INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
R. K. Pruthi
SARUP & SONS NEW DELHI - 110002
Published by SARUP& SO...
539 downloads
2631 Views
25MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
R. K. Pruthi
SARUP & SONS NEW DELHI - 110002
Published by SARUP& SONS 4740/23 , Ansari Road Darya Ganj , New Delhi· 110002 Tel. : 2328 1029, 23244664, 51010989 Fax: 23277098 E-mail : sarupandsonsin@hotmail .com.
lnternalionaf Politics
to Reserved 1st Edition - 2005 ISBN 8 I -7625-545-9
PRINTED IN INDIA
Published by Prabhat Kumar Sharma for Sarup & Sons, Laser Typesetting at Chitra Computers and Printed at Roshan Offset Printers, Delhi .
Preface
International Politics has entered a period of pr9foll,nd unsettling change. It is riven by discord, cultural diversity, economic inequality and political fragmentation. Revolution in information technology, regiooalizalian of world economy, transformation in Eastern Europe, new axes of conflict and alignment suggest that the world is on the edge of a new historical epoch. Our lives are increasingly influenced by activities and events happening away from the soc ial context in which we carry on our day~to·day activities and emerging trends and patterns of interaction in global politics reveal the complexity of the contemporary international political order. In thi s complexity and di versity, intense patterns of interact ion, the permeability of the nation state, rapid and cascading change, and the fragility of order and governance, the five characteristics features of the international political system can be understood in proper history perspective is the aim of this book. Effort is made to provide to our readers, the important and innovati ve material on the subject, oriented specially for students and teachers. We take this opportunit y to reco rd our g rateful acknowledgements to the authorities on the subject. Librarians and their staffmcmbers have rendered aU poss ible help, we thank them all.
vi
Co-operation, kindness and hard work of my publisher Shri Prabhat Kumar and his staffmembers have been immense. We sh311 all feel adequately rewarded if our humble labour promotes further thining on the subject and also if our readers find the book
useful for them.
Contents
Prefa ce
,
I.
Towards A New Geopolitics
2.
The Place of Political Science
15
J.
Principles of Government
28
4.
The State
49
5.
Thomas Paine 's Political Writings
74
6.
The Evo lution of the Slate
III
7.
The Rights of Man
129
8.
The Politics of Southem Africa
168
9.
West Asia and the World Order
191
10.
Non-Alignment
208
11.
Changing Contours of World Politics
225
12. The Coming International Order
242
13.
268
International Relations : Concept and Application
14. The United Nations and International Politics Index
295 310
1 Towards A New Geopolitics
'A new era is emerging in the life history of the international system' wrote Saul Cohen after the momentous events of 1989 and 1990. He went on to express his optimism that, following the end orlhe Cold War, the whole system would be able to move to a higher stage of development in 1991 . I
Optimism of this kind is inherent in the hope, frequentlyexpressed since 1989, of the dawning of a 'new order' in which that
confrontation which was the keynote of the Cold War would he replaced by an era in which peace and harmony would prevai l. However, in a paper published at about the same time as that of Cohen, Pierre de Senarclens struck a more sombre note when he observed that 'the international scene is still the place where all the crises. conflicts and relations of domination and violence ... appear in their starkest guise' .l
He observed that what Raymond Aron referred to as 'the state of nature' has periodically prevailed over 'the rule of law' thus upsctting the delicately balanced international system. In the aftermath of the Cold War, a new order with its own particular ' rule of law' is in the course of coming into being, but in many parts of the world the convulsions which have accompanied the collapse of the old order appear also to have produced a reversion to something like a 'state of nature'. In the past, the collapse of one order and its replacement by a new one has normally taken place after a regional or global war, a massive rnal of strength among the powers resulting in profound changes in Ihe geographical distribution of power. As a result of th is, the hierarchy ofi ntemational power relationships
2
buernj:uional Polirics
has been transformed. Some great powers have been toppled from their
dominant positions, others have moved up to replace them, while yet others, once great, have fallen completely out of the power rankings. Whatever may have been the individual motivations for their behaviour, the function of the great powers in relation to the
international system as a whole has been to establish and maintain a degree of order. This they have done both individually within their
