Kant and the problem of metaphysics

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics TRANSLATED BY JAMES S. CHURCHILL FOREWORD BY THOMAS LANGAN

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS BLOOMIN GTON

To the memory of Max Scheler

SECOND PRINTING

COPYRIGHT

©

1965

1962 BY INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER:

62-8974

CONTENTS

ix xv xxiii

Foreword Translator's Introduction Author's Preface to the First Edition Author's Preface to the Second Edition

xxv

Introduction: The Theme and Organization of the Inquiry Section One: The Point of Departure of the Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics § 1. The Traditional Concept of Metaphysics § 2. The Point of Departure for the Laying of the Foundation of Traditional Metaphysics § 3. The Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics Critique of Pure Reason

as

9 14

a

_J�

Section Two: The Carrying Out of the Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics A. The Characterization of the Dimension in Which the Regression Necessary for the Development of the Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics Is Carried Out I. The § 4. § S. § 6.

7

Essential Attributes of the Field of Origin The Essence of Knowledge in General The Essence of the Finitude of Knowledge The Field of Origin of the Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics

n. The Manner in Which the Origin is Revealed § 1\ The Outline of the Stages of the Laying of the Foundation of Ontology § 8. The Method by Which the Origin is Revealed

__

23

26 27 27 30 39 42 42 44

IJ. The Stages of the Realization of the Projection of the Intrinsic Possibility of Ontology

46

The First Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: The Essential Elements of Pure Knowledge

47 v

a) Pure Intuition in Finite Knowledge § 9. The Elucidation of Space and Time as Pure Intuitions § 10. Time as the Universal Pure Intuition b) The Role of Pure Thought in Finite Knowledge § 11. The Pure Concepts of the Understanding (Notions) § 12. The Notions as Ontological Predicates (Categories) The Second Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: The Essential Unity of Pure Knowledge § 13. The Question of the Essential Unity of Pure Knowledge § 14. The Ontological Synthesis § 15. The Problem of the Categories and the Role of Transcendental Logic The Third Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: The Intrinsic Possibility of the Essential Unity of the Ontological Synthesis § 16. The Explication of the Transcendence of Finite Reason as the Basic Purpose of the Transcendental Deduction § 17. The Two Ways of the Transcendental Deduction a) The First Way b) The Second Way § 18. The External Form of the Transcendental Deduction The FourthStage of the Laying of the Foundation: the Ground of the Intrinsic Possibility of Ontological Knowledge § 19. Transcendence and Sensibilization [Versinnlichung1 § § § §

20. 21. 22. 23.

Image and Schema Schema and Schema-Image The Transcendental Schematism Schematism and Subsumption

48 48 51 55 55 �8 61 62 64 69 72 74 80 82 86 89 93 94 97 102 106 113

The Fifth Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: The Complete 118 Determination of the Essence of Ontological Knowledge § 24. The Highest Synthetic Principle as the Complete De119 termination of the Essence of Transcendence § 25. Transcendence and the Laying of the Foundation of 124 Metaphysica Generalis Section Three: The Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics in its Basic Originality 131 A. The Explicit Characterization of the Fundamental Ground Estab134 lished in the Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics § 26. The Transce ndental Imagination as the Formative Center of Ontological Knowledge 134 § 27. The Transce ndental Imagination as the Third Fundamental Faculty 141

vi

B. The Transcendental Imagination as the Root of Both Stems

§ § § §

28. 29. 30. 3].

144

Transcendental Imagination and Pure Intuition Transcendental Imagination and Theoretical Reason Transcendental Imagination and Practical Reason

148 153 162

Kant's Recoil from Transcendental Imagination

166

The Basic Originality of the Established Ground and

C. The Transcendental Imagination and the Problem of Human Pure Reason 177

§ 32. The Transcendental Imagination and Its Relation to Time § 33. The Inherently Temporal Character of the Transcendental Imagination a) Pure Synthesis as Pure Imagination b) Pure Synthesis as Pure Reproduction c) Pure Synthesis as Pure Recognition § 34. T� as Pure S;Jf-affectjgQ end 'be Temp,gral.CAw'acter of the Self § 35. 'l'fie Blllha'�{5nginality of the Established Ground and the Problem of M etaphysics Section Four: The Laying of the Foundation of M etaphysics in a Repetition A. The Laying of the Foundation of M etaphysics

as

178 181 184 186 188 193 201

209

Anthropology 212

§ 36. The Established Ground and the Result of Kant's Lay212 ing of the Foundation § 37. The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology 215 § 38. The Question of the Essence of M an and the True Result of Kant's Laying of the Foundation 221 B. The Problem of the Finitude in M an and the M etaphysics of Dasein 226

§ 39. The Problem of a Possible Determination of the Finitude in M an 226 § 40. The Primordial Elaboration of the Question of Being as the M eans of Access to the Problem of the Finitude 229 in M an § 41. The Comprehension of Being and the Dasein in M an

