harris oil was yet another panacea target. 108 As he stated in his memoirs, T still do not think that it was reasonable at that time to expect that the [oil] campaign would succeed; all that the Allied strategists did was to bet on an outsider and it happened to win

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 173 the race.' 109 Even then, scrutiny of oil targets from October 1944 to the end of the war in Europe (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4) indicates that Bomber Command's efforts in this area were hardly negligible, especially in the light of prevailing weather conditions and other legitimate calls on the striking force, a point conceded by the Chiefs of Staff Committee in a postwar appraisal of the German oil industry as a precision target.110 Similar considerations apply to the transportation campaign, all the more so when it is borne in mind that the area offensive was devised, in part, with transportation targets in mind. It is in this connection that the destruction of Dresden by Bomber Command on the night of 13-14 February 1945 — an attack which has come to be regarded as the incarnation of the moral reprehensibility of the area offensive — can be defended. It is true that the Dresden attack had been envisaged by Harris as part of the area offensive directed against civilian populations in eastern Germany (including Berlin, Chemnitz and Leipzig), but the precipitating factor was the Air Staff's desire to lend support to the westwards advance of Soviet forces. Thus, the attacks on eastern towns and cities were designed not only to further undermine German morale, but also for the purpose of disrupting enemy road and rail traffic in close proximity to the fighting front. The bombing of Dresden, therefore, cannot be viewed as an act of wanton destruction, needlessly perpetrated by Harris when the war was all but over. On the contrary, it was entirely consistent with the transportation campaign and for that reason alone it had the backing both of Harris's superior officers and the Prime Minister. Further support for Harris emanated from the postwar 'Thunderbolt' exercise which concluded in respect of the Normandy landings that Above all [the area offensive] resulted in a state of favourable [air] superiority in the European theatre generally, without which Overlord could not have succeeded. It had thrown Germany completely on the defensive in the air. She had heavily reduced her bomber production in order that maximum resources could be devoted to fighters and defensive equipment. Her fighters and flak were deployed not on the critical battle fronts, or to oppose a possible landing, but they were spreadeagled throughout Germany in a vain attempt to defend vital targets at home. Nearly three quarters of a million men were tied down to these defences and probably a greater number were engaged in ARP and repair work.111 But the nub of the issue is provided by alternative uses of the striking force based on the analysis of value set against cost. The counterfactual

174 A History of Operational Research scenario was highlighted, although not quantified, in a memorandum prepared by the Air Staff in 1948 in response to Sir Arthur Harris's personal assessment of the area offensive submitted to the Air Ministry in October 1945.112 Predictably, Harris had sought to justify the offensive on the grounds that 'the enemy's sinews of war were to be found in his industrial cities.' The Air Staff paper began, however, by reiterating the point that area bombing had been envisaged originally as a temporary measure until the striking force could resume the attack on precision targets of direct military value (see above, p. 138). As the memorandum concluded, It is probably true that the great bulk of the enemy's armaments production came from the industrial cities (though this was not demonstrated by the experience of the war), but his most valuable sinews of war (oil and communications) were generally outside them. They were the ones which were severed and most potently brought about his collapse.113 This was, in effect, a ringing endorsement of Zuckerman's approach to bombing policy: far from the bomber being a war-winning weapon in its own right in conformity with the Trenchard doctrine, its main utility lay in tactical support for land forces via the interdiction of the enemy transport and communications system. The implications of this view for wartime bombing policy were profound: area bombing may have contributed indirectly to the success of Overlord, but the striking force could have been deployed with greater effect elsewhere, first in precision attacks on the Luftwaffe and its supplying industries (including oil) in collaboration with the US Eighth Air Force, and then in a relatively short campaign against the communications network of north-west Europe in support of a land invasion. Aircraft and aircrew losses would, in all likelihood, have been minimal compared with the cost of the area offensive, a consideration which would also have applied to German civilian deaths and injuries as well as the physical fabric of the country's principal towns and cities. It is this alternative scenario which underpinned the stance of Zuckerman as well as that of Blackett, Tizard and Galbraith. In several respects, however, their advocacy of precision bombing may be viewed as naive both in its contemporary setting and in historical retrospect. In his most recent study of the role of air power in the Second World War, the distinguished military historian, Richard Overy, has provided an important re-evaluation of Bomber Command's contribution to the defeat of Germany.114 In justifying the conclusion that

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 175 'the 125,000 men and women of Bomber Command made a larger contribution to victory in Europe than any other element of Britain's armed services,' Overy has emphasised the fact that the sustained AngloAmerican bombing offensive cannot be divorced from the sheer magnitude of the infantry casualties of the First World War. It has already been noted that the unwavering commitment of Harris and his colleagues to the area offensive was rooted in the belief that in the broadest possible context, aerial bombardment was the most cost-effective use of Britain's limited military capacity. The attrition rate of operational personnel was high, but the 55,000 deaths over six years of war should be set against the 200,000 casualties experienced by the allied invasion forces within three months of the D-Day landings. Thus, For Britain, with its small population and the lack of a large standing army, a small force of specialised volunteers was arguably a more effective way of mobilising British manpower than the development of a large and inexperienced ground army.116 A second justification for the area offensive which, by definition, was wholly inconsistent with the Zuckerman-Blackett-Galbraith critique, is rooted in a complex of political and psychological factors. Churchill himself remained sceptical of the military effectiveness of bombing, but he supported the area offensive as evidence to world opinion in general and potential allies in particular that Britain remained committed to the defeat of Germany. In its domestic setting, moreover, the area campaign was viewed by the War Cabinet as an important propaganda tool in sustaining civilian morale because it gave the British public the sense that their country was still actively fighting an enemy whose geographical immunity might otherwise have reduced Britain's role to that of a distant spectator.116 If Patrick Blackett was unmoved by such considerations there was yet a further justification for the area campaign on the grounds of its indispensability to allied grand strategy following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. In that context, the bombing of Germany could be, and was, presented to Stalin as direct evidence of the determination of the western allies to prepare the ground for a land invasion of Germany from the west. To the extent that the area offensive absorbed German manpower and other physical resources, and drew Luftwaffe strength away from the eastern front, it also made an indirect but powerful contribution to the ultimate success of the Red Army. In so

176 A History of Operational Research doing it helped to pre-empt the ultimate Anglo-American nightmare of a Russian capitulation. Inevitably, this would have transformed the strategic and tactical situation in Western Europe in favour of Germany thereby reducing the prospects for a successful invasion, perhaps for years to come. In all of these respects, Churchill was surely correct to argue that the area offensive constituted a 'second front' in its own right (see above, p. 142). There remains the issue of the relatively limited impact of bombing on the German war economy in general and the armaments industry in particular. In these respects Overy's conclusions, reflecting the current historical consensus, are based upon a more sophisticated appreciation of the effect of bombing than the official American and British surveys. Quite apart from the fact that the sheer scale of the offensive had direct and measurable effects on public utilities such as gas and electricity, the bombing of towns and cities also had adverse consequences for the performance of the German armaments industry, notwithstanding the statistics cited in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The key issues here relate to the policy of dispersal and diversions of effort. Dispersal, or decentralisation of German industry began in 1942 and was a major factor in facilitating the rapid rise in armaments production as the bombing offensive intensified during 1943 and 1944. But this is to miss the point that Dispersal meant larger hauls between the different premises making an aeroplane and a tank, and area bombing interrupted this delicate net of distribution and supply. Dispersal also meant greater reliance on skilled labour in smaller, less rationalised workshops. Where skilled labour was lacking, new labour was drafted in that was less well-equipped to cope with complex engineering and the quality of German weapons also declined.117 The building of new factories in 'bomb-safe' locations made further inroads into the supply of increasingly scarce labour and materials. In overall terms, the dispersal programme led to 'a constant attrition of managerial energy' and placed insuperable obstacles in the way of rational planning in an industrial structure which had hitherto been geared to centralised control.118 The adverse effects of dispersal were complemented powerfully by the effects of bombing in encouraging wasteful diversions of effort in the German war economy. As it became evident during 1943 that 'bombsafe' locations were disappearing rapidly in the face of the increasing accuracy and penetration of the American and British striking forces,

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 177 Speer, with Hitler's personal backing, began to plan a vast programme of underground armaments production encompassing 93 million square feet of floorspace. Work began during 1944, but by the end of the war only 13 million square feet had been completed. Even that limited achievement had required half a million construction workers with quantities of building materials and machinery to match. Further diversionary effects emanated from the V-weapons p r o g r a m m e inaugurated in 1943 as a deterrent to the area offensive. The resulting VI and V2 were to cast a long shadow forwards into the nuclear age, but they had little effect before the end of the war. Their explosive capacity was minuscule compared to the tonnage of bombs dropped on Germany in 1944-5, whilst most of the Vis fired exploded prematurely, fell outside urban areas, or were destroyed by the British defences. More to the point, the production of V weapons distorted the German technical effort away from strategically more profitable investments in ground-toair missiles and jet-propelled aircraft. In the light of these factors, Overy has focussed critical attention on the key counterf actual question — what would the German war economy have been able to achieve in the absence of bombing? Whilst conceding that the answer must be hypothetical in the current state of historical knowledge, Overy's conclusions raise some important issues for critics of the area offensive, namely that ...it would not be bending historical probability too much to argue that if Germany had been free to mobilise its economy, science, manpower, and that of occupied Europe, entirely free from the bombing threat, the German war effort would have been potentially too formidable to contemplate a western invasion of Europe. The war would then have unfolded in a very different way.119 Counterfactual scenarios are of direct relevance in evaluating the contribution of Bomber Command's ORS to the outcome of the war in Europe. In this setting, there is an obvious and direct analogy with the role of operational research in enhancing the combat effectiveness of Fighter Command in 1940. In his postwar memoirs Sir Arthur Harris paid generous tribute to his ORS, claiming that it had saved the lives of 'thousands' of aircrew and 'hundreds' of aircraft, as well as being an 'indispensable' aid to military effectiveness.120 On the basis of proven results and the Air Historical Branch account, there can be no doubting the validity of Harris's judgement. Although there is some evidence to

