Evangelicalism and National Identity in Ulster, 1921-1998

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EVANGELICALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN ULSTER 1921–1998

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Evangelicalism and National Identity in Ulster 1921–1998

PATRICK MITCHEL

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi S o Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Patrick Mitchel 2003 All Bible quotations are taken from the New International Version (NIV). Copyright © 1973, 1978, 1984 by International Bible Society. The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2003 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-925615-2 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Typeset by Kolam Information Services Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by T. J. International Ltd., Padstow, Cornwall

To the people with whom I belong Ines, Ciara, and Catriona

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To all those who kindly made time to discuss with me their perspectives on the world of Ulster evangelicalism I express my thanks: Professor Finlay Holmes, Revd David Temple, Alywn Thomson, David Porter, Revd Brian Kennaway, Dr John Douglas, Glenn Jordan, Cecil Kilpatrick, Revd Stephen Johnston, Revd John Woodside, Revd Martin Smyth MP, David Hewitt, Dr Joe Liechty, George Patton, Revd Dr John Dunlop, and the late Revd Dr William Fleming. I am also grateful to many others who contributed through informal discussion and gave me new ideas or insights at important stages. Amongst these, an e-mail from Dr Miroslav Volf at about halfway helped to clear a way forward and Dr Neville Douglas directed my attention to useful sources that I would have otherwise missed. I also wish to record my thanks to the Laing Trust, without whose generous scholarship it is unlikely that the doctoral research, on which this book is based, would have reached completion. Much of the information for this book has been gathered at the following locations: the library at Queen's University, Belfast, the Linenhall Library, the Presbyterian Historical Society, Trinity College Dublin, and Union Theological College. Staff were unfailingly cooperative and helpful. I am grateful to staff both at ECONI for making archival material available and at Orange House for their generosity in giving me copies of much of their published literature. All Bible quotations are taken from the New International Version (NIV). I wish to thank in particular Revd Warren Nelson and Dr Peter Childs for their encouragement to undertake doctoral research in the first place. At London Bible College, I am deeply grateful to Dr Derek Tidball for his tolerance, wisdom, and tact in supervising my erratic progress. I am indebted to Professor Steve Bruce for his constructive criticism and generous advice

vii throughout the pre-publication process. Any errors, factual or interpretative, are entirely my own. A special word of thanks is due to my parents for their practical help and support. To my mother for her wonderful hospitality during many visits to ‘the North’ and to NCM, who, whether the subject is his beloved geography, or history, politics, archaeology, or whatever, continues to demonstrate an unfailing curiosity and infectious enthusiasm to ‘go exploring’ in this complex world. Better teachers (and parents) a son could not have. Finally, and even the trusty thesaurus on the word processor cannot help me find the right words here, I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to the three women in my life. To Ciara and Catriona for charmingly reminding me of life's right priorities, and to Ines for her consistent encouragement and patience throughout everything. It is to them that this book is dedicated. Patrick Mitchel Dublin April 2003

CONTENTS List of Figures List of Tables List of Main Abbreviations Introduction PART 1: NATIONALISM, IDENTITY, AND UNIONISM 1. Of Nations and Nationalism 2. National Identity and the Appeal of Nationalism 3. Paradise Lost?: The Rise and Fall of Ulster Unionism PART 2: SHADES OF ORANGE: DIFFERING VERSIONS OF ULSTER EVANGELICALISM 4. Gospel Truth: Describing Evangelicalism 5. Marching Backwards: The World of Orangeism 6. ‘Ourselves Alone’: Paisleyism and the Politics of Purity 7. Generating Distance?: The Changing Identity of Irish Presbyterianism 8. A Balancing Act: The Evangelicals of ECONI Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B Bibliography Index

ix x xi 1 11 13 47 69 103 105 133 171 213 260 299 318 320 322 345

LIST OF FIGURES 1. The spectrum of evangelicalism in Ulster 2. The structure of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland

131 138

LIST OF TABLES 1. 2. 3. 4.

Protestant national identity designation Religions of the population 1926–1991 Protestant Church membership in Northern Ireland Theological composition of denominational clusters in Belfast

91 126 127 128

LIST OF MAIN ABBREVIATIONS AIA

Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed in 1985 between the British and Irish governments, which institutionalized a formal role for the Irish government to monitor legal, political, and security matters of interest and concern to the nationalist population of the North. Succeeded in 1998 by the GFA. DUP Democratic Unionist Party, established in 1971 when Paisley renamed his Protestant Unionist Party to make it attractive to defectors from the UUP. EA Evangelical Alliance, one of the oldest and largest evangelical interdenominational organizations, founded in 1846 in London. ECONI Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland, a para-Church evangelical organization established during the 1980s, committed to peacemaking and conflict resolution. EIPS European Institute of Protestant Studies, established in 1997 to commemorate fifty years of ministry by Revd Ian Paisley. A branch of Martyrs' Memorial Free Presbyterian Church, its purpose is to ‘expound the Bible and expose the Papacy and to promote, defend and maintain Bible Protestantism in Europe and further afield’. FPCU Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster, a fundamentalist denomination, founded in 1951 by Revd Ian Paisley. GFA Good Friday Agreement (or Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations) signed on 10 April 1998, which established a complex system of power-sharing within a devolved Northern Ireland Assembly.

xii PCI RUC RTE SF SDLP UUP WCC

Presbyterian Church in Ireland, the largest Protestant denomination within Northern Ireland. Reformed in ethos and strongly influenced by evangelicalism. Royal Ulster Constabulary, the mainly Protestant police force of Northern Ireland, renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) on 4 November 2001 in light of the Patten Commission on Policing set up under the GFA. Radio Telefís éirenann, the Republic of Ireland's national broadcasting service. Sinn Féin, Irish for ‘We Ourselves’. The political partner of the IRA, together the two are known as ‘the republican movement’ which historically has sought to end the Union and incorporate Northern Ireland within a thirty-two county republic by violent means. Social Democratic and Labour Party, the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland. Founded in 1970, the SDLP is a constitutional democratic party that aims to see the unification of Ireland by agreement. Led by John Hume, the most influential figure of Northern nationalism, from 1982 to 2001. Ulster Unionist Party, the main unionist party in Northern Ireland which governed Northern Ireland at Stormont from 1921 to '72 until the British Conservative government under Edward Heath prorogued Stormont in 1972. Founded in 1948, the World Council of Churches is a global ecumenical network of more than 340 Churches, denominations, and fellowships in 120 countries.

Introduction In his critically acclaimed book Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation, the Croatian systematic theologian Miroslav Volf writes of the challenge Churches face in relating to the cultures they inhabit. Writing from close experience of violence, historic grievances, and the merciless logic of ethnic exclusion in the Balkans, he proposes that in part the answer lies ‘in cultivating the proper relation between distance from the culture and belonging to it’.1 His theological concept of distance and belonging forms an overarching theme of this book, which is an exploration of how evangelicalism in another ethnically divided part of the world, that of Northern Ireland, has interacted with the potent phenomenon of national identity since Partition. In broad terms, it will be argued that in the North the problem has been one of achieving belonging at the expense of failing to establish a healthy sense of distance. A second and related stimulus for this research lies in the work of David Bebbington. He concludes, towards the end of his masterly study of evangelicalism in modern Britain, that ‘nothing could be further from the truth than the common image of Evangelicalism being ever the same.’2 The self-understanding of evangelicals as communicating and protecting the apostolic teaching of the unchanging Gospel has often veiled profound

1

M. Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 37. Volf, then Associate Professor of Systematic Theology at Fuller Theological Seminary in California, draws on his experience of teaching in Croatia during the violent fragmentation of former Yugoslavia. His concept of ‘distance and belonging’ forms a sub-theme within the wider theological framework of ‘exclusion and embrace’ and is explored further in s. 2.2.

2

D. W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 271.

2

INTRODUCTION

changes in expression of the essential characteristics that constitute evangelical faith.3 While the characteristics he defines—conversionism, activism, biblicism, and crucicentrism—may have remained as the key markers of evangelicalism, they have been ‘bound up in the flux of events’ and significantly shaped by the particular environment of the time. He found that, from the 1730s to the 1980s, evangelicalism was transformed, both outwardly in terms of social composition and political attitudes, and inwardly in terms of theology and behaviour. Bebbington traces the shaping forces as changing socio-economic and political conditions which ‘drastically moulded its size, self-image, strategy and teaching’, even occasionally catalysing new phases of behaviour and new expressions of belief. However it is the cultural context which, he argues, ‘does most to explain the shape of the Evangelical religion’.4 Bebbington's work raises questions for the Ulster context. If indeed evangelicalism is moulded by its wider cultural context, how has this process evolved in Northern Ireland? My specific period of concern is Northern Ireland since Partition, its history and politics, with a particular stress on how evangelicalism has been shaped by, or itself has helped to shape, the violent and destructive whirlwind that blew across the land for much of the twentieth century. In other words, how has Ulster evangelicalism interacted with the explosive question of national identity in the past eighty years? This study covers approximately the period from Partition to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA). While the division of Ireland in effect allowed two distinct and opposing national identities freedom to implement their own social, political, religious, and cultural values within their respective territories, the GFA represented a historic attempt to reconcile the competing claims of Irish nationalism5 and Ulster unionism. Thus, the two terminal points for my enquiry embrace a tumultuous period of immense political change including the aftermath of

3

Ibid. 271. See 271–6 for wider argument.

4

Ibid. 272.

5

Throughout this book there are frequent references to the specific movement of Irish nationalism and to the ideology of nationalism in general. The former is usually qualified by the term ‘Irish’ or ‘Catholic’ and where it is not the context makes it clear which concept is under discussion.

INTRODUCTION

3

World War I, Partition, World War II, decades of hegemonic control of Ulster unionism, thirty years of political violence, rapid modernization, and the emergence of the 1990s Peace Process. Such a scenario provides a backdrop for tracing identity change within the various strands of evangelicalism selected for analysis. The religion in the Northern province of Ulster6 has been deeply influenced by evangelicalism from the 1740s to the present day. Already by the nineteenth century, evangelicals were closely associated with the emergence and ideological bulwarking of an Ulster provincial identity vehemently opposed to Home Rule. They offered theological justification for viewing Catholicism as ‘an alien creed and inferior culture’.7 How has evangelicalism been shaped culturally and theologically by the intense conflict of identity contained within this small geographical unit? Has it been indistinguishable from a general Protestant identity, without a distinctive voice? How did evangelicalism, both inside and outside the main denominations, respond to the turbulent political era of twentieth-century Ireland? In other words, the main focus of my enquiry is how different strands of Ulster evangelicalism have attempted to resolve the challenge to belong to and yet remain distant from their own cultural identity. Despite the proportionately large number of adherents and organizations within Northern Ireland, and the pervasive role it plays across social and denominational boundaries, evangelicalism in Ulster had not been studied at a serious historical level prior to Hempton and Hill's outstanding book Evangelical Protestantism in Ulster Society1740–1890. An enormous volume of literature has evolved since 1969 connected with politics, religion, ethnicity, and conflict, but surprisingly little on the role of evangelicalism in a divided society. The work of Steve Bruce has done most to fill this gap. However, his focus on the fundamentalist end of the evangelical spectrum has tended to mask a real

6

Ulster is one of the four ancient provinces of Ireland, comprising nine counties. Technically it is distinct from Northern Ireland, a political entity created in 1921 which consists of six counties, but in practice the two terms are used interchangeably and will be so employed in this book.

7

D. Hempton and M. Hill, Evangelical Protestantism in Ulster Society 1740–1890 (London: Routledge, 1992), p. xii.

4

INTRODUCTION

diversity of evangelical expression within Northern Ireland. This can result in a rather narrow portrait of evangelicalism, unrepresentative of the wider whole. This book will attempt to rectify that bias by painting with a broader brush. While useful work exists on dissecting distinct strands of identity within unionism, little research has been done on identifying and comparing specifically evangelical identities within Ulster Protestantism. Glenn Jordan's book, Not of this World?: Evangelical Protestants in Northern Ireland is a recent exception.8 Drawing on a ‘random’ selection of seventy-two anonymous interviews Jordan distills his findings into a series of thought-provoking reflections about evangelical beliefs and culture in Ulster. My book takes a different approach in that it has both a narrower focus and goes beyond interview-based research to a systematic analysis of primary sources produced by four representative evangelical identities. A comparative approach will be adopted to describe and assess how each has interacted with the political landscape of twentieth-century Ulster. They are: Orangeism, Paisleyism, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland (PCI), and Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI). Several factors controlled the selection of the four samples. First, they embrace Churches and interdenominational organizations all purporting to represent authentic evangelical faith. Second, they offer an opportunity to explore changes in evangelical identity over time. Two of the strands (the PCI and Orange Order) embody religious identities already possessing long historical trajectories before Partition. The Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster (FPCU) and ECONI are organizations originating within my study period, and represent the lively diversity, if not stark polarity, between evangelical communities in Ulster. Third, the samples are broadly representative

8

G. Jordan, Not of this World?: Evangelical Protestants in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff and the Centre for Contemporary Christianity in Ireland, 2001). Jordan's book provides an illuminating insight into attitudes ‘on the ground’ within popular Ulster evangelicalism. While the anonymous nature of the interviews was probably unavoidable, a weakness is that no criteria are given for the selection of his sample nor is data given on the social, religious and political background of the sample group. For a still more general overview see S. McKay, An Unsettled People. The Protestants of Ulster (Belfast: Blackstaff, 2000).

INTRODUCTION

5

of the bulk of Ulster evangelicalism. The PCI is the largest of the three ‘mainline’ Protestant denominations and is strongly influenced by evangelicalism. No study of Ulster evangelicalism can ignore the profound and lasting impact that the avowedly evangelical Orange Order has made on the landscape of Ulster Protestantism. In regard to Ian Paisley it is important to distinguish between the modest size of his fundamentalist FPCU and the powerful political force that Paisleyism represents within Ulster unionism. Despite being the youngest organization there is evidence that ECONI is attracting significant support from a wide spectrum of Ulster evangelicalism. Fourth, as a stimulus for research, the case studies exhibit a variegated, and in some cases mutable, response to the relationship of nationalism and religion. Fifth, all the groups exhibit a medium to high degree of political activism. Given the broad and diffuse nature of evangelicalism, it was necessary to limit the boundary of my study to groups that are politically engaged. In general, charismatic, pentecostal, and Brethren Churches have tended to stress an ‘other-worldliness’ that has minimized active participation in the political sphere.9 This fact, combined with their modest strength within Ulster evangelicalism and the requirement to focus this investigation, means that they have been excluded from examination. Much recent academic and popular attention has been paid to one particular section of evangelicalism within Ulster, that of Ian Paisley and his denomination of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster.10 Paisley is a difficult figure to disregard.

9

Exceptions exist of course. In 1998, prior to the GFA Referendum, a petition exhorting a ‘no’ vote against the GFA on religious grounds was signed by both FPCU ministers and a significant number of charismatic and pentecostal clergy including Pastor James McConnell of the Metropolitan Tabernacle in Belfast (one of the largest churches in Northern Ireland). I am grateful to Dr Steve Bruce for this point.

10

Recent works include: D. Taylor, ‘The Lord's Battle: An Ethnographic and Social Study of Paisleyism in Northern Ireland’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Queen's University, Belfast, 1983); S. Bruce, God Save Ulster!: The Religion and Politics of Paisleyism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); E. Moloney and A. Pollak, Paisley (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1986); C. Smyth, Ian Paisley: Voice of Protestant Ulster (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1987); and D. Cooke, Persecuting Zeal: A Portrait of Ian Paisley (Dingle: Brandon, 1996). A number of journal articles, accompanied by some postgraduate research, have also emerged in recent years.

6

INTRODUCTION

His highly publicized and dramatic street politics have the capacity to strike deep emotive chords in the Protestant psyche and mobilize his followers for radical action. Even the larger, long-established and highly influential Orange Order has attracted little interest in comparison.11 Virtually ignored have been the less strident forms of Ulster evangelicalism, found mainly within the Presbyterian, Anglican, and Methodist denominations that represent the majority of evangelicals in Ulster.12 There are good reasons why this should be so. The ideological content of what will be labelled ‘open’ evangelicalism is characterized by rational, intellectual, and moderate values that stress the need for mutual understanding and tolerance. In the structural conflict of Northern Ireland it is less potent than what will be called ‘closed’ evangelicalism in utilizing myth, emotions, and deep-seated fears to inspire radical action. As a consequence it has a lower public profile. Yet to overlook it is to ignore an important component of Ulster evangelicalism and present an inaccurate and incomplete picture of how evangelicals there have responded to the pressing question of national identity. Thus, the main rationale behind a comparative approach is to place each strand selected in its wider context within the diverse family tree of evangelicalism in Ulster. Part 1 lays the necessary theoretical and methodological foundations for subsequent analysis of Ulster evangelicalism by examining the relationship between nationalism, identity, and unionism. Chapter 1 outlines a broad interpretative approach to nationalism and offers a rationale for understanding Ulster unionism as a form of nationalism. The second chapter examines important functional characteristics of national identity in the modern world. The nature of identity will be defined and its

11

Apart from Tony Gray's The Orange Order (London: Bodley Head, 1972) which was written at a popular level, there has been little serious study on the Orange Order until the recent publication of Kevin Haddick-Flynn's historical analysis, Orangeism: The Making of a Tradition (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 1998) and Ruth Dudley-Edward's sympathetic account in The Faithful Tribe: An Intimate Portrait of the Loyal Institutions (London: HarperCollins, 1999).

12

While general treatments are available, the only specific study of how the predominantly evangelical Presbyterian Church of Ireland has responded to the vexing issues of Northern Ireland is John Dunlop's A Precarious Belonging: Presbyterians and the Coniflict in Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1995).

INTRODUCTION

7

character explored by answering such questions as ‘What is identity?’, ‘How is it formed?’, ‘How is it maintained?’, ‘What is its relationship to nationalism?’, and ‘How does identity operate in conditions of conflict?’ An answer to the question of what is the appropriate relationship for Christians to have with their own particular national identity will be sought by using Volf's themes of distance and belonging. In Chapter 3 attention is turned to a case study of Ulster unionist identity, the cultural and political seedbed for contemporary Ulster evangelicalism. Given the intimacy of unionism's historical affair with Ulster evangelicalism, an outline of its ideological framework and recent fortunes will provide valuable background to an analysis of the relationship between political Protestantism and evangelicalism in Part 2. In Part 2 the focus shifts to evangelicalism. Chapter 4 discusses the general nature of evangelical faith and the difficulties in offering a precise definition of the movement. A particular focus is evangelicalism's relationship with fundamentalism, an issue of some import, particularly when interpreting Paisleyism's role within Ulster evangelicalism. It also introduces the notion of a spectrum, ranging from open to closed evangelicalism, reflecting the multifaceted status of evangelical faith in Ulster and its variegated relationship with unionist national identity. Chapters 5 to 8 then unpack the values and beliefs of each of the selected strands of this spectrum in turn. Questions addressed will include: ‘What are the distinct characteristics of these sub-identities?’, ‘What changes in identity over time are observable within these different shades of evangelicalism?’, and ‘What ideological differences exist in relation to their attitudes to nationalism?’ Volf's concepts of distance and belonging are used as tools to assess each identity's relationship with the historical narrative of Ulster unionism from a theological perspective. General conclusions are then drawn about the character of open and closed evangelical identities in Ulster and the nature of their relationship with nationalism. I should at this point make some remarks about my own perspective. One of the welcome insights of the (Western) post-modern era is a scepticism of modernist hubris as exemplified in the image of the neutral observer objectively distilling ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ from his research, his conclusions impartially

8

INTRODUCTION

disconnected from his personal, cultural, and social context. In its place is an acknowledgement that the writer, whether a sociologist of religion, or a theologian, or whoever, brings to his text a world view laden with presuppositions. In saying this I am not making the philosophical leap of faith of some post-modern deconstructionists who conclude (with absolute certainty) that there is no such thing as absolute truth.13 I am, however, acknowledging that I have certain convictions that have shaped the content of this book since I belong ‘within the evangelical camp’. As such, my intention is not to apply reductionist logic to ‘explain away’ evangelical beliefs and actions within a ‘closed universe’ where all causes and effects are bounded within a self-referential circle of human culture. Rather, I write as a Christian committed to an evangelical understanding of Scripture and the Gospel, but one who is all too aware of the imperfections and limitations (including my own) of how evangelicals attempt to ‘work out their salvation’ within contemporary society. Any critical assessment of Ulster evangelicalism is offered therefore, not to dismiss religious belief, but to discuss what it means in practice for evangelicals to live up to their selfprofessed calling in a context of competing nationalisms within Northern Ireland. The relationship between evangelicalism and society in general is beyond the scope of this study; my primary focus is the intersection between evangelicalism and nationalism. In doing so my study will also inevitably concentrate on the more contentious and political issues faced by evangelicals since the 1920s in Ireland, an era dominated by ‘the National Question’. The obvious danger in such an approach is that it cannot do justice to the much wider reality of evangelical faith and is therefore liable to offer a distorted and myopic view of Ulster evangelicalism as a movement obsessed with the issue of national identity.

13

See for example Jacques Derrida who argued that rather than the existence of objective truth waiting to be discovered, all we have is a ‘bottomless chessboard’ of our own interpretations of reality. J. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 154. For an evangelical critique of such post-modern hermeneutics see A. E. McGrath, A Passion for Truth: The Intellectual Coherence of Evangelicalism (Leicester: Apollos, 1996), 184–200.

INTRODUCTION

9

Evangelicalism has a lively diversity often masked by general studies such as this one. Those who are familiar with a vigorous evangelical subculture throughout Ireland will know that, to many, politics and national identity are peripheral matters of less spiritual significance than prayer, evangelism, participation in Church life, youth work, Christian education, Bible study, social action, preaching, music and worship, children's work, and supporting overseas mission. These traits are central to many evangelicals' lives and form the dynamic heart of a movement whose members claim to be motivated by a genuine desire to love God, to do his will, and to make his love known to others. Also falling outside the remit of this study is the very different case of Southern evangelicalism. A comparative study between Northern evangelicalism's relationship with unionism and Southern evangelicalism's relationship with Irish nationalism was considered but rejected for methodological reasons. A comparison was contemplated in order to explore the striking reality that, in my experience, evangelicals in the Republic (who profess faith in the same apostolic Gospel) largely originate from a Roman Catholic background and are comfortable with an Irish nationalist cultural identity. They feel little, if any, affinity for the unionist politics and Protestant identity of their fellow evangelicals north of the Border. This disparity has the potential to highlight how identity is intimately bound to place, or as Estyn Evans succinctly put it, ‘Of this I am convinced; what is called “Irishness” can be understood only in relation to the homeland…In the long run, I believe geography counts more than genes.’14 If true, one implication for Ulster evangelicals is that the historic association between unionism and evangelicalism is more an accident of history and geography than the continued existence of the Union being vital to protect the truth of evangelicalism. Nevertheless, a comparative study was rejected methodologically because evangelicalism in the Republic of Ireland

14

E. E. Evans, ‘The Irishness of the Irish’, lecture given to the Irish Association for Cultural, Economic and Social Relations, repr. in E. E. Evans, Ireland and the Atlantic Heritage: Selected Writings (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1996), 32.

10

INTRODUCTION

consists of a small, disorganized spectrum of denominational Churches and newer fellowships, largely peripheral to Irish society. Published material is scant. Entirely different questions exist as to how a generally ‘distant’ movement can ‘belong’ to Irish culture and life. The situation demands a wholly different methodological approach using questionnaires and case studies of individual Churches. This in turn would raise serious questions over the validity of any comparative findings between the two regions. The theme of distance and belonging within Southern evangelical identity, while potentially fascinating and productive, is therefore a subject that demands a separate study in its own right.

PART 1Nationalism, Identity, and Unionism


1 Of Nations and Nationalism Surely the nations are like a drop in a bucket; they are regarded as dust on the scales. (Isaiah 40: 15) The kings of Tarshish and of distant shores will bring tribute to him; the kings of Sheba and Seba will present him gifts. All kings will bow down to him and all nations will serve him. (Psalm 72: 10–11) It is a premise of this study that the struggle to express and defend national identity is at the heart of Ireland's twentieth-century political turmoil. Yet, despite its importance for individuals, society, and nation, identity is a concept that is difficult to define. For example, while a wide range of analysts, and even opposing political parties, can agree that the conflict in Northern Ireland is connected to identity, the term is often only used in a narrow and limited sense of being British, Irish, or some associated variation of the two.15 Such an approach fails to discuss the power of nationalism to generate deep and emotional allegiances over long periods. It also overlooks the relationship of national identity with wider contexts such as culture, territory, ritual, emotion, and the nation's destiny. A primary task therefore for Chapters 1 and 2 is to analyse the nature and function of nationalism and national identity in the modern world. A working interpretation of nationalism is

15

See for example B. M. Walker, Dancing to History's Tune: History, Myth and Politics in Ireland (Belfast: The Institute of Irish Studies, 1996), ch.6. See also K. Trew, ‘National Identity’, in R. Breen, P. Devine, and L. Woods (eds.), Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: The Fifth Report 1995–1996 (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1996), 140–52. For a similar approach see E. Moxon-Browne, ‘National Identity in Northern Ireland’, in P. Stringer and G. Robinson (eds.), Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland, 1990 –1 edn. (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1991).

14

OF NATIONS AND NATIONALISM

required that will give an account of its nature and relationship with national identity. In particular, it is necessary to outline my methodological approach to Ulster unionism and delineate my understanding of its relationship with nationalist ideology. Such an analysis will provide a platform from which to assess, in Chapter 3, the journey of Ulster unionist identity since Partition. I will argue that such a theoretical understanding provides a valuable interpretative framework for this research since evangelicalism in Ulster, as elsewhere, is profoundly influenced by the wider cultural and political context in which it exists. Part 1 will form the basis from which a critical evaluation of discrete evangelical identities will be attempted in Part 2.

1.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO NATIONALISM 1.1.1 The persistence of nationalism The nation state is a ubiquitous feature of the modern world. Nationalism is accepted as the normative context for the implementation of political ideals across the globe. Nation states exist as members of the wider international community where the nation is sanctioned as the most, if not only, legitimate form of political activity. Anthony Smith goes as far as to contend that ‘the nation and nationalism provide the only realistic socio-cultural framework for a modern world order. They have no rivals today.’16 Certainly, the overwhelming success of nationalism at the turn of the millennium is indisputable; no other form of political practice exists that begins to challenge its universal appeal and functional effectiveness. Given these considerations, Smith contends that ‘it would be folly to predict an early supersession of nationalism and an imminent transcendence of the nation. Both remain indispensable elements of an interdependent world and a mass-communications culture.’17 This stance, of defending the continuity and relevance of nations and nationalism in what are now post-modern times, is highly contested. Numerous voices, from a perplexing number

16

A. D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 159.

17

Ibid. 160.


15

of academic perspectives offering differing explanations, proclaim the end of the nation.18 In brief, the general case revolves around the impact of post-modernity on traditional forms of nationalism. Nationalism, it is argued, was symptomatic of modernity's quest for uniformity, boundaries, and stability. Nation states were centralized polities characterized by cultural and political homogeneity. The success of nationalism led to ‘not a uniform world, but a world of limited, independent uniformities’.19 In contrast, the post-modern era is characterized by such features as globalization; international money markets; the formation of supranational economic and political organizations like the European Union (EU); and the erosion of the notion of unique and separate cultures under the onslaught of a global homogenizing culture. Such developments, the argument goes, have acted fatally to undermine the autonomy and stability of the nation state. We are thus living not only in post-modern, but also in what some have called ‘post-nationalist times’.20 The impulse for post-nationalism comes from the idea that the modern nation state is too large, remote and distant to satisfy the need for personal identity. Yet, it is too small to survive in a world economy without belonging to a larger economic unit. In McCrone's definition, post-nationalism is really a new form of nationalism that stresses belonging to the nation in terms of citizenship, interdependence, working together in a common territory, and with a non-political nature that has distanced itself from classical nationalism. Such a new form of nationalism is ‘probably the gravedigger of the conventional nation-state with its commitment to a world of sovereign self-reliant nation-states claiming the right to assert themselves and pursue their essential national interests by taking recourse to force’.21 The obverse side of the decline of classic nationalism is the emergence of the ‘new tribalism’, where previously suppressed

18

For example see Z. Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (London: Routledge, 1993), 141.

19

M. Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 130.

20

See for example R. Kearney, Postnationalist Ireland: Politics, Culture, Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997) and also D. McCrone, Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation (London: Routledge, 1992).

21

McCrone, Understanding Scotland, 221.

16


sub-national identities are rising to challenge the old, imposed consensus.22 It is, as Billig puts it, ‘as if the whole business of nationhood is being unravelled’.23 The ‘meta-narrative’ of nationalism is being replaced by numerous micro-narratives acting to destroy it from below, while globalization ‘flattens’ it from above. However, general assertions of nationalism's impending demise should be treated with caution. Several factors significantly qualify the post-nationalist thesis. First, national identities are not easily diluted or exchanged. Each identity has a continuity of character, established over generations, that changes gradually. ‘Being’ Irish, or German (or whatever) requires a long commitment over time.24 National identity has a permanence not quickly brushed aside by the onset of post-modernism. Second, the emergence of new tribalisms may not be so far removed from conventional nationalism as at first assumed. They maintain an essential continuity with classic nationalism in their quest to implement, in the political world, the inalienable right of the group to possess its own homeland. Boundaries remain crucial. The national ideal retains its potency. Third, it is far from clear that supranational projects like the EU are actually corroding the concept of nationhood. Contested visions of Europe's future—pro-and anti-federalist—both continue to revolve around the notion of statehood and national boundaries.25 Mann argues that the development of the EU actually represents a unique case and

22

G. Veith, Guide to Contemporary Culture (Leicester: Crossway Books, 1994), 143–56. Zygmunt Bauman goes as far as to argue that since postmodern nations are so structurally different from modern nations a new language should be employed. They lack genuine sovereignty and national ‘viability’. Thus he announces ‘exit the nationstate, enter the tribe’, Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 141.

23

Billig, Banal Nationalism, 134.

24

The argument for the historic continuity of nationalism, founded on its ethnic origins, has been made most forcefully in the work of Anthony Smith, discussed at more length in s. 1.2 below. See for example A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

25

Billig, Banal Nationalism, 141–2. He notes that the federalist case transfers nationhood to the larger entity of a Federal Europe, while anti-federalists wish to maintain the status quo of existing nations within Europe. In both instances, boundaries and borders remain vital to the national project.


17

only a slight modification of the traditional notion of the nation state.26 Elsewhere, nation states are at varied stages of maturity. Announcement of the imminent death of the nation is therefore premature. Following this reasoning it seems justified to concur with Smith that nationalism retains its considerable power, if modified, in the post-modern era. Such debate can seem somewhat abstract but, turning to Ireland, the issue assumes importance. The post-nationalist case appears to be strongest in the context of stable, peaceful societies where the primary objective of nation building (autonomy in an independent homeland) can quietly be taken for granted. Postnationalism can be described as ‘non-political’, ‘broad and diffuse’, and most significantly, operating without a definite goal in sight. A good case can be made that these are all characteristics embodied within the un-threatened and successful political, economic, and cultural story of contemporary (Southern) Irish identity.27 It may well be that the Republic is beginning to travel, in its own unique way, on a post-nationalist path.28 However, until the late 1990s this was manifestly not the case in Northern Ireland where a contested ideology of place acted to keep nationalist fuels burning brightly. Nationalism therefore must be regarded as a core factor in any interpretation of the Northern conflict.

26

M. Mann, ‘Nation-states in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying’, in G. Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation (London: Verso, 1996), 295–316, see 296–7.

27

It can be argued that the three main components of classic Irish nationalist mythology, exemplified in the de Valeran period, were sacral (God is on our side), historical (a restored Gaelic State), and territorial (an indivisible island). By 2000 all three had been largely abandoned. The first was jettisoned under the impact of increasing secularism, the second pragmatically put to one side as outdated, and the third willingly sacrificed to the northern Peace Process by the modification of Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution to acknowledge the necessity for unionist consent to Irish unity. EU membership has witnessed much of Irish sovereignty being ceded to Brussels. For further discussion of changes to classic Irish nationalist ideology see P. Mitchel, ‘Ireland As it Never Used to Be’, Frontiers, 3/1 (Autumn 1998), 13–18.

28

For further discussion see V. Geoghgan, ‘Socialism, National Identities and Post-Nationalist Citizenship’, Irish Political Studies, 9 (1994), 61–80. Also Kearney, Postnationalist Ireland, 185–8.

18


1.1.2 The character of nationalism Given its sweeping dominance of the modern world it is ironic that a popular perception of nationalism is of a primitive ideology that inspires revolutions, bloodbaths, fanatical extremists, and ethnic cleansing. Nationalism is frequently identified with the retrogressive, the radical, and the ruthless. Clearly, there is truth in the stereotype. Nationalism enjoyed a resurgence towards the end of the twentieth century repeatedly characterized by violent conflict and brutal implementation of ‘purist’ policies to eliminate ‘non-nationals’ from a claimed national territory. However, a narrow definition of nationalism as essentially negative and destructive is, in reality, a caricature. Smith constructs a convincing three-pronged ‘defence of the nation’ against commentators fond of ‘attributing to nationalism many of the conflicts that infest our planet’.29 He proposes that nationalism is neither intellectually incoherent, nor ethically extremist in character, nor essentially politically divisive by nature.30 First, criticism that nationalism is intellectually inconsistent (whether through historical inaccuracies or mythological territorial claims) fails to recognize that national identity does not operate solely at the level of abstract theory; its attraction lies in channelling popular needs and aspirations within a mythic narrative. Since nationalism is at heart a story, awkward facts of history or controversy over where a ‘natural border’ lies represent theoretical difficulties peripheral to the core of nationalist thinking. Second, it is transparent that there are nationalisms and nationalisms. Certainly, history shows that a national identity's preoccupation with ethnicity, cultural distinctiveness, territory, and autonomy may often lapse into exclusion, discrimination, and even extermination of its Other. Yet, it is mistaken to assume that this is a common characteristic of nationalism per se. Nationalism takes many guises. Moderate forms coexist with extremist ideologies. Some are at the early stage of ‘national awakening’, others in a period of peaceful consolidation. Some, like Wales, are more concerned with the survival and strengthening of essential elements of national identity such as the language and culture of a nation, than

29

Smith, Nations, 147.

30

Ibid. 148–53.


19

seeking political autonomy as an ultimate goal.31 The emergence of ost-nationalism is characterized by cultural pluralism rather than cultural homogeneity, citizenship rather than ethnicity, and national interdependence within larger political communities rather than the image of a sovereign independent nation aggressively defending its own interests.32 It is therefore simplistic reductionism to label all nationalisms as exclusivist, oppressive, and discriminatory against minorities. Numerous examples of exclusion and an ominous pursuit of cultural purity exist, yet specific cases should not be taken as normative. Third, nor is it sustainable to argue that nationalism itself is in essence a divisive political force. Again, it can be so, but nationalisms often emerge from the breakdown of states the origins of whose demise are not solely attributable to nationalism. In a more positive light, nationalism provides social cohesion and unity in periods of rapid political change. The divisive ‘dark side’ of nationalism is simply the obverse side of its ‘popular, unifying and solidaristic dimensions’.33 Michael Billig has drawn attention to the normal, ‘banal’ aspects of nationalism, arguing that in established, democratic nations, national identity is ‘flagged’ on a daily routine basis. Communal identity is continually reinforced so that nationhood is a familiar concept in contemporary life. A result is that the world of nations is reproduced as a natural political environment. Such nationalism is familiar, comfortable, and stable in contrast to ‘florid language of blood myths’ contained within ‘hot’ nationalisms.34 The significance for this inquiry of drawing distinctions between various expressions of nationalism is that it focuses attention on the need to evaluate the content, or character, of a particular nationalism. Nationalism is a broad, ill-defined term that has become stretched to include such a variegated spectrum

31

W. Storrar, ‘ “Vertigo” or “Imago”? Nations in the Divine Economy’, Themelios, 21/3 (Apr. 1996), 5.

32

Kearney, Postnationalist Ireland, 15–24.

33


34

Billig, Banal Nationalism, 93. For a similar argument distinguishing between a ‘demonized’ version of nationalism and the routine form, see A. Finlayson, ‘Political Ideology and the Mythic Discourse of Nationalism’, unpublished D.Phil. thesis (Queen's University, Belfast, 1996), 1–3.

20


of political movements that, used on its own, has become virtually meaningless. To describe a movement simply as ‘nationalist’ is to add little to an understanding of its nature. The content of nationalism—its values, myths, attitudes, and cultural markers that are believed to be inherent characteristics of the nation—is what constitutes national identity. It is thus essential to interpret a particular nationalism through the lens of its own national identity if informed conclusions about the type of political movement under analysis are to be reached. It is not the aim here to construct a general sociological theory of nationalism. The point at issue is that while individual nationalisms may have distinct identities and origins, it is possible to identify general patterns of nationalist identity and beliefs.35 In other words, national identities may be examples of different forms of social reality but they exhibit similar structural patterns of thought. National identity revolves around quite specific ideas of what sort of people constitute that nation. Different, and often conflicting, conclusions may be reached within discrete nationalisms, yet they are answering broadly similar questions. For this reason, some time will be spent in Chapter 2 outlining common components of national identity. How these characteristics are ‘filled out’ with meaning in individual cases will vary enormously. This ideological and cultural differentiation is what gives a specific nationalism its unique flavour. Using this framework, it will be my specific purpose in Chapter 3 to describe and analyse the particular content of Ulster unionist identity.

1.1.3 Interpreting nationalism Nationalism has been defined as ‘the ideological process by which nations are constituted. Any ideology which deploys or produces assumptions about a nation in order to explain itself is being nationalist.’36 Such a wide definition is helpful. It guards

35

A point made by James Anderson who acknowledges that while it is unlikely that variegated forms of nationalism can be explained by a single theory, there is considerable scope for progress towards a ‘unity of explanation’. See J. Anderson, ‘Nationalist Ideology and Territory’, in R. J. Johnston, D. Knight, and E. Kofman (eds.), Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography (London: Croom-Helm, 1988), 19.

36

Finlayson, ‘Political Ideology’, 11 (emphasis original).


21

against a limited interpretation of nationalism as the ideological basis of a movement focused on the founding or development of a specific nation. While it includes this, nationalism should not be so tightly confined. Finlayson's definition above is flexible enough to allow the inclusion of movements whose political ideologies depend upon and revolve around the core elements of nationalism. Their utilization of nationalist imagery and language, perhaps for purposes of self-authentication, identifies them as nationalist in character even if their primary objective is not the propagation of the nation in strict terms. The adoption of this definition will be highly significant for this investigation for two reasons. First, it allows Ulster unionism to be interpreted as a form of nationalism despite its peculiar objective to preserve the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom coupled with a general disinterest in independence.37 Second, it permits religious movements to be interpreted as nationalist in character if their ideology suggests this to be the case. Given its importance to this study, some justification for my broad definition of nationalism is warranted. Three are outlined below.

1.1.3.1 The exibility of nationalism First, part of the difficulty in defining nationalism, and a crucial element in its political advance, is because it is highly flexible in content and social form; it rarely, if ever, exists in isolation. Significantly, nationalism is usually accompanied by a descriptive adjective, whether it be civic, ethnic, liberal, democratic, socialist, religious, communist, or whatever. Its strength lies in being able to accommodate and embrace other ideological forms. The protean nature of nationalism allows it to adapt to particular local, social, and political circumstances. Cognizance of this point is essential if a narrow idealist interpretation of nationalism is to be avoided. It also warns of the danger of conflating nation and state. Many nations will seek their own state, but some do not, preferring instead union within larger polity. Catalonia, Wales, and Northern Ireland are all examples of the latter case. Oommen identifies only two essential characteristics for a nation to exist: citizenship and inter-communal communication.38

37

For a detailed defence of this position, see s. 1.3 below.

38

T. K. Oommen, Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, 30.

22


Other factors may be incorporated within a nationalist discourse (e.g. religion) but are not necessary for nationalism to exist. The point is that the multiplicity of nationalist expression dictates that an inclusive approach is adopted if justice is to be done to the breadth of movements that fall under the nationalist umbrella.

1.1.3.2 Nationalism and religion A particular focus of this work is the case where religion acts as an ideological partner of nationalist belief.39 Examinations of the connection between religion and group identity are not new. Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life was a seminal work for a sociological approach that stressed how religious belief, and especially ritual, strengthens group bonds and social ties between individuals through enacted symbolization of abstract social values.40 Another significant work was Malinowski's Magic, Science, and Religion, which emphasized, from a social-psychological point of view, how religion meets the individual's needs for personal security in an uncertain world as well as providing a framework for stability within, and making sense of, that world.41 Such approaches have been catalysts for research that has provided a more complete understanding of the ‘functions’ of religion in a diverse range of societies. Such early sociological theories of religion opened the way for a rapid expansion of interest in the sociological study of religion and religion's relationship with other components of society (such as nationalism) throughout the rest of the twentieth century.42

39

At this juncture, it should be stated that exploring the intersection between nationalism and religious belief does not necessarily imply a rationalist and reductionist view of religion. An examination of this relationship is a markedly separate issue to discussing the ‘truth’ or otherwise of religious faith.

40

E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947 first published 1912.

41

B. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948.

42

For an account of this process see for example M. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1981 especially ch.1. McGuire contends that modern sociology of religion is built upon older classical theories and continues to attempt to understand the nature of society through examination of religion.


23

In Part 2 attention will be paid to both the ideological content and function of four avowedly evangelical identities. Given the often incestuous relationship between religion and nationalism, the issue will not be whether members of these identities deny that their ideology is nationalist or not. Self-definitions will not be accepted at face value. Rather the functions of their ‘religious’ ideology will be analysed and compared with the functions of nationalism and conclusions reached about the nature of each identity selected. The frequent intermeshing of religious and nationalist beliefs in a disparate number of contexts has meant that it is not possible to sustain an artificial dichotomy between two frequently overlapping ideological constructs. Nationalism is rarely ‘purely’ political; indeed, it is seldom not imbued with a religious flavour. Not only can the functions of nationalism and religion be mirror images of each other, but they can share common origins as well. Hastings makes this point plain: ‘Biblical Christianity both undergirds the cultural and political world out of which the phenomena of nationhood and nationalism as a whole developed and in a number of important cases provided a crucial ingredient for the particular history of both nations and nationalism.’43 Consistent with his earlier work, Smith has recently drawn attention to the religious origins of some nationalisms, whereby a contemporary sense of collective destiny can be traced back to older beliefs in divine ethnic election. Such ancient beliefs continue to exert influence in the modern era by giving ‘modern nationalisms a powerful impetus and model, particularly among peoples in the monotheistic traditions’.44 In this scenario, the pursuit of the nationalist agenda for a given community draws its inspiration from the belief in a unique national destiny. The interplay between older pre-modern traditions and myths (like ethnic election, especially in its covenantal form) and the powerful forces of modernization, plays an important part in explaining the passionate intensity of some modern nationalisms.45 In light of these issues, any

43

A. Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 4.

44

A. D. Smith, ‘Ethnic Election and National Destiny: Some Religious Origins of Nationalist Ideals’, Nations and Nationalism, 5/3 (1999), 331–55.

45

Ibid. 332.

24


theoretical approach to nationalism must allow room for how religious movements can take on a nationalist character and vice versa.

1.1.3.3 The narrative of nationalism A third reason for an elastic definition of nationalism is that it is in essence a creative narrative that expresses itself in a variety of forms. Only in certain circumstances will it achieve the necessary coherence and power to mobilize large elements of the population. Geertz identified four stages of nationalism: formation, triumph, organization, and stability,46 the first two being generally the most dramatic. Caution should be exercised in assuming that nationalism has a beginning, middle, and end since this implicitly suggests an onward progression from one stage to another. Such rhetoric is frequently part of a partisan nationalist agenda. Whether Geertz's scheme is strictly accurate is not my primary concern, its value lies in how attention is drawn to the developing and evolving character of any particular nationalism. In other words, each nationalism must be analysed in terms of its own unique historical journey.47 If nationalism is a doctrine, or set of beliefs, then it is continually being reshaped and in turn helping to reshape the wider social context in which it exists. A consequence of this approach is to argue that nationalism is best interpreted individually, in its specific local context. There is no one universal character of nationalism, but rather a spectrum of political discourses organized around particular social, historical, and political influences that shape the content of individual nationalisms. Part of my broad approach to nationalism includes a historical strand of analysis within every identity selected. If nationalist ideology is in a continual process of construction and reconstruction, it can be argued that a histor

46

C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Hutchinson, 1973, 238.

47

This is a separate point from proposing that the origin of nationalism be best explained in narrative terms. Breuilly criticizes such accounts as explaining nothing. It may describe the ‘how’ of the rise of nationalism but it offers no reasons for the ‘why’. See J. Breuilly, ‘Approaches to Nationalism’, in G. Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation (London: Verso, 1996, 146–74, see p. 157. Here the term narrative is describing its changing nature, not its origins as such.


25

ical perspective is essential within any interpretative framework. Static, ahistorical portraits of nationalism will only depict a narrow one-dimensional perspective. Each mode, or narrative, of nationalism tells its own unique story and needs to be understood and interpreted in its own terms. General theories of nationalism concerned with its origins, structure, development, and political function, while valuable, often fail to address the social and subjectivist expression of nationalism at the local level. They can overlook the internal ideological content of a specific nationalism by looking for generalized external causes of nationalism (e.g. modernization).48 From this discussion of nationalism several themes have emerged that will shape my approach to national identity, Ulster unionism, and evangelicalism in the next two chapters and beyond. A first priority will be to focus on the content and character of the individual identities in question. A function of Chapter 2 is to provide the tools to do this. It will describe the general core characteristics of national identity. From this general foundation my approach will not be to define rigidly ‘from the top down’ which identity is nationalist by attempting to fit it into a predetermined box. Rather, case studies will work ‘from the bottom up’ by analysis of ideological development during my study period. The objective will not be simply to draw narrow conclusions about whether nationalism is observable or not. A more interesting and relevant issue to explore will be what variety of nationalism is present.

48

The wider debate about the origins of nationalism is beyond the scope of this study. For articulation of various modernist interpretations see for example E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994; Breuilly, ‘Approaches’; E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; and E. Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. Views rejecting the modernist hypotheses as providing an inadequate view of the nature of nationalism include A. D. Smith, ‘Nationalism and Historians’, in G. Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation (London: Verso, 1996, 175–97 and also Smith, Ethnic Origins ; M. Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, 75–80; T. Garvin, ‘The Return of History: Collective Myths and Modern Nationalisms’, Irish Review, 9 (1990), 16–30; A. Finlayson, ‘Nationalism as Ideological Interpellation: The Case Study of Ulster Loyalism’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 19/1 (Jan. 1996, 89–92.

26


A second priority will be to locate and discuss the nature of any ideological partnerships between nationalism and religion (evangelicalism). Under my broad understanding of nationalism, when and how do any of the four evangelical identities also fall under the seductive power of nationalism? Given the narrative nature of nationalism, a third priority is to maintain a historical perspective and watch for ideological development over time. A particular facet of this perspective will be to look for any relationship of identity change in Ulster unionism with identity change in the different strands of evangelicalism selected.

1.2 ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM, AND THE FORMATION OF UNIONIST IDENTITY Smith has developed a theory of the ethnie or ethnic background of nations that can usefully be applied to the emergence of nationalism in the Irish context. He proposes that modern nationalist movements should be examined in historical terms to determine ‘how far a connection with earlier ethnic ties and sentiments can be established’.49 Cultures, he argues, transform very slowly and many nations are rooted in older ethnic communities that have evolved over time. Yet, these changes operate within a pre-existing framework of loyalties and identities. Not all nations are assumed to have emerged as a result of this process. However the presence of a great many ethnic communities scattered across different continents and cultures over the entire historical record suggests ‘that not only did many nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing ethnie and their ethnocentrisms, but that in order to forge a “nation” today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to “nation-building” ’.50 Once an ethnic community is formed it is difficult to destroy and unlikely easily to disappear. While its form and identity may change over time, the ideological need for modern nationalism to recover the older ‘pure nation’ highlights the ‘durability of older ethnic forms in the heart of the modern era’.51 Thus, a national identity emerges rooted in myth, history,

49

Smith, Ethnic Origins, 13.

50

Ibid. 17.

51

Ibid. See especially chs. 8 and 9 for wider argument.


27

traditions, and symbols (the core of the ethnie). The ethnie forms the basis for later nation building with the advent of the modern concept of nationalism.52 Despite criticism,53 Smith's proposition of individual case studies of ethnie appears subtly persuasive in avoiding overgeneralized claims. On the one hand, it rejects an artificially sharp break between the pre-modern and modern eras and allows for continuity between the modern nation and an older ethnic community. Nations may not be as modern as some believe. On the other hand, it gives due weight to the power of modernization to reconstruct the form and cultural expression of older ethnic ties. Smith steers a reasonable middle course by allowing for some form of continuity between the pre-modern and modern while simultaneously acknowledging the enormous influence of modernization on the emergence of nationalism. In Ireland it was not until the nineteenth century that Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism began to take the shape of nationalist movements.54 The existence of today's Catholic and Protestant populations, with separate and opposing national identities, can be traced back at least as far as the failed attempts at establishing the Reformation in Ireland in the sixteenth century and the plantations of Ireland in the seventeenth century, coupled with the onset of the modern era. The gulf was widened

52

Writing from a historian's viewpoint, Hastings stands in broad agreement with Smith. He notes how modernists are ‘weak on hard history’ and argues that the origins of nations needs ‘to be located in an age a good deal further back than most modernist historians feel safe to handle, that of the shaping of medieval society’. See Hastings, Construction of Nationhood, 2, 12.

53

Smith's reconstruction has been criticized by modernist theorists. Breuilly sees little of value in Smith's approach to understanding nationalism. The discontinuities between pre-modern ethnies and modern national identity are such that little meaningful correlation can be sustained between the two eras. It is impossible to establish with any certainty a discernible relationship between pre-modern ethnic identity and the formation of modern nationalist thought. In addition, he argues that while pre-modern identity was limited to a localized form, ‘almost all the major institutions which construct, preserve and transmit national identities … are modern’. Breuilly, ‘Approaches’, 150–4.

54

For an excellent historical account of this process see ch.4, ‘The Making of the Irish Catholic Nation’ and ch.5, ‘Ulster Protestantism: The Religious Foundations of Rebellious Loyalism’, in D. Hempton, Religion and Political Culture in Britain and Ireland: From the Glorious Revolution to the Decline of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

28


during the Cromwell Protectorate as the ‘puritans attempted to make Ireland Protestant by military might’.55 The penal laws of the eighteenth century, designed to reinforce Protestant social, political, and economic superiority, strengthened emerging ethnic separation. The nineteenth century saw the unfolding of crucial events that would marry existing ethnic differences to the rising tide of modern nationalism.56 As Lieberson argues, nationalism is essentially an ethnic movement where the distinctive characteristics of ‘a people’ is stressed and affirmed, and where the fullest expression of these unique and good national qualities is believed to lie in a separate, independent state. Thus in Ireland, ethnicity became the basis of nationalism.57 In Smith's imagery, the powerful symbolism of the pre-modern ethnie gave shape and direction to the two emerging nationalisms.58 The consequence of these events was the polarization of two distinct

55

D. Hempton, ‘Lessons from Ireland's Unhappy History’, Christian Graduate (Dec. 1981, 10.

56

Desmond Bowen traces four principal developments that catalysed this process of Irish nationalist consolidation during the century. The four events were: 1. The campaign of Daniel O'Connell demanding political and civil liberties for the Roman Catholic majority in Ireland. Coinciding as it did with the emergence of nationalism alongside O'Connell's close support by the Roman Catholic hierarchy, the campaign ensured that the fateful and enduring link would be forged between nationalism's political aspirations and the religious organization of the Catholic Church; 2. the success of Cardinal Paul Cullen's policy of introducing ultramontanism within the Irish Catholic Church; 3. the evangelical crusades of the Irish Church Missions (ICM); 4. the Irish Famine of the 1840s. The latter two events became historical symbols utilized to cement Irish nationalist mythology and reinforce its national identity. They represented tales of English imperialism, the first of enticing Catholics to convert to Protestantism in return for desperately needed food served in soup kitchens (‘Souperism’), the second of English callousness, verging on genocide, at failing to resolve an avoidable human tragedy of huge proportions. See D. Bowen, The Protestant Crusade in Ireland 1800–1870 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978.

57

S. Lieberson, ‘Stratification and Ethnic Groups’, in A. H. Richmond (ed.), Readings in Race and Ethnic Relations (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1972, 199–209, cited by F. W. Boal and J. H. N. Douglas (eds.), Integration and Division: Geographical Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Problem (London: Academic Press, 1982, 335–6 (my emphasis).

58

An important distinguishing feature between the two was Irish nationalism's longer historical trajectory, tracing back its roots to the Celts and the Early Christian period. For further discussion on the role of ethnic origins in the development of both Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism, see ch.2 of C. McCall, Identity in Northern Ireland (London: Macmillan Press, 1999.


29

ethnic groups separated by religious beliefs, with different historic-mythic understandings of their origins, limited intercommunity contact, and in competition for the best land and resources. This polarization set the scene for the tumultuous events of the early twentieth century as a revitalized Irish nationalism sought Home Rule and a militantly determined Protestant unionism fought to remain within the British Empire by resisting the Home Rule bills and threatening physical insurrection. In one sense, the Partition of Ireland was simply a physical recognition of existing cleavages (in terms of religion and ethnicity) between two national identities seeking to impose themselves in the political sphere. An ethnic group is characterized by shared cultural values, a common past, an ability to be self-reproductive, able to identify itself as distinctive as well as being perceived as such by outsiders. Religion and language are often distinctive markers of an ethnic group.59 By such criteria, it can be concluded that both Protestants and Catholics do form two distinct ethnic groups (although largely sharing the same language).60 In my ‘wide’ definition of nationalism, an ethnic group and a nation are virtually identical terms. If there is a difference it is one of degree.61 The ethnic group has the potential to become a nation. One way of looking at nationalism is as active ethnicity—a community mobilized to express its national identity, in a national homeland, within the world of nations. In the modern world, the ethnic community must enter the political arena if it aspires to nationhood (Irish nationalism), or even if it sees itself as existing within a wider state structure (Ulster unionism). An ethnic group with no ambitions of nationhood (Ulster unionism) will be forced to compete in the political sphere, particularly if there is another ethnic community competing for the same source of power.62 The inevitability

59

B. Girvin, ‘National Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland’, in B. Girvin and R. Sturm (eds.), Politics and Society in Contemporary Ireland (Aldershot: Gower, 1986, 109.

60

Douglas and Boal, Integration, 335.

61

See the discussion on the dangers of conflating nationality and ethnicity in Oommen, Citizenship, 54–8.

62


30


of this politicization is because access to power and the ability to influence policies favourable to one's own ‘ethnic core’ lies in the hands of the state. Unionism is a highly politicized form of ethnicity organized around the goal of protecting and defending its community interests within the territory of ‘Ulster’. It therefore represents an energetic and mobilized form of nationalism. In Ireland, political events followed the logic of competing nationalisms struggling to assert their identities. Unionists resisted the advances of Irish nationalism, not with a clear desire to establish their own state, but as a reactive and defensive rearguard action to protect their ethnic core. The result, the creation of the Northern Irish state that no one wanted, was a compromise solution. It allowed the majority of Irish nationalists autonomy to pursue policies consistent with the ‘imagined community’ of the Irish nation, and it gave the unionist population of the Northern six counties an ‘opt out’ clause from the realization of that vision.

1.3 THE CONTESTED NATURE OF ULSTER UNIONISM Drawing on the discussion above, this section will seek to demonstrate how unionism and Irish nationalism represent parallel political ideologies, a view that is much contested. One common consequence of drawing sharp distinctions is to accept Irish nationalism as a bona ifide member of the world of nations, while negatively categorizing Ulster unionism as not ‘nationalist’. This can result in the latter's source of ideology being located in an outdated religious and ethnic mentality,63 or representing an ‘antediluvian religious discourse’,64 or being ‘politically and socially dysfunctional’.65 A symptom of this negative perception has been an academic preoccupation with the quixotic and extreme elements of unionism (paramilitaries, religious zealots,

63

A point made by Finlayson, ‘Nationalism as Ideological Interpellation’, 89.

64

D. Bell, Acts of Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1990, 20.

65

R. Wells, ‘A Fearful People: Religion and the Ulster Conflict’, Eire-Ireland, 28 (1993), 53.


31

and such like), which are often taken as representative of the entire unionist community.66 Rather, it can be argued that the two movements are motivated by analogous forces—the need to defend and express their particular identity in concrete social, political, and territorial terms. In other words, they are ontologically alike, even if their respective political expressions take radically divergent forms. Technical debates about whether the Ulster unionists constitute a ‘nation’ or not thus miss the point. A more productive approach to evaluating and comparing nationalism and unionism is to focus on the ideological content of their identities rather than with what label they should be associated. This gives room for an inclusive approach to movements that do not designate themselves ‘nationalist’ in the strict sense of the word. Emphasizing similar ideological and motivational forces between the two identities should not be assumed to imply that they should share similar destinies. In a rather patronizing article, Brown argues that one reason the Protestant viewpoint has been less attractive than the Irish nationalist version is that, while having a similar sense of history to its opponent, the Protestant/unionist historic-myth has ‘had to perform fewer functions and is necessarily simpler’.67 However, national myths, if they are to function effectively to mobilize mass movements, need to tell a clear and simple story.68 Irish nationalism's heroic tale of noble resistance to eight hundred years of alien domination is no less simple. There are good political reasons why unionism has fared less well in the world of nations than Irish nationalism. While the two identities have profound similarities, for specific reasons (discussed in Chapter 3) their political fortunes have oscillated quite radically since 1921. A broad definition of national identity as a force that motivates group action towards realizing the goals of nationalism—political control over a territorial homeland, a common public culture, internal cohesion, freedom, and self-respect—allows

66

A point made by C. Coulter in ‘The Character of Unionism’, Irish Political Studies, 9 (1994), 1–24, esp. 2.

67

T. Brown, The Whole Protestant Community: The Making of a Historical Myth (Derry: Field Day Pamphlet, 1985, 8.

68

J. Loughlin, Ulster Unionism and British National Identity since 1885 (London: Pinter, 1995, 1.

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Ulster unionism to be treated as a form of national identity. Unionism and nationalism display an essential symmetry in their use of legitimizing myths, the expression of difference in the face of a threatening neighbouring identity and their sacralization of identity through a symbiotic relationship with religion. Roman Catholicism acted as a central strand of identity for Irish nationalism. Ulster unionist identity was defined and reinforced by its inseparable association with Protestantism. My argument is that a formative influence on Ulster unionism and Irish nationalism is the different political context in which they operate. This helps to explain the sharply divergent political fortunes of the two ethnic groups since Partition. It has therefore been the wider political environment that has played an important part in shaping their destinies and not a moral, ideological, or logical superiority of one set of beliefs above the other. This interpretation is at variance with a considerable amount of opinion that distinguishes between the two ideologies as being of a qualitatively different nature. Some such analysis is simply a continuation of the ideological battle between opposing identities and is typically characterized by a general acceptance of one group's beliefs accompanied by a negative assessment of the other's.69 Others derive their conclusions from detailed theoretical analysis and argue that an innate difference in the nature of unionism and nationalism is an important part of the explanation of the conflict.70 Given the contested nature of the relationship between unionism and nationalism, it is necessary to provide an adequate theoretical basis for my hypothesis. Excellent critical reviews of academic approaches to unionism have been carried out elsewhere.71 This discussion will build on such work, but my

69

On the nationalist and republican side see J. Hume, Personal Views: Politics, Peace and Reconciliation in Ireland (Dublin: Town House, 1996 and G. Adams, An Irish Voice: The Quest for Peace (Dingle: Mount Eagle, 1997 respectively. On the unionist side, Roche and Barton stress the limitations of nationalist mythology while ignoring weaknesses in the unionist case. P. J. Roche and B. Barton (eds.), The Northern Ireland Question: Myth and Reality (Aldershot: Avebury, 1991, pp.vii–xviii.

70

For example see D. W. Miller, Queen's Rebels: Ulster Loyalism in Historical Perspective (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978, 4. See below for fuller discussion of Miller's views.

71

Coulter, ‘Character’.


33

specific focus will be on evaluating four varying interpretations of unionism that have emerged over the last twenty years or so that all view it as distinct, in one form or another, in character from its opposing ideology.

1.3.1 Arthur Aughey: citizenship versus ethnic exclusiveness An academic sympathetic to the unionist cause and at pains to distinguish it from Irish nationalism is Arthur Aughey. One of the intellectual proponents of ‘new unionism’, he has been hailed as unionism's long hoped for ‘positive voice’.72 Originating in the 1980s, ‘new unionism’ has been promoted by a loose coalition of writers73 sharing a determination to offer a rational, modern, and secular apologetic for the Union to counter what they see as the unmerited prevalence of the nationalist interpretation of Northern Ireland as well as the outdated Protestant unionism of Ian Paisley and the loyalism of the Protestant paramilitary groupings. Aughey is a member of the Cadogan Group which publishes pamphlets propagating ‘new unionist’ politics. The influence of ‘new unionist’ ideas can be judged by the fact that David Trimble, elected to the leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party in September 1995, is a politician who, with a significant amount of international success, has absorbed and advocated ‘new unionist’ thinking in the search for a political settlement within Northern Ireland.74 Aughey offers a cogent portrayal of unionism as motivated by what he calls ‘constitutional patriotism’.75 This concept

72

D. Kennedy, ‘Unionism Finds a Positive Voice’, Fortnight, 285 (June 1990, 25.

73

O'Dowd lists Aughey, Paul Bew, Brian Barton, Paddy Roche, Graham Gudgin, Dennis Kennedy, Robert McCartney, Richard English, Esmond Birnie, Graham Walker, John Wilson Foster, and Norman Porter as proponents of ‘new’ unionism. L. O'Dowd, ‘ “New Unionism”, British Nationalism and the Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement in Northern Ireland’, in D. Miller (ed.), Rethinking Northern Ireland: Culture, Ideology and Colonialism (London: Longman, 1998, 70–93.

74

On his election, the UUP journal the Ulster Review (1995–6), announced the emergence of a new form of unionism: ‘pro-active, inclusive, open, pluralist, dynamic, progressive, outward, articulate, intelligent, coherent, professional, confident’. O'Dowd, ‘New Unionism’, 70.

75

A. Aughey, ‘The Peace Process; Ambiguities and Possibilities’, published lecture of The Craigavon Society (Dec. 1994, 2. For a detailed presentation of his arguments see Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1989 and ‘Unionism and Self-Determination’, in Roche and Barton The Northern Ireland Question, 1–16.

34


conceives of unionism as acknowledging the authority of the constitutional relationship with Britain. Unionism embodies the underlying principles of a modern state, which are focused on the rights of ‘equal citizenship’ for all its members, whether Protestant of Catholic. ‘Unionism embraces a political allegiance the nature of which is to allow one to express whatever cultural values or identity one wishes.’76 This is what Aughey calls ‘intelligent unionism’ and a version of the state that Irish nationalism seceded from ‘in order to construct a state built on the principles of national and religious exclusiveness’.77 Thus, rather than being obsessed with the ‘romantic nostalgia of Irish nationalism’, which is ‘fully exercised by the issue of identity, with degrees of nationhood defined in cultural rather than political terms’, unionism ‘cannot be understood in terms of “nationality assumptions”. It has little to do with the nation and everything to do with the idea of the state.’78 Supporting evidence for this claim is found in the fact that unionism has never sought independence and even the creation of the Northern Irish state was not a welcome development for unionists who wished Ireland to remain part of the British Empire. It is Irish nationalism, not unionism, which is ‘exclusive’, ‘particularist’, ‘reactionary’, and ‘crypto-racist’.79 It is unionism, not nationalism that offers the best hope of ‘uniting people with nothing in common save the state itself ’.80 In more recent work Aughey has articulated a more nuanced version of this argument that attempts to take into account the reality that unionism has many adherents that do represent exclusive triumphalist forms of ethnic identity.81 He argues

76

Aughey, ‘Unionism and Self-Determination’, 16.

77

Ibid. 7.

78

Ibid. 15.

79

Ibid. 7.

80

Ibid. 16.

81

A. Aughey, ‘The Character of Unionism’, in P. Shirlow and M. McGovern (eds.), Who are ‘The People’?: Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto, 1997, 16–33. See also A. Aughey, ‘Unionism’, in A. Aughey and D. Morrow (eds.), Northern Ireland Politics (London: Longman, 1996, 31–8.


35

that there are two powerful ideas of what is meant by ‘the People’ within unionism which help to explain the apparent contradiction between its professed loyalty to the Crown and its latent rebelliousness that erupts whenever its political interests are threatened. On the one hand is ‘high unionism’. Primarily a conservative political identity, it is only ‘residually ethnic’ and revolves around the idea of the ‘constitutional people’—‘a people, however internally diverse, whose interests are expressed by and through established institutions and whose political identity is filled out by the effective and affective procedures of state’.82 On the other hand is ‘low unionism’ whose locus is found in the radical notion of the ‘sovereign people’—populist, substantially ethnic, and with a religious base. Detached from constitutional legalities, Aughey contends that, ‘populism of this sort respects constitutional form only in so far as it satisfies its need for selfassertiveness…In the Unionist case, it has involved the assertion of local majoritarianism, of a communal and defensive patriotism. “Our wee Ulster” or “the British people of Ulster”, or simply “the Protestants of Ulster” is the fons et origo of all political consideration.’83 Within unionist history these two forms of ‘the People’ have been in constant interaction. Indeed, Aughey suggests that the strength, persistence, and even the ‘necessity’ of the sovereign people lies in the ambivalent attitude of the British government towards Northern Ireland's status within the British state and the continual associated insecurity of the constitutional people.84 Aughey is indeed a creative apologist for the unionist case. However, his attempts to set unionism on the ‘high moral ground’ above Irish nationalism can be challenged on a number of points. First, Aughey has been criticized for tendering an idealized version of unionism ‘untethered by historical or political realities’.85 His portrait of ‘high unionism’ is an abstract model with little connection to the realities of Northern Irish political life. Unionism is concerned with British citizenship, but mainly because the Union offers the best way to maintain and protect Protestant identity. Portraying unionism as equally

82

Aughey, ‘Character’, 22.

83

Ibid. 22.

84

;Ibid. 22–3.

85

Coulter, ‘Character’, 16.

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concerned for the citizenship of the nationalist minority fails to address the fact that they were not embraced as citizens on their terms, only on unionist terms. Or as O'Dowd puts it, ‘the liberal unionist version…is that Catholics are entitled to full civil and religious liberties as individuals but not as nationalists.’86 Second and more seriously, Aughey's analysis denies the reality that unionism is itself an expression of nationalism—the very doctrine he claims it transcends. The analysis in Chapter 3 will show that unionism adheres to a similar complex process of propagating, maintaining, and defending a national identity as Irish nationalism, even if it does not explicitly claim to be nationalist. At the core of unionist identity is the ‘stuff of nationalism’—myths, symbols, rituals, emotion, territoriality, and the desire to control a group's destiny. Unionism is inextricably connected to the ‘banal’ expressions of British state nationalism.87 The thrust of my argument in Chapters 1 and 2 is for the need to recognize the variety and flexibility of nationalism and how ideologies such as unionism fall within its embrace. Aughey and other ‘new unionists’ steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the nationalist character of unionism because to do so would undermine their belief in the ideological superiority of unionism over the regressive character of Irish nationalism. Accepting equivalence undermines unionist political ambitions.88 While the specific goals of unionism and Irish nationalism differ, the motivations are the same. David Mason argues both ideologies arose ‘in response to each group's relative power deprivation and, making use of material and symbolic resources, aim to restructure relations of power through forms of political mobilization aimed at ultimately securing and maintaining access to, or control of, the state’.89

86

O'Dowd, ‘New Unionism’, 79.

87

See s. 1.1.2 above. For further discussion see O'Dowd ‘New Unionism’, 80–4.

88

This of course applies in reverse to Irish nationalists fond of dismissing the legitimacy of unionism as a sectarian power-holding ideology unfit to govern Northern Ireland alone.

89

D. Mason, ‘Nationalism and the Process of Group Mobilisation: The case of “Loyalism” in Northern Ireland Reconsidered’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 8/3 (July 1985, 423.


37

Third, Aughey employs inconsistent criteria in his comparison of unionism and Irish nationalism. Aughey's appeal for unionism to be judged on its ‘intelligent’ or ‘high’ version is special pleading. He allows no such leeway for Irish nationalism, which is judged solely on its triumphalist ethno-religious record of exclusion in the post-Partition era. A selective approach indicates ideological partiality. An abstract rendering of unionism is constructed on a different basis to the rejected version of Irish nationalism while at the same time ignoring the fact that Irish nationalism has modified quite drastically throughout the century and actually functions on a pragmatic level removed from many of its original core beliefs.90 For these reasons Aughey's sharp distinction between unionism and Irish nationalism remains unconvincing. He offers no satisfactory reason for the reader to accept his arbitrary definition of unionism as representing a liberal secular doctrine of ‘equal citizenship’. In spite of his disdain for the backward nature of nationalism based on ethnicity, it seems that he is actually participating in the struggle by offering an updated intellectual defence of unionist nationalism. Aughey's argument represents an attempt to create and ‘sell’ a unionist identity formulated in the more acceptable language of liberal political discourse.

1.3.2 David Miller: community versus nation Published in 1978, one of the most influential interpretations of unionism has been David Miller's book Queen's Rebels, which developed his notion of conditional loyalty.91 Miller's analysis has implications regarding the nature of unionism that place it apart from contemporary nationalism. In contrast to ‘the kind of semi-automatic trust on which modern democratic nation-states rely to establish consent’, historically unionism has only given provisional fidelity to the British nation.92 The origins of

90

See Mitchel, ‘Ireland As it Never Used to Be’.

91

The persuasive force of Miller's thesis can be judged by the fact that a respected authority on the Northern Ireland conflict such the late John Whyte concluded that it ‘provided the most satisfying exposition of unionist ideology to have been published so far’. See Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, 128.

92

Miller, Queen's Rebels, 4.

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unionist political behaviour is to be found in seventeenth-century contractarian thought and practice, and in particular among the Scottish Covenanters who, when the king violated his bargain, did not renounce his reign but refused to obey his ordinances in an attempt to force him to keep his side of the covenant.93 He locates unionism in the thought mode of the seventeenth century to explain why they ‘avoided the more “normal” course of investing the “nation”—any nation—with the attributes of divine-right monarch’.94 Thus, unionism is an anachronism in the modern world of nations, a redundant philosophy, out of touch with the obligations that are an integral part of belonging to a modern nation state. The central peculiarity of unionism is that it has never embraced a British nationality, yet was simultaneously unwilling to assert a distinctive nationality of its own. For Miller this means unionists should be seen as ‘a community’ which was not incorporated into either the British or Irish nations.95 Original and eloquent, Miller's hypothesis is attractive and is supported by the many obvious examples of unionists' conditional loyalty to the British government. There are however serious drawbacks in his analysis that qualifies its validity as an accurate portrayal of unionism.96 His assumption that the concept of the modern state summons the unquestioning loyalty of its citizens is false. Rather than constitutional matters becoming outdated, issues of minority rights and self-determination are pressing contemporary concerns. Instead of being an archaic curiosity, unionism can be seen as representing a universal and modern interest in the question of citizenship.97 Unionist preoccupation with the Union derives not so much from obsolete contractarianism but from the fundamental clash of political, economic, social, and cultural interests between the two communities within Northern Ireland.98 Unionist reaction to

93

Miller, Queen Rebels, 5.

94

Ibid. 6.

95

Ibid. 80.

96

For a critique of Miller see Aughey, ‘Unionism and Self-Determination’, 5–6; Mason, ‘Nationalism and the Process of Group Mobilisation’, 419–21; Coulter, ‘Character’, 2–5.

97


98

Ruane and Todd make a compelling case that the conflict is not abnormal (located in pre-modern obsession with antiquated beliefs and attitudes), but rather the result of the structural configuration of Northern Ireland within the British Isles which locked the two communities into an enduring zero-sum political contest. The underlying causes of the dispute between unionism and nationalism are modern liberal-democratic concerns with ‘equality, security and the distribution of power’. J. Ruane and J. Todd, ‘ “Why Can't You Get Along with Each Other?”: Culture, Structure and the Northern Ireland Conflict’, in E. Hughes (ed.), Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland 1960–1990 (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990, 27–43.


39

their predicament within the wider political context is, as is shown in Chapter 3, a rational response to a situation of threat and insecurity. In his objective of highlighting the uniqueness of unionist ideology, Miller assumes that conditional loyalty is an unusual phenomenon. However, undefined by Miller is what he means by the (presumably ‘normal’?) corollary of conditional loyalty—‘unconditional loyalty’. Yet, no democratic state is founded on such a notion. Unlimited allegiance to the state would be an irrational and irresponsible philosophy. Loyalty is dependent on the state acting in the interests of the nation, as Aughey puts it: ‘unconditional loyalty presupposes a people so devoid of political selfconsciousness…as to be no longer citizens but mere serfs’.99 Thus, again, it is clear that unionism is not an aberration within modern political discourse but is consistent with the norms of contemporary nationalism. The central weakness in Miller's argument is that ‘the contractarianism that pervades unionism represents not its ideological substance, but rather its political form’.100 Once the focus is on its ideological substance, it becomes evident that unionism is essentially analogous to Irish nationalism. In tandem with other approaches, Miller draws too sharp a distinction between what he calls the ‘community’ of Ulster unionism and the Irish ‘nation’.

1.3.3 Lee et al.: regressive sectarianism versus progressive nationalism Others have also proposed interpretations of unionism that emphasize the difference in character between it and Irish nationalism, but for opposite reasons to Aughey. Unsympathetic critics of unionism, such as Lee, Bell, and Nairn, portray it as inherently racist and reactionary.

99


100

Coulter, ‘Character’, 5 (emphasis mine).

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For Lee, unionist ‘loyalty’ in the last resort only means loyalty to the unionist cause. He accepts uncritically Miller's contractarian thesis (though being aware of Mason's criticisms of Miller) as the basis for rejecting the ‘Two Nations’ theory favoured by some unionist apologists. Unionism is not to be seen ‘as a “nation”, in the conventional, if elusive, contemporary sense’. He sees unionism as racist, a type of ‘Herrenvolk democracy’ ideal for ‘settler peoples’, its motivation depicted as calculatingly self-serving and bolstered by its ‘sacred egoism’,101 a conclusion with which Geoffrey Bell concurs.102 To be fair, Lee's analysis of Irish nationalism is similarly hard-hitting. One academic has described his book as displaying an ‘unyielding, even brutal honesty about the nature of the Irish people and their society’ that presents a ‘vision of the past which is bleak; a slothful, aping, barren society, sexually repressed, hypocritical, embittered and cruel, yet unbearably smug and conceited a the same time’.103 Yet, despite this unsparing critique, Lee's analysis of unionism still locates it on a lower ideological level than that of Irish nationalism. Identities (including Irish nationalism) evolve pejorative stereotypes of their Other in the quest to secure and protect their ‘imagined community’. In this sense, all nationalisms personify political self-interest. In addition, Lee's depiction of unionism as supremacist fails to account for the obverse side of unionist superiority, that of fear and insecurity.104 Desmond Bell, in a rather neat inversion of Aughey's position, argues that it is unionism that is constituted around an ethno-religious core, is deeply sectarian in character and politically regressive. Unionists' failure to assert their right to self-determination as a nation ‘locates Protestant political ideology outside the force field of nationalism—any nationalism’.105 The supposed lack of connection between ethnicity and nationalism

101

See J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 4–14.

102

Bell describes unionism as illogical, unreasonable, sectarian, and supremacist. See G. Bell, The Protestants of Ulster (London: Pluto, 1976, 48–63.

103

M. O'Connell, Changed Utterly: Ireland and the New Irish Psyche (Dublin: Liffey Press, 2001, 14–18.

104

See s. 3.3 for further discussion of the crisis of identity within unionism.

105

D. Bell, ‘Acts of Union: Youth Sub-culture and Ethnic Identity Amongst Protestants in Northern Ireland’, British Journal of Sociology, 38/2, 158–83, esp. 164.


41

means that ‘as far as it has a theoretico-ideological base it is one drawn from an antediluvian religious discourse that is schismatic and exclusive.’106 In contrast, it is Irish nationalism that functions around the idea of the nation; a model that offers the best path forward for political maturity. Nairn suggests that the real failure of unionism has been an inability to formulate its own sense of national identity. As such, it is retarded and reactionary, its immaturity being the main blockage to political progress.107 Both Nairn's and Bell's approaches are deficient for the same reason as Aughey's. They apply an artificially rigid definition of nationalism to unionism and Irish nationalism and thus overlook the real functional similarities between the two. They also base their interpretation on the highly questionable assumption that nationalism per se is the fruit of mature political progress. Irish nationalism is also highly preoccupied with issues of ethnicity, religion, and exclusivity. They fail to appreciate that the political development of nationalism (as against the stubborn obduracy of Ulster unionism) is a consequence of the different political context in which the two ideologies function and not evidence of unionist retardation opposed to nationalist sophistication.108

1.3.4 Steve Bruce: ethnic group versus Irish nation The work of Steve Bruce has the merit of taking unionism seriously as a rational and coherent ideology. He criticizes a liberal individualism that complacently dismisses communal identities defined by ethnic, religious, or national factors (and the clash of identities in Ireland is influenced by all three) as ‘prehistoric throwbacks’. The struggle in Northern Ireland may be violent and repulsive, but there is no mystery about it. It is about political power and territorial control, each group realizing that it will be safer and more influential in a state where it will be in the majority. Particularly helpful has been his focus on the role of perceptions, religious belief, and emotions in the

106

Ibid. 165.

107

T. Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain, 2nd edn. (London: New Left Books, 1981, 240–1.

108

For a detailed critique of both Nairn and Bell see Coulter, ‘Character’, 9–12.

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conflict, which has acted as a welcome corrective to reductionist interpretations.109 Bruce's contribution to the debate cuts through much ideological prejudice that has sought to emphasize the distinction between nationalism and unionism. He is critical for example of the nationalist doctrine that ‘Irishness’ (or Catholic ethnicity) is natural and inevitable, with a consequent right to self-determination, yet unionism (or Protestant ethnicity) is accidental and temporary, a by-product of British imperialism. Rather, ‘nations do not create nationalists, nationalists create nations.’ Both unionism and nationalism are the products of social, political, and cultural processes operating over long periods of time.110 It is therefore all the more intriguing that Bruce also chooses to differentiate between the two national identities using similar terminology as Miller, describing Ulster Protestants as an ‘ethnic group’ as compared to Northern Catholics being part of the Irish nation.111 He argues that there is a fundamental asymmetry between them. Technically, based on a narrow definition of nationhood, this is of course correct. Irish nationalists sought and successfully created an independent nation state, a goal never shared by mainstream unionism. However, Bruce develops a major, and questionable, thesis from this assertion that creates an artificial distinction between the nature of Irish nationalism and unionism. He contends that Irish nationalism has a secure identity within the nation that allows it to disassociate from its religious base of

109

See J. McGarry and B. O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995 for an example of ‘hard’ reductionism that rejects absolutely any role for religion in interpreting the northern conflict. For a convincing and sustained critique of their views see J. Liechty and C. Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Columba Press, 2001, 53–61. Liechty and Clegg conclude that such an approach, which seeks to construct a single-cause, narrowly defined ‘rational’ explanation of Northern Ireland, denies the complex interaction of political, religious, cultural, and economic factors underlying the conflict. They conclude that O'Leary's and McGarry's criteria are so artificially strict that they are ‘useless to explain conflict in Northern Ireland’.

110

S. Bruce, The Edge of the Union: The Ulster Loyalist Political Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 30.

111

Bruce, God Save Ulster!, 258.


43

Catholicism and progress beyond narrow ethno-religious ties. Ulster Protestants have found no such secure refuge of identity; neither Britain nor Ulster has proved a satisfactory focus of national loyalty. Instead, unionists have had recourse to evangelical Protestantism as the only guaranteed form of identity available that can provide the ideological basis to avoid incorporation into a united Ireland. This explains the rise of Paisley; only ‘evangelicalism provides the core beliefs, values, and symbols of what it means to be a Protestant’.112 Even unbelieving Protestants, when their identity is threatened, will exhibit a ‘recommitment to traditional Protestantism…even if their recommitment does not extend to religious conversion’.113 In other words, evangelicalism has an importance beyond its constituency, operating as a symbol for ethnic identity and not just a set of theological doctrines. Bruce's analysis of Paisley's popularity has much to commend it. Certainly, it is evident that politically Paisley does enjoy significant support beyond his modest religious base.114 Rationalist critics like O'Leary and McGarry uncompromisingly reject any religiously based explanation of the Northern Ireland conflict.115 Specifically, they accuse Bruce of an ‘unprofessional use of data’ in citing untypical election results to exaggerate the extent and reasons for Paisley's support and conclude that ‘sociologists of religion, over-ambitious to apply their insights, should be more cautious with electoral data.’116 Writing in 1995, citing Westminster election results they argued that the DUP vote historically had failed to challenge that of the UUP.117 However, in local government elections where, unlike Westminster elections, the parties contest seats against each other across Northern Ireland,

112

Ibid. 264.

113

Ibid. 265. Frank Wright first made this point about the respect for belief and the Bible among non-believing working-class Protestants. F. Wright, ‘Protestant Ideology and Politics in Ulster’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 14 (1973), 213–80, esp. 245.

114

In 1986 Bruce estimated that the Free Presbyterian Church had a membership of only 12,000. See God Save Ulster!, 161.

115

McGarry and O'Leary, Explaining, ch.5.

116

Ibid. 197–205.

117

For example, at the 1997 British General Election the DUP emerged with 2 seats (a loss of one from the 1992 General Election) in contrast to the 10 of the Ulster Unionist Party. Its support evidenced slight growth from 11.7% in 1987, to 13.1% in 1992 and 13.6% in 1997. R. Wilford, ‘The 1997 Westminster Election in Northern Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 13 (1998), 145–52, esp.149.

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the DUP's vote seriously threatens that of the UUP.118 In European elections, Paisley's personal vote has consistently swamped that of any UUP candidate119 and even in the 2001 General Election, when the DUP did contest UUP seats, it took three of them raising its total to five (22.5% of the vote, up 8.9% from 1997) as against the six seats of the UUP (26.8%, down 5.9% from 1997).120 Perhaps O'Leary and McGarry, themselves overly ambitious to apply reductionist logic to explain Northern Ireland, would do well to reassess their own prior ideological commitments. Bruce is also right in highlighting unionism's weaker political status in comparison to that of Irish nationalism and the internal sense of crisis engendered by that disparity. This is an issue to which I will return in the synthesis at the end of Chapter 3. Ulster unionists are in a desperate search for refuge and security and I agree that a vital component of Paisley's success is directly attributable to unionism's profound pessimism concerning the future. However, the problem is that Bruce overstresses the distinction between unionism and Irish nationalism. His premise that Irish nationalism is so firmly rooted that it can now ‘dispense’ with Catholicism is unsupportable in the light of the profound and continuing Catholic ethos woven into its fabric and culture. He acknowledges the higher level of religious participation amongst the Catholic population but still argues that somehow unionism depends on its religious base, while nationalism does not. Rather, it seems that religion has been crucial for both national identities as it has provided a sense of specificity around which ethnic groups are organized and identified.

