Journal of Semantics, Volume 1, No 2, 1982

/· JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF THE SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE ...

Author: Nijmegen Institute of Semantics

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JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF THE SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE

MANAGING EDITOR:

EDITORIAL BOARD:

Pieter A.M. Seuren (Nijmegen University)

Peter Bosch (Nijmegen University) Leo G.M. Noordman (Nijmegen University)

REVIEW EDITOR

Rob A. van der Sandt (Nijmegen University)

CONSULTING EDITORS:

J. Allwood (Univ. Goteborg),

J. Lyons (Sussex Univ.),

M. Arbib (U Mass. Amhent),

Th. T Ballmer (Ruhr Univ. Bochum),

W. Manlen- Wilson

R. Bartsch (Amsterdam Univ.),

J. McCawley (Umv. Chicago),

J. van Benthem tGroningen Univ.),

B. Richards (Edinburgh Univ.),

(Max Planck Inst. Nijmegen),

H.H. Clark (Stanford Univ.),

H. Rieser (Univ. Bielefeld),

G. Fauconmer (Univ. de Vincennes),

R. Rommetveit (Oslo Univ.),

P. Gochet (Univ. de Liege),

H. Schnelle (Ruhr Univ. Bochum),

F. Heny (Groningen Univ.).

J. Searle (Univ. Cal. Berkeley),

J. Hintikka (Florida State Umv.), H. Hilrmann (Ruhr Univ. Bochum), G. Hoppenbrouwers (Nijmegen Univ.),

R. Stalnaker (Cornell Univ.), A. von Stechow (Univ. Konstanz), G. Sundheim (N1jmegen Univ.),

St. Isard (Sussex Univ.),

Ch. Trav1s (Tilburg Univ.),

A. Kasher (Tel Aviv Univ.),

Z. Vendler (UCSD),

Ph. Johnson-Laird (Sussex Univ.),

B. Van Fraassen (Princeton Univ.),

E. Keenan (UCLA and Tel Aviv Univ.),

Y. Wilks (Essex Univ.),

S. Kuno (Harvard Univ.),

D. Wilson (UCL).

W. Levell (Max Planck lnst. Nijmegen),

ADDRESS:

Journal of Semantics, Nijmegen Institute of Semantics, P.O. Box 1454, NL-6501 BL Nijmegen, Holland

Published by the N.I.S.

Foundation, Nijmegen Institute of Se mantics, P.O. Box 1454,

NL-6501 BL Nijmegen, Holland

ISSN 0167- 5133 c

by the N.I.S. Foundation

Printed in the Netherlands

SCOPE OF THIS JOURNAL

The JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS publishes articles, notes, discussions, and book reviews in the area of natural language semantics. It is explicitly inter

disciplinary, in that it aims at an integration of philosophical, psychological, and linguistic semantics as well as semantic work done in artificial intelligence. Contributions must be of good quality (to be judged by members of the

board of consulting editors) and should relate to questions of coinprehension

and interpretation of sentences or texts in natural language. The editors welcome not only papers that cross traditional discipline boundaries, but also more specialized contributions, provided they are accessible to and interesting for a wider readership. Empirical relevance and formal correctness are paramount among the criteria of acceptance for publication.

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

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They should be typed on A4 (or similar format), one-sided, double spaced,

and with a wide margin and should be accompanied by an approx. 200 words summary. Footnotes and bibliographical references should appear at the end

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by advance arrangement.

PRICES AND CONDITIONS OF SUBSCRIPTION

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The JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS is published by the Foundation Nijmegen Institute of Semantics (NIS), P.O. Box 1454, NL-6501 BL Nijmegen, Holland. The NIS Foundation is a non-profit organization, set up with the sole aim of furthering the study of the semantics of natural language.

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187

INTENSIONAL

DOMAINS

AND

THE USE OF

TENSE,

PERFECT AND

MODALS IN ENGLISH*

Bob Rigter

Abstract

As regards point 1 , a set of rules of the type used in the autonomous tradition (cf. Culicover et aL 1 977, Lapointe 1980) is adopted here, and it is assumed that syntactic structures are paired with func tional structures (cf. Bresnan 1 978) in such a way that any V1 node in a phrase marker is paired with a tenseless proposition. As regards point 2, it is argued that for every tenseless proposition referring to a state/ event n, the speaker can make a truth commitment to the effect that n holds true at a time 'r1 within a particular intensional domain (hence fortl-J. lD). It is argued that he does this by assigning t wo semantic tenses to that proposition on the basis of certain chronological orderings within that lD. These two semantic tenses will be called domain tenses. The two domain tenses are the Fn-tense and the Tn-tense. The notions Tn and Fn are defined as follows: Tn is the time where n is located in the chronology of the 1D in which the domain tenses for the tenseless proposition referring to n are computed. Fn is the segment of time on which the speaker focuses his attention when committing himself to the truth of n at Tn in that lD. pn is the present of that lD. The tense is defined in terms of the chronological order of Fn with respect Tn -tense is defined in terms of the chronological to P n and the order of T n with respect to Fn . It 1.s argued that a third semantic tense, called a domain-shift tense (henceforth DOSH tense) is relevant for the surface selection of tense and perfect. A DOSH tense is defined in terms of the relation between the present of an embedding 1D and the present of an embedded lD. Tense-representation rules are provided which match the three semantic tenses referred to above correctly with t1110 nodes (i.e. tense and perfect) in finite S structures, and with syntax

,

JOURNAL OF SEMAN TICS, vol.l, no.2,

pp.

95- 1 45

95

Downloaded from jos.oxfordjournals.org by guest on January 1, 2011

A theory for the use of tense and perfect in English should do three things: 1 . It should provide rules defining the phrase markers in which tense and perfect can occur; 2. It should specify what extralinguistic phenomena correlate with the occurrence of tense and perfect in the structures thpt underlie English sentences; 3. It should provide rules which are sensitive to these extralinguistic phenomena, and which place either +PAST or -PAST under te'1Se nodes and either HAVE or� under perfect nodes, in such a way that the resulting surface realiza tions correctly match the conceptualizations which they are used to express.

BOB RIGTER

node (i. e. perfect) in nonfinite V 2 complements. The most complex eromples of 'sequence of tenses ' are covered by these tense-representa tion rules. Alleged exceptions to 'sequence of tenses ' are dealt with.

one

It is argued that in free indirect style, in counterfactual conditional statements, and also in children 's games of pretend and in self-efface ment strategies in conversational interaction (cf. Lodge 1 979), the referent n of the tenseless proposition that is paired with a nonembedded clause is presented a:3 true, not in the speaker/writer's primary ID, but in an embedded ID. The idiosyncrasies of the use of tense, perfect and modals in these nonembedded clauses are thus also to be attributed to domain-shift phenomena.

(I) (2)

Domain tenses 1 JOHN B E ANGRY John i s angry =

In example ( 1 ) the numeral 1 is used to indicate the referent of the tense less proposition JOHN BE ANGRY. Example (2) -- a tensed version of the proposition m (I) - is a statement which expresses a truth com m i t ment on the part of the speaker. In (2) the speaker states that, in his conceptualization of reality, 1 holds true at a moment located in the speaker's present, on which the speaker focuses his attention. -

Let us call the speaker's conceptualization of reality at the time when he speaks the speaker's primary intensional domain (henceforth PID). I use the term intensional domain - abbreviated as ID -- to refer to a domain of interpretation which has its own set of presuppositions and truth conditions, in terms of which propositions can be evaluated and interpreted (cf. Seuren 1 979: 6lff.). The speaker's PID comprises the speake r 's conceptualization of chronological relations in what he thinks of as 'reality'. The speaker 's conceptualization of time can be represented by means of a band which extends to the left, which is the past, and to the right, which is the future. Above, the numeral 1 was used to indicate the referent of the tenseless proposition JOHN BE ANGRY. Now let us use T 1 as a label for the l ine indicating the time when 1 obtains in the speaker 's conceptualization of time. F1 is used as a label for the segment of time on which the speaker focuses his P 1 is attention when com mitting himself to the truth of 1 at T 1 used as a label for the segment of time which is the present of the ID in which 1 obtains at T 1 In the case of (2), this ID is the speaker 's PID. In other words, p 1 is the speaker's own present at the time of speaking. -

•

•

96

J S , vol. l , no.2


1.

INTENSIONAL DOMAINS AND THE USE OF TENSE (3a)

(4a)

T, (5a)

I ::1

(6a)

(7a) T

r1

P1

(4b)

John has been angry

(5b)

John has been angry for hours

(6b)

John was angry

(7b)

John had been angry

(8b)

John had been angry for hours

1 P 'l

p1

(8a)

John is angry

T r1

1

The time diagrams in the a examples of (3)-(8) are matched correctly with the sentences in the corresponding b examples.1 If the English lan guage consiste·d of simple headclauses only, and speakers only made statements about phenomena in what they think of as reality -- i.e. only computed truth commitments in their PIDs -- the following rules would match time diagrams of the sort given above with the correct selection of tense and perfect.

(9)

Rule for F'l-tense representation

If pn> F n , select a +PAST tense. If pn::; F" , select a -PAST tense.

( 1 0) Rule for yn -tense representation

If Fn> Tn , or F n > T n , select a perfect. If Fn:S Tn , do not select a perfect.

In the rules in (9) and ( 1 0), the symbol> means is later than, the < means is earlier than or coincides with, and the symbol >

�ontains only the right-hand segment of.

symbol means

The symbol n stands for a num ber used to indicate the (intensional) referent of a tenseless proposition. In (3)-(8), I is an instantiation of n. In ( 1 0), as in the rest of this article, JS, vol.l, no.2

97


T,

::1 �;I �l

(3b)

BOB RIGTER the term 'perfect' is used to refer to a surface construction containing the a·uxiliary HAVE followed by a past participle. Below, it will be argued that the selection of tense and perfect is not always based on chronological relations in the speaker's ·PIO. Truth commitments may also be made in terms of intensional subdomains (henceforth ISDs). This is why, in the rest of this article, the term 'F0-tense' (cf. (9)) is used to refer to the chronological relation between pn and pn , and the term 'T0-tense' (cf. ( I O)) is used to refer to the chronological relation between F nand T n, in the ID in which n holds FrLtense and the T0-tense are thus two types of tn..te a 'f'l The chronological relatiOns which hold inside an 10 and which, as has been illustrated in (3)-( l 0), are relevant for the selection of tense and perfect T T 2 , rule ( 1 0) selects a perfect for the proposition =

JS, vol. l , no.2

99


2

BOB RIGTER referring t o 2. This accounts for the distribution of tense and perfect in the subclause of ( 1 1 ). The rules in (9) and ( 1 0) thus match the chronology in ( 1 4)/( 1 5) correctly w ith the distribution of tense and perfect m ( 1 1 ) . According t o t h e theory presented here, t h e sentence in ( 1 1 ) can be paraphrased as f ollows: in the present of the speaker's real world, on which the speaker focuses his attention, it is true that Pete thinks something, viz. that m the present of the w orld of Pete's thoughts, which is l ocated in a time segment on which the speaker continues to focus his attention, it 1s true that the referent of THE PLANE CRASH is located at an antenor time.

2.

F inite and nonfinite representation of domain tenses

( 1 6) It seems that J ohn was angry ( 1 7) J ohn seems to have been angry On the basis of the relatiOn between examples of the sort Illustrated in ( 1 6) and ( 1 7), McCawley ( 1 97 1 ), f ollow ing H offman ( 1 966), analyzed the perfect as a transformed past tense. McCawley ( 1 97 1 ) proposed the f ol l owing tense transformations. ( 1 8) a. Pres_. Past�

(J

have

}

b. have AUX ....,. (J

if agreement has not applied. in environ ment have

-

adopted this analysis In R igter ( 1 980a,b), but showed in Rigter ( 1 98l a) that a nontransfor mational approach to the relation between the +PAST tense f or m was in ( 1 6) and the perfect have been in ( 1 7) is feasible. In th1s article I pursue further the approach adopted in Rigter ( 1 98l a), assummg a shal l ow syntax comprismg the f ollowmg PS rules. Comp - S N P - tense perfect - V 1 v - ... Jljlj

V2

JS, vol. l , n o.2


In the analysis presented here, every ID has its own chronology, and truth com m it ments holding inside IDs are made for any tenseless proposition referring to an n, by computation in the relevant domain of two d omain tenses -- i.e. an F "-tense and a T"-tense -- for this tenseless proposition. These se mantiC domain tenses are linguistically represented in accordance with tense-representation rules of the type in (9) and ( 1 0) , wh1ch will, however, be refined below.

INTENSIONAL DOM AINS AND THE USE OF TENSE In ( 1 9) I do not specify the possible complements of V. However, I assume that a V can be subcategorized to take one NP, or two NPs, or 1 an NP - S complement, or a bare S complement, or a V [TO V 2 ] complement, or a bare V 2 complement. I also assume that before lexical insertion terminal labels dominate dummies, and that syntactic structures are paired with functional structures in such a way that any V 1 in a phrase marker is paired w1th a tenseless propos1t1on (cf. Bresnan 197&: 17 ff.). 3 -

I 2

= =

[ 2 ] SEEM JOHN BE ANGRY

The phrase markers underlying ( 1 6) and ( 1 7) before the selectiOn of tense and perfect are g1ven in (2 1 ) and (22), respectively.

(2 1 )

s

�s

w�v2 ,-

perfect

IT

A

A

(22)

JS, voi. 1 , no.2

101


The chronology of ( 1 6) and ( 1 7), and also the two tenseless proposi tions paired with the V 1 nodes in the phrase markers underlymg ( 1 6) and (17), are given in (20). Note that the location of p2 in (20) is in agreement with the constraint in ( I 3).

BOB R IG T ER

(23)

Rules for the representation of domain tenses4 F n -tense representation:

a.

l·· [ 6

]

tense

�

6 ] perfect

vz[

v, [... m

l·· [-PAS T] tense

-+

5[

•••

b . v,[ . . . vz[ 6

]

v,[

perfect

v, [ ... m

[ +PAST] vzll 6 t e n•e perfect

perfect

_,.

v, [ . . . m

vz [ 6

•..

!!'

s

p n� pn pn > Fn

v, [ . . . m H AVE vz[ + PART] v,[ ... ill

3

pn > fn

perfect

Tn -tense representation: c . vz[

6 ] perfect

v, [ ... ]

HAVE

[

v 2 [ + PARTJ v 1 • . . ] perfect

-+

vz [ (J v,[ . . . ]

il

(fn> Tn) v (Fn

>

Tn)

fn � T n

In the rules in (23), n is a number that indicates the referent of the tenseless proposition that is paired w it h the relevant V 1 node. The 1 02

JS, vol. l , no.2


Application of the rules in (9) and ( J 0) on the basis of the chronology in (20) would lead to the correct representation of the Fn-tenses and T n -tenses in the two finite clauses in (2 J) and in the finite headclause in (22). However, the rules in (9) and ( 1 0) do not cover the representation of the F l-tense - i . e . the relation between P 2 and f2 in (20) -- under the perfect node of the nonfinite V 2 complement in (22). I use the term 'nonfinite V2 complement' to refer to a V 2 which is not directly dominated by an S node. The reformulation of rules (9) and ( 1 0) provided Fn-tenses not only under tense in (23) covers the representation of nodes, but also under perfect nodes m nonfinite y 2 com lements. It f also covers the representation of Tn-tenses both in V structures which are di-rectly dominated by an S node, and in nonfinite V 2 comple ments . Note, however, that in § 3, when domain-shift tenses are dealt with, the set of rules in (23) will be extended to accommodate DOSH tense representation, and that this extension will involve a minor modifi cation of rule (23b).

INTENSIONAL DOMAINS AN D THE USE OF TENSE rules in (23) apply from top to bottom in the phrase marker, in the order in which they are listed. Application of (23a) to ( 2 1 ) on the basis of ( 20) insert s -PAST under the tense node in the headclause of ( 2 1 ) , because in ( 20) P 1 = F 1 . The rule in ( 23b) is not applicable to the perfect node in the headclause of ( 2 1 ) , because the y 2 over this perfect .node is the sister of a tense node and the da ughter of an S. Rule (23c) deletes the perfect node in the headclause of ( 2 1 ), because in (20) F1 T1 . =

In the subclause of ( 2 1 ) , the rule in (23a) inserts +PAST under the The rule in ( 23b) is not applicable to tense node, because p2 > F2 the perfect node in the subclause of ( 2 1 ) , because the V 2 over this perfect node is the sister of a tense node and the daughter of an S. Rule ( 23c) deletes the perfect node in the subclause of ( 2 1 ), because in ( 20) F2 T2 . Application of (23) to ( 2 1 ) thus duly results in (24), which is surface-realized as ( 1 6). .