particular territorial spheres and collectively through the establishment of a 'concert' of powers, a balance of coercive forces which, for a period at least, has brought stability, or at least the appearance of it. The successful maintenance of a concert of this sort has been dependent upon the continuing good will of all the major participating powers. Should one of the powers seek unilaterally to bring about substantial change, and so challenge the system, the concert will be unable to survive. Challenges of this sort are motivated initially by attempts to achieve positions of primus illter pares within the existing system and, shoul.d such a development prove intolerable to the other powers, to replace the system by a new one centring entirely on the power itself. Such moves constitute bids to attain positions of dominance and they have nonnally been undertaken in certain clearly identifiable geopolitical circumstances.} The effect of this on the international system has been to link together ' the state of nature', that assertion of unrestricted physical power, with 'the rule of law', the curbing of such power. In the European theatre, the response to a bid by one or other of the great powers to attain a position of dominance has usually been the assembling of countervailing force by a coalition of the other powers. This has had the effect of setting limits to the success oftne aspirations of the would-be dominator. The ' newness' of new international orders has thus largely consisted of changes in the geographkal distribution of the centres of power rather than in the nature and disposition of the power itself. The princ ipal objective of the wielding of such power has been the achievement and consolidation of greater territorial control. Paradoxically this situation has had two opposite effects. It has underpinned a kind of ' rule of law' and at the same time it has pennitted resort to a 'state of nature'.
Towards A New Geopolitics
3
The fonner is a consequence of the exercise of authority; the latter of the persistent ri val ries among those who have aspired to exercise it and conflicts with those who have been its objects. It is the tensions which thi s situation has produced which ha ve been responsible for the eventual breakdown of each new order. Each has, in tum, been replaced by one having a different political geography but with the same basic objectives and relying on the same methods for attaining them. Real innovation within the international system entails far more than changes in its spatial patterns. It necessitates a complete shift away from domination to non-domination as the governing principle within it. There have been times and places when non-dominating forms of international organisation have existed. The Hanseatic League, the United Provinces and the Helvetic Confederacy are examples. However, there has not been an overall regional system in which domination, in one form or another, has not been inherent. The relationship of the dominator to the dominated may at times have softened and even come to be virtually imperceptible. Yet, every system has remained fundamentally coercive and the threat of the use of overwhelming physical force to sustain it has been held in reserve. In the periodic transfonnations of the system, those peoples which have been dominated at one period may themselves become dominators in the next. Thus, relief from one domination has signalled not an end of the process but the beginning of a new one. Actual situations of oppression may have been brought to end, but the domination mode has been subsequently resumed. In assessing, from a geopolitical perspective , whether the establishment of an international system based entirel y on nondomination is a realistic possibility, it is necessary to identify that characteristic particular to geopolitical phenomena which has given the political map one essential difference from those maps depicting the other principal anthropo-geographical phenomena. Whil e the spatial distributions of the phenomena of populati on, industry, and commerce have tended to change fairly gradually over periods, oftime, the spatial arrangements of the phenomena depicted by the political map have tended to change fa r more unevenly. Over considerable periods of time the political map has remained relatively static, and thi s fact may give rise to the impression that fairly unchanging and
4
Internarional Politics
even stable situations pertain. However, this illusion of stability has
proved temporary and periods of relative quiescence have been terminated suddenly and explosively. When the dust has settled, the political landscape is seen to have considerably altered, sometimes beyond all recognition, and this fact is reflected in a very different
political map . Thus. while the behaviour of the other anthropogeographicaJ phenomena has usually been gradualist, that of
political phenomena has been catastrophic. It has been less like a river gradually transforming the landscape through which it flows than a quiescent volcano suddenly erupting with the most devastating effects on other terrestrial phenomena in its vicinity. In order to understand the causes of this behaviour, it is necessary to consider further the nature of the geopolitical s urface and the forces which have produced it. The overall effect of the existence of the geopolitical s urface is to segment the phenomena of the other anthropogeographical surfaces so separating them into territorial compartments. The boundaries of these compartments may be impenneable enough to produce distortions in the behaviour of the phenomena located within them. These compartments are the states, and their basic function is.to provide order and protection. The most fundamental concern of the state is to ensure its own self-preservation, and above all this entails safeguarding its territory and the physical bases of its power. A consequence of this is that states possess a built-in propensity to view change with some suspicion . This particularly applies to change which produces alterations, and especially dimunitions, in its size. While extensions of territory are likely to be welcomed, contractions, which have the effect of diminishing available resources and so overall power, are resisted fiercely. The state is thus basically a conservative phenomenon, most particularly in respect of its territorial integrity, and it seeks to consolidate is position through the attainment of a high Icvel of internal hom ogeneity. The most signi fi cant aspect of this is cultu ral homogeneity which is the essence of the concept ofthe 'nation state' . This has been defined as being an attempt to weld 'national community and territorial state imo coextensive e nt ities'.~ It has been frequently expressed anthropomorphi call y by the use of images and icons depicting the state as a person, for instance, John Bull, Marianne. and
