Middle Powers in International Politics

MIDDLE POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS The book traces the history of the idea of middle-ranking powers through several centuries of European political writings, examines the position of such powers in the League of Nations and the United Nations, and defines the concept of middle powers in the con­ temporary context. The major part of the book, however, is devoted to an exam­ ination of the conduct and an analysis of the role of middle powers in several typical situations of the four principal forms of the states system: namely, the unifocal, the dualistic, the triangular and the multiple system. On the basis of historical material drawn mainly from the inter-American system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the German and the European systems of the nineteenth century and the European and global systems of the twentieth century, various patterns are established and certain tendencies noted in the international conduct and role of such powers. The main conclusions reached are that the systemic roles of middle powers have not always been quite so important or beneficial as claimed on their behalf in both the older and the more recent literature on the subject; that their parts generally have been conditioned by the form and state of the international system; that their scope usually has been greatest when relations between the great powers in the system have been ambiguous, i.e. neither too hostile nor too co-operative; and that their most significant parts in most situations have been in regional and local affairs rather than at the central or global levels of international politics. The last chapter of the book is rounded off with some speculations about the likely roles of middle powers in the global states system of the future.

Carsten

Holbraad

is

Deputy Director

of

the

Centre

for

International Relations, Queen's University, Canada. He has previously been Senior Fellow in the School oflnternational Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, and Research Fellow and Senior Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University. He took his B.Sc. (Econ.) at the London School of Economics and his

D. Phil. at the University of Sussex.

By the same author

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE: A Study in German and British International Theory 1815-1914 SUPER POWERS AND WORLD ORDER

(editor)

SUPERPOWERS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Middle Powers in International Politics

Carsten Holbraad

M

MACMILLAN PRESS LONDON

© Carsten Holbraad 1984 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission. First published 1984 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Companies and representatives throughout the world ISBN 0 333 �5443 5 Printed in Hong Kong

For Sonya and Martin

Contents Preface

lX

Introduction

1 The History of the Idea 1.1 Before 1814 1.2 European Restoration 1.3 German Confederation 1.4 From the Crimean War to the First World War

10

2 The League of Nations and the United Nations 2.1 The League of Nations 2.2 The United Nations

45

3 The Hierarchy of Powers 3.1 Characterisation of Middle Powers 3.2 Ranking of Powers

67

' j ·

The Unifocal System.

4.1 Dominance 4.2 Primacy 4.3 Hegemony

5 The Dualistic System.

10 19 27 33

46 56

68 75

92 100 104 107 117

5.1 Cold War

119

5.2 Diplomatic Concert

134

5.3 Rivalry and Co-operation

140

6 The Triangular System.

159

6.1 Equilateral Triangles

163

6.2 Non-Equilateral Triangles

168

7 The Multiple System.

177

7.1 Diplomatic Concert

179

Contents

Vlll

7.2 7.3

Intense Rivalry Moderate Rivalry

188 196

Conclusion

205

Notes

214

Index

229

Preface The fitful relaxation of tension between the super powers after the Cuban missile crisis, the widening rift between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and the greater independence of French diplomacy under de Gaulle loosened the Cold War pattern of East­ West relations enough to enlarge the diplomatic scope of many of the lesser powers in the global states system. One result was a revival of interest in the international role of the growing number of middle-ranking powers. In the 1960s and 1970s books and articles about the place of middle powers in international politics appeared in various parts of the world. Most of them discussed these powers strictly in the context of the immediate situation, usually relating their policies and conduct to a narrow range of current issues. This !',book presents middle-ranking powers in a wider perspective. Setting out the concept of the middle power against the background ';of the earlier history of ideas about such powers, it examines the conduct of past and present middle powers in a variety of systemic contexts . Drawing on historical as well as contemporary material, it analyses the roles of these powers in several typical situations of the most familiar forms of the states system. This approach makes it possible to attempt a general assessment of the contribution of middle powers to the international political process. Most of the material for the book was collected when I was a member of the Department of International Relations in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. Some of the first ideas on the subject were developed in conversations with my friend and colleague there, the late Sisir Gupta. Several other former colleagues in Australia read various draft chapters and made useful suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Professor J . L. Richardson at the ANU , who commented critically on an early draft of a substantial part of the book. Chapter 5 incorporates sections of my contribution to a volume of essays published in memory of Sisir Gupta ('The Role of Non-Aligned Middle Powers', in M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds), Great lX

