Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia (Rethinking Globalizations)

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Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia

Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia focuses on the relationship between spatial dynamics of globalization and an active civil society by examining the different conditions in which civic spaces emerge in Pacific Asian cities. It makes the important argument that civic spaces are crucial to the production and meaning of liveable cities. Experiences from seven countries and at the global scale are brought together to illuminate how the engagement of civil society in the public sphere is contingent upon creating civic spaces for community life and collective action. The research brought together in this book addresses: •

• • •

The links between civic spaces and civil society; the different types of civic spaces and their connections to civil society efforts at organization and the controls and constraints state and capital interventions place on civic spaces. The social production of civic spaces: how the case studies speak to the formation and transformation of civic spaces in different contexts. Regulation of civic spaces: how state, capital and the community interact in and engage in contestations as well as cooperation over civic spaces. Civic spaces and community mobilization: how civic spaces are sites for the initiation of collective action and can be the outcomes of such action.

This unique book provides a cogent analysis and a series of ten case studies on Pacific Asian countries, adding new research on globalization and civil society that has until now focused on the West. It will be of great interest to a broad range of disciplines including politics, urban studies, geography, sociology, globalization and Asian studies. Mike Douglass is Professor of Urban and Regional Planning and the Director of the Globalization Research Center at the University of Hawaii, USA. K.C. Ho is Professor of Sociology at the National University of Singapore. Giok Ling Ooi is Professor at the National Institute of Education at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She is also Adjunct Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies.

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Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia The social production of civic spaces

Edited by Mike Douglass, K.C. Ho and Giok Ling Ooi

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First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square Milton Park Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business. © 2008 Mike Douglass, K.C. Ho and Giok Ling Ooi for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors, their contributions All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Globalization, the city, and civil society in Pacific Asia: the social production of civic spaces / edited by Mike Douglass, K.C. Ho and Giok Ling Ooi. p. cm.–(Rethinking globalizations; 6) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-415-39789-6 (hardback: alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-20393938-3 (e-book: alk. paper) 1. Public spaces–Political aspects–Southeast Asia. 2. Public spaces–Social aspects–Southeast Asia. 3. Civil society–Southeast Asia. 4. Political participation– Southeast Asia. 5. Spatial behavior–Southeast Asia. 6. Culture and globalization–Southeast Asia. I. Douglass, Mike. II. Ho, Kong-Chong, 1955– III. Ooi, Giok Ling. HT147.S64G56 2007 306.2–dc22 2007014294 ISBN 0-203-93938-7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 10 0-415-39789-8 (hbk) ISBN 10 0-203-93938-7 (ebk) ISBN 13 978-0-415-39789-6 (hbk) ISBN 13 978-0-203-93938-3 (ebk)

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Contents

List of figures List of tables List of contributors Preface Acknowledgements 1 Globalization, the city and civil society in Pacific Asia

vii ix x xiv xvi 1

MIKE DOUGLASS, K.C. HO AND GIOK LING OOI

2 Civil society for itself and in the public sphere: Comparative research on globalization, cities and civic space in Pacific Asia

27

MIKE DOUGLASS

3 Governing cities: Civic spaces, civil society and urban politics

50

K.C. HO

4 State-society relations, the city and civic space

66

GIOK LING OOI

5 Chinese public space: A brief account

79

HENG CHYE KIANG

6 Mosques as a type of civic space in turbulent times: A case study of globalizing Kuala Lumpur

104

MORSHIDI SIRAT AND ATIKULLAH HJ. ABDULLAH

7 Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages

121

MICHAEL LEAF AND SAMANTHA ANDERSON

8 The pavement as civic space: history and dynamics in the city of Hanoi DAVID KOH

145

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vi Contents 9 Changing community relations and emerging civic spaces in Shanghai

175

HANLONG LU

10 From street corners to plaza: The production of festive civic space in central Seoul

194

MYUNGRAE CHO

11 Transient civic spaces in Jakarta demopolis

211

MERLYNA LIM

12 Creating new civic realms in a global city-state

231

LIMIN HEE

13 Bangkok’s Sanam Luang (the royal ground): From a historic plaza to a civic space

254

PORNPAN CHINNAPONG

14 International meetings and dissent: The city as political space for global issues

268

JOSEPH BOSKI

Index

288

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Figures

2.1 2.2 2.3 5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1

Civil society and civic spaces Global timelines, the city and civic space in Pacific Asia Population growth in four Southeast Asia mega urban regions, 1900–2000 Map of Wangcheng in Kaogongji showing a walled city with an orthogonal grid of streets and a walled administration compound in the center Detail from a map of Chang’an engraved on a stone stele in 1080 showing walled residential wards provided with gates on two or four sides of the wards Relief tile from the Han period showing what might be Chengdu’s market surrounded by thick walls and filled with rows of shops Detail of Qingming shanghe tu showing a street lined with shops and a drugstore owned by a minor functionary Schematic reconstruction of Kaifeng showing streets lined with diverse activities Trade and popular entertainment in a contemporary temple fair in Beijing Song period painting of Golden Bright Pond, Liaoning Museum Beijing’s Beihai Park opened to public in 1925 Shimin gongyuan (Citizenship Park) in Beijing “Da-Sai et le modèle rural” Night scene of Beijing’s Wangfujin pedestrian mall Tiananmen guangchang in Beijing Xinhai guangchang in Dalian Spatial distribution of mosques in Kuala Lumpur The National Mosque: the most preferred site for popular protests and demonstration in Kuala Lumpur The Kampung Baru Mosque: discussions and debates normally spill over to nearby food stalls Zhejiang village, Dahongmen, Beijing, China

29 34 36

81

82

84 86 87 88 90 93 93 95 97 97 99 112 113 113 130

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viii Figures 7.2 Dongmei village, Quanzhou, Fujian, China 8.1 Motorcycles and vendors, Nguyen Du Street, Hanoi, Vietnam 8.2 Vendors outside the Opthamology Hospital, Ba Trieu Street, Hanoi, Vietnam 8.3 Bia hoi (draught beer) shop, Yen Phu Street/Thanh Nien Street corner, Hanoi, Vietnam 9.1 Hierarchical governmental management model during planned economy 10.1 Opening day of Plaza Park, 1 May 2004 11.1 The Hotel Indonesia (HI) roundabout (traffic circle) 11.2 National Monument (Monas) in Independent Square 11.3 Suharto’s franchise YAMP mosque 11.4 The Panoptic signboard 11.5 Warnet 11.6 Hotel Indonesia (HI) roundabout in Thamrin-Sudirman Jakarta intersection was filled up by thousands of protestors, May 1998 11.7 The Jakarta Parliament House swarmed by hundreds of thousands of student protestors, May 1998 11.8 The newly renovated HI roundabout, Jakarta, January 2003 11.9 The fenced Monas Square, Jakarta, January 2003 12.1 Open spaces in the Raffles Plan 12.2 View of the contemporary Padang, and part view of Suntec City on left 12.3 Orchard Road “consumption-scape” 12.4 Filipino workers outside Lucky Plaza on Sunday 12.5 Filipino workers in the almost hidden pedestrian alley between the large complexes of Wisma Atria and Ngee Ann City 12.6 Filipino workers in the green space behind Orchard MRT Station 12.7 A precinct, the basic unit of planning in new towns 13.1 Detail map of Rattanakosin Island area in 1896 (2493 B.E.) showing the original trapezoid shape of Tuuk Phramen/ Sanam Luang 13.2 Politically strategic locations and directions of citizen movement

133 146 165 168 177 207 215 216 219 220 222

223 223 225 226 234 235 240 242

242 243 245

256 262

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Tables

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 8.1 9.1 10.1 14.1 14.2 14.3

Sizes of some temple squares Size of some civic/citizen guangchang Civic/citizen guangchangs in provincial capital cities Civic/citizen guangchang in non-provincial capital cities Guangchang at district level Approximate salary levels of a sample of officials of a ward and some other low-salary earners in non-ward employment Housing property pattern and citizens’ evaluation on community life A comparison of the spatial expression of two rallies G8 summits, 1975–2005 APEC ministerial conferences, 1989–2005 WTO-Seattle: Seattle Police Department injuries

89 96 98 100 100 160 180 204 271 273 281

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Contributors

Atikullah Hj. Abdullah is Senior Lecturer at the School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia and currently program chairperson of the Islamic studies section at the school. His main interest and expertise is Islamic economics and social engineering, with specific focus on discovering Islamic-rooted principles in the economic and social life. Atikullah has presented conference papers and published several works relating to Islamic principles in sustainable development and quality of life; Islamic principles in business contracts and agreement; and Islamic principles in disaster management. His current research focuses on Islamic principles of public interest and its role in the development of an Islamic financial system in Malaysia. Samantha Anderson is a Senior Project Officer with the International Centre for Sustainable Cities (ICSC), a non-profit organization headquartered in Vancouver, Canada whose mandate is to catalyse action on urban sustainability in cities around the world through practical demonstration projects, peer learning networks and high profile events. Samantha holds two Masters degrees, one in East Asian Studies from McGill University and one in Urban Planning from the University of British Columbia. Her areas of interest include local economic development, local government capacity, peri–urbanization, migration, gender, and longterm planning. At ICSC, Samantha works primarily on the Sustainable Cities: Partners for Long-term Urban Sustainability (PLUS) Network, a learning network of cities from around the world engaged in long-term planning for urban sustainability. Pornpan (Boonchuen) Chinnapong is Assistant Professor at the School of Architecture, King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Ladkrabang (KMITL), Bangkok, Thailand. Among courses for architecture students at KMITL, she is responsible for Architectural Design Studio, Site Planning, and Introduction to Urban Planning. Her research interests range from urban form and the use of civic space in Bangkok, major urban development plans in Bangkok, and environmental design for the blind’s accessibility. She is co-author of “Bangkok: Intentional World City” in Relocating Global Cities: From the Center to the Margins (Rowman &

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Contributors

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Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2006. With Michael Douglass) and “Bangkok as a Capital and Emergent World City” in Capital Cities in Asia-Pacific: Primary and Diversity (Academia Sinica, 2006. With K.C. Ho). Joseph Boski is a doctoral candidate in Urban Planning at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). His research examines social movements, globalization, and urban geography. He has been a fellow at the East West Center in Honolulu and a researcher at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. Myungrae Cho is Professor of Urban and Regional Planning, School of Social Sciences, Dankook University, Seoul, Korea. He is Director of the Korea Center for City and Environmental Research, Executive Director of the Citizens’ Movement for Environmental Justice, and a Member of the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development. His main research interests are in the fields of spatial political economy, urban sociology and green politics. Major publications include Post-Fordism and Modern Society in Crisis (1999, in Korean), Modern Society and Urban Theory (2002, in Korean), Exploring Green Society (2002, in Korean), Developmental Politics and Green Progress (forthcoming, in Korean), and The Space and Environment of Globalization (forthcoming, in Korean). Mike Douglass is Professor of Urban and Regional Planning and Director of the Globalization Research Center at the University of Hawaii. He has lived and worked for many years in Asian countries where he engages in research on urban development and planning with international development institutions and national and local governments. Current research includes the urban transition in Asia; civil society and civic space; and the globalization of migration and householding. Publications include Japan and Global Migration (UH Press, 2003. With Glenda Roberts); Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age ( John Wiley, 1998. With John Friedmann); Culture and the City in East Asia (Oxford University Press, 1997. With Won Bae Kim). K.C. Ho is Associate Professor of Sociology at the National University of Singapore. An urban sociologist by training, Dr Ho’s research interests range from the political economy of cities, economic restructuring and sub-regional development to urban cultures and community development. He is co-author of City-States in the Global Economy: Industrial Restructuring in Hong Kong and Singapore (Westview, 1997) co-editor of Culture and the City in East Asia (Oxford, 1997) and Service Industries and Asia-Pacific Cities (Routledge, 2005). Limin Hee obtained her Doctor of Design degree from Harvard University in 2005, previously having pursued a Masters of Arts in Architecture at the National University of Singapore. As a registered architect in Singapore, she has built projects on a broad scale, ranging from institutional buildings to infrastructural and public space projects. Since 1997,

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xii Contributors she has taught at the National University of Singapore, having in the last few years also served as Teaching Fellow and invited juror at the Harvard Graduate School of Design. Her research work has been published variously in international refereed journals, presented at conferences, and published in books – on subjects such as urban design, Asian cities, public spaces, architectural theory and design pedagogy. Her current research work includes investigations of the design of public space and its cultural constructions, and also the dynamics of Asian urbanism. Heng Chye Kiang is Professor and Dean of the School of Design and Environment at the National University of Singapore. His research interests are in the history of Chinese cities and architecture and urban design and conservation in Asia. As a consultant for various projects in China, he has won several international design competitions including first prize in the Tianjin’s French Heritage District and Xiaobailou District International Design Competitions in 2005 and 2004 respectively, as well as first prize in the Suzhou Graduate Campus City International Urban Planning/Design Competition in 2002. He is author of A Digital Reconstruction of Tang Chang’an (China Construction Industry Press, 2006) and Cities of Aristocrats and Bureaucrats (University of Hawaii and Singapore University Press, 1999). David Koh is Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Program of Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. He has extensive and intensive research experience in Vietnam and has in the process developed a network of people from academia, government, and think tanks in Vietnam. His first book Wards Of Hanoi, which examines state-society relations in Vietnam, was published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in 2006. He writes regularly on Vietnamese contemporary politics and society, and is a regular op-ed contributor on the subject. He also conducts regular briefings for diplomats, government bureaucrats and analysts on Vietnam. Michael Leaf is the Director of the Centre for Southeast Asia Research (CSEAR) at the University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, Canada; an Associate Professor in the UBC School of Community and Regional Planning (SCARP); and a Research Associate of the UBC Centre for Human Settlements (CHS). The focus of his research and teaching has been on urbanization and planning in cities of developing countries, with particular interest in Asian cities. Since the time of his doctoral research on land development in Jakarta, Indonesia, Dr. Leaf has been extensively involved in urbanization research and capacity building projects in Indonesia, Vietnam, China and Sri Lanka. The courses he teaches at UBC deal with the theory and practice of development planning and the social, institutional and environmental aspects of urbanization in developing countries.

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Contributors

xiii

Merlyna Lim is Assistant Professor of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona State University, with a joint appointment at the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes. She was awarded a PhD in 2005 from the University of Twente in Enschede, the Netherlands, for a doctoral dissertation entitled “@rchipelago online: The Internet and Political Activism in Indonesia.” Her research interests include: political economy of space, cyber and urban activism, globalization, and mutual shaping of technology and society. She holds the following awards: Annenberg Netpublics Fellowships (2005), Henry Luce Southeast Asia Fellowship (2004), WOTRO Fellowship (2003), and ASIST International Paper Contest Winner (2002). Recent publications include a monograph entitled Islamic Fundamentalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: Role of the Internet. Hanlong Lu is Professor and Director of the Institute of Sociology at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), and he is also the Dean of the Faculty of Social Development Studies at SASS. His study area of specialization has been focused on transformation and development and urban studies. He is the author or editor of more than ten books, and the chief researcher (editor) of Shanghai Social Report Year Blue Book, most recently Social Constructions and Social Governance (2006), Equilibrium and Stability: Enrich the Value of Development (2005), Xiaokang: From Goal to Developing Model (2004), Improving the Quality of Urban Life (2003), Urban Governance and Quality of Citizen (2002). He was a visiting scholar and did research abroad in many famous institutes both in the United States and the United Kingdom. Giok Ling Ooi is Associate Professor at the National Institute of Education at Nanyang Technological University. She is also Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies. Her research and publications have focused on urban and housing studies, environment and sustainable development, ethnicity and health. Her two recent books are Housing in the Capital Cities of Southeast Asia (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005) and Sustainability and Cities – Concept and Assessment (World Scientific Press, 2005). Morshidi Sirat is Professor of Urban Geography at the School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang and the Director of National Higher Education Research Institute (IPPTN). As Director of IPPTN, Morshidi is active in contract research work for the World Bank, UNESCOBangkok and several public agencies in Malaysia. As an urban geographer, Morshidi’s research and publications have focused on the relationship between globalization and urban transformation in Malaysia. He has published widely on planning and geography issues in international journals. He has written several books on globalization-planning-service sector nexus and his latest book (co-authored with colleagues from the geography section) on high-tech electronics industries and air cargo services is being published by Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang.

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Preface

This book is the product of four years of discussion among members of our civic spaces group. The objective of the National University of Singapore funded “Civic Spaces in a Global Age” project grant was to assemble a group of researchers to examine the impacts of globalization on civic spaces in a number of Pacific Asia cities over a three-year period. The project partners are Michael Douglass, Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, K.C. Ho, a sociologist at the National University of Singapore, and Ooi Giok Ling, a geographer first with the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) and presently with the Nanyang Technological University. The research plan called for three jointly funded workshops where the research team would meet to discuss research methodologies and findings. The first workshop was held in Singapore in March 2002 with IPS overseeing the workshop organization. This workshop brought together an interdisciplinary group of planners, sociologists, political scientists and geographers interested in examining how local society is reacting to the forces of globalization, specifically with convivial civic spaces a critical element of social organization. This workshop resulted in a set of papers that were published as a special issue in International Development Planning Review, volume 24, number 4 (2002). Mike Douglass secured Toda Foundation funds to have a second workshop in Vancouver in June 2003. The research group worked on a second set of papers that was different from the first round set of IDPR papers in two significant ways. First, we brought together a wider geographical coverage of papers that included China and Vietnam. Second, conceptually we brought together more papers that dealt with the connections between civic spaces and civil society. Unfortunately, the outbreak of SARS meant that half the research group was unable to attend this conference, creating a setback for the group. Thus the completed set of papers did not materialize until December 2004, when we had the third workshop in Singapore. As a research group representing countries in East Asia, Indochina and Southeast Asia, we wanted to use our individual papers to build a composite

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Preface

xv

picture not just of how globalization is impacting on the countries of Pacific Asia, but more importantly to see how local forces of state and society are reacting to such forces. As explained in the introduction of the book, we wanted to recover the social in global cities research, position civic spaces as a unit of observation and analysis of various forces, and most importantly to show how the local can be an influential, countervailing force. Collectively, we hope the essays in the book will provide the reader with a systematic analysis of the relationship between civil society and the production of civic spaces, an understanding of how civic spaces and civil society can become effective forces for social change, and an understanding of common patterns as well as variations in the evolution of such relationships. Mike Douglass K.C. Ho Giok Ling Ooi

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Acknowledgements

The editors would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the National University of Singapore research grant R-014-000-012-123 and the Institute of Policy Studies for making possible the workshop on civic spaces in the global age, held in Singapore in March 2002. The folks at the IPS provided excellent conference organization and allowed us generous use of its conference facilities. We thank Dr Vivian Balakrishnan (then Minister of State for Community Development) for opening the workshop and Professor Tommy Koh for his encouragements and for hosting an unforgettable dinner at Au Jardin, Singapore Botanical Gardens. The second workshop in Vancouver in June 2003 was supported by the Toda Foundation, which also partially funded research for each chapter. The research group met again in December 2004 when the National University of Singapore hosted the International Sociological Association research group on urban and regional research (RC21) meeting. Our research group was supported by the balance of funds from the National University of Singapore research grant. Professor John Friedmann was able to join the group for this meeting and we are grateful for his comments on individual presentations and for his encouragements. We also thank Professor Sim Loo Lee, chair of the Department of Real Estate, for providing workshop support in terms of facilities and conference support. We also received excellent support from Alanna Yeo and Rachel Chan in preparing the collection for publication, and thank Mrs Lee Li Kheng for the production of the maps.

Copyright Acknowledgements The authors and publishers would like to thank the following for granting permission to reproduce material in this work: • •

Notes on Sanlitu illustrations [ ], Nie Chongyi [ ], Song dynasty for Figure 5.1 Hiraoko Takeo, Chang’an yu Luoyang [Chang’an and Luoyang], 1957, for Figure 5.2

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Acknowledgements xvii •

• • • •

• •

Wu Liangyong, “A Brief History of Ancient Chinese City Planning”, URBS ET REGIO, 38/1986, Kassel: Gesamthochschulbibliothek, cover for Figure 5.7 “Old Beijing in Panorama” [ ], Beijing: People Chinese publishing house [ ], 1991, p.117 for Figure 5.8 Mike Douglass for Figure 10.1 Johannes Wijaya for Figure 11.1 International Development Planning Review for Figure 11.4 taken from M. Lim (2002) “Cyber-civic space: from panopticon to pandemonium”, International Development and Planning Review vol. 24, no. 4 p. 388. Yusnirsyah Sirin for Figure 11.7 National Archives of Thailand for Figure 13.1

Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book.

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1

Globalization, the city and civil society in Pacific Asia Mike Douglass, K.C. Ho and Giok Ling Ooi

The challenge of civic participation in Pacific Asian cities Major cities in Pacific Asia1 play multiple and often conflicting roles. Municipal authorities are responsible to local electorates and work to create a liveable environment (better services and amenities) for their residents. However, as cities are the principal bases for foreign direct investment, both national and local authorities have been increasingly engaged in the business of attracting transnational capital to the city, in the hope that these investments build up the urban economy and bring about an increased demand for the city’s workforce, and in turn create an enlarged market for local businesses. As Pacific Asian cities become increasingly integrated into the global economy, these roles have become increasingly complex and often divergent. The changing state and society relationship During the height of the developmental state era from the 1960s to, in most cases, the 1990s, the implicit social contract between government and citizens was the promise of economic growth and material benefit in exchange for curtailment of democratic rights, including freedom of speech and assembly, for the citizenry. Economic growth in the emerging “miracle economies” of Pacific Asia during this period was made possible by the advent of the “new international division of labor,” which represented a massive shift of labor-intensive assembly and manufacturing processes to a handful of “newly industrializing economies,” most of which were in East and Southeast Asia. The industrialization phase created new class fragments that have become more expressive. This has occurred at different levels in terms of: a growing middle class demanding more participation in various civic matters, trade unions and workers resisting weakening terms of employment, as well as a growing group (including migrant labor) that has been marginalized (Hsiao 1993; Rodan 1996; Robinson and Goodman 1996). The combined effects of such collective expressions have been the opening up of an expanded

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2 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia political space. These diverse resistances against strong-arm regimes began to seriously challenge existing regimes for the first time, leading in several cases to fundamental political reform instituting democratic systems of governance. Economic restructuring and state response In the 1980s, the rising urban middle class and the bubble economy generated in Japan led to a new phase of local-global relations. Labor-intensive industry was running its course in higher income countries and began shifting into Southeast Asia from Northeast Asia and Singapore at the same time that global franchise capital found sufficient markets to begin unrelenting intrusion into Pacific Asia cities. In the 1990s global finance capital also began pouring into the region, and major cities began to experience fundamental restructuring of their built environment to reconstitute the urban core for global management and service functions in the form of mega-projects. There is unstoppable construction of shopping malls to host global chain stores, and massive construction of gated suburban communities. Although the collapse of several economies following the very sudden flight of investment from the region in late 1997 brought much of the private sector land development to a halt, public sector investment and public-private partnerships continue in the form of mega-projects aimed at intentionally creating world cities (Olds 1995; Marshall 2003; Newman and Thornley 2005). This occurred synchronically with neoliberal reforms being made a condition of participation in the world economy governed through global trade agreements and, more specifically, as a condition for economic assistance through such agencies as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The effect of these reforms has been to greatly open local economies to intensifying global competition for investment. As labour-intensive operations began to shift more rapidly to China from the 1990s, governments in other Pacific Asian countries felt increasingly compelled to compete for higher-order technology and urban-based service segments of global accumulation. The arena for such competition has been in the largest cities of Pacific Asia. A new complexity in state, society and capital relations The increased involvement of different capital circuits imply the pull of cities towards world city formation and this is reflected in the built environment via new capitalist spaces of production (business districts, techno parks, science parks) and consumption (malls, gated communities). As capital has a transnational orientation, the relationship between capital and community has been fundamentally altered. While corporations have adopted good corporate citizenship as an emblem of their identity, projects

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Globalization, the city and civil society in Pacific Asia

3

which stem from this orientation tend, for most parts, to be national or international in nature. An older relationship between capital and community has declined. For most parts, world city formation is intentional as many governments remain in the developmental state mode in trying to open their economies to all circuits of global interaction. As elaborated earlier, under neoliberal reforms, inter-city competition for foreign investments has intensified and governments have responded by increasingly directing resource allocations toward global intercity competition for world city status. As civil society develops, there is an increasing demand expressed in a variety of domains. There has been a growing popular interest in heritage and preservation as traditional quarters have been lost through capitalist redevelopment. Conservation of green and open spaces in the city has also acquired a new importance as urban residents seek a balance between development and quality of the urban environment. The interaction between state, civil society and capital has grown increasingly complex. Alarmed by a growing civil society, the state has responded in many cases to increasing regulation of public spaces to prevent popular unrest. However, there have also been instances where the state has sided with civil society in preserving built heritage and green space when this has helped solidify its role as the protector of national culture and/or increased its legitimacy and popular support. The increased presence of capital in different circuits has also created a new shift from civil society– state relations to civil society–corporate economy relations as the principal source of contestation over the creation of life spaces in the city. Globalization has also transformed the organization of civil society. For their part, non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations emerging from political reform are also using capital and mega cities as sites to mobilize international as well as national campaigns for social and environmental justice and many other social causes aimed at resisting or at least redefining the terms of global economic and political engagement. All of these observations bring the production of urban space to the forefront in both enabling and reflecting the interplay of global and local forces in Pacific Asia’s principal cities.

Focus of the book The focus of this book is on the various types of life spaces in which civil society finds room to create cultural practices in community lifeworlds. We (Douglass, Ho and Ooi, 2002) term such spaces as civic spaces – spaces of social inclusion in which state and private economy are kept at arm’s distance from dominating the production and reproduction of culture. We believe that that focus on civic spaces will help address the following imbalances in the current state of urban studies and in turn provide a more balanced approach to the study of globalization and the city.

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4 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Recovering the social in global cities research Understanding this particular sphere is crucial. The reproduction of communities has been a neglected area of study in global cities research. While the literature has suggested an increased inequality and divisiveness (Sassen 2000; Marcuse 2000), we really do not have much to go on in understanding how urban society coheres under the fragmenting effects of globalization. It is not enough to go by Iris M. Young’s (1990: 251) dictum of “an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference.” As economies under globalization become more fragile, understanding how society reacts and adapts to these changes represent a crucial avenue of research. One key strategy is examining civic spaces where local relationships are reproduced and sustained. This is all the more important as urbanization increases in Pacific Asia and the share of urban population living in Pacific Asian cities grows. Positioning civic spaces as a unit of observation and analysis Of the possible empirical phenomenon we can observe about globalization and urban change, this book proposes civic spaces as an observational unit. We suggest civic spaces as an indicator of globalization and urban change. As an observational unit, civic spaces, in their various forms (see next section) will allow an important comparative analysis of where capital touches down; how local relationships are reproduced and expanded; and the diverse nature of state alignment with capital and community. Understanding how the local can be an influential, countervailing force The power of the local can be established through the link between civic spaces and civil society. Civil society is manifested in the multitude of voluntary associations, emerging from households, neighborhood associations, religious organizations, clubs, labor unions, and other socio-cultural identities. Such associations are outside of direct control of either the state or the private economy and are often referred to as the “third” sector that co-exists with government and markets to form the public domain or public sphere (Friedmann 1987; Habermas 1989). In providing vital linkages between people and the state, civil society organizations are essential to the functioning of democratic societies and serve as principal institutions directing the self interest of individuals toward defining the public interest and the common good (de Tocqueville, 1969). These organizations serve as the institutional means for citizens to monitor, restrict and direct the uses of state and corporate power. As a social ideal, an active civil society will complement the state and inculcate in its citizens a sense of stakeholdership in the nation-state that goes beyond ownership of material assets and the citizen as consumer (Ooi and Koh 1998: 102).

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More recently, the propensity to form associations in civil society is viewed as being the fountain of social capital that is a crucial source of economic sustainability (Putnam 1993). Through routines of collaborative engagement in civil society, localities build capacities for problem solving and innovation. Multiple forms of association with a high degree of autonomy from state and private business are associated with local economic resilience in the new global economy of informational networks and rapid innovation in knowledge industries (Thurow 1999; PPI 2000). It is important to understand where the local situates in this configuration of forces in the production of urban space. As suggested above, intentional world city formation has exaggerated local–city tensions by increasingly extroverting the attention of public resources to the forces of global accumulation. This does not mean, however, that the local necessarily yields to the global or that capital city and global join together in some fashion to marginalize local community lifeworlds. As the chapters in this collection will show, the outcomes are much more open ended and contextually rich than current literature on global hegemony allows.

The diversity of civic spaces For the social, political and economic promises of the rise of civil society to be realized, there must be civic spaces available for its daily practices and collaborative engagement among its various constituents. Civic spaces are defined as those spaces in which people of different origins and walks of life can co-mingle without overt control by government, commercial or other private interests, or de facto dominance by one group over another. Echoing Lefebvre’s (1991: 59) observation that all social change requires appropriate spaces for its fruition, providing and giving sustenance to civic spaces is a basic requirement for the promises of genuine citizen participation in governance. The use of the term “civic space” here is not intended to be equivalent to either “civil society space” or “public space.” The former, which includes the household as well as exclusive social clubs or even fanatical communes, is much broader in scope. Similarly, the term “public space” normally implies public ownership or direct management by the state; yet many forms of civic space can be found in private or nominally private spaces such as coffee shops, pubs or even the country store. Here the interest is in spaces that are inclusive, that is, open to a broad spectrum of civil society, whether public or private. In this sense, civic spaces are perhaps most closely equivalent to what Evans and Boyte (1986, 1992) call “free spaces” or “community free spaces” (King and Hustedde 1993: 2): A free space occurs in a setting in which people can meet for public talk and actively contribute to solving public problems. It is characterized by several major components: a sense of shared bonds, a comfortable

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6 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia physical, social, and cultural setting, a social network, engaging debate and dialogue, a participatory environment, and a potential for forming larger public networks and vision. If a free space exists, citizens can learn group identity, self-respect, public skills, and the value of cooperation. This unabashedly romantic definition can be seen as adding a spatial dimension to a long lineage of thought about the nature of civil society from Aristotle to the Enlightenment and on to present day discourses about the public sphere.2 It misses, however, the insurgent spaces that are wrought from struggles among factions of civil society, the state and private economic interests. More than a sense of shared bonds, the idea of civic space here is that of autonomy from the state, inclusiveness, and potential for asserting the voice of civil society in the arena of public affairs. As Goffman (1959; 1961; 1963) has argued, civic spaces are “open spaces” in which anyone and everyone has the right of access and the right to initiate contact with each other. Such an interpretation of the role of civic spaces, however, does not discount their being open and contested territories for which claimants from different sectors of urban society can stake a range of varying claims. It is this contestation process that has put the provision of civic spaces and the role that they play under considerable stress in cities of the Pacific Asia. Like civil society, the idea of civic space in Pacific Asia involves a transposition of concepts largely developed in Western society. In a vacuum of public debate about civic spaces, experiences in the Pacific Asian cities suggests that political and social contestations over their provision are nonetheless intensifying in the current moment of accelerated urbanization occurring in the region. In particular, the polarization of population and economic growth in a few metropolitan regions has exacerbated already very high population densities and, as a consequence, struggles over urban land use and the built environment have tended to limit expansion of public sites that might be used as civic spaces (Basnayake 2000; Tan 2000; Wong and Ooi 1989). In this context, the processes of providing civic spaces in Pacific Asia have lacked purpose and clarity. This is partly because city governments, facing extreme financial constraints and repeated crises, are reluctant or have a low capacity to expand public spaces, especially under neo-liberal economic reforms pushing toward privatization. To say this another way, the built environment of Pacific Asian cities is overwhelmingly driven by private sector land developers who seek to maximize profit in land development rather than the public good (Mercado 2000). More critically, many governments limit the provision of civic spaces as a means to contain movements for regime change (Lim 2003). Yet with the rise of civil society and appearance of so many NGOs in the region that are championing “rights to the city,” demands for civic spaces as a claim for democratic governance are also increasing (Friedmann 1999).

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Finally, using the terms “free space” and “autonomy” does not mean that civic spaces are unregulated or have no constraints on access or use. Whether in the form of private property, common property or state property, civic spaces require rules of access and use if they are to function in an inclusive, fundamentally non-violent and civil manner. Although regulation of civic spaces can take place under common property regimes outside of the state, in the contemporary world most civic spaces rely on larger protection by governments to keep commercial interests and other encroachments at bay. The need for regulation makes the provision of civic spaces all the more complex than terms such as “public space” imply. In some instances, for example, civic spaces are created through the regulation of private property, as in the case of laws in several US states requiring privately-owned shopping malls to allow freedom of speech on their premises. These observations lead back to the long-standing thesis that civil society exists in relation to the state in which the roles of law-making and police powers reside and are called upon to insure the “civil” or non-violent uses of civic spaces. As such, civic spaces do not exist under absolute control by either state, civil society or private ownership, but rather as physical (or cyber) spaces that become civic spaces through the interactions of the three. This further suggests that civic spaces are often contested and subject to shifts in power relations. Eight types of civic spaces can be identified as a means to initiate broader discussions on the origins, roles and prospects in the future. A significant body of research related to civic spaces suggests that most of them are under great stress and might even be declining in many instances. At the same time, new efforts to create civic spaces have also been launched. Together they are giving recognition to the widespread concern that cities require such spaces for their social, political and economic life to flourish. Public parks/plazas Public squares, parks and plazas are basic forms of civic spaces in towns and cities in many world regions. In Italy, the piazza has been a vital civic space since Roman times: The grid of archetypical Roman urban design inevitably included a square near the city heart called a forum. In this public space vendors might assemble, festivities take place, friends or enemies gather, opinionated individuals mount a speaker’s podium. In a literal sense, civil society was coterminous with the sum of public opinion heard in the forum, theatre and other places of gathering in the city. Without the infrastructure and the institutions of the city, its strangers and its tapestry of personal connections, there could be no Public Benefit, Common Good, or indeed Civil Society (Witteveen 1996: 78)

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8 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Political mobilization, public rallies and forms of unorganized political exchanges continue to take place in the plaza on a daily basis in Italy and elsewhere. In the US, the public park takes on some of these civic roles, though in a much less routinely organized manner. In Tokyo, Hibiya Park, next to the Imperial Palace, has been the site for popular protest movements since its inception after the Meiji Restoration (Machimura 1997). Much of contemporary research on cities in the West reveal that the plaza and the park are under increasing stress and are sites of intense social conflict. Homelessness, gentrification, increasing social stratification and inequalities between haves and have-nots are manifested in struggles over such spaces, with the tendency to abandon the notion of the park as an inclusive civic space by either letting it become a residential zone for the homeless or excluding “undesirable” people from them through regulations, removing benches or engineering physical designs such as uncomfortably rounded bench seats to discourage sleeping or long-term habitation (Harvey 1992). In response to the potential loss of this vital form of civic space, governments and community organizations have launched public square renaissance and “Save-the-Park” campaigns. In Waterloo, Canada, a combined agora and forum in a civic square with a public amphitheater has recently been created by the municipal government to bring civic and commercial space together in the city center. Dublin, Ireland, has attempted to revitalize the historic area of Smithfield by opening in 1999 a new Civic Plaza the size of two football fields. Among the annual events scheduled is a Freedom of the City Ceremony, with Aung San Suu Kyi, the prodemocracy Nobel Peace Prize laureate, being the first to be honored. Barcelona used the 1992 Olympics to fund the restoration of its main park, and in Paris the Parc André Citroën has been developed on the site of a defunct car assembly plant (Economist 1996). Restoring parks and making them welcome to the public at large are separate matters. For the latter, local citizens need to be engaged in the process of mutual accommodation. Grassroots citizen organizations to make parks, streets and neighborhoods more convivial and inclusive can be found in many cities. In San Francisco, for example, the Community Design Consulting Program of Urban Ecology was formed in 1994 to bring architects, planners, and landscape architects to provide professional design support in collaboration with community groups in low-income, often ethnically diverse neighborhoods. Its Blueprint for a Sustainable Bay Area (Urban Ecology 1996) has as its goals a broad-based process of citizen participation to “confront the challenges that threaten our quality of life; in our homes, neighborhoods, small towns, suburbs and major cities.” In addition to providing much needed open space, the provision of plaza and public parks brings people of many different backgrounds into contact with each other, thus promoting a basic sense of civility that counters a common urban trend of spatial segregation by class, gender, ethnicity,

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age and other differences. This realization underlies many of the citizen movements for maintaining existing and creating new plazas and parks. Public sidewalks and “main street” Public sidewalks, particularly those in downtown commercial and residential areas, have traditionally provided civic spaces for people to mingle as they walk to work, shop or just go for a stroll. Juxtaposed to commercial establishments, they allow for the exercise of civic rights that are normally curtailed in private retail establishments that they front. Jane Jacobs, in her landmark treatise, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), observed that the mix of civic with commercial and residential functions at a neighborhood and community scale was one of the most important enhancements to urban life. Public sidewalks in community shopping areas have been a key element of the mix of civic with other urban functions in the past. As documented by Kunstler (1994) and others (Sorkin 1992), the decline of “main street” throughout urban United States and other countries as the shopping mall supplants older downtown shopping streets has been a direct assault on the civic dimension of urban life. Once the symbol of the convivial city where neighbors met neighbors while shopping and engaging in civic life, the main street has systematically declined with the appearance of huge discount stores and privately owned malls located in suburban and exurban areas. In the US more than half of all residences are now located in suburbs where the primary spaces of human congregation are shopping malls. Exclusively commercial, malls are designed to promote consumption as citizenship. Seemingly public, they are increasingly being patrolled to enforce private property rights, including denial of rights of assembly and free speech and such activities as labor strikes and pickets in front of its shops. The most radical absence of public streets are found in the privately owned exurban urban nodes that are “economically powerful but politically invisible” private developments composed of “office parks, business campuses, privately-planned residential communities and commercial centres . . . containing impressive concentrations of office jobs and hotel space account for extremely high volumes of retail sales,” but are devoid of public functions and civic spaces (Knox 1993: 2). Such “stealth cities” are not confined to the US or high income countries. Jakarta’s Lippo Kawaraci – Lippoland – is a privately owned new town designed for a population of one million “middle and upper class” residents (Rimmer and Dick 1998). Recognizing the reality of suburbanization and the emergence of the mall as the center of public interaction, movements have emerged to legally compel malls to create civic spaces in them (WWC 1996). Several US states have passed laws mandating malls to allow free speech. In Japan, the City of Nagoya created a private–public partnership to build a combined shopping-community center in the form of a high-rise building with public

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events held in the open courtyard on the ground floor and commercial shops and community activities such as public art shows jointly occupying each of the higher floors. On a larger spatial scale, the neo-traditional town planning that has emerged in many countries promises a return to the multi-functional community and its civic spaces (Kunstler 1994). So far, the actual developments, such as Seaside, Florida, Laguna West, California, and Disney’s Celebration in Orlando, Florida, have been oriented toward affluent households and communities. In a related development, advocates of “smart cities” propose that telecommunications and tele-commuting will also allow people to recreate smaller, intimate communities replete with public and civic spaces (Shaw and Utt 2000). Missing from almost all of these suburban developments is a conscious appreciation of civic spaces for all residents. Malls are increasingly policed to keep non-shoppers out, new towns tend to be composed of gated communities that ensure that lower income groups are excluded from whatever common spaces they provide. In Pacific Asia, the lack of public and civic spaces is even more glaring in such developments. Malls are typically devoid of even a bench to sit on, and their food courts do not invite convivial social exchanges of conversation. Common spaces in residential areas also tend to be “top–down” in planning and not generally intended as “free spaces” for community use outside of state surveillance (see in this volume: Hee; Lim; and Boonchuen). Community/civic centers and public buildings Government, non-profit and for-profit community centers have provided civic spaces covering a wide variety of activities, ranging from hobby clubs and the arts to community political organizations and action groups. As noted above, a number of governments have been actively trying to create civic centers to revitalize declining downtown areas as well as civic life. These same spaces, especially public buildings housing government functions, have become the sites of insurgent citizenship (Friedmann, 1998) where the public gather to make demands upon government and, as many cities have experienced since the WTO conference in Seattle in 1999, demands for a more accountable global corporate economy. After the 11 September 2001, terrorist attack on New York City, public buildings and such spaces as public sports and entertainment sites have been systematically placed under increasing police, military and intelligence agency surveillance, with their civic aspects being sharply curtailed. Of course, the actual civic nature of these spaces depends upon the pace of political reform toward democratic forms of governance. Where the pace is slow, such spaces continue to either be sites of government orchestrated pageantry or, as Boski (this volume) calls it, ephemeral citizen insurgence. In other cases, such as more recently in Taipei, even City Hall opened its

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front courtyard to popular access after reforms brought a new party to power in the mid-1990s. Commercial establishments with traditions as civic spaces Some types of commercial establishments are given commercial viability because they are frequented for the civic spaces they provide. Many are long-established social institutions that have continued to thrive in contemporary times. Among the most well known of these commercial places in North America, Europe and many parts of Asia are the coffee shop and the pub where people are generally free to spend hours of time and engage in conversations with strangers as well as friends at modest costs and limited commercial impositions. In Japan and Korea, the privately owned public bath traditionally took on the role as a civic space where all people in a community would gather not only to bathe but to engage in conversations with neighbors. In the case of Japan, it is revealing to note that in the bubble economy of the late 1980s public baths were targeted as a “block busting” technique by land developers who would buy and demolish them to break down community solidarity against the loss of housing to commercial buildings. The result was a precipitous decline of public baths to a mere handful in central Tokyo by the early 1990s (Douglass 1993). The spread of global fast food restaurants are explicitly designed to promote fast eating and quick departure, undermining the civic nature of coffee shops and diners. Global chain shops such as Starbucks – which plans to have 1500 outlets in Asia by 2003 – might offer opportunity for civic encounters, but the gourmet prices of its coffee put it out of range of significant shares of the population. Everywhere, the local diner and coffee shop are yielding to fast food chains, which have enhanced commercial interests at the expense of the civic experience of eating out. Some institutions carry on, however. The UK pubs continue to thrive because they offer civic spaces for local communities. Despite the spread of global fast food chains to Pacific Asia, cities are still replete with local restaurants that provide for social as well as eating occasions. Private establishments regulated by the state to include civic spaces The quality of civic life in all civic spaces greatly depends on the ways in which they are regulated by the state, private or common property owners, stewards and users. In some instances, governments have moved to create civic spaces in privately owned establishments that serve the public at large. The state of Florida, for example, requires airports to provide free speech areas to allow for the expression of the civic freedoms to their users. As noted above, a few states in the US also require malls to allow for free speech. The vast majority of states have not, however, adopted such legislation.

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In Pacific Asia, government regulation of privately owned establishments is exceptionally modest. At the same time, however, in some countries, such as Japan, public–private partnerships in creating buildings that have both civic and commercial space are more apparent than they are in countries such as the US. Cyber civic spaces The emergence of the Internet over the past decade has held the promise of new forms of civic spaces without geographical propinquity. These promises of telematics range from empowering citizens to form “virtual communities” (Graham 1994, 1997) to the re-emergence of (neo-)traditional communities on a human scale in “smart cities” (Shaw and Utt 2000). “Blade Runner” dystopian futures with telematics used to give totalizing control to behemoth corporate governments have also been conjured about the future of wired cities, and there is increasing concern about “digital divides” and privileged spaces in the informational networks that now characterize the contemporary city (Castells 1989; Knox 1994; Graham 2000). The image of the Panopticon (Lim 2002) notwithstanding, revolutions in telecommunications are nevertheless creating new forms of civic spaces. To some observers, the use of the Internet by increasing numbers of people represents an important means for civil society to organize beyond national boundaries. This allows for a confrontation of undemocratic world governance that has already appeared at that scale in the form of transnational corporate networks and intergovernmental bodies such as the World Trade Organization. Internet cafes with low-cost access to computers abound in many Pacific Asia cities, especially in Southeast Asia where the ability to buy computers is still restricted to a small percentage of the population. In addition to person-to-person communications, Internet services provide open chat rooms, bulletin boards and web pages for social and political causes. In the US the public library has begun to take on this role to create virtual communities in the digital age (Molz and Dain 1999). A key issue in this regard is the shift from publicly created to privately owned telecommunications systems that incorporate international flows of money and capital, allowing “corporate capital to escape the regulatory powers of nation-states” (Graham 1994: 418). The increasing concentration of ownership of all forms of media into huge transnational corporations stands in sharp contrast to the promises of the civic space expansion through the spread of easy access Internet use within civil society. In the early 1980s, for example, fifty corporations dominated mass media of all types. As multibillion dollar mergers and acquisitions became a regular feature of global capital by the late 1990s, the number of dominant firms shrunk rapidly to ten by 1997 (Bagdikian 2000). By 2002, the number had decreased to six giant communications conglomerates.3 The influence of these corporations over selection of information and the commercialization of cyberspace

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are identified as one of the most important threats to freedom of the press and speech (McChesney 1999). In Pacific Asia, current tensions in the use of the Internet are mostly related to civil society-state relations as strong-arm governments attempt to directly control political and other information that is bypassing already strong censorship of the press and other media. As political reforms proceed toward more democratic forms of government and economies are increasingly open to transnational corporate linkages, the debates about the Internet as civic space are likely to shift to civil society–corporate economy relations as access to news, information, and knowledge is increasingly filtered through global corporate networks. Marginal, illegal/covert and disguised civic spaces In situations of severe social and political repression of civil society, civic spaces can still exist and be sustained because their particular characteristics or locations are difficult to assail or control by government authorities even though the activities are declared to be illegal or offensive to dominant social groups. Hegemony is never totalizing; resistance is rarely absolutely subdued, human agency can be expressed even by the most marginalized people. Such civic spaces might be harbored, for example, in temples, religious schools or other sites for religious practices that governments dare not directly enter. They are common in large ethnic communities where the very numbers of people and “foreign” languages shield them from intensive state control. Under the authoritarian governments in Pacific Asia, as Korea showed throughout the long struggles toward democratic government covering several decades, universities can become sites where proscribed resistance is shielded by even public institutions. As struggles for reform grow in strength, they move from their marginal spaces into the city’s wider landscapes of public streets and landmarks for insurgent action. Insurgent spaces The appropriation of urban spaces for political insurgence occurs at particular historical moments and sites as forces within civil society rise up to confront the state or other powerful entities such as emerging nondemocratic forms of global government (Boski, this volume). Almost every city has sites that are imbued with deep cultural and political meanings that, while perhaps invisible on a daily basis, have become the spaces for protests and challenges to the dominating interests. Successful occupation of such sites can become a source of political validation and empowerment. As the Tiananmen Square episode of 1989 clearly revealed, capturing – or failing to capture – some sites can put political institutions of an entire nation at stake. Democracy Monument in Bangkok (Boonchuen, this volume), EDSA boulevard in Manila, Hibiya Park in Tokyo (Machimura

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1997), the Parliament building in Jakarta, are among the sites that insurgents know will carry high levels of symbolic importance when successfully occupied. Yet on any given day, these sites are just as likely to be little more than business thoroughfares, places of leisure or even tourism. The types and examples of civic spaces summarized above serve to illustrate that their provision and characteristics are being challenged and transformed in the contemporary cities of the world (Westwood and Williams 1997; Soja 1997). Stress on civic spaces is coming from many sources. Increasing fortification of urban space and surveillance of public spaces have subjected them to closer state scrutiny and presence, reducing the autonomy of those spaces from the state (Davis 1990). Roads and sidewalks inside of growing numbers of gated communities do not allow for civic use. Strengthened private property rights and fear of unwanted intrusions are turning large office buildings from places of public access to armed fortresses. With increasing surveillance of public spaces and privatization of what use to be considered public spaces – large buildings and streets – the city is being remade with diminished civic spaces. Added to these trends is the increasing numbers of transnational migrant communities and multicultural composition of urban populations. While the city has always been thought of as a center of diversity, in the current era this has become exceptionally complex as cities are more stratified by income, ethnic and racial divisions. Even large cities in higher income economies of Pacific Asia are becoming the homes of hundreds of thousands of long-term foreign workers (Douglass 1999; Kassim 2000). Exploitation of insecure immigrant labor increases the vulnerability of the homeless, an underclass of chronically unemployed. It also weakens the position of households working in the service industry. In contrast, a small share of the population enjoys rising affluence. The resulting “heteropolis” is a city fragmented into a myriad of “lifestyle clusters” ( Jencks 1996) or, perhaps more accurately, life chances. Civic spaces in these contexts tend also to fragment along rather than bridge social divides. Yet in many cities, civil society organizations and governments have moved to renew existing civic spaces and to create new ones. Park and civic center restoration, new towns and smart cities, fostering civic spaces in privately owned public places such as suburban malls, and using public libraries for access to the Internet for all community residents regardless of income are some of the many initiatives in this direction. While globalizing forces at play seem to jeopardize civic spaces, these local efforts show that opportunities to create and sustain such inclusive spaces do exist and are being pursued.