( 24) IT -PAST (J SEEM TH AT JOHN + PAST (J BE A N G RY When we apply (23) to the headclause of ( 22), again on the basis of ( 20), the result is the same as in the case of ( 2 1 ). However, when (23) is applied to the V 2 which is directly dominated by V 1 in ( 22), rule (23b) inserts �;;�T under the perfect node because in ( 20), P� F2 . Since the perfect node IS now no longer e mpty, ( 23c) is not applicable. Application of (23) to (22) on the basis of (20) thus duly results in ( 25), which is surface-realized as ( 1 7). ( 25) JOHN -PAST (J SEEM TO

�� T BE A N G RY

Now suppose we want to represent the chronology in ( 26) in the phrase markers in (21) and (22). ( 26) p1

=

F1

=

T1

=

p2

=

F 2> T 2

1 2

= =

[ 2 ] SEEM JOHN BE A N G RY

Application of the rules in (23) matches ( 26) with the following distribu t ion of tense and perfect in ( 2 1 ) and (22), respect i vely: ( 27) IT -PAST (J SEEM TH AT JOH N -PAST ( 28) JOHN -PAST (J SEEM TO

��T BE ANG RY

��T BE A N G RY

Note that rule (23b) leaves the perfect node in the nonfinite y2 comple F 2 . The �::.�r in (28)results from ment in ( 22) unaffected because p2 application of rule ( 23c). The strings in ( 27) and (28) are realized as ( 29) and ( 30), respectively. Note also that the chronology in (26) is the same as that in ( 1 5), and that the distribution of tense and perfect in ( 29) is ·the same as that in ( 1 1 ) . This illustrates that the replacement =

JS, vol. l , no.2

1 03


=

BOB RIG TER of rules ( 9) and ( I 0) by the rule� in l23) does not affect the original eff1cacy of the syste m . ( 29) It seems that J ohn has been angry ( 30) J ohn seems to have been angry Representati on of the chr onology m ( 3 1 ) in the phrase markers in ( 2 1 ) and (22) yields ( 32) and (33), respectively. ( 3 1 ) pl

F1

=

=

Tl

=

p 2 > F 2 > T2

( 3 2) IT -PAST (J SEEM TH A T J OH N +PAST

= =

[ 2 ] SEEM

J OHN BE ANGRY

7��T BE ANGRY

HAVE BE ANGRY + PART

In ( 32) the F 2 -tense I S represented by +PAST under the tense node of the subclause as a result of the application of (23a), and the T2tense is represented by �::�r under the perfect n ode of the subclause as a result of the applicatiOn of (23c). In the nonfinite y 2 complement in (22), however, rule (23a) I S not applicable because the V 2 i s not dom inated by S and does not have a tense node as its sister. Rule (2 3b) does apply, inserting �;:�T under the perfect node because in ( 3 1 ) , As a result, (23c) is not applicable because the perfect node P 2 > F2 has already been filled by ( 23b). The strmgs in ( 32) and ( 33) are real1zed as (34) and ( 35) respect ively. •

(34) It seems that J ohn had been angry (35) J ohn seem s to have been angry The rules in ( 23) match the pairs of sentences in ( 1 6) and ( 1 7), ( 29) an d (30), (34) and (35), correctly with the chronol ogies given in (20), (26) and ( 3 1 ), respectively. The rules in (23) thus relate the sentence in ( I 7), (30) and ( 35) to three different chronologies. This means that (23) predicts that ( 1 7)/(30)/(35) is amb1guous between ( 1 6), (29) and (34). The f ollowing examples, in which the use of tense and perfect is contextualized by m eans of addition of adverbial restrictions, illustrate the correctness of the prediction concerning the ambiguity of ( 1 7) /(30)/ (35) that is embodied in (23). (36) a. It seem s that J ohn was angry yesterday (P2> F2 T2 ) b. *It see ms that Joh n has been angry yesterday c. J ohn seem s to have been angry yesterday (37) a. It seems that John has been angry for weeks now lP 2 F2"" T 2) b. *It seem s that John was angry for weeks n ow c. *It seems that John had been angry for weeks n ow d. J ohn seems t o have been angry for weeks now (38) a. It seems that when he finally lashed out, J ohn had already been angry for weeks (P 2 > p 2 � T2 ) b. *It seems that when he finally lashed out, J ohn was already an=

=

1 04

JS, vol . l , n o.2


( 3 3) JOHN -PAST (J SEEM TO

I 2

INTENSION AL DOM AINS A N D THE USE OF TENSE c. d.

gry for weeks *It seems that when he fmally lashed out, John has already been angry for weeks When he finally lashed out, John seems to have already been angry for weeks

r

3.

Domain-shift tenses

Neither McCawley's rules in ( 1 8) nor the rules in ( 23) can account for the sentence in ( 39), which should be well-matched w1th the chronol ogy in (�0), in which T1 = P 2 , in accordance w1th the hypothesis in ( 1 3). ( 39) John saw that Mary smi led (�0) p 1 > f1 = T 1 = p 2 = F 2 T 2 =

I = JOHN SEE [ 2 ] 2 = MARY SMILE

Application of ( 23a) correctly inserts + PAST under the tense node of the headclause, and (23c) deletes the perfect node of the headclause. In the subclause, however, (23a) inserts -PAST because in ( �0) P 2 fl, and (23c) deletes the perfect node because in (�0) f2 = T 2 . The resulting string would be ( � 1 ) , which would be realized as ( �2). This is an incorrect result. =

( �1 ) JOHN +PAST (J SEE THAT MARY -PAST (J SMILE (�2) John saw that Mary smiles The incorrect match between (�2) and ( �0) illustrates that the rules in (23) must be adapted. Th1s adaptation will not affect the theory that truth comm itments are made within an lD by means of the computatiOn of two domain tenses, which are given a linguistic representation along lines indicated in ( 23). However, if we are to have a set of rules which will successfully predict that ( 39) and ( �0) are well-matched , a third semantic tense -- which I shall call a domain-shift tense (hence forth DOSH tense) -- must be distinguished, and a rule for the linguistic representation of DOSH tenses must be added to (23). Note that, l ike the term domain tense, the term DOSH tense is used to refer to a JS, vol. 1 , no.2

1 05


The rules in (23) yield the same results as McCawley 's rules m ( I 8), but do so by direct surface representatiOn of the relevant chronologiCal relations. The past tense and the perfect in, for example, ( I 6) and ( I 7) are representations of one and the same chronological relation, i.e. the F Ltense, which in the case of ( 20) is P 2 > F£ . The rules in (23) differ from McCawley's rules in (!&a) in that they do not charac terize the perfect as a transformed past tense. The non-application of ( 23c) to perfect nodes that have been ftlled by (23b) parallels McCaw ley 's rule in ( 1 8b), but achieves the same result non-transformationally, i.e. without deleting a ��A�

BOB RIGTER

semantic relation, not to a linguistic formative. Under conditions that will be specified below, a DOSH tense by a + PAST, or remains unrepresented.

IS

represented l inguistically

When we pass down from a higher ID into a lower ID, there are three possible chronological relations between the P n of the lower ID and the P n - 1 of the higher 10. These relations are listed in (43). (43)

1. pn - 1 > p n pn 2. pn- 1 3. pn - 1

f1 = T 1 = p2 = F 2 = T2

I = SIMON SAY [ 2 ] 2 = HE BE H UN G R Y

The location of P 2 is i n keeping with ( 1 3). Application o f (56a) results in a +PAST DOSH-tense representation on the verb BE, which results in was in the subclause in (57). The fact that (58) has is instead of was indicates that in (58) the rule in (56a) has not applied. If the rules in (56) are correct, the non application of (56a) in the case of (58) can only be accounted for if in the case of (58) there has been no domain shift. This would i mply that in (58) both Simon said ... and he is hungry are statements concern ing phenomena in the speaker 's PID. In the reading of (57) which is well-matched with (59), the truth of HE BE H U N G R Y at T2 is presented in terms of the lSD which has its P 2 at T 1 . This lSD represents the speaker 's conceptualization of Simon 's view of reality at T 1 . In (58), however, the location at p1 of the referent of H E BE H U NGRY viewed in a present focus reflects the speaker ' s direct conceptualization of reality. In the case of (57) representing the chronology in (59), T 1 -- i.e. the moment when Simon said that he was hungry -- could be days, weeks or years before P1 , and the utterance of (57) conveys nothing concerning the alleged truth of HE BE H U N G R Y in relation to the speaker's present conceptualization of reality. In the case of ( 58), however, the alleged truth of HE BE H U NG RY is accepted as playing a role in the speaker's present reality. Thus the sentence in ( 58) could be aptly used to ur ge the addressee to serve dinner as soon as possible. The chronology for (58) is given in ( 60). l a = SIMON S A Y [ l b ] l b =H E BE H UN G R Y 1 12

JS, vol . l , no.2


(57) Simon said that he was hungry (58) Simon said that he is hungry

INTENSION AL DOMAINS A N D THE USE OF TENSE In ( 60) the numeral 1 indicates the domain of computation. Thus both the tenses for the proposition S IMON SAY [ l b ] and the tenses for the embedded proposition HE BE H U N G R Y are computed in the speaker 's PID, of which the present is P 1 • It should be noted that the constraint in ( 1 3) is applicable to ( 59), because (59) contains a T n-1 and a pn . The constraint in ( 1 3) is not applicable to (60), however, because ( 60) does not contain a Tn - 1 and a pn.

=

The question that arises now is whether i t can be predicted when speakers will use lSD computations and when they will use PID computa tions for embedded propositions. This choice is dependent on whether the speaker views the truth of the embedded proposition referring to n at T n in terms of an lSD or in terms of his own direct conceptual ization of the real world. The options can be described and, in view of expected parallels between views of reality of different speakers, it is feasible to make probabilistic statements, but it is not the linguist's task to prescribe the choice either way in specific cases. (61) p 1 ( 62)

p

1

p1

=

{

= =

=

p1 8 p1 b

T1

= =

=

p2

=

F2

=

T2

r1 8 r1 b

I 2 Ia lb

= =

=

=

JOHN SEE [ 2 ] THE LIGHT BE ON JOHN SEE [ J b ] THE LIGHT BE ON

The lSD computation of the tenses for the e mbedded proposition in ( 6 1 ) and the PID computation of the tenses for the embedded proposi tion in ( 62) yield identical results. Application of (56) to (61 ) and to ( 62) yields the string in ( 63), which is realized as ( 64). In ( 63) _the rules that have applied are given in parentheses. ( 63) JOHN -PAST (J SEE THAT THE LIGHT -PAST (J BE ON (56c) (56d) (56c) (56d) ·

( 64) John sees that the light is on The theory outlined above· thus predicts that the subclause in ( 64) is ambiguous between representing the speaker 's conceptualization of John 's evaluation of the truth of THE L IG H T BE ON at T2 which is inside F2 which is located at p2 on the one hand, and the speaker's direct evaluation of the truth of THE L IG H T BE ON at T 1 b which is Js, voi.J, no.2

1 13


The rule in (56a) applies in the case of (59), because in (59) two domains are involved. Since ( 59) entails that P 1 > P2 , a +PAST DOSH tense is inserted in the subclause. The result is was in (57). The rule in ( 56a) is not applicable in the case of (60), because in ( 60) only one F 1 b , rule (56c) inserts a -PAST domain is involved. Since in ( 60) P 1 P'-tense in the subclause. The result is is in (58). 6

BOB RIGTER inside F 1 b which is located at P 1 on the other hand. Application of (56) to the chronology in (65) yields the string in (66), under which the rules that have applied are given in parentheses. Application of (56) to the chronology in (67) yields the string in ( 68). Although the +PAST tense in the subclause in (66) is an instance of DOSH-tense representation and that in ( 68) an instance of F n -tense representation, the strings in ( 66) and ( 68) are formally identical, and are both realized as (69). ( 65)

p 1 > f1

=

T'

=

p2

=

f2

=

T2

I 2

= =

J OHN S E E ( 2 ] TH E LIGHT BE ON

(67)

p1

[

>f 1 a II >f1b

=

=

T1 a

Ia lb

l"b

= =

JOHN SEE ( l b ] THE LIGHT BE ON

( 68) JOHN +PAST (J SEE THAT THE LIGHT +PAST (J BE ON ( 56c) (56d) (56c) (56d) (69) John saw that the light was on In (67), II is a vertical notation of Thus (67) indicates a conceptual ization in which the speaker does not shift his focus. There is no formal representation of this II in (69) although the decoder of (69) may assume the s imultaneity of f1 a and F i b on the basis of the absence of perfects T 1 b -- and of the T1a and that f1 b -- which indicates that F 1 a expected simultaneity of perception ( i.e. I a) and perceived state (i.e. l b). In Reichenbach ( 1 947: 293) and Hornstein ( 1 977: 539), keeping the focal time fixed when passing from one clause to the next is looked upon as a general constraint on the grammar of tense, which is referred to by the term 'permanence of reference point ' . Examples like ( 1 6), ( 1 7), ( 20), ( 3 1 ), ( 34), (35), (48), (49), ( 52), ( 53), ( 54), ( 55), (58), (60) above, and many examples to follow in the rest of this article, show that 'permanence of reference point' is by no means a general constraint.? F urther investigation is required into possible cons t r a i n t s on the placement of F, and into other factors influencing the encoding and decoding of information relating to F-placement. =·

=

=

Let us return to examples (64) and (69). I look upon the twofold possibility of computing the tenses of the subclauses in these examples -- cf. ( 6 1 ), (62) and (65), (67) -- as an asset of the theory outlined above, because these sentences do, indeed, allow us to view the truth comm i t ment in the subclause from the perspective either of John (lSD computation, cf. ( 6 1 ) and (65)), or of the speaker (PID computation, cf. (62) and (67)). The choice of perspective in the subclause may 1 14

JS, vol. l , no.2


SEE THAT THE LIGHT +PAST (J BE ON (66) JOHN +PAST (J (56c) (56d) (56a) (56d)

INTENSIONAL DOM AINS AND THE USE OF TENSE depend on the verb that is used in the headclause. For example, the use of THINK instead of SEE in the embedding proposition may make the lSD computation the more likely source of the tenses in the sub clauses in (70) and ( 7 1 ), especially in a context in which the speaker and the addressee know, or presuppose, that the light was not on at the relevant moment. (70) John thinks that the light is on (cf. (64)) ( 7 1 ) John thought that the light was on (cf. (69))

(72) John said that the light was on (73) While he stood looking at the house, John said that the light was on (74) John said just now that the light was on when he passed the house yesterday (75)

{

> 1 8 = T1 8 p1 > F F 1 b = T1 b

I a = JOHN SAY [ l b ] l b = THE LIGHT BE ON

The sentence in (72) may result from a PID computation based on the chronology in (7 5). Because (72) contains no time adverb1als specifying the chronological location of F 1 8 and F 1 b in (7 5), the sentence in (7 2) unlike those in (73� and (74) underdetermines whether reference is made to a situation m which F 1 8 , T 1 8 , F1 b and T 1 b all coincide -- as in the case of (73) or to a situation in which F 1 b and T 1 b are anter1or to F 1 8 and T 1 8 as in the case of (74). This indeter m inacy tallies with (7 5). --

--

--

(76) p 1 > F 1 = T1 = p 2 = F 2 = T 2 (77) p 1 > F 1 = T1 = p 2> F 2 = T 2

I = JOHN SAY [ 2 ] 2 = THE LIGHT BE ON

The chronological orderings in (76) and (77), which, in accordance with ( 1 3), require an lSD computation of the tenses for the embedded proposition, do not show the indeterminacy of (75). Application of (56) pairs (76) with (72), but only in the reading that fits the chronology in (73) Application of (56) to (77) yields (78). •.

(78) John said that the light had been on (79) John i magined that the light was on In view of the semantic bias of IMAGIN E referred to above, it is to be expected that the sentence in (79) does not show the same degree of indeterminacy as (72), and will tend to be interpreted as referring JS, vol. I , no.2

1 15


If we were to replace THIN K in (70) and ( 7 1 ) by IMAGIN E, this would virtually preclude a PID computation of the tenses in t he subclause, because IMAGINE tends to express that the proposition which it intro duces, though true in the lSD introduced by IMAGINE, is false in the domain in which the tenses for IMAGINE itself are computed.

BOB RIGTER to a chronology of the type supplied in (76). The theory presented here thus makes predictions that can be verified by means of a statistical investigation of corpus material. 5. The finite perfect reconsidered In all examples discussed above in which, in accordance with ( 1 3), T n - 1 (see ( 1 5) , (20), a p n is placed at T n - 1 , it so happens that p n - 1 ( 26), ( 3 1 ), (40), (49), (50), (53), ( 55), (59), ( 6 1 ), (65), (76), (77)). This means that in these cases equally good formal results would have P n. Whether been obtained 1f the constraint m ( I 3) had been pn - 1 the co.nstraint in ( 1 3) is correct as it stands can only be determined in cases in which p n - 1 f. T n - 1 . This is the reason why in this section some examples of a subclause embedded in a headclause with a finite perfect construction will be discussed. =

=

p 1 > f 1 > T1

=

p2

=

F2

=

T2

=

=

The chronology in (80) is in keeping with ( 1 3) , and , in accordance with (56), 1s well-matched with (8 1 ). As is ill ustrated in (82), the sen tence in (8 1 ) can be aptly used in a situation in which John is dead at F1 . This would not be possible if the constraint in ( 1 3) had been F n- 1 P n, thus placing P 2 in (80) at f1 . Example (8 1 ) can therefore be adduced as evidence to support the hypothesis m ( 1 3). =

There are also examples with a present p e r f ect that can be adduced . as evidence to support ( 1 3). (83) a.

p 1

=

f 1 >T1

=

p

2

=

p2

=

T2

1 2

b. I have seen someone leave the house

= =

in

the

headclause

I SEE [ 2 ] SOM EONE LEAVE THE HOUSE

When the verb SEE takes a bare y 2 complement, it always expresses d1rect sense perception of an event. From (83a) it follows that T 1 T 2 • As argued in Rigter ( 1 980a: S 1 3) and Rigter ( 1 98 I a: § 4), the followmg extralinguistic constraint is inherent in the nature of direct sense perception: direct sense perception is only possible if perception T 2). Now suppose and perceived event are strictly simultaneous (i.e. T 1 p n, the constraint in ( 1 3) read pn- 1 p n. This that instead of T n - 1 would mean that instead of (83a) we get (84), in which T 1 and T 2 are no longer simultaneous. This would be an unacceptable result. The fact that (83b) is well-matched with (83a), and the fact that in T 2 , constitutes evidence to support ( 1 3). (83a), but not in (84), T 1 =

=

=

=

=

1 16

JS, vol. l , no.2


JOHN KNOW [ 2 ] 1 HE BE SERIOUSLY ILL 2 (8 1 ) John had known that he was seriously ill (82) When, after the funeral, his will was made public, there was no longer any doubt. John had known that he was seriously ill.

