Freedom Not Yet: Liberation and the Next World Order (New Slant: Religion, Politics, Ontology)

FREEDOM NOT YET

NEW SLANT: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND ONTOLOGY

A series

rditcd by

CreJf(m IJnl'is, Philip Goodchild,

fllld KCIIIII:th S"rill

Kenneth Surin

NOTYEr Liberation and the Next World Order

DUKE: UNIVERSITY PRESS

Durhalll lind LOlld(J1I

© 2009 Duke University Press All rights rescrvl-d Printed in the. United States of America on acid-free paper @ Designed by Amy Typeset in Carter

Ruth Buchanan

+

Cone GalJiard

by Tseng lnformation Systems, Inc. Library of Congress Caraloging-in1\lbJication dara and republication acknowledgments appear on the last printed page of this book. Frontispiece: James Baker Hall, 7!Jor1l5. Courtesy of the James Baker Hall Archive.

For Andrcll' Mac/chosc

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

IX

Introduction 1

PART I 1.

-nle Complementary Deaths of the -nlinking Subject and of the Citizen Subject 21

2.

Producing a Marxist Concept of Liberation H

3.

l'ostpolitical Politics and Global Capitalism 65

4. The Exacerbation of Uneven Development: Analysis of the Current Regime of Accumulation 94

5.

-nle Possibility of a New State I: Ddinking 125

PART II 6.

Models of Liberation I: "flle Politics of Identity 141

7.

Models of Liberation II: The Politi c s of the Place of the Subject 165

8.

Models of Liberation II I: The Politics of the Event 197

9.

Models of Liberation IV: -The Religious Transcendent 226

10. Models of Liberation V: Nomad Politics 241

PART III 11. 111e Possibility of a New State II: Heterotopia 265 12. Prospects for the New Political Subject and Liberation 285

Conclusion 295 Notes 299 Bibliography 371 Index 407

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Jandl Watson for much hdp given in countless ways while this book was written. Reynolds Smith, my editor at Duke University Press, was exemplary. Andrew Madehose was my first teacher in economics and philosophy. He will not agree with many of my arguments, but my debt to him has been immense.

Dem an' dem economical plan Still can't find solution &orro\\�n' money fe lend World Bank a nuh wi fr'en

Is life an' debt all wi a fret Life an' debt freedom not yet

MUTABARUKA, Lift alld Debr We shed blood all rhc.se years in ordcr to buy land at market price.l�

USULUTAN camptJillo, 199.!, quoted in Elisabeth Jane Wood, Forging

Drnwmuyfrom Below

"kn of good fortune often cause empires lOU ItEIlD,

to fall.

Berlin

Selbst in dem sagenhaften Atlantis Briillten doch in der Nachr, wo das Meeres verschlang, Die Ers.lllfendcn nach ihren Sidaven (Even in fabled Atlantis lhe night the ocean engulfed it cnle drowning still screamed for their slaves) BERTOLT BRECHT, �Questions Irom a

Worker Who RCJds�

Introduction

l'eriodizations (not to be confused with chronologies, which merely indicate the dates of events), no matter how rough and ready, are indispensable for any lUlderstanding, at the systemic level, of the emergence and consolida­ tion of political systems and instirutions and their lUlderlying structllres of economic production and accumulation. \.Vhere pcriodi7.ation is concerned, the argument of this book is framed by two emblematic or symbolic dates, 1989 and 2001. At the time of writing it is possible rilat 2008 may be added to these symbolic dates at some futllre time, given the fact that there is a growing body of economically informed opinion coalescing arOlUld the view that the bank liquidity crisis which started in 2008 represents the most critical moment for modern capitalism since the great crash of 1929. I t is, however, much too early to fasten ourselves to dlis judgment; sullice to say rhat the ar­ gument of this bOClk, which has been in the process of formulation since the mid-1990S, is that dle current financial crisis, like its predecessor economic crises, is broadly explicable in terms of a marxist (or nl""O-marxist) model of the inherently problematic structure of capitalist development. That is to say, the financial crisis which emerged in 2008 is the product of deep and postponed tensions and impasses in dle capitalist system of accumulation, pressures, and deadlocks which are constitutive of the system itself, so dlat their removal will require a supersession of the system itself.!

The year 1989, invariably associated with dle fall of Soviet-style communism, coincides in the minds of many with the apogee of the JXllitical project as­ sociated with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. This JXllitical project

was trumpeted by its proponents as an American or British "renaissance" in

the world order of that time. It was "morning again in America," said the ever-smiling Reagan (probably mindful of the need to create as much "media separation" between the now-famous images of his beaming optimism on America's behalf and the vote-losing sepulchral earnestness of his predeces­ sor, Jimmy Carter). -lllatcher in

film

repeatedly invoked the reputed Victo­

rian zenith of Britain's imperial supremacy in her pronowlCements about her government's policies: "\Ve must return to Victorian values," she brayed on such occasions. The Reagan-Thatcher project was of course premised on a staunch anti-Sovietism in particular, and a repudiation of any kind of "left" collective politics in general. -llle Reagan-11latcher project was in turn a resJXlnse to the growing eco­ nomic sclerosis which led to the downfall of the so-called Golden Age of JXlstwar capitalist development, an era of relative overall prosperity which e.x­ tended from 1945 to 1975 and which involved a protracted boom in mass pro­ duction and mass consumption, to which the French gave the felicitous term

lcs trmusgloriruses.2 The economic complement of the JXllitical dimensions of the Reagan-Thatcher venture was neoliberalism, dlat is, the "free market" ideology which viewed dle 1970S collapse of the long JXlstwar economic expansion as the outcome of allegedly systemic, as opposed to inadvertent or merely contingent, impediments to the operation of markets and mar­ ket forces. -This neoliberal contention was in turn buttressed by declarations about so-called labor market rigidities (invariably attributed by Reagan and Thatcher to the "excessive" bargaining JXlwer of labor unions), "crippling" government regulation and intervention, "e.xorbitanr" tax bllfdens placed by "big government" on heroic bur somehow still hapless "entreprenellfs" (apparently some things never change; this, after all, was dle overwhelming refrain of

101m McCain s 2008 presidential campaign, with its mindless and '

repeated salutations at campaign rallies of the tax-phobic "Joe the plumber"), as well as the allegedly paralyzing effects of a costly welfare system said to be laden with "disincentives" for the working force (one recalls here the moral pa ni c generated by Reagan and his handlers around the fa ntas y figure of the "welfare queen," typically depicted as a black single mother who drove a Cadillac to pick up her welfare check).3 -llle 1970S economic disintegration associated with the demise of dIe Golden Age was therefore to be addressed by a simple policy prescription, according to the soon to be ascendant neoliberals: to make things better, said the followers of Reagan and Thatcher, governments should remove or ame-

2

INTRODUCTION

liorate all these restrictive policies and their pointless rigidities in order to give markets and market forces a much freer hand. Governments, especially, had no business trying to control markets.

DC1"cglllntWII

and p1"il'atizatum

were thus adopted as key guiding principles, and monetarism and attention to the supply side became the favored governmental financial policy tools; this was the essence of the Reagan-Thatcher ideology (though as Jacques Mazier, Maurice Basic, and jcan-FranS"ois Vidal point om, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

[OECD] did temper dlis neo­

liberal approach with some elements of Keynesianism in its policy frame­ works, and Reagan's overstuJl"ed defense budgets, and his administration's willingness to run massive budget deficits, did amount to a kind of "military Keynesianism").4 TIlls contrived evacuation of the political sphere in dIe somewhat disin­ genuous name of "small government" (TIlatcher, after all, gready augmented centralized government in Britain by virmally dissolving all of its subnational municipal strucmres, and George vV. Bush dangerously, and some say lUl­ constitutionally, advanced dIe prerogatives of the executive branch of gov­ ernment after September 11), along with the cod wisdom that "everydling should be left to the market because dIe market knows best," helped create a political void, especially now dlat the collapse of dIe Eastern bloc has left the United States and its close allies in an uncontested globally hegemonic position. With the gutting of the substantive political formations and their asso­ ciated practices and strategies put in place by dIe regulated capitalism of the Euro-American postwar era, politics in dIe post-1970S \Nest was increasingly degraded into the mere management of voter opinion, involving primarily the mass media-focused orchestration of ""hot button" issues capablc of mo­ bilizing largely docile electorates. (Examples of such issues come easily to mind: the anxieties of American "security moms" after September 11; gay marriage and gun rights in dIe United States; the antisocial behavior of lUl­ mly iIm er-city youth, called "lager louts" and "racaille"

[scum] by Tony Blair

and Nicolas Sarkozy, respectively; campaigns to repatriate undocumented immigrants and radical Islamic clerics in London allegedly hell-bent on re­ placing British law withsharm; the frowned-upon but titillatingly publicized sexual practices of polygamist sects in the American \Vest; and so on.) In the course of such events, the traditional dividing lines between "left" and "right" came to be blurred or erased, as politics in the \Vest became more and more a matter of occupying a palpably mythical "center," this being the

INTRODUCTION

3

presumed location where electoral majorities, no matter how ad hoc, could most easily be put together by the constant trumpeting of such hot-button issues, at least in dleory or psephological fantasy.5 -nle nodal point of this by now epochal shift was subsequently located in the political movements associated with Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, whose basic dlOugh unstated function was to underwrite and consolidate dIe trans­ formations brought about by Thatcher and Reagan and thcir acolytes. Blair's "-Third Way" and the American president's "Clintonomics" involved the fur­ ther "de-social democratization" (the term used by Gerassimos Moschonas) of society as dIe neoliberalism instituted by their predecessors, far from being tempered, came to be even more fully entrenched by Blair and Clinton.blbe political void created by today's ubiquitous economic managerialism in the West (hence dIe mantra "What is g<Xld for "Vall Street is good for all of us;' admittedly not heard so much during the economic meltdown of 2008-9) and dIe accompanying deracination of civil society, have been compensated for ideologically by a spurious politics of human rights and the taking of the society of the spectacle to levels undreamed of by Guy Debord and his colleagues in the Situationist movement. "Human rights" interventions (of the kind wldertaken in the past decade or so in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Liberia, and Darfur) were designed to show that the "new" politics espoused by Blair and Clinton (and it should be emphasized that such human rights interventions were nO[ disavowed by the 2008 American presidential candidates, Jolm ,\-lcCain and Barack Obama) was premised on what gave the appearance of being a resolute and sincere ethical core. However, the vapidity of such appeals to human rights was quickly revealed by the West's failure

to

do anything during the terrible Rwandan genocide, its silence in

the face of Russian atrocities in Chechnya (Russia, like Israel, said it was merely fighting "Islamic terrorism" in its own land), the well-documented abuses perpetrated by the pro-\Vestern Sri Lankan government against its Tamil minority population, and the unending passivity of Europe and the United States in the face of Israel's brutal dispossession of the Palestinian people? Meanwhile political spectacles continue to proliferate. One recalls the British Conservative agriculture minister John Selwyn Glimmer force­ feeding beef burgers

to

his yOlmg daughters in front of television cameras

at dIe peak of Britain's "mad cow" crisis in dIe 1980S in a piteous attempt to convince viewers that eating British beef at dlat time was safe, and Blair's artful manipulation of dIe Princess Diana effect at the time of her death. It is also hard not to notice the incessant pandering to second-rate film actors, 4

INTRODUCTION

elderly roek musicians, sports personalities, "celcbrity" journalists, and media performers (hence dle obligatory appearances on Sawrday NightLi!'! and the shows hosted by Oprah Winfrey and Jon Stewart in the United States and by Sir Michael Parki n son and Sir David Frost in the United Kingdom), evinced by Clinton, Blair, Sarkozy, and their followers, as well as the circus perfor­ mances that now pass for summit meetings (the mandatory group photos of leaders dad in identical batik shirts or some other "native" costume of the host colUmy). Many will recall George W. BLl�h's grotesquely staged "Mis­ sion Accomplished" aircraft-carrier landing, as well as his much publicized cycle ride with Lance Armstrong Sexln after the latter won the Tourde France for a record sevendl time. -nlere is also the seeming need at some stage during an election campaign for nearly every (white) American politician to be tele­ vised in a cowboy hat riding a horse or toting a rille while wearing hwning camouflage.s Ille list can be extended nearly to infinity. At the same time, the neoliberal economic agenda has been prosecuted with unre mitting fervor by its sponsors in the advanced industrialized coun­ tries, and despite dle back-slapping televised appearances dlat American and European government ministers make with co-opted celebrities such as Bono and Bob Gcldof and the much trumpeted but largely cosmetic "initiatives" on global poverty announced every few years at G8 sununits, the income gap between rich and poor cowltries continues to grow.1> The ncoliberal eco­ nomic credo (emblematically associated here with 1989), while it has come under increasing criticism in recent years, especially after the spectacular collapses accompanying dle 2000 dot-com and the 2008 U.S. credit market bubbles and the regionwide economic failure of the East Asian economies in dle late 1990S, nonedleless shows no signs of running out of steam at the idcologic al levcl. Nor does it give any indication that those who manage the world economic system wil l alter its course to take this planet's dispossessed masses significantly into account. In light of the spectacular economic failures just mentioned,

all of which

were initially publicized as ncoliberal success stories, the advocates of the ncoliberal prospectus have had to be much more judiciously understated in their support for it. But the ensuing subterfuges and disguises used by tllCSC advocates of ncoliberalism do not diminish its wlderlying hold on the m inds of those shaping public policy across the globe. Hence in the 2008 U.S. presi­ dential election campaign, the same old strident advocacy of trickle-down tax

cuts was made by the Republican Party candidate, John McCain, and

the dogma that "only privatization can save tlle U.S. social security system" is voiced repeatedly, while the regulator of the United Kingdom's postal INTRODUCTION

5

service (rhe Ropl Mail) re.'ce.'ntJy issued a call for its partial priV;}ti7.arion.1o It is Olle.' thing to discredit nooliix'ralism as all imdlccmal project (and tllis is increasingly being done.'); it is another to unfix its grip on thc minru of decision-making clites in Europe 3.nd North America in W3yS that could bring about an epochal transformation of our current system of production and accumulation.

9/U/.1001 While Ile.'oliberalism has held sway for ove.r tlUCl' decades as an economic and political ideology, it has to bc acknowledged that the.' evcnts now placcd unde.'r the.' titk "'9/U/"l.OOln have also had a very considcrabh.' impact on dl'­ veloped, den-loping, and nondeveloped countries alikc, main.!}' bc'-'"a.use of thc way these cvcnts have becn used to mobilize American public opinion in an avowedl)' nationalist and exceplionalist dircction. TI1C political catechism idcntified with thc American neoconserv:l.live movcment-t"O Wit, Ameri­ can execplionalism, the adamant subordination of the rest of the world to America's interests.AmeriC"J.'s pursuit of unilater3.l and preemptive war in the.' namc of"the struggle against terror" (as the formcr "'war on terror" is now called in U.S. gove.'rnment circles during these morc chastened, post-Iraq occupation, timcs)-has been gin-n a frec rein since thc Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Wasllington.11 If llcolibcralism is the teO/lOlllic regime.' lUlashamedly favored by America and its allies, thell ncoconservatism is h t. e political complement str.uegka.lly linked to this ncoliix'ral popular religion. And if 1989 is t.hl' year m.arking the elear ascendancy of neoliberalism, then 9/11/2001 signifies Ihe apot.heosis of power for its ncoconservative coullterparl. l1 There is of course no such thing as a "pure" politiCS existing only by and for itself. E\'Cry kind of politics is a politics motivated and driven by some regnant idcologic;}1 norion of tile nature and scope of till' political. Hen . ce for most of the sevel\l"eelllh century lhe prcvailing polith.'"al framework in Europe was defined by tile histork compromise between European aristoc­ racies and a powerfully emergent mercanrill' bourgeoisie.; as;} result of this conciliation

3.

politics marked by a del'p ;}nd defining interest in questions

of sovcreignry .and the rights of lhe (individual) citizen came t"O prc\'ail. The political wridngs of GrotiWi, Hobbes, i'ufendorf, Locke, and Spinoza arl' concl'rned overwhelmingly with such questions ofinJividu.a1 rights ;}nd t.heir COIUlCCtiOIl with sovereignty, questions which could not have ix'en posed by their predecessors in the Middle Ages}J 6

INTIlODUCTION

Similarly, in the eighteenth century a vision of politics highlighting the issue of the artificiality or mere conventionality of the political and social could b e g i n to be addressed, now that Grotius, Hobbes, and others had al­ ready posed the key question of what came to be known as "constinuion­ ality." Exemplary in thsi regard are ROllSscau, Hume, and Kant, for whom the polti ical is fundamentally a matter of contrivance or arrangement, so that constimtionality itself had an irreducibly factitious character. Perhaps the most radical acknowledgment of the sheer contingency that pervades social and political structures is I-hune's statement (which is almost an uncanny prefiguration of later theories of ideology), "As Force is always on the side of the governed [for the many are governed by the few], the governors have nothing to support diem but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and d il s maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as the most free and popular." 14 -This i-hunean appreciation of the artificiality dlat pervades

all political

and moral orders extends, with a number of significant differences, to Rous­ seau and Kant. Germane in dlis context is Rousseau's pr inciple that civil society is the primary source of the ev ils dlat aflli ct its members, dlat people are what their government makes them into, and that the realm of the po­ litical dlerefore affords the only means that humans have of remedying these afflictions.l s While it may seem implausible and even egregious to lump Kant with l-lume and ROllSscau, rhe commonality among these thinkers arises from Kant's insistence that all action can ultimately be reduced to the work­ ing of the human will and that the unconstrained capaeity

to

exercise one's

will (albeit n i accordance widl the law) is the basis of freedom, nilminating in the insight that the ideal polity is olle which enables die freedom (or "spon­ taneity") of one being to be reconciled with the freedom (or "spomancities") of other beings according to a unv i ersal Iaw.16 For l-iume, Rousscau, and Kant, politics is dms essentially a set of in ­ stitutional practices designed for rhe ordering of die human will, the pri­ macy of dIe ullimpeded will (except, where Kant is concerned, when the law is breached) reflecting the complete ascendancy and self-confidence of the bourgeoisie in cighteenth-cenmry Europe. The problem of die political which preoccupied GrotitlS, Hobbes, Spinoza, and odlers-their primary goal being to produce a figure of the (early modern) citz i en that could be rec­ onciled with the ontology and explanatory schemas of the mechanist physi­ cal science of die time, as well as the outer limits of any prevailing Christa i n orthodoxy-was by the time of l-iume, Rousseau, and Kant supplanted by a conception of die political in which the figures of the citizen and civil society INTRODUCTION

7

could be taken for granted (at least philosophically). It was now possible, in tllis period of a by now fully anchored mercantile capitalism, [0 install the image of a "free" and entirely factitious civil society in which citizens could begin [0 be at home in tllC laissez-faire mentaljti of tllC burgeoning capitalist markets.17 By rhe beginning of the nincteemh century, with the emergence of the main elements of what was to become the fully fledged modern European state system (as opposed to the early modern Westphalian dispensation of 16+8), tile several strands of Romantic nationalism began to permeate visions of the political. The Romantic repudiation of rhe legacy of the Enlighten­ ment of tile seventeenth and eighteenth cenmries was manifested most di­ rectly in tile linking of the state form to conceptions of etlmicity. Civil so­ ciety itsclf was subsumed by the stmctures of the nation-state, as tile notion of sovereignty was yet again transformed: where once sovereignty reposed in the people's assembly based on the active participation of citizens, now the people were disaggregated and only their representatives assembled. The people thus had

[0

be lmified by another principle, based this time on the

nation-state defined, tribally, on the basis o f ethnic and thus ultimately lin­ guistic affiliation.ls Martin Thom quotes Madame dc Stad from her work Des

circoIIStnllccs actuelles on this powerful historical shift: according to Madame de Stad, while in bygone epochs liberty "consisted of whatever ensured the citizens the greatest possible share in tile c.,ercise of powerl,] liberty in mod­ ern times consists of whatever guarantees the independence of citizens from governments."I? -This paradigm

of the political underwent a furtller transformation in the

second half of the nineteenth cenmry, when industrial capitalism superseded its mercantilist precursor, making i t necessary for tile paradigm's ethnically oriented nationalism to find ways of accommodating the industrial working classes of most Western European nations, as well as North America. In this period, electoral franchises were broadened, albeit gmdgingly and unevenly (women were c.,e1uded even as the franchise was being extended; in most "'estern industrial nations women were denied the vote until after "'orld "'ar I). -The altered parJdigm managed to retain its laissez-Caire economic orientation, though it was now adjusted for the ethnically bounded nation­ state, with its growing population of proletarianized labor.20 After \.Vorld War I the industrial capitalism of the previous period had to contend with the growing need to bring about a compromise between labor and capital, mainly as a consequence of the urgent requirement tllat the dev­ astating economic consequences of the Great War of 1914-18 be addressed. 8

INTRODUCTION

And so the first slow steps leading somewhat unevenly to the welfare capi­ talism of the Golden Age after World War

II

were taken_ This compromise

between labor and capital received a further and vital impetus from the Great Depression and World

War II,

and from these events came the enhanced

institutionalization of the social democratic docnines that occurred in most Western European COlUltries during this period. (The New Deal was viewed as the American correlate of European social democracy, t o the extent that i t too required American capital to compromise with labor.) The vision of the JXllitical that prevailed in this historical phase (the time from dle Great Depression onward) still favored the nation-state as dle pri­ mary locus of social and economic activity. But this notion was augmented by the principle dlat dle individual political subject was entitled to a wide range of social rights: universal health care and education; subsidized housing, child care, and public transportation; employment and wage protections; state provision for old-age pensions; and a relatively capacious overall so­ cial safety net. 1he compromise between capital and labor notwithstanding, there still existed

an

effective dividing line between left and right; while in

Europe during World War

II

the parties of rhe right tended to be Christian

Democrat and mildly nationalist, their rival Social Democratic parties often had e1ectorally viable communist parries to their left, which meant that redis­ tributionist economic programs, no matter how cautious and mild, always had a viable political constituency. Hence the situation obtaining in Britain today, where dle "new" Labour of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown is aligned with the Conservative Party as dle two comending parties of rhe identifi­ able center-right, leaving the more or less centrist Liberal Democrats and the \.Velsh and Scottish nationalist parties to be the

more radical

parliamen­

tary bloc, would have been simply undlinkable during the postwar Golden Age.11 As

I

mentioned earlier, this substantive political demarcation between

left and right started to disappear when neoliberalism became hegemonic from the 1970S onward, and this loss became pervasive after the collapse of "actually existing communism" in 1989. A market zealotry which views JXllitics solely in terms of positioning conformist citizens in front of the mar­ ket, and which insists dlat economic equality can be presented to "realistic" voters only as an abstract "equality of opJXlrtunity" (as opposed to requiring even a minimal degree of actual income redisniburion)-thcsc convictions being this market fundamentalism's main propellant-had dovetailed with the wholesale incorporJtion of electoral politics into the society of the spec­ tacle from the 1980S onward. INTRODUCTION

9

In the process, politics in Western Europe and North America has been put in the service of a sometimes bullying, sometimes cajoling populism (which is what the hugely revamped post-9/11 American nationalism really amount.� to in domestic terms) that has effectively eviscerated the politi­ cal by turning it into the mere business of manipulating and dragooning voters according to the largely fictitious rhythms of election cycles. In this "'postpolitical" politics (not to be conflated with the "apolitical" annihilation of anything to do with politics), politicians and their attendant logos and slogam are advertised and marketed to their somewhat bemused and docile constituencies like tile hard-to-differentiate fizzy beverages typically found in American and European vending machines. Politicians in America and Britain today havc to f)()SSCSS a "brand" in order to succeed; hence in the 2008 U.S. presidential ekction, the McCain "j'vLlVerick" brand apparently flopped with tile electorate, while Obama's "Mr. ('.001" brand was deemed to have been a success. There is no other way to account for the influence wielded in the name of the prevailing market fundamentalism by such advisers as Karl Rove and Alistair Campbell on George W. Bush and Tony Blair, respectively. Indeed in the 2004 and 2008 U.S. presidential elections the category of the "low-information voter"-who knows almost nothing of a political platform o r prospectus, but who can be relied on to be enticed by tile media-conveyed "brand" of this or that politician with an appealing "personality," typically re­ flected in the ability to speak with a sympy voice (Ronald Reagan), or having an alluring smile (Bil l Clinton), or posscssing a folksy demeanor (George W. Bush before his catastrophic decline i n popularity helped e.xpose this pre­ tense for what it was), being blessed with "good hair" (John Edwards before his fall from grace), tile ability to drop at will an upper-class accent for the more declasse "Mockney" crony Blair), or having tile abii l ty to wink sugges­ tively at an audience (Sarah Palin)-became cnlcial for the pollsters, focus groups, and public relations comultants of the major political parties.22 Hand in hand with this marketization of the liberal-democratic politi­ cal sphere has been the full-scale conversion of political parties into post­ ideological vote-harvesting machines mn by profcs.sional cadres primarily attuned to rhe desires of corporate interests. Ross McKibbin describes this development thus: -nle typical politician today, whe.ther minister, shadow minister or "ad­ viser," proceeds from student politics (often with a politics degree), to political consultancy or a think-tank, to "research" or the staff of an active politician. He or she is "good at politics"-which means being good at 10

INTRODUCTION

the nU"eh,1nics of politicS, not neccss.lfily its ideas. The consequence is that the mechanics drives OUi thl' ideas, and (he immedhl.le expels the long-term. l'oliti(S is what the Dil l i y A1iIiI [3 right-wing British t'J.bloid] says today; the long-term is what the Dnily Alnil might say tomorrow_ The crucial relationship now is Ix>tween the politician, the journalist and the '"ad"iser,�1.1 Looking :'lt this from :'lIlother :1ngle, it could be s:1id th3t modern politicS (that is, the politics of the West since 1776 or 1789), until the past couple of decades at le:1St, has always Ix>en about thc st'rugglc to position or reposition so\'Creigmy in some institutional formation or strategic mode of political agency (or both, more ofren than not). However, in today's "low-intensity democracy" so\'crcignry reposes mostly, if not entirely, in the market, and gh'en thc centrality of the self-serving internal apparatuses of the present­ day politiC".l1 part)' (which, b)' being almost exclusively media-focused and driven by the systemkJ.lly induced compl1l�ion to g:lfller \'otes for thcsake of being at the top of the electoral COUIlt no matter what, ends up operating to the detrimcm of an adl'quatcly fUllctioning public sphere), the "dcllIocratic citizen" of today h:1S been left to dangle in the resultant \'oid.1" As McKibbin puts ii, "The political elite is now probably more divorced from sodety, and from any wider organising principles or ideology,

than al any other timc ill

the laSt 150 years:' lS 'Vhat is desperately needed tOOa)', therefore, is a new sociopolitiC".l1 settle­ menr, al once practical and thcorel'iC".lI, thai will reclaim the polilical for the projcct ofa democracy tim will always place the inrerests of the dispos.�esscd at' irs heart. Given the present tarnished stJre of the political (to wit, the "media-theatricali7.cd" politics referred

t'O

b)' Jacques Dcrrida) in Western

Europe and the Uniled States, this democratic project can advance itself only as a projce! of liberation, a libel'ation from the dispossession that is thc r.lle of tlte overwhelming majority of children, women, and men on this planet. This book asks what, if anything, marxism has to sa)' about this putative project ofliberation, lhe bank credit crisis of 2008 and 2009 h:1S prO\'ided a massive iml>ctUS to

commentary, some of it bordering on the imbecilic, evcn though the likely tl'ajectories of this crisis have yer to reach a pOill! of dear discemmem, TIle aim of this book is not to dc1h'er prognoslic.uions on evems such as this, mo­ mentous though they ma)' be, bur to anal)'7x the economic structure which proVides enabling conditions for such economic crises

as

the 111ird World

debt crisis of the 1980s {from which some developing economies ha\'c never

INTROf)UCT(ON

U

truly recovered), the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the Asian financial collapse n i 1997, the dot-com failure in 2001, and now the credit market upheavals. As long as this capitalist structure continues to exist, it is likely that such crises will be chronically recurrent. My argument focuses on this capitalist struc­ ture, and while I advert to some of these crises for what they reveal about tilis underlying economic configuration, I proceed on the premise that the occurrence of an economic crisis is always contingent on the possibilities and capacitics inherent n i this structure. An analytic primacy thus has to be accorded to this structure, as opposed to the descriptions (however accurate and helpful they may be) of this or tilat specific crisis.

Marxism Today For marxism it s i a commonplace, enjoined by the mutual permeation of theory and prJctice, that things occur in specific and determinate ways, and possibilities in some situations are unavoidably conjoined witil their absence in otiler circumstances, so that material limits invariably coexist with open­ ings and opportunities. It is a truism also that liberation n i the face of a massive dispossession must involve change. Marxism is first and foremost a theory and a practice of historical and poitical l change, involving the fol­ lowing levels: - A description and analysis of the cyeles of capitalist accumulation and consumption - A political theory and practice of liberation premised above all on the supersession of capitalist relations of production, it being understood rhat the space of rhe political is opened up by capitalist relations of production - A reading of the history of philosophy, since philosophy is the science of the categories of the virmal, the possible, and the real, these cate­ gories being integral to any depiction and analysis of social being - An analysis of sociocultural formations and subjects, since society and culture are the context in which such subjects act Each of these levels develops in different and specific ways. However, the insight that breaks and continuities at one level are usually reflected at other levels is central to marxism. So, all else being equal, the existence or absence of an oppormniry to engage n i a quest for social and political liberation is likely to be accompanied by the existence or absence of a parallel crisis of production and accumulation at the economic level, and vice versa. 12

INTRODUCTION

Any hisrorical and political crisis is thus just as likely ro be a crisis of categories, and the current crisis (the one that has e:dsted since the demise of the Golden Age of JXlstwar capitalist expansion in the

1970S) is also a crisis

of the category of social class and the accompanying notion of a socioJXlliti­ cal struggle. 11le material failure of a previous kind of instimtional politics, something palpably evident after

1989 (our emblematic date), is reflected in

the failure or problematization of these key categories, in particular dle cate­ gory of class struggle and its attendant political aspirations. \,Vith dle collapse of a politics enjoining a substantive separation between right and left and the emergence of a "postpolitical" politics based on media-oriented populist spectacles, the categories of social class and class struggle, of militancy n i the broadest sense, were jeopardized or pushed to one side, as politics and JXlstpolitics-in late capitalism this is a politics rhat is one and dle same time populist alld authoritarian-have become more and more a matter of getting the right media-friendly faS"ade for dle hypocritical and gleaming-eyed pro­ fessional politician.2tt Innovation and change at the level of the political is therefore absolutely crucial, and so has an undoubted ontological primacy for marxism. Bm just as important for marx ism s i dle innovation or renovation of its categories, especially those that bear on the notion of liberation. If this is a time when real political iIUlOvation has become more unexpected dlan ever, dlen this is also likely

ro

be a time that is ripe for unc.xpected innovation at the level

of (marxist) theory and philosophy. This book addresses the question of this categoreal n i novation. This bexlk has three main sections. The first deals with the current regime

of accumulation, where I argue that financialization on a largely global scale is now the chief instnunent of subordination and dependency on rile part of the poorer nations, and that our conceptions of a globalized political econ­ omy must be modified

ro

take account of dlis momentous shift roward a

highly mobile financial capital. -n10se, me included, who started to make this argument in the

1990S, and who were greeted widl some skepticism then,

now (at the end of

2008) n i variably find ourselves talking to the converted

when advancing this claim. The second section deals widl the constimtion of subjectivity, since sub­ jectivity is one of the key arenas in which dle struggles against dispossession take place. Subjectivity, or dle realm of culmre more generally, is conceived here as the reJXlsitory of the forces and drives that enable human beings ro be produced and reproduced

as

social beings. It is a truism rilat without

this production and reproduction of social and subjective being dlere can be INTRODUCTION

13

no flUlCtioning economic order. "nle discussion in dlis section focuses on a number of key dleorizations of subjectivity, and dle emphasis here is phi l o­ sophical, as opposed to the focus, inspired by social science, on international political economy in the first section. Ibe dlird section takes up the theme ofliberation, and its key geopolitical proposition is the notion of an economic dclinking on the part of the poorer nations. Where subjectivity is concerned, 1 argue that the precepts of a tired humanism need to be replaced by alternative conceptions of subjectivity and agency which do not require dlis jaded humanism as a premise; like liberal democracy, this concomitant Illunanism has failed in decisive ways to live up to what it promised, at least as a set of options materiali7.cd in a viable institutional politics. Is it possible to conceptualize (necessarily and unavoid­ ably in theory but also necessarily for practice) somedling emancipatory that can potentially move the majority of human beings, disenfranchised and de­ prived as they are, beyond the reach of dlese increasingly evident systemic failures? The following pages deal widl the enabling conditions for these economic, political, and social failures. As I have indicated, my argument is avowedly marxist, and my motivating impulse is supplied by the conviction that the governing institutions and forces of our society are owned and managed by powerful clites, planetary in scale, paying lip service (if at all) to dle veneer of accountability demanded by raday's "thin" democracies. But the longing for somedling better, or less bad at any rate, cannot suffice by itself when it comes to launching an emancipatory project. Likewise dle mere analysis of the fundamental stmcrural m i passes of "actually existing capitalism" is also not sufficient on it.� own. Ibis analysis and the longing for a better world, ndispensable i dlOUgh they are, need to be buttressed by a careful sense of where beyond "actually existing capitalism" dle myriad forms of a creative and perhaps still to be imagined activism can take us. The failures of"acrually existing socialism" associated here with the year

1989 mean that there can be

no wholesale returll to its previous forms and arrangements. ·nle bureau­ cratically centralized state is dead, whedler in its Soviet or milder corporatist forms. \Vhich is not to say that there is no need for any kind of bureaucratic organization; after all, it is a commonplace dlat complex societies calUlOt flUlCtion satisfactori l y without at least a modicum of administrative scaf­ folding. Vhat , we must aim for and at the same time experiment with, n i myvicw, is something considerably to the political left of the nowadays skin-and-bone and barely living remnants of the previous social-democratic or New Deal 14