Urbanization and society in Pacific Asia Urbanization in Pacific Asia has been proceeding at a phenomenal rate. Forty years ago, Southeast Asia was largely rural as the United Nations (2001:

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133) estimated that only one in five persons in the developing economies of its ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia Pacific) region resided in urban areas.4 By 1980, one in four was an urban resident, and by 2000, it was one in three. Within East Asia, Korea has experienced rapid urbanization, with the urban population share growing from 57 percent (of the total population) in 1980 to 82.4 percent in 1999. Taiwan and Japan, on the other hand, have had fairly stable urbanization rates in the last 20 years. Southeast Asia as a region has experienced very rapid rates of urbanization, particularly Indonesia, which moved from an urban population share of 22 percent in 1980 to 42 percent in 2001. In 2001, Taiwan, Korea and Japan in East Asia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines in Southeast Asia have more than half their populations living in cities. Urbanization has been influenced by a number of interrelated economic trends. The East Asian Miracle in the 1960s and 1970s has largely been played out in the major cities of Japan, Taiwan and Korea, with the first and second cities playing key roles in manufacturing. The share of primary industry in total output in these countries declined dramatically, being replaced by a rising manufacturing share that has an urban bias. Southeast Asia enjoyed largely a second wave in the 1980s and 1990s as foreign direct investments from the US, Europe and Japan flowed in, supplemented by flows from Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.5 Indochina and China are the recipients of the third wave of investments which mostly begun in the mid-1990s. While China and Indochina countries are still largely rural, the rate of urbanization is likely to increase as these countries (with Vietnam and China as the main candidates) will urbanize rapidly, as and when they become increasingly incorporated into the global economy. While urban growth is rapid, the urban transition is still underway in most Pacific Asia countries. What can be called a significant urban middle class is also recent in most countries, and the successful rise of civil society in the form of legitimate large-scale political communities independent of state-run parties is still somewhat exceptional. For these and other historical reasons, civic spaces have tended to be found in marginal or clandestine sites with important moments of insurgency that have in turn led toward more democratic forms of governance in several countries. The rapid urban change occurring in Pacific Asian cities, coupled with an emergent civil society, make the study of civic spaces (in all its different forms) as an important site for the analysis of global–local interactions in the production of urban space. The potential of civic spaces lie in the collaborations at the micro level and the possibilities of local relationships becoming an important source of social capital. As suggested earlier, the analysis of civic spaces will show up the interplay of forces, in terms of globalization impacts over land use conflicts, to the role of governments in managing such conflicts. The essays in this collection adopt a more open-ended approach to the analysis of various social forces, providing a

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better understanding of the issues on the ground, rather than suggesting a hegemonic interpretation of globalization. As contests over changes in the built environment have sharpened government-society relations, global economic forces are putting pressures on cities to privatize and commodify urban spaces and to replace political citizenship with consumer citizenship. The city is thus being transformed into a site composed of individuals “voting” with money for material possessions rather than a place in which social or political communities have spaces for autonomous civic life. Global economic forces in the form of the activities of multinational companies have also led to the growing concentration of high-salaried service professionals in global cities, leading to increased urban income inequalities and polarization between this privileged internationally mobile group and the working class which have seen their economic fortunes decline as jobs migrate to distant shores (Sassen 2000). The government’s response to this new economic climate has also contributed to the polarization by devoting more attention and resources to economic policies at the expense of social policies (Mayer 1999). All of these challenges to the future of cities in Pacific Asia draw attention to the understanding that the rise of civil society in Pacific Asia has an equivalent in the built environment: the construction of civic spaces that are vital for voluntary social associations to bridge divides through shared experiences, and for people to engage in resolving social, political and economic issues in common. An agenda for policy on civic space thus needs to pay attention not only to progressive reforms in state–civil society relations, but also to ways in which relations between localities and globalization are transforming the content and uses of urban spaces.

Chapter overview The research brought together in this book addresses several major goals: •

•

To theorize and empirically explore the relationships between the civil society and the production of urban spaces. The chapters in the book focus on various types of “civic spaces” that seek to provide civil society with spaces for associational and public life at arm’s distance from state and commercial interests. The ten case studies explore a wide variety of contexts ranging from spaces where lower classes congregated in ancient Chinese cities to cyberspaces of the contemporary Internet – all in a Pacific (East and Southeast) Asia context. While a significant amount of research has been done on this and related topics, to date there are no such studies on them for the Pacific Asia region. To understand the history and role of civil society in social and political philosophies of societies in the Pacific Asia region. Most literature on civil society focuses on the West; much of this literature presents a pejorative view that civil society has never existed in other parts of

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•

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the world. Research in this book seeks to give a better accounting of social philosophies and civil society in Pacific Asia both historically and contemporaneously. To analyze and explain tendencies and issues related to specific types of civic spaces in a given city. Several studies find that great stress has been placed on long-standing community and public spaces. The sources of threats to civic space include the state, which in Pacific Asia has had a marked tendency toward authoritarian control over civil society and its spaces, and the global economy, which is increasingly privatizing and commercializing land use and the built environment. Others show that new civic spaces emerge through state–civil society negotiations and from new forms of technology such as the Internet. To compare and synthesize studies of many cities. The goal of the book is to identify common themes, patterns and issues as well as point out the singularities of each particular context. In this way it can contribute to the broader (as yet almost exclusively Western) literature on society and space.

To these ends, we have identified four broad themes from which the various chapters can be introduced. The links between civic spaces and civil society The three introductory papers in this collection represent more general attempts at highlighting the important links between civic spaces and civil society from three angles. Douglass identifies and discusses how contemporary globalization has created explosive growth in cities and spatial polarization. Such urban restructuring is driven increasingly by global capital and fed by international migration. The result is that Pacific Asian cities have become socially more diverse and face growing inequality and social fragmentation. A number of issues emerge at the level of state–society relations. Local communities react to these changes by pushing for a better quality of life. The reaction of authorities to these demands has been varied and range from democratic reforms to increasing regulation of public spaces. Thus at the level of urban society, such changes and responses clearly call for new forms of governance that can manage the growing inequality and fragmentation, incorporate the growing diversity and create a balance between economic and social developments. Picking up the thread at the governance level, the chapter by Ho looks at local connections by highlighting the community basis for civic spaces and the ways in which civic spaces can provide the foundations for civil society actions. Ho argues that local communities contain vital elements that continue to play important functions in strengthening local relations by being magnets for sociability, as crucibles of opinion, providing

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amplification for action and as repositories of collective memory. These four functions, along with entrenched material interests form the basis for collective action through their ability to develop an identity and bring into focus the sentiments of the community. Such capacities for action work in an ebb and flow fashion, rising with mobilization in response to threats and opportunities, stabilizing where there is formal organization and relating in adversarial as well as collaborative relations with external agencies. By focussing on the state and how it regulates land use through planning, Ooi analyzes the ways in which the state can weaken civil society and public participation through its control over land use development and planning as well as the uses of public spaces through direct policing. Civic space over time in the city-state of Singapore has in the Foucauldian sense, been turned into spaces of surveillance upon which the public’s eye is trained always. Where planning and the control of the use of public space are highly centralized with the state sector as is the case in Singapore, as Ooi argues in her paper, there is little to stop the sidelining or de-centering of such spaces and civic activities in the public life of the citizens and city-state. Ooi’s paper sets the context for the discussion which follows in Hee’s paper on the “internationalization” and ultimately commodification of important civic spaces in Singapore politics. Formation of civic spaces This set of four papers looks into the evolution of civic spaces in specific contexts. China represents a good example of the ebbs and flows of civic space formation. Taking a brief but long-ranging history of Chinese cities, Heng shows how dramatically the civic spaces of the Chinese city changed according to the nature of the regime and its conception of public spaces. As Heng points out, nature and evolution of public spaces in Chinese cities have been closely linked to the power and vision of the regime in power. As the authority of the regime diminished, the flourishing of civic spaces ensued. New types of public spaces also developed as outcomes of efforts by influential reformers as well as arising from visions of new regimes. The potential for urban public space to be appropriated by different groups of people meant that it has been the target of control by authorities throughout Chinese history. Leaf and Anderson take an associational view of civil society and examine the extent to which this layer of organization has taken root in post 1989 China. Their study of two peri-urban villages show that the success of local efforts depends on the embedded nature of relationships between local government and the villagers. Their conclusion is similar to Lu’s, which is that as China’s economic reforms have dismantled the work unit, the effectiveness of local efforts at improving the immediate environment

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depend ultimately on the local government, and the collaborative relations built, as market driven associations and civil society associations are weak and at infancy. In the context of the Chinese city, Leaf and Anderson argue that instead of civic space being conceived of as a space for non-state civil society – that is, unencumbered by the constraining actions of the state – it is more accurate to portray Chinese civic spaces in intermediary terms, as spaces regulated jurisdictionally through lower order components of the state. More importantly, Leaf and Anderson point out that contrary to liberal observers, the advent of economic reforms has not weakened the state but rather strengthened its local components. In their discussion, Leaf and Anderson highlight the differences in the local state’s response to the peri-urban settlements with one case study illustrating tolerance and ultimately assimiliation and the other demonstrating active state repression. The potential of religious sites to function as civic spaces is examined by Sirat and Abdullah. Their study of mosques in Kuala Lumpur shows that while most mosques function as community spaces in themselves, several, because of historical legacies end up functioning as civic spaces in terms of their capacity to function as staging areas for the mobilization of popular opinion over public issues. Significantly, this paper also shows the episodic nature of such engagements, one event in the mid-1970s and the other in the late 1990s indicate the latent social energies that are embedded in such places. The dual nature of religious sites as communal and civic and the episodic nature of transformations mean that we need to understand the factors that allow for the potential transformation of communal spaces to civic spaces. Sirat and Abdullah point out mosques traditionally have acted as sites for public debate over a range of social issues and have supported social and charitable causes. The working out of such social activities have been more prominent for some mosques and, over time, this has become associated with the mosque’s reputation in the eyes of the people so much so that when external events trigger action within these mosques, such sites are transformed into civic spaces for the debate and mobilization of public opinion and action at a much wider scale. A more systematic analysis of how sites emerge as civic spaces is provided by Boonchuen’s study of Bangkok’s Sanam Luang. Her analysis shows how this particular site has accumulated a number of symbolic elements over several decades, from a site hosting the burial ceremonies of national heroes, to its location as a site for free speech. Thus, coupled with its central location and access to other symbolic sites, Sanam Luang has emerged as the most important civic space for Thailand. Like Sirat and Abdullah’s analysis, Boonchuen’s chapter also shows how symbolism stays within the memory of the Thai public such that mobilization attempts that are episodic are identified with the same sites. Her study of Bangkok’s Sanam Luang shows how over the course of more than two centuries this particular site was transformed from privileged royal grounds to a popular civic space as

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the political structures of the Thai Kingdom shifted to a constitutional monarchy and experienced episodic popular mobilization toward more democratic governance that invariably gathered protestors to it. By the mid1980s, however, globalization takes a turn toward restructuring Sanam Luang as a major global tourist destination. The appearance of global circuits of finance and franchizing in Sanam Luang at this time supports the analysis of Douglass (Chapter 2), who observes that this was a critical juncture at which civic space issues in Pacific Asia turned from state–civil society contestations toward civil society-global capital confrontations. In the case of Sanam Luang, civil society organizations were able to successfully oppose the commodification of the important and historic civic space. Regulation of civic spaces These papers take the issue of regulation from a state perspective and examine the contestations (or lack of ) over specific spaces. Organization at the local community level seems to be in flux, as China’s economic reforms have disbanded the local work unit. Lu argues that the need to provide a range of local services to residents remains an important issue and in the case of Shanghai, the local government has been strengthened to assume more functions in managing the needs of the community. While Lu shows the effectiveness of such new arrangements in plugging the gap left by the demise of work-unit organizations, he also highlights several emerging problems. Shanghai illustrates a case of a state very much in control and the paper in large part is devoted to demonstrating the empowerment of local government agencies by higher level government to solve community-level problems. The move towards the privatization of residential housing has created a new common economic interest among homeowners to protect the value of their assets, including common spaces. While Lu provides evidence of commercial provision of open spaces in response to growing demand interests and public-spirited citizen actions, these work with and alongside state agencies. China’s strong state environment is also replicated in Singapore, and Hee’s analysis of four different types of public spaces shows how its civic character remains underdeveloped, in spite of greater participation by private developers in the provision of public spaces and in spite of calls by the government for greater local participation. The case of Singapore is significant for the absence of civic spaces in the abundance of public open spaces and demonstrates the need, as Hee argues, to scrutinize the processes in which such spaces are created. Hee’s paper attempts to unpack the underlying currents of post-colonial urban processes, private sector voluntarism, the forging of identities of marginalized people in the city and the cultivation of an emergent civil society – within the framework of the creation of civic spaces. She argues in the context of civic spaces that are created in historically contingent ways that there are others in the

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making with multi-layered meanings, particularly in Singapore, a city-state well aware of the stakes in global inter-city competition for foreign capital invesments, and yet still searching for self-identity at this juncture in its comparatively short history of thirty-seven years of nationhood. While it is easy to conclude that state regulation is effective at the macro level, at the micro level it is a different matter altogether. Koh’s analysis shows how the law is often forced to make concessions regarding the control of vendors in Hanoi’s sidewalks in order to balance competing demands of accessibility of produce and services to consumers with congestion issues. Where before economic freedom, the pavement had been relatively free of civil activity, by the late 1980s such activity became a daily sight of Hanoi City, and a daily “pain” for Hanoi’s urban administrators. In the contest for use of the pavements in the capital city of Hanoi in Vietnam, Koh highlights the social processes through which public spaces have become sites of civic engagement between state and citizens involving, in many instances, the superior officers of patrolling ward policemen, the residents, media and the roaming vendors who set up business on the pavements. In this way, Koh draws meanings to civic spaces other than as sites of resistance to homogenizing global flows, as Hee has argued in her discussion. Civic spaces and community mobilization The papers in this section are significant for the ways in which they examine specific instances of mobilization, its costs and the consequences of successful mobilization. Of the set of case studies of Pacific Asian countries, Korea stands out as the one country that has made significant achievements in democratic reforms through civil society engagements. Cho’s paper provides an analysis of how an active civil society is tied to a variety of civic spaces. His paper indicates how major streets and their adjacent squares and parks have performed a critical role as staging areas for important grassroot political events. Such events occur outside the arena of institutionalized politics and have over the years been an important avenue for achieving democratic reforms. Cho also shows how such civil society victories have also resulted in the creation of new public spaces that will continue to nourish civic consciousness. The international nature of mobilization is discussed in two papers by Lim and Boski. Lim shows how the shifting grounds of civic spaces have been strengthened by Internet enabled communities. She demonstrates the significant interplay between the organization of activities in cyberspace works itself down to the street level in the form of organized protests. What can be called “insurgent civic spaces” – spaces created as sites for political mobilization against formidable powerholders – are the subject of concern in the two chapters by Lim and Boski. Merlyna Lim traces the historical

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episodes in the production of public spaces of Jakarta from pre-colonial to post-Suharto era. She shows how state-society relations have historically been imprinted in urban space, with each era marked by particular physical, institutional and symbolic representations in public spaces. As Lim states, the histories of people are also the histories of places, and space is an active part of rather than simply a backdrop to social and political change. She provides detailed instances of the ways in which space and place have been bound up with the formation of identities and historical conflicts and struggles over power. In spatializing history, Lim raises the question of whether the massive mobilization and creation of insurgent civic spaces to provide sites for the overthrow of the Suharto regime can be projected into the future toward a more democratic society. Her response is that while insurgent spaces will always have their importance in political change, what is needed is more enduring civic spaces, which are embodied in parks, plazas, sidewalks and other spaces as well as cyberspace. In the short term, one irony of political reform after Suharto is that while political liberties such as freedom of the press and popular assembly are now imprinted in the constitution, successive governments have turned to further controlling public space through fences and other means as a way to dampen political gatherings in the city. These more recent episodes readily show how the control of space can be a powerful tool in controlling civil society. Joe Boski’s paper parallels that of Lim by showing how insurgent spaces emerging around global governance events such as G8 and World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings have become increasingly fortified and policed, with “no-go” zones extending further and further from meeting sites. In reviewing a number of episodes of protest movements around global summits, Boski clearly shows how space is used as an active element of countering dissent by such tactics as moving meetings to remote sites, such as the G8 meeting in the remote Rocky Mountain region of Kananaskis, Canada, and/or simply fortifying and increasing the no-go perimeter around these events to distances that effectively mute any form of protest. State use of the tactics of dislocation, militarization and routinizing of control techniques over the spaces of these events has meant that protest becomes ephemeral. Hope is given to proposals for creating processes of negotiation between state and civil society actors in the planning of such events in a manner that offers reasonable security for the meetings while appreciating the value of social protest. Ultimately, the study of civil spaces relates to the question of how can Pacific Asia’s growing urban populations create life-spaces in the city for a more livable, convivial and democratic future. A key question in this regard is whether or not civic spaces can be routinely created rather than appropriated through civil society–state–economy struggles. Several chapters give hope in this regard, and others pinpoint specific issues and pressure points for an urban agenda. Now, more than ever, the future development

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of cities in Pacific Asia must incorporate the growth of spaces needed for human fruition through an active and inclusive civil society made possible by having access to common spaces for daily association and political voice.

Notes 1 We follow Fuchs et al. usage of the term “Pacific Asia.” This includes the countries of the western Pacific rim (essentially East and Southeast Asia), and excludes South Asia and North America. See Roland J. Fuchs et al. (eds.), Urbanization and Urban Policies in Pacific Asia (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center and Canberra, Australia, National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University, 1987), p. 1. 2 As summarized by Korten (2001, 2): Historically the term civil society traces back to ancient Greece and Aristotle’s concept of a politike koinonia or political community, later translated into Latin as societas civilis, or a civil society. Aristotle described the civil society as an ethical–political community of free and equal citizens of good and responsible character who by mutual consent agree to live under a system of law that expresses the norms and values they share. As the law is a codification of the shared cultural values by which the members of society have chosen to live, it becomes largely self–enforcing–maximizing the freedom of the individual and minimizing the need for coercive state intervention. It is an ideal consistent both with our current understanding of the organizing principles of healthy living systems and with freeing the creative potentials of humanity. 3 AOL-Time Warner, News Corporation, Disney, Bertelsmann, Vivendi and Viacom (Mediachannel, 2002). 4 United Nations (2001) Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2001, New York: ESCAP. 5 On the basis of FDI inflow and outflow data from UNCTAD 2001, Japan has been a net exporter of capital in all three time points (1980, 1990 and 2000). Taiwan has been a net exporter since 1990, primarily into China and some Southeast Asian countries. Korea and Singapore have had significant capital outflows since 1990 but inflows are larger than outflows.

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McChesney, R.W. (1999) Rich Media, Poor Democracy, Urbana, IL: Illinois University Press. Machimura, T. (1997) “Building a Capital for Emperor and Enterprise: the Changing Urban Meaning of Central Tokyo”, in W.B. Kim, M. Douglass, S.C. Choe and K.C. Ho (eds.) Culture and the City in East Asia, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marcuse, P. (2000) “Cities in Quarters”, in G. Bridge and S. Watson (eds.) A Companion to the City, London: Blackwell. Marshall, R. (2003) Emerging Urbanity: Global Urban Projects in the Asia Pacific Rim, New York: Spon Press. Mayer, M. (1999) “Urban Movements and Urban Theory in the Late 20th Century”, in S. Body-Gendrot and R.A. Beauregard (eds.) The Urban Moment: Cosmopolitan Essays on the Late 20 th Century City, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Mediachannel (2002) Issue Guides/Ownership. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed July 2002). Mercado, R.G. (2000) “Environment and Natural Resources Management: Lessons from Programme Innovations of Selected Philippine Cities”, in G.L. Ooi (ed.) Model Cities – Urban Best Practices, Singapore: Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Institute of Policy Studies. Molz, R.K. and Dain, P. (1999) Civic Space/Cyberspace: The American Public Library in the Information Age, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Newman, P. and Thornley, A. (2005) Planning World Cities, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan. Olds, K. (1995) “Globalization and the Production of New Urban Spaces: Pacific Rim megaprojects in the Late 20th Century”, Environment and Planning A, 27:1713–1743. Ooi, G.L. and Koh, G. (1998) “State-Society Synergies: New Stakes, New Partnership”, in A. Mahiznan and T.Y. Lee (eds.) Singapore – Re-Engineering Success, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Oxford University Press. PPI (Progressive Policy Institute) (2000) The New Economy Index. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed July 2002). Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rimmer, P.J. and Dick, H.W. (1998) “Beyond the Third World City: The New Urban Geography”, Urban Studies, 35: 54–72. Robinson, R. and Goodman, D.S.G. (eds.) (1996) The New Rich in Asia, London: Routledge. Rodan, G. (1996) “Class Transformations and Political Tensions in Singapore’s Development”, in R. Robinson and D.S.G. Goodman (eds.) The New Rich in Asia, London: Routledge. Sassen, S. (2000) The Global City, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Shaw, J. and Utt, R. (eds.) (2000) A Guide to Smart Growth: Shattering Myths, Providing Solutions, Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation. Soja, E. (1997) “Six Discourses on the Postmetropolis”, in S. Westwood and J. Williams, (eds.), Imaging Cities; Scripts, Signs, Memory, London: Routledge. Sorkin, M. (ed.) (1992) Variations on a Theme Park; the New American City and the End of Public Space, New York: Noonday Press. Tan, W.K., (2000), “Balancing Nature, Landscape and City,” in G.L. Ooi (ed.) Model Cities – Urban Best Practices, Singapore: Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Institute of Policy Studies. Thurow, L. (1999) “Building Wealth: the New Rules for Individuals, Companies and Nations”, Atlantic Monthly, June, pp. 57–69.

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Urban Ecology (1996) Blueprint for a Sustainable Bay Area, Oakland, CA: Community Design Consulting Program, Urban Ecology Inc., p. 2. Wong, A.K. and Ooi, G.L. (1989) “Spatial re-organization”, in K. Sandhu, K. Singh and P. Wheatley (eds.), Management of Success – The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Westwood, S. and Williams, J. (eds.), Imaging Cities; Scripts, Signs, Memory, London: Routledge. Witteveen, P. (1996) “Understanding Civil Society, Its Ramifications, Its Roots”, Human Mosaic, 30: 72–84. WWC (Walt Whitman Center) (1996) Malltown Square: A Legislating Civil Society Project, New Brunswick, Department Political Science, Rutgers University. Online. Available HTTP: http://www.cpn.org/sections/ affiliates/ whitman/lcs-malls.html (accessed July 2002). Young, I.M. (1990) “City, Life and Difference”, in P. Kasinitz (ed.) Metropolis, Center and Symbol of Our Times, New York: New York University Press.

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Civil society for itself and in the public sphere Comparative research on globalization, cities and civic space in Pacific Asia Mike Douglass

As Pacific Asia enters its first urban century, the forces of globalization are radically restructuring cities as they intersect with local histories and shifting constellations of power. Two contradictory outcomes are readily observed in this local–global process: the rise of civil society and the yielding of urban spaces to the logic of global accumulation. The rise of civil society is manifested in at least two ways: first, the increasing pressure for more livable cities that provide spaces for everyday forms of social engagement away from state and corporate control and, second, insurgent occupation of urban spaces to push the agenda for political reform. In contrast, the logic of global accumulation pits city against city in a hyper-competitive game to build urban landscapes that facilitate the increasing velocity of the global circulation of capital: through the capture and commodification of space, the shift from public to private ownership and control, and the conversion of community and cultural spaces into simulated “world city” spaces for global service functions and localized segments of transnational value-added chains. In the urban turmoil of mobilization for political reform confronting both the state and the logic of global accumulation, each society incorporates and manages these contradictory forces in different ways, depending on their own histories, culture and forms of governance. One way of understanding how a given society intersects with globalization is to explore the spaces of their cities and how civil society has or has not thrived in them in the past, and to look toward prospects for the future. Here called “civic spaces” – socially inclusive spaces with a high degree of autonomy from the state and commercial interest – the focus is on identifying and tracing the uses and transformations of these spaces in Pacific Asia cities. With globalization and urban transformations as the larger dynamic, the discussion in this chapter is premised on the proposition that the need to physically create civic spaces that are open to people of all walks of life is of paramount importance for, and the future of, a more participatory and politically active society in Pacific Asian cities. Taking the view that civil society is as much “for itself” as it is a potential part of the

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public sphere, the discussion begins by exploring the concept of civic space and its relationship to civil society, the state and economy.

Civil society and civic space The term “civil society” has a variety of definitions (Hegel 1967; Tocqueville 1969; Gramsci 1971; de Habermas 1989).1 Here it is understood as the totality of voluntary associations having significant autonomy from both the state and economy. No assumption is made about the “goodness” of such organizations. Nor is any assumption made that to be called “civil society” these associations must be engaged in the public sphere or the direct politics of state policy formation and implementation. As Friedmann (1998) correctly observes, most of the daily engagements through these associations are indicative of civil society for itself, i.e., people engaging with other people for social, cultural, religious or other voluntary association away from state or corporate economy intrusions. Civil society as “civil” cannot long endure without the state, which is tacitly given or forcefully takes on law-making and police authority to, inter alia, make and enforce law, resolve major contestations, and prevent the violence of one person or group against another (Keane 1988). Likewise, every society must have an economy, and with the possible exception of subsistence (self-provisioning) economies operating outside of the market, in the modern world civil society materially reproduces itself largely through an increasingly globalized corporate economy. Civil society thus exists in relation to state and economy, and is fraught with tensions and contradictions. Disharmony within civil society is rooted in this relationship as well, as evidenced in the Jihad vs. McWorld stylization of contemporary global strife and violence (Barber 1996; Castells 1997; Lim 2005). It is rife with class, ethnic, religious, gender, lifestyle and other divisions that can diminish as well as expand chances for social tolerance and cooperation. In this sense, civil society organizations mediate relationships among individuals, the state, and private economic interests. The fact that it does not participate in the political sphere does not mean that it does not exist. Rather, it suggests that, first, civil society can still exist for itself and, second, that in its political involvement it might exist in forms that are sporadic and clandestine. In the case of Pacific Asia, until very recently engagement in the public sphere has been suppressed and marginalized. However, widespread political reforms over the past two decades have created new opportunities for the political activation of civil society. At the same time, cities and civil society are being assailed by the global corporate economy. State complicity in this is manifested – particularly over the past two decades – through neo-liberal political and economic reforms supporting the globalization of all circuits of capital, including the commodification of social relations through the changing of civic space to private commercial space.

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Figure 2.1 Civil society and civic spaces.

How these shifts play out in a given city can be seen through the structuring and usage of urban spaces. The production of space reflects and assists in transforming relations within civil society as well as those among civil society, state, and corporate actors (Lefebvre 1991). Specifically, the following discussion is concerned with the creation and endurance of civic spaces, which are defined as socially inclusive spaces in which people of different origins and walks of life can associate without overt control by government, commercial or other private interests, or de facto dominance by one group over another (Douglass 2002; Douglass, Ho and Ooi 2002). Figure 2.1 locates civic spaces in relation to civil society, the state and economy. As previously noted, civil society is mostly “for itself,” seeking spaces away from overt involvement in the public sphere, state or economic control. Alternatively referred to as “life spaces” (Friedmann 1988), “lifeworld” (Habermas 1989; Cho 2002), “free spaces” (Evans and Boyte 1986, 1992), or “community free spaces” (K ing and Hustedde 1993), these are the spaces of social encounter that contribute to the production and reproduction of practices of social cooperation, problem solving, and social capital formation (Putnam 1993). Since civil society is not necessarily engaged in inclusive or tolerant behavior, it can also form exclusive spaces, including the household, that do not comprise civic spaces. Religious institutions barring non-believers, clubs with membership based on gender, ethnicity, race or other exclusive categories are not civic spaces as defined here; nor are those spaces included which are used for uncivil intentions such as planned violence against other civil society organizations. All of these are here categorized as exclusive spaces. Civil society needs civic spaces to effectively engage in the public sphere. One of the oldest traditions identifying the city with the emergence of civil society is the construction of public squares serving this purpose. Since Roman times, cities of Italy invariably include a public forum in the form of a large centrally positioned square. These were not only spaces for casual social encounters, festivals and petty commerce; but also sites where individuals could express political opinion and engage in debate about

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political affairs of the day. Without such spaces, “there could be no . . . civil society” (Witteveen 1996: 78). However, the mere existence of a public square, park or other spaces that appear to be civic spaces is not necessarily an indication of opportunities for civil society to engage in political discourse or action. Many nominal public spaces are colonized by the state or combinations of state–private enterprise interests (Habermas 1989). Authoritarian regimes typically tightly control parks and other public spaces in which political rallies are orchestrated by the state. As described in revealing detail by Lim (this volume) in her history of civic space in Jakarta, the provision of public spaces by the state was more accurately an attempt to symbolically build a national identity with the aim of legitimizing the authority of regime in power. However, precisely because of the political authority that these areas represent – evidenced by the demanding and achieving of political reform by the assembly of hundreds of thousands of people at these sites in the late 1990s – such spaces are never in total control of the state or any dominant group. Civil society for itself and civil society politically mobilized cannot be clearly separated in the real world. Speaking about political events at a community festival or discussing how to mobilize a campaign for political reform while on an Internet chat line are perhaps common occurrences. Because of such tendencies, authoritarian states strictly limit or have strict surveillance over even the most mundane social gatherings. In the case of Indonesia under the Suharto regime, street corners had a posted sign demanding that any visitor from outside the area must be reported to the authorities within 24 hours after arrival in a neighborhood (Lim 2002). In several Southeast Asian countries, for example, governments reserve the right to detain people who meet in groups of five or more in a public place. In this manner, public spaces are substantially limited as spaces for the flourishing of civil society. To summarize, Figure 2.1 indicates that not all civil society spaces are civic spaces; neither are all public spaces civic spaces. Here the interest is in spaces that are inclusive: open to a broad spectrum of civil society, whether public or private, with every person having the right of access (Goffman 1959, 1961, 1963). This does not mean that civic spaces are unregulated or without any constraints on access or use. Whether in the form of private property, common property or state property, civic spaces require rules of access and use if they are to function in an inclusive, fundamentally nonviolent and civil manner. Although regulation of civic spaces can take place under common property regimes, in the contemporary urban world most civic spaces rely on larger protection by governments to keep commercial and other encroachments at bay as well as maintain the peaceful sharing of these spaces. As the examples above show, the idea of civic space is much more complex than can be captured by simply calling it “public space.” In some instances, for example, civic spaces are created through the regulation of privately owned spaces, such as in the case of laws in several states of the

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United States requiring privately owned shopping malls to allow freedom of speech on their premises. In others, such as the peri-urban settlements around Chinese cities reported by Leaf and Anderson (this volume), the local state can be a crucial actor in securing community spaces. Whether or not people are free to use these spaces is another matter. This very fact that the state is seen as the ultimate regulator of space on behalf of civil society also makes civic spaces continuously susceptible to the state colonization of public space. This further suggests that civic spaces are often contested and subject to shifts in power relations (Mitchell 2003). As noted, civic spaces can exist in privately owned establishments, such as the pub in the United Kingdom, the local coffee shop in the US, or the privately owned public bath in Japan. They can even perhaps be created in such privately owned developments as Suntec City in Singapore (Hee, this volume), although the specter of simulated collective memory and the commodification of civil society experiences, and thus citizenship, suggests that rather than creating an authentic juxtaposition of the civic and the commercial, it is a pseudo-heterotopia (Foucault 1986) of consumerism. They may also be ephemeral civic spaces appearing sporadically as insurgent spaces occupied by social movements seeking political reform, as exemplified in the contested spaces around meetings of the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and other would-be global governance institutions far removed from democratic decision-making processes (Boski, this volume). In these and many other ways, the production of civic space is a process now reaching from the local to the global scale.

Globalization, cities and civic space in Pacific Asia Globalization, as an intensification of interaction around the world, is more than just the sum of local–global relations. The speed of information and decision-making flows are such that actions at one site can be near instantaneously known at another, creating informational streams that transcend a single city or region (Castells 2000). The result is the emergence of networks of decision-making flows rather than simple two-way relationships between a location and, for example, a potential global investor. Positioning within these networks is a multi-player game, as can be seen in the current intercity competition for world city status in Pacific Asia (Douglass 2000). The view from the city is one of a compelling world system that constrains and provides signals that direct local action. This is currently manifested in governments providing infrastructure, tax holidays and other subsidies to out-compete other cities and regions to “win” global investment. Under the ascendant neo-liberal paradigm, ways to win this game are directed toward a limited band of options: deregulation, privatization, ever more open economies, and direct cost recovery for what were previously thought to be public goods and services. In addition, city governments feel increasingly compelled to engage in boosterism in the form of urban

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mega-projects such as the world’s tallest buildings, world hub airports, global business districts, and other investments in the built environment that are not only functionally required to host global flows but are also symbolically powerful in attracting them into the urban economy. There are great variations in which globalization implicates different kinds of relationships. As put forth by Hee (this volume), global capital or any other force is not hegemonic in impacting all localities in the same way or to the same degree; rather, globalization exhibits a complex array of global–local, local–global interactions. Choices are explicitly or implicitly taken through locally constituted state, citizen and business relations of power that, while subject to external forces, have different outcomes with regard to linking (or de-linking) with the globalization processes. All of these global–local engagements have consequences for civil society and civic spaces. In broad outline, globalization fosters and is dependent upon accelerating the urban transition and the restructuring of cities into global networks – serving to advance its speed and scale of accumulation. In the case of Pacific Asia, the timelines shown in Figure 2.2 summarize the major global trends in this region from pre-colonial times to today. Part I of Figure 2.2 indicates that the globalization of basic circuits of capital – commodity trade, production, finance (Palloix 1973) – historically occurred at different points in time. The first moment of global commodity trade came with the Western colonization of much of Asia (from the seventeenth to well into the twentieth century) and was based on an international division of labor characterized by urban-industrial exports from the north and natural resource extraction and primary commodity production in the south. Only from approximately the 1970s onward did developing countries in Pacific Asia begin to experience rapid inclusion into the “new international division of labor” (NIDL) (Fröbel et al. 1980). This saw the massive deindustrialization of the Fordist factory system in North America and Europe paralleled by the emergence of “newly industrializing economies” in the region. The rise of the first generation of export-oriented industrializing “Tiger” (a.k.a. “Dragon”) economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore was subsequently mimicked to a lesser extent by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. By the late 1980s, the “transition economies” of China and Vietnam were also providing export-processing zones in coastal cities in explicit policy attempts to join this process. Accelerated urban-industrial growth in a limited number of Pacific Asia economies began to create an urban middle class of sufficient size and wealth to begin to attract what can be called circuits of consumer franchise capital, which began to saturate cities in Pacific Asia in a surprisingly short space of time. From almost no presence in the 1970s, the magnitude of global franchises is now vast, ranging from fast food restaurants such as McDonald’s, KFC, Lotteria, Mos Burger, and Starbucks to Euro-design

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clothing stores, “big box” outlets, shopping malls and a host of urban services such as taxis and car rental companies. Figure 2.2 also indicates that another major circuit of capital, namely finance, directly entered into the banking and financial systems of Pacific Asia from the 1990s, coinciding with the second wave of export-oriented industrialization moving into Southeast Asia (ASEAN). In the early 1990s, long-standing pressures from the US and Europe as well as international lenders such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) led to a remarkable opening of banking systems that had previously been closed in Pacific Asia. This allowed for massive influxes of short-term investment chasing high interest rates at fixed exchange rates, setting the stage for the sudden collapse of major economies in the region from late 1997 (Douglass 2001b). As discussed below, the combined linkages of manufacturing, finance and franchise capital have radically transformed cities and civic spaces throughout the region. Tier II in Figure 2.2 presents a generalized overview of political transformations that parallel the globally linked economic changes in Pacific Asia. Following World War II up to approximately the mid-1960s or later, the political stage in Pacific Asia was dominated by independence movements and the establishment of post-colonial national governments. Nation-state building was typically carried out as a reaction to colonialism and was manifested by explicit political distancing (and even closing off) of the newly independent nations from economic intercourse and politicalmilitary pacts with the North. Nonalignment, socialist ideologies, and civil/international war in Korea, China and Vietnam created fractures in the region, some of which continue to limit international political relations among nations in the region as well, notably in Northeast Asia. The first phase of export-oriented industrialization in the late 1960s was accompanied in the region by a new type of state, the “developmental state” (Douglass 1994). The principal aspects of these state regimes were twofold; namely, the (1) selective opening of economies to global economy, (particularly to investment and technology for export-oriented manufacturing2), and (2) regime maintenance through implicit social contract promising high rates of economic growth in exchange for severely curtailed political freedoms of civil society. The mantel of leadership shifted from the postcolonial “father of the nation” to “father of development.” As long as the state could deliver high rates of economic growth, which several did, social discontent over laws prohibiting public assembly and freedom of speech, press or other media such as radio and television remained limited, sporadic and muted. Martial law prevailed as regimes increasingly used police force to hold on to power decade after decade. In contrast to the pro-capitalist rent-seeking regimes that geared national economies for export-oriented manufacturing, a few other nation-states were engaged in grand socialist experiments ostensibly to create alternatives to world capitalism. The suppression of civil society in these countries was not

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Figure 2.2 Global timelines, the city and civic space in Pacific Asia.

done in the name of economic development as such, but rather was actively carried out in the name of anti-imperialism and anti-bourgeois tendencies within society. Levels of urbanization remained low; by the 1980s, the economies of these countries could no longer be sustained. Programs of basic economic reform began in earnest, though political reform was less certain, leading to a re-categorization of these countries as being “transitional” economies on the road toward market based economic systems. As a consequence of freeing the mobility of people to migrate and opening economies to global investment in urban services and industry, by the 1990s rates of urbanization in these countries began to accelerate.

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Whether in developmental or transitional socialist states, urbanization and international intercity networks bringing distant sources of information to Asian cities gave support to a rising tide of political discontent and calls for political reform. By the mid-1990s significant political reform was underway in many places, including Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Following the collapse of its economy after the massive flight of global finance capital from the region of 1997, Indonesia joined the process by overthrowing the Suharto regime in 1998 and laying cornerstones for the advent of popularly elected government. The chronology of the global–local transformations in Pacific Asia was simultaneously space-forming and space-contingent. Just as gaining global investment required certain types of infrastructure and urban design, effective action for political reform necessitated command over key sites in cities, which became the insurgent civic spaces of mass mobilization for political reform. The spread of Internet use in the 1990s also proved to be essential in promoting the rise of civil society to effect political change (Lim 2002). In all of these dynamics, instead of simply being a backdrop, the organization of space has been an active part of the activation of civil society (Lefebvre 1991). Tier III of Figure 2.2 focuses on these space-society processes. Over the course of several centuries of history, the now major cities in Pacific Asia were transformed from small fortified imperial centers overseeing local empires and tributary systems in pre-colonial times to the huge, open industrial cities and globally linked service centers of today. Colonialism had a profound impact on reshaping settlements systems. In not a few cases, the major urban-industrial centers that now exist were primarily the creations of colonialism. Jakarta, Rangoon, Penang, Singapore, Saigon, Manila, Hong Kong, to name a few, all came to prominence under European imperialism. Yet it was only at the end of the twentieth century, when the urban transition in Pacific Asia leaped in tempo and magnitude to signal a decisively new era. This leap can be seen in at least five dimensions of urbanization in Pacific Asia: (1) the acceleration of urbanization and spatial polarization; (2) the shift from national civil society–state contestations to civil society– global economy and cultural confrontations; (3) the increasing multicultural make up of metropolitan regions and the impending crisis of citizenship; (4) growing inequalities and social fragmentation; and (5) the search for new forms of urban governance.

Explosive urban growth and spatial polarization Accelerated urbanization and the spatial polarization of national economies is one of the most prominent features of contemporary globalization (Friedmann 2002). In 1950 the urban population of Pacific Asia accounted for only 15 percent of the population, totalling approximately 140 million

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Figure 2.3 Population growth in four Southeast Asia mega urban regions, 1900– 2000.

people; in the year 2000 it was approaching 50 percent of the population with almost one billion people – a sevenfold increase (UN 2001). By 2020 an estimated 54 percent of the total population will be urban, and rural populations will for the first time in history begin a chronic absolute decrease (Dasgupta 2002). Levels of urbanization are now reaching their peak at more than 80 percent in the highly industrialized economies of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, signalling the near completion of their urban transitions. When Korea became a colony of Japan in 1910, Seoul had a population of about 200,000. This increased to slightly fewer than 1.5 million by 1955. Subsequently, the greater Seoul metropolitan region absorbed explosive population increases to reach 19 million and account for 43 percent of the total population of Korea by the early 1990s (Kim and Choe 1996). With slight differences in timing, all other mega-urban regions of open industrializing economies of Pacific Asia have been experiencing this same pattern of explosive, spatially concentrated processes of urbanization. Figure 2.3 shows this pattern for four mega-urban regions – Bangkok, Ho

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Chi Minh City, Jakarta and Manila – which remained under 1 million until the 1960s but have now reached population sizes from 10 to more than 20 million. All are increasing in population at rates that are higher than national population growth. Currently in Pacific Asia, with the exception of very large countries such as China and Indonesia, they account for one-quarter to nearly half of total national populations (Douglass 2000). They have not only become the “engines” of national economic growth (Dasgupta 2002), they have also become centers of social mobilization and intensive contestations not only over political rights but also over the built environment, collective consumption and the right to the city (Holston 2001). Among the most recent experiences of an accelerated urban transition and spatial polarization is China. From officially very low levels of around 20 percent in the late 1970s, urbanization accelerated along with economic reforms in the 1980s, reaching 36 percent of the population in 2000. Government projections indicate that by 2050 cities will account for 70 percent of the national population, which will involve an increase of more than 600 million people. Most of these new urbanites will live in the mega-urban regions of China’s Pacific – Beijing-Tianjin, Shanghai, Pearl River Delta. Vietnam faces equally daunting prospects of coping with its recent acceleration of urbanization that is spatially polarizing around Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) and Hanoi (Douglass et al. 2002). In all mega-urban regions in Pacific Asia, as much as half of all their population increase derives from peri-urban areas where rural land uses are being rapidly and often chaotically transformed into urban uses (Webster and Muller 2002). In the case of China, peri-urban settlement highlights the fact that the country is not only in transition from state-led to marketdriven economic growth, but is also promoting a shift from state to private property regimes, leaving community spaces to be provided through ad hoc processes of negotiation. As Leaf and Anderson (this volume) detail in their investigation of China’s peri-urban development, community spaces continue to exist within a larger, but locally fragmented, state property regime, which they call “local corporatist space.” Dongmei Village on the edge of Quanzhou City in Fujian Province and Zhejiang Village on the outskirts of Beijing exist in areas outside of formal urban planning purview, yet residents are nonetheless engaged with and dependent upon local state actors to secure community spaces. By showing the striking contrasts in the experiences of these two communities, Leaf and Anderson underscore the complexity of urban processes, which are locally contingent and open-ended. They also state that in the midst of political transformation, transposing the concept of civil society to the Chinese context remains problematic in a situation in which personalized “clientelist” linkages with state elites remain paramount and in-migration of new residents into peri-urban areas is pronounced. For all societies in Pacific Asia that have become part of a worldwide urban transition, the implications for civil society and civic space are manifold.

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The rise of civil society is itself imbedded in the urbanization processes creating urban working and middle classes that are increasingly aware of their circumstances and able to organize in the closer proximities of the city. The pace of development and vast leap in scale of major cities also necessitates the adoption of mechanisms to release the state from being the principal initiator of urban planning and development. In its stead comes the global corporate economy as the major force restructuring both cities and the access to urban spaces.

