Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy

Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy Edited by Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata NORMS, INTERESTS, AN...

Author: Yoichiro Sato | Keiko Hirata

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Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy Edited by

Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata

NORMS, INTERESTS, AND POWER IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

Copyright © Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata, 2008. All rights reserved. First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the US—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–8448–7 ISBN-10: 1–4039–8448–4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Norms, interests, and power in Japanese foreign policy / edited by Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–8448–4 1. Japan—Foreign relations—1945– I. Sato, Yoichiro, 1966– II. Hirata, Keiko JZ1745.N67 2008 327.52—dc22

2008012365

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: October 2008 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

List of Figures

v

List of Tables

vi

Preface

vii Part I Introduction

1 Introduction: Constructivism, Rationalism, and the Study of Norms in Japanese Foreign Policy Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata

3

Part II Security and Diplomatic Policy 2 Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Pacifism Akitoshi Miyashita

21

3 International Norms and Civil Society: New Influences on Japanese Security Policy Keiko Hirata

47

4 Norms, Structures, and Japan’s “Northern Territories” Policy Kimie Hara

71

5 Three Norms of Collective Defense and Japan’s Overseas Troop Dispatches Yoichiro Sato

93

Part III International Political Economic Issues 6 Humanitarian and Democratic Norms in Japan’s ODA Distributions Yoichiro Sato and Masahiko Asano

111

iv

CONT ENT S

7 Norms and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy in the South Pacific Sandra Tarte

129

8 Japan’s Role in Latin America’s Debt Management, 1982–1991 Saori N. Katada

151

Part IV Environmental Issues 9 Japan’s Whaling Politics Keiko Hirata 10

The Kyoto Protocol from Formulation to Ratification: Japan’s Role in International Climate Negotiations Eric Shibuya

175

211

Part V Conclusion 11 Conclusion Keiko Hirata

235

Bibliography

251

List of Contributors

273

Index

275

Figures

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 8.1

Should Japan Rearm? Should the Constitution be Revised? Should Japan Possess Nuclear Weapons? Japanese Attitudes Toward the Self Defense Forces Japanese Views on U.S.-Japan Security Treaty What Is the Best Way of Defending Japan? Bank Loan Outstanding to Latin America: Japan and the United States 1980–1988

30 31 32 33 35 36 157

Tables

6.1

Japan’s ODA to Developing Countries (1994–2004). Dependent Variable: TECOOP 6.2 Japan’s ODA to Developing Countries (1994–2004). Dependent Variable: GR ANTSAIDS 6.3 Japan’s ODA to Developing Countries (1994–2004). Dependent Variable: NLAID 7.1 Pacific Islands Basic Indicators, 2004 8.1 JEXIM Bank’s Support to the Brady Plan, with Signing Dates and Amounts 9.1 Cortell and Davis’s Typology of Domestic Structural Contexts 9.2 Levels of International Norm Adoption at the Domestic Level 9.3 Japanese Antarctic Research Program (JARPA) 9.4 Japanese Research-Whaling Program in the North Pacific (JARPN) 11.1 Norms Examined in the Previous Chapters 11.2 Two-Stage Models of Foreign Policy Behavior Involving Rationalism and Constructivism

121 122 123 140 165 179 182 188 189 237 248

Preface

W

hile scholarly works on Japan’s foreign policy abound, those that focus on normative effects on Japanese international behavior have been limited in number and scope. In particular, we are aware of no prior books that examine the role of norms in a wide range of Japanese foreign policy issues. By addressing normative questions, we hope to contribute both theoretically and empirically to the field of Japanese foreign policy as well as to the broader fields of Japanese politics, Japanese studies, and international relations. We believe a project like this is of particular value today. The fields of Japanese foreign policy and international relations have been largely split into two camps; one emphasizes mostly quantitative research from rationalist perspectives, and the other stresses qualitative constructivist analysis. While we acknowledge the need for diverse approaches and methods, we also recognize the importance of conversations between those with diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives so as to ensure informed development of the fields of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. In particular, we believe that the search for common ground between rationalist and constructivist interpretations of foreign policy will advance political theory. The starting point for such interaction and possible synthesis must be solid empirical studies, and this volume attempts to bridge the two sides both theoretically and empirically. In terms of Japanese studies, this book is being published at a critical point. Over the past three and a half decades, the field of Japanese studies has matured steadily. However, as Japan’s relative economic prominence in the world has declined, the field has faced growing challenges, such as decreased availability of research funding and declining student enrollments. Continued growth of the field will require scholarship that not only informs specialists on the study of Japan but also contributes to a wider academic audience. By making use of in-depth empirical analysis to take a fresh look at the intersection between diverse theoretical approaches, we hope this book makes such a contribution.

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P R E FA C E

Finally, we would like to thank those who have helped make this book possible. We are grateful to our contributors for their outstanding chapters and for their patience during the long process of book production. We thank Dianna Hummel for providing valuable research assistance with data collection and database management for chapter 6. Our gratitude goes to Jim Rolfe, who helped with final edits during the last stage of production and whose in-depth knowledge of constructivism proved especially helpful. We thank Palgrave Macmillan’s editor, Toby Wahl, and assistant, Emily Hue, for providing excellent support throughout the process and thoughtfully accommodating our requests for changes in the contents and the production schedule. We are also grateful to the anonymous reviewers from Palgrave Macmillan for constructive suggestions. Numerous other individuals have given us invaluable comments, critiques, and support for our project. We also gratefully acknowledge funding provided for the project by California State University, Northridge, and its College of Social and Behavioral Sciences. We dedicate this book to Yasumasa Kuroda and Michael Haas, two prolific lifelong scholars who have touched our lives with their research and mentorship. We hope this book reflects in some small way their fervent commitment to critical inquiry. An earlier version of Chapter 2 was published as Akitoshi Miyashita, “Where Do Norms Come from? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Pacifism,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7 (2007): 99–120. YOICHIRO SATO AND K EIKO H IR ATA

Part I

Introduction

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Constructivism, Rationalism, and the Study of Norms in Japanese Foreign Policy Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata

A

s in any study on a country’s foreign policy, it is difficult to identify a single paradigm that fully captures the essence of Japanese foreign policy. The overlapping, yet somewhat conflicting paradigms of Japan as both a democratic pacifist state and an elite-guided mercantile state that were dominant during the cold war period are increasingly challenged by a paradigm of a military-realist state in the post-cold war era. Although such paradigm competition is a driving force for advancing scholarship, the lack of dialogue, a common language, and common methods across different perspectives has thus far led many scholars to talk past each other and engage only in mutually exclusive paradigm-based monologues. To be sure, the neorealist paradigm—which emphasizes both realist security policy and mercantilist economic policy—has been dominant in the studies of foreign policy, particularly related to Japan. However, it is also true that the gap between Japan’s economic superpower status since the 1980s and its contrastingly limited military power has been a major puzzle for students of Japanese foreign policy. Events since the end of cold war have raised new questions for scholars. On the security policy front, the decline of the Soviet Union and the rising military strength of China and North Korea have sparked renewed debate between realists and their challengers, both in explaining why the U.S.–Japan security alliance has survived and in predicting how Japan’s regional security policy might evolve. On the foreign economic policy front, a series of intense trade disputes with the United States beginning in the 1980s and Japan’s prolonged

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YO I C H I R O S AT O A N D K E I KO H I R ATA

recession in the 1990s have raised questions about the success, stability, and future of Japan’s mercantile political economy. The challenge to neorealism has come from two directions. In the studies of Japan’s security policy, several scholars have paid attention to the growing multilateralism in Japanese foreign policy from liberalinstitutionalist perspectives,1 whereas constructivist scholars have paid attention to Japan’s pacifist norms.2 However, the lines of debate have often been murky. We hope, through this book, to clarify the nature of these debates. Key to doing so is understanding the nature of constructivism and its contention with rationalism. We now turn to that topic. Constructivism as an Epistemology Disagreement over whether constructivism is an epistemology or a paradigm has contributed to confusion in theoretical debate. Owing to the past dominance of the neorealist paradigm in International Relations (IR) and its association with the conservation of extant political power regardless of ideology, new challenges against realism have tended to originate from liberal camps. Constructivist critics of realism have been often perceived to be liberal idealists, and some of these constructivists have willingly accepted such a characterization. Alexander Wendt identifies an “ ‘idealist’ approach” to be one of the two basic tenets of constructivism, but he uses the term “idealist approach” not as a synonym of utopianism but to mean an approach focusing on “structures of human association” as “determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces.”3 Wendt differentiates the idealist approach from utopianism by calling the latter “Idealism” (with the capital “I”).4 Unfortunately, Wendt’s distinction has often been ignored by many scholars who quote him. As J. S. Barkin correctly points out, the fact that constructivists in the United States tend to be liberal idealists (or utopians) is not a product of constructivist epistemology.5 Rather, this bias is a product of the way constructivism has evolved in response to the dominant neorealist IR scholarship in the United States. While some IR theorists have characterized challenges to realism in terms of a three-way paradigm competition among realism, liberalism, and constructivism,6 others have argued that constructivism should be understood as an epistemology that shares theoretical attributes with both realism and liberalism.7 Indeed, the various streams of constructivism considerably differ on how they stand (and how they think the others stand) on a particular normative agenda while sharing the basic premise that ideas

N O R M S I N J A PA N E S E F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

5

matter in world politics. Theo Farrell, for example, argues that although conventional constructivists do not particularly support a normative agenda, critical constructivists do.8 Even conventional constructivists have tended to focus on the impact of “normatively desirable norms,” 9 a problematic focus that Paul Kowart and Jeffrey Legro call the “good norms problem.”10 Thus, the opposing epistemology of constructivism is neither realism nor liberalism but materialism-rationalism, which has served as the umbrella epistemology for both realism and liberalism. Relations between Constructivism and Materialism-Rationalism The basic premise among various strands of constructivism, that ideas matter, contrasts with the materialist-rationalist focus on tangible material interests. The two epistemologies are not mutually exclusive, however. Hence, debating which epistemology is superior is, in our view, fruitless. Whereas conventional constructivism is open to active dialogues with the materialist-rationalist IR scholarship, others including postmodernists emphasize their distinct research scope by attacking the materialist-rationalist assumptions about absence of shared norms in the conduct of IR.11 The following quotes from Friedrich Kratochwil illustrate that these constructivists are interested in critically deconstructing the implicit (yet often unnoticed) materialist-rationalist assumption: The microeconomic analogy bears out only the technical meaning of anarchy, i.e., the absence of formal organizations acting on behalf of a collectivity. The anarchy in the realist or Hobbesian sense, however, means above all the absence of norms or even the most elementary forms of sociality. Consequently, a persistent equivocation exists in structural realist writings when anarchy is used in these two incompatible senses.12 . . . Under conditions of mutual recognition of rights and the availability of a universal medium of exchange and stable store of value, the transformation of self-interest into a theoretically meaningful concept such as revenue maximization makes sense. It can also be achieved “by assumption” rather than by painstaking empirical research. But to conclude from this rather exceptional case that this method of analysis is also applicable to cases where no such conventions are widely shared, simply because in both cases actors are self-interested, is rather heroic. That people act in order to further their interests is hardly illuminating, and it leads to tautologies unless we specify their preferences ex ante.13

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While pointing out that basic conducts of IR, such as economic transactions, are based on constructed and shared norms, such as expected behaviors based on trust in currencies and/or gold, these constructivists often fail to show how their deconstruction of the materialist-rationalist assumptions can advance theoretical knowledge of the discipline. Self-Imposed Isolation of Postmodernism Within the broad grouping of constructivist approaches, the postmodernist wing has been considered isolationist in terms of scholarly dialogues with the more traditional utilitarian/rationalist theories: realism, liberalism, and their offshoots. At the same time, postmodernism has been criticized for not offering constructive contributions to the field of IR. Stephen Walt, for example, points out what he sees as a serious limitation of the postmodernist approach: As Marxism succumbed to its various failings, its mantle was assumed by a group of theorists who borrowed heavily from the wave of postmodern writings in literary criticism and social theory. This “deconstructionist” approach was openly skeptical of the effort to devise general or universal theories such as realism or liberalism. Indeed, its proponents emphasized the importance of language and discourse in shaping social outcomes. However, because these scholars focused initially on criticizing the mainstream paradigms but did not offer positive alternatives to them, they remained a self-consciously dissident minority for most of the 1980s.14

Meanwhile, conventional constructivists themselves try to distance themselves from the postmodernist school. Blaming realists for misunderstanding constructivism and citing Mearsheimer,15 Farrell defends conventional constructivism and its capacity for dialogue with traditional materialist-rationalist theories by saying, “Realists tend to lump constructivists with critical theorists and to dismiss them as postmodernists.”16 Noting three strands of constructivism (conventional, critical, and postmodern), Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner also draw a line between critical and postmodern constructivism by attributing to the former “a willingness to engage openly in scholarly debate with rationalism.”17 In contrast, for Steve Smith, conventional constructivists have been compromised by U.S.-dominated rationalist IR scholarship, and constructivists should maintain their “reflectivism” and their “constitutive theory” approach (as opposed to the “rationalism” and


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“explanatory theory” dominant in the traditional IR).18 Smith points out that “social constructivism in its dominant (mainly North American) form is very close to the neoliberalist wing of the rationalist paradigm.”19 This raises an interesting question about nonAmerican (mainly European) constructivism. In fact, the English school of constructivist IR (though its proponents include many scholars outside the United Kingdom) draws from the rich intellectual history of European realpolitik, diplomatic Grotianism, and Kantian revolutionism—encompassing both realist and liberal theoretical orientations.20 Thus, unlike the implicit (and sometimes even explicit) liberal idealist bias that underpinned North American constructivism, European constructivism spread more evenly across the liberal-realist spectrum. Positivist Methodology and Constructivism Given the diversity within constructivism and a lack of common methodology, dialogue between constructivists and rationalist scholars (both realists and liberals) has been difficult. Emphasizing the need for a common methodology within constructivism inevitably invites constitutive and reflective analyses, thus further distancing constructivism from the causal analysis of the materialist-rationalist scholars. Yet it is also true that the interpretive approach of the constructivist method and the case study approach of the materialistrationalist scholarship find common ground in an inductive approach to theorizing. Hence the most difficult dialogue is at the level of broader generalization, which, according to materialist-rationalist methodology, requires the hypothetico-deductive approach to theory building. Wendt contrasts holistic, constructivist theories with materialistrationalist theories, which are preoccupied with explaining causal relations and effects from materialist perspectives.21 Constructivists, in contrast, focus on constitutive relationships and effects. They are concerned with actor identities and the meanings they give to their actions. From constructive perspectives, actor identities are not given exogenously but rather are relational, formed in the process of interaction. While the two types of theories are thus different in nature, Wendt also recognizes that they can be complementary and even overlapping, especially in the area of methodology. As he points out, though quantitative analysis and causal theorizing may not always be possible for constructivist research, historical and case studies approaches

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emphasizing process-tracing offer the possibility of common ground between constructivism and rationalism.22 Carol Atkinson’s study demonstrates the possibility of bridging constructivism and rationalism.23 Focusing on global military-tomilitary exchange programs by the U.S. Defense Department from 1972 to 2000 in a controlled design, she establishes significant statistical correlations between key military exchange variables and regime types of the partner countries. Atkinson’s study thus subjects constructivism to the “falsifiability” test of the rationalist methodology. Roxanna Sjöstedt also prefers a structured research design in constructivist research.24 Her research compares the discourses in the three-month periods leading to the Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush doctrines. She argues that “a constructivist approach that employs a structured design is able to present more persuasive arguments than the traditional inductive-style narrative favored by many constructivist studies.”25 Dialogue between rationalists, on one hand, and constructivists or “reflectivists,” on the other, has been difficult, as the two groups tend to have different world views. However, as Wendt suggests, bridging such gaps may be possible with conventional constructivism based on studies with a clear research design and effective use of empirical data. One fruitful area for dialogue between rationalists and constructivists is in the area of norms and their relationship to state behavior. Thus far, research on norms has tended to be dominated by constructivists. However, too often constructivists focus on norm development and diffusion in isolation from consideration of issues of interests and power. In fact, these issues are critical if we are to fully understand how and why norms are incorporated into policy and state behavior. Foreign policy is an especially good domain for exploring these relationships, because of the almost inevitable intersection of norms, interests, and power in foreign policy decision-making and implementation. Role of Norms in Foreign Policy A norm can be defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”26 Norms are distinguished from ideas or beliefs, which do not have to be directly linked to actor behavior or shared at a collective level. In addition, ideas and beliefs do not need to be attached to value judgments. In contrast, norms are accompanied by value judgments and are often seen as reflecting “good” or “bad” behavior (though, as mentioned above, most norms studied by IR


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scholars tend to be those with positive associations).27 A norm should also be distinguished from an institution, which, in one meaning of the term, can be described as a collection of norms. Furthermore, a norm is distinct from behavior, so if a researcher wants to study the effects of norms on state behavior, it is critical to operationalize norms in a way that separates them from the behaviors they might affect.28 Distinct types of norms function differently. Regulative norms order and constrain actor behavior, whereas constitutive norms “express actor identities,” which in turn define interests and shape behavior.29 Constructivists are particularly interested in the relationship of constitutive norms to actor behavior. For example, in his study on Japanese security, Katzenstein explains how Japan’s domestic constitutive norms are intimately connected to Japan’s international security behavior. Norms are not static; they evolve and change. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, who examine norms of women’s suffrage and laws of war, a norm has a life cycle involving three stages: (1) norm emergence, (2) “norm cascade” (a broader acceptance of a given norm at a community/international level), and (3) norm internalization. At the final stage of norm evolution, a given norm becomes incorporated into domestic and international laws, professional training, and bureaucratic operating procedures. When a norm becomes deeply and widely institutionalized, adherence to the norm becomes habitual and few question its validity.30 Tom Farer provides an interesting example of longitudinal normative transformation based on his study of international migration from the seventeenth century to date. Farer argues that the seventeenth-century norm of migration was based on the sovereignty of princes under whom migration of people was liberally accepted as a means to enrich the host kingdoms’ economies. As Farer explains, this norm was replaced through the French Revolution with a norm based on the sovereignty of nation-states that recognized the rights of long-term inhabitants through the concept of citizenship. The concept of citizenship, however, also created the notion of noncitizens or aliens.31 Since then, the normative structure of international migration has added some restraints on a state’s treatment of noncitizens (for example, decent treatment of aliens)32 and also some requirements (such as exempting those who have committed political offenses from extradition).33 Norms in the Study of Japanese Foreign Policy Several studies have addressed the effects of norms on Japanese foreign policy. A notable example is Katzenstein’s aforementioned examination

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of the role of Japanese collective identity and pacific norm in security policy.34 Thomas Berger similarly studied the emergence and maintenance of a “culture of antimilitarism” in Japan.35 According to Katzenstein and Berger, it is not Japan’s materialist interests but rather the country’s pacifist norm that has shaped Tokyo’s foreign policy behavior. Others have examined the role of Japanese citizens’ participation in the making of foreign policy and grassroots efforts to incorporate normative values into policy. Even though foreign policy has traditionally been an elite policymaking domain,36 calls to reform Japanese foreign policy since the 1980s have created openings for more participation by diverse societal groups. One of the most heralded recent examples of citizen participation in Japanese foreign policy is the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the making of Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) policy and implementation.37 For example, some have attributed Tokyo’s suspension of aid to India and Pakistan in 1999 to the strength of pacifist citizens’ movements and their successful efforts to incorporate the antinuclear norm in development policy.38 Still other scholars have examined Tokyo’s reaction to international trade norms. Andrew Cortell and James Davis, for example, analyze how Japan responded to an international trade liberalization norm embedded in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to Cortell and Davis, Japan’s slow-paced internalization of the norm, or the “stopand-go pattern” of norm acceptance,39 is due to preexisting domestic norms of mercantilism and economic nationalism that maintain influence over Japanese policymakers. Over time, and faced with a macroeconomic crisis in the 1990s, Japanese business leaders came to recognize that market liberalization was necessary to avoid an economic catastrophe; they thus adopted the trade liberalization norm for instrumental reasons.40 Still other scholars have pointed to the role of relativist norms in Japanese foreign policy, arguing that Japan do not always subscribe to universal values (for example, on issues related to human rights and democracy, where some international norms hold sway and others do not) but rather tend to have relativist values that are contingent upon external circumstances.41 Others contend that Japan’s human rights policy is based on culturally relativist norms of “Asian values.” According to this argument, Japan does not fully embrace human rights norms because its people see such norms as originating from Western values not shared by Asians.42 However, whether Japanese


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policymakers genuinely believe in cultural relativism is open to debate. For example, Annette Marfording points out, from a rationalist point of view, that norms of cultural relativism can be used by political actors to advance their interests. Marfording illustrates how a cultural norm on human rights can be created by power elites. In her view, the Japanese power elite has created, regulated, and manipulated cultural ideology to its advantage.43 Theoretical Approach Japan has many foreign policy identities. On one hand, Tokyo has been described as lacking its own foreign policy initiatives, passively following the U.S. lead and failing to represent its own interests. On the other hand, scholars focused on economic policy have often portrayed Japan as an aggressive mercantile state. Since the end of the cold war, new images of Japan’s foreign policy have emerged. In the 1990s, Japan became an “ODA (official development assistance) superpower” and soon thereafter began joining UN peace-keeping operations (PKO). Japan’s recent efforts to cement the U.S.–Japan alliance through enhanced military contributions and to seek a permanent seat on the UN Security Council are further steps toward a more proactive foreign policy. However, Japan’s new internationalist identity is far from stable, as seen in the decline of the “aid superpower” orientation since the late 1990s and the rising populist support for Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s nationalist appeals. Japan’s renewed emphasis on “Asia diplomacy,” since the Hosokawa administration took over, faces competing policy objectives in the region (such as a stronger defense vis-à-vis potential threats from North Korea and China) and challenges by what are considered more important strategic objectives (such as security reliance on the United States and the perceived need to adhere to U.S. perspectives). In the past, Japan’s behavior—often described as lacking principles44 —was explained in terms of its relativist culture or the country’s mercantilist orientation.45 Recently, however, a growing number of scholars have focused on norms to explain Tokyo’s international behavior in areas of security policy, development assistance, trade, and human rights, as discussed above. However, these constructivist approaches based on norms compete with realist approaches for interpreting Japanese foreign policy, which have again become prominent following setbacks in Japan’s post-cold war liberal-internationalist agenda since the second half of the 1990s.46

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Lacking a shared methodology, discussions between the constructivist and the reemerging realist schools of Japanese foreign policy have tended to be mutual monologues. Some attempts have been made to bring the two schools together,47 but much more rigorous methodological discussion is required for meaningful dialogue to occur. We hope that this book will contribute to that discussion and dialogue. The volume examines the role of norms in Japanese foreign policy through methodologically rigorous case studies based on clearly identified empirical evidence for claims made. Each case study addresses how norms guide, or do not guide, Japanese foreign policy and how they interact with spheres of interests and power and seeks to answer the following questions: To what extent and under what conditions do norms matter in Japanese foreign policy? Are norms linked to particular interests or to actors’ attempts to increase their power? What is the role of the state in enforcing norm compliance? The impact of both international and domestic norms on Japan’s foreign policy behavior is considered in this book. As for international norms, questions are addressed as to how international norms operate at the domestic level, who promotes them, and why. As for domestic norms, the key questions addressed are how domestic norms are internalized by actors as directions for action and how such norms affect policy debates and outcomes. By analyzing the impact of norms on Japanese foreign policy from the angles of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, this book compares and contrasts the materialist-rationalist and constructivist schools of thought and explores whether these schools are potentially complementary or mutually exclusive. In particular, each chapter addresses constructivism in some fashion or another. By design, they do so in reference to a range of sub-streams within constructivism, or at least in respect to those variants of constructivism that base themselves firmly on empirical data. The breadth of constructivist substreams may be challenging to the reader, who must tolerate a certain ambiguity of reference point from chapter to chapter. Overall, though, we believe the advantages of this approach outweigh the disadvantages, as such a breadth of coverage (again, though excluding antiempirical perspectives) allows for a more thorough exploration of points of engagement with the materialist-rationalist approach. Organization of the Book Following this introductory chapter, the book will present nine case studies (chapters 2–10). Four cases will address security and diplomatic


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policy issues. Three cases will examine foreign economic policy issues. Two cases will analyze international environmental issues. In chapter 2, Akitoshi Miyashita focuses on the mutual causal relations between material factors, on one hand, and cultures and norms, on the other, in explaining Japan’s minimalist defense policy. In contrast to constructivists who inquire into the cognitive process behind formation of material interests, Miyashita shows how material factors influenced the cognitive processes behind shifting public opinion on defense policy. In chapter 3, Keiko Hirata discusses the role of an international anti-landmine norm in Japan’s security policy. Hirata moves away from a strict cause-and-effect framing of the materialist-rationalist approach and details interactions between the international norm and movements of the Japanese NGOs. She argues that norms are not necessarily subordinate to material interests. Kimie Hara in chapter 4 discusses Japan’s changing approach to the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union/Russia, with a focus on interactions between domestic views and the structures of international power politics. Hara emphasizes the complementary aspect of the materialist-rationalist and constructivist approaches, but her view of norms is that they are subject to material interests. Yoichiro Sato in chapter 5 reviews the Japanese government’s use of three norms of collective defense in promoting overseas dispatches of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in a case study of the Antiterror Special Measures Law. Sato shows that UN-centric multilateralism has been used to promote not only SDF participation in UN-authorized PKOs, but also bilateral U.S.–Japan cooperation and SDF participation in the “coalition of the willing” military operations. Like Miyashita, Sato sees norms as being subject to materialist-rationalists. In chapter 6, Yoichiro Sato and Masahiko Asano propose models of Japanese ODA policy and statistically test them. The three models incorporate liberal norms of poverty reduction, civil liberty promotion, and political rights promotion as possible causal factors. The two authors bring normative values onto the materialist-rationalist methodology and carry out quantitative analysis of norm-based explanations. Sandra Tarte in chapter 7 examines the gap between Japan’s prominence as a major provider of foreign aid and its low political profile in the South Pacific region. Tarte employs both material and ideational lenses and considers the compatibility and conflicts between them. Like Hara, Tarte shows how the two approaches can be mutually enhancing. She examines the close connection between Japan’s selective use of domestic norms and its fishing interests in the Pacific

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to explain the persistence of Japanese ODA policy in this region at a time of increasing international pressure on Tokyo to conform to Western aid standards. Saori Katada in chapter 8 looks at the diffusion of transnational norms of international debt management within an international financial policy community and analyzes the interaction between the transnational norms and material interests during the Latin American debt crisis. Katada discusses the diffusion of the norm from materialistrationalist perspectives. Keiko Hirata in chapter 9 focuses on failed norm diffusion at the level of domestic politics in the case of Japan’s whaling policy. Hirata explains how the transnational antiwhaling norm has failed to ignite a broader domestic antiwhaling movement as a result of the domestic cultural and political structures that blocked the transnational norm. Eric Shibuya in chapter 10 considers multiple norms that are expected to drive Japan’s policy on global warming and carbon dioxide emission control policy. Tracing Japan’s positions through the negotiations on emission control and examining the degree of domestic enthusiasm for these positions, Shibuya concludes that it is not environmental ethics but rather the domestic norm of achieving international diplomatic leadership that is the driving force of Japan’s policy. In chapter 11, Keiko Hirata summarizes the findings of the various chapters to address the three main research questions driving this volume: Which are the norms that have most affected Japanese foreign policy? What are the conditions or factors that help determine the impact that a norm has on policy? How do norms interact with material interests and power? In summarizing, she returns to the main theme of constructivism versus rationalism and suggests some ways that the two approaches may be integrated. Notes 1. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” The Pacific Review 14, 2 (2001): 221–240. 2. Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1998). 3. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. 4. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 3. 5. J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review 5, 3 (September 2003): 334–335.


15

6. Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1998): 29–46. 7. Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” 325–342. 8. Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” International Studies Review 4, 1 (Spring 2002): 51, 58–59. 9. Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies,” 58. 10. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 485–486, fn. 81. 11. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics: A Review Essay,” Review of International Studies 30 (2004): 230–231. 12. Friedrich Kratochwil, “Norms Versus Numbers: Multilateralism and the Rationalist and Reflexivist Approaches to Institutions—a Unilateral Plea for Communicative Rationality,” in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, edited by John Gerard Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 446. 13. Ibid. 14. Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations,” 34. 15. John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Premise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, 3 (1994/1995): 41. 16. Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies,” 56. 17. Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52 (1988): 677. 18. Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline,’ ” International Studies Review 4, 2 (Summer 2002): 70–77. 19. Ibid., 74. 20. Barry Buzan, From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 8–10. 21. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 25. 22. Ibid., 82–83. 23. Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972–2000,” International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006): 509–537. 24. Roxanna Sjöstedt, “The Discursive Origins of a Doctrine: Norms, Identity, and Securitization under Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (2007): 233–254. 25. Ibid., 233. 26. Martha Finnemore and Katheryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, 4 (1998): 891.

16


27. Kowert and Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits”, 485–486, fn. 81. It is thus natural that constructive scholars find common ground with liberal idealists (or utopians), since both focus on positive norms or ideals. 28. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 892. 29. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 18. 30. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 895. 31. Tom Farer, “How the International System Cope with Involuntary Migration: Norms, Institutions, and State Practice,” in Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy, edited by Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 259–260. 32. Ibid., 261. 33. These restraints and requirements have gradually led to the creation of an international principle of safe haven for asylum seekers. The notion of refugees, however, has become a narrowly defined one under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which covers individuals who face a well-grounded fear of persecution “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Those who are strictly defined as “refugees” are now protected by an international regime of human rights, whereas broader “involuntary migrants” are left to the dictates of a state’s sovereign rules. Farer, “How the International System Copes with Involuntary Migration,” 261–262, 282. 34. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security. 35. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism. 36. Active participation of citizens in the making of foreign policy has been limited in Japan for several reasons, such as cold war realpolitik, elite monopoly of policy-related information, and mercantilist interests in the making of foreign policy that often excludes nonbusiness perspectives. 37. Kim Reinmann, “NGOs, the State and International Norms,” in The State of Civil Society in Japan, edited by Frank Schwartz and Susan Pharr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 298–315; Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Role of NGOs in Japan’s Aid and Development Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Purnendra Jain, “Emerging Foreign Policy Actors: Subnational Governments and Nongovernmental Organizations,” in Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader, edited by Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 18–39. 38. Satu P. Limaye, “Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22 (2000). Skeptics, however, often downplay the normative influence of NGOs in Japan’s ODA policy.


17

39. Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “When Norms Clash: International Norms, Domestic Practices, and Japan’s Internalization of the GATT/WTO,” Review of International Studies 31, 1 (2005): 21. 40. Ibid., 3–25. 41. See, for example, Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century: From Economic Superpower to What Power? (London and New York: McMillan/St. Martin’s Press, 1998), Chapter 1. 42. See for example, Fumitaka Furuoka, Beatrice Lim Fui Yee, and Roslinah Mahmud, “Japan and Asian Values: A Challenge for Japan’s East Asian Policy in the New Century,” eastasia.at 5, 1 (September 2006). 43. Annette Marfording, “Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture: An Examination of Japan,” Human Rights Quarterly 19, 2 (1997): 431–448. 44. Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, Chapter 1. 45. For example, David Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 46. For example, Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” International Security 22, 4 (1998): 171–203; Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy”; Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” Foreign Affairs 82 (2002): 110–121; Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 29, 1 (2004): 92–121. 47. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).


Part II

Security and Diplomatic Policy


Chapter 2

Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Pacifism Akitoshi Miyashita

O

ne of the enduring puzzles about Japanese foreign policy since the 1970s has been the gap between the nation’s economic power and its military capability. Despite its status as one of the leading market economies in the world, Japan has been very reluctant to translate its economic resources into military power and has acted in large part as what Richard Rosecrance called a “trading state.”1 Although the absolute amount of Japan’s defense budget is quite substantial, its relative size, measured in relation to gross domestic product (GDP), is one of the smallest among the advanced industrial nations.2 Throughout the postwar era, Japan has persistently taken a lowprofile stance on strategic issues and remained highly dependent on the United States for defense. Today, more than six decades after the end of World War II, Japan is still reluctant to become a military power commensurate to its economic status and continues to be very cautious about dispatching its Self Defense Forces (SDFs) abroad. To be sure, Japan has participated in UN peace keeping operations in places such as Cambodia, Mozambique, and Rwanda; enacted numerous defense-related legislation including counterterrorism and national emergency bills; introduced highly sophisticated defense equipment/measures such as the Aegis and the missile defense (MD) system; and had the SDFs join the U.S.-led multilateral forces in Iraq. Behind these actions are the shifts in Japanese perception regarding their national security. In a poll conducted in April 2, 2003 by Yomiuri Shimbun, the most circulated daily in Japan, 67 percent of the respondents said Japan should play a more active role in the area

22

A K I T O S H I M I YA S H I TA

of international security and 54 percent of the respondents were in favor of revising the so-called peace constitution. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution denies Japan’s right of belligerency as a sovereign state and prohibits the nation to possess military forces. Yet, even under the recent shifts in public opinions and the passages of new laws that have allowed the dispatch of the SDFs to places such as the Indian Ocean and Iraq, the Japanese troops are unable to engage in military operations abroad. The duties of the SDFs are strictly limited to noncombatant activities, such as providing drinking water, constructing roads, monitoring elections, as well as some logistical support, including refueling allied warships. There are strict rules on the types of arms that the troops can carry, and they can use them only to protect themselves when they are attacked while on duty. The Japanese are thus still very reluctant to resort to military force to maintain international peace and security. The gap between Japan’s economic and military power has been considered counterintuitive by many scholars on international relations. Thomas Berger, for example, puts this puzzle in the following manner: “Among comparable advanced industrial nations they [Japan, along with Germany] stand out for their extraordinary reluctance to become actively involved in international military security affairs.”3 Many analysts have attempted to explain Japan’s gun-shy diplomacy, especially the gap between its economic and military power. Some argue that the cold war and the alliance with the United States made it both unnecessary and unrealistic for Japan to become heavily armed. Under such external environment, Japan’s best strategy has been to concentrate on economic security while riding cheaply, if not freely, on the United States for military security.4 Others focus on domestic variables, ranging from institutional arrangements and intra-governmental politics5 to techno-nationalism6 and electoral systems.7 In the past two decades or so, a growing number of scholars have focused on such intangible factors as norms and culture in explaining Japan’s defense policy.8 This reflects in large part the rise of constructivism in the study of international relations and the growing emphasis on the role norms and ideas play in shaping foreign policy.9 Constructivists hold that international position alone is insufficient to explain why Tokyo behaves the way it does and that collective identity as a peaceful trading nation and the norm of antimilitarism that emerged after its defeat in World War II have constrained Japan’s postwar defense policy. By showing the ways in

J A PA N ’ S P O S T WA R PA C I F I S M F O U N D AT I O N S

23

which intersubjectively shared norms and ideas shape policies by constituting the identities and interests of actors, constructivists seek to explain the gap in Japan’s economic and military power—a central anomaly from the standpoint of neorealism and a major puzzle in comparative defense studies. Indeed, by introducing intangible concepts such as norms and ideas, constructivists have enriched the study of world politics, which has long been dominated by the approaches that focus on structural and/or material factors in explaining state behavior. As much as it enlightens, however, constructivist theory leaves one crucial question unanswered: where do norms come from? If Japan’s security policy is a product of cultural norms, how did such norms come to be shared among the Japanese in the first place and why do they continue to shape policy? Norms rarely emerge spontaneously; they are often a reflection of underlying material interests and resulting political struggles. As such, explaining state behavior solely in terms of norms may be insufficient and possibly misleading. This does not necessarily mean that shared norms and cultures play no significant role. It only forces us to look into the relationship between intangible variables such as norms and their material underpinnings. This chapter examines this relationship in Japan’s defense policy. In particular, it seeks to reveal the nature of Japan’s postwar “pacifism” and the possible reasons it has been sustained for an extended period of time.10 I argue that in order to explain the emergence and persistence of the kind of norms that have defined Japan’s postwar security policy, one must look not only at the legacy of World War II but also at realist variables such as structures, threat perceptions, and political processes that constructivists often claim to be inadequate or irrelevant. In large part, these variables have defined the character and strength of Japan’s postwar pacifism. This point will be developed by examining the changes in opinion polls and in defense policy of the Japan Socialist Party (since 1996, the Social Democratic Party of Japan), a major opposition party in Japan that has long adhered to a pacifist defense posture. Before going into the details, however, I outline some of the central arguments made by constructivists on Japan’s postwar defense policy and discuss their strengths as well as weaknesses. Constructivism and Japanese Defense Policy Like most domestic political analysts, constructivists begin by claiming that neorealism is insufficient to explain Japan’s national

24


security policy. While the international position may explain Japan’s minimalist defense posture in the 1950s and 1960s, they contend, it fails to account for the continuity in Japan’s defense policy after the 1970s when the nation emerged as the second largest economy in the world. Peter Katzenstein, a leading proponent in this school of thought, argues, “Since the mid 1970s Japan has experienced substantial changes in its relative standing in the international system without great changes in its policy for national security.”11 Similarly, Thomas Berger contends, “[Japan and Germany] contradict a large body of literature that suggests great powers inevitably seek to develop military capabilities commensurate with their economic strength and overall political status in the international community.”12 In light of its renewed power position, coupled with the anarchic nature of the international system, neorealists would lead us to expect that Japan should possess much stronger military forces. Indeed, Kenneth Waltz in 1993 anticipated that Japan, along with Germany, would soon possess nuclear weapons. Two decades earlier, Herman Kahn had made a similar prediction.13 So far, both have been proven wrong. “In sum,” declares Katzenstein, “there exists no observable relations between Japan’s relative position and its security policy.”14 This inconsistency between neorealist predictions and actual defense policy of Japan, among others, led constructivists to focus on nonmaterial factors in explaining the Japanese anomaly. What, then, accounts for the gap between Japan’s economic and military power? Constructivists contend that Japan’s minimalist defense policy derives from the norms (defined as social facts) that have prevailed in the Japanese thinking of national security. As Katzenstein notes, “Japanese officials define internal and external security in comprehensive terms. They emphasize the social, economic, and political aspects of security rather than force more narrowly on the explicitly coercive dimensions of state policy. Japan’s security policy is thus part and parcel of its quest for social stability through economic growth.”15 This comprehensive view of security rests on the common belief among the Japanese that “violence does not pay” and on the collective identity of Japan as a “peaceful trading state.” These shared identities, according to Katzenstein, have informed the way in which Japanese leaders define Japan’s security interests— officials in Tokyo maintain that security should be pursued only by peaceful means. Similarly, Thomas Berger stresses the importance of a collective identity in shaping Japanese (and German) national security policy.


25

According to Berger, “The solution to this puzzle (of the gap between economic and military power) . . . lies in the strong antimilitarist sentiments that emerged in Germany and Japan in the wake of their catastrophic defeat in World War II.”16 He notes that Japan and Germany “share an iron determination to avoid a repetition of past mistakes,” with each nation developing the antimilitarist sentiment that “can best be explained by each nation’s struggle to draw lessons from its troubled past.”17 These cultures of antimilitarism, he contends, continue to characterize the political systems of both nations and place a heavy psychological burden on them in their pursuit of more active defense policies.18 Many analysts, constructivists or otherwise, do point to the collective memory of World War II as a key factor shaping Japanese postwar defense and foreign policy. For example, Masaru Tamamoto writes, “Remembering what happened the last time the nation ventured abroad, the Japanese are afraid of what they might do once they reenter the international political-strategic arena.”19 Similarly, Matake Kamiya argues, “After witnessing nearly two decades of the follies of their own military leaders, the Japanese people developed a deep distrust of the military after the war, as well as a strong aversion to anything related to the military as a tool of national policy, including even Japan’s national security policy.”20 These antimilitarist sentiments have been translated into various self-restraining measures that the Japanese government has imposed on its own defense policy: the three nonnuclear principles (that Japan would not possess, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory); prohibition on participating in collective defense; ban on arms exports; and the imposition of 1 percent of the GDP as the limit on defense spending. In addition, Tokyo, as a matter of policy, has refrained from acquiring such “offensive” weapons as long-range strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although some of the restrictions have been breached or are open to interpretations, the fact that the Japanese government ever had to introduce them to justify or rationalize its defense policy is indicative of the existence of strong pacifist norms among the Japanese people. Structures, Norms, Interests Despite the contributions to the study of Japanese defense policy, constructivism has its own shortcomings.21 One of its fundamental

26


weaknesses appears to be the failure to address the question of where norms come from.22 As Robert Jervis pointed out, “It is one thing to argue that material factors and the external environment do not determine a state’s behavior and to point to the importance of regulative and constitutive norms, shared understandings, and common practices; it is quite another to say how norms are formed, how identities are shaped, and how interests become defined as they do.”23 Indeed, even if we acknowledge the impact of normative forces upon Japanese defense policy, questions such as the following quickly arise: Why has the culture of antimilitarism been sustained in Japan for more than five decades after the end of World War II? If the antimilitarist sentiment is firmly rooted in the Japanese political culture, why has Tokyo chosen not to adopt more pacifist positions such as “unarmed neutrality” as advocated by the Japan Socialist Party and its supporters throughout much of the cold war era? Why has the Japanese government gradually modified its interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to allow gradual expansion of its armed forces since the 1950s? These questions constitute core tests for the constructivist claim that norms matter, yet they remain largely unanswered or are discussed only in a post hoc manner in the literature. As noted, Thomas Berger attributes the origins of Japan’s antimilitarism to its defeat in World War II. He argues that “historical culture is the product of events and experiences, such as revolutions, wars, economic and natural catastrophes, and at times, the impact of intellectual movements.”24 In this sense, the bitter defeat in World War II can be said to have caused the dramatic shift in Japan’s culture of national security from aggressive militarism to pacifism after 1945. This claim appears plausible in its own right but becomes questionable in a comparative context. Does a defeat in a major war always make a country antimilitarist? Did Athens after the Peloponnesian War, the Confederate States after the American Civil War, France after the Napoleonic Wars, Germany after World War I, or Italy after World War II become pacifist? Certainly not, or at least not to the degree that postwar Japan or Germany have been. The question then is: Why does a defeat in a major war make some countries antimilitarist but not others? This leads us to expect that a historical experience alone is insufficient to account for the kind of pacifism that emerged in postwar Japan and Germany. To be fair, Berger acknowledges structural factors. As he notes, “Without the security guarantees provided by the United States, in all likelihood Germany and Japan would have had little choice but to


27

develop more powerful military capabilities, including independent nuclear deterrent forces.”25 Nonetheless, he maintains that the U.S. factor alone cannot explain “the strength of German and Japanese antimilitarism” because even under the U.S. security guarantee Japan and Germany could have possessed much greater defense forces and become more active in military affairs, given the existence of strong domestic forces calling for larger defense buildups.26 While Berger is right to point out that the systemic factors, such as the U.S. security guarantee, are inconclusive, his discussion on domestic politics raises a question about the cultural arguments he makes: If there were people in Japan calling for a larger and more autonomous defense policy, why did their view not prevail? Indeed, there existed in Japan many ideas or positions on the nation’s security policy, ranging from unarmed neutrality and economic nationalism to Gaullism and military realism.27 Why did only the kind of antimilitarism that Berger suggests to have prevailed in postwar Japan triumph and become institutionalized in the Japanese state? That is, why did the culture of antimilitarism take the form of economic nationalism rather than unarmed neutrality in actual policy? As discussed below, norms are a product of politics as much as they are a product of historical events. As such, they cannot be separated from the discussion of power and interests. Other constructivists are more wary of the political foundations of norms and ideas. For example, Peter Katzenstein argues that Japan’s antimilitarist social norms emerged as a result of the sharp ideological battle that divided the nation in the 1950s. He notes, “Until 1960 proponents of competing national identities were locked in bitter conflict. Eventually the proponents of economic nationalism prevailed, institutionalizing a national consensus on economic growth and the subordination of the search for political equality with other states, especially the United States.”28 For Katzenstein, then, norms arise not spontaneously or automatically from historical events. Instead, they are “contested and made and remade through politics.”29 By acknowledging and analyzing the political context within which certain norms emerge and develop, Katzenstein seeks to avoid the mistake of taking any behavior or policy after the fact and point to its intellectual antecedents—a common pitfall of constructivism.30 Nonetheless, while Katzenstein is able to explain why some ideas but not others find their way into policy, his political arguments bring him back to the realist/rationalist position he started out to reject. Had he gone further to ask why doves prevailed over hawks as well as

28


why Japan’s antimilitarist social norms were sustained for an extended period of time, he would probably have had to bring in some structural as well as material factors, such as the cold war, the U.S. security guarantee, and Japan’s economic success. Indeed, one can sensibly argue that, given the alliance with the United States, the Japanese government, led by the pro-American and pro-business Liberal Democratic Party, perceived that it was in Japan’s best interest to pursue a dovish rather than a hawkish security policy—the policy line first pursued by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and subsequently institutionalized in the Japanese state in much of the postwar era. As its national economy expanded, Japan was expected to share a larger defense burden with the United Sates, but Tokyo made only the minimum contribution that was considered necessary to prevent the United States from abandoning Japan.31 The end of the cold war did not fundamentally change this pattern and the United States continues to provide security guarantee to Japan. In this context, it is important to point out that realism, with its central premise on material power and interests, has never been alien to the analyses of Japanese defense and foreign policies. Samuel P. Huntington once noted that “Japan has acted in a way totally consistent with the ‘realist’ theory of international relations.”32 Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels developed the notion of mercantile realism and explained how Japan best fits this model.33 Similarly, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki showed that Japan’s postwar defense policy, while not fully explained by neorealism, is perfectly consistent with the predictions of what he calls “postclassical realism.”34 These studies do not necessarily undermine the role norms and ideas play, but they make us wonder whether Katzenstein’s contention that “the normative context matters more than the economic or military content of policy” is a valid statement.35 The question is not whether norms are more important than material/structural forces but how they are related with each other. In a more recent article, Katzenstein acknowledges the limits of constructivism and advocates for a more eclectic approach combining realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives in explaining Japanese defense policy. As he notes, “Japan’s and Asia-Pacific’s security policies are not shaped solely by power, interests, or identity but by their combination. Adequate understanding requires analytical eclecticism, not parsimony.”36 Unfortunately, he does not fully elaborate his point by specifying how exactly different perspectives can be combined, or how power, interests, and identity interact with one another to shape policies.


29

I argue that explanations based on norms and identities cannot be separated from discussion on structural and material factors when it comes to the question of where norms come from and why they are sustained. Power and interests may not explain everything, but they often account for why certain norms emerge and are sustained to influence policy. While it is true that antimilitarist norms have been stronger in Japan than in most other major countries, the extent to which pacifist norms are sustained has a lot to do with Japan’s security environment and domestic political conditions, such as security ties with the United States, threat perception, economic prosperity, and political stability. As will be discussed later, these variables affected the robustness, as well as content, of Japanese pacifism. When, for example, security was (perceived as) abundant, Japanese norms were more pacifist; when security was scarce, norms grew less pacifist. In the following two sections, I seek to show how structural and material factors have affected Japan’s antimilitarist norms by looking at opinion polls and security policy of the Japan Socialist Party. A careful examination of these major indicators of Japan’s postwar pacifism reveals that the culture of antimilitarism and the collective identity of Japan as a trading state emerged and sustained in large part because the country has been economically successful while its security was guaranteed by the United States. The Paradox of Public Opinion Variables such as cultures and norms are difficult to operationalize. I use public opinion polls to measure Japanese pacifism for two reasons. First, compared with other possible measurements, such as the degree of institutionalization and the content of public speeches by policymakers, public opinion is easier to measure and more readily accessible. Although not always complete, data are available across issues and over a relatively long period of time. Second, most constructivists do use opinion polls to measure the extent to which antimilitarist norms/ cultures prevail in Japan. Berger and Katzenstein cite results of various opinion polls to show how widely and strongly the norms of antimilitarism are embedded in the Japanese society.37 Opinion polls are certainly not the only way to measure norms, but they provide some useful information as to whether there are shared perceptions and identities among the Japanese over the country’s defense policy. According to most opinion polls, the Japanese people have consistently supported the idea of keeping the nation’s defense forces at a minimum, limiting Japan’s international contribution largely to

30


economic assistance, and preserving Article 9 of Japan’s “no war” constitution.38 As Katzenstein notes, “The public has opposed all attempts to shift power to the military, and the end of the cold war did not lead to great changes in this opinion profile. Japan’s antimilitarist social norms have been remarkably stable.”39 That said, a closer look at the polls reveals some interesting trends. First, the pacifist orientation among the Japanese people was actually weaker than the pro-armament sentiment in the immediate postwar years. For example, the polls taken during the 1950s concerning Japanese attitudes toward rearmament show that the supporters of rearmament outnumbered the opponents (figure 2.1). Similarly, more Japanese favored revising the constitution than preserving it in the early 1950s (figure 2.2). Second, the pacifist orientation was weaker in the immediate postwar years than in the subsequent decades. The polls on Japanese

80 70 60

Percent

50 40 30 20 10 0 1951

1953

1956

1957

Year Yes Figure 2.1

No

Should Japan Rearm?

Source: NHK Hoso Seron Chosa Jo. Zusetsu Sengo Seronshi [A Graphical Analysis of the History of Postwar Public Opinion]. Tokyo: NHK Press, 1982, p. 171.

31


80 70 60 Percent

50 40 30 20 10 2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1991

1986

1981

1980

1970

1957

1955

1954

1953

1952

1951

0

Year Yes

Figure 2.2

No

Should the Constitution be Revised?

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun-sha, Yomiuri Nenkan, various years.

attitudes toward constitutional revision revealed that support for constitutional revision was higher in the 1950s than in the 1970s and 1980s (figure 2.2). A similar trend can be observed on the issue of Japan’s nuclear options. Although most Japanese have opposed Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, the number of those who favored it in 1955 was more than double that in 1981 (figure 2.3). These results appear counterintuitive: we should expect more Japanese people opposing rearmament and constitutional revision in the immediate postwar period than in the 1970s and 1980s when memories of World War II were waning as a new generation with greater self confidence began to emerge.40 If, as Thomas Berger argues, Japan’s culture of antimilitarism stemmed from the disastrous defeat in World War II, such culture should have grown weaker with time. What explains the relatively high degree of pro-rearmament attitude among the Japanese in the early postwar years? At least two possible reasons stand out. First, the level of insecurity was relatively high in the immediate postwar era. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Japan’s security environment was highly volatile—the cold war was dividing the postwar world; the communists took over mainland China in 1949; and North Korea invaded the South in 1950. Meanwhile, Japan remained

32


90 80 70

Percent

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1955

1959

1968

1969

1975

1978

1981

Year Yes Figure 2.3

No

Should Japan Possess Nuclear Weapons?

Source: NHK Hoso Seron Chosa Jo, Zusetsu Sengo Seronshi [Graphical Analysis of the History of Postwar Public Opinion] (Tokyo: NHK Press), 171.

unarmed, having enacted the new constitution that denied the right of belligerency and prohibited possession of land, sea, and air forces. Even when it was decided that the U.S. military forces would remain in Japan after the peace treaty, the Japanese people at that time were not sure whether the American military presence would bring peace or war to Japan.41 Under these circumstances, the sense of insecurity prevailed over the antiwar sentiment in Japan. In fact, the level of Japanese support for rearmament went up in the wake of the Korean War. Soon after the war broke out in Korea, the Japanese government launched its rearmament program by creating the Police Reserve Force (PRF) in the summer of 1950. Two years later, the PRF was reorganized into the National Safety Force, which became the SDF in 1954. Support for rearmament gradually declined with these developments and the conclusion of truce in Korea in 1953. Indeed, after the establishment of the SDF, the opponents of rearmament outnumbered the supporters. This interpretation seems to be supported by looking at the Japanese attitudes toward the SDFs during the cold war. Although

33


the majority of the Japanese always favored keeping the SDFs at the existing level, those who favored an increase outnumbered those who opposed it in two periods: the late 1960s and the late 1970s/early 1980s (figure 2.4). It can be said that the incidents such as the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon’s Guam Doctrine (suggesting a decrease in U.S. military commitment in Asia), and the Sino–American rapprochement made the Japanese feel that security was relatively scarce in the late 1960s. Similar psychological effects were present in the late 1970s/early 1980s when events such as President Jimmy Carter’s proposal to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan left Japanese with a sense of insecurity. Many analysts point out that the sense of insecurity in Japan, caused by the fear of abandonment by the United States, was high in those periods.42

70.0 60.0

Percent

50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1966

1962

1961

0.0

Year Should be Increased Figure 2.4

Keep the Current Level

Japanese Attitudes Toward the Self Defense Forces

Source: Sorifu Kohoshitsu, Zenkoku Seronchosa no Gaiyo, various years.

Should be Reduced

34


It appears that the recent shift in public opinion in favor of constitutional revision and an expansion of the SDFs, as shown in figures 2.2 and 2.4, further supports the security scarcity/abundance thesis. That is, the level of threat perception and the sense of insecurity strongly affect the robustness of pacifist norms. The shift is certainly unthinkable without the events such as the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the abduction of Japanese nationals and a series of missile and nuclear tests by North Korea, the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, the rise of Chinese military power, and the Iraq War of 2003. They have gradually altered the political climate in Japan toward greater military assertiveness and contributions. Another reason for the relatively high degree of pro-rearmament attitude among the Japanese in the early postwar years has a lot to do with domestic politics. The fierce ideological battle between conservatives and liberals faded, if not completely ended, after 1960. Until then, the country had been divided on the issue of national security, with conservatives seeking to revise the constitution, expand the SDFs, and strengthen Japan’s security ties with the United States, while liberals opposing constitutional revision, rearmament, and alignment with the United States. The ideological battle reached its zenith when the former class A war criminal Nobusuke Kishi emerged as the prime minister in 1957 and tried to pursue conservative policy agendas. Kishi’s prime objective, to renegotiate the terms of the U.S.– Japan security treaty to make it more “equal” for Japan, was successfully carried out, but his forceful tactics for the ratification of the new treaty in the National Diet backfired, upsetting many Japanese and causing massive demonstrations against him. In the end, Kishi was forced to resign. It was after the turmoil of the security treaty revision of 1960 that the pacifist social norms largely came to define Japanese security policy. After Kishi’s resignation in 1960, Japanese politics stabilized, and a national consensus on Japan’s international strategy—low profile on defense (and dependence on the United States for national security) while concentrating on economic security—began to emerge. By the end of the 1960s, this view became the guiding principle of Japan’s foreign policy.43 Many analysts, including Katzenstein, refer to 1960 as a turning point in Japan’s postwar security policy. On one hand, after the security treaty crisis of 1960, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) chose not to bring the question of national security to the center of political debate; instead, it focused national energy and resources on Japan’s economic growth. On the other, the leftist agenda of abolishing Japan’s security ties


35

with the United States and achieving unarmed neutrality gradually lost popular support. As the national economy began to grow at an unprecedented speed, more Japanese came to believe that the security treaty with the United States brought peace and prosperity to Japan instead of unwanted wars, as leftist political parties had long claimed. Indeed, support for the U.S.–Japan security treaty in Japan has been fairly robust throughout the postwar era (figure 2.5). By the late 1960s, most Japanese people had come to believe that Japan’s security would be best insured by the alliance with the United States and by the SDFs, while supporters of unarmed neutrality and independent national forces had declined and become marginal (figure 2.6). Thus, what is remarkable about Japanese postwar pacifism is that the Japanese people embraced both Japan’s no-war constitution as a pacifist ideal and the U.S.–Japan alliance as an inevitable product of the geostrategic reality. These otherwise antithetical positions are not mutually exclusive but rather reinforcing in the Japanese thinking of national security: they are the two sides of the same coin.44 Indeed, the alliance with the United States became a material and structural basis upon which Japan’s culture of antimilitarism rested. Without

80 70

Percent

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1978 1981 1984 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 Year Useful Figure 2.5

Not Useful

Japanese Views on U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

Source: Sorifu Kohoshitu, Gekkan Seron Chosa, June 2003.