INTRODUCTION

consensus (some would say this consensus n i fal..""t expired some time ago), while eschewing any longing for the shapes of a Soviet-style state socialism. Hut simply arguing for this vision will not advance us toward its implemen­ tation unless we also scrutinize rigorously the possible ways of realizing this vision, and have as well an adequate grasp of the obstacles likely to stand in the way of any concened attempt to n i stitute such a project of liberation. \Vhere do we begin to make a start on this undertaking? There has to be a vigorous democratization of our economic and political i.nstitutions; it is imperative that we find ways to create vastly strengthened mechanisms of accowltability that cannot be kicked to the side so effortlessly by those with the power and influence gained without too much dilliculty in our society by just about anyone with a fat bank balance and bulky invest­ ment portfolio. As part of this process of redemocratization it will also be necessary to weaken the hold of the professionalized oligarchies who today nUl the major European and American political parties (the kind of "no ide­ ology please, only the electoral count matters" oligarchy basically contemp­ tuous of the elecwrare) and to replace it with a poitical l system with parties once again committed to substantive ideological positions (and thus at least embodying a real difference between right and left), in this way becoming a little more reflective of the ramified and often contradictory wishes of the electorate. The sitllation prevalent in Hritain and tlle United States today, where the mechanisms of political represemation arc in the hands of two virtually indistinguishable center-right parties, will therefore have to be rec­ tified quite radically. Any form of democracy heedful of tllese imperatives would already be much less "thin" than the neutered versions being paraded today. In addition, the amply documented weakening of the bonds of commu­ nal solidarity in the United States and in Western Europe (tllOugh let

lIS

not become enamored of romantic notions of the "organic commwlities" of bygone ages) has had as one of its concomitants a perceptible decline in the level of political engagement (the big rufilout in the U.S. presidential elec­ tion of 2008 notwitllstanding)P The upshot is tllat a strengthening of these communal bonds is probably a necessary condition for enhancing participa­ tion in democratic arrangemenL� potentially more substantive than those currently sanctioned by today's "thin" or "low-intensity" democracies. 111e reinvention of such forms of collective solidarity (involving what Raymond Williams aptly called "resources for a journey of hope") is thus a cnlcial task for those invested in the project of liberation. -nlere can be no guarantee that this reinvention will acrually take place or succeed in the longer term-there INTRODUCTION

15

arc no teleologically certified outcomes or "iron laws of history" here! -bur that something like tllis reinvention is needed if the lives of the majority of human beings arc to be bettered is a proposition that cannot really be gain­ said. In some cases, these fom1s of collective solidarity and agency will have to be enacted at the national level (whid1 is not to imply tl1at they calUmt also be ratified at a subnational or paranational lcvel). In some countries there is also a vit"ally important place for a detribalized and popular civic nationalism, which may not be attainable in the mmediate i future or on a large enough initial scale, bur which could nonetheless be indispensable for a project of liberation. (There are importam lessons to be learned from the work of Tom Nairn on a civic as opposed to an etlmic nationalism.) ·n1is possibility will be discussed later, as will several other proposals concerning this project of lib­ eration, once tl1e conceptual scaffolding for tl1em is set up in tl1e subsequent chapters.The revolution I advert to should not be confused with something similar n i the popular consciousness, namely, the stereotyped characteriza­ tiom of "insurrection" or "rebellion." Insurrections and rebellions will occur as long as there arc people who can no longer acquiesce in living conditions they find absolutely intolerable. lbere will certainly be times when such in­ surrections will help advance the course of liberation, and some when they will not. Only an abstract dogmatism will insist from the begiIming that the lot of the downtrodden will never be improved by allY recourse to an n i sur­ rectional violence. But by "revolution" I mean a fundamenr-al and lasting transformation of the capitalist mode of production and aCClunulation and its accompanying stmctures of social relations, and a revolution of this kind may take many generations to bring to fmition (if indeed it were to succeed). Or a revolution may come about in a relatively short time, as was the case with the collapse of tl1e former Eastern bloc in 1989-91. But ci1e likelihood that ci1is revolution will be long, involving as it docs the fundamental super­ session of the capit"alist system, for now seems a less implausible seenario tllan tllat of a spcrtacular and rapid overmrning of the present system. The revolution may also be long because for the foreseeable future its eventual lineaments may be gleaned only indirectly, as opposed to being part of an explicit and quickly m i plemenrable political prospecms.28 11le ex­ emplary militant in this simation will thus have to be not only active and engaged, but patient and persistent, and also alert to the possible emergence of hitherto undetectable modes of political and cultural c.xpressivity. As Raymond \Villiams put it, "Everything that 1 wlderstand of the his­ tory of cile long revolution leads me to tile belief that we are still n i its early 16

INTRODUCTION

stages."19 Or maybe, just maybe, the movemem toward revolution could be at a somewhat later stage? vVe have no way of knowing, but what cannot be gainsaid is dlat dlOse massively disadvantaged by this system have Iitde or no choice but to engage in an economic and social stmggle in which the beneficiaries of this system will not surrender their positions of advantage willingly and quickly.

INTRODUCTION

17

CHAPTER 1 The Complementary Deaths of the Thinking Subject and of the Citizen Subject

The concept of the subject is one of philosophy's pree minent topoi, and like all philosophical concepts it operates in a field of thought defined by one or more internal variables. -nICSC internal variables are conjoined in diverse re­ lationships with such external variables as historical cJXlchs and political and economic processes and events, as well as functions which allow the concept and its associated variables to produce a morc or less specific range of tmth­ effects.] -nle trajectory taken by the concept of the subject in dIe history of philosophy affords considerable insight into how tillS concept is produced, and as a result this philosophic-historical trajectory merits examination by a nyone interested in this concept's creation.

7lJe Classical Citizen Subject There is a convemional wisdom in the history of philosophy regarding the more or less intrinsic connection between the metaphysical-epistemological project that seeks an absolute ground for thought or reason (What is it that enables reason to serve its legislative functions?) and the philosophico­ political project of finding a ground in reason for the modus operandi of a moral and political subject (On what basis is reason able to legislate for the good life or right action?). According to the lineaments of what is by now a thoroughly well-seasoned narrative, the essential congruence between the rational subject of thought and the complementary subject of morality and politics was first posited by Plato and Aristotle. -nlis unity between the two

kinds of subject then found its suitably differentiated way nto i dIe thought of Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, I-Iume, Kant, and Hegel (and a host of their successors). The core of this narrative is expressed by thc somewhat Kantian proposition, characteristic of the Enlightenment n i general, that reason provides dIe vital and indispensable criterion by which all judgments concerning belief, morality, politics, and art are to be appraised, so that rea­ son is dlC faculty dlat regulates dIe thinking being's activity. This activity is in turn the essential means for reason's deployment in any legitimate thinking about dIe world, dlat is, for the thinking being's capacity to describe and explain dIe world in ways that accord fundamentally with reason's precepts. And this precisely because reason s i dIe irreducibly prior and enabling con­ dition of any use of dlis capacity on the part of the subject.2 Reason, in other words, constitutes the thinking being, and the activity of dlis being in mm enables reason to unfold dyn:unically (to provide a somewhat Hegelian gloss on this initially Kamian proposition). In the topography of dlis unfolding of reason, both rational thought and politics :Uld ethics are deemed to find their dovetailing foundation. -nle philosophical tradition provides another way of delineating this con­ nection between dIe rJtional subject of thought and the moral-JXllitical sub­ ject, one that also derives its focal point from Kant. Using dIe distinction between asubjectlllll (i.e., the thing that serves as the bearer ofsomething, be it consciousnc.�s or some other property of the self) and a slIbjcctJlJ (i.e., the thing that is subjected to something else), the tradition has includl-d among its repertoire of concepts a figure of dlought taken from medieval philosophy dlat hinges on dIe relation between the subjectum and the subjectlls. Etienne Balibar, n i his fascinating essay "Citizen Subject," uses dlis distinction

urge that we not identify Descartes's

dlinking thing

(res cogitans)

to

with the

transcendental subject of thought that very quickly became an ineliminable feature of Enlightenment epistemology. Nothing could be further from the truth, says Halibar, because dIe human being is for Descartes the lUlity of a soul and a body, and this wlity, which marks the essence of the human being, cannot be represented in terms of the subjecmm (presumably because the subjecmm, qua intellecmal simple nature, can exist logically without requir­ ing the presupposition of a unity between soul and body).3 As the unity of a soul and a body, the human individual is not a mere intellecmal simple nature, a subjectum, but is, rather, a subject in anodler, quite different sense. In this very differem sense, dIe human individual is a subject transitively related to an other, a "something else," and for Descartes this "somedling else" s i precisely the divine sovereignty. In other words, for Descartes the 22

CHAPTER 1

human individual is really a subjecrus and never the subjecrum of modern epistemology, the latter in

any case owing its discovery

to Locke and not

to Descartes. For Balibar, therefore, it is important to remember dlat Des­ cartes, who s i palpably a late scholastic philosopher, was profoundly engaged with a range of s i sues dlat had been central for his precursors in the medi­ eval period, in particular the question of the relation of lesser beings to the supreme divine being. This was a question which both Descartes and dIe medieval phi l osophers broached, albeit n i different ways, under the ntbric of the divine sovereignty. The Cartesian subject is thus a subjecrus, ont� who submits, and this in at least two ways significam for both Descartes and medieval political dle­ ology:

(1) dIe subject submits to the Sovereign who is dIe Lord God, and

(2) the subject also yields to the earthly authority of dIe prince, who is God's representative on earth. As Descartes put it n i his letter to Mersenne (15 April

1630), "Do not hesitate I tell you, to avow and proclaim everywhere, that it is God who has established the laws of nature, as a King establishes laws n i his Kingdom."4 From dlis passage, and from his odler writings, it is clear dlat the notion of sovereignty was at once poitical l and theological for Descartes, as

it had been for the earlier scholastic philosophers. This is not dIe place for a detailed discllSsion of Balibar's essay, or dIe

magisterial work of Ernst Kantorowicz on this topic; the former, in addi­ tion to being a litde brief (the section on Descartes is only n i tended to be an overview), is also not entirely new n i what it proposes, since Leibniz, Arnauld, and Malebranche had long ago viewed Descartes, roughly their contemporary, as a follower of Augustine, who fmUld philosophy's raison d'ctre in the soul's contemplation of its relation to God, and who therefore took the dependence of lesser beings on dIe divine cminence as philosophy's primary concern. 5 Blit f i Locke is the tnte inventor of the modern concept of the self, as Bali­ bar maintains, who thcn is the real author of the fully fledged concept of the transcendental subject, if Balibar is indeed right to n i sist that it is not Des­ cartes? 1he true culprit here, says Balibar, is not Descartes, but Kant, who needed the concept of the transcendental subject to account for dIe "syn­ thetic uniry" that provides the necessary conditions for objective c.'pcrience. Kant in effect foisted onto Descartes a philosopheme that was really his own "discovery," with Heidegger as his more than willing subsequent accomplice in this dubious undertaking. The omcome ofthis grievous misattribution has been momentous for our understanding, or lack thereof, of the course taken by dlis branch of the history of philosophy.6 THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

23

Kant, however, was about more than just the "discovery" of the transcen­ dental subject. -nle Kantian subject also had [0 prescribe duties for itself in the name of the categorical imperative, and in so doing carve out a realm of freedom in nature that would enable this subject to free itself from a "self­ inflicted tutelage" that arises when we can't make judgments without the supervision of an other; this of course includes the tutelage of the king. The condition for realizing any such ideal on the part of the enlightened subject is the ability to submit to nothing but the m le of reason in making judgments, and so freedom from the power of the despot when making one's judgments necessarily involves a critical repositioning of the place from which sover­ eignty is exercised. Kant declared that no more is the locus of sovereignty the body of the king, since this "tutelage" is stoppable only if the subject is able to owe its allegiance to a republican polity constituted by the rule of reason and nothing but the m le of reason. Whatever criticism Balibar levels at Kant for the (supposed) historical mistake he made with regard to Descartes, the philosopher from east Prussia nonetheless emerges as a very considerJble figure in Balibar's account. For Kant also created the concept of a certain kind of practical subject, one who operates in the realm of freedom, and this practical subject, whose telos is the ultimate abolition of any kind of "self-inflicted tutelage," had to cease to be the "subject" of the king (i.e., the subjectus of Descartes and medieval political theology) in order to become a "self-legislating" rational being? Kant's great achievement therefore lay in his simultaneous creation of the transcendental subject (i.e., the subjectum of modern epistemology) and the philosophical discrediting of the subjectus of the previous theologico­ philosophical and political dispensation. The concomitant of Kant's philo­ sophical glltting of the "subject" who owed his fealty t o the king was dllls the political emergence of the republican citizcn who from 1789 onward (though a good case can be made for including

1776 in this periodization) would

supplant the subject/subjecms of rhe previous historical and philosophical epoch. In the process, Descartes's philosophical world of subjects who sub­ mit, albeit "irrationally" from the Kantian standpoint, to the laws of God and king was dislodged by Kant's world of "self-legislating" mtional subjects who engage in this legislation precisely by adverting to dle rational and non­ theological notions of right and duty. This new subject is dle embodiment of right (Recht) and of dle operation of practical reason (right being for Kant dle outcome that can be guamn­ teed only by the proper

usc

of practical reason). Furthermore dle subject is

considered a citizcn to dle extent that he or she embodies the general will, 24

CHAPTER 1

in which case dle only laws worthy of the name arc dlOse which "come only from rhe general, lUlited will of the people."s Sovereignty is thus glossed by Kant duough a recasting of the Rousseauan social contract. Laws arc rationally promulgatl-d only when they exemplify the general will, and this exemplification of dIe general will is possible only f i there is a perfectly just civil constitution. As Kant put it in his "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," "The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in whichfrctdom under e.xter­

na/ laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent widl irresistible force, in mher words, of establishing a perfectlyjust cil'if constitution."9 -nle outcome, as the philosophy textbooks tell us, was a crucial separation of the eardlly from the heavenly city, of earthly sovereignty from divine sover­ eignty. However, if Kant is the tme n i augurator of the Citizen Subject, then for Balibar, Michel Foucault is the great theorist of the transition from the world of monarchical and divine sovereignty to the world of rights and duties determined by the state and its apparatuses. Salibar concludes his essay widl the following observation: "As to whedler dlis figure lthe Citizen Subject,] like a face of sand at the edge of the sea, is abom to be effaced with the nc.\:t great sea change, that is another question. Perhaps it is !lodling more tilan Foucault's own utopia, a necessary support for that mopia's facticiry."10 I would like now to address the Foucauldian question left by Salibar for future consideration and pose the question of the current destination or fate of the Citizen Subject. 10 do tilis we have to look again at Kant. The reason that constitutes the subject is perforce a Transcendental Rea­ son. -nle obvious Kantian inflection here is not accidental, because the reason that grounds the subject is not a reason that can be specified within the terms of rhe activity of the subject: this reason is dle basis of dlis subject's very possibility qua subject, and by virtue of that, reason is necessarily exterior to the "activity" of dle thinking subject. Reason in dlis kind of employment is thus the activity of a single and universal quintessence whose object is reason itself, so that reason has necessarily to seek its ground within itself, as Hegel noted.11 Reason, by virtue of its self-grOlUlding, is perforce the writing of the Absolute.11 lbe subject's ground, which has to reside n i Reason itself, is therefore emirely and properly metaphysical, and any crisis of Transcen­ dental Reason unavoidably becomes a philosophical crisis of the thinking subject. Kant himself was the first to realize tilis, dlough it was left to his philosophical successors in the movement known as "early Romanticism"

(FnilJrolllalltik) to m:l.ke the acknowledgment of this crisis ofTranscendental Reason into a starting point for philosophical reflection.13 THINKING SUBJEct AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

25

Vith \ Nietzsche, however, the hitherto radical figllfe of the transcenden­ tal subject is propelled into a crisis, and with this ostensibly terminal crisis the fundamental convergence between the rational-epistemological subject and the moral-political subject is denied any plausibility. We know from the te....tbooks of the history of philosophy that reason, insofar as it operates on both the understanding and the will, is placed by Nietzsche entirely within the ambit of the

iVille Zllr Macht,

so that power or desire becomes the en­

abling basis of any epistemological or moral and political subject, thereby irretrievably undemlining or dislocating both kinds of subject. The "will to knowledge" for this Nietzschean-Foucauldian school of thought depends on a logically and psychologically antecedent "will to power." As a result of the n i tervention represented by Nietzsche, tmdl, goodness, and beauty, that is, the guiding transcendental norions for the constitution of this episte­ mological and moral-political subject, are henceforth to be regarded merely as the functions and ciphers of this supervening will to power. The same conventional wisdom also assures us that Marx and Freud likewise "undid" the two kinds of subject and thus wldermined even further any basis for their essential congruence. The constellation formed by Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud (and dleir successors) shows bodl the transcendental subject and the ethicopolitical subject of action to be mere conceptual functions, lacking any substa.ntial being (Kant having already argued in the

Critique of Pure

Reason that the subject of thought is nor a substance). -nlis hackneyed narrative about the collective impact of the great "masters of suspicion" is fine as far it goes; what is far more nteresting, i. however, is the story of what had to come after Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, ofwh:u it is that was going to be done with the mins of the epistemological and moral and po­ litical subject who ostensibly had reigned from Plato to Hegel before being dethroned in the late nineteenth century.14 It is interesting that Balibar, who is as resolute a marxist as anyone could be in these supposedly post-marxist days, appears not to take on board in "Citizen Subject" Marx's well-known critique of bollfgeois democracy, but instead regards Foucault as the thinker who more than any other registered the crisis of this bourgeois Subject. Be that as it may, it is hard to deny that the transcendental subject of modern epistemology suffered calamitously at the hands of Nietzsche (and of Hei­ degger and Foucault after Nietzsche), and that political and philosophical developments n i the twentieth century have cast the Citizen Subject adrift in a rickety lifeboat headed in the direction of the treacherous philosophical reefs mapped by Foucault.

26

CHAPTER 1

But can the course of this stricken lifeboat be altered, and the fWlCtions and modes of expression typically associated with the Citizen Subject be reconstituted in some more productive way, so that this Subject, or its suc­ cessor (but who would that putative successor be?), would be able to meet the political and philosophical demands generated by the prescntlyemerging conjuncmre? Here one senses a certain ambivalence at dIe end of Balibar's essay, a wish that Foucault was perhaps not going to be right when it came to a final reckoning of the fate of the Citizen Subjt.'Ct, and dlat new and better times would somehow come to await a radically transformed Citizen Sub­ ject. But what could be the shape and character of this new life for the Citizen Subject? Balibar has an emphatic proposal: the Citizen Subject will live only by becoming a revolutionary actor. I want to take Balibar's proposal as the start­ n i g point for the discussion that will occupy the rest of this dlapter. There is also the question of dIe theoretical "space" that was once occupied by the transcendental subject of epistemology. \.Vhile we may not quarrel widl Halibar's suggestion that dIe (modem) Citizen Subject supplanted dIe (medi­ eval) subjectlls who owed its fealty to the sovereign monarch and sovereign deity (this now being something of a philosophical commonplace), it has also to be acknowledged, and Halibar himself is certainly aware of this, dIal Kant placed under the category of Right not merely action, bur also knowledge: the Kantian subject is both the Citizen Subject who acts and the epistemo­ logical subject who reflects in accordance widl dIe principles of Reason. This subject may have been displaced or finally extinguished in the second half of the twentiedl century, but the question of the "right use" of Reason remains, or at any rate, the question of the place of a hoped-for right usc of Reason still poses itself. We camlOt accept dlat Reason has "died" simply because its previous philosophic embodiments have been subjected to a concerted critique, no matter how devastating that critique may seem to be. TIus issue is therefore one that demands to be addressed, as a prolep­ sis

to

dealing with the question dlat s i this book's central concern, namely,

that of a potentially enduring transformation of collective political practice, one capable of supporting a project of liberation adequate to dIe challenges posed by today's strucmral and conjuncmral conditions. TIlese conditions, as we saw in the introduction, are those of a globalizing neoliberalism that

has been the dominant regime of accumulation since the end of dle postwar boom in the 1970S (even if dlis economic nt.""Oliberalism appears to be on its knees as a result of the 2008 subprime lending crisis) and a neoconservatism

THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

27

that has bolstered the American poitical l hegemony of the period since 1989. An adequate liberation would therefore be one dlat produced political sub­ jects capable of surmounting the depredations associated with this globaliz­ ing neoliberalism and it.� complementary American neoconservatism.1S

The Demise of{he Clnssicni Citizen Subject \Vhatever Foucault may have said about the supersession of rhe posrclassical

epstime, i and dle death of dle Man-Citizen that accompanied this superses­ sion (I take. Foucault's Man-Citizen to be coextensive with Balibar's Citi­ zen Subject), it is obvious dlat dle subsequent political mutation of classical liberalism n i to a globalizing neoliberalism, as wcll as the disappearance of a viable socialism, have both served to form the basis of what is palpably a new conjuncture. This conjuncture, which some (including me) have called the "postpolitical" politics of the time after 1968, represents an added burden to the already harsh philosophical fate meted out to this Citizen Subject or Man-Citizen by dle "masters of suspicion" n i the late nineteenth century and early twentieth. The rulmination of this trajectory in the postpolitical poli­ tics of the past few decades (as described in the n i troduction) seems to reduce the force of the critique embodied in he t writings of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud; the subjcrt's appareiU superfluity n i this postpolitical dispensation lmdermines the very need for its critique. With the effacement of the focus (i.e., the Citizen Subject) of this critique, critique also finds itself fading into insignificance. At the same time, the apparent superfluity of the classical Citi­ zen

Subject makes more urgent the question of the ontological status of its

pmative successor, dlat is, dlt' subjcrt of tillS postpolitical politics. Is the subject of this postpolitical politics still some kind of vestigially effective subject, a ba.rdy breathing renmant of the Man-Citizen of Foucault's mod­ ern episteme or Balibar's Citizen Subject of the time after 1776 or 1789? And if dlls is tmly so, there comes dle question of what powers, if any, reside n i this seemingly obsolescent renmant of dle classical Citizen Subject. Have we been left with nothing for the metaphysical constinuion of dle possibility of politics bm dle sheer acknowledgment of the power of dle body, dle power of bare life (as proposed by dle thinkers of the "inoperative" comnumity and the community to come), or the appeal to some kind of undeconstmctable justice (as proposed by Derrida and his epigoni)? We don't have to spend too much time dlinking abom such suggestions to recognize that the practices and orders of thought associated with the "societies of control" limned by Dcleuze, and dlOse of dle domain of the biopolitical identified by FOllcault 28

CHAPTER 1

bur also developed by Agamben and Hardt and Negri, derive their saliency from this postpolitical conjuncmre. The centrality of the problematic of the postpolitical, arising as it does from the effacement ofthe Citizen Subject, for any putative project of liberation can therefore hardly be gainsaid. By dIe 1960s and 1970S it had become dear, or dear enough, that the politics of the past two hundred years was no longer able to manage the com­ plex and uneven movements of force that had been unleashed by dIe newest regimes of capitalist accumulation. AldlOugh many periodizations rake 1776 or 1789 to be dIe emblematic starting point for dlis politics of dIe "classical" Citizen Subject (a politics which by the 1970S and 1980S had become more and more clearly perceptible as a "previous politics"), by "classical" politics I mean both a politics based on a centrally planned economy of the party-state (i.e., the system of government that e:dsted n i the former Eastern bloc) and one predicated on the market-oriented liberal-democratic state (associated in a complementary way with what is still called "the West"). 111e citizens of the former Soviet bloc, and of the vVest adversarially simated in relation to the Soviet Union, were both members of dynamic political dispensations requiring visible and even intransigent distinctions between left and right, in ways that are becoming increasingly difficult to imagine in an epoch marked by such solecisms as "compassionate conservatism," "a socialism compat­ ible with the requirements of the capitalist market," "we're all middle-class today," and so forth. No matter how one assesses this previous politics, with its somewhat rigid ideological demarcations between left and right, it was always, even in countries of the former Soviet bloc, the politics of a particu­ lar phase of capitalist development. As indicated, this classical politics lasted from 1776 or 1789 until the lirst unravelings of its supporting international system in dIe early 1970S.16 It has already been noted that he t metaphysical heart of this classical poli­ tics was a particular conception of sovereignty and of the political subject ideally subsumed under the benison of this sovereignty through the principle of representation. Only those vested with sovereignty by those who qualify as members of the polity can tntly represent those who qualify as members of the polity! Sovercignty is thus vested by a polity which in turn is deemed by the sovereign to be the body politic instimted to confer sovereignty, in an unending loop of murual affirmation. Such is the delining, and circular (in the practical and not just the logical sense), formula of this model of liberal democracy. With the new capitalist dispensation that came into being in the 1960s and early 1970S, a dispensation now described and analyzed wIder several THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

29

familiar titles ("post-Fordism," "disorganized capitalism," "flex ible accumu­ lation," "worldwide integrated capitalism," " late capitalism," "empire after the age of imperial empires," " the domain of the biopolitical," and so forth), such notions ofsovereignty were progressivdy eviscerated or circumvented. Ille unprecedented transformations in the capitalist order of the past fOllf decades or so were accompanied by a deracination of the classical political subject, that is, tile Citizen Subject who up to now had been at once enabled and constrained by the principles of sovereignty embodied in the previous political dispensation.lo put it somewhat schematically, if Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, and Foucault wldid this classical epistemological and political sub­ ject, and n i he r process undermined irs philosophical rationales, then tile move to a postpolitical politics associated with the latest stage of capitalist development has had, ostensibly, the effect ofdoing away with the very need for such a classical Citizen Subject as well as tile accompanying phi l osophical rationales provided on its behalf.17 The thing rendered equivocal and otiose by Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, and Foucault, but still needed by the politics that lasted from 1776 or 1789 up to the 1970s, had by the 1970s started to become something of a rdie. Today's regime of capitalist accumulation and tile neoliberal and neo­ conservative ideologies identified with its current ascendancy simply have no need for the classical Citizen Subject, just as they have no need for the ideology of modemization that was an intrinsic component of the first or classical liberalism and the various socialisms and communisms whic h rivaled tillS liberalism in tile period from 1870 llntil 1989.lH -nle disciples of Milton Friedman and Leo Strauss who today control tile U.S. government's elite do not give a hoot about substantive notions of an informed and involved citizenry (however mythicized these notions have tended to be in the sdf­ exculpatory or self-congratulatory versions of America's special "destiny"). All rhat matters for Palll Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John McCain, and Sarah Palin (and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom a couple of decades or so before, in her own version of English e.xceptionalism) is that you and I toe the line set down by those who widd power. One docs not have to be Naomi Klein or George Monbiot to acknowledge that, however complex the processes art� which led to the emer­ gence of the current phase of capitalist devdopment, it is virtually undeni­ able, especially in a time which is seeing the beginnings of an economic crisis whose scale is becoming comparable to the great crash of 1929, that corpora­ tions and markets have gained hugdy n i legitimacy and power at tile expense

30

CHAPTER 1

of the now deracinated Citizen Subject. At the same time, the accompanying notion (however much pervaded by the several myths th,1t buttress the ideol­ ogy of liberal democracy) of a sovereignty lodged wlconditionally in a state that, as a matter of principled necessity, placed its administrative fWlCtions at the disposal of its "people;' has also sucClunbed completely to the dictates of corporations and the dogma of the market.11l The historical and social conditions rhat served to legitimize rhe liberal democratic state and its activities, as well as the figure of this now bygone Citizen Subject, were severely lUldermined in the episteme instituted by transnational late capitalism, whose influential proponents in the overdevel­ oped economies of the North see it as their right [0 administer everything in the name of capitalist (over)accumulation. Thus, for instance, anyone who is moderately well-informed is likely to know (albeit without necessarily being dismayed by such knowledge) that a coterie of energy company executives, including those of Enron until its demise, effectively policed the Bush ad­ ministration's energy policy; that Italy's government is in the pocket of one of its richest men (who bought his way n i to the prime ministership of his country); that Tony Blair's entourage at the JohalUlesburg Earth Summit in­ cluded the boss of one of Britain's biggest corporate polluters; rhat weapons manufacturers, as a result of brazen revolving-door hiring policies, arc so completely in league with departments of defense in the advanced industrial countries that this is no longer reckoned a scandal; and so forth. In the place of rhe Citizen Subject posited as an ideal by rhe Iiberal­ democratic political systems of the past two centuries by and large now stands a new kind of ideal subject, to wit, a consumer subject cajoled and tutored in this country by Disney, Fox News, and USA Tonny. In place of the ideal of the sovereign state whose raison d'ctrc was the representation of its "people" there now exists a state formation that has been transformed over the course of rhe past few decades nto i a much more loosely amalgamated bundle of functions and apparatuses (economic, political, ideological, mili­ tary, and so fordl), with some functions and apparamses demanding very high concentrations of state power for their operation, and others little or none. I-icnce, to take an example very much in die news as I write, spying on American citizens without recourse to judicial warrants is deemed an absolutely necessary c:l:ercise of state power by President George \V. Bush and his handlers, while the functions of the Internal Revenue Service and the govenunent-run social security system are considered superfluous enough by some Republican politicians to warrant the wholesale privatization of

THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

31

America's tax collection and social security systems.20 The various compo­ nents of this highly selective ideology of"market choice," "market flexibi l ity and efficiency," and "the free mobility of capital" operate whenever the func­ tions of the state can be abrog:lted in favor of the private interests rhat serve mling elites, bur are quickly suspended when they do not happen to advance the interests of these elites. I-ience the pathos of rhe sentiment expressed n i a bumper sticker sometimes seen on the vehicles of those likely to be typecast in he t United States

as

"liberals": "It will be a great day when our schools

get all the money and the air force has to hold a bake sale to buy a bomber." The cry behind this slogan is plaintive but tmthful, insofar as it is true dlat for many, if nO[ most, Americans it s i simply inconceivable that privately organized sales of baked goads by schoolchildren and their parents be used to fund the production of air force bombers designed to create " shock and awe" in refractory Third \Vorld countries.21 -nle prevailing system of capitalist production and accumulation, and the state formations associated with it, constimte the external variables for the operation of the deboned political subject of today. Just as important for the argument of this book, the emergence or consolidation, at the level of the subject's activity, of political practices capablc of overturning the regnant capitalist order will hinge cmcially on the possibility of supplanting, at the systemic or stmctural level, this globalized system of production and accu­ mulation. -The theoretical armature for a project of liberation capable of creating a postcapitalist society will dIercfore ncorporate i a critique of raday's world­ integrated capitalist system and its underlying conditions. To the extent dlat marxism (albeit one that s i exploratory and not schematic and unilinear in the way that some previous versions were) has shown itself to be the only "theory" genuinely ntended i to furnish a comprehensive critique of this kind, the project of liberation can usefully employ marxism's distinctive practico-theoretical lexicon when approaching the question of dlis project's conditions of possibility. It is thus a tmism for dlis undertaking dlat those who wish to be free first have to produce knowledge of the things dlat stand in the way of their freedom. This in fact is dle acid test for such a project of

liberation: Does it furnish such knowledge, or docs it sweep it more or less gently to one side? Of course events can and do overtake those who form and steer public opinion. TIllis even dle most polished spin doctors were hard-pressed to serve up blandishmcnrs that could diminish what Hurri­ cane Katrina revealed about rhe all too visibly racialized social and economic

32

CHAPTER 1

structures of New Orleans (in particular) and dIe United States (in general). The same state of affairs is also evident in the current financial crisis, when any campaigning American politician, of no matter what persuasion, has to join in the rimal condemnations of dIe "c.xccsscs" on \Vall Street, while having done all he or she could to create a political framework dIal abetted these excesses.

THINKING SUBJECT AN D CITIZEN SUBJECT

H

CHAPTER 2 Producing a Marxist Concept of Liberation

The fKllitico-historical and philosophical demise of the "classical" Citizcn Subjcct, the primary features of which were sketched in chapter 1, was ac­ companied by a momentous modification of state sovereignty. The changes associated with this rcconsritution of state sovcrcigmy involved a powerful mlltation of the capitalist system, and it will be possible to determine what is entailed by the shift from the Citizen Subjcrr to his or her ostensible suc­ cessor (i.e., the kind of subject sponsored by today's world-integrated capi­ talism and its complementary political formations) only by providing dlC mdiments of a description and analysis of hi t s latest phase of capitalist de­ velopment. Marxism has so far shown itself to be the only school of thought whose raison d'e:tre is this overall critique of capitalism, and this chapter broaches the question of what predsely is involved in producing a marxist concept of liberation'! -The motivation for producing this concept ofliberation s i supplied by the conviction that liberated political and social subjects will emerge only when capitalism, which has failed comprehensively to improve the economic and sodal conditions of the majority of humankind, is supplanted, and that the critique of capitalism is therefore essential for any real insight into the con­ ditions that will have to be rcmediated as a precondition for the emergence of such fully liberated subjects. In the begiIming was stmggle. If there s i , or has to be, something like a "posmlate of reason'"' for the ensemble of theoretico-practicai propositions that s i marx ism, it is perhaps this one. -The srmggies of countless women, children, and men for a bener world have taken place over the ages in very

diverse settings of theory and practice (and this is

to state a commonplace!).