X

Preface

Power Relations, World Order and the Third World, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1981), and I am obliged to the editors for allowing me to use this material here. Chapter 6, with the kind permission of the editor and the publishers of the Year Book of World Affairs, is based on 'Middle-Power Roles in Great-Power Triangles', my contribution to the 1976 volume (London, Stevens & Son). Copenhagen

C. H.

Introduction In the 1 960s and 1 970s, a number of departures from the traditional concern with the policies and interaction of the great powers marked the academic study of international politics. One was a revival of interest in the nature and role of small states. This development, the .first signs of which appeared already in the late 1 950s, was due to JeVeral sets of circumstances. The most obvious was the proliferation of new states in Asia and Africa after the Second World War, which greatly changed the numerical proportion in the world between great powers and lesser states. A more profound cause was the detente in East-West relations in the 1 960s, which presented new diplomatic opportunities as well as new difficulties for many small states. On a less general level, the international drama surrounding �me small states, especially in the Middle East and South East Asia, apd the spectacular performance of a few ofthem, notably Israel and North Vietnam, demanded the attention of students of international �litics. Finally, the opening or expansion of departments of international relations at universities in a number of small countries in various parts of the world made it possible for political scientists of diverse national backgrounds to respond to the new challenges. Their efforts resulted in a fairly substantial number of books and articles, most of them published in the late 1 960s and early 1970s. While this literature often throws a good deal of light on the behaviour of certain kinds of small states in particular types of international situations, as a general treatment of the nature and role of small states it has several shortcomings. In the first place, it more often than not fails to take account not only of earlier writings on the topic, especially those of the inter-war period, but also of relevant work carried out by contemporary scholars in other fields. 1 Second, though it explores the concept of the small state from many angles, it does not provide an entirely adequate and broadly agreed definition of the subject-matter. Third, few of the studies reach generalisations about the international conduct of small states that apply to the category as a whole and seem of a certain importance.

2

Middle Powers in International Politics

Yet, despite the rather limited achievements of the first spate of writings, the new interest in the behaviour of these states helped to broaden the perspective on the society of states and to redress the balance in the study of international politics, which during the period of the Cold War had been tilted too heavily in favour of the great powers. The revival of interest in small states was not accompanied by an equally serious study of middle-sized powers. Most of the small number of symposia and articles about the role of such powers that in the 1960s and 1970s appeared in various countries, including Canada, West Germany and India, were quite limited in scope, often focusing on a narrow range of current issues and sometimes propounding particular ideas of foreign policy. This had been true also of some of the earlier literature on the subject, for example of certain German writings of the early nineteenth century equally limited in relevance and linked with a political programme. 2 Though much has been written about the problems and policies of individual middle-sized powers, little work of substance has been done on the nature and role of these states as a group or a class of the international system . Some of the reasons for this are obvious. First, there is the difficulty of defining the subject-matter of such a study. 'Middle powers', as they have been called, have no special standing in international law that could serve as a guide to their identity. 3 Though various middle-ranking powers enjoyed certain privileges in the great post-war conferences of modern history, their attempts to secure institutional status within the League of Nations and the United Nations were not particularly successful and left no lasting result of real significance. 4 While some political scientists have suggested criteria for distinguishing three or more classes of states and a few have drawn up lists of middle-ranking powers, nobody has quite overcome the serious difficulties of providing an entirely satisfactory definition of the type of power that is neither great nor small. Second, there is the problem of reaching valid and significant generalisations about the international conduct of such powers. Whichever criteria are used for distinguishing middle-ranking powers from those above and below them, the category is likely to include a range of highly heterogeneous powers. Idiosyncracies of political character and differences in international position are bound to affect their behaviour and are likely to make it difficult to detect more than broad tendencies in their responses to various international situations.