178 A History of Operational Research suggest that younger members of Bomber Command's ORS were frustrated by an apparent lack of interest on the part of Dickens and other senior colleagues in unorthodox ideas and approaches, notably in relation to the weight of aircraft defensive armament as a drag on airspeed, 121 there can be little doubt that the section engaged in highly effective programmes of research and statistical evaluation conducive to the accurate routing and concentration of the striking force. In so doing the ORS helped to transform Bomber Command into a cohesive weapon of strategic value. Attrition rates were high, but Dickens and his colleagues fulfilled vital functions in assessing the causes of aircraft losses and making well-founded recommendations for their reduction. 122 Reference has already been made to Charles Goodeve' quantitative estimate of the contribution of Fighter Command's operational researchers to the outcome of the Battle of Britain (see above, p. 82). In the case of Bomber Command's ORS, its impact on the area offensive may be gauged by the dramatic enhancement of navigational capabilities after 1942 and the Command's heightened ability to hit precise targets. Even allowing for the greatly increased bomb-loads which followed on from the introduction of four-engined heavy aircraft after 1942, it is an undisputed fact that operational research rendered the striking force of 1944 vastly more effective than its counterpart in 1942. In this setting W. Barton Leach, in his introduction to the official wartime history of operational research in the US Army Air Forces, concluded that In the books of some god of battles [operational research] has its exact proportion of credit. Improvement by a factor of 1? A factor of 3? The equivalent of 1500 bombers? Futile to ask, and besides, who cares? The [researchers] were members of the team, knew that they were carrying out their assignment, and were mightily gratified at the ultimate result.123 Such judgements are of direct relevance to Bomber Command's ORS, and also have bearing on the strictures of Blackett, Zuckerman and Galbraith. Zuckerman's condemnation of the ORS for its failure to challenge the military rationale of the area offensive has been noted (see above, p. 163), but a balanced view must exonerate Dickens and his colleagues from the extreme, if implicit, charge of dereliction of duty. Even if area bombing was of limited strategic relevance, it was not within Dickens' remit to challenge this fact because his activities were confined strictly to the analysis of tactical issues. In this context, he succeeded admirably. In any event, it is reasonable to presume that in the political

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 179 and military circumstances of 1942-4, a pro-active Bomber Command ORS headed by a Blackett or a Zuckerman which attempted to query the rationale of the area offensive, even on the basis of the most sophisticated of quantitative evaluation, would have received short shrift. Sir John Slessor's 'put down' of Blackett in the matter of 'slide-rule strategy' was vitriolic enough but it was mild in the face of the likely reaction from Sir Arthur Harris. It is interesting to note that of all wartime ORS chiefs, Dickens was the longest serving. It seems likely that he retained the confidence of his single-minded Commander-in-Chief precisely because he refrained from strategic calculation. In concluding this final chapter on the military origins of operational research, it is incumbent on the historian to place the discipline in an international perspective, given the scientific and technological basis of the Second World War. In their postwar memoirs other senior British commanders joined Harris in proclaiming the value of operational research so that there is a considerable degree of consensus on the fact that it fulfilled a vital military role. 124 In the USA, similar perspectives apply, especially in relation to the application of operational research to the Army Air Forces and the Navy. 125 In this respect, McCloskey has pointed to the influence of Robert Watson-Watt and Patrick Blackett in stimulating interest in the attachment of civilian scientists to American military commands. 126 That the Americans learned quickly is confirmed by the fact that shortly after the US entered the war both the Navy and the Army Air Forces had established operational research organisations, all of which fulfilled functions virtually identical to their British counterparts. For the Axis powers, however, operational research was notable for its absence, not least in relation to their air forces. In the German case, in particular, this is surprising in view of that country's notable achievements in scientific and technical education in the period to 1939. But there was nothing in Germany in the 1930s which bore any resemblance to the Tizard Committee on air defence. After 1939 the contribution of civilian scientists to military decision making was limited by the emigration of key personnel prior to the outbreak of war and the subjection of those that remained to political tests of loyalty to the Nazi Party. As Overy has observed, 'If the Luftwaffe willingly exploited science, it did so only to the extent that the Luftwaffe staff believed desirable,' thereby stifling the possibility of objective appraisal of military policy. It is significant in the wider context that whilst Churchill 'chose as his principal confidant a scientist [Cherwell], Hitler chose to surround himself with astrologers,' at least until 1944 when he began to take an

180 A History of Operational Research interest in fundamental science in the quest for new 'terror' weapons. 127 In Britain and the USA, however, the contribution of civilian scientists was always valued, a fact confirmed by the rapid diffusion of operational research throughout their respective military command structures after 1941. Care should be taken, however, not to overemphasise the independent influence of the British scientific establishment. Taking the wartime period as a whole, operational researchers were at the peak of their influence during the first year when they held the key to the successful deployment of radar in the 'Air Defence of Great Britain.' Thereafter, however, following the Battle of Britain, and coinciding with the onset of strategic deliberations on the future course and conduct of the war, operational researchers lost influence to military commanders and their staffs. Indeed, the overall record shows that when operational researchers attempted to move into the area of strategic debate, they were likely to receive short shrift, no matter how prestigious their scientific reputations and contributions to military effectiveness. In this respect, Tizard and Blackett provide the outstanding examples. There remains, however, the case of Zuckerman who certainly did prove capable of high-level influence, most notably in the context of Overlord. But even here, it is evident that the advice tendered in favour of precise transportation targets was entirely in conformity with a pre-determined strategic objective of long-standing, an objective, moreover, which was predicated on political as well as military assumptions.

NOTES 1. See, for example, Sir Arthur T. Harris, Bomber Offensive (Collins, London, 1947); C. Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1943-45, 4 Vols. (HMSO, London, 1961); A. Revie, The Lost Command (Bruce and Watson, London, 1971); Max Hastings, Bomber Command (Macmillan, London, 1985); D. Saward, Victory Denied: The Rise of Air Power and the Defeat of Germany, 1920-1945 (Buchan and Enright, London, 1985); John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985); K. Delve and P. Jacobs, The Six-Year Offensive: Bomber Command in World War 2 (Arms and Armour, London, 1992); Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939-1945 (Harper Collins, London, 1997); Mark Connelly, Reaching for the Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II (I. B. Tauris, London, 2001); Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: Arthur Harris and the Allied Bomber Offensive, 1939-45 (John Murray, London, 2001); Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times (Greenhill, London, 2001).

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 181 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978). PRO, AIR 14/225, Air Staff, 9 December 1937. Cited in Overy (1997), p. 26. PRO, AIR 41/42, S. 463, Vol. 1, End. 14A (1949). Webster and Frankland (1961), Vol. 1, p. 125. Ibid., pp. 178-9. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, Air Historical Branch (AHB), The Bomber Offensive, March 1942-January 1943 (1943), pp. 109-311. Ibid., p.39. W. S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Cassell, London, 1948), p. 567. PRO, AIR 41/42, PM.M., 970/1, 7 October, 1941. PRO, AIR 41/42, WC 23126, AHB, Vol. Ill, Part II, Chaps. 1-4. PRO, AIR 41/42, AHB, 11/70/149 (E). Terraine (1985), p. 261. D. Richards, Portal of Hungerford (Heinemann, London, 1977), p. 166. PRO, COS 155 (0), 31 July, 1941. PRO, JP (41) 444, Para. 7, 14 June 1941. PRO, AHB/II/70/149(E), 1949. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, AHB, Vol. IV, Chap. 23 (1943), p. 316. Overy (1997), p. 80. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, AHB, Vol. II, 30/168, 30 March 1942. Ibid., 3 October 1941. C. P. Snow, Science and Government (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962), pp. 47-53. P.M.S. Blackett, Studies of War (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962), p. 120. Ibid., p. 205. Lord Birkenhead, The Prof in Two Worlds (Collins, London, 1961), pp. 248-9. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea,' Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), pp. 64-5. Overy (1997), p. 185. Zuckerman (1978). Terraine (1985), p. 621. J. D. Bernal and S. Zuckerman, Quantitative Study of Total Effects of Air Raids [Hull and Birmingham Survey] Ministry of Home Security: Research and Experiments Department, 2770, 8 April 1942. Zuckerman (1978), p. 146. For further analysis of these wartime iterations see Paul Crook, 'Science and War: Radical Scientists and the Tizard-Cherwell Bombing Debate,' War and Society, Vol. 12 (1994), pp. 69-101. Blackett, (1962), p. 126. PRO, ARB/RET/906, 2 April 1942. Webster and Frankland, Vol IV (1961), p. 337. Air Ministry (AHB), Operational Research in Bomber Command (1949), p. 3. Ibid., p. 4.