This diversity is of such amplirude that it cannar be encompassed, theoreti­ cally or otherwise, within a single movement, even one as powerful and com­ prehensive as marxism. Many have engaged in differcnt and not always nec­ essarily congruent ways in such struggles. These struggles have never owed their "relevance" to marxism. Rather, it is marxism, n i whatever form, that

has owed its "relevance" to them. As long as people struggle for Iiberarion­ and this in the end is a collective and collaborative. project imeparable from the quest for happiness- it will be possible for marxism to be, or to continue to be, "relevant." Broaching the question of marxism's hmdamental because comtiruting relation to the project ofliberation, and acknowledging that marxism derives its saliency from dIe latter (and not vice versa), n i turn poses dIe question of marxism's position n i regard to the supersession of capitalism, since it is an axiom for all schools of marxism that liberation inextricably involves a countervailing action directed at rhe capitalist system of production and accumulation. But doesn't capitalism c.xercise its dominance in many modes and at many levels, not all of which give the appearance of being directed by the forces and agents of capitalism? Can't it plausibly be presumed, more­ over, that specifically anticapitalist struggles are not the only ones germane for those seeking radical and permanent changes n i their way of life? At­ tempts to address these questioIl.s can proceed on two fronts. First, there are those who will argue rhat ascribing an overwhelming normativity of this kind

to

anticapitalist struggle n i evitably de-emphasizes

struggles in orhercontexts not usually asrociated with the forces and arrange­ ments integral to capitalism, such as struggles for gender and racial equality and campaigm against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Second, there arc those who will argue, in a way that seemingly parallels the argument' about marx ism in the previous paragraph, that mass mOVClnel}[.� with an emancipatory intent c.x isted long before the emergence of the capitalist sys­ tem. The implication is that marxism, whose rairon d'ctre is overwhelmingly the critique of capitalist political economy, is not sufliciClltiy encompassing as

a result of tilis singular focus to do real justice to tilese precapitalist radical

alternatives and the movements that were their vehicles. The argument canvassed in this book does not require a detailed response to tilese hesitations over marxism's putative scope as a tilcory of liberation. Suffice it to say that the perspective c.�poused here on the emergence and devclopmCllt of capitalism departs from more standard marxist or marxisant accounts by proposing that marxism does not have to underwrite what s i in A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

35

esscnce a developmelltalisr conception of the growth and consolidation of C'Jpiralism. According to this developmcnralisr conccption, capitalism as a fully fledged mode of production was :lble ro emerge only when it had supplanted its predecessor feudal mode of production, just as the feudal mode of pro· duction had n i

film

to dispbce a preceding sbve-based mode of produc­

tion in order to attain primacy. It is widely accepted, even in marxist circles, that tltis devdopment'Jlist scheme is llnsatisfactory.2 The position taken n i this book escilews the conceptual underpinnings of this devdopmelltalist scheme. Instead, it takes the core ofanycapit'Jlist system to be constituted by practices and formations involving the employment of formally frec bbor by the owners of the means of production in order to enable the appropriation of surplus value through the operltion of markets. In clpitllisll), bbor :lnd :III other factors of production h:lvc the form of commodities, though it s i of course not nccessary for all socbl formltions in an actually existing capi­ talist socicty to be subsumed under the conunodiry principle (after lll, Trap­ pist monasteries coexist with Goldman Sachs in contemporary America). Moreover, ownersltip of tile means of production need not be confined

(Q

private individuals and comp;mics, since owner-operators, consortia, banks, investment truStS, cooperatives, pension and mumal funds, ;1IId the state can :Ill exercise the various forms of such oWllership, even in a full-blown capital­ ist system.3 In addition, formally frec I:ll>or Clll exist alongside sla\'cry, V:lS­ s:llage, debt·peomge, and flmily work in l capit".llist system. All that m:mers in determining whether or not:l mock of production is capitalist s i for "free" wlge bbor to l>c the economy's prim:lr)' means of rellizing surplus vllue. 111e capit".llist mode ofproflucrioll therefore hlS two components:

(1) a pro­

duction process thlt organizes the socill rd:ltions of production and their patterns of imeraction with the rcgnant technological plmdigm, and

(2) all

accumulation regime which lIses a range of macroeconomic instmmenrs to promote capitalist production and consumption (figures I lnd In :lddition to comprising necess:lrily

l

2).

mode of production, capitalism

:lIsa requires for its proper functioning :l system of regubrion or domin:ltion with tWO constituent modes. The first is l socia/ III/Kit: of (amomi, regll/atioll, which superintends the social conditions of possil>iliry for the various pro­ cesses of production lnd accumubtioll th:lt ill concert m:lke up the c:lpit".llist system. 11le social mode of economic regulation, as its name implies, governs roles :lnd functions inhercnt in manuflcturing and otllcr production pro­ cesses, oversces labor prlcticcs, and man:lgcs thc social l>asis of distribmion nctworks. Hencc, and this is JUSt one c.'\ample, in many Europc;\11 countries 36

CIIAPTER 2

,\IOOe of Production Sites ofPrOOurtion Social Relations of Production

[Material and Immaterial

1-

/ H

I

"

'rodu([ion I Pnxe,"

Technolngies ... Forms ofTedlllological

"- /

'\r---

ProductionJ

A,""unlu larion

"hcroccouomic

Rcginl1P, WorldEClJlIOmic Outioo/.:. September 2002; EstinlJtc or projection.

•

11>1 F

d,ltab:lSC.

Clearly, dle Asian cOlUlrries recovered well in the years after the crisis of 1997, and in the process portfolio n i flows started to pick up as well. -nle consequences of LOC reliance on c.x[ernal capital flows have been noted by students of international political economy in recent years; rht, growing dependence of lOGS on external capital flows has also been instru­ mental in creating the structural conditions responsible for a potentially chronic economic n i stability, especially when LOCS arc confronted with large inflows that prove unsustainable for dlcir t.'Conomies or rapid outflows which quickly become unmanageable. Thus, in addition to the Mc.xican and Asian currency crises, there has been the Russian default of 1998, the Brazilian peso crisis in 1998 and 1999, and Argentina's financial crisis of 2001 (though finan­ cial market turbulence is certainly not the sole cause of these crises).38 10 begin with, dlere is dle sheer disparity of scale between rhe combined

resources of the funds run by financial institutions in the wealdlier countries and the market capital of low- to middle-income countries very new to this foml ofcapitalism. In 1994 the combined pool of funds managed by financial institutions in dle high-income countries ran to around $10 trillion

to

SIS

trillion, whereas the total market capitalization ofall lower-income countries was in the order of $1 trillion.3S> In 2000 the estimated total value of world stocks, bonds, securities, and other financial assets was $50 trillion.40 Total global equity market capitalization in that year amounted to $37 trillion; of this, 40 percent was located in the United States and 20 percent in conti­ nemal Europe, while a mere 10 percent went to developing countries. The United Nations High-Level Panel on Financing for Development reports that $7.5 trillion was saved or invested worldwide in 2000.4J Of this, only

$1. 7 trillion was invested n i developing countries in that year. Total world 1'01

inflows were $209 billion in 1990, $473 billion in 1997 (S178 billion, or

35 percent, was the developing cOluuries' share), and $1,118 billion (5190 bil­ lion, or 17 percent, was rhe developing countries' share) n i 2000. Howe\'er, the share of dle world's 48 least developed cownries in 1999 total world FOI was a meager 0.5 percent. In fact, 70 percent of incoming 1'01 in the period

1993-1998 went to a mere 20 developing countries (out of 138). The abi l ity of many LOCS to influence trends and developments in global financial mar­ kets s i therefore extremely limited. The Morgan Stanley economist Stephen Roach made precisely this point in his testimony to the U.S. I-louse of Rep­ resentatives in May 1999:

Ir may wdl be rhar tht,: tn i y t,:lllerging market ewnomks of the world art,: lit­ erally awash in the turbulent seas of fin:lIldal capital. For c.xamp!c, the equity 84

CHAPTER 3

market capitalization oflarge emerging market coumries such as Korea, Malay­ sia, Taiwan and Brazil each totaled abom $150 to $200 billion in the pr A politics of identity which docs not allow for a progression through

all four of these stages will not suffice as a theory of (complete) liberation. Of course, any kind of social and political advance (involving, say, identity and opposition) is to be welcomed n i a world ruled by an amalgam consist­ ing of plutocratic elites, organizations such as the

IMF, World Bank, and

WTO, which serve the interests of these clites, and a substantial dutch of n i ternational business organizations. Too often marxists have dismissed and overlooked struggles simply because they appeared to n i volve and sanction experiences based only on identity and opposition, but not totality and a conception of an alternative society. In any case, Mann's typology will pro­ vide a set of norms for any assessment of a particular movement's (or pro­ gram's) potential when it comes to serving the many causes whose conver­ gence is the crucial n i gredieIU n i any advance toward a decisive liberation.

164

CHAPTER 6

CHAPTER 7 Models of Liberation II

The Politics ofthe Place ofthe Subject

Ibe politics of subjectivity can be associated, primarily dlOUgh not ncces­ sarily c.xdusivdy, with any politics premised Oil he r notion of a ftmdamcntal reciprocity between a subject, or the "place" ofthat subject, and the putative "other" of this subject or subject-place.1 Jacques Dcrrida is the most notable exponent of the thought of such a politics, though where Dcrrida is COIl­ cerned Enunanud Levinas is very much the background force inspiriting this line of cthicopolitical reflection. Any discussion of this politics ofsubjectivity has to acknowledge from the outset what Dcrrida himself has insisted, albeit

with the meandering twists and spirals typically associated with his rhetoric of deconstmction; for example, "I will propose an abrupt deceleration, but in order to speak to you about urgcncy";2 "Indeed (to further tangle the threads of this prehistory) I almost began this introduction precisely with the problem of translation. Hut did I avoid doing so? I-lave

1 nO[ already

done it?";3 " I will push hyp::rbolc beyond hyperbole."4 The discourse of the subject, says Derrida, while necessary and lUlavoidable, nonetheless has to be comprehensively renovated (though for Dcrrida no such conceptual renovation can control the conditions under which it is undertaken, nor have power over dIe couscquences that eusue from dlis undertaking), so dlat it behooves us to speak of the "effect" or "trace" of the subject radler dIan the subject p::r se.s

Rmo)!(ltillg tbe Dscourse i ofthe Subject For all that he has said about the need for a radical reconstitution of die discourse of the subject,

and of dIe complementary need to conceptualize

the subject as the outcome of a doxa or strategy that "produces" it, Derrida resists any suggestion that the subject has been "liquidated"

in his writings,

or in those of Lacan, Aldlllsser, Foucault, and Heidegger, who are widely regarded as c.xemplary thinkers of "the end of Man." Far from it: the subjcct is for Derrida the name of dIe irremovable power that poses the primor­ dial question to which the

who that is the subject is n i effect the inescapable

answer. Whl�re Derrida is concerned the only answer that can be given to ,

the qnestion "Who?" has to be something that emerges from a place approx

i­

mating to that of dIe subject.6 \Ve must resist the urge to contrast Derrida's work just before his death, with its fairly dear emphasis on retaining the place of the subject, widl his earlier work, which n i places seems to favor an antihumanism dlat commends a "decelltering" of the subject Already in 1966, in his lecture "La structure, .

Ie signe et Ie jeu dans Ie discourse des sciences humaines " Derrida contrasted ,

two "interpretations of n i terpretation," one which does not try to pass "be­ yond man and humanism," and the other which docs. He refuses to gloss the difference between these two positions as one requiring a choice to be made between them. To have to choose bet\vl'"Cn these "interpretations of interpre­ t"J.tions" in this way is to fail to see that there is an irreducible commonality which exists between them that allows their difference to be established in the first place (the ground of this commonality being suppied l by the famous Derridean quasi-concept of dIe "supplement")? In a lecture published in English in 1968 as "The Ends of Man," Derrida again distances himself from

an antihumanism of the kind more typically associated with Althusser and Foucault, arguing as he did n i "La structllre, Ie signe et Ie jeu" dlat a dlOice between dlis antihumanism

and the kind of "anthropologism associated "

\vith dIe writings of Heidegger and Satrre is as false as it is problematic. Making use of Nietzsche's distinction between the "superior man" (hiihere

Mensch) and the "overman" ( Ubermensch), the former still distressed over the loss of dIe tmth of Being while die latter accepts tlIis loss joyfully in an "active forgettng i " Derrida argues that there arc perhaps two "ends of man": ,

one still vestigially anthropocentric, embodiet.i in the figure of the hahere Mensch, and die other rcsolutcly postanrhropocemric, embodied n i the figure of the Obermensch. Derrida suggests that we may be suspended be­ t\veen these t\vo ends of man, and that there is no ultimate basis for choosing 166

CHAPTER 7

between them. In the first case, we confront the being who, embodied in the Nietzschean figure of the superior man, stands guard over the sarcophagus of the metaphysics of existence, feeling a palpable grief at the demise of the man of mctaphysical humanism, but only too aware that this is a vigil over a corpse that cannot be revived; n i the other, the overman leaves the dead to themselves and escapes to another threshold that is beyond Being and Man. But, says Derrida, each of these ends of man is just as much ours as the other. 10 escape in the maIUlcr of the overma.n is impossible, since rhc very attempt

to leave behind the corpse of Being has to retain its place of burial as exactly that localityfrom which one has to break away. To flee from he r presence of the dead is still to be pervaded by he t spectrJ.1 presence of rhe dead. (The tenor of tins argument about the " never tmly left bdlind" is something of a formula or " posmlation;' the kind of term Derrida would probably prefer. One dlinks here especially of his SpCCtcl-S ofMarx.)8 11le place of the subject and its attendant metaphysics of being are thus never really left behind n i Derrida's writings, though dley arc subjected to a consistent and painstaking deconstruction, a deconstmction that began as early as "La stmcmre, le signe et Ie jeu" in

1966 and which has manifested itself in everything he subse­

quently wrote on the subject. Ihe subject who is submitted to this deconstmction arises from a " space" of responsibility dlat is antecedent to rhe subject's emergence and its identi­ fication with the self, with the consequence that "the relation to self, in this simation, can only be difference, that is to say alterity or trace. Not only is the obligation not lessened n i this situation, but, on the contrary, it finds in it its only possibi l ity, which is neither subjective nor hwnan. Which doesn't mean that it is inhuman or without subject, bm that it is out of dlis dislocated

affirmation

[thus without 'firmness' or 'dosedncss'] that something like the

subject, man, or whatever it might be can take shape."9 For Dcrrida, and in "Eating Well" he is simultaneously at his most Hcid.eggerian and Lcvinasian, the wbo that becomes the subjcct is the one who answers to the other in tlns simatioll of primordiality (this representing the legaL], of Lcvinas), tlle other n i this case being the one who poses to rhc one who becomes the subject the primal question of its being

(dlis being Derrida's rendition of the Hei­

deggerian DflScill).1O Thc call from the odlcr is dIUS the basis of dIe subject's constimtion, and the responsibility of heeding or overlooking this call is for Derrida dlC core of dlis event of subject constitution. The gravamen of the argwnent in "Eating \.Vell" is that deconstmction, as is necessarily dIe case widl anything that belongs to metaphysics or epis­ temology, is situated within the remit of a philosophy of the subject. 111is THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

l67

assertion may be difficult to reconcile with the antillllm:mist impulse that dearly motivated some areas of Derrida's earlier work, De fagrammatologie being perhaps the exemplary nstance i of this seeming hostility to any kind of philosophical or political anthropocemrism. In "Eating Well;' however, Der­ rida has moved beyond an unqualified repudiation of the anthropocemric principle, primarily (and here I agree with Herman Rapaport) by espousing a logic of recognition of the kind that belongs to the distinguished tradition extending from Hegel to Sartre, bur which would nO[ typically be associated with the author of De lagrammatologie. This logic of recognition was expanded in "Eating Well" to include the possibility of one's recognition by animals and nO[ just human beings. For Derrida, if one can be recognized by an animal, it dearly follows that the operation of the logic of recognition is not limited to the domain of dIe hnman, with rhe cmcial implication that rhe animal is siruated in principle in the very place where the subject is. The place of the subject is willy-nilly the space of the parahuman, bllt, equally, rhe space of the parahuman (the appropriate way to characterize the "beingncss" of the nonhuman animal) is for Derrida coextensive with the place of the subject. The upshot is that the demarcation between the human and its beyond is destabilized, and both the human and its "animal" exteriority can be placed within dIe ambit of the subject.!! If the disposition of the philosophical humanist s i first and foremost to buttress the philosophy of the subject, and in so doing to retain what the con­ cept of the subject is intended to secure philosophically-namely, the funda­ mental insight that the source of meaning docs

/lot reside n i some stmcture

or wlconscious and m i personal principle, but rather in some locus of reci­ procity or primordial response (however deconstmcted the latter arc) -then what deconstruction necessarily accomplishes is the simultaneous modifica­ tion and retention of dIe place of the subject or subjectile. For Derrida this place is retained even as it is deconstructed. Deconstmction destabilizes the boundary between belief and skepticism, reason and madness, caleulation and spontaneity, text and conte.X[, human and nonhuman, the metaphysical and the premetaphysical, and so forth. But Derrida's retention of the place of the subject or subjectilc even as decon­ struction is pursued comes from the inescapable realization that the very posing of the question of this destabilization has to n i volve a who, in tillS case a who that bespeaks inescapably dIe place of the subject or subjectile. For to pose the question of what is at stake when a boundary is questioned or its

16S

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notion entertained is perforce to posit a conviction, no marrer how provi­ sional or tenrative, that the bowldary in question opcrates in this or that way, that it has this or that significancc, and tltis in tllrn automatically impies l that there is a putativc who that will be addressed by this boundary's notion, a II'ho that can potentially be "convinced" to whatcver dcgree and in whatever way by that which happens to be posited by the notion in question. -nle acknowledgment of the philosophical pcrtinence of thc

who s, i

in

a roundabout way, Derrida's way of rendering Heidegger's Dasein: some mode of being-in-the-world (thc core of any definition of Dasein) is neces­ sarily involved when thcre is the mere possibility of a question being posed about the onc who poses the qucstion. \Vherc Derrida and thc Derridean "Heidegger" arc concerned, the very possibility of formulating a question presupposes thc prior affirmation of the conditions, always involving a modc of being-in-the-world, whic h makc it germanc for that question to begin to be posed by the one who poses it. "IllCse conditions includc the mode of being-in-the-world of the one who venmres the question as well as that of its putative addressec (thesc can of course be onc and the same nd i ividual).I2 But this

II'ho, while occupying the logical or "grammatological" space of

thc subject, does not for Derrida possess in any significant way or dcgrce the feamrcs typically taken to define the subject of classical metaphysics and epistemology. This

who cannot be this

classical human subject becausc thc

grammatological space is the space of Dcrrida's deconstructcd, and thus parahuman, subject, and this subjcrt is for both Derrida (and thc Derridcan "Heidegger") the equivalent of a singularity that is beyond all the categori­ zations that arc involved in thc constitution of the classical human subject. The following passage from " Eating Well" is unambiguous on this point: Undcr the heading ofjemein!..tfkeit, beyond or behind the subjective "self" or person, there is for Heidegger a singularity, an irreplaceability of that

which remains nonsubstimtable in the structure of Dasein. This amounts to an im:ducible singularity or solitude in Mitschl (which is also a condition of Mitsein), but is not that of the individual. This last concept always risks poiming both toward the ego and an organic or atomic n i di visibility. The Dn ofDaseill singularizes itselfwithout being reducible to any ofme categories of human subjectivity (self, reasonable being, consciousness, person), precisely OCGlUSe it is prcsupposed by aU of thosc.B

Two claims can be embodied in the proposition that the "Dn of Dnscill singularizes itself without being reducible to any of the categories of human

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subjectivity (self, reasonable being, consciousness, person)." One is that there are n i bct several philosophies of the subject, to wit, the humanist subject, the subject of writing, the subjectivity instituted by Dascin, the subject as the one designated by the wIJo, and so on, each governed by a separate logic but with no overarching principle to bring them together nto i a single, coherent whole. The other claim is that the singularity designated by the wIJo is consti­ tuted in such a way that it can llCl'er be taken to be a subject (in the full-blown senses underwritten by these philosoph ies of the subject), because the who, here more appropriately designated as a subjectile, comprises myriad objects and part-objects, without any intrinsic rationale or metaphysical accord to unite these parts n i to a "philosophy" of the subject as such. While these two claims can be used to complement each other, they in no way necessarily imply each other. It is possible after all to insist that there is an irreducible plurality of philosophies where the subject is concerned, with no overarching rationale to unify them nto i a comprehensive accowlt of the subject (in this case one would in effect be maintaining dIal dlere is no ground for a theory of the subject), without accepting the proposition dlat the "subject" is a mere fafoll de parler. (The person who accepts this proposition would not even be able to affirm that there is a subject capable of functioning as a theoretical object.) In other words, to determine that dIe subject is a merefarm deparkr, one would have to demonstrate why the assertion that there is such a dling

as a subject lacks plausibility n i a fairly decisive way, perhaps by showing in a nontrivial manner that singularities or subjecti l es are all dlat really exist, and that a subjectile is necessarily an amalgam of objects and part·objects lacking an a priori unifying principle which can elevate these object and part-object components into a subject. -The difference between dlese two positions can be stated thus: in the first case, dIe place occupied by the subject is not ontologically void, but the mat­ ter of choosing between different conceptions of the subject is nonetheless permeated by an evident undecidability; in the second case, the place occu­ pied by the subject is ontologically void because the subjectile (whose mode of being cannot be rendered n i to anything like dlat of a subject) resides in its place, and the question of wldecidability caIUlOt dlerdore even begin to arise. But even f i dIe claims embodied n i these two positions do not imply each other (and for analytical purposes dley are perhaps best kept apart), it is still possible to assert dIem both. Indeed the imprims of bodl are to be discerned n i Derrida's "'Eating Well." 14 It has to be noted, however, that the Derrida of "Eating \Vell" and "To Unsense the Subjectile" has swung toward dIe second of these two perspectives on dIe subject and subjectilc, widlOut 170

CHAPTER 7

repudiating the norion, especially canvassed in his earlier writings, that the theory of the subjCt.:t, qua theory, is permeated by a fundamental undecid­ ability. In "Eating \.Vell," " To Unsense the $ubjectilc," and the long essay "Finis," Derrida takes as his launching point Heidegger's elaboration of the concept of "nothingness" (NiclJtigkeit) in Beillg and Time.tS TIle analysis of "thrown­ ness" provided in Being alld Time identifies bdng with the Nothing and the Not because Dasdn (Le., that which accounts for the "beingness" of one's being) has no control over the ground of its being. In Heidegger's "analytic of Dascill;' thrownness is presented as an existential stmcmre which defines Dasein; by virtue of being "thrown" Dasein is confronted by unconditional possibilities that would exist even f i you or I did not, from which Heideg­ ger coneludes that these possibilities can have no ultimate meaning for us. Absolute possibility thus has a basis in something that Dascin itself cannot entirely dispose of, since to be a being is to find oneself thrown into sOllie possibilities, and thm never into all possibilities, and so possibility n i its fullest amplitllde has a growld whic h caIUlOt be encompassed by Dasdn. In

being thrown, Dasein can only project itself in the face of possibilities it

caIUlOt contain or be fully in command of, and as SUdl it lacks the fixity or completeness of being it would nl'Cd to have if it were to be an " essential" being. Lacking essential and comprehensive being, Dasein's only indispens­ able possibility is the impossibility of essential and comprehensive being, and has thus to be characterized as "nothingness": to be thrown is necessari l y not to have command over all possibilities, over the grOlmd of one's being, and this ground, in its absoilite opacity to Dasein, must therefore constimre itself for Dascin as an insurmountable nothingness. Dascin is a norhingness not able to make possibility into its own defining possibility. A final nonrelation to possibility is Dasein's only possibility. An irremovable stmcmral nullity therefore defines Dasein, and the voice of conscience (Still/me ,us Gewissens) for Heidegger is a voice addrcs.scd to us n i the realization that the world is flmdamentally meaningless because of this nulliry.J6 For Heidegger, I am someone, that is, some being, but the "beingness" of the being that I am is not given to me as an essence even as I heed the call of conscience. My life is the projCt.:t constitmed in response to dlis call, bm dlis project has to con­ stmct its ground in dIe awareness dlat no such ground s i given in advance, and that dlis lack of "givenness" where being is concerned is rhe very thing that gives life its character as "project." 17 There is no growld from which one responds, soberly and responsibly (these being the hallmark of Heideggerian "authenticity" ) to the call of conscience. THE 1'0LlTICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

171

11lis Hcideggerian existential duownness, having its ontological corre­ late in the doctrine of nothingness and issuing as it does in the claim that our essence can never be given to us, is taken by Derrida to provide the lin­ eaments of the concept of [he subjectile. The subjectile is the being who is nor in possession of its being, the one who, like the Anaud depicted in "To Unsense the Subjectile," has passed beyond the necd to have an essence.IS By passing beyond the need to have an essence, the subjectile, like Heidegger's thrown n i dividual, is the exemplary deconstruction of the rational animal that the metaphysical tradition has typically taken as a defining feamre of the human.19 \'Vhat hen [ determines who or what can be located in those spaces and places of the question to which humans and animals alike ostensibly belong, all with the warrant, suppied l by Derridean deconstruction, to be considered subjects or subjectiles? The Derridean answer is ethics, understood here in a sense that makes it ntegral i to the political. But, and this is the gist of the passage from "Eating \.Vcll" cited earlier, tills ethics or poit l ics will be driven by a theory of singularity, and the features dla( define this dleory will lie at dle heart of this ethics or politics. The notion of a singularity is virtually indispensable for any political philosophy seeking to obviate the endlessly problematic polarity between the "individual" and dle "collective" dla( is essential to dle Hobbes-Rousseau-Hegel tradition of reflection on the state and sovereignty, and so Derrida certainly possesses one of the key theoretical elements for providing an alternative to this tradition.

TIle Ethical and Political Singularity For l-leidegger, as we have seen, the call

(Ruf)

of conscience is a call dla(

each individual heeds (or fails to heed) without having an essence to serve as a ground for his or her response to dlis call. 11le call of conscience forestalls any attempt at human self-mastery or self-possession, and as such the call (dlOugh for Heidegger this call is issued n i silence) is fundamentally ethical and politicaPO The call of conscience is a call to responsibility, as dle follow­ ing passage from Being and Time makes dear: The statement dIat Dastill is at the same time the cal!cr and the called has now lost its empty formal charKter and its obviousness.

Omscimcc rcpeals itselfas

the call ofCIIre: me caller is DaSfill, anxiolls in thrownness (in its already-being­ in . . .) about its potentiality-of-being. The one cal!ed is also DaSCill, called forth to its uwnmost potentiality of being (its being-ahead-of-itsclf . . .j. And

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whn is caUed forth by me sunmlOrIS is Dmtill, our of falling prey to me they (already�bcing-togemcr-with-the-world-taken-care-of . . .j. The call of con­ science, that is, conscience itsclf, has its ontological possibility in me fact that Dascbl is care in the ground of its being.ll In other words, the call of conscience is an event which discloses to us Da­ scin's fundamental character as care. LI this evem of disclosure, I find that I am thrown into a past that is nor entirely at my disposal, but which, as the groundless ground of my future, nonetheless constitutes the basis for my potentiality of being, a potentiality from which I construct my life as a project. Only in this way can I avoid leading the kind of life in which I bil to realize that Dasein confronts me with choices between which I have to choose, even dlOUgh there is no ground for making these choices. The n i di­ vidual is thus confronted with two ways of being, one authentic (exemplified by the willingness to make the choices that n i evitably bce us) and the other inauthentic (c.xemplified by the flight from the need to choose). Responsi­ bility, as one would expect, consists in not turning away from this need to make choices. LCYinas, having accepted that Hcidegger had undermined irretrievably any pretension that metaphysics (and ontology specifically) could serve as the "first philosophy," would take this call of conscience and locate it in an ex­ pic l itly e.thical stmcture, in this way mming ethics into dIe "first philosophy" that ontology could never be. For Lcvinas all subjects are such by virtue of the call made by dIe other, with justice then being defined as one's irreducible. responsibility for the other. Despite Derrida's firmness in maintaining that the postdeconstructed subject begins widl a consrimting nonidentity with itself, he still accepts the LCvinasian principle that its underpinning as subject (albeit a deconstructed subject or subjectile) comes precisely from a call made by dIe odler, and the corollary of this principle that justice is one's irreducible responsibility for the other (dlOugh Denida would emphasize that this re­ sponsibility is c.xercised in he r face of dIe undecidability dlat pervades one's relationship with the other). The problem with Derrida's position here c.xtends all the way back to Hei­ degger. If critics and the ethical (for simplicity's sake we can lise some bald nomenclamre that Lcvinas would have been far more comfortable with than Heidegger, who was unrelenting in his repudiation of tidy designations),

and alw politics and rile political, derive from this constitutive feature of Dasein's stmcmre, its typical mode of being-in-the-world, dlen there is an unavoidable sense in which the politics that is legitimated or entailed by this

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conception of rhe subject is a politics of decision vitiated by Hcidegger's (andperhaps Derrida's) inability to tdl llS how the (seemingly always solitary) subject or subjectiic moves from ever-present undecidability [0 concrete po­ litical decision.22 TIlis is especially the case if one is talking of the subjectile who, as I-ierman Rapaport points out, is marked by a certain "autism." It is not apparent how the individual who happens to oc defined by this autism is going to be able to function satisfaclOrily as protagonist in any kind of nontrivial collective political project.B TIlis difficulty will be addressed later, after further discussion of Derrida's positions. -nlere is a troublingvoluntarism at the heart of l-lcidegger's conception of Dasein, and a numocr of commentators have noted a profound philosophical hankering after individual authenticity that reflects Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger.14 TIle Derridean equivalent of l-lcidegger's thrownness is the "interminable experience" which Derrida associates with "a sort of nonpas­ sive endurance of the aporia," this endurance being for Derrida "the condi­ tion of responsibility and of decision." 25 TIle "endurance of the aporia" is subtended by a "stmcture of nullity" that has remarkable affinities with the stmcture displayed in Being and Tillie. TIlis I-Ieideggerian reprise is evident in the following passage from Aporias: The aminomy hen: bener deserves the name of aporia insofar as it is neither an "apparcIlt or illusory'" antinomy, nor a dialectizable conrradiction n i the Hegelian or Marxist sense, nor even a "transcendental illusion n i a dialectic of the Kamian type," but n i stead an interminable txperience. Such an expcrknce must remain such ifone wants to think, to make come or to Icr come any eveIlt ofdecision orof responsibility. The most genera! and therefore. illdewrminatc form of this double and single duty is that a responSible decision must obey a

dllty that owes IlOtlJiltfJ, tbat mllSt (l)rt llOthillg ill order to be a dllty, a duty mat has no debt to pay back, a duty without debt and therefore without duty.26

Derrida goes on to draw out the implications of the assertion that the ethical decision is not bound lip with a "determinable or determining knowledge, the consequence of some preestablished order" (17). Rather than maintain­ ing a rclation to a determination derived from an order of this kind, he pro­ poses that the ethical decision (and presumably his t holds for the political decision as well) be seen as an intermption of the preestablished order and the determinations s i suing from it, while still retaining a rclation to rhis intermption and that which it intermpts. TIle threshold of this intermption resembles a " borderly edge" and corresponds in Dcrrida's scheme of things [0 the Hcideggerian "limit situation" (GYCllzsitllfltioll), which for Hcidegger 174

CHAPTER 7

is the place in which being displays itself to Dasein when Dascin is resolute n i the face of the nullity of e.\:istenceP At the threshold of this borderly edge the maker of ethical and political decisions is faced with a twofold duty. On dle. one hand, his or her decision and its accompanying responsibility, constimted as they are by dle "wlcondi­ tionality of the incalculable," calUlot be shielded by the assurances and certi­ mdes provided by knowledge, dIe institution of a program, or some kind of appeal to reason.lS At the same time, and this is rhe aporia in the exercising of a genuine responsibility, dlese conditions for the making of rhe decision in question cannot simply be discarded: they guide the decision while remain­ i.ng "radically heterogeneous" to the calling that solicits the decision and its accompanying responsibility in the first place. Decision and responsibility have, simultaneously, dIe character of a passage and a nonpassage,

as

dIe

one summoned to decision has to bar himself or herself from the guarantees afforded by "typical forms," such as knowledge, reason, and programs, while at the same time realizing dlat no wish or decree can cause these to be jetti­ soned. The person who decides has thus to live n i dIe lUldecidable while acknowl­ edging the presence of principles and conditions that bespeak the very pres­ ence of the decidable. To decide s i to do so in the active presence of these "typical forms" alln the power of the LUuiecidable dlat make.� every tmly edlical and fKJlitical decision into a singular event, but widlOut having at our disposal any principle that enables us to determine how we arc to make the passage from the undecidable to the detenninate and vice versa. Derrida takes this "aporetic stmctllfe" to be n i tegral to politics and rhe political, contending that there will be no edtics or fKJlirics without he t "inexhaustible singularization" that stems from the operation of this "aporetic stmcmre" (Aporas i 20). To quote Derrida from 77fe Other Headillg: These conditions can only take a nega6ve form (without X mere would nO[ be

V). One can be cert:lin only of mis negative form. As soon as it is converted into pOSitive certainty ("on this condition, there will surely have been event, deeision, responsibility, ethics, or po!itics�), one can be sure that one is begin­ ning to be deceived, n i deed beginning to deceive the other. \Ye arc speaking here with names (event, decision, responsibility, emics,

polities) of"things" that can only cxceed (and mllSt exceed) thc. order of meo­ retica! determination, of knowledge, certainty, judgment, and of statements in the form of "this is that," in omcr words, more generally and essentially, mc order of theprcSl'1It or ofpresCllttltiUlI. Each time they arc rcduced to what

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me)' must exceed, error, recklessness, the umhought, and irresponsibility arc given the so very presemab!c face of good conscience.29 In odler words, politics and ethics can only be engaged n i a realm dlat com­ bines, in a way that is unavoidably aJXlretic, the typical and the singular, and the practices assocbtt�d widl dle political and the ethical can be undertaken only n i a conditional mode, widl conditions being specifiable in a stricdy negative form (meaning that dle conditionals in question can indicate only necessary but never sufficient conditions). Two features of this account stand out. First,

all ethical and political decisions are marked by an epistemological

insufficiency whose source is ontological. Epistemological insufficiency has its origin in a lack of ontological sufficiency that structurally conditions all situations in which decisions are made. Second, and this is a corollary of the previous trait identified widl Derridean ethical and political decision making, the individual making such decisions, confronted by this omnipresent episte­ mological n i sufficiency and its underlying lack of ontological sufliciency, has to deal with a "limit of [rudl" that stems in the end (and this is where Derrida shows himself to be Heidegger's greatest disciple) from the sheer unavail­ ability of ontological knowledge concerning the ego, consciousness, person, the soul, the subject-that is, all the premises of metaphysics.3o A thinking of

being without dle prop of metaphysics would have to be a thinking that goes beyond being, resnlting in an attempt to acknowledge the "place" occupied by that which "bestows" being. But any thinking whidl broached this subject would have to face a set of aporias dlat cannot be dissolved or circumvented. -nlis a:dom of Heidegger's thought is dle starting JXlint of all the positions taken by Derrida on the ethical and the political. A thinking of the ethical and dle JXllitical is for Derrida n i e.xorably bound

up with the "experience of the aJXlria" and the thinking conducted on behalf of this e.xpericnce. For both Derrida and Hcidegger dtis is an experience of being faced with a limit, of arriving at that limit. The experience of this event JXlses the question of dle one who experiences this arriving at dle threshold of limit, of the singularity of dlis being who arrives at the limit. -nle nature of he t limit is such that the new arriVtlllt "comes to be where s/he was not expected, where one wa.� awaiting him or her without waiting for him or her, without expecting

it [sJ attwdre], without knowing what or whom to

expect, what or whom I

am

pitality toward he r event"

waiting for-and such is hospitality itself, hos­

(Aporias 33). Nor only is the new arrivant affected

by the threshold which he or she approaches, but the very experience of the

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threshold itself is affected by the approach of the new arrivant. "This occurs because the new arrivant brings out, in his or her approaching of the thresh­ old, the possibi l ities residing in the dueshold that had only been latent until the emergence of the arrivant. Derrida alights on dle performative character of this disclosure of possibility: dle possibility brought nto i the open by the arrivant comes n i dle form of" an invitation, a call, a nomination, or a prom­ ise

(Verheiml/!!1, Hcissm, etc.)" (33). The crux of this disclosure of possibility

resides for Derrida in dle figure ofthe subjectile, or what he calls (inAporias) "dle absolute nrrimnt": The absolute arrillJ1It docs nO[ yet have a name or an identity. It s i not an invader or an occupier, nor is it a colonizer, even if it can also become one. This is why I call it simply the arriwmt, and nO[ someone or somcrhing that arrives, a subject, a person, an n i dividual, or a living thing, even less fa] mi� grant. . . . Since the arrimllt does not have any idcmity ycr, its place of anival

s i also dc-identified: one docs not ycr know or one no longer knows which is me cOl1mry. the place, the na[ion, the family, me language, and me home in general that welcomes the absolute arrimllt. (34)

Ille absolute arrivant is "'not an intruder, an invader, or a colonizer, because nvasion i presupposes some self·identity for the aggressor and for the vic­ tim."