Introduction

3

Yet there are good reasons why attempts should be made to come grips with this subject. Given that the existing states system, in ·common with many earlier systems of modern history, contains a substantial number of units which obviously are neither great powers nor small states, a study of the role of middle-sized powers seems a natural complement of the traditional concern with great powers and the more recent work on small states. What is more, the intermediate category of states usually comprises a particularly interesting and rather important group of powers. It is the meeting place of once great but declining powers, tired from generations of power politics at the highest level but rich in experience, and oflesser :but ascending powers, conscious of their potential and stirred by :� bition. Together with states long established at intermediate )evels, they form a range not unlike that of the middle classes of some �mestic societies. Indeed, their recurrent preoccupation with the �gers of great-power oligarchy and their tendency occasionally to claim superior wisdom and virtue bring to mind the traditional case �for the middle class as put by political philosophers, from Aristotle to James Mill. 5 f; Focusing on the political relations of the middle-sized powers, )With the great powers and the small states as well as among themselves, is in some respects a particularly suitable approach to the study of the states system and its processes. It allows one to look at �e system from within. Those who concentrate exclusively on the .interrelations of the great powers enjoy the obvious advantages of dealing with the chief actors but are in danger of taking a too Olympian view of international politics. Some of the charges of distortion that have been levelled at historians of earlier times, who were disposed to concern themselves almost entirely with popes and emperors, kings and generals and the ruling classes, and to ignore the lower orders of society, could be laid also against some modern writers on international relations. On the other hand, those who approach the subject from the angle of small states can be at a serious disadvantage. Moving among states which, even when they are neither mere pawns in great-power relations nor outright depen­ dents of a major power, tend to be objects rather than subjects, in the sense that their international behaviour is highly conditioned by the policies and relations of stronger powers, they sometimes find it hard to come to grips with a process which, so to speak, is decided at .higher levels. Thus, an analysis of the conduct of middle-ranking powers may not only illuminate the international system from an to

4

Middle Powers in International Politics

unfamiliar angle but may also present some of its processes in a perspective truer than those frequently associated with either traditional or more novel approaches. A final, and more pertinent, reason for taking up the study of these powers is that their role in international politics appears to have become more important in recent decades. For most secondary powers, aligned as well as unaligned, the East-West detente meant a widening of diplomatic scope. While the improvement in super­ power relations allowed some middle-sized powers to take initiatives of their own in regard to the central relationship of international politics, it permitted other such powers to assume roles in regional politics which in the years of the Cold War had been less possible. As a result, the general state of international relations in many parts of the world came to depend rather more than before on the conduct of these powers. With their scope enlarged and their influence enhanced, some of them became increasingly conscious ofboth their identity and their potential as intermediate powers. Soon the term 'middle powers' and its various synonyms, which had enjoyed little currency since the onset of the Cold War, were brought into use again, while speculation about a special role for such powers, which had languished since the early years of the United Nations, was revived. 6 The aim of the present study is to examine the actual conduct and determine the typical roles of middle powers in international politics. If for the moment we leave aside the difficulties of measuring the strength ofstates and drawing dividing lines in a list of powers arranged according to force at their disposal, we may define the subject-matter provisionally as states that are weaker than the great powers in the system but significantly stronger than the minor powers and small states with which they normally interact. By surveying and analysing the behaviour of such powers in character­ istic situations of various forms of the states system, it may be possible to detect certain tendencies in their international conduct which, when related to the processes of the systems to which they belong, may point to their typical roles in international relations. In very large systems, particularly the global system of the second half of the twentieth century, middle powers often play their most conspicuous parts within their own regions, where their immediate interests usually lie. In such cases, the more typical of their regional, or sub­ systemic, parts will be outlined and discussed. But the study will focus on the systemic roles of middle powers, especially on their