118

For example, in 2001 the anti-Agreement DUP took 131 council seats (a rise of 40 from 1997 compared to 154 for the UUP (a fall of 31). See BBC Online News Website at www.news.bbc.co.uk/vote 2001.

119

In the 1999 European Elections Ian Paisley topped the poll with 28.4% of the first preference vote as against 17.6% for Jim Nicholson of the UUP who narrowly claimed the third Northern Ireland seat ahead of Mitchel McLoughlin of Sinn Féin. See BBC Online News Website at www.news.bbc.co.uk/vote 2001.

120

See BBC Online News Website at www.news.bbc.co.uk/vote 2001.


45

His contention that fundamentalist evangelicalism is the essence of unionism is also contentious. If Paisley's political appeal is significant, it is far from overwhelming. In Chapter 6 I will discuss how Ian Paisley has worked hard to present himself as the authentic voice of Ulster Protestantism, yet the reality is that his party remains a minority one, as does his denomination. Coulter, somewhat harshly, argues that Bruce ‘effectively ignores the complex diversity of unionist thought to offer an interpretation of unionism that rarely rises above the level of caricature’.121 Yet his point has weight. Bruce overlooks the importance of liberal and secular forms of unionism in his determination to make his case. This book will show that Paisleyism is but one distinct strand within a diverse Ulster evangelical identity. The real point in question is Bruce's theory that the source of Paisley's appeal for the ethnic group of unionism lies in his rigorous evangelicalism in contrast to the security offered for nationalists in belonging to the Irish nation. This is an important issue to which I will return in Chapter 6. There I will argue that far from Paisleyism representing a contrasting source of identity to Irish nationalism, it is in essence itself a form of nationalism. In other words, Paisley's popularity within unionism lies not primarily in religion, but in how he has adapted a religious discourse to a nationalist agenda—the survival of Ulster unionism. For the purposes of this discussion on the parallel structures of unionism and nationalism, it is worth reiterating the approach to nationalism adopted in this chapter. Unionist motivations are complex. The Northern conflict is symptomatic of a struggle for political power between two national identities, differentiated by religion and with separate mythic histories, cultures, and aspirations seeking to impose themselves in the same contested space that is Northern Ireland. History has locked them in an intractable ‘structural bind’ that made such conflict all but inevitable.122 Bruce's differential between an ethnic group and nation does indeed have some ‘important consequences’ in terms of what goals each pursues.123 However, functionally it

121

Coulter, ‘Character’, 8. Whyte also questions Bruce's assumption that most Protestants are driven by much the same motivation, Interpreting, 109.

122

Ruane and Todd, ‘Why Can't You’, 39.

123


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seems that the two ideologies operate in parallel ways, but within different political contexts. Ontologically, the ‘ethnic group’ of Ulster Protestantism and the ‘Irish nation’ simply represent two antithetical faces of nationalism at work.

2 National Identity and the Appeal of Nationalism He will judge between the nations and will settle disputes for many peoples. They will beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war any more. (Isaiah 2: 4) On each side of the river stood the tree of life, bearing twelve crops of fruit, yielding its fruit every month. And the leaves of the tree are for the healing of the nations. No longer will there be any curse. (Revelation 22: 2)

2.1 THE FUNCTIONS AND CONTENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY It is time to shift focus from theories of nationalism to a consideration of the functions and structure of nationalist belief as given expression through national identity. As noted in Chapter 1, identity is a slippery concept to define. Billig lists what it is not. It is neither simply an ‘inward emotion’, nor does it mean that all members of the nation somehow share similar physical and temperamental traits. It has a psychological element, but this is difficult to determine with any precision. Rather he contends that national identity is a ‘form of life’, shaped by assumptions about what a nation is and what loyalty to that nation entails. To be understood, it should be dissected into different constituent elements, or nationalist ‘habits of thinking’.124 If national identity composes the content of nationalist belief, it

124

Billig, Banal Nationalism, 60–1.

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NATIONAL IDENTITY

therefore involves attitudes towards oneself, others within the nation, and those on the ‘outside’. It also encompasses beliefs about the nation, its origins, and future destiny and relationship with other nations. For this reason it is made ‘visible’ through study of general ‘imagined’ characteristics of the nation; its myths, culture, territorial associations, symbols, rituals, and place in the world of nations. Given this perspective, this chapter will examine six such characteristics in turn, which contribute towards explaining the appeal and power of national identity in the modern world. Relevant to this perspective, a seventh section will consider how national identities tend to behave in the context of conflict and competition. This discussion will prepare the ground for an examination in Chapter 3 of how these characteristics relate to the specific case of unionist national identity.

2.1.1 The search for belonging Personal identity is concerned with the answer to such questions as ‘Who am I?’ and ‘Where do I belong in the world?’ Individuals answering these questions begin to locate themselves within a social and psychological framework. Social identity is not simply an individualistic expression of personality; it involves a participation in a wider social community. The self is placed within a network of belonging and acceptance. Common bonds between individuals within the community are a sense of shared values, beliefs, and ideals. There is a broad area of agreement over issues of moral, social, and political significance. Group identity is therefore inextricably linked to a sense of ‘sameness’ between community members. The self is defined and categorized in terms of interpersonal similarities observable from group membership.125 The question has moved from a personal one to a corporate one, ‘Who are the people?’ As Billig notes: ‘there is a case to be made that nationalism is, above all, an ideology of the first person plural.’126 This feeling of collective belonging encourages cooperative support groups and organizations that function to promote and

125

J. Whyte, Challenging Times: Challenges to Identity. Twelve-year Olds in Belfast, 1981 and 1992 (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995, 16.

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transmit the customs, habits, and practices of that identity. The individual is ‘thus set in a world of social groups and organisations, ever evolving in a continuous engagement with their environment’.127 Guibernau argues that identities exist only in societies, through which they are defined and organized.128 Individuals have a need to belong to a community and the concept of the nation represents one such community. Thus, the formation of national identity is one component of the search for personal identity and an essential function of nationalism is to interpret and make sense of the modern world. Breuilly suggests that ideologies like nationalism are akin to maps: ‘they arise out of the need to make sense of a certain terrain which cannot otherwise be understood. Unlike maps, however, ideology helps shape as well as delineate that terrain.’129 Smith contends that part of the success of modern nationalism is due to national identity being socially functional. In other words, it is an ideal vehicle for meeting the needs of diverse sections of the population in the contemporary period. The matrix of beliefs that comprise national identity ‘provide the sole basis of such social cohesion and political action as modern societies, with their often heterogeneous social and ethnic composition and varied aims, can muster’.130 This psychological account of national identity can be advanced in different directions. Modernist theorists develop a case for how national identity provides a contemporary source of community in an impersonal, technological age. It acts to bridge the gap, created by the disruptive, alienating onset of modernization, between pre-modern traditional communities and the modern industrial era.131 Some sociologists apply general social psychological theories of group identity such as the Social Identity Theory (SIT) to national identity.132 However, Breuilly

127

J. H. N. Douglas, ‘Political Structures, Social Interaction and Identity Change in Northern Ireland’, in B. Graham (ed.), In Search of Ireland: A Cultural Geography (London: Routledge, 1997, 151.

128

Guibernau, Nationalisms, 72.

129

Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 381.

130


131

For a critical account of psychological approaches to nationalism see Breuilly, Nationalism, 414–18.

132

SIT was originally developed by Henri Tajfel and explores general principles of group behaviour that are assumed to underlie all expressions of group action. For an example of its application to Northern Ireland see A. M. Gallagher, ‘Identity and Ideology in Northern Ireland: A Psychological Perspective’, Irish Review, 4 (1988), 7–14.

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argues that it is important to set limits to psychological accounts of nationalism since they are difficult to prove.133 Their breadth may offer a plausible general explanation of nationalism but they fail to take account of, for example, other non-nationalist responses to modernization. Billig has pointed out how this tendency to over-generalize is evident in SIT. By treating national identity as simply another form of group behaviour and focusing on identity as the individual's inner response to a motivational need, SIT flattens and universalizes the highly variegated landscape of nationalist experience. It is, he argues, ‘as if the Galician peasants' “identity” were of a piece with the national identities of the Poles and Germans’.134 National identity may include the search for belonging and this may be an important component in its success, but it functions as much more than just a feeling or psychological state. It is to these wider functions that I now turn.

2.1.2 National identity and the world of nations In addition to its psychological function, national identity offers a viable form of political existence in a world of nation states. In other words, nationalism has a strongly pragmatic edge. Guibernau defines three major functions. First, it enables those perceiving themselves to be part of the nation to make political choices that will shape their common political future. Second, it facilitates the forming of relationships on an individual and national level. Since national identity draws people together into a unified culture and common world of meaning, it will foster their ability to make relationships and work together. More importantly on a national level, a nation state is defined by its ability to be recognized within the international community and to play its part in international affairs. Smith suggests that one of the core doctrines of nationalism is that to be a genuine ‘nation among the nations’, each nation must be autonomous.135 It is an obvious yet significant point that the rise of nationalism is inextricably linked with the rise of inter

133

Breuilly, Nationalism, 417.

134


135


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national relations on a global scale. Not only is the nation imagined as a unifying construct, but the whole world is imagined as naturally consisting of a host of independent nation states in which each nation seeks recognition and acceptance. Third, belonging to the entity of the nation encourages individuals to believe they are part of a wider whole that transcends their own existence. In national ideologies, the progress of the nation typically is portrayed as noble and of great worth. A strong sense of national identity therefore encourages individuals to believe they are part of something valuable, beyond themselves. A unified nation with a collective will is in a position to exert that will effectively in the realm of international politics. As the question ‘Who are the people?’ is answered in terms of a collective national identity, the nation becomes the only legitimate order of political power. Nations are necessary in the modern world in that they alone represent the ‘will of the people’ (however determined) in wider world affairs. In similar vein, Geertz argues that emerging nations are motivated by two powerful and sometimes opposing motives. The first is ‘to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions “matter” ’. This desire is no less than a search for identity and a demand that it be publicly legitimated in the field of international affairs. The second is more practical: to build a prosperous successful state, develop a higher standard of living and play a meaningful role in the international political arena.136 These important practical functions of national identity help to explain the enduring influence of nationalism in the modern world. They also help to explain much of the character of unionism.

2.1.3 Myth The nation is perceived as having a past, present, and future. The sense of having ‘suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together’ in the past bonds members of the nation within a single identity. For example, when a group perceives itself to have been maltreated, fighting for autonomy, the right to be different and in control of a concrete geographical unit, acts to create a powerful unifying vision of what the nation once was, what it has become

136

Geertz, Interpretation, 258.

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and it can be in the future. Thus, national identity has a strong sense of continuity with the past. Smith calls this link with the past ‘historical embeddedness’. Modern nationalist movements derive much of their power from their ability to connect in popular and political ways with older ethnic identities. ‘Combining these premodern ties and sentiments with the explosive modern charge of popular sovereignty and mass, public culture, nationalism has created a unique modern drama of national liberation and popular mobilisation in an ancestral homeland.’137 Looking back into the past provides an ideological framework for imagining an idealized future. If the nation is ‘historically embedded’ then its future will follow in linear succession to that imagined past. Smith argues that ‘it is this linking of ethno-history with national destiny that works most powerfully to uphold and preserve a world of nations’.138 The mechanism by which the past is appropriated to contemporary requirements is the powerful idea of rediscovering and restoring an image of the authentic nation as it once was, often in a ‘golden era’ of freedom and selfexpression. Heroes and myths of bygone ages are used to provide a coherent and satisfying story of origins and history that act to unite group identity in the present. It is virtually irrelevant that historical fact is a casualty in this process. What matters is that the historical narrative accords with and legitimizes the group's own values and traditions. A crucial part of nation building is thus the process by which the imagined past is rediscovered and re-presented in the modern era. The motivation behind the construction of a nationalist story is not objective historical research but a yearning desire to re-enter into a living past and make it respond to our needs…What counts is the peculiar atmosphere evoked by these events in a highly distinctive setting, one associated with a particular people and no other…Romance, mystery, drama—this is the stuff of any nationalist salvation-drama. It is important, because it helps to teach us ‘who we are’, to impart the sense of being a link in a chain which stretches back over generations to bind us to our ancestors and our descendants. It is also important, because it teaches us ‘where we are’ and ‘who we should be’, if we are to ‘recover ourselves’. By conveying the atmosphere and drama of past epochs in the life of the

137


138

Ibid. 158.

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community, we ‘re-live’ the lives and times of our forebears and make ourselves part of a ‘community of fate’.

139

A successful historical drama will supply the group with its own sense of unique identity and at the same time motivate members to intense commitment and self-sacrifice. This enables them to join the noble narrative, thus endowing their lives with a meaning beyond individual existence. Once created, any such group must act to maintain and develop this sense of identity by ideas and beliefs relating to its existence. This dynamic re-creation of identity will be necessary for any community that includes more people than the present generation and more than one can know personally. Such a group can be called an ‘imagined community’;140 it necessitates a functioning ideology to sustain the collective imagination. In this sense, national identity provides the ideological material to sustain the narrative discourse of nationalism, unfolding a story that grips the imagination of large numbers of people and binds them together in a common understanding of who they are and where they have come from. For example, unionists can talk of the ‘Ulster Protestant People’ precisely because that community believes it has important common experiences and beliefs that make them different from others. What is relevant is not the precise accuracy of these beliefs but their function as the glue that binds the group together. Observers cannot be faulted for pointing out the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and ironies of mythic images of Irish history.141 However, it is unlikely that this will greatly influence the wider ethnic sense of identity. As Bruce rightly points out, what may be imagined will not easily be imagined away and it is dangerous to suppose that it will.142

2.1.4 Culture How then is national identity experienced in the lives of individuals? Over time, home, school, church, and local groups act

139


140

This term was first used by Benendict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reiflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983.

141

For example, see Walker, Dancing, ch.4.

142

Bruce, Edge of the Union, 143.

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to socialize the individual within the host culture. Eventually the self is contextualized within the wider framework of the culture, which acts as an interpretative grid from which the individual views the world. Culture has been defined as ‘an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life’.143 Culture has the capacity to form identity; it mediates the way people relate to themselves, others and to the world. Belonging to a common culture ‘presumes some kind of complicity that only individuals socialized within that culture can understand…this “complicity” contributes to a sense of a common consciousness and the development of links of solidarity among group members’.144 Individuals therefore have a strong sense of loyalty to their cultural identity. When the nation is seen as the guardian and protector of this identity and the personification of ‘the people’, loyalty to the nation will be heightened. Where the nation and the state are coextensive, the state usually becomes the means by which culture is maintained and communicated. If culture can be described as a badge of identity, different national identities can form very different types of cultural markers. Typically they draw from shared traits such as religion and language, but all sorts of other characteristics can be drawn on such as music, customs, laws, folk traditions, architecture, and even physical distinctives such as skin colour.145 The important point is that cultural uniqueness will be stressed. As Smith concludes, ‘the greater the number of differentiating cultural ties and/or unique cultural traits, the more intense the sense of separate ethnicity, and the greater the chances of ethnic persistence.’146 The search for a shared past discussed above will provide necessary resource material for the ‘recovery’ of cultural traits in the present. It is from this repository of ‘national memories’ that the things that help to make up culture—rituals, ceremonies, customs, festivals, traditions, and symbols—derive their power and contemporary significance.

143


144

Ibid. 79.

145


146

Ibid. 28.

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Since being part of a culture is a mediated process it is unsurprising that at times of nationalist resurgence there is a renewed interest in controlling education and literature, coupled with an institutionalized attempt to promote the imagined traits and cultural uniqueness of the particular ‘nation’. When nation and state are coextensive, the control over education enables the development of a strong unified sense of belonging to the ‘same’ community.147

2.1.5 Emotion and territory It has been shown that nationalism is a dynamic and highly successful political force in the modern world. A core factor in its advance is how the concept of the nation binds members together and has the capacity to arouse powerful national sentiment. Smith observes how a powerful sense of national identity often creates a willingness to give up what is most valuable, even to the point of citizens voluntarily sacrificing their lives, sometimes in huge numbers, in defence of the nation during times of national threat (such as wartime).148 Durkheim called this resulting action of subservience of personal existence to the person's source of identity, ‘altruistic suicide’.149 Mol uses the word ‘commitment’ to describe a ‘focused emotion or emotional attachment to a specific form of identity’. Such emotion integrates and reinforces identities and inspires a devoted following.150 Martyrdom ‘for the cause’ is a dramatic and visible sign of a deep-seated commitment to national identity. An abstract system of national belonging is elevated above all other loyalties. It is significant that political analysts of Irish history have pointed out the ‘emotive factor’ involved in the expression of

147

See for example the imposition of an educational policy designed to propagate the ideology of Irish nationalism and revitalize the Irish language in newly independent Ireland. See D. H. Akenson, A Mirror to Kathleen's Face: Education in Independent Ireland 1922–1960 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975.

148


149

E. Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951, 225. First pub. 1897, trans. J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson.

150

H. Mol, Identity and the Sacred: A Search for a New Social Scientific Theory of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976, 217–18.

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identity in Ireland. The late Professor Estyn Evans, writing in 1970, with an intimate knowledge of Irish culture, life, and folklore, pointed to the powerful forces that have underlain the deep fault line between Catholic and Protestant identities in Ireland. The division ‘raises issues in historical, cultural, and political geography which are of wide application. We have been dramatically reminded of the strength of myths, emotions, and habits of mind, of fundamental forces which cannot be tamed by the politician's solution or economic planning alone.’151 Others have agreed: ‘from all the evidence the things most highly valued by Irish people are religious and national identity’.152 Theorists have attempted to explain how individuals invest identity with an ‘emotional charge’ as they connect themselves with their land, language, symbols, and beliefs.153 These constituents of identity become internalized and are perceived as being part of ‘who I am’. Writing about the importance of national labels Billig states, ‘In proclaiming the uniqueness of “our national name”, “we” are not just talking of “our” own particularity…Somehow in ways difficult to articulate, the magic of “our” name matters to “us” deeply, whichever nationality “we” are: it indicates who “we” are, and, more basically, that “we” are. In the secular age, the name of the nation is not to be taken in vain.’154 It is evident that nationalism does not consist simply of a set of rational doctrines. It derives much of its force from a deep-seated emotional attachment to one's name, land, people, and culture. While it can be promoted by education, it is of a different nature to propositional ideologies such as Communism. It is concerned with the intimate core of people's self-understanding; of who they are and their place in the world. Politics may provide the sphere in which national identities struggle for supremacy, but it is nationalism that provides the emotions, aspirations, and fears fuelling the political battle. The deeply held attachment to place means that national identity is highly concerned with territory. An emotional and

151

E. E. Evans, ‘The Personality of Ulster’, Institute of British Geographers, 51 (1970), 1–20.

152

N. C. Mitchel, ‘Ireland: Divided Island’, Geoforum, 8 (1971), 71.

153


154


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even mystical relationship with the land can develop, expressed in poetry, song, painting, and literature. Nationalism involves not only an imagining of the nation, but also of its homeland. Where state and homeland are coextensive, a national border sets the limits of the state to propagate and transmit its national culture. It is more than a physical barrier; it represents the end of a community's identity. Within its boundaries, the nation is truly ‘at home’.

2.1.6 Symbols and rituals National identities exist in the socio-political world of nation states. Where nation and State are homogenous, the relationship between border and identity is quite straightforward. However, very few countries fit a homogenous description. Where nation and State are not identical, there is a high likelihood of internal boundaries, not necessarily physical in nature, but rather existing in the minds of the people on either side of the boundary. These boundaries are often marked with the use of symbols such as flags and wall murals. A symbol is an object or a sign that has a meaning beyond itself. This meaning can only be decoded by those on the ‘inside’. It therefore acts as a way of marking the boundary of a community identity. A symbol can act in two ways. On the one hand, it can be an aggressive marker to ‘others’ to stay outside; it is a place where they do not belong. On the other hand, it strengthens its host community in their sense of unity and security. National symbols such as flags are imprecise; they can bond together a wide range of individuals from different social backgrounds into one common identity. It can be argued that symbols summarize in a vague and yet powerful way, a collective way of life, a common inheritance and destiny. As Geertz puts it, they ‘synthesize a people's ethos’,155 or in Smith's words, ‘They recall us to our lines of descent, they call to memory our common distant ancestors. They inculcate in, and attach, new generations to the mores and traditions of their fathers and mothers. They signpost the common way of life and institutions of the community. They act as visible spurs to emotions of awe and nostalgia.’156

155


156


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Rituals are ceremonial events that help to bring together members of the community at regular intervals. Ritual has been defined as ‘a repetitive enactment of human systems of meaning’.157 National symbols usually act as important visual reminders of national identity during a ritual. During such a ritual, all that unites members of the nation is emphasized. Individuals feel themselves to belong to the greater entity of the group. Ritual and symbolism combine to produce an intensity of ‘national emotion’. Members feel part of the nation and draw strength from the experience. As ritual is enacted, it simultaneously functions to restore, reinforce, and redirect identity.158 It restores by acting to remind participants of their common belief system. It reinforces by renewing the link between past and present and thus strengthening the bonds of belonging to that identity. If effective, it redirects in the sense of continually revitalizing identity in the face of a changing society. Identity is seriously weakened if ritual and tradition become meaningless. In this sense, both symbols and ritual need to be constantly updated and ‘filled with meaning’ relevant to contemporary circumstances. If a group's identity is perceived as being under threat then ritual and symbols can become particularly significant in producing a sense of cohesiveness that inspires group members to act to defend their interests. It is perhaps in this area more than any other that the potential exists for overlap between nationalism and religion. Durkheim compared nationalism's use of ritual to the operation of religious faith. He argued that if a belief were strongly held by a community it would inevitably take on a religious character.159 Building on this premise Guibernau states: ‘A common faith requires a “church”, and it could be argued that the “nation” fulfils this role…as members of the tribe, the individuals who form the nation need to renew and give strength to the community they

157

Mol, Identity, 233.

158

Ibid. 244.

159

He wrote, ‘The contract to solemn ritual binds men doubly; it binds them to one another; it also binds them to the deity … Further we know that divinity is only the symbolic form of the society.’ E. Durkheim, Leçons de Sociologie: physique des moeurs de droit (Paris: French University Press, 1950, trans. C. Brookfield, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957, 195.

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form by periodically reviving their ideals.’160 A case can be made that the traditions and practices of the Orange Order historically have acted as unionism's major source of symbolism and ritual. Particular attention will be given to this facet of Orange identity during its analysis in Chapter 5.

2.1.7 National identities in coniict Rival national identities usually become involved in a struggle to maintain and communicate their identity. Frequently, competition for the resources of the State ensues in the battle to ‘succeed’ effectively against their Other. When a state contains more than one national identity, it is faced with the decision of how to deal with different competing cultures. If a policy of homogenization is adopted there will need to be a parallel policy of discrimination and suppression of the ‘lesser’ culture. Ironically, this may only act to strengthen the suppressed identity. If a state attempts to implement a policy of dual national identities, serious questions are raised over the viability of the State itself. One culture may seek to opt out of the State altogether as in the case of Quebec in Canada. Alternatively, as in the case of Northern Ireland, a dominant culture will perceive itself under threat as equal rights are given to a minority culture that does not recognize the legitimacy of the State granting it those rights. An inevitable result of the functioning of national identity is that as ‘uniqueness’ is stressed, so an awareness of the ‘difference’ of other group identities will become more apparent. Smith proposes that this sense of group uniqueness is underpinned by two assumptions.161 First, the self-perception of the group—in terms of origins, history, culture, and territory—is typically felt to be somehow ‘right’ or ‘natural.’ Second, the corollary of this is that similar perceptions of other identities are felt to be untrue and illegitimate. For example, a recurrent theme within Ulster Protestant mythology is that while ‘our’ group enjoys the favour of God and the inhabitation of a rightful homeland, Catholic nationalists are both disloyal and idolaters, and ‘their’ rights are subordinate to ‘ours’. Since identity is closely connected to culture, there is thus an associated attitude of cultural superiority toward others customs and beliefs.

160


161


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In areas of disputed territory, defence and protection of identity will often result in violent conflict. The violence will further alienate the two communities, increase territoriality and accelerate changes in population distribution to ‘safer’ areas within one's own group identity. Spatial distribution of the various identities is likely to exhibit a high degree of segregation. While populations within divided identities are often not physically recognizable, they can be observed through certain criteria. The geographical area a person lives in can be one important marker of identity.162 Others may include place of work, type of leisure activities, choice of newspapers, what church attended and what language spoken. These physical characteristics are simply external manifestations of internalized beliefs, attitudes, and values. Over time, lack of group interaction will result in a greater and greater sense of ‘Otherness’ between the groups. Douglas describes the consequences in Northern Ireland: ‘Separate social structures and processes also tend to be located in places apart—subgroups live in segregated areas, children are taught separately, and adults work, spend their leisure time, and are even buried apart. Separate social worlds become separate space worlds and these in turn become spaces of identity.’163 The obverse side of this process is that the heightened perceptions of difference can have an integrative effect of deepening a sense of ethnicity within a group as well as reinforcing awareness of a shared history. Competing versions of the past may therefore be tools in an ethnic conflict that can simultaneously act to draw each side closer in on itself as they retreat further apart from each other. This process certainly occurred in Northern Ireland after Partition as two virtually homogenous communities ‘turned their backs on each other’ for decades. In conditions of such isolation, each side will develop negative stereotypes of their Other and positive ones of themselves. A stereotype originates from a generally agreed perception of the other side, but one that is at odds with objective analysis. As a common belief between members of a group, it is propagated

162

F . W. Boal, ‘Territoriality on the Shankill–Falls Divide’, Irish Geography, 6 (1969), 30–50.

163

Douglas, ‘Political Structures’, 153.

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within the culture of that group identity. The power of such stereotypes in divided societies can hardly be overestimated.164 Not surprisingly, the Other is portrayed in a way that focuses on all that is despised, rejected, and feared. ‘They’ not only oppose ‘us’ but they threaten the good and moral order that ‘we’ embody. Stereotypes function to further separate and distance two conflicting identities. At the same time, the negative image of the Other is sharply contrasted with the stereotype of self that accentuates all that is noble, decent, and superior. The two identities thus are locked in a cycle of division and suspicion. Rapidly the Other becomes not just different, but an implacable enemy to be defeated at all costs. I will return to stereotypes in discussing unionist identity.

2.2 NATIONAL IDENTITY, DISTANCE, AND BELONGING From the discussion above, it is clear that nationalism is an enduring and powerful political force with many positive elements. It has the capacity to bind people together through ties of history, race, culture, emotion, territory, language, religion, and a common destiny. The success of nationalism in evolving to become a global phenomenon and a basic organizing principle behind contemporary world politics lies in its ability to combine the rational with the non-rational, the physical with the metaphysical, emotion with practical politics, and reality with myth. While highly functional in the political world, nationalism also has the ability to meet an individual's need for identity, belonging, and purpose. As a dynamic movement, it has the ability to foster a unique and adaptable sense of national identity for each group conceiving itself as a nation. A national identity can act as a resource of group cultural heritage, giving meaning to the past and a vision for the future. Writing from a theological perspective, William Storrar contends that nations and their cultures, while ‘contingent cultural products of human history’, are ‘one of the richest expressions in a fallen world of the original and continuing “cultural mandate” given in Genesis 1: 28 and 2: 15–25…calling on the human

164


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race to name and develop the rich diversity of God's creation’.165 Although created out of an act of judgement after Babel (Gen. 11) the nations continue to have a purpose within the sovereign plans of God. God's holy nation, Israel, is chosen in order to be a light to the surrounding pagan Gentile nations (Gen. 18: 18). At times, the pagan nations serve as instruments of God's wrath on Israel, at others as means of blessing and liberation.166 In the New Testament, the story is one of unity in diversity. While all the claims of nationalisms and national identities are relativized under the supreme lordship of Christ the King, the source of every believer's identity, distinct political, cultural, and national differences are retained, not abolished. While there is a radical equality within the body of Christ (Gal. 3: 28) this does not deny the reality of identity difference between Jew and Gentile. Pentecost witnessed the Spirit speaking to all in their own tongue. Consistent with the universal missiological implications of this event, the task of contextualizing the Gospel among the Gentile nations lay at the heart of Paul's mission and the story of the New Testament. Even in eschatological terms, the Gospel is for the healing and not the eradication of the nations (Rev. 22: 2). The biblical vision is of restored and transformed nations taking their place in the new heavens and the new earth. Thus, Storrar concludes that despite the ‘indiscriminate and sometimes irrational fear of nations and national identity on the part of many Christians, especially evangelical critics of nationhood and nationalism’,167 it is possible to argue that nationalism is not necessarily an ideologically malignant doctrine. Rather, nations are ambiguous communities, which, like the rest of creation, reflect the distorting marks of human rebellion against God.168 Nations may ‘walk the abyss of idolatry and frequently fall into sin’, yet Christians are called to a ‘dual nationality in which they live out their eternal Christian identity within the provisional community and identity of their nationhood’.169

165

Storrar, ‘ “Vertigo” or “Imago?” ’, 4.

166

See Isaiah 44: 28–45 for how the pagan king Cyrus liberates the Babylonian exiles according to God's sovereign purposes.

167

Storrar, ‘ “Vertigo” or “Imago?” ’, 4.

168

Ibid. 4.

169

W. Storrar, Scottish Identity: A Christian Vision (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1990, 124.

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They are to exercise ‘discriminating judgement’ and a ‘true patriotism’ that ‘will expose all that is evil or morally compromised in its own country, in the light of the gospel, and still love the country’.170 However, it is evident that the nature of nationalism parallels the structure of religious belief to such a degree that it is only ever a few short steps away from a descent into Storrar's abyss of idolatry. It is significant that one of Smith's core doctrines of nationalism is that ‘loyalty to the nation overrides all other loyalties’.171 I discussed earlier how religious themes lie embedded within various constituent elements of national identity. Like religion, nationalism is concerned with the unique destiny of the elect, pilgrimage, future hope, liberation, belonging, community, faith, transcendence, loyalty, ritual, and emotional commitment. All too easily, the nation can replace God as the object of worship and ultimate loyalty. Religious images and language become tools sanctifying and serving the interests of the nation. This religious type of nationalism is idolatrous and manifestly opposed to the absolute loyalty to the Kingdom of God demanded by Jesus of his followers. A twofold task lies ahead. Instead of summarily dismissing any expression of nationalism as incompatible with Christian faith, critical judgement will be exercised on the forms of identity within the study. Interwoven with this aim is a second: to assess how evangelical Christians have succeeded or failed in the task of maintaining a healthy relationship with their own national identity. Given that Ulster has been deeply influenced by evangelical religion, and the twentieth century has seen continual confrontation between nationalist and unionist identities, the chosen study period should be a particularly illuminating one for examination. A vital requirement for this task is how to discern what constitutes a proper relationship to one's own national identity. It is here that Miroslav Volf's concept of distance and belonging becomes a useful interpretative tool.172 Given that nationalism so

170

Storrar, ‘ “Vertigo” or “Imago`” ’, 4, 6–7.

171


172

While widely acclaimed, some weaknesses in Exclusion and Embrace have been identified. Williams doubts whether the scandal of the cross can be equated with ‘the failure of [human] self-donation to bear positive fruit …’. See S. N. Williams, ‘Review’, Lion and Lamb, 13 (Summer 1997, 15. Olsen criticizes Volf's focus on abstract theologicalethical reflection about basic attitudes and his failure to translate his conclusions into paradigms for specific action, a tendency also noted by Williams. See R. E. Olsen, ‘Welcoming the War Criminal’, Books and Culture Magazine, 3/6 (Nov. / Dec. 1997, 32–4. However, these flaws do not detract from the author's achievement of articulating the imperative of a cross-centred theology of reconciliation in a world of oppression, conflict, and injustice. Volf's duality of distance and belonging stands as a coherent model from which to work in this research.

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readily seduces its adherents into sacralizing their national identity, encouraging an exaltation of one culture at the expense of another and fostering an ethnocentric self-righteousness blind to the injustices and oppressive character of one's nation, it is clear what Christians should turn from. A consequence of religious nationalism is exclusion of the Other. Volf outlines three methods of exclusion—elimination, domination, and abandonment—that are worth summarizing here in that they will reappear throughout this book. Assimilation is the more benign side of exclusion by elimination. It functions on the basis of a deal summarized by Volf: ‘You can survive, even thrive among us, if you become like us; you can keep your life, if you give up your identity. ’173 The long-term consequence of assimilation is the gradual removal of the Other from public consciousness. The aggressive form of exclusion as elimination revolves around ‘the deadly logic of the “politics of purity” ’. The pursuit of false purity of a person or community ‘sets itself apart from the defiled world in a hypocritical sinlessness and excludes the boundary breaking other from its heart and its world’.174 It is the sin of desiring the world to be cleansed of the Other rather than engaging in honest and searching reflection on one's own imperfections. It is characterized by an obsession with political purity coupled with a preoccupation with the illegitimacy of the cultural identity of the Other rather than the spiritual life of the self. Some of the symptoms of exclusion by elimination have been touched upon in the discussion of national identities in conflict above—discrimination, mental and physical isolation, cultural superiority, the development of negative stereotypes, and the perception of the Other as enemy. These are simply manifestations of the

173

Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 75.

174

Ibid. 74.

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‘will to purity’ that seeks to remove all contamination from our world. Our territory, our origins, our culture, our future—all must be purified from the presence of the defiling Other. Violent expulsion of the Other is the logical consequence of such ideology that dehumanizes, separates, and expels. Domination is a second form of exclusion. It involves active strategies for exploitation and subjugation of others, typically justified by their status as being some combination of moral, intellectual, political, social, or religious inferiority. ‘We make sure they cannot live in our neighbourhoods, get certain kinds of jobs, receive equal pay or honor; they must stay in their proper place, which is to say the place that we have assigned for them.’175 The third form of exclusion is exclusion as abandonment. The Other is simply ignored as superfluous to our existence. Such indiifference is in reality a powerful indicator of how the Other has been dismissed from our world and banished from our thoughts. Their concerns and needs are irrelevant. Volf suggests that cold indifference can be more damaging than the hot passion of hatred. Whereas the latter burns brightly and is consumed, the latter can be sustained over long periods. Yet, what is the creative alternative to exclusion? What comprises a healthy relationship of the Church to its host culture? Volf proposes that the key lies in developing a balanced relationship between distance from the culture and belonging to it. Let me unpack these terms. Distance involves a ‘stepping away from’ the demands of and loyalty to one's own cultural identity. It is a process central to authentic Christian experience. The paradigm of Abraham elucidates this point: To be a child of Abraham and Sarah and to respond to the call of their God means to make an exodus, to start a voyage, become a stranger…at the very core of Christian identity lies an all encompassing change of loyalty, from a given culture with its gods to the God of all cultures. A response to a call from that God entails a rearrangement of a whole network of allegiances…Departure is part and parcel of Christian identity. 176 Yet departure is not an indiscriminate rejection of identity. It is leaving with a new goal in sight. Christians are on a pilgrim

175

Ibid. 75.

176

Ibid. 40.

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journey as ‘aliens and strangers’ (1 Pet. 2: 11) towards a reality that far outweighs the transitory culture to which they belong. The eschatological hope of God's new heavens and new earth, the place where true Christian citizenship lies, dictates that Christians create distance from their own culture and give absolute fidelity to the ‘not yet’ of the Kingdom of God. Theologically the implication is that ‘no culture can retain its own tribal deities; religion must be de-ethnicized so that ethnicity can be de-sacralized. Paul deprived each culture of ultimacy in order to give them all legitimacy in the wider family of cultures. Through faith one must “depart” from one's culture because the ultimate allegiance is given to God and God's Messiah who transcends every culture.’177 The creation of distance has two important outcomes. The first is that it allows space within us to receive the Other as one within the universal body of Christ. This is what Volf terms a ‘ “catholic personality”, a personal microcosm of the eschatological new creation’.178 A corollary of a catholic personality is a ‘catholic community’ reflecting the multicultural diversity within the universal church. Such a community precludes one Church taking a self-sufficient, isolationist stance and in effect dismissing Churches from other cultures as irrelevant to its needs. Rather, a right distance suggests a ‘catholic cultural identity’ that is in essence opposed to the concept of hermetic boundaries of identity. Distance ‘should loosen the grip of our own culture on us and enable us to live with its fluidity and affirm its hybridity. Other cultures are not a threat to the pristine purity of our cultural identity, but a potential source of its enrichment.’179 Elsewhere, commenting on Romans 15: 7 (‘Accept one another, then, just as Christ accepted you’), Volf argues for the imperative that Christians emulate the Trinitarian welcome in Christ by their ‘will to embrace’, or ‘give ourselves to others and welcome them, to readjust our identities to make

177

Ibid. 49, 52.

178

Ibid. 51. It is immediately evident that this term needs clear interpretation. Volf does not seem to be advocating a Christian identity with boundaries so elastic they become meaningless. He writes that ‘a truly catholic personality must be an evangelical personality—a personality brought to repentance and shaped by the Gospel and engaged in the transformation of the world’.

179

Ibid. 52.

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space for them’.180 Such a ‘fluid identity’ is thus founded on the narrative of divine self-donation.181 The second benefit of distance is that it fosters the ability to judge and evaluate the evil within every culture. This especially includes one's own culture. Distance is a prerequisite for discernment; it helps to prevent the insidious corruption of cultural captivity. Distance is the negation of religious nationalism, which can be defined as ‘belonging without distance’. Yet, distance without belonging results in a cold aloofness. It reduces Christian witness to irrelevance within its own enclosed world of meaning. A Christian presence within a culture is essential in order to prevent cultural isolation. Nevertheless, more than this, the need for belonging is grounded in the profound theological significance of the cross of Christ. Galatians 3: 1–4,7 makes clear that at the cross the particularity of the Jewish covenant is fulfilled through faith in Christ. Believers inherit God's promise to Abraham and become children of the ‘man of faith’. Genealogical ties are made irrelevant. The Torah is relativized. The foundations are laid for an universalist multi-ethnic family of God, entered into by faith.182 In 3: 26–8, ‘Paul finds the essence of Christian proclamation: that “in Christ Jesus” there is a new “oneness” that breaks down all former divisions and heals injustices. The “in” of the equation is local and personal; “Christ Jesus” is viewed in universal and corporate terms; and “faith” and “baptism” describe the manner of entering into this state of being “in Christ”.’183 It is of significance that this new transnational family is not an undifferentiated body representing a community of transcendent sameness, shorn of cultural particularity.184 Christian unity rests not so much on the elimination of

180

M. Volf, ‘ “The Trinity is our Social Program”: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement’, Modern Theology, 14/3 (July 1998, 403–23, esp. 415–16.

181

Ibid. 412.

182

See esp. Galatians 3: 1–4, 11. For commentary see for example: R. Y. K. Fung, The Epistle to the Galatians (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1988; R. N. Longenecker, Galatians (Dallas: Word Books, 1990.

183

Longenecker, Galatians, 158.

184

This is an argument that Volf and Gundry-Volf develop in their critique of Daniel Boyarin's post-modern attack on Paul as an apostle of a Gospel that is inimical to difference. Paul's egalitarian message, in Boyarin's thesis, assimilates all identities within an oppressive dominant identity. See D. Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. In response, Volf and Gundry-Volf contend that being ‘in Christ’ does not entail a loss of particularity. Indeed, Christian unity is not based on a type of universal spiritual oneness but in the particularity of the risen body of Christ. Neither does Paul dismiss his fellow Jews as no longer having soteriological significance. Romans 9–11 describes the lasting place of the Jews in God's plan of salvation. Christian unity is not a culture-less, undifferentiated sameness, but one that embraces difference and establishes equality. See M. Volf and J. M. Gundry-Volf, ‘Paul and the Politics of Identity’, Books and Culture Magazine, 3/4 (July / Aug. 1997 16.

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difference between cultures as the destruction, through the cross, of the enmity that separates (Eph. 2: 14). Paul's emphasis in 1 Corinthians 12: 12–14 is not primarily to stress the need for unity (this is the presupposition that he argues from) as to remind the Corinthians of the rich diversity of the body of Christ within the unifying experience of the Spirit. Unity does not require uniformity. Believers remain ‘Jews or Greeks, slaves or free’; it is the racial, social, and religious significance of these distinctions that is nullified in the body of Christ.185 Paul does not deny his distinguished Jewish heritage, however he is utterly opposed to viewing it as having any spiritual value ‘compared to the surpassing greatness of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord’ (Phil. 3: 2–11). An implication of this Christian universalism is that Christians are not called to abandon their own identities within a new ‘culture-less’ community. While all cultures are relativized through the cross, they are not invalidated. As Volf puts it, distance involves leaving without departing: ‘it is no longer a spatial category; it can take place within the cultural space one inhabits’.186 Neither are Christians called to become aliens to their own culture by retreating to an alternative Christian subculture disconnected from the outside world. Belonging calls for an incarnational Christianity that is ‘of ’ a culture yet distinct from it, or as Jesus put it, is ‘salt and light’ to the world. Just as distance creates space to reach across boundaries to the Other, belonging fosters relationships with others within one's own cultural identity. Both need to be held in tension together if a middle path is to be found between the destructive myopia of belonging without distance and the lonely wilderness experience of distance without belonging.

185

G. D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1987, 606.

186

Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 49 (emphasis original).

3 Paradise Lost?: The Rise and Fall of Ulster Unionism ‘Love the Lord Your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind’; and ‘Love your neighbour as yourself.’ (Luke 10: 27 quoting Deuteronomy 6: 5 and Leviticus 19: 18) ‘Everything is permissible’—but not everything is beneficial. ‘Everything is permissible’—but not everything is constructive. Nobody should seek his own good, but the good of others. (1 Corinthians 10: 23) From the discussion so far it is apparent that national identity is a complex phenomenon that touches upon many areas of individual and group behaviour. While my approach to nationalism and identity has been of a general nature, there have been many ‘echoes’ of the struggle between the two opposing national identities that shaped much of twentiethcentury Irish history. It is time to turn to those echoes in order to begin to apply the functions of national identity to Ulster unionism. My goal is a reconstruction of the character of unionist identity. This will be attempted in three stages. The first stage is an examination of the ideological content of unionism's historical myths that function to legitimize contemporary beliefs. The discussion below demonstrates how unionist mythology is double-edged, embracing both negative stereotypes of its Other while simultaneously incorporating positive understandings of itself. The second stage is how unionists sought to implement and express their identity in what I call unionism's ‘golden era’; the period from Partition to the collapse of Stormont. These fifty years of unionist hegemony were characterized

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RISE AND FALL OF ULSTER UNIONISM

by a marked lack of political opposition coupled with considerable political autonomy. The final stage is how unionist identity has experienced a profound crisis since 1972 in response to violence, a fundamental restructuring of its relationship with the minority community within Northern Ireland, and the latter's associated political advance. The evidence points to a stark contrast between the character of unionist identity in these two periods.

3.1 THE HISTORICAL MYTHS OF ULSTER UNIONISM Ulster unionist mythology tells a dramatic and simple tale; of a people facing siege, insecurity, betrayal, and threat and yet heroically displaying communal characteristics of resistance, bravery, loyalty, and integrity in order to emerge victorious over their treacherous enemies. The story is excellently suited to meet the needs of a minority Protestant population within the island of Ireland. It is retold with contextual variations at particular times of crisis in order to mobilize the unionist population to become actors in a new performance of the play. Thus the myth, although rooted in past events, is seamlessly adapted to changing contemporary conditions. The duality of the unionist myth reveals much of the nature of unionist identity. A positive self-image is held up in sharp contrast to the duplicity of those seeking to subvert the Union. Unionists' belief in the legitimacy of their cause can give rise to exasperated incomprehension at why the unionist case is not received more sympathetically by the outside world. The sense of being misrepresented and misunderstood187 reinforces an identity forged by the threat of Home Rule.188 Unionist identity requires enemies. It is fidelity to the

187

An example of this perception among Presbyterians is recorded by John Dunlop in A Precarious Belonging, 7. ‘Presbyterians, along with many others in Northern Ireland, have been blasted by twenty-five years of efficient IRA violence. Along with that they have been besieged by rhetoric, and by international interpreters who seem to have been persuaded that there is only one story to be sympathetically heard and that is the Irish Catholic story…There are, however, other stories to be heard, of which the Presbyterian story is one.’

188

See B. M. Walker, Ulster Politics: The Formative Years 1868–86 (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation and The Institute of Irish Studies, 1989.


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Union that acts to bond together a fragmented Protestant population in a cohesive block, resistant to constitutional change.189

3.1.1 1641, 1689, 1690, 1912, and the Somme: the formative myths of Ulster unionism It is therefore entirely consistent that unionist identity should fasten upon critical moments of the past that speak of siege, betrayal, suffering, and sacrifice and yet of endurance, rescue, liberation, and vindication of a noble cause. Such ‘myth-making’ provides the basis for an emotive call to follow in the footsteps of those who have gone before. It stresses the historical continuity of modern unionism with the heroes and martyrs of the past, thus legitimizing contemporary political positions. It also allows for a complex fusion of the rhetoric of political liberty with the right to religious freedom. Walker has demonstrated that the use of such history is highly selective.190 Such myths act to gloss over very real past and present cleavages within Ulster unionism in order to unite the people against a common foe.191

189

A note of clarification is important at this point. The use of labels such as ‘nationalist/Catholic’ and ‘unionist/Protestant’ can be double-edged in terms of accuracy. On the one hand they describe reality, yet on the other they can oversimplify and distort that reality. A 1993 survey of Protestant and Catholic churchgoers in Belfast found a lively diversity within a range of markers within both communities. The researchers concluded that ‘this lack of internal cohesiveness also points to the fact that there may well be much in common between groups of Catholics and Protestants who share similar moral values, cultural aspirations, and social outlooks, thereby straddling the “traditional divide”.’ They pointed out the dangers of the almost universal and unquestioned rhetoric of two traditions, two communities and two identities, as language that can induce ‘ideological fixity’ and stereotyping. However the report found that ‘on matters of identity concerning nationality, place, and political partisanship, the overwhelming differences between the two communities are crystal clear.’ The main focus of this study is on these divisive issues. Therefore it is argued that in discussing such matters, it is an accurate description of reality to describe the two sides in broad terms as ‘nationalist/Catholic’ and ‘unionist/Protestant.’ See F. W. Boal, M. C. Keane, and D. N. Livingstone, Them and Us?: Attitudinal Variation Among Churchgoers in Belfast (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1997, 166–72.

190

Walker, Dancing, 10.

191

There was a general disinterest throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in developing conflict motifs from 1641, 1689, and 1690. Events such as the 1798 Rebellion, which saw a brief revolutionary alliance between radical Protestant Presbyterians and Irish Catholics within the United Irishmen movement, were later suppressed in Protestant memory. See Walker, Dancing, 2–10. Marianne Elliott notes how the settlers attacked in 1641 were predominantly English, with the bulk of Presbyterians arriving in subsequent decades. See M. Elliott, Watchmen in Sion: The Protestant Idea of Liberty (Derry: Field Day Pamphlet, 1971, 7.

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In October 1641, the native Irish launched an uprising on the Protestant settlers. The precise scale of the fatalities is impossible to quantify with accuracy;192 more important was the profound symbolic significance of the event for later generations. Akenson argues that a vivid folklore emerged soon after the massacre, transmitted orally from generation to generation. However, his evidence for the strength of the communal memory comes from books published in the late nineteenth century.193 It is significant that it was only in the crisis years of the 1880s onwards that unionists ‘rediscovered’ the significance of seventeenth-century events.194 The 1641 rebellion, with its horrific stories of an unprovoked attack on innocent men, women, and children, accounts of rape, torture, and brutal violence, became a potent symbol in Ulster Protestant mythology. It spoke of the innate treachery of the Irish, the settlers as victims, and the suffering of their civilizing forefathers at the hands of primitive, irrational, and violent natives. The moral with this, and all other unionist myths, was that ‘what has happened once can happen again’. An emerging Protestant community was reminding itself of the continual calling to hold the land for which its ancestors had died. The event most commonly identified with Ulster unionists is the annual 12th of July remembrance parade of King William of Orange's victory over James II at the battle of the Boyne in 1690.195 The battle was part of a wider struggle to establish the Protestant succession based on the Glorious Revolution of

192

Figures soon became fantastically inflated, such as the estimate of 154,000 dead. Foster estimates 2,000, Akenson ‘several thousand’. See R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600–1972 (London: Penguin, 1988, 85. Also D. H. Akenson, God's People's: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, 141.

193

Akenson, God's Peoples, 141.

194

Walker, Dancing, 4.

195

For an evocative account of ‘The Twelfth’ see D. Murphy, A Place Apart (London: Penguin, 1979, 283–91.


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1688. The victory at the Boyne provided a rich resource for future generations to utilize. The Jacobite threat had been defeated. The Ulster Protestants had daringly played their part in protecting civil and religious liberties for their coreligionists. England needed the faithful support of the Ulster Protestants for their own well-being. Yet, England's failure suitably to reward Ulster for her stand meant that she was not to be trusted.196 Failure to support the unionist cause was a betrayal of centuries of loyal sacrifice for the nation. The Catholic Irish would remain a continual political and religious threat to Protestant freedom, perpetually prepared to recruit foreign allies to its cause. The Protestants could only rely on their own determination to resist a persistently hostile Catholic neighbour. At heart, their cause was worthy; those acting against it were not only disloyal but also traitors to a glorious heritage. ‘The Twelfth’ annual ritual acts to reinforce this complex set of motifs in popular consciousness. The ubiquitous presence of banners, symbols, and wall murals in loyalist areas serve to remind and warn the ‘loyal sons of Ulster’ of their ever-present peril and the need for constant vigilance. The 1689 Siege of Derry by Jacobite forces was part of the same historical drama. Observers have judged that this is the most effective and powerful of the Protestant myths.197 A group of apprentice boys shut the gates of the city in the face of the approaching army. Thirty thousand Protestant refugees were driven back on their own resources as Williamite help failed to materialize. Nor could they rely on their commander, Colonel Lundy, who advised immediate surrender.198 It was only the heroic resistance of those within the walls that led to their eventual deliverance and the subsequent defeat of James II at

196

Elliott argues that Irish Protestants were bitterly disillusioned by England's policy of restricting the Irish Parliament's powers and continuing application of aspects of the Penal code to loyal Presbyterians. See Elliott, Watchmen in Sion, 15–16.

197

A. D. Buckley, ‘Uses of History among Ulster Protestants’, in G. Dawe and J. W. Foster (eds.), The Poet's Place: Ulster Literature and Society (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1991, 262.

198

In unionist terminology a ‘Lundy’ was forever after a synonym for traitor. His effigy is burned at every annual celebration of the siege since he not only deserted his comrades but also was accused of being in secret sympathy with the Jacobite cause.

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the Boyne. The siege spoke of a glorious stand for liberty in the face of tyranny; of the need for a cohesive union to defeat the enemy; of the dignity, discipline, and self-sacrifice of Ulster Protestants in times of crisis; of the moral superiority of Protestantism over Catholicism; of loyalty overcoming weakness and treachery; of an outnumbered community under constant threat of attack by its hostile neighbours; and of God's hand resting upon his chosen people to rescue them from their ungodly foes. The retelling of seventeenth-century events became a new source of Ulster unionism's ‘origins of descent’. In the upheaval of the early twentieth century, the myths were reapplied to contemporary events and particularly the 1912–14 Home Rule crisis. Jackson ably demonstrates how 1912–14 became a type of renewed ‘creation myth’ for unionism.199 Edward Carson200 became the deliverer of Ulster unionists in peril of betrayal by Asquith. The organization and training, during 1913, of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) by the Ulster Unionist Council, combined with the open act of defiance of landing large quantities of arms at Larne in April 1914, was a re-enactment of Ulster unionists taking matters into their own hands to defend their territory and heritage. As Elliott writes, such apparent disloyalty was ‘in Presbyterian terms…a continuation of that radical tradition of resisting an authority which has betrayed its trust’.201 Miller perceptively notes that the ‘technical illegality’ of Protestant action was justified, somewhat paradoxically, in that they were the only law-abiding citizens in Ireland, defending themselves against unscrupulous enemies who had no respect for the law.202 The extent of the politicization of the Ulster Protestant population can be gauged by the extraordinary number of 218,206 adult male signatories of the 1912 Solemn League

199

A. Jackson, ‘Unionist Myths 1912–1985’, Past and Present (1992), 166–85, esp. 136.

200

Edward Henry Carson (1854–1935), unionist MP for Dublin University, 1892–1918; leader of the Irish Unionist Party, 1910–21; signatory of the Ulster Covenant, 28 Sept. 1912; resisted the inclusion of Ulster in the Home Rule Bill, 1913; involved in the importation of arms to the port of Larne, 1914; resigned as unionist leader, 1921.

201

Elliott, Watchmen in Sion, 27.

202

Miller, Queen's Rebels, 101.


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and Covenant.203 A separate ‘Declaration’ was signed by 228,991 women. Parallels with the sacred nationalist 1916 declaration of independence are strong. The Covenant acted to bond unionists together, through a ceremony with strong religious overtones, at a time of ‘threatened calamity’. This was the first truly popular mobilization of modern Ulster unionism. The Covenant looked back in time to the Scottish Covenanters to justify the actions of 1912. The 1912 Covenant then in turn became a touchstone of unionist orthodoxy that would condition later unionist attitudes to any perceived threat to the Union. The Catholic population would persist as a potential threat to the State. Britain could never be trusted to remain faithful to its task to uphold the Union. Her attitude was all the more reprehensible in the light of Ulster's faithfulness throughout the Great War and her noble sacrifice of her men in battle, particularly at the massacre of the Somme.204 The Somme operates as Ulster's alternative to the 1916 rebellion, the stoic faithfulness of the 36th Ulster Division serving to highlight the base treachery of Pearse and his compatriots, striking against the Empire for which ‘Ulster’ was dying.

203

I will return to the sacralizing themes of the covenant in Part 2. The text reads: ‘Being convinced in our consciences that Home Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as of the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship and perilous to the unity of Empire, we, whose names are underwritten, men of Ulster, loyal subjects of His Gracious Majesty King George V, humbly relying on the God whom our fathers in days of stress and trial confidently trusted, do hereby pledge ourselves in solemn Covenant throughout this our time of threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom, and in using all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland. And in the event of such a Parliament being forced upon us we further solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves to refuse to recognize its authority. In sure confidence that God will defend the right we hereto subscribe our names. And further, we individually declare that we have not already signed this Covenant…God save the King.’

204

Sarah Nelson recorded the depth of the feeling attached to the memory of the Somme amongst Belfast loyalists. The sense of having fought and died for the British Empire was associated with the expectation that such noble sacrifice should earn long-term political recognition and reward. See S. Nelson, Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: Protestant Paramilitary and Community Groups and the Northern Ireland Conflict (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1984, 96.

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Caution is required before assuming that these formative unionist myths exert an equally powerful influence on the contemporary unionist population as a whole. Undoubtedly they do for the constituency Todd has termed ‘Ulster Loyalist’. It is this strand of unionism, she argues, that engages in ritual marches such as ‘The Twelfth’. These events act as annual reaffirmations of the themes of heroic resistance, triumph, betrayal, and a struggle for freedom and liberty drawn from mythic interpretations of seventeenth-century incidents.205 But, Todd also draws attention to a second tradition within Ulster unionism, the ‘Ulster British’, which exhibits a quite different ideological structure to Ulster loyalism. She argues that the former displays limited ritual behaviour and has little sympathy for religious fanaticism and sectarian parades.206 Todd's work is persuasive and her findings are consistent with others who contend that the Ulster Protestant community is considerably more variegated than often allowed.207 Coulter, in his incisive analysis, has warned of ‘unidimensional’ theories of unionism that have failed to describe the reality of ‘the sheer diversity of unionist sentiment and experience’.208 More recently, the political geographer Brian Graham has identified four competing political perspectives within a fractious modern unionism.209

205

J. Todd, ‘Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture’, Irish Political Studies, 2 (1987), 1–26.

206

Ibid. 19.

207

In addition to Todd, other writers have noted the diversity within Ulster unionist identity. Frank Wright distinguished between liberal and extreme unionists, see Wright, ‘Protestant Ideology’, 213–80. Alan Finlayson analyses sub-identities within Ulster loyalism, differentiating it from the more moderate Ulster unionism. See Finlayson, ‘Nationalism as Ideological Interpellation’, 95. Wallis, Bruce, and Taylor focused on the more extreme form of unionism, separating it from a liberal minority who view politics as constructed around compromise, negotiation, and tolerance. See S. Bruce, R. Wallis, and D. Taylor, ‘No Surrender!’: Paisleyism and the Politics of Ethnic Identity in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Dept. of Social Studies, Queen's University, Belfast, 1986, 1–2. Part 2 of this book examines a largely unexplored facet of Protestant diversity, that of Ulster evangelicalism.

208

Coulter, ‘Character’, 2. Coulter also contributes an essay on middle-class unionism in a book dedicated to the deconstruction of the myth of Protestant homogeneity, see ‘Direct Rule and the Unionist Middle Classes’, in Shirlow and McGovern, Who are the People?, 169–91.

209

The four perspectives are integration, devolution, re-Partition/independence, and accommodation. They do not represent a departure from unionism as such, but disagreements as how best to preserve the Union. See B. Graham, ‘Contested Images of Place amongst Protestants in Northern Ireland’, Political Geography, 17/2 (1998), 129–44.


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Sweeping generalizations concerning the unionist mind, ought then, to be treated with some care. However, having said this, it is likely that the themes contained within unionist myths do have a deep resonance within the wider Protestant population, whether they actively celebrate those particular historical events or not. In a perceptive analysis, Morrow notes that ‘Protestantism certainly provides our most direct link to a primordial narrative and myth of origin in non-Catholic Ireland…The predicament for Protestants in Ulster is that the opponent, against whom the whole community has its identity, remains in the midst.’210 A careful comparison of the characteristics of Todd's ‘Ulster Loyalist’ and the ‘Ulster British’ identities shows that while they may have ‘radically different structures’, they share key attitudes towards the plight of the unionist population within Northern Ireland. Both distrust the British government as a power who could betray the good faith of the ‘people of Ulster’. Both have positive self-images; the ‘Ulster Loyalist’ group as loyal citizens, the ‘Ulster British’ in terms of being part of the wider world of great British liberal values, holding to democracy as the basis of civilized society. Both groups feel that those who do not recognize the legitimacy of their cause are to be resisted as illegitimate forces. The ‘Ulster Loyalist’ tends to see the conflict in terms of good and evil, the ‘Ulster British’ as a threat to democracy and stable government. There is a shared sense of grievance that the wider world does not see the justice of their case. Both see the struggle between nationalism and unionism as one that threatens their civil and religious liberties. Catholic nationalism is equated with religious, social, and economic backwardness. Neither grouping takes seriously the complaints of the Catholic minority, one viewing it as a smokescreen for an attack on the Union (Ulster Loyalist), the other perhaps because to do so would undermine its own self image (Ulster British).211 In both cases, the past is used to legitimize and reinforce

210

D. Morrow, ‘Suffering for Righteousness’ Sake? Fundamentalist Protestantism and Ulster Politics’, in Shirlow and McGovern, Who are the People?, 55–71, see 58–9.

211

Todd, ‘Two Traditions’, 22.

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contemporary political structures and beliefs. The cohesive side to an otherwise fragmented Protestant identity is evidenced by opinion poll findings that record a consistently unified unionist attitude towards constitutional change.212

3.2 THE ‘GOLDEN ERA’: 1921–72 3.2.1 The search for security The period from the foundation of the Northern Irish state to the fall of Stormont can be dubbed the ‘golden era’ of Ulster unionism. The spectre of Home Rule had been defeated. The price of the nationalist twenty-six county ‘free Ireland’ was Partition (an uncomfortable fact that nationalists usually ignored). While Partition was a compromise solution, ironically, it simultaneously allowed, for the first time, Ulster unionists and Irish nationalists direct control over the bulk of their respective (and overlapping) ‘homelands’. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act effectively gave the new Northern parliament unhindered control over policing, local government, education, social services, agriculture, industry, and trade.213 The difference was that in the Free State, the claim to autonomy was implemented formally and constitutionally, while in the North it was implemented informally and unconstitutionally. The political ethos of the new Northern state can best be understood in the context of a national identity seeking to protect and defend itself in a situation of perceived threat. Such a

212

Whyte, in a review of research of political differences between the Catholic and Protestant communities concluded that opposition to any dilution of the Union explains the cohesiveness of unionist voting amongst a population that is markedly diverse and often fragmented. In relation to possible future political settlements, the number of Protestants who opted for any form of a united Ireland varied between 1% and 4%. Even as a possible future option, a unitary State was unacceptable to 81% of Protestants in 1974 and 85% in 1982. See Whyte, Interpreting, 76 ff. This figure remained constant up to 1995 when Trew recorded 87% favouring the long-term maintenance of the Union. See K. Trew, ‘National Identity’. The 1993 survey of churchgoers in Belfast found 89% of Protestants questioned said there should be no change to Northern Ireland's status within the United Kingdom. See Boal, Keane, and Livingstone, Them and Us, 167.

213

H. Patterson, ‘Northern Ireland 1921–68’, in Aughey and Morrow, Northern Ireland Politics, 3–10, see 7.


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danger was real, both from the possibility of violent intervention from republican forces opposed to Partition and from the volatile instability of the Northern state in its early years. Developments occurred according to the logic of the structural make-up of a state that contained a large minority opposed to its existence, ideologically supported by the official position of successive Southern Irish governments. The majority therefore set about to secure permanently its identity. Unionism's predisposition for the ‘politics of siege’ were to find fresh expression in ‘their’ newly created state.214 Just as independent Ireland forged its new-found freedom in terms of cultural and political self-definition against Britain,215 the new state defined itself, culturally and politically, as non-Catholic and non-nationalist.216 Kennedy describes how irreconcilable aims meant that ‘broad views and tolerant ideas were in short supply’. Unionists went to great lengths ‘to distance themselves from any concept of Gaelic nationalism’.217 Consequently, unionism failed to develop a positive ethos; it remained a negative defensive force.

3.2.2 Cultural cohesion: the implementation of a British identity If the raison d'être of the new state was to secure the Union, the majority had to control local and central government in order to rule. The basis for accommodation, essential to a liberal democratic culture, was absent, since the state was founded on a zero-sum basis. Frank Wright describes the irresistible logic of this process in his book Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis. Northern Ireland represents a conflict within an ethnic frontier, where two evenly balanced populations exist within the same territory, divided by competing national allegiances.218 In such

214

For a useful discussion of the recent history of Northern Ireland and changing fortunes of unionism, see J. Loughlin, The Ulster Question since 1945 (London: Macmillan Press, 1998.

215

Foster, Modern Ireland, 516.

216

For a detailed discussion of anti-Catholicism in this period see J. D. Brewer and G. I. Higgins, Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland 1600–1998: The Mote and the Beam (London: Macmillan Press, 1998, 87–127.

217

D. Kennedy, The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State 1919–1949 (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1988, 5.

218

F. Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987, 1. See 1–27 for wider discussion of this point.

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a scenario, where a ‘force relationship’ exists between two peoples with similar capacities to respond to each other's aggression, the imposition by one of ‘democratic values’ and the ‘rule of law’ is but a thinly disguised use of State power for communal advantage. The period from the 1920s saw significant political change; the fragmentation of the British Empire, economic depression in the 1930s, world war, and the introduction of the welfare state. Yet, the constitutional question would remain the immovable central issue of Northern Irish political culture. The apparent stability of five decades of unionist control masked fundamental cleavages within the State. The consolidation of unionist power was not used to attempt to reconcile nationalists to their lot within a British state, nor was it likely to have succeeded.219 Rose persuasively argues that Stormont's attempts to reconcile the Catholic minority to life in the Northern Ireland State, by offering a higher standard of living, failed to account for the reality that in Ireland individual aspirations are not solely satisfied with personal economic benefits.220 Changes in the electoral system in the 1920s, from proportional representation to majority rule, while defended in terms of conforming to the Westminster model, ensured unionist domination at both local and parliamentary levels. Unionist hegemony allowed control over scarce economic resources, employment, housing, and schools. Most significantly, it gave freedom to shape the political structure of the State, since political power conferred control over those resources. While unionism was highly concerned with stressing its difference to Irish nationalism, it had no interest in developing an identity separate from that of Britain. Unionist leaders were slow to innovate, contented merely to shadow Westminster legislation. The pervading assumption of this era was in the innate Britishness of the Ulster Protestant population.221 This was reflected, for example, in the sense of pride in ‘Ulster's’ notable role in the Queen's coronation of 1953, perceived as a

219

Girvin, ‘National Identity’, 114.

220

R. Rose, Governing Without Consensus (London: Faber and Faber, 1971.

221

For further discussion of the Britishness of unionist identity in this period see T. Hennessey, ‘Ulster Unionism and Loyalty to the Crown of the United Kingdom, 1912–74’, in R. English and G. Walker (eds.), Unionism in Modern Ireland (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1996, 115–29.


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reward for her significant and sacrificial contribution to the war effort.222 The feeling of belonging to British values and alienation from those of Catholic nationalism was enhanced by the Republic's ‘shameful’ neutrality in World War II. De Valera's policy seemed to be a calculated rejection of all things British, ‘in a new and real sense, the North and South were worlds apart. If the war and neutrality proved, to Unionists, the inherent hostility of Irish nationalism towards Britain and the British, it underlined the worth of Ulster Loyalism, and its importance to Britain.’223 Nor was the reinforcement of a British unionist identity limited strictly to the interpretation of contemporary political events. Given the nature of national identity, it is unsurprising that the new state sought to reclaim the past in order to legitimate the present. However, such attempts were weak and intermittent.224 The problem lay in the difficulty of successfully imagining and expressing the Britishness of unionist identity. The Union, as a political relationship, did not inspire unionists to create a positive and appropriate cultural landscape to represent their presence in the island of Ireland. The dilemma for unionists was that to ‘imagine’ Ulster's place within Ireland was simultaneously to distance it from Britain. Unionists' earlier sense of being Irishmen within the Empire was subverted and forgotten. The alternative was to develop the theme of Ulster having a distinct cultural and national identity from the rest of Ireland.225 While this strategy successfully legitimated a

222

Loughlin, Ulster Unionism, 163–5.

223

Kennedy, The Widening Gulf, 235.

224

Part of the motivation to create the Ulster Folk Museum in the 1950s was a desire to counter the perceived onslaught of Southern ‘cultural imperialism’. There were also efforts to adopt mythical figures such as Finn MacCool and Cuchulainn as symbols of Ulster's ancient independence, thus enabling unionism to compete with Irish nationalism's version of the same history. For detailed discussion see Loughlin, Ulster Unionism, 169 ff.

225

The fullest academic work in support of this view was written by a Dutchman, Max Heslinga. He argued that the similarities between North and South were outweighed by the differences in religion and culture. Partition was simply a physical consequence of real division. ‘The Border’ was not merely a line drawn on a map, but ‘a line drawn in the hearts and minds of men’ and arguably it represented ‘however arbitrarily, an important spiritual divide’. M. Heslinga, The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide, 2nd edn. (Assen: van Gorcum, 1971, 78.

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separatist (from Ireland) British identity, it was to have significant disadvantages. In the short term, its effect was to encourage what Graham has called a ‘culturally indolent’ period of unionist leadership ‘content to define Northern Ireland as a political entity alone—as a muted reverberation of an ill-understood Britain’.226 In the long term, it failed to create what Graham has elsewhere called ‘a cultural landscape, a representative imagery, through which Protestants might come to terms with, and legitimate, their domicile in Ireland’.227 It is evident that the creation of such a landscape has become essential for the survival of contemporary unionism. In short, the feature in common with all unionist image building of this period was the pretence that all of Ulster subscribed to a loyal British identity. Official publications pictured the North as an integral part of the British way of life, with economic and kinship ties with other regions of Britain.228 The minority community became virtually invisible in this presentation of reality. In a neat inversion of RTE's weather map of Ireland, BBC Northern Ireland maps erased the Republic, leaving six isolated counties. The problem for unionism was that it could not do the same for the nationalist population within the State.

3.2.3 Stereotypes The story of Northern Ireland illustrates how the goal of strengthening and defending national identity is intimately connected to the struggle for economic and political resources. While the propagation of identity does not require the resources of the State (witness the renaissance of Catholic nationalism under the Protestant Ascendancy), it is clear that a fundamental motivation of competing nationalisms is that they will seek the control of their own destiny if possible. As the competition intensifies, the obverse side of each group's fostering of internal solidarity is a heightened awareness of difference with their Other. The climate is set for stereotypes to flourish. The ‘right

226

Graham, ‘Contested images’, 143.

227

B. Graham, ‘Ulster: A Representation of Place Yet to be Imagined’, in Shirlow and McGovern, Who are the People?, 34–54, esp. 53.

228

See for example the annual official publications, Northern Ireland Handbook, Ulster Illustrated and Ulster Commentary.


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is on our side’; the Other is caricatured and stigmatized while one's own identity is legitimized and cherished. Heskin found that Catholics tended not to be opposed to Protestants as Protestants, but as people, in terms of their perceived political elitism and grip on power.229 O'Donnell, in his early 1970s investigation of Northern Irish stereotypes, found that by far the most common description used by Catholics to describe Protestants was ‘powerholders’. Protestants also had a negative view of the other side, but more in terms of an imagined subservience to religious (Catholic) and political (nationalist) ideologies. Words like ‘priest-ridden’, ‘breed like rabbits’, ‘superstitious’, ‘brainwashed’, ‘Republican’, and ‘nationalistic’ were chosen. In contrast to Catholics, Protestants displayed a more confident and assertive self-identity. They used words like ‘determined’, ‘decent’, ‘fine people’, ‘industrious’, ‘conservative’, and ‘power-holders’ alongside words describing their political identity—‘British’ and ‘Loyalist’. Significantly, the latter two were the most common self-descriptions.230 O'Donnell's work contained some methodological shortcomings.231 However, the picture at the close of the ‘golden era’ was of a self-confident Protestant identity viewing itself in superior terms to its Other. This notion had a long heritage. Traditionally, a belief in the liberating effects of Protestant faith was linked with Ulster's economic prosperity, based around its shipbuilding, engineering, and linen industries. In the nineteenth century ‘Protestants believed that having access to the “Open Bible”,

229

K. Heskin, Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1980, 47. Interestingly, Heskin contrasts Catholic opposition to unionist political power with Protestant opposition to Catholicism per se. In other words, Catholics see the issue as one of justice and equality, while Protestants see the conflict as (amongst other things) preserving individual freedom of conscience and religious liberty.

230

E. E. O'Donnell, Northern Irish Stereotypes (Dublin: College of Industrial Relations, 1977.

231

Duffy lists weaknesses in O'Donnell's methodology as; providing terms for subjects to describe their ‘own’ group and the ‘other’ group rather than allowing spontaneity; an unorthodox selection of the study sample; and uncertainty regarding the exact date of the study. The last factor could be of high significance given the volatile political context of Northern Ireland. See U. M. Duffy, ‘Group Identity and Intergroup Perceptions in Northern Ireland’, unpublished M.Sc. dissertation (Queen's University, Belfast,1989, 41–3.

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being free from priestcraft and superstition and adhering to a progressive and enlightened faith were at the heart of Ulster's cultural and economic superiority over the rest of Ireland and, equally important, of Protestant Ulster's superiority over Catholic Ulster.’232 Despite the severe problems facing the Northern economy during this period and beyond, unionists could consistently draw comfort from the even worse situation in the South. This reinforced the belief in the inherent foolishness and impracticality of the united Ireland dream. Kennedy's comment about the 1930s that ‘the condition of the South could be pointed to as an indication of the correctness of a basic tenet of Unionism, which was that the economic prosperity of the island of Ireland was dependent on the closest possible ties with Britain’233 remained true for generations of unionists, even despite the collapse of the very industries on which Ulster's success had rested.234 The religious strand of unionist identity will be discussed in some detail in Part 2. Elliott traces it back to the historic sense of election felt by Ulster Presbyterians, combined with a belief in their own purity of principle.235 This led to the conviction that they alone held to belief systems of religious and political liberty, which they had a duty to defend. Todd describes the ‘Ulster Loyalist’ sense of being called to guard and protect a superior Protestant way of life in the religiopolitical sphere from their Catholic nationalist enemies. Only a Protestant ethos could ensure true political and religious liberty.236 Common within practically all strands of unionism was a negative perception of the Roman Catholic Church as an inherently authoritarian and exclusive organization, intolerant of other creeds. The freedom of Protestant conscience and the unhindered approach to God ‘through justification by faith alone’ stood in contrast to priests blocking ordinary people's

232

Hempton and Hill, Evangelical Protestantism, 182.

233

Kennedy, Widening Gulf, 190.

234

John Whyte noted how this economic argument was reversed over time. Later unionists would argue that Northern Ireland required significant economic subvention from a major power to enable it to function. Whyte, Interpreting, 159–60.

235

Elliott, Watchmen in Sion, 26.

236

Todd, ‘Two Traditions’, 4–8, 18–19.


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access to the Scriptures and depriving them of the possibility of God-given freedom.237 Terence O'Neill's238 famously patronizing remarks about Catholics serve to illustrate the Protestant sense of superiority towards the economically, socially, intellectually, and religiously backward Catholic population during the ‘golden era’ of a secure unionist state. It is frightfully hard to explain to a Protestant that if you give Roman Catholics a good job and a good home they will live like Protestants because they will see neighbours with cars and television sets. They will refuse to have eighteen children, but if the Roman Catholic is jobless and lives in a most ghastly hovel, he will rear eighteen children on national assistance. It is impossible to explain this to a militant Protestant. He cannot understand in fact that if you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness they will live like Protestants in spite of the authoritarian nature of their church.239 Given this popular attitude, the experience of the nationalist minority within Northern Ireland since 1921 was not a joyous one. Experience of deliberate and consistent discrimination,240 higher unemployment among Catholics and substantial economic disadvantage, coupled with significant levels of religious bigotry, led to the civil-rights marches of the late 1960s.

237

J. W. Morrow, ‘Peace and Peacemaking: With Special Reference to Church and Community in Northern Ireland’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Queen's University, Belfast, 1976, 55.

238

Terence O'Neill: born 1914, Northern Ireland MP for Bannside, 1946–70; Prime Minister and leader of the Unionist Party from 1963 until his resignation in 1969.

239

Remarks made shortly after O'Neill's resignation, 26 Apr. 1969.

240

For example; the British favouring of unionists at Partition, an unfair Border, gerrymandering of council electorates, unequal housing policies, unfair levels of local government employment, a biased law enforcement system, and the dismissal of calls for equal rights as subversive to the Union. The extent of discrimination under the Stormont regime has become a source of fierce academic dispute. John Whyte, in a review of research on the subject, concluded that it is not a black and white issue, but grey. While unionist discrimination was not as overwhelmingly oppressive as their opponents have claimed, irrefutable evidence exists that it was deliberate and widespread. See J. Whyte, Interpreting, 164–9. Also his article, ‘How Much Discrimination Was There Under the Unionist Regime, 1921–1968?’, in T. Gallagher and J. O'Connell (eds.), Contemporary Irish Studies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983, 1–35.

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3.2.4 The character of ‘golden era’ unionism At this stage, three interim comments can be made about the character of ‘golden era’ unionism. First, the period of consolidation from the 1920s to the 1970s marked the highpoint of unionist self-confidence and sense of superiority. The 1949 Ireland Act had guaranteed the status of their state as long as there was a Northern Ireland parliament.241 The external menace of the Republic was muted and limited to empty rhetoric. The 1965 Lemass–O'Neill talks seemed to mark the beginning of a constructive new era in North–South relations.242 The sporadic attempts in 1956–62 to ignite a renewed IRA campaign had failed. Five decades of unified unionist political control had apparently suppressed the internal threat of the nationalist minority. Unionists still enjoyed the largely uncritical support of the Tory party.243 General disinterest by the British establishment in Northern Irish affairs had given Stormont the freedom to use its power, as Patrick Buckland put it, ‘in the interests of Unionists and Protestants, with scant regard for the interests of the region as a whole or for the claims or susceptibilities of the substantial minority’.244 The notion of Ulster's innate Britishness went virtually unchallenged by anyone in a position of influence. Cultural and political complacency reigned, only somewhat disturbed by deepening concern over the general attitudes of indifference and ignorance prevalent in Britain about Northern Ireland.245 Such attitudes were jarring reminders that unionist perceptions of Ulster's Britishness were not shared in Britain.

241

In 1978 Brian Faulkner, former Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, remarked that the 1949 Act ‘gave Unionists a sense of belonging which lasted for over twenty years’ as cited by Loughlin, Ulster Unionism, 171.

242

Lee, Ireland, 414.

243

Churchill's wartime comments that ‘the bonds of affection between Great Britain and the people of Northern Ireland have been tempered by fire and are now, I firmly believe, unbreakable’ were echoed by Macmillan while electioneering in 1959: ‘My party will never abandon or betray Northern Ireland and no government over which I have the honour to preside will ever think of it.’ For Churchill's speech see Northern Ireland House of Commons Debates (NIHC Deb.), 26, col. 646, 20 May 1943. For Macmillan's statement see Derry Standard (10 Mar.1959) as cited by Loughlin, Ulster Unionism, 172.

244

P. Buckland, A History of Northern Ireland (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1981, 72.

245

Loughlin, Ulster Unionism, 173.


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Second, the negative character of unionism was shaped profoundly by its political context. Unionism and Irish nationalism both employed effective myths in their struggle for control over their respective parts of the island. Both fostered a sense of history that legitimated their own aspirations, while conveniently ignoring the rights of the other group. Yet, the political turbulence of the early 1970s exposed the radically different content of those myths. Irish nationalism had a positive goal in sight; unionism did not. The Ulster Protestants were seeking not to gain, but to hold; not to change the status quo, but to maintain it; not to attain political control but to protect it; not to attack, but to defend; and not to create something new for the future, but to continue with the past. Irish nationalism was ‘going somewhere’; unionism had nowhere else to go. As inevitable political reform was introduced, the Ulster unionists were to suffer a series of profound and disturbing setbacks to the control of ‘their’ territory that would raise uncomfortable questions of identity, ‘Who are we?’, ‘Where do we belong?’, and ‘Where are we going?.’ Third, a guarded and defensive ideology did not encourage space for lively self-criticism. The formation and maintenance of a cohesive block allows little room for revisionists or dissidents. Unionism during this period showed little ability or need for intellectual progression. Cloaked in the comfort of its own mythology it was blind to, or ignored, the building resentment of the nationalist minority. Consequently, it was utterly unprepared for the impending disaster of Stormont's demise. This issue will be of particular relevance in assessing the role of evangelicalism during the ‘golden era’.

3.3 A CRISIS OF IDENTITY: 1972–98 By the late 1960s, this state of affairs quite literally exploded with the civil-rights marches and the re-emergence of violent republicanism attempting to force British withdrawal and the removal of the Border. Stormont was prorogued in 1972 and Direct Rule from London installed. Douglas argues that this was ‘a psychological, social, and political watershed’ in Northern Ireland's history.246 It replaced the politics of control and

246

Douglas, ‘Political Structures’, 162.

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institutionalized domination with the politics of accommodation directed from London. The introduction of such new policies marked a profound shift from the politics of ethnic consolidation. Based on a British conception of tolerance, negotiation, compromise, and reason, they presupposed the equal worth and value of both national identities within Northern Ireland. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA),247 that allowed for a form of power-sharing between the two communities, is a fruit of this policy. What is clear is that recent decades have shaken cherished unionist beliefs, reinforced the embattled sense of siege, and fulfilled pessimistic expectations of the enemies of Ulster being ever willing to renew their assault.

3.3.1 Political loss of control The imposition of Direct Rule served to illustrate the stark divergence between unionist and British perceptions of the problem. The former believed in the integrity of shared values of Britishness rooted in generations of loyal service to Crown and nation. Through such an interpretative grid, the essence of the civil unrest was the unlawful activity of the IRA and those seeking to destroy Northern Ireland. Yet, just as the Republic looked on in bewilderment borne of decades of mental separation, the image of Northern Ireland in Britain was of a foreign country, tearing itself apart in an incomprehensible Irish civil war. Far from eliciting sympathy and support, the unionist leadership were perceived as unreasonable, extreme, and more seriously, un-British. Their zealous protection of an outdated and unattractive version of Britishness seemed archaic. An obsession with symbols, flags, and religion coupled with the sheer violence of unleashed emotion, shocked British public opinion which had long since ceased to think of the nation in terms of an ethnie's destiny, but in more mundane terms of social, economic, and

247

The GFA was signed on 10 Apr. 1998. The participants declared themselves to be ‘committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect’. The Agreement envisioned the creation of an Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. The Assembly and North/South Council were structured interdependently and could not function apart from each other.


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political development.248 In Geertz's scheme, while Britain was at stage four of its national journey,249 the lack of consensus for nation building in Northern Ireland was only now being exposed. Rather than gaining recognition as a loyal British community under threat and requiring support, unionists were perceived as part of the problem, and a rather embarrassing one at that. The idea that Ulster's fate was of crucial significance for the security and health of the British nation, was exposed as wishful fantasy in the harsh light of the British public's and media's increasing alienation from the unionist cause.250 Direct Rule cast the British government in the role of referee between two unreasonable and extreme sides. The politics of reconciliation and compromise, pursued from a ‘neutral’ stance, meant that Britain did not share a fundamental belief of unionism—that the Irish nationalist minority was innately disloyal and could not be trusted. The unionist journey since 1972 has been an unpleasant series of reminders that the cherished bonds of a common British identity, that seemed so assured in the ‘golden era’, were in fact contingent on a favourable political climate. As that climate changed, the bonds became increasingly insecure. The long search for a political settlement since 1972 has further threatened unionist self-understanding. As Sarah Nelson lucidly put it: While Catholics bore the brunt of physical suffering, their beliefs about themselves, their sense of identity, and their conviction that their demands were justified, was more often strengthened than

248

For example see a letter to a Belfast newspaper from Britain: ‘…Why is it that people in Ireland are still caught up in 17th Century myths and attitudes and are unable, or unwilling, to discard these claims of hate? Thoughts should be focused on the essential and over-riding need to improve the conditions of all the people, instead of being preoccupied by flags, symbols, and outdated dogma. Surely if the political leaders are still blanketed in the fog of history it is time they were replaced by unprejudiced, enlightened persons with a decent supply of commonsense. ’ S. H. Boyd (Gwent, Wales), Belfast Telegraph (16 Dec.1996) (emphasis mine). Apart from failing to understand the complex interplay of causal factors behind the conflict, the letter illustrates well an assumed contrast between ‘progressive’ British values and ‘regressive’ Irish ones.