182 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

A History of Operational Research Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., Chap. 2, p. 1. Ibid., pp. 1-2. Ibid., p. 38. Ib/d., pp. 38-9. Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., p. 65. JWd., pp. 65-6. Ibid., Chap. 3, p. 1. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 58. For a full appraisal of Gee see Ibid., Chap. 11, pp. 224-47. Ibid., Chap. 3, pp. 62-3. Ibid., Chap. 14, p. 290. Ibid., p. 292. Ibid., p. 294. Ibid., p. 293. Ibid., Chap. 3, pp. 17-18. Ibid., pp. 18-19. Ibid., pp. 19-20. Ibid., p. 23. For a detailed review of H2S see Ibid., Chap. 12. Ibid., Chap. 5, p. 109. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, AHB, I7ie Bomber Offensive, March 1942-January 1943 (1943), p. 317. PRO, ID/4/23A, Flag 25, 3 November 1943. PRO, BC/M.S., 29961, End. 15A, 7 December 1943. PRO, CM5 268, End. 9L. 11/70/174, 14 November 1943. Ibid., ID/4/355, Combined Bombing Offensive Report. PRO, BC/S, 29961, End. 41B, 2 March 1948. Ibid. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, AHB, 154 (1949). Terraine (1985), p. 269. Webster and Frankland, Vol. 2 (1961), p. 29. Lovell (1975), pp. 61-3. Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (Cassell, London, 1956), pp. 524-5. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Blackett in War and Peace,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1987), pp. 226-7. Terraine (1985), p. 452. Slessor (1956), pp. 524-5. Terraine, (1985), p. 426. Ibid., pp. 425-6.

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945

183

77. Webster and Frankland, Vol. 1 (1961), p. 340. 78. Ibid., Vol. 2 (1961), pp. 54-7. 79. PRO, BC/MS, 311156/C, T h e Employment of the Night Bomber Force in Connection with the Invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom,' 13 January 1944. 80. Zuckerman Papers, Bombing Analysis Unit, 'Air Attacks on Rail and Road Communications: An Analysis of Operations carried out in Sicily and S. Italy,' c. December 1943. 81. Lord Tedder, With Prejudice (Cassell, London, 1966), p. 489. 82. Zuckerman (1978), p. 234. 83. Zuckerman Papers, Bombing Analysis Unit, 'The Effects of the "Overlord" Air Plan to Disrupt the Enemy's Rail Communications,' 4 November, 1944, p. 1. 84. Ibid., pp. 33-4. 85. Air Ministry, Operational Research in Bomber Command, Chap. 5, pp. 114-18. 86. PRO, AIR 8/1109, XC 22465, War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 'Effects of the Allied Bombing Offensive on the German War Effort with Particular Reference to "Overlord",' 3 June 1944; D. Richards and H. Saunders, The Royal Air Force, 1939-1945, Vol. 3 (HMSO, London 1974), pp. 88-9; C. D'este, Decision in Normandy (Collins, London 1974), pp. 88-9; Zuckerman (1978), pp. 259-85; John Peyton, Solly Zuckerman: a Scientist Out of the Ordinary (John Murray, London, 2001), pp. 51-63. 87. D'este (1974), quoting Zuckerman's diary, 9 July 1944. 88. Terraine, (1985), pp. 672-3. 89. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (1946); PRO, Air 14/1910, SC 2209, British Bombing Research Mission: The Analysis of Area Attacks (September 1945; PRO, AIR 41/43, SC 23126, British Bombing Survey Unit: Overall Report (1949). 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid., citing Speer Papers, no. 35. 94. J. K. Galbraith, A Life in Our Times: Memoirs (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 1981). 95. Cited in Richards and Saunders, Vol. II (1974), p. 129. 96. Adolf Galland, The First and the Last (Fontana, London, 1970), pp. 166-7. 97. PRO, AIR 41/43, SC 23126 (1949), citing Speer papers, No. 2. 98. Webster and Frankland, Vol. 1 (1961), p. 485. 99. PRO, AIR 41/43, XC 23126, AHB, Chap. 18, p. 171. 100. Terraine, (1985), p. 557. 101. Webster and Frankland, Vol. 2 (1961), p. 193. 102. Terraine (1985), p. 557. 103. R. J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945 (Europa, London 1980), p. 112.

184

A History of Operational Research

104. 105. 106. 107.

Ibid., p. 109. Ibid., p. 110. Ibid., p. 108. Cited in Sebastian Cox, Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur T. Harris, Despatch on War Operations, 23rd Feb, 1942 to 8th May, 1945 (Frank Cass, London, 1995), p. xix. Ibid., p. xxii. Harris (1947), p. 201. AHB, OS Committee, Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Oil, 'Oil as a Factor in the German War Effort, 1933-1945/ Cited in Cox (1995), p. xxii. PRO, AIR 41/43, XC 21236, AHB, Chap. 18, p. 171. PRO, AIR 41/43, SC 22928, Sir Arthur T. Harris, 'Despatch on War Operations, 23rd February 1942 to 8th May 1945: Air Staff Memorandum on the Despatch by Sir A. Harris (March 1948). Ibid. Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939-45: Reaping the Whirlwind (Harper Collins, London, 1997). Ibid., p. 185. Ibid. Ibid., p. 92. Ibid., p. 197. Ibid., pp. 199-200. Harris (1947), p. 201. Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (Harper and Rowe, New York, 1979). PRO, AIR 41/43, SC 21236 (1949), Chaps. 16, 17 and 19. United States Army Air Forces, Operations Analysis in World War II (Stephenson Brothers, Philadelphia, 1948), pp. 1-2. See for example, Slessor (1956); Sir Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain's Defence against Air Attack during the Second World War (Harrop, London, 1948); C.H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2 (Elek, London, 1973). United States Army Air Forces (1948); Ellis Johnson and David A. Katcher, Mines Against Japan (Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak Maryland , 1973); Philip M. Morse, In at the Beginning: A Physicist's Life (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1977); Charles W. McArthur, Operations Analysis in the US Army Eighth Air Force in World War II (American Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island, 1990); Erik P. Rau, 'The Adoption of Operations Research in the United States during World War II,' in Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes (Eds.), Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 2000), pp. 57-92. Joseph F. McCloskey, 'U.S. Operations Research in World War II,' Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), pp. 910-25. Overy (1980), p. 189.

108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124.

125.

126. 127.

6

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research, 1945-51

An interesting perspective on the postwar diffusion of operational research in Britain beyond the military sector is provided by early American commentaries. In 1954, for example, Florence Trefethen wrote that The general postwar diffusion of OR in Britain proceeded directly from wartime experience and did not pick up a thread of related business activity from prewar years. In one sense this was an advantage. The American industrial manager, having previous experience with management consultants and differing experts of all types, could and did say to the OR man, 'what's new about this?' Unconvincing replies, in many instances deterred management from encouraging the activity: American non-military OR, consequently, got off to a slow start after the war. The British industrialist, on the other hand, immediately recognised OR as a new and valuable instrument.1 This interpretation was subsequently reinforced by the distinguished operational research pioneer, Russell Ackoff, when he pointed to the invasion of American industry by 'specialised scientists' well before 1940. Thus, in contrast to British experience, by the early 1950s substantial progress had already been made in resolving 'managerial problems arising from the interaction of functional departments.' 2 These North American views, therefore, pointed to the enthusiastic welcome given to operational research in the UK industrial sector after 1945. They also highlighted the American lag in its civilian diffusion in the light of earlier developments in scientific management and educational provision geared to the needs of the corporate sector. Superficially, the Trefethen-Ackoff interpretation is attractive. In accordance with Trefethen's account, for example, it might be argued that the very absence of a scientific approach to business management 185

186 Operational Research in War and Peace provided the postwar British advocates of civilian operational research with an original and attractive agenda. It is also the case that the political and economic circumstances of Britain in the later 1940s gave every appearance of providing an ideal environment for the diffusion of operational research beyond the military sector in view of the election of a Labour Government in 1945 committed to the retention of wartime control systems. Insofar as the principal justification for the continuation of controls was the need to allocate scarce resources, this may be viewed as conducive to rational decision-making according to 'fair' and objective criteria. The contemporary vogue for ' p l a n n i n g ' reinforced this perspective to the extent that it hinted at the need for a 'scientific' approach to the resolution of economic and social problems in a resource constrained world. In this setting, the creation of a large, nationalised public utility sector operating at the limits of capacity in view of historic underinvestment and wartime dilapidation helped to focus attention on 'efficiency' criteria in the planning and execution of investment programmes. This applied also to the wider macroeconomic environment in which the weakness of sterling and the balance of payments dictated the need for a postwar export drive on the part of a manufacturing sector with its own considerable resource demands. 3 Finally, it is conventional in this setting to refer to the 'left of centre' political allegiance of some of the leading wartime practitioners of operational research. Patrick Blackett stood out in this respect, but so too did Professors J. D. Bernal, Solly Zuckerman, C. H. Waddington, Dr Cecil Gordon and Robert Watson-Watt. Much has been written of the 'left-intellectual and left-scientific ambience' which proved attractive to the British scientific establishment in the 1930s and 1940s.4 In the former decade admiration for the Soviet Union was rooted, in part, in that country's relatively liberal funding of science together with the high status and prestige enjoyed by the Soviet scientific elite. The arrival of Jewish scientists in Britain in the wake of Nazi persecution was an additional factor, as was the apparent inability of capitalism to deploy the nation's scientific effort in order to secure the full employment of labour and capital. The view that science could, and should be used to advance the cause of socialism was associated most strongly with J. D. Bernal. Indeed, in his 1939 publication, The Social Function of Science, Bernal went as far as to argue, in classic Marxist fashion, that the use of science for the common good would expose the limitations on productive potential set by the profit motive thereby hastening the downfall of capitalist economic organisation. 5 In that