(80)

INTENSIONAL DOM AINS AND THE USE OF TENSE

=

The chronology underlying the use of a present perfect is ei ther Fn > T n or P n Fn > 1" . In the first case, the constraint in ( 1 3) 1 mplies that when a present perfect is used in the headclause and when this headclause contains an embedded S, that embedded S gets a +PAST tense as a result of DOSH-tense representation. This i m pilcation is arrived at as follows. From P 1 F 1 > T 1 it follows that P 1 > T 1 . P 2 , it follows that If P 1 > T1 , and if, in accordance with ( 1 3), T 1 P 1 > P 2 . In that case application of ( 56a) places a +PAST DOSH-tense representation in the embedded S. This is borne out by the example in (85) in which both would and issued manifest a +PAST DOSH-tense representation. pn

=

=

=

However, examples of the type in (86) are also perfectly acceptable. (86) Mr Harari has satd that the money will be paid as soon as the Government issues an export licence It m ay be that in (86) the tenses in the subclauses are arrived at by means of PID computations. However, em beddings of present tenses under clauses with a present perfect would seem to be more frequent than embeddmgs of present tenses under clauses with a simple past. Thts is why a more detailed investigation into the present perfect and embeddings under the present perfect is required. Wtthm the scope of this article the idiosyncrasies of the present perfect cannot be discussed in detail . However, some indications towards a solution of the problem signalled with respect to (85) and (86) can be given. (87) John has told Mary that he 1s !II (88)

1

•

.xH< TEU IWlY

[ 2 ]

The chronology for the headclause m (87) could be represented by the diagram in (88). However , a more precise diagram for the chronology underlying the use of the present perfect in (87) can be based on the following observation in Rigter ( I 980b: 2 2 1 ). "Whenever an event occurs, i t changes the structure of the world in the m ind of a person who is aware of the occurrence of the JS, vol. l , no.2

117


(85) Wildenstein's was unavailable for com ment yesterday. But Mr Max Harari of the dealers has said that the money would be p a td as soon as the Government issued an export licence. ( The Guardian, 1 2 June 1 98 1 , p . 2 (4). M y i talics) 8

BOB RIGTER event, tn the sense that, after that event, that person 's world has become a world in which that event has occurred. Thus an event always has a new world-structure state in its wake." In (88), the event I IS located at T1 , but the new world-structure state in the wake of this event obtains in F 1 . With E1 as a label for the e vent I and with 5 1 as a label for the focal state that follows in l 's wake, (89) represents the chronology underly ing the present perfect in (87) in more detail. It is important to observe that 5 1 is focused on, and that E 1 l ies outs1de the focus. (89)

.

I

r '

:

The d1agram in (89) opens up poss1bill t1es of accounttng not only for the problem signalled w 1 th respect to (85) and (86), but also for collocational restrictions on the use of the present perfect and past time adverb1als. Only 5 1 , and not E 1 , can be speclf1ed by an adverbial referring to definite time. However, E1 can be specl f 1ed by an adverbial referring to an tndefinite ti me.9 Th1s is Il lustrated in (90)-(92). (90) John has now told Mary that he is ill ( 9 1 ) *Yesterday John has told Mary that he is ill (92) John has recently told Mary that he is ill The placement of a P 2 in an intensional-domain hierarchy can be sens1t1ve to the prefocal E 1 (ct. (85)), but can also -- and, it would see m, more frequently -- be sensitive to the focal 5 1 (ct. (86)). It F n - 1 >Tn- 1 would seem , therefore, that the configuration p n - 1 can be F n- 1 s n - 1 , and that F n - 1 > E n - 1 or p n - 1 tnterpre ted as either p n - 1 when this configuration arises, rule ( 1 3) can read T n - 1 as either En - l or S n - 1 . In the latter case, the proposition referring to n can get a present tense by means of an lSD computation. =

=

=

=

Now let us consider the other chronological configuration that is Fn > T n . well-matched with present-perfect constructi ons, 1.e. P n In this configuration, the T n 'straddles' the lef t-hand boundary of � , and the T n requires an obligatory duration adverbial. An example was prov1ded tn ( 5), which I S repeated here. =

f5a) 1

•

J(] [\ BE ANa!Y

r ;b J John has been angry for houn

1 18

JS, vol. I , no.2


_·_�.-' � �- - -�l�tL- - - - - -��

' . ·" " =•· """

IN TENSION AL DOMAINS AN D THE USE OF TENSE ( 5b) John has been angry for hours The question that arises is whether rule ( 1 3) is sens1t1ve to the · left hand segment or to the r 1ght-hand segment of a straddling T. If ( 1 3) IS sensitive to the left-hand segment of a straddling T, the resul t is that pn < pn - 1 , which implies that a +PAST DOSH tense must be selected in a finite S embedded under the clause containing the present perfect. If rule ( 1 3) is sensitive to the right-hand segment of a straddling pn- 1 , which does not lead to DOSH -tense T, the result is that pn representation. Examples (93) and (94) illustrate that either possibility occurs. =

'I have always known that you cared ', she sighed as he closed her m his arms. (94) 'I have felt for weeks that you want me', she sighed as he closed her in his arms. It would appear from (93) and (94) that when the configuration pn- 1 Fn- 1 > T n - 1 arises, rule ( 1 3) can read the symbol > as either > or -·

In this section, options have been indicated for tense selection in fini te clauses embedded in clauses containing finite perfect constructions. The choice out of these options in individual cases requires further investigation. 6.

Semantic tense constraints on the use of modals

Because of limitations on the scope of this article, the treatment of modals presented here will be restricted to a d1scussion of MUST and some brief remarks about WIL L. (95) John I S in Paris (96) John must be in Paris In (95) it is stated as a fact that JOHN BE IN PARIS holds true at T 1 in the focal present of the speaker 's PID (i.e. P 1 F1 T1, JOHN BE IN PARIS). In the reading of (96) in which MUST and 1 expresses a logiCal inference, it is only the logical inference i tself -- i.e. the modal predication with MUST -- that holds true in the focal present of the speaker's PID. JOHN BE IN PARIS in (96) is not stated to b1 a fact in the speaker's PID, but is represented as holding true at T in an lSD that is defined by the presuppositions and truth condi tions tiTat follow from the logical inference to which the predication with MUST refers. Thus JOHN BE IN PARIS m (96), though t rue in that lSD, is only inferred to be t rue in the PID. In (96) the modal predication is used to 'push down' the truth com m i t ment concerning the referent of JOHN BE IN PARIS from the PID into an lSD. The =

=

=

JS, vo1. 1 , no.2

1 19


(93)

BOB RIGTER chronology of (96) IS represented in (97). The analysis I n functional structure of epistemic MUST as the predicate of a tenseless proposition can be traced back to Ross ( 1 969) . 1 D (97) P 1

=

F 1 = T 1 = P 2 = F 2 = T2

I = [ 2 ] MUST 2 JOJ-:N BE IN PARIS =

Syntactically, MUST is subcategor ized as takmg a bare plement. When the rules in (56) match the chronology in the phrase marker m (98), the result is the strmg in (99), duly realized as (96).

v2 com (97) with which IS

S"

�/'--.5. � V2 Nl' tense r:-----V 1 perfect

v /'-..vZ r----V 1 perfect

e

JCJ IN

6

t.

I v�rr

"'-1ST

t.

I �

BE

IN PARlS

(99) JOHN -PAST fJ M UST (J BE IN PARIS When M UST introduces an lSD at T n , the location of the present p n + 1 of that domain is such that, in accordance with ( 1 3), rn pn+ 1 . However, just like the verb EXPECT (cf. the observations under example l ( 53)), M UST does not constrain the placement of the F n + in the domain that It Introduces. This is illustrated in ( l 00)-0 02). =

( 1 00) a. b. ( l O l ) a. b. 0 02) a. b.

=

P1 John p1 = John P1 = John

F 1 = T1 = P 2 P T2 must be In Pans now pZ > F z = T z F 1 = T1 must have been in Paris yesterday F1 T 1 P 2< F 2 = T2 must be in Paris tomorrow =

=

=

=

=

When the rules in (56) match the chronological orderings in ( l OOa) ( l 02a) with the phrase m arker in (98), the resultmg sentences are ( l OOb)-( 1 02b). Note that now, yesterday and tomorrow in ( l 00)-( l 02) are F 2 -specifying adverbials. 1 2(;

JS, vol. 1 , no.2


(98)

INTENSION AL DOMA INS AND THE USE OF TENSE Examples ( 1 00)-( 1 02) illustrate that MUST does not constrain the placement of the F in the ISO that It introduces. However, MUST can only be used if in its own domain -- i.e. the domain In which the pn T n. truth com mitment for the modal predication is made -- p n =

=

( 1 03) Semantic tense constraints on the use of M UST epistem ic MUST: n [n+ I ] deontic MUST: n N P [n+ l ]

1

=

=

T n, If, in accordance with ( ! OJ), MUST can only be used if pn rule (56d) prevents the use of �::i.r before M UST. If, In accordance w i th ( 1 03), MUST can only be used if p n p n , rules (56b,c) prevent the use of �:i.r or a +PAST F n -tense on MUST. The constraints in ( 1 03) thus only leave one possibility for MUST to acquire a + PAST tense: if P n< PI, rule (56a) prescribes the use of a +PAST DOSH tense. =

=

( 1 04) Mary said that John must pay the bill The use of deontic must In ( 1 04) il lustrates that the constraints in ( 1 03), in conJunction with the rules in ( 56), yield correct results. The sentence in ( 1 04) IS ambiguous between the chronological ordermgs in ( 1 05) and ( 1 06). Note that ( 1 05) and ( 1 06) are In keepmg with the constraints In ( I 03) and in ( 1 3). p3

( 1 06)

{

F16 P1 > 1 b :. F

= =

T1 6 T1 b

p 2< p 2

=

T2

T3 MARY SAY [ 2 ] JOHN MUST [ 3 ] JOHN PAY TH E BILL

=

I 2 3

Ia Ib 2

=

=

M ARY SAY [ I b ] JOHN MUST [ 2 ] JOHN PAY THE BILL

The rules in (56) match ( 1 05) with the string in ( 1 07). ( 1 07) MARY +PAST (J SAY THAT JOHN +PAST (J M UST (J PAY (56c) ( 56d) (56a) (56d) (56d) T H E BILL The string in ( 1 07) is realized as ( 1 04), with a past-tense interpretation of must. Note that in ( 1 05) P 1 > T1 and T 1 < T3 . Since ( 1 05) does not SP.ecify how far T1 lies in the past with respect to p 1 and how far T 3 lies In the future with respect to T 1 , it cannot be deter m ined from JS, vol. l , no. 2

121


The functional distinction between epistemiC and deontic MUST can be traced back to Ross ( 1 969) and Perlmutter ( 1 970). It will be seen below that the constraints on the use of MUST in ( I 03) predict correctly in wha t contexts M UST can, after due processing, be realized as past tense must.

BOB RIGTER (1 05) where T 3 is located with respect to P 1 • The opacity of the chrono logical position of P 1 in the lS D i·n which the tenses for JOHN PAY mwt THE BILL are computed tall ies with the fact that the past-tense reading of ( 1 04) leaves it com plete ly open whether payment of the bill might be located before the speaker's present -- i.e. between T 1 and P 1 -- or after the speaker 's present. Application of the rules in ( 56) matches ( 1 06) with the string in ( 1 08). Note that (56a) IS not applicable, because the tenses both for the proposition referring to Ia and for the proposition referring to 1 b are computed in the PID, of which the present is P1 •

The string in ( 1 08) is realized as ( 1 04), with a present -tense mterpreta tion of mwt. Note that this present-tense interpretation of mtist correct ly i mP.Iies that pay ment of the bill has not taken place between 1'1181 and P 1 • This is in accordance with ( 1 06), which implies that P1 < T 2 . In none of the readings of ( 1 04) is it stated that pay ment of the bill will actually take place. This is because truth com m i t ments for JOH N PAY THE BILL, both in the case of ( 1 05) and in the case of ( 1 06), only hold within the lSD in terms of which the truth com m i t ment IS made. Any truths that hold in the deepest lSD in ( 1 05) and (1 06) are subject to the modal predication in the next higher domain. ( I 09) John must pay the bill Now Jet us turn to MUST used in headclauses, as in ( 1 09). U nless the sentence in ( 1 09) IS used in free indirect style (henceforth FIS), mwt in ( I 09) can only be interpreted as a present-tense form . This, too, is consistent with the theory -presented here. When ( 1 09) is not used in FIS, the tenses for the non-embedded modal predication are computed in the speaker's PID. This means that (56a) does not apply, and therefore the only possibility of giving MUST a + PAST tense - i.e. a DOSH tense -- is bypassed. W hen ( 1 09) is used in FIS, however, mwt in ( 1 09) is interpreted as a past-tense form. If the theory presented in this article - - including the constramts on the use of MUST in ( 1 03) -- is correct, this past-tense interpretat ion of mwt in headclauses in FIS can only be accounted for if the +PAST tense on MUST is a DOSH tense. This implies that in F IS the functional structure with MUST -- which refers to a referent indicated by the number n --, though used as the highest tenseless proposition in a headclause, is subjected to a tense computation in terms of an lSD of which the P" lies to the left of P 1 , which is the present of the writer's PID. This implication confirms the validity of 1 22

JS, vol. 1 , no.2


( 1 08) M A R Y +PAST (J S A Y T H AT JOH N -PAST (J MUST (J PAY (56c) (56d) ( 56c) ( 56d) ( 56d) T H E BILL

INTENSION AL DOM AINS AND T H E U S E OF TENSE the theory presented here: a stretch of discourse in F IS is to be looked upon as a verbalization by means of headclauses of information which is subject to the presuppositions and truth conditions of an lSD which the author creates within his own PID. This lSD is conceptualized as the PID of a fictional character, and has as its chronological centre the pn which is the fictional character's present . The F IS convention traditionally places this pn to the left of P1 • 1 2 Example ( 1 1 0) contains a contextualized instance of past-tense must in F IS. ( 1 1 0) He opened his eyes. The room was dark. Oh damn, he must have fallen asleep. He looked at his watch. Five to three!

(1 1 1) ( 1 12) ( 1 1 3) ( 1 1 4) ( 1 1 5)

John John John John John

is in Paris will be in Paris will be in Paris now will have been in Paris yesterday will be in Paris tomorrow

Examples ( 1 1 1 ) -( 1 1 5) illustrate that the use of the epistemic modal WILL -- like epistem ic MUST -- does not constrain the placement of the F n + 1 in the lSD that it introduces. The constraints on the use of M UST formulated in ( 1 03) also hold for epistem ic WILL. Parallel to (95) and (96), the essential difference between ( I l l ) and ( 1 1 2) is that in ( 1 1 1 ) it is stated as a fact that JOHN BE IN P ARIS holds true at T 1 in the speaker 's PID, whereas in ( 1 1 2) only the confident assumption conveyed by the modal predication with WILL is stated as holding true at T1 in the speaker's PID. Parallel to (96), the modal predication in ( 1 1 2) is used to 'push down' the truth com m i t ment con cerning the referent of JOHN BE IN PARIS into an lSD. In ( 1 1 2) JOHN BE IN PARIS is represented as holding true a t T 2 in the lS D introduced by' WILL. As ( 1 1 3) and ( 1 1 5) show, JOHN BE IN PARIS in ( 1 1 2) can be interpreted as holding true at a T2 in an F 2 which is located either in P 1 or to the right of P 1 . Contrary t o MUST, the modals W I L L expressing volition o r habit, and CAN expressing ability or habit can be used if, in the domain of their tense computation, �< P". When this is the case, the past tense in could and would is an F n -tense. For example s, see Palmer ( 1 979: 1 28 ff., 79ft.).

JS, vol. l , no.2

1 23


Although epistemic WILL is often regarded as a modal expressing futurity (see, for example, Dowty 1 979: 322 ft.), it is argued in Smith ( 1 976) and Rigter ( 1 980a: 435ft., notes 1 8, 1 9) that WILL is used to express a confident assumption with regard to either the future, or the present, or the past. Thus examples (95), (96), ( I OO), ( 1 0 1 ) and ( 1 02) in the above discussion of MUST are paralleled by corresponding examples with WILL.

BOB RIGTER 7.