Introduction

5

condu ct in regard to the central relationship of each system. Though

of varying, and sometimes perhaps minimal, importance to the

processes of the system as a whole, such roles must be central to an enquiry that is aimed at providing a general picture of the performance of middle powers in diverse systemic conditions. The basic theme of this work is the connection between the form and state of the international system and the conduct of the middle powers in it. The number of great powers in the system and the political relations that exist between these chiefactors determine the international environment of the lesser states and influence their behaviour, towards the great powers as well as among themselves. The middle powers, closer to the top level of international politics, tend to be particularly sensitive to the conditions that prevail there. For them, each systemic situation presents its own set of difficulties and opportunities. Just how each of them perceives the elements of the situation is bound to depend on a variety of subj ective factors, NCb as the political ideas and passions of its leaders; and how it J/jiiSponds to the situation must to some extent reflect also other such factors, for example its diplomatic tradition and its domestic �titutions. Yet, despite all subjective influences, the reactions of !niddl e powers in comparable international situations may be CX:pected to show some similarities. All of them exposed to the :competitive conditions of international society and determined to JUrvive and prosper, they can neither afford persistently to ignore .dle threats and encouragements presented by the structure of the �tem and the interaction of its principal actors, nor repeatedly fail ,,_, exercise a degree of rationality in their response to them. Variously threatening their interests and offering possibilities of �uring some of their goals, these pressures can sometimes be strong and general enough to produce observable tendencies in the systemic conduct of the middle powers. What is more, they may affe ct their sub-systemic behaviour as well. By setting the broad parameters of-their activities at this level and shaping the general circumstances under which they must defend their interests and pursue their aims in regional affairs, the systemic factors may help to create various patterns of sub-systemic conduct. But the inter­ national conduct of the middle powers, at both the systemic and the sub-systemic level, in turn has effects of its own on the politi­ cal processes of the system. It is the nature and magnitude of these effects that determine the role of middle powers in international politics. 7

6

Middle Powers in International Politics

In both its aim and its theme, the present study obviously reflects a 'state-centric' view of the affairs of the world. Until fairly recently, this would require no special justification. But in the 1960s and 1970s, approaches to the study of international relations that followed the tradition of focusing on the states and their political interaction became the subject of sustained criticism. Drawing attention to the presence and influence of various non-state actors on the world scene, a group of writers argued that states were becoming relatively less important and, therefore, less worthy of attention. The actors to watch, according to this school of thought, were the several sorts of transnational organisations, most of which tended to ignore international boundaries in their operations and some of which, particularly the multinational corporations, occa­ sionally secured a dominating influence on the affairs of individual states. Like some of the other departures from tradition that took place in those decades, this approach reflected, though with some distortions, the particular international circumstances of the period in which it emerged and developed. The detente in relations between the superpowers made it possible for a while to shift attention from matters of national security to broader economic issues. The prosperity of large parts of the world allowed some transnational forces and most multinational organisations con­ siderably freer play than they had enjoyed in the period of the Cold War. And the growing number of recently emerged states in the Third World included some that were willing, or obliged, to let themselves be influenced or dominated by multinational corpor­ ations. This situation led some political scientists to concern themselves largely with the economic factors of international politics, especially with those that transcended the boundaries of states and enjoyed a global range, and to take little account of the political-strategic context in which such factors operated. Though they threw light on interesting aspects of the contemporary scene, particularly on relations between the rich and the poorer parts of the world, these writers did not succeed in showing that the revival in the influence of transnational actors had seriously undermined the states system. The activities of the multinational corporations, on which so much of their case rested, at no time eclipsed the role of states. Though a few of the less viable states, for periods, submitted to domination by foreign organisations, others deliberately used them for the development of their economies or for other purposes of their own. And most of the stronger states either regulated their

Introduction

7

operations or, like the communist states, kept them out altogether. States are still the major actors, and principal powers still the chief actors on the world stage. Hence, the case for viewing the role of middle powers in the context of the states system, and for regarding their conduct as conditioned by the form and state of this system, is a strong one. That the present study is intended to deal with certain more lasting tendencies in international politics, rather than with various novel, and possibly transient, features of the contemporary, or recent, situation, reinforces the case for a state-centric approach. The analytical part of this study rests on material drawn from a number of historical systems, namely the European system from the Congress of Vienna to the First World War, the German states system from 1816 to 1866, the inter-American system of the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, the global and the European system of the inter-war years, and the global system since 1945 . Between them, these systems present structures of one, two, three and more than three great powers. What is more, each of them, �rough a series of marked changes in the political relations of the great powers, offers a variety of typical situations for the other powers in the system. Finally, each of the systems contains a number of states, ranging from a few to many, which may be defined as middle powers. Yet, though in some ways rich and varied, the material presented by these historical systems is inadequate for a strictly inductive analysis of the conduct and role of middle powers. In several of the situations to be distinguished, there simply were not enough such powers in the system to permit generalisations about their be­ haviour. In some cases, one or more of a small number of middle powers behaved, generally for domestic reasons, so erratically as to exclude them from the analysis. In other cases, two or more middle powers, while moved by the same systemic forces, were situated, geographically or otherwise, so differently as to make comparisons problematic. A further difficulty is that where the analysis rests on two or three structurally similar systems, these may be in other respects so dissimilar that comparisons can be made only with reservations. For such reasons, most generalisations about middle powers based merely on facts drawn from the historical material available must be highly tentative. To give a clearer picture of the ways middle powers are inclined to behave, the inductive process has to be combined with a good deal of deduction . If the international conduct of middle powers