Don't Know

36


80 70

Percent

60 50 40 30 20 10

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1984

1981

1978

1975

1972

1969

1968

1967

1966

0

Year

Figure 2.6

Alliance with the U.S. and SDF

Nonalliance and Abolition of SDF

Independent Defense Force

Don't Know

What Is the Best Way of Defending Japan?

Source: Sorifu Kohoshitsu, Zenkoku Seronchosa no Gaikyo. Multiple years.

the security guarantee provided by the United States, it is highly questionable whether the public support for the modest defense force, the peace constitution, and other pacifist policies could have been sustained. In this sense, it was the long postwar peace, more so than the disastrous defeat in the World War II, that kept the postwar Japan a pacifist state.45 The Japan Socialist Party’s Security Policy How strongly Japan’s postwar pacifism is influenced by power and interests can be well understood by looking at the shifts in national


37

security policy of the Japan Socialist Party (after 1996, the Social Democratic Party). The JSP was the largest opposition party in Japan during the cold war, challenging the LDP’s defense policy by advocating unarmed neutrality. Specifically, the party called for (1) abolishing the U.S.–Japan security treaty, (2) preserving Japan’s peace constitution, and (3) eliminating the existing SDFs as they claim that the SDFs are unconstitutional. In many respects, the party represented key elements of Japan’s postwar pacifism both in its philosophy and policy. Although the party’s pacifist orientation attracted many voters beyond workers and intellectuals in the 1950s, its popularity gradually declined after the 1960s as more people came to regard the JSP’s pacifist agenda as unrealistic. The decline was particularly serious in the post-cold war era. The number of seats the JSP gained in lower house elections fell from 136 in 1990 to 70 in 1993 and then to 15 in 1996. In the most recent general election, held in September 2005, the party won only seven seats. Japanese politics went through major changes during the 1990s. The LDP lost power in 1993 for the first time in its history due to an internal split and the emergence of a coalition of most opposition parties and a group of politicians who defected the LDP. The JSP joined the anti-LDP coalition, which selected Morihiro Hosokawa, the former governor from Kumamoto prefecture and the head of the Japan New Party, as the new prime minister. The JSP joined the antiLDP coalition despite disagreement in select policy issues largely because the party leaders felt it important to end the LDP dominance. The price the JSP had to pay to become a party in power, however, was not negligible. In June, the members of the coalition government agreed not to divert from the existing foreign and security policy position pursued by the LDP government. This meant that the JSP now recognized the U.S.–Japan security treaty and Japan’s SDFs, although the party did not publicly announce that it had changed its position on these matters. Under the coalition government, the JSP abandoned its opposition to a bill that allowed the dispatch of SDF airplanes in order to rescue Japanese people in areas of military conflicts overseas. The new government, however, did not last long. The thrust for power led the LDP in 1994 to form a coalition government with the JSP, its longtime political rival, under the socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama.46 For its part, the JSP was ready to leave the anti-LDP coalition as Ichiro Ozawa, who had defected the LDP and played a leading role in orchestrating the coalition, was trying to marginalize the JSP’s influence. Although the JSP was initially

38


divided as to whether it should remain in the anti-LDP coalition or join the LDP to form a new government, the fact that the LDP was willing to give the JSP a prime ministerial seat led the party to choose the latter option. Once in power, however, the JSP officially backed down from its pacifist stance. In July 1994, Prime Minister Murayama announced in the lower house that the U.S.–Japan alliance was indispensable for the peace and stability of the Asia–Pacific region. He also acknowledged that the existing SDFs (of which he was the commander in chief) are constitutional. Once these were accepted, it became logically inconsistent to stick to the party’s long-standing policy of “unarmed neutrality.” On the following day of his lower house speech, Murayama told the members of the upper house that he would no longer pursue “unarmed neutrality” as a policy.47 The LDP–Socialist coalition came to an end in the late 1990s as the LDP regained a majority in the lower house. The JSP seats were no longer needed for the LDP to stay in power. Interestingly, after returning to the old position of the “permanent opposition,” Socialists revisited the pacifist agenda they once abandoned. In spring 2001, the party adopted a new security guideline, which stipulated that the U.S.–Japan security treaty ended its mission with the end of the cold war and should therefore be abolished. It also called for a reduction of the SDF.48 The ways in which the Socialists have changed their security policy suggests that their pacifist norms had a lot to do with their political standing: the JSP held on to its pacifism in large part because it settled into a permanent opposition during the cold war. After it became a party in power, that position was no longer tenable, and the party had to alter its policy orientation rather drastically. The JSP’s pacifist norms, in other words, reflected the party’s distance to power: the longer the distance, the more pacifist the JSP could afford to become. This thesis seems to be validated by looking at the security policy of the Komeito, which followed the path similar to that the Socialists had pursued earlier. Komeito, the political party established in 1964 with the backing of an influential Buddhist organization in Japan, once held a pacifist security stance, which included preserving Japan’s peace constitution, opposing rearmament, and terminating U.S.– Japan security treaty in the long run.49 Over time, and especially since it joined the LDP and the Liberal Party to form a coalition government in 1998, however, the party has altered its position on security issues, including the U.S.–Japan alliance and rearmament. Indeed, once in power, the Komeito became more supportive of Japan’s


39

stronger military ties with the United States and a larger role for Japan’s SDFs both abroad and at home. Without the backing of the Komeito, for example, the LDP could not have been able to pass the bills that allowed the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Like the Socialists, the Komeito also abandoned its earlier position to stay in power. The episode of the JSP’s and Komeito’s security policies illustrates the essence of Japan’s postwar pacifism: norms are inseparable from underlying power and interests relations. Just as the “comfortable” status as a permanent opposition allowed the JSP to sustain its pacifist principles, the peace and prosperity Japan enjoyed under the American hegemony made it possible for Japan to develop and maintain the culture of antimilitarism that constructivists claim has shaped Japan’s security policy. Conclusion Constructivists have advanced the study of Japanese defense policy by illuminating how normative factors shape state behavior. They rightly point out that structural and situational forces alone are indeterminate and that the culture of antimilitarism has affected the ways in which Japan defines its national security interests. To the extent that power and interests cannot be understood except within their normative frameworks and that norms often shape interests and define power, constructivists make a major contribution to our understanding of why countries, as well as individuals, behave the way they do. Nonetheless, they have overemphasized the role norms play while downplaying the structural and material forces that often underlie normative factors. There is no doubt that pacifism has constrained Japan’s national security policy in a significant way. After all, Japan is still reluctant to dispatch its SDF overseas for combat or possess certain types of arms, including nuclear weapons. This chapter has not denied the importance of antimilitarist norms in Japan. Rather, it has called for attention to the structural and material bases upon which norms rest. As this chapter has shown, Japan’s postwar pacifism has been possible in large part because the country has been relatively peaceful since 1945 and the majority of the Japanese people feel that the alliance with the United States has contributed to that effect. In the absence of the American security guarantee, it is highly questionable whether the kind of pacifism that has prevailed in Japan actually could have emerged and be sustained.

40


Power and interests are particularly important in answering the question of where norms come from. Without them, one would be unable to explain why some norms prevail but not others, why certain norms persist for a long time, or why they change. As this chapter has demonstrated, structural factors are critical in understanding why Japan’s antimilitarist norms were stronger in the 1970s and 1980s than in 1950s, why they took the form of remaining lightly armed but not unarmed neutrality, and why they persisted for more than five decades after World War II. Norms do shape policies, but they are often inseparable from material and structural forces. Notes I am grateful to Tatsuo Akaneya, Takashi Inoguchi, Ken Ishida, Ryosei Kokubun, Naoki Ono, David Skidmore, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, Akio Watanabe, and Yoshinobu Yamamoto for their comments and encouragement. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in International Relations of the Asia– Pacific 7 (2007): 99–120. I thank the Oxford University Press for permission to use the materials here. 1. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). 2. Jennifer Lind criticizes the conventional wisdom that portrays Japan as a “military pygmy,” arguing that the nation has become “one of the world’s foremost military powers.” Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 29 (2004): 93. She uses aggregate defense spending as a measure of military power. By comparing Japan’s defense spending and actual military capabilities with those of other advanced industrial nations, she makes a valid point that Japan is by no means a militarily weak state. My argument is that Japan’s military power is disproportionate to its economic size. In other words, Japan spends less on defense than we would expect a country of Japan’s economic power might otherwise spend. On this score, Japan stands out as an anomaly. 3. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 1. 4. Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (1966): 266–279; Donald C. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia: The New International Order (New York: Praeger, 1974); Donald C. Hellmann, “The Imperatives for Reciprocity and Symmetry in U.S.–Japan Economic and Defense Relations,” in Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for America and Japan, edited by John H. Makin and D. C. Hellmann


5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

41

(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1989), 242–243; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (1993): 64–67; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25 (2000): 34; Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” Hideo Otake, Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Seiji [Japanese Defense and Domestic Politics] (Tokyo: San-ichi Shobo, 1983); Hideo Otake, “Nihon ni Okeru Gunsankan Fukugotai Keisei no Zasetsu” [Aborted Attempt at Forming the Military–Industrial–Bureaucratic Complex in Japan], in Nihon Seiji no Soten [Issues in Japanese Politics], edited by Hideo Otake (Tokyo: San-ichi Shobo, 1984), 13–69. Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael J. Green, Arming Japan, Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949–1986 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), chapter 10; Toshio Nagahisa, Gemu Riron no Seiji Keizaigaku: Senkyo Seido to Bouei Seisaku [The Political Economy of Game Theory: Electoral System and Defense Policy] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1995). Glenn D. Hook, “The Erosion of Anti-militaristic Principles in Contemporary Japan,” Journal of Peace Research 25 (1988): 381–394; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London, UK: Routledge, 1996); Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Antimilitarism,” International Security 17 (1993): 119–150; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism; Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993); Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, and Hugo Dobson, Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security (London: Routledge, 2001). Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Katheryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Judith Goldstein and R.O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and

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10.

11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, “Ideas and Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 109 (1994/1995): 907–909; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,” International Organization 50 (1996): 325–347; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50 (1998): 324–348; Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23 (1998): 141–170; Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23 (1998): 171–200; John G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institution (New York: Routledge, 1998); Martha Finnemore and Katheryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52 (1998): 887–917; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Mark Blyth, “Structures Do Not Come with an Instructions Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics 1 (2003): 695–706. Japan is often characterized as a pacifist nation because of its reluctance to use the military as an instrument of foreign policy. Peter Katzenstein, for example, argues that “the Japanese police and military have been, by international standards, very reluctant to use violence.” Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 1. Similarly, Thomas Berger maintains that “they [Japan and Germany] have actively avoided involvement in actions that included the use of military force . . .” Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, iv. I define pacifism along these lines, and use the word synonymously with “antimilitarism.” Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 24. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 1. Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970); Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 22. Ibid., 3. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, x. Ibid., 6–7. Ibid., x. Masaru Tamamoto, “The Japan that Can Say Yes,” World Policy Journal 7 (1990): 498.


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20. Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?” Washington Quarterly 26 (2002/2003): 66. 21. For an excellent recent critique on the constructivist explanations of Japan’s postwar defense policy, see Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “The Sources of Japanese Antimilitarism: Entrapment Fear and Japanese Pacifist Discourse,” paper presented at the annual conference of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1–5, 2004. For a comprehensive review of Berger’s Cultures of Antimilitarism, see Kazuhiko Noguchi, “Book Review: Thomas Berger’s Cultures of Antimilitarism,” Social Science Japan Journal 3 (2000): 140–144. 22. John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20 (1995): 90–92; Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” International Security 25 (2000): 187–212; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25 (2000): 5–53. 23. Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52 (1998): 976. 24. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 12. 25. Ibid., 5. 26. Ibid., 5–6. 27. Yonosuke Nagai, Heiwa no Daisho [Price for Peace] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1967); Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan’s Search for Strategy,” International Security 8 (1983/1984): 152–179; Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and the Purpose in a New Era (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1992), chapters 3 and 4; Andrew Oros, “The Political Origins of Japan’s Domestic Antimilitarist Identity,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, March 24–27, 2002. 28. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 30. 29. Ibid., 38. 30. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by (This edited volume by Katzenstein has been cited in E.N. 9, L8–10) Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 486; Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”; Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” 208. 31. Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Images and Options: Not a Challenger, but a Supporter,” Journal of Japanese Studies 12 (1986): 95–119. 32. Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security 17 (1993): 72. 33. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, edited by Michael Mastanduno and Ethan B. Kapstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 182–217.

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34. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” Pacific Review 14 (2001): 221–240. 35. Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 14–15. 36. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asia–Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” International Security 26 (2001/2002): 167. 37. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 67–71, 112–115, 151–155; Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 116. 38. NHK Hoso Seron Chosa Jo, Zusetsu Sengo Seronshi [A Graphical Analysis of the History of Postwar Public Opinion] (Tokyo: NHK Press, 1982); Shigeyoshi Nishihira, Seron Chosa ni Yoru Dojidaishi [The Current History as Reflected in Opinion Polls] (Tokyo: Buren Shuppan, 1987); Davis B. Bobrow, “Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (1989): 571–604. 39. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 116. 40. In 1975, about 60 percent of the Japanese population belonged to the post-World War II era. It must be noted, however, that there are those who argue that norms can be strengthened with time because they get institutionalized. Sun-Ki Chai, “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization,” International Organization 51 (1997): 389–412. 41. John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: Norton, 1999). 42. Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “The End of the Alliance?: Dilemmas in the U.S.–Japan Relations,” in United States–Japan Relations and International Institutions after the Cold War, edited by Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi, and Courtney Purrington (San Diego, CA: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, 1995), 3–35; Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.–Korea–Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Naoki Ono, Sengo Nichibei Kankei no Kokusai Seijikeizai Bunseki [The International Political Economic Analysis of Postwar U.S.–Japan Relations] (Tokyo: Keio Daigaku Shuppanbu, 2002). 43. Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, “The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism,” in The Political Economy of Japan: Vol. 1 The Domestic Transformation, edited by Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 516–554; Pyle, The Japanese Question. 44. Tetsuya Sakai, “ ‘Kyujo=Anpo Taisei’ no Shuen: Sengo Nihon Gaiko to Seito Seiji” [The End of the “Article 9=U.S.–Japan Alliance System”: Japan’s Postwar Diplomacy and Party Politics], Kokusai Mondai 372 (1991): 32–45. 45. As noted earlier, Peter Katzenstein recognizes the political processes by which Japan’s postwar antimilitarist social norms developed. He


46. 47.

48. 49.

45

argues: “The norms that have shaped Japan’s security policy did not emerge fullblown from defeat in war and American occupation. They resulted, rather, from intense political conflicts inside Japan, both in elite and in mass politics . . . Conflict was so wrenching that by 1960 LDP factions that favored accommodation with the opposition prevailed. The LDP abandoned efforts to make Japan a normal country with a normal military and police.” Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 200. Yet, the more Katzenstein emphasizes the political foundations of Japan’s pacifist norms, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish his constructivist claims from realist arguments. There is no doubt that norms shape policies. The question is whether norms exist independently of the underlying power and interest relations. The coalition also included a small party called Shinto Sakigake. Yoshihisa Hara, Sengoshi no Nakano Nihon Shakaito [The Japan Socialist Party in Postwar History] (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2000), 316–320. Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2001. Nagai, Heiwa no Daisho, 181; Gerald L. Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 24–27.


Chapter 3

International Norms and Civil Society: New Influences on Japanese Security Policy Keiko Hirata

M

ore and more scholars are emphasizing the importance of using a range of international norms for understanding world politics, with constructivist perspectives receiving the bulk of research attention. Some constructivists have focused on the structural aspects of norms used in the establishment of international institutions.1 Others have examined the evolution of particular norms and their roles in regulating state behavior.2 Still others have focused on norm-promoting agencies and the ways in which transnational activist networks3 and international organizations4 serve as agents of normative change at the systemic level. Most of the literature on the spread of norms is focused on international, rather than domestic, factors. But international norms are rarely adopted automatically in domestic politics, instead gaining empowerment in different ways depending on the country involved. In this chapter, I will look at the mechanisms and agents of domestic normative diffusion, discuss the means by which norms (especially those initially opposed by domestic policymakers) become acceptable, and how international norms become institutionalized domestically. The example I will analyze is the adoption of an anti-landmine norm in Japan—specifically, Tokyo’s signing of the Mine Ban Treaty (also known as the Ottawa Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction). I will examine why the state dropped its initial opposition and ratified the agreement in 1998. My contention is that a group of “norm entrepreneurs”— working within a nongovernmental organization (NGO) known as

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the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL)—promoted a norm and succeeded, with the help of a few sympathetic legislators, in persuading the Japanese Prime Minister and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)5 to change their previously held positions. By focusing on the role of norm entrepreneurs in influencing state policy, I will adopt an agency-centered norm-diffusion framework that incorporates elements of social constructivism and rationalism. For instance, I will use the constructivist assertion that norms constitute an important aspect of actor identity and interest (and therefore influence actor behavior)6 to analyze how a group of Japanese norm entrepreneurs promoted a prohibitionary norm against Antipersonnel Mines (APMs), and how they eventually convinced state leaders to change their perspectives of the national interest. The norm entrepreneurs were not always motivated by material interests—as rationalists would argue—but were certainly driven by humanitarian concerns for landmine victims. However, I do not support the argument that rationalist and constructivist views of norms are mutually exclusive. Many international relations scholars have drawn a distinct line between rationalism (in the form of neorealism and neoliberalism) and constructivism, claiming that the former emphasizes the rational choices of actors and the latter the social construction of identity. I believe that constructivism is useful for explaining the formation of the actors’ interests, yet rationalism helps to explain actors’ strategic pursuit of specific interests and goals based on acquired norms.7 In the case under consideration, the norm entrepreneurs were motivated by humanitarian concerns, but they pursued those goals rationally—in other words, after accepting the prohibitionary norm and discovering their interests (the constructivist aspect), they chose the strategy that in their view best met their defined goals (the rationalist aspect). They attempted to maximize their utilities by making means–ends calculations in order to persuade the target agent (the state) to accept their position. In this case, the norm entrepreneurs were able to convince the state to reconstitute national identity and interests—a constructivist reaction. The state’s compliance with the norm entrepreneurs’ argument can also be explained by the latter’s ability to exploit the former’s vulnerability to international criticism. A number of scholars have described Tokyo’s sensitivity to such criticism and its fear of international isolation.8 The advocates of anti-landmine norm successfully used this concern for international acceptance to its advantage.

I N F L U E N C E S O N J A PA N ’ S S E C U R I T Y P O L I C Y

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Constructivists frequently use state security policies as a research focus.9 Rarely do these studies go beyond the scope of decisions made by government and military organizations, since it is they, and not civil organizations, who usually wield the greatest influence on policy decisions. This is done at the expense of non-state actors who often play significant roles in generating and spreading norms on a variety of issues, including security. And as mentioned above, most constructivist research efforts on international norms in all areas, including security, look at international factors without examining how norms are diffused at the domestic level.10 Those who have looked at norm diffusion in domestic contexts—for instance, Gurowitz and Klotz11— have focused on such nonsecurity matters as immigration and apartheid. My goal is to increase our understanding of domestic norm diffusion processes in the security arena. Japan’s adoption of an anti-landmine norm presents an interesting case for at least two reasons. First, Japan is a non-Western industrialized society, and most international norms have originated in industrialized Western Europe and North America, with varying degrees of domestic acceptance.12 A few scholars have examined the domestic adoption of the anti-landmine norm in some countries, including France, Canada, and South Africa,13 but no systematic research has been conducted on the issue in Asia. Of course, the Japanese case cannot be used to represent the views of the entire non-Western world, but it can serve as an example of how a Western norm can permeate a non-Western society via norm entrepreneurs instead of the coercive actions of Western governments. Second, the Japanese state took the unusual action of abruptly changing its policy just a few months before joining 120 other countries in signing the Ottawa treaty. Japan had initially rejected the treaty because its most important ally, the United States, opposed it (primarily because the treaty would require the United States to remove its APMs on the Korean Peninsula). Given Tokyo’s emphasis on the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and its strong support for U.S. foreign policy in general, it is surprising that the Japanese government broke ranks with Washington on such an important issue. Japan’s acceptance of the Ottawa Convention is a rare case of a sudden policy change occurring as the result of norm persuasion. Some limitations need to be noted before proceeding with the discussion. First, the study does not elaborate on how the antilandmine norm originated, evolved, and spread throughout the world. The study is limited to examining how the prohibitionary norm was adopted by the Japanese state under pressure from its own

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norm entrepreneurs. Furthermore, no insights are offered on other norms previously adopted in Japan, or on the qualities of norms that succeed compared to those that fail. A more complete analysis of failed norms is worthy of further research.14 In addition, the main argument offered in this paper—that norm entrepreneurs played a key persuasive role in disseminating the anti-landmine norm in Japan—cannot be extended to other issues.15 Finally, no effort was made to compare different Japanese foreign policy decision-making models as they concern this particular case. Analytical Framework Katzenstein defines norms as “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity.”16 For the purposes of this study, I will focus exclusively on a particular type of norm—constitutive17—that is known to exert strong cognitive effects on actors by helping them understand their identities and interests rather than regulating their behaviors.18 Norms can define standards of appropriateness.19 That is, most actors adopt norms for reasons tied to what they consider to be good or desirable behavior (the logic of appropriateness). Thus, actors ask: “What kind of situation is this?” “Who am I?” and “What should I do now?” And they rely on norms to provide the answers.20 Compliance with international norms can be considered part of a socialization process.21 Faced with activist campaigns, public demands, and/or pressure from other states, decision makers pay increased attention to norms, legitimize and internalize them, and change state policy to comply with them. The more that the decision makers are concerned with their states’ international reputations, the more they become vulnerable to pressure from activists who use “shame” campaigns in support of specific norms. Policymakers may thus feel compelled to adopt certain norms to avoid being labeled immoral, inhumane, or otherwise deficient—especially for norms that have become institutionalized on an international level. Norm compliance is frequently initiated by activists instead of state policymakers, with such domestic actors as NGOs taking the lead. NGO utilization of international norms illustrates the instrumental effects of those norms—an indication that the line between rationalism and constructivism is not as sharp as many scholars contend. Finnemore and Sikkink, for example, discuss what they view as a link between rationality and identity formation as part of the norm diffusion process. They use the term “strategic social construction” to describe the ways in which actors “strategize rationally to reconfigure


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preferences, identities, or social context.”22 They further assert that strategic social construction is based on two stages that involve both norm entrepreneurs and their targeted agents: first, the norm entrepreneurs make detailed calculations to maximize the utility of a particular norm, since “[t]he utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other players’ utility functions in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs.”23 The second stage is characterized by the learning and internalization of the given norm by policymakers—a process that can occur in the absence of obvious material incentives. Finnemore and Sikkink note that the first stage involves rational choice, but the second does not. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein have also suggested the possibility of synthesizing constructivism and rationality to analyze norm diffusion processes, arguing that identity and interest formation may be best explained by constructivism but that rationalism prevails once they are formed. They describe norm diffusion as consisting of two stages: initially, the actors (such as state leaders) learn the value of a particular norm, internalize prescriptions embodied in the norm, form identities, and develop interests linked to those identities. Once these interests are established, the actors pursue them via means–ends calculations.24 Unlike the second stage, the first stage does not involve rationality. I will use a combination of Finnemore and Sikkink’s and Jepperson et al.’s models to analyze Japan’s adoption of the Ottawa Convention.25 This particular case involves two interdependent processes. The first involves the JCBL’s efforts to disseminate the anti-landmine norm. JCBL members used rationally calculated strategies to get what they wanted. Although they were primarily driven by altruism, empathy, and ideational commitment—motivations that pure rationalists cannot account for—they nevertheless used rational means of calculating strategies to achieve their goals.26 The second process involves the adoption of the anti-landmine norm by the target agent (the state)—the result of the JCBL’s successful efforts to disseminate the norm, public demand for signing the treaty, and a growing international consensus in favor of a landmine ban. Tokyo shifted from its usual support of U.S. foreign policy to instead back international humanitarian efforts in opposition to American interests. Motivations for this decision included, among other factors, the desire for international approval and prestige.27 After new identities and interests were found, the state institutionalized the norm by ratifying the Ottawa Convention, destroying its own domestic landmines, and giving substantial monetary donations to international de-mining programs via official development assistance channels.28

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In this case, emulation was a particularly important part of the second process. In the fall of 1997, MOFA officials saw that more than 120 states had already approved the Treaty and that the antilandmine norm had gained legitimacy and general acceptance within the international community.29 As the number of states supporting a ban reached a “critical mass”30 and as public support for the treaty grew, Japan went along with the pro-ban states. Tokyo’s decision supports Price’s observation that once a state perceives that an incipient norm has reached a high level of support among other states, it becomes more likely that emulation will play an important role, since domestic decision makers will want to avoid international isolation.31 From a purely rationalist perspective, states abandon military weapons once they no longer have any material interest in using them. However, the Japanese leadership signed the Ottawa Convention not because they viewed APMs as militarily useless, but because they viewed their military utility as being outweighed by their humanitarian costs. Morality was introduced into the definition of Japanese national interests, a phenomenon that rationalists cannot explain well. There are at least three factors that led to the success of the norm entrepreneurs: (1) they knew how to take advantage of their increasing public support; (2) they successfully managed their pressure strategies, which ranged from public mobilization to alliance formation with a handful of sympathetic legislators with access to policymakers;32 and (3) they took advantage of the state’s sensitivity to its international reputation, thus giving them leverage over state actors. Japan’s Initial Ottawa Stance Public concern for the APM issue increased rapidly during the 1990s—several years into a vigorous global campaign initiated by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a global antilandmine network established in 1992 by six NGOs.33 At the 1995 Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), the campaign focused on securing a comprehensive ban on the production, stockpiling, trade, and use of APMs. When the conference failed to approve such an agreement, a small number of pro-ban states (including Canada and Austria) joined forces with the ICBL to initiate a negotiation forum called the Ottawa Process. In October 1996, representatives from fifty countries, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the ICBL gathered in Ottawa for an international strategy conference on creating a legally binding international agreement to ban APMs.


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The resulting Ottawa Declaration committed the participants to the goals of (1) creating and concluding an APM ban treaty at the earliest possible date, and (2) designing and executing a plan of action to increase resources for mine clearance and victim assistance. On the final day of the conference, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy invited all the attendees to return to Ottawa the following year to sign a treaty banning the export, production, transfer, and use of all APMs.34 Several interim meetings were held in Europe in 1997. In February (Vienna) and April (Bonn), attendees deliberated a draft text of a treaty that included verification measures. The Brussels International Conference for a Global Ban on Antipersonnel Mines held in June of that year was the site of the first formal negotiations for a comprehensive ban treaty; participants declared their commitment to finishing their work by December, 1997. In August, representatives at the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Antipersonnel Land Mines adopted a “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines,” and agreed on timetables for de-mining activities.35 Japan was a reluctant and occasionally obstructive participant at the Brussels and Oslo meetings. As an observer in Brussels, Japan refused to sign that conference’s declaration (it finally did so in August of that year). It then decided to attend the Oslo conference as a full participant once it learned of U.S. intentions to do the same. At Oslo, Japanese delegates (all of them from the MOFA and Defense Agency) gave 100 percent backing to Washington’s efforts to block or dilute the treaty.36 For example, the United States demanded that the Korean Peninsula be exempted from the treaty to ensure the security of its troops stationed in South Korea, that certain types of APMs be exempted, and that the enforcement period of the ban be delayed for as long as nine years. As its demands were rejected, the United States withdrew from the Oslo declaration, and Japan refused to make a commitment to a total ban treaty.37 MOFA officials announced their preference for landmine negotiations to be made part of the UN-sponsored Conference on Disarmament.38 Two factors account for Japan’s resistance to the Ottawa process. As previously mentioned, it was reluctant to contradict the wishes of its most important international ally, the United States; the general position taken by most Tokyo officials is that it is always in its interest to back U.S. security policy.39 The relationship between the two countries has been described as that of a junior ally needing security protection provided by its “big brother.”40 A second reason for

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resistance to the Mine Ban Treaty was bureaucratic: the Japanese Defense Agency opposed a total APM ban because it feared that such a ban would accelerate the existing trend of streamlining defense expenditures.41 The agency also argued that Japan’s circumstances were different from those of pro-Ottawa states—that is, as a country with a long coastline and limited military personnel, landmines could be a crucial frontline defense against invasion by an aggressor nation such as North Korea.42 Japanese NGOs were frustrated over their government’s reluctance to support a total APM ban and criticized officials for what they viewed as contradictions between action and talk. At the 1996 Lyon summit, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced that the country would host an international conference on de-mining technology, which it did in March, 1997 (the Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines). Japan had also expressed support for a global APM ban at UN General Assembly meetings in 1996.43 Thus, the Japanese NGOs used the state’s rhetoric to its own advantage when launching a domestic anti-landmine campaign. JCBL Influence While the ICBL mobilized international public opinion for the promotion of the ban treaty, it was local NGOs that campaigned to persuade their governments to sign and ratify the treaty. In July of 1997, in the midst of uncertainty over Japan’s position on an APM ban, forty-five Japanese NGOs working on de-mining and/or land mine victims’ assistance efforts in Southeast Asia formed the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL).44 Its stated goal was to pressure Japan to fully support the Mine Ban Treaty and to continue making contributions toward the elimination of all landmines. United by shared ideas and values rather than by material interests, JCBL activists argued that Japan had a moral responsibility to support a ban treaty.45 The JCBL immediately started pressuring state officials to support the Ottawa process through a combination of political lobbying and a public awareness campaign highlighting the tragedy of landmine victims. The organization submitted two petitions to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in August 1997—the first simply urging the government to sign the Mine Ban Treaty, the second applauding the state’s decision to participate in the Oslo conference to be held later that month. At the same time, the JCBL sharply criticized Defense Agency Chief Fumio Kyuma for what it viewed as blindly following the U.S.


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lead on the landmine issue. The second petition made mention of Kyuma’s last-minute retraction of his earlier opposition to Japan’s participation in the Oslo conference prior to the American announcement that it would send a delegation. The JCBL called Kyuma’s support for exempting the United States from any ban that might affect the Korean Peninsula “shameful.” Although it criticized the United States for trying to create loopholes in the treaty, the JCBL said that the U.S. position was more understandable than Japan’s, since Washington had expressed both humanitarian concern and strategic interests.46 After the Oslo conference, the JCBL was especially critical of what it viewed as Japan’s passivity, lack of a clear policy, and reactivity to American actions. By the fall of 1997, JCBL’s efforts were paying off in terms of domestic support. Those efforts were boosted when the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the ICBL and its coordinator, Jody Williams. The award enhanced the credibility and prestige of the JCBL in the eyes of the Japanese public—a remarkable achievement for an organization that was less than six months old.47 Suddenly, the JCBL was regarded as a legitimate player on the landmine issue, worthy of media coverage. A second event that boosted public support for JCBL activism was the death of British Princess Diana in September, 1997. Her anti-landmine work had attracted publicity all over the world.48 She had personally supported the publication of an antilandmine picture book by a leader of the Association to Aid Refugees (AAR), a member NGO of the JCBL.49 Because of her death, many Japanese came to know about the anti-landmine picture book and became sympathizers of the AAR’s efforts. The JCBL stepped up its public education and political lobbying efforts, offering public lectures and distributing slides and samples of deactivated landmines to schools and local activist groups. Supporters were kept informed of the Ottawa process via newsletters and by the Japanese media’s newfound interest on the JCBL’s. The JCBL message was simple and clear: APMs are an immoral, inhumane weapon whose primary victims are civilians, including women and children. The group succeeded in establishing an emotional link between APMs and weapons of mass destruction—primarily chemical and biological weapons. Previously, APMs were simply viewed as conventional weapons on par with artillery shells and firearms. In mid-November, 1997, the JCBL presented Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi with another petition (with 35,000 signatures) demanding that Japan participate in the Ottawa process but not attach any amendments to the agreement.50

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The petition was handed directly to Obuchi by Tun Channareth, a surviving landmine victim and a founder of the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines. The event was another JCBL success story, receiving wide coverage in Japan’s major daily newspapers.51 Foreign Minister Obuchi was described as being emotionally moved by Channareth’s explanation of how he lost both his legs in a Cambodian minefield. Channareth expressed his desire to meet Obuchi again at the treaty-signing conference in Ottawa the following month, and the minister responded positively.52 Obuchi’s willingness to meet Channareth was viewed by the JCBL as an optimistic sign that Japan was prepared to change its original position. The JCBL’s optimism turned out to be well-founded. A little more than a week after the meeting between Channareth and Obuchi, and just one week prior to the scheduled meeting in Ottawa, the Japanese government announced its decision to sign the treaty. Foreign Minister Obuchi flew to Ottawa to take part in the signing ceremony along with representatives from 120 other countries. At the conference, Obuchi announced that the Japanese government would contribute ¥10 billion for mine clearance and victim assistance between 1998 and 2003.53 It is clear that Obuchi and other high-ranking officials found it increasingly hard to ignore the pressure resulting from the JCBL campaigns, growing public support for the treaty, and announcements from other states that they were willing to sign it. Soon after Princess Diana’s death, Obuchi made a statement at the Oslo meeting (in September 1997) that “it would not make sense for Japan to oppose the Treaty while cooperating in de-mining activities in Cambodia.”54 His statement surprised not only officials in MOFA and the Defense Agency, but also JCBL activists, since it was very unusual for a Japanese cabinet minister to publicly express support for an idea that was opposed by the United States. Regardless of whether or not he made the statement for purposes of raising his profile with the Japanese public, the JCBL welcomed his comments and made full use of them.55 After the ICBL received the Nobel Peace Prize the following month, MOFA bureaucrats could not help but notice the growing international and domestic support for the treaty. Some MOFA officials were simply interested in backing up Obuchi’s September statement, thus helping him “save face”;56 others caved in and expressed open support for the treaty. The Ministry then announced a meeting with U.S. officials to defuse bilateral tensions over the issue—a major clue that Japan was ready to sign the treaty.57 Prime


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Minister Hashimoto announced his support in late October, claiming that the Defense Agency had to come on board to work out details of a ban.58 Although the Defense Agency later lobbied politicians in both houses of the Japanese Diet to oppose the treaty,59 the MOFA position prevailed.60 How can we make sense of Japan’s signing of the ban treaty? Did the state adopt the anti-landmine norm? It can be seen that, through socialization (promoted by JCBL pressure, public demand, and other states’ support for the treaty), MOFA changed its view of the use of landmines and came to accept the legitimacy of the anti-landmine norm. Accordingly, a new interest in improving Japan’s international image and gaining respect and recognition from the international community through emulation emerged. These developments led to a policy change to sign the treaty. The JCBL Campaign and Treaty Ratification Japan’s commitment to the anti-landmine norm remained in question until final treaty ratification in October 1998. In other words, internalization of the norm was incomplete even after Japan signed the treaty the preceding December. In early 1998, the JCBL was distressed at the lack of any clear signal that the Japanese Diet was planning to ratify the treaty; neither the MOFA nor the Defense Agency did anything to introduce a bill for ratification. The main reason for MOFA’s procrastination was the issue of American stockpiles of landmines in Japan. MOFA was unsure whether ratification would (1) require Tokyo to demand the removal of all APMs at U.S. bases in Japan, (2) ban U.S. forces from ever using APMs in its military activities in Japan, and (3) ban Japanese personnel from transporting APMs from American bases in Japan to other countries, for example, South Korea.61 The last question was especially important because the task of transporting landmines had usually been performed by private Japanese firms or the country’s Self Defense Forces. MOFA maintained that all issues tied to American bases in Japan had to be negotiated with Washington and was therefore unwilling to take unilateral action. The Defense Agency had its own arguments against ratification. For instance, it was actively searching for alternatives to APMs and wanted to delay ratification until its research could be completed.62 The JCBL intensified its campaign in the face of state inaction. It submitted more petitions to Obuchi, who had since become Prime Minister. In a letter delivered to Obuchi in August 1998, the JCBL

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pointed out that thirty-two countries had already ratified the treaty and that Japan had to act quickly to be among the first forty countries to sign on—the number required to validate the treaty. The NGO network argued that it would be an honor for Japan to be one of those forty countries, and it would help Japan maintain its position as a world leader on the landmine issue.63 The JCBL felt that many state leaders were sensitive to preserving that image. The JCBL also used various publications to mobilize public opinion in favor of ratification. Yukie Osa, a longtime anti-landmine activist, had published a handbook on landmines in which she explained the Ottawa process in detail and emphasized the importance of Japanese ratification.64 The influential newspaper Asahi Shimbun published a high-profile editorial written by JCBL board member Motoko Mekata. She argued that if Japan did not ratify the treaty the international community would assume that Tokyo was incapable of making any foreign policy decisions independent of the United States and therefore will fail to get the credit it deserved for its substantial contributions to de-mining activities.65 Obuchi took the unusual step of phoning the JCBL to indicate that he had read Mekata’s opinion piece and that he still supported the treaty.66 The pro-Ottawa Japanese politicians that the JCBL worked with had previously formed a League of Diet Members to Promote a Comprehensive Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines (hereafter called “the League”), chaired by Kenji Kosaka of Shinshinto. The League’s vice chairman was Gen Nakatani of the LDP, known as a defense zoku (a politician who specializes in a certain policy area) and the current Chief of the Defense Agency. Nakatani felt that ratification was inevitable internationally, and that Japan should not go against that trend. Another unusual League member was its steering committee chair, Toshihisa Fujita of the Democratic Party, a member of the House of Representatives. Fujita had worked for Japanese NGOs for nearly twenty years and was one of the first NGO activists ever elected to the House. His résumé showed him as being a past representative of the AAR, a member of the JCBL, and one of the first activists in the country’s anti-landmine campaign. In June 1997 he canvassed the Diet on the issue, collected signatures of support from 387 members from a range of political parties, and submitted them to Prime Minister Hashimoto. Seven former prime ministers signed the petition.67 The League was very helpful to the JCBL cause. Fujita in particular played a crucial role in bringing together NGOs and policymakers. With the League’s backing, the AAR convinced the Nagano Olympic


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Peace Appeal Steering Committee to invite Chris Moon (a landmine victim and a representative of the HALO Trust, a British NGO engaged in international de-mining activities) to carry the Olympic torch in February 1998. His appearance at the televised opening ceremony helped raise public awareness of the landmine issue all over the world.68 Fujita also helped attract media attention at a June 1998 symposium cosponsored by the JCBL and the Canadian embassy in Japan. Panelists included Fujita, the NGOs, and officials from both MOFA and the Defense Agency. Fujita publicly expressed the JCBL’s frustration at the slow pace of ratification efforts and urged the Japanese government to set aside the problem of interpreting the treaty as it might affect American military bases in Japan. A MOFA representative replied that the American APM issue was a major concern and that the Japanese government was correct in consulting with Washington first. Although Fujita did not succeed in persuading the government officials, the event was broadcast nationwide and his and the JCBL’s views were widely publicized.69 The Japanese NGOs benefited greatly from the League’s success in arranging a September 11, 1998 meeting between Prime Minister Obuchi and the JCBL’s Kitagawa and Shimizu; three representatives of the League (Kosaka, Nakatani, and Fujita) were also present, as was Nobuyasu Abe, an official from the MOFA Division of Arms Control and Scientific Affairs. The JCBL presented petitions with 201,500 signatures to Obuchi and restated its position that Japan should be one of the first forty countries to ratify the treaty.70 The meeting was considered a landmark, since it had previously been unthinkable for a prime minister to invite NGO representatives to his residence, based on the conviction that NGOs were simply not considered legitimate players in Japanese politics. Obuchi reportedly responded positively to the JCBL’s request by urging MOFA to finalize a draft law by encouraging all political parties, including his own LDP, to ratify the law within a month.71 At the request of the JCBL, Fujita raised the issue of stockpiled American landmines at ratification hearings held by the Foreign Affairs and National Security Affairs committees. The JCBL did not challenge the U.S. claim of extraterritorial rights, but it did ask for clarification on four points: (1) a ban on Japanese use of APMs on any occasion for its own defense, even in joint operations with the United States; (2) refusal by Japanese Self Defense Forces and private Japanese firms to transport APMs for American troops; (3) requirement of prior notification by the U.S. government about the movement of

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U.S. forces equipped with APMs within Japan, including Japanese territorial waters; and (4) the refusal of the Japanese government to take financial responsibility for the transportation of APMs by U.S. troops in Japan.72 Fujita received clarification on three of the four points (1, 2, and 4); the MOFA vice minister said that the United States would not need to give prior notification for transporting landmines since Japan has conceded to the possession of APMs by American forces stationed in Japan.73 The House of Councilors approved the Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession on September 30, 1998, one day after the House of Representatives passed the bill. Once the decision was made by Prime Minister Obuchi to support the bill, the entire ratification process was completed within three weeks. Although Japan was not one of the first forty signatories of the treaty, it did ratify the bill in time to join those forty countries at a ceremony on March 1, 1999, marking the day the treaty took effect. Japan’s UN Ambassador Hisashi Owada took advantage of the thirteen-hour time difference between Tokyo and New York and submitted Japan’s ratification document to the UN on September 30.74 The JCBL’s Shimizu described the ratification as “a clear illustration of the success of public awareness.”75 Even though it failed to achieve all of its objectives—for instance, the U.S. landmine stockpiling issue—the JCBL considered the Diet’s ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty as an act of much-needed independence from the United States in terms of policymaking, as well as a major step toward eliminating all APMs. The relatively few compromises that are now part of Japan’s domestic APM law allowed Prime Minister Obuchi and MOFA officials to proceed with the ratification process. The compromises gave policymakers enough room to redirect their own interests and the national interests away from subservience to Washington’s interests and toward humanitarian concerns. It also provided them with the argument required to resist the primary opponent of the treaty, the Japanese Defense Agency. One striking achievement of the JCBL effort was the Japanese government’s eventual pledge to destroy about 222,000 APMs within eighteen months.76 Three Japanese firms won contracts with the Defense Agency to begin the task in January 2000.77 Again, this should be considered remarkable in light of the government’s previous refusals to give in to pressure generated by the NGOs, especially in foreign policy. The change in government attitude was reconfirmed in a speech given by Hisami Kurokochi, a MOFA representative, at


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the third meeting of the parties to the Ottawa Convention in 2001, in which she urged other states to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty: In order to establish the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines as a principle of the international community, it is essential that many more countries should become States Parties, including those that have signed the Convention but have yet to ratify it. In Japan, there were some hesitations to accede to the Convention on grounds of national security. However, Japan attached importance to the strong desire of the international community to see such weapons banned from a humanitarian perspective by positively concluding the Convention. Add to this, Japan has been urging the governments of countries that have not ratified the Convention to do so . . . Japan hopes to continue to work together with the other nations concerned to create an environment that will enable as many countries as possible to accede to the Convention.78

Rhetoric aside, the Japanese government has complied with the anti-landmine norm faithfully and completely by destroying all of the 100 million landmines it possessed. It has also increased its monetary donations to international de-mining programs via official development assistance channels. We can thus conclude that the anti-landmine norm has been accepted and internalized by the Japanese leadership and has significantly affected state behavior. Conclusion International norms affect national policy choice via domestic political processes. Japan’s ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty was the result of an NGO network introducing a norm, politicizing the issue, convincing the state to reverse its policy, and eventually seeing the norm become institutionalized into domestic law. The JCBL achieved its goal by framing the landmine issue as a humanitarian disaster, thereby capturing public conscience and support. At the same time, the network also took full advantage of policymakers’ sensitivity to Japan’s international image, which made them open to constructing new interests that would allow them to adopt a new norm. The JCBL aggressively exposed the costs of rejecting an anti-landmine norm. Without that network’s clear articulation of the merits of institutionalizing the norm, and without the considerable public support that it attracted, it is doubtful that policy leaders would have been so quick to reconsider their interests and jump on the anti-APM bandwagon. Rationalists believe that foreign policy is primarily determined via the distribution of material capabilities and material interests.

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However, in this particular case, state interests were neither exogenously given nor objectively determined by material capabilities. Instead, they were socially constructed through the skillful manipulation of persuasive moral values by the norm entrepreneurs. The Japanese leadership developed an interest in signing the Ottawa Treaty due to pressure from its constituency and sensitivity to the international community.79 Neither rationalism nor constructivism alone adequately explains the process by which an international norm is adopted domestically. The JCBL was not driven by material interests but by altruistic humanitarian concerns for landmine victims. Yet, the JCBL searched for rational methods to put pressure on the state and to mobilize public opinion. Its alliance with the League of Diet Members to Promote a Comprehensive Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines was a strategic coup that allowed the umbrella organization to utilize as powerful a media resource as the Nagano Winter Olympic Games to disseminate the anti-landmine message. Their efforts helped them to meet face-to-face with the country’s prime minister—a rare opportunity for a Japanese NGO—to express their detailed concerns and to demand treaty ratification. In contrast, a change in Japanese state policy concerning landmines is best explained by constructivism. For instance, policymakers changed their views after learning about the enormous amount of domestic and international support for the anti-landmine norm. The leaders were socialized into accepting the anti-landmine norm and eventually reconstituted their national interests, despite the obvious material (security) benefits for not signing the Mine Ban Treaty. These leaders came to realize that “it was the right thing to abolish landmines” and institutionalized the anti-landmine norm through the ratification of the treaty. Today, the norm is solidly institutionalized in Japanese foreign policy. In short, the Japanese landmine case reconfirms the idea that rationalist and constructivist interpretations of state behavior are complementary. The explanatory power of these two theoretical approaches taken together is greater than either one alone in elucidating state adoption of international norms.

Notes 1. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Democratic Peace—War like Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument,” Special issue of European Journal of International Relations 1, 4,


2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

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edited by N. P. Gleditsch and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995): 489–515; Richard M. Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 114–152; Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,” International Organization 44, 4 (1990): 479–526. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Chance,” International Organization 52, 4 (1996): 887–917; Richard M. Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization 52, 3 (1997): 613–644. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1996). A limited number of politicians took part in the Mine Ban Treaty. As discussed later in this chapter, the foreign minister, Keizo Obuchi, played an important role in initiating MOFA’s policy change, and a handful of nonpartisan politicians pressured MOFA to adopt the Mine Ban Treaty. The majority of politicians were relatively uninvolved in the process. They only participated for a few days in fall 1998, when they passed a domestic law (prepared by the bureaucrats) in the Diet to ratify the treaty. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1–32; Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. John G. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianism and The Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, 4 (1998): 855–885; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, 4 (1998): 645–685. See, for example, Amy Gurowitz, “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State,” World Politics 51, 3 (1999): 413–445; Edward J. Lincoln, Japan’s New Global Role (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993); Michael Blaker, “Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance,” in Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change, edited by Gerald L. Curtis (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 1–42. For example, Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security.

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10. See, for example, Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo; Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights”; and Price and Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence.” 11. Gurowitz, “Mobilizing International Norms”; Audie Klotz, “Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa,” International Organization 49, 3 (1995): 451–478. 12. John W. Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez, “World Society and the Nation-State,” American Journal of Sociology 103, 1 (1997): 144–181; Scott W. Richard and John W. Meyer, Institutional Environments and Organizations—Structural Complexity and Individualism (London: Sage Publications, 1994). 13. Maxwell A. Cameron, Lawson, Robert. J., and Tomlin, Brian W., eds., To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 14. For a discussion of one failed norm in Japan, see Robert M. Uriu, “The Impact of Policy Ideas: Revisionism and the Clinton Administration’s Trade Policy toward Japan,” in New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations, edited by Gerald L. Curtis (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), 213–240; Robert M. Uriu, “Refuting the Revisionists: Japan’s Response to U.S. Trade Pressures during the Clinton Administration,” paper presented at the International Symposium on Japan and its Neighbors in the Global Village: Current and Emerging Issues, Nagoya, Japan, October 1999. 15. Although parallel arguments may be found in other cases (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions), further studies are needed to generalize the argument of the role played by norm entrepreneurs in Japanese politics. 16. Katzenstein, “Introduction,” 5. 17. In contrast to constitutive norms, regulative norms prescribe or proscribe behaviors for already constituted identities. Constructivists emphasize constitutive norms while rationalists emphasize regulative norms. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide,” European Journal of International Relations 3, 4 (1997): 473–495; Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 451–497. 18. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics”; Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989). Constitutive norms can exert causative effects on behavior, but causation is not always guaranteed. Finnemore


19. 20.

21.

22. 23. 24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

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argues that “Norms create permissive conditions for action but do not determine action.” Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 158. See also Klotz, “Norms Reconstituting Interests.” Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50, 2 (1998): 324–348. It is possible that actors initially adopt norms for instrumental reasons, in response to pressures from societal actors such as NGOs. However, at a later stage they may change their rhetoric, accept the validity of the norms, and engage in a dialogue about norm implementation. Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, 1 (2000): 65–87; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Chance,” 887–917. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Chance,” 889. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Chance,” 910. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”; Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?”; Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 33–75. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Chance”; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security.” Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Chance.” The question of how the activists endorse norms and become norm entrepreneurs is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, the focus of the study is on how such norm entrepreneurs play a role in norm empowerment after constituting their identities and interests. “Semeta Gaisoo, Booeichoo Kuzusu” [Foreign Minister on the Attack, Undermines the Defense Agency], Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 1997, 9; Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Nihon ga Hoyuu Suru Jirai no Hakai Jyokyo,” [Updates on the Destruction of Japan’s Landmines], JCBL Newsletter 11 (1999): 5–7. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Nihon ga Hoyuu Suru Jirai no Hakai Jyokyo,” 5–7; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan, “Taijin-jirai Kusanone Mushoo” [Grassroots Grant Aid Regarding Antipersonnel Landmines], 2000. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mmofa/ gaiko/oda/seisaku/seisaku_4/shien/jirai.html (accesed August 4, 2001).

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29. For a discussion of internationally legitimate norms and Japanese compliance, see Isao Miyaoka, Legitimacy in International Society: Japan’s Reaction to Global Wildlife Preservation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 30. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Chance,” 91. 31. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo. 32. Norm entrepreneurs employ various promotional techniques. According to Price, the list of practical techniques that activists have used to put pressure on states includes framing, emulation, and the grafting of new norms onto established norms. With limited material resources, norm entrepreneurs are forced to use persuasive strategies. Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights.” 33. The six were Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mine Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. 34. Canada worked with several other governments to organize a landmine conference independent of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD), primarily because the CD (a traditional U.N. body established to discuss arms issues) was moving very slowly on the landmine issue due to disagreements among the major powers. John English, “The Ottawa Process: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 52, 2 (1998): 121–132. 35. Motoko Mekata, “Building Partnerships toward a Common Goal: Experiences of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines,” in The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, edited by Ann M. Florini (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), 143–176; Motoko Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu e [Toward a World without Landmines] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998). 36. The proposals put forth by the U.S. government included the exemption of the Korean Peninsula from the treaty to ban landmines, the redefinition of APMs to include “smart landmines” that self-destroy after a certain period of time, and the postponement of the enactment of the treaty for nine years. Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu e. 37. Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu e; Naoki Fukuhara, “Beikoku Nuki no Taijin-jirai Kinshi-jyoyaku” [Signing the Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines Treaty without the U.S.], Mainichi Shimbun, September 23, 1997, 6; Hideya Tanaka, “Taijin-jirai Zenmen Kinshi Jyoyaku” [The Treaty for the Complete Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines], Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1997, 8. 38. Mekata, “Building Partnerships toward a Common Goal”; personal interview with Toshio Shimizu of the JCBL steering committee, Tokyo, December 26, 2000. 39. Tanaka, “Taijin-jirai Zenmen Kinshi Jyoyaku.” 40. Tadamasa Fukiura, Fusako Yanase, and Yukie Osa, Jirai o Nakusou [Let’s Eliminate Landmines] (Tokyo: Jiyu Kokumin-sha, 2000);


41. 42. 43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48. 49.

50.

51.

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Mekata, “Building Partnerships toward a Common Goal”; Tanaka, “Taijin-jirai Zenmen Kinshi Jyoyaku.” Fukiura, Yanase, and Osa, Jirai o Nakusou. “Shimin no Suupaa Pawaa Shoori” [Victory of Citizens’ Super Power], Tokyo Shimbun, December 5, 1997, 12. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Nihon ga Hoyuu Suru Jirai no Hakai Jyokyo.” The JCBL was born long after other local ICBL branches had been established in such countries as Spain, the Philippines, Kenya, Cambodia, South Africa, and New Zealand. However, it wasn’t until just a few months prior to the European meetings that the Japanese felt sufficiently frustrated with their national government to take some action. Several JCBL leaders were aid workers with experience in Cambodia, the country with the world’s largest number of landmine victims. In the 1990s, JCBL head Yasuhiro Kitagawa organized the Association on Phnom Penh, primarily for sending Japanese prosthetics makers and materials to Cambodia. He later helped to create the Citizens’ Forum on Cambodia, whose purpose was to collect and disseminate information on general political and economic issues in that country and to make associated policy recommendations to the Japanese leadership. The head of the JCBL steering committee, Toshihiro Shimizu, also had experience in Cambodia, working in a refugee camp on the Thai–Cambodian border as a vocational trainer in the 1980s and serving as a regional officer at the Japan Volunteer Center office in Phnom Penh in the 1990s. Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu e. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Taijin-jirai Zenmen Kinshi Jyoyaku, Osuro Jyoyaku Kosho Kaigi ni Attate Nihon Seifu ni Taisuru Go-yobo” [Request to the Japanese Government Regarding Negotiations for the Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines Treaty/Oslo Treaty], a petition sent to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, August 30, 1997. Masaya Maruyama, “Nihon no Gijutsu, Jirai Jokyo ni” [Japanese Technology for the Removal of Landmines], Mainichi Shimbun, October 23, 1997, 4. “Shimin no Suupaa Pawaa.” Fusako Yanase, Sani no Onegai Jirai dewa Naku, Hana o Kudasai [Not Mines, But Flowers: A Plea From Sunny] (Tokyo: Jiyu Kokuminsha, 1996). The book was later published in English: Fusako Yanase, Not Mines, But Flowers: A Plea From Sunny – Peace Is Not Enough (Tokyo: Jiyu Kokuminsha, 1998). Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, a petition letter sent to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, November 17, 1997. Maruyama, “Nihon no Gijutsu, Jirai Jokyo ni.”

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52. Ayako Horiuchi, “Jirai Higaisha, Okinawa ni Kuru” [Landmine Victims Come to Okinawa], Jesuit Social Commitments in Japan and Asia Newsletter 97 (2000), http://www.kiwi-us.com/~selasj//jsc/ japanese/bulletin/no97/bu_ja9713.htm (accessed June 12, 2002). 53. “Shimin no Suupaa Pawaa.” 54. Quoted in Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu e, 230; see “Semeta Gaisoo, Booeichoo Kuzusu.” 55. Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu e. Although Obuchi is often recognized as the de facto leader of Japan’s anti-landmine efforts, it is misleading to assume that he alone was the reason for the policy change. It is more accurate to say that he came under strong pressure from JCBL and a handful of pro-Ottawa, pro-JCBL politicians, especially in 1998, to move forward on the Ottawa process. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Japanese NGO network and a relatively small number of politicians convinced Obuchi to support the treaty. In spite of the pressure, Obuchi was slow to promote the treaty’s full ratification once he became Prime Minister in July 1998. Mekata, “Building Partnerships toward a Common Goal.” 56. “Semeta Gaisoo, Booeichoo Kuzusu.” 57. “Japan Says It Will Break Ranks, Sign Land Mine Treaty,” CNN, October 21, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/971021/japan. landmines/ (accessed August 5, 2001); personal interview with Toshio Shimizu of the JCBL steering committee, Tokyo, October 11, 2000. 58. “Japan Says It Will Break Ranks, Sign Land Mine Treaty.” 59. Fukiura, Yanase, and Osa. Jirai o Nakusou. 60. Japan’s signing the treaty was not the result of a state–NGO partnership similar to the one that existed in Canada. Motoko Mekata (an NGO representative of the Association to Aid Refugees) explained, “Japan and Canada are at the opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to partnerships between government and NGOs—no such partnership exists in Japan” (quoted in English, “The Ottawa Process,” 128). Collaboration between the state and JCBL was nearly nonexistent until 1998, when legislators began to cooperate with the NGO network. 61. “Taijin-jirai Kinshi-jyoyaku Shimpo” [Symposium on the Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines], Tokyo Shimbun, June 17, 1998, 8. 62. Another (less significant) reason the ratification was delayed was because of the international reaction to nuclear bomb tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. Within the MOFA, both landmines and nuclear arms control issues are handled by the Division of Arms Control and Scientific Affairs. The division was forced to focus on nuclear nonproliferation efforts and thus was unable to pay adequate attention to the landmine debate. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Reports: Asia–Pacific States Parties, 1998,” http:// w w w.igc.org/hr w/reports/1999/landmines/ W EBA S1.html (accessed October 1, 2000).