Shift from state-driven to global capital-driven urban restructuring Until the 1970s, the planning and development of cities in Pacific Asia, though certainly influenced by global forces, remained largely in the hands of the state and local capital. Boonchuen (2002, this volume), Lim (this volume) and Hee (this volume) provide revealing analyses of the ways in which civic spaces have fared under pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial and (post) developmentalist regimes over the course of history in Bangkok, Singapore and Jakarta. Boonchuen vividly tells of Thai kings traveling abroad to bring back “city beautiful” ideas leading to the creation of public spaces in Bangkok in the early twentieth century. Lim describes how public parks and plaza were part of the early construction of Jakarta under Islamic kingdoms, a mix of sacred and secular encounters under the watchful eye of the state. Each of these and other public spaces were re-built and re-written in meaning over the ensuing centuries. Unlike other spaces in the city, all the transformations of what Lim (this volume) calls proto-civic spaces continued to have a common thread: their intentional use as sites for symbolic reification of state power. With independence struggles and early post-independence nationalist politics in Singapore, the Padang briefly became a principal site for “symbolic confrontation of the masses with the government” (Hee, this volume). In 1998 in Jakarta, the sites of national identity (Monas) and modernity (the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle) created for regime maintenance in post-independence years suddenly blossomed as insurgent civic spaces for social movements seeking radical political reform. Heng (this volume) provides a similar account of the history of public spaces in China. The shift from walled to open city with the transition from the Tang (618–907) to the Song Dynasty (960–1279) marks an important move from containment and close surveillance of public life to freer cities where “streets, public squares in front of city gates, temple courtyards, restaurants, taverns, and pleasure precincts alike were scenes of popular entertainment” (Heng, this volume). Cities underwent further change with the arrival of European colonialism and the reconstruction of newly designated treaty ports, which brought the idea and construction of the public park to China for the first time – as well as the relative demise of the temple as a public space. As seen in other cities throughout the world, social

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movements for political reform against colonialists and the post-colonial state in China in the early part of the twentieth century emerged from gatherings of hundreds of thousands of people at well known public spaces, such as Beijing’s public parks, which served as “important open forum for the dissemination of ideas and the mobilization of the urban populace” (Shi 1998; cited in Heng, this volume). In China, public spaces experienced a setback during the Maoist era, which placed neighborhoods and communities under the danwei (work unit) that controlled all resources. Throughout urban China the danwei started walling themselves off from one another under the pretext of security. The postMao years of reform have led to a substantial expansion of potential civic spaces in the form of public squares and the widespread conversion of older shopping areas into immense pedestrianized commercial streets and squares (guangchang) closed off to vehicular traffic.3 However, although open to the public, all such places remain under supervision and surveillance of the state. In the already market-oriented countries of Pacific Asia the civil society– state equation of contestations over urban space had already begun to change rapidly by the 1970s. The historically compressed convergence on Pacific Asia of the new international division of labor, finance capital and global franchise consumerism catapulted cities and civil society into a radically new era. Instead of the city centering on the palace, city hall or military compounds, the new epicentre, dedicated to global accumulation, mushroomed from pristine skyscrapers and office buildings owned by banks and insurance companies. For the major cities in the region that were established hundreds of years ago, this shift eventuated by the local intertwining of all circuits of global capital occurred within an exceptionally compressed time frame of 30 years or less. From visually quaint settlements still complete with pre-colonial and colonial architecture and open spaces up to the 1970s, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the only major cities that remained on a walkable scale and still centered on (pre-)colonial architecture were those that had yet to fully join the new international division of labor and the enchanted world of finance capital (Lipietz 1983) such as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh and Rangoon. The others had become automobile oriented metropoles of very noisy streets, heavy environmental pollution, and a visible decline of public and (proto-)civic spaces. At least two major phases of restructuring from the 1970s can be identified in these open, newly industrializing economies. The first was the rebuilding and expansion of cities to accommodate export-oriented assembly and manufacturing – which took the form of export-processing zones, deep water container ports, and other mega-infrastructure such as hub airports and fast trains to effectively link cities with global circuits of trade and production – which under the new international division of labor, created a global factory and assembly system. This phase tended to focus urban restructuring more on transportation systems and production sites.

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In comparison to what would come in the late 1980s, central areas of the city, surprisingly, kept relatively low skylines and many middle class inner-city neighborhoods as well as large slum areas continued to exist in central areas. Suburban housing development, especially for the emerging urban middle class, appeared on a large scale, with the syndrome of long hours of traffic congestion with urban expansion well underway in most cities by the end of the 1970s. A second phase of urban restructuring came in the form of intentional world city formation and global franchise consumption, appearing in Pacific Asia only from around 1985 with Japan’s bubble economy and the opening of Pacific Asia to global finance. Most of the investments of this era were no longer being targeted at manufacturing, but were instead aimed at creating global business zones, shopping malls to accommodate global franchise and chain store outlets, as well as massive upscale housing in peri-urban areas of major cities (Bello 1997). The scales of these urban design adventures were impressive. Cyber-Jaya and the world’s tallest building (Kuala Lumpur), the massive new business-industrial center of Pudong (Shanghai), the completely new city of Shenzhen (Guangdong), which grew from 40,000 to 4 million inhabitants in less than 20 years, the Kuningan “Golden Triangle” of office buildings and new towns such as Bumi Serpong Damai (400,000 residents) ( Jakarta), the failed Muang Thong Thani private city for 700,000 people (Bangkok) all appeared at this time along with hosts of shopping malls and extensive suburban housing construction (NYT 1999).4 The city of the 1960s receded into the shadows of the globalized metropolis of the 1990s. By the economic crisis of the late 1990s, affected cities had experienced among the most intensive period of urban restructuring in their history. Displacement of low and middle-income communities in urban centers saw hundreds of thousands of people compelled to leave the urban core to make way for skyscrapers, world trade centers, international tourist development, and shopping malls. In the case of Bangkok, the building boom saw highrise commercial development displace more than 100,000 people within a ten-mile radius from the center from 1984 to 1988 (Padco-LIF 1990). For just the 1988 Seoul Olympics alone, an estimated 750,000 people were forcibly evicted (Bread Alert! 1998). In Jakarta in the late 1990s, a crackdown on slums and trishaw drivers by the governor intent on ridding the city of the poor caused an estimated 200,000 people to lose their houses and livelihoods (Khouw 2001). Such stories and numbers, though rarely officially documented, have appeared in all major cities in the region that have opened to global investment. All of this heady remaking of cities shows that while much of the mobilization of civil society about urban conditions is still directed toward the state and its institutions, the planning and implementation of major land use changes in cities has decisively shifted from the royal household of the pre-colonial days and the halls of town and country planning of colonial

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and post-colonial developmental states to the boardrooms of corporate enterprises – often operating from skyscraper headquarters in distant world cities. The commodification of urban spaces, including the privatization and the sale of public land to private interests, is one of the clearest trends of land use in cities throughout the world, and nowhere has this process been occurring more intensively than in the mega-urban regions of Pacific Asia. The impact on public and civic spaces has been pervasive: replacement of traditional open markets with enclosed supermarkets and malls that have no spaces for social encounters outside of noisy food courts; advertisements and commercial signs meeting the eye at every turn; new business districts without public sidewalks or pedestrian right of ways; widened streets to accommodate the growing number of automobiles with high fences and metal barriers to prevent pedestrians from crossing from one side to the other; huge gated and privately owned suburban housing developments with no rights of public access; private police with surveillance cameras in privately owned shopping areas and buildings; the enclosure of the out-of-doors indoor through the complete filling of lots with buildings, leaving no spaces for public benches, greenery or non-commercial activities.5 The recent appearance of transnational “big box” superstores also provides for no amenities other than vast parking lots and is exclusively automobile-oriented. Even after the crisis of 1997 that left major financial institutions and land developers bankrupt, grand development schemes continue to be launched.6 This is all part of the intensification of intercity competition for global investment. In Bangkok, for example, the government with private sector participation has launched such schemes as the Rama III New Financial District seeking to convert 730 hectares of its Port Authority land to a world city district. This is an area (Klong Toey) that is now filled with the city’s largest low-income population (Douglass and Boonchuen 2006). The case of Sanam Luang, the Royal Ground and people’s plaza fronting the King’s Palace in the original center of Bangkok is a revealing example of the ascendance of global economic circuits over urban land use in Pacific Asian cities (Boonchuen, this volume). Interestingly, globalization was involved both in its transformation into a civic space a century ago and in its now proposed remaking into an international tourist site. Inspired by the City Beautiful Movement in the US and his trip abroad, in 1897 King Rama V had it remade from a royal crematorium and royal rice paddy into a tree-lined open green space. When Thailand changed to a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Sanam Luang began to take on civic space characteristics, including its allowance of freedom of speech similar to that of London’s famed Hyde Park. In the coming decades it became one of the most important sites in Bangkok for political rallies and citizen mobilization around political issues. As sacred ground, popular outdoor space, a place for the homeless and underground economy of the night, and site for political activism, it was a heteropia in one of Pacific Asia’s most cosmopolitan cities.

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By the year 2000 globalization came to Sanam Luang in the form of “Bangkok toward a City for Global Tourism”, a planned transformation into a tourism center by, first, establishing a night curfew to get rid of nightfood vendors, homeless people, and other marginalized users of this space. A parking structure to accommodate 282 tourist coach buses and a large shopping mall are slated for the area. Designed without a public hearing, development of the area has been given to a foreign company that asks for a 20-year monopoly over parking and shopping business. Scheduled for demolition is also Tha Thien market, the oldest open market in Bangkok that has been thriving since it was first built with the establishment of Bangkok in the eighteenth century. How each locality is engaged in the current moment of globalization and what will be the outcomes of its engagement will vary. Koh (this volume) explains in the case of Hanoi that the doi moi market-oriented reforms in Vietnam have created potentially new, or at least newly contested, forms of civic space along the sidewalks of the city. Before the reforms, the state, through periodic campaigns and raids, kept sidewalks clear of vending and commerce. Corruption and other deficiencies in state capacity led to worsening situations particularly following economic reforms legitimizing the private economy. More than just vending, sidewalks are increasingly being appropriated by individual households along them for their own use, which in practice means their exclusive use, as pedestrians are compelled to walk into traffic as they try to navigate the city core. What is revealing about this case is the way in which the juxtaposition of two systems, socialist and burgeoning capitalist, creates ambiguities in the status of civic spaces such as sidewalks. Championed by Jane Jacobs (1961) as a principal source of vitality of the city, the public sidewalk as a civic promenade fronting commercial establishments seems to be succumbing to a daunted state and lack of shared public ethic concerning the primacy of access to pedestrian walkways. As the complex structure of police, ward and neighborhood organizations loosen, a new “sidewalk regime” (Koh, this volume) has emerged amidst continued attempts to enforce regulations against sidewalk vending. Beyond these stories of changes in property regimes, Chinese and Vietnamese cities are also being pulled into the type of land development exhibited in other open, industrialized and industrializing economies. The Friendship Stores in Tianjin no longer sell Chinese bric-a-brac but instead sell the latest European fashion straight from the garment factories now in the country. Suburban shopping malls and big box supermarkets are appearing in the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City. Yet, to paraphrase Carl Sandburg’s (1972) well-known poem about the fog in Chicago, the global corporate and franchise economy quietly comes in on cat’s feet through its ability to obscure the transformations underway, namely, an intensifying commodification and privatization of urban spaces.

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Multicultural cities By the 1990s, major cities throughout the region were becoming decisively more multicultural. During the colonial era multiculturalism was high in Southeast Asia as British, Dutch and French imperialists imported labor from China, India and other colonies into Southeast Asian colonial and semi-colonial (Bangkok) cities. Japan, too, became a major recipient of forced labor from its colonies, though it attempted to repatriate most of these people after its defeat in World War II. From the mid-1980s, a new era of international migration within Asia began as higher income economies (notably Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) began to experience chronic labor shortages due to a shrinking national labor force and the advent of below replacement fertility among its dominant ethnic population. By the end of the 1990s millions of international migrant workers from other Asian countries had become indispensable to these economies (Douglass 1999; Douglass and Roberts 2003). Major cities are the principal recipients of these migrants, and given the long histories of real and imagined ethnic and racial homogeneity in receiving countries, a crisis of inclusion is occurring that is greatly magnifying issues of access to public and civic spaces. Internal migration is also a source of multiculturalism in most countries, particularly those in Southeast Asia. Whether it is hill tribes from the north, Isan from the Northeast or Islamic Thai from the south moving to Bangkok, all add to the ethnic mix of the city that includes people from all parts of the world. Indonesia’s multi-ethnic archipelago brings a similar richness to Jakarta. Singapore’s Chinese population is now at below replacement fertility and is about to rapidly shrink absolutely and in relation to other ethnic groups residing in this city-state. With these trends civic spaces become more, rather than less, important. With inevitable social fragmentation reflecting an increasing multitude of identities, places in which people of all walks of life feel comfortable to gather without fear of the “other” becomes a crucial antidote to the gated communities, surveillance of private residential and shopping areas, and the criminalization of foreigners by the press. Despite these trends toward multicultural cities, Rushdie (2000) notes that minorities and other marginalized populations are “visible but unseen.” Hee’s (this volume) observations of Orchard Road in Singapore as being a locale for a heterogeneous population of wealthy foreign business elites and domestic maids from the Philippines and Indonesia highlight this pattern. For the latter, the absence of civic spaces in that part of Singapore becomes visible when, on any given Sunday, hundreds of Filipinos sit on narrow guardrails on the edge of streets thick with automobiles and buses. Similar stories can be told in cities throughout the region (Douglass 1999). The multicultural reality of Pacific Asia cities is a more critical issue than it might be in many other parts of the world. The reason is that citizenship

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in almost all countries is being reserved for a dominant racial or ethnic group. Routines for becoming either resident or citizen are generally highly restricted. Particularly affected are low-wage foreign workers. In some cases, the shares of these people in national populations have become very high. Approximately 20 percent of the labor force of Singapore is noncitizen. Japan, with its plummeting birth rate and below replacement fertility that is forecast to begin in 2006, faces an extraordinary possibility of foreigners climbing from less than 2 percent now to as much as 20 percent of the total population by 2050 if they were to keep Japan’s population constant at its current level (Douglass and Roberts 2003). Whether the cultural diversity coming with new patterns of migration to Pacific Asia’s metropolitan regions can be accomplished in a socially just, inclusive manner is among the most important issues of this century for the immigrant receiving societies. Inequality, social fragmentation The confluence of global economic forces described above is also generating heightening social disparities at all scales in Pacific Asia: among countries, within countries, and within cities (Karliner 1997; Oxfam 2003; UNCTAD 1999). In the 1990s, much of the rising urban inequality revolved around speculative investments in land. The 1997 crash had the effect of hollowing out a previously expanding middle class and some of the nouveau riche, while creating massive unemployment and deepening poverty for lower income households (Douglass 2001b). Shares of national populations living below the poverty line increased sharply everywhere, and in the wake of the crisis new forms of chronic homelessness have appeared even in high-income economies such as Japan and Korea (Birdsal and Haggard 2000). Yet high-end luxury housing for the very rich has continued to sell and upscale shopping malls continue to be built, showing that the crisis did not substantially affect the wealthy.7 In 2002 alone, 20 new shopping malls were built in Jakarta.

The search for new forms of governance Major metropolitan regions have become too immense to imagine that command planning by government has any hope of working to determine or substantially control land uses and urban growth. The growing multicultural composition of major metropolitan regions also suggests the need for new forms of governance that allow different cultural values in urban policy. New forms of governance that include rather than exclude these marginalized populations are needed if the portent of vast ghettos of foreign workers is to be avoided. Yet in many instances, governments continue to try to use control over urban space to dampen the rise of civil society. In her revealing analysis of Jakarta, Lim (this volume) describes

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how the mobilization of civil society asserting its agenda of political reform by occupying key public spaces has been met by the city government’s redesign of these spaces to effectively prevent access to them by large groups of people. Such redesign of urban architecture is pervasive. The privatization of space into guarded shopping malls, office buildings and gated communities represents a similar trend towards removing civil society from what were once considered to be quintessential public spaces of the open community market and public walkways along streets lined with small shops. Similar attempts to create undemocratic forms of governance at the global scale also involve the control of civic spaces. Corporate interests and global governance have come together in the form of international trade and donor organizations, notably the World Trade Organization (WTO), IMF, and World Bank. New forms of global civic spaces – insurgent spaces of protest and resistance – have emerged around the meetings of these organizations. Two of the most well-known strategies used by these would-be world governments to prevent protestors from voicing their concerns are, first, to use local military-police forces to barricade and occupy substantial areas around meeting sites and, second, to hold meetings in highly inaccessible locations or locations of great cost for protestors to get to, such as Qatar or Okinawa (Boski, this volume). The extent to which local police forces have been activated to close off these spaces is extraordinary, showing the ways in which the national and local state are taking on new forms of enforcement for the sake of global capital. Moreover, cities learn from cities about how to shut down demonstrations, as evidenced by the City of Los Angeles conducting a four-month training program for 70 members of the Genoa police force prior to the Genoa G8 meeting in 2001 where one protestor was killed. Millions of taxpayer dollars are expended to keep these relatively small meetings from having public access.

Conclusions The question raised in this chapter is how the spaces of the city are used to enhance everyday lifeworlds and the inclusion of civil society in public life. The evidence is mixed; certain common trends seem to suggest the paradox is that civil society is rising while access to civic spaces remains low or is even diminishing. From the local to the global scale, existing and potential civic spaces are being turned into enclosed, policed spaces that are typified by surveillance, exclusion, and inhibited public and civic life. A key dimension of stress on civic space and life, especially since the mid-1980s, is the ascendancy of consumerism as the central act of the urban experience. This is being fostered through all types of media directed toward intentionally deflecting cultural and social energies toward global name brand desires and simulacra packaged as freedom of expression (Pine and Gilmore 1999; Douglass 2001a, 2002). Windowless superstores are replacing open markets. Local cultural and sports events that once had local place

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names now have corporate names and logos. Governments in pursuit of world city status contribute to these trends through their sponsorship of mega-projects to create global business hubs complete with the world’s tallest buildings, international convention centers and mega-shopping malls (Rimmer and Dick 1998; Douglass and Boonchuen 2006; Bangkok Post 2002; Boonchuen, this volume). Through all of these changes the city is out of balance in terms of what Friedmann (1988) calls life space vs. economic space. The conviviality of streets scenes is being lost to traffic and pollution, sidewalks without pedestrian passage, streets in new business districts without sidewalks. Potential civic spaces are being captured for exclusive use by factions of civil society. All of this is taking place in cities in which parks and other public spaces are already extremely limited (Boonchuen 2002). At the same time, democratic reforms have made great strides in Pacific Asia over the past decade. Popularly elected governments now exist in countries that within recent memory were under authoritarian rule. In this context, the studies in this book reveal that civic spaces are being created by communities through self-empowerment and through implicit and explicit negotiation with state and other actors. Whether creating such spaces can become a major instead of marginal dimension of the city is uncertain. As the research cited in here shows, the answer to this question does not simply fall from global timelines, but is also a matter of local political processes in actual urban contexts.

Notes 1 Although Hegel is commonly cited as the originator of the concept of civil society (Friedmann 1998), it can be traced to Aristotle’s concept of a politike koinonia or political community, later translated into Latin as societas civilis, or a civil society (Korten 2001: 2). In contrast to Hegel, who mixed voluntary associations with business and the economy, Gramsci (1971) is generally credited with differentiating civil society from (capitalist) economy (Friedmann’s corporate economy; Habermas’ state, society, economy) and state. Common to all definitions is that civil society is in dynamic relationship with the state. 2 Korea did not rely on foreign investment to drive its export manufacturing economy; yet it was heavily dependent upon licensing of Japanese and US technology and joint ventures. 3 “In the morning, they [guangchang] are ideal places for fitness exercise and taiji. In the day, they become city showrooms for performances, exhibitions, commercial activities and promotions organized by government, social organizations and corporations. Kites are often flown here in the evenings; at night they become popular outdoor dance halls.” (Heng, this volume) 4 From 1993 to 1997 an average of 150,000 new middle class and elite housing units were being constructed per year in the greater Bangkok city region (Sopon 2002). 5 In being privately owned and regulated, malls discourage activities such as free seating in open areas or people gathering in ways that are perceived to diminish land rent from the use of floor space. Free speech is not allowed, and

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in Bangkok even taking pictures is also forbidden in many shopping malls (Boonchuen 2002). 6 For example, a consortium of Korean, Thai, Hong Kong and Indonesian developers built the large-scale housing complex of Kota Wisata – complete with international themes for every neighborhood – in peri-urban Jakarta. 7 In Bangkok in the 1985–97 period of hyper-economic growth, the number of slums and slum dwellers actually increased while middle and upper income households were enjoying unprecedented increases in income and wealth (Phongpaichit and Sarntisart 2000; Boonchuen 2002). More than one-fifth of the Bangkok population now live in environmentally degraded communities (ACHR 2000; Douglass and Boonchuen 2006).

References ACHR (Asian Coalition for Housing Rights) (2000) The Poor of Bangkok, http://www.achr. net/th_overview.htm Bangkok Post (2002) Tearing down Tha Tien Market, August 18. Barber, B. (1996) Jihad vs. McWorld, New York: Ballantine. Bello, W. (1997) “The End of the Southeast Asian Miracle” in Focus on the Global South (FOCUS) (Bangkok, Thailand) Online. Available HTTP: http:// www.focusweb.org/content/view/340/ (accessed 28 June 2006). Birdsal, N.L. and Haggard, S. (2000) After the Crisis: The Social Contract and the Middle Class in East Asia, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. BMA (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) (2001) Cities 21 Profile, Bangkok. Boonchuen, P. (2002) “Globalisation and Urban Design: Transformations of Civic Space in Bangkok”, International Development Planning Review, 24(4): 401–18. Bread Alert! (1998) Setting Standards for the Toronto Olympic Bid, Online. Available HTTP: http://www.breadnotcircuses.org/standards_p1.html (accessed 28 June 2006). Castells, M. (1997) The Power of Identity, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Castells, M. (2000) The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd edn., New York: Blackwell Publishers. Cho, M.R. (2002) “Civic Spaces in Urban Korea: The Spatial Enrichment of Civil Society”, International Development Planning Review, 24(4) November: 419–32. Dasgupta, A. (2002) Urban Poverty in East Asia; Focus on: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, Washington, DC: World Bank, East Asia Urban Sector. de Tocqueville, A. (1969), Democracy in America, New York: Harper and Row. Douglass, M. (1994) “The ‘Developmental State’ and the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies”, Environment and Planning A, 26: 543–66. Douglass, M. (1999) “Unbundling National Identity–Global Migration and the Advent of Multicultural Societies in East Asia”, Asian Perspectives, 23(3): 79–128. Douglass, M. (2000) “Mega-urban Regions and World City Formation: Globalization, the Economic Crisis and Urban Policy Issues in Pacific Asia”, Urban Studies, 17(12): 2317–37. Douglass, M. (2001a) “Inter-City Competition and the Question of Economic Resilience – Globalization and the Asian Crisis”, in A.J. Scott (ed.) Global CityRegions–Trends, Theory, Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 236–62. Douglass, M. (2001b) “Urban and Regional Policy After the Era of Naïve Globalism”, in A. Kumssa and T.G. McGee (eds.) New Regional Development Paradigms (NRDP), Volume 1: Globalization and the New Regional Development, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, pp. 33–56.

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Douglass, M. (ed.) (2002) International Development Planning Review: Special Issue on Globalisation and Civic Space in Pacific Asia, 24(4). Douglass, M. and Ooi, G.L. (2000) “Industrializing Cities and the Environment in Pacific Asia: Toward a Policy Framework and Agenda for Action,” in David Angel and Michael Rock (eds.) A Clean Revolution in Asia (Sheffield: Greenleaf ), 104–127. Douglass, M. and Roberts, G. (eds.) (2003) Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Douglass, M. and Boonchuen, P. (2006) “Bangkok: Intentional World City”, in M. Amen, K. Archer and M.M. Bosman (eds.) Relocating Global Cities: From the Center to the Margins, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc (Forthcoming). Douglass, M., Ho, K.C. and Ooi, G.L. (2002) “Civic Spaces, Globalization and Pacific Asia Cities”, International Development and Planning Review, 24(4): 345–61. Douglass, M., DiGregorio, M., Pichaya, V., Boonchuen, P., Brunner, M., Bunjamin, W., Foster, D., Handler, S., Komalasari, R. and Taniguchi, K. (2002) The Urban Transition in Vietnam, Fukuoka and Hanoi: UNCHS, UNDP, Government of Vietnam. Evans, S. and Boyte, H. (1986) Free Spaces, New York: Harper and Row. Evans, S. and Boyte, H. (1992) Free Spaces: the Sources of Democratic Change in America, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Foucault, M. (1986) “Of Other Spaces”, Diacritics, 16(1): 22–7. Friedmann, J. (1988) Economic Space and Life Space: Essay in Third World Planning, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Friedmann, J. (1998) “The New Political Economy of Planning: The Rise of Civil Society”, in M. Douglass and J. Friedmann (eds.) Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age, London: John Wiley, pp. 19–35. Friedmann, J. (2002) The Prospect of Cities, Minneapolis, MN; London: University of Minnesota Press. Fröbel, F., Heinrichs, J. and Kreye, O. (1980) The New International Division of Labour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: Anchor Books. Goffman, E. (1961) Asylums, New York: Anchor Books. Goffman, E. (1963) Behaviour in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings, New York: The Free Press. Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Translated by Quintin Hoare, New York: International Publishers. Habermas (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967) Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Translated by T.M. Knox) New York: Oxford University Press. Holston, J. (2001) “Urban Citizenship and Globalization”, in A.J. Scott (ed.) Global City-Regions, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 325–48. Jacobs, J. (1961) The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York: Random House. Jones, G. and Douglass, M. (eds.) (2007) The Rise of Mega-Urban Regions in Pacific Asia – Urban Dynamics in a Global Era (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2007). Karliner, Joshua (1997) The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization (Sierra Club Books). Keane, J. (1988) Democracy and Civil Society, London: Verso. Khouw, I. (2001) “Are the urban poor marginalized by the city?” The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, June 10, National Scene, 1.

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Kim, J. and Choe, S.C. (1996) Seoul – the Making of a Metropolis, London: John Wiley. King, B. and Hustedde, R. (1993) “Community Free Spaces”, Journal of Extension, Winter, 31(4). Korten, D. (2001) “The Civil Society: An Unfolding Cultural Struggle”, http:// cyber-journal.org/cj/authors/korten/CivilizingSociety.shtml Lefebvre, H. (1991) The Production of Space, Oxford: Blackwell. Lim, M. (2002) “Cyber-civic Space in Indonesia: From Panopticon to Pandemonium?”, International Development Planning Review, 24(4): 383–400. Lim, M. (2005) Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet, Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington Policy Studies, No. 18. Lipietz, A. (1983) The Enchanted World–Inflation, Credit and the World Crisis, London: Verso. Migration News (2002) “Southeast Asia” 9(3): 1. Mitchell, Don (2003), The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space, New York: Guilford Press. NYT (New York Times) (1999) “High-Rise Ghost Town–Muang Thong Thani Rises up above Barren Fields on the Edge of Bangkok”, A10, February 16. Oxfam (2003), Growth with Equity, Online. Available HTTP: http://www.oxfam.org.uk/ what_we_do/issues/debt_aid/growth_equity.htm (accessed 28 June 2006). Padco-LIF (1990) Bangkok Land Market Assessment, Bangkok: NESDB/TDRI. Palloix, C. (1973) “The Internationalization of Capital and the Circuit of Social Capital”, excerpts from Les Firmes Multinationales et le Procès d’internationalisation (Maspero, 1973), pp. 37–63. Phongpaichit, P. and Sarntisart, I. (2000) “Globalization and Inequality: The Case of Thailand”, paper presented at OECD Conference on Poverty and Income Inequality in Developing Countries: A Policy Dialogue on the Effects of Globalization, Paris, 30 November–1 December. Pine, B.J. and Gilmore, J.H. (1999) The Experience Economy, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rimmer, P.J. and Dick, H.W. (1998) “Beyond the Third World City: The New Urban Geography in South-east Asia”, Urban Studies, 35(12): 2303. Rushdie, S. (2000) Satanic Verses, New York: Picador. Sandburg, C. (1972) “‘Fog,’ The Complete Poems of Carl Sandburg”, New York: Harcourt, p. 10. Shi, Mingzheng (1998) “From Imperial Gardens to Public Parks: The Transformation of Urban Space in Early Twentieth – Century Beijing”, in Modern China, 24(3): 219–54. Sopon, P. (2002) “Bangkok Housing Market’s Booms and Busts, What Do We Learn?” Paper presented at the PRRES 2002, Christchurch, New Zealand, January 21–23, 2002. UN (United Nations) (2001) “World Urbanization Prospects”, New York: UN Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (1999) Trade and Development Report 1999, New York: UNCTAD. Webster, D. and Muller, L. (2002) “Peri-Urbanization: Zones of Rural – Urban Transition”, Palo Alto, CA: Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. Witteveen, P. (1996) “Understanding Civil Society, Its Ramifications, Its Roots”, Human Mosaic, 30(1): 72–84.

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Governing cities Civic spaces, civil society and urban politics K.C. Ho

Introduction In our project on civic spaces, we make two major assumptions, first, that for the social, political and economic promises of the rise of civil society to be realized, there must be civic spaces available for its daily practices and collaborative engagement among its various organizations. Second, we maintain that civil society can make useful contributions to the governance of cities if it is given the chance to grow and participate in a myriad of issues that go into the making of livable cities. This paper is an attempt to critically evaluate these assumptions by first locating the concept of civic space within the larger context of urban politics and metropolitan governance, to lay out, as it were, the pieces of the puzzle of which civic spaces represent a crucial element bringing into shape and focus various place-based and segmented interests. This, of course, implies that civic spaces are not “empty” spaces. Other building blocks are needed if the goal is to understand civil society and its promises. This paper represents an attempt to build agency into the concept of civic spaces, an invitation to think through concepts and linkages, accordingly, it will review the forces shaping urban politics and governance. As the focus is on the relationship between civic spaces, civil society and urban politics, its primary emphasis is what Tarrow (1996: 874) refers to as contentious politics: “collective activity . . . relying on noninstitutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state,” and not on the political apparatus of the city. By shifting the focus to civic spaces and civil society, the paper examines how the political apparatus and work of the city is influenced and shaped by the diverse interests and agencies. The distinction between studying the political machinery of the city and civil society should be noted from the onset. Organized parties are very much part of the urban political fabric of cities, with clear organizational structures and networks developed and strewn across the city. In contrast, civil society is a more elusive phenomenon since this depends on both internal and external forces as well as inputs from different segments of the city, rising and fading over different issues and at different parts of the city. It is useful to remember Tarrow’s phrases

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(1996) the “rhythms of contentious events” and “changing seasons of political struggle” to understand this process. This dynamic conception of the ebb and flow of urban politics is necessary to consider the entry of new groups and new issues as well as the processes of claim making, bargaining and negotiation. In this analysis, the interplay between civic spaces and urban politics is essential, namely to examine the capacities of civic spaces to facilitate the organization, mobilization and the sustenance of interest, opinion and collective action; and to examine how the larger context of urban politics and urban governance come to shape such civic spaces. The paper will address the following questions: • •

• •

•

What are the roles of civic spaces (e.g. staging areas, democratic forums) in the organization and performance of civil society? Are civic spaces transitory or do they continue to play an enduring role in the functioning of civil society? In other words, do civic spaces play a role in the formative stages of civil society and lose importance once more permanent structures are in place or do they have an essential role to play in urban politics and governance? If they do play an enduring role, what are the mechanisms by which these spaces sustain themselves (identity, organization, etc.)? Do various civic spaces reinforce each other? How do the lessons from one site transfer on to other sites? Do we see attempts to learn from and network with the types of organizations and associations? What are the roles of non-spatial interests in shaping change?

In specifying the scope of this paper, I am reminded of Joan Nelson’s (1979) comment in the introduction to Access to Power, that her field of study is at best an attempt to bring clarity to a small (but essential) piece of a very large puzzle comprising of a large literature illustrating huge variations between countries. The hope is that the process of urban governance can be better understood by working out the relations between key concepts and by bringing in a number of case studies to illustrate these relations.

Globalization and its influences on urban politics Messy as it already is, urban governance has been complicated by the changes brought by economic globalization, mapping onto an existing local political terrain, with the largest Asian cities being the most directly affected. Two sets of forces derive directly from globalization. The rise in foreign direct investments (FDI) in Asian cities stems from the increasing ability of companies to coordinate production decisions from distant shores, the movement of producer services to support such operations, and the growth of international retail companies as Asian cities have a large middle class. The second trend is the increased international migration of different types

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of labor, both skilled and unskilled workers who move between cities in search of better job prospects, adding to the diverse urban populations in Asian cities. The World Investment Report 2001 (p. 23) indicated that FDI inflows into Asia reached a record high level of $143 billion in 2000. However this has been uneven, with Northeast Asia (Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan) getting the lion’s share of the pie. The share of these three economies has increased from 16 percent in the early 1990s to over 55 percent in 2000. China’s FDI inflow has not only increased, but has broadened over time, changing from labour-intensive industries in the 1980s towards more capital-intensive industries in the early 1990s (pp. 23, 26). While inflows into Southeast Asia in 2000 have been hampered by divestments in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore continued to remain strong contenders for FDI. This new and growing dependence on and competition over foreign direct investments has shaped the orientation of governments pursuing strategies to attract investments. Olds (1995: 1713, 1719) and Marshall (2003) documented the rise of flagship projects in Pacific Asia as anchors of such urban promotional attempts to attract global capital. Bunnell (1999) examined the mega structure Petronas Twin Towers in Malaysia, while Olds (1997) looked into the new corporate landscape in Pudong, Shanghai. Both mega projects are planned as strategies to attract corporate services. Eisinger (2000) observes that municipal governments are “building the city for the visitor class,” referring to the trend of cities becoming centers of leisure and entertainment. The scale and cost, image making and place marketing potential of such trophy projects – mega office towers, airports, stadiums, convention centers, theme parks – become lightning rods for contention, pitting anti-growth movements and poor people’s movements1 and communities under threat of resettlement against the growth-machine politicians and their backers. International migration represents the second force impacting on Asian cities. Gonzales (1999) makes two important observations about migrant workers in Asia when he argues that there is insufficient attention given to the crucial role international migrant workers play in sustaining the development of high performing Asian economies as well as the role played by government policies (in both sender and receiver countries) in maximizing the contributions of migrant workers in both their host and home countries. However, Kapur and Mchale (2003) observe that remittances sent back by foreign workers have reached significant levels so that governments and policy makers cannot afford to ignore their role in keeping poorer economies afloat. According to their estimates, remittances have increased from 80 billion dollars in 1980, to 30.6 billion in 1990 to nearly 80 billion in 2002. A Newsweek feature story ( January 19, 2004, p. 27) on migrant workers argues that such significant income sources are more reliable than foreign direct investments which are sensitive to economic climates, and help to “alleviate poverty, spur investment and cushion the impact of worldwide recession when private capital dries up.”

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Following up the first of Gonzales’ point, the significance of international migrant workers’ terms of their contributions to the economies of host countries means that receiving countries carefully tailor immigration policies to suit the needs of their economies. That migration includes both skilled professional classes as well as low income migrants means that governments often have two policies to regulate such flows. In an analysis of the movement of skilled migrant workers in the Asia Pacific, Iredale (2000) observed that such workers have not been a contentious issue compared to contract labour migration. In a similar vein, Young (2004) points out that skilled workers have had few problems moving in response to new market opportunities while unskilled and semi-skilled workers remain tightly regulated. Holston and Appadurai (1999) argued that government policies are such that they exempt the international professional class from civic duties and they deny rights to the migrant working class. The internationally mobile, courted by competing urban governments for the skills and capital they bring, end up with an absence of moral commitment of place, while the migrant working class become resentful of their marginal status in society. Three case studies generally bear out these observations. Fuess’ (2003) analysis of migrants in Japan indicated that skilled workers are entering into Japan in larger numbers in spite of its strict policies primarily because of their perceived contribution to the Japanese economy. Pillai’s (1999) and Gurowitz’s (2000) analyses of the Malaysian government’s response to contract and illegal migrants has been largely to see them as costs to society and to regulate them rather than to ensure their rights against various types of abuses by employers. However, globalization has also meant that local special interests and human rights groups have increasingly an internationalized network of support. The role of international agencies in supporting local efforts is well documented. Albrow (1996: 142) describes the formation of globalist movements which operate through symbolic acts of protest, networking informally rather than through authority structures. For example, the Scalarbrini missionaries, founded in 1887 in Italy, have developed a growing international network helping migrants exert their rights in host countries. Through Catholicism, the Scalabrinians have been particularly successful in working with Filippino migrants and have established a presence in the Philippines since 1982. Another example is provided by Boski (this volume) who examines networks organizing within insurgent spaces working against trade practices of powerful nations. Brecher and Costello (1994) provide more examples of networking in areas of environment, labor rights and jobs, trade, small business, through networking develop a realization or identification of local issues and self interests with a broader problem and set of common interests. Globalization may invoke different responses from local communities and governments. Machimura (1998: 189, 192) points to the tendency in Asia for globalization to be perceived of as Westernization. Thus, unlike Europe

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where the resistance is largely at the economic front, at least in the case of Japan, local authorities and communities have been reluctant to incorporate foreign populations and have resisted elements of foreign culture. A similar point may be made for Islamic countries.

The local context of urban politics A key variable influencing the formation of civil society efforts is the degree and strength of vertical hierarchical ties as opposed to horizontal linkages organized at a local or regional scale. One example of strong local organization is the presence of pro-growth factions pushing for predominately development programs for the city. In reviewing this phenomenon, Jessop, Peck and Tickell (1999: 145) citing Vicari and Molotch (1990) point out that such features are likely to emerge where local governments have taxation powers, weak integration between various tiers of government, weak party organization and no political party that is anti-growth. A variety of situations confront Asian cities. Ruland (1996: 14–15, 19) points out that local governments are weak and central governments are in control of the cities and various infrastructural projects. The stronger Asian central governments also reinforce the urban primacy of several Asian capital cities – Jakarta, Bangkok, Seoul, and Manila.2 This has the effect of strengthening the already disproportionate share of resources going to the capital city as these are favored by central governments for the symbolic roles as showcases of the nation’s economic, political and cultural achievements. These have the effect of creating mega urban regions. As pointed out by Ruland (1996: 12) and Schmidt (2001: 134) the size of these mega urban regions also means that these are the main economic centers of economic activity for Southeast Asian countries. Medhi Krongkaew’s (1996: 303) data indicated that 67.8 percent of all foreign direct investments stayed within the Bangkok Metropolitan region. Firman (1998: 233) estimates that half of foreign direct investments end up in the Jakarta Metropolitan region. Reviving a point made by Norton Ginsburg in 1976, Korff (1996: 291) also notes that primate cities have a monopoly on the institutions of modernization and observes that this is valid for the capitals of Southeast Asia and suggests that this role is reinforced by the concentration of elites in such cities. This important point is repeated again in a more recent work with Evers (Evers and Korff 2000 17), that: “the city becomes a symbol of the state ideology when urbanism is one factor for access to positions of power and when the state’s organizations is based on the city.” Urban primacy has two implications for local governance efforts. The first is the distortion of efforts in favor of the capital city at the expense of other secondary cities. We refer here to the agglomeration of social service organizations as well as the distribution of funds. Second, the importance of the capital city means that central governments are especially keen on keeping this “jewel” away from intervention and control by other groups.3

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The recent economic history of state-led development in Asia is also significant. Rodan (1999: 6) calls the state the “mid-wife of industrialization” in Asia, with the effect of strengthening the legitimacy of central governments. States which have accumulated such legitimacy go on to develop projects with little objection from various population segments. Thus, Pow (2002) and Boey (2002) show with examples from Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, the image-making projects that governments – the use of world famous architects and design teams (Cesar Pelli for the Petronas Twin Towers and I.M. Pei for Suntec City) to build “trophy buildings,” hallmark events such as the 1996 WTO inaugural ministers meeting in Suntec City, and the creation of “superlative” monuments, the world’s tallest building, the world’s largest convention center, fountain, etc. – convey with varying degrees the economic and symbolic aspirations of central governments. Such efforts have met with little resistance from civil society. Given that state capacity is uneven in Pacific Asia, decreasing capacities of government agencies to deliver services have also resulted in the rise of non-government agencies mobilized to deal with escalating problems (Porio 1997). Thus, the role of such agencies in working with local communities may, in fact, create the necessary structures that make for effective urban governance. However, NGO–community relations are also uneven. Korff’s (1996) review of neighborhood organizations in Bangkok, Manila and Jakarta, reveals the tendency for existing political structures to influence the development of local networks, for instance on how patronage extends below and affects the development of horizontal ties, and how a more democratic climate may allow more room for local organizations to maneuver. It is also important to understand the social organization of local relationships in Asian cities. As Guinness (2003) points out in Southeast Asian cities, beneath the veneer of class divisions and social relations defined by the capitalist economy, lurks a bedrock of primordial social relations established out of an older social structure, a structure ordered by patron–client relations.

Nature of claim-making The cities of Southeast Asia are also at a different stage of development from their American and European cousins. Southeast Asian cities continue to be sites for rural–urban migration even as they are magnets of regional and international migratory labor flows. The coming together of the various groups creates a wide spectrum of politics and unrest. The older politics is of squatters and the urban poor and their concerns for housing rights, education and other urban amenities. Grassroot politics of this nature involve failures of provision and extension of rights. International migratory flows create two different situations. The middle class and the internationally mobile professionals disengage from local involvement and “gate” themselves against the urban poor. There is increasing resentment expressed by the

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middle class against expatriate professionals. The politics of the middle class in Asian cities involves protection of rights, as common interests emerge out of needs to ensure security and existing ways of life. This remains an issue for empirical verification, but in the Pacific-Asian context, the location of planners in urban society differs from that of their counterparts in the west. The vast state metropolitan bureaucracies and the prevailing developmentalist state ideology along with the absence of any local alternative planning tradition have meant that the planning profession find employment in government and in the thick of developmental planning, rather than as advocates for civic rights. Planners in the west are often mediators between state and society, helping local communities to achieve their goals through their planning expertise and ability to at navigate through the bureaucracy.4 In Pacific Asia, by their location and affiliation with class and segment interests, planners tend to be key instruments in advancing state and real estate interests.

Formation of civic spaces The community basis of civic spaces The previous section provided in very broad strokes a conceptual universe of factors shaping urban politics and highlighted how the Asian context may throw up new factors which moderate the influence suggested by ideas developed in other contexts. The next section brings these factors into focus in relation to civic spaces. In other words, the key question is where do civic spaces5 stand within this array of influences on urban governance? There are four mechanisms influencing social organization and solidarity. We begin with place and leap to space. Places have social histories that are the outcomes of habitation. A crucial aspect of the social history of places is highlighted by Walter Firey in a 1945 article. Firey (1945) argued that sentiment and symbolism are important variables shaping the development of places through their abilities to attract similar activities, retain existing ones and resist dissimilar activities. Not all places create strong collective sentiments. The examples Firey chose, Beacon Hill and Boston Commons, have long and rich social histories that provide strong place sentiments. Firey also highlighted immigrant ghettos and slum districts as examples of the identification of ethnicity with place as another type of place sentiment. Suttles (1972) points out that the experience of a common “fate” may actually strengthen such feelings among residents and lead to defended neighborhoods. A more recent study by Godfrey (1988) of ethnic and nonconformist neighborhoods in San Francisco’s inner city suggests that such neighborhoods are created out of a detachment from mainstream culture, an inward-looking solidarity and the resultant joint tendency to cluster geographically. In other words, subcultures and alternate cultures have a tendency to coalesce spatially.

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Such place sentiments may be missing for many other neighborhoods’ experiences. The experiences residents have with places may not be similar and, if similar, are quite easily dissipated through high residential mobility, and neighborhood change. Sentiments may also be weakened by other stronger affiliations at different spatial scales. The collective experience of residents may, over time, take root in terms of a set of place sentiments. Symbols are outcomes of such sentiments as locals attribute meaning to various place elements: buildings, streets, sidewalks, parks, etc. or monuments are constructed to represent heroic deeds and significant events. Symbols then work alongside sentiments and these two attributes reinforce each other. Through the functions of attraction and retention (of similar activities) as well as resistance (of dissimilar activities), places become landscapes that have some degree of integration and coherence. And through sentiment and symbolism, these landscapes become signifiers of meanings and acquire reputations. Locals understand this and visitors are socialized to appreciate or fear such places. In such cases, civic spaces evolve out of the shared meanings and shared representational physical elements of such communities. Boonchuan’s (this volume) discussion of the Sanam Luang in Bangkok as emerging civic spaces is an excellent example of how, over time, certain sites have the ability to acquire and retain certain meanings in the hearts and minds of the Thais. Within the city, some places have the good fortune of developing into places of informal association, sites of unplanned social meetings, places to meet and talk. Termed third places (after home and work) by Oldenburg (1991), such places have the ability to allow patrons from different backgrounds to meet and converse and, in the process, create agreements on social and community issues, thus acting as focal points for community formation. Sirat’s (this volume) discussion of the mosque and its capacity for interaction among the visitors to such sites fits the description of third places. However, the extent to which mosques can contribute to the development of civil society is more uncertain in that one is not clear whether such sites create communal spaces or civic spaces. To the extent that social participation goes beyond a narrow definition of one’s religious status, then mosques and indeed other religious sites have the ability to become civic spaces. Studies of neighborhood mobilization have also indicated that collective experiences may be shaped within a very short time span as responses to external threats such as eviction. The process of mounting a defense also sharpens leadership and hierarchy, organization and alliances. In such cases, civic spaces are created out of a heightening of communal interests resulting in an organizational structure and an emerging network of collaborations, as the case of the Klongtoey Slums illustrates (Niyom 1997). Korff (1996) also points out how community leadership may strengthen over time as a new generation, with better education and local ties, take over the reins of leadership.

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As mentioned earlier, these elements may not be in place in any one community if the residential population is in constant change or when the diversity of interests works against the development of a collective sentiment. Leaf and Anderson (this volume) show how even within the rapidly urbanizing context of China’s peri-urban villages characterized by large migrant flows, the capacity for sociable places to develop exists. However the ability of these elements to form over time and once formed, the capacities of such elements to galvanize action should be noted. Civic spaces within the context of the neighborhood thus become one foundation of urban civil society since these allow for the governance at the neighborhood level. Given the inherent difficulties of collective action at the community level, spaces for civic participation may be formed through overt government action. The motives for such action are varied. In the Brazilian context, Abers (2000: 14), for example, argues that politicians and political parties may create development forums for local communities to participate, in an effort to secure legitimacy and political survival. In the European context of welfarist states, Schmid (2001: 28–29) points out that such structures are also attempts by governments to scale back on their responsibilities by only providing funding while leaving community councils with the task of managing community services. While the creation of state-sponsored civic arenas raises the issue of the nature and degree of meaningful participation that can come from this type of state-sponsored structure (to be discussed in the subsequent sections), the potential of such spaces for participation ought to be noted. Abers (2000) studied the Brazilian regional development forums which allow neighborhood associations to participate in developing local initiatives that compete for funding at the regional development forum. Her study not only demonstrated the ability of local communities to organize in order to tap into a resource pool, but also highlighted the tendencies of communities to build alliances with other communities. Such state initiated efforts demonstrate a potential for a deliberate formation of civic spaces as opposed to the slower evolution or an event-triggered creation of civic spaces.

The role of civic spaces in shaping civil society and urban governance Will the presence of such civic spaces guarantee popular participation and governance? For civic spaces to contribute to the shaping of civil society and urban governance, three essential conditions must be fulfilled: • • •

the ability to mobilize and for participation to be sustained; the possibility of developing a support base beyond the local community; and the necessity of government taking such efforts seriously.