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 187 setting, Bernal emerged after 1945 as an articulate advocate of the economic and social benefits of operational research as conducive to the inauguration of a scientific and socialist millennium. 6 Collectivist discourse among scientists was also organised both informally and formally. Reference has already been made to Solly Zuckerman's 'Tots and Quots' dining club, formed in 1931 to discuss the social and economic responsibility of science (see above, p. 88). The group, which included such distinguished academics as Hyman Levy, Jack Haldane and Lancelot Hogben, was certainly 'left of centre/ although as Zuckerman later recorded, 'most of us were politically naive and one or two were certainly right wing.' 7 At the institutional level, the Association of Scientific Workers, encompassing both scientists and laboratory technicians, was well known for its left-wing stance and also as an organisation subject to communist influence. Significantly, Blackett, Bernal and Watson-Watt served terms as President. After 1939, the Association, growing rapidly in numbers, interested itself in the recruitment of scientists and technicians to the war effort and organised several conferences focusing on scientific issues relevant to the postwar world. In this respect, one notable gathering took place in January 1943 at Caxton Hall where the theme of the conference was the 'Planning of Science.' The keynote address, delivered by Sir Stafford Cripps in his capacity as Minister of Aircraft Production, touched on the military applications of operational research, a theme also highlighted by Air Chief Marshall Sir Philip Joubert, the current Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command. More germane to civilian affairs was the speech by F. Morgan, a member of the command's operational research section, which drew positive lessons for consumers in general from the use of operational research in informing the equipment needs of the armed forces.8 This theme was carried forward by the Association with some vigour. In 1944, for example, the Association was openly advocating 'the very fullest application of science to the personal needs of the British people.' This would entail government sponsorship of 'consumer research' and the use of operational research by manufacturing industry to facilitate closer relationships between company managers and consumers. As Bernal stated at a conference convened by the Association in February 1945 to discuss 'Science in Peace/ once a new product was 'in the hands of the ultimate user, the methods of operational research indicate its shortcomings and the new needs which its user discloses.' The Association's thinking was elaborated further in the same year in a report on 'Research into Consumer Needs.' Ranging over consumer research

188 Operational Research in War and Peace experience in the USA and the USSR, the report called for the establishment of a 'Consumer Research Council' reporting to the Lord President of the Council as the minister responsible for 'science.' In the British context, relevant examples of consumer research included the Therapeutic Trials Committee of the Medical Research Council and the Government Social Survey, the latter established in 1940 to monitor public opinion on a wide range of issues, including the impact of shortages and rationing. Operational research was also cited and once again reference was made to the wartime operational research sections insofar as The [Armed] Services may be considered as consumers of the technical material supplied to them by industry...In peace time we shall require the same techniques to study the most efficient ways of utilising the country's resources for the satisfaction of the consumer's needs and desires.9 As Rosenhead has observed, the 'parallelism' with wartime operational research might be viewed as misplaced in that 'the influence of a powerful wartime monopoly "consumer," the Armed Services, over industrial suppliers somewhat exceeds that of a mass of dispersed, individual, peace-time purchasers.' But in its contemporary setting, concerns over consumer needs in peacetime were validated by the fact that 'in 1945 the post-war balance of power between labour and capital, between consumer and manufacturer, were still unclear.' In advocating the establishment of a 'Council for Consumer Research' the Association was, in effect, attempting to shift the balance of power away from sectional, profit-oriented interests in favour of the wider community. 10 The Association of Scientific Workers was certainly at the forefront of public debate on the peacetime applications of operational research as the war drew to a close. After 1945, however, the lead was taken by a single individual — Charles Goodeve — the former Deputy Controller of Research and Development at the Admiralty and recently knighted in recognition of his wartime service. Goodeve's role in advocating the recruitment of scientists to the war effort has already been noted (see above, pp. 86-7), and insofar as he was aware of the quality of Blackett's work for the Admiralty and Coastal Command, he emerged from the war with a considerable determination to secure the application of operational research to civilian affairs. Appointed as Director of the newly-established British Iron and Steel Research Association in 1945, Goodeve had ample opportunity to give full vent to his enthusiasm for

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 189 operational research in that particular setting (see chapter 7). His position also provided him with a useful platform to proclaim the virtues of operational research to a wider audience. During the decade after the war, therefore, Goodeve mounted what was tantamount to a one-man campaign in favour of operational research via speeches and articles in which he underlined its wartime successes and pointed to a variety of peacetime uses. His early thinking is set out admirably in a 1948 survey paper published in Nature.11 In terms of definitions, Goodeve endorsed the brief formulation set out by the American operational researcher, Charles Kittel (see above, p. 3) and proclaimed the 'scientific method' for its use of 'the rigorous logic of mathematics and statistics' in order to analyse the data emanating from 'controlled experiments...or experiences.' 12 Goodeve further commented that the application of operational research was wholly dependent on the meaning attached to the word 'operations' in Kittel's definition. Thus, In war, operational research was applied to the use of weapons, to tactics, and to strategy. In the peace-time application of operational research studies are directed, for example, to the use of equipment and man-power, to operating procedures, and to the solution of those many problems faced by management in operating or controlling factories or public utilities, or by Government authorities in planning. The field of operational research is very wide; but it will be seen that it is quite distinct from the field of most applied scientific research, the latter being concerned with new or improved processes, equipment, materials, etc.13 The use of the present tense in relation to peacetime applications was validated by the claim that operational research was 'already in full swing.' The examples cited by Goodeve were in the fields of railway and road traffic management, both of which gave 'a promise of useful results on the application of the scientific method.' In the former, Goodeve noted that the L.M.S. company had established a special research unit to investigate the communications system. Recommendations concerning improvements to organisation and equipment were being implemented on the basis of quantitative predictions. In road transport, the Road Research Department of the DSIR was using 'a wide range of the tools of modern science' to investigate improvements in traffic flow and the reduction of accidents. The remaining sections of Goodeve's survey were commendably vague, ranging over the application of operational research to 'Inspection and Maintenance,' and 'Technical Progress.' In a later

190 Operational Research in War and Peace article, however, he reported on the proceedings of a DSIR-sponsored conference which had discussed the relevance of operational research to individual industry research associations.14 These included cotton textiles, ceramics, the electrical and allied industries, the boot and shoe trades and Goodeve's own research association in the iron and steel industry. The account was instilled with enthusiasm, with the reader's attention being drawn to the fact that There never has been a more favourable opportunity for an extension of operational research. With the present 'sellers' market/ competition is at a minimum and and co-operation at a maximum. Organised labour, which has always had to look first for security of employment, is able now to take a broader view and consider efficiency of employment.15 Goodeve concluded with a resume of the objects of operational research 'which have been or could be carried out by the research associations:' 1) to increase production per man hour; per unit of equipment, or per unit of of fuel; 2) to improve quality and suitability of products; 3) to improve the basis for decisions regarding the application of science; 4) to make studies of consumer or market problems, that is scientific studies in market research; 5) to aid in finding the optimum degree of standardisation for any particular field of production; 6) to aid in the planning of research programmes.16 It is thus clear that Goodeve's agenda touched, in part, on the concerns of the Association of Scientific Workers, and although he was politically to the right of Bernal and Blackett, it is evident that he shared their vision of operational research as a means of alleviating or resolving a wide range of social and economic problems. 17 As for contemporary reactions to Goodeve's advocacy, there can be no better indication than that provided by the work of the official Committee on Industrial Productivity (CIP) of which Goodeve was a member. This body was to prepare a substantial report on the 'Principles and Practice of Operational Research' and in view of the importance of this document in the early postwar history of operational research it is worthwhile analysing its contents and ultimate fate in some detail. The origins of the CIP itself have been attributed to the Labour Government's interest in long-term economic planning and the relevance of a 'scientific approach' to the improvement of productive efficiency.18 Whilst this is broadly correct, it is important to note that government

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 191 industrial policy was also influenced heavily by short term economic circumstances, especially in relation to the external accounts. The postwar balance of payments crisis was the immediate product of a war in which exports had been curtailed severely in order to expand production of war materials. Masked during the war by a combination of Lend-Lease, the sale of overseas assets and the accumulation of sterling balances, the payments gap dictated the need for a postwar export drive on the part of manufacturing industry. Whilst 'output now' was the favoured rallying cry, the emphasis on enhanced productivity was indicative of the government's concern with long-term efficiency. In this context, the CIP was only one of a myriad of government sponsored bodies which were appointed to discuss the means of raising industrial output. 19 The CIP was established in December 1947 under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Tizard. Its remit was to identify efficiency-enhancing measures which were likely to raise industrial productivity significantly within a five-year time horizon. 20 In that connection, four separate panels were assembled — on Technology and Operational Research, Import Substitution, Technical Information Services, and Human Factors. In reviewing the work of the CIP it is clear that the panels on Technology and Operational Research and Human Factors were regarded as most critical to the task in hand to the extent that these areas held out the greatest prospects for alleviating resource constraints in particular industrial sectors. In the present context, it is only necessary to refer to the work of the Technology and Operational Research Panel which had the following membership: Sir William Stanier (Chairman), Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Supply and former Chief Mechanical Engineer to the L.M.S. Railway Mr S. A. Dakin, Board of Trade Dr P. Dunsheath. Association of British Chemical Manufacturers Dr C. Gordon, Board of Trade Dr H. Hollings, Gas, Light and Coke Co. Mr L. H. C Tippett, Shirley Institute Professor Willis Jackson, London University Lt. General F. G. Wrisberg, Ministry of Supply Dr W. L. Francis, DSIR Mr E. D. T. Jourdain, Lord President's Office The original terms of reference of the panel were 'to consider the part which the results of technical research can play in increasing industrial productivity and in particular to examine the means whereby