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63. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Taijin-jirai Zenmen Kinshi Jyoyaku no Hijun no Sokushin ni Tsuite” [On Ratification and Promotion of the Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines Treaty], a petition sent to Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, August 28, 1998. 64. Yukie Osa, Jirai Mondai Handobukku [Handbook on Landmine Issues] (Tokyo: Jiyu Kokumin-sha, 1997). 65. Motoko Mekata, “Jirai Shomei no Obuchi-san, Tsugi wa Hijun Desu” [After Signing the Landmine Treaty, Mr. Obuchi, the Next Step is Ratification], Asahi Shimbun, August 4, 1998, 4; Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu e. 66. Personal interview with Toshio Shimizu of the JCBL steering committee, Tokyo, October 11, 2000. 67. “Shimin no Suupaa Pawaa”; Maruyama, “Nihon no Gijutsu, Jirai Jokyo ni.” 68. Fukiura, Fusako Yanase, and Yukie Osa, Jirai o Nakusou. 69. “Tokyo Urged to Sign Land Mine Treaty,” Japan Times, June 16, 1998, 3. 70. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, a letter addressed to the media on JCBL’s meeting with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi on September 11, 1998. 71. “Taijin-jirai Kinshi Jyoyaku Shinpo”; personal interview with Toshio Shimizu of the JCBL steering committee, Tokyo, October 11, 2000. Less than a week after the meeting with Obuchi on September 11, 1998, JCBL learned that forty governments had already signed the treaty, thus leaving Japan out of the first forty-country group that would make the treaty take effect. JCBL immediately released a statement of this news to the media, urging the government to ratify before the end of September 1998, to join some forty other countries to mark March 1, 1999 as the day when the treaty would enter into force. The government’s response to the JCBL statement was quick. As soon as it released the news, the Obuchi administration presented the domestic bill to the House of Representatives. Personal interview with Toshio Shimizu of the JCBL steering committee, Tokyo, December 26, 2000. 72. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Taijin-jirai Zenmen Kinshi Jyoyaku no Hijun no Sokushin ni Tsuite.” 73. House of Representatives, Japan, minute of the House of Representatives Security Committee, 143th Diet Session, September 28, 1998. Fujita failed to win support for substituting the term “regulations to possess landmines” with the phrase “the regulation of use, storage, and possession,” as written in the Mine Ban Treaty. Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura and an official from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry told Fujita that the change was unnecessary, since Japan’s Explosive Control Act already prohibited the use of mines, and the term “regulations to possess landmines” would cover acquisition, stockpiling, and retention. They insisted that the language would not constitute a loophole (House of Representatives, 1998).

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74. Mekata, Jirai Naki Chikyuu e. 75. Quoted in Suvendrini Kakuchi, “Disarmament-Japan: Approval of Landmine Pact Earns Praise,” One World, September 30, 1998, http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/oct98/09_20_014.html (accessed August 4, 2001). 76. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Nihon ga Hoyuu Suru Jirai no Hakai Jyokyo.” 77. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Nihon ga Motsu Taijin-jirai no Hakai ga Hajimatta!” [The Destruction of Japan’s Landmines Has Begun!], JCBL Newsletter 12 (2000): 4–6. 78. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan, statement by Ms Hisami Kurokochi, Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, presented at the Third Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, September 18–21, 2001, Managua, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ landmine/state0109.html (accessed June 6, 2002). 79. This does not imply that material or security concerns were completely absent from Japan’s decision-making on this matter. The fact that landmines on the U.S. bases in Japan were kept intact meant that U.S. material concerns mattered. The United States wanted to maintain these landmines on its bases in Japan (which were legally under the American jurisdiction), and subsequently the Japanese government recognized U.S. security concerns and complied with their requirement.

Chapter 4

Norms, Structures, and Japan’s “Northern Territories” Policy Kimie Hara

T

he disputed territories between Japan and Russia, the “Northern Territories” for the Japanese (“Southern Kuriles” for the Russians), are part of the former Japanese territories occupied by the USSR at the end of World War II. Even to this day, more than a decade after Japan’s negotiating counterpart transformed itself from the USSR to Russia, the issue remains the biggest obstacle preventing the two nations from signing a postwar peace treaty. This “Northern Territories” case provides an interesting example in considering normrelated questions in Japan’s foreign policy. The presently disputed “Northern Territories” comprise the islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan, and also the Habomais, a group of islets and rocks (hereafter called the “four islands”). In government publications and media coverage in Japan, the “four islands return thesis” is often discussed as if it were the invariable Japanese position consistently asserted throughout the postwar years. However, specialists who have studied this problem in detail know that this is not the case.1 In the early postwar years, the Japanese government held the so-called “two islands return thesis,” seeking Shikotan and the Habomais as a realistic goal. It was during the Soviet–Japanese peace negotiations in the mid-1950s that the “four islands return” became a core policy of the Japanese government. Since then, Japan adopted various policies directed to that goal, both from hard-line and soft-line positions. Today, the hard-line policies such as iriguchi-ron (return of all four islands as the prerequisite for improved relations) and seikei fukabun (no separation of politics and economics) are no longer expressed. Yet the goal of “four islands return” remains the same.

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Several questions arise: How did the “two islands return thesis” come about? Why did Japan shift its position from demanding two islands to four? Within the “four islands return” policy, why did Japan’s policy of negotiation shift between soft-line and hard-line approaches? In the post-cold war era, why can’t Japan go back to its original position of the “two islands return” and sign a peace treaty? This chapter attempts to provide some answers to these questions. Approaches adopted here are both structural and normative, or according to Katzenstein and Okawara, “analytical eclecticism.”2 In recent discussions on post-cold war international relations, perceiving the global structural analysis as inadequate for explanation of foreign policies, a growing number of scholars have emphasized the importance of intangible factors such as norms and ideas. While analyzing the development of Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy over the years, consideration is directed to the validity of this perspective. This chapter is chronologically divided into four sections. In each section, a brief description of Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy is followed by analysis both in structural and normative contexts. In the structural context, Japan’s policy choices are discussed in terms of both domestic and international structures. In the normative context, discussion is carried out in terms of what kinds of norms have affected them and where these norms come from. In association with the last question (where norms come from), the relationships between the norms and structures that shape foreign policies are discussed. Early Postwar “Northern Territories” Policy: The “Two Islands Return Thesis” as a Result of World War II After the end of World War II, the territorial disposition of Japan was expected to be made in a peace treaty between Japan and its former enemies, namely the “Big Four” Allies (the United States, Britain, USSR, and China) and their associated states. As was the occupation policy, the peace treaty was drafted under U.S. leadership. Thus, the most relevant partner for Japan to negotiate its territorial issues was then not the USSR but the United States. For the first postwar decade, Japan did not have a fixed “Northern Territories” policy. The term “Northern Territories” originally referred to all former Japanese territories that had been occupied by the USSR in the final stage of World War II. These included Southern Sakhalin and the entire Kurile chain. However, although various alternatives were considered, Japan’s realistic goal of territorial recovery was then

J A PA N ’ S “ N O R T H E R N T E R R I T O R I E S” P O L I C Y

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Shikotan and the Habomais, or the “two islands return.”3 For example, the first Diet resolution on the “Northern Territories” issue was passed in March 1951. It was called “the resolution regarding the entreaty for return of the Habomai islands [Habomai shoto henkan konsei ni kansuru ketsugi].” Accordingly, during its negotiations with the United States, preceding and at the Peace Conference, the Yoshida government of Japan demanded the return of the Habomais, or Habomais and Shikotan together, arguing that Shikotan was part of the Habomai group. Formation of the “Two Islands Return Thesis” How did the “two island return” policy come about? In terms of domestic policymaking, Japanese foreign policy was formulated under the strong leadership of the bureaucracy, that is, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), during the occupation period. Many influential and conservative politicians were purged or imprisoned. In addition, since the most important function of the government in this period was to deal with the Americans and try to influence their occupation policy, a good knowledge of English was useful. Thus, as Reischauer pointed out, “it is no accident that Shidehara, Yoshida, and Ashida . . . of the four prime ministers under the occupation, were all products of the foreign ministry.”4 In the international scene, although the cold war was escalating, it was within the framework of a post-World War II peace treaty that Japan was negotiating its territorial disposition, and Japan’s international position was that of a defeated and occupied country. As a former enemy, Japan was expected to accept the results of defeat in the peace terms set by the victorious Allied Powers. In terms of norms, the most important may be the international or legal norm, of the observance of relevant international agreements. The wartime international agreements relevant to the postwar Japanese territorial disposition included the Cairo Declaration, Yalta Agreement, and Potsdam Declaration. The Cairo Declaration, released jointly by the United States, the United Kingdom, and China in November 1943, outlined the principle of “no territorial expansion,” specifying that Japan would be expelled from all the territories it had taken “by violence and greed.” This principle of “no territorial expansion” was originally enunciated in the Atlantic Charter, which was proclaimed in August 1941 by the Anglo-American leaders. The Yalta Agreement, framed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and USSR in February 1945, specified the conditions for Soviet

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participation in the war against Japan, which included the ceding of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the USSR. The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, which Japan accepted at the time of its surrender, stipulated that “the terms of the Cairo Declarations shall be carried out, and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”5 These international agreements, however, were not necessarily consistent with each other. The Yalta Agreement was a controversial secret agreement that went beyond the principle of “no territorial expansion.”6 Historically, Southern Sakhalin was the only territory in the area that Japan had taken “by violence,” as a result of its victory in the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905. The status of the entire Kurile island chain was determined not by violence but by two Treaties (1855, 1875) that were mutually agreed to by Russia and Japan. The present “Northern Territories” (“four islands”) had always been regarded as Japanese territories since the first bilateral border demarcation of 1855. Despite this contradiction, however, the Japanese government led by MOFA pushed for the return of neither the “four islands” nor the entire Kurile chain, but only the “two islands.” After accepting all the relevant international agreements, it asked for the “two islands return” on the basis that those “two islands” could still be included in “such minor islands” in the Potsdam Declaration. Thus the “two islands return” thesis was born as a result of World War II, reflecting the reality that Japan was a defeated country and the USSR was one of the victorious Allies. In 1951 Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which it renounced South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, together with other territories, in Article 2.7 However, the treaty specified neither a final devolution nor precise demarcation of these territories. Furthermore, the USSR did not sign this treaty. The “unresolved problem” was born here. 1955–1956 Japanese–Soviet Negotiations: “Four Islands Return” as a Result of the Cold War and “Habomai and Shikotan” Transfer in the Joint Declaration In 1955, four years after the San Francisco peace conference and a decade after the end of the War, negotiations on a peace treaty began between Japan and the USSR. The “four islands return” became the core of Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy during this period of


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negotiation. The key events that brought this about were U.S. intervention and the establishment of the “1955 system” in Japanese domestic politics. U.S. intervention in the Soviet–Japanese negotiations is best known as the “Dulles’ warning.” In August 1956, after more than a year of negotiations, the Japanese plenipotentiary, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, was on the verge of a compromise with the USSR over their offer of “two islands” and concluding a peace treaty on that basis. However, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned Shigemitsu that Japan’s residual sovereignty over Okinawa could be endangered if it were to make territorial concessions to the USSR.8 Domestically, the Soviet–Japanese negotiations in the mid-1950s overlapped with the period when the long era of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) hegemony, the so-called 1955 system, was established. Upon the merger of the two conservative parties, the new LDP policy for the Japanese–Soviet negotiations was announced in the form of a policy document called “rational adjustment for Japanese–Soviet negotiations.” This made the “four islands” claim a core policy of the ruling party, and that was tantamount to the government’s policy thereafter. With these developments, the prospect of reaching a compromise in the territorial negotiation appeared to have vanished. Yet, in October 1956, Japan held a bilateral summit and restored diplomatic relations with the USSR. The Joint Declaration released at the time stated: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.9

Despite this Soviet “two islands” pledge to Japan, there has been neither transfer of these islands nor signing of a peace treaty to this date. Formulation of the “Four Islands Return” Thesis The “four islands return” thesis was a byproduct of the cold war, both internationally and domestically. Internationally, Japan became the center of U.S. cold war strategy in Asia. Two major reasons are known for the “Dulles Warning.” One was to secure U.S. control

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over Okinawa and the other was to prevent a rapprochement between Japan and the USSR.10 The strategic importance of Okinawa increased as the cold war escalated in the Asia–Pacific. The United States did not have a strong basis for its retention of Okinawa. If Japan settled the “Northern Territories” problem with the USSR, there would be considerable pressure on the United States to vacate Okinawa. The U.S. administration officially supported Japan’s “four islands” claim, not because it necessarily considered these islands distinct from the Kuriles but because it knew the claim would be unacceptable to the USSR. A primary objective of U.S. cold war policy in the Asia–Pacific was to secure Japan in the Western bloc. The “four islands” claim was a wedge set in place to prevent Japan from achieving a rapprochement with the USSR. In the domestic arena the 1955 System came into being, which also reflected cold war politics. Policies toward peace negotiations with the USSR became political bargaining tools between the two conservative parties, the Liberals and Democrats, upon their merger into the LDP. In order to form a large ruling party to oppose the strengthening socialist parties, Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama of the Democratic Party compromised with the Liberals led by former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The development of the “Northern Territories” policy of this period resulted from the complex interaction of different groups that held different views on “appropriate behavior” toward the USSR. Hatoyama and his entourage, such as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ichiro Kono, were pushing for a quick settlement with the Russians. They believed that a multidirectional peace diplomacy suited national interests, as Japan had to solve pending issues with the USSR, such as the issue of Japanese POWs detained in Siberia, UN membership, and fishery-related problems, as well as the territorial problem. In contrast, Yoshida and people close to him, who came to form a strong faction in the ruling party after the LDP merger, were governed by different ideas. They were traditionally pro-American and anti-Russian. In their eyes, the USSR had been a potential threat to Japan for a long time and was deeply distrusted even from before the cold war. The cold war further provided a structural base for their perspectives. They considered that being under the U.S. umbrella would be more suitable to Japan’s national interests than reconciling with the USSR, which they further believed would encourage communist influence in Japan. With respect to the international or legal norms of observing international agreements, the new addition was the 1951 San Francisco


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Peace Treaty, in which Japan renounced the “Kurile Islands” together with other territories. In the initial stage of the Japanese–Soviet negotiations, both Hatoyama and Yoshida factions agreed in setting the goal of two islands as “not part of the Kuriles.” But Hatoyama’s side thought a peace treaty would be concluded if Japan could achieve the return of two islands, while the Yoshida faction, including elements in the MOFA, thought peace could be prevented by establishing this condition, since in their view the USSR would refuse to return them.11 The “four islands return” claim was originally proposed by MOFA as one of their negotiating strategies to extract the “two islands” offer from the USSR.12 However, since the Soviet “two islands” offer came through unexpectedly fast, MOFA hardened its position and demanded the immediate return of the “four islands.” In the meantime, because of the political struggle among the conservatives, the negotiating strategy toward the USSR, which had originally been set with the bureaucratic leadership, became disordered. Although the new main players were politicians and not bureaucrats, decision-making toward the USSR during the 1955–1956 negotiations showed similar features to the pattern called the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model, or Allison’s Third Model, in that the actual policy outcome was not the product of an intellectual process or routine organizational procedures but of intra-governmental bargaining or pulling and pushing among individual policy actors.13 The players were not necessarily guided by a consistent strategic master plan but rather by conflicting conceptions of national and personal goals. The basis of the territorial policy was largely established by this process. Tossed about by the waves of political battles within the conservative parties (and later the ruling party), Japans’ policy toward the USSR lost direction and consistency even without a change of the premiership. On what legal basis did the United States intervene in the Russo– Japan negotiations? The United States had participated in all of the relevant wartime Allies’ agreements. Yet, Washington now based its argument on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, specifically Article 26, which states, “Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.” Dulles argued that since transfer of territories to the USSR had not been mentioned in the San Francisco Treaty, Japanese acceptance of the Soviet proposal to return only some of them would mean Japan was granting greater

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advantages to the USSR than to the United States, and in that case, Article 26 would enable the United States to claim Okinawa.14 On August 28, 1956, nine days after the “Warning,” Dulles was quoted as follows: That clause was put in the treaty—I wrote the treaty very largely, as you may remember—for that very purpose of trying to prevent the Soviet Union from getting more favorable treatment than the US got.15

This is, of course, cold war logic, completely ignoring the Yalta Agreement in which the United States and Britain promised territorial transfers to the USSR. “Habomai and Shikotan” in the Joint Declaration may be explained as an example in which domestic party politics undermined an international norm. Prior to the summit, in September 1956, in the exchange of letters between the Japanese and Soviet premiers (the Hatoyama-Bulganin letters), the two countries agreed to restore diplomatic relations, just as the USSR and West Germany had done in the previous year (1955), by shelving the territorial issue and signing a peace treaty, that is, accepting the so-called Adenauer Formula.16 This was an agreement between the top Japanese and Soviet leaders. However, at the summit the Japanese side brought up the territorial issue that was not supposed to be discussed there. This was because of an ad hoc LDP decision taken immediately before the Moscow summit. The official diplomatic agreement was perverted by a domestic political agreement, made neither by the Diet nor the Cabinet but by the LDP, that the party would pursue a policy of four islands return. The Japanese representatives at the Moscow summit, such as Hatoyama and Kono, were party politicians. They could not go back to Japan without raising the territorial issue as required by the new party decision. However, it was already clear from past negotiations that the Soviets would not accept the four islands demand. After discussions, the long period of negotiations between the two countries finally ended with the above territorial clause. Though consensus was reached on the terms of the Joint Declaration, it had to be interpreted in such a manner as to preserve the plenipotentiaries’ face at home. Thus, another set of letters, known as the Matsumoto-Gromyko letters, were announced and interpreted together with the Joint Declaration. Those letters, also exchanged preceding the summit, conveniently stated that the USSR and Japan agreed “to continue negotiations on the signing of a peace treaty, which would also include the territorial issue, after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic


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relations.”17 That is, the Habomais and Shikotan were promised in the Joint Declaration, and the question of Kunashiri and Etorofu was to be settled during negotiations for a peace treaty. In the end, there was no peace treaty between the two countries and the “Northern Territories” problem remained the biggest obstacle to normalizing their relations. “Northern Territories” Policy after the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations: Toward the Consolidation of the “Four Islands Return” Norm After the restoration of diplomatic relations, Japan began to strengthen its case for separate treatment of Etorofu and Kunashiri from the rest of the Kuriles, and the “four islands” claim of Japan came to be consolidated during the cold war years. In addition to the existing arguments, which the MOFA had prepared since the early postwar years, a new thesis of “the four islands not being part of the Kuriles” emerged. This argument was hammered out as a formal Japanese government position under the Ikeda government in the early 1960s.18 In the meantime, the USSR also hardened its position and started to claim that the territorial problem no longer existed, as they claimed that it had already been solved in a series of international agreements. In 1973 and 1991, bilateral Soviet–Japanese summits were held. By then the “four islands” goal of Japan had become solidified. Yet, from the period preceding the 1973 summit, various “Northern Territories” policies, including hard-line and soft-line positions, emerged. The most rigid position demanded the return of all four islands as the “entry point” or prerequisite for improved relations (iriguchi-ron). Similar to this position was the policy of “no separation of politics and economics [seikei fukabun].” In contrast, soft positions included “separation of politics and economics [seikei bunri]” and defining the solution of the territorial issue as an outgrowth, or “exit,” after overall improvement (deguchi-ron). The policy of seikei bunri existed in the 1970s, although it tends to be forgotten. For example, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on March 7, 1973, “We consider that the economic cooperation and the territorial problem are not issues to be linked, and not issues that should be linked.”19 Similar to this policy was the “balanced equilibrium [kakudai kinko]” that emerged in the 1990s. The idea was to promote an overall

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improvement in relations by encompassing many other fields in a balanced form, though continuing to include a solution to the territorial problem and the signing of a peace treaty as the most important items on the agenda.20 An option of “phased return [dankai henkan-ron]” also existed in the 1970s, although this was announced by the MOFA in the 1990s as if it were a new policy.21 Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that during the 1973 summit Prime Minister Tanaka made the following suggestion to his Russian counterparts: If Japanese sovereignty over the four islands is recognized, the timing of returning the Habomais and Shikotan, as agreed to be returned upon signing of the peace treaty, and the remaining islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu could be differentiated.22

There was also a “buying” proposal, which was introduced to overcome the stalemate in the negotiations. In March 1972, at an LDP National Land Development Research Council (kokudo kaihatsu kenkyu-kai) meeting, the head of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Shigeo Nagano, suggested “buying the Northern Territories” from the USSR by using Japan’s increasing accumulation of foreign currency.23 Although this ended as simply one domestic opinion, and was not adopted then, the proposal was actually pursued in the 1990s. Former Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev disclosed in his memoirs that after diplomatic negotiations failed, a leader of the ruling LDP (Ichiro Ozawa) offered US$28 billion to buy the islands.24 However, all these strategies failed, and to this day Japan and the USSR have concluded neither a territorial settlement nor a peace treaty. Consolidation of the “Four Islands Return” Norm The Japanese–Soviet bilateral summits of 1973 and 1991 took place against the background of global détente. By the 1970s summit, Japan’s international position had significantly changed from that of a defeated nation, as it had grown to be the world’s second largest market economy. Siberian development and economic assistance to the USSR were major pending issues of Japanese diplomacy toward the USSR in the early 1970s and the 1990s. After restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR, Japanese decision-making on the “Northern Territories” policy became monolithic. Once the national goal was set, the administrative body,


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MOFA, especially its Russian School, was in charge of framing a concrete policy to achieve the goal. Yet, politicians occasionally voiced individual positions for various reasons. The policy of separating politics and economics (seikei bunri) first emerged in the early 1970s, a time of emerging resource nationalism, in response to pressure from the Japanese business community, which was interested in Siberia as an alternative source of natural resources and hence had positive views about rapprochement with the USSR. The voices calling for seikei bunri became strong again at the end of the 1980s, because of concern that Japan’s relations with the USSR were not improving much, while the Gorbachev administration was greatly improving its relations with many other noncommunist countries. However, when it came to preparing for summit meetings, MOFA took the initiative in formulating the negotiating strategy. From its perspective, the peace treaty was not signed because agreement was not reached in the territorial issue; so the peace treaty and territorial problem were inseparable issues. Thus, policy priority was replaced by the unresolved problem from previous summits; that is, settlement of the territorial issues is the precondition for signing a peace treaty. Political leaders obediently followed the manual prepared by the bureaucrats. Prime ministers (such as Tanaka and Kaifu) could not object to the well-established claim for the “four islands return,” since its basis was set in 1955 upon the establishment of the LDP. In hindsight, after the restoration of diplomatic relations, Japan appeared to have fewer incentives for political rapprochement with the USSR throughout the cold war period. Issues such as UN membership and repatriation of Japanese POWs, the major Japanese goals of the 1955–1956 negotiations, had already been resolved. The return of Okinawa by the United States shifted the attention of irredentists from the south to the north, but the campaign did not acquire the intensity of those that had preceded Okinawa’s reversion.25 While nearly a million Japanese lived in Okinawa, none resided in the disputed islands. LDP conservatives’ negative vision of the USSR long constituted an important part of political life, not only in international politics but also in domestic politics, since it discredited the principal opposition parties—the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). The Yoshida group’s traditional policy stance, that “following U.S. leadership and not dealing with the USSR would suit national interest,” was inherited, and the existence of the “Northern Territories” problem was a convenient excuse for failing to deal with the USSR.

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One thing to be noted about Japan’s “four islands return” thesis is that the claim itself turned into a solid norm during the cold war period. Since Japan renounced the Kuriles in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it began to claim that those islands were not part of the Kuriles. By continuing for a long time to claim the “four islands return” and the position of “four islands not Kuriles,” those positions have become established as domestic norms of the “Northern Territories” policy, for which the cold war and the 1955 system provided structural foundations both internationally and domestically. In the period leading up to the 1955–1956 peace negotiations, the Japanese positions on the “Northern Territories” had been extensively discussed in many newspapers and journals. After that, however, there was little discussion or questioning of the “four islands claim” and its legitimacy until the late 1980s.26 The 1991 summit was held against the background of warming East–West relations and a series of developments indicating the “end of the cold war,” such as the democratization of the USSR and Eastern European countries and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Yet, the Japanese negotiation policy presented strong linkages showing continuity from the previous summit of 1973. The claim for the “four islands return” remained unchanged, as did the hard-line approaches as well as the soft-line approaches of dankai henkan-ron, especially the way all were presented as “new policies.” Japanese policy of decision-making toward the USSR after the diplomatic restoration may be explained by the Organizational Process Model, or Allison’s Second Model, in which government policies are seen more as a result of routine or quasi-mechanical processes based on the standard operating procedure (SOP) of large government organizations, in this case the MOFA. The SOP here plays a similar role as norms in the sense that it “defines standards of appropriate behavior.” In this model, top leaders tend to lack independent control over policy.27 Since policy is made on the basis of the existing SOP, it inevitably attaches importance to precedents and tends to fall into incrementalism as a decisional pattern. That is, the decision at point “t+1” can be anticipated by seeing what kind of decision was made at point “t.”28 The SOP in this case is the principle of the territorial negotiations. The territorial claim for “four islands return,” the basis of which was formed in 1955, had solidified by the early 1960s, and incrementalism had added the economic card in the 1970s. Though broad public discussion and government policymaking are not necessarily unconnected, government decision-making in Japan often does not reflect the result of public discussion. This tendency seems to be stronger when supremacy in policymaking rests with


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bureaucrats, who do not have to worry about the next election. Although the “1955 System” became unstable in the early 1990s, bureaucratic initiatives in policymaking remained the same. In fact, the instability of the political regime made bureaucratic dominance even stronger. In the meantime, Japan’s negotiating counterpart had been going through fundamental transformations in its political system since the late 1980s, with Perestroika (restructuring), and this affected its policy on the territorial problem. Following the introduction of “New Thinking” diplomacy, the USSR moved its position from “no existence” in the midst of the cold war era, to recognizing the existence of the dispute and allowing the “four islands” to be on the negotiating table. In 1991, eight months after the bilateral summit in Tokyo, the USSR was dissolved and succeeded diplomatically by Russia. “Northern Territories” Policy in the Post-Cold War Era Whereas there were only three bilateral summits as part of cold car Soviet–Japanese relations, Japan and Russia have undertaken more frequent political dialogues, especially since the late 1990s. Their first bilateral summit was held in Tokyo in 1993. After that, bilateral summits were held in 1997 (Krasnoyarsk), 1998 (Kawana and Moscow), 2000 (St. Petersburg and Tokyo), 2001 (Irkutsk), 2003 (Moscow), and 2005 (Tokyo). In fact, the two countries’ top leaders have met far more often as there have been other summits within multilateral frameworks, such as the Group of 8 (G-8) and Asia– Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings. Japan still maintains the basic goal of “four islands return.” However, it has given up the hard-line territorial positions, such as iriguchi-ron or seikei fukabun, and stopped emphasizing the “four islands” as distinct from the Kuriles. The two countries had set a deadline of 2000 for solving the territorial issue and signing a peace treaty, but this was not met. Japan also proposed a modified dankai henkan-ron, separating negotiations for the two small islands promised in the 1956 Declaration (Habomai and Shikotan) from the negotiations for the other two islands (Kunashiri and Etorofu). As of mid-2007, however, the territorial negotiations have remained stagnant. End of the Cold War, Bureaucratic Incrementalism, and Suzuki Scandals By the time the first Japan–Russia summit meeting was held in 1993, there was general recognition that the cold war structure had collapsed

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both in international and domestic politics. Internationally, the end of the cold war brought external pressure (gaiatsu) on the Japanese “Northern Territories” policy. In the early 1990s Japan continued to pursue its seikei fukabun policy, linking the territorial problem with economic assistance to Russia; this was done not only in bilateral relations but also in the international arena (in the G-7 for example). However, Japan could no longer obtain the same kind of international support as it did during the cold war. Japan was left behind by global post-cold war developments when it persisted with its obsolete policy, and it ended up facing criticism from its former Western allies as being narrow-sighted and unconstructive.29 As a result of this gaiatsu, the seikei fukabun policy virtually collapsed. Domestically, the 1955 system also collapsed in 1993. Yet, as far as the “Northern Territories” policy is concerned, the decision-making structure has seen only minimal change. Even after the collapse of the 1955 System, the LDP has maintained its influence on policy as the biggest opposition party, and since 1994 as part of the ruling coalition. Leadership in policy formation has continued to be taken by the bureaucracy (i.e., MOFA), and this followed the pattern of the Organizational Process Model. In the series of changes in the global circumstances since the late 1980s, however, the Japanese approach has hit the deadlock of incrementalism, presenting typical “irrational” bargainers of the revised Rational Actor Model of Snyder and Diesing.30 Nevertheless, signs of change have emerged, although very slowly, with progress in research on the dispute. From the late 1990s, Japan stopped emphasizing that “the islands are distinct from the Kuriles,” because it became unable to take such a stand. From the late 1980s, almost thirty years after the peace negotiations, a wide range of public discussion regarding Japanese–Soviet relations and the territorial problem began. Several scholars suggested a “two islands plus alpha” formula, basing the territorial settlement on the 1956 Joint Declaration.31 Among these, Haruki Wada’s and Shichiro Murayama’s studies regarding the area of the Kuriles became sensational, questioning the legitimacy of the government’s “four islands” claim.32 Initially their position was criticized by many other scholars and government officials. However, since a long-sealed document crucial to this question was found in the Australian Archives in the mid1990s, the situation has changed. This material, which the MOFA prepared in the early postwar years, clearly recognized the two larger disputed islands (Kunashiri and Etorofu) as part of the Kurile Islands.33


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In the late 1990s, options for Japanese government policy included “return of two islands first [nito senko henkan-ron]” or “simultaneous parallel negotiation [doji heiko kyogi],” which is a modified “phased return [dankai henkan-ron],” involving separate but simultaneous negotiations for the return of the two smaller and two larger islands.34 At the 2001 Irkutsk summit, Japanese Prime Minister Mori actually made a proposal to President Putin based on this idea.35 Bilateral negotiations made no further progress after this Irkutsk summit. On her appointment to the succeeding Koizumi Cabinet, Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka reversed the position and went back to the traditional one of “return of four islands in a batch [yonto ikkatsu henkan].” Tanaka was later dismissed, as she tried to “reform” MOFA and encountered strong opposition from bureaucrats and the LDP politician Muneo Suzuki, who at the time exercised unusually strong influence in MOFA. The situation then deteriorated even further with a series of political scandals involving Suzuki; eventually, both Suzuki and the MOFA Russian specialists close to him (such as former head of the European and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Kazuhiko Togo, and a chief analyst of the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau, Masaru Sato) who had been the key promoters of more flexible policies, including the modified dankai henkan-ron, were purged. The Japanese negotiating counterpart (USSR/Russia) has always been consistent in rejecting the “four islands” solution. Although its official positions shifted several times in the past, it was also consistent in presenting the “two islands” offer as “realistic.” In the early 1970s the USSR had unofficially suggested a settlement with “two islands,”36 and in 1992 Russia made a similar suggestion.37 At the Irkutsk summit of 2001, Putin for the first time recognized the legitimacy of the 1956 Joint Declaration, but he did not commit himself to continuing negotiations over the two larger islands.38 For over half a century, Japan’s “Northern Territories” policies have been formulated under MOFA leadership. However, the bureaucracy’s work is structurally and functionally to implement government policy, and it cannot change a “four islands” goal set by a political decision. It was probable that the purged MOFA Russian specialists had realized the limitations of Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy and envisaged a realistic settlement based on “two islands” transfer as an interim, if not permanent, solution by adopting the modified dankai henkan-ron. The final settlement of this problem will require political decisions. But few politicians want to risk taking a changed stand when the rewards are so limited. Muneo Suzuki was an exception. He enthusiastically

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involved himself in foreign policy issues, especially the “Northern Territories” problem. Many former residents of the disputed islands live in his constituency in Hokkaido, where interest in the issue was generally high. It is understandable that those purged MOFA officials, who were assiduously promoting a solution to this problem, valued their relations with Suzuki. Yet, their way of promoting territorial negotiations with Russia, particularly the modified dankai henkanron, was interpreted as giving up the two larger islands and was not welcomed by MOFA and LDP conservatives. Furthermore, many MOFA officials did not appreciate the “special relations” and unusual control that Suzuki and certain officials had in the Ministry and eventually drove them out by leaking detrimental information about them.39 After being tossed about by the waves of political battles involving MOFA and the LDP, the “Northern Territories” policy again lost direction. After the “Suzuki Scandal,” especially since 2006, the year commemorating the 50th anniversary of the restoration of Japanese– Soviet diplomatic relations, several politicians have attracted media attention by referring to approaches involving some concessions or alternative ideas, such as a “three islands return” approach, the “FiftyFifty solution” to divide the area of the disputed territories into two, or a trilateral approach bringing the United States in their territorial negotiations.40 These politicians include the Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Taro Kono of the LDP and Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). They seem to be feeling the need for a political decision, inspired by the success of the Russo–Chinese border negotiation of 2004 and/or frustrated by the long stagnation in the negotiations. Nevertheless, the MOFA so far denies any changes in Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy.41 Conclusion In the early postwar years, Japan’s policy for territorial recovery was largely prescribed by its international position as a defeated and occupied enemy and by the international norm Japan was expected to adopt as a standard of appropriate behavior: to accept the surrender terms set by the victorious Allies. Its realistic goal for territorial recovery was then the “two islands return.” Ten years later, Japan found itself in the Western bloc in the cold war structure. Domestically, when the conservative parties merged to better oppose the socialist parties, Prime Minister Hatoyama conceded to the traditionally antiRussian and pro-American Yoshida faction over the “Northern


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Territories” policy. The new LDP policy (thereafter the national policy) of “four islands return” was strongly endorsed by the United States. This was not necessarily because of its legitimacy but because of its unacceptability to the USSR. The present “four islands return” claim was created as a result of the cold war, and for several decades the cold war continuously provided structural foundation for this claim both domestically and internationally. In the meantime, various negotiation policies directed to the goal of the “four islands return” were developed under MOFA’s initiative. Furthermore, the claim of the “four islands return” itself became a domestic norm in Japan. Even to this day, when the cold war is generally considered a thing of the past, this norm continues to prescribe Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy. Both norms and structures are important factors in shaping foreign policies. As exemplified in the policies over the Kurile Islands or “Northern Territories” in the past, norms are formed and adopted selectively in structural and historical contexts. Domestic structure certainly matters for decision-making in foreign policy, because which norm prescribes a policy depends on who, or which group, takes the initiative for decision-making. There are also important relations between international structures and norms. It is an international and legal norm that international agreements should be observed in foreign policy formulations. However, countries make international agreements considering their status in the context of international relations (thus structure matters), and their compliance (about which international agreements to observe) is selective. For example, the principle of “no territorial expansion,” specified in the Atlantic Charter and Cairo Declaration, was applied selectively to the defeated enemy countries, but not to the United Kingdom or other European colonial powers among the wartime Allies. The transfer of the Kuriles to the USSR in the Yalta Agreement did not comply with the principle of “no territorial expansion,” but the Allied leaders (the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR) agreed to it as an incentive for Soviet entry into the war against Japan. World War II and the Allies–Axis confrontation provided a structural foundation for these agreements. On the other hand, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was created by the Western Powers, especially by the United States, in the cold war and East–West confrontation structure, where wartime international agreements were selectively observed. The international agreement selectively invoked by the United States in intervening in the 1956 Soviet–Japanese negotiations was this San Francisco Peace Treaty. For Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy, whether it is the “two islands return” of the early postwar years or “four islands return”

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after the mid-1950s, the importance that the international structure prescribed for these policies cannot be disregarded. Japan complied with international agreements in structural contexts—as a country defeated in World War II for the former, and as a Western bloc member in cold war confrontation for the latter. The cold war supplied both domestic and international structural support for the “four islands return theory” and established it as a norm of Japanese foreign policy over the years. Even after the end of the cold war, Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy still retains strong continuities from the cold war. Certainly, it is strongly prescribed by a domestic decision-making structure that has strong continuity from the cold war era and the norms and beliefs shared by Japan’s political leadership. However, one should not necessarily conclude that international structural analysis no longer suffices to explain foreign policy. Strong continuities from the cold war era are also found in terms of the international political and security structures surrounding Japan; including the remaining communist and authoritarian regimes in China and the Korean Peninsula, where nations are still politically divided along the Taiwan Strait and the 38th Parallel; the territorial disputes over Takeshima/Tokdo, Senkaku/Diaoyu, and the “Northern Territories”; and the U.S.-led bilateral security alliances (in the form of the San Francisco Alliance System). Thus, Japanese policy may be interpreted in a regional international structural context as one of the continuities that has not yet been reshaped in the post-cold war era. Although the post-cold war direction is unclear, Japan’s “Northern Territories” policy no longer has the kind of powerful structural support it had previously. Throughout the cold war period, the United States supported Japan’s “four islands” claim. However, with the end of the cold war, continuous U.S. support for the “four islands” claim may not be forthcoming in future. In fact, the collapse of seikei fukabun in the G7(G8) arena was a clear example of the limits of cold war policy. Interestingly, Aso, Kono and Hatoyama, who have recently attracted media attention for their remarks on the “Northern Territories,” are all grandsons of, respectively, Shigeru Yoshida, Ichiro Kono, and Ichiro Hatoyama, who were in the mainstream of Japanese politics half a century ago. In particular, Taro Kono, the youngest and the most progressive of the three, has suggested that the national goal of the “four islands” return be changed. It is especially worth noting that such an opinion has been aired by a politician of the ruling party. This may suggest the possibilities of a broader norm and policy change on this issue in the future.


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Notes An earlier version of this paper appeared as part of the East–West Center Working Papers, Politics, Governance and Security Series, No. 13, November 2005. 1. For detailed studies on the “Northern Territories” problem, see, for example, Kimie Hara, Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo–Japanese Relations, Vol. I, Between War and Peace, 1697–1985; Vol. II, Neither War nor Peace, 1985–1998 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); Hiroshi Kimura, Nichiro Kokkyo Kosho-shi: Ryodo Mondai ni Ikani Torikumuka [A History of Japanese–Russian Border Negotiations] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1993); Takahiko Tanaka, Nisso Kokko Kaifuku no Shiteki Kenkyu [A Historical Study of the Japanese–Soviet Diplomatic Restoration] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1993); Haruki Wada, Hoppo Ryodo Mondai o Kangaeru [Considering the Northern Territories Problem] (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1990); Hoppo Ryodo Mondai—Rekishi to Mirai [Northern Territories—History and Future] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1999). 2. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian–Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” International Security 26, 3 (2002): 153. 3. For details, see Hara, Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, 24–33. 4. Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation, Fourth Edition (McGraw-Hill, 1990), 213. 5. Emphasis added. Here “we” refers to the Allied Powers. 6. The frontier between Russia and Japan had been established in 1855 by the Treaty of Shimoda, as passing between the islands of Etorofu and Urup. The rest of the Kurile Islands became Japanese territory by the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 in exchange for Japanese renunciation of claims over Sakhalin. Thus the present “Northern Territories” were never Russian, the rest of the chain was Russian for only twenty years, and the status of the entire island chain was determined not by violence but by two Treaties mutually agreed by Russia and Japan. 7. For details of the San Francisco Peace Treaty preparations, see Kimie Hara, Sanfuranshisuko Heiwa Joyaku no Moten: Ajiataiheiyo Chiiki no Reisen to “Sengo Mikaiketsu no Shomondai” [Blind Spots of the San Francisco Peace Treaty: The Cold War in the Asia–Pacific Region and the “Unresolved Problems”] (Hiroshima: Keisui-sha 2005); Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia–Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco Sytem (Oxford/New York: Routledge, 2007). 8. Shunichi Matsumoto, Mosukuwa ni Kakeru Niji—Nisso Kokko Kaifuku Hiroku [The Rainbow over Moscow: Secret Records of

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9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

17. 18.

Japan–Soviet Diplomatic Rapproachment] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1966), 114–117; Masaaki Kubota, Kuremurin eno Shisetsu—Hoppo Ryodo Kosho 1955–1983 [Diplomatic Missions to Kremlin—the Negotiations over the Northern Territories, 1955–1983] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju-sha, 1983), 133–137; United States Department of State, The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS hereafter): 1955–1957, Vol. xxiii, 1991, 202– 203; Hara, Sanfuranshisuko Heiwa Joyaku no Moten, 42–46. “Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, Signed at Moscow, on 29 October 1956” (extract), United Nations, Treaty Series: Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations, No. 3768, Vol. 263, 1957, 114. For details, see Hara, Sanfuranshisuko Heiwa Joyaku no Moten, 42–46; Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo– Japanese Relations. Haruki Wada, “Hoppo Ryodo Mondai o Saiko Suru” [Reconsidering the Northern Territories Problem], Sekai, February 1992, 224. Tanaka, Nisso Kokko Kaifuku no Shiteki Kenkyu, 164–165; Hara, Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, 71. For details, see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 144–184. FRUS: 1955–1957, 202–204; Hara, Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, 45. Department of State for the Press: August 28, 1956, No. 450, Secretary Dulles’ News Conference of August 28, 1956, FO371/121040, XC10742, Public Record Office, London. Also FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XXIII, 1991, 211. Hatoyama’s letter to Bulganin of September 11, 1956 stated, “Taking into consideration the particulars of the negotiations between the two nations to date, on this occasion making it a condition to continue negotiations regarding the territorial issue at a later date, I, the Prime Minister, notify that the government of Japan is ready to enter negotiations to effect the normalization of our diplomatic relations, if the Soviet Union agrees beforehand on the following point (1) ending of the state of war between the two nations, (2) mutual establishment of embassies, (3) instant repatriation of the Japanese detainees, (4) effectuation of the fishery treaty, and (5) support of the Soviet Union for Japan’s joining the United Nations.” Hiroshi Shigeta and Shoji Suezawa, eds., Nisso Kihon Bunsho Shiryo-shu: 1855-nen—1988-nen [JapaneseSoviet Basic Document Material Collection] (Tokyo: Sekainougokisha, 1990), 148–149. Ibid. Wada, Hoppo Ryodo Mondai o Kangaeru; Hoppo Ryodo Mondai – Rekishi to Mirai, 273–276.


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19. “Dai-ichi-rui Dai-yon-go, Gaimu-iinkai Giroku Dai-yon-go, showa 48-nen 3-gatsu 7-ka,” [1–4, Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes No. 4, March 7, 1973], 71; Kokkai Shugiin Iinkai Kaigi-roku, 6, Gaimu 1972–1973 [House of Representatives Committee Minutes, 6, Foreign Affairs 1972–73], 11; Hara, Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, 125. 20. Gaimusho Daijin Kanbo Kokunai Koho-ka, Warera no Hoppo Ryodo 1993-nen-ban [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretariat Domestic Public Relations Division, Our Northern Territories, 1993], 27. 21. Ekonomisuto, September 15, 1992. 22. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 10, 1973. 23. Asahi Shimbun, 24 March, 1972; Alexander N. Panov, Fushin kara Shinrai e [From Distrust to Trust] (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1992), 73. 24. Asian Financial Review, February 2, 1995. 25. On May 15, 1972, having been under U.S. occupation since 1945, Okinawa was returned to Japan (although U.S. military bases and facilities were retained). In the late 1960, the reversion movement became intensified and the United States agreed to its early reversion. The formal agreement over Okinawa’s reversion was signed on June 17, 1971 (and came into effect on May 15, 1972). While Okinawa’s reversion had good legal ground, the uncertainty of the “hoppo ryodo” claim was covered with irredentist education. 26. Hara, Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, 168. 27. Allison, Essence of Decision, 67–100. 28. Ibid., 39–40. 29. For example, one of the major criticisms came from a former U.S. president, Richard Nixon. In his article, contributed to the New York Times, March 5, 1993, Nixon condemned Japan for “conditioning aid on Russia’s return of four tiny northern islands.” 30. “The irrational bargainer is characterized by a rigid belief system that dominates his behavior. He knows from the onset of a crisis what the opponent is up to because he has studied the opponent thoroughly and understands his ultimate aims, bargaining style, preferences, and internal political problems. He also is a keen judge of men on his side, knowing whose opinions to value and whose opinions to ignore or bypass. . . . Knowing the opponent as he does, he is not going to be duped by the opponent’s tricks or deceptive statements, nor is he going to lose heart at temporary setbacks, alarms, and rumors, but continues firmly on his chosen strategy through all diversions and difficulties.” Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining Decision-Making and System Structure in International Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 337. 31. Various arguments over the “Northern Territories” problem in the late 1980s are concisely summarized in Sekai, April 1990, 146–160. 32. Haruki Wada, “Chishima-retto no Han’i ni tsuite [On the Geographic Boundaries of the Kurile Islands],” Sekai, May 1986; Shichiro

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33.

34.

35. 36.

37.

38. 39.

40. 41.

Murayama, Kuriru-shoto no Bunkengakuteki Kenkyu [Philological Study of the Kurile Islands] (Tokyo: Sanichi-shobo, 1987). Kimie Hara, New Light on the Russo–Japanese Territorial Dispute, Working Paper No.1995/1, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, May, 1995; Asahi Shimbun, July 12, 1995. “Nito Senko 97-nen ni koso, Hoppo-ryodo kosho de Gaimusho” [The Two-Island-First Planned in 1997, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Negotiations on the Northern Territories], Asahi Shimbun, May 21, 2002. Asahi Shimbun, March 12, 2002. Kimura, Nichiro Kokkyo Kosho-shi, 148–149; Asahi Shimbun, March 24, 1972; Panov, Fushin kara Shinrai e, 67; Hara, Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945, 141. “Nito Senko Henkan, 92-nen, Roshia mo Himitsu Teian” [Two Islands Return First, Russia Also (Had) a Secret Proposal], Asahi Shimbun, May 21, 2002. Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 2002. Sato has published a detailed account and an excellent analysis of the “Suzuki Scandall” and the MOFA’s internal politics behind it. See Masaru Sato, Kokka no Wana – Gaimusho no Rasupuchin to Yobarete [A Trap Laid by the State—Being called Rasputin of the Foriegn Ministry]. (Tokyo: Shincho-sha, 2005). Togo also provides his explanation on this issue in his most recent book. (See Kazuhiko Togo, Hoppo-ryodo Kosho Hiroku – Ushinawareta Godo no Kikai, [Secret Notes on the Northern Territories Negotiations—Five Lost Opportunities] (Tokyo: Shincho-sha, 2007). Yomiuri Shimbun, October 20, 2006; Asahi Shimbun, October 20, 2006; Yomiuri Shimbun, December 14, 2006. See the MOFA’s response to Suzuki Muneo’s question regarding the Yomiuri Shimbun report of December 14, 2006. House of Representative, December 25, 2006. http://www.shugiin.go.jp/ itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/b165266.htm (accessed July 3, 2007).

Chapter 5

Three Norms of Collective Defense and Japan’s Overseas Troop Dispatches Yoichiro Sato*

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ince the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) was dispatched to Cambodia under the United Nations (UN) flag in 1993 for the first time in the post-World War II period, Japan’s overseas SDF deployments have gradually increased in frequency. Scholars and analysts have attributed this change to various factors, such as U.S. pressure,1 Japanese nationalism 2 and internationalism,3 geopolitical interests,4 and resource security interests.5 Ichiro Ozawa, who orchestrated the split in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and engineered the birth of the non-LDP coalition government in 1993, advocated Japan’s contributions to responsibilities of the international society and more specifically personnel contributions in the area of global security as components in the definition of a “normal country.”6 In discussing “personnel contributions,” Ozawa did not take an expansive stance on SDF activities overseas, in particular regarding participation in the “coalitions of the willing,” of recent years, other than as a part of UN-led peace keeping forces.7 Rather, Ozawa was developing a concept of a “peacekeeping reserve force” apart from the SDF; and later this was proposed by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). However, the phrase “normal nation” was later used by others to mean liberating the SDF from Japan’s unique restrictions and allowing them to operate at the level of other militaries and, more specifically, moving away from the “defensive defense only” stance and the ban on collective defense under the current interpretation of the Article 9 of the Constitution.8 Japan’s initial move away from a strict observation of the ban on collective defense started during the 1980s under Prime Minister

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Yasuhiro Nakasone, who brought Japan closer into the overall U.S. cold war strategy of containing the Soviet Union. Thus, the initial context of the discussions of collective defense was bilateral. However, the 1991 Gulf War forced Japan to make a quick decision on participating in a multilateral UN-led military operation. The government of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu suffered a defeat in the Diet over its proposal to send Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) minesweepers to the Gulf, and Japan faced severe international criticism. This major diplomatic setback, known as the “Gulf War trauma,” led Japan to pass the UN Peacekeeping Operation Law in 1992, but the debate on collective defense was avoided to the extent possible by minimizing operational SDF cooperation with troops from other countries. In parallel to a steady stream of SDF participation in UN Peace keeping Operations (PKOs) through the 1990s, the non-UN track of collective defense grew under bilateral U.S.–Japan security cooperation. During the second half of the 1990s, revision of the U.S.–Japan Guideline for Security Cooperation, the accompanying passage of the Regional Contingency Law,9 and the related legislations expanded the scope of SDF activities beyond strictly territorial defense. These measures expanded the scope of bilateral U.S.–Japan military cooperation near (in and out of) Japan’s territorial space in regional contingencies, thereby raising the collective defense question. Since 2001, a third mode of collective defense has emerged in addition to the two previously discussed modes—U.S.–Japan bilateral and UN-centric multilateral—of increased collective defense. The third mode of collective defense has entailed Japan’s participation in multilateral coalitions of the willing led by the United States. While all overseas activities of the SDF, up to the GSDF dispatch to East Timor (1999–2000), were conducted under a unified UN command based on UN Security Council resolutions, Japan in the twenty-first century increasingly dispatched the SDF outside the strictly UN centric framework. Japan started this by sending the MSDF to the Indian Ocean (2001–2007; resumed in January 2008) and by dispatching Air (2003, ongoing as of January 2008) and Ground (2004–2006) SDFs to the missions undertaking rehabilitation operations in Iraq, all the while citing UN resolutions, within a coalition of the willing and without a centralized UN command. The SDF dispatches by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to these coalition operations added a new context to the previous debates on collective defense. The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law—which permitted MSDF dispatches to the Indian Ocean region—went through three extensions

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in November 2003, November 2005, and November 2006 before expiring on November 1, 2007. Between extensions, the basic plan of dispatch was revised with cabinet approval. The expiry of the law in November 2007 was a result of the opposition’s control of the upperhouse majority in the Diet following the election of summer 2007. However, the ruling coalition of the LDP and Komeito resubmitted the bill to the lower house and overrode the upper-house opposition with a two-thirds majority in January 2008. This move opened the way for resumption of the maritime refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. While the MSDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean was conducted under a special measures law with a limited term, Japan’s participation in the third type of (pseudo-UN coalition) collective defense operations seems to be becoming a routine matter. The Japanese MSDF and civilian Coast Guard’s regular participation in multilateral exercises under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI—which aims at intercepting trafficking of weapons of mass destruction components and material) since 2004 has moved the MSDF out of the bilateral box of U.S.–Japan exercises in practice, if not in legal discourse.10 The three modes of collective defense Japan has experienced since the early 1990s have been supported by three versions of norms on collective defense: (1) U.S.–Japan bilateral, (2) UN-centric multilateral, and (3) multilateral coalitions of the willing led by the United States. The MSDF dispatches to the Indian Ocean since November 2001 represent the first and the ongoing case of SDF operation in a coalition without a unified UN command—the third mode of collective defense. The Indian Ocean example may be contrasted with the case of SDF deployments to Iraq, where post facto UN authorization of the reconstruction and security missions through UNSC Resolution 1511 in October 2003 changed the legal status of the SDF dispatches midcourse.11 However, discussions on the MSDF refueling and other actual and proposed operations under the Antiterror Special Measures Law encompass all three norms of collective defense. In historically reviewing the process of legislation and cabinet decisions on the SDF dispatches to the Indian Ocean region under the Antiterror Special Measures Law, this chapter will attempt to examine the role of the three norms of collective defense. Has the balance among the three norms changed over the period of time? If so, what are and who are the drivers of the change? If not, what remains constant? And finally, does consideration of the norms add an explanatory power in this case?

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Maritime Refueling Operation in the Indian Ocean In the morning of September 11, 2001 (U.S. Eastern Standard Time), two of the four commercial airliners that had been hijacked by terrorists crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, and another crashed into the Pentagon (U.S. Department of Defense) building in Washington, DC. The last plane, likely headed for the White House, crashed in a field in suburban Pennsylvania due to resistance by passengers who had learned about the earlier terror attacks in New York and Washington, DC through cellular phone conversations. As the international terrorist organization Al Qaeda was identified as the culprit of these attacks, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1368 to recognize these attacks as threats to international peace and security, thereby opening a path to apply the previously adopted antiterrorism resolutions to undertake new operations against Al Qaeda.12 In response to UNSC Resolution 1368, Japan’s immediate response was to seek possible cooperation with the United States under existing domestic laws, while simultaneously working on enabling Japan’s participation in a multilateral coalition through a new legislation. As the United States decided to send troops to combat Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, Japanese MSDF destroyers escorted the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk Carrier Battle Group out of Yokosuka, invoking the maritime patrol clause of the existing Self Defense Forces Law and labeling the dispatch as Japan’s unilateral and peacetime action. While this escort operation sidestepped the question of constitutionality of collective defense, it was bilateral in its practicality. The Japanese Diet with support of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Komei Party passed the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law in late October during the special session of fall 2001. The law, effective for two years beginning on November 1, 2001, provided grounds for SDF participation in “cooperative support activities” with coalition partners. Despite opposition from the Democratic Party and others, the ruling coalition took advantage of relatively high domestic support and U.S. pressure. Previously, Japan’s overseas SDF dispatches were conducted under the PKO Law of 1992. The PKO Law required UN authorization of military dispatches and the concurrence of the receiving country. While UNSC Resolution 1368 urged UN members to take appropriate measures to counter terrorism, it stopped short of authorizing the invasion of Afghanistan owing to opposition from China and Russia.