Denying that the absolute arrivant can serve as a "legislator" or "the

discoverer of a promised land," Derrida depicts the arrivant, a being "as disarmed as a newly born child," as one who cannot be identified with any telos or eschatology, since this being "excel-ds the order of any determinable promise" (Apurias 34; emphasis in original). AldlOugh the arrivant cannot be reduced to any of these terms, he or she nonetheless makes all thesc pos­ sible, "starting widl the humanity of man, whic h some would be inclined to recognize in all that erases, in the anil'tlllt, he t characteristic of (cultural or national) belonging and even metaphysical determination (ego, person, subject, consciousness, etc.). It is on dlis border that I am tempted to read Hcidegger. Yet dns border will always keep one from discriminating among the figures of the arrimllt, the dead, and the rCl'enallt (the ghost, he, she, or that whic h returns)" (35). >nle reference in this passage to Hcidegger is sig­ nificant, because Derrida states lmambiguously in dlt, paragraph following this passage that he is using the figure of dle arrivant to rethink the notion of Dascin. Just as l-Icidegger used this notion to deconstmct the anthropolog· ism that s i the taproot ofV\'estern Illl'taphysics, Derrida seeks to complement and reconstitute the l-lcideggerian Dascin through his account of the arri­ VaIU.

l-Icidegger used rhe existential analysis of Dascin's bcing-toward-deadl THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

177

to undo onrorheology, the essence of the superordinate system of possibility that made the so-called ontic sciences (biology, anthropology, historiogra­ phy, psychology, etc.) possible, by analyzing death as the "possible impos­ sibility" which, because it cannot be absorbed by this system of possibility (death being the cessation of all possibility for Dascin), represents its untran­ scendable and aporetic limit. In a similar way, Derrida's absolute arrivanr is an "impossible possibility" that marks the limit of a seemingly n i vulnerable system of representation. The notion of a radical finitude lies at the heart of the analytics of Dasein, and Derrida's concepmalization of the absoilite arrivant derives from the extension and deepening of this norion to a num­ ber of existential simations not considered by Heidegger in Being lind Timc. These are the simations of"mouming andghosting (rCI'Clllillce), spectrality or living-on, surviving," the situations par excellence when it comes to defining the subjectile or absolute arrivant.31 Derrida follows Hcidegger n i asking the question, From where does possi­ bilityemerge for Dasein (in the case ofl-Ieidegger) or the subjectile or arrivant (in the case of Derrida) when they face up to the aporctic limit represenred by the grOlUld of Dascin'5 or the arrivant's possibility? The answer, for bocil Derrida and l-Ieidegger, can be found only by making recourse to the self­ constitution of Dasein and the arrivant. This question of self-constitution­ and here Derrida includes the self-constimtion of the ego, person, conscious being n i a way that Hcidegger would perhaps nor countenance-is posed in terms of the question of cile "mineness" (jemeilligkeit) of rhe being of Dasein and rhe arrivant. This is how Derrida a.nswers cilis question: "If/cllleilligkeit . . .s i constimted in its ipseity in terms of an originary mourning, cilen the self-relation welcomes or supposes the other within its being-itself as

dif­

ferent from itself. And reciprocally, the relation to cile mher (in itself Olit­ side myself, outside myself in myself) will never be distinguishable from a bereaved apprehension" (Apurias 61). Derrida calls this net.:essary proximity to the ociler in one's self-constitution "the reciprocal axiom," and suggests that cile apprehension of death, whether of my own death or cile death of an other, is always instituted by a "mineness" that is circumscribed by the ego or even rhe conscious "';' 11le reciprocal axiom cannot be suspended; to mourn, and rhe certitude of death makes mourning n i evitable, is necessarily to not have oneself be there for rhe other or cile other be there for oneself. Mourning, from which cilere is no escape, is thus irreducibly political: "There

is

no polities without an organization of the time and space of mourning,

without a topoitology l of the sepulcher, wicilOut an anamnesic and thematic relation to cile spirit as ghost

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7

[rCl'enlillt], without an open hospitality to the

guest asghost lin English in the originalJ, whom one holds, just as he holds us, hostage"

(61-62).32 In this conceiving of the possible that is the core of

the "e.xistential analysis of death," "being-possible" is shown to be the "being proper to Dasein." 10 await oneself at the limits (and this is necessarily bound up with an awaiting of the other) is to engage in something that is unavoid­ ably destabilizing. Derrida identifies three structures or modes n i this waiting at the limits constiruted by the waiting for death (a waiting we arc consigned to whether we like it or nor):

(1) "awaiting oneself n i oneself" ; (2) "waiting

for the arril'ant," so that one waits for someone else; and (3) waiting for each other

(s'attwdre PIIII l'autre, ('une Pautre; Aporas i 68).

Having a relation to death s i impossible, says Derrida in a necessarily laborious formulation, bl""Calise death is the showing

as

such of that which

caIUlOt appear as such, and so we are able only to name the one thing which appears in death: (the event of) a being's physical or corporeal perishing.33 Death, the "possible m i possibiity;' l is for Derrida the limit at which one waits, since the state of affairs that would make this waiting cease can never materialize. The only thing that would preempt this waiting is the provision, at the point when life is ebbing, of more life, and yet more life, all adding lip to endlessly enended life, and this of course can never happen for a mortal being. Sooner or later we find ourselves at he t place of this aporetic limit. But it is also the place where one is awaited. At this aporetic limit, a place that cannot be chosen (even the one who chooses voluntary euthanasia, say, only alters the time at which he or she comes to this place), the place of dle one who waits and the one who is awaited can be exchanged, interminably, since this is a destination to which no one belongs. No one can be "at home" at the threshold where all possibility ceases. In this place, dlen, all are arrivants. For Derrida we are kept by this secret, a secret that bespeaks a true democracy, since all belong to this place, even if none of us s i "at home" in it.

Singularity and Politics A fundamental presupposition of \\'estern metaphysics is that of an irrevo­ cable stability of conceptual deployment. Metaphysics is possible only if judgment, adequate judgment, is possible, and stable boundaries between concepts and nonconcepts or failed concepts arc dms its sine qua non. How­ ever, this requirement dlat there be a certain fixity to the boundaries that exist between the concept and the nonconcept cannot be met by any final guaramee, and Derrida (like Heidegger) shows n i text after text why judg­ ment, and thus also metaphysics, never have ultimate possession of what THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

1]9

they need conceptually and so can never n i sist that dIe distinction between conct�pt and nonconcept is

as

stable

as

it is typically taken to be. There will

always be an "outside" or "surplus" to metaphysics dlat unhinges dIe very principle of such a stability. If the needed distinction between concept and nonconcept is unstable tout court, then any fixity that attaches to it can emerge only as the resultant of our practices and, by virtue of this, dIe always contingent arrangements that underlie these practices. ·nlCSC practices generate concepts and bestow on them thcir conditions of intelligibility, and it is from this grOlUld that the notion of a singularity derives its force. Ihis insight has bt-en operative in Derrida's thinking from dIe beginning, and his much (and in some cases willfuly) l misunderstood claim n i De lagrallllla l tologie that "there is nodling outside of the text

[il ll)'11 pas de hors-texte]" encapsulates the principle of an

intertextuality (as Derrida's defenders arc wont to maintain n i dlcir ell"orts to protect him from the accusation rhat he is a pernicious "idealist" of the tc.n). Bur also, and perhaps more significantly for our purposes, this for­ mula can be wlderstood to encompass dIe principle, integral to Derrida's lUlderstanding of conceptual practice, dlat "everything" is illSide the text.34 -nlis "everything" would include historical, social, political, and economic considerJtions dlat bear on a [c.n's conditions of intelligibility and tmth, and the claim that "there is nothing outside of dIe text" can then be taken to imply that this (Derridean) theory of tcxtuality and conceptual practice is in ell"ect a dlCOry of ideology. -nlat is, the text profTers a world, which may be the real world or an alternative to that world, in which certain interests arc deemed desirable or wordlwhile and legitimated in the process, while others are overlooked or sidelined and therefore delegirimated.J5 With a constitlltive instability pervading dIe operation of concepts, every conceptual operation is susceptible to deconstruction, that is, the constant permeation of our practices, and not just our textual practices, by what Der­ rida calls diffirllna:. ·nlis in turn connects widl the subject's character as an absolute singularity. Subject cOllStitlition takes place in a field of practices sull"used by the

qllmi-tmllScmdmtal dlat is

dill"crance, and rht, unreserved

Heraclitean passage of diffcrance submits everything to effects that decom­ pose and reconfigure whatever it is that comes within its orbit.36 The strate­ gies that enable dIe movement of differance (these strJtegics are not, how­ ever, identical widl the "event" of the movement of diffcrance) to be what it is are themselves susceptible to the passage of differance (dlis bcing the nub of deconstructive practice), so that rhe enterprise of critique or analysis is itself subject to deconstmction. The upshot is that while metaphysical prin-

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ciples are placed n i abeyance by diffcrance, diffcrance cannot function as a "better" metaphysics than metaphysics itsclf; if it did, diffcrance would have to become an alternative metaphysics, and in doing this, it would have [0 be­ come the presence that it cannot be (since diffcrance is itself the condition of presence, and as that which has to "be" in order to enable presence, it cannot itself be present). If the event of the subject's constitution is subject to the movement of diffcrance, then this event has to originate in an undecidabi l ity that is absolutely primal. 1he subject qua singularity or subjectile e.xists be­ cause the elemental wuiecidability that ensues from diffcrance always calls for a stabilization, however brief and mdimemary, n i the face of the unde­ cidable. \Vhether the realm is meaning or politics, values or metaphysics, any stability of concept or judgment, no matter how provisional or ephemeral, has to follow from a resolve in the face of this measllfcless undecidability to let concept X designate this bllt not that or permit judgment Y to involve the affirmation of this and this but not that or that. At

any rate, concepts

are deployable and judgments issuable only because of a prior ocelusion or stilling of this originary undecidability, thereby enabling us to disregard the mprints i of the ceaseless filL'( that arises from this absence n i principle of the decidable .n

TIlls occlusion or stilling

of the chaos of the undecidable is not in itself

irresponsible. 1here would be no lived world without it; quite the reverse, responsibility counsels that this flux be immobilized in order to make rhe determinations that arc needed to make life livable. It is this flux that makes ethics possible, since ethics and politics arc not possible widlOlit dle real pos­ sibility of making determinations, the " art" of discrimination being n i tegral to ethics. Geoffrey Bennington, perhaps Derrida's most faithful and still rig­ orous interpreter, and also his coauthor and translator, has said the following about this opening for the ethical :

This possibility of ethics in undecidability and n i ventivity is not itself (yet) ethical or political but is, beyond good and (,vil (as Derrida said of writing ,

n i 1967), also the impossibility of any ethic s beillg ethical. Bur if this open­ '

ing s i not yet itself ethi cal, it gives both a principle for judging (any ethical or political judgement that closes off this condition of undeCidability is pso i

facto suspect) and a principle for the infinitisation of nhics and polities This .

infinitisation, which takes place each time finitely, is also called j ustice . For all metaphysical doctrines of ethics and politiCS dose off the undecidable at

some poim: political and social philosophies of ill colours project tdeologies whereby politiCS and morals arc oriented towards their end (in social justice

THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

,

1111

virruc, nansparcncy, etc.), whereas the deconstntctive constntal cannot but suspend this tdeological thrust (this has madc it suspect to many commcnta­ tors) with its radical appeal to a future (thc coming ofthe undecidable singular cvCnt) which wi!! never be a present (this fl1tuf(� that is not a futun' present determining the claim from the carliest work that the future is necessarily monstrous, i.c. formless) although it always happens

11011'.

This appeal

to

an

irreducibly futural future (the interminably j,-l'rmir or to come) suspends de­ construction always this side of any ethical or political doctrille orprwmmme. But Dcrrida is prepared to link this thinking to that of a democracy which is the ethieo-political figure of the never-absolute, never-present dispersion of

diffirallce. Far from preventing ethico-political decisions of the most concrete and pressing kind, this democracy to-come would be the condition of possi­ bility of all decisions, and simultaneously the condition ofimpossibility of any self-righteousness about them.38 111is passage draws out in yet another way some of the implications of the Derridean premise that with the iluJXlssibility of a direct route to the abso­ lute (this being preeluded by difi"crance, since any contiguity with the abso­ lute would arrest he t passage of differance), all who approach the thresh­ old of the ethical and the political do so as arrivams. The engagement with the undecidable lUldertaken by each subject or arrivant is thus absolutely singular: if diffcrance is unending movement, shuttling between the tran­ scendental ("the political," in this case) and dle empirical (Le., "politics") ill order to interrogate bodl in terms of a quasi-transcendental dlat neither can hope to encompass, and which therefore has dle capacity to suspend both realms while also propelli..tlg them n i entin:ly unanticipated directions, then all political and edlical engagement has the potential to take directions dlat arc novel and distinctive. The absence of finality, c..xcept when this is instimted, whedler overtly or tacitly, in order to m i pede the passage of dif­ fcrance (thereby only making this a finality that can always be "nndone" by this quasi-transcendental), means hat t all politics and ethics partakes of the singular. Everything that defines the political (Le., the transcendental plane superordinate to concrete political activity) as we encounter it in the JXlliti­ cal forms and processes explicitly manifested in everyday life, and this quo­ tidian practical politics as it is interrogated by the metaphysics of the political (in tllis way connecting again with the inc..xhaustible passage of diffcrance), always brings with it the possibility of an encOlUlter witll the other. Our re­ spective encounters here arc always with this other, a "not me" n i "me," dIat is the sine qua non of any engagemem with the JXllirical and the ethical.

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One must qualify, if not dismiss outright, dIe impression dlat dlis un­ ending shuttle between the two planes, productive as it is of the irreducibly singular, generates in all kinds of new and n i teresting ways a politics and edlies in which subjects are constantly confronted with novelties and fresh challenges that derive ultimately from the movement of diffcrance, situations which then have to be dealt with through an exercise of the subject's will. -nle passage of diffcrance docs not turn politics n i to voluntarism and politi­ cal logic into a logic for an orchestration of the will in the face of the filL'\: associated with rhe " dance" or "play" dlat is diffcrance, where responsibility takes dlt, form of a "resolute" c.xercise of the will as the subject deal� more or less nimbly with an endless succession of contingencies and "accidents." Derrida's positions on rhe political and the ethical clearly militate against the view that politics and ethics n i volve, at dleir core, what is in essence an exercise of the will (though for Derrida they certainly do not preclude this willfulness). For Derrida, the poitical l subject motivated by a sense ofrespon­ sibi l ity is more likely than not to be claimed by a tradition that he or she ap­ proaches as an inheritance to be adhered to even f i aspects of dlis inheritance are challenged or rt�pudiated.3\> Here Derrida wants to usc the dt.""Construc­ tion of the metaphysics of concepts, and this co ipso includes the concept of the political, to show that a deconstruction of metaphysical concepts s i itself necessari l y political, and that dlis vigi l ance in the domain of metaphysical concepts in turn enjoins, through a kind of osmosis or contagion of practice enabled by diffcrance, an active vigilance in the complementary sphere of an everyday politics, that is, what counts as politics in the more commonplace senses of dIe term.11lis connection between deconstruction and dIe. political is explicitly made by Derrida in his celebrated claim that "jmrice is dIe WI­ deconstructible condition of deconstmction," which palpably implies that at least one of deconstruction's conditions is insusceptible of deconstmction, and rhat this r i removable condition s i jnstice (and hence politics) itself:�o The assertion that a specific polities (a politics n i compatible with dIe re­ quirements of justice would be ruled out, peremptorily, as a condition of deconstruction) is the unfettered condition of deconstruction shows decon­ struction to be situated at the core of dIe political, and vice versa. Decon­ struction operates at the bellest of a spt""Cific conception ofjustice or respon­ sibility as a condition of discharging its other responsibilities. Bur how do we get from this somewhat generalized conception ofjustice, with its attendant politics, to more practical concerns having to do with peace and war, dIe causes of famine, racism, the merciless c.xploitation of women and children, dIe making of decisions and the determining of courses of actions, and so THE [,OllTiCS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

l83

forth? After all, valuable though it is to find a politics crisply and rigorously at work in the throes of deconstmctive practice (i.e., the realm of the onto­ logical), it remains the case that this generalized politics can operate only n i terms of a transcendental horizon and dms have no visibk connection widl practice and commitment (i.e., the realm of the ontic). Derrida has declined to usc deconstmction as a guide for developing pre­ cepts and principks that can inspire conduct. As he sees it, any attempt to use deconstmction to generate political and ethical precepts that will be "useful" for individuals in dIe daily round of their lives is inherently problematic: if used in this way, deconstmction vitiates an mportant i condition for the making of real decisions, since decisions are tmly made only when they are arrived at in the face of dIe undecidabk, and not because a moral or politi­ cal calculus s i availabk that can be applied by rote:u Decisions in the non­ aporetic sense of the term, for Derrida, can be made only in a context sub­ tended essentially by the undecidable; if it were odlerwise, one would simply be adhering to a course that had been predetermined, and this would be no real decision. In stressing the indispensability of this place of the undecidable for a genuine ethics and politics, Derrida adverts to a set of modalities sanc­ tioned by the undecidabk-the possible, the conditional, the "perhaps"­ that arc indispensable accompaniments to the making of real decisions.42 lknnington characterizes this position of Derrida's in the following way: Dernda will say that an evem that occurs on the condition ofthe perhaps lifa dlat condition (bur remembers it

as

its condition): "If no decision (ethical,

i terrupting deteffilination by getting juridical, political) s i po�iblc wimour n i the very imo theperhaps, on the other hand the same dl."cision must nterrupt dling that is its condition of po�ibiliry, the perlJaps itself." Radicalising this thought abour events in general in the comext ofdeci sions leads to a rens i crip­ tion of the concept ofdecision away from me concept of the subject to which it is traditionally bound.43 Derrida's stress on the "pcrhaps" goes hand in hand with a significam demar­ cation made between the SIIbjrct and the epent, harnessed here to the aim of having the subject displaced by the event. The subject needs to be displaced, according to Derrida, because the n i tactness of the traditional subject, premised on notions of self-sufficiency and autonomy, makes every decision undertaken by this quintessential embodiment of rationality and sovereignty nto i something that is fundamentally extraneous to the beinghood of dIe subject. As he puts it, a decision made by this subject is "an accident that

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leaves the subject n i different." By connast, the event "will surprise both the freedom and the will of any subject, in a word surprise the very subjectivity of the subject."44 A genuine decision is one that dislocates the n i tact subject by inserting into the being of the subject the order of the evem, which then serves as an e...[.: eriori!y to the subject, inciting in the subject a passivity or receptivity which conduces to an out-of-joinmess that makes the one who decides into a subjectile. The subject, in the account Derrida proposes, is no longer to be viewed as a "most real" which dk"Ctively turns the world n i to a secondary reality that has to derive its substance from the being of this mmovable i bulwark. 'nle following cmcial passage ftom PolitilJllcs de Famine indicates that in the process of being intermpted by this exteriority, the being of the-one-who-decidcs becomes an arrivant even in regard to itself: "In principle absolutely singular, n i its most traditional concept, the decision is not merely always e.xceptional,

it makes an o:cmptioll of me. In me. I decide,

I make up my mind, sovereignly, would mean: the other-me as other and other than me, makes or make an exception of the self-same. This presupposed norm of any decision, this normal e...c .: eption docs not exonerate from any re­ sponsibility. Responsible for myself before the other, I am first of all and also

respollSiblefur the other befure the other."45 Derrida here rums rhe Heideggerian diremption of the Dasein of the subject by the nullity of Being into an axiom according to which the subject's corresJXlndence with itself is intermpted by the passage of diffcrance. (diffcrance being, among the many things that it is, Derrida's casting of this Hcideggeri:m diremption n i to the form of a quasi­ transcendental), so that the decision made by the subjcct bl"Comes ethical at its core. In coming to a decision, I am drawn into an "event" in which the other is JXlsitioned as a llot lIIe in an incliminable adjacency to me, so that my deciding is dle outcome of an oscillation between the two poles of the

me

and the IIOt lIIe, and the II/e, by virrue of this diremption which consigns the self into an e.'(ile from itself, is thus an arrivant responsible for the arrivant that is the other (in me). "Home," according to this conception, is dle sin­ gularity which emerges from this event n i which a subject constmcts a place in order to deal with its constitutive exile from self and from other, as much as this subject or subjectile is constmcted from dlis place, and as a result is able to issue a welcome in spite of this e.xile. Home, dle place created by the law of wllimitcd hospitality, is where this resJXlllSibility for die other can be discharged, where one or more arrivants can be welcomed unreservedly. This absence of reservation results from the accompanying absence of a determi­ nation that bestows on the arrivant an " essence" or an "anticipation" which

THE [,OllTiCS OF THE ['LACE OF THE SUB/ECT

l85

serves to neutralize dIe "otherness" of the one who s i dIe srranger.46 Hospi­ tality and responsibility have to be without ground, and this nonexistenee of ground is due to the movement of diffcrance. As I said earlier, diffcrance is the quasi-transcendental that is ultimately feSJXlnsible for dlis crucial and originating lack of a ground for politics and ethics. With dlis primordial absence of a ground, undecidability becomes an all-enveloping condition for dIe emergence of democracy: democracy arises when dIe myriad singularities that elude n i corJXlration into an Absolute or All arc rhen free to be organized in ways that make dIem n i susceptible to being dragooned by an organization or n i dividual acting solely at tht, be­ hest of a doctrine or program. Democracy is JXlssible for dIe Dcrridean only when forces preemptive of the possible arc warded off and a ubiquitous and yet enabling uncertainty is installed in the realm of the ethical and dIe JXlliti­ cal. Politics is possible only when a dueshold of hesitation or reserve allows dIe political subject oppornmities to experience thc displacements and reori­ entations n i tegral to any process of transformation and renovation.

Politics beyond Politics? A fundamental gJP between the undecidable as the concomitant ofthe quasi­ transcendental dilfcrance and dIe event of making concrete ethical and po­ litical decisions is n i tegral to Derrida's deconstntction of dIe metaphysics of the political, a metaphysics that has prevailed from the time of the Greeks to Carl Schmitt. Ihis gap may make Derrida vulnerable to what looks like a telling objection advanced by Simon Critchley, who believes that Derrida cannot show how the subject or subjectile, in dlis account, s i going to be able to move from the all-encompassing undecidability so pivotal for deconstruc­ tion to the making and implementation of concrete political decisions. How is one to surmount dIe aporias arising from the chasm between the transcen­ dental or quasi-transcendental basis of wldecidability, with its supervening logic of generalization and generalizability, and dIe "facticity" of everyday decision making, with its logic of the sheerly singular? One way of n:sponding to an objection of this kind is to argue that those who find it compelling fail to sec dlat Derrida's insistence on the separation between dIe quasi-transcendental and dIe empirical, which seemingly mir­ rors the I-lcideggerian distinction between the ontological and the ontic, is intended not so much to create an impasse between the transcendental and the empirical (as these critics of Derrida contend), but is instead a way of lIot absoluti7ing the distinction between the transcendental and dIe empirical

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particular.47 Identifying the feamres of the aporetic logic which governs the passage between the quasi-transcendental and the empirical does not of itself prohibit commerce between the two, bm instead di�plays the terms and con­ ditions that subtend this movement, in this way indicating the compromises, oversights, evasions, and commitments whic h attend the making of this or that connection, no matter how distended or ntervallic, i between dle quasi­ transcendental and the empirical. Derrida in effeet provides the lineaments of a conception of the contingent and the singular in his elaboration of the "nonconcept" of diffcrance, the whole point of which is not to elose off the empirical and dle transcendental from each other, but rather ro allow the oudines of the always contingent underpilUlings of any traffic between the two to be acknowledged and acted upon. ·TIlis passage or oscillation between the empirical and the quasi-transcendental is then the contc.xt, a context itself necessarily outside the purview of the "factically" political and dle ethical, from which dle factically political and ethical singular emerges.

TItis context underlies dle encounter between me and an other, in which we confront each odler as arrivants. Or more precisely, it is dle odler's other that, as a third party .i nvolved in the interchange between dle other and me, who confronts the odler in me.4S TIle complexity ensuing from dle "being there" of this dlird party in the encowtter between the odler and me makes justice possible, maintains Derrida, because dIe presence of an other n i me and in my odler makes it impossible for our relationship to be governed by the principles of a normativity whose overall character has been determined absolutely in advance. ·TIle singularity of the event of such an encounter owes its existence to this radical undermining of the notion that the encow}[er has an essential stmcture in which everydling is given in advance (herein lies the gist of Derrida's critique of Uvinas). For Derrida, justice is possible only because the other is singular and because the event of my engagement with the other has a character that is not set in advance. TIle trajectory of this encOlUlter has to partake of the undecidable and the interminable to ensure that no finality can set limits to justice. If the other is weleomed because he or she happens merely to embody some principle, or because hospitality to the other is decreed programmatically, then my encounter with the odlercannot be animated by a tme justice or spirit of hospitality. Limits can be set to the factical c.xtension or applicability of programs and principles, but if dlis were to be dle case, justice and hospitality would be vitiated in the process. -nlis response to his critics notwidlstanding, Derrida still has a problem with the everyday or factical dimensions of the political. Even if it is granted that dlOse of his critics who accuse him of driving an absolute wedge between THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

187

the transcendental and the empirical are mistaken because he is, on the con­ trary, interested in conceptualizing in as rigorollS a way as possible the meta­ physical (and para-metaphysical) assumptions underlying the interchanges between these two domains, there remains the question of the nature of the conceptual practice involved in establishing a Derridean deli mitation on traffic between the two domains. A conceptual practice, as well as having a specific stmcture, culminates in a specific outcome or outcomes, and the outcome of Derrida's conceptual practice in taking the demarcation between the transcendental and the empirical to function as the fulcrum for concep­ tualizing an adequate enough notion of an ethical and political possibility raises questions that cannot be ignored. What happens when the Derridean notion of the subjectile o r arrivant is inserted into the realm of the factically o r acmally political? Especially toward the end of his life, Derrida did address political ques­ tions of undeniable consequence; the imprisonmem of Nelson Mandela, immigration (the stams of the so-called

srtllS

pnpiers or wldocumented

for­

eigners) in France, genocide, human rights, rJcism, European unification, and Algeria are among the themes dealt with in rhe texts of the past two decades or so. Blit for all this, c.xcept perhaps in the eyes of his more fer­ vent admirers, there is something curiollSly unsatisfactory about this body of writings. There is of course the fondness for the elusive and the aporetic, the unbridled zest for etymological twists and turns (the affinit y with Hei­ degger in

this respect has been much noted, though Derrida lacks the pon­

derousness of his German predecessor), conjuring up the proverbial image of a dog chasing its own tail. But this is a minor foible when pitted against the seriousness and palpable rigor of the work being done in such texts as Poli­

nqlles de l'all/int, Spectres de Marx, Apories, and Rqglles.4'1 At the same t i m e , it is important that we continue to pose the question, which as we have seen is vital to any consideration of the sllStainability of the project of liberJtion, of an openness, a "cermill openness" (this would be Derrida's preferred idiom when characterizing this openness) to the possibility of the emergence of a specific kind of collective subject (since liberation will require the activity of this subject on a significant scale). And not just any collective subject, but a collective subject capable of initiating a range of transformations rhat can have an impact in areas as diverse as Burkina Faso and Washington. In re­ flecting on this possibility, it has to be borne in mind that a philosopher can reflect on the political in at least two ways, given the perspective on libera­ tion canvassed earlier. One option, and it need not be explicitly chosen, conceives of the political 188

CHAPTER 7

solely or primarily as a concepmal emity or philosopheme. The other, and again it is a preference that, philosophically, need not be voiced for what it is, requires that this thinking of politics involve not only the analysis of con­ cepts, but also rhe pursuit of a specific historical and political task, namely, the project of a collective human liberation premised on a decisive super­ session of the capitalist system of accumulation.5o A reflection or discourse of the latter kind on the singularity of political practice will have three foci:

(1)

a subject or addressee;

(2)

the discourse itself, which will take the form

of the formulation of a particular political problem, and which has its own conditions of intelligibility; and

(3)

an object, which is the concrete sima­

tion addressed by the discourse and is the place that circumscribes its con­ ditions of possibility. The pursuit of a collective human liberation involving a supersession of capitalism will clearly require this discourse to be one dlat addresses the question of the possibility of revolutionary transformation, of creating a state or society not finally constrained by the imperatives of capi­ talist accumulation. -Those addressed by tllis discourse, its putative subjects, would be those who would be affected by this possibility of transformation. Its object would be the historical and political conjlUlcrure which enables or blocks dlis possibility, in this case a particular arrangement of classes and their always uneven relations to the mechanisms of capitalist development. Framed in this way it is difficult not to conclude that Derrida's is a dlinking that remains entirely at the level of the philosophical. Of course, there are. the vaunted declarations of Derrida himself and several of his conunentators that the whole point of deconstmction is to show how this bowldary between philosophy and its "outside" is fundamentally lUlstable and aporetic. For Derrida, as we have seen repeatedly, the Dowldary between a concept (phi­ losophy or metaphysics in dlis case) and its outside is wlavoidably caught up in the movement of diffcrance, and so no mastery over the placement of this boundary is achievable in principle. TIle origins of this DoIUldary, or any boundary for that matter, have inserted into them the elemental dismption represented by diffcrance, and this absolutely precludes any attempt to im­ pose a philosopllical rectitude or discipline on dle course taken by diffCrance. Hut this claim widl regard to the all-encompassing wldecidability affecting the operation of any philosophemc can itself neveT escape, fully, philosophy or metaphysics. \Vhile the efficaciousness of the philosopheme can have no ground in a "presence; as Derrida maintains, the realization of this inevita­ bility has to be generated within a frame that encompasses dle philosopheme in question

and its outside,

or even the totality of philosophemes and their

outside. And this frame. will have to contain within itself dle mark of philosoTHE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

189

phy o r metaphysics; it cannot escape this fate.Derrida has never shirked the implications of this leitmotif or axiom of deconstmction.On the contrary, he has said repeatedly that the abyss which lies on the other side of a bowId­ ary or limit is the only place from which an infinite and ungualifiL-d respon­ sibility, and thus ethics and politics, can emerge. With the impossibility of mastery or appropriation, every subject and subjectile has to accept respon­ sibility for what transpires at this necessarily disconcerting limit: "You reach the edge from which what once seemed assured is revealed in its precarious­ ness, its historical breadth-without necessarily disappearing or collapsing." He goes on to say, ....In 'this' place ... you must find yourself, hear yourself out, yourself and your reader, beyond all reckoning, thus at once saved and lost."5J 10 not acknowledge the challenge posed by this inescapable moment of decision is to fail to heed the call of responsibility, and thus to be a stranger to the ethical and political.52 (Failing to heed dIe call of responsibility is an impeccably Heideggerian way of '""pressing the matter, but then Derrida's conceptllali zation of dIe theme o f a summons to responsibility is close

to

Heidegger's.) Derrida also says dlat in this "iteration" of responsibility at the abyssal limit, responsibility itself, though it remains an ideal in its form as a summons, is inevitably compromised and its tenets adheret.i to only incom­ pletely. -nlis summons is where singularities materialize and intersect, where "manners of living, voices, writing, of what you carry widl you, what you can never leave behind" converge to create an ""old lIewlallgungc: the most archaic and the newest, unheard of, and thereby at prc.scnt unreadable."53 Derrida insists dlat dIe production of singularities is governed by a logic which makes it impossible for dIe ego, or any center of consciousness, to fWICtion.At the same time it is hardly deniable that an irremediable abstrac­ tion has seeped deep into this account of rhe constitution of dIe singular. For Derrida, rhe singular comes into being at exacdy dIe moment when the aporetic limit is reached.Or perhaps more precisely, this moment is the occa­ sion and also dIe stimulus for the emergence of dIe singular. Approaching the threshold of the limit dlUs becomes the. indispensable condition for the emergence of any singularity. But what happens when this moment draws ncar) Then, says Derrida, one confronts the undecidable, always, and thi.� unavoidable encounter is then the impctlls which moves the subject or sub­ jectile away from any kind of fixity (admittedly this is a fixity displaying itself primarily o r perhaps e\'en exclusively at the level of concepts ), so that what was previously thought to be immune to the impress o f the contingent is now brought within contingency's reach."ille inevitability of this encOlUlter 190

CHAPTER 7

with contingency is thus the vital and indispensable horizon for generating singularities.54 Ontological difference is the womb from which the singular emerges. The subject's or subjectile's situation

as

a singularity is conditioned, as a mat­

ter of conceptual logic and hence a.\:iomatically, by the movement of differ­ ence. But who or what is the one addressed or constituted by this movement of the undecidable? -nle one so addressed or constituted is for Derrida the one whose being is permeated by what BeIUlington has called "the event of alterity" (i.e., the event which constitutes the singularity):

Dcrnda's man)' morc or less visible imecvemions in connece political situa­ tions . . . arc to mis c..xtem not merely the circumstantial acts of a philosopher elsewhere, and more importantly, developing theories ofknowledge, bur con­ tinuous with each act of deconstntction from the Start, always more or less obviously marked b)' a strategic event of decision in a given context. This does

I/otproJlide II tlxoyctiCillmodd forpolitiCS so much liS it stril'ts to keep opm tbe tpelll of alterity wbicb Illonc Wilkes politicspossiblt and illfl'itllble, bllt whicb politienl phi­ losophy of1111 c%llrs has alwnys tried to close.55 -nle conceptual practice intrinsic t o rhe kinds of JXllitical intervention undertaken by Derrida, and subjected to rigorous reflection in his texts, conceives of politics sively,

a.�

as

taking place primarily, though by no means exclu­

a comext-given "event of decision." Events of decision involve,

potentially, many different kinds of subject (individual, collective, national, transnational, local, gendered, sexual, legal, and so on), depending on the nature of the discourse that makes possible the instantiation of the subject in question. Bm the absolute priority accorded "the event of alterity " does seem to indicate that the subject brought t o this point of decision is typically the solitary individual. Moreover, the

crux

of this encounter with alrerity is

not necessarily to further a project of liberation (however one defn i es that project), bm, rather, whether o r not rhe one immersed in this encOlUlter is able, through this encounter, to "keep open the event of alterity." If JXllitical circumstances, those of an impending revolutionary situation, say, necessi­ tate in whatever way a foreclosing of this prized event of alterity, then the clear implication of this passage (and indeed all of Derrida's oeuvre) is that this revolution must be deemed to have failed in some sense, even if-and this is an entirely plausible scenario-rhe revolution in question improves in very visible ways the lives of large numbers of women, men, and children! Elevating the event of alterity into an untranscendable horizon for rhe constitution of the political clearly

has

counterintuitive consequences with

THE [,OLlTICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

191

regard

to

the realm of the materially political. -The event of alte rity is dle

con dition that makes possible the emergence of a singularity, but the singu­

larity comes into being by "making politics possible," and presumably not by ac co mplis hing a nything else in the realm of "actually e:dsting" politics . It would seem that in Derrida's accOlUlt one becomes a singularity by taking a decisive step in what is irretr ievably a metaphysical p oli tics, or the metaphysi­

cal dimension of p olitics, in which "being political," purely and simply, is co­ extensive with "keeping politics open." And maki ng rhe opening of politics a prized and non n egotiable principle even when human beings may be dying as

a result of actions taken in the world of a n acmal politics is wldeniably

counterinmitive. But to pose dle question again: \Vhat kind of singularity is it dlat emerges from this confront"Jtion with the event of alterity associated by Derrida and his followers with dIe passage of diffcrance?