C. The M etaphysics of Dasein

as

Fundamental Ontology

§ �. The Idea of a Fundamental Ontology § 43. The Inception and Course of Development of Fundam�ntal Ontology § 44. The Goal of Fundamental Ontology § 45. The Idea of Fundamental Ontology and the Critique of Pure Reason

vii

233

239 240 242 247 251

FOREWORD

"In contrast to the methods of historical philology, which has its own problems, a dialogue between thinkers is bound by other laws." Heidegger thus tells the reader in which spirit he should approach Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. This is a "thoughtful dialogue," hence it is as much Heidegger as Kant. Indeed the Kantbuch of 1929 is a model for the long series of dialogues with the leading thinkers of the Western tradition that form Heidegger's rethinking of the whole his­ tory of ontology. The "laws" .&.ov�rnIDg S!lc!t dj!logu�.. �e gr���ed in Heide�e�j� conceptl9n oJ. ��ing..iUld ltow Being 'pas come to be. In the Introduction to Sein und Zeit the role of such dialogue is explained in terms of a program for establishing an authentic, a "fundamental" ontology. The question of "the Being of the things that are" itself came to be at a definite moment in time, with the questioning of the Greek philosophers in the gener­ ation before Socrates. The meaning of the question and the answers given it were in the beginning indetermined, ambiguous, l!.t�t w.i!!I different sorts of possible interpretation. The history of ontology, however, has been dominated E.1_�_�� of"evolving-:!ii.eJ�phY.�!.�al answ��, that 'is, answeR all of the sort that seeks beyond the sum total of things of our experience, a ground in a super-thing-a Platonic Idea of the Good, an Aristotelian Thought of Thought, St. Thomas' Actus purus, Spinoza's Substance. The --meta-physical construction of ontology is necessarily -

ix

accompanied by a "conformity" theory of truth: Truth is con­ ceived as the mind's conformity with the principles of a reality that is lying there before us, already constituted in itself, and inviting our submissive grasp of its reality. Latent in the meta­ physical conception of Being and the conformity theory of truth are great tensions: the t�sion_l?�tw_een the "here-below" and tluL�'!P.i9,gMest C?f things" beyond all expenenee, aDd between....!he_ t?1?-:iec;tum "out-there" and the sub-jectum "in here" Which. ��st someho"" go out of itself to emold and pos�ss. this.-object. The hist.!Y.. �!,-��!.aplIy'�i� has_ been that of the progressive do�OJ!_Q.Lt!tJu)hject. .by_.tbe" !luhl��( After-ill�-lils-tlie subject who knows, and it is in the subject that the criteria of truth are to be found. Descartes takes the decisive step toward converting the object into the subject's "representation." By Kant's time, the way is prepared for the most serious inquiry into the rules governing the subject's placing (stellen) the rep­ resentation ( Vor-stellung) before (vor) himself. With this inquiry the whole historical destiny of metaphysics is fulfilled, although ironically it is saved by being reversed. Because the .Eletaphysical tradition began with the unquestioned assumption �t "Being" lies in a reality already constituted in itself before the human existent arrives on the scene and begins kno� It, a subject-object polarity was established. Then the gradual domination of the object by the subject leads ultimately to the �ealization that witnout the consciousness of the subject the . object could not be. With this tum of events the whole question of Being is projected onto a radically new plane. The "Being" of things is now seen to be grounded in the possibility of experience. The search for "Being" is now directed not toward a "reality in itself" but toward the subjective roots of the transcendental horizons of consciousness. The quest for "Being" is no longer a search for the "thingliest of things"-the "cause" metq-ta-phusika responsible for there being any things in the x

first place; rather, it is a quest to understand how the existent can bring to be a world of meaning, a world of time, a history in which "things'�...h�.mth..sjgnjficaDce. 'WittriOffi(then, the "question of Being" is at a particularly crucial crossroads. Kant opens the possibility of "transcendental inquiry" into the fundamental "ground" of Being. But has he succeeded in penetrating more deeply than the ancient subject­ object split itself, has he plunged through to the authentic moment of the coming to be-neither a subjective nor an objective process, but the mating of the Seienden and the interpretative, time-projecting horizons of the human existent, a mating which brings into being the historical Thing? Heideg­ ger's later dialogues with Hegel and Nietzsche and his laments over the destiny of the "planetary domination of the Technique" are eloquent evidence of his judgment of the historical position of Kant: With Kant the Western tradition has not yet come into full possession of a fundamental ontology that need not devolve either into the subjectivism of 'the Nietzschean "Will for the sake of Will," nor into the objectivism of "the Eternal Return of the Like;" neither into the totalitarian arbitrariness of a ���Technique," nor into the transcendental Absolut­ ism of Fichte:liClreidegger's dialogue with Hegel we are invited to gaze on perhaps the most tragic spectacle of all, a Being-revelation that is so close, ah yet so farl A monumental ambiguity is the result, making it impossible to know whether Being is only the creation of the human will or an Absolute that dips down into time through the medium of the human subject. A fundamental ontology must dispel this ambiguity through a twofold program of inquiry into Being. The published part of Sein und Zeit begins the task of E!ten0.!!!E!0I�al iDQJJi{): into t��_?u��n_ e�stent �. "t!!e place where 'f\eiog comes to �J�J!w�." Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics begins the second aspect of the task, a rethinking of the whole couJte of - .. --