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Legal acceptance of foreign troops into Afghanistan, which could have enabled the Japanese government to invoke the PKO Law, was not forthcoming until a provisional post-Taliban government was established in late 2001 under Hamid Karsai’s leadership. The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law therefore cited UN resolutions but legally defined Japan’s action in terms of self defense. Under the law, the government was required to draft a Basic Plan of dispatch and have it approved by the cabinet. Diet approval of the Basic Plan prior to actual dispatch was not required in the law. However, the government was required to submit the Basic Plan for approval by the Diet within sixty days of the dispatch. The Basic Plan did not authorize any GSDF troop mission to Afghanistan and only permitted dispatch of Maritime and Air SDFs to the Indian Ocean region for logistical support missions. The first Basic Plan of dispatch, approved by the cabinet on November 16, 2001, authorized a maritime refueling mission through the six-month dispatch of four MSDF refueling ships and six escorting destroyers (two and three, respectively, on each rotation). These ships were also authorized to participate in other secondary activities, such as search and rescue and humanitarian support. The Basic Plan also assigned C-130 cargo planes of the ASDF for logistical support mission between a U.S. base in Australia and a UK base in Diego Garcia. The Basic Plan explicitly excluded the transportation of arms and ammunition for the coalition partners by the SDF missions. The initial recipients of the fuel were U.S. naval ships, but British ships soon joined the list of recipients. The ASDF air logistics operations did not receive as much attention in Japan, but it involved a fourcountry cooperation—Japan, United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. These decisions on de facto collective defense in the Basic Plan were thus made at the cabinet level. The Basic Plan was amended on May 17, 2002 with the cabinet approving to extend the MSDF dispatch by one year. On November 19, 2002, another amendment was added to the MSDF mission for the onetime requirement of transporting a Thai engineering battalion and its equipments from Bangkok to Karachi, Pakistan. The Thai troops were part of the coalition effort to rebuild Afghanistan and were assigned to the construction of an airfield. The Thai troops were transported by a Japanese MSDF transport ship in February 2003. The decision on this first operational military cooperation with another Asian ally of the United States, however, involved little public debate. The Basic Plan enabled SDF deployments for its duration (normally six months) and was extended without interruption to the SDF

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operations until November 1, 2007. The MSDF activity, however, was scaled down in the Basic Plan from May 1, 2004. Under the new plan, only one refueling ship and two escorting destroyers were assigned to the Indian Ocean mission.13 Both the declining amount of fuel requirements of the coalition fleet and the heightening tensions over North Korea’s missile and nuclear development were accountable for the reduction in deployment of MSDF ships to the Indian Ocean. The scale of the MSDF dispatch was further reduced a year later when the new Basic Plan cut the number of destroyers to one.14 Under each Basic Plan, the Prime Minister and the Director of the Defense Agency (Defense Minister after January 2007) drafted the Implementation Guideline to provide further details, such as the area and the nature of activities and the names of the assigned ships, for SDF operations. In practice, the Implementation Guideline was also adopted through consultations within the LDP and with the coalition partner Komei Party15 —which amounted de facto to the equivalent of requiring cabinet approval. However, unlike the Basic Plan, the Implementation Guideline was not subjected to Diet scrutiny. As U.S. war preparations against Iraq became imminent toward early 2003, some important policy changes relevant to the collective defense question were made at this level. In December 2002, the MSDF dispatched its Aegis-class destroyer for the Indian Ocean operation under a revised Implementation Guideline. Opposition to this decision focused on the advanced air defense capability of the Aegis destroyers, which raised the collective defense question. As U.S. ships shifted to the Persian Gulf region, the strength of the coalition ships in the Indian Ocean was increased to fill the gap. Japan’s Aegis dispatch was also aimed at preparing for the possibility of escorting Japanese oil tankers in the event of war in the Persian Gulf. Revision of the Aegis dispatch decision had little to do with political opposition. The MSDF in 2003 had only four Aegis destroyers, and one of them was in dock to be retrofitted with missile defense capabilities. Lack of progress in the negotiations with North Korea over the abductions of Japanese citizens and North Korea’s nuclear developments led to the view that a valuable asset like the Aegis ship should be deployed closer to Japan.16 In August 2004, the MSDF relieved the Aegis destroyer Kongo with a conventional destroyer Haruna. The ASDF airlift operation was also closely integrated with the overall U.S. operations, rather than specifically with Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean. In 2002, ASDF C-1 cargo


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planes were added to the list of equipment in the Implementation Guideline, and these planes were used to transport U.S. cargo between its bases in Japan, Okinawa, and Guam. Japan’s contributions freed U.S. transport planes for its operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, while ASDF missions shifted to domestic flights. These missions also familiarized ASDF personnel with coalition operations, where joint operability requires regular cooperation.17 In February 2003, the MSDF started to refuel coalition ships as well as U.S. and British ships. As the two countries prepared for a war against Iraq, NATO member countries (including France and Germany, both opposed to the war against Iraq) came under intense pressure to boost their contributions to the Indian Ocean Operation. Their requests to the MSDF to supply fuel resulted in exchange of diplomatic notes with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in turn expanded the MSDF list of fuel recipients.18 November 2003 Extension The scheduled expiry of the Antiterror Special Measures Law on November 1, 2003 made renewal of the law a major issue in the lower-house election in October 2003. The largest opposition party—the Democratic Party—had repeated its opposition to the law but expressed its willingness to enter into discussions to amend the LDP bill focusing on three issues: (1) Diet approval prior to a troop dispatch; (2) Diet approval of major changes to the Basic Plan of dispatch; and (3) an explicit ban on a second renewal of the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law.19 With the possibility of bipartisan legislation in mind, LDP leaders carefully set the Diet calendar for a special session to assure enough time for deliberations on the bill. Behind the proposal to enter discussions to amend the bill, opinions were divided within the Democratic Party. Several conservative members were personally in agreement with the LDP bill, whereas left-leaning members had little intention of compromising with the LDP. The LDP-led coalition controlled majorities in both the lower and the upper houses. Furthermore, the split within the Democratic Party also discouraged the LDP from compromising with the Democratic Party because of the likelihood that the latter would fail to keep its side of the bargain. In the end, the LDP railroaded through its original bill, and the Democratic Party launched symbolic protests to feed the media with newsworthy visual images. The Koizumi government was also considering expansion of SDF activities beyond maritime refueling. The former defense director,

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Gen Nakatani, commented in a Diet committee session that the government should consider dispatch of P3-C patrol planes of the MSDF in order to improve maritime patrols for the Indian Ocean operation. Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda implied that it was one of the possibilities. Fukuda also admitted that the government was conducting surveys inside Afghanistan to investigate the possibilities of small-scale dispatch of ground troops for missions including humanitarian support.20 Extension of the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law in the fall of 2003 was also linked to another important issue, the issue of SDF dispatch to Iraq. A decision was made within the LDP to legislate on the unpopular Iraq dispatch bill after the election to the lower house. This political consideration, together with the practical needs of the multinational coalition to receive uninterrupted fuel supplies, necessitated that the LDP pass the renewal bill in October 2003, just before dissolving the lower house. Iraq was also relevant because of the ongoing U.S. military operations there. Newspaper reports that some of the fuel Japan had provided to the U.S. Navy vessels might have been used for war operations21 raised the question of collective defense. This issue did not become a major obstacle to the renewal of the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law in October 2003, but the issue resurfaced in October 2007 to block the LDP bill in the upper house. With extension of the Antiterror Special Measures Law, the Koizumi government moved another step closer to dispatching ground troops to Afghanistan. GSDF troops had already been in Iraq since January 2004 under a separate special measures law. The GSDF also had some 400 PKO troops in East Timor to take part in the UN support operation there, but these troops were scheduled to start withdrawing at the end of this mission in May. The Japanese government considered the dispatch of approximately 100 GSDF personnel to Afghanistan in summer 2004 to be engaged in supporting refugees and allies through logistical and medical missions under the Antiterror Special Measures Law.22 However, this did not materialize as the Japanese government determined that security conditions in Afghanistan at that time were still unstable. November 2005 Extension As the expiry of the Antiterror Special Measures Law approached again in October 2005, support for another extension was thinning. The amount of MSDF fuel supply to the coalition ships had declined


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to one-tenth that of the peak time, as the coalition activities were scaled down. In addition to the opposition of the Democratic Party and a sizable voice of reluctance within the ruling party, Prime Minister Koizumi was himself reluctant to continue the maritime refueling operation.23 Continuation of the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean was, however, politically linked with Japan’s GSDF mission in Iraq. In March 2005, the Dutch troops in Samawah, Iraq—who provided security escort to the Japanese GSDF humanitarian and reconstruction operations—withdrew from Iraq. While Australian troops replaced the Dutch in the security escort role, the Japanese government started seeking an appropriate timing to withdraw the GSDF troops from Iraq. In this political environment, the LDP determined that terminating the MSDF mission at this juncture would damage Japan’s image in terms of its contributions to the international cooperative missions. A compromise was reached within the ruling coalition to extend the Antiterror Special Measures Law by another year. November 2006 Extension Two events in 2006 prolonged the MSDF operation in the Indian Ocean and made a significant addition to the scope of the Antiterror Special Measures Law. First, North Korea test fired ballistic missiles in July 2006 in violation of its agreements with the United States and Japan to suspend such testing. UNSC condemned the North Korean testing in Resolution 1659, but they called for only a limited sanction against North Korea and focused on stopping the transfer of missile-related technology and material and financial flows that aid North Korean missile development. Second, North Korea announced on October 3 that it would conduct a nuclear test, and they implemented it six days later. The two events clearly reversed the downscaling trend of operations under the Antiterror Special Measures Law. Three days after the North Korean announcement of the upcoming nuclear test, the newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe quickly decided to submit a bill to extend the Antiterror Special Measures Law by one year. On October 9, North Korea announced that it had conducted a nuclear test; the resulting UN Resolution 1718 to condemn North Korea made previous hypothetical talks about maritime interception of North Korean ships a realistic scenario.24 Abe’s bill was enacted on October 27. The reasoning behind this extension was more complex than simply assuring the United States about Japan’s commitment to the

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alliance. Three issues emerged in relation to collective defense during the course of discussions leading to the extension of the Antiterror Special Measures Law. First, debates started on the applicability of the Regional Contingency Law in the interception scenario. Australia—which has actively promoted trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan through operations such as the UN PKO in East Timor and the security operation for the GSDF contingents in Iraq—announced its willingness to participate in interception operations. This highlighted the impracticality of the Regional Contingency Law in a multilateral context. In the face of the North Korean crisis, domestic caution against invoking the Regional Contingency Law was strong because of the broad scope of its provisions for permissible SDF activities in cooperation with the United States. Second, given the difficulties associated with the Regional Contingency Law, the urgency of the crisis did not allow enough time to legislate a new special measures law.25 Third, at that time, Japan did not have any domestic law to enable the anticipated maritime inspections of North Korean vessels without flag nation (North Korean) consent. In the event of a maritime coalition operation, the Japanese government found it useful to leave open the possibility of quickly rewriting the Basic Plan under the Antiterror Special Measures Law—which would only require cabinet approval, and not full-Diet voting—and invoking it against North Korea to assist the coalition. Fall 2007 Expiration Additional flexibility in the U.S. approach to North Korea after the latter’s nuclear test allowed the possibility of exchanging mutual concessions in an incremental manner. North Korea’s return to the Six-Party talks as a response in early 2007 reduced the possibility of a military showdown through the rest of the year. In August 2007, the Japanese Diet held election to the upper house, in which the ruling LDP lost seats and the opposition parties together gained a majority. The combination of the relaxed regional security context and the new domestic political environment led to the lapse of the Antiterror Special Measures Law on November 1, 2007 and discontinuation of the MSDF maritime refueling mission. Prime Minister Abe had to restart his efforts to renew the law from his weakened leadership position after the LDP’s defeat in the election to the upper house. His approach to the Democratic Party for a bipartisan legislation was cold shouldered by the latter’s president, Ichiro Ozawa. Following the development of a health problem, Abe


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suddenly resigned from the premiership in mid-September. The succeeding Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, was a cabinet secretary in the Koizumi administration and was the key architect of the Antiterror Special Measures Law. Ozawa and Fukuda sought the possibility of a grand coalition between the Democratic Party and the LDP in two closed-door meetings, but the talks broke down when Ozawa failed to convince his fellow party members about such a coalition. The DPJ maintained throughout debates in the Diet that the maritime coalition interdiction operation (and by its extension, Japan’s refueling mission) lacked a UN mandate. Instead, The DPJ advocated nonmilitary contributions to the UN-authorized reconstruction missions in Afghanistan, but the party’s president Ichiro Ozawa was trying to shake both the LDP and the DPJ’s liberal wing by moving further on the issue of GSDF dispatch. Demonstrating DPJ’s differentiated way of responsible international contribution by endorsing the GSDF dispatch to provide rear support for the ISAF’s security operations, 26 Ozawa tried to bargain with the LDP on the discussion of a grand coalition and to consolidate the position of the DPJ and his leadership by shaking off the ex-Socialists. On the other hand, the LDP lobbied coalition countries and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to express their appreciation for the coalition operation in the Indian Ocean and Japan’s maritime refueling. Hasty inclusion of a message of appreciation for the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) participants in the UN Security Council Resolution 1776 (which extended the ISAF operation) caused Russia to abstain from voting on this matter for the first time.27 Fukuda’s LDP prepared a new bill (rather than trying to extend the Antiterror Special Measures Law), as passage of another extension of the existing law before its expiry on November 1, 2007 became impossible due to a tight legislative calendar. The new bill cited UNSC Resolution 1776, focused more narrowly on maritime refueling, and deleted other secondary missions such as search and rescue, humanitarian support, and air logistics that were included in the Antiterror Special Measures Law. This narrowing of the scope of SDF activities sent a message to the opposition Democratic Party that the LDP was willing to incorporate DPJ policy into its bill and give credit to the DPJ for enabling the expansion of the SDF activities in Afghanistan— which the LDP had sought under Prime Minister Koizumi in 2003 and 2004. The other key difference in the new bill was that it entirely eliminated the requirement for the government to submit its Basic Plan of dispatch to the Diet post facto. This change was necessary for the LDP government in order to prevent the majority opposition in

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the upper house from voting down the dispatch plan and creating renewed policy paralysis following the dispatch of the SDF personnel. Shortening the new law’s duration from two (originally intended) to one year as a concession to the coalition partner, Komei Party, and other advocates of stricter civilian control within the LDP also made the annual reporting to the Diet (which was originally included in the bill) meaningless.28 While scandals in the Defense Ministry—a corruption charge against its former administrative vice minister, and false reporting of the amount of fuel supplies in the MSDF Indian Ocean operation— aided the DPJ opposition, public opposition to continuation of the maritime refueling operation both weakened and lacked intensity.29 The Democratic Party prepared its own bill and exploited procedural rules in the upper house to delay the deliberation on the LDP bill, but Ozawa failed both in winning a consensus within the DPJ on GSDF dispatch to support the ISAF and in convincing the LDP’s Fukuda that he needed DPJ votes. The DPJ bill did not include any maritime refueling operation, but it explicitly stated a future possibility of Japanese participation in such an operation if a new explicit UN authorization was to be made available—this was Ozawa’s souvenir to Fukuda in the grand coalition talks. Instead, the DPJ bill included provisions for GSDF dispatches to aid the civil–military post-conflict reconstruction operations under peaceful conditions, but it explicitly ruled out rear support for the ISAF operation—an indication that the DPJ lacked solidarity on Ozawa’s position of bargaining vis-à-vis the LDP. The original Antiterror Special Measures Law expired on November 1, 2007, and the MSDF ships returned to Japan. Other domestic issues, most notably the government’s mishandling of the pension records, dominated public discussions and the DPJ decided not to exhaust its Diet procedural cards on the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law. The LDP, counting on the two-thirds majority in the lower house held by the ruling coalition, decided to override the expected upper-house rejection of the bill. On January 11, 2008, the bill became a law in the twice-extended special session, and the two MSDF vessels were ordered to head for the Indian Ocean region on January 17, 2008 for a renewed refueling operation.30 Conclusion In historically reviewing the process of legislation and cabinet decisions on the SDF dispatches to the Indian Ocean region and


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elsewhere under the Antiterror Special Measures Law, this chapter has attempted to examine the role of the three norms of collective defense: U.S.–Japan bilateral, UN-centric multilateral, and “coalition of the willing” multilateral under U.S. leadership. First, the most hotly debated MSDF refueling of the multilateral coalition ships under the Antiterror Special Measures Law has showed that the third type of collective defense, multilateral “coalition of the willing” under U.S. leadership, has become an important part of SDF operations. Japanese refueling ships supported the maritime patrol and interdiction operations of eleven navies in the Indian Ocean region, including the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the predominance of the U.S. navy in this coalition prior to 2003 and the shrinking volume of Japanese fuel supply in the following years meant that the bulk of the fuel was consumed by U.S. ships.31 The Japanese government’s efforts to characterize the refueling and other logistical support operations as unilateral actions based on a UN mandate reflected the lack of solid public support for both the type one (U.S.–Japan bilateral) and type three (multilateral “coalition of the willing” under U.S. leadership) collective defense. The fact that the first permanent law governing overseas dispatch of the Self Defense Forces is the PKO Law is consistent with the view that the type two collective defense (UN-centric multilateral) has a better chance of acceptance than the other two types.32 Given the weakness of the type one and type three norms, Japan’s continuous MSDF operation in the Indian Ocean from December 2001 through October 2007 and its resumption in January 2008 was a puzzle. Careful review of the three extensions of the Antiterror Special Measures Law in 2003, 2005, and 2006, its expiry on November 1, 2007, and the framing of new legislation in January 2008 shows that maintenance of the U.S.–Japan alliance has been the key driver of Japan’s continuing MSDF and ASDF operations. Japan’s decisions to continue the SDF dispatches under the Antiterror Special Measures Law have been linked with the U.S. operation in Iraq and SDF participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Increased tensions over North Korea’s missile tests and nuclear developments also elevated the need for strong U.S. backing, which in return demanded more Japanese contributions to collective defense. However, the need for closer cooperation in Northeast Asia eventually served to reduce the MSDF role in the Indian Ocean, as Japan could not afford to tie its limited defense resources to remote area operations, despite the symbolic importance of the multilateral antiterrorism coalition. The shifting of ASDF logistical support missions

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from the Indian Ocean to Northeast Asia also reflected the practical importance of bilateral U.S.–Japan cooperation in Northeast Asia. The debate between the LDP and DPJ in the special session of the Diet (November 2007–January 2008) over SDF operations in relations to terrorism in Afghanistan with a background of the grand coalition talks reemphasized the importance of UN endorsements of SDF operations. Use of this norm was common between the LDP and a conservative wing of the DPJ centered on Ichiro Ozawa. Consideration of the three norms in this case study is helpful in understanding Japan’s security policy. Unlike many of the previous constructivist writings on Japanese security, this study did not exclusively focus on a single liberal norm, such as pacifism or antimilitarism. Earlier researchers took an approach to identify a gap in realist explanations of Japanese foreign policy and explain the gap with a cultural norm of the researcher’s choice. This study, in contrast, accepts the premise that prioritization among material interests involves a collective mental constructing process and analyzed what norms are employed by Japanese political leaders to promote particular material interests. As Japan considers a permanent law to generally govern overseas SDF dispatches, examination of the current status of the three collective defense norms is essential to understand the prospects of Japan’s “normalization.” A series of security-related legislation and debates since the late 1990s provides rich empirical material to bridge the rationalist and constructivist studies of Japanese foreign policy. Notes * The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 1. Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (London and New York: Verso, 2007). 2. Benjamin Self, The Dragon’s Shadow: the Rise of China and Japan’s New Nationalism (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006); John Nathan, Japan Unbound: A Volatile Nation’s Quest for Pride and Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004); Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice? (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1999). 3. Ronald Dore, Japan, Internationalism and the UN (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). 4. Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).


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5. Euan Graham, Japan’s Sea Lane Security: A Matter of Life and Death (London: Routledge, 2005). 6. Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for A New Japan (Tokyo, New York, and London: Kodansha International, 1994), 93–95. 7. Ibid., 119–120. 8. For example, Michael Green—who later led the Japan Desk of the National Security Council—treated Ozawa’s support of collective defense as if it exceeded the context of UN-centricism and uses the phrase “normal nation” as synonymous to close allies of the United States such as Great Britain. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 18–20. 9. “Shuuhen-jitai ni Saishite Wagakuni no Heiwa Oyobi Anzen wo Kakuhosuru tame no Sochi ni Kansuru Houritsu” [The Law about Measures to Assure Our Country’s Peace and Security during Contingencies in the Surrounding Areas], May 28, 1999, Law No. 60. ht t p:// law.e-gov.go.jp/ ht m ld at a/ H11/ H11HO 0 6 0.ht m l (Downloaded July 30, 2004). Referred as the “Regional Contingency Law” hereafter. 10. Yoichiro Sato, “Japan–Australia Relations: Friends in Search of Binding Bonds,” in Japan in A Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges, edited by Sato and Satu Limaye (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1996), 214–215. 11. Prior to the UNSC Resolution 1511, Japan’s ASDF engaged in a logistical support mission in Jordan, citing the PKO Law. 12. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1368 (2001), adopted on September 12, 2001. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N01/553/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement (accessed January 29, 2008). 13. Yomiuri Shimbun, April 23, 2004. 14. Asahi Shimbun, April 22, 2005. 15. Asahi Shimbun, December 4, 2002; Yomiuri Shimbun, December 4, 2004. 16. Asahi Shimbun, April 4, 2003. 17. Vince Little, “JASDF Closes Out Airlift Support Mission,” Stars and Stripe, Pacific edition, November 2, 2007. http://www.stripes. com/art icle.asp?sect ion=104&art icle=57474&archive=t r ue (accessed January 27, 2008). 18. Germany, France, Canada, Italy, Netherland, Spain, Greece, and New Zealand joined the recipients in the spring of 2003. Yomiuri Shimbun, February 8, 13, and 28 and March 11, 2003; Asahi Shimbun, February 14 and March 28, 2003. In July 2004, Pakistan joined the MSDF list of recipients. MOFA, “Tero Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochi-hou ni Shitagatte Okonawareru Pakistan Islam Kyowakoku no Guntai-tou he no Buppin-tou no Teikyou ni Kansuru Shokan no Koukan ni Tuite” [About the Exchange of Notes about the Supplies of Goods to the Military of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under

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19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

32.


the Antiterror Special Measures Law], press release, July 13, 2004. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/16/rls_0713a.html (accessed August 10, 2004). Asahi Shimbun, October 1, 2003. Asahi Shimbun, September 30, 2003. Yomiuri Shimbun, May 7, 2003. Yomiuri Shimbun, May 5, 2004. Asahi Shimbun, October 6, 2006. Yoichiro Sato, “U.S. North Korea Policy: the ‘Japan Factor,’ ” in North Korea Policy: Japan and the Great Powers, edited by Linus Hagström and Marie Söderberg (London: Routledge, 2006), 89. Asahi Shimbun, October 13, 2006; Yomiuri Shimbun, October 16, 2006. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 3, 2007. Yomiuri Shimbun, September 19, 23, and 27, 2007; Asahi Shimbun, September 19 and 20, 2007. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 12, 15, and 17, 2007; Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 2007. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll in early December 2007 showed 43 percent of the respondents supported the LDP to use its lower-house super majority to override an anticipated upper-house rejection of the bill, whereas 44 percent opposed. At the same time, only 10.9 percent of the respondents identified defense and security as priority issues for the Fukuda Cabinet, even though they were allowed to pick more than one answer during the survey. The top five issues were social welfare reforms including pension and medical care (61.2 percent), economy and employment (53.0 percent), money in politics (35.1 percent), tax reform and the consumption tax (32.1 percent), and food safety (27.3 percent). Yomiuri Shimbun, December 10, 2007. Asahi Shimbun, January 17, 2008. Between December 2001 and August 2007, approximately 49 percent of the Japanese fuel supply was provided to U.S. refueling ships, which in turn refueled other U.S. ships. Japan also directly refueled U.S. vessels including American destroyers and an aircraft carrier. Ministry of Defense data on which this calculation is based was obtained from Yomiuri Shimbun (October 9, 2007). A revision to the SDF Law in 2007 upgraded SDF participations in UN PKOs from secondary to primary missions. This was supported by 63 percent of the public. Yomiuri Shimbun, January 25, 2007.

Part III

International Political Economic Issues


Chapter 6

Humanitarian and Democratic Norms in Japan’s ODA Distributions Yoichiro Sato and Masahiko Asano*

Japan’s rising economy during the second half of the 1980s and into the early 1990s pushed the country into the limelight of international politics. While Japan’s failure to send troops to the 1991 Gulf War received international criticism, Japan responded in two distinct ways in 1992 to such criticism. First, Japan passed the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law to enable overseas dispatch of troops under restricted conditions. Second, Japan revised its overseas development assistance (ODA) policy to emphasize the country’s contributions to international peace via economic means. Japan’s ODA Charter published in that year spelled out the philosophy behind Japan’s aid programs, their objectives, and emphases. Although Japan remained behind many European countries in terms of per capita ODA contribution, the country occupied the world’s foremost position in terms of the absolute amount of ODA it provided from 1993 to 2000.1 Japan’s prominence attracted attention from scholars and practitioners alike. The earlier criticism against Japanese ODA was that many aid projects were tied to Japanese contractors. Research by scholars and journalists on individual Japanese aid projects have revealed cases of human rights violations and environmental destructions. The 1992 ODA Charter added humanitarian and environmental considerations to Japan’s criteria for aid decisions.2 Japan briefly suspended aid to Burma after the 1988 coup. However, Japan’s resumption of aid in 1990 and its continuation in the absence of progress on the human rights issues in Burma invited a heavy criticism from the Western countries and the United States.3

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Japan’s dual identities as an Asian country on one hand and as a member of the industrialized “West” on the other4 have placed the country in an awkward middle ground on the issue of human rights in its foreign relations. The bloody Chinese military crackdown against demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989 provided a major test of Japan’s commitment to the Western political solidarity based on democratic values. While many have pointed out Japan’s resumption of aid to China ahead of other Western countries and rationalized this decision with Japan’s mercantile interests,5 Japan’s aid resumption was at least tacitly acknowledged and closely followed by its Western friends—suggesting that not only Japan’s commitment to human rights and democracy but also that of the Western countries’ was at best contextual.6 Yet others view Japan’s aid to China in the context of the comprehensive security approach in Japan’s foreign policy.7 The end of the cold war and the “third wave of democratization”8 that followed offered a grand opportunity for Japan to place democratic norms into the core of its aid policy. As East Asia’s newly industrialized economies took off and as Japan’s Western allies expected Japan to enhance its international contributions outside East Asia, Japan’s expanding aid programs in Africa and Latin America received scholarly attention. However, most researchers continued to attribute Japan’s aid policy to its mercantile interests and resource diplomacy.9 Meanwhile, some of Japan’s economic aid has been attributed to its security interests. Japan’s aid to America’s close allies, such as Egypt and Turkey, has been viewed as dues for alliance maintenance.10 ODA to Southeast Asia has been viewed within the broader context of the Fukuda Doctrine, which linked economic growth and political stability of the region with Japan’s comprehensive security. With the worsening government debt situation under the prolonged economic recession of the 1990s, Japan’s ODA budget started declining. With a less than enthusiastic domestic public, the government emphasized efficiency and increased national interest orientations in its aid policy under the revised ODA guideline in 2003. Promotion of human security and economic interdependence were explicitly stated in terms of Japan’s own interests as well as those of the recipients’. While a liberal normative agenda, such as human rights, democracy, and poverty reduction, continued to be included in the guideline, they had to compete against newly added priorities including counterterrorism, reconstruction (such as in Afghanistan and Iraq), and peace building (in Nepal and Sri Lanka for example).11 With some overlap, these explanations of Japanese aid can be grouped into three main theoretical streams: realism, liberalism, and

H U M A N I TA R I A N A N D D E M O C R AT I C O D A N O R M S

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mercantilism. Realism in Japan’s aid policy would entail emphasis on geopolitical and alliance interests, whereas liberalism emphasizes on more abstract, idealist, and often altruistic values including democracy, human rights, and poverty eradication. Mercantilism associates aid with Japan’s own economic interests, such as trade (including natural resources imports) and investments. Thus, if the 1992 ODA Charter was the government’s expression of a liberal norm shift in the ODA policy, the 2003 Charter suggested a realist-mercantilist shift. This chapter examines whether humanitarian and democratic norms, built into the 1992 ODA Charter, have had any impact on Japan’s aid distributions. In order to do so, a statistical model will be employed to test correlations between aid distributions and various causal factors (independent variables). The model was constructed on the basis of considerations of previous quantitative research on Japanese ODA. In the next section, those research works will be reviewed. Following that, the chapter will explain the model, including the operationalized variables it employs to test the model. Taking into account the new realist and mercantilist emphasis of the 2003 ODA Charter, this research attempts to compare the aid policy before Prime Minister Koizumi (1994–2001) and under him (2002–2004). The final section of the chapter will discuss the results and conclude with an analysis of their relevance to the discussion of norms in Japanese foreign policy. Review of the Previous Works Japan’s ODA statistics have been one of the easiest resources to access. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has published annual ODA whitepapers, and their country-by-country reviews provide detailed aid figures at the project level. However, these figures have been used mainly for descriptive purposes only in earlier research. Likewise, Japanese trade and investment statistics compiled by the Ministry of Finance are comprehensive and have been easily accessible. While the dominant discourse on Japanese aid alleged that Japan’s aid is a tool of its mercantilist policy, earlier research on Japanese ODA has not attempted to build statistically tested models to cross-tabulate these economic variables with the ODA figures. However, the reemergence of quantitative methods in American social sciences and its spread to the rest of the world has brought the number-crunching trend into the study of Japanese ODA since the late 1980s. Quantitative studies of Japanese ODA can be further categorized into three distinct groups by their designs. The first group consists of

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single-year studies. The second group consists of pooled time-series studies. Although the single-year design allows researchers to accurately capture the aid distribution pattern and considerations in a particular year, the research is descriptive in nature and its conclusion cannot be generalized across different time periods. The pooled timeseries design enables generalization over the studied period, but it may gross out important changes in the significance of particular independent variables over time—that is, some variables might be significant in the cold war period but not so in the post-cold war period. The third group of research tries to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the two designs by comparing aid distribution patterns in two multiyear periods. Chan’s work was perhaps the first attempt to employ statistical regressions to building a model of Japanese ODA distribution.12 Chan’s study looked at Japan’s ODA distributions in 1986 by categorizing on recipient country and tested them against eight independent variables. Chan’s initial expectation was to statistically confirm the then popularized perception of Japanese aid as motivated by mercantilist interests. Among the eight variables, those that tested the mercantilist explanations were (1) Japanese exports to the recipient country and (2) Japan’s imports of fuels, minerals, and metals from the recipient country. Chan also tested the correlation between aid and (3) the recipient’s gross national products but did not explicitly discuss this variable as a test of mercantilism. (4) Aid recipient’s GNP per capita and (5) the extent of militarization measured by proportion of the population in military were identified as independent variables to test humanitarianism in Japan’s aid considerations. (6) Historical background of being a part of Japan’s “coprosperity sphere” during the World War II was a dummy variable to test the “war reparation” explanation of Japanese aid. The other two variables—(7) adjacency to maritime choke points and (8) existence of NATO base(s)—tested the strategic explanations. Chan found that the correlation between GNP per capita and aid amount was most significant in the negative direction, indicating that humanitarianism toward the poorer countries was the key determinant of Japan’s aid policy. However, the extent of militarization was not significantly related to the aid amount. The “East Asia bias” of the Japanese aid was also statistically confirmed. In Chan’s model, there might be chances that two of the independent variables, “Japan’s main trade partners” and “East Asian countries,” are strongly correlated. If there is a multi-collinearity problem between these two independent variables, then Chan’s statistical results can be distorted


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and misleading. The author should show if there is any multicollinearity problems among independent variables. The “choke point” variable also demonstrated a significant positive correlation, whereas the “NATO base” variable was negatively and only moderately correlated. Most important, for Chan’s main research question, the two mercantilist variables—(1) Japan’s export to the recipient country, and (2) Japan’s import of fuels, minerals, and metals from the recipient country—were not significantly correlated to the aid volume. Saito also used a single-year design, using Japan’s ODA data from 1994.13 Saito examined five independent variables about the recipient country—population, GNP per capita, the volume of trade with Japan, the “East Asia” dummy, and the combined Freedom House scores of civil liberty and political freedom. Saito constructed a twostage model of aid distribution consisting of the first decision, whether to provide aid, and the second decision, on the amount of aid. Saito introduced a time-lag factor in his model as well. His dependent variables were (1) whether a country received ODA loans—dummy, (2) whether a country received ODA grants—dummy, (3) amount of ODA loans, (4) amount of ODA grants, and (5) amount of ODA technical assistance. Saito found that for the first stage, whether a country received ODA loans was explained best by the population of the recipient country—a positive correlation. Other significant correlations existed with GNP per capita (positive) and (GNP per capita)2 —negative. The “amount of ODA loans” variable, however, was best explained by population (positive) and being an East Asian country (positive). ODA grants were more likely to be given to countries with lower GNP per capita, a larger trade volume with Japan, and greater political freedom. However, among the countries that received Japanese ODA grants, countries with a higher GNP per capita and a larger trade volume with Japan were more likely to receive a larger amount of ODA grants. Both Chan and Saito used a single-year dataset, and their decisions to do so have limited any ability to generalize their findings across different time periods. On the other hand, their method had the advantage of weighing precisely the importance of different independent variables in determining the Japanese ODA distributions in a specific year. Stein’s work on Japan’s aid to Africa (Stein 1998), in contrast, adopted a pooled time-series analysis over the 1959–1994 period to examine five independent variables as possible determinants of aid—(1) Japanese investments in the recipient country, (2) exports to it, and (3) imports from the recipient country (mercantilist variables);

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(4) a dummy variable for the introduction of structural adjustment after 1986; and (5) a dummy variable for the 1992 ODA Charter.14 Stein hypothesized that Japan’s support to the U.S. alliance would translate in its Africa policy as support for U.S. promotion of structural adjustments in the indebted countries of the region. To test this hypothesis, he attempted to rule out the other four variables. He ran the tests several times after changing the dependant variable, using total aid volume to Africa, aid volume in economic programs only, and aid volume to the top five recipients only. The structural adjustment was found to be the only variable consistently showing significant correlations. Tuman, Emmert, and Sterken (2001) studied Japanese ODA in Latin America from 1979 to 1993.15 Their dependent variable was the net ODA volume obtained from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Using a pooled time-series design, they examined the effects of thirteen independent variables on distributions of Japanese ODA. The thirteen independent variables were grouped into two theoretical perspectives: idealist and neorealist. The neorealist perspective encompassed both Japan’s mercantile interests and America’s strategic interests. The independent variables that tested the idealist hypothesis were (1) real GDP per capita, (2) political liberalization—a score generated from the Polity III-U dataset, (3) political rights—Freedom House “PR” score, and (4) civil liberty—Freedom House “CL” score. The independent variables that tested the neorealist hypothesis were (5) recipient country’s population, (6) Japan’s exports to the recipient country per capita, (7) Japan’s imports from the recipient country per capita, (8) Japanese FDI per capita, (9) recipient country’s debt per capita owed to Japanese banks, (10) net U.S.-ODA to the recipient country, (11) “attacks by a leftist regime” on neighboring hosts of U.S.-supported rebels, (12) civilian and combatant deaths due to communist insurgencies, and (13) promotion of economic adjustment. The three authors incorporated a one-year lag into the statistical model for most independent variables and also introduced two control variables, “Net ODA in the previous year” and “Year,” to account for annual increase of Japanese ODA during the period studied and for consistency in aid allocations. The authors found that three variables were most significant: real GDP per capita (a variable testing the idealist hypothesis), population (a variable testing the mercantile aspect of the neorealist hypothesis), and debt per capita (a variable testing the mercantile aspect of the neorealist hypothesis). Political liberalization, human rights, and


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regime type (variables testing the idealist hypothesis), Japanese exports, Japanese imports, Japanese FDI (variables testing mercantile aspects of the neorealist hypothesis), and U.S. ODA, leftist attacks, deaths by Communist insurgencies, and promotion of structural adjustment (variables testing alliance management aspects of the neorealist hypothesis) were not significantly related to the aid distributions. Tuman and his other associates tried to explain distributions of Japan’s ODA in Africa16 and in Asia17 with three competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that Japan reacted to U.S. pressure and interests when it formulated its foreign aid policy. The second hypothesis was that Japan used ODA to promote its national economic interests. The third hypothesis was that Japanese ODA was intended to address humanitarian needs. They examined the determinants of Japanese ODA in fourteen Asian countries and thirty-five African countries for the period between 1979 and 1998. The effects of the independent variables were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with panel-corrected standard errors. They found different sets of determinants of Japan’s ODA in Africa and Asia. Their major findings suggested that Japan’s national economic interests and poverty in the recipient country shaped Japanese aid decisions in Asia, whereas humanitarian interests (as measured by poverty, human right, democracy, and food insecurity) affected Japanese aid decisions in Africa between 1979 and 1998. While Tuman and his associates preferred the pooled time-series design for the sake of generalizability of their findings, their design possibly grossed over changes in the pattern of ODA distributions over different time periods. Hook and Zhang’s earlier work offered an attempt to compensate for this disadvantage of the pooled timeseries design and capture possible changes in the emphases of Japan’s aid policy.18 They chose two time periods (1986–1988 and 1993–1995) for comparison. The authors justified their choice of the two particular periods by a significant intervening event that had been expected to cause a change in Japan’s aid policy—adoption of the new ODA Charter in 1992 by the Japanese government. Their set of independent variables was not identical to those found in Tuman and others, but there were considerable overlaps. Hook and Zhang examined two sets of variables: those attributed to the interests of MOFA (socialwelfare conditions, the level of democratic development, and the level of military spending of the recipient country) and those attributed to the interests of Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (Japan’s exports to, Japan’s imports from, and Japan’s direct investments in the recipient country). They found that MOFA

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variables (which would fall within the “humanitarian” category according to Tuman and his associates) were unrelated in both 1986–1988 and 1993–1995 periods, suggesting that the newly stated emphases on promotion of democracy and human rights and demilitarization under the ODA Charter were not implemented. On the other hand, MITI variables (which were commonly used to support the mercantilist explanations) were found to be closely related to Japan’s aid distributions in both periods. Models We have the following three models with three different dependent variables: TECOOP (Model 1), GR ANTSAID (Model 2), and NLAID (Model 3). In each model, we run three different regressions sorted by years (1994–2004, 1994–2001, and 2002–2004) to see whether or not there are any significant changes in the way ODA is allocated before and after the year 2001 when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi came to power. Model 1 TECOOP = a0 + a1PR + a2CL + a3Export + a4Import + a5Investments + a6MineralFuels + a7Population + a8GDP + a9GDP/C + a10Chinaborder + a11Sealanes + a12SMRUS + e Model 2 GR ANTSAID = b0 + b1PR + b2CL + b3Export + b4Import + b5Investments + b 6MineralFuels + b7 Population + b8GDP + b9GDP/C + b10Chinaborder + b11Sealanes + b12SMRUS +e Model 3 NLAID = c 0 + c 1PR + c2CL + c3Export + c4Import + c5Investments + c6MineralFuels + c7 Population + c8GDP + c9GDP/C + c10Chinaborder + c11Sealanes + c12SMRUS + e Dependent variables: TECOOP19 (million yen) Technical Cooperation. A type of Grant, monetary aid need not be repaid, used for small projects in capacity building/training, and so on.


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GR ANTSAID20 (million yen) A type of Grant, monetary aid need not be repaid, used for specific development projects. NLAID21 (million yen) Net Loan Aid. ODA Loan disbursed in a given year minus the repayment in the same year. Used for major infrastructure development. Independent variables: PR: Freedom House Political Right indicator. 22 Each point total corresponds to a rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of political right. We expect that the more political right a country allows its citizens (the smaller the country’s PR score is), the more ODA it is given. CL: Civil Liberty.23 Freedom House Civil Liberty indicator. Each point total corresponds to a rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of civil liberty. We expect that the more civil liberty a country allows its citizens (the smaller the country’s CL score is), the more ODA it is given. Export 24 (1,000 yen) The total annual amount of Japan’s exports to an aid recipient country. We expect that the larger amount of Japanese exports a country receives, the more ODA it receives. Import 25 (1,000 yen) The total annual amount of Japan’s imports from an aid recipient country. We expect that the larger amount of Japanese imports a country transacts, the more ODA it receives. Investments26 (1,000 yen) Japan’s annual sum of direct investments into the aid recipient country. We expect that the larger the amount of Japanese investments into the aid recipient country, the more ODA it receives. Mineral Fuels27 (1,000 yen) The total amount of mineral fuels Japan imports from the aid recipient country. We expect that the larger amount of mineral fuel Japan imports from an aid recipient country, the more ODA Japan provides to that country. Population 28 Population of each country. We expect that the larger population a country has, the more ODA it is given.

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GDP29 Each country’s GDP. On GDP, we have mixed expectations. A country with a large GDP could receive either less or more ODA. From a mercantile point of view, aid to a larger economy makes more economic sense—a possible return is greater. From an altruistic sense, it is a smaller economy (where market forces often do not reach) that needs ODA. GDP/C30 GDP per capita of each country. We expect that the larger the GDP per capita of a country, the less ODA it receives. Chinaborder If a country shares a land border with China, Chinaborder = 1. If a country shares a maritime border with China, Chinaborder = .5, and 0 otherwise. We expect that if a country borders China, the country receives more ODA. Sealanes If a country is on the Japanese sea lane to the Persian Gulf, Sealanes = 1. If a country is located along the Red Sea passage or on the Panama Canal, Sealanes = .5, and 0 otherwise. We expect that if a country is located on a strategic sea lane, the country receives more ODA. SMRUS Special military relations with the United States. If a country has a special military relation with the United States (treaty allies, nontreaty allies, and presence of U.S. bases), SMRUS = 1, and 0 otherwise. We expect that if a country has a special relation with the United States, the country receives more ODA. Results Table 6.1 shows the regression results when the dependent variable is TECOOP: a type of grant, monetary aid not needed to be repaid, used for small projects in capacity building/training, and so on. Four out of the twelve independent variables meet our expectation between 1994 and 2004: countries (1) with more civil liberty, (2) to which Japan exported a greater amount [Variable: Export], (3) from which Japan imported a greater amount [Variable: Import], and (4) situated on strategic sea lanes received more ODA. Countries with more political rights enjoyed by the citizens, more Japanese direct investments,

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more mineral fuels export to Japan, larger population, a border with China, and special military relations with the United States do not seem to enjoy a higher amount of ODA from Japan. GDP and GDP/C show different results: countries with larger GDP received more ODA whereas countries with larger GDP per capita received less ODA. The following three points should be noted as major differences from before 2001 in terms of the possible factors affecting Japan’s ODA. First, countries to which Japan exported more received more ODA before 2001, but this tendency disappears after 2001. Second, countries on (1) China’s border, and (2) Japan’s sea lane did not receive more ODA before 2001, but they were clearly favored after 2001. Third, mineral fuels exports to Japan did not matter for Japan’s ODA before 2001, but mineral fuels exporters received less ODA after 2001.

Table 6.1 Japan’s ODA to Developing Countries (1994–2004). Dependent Variable: TECOOP Expectation

1994 –2004

1994–2001

2002–2004

PR

–

1.352

2.253

–1.375

CL

–

–2.794**

–3.521

0.091

Export

+

1.27e–08***

4.06e–01***

Import

+

2.19e–08***

1.75e–08***

4.60e–08***

Investments

+

2.34e–10

2.19e–10

2.44e–06

MineralFuels

+

–3.86e–09

3.37e–09

–1.25e–08***

Population

+

2.30e–08

1.74e–08

–6.70e–09

3.20e–11**

3.86e–11

1.09e–11

–.00159***

–.00179***

–.407

10.039***

GDP

+ or –

–1.37e–08

GDP/C

–

Chinaborder

+

Sealanes

+

17.243***

10.318

14.960***

+

–4.799

–7.961

–3.192

0.417

0.380

0.857

1324

903

421

SMRUS Adjusted R N

2

–.0018*** 0.715

Note: Explanations for terms used provided in text. **: p < 0.05 ***: p < 0.01

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Table 6.2 shows the regression results when the dependent variable is GR ANTSAIDS: a type of grant, monetary aid not needed to be repaid, used for specific development projects. Only two out of the twelve independent variables meet our expectation between 1994 and 2004: countries with (1) larger investments and (2) smaller GDP/C received more ODA. It turned out that the rest of the factors did not affect the amount of ODA each country received from Japan. The following two points should be noted as major differences from before 2001 in terms of possible factors affecting Japan’s ODA. First, countries with less civil liberty and more investments received more ODA before 2001, but both patterns disappear after 2001. Second, countries with less political rights received less ODA before 2001, but this is not so after 2001. Table 6.3 shows the regression results when the dependent variable is NLAID: Net Loan Aid. This comprises ODA Loan disbursed in a

Table 6.2 Japan’s ODA to Developing Countries (1994–2004). Dependent Variable: GR ANTSAIDS Expectation

1994–2004

1994–2001

2002–2004

PR

–

–2.87

–4.080***

1.265

CL

–

1.858

4.748***

–6.023

Export

+

Import

+

Investments

–1.06

–6.20

e–09

8.93e–09

3.76e–09

3.28e–09

–2.16e–09

+

2.49e–09**

2.46e–09***

–1.03e–06

MineralFuels

+

1.18e–08

2.26e–08

6.06e–09

Population

+

1.96e–08

2.10e–08

1.99e–08

+ or –

–1.59e–11

–9.71e–12

–2.89e–11

GDP GDP/C

–

Chinaborder Sealanes SMRUS Adjusted R N

2

e–09

–0.006***

–0.005***

–0.007***

+

5.421

5.985

1.601

+

7.207

9.484

3.138

+

–2.966

–.654

–4.61

0.055

0.154

0.0027

1126

765

361



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Japan’s ODA to Developing Countries (1994–2004). Dependent Variable:

Table 6.3 NLAID

Expectation

1994–2004

1994–2001

2002–2004

PR

–

12.558**

15.943***

–2.644

CL

–

–17.116**

–32.057***

17.643

Export

+

–5.37e–08**

3.60e–08

–2.62e–07

Import

+

4.44e–08**

–5.35e–09

2.77e–07

Investments

+

3.16e–06**

2.42e–06

8.37e–06

MineralFuels

+

Population

+

GDP

+ or –

–1.45e–08 3.83e–07*** –6.50e–11

1.13e–07***

–3.08e–07***

4.26e–07***

–2.31e–07

–7.46e–11

GDP/C

–

–0.003

–0.011***

Chinaborder

+

10.620

–8.639

Sealanes

+

SMRUS Adjusted R N

+ 2

148.636***

142.814***

1.05e–10 0.012 89.124** 100.416**

–24.91

–20.310

–6.742

0.445

0.615

0.243

692

488

204


given year minus the repayment in the same year and used for major infrastructure development. Five out of the twelve independent variables meet our expectation between 1994 and 2004: countries (1) with more civil liberty, (2) from which Japan imported more [Variable: Import], (3) with larger Japanese investments, (4) with larger population, and (5) on Japan’s sea lane received more ODA. Contrary to our expectation, countries with (1) less political rights and (2) to which Japan exported more [Variable: Export] received more ODA. Countries with more mineral fuels export to Japan, larger GDP and GDP/C, a border with China, and special military relations with the United States did not seem to be affected in terms of the amount of ODA they received from Japan. The following three points should be noted as major differences from before 2001 in terms of possible factors affecting Japan’s ODA. First, countries with (1) less political right, (2) more civil liberty, (3) more mineral fuels export to Japan, (4) larger population, and

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(5) smaller GDP/C used to receive more ODA before 2001 but not after 2001. Furthermore, countries with more mineral fuels export to Japan, surprisingly, received less ODA after 2001. Countries bordering China were not favored by the amount of ODA before 2001, but they were after 2001. Conclusion In this chapter, we have examined three dependent variables (three types of Japanese ODA: technical cooperation, grant aid, and ODA loan) and their possible causal relations with twelve independent variables. The twelve independent variables were grouped into three theoretical perspectives, but some independent variables could represent more than one theoretical perspective. Realist perspective can be supported by positive correlations between a higher ODA amount and (1) the recipient country’s having a border with China, (2) being located on strategic sea lanes, and (3) having special military relations with the United States—Japan’s primary ally. (4) Having a higher mineral fuels export to Japan as a cause of receiving more ODA represents both realist and mercantilist perspectives. The data from the 2002–2004 period, however, do not support strategic use of aid by Japan to gain access to mineral fuel supplies. Among the realist explanations of Japanese ODA, having special military relations with the United States is found to be irrelevant for awarding of the three types of aid. Countries on strategic sea lanes are clearly favored in distributions of ODA loan and technical cooperation aid, but not in grant aid. A border with China emerged as a key reason behind receiving a higher ODA loan and technical cooperation aid during the 2002–2004 period—under Prime Minister Koizumi. Overall, realist factors show a strong explanatory power. Mercantilist perspectives emphasize Japan’s own economic interests in its aid decisions. While Japan consistently provided more technical cooperation aid to the countries from which Japan imported a larger volume of goods, the pattern is not consistent for ODA loans. ODA as a means of export promotion—the most talked about hypothesis about Japanese ODA during the 1980s and the early 1990s—was only supported by technical cooperation aid data. Investments also partially explain aid decisions, but the pattern is not consistent across the aid categories and time periods. Overall, mercantilist explanations hold some truth, but they are on decline in recent years.


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Liberal perspectives of Japanese ODA are represented in this study by three norms and their operationalized variables: promotion of democracy measured by the PR score, promotion of civil rights measured by the CL score, and reduction of poverty measured by GDP per capita. While GDP per capita is a consistent determinant of grants and technical cooperation aid, loan decisions defy this pattern. Better political rights situations in the recipient countries predicted higher amounts of grant aid for the 1994–2001 period, but these factors turned out to be irrelevant to technical cooperation aid and were negatively related to lower loan amounts. Civil liberty, likewise, showed inconsistent results across aid types and the two time periods, despite the recurring emphases on these two norms in the 1992 and 2003 ODA charters. Both PR and CL scores were irrelevant to any aid type during the 2002–2004 period (under Prime Minister Koizumi), indicating their declining utilities in aid predictions. In relation to the book’s emphasis on the role of norms in foreign policy, this chapter focused on three liberal norms that were least directly related to Japan’s material interests—realist/security or mercantile. Our findings seem to best support realist explanations overall, and the explanatory power of the three liberal norms seems to be waning despite the government’s supportive rhetoric about them in its 2003 ODA Charter. Rejection of the liberal norms in this study by no means rejects the utility of norms in foreign policy altogether. It is quite the contrary. Declaration of realist norms emphasizing Japan’s security interests in the 2003 ODA Charter is a clear indication that norms do play a role. However, deconstructing the process through which Japan’s national security interests are (mentally) constructed is beyond the scope of this study. As Japan’s realist shift in ODA policy took place with little direct association with the perceived threats of rising China, it is doubtful that such inquiries will be any more objective than the ones based on material interests and utilitarian assumptions or add meaningful explanatory power.

Notes * The views expressed in this chapter are those of the two authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The two authors express their gratitude to Dianna Hummel for her assistance in preparation and management of the dataset on which the analysis of this chapter is based.

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1. DAC, Development Cooperation, 2003 Report. 2. MOFA, “Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo Taikou” [Official Development Assistance Guideline], adopted by cabinet on June 30, 1992. http:// www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/taikou/sei_1_1.html (accessed January 15, 2008). 3. For explanations of Japan’s aid policy toward Burma, see Donald M. Seekins, “Japan’s Aid Relations with Military Regimes in Burma, 1962–1991: The Kokunaika Process,” Asian Survey 32, 3 (1992): 246–262; Mikio Oishi and Fumitaka Furuoka, “Can Japanese Aid be an Effective Tool of Influence? Case Studies of Cambodia and Burma,” Asian Survey 43, 6 (2003): 890–907. 4. John Miller, “The Outlier: Japan Between Asia and the West,” in Japan in A Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges, edited by Yoichiro Sato and Satu Limaye (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 19–36. 5. Quansheng Zhao, “Japan’s Aid Diplomacy with China,” in Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, edited by Bruce Koppel and Robert M. Orr, Jr. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 162; Qinxing Ken Wang, “Recent Japanese Economic Diplomacy in China: Political Alignment in a Changing World Order,” Asian Survey 33 (1993): 634–635; Dennis T. Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 74. 6. Akitoshi Miyashita, “Consensus or Compliance? Gaiatsu, Interests, and Japan’s Foreign Aid,” in Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration, edited by Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 37–61. 7. Tsukasa Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid to China: The LongRunning Foreign Policy of Engagement (London: Routledge, 2006). 8. Georg Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization: Process and Prospects in the Changing World, Second edition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 129. 9. David Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japanese Foreign Aid (New York: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Jun Morikawa, Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1997); Tsuyoshi Yamamoto, Nihon no Keizai Enjo: Sono Kiseki to Genjo [Japan’s Economic Aid: Its Path to the Present] (Tokyo: Shakai Shiso-sha, 1988); Dennis Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986). 10. Robert M. Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 11. MOFA, Economic Cooperation Bureau, “Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter,” August 29, 2003, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf (accessed January 27, 2008).


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12. Steve Chan, “Humanitarianism, Mercantilism, or Comprehensive Security? Disbursement Patterns of Japanese Foreign Aid,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 19, 1 (1992): 3–16. 13. Jun Saito, “Shoueki to Enjo—Nihon no ODA Kunibetsu Haibun Seisaku no Keiryou Bunseki [Ministerial Interests and Aid— Quantitative Analysis of Japan’s Country-Based ODA Distribution Policy],” Leviathan 19 (1996): 126–145. 14. Howard Stein, “Japanese Aid to Africa: Patterns, Motivations and the Role of Structural Adjustment,” Journal of Development Studies 35, 2 (1988): 27–53. 15. John P. Tuman, Craig F. Emmert, and Robert E. Sterken, “Explaining Japanese Aid Policy in Latin America: A Test of Competing Theories,” Political Research Quarterly 54, 1 (2001): 87–101. 16. John P. Tuman and Ayoub S. Ayoub, “The Determinants of Japanese Official Development Assistance in Africa: A Pooled Time Series Analysis,” International Interactions 30 (2004): 45–57. 17. John P. Tuman and Jonathan R. Strand, “The Role of Mercantilism, Humanitarianism, and Gaiatsu in Japan’s ODA Programme in Asia,” International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 6 (2006): 61–80. 18. Steven W. Hook and Guang Zhang, “Japan’s Aid Policy Since the Cold War: Rhetoric and Reality,” Asian Survey 38, 11 (1998): 1051–1066. 19. Data obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site. www. mofa.go.jp. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Data obtained from the Freedom House Web site. www.freedomhouse.com. 23. Ibid. 24. Data obtained from the Japanese Customs Office Web site. www. customs.go.jp. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Data obtained from the CIA World Fact Book. https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid.


Chapter 7

Norms and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy in the South Pacific Sandra Tarte

S

tudies of Japan’s foreign aid policy have contended, among other things, that Japan’s aid is a response to international pressure to contribute more to international order; that Japan’s aid policy is an instrument or tool of its foreign economic policies; and that it is a function of domestic bureaucratic politics. The influence of norms1 has been mainly considered from the perspective of outside pressure on Japan to conform to or comply with international (namely Western) expectations and standards regarding official development assistance (ODA) effort and quality. Attention has focused on the gap between these standards and expectations on one hand and Japan’s aid profile and policies on the other.2 The following case study seeks to broaden the discussion of norms in Japan’s ODA by exploring the influence and interaction of both domestic and international norms on aid policy and foreign policy behavior. This analysis highlights the formation of internal or domestic ODA norms and their relationship to perceived national interests. It also examines the processes by which international norms impact on Japan’s aid policy “and why they matter when they do.”3 The international norms that are the focus of this study include international environmental norms relating to the law of the sea and the sustainable management of ocean resources. They also include international norms of ODA (namely burden sharing and aid conditionality). In exploring these issues in the context of Japan’s aid to the South Pacific, the study aims to clarify some of the underlying points of contention in respect to the role of norms in Japan’s foreign policy. In particular, it addresses the relationship between norms and interests.