Given all th e above, dlis can only be a singularity constituted at a fairl y high level of abstraction: politics is kept open, yes, but open in ways that could prompt anyone becoming a singularity, or havi ng already become a singularity,

to overlook

what happens ill a situation involving dle welfare

of acmally existin g sub jec ts . After all, t he singular individual owes his or her singular ity to a movement, that of diffcrance, whose primary orienta­ tion or guid ing i mpulse is not really the transformation of the world bur the

keeping open of politics. It could be argued of coutse that this openness of the political is precisel y an enab ling condition of this s ou ght -after material trJllsformar ion. But were dlis argument to be made, the question of dle gap bet ween the event of alr erit y and this proje ct of material tr ansformation

would still arise; furdlermore, dle principle that on ly the event of alte rity is needed to consrimte singularities is left untouched by this cou nterargument. 10 see dlat this account of the constitution of the singular is beset by a trou­ b lin g detachment fr o m the situations of a concrete politics, we can contrast

this view of the singular with the one to be found in the wr it ings of Gilles Ddeuze. For Deleuzc, any entity is what it is, or is able to become what it was in the process of becoming, becanse it is the outcome of a n always specific conver­ gence of forces. It tmllsmirs forces and receives other forces, and the. plexus of these forces makes up dle constitutive powerof the individual (dle notion of

a "constitutive power" being borrowed from Spinoza).56 >The individual, as the event that results from this convergence of forces, is also a singularity. No

individual receives or transmits forces in e.·wetly t he same way as odler indi­ vidnals; if dlc), di d individuals would be qualitatively indistinguis hable from ,

each other; dlat is, there would be no individuals. However, dle individual's 191

CHAPTER 7

"nature" as this singularity, as opposed to that singularity or that other one, is always due to a precise concatenation of forces. What makes Abraham Lincoln the singularity that he is, is the amalgam of forces having to do with his being born in a log cabin in Illinois, his decision

to

abolish slavery, his

speech at Gettysburg, his assassination, and so on, to encompass a veritable myriad of such powers, some received and others transmitted, and coming together to constimte the event "being born in a log cabin;' "deciding to abolish slavery," "speaking at Gettysburg," "being assassinated;" and so on, so that "Abraham Lincoln" names the resultant of all these events. A power­ ful empiricism is at work in this conception of a singularity, an empiricism which derives from the insistence that singularities result from an always par­ ticular constellation of material forces, a materialism which is missing from Derrida's definition of a singularity in terms of its relation to an insistent structural event of alterity generated by the passage of differance.57 If we remm to the delineation of a conceptual practice congruent with a project of radical social and political transformation, then Derrida's unrav­ eling of the horizon from which nil philosophies of the. political must begin

will have as its subject or addressee dIe one who is the subjectile or arrivant. Bur of course

nil are

arrivants when facing the event of alterity dlat is the

mark of an irreducible contingency: George \N. Bush and Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as the Zambian copper miner and the Chicana hotd chambermaid in Los Angeles. Of course each of these individuals will, or will not, be con­ fronted by their respective events of alterity in quite different ways. But this thinking of the event of a1terity has to reckon with an inescapable feature of this encowtter with alterity and its capacity

to

bring one to the realization

that we are all arrivanrs, namely, that dIe Zambian copper miner, say, is in all likelihood going to have a vastly different wlderstanding of his bcinghood as an arrivam from the understanding possessed by George \N. Hush (and this not merely because the Zambian miner did not go to Yale, did not come from a wealthy family firmly positioned at the heart of his cOlUltry's mling elite for generations, etc.).111 is commonplace draws attention to tile need for a view like Derrida's to be complememed by something like a theory of ideology, or at any rate to have at its disposal the wherewithal to accomplish what it is that a theory of ideology is imended to achieve. For the Zambian copper miner and the talentless plutocrat in dIe \"hite House are situated in com­ pletely ditl"erenr life-worlds. (Who can fail to acknowledge this?) And this realization has at least one major consequence with regard

to rhe status quo:

George \-\1. Hush will in all probability acquiesce to this stams quo, whereas the Zambian miner will in all likelihood not fn i d it so congenial. Quite difTHE I'OLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

193

fcrent subject formations and quite different modes of decision making are at stake here, and conceptual practice has to begin by acknowledging this if it is

to

succeed as conceptual practice.

The Derridean could argue, however, dlat this criticism misses the point: what the Derridean deconstmctionist seeks

to

provide is a specification, at

the logico-metaphysical levcl of the condition of possibility, of an always­ nor-yet-decided, so that decisions regarding practices and dIcir outcomes are never yet made by the one who faces the event of alterity. Decisions can be made only when "the ordeal of dIe undecidable" has been submitted to, and from this ordeal emerges a "hesitation," referred ro by Derrida as "a messianic hesitation," which "does not paralyze any decision, any affirmation, any re­ sponsibility. On dIe contrary, it grants them their elementary condition. It is their very experience."5� But there is a logical chasm between a depiction, no matter how detailed or p({c this wlCodcd pathos from now on, btl[ the will guided by eros, though we Ca!Ulot be certain that even dle latter represents a realistic cultural political option in advanced capitalist societies. To repoliti­ cizc what has so far been massively depoliticizcd will be something akin to a revolutionary undertaking.

A New 0lltoWgica{ Script? For the remainder of this chapter, it is m i portant to examine whedler a wholly immanent ontology, with the will guided by eros as its Scotist pivot point, can serve

as

dIe c.xteriority to the political which a hugely depoliti­

cizcd contemporary poit l ies desperately needs to possess if it is to be capable of motivating a viable project of liberation. As I pointed out in the previous section, this Scmist-Spinozist-Deleuzcan ontology posits an infinity of expressivities and [heir associated possible worlds in a way that is at once rigorously immanent and materialist, and also rigorously politicized. Without being transcendent (there being no univer­ sal subject and universal object for it to transcend), this ontology serves as a transcendental field for dle becoming of new multiplicities, each new multi­ picity l being potentially another name for a new kind of political agent iving l for a liberation that the old sovereignties arc now unable to forestall.!6 It has been objected to this Scotist-Spinozist-Deleuzcan ontology that it is really a species of nihilism. Once it is assumed or asserted, so this objec­ tion goes, that all finite being folds back into the virtual, [hen an inevitable devaluation of finite particularity has to ensue, since the virtual can only THE REUGIOUSTRANSCENDENT

237

be the void into which is collapsed dle entire array of differentiations dlat is the growld of each particularity. In dle absence of an ultimately sustain­ able ground for differentiation, particularity is irreuievably undermined, and without a real particularity dlis ontology has no alternative but to end up by positing the One into which all finite difference is poured and totally abol­ ished. Scoms, Spinola, and OelellZe, their philosophical picas on behalf of particularity norwidlstanding, thus end up being disciples of Ploti.nus, the first great philosopher of the One.17 Ihe argument that dlis Scotist-Spinozist-Oeleuzean ontology can only culminate n i a nihilism of the void does not take a crucial feature of Oelcuze's ontology into accowlt. Oeleuze is qnite c.xplicit dlat the void of deterritori­ alization does not exist on its own, but rather exists necessarily in a triptych of dimensions, in which there coexists a dynamic and mutually determining relationship between dle three levels that consist of (1) the monism of a pure perceptual moment,

(2)

the dualism of composition in which pure percep­

tual moments arc unified or " made n i to one" to form sllch objects as a rain­ drop or a forest, and

(3) dle void, which is a pure act of separation or division

that divides things endlessly, so dlat the raindrop can become a molecule of oxygen that can then become something else, as it enters ever new circuits of causality, and so on.

This book did notcmerge from the void, bur from an

assemblage with a particular process of causality that allowed paper, dle act of writing, print technology, the present state of the publishing industry, the author's n i culcation n i to a particular matrix of dlOUglu production and intel­ lectual practice-what we in the academy call "scholarship" -to 0per:lte con­ jointly to produce Freedom Not ut. And with its insertion into a new circuit of causality, this book can in mrn become a text for an examination, a door­ stop, kindling for a bonfire, or a paperweight. (A friend of mine who once lived in a cockroach-infested apartment told me dlat for a long time Oeleuze and Guattari's A

77JolIJlllld Plateaus, a weighty tome, was his f:lVored imple­

ment for bringing a scurrying cockroach to a dead halt.) 1he existent object arises only as dle outcome of such dynamic interactions, and any notion that Odeuzean objects emerge from the pure void and disappear n i to it when they cease to exist (as dlis or that object) is therefore incorrect. 111e Odeu­ zean void always exists simultaneously and in conjunction with the other two dimensions, namely, the moments of evanescent experience and the unity of composition.18 -nlere is no all-encompassing void constituting an absolute exteriority to dle object for dlis particular ontological uadition. As a result, the problem dlat is usually taken to be insurmountable for proponents of the absolute void, namely, how the logico-metaphysical transition from the 2,8

CHAPTER 9

nothingness of the void to the presence of existent objects is to be under­ stood, docs not apply n i Deleuze's case. Quite simply, for Deleuze there is no absolute void, and he r question of the movement from sheer nothingness to the plenitude of existing objects does not arise for him.19 Alongside this objection to an imma.nentist ontology voiced by the sup­ porters of the flnnlqgn i tIIts i is another, related objection, to the effect that both Scoms and Deleuze have no way of conceptualizing the transition from pure possibility to actuality, since they do nor acknowledge a mediating prin­ ciple, n i voking the notion of participation (as the analogy doctrine docs), to enable the transition from possibility to actuality. According to this objec­ tion, f i the existent objcrt docs not participate in that from which it emerges, its emergence can only be surd and arbitrary. This argument for the centrality of analogical participation can be used against those who uphold notions of univocity and immanemism only bcrause it begins with the assmnption that these norions have to begin from possibility, which then has to be converted somehow into actuality. But Deleuze follows Scoms in making an impor­ tant

distinction between possibility and pottlltinlity. Possbility i encompasses

the range of what a thing can become without ceasing to be itself, and if something is merely possible, it is not actual (though of course it has to be possible if it is to become actual). l'ountinlity, by contrast, is act, active, and actuality.20 Potentiality,

unlike

fKlssibiliry, is a state of power, in

this

case the power of producing dIe state of affairs that actuates dIe possibility in question. Potentiality already presupposes an active causal nexus from which dIe acmated entity can emerge. And so Dcleuze and his philosophical predecessors arc able to avoid dIe objcrtion dIat, widl no ontological basis for appeal to the principle of an infinite Being who can convert possibility into actuality, this school of thought is left with an actuality that is simply a ghostly ontological facsimile of mere possibility. But is dlis ontology derived from Scotus, Spinoza, and Dcleuzc really compatible with marxism, understood here as a theoretico-practical anna­ ture requiring both revolution and socialism? The ontological script that can be written out ofthis delineation of the inunanent field ofdIe multiple is cer­ tainly compatible with a marxist conception of liberation. Some would argue that while Deleuzc can acconunodate dIcoretically the notion of revolntion, socialism, which requires that transformation to a new order of social being, cannot be encompassed by a phi l osophy which, n i the eyes of such critics, conceives of order stricdy n i terms of "metastability," and so has to accept the principle that all order is ultimately arbitrary. For if order is no more than metastability, it can never amount to more than a momentary arresting of THE REUGIOUSTRANSCENDENT

239

chaos, and socialism needs more for its realization than just the suspension of the basallhLX .ll For Dcleuze, however, the attainment of socialism is inherently oowui up with struggle, n i tllis case, the struggle to construct an assemblage that is finally able

to

escape the constraining power of the capitalist state. -The so­

cialist assemblage would be one premised on a counterpower that can be di­ K""Cted against the powers of the state assemblages. And here rhe insight that these state assemblages are not fixities, bllt at best only metastable structures, has the tremendous advantage of allowing the conceptualization of their fun­ damental impermanence. As Brian Massumi points out, if metastability im­ poses order, this order is never more than a contingent arresting of disorder. -nle next (socialist) order will come, unless the apparatuses of the capitalist state are able to continue to forestall its arrival.12 And only a politics (for me a marxist politics though it could well be a politics of a radical bur nonmarxist variety) can put in place the conditions that will allow the supplanting of the apparamses of the capitalist state. We cannot be sure, however, that this strictiy immanentist ontology is compatible with Christianity, which seems to be wedded irreducibly to an ontology of tile transcendent. But the possibility of Christianity's being able to incorporate an ontology of unqualified inunanence s i one that can­ not be ruled Ollt tout court. Or it may be that we cannot after all obviate the transcendent, despite what 1 have argued in this chapter, in which case Christianity's ontological preeminence is guaranteed, as John Milbank and otilers have argued. Either way, we know that it is possible for us to delineate convincingly the terms of a conceptual basis for a notion of liberation tilat is unrelentingly inlllanent. What this actually portends for conceptions of liberation so far premised on the transcendent is really another story. For the moment, the immanent ontology of liberation certainly bypasses liberalism, but, as I noted earlier, we callnot be so certain rilat it does the same with regard to Christianity. The only important consideration here, though, i.� whether this inunaneiU ontology can undergird a marxist conception of Jib­ eration, and regardless of what tins portends for Christianity as an ontology, this is all tilat a philosophical marx ism needs.

240

CHAPTER 9

CHAPTER 10 Models of Liberation V

Nomad Politics

Nomad politics, which can readily be identified with Dclcuzc and Guattari's nomadology, has two primary virmcs.J First, unlike its counterpart politics of rhe e.'(ccprionai (vent (associated n i chapter

8 with the writings of Alain

Badiou), it docs not rely on the extraordinary event to provide a basis for the convergence of collective agents around a project of libcratioll.2 The crowds who seemingly emerged out of nowhere to restore Hugo Chavez [0 the presidency of Venezuela after he had been deposed n i a COllp, or the similar crowds of protesters at several G8 swnmits (these now tend to be held in out­ of-the-way mouIltain or island resorts n i the hope of dlwarting protesters), both constitute nomadic formations whose actions are regarded by some as harbingers of significant futurc political transformations.3 Second, and in a more philosophical vein, nomadology has the great merit of bypassing the problematic of representation identified earlier with dle model of sovereignty underwritten by dle "previous'" politics, that is, the modcJ which requires an orchestration, primarily through the mediation of the state, of the throng of individual wills n i to a single collective will or body politic. As I poi.nted Olit earlier, this assembling of dle hodgepodge of n i dividual wills into "the people," who are then represented by dle sovereign or parliamentary body, is regarded by proponents of this liberal-democratic political tradition as the essential, indeed transcendental condition for effective political action.4 In nomadology, this axiom of liberal-democratic political action is totally dispensed with (since in reality all it dcJivers is a mercJy symboic l "unity in

diversity") because the logic of the nomad's political being cannot but be structurally autopoctic; as I already mentioned, nomadic formations direct themselves according to their own powers and their own histories. It should also be noted tllat overlaps are possible between nomadology and tile fKlli­ tics of the event, this convergence being very evident in the work of Dcleuze and Guattari, for instance, who take nom:ldology to provide the logic for a project of stmggle bm who also accord certain events (e.g., the foundation of the Paleolithic state, May 1968) a decisive fKllitical significance. As we h:lve seen from the disnlssions in the preceding chapters that h:lve focused on the politics of identity, of subjectivity :lnd the place of the sub­ ject, and of the event, tile kinds of reflection embraced by the thinkers placed under tllese mbrics have as their commonproblemati'lue the question of the dl:lracter of political subject in the conjuncture of a "postpoitical" l politics. Postpoitical l poitics l is still :I politics; even in an epoch in which the tradi­ tional medl:lnisms of fKllitical representation (identified n i tllis book Witll the trndition tll:lt extends from Hobbes, via Rousseau and Kant, to Rawls) have been supplanted, there is still the need to ensure the continued produc­ tion of social cooperation, this being an absolute requirement for continued capitalist accumulation. In rhe advanced capitalist economies, :IS was seen in part I, these days tile production of social cooperation is undertaken pri­ marily by tile service :lnd information industries, whose primary aim is the promotion of the m i peratives of c:lpital.

The Production ofSocial Control -nle need to maintain constant control over tile forms of social cooperation in film requires tll:lt education, training, and business never end: tile busi­ ness time scale is now 24/7; tile Tokyo stock e.'(change opens almost as soon

n i an unending cycle, training is "on the job"

as

the one in New York closes

as

opposed to being based on the traditioll3l apprenticeship modd (itself :l

holdover from feudalism), and education becomes "continuing education," that is, sometlling ril:lt continues tluoughollt life and is not confined to those aged six to twenty-two. As I noted earlier, this essentially dispersive pro­ pensity is reflected in the present regime of capitalist accumulation, where production is now metaproduction; that is, in tile advanced economics it is no longer focused on rile use of raw materials to produce finished gOClds, but rather on the sale of service.� (especially in the domain of finance and crcdit) and products that n i volve rultural and symbolic production. Social control

2.p.

CHAPTER 10

is no longer left to schools and police forces, but is now also a branch of mar­ keting, as even politics has become "retail politics," in which politicians seek desperately for an im:lge of themselves, or for some "hot-button" issue, to market to largely passive and apathetic electorates ("Doesn't George \V. Bush look absolutely great in blue jeans?"; "Tony Blair sweats too much when he s i on TV"; "Aren't Sarah Palin's glasses fantastic?"; "Let's have dle Ten Com­ mandments put up in Alabama courthouses"), and when public opinion spe­ cblists and spin doctors (Dick Morris in the case of Bill Clinton, Karl Rove for George W. Bush, Alistair Campbell for Tony Blair) are more important to prime ministers :lnd presidents than are capable and wise civil servants. Recording, whether n i administration or business, is no longer based on the written document kept in the appropriate box of files, but on computerized spreadsheets, bar cOt.ies, and other forms of electronic tagging.s The implications of these developments for sure theory are momentous. -nle state itself has become fragmented and compartmentalized and has :lC­ cmed more power to itself in some spheres while relinquishing power totally in odlers. Blit however much the state has mut:lted in dle era of comrol soci­

eties, it still retains the function of regulating, in conjunction with capital, the ":lccords" that channel social and JXllitical power. In his Leibniz book, Deleuzc m:limains that state and nonstate formations :lre constimted on the basis ofsuch "concerts" or"accords."6 These accords are organizing principles which make possible the grouping into particular configurations of entire ar­ rays of evems, pcrson:lges, processes, institutions, movements, and so forth, such that the resulting configurations become integrated formations. As a set of :lccords or axioms governing the accords that reguhte dle operations of the various components of an immensely powerful and comprehensive system of accwnulation, capital is simated at dle crossing point of all kinds of formations, and thus has dle capacity to integrate and recompose capital­ ist and noncapitalist sectors or modes of production. Capital, the ":lccord of accords" par excellence, can thus bring together heterogeneous phenomena and make them express the same world, that of capitalist accumulation. Accords are constituted by selection criteria which specify what is to be ncluded i or excluded by dle terms of the accord n i question. These criterb also determine with which other JXlssible or actual accords :l particuhr ac­ cord will be consonant (or dissonant). The criteria dlat constitute :lccords :lre usually defined and described by narratives governed by a certain normative vision of tmth, goodness, and beauty (reminiscent of rhe so-called medieval transcendemals, albeit translated where necessary into the appropriate con-

NOMAD rOllTlCS

243

temporary vernacular). A less portentous way of making this point would be to say that accords arc n i herently a.xiological, value-laden. \.Vhat seents to be happening today, and this is a generalization that is perhaps somewhat ten­ dentious, is that these superposed narratives and the selection criteria these accords sanction, criteria which mayor may nO[ be explicitly formulated or entertained, are being weakened or qualified n i ways that deprive them of their force. Such selection criteria, which tend to be policed by the state, usually function by assigning privileges of rank and order to the objects they subsume ("Le Pen is more French than Zidane"; "Turks are not Europeans"; "English is the official language of West Virginia" -the politt� equivalent of "Get out ofhere if you want to speak Spanish at a ,,vest Virginia governmcnt office"), as the loss or attenuation of the customary force of such accords makes dissonances and contradictions difficult or even impossible to resolve, and, correlatively, makes divergences easier to affirm. Events, objects, and personages can now be assigned to several divergent and even incompossible series. The functioning of capital in the control .societies thus requires that the state become internally pluralized. The transcendental principles which subtend the constitution of the social order are embodied n i what Deleuze and Guattari call the socius. in Allti­

Oedipus,

the socius is said to be necessary because desiring-production is

coterminous with .social production and reproduction, and for the latter two to take place desire has to be coded and recoded, so that subjects can be "pre­ pared" for their social roles and flUlCtiom. The socius is rhe terrain of this coding and recoding. Another rationale for the .socius stems from the part it plays in consolidating rhe capitalist order. Desire is simultaneously enabled and limited by capital, which frees it from its previous embodiments or cod­ ings so that it can be placed at the disposal of capitalist expansion; after this decoding bycapital, desire is then reined in or recodL-d so that it can subset\'e the novel requirements of capitalist production. Coding or " n i scription" is thus central to the coustitlltion of the .socius, and Deleuze and Guattari respond to rhe crucial question of the "surface" on which this imcribing takes place by n i voking the notion of the Earth. The Earth precedes the comtitution of the socius and is the primordial unity or ground of desire and production. As such the Earth is rhe precondition of production, while also being the object of desire. The first form of the socius

has therefore to n i volve a territorialization, undertaken by a "territorial ma­ dune," which parcels out rhe Earth into segments of social meaning. Once territorialization has occurred, it becomes possible for social ma­ chines (the core of the socius) to operate. Social machines have humam as 244

CHAPTER 10

dlcir parts and arc essential to the generation of cultural forms, which arc needed

[0

link humans [0 their (teehnic:ll) machines. Social machines orga­

nize flows of power and desire by coding them. -Olere arc all kinds of flows: diffcrent kinds of humans, vegetation, nonhuman 3.nim3.ls, agricultural im­ plemeIl[s, flows dlat involve bodily functions and organs, and so on. Noth­ ing escapes coding, and so nothing can escape the purview of the socius. If the socius is a megamachine (a machine that reguhtes odler machines), the fud that drives dlis machine is desire, dlOugh desire s i sh3.ped and orches­ trated by irs n i sertion into tlus megamadline. In modern societies the nature of tlus insertion of desire into the social megamachine has been significanrly transformed. To facilitate the functioning of c.lpiTalism, flows have had

to

become more .Ibstraet, since in ordcr [0 work "Ipital requires lnrersubsti­ tutabiHty, homogeneity, relentless qU3.lHificarion, and an array of exeh3.nge mechanisms. Hand in hand with rhis 3.bsrraction goes a privatization of the social, sincc a systcmic overvalu3.tion of the individual (" Each and cvery one of ),ou matters to me" is the slogan of thc typical huckstering politician on die campaign tmil) is required

to compensate for tile massive collective dis­

investment that takes place in the social as a rcsult of the inexorable growth of die processes of abstraction. 'nle vehides of this privatization arc mled by the Oedipus principle, which functions as a kind of tr;mscendenral regime for the investmem of social desire. Other principles, prim,lrily eoneeflled with morality and punishmem but also with de.lth :Uld cmdty, arc also effective in [his domain. In dispensing with psychoanalysis as the ontology for this constitution of the socius, Ddeuze. and Guattari find it necessary to replace Freudianism widl another ontology ofsocial constinnion. 111is alternative, called by [hem "schizo.:lnalysis" or "nomadoIogy," begins by refusing any kind of transcen­ dental principle purporting to serve as tile ground of tile socius. In place of the logic of neceSSity and cominuity that char.ICterized previous ontologies of the social, Dclellze and Guattari Opt for one tll;lt is marked by "ruptures,� "[imits: "Singularities," "ironies;' and "eolHingencics." 'nlC traditional logic displaced desire as tllC motor th3.t drives the soci3.1 megamachine, and its rcpbccmellt would have to rcinsull wh;u was pushed aside. Schizoanalysis or nomadology would provide a new conception of c..xperience and desiring­ production, emphasizing forms of experimentation not constrained by tile ego or Oedipal stmcmrcs, as well as tile ne.ed to create new forms of collec­ tive (as opposed to merdy individual) liberatioll. 11lis liberation would not, n i deed could not be sponsored by either tile state or capital.

NOMA!)

rouTlcs

2iS

NOlllatWlogy Using the

i itial template, Ddeuze writings of G eorges Dlimezil as their n

and Gliattari provide a fascinating narrative when addressing thc questi on

of political sovereignty n i the platcau titled "Treatisc on Nomadology."7 In­ voking Dumczil s dualism of thc shaman king and the priest jurist cilCY go '

-

-

,

on to say: Undoubtedly, these twO poles stand in opposition term by term, as the ob­ scure and the dear, the violent and the calm, the quick and the weighty, thc terrifying and the regubted, the "bond" and the "pact," ere. But their oppo­ sition is only rdativc; they function as a pair, in alternation, as though they cxpressed a division of the One or constitutcd n i themselves asovereign unity. "At once antirll(:tical and complementary, necessary to one another and con­ sequently without hostility, lacking a mythology of conflict: each specifica­ tion at anyone Ievd automatically calls forth a homologous specification on another. The twO togethert·.maust me field ofthe function." They arc rlle prin­ cipal dClllcnts of a State apparatus that proceeds by a One-Two, distributcs binarydistinnions, and forms a milieu of interiority. It is a double articulation rllJt makes me State apparatus into a stmtlllll.8 Ddeuzc and Guattari take DumLtzil's pcrsonifications, at oncc complemen­

tary and mutually rcn i forcn i g, of the magician-king and cile jurist-priest to constitutc the two-prongcd function of cilC statc. Thcy also follow Dumczil in opposing tills state apparatus, and thus cilC figures of the magici an-king and cile jurist-priest, the Cowltcrforcc represented by the war machine (the

apparatus typically

oyed by nomads). The respt"Ctive properties pos­

cmpl

sessed by the state appararus and the nomadic war machinc can be tabulatcd in hc t following manner (for these propcrties, sec A Thoustllld PlnUtlllS,

60):

sovereignty (polI!YJir)

WAR MACHINE power (pl/iNlllce)

law

event

fi.xity of Being

ontological innovation

gravity

celerity

me. public

secr«l'

binary distributions

multiple becoming

permanence

evanescence

conservation

power of metamorphosis

STATE APPARATUS

246

CHAPTER �o

352-

milieu of interiority

milieu of exteriority

internal, biuniwxaJ relations

external relations

polsi

nomos

semiology

strategy, pragmatics

"striated" space

"smooth" space

coding and decoding

territorialization and deterritorialization

king, jurist

warrior, prophet

concentration

dispersion

strategies of exelusion

resistance, openness

"arborescent"

"rhiwmatic"

hierarchical

nonhierarchical

identity

transformation

individuality

singularity

false plenitude, empty repetition

facing the \'oid

delimitation

immeasurability

Goethe, Hegel

Kleist, Artaud

apparatuses of power

packs, bands

theorems

problematics

formal concentration of power

solidarity

religion

offenses against gods and priests

harmony

rhythm

architecture, cooking

music, drugs

history

geography

measured time

(cIJYOf/os)

indefinite time of event (aeon)

Egyptian state

Moses

man

"becoming·woman"

Ddeuze and Guattari caution against viewing the opposition between the state apparatus and the nomadic war machine n i strict binary terms: Ibe problem is that the eHeriorit)' ofme war machine n i relation to the State apparatus is everywhere apparent bur remains difficult to conceptualiz.c. It s i not enough to affirm that the war machine is cxternal to the apparatus. . . . \Vhat complicates everything is that this exninsic power of the war machine tends, LUlder cerrain circumstances, to become confused with one of the tWO heads of the Scate apparatus. Sometimes it is confused with the magiC viole nce of the State, at orner times with the State's military n i stimtioll. . . . So there s i a great danger of identifying the structural relation between the twO poles of political sovereignty, and me dynamic interrelation of these twO poles, with me power of war. . . . \Vhcnever the irruption of war power is confused with NOMAD POLITICS

Z-l-7

me line of statc domination, everything gus muddled; the war machine can then be underswod only through the categories ofthe negative, since nodling s i left that rcmains outside the State. Bur, rerurned w its milieu of cneriority, the war machine is seen w be of another species, of anomer namre, of another origin. (355) For Deleuze and Guattari, the law of the state is despotic and priestly n i its most fundamental impulses, and anything like an n i terpellation (admit­ tedly an Aithusserian notion that DdellZe and Guattari would certainly not want w usc) of the subject is perforcc conducted in congruence with those "tl ll .' • orems" sanctioned by the state's despotic and sacerdotal orders, thesc sacred or quasi-sacrcd orders persisting eycn when the polity in question s i a liberal democracy with an accompanying normativity ostensibly resting on entirely secular premisesY Etllico-political subjects n i terpellated in this way will therefore be caught up in a transcendental validation of their sub­ jectiYities; for Deleuze and Guattari, legitimation at the hands of the state always places the subject at the mercy of an arche, or founding principle, that requires dIe citizen to be created in the m i age of the state's figures of sover­ eignty, n i this case dIe overarching despot and priest. The outcome will in any case be a thousand little despots, a dlOusand little priests, all defined as model citizen subjects. Ibe state, in dus account, is the product of thought, in this case a think­ ing which is inextricably linked to a desire dlat for Deleuze and Guattari is ubiguitollS and endlessly productive: "Everything is production: tr0dl/ctiml

ofprodIlCCUJIIS,

of actions and of passions; produccioll

of ncm-ding processcs, of distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; prodl/ctiml of collSl/mptiollS, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pains. Everything is production, since the recording processes arc mmed i iately consumed, im­ mediately consummated, and these consumptions directly reproduced."10 -The implications of dlis position arc profound and radical, and they point to, among other things, a significant difference between a standard and al­ most normative reading of Foucault and the authors of Capitnlislllc ct schizo­

phrenic.