192 Operational Research in War and Peace technological improvements and the methods of operational research can best be applied.' 21 At the instigation of Cecil Gordon, representing the Board of Trade, the proposed evaluation of operational research was sharpened so that the panel would also 'review the principles and methods of operational research as applied to Industrial Productivity, in consultation with other Panels [and] recommend how to encourage the spread of such techniques, and to advise on the initiating of special projects.' 22 The reference to Gordon is apposite because he was to play a central role in determining the CIP's recommendations on operational research. His distinguished record in wartime operational research on behalf of Coastal Command has been described in chapter 4 (see above, pp. 107-8). At the end of the war, Gordon moved from his post at the Air Ministry to the Board of Trade as Director of the newly-formed Special Research Unit (SRU) in order to investigate the application of operational research to civilian industry. It is reasonable to assume that Gordon's uniquely valuable work for Coastal Command was known to the then President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, formerly Minister of Aircraft Production. Like Gordon, Cripps was concerned to raise industrial efficiency by a combination of exhortation and selective measures of intervention, albeit on a consensual basis with managers and unions. He certainly had the ambition to transform the Board of Trade into a 'Ministry of Industry' to form the focal point of the government's productivity drive. 23 Thus, under Gordon, SRU's early work concentrated on studies of product variety and standardisation in a range of industrial sectors, but with a particular focus on cotton textiles where Gordon calculated that increased productivity was directly dependent on high-throughput mass production. 2 4 It was his commitment to quantitative analysis of industrial problems, together with his left-wing political sympathies which coloured Gordon's work for the CIP. In this respect, it was significant that he was not only a member of the Technology and Operational Research Panel, but also of the CIP's official Working Party responsible for ranging across all areas of the committee's work from the standpoint of 'a scientific approach' to running industry. Indeed, it was the Working Party rather than the Panel which took the lead in proclaiming the virtues of operational research beyond the industrial sector to embrace 'the machinery of government' where it 'may serve in such fields as the work of O and M Divisions, the framework of capital investment policy, questions affecting the redeployment of labour and the provision of a factual basis for an export policy.' These themes

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 193 were incorporated in a draft report on 'The Principles and Practices of Operational Research' which was available for comment both within and without the CIP in May 1948.25 By January 1949, after the draft had been scrutinised by a number of Whitehall departments, Research Associations and the DSIR, the secretary of the Working Party reported that although it had been well received in the Ministry of Supply, substantial criticisms had been directed against its excessive length and overemphasis on the achievements of wartime operational research at the expense of relevant peacetime applications. 26 Nevertheless, even a superficial reading of the draft report confirms that its 60 single-space typed pages offered a hymn of praise to the potential contribution of operational research to human progress in a wide range of peacetime settings, from industry research associations, civil government departments (including the newly-formed National Health Service) and the nationalised industries, to private sector firms and agriculture. In offering a definition of operational research, the Working Party report endorsed Kittel's emphasis on the use of the scientific method as the basis for executive decisions. The name itself was viewed as having a 'double significance' in that operational research is 'research into the operations of a unit, and it is carried out at the operational — i.e. executive level.' Thus, an operational research team 'exists primarily to aid (and even to stimulate) the executive.' In elaborating on the functions of the operational research team, the report commented as follows: (a) Its function is to examine the methods of operation of the unit under consideration, using all appropriate scientific techniques and disciplines. (b) The team should in general consist of workers with a wide variety of scientific and technological backgrounds, the scientific approach being common to all. (c) Operational Research is undertaken by a separate and trained section which, while it works at the executive level and in intimate and constant contact with executives, has no executive responsibilities. 27 This was followed by a commentary on the 'characteristics' of operational research. These included the need for interdisciplinarity within the research team, the desirability of contact 'at all executive levels' and the absolute requirement for mutual trust between executives and researchers. All of this was validated by the role and status of the wartime operational research sections, especially in Fighter Command where the report presented a clear account of the fruitful working relationships between

194 Operational Research in War and Peace scientists and serving officers which had been so vital in the development of radar. As for civilian illustrations of operational research, the report began by focusing on 'the social field' where it was claimed that there was a long history of pioneering work reaching back into the nineteenth century. According to the report, the social investigations carried out by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and Charles Booth were forerunners of operational research insofar as they had led to 'executive action' in the form of social insurance legislation. This applied also to the work of Sir Cyril Burt in the field of educational psychology carried out on behalf of the London County Council. More recent examples of such work included the wartime Government Social Survey which was alleged to have helped the process of policy formulation in the Ministries of Food and Health. In a similar vein, the report claimed that wartime economic policy also represented an example of 'operational research or near operational research' in that When the war broke out the best theoretical brains utilised their knowledge to solve the economic problems of the war. Surveying the currently available resources of the country, Lord Keynes advocated from the beginning of the war a type of war finance which would include an element of forced savings. When he became one of the main advisers of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, this idea was incorporated in the budget in the form of post-war credits. The quantitative aspects and the shaping of this measure, as well as many other measures of war finance, got their foundation from the official estimates of national income and expenditure carried out in the Central Statistical Office. The necessity for formulating measures of war finance gave a strong impetus to proceed with this research work, and in determining actual financial measures, they led to immediate administrative application.28 It would be interesting to conjecture on Keynes's likely reaction to his designation as an operational research pioneer, especially since the reference to his contribution to war finance was followed by sections on the application of operational research to Royal Ordnance Filling Factories and brick making. The key point to note is that in presenting the case for operational research in peacetime, the authors of the report chose to draw on historic and contemporary precedents far removed from the kind of work carried out in wartime. Ultimately, of course, their ability to convince a sceptical audience was dependent on the credibility of their case for the application of operational research to relevant and

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 195 pressing peacetime problems in the civilian sector, broadly defined. In this respect, the report concluded with a resume of the possible applications of operational research, embracing general and sector-specific issues. They may be summarised as follows: (a) Operational Research as a Means of Reducing the Gap between Scientific Discovery and Practical Application. This would entail collaboration between economists and technical specialists with an input from operational researchers to effect the necessary synthesis. (b) Some Opportunities for Operational Research in Central Government i) The Administrative Machine. Operational researchers would engage in the systematic collection of quantitative data on behalf the Machinery of Government Branch of the Treasury O and M Division. ii) Re-equipment of Industry. Operational researchers could assist in the framing of 'an optimal policy of capital investment' by identifying the relative values of investment projects in both the public and private sectors of industry. iii) Criteria of Efficiency in Nationalised Industries. Given their status as natural monopolies they should be efficient 'in the sense of fulfilling [their] whole set of aims laid down at a minimum cost of man-power, plant and materials. Operational researchers would have a valid role in defining relevant criteria of efficiency. iv) Factors Affecting the Availability of Labour. Operational researchers could assist the productivity drive by calculating the optimal size of labour force at the industry-specific level. v) Some Problems in Foreign Trade. Operational researchers could assist in the framing of export policy by advising on an appropriate product mix in the light of domestic capacity constraints and foreign exchange requirements. (c) Operational Research in Non-Nationalised Industries. The Board of Trade Working Party Reports on individual industries had pointed to a number of subjects suitable for operational research. These included; i) The quantitative assessment of the relative importance of factors affecting productivity in particular industries. ii) Effects of mechanisation. (a) The national cost of raising productivity by new machinery. (b) The productivity of machine-makers.

196 Operational Research in War and Peace (c) Conflict between quality and mechanisation in particular industries. (d) The social and human consequences of technical advance and increased mechanisation. iii) Standardisation. (a) The length of run necessary to get maximum economy in production. (b) The scope for standardisation of products. (c) The efficiency of the distributive system in interpreting and educating public demand and in feeding bulk orders to producers in a form making economic production possible. (d) The cost of changes in fashion, seasonal demand, etc. iv) The application of the principles of layout and flow to individual factories; the balance of cost against advantage in applying these principles. v) The breakdown of operations according to their skill and the effect on productivity of re-deploying labour among these operations. vi) Better labour utilisation. (a) Time and motion study of the efficiency of labour. (b) The development of scientific piece-work systems. vii) Correlation between size and efficiency of the unit (firm or plant). viii) The development of a uniform and rational costing system. ix) The effect of Government controls on efficiency. (d) Operational Research and the Human Factor. Wartime. operational research had pointed to the divergence between the actual achievement and the initial theoretical expectation. This divergence was usually attributed to the human factor. Limited progress was made in this area but the postwar period held out the prospect of more scientific work in this field. In terms of specific applications in the civilian field, the report concentrated on 'Problems for Immediate Study' In order of priority, the nationalised industries were ranked first insofar as any efficiency improvements there would be to the advantage of the economy as a whole. Agriculture was accorded second priority because of its vital role in sustaining the balance of payments in terms of import substitution. Moreover,

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 197 In this industry, the current device for obtaining the correct balance of production and for promoting efficiency is a system of guaranteed prices. By reason of the interaction of the technical, social and economic factors, the problem of developing price or other policies to [promote] efficiency seems one to which the operational research approach can usefully contribute, especially since the term 'efficiency' covers the problems of balance between the efficient use of men, of land and of other factors.29 A third group of industries was identified as being vital to the export drive but limited in its contribution as a result of a shortage of labour. Cotton textiles featured prominently as a potential earner of hard currency, but so too did the tinplate, pottery and foundry trades. In all cases, operational research was viewed as a possible means of raising output in the short term without major capital investment or labour recruitment. The remaining groups embraced those industries such as cutlery, glassware, and the engineering trades — all of them with good export prospects — but constrained by their lack of access to scale economies and capital resources. The application of operational research was again viewed as relevant to raising efficiency in the short term. 30 A final notable theme of the report was its concern with methodology. The section on 'Techniques used in Operational Research' began by noting that It has been emphasized that Operational Research is quantitative, as far as possible, in its methods, and experiment may also play an important part. Much use is made of arithmetical and graphical techniques, and of a good deal of simple mathematics, though genuine mathematical problems occurred (at least in wartime experience) only rarely. The circumstances of the case determine the particular method to be used.31 This was followed by specific reference to the wartime operational research sections: In the use of statistics, there was at times a good deal of confusion among operational research workers, particularly those who were statistical novices, concerning the applicability of tests of significance. Whilst the best modern statistical practice undoubtedly takes into account not only the ill effects of accepting a hypothesis as proved when the evidence is insufficient, but those of rejecting one that is in fact true, and also the cost of reducing