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S A N D R A TA R T E

Do norms “shape the standards of appropriate behavior that (in turn) inform interests and policy?”4 Or are norms instrumental to the pursuit of national interests? Moreover, to what extent does Japan seek to project national norms in the international arena as a way of influencing other states and global regimes? Is there conflict within Japan over norms and national interest? And how does Japan accommodate and/or resist international norms perceived as inimical to its interests. By highlighting the role of norms in Japan’s foreign policy, this analysis also aims to clarify and explain aspects of Japan’s relationship with the South Pacific, a region comprising fourteen independent and freely associated states.5 Japan is a dominant aid donor to the region. In 2001, for example, Japan was the largest (or second largest) bilateral donor to ten countries in the region.6 This aid donation is attributed to both economic interests (resource interests) and political/ strategic interests. But despite these interests, as well as historical and cultural ties with the subregion of Micronesia (which Japan administered between 1918 and 1945), Japan’s political role in the region appears to be marginal compared to that of other aid donors. This apparent paradox may be explained in part by examining the nature and influence of norms in Japan’s aid and foreign policy. The analysis is divided into three main sections. The first section analyses Japan’s domestic ODA norms and their relationship to Japan’s foreign policy. It explores the underlying approach to ODA that Japan adopted in its early or formative years as an aid donor. It is suggested that ODA reflected a broad moral obligation in support of a nationalist goal: “the mobilization of national energies in the cause of economic and technical advance.”7 Aid policy was shaped by domestic norms (both philosophical and procedural) that in turn served national interests. Japan’s aid program and policy toward the South Pacific is based on norms that derive from these origins. The next section examines the impact of international environmental norms on Japan’s ODA policy to the South Pacific. The South Pacific encompasses one of the world’s most productive tuna fisheries and supplies up to one-third of fresh tuna imports into Japan. ODA to the South Pacific was provided initially as a way to secure access to this resource and thereby adjust to a new international norm of extended coastal state jurisdiction.8 Over time, Japan’s aid was mobilized to resist new environmental norms of resource conservation that were perceived as a threat to its interests. The third section deals with the impact of emerging international ODA norms on Japan’s aid policy. Since the late 1980s Japan has

A I D P O L I C Y N O R M S I N S O U T H PA C I F I C

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faced an increasingly difficult task of balancing competing and conflicting pressures on its foreign aid policy in the South Pacific. This reflects tensions between policymakers over definitions of Japan’s national interest and how to respond to emerging international aid norms that are viewed alternatively as threats and opportunities for Japan. It also reflects dilemmas facing Japan as an “aid power”: to promote traditional interests through ODA while also meeting new responsibilities of aid “leadership.” These dilemmas have translated into problems of reconciling Japan’s domestic ODA norms with those of the international donor community. Japan’s ODA Norms and Foreign Policy When Japan began providing aid to the newly independent Pacific island states in the 1970s, it was already a major donor in Asia. Japan’s aid program in fact grew out of a series of war reparation agreements with Asian countries beginning in 1954. These agreements committed Japan to provide grants, private loans, and export credits as settlement for World War II-related damages. Japan’s aid thus began as a way of “compensating” for wartime aggression and occupation of neighboring Asian countries. But these aid flows were also instrumental in facilitating the penetration of Japanese firms into foreign markets—promoting exports as well as securing access to raw materials. Aid—or economic cooperation as it was called—was thus crucial to the economic recovery of postwar Japan.9 In this postwar climate, Japan did not perceive itself to be a rich nation that could afford altruistic “largesse.” Its dependence on trade and foreign sources of raw materials also led to a heightened sense of economic vulnerability. These circumstances gave rise to a broad domestic consensus on the role and purpose of ODA. According to this consensus, ODA would promote Japan’s national interest by assisting in its postwar recovery, restoring its economic power, and repairing relations with neighboring countries. ODA would also help Japan regain a place in the international community. This consensus reflected a fundamental norm that would be an enduring influence on ODA policy: aid was a mutually beneficial exchange that should provide economic benefits to Japan while assisting developing countries.10 This norm of reciprocity was supported by an additional norm of noninterference in the domestic (political) affairs of the recipients. The emphasis on noninterference was also in line with Japan’s perceived national interest. On one hand, it reflected sensitivities in

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Japan’s relations with Asian countries following the war and therefore was considered a necessary approach if relations with these countries were to be rebuilt.11 On the other hand, this ostensible “respect for sovereignty of developing countries” enabled Japan to concentrate on economic relations, which was the basic orientation of its ODA and postwar foreign policy. Aid policymaking procedures underscored this economic orientation. Japanese firms played a key role in supplying goods paid for by reparation grants. Business leaders were also incorporated into the policymaking sphere.12 Responsibility for ODA was divided between a number of ministries and agencies, principally the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA).13 Other ministries also played a key role in specific areas (such as Ministry of Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries). The implementation arms of aid policy were the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) for yen loans, under the supervision of the MOF, and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for grant aid and technical cooperation, supervised by MOFA.14 Decision-making thus took place in a decentralized bureaucracy. No single ministry had total control over all, or even part, of the aid program. This decentralized, collective decision-making system, based on consultation between various ministries, agencies, and the private sector, may be identified as a bureaucratic norm underlying ODA policy. It served to facilitate the input of various interest groups and enabled ODA to be tailored to specific economic goals. Among the features of Japan’s aid that set it apart from other donors was the high proportion of yen loans in its ODA. The share of grants was among the lowest of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) funds provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries. Moreover there was an emphasis on providing infrastructure projects as yen loans. The emphasis on loans for infrastructure development was rationalized on the grounds of promoting self-reliance. This notion of “self-reliance” reflected yet another ODA norm. Loans, not grants, would instill the discipline that would lead to self-reliance, while infrastructure projects supported economic development.15 As would be argued in later years in response to criticisms of Japan’s emphasis on infrastructure development, “Japan’s own growth was accelerated through World Bank loans for infrastructure.”16 The emphasis on self-reliance or “self-help” was a prominent and distinctive feature of Japan’s approach to development assistance. It


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helped explain the use of loans and the focus on infrastructure development (as noted above). It also influenced the “request-based” process of Japanese ODA. According to this process, Japan required an official request from a recipient government for each aid project. But since many developing countries were unable to develop “suitable” projects to request aid from Japan, private sector consulting firms from Japan often played an important role by assisting recipient governments in project identification and formulation.17 “Self-help” was a philosophy that dovetailed well with the norms of reciprocity and nonintervention. Together with the bureaucratic norm of interministerial consensus and consultation, Japan’s ODA norms ensured that aid policy would serve and promote Japan’s national interests overseas. In the South Pacific, aid was initially mobilized to defend Japan’s resource interests in the region—namely access to the rich and abundant tuna resource of the South Pacific. International Environmental Norms and Japan’s Aid in the South Pacific In the postwar era, Japan was the world’s leading fishing nation.18 Japan also had the world’s highest per capita consumption of fish products. Dependence on fish products as a source of animal protein reached a high of 78 percent in the 1955–1960 period and was about 51 percent in the early 1970s.19 Attaining self-sufficiency in food production was a goal of successive postwar Japanese governments and was viewed as essential to Japan’s security. Tuna was of special importance to Japan both as a highly valued domestic food source as well as a source of exports (for the canned tuna market).20 Sustaining Tuna fisheries was highly dependent on distant water operations, and the Pacific Ocean accounted for some of the world’s most productive tuna fishing. By the early 1970s, an estimated 85 percent of Japan’s tuna catch came from the Pacific, particularly the western and central Pacific (which included the waters around Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Kiribati). To support its operations, Japan established fishing bases and joint venture operations throughout the region.21 The postwar era also witnessed the gradual spread, through state practice, of the principle of “extended coastal state jurisdiction.” This practice saw states unilaterally declaring jurisdiction over an area of sea up to 200 nautical miles from a state’s shoreline, within which the coastal state claimed sovereign rights over all living and nonliving

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marine resources. Traditionally, sovereignty only extended to the territorial sea three miles from the shoreline. The “exclusive economic zone” was thus a “fundamental deviation from the regime of freedom of fishing hitherto applicable in those waters.”22 The assertion of extended coastal state jurisdiction reflected a newfound emphasis on conserving the ocean’s resources and ensuring these resources benefited all countries, in particular the developing countries; in other words, the ocean’s resources were to be treated as the “common heritage of mankind.” At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea that began in 1973, the principle of extended coastal state jurisdiction was widely supported by developed and developing states alike. The main opponents were distant water fishing nations, led by Japan. Their concern was that the declaration of EEZs would exclude them from their traditional fishing grounds. The position taken by Japan at the outset was to “reinforce the law of the sea on the basis of the widest possible high seas and the narrowest possible territorial sea.”23 Initially Japan’s policy was to resist the adoption of the EEZ principle, “to stop the expansionist claims of coastal states.” With this aim in mind, Japan’s Fisheries Agency introduced in 1973 a special category of grant aid known as the fisheries grant aid. Through this aid Japan would “show some understanding of the concerns of developing coastal states while resisting proposals that would impinge upon Japan’s distant water fisheries.”24 Once it became apparent by the end of 1974 that the EEZ principle would be incorporated into international law of the sea, Japan’s policy shifted to one of “conditional acceptance.” The Japanese government’s goal thereafter became “protecting within foreign economic zones as much of Japan’s fishing rights as possible.”25 The first Japanese grants to Pacific island states in the 1970s were provided in anticipation of the declaration of EEZs.26 Under the new Law of the Sea regime, Japan was required to negotiate bilateral agreements with coastal states for allowing its fleets access to the EEZ for fishing purposes. Fisheries grant aid was provided to Pacific island countries to promote and facilitate access agreements. As a senior Japanese fisheries policymaker explained: “It was expected that fishing negotiations with various countries would be undertaken on the principle of give and take. If we had nothing to give, we would face difficulty. So it was necessary to have this grant aid.”27 Between 1975 and 1986 (the first ten years of Japan’s aid to the South Pacific), 70 percent of the total grant aid from Japan comprised the fisheries grant aid budget. This aid was provided to countries that negotiated


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access agreements with Japan, those with fisheries joint ventures with Japanese firms, and in some cases to countries with neither of these arrangements but who were members of the regional South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency.28 Although officially under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fisheries grant aid was actually administered by Japan’s Fisheries Agency in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. This meant that the Fisheries Agency defined the role and purpose of the grant aid and the conditions under which it was provided. These were set out in a single policy document as follows: “The fisheries grant aid was born not only as a program to assist fisheries promotion in developing countries but also as an important tool to enable our fishing industry survive in an era of exclusive economic zones.” Moreover, priority for these grants would normally be given to those countries with which Japan had fishing agreements “under reasonable conditions.”29 What this generally implied was conditions that were not too onerous for the fishing industry (in terms of the license fee that the fishing companies were required to pay as a condition of access to foreign EEZs). Fisheries grant aid soon became an indirect subsidy to the access fee, and one of the incentives provided to developing states to encourage them to grant access to Japanese fleets. Pacific island countries were among the main recipients of fisheries grants. In the first ten years of Japan’s aid to the region, the island states received about 20 percent of Japan’s fisheries grant aid (although their share of Japan’s overall bilateral aid was only 1 percent).30 During this period Japan successfully negotiated fishing access arrangements with seven Pacific island countries.31 Japan’s dominant position as a fishing nation in the region gave it a position of power, which was underscored by the economic vulnerability of the island nations. Although countries were generally dissatisfied with the terms of access agreements negotiated with Japan, their dependence on the revenue this generated (and the associated fisheries grant aid) made it difficult to break off agreements for any length of time. Regional opposition to “the increasing tendency of distant water fishing nations to link the grant of aid with the receipt of fisheries access” did not deter Japan from this practice.32 Japan’s aid to the South Pacific was thus based on the norm of reciprocity in aid relations and was in keeping with a fundamental goal of ODA—the protection of Japan’s resource interests in developing countries. Overall, fisheries aid was a tool for securing access to the EEZs of the region and therefore a way to adapt to (and ameliorate

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the effects of ) an international norm that was perceived as threatening to its interests. At the same time, fisheries aid could be a way of contributing to the development of the Pacific island states through provision of fisheries infrastructure, although this seemed a secondary priority.33 The provision of grant aid supported Japan’s fishing operations in the South Pacific (as well as fisheries joint ventures in a number of countries, such as Solomon Islands). Provision of grant aid as infrastructure projects also benefited Japanese businesses that provided the goods and services financed by grant aid. Decentralized aid policymaking procedures, moreover, facilitated the use of aid to support various domestic interests. In the 1990s Japan faced new challenges to its fisheries operations in the South Pacific with the codification of new international norms governing ocean resource management and conservation. These new environmental norms threatened to further curtail fishing operations, in particular on the high seas—those areas of the ocean beyond the EEZ. They were initially encapsulated in Agenda 21 adopted at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development and included the precautionary principle of fisheries management. This states that lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason to delay or postpone measures to prevent environmental degradation. This emerging norm was subsequently enshrined in new global and regional conventions for the conservation and management of tuna and other highly migratory fish stocks.34 Once again Japan’s fisheries policymakers resisted new international norms on the grounds that they would further undermine Japan’s freedom to fish and impose untenable cost burdens on its distant water fleets. In global and regional forums, Fisheries Agency policymakers rejected the validity of the precautionary approach, arguing that it was not practical in the “real world” and could be used to ban all commercial fishing on the high seas.35 The hard-line approach (in opposition to regional and international opinion) reflected growing economic pressures on Japan’s fisheries industry, caused in part by increased competition from other distant water fishing nations. But it also reflected a perceived challenge to Japan’s cultural heritage as a fish-eating nation, similar to the defense mounted in support of commercial whaling.36 In resisting environmental norms considered threatening to Japan’s economic interests, fisheries policymakers sought to use ODA to win support for Japan’s position and to promote alternative norms based on their own view of “sustainable utilization.” A new aid policy, articulated by the Fisheries Agency in 1992, declared that henceforth


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Japan’s fisheries aid would be extended “with a view to contributing from a global standpoint to the appropriate management and effective utilization of fishery resources.”37 More explicit was a comment from a senior fisheries policymaker who argued that Japan should use fisheries aid to “defend our interest and the general principle of sustainable utilization of renewable resources.”38 In line with these declarations, Japan introduced special environment aid for fisheries, including for the South Pacific.39 These initiatives were to counter the “negative image” of Japan as a fishing nation and demonstrate Japan’s concern about the environment. At the same time, Japan provided aid to countries to enable their participation in international forums, such as in the International Whaling Commission. These countries were expected to support Japan’s position on key issues (such as resumption of commercial whaling). The use of aid in this manner was described as a “practical means” to promote support for Japan.40 As discussed earlier, Japan responded to the challenge of a new international norm of ocean governance (the EEZ regimes) by creating and utilizing a special category of grant aid. This was largely effective in ensuring Japan’s access to its traditional fishing grounds in the South Pacific. This success partly reflected Japan’s relative power as a distant water fishing nations in the Pacific island region. It also reflected the absence at that time of competing foreign policy goals and interests in the region. The latter challenge posed by new environmental norms occurred in the context of a more complex diplomatic and political environment for Japan, as described in the following section. This made it more difficult for Japan to utilize ODA in its traditional role of promoting economic (resource) security. International Aid Norms and Japan’s ODA in the South Pacific By the mid-1980s, changing international expectations of Japan introduced new demands and pressures for greater global cooperation, if not leadership. Two new international ODA norms emerged— burden-sharing (in the context of U.S.–Japan relationship) and aid conditionality—and led to changing foreign policy (and aid policy) priorities in Japan. While these norms challenged Japan’s prevailing ODA norms and interests, efforts to adapt to and/or comply with these norms led to conflicts between policymakers in Japan, as well as to competing notions of national interest.

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The 1980s was a decade of aid-doubling plans for Japan and also the decade when Japan attained the status as the world’s largest aid donor.41 This was an era of heightened international tensions due to the cold war, as well as growing friction between the United States and Japan over trade imbalances. In this context, Japan’s ODA assumed a more explicit political orientation and purpose, which was articulated in a 1981 report by Japan’s MOFA. This defined ODA as “the cost of building an international order to secure Japan’s overall national security.”42 In line with this policy rationale, Japan announced a new policy guideline in the early 1980s: “aid to those countries important to the maintenance of peace and stability in the world.”43 In the 1980s, Japan’s aid to the South Pacific was conceived by MOFA in these terms, and the above guideline underpinned a major aid initiative to the region in 1987—known as the Kuranari Doctrine.44 The impetus to this aid-doubling plan was heightened concerns about the Soviet Union’s intrusions into the region (in the form of fisheries agreements with several island states). According to key policymakers in Tokyo, the aim was to double the flow of aid “as quickly as possible” because island countries “needed cash” (the main reason they had agreed to fisheries arrangements with the Soviet Union). If Japan offered more aid it would fill that need and the island countries would not accept Soviet overtures.45 But while policy toward the South Pacific was “geared to the Soviet inroads,” it also encompassed a wider diplomatic agenda: to elevate Japan’s international status and demonstrate its willingness to assume a greater share of the “security burden.” This reflected MOFA’s perceptions of Japan’s national interests and how to promote these through ODA. It also reflected a growing view among some political leaders (including the then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone) that Japan should promote a strong national identity and greater internationalism. For the first time, the South Pacific was considered important in diplomatic terms, independent of the resource interests and policies already established. MOFA officials viewed the region as providing an opportunity to play a more active political role in international affairs and to address demands, particularly from the United States, that it do more to support Western security interests.46 However, this initiative complicated the efforts of the Fisheries Agency to curb the demands by Pacific island states for higher access fees and for the conclusion of a multilateral fisheries agreement along the lines of the United States fisheries treaty with the region. In this context, the strategic aid


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agenda worked at cross-purposes to Japan’s long-standing economic agenda in the region.47 International expectations that Japan assume more global obligations and responsibilities were predicated mainly on Japan’s growing economic power. This led to a widespread view that Japan should provide more ODA to developing countries as a form of burden sharing.48 This view became a norm that Japan’s MOFA adopted to support increased aid flows. It was also a norm that underpinned its aid policy initiative toward the South Pacific. U.S. pressure was utilized by policymakers to convince those sections of the aid bureaucracy resistant to a rapid increase in aid to the South Pacific (such as the fiscally conservative Ministry of Finance).49 In the words of one MOFA policymaker: “If we have the Pentagon or State Department on our side it is easy to wrench the arms of the Ministry of Finance. So in this case we stressed U.S. appreciation for our efforts.”50 The Kuranari Doctrine (and the aid-doubling initiative) reflected a reorientation of national interest that was in line with international expectations of Japan’s role as an aid donor. But these expectations were not limited to quantitative improvements in aid. They were also directed at changing the way in which Japan provided aid. At the global level this was evident in criticism by donor organizations about the high proportion of loans in Japan’s ODA and the high level of tied aid. Trading partners such as the United States linked procurement polices and practices of Japan’s ODA to debates about the “closed” nature of the Japanese market. Although the de jure tying of loans with conditionalities was gradually reduced, critics argued that the low share of projects carried out by Western firms attested to de facto tying.51 Other criticisms that were more evident in the South Pacific context where that most aid was provided as grants, were directed at the proportion of aid given for large-scale infrastructure development (considered inappropriate to the small-scale island economies), and that there was overt use of aid to promote Japan’s resource (primarily fishing) interests. Japan’s ODA was also criticized by island states for being overly bureaucratic and cumbersome. In the 1990s, Japan came under growing pressure to conform to Western donor policies of promoting economic and political reforms in the recipient countries. These policies reflected changing international aid practices in the wake of the end of the cold war, when aid was no longer justified on strategic grounds, and donors sought to address the “structural” problems of development by encouraging policy frameworks that would support economic growth. In the

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1990s, aid programs became more targeted and conditional—on poverty alleviation, sustainable development, human rights, and good governance.52 The evolving international norm of aid conditionality conflicted with Japanese ODA norms of reciprocity (especially the economic returns expected through ODA), noninterference, and self-help. For the policymakers of Japan’s aid, this led to growing tensions between established policies and new policy priorities and interests. MOFA, in particular, was caught between the need to promote a positive image of Japan internationally while accommodating the various economic goals and bureaucratic interests within its ODA system. In the South Pacific, attempts to promote donor coordination through multilateral forums and policy dialogue became more prevalent in the 1990s, motivated in large part by the persistent failure of countries to achieve economic growth despite high levels of aid (table 7.1). These dialogues aimed to promote agreed targets and objectives, including reforming the Pacific island economies. Although mainly at the instigation of other donors (Australia and New Zealand in particular), Pacific island recipients also called for better coordination of assistance to support economic reform. They sought greater

Table 7.1 Pacific Islands Basic Indicators, 2004 Population in thousands Cook Is Fiji FSM Kiribati Marshall Is Nauru Niue Palau PNG Samoa Solomon Is Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu

20 840 108 90 61 10 1.8 21 5,800 181 521 102 11 213

GDP per person US$ 7,549 3,098 1,786 633 1,803 3,500 4,364 6,350 695 2,030 513 2,087 1,346 1,472

Aid per person US$

Aid as a percentage of GDP

Real GDP growth 1990–2004

263 61 923 191 991 1,242 NA 1,295 40 186 132 270 520 154

3.5 2.3 49.5 31.5 53.9 35.5 NA 20.6 6.4 10.4 25.5 16.3 38.6 11.7

2.5 2.6 1.3 4.2 –0.5 –4.4 NA 1.2 3.6 2.4 0.8 2.6 4.3 2.7

Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2005; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Development Statistics, 2006, cited in Pacific 2020 Challenges and Opportunities for Growth, Commonwealth of Australia, 2006.


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use of consultative meetings that included all donors in formulating aid programs and reforms.53 Japan attended these dialogue meetings of donors, but unlike other donors it did not actively engage in debates about economic reform or aid conditionality. It also did not reorient its aid policy in new directions and through new modalities such as regional and multilateral programs. With the exception of its donations to the Pacific Islands Forum, Japan’s ODA remained largely bilateral and project-based, with the traditional emphasis on infrastructure development.54 The new emphasis on policy conditionality conflicted primarily with Japan’s norm of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of recipients. But it also challenged the norm of reciprocity, as the new policy shifted the focus away from mutual exchange of benefits (political or economic). This raised concern in Japan that national interests would be compromised by too closely identifying with the norms being set by the international donor community. Some policymakers reacted to such pressures from the donor community by rejecting the implicit notion that all aid should subscribe to the same formula and by asserting the validity of their own development model and approach to development assistance. They suggested that Japan should assert its own ODA norms in the international arena rather than adopt the norms of the Western donors.55 This assertion of a distinctive Japanese approach to conditionality was apparent with the formulation and implementation of Japan’s ODA Charter. Although opposed to the use of ODA to encourage or impose political reforms in recipient countries, Japan adopted an ODA Charter in 1992 that formalized political conditions for the provision of aid. According to the Charter, Japan would henceforth “pay full attention to” trends in military expenditures of recipients, trends in the development and production of weapons of mass destruction, trends in the export and import of arms, and efforts to promote democratization, market oriented economy, and basic human rights. Japan would reconsider its aid policy if reversals in these areas occurred.56 The ODA Charter was adopted in response to domestic criticism about the lack of transparency in aid decision-making and international criticism that Japan was not doing enough to promote international security. But it did not signal Japan’s acceptance of the principle or norm of intervention to support democracy and human rights. The Charter does not provide for automatic or mandatory aid sanctions. It is simply a set of guidelines to be applied flexibly and cautiously. In practice, this accommodated Japan’s traditional approach of

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“noninterference” in the domestic affairs of recipients. In explaining its policy, MOFA claimed that Japan has an “Asian view” of human rights—a view that is more sensitive to indigenous (as opposed to Western) forms of political development.57 But while generally appreciated by the recipients, the “hands-off” approach by MOFA and reluctance to use aid sanctions have limited Japan’s ability to influence international and regional affairs.58 In the South Pacific, Japan was quick to point out that the Charter did not apply to the island states.59 Despite recent political crises and “democratic reversals” in at least two countries (Fiji and Solomon Islands), there has been no activation of Japan’s ODA Charter. Japanese policymakers reacted to the instability in these countries mainly by withdrawing some aid personnel for their personal security. While calling for a return to democracy in the countries concerned, Japan did not impose aid sanctions unlike other Western donors. This reflected Japan’s norm of noninterference, which was welcomed by some political leaders in the region. But MOFA officials admitted that in responding to the political crises in the region, they faced a dilemma of how to turn Japan’s major aid presence into a political presence without upsetting its traditional foreign policy posture of noninterference. What was of particular concern was that Japan continued to lack recognition in the region as an “aid power.”60 In order to counter this problem, in part, MOFA launched a series of Pacific leaders’ summits held in Japan, known as PALM summits. Here Japan reaffirmed its own distinctive approach to development cooperation with the South Pacific islands, emphasizing its common interests with the region and shared identity as “Pacific islanders.” Through these summits, Japan sought to demonstrate that it would remain “actively engaged in the region as a friend in the Pacific.”61 The PALM summits provided Japan with an opportunity to declare its commitment to working with the region in tackling “common challenges.” One of the main diplomatic challenges it faced was defusing the opposition of the Pacific islands to the shipments through the Pacific of high-level radioactive material and mixed oxyde (MOX) fuel bound for Japan.62 Pacific island countries have repeatedly expressed concern at these shipments (four between 1992 and 2001); they were especially concerned at the prospect of an accident that could threaten (if not devastate) Pacific fisheries, tourism, and other industries. Through the Pacific Islands Forum, they sought negotiations on prior notification, compensation, and liability schemes in case of accident.63 While using the PALM summits to lobby Pacific leaders on the benefits of nuclear power and the safety of the nuclear shipments, Japan


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also utilized innovative aid schemes to appease the region. In 2000, it was announced that Japanese nuclear corporations would contribute US$10 million to a “good will” trust fund “for the purposes of cooperation between Japan and the Pacific island countries.” Annual interest of US$500,000 could be used to finance projects in the region covering environment, energy, and tourism. It was also announced that the principal of the trust fund would be available “to cover the costs of the initial response to incidents during shipment of radioactive materials and MOX fuel through the region.”64 However this latter aspect was subsequently revised by the Japanese government, in order to avoid liability for any nuclear transport accidents. At the 2006 PALM Summit, Japan took the unusual step of announcing a three-year projected aid disbursement target of 45 billion yen (more than US$400 million) for the region. Most of this would be in the form of grant aid and would be implemented through both bilateral and multilateral schemes.65 The foreign policy context in which this announcement was made was strongly influenced by Japan’s concern about China’s growing presence in the Pacific islands region. Several months before PALM 2006, the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, had hosted a ministerial conference on economic development and cooperation in Fiji at which he announced, among other things, preferential loans amounting to RMB3 billion to be provided to the region over the next three years.66 Conclusion This study of Japan’s aid policy in the South Pacific has demonstrated that “norms are not static but are contested and contingent.”67 Aid policy reflects a dynamic interplay of domestic and foreign norms filtered through bureaucratic and political structures. At the same time, the key to understanding “why norms matter when they do” is the relationship between norms and perceived national interests. The origins of Japan’s ODA norms may be traced to the circumstances that surrounded Japan’s emergence as an aid donor, namely, its postwar quest to rebuild its economy and restore economically beneficial ties with neighboring countries. Over time, as Japan’s stature as an economic power and an aid power grew, Japan’s self-image and sense of national purpose also evolved. This created competing and conflicting imperatives that shaped Japan’s role as an aid donor. International norms (such as burden sharing) may be instrumental in achieving certain national policy objectives (such as attaining international prestige and status).68 But international norms may also conflict with and challenge established norms

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and interests (reciprocity—to secure economic benefits, nonintervention). In this “contest,” the record shows a mixed result, where policy innovation and change may be declaratory rather than substantive, as evident with Japan’s ODA Charter and its approach to policy conditionality. In this respect, Japan’s distinctive ODA norms may serve as convenient rationalizations for existing policy interests and preferences. But they may also limit Japan’s policy options and inhibit its ability to project national power in order to influence international events. The anomaly that is evident between Japan’s aid “dominance” in the South Pacific and its lack of political influence or leadership may be largely explained by the persistence of established norms and interests. But it is also apparent that Japan’s self-image does not always match its overwhelming economic power and aid preponderance. For example, fisheries policymakers have pursued a narrowly defined view of national interest based on a heightened sense of Japan’s resource vulnerability and dependence. In a somewhat defensive manner, they have used ODA power as an instrument to resist international norms that conflicted with perceived national interest. This was especially evident with respect to international environmental norms that were viewed as contrary to Japan’s economic and cultural interests. Policymakers also sought to use ODA to bolster diplomatic support for Japan’s position (regarding resource utilization) and thereby project its domestic norms as being in common interests with the interests of developing states.69 The persistence of Japan’s “traditional” approach to ODA, despite its transformation into an economic and aid power, is one of the most striking conclusions that emerge from the study of Japan’s aid to the South Pacific. Despite the dynamic interplay of foreign and domestic norms, policy has remained largely impervious to fundamental change. One explanation for this is the presence of competing perspectives of Japan’s national interest within the aid bureaucracy and how these were promoted through ODA. Such conflict has been especially apparent between the more “internationalist” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the more “nationalist” economic ministries and agencies, such as the Japan Fisheries Agency. As noted above, these differences reflect different sectoral and institutional affiliations and have contributed to policy immobilism. However, it would be imprudent to overlook the deep-rooted nature of established Japanese norms of economic cooperation and the strong vested interests that exist throughout the aid bureaucracy in ensuring their continuation.


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Notes 1. Norms are defined here as collectively held ideas about appropriate standards of behavior. This implies a prescriptive meaning—the way one ought to behave—rather than a descriptive meaning—the way one usually behaves. Prescriptive norms in general “give rise to feelings of moral obligation to abide by and defend the norm.” Richard K. Herrmann and Vaughn P. Shannon, “Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest and Perception in Decision Making,” International Organization 55, 3 (2001): 623. 2. For an example of the literature see Robert M. Orr, Jr., The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); David Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership (London: Routledge, 1993); David Arase, ed., Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); and Yoshinori Murai, ed., Kensho Nippon no ODA [An Investigation of Japan’s ODA] (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 1992). 3. Amy Gurowitz, “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State,” World Politics 51 (April 1999): 413–445. 4. Peter Katzenstein, “Culture, Norms and Japanese Security,” Social Science Japan Journal 7 (August 1996): 9–11. 5. They are Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, Nauru, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and Palau. Foreign aid plays a key role in the economies of almost all these countries. See table 7.1. The region also includes a number of non-self-governing territories and territories possessed by the United States, France, and New Zealand. 6. Japan is also the fourth largest donor to the principal regional grouping, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, providing US$5.7 million between 1997 and 2005. 7. David Williams, Japan: Beyond the End of History (London: Routledge, 1994), 8. 8. The 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea negotiated between 1973 and 1982. 9. This aspect of the origins of Japan’s aid program was noted in the initial studies of Japan’s economic cooperation. John White, Japanese Aid (London, Overseas Development Institute, 1964). 10. This was reflected in the White Papers brought out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of International Trade and Industry in the 1950s and 1960s. See Juichi Inada, “Japan’s Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?” in The International Relations of

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11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

21.

22.


Japan, edited by Kathleen Newland (London: Millennium Publishing Group/MacMillan, 1990), 100–120. Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power. Arase, Buying Power, 1995. As part of the Central Government Reform of 2001, MITI was renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and EPA was absorbed into a newly formed Cabinet Office (and thus dissolved as a distinct agency). JICA was previously the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency. In 1999, the OECF and Japan Export Import Bank were amalgamated to form the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to oversee both ODA and non-ODA official lending. In 2003, JICA was released from MOFA’s formal supervision. Both developments were part of ODA reforms implemented by the Japanese government. Yen loans were originally made to Japanese firms carrying out infrastructure projects in developing countries. In 1965 the first yen loan was made directly to a foreign government. These promoted Japanese exports of plant and equipment and assisted Japanese firms in overseas investment. Susan J. Pharr, “Japanese Aid in the New World Order,” in Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? edited by Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 159–180. Japanese firms generally identified projects that they recommended to recipients as worthwhile projects to request aid for. Thus, while adopting a “hands off” approach on political issues, Japan (through its private sector) tended to be somewhat interventionist on economic matters. In 1989, Japan was overtaken by China as the world’s largest player in fisheries. Statistics from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tokyo cited in Sandra Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands (Canberra and Suva: National Centre for Development Studies and Institute for Pacific Studies, 1998). As a share of Japan’s overall catch of fish, tuna longline fleets accounted for one-third of the value of Japan’s total catch from distant waters by the beginning of the 1970s. Details in Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands. Until the 1970s the Japanese carried out mainly longline operations in the region. The pole and line and purse seine fleets gradually expanded in the 1970s and 1980s. For a discussion of the origins of the EEZ concept, see United Nations, The Law of the Sea: Exclusive Economic Zone—Legislative History of Articles 56, 58 and 59 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York: Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, 1992).


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23. Tsuneo Akaha, Japan in Global Ocean Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 76. According to one estimate, in 1977, about 48 per cent of Japan’s catch of tuna came from areas that would be enclosed by the EEZs of 54 countries. Yoshiaki Matsuda, “Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna Fishery,” in Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, edited by David J. Doulman (Honolulu: East–West Center, 1987), 71–91. 24. Government of Japan policy statement quoted in Akaha, Japan in Global Ocean Politics, 74. 25. Akaha, Japan in Global Ocean Politics, 100. In 1977 Japan was compelled to declare its own EEZ, in part by the decision of the Soviet Union to declare its EEZ. Japan’s move was in order to preserve the status quo around the disputed Northern Territories (through the declaration of overlapping EEZs). 26. The Cook Islands and Western Samoa were the first Pacific island states to declare their EEZs in 1977. They were followed by Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu in 1978, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tonga in 1979, Fiji in 1981, and Tuvalu in 1984. 27. Quoted in Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 83. 28. The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was established in 1979 to assist Pacific island states develop their EEZs and coordinate policy in dealing with nations fishing in distant waters. The agency is located in Honiara, Solomon Islands. Aid statistics are available in Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands. 29. Quoted in Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands. 30. Tsusho-sangyosho (MITI), Keizai Kyoryoku no genjo to Mondaiten [The Present Situation and Problems and Economic Cooperation] (Tokyo: Tsusho Sangyo Chosakai, 1995). 31. These countries included the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. 32. South Pacific Forum Communique, Rotorua, New Zealand, August 9–10, 1982. In 1981, about 90 per cent of access fees received by Pacific island states were paid by Japanese vessels. Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 92. 33. As noted earlier, despite Japan’s principle of request-based provision of ODA, projects were generally identified by Japanese aid and industry officials. There was a tendency not to provide aid for the development of a domestic offshore fishing capacity in the region, as this would create competition for Japan’s own fleets. Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 96. 34. These instruments are the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish

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35.

36.

37. 38. 39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44. 45.


Stocks; and the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, adopted in 2000. See Sandra Tarte, “A Duty to Cooperate: Building a Regional Regime for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific,” Ocean Yearbook (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2002), 261–299. This argument was first used in resisting the campaign to ban largescale drift net fishing in the South Pacific. Japan was ultimately compelled to adopt a moratorium on this type of gear but it refused to sign a regional convention prohibiting drift net fishing. Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 130–135. For a history of whaling debates, see Emily A. Gardner, “Swimming Through a Sea of Sovereign States: A Look at the Whale’s Dilemma,” Ocean Yearbook (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1996), 61–81. Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 141. Quoted in Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 141. An example of such aid initiatives was the “Coral reef natural resource and environment policy” announced in 1993. Generally, Japan’s “environmental aid initiatives” were directed at conserving the coastal marine environment rather than offshore and high seas areas. Comment by Japan’s Minister for Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, July 19, 2001, 2. Pacific island countries that have joined the IWC (with financial support from Japan) include Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Nauru. International pressure on Japan to enhance its aid program had begun in the 1970s because of Japan’s persistent and large current account surpluses. The first aid-doubling plan was announced by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1977. The report, titled Keizai Kyoryoku no Rinen – Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo wa Naze Okonau ka [Principles of Economic Cooperation—Why We Provide ODA], gave two broad reasons for Japan’s ODA program: “humanitarian and moral considerations” and “the recognition of interdependence.” These remained the cornerstones of MOFA aid policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1984 Annual Report (Tokyo: Association for the Promotion of International Development, 1984), 2. This was dubbed “strategic aid” by foreign commentators. See Dennis Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japan’s Foreign Policy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986). Named after Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari who delivered a major policy statement in Suva, Fiji, in February 1987. A detailed discussion of the Kuranari Doctrine is in Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands.


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46. The Nakasone position (which presaged debates in the 1990s about Japan’s international role) was for a more equal partnership with the United States. Takashi Inoguchi, “Nakasone and his Diplomatic Legacy,” Japan Quarterly 34, 4 (1987): 363–370. For later debates, see Michael Jonathan Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 47. This is discussed more fully in Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands. 48. For example, in 1987 the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling on Japan to raise the ratio of ODA to GNP to 3 percent by 1992. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Official Development Assistance 1988 Annual Report (Tokyo: Association for the Promotion of International Development, 1988). 49. The rapid increase in aid to the region was achieved by providing an increased number of large-scale infrastructure projects from the general grant aid budget. Unlike fisheries grant aid, which had a special budget allocation and was largely under the purview of the Fisheries Agency, general grant aid was more susceptible to the competing claims of Japan’s aid bureaucracy. 50. Quoted in Tarte, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, 186. This is similar to the process of using U.S. pressure to serve domestic political agenda, as described in Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power. 51. See for example Margee Ensign, Doing Good or Doing Well? Japan’s Foreign Aid Program (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 52. This was reflected in the OECD/DAC, Shaping the 21st Century: The Role of Development Cooperation, Paris: OECD, 1996; and in the Millennium Development Goals endorsed at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. 53. “Forum Economic Action Plan, 1999 Review,” Trends and Development, 13 (December 1999). 54. Apart from aid to the Pacific Islands Forum, Japan tentatively engaged in joint aid projects with Australia. Its main innovation in the 1990s though was the provision of small-scale grant aid projects (grant assistance for grassroots projects) in addition to large-scale projects. In recent years Japan has also provided certain countries with non-project grant aid. 55. See Yutaka Iimura, “Rethinking Japan’s ODA: Flying the Flag or Not,” Gaiko Forum (English Edition) (Winter 2001): 44–55. 56. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, June 30, 1992 (unofficial translation). The ODA Charter was revised in 2003 with a stronger emphasis on using ODA to serve Japan’s national interest, including access to resources. See Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 272.

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57. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 1, 1994, 13. This approach was also pragmatic in that it ensured that aid relations with economically and politically important countries were not undermined, thus protecting Japan’s national interests. 58. This was apparent in diplomacy in Southeast Asia as discussed in Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 169. 59. In response to questions from the South Pacific Forum, Japan’s representative declared that the aid principles “would only apply to countries that were considered politically unstable or had large military spending.” Therefore these principles did not apply to Forum island countries. Sandra Tarte, “Japan ties new strings to its help,” Islands Business Pacific (January/February 1993): 39–41. 60. Interview with the Director of Oceania Division, MOFA, Suva, August 2000. At the same time, the official was critical of the other donors’ policy of imposing sanctions on the two countries. 61. Opening remarks by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the 12th Post-Forum Dialogue, Tarawa, Kiribati, November 2000. These summits have occurred every three years, beginning in 1997. The first took place in Tokyo, the second in Miyazaki, and the last two were held in Okinawa. 62. MOX fuel refers to mixed plutonium and uranium/oxide fuel destined for Japan’s nuclear reactors. Spent nuclear fuel from Japan is shipped to Europe for reprocessing and transported back to Japan. This program escalated in the 1990s as Japan attempted to build a plutonium-fuelled fast breeder reactor. 63. See, for example, Forum Secretariat Press Release, February 23, 2001. 64. Communique, 31st Pacific Islands Forum, Tarawa, Kiribati, October 2000. 65. www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/spf/palm2006/assist (accessed August 24, 2006). 66. For an analysis of Japan’s recent PALM diplomacy, see Izumi Kobayashi, “Okinawa: the cornerstone of Pacific diplomacy,” The Asahi Shimbun, June 21, 2006. 67. Katzenstein, “Culture, Norms and Japanese Security.” 68. This is a process broadly similar to that described by Gurowitz, “Mobilizing International Norms.” 69. This sense of vulnerability and dependence has become more marked in recent years with the declining status of Japan’s economy. The drop in Japan’s global ODA spending since the late 1990s coincides with heightened concerns within Japan about the state of its economy and a view that “perhaps Japan should worry less about helping others and more about helping itself.” Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 4.

Chapter 8

Japan’s Role in Latin America’s Debt Management, 1982–1991 Saori N. Katada

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inancial crises, such as the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, add stress to the global economy. The viability of international financial stability depends largely on how well the major economic powers can collaborate in managing those crises. When major powers in concert share strong norms, it is more likely that some solution to the crises will emerge. This chapter focuses on the dynamics between the United States and Japan in managing the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s to examine the sources, impact, and importance of transnational norms. The dynamics between Japan and the United States during the decade of the Latin American debt crisis is an intriguing tale of how these two major powers collaborated to provide a solution to the crisis, in which the Japanese government supplied most of the additional financing needed by the U.S. government to resolve the crisis smoothly.1 The case provides some nuanced support for propositions as to the impact of norms on the making of Japanese foreign policy. This chapter is an empirical study of the following questions: Why did the Japanese government and Japanese banks collaborate with the United States in managing Latin America’s debt? Why it did is puzzling, because Latin America lies outside Japan’s traditional sphere of interest, and the Japanese government has had no special policy on Latin America. Moreover, the Latin American debt management scheme clearly served U.S. interests, not Japan’s.2 The conditions were also conducive to a collective action problem, which should have made collaboration difficult. Banks from both countries were heavily exposed, the Latin American governments had limited foreign exchange with which to pay back the interest (or principal) on their

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immense borrowing, and external financial flows to these heavily indebted countries were slow in coming. In this context, the presence of strong transnational norms could be considered an impetus for Japan’s actions. Conventionally, Japanese foreign policy has usually been viewed in terms of realpolitik. On the basis of Japan’s status as the weaker alliance partner to the United States, not only in terms of security but also in economic relations, Japan has usually been considered as a “reactive state.”3 Even when Japan’s economic success and its aggressive overseas expansion threatened this hierarchical relationship, most scholars concluded that Japan would remain a supporter of the United States in the world economy.4 Nevertheless, the “reactive” nature of Japan’s foreign policy does not quite explain some actions on the part of the Japanese government at the time of the debt crisis, such as advocating a debt-reduction scheme through the 1988 Miyazawa Plan. Even though the Japanese government’s behavior in this debt crisis management was driven partially by direct pressure from the United States, domestic political interaction between the Japanese government and banks remained crucial. Those major Japanese transnational banks became critical actors as they established norm-based behavior on the part of the Japanese government. How did the norms matter, then, particularly as most banks were driven by material interests in terms of maximizing profit and minimizing loss? This chapter argues that interests can lead to the establishment of norms and that those norms can lead to actions that might be very much at odds with the banks’ narrow self-interest. That is, the material interests (in this case, mostly in minimizing losses from the debt crisis) dictated the way in which most transnational banks first reacted to the debt crisis by establishing a norm of “no exit” (i.e. no write-off or debt reduction) from Latin American debt and created a unified front against the debtors; this also promoted strong debt management policies among their respective home governments. Once the “debt crisis management norms” are set up, such “norms establish expectation about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave.”5 Those norms also constitute a critical part of the collective identity of transnational banks facing developing country debtors, and the norms and shared identity among those banks made it much more likely that they could ensure collective action among creditor governments because of the domestic political power held by the banks. The existence and influence of norms on banks, though critical, cannot explain fully the Japanese government’s actions. One needs

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also to understand the influence of norms in the institutional and political context in which actors operate. My case study emphasizes that it is important to consider the strong transnational institutions in which “debt management norms” operated. Japanese actors, banks and government, were constrained not only by the abstract norms surrounding debt management but also by the institutional disciplines imposed on them. Actions by Japanese banks within those institutional norms would have had significant implications on their future business prospects, so the shadow of the future influenced their behavior. The shift from the “no exit” norm to a debt-reduction norm, which came about around 1987, provided an opportunity for the Japanese government to step up its efforts to allow its banks to exit from the Latin American debt. That was when the Japanese government’s proactive approach to debt reduction came about. In actuality, the debt management norms first appeared as the debt crisis emerged in a full-blown form after the Mexican announcement of interest payment suspension in August 1982. Until the time of the second waves of crises between 1986–1987, the debt management norms were designed to create a unified front among the creditor banks and governments to make the debtors pay back the full amount and to maintain their interest payments. Of course, such demands on the debtors came with the agreement (or at least an apparent agreement) among the creditors that they would not exit and would maintain lending to those debtors. On the other hand, after the second phase, as the major debtors like Mexico and Brazil plunged into payment difficulties once again, those involved in the debt crisis management changed their understanding and expectations. Thus the contents of norms shifted from “no exit” and complete debt repayment to swift resolution of the debt crisis by implementing write-offs and debt reduction with solid financial support by the creditor governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.6 The chapter depicts stages of Japanese involvement in the Latin American debt crisis from the time when Japanese banks started to get heavily involved in Latin American financing in the mid-1970s through the time of the debt crisis solution in the early 1990s. Throughout the chronological developments, I analyze how norms, and transnational institutions based on the norms, influenced the decisions of the Japanese actors. Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the validity of norm-based explanations.

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Japan’s Involvement in Latin American Financing (mid-1970s–1982) Even before 1982, Japan was considered a solid source of capital by both capital-hungry Latin American countries and by American transnational banks. The political power of resource-rich countries had increased since the 1973 oil shock, and the “indebted industrialization” of many developing middle-income countries in the 1970s had attracted Japanese lending, which was gradually becoming an important component of international finance during this time.7 The expansion of financial opportunities in Latin America came just at the time when the Japanese financial sector was expanding overseas. Banks began feeling the need to expand abroad. As Pauly explains: [it is] related to declining profitability at home, to the internationalization of domestic corporations, and to accommodating signals from the Ministry of Finance. Once initiated, of course, their growth was also driven by intense competition among the Japanese banks, a competition based more on business volumes and market share than on shortterm profitability.8

Japanese banks needed to follow the multinational corporations within their keiretsu (industrial group) when they started transacting directly in foreign markets. This “follow-the-customer” phenomenon obliged the banks to internationalize and expose themselves to financial transactions in developing countries.9 As the Latin American market became attractive, American banks invited many Japanese banks to participate in syndicated loans, greatly encouraging lending by Japanese banks. Japanese banks first gained access and experience in this new field of business by relying on American banks. American banks, on the other hand, welcomed the spread of risk among many other banks from different countries, even though they lost a part of the business to new entrants. The linkage among banks through syndicated loans was reinforced by the structure of these loans, such as through cross-default clauses that would not allow a debtor to default a part of its debt on certain creditors. In this way, throughout the Latin American lending boom and in the aftermath of its debt crisis, cross-border linkages between American and Japanese transnational banks were formally and informally institutionalized.


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Japan’s Behavior at the Height of the Latin American Crisis (1982–1987) Japan was actually quite an important actor in solving the Latin American debt crisis. Throughout the crisis, debt management norms and institutional arrangements influenced the behavior of Japanese banks and its government. During this first stage of the debt crisis management, the prevailing (and politically formulated) understanding of the Latin American debt crisis was that it was a liquidity crisis, which meant that as long as capital inflows in these debtor countries were restored, they would be in position to repay their debt. This notion also led to the imperative view that there would be no exit and no debt-reduction. The creditors decided to put their full effort into, first, establishing a unified front not to allow the debtors to play certain creditors against other creditors and, second, restoring capital inflow or at least not exiting from the exposure that creditor financial institutions have vis-à-vis those debtors. The debt crisis of the 1980s became a system-threatening phenomenon by August 1982.10 The crisis lasted for nearly ten years, preoccupying policymakers and the financial world. On August 12, 1982, Mexican Finance Minister Jesus Silva Herzog told the IMF and the U.S. government that Mexico would no longer be able to service interest payments on its debt. This announcement shook global financial markets because of the size of the creditors’ loan exposure in Mexico, which stood at $80 billion, and because of the fear of repercussions on other major debtors, such as Brazil. Smaller debtor nations, including Ecuador and Bolivia, also requested debt rescheduling in fall 1982. When the crisis hit, policymakers in the creditor governments worked to get emergency loans to Mexico and other indebted countries to help solve their liquidity crises. Mexico’s rescue package was put together by the United States and the IFIs. A total of $2 billion was transferred on August 15 from the United States, 50 percent in food credit and the rest as advance payments on future U.S. oil purchases from Mexico. A few days after the relief package was assembled, negotiations began at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) headquarters in Switzerland to develop an international rescue package. Owing to the likely destabilizing effects of the Mexican crisis, central bankers from creditor countries supported the idea of a multilateral rescue package. They agreed to extend $1.85 billion (including the portion from the United States) in bridge loans until an IMF agreement was

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in place.11 The package between the IMF and the Mexican government was agreed to in November 1982. Mexico promised to substantially reduce its budget deficit by raising taxes and lowering subsidies in exchange for $3.7 billion IMF credit. The rescue package for Mexico totalled $8.25 billion as the year ended.12 In addition, Jacques de Larosière, the Managing Director of the IMF, twisted the arms of Citicorp, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, and other international banks to commit an additional $5 billion to help cover the Mexican balance of payments shortfall in 1983.13 Tokyo followed the lead of the creditor community. When the $1.85 billion rescue package was assembled through the BIS, Haruo Maekawa, then Bank of Japan governor, “promptly obtained the approval of the Japanese government to participate on a scale second only to the United States.”14 Japanese banks were heavily exposed to Latin American debt. When the debt crisis hit in 1982, Japanese banks were handling 15 percent of the Euro loans in Latin America as the lead managers and carried $18 billion in medium and long-term loans to the region, which totaled some 70 percent of their bank lending to developing countries.15 This exposure was concentrated within a small number of Japanese banks, which included 28 major banks and about 12 minor ones. The Bank of Tokyo, as the lead manager, was most exposed to the Latin American debt, with outstanding loans totalling $1.9 billion,16 while the other major banks (Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuji, Sumitomo, the Industrial Bank of Japan, Mitsubishi, and Sanwa Banks) managed 83 percent of the country’s Latin American loans.17 In spite of such loan exposure, the Japanese government forbade Japanese commercial banks from exiting Mexican and Latin American debt in the early phase of the crisis. Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported in December 1982 that when Japanese commercial banks refused to roll over their short-term loans to Mexico, the Bank of England, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, and the Mexican government all pressured the Bank of Japan to make the Japanese banks respond. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) in Japan agreed with the American and British strategy in order to avert a financial meltdown. From that point on, the Japanese banks and government stayed close to the “no exit” norm for Latin American debtors. As figure 8.1 shows, though much of the outstanding debt decreased for the United States, that held by Japanese financial institutions actually increased during the 1982–1987 period. In spite of this rescue package and other debt relief agreements extended to Mexico in 1983 and 1984, there was no complete solution in sight.18 By the middle of 1984, Ecuador and Bolivia announced

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Figure 8.1 Bank Loan Outstanding to Latin America: Japan and the United States 1980–1988 Source: JEXIM Bank’s support to the Brady Plan with Signing Date and Amount: Export Import Bank of Japan, EXIM Japan Bulletin, Vol. 21, November 1997.

the suspension of debt payments, and Peru stopped fulfilling its debt obligations. In June 1984, eleven Latin American debtor nations met in Colombia to discuss the problem. The meeting raised fear among some creditors of a possible collective action by the debtors to strengthen their negotiating power. Although the meeting passed a declaration backing the creditors’ debt relief approaches, the debtor nations’ dissatisfaction with the economic troubles resulting from their debt situation was made clear.19 The collective strategy on the part of the debtors failed, partly due to even stronger collective action among the creditors. Transnational creditor banks that were heavily exposed to the massive debt in Latin America began forming the so-called Bank Advisory Committees (BACs) in each debtor country to deal with their negotiations with the respective debtors. BACs transmitted transnational pressures in dealing with various major debtors in Latin America, and Japanese banks were obligated to follow the agreements drawn out for rescheduling debts or they were forced to provide new loans in spite of their desire to exit. In this process, the Bank of Tokyo, the traditionally outward-looking foreign-exchange bank with the largest exposure to

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Latin American debt, served, with the help of the MOF, as a major channel of pressure among the transnational community of banks carrying loan exposure.20 It also served as a key coordinator of international cooperation for debt relief.21 In addition, the Japanese banks’ tendency to follow the lead of American banks, particularly in Latin America, created a high level of reliance and responsiveness by the Japanese banks to the needs and strategies of the American banks.22 private banks had at their disposal the coordinating mechanism of an “advisory committee” with a track record of success in dealing with problem debtor countries . . . . in unregulated international markets there is unbridled communication . . . Also facilitating communication and coordination among the banks are the legal incentives deriving from cross-default clauses that accompany almost all international loan agreements . . . it can facilitate collusion and the formation of an effective cartel geared to skewing the distribution of the costs of a problem.23

At the annual meeting of the World Bank and IMF in Seoul in October 1985, the Baker Plan was introduced. This plan targeted fifteen of the most heavily indebted countries, including ten in Latin America, through three main initiatives: (1) a continuing effort by indebted countries to produce economic growth, (2) increased collaboration between the World Bank, the IMF, and regional banks to provide $27 billion over the following three years to these countries, and (3) augmented lending by private banks, with an increase up to $20 billion over the following three years.24 The Baker Plan represented recognition by the United States of the need for more aggressive measures to support Latin American countries so that they could recover from debt overhang. Japanese and European banks responded to the Baker Plan with suspicion.25 As noted, ten of the “Baker 15” countries were in Latin America, where American banks had the greatest exposure. Moreover, the banks had already provided significant additional amounts of “new money” through involuntary lending to these high-risk indebted nations. In spite of these concerns, fourteen Japanese banks issued a statement in December 1985 backing the Baker Plan.26 The necessity of a united front induced different Japanese banks to collaborate. At the height of the Latin American debt crisis, the Japanese position was close to that of the United States and other creditors. They accepted that it was very important for the private creditors to have a unified front to deal with debtors, and for the public creditors (the creditor governments) to provide the means to restore capital inflows to the debtor countries. In a sense, the norms established among


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banking sectors across the industrial world condemned solutions utilizing any exit of banks or debt forgiveness/reduction, which might invite moral hazard problems immediately or in the future. Supported by the strong institutional mandate established through the BACs, Japanese banks acted in-line with the other transnational banks. In the context here, the norms shared among those transnational banks seem to have prevailed. Incentives for the debtors to free ride on the cooperation extended by banks lessened as such norm was actively and practically reinforced by the institutional arrangements. The Latin American Debt Crisis Solution (1987–1991) In the latter half of the debt crisis, the Japanese government came up with its own debt initiative, the Miyazawa Plan. This plan finally gave rise to a tangible solution to the debt crisis in many of the debtor countries, and the U.S. government adopted it in the form of the Brady Plan. As the debt problems lingered in Latin America and various attempts to restore economic growth among these countries failed in the mid–1980s, the perspectives on the debt solution and norms that governed the behavior of actors shifted. Banks began to exit from their outstanding debts and began to pressure creditor governments and IFIs to take charge of the debt solution. The Japanese government faced pressure from both the country’s banks, which wanted to follow other transnational banks and exit from Latin American debt, and from the U.S. government, which pressured Japan to take an active role and stepped in with an official financial recycling program. The payment crisis deepened again for major Latin American debtors in 1986 to 1987. First, due to the fall of oil prices and subsequent capital flight, Mexico’s balance of payments, which had begun to improve, worsened in 1986, and the country’s international reserves decreased by some $3 billion in 1987. Mexico needed more than $9 billion in new loans in order to get its economy back on its feet. The IMF provided an emergency stabilization loan package of $1.6 billion to Mexico, as part of a $12 billion multinational rescue package. Rescheduling arrangements between the Mexican government and international banks averted the worst outcome. Attempts to solve the Latin American debt crisis were hit again with Brazil’s announcement of a moratorium on its $67 billion commercial debt on February 20, 1987. The Brazilian balance of payments had also significantly worsened in 1986.