Towards A New Geopolitics
5
Uncle Sam. Yet complete 'congruity' of this kind is, in practice, extremely rare and incongrui ty has been far more usual. The state may even have the effect of exacerbating the dissatisfactions of those section s of the population whic h have been margi nali sed by thf' dominant group. Older and more mature states, for instance France, have come to proximate most closely to a situation of congruity in territory and population. The concept of the French ' Hexagon' has come to possess a natural, even sacred, character. Geometry has been invoked to reinforce geography in imparting a sense of morphological rightness, and attempts by foreigners to detach a portion of the sacred territory have been treated as causes for national grief and chagrin. However, in less consolidated states, such as Yugoslavia. the ' national ' character failed to develop and the older nationalities of which the country was composed, such as the Croats and the Slovenes, remained powerful human realities and evoked greater loyalty than the artificially constructed state. With the collapse of communism-that ideological cement which held together many ramshackle political edifices-the underlying internal tensions surfaced and brought about the complete dismembennent of the Yugoslav state. The ' nation-state' nonnally
seeks identification wifh the dominant cultural group as the ' nation ' and in its own defence it appeals to it for support. This it does by invoking the defence of the state, masquerading as 'nation ', from either external or internal perils. It is the c reation of this cultural identity, which has been the most important single factor in state consolidation. In this the state ceases to be merely the local government of one particular segment of territory and enters the realms of the sacred and the mystical. In the defence of its claims to territorial inviolability and invoking divine sanction for its destiny, the sacred soil of the state may need to be enriched with the pure blood of its martyrs. Indeed, blood appears to be the particular ingredient, above all others, which has imparted to the geopolitical surface its singular rigidity. States, said Leopold Kohr, are the products, ' not of nature but This is essentially because they are products of the assertion of the dominance of one section of the population over the others, the geographical expression of this being the control exercised by the core region of the state over its peripheries. The core is both the centre from which political power is exercised and also the centre of the dominant nation. From this combination may arise an ideology tailored to justify offorce '.~
6
International Politics
the destiny of the nation-state on the world scene and the defence of
the values which it claims to espouse. Such defence can easily tum into aggression if further territorial acquisition is deemed to be necessary in the interests afthe state. Above all, an ideology can justify the assertion of dominance over other states and the necessity of reforming the international system to promote this.
'Any system ', writes AJ.R Groom, 'must have the wherewithal to accommodate change and conflict; only by change can a changing environment be accommodated without conflict or catastrophe' ,6 Since the most individual characteristic of the geopolitical surface is its rigidity, together with the instability and violence associated with this, the creation of a genuinely new international order necessitates the 'nonnalisation' of this surface in tenns of the others. The essential prerequisite for this nonnalisation is the introduction ofa capacity for gradual and non·violent change. Kohr maintained that the 'nation states ' being 'artificial structures masquerading as nations' require 'consuming efforts to maintain themselves' and these efforts are directed principally towards the achievement and maintenance of control over the 'real ' nations. Addressing the problems of Europe in particular, he proposed a new political map made up of these 'real' nations. The ' real ' Europe, concealed for so long beneath the strident and chauvinistic colours of the political map, would then at long last show through. A continent would emerge, Kohr asserted, which was made ' up not of artificial imperialist constructs such as France, Spain and Britain but out of the 'real' nations: Brittany, Catalonia, Scotland and so on. This, said Kohr, is 'Europe's natural and original landscape'.' Thi s would be all the more acceptable as an alternative because, by virtue of their smallness if nothing else, these nations would be more likely to advocate associative rather then dissociative means in the solution of international problems. This idea is founded both on the idealistic belief in what Andre Gide described as 'the virtue of small nations' and on the empirical observation that, because of their weakness, small nations are more likely to see themselves as being gainers rather than losers from a successfully functioning internationalism. How does this proposed transfonnational solution address the panicular problem of the singular rigidity of the geopolitical surface?