249

Geertz identified four stages of nationalism: formation, triumph, organization, and stability. See Interpretation of Cultures, 238.

250

Nelson, Uncertain Defenders, 74.

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weakened by the events triggered by civil rights. In contrast, many Protestants found their political world collapsing around them. Their beliefs, their very political and social system, were being questioned on a world stage, while each political reform…seemed to remove another plank from the structure they were defending.251 Direct Rule ensured that they would never regain political control over their own state. The twin pillars of the GFA are power-sharing and an institutional ‘Irish Dimension’. Thus for the British, Direct Rule was a stepping-stone to a new political structure. General Election results since 1983 have shown a consistent percentage fall in votes for parties representing unionism. Its combined share of the vote has decreased by 47,000 votes representing a drop from 52.1% in 1987 to 49.2% in 1997. The 1997 Westminster election results recorded the total unionist vote falling to under 390,000 for the first time.252 In sharp contrast, Sinn Féin emerged as the third largest party in Northern Ireland with two MPs and 16.01% of the vote (representing 40% of the nationalist electorate). The combined nationalist vote (the SDLP and Sinn Féin) amounted to 40.18% of the votes cast.253 The results of the 1998 assembly election marked the worst performance for the UUP since the foundation of Northern Ireland.254 The 2001 Westminster election results suggested a trend towards approximate parity between the DUP, UUP, SDLP, and SF with support for all four polling between 21.0 and 26.8% of the vote.255 The ‘golden era’ has gone, never to return. In such an uncertain environment, unionist mythology, once again, regains its potency.

251

Nelson, Uncertain Defenders, 11.

252

Wilford, ‘The 1997 Westminster Election’, 148. The combined unionist vote consists of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), and the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP).

253

Ibid. 147.

254

The election took place on 25 June 1998. The UUP vote was the lowest in its history at 172,225 (21.28% ). It was outpolled for the first time by the SDLP (177,963 votes representing 21.99%). Sinn Féin's proportion of the electorate continued to rise with the party gaining 17.65% of the vote and 18 seats in the new Assembly, including two ministerial posts.

255

See BBC Online News Website at www.news.bbc.co.uk/vote 2001.

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3.3.2 Reinforcement of unionist mythology The perception of experiencing gradual political emasculation has had intense effects on unionist identity. One symptom of this process has been a realignment of how Protestants describe their sense of themselves. Table 1 shows Protestant responses in percentages when asked to designate the description that best described their sense of national identity. Of particular note is the dramatic decline of ‘Irish’ as a preferred choice of Protestant identity, a trend begun earlier in the twentieth century as the label became the increasingly exclusive preserve of Irish nationalism. The other significant swing was the move towards ‘British’ and away from ‘Ulster’. Whyte suggests that this may have been due to an escalating IRA campaign coupled with an attempt to assert a non-Irish identity.256 Moxon-Browne proposed that the British label was preferable, in that ‘Ulster’ could be perceived as linked to a ‘weak’ political unit. Although Britain could not be trusted, it was the ‘stronger of the two contenders for control over Northern Ireland’.257 If this is the Table 1. Protestant national identity designation, 1968–1994 (percentages) Year 1968 1978 1986 1989 1991 1993 1994

British 39 67 65 68 66 70 71

Ulster 32 20 14 10 15 16 11

Northern Irish n.a. n.a. 11 16 14 11 15

Irish 20 8 3 3 2 2 3

Notes: The 1968 and 1978 surveys did not include ‘Northern Irish’ as an option for interviewees. Sources: 1968: Rose, Governing without Consensus, 208; 1978: E. Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class, and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Gower, 1983); 1986: D. J. Smith, Equality and Inequality in Northern Ireland, Pt.3, Perceptions and Views, PSI Occasional Paper 39, London Political Studies Institute. This data gathered by Smith did not appear in this report, but was published by Whyte, Interpreting, 69 1989: MoxonBrowne, ‘National Identity’ 1991; 1991, 1993, and 1994: Northern Ireland Social Attitude Surveys (NISA) in P. Stringer and G. Robinson (eds.), Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff), i–iii.

256

Whyte, Interpreting, 68.

257

Moxon-Browne, ‘National Identity’, 29.

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case, and it is a credible thesis, it is deeply ironic that, as British ambivalence regarding the Union became obvious, the Protestant population of the North clung ever more tightly to their sense of Britishness.258 This phenomenon neatly sums up the dilemma facing the Protestant / unionist ‘nation’ and does much to explain a deep sense of pessimism within unionism. In contrast to the nationalist self-identification as ‘Irish’ in all conjectured situations, the unionist exhibits no such confidence. He is certainly not English or Irish. He claims to be British, yet is not accepted as such by those in Britain or Ireland. Whyte concluded that, ‘Protestants are divided between “British”, “Ulster”, and “Irish” and tack uncertainly between them.’259 Other studies substantiate his findings.260 The confusion of identity within unionism has served to reinforce the sense of siege, betrayal, treachery, and even impending doom among a community that sees no positive long-term resolution of the assault on its ethos and values. Unionists distrust both governments. Britain's apparent ambivalence on its commitment to Northern Ireland261 negates, in unionist eyes, even the most emphatic reiteration of the British government's will to uphold the ‘democratic wish of the greater number of the people of Northern Ireland’.262 Unionists remain wary of nationalist demands. Writing in 1990, Ruane and Todd argued that the nationalist political agenda remained strong despite the abolition of Stormont; sophisticated anti-discrimination laws; arguably the implementation of the

258

The 1993 survey of Belfast churchgoers found that about 75% of respondents across all Protestant denominations believed that within twenty years over 50% of the population will be Roman Catholic with all that entails for the future of the State. Yet the same people indicated a high commitment to their Britishness and the North remaining within the UK (80–95%). See Boal, Keane, and Livingstone, Them and Us?, 88–90.

259

Whyte, Interpreting, 71.

260

Boal, Keane, and Livingstone found a ‘considerable ambivalence’ in how Protestant churchgoers described themselves (‘Irish’ 2%; ‘British’ 41%; ‘Ulster British’ or ‘Ulsterman/woman’ 36%; and ‘Northern Irish’ 13%), Them and Us?, 72–3.

261

As evidenced in the Downing Street Declaration (15 Dec.1993) that stated ‘the British Government has no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland.’

262

Downing Street Declaration.


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most advanced fair-employment legislation in Western Europe; major investment of economic expenditure by the British government; significant proposed reform of the RUC; the Anglo-Irish Agreement263; formal legal and political equality; and cross-border cooperation in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, and tourism. Most wanted genuine power, not just formal political equality. Unionists feared that political equality would mean giving up their rights as the majority for whom the state was created in the first place. Power-sharing would involve trying to accommodate a community whose political objectives were the antithesis of their own. Cultural equality would mean the dilution of the British ethos of ‘their’ state. Such equality would so reduce their influence, relative to the nationalists, that the very existence of the state would be at risk. The attainment of economic equality would require positive discrimination, inevitably at the expense of Protestant jobs.264 Over a decade later, facing a post-Agreement future and a functioning power-sharing Executive,265 the implications of political accommodation continued to cause deep resentment.266 Although just outside my study period, a significant example of this was the independent Commission on policing for Northern Ireland established by the GFA and chaired by Chris Patten to ‘ensure that policing arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos, and symbols, are such that in a new approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support from… the community as a whole’.267 Patten's report recommended

263

The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) allowed, for the first time, a formal role for the Irish government in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It set up a joint ministerial conference of British and Irish ministers with a permanent secretariat at Maryfield in East Belfast. Its function was to monitor legal, political, and security matters of interest and concern to the nationalist population of the North.

264

Ruane and Todd, ‘Why Can't You’, 35.

265

Power was devolved to the 108-seat Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive Committee of Ministers on 2 Dec. 1999.

266

An illustration of the disturbing nature of the process towards ‘parity of esteem’ during the 1990s was the decision by the Senate of Queen's University, Belfast to abolish the playing of the national anthem at graduation ceremonies. The ensuing bitter debate included unionist allegations that Queen's was following a nationalist agenda intent on removing symbols of their British identity.

267

The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations, Annex A (Belfast: UK Government, Apr. 1998), 23.

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changing the name of the RUC to the Northern Ireland Police Service; introducing a quota system to ensure a 50% recruitment rate from nationalists; ceasing the practice of the Union flag being flown from police stations; and removing the force's symbols of crown and harp.268 The response of wide-scale outrage from the unionist community illustrates how the search for ‘equality’ and a shared identity within Northern Ireland will inevitably involve further loss of unionist core values. In 1994, Dunn and Morgan carried out preliminary research on the topic of Protestant alienation. Their findings were revealing.269 They discovered ‘a genuine and widespread feeling of unease and uncertainty’ among a broad range of the unionist population.270 Alternative words respondents used were ‘insecurity’, ‘fearfulness’, ‘frustration’, ‘marginalization’, ‘despair’, ‘neglect’, and ‘disaffection’. The alienation was primarily from the British government, not a British identity. British policy was perceived as deriving from a lack of understanding and appreciation of the unionist feelings. The various causes of alienation Dunn and Morgan explore all have a common root—a profound loss of political power and impotence to control their destiny after 1972. For many unionists the AIA marked a significant shift in the nature of the Union. It was interpreted as ‘the beginning of the end’ for a political arrangement that they were committed to maintaining, and yet had little power to do so and minimal confidence that they would succeed. The result was confusion, frustration, and anger.271 A central theme of Protestant alienation revealed in the study was the sense of inferiority to the treatment of the Roman Catholic minority. Protestants felt their story had been ignored in contrast to the hearing given to that of the ‘other side’. Many commented that the minority received advantageous

268

See A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland. The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (London: HMSO, 1999. The rationale for these specific proposals was that ‘a new beginning cannot be achieved unless the reality that part of the community feels unable to identify with the present name and symbols associated with the police is addressed…our proposals seek to achieve a situation in which people can be British, Irish, or Northern Irish, as they wish, and all regard the police service as their own.’ (Paragraph 17.6.)

269

S. Dunn and V. Morgan, Protestant Alienation in Northern Ireland: A Preliminary Survey (Coleraine: University of Ulster, 1994.

270

Ibid. 20.

271

Ibid. 10.


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treatment in employment, investment in community projects, and education. Changes in the demographic profile of the two communities and subsequent population shifts have resulted in old ‘Protestant’ areas becoming ‘Catholic’. Given the link of territory and national identity, such population shifts were construed as a further sign of Catholic expropriation of Protestant rights. Such perceptions of course must be read in the context of sustained and intense IRA violence, which despite republican rhetoric about ‘legitimate targets’, was interpreted by unionists as a systematic assault on their community and their identity. Perhaps the word injustice best summarized Protestant attitudes to their situation. Certainly, since its signing, it has been the perceived moral and political injustice of the GFA that has motivated many of its opponents.272 The international support and sympathy elicited for the Catholic population as a ‘victim’ community, in contrast to the stigma attached to unionists as ‘power holders’, only intensifies this perception. The unionist sense of injustice drew strength from other sources. Despite unionism's defence of the state and support for law and order, Protestants felt marginalized and unrewarded for their loyalty, in contrast to ‘concessions’ granted to those who had acted to destroy the state.273 The RUC faced an uncertain future. A profound sense of outrage at early prisoner releases negotiated in the GFA was a primary cause of substantial unionist estrangement from the Peace Process.274 By 2002, the debate over unionist alienation had gathered such momentum that British Secretary of State Dr John Reid was prompted to make the remarkable acknowledgement that Northern Ireland must not become a ‘cold place for Protestants’.275 The disparity with the relative assurance and security of the ‘golden era’ is acute. The ambivalent and divided reaction of

272

For further discussion see D. Morrow, ‘Breaking the Cycle’, New Routes, 3/4 (1998), 15–19.

273

The failure, in June 1999, of the IRA to decommission before Sinn Féin's entry into the Executive proved a ‘bridge too far’ for an increasingly divided UUP. The GFA remained unimplemented for over 18 months.

274

Morrow, ‘Breaking the Cycle’, 18.

275

Commenting in Liverpool in November 2001 within a context of increasing unionist scepticism towards the GFA, Reid talked of a ‘community which feels its traditions, culture, and way of life are under threat’. See a double feature on Protestant alienation in the Irish Times (14–15 Jan.2002.

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unionism to the 1998 Agreement is an indication that unionists remain acutely aware of long-term republican aims. Gerry Adams276 revealingly remarked, ‘Real negotiations inherently imply change…at the end of a real process of inclusive dialogue of real negotiations, the Union with Britain cannot be strengthened, only weakened, and their [unionists] demands for a return to Stormont become ever less realisable.’277 Yet paradoxically, the insecurity of the post-Stormont years also exposed the political price of unionism's civic and cultural indolence during the ‘golden era’. Political instability seemed to have created some space for rethinking a more positive vision of unionism278 that could envisage power-sharing with the nationalist minority. The 1974 attempt at Sunningdale proved premature because it was vehemently opposed by the bulk of unionist population.279 In 1999, David Trimble280 was able to lead a reluctant and divided UUP into a power-sharing Execu

276

Gerry Adams: born 1948; member of Sinn Féin (SF) by 1964; probably joined Provisional IRA c. 1969; interned in 1972 and 1973–7; elected President of SF 1983; elected MP for West Belfast in 1983, 1987, and 1997; signatory of the GFA Apr. 1998.

277

G. Adams, speech to Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, 23 Mar. 1996, Sunday Times (24 Mar. 1996). See also his comment at a Sinn Féin rally in New York that there is no reason that republicans ‘should not celebrate the centenary of 1916 in 2016 in a free and United Ireland’, Good Morning Ireland, RTE Radio 1 (17 Jan. 2000.

278

See for example Ulster Unionist Party member Norman Porter's book, N. Porter, Rethinking Unionism: An Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1996. Porter describes three forms of unionism, the first two as exclusivist, and argues for the third. The first, cultural unionism, relies heavily on its self-perception as representing a Protestant-British way of life culturally distinct from the rest of Ireland. The second, liberal unionism, naively claims it is a rational, non-sectarian form of political contract mirrored in the rest of Britain. The third, civic unionism, inverts traditional unionist priorities towards an inclusive embrace of unionists and nationalists within Northern Ireland.

279

Agreement was reached on the structure of a Council of Ireland at the Sunningdale Conference of December 1973 between the British and Irish Governments and three parties that had formed a power-sharing executive on 21 November 1973—the SDLP, Unionist Party, and Alliance Party. Both the agreement and the Executive collapsed during the massive Ulster Workers Strike (UWC) of May 1974 called to achieve precisely that outcome.

280

David Trimble: former member of the right-wing Vanguard Party led by William Craig; joined the UUP in 1978; elected MP for Upper Bann in 1990; elected Leader of the UUP 1995; signatory of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement; recipient of the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize with John Hume; First Minister of the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly, Dec. 1999.


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tive because 55% of unionists voted for the GFA.281 He admitted, as part of a cautious search for a new relationship with Irish nationalism, that ‘Ulster unionists, fearful of being isolated on the island, built a solid house, but it was a cold house for Catholics.’282 Even such modest remarks are noteworthy in that they appeared to indicate the beginning of a less defensive and more honest reappraisal of the past than unionism had yet managed. Could unionism begin to construct a positive vision for the future, one that can ‘imagine’ a pluralistic and inclusive political philosophy? However, a tortuous path lay ahead for Trimble, leading a divided party and displaying considerable personal ambivalence towards the merits of the Agreement itself.283 He and other pro-Agreement unionists also continued to be severely undermined by the actions of a republican movement displaying its own considerable ambivalence towards the compromise of its objectives represented by power-sharing.284 The fact that, by October 2002, the Assembly had entered its fourth and possibly most intractable suspension, illustrated the potentially fatal nature of the difficulties inherent in the power-sharing project. However, regardless of the short-term durability of the GFA, the depressing reality for unionists is that power-sharing with Irish nationalists, including Sinn Féin, provides their only lasting viable political option. Joint authority between Dublin and London would further erode the Union and, despite DUP hopes, a renegotiated Belfast Agreement more attractive to unionist interests is a political pipe dream. It is therefore clear that unless unionists can succeed in a creative re-imagining of a new political context for the survival of the Union, the long-term political prognosis is ominous. The Protestant community remains deeply fractured; many remain locked in a mindset that expects unceasing attack from their

281

In Northern Ireland 71.12% of the electorate voted for the GFA, including 55% of unionist voters and 96% of nationalists. The ‘Yes’ figure was 94.39% in the Republic.

282

Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Oslo, Oct. 1998.

283

For a provocatively critical, but ultimately persuasive account of Trimble's erratic leadership, see F. O'Connor, Breaking the Bonds: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2002, 176–213.

284

See the Conclusion for further discussion of confidence-eroding activities of the republican movement and the potential fate of the GFA.

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enemies and yet fear only betrayal from their former allies. They are alone in the world of nations.

3.4 SYNTHESIS From this discussion, it is possible to draw three general conclusions about the nature of Ulster unionist identity. First, a most salient point is the sharp contrast between the fate of contemporary unionism and the fixed certainties of the ‘golden era’. A particular issue of importance in Part 2 will be how Ulster evangelicalism has interacted with the rise and fall of Ulster unionism. Second, the historical reality that ‘golden era’ unionism exhibited an unappealing and exclusive character should not obscure the fact that contemporary unionist identity is seriously fissured and insecure. The loss of unionist hegemony has helped to reveal deep-rooted problems militating against the success of its ‘national journey’ compared to the significant accomplishments of Irish nationalism. In a reversal of nationalism's ‘march to freedom’, unionism has never enjoyed full autonomy. While the ‘golden era’ was independence in all but name, after the loss of Stormont unionism was forced to depend on an external power, uncommitted to its cause, to secure its place within the United Kingdom and represent its interests on the wider international stage. Consequently, it has no recognized place in the world of nations. Unionism is correspondingly incapable of achieving one of the core doctrines of nationalism—international recognition. In addition, its ideology and motivations are subject to widespread and hostile criticism. To unionists, their national identity seems to ‘matter’ less than that of their opponents. This frustrates another central aim of nationalism—treatment on an equal basis with other nations. Northern nationalists enjoy the inherent advantage of ‘belonging’ to the Irish nation. Their interests are directly represented by the Irish government. Unionists have only recourse to a British government committed to facilitating political accommodation. Such an unbalanced access to power places unionism in a correspondingly weak position to control and propagate its identity. Thus, despite the GFA, it is a moot point whether an end to the struggle between two opposing identities is imminent. Within the North, the nationalist minority is ‘on the move’,


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challenging the status quo as never before.285 The differing destinies of the two national identities have only served to illustrate the essential dissimilarity in the content of their historic-myth complexes. Nationalism's heroic and glorious past looks forward to a hopeful future. Unionism's memories of heroism and glory are of an altogether different nature. They operate within a framework of distrust and are essentially reactive to contemporary political events. It would be mistaken to assume, as Akenson does, that the different forces ranged against unionism will result in a future loss of identity.286 To do so misses an essential continuity with past myths. Unionists have always felt themselves to be outnumbered, facing betrayal, friendless, with only their own solidarity on which to rely. The question is, which competing strand of contemporary unionism will prevail—a defensive, power-maintaining, and exclusive identity focused on the past, or a pragmatic, pluralist, and inclusive identity focused on the future? Third, despite its present weakened status and the traumatic effects of sustained republican violence, unionism should not be exempt from searching criticism.287 To apply Volf's threefold paradigm of exclusion, unionism has been in essence an ethnic, particularist ideology, defined in negative terms and practising exclusion through a combination of means. I should reiterate

285

Drumcree is but one symptom of changing times. In 1998 the Orange Order threatened to split over the principle of negotiating with Catholic residents groups to see if mutual accommodation was possible. Regardless of the complexities of the issue, it was a sign of changed times when the ‘right to march’, assumed for generations, was being called into serious question. The rise in Sinn Féin's profile is another. Martin McGuinness, recently appointed as Minister for Education in the new Assembly, remarked at a Sinn Féin rally in New York that in the past there were people who ‘did not want a Catholic and a Fenian “about the place” ’. ‘Today’, he claimed, ‘the message is very clear, we are definitely “about the place”.’ Good Morning Ireland, RTE Radio 1 (17 Jan. 2000).

286

His argument that Ulster Protestant culture is ‘a small world falling apart’, and it is only a matter of time before Ulster is subsumed within a much larger capitalist system where ‘there is no Britain, no Ulster, no Republic of Ireland’ is unconvincing. He confuses unionist diversity for weakness of identity. The one crucial factor that binds unionists together from a wide range of theological and political backgrounds is their common commitment to the Union and opposition to a United Ireland. See God's Peoples, 286–94.

287

For a cogent ‘dissection’ of the unionist case see McGarry and O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, 105–37.

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that my focus on unionism is specifically related to the complex interaction between political and religious identities within Ulster Protestantism. It is not my intention or purpose to attempt to apportion ‘blame’ for the tragic history of Northern Ireland, which is essentially a conflict between two competing national identities. The ethno-religious ideology of Irish nationalism, while not the subject of examination here, has its own damaging legacy of exclusion and triumphalism.288 Unionism eliminated its Other through both passive and aggressive tactics. In the passive form, nationalists could take up their place within Northern Irish society only at the cost of assimilation within a British and unionist identity. Unionism's slogan, ‘Ulster is British’, allowed no space for alternative identities within an erroneously imagined homogenous political culture. More aggressively, unionism practised the ‘politics of purity’ by rejecting nationalists as disloyal, illegitimate, and enemies to be opposed. Since Partition, a negative and enclosed unionism became obsessed with protecting its territory, defending its origins, safeguarding its culture, and securing its future, all at the expense of the threatening Other of Irish nationalists within Northern Ireland. The strong anti-Catholic strand within unionist identity belongs within this political desire to ‘cleanse’ Ulster of Catholic nationalism. A traditional unionist goal is of a full and institutional implementation of a British identity based on a democratic majority. However, rather than being democratic, it is actually an example of political self-interest designed to disenfranchise the minority in perpetuity. It is also selective. Unionists refuse to recognize the right of the majority in the United Kingdom to overrule their wishes, yet they also refuse to recognize the right of the minority in the North not to be overruled by the majority unionist population. Unionism practised domination (the politics of superiority) through caricature, stereotype, and discrimination, isolating the morally, politically, socially, and religiously inferior Other to its ‘proper place’ within the hierarchy of Northern Irish life. While the scale and depth of exclusion was a far cry from ludicrously exaggerated republican claims of Northern Ireland

288

For a balanced historical account of the origins of sectarianism in Ireland see Liechty and Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism, 63–101.


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representing an ‘apartheid state’, unionist apologists have systematically denied the reality of discrimination under the Stormont regime.289 Exclusion was also maintained as unionism abandoned the minority through the cold-hearted politics of indifference. The Other was simply irrelevant in the proud narrative of Ulster's contribution to the British nation. McGarry and O'Leary make a convincing case that unionism exhibits deep-seated political prejudice in its systematic rejection of nationalist concerns and interests.290 During the ‘golden era’ nationalists were in effect ‘imagined’ out of existence. Persistent unionist refusal to recognize any form of ‘Irish dimension’ precluded serious engagement with the question of how to ameliorate the political grievances of the minority or even to explore ways in which a shared notion of citizenship might evolve. The subsequent poverty of creative political thought within unionism helped to contribute to decades of political deadlock. Unionism has also consistently evaded responsibility for its role in the conflict. A typical unionist explanation of ‘the Troubles’ is to blame a combination of republican terrorists, the Irish Republic's ‘illegal’ claim to Northern Ireland, weak British security measures, and the ambivalent attitude of the nationalist community towards violence.291 Indeed, standard unionist interpretations make the conflict incomprehensible apart from an insatiable appetite for power amongst Irish nationalists. Increasing Protestant alienation coupled with the self-perception of being a victim community experiencing profound political injustice will probably only strengthen unionist self-justification.

289

McGarry and O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, see 106–11 for detailed argument.

290

Ibid. 105.

291

For an example of a traditional unionist interpretation of Northern Ireland see I. R. K. Paisley, P. Robinson, and J. D. Taylor, Ulster: The Facts (Belfast: Crown Publications, 1982. The authors articulate an orthodox unionist case for rejecting Irish nationalism. The Republic's national claim encourages the IRA; the authoritarian Catholic ethos of the Republic is antithetical to Protestant interests; allegations of discrimination within Northern Ireland is a nationalist propaganda myth; and the desire of the ‘overwhelming majority’ to remain British denies any legitimacy to the nationalist cause. For a more subtle presentation of the unionist case see T. Wilson, Ulster: Conflict and Consent (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

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There has been a consistent unionist refusal to acknowledge how its mythology of domination and celebration of Catholic defeat has contributed to inter-communal tensions. Unionist displacement of responsibility takes different forms. Aughey represents a sophisticated example of revisionism with his theme of the pre-modern character of ethno-religious nationalism compared to the modern civic nature of unionism.292 Other theories dismissing any legitimacy or integrity to nationalist arguments are less elegant.293 Such approaches not only conveniently ignore the functional symmetry between unionist and nationalist identities, but they also gloss over unionist participation in the use of force to protect its interests throughout the conflict.294 This chapter has attempted to trace the mythology, character, and political narrative of twentieth-century unionism. It has been argued that unionism is best interpreted within its particular political context. It has a rational base and functions within recognizable parameters of other national identities. However, this is not to deny that deep flaws are visible within its ideological make-up. Part 2 will now examine the role of Ulster evangelicalism within that narrative and discuss to what extent it has ‘belonged’ to or remained ‘distant’ from that flawed identity.

292

See s. 1.3.1.

293

See Paisley, Robinson, and Taylor, Ulster.

294

One example is how unionist armed insurrection to defeat Home Rule in 1912–14 is celebrated as an act of liberation. Other events either deleted or dismissed from unionist interpretations include: the violent role of the RUC and the ‘B Specials’ in reacting to the civil-rights marches; unlawful Protestant reaction to the AIA; and the significant contribution of Protestant paramilitaries to the death toll during the Troubles.

Part 2 Shades of Orange: Differing Versions of Ulster Evangelicalism


4 Gospel Truth: Describing Evangelicalism May the God who gives endurance and encouragement give you a spirit of unity among yourselves as you follow Christ Jesus, so that with one heart and mouth you may glorify the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. (Romans 15: 5) All over the world this gospel is bearing fruit and growing, just as it has been doing among you since the day you heard it and understood God's grace in all its truth. (Colossians 1: 6) At this juncture, a working approach to evangelicalism is required. One is only able to talk of ‘evangelicalism’ because certain recognized characteristics exist within what is a worldwide religious phenomenon. This chapter will begin by identifying, in general terms, what type of religion evangelical faith embodies. Since my specific focus is on evangelicalism in Ulster an issue of some substance to discuss is evangelicalism's relationship to fundamentalism. This is because of Ian Paisley's strong fundamentalist associations.295 However, it is important to note that in Ulster, as elsewhere, fundamentalism is only one expression of faith within a wider evangelical identity. This chapter will introduce the notion of a spectrum, ranging from open to closed evangelicalism, which reflects the variegated response within Ulster evangelicalism to the localized political and religious realities of Northern Ireland. Chapters 5 to 8, in effect, identify and discuss the ideological content of this spectrum.

295

For further discussion of this issue, see 5. 4. 2 below.

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DESCRIBING EVANGELICALISM

4.1 EVANGELICAL ESSENTIALS David Bebbington's four pillars of evangelical belief and practice—crucicentrism, biblicism, activism, and conversionism—have gained general acceptance among a wide range of evangelical opinion.296 Together they present a picture of ‘vital religion’: theologically focused on the Atonement, giving primacy of authority to the Bible, zealously energetic in spreading the ‘Good News’, and insistent on the necessity for personal repentance and new life in Christ. Bebbington's terminology is awkward and his scheme appears to marginalize the significant place of personal piety within evangelical spirituality. John Stott professes himself uneasy with a formula that fails to distinguish between human and divine activity. He argues for a ‘reshuffling of the cards’ towards a Trinitarian framework whereby secondary evangelical characteristics (conversion, fellowship, and evangelism) flow out from the three ‘towering truths’ of the revelation of God the Father (the Bible), the redeeming work of Christ (the Atonement), and the ministry of the Holy Spirit (spiritual transformation).297 Stott's response is pertinent because it highlights a tension over what constitutes the most appropriate categories by which to define evangelical faith. Bebbington's terminology is broad in character, allowing considerable latitude in how his categories are applied. Such generalizations are understandable in attempting to describe modern evangelical identity. Tidball states that contemporary evangelicalism, now over two hundred years old, has ‘grown to be an immense tree with all sorts of shoots and branches, which often seem to have little in common, yet which clearly draw off the same roots’.298 Others note that, since the mid-eighteenth century, Anglo-American evangelicalism has undergone ‘significant, even revolutionary’ transformation since the ‘power and the complexity of the movement has made it extraordinarily adaptable to the forces of

296

D. Tidball, Who are the Evangelicals? (London: Marshall Pickering, 1994, 14.

297

J. R. W. Stott, Evangelical Truth (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1999, 27–8. See chs 1,2,and 3 respectively for Stott's further discussion of his three categories.

298

Tidball, Who are the Evangelicals?, 12.


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change’.299 The result is that ‘attempts at precise definitions are rather like attempts to pick up a slippery bar of soap with wet hands’.300 McGrath describes evangelicalism as ‘essentially colligatory in that it finds its identity in relation to a series of central interacting themes and concerns’.301 These statements are simply recognitions of the almost boundless diversity within modern evangelical faith. Evangelicalism incorporates a multiplicity of different groups, united not by any common creed or single unifying structure, but only by a shared commitment to certain essential theological truths and their practical implications. Bebbington's definition is increasingly popular probably because it captures something of the spirit of evangelicalism, in that it includes both theological and descriptive categories in an attempt to give an adequate picture of what it means to ‘be evangelical’. The latter category acknowledges that an essential part of evangelicalism's personality is as a dynamic and fluid movement, imprecisely interconnected through shared beliefs, a common heritage, and broadly similar objectives. Tidball captures this mood: Evangelicalism is as much about an ethos and an infrastructure, a complex network of transdenominational organizations, societies, events, and paraphanalia, [sic] as about a doctrinal position. Evangelicals are great activists…Hence evangelicalism spawns an army of evangelistic campaigns and associations, a riot of welfare agencies and reforming societies, a smörgäsbord of Bible conferences and mission conventions and an abundance of training instruments, and…these are all serviced by a further multiplicity of publishing and telecommunications businesses. 302 In this sense, evangelicalism represents a style, or religious culture, loosely connected to a theological core. This has resulted in an enormous proliferation of Churches and organizations, all simultaneously defining themselves as evangelical,

299

G. A. Rawlyk and M. A. Noll (eds.), Amazing Grace: Evangelicalism in Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 1993, 18.

300


301

McGrath, A Passion for Truth, 22.

302


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while holding this identity in tension with widely varying understandings of ecclesiology, spirituality, and attitude to the world to name but three examples. Ulster, with its complex landscape of evangelical mission halls, para-Church organizations, mission societies, Church fellowships, and evangelically influenced denominations fits squarely into this wider picture. It is evangelicalism's almost bewildering variety (or degree of fragmentation) that has caused different commentators to talk of ‘the twelve tribes’ of evangelicalism within Britain,303 and fourteen in America.304 Gabriel Fackre identified six types of evangelicals305 as does Donald Bloesch.306 The latter refers to ‘the amazing lack of consensus’ on what being evangelical actually means. He argues that the ‘open and fluid’ nature of contemporary evangelicalism and the fact that individuals move within sub-categories of evangelical faith means that static and exclusive definitions will inevitably be inadequate. Examples of such a ‘narrow’ approach include delimiting evangelicalism doctrinally (for example a particular stance on biblical inerrancy or premillennialism); or experientially (the necessity of a particular religious experience); or historically (as evidenced in the eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury revivalism); or denominationally (the claim that evangelicalism is inherently Protestant). Nor can a working definition be too broad (simply a belief in Jesus as Saviour and Lord or a recognition of the divine authority of Scripture) in that it will include beliefs antithetical to the Christian Gospel.

303

C. Calver, I. Coffey, and P. Meadows, Who Do Evangelicals Think They Are? (London: Evangelical Alliance, n.d.).

304

R. Webber, Common Roots: A Call to Evangelical Maturity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1978.

305

G. Fackre, Ecumenical Faith in Evangelical Perspective (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993. The six kinds were: fundamentalist (separatist in character); old (Reformed); new (emphasizing apologetics and social responsibility); justice and peace (active in the socio-political realm); charismatic (stressing the work of the Spirit in healing, speaking in tongues and worship); and ecumenical (focusing on Christian unity).

306

D. G. Bloesch, The Future of Evangelical Christianity: A Call for Unity Amid Diversity (New York: Doubleday, 1983, 24–52. His six expressions of what he terms the ‘new conservatism’ are: fundamentalism; neo-evangelicalism; confessionalist evangelicalism; charismatic religion (including pentecostals and the charismatic movement); neoorthodoxy; and Catholic evangelicalism.


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In light of these factors Bloesch proposes that an evangelical is one who affirms the centrality and cruciality of Christ's work of reconciliation and redemption as declared in the Scriptures; the necessity to appropriate the fruits of this work in one's own life and experience; and the urgency to bring the good news of this unmerited grace to a lost and dying world. It is not enough to believe in the cross and resurrection of Christ. We must personally be crucified and buried with Christ and rise with Christ to new life in the Spirit…we must also be fired by a burning zeal to share this salvation with others. To be evangelical therefore means to be evangelistic. 307 In short, Bloesch contends that the essence of evangelicalism is found in a combination of doctrine and personal religious experience. Grenz takes this further, arguing that ‘the evangelical ethos is more readily “sensed” than described theologically’. In the popular mind, being evangelical ‘means sharing a sense of belonging’ based on an agreed vision of what it means to be a Christian. It is this common encounter with the living God that evangelicals then describe in theological categories derived from the Bible. At the heart of evangelicalism is a shared experience moulded by a shared theology. Thus he concludes that, ‘Ultimately the ethos of evangelicalism in any generation and in any expression—whether that of the sixteenth century, the era of the Great Awakenings or the contemporary postfundamentalist coalition—is an experiential piety cradled in a theology.’308 Grenz is overly optimistic in his claim that an identifiable common vision of evangelical spirituality exists. It is also doubtful that his reconstruction of a universal progression from experience to theology is as straightforward in practice. However, his point that a realistic understanding of evangelicalism cannot be divorced from popular experience is indispensable.

307

Ibid. 17.

308

This vision revolves around a collective desire to make the Bible come alive in personal and community life; a joint sense that one's faith is to be vibrant and central to life; a mutual understanding of prayer as an expression of a personal relationship with God; a common emphasis on personal devotion; a shared desire for fellowship; a collective focus on corporate praise and worship; and a common religious experience of spiritual renewal and transformation. S. J. Grenz, Revisioning Evangelical Theology: A Fresh Agenda for the 21st Century (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1993, 30–4.

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Others have used metaphors such as a kaleidoscope309 or Rubik's Cube310 as models to unlock the shifting complexity of contemporary evangelicalism, where different facets of Christian belief and practice can be endlessly rearranged to produce an almost infinite variety of evangelical identities. The result is that all sorts of disparate groups such as Anglicans, Baptists, reformed churches, new churches, Pentecostals, Mennonites, black Baptists, Southern Baptists, Catholic Charismatics, Methodists, independent evangelicals, and fundamentalists, can be gathered under the blanket term ‘evangelical’, demonstrating just how flexible the term has become. This is not of course to imply that all these strands recognize each other as authentic expressions of evangelical faith, but rather that they share common basic characteristics of what it is to be evangelical. To complicate things further, some of these Christians, for example Lutherans, Presbyterians, Pentecostals, and Charismatics, can derive their primary source of identity from denominational or experiential distinctives and yet still be considered evangelical in outlook by mainstream evangelicals. It is obvious that such a variegated landscape is liable to confuse the unwary traveller. The difficulty seems not so much an identification of core evangelical beliefs, but how to delimit the boundaries of evangelical faith. In an approach echoed by Don Carson,311 Stott offers a concise definition of evangelicals as ‘Bible people and Gospel people’.312 He undoubtedly pinpoints two foundational beliefs for all evangelicals. Any stream of Christianity that does not submit to the Bible as the supreme source of authority (whatever differences that may exist over interpretation, theories of inspiration, and inerrancy), and does not accept the Gospel as the unique means by which

309

T. L. Smith, ‘The Evangelical Kaleidoscope and the Call to Christian Unity’, Christian Scholar's Review, 15/2 (1986), 125–40.

310

Tidball, Who are the Evangelicals?, 20–4.

311

D. A. Carson, ‘Evangelicals, Ecumenism and the Church’, in K. S. Kantzer and C. F. H. Henry (eds.), Evangelical Affirmations (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1990, 347–85. Carson argues evangelicals are loyal both to ‘the gospel as understood in evangelical protestantism’ and to ‘the truth, authority and finality of the Bible’. See p. 349.

312

J. R. W. Stott, What is an Evangelical? (London: Church Pastoral Aid Society, 1977.


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God has made salvation available to those who believe in his son, Jesus Christ, cannot be defined as truly evangelical. In this primarily theological sense, evangelicalism is closely bound to the evangel, the Gospel of Jesus Christ. George Marsden offers a fuller, complementary definition of core evangelical priorities. Evangelicals are Christians who typically emphasise (1) the Reformation doctrine of the final authority of Scripture; (2) the real, historical character of God's saving work recorded in Scripture; (3) eternal salvation only through personal trust in Christ; (4) the importance of evangelism and missions; and (5) the importance of a spiritually transformed life. 313 Carson, in an astute discussion of the divisions and ambiguities within evangelicalism, argues that ‘the combination of these pressures forces us to think of evangelicalism as a movement determined by its centre, not its boundary. So understood… contemporary evangelicalism, consistent or otherwise, embraces a wide range of people, but not all their theological opinions.’314 Elsewhere he proposes that how one demarcates the borders of evangelical faith depends on one's chosen defining criteria. To illustrate this point he discusses the implications of whether one defines evangelicalism primarily through a social, spiritual, or theological lens. Those who interpret evangelicals principally as a social grouping within wider Christianity, will tend to accept the self-definition of those who call themselves evangelical. While this approach allows considerable flexibility in responding to shifts in evangelical belief and practice, Carson argues that it effectively detaches evangelical faith from any theological core. He asks rhetorically, ‘Are evangelical beliefs nothing more than what some who call themselves evangelical believe?’315 A narrow spiritual definition that assumes that being evangelical is synonymous with being a genuine regenerate Christian also has significant weaknesses. It allows

313

G. M. Marsden, ‘The Evangelical Denomination’, in G. M. Marsden (ed.), Evangelicalism and Modern America (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984, pp. viii–ix.

314

Carson, ‘Evangelicals, Ecumenism and the Church’, 354.

315

D. A. Carson, ‘Defining Evangelicals’, in Evangelicals Now (Aug. 2000, 10.

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little room for those who may be authentic believers but who simultaneously hold to other beliefs incompatible with evangelicalism. When faced with the dilemma of apparently genuine faith outside the evangelical camp, those holding to a spiritual definition are forced either to broaden their theological definition of evangelicalism to include previously non-evangelical beliefs or to resort to a judgemental position that dismisses all non-evangelicals as non-Christians. For example, Chapter 6 will demonstrate how Paisleyism exemplifies a spiritual interpretation of a tightly defined evangelicalism that rejects the possibility of authentic faith ‘outside the camp’. Carson's preferred option, and one I share, is that of defining evangelicalism primarily in theological terms. While not denying that evangelicalism is a multifaceted and experiential faith, this approach anchors evangelical faith to the historic orthodox creeds of the Christian faith, supplemented by a dual commitment to the final and exclusive authority of the Bible and to the saving power of the Gospel as displayed in the atoning work of Christ on the cross. In practice, this approach has several positive implications. It connects evangelicalism to a recognizable objective theological core (the Gospel) as outlined in Scripture. When understood in this theological sense, the name evangelical therefore can be applied to groups (past and present) who may not think of themselves primarily in evangelical terms but nevertheless theologically hold to evangelical beliefs.316 It also allows space to accept non-evangelicals as fellow believers if agreement exists on Gospel essentials. A social interpretation of evangelicalism in contrast has such limited historical or theological depth and embraces such a diversity of contradictory positions that the term evangelical becomes, theologically speaking, useless. It is the contemporary elasticity of the word ‘evangelical’ that lies behind David Wells's deeply pessimistic analysis concerning the future of the movement. He argues that evangelicalism's fragmented nature is a symptom not of lively diversity but of imminent demise and an indication that its historic theological and confessional core is

316

For example, many Irish evangelicals claim affinity with figures long predating the rise of historic evangelicalism like Saint Patrick because of his high view of Scripture and dramatic personal conversion to Christ. See P. Mitchel, ‘Evangelicalism at Its Best’, Lion and Lamb, 11 (Winter 2000–1), 4–7.


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disintegrating.317 With no recognizable centre, ‘evangelical’ is becoming a meaningless adjective, devoid of substance. The fact that it is now commonly defined by an accompanying adjective (whether Catholic, conservative, liberal, consistent, charismatic, orthodox, feminist, or whatever) is an indication of theological weakness and a ‘dark prelude to death’.318 Wells perhaps overstates his case, but his point is a relevant one. Without a coherent, distinctive, and differentiating identity, evangelicalism will simply become absorbed into the wider culture in which it functions. A question addressed in the following chapters is to what degree evangelicalism in Ulster has succeeded in avoiding this fate. The portrait of a multifaceted contemporary evangelical identity painted above provides a backdrop for an inclusive approach defining Orangeism, Paisleyism, Presbyterianism, and ECONI as all within a broad evangelical family while suspending (for now) assessment of the theological nature of their evangelicalism. It also acts as a reminder that, as historians of evangelicalism have shown, it is important to interpret regional expressions of evangelical faith within their broader political and cultural framework.319 Evangelicals throughout the British Isles may have differed historically in how they expressed common spiritual beliefs, but they remained recognizable as evangelicals who believed in the same core essentials of the evangel. Similarly, as we shall see, Ulster evangelicals all claiming to follow the same Gospel came to sharply differing and even opposing conclusions on how best to express and defend their faith in twentieth-century Northern Ireland. In other words, Ulster evangelicals may be a peculiar people, but they are not unique. Many of their priorities are common to evangelicalism per se and include an emphasis on the authority of Scripture, theological compatibility with the apostolic Gospel, a focus on the cross, historic

317

Wells, No Place for Truth, 128. Grenz, by contrast, suggests that the contemporary crisis in evangelicalism and loss of evangelical identity is symptomatic of a wider cultural transition into post-modernity. The post-modern era poses a challenge for a rebirth of evangelical theology. See Grenz, Revisioning Evangelical Theology, 13–19.

318

Wells, No Place for Truth, 134–5.

319

See Hempton, Religion and Political Culture and Bebbington, Evangelicalism, esp. 271–6.

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succession with previous expressions of evangelical faith (especially the Reformers), and the necessity of spiritual conversion and holiness. Since truth matters to all evangelicals, Ulster evangelicals' predilection for defining and defending orthodoxy is not atypical within the movement as a whole. Certainly, evangelicalism in Ulster does display its own particular characteristics in a specific context of high religious and political insecurity. The intimidating proximity of the Catholic Church and the persistent threat of Irish nationalism are intimately connected to at least two issues of profound significance within Ulster evangelicalism, namely, attitudes to Rome and the spiritual significance of Ulster in the divine purposes of God.

4.2 EVANGELICALISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM A brief analysis of the recent history of contemporary evangelicalism is necessary in order to define the movement's relationship with its closest relative, fundamentalism. While helping to clarify the distinctives of the two movements, the discussion will also provide a useful background when exploring Paisleyite identity in Chapter 6. Ian Paisley has had long and close links with American fundamentalism and particularly the late Dr Bob Jones Jnr. of the Bob Jones University, a fundamentalist educational establishment in Greenville, South Carolina. In 1966 the university, of which he is also a trustee, awarded Paisley an honorary doctorate. Jones's attendance at the opening ceremony of the Martyrs' Memorial in 1969 was symptomatic of a growing and sustained reciprocal relationship of fellowship and mutual support between Paisley and American fundamentalist leaders. This relationship has been expressed in regular preaching tours by Paisley to the United States and invitations to American fundamentalist colleagues to preach in Free Presbyterian churches in Ulster. It was at the Bob Jones University that the idea for a World Congress of Fundamentalists was first proposed.320 At the

320

For an account of the history of the World Congress of Fundamentalists see ‘History’ in the International Testimony for an Infallible Bible (ITIB) Website at www.itib.org (Feb. 2002. Paisley is also a member of the organizing committee for the Congress. See ‘Committee’ in the ITIB Website (Feb. 2002).


115

Congress's inaugural meeting in Edinburgh in 1976, Paisley was appointed (and remains) a member of the Committee on the Definition of Fundamentalism that produced a doctrinal statement summarizing fundamentalist beliefs.321 The continuing strength of this relationship was reflected in a resolution on Northern Ireland passed unanimously at the 1999 World Congress of Fundamentalists that echoed Ian Paisley's negative interpretation of the Peace Process. It noted with alarm ‘the brazen attempt by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to force armed terrorists of Sinn Féin/IRA into the government of Northern Ireland, against the will of the majority population’. It also resolved to ‘commend Dr. Ian Paisley, MP and MEP, on his resounding, unprecedented victory in the recent election to the European Parliament, topping the poll for the fifth time in the European election for Northern Ireland, each time increasing his share of the vote’.322 The opening on 15 November 1997 of the European Institute of Protestant Studies (EIPS), located in the Paisley Jubilee Complex beside Martyrs' Memorial Church, reflects the development of an educational institution similar to those founded by American fundamentalist Churches. The Institute was opened by Bob Jones IV (grandson of Bob Jones Jnr.) and Ian Paisley

321

The present four-man committee, which also includes Bob Jones III, the current President of the Bob Jones University, states that ‘We believe a Fundamentalist is a bornagain believer in the Lord Jesus Christ who: 1. maintains an immovable allegiance to the inerrant, infallible, and verbally inspired Bible; 2. believes that whatever the Bible says is so; 3. judges all things by the Bible and is judged only by the Bible; 4. affirms the foundational truths of the historic Christian Faith. [These are] the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation, virgin birth, substitutionary atonement, bodily resurrection and glorious ascension, and Second Coming of the Lord Jesus Christ, the new birth through regeneration by the Holy Spirit, the resurrection of the saints to life eternal, the resurrection of the ungodly to final judgment and eternal death, and the fellowship of the saints, who are the body of Christ; 5. practices fidelity to that Faith and endeavors to preach it to every creature; 6. exposes and separates from all ecclesiastical denial of that Faith, compromise with error, and apostasy from the Truth; 7. earnestly contends for the Faith once delivered.’ See ‘What we Believe’ in the ITIB Website (Feb. 2002).

322

See ‘Resolutions’, ITIB Website (Feb. 2002).

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was appointed President. Its purpose is to ‘expound the Bible, expose the Papacy, and to promote, defend and maintain Bible Protestantism in Europe and further afield’.323 The organization's Website contains a wide range of material reflecting common fundamentalist characteristics such as militant separatism, the sole use of the King James Version (KJV) of the Bible,324 alongside a systematic assault on the multiple errors of Rome and any other perceived threats to biblical orthodoxy.325 If Paisleyism then represents a localized Ulster form of fundamentalism, it becomes important to clarify the relationship between fundamentalism and its older relative, evangelicalism. Understood from a recent historical perspective, fundamentalism emerged out of the conservative/modernist debates of the early twentieth century. After the conservatives' production of The Fundamentals (1910–15) they came to be known as fundamentalists. Two divergent strands rapidly emerged within Protestant conservatism326 reflecting different responses to the challenge of how to relate Scriptural truth to the contemporary world. The first, fundamentalism, was characterized by a militantly antimodern ethos. Marsden puts it succinctly, ‘funda

323

From the EIPS ‘Mission Statement’ on the organization's Home Page at www.ianpaisley.org (Feb. 2002).

324

A remark typical of Paisley's bluff Ulster humour illustrates his attitude to non-Authorized Versions of Scripture, ‘If you have your Bible with you, I hope it is an Authorized Version you have. If it is one of these perversions of the Scriptures, put it under the seat and don't bother to take it home, and get yourself an Authorized Version of the Word of God.’ I. R. K. Paisley, ‘The Conspiracy Behind The European Union: The Task Before Us’, a lecture delivered at the Annual Autumn Conference of the United Protestant Council in London on Saturday, 7 Nov. 1998. See EIPS Website.

325

It is perhaps worth noting that the high quality Websites of the EIPS, the FPCU and of the Burning Bush magazine (www.ivanfoster.org) are all designed by Animotion Studios (www.astudios.com), a company based in Greenville, South Carolina with close working ties with Bob Jones University.

326

For discussion of the development of the historical, behavioural and theological differences between fundamentalism and evangelicalism see G. M. Marsden, ‘From Fundamentalism to Evangelicalism: A Historical Analysis’, in D. Wells and J. D. Woodbridge (eds.), The Evangelicals: What They Believe, Who They Are, Where They are Changing (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975, 122–42. For a fuller discussion see also G. M. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 2nd edn. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998.


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mentalists are not just religious conservatives, they are conservatives who are willing to take a stand and fight.’327 The second, ‘new’ evangelicalism, was an emerging reaction against what it perceived as the schismatic character, negative social ethics, intellectual barrenness, and moral legalism of fundamentalism.328 Contemporary evangelicalism thus stands between liberalism and fundamentalism.329 It is critical of fundamentalist separatism, but rather embraces the ideal of interdenominational unity and cooperation. Influential leaders such as Harold Ockenga and Carl F. H. Henry in the United States and John Stott in Britain urged a critical openness to culture as against cultural isolation (or in Niebuhr's terms, Christ-transforming culture as opposed to Christ-against culture). Although sharing a common belief in biblical authority, evangelicalism rejected fundamentalism's literalistic hermeneutic and adopted a cautious biblical critical method that has spawned a renaissance in evangelical scholarship in the latter half of the twentieth century.330 The new evangelicalism rejected the dogmatic and ‘loveless’ temperament of ‘reactionary’ fundamentalism.331 Writing in 1958, James Packer rejected fundamentalism as ‘Evangelicalism at something less than its best’, guilty of excessive individualism, lacking in intellectual integrity, neglecting Christian history, and ‘truculent’ in its attitude to its opponents.332 Recent authors have summarized the key differences between fundamentalism and evangelicalism respectively as: 1. suspicion

327

Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism, 1.

328

See M. E. Marty, ‘Tensions within Contemporary Evangelicalism: A Critical Appraisal’, in Wells and Woodbridge (eds.) The Evangelicals, 170–88.

329

It should be noted that evangelicalism has more in common with fundamentalism than liberalism. Most evangelicals can assent to the five essential points of fundamentalism (the miracles of Christ; the virgin birth; the Atonement; the inerrancy of Scripture; and the resurrection of Christ).

330

The work of scholars such as I. H. Marshall, J. W. R. Stott, F. F. Bruce, J. I. Packer, L. Morris, and D. Guthrie made a profound impact on the intellectual confidence and coherence of modern British evangelicalism. For a participant's account of the recent history of British evangelicalism see O. Barclay, Evangelicalism in Britain 1935–1995 (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1997.

331

C. F. H. Henry, Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1957, 43.

332

J. I. Packer, ‘Fundamentalism’ and the Word of God (London: IVF, 1958, 29–40.

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versus openness to scholarship; 2. a dictation theory of inspiration versus a recognition of human and cultural influences; 3. the exclusive use of the Authorized Version versus newer translations; 4. literalism versus a contextualized interpretation of the text; 5. separatism versus engagement with other Christians; 6. cultural accommodation versus cultural criticism; 7. social withdrawal versus social action; 8. premillennialism versus recognition of different eschatological views.333 Evangelicals consistently distinguish their movement from fundamentalism on other grounds.334 They reject the label ‘fundamentalist’ because it is a ‘modern term’. Contrary to fundamentalism, Packer argues that evangelicalism is not ‘just one “ism” among many that our age has bred. It is, we maintain the oldest version of Christianity; theologically regarded, it is just apostolic Christianity itself.’335 Rather than being an innovation, it is later diversions such as Catholicism and liberal Protestantism, which are viewed as ‘eccentricities and novelties’. Nor, according to Packer, should evangelicalism be understood as synonymous with sixteenth-century Protestantism, seventeenth-century Puritanism, eighteenth-century Methodism, or nineteenth-century revivalism. These movements were simply particular ‘episodes’ of the continuing history of apostolic Christianity.336 Critics of fundamentalism such as James Barr dispute such sharp distinctions. He labels evangelicals fundamentalist insofar

333

Tidball, Who are the Evangelicals? 17–18. John Stott lists ten broadly similar distinctions in his book Evangelical Truth, 21–4.

334

For examples of other discussions of the fundamentalist/evangelical story see McGrath, A Passion for Truth ; D. F. Wells, No Place for Truth: Whatever Happened to Evangelical Theology? (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1993; D. W. Bebbington, ‘Evangelicalism in Its Settings: The British and American Movements since 1940’, in M. A. Noll, D. W. Bebbington, and G. A. Rawlyk (eds.), Evangelicalism: Comparative Studies of Popular Protestantism in North America, the British Isles and Beyond, 1700–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994 365–88; Tidball, Who are the Evangelicals?, 186–95; and R. Quebedeaux, The Young Evangelicals (New York: Harper & Row, 1974, 18–41.

335

Packer, ‘Fundamentalism’, 38. For a similar view see John Stott's bold statement that evangelical faith is not a recent innovation. Rather ‘we dare to claim that evangelical Christianity is original, apostolic, New Testament Christianity.’ See Evangelical Truth, 16.

336

Packer, ‘Fundamentalism ’, 38.


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as they demonstrate fundamentalist ‘ways of thinking’, particularly in their understanding and use of the Bible. His case is that notwithstanding differences in eschatology, social ethics, and separatism, evangelicalism has been profoundly affected by a rationalistic mindset characteristic of fundamentalism.337 By rationalism Barr means not so much that fundamentalists exalt the power of human reason to apprehend divine truth, rather they rely on evidences to verify Scriptural truth. Rationalism in this sense is a circular theological method whereby reason discerns ‘the truth’ from the biblical ‘facts’ that must be true because Scripture is inspired and inerrant. In a significant recent work, Harriet Harris broadly accepts Barr's thesis. She acknowledges that while ‘few evangelicals are fundamentalist through and through’ and despite evangelical attempts (such as Tidball's above) to create distance from fundamentalist approaches to Scripture, she remains unconvinced that the two views differ significantly.338 In essence the two streams share a belief in the fundamentals of the faith and find common cause in opposing all non-evangelical theology, whether liberalism, Catholicism, or neo-orthodoxy. Most significantly, Harris argues, it is their shared conception of biblical authority (and particularly inerrancy) that not only distinguishes them from other theological positions but also unites them within a common framework. She writes, ‘not all evangelicals think in a fundamentalist way about the Bible, but very many do in some aspect or to some degree’.339 Unsurprisingly, evangelicals reject Barr's and Harris's conclusions, arguing that both critics make a priori assumptions that

337

J. Barr, Fundamentalism (London: SCM, 1978.

338

Harris argues that evangelicals, in their desire to distance themselves from the pejorative connotations associated with fundamentalism, have created a caricature of a position to the right of their own that no self-designated fundamentalist would accept. Taking Tidball's first four points, she contends that fundamentalists are frequently well-educated theologians who want to keep reason in its proper place. Like evangelicals they reject a ‘mechanical’ theory of inspiration. As with evangelicals, fundamentalists do not generally believe that the Authorized Version is inspired, only the original Scriptures as originally given. Neither are fundamentalists, she posits, absolute literalists in regard to interpreting Scripture. H. A. Harris, Fundamentalism and Evangelicals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 5–9.

339

Ibid. 15.

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guarantee ideologically acceptable conclusions.340 By making a commitment to biblical authority (which is a defining belief of fundamentalism and of evangelicalism) the criterion by which to identify the presence of a ‘fundamentalist mentality’, such critics will inevitably distinguish the presence of such a ‘mentality’.341 Clearly this is a controversial issue, somewhat peripheral to my main concerns. However, it should be noted that, while Barr and Harris are arguing that evangelicalism has been profoundly impacted by fundamentalist thinking, they are not attempting to conflate the two movements.342 Given the range of issues over which they differ, it is quite defensible to argue that there is a real and identifiable polarity between what are two overlapping but distinct forms of conservative Christianity. Of consequence for this book is the undoubted existence of a spectrum of belief and attitudes within Ulster evangelicalism, ranging from the militantly separatist fundamentalism of the FPCU to conservative evangelicalism through to a more inclusive ‘liberal’ form of evangelicalism. Recent developments within the wider evangelical world confirm and explain something of the nature of this spectrum. By theological analysis of the bases of faith of influential evangelical organizations in Britain and the United States from 1846 to 2000, Rob Warner has traced certain trends in evangelicalism's uneasy relationship with fundamentalism.343 His findings are of direct relevance to Ulster. They not only help to locate Paisleyism on the spectrum, but also to provide a wider context for the emergence of a group such as ECONI. What follows are the broad contours of his argument.

340

For example see Stott, Evangelical Truth, 20–1. He contends that ‘evangelicals will resist the continuing attempt to identify them with fundamentalism or to accuse them of having a rationalistic, fundamentalist mindset’, p. 154.

341

While Harris recognizes that ‘British evangelicals can legitimately claim not to be fundamentalist in the separatist sense, and can show themselves to be flexible regarding eschatology’ because of their concept of biblical authority, ‘they do not thereby escape the charge of fundamentalism’. Fundamentalism and Evangelicals, 7.

342

Harris recognizes the historical and social distinctions between fundamentalism and evangelicalism. Ibid. 15.

343

I am very grateful to Rob Warner for supplying a draft of his current doctoral research, provisionally entitled, ‘Reconstructing Evangelical Theology: Bases of Faith in Transition’. No page numbers are available in subsequent references to this work.


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Established in 1846, the Evangelical Alliance (EA) predated the rise of twentieth-century fundamentalism. The basis of faith of the new alliance (EA-1846) revolved around central evangelical beliefs and was a concise ecumenical statement, deliberately broad, inclusive, and non-defensive in nature. By the time the EA's basis of faith was revised in 1970 (EA1970), both the reasons for the new basis and its content were shaped by internal tensions within an evangelical community divided between inclusivist and exclusivist factions. Throughout the century, despite keeping their theological distance from fundamentalism, evangelical bases of faith had become increasingly restrictive. This was due in part to evangelicalism's battle with liberalism, but also to the overshadowing influence, Warner contends, of fundamentalism on evangelicalism. This ‘drift to the right’ was especially marked for example in the adoption, in several evangelical organizations' bases of faith, of the words ‘infallibility’ or ‘inerrancy’—terms associated with a mechanical fundamentalist approach to Scripture.344 Evangelical tensions famously reached a climax at the Second National Assembly of Evangelicals in 1966 (organized by the EA) in a public dispute between guest speaker Martyn Lloyd-Jones345 and chairman John Stott. Lloyd-Jones's appeal for evangelicals to maintain purity by withdrawing from ‘mixed’ denominations was rejected by Stott.346 The disagreement marked a parting of the ways (if not of a warm personal relationship)

344

Ibid. It was only after the emergence of fundamentalism that evangelicals began to develop, and attempt to impose, a prescriptive formula for biblical inspiration using these terms. Important evangelical bodies that adopted the term ‘infallible’ included Inter-Varsity Fellowship (IVF) in 1928 and the World Evangelical Fellowship (WEF) in 1951. IVF was the precursor of Universities and Colleges Christian Fellowship (UCCF), the owner of Inter-Varsity Press (IVP), probably the main evangelical publishing house in the UK.

345

Martyn Lloyd-Jones (1899–1981): medical doctor; Christian minister in Aberavon, Wales (1927–38) and then Westminster Chapel, London (1938–68); world-renowned preacher and author; influential in numerous evangelical agencies such as IVF and, in its early years, London Bible College (LBC); strongly committed to reformed theology; supportive of the more exclusive British Evangelical Council after his withdrawal from the EA.

346

For a fuller discussion of these events see Stott's official biography by T. Dudley-Smith, John Stott: A Global Ministry (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 2001, ii. 65–71.

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between the two leading figures of British evangelicalism and highlighted an underlying strain between purity and engagement that would continue to divide evangelicalism into the twenty-first century. Lloyd-Jones subsequently withdrew from the EA. Many separatists followed, doubtful that such a theologically broad organization could maintain biblical orthodoxy. Stott, in contrast, was the leading catalyst in a reconfiguration of evangelical theology that emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century. He was a central figure in the creation of EA-1970, a major restructuring of EA-1846 in part prompted by the upheavals within evangelicalism emanating from 1966. Stott's desire was to maintain unity, promote cooperation, and encourage reflection and cultural engagement among evangelicals. Although, somewhat ironically, doctrinally EA-1970 was subtly more conservative than EA-1846,347 it nevertheless resisted neo-fundamentalist pressure to adopt ‘infallibility’ or ‘inerrancy’ and remains as a moderate, unifying basis of faith, significantly to the left of all other major evangelical bases of faith of the era. These events provide a background context for the 1974 International Congress on World Evangelization in Lausanne. Consisting of over 2,700 participants from over 150 nations, the Congress was probably evangelicalism's most significant gathering of the century and the Lausanne Covenant (of which Stott was chairman of the drafting committee) its most influential document.348 Lausanne helped to move evangelical theology away from neofundamentalism and embrace a wider socio-political and cultural agenda. It also encouraged evangelicals to new critical self-awareness, by, for example, inviting them to ‘confess with shame that we have often denied our calling and failed in our mission, by becoming conformed to the world or by withdrawing from it’.349

347

Warner discerns in EA-1970 a ‘hardening of theological arteries’ perhaps due to fear that ‘a moderating revision would result in further haemorrhaging of EA membership in the direction of Lloyd-Jones and his followers, or perhaps ‘in reaction against the radical theological liberalism of the 1960s’. Warner, ‘Reconstructing’.

348

See J. W. R. Stott, The Lausanne Covenant: An Exposition and Commentary by John Stott, Lausanne Occasional Papers No. 3 (Charlotte, NC: Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization, 1975.

349

Ibid. 4.


123

Warner identifies two conflicting trends emerging within evangelicalism in the post-Lausanne era revolving around differing attitudes towards engagement or withdrawal, minimal orthodoxy or maximal dogmatism. The first is ‘resurgent-conservatism’, emphasizing theological purity and entrenching exclusivity in the face of Lausanne inclusivity. In general, it displays a reformed ethos, tends to give primacy to a penal substitution model of the Atonement, insists on infallibility, is non-charismatic, non-Arminian, and is cautions of adopting a socio-political agenda. Increasingly elaborate and exclusive formulations such as The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy350 (C-1978) and The Gospel of Jesus Christ: an Evangelical Celebration351 (GC-1999) are located by Warner in this category.352 It is worthy of note that conservative evangelical and reformed theologian James Packer was associated with both these, primarily American, statements. The second trend, an heir of Stott and Lausanne but moving beyond them, Warner terms ‘post-conservative’. This stream, which emerged in the 1990s, is rearticulating a pre-fundamentalist, broad evangelical tradition (as exemplified in EA-1846) in contemporary terms and re-imagining a theological and cultural agenda of engagement in a postmodern context. It has begun to construct a theology that is not defensive or reactionary, reflecting a positive biblical orthodoxy while being willing to distance itself from an earlier evangelical consensus unduly influenced by fundamentalism. New style bases of faith have been produced to the left of EA-1970, namely by Scripture Union (SU1985), London Bible College (LBC-1998), and Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship (IVCF-2000) in the United States. These statements tend to be more a celebration of orthodox faith

350

The 1978 Chicago statement was produced by the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, itself founded in 1977 with the express purpose, as its title suggests, to expound and defend an inerrant view of biblical inspiration.

351

The drafting committee of Gospel Celebration included Don Carson, Thomas Oden, and J. I. Packer. It was endorsed by over 200 mainly North American evangelical figures including theologians Donald Bloesch, Wayne Grudem, Ron Sider, and David Wells, and high-profile leaders such as Bill Bright, Chuck Colson, Jerry Falwell, Bill Hybels, Tim LaHaye, Billy Graham, Luis Palau, and Charles Swindoll.

352

Warner contends both statements go well beyond the requirements of minimal evangelical orthodoxy. See ‘Reconstructing’.

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as they address contemporary issues like gender, race, and social responsibility. They may take a narrative form (LBC1998) and focus on positive statements of evangelical belief and on praxis rather than attempting to define the boundaries of authentic faith. They consciously attempt to include a diversity of evangelical opinion, including Arminians, Charismatics and Pentecostals who tended to be excluded from ‘resurgent conservative’ bases. While not rejecting the doctrines, these bases of faith find it unnecessary to locate either infallibility or penal substitution as core elements of evangelical orthodoxy. It is significant that these new statements have originated from long-established organizations within the evangelical community. Warner concludes his analysis by tracing a spectrum covering three general categories. The first is ‘the right’ that includes ‘unreconstructed fundamentalists’ and ‘neo-conservatives’ (such as Packer). The second category embraces the ‘moderates’, including ‘traditional or mainstream’ evangelicals and the ‘moderate post-Lausanne conservatives’ such as Stott. The third group include ‘reconstructed evangelicals’ responsible for the new bases of faith within the increasingly influential post-conservative stream. It is time to consider the implication of these trends for interpreting evangelicalism in Ulster. Just as unionism is diverse in character, evangelicalism in Ulster, as elsewhere, encompasses a breadth of belief and practice across denominational and theological boundaries. It is to the nature and strength of identities within this spectrum there that I now turn.

4.3 THE SPECTRUM OF EVANGELICALISM IN ULSTER Given the flexibility of evangelical belief it is difficult to identify numbers of evangelicals within Churches and paraChurch organizations with any precision. Table 2 summarizes census findings on religious affiliation within my study period. However, from recent research it is possible to move beyond broad denominational categories to reconstruct a general por


125

trait of the mosaic that constitutes evangelicalism in Ulster. Table 3 records the numerical strength of the main Church groupings in Northern Ireland by active membership as opposed simply to affiliation referred to in Table 2. Table 4 indicates something of their theological persuasion. It should be noted that the latter's figures are for Belfast churchgoers only. It is assumed here that their findings are broadly representative of the rest of the country. For reasons noted, the first two categories of Table 4 are taken as approximate indicators of evangelical presence. From Tables 3 and 4 it is evident that the largest Protestant denomination in Ulster (the PCI) is located firmly but not wholly within the boundaries of conservative evangelicalism.353 Obviously a spectrum of opinion exists within any denomination, but it is fair to argue that, in Warner's terminology, the PCI fits within moderate ‘mainstream’ or ‘traditional’ evan-gelicalism. Within Irish Anglicanism evangelicals number a significant minority,354 while they form a majority within the much smaller world of Irish Methodism. The modestly sized and highly conservative Baptist Union of Ireland is thoroughly evangelical while the FPCU lies on the fundamentalist wing of evangelicalism. The most rapidly growing sector within the evangelical family is visible within Charismatic355 (new) and Pentecostal Churches, 99% of whose respondents fall within the conservative or liberal-conservative categories. More difficult to assess numerically and theologically is a guarded para-Church organization like the Orange Order.356 Writing in 1971, Richard Rose contended that the Order represented 32% of the adult male population of Northern Ireland which equated to a figure of approximately 100,000.357

353

For further substantiation of this point see s. 7.1.

354

See A. Acheson, A History of the Church of Ireland 1691–1996 (Dublin: Columba Press, 1997 254.

355

The main CFC community is at Strandtown in East Belfast led by Pastor Paul Reid. For a personal sketch of the history and vision of CFC see P. Reid, A New Easter Rising (Leigh: Logikos Christian Publishing, 1993.

356

The formal title for the organization is The Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland (GOLI).

357

Rose, Governing without Consensus, 257.

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Table 2. Religions of the population, 1926–1991 Year

1926 1937 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991

Presbyterian Number 393,374 390,931 410,215 413,113 405,717 339,818 336,891

% 31.3 30.5 29.9 29.0 26.7 22.9 21.3

Church land Number 338,724 345,474 353,245 344,800 334,318 281,472 279,280

of Ire-

Methodist

Other

% 27.0

Num- % ber 49,554 3.9

Num- % ber 52,177 4.1

27.0

55,135 4.3

57,541 4.5

25.8

66,639 4.9

63,497 4.6

24.2

71,865 5.0

71,299 5.0

22.0

71,235 4.7

87,938 5.8

19.0

58,731 4.0

17.7

59,517 3.8

112,8- 7.6 22 122,4- 7.8 48

Roman lic Number 420,428 428,290 471,460 497,547 477,921 414,532 605,639

Catho- Not stated % 33.5

Number 2,304

0.2

33.5

2,347

0.2

34.4

5,865

0.4

34.9

26,418 1.9

31.4

142,5- 9.4 11 274,5- 18.5 84 114,8- 7.3 27

28.0 38.4

%

Notes: All the figures in Table 2 are for Northern Ireland only, even if the denomination is organized on an all-Ireland basis. Source: Northern Ireland Census 1991: Religion Report (Belfast: HMSO, 1992.

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Table 3. Protestant Church membership in Northern Ireland Year

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Presbyteri- Church of Free Presan Church Irelandb byterian a in Ireland Church of Ulster 197,094 162,950 9,621 196,417 162,750 11,319 195,576 162,110 12,550 194,718 161,500 14,100 193,960 160,800 15,400

Baptistc

Brethrend

Methodist NewChurchese

Pentecostalf

7,545 8,269 8,500 7,905 7,900

9,435 9,390 9,480 9,210 9,235

23,056 20,868 19,317 17,700 15,900

8,716 9,338 12,211 15,154 16,815

100 500 1,900 2,975 3,800

Brierley takes active membership to be 58% of the total Presbyterian Church community. The overall PCI membership figure in 1998 was approximately 300,000. a

As with the PCI active membership is taken as 58% of the total Church of Ireland community. The total C. of I. membership in 1991 was 279,280 (1991 census). Other figures in Table 3 represent total Church membership.

b

c

The term ‘Baptist’ here refers to Church membership within the Baptist Union of Ireland (BUI).

d

These figures include all Brethren Assemblies. The largest is the Christian Brethren (7,875 in 1995).

This figure includes Christian Fellowship Church (CFC), founded in 1987. Brierly estimated its membership would reach 2,000 by the year 2000. The 1991 census recorded a figure of 1,300. e

This figure includes Elim (13,215 in 1995), Assemblies of God (1,093 in 1995), Apostolic (320 in 1995), and other Pentecostals (545 in 1995). f

Source: P. Brierly (ed.), The UK Christian Handbook: Religious Trends 1998/99, 1 (London: Christian Research, 1998).

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Table 4. Theological composition of denominational clusters in Belfast (percentages) Denominational cluster Church of Ireland Presbyterian Church in Ireland Methodist Congregational Baptistic Pentecostal/Charismatic Other Presbyterian

Conservative 27 38

Liberal-Conservative 28 29

Liberal 45 33

43 79 83 87 94

35 17 15 12 6

23 4 1 0.4 0

Notes: Boal, Keane and Livingstone used responses to two statements as a litmus test of theological persuasion. The first was ‘Only a conversion experience of Jesus Christ as personal Saviour makes you a Christian.’ The second was ‘What is written in the Bible is the Word of God and is completely without error.’ A person ticking both options was labelled a ‘conservative’, while a ‘liberal-conservative’ ticked one and a ‘liberal’ neither. This very narrow filter of conservative orthodoxy means it is likely that many ‘liberal-conservatives’ would fall within mainstream evangelical belief. Many evangelicals would not insist on a ‘conversion experience’ as an essential qualification for being a Christian. The issue of inerrancy has been major source of debate within evangelicalism in recent years. For these reasons a positive answer to either of the two questions is likely to indicate evangelical belief. Source: Boal, Keane and Livingstone, Them and Us?, 96.

Cecil Kilpatrick, then convenor of the Order's Education Committee, put the contemporary committed membership at over 40,000.358 However, given that his estimate was based on numbers of Orangemen who had responded to an appeal to pay a voluntary levy of £1 to support the work of the Education Committee, the actual figure is likely to be considerably higher. Certainly past levels of membership were hugely influential within the confined political arena of Ulster politics. Within Orangeism there is a diversity of belief and practice, some lodges being staunchly evangelical others having a more social or political ethos, but the theoretical ethos of the organization is recognizably evangelical in character.359

358

Interview with author, 22 July 1997.

359

See Ch.5 for further discussion of this point.


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Turning to the recently formed ECONI group, it asserts (a claim substantiated by its ideological stance) that it stands within mainstream conservative evangelicalism. ECONI subscribes to EA-1970 and can be located at least alongside Stott in Warner's spectrum. However, as discussed further in Chapter 8, ECONI's radical critique of previous evangelical givens, its inclusivity, its wide understanding of the Gospel as including a socio-political agenda, and its commitment to peacemaking, all point to the organization fitting well within a ‘reconstructed evangelical’ ethos. The organization claims to represent ‘no-one but themselves’ but it would be irrelevant and impotent without wider community backing. ECONI maintains that between 33% and 50% of the Protestant population consider themselves to be evangelical, indicating a numerical strength of between 185,000 (12% of the overall population) and 270,000 (18% of the overall population) of which a significant proportion is sympathetic to its goals.360 Drawing these factors together, it is possible to portray the spectrum of Ulster evangelicalism in Figure 1. My particular interest lies with the four sample groups. However, it is useful to locate them in a wider context. The ellipses give an indication of size of the different groups but are not drawn strictly to scale. The horizontal axis has a dual function. The first is to denote the theological spectrum from fundamentalist to ‘liberal’. Charismatic Churches such as the Christian Fellowship Church (CFC) intersect strongly with evangelical identity but stress a common experience of the Holy Spirit that fosters relationships with those outside the boundaries of evangelicalism.361 It is to this ‘spiritual ecumenism’ that the term ‘liberal’ refers and not necessarily to a theological liberalism. Groups like the Evangelical Catholic Initiative (ECI) lie on the periphery of historic evangelicalism.362 Both ECI and CFC are

360

See A Future with Hope: Biblical Frameworks for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Belfast: ECONI, 1995, 5.

361

Paul Reid, leader of CFC, describes himself as ‘unashamedly evangelical’. He argues that ‘we must lay aside our Protestant identity’ and states that he can he ‘can co-exist happily with Roman Catholic Christians’. However, his vision is for ‘non-sectarian churches’ that owe allegiance to neither tradition. See A New Easter Rising, 113–15.

362

See the discussion of ECONI's attitude to the ECI in Ch.8.

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opposed to the political stance of Orangeism.363 As indicated in Table 3, much Ulster pentecostalism is highly conservative and contains strains strongly supportive of Orangeism364 and Paisleyism, hence its position on the fundamentalist/Orange axis. The lack of structural unity between Paisleyism and Orangeism is an issue to which I will return. The second scale on the horizontal axis is between closed and open evangelicalism and the meaning of these terms requires clarification. As is characteristic of evangelicalism in general, considerable tension can exist between different groups in Ulster as they compete for the label of orthodox biblical believers. More specifically, the question, ‘What constitutes a genuine evangelical response to the Northern Ireland conflict?’ elicits sharply differing responses reflecting prior ideological commitment on issues like, for example, the role of a Christian in politics; the nature of the Kingdom of God; the biblical view of the relationship between Church and State; and how best to defend and apply Protestant evangelical faith in a context of threat, fear and violence It is my contention that two separate poles of evangelical identity exist within Ulster, with distinct ideological structures based on differing responses to the issues listed above. I will call them closed and open evangelicalism (Fig. 1). The terms closed and open primarily refer to the character of the identity's relationship with unionist identity. It will be argued that closed evangelicalism, operating within the boundaries of a Protestant unionist identity, has broadly failed to find the balance between distance and belonging to its host culture, opting instead for a (biblically) compromised form of belonging without distance. The word ‘closed’ also therefore refers to an identity encircled

363

Reid asserts that ‘a desire to see our land healed must be on a thirty-two county basis. Mere evangelicalism will never do the job…a new brand of New Testament Christianity is needed.’ He also records holding prayer meetings ‘against the adverse influence of bodies such as the Orange Order, the Black Institution and the Masonic Order’, New Easter Rising, 140–1.

364

For example David McConaghie, religious affairs secretary of the Independent Loyal Orange Order (founded 1902 is pastor of Maghaberrry Elim Pentecostal Church. He is also a spokesman for the Caleb Foundation, a right-wing evangelical pressure group founded in October 1998 to promote the fundamentals of the Protestant faith. See ‘For God and Ulster’, Irish Times (17 Apr. 1999).


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Fig. 1.The spectrum of evangelicalism in Ulster.

by localized political priorities. I will argue that both the Orange Order and the FPCU belong, in distinct ways, within this category and that both are ‘closed’ in the sense of being ideologically impervious to alternative evangelical interpretations of the Northern conflict. ECONI and the PCI will be interpreted as representing open forms of evangelicalism in that they have attempted, to different degrees, to find a creative tension between distance from and belonging to unionist national identity. They display more open relationships with other non-evangelical and evangelical identities as well as being receptive to critical reappraisal of traditional evangelical interpretations of Northern Ireland. As discussed in Chapter 2, national identity is a multi-layered and complex phenomenon that changes through time and which is rarely articulated in merely formal propositions. The fluid nature of identity will mean that an individual may be located

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somewhere on a sliding scale between two poles, each with differing relationships with Ulster unionist nationalism. Areas of overlap are to be expected; for example the Orange Order and ECONI both operate as umbrella organizations that draw members from most denominations including the Presbyterian Church. The two poles are not precise categories, yet neither are they simply abstract theoretical models uncorrelated to reality. Deep ideological cleavages exist between the two categories, particularly concerning the issue of national identity. They reflect real and coherent polarities of evangelical identity to which individuals will tend to cluster given the uncertain political environment of Northern Ireland. My analysis is based on primary source material produced by the different groups. The discussion will aim to describe their ideological content in terms of how they correlate to the various pillars of nationalism outlined in Chapter 2. As throughout this book, attention will be paid to the historical dimension, particularly developments in how evangelicals have interpreted the changing political context in which they have found themselves. Based on this analysis, each section will conclude with an evaluation, using Volf's theological categories of distance and belonging, of how each has interacted with the ideology of Ulster unionism. Does Ulster evangelicalism, as Bruce suggests, provide an important ideological basis to the political success of Ian Paisley and the DUP?365 Is it an essential component of unionist identity and therefore hopelessly compromised by its fusion with nationalism? In other words, is the undeniable success of Ulster evangelicalism, in terms of numbers and impact on society, due mainly to its inextricable political connection with political Protestantism? What changes have there been in the structure of Ulster evangelical identity over time and what are the possibilities of how evangelicalism will relate to unionism in the future?

365


5 Marching Backwards: The World of Orangeism O Lord, God of our Fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, keep this desire in the hearts of your people for ever, and keep their hearts loyal to you. (1 Chronicles 29: 18) It is for freedom that Christ has set us free. Stand firm then, and do not let yourselves be burdened again by a yoke of slavery. (Galatians 5: 1)

5.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW The Orange Order is no peripheral anachronism within Ulster society.366 Founded in 1795, its longevity indicates the continuing relevance of its objectives within the divided north-eastern part of Ireland. The Order was at first primarily an institution associated with the Established Church, the Church of Ireland, and enjoyed a largely rural support base of the landed minority. As such, it had little appeal for a Presbyterian radicalism seeking

366

As noted in the Introduction, despite its significance comparatively few major works had been published specifically on the Orange Order until Haddick-Flynn's Orangeism and Dudley-Edwards' Faithful Tribe. A large volume of material exists on Ulster loyalism of which the Orange Order is a subsection. However, attention is often focused on Paisley and the Protestant paramilitaries. See for example Bruce, Edge of the Union and much of the work of Alan Finlayson, e.g. ‘Discourse and Contemporary Loyalist Identity’, (eds.), in Shirlow and McGovern Who are the People?, 72–94. Given that the Order is slow to share its inner workings with outsiders, and is not noted for its profligacy in publishing material about itself, it seems that Orangeism has been somewhat overlooked. Two important studies, which, although concentrating on Ulster loyalism in general, take the Order seriously, are Todd, ‘Two Traditions’ and Frank Wright, ‘Protestant Ideology’.

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THE WORLD OF ORANGEISM

political and religious equality with their fellow Church of Ireland citizens. However, the tumultuous years of the late eighteenth century saw the collapse of a partial and transitory Presbyterian and Catholic alliance after the 1798 Rebellion. It had aimed to secure the ‘rights of man, Protestant, Catholic, or Dissenter’, but resulted in open sectarian conflict fuelled by a desire to assert religious identity. Hempton has shown that this era of revolutionary excitement was the catalyst for an upsurge in religious activity from which evangelicalism was a major beneficiary. As historic cultural and religious divisions deepened ‘the relevance of evangelical principles to local and political and social circumstances was even more vigorously asserted’.367 The evangelical revival, or ‘second reformation’, that characterized much of the nineteenth century should be understood in the context of Protestant evangelicalism's confrontation with the rise of Catholic nationalism. As the century progressed, each side presented an increasingly potent threat to the other. Unparalleled attempts were made by a proliferation of voluntary evangelical missionary societies to convert Catholics from the errors of Rome to Protestant truth. The story has been excellently told elsewhere;368 I will limit myself to three general conclusions about the origins of evangelical political activism that will help to explain the contemporary objectives of the Orange Order. First, the most important consequence of the nineteenth century was the unifying of previously opposing strands of Protestantism, particularly at times of crisis, into a loose coalition with the religio-political aim of protecting Protestant faith and power.369 The Orange Order became a focal organization for

367

Hempton, Religion and Political Culture, 100–1.

368

Hempton and Hill, Evangelical Protestantism, 47–102.

369

Henry Cooke, the towering figure of nineteenth-century Presbyterian evangelicalism, was one of the foremost advocates for a ‘platform of common Protestantism’ which would take the form of ‘the banns of a sacred marriage’ between the divided Protestant Churches. He argued passionately for the protection of the Established Church. His motivation was primarily preventive, to unite Protestants against concessions to Catholicism that would endanger Protestant liberty and to preserve the Church of Ireland as a bastion of a threatened Protestant ascendancy. For wider discussion see Hempton and Hill, Evangelical Protestantism, 98–9.