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It became increasingly clear that the 1985 Baker Plan had failed to restore economic growth to the indebted countries during the first stage of debt crisis management. It was partly because the new money package did not restore sufficient capital inflows and partly because the plan did not lead to an expansion of productive capacity.27 Some analysts questioned the effectiveness of debt relief plans that presupposed illiquidity as the problem of the major debtors, and began to call for debt forgiveness. U.S. Senator Bill Bradley, for example, criticized the Baker Plan. He advocated instead a 3 percent interest cut, led by the IFIs, on private and official loans for debtor nations that carried out successful structural adjustment. Along with policy failures, the attitude of policymakers in creditor nations changed. Previously, they had insisted that the debt crisis be characterized as a temporary liquidity crisis that could be solved by more inflow of foreign capital that was needed to resolve the debtors’ balance of payments problems. After the 1986–1987 setbacks, policymakers were forced to acknowledge the insolvency of debtor governments as the underlying problem. At about this time, payment difficulties of debtor nations triggered increased loan-loss reserves of several American commercial banks.28 A dramatic response came from CitiCorp, which announced in May 1987 that it had set aside $3 billion in loan-loss reserves to stabilize its position following the Brazilian crisis. In December 1987, Morgan Guarantee said it would retire up to $20 billion of its Mexican debt through the exchange of outstanding loans for government bonds at a 50 percent discount. This exchange converted part of the Mexican bank debt into 20-year bonds that would be backed by U.S. government securities. In this way, Morgan Guarantee exited from major outstanding claims, and Mexico reduced its debt by convincing banks to exchange their loans for U.S. government-guaranteed bonds at a discounted rate. The Morgan Guarantee approach was endorsed by Secretary of Treasury Baker, and it became a model for future debtreduction schemes. These changes in attitude and in banks’ positions were also reflected in a 1987 modification of the Baker Plan. At the World Bank/IMF Annual Meeting, Baker called for a menu approach that would allow commercial banks to select from among various options to support of debt relief. These options ranged from trade and project loans to debt swaps (e.g., for the environment) and exit bonds.29 Tokyo responded to the renewed payment crises among Latin American debtors by increasing its financial commitment to solving the problem, with the objective of recycling Japan’s current account


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surplus.30 Following the announcement of Mexico’s economic problems, the Japanese finance ministry launched a $10 billion Capital Recycling Program in October 1986. This program involved Japanese government contributions of $2 billion to initiate the “Japan Special Fund” in the World Bank, $3.6 billion to the IMF, and $3.9 billion to the International Development Association (IDA, a soft credit window of the World Bank) and the Asian Development Fund (a soft credit window of the ADB). The Program was tripled in size from $10 billion to $30 billion in May 1987, after news of the Brazilian debt moratorium. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone announced that an additional $20 billion would be divided among the IFIs committed to cofinancing along with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund ($8 billion), the Export–Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM Bank) with the private sector and IFIs ($9 billion), and JEXIM Bank’s untied loans ($3 billion).31 This $30 billion Capital Recycling Program was very well received at the Venice Summit in June 1987.32 The Miyazawa Plan, which included debt-reduction schemes with public financing, was informally presented at the IMF Interim Committee in April 1988 and then discussed among the G-7 finance ministers at the Toronto Summit that June.33 The plan was formally put forth during the September 1988 World Bank/IMF Annual Meeting in Berlin. The Miyazawa plan was based on three steps. First, debtors would be required to reach an agreement with the IMF on a structural adjustment program promoting economic growth. Next, bilateral and multilateral public funds for structural adjustment would be increased. Then, banks and debtors would convert a portion of the debt to bonds and reschedule the remaining debt under appropriate conditions after the structural adjustment program had been carried out. The debtor nations could securitize their debt by setting up a reserve account, to be managed by the IMF, related to the proportion of debt converted to bonds and the proportion rescheduled.34 Analysts and policymakers believed that the Japanese government would then provide equivalent lending to debtor countries, which would supply the reserve collateral needed for exit bonds.35 Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita offered support to this interpretation when he announced at the 1988 Toronto Summit that Tokyo would begin a five-year official development assistance (ODA) program, which, together with the $5.5 billion debt relief package for severely indebted countries, exceeded $50 billion in total.36 Although a few countries, including Canada and France, welcomed the Miyazawa Plan, which was also backed by some economists,37 the

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plan was criticized by other creditor governments. Some contended that the plan seemed like “the public bailing out the banks,” with the IMF deployed as a “debt purchasing facility.”38 Washington considered this debt underwriting function through the IMF overly ambitious and expensive. Owing to federal budgetary constraints, the U.S. government was not in a position to provide large infusions of money to the IFIs, and it did not want to relinquish its voice in these international organizations either.39 Also, a public bailout would be more harshly viewed in the United States than in Japan, given the greater scrutiny in the United States over possible misuse of taxpayer funds.40 Some commercial banks joined in condemning the plan, insisting that it would distort the market and lead to further bad behavior on the part of the ill-disciplined countries that might benefit from the debt reduction.41 This transition from the first stage (no debt-reduction) norms to the second stage (public intervention) norms took some time to complete owing to institutional rigidity and the political dynamics among the major creditor governments. As the crises reemerged in Mexico and Brazil, various transnational banks had already shifted their positions away from the first stage into the new approach that led them to exit from their outstanding loan claims in Latin America. Nevertheless, there was limited support for new mechanisms through which the crisis could be mitigated, as the amount of private money in Latin America began to decrease in earnest. Despite various debt-reduction instruments made available to commercial banks, they were reluctant to utilize them because they doubted that even the reduced part of their claims would be fully honored by the debtor governments due to the lack of foreign exchange income. In this context, the notion of increased financial involvement by creditor governments was not well received. Arguments against such involvement focused on the likely political response by taxpayers in creditor countries to bank bailouts with public money; the moral hazard problem that public bailout could create for poorly behaved debtors and free-riding banks; and the budgetary implications of a large bailout plan, particularly for Washington in the late 1980s. Because the U.S. government was the central figure politically supporting the no debt-reduction norms, the changing attitudes of transnational banks were not sufficient to quickly change its policies. On the other hand, Japanese banks became increasingly impatient about their exposure to Latin American debt. As other transnational banks exited on a case-by-case basis, the Japanese banks had to resort to some new measures that would allow them also to retreat from


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their Latin American exposure.42 For the Japanese government, too, such retreat by Japan’s banks would cause difficult political problems with the United States. Because of Japan’s accumulated bilateral trade surplus vis-à-vis the United States, whose economy had been affected largely by Latin America’s weak economies when the U.S. economy itself was suffering from recession in the late 1980s, the Japanese government had to allow the exit of Japanese banks without hurting the Latin American economy. A solution using public money was chosen as the way of compromise. By resorting to such an action, “the Japanese government purchased for Japanese banks a clear path for retreat” from Latin America.43 Owing to the dynamics mentioned above, the Miyazawa Plan had to wait till a change in the U.S. Administration in 1989 for being considered seriously. During his visit to Washington in February 1989 immediately after President George Bush Sr. took office, Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita confirmed that Tokyo and Washington would cooperate in their economic assistance efforts, especially in Latin America and the Middle East. Referring to the deployment of Japan’s ODA and the nation’s support for debt relief, Takeshita noted that “Japan would like to expand the coverage of its ODA from the concentrated allocation to countries like China and the Philippines to a more widespread allocation toward Latin America and Africa.”44 Bush indicated a willingness to revise the Baker Plan, and he pledged that his administration would respond flexibly to the debt problem. Washington was becoming deeply concerned about the prolonged debt problem, the low or negative growth rate of the heavily indebted countries, the potential for negative impact on the national security of those countries arising from economic and social instability, and the possible negative impact of these factors on the prospect for democratization taking place in some of the Latin American countries.45 In response to these concerns, the Bush Administration announced the Brady Plan, named after Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady. This debt-reduction plan sought to help heavily indebted middle-income countries by forgiving debt service to commercial banks or by compressing the debt principal. The plan maintained the key principles of the Baker Plan, including economic growth in the indebted countries, structural adjustment of the debtors, new money inflows from abroad, and a case-by-case approach. However, the Brady Plan also emphasized a menu approach to debt reduction, and any remaining portion of debt and new bond instruments were to be de facto guaranteed by the World Bank and the IMF. The Brady Plan also included penalties for

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recalcitrant commercial banks; those banks that did not abide by the plan’s requirement would have their interest and principal payments suspended for three years. The debtors, on the other hand, were to take measures to lower their debt overhang by restructuring their economies, promoting the inflow of capital, and repatriating flight capital. The Brady Plan closely resembled the Miyazawa Plan. Tokyo and Washington consulted closely before announcing the Brady Plan. At the end of February 1989, Charles Dallara, a Treasury Department official, visited Japan to inform Tokyo that Washington wanted to accept the Japanese proposal. The two governments then discussed the plan in detail.46 When the Brady Plan was publicly announced in March 1989, Tokyo’s Finance Minister Tatsuo Murayama told reporters that I would like to welcome the amply strengthened debt strategy just announced by Treasury Secretary Brady, and would like to support this new plan proposed by the United States that includes voluntary market-based debt and debt-service reduction and repatriation of f light capital. We have been in close consultation with the U.S. monetary authority on this issue, and this new American proposal incorporates fundamental ideas put forth by the Japanese government previously. Japan will collaborate closely with the United States and other governments concerned to implement this new debt strategy . . .47

The remaining G-7 governments accepted the plan in April.48 The heads of states at the Paris Summit backed the plan in July. But Tokyo was the strongest supporter of all. During the IMF meeting in April 1989, the Japanese government pledged to support the plan by giving $4.5 billion through the JEXIM Bank in parallel financing with the IMF.49 When debtor countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Philippines entered negotiations with the IMF in early summer 1989, Tokyo announced an additional $35 billion contribution to the already committed $30 billion Capital Recycling Program of 1986–1987. This contribution brought the total of the Capital Recycling Program to $65 billion over the fiscal years 1987 to 1991, $10 billion of which was allocated to debt relief.50 The first debt-reduction negotiations began in April 1989 between groups of creditors and the Mexican government. The two sides reached a general agreement in July and completed the detailed

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negotiations in September. According to the agreement, donor governments rescheduled their $2.6 billion in official loans and the IMF and the World Bank provided $4.2 billion through the $1.6 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and $2.6 billion Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs), respectively. The JEXIM Bank provided new untied loans totaling $1.9 billion, which included $1 billion in parallel financing with the IMF and $0.9 billion in cofinancing with the World Bank. A total of $48.5 billion of medium- and long-term commercial bank debt was to go under the debt-reduction scheme. Overall, 41 percent of the total debt negotiated ($19.9 billion) was reduced through discount bonds, which lowered the principal by 35 percent; 49 percent of the debt ($23.8 billion) was reduced through par bonds (with an interest reduction to 6.25 percent per year), and 10 percent of the debt ($4.8 billion) was converted as new loan amount equivalent to a quarter of the old debts loanable in four years.51 From 1987 to 1996, the JEXIM Bank alone provided $11 billion in untied loans to Latin America through the Capital Recycling Program and its successor, the Development Initiative program. Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, and the Philippines all benefited from the JEXIM Bank’s untied loans parallel to the IMF agreement and successfully concluded their Brady deals (table 8.1). As major creditor banks saw no prospect of gradually minimizing their overexposure to Latin American debt as of 1987, the norms that ruled the debt crisis management strategies among those banks shifted. Now that the prospects of getting all their outstanding claims back was close to nil, creditors began to get more interested in resolving the debt crisis through official (i.e. governmental and intergovernmental) means. The Japanese government and banks became

Table 8.1 JEXIM Bank’s Support to the Brady Plan, with Signing Dates and Amounts (Millions of dollars, equivalent) Recipient country

Signing date

Mexico Philippines Venezuela Argentina

November 1989 November 1989 March 1991 February 1993

Amount 1,000 300 300 300

Source: Export Import Bank of Japan, EXIM Japan Bulletin, Vol. 21, November 1997.

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strong advocates of debt reduction, partially reflecting the shifts in international positions on debt crisis management norms. Conclusion This case of Latin American debt crisis management shows how collective action among creditors was reinforced by norms established among transnational banks and creditor governments in order to create a certain level of concerted action. Because of strong institutional linkages established among transnational banks before and after the debt crisis, banks from different countries were able to monitor themselves. Owing to political and business reasons, these institutions along with the creditor governments stuck to the norm of a unified front at the height of the crisis. Norms among actors involved in the Latin American debt crisis evolved over time, however, as the economic conditions and perception of the debt crisis shifted. In this context, the changing norms were the result of both material interests and institutional “codes of conduct.” As the economic conditions deteriorated and the actors saw no end to the crisis, the norms of the unified front were abandoned and in its place emerged the increased role of creditor governments in alleviating the foreign exchange shortage among the debtors. The Japanese government also responded proactively to the changing situation by promoting debt-reduction schemes through the Miyazawa Initiative. Although the initiative was not taken up by the international financial community right away, it contributed to shifting the norms or creating new norms in the late 1980s. In addition, Japan was actually one of the prominent actors in providing additional funds for the solution of the crisis as per the new norm. The Latin American debt crisis illustrates the interaction between material interests and norms influencing the behavior of actors involved in it. In the same line with Finnemore’s argument, “norms [did] create permissive conditions for [certain] action.”52 This study provides additional insights into the existing literature on identity and norms, which tend to focus on the humanitarian aspect of international norms.53 Norms can emerge from self-interests. Nevertheless, those norms, which are supported by institutional arrangements, long “shadow of the future” (i.e. future business relationship) issues, and similar perspectives about the world and related political positions, provide a strong basis for identity among the actors and lead them to action. The home governments of these transnational banks would usually have ways to support those norms as banks establish a strong unified front


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to achieve what they perceive to be the best strategy to manage the crisis. Thus, it is important to emphasize the role of institutions and domestic politics in analyzing home governments’ behavior. Finally, when the norms shifted due to external conditions, it was the existing institutions and actors’ expectations based on such institutions that delayed transformation of attitudes. As the debtreduction discussions began to be held in 1987, Japanese banks were still bound by the norms established during the first stage of the debt crisis (i.e. no debt reduction or exit), making it difficult for them to respond quickly. Nevertheless, the Japanese government also participated in shifting such norms to accommodate the needs of Japanese banks (and other transnational banks) facing the changed realities of the late 1980s. Notes This chapter draws in part on my previous discussion of these issues in The Banking on Stability: Japan and the Cross-Pacific Dynamics of International Financial Crisis Management (University of Michigan Press, 2001). 1. An article by Stallings is one of the few written on this subject in English. Barbara Stallings, “Reluctant Giant: Japan and the Latin American Debt Crisis,” Journal of Latin American Studies 22, 1 (1990): 1–30. There are also a few books in Japanese, including Yoshiro Tokunaga, Ruiseki Saimu mondai to Nihon Keizai: Nihon Shudo no Saimu Menjo wo Teian Suru [The Accumulated Debt Problem and the Japanese Economy: Proposal for Japanese Leadership in International Debt Relief] (Tokyo: Touyou Keizai Shinpo-sha, 1988); Toru Yanagihara, ed., Keizai Kaihatsu Shien to Shiteno Shikin Kanryu [Capital Recycling in Support of Economic Development], Kenkyu Sosho [Research Paper], No. 387 (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyu-jo, 1989); Toshihiko Kinoshita, “Developments in the International Debt Strategy and Japan’s Response,” EXIM Review 10, 2 (1991): 62–80; and various publications from the Japan Center for International Finance. 2. Stallings, “Reluctant Giant,” 1. 3. Calder argues that Japan’s political and economic structure helped perpetuate that dependency long after Japan became a “large” state. The Japanese economy requires a steady inflow of resources and cash and a large market, and Japan’s decision-making authority is allegedly too fragmented to undertake an active foreign policy, which has kept Japan’s status of decision-making as reactive to U.S. demands. Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics 40 (1988): 526–529.

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4. Takashi Inoguchi, “The Ideas and Structures of Foreign Policy: Looking Ahead with Caution,” in The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 2: The Changing International Context, edited by Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 23–63. 5. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Culture and Security, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 54. 6. For historical accounts of the regime change from “no exit” to “debt reduction,” see Howard P. Lehman, “International Creditors and the Third World: Strategies and Policies from Baker to Brady,” The Journal of Developing Areas 28 (January 1994): 191–218. 7. About the “indebted industrialization,” see Jeffry Frieden, “Third World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, and South Korea,” International Organization 35, 3 (1981): 407–431. 8. Louis W. Pauly, Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 83. 9. Young-Kwan Yoon supports this argument empirically by showing continuity in the distribution between manufacturing investments and investments in finance and insurance and concludes that “Japanese financial institutions have been following the rapid expansion of Japanese manufacturing firms abroad, which tended to depend exclusively on foreign branches of Japanese banks for financial services.” Young-Kwan Yoon, “The Political Economy of Transition: Japanese Foreign Direct Investments in the 1980s,” World Politics 43, 1 (1990): 12. 10. Unlike many other earlier financial crises in which core countries unilaterally affected those on the periphery, this crisis was triggered by the developing countries’ debts, and it involved major creditor countries because of their loan exposure. For a comparison of this debt crisis with the early periphery financial crises, see Angus Maddison, Two Crisis: Latin America and Asia 1929–1938 and 1973–1983 (Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1985). 11. Joseph Kraft, The Mexican Rescue (Washington, DC: Group of Thirty, 1984), 18–19; Paul A. Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to American Leadership (New York: Times Books, 1992), 201. 12. This $8.25 billion consists of $3.625 billion from the United States, $925 million from the BIS, and an additional $3.7 billion from the IMF. Calculation from Nora Lustig, “Mexico in Crisis, the U.S. to the Rescue: The Financial Assistance Packages of 1982 and 1995,” Brookings Discussion Papers (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996), Table 1.


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13. When the Letter of Intent for the IMF loans arrived on his desk, de Larosiére insisted that there would be no IMF loans to Mexico without the commercial banks providing a commitment for that amount. Although his strategy received an angry response from the commercial banks, it helped bring the commercial banks to participate in the debt solution. This constituted the beginning of “concerted lending” headed by the IMF, which was a dominant form of rescue package operations in the 1990s as well. 14. Volcker and Gyohten, Changing Fortunes, 201. 15. Stallings, “Reluctant Giant,” 5–7. 16. Most of the business for the Bank of Tokyo was overseas. Its rate of profit from businesses abroad in 1979 was 77.5 percent. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 9, 1979. Furthermore, when Mexico announced its interest suspension in August 1982, the Bank of Tokyo’s exposure level in Mexico was 83 percent of its capital. Stallings, “Reluctant Giant.” 17. Stallings, “Reluctant Giant,” 15–16. 18. From Latin America and the Caribbean, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay concluded multilateral debt relief agreements during 1983–1984. World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1994–1995, 78–82. 19. Yomiuri Shimbun, June 23, 1984. 20. Interview with a banker from the Bank of Tokyo, June 1997, Tokyo, Japan. 21. Stallings, “Reluctant Giant,” 19. 22. Robert Devlin notes that well-informed American banks relied increasingly on inexperienced Japanese banks for syndicated lending during the few years before the debt crisis, while these American banks stayed away from new lending in Latin America before the disaster struck. Robert Devlin, Debt and Crisis in Latin America; The Supply Side of the Story (Princeton University Press, 1989), 122, 154. Many Japanese banks increased their amount of syndicated loans in 1981 and 1982 and increasingly served as the leading bank of syndication. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 16, 1982. 23. Devlin, Debt and Crisis in Latin America, 217–218. 24. The formal name of the Baker Plan is “Program for Sustained Growth.” The fifteen countries in the Plan are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Cote d’Ivoire, Morocco, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia. The countries labeled as heavily indebted were later expanded to seventeen and included Cost Rica and Jamaica. 25. Many European banks were actually openly hostile to the Plan. Toronto Star, December 19, 1985. 26. Asahi Shimbun, December 13, 1985. The banks emphasized that their support should be accompanied by the same degree of effort by

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27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.


the debtor governments, creditor governments, international organizations, and other financial institutions. William R. Cline, “The Baker Plan and Brady Plan Reformulation: An Evaluation,” in Dealing with the Debt Crisis, edited by Ishrat Husain and Ishac Diwan (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989), 176–193. See also Benjamin J. Cohen, “U.S. Debt Policy in Latin America: The Melody Lingers on,” in In the Shadow of the Debt: Emerging Issues in Latin America, edited by Richard C. Leone (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1992), 156. Regulatory changes in the United State made it easier for American banks to exit from Latin America’s debt in the latter half of the 1980s. For more information on these changes, see Lehman, “International Creditors and the Third World,” 198–201. These options exempted banks from new money-lending obligations when they converted certain amounts of their outstanding loans as the debtor countries’ government bonds. This scheme was implemented to convert some debts of Argentina in August 1987. A Harvard economist, Jeffrey Sachs, calculated that if Japan recycled its surplus capital to Latin America by $2.5 billion each year for three years, there would be an improvement of the overall U.S. trade balance by $1.15 billion per year. This recycling method would have been a much more effective way of improving the trade balance with the United States than the expansion of Japan’s domestic fiscal expenditure by the same amount, or the recycling of the same amount of capital to non–oil producing countries in general. See Tesuma Fujikawa, “Maware Maaware Okane wa Tenka no Mawarimono: 300-okudoru no Shikin Kanryusochi” [Go Round and Round, Money Goes Around: 30 Billion Dollar Capital Recycling Plan], The Finance, 23 (March 1988): 48–58. For a good summary of the details of the first two programs, see Fujikawa, “Maware Maaware Okane wa Tenka no Mawarimono.” Some of the additional $20 billion was already committed before the announcement of the expanded program. There was a discussion on the “additionality,” as some people questioned how much of the money promised through this program was in addition to the amount of foreign aid and other official flows that the Japanese government would provide anyway. They never reached a closure on this discussion. But many speculated that a numerical target of the recycling packages did help intensify the efforts of implementing agencies to provide more economic assistance to the countries in financial trouble, and as a result there was increased amount of money given to these countries. Interview with a Japanese economist, July 1999, Tokyo Japan. The idea of debt reduction itself was included as part of the “menu approach” in the latter half of the Baker Plan, but what was new about the Miyazawa Plan was that it also included heavy involvement


34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

41. 42.

43. 44. 45.

46. 47.

48.

49.

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of the IFIs’ guarantees supported by the financial contribution of major creditor countries, especially Japan. Kinoshita, “Developments in the International Debt Strategy and Japan’s Response,” 70–71. Also see JEI Report, No. 38B (1988), 3–4. Cline, “The Baker Plan and Brady Plan Reformulation,” 186. Mainichi Shimbun, June 14, 1988. Cline “The Baker Plan and Brady Plan Reformulation,” 186. Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1988. The U.S. Administration was also concerned about Japan’s increased influence in the IMF. See New York Times, September 28, 1988. In addition, there was a suspicion that the Japanese were pushing for this scheme because they would like to arrange the deals to be more favorable to the Japanese banks. Interview with an IMF official, May 1998, Washington, D.C. Frances McCall Rosenbluth, “Japanese Banks in Mexico: the Role of Government in Private Decisions,” International Journal 46, 4 (1991): 679–680. Jeffrey Sachs also mentions the same idea in his article. Jeffrey Sachs, “New Approaches to the Latin American Debt Crisis,” Essays in International Finance 174 (1989): 29. Interview with a Bank of Tokyo banker, June 1997, Tokyo, Japan. Another critical reason for Japanese banks to pressure their home government to create a road for their retreat came from the international agreement at the BIS. The organization of central bankers agreed in 1987 to set a minimum ratio of capital to asset at 8 percent for those banks operating internationally in order to avoid excessive risk to those banks. Because Japanese banks traditionally had very low capital ratio, they needed to call in their loans to meet this standard of capital adequacy. Rosenbluth, “Japanese Banks in Mexico,” 684. Asahi Shimbun, February 3, 1989. President-elect Bush’s speech on the debt problems and strategies, on December 19, 1988, cited in Tesuma Fujikawa, “Ruiseki-saimu Mondai no Aratana Tenkai” [A New Turning Point in the Debt Crisis], Raten Amerika Jiho [Journal on Latin America] (March 1990): 15. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 11, 1989. Quote from Japanese Finance Minister Murayama, cited in Fujikawa, “Ruiseki Saimu Mondai no Aratana Tenkai,” 16 (translated by the author). European banks were relatively ready to accept some debt reduction, thanks to their large reserves and national regulatory policies that would offset the losses from debt reduction. Lehman, “International Creditors and the Third World,” 209. At the same IMF meeting, the United States reversed its previous position regarding an increase in Japan’s IMF quota. It initially supported such an increase, which would move Japan’s position up from the fifth-largest quota. JEI Report, No. 15B, April 14, 1989.

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50. Kinoshita, “Developments in the International Debt Strategy and Japan’s Response,” 72; JEI Report, No. 28B, 1989. 51. Kinoshita, “Developments in the International Debt Strategy and Japan’s Response,” 73. Also see Japan Center for International Finance (JCIF), “Beikoku no Shin Saimu Senryaku to Detto Maketto” [New U.S. Debt Strategy and the Debt Market], JCIF Tokubetsu Repoto [Special Report], 25 (May 1990), 16–26. Japanese commercial bank debt of $9.7 billion was included in the $48.5 billion, but Japanese banks overwhelmingly preferred principal reduction (83%) and took no new money options. 52. Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 158. 53. For example, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); David Halloran Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

Part IV

Environmental Issues


Chapter 9

Japan’s Whaling Politics Keiko Hirata

W

hy does Japan sometimes defy international norms, even when doing so brings international condemnation and no substantial material benefit to the country? What conditions help lead to international norm rejection? To address these questions, this chapter analyzes Japan’s whaling policy and practices, examining why Tokyo has refused to accept an international antiwhaling norm that is broadly supported in most advanced industrialized states, and the mechanisms through which the antiwhaling norm has been rejected. Diverse perspectives have been put forth on the diffusion of international norms at the systemic level. Rationalist regime scholars argue that states comply with international norms either in fear of hegemonic power1 or based on strategic calculations of long-term material benefits.2 Constructivists stress the role of transnational activist networks in international norm diffusion.3 However, these system-level scholars—both rationalists and constructivists—cannot adequately explain why Japan has failed to accept the antiwhaling norm. Rationalists’ explanations are inapplicable to Japan’s whaling policy, which is based neither on a response to hegemonic threats of punishment nor on a rational calculation of long-term material benefits. Likewise, constructivism is unable to illuminate why transnational activist networks have failed to reverse Japan’s pro-whaling stance. These systemic-level perspectives parsimoniously explain the overall trends of norm diffusion at the international level. Yet, they have difficulty accounting for specific cases of norm diffusion, especially if the norm is not adopted. Their shortcomings derive from the fact that they pay little attention to the mechanisms through which international norms reach the domestic level.

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The explanation of Japan’s noncompliance lies in domestic politics, particularly in the interaction between two domestic variables: (1) the policymaking structure and (2) the prior cultural values or norm of policymakers and the society. Whaling involves a highly centralized decision-making structure that limits citizens’ access to the policymaking structure. In this structure, antiwhaling societal actors cannot effectively pressure the government. At the same time, policymakers are imbued with values and norms that influence their policy preferences. These values—collectively learned and shared in a society— predispose policymakers to certain frameworks. If policymakers encounter an international norm that runs contrary to their prior values, they are unreceptive to the norm. In a highly centralized political system without close state–society relations, the cultural background of the policymakers matters greatly; an international norm will be incorporated in policy only if policymakers accept it. Understanding both the domestic decision-making structure and the relationship between the values embedded in an international norm and those of policymakers will shed light on Japan’s whaling policy. These political and ideational variables serve as filters for an international norm, preventing “norm entrepreneurs”4 from gaining access to the decision-making process. International Norm Diffusion Norms are collective expectations of appropriate behavior for actors in a given community.5 What constitutes appropriate behavior is not an objective matter. It is intersubjectively determined by the community in question.6 Norms vary in strength. Some international norms are more salient than others. If a norm is not salient, it may face a competing norm that entails a different set of values and behaviors. Whaling is a highly controversial issue internationally, generating sharp disputes between pro- and antiwhaling states. While the antiwhaling norm—the idea that whales must be protected by a complete ban on whaling—is widely accepted in most Western industrialized states (with a few exceptions, such as Norway and Iceland); this norm is not as widely supported outside the West. In fact, the competing pro-whaling norm has a significant degree of international support, first and foremost in Japan, which kills hundreds of whales every year under the name of scientific research. At the same time, the institutionalization of strict antiwhaling regulations within the International Whaling Commission (IWC)—the major international forum on whaling—serves to project

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the antiwhaling norm internationally. The antiwhaling norm is also strengthened by the political and economic power of its main supporters, including the United States, Britain, and most other industrialized states. How does this context match with international relations theory? We will consider both rationalist and constructivist views. Rationalist regime theorists contend that norm compliance occurs when actors’ interests match the given norm. In this view, actors are utility maximizers, pursuing their desired goals based on cost–benefit calculations. Norms are thus seen as having an instrumental role in affecting state behavior, and norm compliance reflects the selfinterested and rational behavior of states. Regime scholars are divided into two main schools of thought: neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Neorealists argue that norm compliance is a result of hegemonic coercion and the imperative of national survival for weak states. From this perspective, a hegemonic power is crucial in the process of norm creation, dispersion, and enforcement, as hegemons coerce international norms upon other states by means of economic or military sanction. Norm diffusion thus reflects the distribution of material capabilities in the international system, as norm change corresponds to the rise and fall of hegemons.7 This neorealist analysis of norms does not travel well to the Japanese whaling case. Although the international antiwhaling regime (specifically IWC) is led by the United States, Washington as a hegemonic power has not been able to force Japan to abandon whaling, especially its scientific whaling program that began in 1987 (see below). Even though the antiwhaling norm gained strength in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan’s basic position on whaling remained unchanged. Japan made a tactical retreat by accepting the IWC’s moratorium on commercial whaling in the 1980s following the threat of U.S. sanctions. However, Tokyo immediately thereafter defied U.S. opposition and launched the scientific whaling program, thus challenging the authority of the hegemon. According to the second rationalist regime theory, neoliberal institutionalism, norm compliance occurs voluntarily, even in the absence of hegemonic coercion. While neoliberals share the neorealist perspective that states rationally pursue material interests in an anarchic world, they assert that rationalism and anarchy do not exclude cooperation. From the neoliberal perspective, states conform to international norms not because of fear of hegemonic punishment, but because of “the shadow of the future,” that is, long-term material

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incentives. Neoliberals argue that compliance with broadly accepted norms reduces uncertainties, minimizes transactions costs, and facilitates cooperation among self-interested states. Neoliberals stress that states often conform to international norms even though doing so sacrifices short-term material interests, as they are more concerned with long-term absolute gains than with short-term relative gains.8 When applied to the Japanese whaling case, neoliberalism would suggest that Japan adopts the antiwhaling norm because, as a rational actor, it expects to find long-term material benefits from such cooperation. By this measure, Japan can only be seen as acting irrationally. The main power in the antiwhaling IWC is the United States, Japan’s most important ally that protects Tokyo’s security and provides a vast market for Japanese goods. The United States has aggressively opposed Japan’s whaling practices, repeatedly threatening to impose economic sanctions on Japan if it continues whaling.9 Tokyo’s support for whaling thus jeopardizes its close relationship with its key ally. From a utilitarian point of view, Japanese whaling policy is based on a myopic short-term perspective that can seriously threaten Tokyo’s long-term political and economic interests. Transnational constructivists challenge the view that material interests alone explain state behavior and norm diffusion. From their perspective, it is not a hegemon but rather transnational advocacy networks—consisting of groups and individuals united by common principles, values, and beliefs who exchange information and resources in a nonhierarchical, voluntary, and reciprocal manner—that play the key role in norm creation, diffusion, and enforcement. According to constructivists, these networks frame a given issue with the language of morality and ethics to appeal to people’s consciousness and mobilize public support. Transnational networks deploy a variety of strategies, such as shaming tactics, to pressure states to comply with international norms. Yet transnational advocacy networks have been ineffective in Japan’s whaling case. Even though activist groups such as Greenpeace have vigorously protested Japan’s whaling practices by holding rallies and physically blocking Japanese whaling vessels, their direct, often provocative campaigns have completely failed. Rather, these groups have reinforced Japan’s adherence to the pro-whaling policy by angering Japan’s state officials and raising their nationalistic sentiment.10 Thus, neither rationalism nor transnational constructivism is able to illuminate why Japan rejects the international whaling norm.

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Domestic Impact of International Norms These system-level analyses are useful for explaining the broad phenomena of norm diffusion at the international level, but they are ill equipped to explain how international norms reach or fail to reach the domestic level in particular countries. International norms need to be linked to domestic political structure and domestic value systems. Without domestic political and ideational bases in favor of normative change, international norms are unlikely to spread domestically. Domestic Political Structure The role of domestic structure in norm diffusion is explained by Cortell and Davis, who consider four types of domestic structures to explain cross-issue variation in norm diffusion (table 9.1).11 They relate domestic structure to “the organization of decision-making authority and to the pattern of state–societal relations.”12 According to their view, decision-making authority varies along a continuum from decentralized to centralized, depending on the number of bureaucratic agencies or other governmental apparatuses involved in responding to an international norm. State–society relations also vary along a continuum from close to distant. Their Type I structure (centralized decision-making authority and distant state–societal relations) describes an elitist, top-down decision-making arrangement. Decision-making authority is restricted to few state agencies, and, since other agencies are excluded from the decision-making process, there is not much bureaucratic wrangling. In addition, the state is largely autonomous from society; nongovernmental actors cannot exert influence over policymaking as they have almost no access to the decision-making system.13 The Japanese whaling case corresponds to this political structure, involving only Table 9.1

Cortell and Davis’s Typology of Domestic Structural Contexts Pattern of state–society relations (distant)

Pattern of state–society relations (close)

Structure of decision-making authority (centralized)

Type I

Type II

Structure of decision-making authority (decentralized)

Type III

Type IV

Source: Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?,” 455.

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one dominant decision-making agency that is insulated from norm entrepreneurs opposed to state policy (see more discussion below). In this structure, an international norm does not penetrate into the domestic arena unless policymakers themselves adopt norms either instrumentally (based on cost–benefit calculations) or constitutively (through elite learning via persuasion).14 In a Type II structure (centralized decision-making authority and close state–society relations), few government agencies are involved in the process of policymaking. However, societal actors do have some access to the decision-making process. Since decision-making authority is still centralized, societal norm entrepreneurs need to selectively work with key government officials to bring about change. In a Type III structure (decentralized decision-making authority and distant-state society relations), state primacy is expected because there is no institutional mechanism that links societal actors to the decision-making process. However, the Type III differs from the Type I structure in that the decision-making authority is decentralized across various state institutions. Thus actions and interests of these state agencies vary and bureaucratic politicking is likely to take place in this structure. The Type IV structure (decentralized decision-making and close state–society relations) is the most pluralistic of the four types identified by Cortell and Davis. There are various state agencies involved in decision-making. In addition, societal actors have many access points through which to influence policy. Because of the pluralistic nature of the structure, international norms may enter more easily in this structure than in the others. However, due to the fragmentation of the decision-making structure, international norms may be subject to bureaucratic politics that may hinder the implementation of the norms into policy.15 Cultural Values State policy is not determined solely by political structures; prior values or norms of policymakers also matter. In his analysis of British and French multicultural education policies, Bleich finds a significant discrepancy between the two countries; Britain made a policy change in the direction of multiculturalism while France did not. Bleich finds that the gap was caused by the combination of two variables, that is, the political structure and ideational backgrounds of the policymakers.16


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The congruence between international norms and domestic values has been referred to as norm resonance or cultural match.17 According to Checkel, cultural match refers to a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, law), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative procedures).18

Also relevant here is the concept of political culture, which refers to the ideas, attitudes, and beliefs held commonly by a people and forms the basis for their political behavior. For international norms to be incorporated into domestic policy, the prescriptions embedded in the norms must resonate with the views embedded in the political culture of a target state. When an international norm is congruent with domestic values, policymakers are likely to take it more seriously, recognizing the obligations associated with the norm. For example, if a country is open to Western liberal ideas of democracy and human rights, its leaders may be more likely to accept and adhere to international human rights norms.19 Conversely, the salience of international norms in the domestic polity can be hindered by a low level of norm resonance. If the international norm conflicts with the domestic political culture, domestic actors may resist international pressure to adopt the norm.20 There are ample examples of failed international norm diffusion, particularly in the area of human rights, due to a misfit between the international norm and domestic values and norms.21 Norm resonance is not a dichotomous variable but rather scales along a continuum. At one end is a positive cultural match, indicating complete congruence between an international norm and the domestic value system in a particular issue area. At the other end is a negative match, which marks no congruence between them. In the middle is a null match, where the domestic arena contains no obvious normative barriers to a particular international norm.22 Norm resonance is difficult to measure.23 But one can say that the resonance is low when only a small percentage of the population endorses an international norm and the state refuses to legitimize it. High levels occur when not only the state but also groups representing a broad range in the society endorse the norm.24 Policymakers are influenced by domestic political values and norms through socialization.25 If a particular set of values and norms is

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traditionally or popularly supported in the society, they are likely to subscribe to it. They may even propagate and reinforce it through public policy. Interaction between the Domestic Political Structure and Cultural Values of Policymakers Both the domestic political structure and degree of norm resonance affect the adoption and institutionalization of international norms at the domestic level. As Bleich points out, since these two variables are interrelated to each other, examining their intersection is critical to the understanding of international norm diffusion.26 There are a number of possible interactions between the two variables, as norm resonance is a continuum on a scale between high and low. However, for the purpose of simplification, I will limit my discussion to the interactions between the four political structures discussed above and the positive and negative cultural matches (table 9.2). In Situations 1 to 4, policymakers, whether they are in a centralized or decentralized system, have prior values favorable to a given international norm; that is, there is a high level of norm resonance between an international norm and their values. In these situations, the norm is likely to be adopted. Yet the adoption of the norm is at the highest level if the decision-making authority is centralized and insulated from society, warding off societal actors who oppose the norm (Situation 1). In this situation, the policymakers are autonomous from society and unanimously support the international norm. Table 9.2 Levels of International Norm Adoption at the Domestic Level Type I political structure (centralized, distant state– society relations)

Type II political structure (centralized, close state– society relations)

Type III political structure (decentralized, distant state– society relations)

Type IV political structure (decentralized, close state– society relations)

Decision-makers’ Situation 1 cultural attitudes: Highest favorable/positive match

Situation 2 Very high

Situation 3 Extremely high

Situation 4 High

Decision-makers’ cultural attitudes: hostile/negative match

Situation 6 Very low

Situation 7 Extremely low

Situation 8 Low

Situation 5 Lowest (Japanese whaling case)


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In Situations 5 to 8, the policymakers are hostile to an international norm and norm adoption is unlikely to take place. For nonstate norm entrepreneurs, a decentralized system with close state–society relations (Situation 8) is more preferable to the other situations of negative cultural match. In Situation 8, norm entrepreneurs, not denied access to policymaking, can pressure a variety of agencies for change. If one agency does not yield to their pressure, they may try to pressure other policymaking agencies. It may be possible that these entrepreneurs succeed in pressuring some agencies to adopt the norm and that the agencies eventually persuade others to bring about change. State agencies may not internalize the norm but they may decide to adopt the norm instrumentally. For norm entrepreneurs, the next preferable situation of cultural mismatch is Situation 6, in which they can pressure a limited number of state officials. Even though there is a centralized political structure and they do not have many access points, they can still pressure a few agencies through which they can influence policy. For norm entrepreneurs, the worst scenarios of cultural mismatch is Situation 5. In this situation, they are denied access to the policymaking process; state authorities are centralized and shielded from entrepreneurs’ demands. The case of Japanese whaling corresponds to Situation 5 of cultural mismatch, with a centralized decision-making structure and distant state–society relations. The case involves only one dominant agency hostile to the international antiwhaling norm, and norm entrepreneurs lacking access to the policymaking process cannot pressure policymakers for change (see discussion below). In short, the interaction between domestic political structure and prior cultural values influences state compliance with international norms. Unfortunately, though, these variables and their interaction are usually neglected in research on international norm diffusion. Antiwhaling Norm Before discussing what accounts for Japan’s rejection of the antiwhaling norm, I will briefly explain how the norm has developed internationally and how Japan has responded to its development. Though the antiwhaling norm emerged and became institutionalized in the 1970s and 1980s, the norm originated from regulatory efforts by whaling states faced with a depletion of whale stocks several decades earlier. The first international attempt to regulate whaling resulted in the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (CRW), which was adopted by the League of Nations in 1931. The CRW, however, had

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no enforcement powers and was unable to prevent excessive exploitation of whaling stocks.27 After World War II, concerned states established the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) in 1946 “to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of whaling industry.”28 In 1948, these states created the International Whaling Commission (IWC) to implement the ICRW. The IWC was initially a pro-whaling organization interested in promoting the sustainable harvest of whales. However, over the years the organization’s stance shifted toward the preservation of whales (i.e., preventing the killing of endangered whales)29 and the protection of the welfare of whales, or whales’ rights (i.e., ending the suffering of whales “irrespective of their conservation status and irrespective of the benefit of such actions to humans”).30 The change in the IWC’s stance reflected new environmental and animal rights movements in North America and Western Europe that called for, among other things, the protection of marine mammals. In the 1970s, environmental NGOs launched international “save-the-whales” campaigns that called for the establishment of whale sanctuaries and a moratorium on commercial whaling.31 These antiwhaling NGOs successfully promoted two overlapping arguments: (1) whales are an endangered species needing protection; (2) whales are intelligent, friendly, and the largest mammals on earth, thereby also deserving special protection. Antiwhaling advocates brought these two discourses together to persuade the public to support their cause.32 Greenpeace, in particular, led effective campaigns mobilizing the public against whaling, often by resorting to physical obstruction. One of Greenpeace’s most successful efforts was its 1975 expedition against the Soviet whaling fleet in the Pacific, in which Greenpeace activists stood between the Soviet fleet and the targeted whale and captured through a video camera the whalers’ cannon firing the harpoons that exploded in the whale. When the video footage appeared on television in North America, public uproar ensued. As a result of this event and other efforts by NGOs, a new awareness of the importance of protecting marine mammals spread in North America and Western Europe.33 Reflecting the rising public sentiment in favor of protecting whales and other wild mammals, U.S. policymakers adopted two landmark laws in the early 1970s: the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973. The MMPA banned both the taking (which includes harassing, hunting, or killing)


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of marine mammals in the American and international waters and the import of marine mammals and their products into the country. This law ensured special legal protection for marine mammals, placing a higher value on them than on any other creature in the ecosystem.34 In contrast, the ESA was created to protect species considered threatened and endangered (including whales).35 In the 1970s the United Nations started addressing public concerns about the protection of marine mammals. The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm passed a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling as a result of intense campaigns by environmentalists and the U.S. government. This initiative was the first to propose a moratorium on commercial whaling, marking an important step for the whale-preservation movements in the West.36 Furthermore, the UN Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) was established in 1973 to restrict international commerce in wild animals and plants believed to be actually or potentially harmed by trade. CITES lists whales under Appendix I (most endangered species), which excludes them from international commercial trade except in special circumstances.37 The IWC also moved toward a stance of whale preservation. Influenced by the 1972 Stockholm initiative, the IWC adopted several resolutions to restrict whaling. In 1974, the IWC established the New Management Procedures (NMP) as a substitute for a moratorium. The NMP divided whale stocks into three categories, set quotas for each one on the grounds of scientific assessments and sustainability, and held that the commercial whaling of depleted stocks be halted until their recovery.38 Then, in 1976, whale species were allocated separate quotas so that depleted ones would be protected. In 1979, the IWC banned pelagic whaling except for the abundant minke whales in the Antarctic Ocean. In the same year, the IWC established the Indian Ocean as a cetacean sanctuary.39 In 1982, ten years after the Stockholm initiative, the IWC adopted a blanket moratorium on all commercial whaling to be implemented in 1985–1986. The moratorium was highly controversial as it was never endorsed by the IWC’s Scientific Committee, which had not identified any need for a blanket moratorium on all whale species.40 Some prowhaling member-states, such as Norway, lodged an objection to the IWC decision under Article V of the ICRW, thereby legally exempting themselves from implementing the organization’s resolution.41 The United States promoted the international moratorium on commercial whaling through domestic legislation. In particular, it

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took advantage of the 1971 Pelly Amendment (to the 1967 Fishermen’s Protective Act) and the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment (to the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act). Under the Pelly Amendment, the U.S. secretary of commerce can certify to the president that a foreign state is diminishing the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program such as the ICRW, and based on this certification the president can then ban the import of fishery products from that state. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment stipulates that a foreign country’s fishing allocations in the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the United States are to be removed if the secretary of commerce determines that country to be engaged in whaling operations that diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW. In response to Japan’s objection to the IWC moratorium, the United States threatened in 1984 to certify Japan under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. Japan then agreed to drop its objection to the IWC moratorium and halt commercial whaling by the end of 1987 if the U.S. government promised not to make those certifications. Accepting Japan’s offer, Washington decided not to penalize Japan via those certifications.42 The 1982 moratorium on commercial whaling was initially intended to be temporary, as the IWC planned to halt commercial whaling for five years starting in 1986 and then conduct a comprehensive assessment by the end of the fourth year to determine whether to extend the moratorium. But it has become a de facto permanent ban on commercial whaling, even though in 1992 the IWC Scientific Committee reported that many whaling stocks had recovered and recommended a Revised Management Procedure (RMP), a scientific formula for designing catch limits for whales. The RMP has never been implemented, because the IWC decided to instead design an inspection and observation plan known as the Revised Management Scheme (RMS) before the RMP would be put in place. The RMS is to address not only scientific aspects of whaling such as the RMP, but also nonscientific issues, including inspection and enforcement of rules and the humaneness of killing techniques. Owing to disagreements between the anti- and pro-whaling states, the work on the RMS has not been completed, thus causing an indefinite postponement of the RMP.43 Furthermore, the original IWC moratorium on whaling was supplemented by a Southern Ocean Sanctuary adopted by the commission in 1994 to target Japan, which had been trying to resume commercial whaling in the Southern Ocean area.44 Today, the IWC is deeply divided. The antiwhaling camp, consisting largely of most Western industrialized states, opposes whaling


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altogether and has shown little sympathy for Japan’s claim to whaling rights. The pro-whaling camp, led by Japan, Norway, and Iceland, has resisted pressure to give up whaling. In recent years, the IWC membership has rapidly increased in size as each camp has invited its sympathizers to join the organization. The pro-whaling camp has recently enticed small Caribbean, Pacific Island, and African states to its membership, while the antiwhaling camp has lured some East European and Latin American states to the organization.45 Although Japan and other pro-whaling states recently gained strength at the IWC, exemplified by its 2006 “victory” in which it succeeded in passing a nonbinding resolution to oppose the moratorium on commercial whaling (32 voted against and 33 voted for),46 they still cannot overturn the moratorium on commercial whaling since such a change requires a supermajority of 75 percent of the vote. The antiwhaling norm thus remains firmly institutionalized in the IWC.47 Japan’s Whaling Policy The international save-the-whale campaign has never successfully penetrated Japan, an IWC member since 1951. Even though Japan dropped its objection to the IWC moratorium on commercial whaling, Tokyo has never embraced the antiwhaling norm. In fact, Japan has been the most vociferous pro-whaling state in the IWC. In the face of mounting pressure from the antiwhaling camp, the Japanese government has focused on three goals: (1) to continue to capture a large number of whales through its scientific research program, (2) to pressure the IWC to provide four Japanese coastal communities with the same aboriginal subsistence whaling rights that some indigenous peoples are given, and (3) to lift the ban on commercial whaling. First, Japan began scientific whaling research in 1987, immediately after the United States decided to eventually end all foreign fishing rights in the U.S. EEZ by 1988. Despite the IWC’s objection, Japan unilaterally elected to carry out its program in the Antarctic, and it was known as the Japanese Antarctic Research Program (JARPA). Japan justified its action by invoking the scientific research provision in Article VIII of the ICRW: Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, any contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number

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and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.48

Under JARPA, Japan began taking hundreds of minke whales in the Antarctic (table 9.3). The number caught per year increased gradually over the years until 2005, when it nearly doubled.49 In 1994, Japan began another whale research program in the North Pacific. This program, called the Japanese Research Whaling Program in the North Pacific (JARPN), involved the killing of an additional 100 minke whales annually (table 9.4).50 Then in 2000, the scope of JARPN was broadened to include two other species (sperm, and Brydes whales). The IWC adopted a specific resolution calling on Japan to refrain from conducting the expanded program.51 This program also angered U.S. senators, as the two added whale

Table 9.3 Japanese Program (JARPA) Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Antarctic

Minke Whales 273 241 330 327 288 330 330 330 440 440 438 389 439 440 440 441 443 441 856

Research

Total 273 241 330 327 288 330 330 330 440 440 438 389 439 440 440 441 443 441 856

Source: International Whaling Commission (IWC), “Special Permit Catches since 1985,” 2006, http:// www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/table_permit.htm (accessed July 15, 2007).