Towards A New Geopolitics
7
If, as Kohr argued, the new political map would reflect the ' natural and original landscape' then the new surface could prove to be more rather than less rigid. It presents a possible scenario in which an 'eternal' France would be replaced by an 'eternal ' Brittany, Alsace and Languedoc. Likewise, an 'eternal' India could be replace by an ' eternal ' Bengal. Punjab and Kashmir and many 'eternal ' nations might also replace the former Soviet Union. If it is a sustainable argwnent that change must be accommodated, then it·is hardly logical to exclude certain phenomena as being too sacrosanct to be included in this. Indeed, the evidence casts doubt on the automatic virtue of small nations. Small states are by no means immune from aggressive behaviour and consequently from contributing directly to the violence characteristic of the geopolitical surface. After all, the great powers were themselves once small states and their territorial expansion was associated with the presence within them of a particular set of geopolitical characteristics. This spatial equivalent of the aggressive gene nurtured the propensity for territorial expansion.' The central question, then, is not simply about the merits of one particular political map as compared to others. Nor is it a question of one fragile pretence to eternity as opposed to another one. It is how a fundamental change may be made from a rigid geopolitical surface which can be altered only by violent mcans to a dynamic one which incorporates the capacity for non· violent change. Saul Cohen made . the link between the two concepts of small states 'and geopolitical change. As a result of the present tendency towards 'deconcentration of political power' he foresaw a continued 'proliferation' of new states. Important among these were 'gateway states', similar to Rosecrance's ' mediative states ', which were the agents for converting 'zones of conflict' into 'zones of accommodation '.9 [n contrast to Kohr's vision which, although incorporating such profound changes, is ultimately a static one, Cohen's is dynamic . Words like 'change', 'cvolution ' and 'emergence' recur. However, the main stumbling block in converting this potential dynamism into reality lies in making it acceptable to'the principal international actors. Such a development, Cohen maintained, need not be regarded as necessari Iy weakening existing powers. On the contrary, there can be positive advantages to them in allowing the new states to emerge.
8
Intern.ational Politics
Building a capacity for change into the world 's geopolitical surface was advocated by the French political geographer, VanMorvran Goblet, before World War II. In The Twilight of Treoll·es. Goblet proposed that the stalic political geography of Europe, sanctified as it had been by periodic treaties, should give place to a political geography which was 'living and evolving' . He condemned 'Ies lin/ires lIuturelles' (natural frontiers) and ' the emptiness of mystical nationalisms' . 10 Indeed, Goblet regarded the concept of the 'nation' as being essentially something developed by states to further their own interests. Such nations were produced by a method akin to alchemy. the selected ingredients being mixed together-adding fog as well, as did the Celts, he observed wryly. II II was imperative that, given the capacity for self- s
1992 , "Disorder Restored," in Rethinking America Secllrity. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Trcvertoll (OOs.), New York: Norton. pp. 213-3 7. 1994/5' "The False Promise of International Institutions." III/emotional Security 19: 5-49. Morgemhau, Hans 1978. Politics AII/ong Notiolls: The Struggle for Power ond Peace, 5th edition New York: Knopf. Mueller, John 1989, Retreat FIYJm Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books. Nau. Henry R. 1995. Trade alld Securily: US Policy UI Cross- Purposes. Washington, DC: AEI Press. Nordlingcr, Eric A. 1995, isoiariolllsm Recolljigured: American For"igll Policy /01" U Nell" Celltury, Princeton: Princeton Universi ty Press. Nye, Joseph S. 1990, BOl/lld TO Lead: The ("hallgillg Nallll"c 0/ AmeriCQlr P ower. New Yo rk: Bas ic Books.
267
The Coming Internatiollal Order 1992, "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs 71: 83-96. 1995. "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreigll Affilirs 74: 90- 102.