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Both types of civic spaces introduced in the previous section may evolve a series of characteristics that preserves their ability to act collectively. At the community level, there are at least four elements that build a propensity for collective action. At the most fundamental level, places can become magnets for sociability through elements such as playgrounds, pubs and restaurants. The collective effect of such elements is to strengthen associational life. To the extent that these are successful and bring together the community, these are sociable places helping to prevent the isolation of residents by allowing interactivity and the circulation of information. This capability may be further enhanced when residents are long term and/or homogenous in terms of their social status. Places can also become crucibles of opinion, allowing for the formation of a common set of attitudes which characterize the community. Other factors may aid in this process of formation. For example, Janowitz (1967) points to the role of community newspapers as a focal point for news, opinion formation and social networks. Such opinions may also be shaped in response to eternal threats, where the possibility of evictions, or the imposition of negative externalities such as garbage dumpsites by the federal government may mobilize communities into action. Other place elements can also contribute to an amplification for action and, through this, a consolidation of the communal interests (Kuper 1972). The community paper performs such functions, but so too do features such as public squares, and the town hall as sites for organization and protests. These have the potential to amplify action through the ability to generate greater interest both internally and external to the community. Lastly, places act as repositories of memory through monuments, rituals and festivals. While many of such symbols originate from a nation’s history and a culture’s roots, part of a community’s history may be deposited in the form of memorials that allow for a new generation to be socialized to local heroes. In some cases, such elements act as symbolic anchors or markers of territorial ideological currents (Cox 1999: 21). Added to these elements are the material interests of the city. In Davis’ (1991: 9–11; 311–312) reading of Logan and Molotch, two sets of material interests define the city, the pursuit of exchange values (the realization of profit from land sales, etc. by growth coalitions) and the maximization of use values by residents (quality of life issues). Such “landed” interests shaped localized contestations (as in examples of land use conflicts which pit residents against developers) but also create possibilities for collaboration (as in the provision of amenities which create both use and exchange values). Collectively, these four functions along with entrenched material interests, form the basis for collective action through their ability to develop an identity and to bring into focus the sentiments of the community: through interaction, opinion formation, the channeling of action, and the ability to preserve the memory of past victories and the contributions of local leaders. We should however be cautious about assuming that once started mobilization and participation has a problem-free upward trajectory. Schmid

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(2001: 128–129) observes in the cases he has studied that the rate of participation in neighborhood organization board elections is low and residents can be indifferent to the process, adding that many local officials are not qualified and are in a difficult position to check abuses of power at the local level. Abers (2000: 146, 171) also observes that mobilization and interest levels may well dissipate after basic needs are met and local communities slide into passivity. Even when this happens, the ability of communities and local groups to remobilize need to be acknowledged. Collective identity, mobilization and the episodes of past efforts, successes or even failures, can be thought of in terms of what Hirschman (1984: 42–57, quoted by Abers [2000: 174]) calls “social energy,” capable of being conserved for a long time during which actors may not be involved in collective action. In particular, identity and memory are resources which can lay dormant for a long time without resort to episodes of mobilization. In thinking about civic spaces and participation, we also need to recognize the contribution of various social groups, professionals and classes whose interests transcend the boundaries of local communities. Such groups have in them ideologies, values and orientations which predispose them to wider societal interests involving the protection of basic rights. It is such interests which can insert themselves in local communities and spark the mobilization process. Thus, Ho’s (2000) case study of Hong Kong protest movements involving housing for the elderly showed the involvement of social workers in articulating the elderly housing issue when local leaders were absent. An early study by Suksamran (1981) showed the importance of the Sangha (Buddhist monks) in community development. Other specific cases of successful mobilization show the importance of various agencies and actors. Eckstein (1990) documents the case of how the local media played an important role in publicizing the plight of a local squatter community in Mexico city, making this into a public issue and, in the process, getting the support of the middle class. In Taipei, the role of student activists from National Taiwan University was largely responsible for saving another squatter colony at Baozangyan (Hsia 2002; fieldnotes, Jan 2003). A similar story of successful alliances saved the Klongtoey slum area from forced government evictions and enabled the development of various development schemes (Niyom 1997). However, such efforts, if successful, tend to focus on single issues, such as the saving of historic buildings, or the prevention of squatter evictions. For some permanence to be achieved, there must be an alignment of local interests with a wider collective vision. Abers (2000) recognized this for a regional governance structure to emerge, while Brecher and Costello (1994) saw this as an essential condition for the formation of international alliances. Such alignments are the first steps in building a structure capable of sustaining civil society. Under what conditions can local groups have a say in the decision making process? What instruments do local groups have in influencing local

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governments? In 1969, Sherry Arnstein wrote “A ladder of citizen participation,” detailing eight rungs of participation. The ladder is an appropriate metaphor to describe the possibilities of participation. It suggests an uphill climb in terms of societal efforts to influence state actions6 as well as point out the fakes from the real things (only three of the eight are genuine). To accomplish this, local groups must advance through a variety of tactics and strategies. If the objective is with governance, than the concern is not so much with power but with participation and the focus is not just on the state7 but also with capital8. Case studies inform us that protest as well as negotiation are necessary not just to defend but also to advance claims. When civic rights are poorly defined9 and strong constraints prevent the exercise of such rights, it is important to recognize “weapons of the weak,” a famous term coined by Scott. As Ockey (1997) shows, even the elderly, disabled, children and women, played an important role when a Bangkok slum was threatened with eviction. In this endeavor, it is just as important to confront as it is to build alliances and advance collaborative practices. Longer term measures must extend beyond episodic actions of protest (although these are important and necessary in and of itself when authorities are unreasonable and unwilling) to incorporate the creation of new organizational structures involving access and decision making, and also the passage of laws which mandate evaluation (as for example in environmental impact assessments) and guarantees protection (as in the case of consumer rights). Equally important are measures which can reduce inter-group conflict and promote an enlarged solidarity of interests. Davis (1991: 313–314), with 15 years experience as a community organizer and neighborhood planner suggests four strategies to eliminate conflict: through the reduction of interest group diversity, the building of issues over common external threats, the building of consensus over common attributes like ethnicity and religion, and the strategy of improving public goods through the upgrading of amenities. The role of civic spaces in this struggle to govern the city is to provide the impetus for identity formation, collective action and decision making. Cho’s essay (this volume) shows how different types of civic spaces in Seoul work to reinforce relationships and advance debate and actions on different fronts. In other words, civic spaces are the nutrient beds from which the flowers of civic participation bloom. While the process of ensuring effective urban governance may be stalled by indifference, blocked by constraints, sidetracked by competing interests and marred by failures, the promise of such a struggle is something we can aspire towards: In the ideal democratic city, the walls have fallen. Across the divides of difference, people connect; they agree to differ . . . The vision is one of tolerance and diversity, shared values and complexity – not all for one, but many for the all. Where collective life and differences mutually

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Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia coexist, democracy reigns. A full citizenship flourishes as the city’s residents actively engage each other in a civil society that nurtures robust cultures and establishes the foundations for political engagement (Walzer 1991). Socioeconomic polarities are minimized, and injustice, oppression and exploitation are muffled. In this imagined city, frictions are not dispelled, failures are frequent, and disagreements are impassioned. The city of our imagination is not utopia. (Body-Gendrot and Beauregard 1999: 14–15)

Notes 1 According to Mayer (1999: 215) there are two types of movements at the bottom end of the income ladder, anti-growth movements which organize against specific developments and in defense of threatened communities and poor people’s movements organized around welfare rights. 2 The exceptions are China and Vietnam, where the largest cities are not the capital cities, and Malaysia and Japan where there has been more balanced developments among the largest cities. 3 Taipei is one exception, being controlled by an opposition party. 4 See Sandercock (1998) for an account of the alternative conceptions of the planner’s role, values, identity and location in the state-society divide. 5 A reminder of the distinction between place and space is useful here. Space has both an absolute and relative property. As the Oxford Dictionary of Geography points out, absolute space refers to distinctive, real and objective space while relative space is perceived and refers to the relationship between events and aspects of events. Thus the term civic space has both absolute dimensions referring to real places and relative dimensions referring to what is perceived by individuals and communities as the amount or degree of civic participation in any given community or society. 6 On a different note, Migdal (1988) also points to many cases where strong societies have checked the effectiveness of the state. 7 We must resist the danger of using undifferentiated categories. In understanding the role of civil society in state-society relations, it is helpful to differentiate between the two halves of civil society as Chua (2000) suggests. The portion of civil society (charities, welfare agencies, etc.) which works to improve the material conditions of society find little basis for conflict with the state. It is that portion which affirms rights and challenges existing practices where the potential for conflict arises. 8 Here again, it is erroneous to assume capital is an undifferentiated category pursuing a capitalist logic that is always antagonistic with community interests. Timothy William Faithful (2000), the CEO of Shell Canada, argues quite convincingly of why companies exercise good corporate citizenship in issues of health, safety and the environment. His point is that a company’s reputation and the potential lost of goodwill and profits through socially irresponsible behavior are important motivations. However, this argument only holds water if corporate reputations are an important strategic resource, if the industry as a whole supports ethical behavior, and if companies are monitored in their actions and when there are few exit options for corporations which behave irresponsibly or when exit options are costly. 9 A strong civil society and weak state is an insufficient condition to guarantee an effective governance structure. As the Philippines case illustrates, a weak state and a well-developed civil society in itself is not sufficient guarantee of effective

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governance, if the presence of strong localized elite interests block civil society interests (Porio 1997: 33).

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Olds, K. (1995) “Globalization and the Production of New Urban Spaces: Pacific Rim Megaprojects in the Late 20th Century”, Environment and Planning A, 27: 1713– 43. Olds, K. (1997) “Globalizing Shanghai: the ‘Global Intelligence Corps’ and the Building of Pudong”, Cities, 14(2): 109–23. Pillai, P. (1999) The Malaysian State’s Response to Migration, Sojourn, 14(1): 178–97. Porio, E. (1997) “State, Civil Society and Urban Governance in Southeast Asia” in E. Porio (ed.), Urban Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Southeast Asia, Manila: Ateneo De Manila University. Pow, C.P. (2002) “Urban Entrepreneurialism, Global Business Elites and Urban Mega Development: The Case of Suntec City”, Asian Journal of Social Science, 30(1): 53–72. Rodan, G. (1996) “Theorising Political Opposition in East and Southeast Asia”, in G. Rodan (ed.), Political Opposition in Industrialising Asia, London: Routledge. Ruland, J. (1996) “The Dynamics of Metropolitan Management in Southeast Asia: An Introductory Note”, in J. Ruland (ed.), The Dynamics of Metropolitan Management in Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS. Sandercock, L. (1998) “The Death of Modernist Planning: Radical Praxis for a Postmodern Age”, in M. Douglass and J. Friedmann (eds.), Cities for Citizens, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. Schmid, H. (2001) Neighborhood Self-Management: Experiments in Civil Society, New York: Kluwer. Schmidt, J.S. (1998) “Globalization and Inequality in Urban South-east Asia”, Third-World Planning Review, 20(2): 127–45. Suksamran, S. (1981) “Religion, Politics and Development: The Thai Sangha’s Role in National Development and Integration”, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 9(1–2): 54–73. Suttles, G. (1972) The Social Construction of Communities, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Tarrow, S. (1996) “Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article”, American Political Science Review, 90(4): 874–83. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2001) World Investment Report 2001, Online. Available HTTP: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/ webflyer.asp?docid=1485&intItemID=2110&lang=1&mode=toc (accessed 6 October 2004). Vicari, S. and Molotch, H.L. (1990) “Building Milan: Alternative machines of growth”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 14: 602–24. Young, K. (2004) “Globalization and the Changing Management of Service Workers in the Asia Pacific”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 34(3): 287–303.

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State-society relations, the city and civic space Giok Ling Ooi

The nature of state-society relations and hence the role which civil society contributes to public policy decision-making, can be generally assumed to have a considerable impact not only on the production of urban form but also on spatial changes within the city. Such political logic; however, contends for space in an age of economic globalization in which there has been an increasing concern about the displacement of the political by economic logic and the extension of the lore of the market sphere (Autes 1997; Moulaert and Scott 1997). Certainly examples of competition as well as competitiveness among cities abound in the global network of investment flows, which have been reflected in the so-called mega-urban projects designed to attract the attention of international investors and business firms (Olds 1995; Bunnell 2002). This global competition among cities has not only been paralleled by state intervention at both the national and local levels, but also its participation in real entrepreneurial strategies (Hall and Hubbard 1998). The developmental state that had in the 1980s and 1990s driven the rapid transformation and growth of many Southeast and East Asian economies ( Johnson 2001; Castells 1992) appears to have been translated at the local, that is, urban level into entrepreneurialism driven by the local state. The strongest examples of the developmental state have been those which have succeeded in integrating their economies with the global economy at the fastest rate. These include Singapore and, more recently, Thailand, Malaysia and China. Urban landscapes that are the outcome of such entrepreneurial aspirations in cities include the ubiquitous waterfront developments, theme parks and high-rise office towers or the “blandscapes” of the ambitions of city governments vying for global capital investments (Short 1989). Few of these mega-development projects extend to the levels of daily life where they have meaning and social significance for citizens (Thomas 2000). Indeed, the homogenizing effects of global processes are most evident in the development of cities that, to put it rather crudely, are up for sale around the world. Yet, there is also growing evidence that activism is developing to contest the impact of such homogenization and the negative implications of globalization in cities. The latter includes issues such as social

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State-society relations, the city and civic space 67 fragmentation and the marginalization or exclusion of sectors of the citizenry from the benefits of urban economic growth. This activism has not been confined to urban social issues arising from globalization, but has assumed an international scale, with the anti-globalization demonstrations that have haunted World Trade Organization conferences and other international economic cooperation gatherings from Seattle to Davos (Boski 2002). Another representation of the responses that are gathering against the maelstrom unleashed by globalization forces is the Jihad vs. McWorld argument posed by Barber (1996). Such representation does not look as implausible, given the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York. In its aftermath, there has been discovery of a global network of terrorist cells with links apparently to Al-Qaeda, the group that has been accused of the September 11 attack (Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore 2003). The shifting of the focus of city governments from political logic and public policy to solely the economic and the logic of the market has, as Autes (1997) has argued, reduced urban political life to merely a management dimension. While the citizens in cities feel the tension between economic and political logics, at the level of daily political life, the emphasis on the economic has tended to create among urban residents a sense of helplessness toward public action. There is a growing concern about the restitution of democracy at the local or urban level and for people in cities to exert power over their future. Such claims appear to depend or are contingent on the access to and participation in the discourse on the provision of civic spaces in cities. However, such claims ultimately rely on the status of state-society relations and the role of civil society in the political life of the cities. In the following discussion, focus is first placed on an understanding of the state-society relations and development of civil society in Asia and, more specifically, in Singapore. An understanding of state-society relations and the development of civil society provides the context for a discussion of the regulatory environment, against which varying forms of civic engagement evolve, with civic spaces contributing differing roles. This paper argues that the nature of state-society relations needs to be unpacked and comprehended in order to explain the political and social significance of civic spaces in the globalizing cities of developing countries.

State-society relations and civil society – Western and Asian perspectives Civil society and it follows, state-society relations, are represented in two ways in the Asian context (Hill and Lian 1995). The “classic western liberal” position on civil society generally refers to “an open society in which such institutions as political parties, trade unions, independent industrial enterprises, social movements, free churches, liberal professionals and

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autonomous universities, all operate on the assumption that no one group possesses an infallible social blueprint and hence, provides a check on the scope of the state” (Hill and Lian 1995: 224). The second way, which is seen to be more resonant with Asian political structures, represents the state as the legitimate site of political expertise and thus, the arbiter of peace and social order, continuing to delimit the role of civil society activism as well as define appropriate spheres of competence for non-political “interest groups.” Indeed, “the rise of Asia and the debate over ‘Asian democracy’ pose an important challenge to the influential modernization paradigm that upholds a view of history as progressing from traditional towards modernity, characterized by the establishment of a capitalist market and liberal democracy. The once sacrosanct principle of liberal democracy as the yardstick of modernity and human rights is being questioned as representing no more than the imposition of western values and standards over developing nations” (Antlöv and Ngo 2000: 3). The “third sector” which refers to the civil society sector or non-profit sector, so Anheier and Seibel (1990: 8) argue, gained prominence in the West at a time when the role of the state was being rolled back and sized down. There is an assumption in the discussion on civil society in the West and particularly in the developed countries, that where the government and market sectors once performed important roles in the distribution of resources in society, the need has arisen to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the third sector in relation to the other two sectors (Bauer 1990: 272). The situation in developing countries varies considerably since the resource–distribution function of both markets and state sectors have proven to be wholly inadequate without considering the civil society sector in the first place. Indeed, it has been the ineffectiveness of both government and market sectors in meeting basic needs that has more often than not led to the rise of civil society in many developing countries. Hence, care should be taken in comparing state-society relations or the nature of civil society developments between developed countries in the West and developing countries. The assumption that the nature of civil society can be compared cross-culturally is essentially flawed, if the notion of the role of civil society vis-à-vis the other two sectors is assumed to be similar across the world. Colonial history in Singapore has tended to be linked to a civil society sector with greater vitality (Singam 2000; Koh 2000) although there are dissenting views that see such civil society activities as essentially primordialist, organized as they were largely around ethnicity and ethnic group interests (Cheng 1985; Jamann 1994). Civil society and forms of civic engagement might have thrived in colonial Singapore mainly because of the laissez-faire approach that the British colonial administration took towards internal affairs. The flourishing of clan organizations or self-help programs, as well as welfare providers, obviated the need for social policy provision or welfare support by the colonial state (Ooi 1993). Indeed, such a perspective

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State-society relations, the city and civic space 69 on the part of the colonial regime was consistent with its general “divide and rule” strategy of keeping peace not only among the different ethnic groups but also cross ethnic interests in social issues. Yet civil society development during the British colonial regime did not appear to have been linked to well-developed civic spaces that were accessible to the Asian migrant community in Singapore. The civic spaces of the colonial port city were those showcasing the might of empire as well as the need to segregate the European sectors of the city from those where the Asians were to be found (King 1976). The Asian people and households settled in quarters of the city that had been assigned to them in the Raffles’ Plan. Yet rapid population growth soon led to the congestion that meant considerable spilling over into each other’s allotted area of the city. Street and public life became not only necessary but extremely important as a way of coping with the congestion (Kaye 1959). In a way, the vitality of associational life might have been encouraged by the importance of public spaces because of the lack of comfortable and adequate private space (Hee and Ooi 2003). The massive public housing program upon which the independent citystate embarked in 1960 led to the en masse resettlement of the majority of the population then concentrated in and around the city center. New towns and public housing estates were developed that provided every family with a private home and a fair degree of self-containment since it was supplied with piped water supply and electricity. The provision of modern homes was paralleled by the effort to plan for more open space and parks that would be accessible to all residents. These were to become the array of public spaces that are provided for in planning standards alongside those others that are inevitable with the high-rise and high-density type of housing being developed under the public housing program. Such public spaces include the void decks meant historically to provide space for observing the different social functions within the community – weddings and religious festivals involving gatherings among the residents, funerals and other such events. Traditional leadership structures aligned along ethnic lines were gradually replaced by the ruling party’s institutional plan for its own grassroots organizations and leadership. These organizations are now struggling with leadership renewal and a meaningful role as they try to make such leadership more ethnically and also demographically representative of the citizenry (Thamilselvan 2003). These are mainly the groups, however, that have been officially allocated spaces to carry out their activities in the public housing and other neighborhoods. Other groups that have also been officially allocated space in public housing estates tend to be voluntary welfare groups. These are welfare service providers who fill the gaps in the provision of social welfare services by the state. Indeed, the state has consistently averted the assumption of direct responsibility for the provision of welfare assistance services, preferring instead

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to work through charities and voluntary welfare organizations. In this way, state-society relations in contemporary Singapore might not be that different from those prevailing in the colonial period, at least in terms of the state’s relative loose control of welfare groups (Koh and Ooi 2000). Singapore’s state-society relations have been variously labeled. Illiberal democracy and “soft authoritarianism” are but some of the terms that have been used to describe the combination of capitalist economy with a paternalistic authoritarianism that persuades rather than coerces (Roy 1994: 231). Singapore is also described as “Disneyland with the death sentence” (Gibson 1993). Furthermore, the Singapore political leadership has been highly articulate about the West not being a good political model for Asia and rejects the view that there are universal civil and political rights that must be adhered to in all conditions (Haas 1999: 50). The political leadership emphasizes the importance of economic development which has to take precedence over such rights and that discipline and conformity to group values are more desirable social goals than freedom and individualism. According to former Senior Minister and now Minister Mentor, Lee Kuan Yew, “The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy” (Zakaria 1994: 111). Not surprisingly, Singapore has been the most ardent advocate of Asian values (Han 1999). These values are defined as a paternalistic state, government guidance and protection of private enterprises, a communitarian outlook and communalistic practices and an emphasis on social order, harmony and discipline (Han 1999: 4). While such values were held up as accounting for the extraordinary growth in the economies of several East and Southeast Asian countries, following on the East Asian crisis, these values have been found to be rather at odds with a globalizing age. This is an age seen to require transparency, accountability, global competitiveness, a universalistic outlook and universal practices, emphasis on private initiatives and the independence of the private sector. Indeed these are values associated more with the developed and liberal democratic West than the Asian countries. Societies in Asia are seen to under-emphasize these values even if they had not been found antithetical to Asian values in the first place (Han 1999, p. 4).

Globalization, the city and society With globalization of the economy, cities are seen as being the platforms for social adjustment between the forces representing the market and the changes required of society (Autes 1997). While it is argued that the role of cities has been pivotal between economy and politics, the understanding

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State-society relations, the city and civic space 71 is also that the increase in exchange, flows, movements and information which globalization brings about also challenges territorial identities based on political institutions. In brief, globalization implies cities are being reconstructed according to an economic logic and the territorial extension of the market is seen as a force related to the geographical fragmentation of power. This is a decentralizing force that has seen the rise of cities as political actors and new places for public decision-making, particularly regarding local economic development. Yet, the role of cities as the pivot between politics and economy implies they can be expected, in the process, to create new political spaces as well as new legitimization of public action, because cities are also being brought into competition with other political actors animating and organizing urban and regional territories (Autes 1997: 231). These political actors include civil society and citizens’ groups. The extent to which these groups are engaging with the state sector in cities provides the context for the discussion of civic spaces and the role they contribute to public life and public decision-making at the local level.

Recoding the civil and the civic The transformation of Singapore into a modern city-state and economy in the last four decades or so has been driven largely by the state and its planning agencies. Planning has been highly centralized and, until only recently, involved relatively little participation by civil society or the public (Ooi 2004). Land-use development and the allocation of urban space have been strictly controlled and managed by state agencies. This means that there was little public consultation involved in the massive resettlement of a majority of the population from the central area of the city to new public housing estates as well as the major infrastructural development projects that were implemented. One of the then political leaders of the 1960s, had declared that “Modernization requires a certain measure of hard work, sacrifice and discipline [and] we must make radical changes to our economic, social and political institutions and accept ideas and developmental attitudes necessary for the process of modernization” (Chan and Obaid ul Haq 1985: 247). In the planning process, there has been a trend of recoding civic space as public space. This, in many ways, parallels the process or effort that has been made to recode the civil with civic society (Yeo 1991). In a keynote speech, the then Minister for Information and the Arts, Mr George Yeo, argued for a non-political variant of the concept of civil society regarded as more containable within the dominant political culture (Hill and Lian 1995: 225–6). This notion of civic life and civic society is the more acceptable form of civic engagement to the political leadership “to anchor Singaporeans, as individuals and as families, to the country” (Yeo 1991: 81). If civil society usually implies the active, egalitarian participation of citizens

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in the social and political life of their communities – a public realm in which people are free to debate, contest and challenge the issues that affect them and their lives (Nair 1993), then the preference of the government in Singapore is for a civic society where individuals and groups spring up from the grassroots to undertake self-help work and projects which will benefit the community (Chan 1995; Koh and Ooi 2000). In short, the state sector has effectively shaped the boundaries, both spatial and political, within which civil society actors are expected to operate. Far from the openness seen as essential for the civil society groups and organizations to contribute freely to issues affecting the lives of citizens, there has been careful regulation of the space allocated to these groups for their work among the public (Tay 2000). The Speakers’ Corner that was introduced with considerable fanfare in 2000 is located in the city center where only a small proportion of the citizens live. Indeed, there tends to be more expatriates in the city center than in most other parts of Singapore. At any rate at least nine in ten people in Singapore live in public housing estates and new towns that are located outside of the city center. Ironically, therefore, while the Speakers’ Corner may be located in the central area of the city, it is far from being the center of where most people in Singapore live. Furthermore, while the Speakers’ Corner is intended to allow people to speak freely, speakers have to register and live with several rules, including not using audio-visual aids like a loud hailer. Location-wise, the Speakers’ Corner is sited behind a police station at the junction of one of the busiest thoroughfares in the city center. Few can recall the civic role of the public space and tumultuous political events that have actually taken place in the park where the Speakers’ Corner is now located. Political rallies during the elections were staged in the park until the 1970s because a larger number of the voters were still living in the neighborhood. In the process of urban development and change, historical land-uses have been erased, including the homes, shops and associations of the people then living in congested settlements around the parks. With the erasure of these land-uses, the collective memory of the political rallies and assemblies that used to take place in the park has also been erased. The imposition of rules on the use of the Speakers’ Corner reflects the standard government practice towards the use of public spaces provided in Singapore, particularly those developed in the public housing estates where a majority of the people live. Ubiquitous public spaces like the void decks or ground-floor flats of most high-rise residential blocks in public housing estates serve mainly as throughways and breezeways for residents, since most activities like bicycling and ball games are prohibited, among other activities (Ooi and Hee 2002). Indeed, research has shown that many public spaces in public housing estates serve as little more than passageways to elsewhere for residents moving from one place to another as they go about their daily routines (ibid).

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State-society relations, the city and civic space 73 The way in which public spaces have evolved and the problem seen in the use of such spaces as civic spaces through which citizens can engage with public life and in civic activities aimed at participating in and debating issues affecting them, have paralleled the growing regulation and management of the civil society sector in Singapore. Use of public spaces for civic purposes, such as the mobilization of public support for agendas that are not the state’s, is subject to approval by the police to which an application for a public entertainment license has to be made. The rise in the dominance of the state has been matched by the undermining of the role of civil society that had emerged largely during the laissez-faire colonial state and the spaces in the city in which civil society activities can freely take place. Most telling, however, is the planning and provision of public spaces for the larger developmental purposes of the state and in the aesthetics required in urban design. Public or open spaces in the city serve more as relief from high-density and high-rise residential developments or as one dimension in the implementation of the garden city framework employed in the allocation of land for different land-uses (Ooi 1992).

Reclaiming the civic and the civil The problems with locating civic spaces in the city might have driven associational life in part on to the Internet. In 2001, a cyber group comprising Malay Muslims surfaced and came to public notice because of the conflict over the insistence by four Muslim families that their daughters attend their first year at primary school in a tudung, or head-dress (Koh and Ooi 2000). This group calling itself Fateha appeared to have mobilized largely through the Internet via a website called www.fateha.com, and announced it had gathered some 3,300 signatures for a petition to be submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office (Today 24 October 2001). At a press conference in October 2001, the group had announced that it was petitioning the government to allow Muslim students to cover their aurat 1 in school. The group has since disbanded, having come under intense pressure from both the government and the mainstream Malay-Muslim leadership. However, the mainstream Malay-Muslim leadership had been challenged earlier in 2000 by a group of Muslim professionals who suggested the institution of an independent, non-partisan and collective leadership for the Malay-Muslim community (Association of Muslim Professionals 2000). While not necessarily related, the call for such a leadership in preference to the representation of the community provided by the ruling party’s MalayMuslim Ministers of Parliament culminated an eventful year for the MalayMuslim community as it negotiated the retention of its religious schools, or madrasahs, in the face of the government’s demand for the schools to introduce the teaching of modern mathematics and science to its students. Detractors took exception to the government position that the madrasahs represented less of an education system than the national education

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system, arguing that the madrasah system was integral to the life of the community that did not always define itself by the same secular, materialistic values that the rest of the national community might (Koh and Ooi 2002: 257). A compromise was finally reached whereby individual madrasahs would be recognized if their students could meet a minimum standard of achievement in a national curriculum – a move that some groups such as the Alternative Joint Committee of Madrasah might have seen as a compromise of the religious educational system itself. There have been other groups that have been initiated through the Internet. A long established group is Sintercom, or Singapore’s Internet Community, which can be loosely termed a political commentary group. The control of the media by the state has been challenged briefly by the electronic form of civil society in the new Information Age. The Singapore Internet Community (Sintercom) was one of the many Internet-based portals that were created to discuss Singapore politics in what was a relatively free-wheeling and no-holds-barred fashion. The attempt that the portal made to register in Singapore revealed the difficulties that the regulators had with the new medium, since the standard format for registration required information about the place of business, names of office-holders and membership listing. These do not apply with a cyber community comprised of contributors from around the world, and much less a hierarchy of officeholders. Not surprisingly, the application was rejected. Well into its eighth year of operation, Sintercom ran into legislation barriers that were imposed on freedom of expression, by way of rules for broadcasting on the Internet. In July 2001, the Singapore Broadcasting Authority made it known that Sintercom had to register as a political website subject to the rules being implemented for broadcasting. Such conditions would impose a form of control and a regulatory environment that would make the website very difficult to operate since it would be selfdefeating for members to require censorship for an effort that had been initiated on the premise of allowing contributors to speak their minds freely. State-society relations in Singapore, following the end of colonial rule, have therefore tended to be characterized by the state’s imposition of controls and procedures calculated to keep civil society in arenas that best suit the prevailing political order – the provision of welfare services and selfhelp, as well as grassroots work in support of the ruling party’s initiatives. Such management and control, which reflect the nature of state-society relations, have been extended to public spaces and, hence, they function as civic spaces for the mobilization of public support for public causes and wider societal interests. Indeed, even the sole authority for the allocation of the use of public spaces is the state and its agencies. Instead of civil society acting to contest the scope of the state, it is the reverse that occurs. Such state-society relations are not, however, without their tensions. These have not only been manifested in the contestation of over real space (e.g. issues of heritage conservation in the city) – but also over cyberspace.

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Participatory democracy and civic spaces In posing the question “Just whose city is it?” Sassen (1999) highlighted a key issue in cities that are as globalized as Singapore. There is a question of identity and the extent to which the citizenry identifies with the national identity and nationalism that should, in the long term, serve the agenda of the exclusive group of elites and intellectuals who support them, rather than the interests of the society. Globalization has tended to fragment society at the local level, leading to a re-configuration of identities and alliances. Many citizens must necessarily evolve multiple identities that include the national identity, which then becomes but one of the many ways in which the individual defines herself. Reclamation of the civic or the civil, which is somehow being recoded by the government sector, as seen in the activism of Fateha, has been a point of contestation between what can be viewed as a group’s right to cultural and religious expression, versus its responsibility and obligations to the national community or the national scheme of things (Koh and Ooi 2002: 261). The political leadership appears to be recognizing the importance of a sense of ownership and place identification in order to more effectively root its citizenry to the nation-state. Yet, the oft-drawn observation about how rapidly the landscape is transformed in Singapore encapsulates much of that which many citizens identify with spaces and places. Ordinary Singaporeans regularly see places where they have spent their childhood removed to make way for new developments (George 2000). Participatory processes that have been institutionalized include the Town Councils but here the decision is politically motivated (Ooi 1990). Voter accountability – rather than the aim of including greater public participation – appears to be the motivation behind the introduction of the town councils. Since the polls have not provided much evidence of the importance of participation or otherwise to voters, these councils have generally not emphasized greater involvement of the residents with the planning of public spaces or even the upgrading of older estates. The following quote expresses the frustration associated with the state’s project of introducing greater self-determination at the grassroots level: The Housing Board has its new towns, and the Urban Redevelopment Authority its land-use zones and planning districts. Singapore is also divided into town councils, community development council districts and electoral divisions. Tugged by so many agencies and agendas, most places in Singapore have had their identities muddled, mixed or massacred by changes to names and boundaries. As a result of changes before and after the 1997 general election, for example, the residents of Bedok HDB estate, who used to be served by the Bedok town council, found themselves having to pay their conservancy charges to East Coast town council instead. Residents of Jurong had their town

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Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia council changed from Jurong to Bukit Timah. Many estates are split between different town councils. At Bukit Batok East Avenue 6, for example, Block 230 is looked after by Bukit Timah Town Council, while Block 231 across the road comes under Hong Kah Town Council. (George 2000: 191)

A major problem has been the lack of public participation in the planning process. Little institutionalization of processes that will allow for public participation has been introduced. Efforts, such as the development guide planning process, have been reduced to the mere staging of exhibitions of plans. With the view of incorporating public feedback, these efforts are supposedly firmed up, but there is usually no repeat exhibition organized to inform the public or citizens who have provided feedback exactly how it has been incorporated. It is evident that civil society remains severely circumscribed in its scope for activism, judging from the state’s control and management of the use of public spaces by civil society groups and actors. There are strict limits on the use of public spaces as civic spaces as the state seeks to construct the boundaries and nature of the civil society sector. The tussle for civic space between the state and civil society represents the social process in which civil society actors are engaged as they struggle for greater political freedoms and channels of representation. This would involve more effective representations of civil society sector interests that have been somewhat sidelined by the state in its focus on a globalization agenda and economic growth. A denial of real, physical space for more active mobilization in terms of public participation for civil society can be seen as the reflection of the limitations and constraints imposed on the development of a more equal footing in state-society relations for all sectors.

Notes 1 Aurat refers to parts of the body that need covering – these are stipulated for both males and females according to Islamic law.

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Moulaert, F. and Scott, A.J. (1997) “Globalization, Economic Restructuring and Urban Society”, in F. Moulaert and A.J. Scott (eds.) Cities, Enterprises and Society on the Eve of the 21st Century, London: Pinter. Nair, S. (1993) Political Society, Commentary: Civil Society, 11(1): 15–9. Olds, K. (1995) “Globalization and the Production of New Urban Spaces: Pacific Rim Megaprojects in the Late 20th Century”, Environment and Planning A, 27: 1713– 43. Ooi, G.L. (1990) “Town Councils – Self-Determination of Public Housing Estates in Singapore”, Institute of Policy Studies Occasional Paper No. 4, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Times Academic Press. Ooi, G.L. (1992) “Public policy and park development in Singapore”, Land-use Policy, January, pp. 64–7. Ooi, G.L. (1993) “Health Care Development and Ethnic Medicine in Malaysia”, Third World Planning Review, 15(3): 273–86. Ooi, G.L. (2004) Future of Space – Planning, Space and the City, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press. Ooi, G.L. and Hee, L.M. (2002) “Public Space and the Developmental State in Singapore”, International Development Review, 24(4): 433–47. Roy, D. (1994) “Singapore, China and the Soft Authoritarian Challenge”, Asian Survey, XXXIV, p. 231. Sassen, S. (1999) “Whose City is It? Globalization and the Formation of New Claims”, in A.F. Foo and B. Yuen (eds.) Sustainable Cities in the 21st Century, Singapore: Singapore University Press. Short, J. (1989) The Humane City: Cities as if People Matter, Oxford: Blackwell. Singam, C. (2000) “Civic traditions in Singapore: A Feminist Perspective”, in G. Koh and G.L. Ooi (eds.) (2000), State-society Relations in Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Oxford University Press. Tay, S. (2000) “Civil Society and the Law: Three Dimensions for Change in the 21st Century”, in G. Koh and G.L. Ooi (eds.) State-society Relations in Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Oxford University Press. Thamilselvan, A. (2003) “Participation of Minorities in Grassroots Organizations: Old and New Issues Revisited”, Journal on Active Community, 3: 25–9. Thomas, H. (2000) Race and Planning – The UK Experience, London and New York: UCL Press. Today (2001) “Timing of Petition by Civil Rights Group Questioned”, 24 October. Yamamoto, T. (ed.) (1995) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community, Singapore: Japan Center for International Exchange and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Yeo, G. (1991) “Civic Society – Between the Family and the State”, Inaugural NUSS Lecture, 20 June, World Trade Center Auditorium, Singapore. Zakaria, F. (1994), “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”, Foreign Affairs 73(2) Online. Available HTTP: www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/other/ culture.html (accessed 27 June 2006).

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5

Chinese public space A brief account Heng Chye Kiang

To the east and on the northern side of the street is the wine shop of Pan Tower, and below it a market gathers every day from the fifth watch (3–5 a.m.), where they buy and sell clothes, calligraphy and paintings, precious baubles, rhinoceros horn and jade. When it comes level light of dawn, then such items as sheep’s head, tripe and lung, red and white kidneys, udders, tripe, quails, rabbits, doves, wild game, crabs and clams have disappeared. Then the various handy men come to market to buy and sell miscellaneous small items that are used in provisions.1 (Meng Yuanlao, Dongjing menghua lu [Record of a Dream of Splendor in the Eastern Capital], preface dated 1147) Until the nineteenth century or even the early twentieth century, Chinese cities were very different from their Western counterparts. The quintessential public space – the public square that constitutes the jewel and core of most European cities – was conspicuously absent in traditional Chinese cities, at least not in the form we know of in the West. The prevalent public square in which the cultural and political life of the European urban polities is enacted was not necessary for, nor desired by, the Chinese ruling agency to have in its cities, since the power was centralized in a highly autocratic state, not to be shared with any secular group or religious order. When it existed in the form of an imperial or palace square before the Imperial City, it was a very different urban space, with its own rules and rhythm of use. Instead, until late imperial times, the quintessential public space in Chinese cities was the street/street-market as described in the quote above, taken from a popular record of Kaifeng written in the early twelfth century. It was predominantly in and along these linear channels that public life was conducted. And even this was a hard won battle that took several hundred years of urban development and popular contestation before its role was accepted and entrenched. However, this does not mean that Chinese cities did not have other forms of public space. During its long history, other urban elements began to play increasingly important roles as the loci for public activities. Foremost amongst them are the market, temple courtyards and to a lesser extent, gardens.

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This paper begins by examining the birth of a ubiquitous form of public space – the transition from the enclosed market compound to the commercial street – and outlines the development of others in history. Given the geographical and historical scope, it is difficult to characterize public space in Chinese cities in a single paper. Rather, the purpose of this paper is to sketch the changing nature of public space during the major phases of Chinese city development and provide a basis for its development before concluding with the recent development of a new form of public space – the guangchang, or square.

From market to street In the article “The historical development of Chinese urban morphology,” Wu Jin divided the long development of Chinese cities into four phases: the walled city (770 BC–AD 906), the open city (618–1840), the colonial city (1840–1949) and the socialist city (1949–85) (Wu Jin 1993). While one may take issue with the periodization, the terminology and even the specific dates concerned, the general categorization into four periods is useful as a framework for studying the development of public spaces in Chinese cities.2 Important cities in imperial China were mainly administrative in nature. At the lowest level, these were county seats chosen at convenient locations well served by the local communication network. This was vital not only because the county town was also the market center for the region but also because local taxes largely collected in kind had to be channeled to the town and forwarded to the prefecture and subsequently to the central government.3 Their small size precluded them from playing significant political roles. Prefectural/provincial seats were administrative centers first and foremost. Sited at pivotal locations, they were well connected to their counties and linked to the national network of trunk roads and waterways (Peterson 1973). Capital cities in China were usually established for political, administrative and military reasons rather than for economic purposes although these cities were at times busy commercial centers before they became capitals. Even if they were not to begin with, they would quickly become important commercial hubs soon after being named capital. Unlike the more organic layout of commercial townships, administrative centers, by virtue of the fact that they were seats of government, demanded the physical intimations of imperial presence. They were typically orthogonal and axially symmetrical walled cities, at the center of which was a walled administrative compound (Figure 5.1). In the case of the capital, this walled compound comprised the imperial and palace cities. The city was usually ordered by a grid-iron network of streets oriented north–south. In the case of the Sui (581–618) and early Tang (618–906) cities of the so-called “walled city” or “closed city” period, the instrument of authority was very clear. The central authority had absolute control, at least until

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Chinese public space 81

Figure 5.1 Map of Wangcheng in Kaogongji showing a walled city with an orthogonal grid of streets and a walled administration compound in the center.

the An Lushan rebellion (755–63), over the production of space. The Sui and the early Tang administrations adopted and refined the institutions of the earlier sinicized non-Han Northern Dynasties concerned with the functional hierarchical organization of society (Gernet 1982). The strong, autocratic grip that the Sui and early Tang emperors had over their cities produced an equally strict urban order of walled monofunctional wards separated by wide, policed streets, confining citizens to easily controllable quarters. Early Tang cities were strictly zoned into functional areas such as administrative precincts, residential wards (fang) and market compounds (shi) (Figure 5.2). Each of these entities was surrounded by walls provided with a limited number of gates for easy control and supervision. These walls

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Figure 5.2 Detail from a map of Chang’an engraved on a stone stele in 1080 showing walled residential wards provided with gates on two or four sides of the wards.

were as much for the protection as for the control of the inhabitants of the wards, guarding the city against popular unrest (Heng 1999). Wide avenues separated these walled enclosures. These walls made it easy for the police to ensure the city’s security. They facilitated the arrest of criminals by confining them within the ward where the crime was committed or providing them with no nooks and corners to hide if they were outside. A strict curfew system further limited the movement and activities of inhabitants both spatially and temporally. In fact, early Tang cities, especially capitals Chang’an and Luoyang, may be regarded not only as cities but as something more ambiguous, perhaps as a fortified collection

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Chinese public space 83 of semi-autonomous, closely guarded towns or camps separated by wide expanses of policed avenues. In such regulated cities, the movement of its inhabitants was stringently controlled. In the Tang capitals for instance, barring severe corporal punishment, inhabitants were not allowed to leave their walled residential wards before dawn and after dusk, much less hold assemblies in public places. These rules were suspended only three days a year, on the 14th, 15th, and 16th day of the first lunar month – permitting city folks to stroll the streets at night in order to enjoy the New Year Lantern Festival (Heng 1999). The large palace square in front of the imperial and palace cities was more for the purposes of parade and security than for public assembly and recreation.

Markets Despite severe controls, Tang cities such as Chang’an and Luoyang did have their public spaces. The market was perhaps the most important public space during this period. The government’s disdain for commercial activities and merchants alike relegated them to closely supervised enclosed markets. As opposed to the easily accountable land-bound peasantry that provided the foundation from which corvee labor and soldiers could be easily conscripted, the geographically mobile merchant and his trading activities were seen as non-productive. Furthermore, the merchant was also seen as a disturbing factor that could upset the established social order by providing an alternative means of social advancement through wealth. Besides, many uprisings throughout Chinese history were in one way or another linked to the market – hence the necessity of strict control over merchants and their activities (Lu 1996). Tang Chang’an had at least two markets, each occupying an area of about a square kilometer and surrounded by tall thick walls. In these fortified enclosures were thousands of shops and warehouses, served by a network of streets and alleys. Although open for business only from noon till dusk, these markets also served as places of entertainment for the populace (Figure 5.3). Numerous restaurants, wineshops and brothels set up business here offering an entire range of amusements from wine and song to prostitution (Heng 1999). Occasionally, music competitions were also staged. Even public executions too were conducted in these markets and the heads of executed criminals were displayed there as a public deterrence to crime. A temple was found in each of the two markets as well. In the later half of the Tang period, certain of the residential wards too became areas to which inhabitants gravitated for recreation. With a weakened central authority, an expanding economy and the emergence of a prosperous urban class, the strict urban structure was gradually being eroded. In particular residential wards began to appear shops, restaurants and even brothels. These quarters were popular “night spots,” which pulsated with activity until late into the night (Heng 1994).

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Figure 5.3 Relief tile from the Han period showing what might be Chengdu’s market surrounded by thick walls and filled with rows of shops.

This phenomenon became even more prevalent towards the end of the Tang period. This was further aided by the half-century long interregnum after the fall of Tang, which decimated much of the aristocracy and the gentry, brought an end to the “apogee of the power of the great aristocratic clans” and paved the way for a new social order (Wright and Twitchett 1973). Under the more pluralistic Song society, commercial activities, once considered a necessary evil and kept to a minimum, blossomed. The imperial coffers that depended mainly on agricultural taxes now derived a large income from commercial taxes. Shops once confined to fortified market enclosures spilled into the streets. The walls that used to define the avenues gave way to shop fronts. Even officials and gentry, attracted by profit, participated in commercial ventures that were once regarded with contempt. In fact, many of the rental properties that encroached on the public roadways were built and owned by high officials themselves. Once confined to the walled enclosure of the Tang markets, the commercial street was finally liberated in the open city.

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Streets The birth of the commercial street was as important a development for Chinese urban morphology as it was for Chinese public space and activities. With the breakdown of both the ward walls and curfew system, commercial activities could take place almost anywhere and throughout the day and night if necessary. Whereas at the morphological level, Chinese cities transitioned from the status-sensitive walled wards of a highly hierarchicized society to pluralistic street-centered neighborhoods, public space. Hence, public life once confined to walled enclosures during certain times of the day now pervaded the city round the clock (Heng 1994). The open city was significantly more popular than the closed city of the previous era. There was, at one level, a gradual political loosening that slowly rendered the city and its constituents more accessible to its inhabitants. Streets, public squares in front of city gates, temple courtyards, restaurants, taverns, and pleasure precincts alike were scenes of popular entertainment, differing only in intensity and regularity (Figure 5.4). Imperial relatives, scholarofficials, and the common people frequented the same establishments, limited more by their financial ability than by their hereditary social status. The activities of the open city now appear to be organized along streets. The mental map of the city was also similarly structured. The primary structure of the Northern Song capital Kaifeng, for instance, was constituted by three major commercial streets together with four imperial avenues, to which the other secondary and tertiary streets and alleys were attached to form a closely knit road network (Figure 5.5). Unlike the wide, featureless, policed thoroughfares of Chang’an, the major streets and avenues of Kaifeng were very different socially, visually and psychologically. Along a 2.5 km stretch of one of the city’s three major commercial arteries, for instance, were many government installations including the Imperial Army, Medical Relief West Bureau, West Government Hostelry and the Capital City Defensive Arsenal; at least a Zoroastrian temple, two Buddhist monasteries, a Taoist temple, an imperial shrine and numerous other religious buildings, businesses – including eateries, fanciful restaurants such as Clear Wind Loft and Yichenglou, hotels, numerous drugstores – and peddlers of all sorts. Along it was also found the urn market where public executions were conducted, and large popular entertainment precincts, or wazi. Here, too, the houses of the common folks and the vast mansions of the rich and powerful were found. This major commercial artery is only one of seven, lined with establishments of all kinds, including shops, taverns, restaurants, ateliers, entertainment facilities, religious institutions, government edifices and residences, which criss-crossed the city. Not only were the streets of the city made available to the urban dwellers at all times of the day and night, businesses were conducted in them round the clock. Henceforth, the street had become the most important of all public spaces in China.

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Figure 5.4 Detail of Qingming shanghe tu showing a street lined with shops and a drugstore owned by a minor functionary.

Temple fairs, gardens and squares Other than the street, the expanded economy, pervasive commercialization and consumption that accompanied urban living during the Song dynasties and the open-city period gave rise to new forms of public spaces as well. Foremost on the list were monastery/temple courtyards. Although privately owned, these courtyards were entirely opened to the public during certain days of the week or month when temple fairs were held. Temple

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Figure 5.5 Schematic reconstruction of Kaifeng showing streets lined with diverse activities.