DelellZe and Guattari dearly accord great importance to desiring­

production (as indicated by the passage above). But this undeniable saliency of desiring-production does not translate n i to the primacy of the modes of production as such, which is what one would expect of a more conventional marxist or marxisant t1unking. Instead Deleuzc and Guattari bestow this pri­ macy on the so-called machinic processes, dlat is, the modes of organization that link myriad kinds of "attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipa-

248

CHAPTER 10

thies, alterations, amalgamations, penetrations, and expressions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one another" (A '17Jo//.Sswd P/atrnlls 90). The modes of production depend on these machinic processes for their constinltion ('1-35). The upshot is [hat the modes of production are always themselves the product or derivation of a ceaselessly generative desire: what enables each mode to be constituted is an always specific, indeed aleatory aggregation of desires, forces, and powers. ·nle organization of productive desire gives the mode of production its enabling conditions, and not vice versa, as is the case in some of the more typical marxisms. In arriving at this formulation, though, Deleuze and Guattari are very much in line with what Marx himself said about the necessity for society to exist before capitalism can emerge in anything like a fully fledged form: a society-state with preexisting surpluses has already to exist if the (capitalist) extraction of surplus-value is to take place. To quote Deleuze and Guattari: "Marx, the historian, and Childe, the archaeologist, arc in agrecmem on the following point: the archaic imperial State, which steps in to overcode agriculrural communities, presupposes at least a certain level of development of these conunwlities' productive forces since there must be a potential surplus capable of constiruting a State stock, of supporting a specialized handicrafts elass (metallurgy), and of progres­ sively giving rise to pubic l nmctions. This s i why Marx links the archaic State to a certain [precapitalist] 'mode of production'" (A "UJOIISfilld Plateaus 428). -The state, in other words, gives capital its "models of realization" (434). But the state that provides capital with the models it needs in order to be effec­ tuated is already functioning even before it manife.�ts itself as a concretely visible appararus. The state, in tillS case the Paleolithic state, destroys or neu­ tralizes the hwlter-gJtherer societies hat t it came to supersede, but before this happens there has to be a necessary point of convergence between the state and the hunter-gatherer troupes. ·nlis point of convergence, which the troupes ward off and anticipate at the same time, designates a situation or space in which, simultaneously, the existing hunter-gatherer formations are dismantled and their successor state formations put in place. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, tile two sets of formations unfold "simultaneously in an 'archat."Dlogical: micropolitical, micrological, molecular field" (431).11 -nle sute achieves its "actuality" through a comple.x and uneven process .nvolving i the arresting or caging of nonstate formations, so that both state and nonstate formations e.xist in a field of perperual imeraction. This inter­ active field, in the parlance of Dclell7.e and Guattari, is irreducibly "micro­ political" or "molecular," and so sute formations, which for them are quinNOMAD POLITICS

Z4-9

tessentially "macroJXllitical" or "molar," are nor positioned in a field that has already been transformed by the state apparatuses or their prototypes n i to something that is (now) exclusively macroJXllitical or molar. It is virtually an axiom for Deleuzc and Guattari that before, and alongside, the macroJXlliti­ cal there is always the micropolitical. -nle state has perforce

to interact widl

the micropolitical.

-nlis s i at odds with a certain interpretation of Foucault (regarded as the exemplary philosopher of the micropolitical) which views micropolitics

to

be a relatively new development arising more or less strictly in response to forms of power, preem.inently bioJXlwer, that did not ex ist before the onset of the most recent phases of modernity. \Vhile it is not quite elear whether Foucault himself should be saddled with this view, it remains the case that for Deleuzc and Guattari the state apparatuses always emerge n i a "molccu­ Iarized" field that the state never entirely contains or neutralizes. -nle ap­ pearance of the state cannot therefore be the outcome of its own efficacy, of any inherent propensity on its part to generate its own enabling conditions. \Vhatever its powers, autogeny is beyond the JXlwer of the state to accom­ plish. j\1icropolitics have therefore always been antique in it.� provenance, and rhe state came about as an n i vention designed to arrest dlese micro­ political forces. Moreover, as an invention, dle state necessari l y had

to

be

"dlOught" before it could begin to be efiicacious in any social and political field.ll But the state has to deny this irremovable factitiousness of its "origins" and present itself precisely as its "opposite," that is, as an unthought (at any rate where origins arc concerned) : " Only dlOught is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is wliversal by right, of elevating the State to dle level of de jure universality"

(A -flJollSlllld Plateaus 375). -nlought confers on the

state its character of a singular and universal form, dle fullest c.xpression of the rational-reasonable

(Ie ratioll1ul-raisollllable). The foremost

exponent of

tllis "thought" behind the genesis of the state is of course Hegel, who explic­ itly views the state as the embodiment of the universal, as the realization of reason, and thus as the spiritual community that incorporates all individuals within itself. Against this view, which derives the state from the rational­ reasonable, Deleuze and Guattari hold that it is the rational-reasonable itself that is derived from the state. The state provides the formal conditions for the enactment of the rational-reasonable

(375-76), and thought (as rhe pri­

mary instantiation of dle rational-reasonable) in turn necessarily confers on the state its "reason"

(lui timmer, ncccssairemrllt "raison»; 556 n. p). Reason .

or thought becomes the province of the state in dlis Hegelian (or quasi250

CHAPTER 10

Hegelian) view, and Deleuze and Guattari therefore propose a wresting of thought from the state and a complementary reruming of the state to thought, in the form of an acknowledgment of the state's irreducible fictive­ ness. The archaic state that arose from a recoding of the primitive territorial codes of the hunter-gatherer troupes instituted an organized production as­ sociated with the creation of "a particular kind of property, money, public works" (A 1hollS(llId PfliteallS 448). But this archaic state was not able to pre­ vent a substantial quantity of "decoded flows" from escaping: The State docs not create large-scale

works without a flow of indepemknt

labor escaping its bureaucracy (notably n i memines and in metallurgy). It docs not create the monerary form ofthe tax without flows ofmoney escaping, and

nourishing or bringing imo being orner powers

(notably in conmlercc and

banking). And above all itdocs not create a system ofpublic property without a flow of private appropriation growing up beside it, then beginning to pass beyond its grasp; this private property docs not itself issue from the archaic system but s i constituted on the margins, all the more necessarily and inevi­ tably, slipping through the net of ovcrcoding. -This

(449)

epochal transformation confronted the succeeding state apparatuses

with a new task. Vhere \ the previous state form had to overcode the already coded 110ws of the hunter-gatherer groups, the new state apparatusc.� had to organize conjunctions of the decoded 110ws that had been escaping their ar­ chaic predecessor. These became the appararuses ofa polynucleated and more complex kind of state. But even here the state could not prevent decoded 110ws from escaping (yet again), and the. most recent versions of these flows attained an "abstract," "generalized" conjunction which overturned their adjacent state apparatuses and created capitalism "at a single stroke" (45253). Capital thus represents a new and decisive threshold for the proliferation of flows, and this capitalist "force of deterritorialization infinitely [surpasses1 the deterritorialization proper to the State" (453). But capital's superiority in this regard did not spell the end of the state. Instead, the state wlderwent a further mutation, and the modern nation-state was bonl.

Tile State ami Capital The relation between the state and capital is thus one of reciprocity. Capi­ talism is an " independent, worldwide axiomatic that is like a single City, megalopolis, or 'megamachine' of which the States are parts or neighborNOMAD POLITICS

251

hoods" (A 77JoIISlilld Plateaus +53). The state form is not totally displaced by the "worldwide, ecumenical organization" of capital, but in its modem manifestation it has become a "model of realization" for capital. As such, it is the ftUlction of each statc today to "[group] together and [combine] several sectors, according to its resources, population, wealth, n i dustrial capacity, etc." (+5+). Under capitalism, the state serves "to moderate rhe superior de­ territorialization of capital and to provide dIe latter with compensatory re­ territorializations" ('+55). llIe state becomes a field for the effectuation of capital, and it does this by reharnessing and reorganizing flows which capital brings together and decomposes (221). Capitalism will even organize and sustai.n states thal are not viable for it.� own purposes, primarily by crush­ ing minorities through integration and c.'\termination (+72). Ihe primacy of capital manifest.� itself at the highest level of abstraction: capital is an interna­ tional organization that can organize with a prodigious resourcefulness the various state formations in ways that ensure their fundamental "isomorphy" (which is not to be confused widl "homogeneity" in Dcleuze and Guattari's scheme). International capitalism is capable of bringing about dIe isomorphy of very diverse forms and their attendant forcc.�. As I noted earlier, Dcleuze maintains that cultural and social formations are constituted on the basis of "concerts" or "accords." 13 These accords or organizing principles make possible dIe grouping into particular configurations of whole ranges of phe­ nomena, such that dIe resulting configurations become integrated forma­ tions. As a set of accords or axioms governing the accords that regulate the operations of the varions components of an immensely powerful and com­ prehensive system of accumulation, capital is situated at the nodal point of a plethora of formations, and thus has dIe capacity to integrate and recompose capitalist and noncapitalist sectors or modes of production.14 Capital, the "accord of accords" par excellence, can bring together heterogeneous phe­ nomena and make them express the same world, that of capitalist accumula­ tion. -Thus in Malaysia, for example, the accord or set of accords that controls the high-tech world of downtown Kuala Lumpur (the location of what was until recendy the world's tallest skyscraper) and the accord (or set of accords) that constitutes the world of Stone Age production to be found among the tribespeople in the interiors of eastern Malaysia (Sabah and SarJ.wak) are not intertranslatable (or not direcdy or immediately so). But what dIe accord of accords created by capitalism does, among myriad odler things, is to make it possible for the artifacts produced by dIe indigenous peoples of these interior regions to appear on dIe tourist markets n i downtown Kuala Lumpur, where 252

CHAPTER 10

they are sold alongside Microsoft software, Sony camcorders, and Macintosh

1'0werBooks. The disparate and seemingly incompatible sphercs of produc­ tion and accumulation reprcsented by downtown Kuala Lwnpur and dIe in­ terior regions of Sabah and Sarawak (which are only about five hundred milcs from Kuala Lumpur)

are rendered "harmonious" by a higher level accord or

concert established by capital, even though the lower level accords remain (qua lower level accords) disconnected from each

mher. Each

lower level

accord retains its own distinctive productive mode and its associated social relations

of production, even as

quite different modes

it is brought

n i to

relationship with other,

and social relations of production

governing ground-level accords)

by

(each widl its

own

the meta- or mega-accord that is capi­

talism in its current world-integrated phase. The concerto grosso brought about by this prodigiously c.xpansive capitalist accord of accords enables the lower level accords to remain dissociated from each other while still express­ ing the same world, the world of dIe current paradigm of:tccumulation. In a country like Malaysia, and indeed anywhere else in the \vorld, every and any kind

of production can thus be incorporated by the capitalist algorithm and

made. to yield a surplus-value. This development has

effectively disma.ntled

the intellectual terms of the age-old debate about precapitalist modcs of pro­

duction and their relation

to

a successor capitalism. -nlis debate was con­

cerned, n i dIe Ill:tin, widl

the putative laws th:tt

of the prec:tpitalist modes

by their capitalist successors, but the qucstion of

underlay dIe supersession

this superscssion h:ts become moot n i the current phase of accumuhtion: as the case of Malaysia illustratcs, the precapitalist modes can continue to exist in precisely that form but at

the same time are inserted into a complex and

dynamic network that ineludcs, n i the spirit of a vast and saturating ecume­ nism,

all the various modes of production, precapitalist

and capitalist alike,

so that they function in concert with each odler, in this way promoting the realization of even gre:tter surplus-values.!5

Accords Accords are

constituted by selection criteria,

which specify what

is

to be

n i cluded or excluded by the terms of the accord in qucstion. ·nlCSe selection criteria are being weakenl-d

or qualified in ways

that deprive them

of their

force. The selection criteria that ground an accord assign privileges of rank and order to the objects

they

subsume ("John McCain is

more American

than Barack Obama"; " Toledo is a qun i tcssentially American town in a way that Miami is not"). The disappearance or we:tkening of the tradi tional criteNO....!AD POLITICS

253

ria that buttressed such accords makes dissonances and contradictions diffi­ cult orcven impossible to resolve; concomitantly, divergences become easier to uphold. Events, objects, and personages can now be assigned to several divergenr and even incompossible series, a phenomenon spectacularly dem­ onstrated by Lautreamont's uncannily surrealistic definition of reality (or beauty) as "the chance encounrer between a sewing-machine and an umbrella on a dissecting-table." Such a Lautreamontean, culwrJ.lly sanctioned disposition in the present day, conducing as it does to a traffic in all kinds of n i compossibilitics and divergences, is becoming increasingly commonplace. As each of us takes the opporrunity to negotiate for the fifteenrh or hundredth or whatever time the several historical avant-gardes, the writings of Borges, cyberpunk, the matrix, and so forth, we become familiarized with the propensities of a Lau­ treamontean con�ciousness in ways not available

to

a learned and cosmo­

politan person living as recently as fifty years ago. 11111s, for instance, we have a whole genre, magical realism, predicated on the logic of incompossi­ bility (something can be a bird and Simon Bolivar at the same time and, even more "implausibly," at the same point in space); tllere is a new technological form based on the same logic (such underwent in his video

·nJrilkr),16

as

the morphing that Michael Jackson

as well as entire schOClis of music which

usc tones in series that escape or block any kind of resolution by the diatonic scale (as in the work of John Cage, Tom Takemitsu, and free improvisational jazz)P Such examples can be multiplied according to one's taste. This pervasive weakening of the force of these "transcendental" accords, and of the narratives and images which sustain them, may be associated with the collapse of a number of once widely entrenched distinctions; the boundaries between public and private, n i side and outside, before and after, political left and political right, and so on have all become difficult, if not impossible, to uphold. In the process, however, accords thus detached from the narratives and other conditions capable of guarJ.nteeing their stability likewise become "impossible." \.Ve may be living in worlds that are no longer predicated on any real need to secure and maintain accords, worlds charJ.c­ terizcd by sheer variation and multiplicity (but still functioning according to an "J..'l:iomatic,

Le., capital, that ensures their fWldamental isomorphism n i the

face of this lUlcontainable diversity), worlds rllat partake of a nco-Barogue perhaps more " tmly" Baroque than its predecessor, as Dcleuze maintains n i his book on Leibniz. Or rather, rllese arc worlds in which the work of accords is now done emblematically and allegorically, so that there is no real

254

CHAPTER 10

accord for what it is that, say, constitutes "Englishness" (or perhaps more accurately, there is now the realization that our accords determining what it is that constitutes "'Englishness" rest on an ineliminable fictiveness, so that these accords lack any kind of transccndenral legitimation). In the absence of anything approximating to a transcendental backstopping, "being English" can be designated only ascriptively or emblematically, dlat is, nonabsolutely, as when Queen Elizabeth II (who has as much claim to be regarded as Ger­ man) is so easily allowed to "cowtt" as "English," while supporters of the Conservative politician Enoch Powell, a British and n i tellectually upscale version of the polld jaiste Jean-Marie Le Pen, were able to cavil nastily over whether a London-born son or daughter of a Jamaican immigrant could jus­ tifiably be regarded as "English." The ascriptive or emblematic imputation of Englishness would allow it to be placed into at least a couple of divergent series. There would be Enoch Powell's grimly robust and settled series, which would effectively confine Englishness to him and his benighted ilk, but other, more expansive series would count as English the London-born children of Jamaican inunigrants, the half-American Winston Churchill, the Ca.nadian-born English tennis player Greg Rusedski, and the Japanese-born novelist Kazuo lshiguro. Cru­ cial to this more ascriptive way of assigning or determi.ning identities is the abandonment of dIe concept in favor of description (a move delineated by Deleme n i his Leibniz hook). Typically, dlt, specification of an identity re­ quires dlat the identity under consideration be determinate in regard to a concept ("being a communist," "being Irish," "being an economist,'" or what­ ever), a concept whose range of applicability is regulated by certain criteria of belonging. -nlese criteria are motivated and underpinned by accords of the kind described earier, l and the breakdown of these accords means that the concepts they support and organize can be replaced by descriptions. Hence, for example, in place of the concept "being an English person" one could have the descriptions "Queen Eliza.bedl II conducts herselfas an Eng­ lish woman," "Greg Rusedski s i the Canadian-bam teIUlis star who plays for England," "the Japanese-hom anglophone Kazuo lshiguro is a novelist," and so forth. Such descriptions, as opposed to dIe concept " being English," would allow Englislmess to be used ascriptively or emblematically, so that it could be placed, depending on the particular instances involved, n i two or more divergent series. This substitution in principle of the description for the concept would be a not inappropriate way of acknowledging the emergence of a new intellectual and cultural condition (we could call it dIe time after

NOMAD POLITICS

255

the end of the Empire, which is our time undeniably) in which it has become more difficult than ever to claim that there really are transcendental accords

which subtend this or that way of designating Englishness. The worlds opened up by Capitalisme ctschzophrenic i are worlds whose ac­ cords are characterized in very decisive ways by dle kinds of allegorizing and emblematizing propensities just described. "lbese are worlds marked by the "systemic" loss of transcendental accords; dley are worlds that are perhaps seeing the exponential growth of the capacity to accommodate what Deleuze

and Guattari call "dle anomalous" (I'allolllal). The anomalous, n i dleir vicw, "has nothing to do with the preferred, domestic, psychoanalytic individual. Nor is the anomalous the bearer of a species presenting specific or generic characteristics in their purest state; nor is it a model or unique specimen; nor

is it dlC perfection of a type incarnate; nor is it the eminent term of a series; nor is it the basis of an absolutely harmonious corresJXlndence. 1he anoma­ lous is neither an individual nor a species; it only has affects, it has neither

fumiliar nor subjectified feelings, nor specific or significant

characteristics"

(A 'nlol/sand Plateaus 244). -The realm of the anomalous lies between the do­ main of "substantial forms" and that of "determined subjects"; it constimres "a natural play full of haecceiti es, degrees, ntensit i ies, events, and accidents that comJXlse individuations tot"ally different from those of the well-formed subjects dlat receive them" (253).18 ·nle upshot is that each individual is a potenti ally n i finite multiplicity, dle product of a phamasmagoric movement between an inside and an outside.11t All this amounts to dle lineaments of a new and interestn i g theory of the place of the subject in dle cultures of contemporary capitalism. Capitalisme ct

scbwphrinie i approaches this theory of the subjl"1:t via a dlcory of singularity, the category that more than any mher goes beyond the "collective versus individual" dichotomy that is essential to the Hobbes-Rousseau-Hegel tra­ dition of reflection on dle state or sovereign. Ihis account of sn i gularity, and here I must be very brief and schematic, can in turn be connl"1:ted widl the theory of simulation given in Deleuze's Lolliquc dll seIlS and Difference ct

ripitition,

since for Deleuze simulation (or the simulacrum) is the basis of

singularity.lu In a universe of absolute singularities, production can only take dle form of a singularity; each singularity, in dle course of production, can only re­ peat or proliferate itself. In production each simulacrum can only affirm its own difference, its distanciation from everything else. Production, in this account, is a ceaselessly prolf i erative distribution of all the various absolute singularities. Production, in Deleuzc's nomenclamre, s i always repetition of 256

CHAPTER 10

difference, the difference of each thing from every other thing. Capitalism, though, also embodies a principle of repetition. The axiomatic system that is capitalism is predicated on identity, equivalence, and intersubstitutivity (this being the logic of the commodity form as analyzed by Marx). In which case, repetition n i capitalism is always repetition of the nondifferent, or rather, the different in capitalism is always only an apparent different, because it can be overcome and "retlirned," through the process of abstract c.xchange, to that which is essentially the same, the always fungible. Capitalism, as

Capi­

talisllle ctsch:wphrill i ie indicates, effects an immense series of transformations ("deterritorializations"), only to make fKlssiblc more powerful recuperations and retrenchments; it breadles limits only in order to impose its own limits, which it "mistakenly" takes to be coextensive with those of the universe.21 The power of repetition in capitalism is therefore negative, wasteful, and ultimately nonproductive. Capitalistic repetition can therefore be said to be nonbeing n i Spinoza's sense, a conclusion that Delcuze and Guattari do not hesitate to draw. In the scheme of l Apitalisme ct schwphri i lle, i capital is constitlitively lUI­ able to sustain a culture of genuine singularities, even though it creates the conditions for the emergence of a cultllfe that could, with the requisite trans­ formations, mutate into such a culture of genuine singularities, a cultllfe, however, that will necessarily be postcapitalist, which has the capacity to produce such singularities.22 Intrinsic to the notion of a singularity is the principle that a common or shared property cannO[ serve as dIe. basis of the individuation of X from all that is lIot-X: f i I share the property of being over six feet tall with anyone else, dlen that property cannot,

in and

of itself, serve to individuate either

me or that person. A singularity, the being-X of that X dlat makes X different from all that is lIot-X, cannot therefore lUIite X with anything clse. Precisely the opposite:

X is a singularity because it is not united to anything else

by

virtue of an essence or a common or shared nature. A singularity is a dling with all its properties, and although some commonality may pertain to this thing, that commonality is indifferent to it qua singularity. $0 Felix Guattari will have the property "being French" n i common with odler people, many millions of them, in fact. Hut a singularity is determined only duough its relation to the totality of its possibilities, and the totality of possibilities dlat constinltes Guattari is the totality of an absolute singularity. If another being had each and every one of dIe possibilities whose totality constituted and thus individuated Guattari, then that being would perforce be n i distinguish­ able from Guattari . -nlis being and Guattari would be dIe same person. NO....IAD rOLlTICS

257

In a time when transcendental accords can no longer really give us our worlds, Deleuze and Guattari believe we have ro look for worlds that give us a different basis for the construction of solidarities, worlds in which a new kind of politics can find its raison d'etre. -nlis politics will start from the realization that our criteria of belonging are always subject to a kind of chaotic mOlion, that our cultures have always told us an enabling ie l when they denied this, and through this denial have made possible the invention of nation-states, tribes, e1ans, political parries, churches, perhaps everything done up ro now in the name of conmmnity. 'TIle reader of Deleuze and Guat­ tari may have the feeling, both dreadful and exhilarating at the same time, that

that time, the time up ro "now," has begun inexorably to pass.

But we

still need our solidarities, now more than ever. They arc indispensable for any politics capable of taking us beyond capitalism. These solidarities, howe\'er, will be based not on the securing of transcendental accords; capitalism, that most revolutionary of forces, has moved that possibility into desuerude. Our solidarities will be predicated instead on what the reader of DelellZe and Guattari will know as the power of singularity, a power still perhaps in search of its appropriate models of realization.23 Since this politics still awaits its models of realization, the power of sin­ gularity, which despite the absence of these models is still precisely that, a power, can only manifest itself as the wldertaking of a certain risk, rhe "play­ ing of uncertain games," all the things that conduce to the "revolutionary­ becoming" of people who have not yet made the revolution their explicit agenda. What will be the relation of this revolutionary-becoming ro rhl' project of the state? Can the solidarities associated with these singularities be regimented, and thus neutralized, by the state in ways that preempt n i sur­ mountably the prospects of any kind of revolutionary transformation? -The flows of power in the current social and political dispensation are fluid and relatively open, even as they arc JXlwerfully managed and contained by the elites who rule us. 111is development underlies the increasingly wide­ spread perception that governments n i he r advanced industrial countries wield more and more control despite the simultancous prevalence of ide­ ologies of deregulation, privatization, and "getting the government off the backs of the people" (the mantra of Ronald Reagan, among others). And so it looks increasingly as if the notion of representation which made the previous kind of "citizenship politics" possible has now been supplanted, even as the instnnnents which underpin it are treated as sacred objects. There is perhaps no better example of dlis than the. U.S. Constirution, traduced by an ever expanding capitalist depredation even as its traducers profess their undying 258

CHAPTER 10

veneration for this old docllment.24 The blocking of any passage through the philosophy and politics of representation underlying such developments will have significa.nt effects not only on our conceptions of citizenship, but also on our related notions of etlUlicity, race, patrimony, clan, nation, and sovereignty. These notions have deeply ingrained personal resonances that will continue to be felt despite the criticisms directed by philosophers and theorists at the concept of representation. Bur if the philosophy of represen­ tation no longer works, and its limitations are impossible to conceal, what should be put in its place? -nle invention of something different (such as the Delell7.ean notion of a political desire or form of willing based on singulari­ ties not regulated by transcendental accords) to put in place of the system of representations that has governed thinking and practice about ethnicity, race, patrimony, cla.n, nation, and sovereignty, these representations being the cornerstone of the (pist/we or

I1Iwtaliti that has

prevailed since

1776 or

1789 or 1492 (used here as emblematic markers), will have to be an immense collective undertaking, perhaps spanning many generations. 1he core of tltis system of representation is its m i perative that all are required to "belong" in some way or other to the various collectivities superintended by this system's logic. An enabling political desire will free us from the need to continue to make dlis a world where all are required to belong to such collectivities. State power is ofcourse the most significant impediment to tile realization of dlis emancipatory lU1dertaking. The state identifies, COlU1ts, and assigns to its various classificatory systems coundess numbers of human beings, all as part of its admiItistratiye remit, and the pressing question for the Deleuzean aCCOWH of political desire is its capacity to mobilize desire n i ways that make possible an obviation of state power. The world is changing even as we reflect on it. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been largely n i stmmental in the emergence of a U.S. hegemony. As a result, the antagonism between capi­ talism and bureaucratic socialism has been replaced by a range of stmggles among competing brands of capitalism (German social market capitalism, the Blairite Third Way, American free market capitalism, Japanese corporat­ ism, and so on). Here the outcome is still WKertain, as n i dicated by the con­ tinuing world economic stagnation and the wars being fought by the Hush administration and its allies. Despite tltis uncertainty, there are a number of trends in the international system that appear to be fairly consequential. Pre­ eminent among these is a more active role n i this system for regional as well as local states, and tllese are being accompanied by new stmctures of cultural identification that are tied to regions or subregions radler than nation-stares (such as tile various "separatisms" associated with tile Basques, Catalonians, NO.\IAD rOLlTICS

259

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ing autonomously of dle state system, will furnish the stimulus for adopting a different kind of allocation strategy, one premised on a (selective) delink­

ing, and embarked upon with the PurfXlsc of transmuting the state apparatus (sinct� the state is the institutional asscmblage that has final control of the regime of groWdl, and indeed there can be no properly constituted regime of growth without the involvement of the state). 1he first priority therefore

is a "'destatized" collective national liberation project, the success of which will then lead to a reconstitution of the state itself. Most c.\:isting propos­ als for economic and fXllitical reform in the less-developed countries view the reform and reconstitution of the state

as

the principal objective whosc

attainment will then lead to a whole range of other benefits ("efficient" eco­ nomic development, protection of hwnan rights, the upholding of democ­ racy, etc.). This is to put the proverbial cart before the horse, since in many

lDGS the state is merely an instmment at the disposal of the mling elite (who tend n i variably to be the recipiems of the substantial personal benefits to be derived from subservience to the Washington consensus). It will therefore be necessary to have an alternative and non-state-oriented base within the

lDGS in question from which the project of state reform can be initiated and sustained.

CnfJitalislllc ctschi:wphrinic s i perhaps best viewed as a compendium of po­ litical knowledge, nonmolar and nonarborcscent in aspiration and plltative scope, which furnishes axioms for the pursuit of the revolutionary project of surmounting capitalism. Dcleuze and Guattari insist dlat there are no pregiven laws to shape or entail this olltcome; only struggle, and failures always accompany successes in struggle, can do this. The only other alter­ native is acceptance of the current finance-led, equity-based growth regime with its concomitant American hegemony and continuing worldwide eco­ nomic polarization. -nlis line of argument is taken up in chapter 11, where I argue that the poorer countries have no option but to choose a strategy of sclective "delinking" from dle econom.ics of the metropoitan l center.

NOMAD ['oliTieS

261

CHAPTER 11 The Possibility of a New State II Hcterotopill

V\'here discussions ofutopia arc concerned, rhe warning given by M. I. Finley s i particularly apt: "Ever since Thomas Morc gave the world the word Utopia early in the sixteenth century, a scmamic duster has grown rOllnd it, or per­ haps I should say a spectrum of meanings, of great range and complexity, and of no little confusion." I Consideration of the notion of utopia, bodl as a concept designating a particular kind of reflection ("thinking about a bener future;' "thought that confounds social pessimism;' "thinking that neces­ sarily involves the criticism of ideology" ), or as the more or less practical implementation of some scheme or blueprint for a Dener world ("concrete utopia," "rhe utopian design of institutions"), tends to be conducted in terms of one tense ("the future") and one modality ("the possible" as against " the impossible" or "absolutely unrealizable"). 'A'hen cast in these terms, the concept of utopia is marked by a temporal specification signaling a radical break between an existing state of affairs and one that is still to be realized: the time that is properly utopian is always the time lifter some previous time deemed to be nonutopian. If this is not the case, then the utopian is glossed n i terms of a IIOW that is so completely ade­ quate that it CMUlot be improved upon or superseded n i some fundamentally dec isive way. In the ianer casc, the parrent of temporality is admittedly some­ what altered, but its import remains the same; that is, when the present is re­ garded as an apotheosis or culminating point, we can hope only to maintain i[ in its present form, in which case any transformation of an ex isting state of affairs can amount only to a decline or fall from this current state of supreme

exeellence, and so in principle the furore can only continue to be " the same" as the present or else amount

to

a decline or worsening in relation to the

present. In both cases, however, and this is the crucial POilU, a gJP is neces­ sarily posited between a better or best possible state and a worse or worst possible state. In the one case the putatively good state exists n i the future (in which case the better or best possible state is yet to come), and n i the other it exists now (in which case the furore cannO[ be the sphere in which any real improvement occurs and is more likely than not to be regarded as dystopian). -These propositions are clearly exemplified in the following quotation from Oscar Wilde's essay Tbe SOli! ofMall lllldcr Socialsm, i so famous that it appears as

a motto on nearly every website dealing with the subject of utopias: "A

map of the world that does not include Utopia is nO[ worth even glancing at, for it leaves om the one country at which hlUnanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias."2 Implicit in \Nilde's characterization is the proposition that utopia is a des­ tination to be arrived at or moved toward, and that this movement is ine.,tri­ cably linked to a certain conception ofprogress, so that "landing" necessarily takes the form of a progression from one state or condition to another, with the clear implication that the preceding state is ostensibly a less gexld "coun­ try" than its successor, the place or condition of plenitude or perfection. Regardless of what may be said ahom this narrative of progress canvassed by Wilde, utopia is constmed in it as a "departure" made from a place or occasion that is qualitatively n i ferior to the subsequent place or occasion of "landing." -The assumption at work in this somewhat commonplace logic of the utopian is that of an inverted relation to the situation of a currently exist­

ing society, so that tile utopian is depicted by the adherents of this logic as a state of affairs necessarily involving m i provements upon existing social ar­ rangements, or, even more rJdically, the pursuit or implementation ofutopia

is thought to require the complete overturning of these arrangements in their present form.3

Utopa i l'erstlS Heterotopia? -The question of tile relation of the utopian to existing social forms has been a ve.\:Cd one throughout tile history of utopian thought. An interesting com­ parison can be made between the respective positions of Finley and Foucault . Finley, who concludes his essay with Wilde's declaration "A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at," clearly endorses 266

CHAPTER U

the logic of the utopian just mentioned, with its emphasis on the inextri­ cable bond between thl' utopian and conceptions of social progress. Fou­ cault, by contrast, arguccl in his litde essay on "heterotopias" dtat utopias, unlike heterotopias, arc "fundamentally unreal spaces."4 Finley, in contrast­ ing the notion of utopia widl myth (such as the myth of a Golden Age or a Garden of Eden), maintained dlat utopia has a practical and aerive relation to "reality," and that

this

relation is cnldal

to

any

transforming

influence

that the utopian imagination may have upon existing social formations.s Foucault has a quite different emphasis, and characterizes heterotopic places as "real places-places that do exist and that are formed in dle very founding of society-which arc something like countersites, a kind of effectively en­ aered utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within dle culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind arc outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. . . . Between utopias and these quite other sites, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed, joint experience" (24). Foucault's paradigmatic example of the heterotopic site, "a mixed, joint experience," is the mirror. Giving a twist to the Lacanian thesis of thl� mirror stage, as well as Merleau-Ponry's concept of a "chiasmic" stmctllre which enables beings to "slip into each odler;' and merging these n i sights with the kernel of Bataille's notion of a "heterology" to form what he calls a "hetero­ topology," Foucault writes: The mirror s, i after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. I sec myselfthere where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a SOrt of shadow that gives viSibility to

myself, that enables me to sec myself there where I am absent: such is the

utopia of the mirror. Bur it is also a hcterotopia n i so far as the mirror does c.xist n i reality, where it exerts a son of coumeraetion on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Starti.ng from this gaze thar is, as it were, directed roward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; J begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute. myself there where J am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when J look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, cOllilected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be percclved it has to pass through this virtual point whi.ch s i over there. (2_1.)6

Hl:.'EROTOPIA

1.67

111e heterotopia idenrified by Foucault in this passage is notable for the way it is premised on a particular conceptllalization of the relation or passage between an "inside" and an "outside" that transcends, even while working its way through, the dichotomy betwcen the real and the unreal. At work here, therefore, is a certain conception of the modal category that bypasses

l'irtllnl, which functions as a

dlt� relationship of conrraricty typically said

to c.x ist between the JXlssible and the acmal (and about which more will be said shortly). At dle heart of this passage bctween the inside and the outside is a move­ ment between a succession of images, in this case dle various m i ages of one­ self "over dlere" n i the mirror (rhe outsidc) and dle complementary images of oneself "over here"

(dlC insidc). TItis movement or oscillation between

these sets of images is really a movcment between perspectives, at each of which a particular ensemble is constructed out of these images by the per­ ceiver? "Heterotopia" is thus the name of the orchestrating principle which links these perspectives into an amalgam that makes it possible for thcir as­ sociated ensembles to be enfolded into each other, dlis cnfolding being the outcome of an organization of forces in the perceptual field that results n i the concretely indivisible composite that s i "1." More generally, and taking into account forms of organizing forces that have nothing specifically to do with perception, dlis organization or process is precisely what generates the structural "site" of this or th:lt heterotopia. A radical constructivism there­ forc underies l Foucault's characterization of heterotopia, and this construc­ tivism is generalized by him to encompass all heterotopias, and not just those manifestations of heterotopia in dlC domain of perception.8 Heterotopias JXlssess a modality, that of the virtual, which is quite differ­ ent from dle modality characteristic of utopia; utopia belongs in principle to the realm of a possibility that, qua pnre possibility, awaits its JXltential actu­ alization in some future, a fumre that will come to be utopia's presem when this acmalization in fact takes place. Unlike the purely JXlssible, however, the virtual is real, bur somewhat like the possible, it is not actual (although it does not share any other properties with the possible). Only a state of af­ fairs which had been possible can be actual; the virtual, by contrast, s i a pute exteriority that is adjacent to, and inextricably bound up with, all elements n i the actual, while not in any way partaking of dle acmal. 111e acma] acts on the virtual, since the virtual constitutes a basis for the emergence of dle sin­ gnlarities which manifest the virtual in dle domain of dle actualY TIle event from which a singularity (which, as a singularity, s i neither individual nor personal) comes to exist eludes its manifestation in that singularity even as it 268

CHAPTER 11

is brought to expression in it; here Deleuze and Foucault adhere to the Stoic doctrine which affirms that the event is real without being acmal. The virtu­ ality that is heterotopia takes shape when a world s i constimted by a certain ontological genesis. A measure of philosophical abstraction is unavoidable in providing a description of this ontological genesis, but since the structure of heterotopia is rooted in the strucmre of this ontological genesis, this de­ scription must be a part of the delineation of the heterotopic place.