The application of (56) il lustrated in two examples con taming a past tense to refer to a state/event in the speaker's future

The theory presented m this article provides the correct tenses for the following example from Ejerhed ( 1 979: 1 ). ( 1 1 6) The cntics will write that you were lousy tonight (said before the show) The chronology of ( 1 1 6) is represented in ( 1 1 7). =

F1

=

T1

=

p 2 < F2

=

T2

=

p 3 >F 3

=

T3

I [ 2 ] WILL 2 THE CRITICS W R ITE [ 3 ] 3 YOU BE LOUSY Note that ( 1 1 7) IS in keeping with the constraint m ( 1 3) and the con straint in ( 1 03), which also holds for epistem 1c WIL L . Application of (56) matches ( 1 1 7) with the strmg in ( 1 1 8). =

=

=

( 1 1 8) THE CRITICS -PAST (J WILL (J W R ITE THAT YOU + PAST (J BE (56c) (56d) (56d) (56c) (56d) LOUSY TON IGHT The string in ( 1 1 8) is duly realized as ( 1 1 6). The + PAST tense in were in ( 1 1 6) is a case of F 3 -tense representation in the deepest embedded lSD. In ( 1 1 6) the only truth commi tment that is made in terms of the speaker ' s PID 1s the expression b y means of W IL L that the speaker entertams a confident assumption at T 1 , which is located in the speak er's present on wh1ch he focuses h1s attention. In ( 1 1 6) the truth com mitment that 2 is located at T 2 in F 2 m ( 1 1 7) only holds for the lSD which IS m troduced by WILL and whiCh constitutes the set of presuppo Sitions and truth conditions that IS confidently assumed at T 1 in the speaker's PID. Likewise, in ( 1 1 6) the truth com n � i t ment that 3 is located at T 3 in F 3 m ( 1 1 7) only holds for the lSD introduced by W RITE which represents the set of presuppositions and truth conditions ascribed to the crit ics at P 3 which comc1des with T 2 , which is the t i me when the cnt1cs are expected to write. From ( 1 1 7) it follows that P 1 < T 2 > T 3• Smce there 1s no indiCation as to how far T 2 lies in the future with re spect to P1 and how far T3 lies in the past with resp�ct to T 2, ( 1 1 7) does not specify whether P 1 IS later or earli l r than T . The fact that in the deepest embedded lS D in ( 1 1 7) the P of the speaker's PID is 'in VISible ' is borne out by the necessity to add 'said before the show' in ( 1 1 6) to ensure a readmg in which T3 > p 1 . ( 1 1 9)

I 24

He said that the critics would see that you were nervous (said before the show) JS, vol. 1 , no.2


( 1 1 7) p 1

INTENSIONAL DOMAINS A N D THE USE OF TENSE T1

p2

=

F2

=

T2

=

p> < F 3 I 2 3

4

= = =

=

T3

=

p4

=

F4

=

T4

HE SAY [ 2 ] [ 3 ] WILL

THE CRITICS S E E [ 4 ] YOU BC N ERVOUS

The chronology in ( 1 20) is in keepmg w ith the constraint i n ( 1 3) and the constraint m ( ! OJ), which also holds for epistem1c W I L L . Application of (56) matches ( 1 20) with the string in ( 1 2 1 ) , which IS duly realized as ( 1 1 9). (121)

The + PAST tense in would m 0 1 9) is the result of DOSH-tense represen tatton (ct . (56a)), which applies because ( 1 20) entails that P1 > f>2 . The +PAST tense in were m ( 1 ! 9) is the realization of a DOSH tense wh ich is 'copied dcwn ' by means of the a -rule in ( 56a) . Note that (56) predicts correctl 1 that, if m ( 1 20) we change the chronology in the PID into F T 1 , and keep the chronology in the lower domams constant, P1 the result IS not only that said changes mto says, but also that would changes mto will, and that were changes into are. =

=

Analogous f o what we have seen in the case of ( 1 1 6)-( 1 1 8), the location of P is ' invisible' in the two deepest ISDs in ( 1 20) . Without the additi b = T 2 b. This means that p> must also remain located in P 1 . Thus the result is that only F 2 8 , T 2 8 , F 3 b and T 3 b are shifted into f1 . The resulting chronology is provided in ( 1 66). ( 1 66)

> F. 1

P1 = F 2 b = T2 b

= T1

�ta = rza p 3 � ��b = T3 b >

=

I = CHARLES SAY [ 2a 2a = JOHN BE HERE 2b = [ 3b ] WILL 3b = H E BE SAF E

( 1 67)

CHARLES +PAST

(J

S A Y THAT IF JOHN +PASTCDE

(56c) (56d) BE HERE, H E + PASTCDE ( 1 68)

(J

WILL

��T

( 1 37) BE SAF E

0+

3b ]

HAVE + PART (56b)

( 1 37) . (56d) (56b) Charles said that if John had been here, he would have been safe

Application of (56) and ( 1 37) matches ( 1 66) with ( 1 67), which is realized as ( 1 68).

JS, vol. l , no .2

1 35


The rules i n ( 1 37) and (56d) match ( 1 63) with the string in ( 1 64), which is realized as ( 1 65).

BOB R IGTER

a counterfactual-world conceptualization can only be made in the speaker's own present. This latter observation is, in fact, a paraphrase of ( 1 6 1 ).

The CDE constraint ( counterfactuai-domain entry constraint) in ( 1 6 1 ) can be further supported by empir ical evidence. In the discussion of ( 1 04), ( 1 05), ( 1 06), we saw that in the case of tense computation in a real-world lSD introduced by a past-tense modal, the rules for tense representation within that lSD are blind to the whereabouts of P 1 , as a result of which the chronological position of Tn with respect to P 1 is left opaque. Now consider ( 1 69). =

( 1 69) Mary thought that Charles would say: "If John were here, he would be safe" The question is what happens to the direct quotation when we convert it into reported speech. It follows f rom the discussion of ( 1 04)-( 1 06) that in ( I 69) the chronological position of the T for CHARLES SAY [ . .. ] with respect to P 1 is opaque. However, if ( 1 6 1 ) is correct, the reported form of _Jhe quotation in ( 1 69) is computed in a counterfactual lSD of which the P is located at P1 • Thus ( 1 6 1 ) predicts that the reported variant of the direct quotation in ( 1 69) will show where the T for C H A RL E S SAY [ ... ] in ( 1 69) is located with respect to P1 • This predic tion is borne out by the examples in ( 1 70) and ( 1 7 1 ) . ( I 7 0 ) M a r y thought that Charles would say that if John had been there he would have been safe ( 1 7 1 ) Mary thought that Charles would say that if John were there he would be safe 1 36

JS, vol. l , no.2


The theory presented here -- i.e. in ( 1 3) , (56), ( 1 37), ( 1 4 1 ), ( 1 6 1 ), ( 1 62) -- consistently yields correct results. Examples ( 1 63)-( 1 68) illustrate that it covers counterfactual conditional statements both in non-embed ded positions and in embedded positions. If we accept the theory pre sented here as a working hypot!}_�sis, we must try to understand the remarkable fact that in ( 1 66) the P of the counterfactual ISp introduced by SAY is not located at T 1 (cf. ( 1 3) and ( 1 62)), but at P (cf. ( 1 6 1 )) . T h e placement of t h e highest barred P of a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l domain is reminiscent of the mechanism of PlD computation of the tenses of embedded propositions. In these PID computations, the F of an embedded proposition is not related to a P n introduced at T n - 1 , but it is related to P1 • In the case of embedded counterfactual conditionals, a similar mechanism operates, the difference being that now the relevant F is not rela.!_e d to P 1 , but to its counterfactual counterpart, which is the highest P of the counterfactual domain, but which ts also located at P 1 • The psychologically interesting conclusion would appear to be that both instde a real-world conceptualization and inside a counterfac tual conceptualization, the step from the embedding ID into the embed ded ID is made at the relevant T n in the embedding domain -- cf. ( 1 3) and ( 1 62) -- but the step from a real-world conceptualization into

I N TENSIONAL DOMAINS AN D THE USE OF TENSE In ( 1 69), Charles is thought of as referring to a state of affairs that obtains at the T for CHARLES SAY [ ]. If in ( 1 69) this T is thought of as located before P1 , ( 1 70) is the correct reported variant of ( 1 69). If, on the other hand, the T for CH ARLES SAY [ ] is thought of as located after P 1 , ( 1 7 1 ) is the correct reported variant of ( 1 69). Thus ( 1 69)-( i 7 1 ) support the CDE constraint in ( 1 6 1 ). .••

•..

1 1 . Domain-shift tenses m headclauses used in games of pretend and in self-effacement strategies

( 1 72) Speaker A A B A

[Stage] Direction

You said you were going to the ball.

B B A

You got cross and argued about it.

B B

You were mother and she d idn' t want you t o go

Game Where are you going tonight? I ' m going to the ball. Is the Prince going too? Yes, and I ' m going with h i m . Oh no you 're not -- I am. We'll see about that. Mother!

•

A ( 1 73) a. b. c. ( 1 7/f) a. b.

You're not going to the ball tonight!

Would you shut the window, please? Was there anything else? I thought you were on the dole. I thought you 'd gone. I thought you m ight like to have one of these.

Lodge ( 1 979: 368) observes that in the examples in both ( 1 7 2) and ( 1 73) the past tense is the grammatical form associated with 'not the reality in which we are at the momen t ' . If we call the speaker's conceptualization of ' the reality in which we are at the momen t ' h i s P ID, Lodge's observation implies that i n ( 1 72) and ( 1 73) t h e use of the past tense is associated with information which holds true in JS, vol. 1 , no.2

1 37


Lodge ( 1 979) discusses the use of the past tense in ch ildren 's games of pretend and in self-effacement strategies in conversational interac tion. 1 6 Some of his examples are given in ( 1 72) and ( 1 7 3). The examples in ( 1 7/f) are from Kress ( l 977:/f5).

BOB RIGTER an lSD. It is important t o observe that these ISDs, though constituting worlds which are not identical with the world of the PID, are not counter factual. Thus, referring to ( 1 72), Lodge ( 1 979: 366) remarks: ' I t would perhaps be misleading to use the term s R EALITY and UN R EALITY with reference to the framework and the game in that it is not possible, and perhaps even irrelevant, to say which is real and which is unreal to the child . ' Statements and questions of the type i n ( 1 7 3) and ( 1 74), too, are presented as referring to information in an lSD. The reason why this is done is to avoid a direct confrontation in terms of the speaker's and addressee's PIDs. As Kress ( 1 977: 4 5) puts it: ' the past-tense mor pheme -ed acts to remove the force of the utterance from the actual now, to the non-actual not-now. In other words, the speaker protects himself against challenge: if h is or her hearer should respond [ t o ( 1 74) ] with well, I haven't/don 't, he is protected by the non-actual modality of the clause. ' .•.

In § 6 it was stated that the F IS convention traditionally places the P n of the lSD which is the author 's conceptualization of the fictional This has the advantage that the character 's PID to the left of P1 author can switch over into and out of F IS without changing tenses, since stretches of F IS are usually embedded in a past-tense narrative. Note, however, that in l iterary theory a distinc t ion is made between 'chronological time' and 'fictional time ' (cf. Bronzwaer 1 970: 4 l ff . and also Maatje 1 970: 7 2 ) . Though i n past-time narratives the distance between P 1 - the present of the fictional world -- and the author's P1 may originally have been chronological, this distance can be regarded as the distance between the real world and a fictional world. Similarly, in cases like ( 1 72)-( 1 74), there is no chronological distance between P 1 and P l , but there is a difference in reality value between the worlds i.e. the IDs -- of which pf and P 1 are the presents. The use of a +PAST DOSH tense in headclauses in FIS, in children's games of pretend and in self-effacement strategies parallels the use of a modal as it was described in § 6, i.e. the +PAST DOSH tense is used in these areas to ' push dow n ' truth com mitments from the PID into an lSD. The familiar notion of the ' modal ' past tense is thus another instance of a domain-shift tense. •

-

1 2.

1 38

Conclusion

JS, vol . 1 , no.2


The examples i n ( 1 72)-( 1 74) contain instances of the manifestation of DOSH tenses in headclauses. That the relevant ISDs are not counter factual, and that these DOSH tenses are not CDE-tenses is borne out by the fact that the use of 1/he were in the headclauses of exam ples of the types in ( 1 72)-( 1 74) is ungrammatical.

INTENSION A L DOM AINS A N D THE USE OF TENSE

Department of English U niversity of Leiden Leiden - The Netherlands

Notes

I want to thank Fnts Beukema, Colin Ewen, Erica G arcia, L iliane Haegeman, Noel Osselton, Pieter Seuren, Robin Sm ith, Ron Verheijen and Herman Wekker for their comments on earlier versions of this art1cle. The theory in this article was presented m different stages of its development in papers read at the annual meeting of L inguistics in the Netherlands on 2/f January 1 98 1 , and at the International Colloquium on Discourse Representation in Cleves on 1 5- 1 8 September 1 98 1 . l For a detailed discussion of m y representation of a speaker's conceptualization of chronological orderings, see Rigter ( l 980a, l 980b). This representation has evolved from Reichenbach ( 1 94 7 : 287 -298). Where Reichenbach uses the labels S, R and E, I use P n , F n. and Tn, respectively. Note that my p n and Fn are segments of t1me in the con ceptualization of the speaker, and that Reichenbach's S and R are points in time. Whereas a point in time cannot fully include a segment of t ime, my P n and F n , as segments of time, can fully include a time segment T n (cf. ( 3a), (6a)). This difference is essential for the correct application of rules like ( l 0). For a discussion of the not1on � in relation to the notion Betrachtzeit in Wunderlich ( 1 970), see R igter ( l 980c: 867, note 2). A lthough Wunder lich ( 1 970: 1 22) acknowledges that the introduction of the notion Betrachtzeit which corresponds with my Fn -- can be motivated in various ways, his extensional approach does not allow the use of this notion. Dowty ' s ( 1 979) logic does not allow the use of Reichenbach ' s reference point - which corresponds w i t h my F n - - e1ther, because it gives the simple past and the present perfect the same truth condi tions. Therefore, he states that 'this approach fails completely as a semantic account of the difference between the two tenses' (Dowty *

--

JS, vol. l , no.2

1 39


This art1cle demonstrates the relevance of the conceptualization of chronological relations inside, and of chronological and ontological relations among, intensional domains for the grammar of tense, perfect and medals. Although the theory in th1s article is Il lustrated with the help of isolated sentences, one and the same mtensional domain whether 1t is the speaker 's primary intensional domain, or whether it 1s an intensional subdomam can be relevant for the selectiOn of tense, perfect and medals in the headclauses and subclauses of continuous or discontinuous sets of sentences in a stretch of discourse. Thus the analys1s of the relevance for the grammar of tense, perfect and modals of relations within, and among, mtensional domams pre sented here can also be seen as contributions to the study of discourse semantics.

BOB RIGTER 1 979: 33 1 . Dowty's i talics). Dowty recognizes, however, that Reichen bach's R may be significant in a pragmatic theory, and in a theory of narration. Not all logicians agree that the familiar problem posed by the truth-conditional identity of simple past and present perfect should lead to d iscarding the Re1chenbachian approach. Thus, in view 9..f the l ingUi stic relevance of Reichenbach's R, Guenthner ( 1 977) and Xqvist ( 1 978) opt for designing a semantics that recognizes Reichen bach's R, and in which the proposed translations of sentences with a si mple past and w ith a present perfect turn out to be logically dis t inct. As Guenthner & Rohrer ( 1 978: 7) put it, ' Thus instead of trying natural language ] to standard pred icate logic ... , to relate every N L [ a more worthwhile enterprise might be to construct 'representing logics' for N L s in such a way that these logical languages capture as closely as possible the 'logic' of the N Ls they were designed to represent ' . 2 Note that i n ( 1 3) the sy m bol must be read as coincides with o r is contained in ( cf �9) and ( 1 0)). On the other hand, when the symbol is used in for mulas of the type in ( 1 4), it must be read as is t h e i n =

=

tensional referent of.

3 As Bresnan remarks, the syntactic structure which is paired with a functional structure differs from this functional structure in a number of respects. Thus, for example, a functional structure contains a subject argument, which I S not found in the v 1 • In Bresnan 's approach, the V under V 1 would be paired with the verb in the functional structure, and lexical-interpretive rules relate the arguments in functional struc ture with syntactic constituents. In this article I shall not supply explicit lexical-interpretive rules, but I assum e that such rules can be devised. The modular approach and the shallow syntax adopted here make it possible to avoid the complexi ty of involved transformational deriva t ions. The rules in ( 1 9) constitute a rough syntactic sketch devised for expository purposes. These rules somewhat resemble the PS rules proposed in Akmaj ian, et al. ( 1 979), which are nearly identical with those used in Lapointe ( 1 980). Note, however, that the PS rules in and in L ap o i n t e ( 1 9), contrary to those in Akmaj ian, et al. ( 1 9 7 9) ( 1 98 0), do not allow the generation of modal auxiliaries in the position occupied by tense in ( 1 9), ( 2 1 ) and (22). For arguments relating to this point, see R igter ( l 98 l a: 48-53). The phrase m arkers used in this article are close enough to those et al. generated by the phrase structure grammar proposed in Gazdar phrase ( 1 98 0) to make an integration of my theory and Gazdar et al. 's structure gram m ar conceivable. Note, however, that in my approach the non-occurrence of the auxi l iary of the perfect before modals is ruled out by semantic constraints on the use of modals. For discussion see § 6 of this article. HAVE rather than H A V E + PART i s that I 4 The reason why I print + P A R T want to indicate that H AVE governs the selection of a participial form of the following verb, without suggesting that PART is an affix that 'hops' on to that verb. L ikewise, +PAST and -PAST are to be looked upon as instructions governing the selection of particular finite 1 40

JS, vol. l , no.2


=

INTENSION A L DOMAINS A N D T H E USE OF TENSE

=

=

=

=

t

JS, vol. 1 , no.2

=

141


verb form s rather than as syntactic formatives that 'hop' on to verbs. For a motivation of these remarks, see Lapointe ( 1 980). See also Gazdar, et al. ( 1 980). 5 However, (57) can also be the result of a PID computation. See the discussion of ( 72)-(77). 6 The observations made in Wekker ( 1 980: 96, 97) fit in with the theory presented in this section. Wekker states: 'If the tense of a subclause depends on that of the superordinate clause, we shall call this temporal subordination; in such cases both clauses have the same point of orientation in time ' [my italics]. Wekker's temporal subor dination occurs precisely in those cases in which I postulate a domain shi f t and an lSD computation. Now let us reconsider the chronology in (59), which is well-matched with (57). In (59), P1 I p2 . This means that Wekker 's ter m 'point of orientation' is not applicable to the present T 2 is comcidental. of an !D. The fact that in ( 59) F 1 = F 2 and T1 This is clear when we consider the following sentence with two possible chronologies that are well-matched with i t . ( A ) Simon said that he had been hungry T 1 P 2 > F 2 = T 2 (ct. Simon said: 'I was hungry.') (B) p 1 > F1 (C) p 1 > F 1 = T 1 p2 > F 2 > T 2 (cf. Simon said: ' I had been hungry ' . ) The o.p ly elemf nts t h a t m u s t b e located in the sa m e t i me segment are T and P (ct. ( 1 3)). Although P 2 could be properly referred to as the 'point of orientation' for the subclause, T 1 cannot in the same way be referred to as the 'po int of orientation ' for the superordinate clause. It would seem therefore that, when interpreted in term s of the fa1rly explicit f ramework presented here, Wekker 's term 'point of orientatio g ' covers two disparate notions, viz. T 1 for the superordinate clause and P for the subclause. Wekker ( 1 980: 98) states that ' temporal subordination also occurs in simple independent sentences', which he illustrates with example (D). (D) He tele�honed the police. There had been an explosion. >F a = T 1 a I a = H E TELEPHONE THE POLICE (E) pf II 1 � 1 b >F T l b THERE BE AN EXPLOS ION If the term ' temporal subordination' is at all applicable to ( D), it is used to cover an essentially different phenomenon here. The use of had been in ( D) is due to th fact that in h is PID the speaker does T not shift his focus (i.e. F 1 a = F b ) when passing from the first sentence to the second. Note that when Wekker states that 'the point of orienta t ion is the event described in the first sentence ', he uses the term 'point of orientation' to refer to T1 a. Incidentally, example ( D) illustrates that one and the same ID may be relevant for the tense computation for sets of separate sentences in a stretch of d iscourse, and that the speaker's handling of F can be an important discourse-structuring device. 7 When I was com pleting this article, Hornstein ( 1 98 1 ) came to my notice. In Hornstein ( 1 98 1 : 1 5 1 ) the 'per manence of reference point' constraint is weakened considerably. It is taken to apply to adverbial sentences, but not to 'sequence of tense sentences'. However, examples