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Protestant resistance to the gains of Catholic nationalism whether it was Emancipation or Home Rule. The Order gradually attracted Protestants across denominational and class boundaries. Its strength ‘waxed and waned in response to Protestant perception of Catholic aggression’ and its members ‘infiltrated many important institutions’.370 Orange historians record that Orangeism in the 1860s and 1870s expanded rapidly in the face of resurgent nationalism, ‘for the first time Presbyterian ministers had begun to become Orangemen in any numbers.’ Significantly they add, ‘what else was there to unite Protestants in any real way?’371 Anti-Catholicism lay at the heart of nineteenth-century Protestant solidarity. Second, the themes of loyalty to the Crown and civil and religious freedom are foundational doctrines of the Orange Order that have extended their trajectory into the heart of twentieth-century Orangeism.372 The positive selfunderstanding of Orange identity rests on these ideas, which are held up in stark contrast to the perceived failure of Catholicism to be either loyal or libertarian. A third historical pointer for this discussion of contemporary Orangeism is that the crystallization of Protestant ideology, greater evangelical cooperation, and the rise in popularity of the Orange Order throughout the century meant that the Orange version of Irish history lies at the heart of the foundation of modern unionism. A nest of political objectives—the maintenance of Protestant power, the protection of Ireland's position within the Empire, and the preservation of a superior Protestant way of life—were spiritually anointed by the support of evangelicalism to the unionist cause. ‘The part played by evangelical religion in stiffening the resolve of Ulster Protestants against Home Rule should not be underestimated. For over a century

370

Ibid. 85.

371

M. W. Dewar, J. Brown, and S. E. Long, Orangeism: A New Historical Appreciation (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1967, 142.

372

These themes are exemplified in the entreaty delivered by the Earl of Erne and the Earl of Enniskillen on behalf of the Grand Lodge to the Orangemen of Ireland on 27 Dec. 1885, ‘We therefore appeal to those, who though hitherto differing from us, now realize the imminent peril which in common confronts us all to stand shoulder to shoulder with us in defence of the Union, and to advance the cause of loyalty, liberty and religion.’ Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 143–4.

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old Reformation polarities had been given new social meanings in a province sufficiently divided on grounds of religion to sustain the crudest forms of stereotyping sanctified by theological principles.’373 The fusion of God and Ulster resulted in a parallel fusion between the Orange Order and the Ulster Unionist Party. Institutional links were forged between the two organizations that still function. Delegates from the Order have one sixth of the 800 seats at the Ulster Unionist Council, as well as seats on many unionist constituency associations.374 The Orange Order, urging voters to support the Ulster Unionist Party candidate, officially backed Unionist Party manifestos.375 For generations no Unionist candidate stood a chance of selection without first being a member of the Order. Every leader of the party has been an Orangeman before his election to office. From 1921 to 1968, 138 out of 149 Unionist Party MPs for Stormont were Orangemen.376 Sir James Craig's377 oft-quoted remark about ‘a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State’ should be viewed in the context of his conscious ordering of priorities: ‘I am very proud indeed to be Grand Master of the Orange Institution of the loyal County of Down. I have filled that office for many years and I prize that far more than I do being Prime Minister. I have always said that I am an Orangeman first and a politician and a member of this Parliament afterwards.’378 While the 1912 Solemn League and Covenant was written in the Presbyterian language of the Scottish Covenanters it embraced the whole spectrum of Ulster Protestantism: Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, and Nonconformist alike.379 Formally approved by the Churches, the signing of the Covenant was in many cases integrated within the ritual of a specially organized

373

Hempton and Hill, Evangelical Protestantism, 181–2.

374

Gray, The Orange Order, 223.

375

Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 188.

376

Haddick-Flynn, Orangeism, 331.

377

Sir James Craig (1871–1940); central figure in the foundation of the Northern Irish State; Northern Ireland MP for County Down, 1921–7; leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Feb. 1921; first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, June 1921, until his death.

378

Speech to the British House of Commons, 1934, as cited by Gray, The Orange Order, 224.

379

J. Liechty, Roots of Sectarianism: Chronology and Reiflections (Belfast: The Irish Inter-Church Meeting, 1993, 39.


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church worship service. The Covenant was a climax of increasing Protestant solidarity underpinned by Orange principles and sealed the connection between the cause of Ulster and the divine favour of God. As The Times put it, ‘the covenant was a mystical affirmation…Ulster seemed to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Deity.’380 The Northern Irish State was created out of the matrix of such beliefs. It would be the primary function of the Orange Order to guard and reinforce this ideology throughout the life of the State. It was no coincidence that the ‘golden era’ of Ulster unionism corresponded to the ubiquitous presence of the Orange Order in all levels of Protestant society.381 It is therefore important to note that contemporary Orangeism is not a deviation from how evangelicalism has interacted with the political fate of Protestantism in Ulster. Rather its self-proclaimed objective is negative, to defend and protect the historic marriage of evangelical faith and unionism. This is why it has been located within closed evangelicalism. How it has attempted to achieve this goal is the issue to which I will now turn. First, however, a brief comment is in order about the loosely autonomous and democratic organizational structure of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland. The ‘powerbase’ of the Institution is the Private Lodge, of which there are 1,400 in Ireland. Each lodge has a high degree of autonomy and varies in character and ethos, some being fervently evangelical, others little more than social drinking clubs. Private Lodges send six representatives to make up 126 District Lodges, which in turn send between seven and thirteen delegates to form twelve Country Grand Lodges. Collectively the County Grand Lodges choose 250 representatives who constitute the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland (GOLI). The Grand Lodge primarily functions through the work of its seven committees (see Fig. 2).382 While

380

The Times (6 May 1913 as cited by A. J. Megahey, ‘The Irish Protestant Churches and Social and Political Issues 1870–1914’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Queen's University, Belfast, 1969, 89.

381

For further discussion of life in the ‘Orange state’ see Haddick-Flynn, Orangeism, 326–36.

382

The information for Fig.2 was drawn from the GOLI Website at www.grandorange.org.uk (May 1998.)

138


Fig. 2.The Structure of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland.

it has executive authority for the overall policy of the Institution, the Grand Lodge has limited capacity to control local policies and actions of private lodges and largely reflects popular Orange sentiment ‘on the ground’. This point is of further relevance below.

5.2 LEGITIMATION There are two distinct ‘historical sources’ that are used to legitimize the contemporary goals of the Loyal Orange Institution.

5.2.1 Faithful to the past The first is a type of historical reconstruction that interprets contemporary events as part of a continuing historical struggle to maintain Protestant freedom. The Grand Lodge is highly preoccupied, if not obsessed with the past. Practically every publication of its Education Committee is a look back into history in order to explain the present.383 In a 1995 bicentenary

383

For example a selection of titles published by the Education Committee of the GOLI are; Londonderry City of Refuge ; King William III and the Battle of the Boyne ; Aughrim: The Last Battle ; The Glorious Revolution ; Murder Without Sin : The Rebellion of 1798 ; The ‘B’ Specials ; The Enniskillen Men ; and The Battle of Dolly's Brae.


139

publication Orangemen were exhorted to learn from their history: ‘as we celebrate the 200 years of the founding of our Glorious Institution, it is important that we remember the lessons of that time…many of the lessons learnt by our forebears are true for us in this age…It is important that we learn from our past and even more as we celebrate this occasion we must keep clearly in mind and in view the enemy that we face in this age and be prepared to make the same defence of all we hold dear to us.’384 The calling of the Orange Order in the twentieth century then is to be faithful to the heritage of the heroes of previous generations. Contemporary actions are judged by their adherence to a canon of Orange mythology that includes the seventeenth-century myths discussed in Chapter 3 along with material focused around a group of highly symbolic incidents within the Order's history. A prime aim of Orange historiography is therefore to demonstrate that the modern Orange Order faces essentially the same challenges as those of its founders. As a result, the imagined community of Orangeism is preoccupied with history, not as a tool to re-imagine the future, but to ensure that the future is a replay of the past. Modern struggles for political control between unionism and Irish nationalism can thus be interpreted as lying in continuous succession to an endlessly repetitive battle between Protestantism and Catholicism, good and evil, truth and error, loyalty and disloyalty. An analysis of Orange literature illustrates this cyclical interpretation of history. Prominent Orangeman and Presbyterian minister, Warren Porter asserts that ‘an Orangeman is heir to the martyrs’385 in his calling to be a loyal citizen under the terms of the Glorious Revolution. In Steadfast for Faith and Freedom Martin Smyth386 states that Orangeism ‘has not deviated from its

384

C. W. Ferrel, Imperial Grand Master, ‘Greetings from Overseas’, in B. Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom: 200 Years of Orangeism (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1995 3 (emphasis mine).

385

W. W. Porter, ‘Here We Stand: An Outline of Orange Principle’, in B. Kennedy (ed.), A Celebration 1690–1990: The Orange Institution (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1990, 22.

386

Revd W. Martin Smyth: elected MP for South Belfast in 1982; Imperial Grand Master of the Orange Order 1973–1996; Presbyterian Minister without charge; senior figure in the UUP: opposed to the GFA; challenged David Trimble's leadership of the UUP in Mar. 2000, receiving 43% of the Ulster Unionist Council vote.

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primary function as envisaged by its founding fathers…it is unashamedly Protestant, for the protection of Protestant people and property’.387 Modern Orangeism draws its legitimacy and purpose from seeing itself as the guardian of the ideals of 1795, which were ‘to defend themselves, to support the Protestant religion, and to uphold the King and Constitution’.388 The Orange archivist, Cecil Kilpatrick, develops the theme at length in an imaginative application of themes from the Glorious Revolution to contemporary political events in Ulster.389 King James's political duplicity is paralleled to that of the current British government. His claim to absolute monarchical rule is adjudged equivalent to Westminster's bipartisan approach to Northern Ireland; a policy of ‘Parliamentary despotism’. James's opposition to democracy and Protestant civil and religious liberty is recurring in the British policies of enforced power-sharing and discrimination against the Protestant population of Ulster. Modern Protestant resistance to illiberal and unjust government is simply a replay of the justified opposition to James's corrupt rule. Loyalty is earned through good government. Orange loyalty today is ‘part of a contract, given in return for the protection and security of our lives, liberty, and property and our right to pursue happiness. Has the government been faithful to the contract as regards the people of Ulster? The answer is no, it has not.’390 If a government acts to destroy freedom, Kilpatrick argues, the people have the right to pursue its abolition; the ‘men of 1688 would say Amen’. He exhorts contemporary Orangemen to ‘take heart and inspiration from those who have gone before and prove ourselves worthy of our heritage’.391 George Patton (executive officer of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland), discussing the future relevance of the Order, argues that ‘there is a tremendous opportunity to be

387

W. M. Smyth, ‘Foreword’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 2.

388

J. Brown, in Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 86.

389

C. Kilpatrick, The Glorious Revolution: Its Lasting Results and Relevance Today (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, n.d., c. 1990?).

390

Ibid. 39.

391

Ibid. 40.


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grasped by an organization whose principles will remain as important in the 21st century as they were in 1795.’392 Yet, beyond vague notions of community service he is unable to articulate what type of opportunity is actually presented. The only idea with the power to act as the cohesive centre of Orangeism is, and always has been, the common determination of its members to resist any political developments that are perceived as endangering the constitutional connection with Britain and thus threatening Protestant liberty. The Orange interpretation of history is therefore a closed system, relatively impervious to ideological innovation and slow to respond to changes in society. Orange orthodoxy means protecting the status quo (or what is left of it in light of the losses incurred by Protestant power in Ireland since 1795), and is locked in a discourse controlled by the concerns of a nineteenth-century Protestantism confronting a resurgent Catholicism. Given the continuing conflict between Irish nationalism and unionism within Ulster, Orange identity remains a potent force. Its appeal for legitimacy, based on a 200-year-old quarrel, still corresponds closely enough with modern realities to attract continued support from a sizeable proportion of the Protestant population. In 1990 senior Orangeman Billy Kennedy judged that the movement was in a ‘healthy and vibrant state with 100,000 members’.393 Despite Kennedy's optimism, the Order is undoubtedly in significant decline. Commentators estimate that it had about 200,000 members in the 1960s.394

5.2.2 Faithful to the faith A second source of legitimation also lies in the past, beyond the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, back to the Reformation. Orangeism is portrayed as a bulwark of the Reformed Faith. By association with the ‘Heroes of the Reformation’395

392

G. Patton, ‘The Orange Institution: The Future’, in Kennedy, (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 13.

393

Kennedy, ‘The State of Orangeism in 1990’, in Kennedy (ed.), A Celebration, 12–13.

394

P. Berresford Ellis, Orangeism: Myth and Reality (London: Connolly Publications, 1995, 11.

395

See D. Richardson, Heroes of the Reformation: John Wycliffe (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, n.d.).

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the Order perceives itself as personifying the values of historic Protestantism, thus justifying its claim to be an authentic voice of biblical Christianity: ‘The Orange Order is a Protestant Brotherhood, pledged to defend the Reformed faith against all errors and encroachments…Once Orangemen allow themselves to betray Biblical Protestantism they deny their raison d'être.’396 Orange apologists consistently present the Order as primarily a religious rather than a political organization. David McConaghie of the Independent Loyal Orange Order writes, ‘I can state quite categorically that we exist primarily for the defence and promotion of biblical Protestantism, and that our heartbeat is essentially religious.’397 This assertion is echoed by others: ‘the whole tenor of the movement is religious, by its conditions of membership; by its ritual; by its keen interest in the Protestant and evangelical emphases of the Gospel.’398 Porter contends that ‘The Orange Creed is “mere Christianity”. We are pledged to no sectarian shibboleths. We stand for the creed of Catholic Christians.’399 Free Presbyterian minister, Ron Johnstone, states categorically, ‘As members of the Royal Arch Purple Order we make no apology for calling ourselves Evangelical Protestants. As such we believe in an open Bible, an open road to heaven through Christ and the right of an open mind.’400 A recent booklet by evangelical ministers Ian Meredith and Brian Kennaway has the explicit purpose of establishing the evangelical credentials of the Orange Lodge. Considerable effort is expended in distinguishing the origins, beliefs, and ritual of Orangeism from the Masonic Order.401 The authors

396

Patton, ‘The Orange Institution’, 13.

397

Irish Times (19 Nov. 1996).

398


399

Porter, ‘Here We Stand’, 25. Presumably by the phrase ‘Catholic Christians’ Porter is referring to the catholicity of the Christian faith whereby all who are believers ‘in Christ’ belong within his body, the universal Church.

400

R. Johnstone, Behind Closed Minds: An Examination of the Book ‘Behind Closed Doors’ (n.p.: Grand Royal Arch Purple Chapter of Ireland, n.d., 2000?), 1.

401

I. Meredith and B. Kennaway, The Orange Order: An Evangelical Perspective, (n.p.: n.p., 1993, 4–18. Attention is given to the issue of freemasonry because it exerted considerable influence on the structure, ritual, symbols and practice of Orangeism. The authors admit that ‘because some of the founders had been masons they used the Masonic system which they knew worked’.


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argue that the Order has a specifically Christian ethos. Its purpose is ‘the advancement of pure biblical Christianity, as opposed to the superstitions and idolatries of Romanism’. Distinct from freemasonry, the ‘Qualifications of an Orangeman’ state that he should ‘have a sincere love and veneration for his Heavenly Father’ and ‘a humble and steadfast faith in Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind, believing in Him as the only mediator between God and man’. They state, ‘the Jesus Christ of Orangeism is the One of whom the Scriptures testify’. Again unlike freemasonry, the Bible is the unique source of authoritative revelation, at the centre of much Orange ritual and symbolism. During the admission ceremony a candidate is exhorted by the lodge master to ‘read the Holy Scriptures, and make them the sole rule of his faith and practice’. They conclude that ‘as far as the Orange Lodge is concerned, our principles are scriptural and ours is not to apologize but to answer current misunderstandings’.402 A notable feature of this presentation is the limited notion of what constitutes an evangelical movement. Stress is laid on idealized codes of practice such as the Qualifications of an Orangeman,403 yet entrance to the Order is a formality for any

402

Ibid. 23.

403

‘An Orangeman should have a sincere love and veneration for his Heavenly Father; a humble and steadfast faith in Jesus Christ, the Saviour of mankind, believing in Him as the only Mediator between God and man. He should cultivate truth and justice, brotherly kindness and charity, devotion and piety, concord and unity and obedience to the laws; his deportment should be gentle and compassionate, kind and courteous; he should seek the society of the virtuous, and avoid that of the evil; he should honour and diligently study the Holy Scriptures and make them the rule of his faith and practice; he should love, uphold and defend the Protestant religion, and sincerely desire and endeavour to propagate its doctrines and precepts; he should strenuously oppose the fatal errors and doctrines of the Church of Rome, and scrupulously avoid countenancing (by his presence or otherwise) any act or ceremony of Popish worship; he should, by all lawful means, resist the ascendancy of that Church, its encroachments, and the extension of its power, ever abstaining from all uncharitable words, actions, or sentiments, towards his Roman Catholic brethren; he should remember to keep holy the Sabbath day, and attend the public worship of God, and diligently train up his offspring, and all under his control, in the fear of God, and in the Protestant faith; he should never take the name of the Lord in vain, but abstain from all cursing and profane language, and use every opportunity of discouraging these, and all other sinful practices, in others; his conduct should be guided by wisdom and prudence, and marked by honesty, temperance, and sobriety; the glory of God and the welfare of man, the honour of his Sovereign, and the good of his country, should be the motive of his actions.’

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Protestant male, regardless of religious belief.404 The evangelical identity of Orangeism seems to rest on external rituals involving the Bible and biblical imagery—whether it is a new member receiving a Bible or using biblical texts within the various ceremonies of the three degrees of Orangeism.405 The authors stress that the main difference between the use of the Bible in the Royal Arch Purple degree406 and a similar degree within freemasonry is that the latter incorporates non-biblical material. Given the close structural parallels between the Masonic and Royal Arch degrees, the validity of such distinctions seems weak.407 There is also no exegetical assessment offered of the appropriateness of how the texts are applied in either ceremony. The way is left for the ‘open Bible’ to be used simply as a Protestant symbol divorced from a genuine evangelical desire to hear the Word of God speak through its original context. Frank Wright noted that the symbol of the open Bible acts as ‘the lowest common denominator as between different Protestants' conception of what they are defending; defence of the socialization process of evangelical Protestantism is more of a universal

404

Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 194–5. They admit that in reality the Order ‘sets itself to include every man—being a Protestant—who can be helped by membership’. Expulsion for a failure to exhibit Christian character is very rarely practised.

405

In an otherwise helpful discussion of Orange identity, Buckley and Kenney accept that Black ritual is ‘Christian’ simply because it utilizes genuine biblical themes within its imagery. A. D. Buckley and M. C. Kenney, Negotiating Identity: Rhetoric, Metaphor and Social Drama in Northern Ireland (London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995, 191.

406

The Royal Arch Purple degree is the single degree of the Royal Arch Purple Order which, in Ireland, is technically separate from the Grand Orange Lodge. Kennaway and Meredith admit ‘it is the most “Masonic-like” part of our ceremony’.

407

Buckley and Kenney note parallels with the Royal Arch degree of Irish freemasonry. The two degrees not only share similar symbolic content but are also the first of the higher degrees within both systems and both contain biblical material. The Masonic Royal Arch includes reference to Josiah's repair of Solomon's temple, while the Royal Arch Purple revolves around the Exodus story. Buckley and Kenney, Negotiating Identity, 177–8.


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concern than an actual belief in evangelicalism itself.’408 It is in this context that Martin Smyth's comment that the Shankill Road Protestants are ‘Bible lovers if not Bible readers’ is to be understood.409 Meredith and Kennaway argue that religious ritual is not essential to the Order's principle or motivation. While agreeing with their premise, it can be argued that what is indispensable to Orangeism is its political objectives, which are about maintaining a religio-political entity that will ‘advance Protestant principles in church, state, and society at large’.410 Protestant liberty is seen as dependent on political constitutional arrangements that support Protestant hegemony. This is why the Order thrives in times of threat, whether during the Home Rule crisis or the 1990s Peace Process.411 Religious ritual sacralizes the political ethos of the Order. While some Orangemen are united by common religious convictions, all are bound together in a collective political opposition to Catholic nationalism. The precedence of political objectives above the spiritual is illustrated in the Orange use of myth and heroes.

5.3 HEROES AND MYTHS The Battle of the Diamond is reconstructed in some detail in Orange publications since it functions as a touchstone for Orange orthodoxy.412 Protestant heroes of the battle could ‘share the glory’ as those who had overcome a treacherous, unprovoked, and violent assault by the Defenders upon their lives and property. Brown, an Orange historian, describes the

408

Wright, ‘Protestant Ideology’, 251.

409

Ibid. 245.

410

Meredith and Kennaway, The Orange Order, 22.

411

A large significant rise in the demand for membership in the Portadown area was recorded during the initial Drumcree standoffs in 1995 and 1996. George Patton admitted the growth in recruits was not spiritually motivated but arose from a desire to protect political Protestantism; ‘people join in greater numbers when they perceive their community to be under threat…they feel there is a need for a strong organisation that reflects their ethos and reflects their identity.’ Irish Times (14 June 1997.)

412

See also C. Kilpatrick, The Diamond in Its Historical Setting (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland Education Committee, 1996.

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situation: ‘local outbreaks of Defenderism were only part of a widespread conspiracy, and evidence of a dangerous plot against the Government, and more especially against the Protestants of Co. Armagh.’413 The picture is one of a surrounded Protestant community gallantly being forced to defend itself; ‘quite literally the gun was being put to their heads, and if the State authorities could or would not protect them, surely they can not be faulted for making ready to protect themselves.’414 The Defenders initiated hostilities, breaking a signed treaty by doing so. A desperate defence at Dan Winter's cottage ensued involving acts of selfless bravery such as that of Peggy Henderson, ‘a Protestant heroine’, risking her life to smuggle ammunition, concealed in her skirt, to the besieged men.415 The Defenders are portrayed as ‘aggressive’, ‘riotous’, responsible for ‘savage’ attacks, and opposing ‘law and order’.416 This image is held in contrast to that of the Protestant actors in the drama as unwilling participants in ugly sectarian strife. The undisciplined rebels were overcome at the critical moment by well-trained Protestants who ‘stepped out, dressed their line according to the drill-book, and fired a destructive volley…directly into the disorganized mobs of Defenders’.417 Only in the face of mortal threat did the survivors decide to form the new Orange brotherhood ‘to defend themselves, to support the Protestant religion, and to uphold the King and Constitution’. As the foundation myth of Orangeism, the Diamond is instructive. Apart from echoing themes described in the seventeenth-century myths—Catholic disloyalty and treachery, vindication of loyal persecuted Protestants—it highlights how the heroes of Orangeism are consistently those who have fought (often literally) in the political sphere to protect Protestant rights, rather than those who have been evangelists, theologians, or exemplary models of Christian character.

413

J. Brown, ‘The Battle of the Diamond’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 5–9, esp. 8.

414

W. W. Porter, ‘Orangeism: A Force for Protestant Unity’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 101–3, esp. 102.

415

For the full account see Kilpatrick, The Diamond, 17.

416

Brown, ‘The Battle of the Diamond’, 7–9.

417

Ibid. 9.


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In his essay in honour of the first ten Grand Masters of the Orange Institution, Kilpatrick traces how each battled against the particular threats to Protestant liberty that arose in his time.418 For example, the first Grand Master, Colonel William Blacker, is celebrated as one who, in 1795, ‘sat up all night melting down the lead intended for his father's new roof and casting it into musket shot’ and later witnessed the climax of the battle. In the following years he led a corps of yeomanry into action to repulse the 1798 Rebellion, was unfairly dismissed from his position as a magistrate in 1833 due to his Orangeism, and campaigned against the dissolution of the Order in 1836. Themes of loyal military service to the Crown, bravery in action, resistance to political advance of Catholic nationalism, undeserved censure from the enemies of Orangeism, personal integrity and, above all, faithfulness to the Orange cause, run throughout each biography. Actual religious belief is mentioned only once (the Earl of Roden, ‘a deeply religious man of a strongly evangelical bent’) and acts to bolster the integrity and therefore political actions of the Grand Master in question. The goal of twentieth-century leadership is to follow this paradigm. The review concludes, ‘there have been a further eight Grand Masters of Ireland, all of whom have continued the worthy traditions of those who bore the burden and heat of the day during the first 100 years’. The article is prefaced with an out-of-context quotation from Genesis 6: 4, ‘And there were giants in the earth in those days’, which obviously is intended to refer to the ten Grand Masters. The text acts to sacralize the origins and objectives of the Orange Order. The political task facing Orangeism is a battle to implement the will of the Lord. Since Protestantism is ‘purer and closer to the New Testament in doctrine and practice than any other form of Christianity’,419 God must be on the side of those who give their lives to defend the cause of Orangeism and unionism. An example of this linking of ‘secular heroes’ with the sacred is exemplified in the Orange interpretation of the Somme. The war dead are idealized as men who willingly sacrificed their lives for lofty principles. ‘It is truly an amazing record of devotion to duty

418

C. Kilpatrick, ‘The 10 Grand Masters of the first 100 Years of the Orange Institution’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 15–28.

419


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and the cause of civil and religious liberty in which those noble men believed.’420 The connection is seen most explicitly in the preaching of Martin Smyth. Discussing Luke 9: 51, ‘he steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem’, he parallels the challenges facing Jesus with the experience of the 36th Ulster Division at the Somme.421 Just as Jesus had forsaken the glory of heaven, faced a dark and difficult path and yet decided to press on, the Ulster regiment, ‘many of them wearing their Orange Collars’, had turned aside from their primary task of defending Ulster, ‘to serve the greater cause of liberty’. Just as Jesus ‘did not flinch from the horror of that bitter cup’ and the hatred of his enemies, so the Ulstermen ‘paid the price to the full’ as they stormed the German position called the ‘Crucifix’. Just as Jesus endured the cross for the joyful vindication of the Resurrection, the soldiers ‘won an imperishable place in the annals of military exploits’. Although he denies it,422 the imagery is, ironically, purely Pearsean in its exaltation of the sacrifice of Ulster (Protestant) men to a level analogous with the sacrifice of Christ.423

5.4 SYMBOLS, RITUALS, AND MARCHES The Order has always been highly preoccupied with symbols and rituals, with marches providing the public opportunity to

420

H. Radcliffe, ‘The Faithful and the Brave’ in The Twelfth: 1921–1971 (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1971, 37.

421

W. M. Smyth, Stand Fast (Belfast: Orange Publications, 1974, 18–19. Sermon preached in the Grosvenor Hall Belfast, 27 June 1971, at the anniversary service of the 36th Ulster Division Loyal Orange Lodge 977 to remember the fallen at the Somme, 1 July 1916.

422

Smyth argues that such images are only illustrations by which to draw lessons from Scripture for today's world. Interview with author 31 Mar. 2000.

423

It should be stressed that this is no isolated example of Smyth's preaching. Elsewhere he links explicitly the last-minute deliverance of the Protestants at the Siege of Derry with the deliverance obtained by God sending his Son ‘when all seemed lost’. The brave decision of the Apprentice Boys to shut the city gates in the face of great opposition is compared to deciding for Christ. As God was with the men of Derry, so shall He be with the one who trusts in Him. The victorious King William III on his white horse resembles another rider and white horse, namely, ‘Christ, the Word of God’. Thus, ‘just as William served under God on that fateful July day and won tremendous victory so should we today’. See W. M. Smyth, The Message of the Banners (Belfast: The Evangelical Protestant Society, n.d.), 8–16.


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express its particular understanding of Protestant identity. As even the Grand Lodge's historians acknowledge, marching plays an important role in establishing territorial control over disputed areas, When reports of disorder, intimidation, and ‘agrarian’ crime came in from the South, the northern Protestant refused to allow the slightest self-assertion to the ‘other side’, lest the same occur in his own neighbourhood. On the 12th of July, and on other occasions, he marched with his lodge behind his regalia…and armed with his yeoman gun, to show his strength in the places where he thought it would do most good. Where you could ‘walk’ you were dominant… 424 Yet ritual marches also function to strengthen Orange identity,425 particularly if performed in the face of hostile criticism. The annual Twelfth parades are a dramatic replay of old battles calling contemporary Orangemen to the same stalwart defence of their faith as their forefathers.426 The right to march has been defended by comparing Orange parades with the triumphal entry by Jesus into Jerusalem, thus linking the processions with a public stand for Gospel truth which may be opposed and misunderstood.427 However, this section will focus primarily on the meanings of the emblems and degree ceremonies that lie behind this public face of Orangeism. Technically, the Orange Order in Ireland is a separate organization from the Royal Arch Purple Order and the Royal Black Institution. An Orangeman can only join the Arch Purple after completing the first two degrees of the Orange Order. The first, or orange, degree of the Orange Order is an initiation ceremony where the candidate promises he will uphold the Protestant faith and be loyal to the Sovereign. The second is

424

Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 118 (emphasis mine).

425

See s. 2.1.6 for how ritual acts to restore, reinforce, and redirect identity to suit changing circumstances.

426

S. S. Larsen, ‘The Glorious Twelfth: A Ritual Expression of Collective Identity’, in A. P. Cohen, (ed.), Belonging: Identity and Social Organization in British Rural Cultures (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, 278–91.

427

Smyth, Stand Fast, 22–5. He writes that just as Jesus encountered animosity while on a mission of peace, so the Orangemen will face opposition as they peacefully witness to their Reformed Faith. Just as the Pharisees tried to silence the crowd, so ‘men—even religious men—would seek to silence the witness of God’.

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the purple degree, where as with the orange, the member is given lectures on the biblical basis and significance of Orangeism. The Royal Black has eleven degrees, its members being drawn from those of the Arch Purple. Thus, in practice, the three function as individual components of a unified movement. An Orangeman progresses through the lodge system by participating in different degrees or ceremonies. On the completion of a degree, the Orangeman is entitled to wear a symbol, often a metal emblem, related to the text(s) incorporated within the initiation ritual. Many of the symbols are exhibited on banners, certificates, and arches erected over roads during the ‘marching season’. Symbols and rituals play a major part in Orange identity. Both are suffused with biblical imagery yet simultaneously surrounded by an atmosphere of secrecy that makes it difficult to ascertain the precise content of the ritual.428 It can be argued that while Orangemen cite the use of Scripture as evidence of its evangelical nature, how the Bible is actually used suggests that it is more often simply an ideological prop which acts to strengthen and sacralize Orange identity. To substantiate this view I will briefly examine different ways that the Bible is incorporated within Orange symbolism and ritual. My main purpose here is to focus on how biblical texts are used within the various degree rituals. Space does not permit a detailed analysis; however, the symbolism is generally unambiguous and focused around a central theme.

5.4.1 Orange Order: orange and plain purple degrees The orange and plain purple degrees date back to 1795 and 1796 respectively and are structured around Israel's flight from Egypt, to the crossing of the Jordan and entry into the Promised Land.429 The original orange degree, simplified in 1800, was

428

Passwords and oaths of secrecy have been an element of Orangeism from its inception. Meredith and Kennaway acknowledge that ‘part of our ceremonial work, which includes instruction on how we may recognize one other, is a matter which we wish to keep to ourselves’. The Royal Arch Purple Order and the Black Institution are shrouded in secrecy. Such practice binds members more closely together, fostering an exclusive sense of belonging. All three Orange organizations use initiation ceremonies based on unwritten oral traditions.

429

Research Group of the Royal Arch Purple Order, History of the Royal Arch Purple Order (n.p.: n.p., c. 1994), 174–5.


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focused on the Passover and Exodus. The candidate was asked a series of ritual questions based on Bible narratives by a ‘lecturer’ of the degree.430 Texts used include extracts from Exodus, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Second Chronicles, and the Psalms.431 The orange degree was simplified in 1800 and consists of a basic catechism and address. The original form of the plain purple degree focused on giving of the law to Moses on Mount Sinai and the construction of the tabernacle in the wilderness. The colour purple refers to the blue, purple, and scarlet curtains surrounding the Ark of the Covenant (Exod. 26: 1). This degree was simplified in 1820 and reduced to a single question and answer session between candidate and lecturer. Three emblems associated with it are King William, the Crown, and the Bible.432

5.4.2 The Royal Arch Purple degree This degree, originally known as the ‘Purple Marksman’ after the ‘mark’ of twelve stones left by Joshua after crossing the Jordan (Josh. 4: 1–9), uses a highly stylized ritualized drama in conjunction with an allegorical interpretation of Scripture.433 It is divided into three stages; preparation, travel, and the reading of Scriptures. Biblical material includes Jacob's dreams (Gen. 25–8), the Exodus and the Ark, and the arrival in the Promised Land. An ex-member describes the ritual in which the candidate is taken around the chapter room three times,

430

For example, questions and answers of the original orange degree included: Question : Whence came you? Answer : From the house of bondage. Question : Whither do you go? Answer : To the promised land. Question : How do you expect to get there? Answer : By the benefit of a password. Question : Have you got that password? Answer : I have. Question : Will you give it to me? Answer : I will divide it with a brother. Password 1 : MIGDOL (the place of Israel's first encampment). Password 2 : The Great I am hath sent me unto you. (Research Group, Royal Arch Purple, 174.)

431

Gray, The Orange Order, 205. Gray, astonishingly, could not find any central link between the texts used.

432

Information taken from the visual display about Orange ritual and history (contributors including several senior Orange figures) at the reconstructed Hand and Pen Orange Lodge from Corbeg, Silverstream, Co. Monaghan in the Ulster Folk Museum, Cultra, Holywood, Co. Down.

433

Again it is difficult to describe with precision the details of the ritual. Even the members of the research group explaining the present function of the degree had ‘to remind ourselves of the constraints which are placed upon us’.

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the floor of which is covered in branches and brambles…during his three journeys…the candidate (without warning) is violently whipped on his legs with brambles and branches by the assembled brethren…after the gravity of his obligation is further impressed upon the candidate, the assembled chapter gather at the back of the steps [‘Jacob's ladder’] and unfold a large canvas blanket. The blindfolded initiate, who has his back to the blanket, is then told to cross his arms whilst still kneeling upon the representation of a coffin. He is then asked, ‘In whom do you put your trust?’ The nervous candidate answers ‘God’, whereupon…he receives a violent push backwards onto the blanket…when he is brutally kicked and tossed upon the blanket for a number of minutes. This practice is known as ‘riding the goat’. 434 Reconstructing the deliberately vague official descriptions given by the Order it seems that each action has a highly symbolic meaning. In the dramatized ‘travel’ section of the degree, the candidate walks around the room in a reenactment of Israel's wilderness wanderings. He is beaten with sharp plants to recall the suffering of God's people there. Once he has proved himself worthy the new member ‘advances’. This is paralleled with the advance of the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and the half tribe of Manasseh across the Jordan to assist their fellow Israelites to secure the Promised Land.435 The Scriptures are ‘very carefully chosen…to convey a message to those who receive the degree’.436 While the authors do not explicitly explain the message, it is clear that the theme is that God will vindicate his people and, even despite their disobedience and suffering, they will, with faith in him, reach the Promised Land. The ten symbols associated with the degree consolidate this theme.437 For example, Orange historians propose that the open

434

W. P. Malcomson, Behind Closed Doors (Belfast: Evangelical Truth, 1999, 54–5, esp. 73. From such descriptions of Royal Arch Purple symbolism and ritual, Malcomson concludes that the Order is part of a Satanic conspiracy designed to lead people away from Christ. For a Royal Arch Purple rebuttal of Malcomson's highly polemical book, see Johnstone, Behind Closed Minds.

435

Research Group, Royal Arch Purple, 193.

436

Ibid. 194. For reference, the texts read during the conferring of the degree are; Exod.3: 15–18; Num. 14: 11,12, 26–8, 33; Josh. 5: 13–15; Ps. 107: 12–15; Gen. 28: 10–14; 1 Cor. 13: 13; 1 Cor. 15: 56–7; Gen. 1: 14–18; 1 John. 1: 5; Exod. 13: 21–2; 1 Cor. 15: 58; Rev. 22: 21.

437

The full range of emblems are: three-stepped ladder; anchor; three-branched candlesticks; coffin; Bible; five-pointed star; Noah's Ark; the Ark of the Covenant; sword pointed at the heart; and the Arch.


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Bible functions to show ‘from where the teachings of our Order are derived’. The Ark of the Covenant is a visible reminder of God's promise to guide his people safely through their journey, a promise that ‘is still as relevant to us today’. Noah's Ark is symbolic of how God saves his faithful people from surrounding disbelief. The anchor acts as a symbol of a safe arrival after a stormy voyage of faith under trial.438

5.4.3 The ritual of the Royal Black Institution. The eleven degrees439 of the Black Institution operate in a similar fashion, each stage being associated with particular symbols and biblical texts. Buckley analysed the relationship between the texts, symbols, and banner pictures using a representative sample of photographs of the ‘Blackmen’ on parade.440 He found a clear unifying theme running through an imaginative fusion of symbols, stories, and illustrations which is manifest in the following popular examples, 1. Jacob's Dream (Gen. 25–8) is linked with a seven-stepped ladder. The story is attractive in that Jacob is chosen by God to occupy Canaan, not his unfaithful brother Esau. He remains faithful by refusing to marry Canaanite women.

438

Research Group, Royal Arch Purple, 193.

439

Each of the eleven degrees has an associated number of Bible stories and emblems. 1. The Royal Black Degree: Joseph and his coat of many colours; the Exodus; Elijah and the Prophets of Baal. Emblems: skull and bone; coffin; hand; burning bush. 2. The Royal Scarlet Degree: Joshua, Rahab, and the battle of Jericho. Emblems: trumpets; the Ark of the Covenant. 3. The Royal Marks Degree: the crossing of the Jordan. Emblems: 12 stones. 4. Apron and Royal Blue Degrees: Solomon and the building of the temple. The wise men and the slaughter of the innocents. Emblems: square and compass; plum; lever; apron. 5. Royal White Degree: David and Goliath. Emblems: five stones and a sling. 6. Royal Green Degree: Adam and Eve; Noah's ark. Emblems: gardener's tools; Noah's ark; dove. 7. Royal Gold Degree: two and a half tribes creating a separate altar at Gilead. Emblems: gold crown. 8. Star and Garter Degree: Melchizedek and the priesthood of all believers. Emblems: seven-pointed star. 9. Crimson Arrow Degree: Jehu's purge. Emblems: arrow through the heart. 10. Link Chain Degree: Daniel's dream; Belshazzar's feast; Daniel in the lion's den. Emblems: balance. 11. Red Cross Degree: death and resurrection of Christ; the New Jerusalem. Emblems: red cross. Source : Hand and Pen Orange Hall display, Ulster Folk Museum.

440

A. D. Buckley, ‘The Chosen Few: Biblical Texts in the Symbolism of an Ulster Secret Society’, Irish Review, 2 (1987), 31–40. The essay first appeared in Folk Life, 24 (1985–6).

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2. The story of Joseph (Gen. 37–50) is depicted in a series of different banner pictures and linked with the emblems of a skull and crossbones and a coffin.441 Through his faithfulness he is blessed by God and becomes a ruler in a foreign land. 3. The Exodus was overwhelmingly the most commonly used biblical motif. Numerous banner pictures were associated with a wide selection of emblems including, Aaron's Rod; the burning bush; tablets of stone; Moses; pots of Manna; the Ark of the Covenant; and the Tabernacle. The strength of the parallel between Israel and the Protestant settlers in Ulster lies in the imagined common experience of pilgrimage, liberation, and true faith being established in the place of idolatry in a hostile environment. Although the precise form of the degrees have altered over time the overriding theme has remained constant and runs throughout the Orange, Arch Purple, and Black rituals. It is of the struggle of God's chosen people in a hostile land, contending against alien peoples and false gods eventually to reach, with faith, the Promised Land and the blessing of God. Old Testament characters like Rahab, Gideon, Ruth, David, Elijah, Jehu, and Daniel are used as variations on this theme. Those who remain loyal to Yahweh he will vindicate, even against vastly superior forces. The Promised Land belongs to God's people as a gift of grace; it is their duty to establish pure religion within its borders. It is noteworthy that the vast majority of Bible stories used are Old Testament narratives. Wisdom literature is ignored and the Prophets are relegated to periodic supplementary appearances. The few New Testament images, such as the massacre of the innocents in Bethlehem, the vision of the New Jerusalem, and the Red Cross, emphasize the successful confrontation with evil by the one that remains faithful. Markedly absent from Orange biblical usage is any reference to major themes of evangelical theology such as justification by faith in Christ, mission, discipleship, the Church, or even the authority of the Bible. Indeed, Orange ritual fails even to attempt to construct a coherent framework for orthodox Christian doctrine. By its skewed

441

Apparently the name ‘Black’ comes from Joseph's mourning for Jacob, the skull and crossbones being symbolic of Jacob's bones being carried back to Canaan from Egypt for burial. Cecil Kilpatrick, interview with author, 22 July 1997.


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and unrepresentative selection of biblical material and its disinterest in theology, Orangeism's real objectives are laid bare. The clear priority is to tell a story conducive to the goals of political Protestantism in Ulster. Orangeism exists in a context where the ethnic and religious interests of Ulster Protestants intersect and in a culture where belief in the truth and authority of the Bible historically was deeply ingrained. Biblical imagery was too powerful a tool not to use in the service of Orange goals. Symbolism and ritual function in an imprecise way. Officially Orangeism denies that it teaches that the Ulster Protestants are God's chosen people, citing the essence of Protestantism as justification by faith, a means of salvation available to Catholic or Protestant.442 Some argue that Protestants are rather ‘God's favoured people’ in that they enjoy the spiritual benefits of the Reformation.443 Yet, the ritual throughout all levels of Orangeism provides a rich source of images and themes that when combined with an unambiguous correlation of the experience of Old Testament Israel with the historical experience of Protestants in Ulster,444 effectively encourages its members to believe that they alone are God's elect people. Their vital responsibility is to protect political Protestantism in order to ensure the spiritual, economic, and cultural blessing of God upon the land.445 ‘The Orange Order is a patriotic brotherhood…For true Orangemen assert that our country shall be righteous as well

442

See Cecil Kilpatrick's letter on this issue, that if a sinner prays for forgiveness with a sincere and penitent heart, he will be accepted by God whether ‘be he Jew or Gentile, Roman Catholic or Protestant’. Irish Times (12 Nov. 1996). Also Meredith and Kennaway, The Orange Order, 28–9.

443

David McConaghie writes, ‘Orangeism, precisely because it is built on the foundation of biblical Protestantism, treats no one as one of “God's chosen people” because they assent to a particular creed or attend a professing Christian church.’ Irish Times (19 Nov. 1996).

444

In contrast to McConaghie's idealism, Martin Smyth, while preaching about the lessons of 1689, casually blurs the theoretical distinction between believing Protestants and ethnic Protestants, ‘Ulster Protestants…were one in their Faith and Heritage. They feared God and not man. Their roots can be traced deep into the subsoil of Old Testament endeavour and experience.’ From a sermon preached at Richview Presbyterian Church, 18 Dec. 1966 to mark the shutting of the Gates of Derry. Smyth, Stand Fast, 31.

445

The practical effect of symbolism is probably more accurately judged in popular Orange sentiment than in formal statements of official belief. A large body of Orange songs and poems has evolved over time. A typical example is ‘The Orange ABC’. Verses three and four connect Orange experience with the Old Testament, while verse five refers to the degree ritual of the Royal Arch Purple, which only ‘some’ Orangemen undertake: ‘I is for the Israelites that crossed over Jordan's streams, and | J stands for Joshua, our guide he still remains; | K for Knox, Scotch Reformer, who for the truth did stand, | L stands for Luther, his doctrines we'll commend. || M stands for Moses, as he viewed the land, | N stands for Noah, who built the ark at God's command; | O stands for Orange, a colour you have all worn, and | P is Purple, with which the ark was borne. || Q is for Question you are asked at the door, | R is for the Road, my boys, some of you have trod before; | S is for the Secret you're sure there to find, | T is for Travels you will always bear in mind.’

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as strong. “The throne is established in righteousness”.’446 From this perspective, it is but a short step to assume that Protestant cultural identity per se is inevitably superior to Catholic culture and thus that Protestants are intrinsically superior to Catholics. A framework is complete where stereotypes can flourish.

5.5 AN UNCHANGING FOE It was noted earlier that the greater the number of distinctive cultural characteristics an identity possesses the more acute its sense of difference from others.447 The unique nature of Orange identity has meant that, while it maintains a robustly positive self-image, it simultaneously promotes a profoundly negative view of other identities that conflict with Orange reality. While, on the one hand, an Orangeman is urged ‘to abstain from unkind words and actions towards Roman Catholics’, on the other hand, a central purpose of the Institution is ‘to expose their Church as idolatrous, superstitious and holding many unbiblical and anti-scriptural doctrines’.448 The Roman Catholic Church is portrayed as an enemy of freedom. Contemporary Orangeism stands against ‘the tyranny…of an authoritarian Church’.449 One function of marches is ‘to proclaim to all and sundry our determination to be free from any Republican Ireland and a totalitarian Romanism’.450 Alternatively, put more graphically, ‘papal power and political tyranny are children of the same womb’.451

446

Patton, ‘The Orange Institution’, 13.

447

See s. 2.1.4.

448


449

‘What Does Orangeism Stand For Today?’, GOLI Website (May 1998).

450

Smyth, Stand Fast, 24. Sermon preached in Great Victoria Presbyterian Church on Palm Sunday, 1970.

451

Porter, ‘Here We Stand’, 22.


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Ironically, the Catholic Church is understood to be operating on a similar basis as the Orange Order, as a religious institution with overt political objectives. In an Orangeman's eyes, Catholicism is synonymous with Republicanism, both are in error and both are to be resisted at all costs. Since Catholicism's ‘unbiblical and unreformed prayers for the dead and the false concept of the Mass…are abhorrent to lovers of Christ and truth’, the way to resist such dangerous heresy is to battle for the true faith by protecting the government and constitution of the State.452 The barbaric campaign of the IRA since 1969 has only served to reinforce for generations the association between Republicanism and evil, Catholicism and tyranny, Irish nationalism and disloyalty. The conflict in Northern Ireland then is primarily a spiritual contest, played out in the political sphere. For example, the task for Orangemen in 1969, and which is unchanged, was to ‘wage a successful war against evil’ and, like Jude, ‘contend for the faith’.453 Then, the forces of evil included the ‘sinister elements’ arrayed against Northern Ireland such as the Civil Rights and Ecumenical Movements. The common link between the two was their denial of the Reformed faith. Such a threat ‘poses our greatest challenge…We must stand with our fathers to oppose such error and proclaim the truth given to us.’454 Like Daniel, Orangemen are called to resist religious compromise even if it means suffering the pain of misrepresentation and international contempt.455 An inclusive liberalism, as exemplified in ecumenism, jeopardizes the entire structure of Orange identity, which proclaims the defence of the true faith. Once Roman Catholicism is accepted as a Christian Church and its members as children of God,456 the raison d'être of Orangeism virtually collapses. Long's rhetoric indicates the sensitivity of the issues at stake: ‘Any

452

Smyth, Stand Fast, 10.

453

Ibid. 10–13. In a sermon on Jude 3 first preached in 1969 at Aughafatten Orange Hall, Smyth explicitly links Jude's task to contend for the apostolic faith in times of trial with the political situation facing Ulster Protestants at the start of the Troubles.

454

Ibid. 11.

455

Ibid. 33.

456

John Marsden, lecturer in theology at the predominantly liberal Church of Ireland Theological College, sparked off a furious row by arguing in the Irish Times that ‘the cancer at the heart of Orangeism is its refusal to recognize its Roman Catholic neighbour as also a child of God.’ The vehemence of the replies by senior Orange figures demonstrates the depth of the issues at stake. See the letters page, Irish Times (5, 12, and 19 Nov. 1996).

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attempts that seem to suggest a watering down of Protestant principles and a desire to placate and accommodate Roman Catholicism with its totalitarianism in doctrine and practice are feared and denounced as treachery to the cause.’457 There would be no longer any need to defend the Border apart from rather mundane economic, political, and social reasons. The emotional battle for purity, truth, and the glory of God would be over. Orangeism needs an unreformed Catholicism on its doorstep in order to continue to interpret the Northern conflict in spiritual terms and so sacralize Orange identity. Undoubtedly (Southern) Irish society of the first two-thirds of the twentieth century did represent a classic case of belonging without distance (a complex fusion of Catholicism and Irish nationalism).458 However, despite profound changes in that society,459 Orange perception of the contemporary nature of the Roman Catholic Church remains that of a pre-Vatican II authoritarian, monolithic, and all-powerful religio-political organization, and of the Irish Republic as a ‘priest-ridden’ society subservient to her Church. Modifying a stereotype can be a dangerous business: it can send out shockwaves that could cause the whole edifice to come tumbling down. This reality was made starkly evident during the late 1990s when a group of senior Orangemen began attempts at modest reform of the Order.460 They were alarmed at the increasingly militant influence of the small but vociferous ‘Spirit of Drumcree’ group within the Grand Lodge.461 Kennaway and others are no revisionists, they hold to traditional Orange ideology.462 Their

457

Long in Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 189–90.

458

For a good account of this story see T. Inglis, Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in Modern Ireland, 2nd edn. (Dublin: UCD Press, 1998.

459

See Mitchel, ‘Ireland’; and Inglis, Moral Monopoly.

460

In an article ‘Hardline pride condemns Orangemen to isolation’, the journalist Liam Clarke listed the members of this loose grouping as Brian Kennaway, Cecil Kilpatrick, Clifford Smyth, Denis Watson (Co. Armagh Grand Master), Henry Reid, and Nelson McCausland. Sunday Times (18 June 2000).

461

The ‘Spirit of Drumcree’ group, led by Joel Patton, was highly critical of moderate Orange leadership's response to the Drumcree crisis.

462

Kennaway describes himself as an Orangeman first and a member of the Orange Order second. If the latter departs from Orange principles, it will be possible to continue to be an Orangeman while not being a member of the Orange Order. Interview with author, 29 Mar. 2000.


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strategy was more one of positive public relations and modernization of the Institution, particularly arguing the case for organizational separation from the UUP. Since the collapse of the ‘golden era’, the Order's ethos had become increasingly populist and political.463 Kennaway is concerned that poor leadership, intellectual poverty, a lack of vision, spiritual decline, and an inability to cope with the profound changes in the political landscape during the Peace Process pose a threat to the Order's continued existence. Without spiritual renewal, Kennaway argues, the Order will face divine judgement for its spiritual disobedience and departure from true Orange principles.464 The reaction to such constructive criticism is instructive. Increasingly isolated, by June 2000 Kennaway, Reid, Kilpatrick, and six others were forced to resign from the Education Committee after an inquiry into their activities by the Grand Lodge.465 Shortly before, Kennaway had despaired of the Order as ‘unreformable’ due to its populist democratic structure (see Fig. 2).466 His marginalization within the Order is evidence of how, within Orangeism, ‘hard nationalism’ will always win in a contest with the ‘spiritual’ ideals of the movement. Kennaway's optimism that the core of Orangeism revolves around anything other than power politics has been exposed as an illusion.

5.6 A NOBLE CAUSE A further strand of Orange identity is revealed in how it views itself as defending a worthy and noble cause. What could be worthier than fulfilling God's plan for Ireland? In Orange understanding the Order has been crucial to Ulster's resistance to absorption within an all-Ireland Catholic state, a fate contrary

463

Other Orangemen, while opposed to Kennaway's views, accept that since the 1960s the Order has lost much of its old ‘blue blood’ and middle-class support. Martin Smyth, interview with author, 31 Mar. 2000.

464

Interview with author, 29 Mar. 2000.

465

L. Clarke, ‘Hardline Pride’. Clarke closes his article by suggesting that the Order ‘has become an unwittingly subversive force. By reducing Unionism's room for manuvre and draining flexibility out of the system, it is killing the thing it loves.’

466

Interview with author, 29 Mar. 2000.

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to God's will. A former Belfast City Grand Master, Thomas Passmore, argued that in the providence of God the Orange Order had been the only real source of Protestant unity, adding ‘if the Orange Institution fails, Ulster will fail’, but ‘if God be for us who can be against us?’467 The fate of Ulster has significance far beyond Ireland. Since it represents ‘the last bastion of evangelicalism’ in the United Kingdom, if Ulster falls the cause of the Gospel will be weakened elsewhere.468 Letters to the Orange Standard typify this interpretation of Northern Ireland. One writer stresses the need ‘to convey to our people the true and historic nature and significance of the conflict in which we are engaged’. He argues that the Churches fail to preach the ‘truth of Ulster's position and purpose in the plan and will of God…We read the story of Protestant Ulster's stand for Bible truth and her uncompromising opposition to the age-long enemy of truth, the church of Rome …Ulster's war is a religious war…Ulster is a Protestant bridgehead…against the extension of the political and spiritual power of the Roman church to these six counties.’469 This exalted calling is supplemented by other more pragmatic motivations, ‘The Order has maintained an utter loyalty to the British Crown and the British connection as a racial necessity and an economic lifeline necessary to the existence of the state's life.’470 Other policies follow that are consistent with this framework. An example is the rejection of the possibility of powersharing with Catholic nationalism as envisaged at Sunningdale. A typical response was that of influential Orangeman Sir Knox Cunningham: ‘I am appalled at the disaster to the Union that will come from sharing power with the SDLP.’471 On 30 October 1973, the Central Committee of the Grand Lodge of Ireland said ‘No to Power Sharing’ on the grounds that it was ideologic

467

Orange Standard (May 1974.

468

M. W. Dewar, Why Orangeism? (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland Historical Committee, 1958, 16–21.

469

F. Millar Jnr., The Orange Standard (Feb.1974.

470

Belfast County Grand Lodge, Belfast County Grand Lodge: Centenary Official History 1863–1963 (Belfast: Universal Publishing Company, 1963, 18 (my emphasis).

471

Sir Knox Cunningham, address to the Ulster Unionist Council, Orange Standard, Nov. 1973. Knox Cunningham was highly influential and had been PPS to Harold Macmillan.


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ally and politically impossible to share power with those committed to destroying the Union.472 A survey of the Orange Standard since the suspension of Stormont reveals a theme of profound distrust arising from the ‘duplicity’ of the British government's policy of accommodation and a lament for the failure to recognize and reward the loyalty of the Ulster Protestant people. The Grand Orange Lodge's response to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement remains consistent with this attitude. Its verdict on the deal called for an emphatic ‘no’ vote at the forthcoming referendum: ‘we would implore pro-Union voters to have the courage of their convictions and, with the belief in protecting their birthright and heritage, they must do what is right for their beloved Province on May 22’.473 The role of six dissident UUP MPs in opposing their leader's signing of the document was particularly significant given that all were Orangemen.474 Issues of particular concern to the Grand Lodge included ‘the overriding role for Dublin in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland’ and ‘the promotion of symbols and culture which are alien to the great majority of people in Northern Ireland’.475 The Grand Lodge's stance was echoed by a wide selection of county and district lodges. The Belfast County Grand Orange Lodge rejected the GFA on the basis that it was ‘fatally ambiguous, morally objectionable and constitutionally flawed’. The Lodge concluded, with a certain clumsy logic, that ‘A “yes” vote is akin to political suicide which, like the human variety, is irreversible.’476

472

Orange Standard, Nov. 1973. Martin Smyth and Walter Williams signed the statement to the paper.

473

‘The Agreement’, GOLI Website (May 1998).

474

The six were: Revd Martin Smyth, William Ross, Jeffrey Donaldson, William Thompson, Roy Beggs, and Clifford Forsythe. Lord Molyneaux, ex-leader of the UUP and Sovereign Grand Master of the Royal Black Institution, supported their stance.

475

‘The Agreement’, GOLI Website.

476

‘Press Release from the Belfast County Grand Orange Lodge’, GOLI Website (13 May 1998. The Larne District L.O.L. concluded that a No vote was the ‘only way to safeguard the interests of the Unionist people’, ‘Press Release from the Larne District L. O. L.’, GOLI Website (11 May 1998. It should be noted however that rejection of the Agreement was not unanimous. A new group called ‘Spirit of the Union’, consisting of senior Orangemen in counties Down and Antrim, issued public statements calling for Orange unity and the freedom to vote ‘Yes’. Belfast Telegraph (7 May 1998.)

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The nobleness of the Orange cause is also seen in the Order's contribution to the success of Ulster. The combination of an Orangeman's dual loyalty to Crown and Christ means that he should exhibit ‘good citizenship’ that will benefit his community and country. Looking back, at the close of the unionist ‘golden era’, Long praised the role of the Orange Order's ‘huge and undiminished influence for…the good of this Province and all its people’. Orangeism stands for ‘peace and prosperity’, its interests lie in the ‘well being of the people of the country’. The Order's ‘total offering to the making of Northern Ireland is beyond calculation’, it has contributed ‘courageously and unselfishly; constructively and openly’, and has been a key factor explaining Ulster's economic and social progress, even in the face of many disadvantages.477 Orangemen have been at the forefront of Ulster's political life and been responsible for ‘much of the beneficent legislation’ that has shaped the nature of the State. As a result ‘Orangemen are proud of Northern Ireland. They regularly show their devotion to the province.’478 In Smyth's words the Order's ethos is summarized by ‘practices by the greater number for the well being of all’.479 In other words, since Orangeism stands for ‘civil and religious liberty for all’, the implementation of political Protestantism, with its values of democracy, freedom of conscience and respect for law and order, actually benefits the Roman Catholic minority whether they acknowledge it or not. The failure of the minority to recognize the privileges of living in ‘a delectable place’ like Northern Ireland is explained in terms of ungrateful indolence: ‘It is easy to cry “bigot” at an Orangeman and to plead victimization at his hands. It is stupid to cry when you do nothing, even though you have the freedom and the competence to improve your lot for yourself and instead of offering your help for the better government of the country, you talk against it and promise to rejoice if it ceased to exist. This is the attitude of many of the minority in Northern Ireland.’480

477

S. E. Long in Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 185–200. One of the hindrances to progress was the existence of ‘enemies within and without’, coded language for the Irish nationalists inherently disloyal to the State.

478

Ibid. 186.

479

Smyth, ‘Foreword’, 2.

480

Long in Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 186.


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The laudable attributes of the Order are emphasized in other spheres. Rather than being a negative anti-Catholic force, it is a ‘positive Protestant (Pro Testanto) “witness for” the faith’, open to all (Protestant) creeds and colours including exRoman Catholics.481 Instead of being linked in a tribal fashion to the political interests of unionism, Orangeism ‘is an International Brotherhood of Protestants, which may or may not, have a local connection to a particular political ideology’.482 While often only associated with being a marching organization, the Order is deeply involved with caring for orphans, widows, and ‘a multitude of charities and missions’.483 An interesting theme within Orange literature is a self-professed awareness of its weaknesses,484 particularly the credibility gap between its ‘lofty and magnanimous principles’485 of Christian witness and the scarcely hidden naked sectarianism of some Orange behaviour and tradition.486 Acknowledgement of the dichotomy acts as evidence of the Order's willingness to listen to criticism. Another associated theme is the belief that much criticism of the Order derives from an ignorance of its real nature. In this scenario, some attack the Institution by twisting the truth and promoting ‘black propaganda’ that others uncritically accept. If they spent time in objective research they would find that ‘

481

Meredith and Kennaway, The Orange Order, 22, 28–9. The authors argue that ‘the best friend that the Roman Catholic has is the truly devout Orangeman’ who will not only act in a Christian manner but allow him the rights of conscience even though he may disagree with his religious convictions.

482

Ibid. 22. See also S. E. Long, ‘International Orangeism: Origins and Beginnings’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 67–83.

483

Smyth, ‘Foreword’, 2. Since 1887 the Orange Order's orphan fund had helped 6,750 children. See also B. Courtney, ‘The Lord Enniskillen Memorial Orphan Fund’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 59; B. Courtney, ‘Working to Help Others’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 39.

484

Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 194–8. Smyth, ‘Foreword’, 2. Meredith and Kennaway, The Orange Order, 23.

485


486

Orange Songs such as ‘Kick the Pope’ and ‘Croppies lie Down’ are popular manifestations of anti-Catholicism. The infamous taunting of Catholics outside Sean Graham's bookie's shop on the Ormeau Road during an Orange march in July 1994 shortly after five Catholics had been murdered there in a loyalist sectarian attack, was a more sinister example.

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Orangeism lives by its principles.’487 A significant amount of opposition derives from ‘lukewarm Protestants who do not appreciate what this Institution stands for’.488 Long laments that the Order is often made a ‘scapegoat’ and is an ‘easy target’ for its critics. Since no organization is perfect he confesses that it is ‘strange to find churchmen denouncing an organisation that tries hard to encourage loyalty to the Church and to the Christian faith’.489 Orangemen ‘need to explain ourselves’ to counter ill-informed perceptions of the Order.490 The underlying assumption of such rhetoric is that if Orangeism's authentic character were recognized this type of criticism would dissipate. In effect such views act to insulate the Order from external censure, which is either misled or hostile, and reinforce Orange belief in the integrity of its convictions. Patton writes that, ‘we can take inspiration from the criticism as it comes from those who see the Orange Order as a major threat to their plans’.491 Despite Orange belief that all of these admirable characteristics demonstrate that the Order is an altruistic body primarily concerned with proclaiming and defending the Christian Gospel, the case is unconvincing. In reality Orange ideology allows no legitimate place within the State for a Catholic nationalist. Good citizenship is measured only in support for the Union and the maintenance of political Protestantism. Catholic grievances against the Orange flavour of Northern Ireland during the ‘golden era’ are dismissed as a pretence to attack the legitimacy of the State.492 The international dimension of Orangeism is a historical curiosity rather than evidence of the

487

G. Patton, ‘Orangeism Lives by its Principles’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 35. See also Meredith and Kennaway, The Orange Order, 4, where they lament that ‘many have come to their own conclusions on the basis of hearsay, limited knowledge, or in some cases, no knowledge at all’.

488

S. E. Long, ‘The Imperial Orange Council’, in Kennedy (ed.), Steadfast for Faith and Freedom, 84–7, esp. 85. See also Porter, ‘Orangeism’, Steadfast, 101. Porter remarks that it is ‘woolly minded liberal Protestants’ who misunderstand the Order's positive contribution to Protestant unity.

489

S. E. Long, ‘Orange Reality’, in The Twelfth: 1921–1971 (Belfast: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1971, 46–9.

490

A remark made by Brian Kennaway at the 34th Glenstal Abbey Ecumenical Conference in Co. Limerick. Irish Times (28 June 1997.)

491

Patton, ‘Orangeism Lives’, Steadfast, 35.

492

Smyth, Stand Fast, 10.


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possibility that the Order could be ideologically disconnected from unionism. Orangeism and unionism share the same goals and remain structurally interdependent even if they may in the future become formally separate.493 Orange charitable work is striking in its exclusive nature, serving only those within the Orange family.494 While the Order may grant that actual Orange practice may fall short of the ideal, little or no action is taken to rectify the situation. Instead, it is apparent that the Order's positive understanding of its aims and ethos only serves to sharpen the contrast between Orangeism and its enemies. They are perceived as the opposite, or Other, of Orange identity. If Orangeism represents light and goodness, its opponents represent the forces of darkness and evil.

5.7 SYNTHESIS It is clear that, on some levels, Orangeism has been spectacularly successful. It has constructed a ‘historically embedded’ identity, sustained by highly imaginative symbolism functioning within a regular pattern of ritualized activity. The Orange story is superbly adapted to provide a satisfying emotional, rational, and spiritual explanation of the political fate of the Protestants of Ulster. With its complex, long-established and unique personality, Orangeism has forged a rich emotive resource of ‘memories’, customs, traditions, and symbols that are full of meaning to those within its boundaries. It is a strong, coherent, and self-sustaining belief system, resistant to rapid change or effective criticism. It has been able to mirror, within its religious structure, the political, cultural, social, and economic aspirations of a large proportion of Ulster Protestants. As a result, closed evangelicalism has thrived within Ulster society throughout this century.

493

Kennaway has argued for the organizational separation of the Orange Order from the Ulster Unionist Party, Irish Times, 28 June 1997. In contrast, Martin Smyth contends that the link is a legitimate method of bringing a Christian influence to bear on the world of politics. Interview with author, 31 Mar. 2000.

494

The Lord Enniskillen Memorial Orange Orphan Society gives grants only to orphans, of whom at least one parent was a member of the Orange Institution or Association of Orangewomen. Courtney, ‘The Lord Enniskillen’, 59.

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Yet this success has not been achieved without significant cost. In my description of Orangeism's imagined community I have shown how, within each building block of identity—legitimation, myths, symbolism, ritual, and the assertion of difference—religious imagery and language is utilized in a subordinate manner to authenticate the objectives of political Protestantism. The controlling ambition of the Order is a political one, to be faithful, not primarily to Scripture, but to the achievements of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the brave stand for freedom made at the Diamond in 1795. Thus, whether it is a claim to represent the evangelical tradition, or to be a biblically based organization, there is little actual concern for the theological content of either. It is significant that an Orangeman can hold theological views ranging from Unitarian to Anglo-Catholic to being a member of the Masonic Order and break no doctrinal qualifications for membership.495 Being ethnically Protestant is essential; being evangelical is an optional extra. Evangelicalism is reduced to standing by the slogan of ‘Justification by faith’ and using the Bible in religious ritual. Biblical texts are manipulated, without regard for any hermeneutical principles, in an allegorical manner to endorse the destiny of the Ulster Protestant nation. Simply counting the numbers of Protestants in Ulster can thus assess the advance or retreat of the Reformed Faith.496 Undoubtedly religion does play a central part in Orange identity. However, its prime function is to elevate the political struggle between Protestant unionism and Catholic nationalism to a spiritual level. If God is on your side, it is not only difficult to lose, but you are involved in a momentous battle with eternal consequences. The issue is not just whether Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom, but whether good will overcome evil, freedom conquer tyranny, truth triumph over error, light outshine the darkness, and God's people maintain their inheritance of the promised land.

495

Cecil Kilpatrick, interview with author, 22 July 1997.

496

This is how the state of the Reformed faith is evaluated in ‘Reformed Faith on the Retreat?’, Orange Standard (June 1997.) Despite dropping numbers of Presbyterian Church members (down to 300,000), the article draws comfort from the fact that this total ‘combined with the wider Presbyterian community, represents an immensely important section of the Ulster population.’


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If it is correct to understand unionism as a form of nationalism, it follows that Orangeism is, in essence, a religious expression of unionist national identity. While it differs in form from secular unionism in its use of Christian imagery and ritual, in practice they are inseparable. The ‘golden era’ of Ulster unionism represented the fulfilment of Orange goals—‘a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people’. The Orange Order operates as an ideological and political support for Ulster unionism giving largely unqualified and uncritical patronage to the unionist cause.497 Both Orangeism and unionism are organized around the components of nationalism—territorial control over a homeland, a perception of uniqueness, the implementation of a common culture, internal cohesion, the goal of freedom, a positive self-image, and a historic sense of destiny. While they may fill these components with slightly different content, they share virtually identical ideological objectives and political experiences. This interpretation is not meant to deny the genuine sincerity of many Orangemen's Christian convictions. Rather, it suggests that they are held within a discourse controlled and structured by nationalist sentiment. Yet to conclude that Orangeism is a religious form of unionist national identity can only be a partial analysis. Comment is required on the character of Orange identity. It has been shown how, given its symbiotic relationship with unionism, Orangeism shares in its power-maintaining tactics of exclusion. A self-positive image of noble faithfulness legitimizes the ‘politics of purity’ whereby Ulster is physically and spiritually sheltered from the defiling Other. Irish nationalists and Roman Catholicism are but two manifestations of the one enemy of Ulster, the stronghold of genuine Christianity. No space can be granted to the illegitimate and threatening Other; it must be removed from the Orange world. The structure of Orange

497

The only major point of confrontation between the Order (along with the Protestant and Catholic Churches) and the government was the 1923 Education Bill that envisaged a non-denominational educational system for the new State, a goal rejected by both communities. The Order's negative response to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement opposing the perceived compromises of the Ulster Unionist Party leadership is a recent example of how the institution represents ‘hard nationalism’ in order to defend the political purity of unionism in times of crisis.

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identity facilitates exclusion at every level: religious, political, social, and intellectual. Exclusion is practised not so much by indifference, as by elimination and domination. Orangeism thus represents a complex fusion of horizons epitomized by the rubric, belonging without distance. At a religious level the Order is profoundly compromised since its ‘soul’ is ‘sold out’ to nationalism. It is ideologically incapable of creating distance from the goals of unionism because the fate of Ulster is its first and absolute priority. The Bible's eschatological and spiritual perspective of cultural relativity becomes instead the culturally captive political utopia of a pure and free Ulster. Orangeism exemplifies the corrosive effects of the failure to balance belonging with distance. If Orangeism shares unionist nostalgia for the past, it also faces a threatening and uncertain future. The journey of Orange identity since 1921 has been synonymous with the trials and tribulations of Ulster unionism. Orangeism was at the height of its influence throughout the ‘golden era’ and, like much of unionism, has been fighting an increasingly desperate rearguard battle to retain Protestant power ever since. Like unionism, and for similar reasons, Orangeism finds itself increasingly isolated and impotent to control its destiny. In 1997, speaking from an Orange perspective, William Bingham summarized Protestant feeling in three words: alienation (from the political system), suspicion (of imminent betrayal), and fear (of Republican violence and British government appeasement).498 The sense of Orangeism's political isolation is well captured in the Orange Standard's vain and mistaken predictions about the outcome of the May 1998 referendum on the Good Friday Agreement: The Ulster Protestant people will…refuse to drink from the poisoned chalice and to fall into line meekly as their freedoms and liberties won by generations of Ulstermen through blood sacrifice are poured down the drain. Ulstermen and women will not allow themselves to be trussed like helpless flies for the Irish spider to devour…how could Ulster Protestants, Orangemen and Unionists worthy of their name, ever trust their future and that of their descendants to a regime so

498

W. Bingham, ‘Making Sense of Northern Ireland: An Orange Perspective’, paper given at a New Dialogue Labour Party fringe meeting, Brighton (30 Sep.1997). Bingham was then Deputy Grand Chaplain of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland.


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clearly under the control of men and women, who have followed mercilessly and without deviation, a programme designed to consign a free people to slavery and the dustbin of history? 499 The article is suffused with unionist mythology. The conflict was partly due to the British government's appeasement of violence. The government has ‘been so wooed by Dublin and U.S. President Bill Clinton that it will bend over backwards in its attempt to placate the enemies of Ulster and the Ulster majority’. The crisis would have been solved by ‘draconian security measures to crush Republican violence’. The ‘decent God-fearing and law-abiding Ulster people’ have been cruelly abandoned at their time of need by the government's failure ‘in its duty to provide the security the Ulster people deserve’. This tragic state of affairs is contrasted with the security of the Stormont era that ‘served the people so well for nearly 50 years’. In this reconstruction, the recent history of Ulster is a ‘dreadful story of betrayal which is still continuing, and will eventually succeed unless there is a united front by all the unionist people of this Province and their leaders’. Inextricably linked to unionism ideologically and structurally, Orangeism shares the alienation felt by a significant proportion of the Protestant population. ‘Abandoned’ by the politics of accommodation and imperilled by the rise of nationalism and republicanism, it seems only able to look back at the past in frustration and loss. After some hundred years at the core of unionist identity, political marginalization, increasing internal pressures,500 and a lack of vision for the future threaten the onset of terminal decline. In this context, its understanding of history as a continual repetition of the past is both its great strength and weakness. A strength, in that no matter how hostile Irish nationalist, British,

499

‘Weak Government which Tolerates Murder’, Orange Standard (May 1998.)

500

The associated violence at ‘Drumcree IV’ when the Order was banned from marching down the Garvaghy Road, led to large-scale violence and the to the deaths by firebomb attack, on 12 July 1998, of three young brothers from the Quinn family in Ballymoney. The deaths caused deep disquiet amongst many Orangemen. Prominent clergy like Revd William Bingham, the Order's County Armagh chaplain, spoke out against hardliners. Other chaplains resigned. The crisis spurred the Church of Ireland to reassess its relationship with the Order. Subsequently, a report was commissioned by the Standing Committee of the General Synod. One of its findings was that ‘most would agree that Drumcree has damaged the witness of the Church…it is apparent that we fail in our witness, and have failed in the present situation…Can we possibly profess to love our neighbours while supporting an Institution that (at least historically) celebrates their defeat?’. ‘A Theological Comment on the Issues Involved in the Drumcree Situation’, Church of Ireland Gazette (8 Jan. 1999), 8–10. More recently still, Earl Storey, Rector of Glenavy Parish, Co. Antrim has published a book calling for the Church gradually to disengage from the Order. See Traditional Roots: Towards an Appropriate Relationship Between the Church of Ireland and the Orange Order (Dublin: Columba Press, 2002.

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and world opinion becomes, Orangemen will interpret events as a confirmation of the essential rightness of their cause—a weakness, in that Orangeism seems incapable of creating imaginative new horizons of thought. Ironically, as a ‘bulwark of the Reformed Faith’, Orange belief seems immune from reformation. The collapse of the ‘golden era’ and nearly thirty years of violence have only served to reinforce its insular character. As will be shown, this reactive defensiveness is one of the significant markers that differentiate closed evangelicalism from its open form.

6‘Ourselves Alone’: Paisleyism and the Politics of Purity Can a corrupt throne be allied with you—one that brings on misery by its decrees? They band together against the righteous and condemn the innocent to death. But the Lord has become my fortress, and my God the rock in whom I take refuge. He will repay them for their sins and destroy them for their wickedness; the Lord our God will destroy them. (Psalm 94: 20–3) You are my war club, my weapon for battle—with you I shatter nations, with you I destroy kingdoms. (Jeremiah 51: 20)

6.1 BACKGROUND The Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster, established in 1951, is organized around its founder and only moderator, the Revd Dr Ian R. K. Paisley. Born in 1926, Paisley's life has spanned the emerging threat to unionism's ‘golden era’, the collapse of Stormont, and the subsequent period of the politics of accommodation directed from London. The fortunes of the new denomination can only be understood within this wider political framework since Paisleyism itself is best interpreted as a case of politico-religious convergence.501 As the crisis for the Unionist Party deepened throughout the 1960s the political and religious fortunes of Paisley rose. Vocal street protests against the policies of O'Neill and the theological

501

See C. Smyth, ‘The Ulster Democratic Unionist Party: A Case Study in Religious and Political Convergence’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Queen's University, Belfast, 1983. See also C. Smyth, ‘The DUP as a Politico-religious Organisation’, Irish Political Studies, 1 (1986), 33–43.

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PAISLEYISM AND THE POLITICS OF PURITY

implications of the ecumenical movement marked the beginning of a deliberate campaign to unsettle both the religious and political status quo of Ulster Protestantism in order to create space for a vibrant expression of fundamentalist evangelical-political identity. In this task Paisley has been relatively successful. The past thirty years have witnessed his relocation from the fringe of Ulster politics to the centre. From being a figure of amusement and mockery he now enjoys the status of commanding the largest vote of any European MEP. From humble beginnings as a fiery gospel preacher within a parochial subsection of Ulster evangelicalism he is now, both for good and ill, a figure of international repute. His personal accomplishments have been accompanied by the growth of both denomination and party from their inauspicious origins. However, Paisley's dramatic achievement of helping to split the unionist monolith by establishing, in 1971, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),502 has not been mirrored in a similar proportion of Protestants joining his Free Presbyterian Church. It remains a small grouping which has made little impact on rival denominations, numbering forty-nine congregations within Northern Ireland, and ten outside it, with an estimated population of Free Presbyterians of only 12,363.503 Possible reasons for Protestant support for Paisley outside the circles of Free Presbyterianism will be discussed below, but at this juncture caution should be used in attributing to Paisley the label, ‘voice of Protestant Ulster’.504 Certainly it is a distinction Paisley

502

Other Protestant parties that emerged in the late 1960s, such as William Craig's Vanguard Movement, dissipated over time, whereas the DUP established itself as one of the main Northern Ireland political parties providing serious electoral competition to the larger Ulster Unionist Party. In the 1996 Forum Elections, the DUP secured 18.8% cent of the vote compared to 24.2% cent for the UUP. At parliamentary elections it had experienced modest gains from 11.7% cent in 1987, to 13.1% cent in 1992 and 13.6% cent in 1997. For full details see Wilford, ‘The 1997 Westminster Election’, 147. This trend shifted significantly in the 2001 Westminster election when the DUP's support rose 8.9% cent to 22.5 per cent of the vote, narrowly ahead of Sinn Féin (21.7%, up 5.6%) and the SDLP (21.0%, down 3.1%) and a remarkable 14.8% closer to the UUP (26.8%, down 5.9%). See BBC Online News Website at www.news.bbc. co.uk/vote 2001.

503

1991 Northern Ireland census.

504

Both Bruce, God Save Ulster! and Smyth, Ian Paisley argue that this is a valid title for the ‘big man’.


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claims for himself but Protestantism in Ulster is too diverse for it to be an accurate description of reality. My primary interest in Free Presbyterian identity lies in comparison and contrast with mainstream evangelicalism. What are the distinctives of Paisleyism from Orangeism and Presbyterianism? Where between the two poles of evangelical identity does it lie? How does Paisley's ideology interact with nationalism? Bruce argues that the reason for Paisley's success lies in that he powerfully reiterates historic Ulster Protestant ideology in a context of widespread secularism. In other words Free Presbyterians ‘continue to believe things…other Protestants have given up’. He continues, ‘I am not convinced that there is any great evidence of innovation in either Paisley's religion or…his politics. Paisley…built his political and religious movements on highly traditional platforms.’505 Certainly there is much truth in this thesis and it is substantiated by Paisley's own perception of his role as God's faithful servant, alone battling for the truth while surrounded by heretical Catholicism, apostate Protestantism, and evil republicanism. David Taylor agrees: ‘his future success…depends, in both religious and political spheres, on his skill in articulating and leading Protestants within a framework of traditional loyalism and evangelical Protestantism. What has been markedly absent from Paisley's leadership is originality, or any creative ideas that might break with established orthodoxies.’506 Alternatively, Smyth proposed that Paisleyism represents a ‘unique and innovative ideology’. Building on Miller's hypothesis in Queen's Rebels, he argues that Paisleyism is a fusion of seventeenth-century Presbyterian contractual allegiance to the State with twentieth-century American fundamentalist premillennialism.507 Bruce minimizes the importance of the American connection,508 and while technically he may

505


506

D. Taylor, ‘Ian Paisley and the Ideology of Ulster Protestantism’, in C. Curtin (ed.), Culture and Ideology in Ireland, Studies in Irish History, 2 (Galway: Galway University Press, 1984, 77.

507

Smyth, Ian Paisley, 115–16.

508

Bruce rejects Smyth's theory by arguing that the FPCU's premillennialism differs from American fundamentalism in both its content and origins. The latter are ‘pretribulation rapturists’ a position the Free Presbyterian Church repudiates. Paisley's eschatology can be traced to have its origins within British Calvinist theology, not American fundamentalism. See God Save Ulster!, 206–7.

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be correct, it is difficult to discount the American fundamentalist influence on Paisley's robust revivalist style.509 As I will show, fundamentalist-evangelical tensions form an important component (but not the primary cause) of Paisleyism's confrontation with open evangelicalism. Although my analysis will locate the main source of Paisley's originality elsewhere, Smyth's view of Paisley as an innovator is important. It helps to explain the emergence of Paisleyism as a distinct identity from a largely unaltered Orangeism.510 Real ideological and structural differences exist between the two. In 1966, responding to concern at the number of supporters Paisley was drawing from the Orange Order, Sir George Clark, then Grand Master, acknowledged the problem but thought it better for the Order to be rid of such ‘militants’ who had little to contribute to the Institution.511 Other symptoms of dissimilarity are the Orange Order's refusal to permit Free Presbyterian ministers to function as district chaplains (in contrast with other main Protestant denominations),512 and the deliberate rejection of a constitutional position for the Orange Order within the DUP's organizational structure.513 In short, Bruce and Smyth provide differing theoretical interpretations to explain the emergence of Paisleyism. It will be argued below that neither adequately capture the essence of Paisleyite distinctiveness. This is not primarily a question of fundamentalism or a reiteration of historic evangelicalism, but is located in the emotional appeal of a mythological nationalist narrative.

509

For wider discussion of Paisley's fundamentalist links see Smyth, Ian Paisley, 122–7.

510

As with the Orange Order, Paisleyism is often described as part of Ulster loyalism with little attempt to analyse the differences of emphasis between the Free Presbyterians and elements of loyalism. Even the work of Todd, ‘Two Traditions’ and Wright, ‘Protestant Ideology and Politics’, fail to discuss the distinct characteristics of Paisleyism and Orangeism. The structural relationship between the two will be discussed in more detail below.

511

Belfast Telegraph (9 June 1966).

512

Cecil Kilpatrick, interview with author, 22 July 1997.

513

Smyth, Ian Paisley, 59.


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The discussion will illustrate how Paisley self-consciously operates from within the framework of closed Ulster evangelicalism yet adds his own unique emphasis to each component of that identity. Typically this emphasis takes the form that he alone is the one truly fulfilling the exalted calling of Ulster Protestantism.514 The result is an imagined community that is similar to yet distinct from Orangeism. By establishing a significantly different identity from that of conventional Ulster unionism and evangelicalism, Paisley has succeeded in creating enough ideological space to sustain both his political party and religious community. Analysing the distinctive characteristics of Paisleyism that distinguish it from other forms of Ulster evangelicalism will identify the means by which he has achieved this.

6.2 THE DISTINCTIVES OF PAISLEYISM In a sense, Paisleyism's entire ideological structure is a sustained process of political and spiritual legitimation. The connecting thread that runs through the rich diversity of symbols and historical examples utilized within the identity is the theme that Paisleyism alone personifies authentic biblical Protestantism in Ulster. This thread links apparently disparate elements of Paisleyite identity into a coherent and seamless whole.

6.2.1 Persecuted righteousness The Ravenhill Road Martyrs' Memorial Free Presbyterian Church was opened in October 1969 and remains the religious headquarters of the denomination. The name is significant. Within its hallways busts of heroes of the Reformation line the walls. The symbolism is explicit. Paisley locates himself within a historic framework of a persecuted faithful minority, fearlessly proclaiming the true Gospel regardless of personal cost. It is in this context of a threatened elect battling to maintain the truth that Paisleyism must be understood. In a penetrating study, Mac Iver notes how a Reformation figure like John Knox has served as an ideal model on which

514

A provocative title for Paisleyism, but arguably an accurate one, would be Sinn Féin evangelicalism.

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Paisley has built his career.515 Not only is Knox a Reformer from whom Ulster Presbyterians can trace their historic roots, his heroic attacks on popery within a period of fierce Catholic–Protestant antagonism act as a source of inspiration: ‘John Knox was a man of God wasn't he? When I read about him my blood warms in my veins and fire seizes my soul…He had a conflict with Rome and he conquered it by a “no compromise attitude”. May the Lord help us in this day to have no compromise with the minions of the Roman Antichrist.’516 Just as ‘John Knox was God's man for his country, his day and his generation’ the need in contemporary Ulster is for ‘men of Knox's spirit and power today’.517 Paisley is that chosen man, the one called to assume Knox's mantle, just as the latter had done from the biblical heroes. His task is to be faithful to Knox's example: ‘Let us learn the lesson that every true Christian will be a patriot, loving his country and willing to sacrifice himself that righteousness might flourish in the land.’518 Paisley's sense of personal calling as a persecuted prophet has been graphically demonstrated in his preaching. Using Acts 27 more as a source for dramatic images than as a text to be exegeted,519 he associates the fate of Ulster with the doomed ship carrying Paul to Rome. The reason for the impending disaster was that the warning of the man of God (Paul) was rejected. Similarly, Ulster is on ‘a disaster course’ since the voices of the men God had raised up to warn of Ulster's peril were ignored. ‘I say it with great humility, but I say it with defiance and honesty that I was one of those men.’ The people of Ulster ‘should have

515

M. A. Mac Iver, ‘Ian Paisley and the Reformed Tradition’, Irish Political Studies, 35 (1987), 359–78. When asked who were his heroes, Paisley replied, ‘In terms of the faith, John Knox would be a character I esteem highly.’ ‘Mr Protestant’, Interview in Third Way, 19/9 (Nov. 1996), 13–17.