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Figure 5.6 Trade and popular entertainment in a contemporary temple fair in Beijing.

courtyards were already, to a certain extent, public spaces in the previous eras, particularly during temple celebrations and fairs. However, it was after the increased commercialization of farm goods and the rapid expansion of population and urban centers that such temple fairs took on the new dimension of important markets where trade and popular entertainment involving the masses took place (Figure 5.6). During temple festivals, stages, if not already present, were set up for popular performances and were open to the general public. Descriptions of the bustling scenes of temple fairs from the open city period abound. Xiangguo monastery, an important Buddhist sanctuary in Song Kaifeng became a popular fair ground five times a month: Inside the courtyard were set out parti-colored canopies [over the] booths and public shops; here were sold mats made of fine bamboo and rush, screen curtains, laundry items, saddles and bits, bows and swords, fruits in season, dried meats and the like . . . The two cloister corridors [sheltered] the temple nuns, selling embroidered collars and girdles, flowers, pearl and jade, head ornaments, washed gold artificial flowers in life-like colors, kerchief caps, (women’s) hats to hold up the hair, ribbons, and the like. Back of the hall and in front of the Zisheng Pavilion was where all books, curios, and pictures were sold, and where the various ex-provincial officials had such things as regional specialties, incense and medicine for sale. The rear corridor was all fortune tellers, conjurors, portrait artists and the like.4

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Chinese public space 89 Table 5.1 Sizes of some temple squares Name

Size (ha)

1 2 3 4 5

0.5 0.26 0.13 0.04 0.06

Nanking-Confucius Temple Square Anhui-Jiuhua Mountain-Huachen Temple Square Tianjin-Tianhou Gong Square Shanghai-City God Temple Square Hefei-City God Temple Square

Source: Figures are taken from Wang, Yan (2002). Design Rationale of Guangchang in Contemporary Chinese Cities, MA(UD) Dissertation, The National University of Singapore.

In short, the monastery courtyard became a vast market where goods of all sorts from around the country were sold. Xiangguo monastery was not unique. In other great monasteries such as Kaibao and Jingde, fairs were also held, music lofts were also erected and music performed. In smaller market towns, miaoshi, or “temple markets,” usually crowded with people, were also commonly held together with theatrical performances (Quan 1934). During major celebrations “they greeted the deity with hundreds of plays” (Heng 1999). Similarly, Bao’en monastery, perhaps the largest Buddhist monastery in Ming period Nanjing, was not only a place of pilgrimage but also an important venue for popular entertainment and where city folks went to catch some fresh air on hot summer nights. The political loosening that was slowly rendering the city more open not only happened at the places usually associated with the populace but also at installations typically out of bounds to the common people. Imperial gardens aside, even the Golden Bright Pool in Song Kaifeng, where the imperial troops practiced naval battles, was opened to the citizens for all kinds of activities 40 days a year (Figure 5.7). On the day of Lichun, which marked the beginning of spring on the tenth day of the first month, commercial activities went on even in the open space in front of the Song capital’s two metropolitan county bureaus. During the first 15 days of the New Year, even the palace square before the Imperial City became a sea of celebration for many days and nights. The palace even provided entertainers to perform for one and all in the elaborately decorated and lit imperial square. On certain days during these celebrations, one could even see the emperor and his officials atop the Gate of Displayed Virtue amidst curtains and canopies, enjoying the performances and granting occasional pardon and amnesty to the sentenced and banished. The public space had, in this case, been used by the emperor as “setting for acts of legitimization, as well as for the public display of justice,” once again reinforcing his position as the ultimate source of power.5

Western influence, reforms and parks Until late imperial times when foreign incursions and their aftermath brought another wave of drastic changes to certain Chinese cities, the structure of

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Figure 5.7 Song period painting of Golden Bright Pond, Liaoning Museum.

cities and of daily life did not change very much, if at all. It was rather a question of intensity. China’s population had grown from about 85 million in 1080 to about 300 million by 1800. The major public spaces as constituted by the streets, temples and their courtyards, open spaces at bridgeheads, in front of city gates and so on, continued to provide the venue for public activities, social, cultural and civic life. These were supplemented by other quasi-public spaces such as merchant associations and especially the ubiquitous tea houses. In his article “Street Culture: Public Space and Urban Commoners in Late Qing Chengdu,” Wang painted the street life, activities and culture during the decades prior to 1911 (Wang 1998). Even the description of the public space that was the street in the inland city of Chengdu at the turn of the twentieth century had strong resemblance with that of its counterpart in Kaifeng or Hangzhou some seven or eight hundred years

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Chinese public space 91 earlier. The difference was that Chengdu, as well as many other major Chinese cities, were in the middle of important transformations. This was precipitated by the harassment and presence of Western forces, the semicolonial state of some Chinese cities and the self realization that reforms were necessary to lift the nation out of the tragic state into which it had sunk during the nineteenth century. The setting up of foreign concessions at treaty ports, the grafting of Western urban orders to indigenous urban centers and the introduction of “western” public amenities in these territories of so-called “dual cities” brought about a new consciousness of public space as an instrument of reform ( Johnson 1995). The return of Chinese students and intellectuals who had studied or spent time in America, Europe and Japan further fanned the enthusiasm for reform. What ensued was not only a reform of almost every aspect of the government (beginning with the collapse of the Qing Dynasty) and economic system, but also of society. The social reformers saw the transformation of the physical urban environment as a means to promote social and cultural change and to shape the “values and habits of the lower classes” to create a new Chinese citizen (Wang 1998). Besides other civil works and new amenities, new public open spaces such as parks and squares appeared in many Chinese cities as part of its modernization agenda. Just as the Chinese park began partly as an instrument of social reform, the newly created civic space “provided an arena for the city people to participate in modern China’s transformation” and “heightened city people’s demand for a political voice in national policy making and demonstrated their strong commitment to the idea of democracy in a sovereign republic” (Shi 1998). In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Victoria Park was opened in the British concession in Tianjin. Other parks also appeared in Tianjin’s French, Italian and Japanese concessions. However, until the late 1920s, admission to these parks in foreign concessions was forbidden to the Chinese (Liu 1997). In Chengdu, a public park called the Smaller City Park (Shaocheng gongyuan) was opened in the late Qing. The land had previously been used as practice grounds for archery and riding by bannermen of Shaocheng but was gradually converted to agricultural use with the bannermen’s decline (Wang 1998). With the addition of pavilions, teahouses, stores and a theater, the park became a fashionable place for city dwellers to spend their leisure time. In 1913, an exhibition hall and a library were built in the park. When the warlord Yang Sen occupied Chengdu from February 1924 for 16 months, he further added a large piece of land to the park for use as public exercise ground. He also added the Popular Education Institute (Tongsu Jiaoyuyuan) to the park (Stapleton 2000). The city folks, however, did not share the reformer’s love of physical exercise but frequented instead the four teahouses set in natural beautiful scenery under the shade of trees to such an extent that a contemporary observed that “the teahouse is crowded, but the playground is empty”(Wang et al. 1999).

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Shanghai, too, had its public gardens. Between 1893 and 1909, Zhangyuan was its biggest and most important public space. The private garden was open to the public for free in 1885. With its Western style landscape, restaurant, teahouse, theater, billiard hall, storytelling ground, playground and exhibition hall, it offered the city dwellers a cosmopolitan style of leisure. Many scholars, journalists, officials and business elites too frequented the park. It quickly became the city’s civic space for assemblies and speeches on topical issues such as the frontier crisis, student strikes and the like. However, Zhangyuan’s attraction declined after 1909 when indoor entertainment centers such as Xinshijie (The New World) and Dashijie (The Big World) appeared and gained popularity, leading finally to its closure in 1918. It was, however, in early-twentieth-century Beijing that the impact of parks “on the political, economic and social life of the city people and on the emergence of a modern urban culture” was perhaps most apparent (Shi 1998). Political activists began to hold mass rallies in the parks: at the Central Park in 1915, more than 300,000 Beijing citizens protested the Twenty-One Demands of the Japanese and the compromise by the Beiyang government; in 1925, an estimate of 700,000 people mourned the death of Sun Yat-Sen (Shi 1998). Beijing’s public parks were also used as important open forums for the dissemination of ideas and the mobilization of the urban populace. Although the zoological garden set up in 1906 and officially opened to the public in 1908 by Empress Dowager Cixi could be considered the first public park in Beijing, it was not until the early republican era that the creation of large public parks took place. These were converted from imperial gardens, ceremonial sites and even the Forbidden City itself. Thanks to Zhu Qiqian, then Minister of the Interior as well as President of the Municipal Council, the Qing’s Altar of Earth and Grain became Central Park and was officially opened on 10 October 1914, the National Day of the Republic (Dong 2000; Shi 1998). Other than converting existing halls in the compound to reading rooms of the Ministry of Education and the sanitation exhibition rooms of the Ministry of the Interior, several new buildings were added to house, among other functions, a restaurant, a teahouse, a gymnasium and a flower greenroom. The park had something for everyone and each found their favorite spots, although the commercial establishments attracted the biggest crowds. Following Central Park, a few other parks were opened: South City Park in 1917, the Altar of Heaven in 1918, Beihai Park (Figure 5.8) and Jingzhao Park in 1925, and later the Summer Palace as well as the residential quarters of the Forbidden City. Jingzhao Park, later renamed Shimin Gongyuan, or Citizen’s Park, had the city’s first athletic field, a public library and a “World Garden” featuring a “world map” constructed with rocks, grass and flowers (Figure 5.9). It was a park dedicated to the education of the ordinary people through public entertainment despite the fact that it never succeeded in attracting many people.

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Figure 5.8 Beijing’s Beihai Park opened to public in 1925.

Figure 5.9 Shimin gongyuan (Citizenship Park) in Beijing.

Danwei society and the decline of public space Concomitant with the ascent of the public park was the decline of the temple as a public space, brought about by a combination of factors. Just like the temple fairs, the Chinese park had become a venue combining cultural, social, recreational and commercial activities and gradually eclipsed the temple fairs in popularity. The appearance of modern departmental stores,

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Western-style theaters and other modern amenities also contributed to the decline of temple fairs although they did not entirely disappear. While the parks and new public amenities attracted the upper and middle classes, the temple fairs were still preferred by the common city folks, much to the consternation of the reform-minded officials and elites. As early as in 1903 the elite showed their disdain for traditional rites and activities when an article in the daily Dagong Bao said that attending temple fairs, or miao hui, was a blind or uncultured activity.6 In 1924, Chen Weixin, a zealous urban reformer who had been trained as a YMCA organizer in Shanghai, listed among the most urgent tasks facing Chengdu’s administrations the need to “turn temple grounds into small public parks throughout the city so children are not obliged to play in the streets.”7 Here, as in the rise of early modern Europe was the “gradual withdrawal of elites from participation in popular culture.”8 However, the decline, if not demise, of the temple fairs was only definitive when drastic changes were brought about by the new socialist regime to life in general in China. The most prevalent public space that was the street, and for that matter, all other forms of public spaces, saw the decline of their roles as public spaces during the socialist period, during which time fundamental changes took place in all areas. The new Chinese socialism invented its own socio-spatial configurations. The work unit, or danwei, became the basic building block of society. The Chinese cities were organized into a “danwei society”. Be it governmental, public service or enterprise, these work units were all state-owned, state-administered, supported by a unitary collective welfare and insurance system and controlled by administrative agencies centered on the Chinese Communist Party committees (Yang 2002). According to Yang, in danwei society, authentic citizen participation could not take place because of the lack of at least three factors: the need of citizen participation (public sphere), organization for citizen participation, and competence and willingness of citizens to participate . . . In the danwei society, Danwei controlled all social resources, making it impossible for communities to develop autonomously . . . In a word, danwei society does not allow the existence of public sphere, independent civil organizations, and authentic citizenship. Not only was the Danwei society and public sphere mutually exclusive, the cityscape started to evolve in a manner that began to reflect this reality. All aspects of an individual’s life – housing, welfare, pension, medical insurance, kindergarten, school and commuting service – were supported and controlled by his or her work unit. For a variety of reasons, this fundamentally self-sufficient entity began to circumscribe itself with walls in the mid-1960s. Although the building of walls was strictly controlled by the municipal government, most work units cited security as the reason for which it was

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Figure 5.10 “Da-Sai et le modèle rural”.

necessary to erect walls. By the 1960s, the danwei was practically synonymous with a walled autonomous compound (Figure 5.10). Each had its refectory, bathhouse and grocer; the larger ones even had schools and clinics, not to mention cinemas and swimming pools, all hidden behind walls. Reminiscent of the Tang ward and city, the danwei was very much like an autonomous walled town; the city became a collection of such walled compounds. With the exception of the central commercial area, the other streets, once lined with shops, were now bounded with walls provided with occasional gates. The Chinese city and its public space had come full circle.

Market reform and new public spaces Since 1978, the new policies of Four Modernizations (of agriculture, industry, technology, and defense) put in place by Deng Xiaoping have led to an economic boom sustained over the last quarter of the previous century. The country opened up, courted foreign investments, encouraged joint ventures, and once again sent its students to Europe, the US and Japan. The dizzying speed at which some coastal cities grew transformed their cityscape literally overnight. Even major inland cities saw their urban fabric change drastically. Accompanying this rapid economic growth are new social aspirations, political visions and practices which once again impacted significantly on the cities’ public spaces. Of particular interest is the recent popularity of the buxing (shangye) jie, or pedestrianized (commercial) street, and the flurry of building extensive public space broadly called guangchang. Every major city has at least a pedestrianized commercial street that is thronged with locals and visitors

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Table 5.2 Size of some civic/citizen guangchang Name

Size (m) (W–E × N–S)

Jinan-Spring City Guangchang Jilin-Century Guangchang Beijing-Tiananmen Guangchang Shanghai-People Guangchang Chongqin-People Guangchang Taiyuan-Wuyi Guangchang Nanchang-Bayi Guangchang Shenyang-Civic Guangchang Chengdu-Tianfu Guangchang Jiangyin-Civic Guangchang

780 200 500 600 300 250 160 185 570 350

× × × × × × × × × ×

230 900 800 300 150 180 285 322 380 120


alike. Suzhou has its Guanqian jie; Shanghai its Nanjing donglu; Wuhan its Jianghan lu; and Beijing its Wang Fujing (Figure 5.11). The list goes on. These are usually converted from already vibrant shopping streets and need comparatively little effort to bring about. More are continuously being added to the list. Increasing levels of disposable income, the profusion of consumer goods of every conceivable kind, the pervasive commercialization and consumption have led once again, as was the case earlier in the Song period, to the rebirth of the popular pedestrian mall. On the other hand, the building of large-scale guangchang or public square takes much more political will, resolve and financial muscle since it is usually created by clearing an extensive area of all buildings. Of course, having squares in Chinese cities is not new. During imperial times, forecourts before temples served as squares for religious, social and economic activities to a certain extent. Usually defined by the temple gate, a screen wall and a pair of pailou, such squares were relatively small, taking up anything from a tenth to half a hectare of land.9 Much larger were the imperial squares before the palace and imperial cities such as that in Tang Chang’an, Song Kaifeng, Jin Zhongdu or finally the Qianbu Lang in front of Beijing’s Forbidden City (Wu 1988). The imperial square in Kaifeng measured some 200 meters by 300 meters or 6 hectares of land. Even in the 1950s, many provincial capital cities had planned and built civic guangchang at their city centers. Notable examples are Beijing’s Tiananmen Square (Figure 5.12) as well as the People’s Squares in Shanghai, Chongqing, Chengdu and Nanchang, which were used mainly for assembly and parade. They did not serve the same functions as their western counterparts. Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, at 40 hectares, was the nation’s showcase to the world, especially during national day parades and ceremonies.

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Figure 5.11 Night scene of Beijing’s Wangfujin pedestrian mall.

Figure 5.12 Tian’an men guangchang in Beijing.

However, the situation has changed, especially in the last decade after the lead taken by Shanghai. In 1994, Shanghai redesigned its People’s Square. This was followed shortly by many other provincial cities and their city center guangchang : People’s Square in Chongqing, Tianfu Square in Chengdu,

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Table 5.3 Civic/citizen guangchangs in provincial capital cities Name

Size (ha)

Beijing-Tiananmen Guangchang Shanghai-People Guangchang Chongqing-People Guangchang Shenyang-Civic Guangchang Jinan-Spring City Guangchang Zhengzhou-Green City Guangchang Taiyuan-Wuyi Guangchang Nanchang-Bayi Guangchang Nanking-Shangxi Road Guangchang Fuzhou-1st May Guangchang Wuhan-Hongshan Guangchang Chengdu-Tianfu Guangchang

44 13 4 6.14 16.7 11 6.3 4.6 9 7~8 10.8 20


Dragon City Square in Shenzhen, Green City Square in Zhengzhou, Spring City Square in Jinan and Bell and Drum Tower Square in Xi’an. Usually located in front of the government center, the city center guangchang plays a significant symbolic role, much like a provincial version of Tian’an men Square in Beijing. Even the formal and typically axial symmetrical disposition suggests its importance. This new city center square is not the human-scale public square that we are accustomed to seeing in the West. In fact the term “square,” or guangchang, is a poor description of the new form of public space that is created in these cities. Combining softscape and hardscape – turf, trees, fountains, monumental sculptures and extensive paved surfaces – these very large open spaces are a hybrid of park and square, sometimes more of one than the other. A comparison with Venice’s iconic St Mark’s Square will provide an idea of the extent of these guangchang. Chongqing’s People’s Square, at 4.5 hectares, is about three times the size of St Mark’s Square, while Shanghai’s People’s Square and Jinan’s Spring City Square both at around 18 hectares are more than 12 times its size and Chengdu’s Tianfu Square, at 21.7 hectares, is almost 14.5 times the size of the Venetian square (Wang 2002). For reasons ranging from urban renewal and instilling a new urban order to creating a symbol of economic health and administrative achievement, the fever of building guangchang also spread rapidly to non-provincial capital cities (Yu 2001). City officials had also hoped that an improved urban image could help the city compete more favorably for foreign investments. One after another, medium and small cities built their city center guangchang. Shangdong’s Dezhou has its Central Square; Liaoning’s Dalian, its Xinhai Square (Figure 5.13); Jiangsu’s Jiangyin, its Civic Square;

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Figure 5.13 Xinhai guangchang in Dalian.

Guangxi’s Fangchenggang, its Peach Bay Square – just to name a few. In most cases however, these squares are smaller in size, concomitant with the hierarchy of the cities concerned (Wang 2002). Detractors of such immense expanse of paved and turfed surfaces criticize the agenda behind such creations, the cost of maintaining the lawn, the environmentally unsound nature of such enterprises, the lack of use of these spaces of superhuman scale with little or no shade and see these as shortcuts to providing the requisite per capita open/green space. Sympathizers, on the other hand, counter that regardless of the impetus for the creation of these large-scale urban open spaces or their sizes, they provide the city with veritable public spaces open round the clock for all city dwellers. In the morning, they are ideal places for fitness exercise and taiji. In the day, they become city showrooms for performances, exhibitions, commercial activities and promotions organized by the government, social organizations and corporations. Kites are often flown here in the evenings; at night they become popular outdoor dance halls. This trend of building guangchang has not abated in any way. New plans of cities include them as a matter of fact and entries for urban design competitions continue to feature them prominently. In Beijing, ten projects of guangchang and green areas commenced in 2001; Shanghai has plans to rebuild its People’s Square; Nanjing will be enlarging its Drum Tower Square from 3.3 to 45.4 hectares; and Wuxi has embarked on the construction of a 60 hectare guangchang next to Tai Lake (Wang 2002).

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100 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Table 5.4 Civic/citizen guangchang in non-provincial capital cities Name Satellite city

Size (ha) Shanghai-Songjiang New City-Civic Guangchang Shengzhen-Shajin town-Civic Guangchang Shengzheng-Longgang District-Dragon City Guangchang

7 6 15

Jiangsu Province

Jiangying-Civic Guangchang

4.2

Jiangxi Province

Nanking-Civic Guangchang Yichang-Wuyi Guangchang

5.3 4.85

Guangdong Province

Huiyang-Civic Guangchang Sihui Xiamen-Egret Continent Guangchang Taizhou-Civic Guangchang

13 23 10 22.84

Guangxi Province

Fang Chenggang City Guangchang

16.8


Table 5.5 Guangchang at district level Name Jinan

Dalian

Nanking

Shengyan

Size (ha) Spring City Guangchang (guangchang at municipal level) Hero Hill Guangchang Li Xia Guangchang Pagoda Tree Umbrage Guangchang Rosy Clouds Guangchang Hong Lou Guangchang

16.7

People Guangchang (guangchang at municipal level) Xinhai Guangchang Zhongshan Guangchang Olympic Guangchang

12.5

Shangxi Road Guangchang (guangchang at municipal level) Confucius Temple Guangchang Chaotian Gong Guangchang Hangzhong Gate Guangchang Drum Tower Guangchang

9

Civic Guangchang Exhibition Hall Guangchang Station Guangchang

6.14 2.9 2.45

5.3 2.1 3.2 2.73 2.24

4.5 2.2 2.3

0.5 1.2 2.2 3.3


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Chinese public space 101 Indeed, with rapid economic development, new socio-cultural outlook, better education and exposure of decision-makers, planning/design professionals and citizens to international practices, the range and variety of public spaces will no doubt expand, and so will the use and practice of these spaces by its citizens be increasingly varied. However, be it in China or other societies, now or in history, the ruling agencies have always attempted to manage the creation of public spaces and to regulate their use (Boski 2002; Ooi 2003). Whether it is the outright display of symbols of government and the presence of police officers in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square or the more subtle surveillance by ubiquitous close circuit cameras in London, New York or Washington,10 the object is to dominate the space and regulate behavior within it (Kostof 1992). In the end, the presence and control of significant urban public space in China has invariably been linked to the will of the prevailing regime. The potential of such a space to be subverted by certain groups and to be charged with meanings other than those intended or tolerated made it the object of careful surveillance throughout Chinese history and the lessons of Tiananmen Square will not be easily forgotten.11

Notes 1 Meng Yuanlao, Dongjing menghua lu [Record of a Dream of Splendor in the Eastern Capital], preface dated 1147, henceforth abbreviated as DJMHL (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1982, p. 15). In this edition, DJMHL is bound with four other works henceforth abbreviated as W4. This translation is based largely on that of the passage found in Wilt Idema and Stephen West’s, Chinese Theater 1100–1450: A Source Book (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1982, pp. 14–5). The Taoist temple – Temple of Precious Scriptures – was built in 1115 by Emperor Huizong who was a devout Taoist. The meaning of helou is obscure. 2 The overlap in dates for the “walled city” and “open city” periods are not explained in the article. If this is a suggestion that both kinds of cities existed at the same time from 618 to 906, the overlap should be much smaller, at most during the late Tang period; in any case, after the 750s. Furthermore, “closed city” is a more appropriate term than “walled city” as even during the “open city” period, cities were still walled. In this article, I hence used the term “closed city,” which is more suggestive of administrative system than the physical attributes of walls (see Heng 1999). 3 During the middle of the Tang period 742–56, there were 1573 such counties with populations ranging from a few thousand to even 50,000 or more. During the same period, there were 331 prefectural seats. 4 See Deng Zhicheng, Dongjing menghualu zhu [Record of a Dream of Splendor in the Eastern Capital Annotated] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1959, p. 67). The translation is rendered by Soper in “Hsiang-kuo-ssu, an Imperial Temple of Northern Sung” in Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 68, no. 1 ( Jan–Mar 1948) p. 26, with slight modifications here. See also Xu Yinong, 2000, in which he discussed the courtyard of renowned Taoist temple Xuanmiao Guan as an urban public space. 5 See Spiro Kostof, The City Assembled: The Elements of Urban Form Through History, London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1992, p. 124, in which he discusses the life and control of the public in public places.

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102 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia 6 Dagong Bao, 1903/04/02. 7 Guomin Gongbao, April 2–10, 1924. 8 J.W. Konvitz, Urban Millennium, Carbondale, 1985, p. 30 quoted in Kostof, 1992, p. 125. 9 Pailou is a ceremonial/commemorative gateway. Tianjin’s Tianhua Temple Square took up about 0.13 ha, Anhui’s Jiuhuashan Huachen Temple Square about 0.26 ha and Nanjing’s Confucius Temple Square around 0.5 ha (See Wang Yan 2002). 10 There are more than one million close circuit TV cameras in operation in London, one for every 60 citizens with the average Londoner caught on film about 300 times a day. Times Square in New York has as many as 200 surveillance cameras “observing every move you make” See http://www.cbsnews.com/ stories/2002/04/19/sunday/main506739.shtml 11 What began as a mild parade in April 1989 developed through the month of May into a massive rally for democracy by students gathered in Tiananmen Square. They were supported by Beijing residents, workers and farmers, thus further threatening China’s power structure. A bloody suppression took place on June 4 with the help of tanks and armored vehicles, ending the students’ occupation of the foremost public space in China and reclaiming for the establishment an important symbol of the state.

References Boski, J. (2002) “Responses by State Actors to Insurgent Civic Spaces since the WTO Meetings at Seattle”, International Development Review, 24(4): 363–82. Dong, M.Y. (2000) “Defining Beiping – Urban Reconstruction and National Identity, 1928–1936”, in J.W. Esherick (ed.) Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Dong, Y. (1999) “Juggling Bits: Tianqiao as Republican Beijing’s Recycling Center”, Modern China, 25(3): 303–42. Gernet, J. (1962) Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gernet, J. (1982) A History of Chinese Civilization, trans. by J.R. Foster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. He, Y.J. (1996) The Planning History of Ancient Chinese Cities, Beijing: Zhongguo Jianzhu Gongye Chubanshe, [Shanghai Construction Press]. Heng, C.K. (1994) “Kaifeng and Yangzhou: the Birth of the Commercial Street”, in Z. Çelik, D. Favro and R. Ingersoll, Streets: Critical Perspectives on Public Space, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Heng, C.K. (1996) “A Contest of Wills in the T’ang Market”, Journal of Southeast Asian Architecture, 1: 92–104. Heng, C.K. (1999) Cities of Aristocrats and Bureaucrats: The Development of Medieval Chinese Cityscapes, Singapore: Singapore University Press. Johnson, L.C. (1995) Shanghai: from Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074–1858, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kostof, S. (1992) The City Assembled: The Elements of Urban Form Through History, London: Thames and Hudson. Li, D.H. (2001) Urban Planning Theory, Shanghai Jianzhu Gongye Chubanshe, [Shanghai Construction Press]. Liu, H.Y. (1997) “Foreign Concessions and the Transformation of Tianjin’s Urban Space”, Chengshi Yanjiushi [Urban History Research], 13–14: 109–23.

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Chinese public space 103 Lu, W. (1996) Shijing wenhua [The Culture of Markets], Shenyang: Liaoning Educational Press. Peterson, C.A. (1973) “Hsien-Tsung and the Provinces”, in A. Wright and D. Twitchett (eds.) Perspectives on the T’ang, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Quan, H.S. (1934) “Zhongguo miaoshi zhishi de kaocha” [Study of the History of Temple Markets], in Sihuo, 1(2): 28–33. Shi, M.Z. (1998) “From Imperial Gardens to Public Parks: the Transformation of Urban Space in Early 20th Century Beijing”, Modern China, 24(3): 219–54. Stapleton, K. (2000) “Yang Sen in Chengdu: Urban Planning in the Interior”, in J.W. Esherick (ed.) Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Twitchett, D. (1956) “Monastic Estates in T’ang China”, Asia Major, 5(2): 123–46. Twitchett, D. (1961) Land Tenure and the Social Order in T’ang and Sung China, London: School of Oriental and African Studies. Twitchett, D. (1966) “Chinese Social History from the 7th to the 10th Century: the Tunhuang Documents and their Implications”, Past and Present, 35: 28–53. Wang, D. (1998) “Street Culture: Public Space and Urban Commoners in LateQing Chengdu”, Modern China, 24(1): 34–72. —— (1999) Street Culture: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics in Chengdu, 1875–1928, Thesis (Ph.D.), Johns Hopkins University. Wang, K., Xia, J. and Yang, X.H. (1999) City Square Design, Nanjing: Southeast University Press. Wang, Y. (2002) Design Rationale of Guangchang in Contemporary Chinese Cities, MA(UD) Dissertation, The National University of Singapore. Wright, A. and Twitchett, D. (1973) Perspectives on the Tang, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wu, J. (1993) “The Historical Development of Chinese Urban Morphology”, Planning Perspective, 8: 20–52. Wu, L.Y. (1988) Selected Essays on Urban Planning and Design, Beijing: Yanshan Press. Xu, Y.N. (2000) The Chinese City in Space and Time, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Yan, Z., Zhang, J.M. and Cui, D.X. (2001) “Control on the Size and Land Use Structure of Guangchang”, Chengshi Guihua Huikan [Collected Papers on Urban Planning], 134: 25–9, April 2001. Yang, K.F. (2002) “From ‘Danwei’ Society to New Community Building: Opportunities and Challenges for Citizen Participation in Chinese Cities”, Chinese Public Administration Review, 1(1): 65–82. Yu, K.J. (2001) “Be Cautious to the ‘City Beautiful Movement’ in Contemporary Chinese Cities”, Zhongguo Jianshe Bao [China Construction Newspaper], 16 April 2001. Zhang, J. and Huo, X.W. (2002) “Human Scale in the Planning and Design of Ancient Beijing”, World Architecture, 2: 66–71.

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Mosques as a type of civic space in turbulent times A case study of globalizing Kuala Lumpur1 Morshidi Sirat and Atikullah Hj. Abdullah

In this global era, and within the context of the “centrality of cities” (Sassen 1994), one would expect that modern cities and their civic spaces would be the seedbed for the development of a civil society, which would in the medium to longer term contribute to the goals and objectives of sustainable communities. Historically, religious institutions, in particular mosques, have played an important role in societal development. Arguably, societal development has led to the emergence of some rudimentary form of a “civil society” within the context of the Islamic nation entity. It is important to note that, the idea of a progressive civil society that is ethnically and culturally integrated has already been embedded in an Islamic ethical framework, which is increasingly marginalized for political expediency, among other reasons (see Derichs 2001: 6). In the contemporary context, however, Friedmann (1998 cited in Douglass 2003: 3) notes that “most of the daily engagement through associations are indicative of civil society for itself, i.e. people engaging with each other for social, cultural, religious or other voluntary association away from state or corporate economy institutions.” It can be said, therefore, civil society normally carries out activities within the confinement of civic spaces. In the present context, “civic spaces” are defined as “socially inclusive spaces in which people of different origins and walks of life can mingle without overt control by government, commercial or other private interests, or de facto dominance by one group over another” (Douglass 2003; Douglass, Ho and Ooi 2002). While it is acknowledged that “not all civil society spaces are civic spaces,” based on the abovementioned definition, this chapter will proceed to hypothesize that, in the specific case of the city of Kuala Lumpur, mosques are indeed important civic spaces for its citizens. Moving on from the above hypothesis, this chapter is an attempt to explicate to what extent mosques are civic spaces in the context of the development of a civil society in the increasingly globalized city of Kuala Lumpur. In this connection, this chapter will seek to answer several questions pertaining to the above objective. First, is it appropriate to consider mosques as civic spaces in the context of current thought and conceptualization on civic spaces and city development? Second, in terms of the historical development of mosques, what

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are the specificities or singularities that justify their position as civic spaces in the context of city development? Third, to what extent are the establishment of mosques as civic spaces and subsequent role inextricably related to the changing socio-economic and political characteristics of city inhabitants? Fourth, what is the future of mosques as civic spaces in Malaysia’s major cities?

Civil society and civic space Hefney (1998) has noted the importance of pluralism and democracy in the emergence of civil society in his literature. Yamamoto (1995), for instance, has alluded to the characteristics of a civil society in the Asia Pacific community. In the field of urban planning, the emergence of civil society in cities would enable cities to function better as a place to live in and exist (see Douglass and Friedmann 1998). Echoing the views of other writers on civil society, Hefney considers this “civic space,” or “associational sphere,” as “the place where citizens learn habits of free assembly, dialogue, and social initiatives.” Admittedly, in the above context, the concept of civil society “evokes images of freedom to speak and associate without fear.” More importantly, the concept “conjures up images of a public life in which the words and actions of ordinary citizens would be duly acknowledged by the state.” Hefney concludes, “if managed properly, civil society can also help to bring about the delicate balance of private interests and public concern vital for a vibrant democracy.” It is argued, therefore that civic spaces are necessary for the proper functioning of the community within the context of a burgeoning civil society as noted above (see Goodsell 1988; Kearne 1998; Hedman 2001). Project for Public Spaces (2002) notes that “civic spaces are an extension of the community; when they work well, they serve as a stage for our public lives.” Indeed, it is conceived that these spaces would act as settings where celebrations are held, where exchanges both social and economic take place, where friends run into each other, and where cultures mix. Following the same vein of thought from Project for Public Spaces (2002), and in the context of city development, civic spaces could be regarded as anchors for downtowns and communities, acting as focal points for definition and foundations for healthy growth. Civic spaces are therefore important assets, providing opportunity for people to relax and enjoy themselves, giving a new meaning to greater community livability. In other words, these spaces are important to communities, which ultimately make up cities. From the above discussion, there are several viewpoints as far as civil society and civic space are concerned. In the context of this chapter, there are “a number of defining characteristics of civic spaces” (Douglass 2003: 4) and it is therefore important at the outset to define civil society and civic spaces. Following Douglass (2003), “civil society exists mostly for

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106 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia itself ” with people engaging with each other for social, cultural, religious or other voluntary association in “spaces away from overt involvement in the public sphere, state or economic control.” Based on the above definition, it appears that religious institutions in general may not be accepted as civic spaces. However, our assertion is that, on closer examination, there are specific cases and instances whereby religious institutions (such as mosques) could be considered as civic spaces, for they exhibit some of the defining characteristics of such spaces as outlined by Douglass (2003).

Civic space, religious institutions and the city: setting the context In the context of civil society – civic spaces – city development nexus noted above, it is argued here that the role of religious institutions must be seen in the right perspective. Many of the arguments for considering religious institutions as important civic spaces in cities are provided by Ramsay (2000) and, to some extent, the many writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, which formed the thrust of this chapter. According to Ramsay, religious institutions are the most vital and enduring of all institutions engaged in civic activities and community organization. Arguably, in many cities of the western world, and particularly in the American context, faith-based community organizing and development provide contemporary examples of faith-inspired political action in cities. Alexis de Tocqueville notes that, in the United States of America “religions established a common base of morality, which prevented majoritarian rule from descending into tyranny and served as an independent voice of authority interposed between the individual and the state.” More recently, the depth of this argument has been furthered by western intellectuals and scholars, for whom the preservation of freedom depends on the strongly-felt presence of an autonomous religious institution that will not allow itself to be used or co-opted for political purposes (Ramsay 2000). However, the above observations, with respect to the role of religious institutions in providing civic spaces for activities in the city need an empirical boost for basic information about faith-based activities in cities is grossly lacking, making it difficult to perceive the sector or gauge its scope or role accurately in city development (Ramsay 2000). Ramsay’s observation is particularly true of the role of mosques in Malaysia, where conjectures have overtaken reality. Once again, Ramsay (2000) provides most of the logical underpinning and reasoning for considering religious institutions as important civic spaces in cities. Ramsay argues for a guiding paradigm, which can be briefly interpreted as follows: “Human life before God is not the life of isolated, utilitarian individualists but life in community.” Arguably, Ramsay’s city development process within the context of a religious perspective is

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clearly critical of the secular culture’s “issue-related approach to urban life in which particular problems are typically related to particular groups or neighborhoods and may not be viewed as problems of the city as such.” Ramsay considers single-issue agendas, which is inherent in issue-related approach, as harmful to city development effort. This is so because issues such as violence, urban economics, unemployment, and drug addiction are interrelated and quick fixes are inappropriate. In this situation, a faithful presence and long-term commitments are needed, which, in today’s development vocabulary, is referred to as “sustainable approach.” In the context of Western society, the church usually “improvises metropolitan and ecumenical forms, directly opposing the centrifugal forces associated with economic restructuring” (Ramsay 2000). Cisneros (1996) has provided similar arguments regarding the important role of religious institutions in community building and development at the level of the city. Shipps (not dated) has alluded to the idea that chapels, churches, synagogues, mosques and temples are religion’s most visible physical manifestations of their influence in the city. Admittedly, as Shipps (not dated) noted, the amount and kind of strength these institutions have also decides how much real (or potential) political, economic, and cultural influence is (or may be) wielded by both secular and clerical leaders, of the various religious communities in a city. The preceding discussion has presented in general terms how one could conceptualize religious institutions as important civic spaces in the context of city development. The following discussion will examine in detail the arguments for considering mosques as a critical element in societal development, acting as a type of civic space for organizing community activities at the level of the city. More importantly, Derichs (2001: 4) observes that “about the only place where a fruitful, pluralist political debate can take place are the mosques . . . For those who want to discuss and want to be informed but do not have access to non-mainstream media, let alone the Internet, the mosque is the place to go.”

Mosques – a type of civic space? Historically, the mosque was never meant to be simply a place of worship (for prayers could be performed anywhere) with little or no participation by Muslims (or indeed non Muslims) in it beyond that (Abdul Malik Mujahid 2003; Talha 2001, Al-Faruki and Al-Faruki 1996). In view of its multifunctions and roles, historically, the architectural design of mosques would normally include a main prayer hall and a courtyard. While the prayer hall was meant for the conduct of prayers among the believers, the courtyard that adjoins the mosque was clearly a communal civic space, where civic activities were normally conducted and attended by all sectors of the local community. There is no overt restriction to other sectors of the population in terms of participation.

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108 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Traditionally, mosques were the venues of political debates (where the public and the rulers were of equal standing and there were opportunities to express views freely), of autonomous learning institutions, and of institutions that collect and distribute donations (Darsh 1996). Debates and other community-wide activities were normally inclusive in nature and conducted in the courtyards. Thus, from a historical perspective, mosques played a very important role in community organization and development – it was an important institution that united local communities through its programs and activities. In other words, this religious institution was the locus of the community. Comparing the present situation with that of the past, Abdul Malik Mujahid (2003) notes that there was a dynamism and activity that is absent from many of the mosques of the Muslim world today. Realizing the importance of this institution in community organizing and development, the first International Islamic Conference held in Mecca in 1975 was of the opinion that steps must be taken to revive the multifunctional role mosques used to play. This conference recommended that, among other things, mosques must be the center of social life. In spatial planning terms, it meant that mosques should be built in the heart of the city or the community. Apart from being a prayer center, it is also recommended that mosques should be planned with a view to serving the surrounding community. As such, mosques located within a community should have a library, reading room, lecture hall, social function hall, a playing ground, a small clinic for emergency treatment, accommodation facilities for guests and so on. Many emergent Muslim countries have welcomed these recommendations and grand mosques were built in the heart of their modern cities and residential suburbs. For a while mosques functioned not only as prayer centers but were planned with ample space for gatherings and meetings. Muslims and non-Muslims congregated to discuss and debate issues of concern within the surroundings of mosques (or courtyards), giving hope to the rise of civil society in many emergent Muslim societies. However, mosque architecture and design in the Muslim world today have made the spaces thus created more of an exclusive rather than an inclusive civic space, thus deviating from the very spirit of mosque architecture. In Malaysia, for instance, there are five main factors which govern the architectural styles of mosques, namely: ethnic culture, climatic conditions, colonialism, technology utilization and the political environment (Ghafar 1999: 6). It is interesting to note that the political environment is also regarded as an important influencing factor. Evidently, in times of turbulent political environment, spaces within new mosques are designed in such a way as to prevent these spaces from being taken over by large gatherings. It is noteworthy that, in the context of the emergence of a “civil society,” governmental scrutiny and surveillance of mosques was first recorded during the Abbasid era, whereby the all encompassing function of the mosque was severely curtailed. Restrictions were imposed upon the office of the imam, depriving him of community leadership and reducing his

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influence to just that of a man that led in prayer. Since then, we have seen the gradual erosion of the influence of mosques but the enduring existence of mosques as civic spaces, where issues pertaining to politics and socioeconomy are still being debated. From the above, it is important to realize that the role and functions of mosques have changed significantly since the Abbasid era. In modern times, a majority of mosques have been designed without a courtyard; as such, it can be assumed that without such an element, a mosque could not possibly provide communal civic space for the local community. It follows that the absence of such an important element in mosque design plus other controls and restrictions made it almost impossible for it to function as an inclusive space (Douglass 2003). Generally, therefore, mosques could not be regarded as a type of civic space, according to the defining characteristics noted earlier on in this chapter. However, interestingly a cursory glance at the situation in Malaysia, in particular the city of Kuala Lumpur, indicates that even in the absence of a formal courtyard, there are indications of the existence of a type of “civic space” in religious institutions such as mosques. Furthermore, lately it was felt that modern mosques should be designed to enable its function as civic spaces (Mohamad Tajuddin 1998). This chapter will proceed to look at this space to ascertain its nature and subsequently determine whether it qualifies as a type of civic space, according to our conceptualization.

Civil society and civic space in Malaysia: an overview In view of the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, during his term as Deputy Prime Minister, introduced a model of civil society (masyarakat madani), which was fully devoted to the acceptance of the diversity of religious traditions (Derichs 2001: 6). Derichs further elaborates that: The core arguments of Anwar’s vision of the masyarakat madani are embedded in a secularist and democratic framework that will provide for a responsible and accountable civil society – a civil society that is also responsive to the state’s agenda. (Derichs 2001:6) More recently, however, “civil society” was conceived and articulated in the context of national development aspirations. It is argued that the growth of a civil society is the social and political basis for attaining Malaysia’s goal of becoming a “developed country” by the year 2020 (Abdullah et al. 1996: 6). Dr Mahathir (1991) has outlined nine challenges that need to be met if Malaysia were to become a “developed country” by the year 2020, and according to Abdullah et al. (1996: 6) seven of these pertain to the development of a civil society.2 The seven challenges that could underpin such a society are as follows:

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110 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia • • • • • • •

National integration and the development of a “Bangsa Malaysia,” or “Malaysian nation” Creating a psychologically liberated and secure Malaysian society Developing a mature and democratic society based on communitarian democracy Establishing a matured, liberal and tolerant society Establishing a caring society and caring culture Ensuring an economically just society Establishing a moral and ethical society

Until now, scant attention has been paid to the challenges noted above, which relate to the creation of a civil society in Malaysia (Abdullah et al. 1996: 6) and the role of civic spaces through which the above could be realized. While it would be a great challenge to translate all of the above seven ingredients for a civil society in this turbulent period it would be a great achievement indeed if Malaysian cities such as Kuala Lumpur (and their civic spaces) emerged as the seedbed for the development of a civil society. In the context of the civil society movement in Malaysia, civic space would be interpreted as “a setting in which people can meet for public talk and actively contribute to solving public problems.” In Malaysia, the city of Kuala Lumpur is a good candidate to explore the theme of “civic spaces in a globalizing city” within the context of a turbulent period and the increasing multi-ethnic nature of its population.

Mosques in Kuala Lumpur as civic space: methodological aspects The research reported in this chapter has tackled the abovementioned questions through empirical investigation of four sub-areas within the city of Kuala Lumpur – the city center (mixed uses for commercial, business and residential), high-income residential suburb, middle-income housing area, and low-income high-rise flats. The identification and delimitations of these sub-areas as either high income or low income were made based on proxy data and information such as housing types and cost. The book, Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 2020 – A World Class City, provided good indications of housing types and cost in the city, which could be translated as indicators of income levels. It is not possible to delimitate areas within the city or any other city in Malaysia based on income data, for that matter, as this data is not available. The primary foci are the local communities (Muslims and nonMuslims), the mosques’ committees and key officers of relevant regulatory agencies. Data was gathered through loosely structured in-depth interviews with key informants among mosques’ officials and key officers of government departments such as the Department of Islamic Development of the Prime Minister’s Department. Other important sources of data were

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newspaper articles and interviews with civil societies in Kuala Lumpur. Qualitative data analysis was subsequently undertaken to address the pertinent questions of the civic space–city development theme, primarily to ascertain whether mosques in Kuala Lumpur could be considered as a type of civic space. At the outset, it is important to contextualize the discussion with respondents around developmental issues and from which we need to determine whether discussions and debates that were conducted within the mosque compound (but outside the main prayer hall) were “exclusive” or “inclusive” in nature. Based on their responses we could then determine to what extent mosques under investigation meet our defining characteristics of what a civic space is.

Spatial Distribution of Mosques in Kuala Lumpur At the end of 2002 there were no less than 43 mosques in Kuala Lumpur and by 2006, that is, the end of the Eight Malaysia Plan period, there would be 62 mosques in the city. Although there are mosques in all the strategic zones in Kuala Lumpur as defined by the Kuala Lumpur plan, these are not evenly distributed according to population distribution (City Hall of Kuala Lumpur 2005). For instance, middle- to high-income zones such as Wangsa Maju-Maluri, City Center and Bukit Jalil-Seputeh have the highest number of mosques. Sentul-Menjalara zone, which is a high-income zone with substantial low-income households, comes second; followed by Bandar Tun Razak-Sg. Besi, which is mainly a low- to middle-income area with substantial high-income households, comes third; Damansara-Penchala, which is a high-income zone, comes last (see Figure 6.1).

Mosques in Kuala Lumpur – a type of civic space? Based on the evidence collected from both primary and secondary sources it appears that the majority of mosques under investigation do not qualify to be considered as civic spaces, according to our definition. Like many other religious institutions, they form “exclusive spaces,” or rather, “sacred spaces.” Furthermore, there is limited opportunity to engage in political discourse or action in these spaces. Even if there are opportunities for such engagement, these would normally be conducted among specific groups only; the exception being two important mosques located in the city center: the National Mosque (Figure 6.2) with ample spaces (both planned and unplanned) for informal discussion and debate within its compound, and the Kampung Baru Mosque at the fringe of the business and entertainment enclave of Kuala Lumpur (known popularly as the Golden Triangle Area). Based on information provided by interviewees, the “civic space” for the purpose of political discourse and debate in the Kampung Baru Mosque normally spills over to the footpath and adjacent hawker stalls (gerai ) (Figure 6.3).

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Figure 6.1 Spatial distribution of mosques in Kuala Lumpur.

The National Mosque was built as a symbol of unity, and ethnic and religious tolerance in Malaysia (Malaysia, not dated); the Kampung Baru Mosque, on the other hand, was a typical mosque in a primarily Malay “urban village.” While the National Mosque was consciously built with the aim of

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Figure 6.2 The National Mosque: the most preferred site for popular protests and demonstration in Kuala Lumpur.

Figure 6.3 The Kampung Baru Mosque: discussions and debates normally spill over to nearby food stalls.

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114 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia “bridging” the various ethnic and religious communities (and as a tourist attraction), the latter was not. The Kampung Baru Mosque, however, is a good example of how a mosque in a predominantly Malay-Muslim community was generally seen as an arena to publicize issues pertaining to other non-Muslim communities too (and these are mainly political in nature). The “bridging” role of this mosque comes naturally then. In fact, a common thread between these two mosques is the fact that those interviewed emphasized the “bridging” role of their respective mosques cutting across socio-economic divides. It is primarily because of this, that protestors and demonstrators in the city tend to choose the National Mosque and the Kampung Baru Mosque as their centers of political action. To protestors and demonstrators, these spaces symbolized solidarity and multi-ethnic co-operation; they would normally command maximum coverage from the print and electronic media. In the preceding discussion, the importance of these two civic spaces will become evident through a discussion on political protests and demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur in the late 1970s and late 1990s. It also demonstrates the difficulty of late of separating political spaces from civic spaces in the city of Kuala Lumpur.