Olltological Gmesis and the Structllre ofHeterotopia: Sollie Ideas of Gilks Deleuze A world exists when it can be populated by olle or more singularities.lO These singularities, which are potentially infinite n i number, are selected as a result of an operation in whic h a singular point is extended to encompass a range of "normal" points. l11is extension occurs wltil another threshold ofsingularity is encountert'd, and a world s i constituted and actualized when tills and other

singularities extend over that particular range of normal points. Singulari­ ties are ac[Ualized in a world, and also in the individuals who belong to that world. Ihese modes of acrualization are several, according to Deleuze: "To be actuali7.ed or to actualize oneself means to extend over a series of ordinary points; to be selected according to a rule of convergence; to be incamated in a body; to become the state of a body; and to be renewed locally for the sake of limited new acrualizations and c.xrensions" (110).11 \\'hat is actualized is also expressed, and what is c.xpressed is a world that is composed of "differ­ ential relations and of contiguous similarities" (111). At this point Deleuze introduces the Ldbnizi:m idea of an illcompossibility. According to DelellZe, a world is formed when a series depending on a particular singularity con­ verges with a series which depends on another singularity; this convergence then defines compossibility. Conversely, when the series in guestion diverge, another world emerges, one thar is incompossibk with the first. The concept of incompossibility cannot be derived from the notion of contradiction: the state of affairs in which George W. Bush does sanction the occupation of Irag is incompatible with the one in which he does not sanction the occupa­ tion of Irag, not because these two propositions contradict each other, but precisely because of the n i compossibility that obtains between the world in which Bush sanctions the invasion of Irag and the one in which he does not. Hence when one of these worlds is acmaIi7.ed, the other state of affairs can­ not arise, and vice versa. But it is entirely a matter of political and historical contingency whether or not Bush sanctions the invasion of Irag; hence the HI:."TEROTOPIA

269

ProfXlsitions expressing these two states of affairs

arc

not logically contra­

dictory. Though of course once one of these worlds is actualized (in this case the one in which Bush d&s sanction the occupation of Iraq), the other (in tillS case the world in which Bush does

'lOf sanction tile occupation of Iraq)

cannot be brought to the point of actualization. This stmcture of incompossibility aL,

28

124-47.

Admittedly, the pervasive nondecidability of quotidian reality comes about as a result of politics itself. In the age of integrated world capitalism, the. state has the basic function of disaggregating and neutralizing the countervailing forces ranged against it, in this way placing the. apparatuses of the state at the. disposal of capitalist acolillulation. Anyone who in 2009 doubts this is perhaps totally unaware of the massive. government bailouts, in nearly every economically ad­ vanced country, of banks whose lending policies in recent years have been con­ sistendy reckless and intellectually discordant with any professed respect for "economic fi.UldamentJls� (I of 2008 and

am

referring here of course to the financial crL�is

2009). The state's primary flUlction, therefore, is to ensure this de­

cisive continuity, with its concomitant undecidability, so that even those. forces ranged against capital arc somehow allowed to function in ways that augment capitalist accumulation. 'There is a confluence between dle state and the social, in which the forms of opposition to capital are not efhced, but instead are used to intensify and extend the forms of social organization fi.lrthering capitalist accumulation. There. is no better illustration of this phenomenon than the way the oil and coal-mining companies nowadays seek not to distalKe themselves from �green" causes, say, bur instead project themselves as cxemplary cnstodians of the environment, primarily in television commercials in which, to a backdrop of sunshine and chirping birds overlaid with soft new age music, disused oil fields or open-pit coal mines are shown to be planted with trees and blooming flowers. By rendering nondecidablc the difference between a genuine steward­ ship of the environment and the lasting environmental despoliation that in fuct

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

311

rakes place when oil and coal extranion occurs, any opposirion, potcnrial or real, to the profir-taking aniviries of the American oil and coal companies is cffcerivdy nenrralized or blnnted. In dle age of a tTnical polirieal reason, it is perhaps no surprise thar rhe first Presidem Bush should insist on calling himself an �environmeiUalisr." The srate is of coursc the principal architcer of social arrangemems designed to give rhe forces of nondecidabiliry a freer rein. The American state is in eifeer the metacorporation of the corporations, as many left-leaning commenrators have poimed out.

29 for rhis, see Badiou, �Philosophy and i'oliti{S,� 29. See also Deleuze, �On Phi­ losophy,� in Negotiatioll5, 153, whcrt� he asserts, "Jurisprudence . . . is the philosophy of law, and deals with singulariries.

. h advances by working our from

singulariries."

30 See Bcnjamin, "'Theses on rhe. Philosophy of History,� 255-66. 31 In addirion to rhe works of laussig already mentioned, sec Comaroft" and Co­ marofl", OfRel"llltiolllllld Revollltion, and Jean Comaroff, Bodyof1'0",", !:jpirit of R£iUfallce. See also the essays colleered in Comaroff and Comaroff, Modemity IIl1dIt! Mllkollmm. 32 This formulation and cxanlple s i taken in slightly modified form from Bernard Williams, �Truth in Ethics." H See Negri, �Notes on the Evolution of the lhought of Louis Althusser,� 54. Negri is discussing a Iinc of rcfleerion, involving revolutionary thought and praerice, pursued by Althusser in the writings of the last few years of his life, My next few paragraphs are indebtcd to Negri. Benjamin's remark "Only for dIe sakc of the hopeless are we given hope,� though not mentioned by Althusser or Negri, also reflcets this cnD': of liberation. For Benjamin, liberation can be e:"presst-d only in terms of what Adorno has called an "impossible possibility.� See Adorno, "A Portrait of\Vaiter Benjamin," 24l. H As I pointed out earlier, Spinol-a ptovides In

plary formulation of this

c.wm

ontology of the desire for liberation in his Etbiu.

35 For these terms, see l'oucault, the Order of nJillg!. Foucault's account of the three epistemes-dassicai, modern, and curreiU-is being invoked here and in the following paragraphs. See also Rabinow, "Artificiality and Enlightenmcm," whose line of argumenr regarding FOUCJult is being followed very closely here.

36 See Deleuze, FOIICIIlllt, 13l. 37 See Dcleuze, FOIICIIlllt, 13l. 38 For this image of MJn as a drawing Jt the water's edge, see Fou{'ault, nJe Onkr ofnJing!,387. 39 See Dcleuze, FOIICIIlllt, 132. 40 See Deleuze, FOIICIIlllt, 132. Thecmbedded quotation is from tbe Orderof7hillgi, 38. 41 See Mandel, "Karl Marx," 7.

312 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

G mptcr j. POJtpoliticnl l'oIitics 1 On the Golden Age, see Kindleberger, �Why Did the Golden Age Last So Long!," and the somewhat riglllnti01mute narrative provided in Glyn et aI., �The Rise and hlJ of the Golden Age.� \:or acCOlUlts of the course taken by dle ad­ vanced cJpitalist countries n i the succeeding decades (the 1980s and 1(905), see Glyn, "The Costs of Stability" and ""Global Imbalances" ; Lipictz, ""The Debt Problem"; Ma7ie.r et al., IVhm EC01wmic Crir(5 Elldlll'?; Pollin, "Contemporary Economic Stagnation in World Historical Perspective" and

CIlIIWUrJ of De­

iCmt. for accounts of the precise nature and causes of the crisis of the 19705, as­ sociated by some with the demise of the Golden Age, see the

liglllntiOllllifte

Lipictz, .Mmgcs i nlld Mimdcs; Mandel, nJt S(cOIld Slump, whose explanation is based on an application of ""long-wave" theory; O'Connor, Ammllflntioll Cmir, who vil'ws the crisis as one of J pervasive overproduction leading to an acute diminution of surplus value; and R. Brenner, nJt Ecolwmics oJGlobnl lifrblllmcc, who rejects the Fordist/post-Fordistdichotomy, and indeed the whole notion of a Golden Age, in favor of an explanation in terms of a systemicllly debilitating competition lx,tween earlier and later developing national capitals. Ash Amin, "Post-Fordism,� gives a lucid overview of the literantre on the transition from the Golden Age to its successor.

2 Baker, Epstein, and Pollin, introduction, 1-34, see especially 16, explicidy link the onset of the. Leaden Age in the mid-1970S with the emergence of globaliza­ tion. l'oulantzas, CltllW

ill vlIItempomry Cnpitnlirm, links the emergence of a

new m i perial formation driven by American capital to the crisis experienced by the postwar system of accumulation. 3 Hirst and Thompson,

Globnliz.ntioll ill QII(Stioll, arc convinced that a "genuine"

globalization occurs only if its associated processes involve the elimination of the state, and since the state has not ceased to exist and

to be effective in n i ter­

nationall'Conomic management, they conclude that dlere has not bern a " true" globalization. The question of the role of the state in these transformations is obviously a crucial one, butpace Hirst Jnd Thompson, it is somewhat implau­ sible

to presume that the elimination of the fllllctions of the state has to

be an

absolutely necessary prerequisite for genuine globalization. For other skepti­ cal arguments about the �openness" of the world economy, sec Gordon, "The Global Economy," by now clearly datlxl, but still important as a relatively early but important statement of the skeptic's position. Gordon's data cover only up to 1984, and the world's economy has certainly become more ""open" since. then. The claim that the world economy prior to 1913 was just as integrated as its post-1970 counterpart is judiciously examined by Baku et al" introduction, 15. They conclude that while overall the levels of integration between the two economic dispensations are roughly similar, there arc two very significant dif­ ferences nonetheless: from 1950 to the present there has been J substantial rise

NOTES TO CHAPTER :1

313

n i the percentage of manufacmring exports on dIe part of the. less developed economies (who were scarcely visible as economic forces prior to 19l:j), and, again unlike the earlier dispcnsation, there has been a massive growth of short­ term capital movements ill the current phase of capitalist accwnubtion. On the primac)'of domestic national markets, see MaIID, �HJ.S Globali;o;ation Ended the Risc and R.ise of the Nation-State:," who points out that

80 percent of world

production is still for the domestic market. Mann's data are very likely to be out of date by 1.008, but Glyn, in "Global Imbalances," 31, points out that based on

OECD labor forcestatistics, such domestic economic activities as " wholesale and retail tr.J.de, community, pcrsonal and social services, utilities and construction together account for some 00 per cent of employment in dlC

OECD as J whole,

r.J.ther more in the U.S." 4 United Nations Development Programme,

Hlflllnll DC1'Clopmmt fupu/"t 200S,

116. Figures 4 and 5 arc takcn from the sallle publication. 'The calculations for figure 4 arc taken from the United Nations Industrial Dn·elopmcnt Organi;o;a­ tion, llldmtrial Dfl'Clopmmt Report 2004, and those for figure 5 arc taken from the World Hank, 5 United Nations

�Vo/"ld LHl'c/opmmr bldicatlm lOOS. Development I'rogr.J.mme, Hlfmnn Dcvtlopmmt fuporr lOOS,

117· 6 The problem is that aggregate flows of trade and investment GUl tell us only part of the story. These flows have microeconomic effects, J.Ild until these effects are identified and J.Ilalyzed, the fuller story is not likely to unfold. TIIUS in a more opcn economic environment of the kind said to be made possible by global­ i7_,ltion, the possibility of a firm relocating to another country may make its workers opt for lower wages in the hope of maintaining overall employment levels, and the complete story can be told only by examining the cffect of an n i vestment flow on that country's demand curve for labor (since in some firms workers may still wish to sacrifice ovenll employment in order to safeguard their existing wage levels; the story of workers accepting job cuts n i order to retain current wage levels is certainly one we read about nearly every week). Without looking at the demand curve for labor, we cannot tell whether workers in a particular sector arc trading jobs for wages or wages for jobs. On the need to take such microeconomic considerations into account when examining the effects ofglobal flows of tr.J.de. and investment, see Hardhan, Howles, and \Yaller­ stein, introduction, 1-11..

7 Peck and Tickell, �Scarching for a New Instimtioml Fix," 280--315, follow Alt­ vater, "Fordist and post-Fordist International Division of Labor J.Ild Monetary Regimes;' 1.1-45, ill treating "post-Fordism" as a term employed in a purely negative sense to designate the end of a particular phase of capitalist develop­ ment without the accompanying suggestion that a successor phase was already, or L�soon to be, in place. According to Peck and Tickell, the ending of one such phClse could be accompanied by a period n i which several post-Fordist forms competed with each other for consolidation before one becClme dominant.

314

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

Hence their preference for the more neutral term nfJI'oJordilmc, which carries no implication that the transition from an exhausted strand of capitalist devel­ opment (Fordism)

to another (post-Fordism) had already been accomplished.

8 The n i sight that a pOlariZl-d world system is the condition for the emergence of any modern regime of capitalist accumulation lies at the heart of the writings of Samir Amin. See. Ainidelylop1llC1lt Jnd Re-ll.radillg

tbe Pomvnr Period.

9 The World Bank's �Vorld DClylopmmt ll.rpmT of 1997 espoused these neoliberal precepts in a mapter titled "Refocusing the Effectiveness of the State," whose. basic premise is that �rthe I state has much to do with whether countries adopt the institutional arrangements tUlder which markets GUl flourish" (29). The. dear preslllllption is that the �flourishing of markets� sets the primary agenda for a coulltry's economic policy. TItis postulate lies at the heart of what Lipietz has calk-d ....liberal productivism,� that is, the. ideology which overturns the principle, crucial to any project ofsocial emJ.llcipation, that tedmological progress is justi­ fil..:! by sodal progress, in favor of the notion that tedmological progress is self­ justifying and needs no other warrant. See Lipietz, �l'ost-Fordism and Democ­ racy," 3'B-H, and ....The Next Transfomtation," 112-40, especially 122-27. "nte problem with Lipietz's characterization ofneoliberalism is that it over­ looks neoliberalism's part in supporting rent- and rcnticr-led l'Conomic activities (which have little. or nothing to dowith production per se). lbis is a ctitical over­ sight given the central role pbyed by finance capital in the colltemporary world economy (as pointed out in Dunford, 'Towards a Post-Fordist Order?"). I shall deal with the vitally important relation of the state to financialized regimes of growth later in this chapter. to

In four books, The C npimlilt Stnre, Stnte "D}(()J:Y, l1x Future oft/x Cnpimlilt Stntc, and Stnte l'ull't'r, Jessop has provided the most sustained thinking in state theory undertaken from a marxist perspective since the late Nicos Poubnt7.as. Jessop's position, which merges insights taken from the Ecole Regulation and systems theory with a neo-Gramscian conception of hegemony, hinges cnldally Oil the J;ordism/post-Fordism dichotomy. Joachim Hirsch's position is very simi­ lar n i its theoretical orielltation, except that, more than Jessop, he emphasizes the causal centrality of the �denatiotlJ.lization" of capital that cnsues from the crisis of J;ordism. See Hirsch, "Nation-State, International Regulation, and the Question of Democracy," "Globalization ofCapital, Nation-States and Dcmoc­ racy," and "Globalisation, Class and the Question of Democracy."

II See Jessop, �Fordism and I'ost-Fordism,"

State,"

47-52, and ....l'ost-Fordism and the

251. Jessop also considers the emergence of new technologies to be

another cnlcial factor in the rise of post-Fordism. See "Post-Fordism and the State,"

258, and "Capitalism and Its Future." Interestingly, in �l'ost-Fordism

Jnd the State," Jessop considers the role of new technologies to be part of the movement to flc.'l:ible specialization, whereas in "Capitalism and Its Fumre" he regards the appearance of Ill"V tl'Chnologies as

all

n i dependent (but still co­

present) constituent of post-Fordism. It should also be noted that when refer-

NOTES TO CHAPTER :l

315

ring to Fordism and post-Fordism, Jessop is careful to distinguish between the two strands, one "theoretical" and the other "practical," thar are constitutive of each of them JS stmcrures: on the one hand, the " acrually existing stn1cmr.l1 fonn� and dynamics,� and on the other, �the presence of modes of calculation Jnd strategies which aim to implement them� ("Posr-Fordism and the State,�

254). This distinction s i analytically necessary because of the lag that can exist between the two levels. As Jessop points out, planners and economic agents Gill be engaged, often without evident intent, in implementing the rudiments of an emergent regime of accumulation (such as post-I'ordism) loven as its sometime­ to-be replaced colutterpart (Fordism in this case) is still active and dominant.

12 The caveat that Fordist."faylorist production is not entirely displaced by post­ l"ordist flexible production is necessary because dlere is still a "pcripheral� Ford­ ism and laylorism in the. less-developed countries. For an anempt to analyze the first stages of this development, see Lipiea, " lowards Global Fordism?" This is Ixx:ause post-Fordism affords the possibility ofre{·omposingTaylorist principles into a "neo-Taylorism� that can be inserted at selective points in the production process. On this, see Lipka, 1oll'IInU II Ncll' EcrJ1wmic Order. For the counterargument that flexible specialization is not as generalized as many of its proponents take it to be, Sl"C Hirst and Zcidin, " Flexible. Specializa­ tion," 220-39. Jessop, however, s i cautious enough to say that "flexibility alone

L�insufficient to define post-I�ordism� ("Post-l'ordism and the State,� 258).

13 See Jessop, " Post-Fordism and the State,� 258. The proposition that capitalist production regimes seck to overcome or bypass the. alienation of the Fordist­ Taylorist mass worker by moving to production systems rdying on "after­ Fordist� flexible bbor practices and strucmres (and appropriately "socialized" workers and social subjects) is central to the thinking of other schools of marx­ ism and not just the riglllnti01mutc Jessop. See, for n i stance, Negri, Revollition

R£tricvtd, 17Je Politics ojSllbl'ersi01I, and "Twenty lbeses on Marx." 14 See Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State,� 255, and "Capitalism and Its Future," 57l. 15 Jessop is careful to stress that the. emergence of the post-I'ordist macroeconomy cannot "be reduced to effects of a crisis of Fordism" since other gl'Opolitical fac­ tors played a key part in the unfolding of post-Ford i sm. The. end of Fordism was succeeded by "often n i tense struggles between competing versions of capital­ ism," and dlese struggles were affected by such events as the end of the cold war, the onsetof the Pacific Century, and the rise of multiculturalism, and not just by macroeconomic considerations ("Capitalism and Its Future," 573 ). Hirsch more than Jessop emphasizes the part played by the cold war in generating "global Fordism." See his "Globalization of Capital, Nation-States and Democracy;'

39-40. 16 On "lean� production viewed from J perspective similar to that of the Ecole R.egulation, see Hoogvelt and YuasJ, "Going Lean or Going Native?"

316

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

l7 Jessop, "Restrucruring the Welfare State," 54-76, and -'flle Transition to Post· Fordism and the Schumpeterian Workfare Statet 13-37.

l8 jessop, -Post-Fordism and the State," 259-61. 19 Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State,� 260. The financial crisis of 2008, continu­ ing into

2009, drives home Jessop's point that a "relatively stable" post-Fordist

formation has yet to be rea!i7.cd.

20 Hirsch, "Nation-State,� 276. 21 Jessop, ""Post-Fordism and the. State," 262. 22 Jessop argues that the post-Fordist state did not materialize directly from the crisis of Fordism. Rather, resources drawn from Fordist forms and principles were employed n i itiaUy in an unsuccessful attempt to contain the crisis. Only when these failed did '"transitional post-I:ordist regimes" emerge. See "Post­ Fordism and the State," 262.

23 jessop, "Post-Fordism and the StJtet 264. See also Hirsch, "Globalization of Capital," 42.

24 jessop, " Post-Fordism and the State," 266-71, suggests that there are in fact three Schumpeterian workfare state strategies. One, perhaps the most fre­ quendy acknowledged, is neoliberJI and bask-aUy submits the state to the re­ quirements of the private Slx:tor. The second is neocorporatism, which differs from its Fordist predecessor to the extent that it seeks ro accommodate supply­ side considerations and combine self-regulation with state regulation. The third s i neostatism, which uses state apparatuses to orchestrate responses oriented to the supply side. In aU cases the new international competitive environment dlJt defines -after-Fordism" sets the terms for the. implementation of these strate­ gies. Jessop also says that these strategies can be combinlxl, as they are in the European Union, for instance. .

25 Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State,� 275. See also Lipierz,Mir'Wt:>alldMirncle5, 25· 26 Jessop, -Capitalism and Its Future;' 5H-79. 27 Although, pace Jessop and Hirsch, the. ability of the United States to head and direct this l"<juity-based reginle has, for the tillle being at any rate, put paid to notions of a " triadk-" competition in which Germany and Japan are serious economic rivals of the United States. It is still early to tell whether the bursting of the housing market bnbble, and its associated banking failures, has pnt paid

to American leadership of the equity.based regime of accll1llUlation. On the tendency of the Ecole Regulation

to

overestimate the potential of the Japa­

nese and German models of capitalism to compete with their "Anglo-Saxon� counterparts,

see

Grahl and Teague, "The Ri gulntiolJ &hool, the Employment

Relation and HnJJlcializJ.tion."

28 In his more recent work with Ngai.Ling Sum, Jessop does acknowledge the "Eurocentrism" of his earlier work. See Jessop Jnd Stull, Beyond tbe Rrgulntioll Approach.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

317

29 l;or this figure, see International Fit1Jncial Services, London,

City Bll$intM

Series. 30 See Bhaduri, "Implications of Globali7..ation for ,\.hcrocconomic Theory and Policy in Developing Cownries," 152. Sec also Harris, �International Finan­ cial Markets and National Transmission Mechanisms,� 199-212; Griffith-Joncs and Stallings, �New Global Financial Trends," 143-73. A goo:! summary of the changes that have takcn place in global financial markets in the past two decades is in Helleiner, Statu alld tbe Rccmcrgf1lccofGlobal!'illallce; Griffith-Joncs, Global

(Apital Flows; Eatwell and Taylor, Global Fillallu at Risk; Obstfcld and Taylor, Global Capital A11IrketJ. 31 For these fignres, see Drabek and Griffith-Jones, �Summary Jnd Conclusions," 215. 32 Deutschcs Bundesbank, Tbe Role ofFDl ill Emergi ng A1nrka ECOIIomu i , 9. 33 Institute ofIntertlational Fi.na.nce, "Resilient Emerging Markets Anract Record I'rivate Capital FJows,� press release, 6 March 2008. This press rele3Se goes on to say that "dircct llwestment into emerging economies is currendyon an upswing with net inward

FDI to total $1.86 billion this year, compared to an cstimated

$1.56 billion in 2007 and $167 billion above the :W06 volume."

H Henwood, Wall Street, is still the most readable and informative account of many of these new financial instruments and dlC. markets in which they operate. According to the

lHallcbutcr Gllardiall IVcekly, 9

November 1997, the United

Statcs had more than 2,800 mutual funds controlling over $4 trillion, with $220 billion being placed in them in 1996 alone (nearly double the 1995 total of $1.42 billion). At the time. of the crash in October 1987 there were only 812 U.S. mumal funds manJging a total of S242 billion. By 2003 pension funds consti­ nned 40.7 percent of aU U.S. equity assets, invcstment companics 22 perccnt, insurance {·ompa.nies 23.3 percent, bank Jnd trust companics 11.7 perccnt, and foundations 2.4 percent. In the past twenty-five years investment companics Jnd mumal funds have grown very rapidly (2.6 percent of assets in 1980 to 22 pcrcellt in 2003), followed by pension funds (32.6 percent in 1980 to 40.7 percent in 2003). In this period, bank and trUSt companies have declined sig­ nificantly (38.8 percent of total assets in 1980 to ll.7 percent in 2003). For this information, sec Omference Board, Imtitlltiollal lliloestmmt Report 2005.

In 1994 two American pension funds alone, dle Teachers' Insurance and AmlUity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund the California Public Employees Retirement System

(TIAA-CREF) and (CalPERS), had assets of

$140 billion and $100 billion, rcsp{":changc bctwecn nations. Sec his "Fcudalism and Capitalism in Latin America." 42 Scc Arrighi, ""Hcgcmony Unravclling: Part 2.,'" 87. 43 Arrighi, '"Financial ExpJllsions in World Historical Pcrspectivc," 155; scc also Arrighi, '"Hegemony Unravelling: Part 2," 86. I take. this description ofhis posi-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

HI

tion from Arrighi's somewhat heated response to a review ofhis book by Robert Pollin. See. Pollin, " Contemporary Economic Stagnation in World Historical Perspective." I don't mean to adjudicate n i this exchange, and merely use part of Arrighi's response bl'uuse it contains an excellent summary of the position he sets out in ·nx Long Tll'(//t�tb Cmtllry. 44 Arrighi, ....Financial Expansions," 157. See also Arrighi and Silver, CbnOJ alUi GOI'­

"/lanre ill the AiodeTII World System. 45 Arrighi, "Financial E"pansions," .." 157. I'ollin agrees with Arrighi on this point (that all financial expansions are succeedlxl by their material counterparts) in "Contemporary Economic Stagnation," 115-17. 46 That no such Hegelian

IVclweist s i at work in Arrighi's

architectonic is dear

from his insistence that "sustained financial expansions materialize only when the enhanct"verence and contrariness that permeated such works as LllckyJim, Look Back

iJ/ A/wer, and Jwm at the Tup did not last long. By the. time Mrs. Ihatchcr took office in 1979, the erstv.·hilc Angry Young Men (Kingsley Amis, John Braine, John Osborne, and Philip Larkin) had become bibulous old reactionaries with an unstinting admifJtion for hcr policies. I�or the cultural contnt underlying the emergence of thc Angry Young Men, seeAlan Sinfield's c.'l:cellentLiterature, Politic5, alld Cultllre ill Pustll'tlr Britain. For studies of the cultural context for Beat writing, SL'C Mitmen, van der !knt, and van Elteren, Bmt Clilmn; Raskin, American 8crmlll. 3 For two accounts, from rather different persp"ctives, that stress the considerable significance of Ihird World insurrectionary movements for left-wing activist groups in the \Vest in the 1960s, sec Elbaum, J{clYJiutirm ill the Air; K. Ross,May

'68 alld ItI Afterlivc5.

4

The most notable recent auempt to delineate the significance of the new so­ cial movements for the quest for emancipation is probably Laclau and Mouffc,

HtgelilollY and Socialist StratWY.

Sec also their "Post-Marxism without AIXllo­

gies"; Ladau, "Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity," 93-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

H9

108; Mouffc, " Democratic Politics and the Qucstion of Idcntity,"

33-,45. For

commentary, see Landry and MacLcan, "Rercading Laclau and Mouffe�; Fisk, "Post-Marxism," 144-65. For an account which sces the crisis of the New Left as thc ground for the emergcncc of the new social movcmcnts and its subsequcnt identity politics, see Farrcd, �Endgame Idcntity?"; Gilroy, "British Cultural Studies and the Pitfalls of Idcntity," .!23-39.

5

See Palwubo-Liu, "Multiculturalism Now." See also his �Assumcd Idcntities."

6

Palumbo-Liu rcgards Mcad's Alld Krep YIJ/lr PowderDry: All AmbropologutLooks

at America as the locus classicus of this endcavor. Hc s i indebted to the discus­ sion of Mcad and Ruth Bcncdict in Shannon, A IVurld Made Safefor Dif!erwccs. Shannon argucs that the. American politics of idcntity Jrosc not in the so-called countcrcultural 191los, but two dccades before, during thc cold war.

7

See Palumbo-Liu, '''\Iuiticulturalism Now,"

U2-q, quoting Benedict, n)e

CJff)5IllJtbcmmn alld the Swom, 14-15. 8 Palumbo-Liu, "Multiculturalism Now," Unitcd States,"

u5-16.

See also Huntington, "lbc

59-115; 71)e Clmb of Ch·i/iz.ntiolli allii the }{elllakj,{1J of World

Order. 9

Homi Bhabha is thc forcmost dlinkerof the problcms posed by this situation of a necessary negotiation bCt\V('en cultures, all of which are wlavoidably partial by virtuc of thcir embeddedness in the local. See

17Je Locatioll of Culture and

" Culeure's In-Between." 10 A qualification of �current� is needed herc, because the ncoo to engage in a negotiation �tween partial cultures is not confined to the pa st few decades, bnt was fclt in bygone centuries. Linda wiley has made the point that a British identity had to be. forged ou[ of its Scottish, \Velsh, and Irish clements n i order to enable Protestant Britain to wage war with Catholic France and to cnablc Britain's impcrial

CIlterprises.

See her BritolJJ: FOflJi1!IJ tbe NarWlJ, 1707-1837. Her

suggestion that facilitating Britain's imperial ontreach is a motivating factor n i this recourse to a British identity s i borne ou[ by Gananath Obeyeskere, who argues that British sailors exploring the Pacific in the eightecnth ceneury had willy-nilly to feson to a conception of British idcntity n i their attempts to make themselves understood, as "British,� to the inhabitants of the islands. See Obeyeskere, "'British C..anb ni als,'''

7-31.

11 The suggestion here that a fueurc collenive liberation will almost ccrtainly cm­ body many disparate approaches and forms of action s i in line with the late Iris Marion Young's persuasive argument that pluralism will be an unavoidable fea­ ture of a fumce transformed society. Sec herjmticc ami the 1'0litic5 ofDiffermce, chapter 6. 12 The forcmost reC(�nt exponent of dlis argumcnt is \Valter Benn Michaels. Sec his "Political Science Fictions." Michaels's main point in this essay is that real antagonism arises only at the level of political ur ideological difference, and not racial or cultural difference, and that here it is not "differcnce" bur "'sameness" that is germane. If one believcs that one's ideological position is right or par-

340

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

takes of the truth, this is not because it happens

to be. different from someone

else's, but blx:ause one believes it to be right or true for everyone. 'nlat is, one believes it

to be the same for everyone. A contention between rival tmths is

thus more properly to be seen as fragmentation within the. univers;tl and not as a battle between particularisms. A similar point about the nlx:essity of this "nniversalism of truth� is made by Alain Badiou in ;til his writings. Michaels's conclusion is that there is re;tl politiCS only when there is "an indifterence to difference� (662). His position is problematic insofar as he. assumes that cultur al or racial differenccs cJllnot be "real" politic;tl or ideological diftcrences, whereas it is clear that then.> can be instances when racial or cultural differences are un­ avoidably political (apartheid South Africa would be a case n i point). For a cri­ tique of Michaels along these. lines, see M. it Ross, " Commentary," especially 835-n 13

l :un ('ettainly not suggesting that movements based on identity cannot be effi­ cacious independently of anticapitalist struggles conduned under marxist aus­ pices. As I indicated n i chapter 2, this claim s i not plausible when struggles occur in contexts marked by very diverse social relations, the r:Ulge and pleni­ mde of whk-h C:Ulllot be encompassed within the remit of a single movement, however capadous and dynamic that movement is.