516

I. R. K. Paisley, ‘John Knox: His Conflicts and Conquests’, Revivalist, Special Knox Issue (Dec. 1972. The Revivalist has been the official organ of the Free Presbyterian Church since 1951.

517

I. R. K. Paisley, Three Great Reformers (Belfast: Puritan Printing Company, 1968, 46–7.

518

Ibid. 44 (emphasis mine).

519

For an analysis of Paisley's use of the Bible see R. M. M. Creighton, ‘ “For God and Ulster”: An Examination of Protestant Use of the Bible in Response to Political Violence in Northern Ireland’, unpublished MA thesis (London Bible College, 1989.


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listened to me’; instead O'Neill's ‘voice of folly’ was obeyed. Paisley represents himself and his flock as a lone, loyal, spiritual voice pitted against a ‘conspiracy of such viciousness and vileness that God alone knows how we will extricate ourselves from its imprisonment’.520 Paisley's two spells of incarceration in the late 1960s served as dramatic visual verification of his claims of succession to the Reformation and biblical martyrs. They also coincided with the period of major growth of his denomination. While in prison he interpreted his experience as analogous to Paul in suffering for the Gospel, quoting 2 Timothy 1: 8.521 On hearing of O'Neill's resignation while in his prison cell he wrote to his congregation that ‘We have had a long and bitter struggle. As a people we have suffered. As your minister I have been maligned and persecuted, and you have all shared the maligning and persecuting. We have been in the depths together. Every effort has been made to smash the testimony of the Church and the credibility of me, the minister of the church. THEY HAVE FAILED, FOR GOD WAS OUR HELPER.’522 Using such language Paisley was able to associate himself and his denomination with the emotive image of the persecuted righteous minority, whom God will vindicate. Having little political power, their victory was due to God alone: ‘We are just a lot of nobodies, and the enemy thought he could trample us out, BUT GOD DELIVERED US.’523 It is evident that for Paisley there is an unbroken continuity between the experiences of the modern defenders of Ulster and the sixteenth-century Reformation heroes. They share the same task, resistance against the enemies of the Lord, and the same hope in his sovereign power to vindicate his people. In preaching Paisley has remarked, ‘They said to Luther “the world's against you” and so it was. And the world is against us. But God

520

I. R. K. Paisley, The Dagger of Treachery Strikes at the Heart of Ulster. An address given at Martyrs' Free Memorial (n.p. : n.p., 1972.

521

I. R. K. Paisley, in the Foreword of Messages from the Prison Cell (n.p.: n.p., 1969. The text reads, ‘Be thou therefore not ashamed of the testimony of our Lord, nor of me his prisoner: but be thou partaker of the afflictions of the gospel according to the power of God.’ (AV).

522

Ibid. 21 (emphasis original).

523


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still lives and answers prayer.’524 A graphic example of this view is his interpretation of the hostile reaction to his vocal protests within the European Parliament in Strasbourg in October 1988 during a visit by the Pope: I have read in the Book of Revelation the power of the word of testimony, but I had never realized what power was in a martyr's testimony…that vast assembly erupted, and the books started to fly and the punches started to be thrown, and the kicking started, but I held my ground and maintained my testimony. There is no difference between Europe today and Europe in Reformation times. This afternoon I read again the story of Luther at the Diet of Worms. Who presided over the Diet of Worms? The Emperor Charles, head of the Holy Roman Empire. Who was he? He was a Hapsburg. It is interesting to note that one of the men who attacked me is the last of the Hapsburgs—Otto Hapsburg…I said to myself, ‘The Hapsburgs are still lusting after Protestant blood. They are still the same as they were in the days of Luther.’ 525 It is this interweaving of a wide range of complex themes into a single, emotive, and noble tale that constitutes one of the key components of Paisleyite identity. The historical story does not stop at the Reformation. Since the Reformers' bravery was simply an outworking of their obedience to the example of Jesus, Paisley's willingness to imitate the martyrs places him in direct succession to Christ. Paisley's ‘testimony’ in Strasbourg consciously reiterated Thomas Cranmer's defiant statement, ‘I refuse you as Christ's enemy and Antichrist.’ Preaching about the incident later, the hostile reaction that followed was interpreted as proof that ‘the blood of the martyrs is still to be shed. The full martyr roll is not made up yet. That's the task that's before us.’526 Similarly, replying to a letter of criticism from Archbishop elect, Dr Alan Buchanan, in October 1969 he

524

I. R. K. Paisley, United Ireland—Never!: An Address by Ian R. K. Paisley, sermon preached at Martyrs' Memorial Free Presbyterian Church, 6 Feb. 1972 (Belfast: Puritan Printing Co., 1972.

525

D. W. Cloud, ‘Dr. Paisley's Stand for the Old Bible’, FPCU Website at www.freepres.org (May 1998).

526

I. R. K. Paisley, ‘The Conspiracy Behind The European Union: The Task Before Us’, lecture delivered at the Annual Autumn Conference of the United Protestant Council in London on 7 Nov. 1998. See EIPS Website at www.ianpaisley.org.


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wrote, ‘your accusations against me are similar to those brought against the prophets, the Lord Jesus himself, the Reformers and the martyrs…I am happy to be in such company.’527 In response to Buchanan's question as to whom he was loyal, Paisley continued, ‘I am loyal to Jesus Christ…I am loyal to the Bible…I am loyal to the great Protestant Reformation…I am loyal to the Queen and the throne of Britain, being Protestant in the terms of the Revolution Settlement…I am loyal to Ulster—the Ulster of our founding fathers.’528 By such rhetoric Paisley establishes that hostility to him is equivalent, not only to hostility to Christ, but also to biblical truth, the values of the Reformation, and Ulster's place within the United Kingdom. The power of the ideology lies not only in its connection of contemporary political events with dramatic spiritual battles, but in its fusion of traditional Ulster siege mythology with Paisley's own destiny and actions. He has personalized the Ulster unionist myth of the persecuted faithful. In a sense, his whole politico-religious career has been a conscious re-enactment of the past. The continuing existence of Paisleyism is interpreted as a sign of God's preservation of his servant: ‘I should have been wiped out politically years ago—the press has attacked me, everybody has attacked me, but I've survived and I will survive, because the grace of God will preserve me.’529 In addition it should be recalled that, particularly in the early years, both the political and religious facets of Paisleyism remained minority movements, often reviled within unionism.530 The call to the faithful remnant corresponded with numerical and relational reality and so reinforced the original premise. Having described the militantly defensive outlook of Paisleyism, expressed in the language of spiritual conflict, it is time to look at how that identity has interacted with rival forms of Ulster Protestantism.

527

Belfast Telegraph (10 Oct. 1969).

528

Ibid.

529

‘Mr. Protestant’, Third Way, 17.

530

In 1966 in reaction to Paisley's rising notoriety, O'Neill described Paisleyism as ‘horribly familiar’ to fascism. Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, 132.

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6.2.2 Separation from enemies Writing in 1969 on Psalm 35: 26–8, where David implores the Lord to defeat his enemies, Paisley applies the psalmist's words to his own opponents within unionism: ‘They joined together. They acted in unison. They combined in their opposition. We can see that wicked confederacy all about us. A corrupted legislature, a corrupted judiciary, a corrupted Church, a corrupted Press, all combine against humble believers in Christ. They hate us without cause…how these enemies have exalted themselves in order to crush the people of God.’531 The scene pictures the faithful remnant surrounded by a formidable array of hostile forces without even a mention of their deadliest foe, the Church of Rome. Paisleyism is renowned for the extravagant imagery of its anti-Catholicism, but note should be taken that such hyperbole can obscure the fact that such antipathy extends to practically every other expression of Ulster Protestantism. The title of the denomination was carefully chosen; ‘the Free in our name refers to our total disassociation from the major Presbyterian denominations of the world, which have largely repudiated the historic Christian faith’.532 The reason for this ‘ourselves alone’ stance lies in Paisley's fundamentalist doctrine of separation which in turn is based on his understanding of Church history. This is viewed as a recurrent battle for Gospel truth between the forces of apostasy and reformation. The sixteenth-century Reformers are taken as models of those who successfully identified and withdrew from apostate faith. Reformation history assumes an authority similar to that of Scripture; what was achieved in the past must be adhered to in the future.533 Modern political events must therefore be analysed in order to identify the re-emergence of the ever-present forces arrayed against the Church. Given the reality of this continuous threat it is therefore a vital obligation of the True Church to identify and interpret the signs

531

Paisley, Messages, 22–3.

532

‘Why “Free Presbyterian”?’, FPCU Website.

533

A good illustration of this is seen in Paisley's attitude to the Westminster Confession of Faith. He defends the Confession, not as merely an interpretation of Scripture, but ‘more an identification of Scripture being fulfilled, like John the Baptist and Jesus made such identifications’. New Protestant Telegraph (8 July 1989).


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of the times, which are taken as fulfilments of biblical prediction534 within an urgent eschatological framework.535 Once the forces of apostasy have been recognized the task of contemporary Christians, as in the past, is to preserve their faith from all forms of contamination. This is where Paisley's self-designation as ‘God's man’ for Ulster becomes significant. He has been shown how to interpret current events and warn his followers of their real enemies. Since contamination with the enemy is spread by contact, those who associate with apostates, or even fail to condemn error, become themselves guilty of denying the Gospel of truth.536 It is within this framework that Paisleyism's attitude to the rest of Ulster Protestantism can be understood. John Wylie537 rejected the legitimacy of the evangelistic efforts of both the Methodist and Presbyterian mission bodies as spurious since both Churches were, at that time, members of the World Council of Churches (WCC).538 He continued, ‘this brings into one filthy cage all the unclean birds of Christendom; the unbloody Unitarians; the unholy Presbyterians; the in and out Methodists; and the down and out Baptists; and all have their hands stretched out to the mother of harlots, Rome.’ The concept of being tainted by the sin of association is not unique, indeed it is a defining

534

Again, using the Westminster Confession as an illustration, Paisley argues that, just as Jesus and John the Baptist fulfilled biblical prophecy, ‘a very great deal depends, for the true church of Christ, on our correctly distinguishing and identifying the Antichrist of Scripture’. New Protestant Telegraph (8 July 1989).

535

For a useful discussion of Paisleyism's eschatology see Bruce, God Save Ulster!, 226–31.

536

Paisley resigned from the Shankill Road Lodge in 1970 due to the failure of the County Grand Lodge to expel one of its members for attending a Roman Catholic funeral ceremony. He is a member of the Independent Orange Order, a body critical of the Grand Lodge's association with the Ulster Unionist Party.

537

John Wylie (d. 1991): brought up within Irish Presbyterianism, converted at nineteen; disillusioned with liberalism within the denomination; helped found the Free Presbyterian Church in 1951; ordained minister of Cabra Free Presbyterian Church, Oct. 1951; appeared in court twice with Paisley during 1957 for disorderly conduct; jailed with Paisley and Ivan Foster on 20 July 1966 for public order offences while protesting outside the Presbyterian General Assembly.

538

Revivalist (Feb. 1957).

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characteristic of fundamentalism.539 The Free Presbyterian leader's doctrine of separation resonates powerfully with policies taught at Bob Jones University and other fundamentalist institutions. Other fundamentalists would endorse Paisley's verdict on an annual Ulster Evangelical-Catholic conference: There is no place for dialogue with Rome. There is every place for disputation, dispute, argument, and controversy…When Satan rebelled, God did not call him to the dialogue table: He cast him out of Heaven. The Bible says that we are to resist all the children of the Devil who preach the doctrines of the Devil; it does not say that we are to recognize them or to have dialogue with them. The Scripture injunction is: ‘And have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them’ (Eph. 5: 11). These evangelicals are not reproving but actually approving the Roman Catholics with whom they are entering into dialogue, and they are thus approving the doctrines of the Church of Rome. 540 Where Paisleyism becomes theologically innovative is in how it perceives a unified conspiracy against the faithful in Ulster, instigated by the Devil, that embraces a diverse alliance of foes, under the instigation of the Church of Rome, including the British and Irish governments,541 Protestant apostasy, the media,542 the American administration, Irish nationalism,543 the

539

See the discussion of the negative characteristics of fundamentalism, of which Paisleyism is an example, in Packer, ‘Fundamentalism’, 32.

540

I. R. K. Paisley, ‘Belfast Churches Join the Rome Express’, EIPS Website (10 Dec. 1998). The conference in question was the 12th Evangelical-Roman Catholic Conference, a series that emerged from the ERCDOM Report (Evangelical / Roman Catholic Dialogue on Mission 1977–84).

541

Dublin is guilty of ‘sectarian bigotry’ in presiding over the drop of the Protestant population of the Republic from 10% to 2% as well as in its support of terrorism and its strategic alliances with other Catholic countries. New Protestant Telegraph (17 Dec. 1988). Elsewhere, Paisley accuses the Roman Catholic Irish State as practising ‘kid-gloved genocide’ (sic! ) in order ‘to totally obliterate the Protestant population’, The Ulster Problem Spring 1972: A Discussion of the True Situation in Northern Ireland (Greenville: Bob Jones University Press, 1972, 5.

542

The media, including the Belfast Telegraph, ‘use their power to blatantly try to make and break candidates by blowing smoke and hoping the public will conclude there must be fire’. New Protestant Telegraph (17 Dec. 1988).

543

Sammy Wilson, a leading figure in the DUP, illustrates the conspiracy consciousness that results from attributing collective guilt to one's political opponents: ‘The IRA, Sinn Féin, those thousands who vote for Sinn Féin and those churchmen who repeat the words of the IRA, can only be treated as one large enemy.’ New Protestant Telegraph (14 Jan. 1989).


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European Community,544 the ecumenical movement, Irish republicanism, the RUC,545 the Fair Employment Agency,546 the godless Protestant paramilitaries,547 all periodically aided by the weakness of the Ulster Unionist Party.548 In this scenario their common objective is to destroy Ulster as a beacon of evangelicalism: ‘you are not going to be put into a united Ireland overnight you know…they will sell us piecemeal, a little here and a little there. A little appeasement here. A little appeasement there. Little by little they will seek to undermine and sap the very foundation of our Ulster and Protestant heritage.’549 The battle for the faith is also a battle for Ulster and vice versa. The calling for adherents of Paisleyism is to remain pure by maintaining separation from the world. A good example of how the faithful would themselves become guilty if they entered into dialogue with the enemy is the warning that ‘no accommodation can be reached with armed murderers without

544

The EEC posed a grave threat to result in the ‘destruction of Britain's natural sovereignty’ and thus had grave implications for the place of Ulster within the UK. New Protestant Telegraph (3 Dec. 1987).

545

When Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir Jack Hermon did ‘a grave disservice to the Province’ in using the force to bolster ‘the act of treachery’ of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. New Protestant Telegraph (22 Oct. 1988).

546

The FEA is regularly accused of being a tool of discrimination against Protestants. An editorial in the New Protestant Telegraph (11 Feb. 1989) describes it as ‘another enemy’ to be resisted.

547

Paisley has had an ambiguous relationship with Protestant paramilitary groups. At times cooperating with them in street demonstrations and civil disobedience and at times seeing them as one more enemy of true Protestantism, ‘the Loyalist paramilitaries look on me as their worst enemy…they curse my religion, curse my Bible, curse all I stand for’. ‘Mr Protestant’, Third Way, 14–17.

548

Paisleyism has enjoyed an unstable relationship with the Ulster Unionist Party since its early clashes with O'Neill and the unionist establishment. Periodic alliances have usually faltered on the DUP leader's claim to represent the true interests of unionism. A regular theme within the New Protestant Telegraph is the dangerous ineffectiveness of the UUP leadership. An example is an attack on ‘the weak and indecisive tactics of the UUP’ under David Trimble. New Protestant Telegraph (Nov. 1996). Paisley once referred to James Molyneaux as a ‘Pontius Pilate’; an interesting remark revealing how biblical imagery is seamlessly applied to contemporary politics.

549

Paisley, Dagger, 11.

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becoming co-guilty with their crimes’.550 The degree of self-imposed isolation can be gauged by the denunciation of even a staunch unionist like Robert McCartney as hopelessly compromised even while writing in defence of the Union. His crime was to make his case at the invitation of a publisher ‘associated with Roman Catholics and Nationalists’.551

6.2.3 Doctrinal purity: Paisleyism, the Orange Order, and the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. 6.2.3.1 The Orange Order A consequence of Paisley's strict separatism is that those outside the borders of Paisleyism are, quite simply, apostate; ‘the whole ecclesiastical setup of Protestantism has become corrupted, has become deProtestantised, has become apostate’.552 Unfaithful Protestants belong with heretical Catholics and secular political powers in one interconnected group of spiritual forces opposed to the ‘gospel standard’ exemplified in Paisleyism. By such a stance not only are the mainline denominations representing the vast bulk of the Ulster Protestant population dismissed, but also the Orange Order which draws its membership predominantly from that population. It is worth noting how many ideological similarities Paisleyism shares with the Order. In common with Orangeism it interprets history as a repetitive struggle between good (libertarian Protestantism) and evil (tyrannical Romanism); uses traditional Ulster Protestant historic-myth material;553 sees Ulster as the last bastion of evangelicalism in Europe;554 opposes the ecumenical movement as a menacing threat to Gospel truth;555 sees

550

New Protestant Telegraph (Jan. 1995) (emphasis mine).

551

New Protestant Telegraph (14 Jan. 1989) (emphasis mine). See R. McCartney, Liberty and Authority in Ireland (Derry: Derry Field Day Pamphlet, 1985. Political developments during the late 1990s saw a rapprochement between McCartney's United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) and the DUP.

552

Revivalist (Sept. 1983) as cited by Cooke, Persecuting Zeal, 69.

553

For example see the New Protestant Telegraph (8 July 1989) celebrating the three hundredth anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne.

554

This is a favourite phrase of Paisley, occurring often in newspapers when under his editorial control such as the Revivalist and the New Protestant Telegraph.

555

Clergy sympathetic to the ecumenical cause are ‘tainted with Rome's bitter hatred’, New Protestant Telegraph (3 Dec. 1988). Ecumenical dialogue is a pathetic watered-down version of Christianity that encourages you ‘to “love your enemy” so that he can murder you at home’. New Protestant Telegraph (17 Dec. 1988).


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Ulster's most dangerous enemy as the Church of Rome;556 rejects the principle of power-sharing in Northern Ireland;557 denounces the weakness of much Protestantism that fails to live up to Reformation principles;558 and profoundly distrusts the intentions of the British government.559 Yet despite these real affinities in ideology and policy the two identities have little structural interaction.560 The reason is that whereas Orange identity is inclusively vague in its inference that the Protestants of Ulster are ‘God's people’, is proud of its interdenominational structure, and displays little enthusiasm for doctrinal debate, Paisleyism exhibits no such lack of clarity. The emerging Free Presbyterian Church set out to distinguish itself from a compromised Orangeism. The failure of clerics within the Orange Order to condemn the

556

See the discussion on political purity below.

557

Paisley rejected the notion of power-sharing at Sunningdale in 1973 since both the SDLP and republicans were together in a ‘disloyal camp’, Belfast Newsletter (12 Nov. 1973). Later Paisley argued that the agreement signalled ‘a death knell’ to the preservation of Ulster's Protestant heritage, Irish Times (6 Feb. 1974). More recently the 1995 Frameworks for the Future document aimed at a new form of political accommodation was described as setting out ‘the parameters of the cage in which Unionists are to be corralled’. New Protestant Telegraph (Mar. 1995). The DUP unambiguously rejected the power-sharing arrangements of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement as a fundamental weakening of the Union. See ‘10 Steps on the Road to Dublin’, DUP Website at www.dup.org.uk (14 May 1998).

558

Discussing the Westminster Confession of Faith's description of the Pope as the Antichrist, Paisley argues the ‘True Church of Christ’ will be able correctly to distinguish the Antichrist of Scripture as Rome. ‘Those nowadays, even among evangelicals, who challenge this assertion regarding the Papacy’ are by implication outside the True Church. New Protestant Telegraph (8 July 1989).

559

Successive British prime ministers have been castigated for their failure to act in the best interests of Ulster Protestantism. Margaret Thatcher had ‘blood on her skirts’ for pushing through the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the face of unionist opposition. Westminster is ‘full of devious politicians’, where ‘every move is being made to destroy Northern Ireland’. New Protestant Telegraph (3 Dec. 1988).

560

Bruce recorded that of forty-four Free Presbyterian ministers, only one was a member of the Orange Order, none of the Black Preceptory, and ten of the Apprentice Boys of Derry. Bruce, God Save Ulster!, 152.

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WCC constituted a ‘treacherous betrayal of Protestantism by the leading Protestant clergy of our Province in their union with the WCC’.561 Wylie hoped that there would be ‘genuine Protestant representation’ within the leadership of the Grand Orange Lodge but was not surprised that apostate Presbyterians and Baptists within the Order were in favour of retaining links with the WCC.562 Although the Orange Order did eventually publicly oppose the WCC,563 Paisleyism had successfully highlighted the ambiguity at the core of Orangeism. While officially professing adherence to evangelical Protestantism, in reality, and despite the arguments of some evangelicals within it, Orangeism represents a form of ethnic Protestantism largely paying lip-service to evangelical ideals. Paisley, in contrast, combines a serious commitment to those ideals with an absolute allegiance to the goals of political Protestantism. Consequently, within the historic experience of Ulster evangelicalism he has the ability to claim a moral ascendancy over those who have obeyed the voice of God with lesser determination. Thus while the Orange Order and Paisleyism have much in common, a vital ideological difference separates them. Paisleyism explicitly denies that the Protestants of Ulster are in some general sense God's people. The faithful are a very much more select group than that. If all mainstream Protestantism is apostate, implicitly it seems that Paisley's ‘chosen people’ are virtually synonymous with the members of his Free Presbyterian Church. During the 1960s Paisleyism was also critical of the Orange Order for other reasons. Given the new movement's doctrine of guilt by association, the Institution was discredited by its symbiotic relationship with the Unionist Party.564 The taint of

561

John Wylie, Revivalist (Feb. 1957).

562

The Free Presbyterian accusation that Irish Baptists were members of the WCC was without foundation. See for example, I. R. K. Paisley, The World Council of Churches (Belfast: Puritan Printing Co., n.d.). The Baptist Union of Ireland separated from the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland before the latter joined the WCC. I am grateful to John Birnie for this point.

563

On 12 July 1966, a resolution was eventually passed in response to Paisley's attacks, condemning the WCC as a body working towards ‘one united church’.

564

See Smyth, Ian Paisley, 59–60, for a discussion of negative DUP attitudes towards the Orange Order.


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cooperating with the ‘tyrant O'Neill’ and his policies promoting the ‘virus’ of ‘ecumenism, both ecclesiastical and political’,565 meant that the Order was irredeemably compromised with the ‘ruling junta of Lundies at Stormont’.566 As with the Unionist Party, Paisleyism has periodically cooperated with the Orange Order for reasons of mutual benefit,567 but its relationship with Orangeism remains fraught. While needing the support of grass-roots loyalism, it maintains its stance as the sole loyal voice of Protestant Ulster. Paisley's success at highlighting the equivocal nature of the Order's evangelicalism alongside its spiritual impurity was aided by two other important differences. The first is found in the organizational structure of the two identities. The imperious presence of Ian Paisley's personality towers over the two strands of Paisleyism, the Free Presbyterian Church and the DUP. Both reflect the unchallenged authority and ideology of their founder and leader. The esteem and honour in which he is held by many of his followers as ‘God's man’ for Ulster568 has meant that he has an unrivalled ability publicly to determine policy using his considerable oratorical skills in a manner relatively unrestrained by organizational hierarchies. As a result, the less-structured Paisleyism enjoys significant advantages over the highly institutionalized and bureaucratic Orange Order.569 The second difference is in the intensity of belief holding the identities together. Both the DUP and Free Presbyterian

565

Paisley, Messages, 21.

566

Speech made at the Ulster Hall, 18 July 1966 as cited by Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, 134. The ‘Lundy’ charge would be a recurring feature of Paisley's critique of successive unionist leaders. Paisley played a significant role in removing three prime ministers from office: O'Neill, Sir James Chichester-Clark, and Brian Faulkner.

567

The 1974 UWC strike is the most obvious example of the power of Protestant unity when grass-roots loyalism, Paisley, some elements of official unionism, and the paramilitary UDA combined forces to destroy the Sunningdale Agreement. In contrast, Paisley's attempt in 1977 to repeat the 1974 strike without the support of Orangeism ended in ignominious failure. See Bruce, God Save Ulster, 114–16 and Smyth, Ian Paisley, 110–13.

568

Taylor, ‘Ian Paisley’, 64.

569

Both elements of Paisleyism are now well organized, although in the early years the DUP had virtually no structure whatsoever. However, this does not detract from the continuing power of Ian Paisley as embodying the beliefs of both Church and party.

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Church emerged out of Paisley's total confidence in his cause and his willingness to suffer for his beliefs. He recognized that the key to winning support from established unionism was in the depth of commitment shown to the task of defending Ulster, ‘the struggle will be won in the hearts of the loyal people of Northern Ireland, we can win this battle by dedication to our cause’.570 Historically the Orange Order, within mainstream unionism, had successfully expressed Ulster Protestant identity. Yet, as the ‘golden era’ collapsed along with old certainties, Paisleyism represented unequivocal truth, substantiated by the apparent fulfilment of its leader's doom-laden prophecies. In contrast, the Orange Order was associated with the stagnation of fifty years of unchallenged unionism. Paisleyism offered an alternative vision, attractive for many due to its immediacy, apparent political relevance, deep conviction, and a willingness to act on those convictions. Ian Paisley's life can be described as a living model of protest, particularly exemplified in street demonstrations as theatres of confrontation where the drama of the faithful encountering their enemies could be played out. Thus, while Paisleyism and Orangeism share the same historical myths—the special place of Ulster in the sovereignty of God, Reformation heroes, Derry and the Glorious Revolution, the Boyne, 1912, the heroism of Sir Edward Carson, and the Somme—Paisley has attempted to expropriate each one for himself by interpreting his own life as a modern replay of past heroes.571

570

Belfast Newsletter (12 Nov. 1973).

571

This is particularly true of the greatest modern hero of unionism, Sir Edward Carson. Throughout his career Paisley has been conscious of the advantage of political legitimation. O'Neill failed to convince unionists that ‘no one anywhere [should] make the mistake of thinking that because there is talk of a new Ulster that the Ulster of Carson and Craig is dead’. Ulster at the Crossroads (London: Faber and Faber, 1969, 50–1 as cited by Jackson, ‘Unionist Myths’, 169. Paisley's actions were more persuasive: for example erecting a statue of Carson outside his Martyrs' Memorial church and organizing protest campaigns in 1980 and 1985 that culminated in rallies at the Carson monument in front of Stormont. The Carson Trail campaign of 1981 was designed to mirror the eleven rallies across the Province that Carson held prior to the Covenant Day of 1912.


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6.2.3.2 The Presbyterian Church in Ireland Ian Paisley's consummate passion for doctrinal purity has profoundly shaped relations between Paisleyism and the Presbyterian Church of Ireland. The origins of the Free Presbyterian Church lie in a schism within the Lissara Presbyterian congregation of Crossgar. A breakaway group, unhappy with rulings of the Down presbytery, began meeting in Lissara Mission Hall and constituted themselves as ‘The Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster’. Paisley, who had been involved in the controversy, was eventually asked to lead the fledgling denomination. The opposition to the conservatives in Crossgar was perceived as a symptom of the grip of liberalism upon the Church hierarchy. One participant described it thus: ‘men and women who know and love the Lord had become thoroughly sick of pride and pretence, hypocrisy and humbug, sermons and ceremony and had decided like all the Reformers, to throw from around their shoulders a dead and defunct formalism and to rise to a new era of life and blessing’.572 Paisley later protested against ‘the dictatorial, anti-evangelical, and anti-evangelistic attitude of the Presbytery of Down’.573 The result was that, ‘from March 1951, Paisley was committed to active competition with the Irish Presbyterian Church’.574 It was from this period that Paisley, who had occasionally been ministering within Irish Presbyterianism, began propounding the highly dramatic tale of the fall of the Presbyterian Church into apostasy.575 The account, appearing within a series of articles first published in the Revivalist in 1955 and reprinted in

572

G. K. Gibson, ‘The Birth of Free Presbyterianism in Crossgar’, Revivalist (Mar. 1956).

573

Revivalist (May 1967).

574


575

Ian Paisley was familiar with secessionist religion from an early age. His father, Kyle Paisley, a Baptist pastor, had resigned from the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland over his perceptions of apostasy and compromise within the Union and formed the independent evangelical Waveney Road Tabernacle in Ballymena. His son, after completing his studies at the Reformed Presbyterian College in Belfast from 1943 to 1945, was called to minister at the Ravenhill Evangelical Mission Hall, itself a result of a schism within the Ravenhill Presbyterian Church in 1935. For an excellent account of Paisley's early years, see Bruce, God Save Ulster!, 27–39.

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1967–8,576 recounts how a once great Church succumbed to decline, error, and heresy. It is a ‘sad story of the Irish Presbyterian Church's apostasy. A story of betrayal after betrayal and a selling out to “another gospel”, evacuated of all the essential truths of Evangelical Christianity.’577 Ian Paisley legitimizes his own stance against Irish Presbyterianism by interpreting Church history as a repetitive battle to guard the apostolic Gospel. The cycle of apostasy and reformation had begun in the sixteenth century and had continued to be played out in Ulster. Conflict between subscribers and non-subscribers to the Westminster Confession in the eighteenth century was in effect a battle between orthodoxy and unorthodoxy.578 Henry Cooke's vigorous campaign against ‘New Light’ Presbyterianism during the Arian controversies of the nineteenth century was a second noble struggle to defeat liberalism within the Church, a victory greatly blessed by God with the sending of the 1859 Revival.579 After the death of Cooke, heresy infiltrated the Church. The Davey trial580 of 1927 is interpreted as a ‘decisive moment’ in the fall of the PCI. The Church's ‘whitewashing’ of Davey (‘the Devil's plant’) and subsequent lack of repentance

576

‘The Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster: The Inside Story’, Revivalist (1967–8). See also ‘The Apostasy of the Irish Presbyterian Church’, Revivalist (May / June 1967. Numerous other articles over the years attacked the legitimacy and credibility of the PCI. For example see, ‘The Falsehoods of Six Irish Presbyterian Ministers Exposed’, Revivalist (Dec. 1978).

577

Revivalist (June 1955).

578

For a detailed account of the controversy see Finlay Holmes, Our Irish Presbyterian Heritage (Belfast: Publications Committee of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1985, 61–8.

579

Revivalist (June 1967). The hope that God will send another revival to accompany the Free Presbyterians' battle for the truth is a regular theme of Paisley's preaching, ‘I believe this Province has got to remain totally and absolutely separate … I am a separatist right along the line … I will tell you that the solution to this problem [Northern Ireland] is for God's people to get back to God and get upon their knees and pray down upon this land a mighty old fashioned heaven-sent, sky blue, devil-defeating, popery wrecking revival.’ I. R. K. Paisley, The Man Who Kissed the Door of Heaven But Went to Hell and Other Sermons by I. R. K. Paisley (Belfast: Puritan Printing Co., 1975, 16–17.

580

J. E. Davey, then professor of biblical criticism at the Presbyterian College was formally charged with heresy for propounding ‘modernist’ views that denied the essential truths of the Christian faith. He was acquitted at his trial in 1927. For his accusers, the college had become ‘a seedbed of rationalism’. See Holmes, Presbyterian Heritage, 153–5.


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for his acquittal illustrated the hold that false teaching had gained and continues to exert within the denomination.581 The subsequent secession of a group of Presbyterian ministers to form ‘The Irish Evangelical Church’582 became an ideal model for Paisley to follow some twenty-four years later. The issues were identical, the response the only legitimate one for those committed to fundamentalist faith—separation.583 The formation of the FPCU claims to stand in direct historical succession to the previous schisms within Irish Presbyterianism. The conclusion is obvious; the whole purpose of the tale is to prepare the ground for the claim that only the FPCU represents the orthodox faith of, not only historic Presbyterianism, but also all of Ulster evangelicalism. Those who fail to recognize this truth are in deadly peril, ‘the people who are subjected to the leadership and influence of disobedient servants of God and false prophets…and who willingly yield to such, are hastening disaster and judgement’.584 Paisley expanded on this theme in a booklet. The PCI's membership of the WCC was evidence that ‘ecumenists are now in charge of Irish Presbyterianism’. Those who exhorted members to remain (such as Revd Warren Porter, Presbyterian minister and prominent Orangeman) were advising ‘spiritual suicide’ because the WCC was ‘doctrinally unbiblical’, ‘basically unprotestant’, ‘ecclesiastically unclean’, ‘practically unChristian’ and ‘spiritually untrustworthy’. The only option for a ‘true and faithful believer’ was to reject ‘the apostles and

581

Dr John Douglas, clerk of presbytery and principal of the FPCU's Whitefield College. Interview with author, 5 June 2000.

582

For an account, from one of the participants, of the formation of the new denomination, later the Evangelical Presbyterian Church, see W.J. Grier, The Origin and Witness of the Irish Evangelical Church (Belfast: Evangelical Bookshop, 1945.

583

‘ “There must be no communion on the part of God's servants with impugners of fundamentals. It was imperatively necessary…to break off from all church fellowship, from all intimate fellowship”…This is the uniform teaching of Scripture and the seceders of 1927 felt it their bounden duty to yield obedience to it.’ Grier, Origin, 51.

584

I. Foster, ‘Birds of a Feather’, Burning Bush: A Protestant Witness in a Day of Apostasy (Mar. 1997. The Burning Bush is the monthly paper of Lisbellaw Free Presbyterian Church, edited by Revd Ivan Foster, a senior figure within Free Presbyterianism.

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disciples of apostasy’.585 For Douglas, the PCI's subsequent withdrawal from the WCC was mere #x2018;windowdressing’. If the PCI is ever to reclaim its orthodox heritage it will require repentance from past apostasy, a genuine change of doctrine and a reaffirmation of the Westminster Confession's judgement of the Pope as Antichrist.586 The particular vehemence of the attacks on Irish Presbyterianism, itself only one apostate body among many within Protestantism, is best understood as an indication of the ideological need within Paisleyism to undermine the legitimacy of the largest Protestant denomination in Ulster. The theological content of Paisley's preaching, while often containing a straightforward Gospel appeal, is suffused with images and illustrations that will contain most meaning for those familiar with the religious world of Ulster Presbyterianism. Paisley's rhetoric is designed to replicate the Crossgar schism and draw new members predominantly from within the PCI.587 It is in this context of competition that the notorious picket outside the 1966 General Assembly and Paisleyism's subsequent unceasing criticism of the denomination can be interpreted.588 However, although the new movement nearly doubled its number of congregations from thirteen to twenty-five in the eighteen months after the 1966 jail sentence,589 it has failed to make a significant impact on Irish Presbyterianism. The larger denomination is numerically unthreatened by the smaller Church and seems to operate an unofficial policy of ignoring the accusations of its most vocal critic.590 After over forty years of

585

Paisley, World Council, 30.

586

Interview with author, 5 June 2000.

587

While a disproportionate number of other members were drawn from the smaller and more theologically conservative wings of evangelicalism, such as the Baptists and Reformed Presbyterians, some 46% of FP clergy are former Irish Presbyterians, a figure replicated for Church members. See Bruce, God Save Ulster!, 282–4.

588

On 6 June 1966, Paisley and a large group of supporters heckled the moderator and other leading figures in an intimidating fashion as they flanked both sides of the exit of the Assembly Hall. The events at that time were unprecedented and led to Paisley's first period of imprisonment.

589


590

Ian Paisley's name is rarely mentioned in official Church statements or publications. The Church has no official stance on Paisleyism and has not (and probably could not have) entered into inter-denominational dialogue with the Free Presbyterian Church.


193

anti-Presbyterian bombast it is unlikely that a new wave of recruits will defect from the ‘apostate church’. It appears that the very success of Ian Paisley in creating a highly dramatic account of Irish Presbyterianism's spiritual bankruptcy has meant that the vast majority of Presbyterians view him with considerable suspicion. The call to separation has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

6.2.4 Political purity: saving Ulster from corruption A fourth distinct emphasis of Paisleyite identity is found in its understanding of political theory. Mac Iver has shown that Reformation thought about the nation as a community to be modelled on the Old Testament notion of socialpolitical covenant has particular resonance for Paisley, since God is understood as continuing to deal with modern nations as he did with those of the Ancient Near East.591 The special place of Ulster within the sovereign work of God is due to its calling to be a truly reformed nation, a type of Old Testament Israel.592 Consistent with his doctrine of separation, Paisley does not countenance the idea that there is such a thing as a Christian nation; however God can have vital plans for the nation blessed with a faithful minority within its borders: ‘God has shown me that He has a remnant of people in Ulster. He has his own people here. A chosen people! An elect people! A redeemed people! A blood washed people! A saved people! A God fearing people! A separated people! His people!’593 The awful reality of Ulster's perilous position is only ameliorated by trust in the sovereign plans God has for Ulster through his elect people: ‘this little province has had the peculiar

591

Mac Iver, ‘Ian Paisley’, 368. She convincingly argues that Paisley follows Knox's view of political theory.

592

Brewer and Higgins argue for Paisleyism as representing a ‘covenantal’ form of anti-Catholicism, a system of beliefs dependent on the notion that contemporary Ulster Protestant experience is parallel with that of Old Testament Israel. For further discussion see Anti-Catholicism, 135–51.

593

Paisley, Dagger, 13. At the end of the sermon Paisley speculates as to how God will save Ulster. Prefacing his remarks with his opposition to law-breaking, he concludes that the UDA, ‘I believe have a vital part to play at this time. I pray for them that they will be able to take the right step … God can use them. I believe it … I know God is going to deliver.’ Writing in 1972, his prophecy was soon to be fulfilled when the UDA's support of the 1974 UWC strike enabled it to succeed.

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preservation of Divine Providence…God has a purpose for this province, and this plant of Protestantism sown here in the north-eastern part of this island. The enemy has tried to root it out, but it still grows today, and I believe, like a grain of mustard seed, its future is going to be mightier yet. God Who made her mighty will make her mightier still in His Divine will.’594 The faithful remnant has the task of ensuring their nation lives up to its exalted calling. Paisley has regularly articulated his view that God's laws are equally applicable to the nation as to the individual: ‘The standards of God are the same for the Nations as for the individual. God demands righteousness of the individual and condemns his sin. God demands national righteousness and condemns national sin.’595 As the political arm of Paisleyism, the DUP has often been involved in controversy over its attempts to implement legislation based on Old Testament ethics at council level.596 The nation that repudiates God's laws will fall under divine judgement, ‘Isaiah's stern indictment of Israel can be applied to Britain today. The need of the hour is immediate restoration of a prophetic-type ministry in our land to expose the corruption and godlessness of the age and call a backsliding nation back to God.’597 The purpose of politics is to establish the values of the Kingdom of God in the secular realm: ‘The distinction between the two kingdoms must ever be maintained…membership of Christ's Kingdom comes first, but membership of that Kingdom enables the Christian to be so inspired by spiritual strength that he will labour with all his might in the earthly kingdom, so that the prayer which Christ taught his disciples to pray will be answered, “Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven”.’598 Paisley has developed a distinctive theological rationale for how the elect are to deal with civil authorities that do not share

594

I. R. K. Paisley, ‘A Prime Text for a Prime Minister’, sermon preached in Martyrs' Memorial, 15 Dec. 1985, as cited by Bruce, God Save Ulster!, 269–70.

595

Revivalist (May 1982).

596

The most publicized issue has been the debate about Sabbath day observance with DUP-controlled councils closing public sporting utilities on Sundays.

597

I. R. K. Paisley, ‘Ah Sinful Nation’, a sermon based on Isaiah 1: 4–6. Revivalist (Feb. 1957).

598

I. R. K. Paisley, New Protestant Telegraph (17 Dec. 1988).


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this view of political theory. Drawing on the Covenanters as inspiring examples and models of righteous resistance to ungodly rule, he contends that they supplemented the incomplete contribution of Reformers like Luther and Calvin on the issue of political obedience to the State.599 Romans 13 is interpreted, not as an entreaty to submit to all governments as ordained by God, but as a form of political contract. Obedience is conditional on the ruling powers fulfilling their God-appointed task of protecting the State against corruption. A legitimate ruler is one who ‘does right’ in the eyes of God. The people have no obligation to obey an unjust and unlawful ruler, indeed it is their duty to resist; pietistic compliance is not an option. Paisley reasons that resistance is not contrary to the Word of God. A distinction is held between the position ordained by God and individuals who temporarily hold that office yet abuse their God-given authority; ‘the ordination has to do with the office and not the character of the occupant of that office’.600 Such a person has lost the right to be obeyed as a representative of a God-ordained government. Discussing Romans 13: 1–5 he asserts that ‘it must be said at the outset that these verses do not apply to laws contrary to the law of God…For example…the office of father, the power of a father, is divinely ordained but the abuse of the office is not divinely ordained.’601 While not unique, the advantage of the theory is that it hinges on an ability to identify any misuse of Godgiven powers in contemporary politics. Since Paisley is perceived as ‘God's man’, he is able to interpret British accommodation as a betrayal of their divinely ordained duty to uphold Protestantism and resist Romanism.602 Margaret Thatcher, by

599

I. R. K. Paisley, The Crown Rights of Jesus Christ (Belfast: Martyrs' Memorial Productions, 1985. The struggle of the Covenanters to resist the claims of the Stuart kings, becomes an ideal model by which to interpret contemporary Ulster politics. Just as the claim of a ‘divine right’ monarch was an affront to Christian freedom, so is the notion that government has a ‘divine right’ to unquestioning obedience.

600

I. R. K. Paisley, An Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans: Prepared in the Prison Cell (London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1968, 173.

601

Ibid. 172–3.

602

Consistent with the Paisleyite concept of ‘guilt by association’, Romanism is understood as an inclusive alliance including Irish nationalism, republicanism, and the Roman Catholic Church. An example is Paisley's description of ‘the Roman Catholic IRA’.

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‘her disregard of democracy’603 in establishing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, had transgressed the boundaries of her proper authority. Resistance was the response demanded of those loyal to a State established under the sovereignty of God. If the British government ever attempted to implement a policy of a United Ireland, it would be betraying its trust and could expect to forfeit any hopes of loyal obedience from the citizens of Ulster; ‘If the whole constitutional position of our country is destroyed by an act of treachery by the British Government, the people have the inalienable right under God's law to resist that.’604 It is from this background of Paisleyism's self-appointed task of guarding the holiness of the nation that its radical attitude to the British constitution and the Roman Catholic Church is best interpreted. Just as the True Church is to be preserved against the taint of association with heresy, so the Protestant nation is to be protected against the defiling influence of Rome. Paisley lays great stress upon the 1689 Williamite Settlement and the 1701 Act of Settlement, documents that defined the Protestant nature of the Crown and constitution. Loyalty to the ‘Protestant nation’ is assessed by the level of determination to resist the insidious power of ever-present ‘Romanizing influences’ on the State: ‘it was on a no Popery platform that the maiden city was saved three hundred years ago. It was on a no Popery platform that the Glorious Revolution Settlement was erected and it was on a no Popery platform that these six counties were delivered in 1921 from the jackboot of Roman Catholic authoritarianism.’605 The vision of Derry as an innocent virgin in danger of being violated is a graphic image of the defiling touch of Roman Catholicism. As has been shown, Paisleyism's determination to resist Romanism is mirrored

603

New Protestant Telegraph (19 Nov. 1988).

604

‘Mr Protestant’, Third Way, 14. Elsewhere, Paisley has made clear that legitimate resistance includes the resort to force. Speaking to an Ulster Clubs Rally in June 1986 he said, ‘every man in Ulster, including every member of the RUC, is now to declare himself whether he is on the side of the lying, treachery, and betrayal of the agreement, or whether he stands ready to defend to the last drop of blood, his Ulster and British heritage’, as cited by Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, 398–9.

605

I. R. K. Paisley, New Protestant Telegraph (3 Dec. 1988).


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within Orangeism.606 However, Paisley goes beyond Orange convictions in the depth and complexity of his antiCatholicism. While Orangeism shares Paisleyism's concern about the religio-political threat of a ‘tyrannical Romanism’, the latter is unique in its depiction of the danger posed by Rome more in terms of a contagious sickness spreading to all those who come in contact with the source of infection rather than merely the worry that the beliefs and practices of Rome will be adopted by those meeting individual Catholics. ‘The attitude of Free Presbyterians and the Free Presbyterian Church to Roman Catholicism and Roman Catholics can be likened to a doctor's attitude to disease: the doctor loathes and fights the disease, but he has compassion and concern for the diseased.’607 Douglas uses a different but equally emotive image. The Catholic Church is likened to a ‘disreputable, dishonest, and deceitful suitor’ courting the bride of Christ. The courtship is one between the True Church and corrupt Antichrist. For the bride to maintain her purity she must avoid all dealings with priests and the false religion of Rome. It is impossible even to show good neighbourliness to the Catholic Church; ‘how can you be a good neighbour to antichrist?’608 As with its view of apostate Protestantism, Paisleyism's rigid doctrine of ‘guilt by association’ leads to the radical stance of total separation from error. Any official contact at all with the Church of Rome is laden with hidden dangers. This is best illustrated by examining Paisleyite understanding of the British constitution. Paisley asserts that any cordial dealings between the authorities of the State and those of the Catholic Church are in reality a violation of, and threat to, the constitution. Rome ‘is a system bent on world domination’609 that will always seek to destroy

606

An example is the response of both Ian Paisley and Martin Smyth to the visit of the Pope to Britain in 1982. The former organized protest rallies to coincide with each stage of the Pope's visit, interpreting the tour as a violation of the constitution, the latter argued that the Pope was visiting as head of an imperialist Vatican State and as such was ‘not welcome in this kingdom’. Orange Standard (Nov. 1981).

607

I. Foster, ‘Evangelism Not Ecumenism: Why Every Free Presbyterian Should Support the Evangelising of Roman Catholics’, Burning Bush Cassettes (Feb. 1989) as cited by Creighton, ‘For God and Ulster’, 22.

608


609

New Protestant Telegraph (Oct. 1985).

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the Protestant status of the British nation. Contemporary events confirm a replay of old strategies: ‘remember the tactics of Rome are unchanged. To-day she seeks to reconquer our nation by papalising our Royal House of Windsor. Prince Philip, a notable Sabbath desecrator, is but a hair's breadth from being a papist.’610 Paisley's regular articulation of concern over the religious faithfulness of royalty is connected to his view of the monarchy as the linchpin of British Protestant identity. The Queen is perceived as having a solemn obligation, to the nation and to God, to uphold her coronation oath ‘to maintain the Laws of God, the true Profession of the Gospel, and the Protestant Reformed Religion, established by Law’.611 Her primary task therefore, consistent with the outcome of the Glorious Revolution, is to encourage the opposition of Romanism as a national policy. Since ‘the Church of Rome has been continuing to assault each and every principle of the Revolution Settlement ever since’,612 the failure of the monarch,613 other members of the Royal family614 and her government615 to implement such policy is symptomatic of a grave constitutional crisis. Abandoning the original meaning of the constitution opens the door for the destructive forces of Romanism to undermine the great British Protestant heritage. The consequences for the nation will be catastrophic, God's judgement will fall; national decline will be a sign of a divine curse.616

610

Paisley, Three Great Reformers, 46.

611

Protestant Telegraph (July 1978) as cited by Mac Iver, ‘Ian Paisley’, 372.

612

A. Noble, ‘The Significance of the Williamite Revolution Settlement’, a lecture at the opening seminar of the European Institute of Protestant Studies, 31 Jan. 1998. See EIPS Website.

613

The occasion of the Queen's meeting with the Pope was in breach of her coronation oath. Protestant Telegraph (July 1978).

614

A future king ‘will have to swear at his coronation that he is “a faithful Protestant” ’, otherwise he should not accept the office. Revivalist (Sept. 1981).

615

Margaret Thatcher, by appointing a full ambassador to the Vatican, had ‘changed at a stroke the whole Revolution Settlement and she has acted unlawfully and unconstitutionally’. Revivalist (Mar. 1982).

616

The curse is not only national. Commenting on the Queen's visit to the Vatican in Oct. 2000, Paisley connected Royal misfortune with previous contact with the Papacy. ‘Why didn't the Queen learn that when she received the Pope in Buckingham Palace instead of blessing there was a curse? Her family torn with marriage uproars and divorces. Windsor Castle almost burned to the ground and a state of Divine retribution rested on her family and the House of Windsor. No one ever got the blessing of the antichrist and prospered. No one could ever have that blessing and prosper.’ I. R. K. Paisley, ‘None Dare Call It Treason’, sermon preached in Martyrs' Memorial Free Presbyterian Church, 22 Oct. 2000. See EIPS Website.


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We would remind your Majesty humbly of the terms of your own Coronation Oath and, in the name of Almighty God, warn you of the disasters that must come to our nation through any entanglements or alliance with the Roman Antichrist or any of his representatives. Idolatry means the curse of the Almighty, and that curse must, of necessity, fall upon all who identify themselves with that system of idolatry depicted in the Holy Scripture as ‘Mystery, Babylon the Great, Mother of Harlots and the abominations of the Earth’ (Revelations 17).617 In the face of such impending national doom, the appeal that ‘may God awaken our Nation to the urgent and vital need to turn again to His ways, to stop appeasing Romanism and its apologists, and to defend without fear or excuses the Protestant principles which made our country great’ gains both cogency and urgency.618 This links to a further way Paisleyism exceeds the boundaries of Orange ideology, namely its apocalyptic view of Roman Catholicism. Dr James Beggs, in a series of articles in the New Protestant Telegraph, gives a lucid outline of this position.619 The rise to power of the fourth beast of Daniel's dream (Daniel 7: 19–27) is identified with the emergence of the Church of Rome; ‘Rome equals that which shall attack God and twist the truth.’ New Testament verses are interpreted similarly as referring to the Vatican. The Pope is ‘the man of sin’ of 2 Thessalonians 2: 3–11. Phrases within this passage, such as ‘the secret power of lawlessness’ and a ‘powerful delusion’ that will deceive many, are particularly suited to the popular Free Presbyterian view of Rome as an extremely effective agent of a great conspiracy against Ulster: ‘The Roman Catholic Church lies at the heart of the problem of Northern Ireland. She has indoctrinated her people against everything Protestant…the history of Ireland reveals just how deeply that politico-religious

617

‘Letter to the Queen’, Revivalist (Feb. 1970) as cited by Mac Iver, ‘Ian Paisley’, 371–2.

618

Noble, ‘Williamite Revolution’.

619

New Protestant Telegraph (25 Feb. 1989 and 3 Mar. 1989).

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system, the Vatican, is responsible for Sinn Féin/IRA crimes.’620 Her antipathy towards Ulster Protestantism arises from her true nature: ‘where Rome is freedom dies. Rome is darkness, she extinguishes light. Rome is idolatry, she blots out true spiritual religion. Rome is Antichrist, she usurps the True Christ. Rome is dictatorship, she crushes all dissent. Rome is tyranny, she destroys all liberty.’621 The Apostle Paul's warnings in 1 Timothy 4: 1–4 to be aware of ‘hypocritical liars’ who ‘forbid people to marry’ are applied directly to the practice of celibacy within Catholicism. Apocalyptic passages such as Revelation 17 (as well as 13: 1–8) are decoded as referring explicitly to Rome as a force of great evil, inspired and directed by Satan, utterly opposed to the purposes of God. Those ‘weak Protestants’ who hold to the belief that Rome is a Christian Church are dangerously deluded because they have ceased to protest against evil doctrine.622 The failure to appreciate ‘what Rome is and what her objectives are, leads to betrayal and ultimate destruction’.623 The scope of Rome's duplicity is pervasive: ‘Let me tell you from this pulpit that there is a plan to destroy the Protestantism and freedom of this United Kingdom and it is working in Downing Street, it is working in Buckingham Palace, it is working everywhere. The power of the Church of Rome.’624 For example, in areas of Belfast where the forces of Catholicism and nationalism have advanced, Protestant churches have been abandoned and burned.625 Survival depends on the ability to realize the true nature of the titanic spiritual battle against the forces of darkness in which Paisleyism is engaged. The Roman Catholic Church is ‘the fountain head of all our ills…the terrorism of the IRA has sprung out of the theology of

620

New Protestant Telegraph (3 Dec. 1988.

621

New Protestant Telegraph (14 Jan. 1989).

622

Douglas describes Presbyterians who recognize the Catholic Church's status as a Christian Church as suffering from ‘a self-induced hypnotic dream’. Interview with author, 5 June 2000.

623

New Protestant Telegraph (14 Jan. 1989). Similarly, Ivan Foster described the Political Committee of the Methodist Church talks with the republican movement in the 1990s as a ‘witches brew of political expediency and hypocrisy’ that is ‘an abomination in the eyes of God’. Burning Bush (July / Aug. 1997).

624

Paisley, ‘None Dare Call It Treason’.

625

Douglas, interview with author, 5 June 2000.


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Rome…at present in Ulster the direction of turning is toward idolatry, toward rebellion. That will result in destruction falling upon us only all the more swiftly.’626

6.3 SYNTHESIS At the outset of this discussion, the views of Bruce and Taylor on the reasons for Paisley's popularity were contrasted with those of Smyth. The debate of tradition versus innovation is a pertinent one in that how the relative success of Paisleyism is accounted for is intimately connected with an identification of the essence of Paisleyite identity. Contrary to both positions outlined above, I contend that Paisleyism's appeal derives primarily from it being a passionate form of nationalism. However uncomfortable it may make some Christians,627 Bruce is justified in placing Paisley where he claims to be, standing in direct succession to the Reformers and the great Protestant confessions of faith in his denunciation of the Pope as the Antichrist.628 The same identification is found in Calvin, a charge however that he carefully separates from the Roman Catholic Church as a whole.629 I have shown how Paisley follows Knox's theory of political contract, how he holds

626

Ivan Foster, Burning Bush (July/Aug. 1997.

627

One of Dennis Cooke's main objectives in Persecuting Zeal is to demonstrate that Paisley stands outside Reformation and evangelical thought in his description of the Roman Catholic Church as non-Christian.

628

‘Mr. Protestant’, Third Way, 15–16. In the same interview Paisley dismisses as ‘the propaganda of new evangelicalism’ the notion that Rome could be a Christian Church. Elsewhere he argues that the FPCU holds to a standard Reformed doctrinal basis in its articles of faith and form of Church government. See I. R. K. Paisley, ‘The Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster’, in N. Richardson, (ed.), A Tapestry of Beliefs: Christian Traditions in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1998.

629

Calvin asserts, ‘Daniel [Dan. 9: 27] and Paul [2 Thess. 2: 4] foretold that Antichrist would sit in the Temple of God. With us, it is the Roman Pontiff we make the leader and standard bearer of that wicked and abominable kingdom.’ However he continues ‘we by no means deny that the churches under his tyranny remain churches…In them Christ lies hidden, half buried, the gospel overthrown, piety scattered, the worship of God nearly wiped out…I call them churches to the extent that the Lord has wonderfully preserved a remnant of his people.’ J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. J. T. McNeill (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1960 ii, bk. 4, ch.2, s. 12, 1052–3.

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tenaciously to the wording of the settlements that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, and how he replicates the determined stand of the Covenanters to refuse unqualified allegiance to the State. In this strict historical sense, Paisleyism does indeed represent an authentic strand of evangelical identity. Yet Bruce is unconvincing in his attempts to explain the rise of Paisleyism in terms of the wide appeal of his traditional evangelicalism to even unbelieving Protestants in search of a focus of identity.630 His argument is insufficient to explain the distinctiveness of Paisleyism from bodies such as the Orange Order and Irish Presbyterian Church who also see themselves as articulating historic Ulster Protestantism. A second weakness is that he fails to account for the relatively marginal place Free Presbyterianism occupies within Ulster evangelicalism and how, in its ideological make-up, Paisleyism isolates itself from mainstream Ulster Protestantism. If Paisleyite evangelicalism represents the ‘core values of what it means to be Protestant’ then one would expect the Free Presbyterian Church to be posing a substantial challenge to mainstream Ulster evangelicalism, not remaining on the periphery. More convincing is Smyth's thesis that the nucleus of Paisley's magnetism lies in a fusion of fundamentalism, American premillennialism, and political contractarianism. Smyth exaggerated the importance of the latter two components of Free Presbyterian identity. The FPCU is agnostic on which particular eschatological scheme is biblical631 and, as noted in Chapter 3, unionist conditional loyalty to the State is a characteristic of unionism per se, and is not unique to Paisleyism. Of more significance is the fundamentalist character of Paisleyism, which underlies much of its confrontation with moderate evangelicalism. The conflict is symptomatic of the wider cultural and theological gulf between fundamentalism and ‘new’ evangelicalism discussed in Chapter 4. In this sense, Paisleyism's militancy,632 separatism, anti-intellectualism, literalism, rationalism, limited social conscience,

630

See the discussion on Bruce in s. 1.3.4.

631

FPCU Website. In practice, the great majority of Free Presbyterians are premillennialist.

632

Harris notes that militancy is an important strand of fundamentalism, Fundamentalism and Evangelicals, 4.


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and rigid patriarchialism are simply manifestations of the ‘defensive, sectarian mentality’ commonly associated with fundamentalism.633 However, this can only be a partial explanation of Paisleyite particularity. Bloesch, in a trenchant critique of fundamentalism, argues that as an instinctively right-wing movement it is particularly susceptible to the temptation to politicize the Gospel. Here, as elsewhere, fundamentalism displays an affinity with ‘accommodationist religious liberalism’.634 If, in America, the form of fundamentalism's marriage with the political right has been a ‘tacit, and sometimes open alliance with capitalism’, it can be argued that in Ulster, Paisleyite fundamentalism represents a localized form of nationalism. In other words, a key element in its success lies in its cultural accommodation with the goals of Ulster unionism. Paisley's dual career as a political and religious leader is an illustration of this strategic partnership. In numerous statements and publications, he has consistently re-articulated traditional unionist dogma of the ‘golden era’ and placed it within a spiritualized interpretative framework. It is a profound irony that a holy separatist movement is at heart wedded to the temporal world of politics. For example, in one reconstruction of the ‘true situation’, Paisley claimed that nationalist objections to Partition were illegitimate in that it was an internationally recognized agreement; allegations of discrimination were unfounded, for in reality the Catholic population enjoyed liberal treatment in education and ‘all other fields’; the violence represented a battle between terrorist forces and those of law and order, not an inter-communal conflict between two identities; the solution was to use force to ‘end this revolution that is taking place in our country’ and simultaneously to legislate for the complete union of Northern Ireland within the UK. The goal of such unionist ideology is a spiritual one; ‘if we can save the Union with Great Britain, then I believe we shall be able to preserve our heritage and have the freedom to preach the Gospel and practise Gospel liberty the way we know it in the Bible’.635

633

Bloesch, Future of Evangelical Christianity, 22. See also 24–9 for a useful discussion of fundamentalism.

634

Ibid. 22.

635

Paisley, The Ulster Problem, 3–10.

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Given these perspectives, it is my contention that the attraction of Paisleyism for a section of the Ulster Protestant population lies in its particular expression of nationalism, one that is organized around a theological core of deeply held evangelical beliefs. The result is an innovative cocktail of fundamentalism with intense nationalism that succeeds in incorporating a diverse array of ideological imagery. This potent mixture functions both to define its identity as separate from all others and to sustain its members' exalted sense of calling in their task of defending Ulster. It is the emotive, nationalist character of Paisleyism that best explains its significant support from those who do not share its religious convictions, both within the DUP and outside it. Ian Paisley is trusted as a ‘safe pair of hands’ to defend Ulster. His depth of commitment gives assurance to his supporters that he will not compromise on the integrity of the Union. A central theme in my discussion of unionism was that the ambiguity of Ulster's constitutional status as a Province within the United Kingdom and the lack of a homogenous ‘Ulster nation’ should not disguise the fact that unionism displays the key components of nationalism. Clearly there are many different shades of nationalism. Just as the Irish form embraces the militant ‘fundamentalists’ of the IRA alongside the pragmatists of the Republic's main political parties, so unionism incorporates moderate and radical manifestations of nationalist feeling. Paisleyism can be located at the extreme pole of closed evangelicalism as an ideology that calls its members to the nationalist cause of saving Ulster from betrayal. It is no accident that the emergence of Paisleyism has coincided with the collapse of the unionist ‘golden era’. Paisleyism requires a volatile political atmosphere just as a fish needs water. Fear, insecurity, uncertainty, and alienation are the movement's oxygen. As discussed in Chapter 3, a growing Protestant identity crisis has been coupled with unionism's inherent political impotence. When he warns that ‘we have no friends across the world. When I say this I am not talking about the rank and file of people. I'm talking about governments’ he accurately reflects unionism's weakness on the international stage.636 This gloomy scenario

636

Paisley, United Ireland—Never!


205

has given Paisley the opportunity to meet uncertainty with certainty, to offer the comfort of denouncing Ulster's enemies as spiritually and politically illegitimate and to make sense of the past, present, and future through the nationalist tool of a simple and emotive historical myth. The classification of Paisleyism as undiluted nationalism can be supported by comparing it with the function of national identity outlined in Chapter 2 in two specific areas; intensity and use of a national historic-myth. It is the intensity of Paisleyite identity that distinguishes it from other forms of unionism. Members are called to participate in a conflict that involves them directly. Just as the life of their leader has embodied the confrontation between good and evil, truth versus apostasy, and holiness versus immorality, so his followers are caught up in a battle that is fought by street protests, fervent prayer meetings for Ulster's deliverance, constant vigilance against new conspiracies, and political activism against immoral legislation to ensure the continued holiness of Ulster. Ensuring personal sanctification is part of the wider divine purpose for Ulster as a beacon of evangelicalism to the rest of Europe, echoing Israel's calling to be ‘a light to the nations’. The political conflict is a symptom of a larger transcendent battle between God and Satan. The power of Paisleyism has been its ability to weave a coherent, dramatic, and imaginative story, neatly dovetailed with the threatening reality of the political crisis facing unionism in the form of resurgent Irish nationalism and neutral British government policy. Themes of Ulster's doom and imminent betrayal by a phalanx of powerful enemies are juxtaposed with the noble calling of the faithful to resistance, spiritual purity, prayer for revival, imitation of past heroes, and boldness in the face of deceitful foes. Chapter 2 demonstrated how emotion acts to integrate, reinforce, and inspire a sense of belonging to a national identity. As attachment to land, history, religion, and culture become essential components of an individual's identity they are invested with a deep emotional commitment. Emotion is the fuel of nationalism. Paisleyism's success in challenging the established structures of the Unionist Party and the Orange Order has been its ability to generate passionate levels of devotion from its members. Indeed, their level of dedication is

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frequently contrasted to that of other ‘so-called evangelicals’ who are hopelessly compromised.637 Whereas the Orange Order is primarily a political organization that uses religious imagery for legitimation, Paisleyism revolves around a set of theological beliefs that have radical implications for its form of politics. The difference of emphasis is significant in that the priority of Paisley's evangelicalism lends weight to his claim to represent historic evangelical faith. Paisleyism's deeper religious commitment adds another strand to its emotional power. While it shares Orangeism's analysis of the Northern conflict as a spiritual battle, it displays a greater readiness to act on that belief; to suffer, to be persecuted, to be ostracized. Rejection of the prophetic voice is interpreted as a divine affirmation of the obedient servant of God. In other words, Paisleyism's ability to hear, and courage to obey the voices of past spiritual and political heroes enables it to claim spiritual superiority over other strands of Ulster evangelicalism. The sheer range of Paisleyism's historical imagery, which far outperforms Orange mythology in its inspirational appeal, binds its members together in a closed world surrounded by their enemies. The resultant isolation encourages a greater sense of belonging, uniqueness, and emotional commitment to their shared identity. The characteristic certainty of Paisleyism in the rightness of its cause, demonstrated in its language and imagery, is a symptom of fervent nationalism. Forceful and populist rhetoric serves to mobilize its members to collective action that is usually militantly aggressive in its nature.638 Such absolutism leaves no room for Orange interdenominational inclusiveness or dialogue with other apostate evangelicals. Exclusion of those who have betrayed Ulster's cause (which is indistinguishable from God's cause) is characteristic of an extremist nationalist ideology, one that assumes the right to define the loyal members of the nation and pronounce God's judgement on the unfaithful. As Douglas

637

See Ivan Foster's dismissal of Presbyterian moderator Harry Allen as a ‘professed evangelical’ whose ‘evangelicalism is of the weak and watery kind’. Burning Bush (Mar. 1997.

638

The most explicitly militaristic event Paisley has organized was the creation, in Feb. 1981, of his short-lived ‘Third Force’, a quasi-paramilitary ensemble of volunteers created to defend Ulster.


207

revealingly remarks, those who do not respect the authority of the State (Irish nationalists) ‘do not merit equality’ within Northern Ireland. Equality can only be ‘earned’ by accepting the validity of the Union. Nationalist experience of discrimination was ‘almost entirely self-inflicted’ due to their attempts to destroy the legitimate State of Northern Ireland.639 It is also in its use of a national historic-myth that locates Paisleyite identity within the framework of a classic nationalist salvation drama. Paisleyism has succeeded in creating a unified image of what the nation once was and should be in the future. The primary task of its adherents is to ‘re-create’ Ulster as it ought to be. Ulster is imagined as having enjoyed a ‘golden era’ of glorious freedom, undivided loyalty, and material affluence, a legacy now under threat: ‘our little country which was prosperous, our little country which was strong, our little country that was glorified in its liberties, our little country that was exalted in its loyalties, is now the plaything of our enemies’.640 The story is not precise, but from recent publications and my previous analysis, the subtext is clear. Ulster's divine purpose is to be a country exemplifying the liberating and civilizing merits of the Protestant Reformed faith. According to Arthur Noble of the EIPS, in contrast to Irish nationalist mythology, it was the Ulster Scots, in the form of the Uliti, a British tribe predating the later arrival of the Gaels, ‘who were the original inhabitants of Ulster and as such are its rightful historical owners’.641 It was the arrival of ‘the foreign religion of Roman Catholicism’, not British colonialism, that dragged the Irish ‘into centuries of spiritual servitude and social deprivation’. Medieval Catholicism replaced ‘the ancient unadulterated Christian faith of the island's inhabitants’ which had spread and flourished during Patrick's ministry.642 Noble concludes that ‘those who falsely label Protestantism as the invader imposed from England would do well to remember that the Reformation was a return to the Christianity of Patrick's time’.643 The Plantation and subsequent Protestant colonization of Ulster were part of God's

639


640

Paisley, Dagger, 9.

641

A. Noble, ‘The Mentality Of Deceit: Unmasking Ancient Irish History’, EIPS Website (28 Jan. 1998).

642

Ibid.

643

Ibid.

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sovereign plan to establish the Gospel in Ireland.644 Protestantism displaced the corrupting power of Romanism that bred disloyalty and superstition.645 Before the Plantation, Northern Ireland had been ‘a backward part of Ireland…but the settlers cut out of the soil and out of the province a road to prosperity’.646 The tragedy of Ulster's recent history is that the unchanging enemy (Rome) has, through a mixture of republican violence and political machiavellianism, undermined the Protestant birthright of Ulster. Protestant memories need to be ‘stirred’ in order to recall previous attacks by Rome; the horrors of 1641 ‘when the people of God in this Province were hounded and some of them crucified on their own doors’; the ‘great and mighty Puritan Oliver Cromwell’ who delivered Ireland; the ‘gallant men of Londonderry’ in 1689 who refused to surrender; the brutal sectarianism of the ‘Roman Catholic rebellion’ of 1798; and the treacherous uprising of 1916.647 The once blessed nation has been sullied, attacked, and betrayed. Now, once again, ‘the wicked walk on every side, when the vilest men are exalted’.648 The task of Paisleyism is to restore Ulster to her former glory. God will not abandon his people, I want to tell you something. Do you think that God delivered the people of Ulster in 1641 to let Ulster perish in 1972? I don't. Do you think that God delivered us in 1789 to let us perish in 1972? I don't. Do you think that God delivered us in 1916 to let us perish in 1972? I don't. Do you think that God saved us from Rome rule in 1920 to let us perish today? I don't. I believe that the God who delivered our fathers will deliver us.649

644

For an early articulation of this story, described as a stage-by-stage betrayal of Ulster's birthright, beginning at the Plantation and traced through the 1641 Rebellion, the Revolution Settlement, 1798 Rebellion, 1859 Revival, Home Rule Crisis, and up to the formation and subsequent fall of Stormont, see ‘Betrayal of Ulster's Protestantism’, Revivalist (Aug. 1955).

645

Paisley regularly contrasts the freedom (including that for Roman Catholics) and prosperity of Protestant Ulster with the authoritarian domination of the Republic of Ireland by the Catholic Church. In contrast to the increase of the Catholic population in the North since Partition the Protestants of the Republic have been ‘ethnically cleansed, burnt out’. ‘Mr Protestant’, Third Way, 13.

646

Paisley, The Ulster Problem, 3.

647


648

Paisley, The Ulster Problem, 3, quoting Psalm 12.

649



209

It is, at heart, an attempt to fight to implement a mythic vision of the past in the present. Paisley would concur with this assessment if the word ‘mythic’ were discarded. Quoting such criticism he states, ‘The trouble with the Paisleyites they live in the past. So they say. We believe in the past. We are not ashamed of it. Yes!’650 Noble puts it succinctly: ‘the people of Ulster must fearlessly assert their true British identity in the knowledge that historical and Biblical truth is on their side’.651 This exalted goal connects the assorted distinctives of Paisleyite identity described above. The attempt to reassert Protestant power over the country will result in persecution of the faithful. All who do not share in the task must be considered enemies. Since Ulster was doctrinally and politically pure in the past, so she must be in the future. If the Williamite Settlement was part of God's plan for Ulster and correctly defines the proper relationship between Church and State, it becomes practically a sacred model for how modern political discourse should be structured. Ian Paisley's achievement in creating a dramatic tale of national liberation of an ancient homeland is unadulterated nationalism. The entire pantheon of Protestant heroes from the past, both evangelical and political, acts as a parallel authority to Scripture. Biblical texts and history are interpreted within the overarching narrative of Ulster's tragic fall from glory and the urgent responsibility to fight for her rightful restoration. I happen to believe that the cry of the martyred dead arises to the ear of the Most High. God may not hear our sinful prayers. God may not hear the prayers of a backslidden, worldly church today, but God will hear the cry of the martyrs' blood and I do not believe that this great nation of ours is going to be left prey to the whole system of Romanism. I believe that God has a deliverance for this land: that God has salt in England, Scotland, Wales and Ulster and that salt will be the saving of the nation.652 Given this order of priorities, attempts like Cooke's to undermine Paisleyism by pointing out that technically it does not represent the Reformers' view of the Roman Catholic Church are somewhat irrelevant. He misses the point that Paisley is

650

Ibid.

651

Noble, ‘Mentality of Deceit’.

652

I. R. K. Paisley, Revivalist (Mar. 1982).

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concerned about a different level of truth. His is a nationalist tale, designed to grip the imagination and inspire his followers to defend their beloved Ulster. Such a judgement does not necessarily deny the authenticity of many Free Presbyterians' Christian faith, but argues that Paisleyism is a religious ideology distorted and controlled by nationalism. Yet, if Paisleyism represents ‘high’ nationalism why has it not captured even more religious and political support? A drawback has been that the achievement of forging a distinct identity has been a highly divisive exercise that has estranged many potential supporters. By its very nature Paisleyism is an insecure identity that needs enemies, fears, and conspiracies to sustain its dynamism. It belongs outside the establishment in that it is inherently incapable of dialogue or compromise—the language of democratic politics. The result is that it only appeals to a limited constituency of believers attracted by the magnetic power of a form of nationalism sanctified by heroic evangelical imagery. In the terms of my interpretative model, Paisleyism represents an impassioned form of belonging without distance. Returning to Volf's tripartite division of how exclusion functions, it is clear that Paisleyite ideology practises exclusion by both elimination and domination. Qualitatively it embodies an aggressive form of elimination (the ‘politics of purity’) in order to remove the Other from its world. Allegations exist that Paisley provided the ideological inspiration to numbers of individual loyalist paramilitaries literally to eliminate their Other (Irish nationalists) through assassination and intimidation. In an interview, former terrorist Winston Churchill ‘Winkie’ Rea identified Paisley's militaristic rhetoric as a major influence on his decision to ‘fight’ for Ulster.653 Care is required in assessing claims potentially motivated by a significant degree of self-interest. Research suggests that Paisleyites, and Ulster evangelicals in general, demonstrate a strong aversion to paramilitary violence. Indeed a notable number of loyalist and republican gunmen have turned from violence after hearing the Gospel in prison and committing their lives to Christ. Loyalist paramilitary organizations have enjoyed scant electoral support from the wider Protestant population. Despite

653

P. Taylor, Loyalists (London: Bloomsbury, 1999, 175.


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Ian Paisley's contentious public career, no compelling evidence exists to suggest that he has either been involved in terrorist activity or deliberately encouraged others to engage in violence.654 As Bruce points out, Paisley may follow a religiously mandated political agenda, but he does so within the framework of liberal democratic politics.655 Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Paisley has helped to foster a political and spiritual climate whereby enemies are dehumanized, reviled, and stereotyped. ‘Our’ origins, ‘our’ territory, ‘our’ faith, and ‘our’ future must be kept pure from the contaminating Other. Paisleyism isolates itself from the corruption of the surrounding world in a self-imposed cocoon of sinless virtue. A relentless pursuit of a false political purity exists in tandem with an obsession with the illegitimacy of other identities, whether apostate Protestants or idolatrous Catholics. The sin of desiring Ulster to be cleansed of the Other is reinterpreted as a passion for holiness. Motivated by the objective of ‘reestablishing’ a pure and homogenous Ulster, Paisleyism is, to use Volf's words, ‘governed by a logic which reduces, ejects, and segregates’.656 Paisleyite use of exclusion by domination is evident in its systematic relegation of its Other to a status of religious and/or political inferiority. Equality for Irish nationalists can only be gained when you become ‘one of us’, otherwise, again to use Volf's phrase, ‘they should stay in their proper place’, that is a place where they remain a silent and unthreatening witness to Ulster's exalted calling within God's will. It is significant that the story of the movement's progression can only be understood within the localized context of the crisis facing unionism after the collapse of the ‘golden era’. The depth of its cultural captivity is evident in that without the spectre of imminent unionist betrayal Paisleyism would lose both its coherence and potency. It is profoundly incongruous that a movement that glories in its evangelical credentials undermines biblical authority by utilizing a distorted hermeneutical lens to

654

S. Bruce, ‘Fundamentalism and Political Violence: The Case of Paisley and Ulster Evangelicals’, in Religion, 31/4 (Oct. 2001, 387–405. I am grateful to Steve Bruce for supplying an earlier draft of this article.

655

Ibid.

656


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deny the indiscriminately inclusive implications of the Bible's teaching on the nature of the Church (Rom. 3: 22–4).657 An even greater irony is that, by rejoicing in its uncontaminated identity and the expulsion of all that is impure from God's presence, Paisleyism represents a retreat into an inviolable Pharisaical self-righteousness that idolizes the myth of the Protestants of Ulster as God's people in God's chosen land. At its core, Paisleyism is fundamentally opposed to the radical, boundary-breaking Good News of the Gospel.

657

See the discussion on ‘National identity, Distance and Belonging’ in s.2.2.

7 Generating Distance?: The Changing Identity of Irish Presbyterianism Woe to you who are complacent in Zion, and to you who feel secure on Mount Samaria, you notable men of the foremost nation, to whom the people of Israel come! (Amos 6: 1) If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone. (Romans 12: 18)

7.1 BACKGROUND 7.1.1 The evangelical pedigree of Irish Presbyterianism The Presbyterian Church in Ireland has a long association with evangelicalism.658 The formation of the present General Assembly in 1840, by the uniting of two previously distinct strands of Presbyterianism, the Synod of Ulster and the Secession Synod, marked a historic step in the establishment of evangelical orthodoxy at the heart of Irish Presbyterianism. Prior to this, the subscription controversies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that split the Church had revolved around the issue of written adherence to the Westminster Confession. The issue of orthodoxy versus heresy became more clear cut in the nineteenth century in the battles between the ‘Old Light’ evangelical Henry Cooke and the ‘New Light’ Arian, Henry Montgomery. The withdrawal of the non-subscribers from the Synod of

658

For a detailed discussion of the historic influence of evangelicalism within Irish Presbyterianism see D. W. Miller, ‘Presbyterianism and “Modernization” in Ulster’, Past and Present, 80, (Aug. 1978, 66–90.

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IRISH PRESBYTERIANISM

Ulster in 1830 prepared the way for the union of 1840.659 The triumph of Cooke, and the rising prominence of evangelicalism throughout Ulster, climaxed with the tumultuous events of the ‘Year of Grace’, the 1859 revival, which witnessed an outpouring of evangelical fervour.660 The balance between liberal and conservative elements within the Church has fluctuated periodically ever since. The late nineteenth century saw an increasing influence of higher criticism within teaching faculty of the Church's theological training colleges, illustrated by the appointment of Thomas Walker, a proponent of ‘modernist’ ideas, to the Hebrew Chair in Belfast in 1888.661 It was the 1927 heresy trial of a later liberal, Professor J. E. Davey, which exposed underlying tensions within the Church. Davey's overwhelming acquittal by the General Assembly, by 707 votes to 82, was indicative of the Church's resistance to schismatic influences at a time of religious and political consolidation, but also of the acceptability of ‘liberalism’662 within the denomination. In 1944, evangelicals like Robert Dickinson663 were in a minority and made to feel it.664

659

J. Thompson, ‘The Formation of the General Assembly’, in Challenge and Conflict: Essays in Irish Presbyterian History and Doctrine (Antrim: W. & G. Baird, 1981, 134–48, esp. 135.

660

Hempton and Hill argue the revival was ‘a kind of mid-century stepping stone reflecting the consolidation of earlier evangelical enthusiasm’, Evangelical Protestantism, 160.

661

A. A. Fulton, ‘Church in Tension—in the Twentieth Century—Mainly’, Challenge and Conflict, 149–88, see 154–9.

662

It should be clarified that this term does not refer for example to a radical scepticism that denies the historical authenticity of crucial Gospel events. The ‘liberalism’, which dominated the Church from the 1920s to the 1950s, did not abandon historic doctrine, but it was characterized by distaste for evangelical enthusiasm and conversionism. Later evangelicals would recall being dismissed disdainfully for their views.

663

Robert Dickinson 1925–96: ordained 1953; Moderator of General Assembly 1985; prominent in the Westminster Fellowship and Campaign for Concerted Witness to Reformed Truth (CCW, also called Campaign for Complete Withdrawal); member of the Orange Order.

664

Writing in 1986 Dickinson recalled the sharp division between those inside and those outside evangelicalism. His comments formed part of a tribute to T. S. Mooney, an elder and influential evangelical who played an important role in encouraging the minority of evangelical ministerial students at Magee University College. See TSM Books, Mission Completed: T. S. Mooney of Londonderry 1907–1986 (Belfast: Universities Press, 1986, 52.


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The period was characterized by a rather lifeless orthodoxy, lacking in evangelistic zeal or passion for Gospel truth. The discussion below will show how this situation was paralleled in the Church's complacent attitude to politics. Senior churchmen point to local awakenings such as that at Trinity Presbyterian church, Ahoghill, Co. Antrim in the late 1950s as evidence of a revival of evangelical fortunes.665 The minister of Ahoghill at the time, William Fleming,666 published an account of the revival in which he records fervent prayer meetings, numerous conversions, and the formation of the Irish Revival Fellowship (IRF) in February 1960. The IRF sought to encourage prayer for revival throughout Ireland through nights of prayer, prayer retreats, and a monthly newsletter. Fleming estimated that up to 170 groups representing about 3,000 people supported the nights of prayer.667 This period also witnessed a significant Church-wide mission in 1955. The formation of evangelical groups such as the Westminster Fellowship were also important catalysts for the emergence of an increasingly self-confident and vocal evangelical constituency within the Church.668 The group existed primarily for fellowship for ministers committed to the standards of the Westminster Confession. Comprised of mainly young ministers the group acted to encourage evangelicals to ‘reclaim’ the historic evangelical and Reformed foundations of the Church. A division of opinion emerged, as some wanted to advance this goal formally through the use of the Church courts. From this perspective, recent liberal trends were an aberration at odds with the stated foundational beliefs of the Church and should be defined as such through application of the Church's own dogmas. This objective led to the formation of the Campaign for Concerted Witness to Reformed Truth (CCW). This body

665

In discussion with David Temple, Superintendent of the Irish Mission, 9 Dec. 1997.

666

Revd Dr W. Fleming 1927–99: ordained 1955; minister of Trinity Ahoghill 1955–1969; moderator 1987; influential evangelical within the PCI.

667

See W. Fleming, ‘If my People’: Demonstrating the Spirit's Power in Revival (Fearn: Christian Focus, 1999, 9–75.

668

I am grateful to the late Dr Fleming for this point. The Westminster Fellowship is a distinct grouping from the better known Westminster Chapel in London, home to Martyn Lloyd-Jones and later R. T. Kendall.

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was active in the contentious debates during the 1970s concerning membership of the World Council of Churches (WCC). In 1980, CCW eventually succeeded in one of its main objectives of removing the PCI from the WCC when the General Assembly voted to withdraw by 448 votes to 388.669 The PCI was not immune from the effects of the struggle between fundamentalism and modernism. The popular campaigns in Ulster from 1921 to 1925 of the (Ulster-born) American evangelist and fundamentalist, J. P. Nicholson, illustrated how conservative reactions against liberalism originating elsewhere would influence developments within Irish Presbyterianism. Karl Barth's ‘theology of the Word’ would, in particular, have a profound influence on the Church's theological perspective.670 Certainly the trend during the latter half of the twentieth century has been of a conservative evangelical nature.671 A four-day conference in Coleraine in August 1997, 2020 Vision, attended by over 2,500 delegates, was an offshoot of the 1990 Coleraine Declaration.672 The focus of the gathering was strongly evangelical in nature; to engage ‘an increasingly secular society with an effective and relevant presentation of the Gospel’.673 The Church-wide mission Flame 74 was followed by Life 2 (1998–9); the latter reflecting an evangelical concern with evangelism and the spiritual revitalization of the denomination. These symptoms of evangelical dominance should be placed in the context of the worldwide resurgence of evangelicalism since the 1950s.674

669

Holmes, Presbyterian Heritage, 174.