198 Operational Research in War and Peace the risk of either or both of these errors to assigned limits, the fact remains that certain kinds of academic experience led to an inordinately serious rating of the danger of accepting an insufficiently proved hypothesis. Such an approach led to a policy of extreme conservatism, since no new trend would be acted on till its existence was proved beyond doubt, however serious the consequences might be.32 In that light, the report called for the early preparation of a textbook on operational research methods, drawing on wartime experience where necessary. In addition, 'some sort of facility should be provided to ensure that operational research papers, particularly those of methodological interest, are published and read by other operational research workers...Either a special journal for the purpose is needed, or a central abstracting service, to keep operational research workers informed.' 33 Discussion of the merits of a textbook was, in fact, already underway, having been considered by the official Advisory Council on Scientific Policy. This body, formed in 1947 to advise the Lord President of the Council 'in the exercise of his responsibility for the formulation and execution of Government scientific policy,' was chaired by Sir Henry Tizard and included Solly Zuckerman as a member. 34 With their backing, the Council established an Operational Research Editorial Committee with Sir Charles Goodeve in the chair, assisted by Cecil Gordon. In view of the fact that Gordon had collaborated with his colleague, Tom Easterfield, in writing the Working Party report, it is strange, at first sight, that they were not invited to expand the report in a suitable form for a wider audience. But to the extent that a textbook should be 'readily intelligible' and 'technically sound,' it was desirable that the task should be 'most suitably...undertaken by scientific journalists.' 35 The task was therefore allotted to Ritchie Calder and Maurice Goldsmith, the former a personal friend of Gordon. By March, 1948, they had prepared a synopsis. 36 To be written for 'the ordinary reader,' the prospective authors envisaged a preface containing 'a direct approach to the industrialist' supplemented by 'a working definition and...signed by names which carry authority a n d respect in industry.' Significantly, in view of s u b s e q u e n t developments, the synopsis stated that the general approach of the book must take account of possible attitudes, misconceptions and resistance to the use of Operational Research. Some may resent it as 'new tangled nonsense;' others may say that there is nothing new in it, that it is merely process research, time-and-rnotion study, business efficiency,etc, in a new wrapper; others may feel

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 199 that the scientists are looking for a pretext to interfere with industrial practices. In this light, the interest of industrialists had to be engaged as a prelude to relating it to their own problems. Thus, 'Operational Research must be discreetly dramatised. And the exciting aspect of Operational Research is to be found in its war-time applications.' In the context of the times — the vital need to release scarce resources for an export drive to aid the balance of payments — the sectoral coverage of the original Working Party report was admirable. As Maurice Shutler has argued, the agenda for operational research bore favourable comparison with the remit of the Sector Working Parties formed as part of the Labour Government's 'Industrial Strategy' after 1975. Indeed, it is difficult to think of much that was left out, a judgement which led Shutler to the legitimate conclusion that the proposed proliferation of operational research recommended in the report would have effectively mortgaged a considerable proportion of the scientific effort of British universities for years ahead. 37 Perhaps anticipating that result, the report concluded that 'Although Operational Research should not be used as a dump for elderly workers whose powers are failing, it should be realised that some useful workers for the field may be obtained from older scientists whose increasing breadth of interest makes them impatient of concentrating on one narrow speciality.' 38 Supply of scientists could also be facilitated by interchange or secondment from universities to industry and government departments. In the event, the ultimate fate of 'The Principles and Practice of Operational Research' was determined by the Working Party's decision that a substantially shorter version should be produced with more emphasis on the practical application of operational research in peacetime. The task was entrusted to the Treasury's Economic Information Unit (EIU) — 'with an economist's rather than a scientist's hand on the pen, supposedly to improve intelligibility.' 39 This was accomplished by the end of May, 1949. When the Working Party reassembled on 9 June it had before it the new draft and a covering note from the EIU. It was the latter which set the tone for the discussion. After referring to the simplification of the language compared to the original, it commented that the redraft Brings out very well...the weaknesses of the original Report, and therein lies its value...it is hard to be sure that this paper is saying anything at all. I hope that you will not think that this is intended

200 Operational Research in War and Peace to be entirely destructive. On the contrary our purpose is to try to show what the reaction of ordinary people is likely to be to the CIP paper as it stands...the more we read the literature which has circulated about,it, the closer we come to the conclusion that operational research is merely a term covering a whole range of sensible activity (already known, studied and applied under other names), arbitrarily, and to no purpose, differentiated from other sensible activity.40 As if this was not damaging enough, the redraft itself incorporated a sequence of annotations by Cabinet Office and Treasury officials. Their consistent theme was that the report failed signally to make a convincing case for operational research as a distinctive activity. More pointedly, the redraft was 'an announcement of some very large territorial ambitions...and the resulting impression Hitlerism/ an extreme view, perhaps, but one which was complemented by the more reasoned judgement that the actual instances of civil operational research cited — good examples being 'the development of costing systems/ Lord Keynes's studies of 'postwar credits' and 'the boot and shoe industry's reduction of 130 American shoe fittings to 30 British ones' — were no more or less than 'commonsense and ordinary good management practice.' In that light, therefore, 'Any field investigation undertaken with a view to improving the effectiveness of results could be OR on this basis. If this is what is meant would it not be better to say so?' 41 Shutler's conclusion that the use of non-technical language was itself a fatal flaw in the redraft is apposite in that the net effect was that operational research appeared to be applied commonsense and the scientific aspects did not shine through even though it was stated that OR workers should have had a scientific training in some discipline — but their sets of such disciplines included Economics, Statistics, Work Study, O and M and Social Science. This is possibly to miss the lesson of the wartime OR Groups, that they were led by people steeped in the scientific method from long practice of a basic science.42 The redraft was considered by the Working Party in June 1949 in the presence of Gordon and Easterfield, the authors of the original report. The inevitable conclusion was that circulation of the report in Whitehall and beyond would be seriously damaging to operational research. The only optimistic comment was offered by the chairman; Dr Alexander King representing the Lord President of the Council, to the effect that

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 201 the report and redraft had at least stimulated discussion on a variety of issues relevant to the raising of productivity. 43 In the immediate postwar years civil operational research in government departments was confined to the Ministry of Works, the Home Office and SRU at the Board of Trade. SRU had a remit 'to apply to some of the broader problems of peacetime industry and trade, statistics and scientific methods which...have proved so valuable to the Services in war.' Under Gordon's leadership, the unit was highly active, with five reports to its credit by August 1948 (44). These were as follows: (1) Concepts and methods of product standardisation and case studies on variety reduction. (2) Analysis of value added per man hour for cotton goods showing that only low value added goods were exported. (3) Estimate of the level of clothing production at which rationing can be abandoned. (4) Forecasting labour supply in cotton areas. (5) Collation of the findings of various [Board of Trade] working parties on productivity. The focus on cotton textiles is understandable, given the industry's critical role in the postwar export drive, but the relevant activities appear to have generated few worthwhile results. In this respect, Shutler cites an internal Board of Trade evaluation which concluded that in addition to difficulties encountered in extracting statistical data from industry, it had proved impossible to provide well-founded conclusions on the best uses for operational research. The effect, therefore, was to 'draw a line' under the subject which 'may well bear prime responsibility' for the slow growth of operational research in civil government. 45 Taking the whole of the period of office of the postwar Labour Government, this is undoubtedly an unduly narrow judgement. Reference was made earlier to the economic and political factors which appeared to be conducive to the diffusion of civil operational research in the immediate postwar years, in particular, the vogue for centralised planning in a resource constrained economy. The Labour Government was certainly committed to industrial modernisation in both the public and private sectors, as evidenced by its interest in standardisation and economies of scale. But despite the dirigiste rhetoric of Sir Stafford Cripps, it never at any time engaged in purposeful strategic planning, let alone a consistent industrial policy which could be applied to the private sector.46 After 1947, the idea of economic planning became increasingly divorced from the allocation of