Nye, Joseph S. and Owens, William 19Q6, "America's Information Edgc" Foreign Affairs 75: 20-36. Oberdorfer. Don 1997. The 711'0 Ko/'eas : A COlllemporary HistOlY , Reading, MA; Addison Wesley. Posen, Barry and Ross, Andrew 1997, "Competing US Grand Strategies," in Lieber (ed.), pp. 100-34. Reich, Robert B. 1990, "Who Is Us'?" Han'alTi Business Rel'iell' 90: 53-64. Rosecrance, Richard 1986, TIJe Rise of Ih e Trading Stale: Cummerce an d Conquest inlhe Modem World, New York: Basic Books. Schwarz, Benjamin 1996, "Why America Thinks It Has tv Run the World:' The At/all/ic mOlllh~1' 277: 92-6. Schweller. Randall 1999, " Reali sm and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources," in Kapsteill and Masta nduno (cds.), pp. 28-68. Singer, Max and Wildavsky. Aaron. 1993. The Real World Oilie r: ZOIlI:,\' of Peace. ZOI/('S of Turmoil, Chatham. NJ: Chatham I-louse Publishers. Strem lau, John 1994/ S. "Clinton's Doll ar Diplomacy," Fo/"dgll Polic.' · 97: 18-35. Thucydides 1954, The Peloponnesial/ 11'(11'. Rcx Warncr (trans.). New York: Penguin Books. Thurow, LeSler 1992, Head to Head ' Til(! COII/ing ECOllomic Battle Among iapa". Europe, alld All/erica, New York: Morrow. Tyson, Laura D'Andrea 1992, JIIllo~' Bashillg WhvlII? Trade Conflier ill HighTee/Illology Indusl ries, Wash ington , DC: Institute for Internationa l Economics. United States Embassy, Tokyo 1992, "Japan's Aggregate Foreign Trade in CY 199 1," Document #220223Z, January. Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Allial/ces, Ithaca: Cornell Press.
Unive~i ty
Waltz. Kennelh. 1979, Them)" o/llllel'l1atiollal Politics. Reading: AddisonWesley. 1993, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," Illternatiollal Security 18: 45-73. Wayman, Frank W. and Di~hl. Paul F. (cas_) 1994, Recollstructillg Realpolitik. Ann Arbor: Unjvc~ity of Michigan Press.
13 International Relations: Concept and Application
There is no major and definitive key outlook on world affairs. Instead of viewing human life and history from the perspective of a single "out look," the hazy discipline ofintcmational relations consists morc of a series of "vanlagc poi nts" or "approaches." These attempt to interpret the various facets of world politics and to systematize the loosely related force s and factors that have chardcterized the recent develo pment of the relations of nations. Prior to the twentieth cent ury it would have been premature and erroneous 10 talk in terms of a well-defined disc ipline of International Relations.
Indeed, the history oflhe subject is surprisingly brief, vague, and frequently irrational. In the nineteenth century it had largely bogged down in super-sophisticated, highly Icgalistic, and philosophically oriented disscl1ations. which only occasionally revealed bricf glimpses of international relations and deal! wit h practical political material s in a purely haphazard and incidental manner. Ulltil the pioneering work of stich political geographers as Ritter a nd Ratzel, who successfully injected notes of down-la-earth reali sm into nincteenthcentury social sc ience, international relations was marc or less compelled to hide behind the cloak of some other di scipline. Thi s "ponmanteau comp lex" was evident even in the brilliant writings of Mahan . whose significant pronouncements on international political mailers we re carefully camouflaged behind [aye rs of diplomatic hi story or internationallaw.
International Relatiolls: Concept alld Application
269
The turning point came with the new century, which brought a tremendous upsurge of interest in international affairs as well as a healthier and more reali stic approach to problems of modern diplomacy. In retrospect it is obvious that the climactic age of IOtal wars has helped to usher in what Dean Acheson so aptly described as the age of " lola1 diplomacy." The revitalizing influence asserted itself from two different and wholly unrelated sources. On the one hand, certain notable Anglo-American writers sparked this progress. Singling out two representative names from among the many pioneers, one must mention Mackinder and 1. Parker Moon, whose massive Imperialism alld World Politics, first published in 1904, served as a useful general textbook and who for the first time in American educational history held the title of"Professor of Intcmational Relations." Simultaneously, a number of Marxist writers, some closely linked to Western European fonns of sociali sm. others clearly the forerunners of Russian Bolshevism, began to expound Communi st doctrine s on international politics and offered concrete applications of Marxist dogmas to the realities of twentieth-century world politics. No student of this discipline can afford 10 neglect the early writings of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, or the differently oriented literary products of Kaulsky or Bergson. For American purposes, thc first truly systematic and penetrating study of the entire field was prepared by Frederick L. Schuman. whose monumentalllllen/atiollal Politics first appeared in 1933. This work had a broad impact on the teaching and rescarch of internalional relations in the United States.