Turbulent times in Kuala Lumpur In September 1998, the multi-ethnic but Malay-Muslim dominated Reformasi (reformation) movement was unleashed after the deputy prime minister’s ouster (Asia Times Online Co. Ltd. 2002). It joined forces with civil society groups in calling for a broad range of democratic reforms (Asia Times Online Co. Ltd. 2002). The Reformasi movement and other civil society groups held assemblies and demonstrations at various strategic places in Kuala Lumpur, particularly at the National Mosque compound. In October 1998, the Kampung Baru Mosque was chosen as the site for several multi-ethnic demonstrations led by the reformation movement. These demonstrations were multi-ethnic and multi-religious in nature, which prompted the Malaysian Islamic Development Department’s directorgeneral to issue a statement in the New Straits Times that “it was wrong for a non-Muslim to make speeches at a mosque as this would cause misunderstanding” (21 September 1999). Another article in the same paper reported that Muslim religious leaders “warned the people not to use the mosque for political purposes and said that the presence of non-Muslims during a demonstration at the National Mosque had affected the sanctity of the place of worship” (21 September 1999). On 12 August 2000 the New Straits Times reported that 300 people, believed to be supporters of Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, held an illegal gathering at the compound of the National Mosque to condemn the High Court’s guilty verdict in the former deputy prime minister’s sodomy case. The above-mentioned events were not the first time mosque compounds were transformed into some semblance of “insurgent spaces” in the city of

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Kuala Lumpur. Demonstrations held by university students at the National Mosque compound in the mid-1970s were recorded as important events in the radical student movement in Malaysia. However, since 1998, the government has gravely regarded the fact that civil society groups were using mosques and its compounds as spaces for voicing anti-government or anti-establishment speeches. Interestingly, civic conversation and debates in mosques were no longer tied to the immediate community or associated with a particular group only. Evidently, mosques in Kuala Lumpur, in particular those located in the lower to middle-income residential areas, drew congregants from outside of the neighborhood. Formal and informal meetings or gatherings were periodically held within the compounds of these mosques and such activities have attracted the government’s monitoring and surveillance machinery (ABC 2002). Incidents such as these have led Camilleri (2000: 400) to note that state controls had left civil society less room for maneuvering. The government has introduced various acts and measures that were “expressively designed to limit the space for communication within and among civil society organizations and the government’s approach was to limit consultative processes to NGOs which espoused acceptable attitudes and policies” (Camilleri 2000: 400). In response to continuous threats from institutions such as mosques “the government removed a number of imams from state mosques and attempted to co-opt others” who are more sympathetic to the government’s position (Camilleri 2000: 402). While the government had already put in place legislation to govern mosque administration before the late 1990s, there was little or no attempt made to enforce this legislation at the local level. In the late 1990s and particularly between 2000 and 2003, however, there was a dramatic shift in the government’s approach and this could be attributed to the Anwar Ibrahim case, and other events that have threatened internal political instability. Seen within the wider context of a much more turbulent time, the traditional role of mosques as civic spaces has indeed eroded to a great extent, particularly in cities such as Kuala Lumpur. At this juncture, it has to be noted that since Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi took office as the fifth Prime Minister of Malaysia on 31 October 2003, reports of government surveillance of mosques and imams were infrequent. The open and transparent style of his current leadership may have contributed to the present situation. However, one may also assume that the previous government under Dr Mahathir Mohamad has successfully replaced anti-establishment and pro-opposition imams with non-partisan individuals such that most mosques are now being administered like government departments, creating fewer problems for the current leadership.

Crackdown on Mosques as civic spaces: some observations in Kuala Lumpur Traditionally, mosques were excellent sites for open and informal discussions on matters relating to community development, inevitably including

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116 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia discussions and debates on government policy. This being so, arguably mosques are important civic spaces within the community. However, the likelihood of other mosques in the city being considered as civic spaces, as conceptualized by Douglass (2003) is very remote indeed. This is so, for a majority of mosques in Kuala Lumpur are severely restricted in terms of administration and design to effectively function as a type of inclusive civic space. Since the late 1950s, state enactments were introduced that laid out the terms and conditions for the appointments of mosque committee members and other matters pertaining to mosque administration.3 While every mosque has its elected official to oversee the daily operation of this institution, other members of the community were not normally prevented from using mosques as venues for conducting their civic activities. However, since 1987, the appointment of mosque officials was controlled by the state religious department, making it difficult for community members to engage in a meaningful associational life. Since the late 1990s, the administrative structure and procedural structure of mosques in Kuala Lumpur resemble that of any government department in the territory. Thus, mosques and their compounds have been transformed as spaces where the community could conduct civic activities and hold gatherings within the guidelines as laid out by the government. Open debates and discourses pertaining to government policy are strictly prohibited. Such prohibitions have gradually reduced civic activities and gatherings in mosques.4 Arguably, mosque congregants from outside the local community were greatly reduced. However, this does not mean that such activities have ceased – they merely moved to other locations outside the mosques and outside government surveillance. With respect to civic activities and community organization, mosques located in the high- and middle-income residential areas and under the management of committees comprising of people from the corporate sector and other professionals, continue to be active venues for civic activities. Evidently, these mosques continue to function as important “civic spaces” for the community and surprisingly surveillance activities are minimal and less visible. On the surface, there is a sense of openness to interfaith camaraderie, particularly in the high-income residential areas, which occasionally are translated into a common agenda and civic responsibility for the areas concerned. However, apparently the production and reproduction of practices of social cooperation, and problem solving according to Putnam (1993), was largely selective and exclusive in character. Nonetheless, mosques’ congregants in these areas are drawn from the local community and they talk as residents of the neighborhood. Arguably, the effectiveness of these groups as civic organizations (and using mosques as spaces for civic activities) lies in their ability to control both local and national political resources, their capability to cooperate, coordinate and form coalitions with other civic associations in dealing with the state. Evidently,

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the establishment and subsequent role of mosques as a type of civic space (albeit in a very restricted manner) is inextricably related to the socioeconomic and political characteristics of city inhabitants. It is important to note that mosques could become socially inclusive spaces for the local community in the future if these positive elements are sustained in the medium to longer terms.

Discussion and conclusion Camilleri (2000) observes that the use of mosques as a platform for criticism of government policy was very common in the immediate past. Interestingly, though, this situation continues in the present day. For this reason, even though great mosques are being built in Malaysian cities, in particular Kuala Lumpur, these institutions are under great stress. In view of this, mosques cannot perform their multi-functional roles satisfactorily. While mosques were important spaces for community organizing activities in cities of the past, their role in this sphere in these turbulent times has severely been curtailed. However, it appears that such curtailment varies from mosque to mosque and according to location. While the same enactments or legislation pertaining to community organizing activities and associational life are applicable to all mosques, in Kuala Lumpur, mosques located in the higher-income residential areas are subject to lesser scrutiny and surveillance. While there is, at present, overt control of these important institutions by the government, it is important to note that, generally, there is nothing subversive in the nature of issues that are generally discussed in mosques in the high-income residential areas. Noraini (2001) has highlighted the fact that historically, Islamic civilizations have developed their own conceptions or understanding of religious tolerance, civility and civil society, which are obviously very different from the West. One can deduce that, under the independence of Muslim communities (umma) from the state, under the spiritual leadership of the ulema, the rule of law to protect personal life and property, religious and ethnic pluralism, consultative and consensus methods of decision-making are developed under strict Islamic tenets. These tenets are alien to the West’s conceptual and philosophical construction of what is civil society. In this sense, the Muslim umma has developed its brand of civil society. Admittedly, while it is not possible to evoke the grandeur past of Islamic civilization and civil society, there is always a future for mosques (as civic spaces) in modern and globalizing cities in Malaysia, as long as they operate within the guidelines set by the government. In other words, for mosques to function as important civic spaces in cities, this institution must show less leaning towards oppositional politics. Looking towards the future, the provision of civic spaces such as these should meet the needs of multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies for vibrant associational life and shared civic culture. This is so because there is no legislation that prohibits non-Muslims to partake in civic activities

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118 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia in the compound of a mosque. Arguably, restrictions and barriers are imaginary rather than real. In most instances, these are self-imposed. This chapter began with an assertion that in this global era, and within the context of the “centrality of cities,” one would expect that modern cities (and their civic spaces) would be the seedbed for the development of a civil society. This has indeed been reflected in the context of many cities in the developed world. In the context of the Muslim world, while historically mosques have played important roles in societal development, these roles have not automatically qualified them as important civic spaces for the citizens. Arguably, it is inappropriate to consider all mosques in Kuala Lumpur as civic spaces in the context of current thinking. Admittedly, mosques generally are indeed exclusive spaces for they are not open to a broad spectrum of civil society, with every person having the right of access and the right to initiate contact with each other. The case of the National Mosque and the Kampung Baru Mosque are unique in the sense that they have fulfilled the very definition of civic spaces, that is: civic spaces are “inclusive spaces.” Interestingly, of late, it appears that mosques as civic spaces are increasingly under great stress and under intense scrutiny, for these civic spaces are increasingly becoming “insurgent spaces” (Boski, this volume), which is notably a central essence of civic spaces as noted in current conceptualization. This unwarranted scrutiny and surveillance has undermined the emergence of a civil society based upon the institution of mosques. This chapter has unraveled, in the context of the globalizing city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the nature of the scrutiny and the related legal instruments for the purpose of surveillance and control. It has been shown that the role of the Kampung Baru Mosque as a type of civic space is inextricably related to the changing socio-economic and political development within the city and beyond. An emerging question from all of the above relates to a proposition that the preservation of freedom depends on the strongly felt presence of an autonomous religious institution that will not allow itself to be used or co-opted for political purposes, which is to be examined in the context of a globalizing city such as Kuala Lumpur.

Notes 1 The authors acknowledge the research grant provided by Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang and the TODA Institute, which has resulted in this chapter. 2 Dr Mahathir Mohamad and his then heir apparent, Anwar Ibrahim, initiated the idea and public discussion of constructing a civil society through an Islamic modernity in the mid-1990s. See Noraini (2001). 3 For a detailed discussion of the various enactments and how these have affected mosques in Kuala Lumpur in terms of their ability to conduct open discourses on various topics ranging from community development to government policy, see Morshidi and Atikullah (2003), “Masyarakat madani dan ruang sivik dalam Kuala Lumpur yang semakin global: Memahami peranan dan kedudukan masjid dalam pembangunan bandar”, National Geography Conference, Society, Space

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and Environment in a Globalised World: Prospects and Challenges, City Bayview Hotel, Penang, 29–30 April. 4 Derichs’s (2001) observation that “Censorship is hardly extendable into the mosques” was proven not true in Kuala Lumpur.

References ABC (2002) “Surveillance in Malaysia’s Mosques”, The Religion Report, 13 November. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 27 April 2004). Abdul Malik Mujahid (2003) “Rethinking the Masjid in America”. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 1 December 2005). Abdullah, J.S., Anuar, M.K. and Pillay, S.S. (1996) Caring Civil Society – Final Report, Intensification of Research in Priority Areas, Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment. Al-Faruki, I.R. and Al-Faruki, L.L. (1996) Cultural Atlas of Islam, New York: Macmillan. Asia Times Online Co., Ltd. (2002) “Malaysia’s lopsided policies”. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 27 April 2004). Camilleri, J.A. (2000) “States, Markets and Civil Society in Asia Pacific”, in The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region, vol. I, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Cisneros, H.G. (1996) “Higher Ground: Faith Communities and Community Building”, Washington, DC: Department of Housing and Urban Development. City Hall of Kuala Lumpur (2005) “Structure Plan Kuala Lumpur 2020”, A World Class City, City Hall Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur. Darsh, S.M. (1996) “The Mosque as a Community Center”, in S.M. Darsh (ed.) The Role of Mosque in Islam, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam. de Tocqueville, A. (1996) Democracy in America, New York: Harper and Row. Derichs, C. (2001) “Politics and Islamization in Malaysia”. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 1 December 2005). Douglass, M. (2003) “Civil Society for Itself and in the Public Sphere: Comparative Research on Globalization, Cities and Civic Space in Pacific Asia”, IPS-NUS workshop on Globalization, Cities and Civic Spaces in the Asia Pacific, Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore, 11 August. Douglass, M. and Friedman, J. (eds.) (1998) Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age, New York: John Wiley. Douglass, M., Ho, K.C. and Ooi, G.L. (2002) “Civic Spaces, Globalization and Pacific Asia Cities”, International Development Planning Review, 24(4): 345–61. Friedmann, J. (1998) Economic Space and Life Space: Essays in Third World Planning, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Ghafar, A.A. (1999) “The Architectural Styles of Mosques in Malaysia: from Vernacular to Modern Structures”. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 27 April 2004). Goodsell, C.T. (1988) The Social Meaning of Civic Space, Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas.

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120 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Hedman, E.L. (2001) “Contesting State and Civil Society: Southeast Asian Trajectories”, Modern Asian Studies, 35(4): 921–51. Hefney, R.W. (1998) “Civil society and democracy”, Journal, May–June, issues 2 and 3. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 27 April 2004). Kearne, J. (1998) Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, Cambridge: Polity Press. Mahathir Mohamad (1991) “Malaysia: the way forward”, speech delivered at the Inaugural Meeting of the Malaysian Business Council, Kuala Lumpur, 29 February. Malaysia (not dated) Selamat Datang ke Masjid Negara. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 27 April 2004). Mohamad Tajuddin Mohamad Rasdi (1998) The Mosque as A Community Development Center: Programme and Architectural Design Guidelines for Contemporary Muslim Societies, Skudai, Johor: Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. Morshidi, S. and Atikullah, A. (2003) “Masyarakat madani dan ruang sivik dalam Kuala Lumpur yang semakin global: Memahami peranan dan kedudukan masjid dalam pembangunan Bandar”, National Geography Conference, Space and Environment in a Globalized World: Prospects and Challenges, City Bayview Hotel, Penang, 29–30 April. New Straits Times (1999) “Do not use mosque for politics”, 21 September. http:// archives.emedia.com.my Noraini Othman (2001) “Islam and civil society in Southeast Asia (with particular reference to Malaysia and Indonesia)”, The Institute of Ismaili Studies. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 1 December 2005). Project for Public Spaces (2002) What is a Great Civic Space? Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 27 April 2004). Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ramsay, M. (2000) “Redeeming the City. Exploring the Relationship between Church and Metropolis”, New England Journal of Public Policy, 16(1): 7–31. Sassen, S. (1994) Cities in a World Economy, Thousand Oaks, CA: Fine Forge Press. Shipps, J. (not dated) “See You in Church? Religion and Culture in Urban America”. Online. Available HTTP: (accessed 1 December 2005). Talha, G.H. (2001) “Whither the Social Network of Islam”, Muslim World, 91(3/4): 311–9. Yamamoto, T. (ed.) (1995) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community, Singapore/Tokyo: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies/Japan Center for International Exchange.

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages Michael Leaf and Samantha Anderson

It is not our intention in this paper to provide a systematic or comprehensive treatment of civic spaces in Chinese cities, as such an undertaking would be beyond the scope of a single paper; instead we will look specifically at the concept of civic space in the context of current rapid urbanization in Chinese peri-urban villages. We see Chinese peri-urbanization to be of great and growing significance not only because of the geographical extent of this phenomenon during the current accelerated phase of China’s urban transition, but also because of the challenges this form of grassroots urbanization poses for thinking about the evolving roles of state and society in the creation and maintenance of urban space. By choosing to focus on one particular phenomenon in current Chinese urbanization in this exploration of civic space – the urbanization of periurban villages – we must necessarily draw upon two dimensions, or two sets of meanings regarding urban space and its societal implications. The first is with regard to the nature of Chinese urbanism, particularly its structure and administration, as this is necessary for addressing questions of civic space, civic culture, and by extension, civil society in urban China today. But it should also be remembered that China is now in the midst of a critical historic transition, a shift from a predominantly rural society to one which will soon (i.e. within decades) be defined as fundamentally urban. The second set of meanings to consider here is therefore with regard to the nature of peri-urban settlements, particularly those seen as having developed “informally” or without official sanction, a situation for which there is much comparative experience and theoretical analysis to draw upon from societies elsewhere in the world, societies which have been undergoing their own urban transitions. In other words, it is not just the essentially Chinese aspects of this phenomenon that concern us here, but its “transitional” character as well – that is, with respect to the critical dimensions of China’s own urban transition. The basic approach which has been put forward for this comparative inquiry of civic spaces across the Pacific Asia region is that of a typological study, an approach which is well established in the tradition of comparative urban studies, particularly in regard to the analysis of urban spatial

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122 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia structures. In the case of thinking about civic space, however, such typologizing is complicated by the fact that the typology concerns not just the physical nature of the spaces but, perhaps more importantly, their societal use as well, use which is highly conditioned by the cultural and political particularities of the specific localities. In the case of the Chinese city, we put forth the argument here that instead of civic space being conceived of as a space for non-state civil society, that is, unencumbered by the constraining actions of the state, it is more accurate to portray Chinese civic spaces in intermediary terms, as spaces regulated jurisdictionally through lower order components of the state. Building upon current interpretations of the local state in China, we have adopted the term “local corporatist space” to convey the essence of this type of civic space. The degree to which such corporatist spaces exhibit or allow for socially (or even politically) autonomous functions will be determined not only by the relationships between residents and local administrative units, but also by the powers of local units to represent local interests to higher level components of the state, whether through formal channels, or perhaps more commonly, through continuing and continuously re-invented personalistic ties. By emphasizing the local corporatist nature of spatial regulation in the Chinese city (in this case with reference to peri-urban villages, although the case could be advanced more generally), we are attempting to separate out notions of civic space from concepts of civil society, in recognition of the ambiguities surrounding the articulation of civil society in China today. The paper is broken down into two main parts, followed by a brief conclusion. In the following section, we examine the current state of thinking around the critical issues of civil society, local governance and civic space in Chinese contexts, as we feel it is necessary to challenge the assumptions implicit in each of these concepts before applying them to the analysis of Chinese peri-urban development. Following this, we give brief portrayals of two peri-urban villages, which have been transformed into lively urban places during China’s ongoing post-Mao reform period – a period of tremendous social and economic change, which is manifested in spatial terms through the historically unprecedented expansion of China’s cities.1 In conclusion, we make the case for linking the analysis of this form of “informal” development with a broader, global understanding of the formation of informal settlements, which have come to characterize urban transitions elsewhere in the world. The question of urban informality presents challenges for thinking about socio-spatial regulation and planning in the cities of the future, challenges which can only be addressed through a more careful understanding of the intricate interactions between state and society and, in particular, how these are manifested at local levels.

Civic space and civil society in Chinese contexts The basic assumptions upon which this inquiry rests are straightforward and somewhat self-evident: that the continuing urbanization of Pacific Asia

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 123 implies an expansion of civil society or at least of civic life, due to the increased capacity for social interaction and associational life that urbanization brings. This implies as well a spatial correlate – civic space, or the space within which such interactions occur – which is something different from, though overlapping with, more traditional notions of public space. The distinction here lies in the nature of state control over public space: the degree to which regulatory control is a constraint on free association determines whether a particular public space is properly also considered a civic space. Stated this way, this line of inquiry raises particular questions regarding notions of the state, not only because of the state’s regulatory role visà-vis urban space, but because of competing conceptualizations of the role of the state with respect to civil society. In this section, we therefore briefly review current interpretations of civil society and state-society interaction in the Chinese context as a basis for further examination of Chinese civic spaces.

Civil society in China (?) Is there a universal definition of civil society which can help guide this inquiry? In recent years, the rise of the discussion of civil society in China, if not, the rise of civil society itself, has been premised in part on liberal notions of civil society, perforce equating civil society with a non-state realm. This view sees civil society to be a counterweight to or a restraint on the state, in that it can provide pathways for the articulation of societal needs beyond those which are envisioned by the state, or, in other words, pluralistic notions of the public good. The links here to developmentalist perspectives on political change are obvious, driven by the idea that the ongoing economic liberalization that has characterized China’s current reform era opens space for alternative political expression or pluralism by creating new interest groups and changing the basic relations between political and economic actors in Chinese society. This “search for civil society” (White 1996a) as a means for gauging democratization in China has clearly been influenced by recent developments in the post-socialist societies of Eastern Europe and by China’s own democracy movement in the late 1980s (Brook and Frolic 1997), as well as by the long tradition of western sociopolitical thought originating from De Tocqueville, which links associational life to political liberalization.2 One relevant aspect of the debate around this has been with regard to whether the elements which comprise civil society are necessarily overtly political in their nature, or, stated another way, whether non-political associational forms of civil society hold potential for shaping progressive social change (White 1996b). This “associational life” view of civil society, with it implying that associational structures, both formal and informal, need not have an expressed political purpose in order to constitute elements of a civil society, has the added virtue of allowing for a deeper historical perspective in that it provides points of comparison to societal forms in China’s pre-communist past. A central question here is whether associational life

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124 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia now, as it has been quickly building in the reform era (He 1997), is necessarily a direct reaction to the recent Maoist period in which the state held complete hegemony over society, or a broader attempt at the revival of associational forms from China’s past.3 One characteristic worth noting is that of elite leadership despite the apparent popular basis for such associations both now and in the past, which in the late Imperial and Republican periods included such organizations as the places of origin for support groups, temple associations and lineage societies, as well as vocational associations such as service and trade guilds. We find the issue of elite leadership in Chinese associational life to be very relevant to the more fundamental question of whether one can legitimately think of such social forms as truly non-statist. The apparent contradiction here is that although Chinese social organizations are ostensibly autonomous from the state, they must still rely on elite patronage to guarantee their viability, with the elite in China today still defined essentially in political terms (Ding 1994; He 1997). If associational life in China today is seen to be the current manifestation of civil society, it is not the non-state realm envisioned by liberal theorists. Alternative views of dealing with this apparent contradiction have thus been put forward in such forms as “state-led civil society” (Frolic 1997) or “semi-civil society” (He 1997). Such alternative views may be interpreted through a Gramschian view of civil society, which is inclusive of structures of the state, in contrast to the Habermasian emphasis on the non-state realm that has come to dominate current liberal discourse regarding civil society (Cheek 1998). Such a conceptualization is more consistent with the persistent Leninist nature of the Chinese state, and may hold greater relevance as well for what could be termed culturalist views of Chinese (and perhaps other Asian) authority structures today. One theoretical interpretation along these lines is given by the political scientist X.L. Ding (1994), whose institutional analysis of Chinese society and polity relies upon what he has termed “amphibiousness,” a term chosen to reflect the “double life” of Chinese elite leadership, both within formal state structures as well as in the structures of what might otherwise be seen as autonomous formations, including both social organizations and the institutional structures of the market economy. Instead of yielding to a view of the purely hegemonic role of the state through institutional amphibiousness, Ding stresses the indeterminacy of individual institutions – both official and unofficial – and argues that the potential for progressive change comes from within, through the agency of what he terms “counter-elites,” or those individuals who are able to maintain personalistic linkages to both state and non-state structures. This is in contrast to the emphasis on social and political change arising from the negotiated interactions between state and civil society as envisioned by liberal models. In his argument, the mutual infiltration between state and society that one finds in China today undercuts the necessity for truly non-state formations as a requisite for affecting progressive change.

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 125

The Logic of the Local To summarize the discussion thus far, this is an argument that a true nonstate realm does not exist in China today. But if the state is everywhere, what is the state? This is perhaps a more consequential question for thinking about the meaning of civic space than searching for universal (or at least logically consistent) interpretations of civil society. It is complicated, however, by current governance trends in China, both with respect to the devolution of administrative and fiscal functions and with the development of regulatory structures for the rapidly evolving market economy. Much has been written in recent years on the implications of decentralization and the advent of the market economy for the local state in particular, with a range of classificatory labels appearing in literature regarding the “local developmental state” on one end to the “local predatory state” on the other, with various emphases on entrepreneurialism, corporatism and clientelism in between (Tsai 2002: 252–253). These are by no means mutually exclusive categories as the various interpretations of the local state in China must deal with sometimes simultaneous instances of support and predation by the apparatuses of the local state, with such distinctions also colored by often wide regional differences throughout China. What is consistent and relevant here is the emphasis on both the revived strength of the local state, in all its diversity, and its potential for being both fragmented and riven with clientelistic networks. Studies of the local state thus directly challenge notions of the monolithic state and emphasize the criticality of the logic of the local, an indication of the local social embeddedness of governance processes. This can be seen as one expression of the persistence of a personalistic legal culture in contrast to objective rule of law. This continuing long tradition of legal instrumentalism (Potter 1998) is particularly relevant to local levels, as the state-society relations it engenders are often dependent upon the face-to-face interactions of clientelism, which in general are understood to benefit from social intimacy as one would find at the level of the locality (Scott 1977). The diversity inherent at local levels challenges generalization. Diversity of the local, nonetheless, is conditioned by the persistence and redefinition of previous structures through which centralized control was (and in many respects still is) manifested in China. In her analysis of the changing nature of administrative practices, Shue (1994) emphasizes the inherent tensions between central and local during the Maoist period and how these tensions underlie the current move toward increased localism. The structure of the local is presented as one of social cellularity, as apparent, for example, in the close correspondence between structures of production and social reproduction in the urban work unit (danwei) and its parallels in the hierarchical administrative structure (Leaf 2000). Shue sees such cellularization of social, economic and administrative/political structures as less an attempt to weaken associational structures by the Maoist

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126 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia state than, in her terms, to “miniaturize” society, and in so doing increase its legibility to the state.4 The challenge here is that in establishing such structures, particularly in the absence of cross-cutting linkages such as one would derive from market relationships or more open political discourse, the cellular structures have turned inward, with such critical particularist adaptations as an increased reliance on personalistic networks (guanxi) to grease the economic and social machinery.5 Thus one finds, by the late Maoist period, a situation of both intense centrality of the national polity and entrenched localism, strengthened internally through clientelistic personal networks. The implication here is that pressures for reform through the inculcation of market forces are derived not only from the potential for increased productivity through a shift away from administrative pricing, as is generally argued, but also the recognition by the state of its weakening control over the low-end cellular structures of the Chinese economy and society.6 In her analysis of the institutional basis for China’s rapid growth through the reform period, Oi (1999) finds the key factor to have been the reinvention or re-articulation of such Maoist local structures in response to new opportunities afforded by market reforms, thus resulting in what she sees to be increased local corporatism. Highly localized developmental states in rural China, or what Oi terms “local corporate states” have thus been able to derive greatly increased powers through economic gain, particularly during the period of growing township and village enterprises through the 1980s and early 1990s. Such an interpretation is highly relevant for understanding the growing economic strength of erstwhile administrative units within Chinese cities as well (Leaf 2005). Through such means, local administrative units, such as the urban street committee ( jiedao) and the peri-urban village committee (cunweihui), are re-invented in increasingly corporatist forms, a manifestation of the persistent ambiguity between public and private and between state and society in the current period. Such local state corporatism, with its entrenched amphibiousness and continuing reliance on clientelistic relations, is key to understanding the phenomenon of peri-urban growth and development, as it allows us to deal with the delicate question of autonomous social formations and the intricacies of local state-society relations. The civic spaces arising from peri-urban growth should thus not be seen in grassroots terms as spaces for free association unencumbered by the state, but rather as spaces created by, or at least regulated by, local corporatist structures.

The social nature of civic space The understanding of civic spaces to be “those spaces in which people of different origins and walks of life can co-mingle without overt control by government, commercial or other private interests, or de facto dominance by one group over another” (Douglass 2001) implies that in thinking about

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 127 civic space we must be mindful of a number of diverse attributes, both in terms of spatial and social relationships and, perhaps more abstractly, with regard to the nature of local governance as it pertains to spatial and social regulation. Clearly a consideration of physical attributes alone would be insufficient for advancing our understanding of civic space; a public commercial zone with the physical attributes of a traditional “main street” would nonetheless not be truly civic space if it were purposefully exclusionary of a significant component of local society that might otherwise use the space. Our view is that with regard to social and spatial characteristics, good civic space should exhibit those attributes that have come to be understood as underpinning successful public space in general, including density and variety of activities (that is, not limited exclusively to a single function, such as purely commercial use), in addition to ease of accessibility to the complete spectrum of social classes and groups. The quality of civic space will therefore be shaped by density, meaning both the density of the population who can access the space as well as the density of activities which will attract diverse groups of people. The issue of accessibility implies as well the attribute of proximity, which may be difficult to obtain in an urban setting beset by spatial segregation by social group or class. A further basic dimension of successful public (and by extension, civic) space is temporal, in that urban spaces which are occupied and used over a longer period of time throughout the day (and for other longer term cycles) will allow for a greater mixing of people and activities than would otherwise be the case. Beyond these physical and social attributes, the quality of civic space will be conditioned by how the space is regulated or otherwise disciplined, and whether or not through such regulation additional constraints are imposed on the space that might inhibit its inclusionary character. This is necessarily a governance issue as it raises questions of, first, how broadly shared the notion of the public good might be, and second, the degree to which the local state (as the presumed regulator) can legitimately impose conditions on public space in the interest of articulating and maintaining the public good. Trade-offs are necessarily involved, with regard to such things as public safety and security as well as cleanliness and the quality of public infrastructure and services. Beyond this, one might also distinguish between explicit, formal or overt forms of regulation and more covert or clandestine forms, which the state may impose in seeking to discipline or monitor societal forces. This is also a governance issue with regard to the popular perception of the local state, as in practice, civic space can function in either an oppositional or integrative manner with respect to its capacity to foster collective activities, which either challenge or respect the nature of local regulatory control. In other words, the distinction between public space per se and the notion of civic space which we would advance here is dependent also upon the nature of the local state and its relation to its citizenry. This observation links back to our discussion of civil society, with the added caveat

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128 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia that civil society need neither be oppositional nor even progressive in its nature in order for it to be legitimate; there is significant potential for cultural and political conservatism to be articulated through an active civil society, however the term may be defined. The distinction between oppositional and integrative functions of civic space, and, for that matter, between oppositional and integrative tendencies of civil society arise directly from the actions of the state, that is, whether it is supportive, tolerant or repressive of the social (and political) uses of civic space. In this respect, the question of state coherence or fragmentation becomes critical. It is our contention here that the corporatist nature of the local state in China holds the potential for shaping positive, integrative civic spaces in the urban periphery; but where such local state structures and forces come into conflict with higher levels of authority, the outcome is much less certain. The specific civic spaces which we look at here are the public gathering spaces – the main streets and markets – in two peri-urban settlements in Chinese cities, Dongmei Village on the edge of Quanzhou in Fujian, and Dahongmen (unofficially referred to as Zhejiang Village) on the southern border of Beijing’s urban area. Both have been informally developed, in contrast to pre-planned urban spaces, and have grown to be active urban settings originating out of pre-existing villages, which were predominantly agricultural in the past. In this sense, these are both components of the new urban landscape that has emerged out of China’s current accelerated phase of its urban transition. In both cases, we find an emphasis on the integrative character of these spaces – especially with regard to the function of these spaces in fostering social integration across the historically deeply embedded distinctions between urban and rural populations and between local and non-local. The two cases, however, indicate very different responses on the part of the state, or of components of the state, vis-à-vis regulation.

Case studies: corporatist spaces in peri-urban China China’s post-Mao reform era has been characterized by tremendously accelerated urbanization, which is understood as both a reaction to the previous constraints on urbanization imposed by the state under Mao, as well as a conscious effort to create new urban forms to accommodate the needs of a rapidly expanding market economy (Leaf 1998). Urban building programs, especially of cities along the economically booming eastern seaboard, have been extensively documented and analyzed. Overall, the phenomenon of current Chinese urbanization is seen to derive from both a statist effort, related to devolution of governance and development functions to lower levels in the administrative hierarchy in line with market needs (Yeh and Wu 1996), as well as popular initiative, seen in various forms as “urbanization from below” (Guldin 2001). The rapidly changing landscapes of the peri-urban regions are but one manifestation of the total project

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 129 of urban redevelopment and expansion (Webster 2001). Their significance lies in both the new physical forms which have arisen since the 1980s and in their social formations, as places of interaction between erstwhile local villagers, displaced former urbanites who are moving out of crowded inner city neighborhoods) and, in many instances, newly formed communities of rural migrants, who in total now comprise perhaps as much as one tenth of the entire national population (Chang 1996; Chan 1994). Periurban regions therefore hold the potential to be not just the sites of a new urbanism, the outward edge of China’s accelerated urban transition, but landscapes of integration between rural and urban societies, an historical divide which has long characterized the nation. The effects of the urban transition – in China as elsewhere – are seen not just in broad demographic terms with respect to numbers and proportions of urban and rural residents, but in the potential for creating new and unforeseen social and cultural relations. As with our previous caveats regarding generalization and local diversity, it should be remembered that the two cases reviewed here are not meant to portray typical examples nor impart an exhaustive understanding of the conditions of such settlements within China; at best, they are merely indicative, although perhaps in this way they may serve as a basis for drawing some tentative conclusions with respect to the ideas about state-society relations and the creation of urban space which we have advanced above. Zhejiang Village The case of Zhejiang Village, on the southern edge of Beijing’s urban boundary, is perhaps the most famous and best documented7 example of how the processes of China’s peri-urban development are driven by local, villagelevel administrative units operating in alliance with the socio-economic interests of specific streams of rural migrants. The origins of Zhejiang Village as a migrant settlement in the Dahongmen area of Fengtai District, on the southern edge of Beijing’s urban boundary, may be traced back to the early 1980s, when migrant entrepreneurs from the Wenzhou area of Zhejiang province, far to the south from Beijing, began renting space from local villagers, first for accommodation and later for production facilities (see Figure 7.1). The early migrants were attracted to the area both for its location – as Dahongmen is not far from the Qianmen area where the migrants’ initial markets for low-cost garments were located – and for the availability of inexpensive space for rent. Unlike urban residents per se, who were prohibited from renting out housing in the early reform period, the villagers on the urban edge were unencumbered by such prohibitions, and although the farmers in Dahongmen were at first reluctant to deal with the Zhejiang migrants, they quickly learned that the provision of rented accommodation could be much more lucrative than growing vegetables. The migrant population grew quickly over the course of the 1980s and early

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Figure 7.1 Zhejiang village, Dahongmen, Beijing, China.

1990s, based first on chain migration from Zhejiang with other migrant workers coming from further afield as job opportunities continued to open up in the burgeoning garment production facilities of the area. By the mid-90s, Zhejiang Village, as it had come to be known locally, was home to more than 100,000 non-local migrants, in comparison to the 20,000 or so erstwhile villagers. The physical transformation of the area was dramatic. After an initial period of renting rooms and building small-scale facilities for the migrants, villagers began to enter into larger scale and longer term agreements with informal developers from Zhejiang, who constructed what came to be known as dayuan (big courtyard) housing compounds. These single story brick structures were comprised of hundreds of small, individual household units, with the largest providing accommodation for as many as 6,000 residents. The extensive scale and inward-turning nature of the dayuan may be attributable to a number of factors, perhaps most crucially that of public security and fear of crime in a social context that was largely deserted by the Beijing municipal authorities.8 The massive scale of dayuan construction is also indicative of the social and economic processes

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 131 surrounding their development; these were not the result of either individual or collectivized household efforts, but rather facilities created through the efforts of individual migrant entrepreneurs who would enter into business arrangements with the local villagers to secure the building sites, materials and labor to create these rented lodgings. In this respect, these migrant bosses (laoban) were reproducing long-standing social practices in the complex mix of instrumental (with respect to their individual profit incentives as entrepreneurs) and affective ties (as they acted on behalf of and in collaboration with their fellow migrants), which they drew upon in establishing their intermediate positions between migrant and native communities.9 The dominance of collective over individual tendencies was apparent in other aspects of life in Zhejiang Village as well. The migrant communities, although ostensibly the aggregate outcomes of spontaneous efforts on the part of many individuals, maintained official links to the administrative authorities in Zhejiang province. This was apparent not only in the Wenzhou municipal representative offices established in Zhejiang Village, but also in the efforts of local authorities from Zhejiang province to establish such social services as health care and education in this migrant settlement so far from home (as these were social services denied by Beijing authorities to these non-registered residents). Such official collaboration also underlay the development of wholesale marketing facilities in Zhejiang Village, such as the large Jingwen trade building, its name indicative of the roles of Beijing and Wenzhou authorities in its establishment and maintenance. In this context, it is difficult to speak of this settlement as an entirely nonstate space, despite its essentially informal or grassroots origins. Civic spaces, or the civic nature of Zhejiang Village’s public spaces, may be thought of with regard to two different forms, in consideration of the particular built environment of the settlement. First were the collective spaces within the largest dayuan, which consisted of internal main streets with local commercial enterprises and collective facilities such as the compounds’ public toilets. These were civic spaces to the extent that the social interactions which they engendered worked to build the collective identities of the dayuan residents, thus helping to empower the migrant communities in psychological terms, if nothing else. They were exclusionary spaces, however, like any internal public space in a large urban compound (such as that of a Beijing danwei), and here one may make the distinction between the form of “bonding” social capital that the use of such spaces facilitated and the “bridging” social capital more commonly associated with notions of civic space,10 as the social cohesion derived from life in the dayuan was inwardturning rather than broadly integrative. The second layer of potential civic spaces were the public spaces outside of the dayuan, consisting of small streets lined with shops and stalls, which opened in certain instances into larger covered markets. Such spaces were the sites of informal, quotidian interactions between migrant

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132 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia groups and local villagers, and beyond them, with other Beijing residents who would disregard the stigma of lawlessness officially promoted in the Beijing press in order to seek out Zhejiang specialties in the local shops. Conversations with people on the street indicated a general sense of admiration for the migrants among local villagers for their hard work and entrepreneurial spirit. There was, however, also the recognition that most Beijingers would not even consider entering the area due to how Zhejiang Village was officially portrayed to the larger public. The public spaces of Zhejiang Village were thus civic spaces, in that they were by no means exclusionary, although the civic nature of these spaces was highly constrained by external factors. As we have argued, the spaces of Zhejiang Village were only ambiguously “non-state” spaces,11 considering the quasi-official status conferred through recognition by local authorities, both those of Beijing (particularly the village committee, though also the district government through their involvement in fostering and regulating the local wholesale garment trade) and those of Wenzhou (through their local administrative offices). The contradictions derived from an understanding of a multi-layered or even fragmented state are apparent in the strained history of the settlement. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Zhejiang Village was beset by repressive pressures from higher level authorities, which came to a head in a massive campaign of destruction and dislocation in late 1995. As portrayed in detail by Zhang (2001), this period of the settlement’s history was marked by a deep division between higher and lower level authorities, and driven by the general rhetoric that the destruction was for the migrant community’s “own good,” despite the devastating effects that it had for most residents. The subsequent rebuilding, recovery and further expansion of Zhejiang Village – now understood to be a proper, newly urbanized component of the city of Beijing – bears out the understanding that municipal authorities did not perforce oppose the development of this migrant community, but rather, wanted it to take place on the state’s own terms. In Zhang’s analysis, the main reason for “cleaning up” the settlement was that “upper-level officials were worried that the de facto recognition of migrant leadership would encourage uncontrolled growth of migrant power that would ultimately displace local government rule” (ibid: 207), despite the understanding by lower level officials of the mutual benefits of collaboration with migrants. The destruction and reconfiguration of Zhejiang Village thus demonstrates the limits to local autonomy and the practical constraints to local state corporatism in the present context of the state in China. Dongmei Village In contrast to the scale of development in Zhejiang Village in Beijing, the urbanization of Dongmei, a former agricultural village on the edge of Quanzhou in southern Fujian province, has been much smaller, and in

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Figure 7.2 Dongmei village, Quanzhou, Fujian, China.

this respect might be considered to be more typical of China’s peri-urban development (see Figure 7.2). Nonetheless, the specific historically and geographically determined characteristics of Quanzhou caution against excessive generalization. When Marco Polo visited the city in the late Song period (1127–1279), Quanzhou was southern China’s largest seaport and quite cosmopolitan in its makeup; now, however, it is a medium-sized city, with an urban core population of less than 300,000.12 This long history of international linkages, reinforced since the late nineteenth century through sizeable out-migration of China’s Hokkien-speaking population, has meant that Quanzhou has maintained a very high degree of external linkages, both to the neighboring island of Taiwan, and further, to the nations of Southeast Asia, where the Hokkien language group constitutes the largest proportion of resident overseas Chinese. The people of the region have sought to maintain their connections to overseas relatives over the decades – connections which have flourished under the open-door policies of the reform era. Furthermore, due to the city’s strategically vulnerable location across the straits from Taiwan, Quanzhou in the past received disproportionately low investment from the central government, a factor which underlies the persistence of private property relations in the region and which has no doubt added to the region’s strong sense of local autonomy. These two characteristics of

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134 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia dense, though atomistic, transnational linkages and local state respect for private property meant that Quanzhou was particularly well-poised to benefit from the multiple, small-scale networks of “guerilla” investment which has driven the economic boom of southern China’s littoral region since the 1980s (Hsing 1998). The village of Dongmei (literally, “Eastern Beauty”), with an official registered population of approximately 2,000 (as of 2001), is situated a few kilometers to the east of the ancient core of the city, in an area which had been largely ricefields until the early 1990s. The “greenfields” nature of this eastern edge of the city, in contrast to geographic constraints in other directions, has allowed the area to absorb a large proportion of the city’s new commercial and industrial construction, and portions of the formerly rural district of Fengze, including the area where Dongmei is located, are now being incorporated into the city proper. In addition to this consequential administrative change, two other factors, both derived from the expanding spatial economy of the city, have greatly accelerated the village’s urban transformation. First, a major input of capital came with the village committee’s decision in the early 1990s to transfer land rights for 3.6 hectares of ricefields (approximately 20 percent of the village territory) to a development company from the city, which subsequently built a residential estate (Dongmei Huayuan), housing approximately 2,000 residents, primarily government workers and other middle-class professionals from the city. The compensation funds obtained from this land transfer were then reinvested in the development of small- and medium-scale factories and in the construction of new multi-storey houses by the villagers, thus transforming the built environment of the village from a landscape of small traditional houses into a dense urban neighborhood clustered around two parallel commercial streets. The second significant factor shaping this transformation was the influx of rural migrants into the area. By the late 1990s, Dongmei Village accommodated more than 4,000 of the so-called “floating population” (liudong renkou) – primarily from Sichuan and Gansu provinces in west China – who worked in the village factories or in the many small production facilities which villagers had set up in their re-built houses. If it was the sale of land use rights which gave the initial boost for the redevelopment of the village, then it was the low-cost labor of the migrants which permitted its economic expansion and consolidation into a flourishing urban area over the course of less than a decade. Opportunities for urbanization thus came from two directions: emanating outward with Quanzhou’s expanding spatial economy, and pouring in from the countryside with the manpower of rural-urban migrants. In thinking about the spatial patterns of development and the potential for civic space in this newly urbanized area, one important characteristic to point out is the degree of crowding apparent in Dongmei. Even though the traditional houses of the erstwhile farmers have almost entirely been

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 135 replaced by much larger structures, the overall population of the village has more than tripled in the same time period, and much of the new construction accommodates new economic uses. Typically, one finds a new house in the village to have its ground floor given over to small-scale manufacturing – such as shoe production, printing, or the manufacture of packing materials – with upper floors (in many cases up to five stories) allocated for residential space for the villagers, plus warehousing space and dormitory accommodations for the migrant workers. Spatial constraints for the residents, especially the migrant workers, means that much of the life of Dongmei takes place in public spaces, along the main commercial streets and in the small public square built in the center of the village. Here one finds an array of activities, from shopping and eating to billiard games and other entertainments set up along the street. The formal, covered public market, built adjacent to the walled compound of the Dongmei Huayuan estate to the northeast of the village, is also very active, although it tends not to attract the same density of daily crowds as the streets in the core of the village. Overall, we would argue that these are the civic spaces of this newly urbanized area, as these are the places of coming together and intense social interaction both within the migrant communities (thus building bonding social capital) and between the migrants and villagers (facilitating the creation of bridging social capital). From our observations, the third group of proximate residents – the displaced urbanites housed in the walled residential estate – has much less interaction with either the villagers or the migrants in the village. Much of the daily lives of the estate residents takes place away from Dongmei Village, as many residents commute into town for work or school, while the activities of those who do remain behind are largely accommodated within the walls of the estate by local services such as a grade school, kindergarten and local-scale shopping facilities.

Similarities and differences Considering the situation in Dongmei Village relative to that of Zhejiang Village in Beijing, we see similarities in terms of the nature of public spaces; in both, these are integrative spaces, allowing for and promoting the free interaction between migrant groups and local villagers, though in both cases we find exclusionary aspects as well – in that urban residents other than the immediate villagers tend to stay away from these places. In the case of Beijing, this was prompted, no doubt, by the official portrayal of migrant settlements in the popular press. While such biases are not immediately apparent toward migrants in Quanzhou, there is still a sense of social distance between the estate residents and those of Dongmei Village, which tends to keep the estate residents out of the seemingly lower class setting of the village despite the adjacency of the estate. A major difference between the cases of Zhejiang Village and Dongmei Village has been with the official response on the part of the higher level

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136 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia municipal government. In Zhejiang Village, as we have seen, villagers and migrants have been beset by an ongoing conflictual relationship with municipal authorities, and it has been the strength of clientelistic ties between local bosses and those in higher official positions which has served to protect and stabilize the settlement. Such ties have been tenuous at times and proved wholly insufficient to protect the settlement at the peak of the municipal government’s clean-up operations. A similar approach of clientelistic analysis would no doubt also be relevant to the case of Dongmei as a means of accounting for the multi-faceted mix of formal and informal, affective and instrumental ties between village officials and higher level authorities. One finds, for example, similar economic links between villagers and citybased interests and the housing estate developers in Dongmei and the district authorities overseeing the establishment of the wholesale garment markets in Zhejiang Village. What differs, however, is the relative position of the migrant communities, with much stronger local power manifested in the migrants in Zhejiang Village, in terms of their local economic strength (as entrepreneurs and business-owners, in contrast to the working population who comprise the migrant community in Dongmei Village), their higher level of organization, and in their overall numbers in proportion to local residents (5:1 compared to 2:1). In contrast to the conflictual setting of Zhejiang Village and the constant need to keep conflicts in check through patron-client ties, the relationships between local and municipal officials in Dongmei Village may be described to be much more collaborative. Despite the sub-standard development of much of the village (with houses built to excessive heights and with insufficient set-backs and street access), the municipal government has undertaken an approach of gradual, in situ upgrading, including the widening of main streets, paving of alleys and retro-fitting of basic infrastructure. There is still pressure for the newly urbanized village to conform to the sensibilities of the city’s master plan, but conformance here is attained through on-going negotiation, in contrast to the heavy-handed approach of wholesale destruction and rebuilding that was so disruptive in Zhejiang Village. It would be difficult to pinpoint the key factor underlying this difference, as the two cases are greatly dissimilar in a number of respects: the overall sizes of the two cities; the scale of development of the two urbanized villages; the different local political economies of development in Beijing and Quanzhou, including a much stronger continuous tradition of property rights in Quanzhou; and very different situations with respect to the migrant populations. In Zhejiang Village, the migrants included an economically significant entrepreneurial class. In Dongmei, with the exception of several small-scale shop owners, migrant livelihoods are almost all derived from their work as hired workers, a situation which allows village authorities to publicly assert the temporary nature of their residence in Dongmei. A relevant generalizable issue here is how in both cases a local government unit (the village committee) has been able to take advantage of the

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 137 opportunities arising from the growth of the market economy by entering into strategic alliances with other non-local actors. In the case of Zhejiang Village, the opportunity arose from the Wenzhou entrepreneurs, while in Dongmei Village opportunities were more closely linked to the ongoing expansion of Quanzhou’s spatial economy. In both cases, it was the corporate nature of local government units that allowed it to go beyond its basic administrative mandate to take on increasingly economic functions,13 functions which in practice form the fiscal basis for this new component of Chinese urbanism. In regulatory terms, such patterns and practices of highly local development are often contrary to the planning mandates and visions of higher level municipal authorities, as was the case in the two examples here. In consideration of the state-society framework we have advanced above, seeking to understand the resolution of such contradictions does not lie in the interactions between the state and a non-state civil society, but rather internally, in the formal and informal relations between fragmented components of the state as it now exists in China. Civic space, as we have been dealing with it here, does not function to build up an oppositional basis for society vis-à-vis the state, or to foster a civil society which can check the power of the state, but rather as an integrative mechanism to legitimize and thus strengthen the social underpinnings of the most local components of the state. The shortcoming here is that the powers of local social forces – and the hopes that some observers might pin on a flourishing civil society – are ultimately dependent upon the strength of the local unit of the state. What resources the local corporatist state can bring to bear, whether political or economic or derived from manipulation of clientelistic ties, will thus determine the developmental fate of the locality. The key to successful local development thus appears to rest less on the ability of civil society, as it is commonly understood, to properly engage with the forces of the state, than with local components of the state to deal with higher level components of the state on behalf of their own corporately defined citizens.