14 On thinking that the limits of capital are coe..uensive with those of the universe, Sl"C DeleU7.e and Guattari, A TlJQmalld Platen/Ii, 23-24. The point that capital's supremacy is not unassailable is made by Slavoj Zizek in several of his works, but most notably in "Multiculmralism, or the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capit;tlism,� especi;tlly 35. 15 l:or Gilroy, see "British Cultural Studies and the Pitfalls of Identity," 223-39, where he concludes that it is important "to dispose of the idea that identity is an absolute :UId to find the. courage necessary to argue that identity forma­ tion-even body-coded ethnic and gender identity-is a chaotic process that em have

no end. In this way, we may be able to make cultural identity a prem­

ise of political anion rather than a substinne for it" (238). Gilroy contends that the theme. of identity is already present when the question of class affiliation

to E. p, Thompson's TIlt Maki,w (If the ElIgliJ;" Wurking Class and Rk-hard Hoggart's 7"e VIeS (IfLiteracy. This adds an is posed, a proposition that is essential

n i teresting complication for those who regard the concern with identity as a feamre of a politics that sU('ceeded one based on the institutions ofclass, Wendy Brown is less concerned to argue that identity politics is the successor of a pre­ vious class-based politics, and prefers instead tosee this transformation in terms of the weakening or disappearance of J viable critique of capitalism. For Brown, see States (If Injury, espedally 59. See ;tIso Brown's ",VoWlded Attachments," 199-227· 16 Zif.ek in several of his works, but most notably in uMulticulmralism, or the Culmral Logic of Multinational Capitalism," espedally H. 17 Zu.ek, "Multiculturalism," 44; his emphasis.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 HI

18 Bobbin, "n,c Shield ofAchillu, 750. Bobbin's argument relies on a numberofvast theses expressed with considerable magniloquence (e.g., " We are at the begin­ ning of the sixth great revolution in strategic and constitutional affairs"; ""nle new age ofindeterminacy into which we are now plunging") to conclude that the outmoded nation-state structure is not going to be able to deal with a whole range of geopolitical and cultural problems caused by all emerging conjuncmre that will be dominated by "market states." See 213-42 for Bobbitt's at·count of the market-state. For J useful review of Bobbitt's book, to which ! am much n i debted, see David Runciman, �lbe Garden, the Park and the Meadow." 19 Bobbin, The Shield ofAchiiks, 750-51; Bobbitt's italics. It should be pointed out that this s i one of several scenarios countenanced by Bobbitt, though he does believe that this one is more likely to be reali7.cd than the others. What Bobbin does in constructing this scenario is to n i tensify further tendencies that arc al­ ready manifesting thenl�dl'es demographically. For instance, the most recent U.S. census revealed that 5, percent of Californians do not identify themselves as white and that 40 percent of Californians speak a language other thJn Eng­ lish at home. The migration of"liberals� to states like Oregon and Vermont for culrural political reasons and Florida "snowbird" retirees with monocultural preferences to leave polyglot south Horida for less cosmopolitan Appalachian mountain towns ill Georgia and North Carolina are phenomena that are in the process of being documented. 1.0 ·There is a slight but still significant difference between the operation of the �chain of equivalence" in the respective accounts provided by Zikk and Rob­ bitt. Zitek follows Ladau JndMouft"e.in taking the chain ofequivalence to oper­ ate among progressive groups (women, blacks, workers, gays, and so forth), whereas in the "developmental picmre of thc State" constructlxl by Bobbitt this chain encompasses all identity-based groups. On the chain of equivalence n i Ladau and Mouffe, see, in addition to their HegcmOl�Y and Socialist Stmtegy, Mouffe's " l;eminism, Citi7.cnship and Radical Democratic Politics,� espl'cially 372. Bobbitt, a professor of constirutional law and J former official on the Na­ tional Security Council and other agencies (in both Republican and Dcmocratic administratious), holds no brief for any kind of progressive politics, preferring n i stead to talk of the "importance of developing public goods-such as loyalty, civility, tnlst in authority, respect for family life, reverence for sacrifice, regard for privacy, admiration for political compctence-that the market, unaided, s i not well adapted to creating and mJintaining� (814). Bobbin is dearly a cold war liberal with the slightest ofThird \Vay whifts to some ofhis convictioJlS, and his list of"virrues" would probably meet with approval from Dick Cheney Jnd Donald Rumsfeld, but not perhaps Trotsky, Thomas Sankara, Cesar Chavez, Mariategui, or Subeommandante Marcos (who today would probably want the n i vocation ofsuch "public goods" to be tied insome way to a critique of the role ofthe United States as the principal arcrutl'Ctofa banefulglobal order, J critique that s i nowhere to be. found n i "Dx Sbicld ofAcbitm). The argument ofnu Shield 341. NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

ofAchilles hinges on the

thesis that states are constimted by the relationship

that obtains between military power and strategy and the legal system, and for this reason Bobbin Glllnot do real justice to notions of l'Conomic, political, and idl'Ological power in the way that, say, Michael Mann does in the Sonn:uofStxinl

l'owC/", volumes 1 and 2. 21

This point is made by Zikk and Wendy Brown, See Zizek, "Multiculturalism,"

47; Brown, Stnrn ofInjnry, 64. Brown is likewise concerned with the problem­ atic nature of the universal as it is invoked by a troubling version of the politics of identity.

22 All snbsequent references

to Nozick,

Annrchy, Stntc, nlld Utopin

are cited in

parentheses in the text. David Runciman has notlxi the affinity between Robbin and Nozick in �·nle Garden, the Park and the Meadow." Nozick subsequently moved to a version of liberalism inspired in part by isaiah Berlin and repud.i­ ated his earlier libertarianism, preferring instead a position that acknowledged "multiple competing values." His earlier absolutist libertarianism was never more than a defense of one of these competing values, and this value could "sometimes be overridden or diminished in trade offs." "or this repudiation, see Nozick's essay �·nle Zigzag of Politics," in 111( Exnmined Life, especially 292.

23

As David RuncimJll has correctly observed with regard to Nozick in �The Gar­ den, the Park and the Meadow."

24

It is important to recognize a fundamental difference between Nozick and Bobbin, their conmlonalities notwithstanding. Nozick's metauropia is derived conceptually from his doctrine. of the minimal state, a doctrine he takes to be enjoined by the conception of the inviolability of individual rights he imputes to Kant (but which admittedly owes more to Nozick himself than to Kant). Nozick is simply not interestlxj in the historical conditions that mayor may not make such a �utopia of utopias" realizable. By contrast, Bobbitt is profoundly interested in historical processes, and. in fact takes the market-state to be one of the outcomes of the "fifth great revolution in strategic and constitutional af­ fairs," namely, "'the Long War� that began in 1914 and ended with the senlement reached in Paris in

1990 that brought an official

end to the cold war. Strictly

speaking, Bobbitt's muiticulmrai and decentralized market-state polity is not a utopia, if �utopia" is defined as the embodiment of an ideal state of affairs (however the content of this state of affairs concerned, this polity resuits from the weakening of the nation-state

as

is characterized). Where Bobbin is

"market in sovereignty" created by the

the traditional repository of sovereignty. This

polity in itselfis not something that is necessarily desirable or undesirable from a philosophical standpoint, and Bobbitt does not pay anention to its philosophi­ cal underpinnings.

25

Robbin's decentralized federalism, in addition to showing that a multiculmral politics will be a constitutive feature of the modus operandi of this system, also makes it clear that this multicultural politics is nor likely to be in a position to distinguish in practically significant ways between progressive and reactionary

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 343

in such a system, feminist, environmental protectionist, and gay and lesbian communities will cx ist alongside Southern Baptist fundamentalists and Alaskan wolfh\lllters in a relation of parity. 26 "\Ve do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany," said Thomas Mann, implyn i g that to be a "'good German" s i incxtricably bound up with being a good European." Fora useful discussion of the. implications of the quo­ tation from Mann and othcr issues, sec Risse and Englemann-Martin, "Identity Politics and European Integration," 287-316. -IowaN the. end of his life, Ray­ mond \ViIlianls took to referrn i g to himself as a "\Velsh European" in order to avoid having to designate himself as a Briton. 27 On religious identities, sec Kastoryano, Negutintil!9 Identities; and "Muslim Diaspora(s) in Western Europe." 28 This crisscrossing quality in identity constinnion was dealt widl in chapter 2. 29 Sec Herzfeld, "1he European Self," 139-70. For Macpherson, sec TIJe l'olitical TIxm:y ofPos5tssil'e Individlln/iJ;m. For Dumont, see Hom(} Hicmrchims and &sap m/ IlIdil'idlloliJ;m. One of the outcomes of th is process, whereby the concept of a European identity came to bc permeau:d by the dovctailing ideologies of an individualistic autonomy and colonial superiority, was dle extrusion of non­ Europeans (such as Muslims) from the. conccpmal fold of this identity. On this, SLoe Asad, "Muslims and European Identity," 20!)-27. Herlield also makes the point that fields such as cultural anthropology can serve the useful function of identifying thc efte.:L� exerted by this ideology of individualism in our analyses of nationalism and the role of the nation-state. 30 Herzfeld provides a list of anthropological texts and studies of nationalism which incorporate features of thistroubling individualism in "'The European Self." Of course the notion of identity is not confined to the individual and can be extended to groups and even nations, as indicated by the title of Fernand Braudel's magisterialL'idmtitide In Fmm:e. 31 For such questions, sec Herzfeld, "'The European Self," 14-4. Herzfeld is of course speaking of an e.".;:plicitly European identity in this essay, but his caveats about thc invocation of a European identity can be. generalized to cover any kind of identity. 32 "fhe distinction between a Grmu and a Scbmllke is highly technical and not without its problems. For a discussion of the distinction Jnd some of the prob­ lems involvl-d, scc Inwood, A Hegd Dictimlllr.v, 177-78. B An American colleague of mine, obviously fond of television, said that it was the telecasting for hours on end of these sports," in which everything seeml-tl to happen in an unending slow motion (and that was when something happcned at all!), that gave him the greatest culture shock" on his first visit to Britain. Incidentally a similar sentiment in regard to cticket is e."l:pressed by Zi ick, who calls it ""a senselessly ritualized game, almost bl)'ond the grasp of a Continental, in which the prescribed gestures (or, more predsely, the gestures established by an \lIlwrinen tradition), the way to throw a ball, for example, appear to be gmforms.

"

"

"

,

344

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

tesquely 'dysfunctionaL'" SL'C "Enjoy Your Nation as Yourself," 200-237, quo­ tation from 280 n. 2. 34 On the essential derivability of individual from collective identities, see Caplan

and Torpey, introduction to

DowmeIJti'!!J Jlldil'idlffll

Jdmtity, 1-12, espe­

cially 3. 35 On the development ofthese citizenship rules and the history of these CJtegories

and collectivities, see the essays in part 3 of Caplan and Torpey, Docu1llf1lting IlIdjl'idllfll JdCllti�y, 197-270. For a different approach to these questions, ap­

pealing to a logic of admini5tration he calls "governmentality,� see Foucault, "Governmentality," 87-104. 36 37

! discuss the nature and function of the state in the current regime of accumu­ lation n i chapter 1l. See Mann, ComcouslltJJ i and ActiOlI among tbe �VCitel"1l Workj,!!J Cltw, 12-13. lbe typology of forms of working-class COll.'iciousness provided by "-hrm is modified in my account to be more generally applicable to aJJ forms of political struggle.

38 Mann, Comd oUJlIuJ find Action tIIlW'!!J tbe �V(5terll Workil!!J Clan, 13. 39 Ibid.

(]Japrer 7. -nJe Politics ofSubjectil'iry 1 It would be more accurate to say that for Jacques Derrida dlls ....place" of the

subject is strictly speaking a "nonpbce" positioned n i a relationship of adjacency to the "place," in the chain ofsignification, from which the. significrs that consti­ nne the subject are able to funnion. Or to pnt it in Heideggerian parlance: Der­ rida appro.1ches the subjen in terms of a poetics as opposed to a semiology. 2 Derrida, "Ethics and Politics Today,� in NegotiatiOlIJ, 296. 3 Derrida, "lmroduction: DesistJ.nce,� 5. 4 Derrida, ....To Arrive-at the Ends of the State;' in Rogues, 143. 5 Though he never pres ents his thinking on the subjen (or anything else for that

m.1tter) in the. form of theses or arguments, Derrida nonetheless advocates a recasting or deconstruction of the "place" of the notion of the subjen in " Eat­ ing Well," especially 272. In "To Unsense the Subjenile,� he proposes that the notion of the subjenile

(Ie mbjrctile)

be substituted for that of the subjen, the

former connoting tlle elements of subjugation and projectability that are not present in the classical doctrine of the subject. To quote Derrida, ....Subjenile, the word or the thing, can take the place of the subjen or the objen-being neither one nor the other� (61) . As will be seen later, Derrida's account ofjustice and the ethics of responsibility views the place of this subjeniJe as its starting point. 6 Derrida, ....Eating Well;' 258. 7 t:or the English version of "La stmcture, Ie signe et Ie jeu dans Ie discourse

des sciences humaines," see "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in IVriting alld Difference, 278-93, especially 293.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

345

8 Durida, "Ihe Ends of Man," in Mnr;gim ofl'hiIoJopb.y, 111-36. 9 Derrida, " Eating Well,� .!61; emphasis and parentheses n i original. 'This power to ask the question to which the subject is the answer is Derrida's rendering (which is not to be eonfmed with anything like a straightforward appropria­ tion) of Heideggu's lJaieill. For insights into the relation between Derrida and

! am indebted to Bcnnington and Derrida.}/U"qlle5 Drrridn, .!74-81; D. Wood, Thinkillg nfter HeitU!1!Jcr, esplx:ially the essay "Hcidegger after Du­ Heidegger,

rida," 93-105.

10 Durida states in �Eating Well" that not even Heidegger escaped the structure of a "transcendental analytic," and that no philosopher, and this again n i clndes Heidcggcr, has been able to extricate philosophy from its grounding in an "an­ thropologism." This declaration and its ranlifications Jre taken up and accen­ tuated by Rapaport in Lnter Den-ida, 97-137. For Dcrrida's own estimation of the relation of his thought to that of Heidegger's, sec the essay �DifUranee" in

MmlfiIlJOfl)bilosopJ�y, .!2-.!5, and l'05itiOIlS, 9-10. Sec also the fascinatingessay by DerridJ et aI., �The Original Discussion of'Diffcrance,''' especially 86. Derrida's statement about Hcidegger's failure to overeomc the vcry anthropologism he niticized wonld be disputed by some of Heidegger's commcntators, even f i they happcn not to engagc directly with Derrida. Sec, for instance, DasUlr, "'The Critique of Anthropologism in Hcidegger's Thought,� 119-H.

11 Durida's claims about the capacity of the animal to recognize the other qua other are likely to be controversial. Be that as it may, the argument regarding thc pariliUlllaJl and the singular that hinges on this claim Glll be detachl>tl from it and viewed in its own right.

12 'This s i a gloss on De.rrida's construal of Heidegger's Dasein, which Derrida vicws as the power of a being to ask questions about itself. Sec. �Eating \\'ell,�

160-61. 13 Derrida, "Eating Well,� 271. The early Duridean text which recommcnds a dc­ centering of the subject is "StrucUlre, Sign, PIJy� (Sl'C note 7 above). But we should note Rapaport's salutary reminder that there is a flmdaJllcntJI difference between Hcideggcr and Durida at this point. For Hcidcgger, unlike Derrida, the

who which embodies

this power to ask questions about itself s i not to be

identified with Dasein; as Heidegger sees it, the very capacity to ask such ques­ tions already makes the

who n i to a social and psychological subject,

and hence

prevents it from bcing an appropriate manifestation of Dascin. For Derrida, on the other hand, and here thc influence of Lcvinas is perhaps more tclling than that of Hcideggcr, this

who is an alien element not to be incorporated into the

nexus that makcs it a psychological and social subject. See R.apaport, Lnter Der­

rida, 116-17. Rapaport's main argument is that thcre is all "earlier� and a "later� DerridJ, the former espousing a dlx:onstructed linguistic subject, the bnu es­ chewing the linguistic turn and preferring the existential subject made well­

knO\\,t by Sartrc and deconstructed in a �counter-existentialist existentialism� n i augurated by Uvinas, but developed by Bataille and Blanchot and takcn up

H6

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

by Derrida. Rapaport also suggests that Derrida oscillates between several phi. losophies ofthe subjcx:t (the. humanist subject, the subject of writing, the. subject of Dasein, the subject as the wbo, and so on) without according primacT to any one. My exposition n i what follows is indebted to Rapaport's understanding of Dcrrida's positions, though I take issue with his reading of Derrida's subjectiJe. In fairness, however, it has to be noted that the problem with the subjectile is as

much Dcrrida's as Rapaport's.

14 Both these positions are also present in Heidegger's writings . Bei,!O nlld Time straddles two senses of Dasein, one n i which Dasein, bcx:ause it possesses irre­ ducibly the property of " mineness" (jemeilligkcit), has always to lx- addressed by a personal pronoun ("I am," "you are"), and the other in which Dascin tran­ scends the world. For the former, see Bej,!O nlld Timc, 40; for the "transcen­ dence of the Being of Dasein," see 33-H. In his bter writings Heidegger stressed more the separation of Dasein from "Man," and maintained that its essential function is to serve as the '"guardian" of being (which it does by '"falling away� from itself). On this see Heidegger, GCSIImmmgnbe, 302. William j. Richardson suggests that in hL� later writings Heidegger StresSLxl Dasein's growlding in " the primordial not that belongs to being," a grounding in negativity expressed through two images, that of the abyss (Abgnmd) and that of the -nonground"

(U,!Onmd), thc formercolUlOting "mystery" and the buer '"subversive power," See Richardson, "Ihsein and the Ground of Negativity," especially 50. 15 "Finis," in Aporias, 1-42, can be viewed as Derrida's unraveling (and simulta­ neous retention) of the. key Hcideggcri,Ul notion of a "being toward death."

16 Heidegger, Beil!O nlld Timc, 238-84. Heidegger takes this " voice of conscience" to be inextricably bound up with Dasein's "everyday self-interpretation." For valuable commentary, see Guest, "L'Origine de Ia ResponsabilitC"; Dasmr, '"llle Call of Conscience," 87-98.

17 Heidegger, Beingnlld Time, 285. The exemplary readings of this aspect ofBej,!O nlld Time arc to be found in Dreyfus, Bcj,!O-ill-the-World; Haar, HdMM£r et {'osmer M /'IJ(Jmme. 18 Rapaport takes this mark of the subjectile, that is, its passing bc)'ond the. need to possess an essence, to be a primary feature defining the figure of the subaltern, for reasons outlined below (see note 20), I believe. this claim to be quite prob­ lematic. For Rapaport's claim, see Lnter Derridn, IH-37.

19 It is for this reason that "Eating Well" takes seriously the possibility that animals can occupy the space of the subjectile.

20 At the same time it has to be stressed that the call of conscience is not a moral Slllimons. As '\Iichel Haarpoints out, this call is strinly "autoaffenive" because. it is addressed by Dasehl to Dasein out of Dasein's thrownness, Jnd does not correspond to an imperative issued by J deity or moral order that would stand n i relation to Dasein as an exteriority. See Haar, HeideMcr, 45-54. 21 Heidegger, Beillg nlld Time, 256; emphasis and ellipses in original; trauslation slightly altered. NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

H7

22 Simon Critchlcy has made this criticism of Dcrrida, bue it should also be di­

recced at Heideggcr. Sce Critchky's cssays '"['ost-Dcconstruccive Subjcccivity,� and "Dcconstruccion and Pragmacism: !s Dcrrida a Private lronist or a 1\lbJic

Liberal?� in his colk·ccion Etb0-l'olitia-5I1jccti b l'ity. One way of crying to ncu­ tralize an objcccion like Critchky's is to argue that Dcrrida is referring here to thc political as such, that is, the conditio/IS that makc political accs and n i stim­

tions possible, as opposed to politics as sut'h, that s i , the concrete accivities and organiz;ations that have their enabling conditions in the political as such.

For a

similar distinccion, see Ikardsworth, Derrida and rbe l'olitical, ix. The focus un the pulitical, as opposed to politics as such, cnables us to appreciate Derrida's smdied refusal to issue stipulatiuns regarding this or that particular accivity or political agenda, or to say that f i une is a marxist, one would do such and such, urevcn if une were a marx ist, one would be such and such. A certain metaphysics of the political has to be adhered to f i one s i to find such stipulations persua­

sive, and the whole point of deconstruccion s i to discredit a metaphysics of this kind.

Lt:Vinas is exempt from this charge of voluntarism (which is not to sugge.st that his conccption of the cthical is frce of problems) bccausc hc use.s the notion of an irreducibk cxcess to serve, in efflx:t evcn f i not in intcnt, as a transccnden­

tal principle that is cxtcrior to thc ethical and the. political and which thcrefore ,

rdativi7.c5 both thcse domains. Ibis transcendencc, premised on thc notion of an other infinitdy different from all its othcrs, is, however, thc source of other

difficulties. Derrida himself criticized Ll:Vinas for resorting to the concept of infinity in this way, since the infinite always has a parasitic rdation to thc finitc.

See Derrida, "Violence et metaphysique, English vcrsion (rl'vised) in IVriting "

alld Differmce, 79-153. Dcrrida s use of "the politicar as a quasi-transccndental '

may have apparent affinities with Uvinas's philosophic disposition for the tran­ scendcnt, but differs from it because Derrida takes pulitics, in a vcry compli­ catcd way, to have lines of COlllcction to particular accive traditiuns, marxism being thc tradi tion to whit-h Derrida is in closest, though not necessarily un­ broken, proximity as an "inheritor." On this n i hcritancc, see Derrida, 5fXctrn

ifMarx, 54· 23 Sec Rapaport, Later Darida, 12,,-25. Rapaport secs no problem with this and docs not blink at the potcntially problematic implications which stcm from say­ ingthat the Dcrrida of "To Unscnse the Subjeccile" is speaking on behalf of the

muee subjcctiJe, who by virtue. of this mutcncss is unavoidably subaltcrn. There L� a glaringly obvious difficulty with this proposal, sn i ce having the. philosopher

speak on behalf of thc subj l ...·tilc, and there secms to be no altcrnative to this secnario n i Rapaport's conccption of the subjecciJe, eftcctively makes the phi­ losopher thc primary initiating force when it comes to undertaking any projccc of political cransformation. At any rate, the onus for making this transforma­

tion, for giving it its initial impetus, will lie with thc philosopher, who will be

348 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

n i a position to name and authorize the desire of the mute subaltern. Rapaport

thinks this is one way of resolving the problem identified by Gayatri Spivak in her classic essay " Can thc Subaltern Speak!,� that is, by having thc philosopher speakon behalfof the. ones who Jre rendered silent. But this is reaUy no solution at alL TIle philosopher, oranyone else in a similar position, has to be able to hear the subaltern n i the first place. R.apaport's error lies in presuming dlat having the n i tellectual resources and the inclination to fashion a thl'Oryof the subaltcrn (as he and Derrida undoubtedly have) s i equivalent in some sense to having the ability to be heedful of the desire of the subaltern. Willingness (the domain of the ethical) cannot be confbted with ability or capability (the domain of the political) since someone can be willing and not able, or ablc and not willing.

24 AB Richard Polt has noted, althongh there are only three footnote references to Kierkegaard in Beillg and Time, each of these comments favorably on the Danish philosopher widely regarded as the precursor of modern ex istentialism. See Polt, Heidl!f!1er, 166 n.

orld, esplx:iaJJy 120. See. aLro Dreyfus, Beilg-in-the-W l

the appendix (cowritten with JaJle Rubin) titled "Kierkegaard, Division II, and Later Heidegger," 284-340.

25 For this formulation regarding the "endurance of the aporia,� see Derrida, Apo­ rias, 16.

26 Dcrrida, AjJQrim, 16; emphasis n i original. SubslXJuent quotations from AporiaJ are cited parenthetically in the. text. Sec also Derrida, l'anil!1li, 5-35, and The Gift

ofDeatb. 27 Hcidegger, Beig n and Time, 275-76. It s i interesting that Derrida notes in Apo­

rim

that thl' structure of the '""borderly edge" is expressed in a langnage that

"does not fortuitously resemble that of negative theology"

(19).

28 On the "unconditionality of the incalcnlable," see Derrida, "To Arrive-At the Ends of the State (and of War, Jnd onYorld ,Var)," in Rqgues, 141-59.

29 This passage is quoted inAjJQrim, 20; emphasis in original. ·The original is in "fl,&

OtherHeading, 80-81. Derrida identifil"S three kinds of aporias: (1) an absolute impermeability ofthe borders between knowing and not knowing, (2) ane:l:cess of permeability between these borders, and

(3) dle antinomy which precludes

the very notion of J. passage across these borders

(20-21). In each case, their

difterences notwithstanding, the outcome s i a pervasive epistemological insnf­ ficiency.

30 The desire to analyze our situation without resorting to assumptions derived from philosophical anthropology, and ultimately theology, underlies Heideg­ ger's recourse to the cumbersome apparatus that constitutes the "analytic of Da­ selll." Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger's ultimate goal is the. critique of ontotheol­ ogy, the theory of the intelligibility of the totality of being, premised on the existellce of a highest being or its cognates. But this critique is not undertaken III the spirit of a skepticism directed at the highest being. Rather, Heidcgger (and Derrida follows him here) llndertakes this critique through an interrogation of

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

349

dIe mmed i iately given, or that which is directly encountered in the everyday. On this, see Courtine, "Donner(Prendre,� especially

28; Dastur, "lbe Critique

of Anthropologism in Hcidegger's Thought," 31 [ am not sure that Derrida is entirely correct when he says that these concepts were not delineated by Heidegger because he regarded dIem as belonging to "derivative disciplines such as psychology or psychoanalysis, theology or meta­

(Apol"im, (1). If the analytic of Dasein accords a primordiality (UI"­ ifJrnllglichkeit, perhaps Heidegger's favorite word!) to AIWIT as one ofthe �b,\Sic physics"

moods" that discloses Dasein's being to itself, then an equal emphasis is placed on

Em,bIoSJuJJt:it

(resoluteness), Heidegger's version of Nietzsche's creative

transformation, which transfigures the past and opens up new pOSSibilities of being. If there is anything like a decisive difference between Derrida and Hei­ degger (and there may be other, equally significant difterences), it would reside n i Derrida's unrelenting propensity to de(·onstruct all the places from which the philosopher speaks, and in so doing to bring philosophy into a relationship of adjacency to the promptings of a "new order of law and democracy to come� (this new law being for Derrida the law of;l1l unconditional hospitality). Hei­ degger, by contrast, requires philosophy to be attuned only to the language of dIe ancient Grl"C,ks and his particular brand ofphilosophical German, since only these languages have, ostensibly, a special affinity for those rare Jnd e:l:ceptional occasions when Being is disclosed. This criticism of Heidegger is trendlandy made in Bourdieu,

The Political Olltoil{fJY ofMartill Hcidrggcr. For Derrida on J.

"new order of law and democracy to come," see his essay "On Cosmopolitan­

011 C05mopolitallum and Forgil'cIU'SJ, 23. It could be argued of course that the specific import of a work like Heilig alld Time is at odds with this cir­

ism," in

cumscription of the scope ofphilosophy, since the outcome of Heidegger's �de­ struction" of all previolls Western humanisms (these having reduced the world to the projection of a human subject) is an expansion of Being's purview to include "l�erything," and that Heidegger's real failure, lay in his llability i to find J.

politics congruent with Heilig fwd Time's occluded democratic principle. For

this view of Hei/w nlld

Time's fWldamentai, and radical, accomplishment, see

DasUlr, "The Critique of Anthropologism n i Heidegger's -nlOught,� 119; how­ ever, Dasturdocs not deal with the political implicJtionsof this line ofthought. Derrida would probably not disagree with this assessment of Heilig ami Time.

32 Geoftrcy Bennington has modified and extended to philosophy Derrida's proposition that "there is no politics without an organization of the time and space of mourning� and argues that with the application of this doctrine of radical finitude there can also be no philosophy "without an organization of the time and space of mourning.� See his way and not tbar. According to these critics of inullanl'nce, in absolute. immanence everything has to replicate the given (because ontologically this is all there is to replicate), and this then becomes the source of an unavoid­ able ontological violence. Univocity holds beings on the same plane through sheer and naked power, whi ch then has perforce to destroy peaceability. I am can legitimize only a "bad difference� since

un

indebted to John Milbank for many helpful discussions on this topic. 10 For Zitek's position, see TIle Fragik Absolute, 011 BeliJ:f, and TIJe l'uppet and tbe

Dwarf John Milbank arrives independently at a position similar to Zilck's when he says that "to achieve an adequate ontology . . materialist socialism needs to invoke theology" ("Matera i lism and Transcendence," 7). Milbank diverges from Zitek (and Badiou) on the important question ofthe. transcendent, which the marxist thinkers, with their �secularislxl l'ia lI>ltim," disavow. To quote Milbank, "The turn to the se{'uiarised I'ia /Jcgtltil'tl however, because it docs not admit any real transcendent superabundant plenitude within which reli­ .

gious performances might remotely participate, never recognises any degrees of more-or-less correct manifestation of the absolute, or any advance. towards the absolute that s i not equally and inversely a regression" (12). 11

Milbank, '·"hterialism and TranscendelKe," 14-16. NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 359

12 Howard Caygill has dealt brilliantly with this asPL'H of Kamian judgment in his

Art of}udgmmt. 13 Gilles Deleuze hdS stated this problem perspicaciously: "'Now we see Kant, at an age when great authors rarely have anything new to say, confronting J prob­ lem that will lead him to an extraordinary undertaking: if the faculties

Gn

thus

enter into variable relationships in which each faculty is in tum regulated by one of the others, it must follow that, taken together, they are capable of free and unregulated relationships in whkh each faculty goes to its own limit, and yet in this way shows the possibility of its entering into an iI/determinate

[qUdcOllQIIC I

harmony with the others" ("On Four Poetic I:onnulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy," EWI'y5 Critical alld Clinical,

H-H; emphasis in origi­

nal).

14

l;or a theological reading of this contemporary repristination of the sublime, see Milbank, "Sublimity," .Hl-H.

15 Deleu7.c, "On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Phi­ losophy," H

16 The basis for this nl�V immmentist ontology is Spinoza's insight that the other is not a subject n i the sen�e associated with Locke and Descartes, but is instead a mode. whose expressivities are registered by other modes, each with its own spe­ cific kind of receptivity determined by the kind of mode that it is. For Spinoza's formulation, see his EtbiCl, especially part I I, proposition 49 (pp. 156-57 of the I'arkinson edition). I:or elaboration, see Deleuze,

b:preJYiollirm iI/ l'bilo50pby;

Howie, Ddmu and Spilwza.

17 This is the. gist of Badiou's critique of Dele.u7..e. in his quite brilliant Delmzc:

"flx Clamor of Beil/g.

John Milbmk endorses this critique in UMaterialism and

Transcendence,� 15-18. Conor Cunningham provides the. first complete geneal­ ogy of this baneful trajectory from Deleuze back to Plotinus in his Gmealogy of

Nibilis»I. As [ will shordy indicate, I disagree with this assessment of Deleuze. 18 Brian Massumi has correctly pointed out the franal nature of Deleuze's concep­ tion of the object, which requires it to be Imderstood in tertn� of the triptych of dimensions just mentioned. See A

User's Guide to "Capita1�111 and Schizophre.

na," i :15-38. I am indebted to Massumi's account. 19 Advocates of the allalqjia mtis, Jolm Milbank for n i stance, believe that the doc­ trine of analogy does not have to confront this problem because it avoids posit­ ing any kind of originary void. For Christian theology the source ofthe created order is the ineffable divine plenitude from which all things are engendered. The account just given of Deleuze.'s fractalized conception of the object shows that DeleUl.c too has a theory of the originJry plenitude, except that in his case it is a rigorously immanent one.

20 For this definition of "potentiality," see Deleuze, SpillOUl, 97. 21 See Milbank, "'Materialism and Transcendence," 23-25. 22 See Massumi, A

360

UiCT"'5 Guide to "Capitaliwi alld Schizopbnmin," 57-58.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

G mptcr /0. Nomad I'oliti£!; 1

There are significant affinities between the nomadology of Deleuze and Guattari and the theory of the multitude Jssociated with Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's Empire. Sl"C also their lVIlIltitlldes:

War and Democmcy in the Age ofEm­

pire. These affinities hinge on their respl"Ctive versions of autopoesis:

nomadic

formations and multimdes are said by Delenze and Guattari and by Hardt and Negri to dirl"Ct themselves according to their own powers and their own histo­ nes.

2

It should be pointed out that some of Alain Badion's more recent work shows less emphasis on the. exceptional l"l·ent and more on the. contribution of cvents, cvcn of a quotidian variety, to the formation of subjectivity.

3

For an application of multitude theory to the events that led to Chavez's rcsto­ ration as president of Venezuela, see Heasley-Murray, ""It Happened on TV." For the GenoJ G8 demonstrations, see Negri, "Italy's P05tmodern Politics,�

4 5 6 7

5.

Sec chapter 1 above. See Deleuze, "PosL'Kript on Societies of C.ontrol," Negoriation.:citcd" if becomil!IJ dmrer as �to become apat/xti," if rrcedillg iI/to ohm/rity bcmllse ,"fir rc/atioll to "to b(((JIIUpolitical�r ill­ roll'edv is cbm!IJed), whereas singularity is this process of connection itself. An individuality is thus the outcome of the process of singularization. A hdpful account of Deleuze.'s conception of

the rdation between a singularity and an

n i dividual is in James Williams, GilIe5 DelewuI (£DijJerCllu and Repetition," 138ophy, ed. Peter Hallward. London: Continuum, 2004.

. COllrt tmitld'onrolqIie tmmiroin;. Paris: Seuil, 1995. ---. Ddmze: "flJ( ClalllorofBeing. TrJ.llS. Louise Burchill. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Originally published as DeiC/lzc (Paris: Hachette, ---

1(97).

---. De qllai Sarkozy tIt-ilk 110m? Paris: Nouvelles Editions Lignes, L007. . D'IIII dimstn oosC1lre (Droit, Etat, 1'oliti'll/e). ParL�: L'Aube, 1991. ---. Ethics: All Umicrltalldillg of El'il. Trans. Peter Hallward. London: Verso, 2001. Originally published as L'etlJUJlle: &ini JIIr In cOliscicllU dll mal (Paris: ---

Hatier, 19(3)· ---

. '"The Ethics of Truths: Construction J.I1d Potency." Trans. Thelma Sowley.

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