/

xi

that historical coming to be of "Being" and "Truth." The two enterprises--the "existential analytic" and the "recalling of the historical destiny" of the Western tradition-progressively illumine one another. Sein und Zeit would not have been possible if this historical evolution had not brought us to our present state. And we would not be at that point, that is to say the history would not be so comprehended and therefore ad­ vanced another step, if Sein und._Ze!�J1.!l��ct,u�L been carried out. Ktm1..!l!!!LJ!!.'Lf..!9l!1!'E "�f M:etaphysics is, then, a collision of the vision of Sein und - i;it �Wiih 'th�-'�on-of -the Critique oJ Pw:elteason,-ilie-Iatter- a\,fsion"';ithOtit whicn-:S-e7n

u�Telt'i�Iili[�T§;;'�;;P9iii�I��:,�i(9Pi��?:.�� ZeIt nidto �nd,.-giving.the-Critiqlle .in Jb3t.,..�ac£.lts ultimate sen'se. �'--'-Iii"'Ka�t' and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger is not,

then, trying to say what Kant "really" said, nor what he "meant" to say. Rather, in this work we simply witness Heidegger in the very personal act of nourishing the enterprise of funda­ mental ontOlogy on the wine of the first pressing of the Critique. Against the background of his conception of the history of ontology and with the basic discoveries of Sein und Zeit in mind, !Jeidegger wishes to profit as !llU� !�))2�ible fr�e . Critiqu7s"'transce.m1Cfijtill�t1ll£�tl!w1.214.nagmBUgn a(l'oundation .2t a _9rl.ll.bQrWlQ.,QL���Heidegger wishes to liberate these discoveries from whatever hesitations, ambiguities, or later subjectivizing or absolutizing interpreta­ tions may keep them from full fruition. This fruition is the "fundamental ontology"--and Kant and the Problem of Meta­ physics is an instrument of that peculiarly Heideggerian enter­ prise. Is this work of interest then only to the student of Heidegger and not to the �tudent of Kant? Were Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" based on a fantastic and absurd reconstruction of the history of philosophy, such would then be the lamentable ..

xii

case.

That there are some unacceptable elements in Heideg­

ger's reading of the history of our tradition is undeniable. But

before anyone consigns the whole enterprise to the limbo of philosophical curiosities, let him, if he is a serious student

of Kant, read the work here translated as evidence that there

is much in what Heidegger says about our history, and that

both his insights and his errors in this regard run on the deepest

explanation. Before Heidegger applied Sein und Zeit to Critique of Pure Reason, no one had so clearly seen the

possible level of historical

the phenomenological ontology unveiled in the

ontological mission of Kant's great work, the sense in which

ontology. Heideg­ dP.t�. ����� 9!

its anti-metaphysics is precisely fundamental

ger's Being-in-time visio� .�!l�J..n�es the temporal synthesis of the imagination as ground of

..

the

cOiDiD�-or1li�:jliiit "arlf'riever�'has'ooen o;foIe:"An(f !,ga� � g ,w. ..

..�..

� ,,� �

, ........�.,.........

..................0.4 .. ..�".,��, .......u.-:��">.fo.'*�".

O''UiC

..�_loI.... �� ...

in this perspective, the First Edition's glimpse of the problem

of the Nothingness of the "Thing in itself"

is brought into

stark relief, and the Second Edition's apparently deliberate backing away from it is dramatized so that the enigma it

poses cannot be overlooked.

These are contributions of authentic Kantian commentary­

of a dialogue with Kant on his own level. Criticism of

and the Problem of Metaphysics

Kant

should march on this same

level. Only the confrontation of ontology with ontolOgy, and

this in a way that can challenge a whole conception of history,

is worthy of participation in this dialogue. It is in this sense that the is a model, not only for Heidegger's own

Kantbuch

subsequent dialogues, but for all "thoughtful dialogues between

thinkers. " Philosophical explanation is only worthy of our

tradition when it moves with the current of Being itself.

THOMAS LANGAN

xiii

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, accord­ ing to Heidegger, is to explicate the Critique of Pure Reason "as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics as a problem of

fundamental ontology" (p. 3 ) . Metaphysics, Heidegger explains, can be divided into two distinct parts, ( 1 ) metaphysica specialis, which is concerned with the study of the particular spheres of essents,l i.e., God, nature, and man, within the essent in totality. and (2) metaphysica generalis, the object of which itthe s� �._esse�!"':iE- general." i�l!.!2!�-or in Kant) termin