BOB RIGTER (F) and (G) show that this formulation is still too strong. (F) When she was assaulted, she had defended herself with a stiletto (G) The bell rang before John had finished his essay (H) S E , R 1 R S S In Hornste in's theor y, both example (F) and example (G) would have to be represented by the diagram in (H). The notation E , R means 1 R means that E 1 and R are cotemporaneous. The notation E 2 that E 2 IS anterior to R. In (H), E 1 is the time when SHE BE ASSAULT ED/TH E BELL RING holds true, and E, is the time when SHE DEFEND H ERSELF/JOHN FINISH H IS ESSAY ho tds true. Because of the postulate of the permanence of reference point (i.e. R R) in adverbial sentences, Hornstein's theory predicts that E 2 IS anterior to E • This is at variance 1 with the interpretation of (F) and (G). It follows that the postulate of the permanence of reference point is untenable as a constraint on adverbial sentences. At this point, some further com ments on Hornstein ( 1 98 1 ) are in order. Hornstein ' s ar ticle offers strong confirmation for the Reichen bachian approach which his work and my work have in common. Horn stein deals with sequence of tenses in a way which is very similar to mi ne. See, for instance, Hornstein's rule [44] and my rule ( 1 3). However, my discussion of this rule in §§ 5 and 10 goes into considerably more detail, and indicates how Hornste i n ' s rule [44] m•ght be refined. Hornste.n's theory also has a correlate for my PID computations. This consensus strengthens our posi tion. There are a number of differ ences between our approaches, however, and the ground that we cover Is also differen t. Hornstein's rules for SOT only refer to chronological relations, whereas in the present article SOT covers a wider area including modal tense phenomena which cannot be described in purely chronological terms. Hornstein limits himself to finite clauses, whereas my tense theory also covers non-finite constructions. Hornstein does not provide explicit rules for the tenses in SOT examples: his discussion concentrates on the determ ination of the location in time of the state/ event whiCh is the referent of the deepest embedded proposi tion. Another more general difference between Hornstein's work and mine is that Hornstein has devised a rule mechanism which works well in a prom ising number of respects, but which goes unexplained in certain crucial areas. For example, Hornstein 's l.near ity principle i mplies that there is an essential difference between the notations E, R and R , E, although both these notations mean that E and R are cotemporaneous. If this linearity principle .n the formulation of his rules is crucial for the success of Hornstein ' s theory, it would seem to me that rather than claiming that the linearity principle is an 'innate condition on tense configurations' (Hornste.n 1 98 1 : 1 50), it should be investigated what the semantic or conceptual differences between E, R and R, E could be. What I try to do in this ar ticle, and what I have tried to do in my previous work, is not only to devise rules for the grammar of tense, but also explore in some detail what the semantic and conceptual correlates of these rules might be. =

JS, vo! . l , no.2


1 42

INTENSION A L DOMAINS AND THE USE OF TENSE 8 I owe this example to L il iane Haegeman. 9 For a discussion of collocational restrict ions on combinations of various kinds of time adverbials with tense and perfect, see Rigter ( l 980a: §§ 3 and 8). 10 There is an obvious correspondence between functional structure and the deepest syntactic structures postulated m generative seman tics. For discussion see Bresnan ( 1 978). I I The fact that m the case of a present-tense Interpretation of must in ( l 04) F 2 and T2 cannot be located in F1 b and T1 b IS not a m atter of tense assign ment, but a matter of constraints on the use of the � rogressive. If we were to change ( 1 06) mto a chronology in F1b T1 b P2 p2 T 2 , the resultant sentence would which P have to be Mary said that Jolm must be paying the bill. For further dis cussion of conceptual constramts on the use of the progressive, see Rigter ( l 980b: 2 1 9-22 1 ). See also Beukema &. Rigter ( 1 98 1 : 92, 93, 1 1 9- 1 22). 12 What is mvolved here is a fictional past rather than a chronological past. For further d iscussion see § l l . 1 3 The hierarchical relation between If James is ill and he is in bed can be represented as follows: =

=

=

=

=

�

I f Ja�res

is

1II

S

c---.....__

he i s 1 n hc-J

I use the term clause to refer to a subject-prediCate constitute, I.e. to the S in the above diagram . The S' m this diagram IS a constitute of which the S is the head. For S ' I would use the term clausal. F or f u r ther details, see R1gter ( 1 978: 47 , l l l ). 1 4 I use the term 'formative' for ease of exposition. Like +PAST and -PAST, this + PASTCDE ' formative' should be looked upon as an instruction governing the selection of particular finite verb for ms rather than as a syntactic formative that 'hops' on to a verb. Cf. note 4. 1 5 The following German sentence shows that the distribution of +PASTCDE tenses and +PAST tenses in German IS the same as in English. Wenn Heinrich gewusst hi:itte, dass Gretchen hier war (/*wa:re),

dann wi:ire alles in Ordnung gewesen.

1 6 The use of the past tense in children's games of pretend is very frequent in Dutch. I thank Herman Wekker for drawing my attention to Lodge 's discussion of this use of the past tense in English.

JS, vol. l , no.2

143


�

Mv

BOB RIGTER References

1 44

JS, vol. l , no.2


Akmaj tan, A., Steele, S . M . & Wasow, T . , 1 979: The category AUX tn universal gram mar. Linguistic Inquiry 10 ( 1 }. �qvist, L., 1 978 : On the distinction l;>etween the present perfect and the simple past in English. In C. Rohrer (ed.), Papers on Tense, Aspect and Verb Classification, Gun ter Narr Verlag, Tubingen. Beukema, F . H . & Rigter, G . H . , 1 98 1 : Conscious Command. Van Walraven, Apeldoorn. Bresnan, ]. W ., 1 978: A realisttc transformational grammar. In M . Halle, J. Bresnan & G . Miller (eds.), L inguistic Theory and Psychological Reality. M IT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Bronzwaer, W . J . M . , 1 970: Tense in the Novel. W o l t e r�- N oordh o f f , G ro ningen. Costa, R., 1 97 2 : Sequence of tenses in that-clauses. In C.L.S. 8. Chicago. Culicover, P . W . , Wasow, T. & Akmajian, A . , 1 97 7 : Formal Syntax. Acade miC Press, New York. Dowty, D. R . , 1 979: Word M eaning and Montague Grammar. Reidel, Dor drecht. Ejerhed, E., 1 979: On lim tttng theses in an adequate semantics for Engltsh tenses. Publication 20, Dept. of Linguistics, Universi ty of Ume� . Gazdar, G . J . M . , Pullum, G . K . & Sag, I.A., 1 980: A phrase structure grammar of the English auxil iary system. In I.A. Sag (ed .), Stanford Working Papers in Grammatical Theory. Vol 1 . Guenthner, F . , 1 977: Remarks on the present perfect in English. In C. Rohrer (ed.), On the Logical Analysis of Tense and Aspect. Gunter Narr Verlag, Tubingen. Guenthner, F. & Rohrer, C. (eds.), 1 978: Studies in Formal Semantics. North-Holland, A msterdam. Hoffman, T.R., 1 966: Past tense replacement and the English modal auxil iary system. In Harvard Computation Laboratory Report NSF-1 7. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Hornstein, N . , 1 977: Towards a the"o ry of tense. Linguistic Inquiry 8 (3). Hornstein, N . , 1 98 ! : The study of meanmg in natural language: three approaches to tense. In N. Hornstein & D. Lightfoot (eds.), Explanation in L inguistics. Longman, London and New York. K ress, G . R . , 1 977: Tense as modality. University of East Anglia papers in linguistics 5. Lapomte, S . G . , 1 980: A le"ical analysis of the English auxtltary verb system. In T. Hoekstra, H. van der Hulst & M . Moortgat (eds.), Lexical Grammar. Foris, Dordrecht. . Lewis, O . K . , 1 973: Counterfactuals. Blackwel l, Oxford. L odge, K . R . , 1 979: The use of the past tense in games of pretend. Journal of Child Language 6. Maatje, F .C., 1 9 70: Literatuurwetenschap. Oosthoek, Utrecht . McCaw ley, J . D. , 1 97 1 : Tense and t i m e reference i n English. In C . J . Fill more & D.T. Langendoen (eds.), Studies in L inguistic Se mantics. Holt, R inehart & Winston, N ew York.

Linguistics and Philosophy An International Journal Managing Editors: ROBERT WALL and RICHARD C. GRANDY Executive Editorial Committee: MAX CRESSWELL, OSTEN DAHL, HANS KAMP. LAURI KARTTUNEN, ASA KASHER, STANLEY PETERS i and Philosophy is a journal for studies focused on natural Lingustics language and will interest lingu1sts as well as philosophers. Contribu·

journal include: Traditional areas 1n the phtlosophy of language such as meaning and truth, reference, description, entailment, speech acts, Traditional areas of linguistics such as syntax, semantiCS and pragmatics (when the studies are of sufficient explicitness and generality to be of philosophical interest as well); Systems of logic with strong connections to natural language: modal log1c. tense logic, epistemic logic, intensional logic; Philosophically interestmg problems at the intersect1on of lin· guistics and other disciplines: language acquisition, language and perception, language as a social convention, Philosophical questions ra1sed by linguiStiCS as a science: linguistic methodology, the status of lmguistic theones, the nature of linguistic universals. A Rapre•nutlva S.lection of Some Recant Articles Ewan Kle.n

A Semantocs for Posotive and Comparative Adjectives. Richmond

H Thomason. A Modal Theory for Propositional Attitudes. Jaakko Hintikka· On the Any·TheSIS end the Methodology of Longuistocs Emmon W Bach. In Defense of Passive. Jon BarwiSe and Robin Cooper· Generalized Quantifiers and Natural l.Bngu��ge. Gregory T. Stump: The Interpretation of Frequency Adjectives. Ruth M. Kempson' and Annabel Cormack. AmbiguitY and Ouan· tification. Neil Tennllf'lt· Formal Games and Forms for Games.

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tions come 1n the form of articles, rev1ew articles, notes, discuss1ons. and remarks and replies. Topics wh1ch fall into the scope of the

INTENSIONAL DOM AINS A N D THE USE OF TENSE

Linguistics

I.

Seuren, P.A. M . , 1 979: The logiC of presuppos1t 1onal semant iCs. Dept. of Philosophy, University of N i J megen. Sm 1th, C.S., I 976: Present CurioSities. In C.L.S. 1 2. Chicago. Wekker, H.C., 1 980: Temporal subordinatiOn m Engllsh. In W. Zonneveld & F. Weer man (eds.), Linguistics in the Netherlands 1 9771 979. For1s, Dordrecht. Wunderllch, D., 1 970: Tempus und Zeitreferenz im Deutschen. M a x H ue ber Verlag, Mi.inchen.

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Morgan, J.L., I 969: On the treatment of presuppositiOn in transforma tional grammar. In C.L.S. 5. Chicago. Pal mer, F .R., I 979: Modality and the English Modals. Longman, London and New York. Perlmutter, D.M., 1 9 70: The two verbs begin. In R.A. Jacobs & P.S. Rosenbaum (eds.), Readings in English Transformational Gram mar. Gmn, Waltham, Massachusetts. M ac m i l l a n , New ReiChenbach, H., 1 94 7 : Elements of Symbolic Logic. York. Riddle, E., 1 978: Sequence of tenses m English. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Un1vers1ty of Ill inois at Urbana-Champaign. R•gter, G . H . , 1 978: First Explorations in English Syntax Part I. Van Wal raven, Apeldoorn. R1gter, G . H . , 1 980a: Time diagrams and rules for tense and perfect m English. In W. Zonneveld & F. Weerman (eds.), L i nguistics in the Netherlands 1 9 77-1 979. Foris, Dordrecht. R1gter, G . H . , 1 980b: States, events, and the use of tense and perfect m English. In S. Daalder & M. Gerritsen (eds.), L inguis tics in the Netherlands 1 980. North-Holland, Amsterdam and New York. R1gter, G.H., 1 980c: Laymg the ghost of times past. Linguistics 1 8. R •gter, G.H., 1 9 8 1 a: Stacked structures m Engllsh: semantiC mot ivation and syntactic stipulation. Lingua 53. Ross, J.R., 1 969: Auxi lianes as mam verbs. Journa l of Philosophical

COUNTERF ACTUALS AND CAUSALITY

D.S. Bree

Abstract

INTRODUCTION Over thirty years ago Goodman ( 1 947) posed two problems in deter m inmg the truth status of counterfactual cond itionals. The first problem arises because certain statements must be temporarily removed from the set of all true statements before a counterfactual can be evaluated. For example to evaluate the truth status of a condit ional one adds i ts antecedent to the set of all true statements. If this is done for a counterfactual conditional, whose antecedent must be false, both the antecedent and its negation will be in the set. Now from a proposi tion and its negation any conclusion may be drawn, so all counterfactuals would be true. Thus the negation of the antecedent must be removed from the set of true statements. However, this by itself is not sufficient as the negation of the antecedent may well be deducible from the remaining statements, so some of these must be removed also. Once JOU RNAL OF SEMAN TICS, vol. l , no.2, pp. 1 4 7 - 1 8 5

1 47


There are three parts to this paper. In the first part the difference between hypothetical and coWlterfactual conditionals is examined. Both Adams's argument that indicative and subjWlctive conditionals differ in the de-gree to which they are justified and Lewis 's contention that coWlterfactuals differ from hypotheticals in that they fail to contrapose are both shown to be WlfoWlded. Standard tests confirm KarttWlen 's claim that the difference lies not in the truth conditions but in the falsity of the antecedent being presupposed and the truth value of the consequent being a conversational implicature. There is also a pragmatic difference: coWlterfactuals are more difficult to verify. In the second part 4 solutions to the coWlterfactual problem are criticized partly in light of the differences foWld in the first part. Goldstick's extension of Goodman 's classic solution is shown to be an incomplete algorithim. Lewis 's possible world solution reduces the problem to finding a criterion by which to order possible worlds. Krat zer's solution, also in the possible worlds tradition, requires a heuristic for partitioning propositions. It is only the older solution of Rescher and Simon, based on causal ordering, that is adequate for causally based coWlterfactuals with false consequents. In the last part of the paper Simon and Rescher's method is extended to accidental coWlter factuals and coWlterfactuals with true consequents.

D.S. BRtE some statements are removed it is not clear when one should stop. One criterion m ight be that none of the remaining statements should be false if the antecedent were true; in short the remaining statements should be 'contenable' with the antecedent. But note that t his criterion is itself expressed as a counterfactual, so a circularity in the procedure has been introduced. This we call the 'cotenabilit y ' proble m . Goodman 's second problem arose because he believed that a counterfactual had to be based on a lawlike statement, linking the antecedent and conse quent, and he had no good way of distinguishing lawltke from nonlawlike statements.

S I. If the match had been struck, it would have lit. 52. If the match had been struck, it wouldn't have beer. dry. I

will be using these two sentences throughout different proposed solutions.

as

a

basic

test

for

There have been many solutions proposed for Goodman 's two counter factual problems, none of them entirely satisfactory. I will look at four in this paper. One, Goldstick 's, is an extension of Goodman's method in the classical tradition. Unfortunately it is not a completely specified algorithm. Two, by Lewis and by Kratzer, are in the possible world tradition. They both provide complete algorithms for handling counterfactuals. However, they do this at the expense of raising a difficult representation problem . The fourth approach, by Simon and Rescher, predates the others. It requires a causal ordering as a basis for representing our knowledge of the world, which may well account for its neglect in the philosophical literature. However, it does provide a quite adequate method for handling counterfactuals and requires the psychological ly reasonable assumption that we have causal models in our heads. I t has, however, a drawback: it only handles causally based counterfactuals with false consequents. These four methods will be discussed in the second section. In the conclusion I will put forward an extension of Simon and Rescher's m ethod to cover accidental counterfactuals, which can handle the well known examples of accidental counterfactuals, and also counterfactuals with true consequents. But first, I want to generate some criteria for assessing the different proposed solutions. So I begin by discussing the difference between counterfactuals and hypotheticals, independently of any particular logical point of view.

148

J S , vol . l , no.2


The 'cotenability.' problem arose because Goodman wanted to distin g u ish for example between the acceptable (S 1 ) and the unacceptable (52).

COUNTERF ACTUALS A N D CAUSALITY IS

THERE A SEPAR A TE PROBLEM OF VERIFICA TION FOR COUNTER FA CTUAL CONDITIONALS ?