670

Fulton, ‘Church in Tension’, 159. Fulton records how successive professors of systematic theology, J. M. Haire and J. Thompson, were friends and students of Barth. The result has been that ‘the theology evolved in the Presbyterian faculty as of today is less speculative than at the beginning of the century, more exclusively biblically based … and more Christocentric in its balance and emphasis than in the past’.

671

An example of this general trend of evangelical growth has been documented amongst Belfast Protestants in Boal, Keane, and Livingstone, Them and Us?, 95–6.

672

The Coleraine Declaration emerged out of a Special Assembly in Sept. 1990 designed in part to re-energize the Church to meet the increasingly diverse challenges of the late twentieth century.

673

Presbyterian Herald (Oct. 1997), 22. The Herald is a populist magazine published by the Presbyterian Church in Ireland.

674



217

The result of this pendulum swing has been that the modern Church is profoundly shaped and controlled by evangelicals. Union Theological College functions from a thoroughly evangelical perspective, both through its staff and in the nature of its student body. Evangelicals constitute an overwhelming majority at the General Assembly, even if not always a united one.675 Differences of opinion exist particularly on attitudes to the Orange Order and the Church of Rome, but it should be stressed that such debates broadly take place within the embrace of evangelicalism.

7.1.2 Historical characteristics of Irish Presbyterianism Historians have drawn attention to the significant impact of Presbyterian thought and practice on the character, culture, and politics of Ulster Protestantism up to the present day. In his book, Ulster Presbyterianism: The Historical Perspective, Peter Brooke describes ‘a strong, independent intellectual tradition, rooted in an impressive institutional continuity, achieved without the help of and often in opposition to the state’.676 The historical experience of being outsiders faced by hostile forces was an important component in the formation of Presbyterian identity. Brooke distinguishes three distinct stages of Presbyterian history when ‘the church was the intellectual and moral centre of a self-directing community’; each characterized by a different phase of a vigorous self-sufficiency.677 The first, during the seventeenth century, saw the Church stand as an organization distinct from, and at times highly critical of, the State, maintaining its own control over matters of faith and morals. The second, from the later seventeenth to the midnineteenth century, witnessed the highpoint of Presbyterian autonomy, with the Church acting as the ‘organising centre of a quasi-national society…a virtual nation within the nation’. In the third stage, during the later nineteenth century, the Church

675

Evangelicals are now in the position to win every vote comfortably if a common consensus exists. However, they remain divided over issues as diverse as ecumenism, the role of women, the Orange Order, and Roman Catholicism. I am grateful to Revd Stephen Johnston for this point.

676

P. Brooke, Ulster Presbyterianism: The Historical Perspective 1610–1970 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987, p. viii.

677

Ibid.

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retreated to become more akin to a ‘private worshipping society’ within a rapidly coalescing Protestantism that resulted from the rise of unionism to oppose the spectre of Home Rule. Presbyterianism's deep distrust of centralized power and its emphasis on the liberty of individual conscience continues to be reflected in the Church's highly democratic structure.678 A complex network of relationships act to balance power between individuals, kirk sessions, congregations, ministers, presbyteries, boards, committees, the General Assembly, and the moderator. The system depends on multiple levels of accountability ensuring against the possibility of any group or person exercising autocratic rule within the Church.679 A somewhat ponderous and bureaucratic form of contemporary Church government can mask the strong anti-authoritarian impulse that lay behind its formation. Presbyterian radicalism—the determination to defend deeply held libertarian principles regardless of the cost—has underlain Presbyterian involvement in disputes both inside and outside the Church.680 At the end of the nineteenth century such radicalism found expression in Presbyterian rejection of the illegitimate authority of an unbiblical and numerically dominant Catholicism that posed a greater threat to liberty than the Anglican Ascendancy. From 1886 to the Home Rule crisis of 1912–14, Protestant differences became subsumed within a common commitment to unionism. To use Brooke's phrase, this was the transition period that witnessed the shift ‘from Presbyterian to Protestant’. My concern in this chapter is to analyse how a Church with a deeply ingrained propensity for radical action has interacted with the destiny of Ulster unionism since Partition. To do this I will build on the foundations outlined in Part 1. If different

678

See Dunlop, Precarious Belonging, 8–18 for further discussion of this characteristic.

679

It is probably this quality that helps to explain Presbyterian aversion to Ian Paisley, the perennial moderator of his own denomination sometimes caustically referred to as the ‘Protestant Pope’. While claiming to represent authentic Presbyterianism, the structure of Paisleyism is inimical to traditional forms of Presbyterian democracy.

680

An example is the participation of many Presbyterians in the 1798 Rebellion, an apparently anomalous development in light of later Irish history. However, it stands squarely in the tradition of Presbyterian resistance to perceived illegitimate authority.


219

strands of closed evangelicalism are, to a greater or lesser degree, subordinate in character to a particular expression of nationalism, what has been the experience of Presbyterianism? Different facets of the Church's response will be explored in two stages. The first stage will consist of a discussion of three aspects of the ‘golden era’, namely; the Church's relationship with the Orange ideology; the Presbyterian sense of national identity; and Presbyterian attitudes to the Northern Irish State. The second stage will include an analysis of any observable shifts in Presbyterian identity during unionism's crisis years.681

7.2 AT EASE IN ZION: THE ERA OF BELONGING 7.2.1 Presbyterianism and Orangeism The PCI has no official connection with the Orange Institutions. However, from the time of the Home Rule crisis and throughout much of the ‘golden era’, Presbyterianism and Orangeism moved ever closer, cementing a rapprochement begun during the second half of the previous century. It is a matter of historical record that both on a popular and institutional level the main denominations fully supported the rejection of Home Rule and gave virtually unqualified approval for Ulster's pact with God in the form of the 1912 Solemn League and Covenant.682 Speaking at an Orange rally in Kilkeel in September 1932, Viscount Craigavon, Prime Minster of Northern Ireland, could recall ‘the noble part played by the

681

The main sources for official Presbyterian policy are the minutes and reports of the General Assembly. It is important to note, however, that there is a danger in assuming that the official publications of an annual gathering are widely read and discussed at a popular level. It is doubtful that this is the case. The democratic structure of the PCI means that while reports submitted to the Assembly are ‘received’ they do not necessarily reflect Church policy. Representatives attending can simply ignore committee conclusions. In practice, the deliberations of the Assembly are largely confined to an interested minority. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that official Church statements on contentious issues actually represent popular sentiment. Reports are committee driven and reflect the theological and social concerns of the committee members. To balance this I will also use comment from the Witness, a popular newspaper of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland from 1874 to 1941.

682

See Ch.3 for the full text of the covenant.

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Protestant churches during the crisis which led to the establishment of Ulster's local legislature.’683 The unionist case was built around social, political, and economic factors but was substantially bolstered by the Churches' enthusiastic theological endorsement of the cause. Finlay Holmes684 has documented the depth of Presbyterian involvement in the campaign to defeat ‘Rome Rule’.685 In 1910, eleven former moderators published a manifesto opposing Asquith's bill, arguing that the interests of all of the people in Ireland were best protected within a union with Britain.686 The idea of an Ulster Covenant originated with Thomas Sinclair, a Presbyterian elder.687 In 1912, the moderator, Henry Montgomery, a committed evangelical, dismissed government and Irish nationalist assurances of the protection of Protestant civil and religious liberties as ‘not worth the breath used in speaking of them or the ink required to write them’.688 Montgomery also helped lead a religious service on Easter Tuesday 1912, which served to bless the subsequent military-style parade by 100,000 men at Balmoral. Prior to this, a massive unofficial convention of Irish Presbyterians, held in Belfast on 1 February 1912, had emphatically rejected Home Rule. Such was the level of support for this position that the 1912 General Assembly did not consider it worth debating the Home Rule question that year.689 On Covenant Day, Presbyterian and other Protestant Churches became communal foci where the Protestant populace could sign the sacred document after attending a special church ser

683

Witness (2 Sep. 1932).

684

Professor Finlay Holmes 1926– : ordained RAF chaplain 1954; Campbell College chaplain 1960–3; lecturer Magee Theological College 1963, appointed Professor of Christian History and Doctrine, 1971; Principal of Union Theological College 1987–92; moderator 1990; active historian of the PCI.

685

R. F. G. Holmes, ‘ “Ulster Will Fight and Ulster Will Be Right”: The Protestant Churches and Ulster's Resistance to Home Rule, 1912–1914’, in W. J. Shiels (ed.), ‘The Church and War’, Studies in Church History, 20 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 321–35.

686

R. F. G. Holmes, The Presbyterian Church in Ireland: A Popular History (Dublin: Columba Press, 2000, 123.

687

R. F. G. Holmes, Presbyterians and Orangeism (Belfast: Presbyterian Historical Society, 1996, 8.

688

Witness (19 July 1912) as cited by Holmes, ‘Ulster Will Fight’, 322.

689

Ibid. 327.


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vice. The text of the deed was of course couched in the Presbyterian language and imagery of the Scottish Covenanters. The 1913 Assembly received a memorial from 131,351 members of the Church reiterating their determination to resist Home Rule. It was passed by 921 votes to 43. During debates the crisis was compared with the trials and persecutions Presbyterians had suffered in past centuries.690 In 1913, a Church historian exhorted his fellow Presbyterians to recall their predecessors: ‘Let us be true to the heritage they have left us and not surrender lightly what they have won for us at so great a cost.’ Many of his fellow Presbyterians were taking such exhortations literally, ‘quietly and resolutely preparing to take up arms’ to defend the British connection.691 A typical example of the alliance of mainstream Protestantism with the cause of Orangeism is found in a sermon on ‘Christian Liberty’ preached by Samuel Prenter,692 an ex-moderator of the Presbyterian Church. In it he compared the uncivilized, enslaving, and tyrannical characteristics of Catholic nations with that of the Protestant nations on whom ‘Christ has bestowed…the priceless gift of spiritual liberty’.693 By 1914, the moderator, James Bingham, could describe the Ulster Volunteers (an armed force prepared for battle with government forces) as having the right to resist illegitimate authority. They were ‘a great and noble army of men…preparing to defend themselves and us from the dangers that threaten our citizenship, liberties, and religion’.694

690

Ibid. 332–3.

691

R. F. G. Holmes, ‘Ulster Presbyterianism and Irish Nationalism’, in S. Mews (ed.), ‘Religion and National Identity’, Studies in Church History, 18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, 535–48, esp. 547–8.

692

Of significant interest is the Witness' obituary tribute to Prenter, who was also a convenor of the Irish Mission, as ‘a great patriot’ with a burning passion for Ireland to be delivered from the ‘religious thralldom in which it was held’. He was a supreme politician and churchman. His ‘religious faith and his political convictions were inseparable, if necessity led him to preach the one, the same necessity made him fervently proclaim the other’. Witness (9 Jan. 1920).

693

Sermon preached in the Fowler Memorial Hall in aid of the Orange Institution, on Sunday 4 May 1913. S. Prenter, Christian Liberty (Dublin: Leinster Printing Co., 1913, 6.

694

Witness (2 June 1914 as cited by Holmes, ‘Ulster will Fight’, 334.

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Another strand of Orange analysis adopted within Presbyterianism during this period, that of Rome being responsible for the political conflict engulfing Ireland, is recorded in the Witness: ‘the only effective cure for the ills of Ireland…was the gospel of Jesus Christ…when the Roman Catholic hierarchy and priesthood obey the teachings of the Man of Nazareth and declare them truly to their people, then will all the plotting and pampering of sedition cease in our country’.695 As with Prenter, Irish Christian patriots were those who longed to see Ireland liberated from the bondage of Catholicism. Not surprisingly the colportage work of the Irish Mission (an evangelistic organization within the PCI existing to win the people of Ireland to a living faith in Christ) was a focus for such patriotism. The call to evangelize Ireland ‘makes a special appeal to that God-implanted spirit of patriotism which beats in the breast of every true man and woman. The Irish Colportage Association surely appeals to that Christian patriotism which finds so large a place in the Old Testament…surely every true Christian Irishman must feel the same desire for Ireland and fervently utter that prayer, “God Save Ireland” so often degraded into a mere party call…The supreme cure for all the ills of Ireland lies in the Bible.’696 Later the same year the editorial stated that ‘the real trouble in Ireland is essentially a religious one, the spiritual ignorance and bondage of the people as a result of the predominant influence of the papacy in our land’ which has blocked ‘the path of intellectual, material, and spiritual progress’. It continued, arguing that the solution of the Irish problem lies with the vision of those like the Irish Mission and ‘primarily not with partisan politicians, but with true religious patriots [in] the Evangelical churches of Ireland. The supreme need of the present crisis is for…a fuller consecration to the task of winning Ireland for Evangelical Christianity…Only in Evangelical Protestantism will there be room in Ireland for every church professing the Christian faith, liberty for every Irishman to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience and freedom to contribute his share to the well-being and progress of the community.’697

695

Witness (11 June 1920).

696

Witness (8 Apr. 1932).

697

Witness (16 Sep. 1932).


223

Cardinal MacRory's infamous remark in 1931 that ‘the Protestant Church in Ireland is not even part of the Church of Christ’, reverberated for generations. The initial consequence was to provoke a united response of Orange and Presbyterian leaders acting to defend Protestantism. The Witness endorsed the reactions of Orangemen like unionist MP Rowley Elliott who, speaking at an Orange rally, called for modern Protestants to imitate their forefathers of 1689. He argued that ‘they would be quite unworthy of their sacrifice and heroism if they did not, at all costs, defend their Protestantism against all attacks from whatever quarter’.698 One of the most potent alliances between the PCI and Orange Institutions was the campaign to reform the proposed structure of the new State's educational system to be more amenable to Protestant interests. The 1923 Minister of Education's bill envisaged the omission of religious instruction in the curriculum. The aim was to permit the participation of Catholics and Protestants in a secular programme. For the Order it was a ‘betrayal of what they had fought for in the Home Rule crisis—the opportunity of ensuring that their children be brought up as Protestants.’699 Since popular Orange perception was that ‘Ulster's greatness stemmed from its heritage of Bible truth’, 700 the removal of the Bible from the classroom was a grave threat to the State. All the Protestant Churches opposed the bill, primarily because it removed Church influence from management committees and was interpreted as discriminating unfavourably against Protestants.701 A key figure in the battle against government educational policy from 1923 until 1947 was Presbyterian minister William Corkey.702 Close cooperation between the specially instituted Grand Orange Lodge

698

Witness (2 Sep. 1932), 7.

699

See Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 176. For wider discussion of the issue from an Orange perspective, see 174–85.

700

Ibid. 177.

701

For a detailed discussion of this issue see D. H. Akenson, Education and Enmity: The Control of Schooling in Northern Ireland 1920–50 (Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1973.

702

Corkey became moderator in 1945 and published a memoir, An Episode in the History of Protestant Ulster, 1923–1947 (n.p.: n.p., n.d.). Speaking to the Belfast Synod of the Presbyterian Church on 27 Mar. 1928, Corkey argued the Act ‘takes away from the Protestant churches all association with education and at the same time endows the Church of Rome and entrenches her clergy more firmly that ever in the educational system of our country’. Cited by Dewar, Brown, and Long, Orangeism, 176.

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committee and the Protestant Churches formed a formidable coalition that eventually succeeded in pressurizing the government to amend significantly its original legislation. Nor was this harmony of purpose limited to specific controversies. While official ties such as those that existed between the Order and the Ulster Unionist Party may have been absent, Presbyterianism and Orangeism comfortably consolidated their interests throughout the Stormont years. The General Assembly and the Orange Order had a good working relationship. Many clergy were either members of, or were sympathetic to, the Order. Some churches only called Orange ministers. Practically all kirk sessions had Orangemen influencing their policies and most congregations had a significant Orange constituency. Few clergy could afford to disregard the views of the Loyal Orders while exercising their ministry. An example of the two organizations' convergence of interests was the publication in 1940 of The Orange Order: Its Religious Origins; Its Scriptural Basis; Its Protestant Principles by F. R. Gibson and F. C. Gibson.703 The former was convenor of the Irish Mission who became moderator in 1971. The pamphlet forcefully argued that Orangeism is essentially evangelical in its defence of the great Protestant principles of justification by faith, the priesthood of all believers, and the right of private judgement. Thus, it can be argued that in the events leading up to Partition and beyond, at both an institutional and popular level, Presbyterianism stood in united solidarity704 within closed evangelicalism. Presbyterian motivations for rejecting the legitimacy of Catholic nationalism had become indistinguishable from the historic objectives of Orangeism—protection of legitimate (i.e. Protestant) power, the defence of a culturally and economically

703

F. R. Gibson and F. C. Gibson, The Orange Order: Its Religious Origins; Its Scriptural Basis; Its Protestant Principles (Belfast: The Office of the Christian Irishman, 1940. The Christian Irishman is the magazine of the Irish Mission of the PCI.

704

Dissident voices, such as Revd J. B. Armour of Ballymoney, an ardent Home Ruler who opposed the politicization of the Church on the issue, were scarce and unable to attract popular support.


225

superior way of life, loyalty to the Empire, and the maintenance of religious freedom. Bound up with these objectives were a potent mix of emotive images revolving around ‘saving Ulster’: liberation; preparation for a noble sacrifice; the right to fight; being faithful to the heritage of the past; and defending a threatened homeland. Just as Orangeism had come to embody the alliance of unionism with Ulster evangelicalism, so Presbyterianism had followed the same path of ‘spiritually anointing’ the cause of unionism. Indeed, so successfully did unionism merge previously competing identities, embracing them within an uni-dimensional monolith, that historical animosities were largely forgotten. Over time it became more difficult to identify an obviously distinct Presbyterian identity from that of other strands of Ulster Protestantism.

7.2.2 Britishness During the birth of the Northern State the Witness reflected hopes and feelings common to many of the Protestant population; ‘we love our kingdom and Empire and pray that the good hand of God may lead us in all things according to his will, for his will is peace’.705 In Protestant eyes, Partition had been a grievous blow partly because it damaged the unity of the British Empire of which Ireland had been an integral part. Within its embrace, the values of Protestantism were cherished and protected. No such position would pertain under Irish nationalism; ‘we are proud of the Empire which Ulstermen helped build up, and have no intention of leaving it for a comic opera Republic’.706 Writing in 1940, J. E. Davey concluded that, whatever the diversity of Presbyterian opinion on some political issues, there has been no difference on one point; all parties of the Church have been proud of their British connection and of British culture and its achievements. As the Rev. William Park said in his inaugural address to the Jubilee Assembly in 1890, ‘Seldom if ever have any of us been ashamed to declare we were Britons, subjects of good Queen Victoria…It is something to be an Englishman in the widest sense of the word, a citizen of that great Empire on which the sun never sets, and whose flag, wherever it waves, brings justice, liberty and peace’. Whatever quarrels with British policy members of the Assembly may have

705


706

Witness (10 Mar. 1939).

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had from time to time, and whatever their views of the best solution of the Irish problem, the sentiment of loyalty towards and pride in the British inheritance and commonwealth of peoples has been common to all. 707 Nearly twenty years later J. M. Barkley, former principal of Union College, endorsed Davey's words as accurate.708 Such sentiments neatly encapsulated the shift in Presbyterian thinking from Brooke's ‘quasi-national’ community, to one defined externally as belonging to something greater than itself. While not consciously promoting a fusion of religion and nationalism, the culture of Presbyterianism was profoundly British. Union Jacks flew (and continue to fly) from church steeples during ‘the Twelfth’; Girls' and Boys' Brigades, with their strong military and British ethos, formed (and still form) an integral part of church youth work; rolls of honour on church walls commemorated those who had perished while fighting for Britain. Such occasional symbolic markers of identity were simply reminders of how deeply ‘Britishness’ had pervaded Presbyterian beliefs and attitudes. The universal feelings of loyalty and pride in their Britishness among Presbyterians were mirrored within unionism as it implemented policies that reinforced Ulster's British identity in contrast to the South's passionate expression of Irishness. Symbolic events, such as the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Abercorn (the King's representatives in Ireland) to the Central Presbyterian Association in March 1931, simply reflected the reality of how Presbyterianism had moved into the heart of the Ulster establishment. The Duke could even talk of ‘the splendid feeling of harmony and co-operation that to-day exists…among us’.709 The visit of the King a year later to open the new Stormont buildings was reported by the Witness as a day of glorious celebration when ‘Ulster had at last re-found her soul’.710 It is significant that from 1921 to 1932 the fledgling parliament sat in Assemblies College Belfast.

707

J. E. Davey, Centenary 1840–1940: The Story of a Hundred Years (Belfast: W. & G. Baird, 1940, 62.

708

J. M. Barkley, A Short History of the Presbyterian Church (Belfast: Publications Board of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1959, 61.

709


710

Witness (18 Nov. 1932).


227

The new State provided the opportunity to maintain British Empire values in contrast to those who had shown themselves enemies of law and liberty. Commenting on James Craig's manifesto for Northern Ireland in 1921, the Witness enthusiastically subscribed to his vision. Craig, himself a Presbyterian, promised that the province would exemplify devotion to the throne, close union with Great Britain, pride in the British Empire and an earnest desire for peace throughout Ireland…The King will never have more loyal subjects…we have stood with Great Britain through thick and thin, and have made our unalterable choice to stand with them to the end. Our Parliament will mark no division of sympathy and Imperial aim. It will ever be a faithful daughter at the mother's side. The same old flag will cover us both. It will have us, as much as it ever had, for its defence and honour. 711 Given the regrettable necessity of Partition, now was an opportunity to have a different government, one the Witness hoped would ‘be the best in the Empire’ and would allow for ‘quietness and rest and time to grow in the things which make people strong and good’. It continued, ‘we are of the opinion and devoutly pray that it will be the will of God that our Parliament may be an example of the right kind of Ireland, and may prepare and show the way for peace, contentment and prosperity to the whole country’.712 In 1932, the moderator, Dr James Macauley, echoed the sentiments of other Protestant leaders in hoping for ‘the continuance of the freedom and equal rights that all sections of the people now enjoy under the Imperial parliament; we have prospered through its remedial legislation; the whole of the country has been advancing in wealth and contentment’.713 The fact that Ulster could balance its budget in times of severe economic depression was due to ‘a triumph of management of finance’ by the unionist government.714 It was interpreted as a result of reaping the economic benefit of Empire status as exemplified in the 1932 Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference from which unionist leaders returned exuberant at securing significant export markets for the country.715

711


712

Ibid.

713

Witness (2 Sept. 1932).

714

Witness (15 May 1931).

715


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The acceptance of a matrix of beliefs that Ulster's peace and prosperity was linked to her Protestantism and Britishness was imaginatively articulated by Craigavon at an Orange rally in 1932 and described approvingly by the Witness. He claimed that Britain has proved splendidly true to herself and to the Empire and had incorporated Northern Ireland into her parliament and constitution, ever there to remain like a sheet anchor of the United Kingdom; full freedom and equal rights were enjoyed by all classes and creeds under the aegis of both the Imperial and local assemblies…it filled him with pride of race that in the end Great Britain always ‘played the game’ and that Ulster never lagged behind. Full of deep thankfulness for the successful overcoming of the many dangers with which they had been so frequently beset, and assured that unity in their ranks was the first essential to progress and happiness, they would carry on as they had begun, religiously, soberly, quietly and determinedly…we will hold Ulster solid for King and Empire. 716 The rationale behind this vision of Ulster, namely that unionism was of a morally superior and ideologically different character to the unstable excesses of Irish nationalism, would remain unexamined for generations. Northern Ireland's calling was to play her part within the Empire. Those unwilling to share in that task were, in effect, marginalized. Ten years later the Witness put it succinctly: ‘the proper view of society is that it is an extension of the family. We belong to the family of the country, to the family of the nation, to the family of the Kingdom, to the family of the Empire.’717 Those holding an ‘improper’ view of society, Irish nationalists within Northern Ireland, were by implication illegitimate children excluded from the welcome embrace of the family circle. An example of casual Presbyterian indifference to the nationalist minority is seen in the Witness's attack on de Valera's stated intention to remove the oath of loyalty in the Free State. The paper declared, ‘the majority of people of Northern Ireland are loyal to the King and the Kingdom and the Empire (without any oath) and are determined so to remain’.718

716


717

Witness (2 Jan. 1931).

718

Witness (8 Apr. 1932). In a neat inversion of de Valera's understanding of the geographical tidiness of a unitary State, the paper claimed that his vision was flawed since ‘the unalterable facts are that the British Islands lie together in the realm of nature and are utterly dependent on one another for their very existence’. Witness (26 Feb. 1932).


229

Presbyterian commitment to Britain had been deepened by considerable sacrifice during the two world wars and the subsequent incorporation of the wars into Presbyterian folk memory and experience. One illustration of this was in 1926 when the moderator, J. G. Paton,719 presided over the opening of the imposing War Memorial Hostel in Belfast city centre. Personal loss of family members; noble memories of the heroism of Ulstermen at the Somme; annual Remembrance Day ceremonies; and pride in Ulster's strategic wartime role, all acted to cement feelings of Britishness with the experience of having played a vital part in sustaining Britain's pre-eminent place in the world of nations.720 By 1939, the Republic's determination to opt out of the looming conflict seemed to hasten the rift between the two parts of the island. In contrast to earlier views expressed in the Witness about the naturalness of one country within the Empire, there were the signs of ideological innovation to legitimize the ‘historic’ uniqueness of Ulster that would gain credence over succeeding decades. The Witness asserted, ‘If Mr de Valera can produce an Irish Nation, then we, relying on facts and not on imagination, can prove that there was an Ulster Nation which never submitted to the rule of the South.’721 The Border was ‘secured as a protection for our ancestors in centuries long past and it is a reminder to us that we were always free from the thraldom of the South…Eire cares nothing about the Empire and no doubt if Britain was engaged in a war she would try and stab her in the back as she did in 1916. It is as much in the interest of Great Britain as in our own that there should be a strong Ulster…a loyal Ulster can be at once a bulwark and a spearhead against those who hailed the Germans as allies in the Great War.’722

719

Paton had served as an Army chaplain during World War 1 and had received the Military Cross. See Davey, Centenary, 79–80.

720

Given the significance of wartime sacrifice, the IRA Remembrance Day bombing at the cenotaph in Enniskillen in November 1986 which killed several members of Enniskillen Presbyterian Church, had an impact far beyond the immediate human tragedy. It attacked the very core of Ulster Protestants' British identity and the memory of those who had died in its defence.

721


722

Witness (3 Feb. 1939).

230


Underpinning the Presbyterian sense of Britishness was the acceptance of the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland State, however undesirable it may have been at the time of Partition. The General Assembly, although lamenting the division of the United Kingdom,723 and deeply suspicious of the ‘alarming decrease of our Protestant people’ and ‘an equally alarming increase in the Roman Catholic environment by which those people who remain are surrounded’,724 exhorted their members in the South to support the constitution under which they found themselves.725 Later Church historians would claim this attitude was consistent with Calvinist doctrine that the State had a positive role of providing a stable environment for the Christian life.726 The assumption was that loyalty to the Northern State was not only desirable but also required from all citizens. The manifest refusal of the Catholic minority to demonstrate such allegiance was perceived as an outrageous offence against the ‘natural order’ of a unitary State. It meant that they were not only potentially seditious, but also disobedient to God's sovereign order. An assertion of Irishness, instead of the Britishness expected of all subjects of the legally formed State, was therefore perceived as inherently incompatible with the practice of good citizenship. A consequence of this deeply held sense of British identity was that, as unionism promulgated the image of Ulster as a loyal British province, via both publicity and legislation throughout the ‘golden era’, Presbyterianism was deaf to the voices of those who did not share the vision. Despite a clear progression in the development of the General Assembly's thinking on social matters,727 the Church failed to grapple adequately with the foundational issue behind the looming conflict, namely the div

723

In 1925, the Assembly reported that Partition was only ‘reluctantly accepted as the lesser of two evils between which it was necessary to choose’. General Assembly Reports (G. A. Reports ) (1925), 92.

724

Irish Mission Report in G. A. Reports (1923), 4.

725

General Assembly Minutes (G. A. Minutes ) (1922), 144.

726

J. M. Barkley, ‘The General Assembly and Society’, in R. F. G. Holmes and R. Buick Knox (eds.), The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland 1840–1990: A Celebration of Presbyterian Witness During 150 Years (Coleraine: Coleraine Printing Co., 1990, 188.

727

Barkley, ‘The General Assembly and Society’, 186–203.


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isive question of national identity and how the Irishness of the nationalist minority could be embraced within Northern Ireland. An important factor in this failure was a buoyantly self-confident and positive image of both unionism and Irish Presbyterianism that hindered hard critical reflection.

7.2.3 Cocooned complacency: Presbyterian experience within Northern Ireland At the time of Partition, Presbyterian statements echoed the optimistic hope of unionist politicians that a new peaceful order could be established. The 1921 General Assembly report on social reform avowed Presbyterian commitment to social justice. It affirmed equal rights for all children to education; industrial development that would benefit ‘the wellbeing of all’; and social and moral reform that would ‘remove all conditions of living that tend to downgrade and the creation for all of an environment that shall be healthy, dignified and pure’.728 Yet, in his approving appraisal of Presbyterian social policy, Barkley admits ‘the positive proposals remained a dead letter for many years’. He locates the reason for this as primarily due ‘to the fact that one third of the population sought the destruction of the State’.729 His discussion fails to acknowledge the fundamental cleavage between the assumptions shaping Presbyterian policy and the opposing goals of the minority community. For Presbyterians the ‘national question’ had been settled, if somewhat unsatisfactorily, with Partition as a solution that avoided further bloodshed.730 The difficulty was that, for nationalists, Partition represented not a settlement but ‘unfinished business’. The 1921 Report, and many others that followed, was formulated out of an ethos that took for granted the legitimacy of the State and the consequent responsibilities of all its citizens to contribute towards its good fortune. An indication of this outlook was evidenced in 1930 when the Church instigated an annual ‘Citizen Sunday’ whereby ministers would remind their congregations of the social duties incumbent on faithful

728

G. A. Reports (1921), 78–80. The repetition of the phrase ‘for all’ is indicative of the assumption that nationalists would benefit from living in a peaceful and stable Northern Ireland.

729

Barkley, ‘The General Assembly and Society’, 192.

730

G. A. Reports (1925), 92.

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subjects.731 During the 1940s, a series of General Assemblies reiterated the Church's commitment to social justice and human rights: ‘she must point the way forward to a social order based on righteousness and brotherhood.’732 Dominated by wartime concerns, these reports were often statements of general principle and had little direct to say on Northern Ireland. An exception to this was the 1950 report of the National and International Problems Committee on ‘The duties of a Christian in relation to the Political and Religious differences in Ireland’.733 The main thrust of the report stressed the need for political beliefs to be guided by ‘a spirit of tolerance and common sense’ whereby nationalists and unionists would accept and understand each others' fears and aspirations. It urged that ‘Christians of all denominations should renounce everything that savours of falsehood and bitterness, and that, even amidst disagreements they should seek to promote the spirit of goodwill throughout the land.’734 A Christian ought not ‘to rest content with a blind unreasoning patriotism of any variety. His primary loyalty must be to Christ and His kingdom; and his loyalty to any party or State must not be allowed to conflict with this higher allegiance.’ It continued, ‘the Christian…must be on his guard against false political propaganda of any kind…reports about discrimination, injustice and persecution of minorities on either side of the border, are often grossly exaggerated…we must …expose untruthful propaganda from whatever source it comes’.735 The report acknowledged that in regard to bigotry, intolerance, and persecution in Ireland, ‘all the denominations have failed to speak sufficiently clearly in this connection’.736 Furthermore, that while both governments, North and South, were making ‘a genuine attempt to deal justly with their religious minorities’, injustices had occurred. Yet, despite the report's irenical tone and a willingness to engage in limited self-criticism, a closer reading suggests that, unsurprisingly, the authors were writing from a highly traditional unionist perspective. For

731

G. A. Minutes (1930), 50.

732

G. A. Reports (1943), 53. See also the Social Services Committee Reports to the Assembly 1942, 1943, and 1944 and the 1942 Declaration on the Rights of Man in G. A. Minutes (1942), 37.

733

G. A. Reports (1950), 87–91.

734

Ibid. 90.

735

Ibid. 88–9.

736

Ibid. 89.


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instance, while a unionist was encouraged to explain the logic of his position and seek to understand nationalist objectives, significantly more was required of a nationalist who ‘must recognize that Eire and Northern Ireland are both states in their own rights, taking their status as such from the same legislation, that both have the right to govern themselves according to their own ideas, that the clock cannot be put back, and that the surest way to bring about a drawing together of the two states is by helpful co-operation and goodwill’.737 This is a succinct summary of an unionist analysis that remained applicable to the late 1990s. To accept it, a Northern Catholic would have to abandon the goals of Irish nationalism. Little space was allowed for the expression of nationalist identity within Northern Ireland and the analysis was coupled with a revealing description of the perceived motivations behind the two ideologies. Unionism was founded on hard economic and social realities and the inherent diligence of the Protestant Ulsterman.738 In contrast nationalism was depicted as being motivated by base passions such as pride, enmity, illusion, greed, and frustration. The unionist should attempt to comprehend ‘the place of sentiment, the love in men for prestige and for the symbols of freedom, the hatred of England that has existed here for centuries, and is still fed by schemers or dreamers, the sense of being thwarted in regard to the relatively wealthy North by the military power of Britain, and the like factors which so motivate the Nationalist in his thinking and desires’.739 In similar vein, while granting that intolerance easily grew out of an invidious combination of politics and religion, the real cause of intolerance in Ireland was to be found in the essential nature of the Roman Catholic Church: Perhaps the real difficulty for the Protestant, faced with Roman power and control, is the question of intolerance. The one thing that cannot be

737


738

The article continued, ‘It is perhaps natural that an industrious Northerner should hesitate before he would unite with a state already so overburdened with the upkeep of non-productive establishments and religious institutions, abandon a connection with Britain that has existed for centuries and accept worsened opportunities of obtaining a livelihood with a lower standard of social service.’

739

Ibid. 88.

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tolerated is intolerance. When a Protestant is intolerant he is false to his principles, and, we regret to say, there have been such cases; but for a Roman Catholic intolerance is in considerable measure an accepted principle. The persecution of Roman Catholics by Protestants in the past, such as they were, have been repented of and repudiated, and many Protestants fear that if the Roman Church were to regain power to revive persecution it would do so…and the Protestant not unnaturally fears that to pass under Roman political control would be to pass from adulthood, or at least adolescence, back to childhood and the nursery.740 The intolerance of the Roman Church grew out of its religio-political ambitions that defined it as an organization with objectives beyond those of a Church: One root of the Catholic–Protestant conflict…is the fact that the Roman Catholic Church is a worldwide religious organisation that seeks to gain control of the institutions of mankind and public life generally; it is not merely a Church, it is a political organisation. And as long as it maintains this position, we are inevitably confronted by irreconcilable factors, which no desire to compromise or placate can make agree. Thus the Protestant often fears the dangers of the violation of his freedom, and of ecclesiastical power in religious, political and social affairs.741 Such sentiments need to be read in the context of the triumphalist advance of de Valera's Gaelic Catholic nation and the pre-Vatican II nature of the Irish Church. Yet the overall picture that emerges from Presbyterian thinking about issues of national identity during this period is one that is indistinguishable from mainstream unionism in its analysis of the problem, its view of the Roman Catholic Church, and in its comfortable cooperation with the Orange Institutions. This is an unsurprising conclusion, particularly as John Whyte points out, there was remarkably little critical reassessment anywhere of the predominant nationalist, unionist, and Marxist interpretations of Northern Ireland until the 1960s.742 Yet the apparent inevit

740

Ibid. 90.

741

Ibid. 88.

742

Whyte, Interpreting, ch.9.


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ability of the process should not conceal the lack of creative theological reflection from a Church with a radical heritage self-consciously submitting itself under the liberating authority of the Word of God. Indeed, it is significant that a survey of the Assembly reports throughout the ‘golden era’ reveals a remarkable silence on how biblical principles applied to a country deeply divided over the constitutional authority of the State. In the days of unionist hegemony it quite simply was not an issue high on the Church's agenda. The evidence suggests that Presbyterianism had little appetite for a prophetic role to its own community. In common with unionism, it participated in presenting an image of all of Ulster subscribing to a loyal British identity in a way that virtually erased the presence of the nationalist community. Nationalist complaints about social injustice, an issue the Assembly had thoughtfully considered, tended to be dismissed as exaggerated propaganda designed to undermine the State.743 Consistent with this was a minimalist approach taken by Church historians of the period in discussing the implications of the collision of interests between unionism and Presbyterianism. A largely uncritical portrait of Presbyterian life and witness emerged. Davey, reviewing the one hundred years since 1840, concluded that ‘the century has been one of life and progress in every department of the Church's interests. And those who have gone forth as emigrants…have taken with them their inheritance of Irish Presbyterianism, which has proved itself in the day of trial again and again, as in the Home Land, to be a force for freedom and independence, for moral uprightness and for practical usefulness.’744 Barkley's assessment of the 1850–1950 period is remarkable for the absence of comment about Presbyterian involvement in the Home Rule crisis and the Church's relationship with unionism in the post-Partition era. While he acknowledges that ‘the political division of the country has created many serious difficulties’ these were restricted to

743

Even the moderate liberal J. E. Davey attributed nationalist complaints as due to the Roman Catholic's ‘love of grievance which finds imaginary grounds where real ones do not exist and exaggerates them greatly where they do’. From A. A. Fulton, Biography of J. Ernest Davey (Belfast: Church House, 1970, 32–3, as cited by Holmes, Presbyterian Heritage, 169–70.

744

Davey, Centenary, 89.

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managing the changes brought by a declining Presbyterian population in the South and the need for more ministers to meet the demand in a rapidly expanding Belfast.745 The overriding image of the Church that emerges from the ‘golden era’ is one of it enjoying an unheralded position of political security and social influence. This is well captured in R. L. Marshall's tercentenary sermon in 1942, in which he enjoined his listeners to celebrate the faithfulness of those gone before. The perspective is one of having at last arrived and giving thanks for those who had made it possible: ‘The days of legal persecution are over; the spirit of hostility is vanishing away; as compared with our fathers, we are at ease in Zion…We remember dark days of massacre and hunger and persecution in this land to which long ago our fathers came. We remember all those of our kith and kin who counted not their lives dear in loyalty to Christ's crown-rights, and the everlasting freedom of His children.’746 Whatever the merit, or lack of it, in such affirmative self-appraisals of Presbyterian character, the tone of ‘golden era’ Presbyterianism was one of comfort and gratitude, which combined to encourage an attitude of self-satisfaction, shaped by the mindset of a majority, towards the question of national identity. The Church was at ease, proud of its contribution to the success of Northern Ireland and enjoying an apparently permanent security after decades, if not centuries, of struggle. Its bearing throughout the period was shaped by comfortable assumptions about the moral victory that the existence of Northern Ireland represented. This outlook generated three important consequences. The first effect on Presbyterianism was to stifle any creative theological reflection on the very issue that would eventually tear the supposedly quiet, industrious, and loyal Ulster apart. The second was that, as Catholic and Protestant communities continued to drift poles apart, the Church participated in unionism's cocooned complacency of the late 1960s, before events erupted to shatter the image of Ulster as a good, moral,

745

Barkley, A Short History, 62.

746

R. L. Marshall, ‘The Commemoration Sermon’, in Three Hundred Years of Presbyterianism 1642–1942 (Belfast: Tercentenary Committee of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1959, 7–9 (emphasis mine).


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just, and naturally British part of the United Kingdom. The third was that the minority community within the North was, in Volf's terminology, excluded through indifference. Indifference functions when ‘a “system”—a political, economic, or cultural system—insinuates itself between myself and the other. If the other is excluded it is the system that has done the excluding, a system in which I participate because I must survive and against which I do not rebel because it cannot be changed…I reason: the road from Jerusalem to Jericho will always be littered by people half-dead; I can pass—I must pass—by each without much concern. The indifference that made the prophecy takes care also of its fulfilment.’747 In Ulster, the Other had been pushed to the periphery of Presbyterian consciousness by the sheer success of the unionist ‘system’. Throughout its turbulent history the Church had contained a wide breadth of opinion with space for lively debate. While the ‘golden era’ witnessed a coalescing of that rigorous identity within a period of cultural cohesion, there is now some evidence that it is slowly re-emerging. The next section will attempt to show how an increasing stream within the Church has begun to reassess the closed evangelical interpretation of the Northern Ireland conflict and the Church's relationship with both unionism and Orangeism.

7.3 TALKING DISTANCE John Dunlop makes the valid point that when movement for social and political reform ‘arrived at last in the 1960s it was not initiated by the Churches’.748 This was the era of the O'Neill-Lemass talks and high hopes that a thaw in North–South relations would finally lead to a nationalist recognition of Northern Ireland. The influence of Vatican II had resulted in a significant improvement in Presbyterian–Catholic Church relations. Rather than evidence of a drift to apostasy, as Ian Paisley alleged, it is best to interpret such rapprochement in the context of the comfortable safety of a majority. Partition seemed a dead issue;

747


748

J. Dunlop, ‘The Self-Understanding of Protestants in Northern Ireland’, in E. McDonagh (ed.), Irish Challenges to Theology: Papers of the Irish Theological Association Conference 1984 (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1986, 18.

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Northern Ireland was securely established. Protestants could relax. Within this atmosphere there had been cautious signs of fresh thinking about the political situation within the Church. A 1966 report by the National and International Problems Committee on ‘Religious Discrimination in Ireland’ was undertaken ‘to meet the widespread allegations of religious intolerance which are made about this country…We believe that a reasonable and moderate approach to the whole problem will contribute to its solution.’749 It stated that, if any of the charges are accurate, Christians ‘should encourage a sincere determination to right what is wrong’. Some thought such a report unnecessary and, after criticisms of the first draft, a revised one was accepted in 1967 that exhorted ‘Christians of all denominations…should unitedly oppose it [religious bigotry] and courageously foster a spirit of reconciliation and charity.’750 Since the beginning of inter-communal violence in 1969, Presbyterians have shared in Ulster Protestants' experiences of fear, siege, betrayal, and alienation. Many communities have been deeply traumatized by republican violence.751 Presbyterians are no longer at ease in Zion. As unionists, many see their political future as bleak. The Church has faced the challenge of ministering to its own community while attempting to address the politics of identity that lay behind the eruption of the nationalist–unionist confrontation. At times this has caused some tension as old certainties are questioned.752 Since 1969 the Church has responded to the situation by publishing a substantial volume of literature addressing different facets of the conflict.753 The general thrust of this material has been consistent with the ethos of the 1966 Report, namely a

749

G. A. Reports (1967), 120.

750

Ibid. 129.

751

Dunlop, Precarious Belonging, 122–32.

752

Holmes, ‘The General Assembly and Politics’, in The General Assembly, 180.

753

The Church and Government Committee makes comments each year in the Assembly Reports, often alongside comments by the General Board. These statements have been gathered together with other relevant other statements in annual pamphlets, The Northern Ireland Situation: Church Statements, pamphlets 3–26 (Belfast: Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1968–98). See also the book, Presbyterian Church Statements on the Northern Ireland Situation 1968–1981 (Belfast: Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1981. In addition, special reports are commissioned by individual committees. Important ones are listed in Appendix B.


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stress on the values of reason and moderation. Presbyterians have been encouraged to act in a way that promotes reconciliation, peace, and stability within Northern Ireland. It is a moot point how effective Church statements have been in shaping Presbyterian thinking ‘on the ground’. A regular theme in Presbytery remarks is the reservation over theoretical reports with little scope for practical action.754 In 1980, even when the Government Committee attempted to initiate local action following a conference on ‘Christian Responsibility and Spiritual Leadership in Northern Ireland Today’, none of the sixteen (out of twenty-two) Presbyteries who replied could report any enthusiasm for action by their members. The Committee could only speculate that frustration, fear, apathy, and hopelessness had paralysed the prospect of a proactive response.755 It has been this author's experience that very rarely would one hear a sermon addressing the issue of Christian responsibility in a divided society. This point is supported by the observations of David Temple, Superintendent of the Irish Mission, who noted that in his visits to numerous congregations he sometimes wonders ‘if we exist in the same world’ given the almost complete disregard of contemporary political events.756 Hence caution should be exercised in equating the production of reports with the ability to change longestablished perceptions themselves reinforced by the advances of a resurgent Irish nationalism, coupled with recent memory of a remorselessly efficient republican terror campaign. However, an examination of the evidence suggests a genuine shift within the identity of modern Presbyterianism away from its symbiotic relationship with ‘golden era’ unionism. It appears that, in its theoretical ideology at least, Presbyterianism is

754

See the Government Committee's comments that communication breakdown between committees and Church members because of the ambiguous official role of the Church. G. A. Reports (1976), 19. For a similar conclusion see also G. A. Reports 1978, Comments on Study Document, ‘Have We a Word from the Lord?’, 18. Presbytery response to a 1994 Report expressed ‘a weariness with endless remits’, G. A. Reports (1995), 209.

755

G. A. Reports (1980), 10.

756

Christian Irishman (Mar. 1996), 5.

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becoming increasingly ‘distant’ from the dogma of closed evangelicalism. To support this argument, published material of the PCI will be analysed under three categories. It will become evident that distinct themes of continuity and discontinuity exist between the modern period and the ‘golden era’.

7.3.1 British and unionist An obvious strand of continuity is the unbroken Presbyterian commitment to a British and unionist identity. In reacting to the two most traumatic political developments since 1972, the Assembly reflected the sentiments of unionism in general. First was the shock of Stormont's prorogation. The Assembly protested, claiming to ‘speak for a people in Northern Ireland who, without consent, are now suffering a massive deprivation of their constitutional and civil rights…this is being done after they have suffered, patiently and resolutely, prolonged and violent attacks upon them by both hand and tongue. The pain and loss of confidence for all this…should not be underestimated or disregarded.’757 Second was the outrage at the imposition of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, without unionist consent, in 1985. The lack of consultation ‘has created a feeling of alienation’ amongst the loyalist section of the population. Their resistance to the Agreement was the result of ‘deeply felt hurt by those who have been in the past, and would seek to be in the future, loyal to Queen and country’.758 Instead of promoting peace, stability, and reconciliation, the Government Committee asserted that the Agreement had ‘been an abysmal failure’.759 Its imposition without consultation of the majority community was ‘wrong and a denial of fundamental democratic rights’.760 Yet, while sharing unionist assumptions about the rights of the peaceful and loyal majority, the Church recognized the need to ameliorate nationalist opinion, and at times stood against mainstream unionist convictions. In 1973 the General Board welcomed the doomed Sunningdale Agreement as a ‘positive

757

G. A. Reports (1972), 7.

758

G. A. Reports (1989), 3.

759

G. A. Reports (1989), 4–5.

760

‘Initial Statement of the Government Committee’, The Northern Ireland Situation, pamphlet 14a, 6–7.


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and constructive step towards a framework for better understanding.’761 The structure of a Sunningdale-type agreement, with a devolved government for Northern Ireland incorporating some form of power-sharing between the two communities, has consistently been the preferred option of the Assembly.762 It combines the presupposition of the legitimacy of Northern Ireland763 with a willingness to reform the legislature to embrace Northern nationalist allegiance. As early as 1971 the Church recognized that ‘the political “status quo” which endured for half a century, can have no place in the Northern Ireland of the future…A willingness to accept change only when it does not inconvenience us must be replaced by welcoming change which aims at the common good and a just society.’764 The policy of the Church was summarized in 1972 and reiterated many times since, ‘the elimination of all legitimate grievances in efforts to create a united and prosperous community in Northern Ireland on the basis of equality, justice and reform’.765 In other words, the Church stands within a moderate unionist position of retaining the Union while seeking to accommodate nationalist identity. Nationalist alternatives presupposing some form of unitary state, as presented in the 1984 New Ireland Forum Report, were rejected as not providing ‘an acceptable framework for the solution of our present problems’.766 However, it is significant that even such moderate attitudes mark a separation from closed evangelicalism. Both Paisleyism and Orangeism reject power-sharing as an invasion of the purity of political Protestantism. Thus, while holding a commitment to unionism, it can be seen how the Church has begun to develop a distinct interpretation of the causes and cures of the Northern Ireland conflict. In the remaining two categories a sharp

761

G. A. Reports (1974), 13.

762

See widespread Presbytery support for minority participation in answers to the National and International Problems Committee's questionnaire, ‘Christians in a Situation of Conflict’, G. A. Reports (1973), 197.

763

The important 1993 document, Presbyterian Principles and Political Witness in Northern Ireland makes this position explicit and consonant with Reformed principles, 14.

764

‘Radical Change, Reform and Revolution’, G. A. Reports (1971), 172–3.

765

G. A. Reports (1972) 3. See also the 1993 position of supporting ‘devolved participatory government to the province’. Presbyterian Principles, 16.

766

G. A. Reports (1985), 16.

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discontinuity is evident between the present and the past expressions of Presbyterian identity.

7.3.2 Response to the conict A second strand of Presbyterian dissociation from closed evangelical ideology is evident in the Church's markedly different response to the ‘The Troubles’. This can be summarized in two areas.

7.3.2.1 Admission of failure Unlike closed evangelical ideology, the PCI has responded to the trauma of sectarian strife by displaying a willingness to engage in reflective self-criticism. The 1969 Church and Community Report stated, In what has happened we are reaping the harvest of mutual suspicion and fear, of non-co-operation, vested interests and party advantage …There has been, for too long, a conspiracy of silence, or of crying ‘Peace! Peace!’ when there was no peace. Although our General Assembly and Church have repeatedly spoken out on issues of social justice and have tried to act in fairness to our fellow-citizens of whatever communion, we must confess that we have not done so with sufficient zeal and urgency, self-examination and self-denial. We have not always loved our neighbour as ourselves and have not infrequently made the conduct of others an excuse for inaction or reaction on our part.767 The report continued that while ‘such a distressing situation marks a grievous failure on our part, as a Christian Church and people, we do not consider the fault is ours alone’.768 This tone has characterized many documents throughout the post-Stormont years. In 1993, it was stated that ‘the Presbyterian Church shares the guilt of the majority community in Northern Ireland for tolerating the practice of discrimination in jobs, housing and voting rights which largely led to the Civil Rights Campaign of the 1960s.’769 The role for the Church in this situation was defined in 1975 as twofold. First, to exhort and lead its own community to display Christian attitudes and actions. Second, to promote

767

G. A. Reports (1969), 5.

768

Ibid. 7.

769

Presbyterian Principles, 15.


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the search for ‘ways of accepting and respecting others, as groups as well as individuals; and to do this while remaining faithful to our own heritage and evangelical calling with its mission to all men’.770 Elsewhere it was recognized that this is not an easy task. The conflict of cultures means that Christian involvement in politics is fraught with ‘difficult dilemmas of conscience and…morally complicated decisions’. Under these circumstances neither Christians nor the Church are ‘assured of better political judgement or skills in government than are unbelievers’. Christians have a responsibility to speak, not just for their own group, but ‘also for the wider Christian family, for all who suffer injustice and for the good of the whole people’.771 Other Church statements have called on Presbyterians to display Christian attitudes such as repentance and forgiveness, combined with a steadfast hope in the sovereign power of God.772 In tandem with this stance was a recognition that transformed attitudes must be accompanied by revised political structures. The aspirations of the Church were summarized in the 1994 Peace Vocation. It connects faithfulness to evangelical beliefs with the call to inter-Church dialogue, the search ‘for new structures of consent and participation’ and an ‘accommodation of diversity’.773 At each of these points the Vocation accentuates the sharp distinction between closed and open interpretations of what constitutes genuine evangelical orthodoxy in the Northern Ireland context.

7.3.2.2 Rejection of religious nationalism The PCI repudiates the notion that inter-communal violence represents a spiritual battle for the soul of Ulster. A review of the Assembly literature since the late 1960s shows continuing horror at the violence and condemnation of the ‘inexcusable’ actions of all terrorist groups that presented ‘a deadly challenge

770

‘Loyalism in Ireland’ in Republicanism, Loyalism and Pluralism, 57.

771

Presbyterian Principles, 11–12.

772

For example see G. A. Reports (1989), 4. Also Presbyterian Principles, 22–4.

773

See Appendix A for the full text of the Peace Vocation. A good example of Church policy was articulated by Revd John Dunlop during a presentation by the Church to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in Dublin, ‘We look for a new kind of Ireland, marked by cooperation, mutual affirmation, honour and respect … within the whole island the significance of the culture, religion, and identity of majorities and minorities should be recognized, respected and protected.’ Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in Dublin, Report of Proceedings, 11, presentation by the Presbyterian Church in Ireland (24 Mar. 1995, 17.

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to the moral sense of all sections of the community’.774 While closed evangelicalism shares an abhorrence of political violence, it typically interprets the republican campaign as part of a wider Catholic conspiracy against Ulster's status as a bulwark of evangelical Protestantism. Such a belief encourages the dynamics of siege, dismisses minority grievances as subversive, locates blame with the British government or Irish nationalists, and precludes objective self-examination. In contrast, PCI reports indicate an analysis incompatible with that of closed evangelicalism. In short, the conflict is a consequence of a malign confluence of social, political, cultural, religious, and historical factors that have resulted in two blocks, unionist and nationalist, competing for political control.775 Consistent with this interpretation, in 1990 the PCI declared ‘We believe that amid the conflicting cultures God is willing to create a distinctively Christian counter culture, in which we distance ourselves from the kind of Protestantism which closely identifies the reformed faith with particular political and cultural aspirations.’776 A key tenet of closed evangelicalism is its belief that Protestant privilege is embedded in the British constitution, justifying its goal of defending and enforcing that principle. Yet, in a trenchant renunciation of this view the authors of Presbyterian Principles state that ‘The attitude of mind which seeks to enshrine a particular religion or set of religious convictions in the constitution of the State, and proceeds to use religion to undergird the claims of a particular group, party, or nation to absolute and exclusive power, is an increasing danger in the modern world …the trouble comes when the state becomes confessional.’777 In the lengthy 1994 report ‘Nationhood—A Sense of Identity’, lessons were drawn from different case studies around the

774

G. A. Reports (1983), 8.

775

For an example of this appraisal see ‘Pluralism in Ireland’ in Republicanism, Loyalism and Pluralism in Ireland, 62–3.

776

Coleraine Declaration, para. 3 (1990) (emphasis mine).

777



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world. Again its conclusions illustrated the interpretative gulf between Presbyterianism and closed evangelicalism. The past, while important in forming identity, should not dictate the present; both its glory and shame should be ‘owned’ and learnt from. The exclusive vision of Ulster as a Protestant homeland is replaced by the need to embrace ‘majority and minority identities within the same territorial space’, a task it called ‘the civilized management of diversity’.778 Significantly, equality between different nationalities was affirmed. Protestants may need to be reminded that ‘we do not have a natural claim to any territory and that laws should protect and provide for the weaker members of society. ’779 In other words, the Northern conflict may raise difficult theological and political questions, but it is not in essence a cyclical spiritual contest between good and evil. The Church has consistently identified a key problem in Ireland as being the fusion of religion with secular political goals. In 1972 the Assembly asserted ‘Though the majority of our people in Northern Ireland may give political support to the Unionist Party and a lesser number be members of the Orange Order, yet as an organized Church of some 400,000 souls we are not committed to these or any other institutions or parties …’780 The 1975 document ‘Loyalism in Ireland’, while side-stepping a direct critique of the Orange Order, described Ulster loyalism as a form of tribalism, ill-suited to form the basis of a plural state. It rejected the idea that the Church required defence by loyalist organizations in order freely to practise and propagate the Protestant faith: ‘It must be affirmed that if the Church becomes dependent on any one political party, or confined to any one social or political community it ceases to live by the one universal Christian Gospel or under the sole authority of Jesus Christ.’781 Similarly a 1977 study document warned, ‘the Church must always remember and remind people that no one structure of government, political party, or programme may claim a Christian monopoly’.782 In 1982, a

778

‘Nationhood: A Sense of Identity’, G. A. Reports (1994), 214.

779

Ibid. 216–17.

780

G. A. Reports (1972) 4.

781

‘Loyalism in Ireland’, in Republicanism, Loyalism and Pluralism in Ireland, 56.

782

‘Have We a Word From the Lord?’, G. A. Reports (1977), 11.

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discussion paper ‘Concerning the Role of the Church’ concluded in terms inimical to closed evangelical theory: ‘Our calling to be God's redeemed and servant people, through all life and all the world in our own day, requires that we forswear making an idol of our own or any community or nation, race, or class…we must beware of making “sacred” causes out of our particular campaigns, of fathering them on God, so that we are automatically good and our opponents wicked!’783 Presbyterian Principles and Political Witness restated the position by warning of the danger of ‘equating the realm of politics with the Kingdom of Christ’. It continued, ‘The freedom of the Church both to criticize and to uphold what it discerns to be ethical principles in the political sphere must be safeguarded if religion is not to become idolatry and political commitment be allowed to be the highest point of people's loyalty. Any subservience of religion to politics is inimical to the Gospel which holds out a vision of a larger community in which political just as other differences are judged, relativized and, so far as possible, reconciled.’784 Implicit, and occasionally explicit, is the process whereby Irish Presbyterianism has distanced itself from the ideology of ‘extreme’ Protestantism and particularly that of Ian Paisley. The description in the 1969 Assembly Reports, while not naming him, graphically described Paisley's street protests against the civil-rights marches. It condemned those who ‘banded themselves together to prevent, by physical resistance, the peaceful expression of opinion’. It continued: By violence of speech and action, by personal vilification and harassment, they have dishonoured the cause they professed to defend… Such treatment of those who were protesting against what they believed to be wrong has been a grievous betrayal of the Protestant and Presbyterian principles of civil and religious liberty and respect for conscience. We believe that many still do not realise the irreparable damage which has been done to the witness of the Gospel and to the Protestant and Presbyterian name…Avowed enemies of Christianity could not have done more damage to the faith than the things which have been said and done under the banner of religion …785

783

‘Concerning the Role of the Church’, G. A. Reports (1982) 16.

784

Presbyterian Principles, 12, 19–20.

785

‘Church and Community 1’, G. A. Reports (1969), 5–6.


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Two years later even stronger imagery was used to describe those who rejected calls for reconciliation by attacking those who did: ‘intimidation by some Protestants who hold extreme conservative views, of other Protestants who are more liberally minded has been a scandal…Religious fascism is foreign to the spirit of Christ.’786 Continuing the practice of publishing somewhat elliptical critiques of unnamed sections of religio-political Protestantism, the authors of Presbyterian Principles contend that ‘the ugliest perversion of “religion” in the cause of a political goal occurs in anti-Catholic invective and in sectarian murders’.787 While officially denouncing the latter, both the Orange Order and Paisleyism regularly indulge in the former. More specific reproaches were directed at the Orange Order after the events of Drumcree in July 1996 when a previously banned Orange march was forced down the Garvaghy Road. The Government Committee lamented the actions of the Order and loyalists who through their actions had done ‘enormous damage to the credibility of the Christian witness in this country’. Such disobedience to the State was unjustified both biblically and politically.788 In 1999, the moderator, John Dixon, a respected evangelical leader, articulated widespread criticism of the Order's continuing uncompromising stance on Drumcree: ‘there is a feeling among the Christian community that the image of Orangeism derived…from Drumcree would leave many believers terribly uneasy about their place of worship being abused’.789 Popular magazines such as the Christian Irishman, formerly a focus for a ‘Christian patriotism’ dedicated to defeat the power of Rome, now regularly carry features critical of Orange orthodoxy, particularly in the editorials of David Temple, Superintendent of the Mission and a committed evangelical.790

786

‘Radical Change Reform and Revolution’, G. A. Reports (1971), 174.

787


788

‘The Northern Ireland Situation’, 25, 2, 5.

789

Sunday Times (30 May 1999).

790

For example see, editorial, Christian Irishman (Sept. 1996), 5. Also ‘Some Biblical Perspectives on Christians at the Polls in Northern Ireland’, Christian Irishman (Apr. 1997), 24–6.

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Such changes are symptoms of increased diversity of opinion with the PCI on Orangeism. The letters page of the Presbyterian Herald reflects these tensions. While one writer castigated the editor of the Herald for reporting on the Order as if it was ‘part of our Presbyterian life’ and allowing the magazine to become a forum for a political cause,791 another rejects such charges, asserting that members of the Order frequently form the backbone of individual churches.792 Another letter expresses thanks to those who participated in the Orange Order's ‘Long March’ designed to highlight the ‘denial of civil and religious liberties for our people’ on the eve of Drumcree 1999.793 Other evidence reinforces the impression of an ambivalent attitude towards Orangeism amongst Presbyterians. Holmes typifies such ambivalence by his restrained description of the Order's relationship with the PCI unaccompanied by any critical analysis. He simply notes that ‘It is widely recognised that some of the most dedicated ministers, elders and members of our Irish Presbyterian Church are associated with the Order.’794 On the one hand, the 1993 Belfast Churchgoers Survey indicated that 65% and 62% of ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal–conservative’ Presbyterians respectively (which together represented 65% of the total Presbyterian sample) were identified as approving of the Orange Order.795 Yet, on the other hand a separate study confirmed that historically, while many Presbyterians have been Orangemen, few ministers have been active participants. In

791

Letter from David Torrens, Presbyterian Herald (Mar. 1999), 9.

792

Letter from ‘A Christian, a Mother, an Orangewoman and Hardworking Church Member’, Presbyterian Herald (May 1999), 9.

793

Letter from Revd Stephen Dickinson, minister of Glenarm and Carnalbana, Presbyterian Herald (Sept. 1999) 9.

794

Holmes, Presbyterianism and Orangeism, 10. Holmes lists Presbyterians who have also been prominent Orangemen. They include moderators J. K. L. McKean in 1953, W. A. A. Park in 1961, T. Lundie in 1974, and Robert Dickinson in 1985. Ex-Grand Master Martin Smyth is an ordained Presbyterian minister, as are John Brown the Orange historian and Dr Warren Porter, a Grand Chaplain in the organization. The 1999 moderator, John Lockington, was also an Orangeman.

795

Boal, Keane and Livingstone, Them and Us?, 96, 110. See Table 4.


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1991 only 13.5% of ministers were recorded as being members of the Order.796 A final strand of evidence of the distance now existent between the PCI and religious nationalism is the positive reaction of the Church to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The Church and Government Committee issued a detailed response that described it as neither defeat nor assimilation, but ‘a political accommodation which could be the way out of the darkness of the last 30 years into a better future’. It continued, ‘Christians are to be masters of political strategy and not servants of ideologies like Unionism and Nationalism.’797 An associated ‘Nine-point Plan’ for assessing political accommodation exhorted Presbyterians to ‘beware of the sinful tendency to see things from only one point of view’.798 It can be concluded that overall, while the Presbyterian Church has been rather coy in forthrightly rejecting the key assumptions of Orangeism,799 it has, at least at Board and Committee level, effectively defined itself as outside the parameters of closed evangelicalism.800

796

D. Morrow, The Churches and Inter-Community Relationships (Coleraine: University of Ulster, 1991, 21. For a personal apologetic of Orangeism from a Presbyterian minister and Orange County Grand Chaplain, see W. Bingham, ‘A Rich Diversity’, Presbyterian Herald (November 1997), 14–15. His position is summarized by the statement, ‘I am committed to Orangeism, but I am supremely committed to Christ.’

797

‘A Presbyterian Response to the Agreement’, Church and Government Committee (Belfast: Church House, 24 Apr. 1998.

798

‘Assessing Political Accommodation’ (Belfast: General Board, 2 Apr. 1998.

799

On 3 June 1992, in light of a report by the Doctrine Committee, the General Assembly issued a candid rebuttal of Freemasonry, disapproving ‘of communicant members of the Church being involved in Freemasonry’. However, given the long historical relationship between Orangeism and Presbyterianism, the latter has been reluctant to explore the implications of Orangeism's connections with Freemasonry or publish reports critical of the biblical basis of Orangeism.

800

A recent illustration, outside this book's study period, of this continuing process was incoming moderator, Trevor Morrow's inaugural address to the General Assembly. He exhorted the Assembly to ‘rediscover what it means to be radical dissenters’ for whom ‘there ought to be no political traditions that we will not question, no cultural customs that we will not challenge, no sacred cows that we will not sacrifice…’. T. W. J. Morrow, ‘Jesus for the 21st Century: Address to the Opening Meeting of the Presbyterian General Assembly, June 5, 2000 by incoming Moderator, Dr Trevor Morrow’, Christian Irishman (July / Aug. 2000, 5–10.

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7.3.3 Attitudes to Rome The theme of discontinuity continues with a comparison of closed evangelical and Irish Presbyterian attitudes to the Roman Catholic Church. The status of the Presbyterian Church as a Reformed body that recognizes the priesthood and sacraments of the Church of Rome (though at times creating considerable tension within the former)801 acts as a significant moderating factor against closed evangelical stereotypes of Rome. Holmes traces the story of improving relations between the PCI and the Catholic Church during the early 1960s.802 In 1963 the Assembly not only welcomed the Vatican's decree on ecumenism, but also passed a resolution expressing penitence for past attitudes of uncharitableness towards Roman Catholics.803 However, it seems that on this issue closed evangelicalism continues to exert a powerful influence within contemporary Presbyterianism. The warming of inter-Church relationships, coupled with voluble accusations of apostasy by Ian Paisley, stimulated vigorous debate within the denomination in the 1960s. Fulton identifies a continuing fundamentalist influence within the denomination, sympathetic to Paisleyite opinion that has played a significant role in shaping the Church's attitude to the WCC, the contemporary relevance of the Westminster Confession and Presbyterian attitudes to the Roman Catholic Church in general.804 The Coleraine Declaration admitted that, ‘within our Church we are deeply divided between those

801

Fulton, ‘Church in Tension’, 169–73.

802

In 1961 the moderator, Dr Austin Fulton, exhorted his church to work with Roman Catholics for the common good of society and share in works of Christian charity. In 1963, the General Assembly stood as a sign of respect to the late Pope John. Holmes, Presbyterian Heritage, 170–1.

803

The resolution resolved, ‘to urge upon our own people humbly and frankly to acknowledge and to ask forgiveness for any attitudes and actions towards our Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen which have been unworthy of our calling as followers of Jesus Christ’. G. A. Minutes (1965), 26.

804

Fulton, ‘Church in Tension’, 162–3.


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who would affirm what we have in common with Roman Catholics, and those who feel that to minimize the differences is to compromise the Gospel.’805 This tension had earlier resulted in the 1968 Assembly commissioning a report from the Doctrine Committee, published in 1970, on issues arising from Roman Catholic–Presbyterian dialogue, with particular reference to the Westminster Confession's equation of the Pope as the Antichrist.806 The report reaffirmed the historic Reformation position and was couched in the language of objective historical assessment, forgoing the use of invective. It argued that, while Luther and Calvin understood the papal system to be Antichrist, their apocalyptic terminology must be interpreted in the context of sixteenth-century polemics and a militantly hostile Catholic Church opposed to the light of Reformation principles. The report continued that the biblical concept of Antichrist stands for ‘forces of evil’, that are ‘hostile to all the grace and truth revealed in Christ’. Such forces are manifest in every age. The direction of the rest of the document suggests that, contrary to closed evangelicalism, there is no necessity permanently to connect Rome with Antichrist. This belief was made explicit by a 1988 resolution of the General Assembly that declared ‘that the historical interpretation of the Pope of Rome as the personal and literal fulfilment of the biblical figure of “the AntiChrist” and the “Man of Sin” is not manifestly evident from Scripture. A variety of views have long been held on this topic consistent with a loyal regard for the authority of Holy Scripture and a genuine acceptance of Reformation standards.’807 Following the Reformers, the authors of the 1970 report argued that despite Rome's retention and addition of unscriptural doctrines, it continued to adhere to many of the foundation doctrines of the Christian Church.808 Rome's teaching of these doctrines may

805

1990 Coleraine Declaration, para. 3.

806

G. A. Reports (1970), 9–35. Twenty years later the same committee published a second report entitled ‘Agreements and Disagreements of Irish Presbyterianism and Roman Catholicism’, G. A. Reports (1990), 7–23.

807

G. A. Reports (1988), 330.

808

For example, the Incarnation, Trinity, Atonement, Grace, Forgiveness of sins, Infallible Truth of Scripture, Eternal Life and Final Judgement. G. A. Reports (1970), 32.

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be ‘seriously affected’ by other erroneous dogmas,809 but ‘salvation is possible within her, even though the way of salvation tends to be obscured’. This position represents no innovation; both the 1970 and 1990 reports grounded their conclusions in Reformation teaching. Calvin wrote: ‘We deny not to the Papists those vestiges of a church which the Lord has allowed to remain among them…In one word, I call them churches, inasmuch as the Lord there wondrously preserves some remains of his people, though miserably torn and scattered, and inasmuch as some symbols of the Church remain.’810 Of particular contrast to Presbyterian attitudes in the ‘golden era’ are the views contained within a 1984 Irish Mission report: To-day, as never before, the Bible is our common source book. Such great words as God, Christ, sin, atonement, salvation, judgement, hell and heaven, are common to both religious communities and in their use we share in general a common understanding. Or take for example the ancient creeds, the Apostles Creed and the NiceneConstantinopolitan Creed. These are accepted by all Reformed Churches and, whatever erroneous paths the Roman Church has taken, she has never surrendered a single article of these ancient creeds.811 It continued that since ‘Roman Catholics are inheritors of an erroneous totalitarian system of religious belief ’ the duty of the Irish Mission is to communicate the Bible, a task hindered by ‘a harsh, judgmental, evangelical fundamentalism’. Indeed, instead of the correct response to Rome being a glorification of liberating Protestantism, Protestants ‘would do well to take a good look at what is called Protestantism in Ireland to-day. If the perception of the young Roman Catholic is accurate, namely, that a Protestant is someone who is pro-British, anti-Catholic and anti-Republic, then we would do well to look at our image. In approaching Roman Catholics we must also be conscious of the bankrupt state of Protestantism from a spiritual point of view.’812

809

Ibid. 32. For example; Papal authority, Papal infallibility, invocation of the saints, purgatory, the role of the Virgin Mary, and the sacerdotal priesthood.

810

J. Calvin, Institutes, bk. 4, ch.2, s. 11 and 12, as cited in ‘Agreements and Disagreements’, 12.

811

G. A. Reports (1984), 187.

812

Ibid. 188–9.


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The 1970 Assembly report concluded that in the modern period, although ‘vital and fundamental’ differences remain, ‘Vatican II does point to a more biblical and evangelical approach.’ Discussion concerning Church unity may be out of the question, yet ‘it is part of our calling and witness, as a Church, to engage in conversations and discussions on such matters as Authority…the Way of Salvation…the Church.’ Such inter-Church dialogue represents ‘not a “sell out” to Roman machinations’, there is no evidence that it will involve ‘a gradual movement away from, or weakening, or obliteration of true Protestant standards which haunts the imagination of some of our people’.813 In the 1990s, instead of Rome being portrayed as an ambitious and immutable socio-political system dedicated to extending its sphere of control, modern Presbyterianism readily recognized the profound changes within that Church: ‘The Roman Catholic Church, which Presbyterians encounter today, is different from the past. Most of our members have experienced real generosity of spirit from that Church. By and large our leaders are respected and befriended as colleagues and our members are affirmed for their distinctive witness.’814 Describing himself as a ‘catholic evangelical’, Trevor Morrow815 represents one strand of opinion within the PCI in his willingness to embrace fellow evangelicals from within Catholicism. Writing from a Reformation perspective of affirming justification by faith alone, he describes those who insist that Roman Catholics must not only display justifying faith but also leave the Catholic Church as preaching a Gospel at odds with Reformation principles.816

7.4 SYNTHESIS The story of a culturally captive Presbyterian identity during the ‘golden era’ has been described in some detail. Some have argued

813

G. A. Reports (1970), 32–3.

814

‘Presbyterians and the Republic of Ireland’, report debated at the 1997 General Assembly. Appendix D of The Northern Ireland Situation, pamphlet 25 (Belfast: Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1997).

815

Revd Dr Trevor W. J. Morrow 1948–: minister of Lucan Presbyterian Church, Dublin; member of the Church and Government Committee; moderator of the General Assembly 2000.

816

T. W. J. Morrow, ‘Adventures in Reconciliation’, Christian Irishman (July/Aug. 1998, 6–7.

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that it was the Calvinism of Irish Presbyterianism that provided the necessary theological framework to support the popular notion of the Ulster Protestants enjoying the status of God's elect people, often a vital ingredient of nationalism.817 ‘Although the Scots colonists of the north did not delude themselves into thinking that they were the Chosen People, the analogy was strong, and they acted under the conviction that they were a Chosen People.’818 Akenson suggests that these Ulster Scots concepts were dispersed into wider Ulster Protestant consciousness, an indication of the ‘cultural hegemony’ that they came to hold over the rest of the Protestant population.819 Bruce and Wallis also connect Calvinism with the penchant for the development of a settler self-conception as a separated elect and to a highly activist approach to the world of politics.820 They conclude that the latter can encourage an ‘obligation of the righteous to rule’ and that ‘Calvin's formulations of the religious doctrines of predestination and the covenant were readily susceptible to being reworked into justification for nationalism.’821 Both reconstructions present a plausible interpretation of the facts. Calvinism has undoubtedly been an important factor in shaping the Protestant mindset, particularly its contractual view of the relationship between ruler and ruled. In the ‘golden era’, Presbyterianism supported the view that the innate loyalty, industriousness, and trustworthiness of Ulster Protestantism qualified it to be the natural faith underlying just government. Presbyterianism did indeed take a highly activist approach to politics, eschewing a false dichotomy between the sacred and the secular. However, caution should be exercised in depicting Presbyterianism simply as a tribal nationalist religion. Although eloquent, Akenson's reconstruction in particular is conjectural and at times lapses into caricature.822 His analysis depends on an un

817

Akenson, God's Peoples, 118–19. See also S. Bruce and R. Wallis, Sociological Theory, Religion and Collective Action (Belfast: Queen's University, Belfast, 1986, 227–85 for a lengthy discussion of Calvinism and conservative Protestant politics.

818

Akenson, God's Peoples, 118–19

819

Ibid. 186.

820

Bruce and Wallis, Sociological Theory, 232–3.

821

Ibid. 271–2.

822

For example, see Akenson's contentious statements that ‘Calvinism would have remained another sad case of a man invoking God in order to be inhumane to mankind had not Calvin been a writer of genius in religious questions.’ In addition, ‘Calvinism was … a perfect tribal religion’ and Calvin was ‘extremely legalistic’. God's Peoples, 112–14.


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necessarily negative theoretical understanding of Calvinism and not on source material from the Presbyterian Church stating such doctrines. Indeed, in contrast to the Orange tradition and the Free Presbyterian Church, it is difficult to find such doctrine propagated by the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. Presbyterian indifference to social injustice and a simplistic analysis of the Irish problem (which would be solved if everyone were converted) was more likely to be due to the individualistic and pietistic influences of the nineteenth-century evangelical revival823 than the prejudice of a Calvinist tribal religion. Their analysis also overlooks the reality that contemporary Presbyterianism explicitly rejects the ideology of closed evangelicalism. A further flaw of the argument is that it ignores the fact that, from its very early days, the then almost exclusively Anglican Orange Order was utilizing biblical imagery to imply a connection between Israel and the destiny of Ulster Protestants. What does seem clear is that political insecurity, and particularly the Home Rule crisis, acted as the catalyst for this type of ideology to gain credence within Protestantism in general. Duncan Morrow has written how all the Churches became captive to political ideology: Churches have become the most continuous vehicles for community memories, myths and histories…As such each church has overwhelmingly ministered within and to one political tradition, each of which has at times felt threatened by the other…the churches in Northern Ireland have therefore mirrored the divisions of secular society and, often unwittingly, they have given them institutional shape and ideological validity.824 My analysis of modern Presbyterianism has revealed a significant shift away from the politics of spiritual legitimation. While the catalyst for this development does not seem to have been inspired by innovative theological reflection, but elicited by external political upheaval, it nonetheless suggests the beginning of an im

823

Morrow, Peace and Peacemaking, 123.

824

D. Morrow, ‘Church and Religion in the Ulster Crisis’, in S. Dunn, (ed.), Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995), 151–67, esp. 163–5.

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portant realignment of Presbyterian identity. The traumatic events of the last thirty years seem to have begun to shake the Church out of its complacency. A consequence is that the assumptions of closed evangelicalism are being increasingly questioned, at least at an ‘official’ level. While the response of closed evangelicalism to the political crisis facing unionism has been an ever more intense battle to maintain Protestant power, the same events have, in contrast, acted to divorce, theoretically, Presbyterianism from nationalist-type beliefs. By rejecting the use of dramatic ritual, biblical imagery, historic-myths, a sacred view of the land, stereotypes, and emotive language, the Church has detached itself from the mechanisms required to sustain a nationalist-salvation narrative. More significantly, by participating in self-critical evaluation, demonstrating an openness to engage with their Other (Roman Catholics/nationalists), articulating a concern for social and political justice, and abandoning the use of power-maintaining ideologies, the Church exhibits the characteristics of an identity that has moved beyond the impenetrable, egotistic, and excluding world of religious nationalism. It can be argued that this reconstruction helps to interpret the Church's fraught relationship with Paisleyism, which is primarily a religiously motivated nationalist movement. Presbyterianism's lack of such nationalism was a key reason for Paisley's vitriolic attacks on the Church. The two identities remain starkly separated despite the now overwhelmingly evangelical nature of the Presbyterian Church. However, the cost of the Church's adoption of unionist rhetoric cannot easily be disregarded. There remains a continuing reluctance to identify Ulster as having represented a Protestant confessional State, in part sustained by Presbyterian support ‘for God and Ulster’. The Church displays a persistent and marked ambivalence towards the status of the Orange Order. Despite official statements highly critical of ideology that permeates Orangeism, direct censure of the Order continues to be avoided. The cost of open confrontation with a significant swathe of conservative unionist opinion within the Church appears to preclude action. It seems as if Presbyterianism remains weighed down by historical baggage. As a denominational organization primarily shaped by institutional interests of maintenance and security it has been reactive rather than proactive in the face of profound


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political and theological challenges. The evidence suggests that the Church has been shaped by the conflict between unionism and nationalism more than it has shaped an alternative to that conflict. Irish Presbyterianism thus faces a long struggle to escape from the legacy of uncritical ethnic identification. Given this context, Morrow's comments on the Churches in general are apt, ‘The churches may not be opposed in theory to changed community relations, but to actively participate in them means jumping over deeply felt historical and doctrinal differences.’825 The fact that closed evangelical ideology was propagated, virtually unchallenged, by both sacred and secular branches of unionism for most of a century, has meant that it has successfully permeated popular Protestant consciousness. The Presbyterian Church in Ireland, having actively participated in that success, now faces a daunting dual challenge of regaining its distinct independent identity while convincing a threatened membership to accept its call for a generous accommodation of diversity. Change is proving to be a slow and painful process, as the strains over attitudes to Rome and the Orange Institutions indicate. There are a number of reasons for this inertia. The first, and perhaps most influential factor behind Presbyterian inaction lies in the historical legacy of living at ease in Zion. The ‘golden era’ fostered a sense of political and spiritual complacency whereby a large, self-sustaining, secure, and divinely blessed community assumed ‘this is the way things should be’. The unchallenged assumption that Presbyterianism was coterminous with unionism gave few resources to re-imagine an alternative identity. The pervasive nature of this relationship meant that there was little need to indulge in overtly nationalist rhetoric. Significant support for Orangeism within the PCI simply symbolized the strength of wider communal support for unionist objectives. Ironically, the lack of obviously idolatrous ideology in the ‘golden era’ militates against contemporary recognition of the failures of the past. Consistent with this point, Liechty and Clegg argue that the Churches as institutions

825

D. Morrow, ‘Churches, Society and Conflict in Northern Ireland’, in Aughey and Morrow, Northern Ireland Politics, 190–8, esp. 196.

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and many individual Christians in Northern Ireland continue to live their lives in denial that sectarianism is an issue for them.826 In addition, as the Church struggles to respond creatively to rapid numerical decline and increasing secularism, issues concerning its past and present relationship with unionist identity remain peripheral priorities. There is also evidence that Presbyterian ambivalence towards an honest appraisal of the past is mirrored in members' attitudes to faith and politics in general. Despite displaying a strong concern for social engagement, Presbyterians remain sharply divided over whether Christians should be involved in political affairs.827 Progress has also been hindered for other reasons. Despite a sincere concern to apply biblical truth, Assembly reports are often statements of principle rather than blueprints for action. There remains no effective mechanism for their implementation at a local level despite this problem being recognized as far back as 1982: If we are to get beyond merely proclaiming one's own ideas and aspirations as ‘Christian principles’, this would seem to call for far more sustained effort in seeking to apply the light of the Bible to our political situation and choices; and to ask this not just of the Church's personal or corporate leadership, but also of its members generally. We have surely not been faithful enough in doing this. It may mean at times proclaiming uncomfortable, ‘disloyal’ truths, as did the ancient prophets.828 The 1982 report is instructive for three reasons. First, it appears that the ‘sustained effort’ required to reach ordinary members was not forthcoming. The reason for this may be linked to the second point. Elsewhere the report points to another obstacle militating against effective action, namely the Church's highly democratic structure. It records ‘a wide and acceptable variety of political opinion within the Church, and of theological or Biblical interpretation’ on what should be the Church's proper

826

Liechty and Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism, 280.

827

Commissioned by the Board of Social Witness of the PCI in 1990, Bamford and McCullough invited response to the statement that ‘Individual Christians have a moral responsibility to be involved in political affairs.’ Only 4.5% strongly agreed, 29.2% agreed, 23.3% were uncertain, 37.1% disagreed, and 5.9% strongly disagreed. Bamford and McCullough, Burning Issues, 90.

828

‘Concerning the Role of the Church’, 11–12.


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attitude to public issues and political affairs.829 It appears that the required consensus on the nature of the problem and its solution is absent. As a consequence the PCI lacks both the will and a common vision on how to make a practical difference ‘on the ground’. Third, despite these shortcomings, in its willingness to proclaim ‘disloyal’ truths, the 1982 report, and many others mentioned above, probably provided the ideological stimulus for others to articulate and implement a challenge to closed evangelicalism. It is likely to be no coincidence that one of the catalysts for the formation of ECONI was a seminal statement by twenty-four Presbyterian ministers.830 Volf has written that ‘the overriding commitment to their culture serves churches worst in situations of conflict. Churches, the presumed agents of reconciliation, are at best impotent and at worst accomplices in the strife.’831 Although it is apparent from my analysis that Irish Presbyterianism practised exclusion primarily through indifference rather than overt elimination or domination, its spiritual bulwarking of the goals of Ulster unionism classify it as an accomplice during the Partition period and beyond. It can be said that the Church then represented a diluted form of belonging without distance. A significant reassessment of the PCI's relationship with unionist identity has enabled Irish Presbyterianism to create significant distance from the ideology of its host culture. However, it seems that, as yet, the Church has only moved as far as a largely theoretical repudiation of a spiritual legitimation of national identity. As such, while no longer an accomplice, it continues to be, on this specific issue, effectively impotent to confront the powerful emotive appeal of nationalism. It remains an open question whether distance, having once been lost, can be regained.