8

Middle Powers in International Politics

tends to be conditioned by the prevailing forces in the system to which they belong, the starting-point for a process of deduction must be the interaction of the great powers. Each type of situation created by the dynamics of this interaction, determined as it is by the number of great powers and the state of their relations, presents a range of theoretically possible roles for the middle powers in the system. It also produces a set of constraints and incentives likely in some way to influence their response to the situation. By listing the various conceivable roles and assessing the probable effect of the particular systemic influences at work, it is possible to formulate hypotheses about the types of role most likely to be attempted . These hypotheses then may be tested against the actual behaviour of middle powers in relevant historical situations. The inductive and the deductive method can go hand in hand. While abstract analysis of the system and its processes may be brought in to clarify generalisations made from historical material, recorded facts can be used to try out hypotheses based on deduction from implicit models. The extent to which it is possible to marry the generalisations and the hypotheses without doing violence to the facts or infringing the rules of logic depends on the degree of systemic conditioning of the behaviour of middle powers, and is thus a test of the basic assumption of the present study. As we shall see, the issue of this marriage of the inductive and the deductive approach is a series of propositions about the typical conduct and likely role of middle powers in certain kinds of international situations. A combination of vague generalisations from limited material and abstract analysis of implicit models is useful also when it comes to assessing the effect that the efforts of middle powers are likely to have on the processes of international politics. By estimating the actual achievements of such powers in a number of concrete situations as well as exploring the limitations on their influence inherent in the system, it is possible to gain an indication of the importance of their various roles. Here again, as we shall see, the outcome of the two-pronged investigation is a set of observations about tendencies in diverse situations of the several systems. The first three chapters of this book trace the development of the concept of middle powers. Starting with the initial emergence and occasional reappearances of the idea in European political writings of earlier centuries, the story continues with the attempts after the First and the Second World Wars to secure a special status for such powers in the League of Nations and the United Nations. The last

Introduction

9

stage takes in various scholarly efforts of more recent decades to define middle powers and classifY states, which lead up to a discussion of the definition and classification used in this work. The last four chapters, which constitute the main part of the study, outline certain patterns of conduct and point to some characteristic roles of middle powers in various typical situations of each of the four basic forms of the states system, namely the unifocal, the dualistic, the triangular, and the multiple. The discussion of the latter form of system is rounded off with some brief speculations about the various imaginable roles of middle powers in a global multiple system, one of the most frequently canvassed possibilities for the future of the international political system. The analysis of the four sorts of system allows us to identify the kind of systemic conditions that have proved most favourable to middle powers set on taking an active part in international politics, whether at the systemic or at the sub-systemic level. The book concludes with an attempt to estimate the quality of the contribution of middle powers to the international political process. Bearing in mind the claims that have been made on behalf of such powers, in the earlier as well as in some of the more recent literature on the subject, we shall try to decide, on the basis of their record, whether, how, and to what extent middle powers tend to take a constructive part in the pursuit of the basic goals ofinternational society - order and security, peace and j ustice.