202 Operational Research in War and Peace resources at the sectoral level as the management of supply gave way to discretionary demand management. Indeed, by the end of its period of office, full employment, the control of inflation, maintenance of the exchange rate and equilibrium in the balance of payments were the principal policy objectives of the Labour Government. 47 In this setting, the necessity of increasing output in the short term reduced the relevance of operational research as a means to enhancing future competitiveness. Overt political considerations also help to explain the government's and Whitehall's resistance to the diffusion of operational research. As Rosenhead has observed, the onset of the Cold War after 1947 induced a change in the intellectual climate in which certain ideas and policies, including that of centralised state planning, became tarred with the brush of totalitarianism. Operational Research, because of the socialist perspective of many of its originators, and more generally through the left-wing image that science and scientists had acquired since the 1930s, was exposed to this chill wind.48 It is significant that Blackett and Bernal, for all their scientific eminence, were progressively marginalised in British science politics after 1947. In Blackett's case, this was registered in his failure to be appointed to the Central Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, although he did become one of the 'science' members of the newly-formed National Research and Development Corporation in June, 1949. Blackett's 'almost total exclusion from the inner advisory circles of the Government' until 1964 was the direct result of his principled opposition 'to almost every aspect of Anglo-American atomic policy' as stated publicly in his Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy, published in 1948.49 As well as advocating a neutralist stance for Britain in the emergent phase of the Cold War, the book contained vitriolic criticisms of American bombing policy, both conventional and nuclear, during the Second World War. It also registered his deep concern that Britain's limited supply of scientists would be better employed in the business of pure research in university laboratories or in applied work on behalf of civilian manufacturing industry. 50 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in Whitehall Blackett should have been exposed personally to the 'chill winds' identified by Rosenhead in view of his 'unreliability' and as the purveyor of 'dangerous nonsense' in the matter of postwar defence policy.51 As for Cecil Gordon and SRU, their fate was sealed on several counts. In the first instance, SRU sat uneasily within the Board of Trade. As Gordon's colleague, Tom Easterfield, recalled,

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203

Our remit was somewhat vague, somewhat like that of the wartime O. R. sections, of investigating anything we were asked to and at the same time anything else we thought might be useful, as far as time permitted. In the armed forces, this worked well, since the usefulness of O. R. sections was established early, spreading out from obviously 'scientific' (i.e. technological) studies to associated studies of organisation, congestion, information flow, efficiency and so on; moreover, in the armed forces the intimate contact between the O. R. staff and and the officers, not only in the offices and Nissen huts but also in the bar and the mess, meant that personal confidence was established..., and that there was the possibility of hearing the gossip that reveals what will be an important problem. In the B.o.T., the administrators with whom we had to work had no conviction that we could be useful (the more so as the place had a large number of units and advisers who seemed depressed because their advice was seldom asked for, a n d m o r e s e l d o m taken); they w e r e less tolerant of unconventional language; and there was very little opportunity for any sort of informal contact.52 F u r t h e r difficulties s t e m m e d from G o r d o n ' s o w n p e r s o n a l i t y w h i c h w a s calculated to m a k e influential enemies both within a n d without SRU. In a n i n f o r m e d essay in biography, R o s e n h e a d h a s described a m a n 'careless of his a p p e a r a n c e ' w i t h a l o u d voice w h i c h grated 'like a s a w t h r o u g h h a r d b o a r d . ' Possessing a brilliant m i n d in combination w i t h a rebarbative personality, G o r d o n w a s n o t inclined to suffer fools gladly. After i n t e r v i e w i n g s o m e of his former colleagues, R o s e n h e a d concluded that No one remembers Cecil Gordon as tactful. On one occasion the young children of a friend and colleague were reduced to tears by his ceaseless flow of talk at the dinner table. Civil servants overwhelmed by the 1947 fuel crisis received the same insensitive treatment. Those who failed to warm to him found Gordon inconsiderate, brash, intemperate. But this was the obverse of his whole-heartedness. He was impatient, persistent, not willing to be put off. If obstructed, he dug his toes in. Or he went straight to the top. It worked under wartime conditions.53 For G o r d o n , the final point w a s the n u b of the matter. A willingness to cut red t a p e a n d to b y p a s s conventional p r o c e d u r e s w a s all very well in circumstances of total war, b u t this could n o t be replicated in peacetime, not least in a Whitehall d e p a r t m e n t devoted exclusively to civilian affairs.

204 Operational Research in War and Peace Matters were not helped by the fact that the Permanent Secretary at the Board of Trade — Sir John Henry Woods — possessed laissez-faire s y m p a t h i e s which were completely at variance w i t h G o r d o n ' s interventionist agenda. SRU's continuing difficulties in extracting statistical data, accurate or otherwise, from industry was also a major problem: it has already been noted that it rendered it virtually impossible to formulate well-founded recommendations on the best uses of operational research. In this context, it is instructive to note that SRU's work on added value per man-hour and variety reduction in the cotton industry was possible only because of the cooperation received from the Shirley Institute in gathering statistics on behalf of the Cotton Industry Research Association. 54 Finally, it should be noted that Gordon himself was a former member of the Communist Party and remained a lifelong Marxist. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that he was regarded in a similar light to Blackett and Bernal. SRU itself did not survive the end of the 1940s, by which time Gordon had accepted the position of Senior Lecturer in Social Biology, working under Professor C. H. Waddington at the University of Edinburgh. 55 Two issues remain to be considered, first the fate of the proposed 'textbook' on operational research, and secondly, that of the Committee on Industrial Productivity itself. Although Calder and Goldsmith as authors of the prospective text agreed on a division of labour (Calder covering the wartime record of operational research and Goldsmith examining civilian applications), it would appear that all did not go well. In June 1949 it was reported to the Working Party that the project, as originally envisaged by the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, would not be completed due to Goldsmith's appointment to a UNESCO post. It was therefore decided that Sir Charles Goodeve should be approached as a possible author in his capacity as chairman of the editorial committee. 56 Although nothing came of this initiative, the name of Roy Innes was mooted as a former operational researcher in the Air Ministry and Fighter Command specialising in radar operations and bombing analysis. Innes was, however, the current General Secretary of the Association of Scientific Workers and a known Communist. Both affiliations were no doubt sufficient to secure his rejection.57 As for the CIP, it is evident that Tizard's personal enthusiasm for its productivityenhancing role began to wane during the autumn of 1948. In October, the Technology and Operational Research Panel was laid down, although the Human Factors Panel and the Working Party survived. In the following year Tizard's conviction that a combination of continuing

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 205 capital shortage and long lead times in R and D was hardly calculated to enhance productivity in the short term came to be widely accepted within the CIP. 58 This served as a precursor to the CIP's formal dissolution in July 1950. Whilst it is now accepted that the postwar Labour Government was the first peacetime administration 'to put raising industrial efficiency close to the centre of its economic policy agenda' there is no consensus as to the real impact of its productivity drive on industrial performance. It is true that manufacturing productivity rose strongly between 1946 and 1950 — possibly by as much as 6 per cent per annum — but even the most revisionist economic historian of the period has accepted that the contribution of industrial policy is 'unclear.' 59 Still less is it possible to claim any role for operational research. Its public visibility was confined largely to the few articles published by Goodeve, and even then the relevant journals were hardly likely to have enjoyed a wide readership at the level of industrial managers. The articles themselves were worthy efforts, but it is clear, with the benefit of hindsight, that Goodeve's examples of the civilian applications of operational research were less than convincing in terms of their direct relevance to the raising of industrial efficiency. This certainly applied to the CIP's Working Party Report, and it was a critical factor in encouraging the hostile response from within the Treasury and other Whitehall departments. The application of operational research to 'the machinery of government,' moreover, was always likely to be in conflict with a conservative civil service with an ethic of administration rooted firmly in the nineteenth century. Modernising impulses in this sphere would have to await the election of another Labour administration committed to far-reaching institutional reform (see chapter 10 below). These factors were sufficient in themselves to ensure a lukewarm reaction to operational research and the optimistic claims of its principal supporters. It can only be said that their advocacy was damaged further by overt political considerations at the inception of the Cold War. The chapter began with reference to American perceptions of the postwar diffusion of operational research in Britain. On the basis of the evidence presented, it is clear that their optimistic tone must be severely qualified, at least in relation to contemporary reactions to operational research as a means of achieving early and measurable increases in industrial productivity. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the civilian diffusion of operational research after 1945 was entirely dependent on committed individuals wielding high executive authority

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a n d t h e r e b y in a p o s i t i o n to c i r c u m v e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s i s t a n c e to m a n a g e r i a l innovation. Even t h e n , the sectoral coverage w a s limited to the recently nationalised coal i n d u s t r y a n d the iron a n d steel i n d u s t r y . As in the case of administrative reforms in Whitehall, the diffusion of o p e r a t i o n a l research into the civilian m a n u f a c t u r i n g sector w a s n o t to m a k e s i g n i f i c a n t h e a d w a y u n t i l t h e 1960s i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s of u n p r e c e d e n t e d m a n a g e r i a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g w h i c h followed in the w a k e of a notable u p s u r g e in m e r g e r activity.

NOTES 1. Florence N. Trefethen, 'A History of Operations Research/ in J. F. McCloskey and F. N. Trefethen (Eds.), Operations Research for Management (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1954), pp. 30-1. 2. R. L. Ackoff, 'A Comparison of Operational Research in the USA and Great Britain,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1957), pp. 88-100. 3. Jim Tomlinson, 'Mr Attlee's Supply-Side Socialism,' Economic History Review, Vol. 46 (1993), pp. 1-22; Jim Tomlinson, Government and the Enterprise since 1900: The Changing Problem of Efficiency (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), pp. 161-85. 4. Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of the 1930s (Allen Lane, London, 1978); P. G. Werskey, 'British Scientists and Outsider Politics, 1931-1945/ in B. Barnes (Ed.), Sociology of Science (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972), pp. 231-50; Jonathan Rosenhead, Operational Research at the Crossroads: Cecil Gordon and the Development of Post-war OR/ Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 40 (1989), pp. 3-28. 5. J. D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science (1939); Idem, 'Lessons of the War for Science,' Proceedings of the Royal Society, A 342 (1945), pp. 555-74; Idem, Science in History (Watts, London, 1954), pp. 580-607. 6. D. M. C. Hodgkin, 'John Desmond Bernal, 10 May 1901-15 September 1971/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 26 (1980), pp. 17-84; M. Goldsmith, Sage: A Life of]. D. Bernal (Hutchinson, London, 1980). 7. Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords 1904-46: An Autobiography (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978), pp. 393-4. 8. Rosenhead (1989), p. 6. 9. Cited in Ibid, p. 12. 10. Ibid. 11. Sir Charles Goodeve, 'Operational Research/ Nature, Vol. 161 (13 March, 1948), pp. 377-84. 12. Cited in Ibid., p. 377. 13. Ibid.