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Table 9.4 (JARPN)

Japanese Research-Whaling Program in the North Pacific

Year

Sperm

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Sei

Brydes

1 5 8 5 10 3 5

1 40 50 100 100

43 50 50 50 51 50

Minke 21 100 77 100 100 100 40 100 102 101 100 101

Minke (coastal)

50 50 60 121

Total 21 100 77 100 101 100 88 159 247 261 314 377

Source: International Whaling Commission (IWC), “Special Permit Catches since 1985,” 2006, http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/table_permit.htm (accessed July 15, 2007).

species are protected under the 1973 U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act. These senators, led by Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman, urged the Clinton administration to take a strong action against Japan’s expanded whaling.52 The broadened program also prompted U.S. Commerce Secretary Norman Mineta to recommend to President Clinton to consider trade sanctions against Japanese fishery products under the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967.53 Although the Clinton administration did not impose trade sanctions, it expressed its disapproval of Japan’s new program by boycotting a UN environmental conference in Japan.54 In 2002, JARPN was expanded further to include an additional species (sei whales) and additional minke whales from coastal waters.55 As table 9.4 shows, the total number of whales caught under the program has steadily increased since its inception. The Japanese government has argued that the purpose of scientific whaling is to establish a scientific system for the conservation and management of minke, Bryde’s, sei, and sperm whales.56 However, critics have condemned the program as representing commercial whaling in disguise, since the whales captured in the program end up being sold in the open market as whale meat. 57 Critics have also questioned the objectivity of Japan’s research,

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contending that the programs are designed to gather data to be used in justifying the restart of commercial whaling rather than to be independently analyzed for authentic scientific purposes. 58 The IWC has repeatedly passed resolutions condemning Japan’s scientific whaling program. Japan’s second goal at the IWC is to gain the status of aboriginal subsistence whaling for four coastal whaling communities in Japan. Tokyo has demanded that, under the rules of the 1982 moratorium, the four coastal communities of Japan be given rights similar to the whaling rights that indigenous communities in the Arctic are accorded. Tokyo maintains that these Japanese coastal communities have traditionally depended on small-type coastal whaling (STCW) and that they should thus be allowed an annual quota of fifty minke whales—a species that in Japan’s view is abundant in stock.59 Japan sees it as contradictory that while, on one hand, the hunting of abundant small-type minke whales in Japanese waters (under the STCW scheme) is prohibited, on the other, Alaskan Inuits are allowed by the IWC to harvest about fifty endangered bowhead whales annually.60 The IWC has repeatedly rejected Tokyo’s request for the quota of 50 minke whales for the Japanese whaling communities on the ground that Japan’s coastal whaling contains a commercial element and thus violates the moratorium.61 To protest this decision, Japanese delegates tried in 2002 to reject American and Russian requests to renew aboriginal whaling quotas for Alaskan Inuits and Russia’s indigenous Chukotka people. The effort failed.62 These delegates maintained that they had no intention of hurting the indigenous people in the Arctic, but they insisted that they needed to take action to end the “double standard” of the antiwhaling members who would not allow Japanese communities to whale.63 Japan’s third goal at the IWC is most challenging: to end the ban on commercial whaling. Japanese delegates have maintained that a modest and controlled exploitation of whales (i.e., commercial whaling) should be resumed because there is no ecological reason to abandon whaling entirely. Japan has repeatedly petitioned the commission to consider overturning the moratorium, but in vain.64 Recently, Japan and other pro-whaling states succeeded in passing the nonbinding St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration in 2006 that called for the end of the moratorium on commercial whaling. This was made possible, according to critics and some Japanese politicians, by Japan’s lobbying efforts through foreign aid (otherwise described as the buying of votes of small poor states). Although the resolution was primarily symbolic, Japanese delegates considered the vote an important


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victory, hoping that this would eventually lead to the lifting of the moratorium.65 To further promote the anti-moratorium campaign in the IWC, Tokyo hosted a meeting called the Conference for the Normalization of the International Whaling Commission, in 2007, which most antiwhaling IWC members boycotted.66 In all these efforts, Japanese officials were uncharacteristically aggressive, defiant, and provocative. According to a Japanese prowhaling legislator, whaling is one of the few issue areas where “Japanese foreign policy is not trash-able” (suteta mono dewa nai), indicating that while Japan is usually deferential in the foreign policy arena, especially to the United States, the country’s actions are anything but deferential on whaling.67 At each annual IWC meeting, Japan faces considerable hostility from the antiwhaling camp.68 Japan then fires back, threatening its opponents by suggesting that Tokyo might boycott IWC committees, withdraw from the IWC, and form a separate pro-whaling commission.69 Political Structure Why does Japan reject the antiwhaling norm? As suggested earlier in the chapter, the answer lies in domestic political and cultural contexts. The Japanese political structure regarding whaling is highly centralized with a single agency that is in power: the Fisheries Agency (FA) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (MAFF). Japan’s harsh criticisms of antiwhaling states come from the FA, as put forth in particular by the Whaling Division within the FA’s Far Seas Fisheries Division. This political structure largely excludes the influence not only of antiwhaling NGOs, but even of other state agencies or legislators. The FA, however, is not homogenous. Tensions exist between those in charge of whaling and those who oversee fisheries. When the IWC passed the 1982 moratorium on commercial whaling, the Whaling Division of the FA tried to persuade the fisheries officials within the agency to accept the Whaling Division’s idea that Japan should file an objection to the moratorium. These whaling officials argued that accepting the moratorium would have a spillover effect, creating more regulations of other international fisheries regimes that could harm Japan’s fisheries interest. Although the whaling officials finally gained concession from the fisheries officials and filed an objection to the moratorium, they had to withdraw the objection soon afterward; the fisheries officials in the FA and MAFF pressured the whaling officials to do so. Since Japan’s fishing interests were

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much more substantial than its whaling interests, the views of fisheries officials, supported by private industry, won out over those of the whaling officials.70 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the agency in charge of Japan’s international diplomacy, is involved neither in making nor in implementing whaling policy, but simply communicates Japanese policy to the world. MOFA officials (specifically the Fisheries Division of the Economic Affairs Bureau within the ministry) join FA/MAFF officials in representing Japan at the IWC; MOFA also responds to foreign criticisms of Japan’s scientific whaling program and attempts to ease conflicts with antiwhaling states through public relations efforts. According to McNeill, MOFA is “a reluctant partner at best in the whaling mission”71 and takes a much milder approach to whaling than does the FA. Nonetheless, the ministry defends the FA’s position on whaling in the international arena. For example, taking the FA’s position, the ministry has argued that “certain NGOs and the media are spreading misinformation on this [whaling] issue to the public to provoke an emotional reaction against our activities which could make dialogue difficult.”72 MOFA also emphasizes the legality of Japan’s action (which, in its view, is in line with the ICRW) and stresses that Japan acts in harmony with the international community. As Wong points out, MOFA’s support for the FA/MAFF and its attempt to ease conflicts with other states reflect the ministry’s internal politics. The ministry is divided on the whaling issue: The Ocean Division of the Economic Affairs Bureau within MOFA enthusiastically promotes the FA’s whaling policies, while the North America Bureau is highly sensitive to the adverse impacts of Japan’s pro-whaling position on U.S.–Japan relations and is thus least supportive of whaling.73 Regardless of the internal division, MOFA does not challenge the FA’s authority in developing and implementing whaling policy and instead focuses on explaining Japan’s pro-whaling policy to the world. Meanwhile, the FA is comfortably supported by many pro-whaling Diet members. All political parties in Japan, including even the Communist Party, support whaling. Japan’s two largest parties—the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—have pro-whaling legislative groups (the Parliamentary League in Support of Whaling, and the Parliamentary Council to Address Whaling Issues, respectively). In particular, the LDP’s Parliamentary League has included a number of prominent politicians,


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such as former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (who represents the whaling district of Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi Prefecture), Foreign Minister Taro Aso, and Yokohama Mayor Hiroshi Nakada.74 These pro-whaling politicians are not directly involved in policymaking on the issue, largely entrusting the FA with decision-making authority. Diet members not in these pro-whaling groups also, for the most part, support whaling; though whaling is a peripheral issue to them, as they and their constituents have more pressing concerns,75 they do not voice opposition to the FA’s policy. Since virtually no antiwhaling legislators exist in Japan—except one representative from Okinawa— the FA does not face any serious opposition from Nagata-cho, Japan’s Capitol Hill.76 The FA selectively works with a few societal actors. The agency subcontracts Kyodo Senpaku, a private fishing company with approximately 300 employees, to hunt whales for the scientific research program. The Institute of Cetacean Research, a semigovernmental institute established when the IWC banned commercial whaling, conducts scientific research and provides evidence to support the FA’s claim that certain whale species are abundant. After research, the Japanese government buys the whale meat, and the money generated from the sale is used to cover the cost of the research program. The government then distributes the whale meat to Japanese local governments, which pass it on to wholesale fish markets.77 The FA also supervises the Japan Whaling Association, a semigovernmental organization that collects and provides information on whaling. The organization aims at assisting the Japanese government in public relations efforts for resuming commercial whaling.78 All of these societal actors—the fishing company, the research institute, and the whaling association—are, of course, supporters of whaling.79 The only actors inside Japan to oppose Tokyo’s whaling policy are a handful of transnational and Japanese NGOs.80 Their antiwhaling campaigns have failed to achieve traction. This is partly due to a cultural mismatch between their antiwhaling campaigns and Japanese values, as will be discussed below. However, their failure also derives from their inability to establish working relations with the bureaucracy. They have, not surprisingly, found no common ground with the FA. In other fields such as humanitarian aid, Japanese NGOs critical of state policy have had some success in collaborating with the bureaucracy, particularly with the MOFA. NGO–MOFA cooperation has been enabled not only by strong public support for NGOs involved in aid and development issues, but also by intense competition between

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ministries involved in Japan’s official development assistance (ODA). With multiple ministries competing for control of the ODA and the budget and power that accompanies it, each ministry seeks allies to strengthen its hand. As other ministries are aligned with the business sector, MOFA has sought the cooperation of NGOs. Even though many NGOs are critical of Japan’s ODA policy, they nevertheless share an interest in increasing humanitarian assistance to the developing world. By partnering with NGOs, MOFA can be a better advocate of policies that emphasize humanitarian rather than infrastructure aid, which would thus more likely come under the ministry’s jurisdiction.81 With regard to whaling, however, this type of close relations does not exist between antiwhaling NGOs and any government ministry. There is no common interest between NGOs and the FA and no political space for other ministries to be involved. Antiwhaling NGOs thus lack both access points to the policymaking process and public support for their cause. In summary, the whaling case involves a top-down policymaking structure in which the FA shapes Japan’s policy without facing any serious challenges to its authority. If the antiwhaling norm is to be empowered domestically, the agency has to be the first to embrace it. Since the FA has no interest in changing its position, and since antiwhaling actors have failed to change the FA’s views or create a powerful enough social movement that would force the agency’s hand, the pro-whaling policy has continued. Cultural Values Many Japanese perceive the whaling controversy largely as a cultural matter, believing that Japan has distinct kujira-bunka (culture of whales) or more precisely, geishoku-bunka (a whale-eating culture).82 According to Japanese scholars, geishoku-bunka dates back to prehistoric times.83 On the basis of the discovery of whaling drawings, whale bones, and hand harpoons in ancient burial mounds, they claim that Japanese communities first ate stranded whales and then began primitive whaling during the Jomon period (10,000–300 BC). These scholars also argue that with the introduction of large nets toward the end of the seventeenth century, Japanese commercial whaling began in Taiji (near Osaka) and spread to southern Japan in the eighteenth century and then to northern Japan in the following century. This supposedly led to a collective geishoku-bunka, with whalers sharing the whale meat with other villagers, and local communities developing their own unique whale cuisines. According


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to this view, Japanese have used whales in a distinct manner. Unlike Westerners (e.g., the Americans, British, and Dutch) who used whales principally to extract oil, the Japanese are described as having used almost the entire whale for food and oil, without “wasting” any body parts.84 Cultural views do not have to be based on historical facts. They can be myths based on partial truths. For example, Japanese scholars often neglect the fact that for thousands of years geishoku-bunka was limited to certain coastal regions in Japan and that the eating of whale became commonplace nationally only after World War II (due to the necessity to feed the impoverished population).85 In fact, even during the early twentieth century, some people in northern Japan resisted killing whales as they saw them as mystical gods (“Ebisu”) who looked over communities and helped bring them wealth.86 Nevertheless, the concept of geishoku-bunka is shared collectively throughout the Japanese society. The legitimacy of geishoku-bunka rests not only on the common Japanese belief that eating whales is a tradition practiced for thousands of years, but also on the notion that whales are a kind of fish.87 On the basis of Buddhist teachings, the Japanese historically considered eating fish and whales acceptable, whereas eating land animals was undesirable. This belief is evidenced by several decrees provided by Japanese leaders. For example, in the sixth century, Emperor Tenmu, an ardent Buddhist, banned the killing and eating of animals except for fish and whales. In the seventeenth century, Tsunayoshi Tokugawa, the fifth shogun of the Edo period, issued a similar degree.88 Many Japanese observers thus argue that whale eating is an important part of Japanese history and culture, as opposed to the eating of beef, which, as they correctly point out, began only in the past 200 years in Japan following the Westernization of the country.89 Because of the perception that whales are fish, many Japanese do not share Western animal rights activists’ view of whales’ rights. According to one cross-national survey on public attitudes to whaling, conducted by North American researchers, there is a wide gap in perception between people in Japan and those in the antiwhaling countries. For example, 64 percent of the Japanese respondents in the survey stated that there was nothing wrong with whaling if it was properly regulated, whereas only 21 percent of Australian respondents agreed with this statement. Also, only 25 percent of the Japanese respondents stated that they could not imagine anyone would kill anything as intelligent as whales, whereas 64 percent of the Australian counterparts agreed with this statement.90 The idea of whales being

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fish is so deeply rooted in Japanese society that it is institutionalized through law and regulations. Whaling is controlled by the 1949 Fisheries Law.91 And issues related to whales are considered not as environmental issues but as fisheries matters, thus bringing it under the jurisdiction of the FA, not the Environmental Agency (EA).92 Like the general public, Japanese officials in the FA and MAFF, particularly those in charge of whaling affairs, are firm believers in the culture of whaling. They have published widely about Japan’s geishoku-bunka, which, in their view, has lasted for thousands of years. They have defended Japan’s whaling policy as being based on what they term as the country’s legitimate cultural practices.93 One can say that the organizational culture of the FA/MAFF on whaling derives from the larger societal pro-whaling culture. At the same time, the FA and MAFF officials have gone further, aggressively propagating their belief in the culture of whaling and sharply criticizing the “double standards” of antiwhaling states. They have framed the whaling controversy as a struggle between “meat eaters” (especially the Anglo-Saxons) and “fish eaters” (the Japanese) and have portrayed the “meat eaters” as racists and cultural imperialists. At the 1989 IWC meeting, for example, Japan’s commissioner argued that the meat-eating culture was taking advantage of the IWC to destroy the fish-eating culture.94 According to this view, it is hypocritical to ban the killing of certain mammals such as whales while killing others such as kangaroos (in Australia), foxes (in Europe), and baby cattles (in the United States). They have argued that any culture has the right to maintain its practices as long as they do not lead to overharvesting and extinction.95 These nationalist sentiments run high in the FA. According to Tetsu Sato, Professor of Ecology and Environmental Sciences, Nagano University: The fundamental root cause of the whaling issue in Japan is a kind of trauma or destroyed pride which is handed down through generations of bureaucrats. The trauma came from Japan being labeled a cruel country, and having eggs and paint thrown at it. To lift this trauma the bureaucrats really need for the moratorium to be lifted. They would see this as a victory for their own value system. It is not really a problem of reviving the whaling industry now; it is a problem of national pride, or at least government and bureaucratic pride. They basically need a symbolic victory.96

In this light, it is interesting to review the efforts of NGOs on this issue, and particularly those of transnational NGOs. By aggressively


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campaigning against Japanese whaling and even attempting to physically block Japan’s whaling fleets, transnational NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd, have further fueled the “antiimperialist” rhetoric of FA officials, who label them as eco-terrorists hostile to Japanese culture.97 FA officials have propagated their cultural (and nationalist) views together with claims of law and science. They have justified Japan’s scientific whaling as being legal under Article VIII of ICRW and have portrayed Japanese whaling as eco-friendly. According to the FA, certain types of whales have rapidly increased in number in recent decades and it is thus more sustainable to hunt these whales moderately (as Japan does) than attempt to preserve them all. The FA claims that such a rapid increase represents a potential environmental problem, since these whales eat so many fish that they could eventually destroy the ecological balance and threaten fishing industries.98 The FA thus presents cultural, legal, and scientific justification for its pro-whaling policies and practices.99 Of the three elements, though, cultural values constitute the foundation of Japan’s prowhaling stance, whereas the legal basis (e.g., ICRW) and pro-whaling scientific data are of secondary importance. Because FA officials believe in the cultural legitimacy of geishoku-bunka, they also insist on the legality of whaling and the scientific reasoning for it. Without their belief in geishoku-bunka and Japan’s right to pursue its perceived culture, legal matters and scientific data would have no value by themselves. Of course, cultural views do not exist in a political vacuum. They can be exaggerated and instigated by political actors, as seen in the accusations of racism and cultural imperialism by FA officials. Cultural views can also be exploited by self-interested actors. It is likely that FA and MAFF officials are driven to promote their view of geishokubunka not only because of their firm belief in it but also because of their own bureaucratic interests in whaling. The end of whaling could mean a decline in the FA’s budget and political power. Given the intense interministerial rivalries in Japan, it is not likely that MAFF/ FA would voluntarily concede one of its major areas of jurisdiction.100 Also, officials in the FA (and MOFA) reportedly fear that the ban on whaling will potentially spill over into the general fisheries areas under their domain. Japan has faced increased international pressure to regulate its fisheries activities, especially those involving southern bluefin tuna.101 Cultural views interact not only with the actors’ interests but also with their power. In a highly centralized decision-making system

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with distant state–society relations, the views of those in power prevail. Societal actors who oppose these views are unable to access the decision-making system. And if the public as a whole share the views of policymakers, there is little room for those with alternative views to generate support for their cause. In light of all this, some Japanese environmental groups have avoided the whaling question altogether, for fear of alienating the public. Those that have taken up this question have had to confront a populace that is, for the most part, in support of whaling. Conclusion Japan’s support for whaling cannot be elucidated by system-level analyses. Both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism fail to explain Japan’s policy, which is based on neither hegemonic pressure nor long-term material interests. Constructivist accounts of norm diffusion fail as well, because transnational activist networks have had little effect on Japan’s whaling policy. Thus, although system-level analyses are helpful for explaining general phenomena of norm diffusion, they are unable to specify the exact mechanisms through which international norms reach or fail to reach the domestic level. Japan’s rejection of the antiwhaling norm is best understood through a structural-ideational analysis focusing on two domestic variables in the process of norm compliance: the domestic political structure and preexisting cultural values of policymakers. This analysis shows that the decision-making process over whaling is highly centralized under the leadership of the FA. Japanese policymakers in the FA are both imbued with societal values that are antagonistic to the international antiwhaling norm and are active in exacerbating such values. The FA’s dominance over the making and implementing of whaling policy, combined with the hostility of the FA to the antiwhaling norm, provides little political opening to antiwhaling norm entrepreneurs. At the same time, the great divide between the international norm and domestic cultural values makes it difficult to generate public opposition to whaling. With a centralized political structure, distant state-society relations, and a low level of cultural resonance, the context surrounding Japanese whaling is the least conducive to international norm diffusion among all possible situations. Will it be ever possible to overturn Japan’s pro-whaling position? There are at least two scenarios in which Japan’s whaling policy could change, although neither is likely in the near future. First, if there was a decentralization of policymaking on this issue, with a weakening of


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the power of FA/MAFF vis-à-vis that of the MOFA or the Prime Minister’s office, this could create opportunities for change. For example, if MOFA exerted more influence in the decision-making process, whaling policy could start reflecting the ministry’s internationalist view; Japan may take a more conciliatory stance on whaling by stopping the use of provocative language and making some concessions to international pressure. And with MOFA’s active involvement in the process, state–society relations on this issue could change as well, with environmentalist NGOs finding a more natural partner in MOFA than in the FA. A second scenario would depend on ideational change. It may not be impossible that policymakers’ views on whaling would change over time via public pressure or socialization. For example, even though the political structure lacks close state–society relations, policy leaders may be still concerned with public opinion on whaling. Thus, norm entrepreneurs may work toward mobilizing public opinion first to gain public support for the antiwhaling cause and then to pressure the government. Norm entrepreneurs could, for example, target Japanese youth, who are generally more open on the issue of whaling than are the middle-aged or the elderly. In fact, with Japan’s consumption of whale meat dwindling steadily since 1970, today’s Japanese youth have grown up eating very little whale, and thus they have less emotional attachment than their elders to whale meat and whaling.102 Influencing youth opinion could thus be a possible point of leverage. Neither of these changes is likely to occur quickly. The current combination of FA dominance on this issue, imperviousness of the FA to outside pressure, and cultural mismatch between the antiwhaling norm and the views of the FA and society mean that support for whaling is firmly entrenched in Japan. As this case of whaling illustrates, neither hegemonic pressure nor consideration of long-term material interests or the activities of transnational networks can bring about norm diffusion when the confluence of domestic political structure, state–society relations, and domestic cultural values are aligned against it. Future research on international norm diffusion at the domestic level would be wise to take these three domestic-level factors, and their interaction, into consideration. Notes This chapter is based in part on my previous publications on this issue: Keiko Hirata, “Beached Whales: Examining Japan’s Rejection of an International

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Norm,” Social Science Japan Journal 7, 2 (2004): 177–197; Keiko Hirata, “Why Japan Supports Whaling,” Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 8, 2–3 (2005): 129–150. 1 . Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1–21. 2. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 3. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 4. Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,” International Organization 44, 4 (1990): 479–526; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40, 3 (1996): 363–389; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, 4 (1998): 887–917. 5. Katzenstein defines norm as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.” Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5. For a similar definition (norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”), see Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” 6. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1–38. 7. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Keohane, After Hegemony. 8. Keohane, After Hegemony. 9. Steven Pearlstein, “Clinton Presses Japan to Halt Whale Hunts,” The Washington Post, September 14, 2000, A31; Doug Struck, “U.S. Fishing Sanctions Call Japan: Clinton’s Response to Whaling is Seen as Election-Year Ploy,” The Washington Post, September 16, 2000, A15. 10. See Masayuki Komatsu, Kujira wa Tabete Ii! [It is OK to Eat Whales!] (Tokyo: Takarajimasha, 2000); Morishita, Joji, Naze Kujira wa Zashoo Suru no ka [Why Do Whales Get Stranded?] (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 2002).


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11. Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40, 4 (1996): 451–478. 12. Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?,” 454. 13. Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?” 14. Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change,” International Organization 55, 3 (2001): 553–588. 15. Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change. 16. Erik Bleich, “From International Ideas to Domestic Policies: Educational Multiculturalism in England and France,” Comparative Politics 31, 1 (1998): 81–100. I do not adopt Bleich’s models completely, however, because his model of political structures, based on a dichotomy between centralized and decentralized political systems, does not take into account state–societal relations. Bleich’s model implies that as long as the political system is decentralized, nonstate actors have many access points. Cortell and Davis’s Type III shows otherwise; even when a system is decentralized (with many decision-makers involved), nonstate actors still may not be able to penetrate into the decision-making process if the state is insulated from societal pressure. I thus adopt Cortell and Davis’s model of political structures. 17. Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Ropp, “International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change: Conclusions,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 234–278; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, 1 (2000): 65–87; Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43, 1 (1999): 83–114. 18. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” 87. 19. Risse and Ropp, “International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change,” 271–271. 20. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe”; Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms.” 21. See Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. 22. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe.”

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23. Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms.” 24. Darren Hawkins, “The Domestic Impact of International Norms and Transnational Networks” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30–September 2, 2001). 25. Hennning Boekle, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, “Constructivist foreign policy theory,” in German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, edited by Volker Rittberger (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001). 26. Bleich, “From International Ideas to Domestic Policies.” 27. Bruce J. Stedman, “The International Whaling Commission and Negotiation for a Global Moratorium on Whaling,” in Nine Case Studies in International Environmental Negotiation, edited by Laurence E. Susskind, Ester Siskind, and J. William Bresline (Cambridge, MA: The MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, 1990), 151–175. 28. International Whaling Commission (IWC), “The Text of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946 and Its Protocol,” http://www.iwcoffice.org/Convention.htm (accessed July 1, 2002). 29. Peter J. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1997); Robert L. Friedheim, “Introduction: The IWC as a Contested Regime,” in Toward a Sustainable Whaling Regime, edited by Robert L. Friedheim (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), 1–45. 30. Stuart R. Harrop, “From Cartel to Conservation and on to Compassion: Animal Welfare and the International Whaling Commission,” Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 6, 1 (2003), 81. 31. Robert Mandel, “Transnational Resource Conflict: The Politics of Whaling,” International Organization 24, 1 (1980), 99–127. 32. Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran, Japanese Whaling: End of an Era? (London: Curzon Press, 1992); Friedheim, “Introduction.” 33. Robert Hunter, To save a whale: The voyages of Greenpeace (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1978). 34. Public Broadcast Station (PBS), “Faroe Islands: Message from the Sea,” television program aired as part of PBS’s Frontline/World, June 26, 2007; Public Broadcast Station (PBS), “Whaling and International Policy.” http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/ faroe605/whaling.html (accessed July 1, 2007). 35. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, “The Endangered Species Act of 1973,” http://www.fws.gov/Endangered/esa.html (accessed July 13, 2007). 36. Stedman, “The International Whaling Commission and Negotiation for a Global Moratorium on Whaling.”


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37. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), “How CITES works,” http://www.cites. org/eng/disc/how.shtml (accessed July 10, 2007). 38. These categories are the Protection Stocks (PS, which comprised the highest category, including right, gray, humpback, blue, fin, and sperm whales), the Initial Management Stocks (IMS), and the Sustained Management Stocks (SMS). Commercial whaling was permitted for only IMS and SMS. Friedheim, “Introduction,” 4. 39. Stedman, “The International Whaling Commission and Negotiation for a Global Moratorium on Whaling.” 40. Arne Kalland, “The Anti-Whaling Campaigns and Japanese Responses,” http://luna.pos.to/whale/icr_camp_kalland.html (accessed July 3, 2002). 41. Friedheim, “Introduction.” 42. Kazuo Sumi, “The ‘Whale War’ between Japan and the United States: Problems and Prospects,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 17, 2 (1989): 317–372. The U.S. government’s decision not to certify Japan prompted an antiwhaling group to file a lawsuit against the United States. The group argued that the amendments required that Japan be certified. In 1985, a U.S. district court ruled on behalf of the plaintiff, finding that the secretary of commerce did not have discretion in regard to certification and that Japan thus had to be certified. Later that year, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. Shortly after that, Japan hinted that it might “withdraw the withdrawal” of its objection to the IWC moratorium if the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. In 1986, the Supreme Court overturned the court of appeal’s decision, finding that the secretary of commerce did indeed have the discretion whether to certify Japan. The Japanese government thus decided to maintain its policy of withdrawing its objection to the ICW moratorium. Sean D. Murphy, ed., “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 95, 1 (2001), 132–161. 43. Neither the RMP nor the RMS has been implemented and formally adopted into the IWC Schedule. International Whaling Commission [IWC], “Revised Management Procedure,” 2004, http://www. iwcoffice.org/conservation/rmp.htm (accessed July 20, 2007); International Whaling Commission [IWC], “Revised Management Scheme,” 2004, http://www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/rms.htm (accessed July 20, 2007). 44. Friedheim, “Introduction.” 45. David McNeill, “Japan Refutes ‘Marine Darth Vader’ Charges,” The Japan Times Online, May 30, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/ cgi-bin/fe20070530a1.html (accessed July 20, 2007). 46. IWC, “The St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, 58th Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission,” IWC/58/16Rev Agenda

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Item 19, June 20, 2006. The resolution, known as the St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, argues that the IWC has failed “to meet its obligations under the terms of the ICRW” and declares the signatories’ “commitment to normalizing the functions of the IWC based on the terms of the ICRW.” The resolution states that the moratorium on commercial whaling was unnecessary as the IWC’s Scientific Committee identified many species as abundant. 47. Japan’s inability to change international regulations to restart commercial whaling is also exemplified in CITES. Although many CITES member states are sympathetic to Japan, they have not successfully institutionalized the pro-whaling cause. For example, CITES has repeatedly rejected Japan’s proposals to delist a few species of whales (e.g., minke whales) from Appendix I (most endangered species) to Appendix II (potentially endangered species subject to monitored or managed trade) of the convention. If accepted, these proposals would have allowed resumption of commercial trade of these species. In 2002, Japan proposed to delist minke whales and Bryde’s whales to Appendix II, but it failed to muster even a majority of the vote. (A two-thirds majority is required for such proposals to be approved.) The delegates voted 54–41 to reject Japan’s minke whales proposal and 63–43 against the Bryde’s whale proposal. CITES and the IWC usually work cooperatively and complimentarily. When the IWC moratorium entered into force in 1986, CITES agreed to include in Appendix I all the species of whales listed in the ICRW Schedule. CITES regulates whale products in international trade, while the ICRW provides for the conservation and management of whale stocks. Alistair Bell, “UN Body Blocks Japan Bid to Trade in Whale Meat,” Malaysian Nature Society E-Environment. November 27, 2002, http://www.mns.org.my/article.php?sid=301 (accessed December 1, 2003); United States Department of the Interior, “United States Hails Rejection of Proposals to Resume Commercial Whaling,” November 8, 2002, http://www.doi.gov/ news/021108a.htm (accessed December 1, 2003); CITES, “Conservation of Cetaceans, Trade in Cetacean Specimens and the Relationship with the International Whaling Commission,” Resolution Conference 11. 4, Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Kenya, April 10–20, 2000. 48. International Whaling Commission (IWC), “The Text of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946 and Its Protocol.” Japan was not alone in conducting whaling operations under the name of scientific research. Norway, South Korea, and Iceland also have carried out scientific whaling. William C. Burns, “The International Whaling Commission in the 1990s: Problems and Prospects,” in International Wildlife Law Occasional Paper Series, 6 (Madison, WI: The Pacific Center for International Studies, 1994).


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49. Masaaki Ishida, “Brief Outline of the Japanese Research Whaling Program in the Antarctic (JARPA),” 2002, http://luna.pos.to/ whale/gen_jarpa.html (accessed July 23, 2003); “Nihon, Chosa Hogei o Baizo [Japan Resuming Its Scientific Whaling Research Program],” Asahi Shimbun, June 21, 2005, 7. 50. International Whaling Commission (IWC), “Special Permit Catches since 1985,” 2006, http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/table_ permit.htm (accessed July 15, 2007). See also William Aron, William Burke, and Milton Freeman, “Scientists versus Whaling: Science, Advocacy, and Errors of Judgment,” Bioscience 52 (2002), 1137–1140. 51. IWC, “Final Press Release,” Annual Meeting, Adelaide, Australia, July, 2000, http://www.iwcoffice.org/PRESSRELEASE2000.htm (accessed July 28, 2003). 52. Robbins Barstow, “24 U.S. Senators Condemn Japan’s Renewed Whaling,” Whales Alive 9, 3 (2000), http://csiwhalesalive.org/ csi00302.html (accessed July 15, 2003). 53. Norman Mineta, “The Case Against Japan’s Whaling Program,” Japan Times Online, August 26, 2000, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/ cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20000826a2.htm (accessed July 22, 2003); “Mineta Recommends Clinton Penalize Japan over Whaling,” Japan Times Online, September 14, 2000, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/ cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20000914a1.htm (accessed July 22, 2003); The White House, the Government of the United States, “President Clinton Directs U.S. Actions in Response to Japanese Whaling,” September 13, 2000, http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/new/html/ Wed_Oct_4_115616_2000.html (accessed July 15, 2003). 54. “Japan Slams U.S. for Sanctions Threat over Whales,” CNN, September 5, 2000, http://www.cnn.com/2000/NATURE/09/05/ japan.whaling.ap/ (accessed July 15, 2003). 55. “IWC 2006: A Middle Way to Whaling,” Japan Times Online, May 22, 2002, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle. pl5?ed20020522a1.htm (accessed July 22, 2003). 56. Nihon Geirui Kenkyu-jo [The Institute of Cetacean Research (ICR)], 2003-nen Kita-Taiseiyo Geirui Hokaku Chosa [Research on the Harvest of the Japan Research Whaling Program in the North Pacific, 2003], May 13, 2003, http://www.icrwhale.org/02-A-24.htm, July 23, 2003. 57. After the completion of research, a few thousands tons of whale meat are sold annually. “Japan—the Politics of Whaling,” The Economist, September 9, 2000, 42. 58. S. J. Mayer, A Preliminary Review and Evaluation of Scientific Whaling from 1986 to 1996 (unpublished manuscript). http://www. equilibrioazul.org/documentos/whaling.pdf (accessed July 7, 2006). 59. It should be pointed out that Japan has not completely stopped STCW or commercial whaling. Small coastal whaling firms have been hunting whale species that are not subject to the IWC’s ban on

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60.

61. 62.

63.

64. 65.

66.

67. 68.

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commercial whaling (e.g., Baird’s beaked, pilot whales, Dall’s porpoises). However, these firms are given quotas and thus regulated by the government. Japan Whaling Association, “Questions and Answers,” http://www.whaling.jp/english/qa.html (accessed July 23, 2003). Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling; Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), “Japan’s Position on Small-Type Coastal Whaling and Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling,” media release, May 24, 2002. Friedheim, “Introduction,” 135. Prior to that vote, Japan had proposed a compromise to the United States and Russia to amend the aboriginal quota and also to allow Japan an STCW quota of twenty-five minke whales. However, the IWC voted the amendment down. See “IWC Meeting Ends in a Bitter Divide,” Japan Times Online, May 25, 2002, http://www. japa nt imes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geta r t icle.pl5?nn 20020525a3.ht m (accessed July 21, 2003). “Bow to Aboriginals Seen as ‘Sunny Day’ for Japan,” Japan Times Online, May 24, 2002, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ getarticle.pl5?np20020524a3.htm (accessed July 21, 2003). In October 2002, however, Japan changed its position and supported the renewal of the aboriginal whaling quotas for the Inuits and Chukotka for the next five years on condition that Japan’s scientific whaling data be considered at future IWC meetings. As a result, the IWC endorsed the renewal. It is speculated that Japan supported the proposal for the quota renewal because the United States switched its position and supported a Japanese resolution calling for an early decision on its request for the quota of 50 minke whales under the STCW scheme. “U.S. Denies Whaling Quid Pro Quo,” Japan Times Online, October 17, 2002, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ getarticle.pl5?nn20021017b4.htm (accessed July 28, 2003). Colin Nickerson, “In Japan, Saving Whales Means Losing A Lifestyle,” Boston Globe, June 21, 1991, 1. David, McNeill, “Kujira Saishu-Senso ga Hajimatta” [The Last Round of Whale War Has Begun], Newsweek Japan, May 30, 2007, 36–41. IWC 2007, “Conference for the Normalization of the International Whaling Commission, Chair’s Summary,” IWC/59/7, Agenda item 7, February 13–15, 2007, Tokyo. http://www.iwcoffice. org/_documents/commission/IWC59docs/59-7.pdf (accessed July 15, 2007). McNeill, “Kujira Saishu-Senso ga Hajimatta.” Milton M. R. Freeman, “Japanese Community-Based Whaling, International Protest, and the New Environmentalism,” in Japan at the Crossroads: Hot Issues for the 21st Century, edited by Kotaku Ishido and David Myers (Brisbane: Central Queensland University Press, 1998), 12–31.


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69. “Reaction to Lost Votes: Japan Threatens to Pull out of the IWC,” Japan Times Online, June 21, 2003, http: www.japantimes.co.jp/ cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030621a3.htm (accessed July 21, 2003). 70. Anny Wong, The Roots of Japan’s Environmental Policies (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001); Hirata, “Why Japan Supports Whaling,” endnote 18. 71. David McNeill, “Japan and the Whaling Ban: Siege Mentality Fuels ‘Sustainability’ Claims,” Japan Focus (February 13, 2007), http:// japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2353 (accessed July 18, 2007). 72. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Government of Japan, “The Position of the Japanese Government on Research Whaling,” http:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq6.html (accessed June 26, 2002). 73. Wong, The Roots of Japan’s Environmental Policies. 74. McNeill, “Japan and the Whaling Ban.” 75. Wong, The Roots of Japan’s Environmental Policies. 76. McNeill, “Japan and the Whaling Ban.” 77. “Japan—the Politics of Whaling,” The Economist, September 9, 2000, 42. 78. Japan Whaling Association. “What’s [sic] Japan Whaling Association?” http://www.whaling.jp/english/intro.html (accessed July 18, 2007). 79. These whaling-related societal organizations have hired many former FA/MAFF officials after they retired from the bureaucracy. See Sato, “Modeling Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy,” in Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific, edited by Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 80. Japan’s nonprofit sector is diverse. Some nonprofit organizations are pro-whaling and strongly support MAFF and the FA’s stance on whaling (e.g., Japan Whaling Association, Japan Small-Type Whaling Association, Institute of Cetacean Research). However, many of these groups are semigovernmental associations that are incorporated, receive government subsidies, and maintain close relations with government officials. They are not usually considered NGOs in Japan because of their lack of independence from the government. Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2002). 81. Hirata, Civil Society in Japan. 82. Sumi, “The ‘Whale War’ between Japan and the United States”; Zenjiro Doi, Saikin Hogei Hakusho [White Papers on Recent Whaling] (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1992); Seiji Osumi, Kujira to Nihonjin [Whales and the Japanese] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003). The terms kujira-bunka and geishoku-bunka are often used interchangeably. The former has a broader connotation, however, referring to a wide range of cultural practices using whales, such as whale eating, whale art (kujira geijutsu), and literature on whales. 83. Junichi Takahashi, Kujira no Nihon Bunkashi: Hogei Bunka no Kooro o Tadoru [The Japanese Cultural History of Whales: Tracing

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84. 85.

86. 87.

88. 89. 90.

91. 92.

93.

94. 95.

96. 97. 98. 99.

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the Path of Whaling Culture] (Kyoto: Tankosha, 1992); Osumi, Kujira to Nihonjin. Osumi, Kujira to Nihonjin. Kalland, “The Anti-Whaling Campaigns and Japanese Responses.” “Whaling in Japan: Local Flukes,” The Economist, July 14, 2007, 44. See also Ishii and Okubo, “An Alternative Explanation of Japan’s Whaling Diplomacy in the Post-Moratorium Era,” Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 10 (2007): 55–87. Takahashi, Kujira no Nihon Bunkashi. This Japanese view is reflected in the Japanese writing system. The kanji character for kujira (whale) includes a radical that means fish (uo-hen). Osumi, Kujira to Nihonjin. Sumi, “ ‘The Whale War’ between Japan and the United States.” Milton M. R. Freeman and Stephen R. Kellert, Public Attitudes to Whales: Results of a Six-Country Survey (Alberta, Canada: Canadian Circumpolar Institute, 1992). Wong, The Roots of Japan’s Environmental Policies. Ishii and Okubo highlight an interesting case in which a positive statement made by the director of the EA on the aforementioned 1972 Stockholm proposal (that called for a whaling moratorium) was rebuffed by FA and MOFA officials who argued that the director’s view was only personal. Ishii and Okubo, “An Alternative Explanation of Japan’s Whaling Diplomacy in the Post-Moratorium Era.” Komatsu, Kujira wa Tabete ii!; Masayuki Komatsu, Kujira to Nihonjin [Whales and the Japanese] (Tokyo: Seishun Shuppansha, 2002); Morishita, Naze Kujira wa Zashoo Suru no ka; Masayuki Komatsu, Kujira: Sono Rekishi to Kagaku [Whales: The History and Science] (Tokyo: Goma Shobo, 2003); Masayuki Komatsu, Kujira: Sono Rekishi to Bunka [Whales: The History and Culture] (Tokyo: Goma Shobo, 2003). Stedman, “The International Whaling Commission and Negotiation for a Global Moratorium on Whaling,” 157–158. Komatsu, Kujira wa Tabete Ii!; Anthony Browne, “You Eat Cows and Pigs, So Why Can’t We Eat Whales?” The Observer, June 24, 2001, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/focus/story/0,6903,511787,00.html (accessed December 1, 2003); Mick Corliss, “Where Kujira Cuisine is a Matter of Course,” The Japan Times Online, May 19, 2002, http:// www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?.fe20020519a4htm (accessed July 15, 2002). Quoted in McNeill, “Japan and the Whaling Ban.” McNeill, “Kujira saishu-senso ga hajimatta.” Morishita, Naze Kujira wa Zashoo Suru no ka. Isao, Miyaoka. Legitimacy in International Society: Japan’s Reaction to Global Wildlife Preservation (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2003).


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100. Sato, “Modeling Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy.” 101. In 1998, for example, Australia and New Zealand protested against Japan’s unilateral experimental fishing for southern bluefin tuna by invoking formal dispute settlement procedures under the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (known as the SBT Convention), an accord established in 1993 by the three states to manage depleting stock. Despite their protest, Japan continued its experimental fishing program. Australia and New Zealand then brought the case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), alleging that by undertaking experimental fishing Japan had failed to comply with its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in relation to the conservation and management of the southern bluefin tuna stock. ITLOS ordered that Japan refrain from conducting experimental fishing except with the agreement of these states. When Japan submitted its objection to ITLOS in 2000, an Arbitral Tribunal (pursuant to the UNCLOS) was convened to hear the case. The Tribunal then decided that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of the dispute and revoked ITLOS’s decision. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Dispute between New Zealand and Japan Concerning Southern Bluefin Tuna,” http:// www.mft.govt.nz/support/legal/disputes/disputeontuna.html (accessed December 1, 2003). See also Yoichiro Sato, “The Southern Blue Tuna Regime: Rebuilding Co-operation,” New Zealand international Review 26, 4 (2001): 9–13; Yoichiro Sato, “Fishy Business: A Political-economic Analysis of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute,” Asia Affairs: An American Review 28, 4 (2002): 217–237. 102. Mick Corliss, “Arguments of Whalers, Opponents Both Have Merit, Writer Believes,” Japan Times Online, May 18, 2002, http://www. japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20020518b2.htm (accessed July 15, 2002); “Shoogyoo-hotei Teishi 14-nen, Kujira Banare Susumu” [14 Years since the Halt of Commercial Whaling, People Detached from (Eating) Whales], The Kyushu Yomiuri Shimbun, May 17, 2002, http://kyushu.yomiuri.co.jp/spe-2/ kujira/news/news0517a.htm (accessed June 26, 2002).


Chapter 10

The Kyoto Protocol from Formulation to Ratification: Japan’s Role in International Climate Negotiations Eric Shibuya

Japan’s position in the climate change negotiations has been a

balancing act between international recognition and domestic approval. The global environment has generally proven to be a valuable issue for the Japanese government to play an international role while avoiding much domestic controversy. The government’s failure to expand the interest on climate change domestically, however, has meant that the government is not able to rely on strong and consistent popular support to counter other vested interests (not the least of which is factionalism within the government itself). The explicit and implicit motivations behind the Japanese government’s policy on climate change are examined in the larger picture of Japan’s perception of itself as a major actor in the international arena. The motivations for Japan’s actions in international climate negotiations are found more in the political benefit achieved by those actions rather than any specific commitment to the cause of mitigating greenhouse emissions. In 1997, Japan hosted the Third Conference of Parties (COP3) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). COP3 was tasked with giving teeth to the UNFCCC by formulating a binding agreement that set definite emission reduction targets for greenhouse gases (GHGs) by developed nations. While many hailed the document that resulted, the Kyoto Protocol, as a major step toward the mitigation of GHGs, others criticized it for being the product of an eleventh-hour compromise, a paper success

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that would have no real impact on the problem. Despite the signature by U.S. President Bill Clinton, the Protocol was never sent to the Senate for ratification. (It is highly unlikely that the Protocol would have been ratified.) The position of the critics was significantly bolstered in 2001 when the new Bush Administration announced that it would abandon the Protocol, arguing that ratification and implementation would be severely detrimental to the United States’ economy. In the wake of that declaration, the Japanese government worked parallel diplomatic tracks to bring the Kyoto Protocol into force, while at the same time working to return the United States under the UNFCCC rubric. This chapter investigates the factors that explain Japan’s policies regarding climate change generally and the Kyoto Protocol in particular. It examines how environmental concerns have been framed and articulated in Japan and what domestic and international norms led to the positions taken by the Japanese government. There should be a clear understanding that not only norms in the moral sense but also interests (electoral and financial, among others) can drive policy, and that these two concepts (norms and interests) can reinforce each other or be in conflict. In the case at hand, the Japanese government had to balance its sense of the nation as a major international power with its domestic norm of pacifism/military isolationism. This chapter will describe how the issue of greenhouse gas mitigation would be the vehicle for Japanese officials to satisfy both these concerns. On Culture and Norms It is no longer a matter of dispute that culture and norms have an impact on formulating foreign policy, and in international relations more generally. More valuable research questions focus around how cultural factors are inserted into world politics. An effective analysis should not suggest a reductionist explanation of foreign policy that, as Curtis says, “so devalues the concept [of culture] that it stands for nothing more than whatever surfaces as the dominant pattern of social interaction at any particular point in time.”1 The work of Peter Katzenstein has significantly advanced the understanding of the role norms play in international politics. “Norms” are understood as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.”2 An interesting heuristic is Katzenstein’s distinction between constitutive and regulatory norms.3 Constitutive norms influence how a group comes to understand itself (as a group), while regulatory norms form the basis for prescribing (or

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evaluating) the behavior of an already accepted identity group. Some regulatory norms are so powerful and so widely accepted as to virtually bar action to the contrary (for example, the universal condemnation of slavery). Others are not that powerful, but have enough weight that they can serve as a basis for criticism (criticism that is viewed internationally as having some legitimacy) when a state acts contrary to it. In the discussions from the late 1980s leading to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), a constitutive norm on climate change was developing, as a group of states began to craft a group identity as “the climate change regime.”4 This regime focused on the idea of climate change mitigation, though it was not able at that point to regulate behavior (or even, arguably, describe what the “proper” behavior of a member of the regime should be). This condition extended even up to the formulation of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Although the international uproar at the U.S. abrogation of the Protocol suggests that a weak regulatory norm (those states that are part of the climate change regime “should” be part of the Protocol, or at least some similar mechanism) on GHG mitigation may be forming, it is clearly still too weak to induce compliance. Arguably, one of the reasons a strong regulatory norm has not manifested is that even countries that support the Protocol have not fully internalized the norm of GHG mitigation but have chosen to support the Protocol for other reasons (normative or otherwise). While culture certainly matters in international politics, the other extreme should not be taken in assuming that international norms always matter. Culture and norms do not always have an impact in the same way in every context. How the government views the international society from which the norms come, as well as forces in the domestic arena, has to be considered.5 Although not specifically focused on norms, there is some value here in Robert Putnam’s famous articulation of foreign policy formulation as a two-level game. On one side of the game, governments formulate an agreement (Level 1) that then has to be approved by their domestic constituents (Level 2).6 The second form of the two-level game is more pluralist in nature, where ideas rise up from the grassroots and are then taken up by the elites. The argument made here is that the pluralistic form of the game has little explanatory value over the more elite-driven model in the case of Japan and climate change. Whatever the direction of the interaction (top-down or bottom-up), it would be naïve to assume that these levels are really considered separately and distinctly from each other. Diplomats and other

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policymakers are certainly sensitive about having to “sell” international agreements back home, which conditions their negotiation and the final agreement (and the success thereof). Second, the articulation of a proposal (how something is stated and framed) can often be more important than what is being said, especially when considering which audience the speaker is primarily concerned with. Attempts to answer how and why environmental movements arise and gain political salience have produced a wealth of academic literature. Rather than simply focus on cost–benefit types of analysis, environmental movements stress the point that mass-based movements are not driven solely by material gain. Most prominently, Ron Inglehart argues that the development of “post-materialist” values is a significant factor in the development of environmental movements. Simply put, once a certain level of economic development has been reached, the concerns of the populace will shift from profit and economic growth to other issues usually considered as “quality of life” questions.7 While Inglehart’s analysis seems to explain much of Japan’s behavior in the post-World War II period, relying on this cultural shift alone as a source of Japan’s environmental policy is as simplistic as focusing on more material interests, and Inglehart’s analysis does not seem to explain much of Japan’s international behavior regarding climate change. Indeed, as post-materialist values are about lifestyle changes, they may manifest more powerfully in domestic issues rather than international ones. Environmental movements may be more focused on domestic issues (at least primarily) even in post-materialist societies. While norms and values have power, pragmatic issues of electoral concerns have served, at the very least, as intervening variables in the construction of environmental policy in Japan. Although it is mostly focused on more material values, Putnam’s two-level game can easily incorporate nonmaterial issues such as norms. The framing of international environmental policy in general, and climate change specifically, are a clear illustration of this point.8 The international politics of the environment have long been a fruitful area for analysis of the impact of norms on policymaking. Environmental concerns, particularly issues of preservation and conservation, are often juxtaposed against economic motivations. Arguments for the preservations of “natural areas,” nonhuman species, or simply areas of aesthetic value are usually placed in opposition to questions of employment and economic development. The environmental “lobby,” for lack of a better term, can often be hard pressed to gain a foothold in the political arena against (usually entrenched) economic interests.


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Environmental Degradation by Example: Japan’s Early Environmental Policy Helmut Weidner identifies three phases to Japan’s reaction to environmental problems: 1. Ecological Ignorance 2. Symbolic Policy 3. Technocratic Policy 9 Japan’s economic policies in the post-World War II period exemplify the first stage. In the aftermath of World War II, the overriding focus of the Japanese government was the rebuilding of the Japanese state. In particular, restoration of the economic sector was the main driver behind Japan’s governmental policies, and little consideration was made for ecological concerns, including that of basic human health. Through the 1950s and 1960s, there is little argument that Japan achieved its economic goal, but this came at a significant cost to the environment. By the late 1960s it could be argued that Japan was literally the most polluted nation on earth.10 However, owing to the economic benefits that were beginning to manifest themselves, such a situation did not continue for long. Indeed, no other country exhibited the drastic shift in concern and rapidity of action on environmental issues as Japan did.11 By the late 1960s, the impact of Japan’s reindustrialization was being felt. These impacts were in the realms of economic growth and environmental degradation. Perhaps most important for the government, citizens began to feel the effects, enjoying the benefits of economic growth but also experiencing environmental decay. In response to this emerging post-materialism, the government responded by passing the 1967 Basic Environmental Protection Law. But although the legislation was strongly worded, it was weakly enforced.12 Most problematic in terms of implementation was a stipulation that “the protection of the living environment be pursued in ‘harmony’ with sound economic development.”13 Industrial lobbies were thus able to keep economic considerations as the primary focus of government policies. However, this phase of “symbolic policy” would fall away quickly. In 1967, the same year the Basic Environmental Protection Law was passed, the famed “pollution cases” (Niigata Minamata disease, Itai-itai disease, Yokkaichi asthma, and Kumamoto-Minamata disease)14 brought the environmental issue into sharp focus. These instances of “pollution disease” gained enormous public visibility. It

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was clear that the existing legislation was not sufficient to protect the environment. Grassroots movements increased, and even local governmental leaders urged the national government to take action.15 Such a highly charged political atmosphere could not be ignored and spurred government action. The so-called Pollution Diet of 1970 passed fourteen laws to regulate pollution, including “the first law in any nation to designate as a crime an act of pollution that damaged human health.”16 As a percentage of its total investment, by 1975 Japan spent more on pollution control than any other developed nation.17 Japan’s government worked with industries to set up goals for environmental cleanup and protection. The main focus was on clean air and toxic substances, due to their visibility and substantial harm, respectively.18 Subsequently, Japan accomplished a lot in alleviating much of the environmental degradation that its earlier policies had caused. For example, Japan did a remarkable job in reducing the amount of sulfur oxides (SOX) and nitrogen oxides (NOX) in the air. By 1990, Japan employed five times more “scrubbers” than any other industrial nation.19 It would be a mistake to draw a direct line from Japan’s experience with the pollution cases to its position on climate change. Japan’s primary environmental concern over the past three decades has been domestic in focus. The core interest of Japan’s environmental protection policies has been to alleviate the effects of pollution on its citizens. Domestic environmental movements, in comparison to those in the West, have been more concentrated on local issues and remain relatively weak on the national scale.20 Local concerns and local environmental movements are by definition closer to the populace and have found greater avenues to be heard. The negative publicity of the court cases pushed local governments to demand action at the national level. However, this local-to-national connection is much stronger, obviously, for issues such as recycling and organic farming than for international issues such as climate change. Despite Japan’s strong record in domestic environmental policies since the 1970s, less emphasis has been placed on regional or international environmental problems, and some of these problems have been exacerbated by Japan’s policies. A clear example of this has been the timber industry.21 Japan has until recently put more emphasis on securing access to resources and continuing economic development; environmental factors have not been of major concern. While a norm of environmental stewardship has some resonance for domestic issues in Japan, this norm has not fully manifested itself in Japan’s foreign policy. This is


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due to the fact that Japan’s international environmental policy is connected less to norms of environmental protection and have more to do with Japan’s sense of itself as a major power with international obligations. How these obligations manifest in international environmental issues is the subject of the next section. Environmental Leadership by Necessity: Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War Order There are three major venues of power: military, economic, and diplomatic. In exercising international leadership, Japan is clearly constrained in exercising leadership in the military domain. However, an environmental issue such as climate change falls primarily into the “diplomatic” domain and is a matter in which Japanese diplomats saw potential for Japan’s leadership. International pressure (gaiatsu), especially from the United States, plays a very important role in shaping Japan’s foreign policy,22 while the most significant domestic limitation Japan faces in playing an international role is clearly the constitutional limits placed upon its military. Since Japan cannot play a major international role militarily, it must find another arena to contribute. Clearly, elements of the government viewed environmental issues as such an avenue. Gurowitz notes in her discussion of norms and Japan’s policies toward immigration that, while Japan is often viewed as relatively closed off from international society, “an important part of the history of the Japanese state has been extreme sensitivity to what peers in other states think about Japan.”23 Evidence suggests that even on other environmental issues of lesser technical complexity than climate change, Japan has proven hesitant to act, doing so only with other considerations in mind (a behavior that Blaker terms “coping”24). For example, the increasing concern over ozone depletion was viewed with skepticism and resistance in Japan, and the subsequent actions in the elimination of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone depleting substances came about very slowly. Miranda Schreurs quotes members of the Japanese Environmental Agency who argue that the December 1980 decision by Japan to freeze production of some CFCs was taken “not because it decided that regulations of CFCs were necessary to protect the ozone layer, but rather in consideration of [Japan’s] relations with international society.”25 To the extent that Japan signs onto international environmental agreements due to gaiatsu, policies will be incremental and implementation will be unenthusiastic.

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The Kyoto Protocol, however, was supposed to be different. It was not a product of gaiatsu, but rather was “Japan’s” Protocol, and Japan had put a significant amount of its prestige on its ratification. But while there may have been general agreement among Japanese officials on the preference for a leadership role on the global warming policy, there were significant differences as to what would comprise such a policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Environmental Agency, EA) favored a meaningful agreement on climate change, while the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was resistant to any agreement that they viewed as detrimental to Japan’s economy. From the opposing views of these factions, the government leadership (looking for both international and domestic approval) needed to craft a policy. Japan’s Role in the Climate Negotiations: Rio to Pre-Kyoto Japan’s international role from the late 1980s was an unusual one. While it was still riding at the crest of its enormous economy, its lack of an international military presence during the first Gulf War drew sharp criticism, particularly from the United States. Subsequent decisions to send Japanese police officers in late 1991, and the Ground Self-Defense Forces two years later, to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia engendered tremendous controversy within Japan. But while there was strong domestic resistance to Japan’s international military contributions, there was also a feeling that Japan had international obligations as a “great power.”26 Japan’s international obligations were not contested, but the dilemma was rather about what form those obligations would and could be met that would satisfy both domestic and international audiences. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa targeted UNCED, the so-called “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, as the forum for Japan to do more on the international front. The global environment would be an effective issue toward which the Japanese government could contribute, and this topic would certainly be easier to handle politically back home than questions of international military deployments. Former Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita noted, “Whereas Japan’s participation in the UN peacekeeping operations stirs up political controversy, the protection of the global environment is an issue area to which Japan can contribute without hesitation.”27 This is an interesting construction of the motivation behind Japan’s international environmental policy. The issue at stake is not an evaluation of


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whether protecting the global environment in itself is a moral (or political) “good,” but that Japan’s actions in this sector of the international arena is less problematic on the domestic front as it does not spur the same kind of controversy as military action. The norm being valued here is not environmental protection but international leadership. Also, there is a calculation that this area of international leadership will be less problematic to sell to the domestic audience. The initial stages of the Earth Summit saw Japan stand out particularly well. Not only did Japan send the largest delegation but also, and more importantly, financed the conference, at the request of UNCED Secretary-General Maurice Strong.28 However, finances and delegation strength aside, Japan displayed little leadership regarding the substance of the conference. Domestic issues continued to make matters even more problematic, as UNCED took place during the Diet debate over Japan’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. (Ironically, this prevented Prime Minister Miyazawa himself from attending the Earth Summit.) Other issues overshadowed the events at Rio, and there was little sustained domestic debate on Japan’s role in the international environmental arena. A 1993 Gallup-affiliated survey placed Japan at the bottom among industrialized countries in percentage of respondents willing to pay higher prices in exchange for protecting the environment.29 Matsumura notes that the environment as an issue area was maintained through many subsequent administrations (even non-LDP governments or coalitions), though the motivations for pushing the environment issues may have been different. He notes especially about the coalition government of the LDP and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) that came to power in June 1994. Matsumura argues that since the SDP had “denied the existence of the Self Defence Forces (SDF) before entering the coalition government . . . it had to search for an attractive international contribution as a substitute for the rather militaristic peacekeeping operation.”30 The signing of the UNFCCC was hailed as the beginning of a real international effort to mitigate the consequences of anthropogenic climate change. But the Convention’s call for voluntary cuts in GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the developed nations was completely ignored. Upon the Convention’s entry into force, the first Conference of Parties (COP1) met in 1995 in Berlin to negotiate ways to actually achieve GHG mitigation. The United States proved to be the major obstacle, unwilling to negotiate different reduction targets for developed nations or specific timetables for countries to meet these commitments. With the clear recognition that there would be no

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substantive agreement at Berlin, the decision was made to target the third Conference of Parties in 1997 as the meeting to produce a binding agreement with definite reduction targets and timetables. Japan put its international reputation on the line and offered to host COP3. Japan was taking a risk with this announcement, as there had been no real discussions in Japan about the consequences of climate change and the costs of mitigation or adaptation policies. There was simply no strong popular concern on the climate change issue, making it vulnerable to shifts in the political and economic condition.31 Japan’s Role in the Climate Negotiations: Kyoto Despite the bold declaration inherent in its offer to host COP3, no significant discussions of greenhouse reduction targets or methods to achieve those reductions took place in Japan until just a few months prior to the meeting. Though the government had pushed Japan into a leadership role on climate change, there was little work done in Japan to examine what the stakes really were. Rather than specific technical analysis, the public discussion that existed in Japan over climate change was general in nature. Japan’s GHG reduction plan in fact was not developed until three months prior to Kyoto.32 The goal for the Japanese government was a successful conference. At the most basic level, this meant a conference that produced an international agreement. However, Japan had to consider the damage that an agreement that was viewed as having no real “teeth” would do to its international prestige, while it could also not have an agreement that called for massive greenhouse reductions, which would inevitably fail. Unlike previous negotiations such as those in Berlin, where it took a much harder line against the United States, Japan entered COP3 with the clear idea of crafting an agreement that would meet with U.S. approval. It was understood at Kyoto that an agreement without the main emitter of GHGs on board would be a failure.33 Japan would not and could not simply acquiesce completely to U.S. demands, however. Among the more contentious issues expected at Kyoto was the question of “differentiation”—different targets and reductions levels for different countries. The idea of differentiation was in line with the UNFCCC’s understanding of “common but differentiated responsibilities” that were said to fall on developed and developing states in the mitigation of climate change. The United States at previous sessions had opposed differentiated targets for individual developed nations, arguing instead for a uniform reduction target. However, the


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uniform target proposal was severely opposed by the European Community and Japan. Japan had a long-standing domestic program to mitigate air pollution and had already made some of the hard choices on energy efficiency policies. Many EU countries had already instituted consumption taxes on energy, pushing for greater energy efficiency and responsibility. A uniform reduction target for developed countries would penalize Japan and the EU that had already taken steps toward energy efficiency and sustainable consumption, while countries that had not done so (notably the United States) would presumably have a relatively easier time achieving the uniform target.34 This obstacle was overcome when the United States announced early during COP3 that it was withdrawing its objection to differentiated targets. The pressure Japan and the EU placed on the United States during COP3 to obtain a meaningful, but realistic, agreement was significant. The United States came to Kyoto with the most conservative opening proposal—a promise to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by 2012 (not 2005 as most other proposals set as the target date). The United States then offered a “compromise” proposal of a 2 percent reduction. That target was universally derided, and the United States followed with a proposal for a 6 percent reduction, eventually concluding Kyoto with a promise of a 6 percent reduction by 2012. The Protocol would enter into force with fifty-five ratifications by states that accounted for 55 percent of the developed nations (referred to as the Annex B nations) total GHG emissions in 1990.35 Since U.S. GHG emissions in 1990 accounted for 33.7 percent of the developed world’s total, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was possible without U.S. support, but it was clear that ratification would be much easier to achieve with U.S. approval, both in terms of its GHG contribution and its leadership position in world affairs. The most significant piece in the Protocol, beyond the commitments made, was how those commitments would be met. The Protocol does not set a single target year, but expects the Annex B nations to meet their commitments by the period 2008–2012, thereby giving nations more flexibility in implementing policies. The Protocol opens the possibility of establishing an emission permit trading program between Annex B nations, as well as a “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM) program. The CDM would allow collaboration between Annex B and Non-Annex B (developing) nations to curb GHG emissions in the latter, with a portion of that reduction to count toward the Annex B nation’s commitment.36 In October 2002, Japan announced it would renovate inefficient power plants in Kazakhstan. The expected

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reduction in GHG emissions would credit Japan with some 62,000 tons per annum toward its Kyoto Protocol commitment.37 Japan’s Role in the Climate Negotiations: Post-Kyoto Japan’s position in the climate change negotiations has been a delicate one, especially after the formulation of the Kyoto Protocol. A phenomenon not unique to Japan is a failure in the popular discussion of emission reductions under Kyoto to note that the targets are percentage reductions from 1990 levels rather than current emission levels. Japan’s Kyoto target is 6 percent, but Japan’s own GHG inventory for 2004 places its emissions at 12 percent above the 1990 level, necessitating an 18 percent cut from current levels to meet the Kyoto commitment.38 The problem of the economic consequences of GHG mitigation and reduction is especially acute in Japan due to the fact that about 90 percent of Japan’s total GHG emissions come from carbon dioxide.39 Carbon dioxide emissions are the unavoidable byproduct of fossil fuel consumption, both through industrial and residential use as well as use of motor transport. Since most of Japan’s GHG emissions come from CO2, its climate policy has to consider industrial and trade issues with even more care than done by the United States. This is even more significant due to the fact that Japan, as mentioned earlier, had already instituted a strong program of energy efficiency prior to the 1990s. Unlike the United States, for instance, much of the “fat” has already been trimmed from Japan’s energy use. How then, did Japan intend to meet its Kyoto target? The plan was for achieving some of its GHG reductions by the increased use of nuclear power, but the Tokaimura radiation accident in September 1999 had crippled domestic support for nuclear energy.40 The ambitious plan of twenty new nuclear power plants being built in the next decade now seems highly unlikely.41 The other option for Japan to meet its commitment is the institution of an emissions permit trading program and a rather expanded counting of carbon “sinks.” PostKyoto negotiations focused on how much the absorption of CO2 by forests should be counted toward a country’s reduction target. The current agreement would limit sinks to account for no more than half the total commitment of a country. The EU contingent wanted a very restricted measurement, arguing that carbon sinks were only temporary measures and that a generous measurement would give countries credit for doing nothing. Countries such as Canada and Japan,42


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however, were fighting for a more liberal counting of sinks. Japan asked for its sinks to count toward 3.7 percent of its total 6 percent commitment. The disagreement over carbon sinks in fact was a major obstacle within the negotiations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. While both Japan and Canada received fairly generous accounting of their sinks, the big winner by far in the sinks category was the Russian Federation, which will be discussed later. Perhaps even more problematic is the viability of an emission trading scheme (ETS). Although the proposal is understandable in theory (countries that are expected to exceed their emissions cap will buy “permits” from countries that will not exceed their emissions) and has policy parallels (the domestic permit system for sulfur dioxide in the United States, for example), the practical reality is that the system as currently envisioned is quite problematic. The desire to finalize an agreement in Kyoto led to most of the tough decisions being deferred to future meetings. The mechanics of the ETS is one of these deferred decisions.43 Given the stated commitments for reductions listed in the Protocol, it is highly unlikely that most countries will achieve their targets strictly through the implementation of domestic measures. The ETS is clearly necessary for the Protocol to succeed. However, the need for political compromises in setting emissions baselines has meant that countries such as Russia and Ukraine stand to earn a significant windfall. Since they were able to set 1990 as their base year for emissions, prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the subsequent economic downturn after the disintegration of the USSR has meant that the emissions “baseline” for Russia and Ukraine is artificially high, essentially giving them “free” tradable emission permits (referred to as “hot air” by many pundits). Transfer of funds to these countries (who have in essence done nothing) is not taken kindly by many other governments. The U.S. abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol threw the burgeoning international regime into chaos. This declaration was a significant blow to Japan’s prestige, as the Protocol named for its ancient capital was now in serious jeopardy. COP6 was suspended as the other countries tried to get the United States back on board. A resumed session (referred to as “COP6½”) was held, with Japan and the EU taking harder lines in public, while Japan still worked in the background to get the United States to resume negotiations. Environment Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi noted, “The United States’ participation in the Protocol is an issue that does not pertain to the U.S. alone, but has great influence on developing countries as well. . . . We hope to continue talks with the EU and also work on having the U.S. take

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part.”44 While the Protocol entered into force without U.S. support, the Japanese government had to balance the now more vocal traditional business lobbies with its relationships with the United States. (Though most Japanese businesses criticized the Protocol, some sectors—particularly those in energy efficiency and alternative technologies—have recognized that ratification will benefit them.) By the end of the resumed COP6, Japan and the EU had attempted to encircle the United States, siding with Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and bring it into force. The real opportunity to ratify Kyoto finally came with COP7 in Marrakech, but not without even more compromise. While Japan and Canada received a fairly generous accounting of their sinks, the Russian Federation literally hit the financial jackpot by practically doubling its accounting of sinks from 17 to 33 megatons annually. Without the presence of the United States, ratification by Russia was essential, and the Russian government certainly recognized this. By expanding the amount of GHG reduction to be counted by their sinks, Russia opened even more of its “hot air” available for eventual emissions trading and the consequent financial windfall it could avail. (As a potential side benefit, the liberal definition of sinks makes it easier for the United States to contemplate eventually reentering the regime under the Protocol.) Ratification of the Protocol was a hard sell in Japan, as business interests now evaluated the costs involved more seriously.45 Former lawmakers have called the Protocol “an unfair treaty written by people with no understanding of industry.”46 Nevertheless, the Protocol was ratified by Japan in June 2002.47 Although Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Bush discussed climate change and the Protocol when they met in 2002, the U.S. position was not swayed. Of course, notable events such as the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent “War on Terror” had taken away much of the short-term attention from climate change. While Japan hopes to bring the United States on board the Kyoto regime eventually, it has been careful not to push the issue at this point. Publicly, Koizumi has praised the U.S. alternative policy to the Kyoto Protocol.48 Conclusion Japan’s foreign policy is clearly a two-level game, balancing on the twin pillars of international prestige and domestic support (or lack thereof). When these forces generally coincided in the direction of encouraging change (as they did in the formulation of the Kyoto Protocol), Japan’s choices became relatively easy. However, when the


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forces run counter to each other (as is seen in the domestic resistance to the Protocol’s ratification due to perceived economic hardship conflicting with the international achievement of the Protocol’s ratification), then the Japanese government negotiates its position by weighing the relative value of international and domestic motivations and by employing normative arguments to justify its policy actions. In reconciling the very different interests and concerns of MOFA, EA, and MITI, the government leadership had to craft an internationally meaningful climate change agreement that would gain the support of interest groups back home as well. The norms that played roles within that discussion were constitutive in nature—what was the government’s (and Japanese society’s) sense of itself. The government was looking to make an international contribution as befits a major power while also dealing with domestic tensions regarding certain international activities. And while the Japanese citizenry see an obligation for making an international contribution, the strong domestic norm of pacifism bars this contribution from being significantly military in nature. The political elite chose the international environment as the arena to make a contribution, which was less as a concern for the global environment and more on the motivation that Japan’s economic power brings with it an obligation to play a role internationally: The fundamental issue has been: can Japan contribute to the enhancement and maintenance of international public goods . . . through the existing foreign policy framework, while furthering the well-being and prosperity of the Japanese? . . . One option is to pursue a foreign policy involving military activity that would eventually require major political rearrangements including amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution. The other is to further pursue foreign policies not involving military activity. . . . Japan’s environmental foreign policy represents one aspect of the latter option. Thus, the basic domestic political framework and the quest for international contribution through nonmilitary means . . . generated the rationale for the government to take initiatives in environmental diplomacy.49

While some of the environmental policy shift in Japan in the late 1960s could be ascribed to emerging cultural shifts along the lines of Inglehart (catalyzed by significant court cases and domestic protests), these values have not strongly manifested themselves in Japan’s international contribution, because Japan’s international environmental focus is not the environment as such but international prestige. Japan’s

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role in the international global climate change negotiations was not based on domestic concerns about the global environment coming from a rising grassroots movement. Rather, the elite picking of the environmental issue coincided with a domestic public opinion that was generally supportive of Japan’s nonmilitary international activism. In a sense, any issue that would enable Japan to bring its technical and financial resources to the fore (rather than its armed forces) would have been more acceptable domestically. By the 1980s, the diplomatic pressure for Japan to play a larger role in international affairs was even stronger. The environment proved to be an area in which Japan had the financial capital and technical expertise to influence international issues. However, while in a larger sense the norm of international prestige has shaped Japan’s national interests and subsequent policy, the somewhat tactical calculation on the part of successive Japanese governments that the global environment would be an effective issue area for gaining international prestige while avoiding domestic controversy has resulted in the situation that there remains little public awareness of global environmental issues. Mason notes that although approximately 4500 environmental groups exist in Japan, only about 9.5 percent claim to be active nationally, and the most visible actions (such as recycling, antipollution campaigns, organic foods, and cooperatives) focus on “discrete local issues rather than broader programs and policy contexts.”50 A nationwide poll of adults sponsored by the Prime Minister’s Office taken in late 1998 and released in April 1999 showed an even split between those who were well aware and somewhat aware of the Kyoto Protocol and those who were not well aware or not aware at all.51 An earlier poll by Asahi Shimbun shows another nearly even division on the question of accepting a less comfortable life in order to prevent global environmental degradation. While 50 percent of those surveyed said they could accept this, 44 percent said they could not.52 Because there has been no sustained debate on climate change in Japan, there is no significant domestic constituency to maintain the political salience of the issue (though this constituency is beginning to emerge). The global environment was a valuable issue for the Japanese government to play an international role without much domestic controversy, but the failure to expand the interest on climate change within Japan has meant that the government is not able to rely on popular support against other vested interests and must use other methods of framing the debate to achieve its goals. While the government leadership saw the environment as the issue to gain or shore up popular support, this did not mean that there was a coherent sense of what Japan should do.