1 The History of the Idea Since the focus in both the older and the newer literature of international politics generally has been on the principal powers, the basic distinction in writings about the modem states system has always been between great powers and others. More often than not the latter have been grouped together under the label of minor powers or small states and given only little attention. But many writers of the past have divided the non-great states according to size and importance into two, and sometimes three or more, classes. Some of them have gone out of their way to comment on the nature and speculate about the role of the powers in the category immediately below the great powers. And a few have actually made this intermediate level in the hierarchy ofpowers their chief concern. Far from amounting to a continuous tradition of thought on the subject, the observations on the character and discussions of the function of secondary or middle powers to be found in earlier political writings can be described as scattered and isolated . Yet, the fact that the part played by these powers in the international system has been for centuries an occasionally recurring subject of the literature makes it worth tracing the history of the idea. For the earlier period it may suffice simply to note some of the ideas that have been advanced and trace any development of thought that may be observed. But for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from the states systems of which most of the material for the analysis of the conduct and role of middle powers to be set out in later chapters is drawn, there is more point in presenting the ideas in the systemic and political contexts in which they arose. 1.1

BEFORE 1814

A sketch of the earliest history of the notion of middle powers in European political thought may be found in a fragment of a draft chapter on the grading of powers left by the late Martin Wight. 1 lO

The History of the Idea

11

Here Wight showed how the grading of powers started with the simple recognition that states are of different kinds and magnitudes and developed into the doctrine that they accordingly have different roles in international society. Some of the early writers he found it particularly worth looking at were Aquinas, Bartolus and Botero. When Thomas Aquinas, writing more than seven hundred years ago, tried to formulate the concept of the state, he came up against the difficulty that states are heterogeneous. His response was to distinguish three classes of political units: city, province and kingdom. He did not define his intermediate category, and it is not clear from his usage what exactly he meant by the term 'provincia'. 2 Yet by introducing three classes of states he prepared the way for future speculation about the nature and role of the members of the middle class. In the following century Bartolus ofSassoferrato, the Italian post­ glossator, took the division into three classes one step further. By fitting the Aristotelian triad of constitutions into a grading of states, he arrived at the following order. First, magna in primo gradu magnitudinis, came city-states, which, in his view, ought to be ruled by the whole people. Next, major, et sic in secundo gradu magnitudinis, were states too large in territory for direct democracy and best governed by aristocracies. His examples were Venice and Florence. Last, maxima, et sic in tertio gradu magnitudinis, came a people or nation so wide in dominion that only monarchy could provide it with unity and good government. Here the Roman Empire would be a good example, he suggested. 3 Bartolus's criterion for classifying states, we may note, was territorial size, and his concern constitutional form rather than international role. But by associating a particular type of government with each class of state he helped to bring out the point that differences of size between the three classes go with differences of kind. Surveying the following centuries, Martin Wight did not find anyone before Botero who developed the grading of powers and gave substance to the class of middle powers. Giovanni Botero was a Jesuit-trained Piedmontese teacher of philosophy and rhetoric who became archbishop of Milan. His Ragion di Stato appeared in 1589. At the outset of the book, he divided states into three classes: some dominions are small, others large, others medium; and these are not absolute but comparative, and with respect to their

12

Middle Powers in International Politics neighbours. So a little state is one that is not able to maintain itself alone but has need of protection and of the support of another, as the Republic of Ragusa, and of Lucca. A medium one is that which has force and authority sufficient to maintain itself without the need of the help of another, as the Dominion of the Signory of Venice, the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Duchy of Milan, and the County of Flanders. Then we call those states great which have notable advantage over their neighbours, as the Turkish Empire, and that of the Catholic King. 4

A few pages later Botero asked which states, large, small or middle­ sized, are most lasting. After discussing the effects of the weakness of small states and the dangers of being large, he turned to the advantages of the middle-sized states: Middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth and power being moderate, passions are less violent, ambition finds less support and licence less provocation than in large States. Fear of their neighbours restrains them, and even if feelings are roused to anger they are more easily quieted and tranquillity restored. . . Thus some middle-sized powers have lasted far longer than the greatest, as we see in the case of Sparta, Carthage and above all Venice, for there has never been an empire in which mediocrity of power went with such stability and strength. Yet although this medio­ crity is more conducive to the preservation of an empire tha'n excessive power, middle-sized States do not last long if their leaders are not content but wish to expand and become great, and, exceeding the bounds of mediocrity, leave behind also those of security . . . So long as the ruler recognises the limits of mediocrity and is content to remain within them his rule will be lasting. 5 Obviously preferring states of middle size, for which he used the terms me