Conclusions: informality, inclusion and local corporatism Over the past four decades, a significant body of academic research and writing has developed around the theme which is perhaps most commonly summarized as “informal settlements,” that is, those components of thirdworld urbanization which occur to one extent or another outside of the formal regulatory framework of the state. Although significant attention has been given to interstitial sites of informal development – slum and squatter settlements in inner city settings – one could argue that in respect to aggregate global trends, it is the informal settlements of the urban periphery that constitute the bulk of urban informalization in spatial terms,14 an indication of where informal development fits in the overall urban transition which is so unevenly impacting the world today. The point has been

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138 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia made that much of the early research interest in informal settlements was driven by an ideologically colored hope for articulating an alternative form of urbanization, with the “squatter” as a form of new urban pioneer, standing up to the exclusionary tendencies of urban market economies, and in this way helping to democratize the third-world city (Smart 1986). In contrast to such communitarian impulses, much attention was subsequently given to the question of how market relations fit into informal development (Moser 1982), with streams of analysis, such as that dealing with the “pirate” developers of Bogota (Vernez 1973; Doebele 1977), emphasizing the ambiguity of market processes in informal land development and the importance of understanding how local political economies and local institutional forms shape the potential for informal development (Gilbert 1981; Collier 1976). The regulatory grey area in which informal development is situated has thus come to be understood as a critical determinant of social exclusion in cities throughout the developing world (Fernandes and Varley 1998). And although, as it is argued, potential exists for a high degree of local autonomy in such contexts of weak regulation, there are in all likelihood greater possibilities for political manipulation, denial of basic rights and entitlements, and the entrenchment of urban settings beset by poor quality and unhealthy environments. Much of the recent writing on informal settlements by international agencies and others (UNCHS 1990, for example) thus argues for inclusionary approaches to “formalizing the informal” or “regularizing the irregular”, an indication, as we see it, of the fear of persistent socio-economic dualism in the cities of the developing world. In the case of China, such fears of persistent dualism are linked to longstanding, historic patterns of segmentation between rural and urban components of society, which perhaps ironically came to be institutionally reinforced during the period of centralized socialism through the draconian application of the household registration (hukou) system (Chan 1994). Over the course of the reform period, the political validity of the hukou as a mechanism of social control has been undermined not only by the phenomenon of rural-urban migration, but the gradual disassembly of the set of entitlements linked to an urban hukou (access to guaranteed employment, housing, urban services, education, subsidized goods, etc.) or in terms of the promises of the Chinese state, the breaking of the “iron rice bowl” (Solinger 1999). The risk now is that such older forms of societal dualism – between the city and the countryside – are coming to be replaced by growing segmentation within urban settings, particularly as urban populations continue to expand and new spatial forms are created in today’s Chinese cities. It is in this context that hopes are increasingly pinned to the development of civil society as the means for articulating societal needs beyond what is imagined or understood by the state. This is seen as particularly

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 139 critical for those components of urban society who are excluded or marginalized from the mainstream of urban society, such as the migrant settlers and the erstwhile farmers on the edges of China’s cities. As we have argued above, such a conceptualization is indeed problematic in the Chinese context, not only because of the restricted potential for the articulation of a non-state civil society, but because of the segmented and multitiered nature of the state in China. In contrast to the expectations of liberal observers, the advent of market reforms in China has not weakened the state but, rather, has economically bolstered and thus entrenched its most local components. In such a setting, the representation of societal interests vis-à-vis the state is unlikely to occur through the presumed mechanisms of civil society, but instead is filtered upward through lower order components of the state. The risk here is that local communities and new social actors are as dependent as ever, if not more so, on the powers and abilities of local state actors. The uneven, or perhaps unpredictable, trajectories of social change and spatial development in the two cases of peri-urban development we have referred to here indicate the tenuousness and local specificity of such relations. Despite our concerns regarding the potential for autonomous civil society, we find that the concept of civic space does indeed have value for interpreting the formation of more inclusionary local societies, as in this case with the increased capacity for social interaction engendered by the public spaces of urbanizing peri-urban settlements. Such possibilities are apparent in the ongoing consolidation of non-local migrant communities in places such as Dongmei and Zhejiang Village. This is not necessarily, nor need it be, an expression of a growing civil society in the sense that this has come to be popularly understood. The strength of such local communities, fostered through increased social cohesion and the enhanced potential for further economic advancement, nonetheless confers greater legitimacy to such local corporatist units as the village committees in these two cases. Whether this is sufficient to permit the further legitimization and consolidation of these newly emerged components of Chinese urbanism will no doubt depend upon factors and forces beyond the means of the local communities themselves. Formalizing the informal and thereby erasing the regulatory greyness from Chinese peri-urban development is thus more likely to occur as an outcome of state actions than through the strength of societal forces.

Notes 1 Recognizing, however, that certain parallels may be drawn to the patterns of urbanization and the opening up of urban culture which characterized the transition to Song period urbanism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (Heng 1999). 2 A particularly influential discussion of the continuing relevance of the DeTocquevillean tradition is that of Putnam (1993).

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140 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia 3 There is no question that Chinese citizens now once again enjoy a vibrant associational life, as attested to by the many thousands of social organizations which have become officially registered since the early 1990s, in accordance with requirements put in place following the events of 1989 (He 1997). As Shue notes however, “most of these associations are by no means entirely self-constituted, nor do most of them apparently seek or enjoy much relative autonomy from the state. Some are more autonomous, and others less so. All, however, are enveloped in a rhetoric of corporatist interpenetration and encapsulated in a self-conception that stresses corporatist consultation, cooperation, and harmony in action with the party-state and its aims” (Shue 1994, p. 83). 4 We use the term “legibility” in the sense favored by Scott (1998), that is, in reference to the simplification of societal phenomenon in the interest of facilitating the functions of government. 5 A tendency characterized by Walder (1986) as “communist neo-traditionalism” in his study of factory relations in Guangdong. 6 It should be pointed out as well that such social cellularity has a distinct correlate in urban spatial structures as well, with the physical city of the Maoist period characterized by walled compounds delimiting the territories of work units (Gaubatz 1995). Such spatial cellularity is characteristic to one degree or another of much of China’s historic urbanism, as referred to by Skinner in reference to Qing China (1977). From more recent work on historical urbanism by Heng (1999), we can see the importance placed by the state on social control through the cellularity of ward structures in the Tang period, and how these spatial and administrative structures were increasingly disassembled through the transition to Song period urbanism. In this, one gets a sense of the cyclical nature of spatial cellularity throughout Chinese urban history, and how this is closely interwoven with efforts at maintaining state hegemony over society, a theme paralleled by Gates’ (1996) interpretation of the grand sweep of Chinese history as the playing out of tensions between statist (“tributary”) and familial (“petty commodity”) modes of production. 7 Our account here draws upon the extensive study of Zhejiang Village by Zhang (2001) as well as relevant materials by Wang (1995), Béja and Bonnin (1995), Leaf (1995), Xiang (1996), Liu and Liang (1997), Ma and Xiang (1998), Solinger (1999) and site visits to Zhejiang Village in 1994, 1996 and 1998. 8 This is likely a manifestation of the contradiction, as pointed out by Solinger (1999), between the public perception of rural migrants as perpetrators of crime and the migrants’ own perceptions of themselves as victims of crime, in that police security accorded to urban residents is largely denied to the non-registered proportions of urban settlers. 9 One may note here the odd reproduction of the Chinese tradition of cellular urbanism through this essentially non-statist or effectively grassroots effort. If cellularity is generally assumed to derive from top-down efforts at maintaining state control (see Heng 1999 for one reading of this), what does it mean when non-state market processes yield similar socio-spatial results? That this is what the people are accustomed to? That this is the basic manner in which the residential development industry is organized, even in such an “informal” or non-statist realm? Or that the need for security as derived from collective residential development is as much a societal as a state impulse? One could perhaps argue that this scale of development derives from the particular political economy of informal development in this instance, with individual large land-owners (i.e. local villagers) becoming clientelistically tied to specific Zhejiang laoban who have the social and financial resources for undertaking this sort of development.

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 141 10 These terms have been advanced, in particular, in the work of Woolcock (1998), with social capital between members within a bounded group referred to as “bonding” social capital, as distinct from the “bridging” social capital which may exist between members of different groups. 11 Although we recognize that this is a relative term which may be contrasted to an extent with the emphasis placed by Xiang (1996) and Zhang (2001) on the non-state nature of Zhejiang Village’s development. 12 For further information on Quanzhou’s history and recent patterns of development, see: Abramson et al., 2002; Leaf 2002a; and Leaf and Abramson 2002. For more information on Dongmei Village in particular, see Abramson et al., 2000; and Leaf 2002b. 13 A similar urban example from Guangzhou is given in Leaf 2005. For more on the fiscal and economic practices of local administrative units, see also Guldin 2001. 14 One early theorist of informal urbanism, John Turner (1968), emphasized the distinction between inner city and peri-urban sites for settlement, by linking development in these two zones to the life-cycles and aspirations of new urbanites, with, in his terms, “bridgeheaders” locating in inner city sites, and “consolidators” clustered on the urban edge. The inter-relationships between employment availability and migrant life-cycle have spatial implications for migrant settlement in Chinese cities as well (Wu 2002).

References Abramson, D., Leaf, M. and Tan, Y. (2002) “Social Research and the Localization of Chinese Urban Planning Practice: Some Ideas from Quanzhou, Fujian”, in J. Logan (ed.) The New Chinese City: Globalization and Market Reform, London: Blackwell. Abramson, D., Leaf, M. and students of Plan 545 (2000) “Urban Development and Redevelopment in Quanzhou, China: A Field Studio Report”, Vancouver: Asian Urban Research Network Working Paper Series, UBC Center for Human Settlements. Béja, J.P. and Bonnin, M. (1995) “The Destruction of the Village”, China Perspectives, 2: 21–5. Brook, T. and Frolic, B.M. (eds.) (1997) Civil Society in China, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Chan, K.W. (1994) Cities with Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China, New York: Oxford University Press. Chang, S. (1996) “The Floating Population: An Informal Process of Urbanization in China”, International Journal of Population Geography, 2: 197–214. Cheek, T. (1998) “From Market to Democracy in China: Gaps in the Civil Society Model”, in J.D. Lindau, and T. Cheek (eds.) Market Economics and Political Change: Comparing China and Mexico, Lantham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Collier, D. (1976) Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ding, X.L. (1994) “Institutional Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China”, British Journal of Political Science, 24: 293–318. Doebele, W. (1977) “The Private Market and Low Income Urbanization in Developing Countries: The Pirate Subdivisions of Bogota”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 25(3): 531–64.

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142 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Douglass, M. (2001) “Civic Spaces in a Global Age: Proposal for Research in Pacific Asia Cities”, unpublished proposal. Fernandes, E. and Varley, A. (eds.) (1998) Illegal Cities: Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries, London: Zed Books. Frolic, B.M. (1997) “State-Led Civil Society”, in T. Brook, and B.M. Frolic (eds.) Civil Society in China, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Gaubatz, P.R. (1995) “Urban Transformation in Post-Mao China: Impacts of the Reform Era on China’s Urban Form”, in D.S. Davis, R. Kraus, B. Naughton, B. and E.J. Perry (eds.) Urban Spaces in Contemporary China, New York: Cambridge University Press. Gates, H. (1996) China’s Motor: A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Gilbert, A. (1981) “Pirates and Invaders: Land Acquisition in Urban Colombia and Venezuela”, World Development, 9(7): 657–78. Guldin, G.E. (2001) What’s a Peasant to Do? Village becoming Town in Southern China, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. He, B. (1997) The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Heng, C.K. (1999) Cities of Aristocrats and Bureaucrats: The Development of Medieval Chinese Cities, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Hsing, Y.T. (1998) Making Capitalism in China: The Taiwan Connection, New York: Oxford University Press. Leaf, M. (2005) “Modernity Confronts Tradition: the Professional Planner and Local Corporatism in the Rebuilding of China’s Cities”, in B. Sanyal (ed.) Comparative Planning Cultures, New York: Routledge. Leaf, M. (2002a) “Urban Development and the Search for Civil Society in China: A View from Quanzhou,” in S. Sargeson (ed.) Shaping Common Futures: Collective Goods and Collective Actions in East and Southeast Asia, London: Routledge. Leaf, M. (2002b) “A Tale of Two Villages: Globalization and Peri-Urban Change in China and Vietnam”, Cities, 19(1): 23–31. Leaf, M. (2000) “Globalization, Civil Society and Chinese Urban Development,” in T. Matsubara (ed.) Canada and Japan in the Pacific Rim Area: Proceedings of the Fifth Ritsumeikan-UBC Seminar, Kyoto: The Steering Committee of the Fifth RitsumeikanUBC Seminar, Ritsumeikan University. Leaf, M. (1998) “Urban Planning and Urban Reality under Chinese Economic Reforms”, Journal of Planning Education and Research, 18(2): 145–153. Leaf, M. (1995) “Inner City Redevelopment in China: Implications for the City of Beijing”, Cities, 12(1): 149–62. Leaf, M. and Abramson, D. (2002) “Global Networks, Civil Society and the Transformation of the Urban Core in Quanzhou, China,” in E. Heikkila and R. Pizarro (eds.) Southern California and the World, Westport, CT: Praeger. Liu, X.L. and Liang, W. (1997) “Zhejiangcun: Social and Spatial Implications of Informal Urbanization on the Periphery of Beijing”, Cities, 14(2): 95–108. Ma, L. and Xiang, B. (1998) “Native Place, Migration and the Emergence of Peasant Enclaves in Beijing”, The China Quarterly, 155: 546–81. Moser, C.O.N. (1982) “A Home of One’s Own: Squatter Housing Strategies in Guayaquil, Ecuador”, in A. Gilbert (ed.) Urbanization in Contemporary Latin America, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

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Civic space and integration in Chinese peri-urban villages 143 Oi, J. (1999) Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Potter, P.B. (1998) “Economic and Legal Reform in China: Whither Civil Society and Democratization,” in J.D. Lindau and T. Cheek (eds.) Market Economics and Political Change: Comparing China and Mexico, Lantham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Putnam, R.D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Scott, J.C. (1977) “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” in S.W. Schmidt et al. (eds.) Friends, Followers and Factions, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Scott, J.C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Shue, V. (1994) “State Power and Social Organization in China”, in J.S. Migdal, A. Kohli and V. Shue (eds.) State Power and Social Forces, New York: Cambridge University Press. Skinner, G.W. (1977) “Introduction: Urban Social Structure in Ch’ing China”, in G.W. Skinner (ed.) The City in Late Imperial China, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Smart, A. (1986) “Invisible Real Estate: Investigations into the Squatter Property Market”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 10(1): 29–45. Solinger, D. (1999) Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State and the Logic of the Market, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Soliner, D. (1995) “The Floating Population in the Cities: Chances for Assimilation”, in D.S. Davis, R. Kraus, B. Naughton and E.J. Perry (eds.) Urban Spaces in Contemporary China, New York: Cambridge University Press. Tsai, K.S. (2002) Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Turner, J.F.C. (1968) “Housing Patterns, Settlement Patterns, and Urban Development in Modernizing Countries”, Journal of the American Planning Association, 34(6): 354–63. UNCHS (United Nations Center for Human Settlements) (1990) The Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, Nairobi: UNCHS. Vernez, G. (1973) “Bogota’s Pirate Settlements: An Opportunity for Metropolitan Development”, doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. Walder, A.G. (1986) Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Society, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Wang, C.G. (1995) “Communities of ‘Provincials’ in the Large Cities: Conflicts and Integration”, China Perspectives, 2: 17–21. Webster, D. (2001) “Inside Out: Peri-urbanization in China”, unpublished paper, Stanford University Asia Pacific Research Center. White, G. (1996a) In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China, New York: Oxford University Press. White, G. (1996b) “The Dynamics of Civil Society in Post-Mao China”, in B. Hook (ed.) The Individual and the State in China, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Woolcock, M. (1998) “Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework”, Theory and Society, 27(2): 151–208. Wu, W.P. (2002) “Temporary Migrants in Shanghai: Housing and Settlement Patterns”, in J. Logan (ed.) The New Chinese City: Globalization and Market Reform, London, Blackwell.

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144 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Xiang, B. (1996) “How to Create a Visible ‘Non-State Space’ Through Migration and Marketized Traditional Networks: An Account of a Migrant Community in China,” paper presented at the International Conference on Chinese Rural Labor Force Mobility, Beijing, 25–27 June 1996. Yeh, A.G.O. and Wu, F.L. (1996) “The New Land Development Process and Urban Development in Chinese Cities”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 20(2): 330–53. Zhang, L. (2001) Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks within China’s Floating Population, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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8

The pavement as civic space History and dynamics in the city of Hanoi1 David Koh

Since the mid-1980s, the pavements of Hanoi have become keen spaces of contest between state and society. This contest was very visible, even pronounced in many places. Many people, including many former state employees, staked claims to pavement space where they had before respected the government’s regulations by a much larger measure. The key change occurred after 1990, when the market economy came into full play. Before economic freedom, the pavement had been relatively free of civil activity; by the late 1980s, such activity became a daily sight in Hanoi City, and a painful daily issue for Hanoi’s urban administrators. The push factors in the beginning were hyperinflation, economic restructuring and reduction of the state sector, which used to provide most of, if not all, the employment in Vietnam. People in Hanoi were joined by roaming vendors (hang rong) who came into the city from the villages to peddle farm produce. This was more the case after 1988 than before, because in 1988 the state liberalized the agriculture procurement system; peasants were allowed to sell their surpluses directly to the market after fulfilling state contracts. One could also see that market activity was not the only use people made of the pavement. In addition, especially in the 1980s and in older parts of the city where housing space for each family has been tight, many Hanoi residents reluctantly did their personal, family, and business chores on the pavement, including activities like personal hygiene tasks, washing, cooking, recreation and storing and displaying goods. These vending and household activities have had consequences for traffic safety, although they also make scenes on the pavement of Hanoi more colorful. Many pedestrians prefer to walk on the road because those pavement activities interrupt their walks on many busy streets. Pavement vending also causes interruptions, obstructions and hazards to traffic, because many motorists stop to make purchases (see Figure 8.1). Therefore, streets and pavements crowded with vending and household activities are more likely to cause traffic jams and accidents. Increased pavement vending, combined with huge increases in the number of vehicles on the road, poor driving habits and poor road infrastructure, are

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Figure 8.1 Motorcycles and vendors, Nguyen Du Street, Hanoi, Vietnam.

responsible for a big increase in the number of traffic accidents, especially serious and fatal ones. With a view to reducing traffic accidents, the Vietnamese party-state has been trying to enforce order on the pavement in Hanoi. Two major campaigns, held respectively in 1986 and 1991, achieved much less than ideal results. The government was disoriented and merely coping until the third major campaign in 1995 managed to restore some sort of order. But the problem has only been partially solved. At many points and many times, much pavement – and even road space – of the city has been taken over by pavement activities of the people, by the people, and for the people. On the other hand, consider this paradox: the party-state has an administrative machinery that goes down to one people’s committee ward for about every 10,000 residents, one party cell for about every 500, and one state agent for every 100 people in Hanoi (Koh 2000). Population density in Hanoi is high, and state agents and neighbors can notice every act that transgresses the law. More important is the point that the Vietnamese state sees this extensive machinery as its tool to better govern society microscopically. To a large extent, this machinery has failed to live up to its high expectations. This paper will examine the history of state-society contest over the pavement in Hanoi. It will then point out the salient dynamics of the pavement

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The pavement as civic space 147 contests, and then offer some thoughts on what kind of civic space is pavement space in Hanoi and how that impacts our thoughts about the relationship between civic space and civil society.

The serious traffic situation after 1975 There are many causes for the serious traffic situation after 1975. Some of the causes are direct, while others are indirect but provide the context in which the direct causes, one of which is pavement vending, are played out. One reason that has directed the Vietnamese government to install traffic and pavement campaigns has been the high number of fatalities and casualties. Elsewhere, I have laid out the reasons for the accidents, especially the high growth in vehicular traffic, bad road habits and poor infrastructure (Koh 2000). This paper will focus on efforts to tackle pavement congestion. Vending activities on streets and pavement in Hanoi have contributed to the constriction of road space. Trading on the pavement is not something new. For instance, the selling of food on the pavement has been seen in Hanoi for a long time, at least since the beginning of this century (Thach Lam 1943). In the late 1950s, pavement food operators numbered more than 10,000 across the city (Tran Huy Lieu 1960: 290). As a result of socialist policies from the 1950s to 1980s, which banned all purely private enterprises in the commerce sector, the pavement foodstalls had largely disappeared by 1960 (Ly Kien Quoc 1975: 23). Then came the rapid expansion of private trading activities in the 1980s, especially the sale of secondhand goods. In the middle of 1982, observers noted the appearance of illegal pavement markets selling secondhand goods along main streets such as Ngo Thi Nham (where the Hom market that sold fresh produce was located), Nguyen Cong Tru and Tran Nhat Duat (beside the old railway station at Long Bien Bridge). Later, the range of goods went beyond secondhand goods to the full range of fresh produce as well as cooked food, snacks, beverages, and even controlled items such as beer. Sellers took over the whole pavement, and on some streets where traffic was still not too heavy, they even traded on the streets (Nguyen Xuan 1982). The Nguyen Cong Tru market later developed into the famous and sprawling Open Market (Cho Troi), specializing in secondhand, stolen and smuggled goods, as well as electrical tools and appliances. Indeed, the many lanes within this market vanish and consolidate into a huge market area in the day, making the whole area impassable to traffic. Official figures on the number of private traders on the pavement are not available, but figures on the private sector’s share of trade may provide some clues. The share of the private sector in the total volume of trade in Hanoi jumped from 25.8 percent in 1975 to 50.6 percent in 1983, showing a temporary slowdown in increase only in 1981 (So Van hoa Thong tin and Thanh pho Ha Noi 1984: 91). The party-state looked upon the growth in private sector trade disapprovingly but could not stop it (To Huu 1980).

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148 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia After 1975, the city authorities repeatedly promulgated pavement and traffic regulations, beginning with 971 QD/UBHC on April 1981. In particular, in 1984, for the first time, the city authorities stated that pavements were for walking on; other uses required approval from the Hanoi Department of Transportation and Urban Public Works (Giao thong Cong Chinh, henceforth GTCC) and fees would be charged. That indicated the beginning of an official state side to the pavement space contest in Hanoi. Before 1995, there had been at least three significant national campaigns to mobilize the people to help keep the streets clear and traffic orderly.

The first two traffic and pavement order campaigns: 1983–1991 The first known large scale campaign which had a traffic and pavement order component in the post-1975 era in Hanoi was one called “Tidy Houses, Clean Streets, Beautiful Capital” (gon nha – sach pho – dep thu do) in 1983. Clearing the pavement for pedestrians was one of many objectives of the Hanoi campaign (Tran Dung and Vu Long 1983) In Hanoi, the ward authorities are the basic level of urban state administration. They were responsible for implementation and enforcement, with the help of their self-defense militia and mass organizations. Pavement appropriators and squatters were given reprieves and a deadline to clear out. Not much else is known about this campaign unfortunately, but at that time the traffic situation was not as serious as it was in later years. In 1986, the national government started a national pavement and traffic order campaign called “404.” No reason was given officially for the campaign but it was probably a response to the worsening traffic order situation. The 404 campaign, named after the serial number of the government directive, mandated every ward in Hanoi to set up a “Team 404.” Each team consisted of ward officials, including the police, public works, and market management sections; neighborhood leaders such as party cell and resident group leaders; and mass organization representatives within the ward. The policemen received their orders directly from the District; they then coordinated their work with the 404 teams (P.V. 1986; Kim Dung 1988). The tone of implementation, however, was to educate rather than punish; ward authorities sought to establish practices in each resident cluster that promoted education, and awareness, as well as peer pressure. Resident group heads and mass organization representatives who worked under the wards’ direction briefed households under their charge of the traffic rules and penalties, and what to do or not do within their locality. Another method used was mobilization by mass organizations and neighborhood leaders. For instance, the Ho Chi Minh Youth Group (there is a branch of the Group in every ward) roped in its members to patrol the

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The pavement as civic space 149 streets during the peak hours (Nguyen Trieu 1988; P.V. and Quang Nghia 1983). Mobilization was only reinforced with regular patrols by a team of regular ward inspectors, directed by the police. In 1988, the City legislated heftier fines for offenses against its “Regulations on fines for traffic order and safety in the City of Hanoi,” indicating that a stronger deterrent was required and the pavement and traffic situation probably got worse (Uy ban Nhan dan Thanh pho Ha Noi 1988). Other indicators were vigorous complaints from journalists about the huge growth in numbers of pavement vendors who operated without licenses from the city authorities. A GTCC official explained to the Ha Noi Moi,2 the Hanoi daily newspaper, that his office was shorthanded, that sometimes pavement situations were out of control and had to be ignored. However, the media and the public were of the view that the disorder on the pavement was due to the GTCC and the ward administrators, especially the ward police “selling” pavement space. GTCC and ward officials, according to critics, were turning a blind eye in exchange for bribes for individual law enforcers or kickbacks for their organizations. These allegations were neither denied nor confirmed by the same GTCC official, whose answers were evasive. Meanwhile, other newspaper sources made the same allegations (Thanh Chi 1991; Nguyen Quang Hoa 1991). Incompetence and corruption, however, were only parts of the picture. At least four other reasons explain why the situation worsened. First, the GTCC officials were unable to cope with the growth in numbers of pavement vendors. Private sector trade was legitimized after the Sixth VCP National Congress in 1986. The growth in pavement vending was also due to many people turning to trading on the pavement to fight hyperinflation using the quickest, if not the most effective, way. In 1991, it was estimated that the pavement economy could have employed 23,000 people, more than double the number of pavement breakfast operators in the late 1950s (Nguyen Quang Hoa 1991). Whether to crack down strictly on unlicensed operators posed a big dilemma for authorities. Vendors on the pavement were being gainfully employed in the difficult economic environment. The vendors were of course causing much disruption in social order on the streets, but the trade-off for a more orderly pavement was fewer jobs, which would undermine political stability. Second, the GTCC bureaucracy was hindering applications for licenses to use the pavement for trading. The bureaucratic delays they caused persuaded many pavement vendors that they should not bother with applying for official licenses, and success was not guaranteed anyway. Instead, vendors bribed ward officials to mediate and ignore their activities. Potential license applicants saw many unlicensed vendors not being fined or dealt with, or were dealt with by the ward only periodically and sparingly. Vendors then decided formal licenses were inferior to the mediation method (Nguyen Quang Hoa 1991). Some illegal vendors received special treatment based on family ties and friendship, whereas other illegal

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150 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia vendors paid the ward or ward officials in order to stay open for business (Nguyen Chi Tinh 1991). Many vendors with neither licenses nor connections were willing to be “fined” periodically, indicating that their profits were quite attractive and could absorb the cost of fines or bribes, or both. Third, law enforcers were also facing stiff resistance from pavement vendors, many of whom persisted on the pavement because proper markets that could house them were insufficient (Dinh Huong Son 1990; Nguyen Chi Tinh 1991). Many vendors, especially roaming vendors, did not want to obtain a regular seat in the regular markets because of the overheads. Places were also insufficient, and residents of Hanoi were given priority in their allocation (Tran Hung 1997). A policeman of the Truong Dinh Ward referred to the roaming vendors from the villages who faced a similar situation: Soon, when we enforce the new regulations on fines [in 1988 for traffic and pavement order] it would be easy to deal with motorists or with people with pushcarts, but as for the women who are selling vegetables and fruits [on the pavement] in the early mornings beside the Mo market, it would be very difficult to enforce rules. They strive to sell as much as possible so as to get back to their farm work. They cannot find places in the market. When we chase after them and they move on to sit at the junctions, they then become the victims of petty thievery. Every ward is facing the same problem and trying to look for a solution. (Kim Dung 1988) Ward policemen were also afraid of pushing the pavement people too hard. For instance, a government official said a good way of maintaining police authority on the pavement was to make sure they did not have to face challenges from consumers and vendors at the same time, especially during the peak hours of traffic and market activity. Ward policemen thus usually operated two daily shifts to patrol the pavement. The first shift started well before six o’clock in the morning and focused on preventive action: they let roaming vendors and residents use the pavement, but asked the users to tidy up before the peak hour period, from eight to nine in the morning (Nguyen Chi Tinh 1991). Fourth, ward officials were lax because they were responding to local needs. To them and their residents, pavement vendors brought the convenience of a larger array of goods and services to their doorsteps. This convenience was important for housewives and shopkeepers who did not want to go too far to the market for their daily marketing. People who are on their way to or from work usually preferred to do their daily marketing on their motorcycles or bicycles for convenience, and they preferred to stop where there were pavement vendors rather than park and walk into markets. Their interests coincided with those of pavement vendors (Tran

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The pavement as civic space 151 Hung 1997). The case of Trang Tien Ward demonstrated how wards may have responded to local needs. In that ward, a regular but illegal and disorderly fresh produce market met on Nguyen Khac Can Street. Roaming vendors there often took over the whole street as well as its pavement. On average, there were two to three traffic accidents a day whose causes were traced to the market crowd. However, instead of clearing the vendors from the street market, the ward made its own internal decision against city regulations to allow the market to continue, with the condition that it conducted business in an orderly fashion. The ward’s reason was that residents in the area needed the street market as there was no proper market in that area (Ton Xuan Thich 1988). Poor results of implementation of the “404” campaign, therefore, seemed to be related to the overwhelming socio-economic situation, other than just corruption. Regulations for pavement usage, such as requiring formal licenses for vending activities, did not make life easier for various groups of people in society who needed extra income badly. Consequently, voices for changing the pavement regime emerged from the middle of 1990. The Ha Noi Moi reflected public opinion that the 1984 central government regulation of allowing only pedestrian activity on the pavement was unrealistic (1990). Following that, the GTCC experimented with allowing licensed vending on certain streets and lanes in Hanoi, but not on Hanoi’s major roads. In the middle of 1991, the Hanoi City People’s Council debated on GTCC’s experiment and agreed the GTCC could issue licenses for limited business use of the pavement. The criteria to be used by the GTCC for deciding which roads to exclude or include were the condition and width of the pavement (Nguyen Chi Tinh 1991). This change in policy generated an immense response from society. Trading business license applicants increased from only 28,000 in 1989 to 53,000 in 1991, and a large number of them applied to operate on the pavement (Tien Phu & Phan Tuong 1993). From mid-1990, when the GTCC began its experiment, until December 1991, the GTCC issued 9,000 pavement vending licenses, or 16 per day, which was about 37 percent of the total number of pavement vendors (Nguyen Quang Hoa 1991). These city level adaptations that softened the governmental regulations were, however, reversed several months later in December 1991 by a new nationwide traffic and pavement order campaign (Decree 135/CT). To implement the national government decree, the Hanoi City People’s Council issued an order called the 57/UB.

The 57/UB (December 1991) The objectives of 57/UB were to prevent further growth of legitimate pavement vending and to restore order on the pavement. The city directive stopped the issuing of new pavement vending licenses, except for applicants whose families were in genuine financial difficulties.

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152 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Furthermore, the 57/UB required business entities to have a shop front if they wanted to provide services (Ha Noi Moi 1991), but it was clear the government could not apply the rule to thousands of petty service providers such as bicycle repairers and motorcycle taxi drivers, just to name two of them. The policy reversals were probably caused by the fear that licensed traders would overwhelm the pavement, making the problem worse, not better. By then, licensed business users of the pavement could prove difficult to remove from the pavement, if it was ever necessary to do so. To implement 57/UB, the city administration emphasized mobilization and education rather than strict enforcement. In 35 localities across Hanoi where the traffic situation was particularly pressing, the City police patrolled with 35 “self-management teams.” Each team member received 30,000 dong per month (about US$3 at that time) for helping the police patrol streets, dealing with traffic offenses and accidents and for resolving social conflicts among residents (caused by competition in use of the pavement) (ibid). The teams worked only during peak hours in the morning and in the late afternoon-early evening (Bui Ba Manh 1991). They did not have legal powers to enforce the law; the maximum extent of their capability was to remind people of the rules and to threaten reporting the offenders who did not follow the rules (Le Phuong Hien 1992). Most if not all the team members were people who were middle-aged, army veterans, unemployed youths or members of families who were poor. Thus, the exercise also looked like one that sought to create employment. Instead of establishing “self-management” teams, some wards chose to utilize the existing “people’s defense force” (dan phong), which comprised mainly war veterans, to assist the police. The city authorities also asked the wards to use a few other mobilization methods. One method, which has stayed a feature of mobilization in the implementation of many party-state policies, was to ask all residents and people in work places to sign a pledge (giay cam ket). By signing the pledge, signatories acknowledged that they had been briefed by a ward official of the 57/UB rules. They promised compliance, and if found wanting, had to accept punishment without question. Other than individual residents, people in workplaces – including private businesses – were also asked to sign the pledge (Tran Que Thuong 1992a, 1992b). Another method of mobilization was to use the public address system to announce daily messages, reminders and important notices of the ward to residents. The timing of addresses was usually at half-past seven in the morning, and half past four in the afternoon. Each address lasted about half an hour. Most reports on the implementation of the 57/UB by Hanoi’s wards saw immediate improvements. The City administration claimed initial successes for the 57/UB campaign (Phan Thi Boi Hoan 1992; Tran Que Thuong 1992a; Kim Dung 1992; Phan Tuong 1993). The combination of mainly mobilization methods, peak hour direction by the police at busy junctions and roads, and daily attention from the wards and the districts extracted

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The pavement as civic space 153 results. Immediately after 57/UB took effect, appropriation of the pavement almost ceased, indicating the effectiveness of the ward party-state machinery, if it did focus on the job. In the Hoan Kiem District the transformation was particularly stark, because pavement offenses and traffic disorder were most serious in this center of trade (Vu Dinh Hoanh 1993). Some wards such as Cat Linh reported a more orderly traffic situation after the self-management teams went into action (Le Phuong Hien 1992). Most people, however, were pessimistic about the 57/UB campaign remaining effective for long. True enough, around three months after implementation started, complaints about the return to disorder began to pour in (Nguyen Van Xay 1992: 1). Ward officials were reportedly “tired” and not paying attention to the daily routines of supervision and checking on management of pavement; diligence separated wards that had implemented the 57/UB effectively from those who had not. Because of the shortage of hands, follow-up action by ward officials to maintain order was very weak (Kim Dung 1992; Tuong Anh 1992; Thanh Hung 1992). A few interviews I conducted among Hanoi’s residents who witnessed the pavement situation in the early 1990s suggested at that time the pavement of streets such as Lo Duc and Nguyen Cong Tru were full of stalls, so much so that one could never stroll smoothly without coming across obstacles or being forced to walk on the street (Fieldnotes 26/11/1996; 28/11/1996; 18/12/1996). These two streets were, moreover, not the hottest spots of disorder in Hanoi. There were two main weaknesses of the 57/UB. The first was the unevenness of implementation. The observant noted that policy implementation had been “administratized” (hanh chinh hoa), meaning that the policy had an impact only during office hours, when ward policemen and inspectors were still present on the streets (Phan Thi Boi Hoan 1992; Thanh Hung 1992; Thuy Hang 1993). After office hours, pavement vendors came back onto the pavement in full force. Furthermore, when offenders were caught, some were dealt with strictly, while others were let off. In some wards, officials even completely ignored the pavement situation. The uneven treatment happened sometimes on the same street, such as when two or several wards shared one long street. For instance, on the eastern side of Le Duan Road was the Cua Nam Ward of the Hoan Kiem District. The Ward was strict in preventing spontaneous street markets from forming around the proper Cua Nam market. On the western side of the same stretch of the road 200 meters away, however, the Van Mieu Ward of Dong Da District ignored disorganized markets at the entrance to the Tran Qui Cap railway station. “This made the people have different opinions about law enforcers – that this one was good, the other was bad . . .” (Kim Dung 1992). Unevenness devalued the impact of mobilization, because people saw no need to obey government policies if officials played favorites (Thanh Thuy 1994). There were also indicators that the unevenness was because ward authorities “sold” pavement space, such as in Nguyen Du ward

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154 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia where the owners of a cafe took over the recreation space previously reserved for school students but they were never dealt with by the ward authority (Thanh Thuy 1994). This lease of public space has been researched by Peter Higgs (1996). While the unevenness was thought by journalists to be caused by ward officials “selling” pavement space, it was not necessarily so all the time (Thanh Mai 1992a). Instead, unevenness might have reflected the contradictory pulls in different directions by public opinion, city-level decision-makers and ward implementers. Essentially the tension was about a choice between enforcing rules strictly or in a flexible manner. Some people favored a total ban of pavement vendors, but their opposition thought a total ban meant that housewives had to walk further to satisfy daily marketing needs and had to subject themselves to higher prices in the proper markets if there was no competition from the pavement. Furthermore, where would the vendors go, and what would they do to earn a living? Housewives and vendors were happy with lax wards such as Nguyen Du, but residents who did not earn their living on the pavement complained of congestion and disorder and wished that the Nguyen Du Ward authority were stricter (Tran Que Thuong 1992b, Vu Dinh Hoanh 1993).3 Evidently, the wards have had a role in fine-tuning the party-state policy. According to journalists and officials, ward officials could assess the needs of each and every neighborhood and decide whether some roaming vendors should be allowed total freedom on smaller streets at marketing hours if they were not likely to affect traffic conditions. The best example of such a peak-hour-only market after 1996 would be Le Ngoc Han Street, which is not a major traffic artery but parallel to one. During marketing hours, the whole street is turned into a market and vehicles are not allowed to enter. This market was used to channel all roaming vendors from the very busy Lo Duc Street just next to it. Because this was an informal arrangement, roaming vendors objected to my taking photographs of the scene. The ward could report on the situation to the upper levels, and make suggestions to fine-tune the policy. The result of such feedback led to a suggestion by the City Police Department to the city authorities to allow some 20 markets, which had been formed by pavement vendors, to be recognized as permanent markets. Fifty-two other such markets were classified as temporary (meaning they were illegal but tolerated) and thus also allowed to continue operations (Vu Dinh Hoanh 1993). Within two years of implementation, in the Hai Ba Trung District, 62,790 pavement businesses were relocated to markets successfully (Phan Tuong 1993). Part of the “credit” for the continued freedom of pavement vendors goes to the vendors themselves. Because of their experience with previous campaigns, most vendors were able to gain the upper hand over policemen and inspectors. They adopted a wait-and-see attitude when the 57/UB began;

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The pavement as civic space 155 several days after the [57/UB] campaign was started, at the stalls which had appropriated [the pavement], the sheds which had been taken apart, their owners used nylon [sheets] to cover or close up temporarily. Who can be sure that the sheds would not become active again, or return to these places, when the private businesses [insist to] carry on displaying their wares for sale at the same places as well? (Thanh Mai 1992b) After the initial fervor of the campaign had died down, pavement vendors reverted to their old ways, slowly and cautiously (Tuong Anh 1992). Using a method similar to the way people built illegal sheds and houses on public land, They appropriated upon the pavement using the “impose and extend” method, a little bit every day, and slowly becoming bolder, making the situation “comfortable to the eye” not just to the business owners but also to enforcement personnel as well. When the latter bothered to stop and look closely, the pavement was already full of goods. Everybody wanted to expand their spaces, people fought with each other for places to sit which caused disorder, traffic jams and traffic accidents. Ward police numbers were just too few and spread too thin; they were often ineffective. (Le Phuong Hien 1992) A survey done in two Hanoi wards (not mentioned by name in the source) by the Hanoi Police Department in 1992 revealed that 100 percent of vendors who gathered in illegal markets, on pavement and streets in those two wards responded with “lack of concern” (khong quan tam) for the 57/UB, and 35 percent of respondents knowingly offended rules that prohibited pavement vending (Nguyen Xuan Yem 1995). The situation in 1994 was worrisome to the government. In 1993 as well as 1994 the accident figures showed that, on average, every five days in Hanoi four persons died and six were injured in traffic accidents (Kim Lien 1994). In the first half of 1995, the number of traffic accidents in Hanoi ballooned to 3,100, and the number of dead and injured was 1,429 and 2,326 respectively. These figures, if correct, meant an average of 13 traffic deaths per day in those six months. The government linked the worsening situation to pavement vending, with a new government campaign, the 36/CP, continuing to target pavement vendors as a cause of traffic accidents (SRV 1995).

The 36/CP, May 1995 Preparatory work for the 36/CP was extensive. The government promulgated the decree in late May 1995 but, in contrast to the style of implementation in past campaigns, delayed the effective date till 1 August 1995.

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156 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia It was to give people and state agencies more time to prepare and get used to the new campaign. During the months of transition, the mass media did its part by holding special programs and quizzes to promote awareness. Every day, television stations fed audiences with traffic rules and news on major traffic events. The government also used long-established propaganda methods, such as putting up huge posters, hanging red banners with slogans across streets, and erecting painted panels on all major roads. A steering committee for 36/CP was established at every level of state administration and every government agency (Ha Noi Moi 1995b; Bui Danh Luu 1995). The 36/CP was implemented at all levels well before the effective date, and all offenses were forgiven in the approximately two months leading up to the effective date of 1 August 1995. All efforts were to make sure that on the effective day, a fundamental change in traffic order was already in place (K.D. 1995). In terms of market management, the 36/CP granted City authorities the right to make some exceptions on designated streets to allow display and sale of goods, although in principle all pavements and roads could only be used for the purposes of commuting and traffic. The Hanoi administration managed to disperse 21 illegal street markets causing traffic jams (K.D. 1995). Plans were to disperse another 16 that had caused less urgent traffic problems, although this matter pended on local authorities to draw up plans on relocation of vendors, indicating possible resistance from the districts and wards who were more concerned with the livelihood and marketing convenience issues. At the neighborhood level, the government continued to ask wards to use mobilization methods. Many meetings to publicize the 36/CP were carried out among the people (K.D. 1995; Ha Noi Moi 1995b). Wards distributed materials published by the city to publicize the 36/CP, and utilized the loudspeaker system to remind people of the “do’s and don’ts” at particular points of congestion in the wards. On a daily basis as well, groups of volunteers of the ward, especially the “storm troopers,” (doi xung kich) patrolled streets and reminded people about pavement and traffic rules (Vinh Yen 1995). All households, especially those who had a shopfront facing the street, were asked to sign a pledge that required them to ensure that there was always a corridor wide enough for pedestrians to use (Nhom Phong Vien 1995; P.V. 1996). During the grace period, offenders who were forgiven were asked to sign a pledge and promise not to repeat offenses (Thu Huong 1995; Manh Hung 1995). However, under the 36/CP, Hanoi’s wards went beyond mobilization to emphasize self-regulation at the neighborhood levels, through further development of the “self-management” model. Making households responsible for the portion of the pavement in front of their houses is a method already mentioned. Several other variants of the “self-management” teams, first used under the 57/UB, also appeared. One variant was called the “Self-Managed Family Groups” (nhom lien gia tu quan). Each of these

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The pavement as civic space 157 mutual-help and self-policing groups consisted of seven to ten neighboring households. Its members adopted rules of the 36/CP, and where necessary, provided separate rules and agreements among themselves to tackle special pavement order problems specific to the group’s area. With the backing of the ward’s authority, these groups were able to enforce rules on fellow residents. In this way, the police were kept out, and minor offenses were dealt with within the group. The authorities hoped that such selfpolicing would cultivate considerate pavement habits for the future (Kim Dung 1995). The same self-management method was extended to private businesses, state agencies and enterprises (P.Q. 1996b). Another variant of “self-management” was to have an “alliance” between the schools and the ward authority to deal with traffic and pavement problems caused by schools. Most schools of Hanoi are located on narrow streets and the crowd of students and parents in front of the school gate waiting for pickup or for friends pose traffic hazards and jams. Learning centers and tuition centers also produce the same problems in the early and mid-evening. In August 1995 the Hang Trong Ward pioneered the “alliance” model by arranging to have the schools publicize the 36/CP and using citizen education periods to promote awareness. The schools informed the ward what time school dismissed and even arranged for parents to pick up their children at a place that was further away from the school, but possessed wider space for parking and waiting. The schools helped the wards by spacing out the dismissal times at 15 minute intervals (P.Q. 1996b). Other wards with schools on busy streets also practised this method, such as Pham Dinh Ho Ward with a school on the Lo Duc Street, Nguyen Du ward with a school on Tran Xuan Soan Street, and Hang Bai ward with the school on Ly Thuong Kiet Street. One member of the public commented that the 36/CP was the best public policy ever implemented in terms of effectiveness because it had the personal attention of the Prime Minister (Vinh Yen 1995). Indeed, in its first month the 36/CP proved much more effective than all its predecessors, and much credit went to its intensive and extensive preparations. The Minister for Traffic and Transport noted that the 36/CP had created a mood of voluntary compliance, something that the government had failed to accomplish in the past. The good result was unexpected (“bat ngo”) (Bui Danh Luu 1995). Most of the newspaper reports on implementation of the 36/CP in Hanoi noted its success. Many foreigners on return visits to Hanoi after the 36/CP started have told me that traffic order and cleanliness had improved tremendously. The success of the 36/CP could be measured quantitatively by the fact that in Hanoi, one month after implementation began, there were only 27 accidents, causing 14 dead and 24 injured, a substantial reduction compared to monthly averages before the 36/CP was implemented (P.V. 1995; Bui Danh Luu 1995; Nguyen Quang Hoa 1995). However, the media and members of the public did not believe that the good, orderly situation in the early days of the 36/CP would last, even though generally people supported the policy. They called the expected

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158 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia phenomenon “elephant head, rat tail” (dau voi duoi chuot), a term that described something that started with a bang but was never followed-up or done thoroughly (Minh Duc 1997). That worry was later proven valid. Two months into the campaign, many readers of the Ha Noi Moi wrote in to complain that the streets and pavements of Hanoi had become disorderly again. In many places, vendors and residents again openly flouted rules right under street signs which prohibited those offenses (Thanh Chi 1995). After adopting a wait-and-see attitude for two months, during which they stayed low, unlicensed vendors cautiously re-emerged. Their new setups became more modest and mobile, so as to be ready for any police swoop which they no doubt kept a keen look-out for (Nguyen Truong Giang 1995). Upon seeing the police within 50 meters away, they packed up quickly and dashed for the small lanes, or got up and pretended to be walking and carrying their products somewhere, which was not an offence. In the evenings when dusk fell, however, fresh produce sellers usually could stand on street corners without fear of being harassed by police. Policemen and “self-management” team members did not work overtime; so cooked food stalls usually emerged in the evening to take advantage of “administratization” (Nguyen Quang Hoa 1995). The Hang Da market area is the best example. Shops that normally displayed their wares within shops in the day put goods out on the pavement in the evenings. Cafes all around the City put out their stools and coffee tables onto the pavement when night arrived. Basically, at certain times of day and in the night, the pavement was unaffected by the 36/CP. I frequently observed implementation of 36/CP around the Ngo Thi Nham, Dong Nhan, Nguyen Cong Tru wards, the Hang Da and Hom markets and within the city center. I found that the police and “self-management” teams were very active between eight o’clock to eleven o’clock in the morning, and between four o’clock and six o’clock in the evening. They were usually not seen in these areas at other hours at all. The city police department did informal surveys across the whole city five months after the 36/CP began, and found that all pavement on 180 streets surveyed usually saw the pavement economy come to life in the early mornings and late evenings (Tien Chinh 1996). Evidently, the local authorities have no choice but to allow the situation to return to chaos after office hours because of the lack of manpower. Here, I would like to divide up the analysis of reasons for the limitations of the campaign into those that pertain specifically to the 36/CP and those that underlaid every major traffic order policy in the City of Hanoi. One of the problems with the 36/CP was that while the high level of fines was meant to deter offenders, this had no effect on the intention of vendors to trade on the pavement. Because the minimum fine was 50,000 dong, roaming vendors who sold cheap fresh produce usually did not bother to retrieve their goods after the goods were confiscated. The cost of their products was usually only 10,000 dong, a more bearable loss than the fines

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The pavement as civic space 159 when we consider that their daily profit was only 10,000 to 20,000 dong (Nguyen Quang Hoa 1995; Bich Huu & Bich Huong 1997). Furthermore, because inspection work was uneven and irregular, vendors knew that if they kept off the well-inspected streets during office hours and were sharp enough, they stood a good chance of not ever being caught. Even when the policemen were on hand, they were able to wrangle with the police in order to free themselves. There was no way to make a fine stick with the offending individual, and no penalty can thus be effectively demanded if the offender does not come forward. While people applauded efforts to clear the pavement and make roads safer, many people were also unhappy with the many inconveniences the 36/CP caused. People had to take care of how they parked their vehicles to keep the walkways clear, when there was no such need and nobody had any authority to tell them how to park their vehicles before. People could no longer carry out activities on the pavement which they would rather not do within their homes – such as washing of vehicles, or clothes, even though they could still do so at night, after office hours. Businesses could no longer use the pavement as their daytime warehouses or workshops. Having to move things into the house during the day limited the scale of their business and pushed them into size constraints within the house (Fieldnotes 28/11/1996). At the household level, the 36/CP also reduced convenience for some housewives because not every street and ward allowed roaming vendors. The view from the ward was that it was given a huge task that was impossible to enforce properly and faithfully without adequate manpower (Nguyen Quang Hoa 1995). “Administratization” and unevenness in implementation were related to inadequate compensation for ward policemen and ward patrol team members. For example, a member of the “selfmanagement team” – not considered a state employee – was paid 200,000 dong per month in 1995.4 Compare that with the “official” monthly remuneration of ward officials and some other wage earners in 1996/97 by referring to Table 8.1. The amount of formal income that ward officials, ward policemen and members of the “self-management teams” earn is not enough to maintain decent living standards for a household of four persons. The open secret in Vietnam is: Most party-state employees at any level of government would have some source of side income which they spent time acquiring after or even during office hours. For this fact, Vietnamese have an idiom that says, “The outer leg is longer than the inner leg (chan ngoai dai hon chan trong),” with “outer leg” referring to the informal economy and “inner leg” referring to formal employment. Most officials of the ward would be no different. Furthermore, because of the lack of funds, “selfmanagement” team members were not required to do a whole day’s work, let alone overtime. Some wards even reported shortage of funds for the policemen’s overtime pay or to buy printed copies of the 36/CP (each

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160 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Table 8.1 Approximate salary levels of a sample of officials of a ward and some other low-salary earners in non-ward employment, circa 1997. Job

Approximate official salary or income per month (dong)

Trishaw drivers

300,000 to 500,000 (Minh Quang & Pham Hieu 1997)

Roaming vendors

300,000 and above (10,000 to 20,000 per day)

Road sweepers

700,000 to 1,000,000 (Thu Thuy 1996)

State cadres*

140,000 starting salary (Head of a Section got around 450,000.)