829

Ibid. 11. The paper lists four general types of responses ranging from the minimalist to the radical. They can be summarized as follows: 1. in a context of ‘unreasonable’ actions and unchristian attitudes, Christians should display reasonableness within a credible Christian framework; 2. the Church should be a more positive organized political force advocating social justice; 3. rather than focusing on society, the Church should concentrate on developing Christian attitudes amongst its members; 4. the Church should create distance from its traditional associations with ‘a particular community, tradition, or national loyalty’.

830

See Ch.8 for further discussion of this statement.

831


8 A Balancing Act: The Evangelicals of ECONI As water reflects a face, so a man's heart reflects the man. (Proverbs 27: 19) Accept one another, then, just as Christ accepted you, in order to bring praise to God. (Romans 15: 7)

8.1 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI) emerged out of a series of conferences organized by evangelicals in the mid-1980s.832 The meetings represented ‘an attempt to address the issues of our confused and torn society’ by evangelicals who were ‘concerned that the glory of God was at stake in Northern Ireland and believed that the time had come to speak out’.833 The formation of ECONI, an interdenominational and para-Church organization, was an implicit indication that a significant number of evangelicals felt that the Churches had failed in their task of ‘resourcing Christians for a biblical response’834 to the Northern conflict. In November 1985 a statement ‘For God and His Glory Alone’ was published in the Belfast Telegraph, signed by twenty-four Presbyterian ministers holding evangelical

832

The first of these was ‘The Word of God to Northern Ireland’, held at Queen's University, Belfast in 1984. See Word of God to Northern Ireland Conference Papers (Belfast: Queen's University, Belfast, 1984. A second Word of God conference followed in 1985 to be followed by ‘Christianity and Culture in Ireland’, held in Castlewellan in 1986 and hosted by the Irish Christian Study Centre (ICSC).

833

ECONI, What Does the Lord Require of Us?: Evangelicals Asking Questions (Belfast: ECONI, 1993, 29.

834

This is the slogan of official ECONI literature.

THE EVANGELICALS OF ECONI

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beliefs. It was addressed ‘to all Christian people in Ireland and in particular members of the Presbyterian Church’.835 The authors were responding to the volatile political atmosphere generated by the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and in particular the sharply negative response to that document by the Church and Government Committee of the Presbyterian Church.836 Four brief paragraphs on ‘Loyalty’, ‘Rights’, ‘Reconciliation’, and ‘Choice’ outlined what would become basic tenets of ECONI philosophy. On ‘Loyalty’, the group asserted that ‘the apparent identification of Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches with Loyalism and Nationalism is a contradiction of Christ's affirmation of the primacy of the Kingdom of God’. On ‘Rights’ the ministers stated that ‘it is our conviction that it is foreign to the mind of Christ for the Churches of this island to become the advocates of the rights of one community to the exclusion of the other’. On ‘Reconciliation’, ‘the identification of the Kingdom of God with any one political ideology’ was described as an ‘Idolatry and affront to Almighty God. It is a perversion of the Gospel…’ Significantly, the statement on ‘Choice’ undermined the core of Paisleyite and Orange belief in the imperative to protect the Gospel by securing Ulster's destiny. The group claimed that ‘living under God we are open to the future whatever His plan and purpose for us in Ireland may be’.837 The statement acted as a catalyst and after a follow-up conference in Belfast in January 1986, a group of about twenty evangelicals began to meet regularly from November 1987 to discuss an evangelical declaration addressing the issues raised by the ongoing Northern conflict. After wide consultation with leading evangelicals in Northern Ireland and beyond,838 they published, in September 1988, For God and His Glory Alone, a booklet outlining ten biblical principles relevant to Christian witness in a divided community.839 Over two hundred prominent

835

From the text of A Statement by Some Presbyterian Ministers issued in Nov. 1985. I am grateful to Alwyn Thomson for supplying a copy of this statement.

836

For further comment see s. 7.3.

837

A Statement by Some Presbyterian Ministers.

838

Including for example leading British evangelicals, Clive Calver (then General Director of the British Evangelical Alliance) and John Stott.

839

The ten principles discussed were: Love, Forgiveness, Reconciliation, Peace, Citizenship, Truth, Servanthood, Justice and Righteousness, Hope, and Repentance.

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evangelicals endorsed it and by 1993 over 9,000 copies had been distributed. The booklet outlined a framework for ECONI's future activist approach. It rejected as inadequate a pietistic ‘Call to Prayer’ that identified ‘the problem as being “out there”—with the terrorists, the politicians or the government. But it is not enough to pray for peace in these terms. We must ask God to begin with us—to make us peacemakers.’840 Rather than evangelicals cooperating in an identification of Christianity with one political allegiance and thus becoming ‘part of the disease’, the booklet urged evangelicals to look afresh ‘at the Bible in order to identify some principles which we hope will help us become part of the cure’.841 It admitted to a sense of ‘shame that we have often been the last to affirm publicly the biblical values which others outside our particular community have highlighted’ and acknowledged that ‘far too often our values, attitudes, and actions have been but an imitation of society and not of the character of Christ’.842 For God and His Glory Alone contained a challenge to make evident Scriptural values, attitudes, and actions in both individual's lives and the wider community. It contained a ‘commitment to action’ that would lead ‘to a determination to work together to bring glory to God by living Christlike lives’.843 This commitment led to a conference in Belfast on 15 April 1989 for those who had commended the original booklet. There it was decided to attempt to apply the principles sketched in the 1988 statement in a direct manner to specific issues of relevance in Northern Ireland. The organization's ability to act was significantly assisted by funding from a combination of sources.844 A series of Action Packs, each exploring the practical implications of one of the ten biblical themes, were produced for Church groups reflecting on the challenges of Christian discipleship in a divided community. A booklet of addresses given at the launch of the Action Packs in April 1992 entitled What does the Lord

840

For God and His Glory Alone (Belfast: ECONI, 1988, 1 (emphasis original).

841

Ibid. 1

842

Ibid. 2–3.

843

Ibid. 3.

844

Subsequent funding has been secured from the European Peace and Reconciliation Fund, the Community Relations Council and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. See Resourcing Christians for a Biblical Response: ECONI Review 1996–1998 (Belfast: ECONI, 1998, 17.


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Require of Us? was published in 1993. In it David Porter845 wrote, ‘We do not want simply to accept the neatest answers our tradition provides. We want instead to stay with the questions, wrestling with God until we discover afresh his answer and then, having done so, to ACT.’846 The strategy of encouraging Christians to grapple with biblical perspectives raised by the clash of competing national identities has been advanced through a wide range of programmes and publications. Together they provide a profile of a highly proactive organization which describes itself as ‘committed to partnership; serving local churches, and supporting leaders; working with Christian groups and community organisations’.847 Programmes include: an annual ECONI Sunday848 amongst a wide spectrum of evangelical Churches; Christian Citizenship Forums providing a platform for interaction between Christians and representatives of the main political parties including Sinn Féin; clergy forums and clergy training days;849 an annual conference;850 and training courses such as ‘Journey in Understanding’851 and ‘Bridge Builders’.852 Publications include: The Lion and Lamb magazine, which has become

845

David Porter, then ECONI Development Officer. Appointed Director of ECONI in Sept. 1995.

846

What Does the Lord Require of Us?, 9 (emphasis original).

847

ECONI publicity leaflet, ‘Making Peace, Bringing Healing, Doing Justice, Creating Hope’.

848

Over fifty-five churches took part in the first ECONI Sunday on 7 Nov. 1993 representing the involvement of over 10,000 people. What does the Lord Require of Us?, 29.

849

An example of a clergy training day was one on 20 Nov. 1997 addressing over eighty Church of Ireland clergy at the invitation of the bishop of Connor.

850

The first public conference was in Belfast on 5 Nov. 1994 on the theme of Christian Citizenship. Addressed by leading British evangelicals John Stott and Elaine Storkey, it was attended by over 370 people.

851

A six-week evening course with an educational ethos that assumes that greater understanding will lead to observable shifts in thinking and conduct. Subjects such as history, culture, politics, and religion are examined in turn and then reflected upon from a Scriptural perspective. ECONI publicity leaflet, ‘Journey in Understanding’.

852

A ten-week course which aims ‘to motivate and equip Christians’ to ‘consider some of the strategic and practical matters relating to how one may actively begin to empower churches, groups and other individual Christians to become active in peace-making’. ECONI publicity leaflet, ‘Bridge Builders’.

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the popular intellectual platform for advancing the goals of ECONI; the Pathways series of booklets;853 biblically based guides for Christians responding to the unfolding peace process such as A Future With Hope: Biblical Frameworks for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland;854 public statements;855 devotional Bible readings;856 and books such as Faith in Ulster.857 It is clear that during its brief history ECONI has established a high profile within Ulster evangelicalism and beyond. David Porter claims that over four hundred and fifty churches, representing over one third of all Protestant congregations, are now taking an active interest in the work of ECONI.858 ECONI have regularly been invited to present seminars at New Horizons, one of the largest annual evangelical gatherings in Northern Ireland. During 1997–8, the group claimed to have had direct involvement with 28,000 people through their events and publications.859 The media have recognized ECONI as a significant voice within the evangelical community. Representatives of ECONI have been deeply involved in mediation at crucial times

853

A series of twelve booklets, four of which were published by late 1998. Four titles deal with the question of evangelical self-definition, four are biblical expositions applied to Northern Ireland, and four represent biblical reflections on the nature of politics.

854

A Future With Hope: Biblical Frameworks for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Belfast: ECONI, 1995. It was made available to political and community members, the British and Irish governments, and the Dublin Forum for Peace and Reconciliation.

855

For example, A Statement of Concern, in response to the Downing Street Declaration (17 Dec. 1993. Others have followed at politically significant moments such as the announcement of the IRA and loyalist ceasefires and the subsequent breakdown of the IRA's cessation of violence. See God's Call to Peacemaking (7 Sept. 1994, Building Hope (21 Oct. 1994, and A Time to Listen (16 Feb. 1996 respectively.

856

A. Thomson. (ed.), Border Crossings: Affirming Faith by Crossing Boundaries (Belfast: ECONI, 1999. A collection of fifty daily Bible readings based on the Gospel of Luke, the readings focus on the words and actions of Jesus and their significance for Christian discipleship in contemporary Ulster.

857

The rationale of the book is that it is ‘an introduction to a wider debate on Protestantism and unionist identity, particularly on the role of evangelical Christianity in establishing and maintaining that identity’. Over fifty contributors, the majority drawn from a wide cross-section of Protestant society, were invited to reflect on the question ‘What Does “For God and Ulster” mean to you?’ A. Thomson. (ed.), Faith in Ulster (Belfast: ECONI, 1996, 10.

858

Resourcing Christians, 5.

859

D. Porter, publicity letter (Dec. 1998).


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of inter-community conflict. In March 1997 David Hewitt860 was appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to the politically sensitive Parades Commission, a development welcomed by ECONI.861 An indication of the group's impact on the denominational establishment was given when, in April 1998, the evangelical magazine the Little Acorn862 carried a tribute to ECONI by the leaders of the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Methodist Churches on the occasion of its tenth anniversary. Archbishop Eames stated that ‘I view what has emanated from ECONI as vital to my understanding’ of what the Bible has to say to a community facing profoundly challenging questions.863 Presbyterian moderator, Samuel Hutchinson, wrote, ‘After ten years it has become apparent that the voice of ECONI is one that cannot be ignored…I believe that ECONI is destined to be a significant voice in Northern Ireland for many years to come.’864 The overall portrait that emerges from this review of its activities is of a highly motivated and energetic organization that has made a significant impact within evangelicalism in Ulster. It is an argument of this book that a key reason for ECONI's growth of influence has been its success in forging a distinct identity with Ulster evangelicalism through balancing belonging with distance. Evidence to justify this view will be gathered in two stages. First, by summarizing ECONI's overall interpretation of the role of evangelicalism within Northern Ireland. Second, by then demonstrating how the group has sought to create distance from established patterns of evangelical response to the political complexities of Northern Ireland. This chapter will show how, in both its methods and ideology, ECONI constitutes a distinct alternative identity to the closed evangelicalism of Paisleyism and Orangeism on the one hand, and the passive impotence of mainstream denominations like Presbyterianism on the other. It will be argued that a significant

860

David Hewitt: solicitor and Presbyterian elder; co-founder of ECONI.

861

Lion and Lamb, 12 (Mar. / Apr. 1997, 9.

862

The Little Acorn was launched at a national level in 1997 to provide a popular platform for discussion of contemporary issues, news, and book reviews from an evangelical perspective.

863

R. Eames, Little Acorn (Apr. 1998), 4.

864

S. Hutchinson, Little Acorn (Apr. 1998) 5.

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achievement of the group has been its ability, not only to create distance, but also simultaneously to retain a sense of belonging within Ulster evangelicalism. Issues related to the strength and profile of ECONI's support base will emerge occasionally within this chapter. However, some preliminary comment is required at the outset. While the organization draws support from across the evangelical spectrum, it is difficult objectively to measure the depth of this support. ECONI is not a Church or membership organization. The group claim to represent no one but themselves. Certainly the initial impetus for the creation of ECONI was that of disaffection and frustration with ‘closed’ or ‘impotent’ expressions of Ulster evangelicalism.865 Dissidents offer uncomfortable alternatives to the established status quo. By definition they dissent from mainstream opinion and in this context ECONI should be understood as a minority voice within Ulster evangelicalism. This is not to say the group stands outside orthodox evangelical faith (it belongs squarely within its boundaries), but rather that it challenges established political and religious orthodoxies. In terms of the profile of ECONI's support, both age and class appear to be significant factors. The age profile of key personnel is that of welleducated individuals in their 30s and 40s with significant ministry experience outside Northern Ireland. The picture is of a younger evangelical generation, driven by a desire for change from the stale introverted unionism of the ‘golden era’ and keen not only to move beyond the fixed political certainties of the past but also to confront the spiritual assumptions with which it was associated. An intriguing question is why it was only in the late 1980s and not late 1960s that evangelicals in Ulster began seriously to ask radical questions. Undoubtedly ongoing IRA violence played a significant role in delaying any potentially ‘disloyal’ re-imagining of evangelical attitudes. After twenty years of conflict potentially dangerous questions could be confined no longer. It appears that a generation of evangelicals was faced with the reality of continuing inter-communal violence on the one hand and a unionist interpretation of events that precluded any necessity for reflection and critical self-examination on the other hand. Rejecting this impasse, and

865

David Hewitt, interview with author, 3 Dec. 2001.


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convinced that ‘the Troubles’ raised issues of profound theological and spiritual significance, they began a process of reflection and discussion on what God, through scripture, was saying to Christians in Northern Ireland. Central to this agenda were two convictions. The first was the evangelical belief that God's Word, through accurate exegesis and responsible hermenentics, spoke with authority and truth into their cultural and political context. The second was a judgement that it was a malign interaction between faith, identity, and nationalism that provided the dynamic force behind the Northern conflict.

8.2 CREATING DISTANCE A significant insight into the personal motivations of the ECONI leadership is contained in a 1992 address given by David Porter. He acknowledges a feeling of anger: an anger that can act as a barrier in relating to the leadership in our evangelical churches. I believe I am not alone in this but that many of my generation feel the same way…Why, when I was growing into maturity of faith, attempting to respond to the vital concerns facing our society, were my only models fundamentalist fuming on the one hand and evangelical silence on the other? Why, when I tried to express my concern for cross community matters through movements like the peace people, was I made to feel in some way I was betraying my faith? Why has it taken so long to find a public evangelical lead on these kinds of issues? Why is it when I seek to follow the real Jesus I am marginalised most by those who claim to know him best? Why, when our evangelical faith and foundations are so secure, are we the most insecure, failing to respond creatively to challenge and change for the sake of the Kingdom of God? Only honest reflection on these questions will enable us to face the pertinent question: What on earth are we doing?…Honesty will compel us to acknowledge that fear has paralysed us: fear of the fundamentalist shadow that hangs over us; fear of alienating our own people; fear of rejection and hostility.…a greater fear needs to compel us: a fear that in seeking to gain the Kingdom we lose it by a betrayal of its priorities and values…our goal is to encourage commitment to action and change. Such a commitment is demanding: it demands that we take risks; that we act in our community with faith and integrity; that we do something. 866

866

D. Porter, ‘The Pertinent Question’, in What Does the Lord Require of Us?, 26–7.

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Porter's comments are significant in that they summarize key aspects of ECONI's interpretation of evangelicalism's failures of the past and its challenges for the future. Three goals implicit in Porter's statement can be summarized as follows. First, in the past evangelicals committed to the primacy of God's Word had failed to form a coherent and effective alternative to the inhibiting consensus of religious nationalism as represented by the Orange Order and Paisleyism on the one hand and orthodox powerlessness on the other. Porter's comments on his frustration at being faced with a choice between ‘fundamentalist fuming’ and ‘evangelical silence’ is indicative of a desire to forge a third way between the two. This is made explicit in ECONI's Strategic Vision Plan; ‘It is essential that Christian disciples in the modern world reject both the pietistic separation of faith and society and the fundamentalist integration of faith and politics. We therefore endeavour to embrace a biblical world view that emphasizes both our primary loyalty to the Kingdom of God and our understanding of the good news of the kingdom as being for the whole of life, for both the individual and society.’867 The formation of ECONI is therefore an attempt to fill that void and establish the ‘creative evangelical response’ so long absent from Northern Ireland. Second, in contrast to the past, ECONI states it is ‘committed to tackle the hard issues that confront us’.868 ECONI sees itself as distinct in that it is willing to take risks of incurring opposition from the ‘fundamentalist shadow’ and of alienating evangelicals unprepared to face up to the implications of biblical teaching applied to the Northern Ireland situation. Porter identifies fear as a key reason for the lack of a credible evangelical alternative to the dogmatic certainty represented by Orangeism and particularly Paisleyism. In this reconstruction, evangelicalism had become captive to the forces of religious nationalism out of an unwillingness to engage in conflict and enter the battlefield for the soul of authentic biblical Christianity. ECONI's aim to correct this failure is spelt out in the Pathways booklet, The Politics of Holiness, ‘Like the master we may have to consciously

867

ECONI Strategic Vision Plan 1996–2000 (Belfast: ECONI, Apr. 1996, 10. I am grateful to David Porter for making this material available.

868

Strategic Vision Plan, 10.


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confront and expose those visions of holiness that are leading the people of God away from their calling. It may be that we cannot practise true holiness until we are prepared to challenge false ideas of holiness that have affected our community.’869 Third, Porter's comments also display a determination to implement change. In ECONI's reconstruction, the consequence of past evangelical inaction, whether due to a pietistic withdrawal from the world or the production of statements with no mechanism for implementation, meant that evangelical beliefs had had little effect on society. A central concern of the organization is with ‘the vitality, credibility, and integrity of the life and witness of the church in this community’.870 Elsewhere Thomson writes of the encouragement that there are ‘other evangelicals who are equally committed to challenging the failings of evangelicalism in this country’.871 To this trinity of objectives a fourth should be added, made explicit in the Pathways booklet, The Fire and the Hammer, namely, that ECONI perceives itself as fulfilling a prophetic role to the Church in the sense that its voice carries a double-edged message of hope or judgement. The underlying theme of the booklet is a comparison between the religious and political crisis facing Judah in Jeremiah's time and the contemporary challenges facing God's people in Northern Ireland. A reading of the publication indicates that, just as in Jeremiah's time, ECONI is the minority voice inviting the people of God in Northern Ireland to consider the possibility that their enemy may even be God himself. Thomson's analysis of the evangelical community in Northern Ireland in 1997 was of a numerically strong, missionary-minded and spiritually blessed people. Yet in a stinging indictment he goes on to describe Ulster evangelicals as a people whose hearing of the word of God is compromised. We have made the weapon of God's Spirit into a weapon of our own beliefs. We proclaim that we have set aside the idols of false religion, yet in their place we have established our idols of land and people. We proclaim

869

A. Thomson, The Politics of Holiness (Belfast: ECONI, 1998, 39.

870


871

A. Thomson, The Fractured Family: Fundamentalists, Evangelicals and ECONI (Belfast: ECONI, 1995, 23 (emphasis mine).

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our worship of the Lord of all, the ruler of the heavens and the earth, yet we have made of him a tribal deity, invoking him to preserve our land. We proclaim ourselves defenders and proclaimers of the truth of God, yet our truth is loveless and graceless, sometimes vicious and embittered. We proclaim ourselves to be hearers of the word, yet our ears are closed to the word that challenges our traditions.…We wish only to see the fire and hammer fall on others—our enemies, yet we do not wish it to fall on us, we see no need for it to fall on us. Yet perhaps God's anger is coming close to us. Perhaps the hammer is about to fall, perhaps the fire is about to consume. 872 The choice for Northern Christians is presented as a stark one. Will they stubbornly refuse to heed the call of God and face judgement or will they grasp the ‘opportunity to be architects of their own future’ and follow the ways of the Lord?873 Given these four goals, it can be assessed how the group has tried to define itself, to use Volf's terminology, as distinct from both complicit and impotent forms of Ulster evangelicalism.

8.2.1 Distance from complicit evangelicalism As mentioned above, Faith in Ulster is presented as a contribution to a debate. ECONI's understanding of the nature of the debate is sketched in the Foreword in the form of several questions that, when answered in the affirmative, define the reason for the group's existence: ‘Had evangelicals in our community failed a test of loyalty? [to God] Had we been guilty of setting aside the values and priorities of the Kingdom of God in the cause of defending Ulster? Had Ulster—the land, the culture, the Protestant people—become our God? For Ulster evangelicals in the choice between Faith and Ulster, was it God who had lost out?’874 It is obvious that ECONI's answer to these rhetorical questions is ‘Yes’. Thomson continues by referring to the ‘desire to distance oneself from a rejected ideology’. Elsewhere he writes of a view that is ‘in direct opposition to the position of ECONI. This view is best described as a form of religious nationalism.’875 The four (Presbyterian) ECONI contributors to Faith in Ulster all, in different ways, emphatically reject the notion that the political fortunes of Ulster are necessarily inter

872

A. Thomson, The Fire and the Hammer (Belfast: ECONI, 1997, 16–17.

873

Ibid. 23.

874

Faith in Ulster, 7.

875

Thomson, Fractured Family, 23 (emphasis mine).


271

twined with the advance of the Gospel. Perhaps because they are personal reflections they are more candid than diplomatically crafted official statements. David Hewitt argues that a ‘lethal mix of national identity, bad religion and exclusive claims to pieces of land’ has left a legacy where the credibility of the Gospel will be tested by the response of those who claim to follow Christ.876 By implication ‘bad religion’ is defined as that which sanctifies the political objectives of a nationalist ideology. From my previous analysis this includes both Orangeism and Paisleyism. Stephen Williams proposes that even securing Ulster's safety will not ‘necessarily mean gaining the ability to worship in spirit and in truth: in fact, we may, en route, destroy spirit and forfeit truth’.877 Roz Stirling admits to ‘great difficulty with any expression or slogan that even suggests that allegiance to God is equal with any other allegiance’.878 Steven Stockman goes further in confessing to feelings of ‘rage’ at the ‘perversion’ of the phrase For God and Ulster. Referring to Orange marches, he states that he has ‘no doubt that I have seen evil masquerading behind words that have no root or vine or fruit’. Again in reference to the Orange Institutions, he argues that genuine Christian discipleship should be ‘the antithesis of Drumcree’ and those who defend the slogan by saying God comes first will be judged by the words of Jesus, ‘by their fruits you shall know them’.879 Consistent with these sentiments, David McMillan writes of ‘being driven into action by an abhorrence of the association of the Gospel with an Ulster Protestant / Unionist culture’.880 It is thus clear that ECONI has an explicit agenda of countering the historically dominant analysis of the Irish problem within

876

D. Hewitt, Faith in Ulster, 62–3.

877

S. N. Williams, Faith in Ulster, 118. Stephen Williams is Professor of Systematic Theology at the Presbyterian Union Theological College, Belfast and a member of the ECONI Steering Group.

878

R. Stirling, Faith in Ulster, 107. Roz Stirling is employed as Youth Officer for the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and is a member of the ECONI Steering Group.

879

S. Stockman, Faith in Ulster, 109–10. Steven Stockman is an ordained minister of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and a member of the ECONI Steering Group.

880

D. McMillan, ‘From Sunny Norn Iron’, Lion and Lamb, 11 (Jan. / Feb. 1997) 2. David McMillan is a Baptist pastor and became Chairman of the ECONI Steering Group in 1997.

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evangelicalism as represented by the Orange Order and in more extreme form by Ian Paisley. There is a crusading element in ECONI's objectives to effect change at a popular level. To be successful it necessarily entails diminishing support for ‘bad religion’. The organization's Strategic Vision Plan makes this goal transparent: Central to this problem for the Christian faith is the potent mix of religion and national identity. The most notable feature of this influence is the extent to which our conflict of culture and nationality has been interpreted by religious language and images—specifically images of religious conflict. This interpretation has resulted in a religiously inspired sanctification of one community and a corresponding demonisation of the other…This factor of religious nationalism is a major spiritual force to be countered within both Protestantism and Catholicism. 881 Thus, while ECONI publicity material presents its goals in a more positive light—as promoting authentic biblical principles and facilitating peacemaking—the corollary is that defining religious nationalism as a spiritual force to be opposed implicitly declares those propagating forms of religious nationalism as illegitimate or distorted expressions of evangelicalism. Thomson writes, ‘We do, however have a biblical responsibility to challenge attitudes and beliefs that are dishonouring to God, and religious nationalism, whatever its source, dishonours God.’882 He defines religious nationalism by quoting from Paisleyism's oracles, the Protestant Telegraph and the New Protestant Telegraph, alongside the Ulster Bulwark.883 The ‘crucial conviction’ underlying the ideology is a fusion of horizons whereby the fate of Ulster is inextricably linked with the fate of Protestant truth: ‘This is no mere matter of politics—eschatological conflicts are being played out in the fields and lanes of Ulster. At peril is not just a community but the future of the Christian Gospel itself. This is an analysis that ECONI firmly opposes as incompatible with true evangelicalism.’884

881


882

Thomson, Fractured Family, 24.

883

Ibid. 24–5. The Ulster Bulwark is a publication of the Evangelical Protestant Society.

884

Ibid. 25.


273

Three reasons are presented to substantiate the illegitimacy of the religious nationalist perspective. First, ECONI emphatically rejects the proposition that ‘any one country is uniquely special to God’ because since New Testament times the people of God ‘constitute a transnational community with an identity that transcends the constraints of nationalism or patriotism’.885 Second, the tendency of ‘some evangelicals’ to confuse the people of Ulster Protestantism with the people of God is described as ‘a major error and a dangerous error’ since unbelieving Protestants are ‘no different from other unbelievers, they enjoy no special status before God’.886 Third, religious nationalism's objective to implement and protect a Protestant ethos in Ulster is condemned in terms that illustrate the depth of the ideological gulf between ECONI and the Orange/Paisley end of the evangelical spectrum: ‘The truth is that a Protestant state is not a Christian state—whatever that might be. It is therefore imperative that evangelicals denounce the very notion of a state founded on the views of a religious group. A Protestant state is no more godly than a Catholic state or a secular state. Indeed, taking the name of God as justification for such a position these individuals risk taking the name of God in vain—the practice of idolatry.’887 The implications of such beliefs are criticized with equal passion. They are said to marginalize the minority community as ‘unfit to exercise political power’ and as ‘second-class citizens’ and ‘aliens’ in Northern Ireland. To summarize: it is evident that in effect ECONI perceives itself as engaged in an ideological and spiritual battle for the claim to represent authentic, biblical, and evangelical faith in Ulster. Thomson makes this explicit: ‘True followers will not fear that their holiness will be contaminated by others. True followers, like Jesus, will have a holiness of the centre, not of the boundaries. In Northern Ireland, true followers will, like their master, have to challenge the boundaries that have been drawn by others.’888 By implication, ‘untrue’ followers of Jesus are embodied by those who hold to the core beliefs of what I have labelled closed evangelicalism.

885

Ibid. 25.

886

Ibid. 26.

887

Ibid. 26.

888

Thomson, The Politics of Holiness, 39.

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8.2.2 Distance from impotent evangelicalism However, it should be noted that ECONI has also ‘created space’ as a distinct identity in its deliberate decision not to mirror the passive response of the institutional Churches, which has been a particular characteristic of the Presbyterian Church. Chapter 7 described how, while Presbyterian evangelicalism during the ‘golden era’ may not have fully endorsed the ideology of Orange religious nationalism, it withdrew into the comfortable security of an identity defined by Britishness, contentment, and majority control. The overriding characteristic of the evangelicalism of this period was the absence of any felt need to change. Questions of national allegiance and political reform were thought to have been settled with Partition. The case was closed. ECONI's analysis presents a rigorous critique of such partisan inertia. It contends that ‘often the major denominations are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as chaplains to their own side of the ethnic divide.’889 In the light of this reality, the Strategic Vision Plan declares a willingness ‘to critique the past in the light of God's word…this demands that we critically evaluate our continuing values, actions and attitudes and take the risk of stepping outside the safe boundaries of our Evangelical tradition…’.890 While the primary target in The Fire and the Hammer may be a tribal religion that idolizes ‘land and people’, it is clear that a secondary target is those who are either blind to the dangers of the surrounding false religion or see it and yet stay silent. The situation in Judah is reconstructed as one where a warped society gives the appearance of normality. Yet, while many remain blind to the flaws of their society, the few see through the falsity of it all. Among the few some stay quiet—trying to live as best they can…But there are others—the few among the few; those who see not just a handful of unfortunate laws, but a people at war with their God…they see a people confident in God's blessing, bringing on themselves God's judgement…they know the wrath of God on false religion and on those who lead his people into idolatry, pride and complacency…The few among the few hear the voice of God and are compelled to speak—whatever the cost. 891

889

Strategic Vision Plan, 5 (emphasis mine).

890

Ibid. 6.

891

Thomson, The Fire and the Hammer, 5.


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This historical context is directly applied to Northern Ireland where the people of God face ‘the same call’ to listen to the radical message of God's Word. Neither silence, nor donning an insulating cloak of complacency, is viewed as a viable option for the people of God. Elsewhere Thomson, in discussing the construction of boundaries of political allegiance and identity, argues that although some may have participated ‘almost unconsciously, not realising…the consequences’ and others may ‘console ourselves with the thought that we have not built up the barriers’ the real questions for all evangelicals are ‘how many of us have followed the master in breaking them down? How many of us have been willing to break through the boundaries?…Wherever we stand if we have not been breaking through the boundaries and bringing the presence of a God centred holiness into the life of our community we have, in effect, subverted the work of the gospel in Northern Ireland.’892 While official statements within Irish Presbyterianism may closely parallel ECONI's interpretation of the challenges facing those committed to applying biblical principles to the Northern conflict, it is clear that ECONI's highly activist approach is in marked contrast to Presbyterianism's limited capacity to introduce change. The group manifestly believes that ‘stepping outside safe boundaries’ means engaging at local church level with the aim of changing attitudes and actions, a strategy alien to Presbyterian Church structure. Nor was denominational inactivity due solely to cumbersome Church organization. When moderator Samuel Hutchinson candidly remarked that the ‘muted’ effect of ‘admirable sentiments’ expressed by his Church and others was also due to the suspicion and distrust of any who engaged in cross-community ventures within the context of the zero-sum game of nationalist / unionist politics. He admitted that ‘the time was therefore ripe for the emergence of a voice that was clearly evangelical in tone…and that would be courageous enough to speak out on burning issues’.893 By implication the Churches had failed to offer a radical alternative to religious nationalism. It seems that ECONI's ability to embrace a wide spectrum of evangelicals is indicative of its significant support

892

Thomson, The Politics of Holiness, 38–9.

893

Hutchinson, Little Acorn, 5.

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within the evangelical constituency. The diverse theological background of those who have affirmed ECONI's cause894 suggests that the organization has become a focal point for a significant cross-section of Ulster evangelicalism wishing to distance itself from the limited alternatives of the ‘golden era’.

8.3 ESTABLISHING BELONGING: ECONI AND ULSTER EVANGELICALISM The converse side of ECONI's formation of a discrete identity, questioning long-established evangelical political assumptions, is a clear objective to establish a sense of belonging to historic evangelicalism. This has been attempted in two ways. The first tactic has involved an exhaustive proclamation and defence of the organization's evangelical credentials. The second has been to establish a biblical basis for a porous evangelical identity. In other words, one that is inclusive rather than exclusive in character. Each of these approaches will be examined in turn.

8.3.1 Asserting evangelical orthodoxy An ECONI discussion paper asserts, ‘ECONI grew out of and reflects the evangelical tradition within the broad Protestant community.’895 However, given the existence of fiercely competing claims of what constitutes genuine evangelicalism in Ulster, ECONI has been forced to demonstrate that its ethos represents an authentic evangelical response to the Northern Ireland conflict. David Porter confesses to a personal reluctance to ‘respond to the pressure to define Evangelicalism’ but notes that ‘the response from within the Evangelical family whose commitment to God requires a commitment to Ulster is primarily to attack our Evangelical credentials…the more we address the

894

ECONI's claim to ‘have drawn support from across the evangelical spectrum’ (Thomson, The Fractured Family, 22) is substantiated by a survey of those who have contributed in print or by active participation in events. The list for example includes leaders from Baptist, Presbyterian, Elim Pentecostal, Christian Fellowship Church (CFC), Methodist, Brethren, Anglican, Evangelical Presbyterian, and Reformed Presbyterian Churches.

895

ECONI, ‘The Evangelicals of ECONI: Discussion Paper on Evangelicalism Presented to the Steering Group’ (Belfast: ECONI, 17 Apr. 1997). I am grateful to David Porter for making this paper available.


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specifics of our situation the more our integrity as Evangelicals is questioned.’896 As Derek Poole, ECONI Development Officer, admits ‘the struggle to define the nature of Evangelicalism goes right to the heart of our work. What does it mean for Christians who identify with this particular heritage and value its theological emphasis to engage in peace, justice, and reconciliation?’897 Given this context the group has sought to substantiate its claim to represent biblical faith by adopting three complementary approaches.

8.3.1.1 Confessional orthodoxy The first method involves defining confessional orthodoxy. ECONI publications emphasize that it is an organization holding to, and arising from within, traditional core beliefs of evangelicalism. An important consequence of claiming to speak from within the recognized boundaries of evangelicalism is that there is a higher probability of being listened to by that constituency. A recurring theme of this study has been how the key to substantiating contemporary legitimacy is the ability to demonstrate a sense of continuity with the past. This is true of nationalism and its historic-myth as well as of evangelicalism as a modern expression of first-century Christianity.898 ECONI, operating in a highly volatile political environment and faced with a deeply rooted historic unionist sense of fear, siege, and betrayal, can only hope to be heard by those it is addressing if it is trusted theologically, while simultaneously winning respect through the coherence of its arguments. David Hewitt, reflecting upon the origins of ECONI, notes that ‘a desire for action was balanced by the awareness that in addressing evangelical protestants in Northern Ireland we needed to be sensitive to that community's fears. Only so could we hope to bring them with us as we sought the Word of God for Northern Ireland.’899

896

D. Porter, Lion and Lamb, Special Issue, 14 (Autumn 1997, 3–4.

897

D. Poole, ‘Evangelicalism: The Vital Ingredients’, Lion and Lamb, Special Issue, 14 (Autumn 1997, 1.

898

For example see John Stott's book, Christ the Controversialist, the purpose of which is ‘to argue that “evangelical” Christianity is authentic Christianity, true, original and pure’. J. R. W. Stott, Christ the Controversialist (London: Tyndale, 1970, 13. See also the discussion of evangelicalism in s. 4. 1.

899

D. Hewitt, What Does the Lord Require of Us?, 6.

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How has ECONI attempted to win this trust? The answer lies in the group's own determination to be a single-issue movement.900 The issue in focus is the role of evangelicalism within a situation of conflicting national identities. Thomson acknowledges that other groups have raised broadly similar questions but claims that ‘ECONI's position is grounded in a distinctively evangelical theological perspective.’901 He continues by outlining an apologetic of this approach, claiming it is shaped by the doctrines of Scripture, God, Humanity, Salvation, the Church, and the Kingdom of God.902 The implications of each doctrine are briefly applied not only to justify ECONI's strategy but also to root it in an evangelical framework of belief. The doctrine of Scripture means that all human traditions, whether theological, cultural, or political, should be measured against biblical truth. The doctrine of God as Lord of creation requires a constant ‘testing of all our beliefs and attitudes to see if they glorify him’. The doctrine of Man as made in the image of God means that it is ‘indefensible for Christians by their attitudes, actions or words to demean or discount others’. The doctrine of Salvation that calls believers to follow Jesus, teaches that Christians ‘have a responsibility to challenge and overcome evil whatever its source’. The doctrine of the Church calls the people of God to live as the transformed body of Christ, exhibiting transformed attitudes in the social and political realms. The doctrine of the Kingdom of God teaches that disciples have submitted to the reign of God. If God is king then all other allegiances become secondary. The application is categorical: ‘Christians cannot live for God and Ulster.’ It is evident that at every point, ECONI's positive presentation of evangelical priorities simultaneously includes a negative critique of the attitudes and beliefs of closed evangelicalism. The argument seeks to establish that not only do the group's aims derive from obedience to biblical doctrine (an essential defining characteristic of evangelical belief), but also they are portrayed as an imperative outworking of authentic faith. Christians who believe that all forms of social action are a ‘distraction’ and ‘doomed to fail’ because of their lack of evangelistic em

900

Thomson, The Fractured Family, 20.

901


902

Ibid. 20–2.


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phasis are described as holding a ‘narrowly circumscribed’ view of the Gospel that fails to appreciate the full implications of the Gospel for the contemporary world.903 In the Ulster context, ECONI's delineation of the boundaries of confessional orthodoxy locates Orange and Paisleyite identities outside the limits of bona fide evangelicalism.

8.3.1.2 Institutional links within evangelicalism Institutional relationships reveal much about the ethos and doctrinal stance of an organization. ECONI states that ‘As a group we are part of a bigger Evangelical constituency, a wider church and of society as a whole. We therefore are willing to develop strategic partnerships with a range of other Christian agencies, churches and community groups and movements, always retaining our own distinctives as an Evangelical Christian group.’904 The connection with Stott and Storkey mentioned above is significant in terms of to what type of evangelicalism ECONI belongs. ECONI is a member of EA and its Deed of Trust is founded on the EA's basis of faith. David Porter is a member of the EA's Executive Council and regularly contributes to Third Way.905 It can be argued that a group like ECONI is symptomatic of the revitalization of evangelicalism in the post-war period discussed in Chapter 4. The signing of the 1974 Lausanne Covenant and the growing strength of the EA in the United Kingdom reflected a renewal of evangelical concern for social action to balance a predilection for a private personal piety unconnected with the world. ECONI, as an evangelical movement concerned to relate Christian faith with the surrounding political world, should be understood within this wider framework of recent evangelical history. ECONI's basis of faith is specifically centred on the Lausanne Covenant, and, as suggested in Chapter 4, the group displays many of the characteristics of Warner's ‘reconstructed evangelicals’ in its emphasis on social justice and peacemaking, critical view of traditional evangelical shibboleths, non-defensive inclusive ethos, and preference of minimal orthodoxy rather than maximal dogmatism as a basis

903

Ibid. 2.

904


905

A Christian magazine seeking to relate biblical faith to secular matters. It is based on the 1974 Lausanne Covenant, an evangelical declaration of intent regarding the unfinished task of world evangelization.

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for evangelical unity. It is not without significance that when, in 1999, the organization relaunched a major branch of its ministry as a ‘Centre for Contemporary Christianity in Ireland’ (CCCI) it deliberately eschewed the term ‘evangelical’ in favour of the broader word ‘Christianity’. London Bible College chose the same option in its redrafted postconservative basis of faith (LBC-1998). This point will be of particular relevance in my interpretation of ECONI's relationship with a fundamentalist movement like Paisleyism.

8.3.1.3 Ecumenical caution The history of peacemaking initiatives in Northern Ireland is littered with myriad cross-community groups seeking to encourage reconciliation and understanding between the divided communities. Organizations, both Christian and secular, have emerged, some to make a short dramatic impact like the Peace People, others to become established as part of what has become a cross-community industry within the North.906 The vast majority of groups have, at the centre of their programmes, activities facilitating contact between Protestants and Catholics designed to promote interpersonal relationships and break down the pernicious influence of stereotypes. Some Christian groups, such as the Corrymeela Community, foster reconciliation primarily through the healing and deepening of relationships.907 Others like the Christian Renewal Centre (CRC) in Rostrevor, seek to develop restored relationships from an evangelical and charismatic perspective as a consequence of an individual's reconciliation to God through faith in Christ.908

906

Some examples of Christian cross-community organizations are the Corrymeela Community, the Rostrevor Christian Renewal Centre, the City of Belfast YMCA, and the Cornerstone Community. Protestant and Catholic Encounter (PACE) and the now defunct Peace People are representative of a secular approach.

907

A central aim of Corrymeela is reconciliation on the horizontal plane, between people, through ‘meeting, dialogue and learning’ in order ‘to dispel ignorance, prejudice and fear and to promote mutual respect, trust and co-operation’. ‘Who We Are’, Corrymeela Website at www.corrymeela.org.uk (July 1998).

908

The CRC was founded in 1974 by Revd Cecil Kerr, operates around a mixed community of believers from Protestant and Catholic backgrounds seeking to model a pattern of reconciled relationships made possible by being joined ‘in Christ’.


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It is significant that ECONI has chosen not to engage in such cross-community activities and displays a marked reluctance to be officially identified as an ecumenical peacemaking group. This is despite clear evidence that leading evangelicals in ECONI have little difficulty recognizing the authenticity of evangelical Catholic experience.909 No practising Roman Catholics occupy positions on the ECONI steering group, central coordinating committee or Trust. While ECONI maintains dialogue with a wide range of political and theological organizations, no Roman Catholics have been invited to represent ECONI in a public forum. The reasons for this seem to be twofold. The first is theological. The group has published an analysis of the theology of the Evangelical Catholic Initiative (ECI), describing it as ‘incoherent, eclectic and confused’.910 The reasons given for this conclusion are that, even while the genuineness of their Christian faith is not in question and while ECI affirmations may be recognizably evangelical in tone,911 they are held in tandem with other beliefs that ‘are incompatible with evangelical conviction’. Furthermore, Thomson argues that evangelicalism only has meaning within a fundamental theological and confessional core. If this core is abandoned, evangelicalism is reduced to meaninglessness. If it is maintained then ‘we have to say that “evangelical Catholics” are not evangelicals’.912 This conclusion is tempered by a willingness to ‘enter into a constructive debate’ with evangelical Catholics on how to

909

David Hewitt has recounted his spiritual journey: ‘My understanding of Scripture had led me to believe that the Kingdom of God was fairly well centred in the evangelical Protestant tradition. But now, through a friend from my own evangelical tradition I was discovering practising Catholics whose commitment to Jesus Christ and the Scriptures was undeniable.’ See Faith in Ulster, 62. See also David Montgomery's plea (a Presbyterian minister and member of the Steering Group) for born-again Biblebased Catholics to be accepted as evangelicals. D. Montgomery, ‘Sorting Out the Family: Is Evangelicalism a Purely Protestant Phenomenon?’, Lion and Lamb, Special Issue, 14 (Autumn 1997, 22–5.

910

A. Thomson, ‘A World of Difference: The Evangelicals of ECONI’, Lion and Lamb, Special Issue, 14 (Autumn 1997, 9.

911

See the seminal leaflet What is an Evangelical Catholic? published with ecclesiastical permission by a group of evangelical Catholics in 1992. ECI emerged out of this initiative.

912

Thomson, ‘A World of Difference’, 10. David Porter shares this view in the same issue, 3.

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work together, ‘not on the basis of a shared evangelical identity but on a shared Christian faith’.913 ECONI's stance on this issue, while clearly not a unanimous one, has helped to strengthen the organization's evangelical credentials within the context of a conservative religious climate. The second reason is pragmatic. Within the defensive mindset of much of Ulster evangelicalism, attitudes to the ‘ecumenical involvement’ have become a defining test of theological orthodoxy. Those participating in the mildest form of Protestant and Catholic encounter are labelled ‘ecumenical’ and therefore liberal. As is shown below, the main line of attack on ECONI within evangelicalism is on precisely this issue, despite the group's careful determination not to have its primary objectives confused with distracting controversy.

8.3.2 An inclusive identity The second identifiable means by which the organization has attempted to secure a sense of belonging within evangelicalism is in the type of evangelical identity it represents. In essence it can be argued that this is an identity of embrace rather than exclusion, although, as we will see, there can be inherent contradictions in pushing the borders of an inclusive identity too far. It has been shown how ECONI, at both leadership and popular levels, has drawn minority support from a wide spectrum of Ulster evangelicalism. As an organization operating on the basis of fundamental evangelical affirmations and free of denominational history and affiliations, it has enjoyed the advantage of enabling supporters to leave their theological distinctives to one side. However, it is in ECONI's attitude to its Other (closed evangelicalism) that its attempt to create a self-consciously inclusive identity can most clearly be demonstrated. This approach is articulated in the foreword of Faith in Ulster where it is acknowledged that ‘the zeal of the new convert can lead to a neglect of the obvious. In a desire to distance oneself from a rejected ideology, it is all too easy to distance oneself from those from whom it still has meaning. In the rush to speak, to be an alternative voice, there is a danger that we no longer listen to the

913

Thomson, ‘A World of Difference’, 10. David Porter shares this view in the same issue, 10.


283

legitimate hopes and fears, hurts and expectations of those with whom we differ.’914 The book is described also as ‘an exercise in listening’, to voices outside the ECONI fold. Elsewhere, specifically in relation to the Loyal Institutions, David McMillan writes of the need to listen and the need to build relationships…Driven into action by an abhorrence of the association of the Gospel with Ulster Protestant/Unionist culture, the last thing some of us thought of doing was to spend time understanding, listening and engaging with those in our own community with whom we disagreed. We assumed too much knowledge, built barriers rather than bridges and were perceived as shouting from the safety of a hilltop—just like other ecclesiastical figures—rather than getting involved at the coal face. 915 How has this desire for dialogue been applied to ECONI's attitudes to Paisleyism, Orangeism, and Catholicism? An assessment of how successful ECONI has been in forging an inclusive evangelical identity will follow in section 8.3.3.

8.3.2.1 Attitude to Paisleyism Although rarely mentioning Ian Paisley by name, it is clear that the very existence of ECONI and its entire theological perspective stand in direct opposition to the ideology of Paisleyism. It is therefore intriguing that the group steadfastly refuses to define Paisleyism as outside the parameters of evangelicalism. In a review of Persecuting Zeal, Thomson rejects Cooke's attempt to ‘define—or redefine—Protestantism and evangelicalism in a way that excludes or marginalises Paisley’, contending that while Paisley's views should be challenged, he represents ‘one authentic voice of the Protestant tradition’.916 Elsewhere he accepts that fundamentalism, of which Paisleyism is a manifestation, should be defined as ‘an integral part of evangelicalism’,917 itself best understood as ‘a spectrum’ of beliefs and attitudes. The group is particularly careful to reject popular caricatures that refuse ‘to

914

Faith in Ulster, 7.

915

‘From Sunny Norn Iron’, 3. McMillan goes on to urge evangelicals to be active in attending Orange events in order ‘to listen, witness and engage’. The mention of ‘other ecclesiastical figures’ is probably a reference to Ian Paisley and the launch of the ‘Third Force’ on a Co. Antrim hilltop in 1981.

916

A. Thomson, Lion and Lamb (Nov. / Dec. 1996, 11.

917

Fractured Family, 16.

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take fundamentalism seriously as a theological and historical phenomenon’. They refute the charge that fundamentalism is inherently anti-intellectual arguing that a more accurate description of the movement is ‘antimodern’.918 Thomson rejects ‘superficial’ and ‘pejorative’ approaches to fundamentalism common amongst evangelical critics. He accuses them of being embarrassed by their shared theological and historical roots and defining fundamentalism ‘in a way that allows them as “evangelicals” to distance themselves from “fundamentalists” ’.919 He argues that ‘it would be wrong to oppose their exclusivist understanding of evangelicalism with one of our own.’920 Thus ECONI, while acutely aware of the areas of contention between fundamentalism and evangelicalism, accepts the diversity of both within a broad evangelical identity. Rather than exclusion they argue for the right ‘to challenge attitudes and beliefs that are dishonouring to God’, through persuasion, dialogue, and respect. Thomson contends that a diagnosis of religious nationalism is not a justification for dismissing all such people as sectarian or bigoted. The great majority of these folk are godly and spiritual people, leading exemplary Christian lives…The story of God's people, both in Scripture and throughout Christian history, is a story of God's mercy and patience with flawed people. When God sees flaws in his people he does not reject them—instead he remakes them. Persistent disobedience does bring judgement—but the judgement belongs to God. 921

8.3.2.2 Attitude to Orangeism ECONI's relationship with the Orange Order is most clearly defined in an issue of Lion and Lamb devoted to the subject. The director writes that ‘Several of us in the ECONI Steering Group have personal and family backgrounds in the Loyal Institutions. Our journeys of Christian discipleship have brought us to biblically challenge and critique many of the assumptions at the heart of Orangeism.’922 Yet, the full context of the language

918


919

A. Thomson, ‘Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism’, in Richardson, Tapestry of Beliefs, 249–61.

920

Thomson, ‘A World of Difference’, 8.

921


922

D. Porter, ‘From the Director’, Lion and Lamb, 13 (Summer 1997, 1.


285

employed by Porter should not be overlooked. He talks of ‘our fellow evangelicals within the order’ and in asking the question whether Jesus is with them, he affirms as part of ‘our commitment to our brothers in Christ in the orders, we pray and look for evidence that he is’.923 For ECONI the crux of the matter is Orangeism's claim to represent biblical Protestantism. An open letter from the group to the Orange Order challenges believers within Orangeism to fulfil this assertion by displaying obedience to biblical teaching in four ethical areas. First, by following the example of Jesus in choosing to suffer injustice and trust to the justice of God. Second, to consider the effect of an unwanted parade on the effective proclamation of the Gospel to the community in that area. Third, voluntarily to give up legitimate rights for the sake of the Gospel. Fourth, to submit to authorities instituted by God, even when it is believed their decisions are unjust and unfair. The letter closes by reminding ‘Christian members of the Institutions’ that they are under ‘a biblical obligation to ensure that their actions and words are determined by the word of God, not human traditions’.924 It is clear that official ECONI policy is not to exclude the Order as pseudo-evangelical, but to let it be judged according to its fidelity to biblical ethics. In this way, the group are attempting to maintain dialogue while leaving a verdict on the biblical legitimacy of Orangeism in abeyance. However, it is significant that the same issue contains a sustained polemic against the biblical basis of Orangeism that attacks the Christian integrity of the organization on seven fronts: its Masonic heritage and structure; unscriptural secrecy; extra-judicial oaths; displacing the rightful role of the Church in proclaiming the faith; exercising discipline and binding the conscience of a member; the fusion of faith with political Protestantism; the damaging effect of partisan political loyalty on the task of spreading the Gospel; and the unqualified allegiance demanded of Orangemen to the British constitution that usurps the rightful place of Christ as Head of the Church.925

923

Ibid. 1.

924

ECONI, ‘Seek Peace and Pursue It: An Open Letter to Christians in the Loyal Institutions’, Lion and Lamb, 13 (Summer 1997, 4–6.

925

N. Wilson, ‘Covenanters and the Orange Order’, Lion and Lamb, 13 (Summer 1997), 10–14.

286


Wilson's criticisms are presented as those of an individual from a Covenanting perspective alongside those of Brian Kennaway of the Orange Order. It is evident that, as with Paisleyism, ECONI are attempting to achieve a delicate balance of distance and belonging. This is despite clear indications that they view the ideology of Orangeism as a corruption of the Gospel. The group's strategy appears to be to stimulate debate about key issues of Christian citizenship rather than be diverted into acrimonious public arguments. Having established distance through a trenchant critique of closed evangelicalism, the group is endeavouring to maintain some sense of belonging with traditional forms of Ulster evangelicalism by opting not to be drawn into official pronouncements on their authenticity (or lack thereof).

8.3.2.3 Attitudes to Catholicism It is consistent with ECONI's unwillingness to be distracted from its primary objective that it takes no official position on the status of the Roman Catholic Church. The group's thinking is most clearly spelt out in the Pathways booklet, Beyond Fear, Suspicion and Hostility. Three representative views held by ‘mainstream evangelicals’ within ECONI are described in turn. Despite differences, ‘all respect one another's integrity’ and ‘as evangelicals…are committed to searching the Scriptures together to see where the full truth lies’.926 A common foundation for all three views is a ‘rejection of an attitude of hostility towards Roman Catholicism’. In a specific reference to Free Presbyterian beliefs (also applicable to Orangeism), this prejudice is connected with extreme religious views of Rome as ‘evil, satanic and irredeemable’. In this scheme, Rome is the inspiration for Irish nationalism's assault on Northern Ireland and thus a deadly threat to Ulster's Protestant heritage. Thomson argues that it is ‘a false assumption’ to infer that this view is representative of Ulster evangelicalism as a whole, stating, ‘many people within the large evangelical community within Northern Ireland reject this extreme interpretation’.927

926

A. Thomson, Beyond Fear, Suspicion and Hostility: Evangelical –Roman Catholic Relationships (Belfast: ECONI, 1994 5 (emphasis original).

927

Ibid. 8.


287

Clearly then, in keeping with a porous identity, the basic thrust of ECONI's approach to Roman Catholicism is to facilitate cooperation and understanding. The three positions can be briefly summarized. The first is pragmatic ecumenism. Evangelical proponents of this view stress the importance of Christian unity, not through all embracing Church structures, but through ‘cooperation in practical and social matters, in fellowship, in worship and in mission’.928 While Catholicism contains error, truth is also present. Rome can be understood as a Christian Church in that all denominations are imperfect manifestations of the invisible Church, which is not limited to any one denomination. Significant changes within Catholicism since Vatican II are taken as opportunities to establish ‘new, positive relationships’ with Roman Catholics. Closer relationships can result in joint worship (‘if the service contains nothing contrary to evangelical conviction’) and witness (‘provided there is agreement on the content of what is being proclaimed’). The second approach is pragmatic separatism. The key issue for pragmatic separatists is their analysis that, despite changes, Rome does not clearly proclaim the fundamental truths of the Gospel and continues to assert doctrines incompatible with evangelical faith. Since there is no shared understanding of, or commitment to, truth, ‘it follows from this that all talk of denominational unity, common worship, or common evangelism is pointless’.929 This position allows for individual and informal meetings for prayer and fellowship with other believers, cooperation on issues of common concern and ‘open and honest’ dialogue, but it resists any formal, inter-Church associations. The third, rather naïve, perspective called standing together, downplays the importance of denominational structures, arguing that the Church is simply ‘a local gathering of those who have professed faith in Jesus Christ’. Since denominations are not Churches, believers can engage in fellowship, worship, and evangelism regardless of Church background. Structural questions related to ecumenical relationships become virtually irrelevant. As with the other positions, there is no impetus towards denominational unity. However, since believers are joined as one

928

Ibid. 14.

929

Ibid. 19.

288


regardless of their Church affiliation, the way is opened for shared fellowship among brothers and sisters in Christ.930 The discussion of the various options reveals much about ECONI's desire to establish flexible boundaries. Those who hold to unchanging views of Rome are described as ‘locked in a sixteenth-century time warp, oblivious to the changes within Roman Catholicism, within evangelicalism and in the world…it is not sufficient to force present experience into the paradigms of the past’. A more adept summary of Orangeism would be difficult to devise. Rather, evangelicals are encouraged to recognize the positive opportunities that exist for Evangelical-Roman Catholic cooperation in the areas of dialogue on mission, social witness, orthodox apologetics, and evangelism. Thomson notes that, ‘whatever position they may hold, all evangelicals associated with ECONI, and many others, would gladly cooperate with Roman Catholics in at least some of the areas listed’.931 Significantly, those who hold the pragmatic separatist line should ensure that ‘they do not end up rejecting relationships with those within Roman Catholicism who are Christians. This may be a “tidy” position, since it renders matters quite straightforward, but it is not a defensible position biblically.’932 It is transparent that ECONI's approach to Catholicism attempts to balance a concern for biblical truth with an openness for building constructive relationships across denominational boundaries. This is a fluid position, willing to adapt to changing historical circumstances. It is also one characterized by an acknowledgement of human limitations, and that discovering truth may be a difficult process. Static, monolithic, and negative views of Rome are rejected: ‘it is all too easy to assume that our understanding of Scripture is such that we have little to learn. The word of God flows to us through well worn channels and is entirely predictable.’933 Recognition of a diversity of evangelical views is coupled with a plea for acceptance of others' opinions as worthy of respect. Whatever a particular point of view, the booklet concludes by calling for evangelicals' attitudes to Rome to be marked ‘by courtesy, dignity and integrity’. Thus,

930

A. Thomson, Beyond Fear, Suspicion and Hostility: Evangelical: Roman Catholic Relationships (Belfast: ECONI, 1994) 5 (emphasis original) 25. For a fuller statement of these positions see 11–25.

931

Ibid. 27.

932

Ibid. 29.

933

Ibid. 26.


289

both qualitatively (attitudes) and quantitatively (structural relationships) ECONI exemplifies a cautiously porous identity in relation to the Roman Catholic Church, cautious in that the group appears to resist tying itself to any formal policy on the matter.934

8.3.2.4 Opposition The difficulty facing ECONI in maintaining an inclusive identity is illustrated by a review of the type of opposition the organization has encountered within evangelicalism. Opposing groups consistently attack ECONI's evangelical credentials. If it can be shown that ECONI does not belong to the evangelical family, its message can be dismissed as a symptom of liberal or ecumenical folly. Ian Paisley described the 1994 ECONI conference addressed by John Stott as a meeting of ‘so called Christians’.935 Referring to ECONI's meeting with Sinn Féin936 he asserted that ‘Our faithfulness to God's Word must rise above a mere spirit of curiosity that down through the generations of time has contributed to a diluting of evangelistic principles and has been in

934

Although outside my study period, it is worth noting that this caution appeared to be evident in the controversy stirred by J. I. Packer's visit to Dublin on 31 July 1998 to coincide with the launch of the booklet Evangelicals and Catholics Together in Ireland (ECTI). Packer had been involved in the highly contentious American evangelicals' and Catholics' (ECT) initiative which he describes as a venture bringing together Protestant evangelicals and Roman Catholic evangelicals committed to a dual mission of evangelism and social witness. Despite some similarities to ECONI's stance described above, the ECTI document was signed by only five out of forty-two people who had served on the Steering Group from 1996 to 1998 and by none of the full-time ECONI staff. It may be that few of this group were asked to endorse the statement. However, such widespread reticence is more likely to indicate a combination of some discomfort with the document's theology and an unwillingness to embroil ECONI in such a public and emotive debate. For further reference see J. I. Packer, ‘A Path Through the Jungle’, in Frontiers, 3/3 (Spring 1999), 3–5 and other related articles in the same issue. See also Evangelicals and Catholics Together in Ireland (n.p.: n.p., n.d.).

935

I. R. K. Paisley, Sermon in Martyrs' Memorial Church, Sunday 6 Nov. 1994.

936

ECONI met publicly to listen to and debate with two prominent members of Sinn Féin, Tom Hartley its secretary and Mairtin O Muilleoir a Belfast Councillor, in Belfast on 9 February 1995. For further information see the Irish Times (6 Feb. 1995).

290


direct conflict with the inspired word of the Apostle Paul…as fundamental evangelicals we are constrained to the reality of the situation where under God's Divine decree there can be no communion between light and darkness.’937 Later in the Revivalist, he connected the meeting with the fact that these ‘members of the Evangelical Alliance’ hold that Rome is a Christian Church, concluding ‘How the mighty are fallen!’938 In February 1997, a group of Free Presbyterian and Elim ministers walked out of an ECONI Clergy Conference leaving behind leaflets entitled Evangelical Contribution or Ecumenical Confusion? The leaflet accused ECONI of being ‘spurious Evangelicals’ who ‘do not uphold the Scriptures as the only revelation of the Word of God’.939 Writing in the Orange Standard, Revd Robert McEvoy940 argues that many who originally endorsed ECONI no longer do so because of its development into ‘a thoroughly ecumenical body’. He criticizes an article by David McMillan for its ‘ecumenical and liberal leanings’ and its ‘disservice to Protestantism and Biblical evangelicals’ for presupposing that evangelicals should not be members of the Orange Order.941 The Evangelical Protestant Society (EPS) concluded about For God and His Glory Alone that ‘it is a product of those who are unwilling to support the Protestant cause of our people’.942 In more recent literature about ECONI, Seamus Milligan, the secretary of EPS, asserts that ‘ECONI ignores the blasphemies which Rome perpetuates in its idolatrous system’. He continues ‘If being an evangelical Protestant and being willing to walk in the footsteps of Godly men like Bishop Ryle, C. H. Spurgeon, John Wesley, Martin Luther and John Calvin makes us intolerant then so be it. I would prefer to be identified with their beliefs

937

I. R. K. Paisley, ‘Statement from Dr. Ian Paisley, Moderator, Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster’, 10 Feb. 1995.

938

Revivalist, (Mar. 1995), 14.

939

‘Evangelical Contribution or Ecumenical Confusion?’, leaflet (n.p.: Northern Ireland Alliance of Conservative Evangelicals, n.d.).

940

Revd R. K. McEvoy: Co-ordinator of Studies for the Elim Church Pastoral Training Programme; Member of Loyal Orange Lodge (LOL) 71 and District Chaplain of Largymore Royal Black District Chapter No. 9.

941

R. K. McEvoy, ‘Orangemen Beware! The man from ECONI is watching you!’, Orange Standard (Mar. 1997, 7.

942

Ulster Bulwark (Jan. / Feb. 1989), 5.


291

rather than the compromising teaching which are espoused by many of those who are identified with ECONI and other similar groups.’943 One of the most vociferous critics of ECONI is Cecil Andrews of Take Heed Ministries.944 In a booklet devoted to the issue, Andrews systematically attempts to disprove the evangelical credentials of leading ECONI figures.945 His thesis is that ‘ECONI have departed from the position held by those in the past who would have been viewed as Evangelicals…ECONI have hijacked the word “Evangelical” and are using it in a totally “New-Evangelical” context.’946 Evidence for this claim hinges on evidence of any association with non-evangelical movements, whether through meeting members (or even using literature) of the Roman Catholic Church, ECI, or the charismatic movement. ECONI's ‘failure to obey the clear teaching of Scripture’ and ‘separate themselves from those who deny the truth of the gospel’ means that ‘genuine Evangelicals should not support the aims and actions of ECONI…but should rather “mark them which cause divisions and offences contrary to doctrine which ye have learned and avoid them” (Romans 16 : 17).’947 ECONI has also precipitated a lively debate within the Baptist Union of Ireland. A pastor remarked at a 1996 Union conference that ‘There are groups springing up all the time claiming to be evangelical…I mention ECONI as an example, surely a misnomer if ever there was one. How can I sit down with men who already accept Rome as genuine, men who have no trouble praying to and praising God with Catholics?’948

943

Ulster Bulwark (Jan. / Feb. 1996), 4.

944

Andrews is active in Baptist circles and well known within conservative Ulster evangelicalism for his cult awareness literature and activism against a wide variety of movements he perceives as undermining historic evangelicalism.

945

C. Andrews, The Evangelicals of ECONI (Carryduff: Take Heed Ministries, July 1995. Figures singled out include David Hewitt, Ken Wilson, David McMillan, Cecil Kerr, David Porter, and Alwyn Thomson.

946

Andrews, ‘The Evangelicals of ECONI’, 1. The term ‘new’ suggests innovation and deviation, separating ECONI from historic, biblically based evangelicalism.

947


948

Billy Houston, Pastor of Carr Baptist Church, speech to Baptist Union of Ireland Churches' Council Meeting, May 1996.

292


In June 1997 this common concern about doctrinal purity motivated the Free Presbyterian Church, the Independent Methodist Church, Elim Pentecostal Churches, the Independent Orange Order, and the EPS to issue a joint statement warning that ECONI was ‘a spiritual Trojan Horse’ subverting true Protestantism.949 Esmond Birnie950 has articulated a more subtle attack. He argues that ECONI represents a form of what he calls Liberal Evangelical Post-Unionism (LEPU), characterized by a shift away from traditional conservative evangelicalism.951 LEPU is identified by the following: ‘An openness to various explanatory models regarding the Cross…an emphasis on structural evil and communal/historical guilt, use of subjective and psychological approaches to reconciliation, a reading of Biblical theology which is sometimes narrative rather than systematic, down-playing of anti-Catholicism on grounds of principle or pragmatism, and “anti-triumphalism” [i.e. a reluctance to use any State/ legal backing for Christian principles].’952 LEPU's antithesis, Conservative Evangelicalism/Reformed Christianity and Political Unionism (CEPU), in which the author believes, remains undefined. Birnie's case is fatally weakened by an absence of any supporting evidence that ECONI adheres to any of the characteristics of LEPU and an unproven assumption that such characteristics do actually represent a ‘liberal’ form of evangelicalism. In this context it is unsurprising that ECONI

949

Irish News (18 Aug. 1997). The report in the Irish News included a reference to the Baptist Union of Ireland. This was an error. The Union did not, and was not asked to, endorse the statement. The Union contains a vocal minority, including Cecil Andrews and Pastor Billy Houston, intent on excluding Churches associated with (widely defined) ecumenical and charismatic influences. In the late 1990s the Churches' Council rejected a campaign by the group to tighten one particular ‘Object’ of the Union (to foster spiritual unity with other genuine Christians) to exclude all involvement in ‘false ecumenical ventures’. For Andrews' perspective on this issue see C. Andrews, ‘When is a Baptist Union not a Union?’, News from the Front, Takeheed Ministries Website at www.takeheed.co.uk (Sept. 1998).

950

Dr J. E. Birnie: UUP Assembly Member for South Belfast; lecturer and economist at Queen's University, Belfast; member of Lowe Memorial Presbyterian Church, Finaghy, Belfast; pro-Agreement ‘new unionist’.

951

J. E. Birnie, ‘Liberal Evangelical Post-Unionism and ECONI’, Lion and Lamb, 24 (Spring 2000, 23–6.

952

Ibid. 23.


293

Steering Group member, Ken Irvine, responded to Birnie by describing himself as adhering to a different form of CEPU—that of conservative evangelical post-unionist.953 Other ECONI supporters dismiss Birnie's thesis as a caricature, untethered to reality.954 Elsewhere Birnie has also mounted a sustained critique of what he sees as the faulty analysis of ‘Protestantism's radical chic’ to whose arguments ECONI ‘has attempted to provide a cutting edge’.955 He describes ECONI and a number of representatives within the PCI, Methodist, and Church of Ireland Churches as implying that ‘Protestant unionists in Northern Ireland, especially those sometimes designated “fundamentalists” by their radical critics, made their politics into a form of idol.’956 He disputes the validity of their case, arguing it is based on questionable economic and political assumptions. In addition, ECONI's analysis in particular, he contends, is coloured by an Anabaptist perspective of Church–State relations. Those critical of unionism, in their desire to foster inclusivity, have been influenced by secular forces such as relativism, ecumenism, and a politically naïve endorsement of Anglo-Irish diplomacy.957 Birnie's arguments raise some general issues to which I will return in the Conclusion. Regardless of the plausibility of his case, it is significant that a quite different form of criticism, coupled with an economic and political defence of unionism, is again focused on the group's alleged liberalism, or relativism, or ecumenical openness.

8.3.3 A balancing act It is apparent that ECONI's stated desire for mutual recognition and respect within differing strands of Ulster evangelicalism stands little chance of reciprocation. Yet how consistent is

953

K. Irvine, ‘CEPU: A Personal Testimony’, Lion and Lamb, 25 (Summer 2000, 19–21 (emphasis mine).

954

B. Brown, ‘Fancy Models or Straw Dolls?’, Lion and Lamb, 25 (Summer 2000, 22–4.

955

J. E. Birnie, ‘The Evangelical Critique of Unionism: Prophetic or Unprofitable?’, Frontiers (Summer 1998), 14–19. For the full articulation of his views see his booklet, Without Profit or Prophets: A Response to Businessmen and Bishops (Belfast: Ulster Review Publications, 1997.

956

Ibid. 15.

957

Ibid. 17.

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ECONI's own inclusive policy? Elsewhere Thomson describes, in trenchant terms, unnamed separatists (such as Ian Paisley) as representing ‘a sickness within evangelicalism’. Quoting from a slogan popular within Paisleyism, he argues that ‘ “the great and glorious” doctrine of separation’ adds to the Gospel to such a degree that it has become ‘another gospel’. Furthermore he alleges that it is a betrayal of the principles of the Reformation and ‘an offence to the work of the cross’.958 Given the profound resonance within evangelicalism of the charge of preaching a false Gospel959 it is difficult to imagine a more serious accusation.960 Similarly, Heather Morris, while not naming Paisleyism, contends that ‘the advocacy of separatism is not consistent with Pauline teaching or practice’.961 Thus, it can be argued that ECONI's stance on Paisleyism is ambiguous, if not contradictory. The dilemma revolves around the difficulty of defining the essence of evangelicalism. A broadly sociological definition of Paisleyism as a historically rooted movement within Protestantism leads Thomson to locate Paisleyite identity firmly within the evangelical spectrum. However, the same author, when critiquing attitudes central to Paisleyism from a theological perspective, labels it a false Gospel. This tension is also exhibited within the steering group, with Montgomery, in a clear reference to Ian Paisley and others, proposing that the evangelical family should ‘disown those who court controversy, revel in rumour-mongering and perpetuate prejudice’.962 It seems that a theoretical inclusion of fundamentalism within Ulster evangelicalism is made problematic in that in Ulster it is fundamentalists like Paisley who are also religious nationalists. A persuasive case for including fundamentalism within a broad

958

A. Thomson, ‘Comment’, Lion and Lamb, Special Issue, 14 (Autumn 1997 2.

959

See especially Galatians 1: 6–9.

960

The logical consequence of the latter conclusion is to follow Saint Paul and say ‘If anybody is preaching to you a gospel other than what you accepted, let him be eternally condemned!’ Galatians 1: 9.

961

H. Morris: Methodist minister and member of the ECONI Steering Group. See H. Morris, ‘Boundary Markers’, Lion and Lamb, 15 (Winter 1997–8), 5–7.

962

Montgomery, ‘Sorting out the family’, 25 (emphasis mine).


295

evangelical identity fails to address the reality that ECONI's entire ideological stall is set out with the purpose of undermining precisely the type of religio-political fusion of which Paisleyism is a classic example. Given the ideological gulf between ECONI and Paisleyism, ECONI's position not only lacks consistency but is also an abstract inclusiveness, devoid of any relational meaning between the group and Free Presbyterianism. Thomson is well aware of the difficulties of defining contemporary evangelicalism. He acknowledges that a ‘shared confessional identity’ will not prevent profound divisions among different strands within evangelicalism and concludes, ‘perhaps we have to accept that in the future we will have to define ourselves by the kind of evangelicals we are rather than defining ourselves simply as evangelicals’. Yet at the same time he accepts that evangelicalism ‘cannot be endlessly flexible without becoming meaningless. There must be borders if there is to be any sense of standing in a recognisable theological or historical tradition.’963 The point is well made. Evangelicalism, as a movement centred on the theological truth of the Gospel, cannot be understood in purely sociological terms.964 The difficulty seems not so much an identification of core evangelical beliefs, but how to delimit the boundaries of evangelical faith. This perspective helps to unlock ECONI's dual attitude to Paisleyism. It seems that Paisleyism is understood as sociologically and historically representing a type of evangelical identity, but theologically embodying an ideology inimical to cardinal evangelical principles. How the merit of this position is assessed will depend on how one chooses to define evangelicalism. If a primarily theological approach is used, ECONI's analysis will seem inadequate. The findings of this book suggest that Paisleyism is in essence motivated by nationalist objectives legitimized by evangelical belief and imagery. This conclusion, taken in conjunction with ECONI's own judgement of religious nationalism as idolatrous, would suggest a more appropriate definition of Paisleyite ideology as incompatible with historic

963

Thomson, ‘A World of Difference’, 8.

964

D. A. Carson, The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism (Leicester: Apollos, 1996, 454–5.

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evangelicalism. In other words, it is a distortion of the Gospel and attempts from ECONI's perspective to retain a sense of belonging with Paisleyism will fail to bridge this ideological chasm. For similar reasons it is doubtful whether ECONI's interpretation is either effective or consistent in regard to Orangeism. It is true that Orangeism differs from Paisleyism in two important respects. First it rejects the latter's isolationist stance, viewing itself as a force for Protestant unity. Second, its inclusivism is borne out of an effective disinterest in theological truth. Orangeism is a political movement that uses biblical imagery in a vague manner to justify its cause. Orangeism is nominally evangelical and is undoubtedly a ‘looser’ ideology that allows a wide breadth of opinion within its ranks. Evangelicals argue this presents them with a natural mission field through which to reform the Institution. ECONI is clearly addressing such a segment within Orangeism while reserving judgement on the biblical basis of the movement as whole. The group clearly wishes to stimulate positive reform from within rather than denouncing the Order as irredeemably opposed to authentic evangelical values. However, despite these important differences, my analysis has shown that Orangeism shares key ideological beliefs with Paisleyism. Both movements are controlled by the nationalist objectives of a political Protestantism sacralized by religion. From ECONI's own analysis of religious nationalism as a malign spiritual force, a consistent position would be to make explicit what their analysis makes implicit, namely, that the core beliefs of Free Presbyterianism and Orangeism stand in need of profound theological reform if they are to be compatible with authentic evangelical faith. Whether such reform is likely, or even possible, is an issue to which I will return in the Conclusion.

8.4 SYNTHESIS It is clear that ECONI faces considerable challenges in its desire to create distance from, and yet belong to, an Ulster evangelical identity. Success in establishing distance can simultaneously destroy any sense of belonging. An overdependence on belonging can hinder the prophetic task of creating distance. From my examination of the group's history and beliefs it is


297

evident that ECONI has made substantial progress in creating a viable alternative evangelical identity in Ulster, distinct from both complicit and impotent forms of Ulster evangelicalism. Distance has been achieved from the latter primarily through activism and the implementation of practical training programmes. The task of creating distance from the former has revolved around hermeneutical issues of how the Bible is to be applied to the Northern Ireland situation. Belonging has been achieved amongst a wide spectrum of moderate evangelicalism that had rejected the option of closed evangelicalism and yet had been offered little alternative by a complacent orthodoxy during the ‘golden era’. However, it seems that the group's greatest challenge is how to balance its distance with any meaningful sense of belonging to its Other. Despite attempts by ECONI to define an inclusively broad spectrum of evangelical belief, its stance on this issue remains unconvincing. The group's own polemical analysis of religious nationalism make it difficult to reconcile the concept of ECONI and Orangeism/Paisleyism sharing any significant common evangelical identity. It is apparent that the Orange/ Paisley (closed) and ECONI (open) strands are irreconcilably divided over not just the issue of a sacralized national identity, but on appropriate Church–State relations, interpretation of the causes of the conflict, what constitutes an authentic evangelical response to Northern Ireland, and even the nature of genuine evangelical faith itself. It is therefore more realistic to conclude that ECONI is a distinct expression of evangelicalism, dissimilar in both ideology and character, from the varieties of closed evangelicalism represented by the Orange Order and the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster. Put simply, closed and open forms of evangelicalism represent two distinct belief systems. Deciding which identity lies closest to historic evangelicalism then becomes a matter of definition and debate. A stated aim of ECONI is to be a catalyst for change at a grass-roots level through resourcing and influencing Christian leaders. Its highly activist approach derives from this commitment. However, the very nature of an open identity may militate against the achievement of this goal. My review of ECONI activities suggests that participants will be those who are already sympathetic to a critique of religious nationalism. Publications,

298


while written at a non-academic level, require familiarity with issues of some theological and political complexity.965 ECONI's literature is rationalistic and educational, accessible primarily to those with an astute theological awareness—values of most relevance to a well-educated middle-class constituency. ECONI adopts an objective approach and a deliberate abandonment of the emotive tools of nationalism (the use of ritual, symbols, and historical myth). It refuses to indulge in the politics of fear and siege. It displays a willingness to question the sacred cows of closed evangelicalism in a search for truth and a tendency to deal in the subtleties of theological debate. It selfconsciously attempts to embrace diversity. All of these characteristics stand in contrast to the simple, popular, unifying, and emotional appeal of nationalist religion. While it may be argued that ECONI possesses more persuasive evangelical credentials than Paisleyism or Orangeism, in political terms it represents a weaker identity, less able to band members together in a common cause. Operating in a context of shrinking unionist support for the GFA and increasing fear and distrust that fuels unionist myths, the group faces considerable obstacles in its goal of eroding the ideological base of closed evangelicalism. It is significant that some members remain cautious about ECONI's potential to impact on Ulster society as a whole.966 Perhaps at the very least, the group has succeeded in creating a coherent platform for an expression of evangelicalism shorn of ethnic particularity to be heard at last in Ulster.

965

For example issues covered in depth, accompanied by detailed book reviews, in recent issues of Lion and Lamb include hermeneutics; defining evangelicalism; Christian citizenship; peacemaking; peace, justice and reconciliation; and the politics of holiness.

966

In discussion with the author, 14 May 1998.

Conclusion But by faith we eagerly await through the Spirit the righteousness for which we hope. For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision has any value. The only thing that counts is faith expressing itself through love. (Galatians 5: 5–6) Whatever happens, conduct yourselves in a manner worthy of the gospel of christ. (Phil. 1: 27) A theme of this book has been that the conflict in Northern Ireland is not a mysterious or unique phenomenon. As elsewhere around the globe,967 a clash between competing nationalisms for the power to express ethnic identity in a territorial ‘homeland’ has been fuelled by a potent cocktail of religious, historical, economic, and social factors, all sustained by the remorseless logic of violence. This study has taken religion seriously as a factor in this conflict and shows how, for evangelicals, radically differing interpretations of what the Bible says to the conflict are vital to understanding diverse Protestant attitudes and actions in the post-Good Friday Agreement era. The GFA was chosen as a natural terminus of study in that, however interpreted, it signifies a significant conjuncture in Irish history. The GFA is an ambitious and innovative attempt to manage the conflict of identity at the heart of the Northern Ireland problem. Not only does it provide a complex framework for the sharing of power between two competing national identities, it also seeks to initiate ‘a new beginning’ characterized by

967

See especially Wright, Northern Ireland and more recently J. McGarry (ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 for a comparative analysis between Northern Ireland and a number of ethnic conflicts across the globe.

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‘reconciliation, tolerance and mutual respect’.968 In attempting to facilitate these outcomes, the GFA emerged as an ambiguous and open-ended document. How successful the Agreement will be in achieving its aims raises a number of open questions likely to remain valid for years to come. Can two opposing forms of national identity co-exist in prolonged cooperation within one devolved government? Can unionists find security despite an unsecured Union? Can nationalists achieve, and even be content with, political, cultural, and economic equality within a transformed Northern Irish society? My specific interest here is to conclude first with a discussion of the challenges that the post-GFA era poses to unionism and then to discuss the challenges this changing political context sets both closed and open evangelicals in Ulster in light of their historical relationship with unionist identity. Ruane and Todd discuss how, as a political deal, the GFA attempts to address three aspects of the conflict in an evenhanded manner.969 However, at each point, despite its intended impartiality, it raises profoundly more uncomfortable questions for unionists than it does for nationalists. First, the GFA addresses the conflict of communal interests between the Protestant need for security within the Union and the nationalist goal of political, cultural, and social equality. The GFA tries to reconcile this collision of interests by simultaneously strengthening the Union while guaranteeing full equality to nationalists within Northern Ireland.970 The problem for unionism is that full equality will inevitably mean a further weakening of unionist identity. For example, complete political equality will involve the formal

968

The Agreement, 1.

969

J. Ruane and J. Todd, ‘The Belfast Agreement: Context, Content, Consequences’, in J. Ruane and J. Todd (eds.), After the Good Friday Agreement: Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1999, 1–29.

970

Ibid. 18–19. The number of steps taken to ensure communal equality is comprehensive. They include the principle of parallel consent within the Assembly voting structure; the power-sharing Executive; a first minister and deputy first minister with identical powers drawn from both communities; reform of the RUC to encourage participation from nationalists; a North–South Ministerial Council balanced by a British–Irish Council; and a range of policies designed to promote fairness in the realms of human rights, justice, and economic conditions.

CONCLUSION

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recognition of Irishness, including presumably the Irish flag, on an equal basis with symbols of British identity within Northern Irish political culture. At each step, equality inevitably further erodes the British ethos of the State. Second, it attempts to resolve the problem of legitimacy in that previously no political system has proved acceptable to both nationalists and unionists. The GFA bypasses the issue of the legitimacy of the Partition, and attempts to create what Ruane and Todd call ‘a new institutionalisation of legitimacy’, endorsed by subsequent referenda, which both nationalists and unionists can accept.971 On the one hand, the GFA legitimates Northern Ireland's position under British sovereignty within the United Kingdom for as long as a majority wishes to remain—a principle accepted for the first time by an Irish government. On the other hand, it significantly strengthens nationalist objectives in a number of ways. The Union is more vulnerable in that it rests solely on the will of a majority within Northern Ireland. The Agreement also formally legitimates nationalist political aspirations as of equal validity with those of unionists. It gives room for expression of an island-wide nationalist identity, through the implementation of (compulsory) North–South bodies. It also in effect negates the political advantage of a unionist majority in the devolved government by making cross-community agreement a prerequisite for political progress. Third, in a context of a changing demographic and political balance within Northern Ireland, the GFA attempts to ameliorate the deeper causes of future conflict through the generation of wide-ranging social changes to stimulate improved relationships within Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland. The Agreement aspires to delivering human rights, decommissioning, fair policing, and relationships of ‘partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands’. It also holds out the hope of ‘a new political dispensation which will recognise the full and equal legitimacy and worth of the identities, senses of allegiance and ethos of all sections of the community in Northern Ireland’.972 However, for many unionists such high hopes are dampened for two reasons. The first is the

971

Ibid. 20.

972

The Agreement, 1, 22.