At first glance i t would appear that there really is no difference. For example If Angeline has jumped off the Empire State Building, she' s dead. If Angeline had jumped off the E mpire State Building, she'd be dead. have similar truth condi t ions, except that in the latter both the anteced ent and the consequent are denied. If this extra information were added to the hypothetical then the counterfactual would result. I will argue below that this is a secondary difference. Moreover the plausibility of these two sentences can be put into doubt by querying the causal relationship, e.g. Not necessarily, she' s an expert hang-glider, you know. would be a reasonable wax of denying either sentence. I' II now examine Ayers's claim that the truth condi t ions of a counter factual do not differ from those of a hypothetical. I ' ll reject Adams's argument, namely that, even if this is so, subjunctive conditionals do differ from indicative ones in the degree to which they are j ustif ied. JS, vol. l , no. 2

1 49


Since Goodman ( 1 947) p osed the problem of verifying counterfactual conditionals, there has been a series of incomplete attempts to solve ' the problem '. Before any further endeavours are made in what is beginning to appear a fruitless pursuit, we should check that there actually is a problem , and, if there is, try to be as precise as we can about how the problem should be formulated. Most scholars have assumed that counterfactuals cannot be handled in the same way as hypothetical condi tionals, and have then gone on to show how the task of verifying a counterfactual can be performed. Few have disagreed that there is a sep arate problem of verifying counterfactuals over and above any problems associated with verifying hypothetical condition als. Now I want to make a distinction between two issues. It may or may not be the case that there really is a distinction between how people verify counterfactuals and hypotheticals; it may also be the case that the method proposed for verify ing conditionals is one which does or does not handle hypotheticals differently from counter factuals. It would be nice to know the answer to the first point before we consider the various methods. For if it really is the case that people verify hypotheticals and counterfactuals in the sam e _ way, then any method which operates differently on the two is surely ill adviseol"e 'II Olga had not gone to t,... part1. Boros would >loll not have. gone.'.

Possoble worlds repre�r11a10on of Lew.,•s party goong exampl� cp- Boros goes, t

•

Olga goes.

153


While a counterfactual may not differ in its truth conditions from a hypothetical, both Lewis (1971) and Stalnaker (196&) claim that it can't be contraposed. First I'll show that Lewis's argument, which is more precise than Stalnaker's, either fails or holds for hypotheticals as well, i.e. that there is no difference between the two types of conditional. Then I'll develop a method for contraposing both types.

D.S. BR!:E Boros: docon't go

0U Olga doesn't go, Soru sors'. 1\JIIQ

OR

'If 01&6 donn't &O, Boros dorsn't go'.

·u Boros&�$, Olga •toll ��·.

Turning now to the conclusion, we find it can be represented by Fi�ure I C. In the innermost sphere containing ,.., t , for any world in whtch "' t holds"' cp is also the case. But the conclusion is a statement about Boris's motivation, and it has been supposed that this is. captured by Figure lB, which i s inconsistent with Figure lC. The difference can also be represented by two payoff matrices as shown in Figure 2. Olga has the same payoffs i n both matrices, but the supposition and the conclusion make different claims about Boris's view of the payoffs. As there is a clear contradiction, something must be discarded; but why did Lewis choose to drop the legitimacy of contraposing the counter factual? A similar line of reasoning would lead him to abandon contra position for hypothetical conditionals as well. For example If Boris is going, Olga is going. and its contraposition If Olga is not going, Boris is not going. are also not equivalent in that the first is a statement about Olga's motivation and the second one about Boris's. Should we go so far then as to abandon the legitimacy of contraposing hypothetical condition als? Or should we be careful in how we perform the contraposition, working with the deep structure underlying the sentence, rather than with the surface form? I think that both types of conditionals can be contraposed, with a careful method that distinguishes between accidental and causal conditionals. I will start with a simple example in which no lawlike statements underlie a counterfactual. Consider the accidental counter factual introduced by Goldstick ( 1978): Sll.

154

If there were nine Oxford Professors of Philosophy (Opps), there would be as many Opps as there are major planets in

JS, vol.l, no.2


FICUI!E 2: Payoff matn• lor Lewis's party &o•n& e•ampl�: upper rtght trJan&le lor Boros's pooyofl, lower lelt lot Olga's.

COUN TE RF ACTUALS A N D CAUSALITY the solar system . This i s a handy way o f saying all o f the following: S I 2. S 1 3. S l 4.

If there are nine Opps, there are as many Opps as there are major planets in the solar system. There are not nine Opps. There are not as many Opps as there are major planets in the solar system .

S 1 5.

If there are not as many Opps as there are major planets in the solar system, then there are not nine Opps.

We now want to combine S 1 3, S l 4 and S 1 5 in one statement. English provides a means of doing this: Since there are not as many Opps as there are major planets in the solar system , there are not nine Opps. So in general the rule for contraposing a counterfactual in which the consequent as well as the antecedent is false, If

a

were, then � would be.

is to drop the mod al words t o remove the truth conditions on the antecedent and consequent, contrapose the resulting hypothetical condi t ional and replace if by since. This last step restores the correct truth status to the antecedent and consequent. Proceeding step by step we get: If rt. � . I f "' j:l , "' C h Since �, "'

,..,

a.

So by taking account of the truth conditions we can contrapose accident al counterfactuals with false consequents. As an example of a counterfactual with a true consequent consider the following situation, inspired by an experiment originally performed by Wason ( 1 968). Each card has a digit on one side and a letter on the other. The cards have been numbered and lettered in such a way as to obey the rule:

JS, vol. l , no.2

155


When w e wish t o contrapose S l l w e want to contrapose only the condi t ional. We must not change the presupposed or conversationally i mplied truth status of the two propositions underlying the antecedent and consequent. Thus we must not alter S 1 3 and S l 4. Contraposing S l 2 gives

D.S. BR!:.E if the digit is even, then the Jetter is a vowel. A card is drawn from this stack at random and turns out to have a 3 and an A on it. On the basis of what we know about the way the cards were made we may say of this first card S 1 6.

If the digit had been even, the letter would still have been a vowel.


We proceed in a similar way as with the f a lse consequents by removing the modals and still so that the truth condi tions of the antecedent and consequent are absent which gets us back to the original rule. We contrapose this to get If the Jetter is not a vowel, then the digit is not even. We now need to add back that the letter was a vowel, which can be done by replacing the subjunctive, and we need to confirm that the digit was indeed not even which also needs a modal and the introduction of still. This gives If the Jetter had not been a vowel, the digit would still not have been even. Or to put it more naturally If the Jetter had been a consonant , the digit would still have been odd. which is a perfectly acceptable deduction from 5 1 6. In general, the procedure for contraposing a counterfactual w1th a true consequent, taking account of the truth conditions, is first drop the modals and the word m the consequent, such as still, which shows that the consequent is true; then contrapose the resulting hypothetical conditional; and finally add back the t ruth status of the new antecedent by replacing the subjunctive, and of the consequent by replacing the modal and the still or nevertheless. Thus If

cr

were, then � would still be.

becomes step by step If If If

cr, ,...., ,....,

�� , "' 01. � were, then

"' 01

would still be.

N ow we can contrapose accidental counterfactuals with either false or true consequents. 156

JS, vol. J , no.2

·

COU N TERFACTUALS A N D CAUSALITY Now I need to extend this procedure from accidental conditionals to ones in which some causal mechanism is involved. In Lewis's example we seek a contraposi tive of If Boris is going, Olga is going. which retains the information about Olga 's motivations, rather than transferring them to Boris. We need to find a procedure that will get us to If Olga isn't going, then Boris can ' t be going.

If it rains the streets get wet. But the explanation may be that the inference is a modus tollens on a causal mechanism, e.g., If the streets are dry, it can ' t have rained. The use of the medals must or can 't indicate this mference is based on modus tollens (see also Sellars, 19 58). However they are not necessary; they are just helpful. For example If the streets are dry, it hasn ' t rained. can also be interpreted as a modus tollens upon the same causal mecha nism. However when a direct causal interpretation is available then there will be no search for a modus tollens interpretation. So the correct contrapositive of L ewis's premise is If Olga had not gone, then Boris couldn ' t have gone. Now this form of the contraposition tion

IS

not falsified by Lewis's supposi

If Olga had not gone, Boris would have. We can now see how the two procedures outlined above might be adapted for the contraposition of causal counterfactuals. Tentatively I propqse a rule that should be incorporated into the m iddle step of each procedure, the one in which the hypothetical conditiOnal is contra posed:

JS, vol. l , no. 2

1 57


The introduction of the modal can't indicates that the inference is not based on a direct causal mechanism. When one interprets a condi tional one searches for an explanation of the inference that is bein g claimed. Usually this is a direct causal mechanism (Bree & Smit, 1 98 1 ) as for example in

D.S. BRtE If mu.st or can 't were not present in the original consequent, add the appropriate one to the consequent , and v 1ce-versa. This rule should be part of the procedure for contraposing a hypothetical conditional, and so is not peculiar to the counterfactual. The procedure then becomes (where � is to be read as 'causes') If a were, then � would be. a � j:l, ""' cr, ""' � If a , then �· If ""' �. thell cr can' t be. Since ""' � , cr can't be. a ="t> � , ""' a, � If a were, then � would still be. Ifcr , then � · If ""' � , then a can ' t be. If ""' � were, then cr still couldn't be. If a were, then � would have to be. fl =:;:. a , "' 0', � ,.... If a , then fl must be. If "' fl , then "' a . Since ""' � , rt. If cr were, then fl would still have to be. ""' fl � a, If a, � must be. If ""' � , then ,..., a. a, � If ,..., � were, then a still wouldn ' t be. ""'

,....

,...,

It remains to be seen whether these procedures will stand up to testing by example. They are incomplete as can be seen by applying P2 to If the sun were shining, the streets would still be wet. t o get the non-5equit ur If the streets weren't wet, the sun still couldn ' t be shining. rather than Even though the streets are wet, the sun could still be shining. The reason is that still is being used not only to indicate a true conse g uent (� ) , but also to deny the applicability of a causal connection t "' ( a � "' � ) ) .

But contraposition does not solve the counterfactual problem Is it possible to solve the problem of counterfactuals, by contraposing the counterfactual into a non-counterfactual statement? W e see that counterfactuals with false consequents can be contraposed into since sentences. However, we get back to where we started when we contrapose counterfactuals with true consequents, namely a counter factual conditional! So even if we manage to develop a procedure for evaluating the since sentences (and thus the counterfactuals with 1 58

JS, voi. J , no.2


P I . Given: Derive: To get: P2. G iven: Denve: To get: P3. G iven: Derive:. To get: P4. G iven: Derive: To get:

COUNTERF ACTUALS A N D CAUSALITY false consequents) we will still be left with the problem of evaluating counterfactuals with true consequents. Now counterfactuals are usually used in a context where their conse sen quents are false, so most of them can be contraposed into since tences. But most unfortunately even this does not really help us! For example the contrapositJOn of S l is not simply S J 8.

Since the match did not light, i t was not struck.

but using P 1 it is Since the match did not light, i t can ' t have been struck.

The introduction of necessity makes S 1 9 no longer a simple matter of consulting the actual world, as was the case with S 1 8. We need to introduce some law or sets of possible worlds. So contraposition does not solve the counterfactual problem , even for counterfactuals with false consequents, just as Goodman surmised in 1 947.

Entailments, presuppositions and conversational implicatures As counterfactuals do not differ from hypotheticals in their truth conditions, nor in our ability to contrapose them we need to look else where for a difference. Lewis ( 1 973) claim s that neither the falsity of the antecedent, nor that of the consequent are entailed by the counterfactual. Karttunen ( 1 97 1 ) claims that the former is presupposed but the latter is only a conversational i mplicature. Let us now examine these claims. Lewis ( 1 973: 26- 3 1 ) supports his claim by demonstrating a counter factual with true antecedent and consequent: A. If Caspar had come, it would have been a good party. B. That's true for he did come, and it was a good party. You didn ' t see him because ... To back this intuitive argument we need a formal test of entailment and I propose: a proposition p entails another proposition q if both when p is true q is also true, and when q is false then by modus tollens p is al so false. That a counterfactual entails neither the falsity of its anteced ent nor its consequent can be readily demonstrated as both fail the modus tollens part of the entailment test. Neither the truth of the antecedent nor that of the consequent entails the negation of the counterfactual. In Lewis's example the two inferences: Caspar came to the party, so A is wrong. It was a good party, so A is wrong. JS, vol. 1 , no.2

1 59


S J 9.

D.S. BRJ:.E do not hold. As expected we need to look for a weaker connection than entailment.

ii. D. If Caspar had come, it wouldn't have been a good party. E. Oh, so the party wasn ' t a good one. Here E 's reply to D is inappropriate. Karttunen brings out this later point very n1cely by providing a counterfactual with a consequent that the speaker believes to be true: If Harry had known that Sheila survived, he would still have gone home. The second half of Karttunen's claim is that the falsity of the conse quent is cancellable. This is the criterion that Grice uses to detect a conversational i mplicature. Applying this test to Lewis 's example: *If Caspar had come, it would have been a good party. But he did come anyway. If Caspar had come, it would have been a good party. But it was a good one anyway. confirms Karttunen 's point. Thus the truth status of the consequent is a conversational i m plicature. Karttunen 's explanation for this fact is based on Geis and Zwicky's ( 1 97 1 ) claim that some conditionals are com monly 'perfected' i n to biconditionals, e.g. that If you mow the lawn, I'll pay you five dollars. invites the inference that If you don ' t mow the lawn, I won ' t pay you five dollars. So that transform ing the former to the counterfactual If you 'd mowed the lawn, I 'd have paid you five dollars. uses the invited inference · toget her with the falsity of the antecedent 160

JS, vol. I , no.2


Karttunen ( 1 9 7 1 ) has argued that the falsity of the antecedent is presupposed but that the falsity of the consequent is only an 'invited inference ' because the latter is cancellable whereas the former is not. To check that th1s is the case let us use Kempson ' s ( 1 97 7 : 1 43) ( ii) test for presupposition: p presupposes q if (i) when p is true so is q, when p is false q is still true and (iii) when q is false no truth value can be given to p. In Lewis's example the falsity of the antecedent is a presupposition of the counterfactual as it passes all three tests: However the falsity of the consequent is not a presupposition as it fails the second test:

COUNTERF ACTUALS AND CAUSALIT Y to deduce t h e falsity o f t h e consequent. U nfortunately t h i s explanation is incorrect as the consequent of a counterfactual that is based on a conditional that does not invite the inference of the biconditional is still false, e.g. If it had rained, the rivers would have risen. conversational ly i mplies that the rivers haven ' t risen. However, the corresponding hypothetical conditional If it has rained, the r ivers have risen.

If it hasn ' t rained, the rivers haven ' t risen. So the conversational implicature of the falsity of the consequent of a counterfactual does not depend on the underlying hypothetical bemg interpreted as a biconditional. One is tempted to conclude that the consequent is conversationally implied to be false unless it contains still in which case i t is implied to be true. However still does not necessarily indicate that the consequent is true, e.g. If Elaine 's uncle had stuck to his desire for aloneness, he probably would still be alive. ( L l 9) 1 in which the consequent is false. Still is being used here to indicate that the consequent was true at one time, even though it was false when the counterfactual was uttered. Thus still s1mply serves as a mar ker that the consequent was true at one time, and the hearer may presume that it is also true at the time of utterance unless the speaker has given an indication to the contrary. While still may be used to indicate that the consequent is true, even if always indicates that it is true, e.g. She wouldn't have, even if he'd asked her. (P22) However neither even if nor still are necessary for indicating truth, e.g. For a while there was such a shrill girlish com motion I couldn ' t have made myself heard i f I'd had the equivalent o f the message to Garcia. (B08) Here either still or even if could have been used. There is also a t hird possibility, as Karttunen mentions, in which the JS, vol. l , no.2

I61


does not, during springtime, invite the inference.

0. 5.

BR!:E

consequent contains a reference to the false antecedent and so can have no truth value, e.g. If Fran had baked a pie, she would have eaten it. Thus the truth status of the consequent of a counterfactual is certainly no more than a conversational implicature. The rule for determining this truth status must be compl�x, for example something like: i.

A pragmatic difference We have seen that counterfactuals do not differ from hypotheticals in their entail ments nor in our ability to contrapose them. They do differ however in their presupposition of the falsity of the antecedent and in the conversational i mplication of the truth or falsity of the consequent. There is a further difference which has not been suggested but I believe is important . This is the ease with which their truths can be ascertained. For hypothetical conditionals it is sometimes possible to verify them directly f rom the actual world, either by enquiring how things were or are, or by waiting for events to unfold. For particular hypotheticals such as 53 it is possible that they can be verified by enqu iring directly into the state of the actual world, either how it was or is, or by waiting for events to unfold. It is possible sometimes to verify universal hypothetical conditionals such as If a metal rod is heated, it expands. by causing the antecedent to be fulf illed and see if the consequent follows, or by searching for occasions in which the consequent is false and checking that the antecedent is also false. I am not claiming that this possibility is open to all hypothetical conditionals, e.g., not for If a star collapses into a black hole, it turns into a new universe. but that such a procedure is not available for counterfactual conditionals, unless they are used inappropriately, i.e. when their protasis is in fact the case but the speaker believes that it isn't. I think that this empirical difference is the reason for the pursuit of a solution to the counterfactual problem. But the pursuers themselves think that 1 62

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ii. iii.

If the consequent contains an anaphoric reference to the antecedent it has no truth status. If even if is used then the consequent is true. Otherwise the consequent is false unless the speaker has provided a context in which it is clear that the conse quent is true. Still may be an indication of such a context.

COUNTERF ACTUALS AND CAUSALITY they have to overcome a difference in meaning between the two sorts of conditional. Thus the empirical difference, even though it may be solvable, never even gets tackled. I will return to this difference below.