FOUR MAJOR APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1. The Legalistic School This approach is derived from the study of intemationallaw and is imbued with legal systems, juridical values. and expectations. Its principal emphasis is on the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and its overriding obj::ctive, the maintenance and perpetuation of regional a nd global peace. It optimistically sets out to survey international relations primarily as a set of restraints imposed upon
lmemalionai Politics
270
the individual nation -state by the community of civilized nations.
This attitude assumes exceptionally high standards of international behaviour and methods ofthe day-by-day operation even when there
seems to be little ground or few practical reasons for making such starry-eyed assumptions.
In order to insure a peaceful status qllO, exponents of thi s school urge individual nation-states, as participants in international disputes or crises. to resort to certain complex and highly developed techniques of confl ict resolution. The three methods most frequently discussed in
the literature are arbitration, adjudication, and- last but not least negotiation. Arbitration in thi s co ntext implies the voluntary submission of dispu tes by the individual states to a judge or group of judges of their own choice. It further implies the unanimous acceptance of the judicial award as binding and postulates a continuing deep respect for the law. Important methods "approaching arbitration" have developed as parallel procedures of dispute resolution. These involve the use of Mixed Com mi ssions, Commissions of Inquiry and of Conciliation, and have been widely employed throughout the nineteentwenties and thirties. Adjudication assumes that t he dispute is submitted ·to a permanent international court, which, acting as the strong arm of a truly international judiciary, has firm powers of imposing sanctions upon the participating governments. Unhappily, both the Permanent Court to International Justice of pre- World War II vintage, and more recently the International Court of Justice, are merely pale replicas of the forceful image of a strong and independent seal of international judicial power. Of overriding importance are the well-established senlement techniques of international negotiation, whieh-at their best--can be defined as diplomatic bargainin g processes based on the mutual assumption of successful settlement. Within the framewo:-k of such "Conference Diplomacy", whether secret or open, each side will strive to attain max imum national advantages with minimum concessions to the other sidc. Nevertheless, diplomacy by conference also presumes a friendly and constructive atmosphere in which workable intcrnational soluti ons can readily be hammered out w ithout violations o f that untouchable "taboo" of world affairs, the selfish national interest.
llllemational Relations: Concept ami Application
27.
This last poinllcads to the most relevant criticism of the legalistic school. Its exponents tend to live in [he clouds, hopefully anticipating both high moral standards of international conduct and selfless law. abiding patterns of national behaviour. It is safe to state that tbe era of such high expectations disappeared irretrievably on June 28, 1914, when the tragedy at Sarajevo set off the new age of total wars. Other approaches to international politics had to emerge from the bolocaust of World War I, as logical aftereffects and consequences of world·wide sentiments of disillusionment and despair.
2. The Organizational-Idealistic Approach As a reaction to the tragedy of World War I, thi s school of thought expressed a growing sense of the need for collc.:tive action against aggressor states. Stecped in the spirit of intcrnational organization, it carried the earlier and strictly legalistic approach a long step further by advocaling the "tinning up" and invigoration, first oflhe League of nations, and later of the Un itcd Nations. At its besl, Ihis approach also placed emphasis on such regional organizations as the Pan·American Union, the OAS, and more recently on NATO and SEATO. Its exponents engaged in a continuing argument concerning the primacy of regional vis-a-vis uiliversal types of organization, an argument that could nol be properl y resolved in vicw of thc many intangible considerations on both sides. The idealism of thi s school was most apparent when il professed that the mere existence of a broad internationa l organization was a sufficient safeguard for the maintenance of peace and hannony. It thus tended to ignore the impa ct of the nation-state and th e many complicating ethni c, religious, demographic, or geopolitical forces which- whether divisivc or cohesive in character--