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In other words, although there was a constitutive norm on climate change (“the Japanese Government and People Care about Climate Change”), it was not strong enough to become a regulatory norm in Japan and bring about specific actions. Rather, the approach taken by Japan has been very pragmatic rather than norm-based. Japan effectively protected itself by achieving a critical concession in the Marrakech negotiations that there would be no sanctions against any country failing to meet its commitments.53 The absence of deep-rooted domestic support for global environmental issues meant that Japan’s push for the Protocol’s ratification was somewhat halfhearted. Ratification was, in many ways, the easy step. Now choices need to be made on ways to implement the Protocol. Japan’s ratification of the Protocol may be a sign that the norm of GHG mitigation has become internalized within Japan, but until a serious discussion regarding the stakes in the climate debate occurs, political support for the Kyoto Protocol within Japan will remain ephemeral.

Notes All opinions expressed here are those of the author alone, and do not reflect official positions and policies of the Marine Corps University, U.S. Department of Defense, or the United States Government. The author thanks Keiko Hirata and Yoichiro Sato for editorial comments, and Dianna Hummel for research assistance. Any errors of fact or interpretation are the author’s alone. 1. Gerald L. Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 11. 2. Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5. 3. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, 5. The distinction is not absolute, as some norms both constitute identity and regulate behavior. 4. See Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard, eds., Negotiating Climate Change: The inside Story of the Rio Convention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 5. Amy Gurowitz, “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State,” World Politics 51, 3 (1999): 413–445. 6. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, 3 (1988): 427–460.

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7. See especially Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 8. See David Dery, Problem Definition in Policy Analysis (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); and David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, “Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy Choice,” Policy Studies Journal 21, 1 (1993): 56–71. For a discussion on the social construction of knowledge regarding climate change, see Sheila Jasanoff, “Science and Norms in Global Environmental Regimes,” in Earthly Goods: Environmental Change and Social Justice, edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Judith Reppy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 9. Helmut Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective: Lessons for a Preventive Approach,” in Environmental Policy in Japan, edited by Shigeto Tsuru and Helmut Weidner (Berlin: Sigma Bohn, 1989). 10. Margaret A. McKean, Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 17. 11. David Vogel, “Environmental Policy in Europe and Japan,” in Environmental Policy in the 1990s, edited by Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1990), 261. 12. Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective,” 484. 13. Ibid., 484–485. 14. Jun Ui, “Anti-Pollution Movements and Other Grass-Roots Organizations,” in Environmental Policy in Japan, edited by Shigeto Tsuru and Helmut Weidner (Berlin: Sigma Bohn, 1989), 113. Incidentally, McKean, Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan, 20, notes that the plaintiffs won each of the pollution cases with judgments handed down between 1971 and 1973. 15. Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective,” 485–486. 16. McKean, Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan, 21. 17. Vogel, “Environmental Policy in Europe and Japan,” 262. 18. Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective,” 488. 19. Vogel, “Environmental Policy in Europe and Japan,” 266. Scrubbers are devices that remove SOX and NOX from smokestacks. 20. A small aside may be of interest here. There is a large segment of the literature that has noted the existence of a “victim” ethos in Japan. This has manifested itself most notably in the nuclear issue (Hiroshima and Nagasaki obviously, but also exposure to U.S. nuclear tests in the Pacific in the 1950s, particularly the “Bravo” test in March 1954, which spread radioactive fallout over the Japanese fishing boat Fukuryu Maru). Whether this ethos extends into how environmental issues are constructed more widely in Japan would be an interesting avenue for further research but is beyond the scope of this chapter.


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21. See especially Peter Dauvergne, Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). To emphasize the point of Japan’s preoccupation with domestic environmental concerns over international ones, note that Japan has one of the highest rates of newspaper recycling. 22. Mike Danaher, “Nature Conservation, Environmental Diplomacy, and Japan,” Asian Studies Review 23, 2 (1999): 254. 23. Gurowitz, “Mobilizing International Norms,” 442. 24. Michael Blaker, “Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance,” in Japan’s Foreign Policy, edited by Gerald L. Curtis (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 3. 25. Quoted in Miranda Schreurs, “Policy Laggard or Policy Leader: Global Environmental Policy Making in Japan,” Journal of Pacific Asia 2 (1994). 26. Hiroshi Ohta, “Japanese Environmental Foreign Policy,” in Japanese Foreign Policy Today, edited by Takashi Inoguchi and Purnendra Jain (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 102. 27. Quoted in Ohta, “Japanese Environmental Foreign Policy,” 104. 28. Kei Karasawa, “Japan and the World Environment,” in Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect, edited by Warren Hunsberger (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 78–79. 29. Robert J. Mason, “Whither Japan’s Environmental Movement? An Assessment of Problems and Prospects at the National Level,” Pacific Affairs 72, 2 (1999). 30. Hiroshi Matsumura, Japan and the Kyoto Protocol: Conditions for Ratification (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 9. The SDP also was interested in taking a greater role in international environmental issues. Since accepting the constitutionality of the SDF was a requirement for the SDP to enter into the ruling coalition, the SDP needed another issue to draw back support from the left. Support for Japan’s increased profile in international environmental issues thus had the benefits of drawing back support from segments of the left while also satisfying segments of the right regarding Japan’s international contribution. 31. Matsumura, Japan and the Kyoto Protocol, 10. 32. Ibid., 11. 33. As simply a practical issue, if an emissions trading mechanism is envisioned as part of climate mitigation, such a mechanism would not be effective without the participation of the world’s largest emitter. 34. Ironically, Australia also opposed differentiation, but for exactly the opposite reasons than the EU and Japan. As the world’s leading exporter of coal, Australia argued that economies such as theirs, which were more highly dependent on fossil fuels, should have lower targets than countries that did not rely as much on fossil fuels. See Jeremy Leggett, The Carbon War: Global Warming and the End of the Oil Era (London: Routledge, 2001), 237–238.

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35. The first Annex B countries to ratify the Protocol were Romania and the Czech Republic, accounting for 2.4 percent of the 1990 world GHG total. 36. See Michael Grubb, Christiaan Vrolijk, and Duncan Brack, The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999). 37. Yomiuri Online, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/02/20021018i214.htm (accessed October 18, 2002). 38. Ministry of Environment, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report of Japan, August 2006, 2. 39. Kenichiro Yamaguchi and Naoki Matsuo, “Climate Change Mitigation in Japan,” in Climate Change: Science, Strategies, and Solutions, edited by Eileen Claussen (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2001), 133–134. 40. Matsumura, Japan and the Kyoto Protocol, 60. 41. Shigeto Tsuru, The Political Economy of the Environment: The Case of Japan (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999), 221. 42. And the United States when it was still part of the negotiations. 43. For an excellent discussion on the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, see David G. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 44. “EU Committed to Implementing Kyoto Protocol Without US,” Japan Policy and Politics, April 16, 2001, http://findarticles.com/p/ art icles/mi_m0X PQ /is _ 2001_ April_16/ai_73374713/pg _1 (accessed May 21, 2008). 45. Alex Kirby, Japan Cools on Climate Pact, BBC News, January 3, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_1740000/ 1740677.stm (accessed January 5, 2002). 46. Quoted in “Greenhouse-Gas Measures Delayed by Industrial Foes,” Yomiuri Shimbun, February 10, 2002, available from http://www. yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20011231wo12.htm (accessed February 22, 2002). 47. “Japan Officially Ratifies Kyoto Climate Protocol,” The Japan Times, June 5, 2002. 48. “Koizumi tells Bush he will keep at structural reforms,” Japan Policy and Politics, February 25, 2002. 49. Hiroshi Ohta, “Japan’s Environmental Foreign Policy and the Concept of Comprehensive National Security,” in Ecological Security in Northeast Asia, edited by Miranda Schreurs and Dennis Pirages (Yonsei: Yonsei University Press, 1998), 96–97. 50. Mason, “Whither Japan’s Environmental Movement?” 51. Interviews conducted by the Shin Joho Center for the Prime Minister’s Office from November 12 to 22, 1998. On the question, “are you well aware, somewhat aware, not well aware, or not aware at all that many countries gathered in Kyoto in 1997 to discuss


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measures to prevent global warming and made a resolution to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide?” 15 percent said they were well aware, 35 percent somewhat aware, 32 percent not well aware, and 18 percent not aware at all. Data obtained from Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL), Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Roper Center bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. 52. Asahi Shimbun poll of national voters taken from June 8 to 9, 1997 and released on June 11, 1997, Japan Public Opinion Location Library. 53. “Kyoto Protocol Finally Gets Green Light,” ENDS Environment Daily, European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, November 13, 2001. Russia, Canada, and Australia were also supporters of this proposal. Whether the compliance mechanisms will be “legally” rather than “morally” binding is a decision that has been deferred until the Protocol enters into force.


Part V

Conclusion


Chapter 11

Conclusion Keiko Hirata

T

he case study chapters have analyzed the effect of norms in diverse areas of Japanese foreign policy. In this concluding chapter, I will draw on and synthesize these case studies to address three overriding questions: 1. Which are the norms that have most affected Japanese foreign policy? 2. What are the conditions or factors that help determine the impact a norm has on policy? 3. How do norms interact with material interests and power? Before addressing these questions, three brief comments should be noted. First, the term constructivism used in the previous chapters refers to thin or conventional constructivism, as opposed to thick constructivism. Unlike thick constructivism, which does not acknowledge the validity of empirical work, thin constructivism emphasizes the existence of social reality and “endorses a scientific approach to social inquiry.”1 Second, the chapters have focused on norms rather than ideas or beliefs. Norms are held, not individually, but collectively at a societal or group level, whereas ideas and beliefs can be held both collectively and individually. In addition, norms are expectations of appropriate behavior, while beliefs and ideas are not immediately linked to behavior. Third, the book has examined both international and domestic norms. Some chapters have focused on either international or domestic norms; others have examined both. It is important to make this international–domestic distinction, as international and domestic norms appear to require different sets of conditions to have an impact on policy, as discussed below.

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Which Norms Matter? The chapters in this book examine a variety of international and domestic norms. At the international level, these include an anti-landmine norm (chapter 3); a norm of territorial sovereignty demanding Japan to abandon territories on the basis of the CairoYalta-Potsdam agreements (chapter 4); norms of resource conservation and development assistance (i.e., norms of burden sharing and conditionality, chapter 7); norms of debt management (chapter 8); an antiwhaling norm (chapter 9); and an anti–global warming norm (chapter 10). Some of these international norms have been fully incorporated into Japanese foreign policy (e.g., the anti-landmine norm and the norms of Latin American debt management). Other international norms have been halfheartedly accepted by Japanese policymakers, thus having limited or indirect impact on policy (e.g., the environmental norms of resource conservation, the international ODA norms of burden sharing and aid conditionality, and the international anti–global warming norm). Still others have been rejected by Japanese policymakers and thus have had almost no impact on policy (e.g., the norm of territorial sovereignty and the antiwhaling norm; see table 11.1). Similarly, a number of domestic norms are examined, including a norm of pacifism (chapter 2); a norm of four islands return demanding the Soviet Union/Russia to return to Japan all of the four islands (the Northern Territories) that are in dispute between the two countries (chapter 4); collective defense norms of U.S.–Japan bilateralism, UN-centric multilateralism, and multilateral coalitions of the willing led by the United States (chapter 5); ODA norms of human rights and democracy promotion (chapter 6); ODA norms of aid reciprocity, self-reliance, and noninterference (chapter 7); a pro-whaling norm (chapter 9); and a norm of international leadership (chapter 10). Interestingly, all the domestic norms examined in the chapters, except for the ODA norms of human rights and democracy (chapter 6), have significantly affected Japanese foreign policy (table 11.1). Several of the case studies (chapters 4, 7, 9, and 10) examine the interaction between international and domestic norms (table 11.1), analyzing how international norms have been contested at the national level as they competed with domestic norms or interests. Two of these chapters of norm contestation (chapters 4) show that the international norms in question have met strong Japanese opposition because of conflicting domestic norms, thus resulting in no significant policy change. Chapter 4 illuminates how strongly

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CONCLUSION

Table 11.1

Norms Examined in the Previous Chapters

Chapter

Topic

International norm

Domestic norm

2

Security policy

3

Landmine policy

Anti-landmine norm

4

Policy on the Northern Territories

Norm of no territorial expansion (based on the Cairo–Yalta– Potsdam agreements)

5

Policies on overseas troop dispatches

Collective defense of U.S.–Japan bilateralism, UN-centric multilateralism, and multilateral coalitions of the willing led by the U.S.

6

ODA policy

ODA norms of humanitarianism and democracy promotion

7

ODA policy in the Environmental norms ODA norms of South Pacific of resource conservation reciprocity, nonODA norms of burden interference, and self reliance sharing and aid

8

Policy for the Latin American debt crisis

Norm of no exit

9

Whaling policy

Antiwhaling norm

Pro-whaling norm

10

Global warming policy

Anti-global warming norm

Norm of international leadership

Norm of antimilitarism Norm of the return of all the Northern Territories (four-islands return)

conditionality Norm of debt relief

Note: Norms in bold have had significant influence over policy; norms in italic have had indirect or limited impact on policy; and norms in neither bold nor italic have had no or almost no impact on policy.

Japanese policymakers have opposed the international norm of territorial sovereignty (based on the Cairo–Yalta–Potsdam agreements) and how firmly they have maintained the domestic norm of four islands return. Chapter 9 provides a similar example in which the international antiwhaling norm (promoted by many Western states) has met fierce domestic opposition based on Japan’s prowhaling norm. In these cases of norm contestation, the domestic norms have prevailed over the international ones.

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The other two chapters of norm contestation (chapters 7 and 10) reveal that the international norms in question did not meet such a high level of domestic resistance but still were not fully embraced by policymakers. The international norm of resource conservation (discussed in chapter 7) has contradicted Japan’s own norm of aid reciprocity, thereby leading the government to create new Japanese ODA programs (such as new fisheries aid programs for the South Pacific) to help Japan to both cope with the demands of the international norm and pursue Japanese fisheries interests—that is, to gain access to fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the South Pacific in exchange for Japanese aid. Similarly, the international ODA norms of burden sharing and aid conditionality (chapter 7) have challenged the Japanese norms of self-reliance and nonintervention, respectively. According to Tarte, this international–domestic normative gap eventually led Japanese officials to take a middle ground to create an ODA Charter that recognizes the importance of human rights and democracy but also asserts Japan’s own aid philosophy of self-reliance and noninterference. Tarte argues that the principle of human rights in the Charter has largely remained declaratory, not having been fully applied to the South Pacific. Tarte’s argument is particularly interesting in that, facing normative incongruence between the international and domestic norms, the Japanese government has pragmatically developed new policies to balance the conflicting demands. In a similar vein, chapter 10 demonstrates that the international anti–global warming norm has not been fully embraced by policymakers in Japan. However, Shibuya’s case differs from Tartes’s in that the international norm the former examined has proven to be somewhat compatible with a domestic norm of international leadership; that is, Japan must take a leadership role in international nonmilitary arenas (a norm supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOFA, in particular). Thus, as Shibuya argues, MOFA officials have promoted active involvement in the Kyoto Protocol, not because they have completely internalized the anti–global warming norm but because they have striven for reasons of power and prestige to play an active role in non-security-related international affairs (table 11.1). What Conditions Matter? Under what conditions do norms affect policy? As Shibuya pointed out in chapter 10, foreign policymakers usually play a two-level game involving unique mixes of international and domestic norms.

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At the international level, policymakers are on the receiving end of international norms promulgated by international institutions. At the domestic level, they are expected to bring domestic norms into foreign policy and to pursue Japan’s national interests at the international level.2 This two-level game involves processes of compliance with international norms and application of domestic norms into foreign policy. As discussed above, international and domestic norms often compete with each other. But the process of international norm compliance and that of domestic norm application seem to work differently, and thus these processes need to be examined separately. Compliance with International Norms How do international norms affect foreign policy? In this book, two chapters demonstrate clear examples of international norm compliance (chapter 3 on landmines and chapter 8 on the Latin American debt crisis management) while two other chapters show a failure to comply with international norms (chapter 4 on the international sovereignty norm that was based on the Cairo-Yalta-Potsdam agreements, by Hara; and chapter 9 on the antiwhaling norm by Hirata). These successful and failed cases of international norm compliance suggest there are at least six overlapping conditions that can affect norm diffusion at the domestic level: (1) the existence of agents of norm diffusion; (2) the strength of international norms; (3) the international or domestic power structure in which norm politics takes place; (4) material interests of policymakers; (5) transnational socialization of policymakers into international norms;3 and (6) the positive match (or congruence) between an international norm and domestic culture or a domestic norm. The importance of agents in international norm compliance is highlighted in chapter 3 and chapter 8. Hirata discusses how norm entrepreneurs (NGO actors) promoted norm diffusion in Japan, working as pressure groups demanding and verifying state compliance with the anti-landmine norm. In the face of pressure by these norm entrepreneurs, MOFA officials eventually learned the value of the norm and changed its preexisting stance on landmines to adopt the anti-landmine norm in policy. In contrast, Katada shows how international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established norms and rules that their member states followed at the time of the Latin American debt crisis. Katada’s case indicates that these organizations served as norm teachers or suppliers of norms to their member states.

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Chapter 3, chapter 4, and chapter 8 emphasize the importance of the strength of international norms. The strength of a norm may be measured in terms of commonality and specificity.4 Commonality refers to how widespread a particular norm is and how legitimate it is considered in a given community. A high degree of commonality means that the norm has been already established and widely accepted in a community. According to Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner, a medium degree of commonality (that is, a norm being shared by a majority of actors) is necessary for the norm to have ascribed influence on a state’s behavior.5 Chapter 3 and chapter 8 attest the importance of commonality of an international norm. Specificity refers to how precise and detailed a norm is. Chapter 4 discusses how lack of specificity of an international norm (related to territorial sovereignty) contributed to its failure to be adopted at the domestic level. In Hirata’s view, Japan accepted the anti-landmine norm and signed the Mine Ban Treaty after an increasing number of countries expressed their support for the treaty. Hirata’s chapter 3 indicates that if a norm exhibits a high degree of commonality, a state like Japan that is highly concerned with its international image may comply with the norm through the process of socialization. Hirata’s case thus suggests that the conditions of commonality and socialization can work hand in hand; the commonality of a given norm facilitates the socialization process of target agents (i.e., states; on socialization, see below). At the same time, Hirata shows how a state’s socialization process can also involve active norm entrepreneurs who take advantage of the commonality of the norm and teach the state the value of complying with the norm. This means that these three conditions of international norm compliance—agent, commonality, and socialization—can interact with each other toward compliance. Katada also notes the importance of norm commonality, emphasizing that the commonality of the norm of no exit (of international commercial banks from the indebted Latin America) in the first stage of the Latin American debt crisis made Japan adhere to that norm even though Japanese policymakers knew that norm compliance would not materially benefit Japan in the short run. Her chapter also suggests that norm commonality was linked to the international power structure in which the United States backed the norm as a hegemon. Her chapter thus shows that the second condition for international norm compliance, commonality, can intersect with the third, power structure (on the role of power, see below). Hara’s analysis of Japan’s Northern Territories policy illustrates the importance of the other measure of norm strength: norm specificity.

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She identifies the lack of specificity of the international sovereignty norm as a major source of the Soviet/Russo–Japan territorial dispute. Hara quotes the Potsdam Declaration to show how unclear the international sovereignty norm is: “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine” (chapter 4 of this book, emphasis added by Hara). As Hara argues, the imprecise nature of this norm has provided room for Japanese policymakers to interpret the norm differently than Soviet/Russian officials. The international or domestic power structure can also affect international norm compliance. As mentioned above, chapter 8 shows how the international power structure influenced Japan’s norm compliance during the Latin American debt crisis. In contrast, chapter 9 illustrates the importance of the domestic power structure in blocking international norm adoption at the national level. Hirata argues that the international antiwhaling norm failed to affect Japanese whaling policy because of a domestic power structure that concentrates decision-making power on this issue to the Fisheries Agency and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), two groups that harshly reject the norm. The next condition for international norm compliance is at the receiving end: the material interests of domestic foreign policy actors. International norm diffusion is affected by how policymakers who formulate foreign policy see a given international norm; that is, how their preferences and interests are formed with regard to the international norm in question. Their preferences may be shaped by material interests, as rationalist scholars argue. Chapter 8 demonstrates that policymakers adopted the international norms of “no exit” and debt relief because they found utility in them. They adhered to the international norms to promote their long-term material interests or the “shadow of the future” (see below for further discussion of material interests in Katada’s chapter).6 It is also possible that policymakers adopt an international norm for nonmaterial reasons. Policymakers of foreign policy can be norm learners or “constitutive units of international society.”7 They may accept international norms through the process of transnational socialization, “a process whereby government decision makers internalize international norms” that are shared among the states.8 Chapter 3 argues that policymakers were initially hesitant to accept the international anti-landmine norm for material reasons, but they eventually internalized the norm through the process of transnational socialization. The policymakers came to accept the anti-landmine

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norm as a standard of appropriate behavior at the international level. Again, their socialization was facilitated by two other conditions, the existence of norm entrepreneurs who taught the value of the norm, and the commonality of the norm. The final condition is a match between international norms and existing societal values and norms. If the preferences of domestic makers of foreign policy are shaped by societal culture or norms surrounding them, the positive relationship between the domestic culture or a particular domestic norm and a given international norm is critical to a state’s compliance with the international norm. As chapter 9 demonstrates, if there is a high level of congruence between the two (i.e., a positive match between the domestic norm or culture and the international norm), norm compliance is more likely. In such a case, policymakers adopt an international norm because they believe it is culturally appropriate to do so. At the same time, if the international norm conflicts with the domestic norm or culture, it is unlikely to be adopted domestically. In summary, the case studies on international norms in this book help confirm that the six conditions discussed here affect international norm compliance. However, it remains difficult to determine which conditions or combination of conditions are most important for international norm compliance (see further discussion below), or whether there are additional conditions beyond the six illustrated in this book that affect international norm adoption at the domestic level. Application of Domestic Norms to Foreign Policy Seven chapters of this book have examined domestic norms (chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10). One of the chapters (chapter 6) demonstrates a case in which domestic norms have not fully affected foreign policy, whereas the other six chapters demonstrate cases in which domestic norms have strongly affected foreign policy. Based on these seven chapters, we can identify at least four conditions or factors that account for adoption of domestic norms in foreign policy: (1) domestic or international power structure, (2) material interests of domestic policymakers; (3) the societal socialization of domestic policymakers, and (4) strength or commonality of norms.9 Domestic norms are likely to affect foreign policy if they are structurally supported. The domestic norms discussed in this book that have affected policy have been firmly backed by key decisionmakers in the domestic power structure: the norm of antimilitarism adhered to by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP; chapter 2); the

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norm of four islands return by the LDP and MOFA (chapter 4); collective defense of U.S.–Japan bilateralism, UN-centric multilateralism, and U.S.-led multilateral coalitions of the willing by LDP and Democratic Party of Japan leaders (chapter 5); the ODA norms of reciprocity, noninterference, and self-reliance by MOFA officials (chapter 7); the pro-whaling norm by the Fisheries Agency and MAFF (chapter 9); and the norm of international leadership by MOFA (chapter 10). Each of these norms gained impact due to the domestic political structure in which key decision-makers promoted the norms. At the same time, both the domestic and international power structure can affect the adoption of a domestic norm in foreign policy. As discussed above, chapter 4 demonstrates that the domestic norm of four islands return was supported by the domestic power structure led by the LDP and MOFA and simultaneously supported by the cold war international power structure, with the United States pressuring Japan to reject a compromise involving return of only two islands. Hara argues that the four islands return norm was firmly established and institutionalized into policy with the assistance of both the international and domestic power structures and that this international/ domestic alignment has made it difficult for a new norm on the Northern Territories to gain acceptance. Four chapters (chapters 2, 5, 7, and 10) identify the material interests of policymakers as a critical determinant for domestic norms to influence foreign policy, and another chapter (chapter 6) illustrates that the material interests of policymakers is the primary reason for the domestic norms’ failure to affect policy. In terms of the successful application of a domestic norm into foreign policy, chapter 2 shows how there were interests that emerged behind the salience of the antimilitary norm. Miyashita argues that domestic norms are used or even invented by the makers of foreign policy to advance their own interests or interests perceived to be that of Japan. Chapter 5 confirms this point, arguing that collective defense norms have been crafted and used by political actors to advance what they view as Japan’s national interests. Likewise, chapter 7 illustrates that the domestic ODA norm of aid reciprocity clearly reflects Japanese business interests. Also, chapter 10 shows how the interests of foreign policy officials in gaining international political power and prestige have driven the Japanese pursuit of an anti–global warming policy. In terms of the failed application of a domestic norm into foreign policy, chapter 6 deserves special attention. The authors argue that Japan’s material interests are the primary reason for its failure to comply with its domestic ODA Charter norms on human rights and

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democracy. What is intriguing about this case is that the Japanese government officially established the ODA Charter to fend off foreign pressure demanding that Japanese aid pay more attention to nonmaterial issues such as democracy. Yet, as Sato and Asano demonstrate, and as confirmed by chapter 7, the ODA Charter has become little more than declaratory. While Japan thus appears to embrace the charter’s norms, in reality the Japanese government has instrumentally used the norms to appease critics of Japanese ODA. Chapters 6 and 7 affirm that political actors can create, manipulate, and work around norms for their material interests (see below for further discussion on interests and norm adoption). Chapter 9 illustrates how societal socialization has played a pivotal role in Japan incorporating a pro-whaling norm into policy. Societal socialization refers to a process in which policymakers internalize societal norms and culture that are widely shared by the people of their community.10 According to Hirata, policymakers have been socialized into believing that it is culturally appropriate to eat whale meat. They have fully internalized the pro-whaling norm and have backed the cultural legitimacy of the norm. Her chapter demonstrates that socialization can affect the application of domestic norms into foreign policy. Also, it indicates that once firmly established in society as a legitimate norm, makers of foreign policy are likely to observe it. Thus it seems there are at least two ways in which societal socialization affects foreign policymakers. First, they internalize societal norms as a result of the socialization processes that they, along with the general public, are subject to. Second, they wish to behave consistently with societal expectations of appropriate behavior as they see themselves as representatives of their society at the international level. If they behave against these expectations, they may risk losing their societal recognition of being legitimate national representatives.11 Societal socialization is closely linked to another condition of domestic norm adoption in foreign policy, the strength or commonality of a given norm. Chapter 2 indicates that the maintenance of the pacifist norm was linked to the commonality of that norm. Chapter 9 also addresses the issue of commonality; the widely supported pro-whaling norm in the public has helped policymakers in the Fisheries Agency to reject the international antiwhaling norm. How Do Norms Intersect with Interests and Power? As the previous discussion suggests, norms do intersect with material interests and power. Material interests and power can help norms to

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affect foreign policy. In many cases, they were critical to a norm adoption in policy. In addition to interests and power, some chapters have shown that socialization can affect international norm compliance or domestic norm application into policy. The International Relations literature generally points out two approaches to a state’s norm adoption in policy: rationalism and constructivism. Rationalists argue that both material interests and power structure are independent variables for the dependent variable of states’ norm compliance. In contrast, constructivists claim that socialization is an independent variable for norm adoption: states adopt policy in line with norms when state policymakers internalize them, thereby undergoing the process of socialization.12 The case studies in this book affirm the validity of both approaches. Norms are often effected by material interests and power. At the same time, socialization may better account for norm adoption than interests and power in some situations. Rationalism: How Norms Intersect with Interests and Power As summarized above, the majority of chapters in the book illustrate how the Japanese government has supported norms based on its material interests and/or the international or domestic power structure. Chapter 8, for example, takes a rationalist approach, arguing that Japan supported the norm of no exit (of Japanese banks from the debt-ridden Latin America) in the 1980s due to “the shadow of the future.” She explains that despite the fact that the norm would not bring about material benefits to Japan in the short term, Tokyo adhered to that norm because it did not want to sever relations with transnational financial institutions that supported the norm, or with the United States, the key power behind these institutions. She demonstrates how the shadow of the future induced Japan’s norm compliance and promoted its international cooperation. Based on Katada’s findings, we can say that (1) material interests may induce international norm compliance, and (2) states may comply with international norms when compliance is enforced by a powerful state or when the complying state fears retaliation if it does not conform. For these reasons, a norm promoted by the United States is more likely to be complied with by other states than a norm advocated solely by small states with limited international power. Like international norms, domestic norms also intersect with material interests and power, as illustrated in chapter 2. In analyzing

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how the domestic norm of pacifism emerged in the 1960s and was maintained throughout the postwar era, Miyashita finds that material interests and power were behind the norm development. His main points are twofold: (1) Japanese policymakers had material interests in adhering to the pacifist norm as they found economic benefit from Tokyo’s pacifist policy; and (2) the pacifist norm was sustained because it was supported by the ruling party, the LDP. Miyashita demonstrates how state actors can select and reinforce a norm according to their political interests. In other words, norms do not necessarily emerge out of broad cultural values. Rather, a state can create and instrumentally use norms to advance its interests. Other chapters similarly demonstrate a state’s ability to strategically create and manipulate domestic norms. As discussed above, chapter 7 argues that the Japanese government established an ODA Charter to deflect international criticism of Tokyo for not complying with an international norm of aid conditionality to promote democracy and human rights. Ironically, however, the government may not even fully embrace the norms it creates. Sato and Asano demonstrate in chapter 6 that the government never fully implemented the norms of democracy and human rights that it put forth in the new ODA Charter. At the same time, a state can flexibly change its normative stance in response to new international or domestic forces. Chapters 5 and 8 show how a state’s position on a norm can change over time on the basis of changes in its politico-economic contexts. Sato discusses Japan’s shift on collective defense norms after the 9/11 terrorist attacks; government officials increasingly supported the coalitions of the willing led by the United States after the tragedy. Similarly, Katada explains that Japan shifted its allegiance from the norm of no exit for the Latin American debt management to the norm of debt reduction. In short, from rationalist perspectives, material interests, power, or a combination of both (independent variables) account for norm adoption in policy (dependent variable), sometimes with the influence of intervening variables such as commonality. Constructivism: Norms and Socialization Norm adoption in policy, however, cannot be always explained solely in terms of material interests and power. Chapter 3 supports a constructivist argument that a change in a state’s behavior can be attributed not to material incentives but to the state’s new interpretation or awareness of the value of a given norm (in her case the anti-landmine norm). In the process of socialization, the state can

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find new interests in foreign policy that may lead the state to accept a new norm and a new policy. In other words, state interests are changeable and are not given exogenously. Chapter 9 also demonstrates the power of socialization and internalization of a norm; policymakers have culturally socialized into the pro-whaling norm. Even if there are no substantial material benefits from adhering to its pro-whaling norm and its research whaling programs, Japan is not likely to abandon them, owing to the internalization of the norm by policymakers. Hirata’s cases based on constructivist analyses have identified the importance of intervening variables such as norm entrepreneurs, commonality, and norm congruence (a positive match between domestic and international norms). It is unclear, however, if socialization (independent variable) always require these intervening variables for norm adoption in policy (dependent variable). Future Research on Norms If rationalism and constructivism both have explanatory power, how do we know which approach better illuminates norm adoption? Alternatively, is it possible that rationalism and (thin) constructivism can act in concert in explaining norm diffusion? Can rationalism (which emphasizes rational actors’ material interests and power) and constructivism (which emphasizes socialization and internalization of norms) be integrated into a coherent research approach that maximizes the strengths of each perspective? Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara argue that we need an eclectic approach to the studies of international relations, arguing, for example, that both structuralist and constructivist approaches are required to account for Asian regionalism.13 Other scholars have suggested that a two-step model is preferred (table 11.2). Legro, for example suggests that constructivism is best for analyzing the first step of preference formation of domestic policymakers, which is based on culture and norms. Rather than assuming that preferences are automatically given, as rationalists argue, Legro believes that constructivism can identify the origins and emergence of preferences.14 However, Legro believes that rationalism is best for analyzing the second step of strategic interactions at the international level, in which rational actors attempt to maximize their utility. Chapter 3 offers support for such a model when Hirata demonstrates that actors (in this case, nongovernmental organizations) driven by a humanitarian norm are actually rational utility maximizers. Norm-based preference formation thus induces strategic interaction.

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Table 11.2 Two-Stage Models of Foreign Policy Behavior Involving Rationalism and Constructivism Model 1

Model 2

First step

Preference and interest formation (explained by constructivism)

Instrumental adoption of a norm (explained by rationalism)

Second step

Strategic pursuit of interests (explained by rationalism)

Internalization of the norm (explained by constructivism)

Sources: For Model 1, see Legro, “Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step.” For Model 2, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” International Organization 59, 4 (2005): 801–826.

Other scholars have suggested that the two steps be reversed, with rationalism preceding constructivism in the diffusion and adoption of norms. The first step involves actors pursuing norms instrumentally. The second step refers to a process of internalization of the norm that was first pursued instrumentally. This means that policymakers may instrumentally adopt a norm for material interests or power but that they may eventually internalize the norm. Checkel examines this twostep model by analyzing regionalism in the European Union (EU). He claims that EU members initially accepted norms of regional cooperation in pursuit of their own material interests but that they eventually came to internalize the norms of regional cooperation.15 In this process of socialization, a state can “switch from following a logic of consequence to a logic of appropriateness.”16 These two two-step models suggest that the logic of consequences (rationalism) and the logic of appropriateness (constructivism) are not mutually exclusive. They can be complementary, rather than contradictory.17 State actions can be driven by a combination of utilitymaximizing motivations and internalized norms or habits. The case studies in this book, which examine the role of norms in foreign policy behavior on issues related to security, economic affairs, and the environment, bolster the view that both rationalism and constructivism contribute to such analysis. Further empirical research that explicitly tests a variety of models, including those based on constructivism, rationalism, and on both the combined models illustrated in table 11.2, is required. Through such research, we can better understand the mechanisms through which norms affect foreign policy and the interaction of constructivist and rationalist processes underlying those mechanisms.

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Notes 1. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1. 2. See also Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, “Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory,” in Germany Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, edited by Volker Rittberger (Manchester, UK and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 104–137. 3. Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner, “Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory,” 111–112. 4. Ibid., 109–110; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” International Organization 51, 1 (1997), 34. 5. Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner, “Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory.” 6. Theo Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Lynne Rienner, 2005), 9. 7. Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner, “Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory,” 111. 8. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 111–113. 10. Ibid., 111. 11. For a similar argument, see ibid., 113. 12. Ibid., 111. 13. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian–Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclectivism,” International Security 26, 3 (2001–2002): 153–185. 14. Jeffrey W. Legro, “Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” American Political Science Review 90, 1 (1996): 118–137. R isse and Sikkink point out four stages of norm adoption: (1) process of instrumental adoption of norms, (2) process of moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion, (3) process of institutionalization and habituation, and (4) process of internalization. Thomas R isse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human R ights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by Thomas R isse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 11–16. 15. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” International Organization 59, 4 (2005): 801–826. R isse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change.

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16. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,” 804. 17. Farrell, The Norms of War, 8–9; James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsonaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 52–72.

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Contributors

Masahiko Asano is professor of Political Science at Takushoku University, Tokyo. He is the author of Shimin Shakai ni Okeru Seido Kaikaku: Senkyo Seido to Kouhosha Rikuruuto [Institutional Reform in Civil Society: Electoral Systems and Candidate Recruitment] (Keio University Press, 2006). Kimie Hara is the Renison research professor and associate professor at the Belair Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Waterloo, and a CIGI Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Canada. She specializes in modern and contemporary international relations of the Asia–Pacific region, with particular focus on Japan and regional conflicts. Her recent publications include Cold War Frontiers in the Asia–Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System (Routledge, 2007). Keiko Hirata is assistant professor of Political Science at California State University, Northridge. Her research focuses on Japanese foreign policy, international relations in Asia, and state–society relations. She is the author of Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development Policy (Palgrave, 2002). Saori N. Katada is associate professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. Her research focuses on comparative regionalism, international political economy, and Japanese foreign policy. She is the author of Banking on Stability: Japan and the Cross-Pacific Dynamics of International Financial Crisis Management (University of Michigan Press, 2001; awarded Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Book Award in 2002). She has also coedited Global Governance: Germany and Japan in International System (with Hanns Maull and Takashi Inoguchi; Ashgate, 2004). Akitoshi Miyashita is professor of International Relations at Tokyo International University. He is the author of Limits to Power: Asymmetric

274

CONTRIBUTORS

Dependence and Japanese Foreign Aid (Lexington Books, 2003) and coeditor, with Yoichiro Sato, of Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration (Palgrave, 2001). Yoichiro Sato is professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. His research interests range from Japanese foreign policy, East Asian security, and international political economy to maritime issues such as fishery and piracy. His recent books include Japan in a Dynamic Asia (coedited with Satu Limaye; Lexington Books, 2006) and The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond (coedited with Kevin J. Cooney; Routledge, due fall 2008). Eric Shibuya is associate professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College in Virginia. His research focuses on political violence, environmental security, and the politics of the Oceania region. His most recent publication is “Principales amenazas medioambientales para los Estados insulares del Pacifico” [Main Environmental Threats to Pacific Island Nations], Annuario Asia-Pacifico 2006, Casa Asia, City Council of Barcelona, Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estrategicos, 2007. Sandra Tarte is associate professor in the School of Social Sciences, University of the South Pacific, Fiji. She specializes in the international politics of the Pacific islands region and is the author of Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands (National Centre for Development Studies and Institute for Pacific Studies, 1998). She has also written widely on regional fisheries diplomacy in the Pacific.

Index

Abe, Shinzo 101, 102, 193 Adenauer Formula 78 Afghanistan 33, 96, 97, 99, 100, 103, 106, 112 Air Self Defense Force see Self Defense Forces Antimilitarism see Norms, Antimilitarism Antiterrorism Special Measures Law 94–105 Argentina 165 Asian Development Fund 161 Aso, Taro 86, 193 Atlantic Charter 73, 87 Australia 97, 140, 149, 196, 205, 209, 229, 231 Axworthy, Lloyd 53 Baker Plan 158, 160, 163, 169, 170 Bank for International Settlements 155, 156 Bank of England 156 Bank of Japan 156 Bank of Tokyo 156, 157, 169 Basic Environmental Protection Law 215 Bolivia 155, 156, 169 Bradley, Bill 160 Brady, Nicholas 163 Brady Plan 159, 163, 164, 165 Brazil 153, 155, 159, 162, 169 Burma 111, 126 Bush, George, Sr. 163, 171 Bush, George, Jr. 212, 224 Cairo Declaration 73, 74, 87 Cambodia 21, 56, 67, 93, 218

Canada 49, 52, 66, 68, 107, 161, 222, 223, 224, 231 China 3, 11, 72, 73, 88, 96, 112, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 163 CITES see United Nations, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora CitiCorp 156, 160 Climate change 211–31 Clinton, Bill 189, 212 Conference for the Normalization of the International Whaling Commission 191, 206 Constitution 22, 26, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 93, 225, 229 Constructivism 4–8, 12, 22, 23, 47, 49, 235, 245, 248 Japan’s defense policies and 23–9, 175 Materialism-rationalism and 5–6, 8, 62 Norms and 3–13, 27, 62, 178, 246–7 Positivist methodology and 7 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 183 Convention on Conventional Weapons 52 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction see Ottawa Convention Costa Rica 164, 169

276

INDEX

Democratic Party of Japan 23, 86, 93, 99, 102–5, 192, 243 Diana, Princess of Wales 55, 56 Dulles, John Foster 75, 77, 78 Earth Summit see United Nations Conference on Environment and Development East Timor 94, 100, 102 Economic Planning Agency 132 Ecuador 155, 156, 169 Endangered Species Act 184, 185, 202 Environmental Agency 100, 196, 218, 225 European Community (Union) 221, 222, 223, 224, 229, 248 Export-Import Bank of Japan 161, 164, 165 Fisheries Agency 134, 135, 136, 138, 144, 149, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 199, 241, 243, 244 Fisheries Law 196 Fishermen’s Protective Act 189 France 26, 49, 99, 107, 145, 161, 180 Fukuda, Yasuo 100, 103, 104, 108, 112, 148 G7/G8 83, 84, 88, 161, 164 Great Britain see United Kingdom Greenpeace 178, 184, 197 Ground Self Defense Force see Self Defense Forces Hashimoto, Ryutaro 54–5, 57, 58, 67 Hatoyama, Ichiro 76, 77, 78, 88 Hatoyama, Yukio 86, 88 Hatoyama-Bulganin letters 78, 90 Herzog, Jesus Silva 155

Institute of Cetacean Research 193 International Campaign to Ban Landmines 52, 54, 55, 56, 66, 67, 68 International Committee of the Red Cross 52 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 184, 185, 186, 187, 192, 197, 202, 203, 204 International Development Association 161 International Financial Institutions 153, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 171 International Monetary Fund 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 169, 239 International Whaling Commission 176, 177, 178, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 196, 203, 204 Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines 48, 51, 54–61, 67, 68, 69 Japan Communist Party 81 Japan International Cooperation Agency 132, 146 Japan Socialist Party 23, 26, 29, 36–9, 81 Japanese Research Whaling Program In the North Pacific 188, 189 Japan Whaling Association 193, 207 Japanese Antarctic Research Program 187, 188 Japanese Defense Agency 53, 54, 56–60, 98 JEXIM see Export-Import Bank of Japan Kaifu, Toshiki 81, 94 Kawaguchi, Yoriko 223

INDEX

Koizumi, Junichiro 11, 85, 94, 99, 100, 101, 103, 113, 118, 124, 125, 224 Komei Party see Komeito Komeito 38, 39, 95, 96, 98, 104 Kono, Ichiro 76, 78 Kono, Taro 86, 88 Kuranari Doctrine 138, 139, 148 Kurile Islands 72, 74, 77, 79, 81, 84, 87, 89 Kyoto Protocol 64, 211–31, 238 Latin America 112, 116, 151–72, 240, 245 League of Diet Members 58–9, 62 League of Nations 183 Liberal Democratic Party 28, 34, 37, 58, 75, 78, 80, 81, 84, 86, 87, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99–106, 108, 192, 219, 242, 246 Liberalism 4–6, 12, 48, 112, 113, 178 Maekawa, Haruo 156 Marine Mammal Protection Act 184, 189 Maritime Self Defense Force see Self Defense Forces Matsumoto-Gromyko letters 78 Mexico 153, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 169 Mine Ban Treaty see Ottawa Convention Mineta, Norman 189 Ministry of International Trade and Industry 69, 117, 132, 146, 218, 225 Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries 132, 135, 191, 192, 196, 197, 199, 207, 241, 243 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry see Ministry of International Trade and Industry Ministry of Finance 113, 132, 139, 154, 156, 158

277

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 48, 56, 57, 73, 74, 77, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 99, 113, 117, 132, 135, 138, 139, 140, 142, 144, 192, 193, 194, 197, 199, 218, 225, 238, 239 Miyazawa, Kiichi 218, 219 Miyazawa Plan 152, 159, 161, 163, 164, 166, 170 Morgan Guarantee 160 Mori, Yoshiro 85 MOX fuel 142, 143, 150 Murayama, Tatsuo 164 Murayama, Tomiichi 37, 38 Nakada, Hiroshi 193 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 94, 138, 149, 161 Neoliberalism see Liberalism Neorealism see Realism New Zealand 67, 107, 140, 145, 209 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 10, 16, 50, 52, 54, 58, 59, 60, 65, 68, 184, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 199, 239, 247 Norms Aid policy 129, 137–43 Anti-landmine 47–62 Antimilitarism 10, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 35, 39, 106, 237, 242 Civil liberty 10 Civil society and 47–62 Collective defense 13, 95 Compliance with 50 Cultural values and 180–3, 212–14 Debt crisis management 152, 153 Democratic 111–25 Diffusion of 176–9 Domestic 10, 12 Domestic politics and 176, 179–87, 242–4 Environmental 129, 133–7

278

INDEX

Norms—continued Foreign policy 9–11, 22, 27–9, 61, 125, 129, 130–3, 212–14, 242–4 Future research on 247–8 Human rights 10 Humanitarian 111–25 Immigration 217 International 10, 12 International agreements 73, 239–42 International trade 10 Material interests and 13, 166, 245–6 Political rights 13 Poverty reduction 13 Rejection of 175, 191, 197 Relativist 10 Summarized 236–8 Whaling 175–97, 236, 239, 241, 243, 244, 247 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 99, 114, 115 North Korea 3, 11, 31, 34, 54, 98, 101, 102, 105 Northern Territories also Southern Kuriles 71–88, 147, 236, 240, 243 Obuchi, Keizo 55–60, 63, 68, 69 Official development assistance 10, 11, 13, 14, 111–25, 129–44, 161, 163, 194, 236, 238, 244 Charter 113, 116, 126, 141, 238, 244, 246 Ohira, Masayoshi 79 Okinawa 75, 76, 78, 81, 91, 99, 150, 193 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 116, 132 Ottawa Convention 47, 49, 51, 52–61 Ottawa Declaration 53

Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 132, 146, 161 Ozawa, Ichiro 37, 80, 93, 102–5, 106, 107 Pacific Islands Forum 141, 142, 145, 149 Pacifism see Norms, Antimilitarism PALM summits 142, 143 Peru 157, 169 Philippines 67, 163, 164, 165, 169 Postmodernism 6–7 Potsdam Declaration 73, 74, 236, 237, 239, 241 Public opinion 21, 29–36, 195–6, 226 Realism 4, 5, 6, 12, 23, 27, 28, 48, 112, 113, 177, 198 Realpolitik 7, 16, 152 Regional Contingency Law 94, 102 Russia 13, 71, 74, 76, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 91, 96, 103, 190, 206, 223, 224, 231, 236, 241 see also Soviet Union Russo–Japanese War 74 Sakhalin 72, 74, 89 San Francisco Peace Treaty 74, 77, 82, 87 Sea Shepherd 197 Self Defense Forces 13, 21–2, 32–4, 39, 57, 59, 93–105, 107, 219 Shigemitsu, Mamoru 75 Social Democratic Party 23, 37, 219, 229 see also Japan Socialist Party South Korea 33, 53, 57, 204 South Pacific 13, 129–44, 238 Southern Kuriles see Northern Territories Soviet Union 3, 13, 71–88, 90, 94, 138, 147, 223, 236 see also Russia

279

INDEX

St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration 190, 203, 204 Suzuki, Muneo 83, 85, 86, 92 Takeshita, Noboru 161, 163, 218 Tanaka, Kakuei 80, 81 Tanaka, Makiko 85 UN Peacekeeping Operations Law 94, 96, 97, 105, 107, 111 United Kingdom 7, 72–3, 87, 97, 177 United Nations 52, 54, 60, 76, 90, 93, 96, 185 Conference on Disarmament 53 Conference on Environment and Development 136, 213, 218, 219 Conference on the Human Environment 185 Conference on the Law of the Sea 134 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 185, 204 Convention on the Law of the Sea 146, 147, 209 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 16

Framework Convention on Climate Change 211, 212, 219, 220 Peacekeeping 11, 21, 94, 218, 219 Resolutions 96, 101, 103 United States 3, 33, 59–60, 72, 73, 75, 77, 87, 88, 96, 138, 139, 151, 155, 156, 158, 160, 162, 163, 177, 184, 190, 191, 213, 218, 220, 221, 224 Alliance with Japan 11, 35, 49, 53, 57, 94, 152, 178 USSR see Soviet Union Venezuela

164, 165, 169

Whaling 136, 137, 175–209, 237, 239, 241, 247 World Bank 132, 153, 158, 160, 161, 163, 165 World War II 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31, 36, 71, 72, 73, 184, 195, 214 Yalta Agreement 73, 74, 78, 87, 236, 237, 239 Yoshida, Shigeru 76, 77, 81, 86, 88

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