Ward policemen

300,000 onwards (A policemen in service for about ten years already received close to 1 million per month.)

Chairman of people’s committee

390,000 (after twenty years of service)

Ward doctor

300,000 (about five to ten years of service)

Resident group head

50,000

Assistant resident group head

30,000

Ward party secretary

450,000 (more than twenty years of service)

Party cell secretary

30,000

Retirees

200,000 (Retired senior ranks from the armed services, such as a Senior Colonel (dai Ta) got about 1,000,000.)

Source: From various local sources compiled by author. Note: Jobs in italics are directly in party-state employment. Road sweepers are employed by state companies and I consider them to be indirectly under state employment. The statistics were gathered from newspaper reports, interviews, and conversations with ward officials and many friends who were state cadres.

ward had to buy its own from the official publisher, the Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, or National Politics Publishing House) to distribute to every policeman (Nguyen Quang Hoa 1995). Such a situation encouraged many pavement vendors to switch to vending at night or during daylight hours when ward officials paid no attention. For instance, one only needs to walk, during breakfast time as well as lunch time, around government offices in the middle of Hanoi to see temporary food stalls appearing on the pavement. Food stalls or shops also appropriate the pavement with extra tables and chairs. In fact, the operator of my favorite noodles stall, Phuong, operates the whole morning and early afternoon, but between half past eight and eleven o’clock in the morning, which are the hours of police inspections, she moves into a small lane. From six o’clock to half past eight in the morning, and from eleven o’clock to two in the afternoon, she mostly operates without harassment. Her working hours are the result of an informal understanding between her and the ward on how best to balance her economic needs and the

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The pavement as civic space 161 need to maintain order on the pavement. She has to meet with the leadership of the ward once a month “to work” (lam viec), a term for the monthly meeting with the ward at which her situation is assessed. At the meeting, she may have to pay formal and informal taxes.

Underlying factors The chief difficulty experienced by the Hanoi city in ensuring order on the streets and pavement is still the road infrastructure of the city. Major traffic arteries attract people to set up businesses as well as attract vendors. Therefore, expanding the present carrying capacity of roads and streets within the city heavily used by traffic is a major task. Official measurements of present road usage rate may underestimate the real situation. In 1995, a Hanoi city official cited a government survey of 137 Hanoi traffic junctions that found 46.3 percent of traffic junctions had a flow rate of 300 vehicles per hour (5 per minute), 34.55 percent had 300–500 per hour (5–8.3 per minute) and 13.5 percent had the highest range of 500–800 per hour (8.3–13.3 per minute) (Vu Dinh Hoanh 1995). People who have lived in Hanoi along busy streets and know its major roads at busy hours may consider these figures low. For my own curiosity, in December 1995, at about four o’clock in the afternoon, close to evening peak hours, I stood on Lo Duc Street, across from the walls of the Ministry of Forestry and Development of Agriculture, to count the traffic flow rate. The road width was about seven meters with traffic going in two directions. Lo Duc was a fairly busy street with schools, markets, lots of shops, and was a major artery linking the city center to the southeast corner of the city that was witnessing rapid residential development. I counted an average of 60 vehicles (all types included) per minute passing in either direction. That amounted to 3,600 vehicles per hour, about four times the highest official estimate. The second major, underlying difficulty is that a vast number of people depend on pavement vending in varying degrees for their livelihood. Economic difficulties in the late 1980s forced many people to “burst out” (bung ra) onto the pavement to make a living or to make enough to cover what was lost though inflation. As a result, whether it was a deliberate directive from the top or merely the awareness of officials at lower levels, ward officials have believed that people must be given some breathing space in these difficult times. One ward chairman noted, “The people can row the boat, but they can overturn the boat as well . . . The political authority must be flexible; the people cannot take it if it is too tough.” [“Dan la nguoi cheo thuyen, cung la nguoi lat thuyen . . . Chinh quyen phai biet co gian, qua cung thi nguoi dan khong chiu noi.”] (Fieldnotes, 17/5/1997) At the same time, however, the policemen were also afraid of eliciting adverse reactions from large groups of people who depended on the pavement for livelihood, although it depended on the ability of the vendors to stay their ground. When I asked an informant why she thought traffic order in Hanoi was not ideal, she said,

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162 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia In Vietnam, it is difficult to order people around. The law is only for people who are obedient. Those who are not obedient often have a powerful way to escape compliance. The simplest traffic order example to see this difference is to contrast the women selling vegetables from two baskets hanging from a pole, with the man selling fruits on pushbikes. When the ladies are ordered by the policemen to clear the pavement or the streets, they would usually move on. But the men, being men and stronger, could refuse. If the policemen try to use force, force would be used in return, and so the policemen have no choice but to leave those men alone. Such daily occurrences are a reminder to people that if one has power, one may stay above the law. (Fieldnotes 10/3/1997) The awareness that people cannot be pushed too hard is now evident in the decisions that the party-state makes. The 36/CP contained a provision whereby city authorities should make sure that adequate amount of pavement space is allocated to vendors to cater to marketing conveniences and livelihood for roaming vendors. On 20 October 1995, via Decision 3814/ QD-UB, the city authority officially allowed some vendor trading on 57 streets and small lanes of Hanoi, and provided the conduct of vending followed five guiding principles (Ha Noi Moi 1995a). These principles were not published but I gather from observation they were the following: • • • • •

vendors should be from poor families; they should not contribute to traffic disorder (and thus would be allowed only at certain times of the day); they should not be allowed where the pavement is too narrow; they should clean up any rubbish at the end of the day; and they should pay taxes to the ward.

The city also allowed retirees (whose pensions were not sufficient to sustain them) to sell lottery tickets on pavement stalls. Motorists stopped at their stalls freely without being harassed by policemen. But the retirees’ plight was addressed only after the Ha Noi Moi urged the city authorities to consider giving them special concessions (Tuan Anh 1997; Huong Thuy 1995). The awareness of being careful with people’s livelihood penetrates the ward level of administration. For instance, at a ward meeting convened for my formal visit to the ward, the chairwoman of the ward’s Women’s Association said the reason why the roaming vendors were driven off from the pavement while vendors who were residents could stay was because the ward had to help residents with economic difficulties. Women’s Association officials also acted as guarantors for poor families when the latter asked for permission from the ward to have a vending stall on the pavement, and the ward gave their requests special consideration (Fieldnotes 17/5/1997).

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The pavement as civic space 163 One other way to gain further insight into how ward officials see the need for them to be flexible towards vendors is to see the work conditions of two groups of people – the roaming vendors and the ward policemen. Roaming vendors There are mixed feelings among the public and the government regarding whether to allow vendors to ply the streets (Chi Thanh 1988; Dinh Huong Son 1990; Nguyen Chi Tinh 1991; Thanh Chi 1991; Nguyen Truong Giang 1995). One view says that modernity is not compatible with the business nature of roaming vendors. They pollute and congest the city, and the urban landscape loses its beauty. The opposite view, such as that represented by the newspaper articles that called for breathing spaces for hard-pressed people, want the roaming vendors to remain, but under control and management. What have roaming vendors done to evoke such contrasting views? Most roaming vendors in Hanoi are from the excess rural work force in their villages. They come to Hanoi in between planting seasons to look for temporary jobs, such as selling cooked food and durables to supplement the family income. A substantial number come to Hanoi and stay a few days at a time to sell farm produce directly to customers for greater profit instead of selling them through middlemen (Do Ngoc Duong 1995). When their own goods are sold out, these roaming vendors return to their villages to procure more or buy more from the wholesale markets in Hanoi to resell. Their petty trade usually does not attract the taxmen and their overheads are low, so they are serious competitors to traders sitting in the markets (Nguyen Chi Tinh 1991; Nguyen Quang Hoa 1991; Tran Thanh Tuong 1998). Pavement vendors usually know that their trading activities on the pavement are against the law. “They do not protest, they do not wish to apply for a shophouse to trade in; they just want the state to allow them to live off the pavement” (D.T. Phuong 1997). But to survive, they have to be conversant in “guerrilla” tactics in avoiding law enforcers. Fresh produce roaming vendors thus have to use the tactic of perpetual walking and sticking close to the shops’ end of the pavement if they have to stop. Consequently, their lot is hard; each day, they may walk for kilometers within the city while carrying the weight of goods on their shoulders (Tuan Anh 1997). The first reason why people and the government have mixed feelings about roaming vendors is that while they bring conveniences to a large number of people on a daily basis, they also cause road traffic to slow down considerably and become more hazardous. The roaming vendors tend to stand on the pavement of busy streets at peak hours of traffic to attract as many commuters as possible. This behavior holds up traffic flow, and is greatly disliked by commuters. The risk is great to the vendors when they do so. Streets with busy traffic are usually well-patrolled during peak hours. Therefore, when police patrols arrive to corner the vendors,

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164 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Many scenes bring tears to eyes. One policeman is sighted, and the sellers shout: “Police! Police!” The roaming vendors scamper in all directions. Shoulder poles hook into each other, spilling fruits and vegetables onto the road. Everyone tugged and pulled to disentangle from another. Noisy arguments drew people to assemble and watch. Sounds of rushing and nagging intermixed with cursing and crying. (Mai Hoa 1996) The unlucky ones, whose poles and shoulders the policemen could reach, argue, resist, beg, and at the same time pull away from the policemen. If they were lucky the policemen might let them go. As long as the vendors’ reconnaissance is good, trading arrangements mobile, and are not hemmed in by the patrol teams, they can usually move on without being detained by the policemen. Those with slower reflexes are less lucky. Even after their products are confiscated, however, the roaming vendors usually pour in fresh capital to continue trading on the streets. They do this simply because profits are irresistible when compared to the fruits of labor in their villages (Xuan Ha 1997). A typical visual profile of roaming vendors would be those seen in a photograph taken in 2005, when the situation of disorderly street vending was under good control (Figure 8.2). A second reason why roaming vendors evoke mixed feelings among city folks is that they tend to leave rubbish behind wherever they stop to trade. Road sweepers of the City Environment Company exert great effort and patience in cleaning after roaming vendors. I came to know the magnitude of the work only after waking very early one morning. I had decided to ride my motorcycle to Tran Xuan Soan Street to check out a daily “market” of roaming vendors from outside the city, which I had heard about. It always started outside the Hom Market building from around three o’clock in the morning until half-past seven. By the time I reached there at seven o’clock, the street was filthy and everywhere littered with unwanted wastes that vendors had left behind. I rode into the street, winding through scattered piles of rubbish; the tall ones needing frequent detours, and little asphalt was left uncovered. When I returned to the street at eight o’clock, after breakfast, the street was clean again because of efficient work by road sweepers. A similar situation occurred every day on Hang Khoai Street outside the Dong Xuan market, in the late afternoon and early evening, and outside the Mo market Bach Mai in the pre-dawn hours. The views of the ward policemen Ward policemen were the main law enforcers, and they did not like enforcing the 36/CP. They faced pressure from four sides: superior officials, the media, the residents and the roaming vendors. The pressures generally are of two types: pressures of performance and accusations of corruption, and pressures of “moral economy” arising from sympathy for

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The pavement as civic space 165

Figure 8.2 Vendors outside the Opthamology Hospital, Ba Trieu Street, Hanoi, Vietnam.

roaming vendors (Xuan Ha 1997). The first type of pressure makes the policemen work hard on a daily, endless task. The second type of pressure makes them shy about performing their duties. Whether they did well or neglected the situation, they are abused by any one of the four sides. The

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166 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia more the policemen carried out their duty, the more they felt helpless because the problems recurred every day, with the same people and at the same spots. It was troublesome dealing with the roaming vendors when they were arrested because the traders usually cried and begged, attracted attention to the situation and even abused policemen if they felt they had been treated unfairly (Mai Hoa 1996). The roaming vendors felt that way because they could not accept why local residents were allowed to trade on the pavement while they were not allowed to do the same, especially when local residents who were roaming vendors were also offending the 36/CP but were never dealt with. They were even of the opinion that the injustice arose out of their inability to pay off officials (Xuan Ha 1997). The policemen were aware of the guerrilla tactics of the roaming vendors but there was nothing more they could do except to make their presence felt, and to hope that the city government resolved the problems of infrastructure and livelihood as soon as possible.

The pendulum swings the other way? Post-36/CP and the 22nd Southeast Asian Games Eight years of implementation of the 36/CP after 1995 has seen an equilibrium achieved, more or less, between state and society in their contest over pavement space. On the one hand, in wards (which has been the majority) where conditions allow, ward policemen and pavement order teams have been easy-going in their checks and demands to reclaim the pavement, a public space, from unauthorized use by the individuals. On the other hard, in a small number of wards and streets whose conditions do not allow, such as those in the middle of the city and close to important landmarks, policemen have been stricter. Campaigns usually produced good results at the beginning but petered out as the pressure from levels of authority eased off. A lengthy period of deterioration would then create pressure on the government to recommence stiff operations or a new campaign. The situation evolved, however, with the impending arrival of the 22nd Southeast Asian (SEA) Games. To be held in Hanoi, the Games’ impact on pavement life offered a slightly different perspective on state-society relations – that of a state capable of putting down its foot where it mattered. The government wanted to stamp its authority on street order to impress the thousands of foreigners who would stay in Hanoi for the Games for weeks. These efforts culminated in the promulgation of Decree 15/2003 on 19 February 2003, which was comprehensive in its treatment of traffic order and pavement order offenses. It was in fact a renewal of the 36/CP, except that fines were stiffer. In the months leading up to the Games and during the Games, many ward authorities in Hanoi began to clear the pavement. They banned parking of motorcycles along main roads and absolutely disallowed shops from displaying goods or using pavement space for their business. The

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The pavement as civic space 167 strictest places were along Hue Street, an important southern entry into the city and the 36 Streets area. With the Decree 15/2003, patrols were much more regular, as I had witnessed in a few wards, and infringing roaming vendors and motorcyclists were hauled up and had their goods or vehicles retained. Further, the traffic police made traffic flow smoother by turning many two-way streets into one-way streets, and more policemen and ward personnel stood on road corners to enforce laws on traffic users and pavement activities. Yet, this strong state would also tolerate infringements at the margins, especially when the situation suits its objectives. It was still impossible to ban all roaming vendors in all areas, as marketing is an important need where there is a widespread lack of proper markets. The further one went out from the center and busy streets, the more lenient the wards were. During the SEA Games, revelers jubilant over Vietnam’s victories on the soccer field thronged the roads till late and needed to fill up stomachs before going home. Thus, during the SEA Games, supper shops were allowed to open till very late after midnight. During the celebrations, people got out of their homes and onto motorcycles to fill roads, but no policemen bothered about how vehicles were illegally parked on pavements, or whether drinks and noodle stalls should close by 11pm. Widespread traffic infringements were disregarded. It remains to be seen whether the efforts to maintain a strict regime on the pavement of major streets are sustainable in the long run, and hence, whether the state would be able to maintain a strong hand for long. For one, such intensive efforts come at a huge cost not just the employment of extra manpower, but also the more intensive use of manpower. This extra effort yields no significant extra income for law enforcers, especially if people know that the state is determined and would do their best to obey the law. Second, measures such as prohibition of parking along a number of major roads and streets where major shops are located would sooner or later meet with discontent and lobbying from shop owners. After all, they pay their wards a fee every month (collected in the name of keeping pavement orderly and clean) to use parts of the pavement and strict prohibition of such use would discourage shop owners from paying and would hurt ward officials ultimately.

Conclusion: some thoughts about civic space and civil society This analysis of Hanoi’s street culture illustrates several important features of civic space and civil society. One of the first issues is the way in which spontaneous markets can arise anywhere and anytime in Hanoi. If spaces for markets are also civic spaces (meaning spaces for the people), then markets traditionally are also the spaces where all kinds of people meet to buy, sell, eat, drink and sit down

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Figure 8.3 Bia hoi (draught beer) shop, Yen Phu Street/Thanh Nien Street corner, Hanoi, Vietnam.

to discuss things. It is where society meets regularly for all sorts of purposes. Markets are, of course, not the only contemporary civic spaces, but one of the earliest forms that began when people needed to specialize and trade. Roaming vendors in Hanoi, when they are able to meet in large numbers, render a high degree of mobility to markets as civic space. If we accept the above premises, then we can think of civic space not as fixed physical places. Instead, we can think of civic space as being made out of existing physical space by people who need to do so, wherever and whenever. In a country with conditions such as strict political and social control, intolerance of political opposition and libertarianism, which is reflected in the planning for the use of public space, this agility seems important for civil society to develop. This agility is impossible for the state to prevent and for civic space supporters to plan. Markets alone are not civil society but the markets as civic space are available to civil society groups when they need to meet under cover from a prying state that is unfriendly to civil society. In a situation whereby people meet at public spaces such as the pavement to enjoy goods and services of the private sector as well as to discuss civic issues, market spaces can therefore double-up as civic spaces. The scene in Figure 8.3 is a good example.

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The pavement as civic space 169 Furthermore, what is interesting in Hanoi’s case is market space as civic space has been forced on the state, who basically could not provide alternatives, but is also very unwilling to clamp down hard on the “bursting out” (to use a Vietnamese term) of pavement activities, for fear of the consequences, one of which is massive social unrest. Where it suits the state, however, it has taken the initiative to promote primitive civil society groups and allowed them to earmark some space as their own which others may not infringe. The self-regulation groups are a case in point. Deciding to establish such groups is a result of the willingness to experiment on the part of the state, and to concede some space not under direct control of the state. The objective is for greater governance effectiveness. This willingness to experiment holds out hope for the development of civil society, if civil society can be perceived as helping rather than hurting the regime. However, it is also noted that the decision to favor selfmanagement came fairly late in the long history of the state-society contest on the pavement. This shows that a state used to wielding control will need time to relax its hold. Another issue is how civil society can arise from the granting of civic space. While civil society is still fairly limited in size and scope of development, it has nevertheless grown and is much freer to operate now, than during the late 1980s. This growth of civil society has been a result of the social welfare sector’s need for non-state actors and non-state funding that has arisen from the incompetence of the state. Growth of civil society in other arenas has been less or virtually absent, with some groups facing enormous difficulties in operations and others clamped down by the state. This development seems to be in opposition to the constant emphasis among urban planners and urban authorities for the need to have more civic space (open, healthy places) where people can gather and spend recreation time. That the voice is coming from within the state is surprising, and it reinforces the notion that disaggregation of the state in communist societies is a useful tool of analysis (Migdal 1994: 15). It allows us not to be captured by a state-society dichotomy, but it certainly does not clash with the reality that state planners are in some ways responsible for the creation of civic space. In the same way, when we look at how the state may be persuaded by civil society groups to allocate more civic space, a disaggregation of the state seems to be a good approach. In the case of the pavement of Hanoi, state disaggregation is an invaluable tool of understanding as one faces great unevenness in regime implementation, in time and in space. In this unevenness, the role of the ward as the local authority is important as it mediates between conflicting demands of state and society. In this same way, in any country with a similar context, civic space may be promoted through appealing to lower levels of state authority, based on knowledge of local conditions and local needs that the local authority can rely on to negotiate with the central authority in favor of more civic space.

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Notes 1 Grateful acknowledgement is given to the Toda Foundation for helping to fund this research and for organizing and funding the Second Grand Conference in Vancouver. 2 Ha Noi Moi means “New Hanoi.” It is published by the party branch in Hanoi. 3 Tran Que Thuong was a policeman working in the Hoan Kiem District while Vu Dinh Hoanh was the Deputy Chief of Police of Hanoi City. 4 At the time this data was collected, the exchange rate was 1 USD to 11,000 VND.

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The pavement as civic space 171 K.D. (1995) “Tich cuc chuan bi cho ngay dau tien thuc hien Nghi Dinh 36/CP cua Chinh phu” [Enthusiastic preparations for the first day of implementation of 36/CP] Ha Noi Moi, 29 July, pp. 1, 4. Kim Dung (1988) “Qua mot so chot trat tu giao thong thuoc quan Hai Ba Trung” [At a few traffic order hotspots in Hai Ba Trung District] Ha Noi Moi, 30 October, p. 1. Kim Dung (1992) “ ‘57’ lam duoc, phai giu duoc” [Achievements of 57 must be maintained Ha Noi Moi, 9 March, p. 2. Kim Dung (1995) “Nhom lien gia tu quan o cum dan cu so 2 phuong Ngo Thi Nham” [“Self-managed family groups” in Resident Cluster no. 2 of Ngo Thi Nham Ward] Ha Noi Moi, 22 September, p. 2. Kim Lien (1994) “Tuyen truyen nhieu nhung trat tu an toan giao thong van kem” [Much mass education but traffic order and safety still far from ideal] Ha Noi Moi, 11 May, p. 2. Koh, David (2000) “Wards and State-Society Relations in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”, PhD Dissertation, Department of Political and Social Change, The Australian National University. Le Phuong Hien (1992) “Doi tu quan giao thong – trat tu phuong Cat Linh” [The traffic and order self-management team of the Cat Linh Ward] Ha Noi Moi, 8 January, p. 2. Ly Kien Quoc (1975) “Ba muoi nam cai tao va xay dung kinh te, phat trien van hoa cua nuoc Viet-Nam Dan chu Cong hoa (1945–1975)” [30 years of reform and building of the economy, developing the culture of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (1945–1975)] Hoc Tap (8). Mai Hoa (1996) “Hang rong: chuyen nho ma khong nho” [Hawkers: apparently small but actually big matter] An Ninh Thu Do, 13 December, p. 3. Manh Hung (1995) “Lien ket thuc hien Nghi Dinh 36/CP” [ Joint implementation of 36/CP] Ha Noi Moi, 28 July, p. 1. Migdal, Joel S. (1994) “The state in society: an approach to struggles for domination”, in J.S. Migdal, A. Kohli and V. Shue (eds.) State power and social forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 15. Minh Duc (1997) “Trat tu an toan giao thong” [Traffic order and safety] Nhan Dan, 13 January, p. 2. Nguyen Chi Tinh (1991) “Tam cho su dung via he mot so duong pho de quan ly nguoi buon ban” [Allowing temporary use of pavement along a few roads in order to manage traders] Ha Noi Moi, 30 January, pp. 1, 4. Nguyen Quang Hoa (1991) “Via he, duong . . .” [Pavement, Roads . . . ] Ha Noi Moi, 16 August, p. 3. Nguyen Quang Hoa (1995) “Luc cuc ‘36’ ” [Internal conflicts of “36”] Ha Noi Moi, 18 October, pp. 1, 3. Nguyen Trieu (1988) “Tren mot truc duong trong diem” [Along the axis of a few busy streets] Ha Noi Moi, 9 November, pp. 2, 4. Nguyen Truong Giang (1995) “Quan Thanh, 2 thang thuc hien ND36/CP” [Two months of 36/CP at Quan Thanh Ward] Ha Noi Moi, 9 October, p. 2. Nguyen Van Xay (1992) “Rat can ‘ba kiem tra’ trong thuc hien chi thi 57” [Real need for “three checks” in implementing Directive 57] Ha Noi Moi, 5 March, p. 1.

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172 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Nguyen Xuan (1982) “Pho . . . cho!” [Street . . . Market!] Ha Noi Moi, 11 June, p. 1. Nguyen Xuan Yem (1995) “Vi pham hanh chinh va cong tac giao duc y thuc, loi song theo phap luat cho cong dan” [Administrative offenses and work on education for citizens to cultivate consciousness and way of life that respects the law] in Dao Tri Uc (ed.) Xay dung y thuc va loi song theo phap luat [Build consciousness and way of life that respects the law] (Ha Noi: De tai Khoa hoc xa hoi Cap Nha nuoc KX-07-17, 1995) pp. 213–24. Nhom Phong Vien Ha Noi Moi (1995) “Ngay khoi dau” [The first day] Ha Noi Moi, 2 August, pp. 1, 3. P.Q. (1996a) “Hoan Kiem nhan dien hinh co quan xi nghiep tu quan thuc hien ND 36/CP” [Hoan Kiem District uses self-management model for state agencies and enterprises in implementing 36/CP] Ha Noi Moi, 10 August, p. 1. P.Q. (1996b) “Lien ket truong – phuong mot mo hinh can duoc nhan rong” [School – Ward alliance – a model that needs to be spread widely] Ha Noi Moi, 15 November, p. 2. P.V. (1986) “Phuong Hang Bai xay dung nep tu quan duong pho, lam chu so nha” [Hang Bo Ward builds self-managed streets and houses] Ha Noi Moi, 12 March, p. 2. P.V. (1995) “So ket mot thang thuc hien Nghi Dinh 36/CP cua Chinh phu” [Preliminary review of the first month of implementation of the government’s 36/CP] Ha Noi Moi, 14 September, p. 1. P.V. (1996) “CA phuong O Cho Dua lam tot vai tro nong cot thuc hien ND 36/CP” [O Cho Dua Ward police performs its pillar role well when implementing 36/CP] Ha Noi Moi, 2 October, p. 2. P.V. and Quang Nghia (1983) “Hon 5.000 luot thanh nien, thieu nien va cac luc luong an ninh tham gia tuyen truyen giao duc nep song moi, lao dong xay dung thu do va kiem tra trat tu tri an o noi cong cong” [More than 5,000 youths, children and security forces participate in mass education on the new way of life, labor to build the capital, and checks on order and security in public places] Ha Noi Moi, 20 April, p. 1. Phan Thi Boi Hoan (1992) “Phuong Kim Lien voi chi thi 57” [Kim Lien Ward and Directive 57] Ha Noi Moi, 13 January, p. 2. Phan Tuong (1993) “Sau hai nam lap lai trat tu he, duong pho o quan Hai Ba Trung” [After two years of restoring order on the pavement and roads in Hai Ba Trung District] Ha Noi Moi, 13 October, p. 2. So Van hoa Thong tin and Thanh pho Ha Noi (1984) “Thu Do Ha Noi: 30 nam xay dung va bao ve che do Xa hoi Chu nghia” [Hanoi the capital: 30 years of building and protecting the Socialist system] (Hanoi) p. 91. Thach Lam (1943) “Ha Noi bam sau pho Phuong” [Thirty-Six Streets of Hanoi] (Saigon: Doi Nay). Thanh Chi (1991) “Trat tu do thi, mot viec cap bach” [Urban order – an urgent matter] Ha Noi Moi, 18 March, p. 2. Thanh Chi (1995) “Trat tu giao thong do thi o Ha Noi truoc va sau ND 36/CP” [Urban traffic order in Hanoi before and after 36/CP] Ha Noi Moi, 16 October, p. 2. Thanh Hung (1992) “Trat tu, ky cuong do thi lai bi buong long” [Urban order and discipline are loose again] Ha Noi Moi, 4 September, p. 2.

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The pavement as civic space 173 Thanh Mai (1992a) “Xung quanh viec thuc hien chi thi 57” [About implementation of Directive 57] Ha Noi Moi, 6 January, p. 2. Thanh Mai (1992b) “Thuc hien chi thi 57 o mot con duong” [Implementing Directive 57 on one road] Ha Noi Moi, 8 January, p. 3. Thanh Thuy (1994) “Thu xem tham nhung cap phuong den dau!” [Let’s see how deep corruption is at the ward level!] Ha Noi Moi, 1 July, p. 2. Thu Huong (1995) “Cac cap, nganh, doan the tich cuc trien khai thuc hien Nghi Dinh 36/CP” [All levels, branches, and organizations enthusiastically prepare to implement 36/CP] Ha Noi Moi, 31 July, pp. 1, 4. Thuy Hang (1993) “Trat tu do thi o phuong Trang Tien” [Urban order at the Trang Tien Ward] Ha Noi Moi, 26 February, p. 2. Tien Chinh (1996) “Khong nen hoi: ‘Ton tai hay khong ton tai?’ ” [We should not ask “Should it or should it not exist?”] An Ninh Thu Do, 9 December, pp. 1, 3. Tien Phu and Phan Tuong (1993) “Qua 2 nam lap lai trat tu he, duong pho” [After 2 years of restoring order on pavement and roads] Ha Noi Moi, 29 October, p. 2. To Huu (1980) “May quan diem co ban ve may van de lon trong cong tac phan phoi luu thong” [A few basic points and a few big problems in the distribution and circulation of goods] TCCS, 8: 10–20. Ton Xuan Thich (1988) “Phuong Trang Tien giu gin trat tu cong cong” [Trang Tien Ward keeps public order] Ha Noi Moi, 28 October, p. 2. Tran Dung and Vu Long (1983) “Tu phuong Hang Bong . . . den phuong Phan Chu Trinh” [From Hang Bong Ward . . . to Phan Chu Trinh Ward] Ha Noi Moi, 19 April, pp. 2, 4. Tran Hung (1997) Hanoi Architecture University Presentation on 8 May at the Institute of Sociology, Hanoi. Tran Huy Lieu et al. (eds.) (1960) Lich su thu do Ha Noi [History of Hanoi the Capital] Hanoi: Su Hoc. Tran Que Thuong (1992a) “Phuong Hang Dao thuc hien co hieu qua chi thi 57 cua UBND Thanh pho” [Hang Dao Ward implements effectively Directive 57 of the City People’s Committee] Ha Noi Moi, 17 January, p. 2. Tran Que Thuong (1992b) “Nhin lai hai thang thuc hien chi thi 57 o Quan Hoan Kiem” [Review of two months of implementation of Directive 57 in Hoan Kiem District] Ha Noi Moi, 28 February, p. 2. Tran Thanh Tuong (1998) “Street vendors and taxes killing off markets” Vietnam Investment Review 8/6/1998, carried by Reuters, 8 June. Tuan Anh (1997) “Noi niem nhung nguoi lam kinh te via he” [The feelings of those working in the pavement economy] Lao Dong Ha Noi, 10 January, pp. 1, 7. Tuong Anh (1992) “Tong kiem tra, duy tri ket qua thuc hien chi thi 57/UB ve giu gin trat tu he, duong” [General inspection to maintain results of Directive 57/UB on maintaining order on pavement, roads] Ha Noi Moi, 16 September, pp. 1, 4. Uy ban Nhan dan Thanh pho Ha Noi (1988) “Quy dinh ve viec phat vi canh doi voi nhung vi pham Trat tu an toan giao thong trong thanh pho Ha Noi” [Regulations on penalties for common nuisance offenses against traffic order and safety in Hanoi] Ha Noi Moi, 8 October, p. 3. Vinh Yen (1995) “Can giu cho he thong, duong thoang o moi noi, moi luc” [Every pavement and road needs to be clear at all times] Ha Noi Moi, 31 July, p. 2. Vu Dinh Hoanh (1993) “Sau gan 20 thang thuc hien chi thi 57” [After close to 20 months of implementation of Directive 57] Ha Noi Moi, 9 July, p. 2.

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174 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia Vu Dinh Hoanh (1995) “Lam gi de thuc hien Nghi Dinh 36/CP cua Chinh phu co hieu qua cao?” [What is to be done to ensure implementation of 36/CP of the government is highly effective?] Ha Noi Moi, 1 August, pp. 1, 4. Xuan Ha (1997) “Giai quyet nan hang rong qua that khong de!” [Really not easy to solve the hang rong problem!] Lao Dong Ha Noi, 10 January, p. 2.

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9

Changing community relations and emerging civic spaces in Shanghai Hanlong Lu

Introduction: the challenge of community organizations in China It is common knowledge that China has been undergoing rapid changes since the beginning of its economic reforms in the 1980s. These changes are mostly the result of the close link between the economic system and the social organization. The long period of a centralized planned economic system has caused China to exhibit many characteristics of a redistribution society. In contrast to the society with a market economy, the redistribution society dismisses the basic market principles and ignores the role of the market in the process of preliminary distribution of social resources. Instead, in an effort to achieve a justified social goal, this sort of society emphasizes the role of the state in controlling all social production resources, and advocates highly centralized production and distribution procedures. Since China completed its socialist reform in 1956, the Chinese economic system has been developed as the planned economic model, with the result that the state directly controls the country’s economic activities and dynamics. The social structure has also been changed along with the economic system. As a result, governments at all levels directly run all kinds of industries, practically control all socio-economic resources, and undertake all social responsibilities. The power of the government has increasingly penetrated into society. The overwhelming presence of state power has become one of the most important features of the economic redistribution system in China. Within this system, there has been little or no space for the development of civil society. At a basic level, the aim of Chinese economic reform is to “separate government and enterprise,” which means that the enterprise should become an independent entity in the market. Likewise, the goal of the grassroots social system reform is to make community an independent entity in the society and an alternative option of the work-units (danwei). The core of this reform is to “separate government and community.” This sort of reform is to re-adjust the relationship between the state and society, rather than simply redistribute intra-governmental powers. In other words, it requires the government to give away part of its powers to the society.

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176 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia This paper provides an overview of Chinese community development in recent years by analyzing the two facets of this social reform. At the structural or organizational level, the paper examines the case of Shanghai and shows how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government have managed to reinsert its presence in community affairs after the local work-unit has become increasingly weakened as a result of these reforms. The second part involves a discussion of the community’s response to such institutional changes. Several important questions will be addressed in this paper. In the past, the work-unit was a fundamental mode of socio-economic organization of daily life, since this organization not only provided work opportunities but was also responsible for the workers’ social needs such as housing, education and security. Has the enlargement of the market meant that local residents are more inclined to take care of their own needs on their own? Are they less inclined to join government-initiated committees to take care of their social needs? Or are local residents likely to form their own associations to solve their own problems? Is there evidence of such organizations alongside state-sponsored ones?

Changing community organizations in China During the period of planned economy, the government serves people’s needs through two types of organizations. The first is the state-controlled enterprise system or work-unit administrative system, while the second part is the local government controlled residence committee ( jiedao-juweihui). Both the work-unit and the residence committee are within the control system of the Party-state (dangzheng). Before China’s 1978 reform, there were almost no independent social associations in the country except for state-controlled enterprises and local government controlled residence committees. In other words, China has a big state and a small society, where state power largely overwhelms the power from the grassroots level society. The CCP and the government directly enjoyed state power.1 In the eyes of those Party-state administrators, the whole society is their subordinate and is governed by them. The work-unit and the resident committee represent the presence of the state in the lives of the people. The work-unit organizes the production, while the resident committee supports the welfare needs of the community. In terms of hierarchy, three kinds of organizations are responsible for administration at the local level. The first type is the Party-state institution which exists at four levels: from the national level to the township/ sub-district level (see Figure 9.1). Major cities like Shanghai are at the provincial level, and they have two levels of elected governments: one is the municipal government and the other is the district government. For example, Shanghai currently has 19 district governments. Since the city is very large, the population of each district ranges unequally from 500 to 1,500 thousand. Each district government has several office branches in its

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Changing community relations and emerging civic spaces in Shanghai 177

National Government CGOE Provincial/Municipality Government PMGOE District/County Government DCGOE Town Government

Street Office

TOE

Workers

Family

Unemployed, Disabled, etc.

Note: CGOE (Central Government Owned Enterprises) PMGOE (Provincial or Municipality Owned Enterprises) DCGOE (District or County Government Owned Enterprises) TOE (Town Owned Enterprises)

Figure 9.1 Hierarchical governmental management model during planned economy.

sub-districts. We call them sub-district committee ( jiedao, the Chinese term of Jiedao means “street”). The population of the sub-district committee ranges from 50 to 150 thousand residents. According to the research conducted in Shanghai, the CCP sub-district committee has established ten administrative offices, organizational departments and propaganda departments in the community to undertake more than 140 assignments. At the community level, not only the government administrative sectors have established their offices, but other agencies such as industrial and commercial departments, housing management department, police and hospitals have also set up their executive offices. Enterprises constitute the second kind of organizations in Chinese local society. They are mainly work-units. These work-units belong to various levels of government organizations, and are not necessarily within the jurisdiction of the aforementioned local Party-state institutions. The enterprises that are within the jurisdiction of the local Party-state organizations are neighborhood factories, welfare enterprises, and small-scale private enterprises. These enterprises stand at the bottom of social hierarchy and have very limited resources.

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178 Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia The third kind of Chinese local society organization is the community mass organization. The residence committee is one of those mass organizations that are authorized by the Chinese constitution. According to law, every 100–700 households in the city should belong to a unit of the residence committee. However, most residence committees include more than 1,000 households, especially in big cities. The residence committee office is the public space for the residents. Also, there are some legitimate mass associations, such as the Organization for the Workers, the Organization for the Youth and Women, the Committee for the Elders, and the Homeowner Association. There also exist many informal mass organizations, such as friendship associations and resident interest groups. Under the planned economic system, the community mass organizations usually obtain their funding and human resources from the community’s Party-state system, and work under the leadership of this Party-state system. In Shanghai, the community Party-state system is defined as the government office and the CCP committee for the sub-district. The local Party-state institutions are at the heart of this three-tier local organizational system. Their relationship with the grassroots-level branches of other Party-state agencies (as mentioned in the first level of the hierarchy) forms the so-called “tiaokuai ” relationship (literally, the relationship between stripes and blocks). On the other hand, their relationship with the enterprises (as mentioned in the second kind of the hierarchy) is a kind of administrative relationship, where the enterprises have higher administrative rankings than the local Party-state institutions. Only the third kind – the community mass organizations – are under the leadership of the local Party-state institutions. Therefore, this hierarchy structure indicates that the community society is rather powerless and is simply derivative of the local Party-state institutions and is subordinated to the Party-state leadership. The features of this centralized planned redistribution social system bear many similarities to the way of management in the army. The operation of the Chinese redistribution economy depends on the policy orders from the national leaders to assign tasks and make arrangements (like the military orders from the top generals), rather than relying on free market signals. The basic necessities of life are supplied on the basis of fixed quota, which is the same as the wartime ration system when production is interrupted by war. In short, people’s daily lives are organized in a way as if they were under the threat of war. More importantly, the social organizational system in China also exhibits militarized features. The People’s Commune System carried out in rural areas since 1958 tried to rearrange China’s rural areas into a three-level militarized structure of “commune – production team – small production team.” And the urban enterprises have been organized into the highly structuralized “work-unit system.” Both of these organizational modes are multifunctional in the sense that they have to undertake not only economic but also social functions. Moreover, both of them have the characteristics

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Changing community relations and emerging civic spaces in Shanghai 179 of military organizations in the sense that they are not only production units, but also production “rear” in that the provision of life security and other welfare services is included (Bian 1994). To put it aptly, the organizational method of both the People’s Commune System and the Party-state system is a copy of the military organization mode. The basic features of a wartime system forbid the existence of a private sphere, and sacrifice individual needs to the collective interests within the system (Lu 2000). Thus, before the 1978 reforms, the state and the Party totally controlled Chinese economic resources. Chinese social organization showed wartime characteristics. Almost everywhere, the public sphere was occupied by the government and could not be used for public gatherings. China’s economic reform has not only changed its socialist economy but also transformed the wartime social organizational system that was associated with it. Particularly, with China’s entry of WTO, Chinese economy has increasingly integrated into the world market. The reform has changed the Chinese economic system into a mixed situation in which new economic forms coexist with the state-owned form. Thus, China’s development over the past two decades is not simply the result of economic reforms, but significantly, it involves the modernization of the whole society. Notably, the process of marketization has led to reform of the housing system. Presently, all towns and cities in China have stopped the work-unit housing benefits distribution of housing, and the original state-owned houses have been sold to residents at discounted rates. For instance, about 70 percent of state-owned houses in Shanghai have been sold to their original residents and these people have become homeowners. With economic reforms, more than 50 percent of people in Shanghai are house owners. A recent urbanization and community research study conducted by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences indicates that housing property has a significant impact on people’s degree of satisfaction about their living conditions (see Table 9.1). As shown in Table 9.1, the citizens who have bought their houses with discounts during the housing reform are those who are most satisfied with their living conditions. They also give the highest scores to their community environment. These relationships are statistically significant. As more and more residents become house owners, they are banding together to form homeowner’s associations to represent and protect their interests. The house owners have become more and more concerned about their community because the community environment has a direct impact on the commercial value of their homes. According to the regulations of housing reforms, in residential areas where more than 60 percent of public housing has been privatized, residents are required to establish a homeowner’s association. The main function of such associations is to sign contracts with property management companies and to properly use the management fee. It also helps to write regulations on issues regarding public order, public sanitation, and the use of public facilities.2 These

4.66 35 1.14 4.65 633 1.35

2.74 35 0.66 2.94 633 0.73 4.65 1008 1.30 0.35

4.78# 178 1.25

2.50# 178 0.63

2.80 1008 0.73 0.000***

4.52b 162 1.22

Community safety

2.62a 162 0.73

Satisfaction on the house

4.28 1006 1.14 0.78

4.26 631 1.18

4.37 35 1.14

4.43# 178 1.01

4.27 162 1.15

Community attainments

3.82 1008 1.44 0.002**

3.72 633 1.48

4.09 35 1.38

4.17# 178 1.34

3.78 162 1.38

Environment and sanitation

5.40 1008 1.15 0.203

5.42 633 1.21

5.16# 633 1.28 5.11 1008 1.23 0.005**

5.03 35 1.25

5.35 178 1.04

5.46# 162 1.03

Daily-life convenience

4.40 35 1.54

5.06 178 1.04

5.10 162 1.15

Location within the city

Notes * p

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Culture and Society in the Asia-Pacific (Pacific Studies)

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Democracy and Civil Society in Asia: Volume 1: Globalization, Democracy and Civil Society in Asia (International Political Economy)

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The Politics of AIDS: Globalization, The State and Civil Society

The Global Legitimacy Game: Civil Society, Globalization and Protest

Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical Globalization

Towards Recovery in Pacific Asia (ESRC Pacific Asia Programme Series )

Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present (Asia Pacific Perspectives)

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Economic Development in Pacific Asia

Political Development in Pacific Asia

Economic and Social Development in Pacific Asia

Cultural Governance and Resistance in Pacific Asia

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Globalization, the City and Civil Society in Pacific Asia (Rethinking Globalizations)

Globalization and Global History (Rethinking Globalizations)

Globalization and contestation: the new great counter-movement (Rethinking Globalizations)

Culture and Society in the Asia-Pacific (Pacific Studies)

Civil Society In Central Asia

Global Activism (Rethinking Globalizations)

Democracy and Civil Society in Asia: Volume 1: Globalization, Democracy and Civil Society in Asia (International Political Economy)

Globalization and Educational Restructuring in Asia and the Pacific Region

Television, Regulation and Civil Society in Asia

Globalization as Evolutionary Process: Modeling Global Change (Rethinking Globalizations)

Globalization and State Transformation in China (Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies)

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Higher Education in the Asia-Pacific: Strategic Responses to Globalization

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AIDS in East Asia and the Pacific

Europe and the Asia Pacific (Esrc Pacific Asia Programme (Series).)

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Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical Globalization

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