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demographic issue. However uncertain its date of emergence and voting preference, even the possibility of a future nationalist majority remains an ominous prospect. The second is the wearying prospect of the continuing and unavoidable political risk incurred by participation in the GFA. As one journalist has noted, no one is convinced that ‘the republicans are moving any further away from their long-term political goal. The problem for Trimble—and he knows it—is that the same doesn't hold true for the unionists.…For unionists the scariest thing about the Good Friday Agreement is that there is no full stop.’973 Unionists face the dilemma that even wholehearted participation in the structures of the GFA carries no guarantee of securing the Union and may even undermine it. Positive participation may conciliate a substantial number of nationalists to life within a transformed Northern Ireland. However, making the Agreement work may simply increase the political and cultural resources of nationalists to advance political goals inimical to unionism. This conundrum was encapsulated in July 2002 by Sir Reg Empey974 when he lamented that the UUP faced a ‘terrible dilemma’ over whether to continue its support for the power-sharing Executive, while simultaneously bolstering the political position of Sinn Féin in the face of minimal IRA decomissioning.975 Alternatively, attempting to delay and frustrate the implementation of the Agreement is not only a politically damaging and negative strategy, but ironically may accelerate the very process it is designed to block by alienating the minority community and strengthening their sense of nationalism.976

973

Emily O'Reilly, ‘Trimble Discovers that Provisionals at Peace are a Far More Lethal Force’, Sunday Times (28 July 2002). Another example of republican intent is found in Gerry Adams's dismissal of the SDLP as ‘post-nationalist’ since it has abandoned the core goals of Irish nationalism and accepted the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland State. G. Adams, Today, BBC Radio 4 (13 Apr. 2002).

974

Sir Reg Empey OBE, 1947– : Lord Mayor of Belfast in 1989 and 1993; Northern Ireland Assembly Member for East Belfast; vice-president of the Ulster Unionist Council; senior UUP negotiator in the GFA talks; unionist Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment 1999–.

975

M. Purdy, ‘A Week in Politics’, BBC Online News Website at www.news.bbc.co.uk (28 July 2002).

976

J. Ruane, ‘The End of (Irish) History? Three Readings of the Current Conjuncture’, in Ruane and Todd, After the Good Friday Agreement, 145–69, see 157–8.

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It is therefore unsurprising that in a post-GFA era, despite the significant achievements, the political struggle between nationalism and unionism continues apace.977 Joseph Ruane has astutely drawn attention to the fluid and contradictory nature of the GFA by describing three alternative ‘Readings’ of the Agreement, each persuasive and plausible, yet at many points mutually exclusive. Reading I is optimistic that the conflict, under the influence of global forces such as secularism, post-nationalism, and postmodernism, is at last at a final stage of resolution. Reading II envisages continuing conflict, but shifting from a high-intensity to a low-intensity mode with potential for a return to highintensity conflict. Reading III is pessimistic. The inherent contradictions within the GFA will unravel any opportunity for long-term stability. He concludes that such has been the unpredictability of the Peace Process all three readings, at different times, have appeared closest to reality. Since no one reading dominates, all three should be taken as ‘complementary, partial approximations to a contradictory reality’.978 In other words, the political environment of the post-GFA era is fluid, open, unstable, and indeterminate. Which reading eventually prevails may well revolve around the quality, creativity and energy of pro-Agreement political leadership in its struggle against political forces intent on destroying the Agreement. Certainly, over four years after the GFA, Reading II and particularly Reading III seem more compelling than Reading I. All the parties to the conflict have emerged with their own versions of history largely intact. Indeed, the success of the GFA depended on a pragmatic political sidestep of awkward issues such as apportioning responsibility and repenting for past actions. Evidence shows that the two communities, particularly

977

A stream of books continues to be published discussing the ongoing political turmoil of the post-GFA era. For example see P. Bew, P. Gibbon, and H. Patterson, Northern Ireland 1921/2001: Political Forces and Social Classes (London: Serif, 2002; M. Morrissey and M. Smyth, Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement: Victims, Grievance, Blame (London: Pluto, 2002; R. MacGinty and J. Darby, Guns and Government: The Management of the Northern Ireland Peace Process (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002; M. Cox, A. Guelke, and F. Stephen (eds.), A Farewell to Arms: From ‘Long War’ to Long Peace in Northern Ireland (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.

978

Ruane, ‘The End of (Irish) History?’, 169.

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in conflict zones, are increasingly polarized.979 Bitter local sectarian conflicts and continuing violence are symptomatic of the reality that there is little sign, if any, of the peaceful agreement and cooperation envisaged in the Agreement. Significant sections of both communities, from dissident republicans to a broad coalition of anti-Agreement unionists reject the possibility of compromise on core nationalist issues. Despite the onset of decommissioning and an IRA apology to ‘non-combatants’,980 Sinn Féin's objectives remain clear—a thirty-two county socialist republic and an end to the British government's presence in Ireland. The past continues to be used as a weapon in the competition for political legitimacy in the present. Widespread nationalist disillusionment with the sincerity of the UUP leadership's desire to implement the Agreement981 is mirrored by increased unionist scepticism towards the Peace Process. Unionist support for the GFA had dropped from 55% in 1998 to 32.9% in October 2002.982 Unionist disbelief in the sincerity of the republican movement's commitment to peace revolved around issues such as the IRA's resistance to engage in a process of ongoing decommissioning leading towards eventual disbandment, its continued involvement in ‘punishment beatings’, its apparent links with the

979

B. C. Hayes and I. McAllister, ‘Ethnonationalism, Public Opinion and the Good Friday Agreement’, in Ruane and Todd, After the Good Friday Agreement, 30–48, see 35–6.

980

An IRA statement received by An Phoblacht (Republican News ) on 16 July 2002, couched in traditional republican terms of equating all casualties of the conflict as ‘victims’, offered ‘sincere apologies and condolences’ to the families of ‘non-combatants’.

981

For example, in July 2002, Brid Rodgers, deputy leader of the SDLP and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, exasperated at UUP equivocation over participation in power-sharing, bluntly commented ‘David Trimble appears to want an each-way bet on the peace process and the nationalist people are fed up with him. His actions over recent weeks have caused many nationalists to question his real motives and many are wondering whether he and the UUP support the Good Friday Agreement and power-sharing at all.’ ‘Rodgers Calls on Trimble to Back Inclusive Powersharing’, Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Website at www.sdlp.ie (25 July 2002).

982

Opinion poll commissioned by the BBC Northern Ireland political programme, ‘Hearts and Minds’, which surveyed 1,080 people on 15–16 Oct. 2002. Interviews for the poll were conducted across all the 18 parliamentary constituencies and 26 district council areas of Northern Ireland. See BBC Online News Website at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ northern_ireland/2335861.stm

CONCLUSION

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Columbian terror group FARC, and particularly its likely participation in high-level intelligence-gathering operations within Castlereagh Police Station and the Northern Ireland Office at Stormont—all occurring during Sinn Féin's participation in government.983 As a result of what the then Secretary of State Dr John Reid called ‘a collapse of trust’, the Assembly was suspended on 14 October 2002 for the fourth time and direct rule from London reintroduced for an indefinite period. These are all indicators that the unionist–nationalist power struggle has only changed in form, not content. It is in this shifting political environment that a significant process of debate and reflection has begun within Northern Irish society on how to come to terms with the recent past and to build a stable future. The very nature of this debate exemplifies how the clash of identities continues to impact at every level. Whether it be discussion of the need for a ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, the role of policing (past and present), the necessity of public inquiries into past events, the place of repentance for past actions, or the pastoral need to ‘hear’ victims' stories, each issue tends to become a means by which to justify and legitimate contemporary nationalist objectives. The contemporary political difficulties facing unionism pose a number of challenges to Ulster evangelicals. An aim outlined in the Introduction was to assess evangelicals' relationship with the ‘destructive whirlwind’ of enmity into which they were drawn and, at times, helped sustain. ‘Owning’ and recognizing the past is an essential step in mapping a path towards what a proper balance of distance and belonging will look like in twenty-first century Northern Ireland. Their response will dictate what type of contribution they will make in a post-GFA society. This book is offered in part as a resource for those

983

Protracted legal proceedings were likely to arise from each of the last three events with ongoing negative implications for unionist–republican relationships. In August 2001, the Colombian authorities arrested three suspected IRA men, accusing them of training FARC rebels. In March 2002 a well-planned robbery of highly sensitive security information from Castlereagh Police Station in Belfast, was attributed by senior police officers to IRA activity. In October 2002, after a police raid of Sinn Féin offices in Stormont, several people including senior SF figure Denis Donaldson, were charged with participating in an intelligence-gathering operation likely to benefit terrorism.

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willing to engage in such a process. I am not naïve enough, however, to suppose that the findings of academic research has the ability to neutralize the potency of historical myth and how it sustains and legitimates a nationalist narrative. As A. T. Q. Stewart sardonically remarks, ‘history is not a branch of social welfare’, more often unpalatable conclusions are not so much disputed as simply ignored.984 However, a direct challenge for evangelicals in Ulster is how to live up to their chosen self-designation as evangelicals. The four strands of identity in this study all claim to embody an authentic form of biblical Christianity. By definition, all evangelicals recognize the absolute authority of Scripture as God's revealed and inspired Word. It is precisely because they claim to take the Gospel and the Bible seriously that evangelicals face the difficult challenge of responding to Paul's exhortation that ‘Whatever happens, conduct yourselves in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ’ (Phil. 1: 27). It has been my contention that, in the context of a political power struggle between competing nationalisms, authentic Christian conduct will reflect a balanced tension between Volf's theoretical concepts of distance and belonging. But what might such a life look like in practice and what particular challenges lie in store for different evangelical identities to achieve this healthy balance? An answer to these questions can be sketched at three levels; political, theological, and relational. It is with these sketches that I conclude. At a political level it means creating a healthy distance from one's own national identity. It is important briefly to discuss what this need not entail. This book has shown how historically evangelicals in Ulster—whether Presbyterian, Orange, or Paisleyite—engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship of spiritual legitimation of Ulster unionism. This is not to deny that there were, and may continue to be, strong economic, religious, and political reasons to support the Union. Neither does it exempt Irish nationalism from a similar charge of claiming ‘God is on our side’. Nor does it necessarily endorse exaggerated nationalist claims of unionist discrimination in the ‘golden era’. Neither does this conclusion necessarily embrace the notion that

984

A. T. Q. Stewart, The Shape of Irish History (Belfast: Blackstaff, 2001, 185.

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evangelicals should engage in trans-generational group guilt for the actions of their predecessors. Nor does it require evangelicals somehow to abandon unionism or their Ulster Protestant culture and identity (if that is what they are). All these are arguments that Birnie employs in an attempt to reject the original premise of evangelicalism's spiritual anointing of unionism.985 Rather, it does mean accepting that unionism is but one manifestation of nationalism and as such is but a transient and imperfect political ideology. It involves abandoning any spiritual legitimation for that identity and recognizing that evangelical faith is not dependent on any political philosophy. It creates space for critical evaluation of unionist identity and accepting the political legitimacy of Irish nationalism on the same open yet critical basis. Ultimately, rather than holding an overriding commitment to the political cause of unionism, it means asking first what best will advance the Kingdom of God in Ireland as a whole. If this means supporting the GFA or even a United Ireland then so be it. Moreover, it is in relation to the quest for political power that serious questions need to be asked of evangelicalism in Ulster. As disciples of Christ, evangelicals claim to follow in the footsteps of a Messiah who eschewed violence and the seductive temptation of temporal power for the cold nails of the cross. Evangelicals are to represent values shaped, not by contingent political ambitions, but by the cross of Christ, the climax of God's gracious salvific act for his enemies (Rom. 5: 8–11). God's confrontation with his Other (sinful mankind) took the form of self-sacrifice, the goal being reconciliation (2 Cor. 5: 18–21). Victory was achieved, not through strategies of power and domination, but through apparent powerlessness. Just as Jesus rejected the use of force to advance his aims (Luke 22: 49–52),986 the message of the cross is one of ‘weakness’ and ‘foolishness’ to a world of competing nationalisms (1 Cor. 1:18–2: 5). His enemies enter his forgiving embrace through repentance and faith in an attitude of grateful humility. It is those who attempt to reflect these attitudes in the

985

Birnie, ‘Evangelical Critique’, 14–19.

986

For wider discussion of the theology of Jesus see for example C. Blomberg, Jesus and the Gospels: An Introduction and Survey (Leicester: Apollos, 1997, 383–412, esp. 390, 397.

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divided society of Northern Ireland, who will manifest priorities consistent with the crucicentrism at the core of authentic evangelical belief. Spiritual legitimation of unionism, motivated at least in part by a quest for power, is incompatible with proclaiming faith in a Messiah voluntarily executed by the State. Closed evangelicalism continues to be dominated by a nationalist agenda and demonstrates a relentless desire to dismiss its Other and reinforce its own legitimacy through threat, fear, and exclusion. By failing to create distance, closed evangelicalism has experienced the corrosive effects of what Volf terms the ‘ego-boosting self-deceit’ of ‘power-maintaining ideologies’.987 In contrast, the Bible cautions Christians against being taken captive ‘through hollow and deceptive philosophy which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ’. (Col. 2:8). Interpreting this verse, the renowned theologian, N. T. Wright argues that Paul's exhortation is best understood as a warning against reverting to follow former national ‘gods’. The Colossians had been set free in Christ from any previous national solidarities.988 By pursuing a nationalist agenda, closed evangelicalism has lost touch with the priorities of its Lord who said ‘My kingdom is not of this world’ (John 18: 36). A practical implication of achieving distance in Northern Ireland is that evangelicals should be pursuing policies designed to ameliorate nationalist conflict rather than perpetuating the struggle. However ambiguous, the GFA does give some ground for optimism in that it reflects modification of essentialist nationalist claims. Since nationalism is an ideological construct whose mythic narrative can be adapted to changing political contexts, there is room to hope that the GFA represents the emergence of streams within both unionism and nationalism willing to create ideological space for each other, if not within

987


988

Similarly, on Colossians 1: 16, Wright concludes that ‘all things’ refers to a totality of all realities that owe their existence to Christ and are subject to him. Given Paul's mention of ‘thrones, powers, rulers, or authorities’, he suggests that it is quite legitimate to include this as a reference to international power politics. N. T. Wright, Colossians and Philemon (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1986, 71–3 and 101–2.

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a common identity, at least within significantly broadened ideologies. After thirty years of violence, it represents an acceptance from all its signatories that compromise is the only viable option. Particularly given the patchwork-quilt settlement pattern of Northern Ireland, the alternatives of continuing violence, of ethnic separation, or the outright victory of one identity, hold only the prospect of prolonged and bitter conflict. The second level on which Ulster evangelicals face a significant challenge is theological. It is clear that unionism currently is faring poorly in nationalist terms and this is having a profoundly negative effect on the unionist community. Deeply pessimistic, surrounded by enemies, fearing an imminent sell-out, angry at the perceived injustice of the Peace Process, and impotent to control its destiny, it feels alone and friendless within the world of nations. These same attitudes are replicated within Ulster evangelicalism, particularly Orangeism and Paisleyism. As political crisis reigns, the Gospel itself appears imperilled. It is as if actual evangelical truth is powerless to shape a more positive perspective. Security and belonging appear to derive from Ulster's political fate rather than any deeper spiritual reality. Living a life worthy of the Gospel will mean recognizing that an evangelical's source of belonging lies elsewhere than the particular political fortunes of any nationalism. The Christian faith contains profound spiritual resources to transform feelings of fear, loss, suffering, and injustice into a calm, hopeful assurance of a faith dependent not on the vagaries of political fate, but on the sovereign God reigning over all nations. For instance, evangelical Christians have a deep awareness of the doctrine of justification by faith. This teaches that simply due to God's unmerited kindness he sends his son Jesus to die a substitutionary death for alienated sinners. Those who place their faith in him find acceptance, not on their own merits, but through Christ's perfect sacrifice on the cross. This Gospel offers the ‘Good News’ of forgiveness, eternal life, the security of adoption into God's family, and the future hope of heaven. It is in light of this liberating hope that Paul can write even from prison, ‘I will continue to rejoice…for me to live is Christ and to die is gain’ (Phil. 1: 18–21). This book has at times highlighted the close similarities between nationalism and religion. Here lies however the greatest

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difference. Nationalism is profoundly ‘earthly’, an ideology tied to the concrete political realities of this world. Nationalist dreams, however grandiosely wrapped up in religious imagery, take a short-term political perspective. Biblical faith in contrast centres around the eschatological dimension of the return of Christ and the consummation of the Kingdom of God. In other words, ‘this world is not all there is’. An authentically Christian identity is that of an alien and stranger (1 Peter 2: 11) on a pilgrim journey to the source of their united identity in Christ and their place of true belonging, the presence of God in heaven. Such a vision is not escapist,989 but gives a sure hope for the future and results in a radically different order of priorities in the present to that of any temporary nationalist narrative. It is apparent from the findings in this book that evangelicals who have managed to maintain their ideological distance from nationalism have been markedly more successful in drawing on these rich biblical themes and have a correspondingly more trusting and confident view of the future than those driven by a nationalist agenda. Indeed, it is likely that for the foreseeable future closed evangelicalism will remain wedded to the declining political fate of unionism. The outlook for the emotional and spiritual health of Orangeism and Paisleyism is therefore bleak. Further crisis, deepening fears, increasing isolation, anger, and powerlessness will only further widen the already existing gulf between the two poles of evangelical identity. In short, the fragmentation of Ulster evangelicalism seems set to continue and probably increase. The third level in which evangelicals face a challenge to live up to their name is relational. The Gospel calls believers to love of both God and neighbour. In the deeply subversive parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus makes it clear that neighbourly love cuts across all religious and ethnic barriers and that even one's heretical enemy is one's neighbour.990 Echoing Jesus, and in one

989

See for example 1 Corinthians 15 for how Paul's complete confidence in the truth of Christ's resurrection and in the hope of the resurrection to come leads him not to a pietistic withdrawal from the world, but to the urgent and sacrificial task of mission to the Gentiles.

990

Our historical distance from the text should not obscure the shocking power of Jesus' deliberate choice of a Samaritan as the ‘hero’ of the story. For further discussion see C. Blomberg, Interpreting the Parables (Leicester: Apollos, 1990, 229–33.

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of the finest moments of New Testament literature, Paul also emphasized the absolute priority of love. He wrote to the church in Corinth that If I speak in the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I am only a resounding gong or a clanging cymbal. If I have the gift of prophecy and can fathom all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have a faith that can move mountains, but have not love, I am nothing. If I give all I have to the poor and surrender my body to the flames, but have not love, I gain nothing. (1 Cor. 13: 1–3) A crucial question therefore in relation to authentic evangelical faith becomes a qualitative one: ‘What type of evangelical identity does each represent?’ Connected to this question is another. For an identity to exist it must have boundaries that act to define its core characteristics and separate it from what it is not. What type of boundaries then ought to mark discrete evangelical identities, impenetrable or porous?991 It has been my argument that a truly Christian identity will reflect the radical boundary-breaking nature of the Kingdom of God preached by Jesus. The achievement of distance will enable it to resist the temptation to idolize its own culture while simultaneously creating space to receive the Other within a catholic cultural identity. Paisleyism is a sealed identity, withdrawn from the outside world and practically all other forms of evangelicalism, in an enclosed cocoon of self-fulfilling prophecy. Orangeism, despite its interdenominational ethos, remains locked in a repetitive historical cycle consisting of Catholic enemies and Protestant allies playing out the same battles throughout different generations. The boundaries of such closed evangelical identities are tightly drawn because they are controlled by a need to protect the ethnic core of the nation. Impenetrable borders are indications of an identity shaped, not by the universal scope of the Gospel of grace, but by the dictates of nationalism. Such belonging without distance allows no room for alternative identities. Exclusion is practised as a virtue. History is reconstructed into a simple story that reduces reality to a stark polarity of good versus evil, innocent versus guilty and purity versus corruption. Since ‘truth’ has been found, there is no interest in participating

991

I am grateful to Miroslav Volf for his helpful comments on this point.

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in self-critical examination of a satisfying world-view that authenticates ideological prejudice. The consequence is an impenitent and dogmatic moral assurance that legitimizes the exaltation of one culture, one land, one people, homogenous and unified, bound together in a common destiny. Superfluous and distracting concepts such as repentance, forgiveness, or ‘love of the other’ are sacrificed in the noble pursuit of justice and liberation. The Other, whether ‘liberal’ Protestants or deceived Catholics, are marginalized, dehumanized, and stereotyped in order to be dismissed from the idealized vision of ‘what should be’. As Volf notes, such exclusion is due not only to the threat the Other poses, but is motivated by a desire for power: We exclude because we want to be at the center and be there alone, single-handedly controlling ‘the land’. To achieve such ‘hegemonic centrality’ we add conquest to conquest and possession to possession; we colonize the lifespace of others and drive them out; we penetrate in order to exclude, and we exclude in order to control—if possible everything, alone. 992 From the evidence of this book, it appears that Paisleyism and Orangeism simply reflect the dominant values of their surrounding culture, a culture shaped by the competition for power between the two nationalist ideologies of Ulster unionism and Irish nationalism. Evangelicalism is used as a weapon in the war, acting to reinforce and justify nationalist objectives. However, Paisleyism and Orangeism are not synonymous with Ulster evangelicalism in general. The fractious and diverse nature of Ulster evangelicalism should warn against monolithic interpretations of Protestantism. Closed evangelical ideology is now being challenged from within the evangelical fold. Commenting on such breaches of Protestant solidarity, Morrow writes, ‘Protestantism in Ireland may indeed be part of the glue of Ulster Unionist ideology but simultaneously it may be the source of the most profound critiques.’993 This study suggests that this prediction is finding fulfillment with the emergence of open evangelicalism in Ulster.

992

Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 78–9.

993

Morrow, ‘Suffering for Righteousness' Sake?’, 62.

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It can be argued that Presbyterianism and ECONI represent porous evangelical identities. From the discussion in Chapters 7 and 8 several features can be identified that are common to both: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

A willingness to recognize the spiritual legitimacy of those outside their own boundaries. An openness to engage in self-critical evaluation and repentance. Entrance into dialogue and relationship with their Other. An acknowledgement of the finite capability of the fallen human mind to grasp all truth. A willingness to listen to, and be informed by, the perspectives of those outside one's own identity. A desire to love enemies rather than eliminate them from their world. A rejection of the use of power or threat in order to protect truth. Opposition to any form of sacralization of national identity.

Such flexibility is deeply threatening to impenetrable identities because it undermines the basis by which their borders are maintained. This is probably why any association with Catholicism becomes a sign of confessional bankruptcy. From these three sketches, it is evident that deep ideological cleavages exist between what I have called open and closed evangelical identities. Despite all four groups' claims to represent evangelical orthodoxy, it is difficult to imagine any meaningful level of cooperation and unity between the two poles of the spectrum. This observation in itself is significant. It suggests the existence of an alternative allegiance that has displaced evangelical faith as a primacy source of identity. It is my contention that closed evangelicalism has substituted nationalism as its core ideology. Suffering from the noxious effects of belonging without distance, it has parted company with historic evangelical faith. In making this judgement, I reiterate that I am not attempting to dismiss the authenticity of any individual's faith. Rather, I am arguing that to be consistent with their own claims, the belief systems of both Orangeism and Paisleyism stand in need of profound reassessment. To be effective, such reassessment

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would need to displace nationalism from the heart of closed evangelical ideology. This would entail a consistent rejection of any power-maintaining mechanisms, a reorientation from a temporally dominated agenda to one shaped by eschatological hope, and a radical reshaping of sealed boundaries to create space, not necessarily to agree with the Other, but at least to create ideological space to love the Other as a neighbour, even if a heretical one. Participants within closed evangelical communities would need to be highly motivated to initiate such reform because they would be engaging in a risky confrontation with powerful collective myths. For evangelicals, such motivation is only likely to originate, not from a secular appeal for peace or political stability, but within the terms of religious conviction. It would require a Pauline ‘Damascus Road’ type of experience whereby they become convinced that God's Word itself challenges cherished assumptions. Only in the light of such radical revisionism might repentance for past actions and a desire for reconciliation become evident.994 However, such an internal revolutionary reappraisal within closed evangelical communities remains difficult, if not impossible, to envisage. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, Orangeism remains in denial regarding the validity of both internal and external criticism. To displace its nationalist agenda, the Order would need formally to disassociate itself from the Ulster Unionist Party. In tandem with this would be the challenge to transform itself from a political organization that uses religion to sanctify political unionism, into a non-political religious, educational, and cultural body committed to upholding Protestant values. Liechty and Clegg imagine the necessary scenario: Its cultural expressions in music, symbols, and parading to church, especially those associated with 12 July, if stripped of their political baggage and treated as a celebration of common history, have the potential, if treated with care, to take on the air of community festivals…It would require also a willingness to actively mitigate their antiCatholicism so that it no longer fuels antagonised division within the community. It is not a matter of having to relinquish the truth claim that the Roman Catholic Church is radically in error, but rather,

994

For an extensive discussion on redeeming identity and belonging, see Liechty and Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism, 279–336.

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on the one hand, it is a question of separating that claim from issues of political sovereignty and party political considerations and, on the other hand, of building relationships with and acting co-operatively with the Catholic / nationalist community, where possible, to further the development of peaceful, civic society in Northern Ireland. 995 The authors conclude their blueprint for a non-sectarian Orange Order with an open question. To paraphrase: would removing its nationalist ideological core and replacing it with religious, cultural, social, and civic elements, result in an institution unrecognizable from the Orange Order? It is an important question, which goes to the heart of the issue of whether the Order is redeemable from the grip of nationalism or not. In my view, regrettably it is not. Orangeism (and Paisleyism to an even stronger degree) is an oppositional identity forged in and sustained by a hostile political and religious context. Orange and Paisleyite ideologies are woven around a nationalist ‘thread’ which provides a sense of coherence and power. Unravelling nationalism from its complex, interwoven relationship with evangelical belief and imagery would cause the entire fabric of their belief systems to fall apart. They are therefore irredeemably nationalist in character. In this context, it is highly significant that both organizations unambiguously reject open evangelicalism's hermeneutical method and conclusions. Despite the use of responsible biblical exegesis, carried out within an evangelical framework and coupled with careful attempts to build trust and sustain dialogue, the PCI's and ECONI's arguments are minimized and summarily dismissed. Awkward interpretations of reality, however firmly based on the Bible, that do not ‘fit’ a nationalist myth are simply not ‘heard’. However, important challenges also face identities within open evangelicalism. Volf writes that exclusion can be maintained by different emotional attitudes ranging from hatred to indifference.996 As has been argued, it was the latter attitude that characterized Presbyterianism's exclusion of the minority community in the ‘golden era’. While Presbyterianism did not completely enter the emotional vortex of nationalist mythology, it became subsumed into the comfortable assumptions of a British unionist identity. Although since the late 1960s attempts

995

Ibid. 126–7.

996


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have been made to create distance from this claustrophobic relationship, the PCI, for a variety of reasons discussed in Chapter 7, continues to be reluctant publicly to debate its relationship with Orangeism and unionism. As a result, the Church's success in establishing distance remains largely abstract in nature. However, it is not without significance that many of the political, theological, and relational building blocks necessary to create the balance of distance and belonging characteristic of an open identity are in place. What appears to be required is a consistent determination to implement suggestions raised within its own General Assembly reports at a leadership and popular level. Alongside this priority, a clear focus needs to be maintained on the missiological calling of the Church, not only to bear witness to but also to embody the universal scope of the Gospel of grace. As a significant participant in the sorry history of Northern Ireland, the Church needs to ‘own’ its past of uncritical complacent indifference and engage in honest self-evaluation and repentance. It is clear that this process has begun and it will need wisdom and courage to bring it to fruition. In particular, the PCI has yet to follow through on its rejection of any politically captive or power-based religious ideology. To be consistent, the Church needs not only to initiate a process of disengagement with the Orange Institutions but also with any other flags, symbols, or traditions that suggest that the Church is spiritually endorsing the political cause of unionism. Establishing distance from nationalism need not entail Presbyterians losing their unionist identity, but it would remove the trappings of one national identity from the realm of the sacred and create space for a catholic cultural identity in Christ. If attempted, the degree to which this will be a traumatic exercise will indicate the depth of the idolatrous fusion of nationalism and religion within church members' attitudes. The evangelicals of ECONI have begun to grapple seriously with the task of redefining belonging through establishing a necessary distance. ECONI represents an Ulster evangelical identity willing to part with, and if necessary confront, religious nationalism while holding firmly on to its confessional values. Maintaining the dialectic between distance and belonging has enabled ECONI to articulate an evangelical identity focused around a biblical, rather than a nationalist, ideological core. A

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voice heard all too rarely in Ulster throughout the twentieth century, it presents a cogent alternative to the malign influence of religious nationalism within Ulster evangelicalism. The existence of the group is reflective of a failure of earlier generations to challenge accepted orthodoxies of both closed and pietistic evangelicalism. While the timing of the group's emergence does reflect a changing political and spiritual context after the collapse of the comfortable and unexamined assumptions of the ‘golden era’, its creation need not be interpreted as being symptomatic of an erosion of evangelical confidence in the face of unionist decline nor, as Birnie asserts, of the corrosive effects of relativism within conservative evangelical theology.997 Historically, evangelicalism has usually been a ‘protest’ movement, where discontent with traditional norms is accompanied by a desire for biblically based spiritual renewal. ECONI's prophetic appeal to the final authority of God's word is fully consistent with the radical reforming impulse at the heart of evangelical faith. ECONI's location within a network of mainstream international evangelicalism signals an increasingly visible identification by many Ulster evangelicals with a broader faith, beyond the confines of a culturally captive evangelical faith driven by local political agendas. Indeed, this book has shown how religious identity is profoundly influenced by the local culture in which it exists. Given the more diffuse nature of an open identity, it remains to be seen how effective a relatively marginal organization will be in catalysing a broad re-evaluation of attitudes within Ulster evangelicalism during the twenty-first century. It is ironic, but quite consistent with the ‘foolishness of God’ who demonstrates his power through apparent weakness (1 Cor. 1: 18–2: 5), that the waning political power of Ulster evangelicalism may prove in time to be a spiritual blessing.

997

Birnie, ‘Evangelical Critique’, 17.

APPENDIX A THE CHURCH's PEACE VOCATION WE THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN IRELAND, called by God, in the grace of Jesus Christ, and in the power of the Holy Spirit, to live in faith, hope and love, as children of our heavenly Father, and witnesses to God's Kingdom, publicly acknowledge our vocation to peace, which is both the gift and mission placed on us by God. WE BELIEVE that the same evangelical faith in Jesus Christ, which emboldens us to pray to God as our heavenly Father, challenges us to develop radically new attitudes and relationships with our neighbours in Ireland. WE AFFIRM that to be Christian peacemakers in our situation: We must grasp more clearly the distinctive teaching of our Lord which challenges the general practice of our world, and breaks the vicious cycle of matching injury with injury, hate with hate, ignorance with ignorance. We must therefore be prepared to meet and talk together: with those in our own Church with whom we have disagreements; with those from Churches whose practices and beliefs differ from our own; with those from whom we are politically divided. WE AFFIRM that to be Christian peacemakers in our situation: we must recognize the responsibility given by God to government, and to those who serve the cause of law and order, so as to encourage well-doing, correct evil-doers, and protect the innocent. We must therefore reject violence; seek ways to advance justice and promote the welfare of the needy; affirm that in democratic societies all citizens are called to share in these responsibilities;

APPENDIX A

and encourage all efforts to establish new structures of consent and participation. WE AFFIRM that to be Christian peacemakers in our situation: We must be initiators of programmes of action which will contribute to peace in our community. We must therefore provide resources and encouragement to enable congregations to move forward at the local level in the field of inter-community relations. WE UNDERSTAND peacemaking to be an affirmation and accommodation of diversity, and that our particular history in this land of divided communities and recurring violence, of mutual suspicion, fear and injury, makes it imperative that we reassert the Church's own proper calling to seek peace, and the things that make for peace in our day. Adopted by the General Assembly, 8 June 1994.

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Appendix B SELECTED REPORTS AND STATEMENTS PUBLISHEDBY THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN IRELAND Church and Government Committee ‘Church and Community 1 & 11’, G. A. Reports (1969), 5–11 ‘Have we a word from the Lord?: A Study Document’, G. A. Reports (1977), 7–11. ‘Concerning the Role of the Church’, G. A. Reports (1982), 9–16. Presbyterian Principles and Political Witness in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1993). Board of Social Witness D. Bamford and B. McCullough, Burning Issues: The Social Attitudes of Presbyterians in Northern Ireland: A Comparative Study (Belfast: Board of Social Witness, 1990). Committee on Doctrine ‘The Relation of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland to the Church of Rome’, G. A. Reports (1970), 9–35. ‘The Church's Comment on Political Affairs’, G. A. Reports (1976). ‘Agreements and Disagreements of Irish Presbyterians and Roman Catholicism’, G. A. Reports (1990), 7–23. National and International Problems Committee ‘Radical Change, Reform and Revolution’, G. A. Reports (1971), 151–76 ‘Christians in a Situation of Conflict’, G. A. Reports (1973), 187–99 ‘The Aims, Ideals and Methods of Irish Republicanism: And the Attitude of Irish Presbyterians to It’, G. A. Reports (1974).* ‘Loyalism in Ireland, With Special Reference to Ulster and Presbyterians’, G. A. Reports (1975).* ‘Pluralism in Ireland: A Brief Study of How People of Different Communities May Live Together in Tolerance and Cooperation’, G. A. Reports (1976).* ‘Nationhood—A Sense of Identity’, G. A. Reports (1994) 200–20.

APPENDIX B

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These three reports are found together in, Republicanism. Loyalism and Pluralism in Ireland (Belfast: Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 1978). *

Other 1990 Coleraine Declaration 1992 Mission Statement of the Presbyterian Church 1994 Peace Vocation

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Democratic Unionist Party Website at www.dup.org.uk ‘10 Steps on the Road to Dublin’ (14 May 1998). European Institute for Protestant Studies (EIPS) Website at www.ianpaisley.org ‘Mission Statement’ (Feb. 2002). Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster Website at www.freepres.org Cloud, D. W., ‘Dr. Paisley's Stand for the Old Bible’ (May 1998). ‘Why “Free Presbyterian”?’ (May 1998). Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland (GOLI) Website at www.grandorange.org.uk ‘What Does Orangeism Stand For Today?’ (May 1998). ‘The Agreement’ (May 1998). ‘Press Release from the Larne District L.O.L.’ (11 May 1998). ‘Press Release from the Belfast County Grand Orange Lodge’ (13 May 1998). International Testimony for an Infallible Bible (ITIB) Website at www.itib.org ‘What we Believe’ (Feb. 2002). ‘History’ (Feb. 2002). ‘Committee’ (Feb. 2002). ‘Resolutions’ (Feb. 2002). Noble, A. ‘The Significance of the Williamite Revolution Settlement’, lecture at the Opening Seminar of the European Institute of Protestant Studies, 31 Jan. 1998. EIPS Website at www.ianpaisley.org. —— ‘The Mentality Of Deceit: Unmasking Ancient Irish History’, EIPS Website at www.ianpaisley.org (28 Jan. 1998). Paisley, I. R. K., ‘The Conspiracy Behind The European Union: The Task Before Us’, lecture delivered at the Annual Autumn Conference of the United Protestant Council in London on 7 Nov. 1998. EIPS Website at www.ianpaisley. org. —— ‘Belfast Churches Join the Rome Express’, EIPS Website at www.ianpaisley.org (10 Dec. 1998). —— ‘None Dare Call It Treason’, sermon preached in Martyrs' Memorial Free Presbyterian Church, 22 Oct. 2000. EIPS Website at www.ianpaisley.org. Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Website at www.sdlp.ie ‘Rodgers Calls on Trimble to Back Inclusive Powersharing’ (25 July 2002). Books, articles, and printed sources The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations (Belfast: UK Government, Apr. 1998).

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Mitchel, N. C., ‘Ireland: Divided Island’, Geoforum, 13 (1971), 58–60. Mitchel, P., ‘Ireland As It Never Used to Be’, Frontiers, 3/1 (Autumn 1998), 13–18. —— ‘Evangelicalism at its Best’, Lion and Lamb, 11 (Winter 2000–1), 4–7. Mol, H., Identity and the Sacred: A Search for a New Social Scientiific Theory of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976). Moloney, E. and Pollak, A., Paisley (Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1986). Morrissey, M. and Smyth, M., Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement: Victims, Grievance, Blame (London: Pluto, 2002). Morrow, D., The Churches and Inter-Community Relationships (Coleraine: University of Ulster, 1991). —— ‘Church and Religion in the Ulster Crisis’, in Dunn. S. (ed.), Facets of the Coniflict in Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995), 151–67. —— ‘Churches, Society and Conflict in Northern Ireland’, in Aughey, A. and Morrow, D. (eds.), Northern Ireland Politics (London: Longman, 1996), 190–8. —— ‘Suffering for Righteousness' Sake? Fundamentalist Protestantism and Ulster Politics’, in Shirlow, P. and McGovern, M. (eds.), Who are ‘The People’?: Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto, 1997), 55–71. —— ‘Breaking the Cycle’, New Routes, 3/4 (1998), 15–19. Morrow, J. W., ‘Peace and Peacemaking: With Special Reference to Church and Community in Northern Ireland’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Queen's University, Belfast, 1976). Moxon-Browne, E., ‘National Identity in Northern Ireland’, in Stringer, P. and Robinson, G. (eds.), Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland, 1990–1 edn. (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1991). —— Nation, Class, and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Gower, 1983). Murphy, D., A Place Apart (London: Penguin, 1979). Nairn, T., The Break-Up of Britain, 2nd edn. (London: New Left Books, 1981). Nelson, S., Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: Protestant Paramilitary and Community Groups and the Northern Ireland Coniflict (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1984). Noll, M. A., Bebbington, D. W., and Rawlyk, G. A. (eds.), Evangelicalism: Comparative Studies of Popular Protestantism in North America, the British Isles, and Beyond, 1700–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

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Scripture Index Genesis 1:14–18 152 n. 71 1:28 61 2:15–25 61 6:4 147 11 62 18:18 62 25–8 151, 153 28:10–14 152 n. 71 37–50 154 Exodus 13:15–18 152 n. 71 13:21–2 152 n. 71 26:1 151 Numbers 14:11 152 n. 71 14:12 152 n. 71 14:26–8 152 n. 71 14:33 152 n. 71 Joshua 4:1–9 151 5:13–15 152 n. 71 Psalms 35: 26–8 180 107:12–15 152 n. 71 Isaiah 1:4–6 194 n. 97 44:28–45 62 n. 43 Daniel 7:19–27 199 9:27 201 n. 129 Luke Gospel of 264 n. 25 9:51 148 10:25–37 310 n. 24 22:49–52 307 John 18:36 308 Acts 27 176 Romans 3:22–4 212 8:5–11 307 13 195 13:1–5 195 15:7 66 16:7 291

1 Corinthians 1:18–2:5 307,317 12:12–14 68 13:1–3 311 13:13 152 n. 71 15 310 n. 23 15:56–7 152 n. 71 15:58 152 n. 71

346 2 Corinthians 5:18–21 307 Galatians 1:9 294 nn. 128, 129 3:1–4 67 3:7 67 3:11 67 n. 59 3:26–8 67 3:28 62 Ephesians 2:14 68 5:11 182 Philippians 1:18–21 309 1:27 306 3:2–11 68 Colossians 1:16 308 n. 22 2:8 308 2 Thessalonians 2:3–11 199 2:4 201 n. 129 1 Timothy 4:1–4 200 2 Timothy 1:8 177 1 Peter 2:11 66,310 1 John 1:5 152 n. 71 Jude 3 157 n. 88 Revelation 13:1–8 200 17 199, 200 22:2 62 22:21 152 n. 71

SCRIPTURE INDEX

General Index Abercorn, Duke of 227 Adams, Gerry 96, 302 n. 7 Akenson, D. H. 72, 99, 223 n. 44, 254 Allen, Harry 206 n. 137 Alliance Party 96 n. 93 An Phoblacht 304 n. 14 Anderson, Benedict 53 n. 17 Anderson, James 20 n. 21 Andrews, Cecil 291 292 n. 118 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) 93–4, 102 n. 108, 183 n. 45, 185 n. 59, 196, 240, 261 anti-Catholicism 100, 135, 163, 180, 197–201, 247, 252, 292, 314–15 Antichrist 181 n. 34, 185 n. 58, 192, 201, 251 apostasy 180–2, 189–92, 205, 237, 250 Armour, J. B. 224 n. 47 Aughey, Arthur 33–7, 39, 40–1, 102 ‘B Specials’ 102 n. 108 Bamford, D. 258 n. 170 Baptists 128, 131, 181, 186, 276 n. 63 Baptist Union of Ireland 125, 127, 189 n. 75, 291, 292 n. 118 Barclay, Oliver 117 n. 36 Barkley, J. M. 226, 231, 235–6 Barr, James 118–20 Barth, Karl 216 Bauman, Zygmunt 15 n. 4, 16 n. 8 Bebbington, David 1, 2, 106–7 Beggs, James 199 Beggs, Roy 161 n. 109 Belfast Telegraph 89 n. 62, 182 n. 42, 260 Bell, Desmond 39–40 Bell, Geoffrey 40–1 ‘belonging’:; ‘belonging without distance’ 67, 130, 158, 168, 210, 259, 313; ‘belonging and distance’ 265–6, 286, 296–7, 305–17; to a national identity 15, 38, 45, 48–50, 51, 55–6, 58, 61, 63, 81, 86 n. 55, 98, 150 n. 63, 205–6, 226; as a term 1, 7, 10, 63–4, 131–2; see also ‘distance’; Volf Bible:; conferences 107; fundamentalist uses of 118–19, 176 n. 19; ‘open’ 84–5, 142, 144, 152–3; Orange uses of 144–5, 150–1, 154–5, 166, 168, 223; source of divine revelation 106, 109, 110, 112, 143, 212, 252, 258, 262, 265, 297, 299, 306, 308, 315; study 9, 264; as a touchstone of orthodoxy 116, 160, 179, 182, 203, 222; translations of 116; see also Scripture; Word of God Billig, Michael 16, 19, 47–8, 50, 56 Bingham, James 221

348

GENERAL INDEX

Bingham, William 168, 169 n. 135, 249 n. 139 Birnie, Esmond 33 n. 59, 292–3, 307, 317 Blacker, William 147 Bloesch, Donald G. 108–9, 123 n. 57, 203 Blomberg, C. 307 n. 20, 310 n. 24 Boal, F. W. 71 n. 3, 78 n. 26, 128 Bob Jones University 114, 115 n. 27, 182; see also Jones Border, the 9, 81 n. 39, 87, 158, 229, 232 Bowen, D. 28 n. 42 Boyarin, Daniel 67 n. 61 Boyne, Battle of 71–4, 184 n. 53, 188; see also Twelfth Brethren Churches 5, 127, 276 n. 63 Breuilly, J. 24 n. 33, 25 n. 34, 27 n. 39, 49–50 Brewer, J. D. 79 n. 30, 193 n. 92 Brierley, P. 127 Bright, Bill 123 n. 57 British:; Constitution 140, 146, 196–8, 244, 285; Empire 29, 34, 42, 80, 225, 227; Government 35, 38, 77, 90, 92, 93–4, 98, 140, 161, 168–9, 182, 185, 196, 205, 244, 304; ‘London’ 87–8, 97, 171, 305;‘Westminster’ 140, 185 n. 59; identity 13, 35, 36, 37–8, 76–7, 79–82, 83, 86, 88–9, 91–4, 100, 160, 198, 209, 225–31, 235, 240–2, 252, 274, 301, 315; nation 37, 73, 88–9, 101, 198–9, 228 British Evangelical Council 121 n. 51 Brooke, Peter 217–18, 226 Brown, J. 145–6, 248 n. 137 Brown, Terence 31 Bruce F. F. 117 n. 36 Bruce, Steve 3, 41–6, 53, 76 n. 21, 132, 133 n. 1, 173, 174, 201–2, 211, 254 Buchanan, Alan 178–9 Buckland, Patrick 86 Buckley, Anthony D. 144 n. 40, 153–4 Burning Bush: A Protestant Witness in a Day of Apostasy 191 n. 84 Cadogan Group 33 Caleb Foundation 130 n. 70 Calver, Clive 261 n. 7 Calvin, John 195, 201, 251–2, 291 Calvinism 230, 254–5 Campaign for Concerted Witness to Reformed Truth (CCW) 214 n. 6, 215–16 Carson, Donald A. 110–12, 123 n. 57 Carson, Edward 74, 188 Centre for Contemporary Christianity in Ireland (CCCI) 280 charismatic:; Churches 5, 125, 128–9; Christians 110, 124, 291; as a term 113, 123, 280 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy 123 Christian Fellowship Church (CFC) 127, 129–31, 125 n. 61, 129 n. 67, 276 n. 63 Christian Irishman 224 n. 46, 247

GENERAL INDEX

Christian Renewal Centre (CRC) 280 Church of Ireland (including Anglican) 6, 125, 126–8, 131, 133–4, 136, 169–70 n. 135, 189, 218, 255, 265, 276 n. 63, 293; Theological College 157 n. 91 Church of Ireland Gazette 169 n. 135 Churchill, Winston 86 n. 57 City of Belfast YMCA 280 n. 75 Civil Rights Movement 85, 87, 89–90, 102 n. 108, 157, 242, 246 Clark, George 174 Clarke, Liam 158 n. 95, 159 n. 100 Clegg, Cecelia 42 n. 95, 257–8, 314–15 Clinton, Bill 169 Coleraine Declaration 216, 250–1 Colson, Chuck 123 n. 57 Congregational Church 128 Cooke, Dennis 201 n. 127, 201 n. 127, 209–10, 283 Cooke, Henry 134 n. 4, 190, 213–14 Corkey, William 223 Cornerstone Community 280 n. 75 Corrymeela Community 280 Coulter, Colin 45, 76 Covenanters 38, 75, 136, 195, 202, 221 Craig, James 136, 188 n. 71, 227; see Craigavon, Viscount Craig, William 96 n. 94, 172 n. 2 Craigavon, Viscount 219–20, 228 Cranmer, Thomas 178 Creighton, R. M. M. 176 n. 19 Cromwell, Oliver 28, 208 cross, of Christ 67–8, 148; in evangelical theology 63 n. 49, 109, 112–13, 292, 294, 307–9 Crown, the 35, 88, 94, 135, 147, 151, 160, 162, 196 Cullen, Cardinal Paul 28 n. 42 culture:; Irish nationalist 10, 44, 161; and national identity 13, 18, 31, 48, 50, 52, 53–61, 64–8, 167, 205, 244, 311, 317; as a term 1, 4, 8, 14–15, 59, 79, 80, 93, 107, 113, 117, 130, 155; unionist 3, 100, 156, 217, 225–6, 259, 270–2, 283, 301, 307, 312 Cunningham, Knox 160 Davey, J. E. 190, 214, 225–6, 235 de Valera, Eamon 81, 228–9, 234 decommissioning 95 n. 87, 301, 304 Defenders 145–6 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 43–4, 90, 97, 132, 172, 174, 187, 194, 204 Derrida, Jacques 8 n. 13 Derry, 1689 Siege of 71–4, 148 n. 58, 188, 196, 208, 223 Devil, the 182, 190; see also Satan Diamond, battle of 145–6, 166 Dickinson, Robert 214, 248 n. 137 Direct Rule 87–90, 305 discrimination 18, 59, 64, 92, 203, 232, 238; nationalist

349

experience of 85, 100–1, 207, 242, 306; unionist experience of 93, 140, 183 n. 64 ‘distance’:; from a national identity 79, 81, 168, 244, 246, 249, 259, 265–6, 270, 276, 282–3, 296–7, 306–11, 315–6

350

GENERAL INDEX

‘distance’: (cont.):; as a term 1, 7, 10, 63–4, 131–2; see also Volf Dixon, John 247 Donaldson, Jeffrey 161 n. 109 Douglas, John 191 n. 81, 192, 197, 200 n. 122, 206–7 Douglas, Neville 60, 87 Downing Street Declaration 92 n. 75, 264 n. 24 Drumcree 99 n. 99, 145 n. 45, 169–70 n. 135, 247–8, 271; see also ‘Spirit of Drumcree’ Dudley-Edwards 6 n. 11 Duffy U. M. 83 n. 45 Dunlop, John 6 n. 12, 70 n. 1, 218 n. 21, 237, 243 n. 116 Dunn, S. 94–5 Durkheim, Emile 22, 55, 58 Eames, Robert 265 ecumenism 157–8, 172, 183–4, 187, 191–2, 217 n. 18, 250, 280–2, 287–8, 289–93 1859 Revival 208 n. 144, 214 Elim Pentecostals 127, 130 n. 70, 276 n. 63, 290, 292; see also Pentecostals Elliott, Marianne 72 n. 5, 73 n. 10, 74, 84 Elliott, Rowley 223 Empey, Reg 302 Enniskillen, Earl of 135 n. 7 equality:; political 38 n. 84, 83 n. 43, 93–4, 134, 207, 211, 241, 245, 300–1; spiritual 62, 67 n. 61 ERCDOM Report 182 n. 40 Erne, Earl of 135 n. 7 eschatology:; and national identity 62, 66, 168, 272, 310, 314; in Paisleyism 173 n. 8, 181, 202; views of 118–19 ethnic(ity):; conflict 18–19, 60, 309; group 29, 32, 41–6; relativized in Christ 66–8; as a source of identity 26–30, 33–5, 52–4, 100, 155, 166, 186, 299, 311; as a term 1, 18, 21, 23, 49, 67, 79, 88, 257, 274, 298, 310 ethnie 26–8, 88 European Institute of Protestant Studies (EIPS) 115–16 European Union 15, 16–17, 178 n. 26, 183 n. 44 Evangelical Alliance (EA) 121–3, 261 n. 7, 279, 290; 1846 basis of faith (EA-1846) 121–3; 1970 basis of faith (EA-1970) 121–4, 129 Evangelical Catholic Initiative (ECI) 129–31, 281–2, 291 evangelical Catholics 281–2 Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI):; and Catholicism 280–2, 286–9; within evangelical spectrum 5, 113, 120, 129, 131–2, 276–82; and Orangeism 270–3, 282–6, 290, 296–8; as an organisation 4, 113, 120, 260–98, 313, 316–17; origins of 259, 260–7; and Paisleyism 261, 265, 268, 270–3, 279, 280, 283–4, 286, 289, 294–8; and Presbyterianism 274–6; and unionism 266, 292–3 Evangelical Presbyterian Church 276 n. 63; see also Irish Evangelical Church

GENERAL INDEX

Evangelical Protestant Society (EPS) 290, 292 evangelicalism:; ‘closed’ 6, 7, 130–2, 137, 165, 170, 175, 204, 219, 224, 240, 241, 244–5, 249, 250–1, 255–6, 259, 265, 273, 278, 282, 286, 297–8, 308, 310, 313, 317; definition of 105–14, 276–9, 295; as a historical movement 1–2, 3, 116–18, 120–4, 214, 216; ‘open’ 6, 7, 130–2, 170, 174, 297, 312, 315; relationship with fundamentalism 7, 114–24, 283–4; spectrum within Ulster 120, 124–32, 279–82, 289–96; as a term 1–4, 7, 8, 105, 166, 216, 265, 268, 283, 289, 294, 312; and unionist identity 9, 43–6, 98, 102, 132, 134–7, 160, 183, 184, 202–3, 205–10, 267–73, 306–17 Evangelicals and Catholics Together in Ireland 289 n. 103 Evans, Estyn E. 9, 56 exclusion:; by abandonment 64–5, 100; through indifference 65, 101, 228, 237, 255, 259, 315–16; by domination 64–5, 88, 100–2, 168, 210–11; by elimination; through assimilation 64, 100; through the ‘politics of purity’ 64, 100, 167, 206–7, 210–12; as a term 1, 18–19, 37, 64–8, 100, 261, 282, 284, 308, 311–12 Fackre, Gabriel 108 Fair Employment Agency (FEA) 183 Falwell, Jerry 123 n. 57 Famine, the 28 n. 42 Faulkner, Brian 86 n. 55 Finlayson, Alan 19 n. 20, 20–1, 25 n. 34, 76 n. 21, 133 n. 1 Flame '74 216 Fleming, William 215 Forsythe, Clifford 161 n. 109 Forum for Peace and Reconciliation 243 n. 116 Foster, Ivan 181 n. 37, 191 n. 84, 200 n. 123, 206 n. 137 Foster, R. F. 72 n. 6 For God and His Glory Alone 261–2, 290 Frameworks for the Future 185 n. 57 Freemasonary 130 n. 69, 142–4, 166, 249 n. 142, 285; Royal Arch degree 144 n. 42 Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster (FPCU):; formation of 171–2, 189–192; as an organisation 4, 5, 114, 120, 125, 127, 131, 142, 171–212, 255, 286, 290, 292, 295–7; see also Paisleyism Free State 78, 228 Fulton, A. A. 216 n. 13, 250 fundamentalism:; definition of 115 n. 27, 116–18, 283–4; as a ‘mentality’ of 118–20; as a term 7, 105, 174, 182, 216, 295; see also evangelicalism; Paisleyism Fundamentals, The 116 Gallagher A. M. 49–50 n. 9

351

352

GENERAL INDEX

Garvin, T. 25 n. 34 Geertz, Clifford 24, 51, 57, 89 Gellner, Ernest 25 n. 34 Geoghgan, V. 17 n. 14 Gibson, F. C. 224 Gibson, F. R. 224 globalization 15–16 Glorious Revolution 72–3, 139–40, 166, 179, 188, 196–8, 202 God:; chosen people of 59, 74, 147, 154–5, 185–6, 188, 212, 254–5; forces opposed to 191, 199–200, 230, 268–9, 272–3, 290–1; judgement of 269–70, 274–5, 284; and nations 61–3; plans for Ulster 114, 137, 159–60, 166, 193–9, 205, 207–9, 227; ultimate allegiance to 65–7, 244–6, 261–2, 270–1, 278, 308–10; see also Bible; Gospel; Kingdom of God; Word of God Good Friday Agreement (GFA):; aims of 2, 88, 90, 300 n. 4; as a date 2, 299; electoral support for 97; evangelical attitudes to 307; future of 98–9, 299–305, 308; Orange attitudes to 161, 168–9; Presbyterian attitudes to 249; unionist attitudes to 5 n. 9, 93–7, 298, 304 n. 15 Gospel:; contextualization of 62, 216; core essentials of 111–14; disagreements over 180–1, 190, 246, 261, 271, 272, 278–9, 286, 287, 291, 294, 296; eschatological purpose of 62; message of salvation 1, 8, 9, 63, 108, 110–11, 129, 142, 149, 164, 175, 177, 192, 198, 203, 210, 212, 215, 245–6, 251, 253, 275, 285, 295, 306, 309–10, 311, 316; and Ulster's fate 160, 184, 203, 207–8, 222, 261, 270–1, 283 Gospel of Jesus Christ: An Evangelical Celebration 123 Graham, Billy 123 n. 57 Graham, Brian 76, 82 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland (GOLI) 137–8, 140, 161, 186, 223; orange degree 150–1; plain purple degree 150–1; see also Orangeism Gray, Tony 6 n. 11, 151 n. 66 Grenz, Stanley 109, 113 n. 23 Grier, W. J. 191 n. 82 Grudem, Wayne 123 n. 57 Guibernau, M. 25 n. 34, 49–51, 58–9 Guthrie, D. 117 n. 36 Haddick-Flynn, K. 6 n. 11, 137 n. 16 Haire, J. M. 216 n. 13 Harris, Harriet A. 119–20 Hastings, A. 23, 27 n. 38 Hempton, David 3, 27 n. 40, 134, 214 n. 3 Hennessey, T. 80 n. 35 Henry, Carl F. G. 117 hermeneutics 117, 166, 211–12, 267, 297, 315 Hermon, Jack 183 n. 45 Heskin, K. 83 Heslinga, Max 81 n. 39

GENERAL INDEX

Hewitt, David 265, 271, 277, 281 n. 78, 291 n. 114 Higgins, G. I. 79 n. 30, 193 n. 92 Hill, M. 3, 214 n. 3 Hobsbawm, E. 25 n. 34 Holmes, R. F. G. 220, 248, 250 Holy Spirit 62, 68, 106, 109, 129, 247, 269 Home Rule 3, 29, 70, 75 n. 17, 78, 102 n. 108, 135; 1912–14 crisis 71–5, 145, 188, 208 n. 144, 218–21, 223, 235, 255 Houston, Billy 291 n. 117, 292 n. 118 Hutchinson, Samuel 265, 275 Hume, John 32 n. 55, 96 n. 94 Hybels, Bill 123 n. 57 ‘imagined community’ 30, 40, 53, 139, 166, 175 Independent Loyal Orange Order 130 n. 70, 142, 181 n. 36, 292 Independent Methodist Church 292 inerrancy 108, 110, 115 n. 27, 117 n. 35, 119, 121–3 infallibility 115 n. 27, 121–4 Inglis, T. 158 n. 93 inspiration 110, 118, 119 n. 44, 121 n. 50, 123 n. 56 International Council on Biblical Inerrancy 123 n. 56 International Testimony for an Infallible Bible (ITIB) 114 n. 26 Inter-Varsity Fellowship (IVF) 121 n. 50 Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship basis of faith (IVCF-2000) 123–4 Inter-Varsity Press (IVP) 121 n.50 Ireland:; as a place 9, 70, 74, 82, 137, 215, 232; political background of 2, 3, 8, 13, 17, 27–30, 41, 56, 77, 78, 79, 133, 141; in Protestant ideology 207–8, 215, 220, 222, 225–6, 227, 261, 307; Republic of 9–10, 17, 81, 82, 86, 88, 101, 158, 204, 225, 229, 252, 304; see also Free State; ‘the South’; unionism Irish:; Government 79, 98, 182, 301; ‘Dublin’ 97, 161, 169,182 n. 41; identity 9, 13, 16, 17, 42, 56, 91–2, 230–1, 300–1; nation 30, 39, 41, 42–3, 45–6, 98, 229, 234 Irish Church Missions (ICM) 28 n. 42 Irish Evangelical Church 191 Irish nationalism 71 n. 3; criticism of 40, 100, 158, 306; as a form of nationalism 30–3, 34, 36, 41; political progress of 27–30, 82, 87, 92–5, 98–9; see also unionism Irish Republican Army (IRA) 70 n. 1, 86, 88, 91, 95, 115, 157, 182 n. 43, 195 n. 102, 200, 204, 229 n. 63, 264 n. 24, 266, 302, 304–5 Irish Revival Fellowship (IRF) 215 Irish Times 157 n. 91 Irvine, Ken 293

353

354

GENERAL INDEX

Jackson, Alvin 74 Jesus Christ:; ‘body of ’ 62, 66–8; discipleship to 63, 250 n. 145, 306–11, 316; in ECONI thought 261–2, 264 n. 25, 267, 271, 273,278, 285; in Orangeism 124 n. 58, 148–9, 154, 157, 162, 249 n. 139; in Paisleyism 178–80, 194, 197, 200; in Presbyterianism 221–2, 232, 236, 245–6, 247, 250 n. 146, 251–2; as saviour 106–12, 115 n. 27, 117 n. 35, 142–3, 201 n. 125, 210, 280, 287–8 Johnstone, Ron 142, 152 n. 69 Jones, Bob Jnr 114–15 Jones, Bob III 115 n. 27 Jones, Bob IV 115 Jordan, Glenn 4 justification by faith 84–5, 154–5, 166, 224, 253, 309 Keane M. C. 71 n. 3, 78 n. 26, 128 Kearney, R. 15 n. 6, 17 n. 14 Kedourie, E. 25 n. 34 Kennaway, Brian 142–5, 150 n. 63, 158–9, 163 n. 116, 164 n. 122, 165 n. 128, 286 Kennedy, Billy 141 Kennedy, D. 79, 84 Kenney, M. C. 144 n. 40 Kerr, Cecil 280 n. 77, 291 n. 114 Kilpatrick, Cecil 128, 140, 147, 155 n. 77, 158 n. 95, 159 King James II 72–4, 140 King William of Orange 72, 148 n. 58, 151 Kingdom of God 63, 66, 130, 194, 246, 261, 267–8, 270, 278, 307–11 Knox, John 155 n. 80, 175–6, 193 n. 91, 201 LaHaye, Tim 123 n. 57 Lausanne 1974 International Congress on World Evangelization 122–3, 279 Lee, J. J. 39–41 Lemass, Sean 86, 237 liberal theology 21, 113, 117 n. 35, 119, 121, 129, 157, 189–90, 203, 213–16, 282, 289–90, 292–3, 312 liberty (civil and religious):; denial to Catholics 36; denial by Catholicism 135, 140, 168–9, 184, 200, 218, 227, 248; in unionist ideology 71–6, 77, 84, 134 n. 4, 140–1, 145–8, 162, 203, 207–9, 220–2, 225–6, 246 Lieberson, S. 28 Liechty, Joe 42 n. 95, 258–9, 314–15 Life 2 216 Lion and Lamb 263–4, 284, 298 n. 134 Lissara Presbyterian Church, Crossgar 189, 192 Little Acorn 265 Livingstone D. N. 71 n. 3, 78 n. 26, 128 Lloyd-Jones, Martyn 121–2 Lockington, John 248 n. 137 London Bible College basis of faith (LBC-1998) 121 n. 51, 123–4, 280 Long, S. E. 157–8, 162,164

GENERAL INDEX

Lord Enniskillen Memorial Orange Orphan Society 163 n. 118, 165 n. 129 Loughlin, J. 79 n. 28, 81 n. 38 loyalism 33, 73, 76–7, 81, 83–4, 133–70, 173, 174 n. 10, 187, 210, 224, 245–7, 261, 283, 284–5; see also Orangeism loyalty:; British lack of 77, 94–5, 161, 195–6; Catholic lack of 59, 89, 100, 135, 139, 146, 157, 162 n. 112, 185 n. 57, 206–8, 230; in ECONI 261, 268, 270, 285; to the nation 47, 54–5, 63, 65; in Orangeism 135, 139–40, 147, 149, 160, 162–4; in Paisleyism 177, 179, 187; in Presbyterianism 224–9, 232, 235–6, 240, 246, 254; in unionist ideology 35, 37–9, 40, 43, 70, 73–4, 76–7, 82, 88–9, 95, 202 Lundie, T. 248 n. 137 Lundy, Colonel 73, 187 Luther, Martin 177, 178, 195, 251, 290–1 Macauley, James 227 McCall, C. 28 n. 44 McCartney, R. 33 n. 59, 184 McCausland, Nelson 158 n. 95 McConaghie, David 130 n. 70, 142, 155 n. 78 McConnell, James 5 n. 9 McCrone, D. 15 McCullough, B. 258 n. 170 McEvoy, R. K. 290 McGarry, J. 42 n. 95, 43–4, 101, 299 n. 1 McGrath, Alister E. 8 n. 13, 107 McGuiness, Martin 99 n. 99 McGuire, M. 22 n. 28 Mac Iver, M. A. 175–6, 193 McKay, Susan 4 n. 8 McKean, J. K. L. 248 n. 137 McLoughlin, Mitchel 44 n. 105 McMillan, David 271, 283, 290, 291 n. 114 Macmillan, Harold 86 n. 57, 160 n. 106 MacRory, Cardinal 223 Malcomson, W. P. 152 n. 69 Malowinski, B. 22 ‘man of sin’ 199, 251; see also Antichrist Mann, M. 16–17 Marsden, G. M. 111, 116–17 Marsden, John 157 n. 91 Marshall, I. H. 117 n. 36 Marshall, R. L. 236 Martyrs' Memorial Church 114–15, 175 Mason, David 36, 40, 42, 173 Meredith, Ian 142–5, 150 n. 63, 163 n. 116, 164 n. 122 Methodist Church 6, 126–8, 131, 181, 200 n. 123, 265, 276 n. 63, 293 Miller, David W. 37–9, 40, 74, 213 n. 1 Milligan, Seamus 290 Minister of Education's Bill (1923) 223–4

Mitchel, P. 17 n. 13, 112 n. 22 modernization 3, 23, 25, 27 Mol, H. 55 Moloney, E. 5 n. 10 Molyneaux, Lord 161 n. 109, 183 n. 48 Montgomery, David 281 n. 78, 294

355

356

GENERAL INDEX

Montgomery, Henry (19th century ‘New Light’ Presbyterian) 213 Montgomery, Henry (1912 PCI Moderator) 220 Mooney, T. S. 214 n. 7 Morgan, V. 94–5 Morris, Heather 294 Morris L. 117 n. 36 Morrow, Duncan 77, 255, 312 Morrow, Trevor W. G. 249 n. 143, 253 Moxon-Browne, E. 13 n. 1, 91 Murphy, D. 72 n. 3 myth:; and ECONI 298; functions of 51–3; of Irish nationalism 17 n. 13, 31–2, 87, 99; of Orangeism 139, 145–8, 166, 188; of Paisleyism 174, 179, 184, 188, 205–9, 212; and Presbyterianism 256; as a term 6, 18–20, 23, 26, 29, 45, 48, 56, 61, 255, 277, 306, 308, 314–15; of unionism 31–2, 36, 53, 59, 69–78, 87, 90–1, 99, 102, 169 Nairn, T. 39–41 nation:; Christian attitude to 61–8, 244–6; ‘destiny of ’ 13, 26–7, 51–3, 207–9; and ethnic group 29, 45; and State 21, 34, 55, 57; as a term 13–15, 17, 18–21, 38–9, 47–51, 54–8, 61, 193, 217, 244, 311; see also Ulster; unionism national identity:; Christian approach to 7, 8–9, 61–8, 259, 271, 297, 306–9, 313, 316; in conflict 59–61, 95, 98–9, 132, 300; definition of 20, 31–2, 47–8, 69, 131–2; functions of 48–59, 205; and nationalism 13–14, 16, 18–20, 26–7, 29, 50–1; as a term 1, 2, 6, 8, 13, 25, 219, 230–1, 234, 236 nationalism:; and ‘emotion’ 13, 36, 47, 55–7, 58, 61, 205; as an ideology 13, 36, 37, 40–1, 48–59, 98, 167, 298; interpretation of 13–25, 26–7; and religion 5, 22–4, 26, 61–8, 226, 254, 270–3, 306–17; see also national identity nation-state 14–17, 37–8, 42, 50–1, 57 Nelson, Sarah 75 n. 18, 89–90 New Ireland Forum 241 New Protestant Telegraph 184 n. 53, 199, 272 Nicholson, J. P. 216 Nicholson, Jim 44 n. 105 1916 Rising 75, 208, 229; see also Pearse Noble, A. 207–9 ‘North, the’ 86, 92, 98, 100, 232, 233, 237, 280, 301 Northern Ireland:; British attitudes to 86, 88–9, 92; constitutional status of 71, 78, 80, 141, 145, 157, 196, 204, 228, 235, 240; identity conflict within 6, 8, 13, 17, 33, 41, 43–6, 59–60, 70, 79–80, 82, 85, 94, 100, 157, 160, 233, 299–302,

GENERAL INDEX

307–9; political history of 71–82, 87–98; see also Ulster; ‘North, the’ Northern Ireland Assembly 88 n. 61, 90, 93 n. 79, 97, 305 Northern Ireland Handbook 82 n. 42 Northern Ireland Police Service 93–4 Oath of Loyalty 228 Ockenga, Harold 117 O'Connell, Daniel 28 n. 42 O'Connell, M. 40 n. 89 O'Connor, F. 97 n. 97 Oden, Thomas 123 n. 57 O'Donnell, E. E. 83 O'Dowd, L. 36 Old Testament, use of 154–5, 193–4 O'Leary, B. 42 n. 95, 43–4, 101 O'Neill, Terence 85, 86, 171, 177, 179 n. 30, 183 n. 48, 187, 188 n. 71, 238 Oommen, T. K. 21 ‘Orange ABC’ 155–6 n. 80 Orange Order 4–6, 59, 99 n. 99, 125–8, 133–70, 174 n. 10; democratic structure 137–8, 159; Education Committee 128, 138, 159; marches, see parades; parades 72, 76, 148–50, 153, 156, 163, 247, 248, 271, 285; see also GOLI; ‘Qualifications of an Orangeman’; Royal Arch Purple Order; Royal Black Institution Orange Standard 160–1, 168–9, 290 Orangeism 4, 133–70; and Catholicism 156–9, 163 n. 121; within evangelical spectrum 113, 130–2; and Presbyterianism 133–5, 137; and unionism 133–7, 164–5, 166–70; see also ECONI; Paisleyism ‘Other’ 18, 40, 59, 61–2, 64–8, 69, 82–3, 100–1, 165, 167, 210–11, 237, 256, 282, 297, 307, 308, 311–14 Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference (1932) 227 Packer, J. I. 117–18, 123–4, 289 n. 103 Paisley, Ian Robert Kyle 5–6, 33, 44 n. 105, 115 n. 26, 116 n. 30, 171–2, 218 n. 22, 237, 246; as ‘God's man’ 176–7, 181, 187, 195 Paisley, Kyle 189 n. 75 Paisleyism 4, 5, 112, 113, 171–212, 309–15; and Catholicism 195 n. 102, 197–201, 208 n. 145; within evangelical spectrum 120, 130, 306; fundamentalist associations 7, 105, 114–16; interpretation of 43–5, 132, 173–5, 201–12; and Orangeism 173–5, 184–8, 197, 199, 202, 205–6; and Presbyterianism 173, 180, 181, 186, 189–93, 218 n. 22, 237, 241, 246–7, 250, 256; and unionism 171–2, 175, 180, 188, 205, 211; see also ECONI Palau, Luis 123 n. 57 Papacy, the 116, 222 Parades Commission 265

357

358

GENERAL INDEX

paramilitaries 30, 102 n. 108, 133 n. 1, 183, 210 Park, W. A. A. 248 n. 137 Partition: context of 29, 78–9, 81 n. 39, 203, 225, 227, 230–1, 237, 274 as a date 1, 2, 3, 4, 14, 32, 37, 60, 69, 100, 218, 224, 235, 259 Passmore, Thomas 160 Paton, J. G. 229 Patrick, St 112 n. 22, 207 Patten, Chris 93–4 Patton, George 140–1, 145 n. 46 Patton, Joel 158 n. 96 Paul, St 62, 66–8, 176–7, 200, 209, 294, 306, 308–11 Peace People 267, 280 Peace Process 3, 17 n. 13, 95, 115, 145, 159, 264, 303, 304, 309 Peace Vocation 243, 318–19 Pearse, Patrick 75, 148 Pentecostals 5, 108 n. 12, 110, 124, 125, 127–8, 131, 276 n. 63; theology 130 pietistic spirituality 195, 255, 262, 268–9, 279, 310 n. 23, 317 Plantation, the 27, 207–8 Pollack, A. 5 n. 10 Poole, Derek 277 Pope, the 176, 178, 196–8, 199; see also Antichrist; ‘man of sin’; Papacy Porter, David 263, 264, 267–9, 276–7, 279, 284–5, 291 n. 114 Porter, Norman 33 n. 59, 96 n. 92 Porter, Warren W. 139–40, 142, 164 n. 123, 191 248 n. 137 ‘post-conservative’ evangelicals 123–4, 280 post-modernism 7, 8, 14–17, 67 n. 61, 113 n. 23, 123, 303 post-nationalism 15–17, 19, 302 n. 7, 303 power-sharing 88, 90, 93–4, 96–7, 140, 160–1, 185, 241, 304 n. 15 premillennialism 108, 118, 173, 202 Prenter, Samuel 221–2 Presbyterian Church in Ireland (PCI) 4, 6, 84, 113, 126–8, 131–2, 133–4, 135, 136, 176, 213–59, 261, 265, 274–5, 313, 315–16; Board of Social Witness 258 n. 170; and Catholicism 134, 217 n. 18, 220–3, 233–4, 237, 250–3; Church and Government Committee 238 n. 96, 239, 240, 247, 249, 261; democratic structure of 218, 258–9; Doctrine Committee 249 n. 142, 251–2; General Assembly of 192, 213, 217–18, 224decisions of 214, 216, 220, 230, 251; reports of 219 n. 24, 230–1, 242, 316; Irish Mission of 222, 224, 239, 252; National and International Problems Committee of 232–4, 238; and Orangeism 217, 219–25, 234, 237, 241, 243–9, 255–7; and Paisleyism 173, 181, 189–93, 202, 218 n. 22, 256; and unionism 217–18, 225–31, 232–7, 240–2, 249, 256–7; see also ECONI; Orangeism Presbyterian Herald 216 n. 16, 248

GENERAL INDEX

Presbyterian Principles and Political Witness in Northern Ireland 241 n. 106, 244, 246–7 Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 90 n. 66 ‘Promised Land’ 151–5, 166 Protestant:; alienation 94–5, 101, 168, 169, 204, 238, 240; Ascendancy 82, 218; see also British; evangelicalism; unionism Protestant and Catholic Encounter (PACE) 280 n. 75 Protestant Telegraph 272; see also New Protestant Telegraph ‘Qualifications of an Orangeman’ 143–4 Queen, the 80, 179, 198, 240 Ravenhill Presbyterian Church 189 n. 75 Rea, Winston Churchill ‘Winkie’ 210 reconciliation:; and politics 89, 238–9, 240, 247, 259, 264, 277, 280, 299–300, 314; theology of 109, 261, 292, 307–8 ‘reconstructed evangelicals’ 124, 279–80 Reformation 27, 111, 136, 141, 155, 175–80, 185, 188, 193, 207, 251–3, 294 Reformed faith 123, 141–2, 157, 166, 170, 198, 207, 215, 244, 250–2, 292 Reformed Presbyterian Church 192 n. 87, 276 n. 63 Reformed Presbyterian College 189 n. 75 Reformers 114, 179, 180, 189, 195, 201, 209, 251 Reid, Henry 158 n. 95, 159 Reid, John 95, 305 Reid, Paul 125 n. 61, 129 n. 67, 130 n. 69 Remembrance Day 229 republicanism 79, 87, 99, 100, 200 n. 123, 210, 302, 304; unionist attitudes to 70 n. 1, 95–7, 101, 156–7, 168–9, 173, 183, 195 n. 102, 208, 238–9, 244, 304–5 Revivalist 176 n. 16, 189–90, 290 ritual 13, 22, 57–9, 63, 73, 76, 136–7, 142–5, 148–56, 165–7, 256, 298 Robinson, P. 101 n. 105 Roche P. 32 n. 55, 33 n. 59 Roden, Earl of 147 Rogers, Brid 304 n. 15 Roman Catholic Church 126; and Irish nationalism 28 n. 42, 32, 42–4, 71 n. 3, 166, 234; see also ECONI; Orangeism; Paisleyism; PCI; unionism Rose, Richard 80, 125 Ross, William 161 n. 109 Royal Arch Purple Order 142, 144, 149, 150 n. 63, 152 n. 69; Royal Arch Purple degree 151–3 Royal Black Institution 144 n. 40, 149–50, 153–6, 161 n. 109 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 93–5, 102 n. 108, 183, 196 n. 104, 344; see also Northern Ireland Police Service Ruane, Joseph 38 n. 84, 92–3, 300–1, 303

359

360

GENERAL INDEX

Satan 152 n. 69, 182, 200, 205, 286 Scripture:; fundamentalist uses of 119, 121, 182; Orange uses of 143–4, 150, 151–3, 166; source of divine revelation 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 180, 209, 251, 267, 278, 284, 286, 290, 291, 306; study of 288; as a touchstone of orthodoxy 84–5, 199; see also Word of God Scripture Union basis of faith(SU-1985) 123–4 sectarian(ism):; conflict 134, 146, 208, 242, 247, 304; as a term 76, 142, 163, 203, 257–8, 284, 315; unionism as 39–41 separation, doctrine of 116–19, 120, 122, 180–4, 191, 193, 197, 202–4, 254, 287–8, 291, 294 1798 Rebellion 71 n. 5, 134, 147, 208, 218 n. 23 Sider, Ron 123 n. 57 Sinclair, Thomas 220 Sinn Féin (SF) 90, 97, 99 n. 99, 115, 182 n. 43, 200, 263, 289, 302, 304, 305 1641 Rebellion 71–2, 208 1689, see Derry 1690, see Boyne Smith, Anthony D. 14, 16 n. 10, 17, 18–19, 23, 25 n. 34, 26–8, 49, 50–5, 57, 59, 63 Smyth, Clifford 158 n. 95, 173–4, 201, 202–3 Smyth, Martin 139–40, 145, 148, 149 n. 62, 155 n. 79, 157 n. 88, 159 n. 98, 161 n. 109, 162, 197 n. 106, 248 n. 137 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 90, 96 n. 93, 160, 302 n. 7, 304 n. 15 Social Identity Theory (SIT) 49–50 see also Tajfel Somme, the 75, 147–8, 188, 229 ‘South, the’ 9–10, 81, 84, 86, 149, 158, 226, 229, 230, 236–7, 301 ‘Spirit of Drumcree’ 158 ‘Spirit of the Union’ 161 n. 111 stereotypes 40, 60–1, 64, 69, 82–5, 156, 250, 256, 280 Stewart, A. T. Q. 306 Stirling, Roz 271 Stockman, Steven 271 Storey, Earl 169 n. 135 Storkey, Elaine 263 n. 19, 279 Stormont 69, 78, 80, 86, 87, 92, 96, 98, 101, 136, 161, 169, 171, 187, 208 n. 144, 224, 226, 240, 242, 305 Storrar, William 61–3 Stott, John W. R. 106, 110–11, 117, 118 n. 39 n. 41, 120 n. 46, 121–4, 129, 261 n. 7, 263 n. 19, 277 n. 67, 279, 289 Sunningdale Conference 96, 160, 185 n. 57, 240–1 Swindoll, Charles 123 n. 57 symbols 27, 36, 43, 48, 54, 56, 57–9, 72–3, 81 n. 38, 88, 93–4, 144–5, 161, 233, 252, 301; and ECONI 298; in Orangeism 148–56, 165–6, 314; in Paisleyism 175; in Presbyterianism 226, 316

GENERAL INDEX

Tajfel, Henri 49 n. 9 Taylor, David 76 n. 21, 173, 201 Taylor, J. D. 101 n. 105 Temple, David 239, 247 Thatcher, Margaret 185 n. 59, 195–6, 198 n. 115 Times, The 137 ‘Third Force’ 206 n. 138, 283 n. 84 Third Way 279 Thompson, J. 216 n. 13 Thompson, William 161 n. 109 Thomson, Alwyn 269–70, 272–3, 275, 278, 281–2, 283–4, 286, 288, 291 n. 114, 294–5 Tidball, Derek 106–7, 119 Todd, Jennifer 38 n. 84, 76–7, 84, 92–3, 300–1 Trew, K. 13 n. 1, 78 n. 26 Trimble, David 33, 96–7, 183 n. 48, 302, 304 n. 15 Trinity Presbyterian Church, Ahoghill 215 ‘Troubles’, the 101, 242, 267 Twelfth, the 76, 149, 226, 314–15; see also Boyne 2020 Vision 216 Ulster:; and Britishness 225–37; ‘for God and’ 136, 137, 219, 256, 264 n. 26; in Paisleyite ideology 193–201, 204–12; as a place 2, 3, 4, 30, 35, 43, 63, 73, 75, 80, 81, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 100, 101, 105, 108, 114, 120, 130, 140, 148, 154, 159, 160, 162, 167, 168, 169, 176, 177, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 190, 192, 203, 225, 294, 297, 298, 317; rejection of ‘for God and Ulster’ 243–4, 261, 270–3, 278–9, 309; see also God Ulster Bulwark 272 Ulster Commentary 82 n. 42 Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 187 n. 67, 193 n. 93; see also paramilitaries Ulster Folk Museum 81 n. 38 Ulster Illustrated 82 n. 42 Ulster Review 33 n. 60 Ulster Scots 207, 254 Ulster Solemn League and Covenant 74–5, 136–7, 219–21 Ulster Unionist Council 74, 160 n. 106 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 33, 43–4, 90, 95 n. 87, 96, 136, 159, 161, 167 n. 132, 181 n. 36, 183, 224, 302, 304, 314 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 74, 221; see also paramilitaries Ulster Workers Council (UWC) 96 n. 93, 187 n. 67, 193 n. 93 Union, the 33, 35, 38, 70–1, 75, 77–9, 81, 92, 94, 96–7, 135 n. 7, 160–1, 164, 184, 203–4, 207, 220, 241, 300–2, 306 Union Theological College 217, 226 unionism:; challenges facing 87–102, 204–5, 300–2, 309–10; contractarian character of 37–9, 40, 202; division within 4, 76–7, 96–8; as a form of nationalism 6, 21, 30–46, 51, 204, 307, 312; ‘golden era’ 3, 78–87, 171

361

362

GENERAL INDEX

unionism: (cont.):; and Irish nationalism 2, 27–37, 39–41, 42–3, 78–80, 82–5, 87, 92–6, 98–9, 139, 141, 166, 233, 301–3, 308–9; and national identity 31–2, 36, 41, 69–82, 92 n. 74, 131, 167; as a term 4, 6, 14, 25, 71 n. 3, 132; see also ECONI; evangelicalism; GFA; Paisleyism; PCI United Ireland 43, 78 n. 26, 183, 196 United Kingdom:; as a term 100, 115, 160, 200, 230, 279; Ulster's place within 21, 98, 166, 179, 204, 228, 237, 301 United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) 90 n. 66 Universities and Colleges Christian Fellowship (UCCF) 121 n. 50 Vanguard Party 96 n. 94, 172 n. 2 Vatican 199–200, 250; Vatican II 158, 234, 237, 253, 287 Volf,Miroslav 66 n. 55, 67 n. 61, 99, 132, 210, 211, 237, 259, 270, 306, 308, 312, 315; on distance and belonging 1, 7, 63, 65–8; on exclusion 64–5 Walker, Brian 13 n. 1, 71 Walker, Thomas 214 Wallis, R. 76 n. 21, 254 Warner, Rob 120–5, 129, 279 Watson, Denis 158 n. 95 Waveney Road Tabernacle 189 n. 75 Wells, David F. 112–13, 123 n. 57 Westminster Confession of Faith 180 n. 33, 181 n. 34, 185 n. 58, 190, 192, 213, 215, 250–1 Westminster Fellowship 214 n. 6, 215 Wilford, R. 43 n. 103, 172 n. 2 Williams, Stephen 271 Wilson, Ken 291 n. 114 Wilson, Norris 285–6 Wilson, Sammy 182 n. 43 Wilson, T. 101 n. 105 Witness, The 219 n. 24, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 246 Whyte, John 37 n. 77, 45 n. 107, 78 n. 26, 84 n. 48, 91–2, 234 Word of God:; conferences 260 n. 1 source of divine revelation 195, 235, 269, 277, 285, 288, 290 World Congress of Fundamentalists 114–15 World Council of Churches (WCC) 181, 185–6, 191–2, 216, 250 World Evangelical Fellowship (WEF) 121 n. 50 World War I:; and unionist identity 75, 229 World War II:; and Irish nationalist neutrality 81, 229; and unionist identity 229 Wright, Frank 43 n. 99, 76 n. 21, 79–80, 144, 299 n. 1 Wright, N. T. 308 Wylie, John 181, 186

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