Conclusion We have seen that the simple position that a counterfactual is equivalent in its truth conditions to a hypothetical together with the negation of the antecedent and consequent is not tenable, i.e. 0+

C is not equivalent to (A :::> C) A ( "'A A �)

where 0+ is a sign i use to indicate a counterfactual relationship. The counterfactual, just as the hypothetical, entails neither the falsity of its antecedent nor of its consequent. It is also contraposable. However m other i mportant respects the counterfactual is not the same as a hypothetical. A counterfactual presupposes the falsity of i ts antecedent. I t is inappropriate for a speaker to use the counterfactual unless he believes that the antecedent is false; so the listener may take i t for granted that the speaker wishes to indicate that i t is indeed false. In other words (Haviland and Clark, 1 974) the falsity of the antecedent is accept ed by both parties as 'given' information. What is ' new' information is the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent. The counterfactual also differs from the standard hypothetical in that the speaker may conversationally imply either the truth or falsity of the consequent, usually the falsity. (There are also non-stand ard uses of if in which the truth or falsity of the consequent is indicated, e.g. There are biscuits on the table if you want some. (Austin, 1 96 1 ) If Jo stays a t home, she still feels m iserable. but these are rare compared to the counterfactual case.) Last but perhaps most importantly the counterfactual may be more difficult to verify in reality than the hypothetical. Bearing these three differences in m ind we will now turn to some proposed solutions to the counterfac tual problem.

SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS Several solutions have been proposed to Goodman's problem of counter factuals. The best known is Lewis's ( 1 97 3) approach based on a possible JS, vo1. 1 , no.2

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A

D.S. BR!:E

Let us f irst review what Goodman ' s problems were. H is first problem anses when, following the standard method for evaluating hypotheticals, we try to add the antecedent , A, of the counterfactual to the set of true propositions. All these propositions cannot be retained as they may, in conjunction with A, lead to tautologically false statements. The simplest instance is that ,..., A must not be retained in the set, S, of conditions relevant for evaluating the counterfactual. Further the whole set S must be compatible with A, otherwise "'A may be derived indirectly. We must also be sure that the negation of the consequent , C, which may be a true proposition, is not included i n S ; and that C cannot be derived just from S without the help of the antecedent . So S must be compatible both with C and with "' C. (This reasoning concerning C i mplicitly assumes that "' C rather than C is the case, contrary to our analysis above in which either may be the case; luckily the ultimate criterion is symmetrical.) If this procedure is followed then sentences such as S J . If the match had been struck, it would have lit. are acceptable. In this case S would contain

d o $

the match was dry, there was sufficient oxygen etcetera, a dry match in the presence of oxygen etc. · lights when struck .

Two true propositions could not have been included:

"'s ,... z

Adding

s

the match was not struck, the match did not light. to the set S enables l to be deduced using the law $.

But Goodman wanted to go one step further as he thought sentences such as 1 64

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worlds formalism. Unfortunately this elegant method requires possible worlds to be partially ordered with respect to their similarity with the actual world; a task which is no less difficult than the original cotenability problem . Recently Kratzer ( 1 979), working along sim ilar lines has proposed a solution which requires propositions true in the actual world to be partitioned; this partitioning is not trivial. Some time ago S imon and Rescher ( 1 968) claimed to have solved the problem for causally based counterfactuals; this requires that the causal ordering of the world be known. Before we review these three approaches in the light of the analysis in the previOus- section I want to look at recent claims by Goldstick ( 1 979) that a refinement of Goodman 's original method is sufficient t o solve the cotenabdity problem and that the problem of distinguishing laws from non-laws is irrelevant.

COUN TERF ACTU ALS AND CAUSALITY 52.

If the match had been struck , it would not have been dry.

should be unacceptable. Now "' l must be retained in the set S as it is compatible with the antecedent and both the consequent and its negation, and d dropped. When now s is added to S then "' d m a y be d educed by modus tollens and the counterfactual is acceptable, which was not wanted. To prevent this Goodman introduced an additional requirement, namely that it is not the case that S would not be true if A were. This is a condition that A is 'cotenable' with S. But this cotenability condition is itself expressed as a counterfactual. So there is a circularity in the procedure for ascertaining the truth of a counterfactual.

Goldstick's extension of Goodman's method Goldstick ( 1 978), who IS essentially concerned to continue the work of Goodman, denies that lawlike statements are necessary for the truth of counterfactuals, citing acceptable accidental counterfactuals in support of this, e.g. S 1 1 . He also claims to have overcome the first major problem , the problem of relevant conditions. Goldstick avoids the cotenability problem by allowing such counter factuals as 52 to be acceptable under appropnate conditions. He gives as an example of such conditions " Match M has never been on fire, and a couple of researchers are arguing over whether it has been dry or not. Finally, the one who thinks not accuses the other one of hypothesis-saving. 'Tell me,' he challenges him, 'what could have happened that would have actually convinced you the match wasn 't dry?' ' Well,' the other replies, 'naturally, if it had been scratched, it wouldn ' t have been dry." Let us accept for the moment that there are conditions under which such counterfactuals as 52 are acceptable, and go on to consider his procedure for determining whether a counterfactual is true or not. 1 will describe a slightly simplified version but one which is sufficient for our purposes. We start with a set of sentences that are true in this world. These sentences may be compounds of simple sentences, but do not contain any subjunctive sentences. At the first step of the procedure sentences are removed from this set that are not compatible with the antecedent of the counterfactual. In the second step sentences are removed that are not compatible with the consequent or its negation. In the final JS, vol. � , no.2

1 65


The second problem, that of distinguishing laws from non-laws,\ is notorious.

D.S. BRI:E step the antecedent is added to the rematntng sentences and an attempt is made to deduce the consequent or its negation. What I will call Goldstick's algorithm is

.....

The rationale for most of the steps in this procedure is clear from the rationale underlying Goodman 's proposal. However, there are a couple of additional steps that need justification. The reason for in cluding step G lb is to exclude such true sentences as "' A V C from S. This is consistent with A, so may not be removed at step G I a. However if it were allowed to remain its combination with A would lead to C, so that any counterfactual would be true irrespective of its antecedent. The second addition is that in step G2a all subsets K' are to be consis tent not with C but with A & C. I believe that this is an unnecessary modification but the difference I S minor; if step G2a is retained as Lt stands then step G3a becomes redundant (see Appendix). When we perform the algorithm in the correct order for the counter factual 52, with s as A and "'d as C, we get: l . Eliminate "'S as being inconsistent with s. This leaves the sen tences d, o, z, $. By applying modus tollens to $ we can infer "' S , so one more sentence must be removed. Normally we would remove "' l, leaving the set S as { d, o, $} . 2. Eliminate d from S as it is inconsistent with the consequent "'d. This leaves { o, $ } as the set S ' . 3 . There is n o subset o f S ' from which, together with the ante cedent s, the consequent "'CC can be shown true or false, .....

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G l . Discard true sentences until the following conditions are satisfied for all conjunctions, K, of sub sets of remaining ser.tences: a. K is consistent with A b. If K is derivable from 0 & "'A , then it is derivable from 0 alone, where 0 is any of the remaining true sentences. The remaining true sentences form the set S. G2. Discard sentences from S until the following conditions are satisfied for all conjunctions, K ', of subsets of remaining sentences: a. K' is consistent with A & C, b. K' is consistent with "'C. The remaining sentences from S form the new set S'. G3. a. If there is a subset of S' whose conjunction U is such that c is derivable from A & U. then the counterfactu al is false, otherwise b. If there is a subset of S' whose conjunction T is such that C I S derivable from A & T, then the counterfactual is true, otherwise c. The counterfactual is false.

COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSALITY so the counterfactual is false. If, on the other hand, instead of deleting ,...f at step G 1 we had deleted d, then the final set S' would have been {o, "' !, $} Combining this with s enables the consequent "-'d to be derived, so the counterfactual would be true. So the truth of 52 depends on what sentence is chosen for deletion in step G l . In the example context that Goldstick provides to show that 52 can be true it is clear that the dryness of the match is under discussion and so d should be removed from the set of true sentences, so 52 would be true as required. .

Let us now see if the algorithm conforms to the points made in the previous section. The falsity of the antecedent is a presupposition, so a true antecedent should result in a failed algorithm. This is not the case with Goldstick 's algorithm. If A is the case no statements are discarded at step G 1 . Sentences are discarded at step G2 so that neither C nor "' C can be derived. At this point A may or may not be discarded. If A is not left in 5' then when it is added to 5' in step G3, either "' C (or C) will be restored and the counterfactual will be false (or true). If A has been left in 5' then neither C nor "' C will be deducible and the counterfactual will be false by step G3c. Thus the falsity of the antecedent is not presupposed. Although Goldstick assumed it when writing the algorithm, it is certainly not entatled by the algorithm. So it cannot be anything more than a conversational implicature. The truth value of the consequent should be a conversational impli cature. Goldstick's algorithm neither entails the falsity of the conseJS, vol. l , no.2

1 67


If we are willing to go along with the assumption that counterfactuals such as 52 can be acceptable under the appropriate cirsumstances, then Goldstick 's method, simplified at some points, is suitable. It overcomes the circularity in Goodman's formulation, which required cotenability at step G l as well as consistency, by permitting counterfac tuals such as 52 to be true on occasion. However; even Goldstick 's algorithm is not complete as it does not provide any rule about which sentence has to be removed from the set of remaining true sentences when elimination of one is required. Goldstick is aware of this point and pro11ides a heuristic for which sentences should be dropped. For example, that S 1 is usually acceptable whereas 52 is not "derives from the relative uncommonness in our reasoning of cases where it is actually harder to verify the fulfillment of such a simple and super ficial condition as the dryness of some given match than it is to deter mine the fulfillment of a complex conjunctive condition to the effect that the match is well made, environed with sufficient oxygen to support ignition, etc." (Golds tick, 1 978: 8-9). So Golds tick's algorithm needs to be filled in with a heuristic such as this 'difficulty of verifica tion' heuristic: when required to drop a sentence from S choose the one that is hardest to verify.

D.S. BR!:E quent nor presupposes it; the algorithm can be executed for a true consequent. So the truth value is a conversational implicature. However, the algorithm can lead to incorrect conclusions when the consequent is true. For example consider Lewis's example: If Boris had gone to the party, Olga would still have gone. in which Olga went only because Alexis went. In step G2b Olga's going is discarded from S, but so is Alexis's gomg., because this is inconsistent with Olga's not going. Then when Boris's going is added to S' at step GJ there is no way to deduce that Olga went nor that she didn ' t go, i.e. by step GJc the counterfactual is false, inapproprately.

In summary Goldstick's algorithm is inconsistent with the counterfac tual's presupposing the falsity of the antecedent and it can fail for a counterfactual with a true consequent. It is incomplete in that it does not specify which propositions should be dropped from the set of true propositions; the algorithm needs to be complemented with a suitable heunstic such as 'drop the proposition that is hardest to verify'.

Lewis 's possible worlds Lewis ( 1 973) has proposed a solution to the problem of counterfactuals based on the possible worlds semantics. After sketching h1s proposal, I will refute both his content1on that th1s scheme is an improvement on metalinguistic proposals such as Goldstick's, and that probability is not a suitable basis for similarity. Lewis ( 1 9 73: 1 4) sets up the following system of spheres: "$ is called a (centered) system of spheres, and the members of each $ 1 are called spheres around i, if and only if, for each world l, the following conditions hold. (C) $ 1 is centered on i, that is, the set { i} having i as its only member belongs to $1• ( I ) $ 1 i s nested; that is, whenever S and T belong t o $1 , either S is included in T or T is included in S. (2) $1 is closed under unions; that is, whenever S is a subset of $1 and US is the set of all worlds j such that j b e I o n g s t o

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The same algorithm can handle hypothetical conditionals; steps G l and G2 are then redundant. For example that 'Angeline's being an expert hang-glider' is sufficient to cast doubt on both the hypotheti cal and counterfactual is accounted for by the positive outcome of step G3a in both cases. Hypotheticals are eas1er to evaluate than counterfactuals in that steps GJa and GJb may be physically tried out for the former but not the latter.

COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSALITY

Now a counterfactual with antecedent . A and consequent C is true at a world i if and only if either:

( I) no A-world belongs to any of the spheres in $ 1 , or (2) some sphere S in $1 does contain at least one A-world, and A => C holds at every world in S. The first condition is vacuous and so I will consider only the second one. How has Lew1s coped with the cotenability problem? He has done so by positing his system of spheres containing possible worlds. A counterfactual is verified by moving out from the actual world i until a sphere is found which contains a world m which A holds. Note that this is a possible world, so all subsets of propositions in this world must be cotenable with A. However, Lewis neglects to consider consistency with the consequent. He does not attempt to reach a world where the consequent is deduced from the antecedent; the consequent must simply be evaluated in all the worlds in the nearest sphere S containing an A-world. So such counterfactuals as S20.

If the match had been struck, horses wouldn't be able to fly.

are accepted as true in all worlds where horses can 't fly. Thus Lewis has nothing corresponding with the second step in Goldstick's algorith m , and suffers the consequence of being further removed from natural Jan!?UF) where F is always false, then cons1stency of K' with A and with C is

"' ((K ' &. A) ::>F) & ""(( K ' &. C)::>F) which can be simplif1ed to "' [((K ' &. A)=> F) V ((K ' &. C)::>F)] "' [( K ' &. A &. K' &. C)=> F) "' [( K ' &. (A &. C)) ::> F]

as "'X &_ ..... y = ---( X V Y), as ( X :::> F) V ( Y :::> F) = ( X &. Y b F

This IS to say that cons1stency with A and cons1stency with C is the same as consistency with A &. C. But th1s is counterintuitive. If a patient has symptoms that are cons1stent with his having a virus of type X and they are also consistent with his having a virus of type Y, 1t might still be the case that they are not consistent with his having both viruses at the same time. The problem arises because we used ' & ' to join the two parts of the premise; but K ' &. A m ight well be true for one set of truth values while K' &. C is true for another set of truth values, while there IS no set for which they are both true. This is the case for example with K' "'A v "' C. However, if K' is consistent with A &. C, it must be consistent with C separately as =

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Goldstick introduced two changes to Goodman 's method for determining counterfactuals. The second of these I believe is unnecessary. The second addition is in step G2a where all subsets K' are required to be consistent not simply with C but with A &. C, even though they are already consistent with A by step G I . The reason for this appears to be that it seems a stronger requirement. But if it is so, why is a similar stronger requirement not introduced at step G2b? Goldstick's reason (personal communication) is that "this would effectively preclude the der1vability of C from the conjunction of A with any of K 's con juncts thus makmg every subjunctive conditional come out false". But by a similar argument the requirement G2a will preclude the de r ivability of -c from the conjunction of A with any of K "s conjuncts, thus preventmg step G3a from ever being operat1ve. In other words counterfactuals could only be false indirectly. If this is acceptable then step G3a should be removed from the algorithm.

COUNTERF A CTUALS AND CAUSALITY

.... [(K I & (A & C)) ::> F] "' ((K I & A) ::> F &"" ((K I & C) ::> F), =;:. "" ((K' & Cb F). =

So consistency with A & C is stronger than consistency with C alone as Goldstick maintained. (A similar examination of Lewis's cotenability shows that he was incorrect in his assumption.)

As we have already seen, there is also a redundancy between steps G2a and G 3a. At this point it is tempting to consider the feasibility of dropping steps G l b and G3a while retaining step G2a. However, it should not be forgotten that consistency with A & C requires consis tency with A, which is step G I a. Should we drop this also? We cannot do this, as Goldstick points out, as the order in which the processes, described in steps G l and G2, are executed, is important. If the consis tency with the consequent were checked first then the ambiguity con cerning the truth status of counterfactuals such as 52 would not remain, instead they would be false. If step G2 is executed before step G l with 52, starting with the true sentences { "' s, d, o, "' I, $ } : 2. I.

Eliminate d from the true sentences as it is inconsistent with the consequent "'d, which leaves { r:ws, o, "' I, $} which is consistent with both d and "' d. Eliminate "' s as it is inconsistent with the antecedent s, which leaves {o, I $ } which is consistent with s. Combining the antecedent s with this set enables us to de rive, by modus tollens on $, "" d which is the consequent. So the counterfactual is true. "'

3.

,

So reversing steps G I and G2 will result in the truth of counterfactuals such as 52 irrespective of their context. This is not desirable in the least considering that 52 would normally be regarded as false. So it is necessary to retain the order as specified in Goldstick 's procedure. JS, vol. l , no.2

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Having accepted that consistency with A & C is more stringent than consistency with A and with C separately, we must now ask our selves whether or not this extra stringency is necessary in step G2a. I find Goldstick's argument on this point to be weak. On the one hand, he wants to eliminate such propositions as "'A V "" C from the set S. This would clearly be done by requiring consistency with A & C but not by requiring consistency with C alone. However such proposi tions are removed by step G l b because they are derivable from "" A alone. He also wants to remove such propositions as (...A V "'C) & 0 for any 0 because directly A is added to the set in step G 3, "" C can be deduced for any A (personal communication). However, such proposi tions will be excluded from S by step G l b because they are derivable from 0 &"" A but not from 0 alone. So there is a redundancy between step G l b and G2a.