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 207 14. Sir Charles Goodeve, 'Operational Research in the Research Associations,' Nature, Vol. 161 (17 April, 1948), pp. 584-5. 15. Ibid., p. 585. 16. Ibid. 17. Ackoff (1957), pp. 88-100. 18. Rosenhead (1989), p. 16. 19. Tomlinson (1994), pp. 161-85. 20. PRO CAB 124/1094, 34095, 18 December, 1947. Provisional Committee on Industrial Productivity. 21. PRO CAB 132/28, 34013. CIP (48) (1), 2 February, 1948. Committee on Industrial Productivity, first meeting. 22. PRO CAB 132/47, 34013. CIP (TR) (48), 20 January, 1948. Committee on Industrial Productivity: Panel on Technology and Operational Research: Terms of Reference. 23. D. E. H. Edgerton, 'Whatever Happened to the Warfare State? The Ministry of Supply, 1945-51/ in Helen Mercer, Neil Rollings and Jim Tomlinson (Eds.), Labour and Private Industry: The Experience of 1945-51 (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1992), pp. 95-6. 24. Rosenhead (1989), pp. 11-13. 25. PRO CAB 132/28, 34013 (CIP) (48) (25), 21 July, 1948. The Principles and Practices of Operational Research; Report by the Working Party of the Committee on Industrial Productivity (Final Draft). 26. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095 (CIP) (WP) (49), 17 January, 1949. Committee on Industrial Productivity: Working Party. Minutes of Second Meeting. 27. Ibid., p. 2. 28. Ibid., p. 11. 29. Ibid., pp. 32. 30. Ibid., pp. 37-9. 31. Ibid., p. 17. 32. Ibid., p. 20. 33. Ibid., p. 22. 34. PRO CAB 132/64, 34013, S. P. (47) 1, 18 February, 1947. Advisory Council on Scientific Policy: Terms of Reference and Composition. 35. PRO CAB 132/81, 34095. Advisory Council on Scientific Policy: Operational Research Editorial Committee. Minutes of a Meeting held on 27 January, 1948. 36. PRO CAB 132/81, 34095, S. P. (O.R.E.) (48) 1, 4 March, 1948. Advisory Council on Scientific Policy: Operational Research Editorial Committee: Argument and Synopsis. 37. Maurice Shutler, 'Operational Research and the Creation of Wealth,' International Working Seminar, University of York (1978), pp. 1-5. 38. PRO CAB 132/28, The Principles and Practices of Operational Research. 39. Rosenhead (1989), p. 19.

208 Operational Research in War and Peace 40. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095, 9 June, 1949. Working Party of the Committee on Industrial Productivity: Minutes of Meeting. 41. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095. A Short Account of Operational Research Describing its History and Techniques and Its Bearing on Productivity. 42. Shutler (1978), p. 4. 43. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095, 9 June 1949. Working Party of the Committee on Industrial Productivity: Minutes of Meeting. 44. Rosenhead (1989), p. 13. 45. Shutler (1978), p. 5. 46. Tomlinson (1993). 47. M. W. Kirby, 'Supply-Side Management,' in N. F. R. Crafts and N. Woodward (Eds.), The British Economy since 1945 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), p. 239. 48. Rosenhead (1989), p. 24. 49. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea,' Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), pp. 70-1. 50. P. M. S. Blackett, Political and Military Consequences of Atomic Energy (Turnstile Press, London, 1948). 51. Solly Zuckerman, Six Men Out of the Ordinary (Peter Owen, London, 1990), pp. 27-8. 52. T. E. Easterfield, 'The Special Research Unit at the Board of Trade, 19461949/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 34 (1983), p. 565. 53. Rosenhead (1989), p. 23. 54. Easterfield (1983), pp. 566-7. 55. Rosenhead (1989), pp. 21-2. 56. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095. Committee on Industrial Productivity: Minutes of a meeting held on 9 June, 1949. 57. Rosenhead (1989), pp. 20-1. 58. A. King, cited in Ibid., p. 20. 59. Tomlinson (1994), pp. 184-5.

7

Operational Research in Iron and Steel

After its formation in 1916, the DSIR developed a dual strategy for the sponsorship of industrial research in the UK, in the first instance by the creation of research establishments under its own auspices, and secondly by encouraging specific industries and trades to form their own cooperative research associations. For the latter, financial subsidies were available and within five years of its formation, the DSIR had presided over the creation of 20 such associations. Thirty years later, the number had doubled so that they encompassed approximately one half of manufacturing industry 1 It has been suggested that these associations provided 'a natural home' for operational research 2 and it is certainly true that some interest was displayed in the later 1940s. In 1948, for example, the periodical Nature contained a report on a conference on operational research convened by the Committee of Directors of Research Associations in cooperation with the DSIR.3 The overall consensus was that operational research was a worthwhile activity to the extent that its purpose was to raise productivity and product quality via optimum standardisation, and to apply scientific studies to management problems.4 If these praiseworthy objectives resonated with the recommendations of 'The Principles and Practices of Operational Research' then it should occasion no surprise for the conference rapporteur was none other than Charles Goodeve, currently serving as a member of the Committee on Industrial Productivity. In 1948, Goodeve was Director of the British Iron and Steel Research Association (BISRA), a body formed in 1945 which he had been invited to join directly after his departure from the Admiralty. BISRA was the product of an initiative from within the British Iron and Steel Federation (BISF) to form an industry-wide research facility in order to resolve common problems on the basis of pooled expertise. In this setting, BISRA was designed to complement the research efforts of individual firms within the industry.

209

210 Operational Research in War and Peace At its inception, BISRA was financed jointly by the DSIR and the BISF. It contained a membership of 298 firms and was subject to the oversight of a council composed of representatives of the BISF, the Iron and Steel Institute, and the DSIR.5 If its ultimate purpose was to enhance the industry's performance in terms of overall competitiveness, then it can only be said that Goodeve's task as director of BISRA was truly formidable, given the industry's unfortunate historical legacy. As the oldest established national producer, the British industry had begun to encounter severe problems of modernisation well before the end of the nineteenth century. Small and widely scattered production units, dispersed control and lack of vertical integration may have been appropriate in the age of wrought iron, but these entrenched structures placed major obstacles in the way of any decisive movement towards bulk production on the basis of advanced processes. Alternate periods of boom and slump in a situation where plant was very durable exacerbated the problem of structural rigidity and encouraged the movement towards price-fixing agreements, the latter helping to sustain high-cost and relatively inefficient producers. 6 The interwar period gave rise to new difficulties in the form of depressed demand at the same time as the industry's financial burdens increased dramatically. It is true that over the divide of the First World War, and continuing into the 1920s, the pace of amalgamation accelerated, but by the end of the interwar period the structure of the industry lagged far behind the achievements of its American and German counterparts in terms of integration and high-throughput production. The BISF itself had been established in 1935 as a direct response to the award of enhanced measures of protection following the enactment of a general tariff in 1932. There can be no doubt that the Conservative-dominated government of the day and the industry's critics intended that the BISF should preside over a programme of rationalisation in the form of regional mergers. To their mutual disappointment, however, the Federation's organisational reforms focused on the restriction of competition in response to further moves towards price controls. As the industry's most recent historian has concluded, a government which was opposed to direct measures of intervention was obliged to sponsor 'a cartel over which it had little control.' 7 In the light of the industry's recent history, BISRA's future was clearly uncertain. It is true that the creation of a fully mobilised war economy after 1940 had helped to strengthen the industry's central organisation, not least as a result of coordinated investment strategies. In addition, there was a growing appreciation of the Anglo-American

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 211 productivity gap in the context of an acute scarcity of resources for capital investment. 8 Inter-firm jealousies, however, persisted so that influential elements within the industry remained suspicious of the possibility that the very creation of BISRA might compromise inter-firm competitiveness, especially in the context of firm-specific product and process innovations. It is also the case that Goodeve himself viewed the £190,000 annual budget awarded by the industry to BISRA (inclusive of a DSIR subsidy of £60,000) as failing to 'encompass the large and aggressive organisation' that he envisaged. 9 His one advantage, in addition to his singular energy and powers of persuasion, was that he simultaneously held the title of Director of Research not only for BISRA, but also for the BISF itself. The latter position was to prove essential in giving Goodeve direct access to the highest levels of influence within the Federation.

1

1946

|

,

1950

1

1

,

1954

p

1958

1962

Years ended 31 December

Figure 7.1 The Growth of BISRA Source: R D. Richardson, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 27 (1981), Fig. 7, p. 340.

212 Operational Research in War and Peace

PLANT ENGINEERIKO AND ENERGY (A)

Mechanical engineering Control engineering Civil engineering Energy

CHEMISTRY (A) Process chemistry Refractories and slags Corrosion

PHYSICS (A) Instruments Fluid dynamics Metal physics Automation OPERATIONAL RESEARCH (A) Operational investigation Systems evaluation Human factors

STEEL MAKING (Q

(A ind B)

Raw materials Iron ore preparation Blast furnaces Technology and practice

S P e c i a 1 i s t d e P a r m/ n t s

Converters Electric furnaces Process Chemistry Ingots and continuous casting

MECHANICAL (C) WORKING (D)

Rolling Forging Wire drawing Tinpiate Coatings Steel snip processing

METALLURGY