D.S. BRtE Moreover step G l b must be retained, so either step G 3a may be dropped or step G2a modified to require that K ' is consistent only with C. Interfaculteit Bedrijfskunde Poortweg 6-8 Delft - The Netherlands

Notes

References

Austin, J.L. , 1 9 6 1 : lfs and cans. In J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock,(eds.), Philosophical Papers of J. L. Austin. Oxford, Oxford University Press, Pp. 1 53- 1 80. Adams, E. W ., 1 970: Subjunctive and indicative conditionals. Founda tions of Language, 6; 89-94. Ayers, M .R., 1 965: Counterfactuals and subjunctive conditionals. Mind, 74; 347-364. Bree, D.S. &: Smit, R.A., 1 9 8 1 : Non standard uses of if. NATO Symposium on Artificial and Human Thinking, Lyons. Working Paper 79/042. Delft, Interfacul teit Bedrijfskunde. Geis, M.L &: Zwickey, A.M., 1 97 1 : On invited inferences. L in g u i s tic In quiry, 2; 56 1 -566. Glendinning-Johnson, J.J.C., 1 975: Syntax and semantics of if-clause con stroctions. Ph.D. dissertation, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania. Goldstick, D., 1 978: The truth-conditions of counterfactual condi tiona! sentences. Mind, 87; l - 2 1 . Goodman, N . , 1 947: The problem of counterfactual conditionals. Journa l of Philosophy, 44; 1 1 3- 1 28. Haviland, S.E. &: Clark, H.H., 1974: What's new? Acquiring new informa tion as a process in comprehension Journal of Verbal Learn ing and Verbal Behavior, 1 3; 5 1 2-52 1 . J ackson, L.R., 1 976: Conditional stroctures. Ph.D. dissertation, Universi ty of F lorida. Karttunen, L., 1 9 7 1 : Counterfactual conditionals. L inguis tic Inauiry, 2 ; 566-569. Kempson, R.M., 1 977: Semantic theory. Cambridge, Cambridge University .•

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l Example sentences followed by a code in parenthesis, e.g. (L 1 9), indicate that the sentence occurs in the Brown University Corpus of written American English as compiled by Kucera and Francis ( 1 967). The letter, e.g. L, indicates the subcorpus and the number, e.g. 19, the text within this subcorpus.

COUN TERF ACTUALS AND CAUSALITY

.

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Press. K ratzer, A., 1 979: Revision and partitions. Manuscript. Max Planck Institute, Nijmegen. Kucera, H. & Francis, W .N., 1 967: Computational analysis of present day American English. Providence, Brown University Press. Lewis, D.K. , 1 973: Counterfactuals. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Universi ty Press. Mackie, J.L., 1 962: Counterfactuals and causal laws. In R.J. Butler, (ed.), Analytical Philosophy. Oxford, Blackwell. Pollock, J .L., 1 976: The 'possible worlds' analysis of counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies, 29; 469-476. Sellars, W .S., 19 58: Counterfactua1s, dispositions and the causal modali ties. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell, (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol.2, Pp. 227-248. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Sosa, 1 975. Simon, H.A. & Rescher, N., 1 966: Cause and coun t erfactual Philosophy of Science, 33; 323-340. Sosa, E. (ed.), 197 5: Causation and conditionals. London, Oxford Universi ty Press . Stalnaker, R.C., 1 968: A Theory of conditionals. In N . Rescher, (ed.), Studies in logical theory. Oxford, Blackwell . Reprinted in Sosa, 1 975. Wason, P.C., 1 968: Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experi mental Psychology, 20; 273-28 1 .

SHOR T NOTICE

AGAINST CONVERSATIONAL 1MPLICATURE

Kim Sterelny

Abstract

(1) Someone should teach oilmen 's sons to shoot straight. How is it that A understands (1) ? A natural answer for those working within genera tive grammar nms as follows. S and A have internalised a common system of semantic, syntactic and phonological rules. In virtue of common possession of this apparatus, the message that S encodes A decodes. 2 So our theory of the grammar of English provides an account of how English sentences are understood providing we take the theory to be a claim about the psychology of English speakers. But it seems that this account of understanding is insufficiently general. For consider the following quite standard examples. Imagine a group of people at a table, eating. One says to another: (2) Can you pass the wine ?

The addressee, rather than answering, passes the wine. Another standard example: imagine a nobleman and his lackey alone in a room at the nobleman 's residen�e. The nobleman says: (3) It 's cold in here.

The lackey closes the window. A further example. Two burglars are in a warehouse. One lifts his head saying: (4) That 's a police siren.

The burglars leave hurriedly. Some like (2) in deep standing

writers on 'Indirect Speech Acts' have suggested that sentences are lite � ly requests: that they are represented as requests structure. But even if they are right, the account of under alluded to above will not generalize to all these cases. It

JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS, vol. 1 , no.2,

pp.

1 87-1 94

1 87


In this paper I shall attempt to show that a considerable amoWlt of recent effort in linguistic theory has been devoted to a non-solution of an apparent problem. 1 The problem arises through a commWlicative contrast. In some cases a sentence conveys its literal meaning. For instance, suppose a speaker (S) utters to someone (A)

KIM STERELNY is obvious that (3), literally, is a statement about the temperature of a contextually definite space-time region, while (4), literally, is a statement about a continuing noise. But despite their literal meanings, (2) conveys a request, (3) a command, and (4) a suggestion. It seems therefore that some more general a ccount needs to be given of how (2)-{4), and the indefinitely many sim ilar cases, are understood.

Conversational Postulates and Conversational Implication

2.

Grice attempts to give a general mechanism for explaining hearer uptake of (2)-(4). This seems reasonable: hearers understand what IS intended in these situations without the aid of conventional links between literal meaning and what is understood. Yet the situations are not learnt off, one by one. So it seems that Some general mechanism IS a t work. Grice's bas1c idea is to credit speakers with knowledge of a set of principles governing conversational exchange additional to syntax and semantics. These principles are maxims of conversation which, in dif ferent ways, spell out the Cooperative Principle: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which 1t occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." (Grice, I 97 5: 45) The CP is spelt out in term s of four aspects: Quality, Quantity, Relation, Manner; each aspect being associated w1th conversational maxims. For instance: Quantity

I . Make your contribution as informative a::. is required.

2. Do not make your contribution more informative than

is required. 1 . Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack sufficient evidence. Relation I . Be relevant. 2. Be perspicuous. etc. Quality

The general mechanism underlying cases like (2)-(4) can now be sketched. The maxims can be violated in a number of ways (for instance one can violate Quality by cunningly lying), but one way is particularly 188

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In this paper I will sketch Grice 's mechanism for handling cases l ike (2)-(4). I then argue that: i. Grice 's theory of how these cases are to be handled is not easily integrated within a well motivated theory of language. At best G rice 's m echanisms are part of the heuristics of language use: rough rules of thumb available to language users. ii. Grice 's mechanism is not needed to explain how examples like (2)-{4) can be understood.

AGAINST CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE important. Namely: situations where one of the maxims is obviously being violated but where the hearer has no reason to think that the speaker is refusing to cooperate. In such cases, Grice speaks of a reconciliation hypothesis being conversationally implicated: the i mplica ture is that which reconciles a cooperating speaker with the maxims. (Grice, 1 975: 49-50). So, the explanation of (say) (3) goes something like this. While (3) does not say or mean 'Close the window' it violates, or flouts, the maxim of relevance. The lackey searches for a reconciliation hypothesis, and a fairly obvious chain of reasoning leads him to the command, to shut the window.

3. A Pragmatics Component? One way of understanding the maxims of conversation is by analogy to the rest of generative grammar. Take the maxims to form a pragmat ics component , a set of universal rules that explain speakers abilities in ways precisely analogous to the way corresponding syntactic and semantic abilities are explained. Further, since conversational implication starts from the literal meaning of what is said, we can take it to be supervenient on the syntactics and semantic components: taking output from those components as its input. However, I will give four reasons for denying that the CP and the maxims form a pragmatics component that we can add to the rest of our grammar. 1 . An ad hominem point: Grice sees conversation as a special case of cooperative activity (pp.47-48); the maxims are special cases of general principles of cooperation. But then the maxims cannot be seen as part of a grammar (grammars are ability specific, not special cases of our general cognitive capacities), for that would sever the connection between the rules of conversation and the rules of general cooperation. JS, vol . l , no.2

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There are obviously considerable problems of detail working this idea through. For instance, though obvious, the lackey 's inference to the command is only one of many reconciliation hypotheses. What determines appropriate from inappropriate implicatures ? Again: Grice's account generates implicatures only on the assumption that the speaker is obeying the CP. But pointedly refusing to obey the CP can generate implicature - like phenomena: for instance, abruptly and determinedly changing the subject of a conversation. Moreover, there will be prob lems in refining the notions Grice uses to make them clear and precise. But I shall not be concerned in this paper with such details. In the next section I discuss the nature of the conversational maxims and their relationship to generative grammar. In the following section I argue for the dispensibility of the max ims.

K I M STERELNY

3. Moreover, there IS a profound difference between the syntax and semantics of a language, and its pragmatics. Violations of the syntax and semantics of English, if moderately serious (for instance violations of Ross's constraints) result in the failure to produce English. But lying, speculating irresponsibly, answering questions profusely or irrelevantly, all count as speaking. The Cooperative Principle and the maxims do not define the language; the syntax/semantics does. Grice does suggest that in a somewhat weaker sense the CP and the maxi ms' are constitutive of language, in that widespread and general violations of these principles would cause the collapse of the institution of language (Grice, I 97 5: 46-48). Language would Jose its point if, e.g. we mostly lied or even if we were mostly mistaken.4 But I think that not even this limited defense of the constitutive nature of pragmat ics ultimately succeeds. i. It is claimed that the maxims must normally be obeyed if conversa tion is to have a point. But this is plausible only for some maxims. If the maxims of quality were standardly and grossly violated, perhaps conversation would be impossible or pointless. If in, say, asking a ques tion we were more likely than not to get a lying, speculative or irrele vant answer, we might give up asking questions. But even this is not obvious. Especially if forewarned, information can be had from lies, speculations, and irrelevancies. Conversation will be useful so long as speech behaviour is not random. It is still less obvious that the maxims of quantity and manner are essential to language. How great would be the inconvenience of prolix, overdetailed, or too sketchy answers? Indeed, how great is the inconvenience of such answers ? ii. A pragmatics component would help define the language only if language is essentially a communicative device. But while it is 190

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2 . More seriously, transformational generative syntax is arbitrary, given the function of language. To characterize behaviour as rule governed is to take it to be arbitrary. For instance: given a specification of the form of the indicative in English, the form of the imperative is arbitrary. Given both the form of the indicative, and the functions of the imperative we could form the imperative indefinitely many ways. We could use the indicative form backwards, shout it, etc. But we can form the imperative, for indefinitely many sentences. Hence it is reasonable to suppose English speakers to have internalised an imperative formation rule. But it would be otiose to do so if the impera tive form (given the indicative) was determined by more general consid erations (functional or perceptual considerations, for example). It is the fact that the imperative form is arbitrary, i.e. not d e te r m i ned by more general considerations, that makes it reasonable to take imperative formation as a rule-governed process. Consequently taking conversation to be rule -governed is to take conversational interaction to be arbi trary in the same way that linguistic forms, or rules of a game are arbitrary. This is both implausible in itself and cuts diametrically across Grice 's intentions.

AGAINST CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE obvious that this is one function of language, it is not obvious that this is its essential function: it is at least as plausible to take its essential role to be its serving as a medium of thought. 5 Moreover, if language functions basically as a medium of thought, we would expect there to be the difference we find between the syntactics/semantics and the pragmatics. For then language would be constituted by its syntax and 1ts semantics, but not by the conditions under which it can be used as a medium of communication.

If .

The Maxims a s Heuristics

What then are the CP and the maxims if they are not l1ke rules of grammar? Perhaps they are simply very approximate generalisations about conversational behaviour known to speakers and hearers. Since they are known to hearers they can exploit this knowledge in making mferences from what speakers say to their cognitive states: their beliefs, intentions, and so on. Moreover, smce the speakers both know these generalisations themselve.s and expect their audience to know them, they can reasonably expect their audience to make these infer ences. This line of thought has initial plausibility. But I shall argue that we do not need the CP anci thP m r� v i m o; IO'Ven as heuristic devices. We can explain the audience's uptake of (2)-(lf) and their like without them. If the mference from (3) to (5) ( 3) It's cold in here. JS, vol. l , no.2

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If , A final point on the contrast between G rice ' s mechanism and the syntactic and semantic components. The syntactic and semantic components are normally taken to be theories of sentence-types. Thus the syntax defines the class of sentence types m the language and associates with each sentence-type a number of syntactic descriptions. The seman tic component associates with each sentence a range of semantic descriptions, one for each interpretation of the sentence in the language. It would be at best completely unhelpful to take G rice's theory of implicature to be a theory of sentence-types in this sense. For 1t would then define the class of possible implicatures of each sentence type of the language. But there is no interesting relationship between sentence-types and what they can implicate. It is agreed that implica ture depends at least in part on the non-linguistic context, on the stage setting. But it is obvious that, given a suitable stage settmg, a sentence-type can implicate near enought anything. 6 Hence all sen tence-types would be associated with the same class of possible implica tures. But then there is no pomt to defining implicature for sentence types. There are no interesting dependencies between the meaning and form of a sentence-type and what it can implicate.

K IM STERELNY (5) Shut the window. is a case of conversational implicature, then three conditions need to be met: i. The inference must in some essential way depend on the conven tional meaning of (3), not just on the audience knowing ( 3) is not meant literally. ii. The inference must in some way depend on the C P and the maxims. iii. The inference must in some way depend on the circumstances of the utterance.

Now it is clear that the meaning of ( 3) is involved essentially, via 'cold' and 'here ' . It is also obvious that background knowledge is involved: the power relations between the duke and the lackey, the lackey 's knowledge that the duke does not enjoy bemg cold, etc. But it is not obvious that the CP and the maxims play an essential role. If they do, It IS in the premise that the duke is not j ust making idle conversation. A defender of Grice's programme m ight take this premise to be a disguised version of the maxim: Be Relevant. But this defense fails. The mference does not depend on any general principle of relevanc;e. Rather it just depends on that particular utterance not be mg idle. Now we can obviously know that a particular utterance is not idle independently of any views we many have about the general principle. Our confidence in the general principle is bases on knowledge of particular cases. Moreover, the general principle is at best only approxi mately true. Many conversational interchanges do not exhibit such a principle even on a generous interpretation of 'relevance.' But we will often be in a good position to know that a particular utterance is not idle. So the lackey's opinion on the idleness or otherwise of the duke 's remark will be quite independent of any allegiance to a general principle of relevance; rather it will be based on his knowledge of the duke and his habits, linguistic and non-linguistic. We can explain how the lackey can understand from (3) that the duke wants him to close the window without invoking the CP and the maxims. I thmk this result is quite general. Our ability to detect the purpose behind another's remark is not dependent on the approximately true claim that they always have some purpose or other; information that weak would never yield the specific purpose. Nor is the speaker's confidence that we will be able to do so dependent on this approximation. The audience 's inference to the speaker's state of mind will normally depend on the idea that the speaker is not speaking idly, lying or 192

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So the lackey hearing ( 3) should infer as follows. The duke is unlikely to be making idle conversation, or abstract meteorogical remarks. (Here the maxims of relevance seems to play a role). Inference, given background information: he means me to shut the window.

AGAINST CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE speculating irresponsibly, etc. But the audience's confidence in this idea is not parasitic on his confidence in the approximate generalisations but rather on his knowledge of the speaker. The CP and the maxims do not have any explanatory power in the paradigm cases in which they are thought to be exploited. Division of Linguistics Department of Philosophy La Trobe University

2 3 If

5 6

The central work is that of Grice ( 1 975) and Grice ( 1 978). But it has resulted in considerable spin off; for instance Morgan ( 1 975) and Cole ( 1 978). This theory is explicit in Katz ( 1 966: 1 03- l OLf); and more cautiously in Fodor ( 1 975: 1 03-1 1 2). For explanations along this line see a number of papers in Cole and Morgan ( 1 97 5), espeCially those by Green and Davison. Similar ideas have been independently suggested, see for example Dennett ( 1978) and Lewis ( 1 97Lf). As Harman argues in a number of places, for example in his ( 1 973). My argument for this is a promise. Specify two sentence types, and I will specify situations in which each implicates the other.

Refer-ences

Cole, P. & Morgan, J. (eds.), 1 975: Syntax and Semantics. Vol.3. Academ ic Press, New York-London. Davison, A., 1 975: Indirect Speech Acts and what to do with them. In: P. Cole & J. Morgan (eds.), 1 975. Dennett, D., 1 978: Brainstorms. Bradford Books, Montgomery, Vt. Fodor, J.A., 1 97 5: The language of Thought. Harvester Press, Hassocks, Sussex. Grice, H., 1 97 5: Logic and Conversation. In: P. Cole & J. Morgan (eds.), 1 97 5. Grice, H., 1 978: Further Notes on Logic and Conversation. In: P. Cole (ed.): S)'ltaX and Semantics. Vol.9. Academic Press, New York London. Green, G., 1 97 5: How to Get People to Do Things with Words: the Whimperative Question. In: P. Cole & J. Morgan (eds.), 1 975. Harman, G., 1 973: Thought. Princeton U . P., Princeton. JS, vol . l , no.2

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Notes

KIM STERELNY Katz, J., 1 966: The Philosophy of Language. Harper and Row, New York. Lewis, D., 1 9 74: Language, Language and Grammar. In: G. Harman (ed.): On Noam Chomsky. Anchor Books, New York. Morgan, J., 1 97 5: Some Interactions of Syntax and Pragmatics. In: P. Cole &. J. Morgan (eds.), 1 97 5.


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October journal No.22 Autumn (1982)

Semantics, Volume 2

Journal on Data Semantics 1 conf

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Applied Linguistics Volume 1, No.2, 1980

Journal of Semantics, Volume 12, Issue 3, 1995

Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 1, No. 1

Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 2, No. 2

October journal No.21 Summer (1982) - Rainer Werner Fassbinder

Cell Journal, January, 21, 2011, Volume 144, No. 2

Microwave Journal, February 2011, Volume. 54, Issue No.2

Journal on Data Semantics XV

AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY, Volume 1, No 2. 2008, Biannual Journal of Theology, Culture & History

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International Journal of Greek Love, vol. 1, no. 1

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